China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise (Routledge Contemporary China)

China and Africa

The developing world has been an important arena where China has attempted to combat ‘hegemony’ by other powers and construct a support constituency to bolster China’s position in its various tensions with the West. With China’s rise to the status of great power, trade and political links between Africa and China have been escalating at an astonishing rate. Sino-African relations are becoming an increasingly significant feature of world politics, fuelled by China’s growing hunger for energy resources, and the desire of many African countries to seek a partner that, unlike the West, does not worry about democracy and transparency, and does not seek to impose political conditionalities on economic relations. This book provides a comprehensive assessment of relations between China and Africa. It discusses the historical evolution of Sino-African relations in the period since the 1949 revolution, going on to consider in detail China’s relations with Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi. It demonstrates how China has used the rhetoric of anti-hegemonism to secure and promote its position in the Third World, and examines the ways in which Beijing has utilised its African ties as a vehicle to challenge Superpower hegemony. Overall, this book provides a thorough analysis of the hitherto under-researched topic of relations between China and Africa, a phenomenon of critical importance in contemporary international politics. Ian Taylor is Senior Lecturer in the School of International Relations, University of St Andrews, and Associate Professor Extraordinary in the Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. His most recent books are NEPAD: Towards Africa’s Development or Another False Start? (2005), and Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent (Edited with Paul Williams, 2004).

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China and Africa Engagement and compromise

Ian Taylor

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2006 Ian Taylor All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-96863-8 Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 0-415-39740-5 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-96863-8 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-39740-7 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-96863-5 (ebk)

Contents

Acknowledgements 1 China’s foreign policy in context

vi 1

2 Historical introduction to China in Africa

16

3 Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era

35

4 PRC relations with Angola

75

5 China’s relations with Mozambique

93

6 Relations between China and Zimbabwe

106

7 PRC relations with South Africa

127

8 Chinese relations with Namibia

153

9 China’s relations with Zambia

164

10 China’s policies towards Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi

181

11 Conclusion and the future

197

Bibliography

207

Index

231

Acknowledgements

This study has benefited from research in both China and Africa. I would first like to thank Professor James Tang of the University of Hong Kong for all his assistance and encouragement, also to the staff at the Centre of East Asian Studies, Hong Kong, from which most of the Chinese material were sourced and analysed. I would also like to thank Professor Xinning Song at Renmin University, who invited me to present an aspect of my work at a conference he organised in Beijing. Professor Shaun Breslin at the University of Warwick has at all times been encouraging and supportive of my work and a great friend. In the course of my research in Africa I have had the privilege of visiting a number of institutions. In particular, I would like to thank the South African Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg and the Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, for permitting me access to their libraries and archives. I would also like to acknowledge the help and assistance from the staff of the following libraries: the University of Botswana; University of Namibia; University of Stellenbosch; University of the Witswatersrand; University of Zambia and the National Archives of Zambia; and the University of Zimbabwe and the National Archives of Zimbabwe. I would also like to acknowledge access to the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur; the School of Oriental and African Studies, London; the University of Edinburgh; and the University of St Andrews. I would also like to gratefully thank the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland for their financial support for aspects of this project. Finally, I would especially like to thank my wife, Joanne, for her support and love whilst completing this work.

1

China’s foreign policy in context

The People’s Republic of China’s image – both within and outside China – is that of a ‘great power’ and as the PRC has become a major global economy, increasingly a debate has begun as to whether China is in fact an emerging ‘Superpower’. However, the difference between the PRC’s image of a great power and the leap to the status of a ‘Superpower’ has been problematic both for Beijing, and for theorists of Chinese foreign policy. Paradoxically, China has to date been largely unable to forcefully project itself onto the international scene – particularly outside of Asia. In order to rationalise this situation, a major feature of China’s informal national ideology – its self-perception vis-à-vis the rest of the world – is that China has somehow been ‘cheated’ of its place in the sun by the imperialists of the nineteenth century, and that this prevention of China assuming its ‘rightful place’ as a world power has continued, even to contemporary times. As a result of this, China has been particularly vocal in its call for opposition to expansionism by other powers – ‘hegemonism’ (ba quan zhu yi) – of all types. Hegemonism as defined by the Chinese fits with Gilpin’s assertion that hegemony ‘refers to the leadership of one state … over other states in the system’ (Gilpin, 1981: 116). Because of its self-perceived position in the international system, China has constructed a fairly consistent foreign policy aimed at preventing or limiting the development of ‘hegemony’, whilst at the same time trying to carve out space for itself as its economy continues to grow. China uses this rhetoric to rally support for itself primarily within the developing world and its anti-hegemonic posture can thus be seem to be aimed at circumstances perceived as antagonistic to the PRC. In the 1970s the fear of the Soviet Union dominated Chinese thinking, leading to rapprochement with the United States and a period of intense activity to combat Soviet influence in the developing world, particularly in Africa (Kim, 1987; Levine, 1988; Robinson, 1988; Segal, 1982). This was cloaked in the mantle of ‘anti-hegemonism’. Spurred however by accusations of over-dependence on Washington’s ‘security umbrella’ and Beijing’s dissatisfaction with Reagan’s equivocal position on Taiwan, the PRC in the 1980s sought to widen its international linkages. Again, this was justified by appeals against Superpower ‘hegemony’. Though a period of relative neglect followed, the anti-hegemonic rhetoric was again deployed following Tiananmen Square when the developing world proved to be highly useful for China’s leadership as a

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China and Africa

support constituency. Today, ‘anti-hegemonism’ and appeals to sovereignty and non-interference are routinely deployed as central planks of China’s foreign policy. Note in this regard China’s Africa policy document, released in January 2006, which asserted that China will base its relations with Africa on the ‘principles of independence, equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs’ (China’s Africa Policy, 2006: 4).

Aspirations of centrality A key issue related to the above is that historically, China’s perception of its relatively weak capabilities and its wider vulnerability within the international system clashes with the tangible, if yet unquantifiable ‘Middle Kingdom’ (Zhongguo) mentality (Fairbank, 1974), which sees China as central to the world. As one Chinese observer asserted, ‘Chinese people believe that China, which has the world’s largest population, a glorious history and distinguished civilisation, deserves an enhanced, respectable place in the community of nations’ (Wang, 1994: 28). Thus, ‘the attainment of … great-power aspirations … draws upon strong emotions, linked to nationalist sentiments, traditional cultural ethnocentrism and a deeply rooted sense of injustice at the hands of foreign (especially) Western countries’ (Swaine, 1995: 84). Inherited from pre-Revolutionary China, this ‘feeling of superiority and … determination to become a great power’ (Chao, 1986: 21), has compelled the Chinese leadership to attempt to project China’s presence and reputation abroad, as a means by which Beijing could attempt to make good the ambitions and aspirations of a reinvigorated China. The desire to possess centrality and autonomy of action in the international system, has thus been a particular feature of Beijing’s foreign policy (Kirby, 1995). The feeling that China has a special role to play in world affairs is palpable from reading Chinese pronouncements. As Hu Yaobang once remarked, ‘being a large country…China ought to make a greater contribution to the world community’ (Hu, 1990: 564). Thus China’s foreign ambitions have translated themselves into policies which have aimed to enhance the PRC’s standing abroad. Yet until recently, because of inherent limitations on Beijing’s ability to do so, this was generally at minimal cost to China. The developing world has been a particular area where Beijing’s foreign policy has pursued ‘the development of common interests with [the] Third World to raise China’s global stature and increase Beijing’s bargaining leverage with the United States’ (Swaine, 1995: 87). As one writer noted in the past, ‘the PRC views itself as a major force in the Third World and attempts to act accordingly’ (Weiss, 1988: 19). The 2006 document China’s Africa Policy expressly referred to ‘China, the largest developing country in the world’ (2006: 1). Yet the shortcoming in China’s ability to project itself has resulted in China attempting to utilise the developing world as a means by which it can, at times, advance Beijing as a truly global figure. As Kim (1996: 266) remarked of China’s perceptions of itself being labelled merely as a regional power, the PRC is involved, ‘in an ongoing struggle to enhance physical and psychological well-being, in the course of

China’s foreign policy in context 3 which [China] attempts to secure an identity as a global power that others do not bestow, while others attempt to bestow an identity as a regional power that [China] does not appropriate’. Yet, at times China advances what has been termed a call for ‘international affirmative action’, in favour of restoring China’s ‘rightful place’ at the centre of world politics (Levine, 1995: 44). As a result, Beijing has frequently identified its interests with that of the developing world, as a means by which China can bolster its own position in the international system. Beijing in fact has repeatedly classified the PRC as a ‘developing nation’. Thus at the opening of the Sino-Africa Forum in late 2000, it was claimed that whilst ‘Africa [is] the continent with the largest number of developing countries’, China is ‘the largest developing country in the world’ (People’s Daily, 10 October, 2000). The supposed pursuance of hegemonic ambitions by other hostile states has always been a major concern of the PRC’s foreign policy. This is particularly so in the developing world where the attempted prosecution of political and particularly economic designs on weak underdeveloped states has been more brazen. The prevention of such activity, constructed as anti-hegemonism, has long been a central organising concept around which China’s foreign policy in the developing world has been formulated. Hence fairly consistently throughout China’s role in the developing world, Beijing has constructed both a reactive and proactive policy agenda, designed to resist ‘hegemonic’ developments and develop favourable linkages independent of other states’ machinations. As part of this, ‘anti-hegemonism’ has also come to mean the revision of a world economic and political system that Beijing sees as inherently hostile to its own ambitions. Africa has been of value to the PRC in this crusade because of the influence that developing nations possess in the United Nations, and because Africa provides a large support base. After all, every state possesses one vote in the United Nations – no matter how small or impoverished that state may be. Whilst Beijing’s priorities have increasingly focused on economic growth and development, the conceptualisation of anti-hegemonism as a tool of Beijing’s foreign policy has remained constant. Certainly, the developing world in general and Africa in particular has – and is – a most useful site for China to project its status claims and also, to act as a serviceable shield in times of crisis for Beijing. Through a mixture of rhetoric and physical involvement, the PRC has allied itself to varying degrees of intensity, to some of the world’s poorest countries. The subsequent dichotomy between Beijing’s rhetoric and policy implementations makes China’s Africa policy an engaging study.

Focus on Southern Africa China is essentially a determined and value-maximising state, operating in an environment perceived as disadvantageous to itself. Past injustices, the vicariousness of the Superpowers (and now, American hegemon) and the ‘unfair’ global economic and political system have all been cited by Beijing as preventing China regaining its ‘rightful place’. As a result, China has attempted to construct linkages with the developing world as a means to bolster its own position in the

4

China and Africa

international system. This has staked out Sino-African relations since at least the 1960s. Southern Africa in particular has been a constant focus for China and the PRC’s policy pursuance in Southern Africa has exhibited a constancy that has survived the radical developments in the post-Mao era. As a pro-Beijing source put it, ‘Over the … years, the manifestations of forming alliances and seeking hegemony in the world often changed according to circumstance, so the targets, essential points, and priorities of struggles … were also readjusted correspondingly’ (Liaowang Overseas Edition, August 25, 1986). Though Beijing’s policies towards the developing world experienced a de-emphasis as China’s economic modernisation picked up, the Tiananmen crisis and the (temporary) relegation of the PRC to pariah status by much of the world community re-invigorated Beijing’s Africa policy as China’s leaders debated the risks of the open door policy (Whiting, 1995: 59). Essentially, Beijing opportunistically realised that Africa offered a source of steady allies, able to support China in times of dislocation with the West, and also protect the PRC in the global arena at a time of intense domestic and international crisis for China. The clearest evidence of this was made in the statement made around the time of Tiananmen Square, when Beijing started to ‘re-discover’ its developing world allies: ‘at a critical moment it was still those Third World countries and old friends which gave China the necessary sympathy and support. Therefore, from now on China [would] put more efforts in resuming and developing relations with these [countries]’ (Cheng Ming, October 10, 1989). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its surrogates, China in the contemporary period has resurrected its anti-hegemonic posture and argued that following the evolvement of a ‘multi-polar’ world, the developing world should be wary of the West’s attempts to, ‘step up their intervention and penetration in the Third World, in an attempt to incorporate the Third World into their own spheres of influence’ (Renmin Ribao, January 5, 1991). Framed around the rhetorical concept of anti-hegemony, the developing world has thus remained important in Beijing’s thinking and has been seen as a possible ‘third force’ independent of any major powers. At the same time, as China’s economy continues to grow exponentially, the developing world – and Africa in particular – is more and more a site where Chinese economic expansion is increasing massively. Note that trade between China and African nations jumped 39 per cent to $32.17 billion in the first ten months of 2005 – a huge increase by any standard (BBC News, January 6, 2006). Southern Africa as a particular focus for a book discussing China’s general Africa policy is justified in that this region has traditionally been the centre of attention for Beijing on the continent. It was here that China first engaged with the anti-colonial movements and certainly expended the most energy, and it was in Southern Africa where China has expanded its economic ambit. Southern Africa also hosts the continental economic – and arguably political – hegemon and thus any discussion of China’s Africa policy cannot but avoid a discussion of China’s links with South Africa. But equally, Southern Africa is seen as emblematic of various historical and current tendencies that have staked out Beijing’s engagement with the wider continent. From the anti-colonial moment, to Sino-Soviet

China’s foreign policy in context 5 antagonism and rapprochement with Washington, through to Tiananmen Square and the contemporary fixation on expanding economic linkages, Southern Africa has been at the fore. Thus in this sense, focusing in on the sub-continent is logical and useful heuristically. Following on from this, this book seeks to answer two key questions about Chinese foreign policy in Africa: how successful has Beijing been in ‘bridging the gap’ between the ambitions and the realities of Beijing’s foreign policy through involvement in Southern Africa; and how important has Chinese rhetoric regarding ‘anti-hegemonism’ been as a device to manage the PRC’s external affairs? Whilst recognising that it is impossible to structure a foreign policy as complex as that of the PRC’s within one restricting ‘grand theory’, it is suggested that the study of China’s Africa policy sheds light on one key area of Chinese foreign policy. Hopefully, this will help students of Chinese foreign policy understand better Beijing’s conduct in the broader developing world.

Analysing Chinese foreign policy The study of Chinese foreign policy has been notoriously problematic for international relations theorists (see Yu, 1994; Kim, 1989, 1994; Yahuda, 1983; Ng-Quinn, 1983; and Wu, 1980). Indeed, it has been written that PRC foreign policy is so multifarious that it defies the application of any one theory (Kim, 1994). Intriguingly, in the past the study of Beijing’s foreign policy concentrated on a variety of aggregates in the hope of producing an elusive ‘grand theory’. For example, some writers concentrated on China’s historical legacy as a means by which the present could be frame-worked (see Cranmer-Byng, 1973; Mancall, 1963; Fairbank, 1968, 1969; Salisbury, 1992). Others attempted to psychologically deconstruct Chinese attitudes in order to reconstruct a behavioural theory of the PRC’s foreign policy (Shih, 1990; Pye, 1992). The problem with both approaches is that they firstly assume the ‘uniqueness’ of China – itself problematic – and secondly, render the construction of International Relations theories capable of encompassing a variety of states impossible. Why China is ‘unique’ and not say, Zimbabwe, is generally brushed aside by experts in a variety of fields. The inference from this is that China can therefore only be properly understood through a rigorous dissection of its own physical or psycho-cultural histories. In the case of China, this would leave the study of the PRC’s foreign relations in the realm of what Whiting perhaps dismissively called the ‘esoteric analysis of Sinologues’ (Whiting, 1975: xiv). Yet, the actual relationship between Chinese cultural attitudes and Beijing’s foreign policy behaviour has never been satisfactorily clarified by scholars of this approach (Ng-Quinn, 1983: 207). Nevertheless, the ‘Sinocentric’ school does remain present in contemporary international relations theorisation on the PRC, primarily from Chinese scholars themselves. On the other hand, as a result of our so-called post-ideological world we now live in, ideological studies have largely disappeared. With the radicalisation of Chinese politics in the 1960s and 1970s, analysts of Chinese foreign policy often concentrated on the ideological equation as a variable (Armstrong, 1977;

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China and Africa

Bert, 1974; Van Ness, 1970). The study of Mao Zedong’s own ideological position and leadership – the ‘Mao in command’ model – was often integrally linked to this (Kim, 1977; Oksenberg, 1976; Meisner, 1977; Pye, 1977; Tang and Halperin, 1965). This approach had the advantage in that Chinese policy towards particular areas – for example the developing world – could be analysed through a credible theoretical framework (Young, 1979). However, as Bin Yu (1994: 238) pointed out, these studies also assigned to Beijing a ‘uniqueness’ that was again problematic. In addition, in the ‘de-ideologising’ days of contemporary China, the concentration on the ideological component in China’s foreign policy is out-dated and arguably obsolete. In the pragmatic absence of the practical application of ideology in Chinese foreign policy today, scholars attempting to construct an argument based on any supposed Chinese political ideology in foreign relations, would indeed be hard-pressed. Any attempt to understand China’s foreign policy relying on the utilisation of contentious explanations such as above, is thus an unfeasible exercise. Whilst not outright dismissing such approaches as contributing to the wider study of Chinese foreign policy, it is the observable behaviour of Beijing and its conduct with other states and actors that is the most satisfactory approach to take. By acknowledging China’s attitude to the wider world and analysing China’s interaction with the international system, one may arrive at a satisfactory analysis of the PRC’s foreign policy behaviour. As Hamrin (1986: 50) once asserted, ‘one must look at both the international situation which China must respond and the attitude towards the outside world prevailing within the Chinese leadership’. Such an approach is quantifiable, methodical and measurable. This study therefore concurs with scholars who have approached the PRC’s foreign policy as an exercise in observation (see for example, Gurtov and Hwang, 1980; Nelsen, 1989; Segal, 1982; Solomon, 1981; Whiting, 1975; Yahuda, 1978). Though history, ideology, the quirks of Beijing’s leadership and even geographical factors have all influenced Chinese foreign policy, it is the relationship with other states that has ultimately dictated the direction of China’s foreign affairs (Tow, 1995: 120). As a result of this, the PRC has been called ‘the high church of realpolitik’ (Christensen, 1996: 37). China’s sense of inadequacy on a global scale vis-à-vis other major powers and its aspirations to be ranked as a true ‘great power’ has therefore informed Beijing’s policy towards the developing world. By employing rhetoric, the development of political and commercial linkages and a general sense of identification with the developing world, the People’s Republic of China has sought to boost its own international standing and maximise its options in response to the changing dynamism of the international system.

The study of China’s policies towards the developing world In the study of the PRC’s foreign relations, China’s developing world policy has been a constant though relatively neglected theme. This is curious given that policy pronouncements have often placed the developing or ‘Third’ world as central to Beijing’s foreign concerns. Though the PRC acknowledged the developing

China’s foreign policy in context 7 world’s potential as early as the 1950s, in essence this conceptualisation received a major stimulus from the PRC’s perception in the early 1970s of the developing world’s growing importance on the world stage: Asian, African and Latin American countries … have liberated themselves one after another. They have … developed and grown strong enough [to] become a powerful new emerging force … They are playing an ever more significant role in international affairs. (Peking Domestic Service, October 20, 1973) Essentially, the PRC came to a realisation that the developing world offered an opportunity to China to break out of the structures imposed upon it by the two Superpowers and project its influence beyond such constraints (Hamrin, 1986: 34). However, as noted, despite the importance of the developing world to PRC foreign policy and the empirical richness that the area offers to analysts of China’s foreign relations, the available literature on Beijing’s developing world policy – outside of its immediate Asian neighbours – has been sparse (cf. see Behbehani, 1981; Calabrese, 1990; Johnson, 1970; Wang, 1981; Shichor, 1979). Previous scholars who have written on China’s policy towards the developing world in general have tended to stress the Superpower factor as the main arbiter of PRC actions (Harris, 1985; Sutter, 1986; Akindele, 1985; Ogunbambi, 1982). For example, Harding (1981: 259) argued that the prevention of encirclement by the United States and/or the Soviet Union was Beijing’s principal policy concern. Kim perhaps more crudely perceived Beijing’s developing world policy as a function of China’s ‘siege mentality’ (Kim, 1994: 130). After Tiananmen, this conceptualisation however gained perhaps pertinent credibility and indeed was utilised by the Chinese themselves (Huang, 1990). It is of course acknowledged that concern over Superpower activity was frequently a significant feature of Chinese foreign policy and that equally, the PRC was keen to deny this – or that the omnipotence of the bipolar global system shaped the world situation. For example, China asserted that it was, ‘delirious talk … that the international situation depends on the direction and process of development of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union’ (New China News Agency, January 22, 1974). Having said that, studies of China’s developing world policies in the most part relegate Beijing’s activities to that of being merely responsive and reactive. In the ‘multi-polar’ world of the post-Cold War era, such an interpretation is conceptually problematic. If China’s developing world policy was merely a side chapter of the Superpower global duel, how can the continuation of Beijing’s presence in the developing world after the ‘collapse of communism’ be explained? Related to this, previous studies make little reference to the constraints of the international system, nor Chinese anxiety to project itself beyond Asia. In contrast, this book asserts that Beijing’s foreign policy towards the developing world has possessed a dynamism of its own, and is rooted in Beijing’s specific policy aspirations and agenda with regard to the international system. The utilisation of the developing world by China to boost the

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PRC’s own perceived power and influence is, it is suggested, as equally as important in explaining Chinese policy. Certainly as Chan (1985: 383) remarked, by the late 1980s the PRC saw African nations in their own right, not as ‘pawns in a SinoSuperpower competition’. Writing before Tiananmen Square, Zhimin Lin (1989) asserted that Chinese policy towards the developing world was domestically orientated, with China’s modernisation programme driving the search for new markets and commercial opportunities. Connected to this was the PRC’s desire for a peaceful and stable economic and political environment to allow for the successful pursuance of modernisation. This meant that Beijing sought developing world support and in return committed itself – rhetorically at least – to a reconstruction of a new international economic order. In Southern Africa, it will be shown that a shift in emphasis from a political to an economic agenda in the developing world took place. This has usually manifested itself through the development of economic linkages between the African states and various PRC commercial enterprises. However, after Tiananmen and the subsequent (temporary) isolation of Beijing, close political linkages were re-built and anti-hegemonism was re-deployed as a rhetorical device to prevent Western interference in state (primarily China’s) sovereignty. This was a reaction to what Beijing perceived as a hostile international system, and Washington’s growing power.

China and Africa: a literature review It is valuable to examine the literature already published on Sino-African interaction and to summarise the different approaches and conclusions that the various scholars have taken and arrived at. Compared to other area studies on Chinese foreign policy, the study of Sino-African relations has been sparse. The study of Chinese involvement in Southern Africa in particular has been greatly neglected, with very little research on the subject, especially regarding developments since the early 1970s. To date only one unpublished thesis has been written explicitly giving an overview of PRC activity in the Southern African region – Prinsloo’s 1976 study, which analysed the importance of Maoist ideology on the PRC’s formulation of its Southern African policy. Although the thesis was groundbreaking in its treatment of China’s relations with Southern Africa, Prinsloo arrived at a number of premature conclusions. Notably, Prinsloo argued in 1976 that China had essentially lost the competition with the Soviet Union in the struggle for influence and hegemony in the Southern African region due to Beijing’s inability to compete with the Soviet’s military and economic superiority. Whilst it must be acknowledged that Prinsloo was correct in his prediction of PRC failure in Angola (though for different reasons), the author was fundamentally wrong in his assertion that China itself was seeking to gain hegemony in Southern Africa. This is not consistent with the facts. Beijing’s aims were to combat hegemony, not compete for it. The PRC had neither the political, military or economic means or will then (or now) to attempt to establish hegemonic spheres in Southern Africa. The PRC’s support for disparate guerrilla groups in the region was an attempt to make good this shortfall.

China’s foreign policy in context 9 Another scholar, Bih-jaw Lin, posited that Chinese foreign policy towards Southern Africa changed and adapted according to ‘domestic necessity and the international situation’ (1986: 4). Concentrating on the two concepts of antiimperialism and the theory of contradiction, Lin posited that the PRC believed that the main global contradictions (and hence the countries most susceptible to revolution) were found in the developing world. It therefore served Beijing’s interest and ambitions to support the liberation movements active in those regions. This was seen by Lin as motivating Chinese behaviour in the 1970s. However, as the drive to domestic economic modernisation and development gathered pace in the mid-1980s, Lin saw that Beijing changed a policy of involvement to that of a de-emphasis on ideology and disentanglement. Although Lin acknowledged that the changing global situation would affect China’s African outlook (as did Yung-lo Lin, 1980), he still however erroneously insisted that the PRC posed a strategic threat to South Africa through its support of the ANC and SWAPO. This was fundamentally wrong. Even without the benefit of hindsight, it was surely obvious that China could have never posed a direct strategic threat to Pretoria. Whilst pursuing anti-hegemonism, Beijing particularly by the mid1980s aimed at a stable environment suitable for the development of commercial linkages to the region (whilst retaining an anti-apartheid posture). The belief that Beijing could strategically threaten South Africa was inaccurate. A couple of approaches to Sino-African studies have postulated the existence of a variety of conflicting options in Chinese foreign policy. The assertion of one chosen policy over the other has been seen as solving this contradiction. Others have seen the resulting tensions between different policies as the driving force for Chinese foreign policy. There are two studies which illustrate this procedure, though both are now fairly old. Larkin’s central thesis was that though the PRC leadership regarded Africa as fertile ground for the export of the Chinese revolutionary model in the long term, this seemingly radical position was tempered by pragmatic and essentially non-disruptive policies aimed at avoiding the alienation of friendly or neutral governments – what Larkin referred to as the ‘insulation between the short term and the long term’ (1971: 211). Larkin essentially argued that Beijing’s policy in Africa was evolutionary and determined by immediate attainable goals. Because of this, any real chance for a Maoist triumph on the African continent was always unlikely. Larkin’s study was one of the first serious examinations of China’s foreign policy in Africa in general and must be viewed in the light of this. The fact that it was undertaken during or at the end of the Cultural Revolution meant that his analysis was unduly influenced by the ideological fervour and upheaval in the politics of that time. He thus tended to over-emphasise the role of exporting of the Maoist revolutionary model in shaping policy in Africa without tempering such an assertion with the omnipresent pragmatism that the PRC demonstrated in its dealings with Africa. Larkin also underestimated the importance of the Sino-Soviet rivalry variable in the formulation of the China’s African policy and its anti-hegemonic posturing (see Yu, 1978; Gavshon, 1981). In contrast, competition with Moscow and the combating of ‘social-imperialist’ hegemony was in fact a major factor in Beijing’s policy towards Southern Africa.

10

China and Africa

Although not solely concerned with Africa, in a study of revolution and China’s foreign policy, Van Ness argued that the Beijing leadership essentially regarded practical action as the means by which they could secure the security and survival of the Maoist state and that this practice was strikingly evident with the publication of Lin Biao’s (1965) exposition on the ‘People’s War’. Like Larkin, Van Ness posited that there was a separation of the short-term and the long-term and from the practical and the revolutionary. This separation was settled with China deciding for the most practical option, in line with most states’ pursuance of foreign policy as a means by which the security of the state can be ensured. As Van Ness said, Chinese policy in Africa was ‘first and foremost concerned with preservation’ (1970: 197). Whilst agreeing with Van Ness’ general assumptions on the foundations of Beijing’s foreign policy in the Third World, the reductionist element of his theory is rejected. Chinese foreign policy was more than just a strategy of survival. Anti-hegemony conditioned Beijing’s outlook on the developing world and was derivative of a number of sources. Whilst nodding towards regime preservation, ideology, economic development and the changing materialist conditions of the developing world itself were all variables in deciding Beijing’s anti-hegemonic behaviour. Ogunsanwo accurately emphasised the continually changing nature of Beijing’s African policy – what was dubbed ‘revolutionary pragmatism’ (1974: 267), and also asserted that China’s policy was largely reactive and not proactive. Ogunsanwo argued that the PRC was compelled to act in Africa through trade and aid packages rather than on the preferred ideological level due to the progressive development of a mutually hostile triangular global system involving PRC, the Soviet Union and the United States. Ogunsanwo’s work marked an improvement on Larkin’s earlier study and was the first serious academic work by an African on the subject. However, the accuracy of his assertion that China’s policy in Southern Africa was merely reactive will be challenged. Although Beijing did react accordingly to Soviet manoeuvres in the region, its policies – particularly with regard to its aid programmes – will be shown to be proactive and pioneering. The concept of anti-hegemonism does not merely infer that it is a reaction against a set of unfavourable circumstances. Rather, the proactive and creative elements to it – the building up of multilateral structural alliances with minimal attention to one’s supposed ‘rivals’ activities – was a feature of China’s behaviour that will be illuminated in this work. A number of other writers have concentrated on the importance of ideology in shaping PRC policy towards the African continent. For example, Deshpande (1980) adapted Armstrong’s (1977) wider thesis on the importance of the ‘united front’ doctrine, in constructing a coherent framework in order to analyse Beijing’s motivations and actions in Africa. Similarly, Young Mun Kim (1979) argued that the PRC strongly relied on ideological concepts to formulate its foreign policy. These concepts, such as class, imperialism and contradiction, allowed the PRC to evolve a framework by which a policy could coherently develop. Young posited that this produced the ‘theory of the three worlds’ (see Chan, 1985), and led to the subsequent development of a united front (in association with many African states

China’s foreign policy in context 11 in alliance with Western powers) in an attempt to shut out the hegemonic aspirations of the Soviet Union. Hutchison (1975) in his study on Sino-African relations posited the thesis that China’s policy in Africa was driven by multiple factors intimately linked to each other. Hutchison in particular analysed the importance of the Chinese revolutionary and development model and the desire of the PRC to export this to Africa as a means of demonstrating the superiority of Maoism and in particular the Chinese brand of Marxism-Leninism. Whilst disputing the correctness of such a weighted assertion, this study would concur with Hutchison’s theorisation that the PRC moved to fill in the vacuum left by the retreat of the colonial powers in Africa in direct competition with the Soviet Union and that there was also a ‘second vacuum’ in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. This left the Soviet Union vulnerable to accusations of ‘social-imperialism’, something which the PRC attempted to exploit to the full. Whilst China explicitly denied that such a ‘vacuum’ existed in Africa, geo-strategic concerns, specifically Soviet encroachment in the Indian Ocean were, according to Hutchison, also a variable influencing China’s policy towards Africa particularly on the Indian Ocean coast. However, whilst this study would agree (with reservations) with the ‘vacuum theory’, it would depart from such an approach by asserting that China’s policy was not aimed at filling the perceived vacuum, but merely preventing the development of any alternative hegemonic threat. This book also, it should be noted, acknowledges Wei’s thesis that the competition with the Republic of China on Taiwan was also an important variable in influencing Beijing’s behaviour in Africa. Approaching the subject from a different angle, case studies conducted by scholars shed valuable light on the involvement of the PRC with Africa. Yu’s works were important explorations on a micro level of how the PRC became extensively involved in an African country – in this case, Tanzania. Yu took an instrumentalist approach in his studies. He classified China’s economic and technological aid as being informal instruments of Beijing’s foreign policy to influence potential allies through international co-operation and interaction. This policy Yu argued was innovative and complex, engaging a multiple of linkages between the PRC and Tanzania (1975: 150-151). In addition, Yu criticised over-emphasis on only one particular aspect of China’s policy, be it co-operative or conflictual and argued that any study of Chinese foreign policy ‘requires that the two interaction patterns be placed in juxtaposition’ and viewed together (1970: 12). Yu also wrote a number of articles outlining a broader picture of China’s involvement in Africa. Initially, Yu (1972) saw Chinese policy in Africa as being driven by three primary objectives. First, the PRC attempted to establish and develop their revolutionary influence by aiding the African movements fighting against colonialism and White-minority rule. Second, Yu saw Africa as an ‘indirect battleground’, in attempts to oppose United States and Soviet intrigue. Third, the PRC wished to demonstrate the superiority and effectiveness of their own development model. Yu expanded on his thesis of the Chinese model, specifically linking the people’s war formula to this concept of the PRC

12

China and Africa

demonstrating their own successful national liberation, as the road to follow for the African peoples (Yu, 1977). Linked to this was China’s developmental experience, which was portrayed as a possible viable option for Africa and, according to Yu, was embraced by Tanzania. Yu also saw the two Superpowers as highly significant in propelling activity in Africa and that ‘China’s African policy [was] closely linked to Chinese interaction with the United States and the Soviet Union’ (1977: 108). In contrast to Yu who argued that Africa played a central role in Chinese foreign policy, Segal (1992: 116) asserted that Chinese involvement in Africa was largely rhetorical and that Africa mattered little to China. Linking the PRC’s ignominious failure in Angola and Beijing’s inability to provide major aid to postindependence Mozambique and Zimbabwe, Segal posited that China was only a peripheral actor in Africa. In what was essentially a critique of Chinese foreign policy, Segal clearly viewed rhetoric as of far more substance in Beijing’s African policy than actual deeds. Whilst agreeing with a number of points Segal raises in his analysis of Chinese failure, it will be demonstrated that the PRC was not (and is not) an insignificant actor in Southern Africa. Beijing’s influence in the region in the mid-1970s was considerable and was regarded as such by a variety of political players in the regional milieu. In the 1980s the PRC’s activities in Africa were less high profile but the conceptual framework of anti-hegemonism still directed PRC policy towards Southern Africa. Today, whilst business and commercial activities dominate China’s engagement with the continent and sub-continent, the rhetoric of anti-hegemonism does make occasional reappearances and China is expanding exponentially throughout the continent. In the last book to have been published on China’s relations with Africa, Snow (1988) argued that Sino-African relations were an illumination on the strength and possibilities of South-South co-operation and interaction. This is an interesting but debatable point for it seems to take Chinese pronouncements on its policies in Africa at face value, ignoring the intense realism that drove Beijing on the continent. Unfortunately, Snow’s work is dominated by his contentious thesis that Africans and Chinese naturally have a great deal in common and that because of this it was and is almost ‘inevitable’ that the two should draw together. In addition, Snow came to a number of somewhat eccentric conclusions, such as the unlikely suggestion that Mandarin Chinese might become a second language in parts of Africa. It is unfortunate that Snow allowed enthusiasm for the subject to cloud his better judgement and this possibly negated a fine opportunity to update and contemporarise Sino-African studies, though a later article of his moderated the Sinophilic aspects of the previous work (Snow, 1995). Emphasising interaction, Bermingham and Clausen (1981) saw Sino-African relations as mutually beneficial. The PRC gave African states and liberation movements bargaining power with the two Superpowers – an effective counterweight and alternative against perceived imperialist hegemony. For their part, the African states gave crucial support (26 of the 76 votes cast in favour of the PRC were African), in the October 1971 vote on China’s admittance into the

China’s foreign policy in context 13 United Nations and in part conducted a number of national liberation struggles and political developments which reflected aspects of the Chinese model. In essence, Bermingham and Clausen assert that Sino-African interaction was an interchange between what they term, ‘the most unequal equals’ (1981: 31). Thus, though there have been a number of works published pertaining to SinoAfrican relations and interaction in general, there has been to date little on the PRC’s role in the general Southern African region. More importantly, works on Sino-African relations are also somewhat dated – most only covering material and data up to the early 1980s.

Approach and structure The end of the Cultural Revolution was chosen as the starting point for this book as it was not until that period (the early 1970s) that the PRC explicitly proclaimed itself as a member of the developing world community (Kim, 1994: 128). This study takes Halpern’s (1972) assertion that the Cultural Revolution’s end was marked by the 12th Plenum of the 8th meeting of the Central Committee of the CPC (October 13-21, 1968) as a convenient marking point from which significant indices of change can be identified in the PRC’s foreign policy. This period saw the re-emergence of the PRC onto the global stage after its introspective interval from 1966 to 1969 (though it will be demonstrated that in the case of Southern Africa, this disruption to foreign policy has been exaggerated). The end of the Cultural Revolution therefore provides a convenient starting point for the study of China’s foreign policy towards Africa. In addition, the wars of national liberation in Southern Africa and the struggle against apartheid and colonialism began in earnest in the 1970s (as did Superpower involvement in the region). This upsurge in the national liberation struggle coincided with the re-emergence of the PRC onto the global (specifically developing world) scene. The dative framework commencing in the post-Cultural Revolution era of PRC foreign policy is therefore suggested as a legitimate starting point for this study. This book aims to test the hypothesis that the rhetoric of anti-hegemonism has been the guiding force in Beijing’s policy formulation towards the developing world and Southern Africa in particular, and that this stems from Beijing’s perception of its own constraints. Methodologically, this has been interwoven with reference to the wider international system. The tensions that have resulted and their effect on PRC policy towards Southern Africa are a major feature of this work. Chapter 2 is a retrospective study of Beijing’s actions towards the developing world and Africa in particular from the victory of the Communist revolution in 1949, to the Cultural Revolution. This chapter aims to contextualise Chinese policy in Southern Africa and identify a number of themes in Beijing’s activities. Chapter 3 examines Chinese policy towards the region as a whole from the end of the Cultural Revolution. This is the main body of the book and will examine in depth the rhetoric deployed and the policies pursued in the period under review. This will be contextualised with reference to the broader global contemporary

14 China and Africa situation, and the influence of the international system on the PRC’s policy behaviour. In an attempt to widen our comprehension of Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa – and by extension the developing world – the relations China had with the governments and liberation organisations (in many cases, the governments-in-waiting) of the region will be analysed as part of the study. Chapters 4 to 10 will therefore consist of in-depth examinations of Chinese policy towards the states of Southern Africa on a case-study basis, interweaving each individual state’s interaction with Beijing with the wider international system and how China saw the state’s role in its African policies. The PRC’s involvement in aiding the various liberation organisations in the region is of particular interest in demonstrating Beijing’s commitment to antihegemony. The extent to which China helped organisations such as ZANU in Zimbabwe; FRELIMO in Mozambique; the PAC in South Africa and UNITA and the FNLA in Angola will be critically examined. The value of the PRC’s support will also be evaluated within an analytical framework. Did such support help or hinder the organisations concerned? Did such aid adversely affect relations with other liberation organisations in the same countries, purportedly fighting the same cause? Did Chinese aid influence the political ideology of the recipient liberation organisation and how important was the Sino-Soviet split in deciding the recipients of Chinese aid? Did the split adversely affect the liberation struggle in Southern Africa? Finally, how can Chinese support for the liberation organisations be conceptualised as part of Beijing’s anti-hegemonic policy? In this context, Chapters 4 to 6 (on Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique respectively), are of interest because of the nature of Chinese involvement in these countries during their respective wars of national liberation. Chapter 7 on South Africa is of particular contemporary interest because this is the region’s economic and political giant. South Africa was also of course the key to much of the events that concentrated the region’s (and the world’s) energies for over 30 years. South Africa’s de facto colony of Namibia is examined in Chapter 8. Zambia will be examined in Chapter 9. This state has had the longest (and perhaps most stable) relationship with Beijing in Southern Africa. Finally, the smaller nations in the region and their intimate relationship with South Africa, will be examined in Chapter 10. Lesotho is of interest, as is Swaziland and Malawi, because of extensive Taiwanese involvement and the competition for influence that subsequently entailed between Taipei and Beijing. Chapter 11 will conclude with a re-examination of the premises on which this book is constructed. Chinese policy towards the Southern African region has undergone a number of shifts of emphasis and reappraisals of priorities. The challenge of this book is to analyse the changes (and continuities) in the PRC’s relations with Southern Africa and evaluate how and why China’s policies have developed. Essentially, this book suggests that the PRC’s foreign policy in Southern Africa has been highly adaptable and utilitarian – ‘pragmatically realist’ – within the overall framework of anti-hegemonism and has sought to maximise benefits for Beijing

China’s foreign policy in context 15 at minimal cost. By providing such a study, it is hoped that this work will help students of Africa in placing China in its context in the political and military struggle for the liberation of the region and developments in the post-independence era. This study will also hopefully stimulate those interested in China’s foreign policy in previously ‘neglected’ areas and fill in a gap in our knowledge of China’s involvement in the developing world.

2

Historical introduction to China in Africa

Chinese contacts with the African continent stretches back centuries (see Duyvendak, 1949; Filesi, 1972). Chinese coins and porcelain fragments dating from the Sung Dynasty (960-1279) have been found at archaeological sites in Zanzibar, along the Swahili coast of eastern Africa and as far south and as inland as Great Zimbabwe. These discoveries indicate that contact, however indirect, between China and Africa has existed for a considerable period of time. It was the famed explorations by the Chinese Moslem admiral Zheng Ho during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) however that saw the first concrete manifestations of personal Sino-African relations. The admiral made seven voyages between 1416 and 1423, two of which reached the east African coast. Zheng Ho brought with him products to conduct commerce with the local people. Examples of these have since been found in Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and South Africa (Gao, 1984: 245). These efforts by Zheng Ho have since been regarded as the ‘climax of China’s efforts to develop relations with Africa’ in the pre-Revolutionary era (ibid., 245-246). China’s self-imposed withdrawal from the world under the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) coincidentally followed Portuguese navigational exploits along the eastern African coast, which effectively shut out further Chinese efforts at maintaining contact with Africa. However, the historical mission by Zheng Ho was symbolically useful for China, and was referred to by a number of China’s leaders in subsequent dealings with Africa. For example, Zhou Enlai on his tour of Tanzania in 1965 said ‘my colleagues and I do not find ourselves in a strange land. Intercourse between our countries dated back to nine hundred years ago. Some five hundred years ago, the Chinese navigator Cheng Ho reached East African coasts’ (New China News Agency, June 5, 1965). However, following the adoption of a closed-door policy by the Qing dynasty, contact between China and Africa became minimal. It was only in 1897 that a Chinese consulate general was opened in Johannesburg by Qing representatives, to oversee and protect Chinese nationals who had emigrated to the country, though actual intercourse between China and South Africa remained negligible. And it was not until the turn of the twentieth century and the controversial recruitment of Chinese labourers for the gold mines of the Witswatersrand in South Africa that this changed (Richardson, 1977). Yet, under the Guomindang following the 1911 revolution, Africa again retreated to a position of irrelevance for the

Historical introduction to China in Africa 17 republican government (though South Africa and China established diplomatic relations in 1931). It was only after the Communists took power that the links originally formed by the ‘eunuch admiral’ Zheng Ho in the fifteenth century were restored and China pursued an active foreign policy in Africa.

Pre-1949 conceptualisation of a ‘Third World’ Prior to 1949, Mao Zedong formulated the concept of the ‘intermediate zones’ as the crucial arena of contradiction between capitalism and socialism. This was seen as where conflict between the two world systems would be engaged (Mao, 1971: 348). This ‘intermediate zone’ was defined as all countries between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a concept was very broad in its identification and included overtly capitalist states such as Great Britain and France as well as their overseas colonies. Whilst touching on the concept of a third category in global politics, Mao was a prisoner of his times and theorised on the material conditions of the world as it existed then (in 1946). There were very few independent states in Africa at the time, and nationalist movements were in their infancy (or nonexistent). Mao was a Communist who in a world of seemingly Manichean divisions between capitalism and socialism saw only ‘us’ and ‘them’ – this produced the ‘leaning to one side’ theory (see below). The intermediate zone was essentially an arena of competition for the two forces of capitalism and socialism, implying a zero-sum approach to international politics, with winners and losers in the intermediate zone, i.e. the gaining of hegemony in areas ‘won’. Mao was therefore early on postulating the concept of hegemony in the zones outside the immediate influence of the Superpowers. Mao’s theorisation of the intermediate zones may be seen as the building blocks of a future conceptualisation of a ‘third world’ between Moscow and Washington. Crucially, this tripartite viewpoint of the existence of a ‘third world’ would allow Mao to elaborate on the PRC’s own individuality in international relations separate from that of the Soviet Union.

Revolutionary China 1949-1955 Despite Mao’s previous theorisations, from October 1949 until after the end of the Korean War (1950-1953), the newly founded PRC was preoccupied with a number of domestic and external problems which precluded it from actively engaging in a foreign policy which may have encompassed Africa. As Article 54 of the PRC’s first plenary session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference said, ‘the principle of the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country’ (Common Programme, 1950: 19-20). Consequently, a large amount of Beijing’s political energy was expended on effectively stabilising China’s borders with her neighbours, for example in Xinjiang, Manchuria and Tibet. In addition, Beijing sought to unify the Chinese people under the Communist Party and begin the process of the reorganisation of Chinese society (Walker, 1955). In foreign affairs, Chinese sources have characterised this period

18 China and Africa as an attempt to ‘bury thoroughly old humiliations in the country’s foreign affairs’ (Xinhua November 25, 1994). During the immediate post-Revolutionary period, Chinese Communist foreign policy was greatly influenced by the Soviet Union’s support, signified by the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950. Because of American support for the Guomindang during the civil war, China viewed the United States as being firmly opposed to the Communist regime in Beijing. The United States was seen by Beijing to intervene on behalf of South Korea against the Communist North in the Korean War, and support the French (albeit indirectly) against the Vietminh in Indochina. This largely conditioned the foreign policy that China pursued, and in the case of Korea exacerbated Sino-American tensions (Chen, 1994). Mao Zedong had early on adopted the policy of ‘leaning to one side’ on the side of Moscow and rejected the notion of neutrality. As mentioned previously, he conceptualised the world into an almost Manichean division of two camps and consequently Mao insisted, that ‘all Chinese without exception must lean to the side of imperialism or the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road’ (Mao, 1969: 415). The PRC was thus firmly allied with the Soviet Union and this resulted in China’s foreign policy outside of Asia being closely tied to that of Moscow’s. Any contacts between Chinese Communists and non-Asian delegates was through Moscow-financed front organisations (Larkin, 1971: 15).

Five principles of mutual coexistence In 1954, however, China did formulate a set of ‘principles’ that were to supposedly guide Beijing’s foreign policy conduct and the relations China was to have between other countries. These were known by the Hindi term the ‘Panch Sheel’ or ‘Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence’, and were originally agreed upon by Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru of India on June 28, 1954. The Five Principles were: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity non-aggression non-interference in each other’s internal affairs equality and mutual benefit peaceful coexistence (Foreign Policy of India, 1958: 97-98).

These principles originally only prescribed relations between China and India. During the Bandung Conference (below), Beijing expanded them to dealings with all non-Communist developing world countries. By the start of the 1970s, they had become applied to relations with all states. That there was a contradiction between the idea of peaceful coexistence as found in the Panch Sheel and Beijing’s antagonism towards the Superpowers or the capitalist world was apparent. For example, Mao himself said that, ‘it is inconceivable that war can be abolished … when the capitalist system still exists in the world. We do not believe that class can be eliminated without a revolutionary war’ (Miscellany of Mao Tse-Tung Thought, 1974: 264-265). Thus whilst proclaiming its intention to abide

Historical introduction to China in Africa 19 by peaceful coexistence, Beijing clearly viewed the actualities of this and avoiding war as dialectically impossible. Nevertheless, the Five Principles were held to guide China’s relations with other states as Chinese foreign policy developed.

Early China-African contacts Having said this, very little contact with Africa or Africans was made in the pre-Bandung period. Southern Africa was particularly neglected, primarily because all except South Africa remained under colonial administration and African nationalist organisations had yet to be formed in most countries – South Africa of course being the exception – the African National Congress had been founded in 1912 (as the African Native National Congress). Any involvement in the early post-Revolutionary era was largely rhetorical. For example, in a telegram to its joint secretaries A. Meer and J. Sight in September 1950, Mao expressed support for the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) in their struggle against racial discrimination (China’s Foreign Relations, 1989: 356). However, Beijing failed to support this with any concrete actions. South Africa in fact is one of the only documented countries in this period to provide an African visitor to Beijing in the form of Walter Sisulu, the SecretaryGeneral of the African National Congress. He paid a visit to Beijing following the 1951 World Youth Festival in Berlin (Larkin, 1971: 15). Sisulu was apparently impressed by the Chinese government and was for a time an admirer of Mao. One visitor to Sisulu’s house in Johannesburg wrote ‘In Sisulu’s house … hung a photograph of ‘our beloved Chairman Mao Tse-Tung’ (Sampson, 1958: 155). This presumably encouraged Y. Cachalia and D. Mistry of the SAIC to send a message in early 1952 to Zhou Enlai requesting support against the discriminatory racial policies being practised by the then Union government of South Africa (South Africa was not to become a republic outside the Commonwealth until 1961). The Chinese Premier responded in a sympathetic manner, though again only through a verbal message of solidarity (Daily News Release, 25 January, 1952). Sisulu and Duma Nokwe of the ANC later went on a five-month tour of Communist countries, including the PRC. Apparently, Sisulu was profoundly affected by the similarities between the Chinese and African peasantry (Benson, 1963: 199). However, it must be noted that not one of the four independent African countries at that time, Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa, recognised the Beijing government. Official contact between China and Africa then in the immediate post-Revolutionary, pre-Bandung, period was largely negligible. A Chinese delegation did however visit Cairo in 1951 to attend a joint meeting of the Universal Postal Union and the International Air Transport Association (Larkin, 1971: 16).

Asian-African Conference The Asian-African Conference was a seminal event in Sino-African history, for it was at the Bandung Conference of 1955 that Communist China first made its

20

China and Africa

tentative links with the African continent. The Asian-African Conference was convened in Bandung, Indonesia 18-24 April 1955. The concept of an AsianAfrican Conference had first been suggested at a meeting of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan in Colombo, Ceylon in April 1953. This was formalised by the so-called ‘Colombo Powers’ on December 29, 1954. Of the 29 countries that attended the conference, six were African – Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (Ghana), Liberia, Libya, and Sudan (The Central African Federation (now Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) was initially invited but was forced to turn down the invitation due to its not being ‘in a position to attend’. The Federation was then still ruled by the United Kingdom). However, the only independent African political ruler to attend was Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and it was towards Egypt that China began directing its diplomatic efforts. Ethiopia sent its Foreign Minister; the Gold Coast sent their Minister of State; Liberia sent their Secretary of State; Libya sent the Libyan Ambassador to London; and Sudan their Prime Minister. However, Sudan was not to become fully independent until 1956. Thus there were a number of discussions between the Beijing and Cairo delegates, and Zhou Enlai extended an open invitation to all the Egyptian delegates to visit Beijing (Larkin, 1971: 17). This led to the establishment of a trade agreement between Egypt and China on August 22, 1955 and Egypt was to subsequently become the first African country to establish relations with Communist China on May 30, 1956. However, other African delegates attended as observers to the conference and it was at Bandung that the provisional contacts first established in 1950 between China and members of the South African liberation movement were further established. A three-man delegation representing the ANC and the South African Indian Congress attended Bandung led by Moses Kotane, a veteran African Communist and member of the national executive committee of the ANC (Pike, 1985: 158). With Kotane’s Communist credentials, it is highly likely that some sort of contact was established between the Chinese and South African delegations. For some writers, the Asia-Africa Conference was of great and lasting importance (Abdulgani, 1981; Kahin, 1956). For Sino-African relations it was certainly the first time that Africa figured on China’s agenda, albeit grouped together with Asia. Some writers however have postulated that Africa was relatively unimportant to China at Bandung (Larkin, 1971: 19). This ignores the realities of the African situation that existed at the time and the different influences that may have shaped African reactions to China. First, Ethiopia, Liberia and Libya were firmly pro-Western and would likely have rebuffed any overtones emanating from Beijing or, as the Chinese put it ‘other countries … desire the recognition of People’s China, but their governments, under pressure from the United States, dare [not] do so’ (Chu, 1956: 3). Second, Sudan was not yet independent at the time of the conference, yet once self-governing it became the second African country to recognise Communist China, on February 4, 1959. Third, the African liberation organisations by their very nature acted clandestinely. To be seen giving overt support to the ANC for example would have been detrimental not only to

Historical introduction to China in Africa 21 China’s cause but also to that of the liberation movement involved. The success of China’s overtures to Egypt bear witness to a limited diplomatic offensive in Africa and show that China was interested in Africa. Chinese foreign policy, it must be remembered, was still largely determined by influences from Moscow. Nevertheless, Bandung marked the start of a definite interest by the PRC in Africa and in the developing world in general. Zhou Enlai was at pains at the conference to minimalise differences between the newly independent states and emphatically denied that China had any wish to interfere in any country or promote subversive activities (Ambekar and Divekar, 1964: 15). This period was dubbed the ‘Bandung Era’ and lasted until approximately 1959. It is from this point that the beginning of China’s involvement in Africa and the anti-colonial struggle developing on the continent became definite. This may be illustrated by the creation of a West Asian and African Affairs Department by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 1956. Previously, this office had been the West European and African Affairs Department. The change in nomenclature reflects the perceived growing in strength of anti-colonialism and the importance that China attached to this development. A Chinese Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries was founded in March 1958.

Post-Bandung Following Bandung, the People’s Republic of China began to gradually become more involved in Africa. At this point, China concentrated on North Africa, particularly Algeria and Egypt. It was notable that Beijing quickly ignored Zhou’s platitudes on non-interference. For example from 1957 until Algerian independence in 1962, China issued propaganda on behalf of anti-French rebels and supplied the FLN with weapons and training in their fight against the French colonial power. At this time, China also began to develop a fairly strong relationship with Nasser’s Egypt. In July 1955 China agreed to purchase a large amount of Egyptian cotton, and in August a trade agreement was signed between Beijing and Cairo (Hutchison, 1975: 15). This was the first trade agreement between China and any African state. China also offered to send 280,000 ‘volunteers’ to aid Egypt during the Suez crisis (Kerr, 1965: 439). This may be seen as an interesting example of PRC hyperbole. At the time, Beijing had no means by which it could have transhipped over a quarter of a million men to the Middle East. Such an offer however was no doubt intended to play to the Afro-Asian gallery. Links between China and other North African countries also progressively developed with cultural visits to Ethiopia, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. The former three states became the next African countries to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC – Morocco on November 1, 1958; Algeria on December 20, 1958 and Sudan on February 4, 1959. Chinese attendance at international conferences was at this point one of the main avenues by which Beijing attempted to develop linkages with Black Africa. The end of 1957 saw the first Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference being held in Egypt, and this was followed in April 1958 by the First Conference of Independent African States in Ghana

22

China and Africa

(Legum, 1958). Beijing’s polices towards Sub-Saharan Africa however remained cautious whilst tension with Moscow began to grow. Yet it is apparent that Chinese interest in the continent was expanding rapidly at this point. In 1959 ten Chinese delegations visited Africa, whilst 1960 saw this number double to 25 and by 1962 this number was 52. The number of African delegates to China was also expanding rapidly–50 in 1959 and 98 in 1960 (Ogunsanwo, 1971: 45). This implies a concerted effort to expand and diversify China’s African contacts, related to growing Sino-Soviet tensions and the forthcoming Moscow conference of Communist parties in November 1960 (Larkin, 1971: 45). Already, the PRC had begun to develop its own theoretical position towards the emerging independent nations.

Sino-Soviet tensions and the theory of the ‘Intermediate Zone’ With the death of Stalin and Khruschev’s policy of detente towards the United States, Mao grew increasingly suspicious of Moscow’s continued commitment to the revolutionary cause (Albright, 1978: 23). In 1958, Mao elaborated his previous concept of the intermediate zone by distinguishing between the developed capitalist members (the metropolitan powers) and the newly independent and underdeveloped states. The underdeveloped world was seen as the ‘first immediate zone’, while the capitalist states in the West (i.e. non-socialist Europe, Canada, Australasia and Japan) belonged to a separate group: the ‘second intermediate zone’. This conceptualisation of Mao’s was closely linked to his theory of contradictions. According to Mao, contradictions in the world centred around the differences between the capitalist and socialist camps (greatly expanded since Mao’s initial formulation of the intermediate zone in 1946); the bourgeoisie and working-class within the capitalist states; the colonised and the imperialists; and the imperialist nations (inter-capitalist competition). This up-dated conceptualisation of a ‘third zone’ between the two Superpowers offered the PRC room for manoeuvrability centred around a unique perception of the character of the nationalist leadership in the struggle for Africa. This leadership was seen as progressive, anti-imperialist and potentially a support base for Beijing. Though bourgeois in origin, Beijing was impressed by their resistance to neo-colonialism and hostility to the former colonial powers. The initial aggressive stance by the emergent African leadership (symbolised by Nkrumah of Ghana) was complementary to the PRC’s aim of anti-hegemony. Beijing’s attitude towards the nationalist leadership was, however, essentially at variance with that of Moscow’s. The Soviet’s view was that the first stage of revolution in Africa would be the capture of power from the colonialists. It was only after this initial change in regime that a socialist revolution could take place. Beijing, however, regarded the national democratic revolution as providing potential for the ultimate capture of power. This would be led by the Communists but in co-operation with a broad united-front of workers, peasants and the bourgeoisie. If the Soviet Union, lulled by its policy of détente, was to become ‘complacent’ towards the hegemonic ambitions of the capitalist West, Beijing felt compelled to

Historical introduction to China in Africa 23 intervene on behalf of the socialist community. This of course had two important side-aims. First, it enabled the PRC to offer itself up as an alternative socialist model (and possible future leader of the socialist world), and second it allowed the Chinese manoeuvrability vis-à-vis the Soviets. Tensions between Moscow and Beijing were already developing, and by constructing linkages in Africa, Beijing was aiming to strengthen its own position against the Soviets and break out from any hegemonic position it felt constrained by. Beijing constructed a theoretical position that implicitly posited the developing world and China together and inferred an antagonistic relationship with the two Superpowers. Seeing the future as being deprived of Soviet aid and support, Beijing sought to construct linkages with what at the time was viewed as an emerging power bloc – the new Africa. Thus as the 1960s progressed, the PRC became progressively more involved in Africa.

Period of success, 1960-1965 Following the Communist Party conference in Moscow, the Sino-Soviet relationship rapidly deteriorated. At the same time China’s relations with Africa began a new and distinct era. Indeed, the years 1960-1965 saw Beijing achieve great diplomatic success, with the PRC entering into relations with 14 newly independent African states (Ghana; Mali; Somalia (1960); Zaïre (1961); Uganda (1962); Burundi; Kenya (1963); Benin; Central African Republic; Congo (Brazzaville); Tanzania; Tunisia; Zambia (1964); and Mauritania (1965)). However, whilst welcoming the growing independence of Africa from overt colonialism, these new states were ideologically problematic for China, for most had achieved their independence without any real revolutionary struggle and had swiftly adopted the constitutional and legal frameworks that had been left behind by the colonial powers. Despite this, China viewed these new states as having a favourable impact on the global system and pursued a policy of offering immediate recognition upon independence. Whether the new African state reciprocated was a matter left to the Africans. China focused on Africa as a field of operations and this was signalled during this period by the formation of a number of organisations devoted to strengthening Sino-African ties. Secret Chinese army documents obtained in 1961 indicate that China saw the revolutionary situation in Africa in the long-term, and Chinese activities in the 1960s can be seen to be aimed at this. Africa was evidently regarded as a key point of world interest. It is useful to quote at length a few sentences drawn from this document: Among the independent countries of Africa, if only one or two of them complete a national revolution … the effect will be very great, the time ripe for action, the revolutionary wave will be able to swallow the whole African continent, and the 200 million and more Africans will advance to the forefront of the world. We should take long-range views of this problem. (Cheng, 1966: 484-485)

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Beijing’s attitude towards the African continent and its policy formulation therefore was based on the understanding of Africa as being on the first, antiimperialist step of a two-step progressive process – the second step being a genuine socialist insurrection or revolution. Beijing’s position was to be that of ‘educator’ – although it was repeatedly emphasised that any outside help could only ever possibly be supplementary to the domestic revolutionary situation. Thus disruption and the promotion of unrest in Africa became central to China’s policy towards Africa in this period, as a means by which the ambitions of the United States and the Soviet Union could be frustrated. The encouragement of a radical image for the PRC also aimed to maximise what was perceived as a euphoric atmosphere on the continent as more and more new African states emerged. Domestically, in the late 1950s and early 1960s China experienced a leftward turn in its politics. At the same time, contact with Africa continued to increase. In 1960, Sekou Touré of Guinea became the first African head of state to visit China (Peking Review, September 14, 1960). Sekou Touré’s visit was remarkable in that it represented a watershed in Chinese policy towards Africa as Beijing for the first time committed itself to economic and technical aid to a newly independent African state (Hutchison, 1975: 56). Visits by African heads of state to Beijing began to increase and were received by masses of rapturous ‘spontaneous’ Chinese citizens assembled to welcome the guest and his entourage. As Ogunsanwo (1974: 78) remarked, these visits served two important purposes for the Chinese leadership. First, the visits demonstrated that the opinions of the Chinese leadership were respected and accepted by other world leaders, and second, they reminded the Chinese people that their actions were being closely watched (and admired) by the rest of the world. In addition, they demonstrated that the PRC was not standing alone, had allies throughout the world and was successfully combating the hegemonic intrigues of the two Superpowers. In February 1961 the Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund Committee met for the first time in Conakry, Guinea. The aim of this organisation was to provide support for African liberation organisations and was largely a precursor to the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). China indicated its developing interest in Africa by becoming a member and a Chinese delegate was elected Vice-Chairman (Lowenthal, 1964: 177). Whilst money was certainly supplied, it is likely that Chinese weaponry was also provided to the recipient organisations as three of these were already waging an armed struggle (Larkin, 1971: 60). Involvement in the fund enabled China to become closely acquainted with the personalities involved in the various organisations and was a valuable way for China to forge and develop long-lasting linkages.

Zhou Enlai’s African tour At the end of 1963, Zhou Enlai embarked on his much publicised ten-nation tour of Africa (see Adie, 1964). The main purpose of this tour was to rationalise China’s policies in Africa and to promote the planned second Bandung conference. As part of the PRC’s anti-Soviet policies, it was hoped by Beijing that such

Historical introduction to China in Africa 25 a conference would prohibit Moscow from attending, and would act as a launching pad for China to adopt a leading role in the developing world in the drive against hegemonism and colonialism. Because of a joint Yugoslav-Egyptian proposal for a non-aligned conference – which would have excluded China and diverted attention from the planned second Bandung – China was eager to gain as much support as possible for its plan and neutralise the other. However, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco were largely non-committal to the Chinese. Only Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Ethiopia, and Somalia agreed on the necessity for a second Afro Asian conference. However, the tour was received in a lukewarm fashion by Africa (Adie, 1964). Zhou’s tour was largely remembered for his perceived ill-advised comments that ‘revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout Africa’ (New China News Agency, February 3, 1964). Despite Zhou attempting to clarify his remarks by talking of the ‘national democratic revolution’ (New China News Agency, February 4, 1964), the damage was done and, as Hutchison (1975: 68) remarked ‘tended to obscure the previously conciliatory tone of his tour’. Zhou’s tour, however mixed its reception, was a signal to the world that the PRC now possessed an interest in Africa. This was a culmination of years of gradual development of interest and the tour was deliberately high-profile – in essence, the PRC was publicising the Chinese presence on the continent, and projecting Beijing’s image and prestige.

China and the Congo Beijing’s spirited public role in Africa continued with its involvement in the Congo crisis. The events in the Congo are notable in that they set a precedent for future Chinese relations with ruling African leaders and also aspiring liberation organisations. When a rebellion led by the Chinese-trained Pierre Mulele broke out in the Congo in 1964 (see Epstein, 1965) the Chinese were swift to supply arms and money to the rebels via Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville) and Tanzania, although this was consistently denied by Beijing (Larkin, 1971: 112). Even after Mulele’s forces were dispersed by Congolese government troops, China continued to support rebellions elsewhere in the Congo (for example, the two rebellions led by Christophe Gbenye and Gaston Soumialot respectively). Mao regarded the Congo as an important opportunity for China, claiming ‘if we can take the Congo we can have all of Africa’ (cited in Tung and Evans, 1967: 223). Chinese policy in the Congo however was largely contradictory. Whilst Beijing broadcast that the Congo was in an ‘excellent revolutionary situation’ (People’s Daily, June 24, 1964), China was also concerned not to offend governments in the region and so played down its involvement through repeated official denials. Thus on the one hand China promoted rebellion whilst on the other China reassured governments that it posed no threat. In essence, in the Congo China played to two different and opposing audiences: one revolutionary, the other conservative. Similarly, whilst secretly supplying arms to the rebels China was always keen to emphasise that the rebels must fight their own battles and that ‘revolution cannot be exported’ (People’s Daily, June 24, 1964). This became a theme of

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Beijing’s in Africa throughout its dealings with African liberation organisations. Whilst China was prepared to supply aid, Beijing was equally keen to stress that success was dependent on the actions of the recipient groups and could not be influenced from outside. This message of self-reliance was to be repeated by Beijing as China’s involvement in Africa deepened. The rebellion in the Congo eventually petered out after large-scale intervention by Belgian troops and so China’s policy in the Congo ultimately failed. Chinese involvement, however, did forcefully impress Beijing’s presence onto the African scene. Still, China almost immediately suffered a reversal of fortune when its diplomatic mission was expelled from neighbouring Burundi. This came after Beijing closely allied itself with Prime Minister Nyamoya who was removed from office for this very reason. Evidently China’s involvement in the Congo had a negative impact on at least some African politicians and made them nervous of Chinese involvement in their country’s affairs. Indeed, China’s behaviour in the Congo made any actions by Beijing on the continent immediately suspicious in some quarters’ eyes.

China and Tanzania A case in point of growing agitation to any Chinese actions in Africa was the response to perceived Chinese involvement in Zanzibar after the coup in January 1964. Indeed, Hutchison (1975: 107) posited that the West’s reaction to events in Zanzibar amounted to ‘hysteria’, coupled with mutinies in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. None of the mutinies were Communist-inspired but found their causes in the more mundane reasons of low rates of pay and the slow Africanisation of the officer corps. Nyerere even went on record to state that ‘there [was] no evidence to suggest that the mutinies … were inspired by outside forces – either Communist or Imperialists’ (cited by Hutchison, 1975: 108). However, examination of the facts show that the initial condemnation of China as being an éminence grise behind the events in Zanzibar largely rested on the tenuous link that Abdul Rahman Mohammed Babu – who was a leading light in the coup and became the Zanzibari Foreign Minister – was the local journalist for the New China News Agency. The fact that Babu was actually in Dar-es-Salaam during the coup did not prevent him from being demonised by the West as an important ‘agent’ of the Chinese who were guiding events from behind the scenes. Even an explicit denial from the revolution’s leader, John Okello, that he was ‘no-one’s agent’, did not stop the general anti-Communist but specifically, anti-Chinese excitement that greeted the coup (Okello, 1967). However, it is true that China swiftly moved to establish a training camp for African revolutionaries on nearby Pemba Island. The Soviets likewise sent arms and technicians to Zanzibar (Joshua and Gilbert, 1965: 41), and this further alarmed Western observers. The fact that both the British and American Chargé d’Affaires were expelled and a multi-million dollar US satellite tracking station was dismantled, did nothing to soothe the general anti-revolutionary tone of the West towards Zanzibar.

Historical introduction to China in Africa 27 It became fashionable to characterise Zanzibar as an island being taken over by Communists and their sympathisers – a ‘black Cuba’ (Kharusi, 1969). This was inaccurate however as the Revolutionary Council in Zanzibar preferred Beijing to Moscow or its allies and the Soviet presence on the island suffered a gradual erosion. Beijing trained Zanzibar’s army as well as constructing a number of aid projects, and in June extended a credit of $14.5 million to the island (Larkin, 1971: 97). It was no surprise then that Western observers eagerly supported the union of Zanzibar with Tanganyika to create Tanzania on April 22, 1964. Legum, for example, saw it as a means by which one set of militants – ‘the ones committed to genuine non-alignment’ could counter the others ‘using non-alignment as a façade to orientate Zanzibar in a Communist direction’ (Observer, April 26, 1964). However, the formation of the United Republic of Tanzania saw China committing itself wholesale to aiding the new African state, and if anything China’s presence in the region grew stronger. Beijing rapidly sent 300 training personnel, to train Tanzania’s army and by the early 1970s China was the only foreign power providing military personnel to Tanzania to train the local forces (Joshua and Gilbert, 1965: 25). Indeed, Tanzania became one of only nine non-Communist receivers of Chinese aid, and the only recipient in eastern or Southern Africa. Chinese economic involvement in Tanzania increased steadily and by the 1970s China had replaced Great Britain as Tanzania’s principal source of foreign credits (Yu, 1972: 19). Tanzania became one of the closest allies of China overseas, and trade flourished – encouraged by the creation of the Sino-Tanzanian Shipping Company in 1966. When the company was formed, China gave Tanzania two freighters, of 10,000 tons each, as a present (Far Eastern Economic Review, July 14, 1966). By 1973 the Company was operating three ships between China and Tanzania (New China News Agency, January 14, 1973). In February 1964 Nyerere visited China and a Sino- Tanzanian treaty of friendship was signed. The special relationship between China and Tanzania was cemented a year later by the official visits to Tanzania by Zhou Enlai in June 1965. It was from this mid-1960s period onwards that China established a definite presence in Southern Africa and Chinese activity in the region began to increase at a rapid pace. Tanzania was geographically strategically very useful for the pursuance of China’s African policies. Dar-es-Salaam hosted a large number of national liberation organisations from the south, who had based themselves in the capital after the OAU’s Liberation Committee established itself there. This gave Beijing an opportunity to propagate its revolutionary message directly to active African revolutionaries based in Tanzania. With the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia, Tanzania broke off diplomatic relations with Britain for refusing to suppress the state. London immediately suspended a US$21 million loan and this caused Tanzania to move even closer to Beijing. In June 1966 the Tanzanian Minister for Economic Affairs and Development paid a visit to Beijing and negotiated a deal whereby Beijing undertook to fulfil many of the projects abandoned by Britain. As has been remarked above, Chinese involvement in Tanzania initially took on the character of a competition between Beijing and Moscow and this competition

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largely centred on the amount of aid either country was willing to extend to Tanzania. Tanzania was one of the rare instances where Chinese aid was more than Soviet aid. It has been posited that the Soviets were preoccupied with other states in Africa such as Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia and Ghana. However, as Yu (1970: 50) remarks, it is more satisfactory to see the Soviet Union as being ‘outmanoeuvred by China in Tanzania’, with China exploiting the opportunities presented to them–such as the key contacts available in Zanzibar following the coup–to establish a strong foothold in Tanzania. Though this did not amount to a zero-sum equation, it is true that China was able to firmly establish itself in Dar-es-Salaam. Through the utilisation of economic and military aid China was able to ‘win’ Tanzania. This was at a time when China was willing to exert such energies towards the promotion of its African policies.

African liberation movements In the pre-Cultural Revolution period, China began to take an interest in the question of freeing Southern Africa from the control of colonial and minority governments. At first, Beijing supported any national liberation organisation and if there were rival movements, Beijing attempted to keep friendly contact with all of them as a means of keeping open the channels of communication. However, following the worsening in relations between Moscow and Beijing, by the early 1960s China reversed its earlier policy of broad support for liberation organisations and in general began to be more circumscribed in aiding movements that sided with Moscow. Thus a process of selecting suitable recipients for Chinese aid was undergone throughout Southern Africa. As a result, two groupings emerged in the region. First, there was the Conferencia das Organizaçoes das Colonias Portuguesas (CONCP) which was established in 1961 and consisted of largely pro-Moscow organisations (these were PAIGC of Guinea; FRELIMO of Mozambique; MPLA of Angola; and CLSTP of São Tome and Principe). Second, there was an informal group of organisations, general smaller and less active, that had split from groups within and associated with CONCP, largely due to ideological or leadership differences. This grouping was formally organised as the ‘Congo Alliance’ between 1963 and 1964, and consisted of the FNLA of Angola; the PAC of South Africa; COREMO of Mozambique and ZANU of Rhodesia. It would however be a simplification to regard this grouping as ‘pro-Chinese’ and the other ‘pro-Moscow’, for the PRC was willing to aid some members of CONCP if it was felt it would benefit China’s anti-hegemonic position vis-à-vis Moscow. At the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation’s (AAPSO) Council Meeting in Tanzania in 1963, China wanted to include Latin America whilst the Soviets wanted to absorb AAPSO into a new organisation. At first China, with the support of Cuba, won and the Afro-Asian-Latin American People’s Solidarity Organisation (AALAPSO) arranged to hold its first conference in Havana in 1966 (Kimche, 1966: 5). However, by the time of the conference Sino-Soviet relations were freezing and as a result the pro-Beijing PAC were refused membership, exposing AALAPSO as a pro-Soviet bloc. A year later AAPSO suffered the same

Historical introduction to China in Africa 29 fate when SWANU was refused a seat at the 1967 Council Meeting and as a result, AAPSO was also seen as an exclusively pro-Soviet front. Thus by the late 1960s the Sino-Soviet dispute had intruded itself into the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. China in essence adopted an anti-hegemonic policy towards the Southern African liberation organisations that effectively reacted to the actions of Moscow and not the local situation. Whenever a movement indicated a willingness to deal with Moscow, China encouraged a rival organisation by switching aid to them, thus aiming to reduce the Soviet Union’s influence. This took on the features of a competition for influence and led to China aiding even patently ineffective organisations because of their supposed hostility to Moscow – the PAC in South Africa and SWANU in Namibia were classic examples of this. Here it is notable that China tended to support organisations with nationalistic, pan-African, even racist ideology as opposed to the more inclusive organisations which looked towards Moscow. These tended to be more socialist-orientated. As Marcum noted, the Moscow-backed organisations, ‘share[d] a dedication to multi-racialism … and an intellectual radicalism more attuned to the permissiveness of Soviet ‘revisionism’ than to the rigid conformism of China’s Cultural Revolution’ (Marcum, 1967: 8). However, this is explicable in that it was likely that China’s perceived Maoist radicalism in itself naturally attracted the more immoderate elements of the various liberation movements. It was only in Mozambique that China was willing (and able) to aid an organisation connected to Moscow. This was because FRELIMO had proven to be the effective fighting organisation in the territory, the leadership of FRELIMO was secure, and because the rival organisations to FRELIMO were weak and largely negligible in the struggle. All of these details made China’s ability to force its own agenda onto the organisation very difficult. This issue came to a head in January 1969 in Khartoum at the International Conference in Support of the Liberation Movements of Portuguese Colonies and Southern Africa. This was organised by pro-Soviet movements and has been seen as an attack on the OAU’s African Liberation Committee which had been plagued since its founding by ‘mismanagement and unrealistic Pan-African expectations’ (Marcum, 1972: 66). However, organisations close to China boycotted the meeting on the grounds that the conference was an attempt at exercising Soviet control over the various liberation organisations. Such a claim mirrored Beijing’s antihegemonic sentiment regarding the perceived threat of Moscow against Beijing and China’s hand behind this boycott can clearly be seen. The organisations receiving aid from Moscow (ANC, FRELIMO, MPLA, SWAPO, PAIGC and ZAPU), however attended and viewed the meeting as successful (Larkin, 1971: 187-188). These pro-Moscow groups became known as the ‘authentics’, having received official OAU recognition. Certainly, a number of liberation organisations began forging co-operative links between each other – the ANC-ZAPU-SWAPO triangle for example (Gibson, 1972: 138). China’s tactics were seen by many as initiating splits in the liberation movements for its own agenda and damaging the effectiveness of such organisations, for in exchange for assistance, Beijing often compelled movements to condemn

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Western imperialism and Soviet ‘revisionism’ (Glantz and El-Khawas, 1975: 209). This effectively resulted in a division amongst the various liberation movements. A side-note to Chinese involvement in the liberation struggle was that it provided the colonial and minority regimes with a useful alibi by which they could justify prolonging their wars of resistance against independence. It was in these governments’ interests to magnify actual Chinese involvement. This was particularly the case for Portugal who felt it necessary to reassure the United States – Lisbon’s weapons provider and NATO ally – that their colonial wars were fought for the West. The commander of the Portuguese armed forces in Mozambique, Kaúlza De Arriaga (1973: 20) for example wrote of the ‘Communist grand strategy’ aiming to ‘destroy Western civilisation’. De Arriaga summed up Portugal’s attitude towards Chinese involvement in aiding the fighters of Lisbon’s colonial rule: From a strategic point of view, Africa is Europe’s security area. Thus, it is really the future of Europe itself that is at stake – the Europe that was the cradle of Western civilisation, and remains today a centre for the irradiation of Western thought. If Communist neo-imperialism were allowed to achieve success in Africa, a new, main objective would then be selected – Latin America, which is strategically the southern flank of the United States. (ibid., 21) Thus Portugal attempted to portray itself not only as the defender of Western civilisation but also as fighting on an extended front-line for the West’s security. Similar propaganda was issued by Pretoria and Salisbury. Chinese involvement in the liberation struggle thus provoked a great deal of fear in the states it was attempting to subvert, and also enabled the minority regimes and colonialists to portray their resistance as an anti-Communist struggle. It is important to analyse the aid that China provided to the liberation struggle, for this will illustrate how important China viewed the area in its approach to the African continent. In analysing such aid it is necessary to point out that China very rarely revealed the concrete quantity of military aid it gave, and the West often deliberately over-estimated it. For this reason, a discussion of China’s aid pre-Cultural Revolution will concentrate on the estimated amount of military materials provided by Beijing and the quality and amount of training provided to the liberation fighters. FRELIMO and ZANU seemingly received most of Beijing’s military aid in Southern Africa prior to the Cultural Revolution (Whitaker, 1970: 12–14). Chinese military instructors made Ghana a base for training guerrillas as early as 1964. A former ZANLA fighter who had been trained in Ghana by the Chinese commented that the guerrillas were ‘taught the principles of war and guerrilla tactics … but the Chinese instructors … refused to discuss politics or Communism’ (Sunday Times, March 24, 1968). From Rhodesia, ZANU fighters are reported to have gone to China itself for training as early as 1964 and these included Josiah Tongogara, the commander of ZANLA. A pocketbook found on the body of one of the guerrillas killed in the Sinoia

Historical introduction to China in Africa 31 skirmish, showed that he had been a pupil at Nanjing’s Military College in 1965 (Shay and Vermaak, 1971: 37). The dead guerrilla apparently was also found with a copy of Mao’s ‘The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People’. Though brought to China, the guerrillas were not apparently indoctrinated with Maoist political propaganda, the training concentrating on tactical and military matters (Grundy, 1971: 53-54). Subjects such as leadership, communications, medical services and engineering were also taught. The men who were trained in China returned to act as instructors themselves. Thus Chinese influence was broadened by their involvement in training camps for the liberation movements. The year 1969 saw not only an escalation in open guerrilla warfare in Southern Africa, but also China sending eight Chinese military experts to Tanzania to teach military skills and Maoist guerrilla tactics. For the war in Rhodesia, this increased involvement by China was to change ZANLA’s tactics from confrontational (as seen at Sinoia) conventional tactics to the classically Maoist teachings on guerrilla warfare (Martin and Johnson, 1981: 12). Chinese aid to the liberation movements prior to 1970 was however limited. There are a number of reasons for this. First, whilst China felt compelled to help the national struggle in Africa because of internationalist commitment and to combat Soviet hegemony, Beijing was always keen to emphasise that the chief burden in the wars of liberation rested on the inhabitants of such areas, and that they could not nor should not rely on outside help. As Lin Biao (1965: 41-42) commented, ‘only by relying on our own efforts can we in all circumstances remain invincible … foreign aid can only be supplementary … [If one] leans wholly on foreign aid … no victory can be won, or be considered even if it is won’. This insistence on self-reliance conveniently helped to explain and justify China’s lack of capacity to materially aid the liberation movements to any great extent. Whilst a ‘Liberation Centre’ was established in Lusaka, Kaunda was extremely wary of allowing Zambia to become a centre for liberation intrigue as well as being suspicious of Communist China’s motives. This meant that China was denied the ability to set up training centres near to the actual areas of conflict. Instead, China established a number of training camps in Tanzania. From an African perspective, the liberation organisations were extremely wary of becoming dependent on one source of supplies. Such an action would have threatened the independence and credibility of their own organisations, as well as giving the supplying state an undue amount of influence in decision-making. Thus a variety of nations were sought as suppliers of military armaments, and whilst the Soviet Union and China aided the liberation organisations to some degree, other sources were of equal importance. These were the OAU, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and non-governmental agencies such as the World Council of Churches (Legum, 1975: 5). Essentially, the African organisations took aid from wherever they could obtain it, and whilst influences did creep in to some extent the source of material aid tended not to overtly determine the political orientation of the various organisations. This had invariably been decided before the acceptance of aid (ibid., 7).

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Cultural Revolution: setbacks in Africa The Cultural Revolution resulted in intense domestic upheaval in China from 1966 onwards. For Beijing’s foreign relations, the Cultural Revolution can be seen to be a disaster and the PRC’s interest and influence in Africa and in the world in general suffered a great setback during the turmoil. For the Chinese, who were only now beginning to construct a coherent policy towards Southern Africa, this was unfortunate. Essentially, China’s image was tarnished and its position eroded internationally in this tumultuous period. This reached a nadir during the so-called ‘Boxer Diplomacy’ period in the summer of 1967, which saw Red Guards occupying the Foreign Ministry and drastically interfering in the operations of the department. All the embassies in Africa with the exception of that in Egypt, had their ambassadors recalled and were only headed by chargé d’affaires. The veteran diplomat Huang Hua remained at his post. Ogunsanwo (1974: 195) speculates that this was ‘so that he could continue to oversee the work of other diplomatic personnel in Africa and in the Middle East as a whole’. In addition, during this period, a number of states in Africa were deeply angered by what was perceived as Chinese provocation. For example, Tunisia broke relations after being accused of ‘standing on the side of US imperialism’ (Peking Review September 22, 1967), whilst Kenya expelled the Chinese chargé d’affaires after a letter emanating from the Chinese embassy accused the Minister for Economic Planning of deliberately trying to sabotage Sino-Kenyan relations. As Larkin (1971: 173) noted, during the Cultural Revolution ‘Chinese provocations in Africa were bizarre’. At the same time, China suffered a major setback in Africa with the overthrow of Nkrumah of Ghana in a coup in February 1966. This was especially embarrassing for China as Nkrumah was in Beijing at the time on an official visit – though the Chinese press politely refrained from mentioning his toppling and Zhou Enlai played host in Beijing. Nkrumah had signed a treaty between the PRC and Ghana which allowed for a number of Chinese experts to be sent to Ghana to train members of liberation organisations at a military training camp at Obenamasi in September 1964 (Hutchison, 1975: 125-126). A number of Ghanaians were also dispatched to China to undergo guerrilla training in late 1964. Whilst SinoGhanaian relations were broadly friendly, as Ogunsanwo (1974: 148) remarked, ‘China’s concentration was being shifted to East and Southern Africa’. Almost immediately, the new Ghanaian military government ordered the expulsion of the Chinese ‘experts’ in Ghana (South China Morning Post, March 9, 1966) whilst China pragmatically attempted to negotiate on how best to hand over unfinished aid projects. The military training camp headed by Chinese instructors was also closed and the instructors expelled. On October 20 1966, after Sino-Ghanaian relations had deteriorated further, diplomatic relations were suspended. The number of foreign delegations visiting China are an indication of the turmoil that was occurring in the Foreign Ministry during the Cultural Revolution. In 1966 the number was 116 (most of the invites for these visits had been issued prior to the start of the unrest), but in 1967 this had been reduced

Historical introduction to China in Africa 33 to 53. By 1968, the number of visiting delegations was a mere 12 (Prinsloo, 1976: 107). It was apparent that Chinese policy in Africa had suffered due to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Diplomats and heads of organisations were viciously attacked and vilified. In this climate it is of no surprise that Africans were reluctant to visit Beijing. However, during the Cultural Revolution, a number of visits by important allies did take place. These were from the five African states closest to Beijing: Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Mali, Tanzania and Zambia. Between 1967 and 1970, Congo-Brazzaville sent 14 delegations to China; Guinea 9; Mali 11; Tanzania 15; and Zambia 9. The last two are of importance for this discussion and demonstrate that China did maintain relations of some substance with trusted friends during the Cultural Revolution. For example, both Kaunda and Nyerere paid official visits to Beijing, and the importance of these and other signals of policy steadiness will be discussed below.

Consistency in China’s Africa policy Whilst negative effects of the Cultural Revolution have been noted, one must examine the manner in which a number of China’s policies towards Africa continued during the period. For example, whilst it is true that Chinese actions in Tunisia and Kenya were reckless, this was because these countries mattered little to China and Beijing could afford to be cavalier towards these states – thus satisfying radicals at home whilst preserving Chinese interests. Though diplomats abroad returned to China during the height of the Cultural Revolution, these diplomats were not made redundant. For example, when Kaunda of Zambia visited Beijing in June 1967, the recalled ambassador to Lusaka, Qin Lizhen, was present at the important functions, thus keeping open a line of continuity with Zambia. Kaunda’s visit was remarkably free of Cultural Revolution-type rhetoric. This is surprising in that it was made at the height of the Cultural Revolution. This could only be in deference to Kaunda’s distaste for the excesses of the period, and a desire to maintain cordial relations with Zambia. This contrasted with some Tanzanian views on the Cultural Revolution. The Tanzanian newspaper Sunday News edition for February 21, 1971 for example saw the Cultural Revolution as ‘a gigantic and beneficial upheaval in Chinese society which will certainly be classed with the great revolutionary experiences of the 20th century’. China – even during the Cultural Revolution – had no desire to lose such a prized friend in the heart of Southern Africa. Nyerere was similarly fêted during the Cultural Revolution, visiting in June 1968.

Concluding remarks Until the end of the Cultural Revolution, China had pursued a double-edged policy in Southern Africa. On the one hand, Beijing was keen to involve itself in the liberation struggle in the region and contributed towards this aim. Though restricted by its material ability to involve itself further, Beijing did actively aid a variety of movements in pursuing their goals and by doing so aimed to combat

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Superpower hegemony and project Chinese prestige in Africa. China’s policies towards Africa largely coincided with the intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute and this meant that Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular became a central point of altercation between the two Communist powers. Whilst it is true that the Cultural Revolution resulted in some serious diplomatic setbacks for China in Africa, the policy of consistency exhibited towards key Southern African allies during this period meant that Beijing was able to resume ‘normal’ relations with the region with little difficulty. China’s public commitment to the liberation struggle – especially through the construction of the TanZam railway – meant China enjoyed a great deal of prestige in the region. Subsequently, Beijing was well-placed in Southern Africa as the struggle for liberation progressed in the early 1970s. Because of past commitments China was identified as a firm ally of the liberation struggle, the Sino-Soviet controversy amongst the various movements notwithstanding. By courting strategically vital Tanzania and Zambia through a judicious usage of economic and technical aid, China was able to establish a bridge between Beijing and the Southern Africa liberation organisations. Thus as the 1970s began and the Cultural Revolution came to an end, China was well placed to pursue a cohesive foreign policy in Southern Africa.

3

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution Era

The end of the Cultural Revolution saw a significant reassessment of China’s Southern African policy (Ismael, 1971: 528). As one Chinese source put it, ‘formerly regarded as a rear of imperialism, Africa [became] a front of antiimperialist struggle’ (Peking Review, July 2, 1971). And according to another source, an, ‘irresistible historical current [was] taking shape in Africa where the struggle … to win national liberation and oppose aggression, intervention and subversion … [was] developing more and more deeply’ (New China News Agency, May 22, 1971). Conceptually, China’s policies towards Southern Africa may be placed within the wider framework of China’s policy of using the developing world to muster support against the Superpowers. By promoting its anti-hegemonic agenda, China aimed to utilise the liberation struggle and the existing Southern African states as a device to posture greater manoeuvrability vis-à-vis the great powers. In addition, Southern Africa may be located within China’s wider agenda of projecting Chinese prestige and influence and allowing it to posture the status of a reinvigorated power, with minimal actual commitment. Involvement in the region’s liberation struggles meant that China was able to posit itself as a concerned party. This was particularly so via the medium of the United Nations. This allowed, or was designed to allow, a bridging of the gap between China’s wish to be taken as a major power, and the actual physical limitations that prevented this adoptive gesture. Steadily, China began to increase its presence in the Southern African region where ‘the struggle of the African peoples against racial discrimination and the White settlers’ racist regimes … [had] gained unprecedented momentum’ (New China News Agency, May 22, 1971). This policy in the ‘last bulwark’ of imperialism (New China News Agency, May 25, 1972) was initially done through a number of diplomatic and aid initiatives that sought to bolster (and in many cases, repair) China’s influence and prestige (Adie, 1970: 1-16). In an attempt to prevent the development of Superpower hegemonism on the continent, China sought to incite Africa against both American ‘imperialism’ and, Soviet ‘revisionism’ and ‘social imperialism’. China doubled its stake in Africa at the end of the Cultural Revolution and in doing so, China hoped to discredit Moscow’s revolutionary credentials whilst conversely, Beijing’s prestige and image as a major power would be bolstered (Yu, 1972: 16).

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The Cultural Revolution had been formally and publicly signalled as ending at the Ninth Congress of the CPC in April 1969. From that point on, Beijing began to attempt to reconstruct a ‘normal’ foreign policy and redress the deviations that Chinese foreign policy had underwent during the years of great upheaval. However, within the international system, China’s position was precarious. Internationally the global system became a bi-polar system. With the decline of European colonialism, largely completed by the early 1970s, new countries – much of them in Africa – began to assert themselves and emerge into the international system. The increase in the number of African countries had, by the end of the Cultural Revolution, made the continent a third power centre which China hoped to utilise for its own ends and prevent from falling under the hegemonic ambitions of either Superpowers (Chang, 1981: 47). Consequently, Beijing viewed the developing world as offering the greatest political opportunities for China to increase its manoeuvrability (Yu, 1977: 105). Chinese propaganda repeatedly asserted that, ‘countries want independence, nations want liberation and peoples want revolution’ (New China News Agency, January 29, 1972). As China viewed the international situation, ‘the African countries have become an important force in the struggle of the small and medium-sized countries of the world against imperialism, colonialism and the hegemony of Superpowers’ (New China News Agency, December 30, 1972). As mentioned earlier, China’s situation vis-à-vis the Superpowers had undergone a profound change at the end of the 1960s (Dillon, 1977). In March 1969, military skirmishes had been fought on the Sino-Soviet borders, and the PRC was mobilised for war with Moscow. As a result of this, rapprochement with the United States was contemplated by the PRC. As Mao reportedly said to his doctor, ‘[China has] the Soviet Union to the north and the west, India to the south, and Japan to the east. If all our enemies were to unite … what do you think we should do? … Beyond Japan is the United States. Didn’t our ancestors counsel negotiating with faraway countries while fighting those that are near?’ (Li, 1994: 514). As a result, Sino-US relations began to thaw, and direct competition with the Soviets in Africa resumed as a cornerstone of China’s African foreign policy. Anti-hegemonism was clearly articulated as a preferred policy by the Chinese in Africa, approvingly quoting the assertion by the Libyan representative at a special session of the UN Security Council in Addis Ababa, February 1, 1972 that, ‘some day we should like to witness the elimination of big-power competition and the game of area of influence [in Africa]’ (New China News Agency, February 3, 1972). Soviet ruthlessness in Czechoslovakia in 1968 had indicated that Moscow was prepared to use force to pursue its foreign policy whilst the border clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops had convinced Beijing that war with Moscow was not only possible but imminent. Thus by the beginning of the 1970s Moscow was viewed as the more hostile to China’s interests. The willingness of the US to improve ties with China was thus viewed in a favourable light by the Beijing government, although China was initially wary of American overtures. By the end of 1969 however, it was evident that Beijing was amenable to US attempts at a

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 37 thawing in relations. This culminated in Kissingers’s secret visit in July 1971. With America emerging from the Indo-China imbroglio, Mao viewed Washington as a ‘paper tiger’ (Peking Review, May 22, 1970) and whilst desirous of warmer relations, definitely came to view the Soviets perceived hegemonic ambitions as a greater threat to Beijing. As Zhou Enlai commented, ‘US imperialism started to go downhill after its defeat in … Korea. It has openly admitted it is increasingly on the decline; it could not but pull out of Viet Nam. Over the past two decades, the Soviet revisionist ruling clique … has made a socialist country degenerate into a social-imperialist country’ (Peking Review, September 7, 1973). As a consequence of these changed circumstances in China’s foreign situation, Beijing embarked on an active African policy in an attempt to repair the damage caused by the Cultural Revolution. A number of African emissaries visited Beijing and were feted by Mao Zedong himself. These included the ambassadors to China from Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Tanzania and Zambia and in June, Chinese ambassadors were dispatched to Tanzania and Zambia in order to strengthen existing ties between Beijing and its African allies. Connections between China and a number of existing liberation organisations were also established in an attempt to undermine the Soviet’s influence. However, China had learned an important lesson from its radical agenda pursued in the 1960s, and abandoned its earlier programme of attempting to foster subversion against independent African nations. Instead China delineated its support to the radical Southern African groups dedicated to overthrowing the minority regimes. This new policy allowed China to maintain relations with established governments in the region such as Zambia, and thus prevent Soviet encroachment, whilst at the same time build up linkages with the liberation organisations (Chang, 1981: 51). Competition for influence with Moscow and combating both Superpowers influence in Southern Africa was a major theme of this policy, and as will be seen was an integral part of Beijing’s struggle against ‘the power politics and hegemonic practices of the Superpowers’ (New China News Agency, May 25, 1972). As one observer asserted, ‘the Chinese … attempted to use Africa as a direct and indirect battleground in their fight against the United States and the USSR’ (Yu, 1972: 16). Crucially for China in the early 1970s, the Soviets were preoccupied with domestic affairs. At the end of the 1960s, Brezhnev had announced that henceforth Moscow would concentrate on developing the Soviet economy. As a result, Soviet activity in Africa declined relatively. Thus from that time until C. 1974, China was in the position to pursue its Southern African policies with little obstruction from Moscow. It was only in the mid-1970s that there was a revival of Soviet activity on the continent – particularly in Angola – and China began to experience policy setbacks as it was exposed as lacking the wherewithal to posture as a real great power. From the end of the Cultural Revolution, China embarked on an extensive aid programme to Africa. Nearly half of its aid was directed towards Africa, indicating the importance China held for the continent. Indeed, between 1970 and 1976, China made more aid commitments to Africa than the Soviets did. China committed US$1,815 million to Africa whilst Moscow committed US$1,019 million.

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For figures, see Yu, 1978: 42. This culminated in China’s undertaking to build the TanZam railway between Tanzania and Zambia, with the cost of this project totalling more than all of China’s aid to Africa since 1960 put together. As Mayall (1977: 7) observed, ‘it was in Tanzania as a result of the [TanZam project] … that the Chinese put themselves in a good position to contain Soviet influence in Southern Africa’.

The TanZam railway The TanZam rail project was indicative of China’s switch towards Southern Africa as a focus of her foreign policy on the continent, as Beijing clearly aimed to maintain and develop the warm relations that existed between Beijing and Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam. The TanZam rail project also signalled that ‘for the first time in five years, the Chinese [were] no longer on the diplomatic defensive’ (Comte, 1971: 21). The subject has been well-covered by previous scholars and thus it is unnecessary to go into any depth here (see Bailey, 1976; Peyman, 1976; Milton, Milton, and Schurman, 1974; Mutukwa, 1977). However, the fact that it was China’s biggest aid commitment to date and was the largest single offer of Communist economic assistance ever made (exceeding the $325 million provided by Moscow for the Aswan Dam in Egypt) makes it worthy of some mention. In October 1964, Tanzania and Zambia issued a joint statement of intent to build a joint railway and appeals for financial backing were made to the World Bank, the United States, Britain, Japan, the Soviets, and the African Development Bank. Western nations had rejected the project as costly, unfeasible and unnecessary (see Mwase, 1983: 535-543), although Britain reportedly offered to finance half of it if necessary. China immediately stepped in to offer the required aid during Nyerere’s visit to China in 1965. Zambia was at first cautious and so engaged an Anglo-Canadian company to survey the project. Despite being optimistic, this survey was rejected by Western states. However, Rhodesia’s proclamation of independence in 1965 influenced Kaunda to accept Beijing’s offer. Thus after discussions, China, Tanzania and Zambia signed the Agreement on the Construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway on September 5, 1967. This undertook to finance and construct the railway line utilising an interest-free loan from Beijing. On November 14 1969 China, Tanzania and Zambia committed themselves to an agreement whereby the proposed Chinese-built line would not, as the original September 5, 1967 agreement stipulated, link up with the Tanzanian rail system (which had a different rail gauge) at Kidatu. Instead, the line was to run from Kapiri Moshi to Dar-es-Salaam. In July 1970 China agreed to an interest-free loan of $406 million to cover construction and rail stock of this new project (New China News Agency, July 12, 1970). With Moscow’s designs in the Indian Ocean being warily inspected by Beijing, it was seen as vital that China kept the Swahili coast free from Soviet influence and naval power. Chinese help in constructing the TanZam railway broadcast their commitment to the liberation struggle for it gave both Zambia and Tanzania the ability to avoid using the rail links through Portuguese Mozambique and Rhodesia. This in turn meant the two states were no longer dependent on Salisbury and could afford to now support the

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 39 liberation struggles without fear of crippling economic reprisals. This greatly boosted China’s standing in the region as an ally of the liberation struggle against the minority regimes. Finally, with the TanZam link completed it was hoped that Dar-es-Salaam would become the economic hub of Black east and Southern Africa, displacing Nairobi in Kenyatta’s pro-Western Kenya and replacing it with a city and country where Beijing’s diplomatic influence and prestige was strongest. Thus China’s commitment to build the TanZam railway must be contextualised around Beijing’s desire to combat Superpower hegemonism in the region, prevent Soviet infiltration in Tanzania and Zambia and boost China’s prestige in Africa and the Third World. This Beijing succeeded in doing and for a period was regarded as a power to be reckoned with in Southern Africa. The actual impotence of China’s power on the continent was only later exposed in Angola. China’s involvement in the TanZam rail project is significant for a number of reasons. First, it demonstrated that despite the ravages of the Cultural Revolution and the effect that this had on Chinese foreign policy, China remained committed to Southern Africa. By signing the protocols on the project at the height of the Revolution, China was not only signalling to the international community that it intended continuing elements of its foreign policy unhindered, it also gave a signal to domestic radicals that their actions vis-à-vis the Foreign Ministry would not be allowed to cripple its interests abroad. Thus the TanZam railway was a highly useful instrument Beijing used to assert that it was still in control of matters and remained committed to Africa and the developing world. Second, Beijing involved itself in the railway for purely selfish reasons: it was a means by which China could attempt to reduce Moscow’s influence in eastern and Southern Africa – explicitly Tanzania and Zambia. Moscow had been studiously developing its naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean and courting allies in the region. For example, the Soviets had established cordial relations with strategically important Somalia. Moscow was also the largest provider of aid to the various liberation organisations in Southern Africa. It was thus inimitable to Beijing’s wider foreign policy to reduce Soviet influence in the area. By committing itself to both Tanzania and Zambia, China hoped to be able to ward off further Soviet incursions in the region. Third, the TanZam project was also a means by which China signalled its escalating interest in the Southern African liberation campaign whilst at the same time, boosting China’s status in the developing world (Yu, 1971). The railway was planned to enable Zambia to break away economically from the White-dominated regimes of the south (Mutukwa, 1972: 15). Being economically free from the south, Lusaka would be in a position where it could support liberation movements more openly without the fear of experiencing retaliatory measures by the White governments. This would be a major shot in the arm to the liberation struggle. In effect the TanZam rail project planned to remove the economic sword of Damocles that both Pretoria and Salisbury held over the head of Kaunda enabling Lusaka to commit itself more fully to the liberation struggle. By involving itself in the railway, Beijing was thus able to portray itself as a leading supporter of the national liberation struggle. Thus as the Cultural Revolution came to an end and

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a more active Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa was about to be embarked on, Beijing was able to enjoy a great deal of kudos in the region in the eyes of many of its people. The rail link also represented an authentic and tangible commitment to pan-African political and economic development and thus enhanced Beijing’s credibility on the continent (Yu, 1980: 41). The railway thus can be seen as a benchmark in Sino-African interaction and a favourable image of the PRC in Africa was to help China in its quest for recognition.

China and admission to the United Nations The question of China’s admission to the UN was a major issue for Chinese foreign policy until the final vote in favour in 1971. China was aware of the fact that the growing number of African members of the UN made their voting vitally important if China was to replace Taiwan in New York. Indeed, as it proved Africa played a crucial role in the debate and the final acceptance of the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations. In October 1971, a pro-Beijing resolution was voted in favour by 76 votes to 35, with 17 abstentions, and this saw the admittance of China to the United Nations. This victory for Beijing was won with the vital support of a number of African countries. Over a third of Beijing’s votes in favour of the PRC in 1971 were from Africa, including four who still had diplomatic relations with Taipei and of the 23 co-sponsors of the ‘important question’, 11 of them were African (Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Zambia). It is certain that without the African votes, China would not have succeeded for ‘by sheer weight of numbers, African countries … contributed to the final outcome of the issue’ (El-Khawas, 1973: 287). The African membership of the UN grew over the years and the vote in favour of China correspondingly grew, tipping the decision in favour of Beijing’s. Southern Africa became a focal point of China’s attentions after Beijing’s admission into the UN, as the PRC was in a position of some political strength and thus could project itself within the international body as an upholder of African causes, in competition with Moscow. This was part of China’s anti-Soviet, antihegemonic policy, and the admission of China into the UN gave Beijing a great boost in its pursuance of this political course. At a banquet to thank those states that voted in favour of admitting China to the UN, the Acting Foreign Minister, Ji Pengfei, linked China’s admission to that of the growing desire for self-determination and pledged Beijing’s support for any wars of national liberation. These were seen as an ‘irresistible trend of the world today’ (New China News Agency, November 3, 1971).

The PRC and the national liberation struggle China’s military interest in Southern Africa was concentrated on the various struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa fighting against ‘racist enslavement and for national liberation’ (New China

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 41 News Agency, May 25, 1972). This reflected a general Chinese desire to safeguard her security interests against perceived Soviet hegemony. Huang Yungsheng’s visit to Albania in December 1968 and the pact subsequently signed illustrated Beijing’s concern that Soviet influence in the Mediterranean was getting worryingly strong. Hegemonic manoeuvres in Africa could by extension not be dismissed. The escalation of armed conflict between the minority states in the south suited China’s policy perfectly. The position of Chinese advisers in Tanzania who were engaged in providing training for both the Tanzanian armed forces and the irregular liberation movements meant that Beijing was in a relatively strong position regarding Southern Africa. By mid-1971 there were an estimated 20,000 Chinese on the Tanzanian mainland and in Zanzibar (Guardian, May 13, 1971). Though the majority were engaged in construction work on the TanZam project, China was undoubtedly by then a presence in Southern Africa providing significant support to the liberation organisations fighting the minority governments. Although the OAU’s Liberation Committee stipulated that any aid to the liberation struggle should be directed at officially approved organisations, China constructed a policy of also supplying aid to rivals of the so-called ‘authentics’ (see individual chapters).

The PRC and Africa’s international position China’s position vis-à-vis Southern Africa was outlined during Huang Hua’s speech to the plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly on October 22, 1972. The speech was notable in that Huang in a sense echoed the words of Zhou Enlai in 1964 on his tour of Africa. Huang asserted that ‘the present situation [was] excellent in the struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism’. Huang reiterated the concept that it was a ‘great trend’ in the world that national liberation and revolution were on ‘the peoples’ agenda. Huang also further developed the concept of an ‘ever broader united front’ against colonialism which the ‘peoples of the world’ were forming. According to Huang, ‘it is very important for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to sympathise with and support each other and strengthen their unity in the struggle’. However, Huang was keen also to assert that any prospective national liberation organisation ‘should rely on their own efforts and take foreign aid as an auxiliary. One should never rely on others to end colonial rule’ (New China News Agency, October 22, 1972). This theory was a progression on the ideas put forward in 1964. By advocating alliances with the former metropolitan countries to withstand Superpower pressure, China was now ranging the entire world against the two Superpowers. Beijing thus began to develop a strategy whereby both the national liberation movements of the developing world and the existing developed countries could be utilised in the struggle against Superpower hegemony. As part of this policy, China began to encourage links between the developing nations and the industrialised world. The Chinese became keen to promote the involvement of African states in a variety of international organisations that promoted dialogue with the

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aforementioned industrialised Second World. The Lomé Convention was one such organisation singled out by Beijing for praise (Peking Review, No. 11, March 14, 1975). According to China the Lomé Convention reflected ‘certain positive change in the attitude toward the Third World … by the West European countries which are bullied by the Superpowers’ (New China News Agency, July 28, 1975). This united front approach was consequently used by China in Southern Africa. All potential allies were to be approached in the struggle against the minority ruled states and to prevent Superpower encroachment. The ideological ‘soundness’ or otherwise of possible allies was to be no longer of paramount importance. This drew criticism from China’s erstwhile European ally, Albania, who argued that China was befriending ‘anti-democratic African cliques’ in order to pursue their new policy on the continent (Hoxha, 1979: 16). Nonetheless, the usefulness of the ally in the struggle against hegemonic attempts – particularly the Soviet Union – in Africa was to dictate China’s attitude and tactics towards them and not the ideology, thus allowing China to assert that ‘gone are the days when the African people were completely under the dictates of big powers’ (New China News Agency, December 30, 1972). This policy was conducted in Africa with enthusiasm by China. Beijing became increasingly interested in forging links with not only African governments in existence but also with the OAU and with the various liberation organisations that were operating in the Southern African milieu. China thus enthusiastically reported that the OAU had declared liberation from foreign domination the ‘principal objective’ of the organisation (New China News Agency, December 30, 1972). In order to further China’s involvement with the OAU, Beijing began to drop support for organisations fighting clandestine struggles against existing majority-ruled states and instead began co-operating with such governments. Examples of such countries are Ethiopia, Cameroon and Tunisia. A number of African states began switching recognition from Taiwan to Beijing as a result of China’s more conciliatory foreign policy overtones. Perhaps the most significant development – certainly to be later as the war in Angola progressed – was the re-opening of relations with Zaïre. As mentioned above, a renewal of interest and involvement in the liberation struggles in the region was undertaken in this period. Beijing purposefully challenged the Soviet Union’s influence and domination of many of the liberation groups that were in existence, with China particularly targeting its efforts on the two Portuguese territories, Angola and Mozambique (see individual chapters). This was particularly so after the OAU’s Liberation Committee in 1973 decided to give ‘priority assistance’ to the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies (New China News Agency, January 16, 1975). This was largely because the military situation in the two colonies was the most precarious and offered the most possibilities for Chinese opportunities to combat the Superpowers tactics of ‘replac[ing] old colonialism … to contend for world hegemony’ (New China News Agency, December 16, 1974). Speeches at the UN condemned the Portuguese and urged assistance for the liberation organisations. China skilfully used her position on the UN De-colonisation Committee and other international

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 43 platforms to advocate a more militant approach to the Southern African question. By doing so, Chinese prestige and status within Southern Africa as a ‘concerned party’ was raised.

Theory of the three worlds Beijing’s view of the world and consequently of Africa was further brought into focus following the speech by Deng Xiaoping at the United Nations in April 1974 and the subsequent speeches and editorials that followed the pronouncements made during the conference. The CPC fundamentally rejected Moscow’s assertions that the Cold War between Communism and capitalism was over. Instead, Beijing proffered a world view that saw the globe in a state of great flux – ‘great disorder under heaven’ as Deng (1974: 5) put it. However, large-scale inter-state wars were rejected and instead, wars of national liberation and revolutionary conflicts were seen as the future predominate method of struggle. The chaotic situation in the world arena was blamed on the two Superpowers who were battling to gain hegemony over the smaller countries, though ‘in bullying others, the Superpower which flaunts the label of socialism is especially vicious’ (Deng, 1974: 7). According to the theory, this in turn sparked off internal problems and conflicts in the smaller states – particularly those that were politically unstable or whose domestic contradictions were exacerbated by Cold War rivalries (New China News Agency, January 8, 1974). In essence, Deng asserted that the world consisted of three parts. The US and the USSR made up the First World, the developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America made up the Third World, whilst the developed countries made up the Second World (Deng, 1974: 7). As part of this ideological framework, Beijing elevated the status of the developing world and actively encouraged the states of Africa in particular to resist the power and influence of the Superpowers on the continent. In addition, China was effectively conceptualised as being at the centre of this Third World. Such a construction allowed Beijing a two-fold stance affording a position of both leverage and of supremacy. The developing world was thus encouraged to regard China as a stalwart ally whilst at the same time they were favourably disposed to lend Beijing support in the PRC’s handling of its relations with the Superpowers. This resistance to the Superpowers was portrayed as developing from three cognisances on the part of the Third World. First, through political and revolutionary struggle ‘the people’ would come to realise that the Superpowers were mere ‘paper tigers’. After this education and further struggles against the Superpowers, the developing world would then come to realise ‘the reactionary nature of US imperialism and Soviet revisionism’. This would result in them closing ranks and developing a strong and unified force against the hegemonic threat posed by the Superpowers (New China News Agency, January 3, 1974). The importance of a unified front against colonialism and hegemonism was repeatedly stressed as the way, to success, and this was seen to be a process under way, for as a commentary asserted, ‘the Third World has risen in revolt against the two

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Superpowers’ (New China News Agency, January 8, 1974). Armed struggle against the colonialist and minority forces in Africa was seen as an integral part of this ‘united front’ against China’s Superpower enemies, particularly the Soviet Union. This armed liberation struggle was to help construct what China saw as an ‘irresistible torrential tide’ that would free the whole of the African continent from overseas forces including Superpower hegemonism (Peking Review, June 29, 1973). If this were to be achieved, China’s own position in the international system would be incalculably improved as influence would no longer count on physical power or ability. Thus China’s anti-hegemonic posturing through the theory of the Three Worlds, was closely liked to Chinese realisation that its ability to project itself in areas such as Southern Africa was limited, but could be strengthened if the Superpowers’ own influence and authority was curtailed or restricted in Africa. Thus restricting Superpower hegemony and ‘equalising’ international relations was of paramount importance for Beijing. As Deng (1974: 35) remarked in his speech, ‘all countries, big or small, rich or poor, should be equal, and that international economic affairs should be jointly managed by all the countries of the world instead of being monopolised by the one or two Superpowers’. The Three Worlds theory also confirmed the notion that China saw itself as a middle power and that the theory was an operational device through which Beijing hoped to manage its relations with the Superpowers, through the utilisation of anti-hegemonic rhetoric. In addition, this theory aimed to boost the influence of China, by allying itself with a wide constituency. As Yahuda (1974: 82) pointed out, the PRC saw that by ‘combining with other states on a general basis and/or specific issues … it [was] possible to achieve a great deal … since on that basis it [was] possible both to negotiate with and struggle against the Superpowers’. By combining an appeal to armed liberation with that of a restructuring of the economic order to favour the developing nations, China aimed to project itself as the spokesman for the developing world and thus boost its own prestige and status. Thus after the Three Worlds theory was made public, the Chinese media was keen to assert that ‘we have friends all over the world’, especially as Beijing viewed the two Superpowers as being ‘at the end of their ropes’, that is, near to defeat by the ‘people of the world’ (New China News Agency, September 28, 1974). Comparisons between China and the Superpowers’ behaviour were drawn and Beijing helpfully sketched a ‘Superpower’ as, ‘an imperialist country which everywhere subjects other countries to its aggression, interference, control, subversion or plunder and strives for world hegemony’ (Deng, 1974: 39). Thus China’s Three Worlds theory was constructed on the foundations of its anti-hegemonic agenda and allowed China to posture greater manoeuvrability in the international system boosting the PRC’s influence whilst at the same time placing China firmly at the centre of affairs with a support constituency made up of the developing world community. It was also, as Chan (1985: 377) asserted, designed to ‘allow Chinese leadership of the Third World’.

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 45

Détente in Southern Africa Chinese policy in Southern Africa continued to develop in 1974. Both Nyerere and Kaunda visited Beijing in the year, illustrating the close ties between China and its two African friends. China made a major diplomatic breakthrough with the establishment of diplomatic ties with Botswana, a country completely surrounded by minority-ruled state. However, Chinese ambitions in Southern Africa did experience a slight problem with the glimmerings of détente in Southern Africa (see Callinicos and Rogers, 1977). With China’s policy toward the minority states based on the politics of confrontation and military opposition, any such sudden move towards compromise and negotiation and away from insurrection and revolutionary warfare would damage Beijing’s position of influence as a possible arbiter of agitational armed conflict. Thus China was keen to denounce détente as ‘rivalry for hegemony between the two Superpowers’, and ‘a blind alley’ (New China News Agency, December 30, 1974). However, it was Chinese developmental policy towards the two main allies in Southern Africa that paradoxically conspired to undermine Beijing’s influence somewhat in this period. With the economic crisis deeply affecting non-petroleum producing countries in the lessdeveloped world, Tanzania and Zambia both began experiencing serious difficulties. The terms of the agreements entered into with China connected to the TanZam railway required the importation of a high amount of Chinese-manufactured merchandise, meant that both states began to suffer. Nyerere summed up Tanzania’s problem by pointing out that Dar-es-Salaam’s petroleum bill had tripled after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the ensuing oil crisis (see Hideshima, 1982). Despite all this, China continued to encourage the oil crisis as a means by which the hegemony of the two Superpowers could be challenged. Such insensitivity to its allies’ needs and problems no doubt helped both Nyerere and Kaunda to attempt to distance themselves from the confrontational politics expounded by Beijing. On a wider African scale, it became apparent that China was beginning to widen its aid to include a larger number of countries and that the criteria for aid had broadened to include regimes that could not conceivably be regarded as ‘progressive’ or noticeably sympathetic to Beijing’s cause – the prime example being Zaïre. China was aiming to widen its linkages with Africa as much as possible and diversify its contacts on the continent. Thus the first air link between China and Africa was through a country ruled by an emperor (Ethiopia) supposedly diametrically opposite to Beijing’s ideal. This pragmatic line was pursued by China as a response to the increase in rivalry between Moscow and Beijing and the increasingly bitter tone that this rivalry was taking in the propaganda war between the two states, particularly in Southern Africa. By 1975 China was referring to Moscow as the ‘world’s biggest exploiter’, and asserting that the Soviets were ‘bent on replacing the United States in lording it over the world’ (New China News Agency, February 12, 1975). China was anxious to develop as many cordial relations that it could in Africa in an attempt to keep Soviet influence to a minimum and Beijing was realistic and pragmatic enough to understand that the ideological

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purity of a country was not the most important factor when it came to accruing allies against Soviet hegemony. As the former Portuguese states evolved to independence, China was determined to thwart the ‘particularly vicious’ intentions of the USSR (New China News Agency, July 28, 1975). With the death of Zhou Enlai in 1976 struggles within the CPC leadership preoccupied China. Beijing however remained committed to keeping out Soviet influence. Zhou’s death in fact gave impetus to this anti-Soviet preoccupation as Moscow was viewed as an instigator in trying to undermine the CPC by promoting ‘revisionism’ within China. The crisis in Washington with the Watergate scandal and US policy reversals in Indo-China meant that China felt it could not count on American power and prestige to keep out the Soviets from Africa, especially Southern Africa. As a result, by 1976 Sino-Soviet competition in Africa and the developing world had never been more acute (Segal, 1985: 17). It was this that helped propel China into the Angolan imbroglio, (see Chapter 4).

Post-Angola However, Angola proved to be disastrous for China’s Southern African policy for China ended up on a side backed by the US and the South Africans, to the disgust of much of Africa. As one commentator noted, ‘the entire blundering episode was rounded off when Peking found itself on the same side as South Africa … For China, cultivating a reputation of siding against the Superpowers, such a stance was a shattering blow to its credibility’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, October 1, 1976). This provoked a cooling in relations between China and their erstwhile allies in Mozambique. With Mozambican displeasure at China’s role in the civil war in Angola and Moscow’s offer of supplies and military aid China found itself gradually supplanted by its implacable foe. As Segal (1985: 18) remarked, ‘the vivid demonstration of China’s weakness in Africa served the Soviet Union well’. This was despite Beijing’s rhetorical posturing that ‘more and more people in Africa … are aware that the Soviet revisionists are the arch-criminals’ undermining African independence (New China News Agency, December 28, 1976). China also began predicting war between the two Superpowers and urged the world to prepare for a new world war. By upping the tempo between the two major powers, China hoped to provoke anti-Superpower sentiment and thus gain prestige as the alternative power in readiness for the coming conflict. In a secret speech the Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua urged a ‘watching two tigers fight’ approach to Superpower conflict through which, the developing world and China would emerge triumphant and Chinese influence greatly extended (New China News Agency, October 14, 1975). Following the Angola debacle though, China became more circumspect in involving itself with the liberation struggles, although Beijing attempted to extrapolate Angola’s experiences so that other African nations could learn about Moscow’s hegemonic ambitions. As Beijing noted, Angola served ‘as a negative example’ about the Soviet Union’s real agenda in Southern Africa (New China News Agency, September 26, 1975).

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 47

Post-Mao With the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and a certain introspection to China’s foreign policy, Beijing began urging on African efforts, but particularly emphasised self-reliance. This accentuation on African self-sufficiency in the liberation struggle was combined with a new vehemence in the propaganda directed against the Soviet Union. China was determined to portray Moscow as an imperialist force aiming for hegemony on the African continent. Indeed, China began to regularly refer to the Soviet leaders as the ‘new tsars’. This was a clear attempt to draw an analogy between the Soviet Union of today and the Russian monarchs of the eighteenth and nineteenth century who had succeeded in extending Russia’s borders from the Baltic to the Pacific. Ironically, Beijing also began to criticise Moscow for dividing African countries into ‘advanced’ and ‘reactionary’. This was of course exactly the policy that Beijing had pursued in its dealings with African countries and liberation organisations for many years. With the abandonment of China’s strict ideological policy in favour of the ‘united front’ approach however, China was now able to level this criticism against Moscow. In addition, China began to criticise Moscow’s involvement in militarily aiding the liberation struggle. This may be seen as a tacit acknowledgement by Beijing that it could not hope to compete with Moscow in supplying military aid to the various liberation organisations in Southern Africa. As a result, China postured a determined antihegemonic stance and aimed to put forward the view that the USSR was involving itself in the region’s liberation struggles because of its own hegemonic agenda. Thus China later accused Moscow of ‘using military aid as a means of blackmailing, brutally exploiting and plundering African countries’ (Beijing Domestic Service, April 6, 1976). With its new non-interventionist policy being developed, Beijing was keen to portray the Soviet’s involvement in Southern Africa as being propelled by motives other than genuine support for freedom from colonial and minority rule. As one Chinese report put it: Facts have shown that it is not true that soviet revisionism has no plans to seek hegemony; nor is it true that it has no intention of establishing military bases in the Indian Ocean. It is doing so covertly and insidiously. (Beijing Domestic Service, June 13, 1976)

Loss of Chinese prestige in the region Whilst within the international system China was undergoing a rapprochement with Washington, by 1978 it was very clear that China had lost the momentum and prestige in Southern Africa that had been painstakingly developed during the immediate post-Cultural Revolution period. What was undoubtedly worse for China was that this had been lost to Beijing’s perceived main enemy, the Soviet Union under Brezhnev, described as ‘even more heinous and wilder than Kruschev’ (People’s Daily, January 6, 1976). Chinese hostility to Moscow caused Beijing to reject overtures made to it by the Soviets in February 1978, with China

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posturing itself as a ‘victim’ of Soviet aggression and calling for a Soviet withdrawal from China’s northern borders (New China News Agency, March 25, 1978). Feeling impotent in the face of continued Soviet expansionism in Southern Africa and elsewhere and vulnerable within the international system, China could merely rhetorically criticise the Soviet’s presence in the region. By 1978, the Soviet Union was in an extremely advantageous position in Southern Africa. In Angola, President Neto forwarded a message of thanks for the telegram that Brezhnev had sent the MPLA at the closure of the first Congress of the MPLA’s new Party of Labour. This party had been established to give legitimacy to Neto’s plans to establish Angola as a Marxist-Leninist state and build the country along socialist lines. In April 1978, Neto visited the Soviet Union ostensibly on holiday and paid a visit to Brezhnev, thus illustrating the very close ties that were now developing between Moscow and Luanda. Brezhnev was keen to assure Neto that Moscow would support Angola in every way. China by contrast had lost a great deal of ground and its anti-hegemonist posturing was greatly damaged. Indeed Zimbabwe was Beijing’s only trump card with its close links to ZANU and Mugabe (see chapter on Zimbabwe). However, within the international system, China’s position was gloomy and according to Beijing sources, ‘war is brewing in the world because of the presence of imperialism. At present the contention between the two hegemonic powers … is becoming more intense [and] will inevitably lead to war’ (Beijing Domestic Service, April 10, 1978). In a move to maintain Beijing’s position in Southern Africa at a time of perceived Superpower tension, China attempted to maintain a level of friendliness with its traditional Southern African ally, Zambia. However, even here the Soviet Union was seen as making an attempt to break these ties. In May 1978 a delegation from the Supreme Soviet visited Lusaka and Kaunda made remarks expressing thanks for Soviet support for the liberation struggle against Rhodesia and expressed hope that Soviet-Zambian ties would be strengthened. Although in September a military delegation from Zambia visited China and was received by Chairman Hua, Soviet attempts at expanding their influence in Southern Africa at the direct expense of China deeply worried Beijing. The fact that Zambia’s Kaunda was so open to Soviet overtures despite the massive investment that China had made in the TanZam railway and other Zambian aid projects (although China resolutely refused to attach strings to such aid) would have been a source of great anxiety and disquiet. For Beijing, it was fortunate that Tanzania proved a more loyal ally. In September 1978 Tanzanian Premier Sokoine arrived in Beijing on an official state visit which illustrated the strength of Sino-Tanzanian ties despite Dar-es-Salaam’s past criticism of Chinese conduct in Angola (New China News Agency, September 11, 1978). Gratifyingly for the Chinese, Sokoine publicly remarked that, those who are not afraid of the truth cannot fail to acknowledge the positive Chinese contribution towards exposing and minimising the dangers of Superpower domination of other countries’ (New China News Agency, September 12, 1978). In addition to this welcome support, Rashidi Mfaume Kawawa during a visit in October pointed out to Zambia that Tanzania had ‘never experienced interference [by China] in our internal affairs’ (New China News Agency, October 4, 1978).

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 49 With Soviet involvement in Angola and Ethiopia accelerating and an increasing amount of Cuban troops being poured into the Ogaden (see Porter, 1984: 182215) China took the opportunity of the 15th OAU summit conference in July 1978 to lambaste Soviet policy in Africa. Beijing described Moscow as the ‘biggest threat facing the African states and peoples’ (New China News Agency, July 25, 1978). Earlier, Beijing had frame-worked its continued opposition to Moscow’s activities in Southern Africa, which had read: People fix their attention on Africa, especially Southern Africa, because the West had its biggest economic interests there … Control of the Republic of South Africa means control of the Atlantic Ocean and the Southern Indian Ocean. Soviet revisionism’s activities in Africa are an important component of its global strategy in contending for hegemony … in the world. (People’s Daily, May 30, 1977) It became apparent to China that Soviet advancement in Africa and China’s corresponding own loss of prestige and influence were matters that had to be addressed. In an attempt at this, Beijing chose the personal approach and dispatched a number of delegations to the continent in order to consolidate and hopefully improve SinoAfrican connections. Vice-Premier Chen Muhua visited Somalia, Gabon and Cameroon; Vice-Premier Geng Biao paid visits to Congo, Guinea, Ghana, Rwanda and Somalia; whilst Ji Pengfei headed a delegation to Togo, Gambia and Sierra Leone. Although none of these states were in Southern Africa they do indicate that China was anxious to remain on cordial terms with a variety of African nations and prevent Soviet expansionism, plus shore up China’s position in another region of Africa. In a further piece of diplomatic wooing, the Mozambican President paid a state visit to China. Since Mozambican independence, China had been careful to cultivate a friendship with Maputo despite substantial differences over Angola and Mozambican willingness to accept Soviet Union aid. Machel was an intensely pragmatic leader and China was evidently aware of this, seeing the Soviet presence in Maputo as a necessity for the FRELIMO regime under extremely difficult domestic circumstances.

China’s economic modernisation and Africa Under Deng Xiaoping, Maoist radicalism was replaced by Dengist pragmatism and an assertion of the economic over the political. The promotion of China’s economic modernisation essentially became the raison d’être of China’s foreign policy, including in Southern Africa, and a more conciliatory tone in Chinese pronouncements emerged. The precedence that the Dengist leadership set for economic reform affairs henceforth set the parameters for the key constituents of China’s foreign policy under Deng. As Deng asserted, ‘we shall concentrate on economic development’ (Deng, 1994: 20). In August 1978 China concluded a Sino-Japanese treaty and in December Beijing and Washington established diplomatic relations. Both parties stressed

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the principle of anti-hegemony (Beijing Review, December 22, 1978). It had become apparent after the Eleventh Congress of the CPC in August 1977 that China’s foreign policy had shifted away from the exhortation to armed revolution and conflict and to a more circumspect advocating of stability and dialogue. Whilst rapprochement with Moscow was largely eliminated, a broad united front against hegemonism was theoretically postured (Cheng, 1989: 163). Anti-hegemonism was deployed as rhetorical justification for the 1979 war with Viet Nam as Vietnamese policy in Cambodia was conceptualised as an extension of Moscow’s hegemonic ambition and Vietnam itself was pictured as an aspiring regional hegemon. That the war came soon after normalisation of relations with Washington allowed Beijing to project itself as a committed anti-hegemonist and as a power intent on peacefully re-integrating itself into the international system and thereby contributing to global peace and stability. Indeed, the concept of lasting stability became a, if not the, major theme of Chinese policy exhortations to Africa. In order for China’s economic socialist modernisation to successfully develop, Beijing preferred – indeed needed – to have a peaceful and stable international climate in which trade and commerce would not be detrimentally disrupted by violent dislocation and conflict. As Beijing emphasised, ‘a peaceful environment is necessary in order to develop the economy’ (Beijing Review, August 10, 1981). In order to promote this concept in Africa, China drew parallels with the African continent and laid part of the blame for Africa’s poor economic performance and misfortune on political instability, outside hegemonic ambitions and ‘interference’ (Beijing Review, November 30, 1981). China viewed African long-term stability as being only possible if the Soviet Union were excluded from the region. As Beijing remarked, it was vital for Africa to ‘resist external interference … [as] the common desire of African … peoples [is] to … oppose splits in Africa’ in the developing world (Beijing Review, July 13, 1981). Pan-African unity remained a rallying call of Beijing’s and Soviet ‘interference’ in Africa was viewed as inimical to stability. To combat this, China advised Africa to, ‘get rid of outside interference, guard against the Soviet Union’s meddling [and thus] solve any problem[s] in a peaceful way’ (Beijing Review, June 1, 1981). As Beijing remarked, stability and economic adjustment was ‘bound up with the struggle against hegemonism in the political field’ (Beijing Review, August 10, 1981). Indeed, stability and the peaceful resolution of disputes would ‘facilitate … economic development, raise the people’s living standard and enhance African unity against hegemonism’ (Beijing Review, March 15, 1982). The United Nations was seen as an area where Chinese influence and prestige amongst the developing world could be maximised and so Beijing began urging that the UN bore ‘serious responsibility for maintaining peace in the world [and] should play its role in this field a is expected’ (Xinhua, December 13, 1980). Thus it was seen as both in China and Africa’s interests to maintain dialogue and dissuade conflict – a break from past Chinese utterances. In connection with African economic progress, China began to emphasise what they regarded as a ‘fairer’ world economic system. In particular, a readjustment of economic and

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 51 commercial relations between the developed and less-developed nations was repeatedly urged. This would of course have benefited Beijing considerably in its attempt at modernising China’s economy. In order to gain African support for this proposal, Beijing began to establish itself as champion and advocate of greater equity between the North and the South (whilst still denying that Beijing sought a position as leader of the Third World). For example, prior to the Cancún economic summit in August 1981, China demanded, ‘an equitable settlement of North-South relations beneficial to the world economy as a whole and to world political stability’ (Beijing Review, August 10, 1981). Beijing was reliant on the industrialised West for high technological imports crucial to its continuing economic development and Japan was particularly important in this respect. However, in the longer term economic and commercial linkages with the developing world were seen as highly desirable, for China needed access to the raw materials that the industrialised North presently enjoyed. This was vital if the Chinese economy was to continue its projected growth rate. Thus Beijing was keen to (and be seen to) advocate not only a fairer system of trade but also develop commercial linkages of its own with the developing world, Africa included. As it can be seen, China was therefore attempting to muster African support for measures that would directly benefit China and its economy. Chinese desire for international stability meant that China began to advocate peace in a number of previously fraught conflict scenarios in Southern Africa. On the question of Zimbabwe, for example, China urged an exploration in talks and debate. During a visit to London in November the Foreign Minister Huang Hua reiterated China’s new conciliatory approach by stating that the settlement in Zimbabwe would ‘be beneficial to the stability of that part of the world’ (Beijing Review, August 10, 1981). In addition, Huang expressed hope that any such political settlement would be ‘satisfactory to all sides’ (Beijing Review, November 9, 1979). China was deeply supportive of the talks in London. This was a major change in policy, as previously the emphasis on armed liberation would have taken no consideration of the White Rhodesian position and whether they were ‘satisfied’. With China emphasising economic development, a continuing war would only damage Chinese policy in the region and, allow for the possible encroachment by the hegemonic ‘wolf’, Moscow. Thus China’s new domestic economic policy had begun to influence Beijing’s policies towards Southern African and had begun emphasising peace and stability rather than conflict, insurrection and revolution. As China’s Vice-Premier, Ji Pengfei, remarked, ‘the Third World and [China] need a peaceful international environment in which to build up our … countries’ (Beijing Review, October 6, 1980).

Li Xiannian’s tour, 1979 Southern Africa remained high on China’s list of international priorities and at the beginning of 1979 Vice-Premier Li Xiannian visited Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and Zaïre. This tour was of major significance as Li was the most senior official to tour Africa since Zhou Enlai’s 1965 famous visit to Africa. This tour

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exhibited China’s desire to jostle for position in the region just as Zimbabwe was shortly to achieve full independence. In recognition of the support that China gave to ZANU during the war of liberation, Robert Mugabe received Li in Mozambique to discuss post-independence relations. Li also visited a number of representatives of other Southern African liberation organisations at their offices in Lusaka. In addition to Li’s tour, Wu Xuequian (the Deputy Head of the CCP International Liaison Department) also paid visits to Tanzania and Zambia in December in a further example of China’s continuing interest in Southern African affairs. However, despite these diplomatic efforts both Mozambique and Zambia went against the Chinese position on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 (Mozambique voted against the motion calling for the withdrawal of foreign (i.e. Soviet Union) troops from Afghanistan whilst Zambia abstained). Whilst Mozambique had consistently exhibited an independent line vis-à-vis both China and the Soviet Union and China had been scrupulously careful not to be seen interfering in African political decision-making, the vote must still have disappointed Beijing, for the only other two African countries to vote against the resolution were the Soviet Union’s two most closest allies on the continent – Angola and Ethiopia. Zambia’s abstention however was in keeping with Kaunda’s stated aim of maintaining a non-aligned foreign policy, whether or not this led to disappointments in Beijing.

Abandonment of violence as a tool With China’s repeated emphasis on the concepts of peace, stability and understanding, it is pertinent to analyse whether this necessarily meant a wholesale abandonment of the Maoist concept of the ‘armed struggle’, a supposition that had been an integral feature of Chinese foreign policy for decades. By examining Chinese policy pronouncements it is apparent that China identified at least three separate situations or circumstances in which armed conflict was likely or a possibility on the African continent. These were: resistance to minority-rule; reaction to encroachment or outright belligerence by the Soviet ‘social imperialists’; and finally, inter-African altercations and friction that could lead to the development of armed conflict (very often sparked by border disputes). With regard to resistance to the minority governments, China still gave qualified support for the armed struggle. However, negotiation and discussion was equally emphasised. For example, during Zimbabwe’s accession to independence, it was suggested that ‘it is all right to enter into negotiations for a political settlement, while persevering in armed struggle’ (Renmin Ribao, April 18, 1980). In essence then, the armed struggle could be most effective in tandem with mediation and arbitration though the use of the armed struggle was not ruled out. With regard to aggression by the Soviet Union against an African state, China urged the United Nations to ‘adopt effective measures to help the people of countries subjected to aggression’ (Beijing Review, October 6, 1980). It is clear that China feared that the Soviet Union was in a position in Africa where it could conduct an exercise similar to that which it performed in Afghanistan.

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 53 With China paradoxically in no position where it could offer Africa any effective resistance – particularly now that Beijing’s energies were concentrated on economic matters – to such a move by Moscow (if such tactics were realistic) Beijing saw the United Nations as the most useful counterweight to Moscow’s perceived grand designs in Africa. Huang Hua gave a summary of what China perceived the Soviet designs were in a speech to the United Nations in September 1980. According to Beijing, Moscow planned a ‘drive south towards the Indian Ocean and into the Pacific Ocean in co-ordination with … activities … in the Red Sea and in the Horn of Africa [all] aimed at seizing strategic sites … from the Red Sea and the Arabian Peninsula in the west, through the Straits of Malacca in the middle and … [to] the South China Sea in the east [in order to] encircle the oil fields in the Gulf and control key international sea lanes’ (Beijing Review, October 6, 1980). Beijing was particularly concerned with Soviet hegemony towards the Indian Ocean and with regional stability now being an aim of China’s Southern African policy, the United Nations was viewed as a useful tool in keeping out the Soviets from making further inroads in Africa. Finally, China was adamant that any interAfrican conflicts and border disputes should be resolved by the African states themselves and by peaceful deliberation. China has traditionally emphasised the sovereignty of states in resolving issues amongst themselves and discouraged international mediation. This partly stems from Beijing’s sensitivity to possible outside involvement in affairs perceived by China as strictly ‘domestic’ matters such as the issue of Tibet and Taiwan. The avoidance of establishing international precedents that may be later utilised in attempting to deal with China’s ‘domestic’ issues is a policy scrupulously pursued by Beijing and as the evidence illustrates, sought in Africa. As Beijing consistently advised, Africans must ‘resist external interference and … resolve their divergence’s and disputes through peaceful means’ (Beijing Review, July 13, 1981).

Post-1980 PRC policy Following on from Zimbabwe’s independence in April 1980, Chinese foreign policy towards Southern Africa received a fresh impetus and Beijing rapidly switched its attention to South Africa and occupied Namibia. China viewed Zimbabwe’s independence as a watershed in Southern African affairs and as ‘an enormous encouragement to the people of Namibia and Azania’ (note that Beijing refers to South Africa by the name that the PAC utilised) (Beijing Review, April 28, 1980). As far as Beijing was concerned, ‘the independence of Zimbabwe … greatly changed the balance of forces in Southern Africa in favour of the nationalindependence movement’ (ibid). It became clear that Beijing viewed the South African regime as the main stumbling block to Namibian independence, and the question of Namibia soon began to occupy China’s attention. Indeed, according to Beijing, ‘the question of Namibia [was now] the most salient issue in the de-colonisation struggle’ (Beijing Review, March 16, 1981). Accordingly, China began to view SWAPO

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(an organisation traditionally supported by Moscow) as the legitimate liberation organisation (see below). This is a clear indication that Beijing was increasingly willing to adopt a pragmatically realist approach to the realities of the Southern African situation and a more amenable approach vis-à-vis the Soviets. China also seemed to develop a concept towards the situation in Southern Africa that borrowed heavily from Mao’s ‘leaning to one side’ policy of the immediate post-revolutionary period. According to Beijing, ‘one cannot remain ‘neutral’ or ‘impartial’ over the issue of [South Africa]’ (Beijing Review, September 28, 1981). With the independence of Zimbabwe and the perceived change in circumstances in Southern Africa, China continued its policy started in 1978 of dispatching senior Chinese delegations to Africa in order to cultivate cordial relations. In April 1980 whilst attending the independence celebrations in Zimbabwe, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua also visited Mozambique and Tanzania. Significantly, whilst in Zimbabwe he also met with the President and Foreign Minister of Botswana. This was important for it signified that Beijing was keen to carry on with its support for the Front Line States and help maintain the struggle against apartheid South Africa. Evidence for this desire is further supported by the meeting of Huang with senior representatives from both the PAC and SWAPO. Whilst it was apparent that China’s domestic economic policy had affected Beijing’s ability and willingness to conduct affairs in African on a scale comparable to earlier years, China did still maintain a commitment to the ideals of Third Worldism. Indeed, Beijing attempted to use the past and policy pronouncements from a previous period in order to give legitimacy to the foreign policy that was being conducted during the socialist modernisation period. Criticism of Mao was formalised by the ‘authoritative assessment of Mao Zedong’ in 1981 when the CPC passed a number of resolutions on ‘certain questions in the history of [the] party’ (Resolution on CPC History (1949-81), 1981). However, Beijing was keen to emphasis that Mao’s policy towards the developing world was fundamentally correct and in addition, that Chinese foreign policy had remained in this respect unchanged. For example, the Chinese press asserted that, ‘many of his views are correct … for instance, the differentiation of the three worlds, opposition to hegemonism, and the concept that China belongs to the Third World’ (Beijing Review, April 27, 1981). Thus though aspects of Mao were criticised, China’s foreign policy was portrayed as being one of continuity and progression, particularly with regard to Beijing’s attitude towards the less-developed nations of the world. China’s policies towards the developing world in the early 1980s saw a re-emphasis of Beijing’s commitment to the developing world and Southern Africa. This was connected to Beijing’s perception of its own position in the international system vis-à-vis the Superpowers. At the turn of the decade, China had viewed the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and Cambodia as part of Moscow’s ‘global strategy’ and claimed that the world was close to war (Xinhua, January 2, 1981). However, since China had established diplomatic relations with Washington, tensions had paradoxically begun to increase between the US and the PRC, in part because of exaggerations and unrealistic notions about each other. Washington had

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 55 hoped that China could be utilised to restrain Moscow. Therefore, the sale of weaponry and transfer of technology was advocated to aid China’s modernisation. China on the other hand aimed to use Washington to help its own agenda, namely. the Four Modernisations, anti-Sovietism and crucially, the resolution of the ‘Taiwan question’. China postured that US intransigence over Taiwan was connected to an ‘erroneous’ view of China. As a source remarked: The US thinks China is poor and weak, menaced by the Soviet Union, and in need of capital and technology from the West. In their opinion, China had to ask for help from the United States, will eventually yield to that country and swallow the bitter pill of ‘two China’s’. (Xinhua, December 19, 1980) With Sino-American relations experiencing a downturn, in part because Reagan was bent on carrying on selling the Republic of China weapons and technology, China sought allies and sympathisers in the developing world and in Southern Africa, to prevent the ‘hegemonism’ of the Superpowers from threatening Beijing. The re-emphasis on developing world affairs was also an attempt by China to ‘correct’ the impression that since Deng’s modernisation programme, Beijing had begun to neglect the developing world. For example, China had viewed the independence of Zimbabwe as only the eighth important event in 1980, after the Polish workers’ strike and the boycott of the Moscow Olympics by many states (Beijing Domestic Service, December 25, 1980). Concentrating on developing its own economy, China was in need of Western technology, investment and expertise. As the developing world was not particularly useful for this purpose, a perception had developed that China was ‘ignoring’ the Third World (Chang, 1982: 71-72). Feeling safer regarding Moscow due to the Soviets having ‘turned Afghanistan into its ‘Vietnam’’ (Renmin Ribao, March 10, 1981), increased European and Japanese economic and political power, and concerned by Reagan’s ‘questionable’ attitude to the ‘two China’s’ issue, Beijing embarked on a policy of renewed outreach to the developing world and Southern Africa with a view to consolidating its anti-hegemonic posturing by attacking US ‘interference’ in other country’s affairs and counteracting negative images of China’s commitment to the developing world. This aimed to bolster China’s prestige within the international system and project Beijing’s image as a major power pursuing a foreign policy outside the parameters of Superpower interference and influence. This became the cornerstone of what was termed China’s ‘independent foreign policy’ (see below). Following on from this re-emphasis on developing world affairs, China’s Premier Zhao Ziyang attended the Cancún Summit designed to narrow the gap between the rich and poor countries posturing itself as the Third World’s spokesman. Involvement in this conference was designed to boost China’s prestige in the developing world whilst maintaining the theme of anti-hegemonism – American ‘hegemonism’ in particular. China viewed the conference as having created a favourable atmosphere for solving economic slowdown in developing countries, but failing to implement effective measures (Xinhua, December 20, 1981).

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China, frustrated at this impasse, blamed Washington for blocking North-South dialogue on developing countries’ economic problems. To this end, Deng Xiaoping told a visiting developing world politician that ‘the advanced countries always look down on Third World countries … Some countries always want to bully us’ (Xinhua, March 26, 1982).

Independent foreign policy At the Twelfth CPC Congress in September 1982, a new direction in China’s foreign policy was adopted. Zhao Ziyang stressed the principle of an ‘independent’ foreign policy and signalled that China was disinclined to be co-opted into any quasi-military alliance with Washington. This policy made it clear that Beijing would never attach itself to any big power or group of powers (Shen and Huang, 1990). Thus China not only criticised Moscow’s ‘hegemonism’, but also Washington’s (Beijing Review, October 19, 1981). China attempted to link the contemporary global situation with the past, with General Secretary Hu Yaobang’s report to the 12th National Congress of the CPC arguing that: The main forces jeopardising peaceful coexistence among nations today are imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism. True, the old system of colonialism has disintegrated with the successive winning of independence by nearly one hundred former colonial and semi-colonial countries. Yet its remnants are far from being eliminated. The Superpowers that practice hegemonism pose a new threat to the peoples of the world. (cited in Diplomacy of Contemporary China, 1990: 560) This policy thus elevated the developing world, including Southern Africa, to the role of counterbalancing the Superpowers’ influence within the international system, to promote China’s influence outside of Asia and, as a symbol of Beijing’s independence vis-à-vis the major powers.

Zhao Ziyang’s tour of Africa, 1982 Continuing this theme, the end of December 1982 saw a visit by Premier Zhao Ziyang to 11 African countries (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Guinea, Zaïre, the Congo, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Kenya and Gabon). This tour indicated that the importance of the developing world had grown within the framework of China’s independent foreign policy and that Zhao’s tour was aimed at promoting China’s interests in Africa, enhancing its influence – particularly in Southern Africa – and creating a ‘new image of its own in the eyes of the Third World’ (Chang, 1983: 8). During the tour (the first by a Chinese Premier since Zhou Enlai’s tour in 1963), Zhao met representatives of both the ANC and SWAPO. This was a signal that China had ditched its hostile posturing toward pro-Soviet movements and wished to improve its relations both with Moscow and with the main liberation organisations in Southern Africa. This was aimed at giving China

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 57 greater manoeuvrability in the region and allowing China to project itself as a concerned party in Southern Africa. During the visit, Zhao was also keen to promote the ‘Four Principles’ of China’s economic co-operation with Africa. These were, equality and mutual benefit, emphasis on practical results, diversity in form, and common development. However, the Four Principles signalled in essence that China was pulling back from offering unconditional assistance. This was necessary, for China’s own developmental agenda prohibited costly aid programmes to Africa. The motives for Zhao’s visit also sprang from Beijing’s need to maintain a support constituency to enable China to pursue its ‘independent’ policy. As an observer noted: African nations form the majority of Third World countries … Communist China has a sharp conflict of interest with Asian countries and … Latin America is the backyard of the United States making it difficult for Peiping to infiltrate. Africa is the only area where there is no conflict of interests. (Chang, 1983: 11) Zhao’s tour was essentially an attempt to secure and cement relations with Africa and promote economic co-operation within the framework of a reinvigorated policy aimed at developing linkages with the Third World. Three main goals of Zhao’s tour may be identified: to overcome strained relations caused by China’s foreign policy swing towards the West in the late 1970s and the perception that Beijing had somehow ‘abandoned’ Africa; to set the groundwork for expanded trade and economic co-operation with Africa as part of China’s economic modernisation programme; to consolidate China’s anti-hegemonic policy in Africa and encourage resistance to perceived Superpower expansion on the continent (Kwan, 1991: 156). Previously, a major accomplishment of Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa was achieved on September 27, 1982 with an agreement on the normalisation of relations with the People’s Republic of Angola, realised on 12 January 1983 with the establishment of diplomatic relations (Xinhua, January 12, 1983). This was of significance for Chinese policy in Southern Africa for it meant that Beijing had succeeded in repairing and stabilising the relationship with Luanda which had been broken following China’s refusal to accept the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola (China had refused to vote in favour of the MPLA government’s admission to the United Nations General Assembly as the representative of Angola on the basis of the Soviet Union’s sponsorship and involvement with the MPLA). This had resulted in China being effectively excluded from Angola for a number of years and had allowed the Soviet Union and Cuba a free hand in Luanda. According to Beijing the Soviet Union and Cuba subsequently ‘occupied’ Angola and effectively controlled the economy and political decisionmaking so much so that Angola ‘[could] not be objectively described as an independent country’ (New China News Agency, August 12, 1977). China’s desire for relations with Angola made Beijing reverse a number of policies vis-à-vis Luanda. For example, the issue of Cuban troops in Angola – a question

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of major contention between Beijing and Luanda – was suddenly re-defined. Previously, the Cubans had been denounced as ‘mercenaries’ (New China News Agency, February 21, 1976), the ‘Soviet Union’s foreign legion’ (New China News Agency, April 2, 1978) and ‘Moscow-brand world gendarmes’ (New China News Agency, June 22, 1976), and Beijing had demanded their total withdrawal. The question was now ‘entirely an internal affair’ and it was up to Luanda to ‘consider whether it is necessary for the Cuban troops to remain on its territory’ (Beijing Review, August 30, 1982). Intent on building bridges in the region, China had reversed its initial policy of outright hostility to the Cuban presence. Thus China was now able to normalise relations with Angola – a major coup for Beijing in view of the former antipathy between the two countries.

China and Southern Africa China’s approach towards South Africa developed in 1982 with Beijing intent on exposing the United States’ ‘connivance’ with the apartheid state (Beijing Review, October 11, 1982). American policy towards South Africa had undergone a change since the accession of Reagan in 1980. With the American policy of ‘constructive engagement’ in operation under Crocker, Washington became preoccupied with the perceived Soviet and Cuban threat in Southern Africa. This policy urged moderation on Pretoria and encouraged dialogue. However, critics remarked that it ‘sent a clear signal that there would be no penalty for intransigence’ (Minter, 1986: 294). The Chinese were highly critical of Washington’s policy as they saw that it gave tacit approval to a variety of South African offensive actions throughout the Southern African region. In essence, this meant that Beijing began to see Washington DC and Pretoria acting in tandem on many occasions. On the question of South African-occupied Namibia for example, Beijing authoritatively stated that, ‘the primary reason why the settlement [of the Namibian question] has been delayed is that South Africa, with the United States’ connivance and support, has made trouble’ (Beijing Review, January 18, 1982). Beijing was adamant that the United States ‘always supports South Africa’, and was a deliberate and willing ally of Pretoria’s (Beijing Review, August 9, 1982). The International Monetary Fund’s loan of US$1,070 million to South Africa in November 1982 was attacked by Beijing as it ‘demonstrates yet again the United States’ support for the South African regime’ (Beijing Review, November 22, 1982). This loan was cited as proof of ‘the faulty structure of the IMF’ (ibid.) and this criticism tied in neatly with Beijing’s theme of the unfairness of the world’s economic framework and the desire for reform. In his annual speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 4 1982, China’s Foreign Minister Huang Hua attacked the United States as an unnamed Superpower and blamed Washington for giving the South Africans confidence to continue ‘their illegal occupation of Namibia’ as well as make ‘military incursions into neighbouring countries, thereby posing a direct threat to the security and stability of the region’ (Beijing Review, October 11, 1982). Frustrated by their own lack of influence in the region in the face of Washington’s own foreign policy manoeuvres,

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 59 China was determined to remain vocal in its criticism of the South Africans and their alleged allies in Washington DC, and thus help maintain a perceived favourable profile in Africa.

Détente with Moscow Paradoxically, whilst Beijing attacked Washington DC for its role in Southern Africa, within the international system there appeared to be a thawing of relations between China and the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. The question of Beijing’s perceived rapprochement with Moscow was addressed by an authoritative statement, which stated that ‘the Kremlin has repeatedly expressed a desire to improve bilateral relations between [Beijing and Moscow] … China hopes that its relations with the Soviet Union will be gradually normalised on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ (Beijing Review, January 24, 1983). It should be noted that Beijing claimed that it was Moscow that initiated the reconciliation and also that Beijing had not altered its stance on the causes of the Sino-Soviet split. China stated categorically that ‘the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations stems from Soviet hegemonism’ (ibid.). However, developing world suspicion at China’s motives were palpable and so Beijing was keen to stress that it did not aspire to being the ‘leader’ of the developing world. In an editorial in December 1983, it was explicitly stated that ‘all the Third World countries, big or small, are political equals. They … should have no leader/follower relations among them … Any country which attempts to pose as a leader and control others will be spurned’ (Beijing Review, December 27, 1983).

Decline in Chinese interest in Africa By the mid-1980s it was apparent that China had effectively lost interest in Africa. Because of continuing problems at home and the desire for economic progress, China was apparently no longer interested in continuing its position as an outside player in the African milieu. China’s preoccupation with internal matters was famously emphasised by Deng Xiaoping in his talks with the Vice-President of Tanzania, when the latter paid a visit to China in April 1985. According to Deng, ‘socialism [did] not mean poverty. Without developing the productive forces and improving people’s living standards, you cannot say you are building socialism’ (Xinhua, April 15, 1985). China remained preoccupied in its foreign policy with its interaction with the two Superpowers, and so during this ‘world peace and development line’ Africa was marginalised by a Beijing government intent on modernisation. Although China maintained that it was still a member of the ‘Third World’, Beijing viewed the problematic developing world as largely irrelevant for its quest for modernisation and a peaceful international environment (Hsiung, 1988: 30). Africa as a whole was now evidently of little importance, for there was tellingly no mention in the Chinese press of the military coup d’états in Sudan, Nigeria or Uganda or of the serious famines that were ravaging whole areas of the continent.

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Instead, the importance Beijing attached to improved relations with the Superpowers was illustrated by the visits to and from China by a number of important dignitaries. President Li Xiannian visited the United States and the American Vice-President George Bush visited Beijing. In addition, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister paid a visit to Beijing. These developments affected China’s policy towards the African continent and Southern Africa in particular. Chinese policy in the 1970s, as has been seen, was driven largely by the desire to combat Superpower hegemony, and in this, Africans were seen as potential surrogates in the struggle against Moscow and Washington. With China now attempting a reconciliation with the two, the importance of Africa to China became less and less. Chinese officials still paid rhetorical lip service to such issues as South-South co-operation but the reality of the situation was that Beijing’s foreign policy was firmly directed towards maintaining and developing cordial relations with the Superpowers as a means by which China might foster its economic modernisation programme. Beijing had recognised that the socialist economic policies under Mao had provided only poverty and backwardness and that to ensure economic advancement China must rely on Western industrial countries to help develop its economy. As Beijing itself lacked funds and depended on foreign loans, there was little in the way that China could help Africa (Yeh, 1990: 304). As one observer remarked, China now had little time for military or economic adventures in the continent, for ‘Africa now [had] commercial, not strategic, significance’ (Wilmot, 1988: 1472). Thus any future Chinese involvement in Africa was linked to realistic economic appraisals. Indicative of this new attitude to Africa can be seen by Beijing pointing the finger of blame for the poor economic performance of Africa at the Africans themselves rather than towards the Superpowers or the ‘unfair’ economic world order. In May 1985, the People’s Daily criticised developing world ‘errors in policy making’. Neglect of Africa got to a point where African students in Beijing demonstrated against China’s policies towards Africa and held aloft banners saying ‘Remember the United Nations in 1971’ – a reminder that it was African nations which helped China’s entry into the UN (Agence France-Presse, June 19, 1986). In China’s modernisation drive, China shifted towards Europe, the United States and Japan as Africa was perceived as having very little to offer in terms of trade and strategic needs, although a Chinese commercial enterprise – the China National Africa Trading Corporation – was established in late 1985 to promote Sino-African trade. Nonetheless, Beijing felt compelled to send Wu Xueqian, China’s Foreign Minister, to Africa to explain China’s situation to the continent, and to publicly reaffirm China’s commitment to Africa in the face of widespread criticism.

Aid to Southern Africa If one examines Beijing’s economic and developmental connections with Africa in this period it is apparent that China’s concern for its own economic evolvement was paramount. Instead of granting spectacular aid as in the past, China insisted that it would suit ‘the task to one’s capacity in giving economic and technical aid’ (Jingji Ribao, June 9, 1986). As China’s preoccupation was with improving the

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 61 economic situation of the country, undertakings of overseas aid necessarily experienced a decline. This obviously influenced the amount of economic aid given to African states and it became even more apparent that China’s foreign aid budget was effectively limited. Aid which was granted was largely small-scale with short periods of Chinese commitment necessary. Capital investment in such projects was minimal and the need for trained technical assistance after the project was completed and spare-part requirements was relatively small. In an attempt to continue to boost China’s prestige, Beijing ingeniously suggested what it termed ‘triangular co-operation’ whereby financial assistance from developed countries would be used to fund Chinese aid projects in Africa (Xinhua, May 17, 1986). Unsurprisingly, this particular Chinese plan was not greeted with any enthusiasm by the West; it was unlikely that the West would bank-roll projects which would only serve to bolster Chinese prestige on the continent. Chinese policy was now committed to cultivating as many allies as possible in Africa and to maintaining those friendships already in existence through low-level aid projects and limited grants of capital. The focus now was on unassuming diplomatic endeavours designed to maintain existing Sino-African linkages and to carry on providing practical developmental economic assistance to those states that needed it. Shrill promotional propaganda advancing Beijing’s version of Marxist-Leninism and seemingly routine agitational threats against China’s perceived enemies – notably the Superpowers – had now been discarded. In its place were quiet, viable, small-scale developmental projects aimed at assisting Africa’s agriculture and health.

TanZam anniversary In August 1986 the tenth anniversary of the commencement of the TanZam railway was marked. It was noticeable that China sent a relatively unimportant dignitary to represent Beijing at the anniversary celebrations. Chen Muhua, although a member of the State Council, was the ex-Minister of Foreign Relations. For such a significant occasion in Sino-African relations (indeed Sino-developing world relations), it might have been expected that a more senior member of the CPC would have been dispatched to such a prestigious event for China. Both the Presidents of Tanzania and Zambia markedly attended the event and indeed both praised the Chinese record of aid and assistance in Southern Africa. Kaunda, for example, described the railway as demonstrating ‘the depth and sincerity of the co-operation between China and the [Southern African] region’ (Xinhua, August 16, 1986). Beijing, for its turn, chose to remind the assembled gathering of its past commitment to the region. Chen Muhua was also able to offer US$5.6 million to help finance the railway’s restoration schedule (Xinhua, August 14, 1986). However, whilst this may be regarded as a sign of Chinese commitment to the two countries and to the railway in particular, an alternative view might see this grant as merely being an attempt by China to save face. A brief examination of the TanZam’s history since its inauguration and China’s track record will illuminate this point.

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The TanZam railway throughout its operational history had experienced numerous problems that to some degree caused considerable discomfiture to China, in the sense that China’s much-lauded and largest aid project did not function particularly efficiently. As one commentator succinctly put it, ‘it has been plagued by lack of equipment, a shortage of skilled workmen, poor management, under-powered Chinese locomotives, slow turnover of stock, and a severe shortage of spare parts’ (Christian Science Monitor, December 12, 1982). Admittedly, much of the railways’ maintenance problems were not of China’s doing. It was only through repeated Chinese commitments of additional aid and technical assistance that the railway was able to function at all. Indeed, even after ten years of service, Chinese advisers were still in the highest positions of policy-making and in positions of influence in the various technical departments. Up until 1982 what was euphemistically termed ‘insufficient management expertise’ had caused the railway to run at a loss (China Daily, April 3, 1989). An upturn in the railway’s fortunes only came about after the rail authorities in Tanzania and Zambia bought new West German rail stock, refitted the Chineseprovided locomotives with new engines and the Chinese basically took over the whole-running of the railway from the Africans. Such a costly and humiliating experience for China no doubt influenced Beijing not to commit itself to such grandiose projects again. China’s legacy in the TanZam railway however remains remembered with gratitude in Africa.

Relations post-Tiananmen Post-1989, China underwent a re-evaluation of its foreign policy vis-à-vis the Superpowers and towards Africa and the developing world as the Tiananmen crackdown resulted in a severe crisis in China’s relations with the West. The Chinese leadership had been surprised by the depth of Western condemnation of Tiananmen Square and responded by an assiduous courting of the Third World. The anti-imperialist and anti-hegemonist rhetoric was revived, and has remained as a rhetorical device in the PRC’s foreign policy. Whilst the events in Tiananmen Square provoked a serious rupture in relations with the West, the Third World’s reaction was far more muted. As one observer noted ‘the events of June 1989… did not affect the PRC’s relations with the Third World as it did with the Western world … What changed [was] the PRC’s attitude towards the Third World countries, which … turned from one of benign neglect to one of renewed emphasis’ (Gu, 1995: 125). Tiananmen in many respects revealed the place of Africa in China’s thinking and the utilitarian attitude Beijing viewed the Third World. As one source revealed: In the past, China’s relations with Western countries have been overheated, giving a cold-shoulder to the Third World countries and old friends (meaning Africa). Judging from the events in this turmoil, it seems that at a critical moment it was still those Third World countries and old friends who gave China the necessary sympathy and support. Therefore from now on China

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 63 will put more efforts in resuming and developing relations with these old friends. (Cheng Ming, October 10, 1989) Isolated by the West, the PRC became introspective for a period and condemned foreign criticism of its domestic policy as ‘hegemonic’ interference in its affairs. Indeed, the Chinese response to post-Tiananmen criticism was largely defiant and uncompromising. As a self-perceived ‘great power’ and with historical baggage continually in mind, Beijing deeply resented the West’s critique of China’s human rights record and the meddling in China’s affairs – resonant of the historical imperialist in Chinese eyes. As one Chinese commentator put it, ‘hostile forces in other countries in the world today are not willing to see the socialist PRC moving towards prosperity and strength and are also determined to overthrow it … this [bears] a striking similarity to … past events’ (Liaowang, October 23, 1989). Deng Xiaoping also melodramatically commented, ‘I am Chinese and familiar with the history of foreign aggression against China. When I heard … Western countries … had decided to impose sanctions on China, my immediate association was [of] 1900 when the allied forces of eight foreign powers invaded China’ (Deng, 1994: 344). As a result, China embarked on a campaign to widen its contacts in the developing world as an attempt to counter and resist the isolation endured at the hands of the West. Since the events of June 1989, a shift in PRC foreign policy orientation and interaction occurred (Yu, 1991: 34). Thus between June 1989 and June 1992, Qian Qichen visited 14 African countries. In addition, numerous developing world dignitaries paid visits to China, with Africa second only to Asia in the number of dignitaries visiting China in the post-Tiananmen era. Such a fact highlights the importance Beijing held Africa as a constituency in garnering potential political support. Mindful of the fact that the West is in fact a minority in international organisations such as the United Nations, courting of developing world nations such as in Southern Africa, would enable the PRC to successfully resist Western ‘hegemonism’, which now took on the role of interfering in China’s domestic affairs. Li Peng’s comments at the Asian-African Law Consultative Committee meeting in Beijing in March 1990 are illuminating on this point and worthy of quoting: [The] new order of international politics means that all countries are equal, and must mutually respect each other … regardless of their differences in political systems and ideology. no country is allowed to impose its will on other countries, seek hegemony in any regions, or pursue power politics to deal with other countries. They are not allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of the developing countries, or pursue power politics in the name of ‘human rights, freedom and democracy’. (Xinhua, March 12, 1990) Whilst it was unclear from exactly whence Li Peng derived these new ‘rules’ of the international system, it was transparent that anti-hegemonism became

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a major theme of China’s foreign policy once again and drove to a certain extent the PRC’s policies in Africa. Whilst the Soviet bloc collapsed, China still conceptualised the world as being threatened by hegemony. As Deng asserted (1994: 318), ‘The world used to be dominated by the Superpowers. Now things have changed. Nonetheless, power politics is escalating, and a few Western developed countries wish to monopolise the world. This is something of which we are very aware.’ China’s policy in Africa thus became two-fold. First political, second economic. Politically, China’s Foreign Minister was sent on a prolonged tour of Southern Africa to consolidate ties (for details of Qian’s trip to each country, see individual chapters. The countries visited were Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique). This trip was of major significance, for it illustrated that Beijing viewed Southern Africa as an important and integral part of China’s anti-hegemonic policy. Qian explained to each African leader ‘about the situation in China following the putting down of the counterrevolutionary rebellion’ and in return these countries expressed ‘understanding’ of the PRC’s actions (Beijing Review, August 28–September 3, 1989). Qian proudly boasted that of 137 countries that had diplomatic ties with the PRC, only 20 had reacted adversely. The conclusion drawn by Qian was that the developing world had, ‘considered it China’s internal affairs and that other countries should not poke their noses into it’ (ibid.). African ‘understanding’ of the PRC government’s position was a major theme of Qian’s trip, as was the desire to assert that it was no business of any other country’s. Qian’s trip was very much part of China’s attempts to shore up African support for its position at a time when Superpower involvement in Africa was on the wane. As one commentator put it bluntly, ‘the tyrants of Tiananmen [stepped] into the African vacuum’ (Crescent International, May 1, 1990). Qian paid particular attention to flattering the Southern African nations, asserting that ‘Southern Africa is rich in natural resources, has hard working people and vast potential for development’ (Beijing Review, December 4-10, 1989). Official Chinese reports listed the support it received for its actions in June 1989 as coming from a number of states in Southern Africa. Qian would no have doubt expressed appreciation at Zambia’s Acting Foreign Minister’s testimony that, ‘after the Beijing incident, some people in the world thought China’s role in the international arena would be weakened. They were wrong’ (Beijing Review, August 28–September 3, 1989). Such statements were music to the ears of Beijing, for maintaining China’s political position in the international system was of paramount importance and was one of the motors which drove China’s Southern African policies. Qian asserted that the Southern African countries had agreed that the events in June 1989 ‘permitt[ed] no foreign interference’, and that as a result of his trip, China would steadfastly support ‘the just struggle of the African countries against hegemony, colonialism and racism’, and continue supporting African economic development (Beijing Review, December 4-10, 1989). As a reward for Beijing’s efforts, Africa was reported as supporting China’s stand against the hegemonic aspirations of Washington, and the OAU’s Secretary General described China as the ‘pillar of strength’ of the Third World (Xinhua, October 22, 1990).

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 65 China maintained the position that in the ‘complicated’ international system, with the dangers of hegemonic ambitions by the perceived now unrivalled US, it was imperative that China and Africa support each other and work together (Xinhua, May 25, 1991). Deng asserted that ‘if the developing countries of the Third World … do not cherish their independence, they will not enjoy that independence for long’ (1994: 321). On a later trip to Africa, which included Namibia, Qian Qichen expanded on this theme asserting that respect for each other’s affairs and non-interference should be the basis of the emerging new international order. Only by China and Africa pursuing these goals ‘hand in hand’ would they succeed (Xinhua, January 24, 1992).

China and Africa’s democratisation Having seen that African nations had rallied around China in its time of need, Beijing began to adopt a posture that was designed to raise its prestige amongst the developing world and, at the same time, continue its anti-hegemonic agenda. Further exemplifying China’s almost complete rejection of Maoism, Beijing argued not for self-development but asserted that Africa’s woes were due to ‘the lack of powerful external and international support’ (Xinhua, October 24, 1994). What Africa needed, China began to posture, was ‘understanding rather than interfering in their internal affairs’ (Xinhua, July 25, 1994). Africa allowed China to expand on its non-interference in domestic affairs agenda, with Beijing criticising the ‘hegemonic’ pressure from the West in the late 1980s/early 1990s for multi-party elections in Africa. As Beijing asserted, the democratic trend, ‘made it much easier for the developed nations to force-feed their former colonies with Western-fashioned values and models, both economic and political’ (Beijing Review, July 27, 1992). At first, China warned African states of the dangers of trying to ‘copy certain fixed models in disregard of the actual conditions in Africa’, which would ‘only serve to aggravate the difficulties there’ (Xinhua, September 4, 1991. China also postured that the call for human rights and democracy was a ploy by the hegemonic West to increase their influence in the Third World. As Deng (1994: 334) asserted, the West ‘talk about human rights, freedom and democracy is only designed to safeguard the interests of the strong, rich countries and which pursue hegemony and practice power politics’. Later, Beijing treated the democratic surge in Africa with bemused caution, calling the process an ‘obsession’ and a ‘temptation’ (Xinhua, July 1, 1992). Ingeniously, China also began to posture that Africa was looking for ‘democracy with African characteristics’ (ibid). However, as Africa’s democratisation began to run out of steam and problems arose, China enthusiastically termed the whole process a ‘disaster’ (Xinhua, December 22, 1994), and proffered the theory that ‘the multi-party politics fuelled social turmoil, ethnic conflicts and civil wars’ (Beijing Review, July 29–August 4, 1996). This was a welcome situation for China as it enabled Beijing to parry external demands for internal reforms and by doing so, gain the support of African nations who had attempted, and failed, to democratise

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their systems. Thus it was of no surprise that China should boast of Kenya that ‘the two countries have supported and co-operated with each other on the human rights issue’ (Xinhua, May 6, 1994). Kenya is of course the target of numerous accusations of systematic human rights abuses. On the economic front, in the post-Tiananmen era China pledged itself to aiding African development and taking a ‘prudent attitude’ towards the establishment of commercial linkages in Africa (China Daily, February 26, 1991). China saw Africa as being an integral part of its policy of opening to the outside world after Tiananmen and pledged to expand its trade with the continent (China Daily, August 14, 1989). In part this may be seen as a reward for African support at the time of Tiananmen. The rather negligible amount of trade between China and Africa prior to Tiananmen may be seen by the fact that it only accounted for 1 per cent of Africa’s total trade and slightly more (1.7 per cent) of China’s total foreign trade (Xinhua, August 21, 1989). Nevertheless, China exhibited a keenness to develop trade links not previously seen, hosting a major China-Africa Seminar on Economic Reform and adjustment in November, 1989, to which Zambia and Zimbabwe sent delegates (Xinhua, November 21, 1989). China also expressed support for the Africa Development Bank, though details of China’s actual commitment were sketchy. Beijing was keen to be seen to be actively involving itself in the region’s development and so attended the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in Zimbabwe in 1993. Speaking at the conference, a Chinese official expressed support for Southern Africa’s economic development and pledged China’s continued involvement in the region (Gu, 1993). In short, the post-Tiananmen era saw China redouble its efforts in Southern Africa and continue its anti-hegemonic posturing as a means by which Beijing could cushion itself against external criticism of its domestic affairs. Thus China was eager to paint the democratic experiment in Africa as a ‘failure’ which had been imposed upon the continent by a hegemonic West. Beijing confirmed its new policy towards the African continent during a visit by President Yang Shangkun to Africa in July 1992. According to Yang, China believed in and would conduct its policies based on: China’s support for Africa to safeguard state sovereignty, national independence, opposition to foreign intervention and the development of their economies; China’s respect for the different political systems and development paths chosen by African countries; China’s support for Africa’s unity and co-operation; China’s support for the OAU; China’s belief that the active participation in the international system by African states as equal members was crucial and that the establishment of a new international economic and political order was of paramount importance; China’s support for economic co-operation with Africa (Renmin Ribao, July 12, 1992). In short, China postured a highly attractive policy towards Africa that was aimed at boosting Chinese prestige on the continent at little actual cost, for much of China’s policy was rhetorical and needed little physical commitment. For example, China was often at the forefront of demanding that other nations increase aid to Africa, or take a more ‘magnanimous’ attitude toward the debt of African countries. In addition, China also attempted to blame the West for Africa’s ills and,

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 67 similar to its own position regarding the past, demanded that the ex-colonial powers ‘rectify’ the situation. Thus, a Chinese press article asserted that, ‘during the colonial days the developed nations plundered the natural resources [of Africa] by predacious means … Therefore … the developed countries should share the responsibilities financially and technically’ (Xinhua, February 27, 1995). Nonetheless, Beijing retained its anti-hegemonic core and designed its foreign policy to resist encroachment by other powers whilst at the same time enhancing China’s own position in Africa. Thus Beijing continued asserting that ‘more attention to the development of the African countries’ was needed and that ‘it is wrong to either ignore the role of Africa or interfere in its internal affairs’ (Xinhua, January 15, 1995). By promoting African development and unity, the PRC aims to strengthen African ability to resist hegemonic development from outside forces and has promoted stability as the paramount aim for Africa before developing the economy and making reforms (Xinhua, January 11, 1994). This remained China’s policy in Southern Africa and was further underscored by Jiang Zemin’s tour of Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali, Namibia and Zimbabwe in May 1996, where Qian Qichen took the opportunity to reassert that ‘the international community should not interfere in the internal affairs of African countries’ (China Daily, May 3, 1996). Paradoxically, as China increasingly integrated itself into the global economy as its modernisation programme gained speed, Beijing was compelled to tentatively play by essentially Western rules (as exemplified by its membership of the World Trade Organisation). Yet equally, China sought to strengthen ties with African countries as a defensive mechanism invariably to be deployed against these very same impulses. This irony reflects the overall tension in Chinese diplomatic policy of pursuing both engagement and a certain distant coolness vis-à-vis the global order, always with an eye to spotting ‘hegemonism’ or ‘interference’ in its internal affairs. This, and the notion that China seeks to ‘restore’ its ‘rightful place’ in world politics by being seen as some sort of leader of the developing world, cannot be overlooked. As part of this, Chinese diplomacy in the late 1990s/early 2000s sought to more and more build up alliances with Africa and other parts of the developing world. This was graphically exemplified by the first Sino-Africa Forum, held in October 2000.

Forum on China-Africa co-operation ministerial conference The Forum met in October 2000 and was attended by nearly 80 ministers from 44 African countries. The meeting essentially had three main objectives. First, the Forum was part of Beijing’s overall strategy to at least rhetorically declare its aim of overhauling the global order and advance China’s traditional hostility to what it sees a ‘hegemony’, in this case the domination of the over-weaning power of the United States. This domination, dressed up as ‘globalisation’, is seen as detrimental to the autonomy and sovereignty of China and, by extension, the developing world. As the then Chinese Premier, Zhu Rongji, said at the Forum, Sino-African ties help ‘build up our capacity against possible risks, which will put us in a better position to participate in economic globalisation and safeguard

68 China and Africa our economic interests and economic security’. They also ‘improve the standing of the developing countries in North-South dialogue so as to facilitate the establishment of a fair and rational new international political and economic order’ (Zhu, 2000). Such a position is based on the belief that ‘when the new international economic order has not been established and countries differ considerably in economic development, the benefits of economic globalisation are not enjoyed in a balanced way’. Consequently, ‘developed countries are benefiting most from economic globalisation; but the large number of developing countries are facing more risks and challenges, and some countries are even endangered by marginalisation’. As a result, according to Minister Shi Guangsheng at the Sino-Africa Forum, the global community should ‘give more considerations to the will and demands of developing countries [including no doubt, China] so as to promote the establishment of a fair and rational new international economic order’. This can be advanced by developing countries building ‘a sense of self-protection’ (People’s Daily, 11 October, 2000). As part of its stated claim to oppose ‘hegemony’, China is intensely suspicious of the West’s promotion of human rights and regards such calls as a Trojan horse through which the West might undermine Beijing. Chinese policy in this regard has then been to more and more cast talk of democracy and human rights (and, occasionally, the environment) as a tool of neo-imperialism. This has fallen on many receptive ears in Africa at the elite level and China is not unaware of this. Indeed, this has been fairly long-standing and China has long ‘managed to piggyback on the Third World’s power of numbers to escape international censure’ (Kim 1994: 137). As part of this, the Forum was a means by which China could advance a position of moral relativism regarding human rights to a mostly sympathetic audience and thus consolidate its standing within Africa and the developing world as a device to resist American domination and hegemony, understood as Washington’s ascendancy in the post-Cold War era. The assertion at the Forum that China and Africa ‘should … enhance their co-operation and consultation in multilateral … organisations in order to safeguard the interests of both’ is a reflection of this concern (People’s Daily, 12 October, 2000). Hence the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (2000) released at the end of the meeting, asserted that ‘countries, that vary from one another in social system, stages of development, historical and cultural background and values, have the right to choose their own approaches and models in promoting and protecting human rights in their own countries’. Going further, the Declaration made the astounding claim that ‘the politicisation of human rights and the imposition of human rights conditionalities’ themselves ‘constitute a violation of human rights’ and that conditionalities for development assistance which are based on good governance and respect for human rights ‘should be vigorously opposed’ (ibid.). All music to the ears of many of the African dictators sat in the hall in Beijing no doubt, and all crafted as a means to promote an ‘alternative’ global order, based on the stance that ‘each country has the right to choose different ways and modes of promoting and protecting human

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 69 rights domestically’ (Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2000a). Of course, such a position grants the elites of each country the arbiters of what are or what are not ‘human rights’ and also, how such rights should be protected (or not, as the case may be). This stance has been advanced by China even though such sentiments run counter to the prevailing belief today that state elites cannot and should not be allowed to hide behind ‘state sovereignty’ to abuse their own citizens. They nevertheless help bolster Beijing’s claim to be the ‘leader’ of the developing world, at least in the eyes of dictatorial elites. The second objective of the Forum was to exhibit both Chinese accomplishments from their Socialist Modernisation programme (thus demonstrating the ‘superiority’ of China’s economic policies), but also to try and encourage African countries to reform (using the Chinese model) as a way of lightening the burden of China’s foreign aid. At the Forum, Beijing, as usual, emphasised that ‘China never attaches any political string to its assistance to Africa or seeks any political privilege in doing so’ (Zhu, 2000). However, then Premier Zhu also talked of the ‘earthshaking changes’ China has achieved since the launching of the ‘reform and opening-up programme’ (ibid.). It was of no surprise that a special aeroplane transported more than 200 senior officials and business representatives from Africa, all who had attended the Forum in Beijing, to Guangdong for discussions on economic ties and to visit China’s economic showcase of reform and modernisation (People’s Daily, 16 October, 2000). Finally, the Forum was certainly part of China’s ongoing strategy to contain and limit Taiwan. China has a number of motives for indulging in this. First, the PRC’s state constitution asserts that it is the legitimate government of all of China, including the island of Taiwan. To allow Taiwan to gain political legitimacy and status as an independent republic or as an ‘alternative’ government of part of China would be an unbearable loss of face for the Beijing leadership and raise questions as to the hold the Communist Party has over the Chinese people. Taiwan is seen as the third unfinished project in the Chinese reunification agenda of the Communist Party that began with Hong Kong’s transfer to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 and was augmented by Macau’s transfer in 1999. To not remain committed to the eventual assumption of sovereignty over Taiwan is at present, unthinkable. This explains why Beijing invited eight African countries that then maintained diplomatic ties with Taiwan to attend the Forum as ‘observers’. However, of the eight (Senegal, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Malawi, Chad, Swaziland, and Sao Tome and Principe), only Liberia and Malawi accepted the invitations. Also, as has been mentioned throughout, China postures an image of itself as being of the developing world, if not its effective leader through the possession of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. This position is aimed at enabling Beijing to project China onto the global stage as a major player in its own right. But, if this image is to be sustained, Beijing feels compelled to maintain an active and visible interest in areas such as Africa, which at times act as a constituency to add political and numerical support to China’s claims. With Taiwan sniping at its heels, China feels propelled to involve itself in the diplomatic tug of war on the continent.

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The outcome of the Forum reflected the increased priority China was placing on Africa at the start of the twenty-first century. As a goodwill gesture, Beijing announced that it would exempt Africa from repaying its US$1.2 billion back to China. A cynic might point out that these debts would not have been repaid anyway, but such actions certainly put Beijing on the moral high ground when calling on the West to do the same with much larger quantities of debt owed to them by Africa. At the Forum, the Chinese also put forward a proposal on furthering Sino-African economic ties, calling for the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the creation of better market access to each other. China also promised to establish special funds and incentives to encourage Chinese enterprises to invest in Africa, reflecting the growing economic imperative underpinning Sino-African linkages (People’s Daily, October 12, 2000).

Sino-African economic interaction As China has become more and more active in the global economy, Chinese companies and corporations have increasingly begun to move offshore and seek markets elsewhere, beyond either the local Chinese market or the immediate Asia-Pacific region. Africa has emerged as one destination of choice. By the end of 2000, Chinese companies had established 499 companies in Africa with a total contractual investment of $990 million, of which $680 million was Chinese capital. As part of Beijing’s encouragement to further develop Sino-African trade since 1995 China has established 11 Investment Development and Trade Promotion Centres in Africa. It can be said that Chinese trade links with Africa have indeed been blooming of late. However, Chinese trade figures need to be treated with caution. The part played by Hong Kong as a transit point for Chinese imports and exports makes bilateral figures very dubious when estimating the significance of other states for Chinese trade: it has been calculated that between 1988 and 1998, over half of all Chinese exports were routed through Hong Kong (Hanson and Feenstra 2001: 2). Besides, foreign invested firms account for just over half of all Chinese trade, i.e. much of Chinese trade is not actually ‘Chinese’ at all, and if domestic Chinese producers who produce under contract for export using foreign components are included, the figure is nearer to 60 per cent (Breslin 2003). In actual fact, the majority of Chinese exports are produced by foreign-funded enterprises, often joint ventures but increasingly wholly foreign owned. Of the actual ‘Chinese’ firms, a number are state owned, but act as if they are independent corporations, whilst an increasing number are under local (provincial, towns, counties, etc.) control. Only the really large corporations might be said to be ‘agents’ of Chinese foreign policy, narrowly understood. It thus remains true that Beijing’s economic interest in Africa is based on three assumptions. First, Beijing seems to believe that the macroeconomic situation in Africa is taking a favourable turn. This analysis is based on the belief that (as the Chinese would no doubt assert), copying China African countries have ‘adopted a set of active measures to push forward the pace of privatisation, open up international trade and reform based on bilateral and multi-lateral trade agreements’.

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 71 As a result, ‘most of the countries have improved macroeconomic situation greatly’ [sic] (Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of Botswana, 2002). Second, Chinese manufacturers (and shopkeepers) believe that the types of goods (household appliances, garments, and other domestic products) which they produce and sell have immense potential in Africa, where the economy is not yet as developed as in Western nations and where the consumers are perceived to be more receptive to the type of inexpensive products that China typically produces. Third, Africa is perceived by both the Chinese government and by Chinese companies to be rich in natural resources, particularly in crude oil, non-ferrous metals and fisheries. Indeed, China’s rapidly developing oil requirements have helped propel Sino-African trade in recent years. In 1993, China became a net importer of oil and oil will be the only feasible primary fuel for the foreseeable future that will be in the position to fulfil China’s growing needs regarding both transportation and industry (Troush 1999). China is projected to rely on imports for 45 per cent of its oil use by 2010. As a result, China has been faithfully developing linkages with oil-rich countries in Africa such as Angola, Nigeria and the Sudan. Analysing this situation, China has since around 1995 began an ‘outwardlooking oil economy’. This is for primarily economic reasons: the average production cost of Middle Eastern oil is still under $2 per barrel, whilst the average production cost of Chinese onshore oil is between $9 and $23 per barrel, depending on the oilfield. As a result, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) were elevated to the status of ministries and located with the State Economic and Trade Commission. The corporations were also granted the task to buy operating rights overseas, and to establish overseas oil exploration. Chinese expansion into oil operations overseas has become obvious. Chinese oil companies now have a presence in places as diverse as Canada, Peru and Sudan. One way by which this policy has been cemented is to use what China refers to as ‘special relationships’. Arms sales are one part of this policy and also help offset costs. Sudan is a particular example. This has been problematic for the African continent. Economic interest in Africa has been manifested through increased amounts of joint ventures, Chinese investment and economic interaction. An emphasis on trade and economic affairs now dominates Sino-African interaction. Between 1989 and 1997 Sino-African trade increased by 431 per cent and trade between China and African nations jumped 39 per cent to £18 billion in the first ten months of 2005 alone. Traditionally, Sino-African trade has been vastly unbalanced in China’s favour, but recently Africa’s exports have begun to pick up (due to oil imports from Africa). In contrast to the past heady days of Maoist ‘solidarity’, China’s economic dealings with most African countries are today based on a cool evaluation of their perceived economic potential, and it is for that reason that Africa can expect a growth in Chinese economic activity in the future. Li Peng’s statement in Ghana that Africa is a ‘continent with great development potential and hope’, underscores the perception that China has an eye on the future economic progress of the

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continent (Agence France Presse (Beijing) 14 September, 1997). Beijing also sees Africa as playing a greater role in future world politics and China seems interested to raise the profile of Africa at forums such as the United Nations Security Council. Such actions are based on the assertion that China and Africa share similar opinions on many major international affairs. At the same time, China has been keen to promote the idea that China should be given privileged access to African markets on the basis of South-South ‘solidarity’ and as a concrete manifestation of a broader counter-hegemonic strategy which China is keen to encourage within Africa. The self-serving nature of this stance is obvious. Certainly, Sino-African trade is lopsided in favour of Chinese exporters who are flooding African markets with cheap household products of limited quality. Such imports into Africa most certainly help China’s trade development but do little to encourage indigenous African manufacturing. Thus the assertion at the Sino-Africa Forum that the Chinese government would ‘encourage’ Chinese enterprises to ‘give preference to African goods in their imports when all other conditions are the same so as to improve the trade balance between China and African countries’ [emphasis added] is a caveat of dubious standing and one that commits Beijing to very little indeed (People’s Daily, 12 October, 2000).

Concluding remarks Whilst the PRC has recognised that Western investment and technological aid is vital for China to maintain its modernisation programme, China has been determined never to be politically isolated by the ‘hegemonic’ West as it was at the time of Tiananmen. With the Soviet Union now no longer, China has felt vulnerable to the hegemonic aspirations of the one remaining Superpower – the USA. A Chinese press article in 1996 made this very clear, and is worth quoting at length: Driven by its hegemonic ambition, the United States has seen the most powerful military build-up in the world … A powerful defence helps ensure America’s impact on world affairs. It reveals the hegemonic ambitions of the United States to interfere in world affairs and expand American interests … Since the end of the Cold War the pursuance of hegemony and power politics has constituted a major factor leading to international disputes and tensions … The country that has been pursuing hegemony and power politics is precisely the US that has been trying to spread the ‘theory of a threat from China’. [But] their attempt to curb the development of socialist China is doomed to fail (China Daily, July 6, 1996) Thus China has assiduously courted linkages with the developing world to counter-balance the perceived threat from a dominating West. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC embarked on an enthusiastic programme of expansion in the African continent as a means by which it hoped to project its image and influence abroad, and boost China’s prestige within the international system.

Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa in the post-Cultural Revolution era 73 By combating Soviet hegemonic ambitions in Southern Africa, China was not only pursuing its anti-hegemonic policy, but also projecting itself as a friend of Africa’s and an ally of the developing world. Such a policy afforded China the opportunity to depict itself as the ‘natural’ leader of a major international bloc (however exaggerated that may have been), and thus boosted the PRC’s standing. Whilst, as it will be seen, Angola proved a disastrous interlude in Sino-Southern African relations, the PRC has managed to retain an influence and presence in Southern Africa out of proportion to its actual physical commitment. By supporting non-interference in domestic affairs, China has been able to secure its own position and at the same time, appeal to African leaders. In addition, China’s emphasis on economic interaction and commercial linkage-building has appealed to Africa and has enabled China to further project itself in the region. This has all been linked to the PRC’s anti-hegemonic posturing for China has been consistently opposed to the development of any position of dominance in Africa (or elsewhere) by any power. As a result, today China maintains its commercial and political links with Southern Africa as a tool by which Beijing hopes to prevent the domination of the region by the West and, by which China may have a reserve pool of friends and sympathisers from which it can draw support within the international system and prevent the isolation it has suffered. A Chinese article made this quite explicit when it said, ‘[The] vast number of Third World countries [will] surely unite with and stand behind China like numerous ‘ants’ keeping the ‘elephant’ from harm’s way’ (Chinafrica, April 1990). In this conceptualisation, the ‘elephant’ of China – a dominant and central figure – is protected by the little countries against outside threat and hegemonism. As a nation attempting to regain its ‘rightful place’ in the international system, Beijing has been acutely aware of the perceived dangers of only one Superpower and the hegemonic threat that this presents to China. Viewing the global situation as increasingly complex and with fierce economic competition and growing nationalism dominating state-to-state interaction, China has asserted a doggedly realist posture that ‘a hierarchy of power … exists within which the more powerful nations dominate the weak’ (Wang, 1994: 29). Thus in an attempt to offset the US and West’s position over China in the international system, China has and will continue to seek improved relations with non-Western powers. Southern Africa, it will be seen from the following case studies, has not been an exception to this general anti-hegemonic foreign policy. Determined to be free of the overt influence of any one power, mindful of past domination by outsiders, and aiming to ‘regain’ its position of eminence in the international system, Beijing has continuously courted Southern Africa and the developing world as a means by which China may project its prestige and influence outside the narrow confines of east Asia, and thus further its claims to that of a ‘great power’. As a result, ‘China’s post-Tiananmen foreign policy has further established the Third World’s importance’, in the overall framework of the PRC’s foreign policy and Southern Africa has played an important role in this (Yu, 1991: 36).

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The following case-by-case examination of China’s anti-hegemonic posturing in Southern Africa and the policies Beijing has pursued in individual countries in the region illustrate the above. No apologies are made for the ‘catalogue’ nature of this approach. By analysing how China has interacted in each state in the region, an overview of China’s policies vis-à-vis Southern Africa may be arrived at and one may examine Beijing’s relations with a particular state – something not possible in a thematically-inspired general survey. In addition, predictions for the future development of Sino-Southern African linkages may be suggested. A preliminary assertion is that it is likely that China will continue to see Southern Africa as a valuable region in which to invest and interact with, and the elites of Southern Africa as a whole will continue to view China as a helpful friend and worthwhile partner. Such a situation thus promotes China’s prestige as an aspiring great power, aids Beijing in its anti-hegemonic posturing and facilitates continued deepening in Sino-African economic exchanges.

4

PRC relations with Angola

Angola had been part of Portugal’s overseas territories for over 400 years by the time the rise of African nationalism started to shake the edifice of the Lusophone empire. An economic boom in the early 1960s, spurred by the exploitation of oil (particularly in the northern Cabinda province), diamond mining and the high price of coffee made the 300,000 White Portuguese settlers in Angola intransigent, compounded by the attitude of the quasi-fascist regime in Lisbon which viewed Angola as an inalienable part of Portugal. Thus the course was set for conflict with Black nationalist organisations bent on freeing Angola from Lisbon’s rule (Marcum, 1969; Wheeler, 1971). Portugal’s war to retain Angola was to be long and bloody, and left the country open to massive outside interference once Lisbon vacated the scene (see Van der Waal, 1993). Angola, however, was in many respects a watershed for the PRC’s policies in Southern Africa and also marked the debut of the Soviet Union as a major power on the continent. Angola proved to be the ultimate testing ground for China’s posturing and the fact that Beijing largely failed this test and emerged with its reputation and prestige severely dented makes the study of China’s involvement in Angola an intriguing one. It was here that the rhetorical nature of Beijing’s antihegemonic Southern African policies clearly emerged, but also Angola came to be seen as an experiment where foreign (non-African) powers tested to what extent they could influence events in Africa (Guelke, 1980). Again, on this score, the PRC largely failed this test.

The liberation movements and China China’s involvement in Angola stretched back to the 1950s in its support for the various liberation organisations in the country. Eventually, China maintained ties with all three major organisations to a lesser or greater extent. The first organisation to be formed was the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) in 1956, after a number of Communist-influenced nationalist groups came together. The MPLA represented the more upwardly mobile population of Angola, the mestiços, assimiliados and White Angolans (assimiliados were Africans who had reached a level deemed by Portuguese authorities to be civilised’. Only one in 100 Black Angolans had reached this arbitrary level by 1960).

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It also found support from the Mbundu population of Luanda and in other urban areas. Led by Agostinho Neto and Marxist in orientation, the MPLA was the best organised of the Angolan movements and had extensive international linkages, particularly with the Soviet bloc (Khazanov, 1986). Military aid from Moscow is believed to date from 1964 after Neto had visited the Soviet Union and secured support: from 1964 to 1974 (i.e. pre-coup), Soviet aid was estimated at £27 million (Hodges, 1976: 176). China had initially followed the MPLA closely, providing arms and some training. However, after an OAU mission recognised the MPLA’s rivals as the legitimate liberation organisation in July 1963, Chinese attention largely shifted away from Neto’s movement. Paradoxically for Chinese ambitions, the MPLA became the most effective organisation fighting Portugal’s rule in Angola (Porter, 1984: 148). However, in a policy that mirrored China’s behaviour towards ZAPU in Rhodesia, China maintained cordial links with the MPLA and this was reciprocated by Neto who expressed ‘friendly respect’ to Mao in a telegram in 1971 (New China News Agency, July 9, 1971). The second major liberation organisation was the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto, which was supported almost exclusively by the rural northern Bakongo ethnic group. The FNLA was strongly backed by Congo-Kinshasa and the FNLA operated bases from that country. The FNLA was perceived as violently anti-White and its leader had led a vicious anti-Portuguese pogrom in 1961 in which nearly 2,000 White civilians were massacred (Marcum, 1969; Mason, 1962). In 1962 Roberto had formed an organisation called Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exilio (GRAE), which was recognised as the government-in-exile of Angola by the OAU. It was from this organisation that Jonas Savimbi split (see below). The FNLA was virulently anti-MPLA and was determined to resist any growth of the more active MPLA in ‘its’ areas. However, unlike the MPLA, the FNLA had remained largely devoid of any ideology and leadership was typically personalised around Roberto. It was also poorly trained and armed, and opportunistic in its seeking of funds, Roberto commenting that ‘we accept help from anyone’ (quoted in African Liberation Reader, vol. 2, 1982: 101). Following the OAU’s recognition of it as the ‘legitimate’ organisation, the PRC took an interest, with Foreign Minister Chen Yi meeting Roberto in Nairobi in December 1963 to discuss Chinese support for the movement (Marcum, 1978: 132). However, because the FNLA were based in the Congo (later Zaïre), which was experiencing a Chinesesupported rebellion, the PRC was refused permission to enter the country in support of the FNLA and as a result contact between Beijing and the FNLA was frozen until 1973. The third Angolan movement was the União Nacional para a Indêpendencia Total de Angola (UNITA) formed in 1966 and led by Jonas Savimbi (see Bridgland, 1986; Wolfers and Bergerad, 1983). UNITA was the main organisation targeted by Beijing for support in the late 1960s. The PRC had been in contact with Savimbi in 1964, after he had led a breakaway from the GRAE. In July Savimbi met both Mao and Zhou Enlai in Beijing and underwent military training in China (Marcum, 1978: 160). In January 1965, Savimbi returned to Beijing

PRC relations with Angola 77 to seek support and armaments and in the next year when UNITA was formalised as a separate liberation organisation cadres were sent to China for training (Sunday Telegraph, February 20, 1977). UNITA became the only organisation mentioned by China in its press reports, and was enthusiastic in its claims to Maoist inspiration (Jackson, 1995: 397). Self-reliance, and people’s war became vocalised by UNITA communiqués and conveyed a genuine national liberation struggle in the style of Savimbi’s mentors. Inspiration was claimed from ‘the creative application of Chairman Mao’s proletarian line’, and UNITA asserted that they were ‘very grateful to the People’s Republic of China and Chairman Mao’ (New China News Agency, July 9, 1971). However, despite meeting Mao in 1967 and discussing future co-operation (Bridgland, 1986: 94), Chinese supplies in this period to the organisation however proved to be disappointing, totalling only £5,000 (Marcum, 1978: 418, n. 380). As a result, Savimbi was to later claim that Beijing’s support amounted to nothing: ‘we were expecting aid from the Chinese [but] it did not come’ (Wolfers and Bergerad, 1983: 210).

Post-Cultural Revolution developments With the end of the Cultural Revolution, China’s need for self-professed radicalist organisations such as UNITA faded as China’s policy-makers no longer required a movement professing devotion to Maoism, however genuine. Thus the main Angolan organisation, the MPLA, re-surfaced in Chinese press statements, albeit alongside UNITA (see for example New China News Agency, February 11, 1971). In July 1971 an MPLA delegation visited Beijing and met Zhou Enlai, and from this date Chinese aid was funnelled through the OAU’s Liberation Committee to the MPLA (New China News Agency, July 24, 1971). The PRC was aiming to broaden its contacts with the liberation movements in Angola, as a means by which it could extend its influence, and cover all eventualities (Spikes, 1993: 74), and so Chinese reports in the pre-coup period gave accounts of both UNITA and MPLA operations (e.g. New China News Agency February 4, 1972). However, the MPLA experienced a grave military and political crisis in late 1973 when the organisation split into three separate and competing factions. One faction, led by Daniel Chipenda, believed that Neto’s close ties with Moscow were precluding the reception of more substantial aid from China. This propelled Moscow to send arms to Chipenda in the belief that Neto’s wing of the MPLA could not hope to counter the growing Chinese-sponsored FNLA with no military wing, which was now led by Chipenda (Valenta, 1978: 9). As mentioned, by 1973 China had moved towards definitely aiding the FNLA. A number of factors came into play to draw the PRC to Roberto’s movement. First, Beijing was keen to balance the influence that Moscow had within the MPLA. Cognisant of the fact that the Soviets had an upper hand in its relationship with Neto’s organisation, China hoped to balance this by supporting the next largest movement, the FNLA. The FNLA was chosen by Beijing to serve this purpose not least because China and the FNLA’s patron, Zaïre, had undergone a remarkable rapprochement in January 1973 following China and Washington’s

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thawing of relations. Such a reconciliation with Zaïre was remarkable in that the Chinese had previously labelled the Zaïrois President Mobuto an American lackey and ‘running dog’. In addition, the fact that a firm friend of China’s in Africa, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, had urged Beijing to support the FNLA probably tipped the balance in favour of Roberto’s movement. Nyerere had been alarmed at the MPLA’s splintering in eastern Angola which had allowed Portugal to move its troops from Angola to Mozambique and thus threatened to stop in its tracks the advancing FRELIMO from consolidating recent victories. Keeping Portuguese troops in Angola and away from Mozambique was imperative and so reconciliation with Zaïre and support for the FNLA was deemed prudent. China was happy to acquiesce and build up linkages with a highly influential African leader in the area and thus in December 1973, Roberto visited China and was promised aid (New China News Agency, December 4, 1973).

Post-Lisbon coup developments, 1974 In April 1974 a military coup d’état overthrew the Portuguese regime in Lisbon. Ever prudent, China quoted responses to the coup from all three liberation movements (see New China News Agency, April 27, 1974). The coup effectively forced all the major world powers to determine their policies towards Angola. Chinese policy rapidly shifted to an all-out attack on the Soviets, as Beijing feared that Moscow would make a move to extend its influence in Angola via the MPLA. As Jackson remarked, both ‘the Chinese and Soviet[s] tried to translate their past support of national liberation in the Portuguese colonies into influence in post-independence governments’ (Jackson, 1995: 414). In May 1974 the first group of 112 Chinese instructors arrived in Zaïre to aid the FNLA (Stockwell, 1979: 67), and in August and early September 1974, a shipment of 450 tons of arms was delivered to the FNLA in Zaïre. In addition, China also supplied UNITA and a rival faction within the MPLA, the latter later joining up with the FNLA (Klinghoffer, 1980: 103). China was confident that the MPLA was fatally weakened by internal splits and so eagerly shipped out a large amount of supplies to consolidate Chinese influence with the FNLA (Bridgland, 1986: 148). In response, however, Moscow began to supply weaponry to Neto’s faction of the MPLA in late 1974, though Chinese supplies at this point outstripped the Soviet’s. It was only later, in 1975, that Moscow began its massive arms shipments. As one commentator asserted, ‘The main factor behind the USSR’s initial decision to back the MPLA in Angola in early 1975 seems to have been a desire to prevent the Chinese from becoming the dominant outside power in Southern Africa’ (Albright, 1978: 34). Within Angola itself, the situation was precarious and Superpower involvement began to increase with the Americans granting the FNLA US$300,000 (Klinghoffer, 1980: 103). Angola at that time was ‘an area open and inviting to outside influences’ (Adelman, 1975: 566) and China’s anti-hegemonic posturing was fully deployed against Soviet machinations in Angola. According to Beijing, Moscow had ‘once again revealed itself to be hostile’ to the national liberation

PRC relations with Angola 79 movements by jockeying for position in post-coup Angola (New China News Agency, September 5, 1974), a crime China was also guilty of. Meanwhile, a number of peace accords had been agreed upon between the liberation movements, culminating in the January 1975 Alvor Agreement which established a transitional coalition agreement prior to elections and independence scheduled for November that year. China strongly supported the peace agreements and OAU efforts to bring the three organisations together, commenting that ‘overcoming difficulties and getting united’ would bring the liberation movements success (People’s Daily, January 22, 1975). Continuing to hedge its bets, China sent three identical letters to all three movements congratulating them on Alvor and warned the leaders to be on their guard ‘against meddling by external forces’ (New China News Agency, January 28, 1975). However, there was little hope for any reconciliation between the three organisations as each deeply distrusted the other and placed their own factional interests first (Minter, 1986: 265). As a result, Angola was shortly to descend into a fratricidal battle for supremacy. Perhaps sensing this, China shipped 93 tons of armaments to Dar-es-Salaam, intending to forward them on to UNITA. However, Nyerere refused to allow them to be processed onwards, and China’s efforts at aiding Savimbi at the time came to naught (James, 1992: 144).

Outbreak of civil war On January 31, 1975 the new transitional government was installed. Prematurely, China congratulated the liberation movements from not falling into the trap set by, ‘the Superpower which calls itself ‘the natural and most reliable ally’ [and who] tried to spread lies and rumours and sow discord to break up the unity of the national liberation movements’ (New China News Agency, February 3, 1975). However, the next day FNLA and MPLA troops were involved in major clashes in the capital, quickly spreading to the rest of Angola (Gunn, 1992). In an attempt at mediation, China invited all three organisations to Beijing between late March and mid-July 1975. UNITA arrived first at the end of March with a delegation led by Samuel Chiwale, General Commander of UNITA (New China News Agency, March 20, 1975). The MPLA, led by Lucio Lara, member of the MPLA’s Political Bureau, arrived at the end of May (New China News Agency, May 30, 1975), whilst the FNLA’s delegation, headed by Hendrik Vaal Neto, a member of the FNLA’s Political Bureau, arrived early July (New China News Agency July 11, 1975). However, even whilst these talks were proceeding, the conflict was rapidly escalating, with Moscow delivering large quantities of arms to the MPLA in March to counter the FNLA’s advances. In response, Beijing charged that Moscow was ‘doing its utmost to sow discord among the three Angolan liberation organisations’ (New China News Agency, September 13, 1975). By July a full-scale civil war was taking place, and the 300,000 strong White community fled the country. China postured the civil war as entirely of the making of Moscow. According to Beijing: [Moscow] disregarded the various agreements concluded among the three Angolan liberation organisations … They deliberately created a split among

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Freshly equipped with Soviet armaments and trained and directed by Cuban advisers, the MPLA managed to evict both the FNLA and UNITA from Luanda by July 1975. As the Zambians commented, Angola had ‘degenerated into a confrontation between the two Superpowers’ (Times of Zambia, July 28, 1975). By August the MPLA had control over 11 of the 15 provincial capitals, prompting the FNLA and UNITA into an uneasy alliance against their Marxist rivals. Alarmed by the MPLA’s success, China attempted to counter by proxy and granted Zaïre permission to supply the FNLA with stocks of Chinese-made weapons it was holding (Valenta, 1978: 14). This led to observers writing of ‘the anti-Soviet, but pro-Chinese’ FNLA (Agence France-Presse, July 19, 1975). However, fearing that the situation in Angola was spiralling out of control, the Chinese military instructors attached to the FNLA withdrew at the end of October (Ebinger, 1976: 689). Commentators have since noted that China’s withdrawal came after possible assurances by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the US would counter any moves by Moscow in Angola (Spikes, 1993: 255). According to Soviet information, the head of the US Mission in Beijing, George Bush, met with top Chinese officials in July 1975 to exchange views on the situation in Angola, and allegedly the PRC and USA agreed to ‘co-ordinate’ their activities in the country (Ignatyev, 1977: 120-121). American military support certainly dramatically increased after mid-1975 when the country erupted into open warfare. Washington quickly moved to pour in amounts of weaponry to both UNITA and the FNLA, in an attempt to stop a MPLA victory or at the least, bolster the two’s bargaining position. In July, US$14 million was allocated to aid the FNLA and UNITA by Washington (Lin, 1990: 3).

South African entry and Chinese withdrawal However, the civil war was radically transformed by the arrival of South African troops in October 1975, who quickly joined in the FNLA/UNITA offensive against the MPLA (Sttenkamp, 1983). This intervention drastically shifted the military balance in favour of UNITA and the FNLA and proved a major setback to the MPLA until the arrival of massive amounts of Soviet weaponry and the intervention of thousands of Cuban troops (Kauppi, 1984: 221-253). The South African intervention though, was extremely embarrassing for Beijing and caused great harm to China’s prestige in the region. As one commentator noted, ‘China [became] aligned with South Africa and the Western capitalist powers against the interests of the MPLA and socialism’ (Klinghoffer, 1980: 103). Pretoria’s involvement had the effect of legitimising the MPLA’s usage of Cuban troops and Soviet weaponry in the eyes of many African observers. Conversely, China was caught out and on the side of the ‘devils’ of apartheid, despite its

PRC relations with Angola 81 claims that the civil war was ‘instigated by Soviet revisionism’ (New China News Agency, October 15, 1975). As a result, Beijing emerged discredited and was forced to witness a Soviet-sponsored MPLA victory. China’s attempt at face-saving by withdrawing from the conflict largely failed, with observers asserting that Angola had been a severe misadventure for China. For example, an Indian correspondent asserted that, ‘the Angolan war has been an unmitigated disaster to Chinese foreign policy, the core of which is confrontation with the Soviet Union … In fact, so far-reaching have been the repercussions of Angola that they affect Chinese diplomacy far beyond Africa’ (Hindustan Times, February 3, 1976). Within Africa itself, the (admittedly pro-Soviet) South African Communist Party commented that ‘It is sad to note once again that China’s wrong foreign policy has landed her in the imperialist camp. To the long list of disastrous adventures … must now be added the shameful history of Chinese backing of the forces opposed to the MPLA’ (African Communist, 1st Quarter, 1976: 3). One could go on quoting adverse reactions to Chinese involvement in Angola from a variety of quarters. Suffice to say, Beijing emerged from Angola with its reputation in Africa severely tarnished and, perhaps equally galling to the PRC, a pro-Moscow organisation secured victory in Angola. Such a victory was a major diplomatic triumph for Moscow, and greatly extended the Soviets influence and prestige in the region. As one commentator noted, ‘Angola provided the Soviets with an opportunity to weaken the influence of their two main rivals – China and the United States – by checking the growth of Chinese influence in Africa, which occurred during the ‘second scramble’, and by preventing the victory of the Chinese and US-backed forces of the FNLA and UNITA’ (Valenta, 1978: 20). China’s anti-hegemonic posturing had been exposed as largely rhetorical, incapable of meaningfully extending to Africa, and the PRC was seen as not being capable of playing any major role in any future conflict between South Africa and its Black neighbours (Wei, 1982: 263). The prevention of Soviet hegemonic ambitions on the continent was also seen as largely outside of China’s remit. Beijing had made an error in Angola and suffered for it. As one Chinese official commented, ‘we made mistakes in Angola … because we simplified the issue [and] reacted blindly, without proper analysis, to the position taken by the Russians’ (cited in Gavshon, 1981: 139). After Angola, China was to become more circumspect in its dealings with other nations in the region. Within the international system, the results of Angola were a disaster for Chinese policies. With the US seemingly ham-strung by events in Vietnam (the North Vietnamese had captured Saigon in April 1975), and their failure to effectively stand up to Soviet machinations in Angola, China’s antihegemonic policy in Southern Africa was in crisis. Only careful and skilful diplomacy in the following years managed to repair the damage caused by Beijing’s involvement in Angola. But, as Jackson noted, Angola had demonstrated that, ‘China was not a Superpower, capable of projecting power beyond Asia; it could become involved in distant disputes only so long as they remained very small in scope. For effective large-scale intervention, China’s leaders looked to the United States’ (Jackson, 1995: 358-359).

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Post-independence relations On November 11, 1975 the People’s Republic of Angola was established by Neto. The MPLA government was quickly recognised by Moscow and its East European allies, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Brazil and the former Portuguese African colonies, who ignored China’s assertions that Angola was about to ‘fall into the Superpower’s snare of disintegration and domination’ (Beijing Domestic Service, November 1, 1975). China attempted to muster support for a call for the immediate departure of ‘mercenaries’, i.e. Cuban and Soviet troops and advisers from Angola, but this call was ignored as indignation at Pretoria’s intervention grew. A rival regime in southern Angola, proclaimed by the FNLA/UNITA, failed to achieve any diplomatic recognition, though it did receive limited support from Washington, Pretoria, Lusaka and Zaïre. Zambia regarded the MPLA government as an example of Moscow urging ‘one wing of the liberation movements to form a government alone to the exclusion of others’ (Times of Zambia, November 8, 1975), though like China could do little practically to thwart this. China, exhibiting its effective withdrawal from the conflict, offered only rhetorical support and refused to recognise the government of either the MPLA or the FNLA/UNITA, criticising the ‘crude interference of the Soviet Union’ in establishing the MPLA regime (Peking Review, November 21, 1975). Meanwhile South Africa pressed on with its advancement into Angola and by December was within 150 miles of Luanda. China characterised South Africa’s incursion as the ‘excuse’ Moscow had been looking for to intervene in Angola (New China News Agency, November 10, 1975). The FNLA meanwhile moved in from the north, bolstered by US arms shipments. However, the intervention of Moscow and Havana, proved the MPLA’s trump card. The US had by December cut off aid to FNLA/UNITA and abandoned Angola, nervous of any repetition of Vietnam’s quagmiring of American foreign policy (Bender, 1987: 125). From October, the Soviets had airlifted a massive quantity of weapons to the beleaguered MPLA and Cuban troops began arriving in substantial numbers – 12,000 by some estimates. Competition with Moscow in Angola was seen as highly dangerous for Washington and so by March 1976 the civil war was over. Pockets of resistance held out until April, but UNITA had already withdrawn to the bush to continue its anti-MPLA struggle from its bases in the south. From that date, UNITA was destined to become a major thorn in the MPLA’s side, but never threatened to topple the regime, and increasingly became embroiled in the Namibian conflict. China largely remained aloof from active involvement from UNITA’s struggle, though it shared Savimbi’s sentiments that Angola was an ‘occupied country’. Only once is China reported to have supplied UNITA: in 1979 when 550 tons of weapons were delivered to the organisation at the instigation of the Americans (James, 1992: 179). Chinese rhetorical duplicity vis-à-vis South Africa and its intense desire to combat Soviet hegemonism, however, was exposed by the news that Beijing had channelled the arms through South Africanheld Namibia (Christian Science Monitor, May 31, 1983). That Beijing should collude with both Washington and Pretoria to aid an organisation fighting against

PRC relations with Angola 83 Soviet influence in Angola, shows the priority that the PRC held for that policy at the time.

Chinese rhetoric versus the soviet presence in Angola On the level of political rhetoric, however, China’s treatment of the postindependent MPLA government was scathing and closely tied to Beijing’s continued anti-hegemonic posturing. Moscow-Luanda ties became strong, with the MPLA and the CPSU signing a 20-year friendship and co-operation treaty in October 1976. Beijing continued to put the blame on the situation in Angola on Moscow, which was characterised as ‘entirely the result of the fierce contention between the two Superpowers, particularly the … part of the Soviet socialimperialists’ (New China News Agency, November 13, 1975). This theme of blaming the civil war in Angola on the Soviets ‘contending for hegemony in Africa’ (New China News Agency, November 25, 1975) and thus sabotaging any chance of a peaceful outcome in the country was developed as the war drew to a close. According to China: differences among the three Angolan liberation movements were … normal and could have been reconciled by them through peaceful consultations … but the Soviets … deliberately created a split … sent in large quantities of arms, supported one organisation alone … and thus single-handedly provoked the civil war in Angola. (New China News Agency, November 15, 1975) Soviet motives for involvement in Angola were conceptualised by China as part of Moscow’s global hegemonic plan and firmly tied to the strategic significance of Southern Africa within the international system and rivalry with Washington for influence. As Beijing said: Angola is a place of great strategic significance. In an attempt to establish its spheres of influence in Southern Africa, the Soviet Union has set its mind on placing Angola under its control and turning it into an important stronghold in its rivalry with the other Superpower over Southern Africa … thereby … strengthening its position of rivalry with the other Superpower for world hegemony. (New China News Agency, November 25, 1975) China angrily denounced the arrival of Soviet troops into Angola in January 1976 asserting that they were to ‘kill the local people’ (New China News Agency, January 14, 1976), and that Soviet involvement in Angola was ‘a component part of its global strategy for contention of world hegemony’ (New China News Agency, January 24, 1976). This deeply worried China who publicly warned that ‘if the Soviet revisionists are allowed to … succeed in their plot, it is hard to avoid the emergence of a second or even third Angola’ (New China News Agency,

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February 4, 1976). This may be seen as a clear message to the United States to ‘do something’ and resist Moscow’s hegemonic ambitions. Concerned at the process of détente between the two powers, China was eager to expose what it termed the ‘détente fraud’ (New China News Agency, February 17, 1976). Such messages again reflected China’s impotence in Southern Africa and its reliance on the United States within the international system to combat Soviet expansionism. China could merely repeat its theme that, ‘a predatory tiger [had] come into Angola from the back door right after the wolf [had been] driven out the from the front door’ (New China News Agency, March 20, 1976).

The Zaïre connection Despite China’s fierce anti-Soviet polemics, the MPLA government itself was not directly criticised, thus leaving the possibilities open for future rapprochement between Beijing and Luanda. China went out of its way to appear neutral towards the MPLA, commenting that ‘all three Angolan liberation movements [had] made contributions’ towards independence (Beijing Domestic Service, November 16, 1975), and never mentioning the organisation when it issued criticism of Moscow’s involvement in the civil war. If this was designed to woo the MPLA, however, it failed for Neto remained bitter towards China for its support for his enemies in the early stages of the war. He was thus happy to concur with the Soviets when he proclaimed that China ‘was no longer a socialist country’ (cited by Henriksen, 1980: 65). China in turn refused to vote in favour of the MPLA government being admitted to the United Nations until there was a ‘fundamental change in the situation in Angola’ (New China News Agency, November 23, 1976) and enthusiastically recorded the activities of the FNLA, UNITA and the Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) in the oil-rich Cabinda enclave, though never mentioning the names of the organisations involved. FLEC was an organisation fighting for independence for the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda, which was separated from Angola proper by a strip of Zaïrois land. FLEC was supported by Zaïre, which had its own designs on the area. This explains China’s reporting of FLEC’s activities. For the reports, see New China News Agency, August 19, 1977. However, openings for reconciliation began to develop as the 1970s drew to an end. Throughout the late 1970s, Sino-Zaïrois relations had remained excellent, particularly after Beijing aided Kinshasa in bolstering its defences against invasions from Angola by Katangese gendarmes in 1977 and 1978 – put down as ‘characteristic of Soviet subversion’ by China (New China News Agency, April 30, 1977). However, with the rout of the second invasion and the then fading of any remaining FNLA activity in northern Angola, Angolan-Zaïrois relations improved and an accord was signed which led to Roberto and his FNLA remnants being expelled from Zaïre in late 1979. This rapprochement between Mobuto and Neto in effect meant that practical obstacles to China’s own reconciliation with Angola were removed, and Beijing began to encourage Neto to develop an independent line vis-à-vis Moscow. Thus Beijing commented on Angola’s attempt to improve its independence ‘by itself’ [author’s italics] (New China News Agency,

PRC relations with Angola 85 December 21, 1978). China appeared close to normalising relations in January 1979 when Luanda agreed to talks on normalisation with Beijing. However, Chinese hopes were dashed, like they were in Mozambique, by China’s invasion of Vietnam and then Moscow’s intervention in Afghanistan – both sticking points for the two countries. Thus Beijing agreed to send aid to UNITA in 1979 as a means by which to keep Soviet strength in Angola diverted and in check (see above). China however did not give up on reconciliation with Angola. In an attempt to undermine Moscow’s hegemony in Angola, China began to play up Luanda’s independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In tactics reminiscent of the radical 1960s, China also attempted to fuel rumours that the Soviets had been responsible somehow for Neto’s death in September 1978 from cancer (New China News Agency, November 25, 1978). Thus in January 1980 Beijing commented that Angola’s government had signed agreements with Western nations and that this was ‘an important step for Angola to free itself from the Soviet hold’ (Xinhua, January 17, 1980). China also gave prominence to remarks from Luanda that ‘the special relations between Angola and the socialist countries do not mean that we belong to a bloc’ and that Angola’s principal trading partners were Western countries (Xinhua, July 28, 1982). With China’s ‘independent foreign policy’ emerging in 1982, outright hostility to Moscow was watered down and a more balanced policy with regard to the Superpowers was pursued. As a consequence, Beijing aimed to decrease tension with Moscow and so the window of opportunity for normal Sino-Angolan relations was opened. This was fortuitous for Beijing, for South Africa’s increased attacks on Angolan territory in search of SWAPO insurgents began to garner widespread sympathy for the MPLA regime, particularly amongst developing world nations. This provided China with a clear-cut opportunity to posture itself as an outraged member of the developing world and once again project itself into the region as an interested party. As a consequence, the PRC came out in explicit support for the ‘Angolan government and people’ (Xinhua, August 30, 1981). Beijing also postured that the MPLA government was not now a Soviet proxy. For instance, China criticised Moscow for making pronouncements on CubanAngolan relations, and asserted that ‘Angola is not a member of the ‘big family’’ [i.e. the Soviet bloc] (Xinhua, February 21, 1982). By encouraging Luanda’s independence, the PRC hoped to subtly undermine Moscow’s position in the country and open up opportunities for China to re-start relations with Angola. These developments came to a head in 1982 when China announced that it was, ‘willing to normalise relations with Angola … At the present we maintain contact with the Angolan government and have suggested normalising relations between the two countries’ (Beijing Review, July 5, 1982).

Diplomatic relations established Angola agreed and Beijing and Luanda recognised each other as from September 27, 1982 (Xinhua, September 27, 1982). However, negotiations for normalisation did not go smoothly as China’s past support for the MPLA’s rivals remained a

86 China and Africa sticking point. For its part, Beijing asserted that it had given assistance to all three organisations but had ceased once independence had been achieved (Xinhua, October 22, 1982). This, and the subsequent failure of China to develop ties with Angola immediately after independence, was subsequently glossed over once normalisation was formalised on January 12, 1983. China’s reconciliation with Angola must be viewed within the wider framework of Beijing’s desire in the early 1980s to strengthen linkages with Africa as a means by which China could project its influence beyond the narrow and limiting confines of the Sino-Soviet-American triangle. Integral to this was a desire to broaden China’s economic linkages with the continent and posture itself as a concerned party in the Southern African milieu. Beijing began to run articles on the economic difficulties faced by Angola (e.g. Xinhua, January 12, 1983), and quickly sent a delegation to investigate the possibility of a trade agreement between China and Angola. As part of this process, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, Gong Dafei, visited Luanda in May 1983 to express ‘China’s desire for closer co-operation with Angola’, a sentiment apparently greeted with some warmth by the Angolan President, Jose Eduardo dos Santos (Xinhua, May 14, 1983). In June 1984 the Angolan Foreign Trade Minister, Ismael Gaspar Martins, visited Beijing to seal the much-discussed trade agreement (Xinhua, June 11, 1984), and China quickly presented Angola with 1,000 tons of wheat as a ‘token of sympathy’ for the drought that was then affecting the country (Xinhua, June 12, 1984). Beijing linked its policy of reconciliation with Angola to the fact that both countries belonged to the developing world and therefore mutual support was crucial. At the same time, China drew attention to Angola’s ‘sagging economy’ and described how outside - particularly Western - nations were attempting to aid Luanda’s recovery. Beijing, it is clear, saw its own developing commercial connections with Angola as part of this international process (Beijing Review, November 5, 1984) and was thus not slow to send an exhibition at the first international trade fair to be held in Angola in November 1984. In addition to the trade agreement, China also began to offer a number of aid packages to Angola, with a view to strengthening ties. In December 1984 a loan agreement to promote trade was initialled (Xinhua, December 11, 1984), and in September 1985, port cargo handling equipment worth 100,000 yuan was donated to Luanda (Xinhua, September 28, 1985). Angola’s willingness to enter into relations with China was influenced by Luanda’s desire to relieve its domestic difficulties and also to reinforce its independent position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (Xinhua, January 17, 1980). This was related to Luanda’s dissatisfaction with Moscow’s protection, and Angola’s economic dependence on markets outside of the Soviet bloc (Steel, 1985). Indeed, Angola had explicitly stated that despite the special relations between Angola and the socialist countries Angola was not a member of any bloc and that Angola highly desired a normalisation of relations with the United States (whilst Washington DC denied Luanda diplomatic recognition, the United States was paradoxically Angola’s largest export market and the biggest investors in Angola were American transnationals). This policy had been pursued as a response to Angolan economic circumstances since at least 1979, despite Soviet warnings

PRC relations with Angola 87 about the ‘dangers’ of dealing with the capitalist West. However, the search for alternative economic partners was given an impetus in late 1981 when it became clear that Angola was going to be denied full membership of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and it became imperative for Luanda to diversify its commercial and political linkages. Thus the agreement on opening up diplomatic relations with Beijing was just as much part of Angolan foreign policy dynamics as it was of China’s.

Chinese rhetoric in support of the MPLA government Whilst China was assiduously courting Angola through a variety of trade agreements and aid packages, Beijing was also active in providing political support to the beleaguered government of dos Santos. In a classic volte face Beijing began overt criticism of Washington’s support of UNITA, which was still waging a costly insurgency against the MPLA. Re-writing history with Orwellian gusto, China proclaimed that, ‘the United States has all along stood on the side of South Africa, in order to repel Soviet and Cuban influence in the region’ (Shijie Zhisihi, May 1, 1986). No mention of China’s role in this affair was made, however. Nor was China’s past support for Savimbi mentioned when China continued its repudiation of UNITA, calling its military campaign ‘a tragedy for the Angolan people’ and drawing attention to Pretoria’s support for the organisation (Beijing Review, November 30–December 6, 1987). Instead, China rather brazenly asserted that ‘UNITA, backed by the United States and South Africa, launched [the] war against the Angolan government’, after independence (Beijing Review, May 16-22, 1988). American interest in Angola was conceptualised within the wider international framework and Washington’s desire to combat Soviet influence in Southern Africa. However, with the thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, China was far more critical of US activities, asserting that American policy of providing aid to UNITA would only serve to ‘intensify the contradictions in Angola’ (Shijie Zhisihi, May 1, 1986). At the same time, in order to project itself as a concerned party in the region, China stepped up its rhetorical condemnation of South African aggression against Angola. calling it a ‘blood crime’ that the world would not forgive (Xinhua, November 24, 1987). At the same time, however, cognisant of the fact that continued war would not serve China’s policies well in Southern Africa, Beijing began encouraging dialogue and also used the lesson of Angola to further its own non-interference agenda by asserting that Angola, ‘proved that the internal affairs of a country cannot be resolved by relying on external forces’ (Renmin Ribao, May 8, 1988).

Visit by Angolan President, 1988 On the political level, Angola’s President Eduardo dos Santos paid a state visit to China in October 1988 (Xinhua, October 20, 1988). That it took five years for dos Santos to agree to visit China indicated that tensions had still existed after diplomatic recognition, despite China’s earnest rhetoric and the playing down of

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past differences. This revision of Angola’s history later went to the lengths of agreeing with the MPLA’s analysis that Cuban troops had merely been sent to Angola ‘to fight against the anti-government UNITA’ (Xinhua, January 11, 1988, a far cry from when these same Cubans were denounced as ‘Soviet mercenaries’. During the visit dos Santos expressed a desire to ‘give a new impetus’ to the relations between Angola and China (Xinhua, October 20, 1988). Interestingly, whilst visiting China dos Santos was lectured on the mistakes of the Chinese Communist Party in waging the class struggle in favour of economic construction. According to Li Peng, ‘this mistake was not rectified until … 1978’ (Xinhua, October 21, 1988). Dos Santos listened appreciatively and informed Li that the MPLA’s main target now was to rectify the finances and economy of Angola, ‘improve our economic leadership, readjust our policies for construction and straighten out our financial affairs’ (Renmin Ribao, October 22, 1988). As a result of the visit, trade between the two countries picked up, and rapidly promoted Angola to being one of China’s most important African trading partner. The promotion of economic construction and a peaceful conclusion to the Angolan civil war so as to allow economic development, were stressed by Beijing during the visit. As Deng Xiaoping told dos Santos, ‘dialogue is better than confrontation, and relaxation is better than tension’ (Xinhua, October 22, 1988). This rhetoric, however, contrasted with reports that dos Santos had discussed with China the possibility of buying Chinese arms to fight UNITA. Whether this was accurate or not, dos Santos left China having signed three treaties on closer co-operation between the two countries (Xinhua, October 22, 1988).

Post-Tiananmen Like many other Southern African states, Angola did not react adversely to June 4, 1989. China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen included Angola on his tour of the region to explain China’s position and was cordially received. The Angolan Minister for External Relations helpfully expressed ‘understanding and support for the resolute actions’ to ‘quell the counter-revolutionary rebellion’ (Xinhua Domestic Service, August 7, 1989). In keeping with China’s focusing on the developing world as a source of friendship to keep out ‘hegemonic’ interference in its domestic affairs, China moved quickly to sign three documents on co-operation with Angola, including a feasibility study of building a party school for the MPLA in Angola (Xinhua, December 23, 1989). The PRC continued this consolidation process by later signing a cultural co-operation agreement (Xinhua, September 8, 1990), and granting Angola US$121 million in credit to buy Chinese-made goods. Beijing officials also met an MPLA delegation in March 1991 to assert that China had the intention to continue ‘wholeheartedly to push the economy forward’ (Xinhua, March 7, 1991). This would have repercussions for SinoAngolan ties as Beijing wished to enhance the economic links between the two countries, and bolster its own position – particularly important to Beijing as the Cold War came to a close and memories of Tiananmen Square continued to affect China’s position within the international system. As one news agency remarked,

PRC relations with Angola 89 ‘China sees itself as leader of the Third World, but is becoming increasingly isolated ideologically after the fall of Communism in Eastern European and African countries’ (Agence France-Presse, June 3, 1991). On the ideological level however, China remained as pragmatic as ever, continuing to encourage economic modernisation and development in Angola and even openly supported the holding of multi-party elections in Angola – though this may be put down to Beijing’s certain knowledge that the MPLA was bound to win. At this time, China attempted to rationalise the MPLA dropping its previous Marxist appellation of Partido do Trabalho (Workers’ Party) by rather bizarrely claiming that the new name ‘reminds the people of the MPLA’s glorious past’ (Xinhua, May 15, 1992). The fact that the name-change was more in-line with the MPLA dropping much of its Marxist pretensions, was tactfully ignored by China who reported, tellingly without comment, that the US President, George Bush, had deemed that Angola was ‘no longer Marxist’ (Xinhua, June 4, 1992). That the MPLA had effectively renounced Marxism to no adverse reaction from China, illustrated the pragmatic nature of Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa and the de-ideologising of China’s external relations under Deng and his successors. Shortly after Angola was declared ‘non-Marxist’, China agreed to help build 600 flats in Luanda and donate US$183,800 to the country to help in re-building (Xinhua, August 3, 1992). Later, an Angolan delegation visited Beijing and concurred with the Chinese statement that ‘both [China and Angola] are facing a common task of developing their economies’ (Xinhua, August 10, 1992). However, as fighting again broke out in Angola, as UNITA refused to recognise the results of the September 1992 elections, China was wary of taking sides and offered little support to Luanda. Wary of involving itself in a seemingly endless imbroglio from which no outside party would emerge with credibility, Beijing showed great reluctance to even comment one way or the other (see for example Xinhua Domestic Service, January 11, 1993). Fearful of external powers involving themselves in an area outside of China’s practical sphere of influence, Beijing merely asserted that ‘no outside forces should be involved in the conflict in the country’ (Xinhua, January 29, 1993), and expressed ‘hope’ that peace could be restored (Xinhua, August 26, 1994). When a peace treaty was signed in November 1994, China rather rhetorically asserted that it would ‘continue to make its efforts for the promotion of peace … in Angola’ (Xinhua, November 21, 1994). China had adopted its anti-hegemonic, non-interference posturing vis-à-vis the situation in Angola, disingenuously ‘informing’ the Angolan Foreign Minister on a visit to China that ‘China has never interfered in the internal affairs of Africa countries’ (Xinhua, March 30, 1994). Warming to the theme of non-interference, Qian Qichen asserted that ‘if big powers really care about Africa, they should not write out a prescription and force Africa to accept it’ (ibid). With China under pressure for its domestic human-rights record, the call of non-interference in internal affairs was one that was repeated to China’s Southern African friends throughout this period – Angola being no exception. As Qian Qichen told the Angolan Vice Foreign Minister whilst in Beijing in mid-1995: ‘Western countries should not use the pretext of human rights to interfere in the

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internal affairs of developing countries. If the Western countries really care about human rights … they should not interfere [but] should offer more support to developing countries’ (Xinhua, June 5, 1995). This theme of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the rallying of developing world support for this stance, for example in Angola, continues (see below). But it is on the economic front that China and Angola continue to build solid ties, particularly in the oil sector. For instance, during a recent visit to Angola, China’s Vice Premier Zeng Peiyang signed a total of nine co-operation agreements with Angola primarily related to the development of Angola’s oil and gas riches. By 2004 Angola had become China’s second largest trading partner in Africa (China Daily, March 7, 2005). In 2004, bilateral trade totalled US$4.9 billion, representing more than a 113 per cent increase from 2003 (ibid.). Chinese companies continue to look for secure oil deliveries and Angola, as sub-Saharan Africa’s second largest oil producer, is central to this policy. Thus during the visit, three oil agreements were signed, with Sonangol, Angola’s state oil company, agreeing a long-term supply of oil to China’s Sinopec oil company. Further, Sonangol and Sinopec are to jointly evaluate an offshore oil bloc-whilst China and Angola are jointly studying proposals for a new oil refinery in Angola. Meanwhile, China has ramped up its provision of aid and soft loans. During the visit Zeng Peiyang agreed to provide Angola with more development aid, providing Angola with approximately US$6.3 million in interest free loans. Yet, the theme of ‘non-interference’, anti-hegemonism and resistance to the developed world is a continuous premise for Sino-African relations, not least with Angola. Importantly, the elites in Luanda (an oppressive, dictatorial regime by any standards) are deeply appreciative of this stance. Consider the fact that Angola’s government, in need of reconstruction funds after the civil war, was in the midst of negotiating a new loan with the International Monetary Fund in 2004. Because of Luanda’s appalling corruption and malgovernance, the IMF was dedicated to including transparency measures to curb corruption and improve economic management. However, as the IMF pressed for agreement, the Angolan government suddenly stopped negotiations. Why? Because Luanda had received a counter-offer of a $2 billion loan from by China’s export-credit agency, Exim Bank. The deal came with very low rates of interest and a generous payback period. But more importantly, none of the IMF’s meddlesome conditionalities regarding corruption or graft are included. Responding to the news, the Angolan Embassy in London asserted that the deal ‘cannot be matched on the current international financial market, which imposes conditions on developing countries that are nearly always unbearable and sometimes even politically unacceptable’. Indeed, ‘It is a well known fact that many developed countries make the support and aid they give conditional on the recurrent issue of transparency. In the case of the agreement recently signed with the Chinese bank, no humiliating conditions were imposed on Angola. The agreement therefore greatly surpasses the contractual framework imposed on the Angolan government by European and traditional markets and opens up a practical means

PRC relations with Angola 91 of sustained and mutually advantageous cooperation with one of the world economies with the highest growth rate’ (Embassy of Angola, ‘Angola-China: An Example of South-South Cooperation’, March 26, 2004). The Angolan Ambassador in China later called Beijing ‘a true friend of Africa’ and crowed that ‘Africa can [now] develop by its own effort with China’s help … without any political conditions’ (Xinhua, January 24, 2006. In other words, the regime in Luanda was flagging up its great satisfaction that an alternative source of resources had been identified that did not demand such irritating things as basic human rights and democracy. However, Douglas Steinberg, Angola country director for the humanitarian NGO, CARE noted that ‘When I hear of this big Chinese loan [I think it] distorts the whole process and gives a lot more flexibility for Angola not to comply with the conditions for other deals … It allows the government to escape … transparency’ (IRIN, February 21, 2005). Global Witness also commented that ‘The long-standing concerns about the lack of fiscal transparency and accountability [by the Angolan government] also extend to the reconstruction process. There has to date been no public scrutiny of either specific reconstruction projects, nor of the procurement process managed by the National Reconstruction Office, including projects selected under the terms of the $2 billion credit line extended to Angola by China’ (ibid.). The big danger is that China’s rapidly developing relationship with Angola will allow the elite in Luanda to continue to be corrupt and ignore governance norms – all in the name of ‘non-interference’ in domestic affairs – a discourse that China assiduously promotes.

Conclusion China’s involvement in Angola in the mid-1970s was in many ways a watershed for Beijing’s policies in Southern Africa. Angola was a testing ground for both the PRC and the USSR. Failure by Moscow to support and obtain victory by the MPLA would have exposed the Soviets to criticism as an ambitious power but lacking the military muscle necessary to back up its words (Metzler, 1978: 76). As it was, it was China which was opened up to extensive criticism after its involvement, for China was shown to be a power incapable of projecting itself physically in the region and having to rely on the ‘imperialist’ United States to pursue Beijing’s agenda, namely, opposition to Moscow. With Beijing exposed on the same side as Pretoria, China hastily pulled out of Angola, but not before extensive criticism of its position. It was thus left to Moscow to present a fait accompli to the world and establish a hegemonic presence in Angola. China’s anti-hegemonic policy was thus shipwrecked on the rocks of Angola’s complicated liberation struggle and subsequent civil war. Having openly supported the MPLA’s rivals in the war, China was naturally viewed with great suspicion by Luanda. It was only after China had readjusted its own policies vis-à-vis Moscow and Luanda itself began to express a sense of independent thinking towards the Soviets that Angola and China were able to embark on rapprochement. Since this process, China has become increasingly

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involved in Angola and sitting on the Security Council, Beijing is a useful ally to have for the war-crippled country. In addition, trade between the two countries has rapidly developed and are focused around the oil industry. Relations are likely to remain on a steady level and only increase in intensity. In short, China is highly likely to further increase its involvement economically in a country in which previously it had suffered a major policy disaster.

5

China’s relations with Mozambique

Like Angola, Mozambique’s ties with Portugal date back 400 years. However, until the late nineteenth century, Portugal’s control of the country was largely confined to the coastal regions and it was only with the general European scramble for Africa that Lisbon sought to extend actual control over the rest of the territory, sparking African resistance that lasted until the 1930s. As in much of Africa, nationalism developed in Mozambique after the Second World War and a number of political parties were formed to express Mozambican anti-colonial sentiment (Munslow, 1983). The Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) was formed in 1962 as an amalgamation of a number of Mozambican nationalist parties (Mondlane, 1969; FRELIMO, 1982). Eduardo Mondlane, a United Nations research officer and associate professor of Syracuse University was FRELIMO’s first president. However, until the death of Mondlane in 1969, FRELIMO was beset by factional arguments as to the direction of the movement, with Mondlane being perceived as moderate and pro-Western (see Arrighi and Saul, 1973). Under Mondlane, FRELIMO undertook a vigorous campaign to achieve international recognition as the representatives of the Mozambican people (Henriksen, 1983: 182-184). As part of this campaign, FRELIMO was keen to avoid becoming involved in the Sino-Soviet ideological split. This resulted in the organisation receiving aid from both Communist powers. FRELIMO was crucially able to largely avoid the squabbles and rivalries that other liberation organisations suffered through siding in the Sino-Soviet argument. Indeed, despite strong pressure from both Moscow and Beijing, the Mozambicans consistently managed to maintain a policy of neutrality towards either Communist power (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 172). This successful policy continued as a bedrock of the FRELIMO government’s foreign policy after independence (Henderson, 1978: 276-286).

Early ties Chinese contacts with FRELIMO stemmed back to 1963 when the organisation’s Secretary for External Relations visited Beijing (New China News Agency, November 25, 1963). The importance the PRC held the growing liberation movement in Mozambique and in Southern Africa in general, was illustrated by the fact

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that the delegation was received by Mao Zedong himself. This reception by Mao followed the recent breach with Moscow, and must be contextualised as such as Sino-Soviet rivalry for the attentions of the various Southern African liberation organisations was beginning to become acute. However, despite FRELIMO remaining largely aloof from such concerns, it received promises of military aid. Indeed, FRELIMO was sufficiently impressed by the Chinese promises of aid that Mondlane visited the PRC shortly after, commenting approvingly of the PRC’s ‘willingness to support the African people’s struggle’ (New China News Agency, November 29, 1963). Also important was Mondlane’s comment that, ‘the historical struggle of the Chinese people had relevance to the present struggle of the people of Africa’ (cited by Henriksen, 1978: 443). Despite this, Mondlane remained wary of China though this period did see FRELIMO and China draw relatively close, with a number of visits to China by guerrillas prior to the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Armed with Chinese-made weapons, FRELIMO officially launched their armed struggle on September 24, 1964.

PRC guerrilla training As with the case of PRC aid to Zimbabwean nationalists, Beijing made efforts to influence the ideological thinking of FRELIMO, as an exercise in aiming to extend Chinese influence and prestige, though it was only with the accession of Samora Machel as leader after Mondlane’s death that FRELIMO moved perceptively towards Beijing’s position. Nonetheless, Chinese training of FRELIMO guerrillas was certainly extensive, though the claim by General De Arriaga, Portuguese Commander-in-Chief in Mozambique until 1973, that 90 per cent of FRELIMO’s troops had been trained by the PRC (Daily Telegraph, September 25, 1972), was no doubt an exaggeration aimed for an alarmed public’s consumption. What is more likely is that FRELIMO cadres were trained in Tanzania by either actual Chinese instructors or PRC-trained Mozambicans. Indeed, one estimate asserted that only 50 Mozambicans received training in China itself, as opposed to the 300 who were instructed in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, FRELIMO like ZANU in Rhodesia adopted a number of Chinese tactics such as self-criticism and Mao’s guerrilla warfare tactics which enabled the organisation to pursue an effective hit-and-run campaign against the Portuguese military, well-suited to Mozambican conditions (Henriksen, 1976: 377-399). Later, Machel was to thank the Chinese for their help, saying: the assistance [China] rendered to the Mozambican people’s war constituted one of the factors of vital significance in our victory … China supplied us with large quantities of arms and other equipment at many decisive junctures, for instance … when we were consolidating our military victory. (New China News Agency, May 25, 1978) In fact, FRELIMO aimed at balancing any overt foreign influence on their movement and was careful not to move too close to either Moscow or Beijing.

China’s relations with Mozambique 95 An example of this was the insistence that any arms transfers to FRELIMO must be registered and supplied via the African Liberation Committee of the OAU. This averted antagonising both Moscow and Western (primarily Scandinavian) backers of FRELIMO, who would have balked at the organisation receiving aid from the stridently radical Chinese. In the event, Chinese arms transfers amounted to only US$1 million compared to the Soviet’s reported US$15 million worth of munitions (Yu, 1980: 176). Although preferring an organisation untainted with ties with Moscow, Beijing had no choice but to continue supporting FRELIMO and continue to exact as much influence as possible whilst in turn combating Moscow’s power. This was because FRELIMO was the only effective fighting liberation organisation in Mozambique, though for a period of time Beijing also supported a rival organisation - Comite Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO).

Beijing and COREMO COREMO was formed in 1965 as a radicalist split from FRELIMO, and almost immediately sought aid and recognition from Beijing (Larkin, 1971: 222). After talks between COREMO’s leader, Paulo Gumane, and the chairman of the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, COREMO received some military aid and began operating from Zambia (ibid: 187-189). The PRC was able to support COREMO without unduly offending FRELIMO because COREMO operated largely in the south of Mozambique whilst FRELIMO was northern-based. This support lasted from 1965 through to 1971 and was indicated by the Beijing press carrying COREMO’s media statements alongside that of FRELIMO’s. Chinese support for COREMO stemmed from Beijing’s desire to combat Soviet influence and its perceived hegemonic manoeuvrings in the region and organisations such as COREMO acted as a useful conduit for opposing Moscow’s activities in the liberation struggle at minimal cost to Beijing. In addition, the radicalisation of the PRC’s position during the Cultural Revolution meant that overt approval and acceptance of Maoism as a guiding principle became a requirement for any liberation organisation to receive aid from China. For small, essentially splittist organisations such as COREMO desperate for international recognition, tacit acceptance of Mao Zedong Thought was a small price to pay, though this did not necessarily mean that the liberation organisation was truly radicalised. However, the PRC also wrote approvingly of FRELIMO’s usage of Maoiststyle guerrilla tactics and paid tribute to military successes enjoyed by the organisation (e.g. Peking Review, November 28, 1969). Beijing recognised that FRELIMO was the prime liberation organisation in Mozambique and though Sino-FRELIMO relations suffered somewhat during the Cultural Revolution, they were never allowed to disappear altogether. Thus as the Cultural Revolution ended, Beijing was in a favourable position to step up support for the organisation. Chinese approval of FRELIMO remained constant and was signalled by coverage in the Beijing press in the post-Cultural Revolution period (e.g. Peking Review, September 29, 1972 and December 1, 1972).

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Post-Cultural Revolution The Cultural Revolution had seen relations between Beijing and FRELIMO go into a state of inertia, with no delegations to China from Mozambique between 1967 and 1970. In addition, 1969 saw the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane. This has variously been attributed to the Portuguese or a clique within FRELIMO with Maoist tendencies. The blame on the Maoist faction rests on the argument that the radical wing of FRELIMO was frustrated at the moderate politics of Mondlane (Cain, 1985: 40). Certainly, as a result of the assassination there was a change in leadership and a swing to the left. The radical Samora Machel became President of FRELIMO and whilst Mondlane had been generally reluctant to accept too much assistance from China, Machel was not and readily accepted PRC aid (Christie, 1988). However, China became increasingly concerned at the Soviet’s activities following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969. With Moscow now perceived as Beijing’s prime enemy, Beijing slowly abandoned the more radical, but largely less effective splinter organisations such as COREMO and instead began concentrating on the cultivation of links with FRELIMO (COREMO was last mentioned in the Chinese press in February 1971. The term ‘patriotic armed forces’ was then used by Beijing – see e.g. New China News Agency, March 6, 1971). In 1971 the new FRELIMO leader, Samora Machel visited Beijing and met Zhou Enlai and a number of top Chinese army officers (Peking Review, September 17, 1971). Interestingly, Machel echoed Beijing’s theme of a common anti-imperialist history, when he commented that, ‘China is a country once subjected to imperialist rule and bullying. Like the Chinese people, the people of Mozambique are compelled to take the road of protracted struggle’ (New China News Agency, August 25, 1971). Following the visit, Sino-FRELIMO ties were considerably strengthened to the extent that a FRELIMO defector was able to later claim that ‘[FRELIMO] is commanded by Communist China, although the Soviet Union … still continues to supply much war material’ (cited in Glantz and El-Khawas, 1975: 215). This, however, was no doubt an over-simplification of the state of affairs, for FRELIMO had the distinction alone in Africa of receiving long-term aid and support from both Communist powers and largely succeeded in transcending the Sino-Soviet squabbles (Henriksen, 1980: 56-75).

Post-1974 coup and Mozambican independence In Portugal, widespread disillusionment at Portugal’s inability to win the wars in their African colonies provoked the April 1974 Forças Armadas officers, Peking Review September 17, 1971, which established a new, anti-colonialist government pledged to withdrawing from Africa (Venter, 1989: 224-272). This resulted in a cease-fire agreement being reached in Mozambique in the September of 1974. FRELIMO was by this point very much the governmentin-waiting and the Chinese recognised this fact with their description of the

China’s relations with Mozambique 97 organisation as the ‘true representatives of the Mozambican people’ (Peking Review, September 13, 1974). Zhou Enlai sent a message of congratulations to FRELIMO, but warned that, ‘neo-colonialism of all colours will look for opportunities to stick in their hands and make trouble’ (New China News Agency, September 15, 1974). This was to be a theme of Beijing’s post-independent ties with Mozambique, with China urgently advising the new government to pay ‘particular attention [to] the hectic manoeuvres of the Soviet[s]’ (Peking Review, September 20, 1974). In February 1975, Samora Machel paid a state visit to China and was warmly greeted by Deng Xiaoping (Peking Review, February 28, 1975). China saw the victory of FRELIMO in Mozambique as a heavy blow to imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism, and as signalling the death-knell of minority rule in the rest of Southern Africa (Peking Review, June 27, 1975). Illustrating the importance Beijing held the developments in Mozambique, Zhou Enlai received Machel in hospital, whilst China committed US$59 million to Mozambique as aid (Moscow by contrast had given only US$3 million) (Yu, 1980: 170). The PRC also rushed to send Chinese doctors to replace the Portuguese who had left en masse upon Mozambican independence after Machel explicitly appealed to China for aid in rebuilding Mozambique (New China News Agency, February 20, 1975). Thus China was theoretically in a strong position in Mozambique. During Machel’s visit Beijing expanded on its anti-hegemonic posturing by explaining to the Mozambicans that, ‘in an attempt to extricate themselves from their crises, [the Superpowers] are intensifying their contention for world hegemony and stepping up their expansion abroad’ (New China News Agency, February 20, 1975). Mozambican officials in fact seemed to concur with Chinese attitudes vis-à-vis Soviet hegemonism and condemned Moscow for requesting military base rights in the country (Legum, 1976: 748). A strong delegation led by the Chinese Communications Minister attended the independence ceremony on June 25, 1975, when the new country was declared the People’s Republic of Mozambique, with the Chinese press claiming that: the glorious birth of the People’s Republic of Mozambique will certainly open up new and extensive vistas for the further strengthening of the friendship between the Chinese and Mozambican peoples and the friendly relations and co-operation between our two countries. (New China News Agency, June 24, 1975) Beijing also took the opportunity of Mozambique’s independence to warn Machel that, ‘hegemonism and neo-colonialism [were] eyeing the Mozambican people’s victory [and] waiting for an opportunity’ (Peking Review, July 4, 1975). For his part, Machel seemed to concur and made explicit FRELIMO’s desire for non-alignment and non-interference in Mozambique. Sino-Mozambican relations seemed strengthened with the signing of an economic and technical agreement in early July, 1975 (New China News Agency, July 3, 1975).

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Loss of influence to the Soviets However, in early 1976 the PRC ambassador was recalled to Beijing and not replaced, and from this point onwards Chinese influence in Mozambique was supplanted by Moscow. The relative decline in Chinese influence may be traced to the fact that the PRC made the costly mistake of backing the FNLA organisation against the victorious MPLA. The MPLA’s leader Neto, and Machel were old comrades and Mozambique had roundly condemned both the FNLA and UNITA. In addition, China’s physical limitations in terms of sophisticated military hardware available for offer to Mozambique was not sufficient for the new state and forced Maputo to turn to Moscow (Abegunrin, 1984: 202). This was a classic example of China’s limitations directly affecting Beijing’s foreign policy in the region and scuppering China’s anti-hegemonic policies. As a result of Beijing being unable to satisfy Mozambique’s needs, China was compelled to witness Moscow gradually gaining a predominant position in the country and further extending the Soviet Union’s influence in the region. Coming after the Angola debacle, the events in post-independent Mozambique marked another low-point in Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa. Indications that Sino-Mozambican ties were not as strong as supposed were illustrated in February 1976 when the Mozambican Minister of Industry and Trade visited Moscow and signed a number of trade agreements with the Soviets. This was followed by Machel paying his first state visit to Moscow in May. During the visit, Machel proclaimed that, ‘the people of Mozambique greatly appreciate the consistent and disinterested aid and the international position of the Soviet Union … We want to establish model relations between the People’s Republic of Mozambique and the Soviet Union’ (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Soviet Union, May 19, 1976). Clearly, Machel had rejected Beijing’s warnings regarding the Soviet’s intentions in Mozambique. Mozambique’s disdain for Chinese activities in Angola were evidenced by the fact that the US$59 million pledged by China in 1975 remained disembursed (Jackson, 1995: 28), and despite robust protestations that the Soviets were ‘stretching their tentacles into Africa in its contention for hegemony’ (New China News Agency, August 19, 1976), Machel chose to ignore Beijing and favour the aid offered by Moscow. Machel made his desire for strengthening Soviet-Mozambique relations explicit when he pledged to make Mozambique ‘the first fully Marxist state in Africa’ (The Times, July 25, 1976). However, speeches at the FRELIMO conference in the next year made it apparent that it was the Soviet model that Machel was aiming for, and not that of Beijing’s. In February 1977 FRELIMO held its Third Congress and called for the application of ‘scientific socialism’. The congress also declared Mozambique as a Marxist-Leninist state, an extension of a process begun during the war of liberation (Ottaway, 1980: 122). This unveiled a moving towards the Soviet model of socialism and, coupled with the steady increase in Soviet and other Warsaw Pact advisers and technicians, indicated that Chinese influence in Mozambique was on the wane. Indeed, China was notably absent from the list of 23 Communist

China’s relations with Mozambique 99 delegations in attendance. The visit to Mozambique by the Soviet President Podgorny and the decision by Machel to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in March 1977, indicated that a discernible shift towards Moscow occurred in early 1977. However, the treaty did acknowledge Soviet sensitivities towards Machel’s desire to remain non-aligned and uninvolved in the Sino-Soviet controversy. Relations between China and Mozambique did, however, slightly thaw in 1977, though largely on the economic level. Mozambique sent a low-level trade delegation to China in July 1977 (New China News Agency, July 4, 1977), and China reciprocated by sending a trade team to the Maputo International Trade Fair in August, 1977. In September the Economic Planning Minister, Marcelinos dos Santos visited Beijing and signed a treaty of economic and technical co-operation (New China News Agency, September 23, 1977). This visit by dos Santos was an attempt by Beijing to heal the breach in relations and as dos Santos put it, ‘strengthen the co-operation between the governments and peoples of the two countries’ (New China News Agency, September 16, 1977). The PRC, smarting from their humiliating involvement in Angola and unable to forcefully project themselves in the region, was merely able to offer rhetorical warnings against the two Superpowers’ contention in the region and urge FRELIMO to ‘carry the struggle against imperialism and hegemonism to the end’ (Peking Review, September 23, 1977). Beijing also attempted to put a brave face on the relatively disappointing level of Sino-Mozambican interaction post-independence, by commenting favourably on Machel’s policy of non-alignment (New China News Agency, September 12, 1977). The thawing in Sino-Mozambican relations was, however, signalled by the return to Maputo of a new Chinese ambassador in November 1977 (New China News Agency, November 29, 1977). More forcefully, the improving political relationship between China and Mozambique was indicated by Machel’s state visit to China in May 1978, who was met at Beijing airport by Hua Guofeng (New China News Agency, May 25, 1978). It seems certain that Beijing felt satisfied with Machel’s pledges of non-alignment and the desire for non-interference in Mozambique’s affairs and so was willing to reconstruct Sino-Mozambican relations on both an economic and a political level. From this, it is clear that Beijing attempted to try to recruit Mozambique into a broad anti-hegemonic front against Soviet machinations, for according to the Chinese, ‘a campaign against hegemonism is rising on the continent [and] Africa has become a forward position against hegemonism’ (New China News Agency, May 25, 1978). However accurate this perception of developments on the continent, China evidently saw its anti-hegemonic policy in the region being best-served by encouraging an independence in spirit amongst African states, Mozambique included. Certainly, Sino-Mozambican relations seemed heading for a new warmth, with Mozambican newspapers praising the legacy of Mao and the Chinese revolution. Indeed, China attempted to build on the goodwill generated by Machel’s reception in China when in January 1979, the PRC Vice-Premier Li Xiannian paid an official visit to Mozambique promising to ‘increase our co-operation’ (Xinhua, January 5, 1979).

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However, the thawing in Sino-Mozambique relations was halted and ties took a second downturn caused by events outside of Africa. Mozambique criticised the PRC for its border war with Vietnam and likened PRC support for Pol Pot in Cambodia to defending African tyrants such as Idi Amin. During his visit the previous May, Machel had publicly expressed concern over the tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia and had urged a peaceful settling of the dispute ‘on the basis of Marxism-Leninism’ (New China News Agency, May 25, 1978). Angered by Chinese actions, Machel officially registered Mozambican displeasure with Beijing’s behaviour at the PRC embassy in Maputo (Isaacman, 1983: 43-44). Later when Maputo refused to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Beijing was incensed by Machel’s posturing. The PRC had hoped that the events in Afghanistan would enable the construction of a broad anti-hegemonic front with states such as Mozambique at the forefront. Instead, Mozambique joined Angola in refusing to criticise Moscow and shortly after, the Chinese ambassador in Maputo was recalled along with a Chinese medical team. Meanwhile, Moscow-Maputo ties strengthened and in January 1980 four Soviet fishing boats were added to the joint Soviet-Mozambican fishing corporation (Xinhua, January 21, 1980). In November Machel visited Moscow and it became clear that Maputo was desirous of joining COMECON. As if to reinforce Maputo’s closeness with the Soviets, in Moscow FRELIMO opened only its second embassy outside of the African continent (the other being in Lisbon). In addition, a number of agreements were signed with Soviet proxies such as Bulgaria and the GDR, all reinforcing the Soviet presence in Mozambique (Xinhua, April 11, 1980). The breakdown in Sino-Mozambican relations in 1979-80 eclipsed that of 1976-77, and though Huang Hua visited Maputo in 1980 on the way to Zimbabwe’s independence celebrations, relations between Mozambique and China remained cool and with little substance. However, China did indicate a willingness to repair the breach, and in August received a Mozambican planning delegation where Huang Hua talked at length with the Mozambican Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano on ‘relations between Mozambique and China’ (Xinhua, April 24, 1980). Interestingly, the Chinese appeared to warn Mozambican about the dangers of over-zealously implementing Marxist practices – a reference perhaps to the planned economy model of Moscow’s. As Vice-Premier Yao Yilin said, ‘we’ve come to know from experience that Marxism must be combined with the concrete practice of one own’s country … the error of left deviation brought grievous harm to us’ (Xinhua, August 8, 1980).

Relations in the 1980s China’s foreign policies changed somewhat in 1982 as Beijing abandoned its violent anti-Soviet posturing for one of equidistance between the two Superpowers as part of its ‘independent foreign policy’. This change in policy coincided with events in Mozambique. Destabilisation by South Africa and the omnipresent disruption by the South African-backed Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) meant that the security of the Mozambique state was

China’s relations with Mozambique 101 under serious threat (see Hall, 1990; Moorcraft, 1987; and Wheeler, 1988). After a disastrous famine in 1983, Soviet aid was seen to be inadequate for the needs of Mozambique and as a result, Machel began a campaign of opening up to outside forces and broadening contacts, particularly with the EEC and China. Thus Mozambican foreign policy began to allow closer co-operation with Beijing in response to the regional situation and the threat posed to Maputo by Pretoria and RENAMO. Whilst China could in no way offer satisfactory military assistance, the broadening of economic and political ties was important for Maputo and at the same time suited the ambitions of Beijing to be seen to be consulted in the region as a player of some weight. Thus in August 1982 Maputo and Beijing signed a trade deal, indicating that a thawing in relations was beginning (Xinhua, August 7, 1982). Later, the Mozambican Foreign Minister, Chissano, stressed that no real breakdown in Sino-Mozambican relations had occurred but that Beijing had had to re-evaluate its internal economic situation before re-deploying aid and co-operation (Isaacman, 1983: 43). According to the deal, Mozambican cotton would be exchanged for chemical products, consumer goods and agricultural equipment. This was in part a recognition by Maputo that Soviet largesse could no longer be relied upon and that alternative sources of aid and assistance were required. Thus the attendance of a PRC delegation at FRELIMO’s Fourth Congress, may be seen as an indicator of the broadening, if not a redirection, of Mozambique’s foreign relations. As a Chinese message to the congress noted, FRELIMO had ‘made readjustments in [its] policies’ (Xinhua, April 28, 1983). Following on from that, China donated US$500,000 to aid victims of a regional drought. In a desire to broaden its developing world contacts and extend its economic markets, China sought out states willing to conduct business with Beijing. Mozambique was one such country. During a visit by Chissano to China in September 1983, the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wu Xueqian, made this quite explicit saying, ‘China is willing to strengthen its economic and technical co-operation with the Third World in a concerted effort to establish a new international economic order’ (Xinhua, September 13, 1983). Two years later, Beijing extended a US$13 million loan without interest to Mozambique. Of this, US$2 million was to buy Chinese consumer goods, whilst US$2 million worth of goods and 2,000 tons of maize were donated (Maputo Radio, July 20, 1984 cited by Summary of World Broadcasts: Far East, July 23, 1984).

Machel’s visit to China, 1984 In March 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati accord whereby FRELIMO agreed not to harbour the ANC and Pretoria committed itself to giving up support for RENAMO (Erasmus, 1984). This accord was seen as a defeat for Moscow as it was an open acknowledgement that the Soviets had failed in its defence of Maputo (Albright, 1985; Kühne, 1985). For its part, China refrained from criticising FRELIMO for dealing with South Africa and carried on nurturing ties with Maputo. The growing links between China and Mozambique

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were symbolised with the visit in July 1983 of Samora Machel and the visit was an indication of Maputo’s desire for a complete normalisation of relations. As Machel said, ‘we wish to maintain permanent co-operation with the People’s Republic’ (Xinhua, July 17, 1984). The Chinese President Li Xiannian spoke approvingly of FRELIMO’s ‘new policies’ and the drive to improve Mozambique’s dire economic situation (ibid.). At a time when the activities of RENAMO was paralysing the economic life of the country, Mozambique was grateful for Chinese help. Machel was no doubt gratified by the decision to further develop economic and technical co-operation and explore the possibilities of exploiting the natural resources of Mozambique in new joint ventures. As he said, his visit was ‘very fruitful’ and ended on a high with an agreement on economic and technical co-operation being signed (Xinhua, July 20, 1984). This was followed up later in the year with a fishing protocol being formalised granting licences to Chinese fishing boats in return for Chinese assistance and materials for developing Mozambique’s fisheries, and in February 1985 China provided US$230,000 worth of farming equipment (Xinhua, February 7, 1985). A Mozambican delegation in June of that year paid a visit to further nurture Sino-Mozambican economic relations.

Post-Machel relations Samora Machel’s death in an aeroplane crash in October 1986 was widely commented on in the Chinese press and Machel was referred to as a ‘respected old friend’ (Xinhua, October 23, 1986). Beijing moved quickly to assure Machel’s successor, Joaquim Chisssano, of its continued support and wish to continue bilateral co-operation (Xinhua, February 2, 1987). This was accepted and in March a delegation arrived specifically to study China’s agricultural reforms and learn from China’s development of small projects (Xinhua, March 10, 1987). The PRC continued to encourage Mozambique’s economic reforms when Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian visited Mozambique on a goodwill visit. As Li Xiannian told visiting Mozambican Prime Minister, Mario Machungo, ‘China’s past experiences and current reform and opening policy can serve as reference for Mozambique’ (Xinhua, November 4, 1987). An agricultural co-operation agreement was signed in April 1988, pledging China to send agronomists and a technical group to Mozambique. Later on, Chissano again visited China and the PRC donated a substantial US$13.5 million credit to be repaid after 20 years and with a 20 year grace period and no interest. China again took the opportunity to advise and encourage Chissano in his economic reform programme and assert that Mozambique’s ‘policies are correct [if] they are conducive to the development of the productive forces’ (Xinhua, May 17, 1988). Indeed, Deng Xiaoping took great effort to remind Chissano that ‘poverty is by no means socialism’ and that one must take ‘a firm grip of [one’s] country’s concrete situation in drawing up … policies’ (Xinhua, May 18, 1988).

China’s relations with Mozambique 103

Post-Tiananmen Mozambique, like most Southern African states, remained aloof from criticism of Beijing following June 1989. Mozambique was one of the countries visited by Qian Qichen during his August 1989 tour and as Xinhua noted, ‘the measures adopted by the Chinese Government in quelling the riot received the foreign leaders understanding and support’ (Xinhua, August 13, 1989). During the visit, Beijing granted US$12 million to construct a new parliament in Maputo, and also signed two agricultural agreements. The theme of domestic stability was continued when Song Ping of the CPC politburo told a visiting Mozambican delegation that ‘a developing country can attain economic growth only in a favourable environment of domestic political stability and unity’ (Xinhua, August 21, 1989). For a country ravaged by internal opposition and sabotage, such words from China would have been understood only too well.

Contemporary relations Following developments elsewhere in the Marxist world, in December 1990 the National Assembly decided to allow multi-party competition and moved away from the one-party state and the Marxist-Leninist model. The country became simply the Republic of Mozambique, and no longer the People’s Republic (see Simpson, 1993: 309-337). With the demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent cutback in aid and assistance, Mozambique realised that it ‘must be prepared to face this harsh reality and to find new paths and new partners’ (Xinhua, February 11, 1991). As a result, China was seen by Mozambique as a natural partner to continue and further develop links with, and so in December 1992 Qian Qichen visited Mozambique and agreed to further develop bilateral ties. At the same time, Qian congratulated Maputo on signing a peace agreement with RENAMO and expressed a hope that this peace would enable Mozambique to enter a new stage of economic development and progress (ibid.). As throughout Africa, China began to earnestly develop economic ties with Mozambique, although the scale is nothing compared to Sino-Angolan links. The possibility of the Chinese government financing the reactivation of the Moatize coal mines, in the western province of Tete province, and resuming construction of the Mocuba textile factory, in the central province of Zambezia, is under way (Mozambique News Agency, April 22, 2004) whilst the volume of bilateral trade between China and Mozambique amounted to US$120 million in 2004, up by 66 per cent, and US$110 million in January through August, 2005. Chinese enterprises have made significant investments in Mozambique, particularly in infrastructure, road construction and fishery (Xinhua, 26 October 2005). However, as in other countries in Southern Africa, concern over Chinese business practices mars some aspects of this relationship. For instance, in December 2005 it was alleged that a timber company owned by Chinese citizens in the northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado was paying its Mozambican workers less than the

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statutory minimum wage. To evade Mozambican labour legislation, the owners of the company ‘produce two wage sheets every month’: On one of these sheets, the one sent to the Provincial Labour Directorate, everything appears to be legal … But the sheets sent to the directorate are phoney, and bear forged signatures … when [a] correspondent went to the company and spoke to the workers, he found that they had not been paid for December, and were unsure whether they would be paid before the end of the year … a second wage sheet, not shown to the Directorate, contains the real wages. (Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique, December 27, 2005) Whilst this is not typical of Chinese business practices in Africa, it does raise concern regarding some customs of investors from Beijing, which are replicated in the region. Relations have remained concentrated around trade and the desire by China to prevent any growth in a global hegemonic power now that Moscow no longer poses a threat. China has continued to help Mozambique in its economic reforms, Jiang Zemin telling the visiting Mozambican Prime Minister Machungo in May 1993 that China was ‘ready to further strengthen co-operation’ (Xinhua, May 6, 1993). In turn, Machungo asserted that, ‘remarkable economic achievements made by China in recent years have set a good example for other developing countries all over the world’ (Xinhua, July 5, 1993). Significantly, Beijing has taken an interest in the peace process in Mozambique, urging international aid for rebuilding the shattered country, donating cash to the Mozambican disaster relief committee (Xinhua, April 15, 1994), and sending a number of observers to supervise the Mozambican multi-party elections in October 1994 (Xinhua, October 20, 1994). Beijing also donated US$25,000 of educational equipment as a goodwill gesture to the newly re-elected government (Xinhua, November 11, 1994). Previously, a Chinese official had met privately with Alfonso Dhlakama, head of RENAMO, to encourage the peace negotiations prior to the elections (Xinhua, March 2, 1994). As a result of the elections, Chinese Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji declared in July 1995 whilst on the Mozambican leg of his seven-nation Southern African tour, that, ‘the realisation of peace … had created favourable conditions for the expansion of economic and trade co-operation between China and Mozambique’ (Xinhua, July 26, 1995). Such rhetoric has continued and it is this economic activity that will likely shape future Sino-Mozambican interaction.

Concluding remarks During the independence struggle, FRELIMO’s aims of eliminating Portuguese colonial rule tied in with both Moscow’s goal of disturbing Western predominance in Africa and Beijing’s policy of combating perceived hegemonic manoeuvrings by the Soviets. The PRC was able to exploit FRELIMO’s desire for international recognition and the need for aid and assistance to involve itself in the liberation struggle in an attempt to thwart Soviet influence over the Mozambican revolutionaries.

China’s relations with Mozambique 105 Whilst FRELIMO was determinedly resistant to any overt demand for loyalty over and above the normal friendly discourse that it was willing to offer to either Moscow or Beijing, this actually coincided with Chinese goals for it meant that there was little chance of Mozambique succumbing to the hegemonic aspirations of Moscow as perceived by China. In essence this meant that during and immediately after the liberation war, China felt relaxed at the state of Sino-Mozambican relations. However, following on from the PRC’s disastrous involvement in Angola and the heavily-criticised invasion of northern Vietnam in 1979, coupled with Maputo’s refusal to condemn Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan, Sino-Mozambican ties slumped to their lowest ebb. It was only with patient work on the part of China that Beijing was able to reconstruct a satisfactory relationship with Maputo and re-engage Mozambique as a friendly state in the region. Sino-Mozambican relations in the 1980s and 1990s have increasingly come to be dominated by economic and commercial matters and China has been an enthusiastic supporter of Mozambique’s own economic reform programme repeatedly proffering China’s own reform experience as a model by which Maputo may learn from. This has been accepted by Mozambique, as has the no-strings attached aid that China has granted to the country on occasions. Mozambique is a country of little strategic use for Beijing now that the Cold War has ended. However, China is as ever determined to prevent the dominance of one country over another in distant regions, as this would necessarily exclude Chinese influence and be a blow to China’s pretensions of a major power. Furthermore, Mozambique affords Beijing a market for its products as well as investment opportunities in areas such as fishing and infrastructure development. The levels of interaction will never be that of China’s role in Angola or South Africa, but Mozambique will continue to fit into China’s Africa policy on a low-level as a means by which Chinese influence and prestige may be extended as well as economic linkages and commitments.

6

Relations between China and Zimbabwe

During the struggles for independence, Beijing’s policy towards Southern Africa was basically opportunistic, and was dependent on China’s perceptions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union’s ambitions. As such, China’s links with the Zimbabwean nationalist movements were tailored more to Beijing’s needs than the liberation organisations per se. Beijing’s involvement, however, did have the positive effect of transforming the tactics and ideology of the main liberation organisation, ZANU. As ‘China’s most important link in southern Africa [was] with ZANU’ (Legum, 1979: 15), whose military wing conducted over 80 per cent of the fighting during the war (Martin and Johnson, 1982: viii), the study of China’s involvement in pre-independent Zimbabwe is thus of particular interest for students of China’s African policy. Equally, developments post-independence reflect the themes that have dominated China’s activities in Southern Africa. And today, China is increasingly active in Zimbabwe, despite – or rather, because of – the ongoing economic and political crisis in that country.

Early ties The nationalist struggle in Rhodesia against the White minority regime began to develop in the post-war period with the revival of the African National Council (ANC) in 1945 (Holderness, 1985). In 1961, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) was formed under Joshua Nkomo (the former president of the ANC) as an expression of African nationalist sentiment against the increasingly reactionary attitudes of the White minority, typified by the victory of the rightwing Rhodesian Front in December 1962 (Bowman, 1973; Meredith, 1980). Almost immediately, the new Rhodesian government banned ZAPU and began to pursue a White supremacist domestic policy (Nehwati, 1969; Palley, 1970). However, within the nationalist movement there was dissatisfaction with Nkomo’s leadership, and so on August 8, 1963 ZANU was formed as a rival organisation, with Ndabaningi Sithole as president, Leopold Takawira as vice-president and Robert Mugabe as secretary-general. Beijing’s association with Zimbabwe stretches back to support for these liberation movements and their ‘just struggle against racial oppression and for national liberation’ (New China News Agency, January 14, 1973). These linkages must be

Relations between China and Zimbabwe 107 put within the context of China’s attempts to build connections in the growing nationalist movements following Beijing’s signalling of interest in Africa at the Bandung Conference of 1955 and, China’s competition for influence with the Soviet Union. At first, African nationalist leadership in Rhodesia was wary of Communism, regarding it as equal to imperialism as a threat to African independence. As Ndabaningi Sithole (the African nationalist who was to lead the split from ZAPU and form ZANU in August 1963) wrote in 1959, ‘Communists promise to give subject peoples freedom and independence, but it is equally true that communism aims at world domination, and this also means African subjugation’ (Sithole, 1959: 142). However, by 1961 Sithole had apparently warmed to Beijing’s overtures, meeting the New China News Agency’s representative in Moshi, Tanzania (Deacon, 1974: 454) and later visiting China. Such a turnaround must be explained. The West was seen as sympathetic to the White Rhodesians, particularly Britain and its attitude towards their own ‘kith and kin’. China by contrast offered assistance and filled in the niche left open by the West. As Sithole (1959: 187) said, ‘help has been accepted from time to time to affect the liberation of the African continent … What is material … is that it is a ‘helping hand’. Beijing also wooed ZAPU prior to the split in the nationalist ranks. In March 1963, ZAPU’s Alfred Gondo visited Beijing, and in August the Cairo representative of ZAPU paid a visit (Day, 1967: 102). However, once ZANU was formed members of the organisation were almost immediately dispatched to China to receive guerrilla training – the first group of five leaving on September 22, 1963 (Martin and Johnson, 1981: 11). In addition, ZANU cadres were trained in Ghana by Chinese instructors (Day, 1967: 107).

Combating of Soviet influence Why Beijing should chose to quickly support a split in the ranks of the nationalists in Rhodesia is explicable in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict. According to Nkomo (1984: 82), he was in contact with Moscow as early as 1958, i.e. prior even to the formation of ZAPU. Nkomo’s relationship with the Soviets was therefore well established before the emergence of its rival ZANU. In 1961 Nkomo had visited Moscow (ibid.: 103), and by the early 1960s ZAPU cadres were being trained in the Soviet Union. Thus though China did not rule out aiding ZAPU (despite its Soviet relationship), ZANU – a new organisation ‘pure’ of Soviet influence – was an attractive target for Beijing’s support. The ZANU-ZAPU split largely coincided with the Sino-Soviet split and Beijing’s increasingly hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union. Thus support for ZANU was a vehicle by which Beijing’s anti-Sovietism could be pursued in Africa. Beijing’s military and political training of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU, was in the context of Lin Biao’s thesis (1965) on People’s War which saw revolutionary prospects stemming from the capture of the literal and metaphorical ‘countryside’ (the Third World) prior to the capture of the ‘cities’ (the capitalist and ‘social-imperialist’ world).

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Thus support for revolutionaries in Rhodesia was part of China’s overall antiSuperpower – specifically anti-Soviet – revolutionary agenda. Moscow, according to Beijing, was involved in southern Africa because it coveted ‘the rich resources there and [wanted] to seize control of the supply line to Europe from the Indian Ocean round the Cape of Good Hope’ (Peking Review, January 6, 1978). China feared such hegemonic aspirations of the Soviet Union as it would have increased the power and influence of the ‘new tsars’ – something Beijing was keen to prevent. It therefore became imperative for Beijing to support struggles in Africa that would resist this (Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement, 1965: 13). China’s policy of supporting ‘splittist’ organisations against the established (invariably pro-Soviet) liberation movements was thus an integral part of this policy.

Military training and arms supplies As the number of ZANU recruits increased, only selected guerrillas were sent to China to be trained as instructors. These instructors then trained recruits at ZANLA camps in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. The actual length of training in the PRC fluctuated between six and nine months, and was typically conducted at Nanking Military Academy (Raeburn, 1986: 39-46). China also supplied ZANLA with armaments. According to Sithole, ‘ZANU [got] a lot of assistance from China in way of arms and so on since 1966’ (Communist Support for the Patriotic Front, 1978: 4). Although no figures are available to quantify the amounts, a Rhodesian document estimated that 25 per cent of all ZANLA weapons were Chinese (ibid.). Certainly, all the arms utilised by ZANLA were in origin (ibid.: 5), although North Korea, Romania, and Yugoslavia also gave substantial quantities (ibid.: 6-7). Weapons of Soviet manufacture reached ZANU via the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity, and also from ZANU’s allies in Mozambique, FRELIMO. Soviet-made weaponry was also supplied by states such as Egypt and Ethiopia. Mugabe later mentioned ‘hundreds of tons of military equipment’ from Beijing and ‘valuable technical assistance’ (Renmin Ribao, May 14, 1981). However, what is certain is that Chinese arms supplies were never enough to satisfy ZANLA’s demands and this shortfall increased after the accession of Deng Xiaoping – at the very moment when the liberation war was intensifying. With Deng utilising the United States as a ‘security umbrella’ against the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, there was a palpable neglect of the developing world by Beijing. This and the demands of Beijing’s nascent modernisation programme combined to restrict China’s policies in the region. At the time this led some observers to question whether ZANU would turn towards the Soviet Union for arms and support (e.g. Africa Confidential 19, no. 24, December 1, 1978: 1). However, fortuitously for Beijing the liberation struggle was by this time very much in its closing chapter, and so the window of opportunity afforded by China’s ‘neglect’ was never sufficiently open enough to allow exploitation by the Soviets. The involvement of China with ZANU had, however, a profound effect on the course of the liberation war in Rhodesia. First, Chinese support enabled ZANU

Relations between China and Zimbabwe 109 to develop from a struggling nascent splinter organisation into the foremost movement in the liberation struggle and second, ZANLA’s military tactics underwent a transformation from conventional military tactics, to the Maoist model of mass mobilisation of the population. This cardinal principle of Maoist military thought was rigidly adhered to by ZANLA throughout the Second Chimurenga. This gave ZANU a far firmer base in the Rhodesian countryside and a stronger support than their political rivals ZAPU. The process was gradual and was masterminded by the commander of ZANLA, Josiah Tongogara who, after his training in China, emphasised ‘guerrilla warfare and specialised mass mobilisation’ (Martin and Johnson, 1981: 81). The key moments for ZANU deciding to adopt Chinese tactics came after the failure of a number of attempted incursions into Rhodesian territory by both ZANU and ZAPU. In 1966, 21 ZANLA guerrillas had reached Sinoia in northern Rhodesia but were intercepted and attacked by the Rhodesian security forces (ibid.: 10-12), and 1967 saw the attempted incursion of 90 guerrillas by ZAPU and the South African National Congress (Ellert, 1993: 25-28). In the first large-scale operation of the war, 47 of the guerrillas were killed by the Rhodesian security forces. ZANU was highly critical of this action (Zimbabwe News, September 30, 1967). A year later, two more large-scale joint ZAPU/ANC guerrilla groups attempted further infiltration of Rhodesia with once again disastrous results (Coker, 1983). ZANU regarded the alliance of the two Soviet-patronised liberation organisations – the ANC and ZAPU – as a tactical error which had enabled ‘Smith and Vorster to unite and concentrate their forces to slaughter Zimbabweans’ (Zimbabwe News, September 30, 1967). The failure of conventional commando-style operations and the involvement of South African forces on Rhodesian soil encouraged ZANU to thus revamp its total strategy, drawing heavily on the training provided by Beijing. As Herbert Chitepo – at the time national chairman of ZANU – said, ZANU ‘tried to correct [ZAPU’s errors] by politicising and mobilising the people before mounting any attacks … After politicising our people, it became easier for them to co-operate with us and identify with our programme and objective’ (Zimbabwe News, November 9, 1973). Although ZAPU pledged to similarly adopt guerrilla tactics, it is clear that their military modus operandi never substantially changed from conventional warfare (Martin and Johnson, 1981: 13). As Nkomo himself admitted, ZAPU ‘had tank crews, and even the complete flying and maintenance staff for a squadron of combat aircraft’ (Nkomo, 1984: 178). Hardly the stuff of a guerrilla army. According to Ken Flower, the head of Rhodesian intelligence, Salisbury was aware in 1969 of the arrival of Chinese instructors at a training camp in Tanzania and that ZANLA’s tactics were undergoing rapid change towards Maoist-style mass mobilisation (Flower, 1987). As Mugabe later confirmed, ‘there was a complete revision of our manner of carrying out the armed struggle. We … realise[d] that the armed struggle must be based on the support of the people’ (Mugabe, et al., 1978: 56). ZANU’s new tactics contrasted with the more conventional warfare pursued by the Soviet-backed ZAPU and this had necessitated a re-adjustment of tactics by the Rhodesian military towards the two respective organisations

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(Reid-Daly, 1983: 227). The ZANLA commander Rex Nhongo (Nhongo became commander of ZANLA upon Tongogara’s death in December 1979), who had originally trained in the Soviet Union whilst with ZAPU, said ‘in the Soviet Union they had told us that the decisive factor of the war is the weapons … Chinese instructors [said] that the decisive factor was the people. This was a contradiction’ (cited in Martin and Johnson, 1981: 88). A ZANLA political commissar went further and echoing Mao stated that ‘politics came before the gun with the masses’ (Comrade Zeppelin, ZANLA political commissar, quoted in Frederikse, 1982: 43). ZANLA guerrillas, trained in Tanzania under Chinese-tutored instructors, thus pursued Maoist tactics during the war of liberation (see Zimbabwe News, December 1974). Even ZANLA’s code of conduct for fighters in the field was adopted wholesale from Mao, as quoted in the Chimurenga song ‘Nzira dzemasoja, dzokuzvibata nadzo’ (‘Code of conduct for soldiers’) cited in Frederikse, 1982: 212). The importance that ZANLA attached to these new guerrilla tactics was underscored when Tongogara reportedly attempted to organise 400 ZANLA guerrillas to be sent to Vietnam to be trained in Maoist-style tactics by the Vietcong (Communist Support for the Patriotic Front, 1978: 7). Tongogara was particularly enamoured of Chinese military tactics for their flexibility and applicability to the conditions in Rhodesia. As he noted, ‘the Chinese usually [said]: ‘Well, we’ve taught you what we know. Now its up to you to go back and apply what you have learned to your own conditions’’’ (cited in Burchett, 1978: 209).

Radicalisation of ZANU One important side-effect of ZANU’s patronisation by China in the early 1970s was that the ZANU and ZANLA rank-and-file became increasingly radicalised and, to the benefit of China, pro-Beijing in sentiment (see Attitudes of the Patriotic Front, 1977). Through frequent contact with Chinese instructors or Beijing-trained tutors, ZANLA’s cadres increasingly adopted a radical socialist credo. The outcome of this radicalisation process was the declaration by ZANU in 1975 that ‘ZANU is guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism. It aims at achieving a socialist revolution’ (ZANU, 1975: 14). When ZANLA guerrillas were killed or captured, Maoist political tracts originating from China were frequently found on their persons (see for example Rhodesia Herald, May 6, 1966), whilst the writings of Marx, Lenin and Mao were continually analysed by the guerrillas with reference to the situation in Rhodesia (Martin and Johnson, 1981: 81). Mugabe described himself as a ‘Marxist of Maoist thought’ (Zimbabwe News, June 5, 1977), and the Rhodesian government saw him as being ‘committed to a Marxist system prevailing in Rhodesia’ (Communist Support for the Patriotic Front, 1978: 3). A ZANU recruit trained in China illustrated the radicalism of many ZANLA cadres when he said, ‘I want a revolution, not just a nationalist armed struggle. I am a Maoist’. He went on to criticise nationalists who simply wanted to ‘take over Parliament and [permit] the whites … to run the economy as usual’ (quoted in Guardian April 8, 1968). This was an indication of the internal contradictions within the liberation movement

Relations between China and Zimbabwe 111 between the radical peasant and working-class cadres and the more ‘pragmatic’ leadership. This dichotomy was to cause problems in the future within ZANU, but also allowed the post-Mao leadership in China to exploit and nurture its linkages with the nationalist elite. The Rhodesians contrasted Mugabe’s supposed radicalism with that of Nkomo, who was ‘seen as a pragmatist who has travelled widely and [seen] the deficiencies of a Marxist system’ (Guardian April 8, 1968). Indeed, the Salisbury government was always very eager to cast Mugabe as an immoderate Maoist with extremism tendencies. However, this was to prove not the case. Indeed, the wholesale radicalisation of ZANU through its involvement with Beijing has to be questioned. Just how genuine was this radicalism? Some observers claim that the leadership of the liberation struggle was in the control of a petty-bourgeois class whose interests inevitably dictated a dilution of any practical implementation of socialism (Astrow, 1983). This leadership’s aspirations – although cloaked in the mantle of Marxism – were always different from the socialist rhetoric displayed during the Chimurenga. It has been argued that ZANU’s political programme came to reflect the interests of this educated petty bourgeoisie, the business sector and the rich peasantry and not the workers and poor peasantry who provided the bulk of the fighting ranks. The leadership’s ambitions were therefore for political not social change in an independent Zimbabwe (Phimister, 1983: 13). Whilst it is true that Mugabe frequently publicly proclaimed his radicalism, he also frequently added a caveat to his socialism. For example, in 1976 he claimed ‘we are Marxist-Leninists’ but qualified this by adding that ‘our own respective customs and the economic situation which has been established by the settlers’ were also crucially important (quoted in Smith and Simpson, 1981: 94). Mugabe’s commitment to Marxism was therefore always doubtful and anchored to a pragmatic understanding of the country’s material conditions. Such pragmatism meant that Zimbabwe’s economic development would always be capitalist, not socialist upon independence. It may be speculated that Mugabe’s more radical comments were made to soothe leftist elements within ZANU – something which was a constant problem for Mugabe in the early years of independence as much of the rank-and-file liberation fighters retained an enduring emotional attraction to the socialist ideals embodied in the liberation struggle. This subsequently led to a disillusionment with Mugabe’s government after 1980. During night-long meetings with the peasantry (pungwes), not only Maoistinspired theory, however, was discussed. The political message was interwoven with matters that the peasantry could identify with from experience, such as the usurpation of the land, institutionalised racism and the disruption to normal working life caused by the Rhodesian regime. These were termed ‘national grievances’ (Lan, 1985: 127-128). In addition, ZANU placed the struggle within a nationalist historical context and the contemporary liberation war was conceptualised as an ongoing continuation of the First Chimurenga of 1896-97. Thus during the liberation struggle, ZANU propagated a mixed populist/Maoist message. African nationalism as defined by hostility to the White settler regime – but not supposedly

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Whites per se – with traditional beliefs tinged with a Marxist critique of the situation (Raeburn, 1986: 152), was the rallying call for ZANU’s cadres in the field and was the message spread amongst the peasantry. This was similar to the nature of FRELIMO of Mozambique’s strategy. As one commentary noted, ‘ZANLA’s doctrine was dominated by Chinese theory and FRELIMO practice’ (Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 1982: 78).

Sino-Soviet competition and its implications for the liberation struggle ZANU’s relations with Moscow-backed FRELIMO in Mozambique – though ultimately extremely close – had initially been hampered by the Sino-Soviet dispute. This political factor in the liberation struggle in Rhodesia is worthy of some analysis. Having adopted a new tactical agenda, ZANU’s next hurdle was to develop a process of infiltration into Rhodesia. Infiltration of its guerrillas through Zambia would have been ideal for ZANU. However, Lusaka and ZANU enjoyed a strained relationship as Kaunda patronised ZAPU. This was a serious constraint on ZANU’s combat effectiveness and ability to implement its planned campaign of mass mobilisation. ZANU saw an opportunity to get around this problem when FRELIMO established zones of occupation free of Portuguese influence in Tete province, bordering northeastern Rhodesia. In 1969 ZANU requested permission to use Tete as a staging post to infiltrate Rhodesia. However, initially, ZANU met with a cool reception from FRELIMO. This sprung from two factors, linked to the wider Sino-Soviet enmity. First, FRELIMO had had relations with the Moscowbacked ZAPU over a long period of time, and second, FRELIMO itself was financed and supported primarily by the Soviets - including much military materials. As part of the ‘authentics’ (as Soviet-backed liberation organisations were termed), FRELIMO was initially reluctant to be seen to aid what was regarded as a rival organisation to ZAPU. Indeed, ZAPU had successfully blocked ZANU’s application for membership in the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation in 1967 by labelling ZANU as ‘pro-Beijing extremists’ (Gibson, 1972: 177). Although FRELIMO enjoyed a stable relationship with Beijing, it would have been unacceptable to Moscow for FRELIMO to readily court a Chinese-backed organisation without first exhausting the options provided by ZAPU. Consequently, FRELIMO offered ZAPU first refusal to exploit the Tete area. ZAPU however was unable to accept FRELIMO’s offer as its conventional tactics were ill-suited to surreptitious infiltration – ZAPU had not attempted to mobilise the populace as ZANU had done (Smiley, 1980: 1064). FRELIMO therefore opted to allow an eager ZANU a chance at infiltration from Tete. This move allowed ZANU to witness mass mobilisation as practised by FRELIMO in action. This reaffirmed ZANU’s belief in the Maoist guerrilla model and thus later led to the Rhodesians claiming that ‘the Chinese masterminded ZANU infiltration’ (Time and Tide, June 1974). The Rhodesians also attempted to exploit Sino-Soviet differences in order to split the liberation movement. The theory of the Three Worlds had asserted the inevitability of contradictions between the Soviets and the United States.

Relations between China and Zimbabwe 113 The Rhodesian Minister for Foreign Affairs thus disingenuously denied that Beijing was involved in subverting the Salisbury government and went on to claim that China was ‘the best ally that the Western world could have at the moment … Because China is as concerned and frightened of Russia as anybody in the West’ (quoted in Canberra Times, June 10, 1976). Such statements were designed to cast doubt on the credibility of Beijing’s support for the liberation struggle and at the same time raise the spectre of Soviet expansionism in Africa. In essence, Salisbury was attempting to enlist the help of both the capitalist powers and China in the fight against Moscow, who were seen as the prime supporters of subversion against Salisbury. The error in this analysis was two-fold. First, it was Beijing not Moscow who were aiding the most active (and to Salisbury, dangerous) liberation organisation (i.e. ZANU) and second, that China saw support for ZANU as the most effective tool in combating Soviet hegemonism. The strongest force to combat hegemony according to Beijing could be found in the Third World. The concept that China would somehow abandon support for ZANU and the liberation struggle and side with the capitalist powers in order to combat Moscow’s ‘expansionist’ tendencies represents a great misunderstanding of Beijing’s policy towards Rhodesia – by no less a person than the Rhodesian Foreign Minister. Although Mugabe did pragmatically approach Moscow for aid, the Soviets and their allies turned ZANU down on a number of occasions (Daily Telegraph, June 24, 1977). Even at the end of the liberation struggle the East Germans were advising ZANU that it was regarded as a ‘splinter group’ and should rejoin ZAPU forthwith (Martin and Johnson, 1981: 266). This fundamental misreading of the situation by Moscow and its surrogates encouraged ZANU to take an overtly hostile stance towards the Soviets and ZANU’s anti-Soviet attitude intruded into the already fraught relationship between the two rival liberation organisations. In 1976 ZANLA trainees, aided by their Chinese instructors, attacked ZAPU cadres at a training centre in Tanzania (Daily Telegraph, August 23, 1976). Such animosity served Beijing well and the Soviet’s exclusionist policy may, in the light of history, be seen to be negative and counter-productive to Moscow’s cause. For instance, as a result of Soviet antipathy towards the organisation, ZANU frequently targeted Moscow’s African policy for criticism and conversely, praised China. For example, whilst on a visit to Beijing, Mugabe remarked that nationalists faced a menace from both the West and Moscow, but that Moscow was ‘more insidious and dangerous’. Nevertheless, ‘the people of Zimbabwe … are bold enough and ideologically prepared to deal with them’ (New China News Agency, July 1, 1977). Mugabe also accused the Soviets of rendering aid, ‘out of the ulterior motive of grabbing spheres of influence, contending for hegemony and fostering puppets’ (ibid.). This was perfectly in line with Beijing’s anti-Soviet, anti-hegemonic aspirations. It would be true to say that the support Beijing gave to ZANU in the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe was important in that it provided the inspiration and ability for a change in military tactics, after the disastrous start to the liberation campaign in the 1960s. This enabled ZANU to successfully prosecute the war of liberation. Combined with other factors such as the collapse of Portuguese Africa and the withdrawal of support by South Africa, Beijing’s aid to ZANU may be

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seen as a contributing ingredient to ZANU’s ultimate victory in 1980. Whilst the motives for such support were heavily tied to China’s opposition to Soviet hegemony in the region, the change of tactics by ZANU – inspired by Chinese training – was a major turnaround for the success of the Chimurenga. Whilst the attendant radicalisation of ZANU, much feared at the time, may be seen to have been an aberration and not long lasting, Maoist ideology mixed with African attitudes proved to be a potent and successful source of inspiration for the peasantry and liberation fighters. However, it was the real prospect of military success that provided the attraction of Maoism, and not an intrinsic applicability per se. This in part explains the temporary nature of ZANU’s radicalism, i.e. once the war had been won, the value of Maoism for the Zimbabwean leadership radically declined. Beijing’s involvement in the liberation struggle, however, introduced the Sino-Soviet conflict into the Rhodesian war and this frequently impinged on the liberation effort. At times this threatened to hamper the successful prosecution of the war. This in fact characterised much of China’s involvement in southern Africa in the 1970s, and was graphically illustrated in the disastrous Angolan civil war (see Chapter 4). Such policy errors seriously damaged China’s credibility in the developing world. In addition, as Deng Xiaoping’s modernisation programme got underway, there was a definite tailing off of interest in continued support for the liberation struggle. This could have been potentially disastrous as the Sino-Soviet rivalry made Moscow disdainful of support for ZANU and thus blocked off the Soviets and their allies as an alternative source of arms supplies. Thus whilst Beijing was a valuable source of support and inspiration in the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe, China proved to be a potentially suspect ally and its patronage a potential liability for the Zimbabwe African National Union. The relationship between Beijing and ZANU may be characterised as having been mutually exploitative and based on opportunism, rather than on any overwhelming ideological premises. This was characteristic of China’s involvement with the liberation organisations in southern Africa in the 1970s, and provided the framework by which Beijing’s relations with the region in the 1980s were conducted.

Relations between China and Zimbabwe post-independence Since 1980, Zimbabwe’s government consciously integrated itself into the global capitalist system. Upon independence Prime Minister Robert Mugabe repeatedly dismissed as ‘simplistic and indeed, naïve’ to dismantle the ‘inherited economy’ (Government of Zimbabwe, 1982: 1). Mugabe went further, recognising ‘that the economic structure of [Zimbabwe] is based on capitalism … we must build on that’ (quoted in Astrow, 1983: 143). This was in direct contrast to the socialist rhetoric displayed by Mugabe immediately prior to independence. Zimbabwe’s political system after independence never seriously challenged the edifice inherited in 1980. Mugabe’s policies may be said to have eventually evolved into a vaguely social democratic one-party dictatorship but not a socialist republic. As one observer put it, ‘while Machel [of Mozambique] embraced Marxism-Leninism, Mugabe practised social democracy’ (Evans, 1988: 221).

Relations between China and Zimbabwe 115 This is important for China’s relations with Zimbabwe precisely because the interests of the Zimbabwean state have coincided with the policy interests of the Beijing leadership. Both have been committed to the development of capitalism and modernisation (in whatever guise), and a radical government in power would have hindered Beijing’s commercial aims in the region. In essence, Beijing was able to find in Zimbabwe a government who shared similar views on development and advancement. Harare aimed to develop a business sector in Zimbabwe under the control of local Africans, but within the existing economic structures (Moyo, 1992: 323). By helping Zimbabwe in this, Beijing was also opening up a market for Chinese companies. At first, this was submerged behind socialist rhetoric and expressions of fraternity. Nevertheless, as the 1980s and 1990s developed it became clear that the foreign relations between the PRC and Zimbabwe was essentially an alliance between two elites determined to pursue a course of ‘pragmatism’ with regard to economic relations. And as the 1990s ended, Mugabe’s descent into naked autocracy saw China step up to play an important role in offering support and alternatives sources of resources as Harare’s options narrowed. Early on, China’s support for ZANU was contrasted with the Soviets’ support for Nkomo. According to one observer, Moscow was only invited to the independence celebrations after the personal intervention of Mugabe himself who overruled the ZANU Central Committee on the grounds that Zimbabwe should pursue a non-alignment policy to both Superpowers (Mayall, 1985: 107). Moscow was thus invited to the independence celebrations on April 18, 1980 only under sufferance (along with Bulgaria, Cuba, the DPRK, Romania and Yugoslavia but not Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary and Poland). By contrast, when Mugabe won the election Beijing was in an advantageous position over the Soviets, warmly greeting the election result (see Xinhua, April 18, 1980) and establishing diplomatic relations as of April 18, 1980 (Xinhua, April 19, 1980). China had skilfully nurtured the ties between ZANU and Beijing prior to independence, for example Li Xiannian had met with Mugabe in Mozambique in January 1979 (Xinhua, January 11, 1979). Mugabe had made it clear after the election that he would ‘continue to … deepen our alliance with those who had been our truest friends’ (Observer, March 6, 1980). This was an apparent tribute to China and a calculated snub to the Soviets. Moscow hastily responded by unilaterally announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe – an action however, ignored by Mugabe. The favourable position that China found itself in at Zimbabwean independence was underscored by Mugabe in an interview he gave to Chinese journalists, where he expressed a wish to develop friendly relations with Beijing (Xinhua, March 7, 1980).

Early Beijing-Zimbabwean relations Beijing’s Foreign Minister Huang Hua was warmly welcomed by the Zimbabwean Foreign Affairs Minister and Deputy Prime Minister upon arrival in Zimbabwe, and was a prominent guest at the independence ceremony (Xinhua, April 18, 1980). Almost immediately, Huang Hua was publicly praising Mugabe’s

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‘realistic and wise’ policies (Xinhua, April 17, 1980) and urging a ‘pragmatic’ approach to solving Zimbabwe’s problems. This was to be typical of Beijing’s rhetoric as the relationship developed. Interestingly, Huang Hua met with 50 representatives of Zimbabwe’s small Chinese community and urged them to aid in the country’s economic advancement (Xinhua, April 20, 1980). By contrast, Moscow’s position in Zimbabwe remained fraught. Anti-Soviet feelings remained high and came to a head by mid-1980, when the Minister of Finance, Nkala, declared that Moscow should not be allowed to open an embassy in Zimbabwe because it would cause ‘disunity’ in the republic (The Herald, July 7, 1980). Moscow’s erstwhile prodigy ZAPU, however, urged Mugabe to initiate normalisation, and Nkomo intervened in the debate on behalf of the Soviets (Xinhua, October 13, 1980). Mugabe for his part minimised the problem and put it down to Soviet tardiness. Failure to establish diplomatic representation in Zimbabwe by the Soviets by the end of 1980 was thought to be because of Mugabe’s insistence that the Soviets publicly renounce support for Nkomo. This was dutifully given by Soviet envoy Solodovnikov (The Herald, November 25, 1980), but received no reply from Mugabe, prompting unease in the Zimbabwean media at the delay in opening a Soviet mission (The Herald, November 26, 1980). It was only in February 1981 that an agreement was reached to establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial status between Moscow and Zimbabwe. Relations were established on the basis that only governmental links would be allowed (thus eliminating ZAPU) and as part of this agreement, six Soviet-made T-54 tanks belonging to ZAPU’s armed wing were quickly removed from a military camp in Bulawayo (The Herald, February 19, 1981). Moscow indicated its resentment at Harare’s treatment of the diplomatic question by refusing to attend ZIMCORD in March 1981 (Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development was a major conference where nearly $1.9 billion was pledged by donors – all Western capitalists (see Chimombe, 1986)). Relations between the Soviets and Zimbabwe were to remain cool throughout the first half of the 1980s. Relations with China, however, were good. One of the first things the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Muzenda, did upon independence was to visit Beijing in June 1980, to ‘thank … the Chinese government and people for what they had done [for Zimbabwe]’ (Xinhua, June 5, 1980). This may be seen as a consolidation exercise by the Zimbabwean government to maintain the ties built up during the liberation struggle or, as Muzenda put it, ‘develop [the] economy with the support of our trusted friends’ (ibid.). Muzenda had last visited Beijing at the end of August 1979. The rapidity by which Muzenda made an invited return journey to China is indicative of the strength in relations that Beijing enjoyed with Mugabe at the time of independence. This strength was again in evidence in May 1981 when Mugabe and a 34 member delegation paid an official visit to China (Beijing Review, May 25, 1981). This visit is critical as it was during this visit that Beijing provided Mugabe with a lesson in pragmatism and de-emphasised ideology in the cause of development. Mugabe was at first instance lavish in his praise of China’s political system, referring to Beijing as his inspiration in attempting to create a ‘new … socialist order’

Relations between China and Zimbabwe 117 (The Herald, May 13, 1981). Mugabe also attempted to impress Beijing by stressing that the Zimbabwe revolution had ‘proved’ Marxist-Leninist theory and the basic principles of ‘Mao Tse-tung Thought’ (speech at Peking University, May 14, 1981 – see Renmin Ribao, May 14, 1981). However, during talks with Mugabe, Deng Xiaoping was particularly keen to emphasise that China had learnt from ‘errors’ and therefore in future would make ‘fewer mistakes’ (Xinhua, May 15, 1981). Suitably admonished, Mugabe later thanked Deng for ‘not [hiding] from us your failures’ (Xinhua, May 14, 1981). This of course came one month before the historic ‘authoritative assessment’ of Mao Tse-tung and the progress of China under him at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Party of China. Deng was essentially warning Mugabe not to follow too closely Mao Tse-tung Thought (though this was never on Mugabe’s agenda) but rather emulate the model for capitalist advancement that he had been imposing on China since 1978. In actual fact, Mugabe as it will be seen, needed little such encouragement. The interest in this conversation between Deng and Mugabe lies in the fact that the leader of the Chinese Party was actively discouraging a former self-proclaimed Maoist (of whatever doubtful credentials) not to follow the Chinese model of socialism under Mao. Instead, Beijing developed the line that Africa had ‘now entered a new period of … developing national economy and bringing benefits to the people’ (Xinhua, May 14, 1981). Class struggle was no longer a key to the successful transformation of society - capitalist development was. This is a reflection of what a reversal of domestic and foreign policy had occurred under Deng Hsiao-p’ing. As Zhao Ziyang said, China was now, ‘breaking away from the persistent influence of left ideas [and] carrying out a policy of economic readjustment’ (Xinhua, May 14, 1981). As if to prove this point, Deng had Mugabe sent to south China to see Deng’s ‘economic miracle’ where, as Zhao Ziyang put it, the ‘current political and economic situation [was] excellent’ (Xinhua, May 15, 1981). Commerce was high on both state’s agendas with Mugabe stressing a desire for China to help develop both the primary sectors and the secondary sectors of Zimbabwe’s economy (Xinhua, May 14, 1981). Beijing in turn was ‘extremely responsive to [Zimbabwe’s] request for participation in their development program’ (ibid.). Two agreements were signed, one on trade, the other cultural (Xinhua, May 14 1981). This granted most-favoured nation status on a reciprocal basis. Beijing in fact was keen to buy tobacco and sugar from Zimbabwe as part of a strategy to develop trade with Southern Africa. This view is vindicated by the fact that by June 1981, China had overtaken South Africa as the main importer of Zimbabwean tobacco (The Herald, June 17, 1981). This had come after Zimbabwe’s break in relations with Pretoria, an action conveniently applauded by the Beijing elite (Xinhua, September 5, 1980). The agreements between Zimbabwe and China however underscored the change in emphasis and indeed the concept of developmental aid as practised by Beijing under Deng. The trade agreement stipulated that Zimbabwe had to import a certain minimum amount of commodities (The Herald, May 14, 1981). This indicated the days of generous aid and altruistic programmes from China were over.

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Beijing now negotiated on the basis of mutual advantage and was reluctant to commit itself to the expensive aid programmes often dispensed under Mao Zedong. The treaties signed during Mugabe’s visit were complemented by the establishment of a number of co-operation agreements later on in the year. These were all commercial enterprises (coal mining, agriculture and light industry) designed to expand Zimbabwe’s market potential and increase employment opportunities. The fact that the agreements between China and Zimbabwe were all related to commerce is significant. By 1981 it was clear that, like China, economic development was Zimbabwe’s priority. Though rhetorical commitment to socialism remained, Mugabe was committed to a ‘pragmatism’ that earned the praise of even such people as Ronald Reagan who told Congress in July 1981 that Zimbabwe, had ‘continued to gain political and economic momentum in an atmosphere that can be characterised as both dynamic and stable’ (Africa Contemporary Record 1981-1982: B887). It is noteworthy that Reagan linked the political and economic fields in his speech. Evidently, Washington DC approved of Mugabe’s ‘realism’ in both fields, as did Beijing, who signed a protocol on economic and technical co-operation in September 1981 (Xinhua, September 24, 1981). China shared with Reagan a positive appraisal of Mugabe’s lack of socialist aspirations and evidence of this in its foreign policy was exhibited in Beijing’s reporting of Zimbabwe’s prospects at independence. Despite acknowledging that Mugabe had ‘no plans for nationalisation’ – a basic tenet of socialism – Beijing asserted that this was a ‘realistic economic measure which [will] make the economy of Zimbabwe more and more viable’ (Beijing Review, April 28, 1980). Beijing was also full of praise for Zimbabwe for ‘protecting private capital and encouraging private investment’ (Xinhua, October 17, 1981). Such policies of course went against the fundamental convictions of socialism. Even the Soviets were critical of ZANU’s moderate economic programme (Izvestia, November 5, 1980 cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Soviet Union, November 7, 1980), yet such an approach by Mugabe was satisfactory to Beijing. China was also noticeably lacking in its criticism of Mugabe after the ZIMCORD conference, despite the emphasis on ‘moderation and reconciliation’ (ZIMCORD: Let’s Build Zimbabwe Together, 1981: 2) at the expense of the implementation of socialism. Beijing had no wish to endanger its successful edging out of Moscow from the Zimbabwean milieu. In January 1983 Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Zimbabwe as part of an 11-nation tour of Africa. This tour was to develop mutually beneficial economic and technical co-operation relations in place of economic assistance. In essence, this was a major policy change towards the developing world by China and this is why a figure such as Zhao Ziyang was dispatched to explain the new economic realities African countries would have to face in their relationship with Beijing. Prior to his meeting with Zhao, Mugabe reminded China that they had given the largest amount of military support during the war of liberation (The Herald, January 11, 1983) This was in effect making a claim on Beijing’s priorities, and may have worked as Zimbabwe received an interest-free loan of $33 million as part of a technical and economic co-operation pact. In addition, China undertook to design and construct the National Sports Stadium (Xinhua, January 5, 19830. In order to

Relations between China and Zimbabwe 119 consolidate the strengthened ties made during the trip by Zhao Ziyang, the President of Zimbabwe, Canaan Banana, visited Zimbabwe’s ‘special friend and ally’ in August 1983 (Beijing Review, August 29, 1983). This visit was essentially a trip to encourage further Chinese economic involvement in Zimbabwe – ‘the economic field is the priority’, as Banana said (ibid.).

Strengthening of economic and military ties August 1985 saw Mugabe once again visiting China. What is notable about this visit is a re-emphasis on economic and commercial concerns. This may be seen as a reflection on China’s domestic preoccupation on economic matters, as well as exhibiting Harare’s desire to improve trading links between the two states. Mugabe apparently saw increased commerce with China as a means by which Zimbabwe could break free from its old (traditionally Western) trading partners. His rationale for this was drawn from the bitter experiences during the war of liberation and the understanding that ‘our old markets were never our friends’ (The Herald, August 31, 1985). Mugabe was also keen to develop trade with ‘friends’ and not purely capitalist partners who ‘regard [Zimbabwe] merely as business partners’ (ibid.). In pursuance of this new idealistic direction in Zimbabwean trading policy, a bilateral governmental commission was established to foster trade and ensure that technical and economic agreements between Zimbabwe and China went smoothly (Beijing Review, September 9, 1985). In turn, Beijing demonstrated commitment by guaranteeing an additional interest-free loan of $25 million. This was to allow Zimbabwe to finance a variety of projects due to begin during the new Zimbabwean five-year-plan, which began in January 1986 (The Herald, August 31, 1985). Mugabe’s tour was also significant in that it was announced that China would train more than 100 Zimbabwean pilots and sell Zimbabwe military aircraft. Whilst this would aid China’s arms industry, it was also beneficial to Harare. Such a commitment would greatly help Zimbabwe’s stated aim of replacing old Rhodesian personnel who dominated the air force. The Zimbabwean Air Force (ZAF) had been essentially unaffected by the process of integration and localisation. Rectifying this situation became particularly urgent for Harare after a number of White personnel were indicted in sabotage operations against their own aircraft (Legum, 1983: 21). The growth of racial conflict in South Africa and the spread of this conflict throughout the region meant that Zimbabwe’s security concerns became urgent. Beijing was also concerned about possible Superpower involvement in the growing cauldron of Southern Africa. By aiding Zimbabwe’s defence programme, Beijing was also aiming to head off any possible offer of assistance from Moscow.

Temporary Rapprochement with Moscow Zimbabwean dissatisfaction with the levels of Chinese economic aid offered had resulted in a gradual rapprochement with Moscow. Relations with the Soviet Union had remained correct but cool throughout the early 1980s. However, with

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the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev on March 13 1985, relations began to gradually improve. In part this was due to growing South African aggressiveness in the region and attacks on ANC targets on Zimbabwean soil (Martin and Johnson, 1986: 43-72). This made Harare anxious for external military support. With Beijing emphasising ‘peaceful co-existence’ and even the non-inevitability of hegemonism, China’s approach to Zimbabwe was seen as inappropriate. As a consequence, Zimbabwe’s relations with Beijing began to cool slightly and warm towards Moscow. Whilst Mugabe visited Moscow briefly in August 1985 for talks with the Deputy Premier Arkhipov, of far more importance was his official visit in early December. The importance Moscow attached to the visit can be gauged by the fact that Mugabe was feted by the top Soviet leadership – Ryzhkov, Gromyko, Shevardnadze and Gorbachev. Whilst in Moscow, Mugabe made the astonishing claim that the Soviet Union was ‘a source of inspiration, and, frankly speaking, a lodestar’ (The Herald, December 4, 1985). Mugabe also in turn praised Moscow for its ‘decisive’ support during the war of liberation and claimed that aid from the socialist states was mainly from the Soviet Union (BBC Short Wave Broadcasts: Soviet Union, December 6, 1985). This of course was a falsehood and must have provoked consternation on the part of China. Mugabe had prepared the ground for this by issuing a speech in which he omitted to name any particular state that had helped in the liberation struggle, merely referring to ‘our friends of socialist countries [and] our friends of non-socialist countries’ (Zimbabwe News, January 1985: 40). It was, however, typical of Mugabe’s elastic rhetoric. In the past he had also awarded the ‘best friend’ title to China, North Korea, Romania and Yugoslavia. Beijing was, however, suitably alarmed and tried to repair the breach by rapidly intervening to supply weaponry to Harare. During his discussions with the Soviets, Mugabe had asked for aid to help develop the Zimbabwean Air Force. Before Moscow could deliver, however, China stepped in and offered F7 (MiG-21) fighters and training in China. There was, however, a levelling off in interest by Moscow in Zimbabwe as Soviet domestic issues took priority and Africa declined as an issue for Moscow.

Beijing’s economic aid to Harare It is important to analyse the aid offered to Zimbabwe by China for this provides us with an example of how Beijing’s domestic change of agenda also affected its relations with developing countries. As an investment to keep relations cordial, China had been quick to provide modest amounts of aid to Zimbabwe upon independence (though compared to Western aid commitments, PRC aid looked paltry: the World Bank pledged $417.3 million, the US $204 million and the EEC $156.3 million). Li Ke, Vice-Minister for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, visited Zimbabwe in September 1980 and pledged a five-year interest-free loan totalling US$26.6 million (Xinhua, September 15, 1980). Zimbabwe was able to start drawing from this almost immediately. Credits such as this were comparatively rare from Beijing and therefore illustrate the potential China hoped Zimbabwe would have in the early years of independence (Far Eastern Economic Review,

Relations between China and Zimbabwe 121 November 11, 1980). However, such concerns appear primarily driven by commercial considerations. With the domestic drive for development and capital accumulation, Chinese enterprises were actively seeking contractual work in Africa in fields such as engineering and construction (ibid.). In fact, Zimbabwe was the leading country in the region in co-operation with Chinese companies. Between 1986 and 1990, US$169.46 million worth of contracts were signed between Zimbabwe and China (Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 1992-93, 1992: 730-743). Much of these projects were to export farm machinery to a country whose most important economic sector remained agriculture. Beijing’s aid commitment therefore must be put in the context of China’s wider economic aspirations rather than ideological socialist solidarity. Although Beijing had started off with a modest aid commitment to Zimbabwe upon independence, it had allowed aid to decrease as pressures from the domestic modernisation programme precluded anything more substantial. It was only with Zhao Ziyang’s tour of Africa and his aim to substitute aid with bilateral economic co-operation that there was a slight blip in China’s aid pattern with Zimbabwe. In fact, aid to Zimbabwe prior to Tiananmen had become desultory. A concrete indication of the decline in such Beijing-Harare links prior to Tiananmen was the fact that of 1,908 Zimbabwean students studying abroad at the time of Tiananmen nearly 91 per cent of these were in Cuba, the Soviet Union or its surrogates (Weekender (supplement to Financial Gazette), October 5, 1990). That is to say, Beijing’s educational links with Zimbabwe had become negligible. China’s overseas student programme had by this time run into serious problems with cuts in financing and the anti-African student riots in 1988 taking their toll. However, in the agitation after June 1989 to find and nurture developing world linkages, Beijing attempted to repair the damage by signing a protocol in early 1993 worth US$180,000 for projects in higher education in Harare (Xinhua, February 24, 1993).

Tiananmen Square and Beijing-Harare relations The crisis in the PRC in June 1989 though damaging to China elsewhere, served to reinforce the alliance between the two countries as Beijing sought to make contacts with the developing world to bolster support and break out of its political isolation. It was at this time that China ‘rediscovered’ its old allies in the Third World. Zimbabwe was high on the list of Beijing’s target countries, and this is illustrated by the Foreign Minister’s visit to Zimbabwe in early August 1989 as part of his six-nation tour of Southern Africa. Mugabe made it clear that he supported Beijing’s moves to ‘stabilise’ the domestic situation (Xinhua, August 3, 1980). The Mugabe leadership was deeply supportive of Beijing throughout the crisis, refusing to – as Mugabe put it – join in with ‘the current anti-China campaign launched by Western countries’ (ibid.). In language reminiscent of the Cold War, Zimbabwe tried to portray Beijing’s isolation post-Tiananmen as a Western ‘conspiracy’ against China. A Zimbabwean Acting Minister offered ‘Zimbabwe’s full support and solidarity with [the PRC] government and people during this time of concerted efforts from Western circles to destabilise China’ (Xinhua, September 29, 1989).

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Such statements were music to the ears of the elite in Beijing. Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen was thus highly grateful to Mugabe for supporting ‘China’s move to stabilise her domestic situation’ (Zimbabwe Radio, August 3, 1989 cited in BBC Short Wave Broadcasts-Middle East and Africa, August 5, 1989). Mugabe repeatedly supported China elite throughout the crisis, later asserting that, ‘any reforms in China can only take place on the basis of its tradition and its own characteristics’ (Xinhua, January 23, 1991). Such comments were an obvious criticism by Mugabe of the democracy movement in China so recently crushed by the Beijing government. Nkomo continued this theme when he visited China in June 1991. He obliquely demonstrated Harare’s solidarity with Beijing by making no references to Tiananmen and concurring with the description of Zhiang Zemin as a ‘steadfast with a strong understanding of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Thought’ (Xinhua, June 28, 1991). Contacts between Zimbabwe and Beijing was used during this period as a conduit for expressing mutual support and vitally for China, to express opinions about the wider international community’s reaction to Tiananmen. For example, the Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress on a visit to Harare in July 1990 made the pointed remarks that, ‘Certain forces after the June 4 last year tried to shut the door that China had opened … Those who bring sanctions against China will bring a loss to their own economies’ (Xinhua, July 2, 1990). The growing crisis of the Leninist-party system in eastern Europe - a system Mugabe had consciously striven to replicate in Zimbabwe with his vanguardist conceptualisation of ZANU (PF) - was of great concern to the Zimbabwean ruling elite. The events in eastern Europe and in China scared Mugabe. No doubt fearful of similar repetitions in Southern Africa against authoritarian states he later publicly renounced his former ambition for a one-party system in Zimbabwe (The Herald, December 28, 1992). Beijing’s search for allies post-Tiananmen and the support that this would offer, was thus highly welcome to Mugabe and was of mutual benefit. Emphasising the domestic sovereignty of nations and noninterference on human rights issues suited both parties. For example, the Foreign Affairs Secretary of ZANU (PF), Nkomo, told a visiting Chinese delegation to Zimbabwe in early 1992 that Harare respected ‘the CPC’s adherence to the socialist road’ (Xinhua, March 31, 1992). Coming after Tiananmen, such a statement demonstrated a rejection of the West’s concern for human rights in China. It also illustrated a drawing together of two increasingly isolated regimes. As the PRC President Yang Shangkun told a visiting Zimbabwean delegation, ‘Under the complicated international situation, developing countries should strengthen their unity’ (Xinhua, April 29, 1992). In May 1993, Mugabe paid a state visit to Beijing. Mugabe was vigorous in his defence of China’s political system and by extension, the Tianenmen crackdown By extrapolating events from Africa’s past colonial history, Mugabe attempted to construct a justification of contemporary Chinese political repression of its own citizenry: ‘There must not be any dictating to China by anybody. Let the Chinese evolve their system … it is dishonest of [the West] and hypocritical to try and preach democracy to China when they themselves have been guilty of not practising

Relations between China and Zimbabwe 123 democracy for so long a time in our own areas of Africa and elsewhere’ (Xinhua, May 6, 1993). Whilst Mugabe publicly defended Beijing, his trip may be seen as exacting a ‘pay-off’ for their support for the Deng leadership during the 1989 crisis. As Mugabe pointedly remarked, ‘Zimbabwe and China … have supported each other in international affairs. ‘But now we feel that these relations must be further improved’ (Xinhua, May 10. 1993). The improvement Mugabe had in mind was further development of trading links. Economic issues typically dominated the visit with a mutual praising of each other’s respective economic policies. Zhiang Zemin expressed admiration for Mugabe’s attempts to develop a political and economic system, which ‘conforms to the realities of Zimbabwe’ (Xinhua, May 7, 1993). Mugabe in turn praised China’s economic policy and expressed a desire for increased Chinese investment in Zimbabwe, particularly in agriculture, manufacturing and mining (Xinhua, May 13, 1993). Whilst Beijing still extended economic aid to Zimbabwe, the amount – $9.4 million (Xinhua, May 7, 1993) – once again illustrated that commercial trade not aid was China’s policy priority.

China’s economic relations with Zimbabwe Relations between Zimbabwe and China since independence have been mainly economic, and this has characterised Chinese-Zimbabwean ties to this day, ironically intensifying as Zimbabwe’s economy crumbles. By the late 1980s Zimbabwe had become an important commercial partner of Beijing’s in Southern Africa. Beijing was particularly keen to import Zimbabwean tobacco, taking up orders worth $34 million in 1990 (Financial Gazette, July 25, 1991). Zimbabwe’s importance was signalled by the creation of an Economic Joint Commission to oversee the development of mutually beneficial capitalist developments. However, it is in recent years that Chinese economic involvement in Zimbabwe has made headlines. As the economy (further) collapsed under Mugabe’s ‘land reform’ programme, it became apparent that ZANU-PF needed allies. The first choice was Libya as Tripoli was able to supply much-needed petroleum and also because Gaddafi was known for his penchant for anti-Western rhetoric – something which Mugabe presumably felt he could tap into. But it was the Chinese who came trumps for Mugabe after he launched his 2003 ‘Look East’ policy, aimed at replacing Zimbabwe’s Western trade partners with the Chinese. ‘In return for bailing out Robert Mugabe’s regime with injections of cash, machinery, equipment and military supplies, Chinese state-owned enterprises have assembled a portfolio of shares in some of Zimbabwe’s prize assets’ (Melville and Owen, 2005: 2). ‘In buying a 70 per cent stake in Zimbabwe’s only electricity generation facilities at Hwange and Kariba, and stakes in the national railway, the Chinese have stepped in where other developing nations (even Libya) have feared to tread’ (ibid.). In fact, China is steadily becoming the largest foreign investor in Zimbabwe and is rapidly growing as one of the largest trading partners of Harare (Xinhua, May 4, 2005). As part of this, the Chinese have been granted the rights to land stolen from White Zimbabweans, including 100,000 hectares of irrigation

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land in the Mwenzi area. Chinese have also been observed looking at a set of farms in the Banket-Raffingora area, some of the largest farms in the Mashonaland area (The Age, July 30, 2005). ‘Settlers (newly established black residents) are being removed from those properties right now. Apparently this is what was agreed in Beijing, that the Chinese are going to take these properties over - and Chinese State farming organisations are actually going to run them’ (ibid.). And in 2005 alone, Zimbabwe bought three passenger planes, six trainer jets and almost 400 commuter buses from China, whilst China agreed to supply trains and rebuild Zimbabwe’s rail network, as well as pledging food relief for millions of Zimbabweans who faced hunger due to the collapse of the country’s agricultural sector. Mugabe has been deeply appreciative of China’s support. At the second SinoAfrican trade summit in Addis Ababa in December 2003, ‘Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe launched into a tirade against Britain and the USA, calling on African leaders to turn their backs on western countries; and to focus on better relations with China, which he said respected African countries’ (Cameroon Tribune, December 17, 2003). Given that China has provided arms and security equipment to Mugabe’s regime in order to defend itself from the Zimbabwean people, this is no surprise. After all, a US$240 million deal between China and Zimbabwe is based on Beijing’s willingness to trade guns for market access in Zimbabwe. Harare’s defence minister told parliamentarians in June 2004 that the deal included 12 jet fighter aircraft and one hundred military vehicles (Vancouver Sun, October 28, 2004). Why Chinese products and investors are flooding such a crisis-prone country is simple: ‘Zimbabwe’s deteriorating political situation and asset-hungry officials may deter most private investors, but the Chinese government can instruct managers of state enterprises to take the risk, rely on good intergovernmental relations to guarantee investment flow, and depend on state coffers to absorb any loss in the last resort’ (Melville and Owen, 2005: 2). However, as one Zimbabwean report framed it: What could China want in Zimbabwe? We do not have oil, our population is small compared to those of larger African countries. Our location is not particularly strategic for an outsider. What the Chinese want is raw materials and opportunities for investment. They will be happy to have a share in mines, power production, anything that can turn them a profit for a comparatively small amount of investment. These are wanted not so much by the Chinese government, but by individual companies. They also need an outlet for the substandard manufactured goods that cannot be sold in the developed world, where they sell their quality products … For China, Zimbabwe is economic small fry, but for ZANU-PF, China is the only way out of a deep hole. (Sokwanele Special Report, June 21, 2005) However, China’s role in Zimbabwe is also more sinister. As the same report noted, ‘only the Chinese … are prepared to assist [ZANU-PF] to stay in power

Relations between China and Zimbabwe 125 against the wishes of their own people … They have no compunctions about democracy or human rights, only a single minded obsession with control. And since their own people do not enjoy democratic freedom of expression and participation, they have no check on what types of regimes they support elsewhere’ (ibid.). Indeed, ‘Not only is it China’s protection from strong Western punitive measures that is attractive to African leaders, but Beijing’s investments come with no conditionality related to ‘good governance’’ (Sunday Herald, August 28, 2005). At the same time, Mugabe’s mortgaging of Zimbabwe to China in return for short-term support further threatens to undermine the country’s economy. The Zimbabwean market has been invaded by Chinese goods, locally known as ‘zhing-zhongs’ (a derisive term to describe anything that is substandard), which have been undercutting local industries. According to one local economist, ‘there was quite an element of dumping here with factory seconds and rejects coming in, and this was true especially of footwear and clothes’ (Agence France Presse, January 25, 2005). A huge influx of goods from China was experienced from 2004 onwards and although Harare increased the import duties on such merchandise, China’s penetration of the economy continues apace. The Zimbabwean government clearly does not care about the effect this is having on the economy, as long as China offers support. This has now reached rather ridiculous lengths, with the announcement in 2006 that Zimbabwe’s government was hoping to see Mandarin Chinese taught in universities. It is not clear whether Chinese will be a compulsory subject, but the Zimbabwe National Association of Student Unions reacted angrily, asserting that ‘It seems they [the ZANU-PF government] are trying every political gimmick to lure the Chinese into this country to bankroll their bankrupt regime. But they should not do that at the expense of students’ (BBC News, January 26, 2006). But such engagement by China is beginning to provoke opposition within Zimbabwe – something Beijing will have to contend with when the ZANU-PF regime falls: China is no longer the champion of African ‘liberation’ or even of African development. Its business deals are purely that – business, and in competition with American business to exploit the opportunities that Africa offers. The political deals serve their own interests first, the ZANU PF elite second, and the Zimbabwean people not at all. ZANU PF seems to think that the Chinese will rescue them and the economy. It’s possible that they will, but not in the name of sovereignty, not in the name of development and certainly not in the name of democratic progress. (Sokwanele Special Report, June 21, 2005). After all, at the height of the land invasions the leader of the Communist Party of China, Wei Jianxing commented that ‘China fully supports the Government of Zimbabwe’s land redistribution programme [sic]’ (Herald, June 14, 2002). And as part of all this, the economic opportunism aside, is the desire to combat ‘hegemony’. As one report on China’s links with pariah regimes such as Mugabe’s

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Zimbabwe put it, ‘Gaining support on the world stage from one of the few corners of the globe where the influence of the United States and of former European colonial powers is on the wane is seen as a goal worth pursuing by China’ (Reuters, December 17, 2005). What of the future for Chinese-Zimbabwean ties? In the 1990s the Beijing leadership’s steady de-emphasis on ideological developing world solidarity (except in times of crises) and the greater emphasis on economic matters seemed to suggest that a decline in China’s relationship with Zimbabwe was on the cards. Indeed, Harare had found it necessary to turn to the capitalist powers in order to find suitable markets and indeed, acceptable levels of economic aid. Until the economic meltdown, Somerville’s early prognosis that Zimbabwe’s economic relations with China would always remain complementary to its stronger ties to the capitalist West held true (Somerville, 1982). However, as Zimbabwe’s crisis has deepened, China has opportunistically entered the fray and solidified previously existing relationships based on history into something far more substantial. With accusations being made that China is ‘colonising’ Zimbabwe and with China’s no-questions-asked stance towards the autocracy of Mugabe, China stands accused of undermining Southern Africa’s democratic credentials, just as in Angola. Currently, the leadership in Beijing does not seem to care too much about this, but the issue of sustainability and what happens if and when Mugabe and his regime falls is something that policy-makers in China will have to one day face.

7

PRC relations with South Africa

The political situation in South Africa was, until the democratic elections, a focus of the international community’s attention and, from the start of the de-colonisation process to the demise of apartheid, an ideological and strategic battleground between the East and the West. As a CIA report noted way back in 1950, ‘apartheid [was] a ready-made invitation for propaganda from the Communist bloc against both [South Africa] and the countries associated with it’ (CIA Report CIA/RE 27-50, November 17, 1950: 8). South Africa’s importance lay in both its strategic geopolitical position and its huge economic resources, for as one writer noted, ‘South Africa dominates the Southern African region economically and militarily’ (Chan, 1990: 8). From South Africa came about one-quarter of total Western manganese supply; the entire West’s strategic grades of amosite asbestos; and important supplies of industrial diamonds, uranium and gold. In essence, South Africa was extremely important for the West’s economic well-being and China was well aware of this, constructing its South African policy in part to try and prevent the possibility of Moscow (however unrealistic that was) from gaining hegemonic control over the country. As Beijing once commented, the Soviets, ‘attempt to control the passage to the Atlantic, the lifeline of the West, and to plunder the region of its rich strategic resources’ (Xinhua, May 20, 1981). Strategically, South Africa straddled the strategic Cape route - particularly important after the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, when shipping around the Cape route increased by over 50 per cent. Geopolitics ensured that Southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular became a major area of contention between the Soviet Union and the West (Griffith, 1976). As a result, the PRC expressed great interest in South Africa, viewing it as a major target of Superpower hegemonic ambitions.

China and South Africa: early ties South Africa is the one country in Southern Africa that has a settled Chinese population of some number (see Yap and Leong, 1996). South Africa established relations with the imperial Qing dynasty in 1905, though the US consulate in Johannesburg handled matters pertaining to Chinese affairs after the 1911 revolution. In 1920 a

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Republic of China Consul-General arrived and since that date ROC consular representation in South Africa was continuous. Indeed, Pretoria-Taipei relations were remarkably resilient, surviving the end of apartheid and only being downgraded at the end of 1996. During the apartheid era both countries ‘aligned themselves against the forces of Marxism and Communism’, as the South African Foreign Minister told his Taiwanese counterpart in 1981 (China News Agency, June 4, 1981). After some apparent hesitation, the PRC broke economic ties with South Africa in 1960 and Sino-South African interaction, until the demise of the minority regime, therefore revolved largely around linkages to the South African liberation organisations. It should be noted, however, that though China announced its severance of commercial ties with Pretoria in July 1960, it was forced to repeat this announcement a further two times and then on periodically deny breaking the sanctions against South Africa. It is extremely likely, however, that the PRC continued clandestine trade with the apartheid government throughout its existence – including buying uranium off of Pretoria (see Far Eastern Economic Review, January 1, 1982). During the mid-1970s there was a brief period when Pretoria flirted with the idea of establishing ties with China on the basis that South Africa’s main enemy was Moscow, as was China’s and so both countries had an interest in shutting out the Soviets. The development fell through, however, after a hostile reaction from the South African press (Geldenhuys, 1984: 115-116). This disclosure was interesting in that it showed an apparent willingness by China to establish links with South Africa purely on the basis of combating Soviet hegemonic aspirations in the area. That such a move would have undoubtedly sabotaged Beijing’s links with the liberation movements in the region, showed that China was willing to sacrifice these linkages in order to pursue the ‘bigger picture’ of preventing the Soviet Union’s strategic machinations in the region. In fact, China was later forced to publicly deny that Chinese leaders planned a visit to South Africa in 1980 (see Renmin Ribao, March 16, 1980). As it was, China had to content itself with developing ties with the various South African nationalist organisations.

China and the nationalist movements The two major African nationalist movements in South Africa were established before 1960. The African National Congress (ANC) was founded in 1912 whilst the Pan-Africanist Congress was established in 1959 by a breakaway faction of Black radicals, angered by the ANC’s perceived ‘domination’ by anti-apartheid Whites (Benson, 1963; Holland, 1989; Meli, 1988; Frederikse, 1990). In early 1960 the PAC organised a campaign against the ‘pass laws’ that required all Blacks in South Africa to carry identity cards with the ANC joining in the campaign shortly after. The culmination of this protest ended with the ‘Sharpeville Massacre’ where 69 unarmed Africans were shot dead by police and a further 180 were injured. The leadership of the PAC were arrested and both the PAC and ANC

PRC relations with South Africa 129 were banned. Perhaps more importantly, the domestic arrangements of the South African regime were catapulted into the global spotlight and remained a major international issue until the holding of democratic elections in 1994. As in other Southern African countries, Sino-Soviet rivalry over support for the nascent liberation movements was a feature of China’s involvement in the region. As Thomas (1966: 161) wrote, ‘South Africa was one of the most clear cut examples of the way the Sino-Soviet dispute divided political groups’. Initially, China attempted to maintain cordial links with the ANC, though refused to supply arms. According to Mandela, an ANC delegation was sent to China as early as 1953 to secure armaments. Apparently, Beijing showed reluctance, questioning the readiness of the ANC for undertaking an armed struggle, and as a result no arms were forthcoming at that point (Mandela, 1994: 148). Relations, however, remained cordial and in 1961 Tennyson Makiwane of the ANC’s National Executive Committee visited China whilst a prominent South African Communist Party (SACP) member, Hilda Bernstein, arrived at the same time. John Marks of the ANC and SACP visited in late 1963. However, a gradual positioning of the ANC within the loose pro-Moscow camp of liberation organisations, meant that Beijing was effectively frozen out of an association with the most effective movement in South Africa (Gibson, 1972: 84-105; Somerville, 1984: 99). From the early 1960s the ANC maintained extremely close links with the pro-Soviet SACP, and such an alliance would have, in the context of the Sino-Soviet crisis, precluded an ANC-PRC axis (Johns, 1973: 278-279). As one writer noted, contacts with the PRC withered in the heat of the Sino-Soviet conflict (Johns, 1991). This was particularly so after the joint ANCSACP formation of the guerrilla movement Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in 1961 (Holland, 1989). Following the decision to launch the armed struggle, both the ANC and the SACP embarked on a series of trips overseas to muster aid and support. Mandela toured a number of African states and arranged for MK training in Algeria, Ethiopia and Tanzania. At the same time, Arthur Goldreich, a SACP cadre, travelled to the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union and as a result shipments of arms and Soviet training personnel began to arrive from 1964 onwards (Campbell, 1986). South African volunteers also began to travel to the Soviet Union to receive training and education. At first, China remained involved in the ANC’s struggle and a sizeable proportion of the first MK cadres sent abroad went to the PRC (Lodge, 1983: 235). However, as the Sino-Soviet split intensified, relations between the ANC and China soured – largely as a result of the SACP’s hostility and China’s unwillingness to support an organisation so closely tied to a pro-Moscow party. No doubt influenced by the SACP, ANC cadres reportedly involved themselves in fierce criticism of China at international conferences in the mid-1960s (Gibson, 1972), and the aid relationship between China and the ANC effectively collapsed (Karis, 1984: 397). The ANC did not, however, suffer from this breakdown, for the SACP provided the ANC with the organisational discipline and military training that enabled it to become the major liberation movement. Thus, the ANC was linked to an organisation that referred to the PRC’s leadership as ‘pseudo-communist[s]’ and called for the removal of the Chinese

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‘political maggots’ (African Communist, no. 70, 1977: 119). It is hardly surprising therefore that the Chinese established linkages with the PAC.

The PAC and China Whilst it is on record that China became involved with the PAC, actual evidence on the depth of Chinese involvement with the organisation is sparse. Initially, the PAC was reported to have received money off of China and Potlake Leballo, the Secretary-General of the PAC, visited China in 1964 receiving US$10,000 (Larkin, 1971: 190-191). He again visited in February 1965 as a guest of the Institute of Foreign Affairs (Pike, 1988: 357). PAC cadres were also trained in Tanzania and Zambia by Chinese instructors and a limited number were reported to have been sent to China proper (Gibson, 1972: 97, 102). The PAC’s ideology was a contradictory pot-pourri of socialism and Black exclusivism, verging on racism, for the PAC saw the struggle in South Africa as primarily a racial one, provoking the multi-racial ANC to describe the PAC as ‘inverted racialism, foreign to the spirit of and traditions of the African people’ (Walter Sisulu, then Secretary-General of the ANC, cited in Frederikse, 1990b: 80). It thus consciously rejected co-operation with the SACP, which had a number of White South Africans in important positions. Initially, under the leadership of its leader Robert Sobukwe, the PAC enjoyed more support from the African population than the ANC but the Soviet Union refused to support the organisation as it was viewed as anti-Communist and seen as being anti-White in sentiment. In essence then the PAC was the left-over of the South African liberation movement and China felt compelled to support it in the misguided hope that it would provide a counterbalance to Moscow’s influence in the SACP and by extension the ANC. China in fact was one of the PAC’s very few international patrons, prompting a PAC spokesman to proclaim that ‘China is our most reliable ally in the common struggle against imperialism’ (New China News Agency, March 31, 1971). The PAC’s links with China, however, were driven by expediency and not ideological conviction. The PAC needed money and international support and whilst the OAU offered some assistance, it was not enough – thus the PAC approached China (Lodge, 1990: 309-310). However, PRC aid and support to the PAC never came near that afforded to the ANC by the Soviets, for as Lodge wrote, China’s support was ‘meagre and unreliable’ (ibid.: 304). The reasons for this are threefold. First, the Chinese concentrated their efforts on countries where there was an exploitable situation by which China could raise its prestige and influence. South Africa was far less vulnerable to guerrilla activity and armed insurrection than states such as Rhodesia or the two Portuguese colonies in the region. Support for actively involved liberation organisations were of far greater propaganda value to Beijing and afforded Chinese policy aims in the region, than in South Africa where the liberation movements were for the large part fairly inactive. The strength of the apartheid state meant that Beijing was simply keener to be seen to be arming an active guerrilla army – such as ZANU – than merely instruct PAC cadres in Tanzanian training camps. Chinese foreign policy towards the situation

PRC relations with South Africa 131 in South Africa lacked subtlety in that knowledge of the various liberation organisations and their politics was limited (Pfeifenberger, 1981: 5). The PAC was seized on after the ANC moved within Moscow’s loose orbit, but as a result of PAC inactivity Beijing largely lost interest and restricted itself to rhetorical condemnations of the apartheid system and Soviet machinations in the region. Second, problems within the PAC itself meant that it never became a serious threat to Pretoria, or even measured up to the ANC’s organisational capacity (Van Staden, 1988). After Leballo boasted of the PAC’s involvement in a suppressed uprising in 1962-63 mass arrests and the re-detention of Sobukwe resulted in a general decline in the PAC’s fortunes. The death of Sobukwe in 1978 was in effect a disaster for the PAC as the organisation slid into internal splits and leadership succession struggles. After Potlake Leballo’s abortive attempt for the leadership failed in 1979 and the leadership was handed over to a triumvirate, violence entered the scene with one of Leballo’s successors – Sibeko – being shot dead in Dar-es-Salaam in June 1979. Although recognised by the OAU, the internecine feuds of the PAC at one point almost led to its being de-recognised, and Zambia had actually banned the organisation from its territory in 1968 due to its behaviour. China however was forced to accept the PAC’s internal feuds with little or no comment – there was no viable alternative. Partly as a result of the PAC’s ineptness and feuding, whilst the ANC had 10,000 guerrillas outside of South Africa and 500-2,000 inside the country, often indulging in audacious attacks on government infrastructures, the PAC could only muster a maximum of 500 insurgents outside of South Africa (Moorcroft, 1994: 352-353). Whilst the PAC somewhat stabilised after John Pokela took up the leadership in 1981, it remained effectively marginalised. Third, China itself was physically not able to support an extensive programme of military aid and assistance. This inability to match Moscow’s generosity meant that China would always remain second in any competition with the Soviet Union for the favours of a liberation movement in Southern Africa if the Soviets made a concerted effort to woo that organisation already courted by China. As it has been seen, it was only Soviet insensitivity and stubbornness vis-à-vis ZANU’s links with Beijing that prevented Moscow from usurping China as Mugabe’s main sponsor. In South Africa, fortuitously for China, the PAC never managed to organise itself to the degree where substantial aid from Beijing was requested. Thus China’s posturing as an ally of a South African liberation movement was in effect never put to the test – a test China most surely would have failed. This did not prevent, however, Beijing asserting at the time of the Soweto uprising that the ‘people’s struggle [proved] that future victories can only come through the gun barrel’ (Beijing Domestic Service, August 29, 1976). To support this victory, however, was outside of China’s capabilities and Beijing instead attempted to harness the ‘powerful support of African and other Third World countries’ (ibid.). Such a posture ignored the realities of the situation in South Africa where wholesale revolt was unlikely to succeed, and where in any case, the leading liberation movement was patronised and supplied by Moscow. The events of 1976 in Soweto and elsewhere were clearly seen by China as an opportunity to combat Soviet aspirations in the country. As it became clear that the ANC was relatively isolated

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from the revolt, at least initially (Holland, 1989: 189), China began to encourage the concept of ‘self-liberation’, as a means by which Soviet influence could be by-passed (see for example the analysis of the Soweto riots in Beijing Domestic Service, August 30, 1976). As China rather hopefully asserted, the South African people had, ‘come to realise that the struggle against hegemonism is inseparable from that against racism under the present situation, [because Moscow is] trying to control the liberation movements by means of military assistance’ (New China News Agency, January 3, 1977). In a situation where China could do very little practically to stop this development, anti-hegemonic rhetoric and appeals were Beijing’s only weapons, despite Beijing’s violent calls for an ‘extensive armed struggle’ (New China News Agency, October 22, 1977). The PAC joined in and accused Moscow of trying to ‘divide the Azanian national liberation movement and work … frantically to deny us the unity that our people demand’ (New China News Agency, May 12, 1977). Nonetheless relations with the PAC remained on a low-level throughout the 1970s. A PAC delegation visited China in July 1972, and a further delegation visited in August of that year (New China News Agency, August 11, 1972). The PRC carried PAC statements – a classic indication of Chinese approval. However, a sign that China was not fully committed to the PAC was the fact that when describing the liberation struggle in South Africa, Chinese press statements referred to ‘the Azanian people’s struggle’, and did not mention the PAC by name (e.g. New China News Agency, December 29, 1975). Visits by the PAC however continued in the early 1980s (Xinhua, October 13, 1980). Despite all this, the ‘bogeyman’ of Communist China continued to bedevil South African perceptions of China’s role in Southern Africa and provoked frequent warnings by South African officials of the Chinese gevaar (threat) to Pretoria’s security (Lodge, 1983: 304). That much of these warnings came after China’s involvement in the TanZam railway, illustrates that Chinese prestige and perceptions of its power was directly influenced by Beijing’s public manoeuvres rather than an actual calculated evaluation of China’s real power and status (see De Villiers, 1975).

The ANC and the SACP Returning to the main liberation movement, the relationship between the ANC and the Moscow-backed South African Communist Party has been the focus of numerous studies (see Ellis, 1992). The main components of the SACP’s political programme were so close to the ANC’s own position that they were included wholesale into ANC policy documents in 1969. As Winnie Mandela later remarked, ‘[the SACP] spoke a language we understood. They talked about the rights of workers in a language that appeals to the masses on the ground’ (Eastern Express, October 13, 1994). However, the ANC-SACP axis should not be over-estimated. Observers consistently viewed the ANC as the senior party in the alliance and that the SACP was far more reliant on the ANC than vice versa (Prior, 1984: 190). From this viewpoint, the ANC was seen as primarily a nationalist movement and

PRC relations with South Africa 133 not a Moscow-stooge and the links with both the SACP and Moscow sprang from a pragmatism that was often overlooked by observers of the liberation movement (Lodge, 1984; Nel, 1990). Because of a failure of White parties to commit themselves wholesale to the removal of apartheid, the ANC was compelled to look elsewhere for support. As Nel remarked, ‘the ANC probably had no other choice but to form alliances to the left if it wanted to achieve success in its struggle against apartheid’ (Nel, 1990: 48). The ANC was not, and never was, a tabula rasa that external or domestic forces could overtly influence, and as a consequence was flexible in its approach, enabling it to receive ‘a continual source of funds, equipment, training and diplomatic support - resources of a scale and quality its rivals could not hope to match’ (Lodge, 1983: 304). Thus the ANC’s linkage with the SACP effectively shut out the PRC from the liberation struggle in South Africa until the mid-1980s. China recognised this fact and repeatedly tried to warn South African movements of the dangers of ‘Superpower hegemonism’ and the ‘Soviet’s social-imperialism’s criminal activities’ (Beijing Domestic Service, January 4, 1976). However, the ANC largely ignored such warnings and did not share China’s perception that a fundamental task of South Africa’s liberation movements was to ‘repel the tiger while chasing away the wolf’ (New China News Agency, October 26, 1977).

SACP hostility to China As remarked earlier, the ANC’s close ally was acutely hostile to China and this necessarily compromised any Chinese hopes of a ‘reconciliation’ with the liberation organisation, although China apparently hoped for some type of accommodation, carrying ANC statements periodically. Much of this hostility was ideological, with the SACP being critical of Maoism and its spread in Africa. In a ‘Communist call to Africa’ in 1978, the SACP went further and urged a total rejection of Maoism and Chinese-style Communism (African Communist, no. 75, 1978: 40). Like many other Southern African movements, the SACP was also greatly angered by the PRC’s involvement in Angola, arguing that it was an example of China ‘showing its anti-African face’ (African Communist, no. 70, 1977: 117). A letter to the SACP’s magazine (and therefore presumably approved) gave a damning critique of the PRC’s African policies and is worth quoting at some length, for it showed the depth of hostility that Beijing’s policies provoked in some quarters: China … oppose[s] everything which the Soviet Union supports even when such a policy is detrimental to the interests of the people concerned. China pursues its international policy only in accordance with its own national interests … Now that the centre of the world revolutionary struggle has shifted to Africa, it would be well for the peoples of Africa to be aware of all the issues at stake … China’s policy is anti-African all round, despite highsounding pronouncements to the contrary. A nation without principle, like an individual, cannot command respect from anyone. (African Communist, no. 70, 1977: 117-118)

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This pronouncement must be contextualised. After the Angolan debacle, Chinese credibility on the continent was low and as a loyal Moscow ally, the SACP was only to be expected to criticise the PRC and denounce their African activities. Nevertheless, SACP hostility to China appeared to be genuine, with a SACP editorial proclaiming in 1979 that ‘China joins hands with imperialism’ (African Communist no. 77, 1979: 5). It is unlikely that such anti-Chinese attitudes did not influence the thinking, at least partially, of ANC cadres and the leadership. Ronnie Kasrils, a prominent South African Communist Party and ANC member, recounted how in the mid-1960s, China’s position was criticised within the ANC ranks and that, ‘both the SACP and the ANC shared the perception that Peking [attempted] to create splits within organisations in order to win support for the so-called “China line”’ (Kasrils, 1993: 87). In addition to SACP hostility to China, however, the ANC was only too aware that 90 per cent of its military aid came from the Soviet Union or its allies (Crocker, 1982: 68). As elsewhere in Southern Africa, Soviet support for the liberation organisation increased dramatically after the MPLA victory in Angola. Up to 500 MK cadres were trained annually in Angola (Vanneman and James, 1982: 49-50), and support from the Soviets and their allies to the ANC was lavish. Relations between the ANC and the GDR were in particular very strong (see Glass, 1980). This state of affairs meant that the PRC, as it will be seen in Namibia, was isolated from active involvement in the liberation struggle in South Africa as a result of Moscow’s success in Angola. China for its part, was forced to accept a minor role in the struggle, a diminution in Chinese prestige (lifted only somewhat by ZANU’s victory in Zimbabwe), and to restrict its support to the largely ineffective and squabbling PAC.

China’s diplomatic rhetoric vs. South Africa As a result, China was careful to involve itself as much as possible in the diplomatic struggle against Pretoria. In 1973 it was one of the four members of the Security Council of the UN to vote against accepting South Africa’s diplomatic credentials in New York, and walked out when this vote failed and a South African addressed the General Assembly (New China News Agency, October 6, 1973). China enthusiastically supported the vote a year later to exclude South Africa’s representatives (New China News Agency, November 16, 1974), and began to develop its theme that Pretoria was being supported by both Superpowers in the cause of ‘imperialism and great-nation hegemonism’ (New China News Agency, November 19, 1974). According to Beijing, the demise of the apartheid government was a ‘powerful blow to the two Superpowers’ (New China News Agency, February 1, 1978). By enrolling the developing world – ‘the main force in the struggle against hegemonism’ – in an anti-apartheid front, China hoped to not only foil the ambitions of the Superpowers, but also project itself as a force in the region on the political level despite its negligible role in the liberation movement proper. Such a policy received a sense of urgency after the Angolan debacle. Chinese rhetoric and commentary on South Africa invariably attempted to link Pretoria to the wider international system, and usually constructed linkages

PRC relations with South Africa 135 between the situation in the region and the Soviet Union’s hegemonic aspirations. Thus China accused Moscow and Pretoria of being in ‘secret collusion’ with Pretoria to control the gold, platinum and diamond markets (Xinhua, April 7, 1981). However, with the accession of Reagan in the White House and his policy of ‘constructive engagement’ (Baker, 1989; Tryman and Mwamba, 1987), China became alarmed that Washington’s position on the African continent and its credibility within the international system would be eroded (Renmin Ribao, April 9, 1981). Such a policy by the US would, China asserted, allow ‘the Soviet Union an excuse and opportunity to penetrate into Africa. This is not a wise move’ (Renmin Ribao, May 4, 1981). Clearly worried, Beijing repeatedly advised Washington of the dangers of being seen to be too close to Pretoria and allowing Moscow to exploit the situation. Beijing’s view was made explicit when it commented that, ‘if the United States does not change this policy it will no doubt provide an opportunity for the other Superpower [USSR] to pose as a natural ally of the African countries while infiltrating and expanding in Southern Africa’ (Beijing Domestic Service (in Chinese) September 10, 1981). Such an appeal to the US illustrated the real impotence of China in Southern Africa. Despite ambitions to be taken as a ‘great power’, Beijing was, when it feared the worst, forced to look to Washington to rival Moscow. In reality, Beijing was unable to prevent any hegemonic machinations by Moscow, and relied on the United States to combat what China feared could be the development of Soviet influence in the region. China’s anti-hegemonic rhetoric thus played an important part of Beijing’s policy in Southern Africa, as it attempted to prompt Washington into a more proactive anti-Soviet policy and a less accommodating position towards South Africa. To indicate Beijing’s own posture against Pretoria, China was assertive in its demand for comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa. However, as China and the Soviet Union relations underwent a period of detente, anti-Soviet utterings declined. Instead, China stepped up a more general condemnatory position towards Pretoria, including a criticism of Western policies towards South Africa. Such a policy sprang from the realisation that the West (in particular the US and UK), were becoming isolated in their position vis-à-vis South Africa. Thus Beijing was conscious of the need to reflect general developing world anger at the West’s perceived reluctant reaction to the situation in South Africa. Such a policy enabled China to maintain its position within the Third World, bolster Beijing’s credentials as a friend of the oppressed, and prevent Moscow from manoeuvring itself into the role of the chief anti-apartheid power. This was particularly crucial as China and the ANC began a process of reconciliation.

Thawing of relations between the Chinese and the ANC Until the 1980s, the aid relationship between the ANC and the Soviet Union had been largely exclusive and Beijing had remained relatively silent in support for the ANC. China had mentioned the ‘Azanian’ ANC on a few occasions in the 1970s, but as the ANC received its main support from Moscow and its allies, the PRC was in effect marginalised. Whilst Soviet aid and support was accessible,

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it was enticing for the Southern African organisation to depend on the Soviet bloc for its requirements, and by extension ignore the PRC. China did however make occasional efforts to break out of this impasse. In 1975 Beijing flirted with the ANC with Oliver Tambo visiting Beijing on a trip apparently sponsored by the Algerians (New China News Agency, April 3, 1975). By this time, China perceived the Soviet Union as the greater threat to Beijing than Washington. However, this visit came to nothing and the cool relations between China and the ANC resumed. The PRC later refused to even acknowledge the ANC’s existence, referring to ANC military actions as being conducted by ‘armed Black guerrilla forces’, with no mention of the MK (Renmin Ribao, July 24, 1980). Again, in 1979 an ANC-PRC rapprochement seemed possible when a Chinese delegation led by Vice-Premier Li Xiannian met with Secretary-General Alfred Nzo. China was prepared to normalise its relations if the ANC committed itself to ‘anti-imperialism’. However, the invasion of Viet Nam by China in February 1979 put paid to these developments as the ANC rushed to condemn Chinese aggression. However, as Moscow and Beijing flirted with each other in the early 1980s, the ANC correspondingly asserted that it was willing to resume normal links with Beijing if it ‘rejoined’ the anti-apartheid struggle (Kempton, 1989: 170). Such a comment of course indicated the popular perception that China was no longer involved in South Africa’s liberation fight. Relations between the PRC and the ANC, however, only really began after Brezhnev’s conciliatory speech vis-à-vis the PRC in September 1982 in Tashkent (Costea, 1990: 404). A month previously, China had called for the release of Mandela from prison – an indication that a thawing in relations was imminent (Renmin Ribao, August 5, 1982). The Soviets broadened their support for other organisations and encouraged the ANC to participate in coalitions of liberation movements – notably involvement in the United Democratic Front. Concerned at events in Poland and preoccupied with Afghanistan, the arms race with Washington and events in the Middle East, Moscow shifted much of its attention away from Southern Africa and showed a reluctance to bear all the costs and responsibilities for supporting the remaining liberation movements in the region (Clute, 1989: 164). As a consequence, Moscow softened its hostility to other powers becoming involved in the liberation campaign. Sino-ANC ties thus entered a considerable thawing phase. This was particularly so after 1983 when China’s policy towards the liberation organisations in South Africa was redefined with the Chinese press announcing that henceforth the PRC would treat, ‘all organisations struggling for national liberation in Southern Africa alike, without discrimination’ (Renmin Ribao, December 31, 1983). In effect, this meant that the PAC lost any special position it had retained with China and that in practice, the PRC was naturally drawn to the largest liberation organisation in South Africa, namely the ANC. This was later signified by an authoritative article in the Chinese press on the situation in South Africa, which failed to mention the PAC yet wrote approvingly that ‘in the hearts of many Black people Nelson Mandela has become their spiritual leader’ (Beijing Review,

PRC relations with South Africa 137 September 22, 1986). The sense that the PRC had somehow abandoned the PAC was further underscored when China asserted that ‘no solution is possible without ANC involvement’ (Beijing Review, December 21-27, 1987). As a consequence of the warming in relations between Beijing and the organisation, Oliver Tambo, the President of the ANC, visited the PRC in 1983 to reopen links with China abandoned for all practical purposes 20 years previously. This was seen by observers as a ‘ground-breaking gesture’ by both parties (The Australian, January 8-9, 1983). The visit by Tambo (accompanied by SWAPO representatives) marked a departure in the PRC’s policy towards the ANC and observers saw this as part of China’s, ‘pragmatism in keeping with Chinese attempts to project an image as a strong ally of the developing world in the face of Soviet “hegemonism” and Western “colonialism”’ (Agence France-Presse, January 6, 1983). China responded by promising military aid – possibly including training (Karis, 1984: 397), for as Tambo announced ‘the Chinese side has assured us of political, moral and material support’ (Xinhua, June 4, 1983). However, Chinese aid at this juncture was not aimed to compete with the Soviets, but was a logical pursuance of the Chinese policy of attempting to broaden its presence in the region and thus its prestige. Kempton (1989: 171) made this clear by stating that, ‘the renewal of Chinese aid [was] a by-product of Soviet policy toward China, rather than a renewal of Sino-Soviet competition’. For its part, Moscow was unconcerned by Beijing’s actions, commenting that the Soviet Union had ‘built up a relationship [with the ANC] over a decade. The Chinese are only beginning’ (Agence France-Presse, January 7, 1983). Nevertheless, PRC-PAC ties did remain – even after China’s rapprochement with the ANC and a PAC delegation visited China in August 1983. Evidently at the behest of China, the PAC announced that it was ‘making efforts to strengthen its unity … with people’s organisations in South Africa’ (Xinhua, August 22, 1983). China by this time was cognisant of the fact that the ANC was the leading organisation in South Africa struggling against the apartheid state, and realpolitik dictated that the PAC had to attempt to construct linkages with it. This was particularly so after China moved closer to the ANC and support for the PAC diminished.

China’s position on violence Under Gorbachev the Soviet Union was more amenable to a negotiated settlement, only too aware of the disaster that had befallen Angola after a protracted liberation campaign and civil war. The ANC began to agree with this approach and quietly dropped much of its violent rhetoric. By 1986, Oliver Tambo was able to assert that the ANC’s objectives were not violent revolution, but to ‘force Pretoria to the negotiating table’ (Financial Mail, January 17, 1986). Such a position suited Beijing’s own policies for it meant that China could continue to involve itself rhetorically – and thus gain kudos as a supporter of the liberation struggle – whilst not actually being required to commit itself overtly. For example,

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China fiercely condemned the imposition of the State of Emergency in July 1985. As Hu Yaobang later commented, China was willing to ‘fight alongside the international community’ against apartheid (Beijing Review, April 21, 1986). Antiapartheid posturing whilst encouraging negotiations thus became China’s policy in South Africa. China’s commitment to non-violent change in South Africa was perhaps classically indicated by its welcoming of the Anglican cleric, Bishop Desmond Tutu, to China in August 1986 (Beijing Review, August 25, 1986). All this was a radical departure from China’s position in the mid-1970s when Beijing asserted that ‘non-violence won’t work … in dealing with counterrevolutionary violence, revolutionary violence is necessary’ (Beijing Domestic Service, January 11, 1978). China by now had dropped its radical call for revolutionary violence and instead joined the mainstream of world opinion by calling for sanctions against Pretoria commenting that ‘only peaceful means [are] left for forcing the South African regime to give up apartheid’ (Radio Beijing, August 14, 1986). In April 1986 Alfred Nzo, the Secretary-General of the ANC, made a visit to China and was fêted by senior Chinese officials (Xinhua, April 11, 1986). Following on from that visit, rapprochement with the SACP was embarked upon, with China hosting the Chairman Joe Slovo and a SACP delegation in 1986 (Xinhua, September 18, 1986). At the same time, China began to exhibit an increased awareness of the complexities of the struggle in South Africa, reporting on how Whites were involving themselves in the fight against apartheid (Renmin Ribao, April 15, 1986). Commenting on this phenomena, China asserted that it left the Pretoria government in ‘unprecedented isolation’ and the regime was close to collapse (Renmin Ribao, August 15, 1986). As a result, the PRC stepped up its rhetorical pressure on Beijing, calling for increased sanctions on South Africa and demanding that Pretoria abandon its destabilisation campaign against its neighbours (The Citizen (Johannesburg) May 26, 1987).

Growth in Chinese contacts with South African opposition Following on from the Whites-only 1987 elections in South Africa, China perceived that the political crisis in the country remained high, with the ultra-right winning an increased percentage of votes whilst the reform-minded left the ruling National Party. According to Beijing’s analysis, ‘the ruling National Party’s progressive personages and the Progressive Federal Party … will exert a tremendous influence on the political process in South Africa after the election’ (Renmin Ribao, May 9, 1987). Following China’s policy of broadening its linkages in South Africa as much as possible, Beijing began to develop dialogue with the liberal elements in South African politics. In November 1987, the veteran anti-apartheid White politician Helen Suzman and the Progressive Federal Party leader, Colin Eglin, visited China to discuss matters with Beijing (Xinhua, November 10, 1987). A month later, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and Alexander Boraine of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa visited (Xinhua, September 6, 1987). South African Trade Unionists were also fêted in China (Xinhua, May 21, 1988).

PRC relations with South Africa 139 The Tiananmen Square massacre was, as might be expected, applauded by China’s oldest ally, the PAC. The PAC sent a message congratulating the PRC government in ‘putting down the counterrevolutionary rebellion’, and at the same time called for a strengthening of relations between the PAC and the PRC (Xinhua, Domestic Service, June 21, 1989). China responded by calling for the ban on liberation organisations to be lifted (Xinhua, October 16, 1989). However, despite the rhetoric China’s actual commitment to the liberation movements remained a reflection of China’s real impotence as an important power in Southern Africa. In October, 1989 the Chinese ambassador to Zambia presided over the hand-over of what was an essentially insignificant amount of aid to the ANC (China donated 80 sports shirts and shorts, 50 pairs of sports shoes, 50 transistor radios and 50 footballs. Enough for a small sized football tournament, but not for a sustained fight against apartheid). The ambassador attempted to excuse the parsimony of the amount on the grounds that ‘the significance is great because it shows China’s support to [the] ANC’ (Xinhua, October 6, 1989). However, the donation showed that China was not willing to overly commit itself to one organisation. Later that year delegations from diverse organisations as the PAC and the liberal Democratic Party visited, indicating that China was maintaining its policy of broadening its linkages with as many players in South Africa as possible (the Democratic Party visited in October whilst the PAC visited in November 1989.

Growth in Sino-South African relations China had continually backed the dismantling of apartheid and managed to project itself in the region as a concerned party, with little practical commitment. Whilst the motives behind this posturing were to project China’s global position as a responsible power, the PRC undoubtedly had economic matters in mind too, and this came clearer as the 1980s ended. Even prior to the resignation of P.W. Botha, China was attempting to trade with Pretoria, and in January 1989 the PRC was reported to be negotiating to buy generating equipment from obsolete South African power stations (Business Day (Johannesburg) January 18, 1989). With an eye on economic development, China stepped up its call for a negotiated settlement following the accession of Frederik de Klerk as South African President in February 1989. Beijing commented approvingly of the ‘increase in numbers favouring dialogue with the government’, and the ‘trend towards a political settlement of South Africa’s problems’ (Beijing Review, January 8-14, 1990). Interestingly, the Chinese were not averse to mentioning that ‘the Black majority lacks a unified leadership and organisation’ (ibid.). The release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990, presumably satisfied Beijing on this score judging by the enthusiasm that the Chinese press greeted his release. Mandela’s release and the lifting of the ban on the ANC, PAC and others, provoked Beijing to urge the various opposition groups to ‘co-ordinate their approaches and eliminate their differences’ (Xinhua, February 12, 1990). Soon after Mandela’s release, he met the PRC ambassador to Zambia and thanked China for its support. Mandela at this point maintained that sanctions were still necessary against South Africa, and

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China publicly concurred, thus in September Beijing asked the international community ‘not to slacken pressure, but to continue effective sanctions’ (Xinhua, September 14, 1990). However, Chinese rhetoric was not consistent with its actions. In November, China announced that South African citizens were permitted to visit China, and in December a delegation from China visited South Africa to discuss possible joint ventures, though this visit was publicly denied. Beijing maintained the pretence of resolute action vis-à-vis South Africa, however, with Qian Qichen earnestly assuring the PAC of continued support for sanctions (Xinhua, January 12, 1991). De Klerk’s announcement of the scrapping of all remaining racial laws in South Africa on February 1, 1991 was greeted with approval by China, and Chinese contacts, especially that of a commercial nature, increased in frequency (Xinhua, February 9, 1991). In May 1991 the South African Foreign Ministry was again forced to deny that a secret visit by PRC officials to South Africa was made to discuss trade links. As a South African newspaper remarked, the visit reflected China’s ‘determination not to let ideological scruples get in the way of commercial benefits’ (The Star (Johannesburg) May 31, 1991). In addition, reports from Hong Kong indicated that China was importing iron ore from South Africa claiming that it was from Australia (South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) May 10, 1991). Chinese non-governmental contacts with Pretoria were begun at this point, with normalisation envisaged once apartheid had formally been abolished. China intimated to South Africa that ties would be welcomed and the normalisation of relations possible once Pretoria severed diplomatic linkages with Taipei. This was to prove the major stumbling block to Sino-South African official ties for a period. In October 1991 South Africa’s Foreign Minister Pik Botha visited the PRC, the first South Africa Minister of Foreign Affairs to do so (Sunday Star (Johannesburg) October 13, 1991). A business delegation from South Africa accompanied Botha, representing large South African commercial companies. Whilst these business contacts were being made, China was busy congratulating the ‘ANC’s show of pragmatism, which is a manifestation of political maturity’ (Beijing Central People’s Radio Network, July 10, 1991). This policy of maintaining links with political groupings whilst assiduously courting business linkages continued. China encouraged the ANC to pursue a ‘pragmatic’ economic policy, for commercial linkages with South Africa stood to benefit China’s own modernisation programme. Questioned as to the morality of trading with South Africa, China disingenuously pointed out that a recent Commonwealth summit had not ‘mentioned’ sanctions, and so Beijing felt justified in developing these linkages with Pretoria (Xinhua, October 24, 1991). As one commentator dryly noted, this ‘pushed the pragmatism in [China’s] foreign policy to a new extreme’ (Christian Science Monitor, October 21, 1991). But as a result, China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met his South African counterpart in January 1992 at Johannesburg’s international airport whilst en route to Zimbabwe. At the same time, it was confirmed that the PRC had an ‘interest section’ under the auspices of the Centre for African Studies, though as a sign of future developments, Taipei expressed unhappiness at this meeting. China expressed a willingness to develop relations

PRC relations with South Africa 141 with South Africa ‘on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ meaning Pretoria dropping Taipei (Xinhua, January 23, 1992). Despite no move by Pretoria, the first official Chinese trade delegation visited South Africa in February 1992, and in July an eight-man Chinese trade delegation visited with the intention to secure contracts with South African suppliers of iron ore, industrial diamonds and paper pulp (The Citizen, August 1, 1992).

Mandela’s visit to China, October 1992 Sino-African ties continued apace and in October 1992 Nelson Mandela visited China meeting Premier Li Peng and President Jiang Zemin. Mandela expressed gratitude for Chinese support to the anti-apartheid struggle, and asserted that ‘the experience of China in economic construction can be used by South Africa as an example’ (Chinafrica, no. 23, November 1992: 24). It was evident that China was attempting to woo Mandela on the question of future political relations. Jiang Zemin, the CPC General Secretary, expressed a wish that the visit would ‘surely strengthen the relations between the CPC and the ANC and between the people of China and South Africa’ (Xinhua, October 6, 1992). However, commercial linkages remained the main vehicle of Sino-South African interaction, with trade between the two countries at US$250 million in 1992 (Xinhua, April 23, 1992). Negotiations for opening a trade office were begun shortly after, despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties. Prior to the elections in May 1994, China had embarked on a thorough wooing of South African politicians in an attempt to put forward the Chinese case for recognition. Delegates from the PAC, SACP, ANC and others, had been invited to China and had listened as Beijing explained their position vis-à-vis Taiwan-South African ties. The Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Tiang Zeng-pei followed this process up by the outright calling for Pretoria to sever ties with the ROC (The Star, March 3, 1994). Thus as the new government took office, this was to become the major issue in Sino-South African relations, parallel to a massive increase in trade between the two countries.

The expansion of economic links In May 1994 the first fully democratic election in South Africa’s history was held with the ANC winning nearly 65 per cent of the vote, the ex-government National Party securing 20.5 per cent, whilst China’s erstwhile protegés the PAC garnering only 1.3 per cent. Prior to the elections China had expressed a desire to open up official ties with South Africa and in November 1993, shortly after South Africa had held its first trade exhibition in China, announced that official economic and trade ties were to be resumed, thus recognising the growing economic links between the two states. Chinese interest in developing commercial linkages with South Africa greatly increased after the elections. Over 120 Chinese companies took part in a trade exhibition in July 1994 in Pretoria (Xinhua, July 5, 1994). Unshackled by

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anti-apartheid sanctions, the door was wide-open for growing links between China and South Africa, according to Volkswagen South Africa’s Dean Robinson (Business Day, July 1, 1994), whilst Nelson Mandela was reported as seeing Asia as a good area to encourage investment from (Hong Kong Standard (Hong Kong) February 3, 1995). The South African press was also upbeat about developing ties with China. South Africa possessed many of the resources that China needed for its economic modernisation programme, such as iron ore, basic steel and iron, vehicle parts and accessories and mining machinery. Trade in 1993 had been US$500 million (Business Day (Johannesburg) September 16, 1993), whilst 1994 saw trade total US$898 million, and South Africa had become, in a short period of time, China’s largest trading partner in Africa (China Daily (Beijing) May 23, 1995). This process had been helped by a growth in Chinese immigrants to South Africa. As part of China’s policy, trade relations between China and South Africa continued to develop prodigiously. In 1991 trade had accounted for only US$14.6 million but by 1994 was US$900 million. With indirect trade via Hong Kong and Taiwan included, this total had more accurately reached US$1.5 billion (Financial Times (Johannesburg) February 13, 1995). Given that China and South Africa did not recognise each other this is significant.

Sino-Taiwanese competition Following the establishment of a democratic South Africa, a diplomatic competition between Beijing and Taipei began for recognition and official relations. As noted earlier, Pretoria had throughout the apartheid era maintained relations with Taipei. As a residue of the ancien régime it may have been expected that the new government in Pretoria would have broken links with the ROC and established ties with Beijing, which after all, had supported the ANC’s struggle. Certainly, the PRC attempted to use the growth of Sino-South African trade as a leverage in its attempt to have Pretoria switch its diplomatic relations from Taipei (see below). Liu Qinhua, a deputy division chief in the Chinese Trade Ministry asserted that the lack of diplomatic ties meant that China felt unable to offer preferential trade links (Financial Times (Johannesburg) February 13, 1995). As Fuchang Yang, the PRC’s Deputy Foreign Minister, insisted ‘the Taiwan question must be settled before diplomatic relations can be established’ (Sunday Times (Johannesburg) June 15, 1993). China appeared to be pursuing a two-track policy towards South Africa. On the one hand encouraging the rapid growth in trade links with Pretoria, whilst on the other refusing to countenance political relations until South Africa ditched Taiwan in favour of Beijing. Qian Qichen for example warned a South African delegation in July 1995 that a state with diplomatic ties with China ‘can only maintain unofficial economic and cultural ties with Taiwan’ (comments made to a delegation from the Foreign Affairs Committee of South Africa’s parliament, cited in Xinhua, July 4, 1995). What is most remarkable about developments vis-à-vis recognition after the elections, was the fact that Nelson Mandela had, in August 1993, given an

PRC relations with South Africa 143 extremely clear-cut indication of his intentions. His statement to Beijing, carried by the SACP’s Joe Slovo, is worth quoting at length: We will … not forget that the rulers of Taiwan Island … [supported] South African racism and the apartheid system. Our policy is clear-cut and unchangeable. When the new democratic system takes place next year, [we] will follow the principles adopted by the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in developing relations with China. In short, the new South Africa will correct the historical injustice in relations with China caused by the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan by the apartheid system. There is no doubt that the new South Africa will diplomatically recognise that the People’s Republic of China is the sole representative of the whole China. (Xinhua, Domestic Service, August 17, 1993) However, Taipei did its most utmost to woo Mandela. During his visit to the ROC in August 1993 whilst still a presidential candidate, Taipei was reported to have provided substantial funds to the ANC’s election campaign (figures as high as US$ 7 million have been quoted, see The Star, December 2, 1994). Despite this Mandela was reported to have said in February 1994 that Sino-South African state-to-state relations ‘should be strengthened’ now that the situation in South Africa had changed (Xinhua, February 23, 1994). The ROC President Lee Teng-hui, however, visited South Africa in May 1994 to attend Mandela’s inauguration as President of South Africa and met Mandela, afterwards asserting that TaiwaneseSouth African ties remained ‘very solid’ (The Citizen, May 13, 1994). Mandela later expressed his policy that ‘unless [Taiwan] does something very bad against us, we would never take the initiative in cutting official ties’ (Agence FrancePresse, June 8, 1994). Taiwan acknowledged that China was engaged in an active campaign to gain recognition from Pretoria, but asserted that the ROC was ‘not static either’ (ibid.). As part of this, Taiwan attempted to counter the PRC’s trade offensive with South Africa with a 48 strong trade delegation to South Africa in August 1994 (Agence France-Presse, August 28, 1994), and perhaps more importantly, announced that it was earmarking US$41 million finance aid projects in South Africa (Agence France-Presse, September 5, 1994). In the face of this competition for South Africa’s favours, some South African observers urged that Pretoria should sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan and establish relations with Beijing. For example, Greg Mills of the South African Institute of International Affairs warned that ‘dual recognition was a non-starter’ and would only antagonise Beijing (Xinhua, June 9, 1994). This period saw high expectations of an immediate switch to Beijing by Pretoria. The Deputy Chairman of the South African Constitutional Assembly, expressed ‘optimism’ about normalising relations between the two countries (Xinhua, December 23, 1994), and the South African Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad, was quoted as saying that Pretoria was intending to establish diplomatic ties and that the forging of ties with Taiwan was likely (Sunday Times (Johannesburg) June 19, 1994). However, nothing developed, prompting China to comment that it ‘wished China and

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South Africa would increase contacts, improve mutual understanding and develop bilateral relations’ (Xinhua, December 15, 1994). The PRC’s Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation went further, arguing that South Africa would immeasurably benefit, once ‘South Africa solves the problem of its relationship with Taiwan’ (The Star, August 11, 1994). However, Nzo visited Taiwan in December 1994 to discuss further economic co-operation and the status of Taipei-Pretoria ties (The Citizen, December 3, 1994). Both countries agreed to strengthen ties and an aid package was discussed. Taiwan, evidently alarmed at PRC pressure on South Africa, proposed taking over a failed oil-from-gas project in South Africa, and converting it into a crude oil refinery at a cost of about US$8 billion. Taipei-Pretoria ties were further strengthened by the signing of the ROC’s first free-trade accord with a World Trade Organisation member, namely South Africa, in February 1995. This accord was important for it signalled that South Africa was willing to maintain its posture of support for Taiwan under Chinese pressure to do otherwise. However, the time for making a firm decision on South African ties with either Beijing or Taipei was fast becoming urgent.

South African Foreign Minister’s visit to China In March 1996 the South African Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo, visited China once again leading to speculation that Pretoria was about to switch recognition. The first official visit by a senior South African leader to China, Nzo’s visit came at a time when Taiwan had just held its first democratic election – boosting the credibility and legitimacy of Lee Teng-hui’s government. Nzo expressed a desire to establish relations with the PRC, and Taiwan at the time was amenable to Pretoria establishing links with Beijing, as long as it was not at the expense of Taipei. The ROC in effect favoured dual recognition by Pretoria of both Taipei and Beijing. As Taiwan’s head of African Affairs, Timothy Yang said, the ROC had ‘no intention of interfering with South Africa’s decision to establish ties with other countries. What matters to us is our relations with South Africa’ (South China Morning Post, March 28, 1996). The de facto South African envoy to China, Leslie Labuschagne, of the South African Centre for Chinese Studies agreed, asserting that South Africa ‘wanted to have good links with both [countries]’ (Eastern Express, March 26, 1996). Mandela had already attempted to reassure Taipei on this point, assuring the ROC that ‘we have no intention of cancelling diplomatic relations with the Republic of China’ (Free China Journal, April 28, 1995). Economic matters played a part in this as Taiwanese trade with Pretoria amounted to an annual total of US$1.56 billion whilst PRC trade was US$1.32 billion (Eastern Express, March 27, 1996). Beijing however refused to countenance such an arrangement, which stood to undermine its whole ‘one-China’ policy with regards to the ROC, though it continued wooing South Africa. For example, the Chinese Minister of Foreign and Economic Co-operation met President Mandela on May 1, 1996 to exchange ‘views on the development of bilateral ties’ (China Daily, May 2, 1996). As Deputy President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki had already acknowledged,

PRC relations with South Africa 145 the PRC was adamantly ‘opposed to a two-China policy and to a one China, one-Taiwan policy’ (Agence France-Presse, February 20, 1994).

Nzo’s visit to Taiwan, July 1996 In July 1996, the South African Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo, visited Taiwan. Initially, Taiwanese opposition MP’s urged the government to ‘prepare for the worst’, as Nzo’s trip was widely expected to signal the end of ROC-South African ties in the face of Beijing’s fierce opposition to dual recognition (South African Press Agency-Agence France Presse, July 1, 1996). Indeed, the visit came after Pretoria indicated that it wanted to establish ties with both Beijing and Taipei (South China Morning Post, July 1, 1996), something which the PRC had repeatedly ruled out. The question of recognition appeared to be the subject of some controversy in South Africa and Nzo acknowledged this, saying that whilst South Africa would like to expand relations with both sides of the Taiwanese Straits, ‘how to achieve this is currently the subject of debate in South Africa’ (South African Press Agency, July 2, 1996). Dual recognition was no problem for Taipei however, and the ROC explicitly said its relations with South Africa would not be affected by Pretoria’s open call for relations with PRC. As Timothy Yang of the African Affairs Department of the ROC’s Foreign Ministry said, ‘South Africa wants to establish ties with mainland China but at the same time it’s clear that it still wants to maintain ties with us’ (South China Morning Post, June 30, 1996). This contrasted with the PRC’s own position which was unwilling to countenance such an arrangement, refusing to move from its preconditioned posturing for establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa. As a Foreign Ministry spokesman said, ‘China does not and will not, accept dual recognition’ (South China Morning Post, July 5, 1996). However, President Mandela appeared to end the debate on the day of Nzo’s departure with an announcement that for a while ended months of speculation: ‘[Taiwan] supported us during the later phase of the struggle … It is not easy for me to be assisted by a country, and once I come to power, say “I have no relations with you”. I haven’t got that type of immorality, and I will not do it’ (South African Press Agency, July 2, 1996). The PRC’s inflexibility on the recognition issue appeared to have backfired, for Mandela remarked testily to the Chinese to ‘resolve your problems. Don’t expect us to’ (South China Morning Post, July 5, 1996). The ROC’s response to Mandela’s comments were enthusiastic. One report described them as a ‘shot in the arm for Taipei-Pretoria relations’ (Free China Journal, July 5, 1996). Taiwan’s Foreign Minister, John Chang, asserted that ‘what President Mandela said was of great significance with very positive implications’ (South African Press Agency, July 3, 1996). Mandela has been noted for remembering ‘favours’ (Christian Science Monitor, May 31, 1996), and as a result his attitude towards Taiwan was influenced by the help it gave the ANC towards the end of the struggle against apartheid and in particular, the funding to the ANC during the election campaign. In addition, however, Beijing’s confrontational posturing vis-à-vis its ‘one China’ policy, would no doubt have rankled Mandela who had previously asserted that ‘he has

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allegiances to friends during the apartheid era … and feels no one should dictate to [Pretoria]’ (ibid.). This attitude had earlier been put forward by Themba Sono, a South African academic, who argued: The foreign policy of a nation is determined by that nation; it is not the product of coercion by another nation. Because recognising Taiwan will ‘anger Beijing’ … is not material reason for cutting ties with Taiwan … While the PRC is a powerful member of the Security Council, this … does not translate into a hegemony in bilateral relations. (The Star, June 22, 1994) That China should be accused of pursuing hegemonic tendencies in its foreign policy vis-à-vis South Africa is an ironic reversal of Chinese rhetoric. Essentially, South Africa felt that it was too large, too influential, and that Mandela enjoyed too high an international standing – the ‘Mandela dividend’ – to be forced into recognising Beijing and de-recognising Taipei at the PRC’s behest. The ROC was, in addition, a big investor in South Africa creating thousands of jobs, and was a major aid donor (unlike China). Thus in August 1996 Taiwanese Vice-Premier Hsu Li-the visited South Africa with a 48-man business delegation to review Taiwanese investment projects in the country. Immediately prior to the visit, a US$12 billion investment scheme involving PRC companies to build a new city in northern South Africa was announced though this proposed project was greeted with some scepticism (South African Press Agency, August 29, 1996). During Hsu’s visit, a US$10 million aid package was agreed upon, and ROC business executives reached an agreement to jointly develop a US$3 billion petrochemical complex in South Africa (Free China Journal, September 6, 1996). The visit of Hsu and the economic agreement was deemed as a ‘move to further affirm Taipei-Pretoria ties after … Mandela asserted in July that Pretoria [would] not break relations with Taipei to formalise ties with Peking’ (Free China Journal, August 16, 1996). Mandela reiterated this stance during the visit, again asserting that, ‘it would be a man of no morality who would go to a country and ask for resources and then once in power say that we will have nothing to do with you’ (Hong Kong Standard, August 27, 1996). Whilst reaffirming the ‘one China’ position and wishing to formalise diplomatic ties with China, South Africa viewed the affair as a domestic issue, and Mandela expressed ‘hope that the people of both countries will sort it out’ (Agence France-Presse, August 26, 1996). This stance by Pretoria however drew heavy criticism from China which likened South African support for the ROC to outsiders backing South Africa’s partition during the apartheid era into White and Black homelands (South China Morning Post, September 5, 1996). In a scathing attack on South Africa’s attempt to pursue a dual recognition strategy, Beijing asserted that Pretoria was violating UN resolutions in creating a ‘two China’s’ situation. Analysts however asserted that Mandela was ‘pulling a bluff’ on China, and therefore maximising South Africa’s manoeuvrability and overseas investment from the two rival countries (Landsberg, 1996).

PRC relations with South Africa 147 China however was aware that South Africa was potentially a major opportunity for investment and remained confident that Pretoria would eventually switch to Beijing. As a consequence, despite Chinese protestations about South Africa’s refusal to cut ties with the ROC, Beijing pursued a ‘kid glove’ approach to Pretoria, and bade its time for the inevitability as it saw it of South Africa choosing the PRC over Taiwan. In this, Beijing proved to be correct.

Switch of recognition On Wednesday November 27th 1996, Mandela announced that Pretoria would cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan and establish full foreign relations with the PRC as from January 1, 1998 (South African Press Agency, November 27, 1996). The announcement was variously termed a ‘surprise’ and a ‘shock’ to Taiwan (South China Morning Post, November 28, 1996). Indeed, a week before the announcement a Taiwanese scholar was confident that relations with the ROC would remain whilst Mandela was in power (see comments by Peter Kien-hong Yu, political science lecturer at National Sun Yat-sen University in Free China Journal, November 22, 1996). Whilst Delina de Villiers-Steenkamp, the South African Consul-General in Hong Kong saw Pretoria’s relations with Taipei as a ‘tricky situation’ (South China Morning Post, November 23, 1996), Pretoria’s Ambassador to Taiwan revealed that he had been informed of Mandela’s decision only ten minutes before it was announced (Agence-France Presse, November 28, 1996). It is evident from such information that the decision by Mandela came as a surprise to involved persons – both Taiwanese and South African and South African opposition politicians lined up to condemn the move. Beijing however predictably welcomed the move as a ‘positive’ act on the part of Mandela (China Daily, November 29, 1996). For its part, Taipei was initially surprised by the move, and then immediately issued a strong protest against the announcement, saying that the news was a ‘very unfriendly decision’ and would seriously hurt existing relations between the two countries (Agence-France Presse, November 27, 1996). Developing on this theme, the ROC’s Ambassador to Pretoria asserted that Taipei would have to review its aid projects to South Africa (South African Press Agency, November 28, 1996), throwing into doubt aid and economic commitments such as a US$3.5 billion petro-chemical plant by the Tuntex Distinct Corporation in the Eastern Cape, and a US$15 million aid package (Agence-France Presse, November 28, 1996). Indeed, Greg Mills of the South African Institute of International Affairs expressed a widespread fear that Taipei would react in a similar manner to its actions after South Korea’s decision to break diplomatic ties with the ROC, i.e. a severance of all economic linkages. Mills urged that Pretoria allow Taipei to ‘save face’ by maintaining relations at the maximum level in order to preserve the invaluable economic ties between the ROC and South Africa (The Star, November 28, 1996). It seems apparent that Pretoria chose this path, for the ROC praised Mandela for the way South Africa carried out its decision to split with Taipei. As John Chang, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister asserted, ‘after preliminary analysis, we believe

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President Mandela absolutely meant well’ (South China Morning Post, December 3, 1996). In turn, South Africa asserted that it wanted to preserve ‘friendly links’ with the island (Hong Kong Standard, December 4, 1996). Previously, the ROC’s Vice-Economic Minister Chang Chang-pang had asserted that the split would not affect bilateral trade and investment links with South Africa (Agence France-Presse, November 28, 1996). Taiwan’s aim seemed to be to maintain as high as possible bilateral ties between South Africa and Taiwan. This has included keeping control of Taiwanese properties, preserving trade and air traffic linkages and exchanging representative offices bearing each others’ formal titles. Indeed, John Chang, visited South Africa to discuss the shape of future ROC-RSA ties in November, 1996, a visit brought forward from January 1997. The fact that these talks happened at all indicated that Taipei was appreciative of Mandela’s tactful and ‘face-saving’ efforts to soften the blow of his decision to switch. In meeting with Chang, Mandela offered the ROC ‘relations on the very highest level short of diplomatic relations’. Chang replied that he thought likely that South Africa and the ROC could ‘work out a formula for [a] future relationship’ (South China Morning Post, December 5, 1996). In January, 1997 Chang again visited South Africa to further discuss the future of ROC-RSA links and claimed to have ‘successfully laid down the foundations for successful negotiations in the future’ (Hong Kong Standard, January 21, 1997). Thus the approach suggested by Mills towards Taiwan seemingly prevented a wholesale split between the two countries.

Motives for switch in recognition The decision to switch relations from the ROC to the PRC may be summarised as stemming from three main reasonings: long-term economic factors; post-1997 Hong Kong; and South Africa’s wish to play a leading role in international affairs. On the economic front, South Africa’s trade with China came to US$1.32 billion in 1995, with trade expected to grow by 15-20 per cent in 1996 (International Herald Tribune, November 29, 1996). Whilst Taiwanese trade with South Africa in 1995 reached US$1.74 billion in 1995 (South African Press Agency, November 27, 1996), Pretoria’s trade with China, including goods shipped via Hong Kong, had been greater than Taipei’s since 1993 (International Herald Tribune, November 29, 1996). In addition, an increasing amount of investment projects were being committed by PRC companies in South Africa at the time. The South African Finance Minister asserted that the switch paved the way for South Africa to achieve Most Favoured Nation trading status with China (South China Morning Post, December 2, 1996). It is difficult to prefer an island of 21 million people over China’s 1.2 billion and its vast trade potential. Thus trade was perhaps the dominating factor in influencing South Africa’s decision to switch ties. With regard to South Africa’s consulate in Hong Kong, the imminent hand-over of the British colony to Chinese sovereignty in mid-1997 posed acute problems for an investment-hungry South Africa but which maintained political ties to China’s political rival. This was acknowledged as the primary item on the South African Consul-General’s agenda in Hong Kong, and according to the

PRC relations with South Africa 149 Consul-General ‘was a factor in Pretoria’s switching of relations’ (South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) November 23, 1996). As De Villiers-Steenkamp pointed out, ‘if South Africa had an unofficial office here for an indefinite period it would be more difficult to indicate to big investors and to make them feel more comfortable’ (South China Morning Post, November 29, 1996). With Mandela’s announcement, the position of the consulate was far more secure and the consulate retained its diplomatic status, thus being in the position to attract investment into South Africa from the newly incorporated Chinese Hong Kong. On the international arena front, Mandela was merely being cognisant of the global realpolitik. Aspirant of playing an increasing role in world affairs, Mandela asserted that Pretoria had become an active participant in the Organisation of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations. As he pointed out ‘a permanent continuation of diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China on Taiwan is inconsistent with South Africa’s role in international affairs’ (South Africa’s Relations with the Greater China Region, 1996). Thus South Africa’s ambition to possess an increasing status in the world system meant that it could no longer afford to maintain political ties with the ROC or pay lip service to what for all intents and purposes is a lost cause. A fourth motivation behind South Africa’s change of mind was put forward by the ROC’s Vice-Foreign Minister Francisco Ou. According to Ou, the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali acted on China’s behalf by influencing Mandela to switch sides in the hope that China would champion his re-election as UN secretary general. Whilst this move was subsequently scuppered by Washington’s veto, if true it was a lesson for South Africa – eager to join the ranks of the powerful – of the cynicism prevalent in the realm of high international politics (Far Eastern Economic Review, February 5, 1997).

Post-recognition ties Since the switch in recognition, Pretoria’s links with China have grown exponentially at both the political and economic level. China is one of the few countries with which South Africa has established a Bi-National Commission. Its structure was set up in 2000 when then President Jiang Zemin visited South Africa and was formerly launched in the South African capital of Pretoria in December 2001. The agreement covers not only bilateral, but also multilateral relations, while promoting trade and investment and was the first structure of its kind established between China and any other country. But it is on the economic front that linkages have been constructed, almost on an exponential scale. China is now among the top six countries in South Africa in terms of overall trade, exceeding some European countries that have long been strong trading partners with Pretoria. There are two aspects of this relationship which are of particular note – in terms of trade relations and through the presence of South African companies in China, of which there are currently around 17, including the Anglo American family such as Anglo Coal, Anglo Gold and Anglo Platinum, as well as major South African banks such as ABSA, Nedcor and

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Standard Bank. Overall trade in 2004 was at about £2.8 billion. Over the six years of formal ties this has been a massive increase. Currently, South Africa exports mainly minerals to Beijing, such as gold, diamonds and platinum, and also machinery, wood, paper pulp and base metals. In return, China exports manufactured goods such as footwear and textiles, as well as cheap electrical appliances. Interestingly, (see below) South Africa has more investments in China than vice versa. However, although overall trade and bilateral investments between China and South Africa remain relatively underdeveloped, Pretoria’s technological expertise in the energy sector and the oil company Sasol’s strong refining and gasification infrastructure are likely to be more and more important for China. ‘In terms of technological expertise, China is looking at South African coal liquefaction methods which seek to form oil from coal. In August [2004] Sasol, South Africa’s chief producer of oil from coal, signed a letter of intent with China to investigate the feasibility of establishing two coal liquefaction plants in the Asian state – one in Shaanxi province and the other in the Ningxia autonomous region – at a cost of around US$6 billion. China has coal reserves of around 1 trillion tonnes’ (Widdershoven, 2004). Yet, growing Chinese penetration of South Africa has, as in Zimbabwe, provoked fears of local producers being put of business. In 2004, trade between South Africa and China totalled £3.1 billion. Currently, Pretoria is running around a £1.4 billion trade deficit with China. Of note is the fact that China also exports labour-intensive manufactured goods while South Africa mainly exports only capital-intensive commodities (only about 5 per cent of South African exports to China are from the manufacturing industry). In effect, this has led to South Africa creating jobs in China while Chinese imports have undermined jobs in South Africa – and indeed across the region. According to Zwelinzima Vavi, head of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), the South African government had moved too slowly in implementing safeguards against cheap Chinese imports in the clothing, textile and footwear sector. This had led to a loss of 55,000 jobs since 2003 (Business Day, November 3, 2005). The Chief Executive Officer of a South African textile company put it thus: There are 30-million textile jobs worldwide in danger of being lost because of the so-called Chinese miracle. Chinese manufacturers exploit their workers in inhuman conditions comparable to 1750 England, paying them about $120 a month for working 72 hrs a week. There are no workers rights, no unions, overtime pay and the like. Their industries are subsidised, financed and given huge export incentives by government. Their currency is clearly manipulated so as to keep their exports more competitive. This in the face of World Trade Organisation regulations. In SA we have an over regulated labour structure, which discourages employment. We must adhere to high minimum wages and are allowed to work only a 45-hour week, a whopping 38 per cent less time than worked in China. Our wages are about 400% higher than in China, which means that the labour cost per unit in SA, at equal productivity,

PRC relations with South Africa 151 is about five times theirs … Rather than promoting love affairs with China, [Pretoria] should devise an imaginative policy that sees SA coming first in all respects. (Business Day, October 25, 2005) In fact, South African trade unions have demanded that provincial governments enforce World Trade Organisation safeguards against China. However, the central government prefers to negotiate a free-trade deal with China that will, it is claimed, protect South Africa’s vulnerable industries. But the main trade union body in the country is extremely agitated by Chinese expansion into Africa: ‘Cosatu said the trade relationship between Africa and China was “colonial” and focused on the exploitation of the continent’s minerals and natural resources without developing its industrial capacity’ (Business Day, November 3, 2005). Furthermore, apart from the huge flow of Chinese imports into South Africa, Chinese investment in the country is actually relatively sparse. Indeed, Beijing’s ‘long-term fixed investments from China indicates a lack of commitment in Africa. Chinese investments in Africa totalled $1.2-billion in 2004. About $200-million of this went to South Africa. In the same year, South Africa invested more than $300-million in China’ (Mail and Guardian, January 20, 2006). In other words, China’s rhetoric regarding developing links with Africa are not matched by action in long-term investment. China seems happy to invest in energy sectors across Africa (including in South Africa) and export huge quantities of cheap manufactured products, but is averse to much more than that. This is increasingly raising questions as to the nature of the relationships that Beijing is crafting with Africa.

Towards the future China’s relations with South Africa were consistently problematic for China before 1996. Initially, China had taken a hostile stand against the apartheid government, supporting the ANC with arms and training. However, because of the vagaries of the Sino-Soviet conflict, China was edged out of active involvement with the ANC and forced to support the largely ineffective PAC. Whilst this afforded China the opportunity to rhetorically involve itself in the struggle, it severely undermined any chance Beijing had in influencing events or being recognised as a major player in the liberation campaign. This contrasted with the role China played in Zimbabwe (see Chapter 6). It was only with a thaw in relations with Moscow that China was afforded an opportunity to forge links with the ANC but despite rhetoric to the contrary, this never came to much. Thus, when South Africa abandoned apartheid China and Taiwan were largely evenly placed – though initially Beijing was presumed to be the natural candidate for Pretoria’s recognition. It was here that China’s unwillingness to compromise its ‘one China’ policy meant that Sino-South African ties were not immediately normalised. However, once official recognition was secured both economic and political linkages with China have increased on a dramatic scale. As Africa’s strongest economy and a gateway to the relatively developed Southern African region,

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Pretoria arguably stands to benefit economically as increasing amounts of commercial interchange between the region and the PRC increase. However, the nature of the economic relationship is increasingly being interrogated from within South Africa. The lack of meaningful long-term investments by China and the flooding of South African markets by cheap Chinese products (as elsewhere in the region) is a cause of concern. Yet, Beijing at the moment seems content with limiting its role in South Africa to extracting and/or importing those mineral resources it requires whilst advancing its own narrow economic interests. How sustainable this is, is open to question. However, as long as the Pretoria government seems in awe of the potentiality of China as a major trading partner, it seems clear that South Africa will not seek to radically restructure the relationship. For now, China’s re-emergence in a country from which it was shut out for so long continues to expand dramatically.

8

Chinese relations with Namibia

Namibia, then known as South West Africa (SWA), was mandated to South Africa in 1920 by the League of Nations, following the defeat of the former colonial power Germany. However, South African designs on the country, particularly after 1949 when (White) representatives from SWA were seated in the South African parliament meant that apartheid was enforced by the South African authorities and entrenched from 1964 (Du Pisani, 1986). Conflict with the United Nations was inevitable and in 1966 an International Court of Justice only avoided condemning South African actions in SWA as illegal on a technicality. In October of that year, however, Pretoria’s mandate to govern the territory was revoked and in 1971 South Africa’s presence in SWA was declared illegal (Dugard, 1973). Black African reaction to South Africa’s rule in SWA had been crystallised in 1959 with the formation of the South West African National Union (SWANU) with Jariretundu Kozonguizi as head. A year later the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) was established and SWAPO and SWANU quickly established headquarters for themselves in Tanzania (see Katjavivi, 1988). In 1964, however, the OAU’s Liberation Committee put a question to both organisations: would they be willing to take up arms against South Africa’s presence in SWA? SWAPO answered in the affirmative, whilst SWANU refused. As a result, SWAPO was recognised as the ‘official’ liberation organisation in SWA and SWANU lost OAU support (Gibson, 1972: 123-124). Guerrillas from SWAPO began infiltrating into SWA in 1965 and in 1966 launched the armed struggle. Military training schemes were agreed with Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, North Korea, the Soviet Union and Tanzania (Vigne, 1987: 91), though SWAPO’s military campaign was hampered by the presence of Portuguese troops in Angola and the fact that the South African military had almost complete superiority over SWAPO.

Initial Chinese contacts At first, Beijing dealt evenly with both SWAPO and SWANU. The Chairman of SWANU had visited China in 1960 (Far Eastern Economic Review, August 25, 1960), followed by a number of SWANU delegations in 1963 and a SWAPO executive committee member visited in October of the same year. However, after losing the OAU’s support, SWANU in essence declined. In January 1966,

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SWANU’s President Kozonguizi denounced ‘Soviet-American collusion under the guise of peaceful co-existence’, echoing Beijing’s own position, but this brought him into conflict with the more moderate members of SWANU’s External Council and he was forced to resign (Gibson, 1972: 126). Later, at the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation council meeting in February 1967, SWANU was expelled and de-recognised as a legitimate liberation organisation. SWAPO was admitted instead and SWANU effectively faded into obscurity, though for a time retained Chinese patronage. SWAPO, despite enjoying Soviet patronage, was by no means anti-Chinese in sentiment. SWAPO continued to send volunteers to China for training and adopted elements of Maoist guerrilla thinking in their military tactics against the South Africans (Dreyer, 1994: 61). Although the Soviets supplied the vast majority of armaments to SWAPO, China did contribute some arms, as evidenced by Chinese stick grenades being discovered at a SWAPO arms dump after independence. Evidence of Chinese training was unveiled in 1968 when a group of SWAPO cadres – the ‘China men’ – returned from training in China to denounce the perceived sloth and corruption of the SWAPO leadership (Leys and Saul, 1994). According to one source, SWAPO cadres were sent to China from 1965 onwards (Herbstein and Evenson, 1989: 14). Certainly, in 1971 a youth league delegation from SWAPO was entertained in Beijing, and China carried SWAPO communiqués. However, a certain ambiguity in Chinese support for SWAPO may be detected in that in briefings on the liberation struggle in SWA, Chinese reports referred to the ‘South West African Patriotic Armed Forces’ (see New China News Agency, August 26, 1971), a non-existent organisation but importantly a term that may be seen to include SWANU. Thus China was able to speak of representatives of the ‘national liberation movement organisations’ – a plurality which afforded maximum manoeuvrability for Chinese policy towards SWA whilst retaining linkages with the prime organisation, SWAPO (New China News Agency, November 8, 1973). However, in 1973 the UN General Assembly voted to recognise SWAPO as the ‘authentic’ representatives of the Namibian people, and from this date, Chinese coverage was exclusively on SWAPO, in line with international opinion. November 1975 saw the visit to China by Sam Nujoma and a SWAPO delegation for ‘friendly talks’ (New China News Agency, November 3, 1975). It is evident that at this point in the liberation struggle, SWAPO was accepting aid from a variety of sources, including the PRC. With no serious rival in Namibia, SWAPO was able, like FRELIMO in Mozambique, to stay largely aloof from the Sino-Soviet dispute. As a result, the bitterness that pervaded relations between the liberation organisations in Rhodesia – in part stemming from Sino-Soviet rivalries – were absent in Namibia and allowed China in later years to develop relatively close ties with SWAPO.

Post-Portuguese coup The situation in SWA dramatically changed after the coup in Portugal in April 1974, which effectively ended Portuguese rule in Angola, and acted as a watershed in the struggle for national liberation. As China remarked, 1975 saw

Chinese relations with Namibia 155 ‘a most inspiring situation in Africa’ develop (New China News Agency, January 31, 1976). Instantly, SWAPO had access to the northern SWA border, military training from Cuban and other Eastern Bloc allies of the MPLA, and bases from which to operate. Aid from the GDR was particularly generous and forthcoming (Costea, 1990: 393-407). As a result, SWAPO recruitment increased from 2,000 in mid1976 to 10,000 in 1978 (Serfontein, 1976: 324), and SWAPO’s military campaign increased massively with up to 100 contacts with the South African army occurring every month (Moorcroft, 1994: 216). In addition, SWAPO henceforth adopted a radical programme espousing Marxism-Leninism and a commitment to scientific socialism (Katjavivi, 1988: 108-109). Whilst there is a debate as to whether this commitment was real or designed to impress Moscow and the MPLA (Leys and Saul, 1994: 143), there is no doubt that it illustrated the close links that had by now developed between SWAPO and the Soviet Union. China had been, in essence, shut out of active involvement in the struggle in SWA in the post-coup period and Moscow’s position in Southern Africa immeasurably improved. As one observer remarked, Angola in effect was a springboard for Soviet ambitions (Janke, 1978: 1-3). The Soviet’s position and influence only increased after 1976 as SWAPO more and more became dependent on Moscow’s military support. South African reaction was two-fold. On the military front, Pretoria built up its presence in SWA on a massive scale, installing a free-fire zone on the border with Angola and declared martial law in the north of the country. On the political front, South Africa began to nurture moderate political parties who in turn would arrive at an ‘internal settlement’ which would bring on an independent SWA, but to all intents and purposes would remain under Pretoria’s control. In January 1976 the UN passed a resolution (385) calling for withdrawal of South African troops and the progress to a democratic election and independence for Namibia. China supported the resolution, though had reservations about the elections as SWA was still under Pretoria’s control and according to Beijing free elections were unlikely to be honoured (New China News Agency, January 31, 1976). In a speech in October, Huang Hua condemned Superpower meddling in SWA and asserted that complications in the liberation struggle were caused by the Superpowers and ‘their strategic needs of seeking global hegemony’ (New China News Agency, October 20, 1976). A year later, a contact group consisting of Britain, the United States, France, West Germany and Canada (the ‘Gang of Five’) was established and put forward a proposal for holding a UN-supervised referendum in SWA, a phased withdrawal of South African troops and the working towards Namibian independence by the end of 1978. SWAPO agreed to this and in August 1977 the parties met to discuss the situation. However, Pretoria complicated the issue by demanding that Walvis Bay, a South African administered enclave on the coast of SWA, was a part of South Africa and non-negotiable. SWAPO refused to accept this and the talks collapsed. China made its position clear on the issue by demanding that Pretoria not use Walvis Bay as a stalling mechanism for avoiding Namibian independence (New China News Agency, July 28, 1978). As a result, the military campaign intensified and spilled over into Angola. In May 1978 the South African Defence Force (SADF) attacked SWAPO bases

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deep in Angolan territory with SADF aircraft bombing one SWAPO base, killing over 1,000 SWAPO personnel (though SWAPO claimed that the dead were largely non-combatant refugees). It was only the intervention of the Cubans and Angolans that prevented a total rout. From then on, skirmishes with Cuban and Angolan troops became commonplace. In December 1978 South Africa unilaterally organised an election in SWA (which SWAPO boycotted). A 75 per cent turnout saw the moderate multi-ethnic Democratic Turnhalle Alliance – ‘a puppet manipulated by Pretoria’ according to Beijing (Beijing Review, January 26, 1981) – win 80 per cent of the vote. The international community however refused to recognise the election or the results. China clearly viewed the election and South African stalling as benefiting the Soviets for according to Beijing’s view, if the proposal of the Western Five had been accepted, and South Africa had withdrawn from SWA resulting in Namibian independence, ‘there would be less opportunities for the Soviet Union to carry on its infiltration and expansion there’ (Beijing Review, April 6, 1979). China went further, drawing a picture of joint – if unintentional – Pretoria-Moscow conspiracy to further their own respective positions. As China saw it, ‘[South Africa] is exploiting the Soviet threat to bargain with the West. Moscow and Pretoria are making use of each other to gain something for themselves before Namibia wins independence’ (ibid.). Clearly, China viewed the involvement of the Soviet Union as part of Moscow’s overarching hegemonic campaign and Beijing contextualised the situation in SWA as part of a global Superpower competition for influence and control with Moscow as attempting to ‘channel the national liberation movements of Southern Africa into their orbit of world hegemony’ (New China News Agency, December 10, 1978). Impotent and unable to directly intervene, China could only rhetorically intercede and remind ‘the Namibian and Southern African people [that they] have the grave task of guarding against and preventing hegemonist meddling and sabotage’ (Beijing Review, April 6, 1978).

China’s position in the 1980s The victory of Mugabe in Zimbabwe greatly bolstered SWAPO’s hopes and again changed the political landscape in Southern Africa with SWAPO declaring 1980 a ‘year of action’. A major clash with the SADF deep into Angolan territory in June 1980, however, left the Namibian guerrillas badly mauled. SWAPO fortunes took a downturn with the accession of Ronald Reagan in 1981 who almost immediately linked South African withdrawal from Namibia with Cuban withdrawal from Angola (Barratt, 1982). Beijing regarded this as ‘yet another pretext for the obstruction of the negotiations’ for independence (Beijing Review, June 13, 1983). In 1981 China called the situation in Namibia ‘the most salient issue in the de-colonisation struggle’ (Beijing Review, March 16, 1981). However, China was in a delicate position over the question of support for SWAPO, which as Beijing well knew, enjoyed ‘influence at home and abroad … immeasurably greater than any other organisation in Namibia’, but at the same time was heavily supported by

Chinese relations with Namibia 157 Moscow and the pro-Soviet Angolan government (Beijing Review, December 15, 1980). Thus China had to carefully balance calls for support for Namibian independence and the national struggle (fought by SWAPO), with condemnations of Soviet hegemonic machinations in the region. An example of this can be found in 1982 at the meeting of the Extraordinary Plenary Meeting of the UN Council for Namibia in Tanzania where Beijing joined other delegates in offering full support for SWAPO and the armed struggle. However, China added a bitter note that ‘the Soviet Union is attempting to penetrate Southern Africa under the pretext of ‘supporting the national-liberation movement’ and through its ‘military aid’’ (Beijing Review, May 31, 1982). However, there was little China could do to prevent this except for issue rhetorical exhortations against hegemonic encroachment. Beijing did however donate a token US$20,000 to the United Nations fund for Namibia, and continue to rhetorically ‘resolutely support’ SWAPO’s military campaign (Xinhua, March 20, 1981).

Growth in Sino-SWAPO relations At the beginning of 1984, a cease-fire was arranged and a conference in Lusaka in May convened. However, Pretoria insisted on linking South African withdrawal from Namibia with Cuban withdrawal from Angola, something which Beijing vehemently rejected (Beijing Review, July 2, 1984). At the same time, a turnaround in China’s fortunes in Namibia occurred with the visit to China of Sam Nujoma with Oliver Tambo of the ANC. This was closely related to the perceived change in the international system by Beijing with China asserting that the Soviet Union was no longer a specific threat to itself whilst Moscow became more amenable to its African protegés warming to Beijing. This thaw in Beijing’s approach vis-à-vis Moscow allowed China to therefore approach SWAPO with promises of aid and assistance. The thaw in relations between China and the Soviet Union also helps explain why Beijing was flexible on the position of Cuban troops in Angola and why Beijing now opposed any linkage between that issue and South African withdrawal from Namibia. As Beijing repeatedly asserted, ‘to link these two unrelated issues will only make the question of Namibian independence even more complicated and delay its settlement’ (Xinhua, April 8, 1987). Nujoma’s visit was, as he said, to brief Beijing on developments and, to ‘ask for material assistance from China’ (Xinhua, January 21, 1983). In turn, Beijing promised to supply SWAPO with ‘all kinds of arms and ammunition’ (Agence France-Presse, January 27, 1983). As a result, the SWAPO leader asserted that China and SWAPO’s ‘bilateral relations will turn a new page’ (Xinhua, January 27, 1983). Nujoma expressed the view that, ‘China plays a very vital and positive role in the organs of the United Nations as a permanent member of the Security Council … and defend[s] the interests of the oppressed people of the world’ (Radio Beijing, January 29, 1983). From this point contact with SWAPO increased, with delegations visiting China in 1983, 1984 and 1985. As Namibia moved towards independence China maintained both material and rhetorical support for SWAPO and kept up a virulent

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anti-South African position within the international system. For example, China opposed the establishment of an ‘interim government’ by Pretoria, seeing it as a means by which South Africa was obstructing independence (Xinhua, June 12, 1985). Beijing however covered the negotiations between Cuba, Angola, South Africa and the United States in 1988 in a positive manner and welcomed the agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Namibian issue (Renmin Ribao, July 24, 1988). As in South Africa, China shifted away from the armed struggle and asserted that ‘the Southern African problem cannot be resolved by military means’ (Xinhua, August 5, 1988). This was an acceptance by Beijing that its interests in the region lay in a stable Southern Africa devoid of armed conflict as war was inimitable to China’s desire to foster economic ties with states in the region.

Post-Tiananmen Ties developed with SWAPO benefited China at the time of the June 1989 crisis as Nujoma was one of the few African leaders to explicitly congratulate China on its suppression of the pro-democracy movement. In a message to China’s ambassador in Luanda, Nujoma expressed his understanding of ‘[the] resolute action taken by the Chinese government and the People’s Army to put down the counterrevolutionary rebellion [and wished] to convey his congratulations to the Communist Party of China … on their victory in quelling the counter-revolutionary rebellion’ (Xinhua, June 21, 1989). Nujoma’s words may be contextualised by a desire to maintain links with China after the forthcoming Namibian independence and also an understanding that the Soviet Union was unlikely to be in a position to maintain a presence in post-independent Namibia. Thus Nujoma’s message, cynical as it may seem, may be seen as being politically astute.

Namibian independence As independence approached, Beijing signalled its desire to remain involved in the country by sending 20 Chinese observers to take part in monitoring the elections (Xinhua, October 26, 1989). Such a move may also be seen as part of China’s attempts to politically rehabilitate itself after Tiananmen. The November 1989 elections saw SWAPO win 41 of the 72 seats in the National Assembly, and on March 20, 1990 Beijing recognised the Republic of Namibia and expressed wishes that bilateral relations would develop smoothly (Xinhua, March 21, 1990). Diplomatic relations were made official on March 22, 1990 (Xinhua, March 23, 1990), and an economic and technical co-operation agreement was unveiled (Xinhua, July 20, 1990). The Namibian Foreign Minister announced that a Namibian embassy would be opened in Beijing ‘in the future’ (ibid.), coinciding with a Chinese delegation’s visit aimed explicitly to ‘develop economic and technical co-operation between the two countries’ (Xinhua, July 14, 1990). This visit concluded with the signing of an economic and technical agreement between the two states (Xinhua, July 18, 1990).

Chinese relations with Namibia 159 The desire to develop relations was seen in January 1991 when a Namibian delegation led by SWAPO’s Chief Co-ordinator, Moses Garoeb visited Beijing to examine setting up joint economic ventures with China (Namibia Today, January 9, 1991). Later, Namibia’s Prime Minister, Hage Geingob, visited China and concurred with Li Peng’s assertion that ‘one country should never interfere in the internal affairs of another country, under any pretext’ (Xinhua, September 3, 1991). Such a statement, bearing in mind that the PRC had actively intervened in a number of Southern African countries – not least Namibia during the liberation struggle – was highly ironic, though it was clear from what context and towards what particular issue Li’s comments were directed at. Regarding Geingob, it was evident that Sino-Namibian relations were totally unaffected by the events of June 1989, and Geingob’s visit ended in an economic and technical agreement between the PRC and Namibia (Xinhua, September 5, 1991). China followed up the development of friendly links by constructing linkages between the Chinese Communist Party and SWAPO. An example of this was the message of congratulations to SWAPO on the opening of their 1991 congress (Xinhua, December 6, 1991). Bilateral party links was another way through which Beijing hoped to break out of diplomatic isolation and prevent international ostracism in the future.

Qian Qichen’s visit, January 1992 Qian Qichen included Namibia during his six-nation tour of Africa, widely seen as a campaign to drum up support from African states in the post-Tiananmen period. Qian made this explicit in a lecture to Namibian diplomats and officials in Windhoek, where he asserted that in the post-Cold War era, ‘a small number of powers [may wish to see] the imposition of certain values or a particular economic model in disregard of diverse circumstances’ (Xinhua, January 22, 1992). Qian expanded on this theme and stressed that the ‘independence of states’ should be paramount and no foreign power should exert hegemony over another. As Qian said, all countries, ‘should refrain from interference in other’s internal affairs’ (ibid.). Coming after Tiananmen and widespread condemnation of the PRC, Qian was explicitly appealing for support and understanding of China’s position on his trip to Africa, for China saw that Africa afforded an opportunity to allow it to break out of its diplomatic isolation and build a system of linkages that would prevent a repetition of China’s pariah status in the future. Qian asserted that Africa was now the ‘cornerstone’ of China’s foreign policy and reminded Namibia and other Africa observers of China’s past and present commitments to Africa’s struggle against imperialism and hegemonism (Xinhua, January 23, 1992).

Nujoma’s tour of China, 1992 In September 1992, Sam Nujoma paid a state visit to China, the ninth visit to China but first as President of Namibia. Expressing gratitude for Chinese help during the war of liberation, Nujoma characterised Chinese aid to Namibia as a ‘symbol of South-South co-operation’ (Xinhua, September 5, 1992). During the

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trip an economic and technical co-operation agreement was signed and it was revealed that China had agreed to send agricultural experts to Namibia whilst joint ventures with China would be increased. Prior to embarking on the visit, China donated 20 tractors and Nujoma had extolled Namibians to ‘learn from the Chinese people’s spirit of self-reliance’ (Xinhua, August 14, 1992). During his visit Nujoma went on to state that ‘Namibia places emphasis on the experience China has gained in its economic construction’ (Xinhua, September 7, 1992). As with other countries in the region, China was enthusiastic in developing economic and commercial linkages and in April 1993, a Chinese trade delegation representing 20 Chinese companies from Shanghai took part in an international trade fair in Windhoek. Economic linkages dominated post-independence SinoNamibian ties and by 1993 both imports and exports totalled US$1 million respectively which, whilst modest, was acceptable for both parties bearing in mind the distance involved and the early stage of development Namibia was in. After elections in March 1995 returned SWAPO for a second term, the re-elected government confirmed that it would carry on a policy of co-operating with China and further develop the ‘excellent’ relations with Beijing (Xinhua, March 22, 1996). The Namibian Foreign Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, visited China in May 1995, holding talks on a number of bilateral issues, expanding economic co-operation and reaching agreement on a range of international issues. During the visit, the Chinese Vice-President, Rong Yiren, asserted that: Both China and Namibia are developing countries and both are facing the tasks of independently developing the economy … Therefore … the two countries should increase contacts and strengthen the co-operation in political, economic, cultural and other fields. (Xinhua, May 19, 1995) The concept of ‘independently developing the economy’, was part of China’s anti-hegemonic policy in that Beijing was keen to try and deter over-dependence on outside economic help in the developing world. Thus Beijing was keen to promote the self-development of countries – with Chinese help. China was also eager to broaden developing countries’ military sources, as well as increase Chinese arms sales, and this was shown by the visit to Beijing at the same time as Gurirab of the Namibian Defence Minister (Xinhua, May 23, 1995). Gurirab also visited Hong Kong, meeting business leaders and inviting investment in his country. Namibia expressed support for a Chinese proposal to abolish the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council, echoing China’s argument that not only the permanent five should be responsible for maintaining peace (Hong Kong Standard, May 25, 1995).

Post-independence ties Sino-Namibian ties have progressively strengthened and developed since Namibian independence and a visiting Chinese Communist Party delegation met

Chinese relations with Namibia 161 Nujoma in June 1995 to be told of Windhoek’s desire to further develop ties with China (Xinhua, June 13, 1995). In July, the Chinese Vice Premier, Zhu Rongji, visited Windhoek as part of his seven-nation African tour and was quite explicit on expanding Sino-Namibian economic ties. As Zhu said, ‘Namibia has rich natural resources and [a] good infrastructure’ (Xinhua, July 31, 1995). The goal of Zhu’s visit was, according to him, to boost economic and trade co-operation and the Chinese government actively encouraged companies to invest in Namibia, particularly in agriculture, fishery, manufacturing and industry. As a result of the visit, China agreed to provide a soft loan to Namibia to boost the establishment of joint economic ventures; provide a batch of goods worth two million yuan; and fund a project to drill 30 bore-holes in north-east Namibia. According to an article in a pro-Chinese Hong Kong newspaper, such deals were part of China’s opposition to big countries bullying small countries and because of this stance, Beijing respected ‘African countries choice of their own road of development’ (Wen Wei Po, July 29, 1995). However, an additional factor in China’s policy was revealed when the article went on to say, ‘Chinese … products entering Western markets … have become the targets of import restrictions, while some countries are brandishing the baton of ‘human rights’ to pose trade threats and sanctions against China’ (ibid.). Thus Chinese interest in extending economic linkages in the region is not only linked to a desire to prevent the domination of developing countries by developed countries – ‘hegemonism’ – but also as a means by which China can withstand pressure from the West to improve its human rights record and/or redress trade imbalances. For instance, when Sam Nujoma visited Beijing in 2004 (his twelfth visit to China), the Chinese asserted that ‘China appreciates Namibia’s firm stance on supporting China on the … issue of human rights’ (People’s Daily, July 21, 2004). China continues to see that improving economic linkages in the region can only help its economic and political position within the international system. Developing linkages, even with countries as small as Namibia, are deemed important. This has continued, with regular visits to China by leading Namibian politicians whilst Namibia has on occasion played host to Chinese delegations. On the Chinese side, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission of Communist Party of China, State Councillor and Minister of Defence Chi Haotian visited in 1998, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Xu Jialu in 1999, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and State Councillor Luo Gan in 2000, Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Wang Wenyuan in 2002, and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Li Ruihuan in 2003. The Namibian Prime Minister Hage Geingob visited China in 1991, Speaker of the National Assembly Moses Tjitendero in 1994, Minister of Foreign Affairs Theo-Ben Gurirab in 1995 and 2000, Chairman of the National Council Kandy Nehova and Deputy Prime Minister Hendrik Witbooi in 1997, Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly Willem Konjore in 2002, and General Secretary of SWAPO Ngarikutuke Tjiriange, also in 2002. Sam Nujoma visited China in 1992, 1996, 1999, 2000 and 2004.

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Chinese construction companies have been particularly active in Namibia, often being granted favourable contracts. Chinese contractors built Namibia’s Supreme Court in Windhoek, as well as magistrates courts in Katutura, Rundu, Outapi and Katima Mulilo, and the Chinese are currently helping build the new State House, which is being built with a grant from the Chinese government (Namibian, December 16, 2005). But China has also been interested in investing in mining, fishing and telecommunications. As a way of facilitating this, the China-Namibia Economic and Trade Mixed Committee was established in 2004, convening its first session in Beijing in 2005. Co-presided by Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce Wei Jianguo and Namibian Minister of Trade and Industry Immanuel Ngatjizeko, attendants included Helmut Angula, director-general of the Namibian National Planning Commission, and Minister of Engineering, Transport and Telecommunications Joel Kaapanda, as well as executives from some Namibian companies and representatives from the Import and Export Bank of China (Xinhua, December 20, 2005). Interestingly, a Chinese satellite tracking, telemetry and command station was constructed in Swakopmund in July 2001 year following an agreement signed in October 2000. China’s Xi’an Satellite Control Centre in Shaanxi operates the Swakopmund ground station. Namibia was chosen as the spaceship would be right over the country, specifically west Namibia, during its re-entry and braking phases. The station houses 20 permanent staff during a mission phase, while about five personnel stay there continuously to maintain equipment (Namibian, August 12, 2001). At the same time, China has been constant in providing relatively generous finances and has been involved in various infrastructure projects. For instance, in 2005 Namibia and China signed a £19 million concessional loan agreement to buy railway equipment for TransNamib’s railway project, to be used to buy 17 Chinese locomotives, 152 open wagons, 30 oil tank wagons and other equipment. Namibia has a grace period of five years in its repayments (Namibian, December 16, 2005). Despite being effectively shut out of Namibia during the war of national liberation due to the influence of the Soviets on SWAPO, Beijing managed to retain linkages with the movement that held China in good stead upon Namibian independence. This was done as part of Beijing’s policy of attempting to prevent a situation where, as they put it ‘the wolf is driven out of the front door [but] the hegemonist tiger … enters through the backdoor’ (New China News Agency, May 23, 1978). Although the global milieu has changed dramatically since those days, the rhetoric of anti-hegemonism is dusted off now and again. For instance, in 1999 Jiang Zemin told Sam Nujoma that ‘humanity is right now at a critical period for global peace and common development, and some of the major tasks around the world are opposing hegemony and power politics and promoting the establishment of a just and rational new international political and economic order’ (Xinhua, July 1, 1999). In reply, Nujoma said that ‘the interference of Western countries has further complicated the situation in Africa, which is a continent beset by difficulties, continuous conflicts, and civil wars. As hegemony continues, the industrialised countries sabotage the unity and cooperation among

Chinese relations with Namibia 163 developing countries’ (ibid.). Recently, the Chinese President Hu Jintao asserted during talks with the Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba in Beijing that ‘China and Namibia should strengthen consultation and cooperation in regional and international affairs so as to jointly maintain the interests and rights of developing countries’ (Xinhua, September 12, 2005). The themes remain constant. With the demise of the Soviet Union and Namibia’s desire to chart a foreign policy which precluded the domination of the new country by any one power, China has been able to offer itself as an attractive, non-interfering partner with which to do business. With an emphasis on commercial matters, Sino-Namibian ties have progressively developed since independence and are likely to continue to do so. The visit of Nujoma to China in October 1996 signified the strength of Sino-Namibian ties, with Jiang Zemin promising to push co-operation between the two countries to ‘new levels’ whilst reiterating China’s anti-hegemonic stand (China Daily, October 24, 1996). In return for a minimal commitment of aid, China has been able to develop a relatively healthy relationship with Namibia. In 2005 two-way trade reached US$96.93 million for January–September, growing 32.2 per cent over the same period of last year (Xinhua, December 20, 2005). Namibia will likely remain a sympathetic and appreciative ally of Beijing and trade and political ties will likely continue to develop and deepen. Starting from a zero base, they can only improve.

9

China’s relations with Zambia

In 1964, the former British colony of Northern Rhodesia became independent as the Republic of Zambia with Kenneth Kaunda of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) as President-elect. Politically, the new country faced a number of key problems vis-à-vis its neighbours as Zambian independence was looked upon by Southern African nationalists as providing an opportunity for a more favourable prosecution of their own liberation struggles whilst the Whiteruled states threatened action if Zambia refused to halt activity by African nationalists based in Lusaka. This clashed with Zambia’s own agenda of national development, regional liberation from minority rule and international independence (Shaw and Anglin, 1979; Notlutshungu, 1975). Economically, Zambia relied heavily on its copper resources and on White-ruled Rhodesia for most consumer goods (Elliott, 1971). The desire to break away from this, to develop Zambia’s economic character and increase Lusaka’s manoeuvrability, thus became a guiding light of Zambian foreign policy (Anglin and Shaw, 1979; Shaw, 1976; Burdette, 1984) and has been termed ‘the politics of disengagement’ (Tordoff, 1977). This resulted in the development of a close relationship with Beijing which aimed to utilise Zambia to increase its own manoeuvrability on a wider, global stage. Zambia was keen to develop linkages with the Black-ruled north, and the PRC, as a means by which it could gain influence and project its presence in the region, volunteered to help in this, as indicated by the TanZam rail project (Anglin, 1976).

Early ties Bilateral relations between the PRC and Zambia have traditionally been among the strongest in the region, and Zambia has been a valued friend of Beijing since the days of independence, though initially Zambia was reluctant to accept China’s advances. It is evident that China targeted Zambia for attention prior to independence, telegramming Kaunda three days before formal independence informing the President-elect of China’s decision to recognise Zambia (New China News Agency, October 23, 1964). One day after independence, Kaunda replied in the affirmative and Zambia and the PRC announced that diplomatic relations were effective from October 29, 1964 the Chinese embassy being opened in Lusaka in late November. As noted, initially, Kaunda preferred Western aid and was suspicious

China’s relations with Zambia 165 of Chinese intentions. This was exacerbated by the appearance in Lusaka of a pamphlet purportedly from China’s ally, Albania, attacking Kaunda and calling for revolution (The Times, April 24, 1965). However, as alternative sources of much-need aid failed to materialise, the generous nature of Chinese aid conditions overcame any lingering Zambian doubts vis-à-vis Beijing (Pettman, 1974). From then on, relations grew rapidly prior to the Cultural Revolution, climaxing with Kaunda’s visit to Beijing in June 1967, at the height of the turmoil. Kaunda enthusiastically greeted the PRC’s detonation of a hydrogen bomb on June 17, 1967 and saw this as ushering in an era in which China would play a major role in the international system (New China News Agency, June 21, 1967). This opinion neatly coincided with Beijing’s own view regarding China’s resumption of its ‘rightful place’ in world affairs. By this point, Zambia was one of the PRC’s greatest supporters on the African continent, and was a linchpin of Beijing’s policies in the region. The importance China held in Zambia was signalled by an agreement to grant Lusaka an interest-free loan of US$16.8 million (Times of Zambia, June 24, 1967). This, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, indicated how important Beijing viewed Zambia in its Southern African policies. Why the PRC should have been so concerned with Zambia is readily explained by a consideration of two factors: Zambia’s geo-strategic position, and the personality of Kenneth Kaunda and his political orientation. On the physical aspects of the country, Zambia was pivotal in the Southern African milieu. As Anglin (1979) noted, Zambia was the most strategically positioned and dangerously exposed host state engaged in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. Bordered by Portuguese-ruled Angola and minority-ruled Rhodesia, with links to radical Tanzania and a heavy dependence on White-controlled transport and economic links, Zambia was from the start inextricably drawn into the crisis in the region over the question of majority-rule and the ending of White privilege. As such, it was in the centre of the geo-political region of Southern Africa and thus Zambia’s foreign policy had to be formulated with regard to its immediate environment (Tordoff, 1974). In essence, Lusaka’s external relations have been reactive to the pressures and situations the state has found itself in. With regard to Kaunda, the President of Zambia enjoyed a reputation as an honest broker in the Southern African milieu. Kaunda attempted to install a national ideology of his own making called ‘Humanism’ which was essentially non-violent and opposed to racism and minority rule, and aimed at the gradual implementation of socialism (Chan, 1985), characterised as ‘at best, a radical expression of reformism’ (Shaw, 1976: 49). Inherent in Humanism, was a desire to remain non-aligned and out of the Superpower global competition whilst Kaunda’s policies towards the minority states to the south, and the cost of this policy to Zambia’s economic welfare, had been characterised as being the ‘high price of principles’ (Hall, 1969). Zambia made a central plank of its foreign policy the liberation of the rest of Southern Africa, for as the Zambian ambassador to Beijing said, ‘without South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola and Guinea (Bissau) being free, Zambia is indeed not free’ (New China News Agency, October 24, 1971).

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In addition, Zambia’s foreign policy was highly personalised around Kaunda (Chan, 1987). It is only recently that Kaunda’s actual lack of concrete action vis-à-vis the White south has been rigorously examined and the rhetorical bluster that characterised much of Kaunda’s presidency exposed (Good, 1987; Chan, 1991; Chan, 1992). Nevertheless, Kaunda remained a warm and valuable friend of Beijing’s, with Kaunda repeatedly referring to China as Zambia’s ‘all-weather friend’ (Xinhua, October 24, 1984). Importantly for Beijing, Kaunda was wary of both Superpowers and the Soviet Union in particular and although Kaunda signed an Economic and Technical Agreement with Moscow in 1967, he followed a strict non-aligned policy in the Superpower competition in Africa and refused to champion Moscow’s aims in Southern Africa (Campbell, 1987: 25). As a result, Chinese involvement with Lusaka became extensive. Politically, the PRC was a vocal supporter of Kenneth Kaunda, the leader of Zambia from 1964 until 1991, and this support for Zambia continued after Kaunda’s electoral defeat to Frederick Chiluba in 1991. Zambia played a reciprocal role, supporting the PRC on the international stage, whilst maintaining a measure of independence. In essence, Zambia played an important part in the PRC’s policies towards Southern Africa and the professed struggle against hegemonism. As the then Chinese Minister of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries said in 1975, ‘although China is separated from … Zambia by mountains and oceans, the common struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism closely links the peoples of our … countries’ (New China News Agency, September 15, 1975).

Post-Cultural Revolution ties Unlike other African countries, relations with Zambia were not drastically affected by the Cultural Revolution. Kaunda, it is to be remembered, had paid a state visit to China at the height of the disturbances and so upon normalcy in Beijing’s foreign policy, Lusaka was well placed to continue its relationship with China. In April 1971, a trade delegation visited China from Zambia, attending the export commodities fair in Guangzhou (New China News Agency, April 23, 1971). The PRC evidently viewed this delegation as important, for it was met by Li Xiannian – Vice-Premier of the State Council and further trade missions visited on a regular basis (in October 1972 and March and September of 1973). The strength in Sino-Zambia ties was further indicated by the holiday visit to Beijing in August of 1971 by Kaunda’s special assistant, Mark Chona, which coincided with talks on establishing an air link between Lusaka and Beijing (New China News Agency, August 1, 1971). Sino-Zambian relations were marked by laudatory rhetoric which linked the two countries together in the wider global struggle against big power hegemony. The acting Foreign Minister of the PRC summed up Beijing’s attitude towards Zambia, when he asserted that, ‘in international affairs, the Zambian government has all along pursued a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment [and has] persistently opposed imperialism and colonialism and big power hegemony’ (New China News Agency, October 24, 1971).

China’s relations with Zambia 167 Zhou Enlai himself linked the PRC’s and Africa’s perceived shared historical background with the contemporary situation when he claimed that: The Chinese and African peoples had the common historical lot of being subjected to imperialist and colonialist aggression and oppression and are today confronted with the common fighting tasks of opposing imperialism, colonialism and the hegemonism of the Superpowers and building their countries. (New China News Agency, September 17, 1972) Thus Beijing linked the anti-hegemonic posture of the early 1970s to the fight against past colonialism both for China and the developing world. This was a consistent theme in Chinese rhetoric in dealing with Southern Africa and was reciprocated by the Zambians who asserted that it ‘it [was] right that we have chosen China as a militant friend for opposing imperialism and colonialism’ (New China News Agency, February 6, 1972). Zambia viewed the seating of the PRC in the United Nations as a matter of urgency in order to offset the hegemony of the two Superpowers in the Security Council, and Kaunda consistently supported China’s quest to secure recognition being instrumental in the vote in 1971 that saw Beijing replace Taipei.

Zambian Vice-President and President’s visits to China Sino-Zambian ties were graphically illustrated by the tumultuous welcome given to the Vice-President of Zambia when he paid a state visit in September 17, 1972. Zhou thanked Zambia for its support in securing a seat at the UN and congratulated Zambia on opposing ‘big power hegemony’ (New China News Agency, September 17, 1972). Zhou also reiterated the PRC’s posture of being a developing world country with a shared history against foreign interference and Kaunda’s posturing regarding Rhodesia was linked to the wider ‘Afro-Asian people’s cause of unity against imperialism’ (ibid.). This was a device whereby Beijing aimed to enlist Southern Africa into the PRC’s wider struggle against imperialism and hegemonism. By doing so, Beijing hoped to project China’s visibility in the region and gain prestige and influence. The Vice-President’s visit though was merely a precursor to Kaunda’s own state visit to China at the height of Sino-Zambian relations. Kaunda arrived with a 27 member delegation in Beijing on February 21, 1974, and was met at the airport by both Zhou Enlai and Li Xiannian. Again, reference was made to ‘the AfroAsian people’s cause’ which struggled against ‘imperialism and hegemonism’ (New China News Agency, February 21, 1974). Zhou’s speech at the official banquet for Kaunda is worth quoting at length, for it gives an insight into China’s attitude towards the international situation at the time. According to Zhou: The contention for world hegemony between the two Superpowers [is] growing ever more intense, the entire world is far from tranquil, and all the basic contradictions of the world are sharpening drastically … At present the struggle to … oppose power politics and hegemonism is developing on an unprecedented scale in the Third World … Beset with troubles at home and

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China and Africa abroad, one Superpower is having a very hard time. The other Superpower has wild ambitions but not enough strength … Looking ahead, we are full of confidence. The Superpowers are bound to decline further, and … the people, comprising more than ninety per cent of the world’s population, will surely decide the destiny of the world. (ibid.)

Thus according to Beijing, the developing world was at a pivotal position in that both hegemonic Superpowers operated from a position of weakness and the Third World, if united, could influence the global situation. With the PRC seated at the Security Council and posturing as an integral member (and by inference, leader) of the Third World, this development would greatly enhance Beijing’s power and influence in global affairs, and would allow it to truly regain its ‘rightful place’ on the international stage. The PRC’s policy of opposition to hegemonic aspirations by other powers was thus an integral part of the wider objective of promoting the importance of the developing world in global politics. This policy was well served by a direct involvement in Southern Africa. Incidentally, the importance China held Kaunda and Zambia was highlighted by the fact that Beijing later let it be known that Mao first formulated the Three Worlds theory during Kaunda’s visit and implied that Kaunda had somehow helped in the construction of this theory (Chan, 1985: 378), although as Chan points out, the Three Worlds theory had been formulated long before. Although Kaunda retained autonomy and independence from Beijing, he was explicit in his identification with the PRC’s ‘principles, ideals and objectives’ in its foreign policy and was apparently content with the volume of trade and commerce flowing between the two countries (New China News Agency, February 21, 1974). It was evident from Kaunda’s speech that China had also been successful in projecting its developmental record as a benchmark for other developing world countries for as Kaunda said in Beijing, ‘you are a model of development’ (ibid.). As a result of the visit, a technical and economic agreement was signed, and this was quickly followed by a trade delegation visit from Zambia in March. The desire to increase trade links with Zambia was shown by China’s participation in the Ndola Trade Fair, and by the visit of another Zambia trade delegation in September, 1974. This was reciprocated by the visit in October by a joint economic and military PRC delegation, ostensibly to attend the tenth anniversary independence celebrations. Although Zambia under Kaunda had been characterised as a ‘state capitalist’ regime with little interest in socialism (Callinicos and Rogers, 1977), the PRC paid fulsome praise to the ‘steady development of the national economy’ (New China News Agency, October 25, 1974).

Sino-Zambian trade relations in the 1970s Whilst bilateral political ties between Zambia and China developed in strength, Sino-Zambian economic relations also developed. It is a fact that under Kaunda, through a combination of incompetence, corruption, mismanagement

China’s relations with Zambia 169 and the external milieu, Zambia’s economy was run into the ground (see Good, 1986, 1989). Thus, Kaunda was consistently eager to build up trade linkages with China. Following Kaunda’s state visit, trade relations between the two countries increased dramatically. Zambian trade delegations visited Beijing on a frequent basis and were rewarded by bilateral commercial contracts aimed primarily at securing the warm relationship between the two states. Even prior to Deng, the PRC saw a vigorous trading relationship as essential to the maintenance of a satisfactory association with that country and during this period economic relations between Zambia and China were the largest in Southern Africa. Although the concentration on commercial matters had not reached the intensity that it was to under Deng Xiaoping, a satisfactory economic linkage with its developing world allies was consistently important. Thus a trade delegation visited China in July 1975, and a Zambian trade team visited in October 1976 to attend the Autumn export commodities fair in Guangzhou. However, because of the limited nature of Zambian products available to the PRC and the poor state of the Zambian economy, Sino-Zambian economic ties have been remained at a relatively low-level, even today.

Sino-Zambian relations and Angola As well as economic ties, party-to-party bilateral relations were also important for the PRC to develop, as indicated by the visit of a friendship delegation from the ruling UNIP in September, 1975, headed by Alexander Zulu (New China News Agency, September 12, 1975). This visit came at a time when the situation in Angola was becoming critical and Soviet involvement was increasing. Though Beijing issued the usual rhetorical appeals against ‘big-power hegemonism’, Chinese impotence was acknowledged by the statement that aid to Angola’s liberation struggle had been ‘to the best of [the PRC’s] ability’ (New China News Agency, September 13, 1975). Lusaka feared Soviet encroachment on Zambia’s flanks and especially the life-line of the Benguela railroad which enabled Zambia to by-pass rail routes through Rhodesia and South Africa. Zulu agreed with Beijing that Soviet involvement had ‘made reconciliation between the liberation movement impossible’ (New China News Agency, September 16, 1975). According to Zulu, ‘the big powers [were] at their sadistic imperialistic game again’, and Zambia moved closer to Beijing on the question of Angola, urging implementation of the Lusaka manifesto (ibid.). Kaunda gave his tacit blessing to the PRC’s involvement in aiding UNITA and the FNLA as a means by which Soviet domination could be prevented. When this failed, Zambia and China drew together in many respects as Kaunda increasingly postured an anti-Superpower agenda in his speeches. Kaunda’s anti-hegemonic stance neatly dovetailed with that of Beijing’s. As Kaunda remarked, ‘we only know too well that wherever a major power makes an appearance it invariably attracts another. And as you know whenever elephants struggle the grass suffers’ (New China News Agency, August 24, 1976).

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Post-Mao relations With the increasingly critical situation in Southern Africa and the introduction of a direct Soviet presence on the borders of Zambia, Kaunda was concerned that Mao’s death in September 1976 would negatively affect Sino-Zambian ties. Thus commenting on the death of Mao, Kaunda expressed the wish that though ‘Chairman Mao [was] gone, may the friendship between … China and Zambia live and flourish’ (New China News Agency, September 19, 1976). However, it was evident that Beijing valued Zambia too much to allow the death of Mao to jeopardise the PRC’s most important bilateral linkage in the region. This was particularly so after Angola and the subsequent damage to Beijing’s image and prestige in the region for Zambia was a useful vehicle by which Beijing could attempt to regain the measure of presence it had had before 1976. Beijing approved of Lusaka’s ‘struggle to oppose the two Superpowers contention for Africa, particularly the efforts of social-imperialism [i.e. the Soviet Union]’ (New China News Agency, October 13, 1976). Similar sentiments were expressed during the visit by Kaunda’s special assistant in August 1977 and in November the Zambian Prime Minister publicly admonished the Superpowers and asserted that their hegemonic ambitions ‘always aggravates the situation [in Africa]’ (Sunday Times of Zambia, November 28, 1977). Beijing continued on this theme when a Zambian military delegation visited in September 1978 with Vice-Premier Chen Xilian explicitly stating that Sino-Zambia relations were, ‘based on our common struggle to oppose imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism’ (New China News Agency, September 26, 1978). Zambia’s importance to the PRC was thus underscored by the visit to Zambia by the PRC’s Vice-Premier in January 1979. This visit was in essence a continuation exercise by the PRC leadership, who desired to further strengthen and develop the friendly relations between the two countries, and also reassure Kaunda that policy towards Zambia was not about to undergo any dramatic change (Xinhua, January 12, 1979). As Li said, Kaunda had, ‘always been [an] old friend of China in the days when chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai were alive. Now that they have left us, the Chinese leaders … continue to regard you as our old friend’ (Xinhua, January 13, 1979). The PRC delegation however also made reference to the inability of Beijing to supply large amounts of aid. For example, Li asserted that ‘China is still a developing country [and] our aid is insignificant … our capabilities fall short of our wishes’ (Xinhua, January 14, 1979). This may be seen as an indication that Beijing was warning its ally in Lusaka that aid was about to be cut back. Li also in essence acknowledged Chinese impotence when he merely rhetorically criticised the Rhodesian government for attacking Zimbabwean bases in Zambia. This supports the thesis that much of Beijing’s policies in Southern Africa were merely rhetorical and though projected Beijing’s image and influence in the region, offered little much-needed help to states such as Zambia. Nevertheless, Zambian commitment to the relationship remained strong, with a Zambian delegation asserting in July 1979 that ‘a strong China … provides a favourable

China’s relations with Zambia 171 basic foundation for peace, stability and social development’ (Xinhua, January 15, 1979).

Aid to Zambia Chinese aid to Zambia has been particularly generous: China has completed dozens of different aid projects in Zambia. China was by far the biggest Communist aid donor to Zambia, extending over US$230 million to Zambia between 1964 and 1979, compared with the Soviet’s US$15 million and the rest of Eastern Europe’s US$60 million (Central Intelligence Agency, 1981: 18-20). Chinese aid to Zambia was conducted, according to PRC sources, on the assumption that, ‘economic and technical co-operation between China and Zambia is mutual assistance among Third World countries on the basis of equality. Such co-operation has its positive significance in transforming the old and irrational international economic order and hence is full of vitality’ (Xinhua, August 18, 1983). A reflection of the importance of Chinese aid to Zambia may be seen by looking at the percentage of outstanding debt owed by Zambia to various countries. In 1970, virtually no public debt was owed to Beijing, whilst the advanced capitalist states and multilateral agencies accounted for 80 per cent of Zambia’s debt. However, by 1976 nearly 40 per cent of Zambia’s debts were owed to China (Republic of Zambia, 1977). This is an indication of how much aid Beijing had provided to Zambia in the early 1970s, and also how poor Kaunda’s management of Zambia was (Good, 1988). The period of most generosity was in the early 1970s when China emerged out of its diplomatic inertia and became increasingly involved in the Southern African milieu. After a period of neglect in the post-Mao period, China resumed aid to Zambia as Beijing re-entered the region and again resumed encouraging the combating of perceived Soviet hegemony by African states. Aid was extended to Zambia as an expression of China’s perception of itself as the Third World’s leading power. It also served the function of maintaining Zambian goodwill towards Beijing. By providing amounts of aid to Zambia, China was able to fulfil a policy aim of projecting China’s image into Africa, and be seen as a generous friend of the continent. By extension, the generosity of the terms of Beijing’s aid to Zambia and other Southern African countries, meant that Chinese aid also acted as an advertisement of the benefits of Chinese friendship to an African country whilst aiming to prevent the growth of Superpower influence in the particular African state. One important way in which the PRC aimed to combat Superpower hegemony in the region (and counteract South African broadcasts throughout Southern Africa), was the agreement to build a medium and short wave transmitting station, handed over in May 1973. As mentioned previously, following Mao’s death and the Chinese reliance on Washington’s ‘security umbrella’, Chinese aid to Zambia decreased to negligible amounts. For example, the donation of 20,000 kwacha to help flood victims in 1978 (New China News Agency, March 28, 1978). However, 1982 saw a resumption of Chinese aid projects, with the biggest project ever undertaken by

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Chinese technicians – a 2,804 metre long bridge in central Zambia, followed in 1983 by the building of the 60,000 tons capacity Chingola maize mill. Beijing also exhibited a generosity of spirit that had seemingly disappeared under Deng, when it agreed to reschedule the repayment of US$7 million debt owed by Zambia (Xinhua, August 25, 1983). The Chinese leadership was skilfully adept at directing its limited aid budget to projects that, though not financially burdensome, would bring back maximum return and projection of Beijing’s image. One such example in Zambia was the agreement in 1984 to build the new UNIP headquarters. Like China’s building of Zimbabwe’s national stadium, this was a prestigious high-profile project that cost relatively little – China donated US$370,000 towards costs (Xinhua, August 16, 1986). Aid to Zambia before Tiananmen was allowed to decline, with only nominal amounts, such as the 3,000 tons of maize donated at time of drought, or the US$27,000 of medical aid supplied in 1986. However, immediately after Tiananmen and China’s scramble to restore linkages, aid to Zambia greatly increased. A brickwork factory was built at the cost of US$1.2 million, a medical clinic constructed worth US$40,000, and US$188,000 was donated by China to upgrade the Engineering School at the University of Zambia. Aid continued at this level as Beijing recognised the importance of its African allies for support on the international stage. Thus in 1993 US$2 million worth of hospital commodities were sent to Zambia, and a year later US$112,000 of engineering equipment. Zambia had proved a reliable ally of China’s and this was Beijing’s way of reward. Aid to Lusaka has been essentially a component part of China’s relations with Zambia, and has helped China in its quest to maintain a high profile in the country. Aid has also served to project Beijing’s presence far beyond its actual capabilities and helped maintain a cordiality in Sino-Zambian relations that transcended the change in Zambia’s government in 1991.

Kaunda’s visit to Beijing, 1980 Returning to the post-Mao era, the continuity of Zambia’s position vis-à-vis the PRC after Mao was further demonstrated by Kaunda’s third visit to the PRC in April 1980 (Xinhua, April 9, 1980). Kaunda repeatedly stressed that Lusaka’s and Beijing’s ‘views concurred on a wide range of subjects’ (ibid.). At a time of acute crisis in the international system and with a perception of increased Soviet hegemonic manoeuvres (as illustrated in Afghanistan), the PRC had begun to attempt to rally support in the developing world in order to project its status as an integral member of the largest bloc in the United Nations: the developing world. This approach it was hoped would bolster China’s own position. As part of this policy, Hua Guofeng referred to ‘us developing countries’, and ‘our common will’ (ibid.). Beijing was aware that Kaunda had attempted a delicate balancing act between the two great Communist powers, with Moscow attempting to play an increasing role in Lusaka. However, whilst Kaunda was happy to accept aid from Moscow, he was wary of too close an involvement and preferred the PRC’s attentions. In many ways, this was a tacit acknowledgement of China’s own limitations

China’s relations with Zambia 173 on its capabilities and was an open recognition that the PRC’s weakness on the global stage presented no threat to Kaunda’s own position. Economic matters came to dominate the visit by Kaunda and in many ways this acted as a precursor to future Sino-Zambian relations. Hua Guofeng informed the Zambian delegation of China’s future priorities, i.e. the Four Modernisations or China’s ‘new Long March’ (Xinhua, April 10, 1980), and Kaunda enthusiastically allied himself with the cause of modernising the PRC, as according to him, ‘the economic strength and prosperity of China is an important instrument of stability in the world. For given the love for peace and the Chinese internationalist spirit, much can be achieved by China to help in the maintenance of peace … of the world’ (Xinhua, April 11, 1980). Whilst such statements may be taken sceptically, what is certain is that Kaunda ‘generously’ announced that he was ‘prepared to further the economic relations between China and Zambia’ (ibid.). Put crudely, this was in keeping with Kaunda’s record of rhetorical bluster and self-importance. Despite this, it was apparent that Beijing regarded Kaunda as an important ally and Zambia as ‘one of China’s oldest friends in Africa’ (Xinhua, April 12, 1980). During the visit, the Beijing leadership reiterated the PRC’s basic anti-hegemonic posture vis-à-vis the Third World, in a speech to Kaunda’s delegation. In it, Deng insisted that, ‘China will always remain a member of the Third World; it will never pursue hegemonism; and it will always uphold proletarian internationalism and firmly oppose hegemonism’ (ibid.). Huang Hua had earlier appealed for developing world unity as hegemonism was threatening world peace and the developing world was suffering the brunt of this activity (Xinhua, April 9, 1980). According to Hua Guofeng, it was Africa that was playing a vitally important role in resisting the hegemonic aspirations of the Superpowers (Renmin Ribao, April 10, 1980). Accordingly, the PRC viewed the African continent as one of three main areas of global contention, and put considerable effort in courting African nations. This was particularly true in the case of Zambia where Kaunda’s visit was followed up by a number of other Zambian delegations, notably the military delegation visit to Beijing in June 1980. Sino-Zambian ties were further strengthened by the visit to China in September that year by Mainza Chona, Secretary-General of UNIP, who reiterated the familiar theme of China and Zambia’s common history and experiences under colonialism and imperialist hegemonism.

Emphasis on economic development In May 1982, Hu Yaobang reiterated the PRC’s policies towards the developing world when meeting a Zambian women’s delegation in Beijing. The message given was a mixture of mutual co-operation and political support amongst the developing world countries – which included China – and economic modernisation and development. As Hu said, ‘our common task is to unite … and oppose imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. At the same time, energetic efforts should be made to develop our national economies to provide a better guarantee for our national independence’ (Xinhua, May 15, 1982). Thus solidarity amongst developing countries was linked to the Dengist economic revolution. Both economic

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development and developing world unity was seen as crucial to maintaining national independence, sovereignty, and manoeuvrability on the international stage. As a result, trade between China and Zambia continued at satisfactory levels, bearing in mind the essentially limited nature of Zambia’s markets. With the Zambian economy in a seemingly never ending cycle downwards and with Zambia in a poor position to purchase Chinese imports, Sino-Zambian trade remained at a relatively constant low-level of interaction. Nevertheless, bilateral economic relations were another way in which Sino-Zambian ties were maintained. Aiming to make good the shortfall in aid, another economic venture that China promoted was the contracting out of projects and labour services by PRC companies and because the Chinese tenders were consistently lower than anything African companies could submit, the Chinese companies began to increase their economic presence in the country.

Zhao Ziyang’s visit to Zambia, 1983 In January 1983, Zhao Ziyang visited Zambia at a time when Zambia was backing the PRC’s position on what Beijing perceived to be hegemonistic actions by Moscow and Hanoi in Afghanistan and Cambodia (Xinhua, January 6, 1983). At this juncture, Beijing was deeply worried by the international situation and sought allies in the developing world to attempt to combat the developments viewed as hostile to China’s interests. As Zhao said, ‘the turbulence and tensions in the world today are the result of the continued rivalry of the Superpowers’. [As a result, China was] ‘disturbed by the economic crisis which is threatening most of the Third World, and it was with this background that [China sought] mutual co-operation’ (ibid.). The theme of mutual aid was developed by the Chinese press at the time of Zhao’s visit, with Beijing stressing that Zambia’s stand against the White supremacist states of the south greatly aided Chinese interests. This statement gave an indication of the PRC’s thinking on the region and the holistic approach China took to combating the possibility of Superpower hegemonistic developments in the area. Political linkages were important, but bilateral relations were largely concentrated in the economic field. Developing world solidarity and anti-hegemonic posturing was seen as being best pursued through intensified economic activity and commercial relations. With China’s domestically concentrating on modernisation, the commercial side to the PRC’s relations with other states became highly important, for as Hu Yaobang said to a visiting Zambian delegation in 1985, in the past, ‘China had not put enough stress on the country’s economic construction, but on political movements and class struggle. But [now] … work should centre on developing the economy and raising living standards’ (Xinhua, June 22, 1985).

South African aggression Whilst China urged greater economic development though, the political situation in Southern Africa worsened with the South African military in an increasingly belligerent mood vis-à-vis their Black neighbours. Rhetorically, Kaunda reacted

China’s relations with Zambia 175 by becoming increasingly radical towards South Africa and repeatedly speaking of sanctions against Pretoria (Martin, 1987: 393). However, practicalities frustrated Kaunda’s bellicosity (Good, 1987). Fearful of Soviet penetration in the region China promised Lusaka increased co-operation and political support. It was apparent that China had learned the lesson of the weakness of isolation and as a result, Beijing assiduously courted linkages with Zambia as well as other Southern African Front-Liners so as to prevent Superpower hegemonism in the troubled region. Essentially, Beijing aimed to have as many allies and sympathetic states in the area for, as Hu Yaobang said, ‘to struggle against reactionary forces … it is best to have greater unity and as many sympathisers as possible, because nothing can be accomplished with few friends’ (Xinhua, July 4, 1986). The relationship between Zambia and China was mutual in nature and both states benefited. The importance China held for the crisis-stricken region was illustrated in May 1987 when the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, arrived on a state visit to Zambia as part of his tour of seven African nations. Echoing Beijing’s calls for unity against hegemonism and economic exploitation, Zambia urged greater South-South co-operation and improved ties with China, whilst for its part, China agreed that developing world solidarity was crucial, and offered China’s vote in the Security Council to the developing world (Xinhua, May 25, 1987).

Kaunda’s visit to China, 1988 The depth of Sino-Zambian ties were illustrated by Kaunda’s fourth state visit to China in March 1988 when on the eve of his visit, Kaunda referred to China’s relations with Zambia as being ‘very deep and strong’ and called China’s relations with Africa and its attitude to debt (the PRC had just reinvested the US$5 million owed by Lusaka back into Zambia) as a ‘break-through’ in solving Africa’s economic problems (Xinhua, February 22, 1988). At this juncture, Kaunda was important to the PRC’s policies in Southern Africa, as not only was he the Executive Chairman of the OAU, but also of the Front-line States. He was thus a person China was keen to court and influence. As a result, Beijing signed an economic and technological agreement with Zambia, and promised improved economic ties after Kaunda called for an increase in joint ventures between the two states. Deng enunciated the PRC’s position on international affairs, and told Kaunda that ‘hegemonism still exists today and Superpowers’ hegemonism is threatening world peace’. Kaunda in turn praised China for being ‘an antiimperialism and anti-hegemony country’ (Xinhua, March 1, 1988).

Post-Tiananmen Like much of the rest of Africa, the events of Tiananmen Square had little effect on Sino-Zambian relations. Zambia was included on Qian Qichen’s list of Southern African countries visited in July 1989 and was received with the by-now standard fanfares on the strength of Sino-Zambian relations. Lusaka refused to criticise Beijing publicly and appeared to concur with Beijing’s explanation of events.

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Indeed, on a visit to China in mid-1990, the Zambian Prime Minister expressed satisfaction that the situation in China ‘remain[ed] stable’ (Xinhua, July 24, 1990). Furthermore, Zambia agreed with China’s analysis that, ‘the new hegemonism and power politics have brought pressure and difficulties to the developing countries, and therefore … the developing countries should strengthen their unity and co-operation’ (Xinhua, July 23, 1990).

Post-Kaunda However, in 1991 Kaunda lost the first multi-party elections to be held in Zambia for 23 years, to Frederick Chiluba (see Hamalengwa, 1992; Chan, 1991; Mills, 1992). At first, personal ties between Kaunda and China remained with a CPC delegation making a brief stopover in Lusaka to pay their respects to him. Nevertheless, China was determined to maintain warm relations with the new government of Zambia and donated 3,000 tons of maize as a goodwill gesture in May 1992 (Xinhua, May 8, 1992). This appeared to have paid off for Beijing as on a visit to Zambia by the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Yang Fuchang, the new Vice-President of Zambia announced that China remained a firm friend of Lusaka’s, ‘regardless of the change of government’ (Xinhua, August 18, 1992). This visit by Yang Fuchang was important for Sino-Zambian relations in that it signalled a continuation of the relations built up by Kaunda, despite the change of government – something which Beijing rather magnanimously called ‘a choice taken by the Zambian people and China will not interfere’ (ibid.). With China extending increased amounts of aid to Zambia, Lusaka made a reciprocal gesture by reaffirming its ‘one China’ policy and praising Sino-Zambian relations (Xinhua, December 2, 1992). In the post-Tiananmen era, China was especially keen to maintain that no country had the right to criticise another country’s domestic arrangements. A key issue that this centred around was human rights, and Beijing assiduously used developing world countries as a shield by which to deflect criticism of China’s human rights record – often phrased as combating Western ‘hegemonic’ manoeuvres. Zambia was one such country which supported China on this matter. For example, the Zambian Foreign Minister on a visit to China in April 1993 concurred with Beijing’s assessment that, ‘with respect to developing countries, the most basic human rights are the rights to subsistence and to development’ (Xinhua, April 10, 1993). The question of human rights and the censuring of China’s record at the United Nations – defeated with the crucial help of African countries such as Zambia, meant that Beijing re-doubled its efforts post-Tiananmen to maintain cordial relations with Lusaka. Criticism of the West’s ‘interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries’, became a common rhetorical theme in Sino-Zambian talks (Xinhua, August 3, 1995). Economic contacts, as mentioned previously, were one way in which China maintained relations, encouraging Zambia in its own economic reform programme. Personal contacts between China and Zambia continued with visits to China by the Zambian President, Frederick Chiluba and the Zambian Defence Ministry Secretary, and to Zambia by the Chinese Vice-Minister of Culture.

China’s relations with Zambia 177 China also went to great lengths to maintain Zambian goodwill towards Beijing, astutely donating computers and stationery to a popular college in Lusaka and, perhaps more crucially, kitting out the Zambian national football side with 10,000US dollars worth of supplies. The wholesale change of attitude by the Deng government towards economic development and modernisation compared with earlier comments was graphically shown when the Chinese Vice-Premier visited Zambia and praised Chiluba’s ‘realistic policies pursued by the government in recent years to develop the economy’ (Xinhua, August 3, 1995). This followed Chiluba’s attempted restructuring of the economy at the International Monetary Fund’s behest and contrasted strongly with the PRC’s earlier defences of Zambia in the face of international pressure on the Zambian government under Kaunda (Beijing Review, December 6, 1982). As China’s economic modernisation programme continued, more emphasis was put on the creation of joint ventures with Zambia. Chiluba was content for this to happen, commenting that, ‘we want to move away from merely receiving help from China and are eager to do business with China so that wealth can be created by our own people’ (Xinhua, October 10, 1993). Having inherited Kaunda’s disastrous economic legacy, Chiluba was well aware of the economic problems facing Zambia (Burnell, 1994). At the same time, Chiluba was explicit in his assertion that Zambia’s economic development was aimed at maintaining state independence and resisting the hegemonic aspirations of other powers (Xinhua, October 9, 1993). Under Chiluba, Sino-Zambian links continued, if not intensified, particularly in the economic realm. The Mulungushi Textiles Factory, which had been launched by China in the early 1980s, continued to play an important role in Zambia’s textile industry, with over 60 per cent of textiles sold at the local markets coming from the factory (see below). China also invested in Zambia’s copper mine industry, with the Chambishi copper mine in northern Zambia being taken over by a Chinese company in 1998 and undergoing two and half years’ rehabilitation. At the time it was projected to create 1,000 job opportunities and produce 45,000 tons of copper a year. As under Kaunda, the frequent exchange of visits by high-ranking government officials continued in the post-Kaunda governments. In 1995 Chinese Vice Premier Zhu Rongji paid a visit to Zambia, whilst in 1997 Premier Li Peng visited Zambia in his seven-nation trip to Africa. Chiluba paid his first visit to China in 1993, two years after he came power and visited again in 2000 with an 11 day tour of six cities including Beijing, Shanghai and Qingdao (People’s Daily, October 11, 2000). During this visit, the state of a leading Chinese investment in the textile industry in Zambia was discussed.

Zambia-China Mulungushi textile factory The Zambia-China Mulungushi Textile Joint Venture (ZCMT) is the largest textile company in Zambia. Based in Kabwe, north of Lusaka, ZCMT employs 2,000 workers and produces 1,800 tons of cotton yarn, 17 million metres of various

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fabrics and 100,000 pieces of garments every year. Through 5,000 contracted farmers, ZCMT controls over 10,000 hectares of cotton farms in Zambia. The factory, formerly under the Defence Ministry of Zambia, was built with Chinese aid and originally inaugurated in 1983 with a £11 million interest-free loan from Beijing. It was initially under Zambian management with assistance of Chinese experts. However, once the Chinese withdrew it ‘did not take long for the factory to shutdown … thanks to the deteriorating macro-economic situation and mismanagement’ (People’s Daily, November 27, 2003). In July 1995, Zhu Rongji suggested during a visit to Zambia that the factory be turned into a joint venture. It was agreed that China’s £11 million pound investment and a further US$1.5 million for overhaul would be converted into a 66 per cent stake while the Zambians would take up the remaining 34 per cent. Both the chairman of the board of directors and the general manager are Chinese, as are all the main management positions. In January 1997, about 30 management and technical staff from the Qingdao Textile Corporation in Shandong Province arrived, taking only 20 days to restart the factory after repairing all the equipment and drafting new rules and regulations. The new joint venture, known as the ZCMT, was formally inaugurated in May 1997 by visiting Chinese premier Li Peng (ibid.). From 1997 to 2003 ZCMT spent about US$20 million on equipment. Interestingly, the monopoly of the raw cotton market by a few big Zambian companies made sourcing cotton expensive – to the extent that ZCMT had to import cotton from Tanzania. To get around this, ZCMT began to move into cotton farming in 1998, providing local farmers with seeds, fertilizer and pesticide in credit. Within five years the ZCMT had become the third largest cotton purchaser in Zambia and even began exporting surplus cotton to China from 2002. Currently, ZCMT has 18 stores across Zambia and two subsidiary companies in Tanzania and Namibia. ZCMT products are sold throughout Southern Africa. Taking advantage of the Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), the ZCMT is also exporting to the United States. In 2000, it delivered 11,000 pairs of shorts to America, then the biggest ever single export of textile products to the American market by a Zambian company, and in 2003 reached an agreement with an agent of Wal-Mart to jointly finance the expansion of its garment factory so that it would have the capacity to produce 100,000 pairs of trousers per month for export to the United States. The ZCMT has also completed a feasibility study for a ginnery in Chipata, capital of Eastern Province. The factory will have a capacity to process 20,000 tons of seed cotton a year and will be jointly financed by the ZCMT, Zambia’s largest cotton processing company Niymba and other partners from China (ibid.). When President Levy Mwanawasa visited China in 2003, an agreement was signed between the Zambian government and the Qingdao municipal authority to encourage Chinese investors setting up businesses in a planned export-oriented industrial park in Mulungushi. Of note, whenever Sino-Zambian ties are mentioned in the Zambian or Chinese media, as well as by either Chinese or Zambian politicians, the ZCMT is held up as the example of success and co-operation, alongside the famed TanZam railway.

China’s relations with Zambia 179

China and Zambia’s mines As is well known, copper is Zambia’s most important commodity. Production has been soaring, in many ways related to China. Firstly, China’s economic ascendance has increased massively the demand for copper. And secondly, Chinese investment in Zambia’s copper industry has rejuvenated an industry that had been dead on its feet in the 1990s. Copper production in Zambia has in fact doubled since 2000. China is currently the world’s biggest consumer of copper and imports into China increase year on year as economic growth spurs demand for cables and electric wires. China relies on imports for one-third of its refined copper demand, which helped push global copper prices to a record high in 2005. In fact, prices for copper rose 52 per cent in 2005 (China Daily, January 26, 2006). As Chinese demand for copper increases, Beijing has been active in securing copper mines overseas. Chambishi Mine in Zambia is in fact China’s first overseas non-ferrous metal mine, with total investment worth US$150 million (Xinhua, March 13, 2003). China Non-Ferrous Metal Industries Corporation, bought the Chambishi copper-mine in 1998 for $20 million and has since invested another $130 million, creating almost 2,000 jobs for Zambians. The mine was recommissioned in July 2003 and, in November 2004, construction started of a $15 million leaching plant, to allow the mine to process its own ore. China is also soon expected to announce investment in exploration for new ore bodies in Zambia. To date, seven Chinese companies have invested almost $170 million in the Zambian mining sector, stimulated by mine privatisations in recent years. The Chinese have also invested in coal-mining in Zambia. Collum Coal Mining at Choma, in the south of Zambia, started production in 2003 and in 2004 produced 20,000 tons, with plans to increase production to more than 100,000 tons. The Chinese owners are in the process of opening a second shaft, with a plan to make it the biggest coal-mine in Zambia. Another Chinese company, Chiman, is developing a manganese mine at Kabwe, with a proved reserve of 4 million tons (Creamer Media’s Mining Weekly, July 22, 2005). However, as has occurred elsewhere in the region, problems have arisen over perceived Chinese business procedures, particularly in Zambia, vis-à-vis safety standards. For instance, in April 2005, 49 people were killed at the BGRIMM explosives factory, located at the mine in Chambishi where, as mentioned above, China Non-Ferrous Metal Industries Corporation (a Chinese government-owned company) operates. After the explosion, there were widespread complaints about Chinese safety standards. Andrew Gilholm, China analyst at Control Risks, was quoted as saying that ‘China has the worst mining health and safety records in the world, and Chinese companies often do not recognize Western standards of corporate governance and responsibility in other countries’ (Dow Jones Newswires, October 12, 2005). Chinese mining companies ‘are state owned and are not responsible to shareholders or restricted by regulatory and reputational concerns in the same way that Western companies are’ (ibid.). Mavuto Gondwe, director with responsibility for health and safety in the Mineworkers Union of Zambia’s agreed, asserting that ‘The way they [the Chinese] handle their safety factors

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are different. They are much below par’ (ibid.). The Zambian government rushed to downplay concerns over safety standards, lest the Chinese be alarmed at the protests by local residents. But concern over Chinese business practices in Zambia, as elsewhere in Southern Africa, continues.

Concluding remarks Under Kaunda, Zambia maintained perhaps one of the warmest relations with China in Africa. Embroiled in the Southern African crisis but acutely aware of the threat posed by Superpower encroachment (particularly after Angola) Kaunda constructed a firm linkage with China, primarily based on political expediency. In turn, China saw in Kaunda a figure widely respected not only in Africa but throughout the world. By developing ties with Kaunda’s Zambia, Beijing was boosting its own prestige and position whilst aiming to shut out Superpower machinations in Southern Africa. Sino-Zambian ties have remained strong, receiving an impetus in the postTiananmen period when Western countries sought to censure China human rights record, which Zambia sought to (and continues to) publicly defend. Though Zambian foreign policy has always had to operate within the Southern African regional context, Kaunda’s electoral defeat saw no real difference in China’s relationship with Zambia. Indeed under the two post-Kaunda presidents, business links and Chinese investment have intensified. As Zambia continues with its privatisation schemes and as demands by China for minerals continues, Sino-Zambian ties will continue to prosper. Indeed, given Zambia’s copper riches, we may well see greater Chinese penetration of Zambia’s economy as investors seek out new opportunities. Though the heady days of Kaunda’s close engagement with Beijing at a political and rhetorical level have long gone, the ‘normal’ relationship now being crafted is likely to persist.

10 China’s policies towards Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi

During the apartheid era, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) were described as ‘captive states’ within southern Africa (Ajulu and Cammack, 1986; Anglin, 1988; Black et al., 1988. This term was used because of the three states’ subordinate relationship with the regional giant, South Africa (Belfiglio, 1980; Bodenmüller, 1973; Isaacs, 1982). This weakness was due to their land-locked geographical position (Anglin, 1972); their almost total economic dependence upon Pretoria (Sejanamane, 1990); and South Africa’s overpowering military muscle. For BLS, South Africa was truly the hegemon and thus BLS had to essentially tailor their foreign policies accordingly. Though BLS were not necessarily totally acquiescent to South Africa (see Boyd, 1976; and Sekgoma, 1990), the environment in which they operated and the general unwillingness to antagonise Pretoria limited Beijing’s manoeuvrability in the four countries.

BOTSWANA Botswana became independent as a republic on September 30, 1966 after a democratic pre-independence election which the moderate Seretse Khama won. Formerly the British protectorate of Bechuanaland, the country at independence was largely dependent upon British aid, cattle ranching, the export of beef and remittances of wages sent back home by migrant workers in South Africa. This situation radically changed after independence as discoveries of nickel, copper, coal and diamonds and generally good rainfall, drove a remarkable increase in overall GNP allowing Botswana to have among the highest per capita income in Black Africa and a growth rate of 8 per cent (Stedman, 1993). Botswana, however, remained dependent to a large extent on South African largesse, and this was problematic to Gaborone (Arnold, 1987; Dale, 1970). As Seretse Khama put it at a banquet in Beijing, ‘our geographical position in the area is such that our survival as a nation depends almost entirely on our neighbours whose policies are diametrically antithetical to our [own]’ (New China News Agency, July 27, 1976). Botswana pursued a moderate course after independence and attempted to keep out of the conflict in southern Africa. Stable and enjoying a working democracy Botswana pursued a market-oriented programme, and aimed for ‘long-term and viable development’ (Molutsi, 1990).

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Initial exclusion of the PRC However, Botswana was a victim of its geographical location and was inevitably caught up in the southern African maelstrom – a ‘hostage to high politics’ (Dale, 1993). As a result, Botswana offered opportunities to Beijing for involvement, as the PRC’s southern African policy developed and the crisis in the region deepened. In essence, Beijing pursued a policy of offering an alternative to what was termed the ‘shadows of Boer and bear’ (Zaffiro, 1989). That is, between accommodation with the ‘devil’ of South Africa, and the ‘demon’ of the Soviet Union. Initially however, Beijing found itself shut out of Gaborone by Taipei. Although delegations from Botswana had visited Beijing in 1965, 1966 and in 1967 (Ogunsanwo, 1974: 270), Botswana established relations with Taipei and not Beijing shortly after independence. Surrounded by White-ruled states on three sides Gaborone simply could not afford to, nor wished to, antagonise either Pretoria or Salisbury by engaging in links with Communist states at independence. Before independence, Beijing had had limited linkages with a number of radical, invariably small and violent parties, but found itself marginalised upon Botswana attaining sovereignty (Wei Liang-Tsai, 1982: 281). A visit to Taipei by the Botswana Vice-President and Gaborone’s commitment to ‘the Republic of China’s rightful position in the United Nations’ (Free China Weekly, July 21, 1968), only served to underline the PRC’s exclusion from the country. Links between the ROC and Botswana were further strengthened by the visit in 1969, of the Taiwanese Vice Foreign Minister, Yang Hsi-K’un (Free China Weekly, October 5, 1969).

Rapprochement with China However, circumstances unrelated to Beijing’s efforts resulted in a gradual rapprochement with the PRC. This stemmed from Botswana’s position in the southern African region and the growing conflict in Rhodesia. Despite only providing humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwean refugees, growing armed incursions by Rhodesian forces into Botswana in search of Zimbabwean nationalists and the deepening of the armed conflict meant that Gaborone’s security situation became precarious. As a result Botswana aimed to lessen dependence on the minority-ruled countries and sought political support from fellow ‘Front-Line’ states – particularly Zambia, Botswana’s only Black-ruled neighbour. This was symbolised by the construction of the ‘BotsZam’ road to by-pass transport links via Rhodesia (Hill, 1973). Botswana also aimed to de-link itself from the South African Rand as a measure of autonomy vis-à-vis Pretoria. This it achieved in 1974. This development of linkages led to a number of consequences for Botswana’s foreign policy regarding the Communist states. Zambia had already an established pattern of relations with a number of Communist nations and as a result, Botswana was drawn into a more accommodating posture towards the noncapitalist powers. This was initially symbolised by the establishment of relations between Botswana and Yugoslavia in September 1970. This, however, did not

China’s policies towards Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi 183 indicate a shift leftwards by Gaborone for, ever pragmatic, Khama also established relations with Japan and West Germany. Nevertheless, when the ‘two China’s’ issue was debated in the United Nations General Assembly in October 1971, Botswana joined Zambia in voting for the admission of the PRC. The anomaly of a ROC-recognising state such as Botswana voting in favour of the PRC’s seating indicated the precarious situation Gaborone felt itself in at the time due to Rhodesian activity and the subsequent desire by Botswana to acquire as many African and non-African allies as possible. Botswana’s policy regarding the ‘two China’s’ question was confused, and reflected uncertainty towards an issue of little relevance to African politics. This was symbolised by Botswana voting against Taipei and yet agreeing to a technical co-operation agreement in April 1972 (China Yearbook 1972-1973, 1973: 387). The PRC was quick to recognise an apparent turnaround in Botswana’s attitude vis-à-vis Beijing, and sent a high-level telegram to Seretse Khama in September 1972, congratulating Botswana on its sixth anniversary of independence (New China News Agency, September 29, 1972). In essence, the PRC was tentatively testing the ground for reaction. Botswana became gradually amenable to PRC approaches, and in 1975 established relations with Beijing. Although this was a diplomatic coup for Beijing, it was far more linked to Botswana’s own political and diplomatic position vis-à-vis the White-ruled states, rather than a re-orientation of Gaborone’s ideological position or indeed, Beijing’s own efforts (Morgan, 1979). Botswana pursued a policy of outreach to its Black African neighbours, and Beijing was essentially part of the baggage that came with this diversification for Gaborone’s foreign policy was aimed at being independent and attempted to avoid Superpower machinations in the region. As a consequence, the PRC was especially keen to foster amicable relations with the country.

Khama’s visit to Beijing In July 1976, the President of Botswana, Seretse Khama, visited China and at an official banquet, Hua Guofeng congratulated Botswana on its policy of non-alignment and ‘contributing to promoting the cause of unity of the Third World countries and peoples against imperialism and hegemonism’ (New China News Agency, July 27, 1976). Taking up the theme that the international situation was ‘excellent’, Hua saw the African countries (including Botswana) as resisting a whole pot-pourri of evils including ‘imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, big-power hegemonism, White racism and Zionism’ (ibid.). Hua’s linking of hegemonism to the wider struggle against the minority states in southern Africa was illuminating in that, according to Beijing, Moscow’s prime aim in aiding the various liberation movements in the region was hegemonistic and aimed at gaining control of the strategically important Cape sea-route. Khama’s response was more circumscribed, and avoided Hua’s anti-hegemonistic utterances. Whilst castigating the West for selling nuclear reactors to Pretoria, Khama avoided referring to Moscow’s role in the region and thus side-stepped the Sino-Soviet rivalry that had bedevilled relations with other southern African states.

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In Seretse Khama, the PRC was dealing with a wizened pragmatist who by force of circumstance and under the shadow of the South African hegemon, was compelled to balance Gaborone’s foreign policy and moderate Botswana’s behavioural policies. As a result, Khama would not voluntarily involve Botswana in the disputes and polemics between Moscow and Beijing for, unlike Kaunda or perhaps Nyerere, Khama was a more calculated and cautious national leader. Beijing’s relationship with Botswana under Khama was therefore necessarily more circumscribed and less prone to lofty ideological outbursts. Whilst Gaborone was unwilling to be drawn into the anti-Soviet rhetoric of Beijing, its firm stand against South Africa and its independent policy regarding both Superpowers made Botswana an attractive state to court. Thus an economic and technical co-operation agreement was signed between the two states at the conclusion of Khama’s visit (New China News Agency, August 8, 1976).

Beijing-Gaborone ties in the 1970s The PRC was quick to capitalise on the visit to Beijing by President Khama and in September 1976 sent a delegation headed by the Minister of Commerce Fan Zi-yu to attend Botswana’s tenth anniversary celebrations. Beijing also began to publicise the pronouncements of the Botswana government, a clear indication of the PRC’s approval of such statements and was typical of Beijing’s activities in Africa towards perceived allies. In addition, Beijing was prominent in defending Botswana and providing rhetorical support at the United Nations. In May 1977, the Security Council of the UN adopted two resolutions in support of Botswana and Lesotho in their struggle to safeguard their sovereignty against South African and Rhodesian encroachment. The PRC was a vocal supporter of this motion, castigating both Pretoria and Salisbury for interfering in Botswana’s territorial integrity. Beijing also took the opportunity to introduce anti-Soviet rhetoric into the debate, criticising the ‘social-imperialists’ for ‘working hand in glove with the Vorster regime’ (New China News Agency, May 26, 1977). Though the PRC called for ‘immediate financial, technical and material assistance’ to aid the victims of apartheid, there is no evidence that Beijing actually contributed anything to this cause (ibid.). This supports the thesis that much of Beijing’s involvement in southern Africa was rhetorical. Though prominent in denouncing South Africa, Rhodesia and the expansionist ambitions of Moscow, the PRC was content to confine its activities to the conference floor and was tardy in providing (the necessary) concrete assistance. Nevertheless, Beijing was skilfully at the forefront of most debates on southern Africa in this period, and thus able to provide the illusion that the PRC was heavily involved. This was a classic example of Beijing bridging the gap between rhetoric and the reality of limited Chinese capability in the pursuance of an active foreign policy in southern Africa. Such a policy posture did have results for antiSuperpower feeling in Africa at the time was high. As the Botswana Foreign Minister said, Africans ‘opposed the Superpowers for turning Africa into a place where to seek hegemony’ (New China News Agency, August 17, 1978). As successor

China’s policies towards Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi 185 to Khama as Botswana’s President, Quett Masire was even more explicit and closer to Beijing’s line when he told Chinese reporters that, ‘the factors of instability (in Africa) are really the two big Superpowers because there is a new scramble for Africa, each one trying to build its sphere of influence in Africa’ (Xinhua, February 19, 1981). This statement was a replication of Beijing’s own posture and neatly complemented Beijing’s anti-hegemonic position. In essence, since the early 1970s Gaborone’s foreign policy was to attempt to steadily disengage itself from the shackles of Pretoria. An avenue by which it could pursue this, was to assert its African identity through hostility to both Superpowers and identify itself with the non-aligned states of the Third World (Johns, 1973). In many ways, Botswana’s independent foreign policy was a precursor to that of Beijing’s. Similar to the PRC and recognising its own vulnerability Botswana attempted to manipulate the international system in order to maximise its own manoeuvrability (Henderson, 1974). China was thus a useful ally by which Botswana could strive for an assertion of its own international identity, and at the same time Botswana was a state at the centre of the southern African maelstrom through which Beijing could project its policies and agenda vis-à-vis southern Africa and Superpower expansionism. Gaborone-Beijing relations then were in essence mutually compatible, and the importance the PRC regarded its relations with Botswana was underscored in 1986 by the visit by no less than Vice-Premier Li Peng to Gaborone. This was reciprocated by a visit to the PRC by the Botswana Foreign Minister in 1988. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the PRC was particularly useful to Botswana at a time when South Africa was pursuing an aggressive military course against its neighbours. This came about after Botswana had allegedly failed to come to an ‘acceptable understanding’ regarding security with South Africa (The Herald (Harare), September 14, 1986). For example, Beijing strongly condemned South Africa’s attack on Gaborone in March 1988 (Xinhua, March 30, 1988). However, China’s practical help in resisting South African incursions was rather limited and Pretoria of course ignored such posturing by Beijing, attacking Gaborone again in June.

Post-Tiananmen relations Beijing’s rhetorical and practical commitments to southern Africa however did result in a ground-swell of support for the PRC at the time of the Tiananmen Square massacre and Botswana’s reaction was markedly similar to other southern African states. This was particularly evident during Qian Qichen’s visit to six Southern African countries to explain the PRC’s position in July 1989. As mentioned previously, the June 4 incident re-focused Beijing’s concentration on the developing world as a support constituency to withstand critical international opinion. As Qian Qichen said in Gaborone, ‘China will … strengthen and enhance its solidarity and co-operation with African and other developing world countries and actively expand political, economic, trade, cultural, scientific and technological exchanges with them’ (Xinhua, July 28, 1989).

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For Gaborone’s part, the Botswana Foreign Minister hoped that China ‘could remove the difficult elements as soon as possible’ (ibid.). The Tiananmen Square massacre actually served to strengthen Sino-Botswana ties as evidenced when Botswana opened its first embassy in Asia in Beijing after President Masire visited China in September 1991 (Xinhua Domestic Service, September 8, 1991). Like many visitors to China, Masire was taken on a tour of southern China to witness the PRC’s socialist modernisation programme ‘in action’ (Xinhua, September 17, 1991). Since then, high-ranking visitors to China from Botswana have included Festus Mogae (as Vice-President) in June 1996 and as President in June 2000, Speaker of the National Assembly Ray Molomo in October 2001, and Foreign Minister Mr Mompati Merafhe in May 1998. Visitors to Botswana from China have included Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji in July 1995, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan in January 2003, Chi Haotian, Vice-Chairman of Central Military Commission of China, State Councillor and Defence Minister, in November 1998 and Wei Jianxing, Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China in June 2002.

Economic linkages As elsewhere, China in Southern Africa, after the beginning of the modernisation programme under Deng, Beijing rigorously attempted to develop trade linkages with Botswana. This was first signalled by the visit of the Vice-President of Botswana, Quett Masire, to Beijing in June 1980 to ‘exchange experience in economic construction’ (Xinhua, June 24, 1980). As one of Africa’s few economic success stories, Gaborone was of particular importance to Beijing as the Botswana model of development was viewed as instructive for China’s own economic construction. As it was, the Vice-Premier of the PRC State Council, Ji Penfei, was eager to inform the Botswana delegation of the changes in the PRC’s domestic situation since the visit of Khama in 1976, and the ‘principles and policies for China’s modernisation programme’ (Xinhua, June 25, 1980). This was later followed up in December 1980, when a Botswana delegation arrived to discuss developing agricultural and economic construction between Gaborone and Beijing. It is evident that Beijing did indeed see Botswana as an ‘exemplary model in the development of national economy’ (Xinhua, September 28, 1981). In a laudatory article describing the economic achievements made in Botswana, Beijing made clear that Gaborone’s success was based on ‘the principle of “democracy, development, self-reliance and unity”’ (ibid.). Apart from democracy, this echoed China’s own perceived path to development. The theme of learning from Botswana’s development record was reiterated by Xi Zhongxun, secretariat to the CPC Central Committee, who asserted that, ‘China could do well in learning from Botswana’s own experience in sticking to a policy of expanding the economy and improving living standards’ (Xinhua, June 9, 1985). Thus Botswana’s independent foreign policy and its developmental experience was remarkably similar to the PRC’s own aspirations. As Li Xiannian remarked

China’s policies towards Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi 187 to Masire whilst hosting a state visit by the Botswana President, when it came to foreign policy, ‘we [China] share identical views in this field’ (Xinhua, November 14, 1983). Certainly, Botswana echoed China’s own anti-hegemonic posture vis-à-vis the Superpowers in Southern Africa, accusing both major powers of pursuing a ‘competition … for world domination’ (ibid.). Sino-Botswana trade linkages were strengthened in early 1984 when a high-level Botswana trade delegation visited China to attend the Guangzhou export commodities fair. As the Botswana Vice-President said, in the economic field, Gaborone ‘welcomed China to invest in Botswana and jointly develop projects to mutual benefit’ (Xinhua, June 11, 1985), for according to President Masire, the Chinese were ‘the type of people we can do business with’ (Daily News, (Gaborone) September 16, 1991). During Li Peng’s 1986 visit, Botswana and the PRC drew economically closer when both granted each other most favoured nation status (Xinhua, September 29, 1986). This resulted in an immediate dramatic increase in Sino-Botswana trade. Beijing was eager to continue commercial linkages with one of the strongest economies in Africa and so sent a trade mission to participate in the 1988 Gaborone International Trade Fair. This resulted in a large increase in imports from Botswana. Likewise, Botswana was keen to attract Chinese commerce. In 1991 the Botswana President expressly appealed for Chinese industrialists to help in the industrial development of Botswana and the PRC’s role in Botswana was positively appraised by the Botswana press. Later, the Botswana ambassador to the PRC repeated that Botswana wanted ‘to encourage Chinese firms to explore prospects of investing in Botswana’ (Daily News (Gaborone), April 1, 1992). Despite criticism over alleged Chinese work practices and the undercutting of local business by PRC companies (Sunday Times (London), August 18, 1991), Botswana has been eager to attract Chinese investment and capital. In fact, according to Gaborone, Botswana has been generally successful in attracting foreign investment from China. Various Chinese construction companies have established themselves in the country and have built numerous buildings around the country, especially in the capital. President Mogae indeed claimed that ‘Botswana had benefited more than China from the Botswana-China relationship’ (Daily News, November 1, 2001). This is difficult to square with the fact that in 2004, China’s exports to Botswana reached US$49.54 million whilst imports from Botswana amounted to only US$2.86 million. However, it seems China does not particularly care about this state of affairs. When asked about this anomaly in China’s relations with Botswana, the Political Affairs officer at the Chinese Embassy, Jiang Zhouteng, simply replied that ‘the Chinese market was open’ and that if the trade balance was to be more equal, ‘the direct sale of diamonds to China would result in an increase in trade volume’ (Daily News, July 8, 2005). Indeed, if local Botswana business people wanted to export to China then they should ‘enter into joint ventures with their Chinese counterparts so that their products could compete in the international market and be able to enter the Chinese market’ (ibid.). The self-serving nature of these remarks, namely that the Chinese market is ‘open’ so there is no problem but that if Botswana traders do want to export to China they should establish joint ventures with Chinese businesspeople

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is remarkable—and perhaps highlights the one-way street nature of much of Chinese business activity in Africa. That the Chinese spokesman should then assert, without conscious irony, that Chinese activity in Botswana ‘terminated the monopoly of foreign companies’ needs no further comment. China’s main export items to Botswana include textiles, garments, machinery and electronic products. Botswana however has been marked as one of the key market niches for Chinese companies to explore project contracting businesses. Completed projects of significance include the office building of Botswana Airlines at Gaborone Airport, the computer building of the University of Botswana, Gaborone’s sewage farm, etc. As of the end of 2003, eight Chinese companies had set up business in Botswana with a total investment of US$4.9 million, of which US$4.7 million is from China. However, it should be added that the government in Botswana has been active in trying to encourage Chinese entrepreneurs to set up factories in the country through which Botswana would export to the United States of America under American Growth and Opportunity Act. Three Chinese owned textile factories such as Rising Sun, Fascinating and Caratex have become key garment and knitwear manufacturers in Botswana, employing 5,900 local workers. Equally, China has expressed strong interest in Botswana’s diamond industry, asserting that Botswana should export its diamonds directly to Beijing. In 2005, the Political Affairs officer at the Chinese Embassy, Jiang Zhouteng, told journalists that Botswana ‘must’ consider direct sales of rough diamonds to China as China was the second largest diamond consumer in the world (in 2004, China imported diamonds valued at US$1.6 billion, 34 per cent higher than in 2003) (Daily News, July 8, 2005). Botswana has also benefited from different forms of Chinese assistance, including grants, concessionary loans and technical assistance. For instance, Botswana received around £15 million to renovate its railway line and £6 million for the construction of the Letlhakane-Dutlwe road, as well as funds for the construction of low cost housing in different towns and villages in Botswana (Daily News, March 2, 2005).

Sino-Botswana relations: an overview In essence, China’s policy towards Botswana has been successful. Within the limitational parameters imposed by the geographical remoteness between the two countries and the limited capabilities that the PRC has been able to exercise in the region, Sino-Botswana relations have proceeded smoothly. Whilst during the apartheid era Beijing was constrained from becoming actively involved, the PRC’s rhetorical support and limited aid programme appeared to satisfy Gaborone. Conceptually, by appealing to Botswana’s own independent anti-hegemonic foreign policy agenda, Beijing was able to capitalise on existing linkages and project Beijing’s presence into Botswana out of proportion to actual power capabilities. Commercial linkages increasingly played an important role in this projection of PRC influence, going hand-in-hand with Beijing’s rhetorical warning

China’s policies towards Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi 189 against ‘the control of world affairs by a single country or a group of countries’ (Xinhua, May 19, 1992). For a country such as Botswana under the omnipresent shadow of a regional hegemon, Beijing’s position vis-à-vis great powers has coincided with Gaborone’s own foreign policy agenda. This has continued to this day, with the Chinese ambassador to Botswana Jiang Zhengyun asserting that ‘We [Botswana and China] are making joint efforts to pursue a more rational and fair international political and economic order in which the developing countries would have equal participation in world affairs and their legitimate rights are safeguarded’, (Daily News, March 2, 2005). China’s relations with Botswana, out of the three BLS nations are the strongest and seem set to continue.

LESOTHO Because of its landlocked geographical position, surrounded on all four sides by South Africa, Lesotho was perhaps more than any other country in the region vulnerable to Pretoria’s machinations (Arnold, 1976). As one source put it, Lesotho was caught ‘between dependence and destabilisation’ (Baynham and Mills, 1987: 53). Historically, there had been long-standing tension between the Basotho and the Afrikaners, and the exposed kingdom has had to look elsewhere for support and protection from White South Africa (Eloff, 1985). Indeed, that was the raison d’être for Basutoland’s inclusion into the British Empire. Economically, Lesotho was and remains almost totally dependent on South Africa. Indeed, its economic history vis-à-vis South Africa has been described as developing from a ‘granary to labour reserve’ (Murray, 1980; Winai-Ström, 1986). This, it has been argued, has created a ‘syndrome of non-development’ (Wallman, 1972). As a consequence of Lesotho’s situation, Maseru-Beijing ties have been one of the PRC’s more complicated and unstable relationships, with links between Maseru, Beijing and Taipei going through a number of radical changes. This has meant that Beijing’s ties with Maseru have been relatively weak and underdeveloped in comparison to other states in the region. Indeed, until the 1980s Taipei had extremely close links with Lesotho and this had effectively shut out Beijing from active involvement in the country. As a result, despite Beijing’s efforts to the contrary and Lesotho’s apparent identification with China’s anti-hegemonic rhetorical posturing, Beijing has in general performed a marginal role in Lesotho.

Early linkages In 1966, the former British colony of Basutoland became independent under Chief Leabua Jonathan, who had won power after winning barely 40 per cent of the votes cast. Upon independence, Jonathan’s party – the Basotholand National Party (BNP) – had to confront the militant Basotho Congress Party (BCP) and the power-seeking King Moshoeshoe II, whilst at the same time balancing relations with Pretoria. Until 1971 this was translated in Lesotho’s foreign policy by a determination to maintain cordial relations with South Africa (Kotsokane, 1969), justified by Jonathan as a ‘realistic’ policy (Weisfelder, 1972; Gilley, 1970).

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As a consequence, like Gaborone Maseru was initially hostile to Communism and promised Pretoria its assistance in eradicating Communism from Lesotho. Indeed, in this period Maseru accused the PRC of promoting subversion in the country. Lesotho had established relations with Taipei two weeks after achieving independence, and this had been cemented by the visit of Jonathan to Taipei a month later. A number of technical agreements were signed between the two nations, and links were further strengthened with Jonathan’s second visit in 1969 (Free China Weekly, August 31, 1969). It is obvious that Taipei highly prized Maseru, for the ROC’s Foreign Minister was a regular visitor to Lesotho. However, domestically Jonathan’s conciliatory approach regarding Pretoria was deeply unpopular and resulted in the BNP losing the 1970 election to the more militant BCP (Macartney, 1973). Jonathan’s reaction was to abort the result, an action satisfactory to Pretoria who feared a BCP-led Lesotho government. Nevertheless, Jonathan began to gradually distance himself from South Africa in a similar fashion to Botswana, though Maseru’s manoeuvrability was far more circumscribed (Hirschmann, 1979). Jonathan’s aim was to lessen dependence on Pretoria and establish closer links with Black Africa north of the Zambezi and with the non-aligned world. This was symbolically started off by Maseru developing links with India. Beijing reacted to this development in Lesotho’s foreign policy by attempting to open up dialogue with a state in Africa, first sending a high-level telegram to Jonathan congratulating Lesotho on its independence anniversary (New China News Agency, October 3, 1972). As a result of Maseru attempting to ‘break Pretoria’s stranglehold’ (Brickhill, 1977), in 1975 Lesotho’s Foreign Minister Kotsokane, visited Beijing and provoked speculation that Maseru was about to switch ties from Taipei. This was part of Maseru’s wider attempt to diversify linkages for Lesotho in an attempt to gain international support against Pretoria. Kotsokane echoed Beijing’s own views when he asserted that Maseru ‘condemned those countries in the world that think that, because of their military power, or because of their economic power or because of their geographical size, they have the right to dominate the destiny of other peoples’ (New China News Agency, May 19, 1975). This was a replication of Beijing’s own anti-hegemonic posture. The PRC’s developing world credentials were by this point well established in Africa, and this stance, though largely rhetorical, enabled Beijing to posit the standing of a trusted friend of African nations. This view is supported by Kotsokane’s speech at a banquet in Beijing during his visit, when he linked Lesotho and the PRC together and argued that, ‘as members of the Third World with [China], we believe that we all have a role to play in insuring that the small countries of the world are protected from domination from either Superpower’ (ibid.). This rhetoric dovetailed with the PRC’s own Third world anti-hegemonic agenda. However, after strong criticism of the trip by conservatives within Jonathan’s own party, there was no change in policy by Lesotho vis-à-vis Taiwan and ties between the two countries remained strong, despite the visit to Beijing (though Taipei cancelled a visit by two investment groups to Lesotho). The PRC however remained interested in Lesotho, periodically quoting Jonathan, a sign of approval

China’s policies towards Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi 191 from Beijing (see for example, New China News Agency, April 30, 1977). This was particularly so when Jonathan echoed Beijing’s own view that ‘the Superpowers [were] seeking gains out of the strife in Africa’ (New China News Agency, September 27, 1977). At this time, Lesotho had experienced numerous attacks by the Pretoria-sponsored Lesotho Liberation Army, which aimed to destabilise Lesotho and Jonathan’s regime and introduce a more amenable attitude towards South Africa. Pretoria also began to raid Maseru in seek-and-destroy missions against suspected ANC bases in Lesotho. This destabilisation policy by Pretoria however failed to prevent Maseru from diversifying its relations with other – notably Communist – powers.

Establishment of Sino-Lesotho relations In 1983 Jonathan visited the PRC on a ‘friendship visit’. This visit was hoped for by Zhao Ziyang to develop a ‘new stage’ in Sino-Lesotho relations and the establishment of bilateral relations (Xinhua, May 13, 1983). Zhao took the opportunity to reaffirm Beijing’s anti-hegemonic posture, asserting that each country should ‘treat each other on an equal footing in international affairs’, and that the PRC was opposed to ‘the big bullying the small’ (ibid.). The visit was significant in that during it, Lesotho and the PRC announced that they had already established diplomatic relations (in Mozambique) on April 30 1983 (Xinhua, May 14, 1983). Maseru gave the necessary commitment to the ‘one China’ policy (Beijing Review, May 23, 1983), and relations with the ROC were broken as of May 14. In return, an economic and technical co-operation agreement was signed. Jonathan was then sent on a tour of Shanghai to witness aspects of the ‘socialist modernisation’ programme (Xinhua, May 16, 1983). Lesotho’s establishment of relations with Beijing sprang from circumstances within Maseru’s government and its position towards South Africa, not from any particular efforts by the PRC. Jonathan felt that a switch to Beijing would keep in line with other front-line states. Like Botswana, rapprochement with Beijing was more an assertion of independence and manoeuvrability towards Pretoria rather than of any ideological dialectic (Lesitner, 1983). As Jonathan said, ‘in spite of being surrounded by a powerful and influential neighbour who is hysterical about the socialist countries, we have not, and we will not, let her determine who our friends should be’ (Xinhua, May 13, 1983). This fact was reinforced by the obvious fragility of the relationship as domestic change within Maseru resulted in the swapping of ties between Taipei and Beijing on a number of occasions. In addition, Maseru’s manoeuvrability remained prescribed by Pretoria. South Africa continued to launch military raids against Lesotho and Maseru’s vulnerability was illustrated by the fact that it was compelled to deport 24 ANC members by South Africa, as a precursor to normalisation of Lesotho-South African relations. However, Jonathan remained defiant and one way that this defiance was expressed was by retaining ties with the Communist powers. Thus in September 1985, King Moshoeshoe II visited the PRC. This was portrayed by Beijing as a vindication of its anti-hegemonic posture, with

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Li Xiannian asserting that the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence should be the supreme norms governing international relations’ (Xinhua, August 31, 1985). This stance was repeated by Beijing throughout the visit and was echoed by Moshoeshoe II, who ‘strongly supported China’s advocacy that all countries, big or small, should be treated equally’ (Xinhua, September 1, 1985). The PRC enunciated a political rhetoric that was highly attractive to states such as Lesotho, effectively at the mercy of a large hegemon within the southern African sub-system. The rhetorical and political support that the PRC offered to Lesotho in this period thus enabled Beijing to play a role – albeit of a highly limited nature – in Maseru’s defiant attitude towards Pretoria.

Overthrow of Leabua Jonathan However, Jonathan’s campaign of withstanding South Africa’s hegemony quickened the end of his rule. In 1986 Pretoria began an economic blockade against Lesotho after Jonathan refused to sign a military pact with South Africa and expel ANC cadres living in Lesotho. Thus on December 20 1985 a South African commando invaded Maseru killing nine, and on January 1 blockaded Lesotho’s border. A bloodless coup on January 20 ended Jonathan’s rule and Lesotho’s ten year campaign of defiance against Pretoria (Berger, 1986; Leistner, 1986). Although the coup had a number of other factors, Beijing clearly saw that the ‘Pretoria blockade provoke[d] the coup’ (Beijing Review, February 10, 1986). The chairman of Lesotho’s Military Council, Justin Lekhanya, assured the PRC ambassador that Sino-Lesotho relations would remain strong, though Lekhanya explicitly aimed to normalise ties with Pretoria and abandon what was perceived as Jonathan’s confrontational tactics vis-à-vis South Africa (Xinhua, March 15, 1986). This became particularly apparent with the signing of the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty in late 1986, which exacted a heavy political price on Maseru. More explicit was the security pact with Pretoria in late March 1986 whereby Lesotho essentially undertook not to support the ANC. In essence, Lesotho’s foreign policy went from an assertive to a submissive role after the coup (Sejanamane, 1988). Initially, however, the coup had little direct effect on SinoLesotho ties, and the Queen of Lesotho visited China in September 1987.

Post-Tiananmen Square relations Like many Southern African countries, Lesotho was remarkably forgiving of the incidents of June 1989. As part of Qian Qichen’s visit to six states in the region, Maseru was called upon in July 1989 (Xinhua, July 28, 1989). Hoping for improved relations Lekhanya made no mention of the events the previous month in Beijing. However, relations between Beijing and Maseru were not to remain stable for on April 8 1990 the PRC severed links with Maseru after Lesotho resumed relations with the ROC (Beijing Review, April 23, 1990). This was recognised as being a radical departure in Lesotho’s foreign policy towards Beijing. The reasons behind this diplomatic switch have been centred around the financial

China’s policies towards Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi 193 inducements offered by Taipei in exchange for political recognition, and not the events of June 1989. Essentially, Taipei was accused of ‘cheque book diplomacy’ in wooing Lesotho back. That this accusation could be made indicates that PRC aid commitments to Lesotho did not match the expectations in Maseru. For a poverty-stricken state such as Lesotho, financial inducements were a strong incentive for shifting diplomatic recognition. The shift in relations was also no doubt influenced by the greater South African influence in Lesotho following the 1986 coup. It was only in 1994 that Maseru restored links with Beijing and broke with Taipei after elections in which pro-Taipei congressmen lost to pro-Beijing delegates. With King Moshoeshoe II expressing the desire to develop friendly ties, an era of stability in Sino-Lesotho relations may have arrived.

Sino-Lesotho ties: an overview Lesotho has been problematic for PRC policy in that its geographical vulnerability and internal tensions meant that no coherent policy could be developed towards Maseru. Though Lesotho was attracted to Beijing’s rhetoric of anti-hegemonism and the equality of states in the international system, the reality of the southern African regional sub-system and Lesotho’s chequered relations with Pretoria has meant that linkages between Beijing and Maseru have always been weak and susceptible to the disruptive influences and actions of the regional hegemon. As a result, Sino-Lesotho ties have been unremarkable and plagued with instability. Recognising Taipei in 1966, switching to Beijing in 1985, then switching back to Taipei in 1990 and finally resuming links with Beijing in 1994 has meant that Lesotho has been an essentially unreliable partner and this has had a direct negative effect on the strength of Beijing’s ties with Maseru, as does the fact that Lesotho has nothing much to trade with China. Whilst it is true that the Chinese government has completed nine aid projects in Lesotho (the biggest of which is the National Convention Center in Maseru), Chinese aid is very low-level. Trade is similarly undeveloped, with total volume between the two countries in 2002 reaching only US$24.5 million, of which virtually all were Chinese imports into Lesotho. However, with a less aggressive China-recognising South Africa, and resumed ties with Lesotho, it is possible that Maseru’s links with Beijing have finally stabilised.

SWAZILAND Swaziland, like Lesotho, is almost totally dependent on South Africa (Potholm, 1972). However, whilst Lesotho’s policy towards Pretoria under Jonathan was confrontational, Swaziland’s was moderately critical (Daniel, 1984). Severely constrained by the regional structural linkages and the dominance of the South African hegemon, Mbabane pursued a pro-Western foreign policy which has excluded the PRC from any involvement (Snyman, 1992; Bischoff, 1986, 1990). Because of this, Swaziland has in essence been largely an irrelevance to Beijing. Contact between the two has been negligible, and as a result treatment of the country in this study will necessarily be brief.

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Swazi-ROC ties precludes Beijing Swaziland achieved independence on September 6, 1968 and established relations with the ROC on the same day. Mbabane’s decision to engage in relations with Taipei were conditioned by its relationship with Pretoria prior to independence (Potholm, 1967). However, Swaziland’s relations with Taipei have apparently been mutually satisfactory and ROC aid has been generous. Investment by Taipei has been moderate, though ROC work practices have apparently caused concern (e.g. Times of Swaziland, (Mbabane) September 13, 1991). Judging by the size of the ROC’s embassy in Mbabane, Taipei greatly values Swaziland as a strategic diplomatic ally in the region. Indeed, Swazi leaders have been regular visitors to Taipei. There was a slight indication of a possible thaw in relations between the PRC and Mbabane when the Mayor of Beijing met the Swaziland International Olympic Committee member in 1992, though this came to nothing and in 1995 King Mswati III visited Taipei. Trade between Beijing and Mbabane has existed, though at a relatively low level. In essence, Beijing has been almost totally absent from Swaziland. Indeed, an indication of China’s exclusion from Swaziland was illustrated by Mbabane being one of the original 16 countries (later rising to 28) promoting the admission to the United Nations of ‘the free people of the Republic of China’ in October 1996 (Times of Swaziland (Mbabane), September 18, 1996). At present, Taiwanese-Swazi ties seem secure, and China remains excluded from the country.

MALAWI The former British colony of Nyasaland gained its independence in July 1964 as Malawi and in 1966 was proclaimed a republic under President Hastings Banda. One of Africa’s more colourful rulers, Banda’s highly personalised and autocratic regime was to present problems to Beijing and sabotaged China’s hopes in the country. Prior to independence, Banda had stated that he would recognise Beijing and support China’s push for UN membership (Short, 1974: 206). However, Banda wished to avoid the PRC-ROC controversy and so both Beijing and Taipei were invited to attend the independence celebrations (Peking Review, July 10, 1964). Beijing, being unwilling to give tacit approval to a ‘two China’ situation refused the invitation, though Zhou Enlai attempted to keep open lines of communication and sent a congratulatory telegraph to Banda on independence day (Peking Review, July 10, 1964). Relations with Beijing however suffered a reversal when the Chinese ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam attempted to bribe Banda to recognise Beijing and end the ‘two China’ policy. Banda refused, but his Cabinet colleagues’ eagerness to accept caused a major crisis in the government and resulted in a number of ministers resigning or being sacked (Short, 1974). Despite this, Banda did talk in favour of China’s admission to the United Nations when he addressed the General Assembly in December 1964 (The Times (London), December 3, 1964).

China’s policies towards Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi 195 However, after discovering that China was supplying ex-ministers with money and insurgency facilities in Tanzania, Banda changed his attitude to Beijing. Now, Banda proclaimed ‘what the Chinese want, I don’t want. What the Chinese do not want, I want’ (quoted by Short, 1974: 237). On July 12, 1966 Malawi and Taiwan entered into diplomatic relations and the door was firmly shut on Beijing. Whilst Banda orientated Malawi closer to the West, Malawi and China became mutually antagonistic. Zhou’s tour of Africa in 1965 provoked Banda to exclaim that ‘he was less afraid of Queen Elizabeth II than … Kublai Khan in Peking’ (Deacon, 1974: 450). Despite tentative attempts by China to heal the breach, Sino-Malawian relations became non-existent, with Banda typically proclaiming that he was ‘strongly and … violently anti-Communist’ (Hirschmann, 1995: 254). In 1968, Banda paid an official visit to Taipei, and contacts with Taiwan increased, particularly in the agricultural field.

Change of leadership: China remains excluded In June 1993 a referendum, financed by ROC money, voted for multi-party democracy. With Banda’s position looking increasingly insecure, China invited a pro-democracy leader to Beijing on a ‘goodwill visit’ (Xinhua, January 24, 1994). However, the offer of relations with Malawi by China after Banda’s fall from power in 1994 was rejected and Malawi remained a firm ally of Taipei’s. The new President Bakili Muluzi, visited the ROC in April 1995 and Malawi (like Swaziland) was one of the states to support Taipei in its application to rejoin the United Nations in October 1996 (Free China Journal, October 12, 1996). A visit to the region by John Chang, ROC Foreign Minister in January 1997 included Malawi and Chang met with Muluzi. Coming after Pretoria’s recent switch to China, the visit was frameworked around Taipei’s wish to shore up its links with Lilongwe, a donation of US$2 million to renovate barracks in the capital being part of this. Although Malawi was one of only two countries recognising Taipei to accept the invitation to attend the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation Ministerial Conference in October 2000 (the other being Liberia), there has been no move thus far to switch relations. Whilst one cannot discount an eventual switch by Lilongwe to Beijing ties with Taipei are strong and the PRC remains excluded from the country at present. As a result, Malawi may need no further concern this work.

BLS: concluding remarks China’s relations with the four small states in Southern Africa were for a long time essentially dependent on the ongoing situation the states found themselves in vis-à-vis South Africa. This was particularly so with regard to BLS and in particular in regard to landlocked Lesotho and vulnerable Swaziland. Though Beijing’s anti-hegemonic posturing and rhetorical support for BLS had some effect, particularly in Botswana where a relatively satisfactory relationship was developed, relations with the countries have been relatively restricted (or indeed,

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virtually non-existent), though Gaborone has been Beijing’s strongest linkage out of the three. In both Malawi and Swaziland Beijing’s rivals in Taipei have succeeded in shutting out China to date though how long this will survive Pretoria’s switch to Beijing remains open to conjecture. Lesotho’s highly vulnerable position regarding South Africa and its internal politics has meant that its ties with Beijing have been unstable and unpredictable. Swaziland and Malawi by contrast, have had virtually no links with China and may no further concern this study. Finally, Botswana has been the most amenable to Beijing’s independent, non-aligned anti-hegemonic language and international posturing and it is Gaborone where the PRC may be said to have conducted a relatively successful foreign policy. Under Botswana’s stable leadership, which aimed at disengaging as far as possible from the South African hegemon, China was afforded the greatest opportunity within BLS to foster a meaningful relationship and this, as the study has shown, Beijing did with some skilful diplomacy. In the current era, where China’s economic take-off has stimulated a massive expansion of Chinese businesses throughout Southern Africa, Chinese links with all four countries are likely to develop and, in the long-run, it is unlikely that Taiwan’s allies in the region will hold out much longer. But the BLS states make interesting studies of some of the problems China has faced in Africa and although small and – to be honest – insignificant to China’s broader foreign policy, reflect noticeable developments within the region.

11 Conclusion and the future

In January 2006 Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing carried out a six-nation Africa tour to Cape Verde, Senegal, Mali, Liberia, Nigeria and Libya. Reflecting the importance that Africa now holds for China, it has become a foreign policy ‘tradition’ in Beijing that the first official overseas visit every year by a Chinese leader goes to Africa. It is hoped that this study has demonstrated the depth and extent to which China has been involved in Africa over the last few decades. The book began by posing a number of questions regarding China’s role in one specific region, namely Southern Africa. Of fundamental importance was the extent to which China has managed to bridge the gap between its ambition to restore its place in the international system and its relatively limited ability to project its power; and how important China’s rhetoric of anti-hegemonism has been as a device to secure and promote Beijing’s position in the developing world. Although China vehemently denies that it harbours any ambitions to become a Superpower, China has attempted to advance itself as a global player beyond its immediate geographical confines. Its efforts to establish its leadership of the developing world is clearly part of this ambition. Such a policy is integral to the Chinese leaders’ stated aim to restore China’s ‘rightful place’ amongst the community of nations. As part of this, China consistently refused to contemplate involvement in the United Nations unless it was accorded status on the Security Council as the legitimate representative of the Chinese nation. This it finally achieved in 1971 through the active support of African nations, who swung the vote in the PRC’s favour. Since that date Beijing increasingly exhibited itself as a ‘concerned party’ in different parts of the world, often through the medium of the United Nations, something which is increasingly apparent today. China’s aim has been to increase China’s prominence in world affairs and boost the role China plays in the international system, as well as secure itself from perceived threats. As the Chinese press has commented, ‘China’s international status was unprecedentally enhanced after acceptance into the UN’ (Xinhua, November 24, 1994). Within the international system, throughout the Cold War China felt constrained by the bi-polarity of the two Superpowers and viewed this milieu as being inimical to China’s ambitions to regain the status it sought. As one writer noted, ‘China has been [a] restless … power because it has recognised its basic weakness in an age of Superpower chauvinism’ (Segal, 1992: 167). However, Beijing

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lacked the real ability to alter the international structure. Thus, in an attempt to bridge the gap between China’s ambitions and its real capabilities, the PRC often utilised the developing world as a vehicle through which China hoped to challenge Superpower hegemony. As Gavshon noted, the ‘Chinese strove to circumscribe Superpower [restrictions] by mobilising the Third World to play a balancing, almost a controlling role’ (Gavshon, 1981: 135), and as Chazan et al. (1992: 388) rightly asserted, the two Superpowers ‘interpreted African interests in terms of containing the other’. Simultaneously, China constructed much of its anti-hegemonic policy (particularly in the 1970s) around containing – or at least hindering – them. As has been shown, Beijing saw it as desirable within the international system to ally itself or rather, to be seen to ally itself, with the anti-colonial and anti-minority rule campaign that dominated Southern Africa for at least four decades. Such a policy was designed to bolster China’s own position within the developing world and boost Chinese prestige amongst the developing nations of the world. In the early 1970s China conceptualised the globe as being divided into three worlds and Beijing increasingly viewed the developing world as offering great potential for solidifying China’s own position within the international system and allowing Beijing to flex greater manoeuvrability vis-à-vis the two Superpowers. As Chan remarked, the Three Worlds theory aimed to ‘bolster China’s prestige … suggest international Chinese influence and appear to suggest a potential for mobilising international power’ (Chan, 1985: 379). This was rhetorically constructed as the campaign against ‘hegemonism’ by which China aimed to reduce the major powers’ strength and influence over the developing world and crucially, by extension, over China and the international system. Thus in Southern Africa, Beijing was relentless in its pursuance of ‘anti-hegemonism’ and constantly exhorted the states of the region to resist Superpower – particularly Soviet – encroachment, for as two Chinese scholars noted, ‘Southern Africa [was] attractive to any Superpower interested in world hegemony’ (Ge and He, 1987: 170). This was intimately linked to China’s own feelings of vulnerability within the global structure, particularly after Moscow embarked on its widely perceived expansionism in Angola, Afghanistan and its encouragement of Vietnam in Cambodia. These events conspired to convince Chinese policy-makers that the Soviet Union was attempting to encircle China and threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s very rule. Southern Africa offered China an opportunity to divert Soviet ambitions and, recruit members for China’s ‘anti-hegemonic’ crusade. Such members would act as a support constituency to defend China in the international community against Soviet machinations. In the case of the liberation movements, they gave the PRC access to issues of increasing international significance, thus raising China’s prominence. However, the events at the end of the 1970s were a revelation to Beijing. It was seen that a reliance on the developing world constituency alone was not sufficient to protect the PRC within the international system against a rapacious and hegemonic Moscow. As a result, China deftly moved to place itself under the ‘security umbrella’ of Washington. A decline in China’s commitment to the developing world followed and China’s general anti-hegemonic line became concentrated on

Conclusion and the future 199 combating Soviet machinations. With China concentrating on economic modernisation after 1978 and radicalisation being removed from its political agenda, the usefulness of the developing world and Southern Africa to Beijing ebbed. The PRC’s integration into the global economic system and the de-radicalisation of its foreign policy under Deng was of primary significance for Chinese foreign policy. However, as has been seen, Beijing did maintained an element of its anti-hegemonic posturing and continued to resist ‘interference’ in the internal affairs of states by the major powers, conscious of how such ‘hegemony’ could limit Beijing’s manoeuvrability. This has continued today and is routine in Chinese foreign policy pronouncements. As Goodman and Segal have commented, ‘as a non-status quo power [China] has … problems in accepting limits on its behaviour’ (1995: 104). After the disappointment felt by China over its initial ‘honeymoon’ with the United States in the early 1980s, Beijing came to the realisation that in essence, whilst the major powers’ policies towards China would shift and change, blow hot and cold, the developing world would always be present and, perhaps cynically, available. As a result, a gradual re-assertion of the developing world’s importance to China was promulgated in its foreign policy. The resumption of more extensive political activities in Southern Africa can be traced from this point. This was given a major boost during the Tiananmen Square crisis and after, where China again utilised the developing world and Southern Africa through its anti-hegemonic rhetoric. Beijing was shocked by the widespread anti-China sentiment that erupted after Tiananmen and the isolation and pariah status that the leadership was forced to endure. Updating China’s anti-hegemonic theme Deng remarked, ‘we used to say that the United States and the Soviet Union were seeking hegemony. Now … the Group of Seven seek hegemony and play power politics too’ (Deng, 1994: 334). As a result, China increasingly turned its gaze towards the African continent, which had been largely steadfast in its support of the Chinese leadership during and after the June 4 crisis. International reactions to the Tiananmen massacre and the development of China’s human-rights record as a matter of international debate and concern exposed China’s position within the international system as being relatively weak and vulnerable. Certainly, China perceived that it could not depend on the Western world to refrain from ‘interfering’ in China’s domestic affairs (though China’s repeated interference in states such as South Africa’s ‘domestic affairs’ was never mentioned). As a result, Beijing was determined never again to be as isolated as it was in the immediate aftermath of 1989 and sought means by which it could bolster its own position vis-à-vis the ‘hegemonic’ West. After the demise of the Soviet Union and the United States’ elevation as the sole Superpower, China viewed this policy as of immediate importance, for China still adhered to the view that outside powers were conspiring to perpetuate Beijing’s weak position in the international system and continued to feel marginalised in the post-Cold War period (Zhao, 1992). As a result, China has postured even the most mildest of criticism of Chinese policy as a ‘gross violation’ of China’s internal affairs and sovereignty and in turn, has warned Africa that

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‘the intervention of external forces still lingers’ (Xinhua, January 24, 1995). At the same time, China has assiduously courted friends in the developing world, such as in Southern Africa, in a concerted effort to construct a support constituency that would enable China to ride out any future criticism of its policies and bolster China’s standing in the international system. For instance, in April 2004 China once again foiled an attempt to have Beijing’s human rights record censured at United Nations Commission on Human Rights, making it China’s eleventh success at the Commission since 1990 in having discussion of China’s human rights thrown out (Xinhua, April 16, 2004). China put forward a motion to reject the draft resolution against China before it was even put to the vote. With 28 votes for, 16 against and 9 abstentions, the 53-member commission approved the no-action motion tabled by China. Of the 28 in support of China, all but two (Russia and the Ukraine) came from the developing world, with South Africa, Burkina Faso, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, and Zimbabwe backing China on its human rights record. Indeed, ‘The representatives of Sudan, Congo, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and Mauritania … spoke at the meeting, stressing the great achievements China has made on human rights’ (Xinhua, April 16, 2004). It should, of course, be pointed out that the composition of the Commission on Human Rights is dominated by countries that routinely violate human rights. If we were to use Freedom House’s annual assessment of countries, then ‘partly free’ countries made up a quarter of the 53-member Commission whilst nearly one-third are classified as ‘not free’. China, it has to be said, relies on this anomaly to defend its human rights record in Geneva. As has also been shown, China successfully realised that much of the developing world was dissatisfied with the ‘irrational international economic order’ (Xinhua, January 15, 1995), and so has consistently attempted to exploit developing world grievances in order to further China’s prestige and position as the ‘spokesman’ for less developed. Such a policy has allowed China to adopt a rather self-righteous tone in its dealings with the developed world and furthers Beijing’s self-perception of itself as a central, normative actor in contrast to other nations who, if their behaviour deviates from the Chinese world view are simply ‘wrong’ (Pye, 1990). As has been stated, the rhetoric of anti-hegemonism has been a guiding force in the PRC’s policy formulation towards the developing world and Southern Africa and this has stemmed from the perception of China’s own constraints within the international system. Anti-hegemonism has, and continues to be, a rhetorical device central to China’s foreign policy, particularly with regard to the developing world and/or its immediate environs. Note in this regard the statement in December 2005 on American foreign policy: Some people, who were disgusted with the United States’ practice of exercising hegemony in international affairs, took the September 11 terrorist attacks as a sign of the beginning of the US decline … People see that the current US Government places itself above the United Nations … People see that the

Conclusion and the future 201 United States time and again interferes with other countries’ sovereignty … We refuse to accept US hegemony. (China Daily, December 27, 2005) By deploying the rhetoric of anti-hegemony, China aims to court support in the developing world, as well as flag up concern over the position that Beijing perceived itself to be in within the international system. This is long-standing, as Boyd asserted long ago, ‘Chinese attempts at international symbolic interaction include endeavours to gain leadership of major political forces on the global scene [such as the Third World] … Such forms of international leadership are expected to bring increased control over China’s [manoeuvrability] and high status’ (Boyd, 1979: 57). So, how may the individual Southern African countries be conceptualised within China’s anti-hegemonic framework? Much of China’s original linkages with Southern Africa were within the structure of developing ties to the embryonic national liberation movements. As has been shown, a large portion of Chinese energy was directed towards combating Soviet influence. Indeed, Beijing’s anti-hegemonic motives propelled China to fraternise with any organisation that the Chinese felt offered an alternative to any Moscow-backed organisation. On the negative side, this led China into supporting ineffective movements such as COREMO in Mozambique, SWANU in South West Africa and the PAC in South Africa. Witness also the opportunism that marked China’s disastrous Angolan excursion. Whilst the national liberation movements were no mere tabula rasa for external powers – including China – to write upon, it can be said that the PRC hoped to utilise the Southern African liberation movements as part of its anti-hegemonic foreign policy in the region, and with the case of ZANU in Rhodesia scored a notable success. A further theme of China’s policies in Southern Africa was the targeting of individual states. As with much of Southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, all roads led to Pretoria. South Africa was the key to unlocking the whole region from its racial impasse, and much of China’s efforts were directed at undermining South African or South African-sponsored rule. At the same time, Beijing was acutely aware that the crisis created by South African intransigence offered Moscow opportunities that China felt compelled to attempt to thwart. Thus China became involved in supporting national liberation movements in Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa itself, whilst at the same time aiding those organisations in Portuguese Southern Africa that Beijing felt able to exercise at least a modicum of influence. Connected to this theme, China aided independent states in Southern Africa in attempt to thwart both Superpower hegemony and the hegemony of Pretoria. Zambia and Botswana were cases in point where Beijing actively encouraged resistance to the overt influence of either South Africa or the possibilities of Superpower intrusion. That China’s anti-hegemonic policies neatly mirrored the independent and non-aligned foreign policy aspirations of Gaborone and Lusaka, meant that China enjoyed a measure of success in these countries and to this day

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maintains warm and friendly ties with the two. The tools by which this was achieved were largely bilateral aid agreements, growing trade and, on a political level, rhetorical encouragement to continue the anti-hegemonic struggle. Turning to the individual states, Zambia was the first country in the region to establish relations with the PRC and has remained a consistently warm ally, even after the veteran friend of China, Kenneth Kaunda, was ousted during the wave of democracy that swept Africa in the early 1990s. Zambia was an important state for China to court during the wars of national liberation in the region as it played host to many of the nationalist organisations and was strategically vital, bordering as it did both Portuguese territories and minority-ruled Rhodesia and South West Africa. The famous involvement of China in the TanZam railway only served to highlight the importance Zambia was held by Beijing and supports the thesis that Chinese aspirations in Zambia followed its general theme of undermining dependence on the economic hegemony of South Africa, whilst at the same time attempting to prevent any incursion by the Superpowers. The TanZam railway and other well-directed (though drastically smaller) aid commitments resulted in Zambia becoming a friendly, if somewhat erratic, friend of China. In part this stemmed from Kaunda’s own agenda to pursue an independent, non-aligned foreign policy which avoided becoming tied too heavily to either Moscow or Washington. By maintaining its well-directed aid and continuing its anti-hegemonic rhetoric – which so frequently struck a welcome chord in Lusaka – China was able to ensure that Zambia remained a supporter of China in the international system. Today, increasing investment by Chinese companies in Zambia, particularly in the minerals sector, means that Beijing’s links with Lusaka continue to prosper. China’s involvement in the various wars of national liberation in Southern Africa produced a mixed bag in terms of success for Beijing. Angola was perhaps the most important conflict that China involved itself in, for the negative dénouement left Beijing exposed and isolated. As one writer commented, ‘China engaged in a balance of power competition worthy of the nineteenth century’s most cynical diplomats’ (Schulzinger, 1989: 223). Chinese involvement in the region declined somewhat after Beijing’s mistake in backing the wrong horse in the Angolan civil war and being seen to be on the same side as apartheid South Africa. As a result, China itself was exposed as a ‘paper tiger’, unable to project itself in Africa and incapable of realistically delivering adequate support to its clients in the region (Segal, 1985: 17-18). In addition, Chinese policy drew heavy criticism for its perceived amoral opportunism and anti-Soviet fixation. This affected China’s opportunities in Southern Africa in the post-Angolan period, and effectively shut out Beijing from Angola for nearly a decade. Though China continued a minimum amount of aid to the Angolan government’s rivals after the victory of the MPLA, ties were finally formed with Luanda in 1983. This event in itself was an indication of China’s pragmatic foreign policy in Southern Africa in the early 1980s with the thawing of Sino-Soviet ties in the international system. However, relations today are intensifying as China’s search for oil supplies propels the development of some intimate links with the regime in Luanda. Rich in oil, Sino-Angolan trade ties are likely to increase dramatically in the future.

Conclusion and the future 203 In a similar vein, though at a much lower volume, trade between China and Mozambique will no doubt develop in the future. Thematically, Mozambique makes an interesting case when conceptualising China’s foreign policy towards Southern Africa, for it was apparent that Beijing invested a great deal of effort and resources to maintaining as warm a relationship as possible with the liberation organisation FRELIMO throughout the war of independence. This was performed in tandem with the Soviet Union. Initially, China seemed to have ‘won’ this competition, yet Mozambique, like Angola, showed that rhetoric was not enough to maintain a relationship in Southern Africa if the country concerned needed more than the ritualistic wringing of hands. Out-manoeuvred and out-supplied by Moscow, China gradually lost its position of influence in Maputo. Despite the Mozambican leadership’s attempts at independence, they were always constrained by the hegemon of Pretoria as neighbours and by their reliance (ultimately ill-founded) on Moscow for their source of aid and weapons. As a result, China was forced to accept a very low-key role in Mozambique. With the demise of the Soviet Union, opportunities arose for China to become closer involved, and certainly China directed well-planned aid and encouragement to a country emerging from a crippling civil war. However, any further developments are likely to be part of China’s wider framework of developing links with South Africa. Ties with Namibia stem from a similar theme and are largely conditioned by China’s eye on the South African economy – though Namibia’s own mineral riches are beginning to attract Chinese investment. Notionally though, the two countries play second fiddle to Beijing’s wish to develop links with Pretoria. Conceptually, the smaller states in the region – Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland – played a minor role in China’s policies towards Southern Africa. Lesotho, wracked by internal problems and always under the shadow of its surrounding neighbour, oscillated between the PRC and the ROC. Although now seemingly tied to Beijing, it is unlikely that China will develop any form of substantial relationship with Maseru. Involvement in all three latter states by China has been minimal, if at most times non-existent. As noted, whether South Africa’s switch over to Beijing will affect the attitude of Malawi and Swaziland towards China remains open to conjecture. Tentatively, however, it is suggested that ROC ties with the two countries concerned will probably not in the long-run – though Taipei’s active pursuance of ‘dollar diplomacy’ may well temporarily mitigate against such a scenario. Botswana on the other hand has enjoyed warm political links with China. Sino-Botswana links are interesting for they were initially formed on the basis of a shared foreign policy approach. Gaborone aimed for a truly non-aligned foreign policy to combat South African hegemony in the region and, to avoid being drawn into the wider Superpower rivalry. Such a policy approach produced consummate conditions for Beijing to increase its presence in Botswana. Both nations shared an anti-hegemonic policy agenda, and as a result of this complementary theme in both countries’ foreign policy, ties between the two developed. Gaborone’s policy allowed Beijing a certain manoeuvrability in Botswana denied to it elsewhere and China was able to conduct relations without reference to any major powers threat

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of hegemonic machinations. As one writer noted, ‘the foreign policy approach followed by Botswana [was] the approach the PRC [tried] to convince all Third World countries to follow’ (Booyse, 1988: 25). The triumph of ZANU in Zimbabwe following the Second Chimurenga was one of Beijing’s biggest political successes in Southern Africa. Coming after the Angolan debacle, the events in Zimbabwe in 1980 were a welcome tonic to China’s Southern African policies. Whilst Moscow, Washington and Pretoria had supported rival groups during the liberation war and in the election, China’s support for ZANU enabled it to posture Mugabe’s victory as a triumph for China against its foes. It also allowed Beijing to reassert its presence in Africa as a concerned player with a role to play as Chinese prestige and influence rose in the region following ZANU’s ascendancy to power. However, precisely the reasons that propelled China to pursue its anti-hegemonic posturing in Southern Africa, i.e. a lack of power and ability to meaningfully project itself in remote regions, meant that China was largely incapable of following up on its success in Zimbabwe, and for a period of time this threatened to allow Moscow to regain its position in Zimbabwe at the expense of Beijing. It was only the demise of the Soviet Union and a tailing off of interest in the region by Moscow that prevented an eclipse of Chinese influence due to its shortcomings in the ability to project its power. However, China has remained in Zimbabwe as a firm friend of the Mugabe regime and this has intensified as Mugabe’s behaviour has led to widespread isolation of Harare internationally. Zimbabwe has consistently supported China in the international system and was prominent in its support of Beijing during Tiananmen. Today both countries speak the language of preventing ‘foreign interference’ in their domestic affairs, and Mugabe has pursued a policy of looking towards Asia for friends and ties in an attempt to allow Zimbabwe greater manoeuvrability in the face of Western criticism of his government. This has neatly dovetailed with China’s own anti-hegemonic policy and has resulted in a warm and lasting relationship developing between China and Zimbabwe. Finally, we come to China’s policy towards South Africa. Pretoria’s apartheid policies meant that South Africa became not only an international pariah but also an international issue. The globalisation of South Africa’s domestic affairs afforded China an opportunity to posit itself as a concerned international actor and allowed Beijing to posture as a fellow developing world nation outraged at the internal structures of South Africa. Thematically, this enabled China to project its prestige as a global actor and influence as the developing world spokesman, with very little real commitment. Rhetoric within the framework of the United Nations was perhaps the PRC’s greatest contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle. Well-directed interventions and rhetorical expositions were the sum of China’s policies towards the apartheid state, and anti-apartheid activists had to seek support elsewhere for any meaningful aid. Much of this stemmed from China’s rivalry with Moscow and its initial construction of linkages with the ineffective and ultimately out-flanked PAC in a policy primarily directed against the Soviets (Hutchison, 1975: 269).

Conclusion and the future 205 However, with the end of apartheid China’s relations and policies towards South Africa have entered a new, still developing stage. As noted, at first South Africa resisted Chinese pressure to switch recognition from Taipei – a posture that frustrated Chinese foreign policy in the country for longer than most observers expected. It was only since Mandela’s cognisance of the realities of the international system and a wish to play a greater role on the global stage that Pretoria switched to Beijing. Yet even whilst China and South Africa maintained no official relations, trade between the two did not particularly suffer and indeed grew – thus illustrating the intense pragmatism that underlies China’s foreign policy. Beijing’s capacity to affect the Southern African milieu was always limited and even today it is primarily in the economic realm where Beijing’s influence is felt. As a result, China has had to depend largely on the rhetorical ‘call to arms’ of its anti-hegemonic pronouncements. By appealing to a ‘commonality of interests’, China has sought to project itself as a natural member of the developing world and has used its position in the United Nations to promote issues that have been dear to the heart of much of the developing world. As Qian Qichen, the then Foreign Minister asserted, ‘China and African countries share common interests on many political and economic issues’ (Xinhua, January 24, 1995). Thus China has called for a restructuring of the ‘unfair’ economic order. The fact that such a restructuring would manifestly boost China’s own position in the international system is no coincidence. China’s emphasis on economic modernisation and progress and its oft-repeated theme of non-interference in domestic affairs has appealed to African leaders, often the target of criticism by the West regarding their own human rights records and internal politics. By remaining opposed to the ‘hegemonic’ dominance of Africa by the West, China has been able to project itself in Africa as a friend of the developing world. This in turn enables China to utilise the developing world as a support constituency whenever China comes into conflict with the West over issues such as human rights. As elsewhere in Africa, China has been able to secure much of Southern Africa’s support in international forums such as the United Nations or the global human rights debate. Such a policy raises a fundamental question about China’s intentions. As one observer posited in the past (but which remains true today), ‘The question to be asked is whether … the Chinese were truly interested in solidarity with the Third World, or whether they were interested or more interested, in securing a position of safety or power … which, among other things acted to protect China’ (Chan, 1987: 22). It is suggested that this study has shown that China has done precisely just that. It has courted the developing world and the nations of Southern Africa in a concerted effort to bolster China’s own position in the international system, and to provide a cushioning support constituency which Beijing may use to shield itself against outside criticism or censure. In many respects, this policy has been highly successful, as shown during the Tiananmen crisis and also in China’s successful resistance of moves to censure its human rights record. It is further suggested that this work has demonstrated that Chinese foreign policy in Southern Africa is frame-worked around the rhetoric of anti-hegemony as a device by which the

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PRC extends its influence and boosts its prestige in an important region outside of China’s limited confines. It has also been demonstrated that China’s anti-hegemonic policy is not merely reactive to the major powers but also has proactive and creative elements to it, such as the building of structural relations with Botswana and Zambia. That much of Southern Africa remains grateful to China for helping them on this score is often asserted by regional leaders when visiting China or hosting Chinese delegations. With regard to the PRC and Southern Africa, what of the future? What is probable is that China will continue to deploy the rhetoric of anti-hegemonism in order to boost Chinese prestige in the developing world, attempt to thwart an overt dominance of the Southern African region by any one power – thereby placing limitations on China’s manoeuvrability – and continue to foster linkages with states in the region on both a political and economic level in order to promote economic growth and a market for Chinese products. In addition, anti-hegemony has more and more been used to protect China’s economic security – Beijing’s sourcing of oil supplies from countries such as Angola is part and parcel of this. The economic agenda is now becoming central to Chinese foreign policy and Southern Africa is no exception. By advancing its political and economic interests in the region, the Chinese leadership aims to continue its project of ‘restoring’ China’s place amongst the community of nations and further projecting China’s prestige and influence. Combined with China’s exponential economic growth and growing reach overseas, Beijing’s engagement and involvement in Southern Africa is without doubt going to experience a deepening and intensification in the future. Whilst this study has shown that China has been present in the region for decades, it is still considered a new arrival in Southern Africa. The hope of this book is to contextualise this ‘new’ actor’s place in the region and on the continent. Future research will, it is hoped, develop the study of China in Africa, for it is one of the emerging issues for the continent as we enter the twenty-first century and can no longer be ignored – something which, it might be argued, has been the case previously.

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Index

Afghanistan 52, 54, 85, 172 Afro-Asia-Latin American People’s Solidarity Organisation 28, 112 Afro-Asia People’s Solidarity Conference 21, 154 Afro-Asia People’s Solidarity Organisation 28–9 Afro-Asia Solidarity Fund Committee 24 AGOA 178, 188 Aid, Chinese to Africa 37, 60–1, 101, 102, 118, 120, 139, 165, 171–2 Albania 165 Algeria 21 ANC 19, 20, 128–52, 191 Angola 12, 46, 48, 75–92, 57, 134, 155 Asian-African Conference (see Bandung) Babu, A. 26 Banda, H. 194–5 Bandung 18, 19–21 Bipolarity 7, 36 Botswana 45, 181–9 Boxer diplomacy 32 Brezhnev, L. 37, 47, 48, 136 Burundi 26 Cachalia, Y. 19 Chen Muhua 49, 61 Chen Yi 76 Chiluba, F. 166, 176–8 China’s Africa Policy (2006) 2 Chipenda, D. 77 Chissano, J. 100, 101, 102 Chitepo, H. 109 Colombo Powers 20 COMECON 100

CONCP 28 Congo 25–6 COREMO 28, 95–6 Cuba 80, 82, 155, 156 Cultural Revolution 13, 32–4, 36, 39, 165 Czechoslovakia 11, 36 Democracy 65–7, 68, 176, 199 Deng Xiaoping 43, 49–50, 56, 59, 63, 64, 65, 88, 102, 108, 117, 169 Dos Santos, J. 86, 87 Dos Santos, M. 99 First Conference of Independent African States 21 Fishing 100, 103, 161 Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence 18–19, 59, 141, 192 FLEC 84 FNLA 28, 76, 77, 78–82, 169 Four Principles of Cooperation with Africa 57 FRELIMO 28, 29, 49, 93–105 Geingob, H. 159, 161 Geng Biao 49 Gong Dafei 86 Gorbachev, M. 120 Guomindang 16, 18 Great Zimbabwe 16 Hoxha, E. 42 Hua Guofeng 99, 172–3, 183 Huang Hua 32, 41, 51, 53, 54, 58, 100, 115–16, 155 Huang Yungsheng 41

232

Index

Hu Jintao 163 Humanism 165 Hu Yaobang 2, 56, 138, 173–4 Indian Ocean 11, 39, 47, 53, 108 Intermediate Zones theory 17 Jiang Zemin 67, 103, 141, 163 Ji Pengfei 40, 49, 51, 186 Jonathan, L. 189–92 Kasrils, R. 134 Kaunda, K. 31, 33, 45, 48, 52, 61, 164–76, 184 Khama, S. 181–4 Kenya 32, 39 Khruschev, N. 22 Kissinger, H. 37, 80 Korean war 18 Kotane, M. 20 Leballo, P. 130–1 Lee Teng-hui 143, 144 Lesotho 189–93 Lin Biao 10 Li Peng 63, 71, 88, 141, 159, 178, 185 Li Xiannian 51, 60, 99, 136, 166, 170, 187 Li Zhaoxing 197 Lome Convention 42 Machel, S. 96, 97, 101–2 Malawi, 194–195 Mandarin 12, 18, 125 Mandela, N. 136, 139, 141, 142–9 Mandela, W. 132 Maoism 9, 10, 11, 22, 29, 31, 49, 65, 95, 110, 114, 117 Mao Zedong 6, 17, 22, 36, 47, 94, 170 Masire, Q 185, 186 Meer, J. 19 Middle Kingdom mentality 2 Ming Dynasty 16 Mistry, D. 19 Modernisation, China’s 50–1, 55, 67, 69, 114, 186 Mogae, F. 186, 187 Mondlane, E. 93, 96 Mozambique 12, 46, 93–105

MPLA 28, 75–92 Mugabe, R. 106, 109, 110, 111, 114–26, 204 Mulele, P. 25 Mulungushi textile factory 177–8 Muzenda, S. 116 Mwananasa, L. 178–80 Namibia 153–163 Nanjing Military College 31 Nasser, G. 20 National liberation groups, Chinese support 8, 9, 11, 13, 24, 26, 28–31, 39, 40–1, 42–43, 47, 94–5, 108–10, 154, 202 Neto, A. 48, 76, 82, 85, 98 Nkomati Accord 101 Nkomo, J. 106, 107, 109, 111 Nkrumah, K. 22, 32 Nokwe, D. 19 Nujoma, S. 154, 157–8, 159–60, 161 Nyerere, J. 26, 33, 45, 78, 184 OAU 24, 42, 64, 130 OAU Liberation Committee 24, 27, 29, 41, 48, 95, 108, 153 Ogaden 48 Oil 71, 90–1, 150, 202 PAC 28, 29, 53, 128–32, 137, 139 Panch Sheel 18 People’s War 10, 11 Qian Qichen 63, 64, 67, 88, 90, 103, 140, 142, 159, 175–6, 185, 192–3 Qiao Guanhua 46 Qing Dynasty 16, 27 Reagan, R. 55, 58, 118, 135 RENAMO 100–2, 104 Roberto, H. 77 SACP 132–8 Savimbi, J. 76–7 Sharpeville massacre 128 Sino-Africa Forum 3, 67–70 Sino-Soviet Alliance 18 Sino-Soviet border clashes 36

Index 233 Sino-Soviet rivalry 9, 11, 22–3, 25, 27, 29, 35, 39, 46, 97, 112–13, 129, 154 Sino-Tanzanian Shipping Company 27 Sisulu, W. 19 Sithole, N. 106–7 Slovo, J. 138 Sobukwe, R. 131 South Africa 17, 58–9, 127–52 South African Indian Congress 19 South-South cooperation 12, 72 Soviet Union, collapse of 4 Sung Dynasty 16 Swakopmund satellite station 162 SWANU 29, 153–4 SWAPO 54, 153–63 Swaziland 193–4 Taiwan 1, 11, 40, 42, 53, 55, 69, 128, 140, 142–9, 182, 193–4 Takawira, L. 106 Tambo, O. 136, 137 TanZam railway 34, 38–40, 45, 61–2, 132 Tanzania 11, 12, 16, 26–8, 31, 33, 41 Three Worlds, theory of 17, 43–4, 51, 54, 168, 173 Tiananmen Square 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 62–5, 103, 120–1, 139, 175–6, 199 Tongogara, J. 109 Toure, S. 24

UNITA 76, 77, 79–83, 87, 169 United Nations 3, 35, 43, 53, 57, 69, 134, 149, 155, 176, 183, 197, 200 United Nations, China’s admission 12–13, 40, 60, 194 Vietnam 50, 81, 100, 105, 136, 198 West Asia and African Affairs Department 21 WTO 67 Wu Xuequian 52, 101, 175 Yang Shangkun 66, 122 Yao Yilin 100 Zaïre 42, 51, 77–8, 84–5 Zambia 164–80, 202 Zanzibar 26–8 ZANU 28, 30, 51, 106–26, 131 ZAPU 106–20 Zeng Peiyang 90 Zhao Ziyang 18, 55–8, 86, 117, 174, 191 Zheng Ho 16 Zhiang Zemin 122 Zhou Enlai 16, 18, 19, 20, 24–5, 32, 37, 46, 76, 96, 97, 167, 194 Zhou Enlai’s tour of Africa 24–5 Zhu Rongji 67, 69, 104, 186 Zimbabwe 12, 106–26