Children of International Migrants in Europe: Comparative Perspectives

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Children of International Migrants in Europe

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Children of International Migrants in Europe Comparative Perspectives Roger Penn & Paul Lambert

© Roger Penn & Paul Lambert 2009 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–01879–2 hardback ISBN-10: 0–230–01879–3 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

To: Cath, Jack and Susie (Paul) To: Mary, Michael, Sarah and Madeleine (Roger) ‘Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita’ Dante Alighieri: Inferno

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Contents List of Tables

viii

List of Figures

x

Acknowledgements

xii

Introduction

1

1 The EFFNATIS Project

4

2 Sociological Models of Immigrant Incorporation

23

3 International Migration to Britain, France and Germany

34

4 Theoretical Paradigms for the Sociological Analysis of Children of International Migrants

46

5 Linguistic Incorporation: Patterns of Language Use

53

6 Structural Incorporation: Education, Training and the Labour Market

73

7 Political and Religious Incorporation

97

8 Cultural Incorporation: Lifestyle, Media and Identity

111

9 Social Incorporation: Friendship and Marriage

124

10

Socio-cultural Exceptionalism: Arranged Marriages in Western Europe

144

11 Conclusions

154

Appendix: Details of the EFFNATIS Data

157

Notes

163

References

168

Author Index

191

Subject Index

197 vii

Tables 1.1 Achieved interviews from EFFNATIS surveys by ethnic/nationality group 5.1 Self-rated ability in writing host-country language (%) 6.1a Regression models for Britain: 1–4 6.1b Regression models for Britain: 5–7 6.2 Regression models for France: 1–5 6.3 Regression models for Germany: 1–5 7.1 Voting in the 1997 French legislative election in Vitry and Tours 7.2 Voting in the 1997 British general election in Rochdale and Blackburn 7.3 Membership of a political party 7.4 Party supported (Germany) 7.5 Party voted for in 1997 election (France) 7.6 Party supported (Britain) 7.7 Party that respondent would vote for, if there was an election tomorrow 7.8 Level of interest in politics 7.9 Interest in politics of parental country of origin 7.10 Percentage of sample knowing names of the political leaders by ethnic/nationality group 7.11 Ethnic/nationality group of respondent by religious affiliation 7.12 Attendance at a place of worship by ethnic/nationality group 7.13 Membership of religious associations/organisations by ethnic/nationality group 7.14 Importance of own religious festivals by ethnic/nationality group 8.1 Favourite food types reported by EFFNATIS respondents 8.2 Clothing preferences of British EFFNATIS respondents 8.3 Use of ‘ethnic’ media among EFFNATIS respondents 8.4 Experiences of discrimination and racial abuse viii

6 71 87 88 90 92 98 98 100 101 101 102 102 103 103 104 107 108 109 109 114 116 119 120

Tables ix

8.5 Perceptions and experiences of discrimination and racial abuse 9.1 Gender of first friend 9.2 Ethnicity of friends by ethnic/nationality group 9.3 Where first friend was met by ethnic/nationality group 9.4 Activities shared with friends in Germany and Britain by ethnic/nationality group 9.5 Activities shared with friends in France: First activity mentioned 9.6 Logistic regression models for the probability that both friends were from the same ethnic group as respondent 9.7 Marital/partnership status and age at marriage of respondents 9.8 Partner from a different ethnic/nationality group to respondent 9.9 Logistic regression models for the probability that partner is from the same ethnic/nationality group as respondent 10.1 Percentage ever married by country 10.2 Arranged marriages by ethnic/nationality group 10.3 Proportion of spouses who were a first cousin 10.4 Proportion of arranged marriages by level of GCSE results 10.5 Whether spouse or future spouse was a first cousin or more distant blood relative in Britain

121 127 127 129 131 132

133 137 138

140 148 149 149 150 150

Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 5.1a 5.1b 5.1c 5.2 6.1a 6.1b 6.1c 6.2a 6.2b 6.2c 6.3a 6.3b 6.4a 6.4b 8.1

Gender and age characteristics of EFFNATIS respondents Citizenship and language use amongst EFFNATIS respondents Religious affiliation amongst EFFNATIS respondents Harmonised occupational/educational measures Classic assimilation Ethnic exclusion Ethnic incorporation Ethnic enclave Ethnic enclave with a glass ceiling Segmented assimilation Transnationalism Segmented transnationalism Hybridity Non-host language use in Britain Non-host language use in France Language used with mother in Germany Proportions using non-host language by extent of use Harmonised measures for Britain Britain: Local measures Occupations of parents and children in Britain Harmonised measures for France France: Local measures I France: Local measures II Harmonised measures for Germany Germany: Local measures Correlations with educational track by ethnic/nationality group Correlations with educational level by ethnic/nationality group Food and drink preferences for the British sample and German allochthons x

10 12 13 15 26 28 29 30 30 31 31 31 32 66 67 68 69 75 76 77 79 80 81 83 84 85 86 115

Figures

8.2 Social activities amongst EFFNATIS respondents 8.3 Patterns of consumption of ‘ethnic’ media 8.4 Patterns of national identification among EFFNATIS respondents 9.1 Summary of determinants of ethnically homogenous friendship and partnership patterns

xi

117 118 122 142

Acknowledgements The EFFNATIS Research was funded by the European Union. Our thanks go to our colleagues on the project for their help with constructing the questionnaires and especially to Harald Lederer, Emmanuel Peignard and Susanne Worbs. We would also like to thank our Commissioning Editor, Philippa Grand, and her Editorial Assistant, Olivia Middleton at Palgrave Macmillan for their patience and encouragement with this book. Roger would like to thank the members of the Sociology Department at UCLA who encouraged us to persevere with this endeavour and in particular Roger Waldinger, Ivan Light and Ruben Hernandez-Leon who allowed him to sit in on their courses and offered their support. Thanks also to Harold Garfinkel and Mel Pollner for their kindness and interest in this research. It was with great sadness that we learnt of the death of Mel last year. Our gratitude goes to Mary for her help with preparing the manuscript, to Damon for his help with the proofs and to Brenda for coming to the rescue with her printer!

xii

Introduction

The profound alienation of many Muslims – especially the second and third generations of immigrant families, young men and women themselves born in Europe – is one of the most vexing problems facing the continent today. (T. G. Ash, New York Review of Books, 5 October 2006) Recent years have witnessed a burgeoning debate about the situation of young Muslims in Western Europe (see Nielsen, 1999; Lewis, 2002; Pauly, 2004; Zaidi, 2007). The seismic events of 9/11 in New York prompted a wide range of responses from pundits and commentators. That there is something to be explained seems self-evident. Some of the hijackers in 2001 were young Muslims radicalised while in Germany as students. The murder of Theo van Gogh, the Dutch director of the film Submission, which dramatised the oppression of Muslim women by projecting images from the Koran onto naked bodies of young women who intoned their personal stories of abuse in Holland in 2004, focused attention on children of Muslim international migrants in Europe. This reached a crescendo in Britain after the London ‘suicide bombings’ on 7 July 2005. Later that year urban riots in many French cities once again put young Muslims (this time with parents from the Maghreb) under the spotlight. Most contemporary commentary tells us a great deal about the ideological assumptions of the commentators. Unfortunately it offers little insight into the phenomena described above. Indeed, much of this discourse elides a range of different themes: Islam as a religion, Muslims as a ‘group’, Islamists, Arabs, immigrants, children of 1

2


immigrants, people whose skin is darker than most citizens in the countries of Western Europe and, of course, ‘terrorists’, ‘militants’, ‘radicals’, ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘suicide bombers’. We have selected three pieces of commentary from the English national press during the early autumn of 2006 to illustrate this point and also a quote from Ash (2006) in the New York Review of Books at around the same time. Seabrook (2006) claimed that ‘widespread psychic disturbance always accompanies social dislocation, particularly mass migration, which brings contradictory belief systems into stark and sudden proximity ... the resulting cultural mix is bound to be “volatile and unpredictable” ’ and also that ‘for too many Muslims integration means the emergence into a subculture of gangs, crime, drugs and alcohol.’ Evidence for these assertions was completely absent within his article, while the device of talking about Muslims as if this were an appropriate term for people living in Europe whose origins are as diverse as Bosnians, Punjabis, Gujaratis, Bengalis and Alevis from Turkey, not to mention Arabs, is clearly both rhetorical and tendentious. Hitchens (2006), in an article entitled ‘Is This What They Mean by “Muslim tolerance”?’, wrote that ‘For years Liberals in the West have spread the myth of “Muslim tolerance.” It does not exist and never did. Where Islam rules, other faiths must cringe in humiliated subjection.’ Quite how this blanket criticism can explain differences among Muslims (notably but not exclusively between adherents to Sunni and Shiite versions of Islam) is unclear. Even less clear is how Hitchens deals with the historical evidence of relative tolerance of other faiths by Muslims in contexts as diverse as Moorish Spain (see Lewis, 1984; Esposito, 2003) and the Ottoman Empire (see Kymlicka, 1995). The novelist Martin Amis also charged into this hermeneutic arena with his short story, ‘The Age of Horrorism: Faith and the Dependent Mind’, published by The Observer (10 September 2006). This offered a self-styled ‘trenchant critique of the grotesque creed of extreme Islamism’ in which Amis lambasted Islam as a primitive and inherently violent creed. What is lacking in these commentaries is any systematic empirical evidence upon which to base any sound judgments about the situation of young Muslims in contemporary Western Europe. What is present, however, is a cacophonous array of cultural projections

Introduction

3

resembling the current vogue for Sudoku puzzles: enter the ideological axe to be ground and the cultural conclusions inexorably follow. Most young Muslims in Western Europe are the descendants of recent cohorts of international immigrants (see Nielsen, 2004). This has a major impact upon their lives. Any understanding of Muslims in Western Europe is inexorably linked to the study of immigrant incorporation and assimilation. The present text is designed to offer an alternative to such populist punditry. It is based upon a comparative empirical project that surveyed over 2,500 young adults in Britain, France and Germany as part of the European Union’s Fourth Framework Research into the ‘Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies’ (EFFNATIS) for international migrants and their descendants within Western Europe.

1 The EFFNATIS Project

The EFFNATIS research This book is about children of international migrants in Britain, France and Germany. It is based upon a survey of young people, aged between 16 and 25 years, undertaken as part of the European Union’s Fourth Framework research into the ‘Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies for Children of International Migrants’ (EFFNATIS). The project ran from 1997 to 2001 and included a variety of pieces of research in eight different European countries. Heckmann et al. (2001) provided a full explanation of the overall project and some of its provisional results. In this book we concentrate upon one aspect of the project, the collection of survey data in 1999 from young people aged between 16 and 25 years in Britain, France and Germany. In each country, samples were drawn from two different groups of children of international migrants and a parallel control group drawn from the autochthonous population. In Britain the two allochthonous groups were young adults with one or more parent from India or from Pakistan (the terms allochthonous and autochthonous are explained below). In France parents originated from either Portugal or the Maghreb (North African countries with a French colonial heritage: Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). The two groups in Germany were respondents whose parents had migrated from Turkey or from the former Yugoslavia. In each country, the two groups of children of international migrants represented the two largest ethnic/nationality1 groups with immigrant origins. Samples in each country were drawn from localities with significant numbers of children of international migrants: Blackburn and 4

The EFFNATIS Project

5

Rochdale in the North West of England, Vitry-sur-Seine (a suburb of Paris) and Tours in France and Nürnberg in Germany. Throughout our analyses, it is important to recognise that we are presenting data on the circumstances of young adults living in localities with disproportionately high immigrant and immigrant–descendant communities. Settlement patterns of international migrants and their descendants tend to be heavily concentrated and highly localised and, as a corollary, most immigrants and their descendants live in localities with high concentrations of such populations (see Ratcliffe, 1996). The sampling schemes employed in each of the three countries were slightly different. In Britain a random sample of addresses was drawn from the electoral roll. These addresses were visited and interviews sought with the aim of including at least 100 children of international migrants2 from both India and Pakistan. In Germany, where the local administration in Nürnberg possessed data on the nationality of inhabitants, a stratified random sample of the two groups of children of international migrants and of autochthons was drawn from city registers. In France, where issues of ethnicity were far more sensitive, the sample was drawn via a series of institutional routes, including schools, colleges and youth clubs. The total numbers interviewed are detailed in Table 1.1. The surveys were usually conducted at the homes of the respondents, although in France many interviews were conducted in institutional settings. The interview mode in France and Britain consisted entirely of face-to-face interviews. In Germany mixed modes of interviewing were used. Most were dropped off for completion (73%) while some (26%) were undertaken face to face. A small number (1%) were conducted by telephone. All interviews were conducted in the language of the host country. The questionnaires covered a wide range of issues incorporating information on the economic, social and cultural aspects of respondents’ lives. The questionnaires in each country shared many, but not all, questions in common. The overall design of each national questionnaire was undertaken on the basis of both pre-study piloting and qualitative interviews with members of the target populations. Wherever possible, question formats were used which replicated survey items used in previous comparable studies. Differences in questionnaire content3 between countries reflected the design choices of the respective British, French and German research teams. Questions

6


Table 1.1 Achieved interviews from EFFNATIS surveys by ethnic/nationality group Number of participants in the study sample British autochthonous Pakistani Indian Not classified*

Location

418

Blackburn (52%); Rochdale (48%)

178 130 118

Blackburn (17%); Rochdale (83%) Blackburn (91%); Rochdale (9%)

French autochthonous Portuguese Maghrebian Not classified*

286

Tours (53%); Vitry (47%)

212 218 7

Tours (19%); Vitry (81%) Tours (23%); Vitry (77%)

German autochthonous Turkish Former Yugoslav Not classified*

215

Nürnberg (100%)

287 283 62

Nürnberg (100%) Nürnberg (100%)

* Interview achieved but respondent could not be classified unambiguously to an autochthonous or allochthonous ethnic/nationality group

on educational and labour market systems were framed in the relevant terminology for each country. A number of attitudinal questions were not asked when national researchers judged that a particular question had limited relevance in their country. The design of the surveys followed the model of a common pre-harmonisation, supplemented by national-specific questions. This type of design is a popular strategy for cross-national comparative surveys (see Harkness et al., 2003; Hoffmeyer-Zlotnick & Harkness, 2005). Throughout our analysis we make use of variables harmonised across countries. A selection of these variables are summarised below. Some of the harmonisation was achieved by asking similar questions in the three countries. In other instances, harmonisation involved considerable post hoc efforts in data transformation. This included the construction of harmonised measures of the educational and occupational circumstances of both respondents and their parents.


7

It also involved deriving comparative measures of language use, religious affiliation, political values and social attitudes. The differences (albeit minor) in sampling strategies employed in the three countries raised important questions about the representative nature of each national data set. Our position is that the EFFNATIS samples allow us to generalise about the experiences of the specific groups of children of international migrants in the three countries (with a caveat, discussed below, with regards to the Indian sample in Britain). We would not maintain that the autochthonous respondents, sampled as they were in localities with high concentrations of minority ethnic/nationality groups, were representative of all autochthons in each of the three countries, but we do believe that they provided an appropriate and pertinent comparison with children of international migrants based upon their shared geographical location. We have confidence in the generalisability of the EFFNATIS sample of children of international migrants as a result of two further factors. First, the different approaches to sampling employed in the three countries all followed commonly used random sampling techniques. The German design involved a stratified random sample. The British sample was based upon a random sample of addresses with cut-offs based upon achieved quotas for Indians and Pakistanis. The French use of quota sampling adopted a strategy which has been used in comparable studies of ethnic/nationality minority groups (see Smith & Prior, 1997). Second, there is evidence that responses by children of international migrants in the EFFNATIS sample followed similar patterns to those found for equivalent groups in other research projects. For example educational and occupational patterns were comparable to those reported for corresponding groups (e.g., Modood et al., 1997; Model, 2005, for Britain; Simon, 2003, for France; and Kalter & Granato, 2002; Seifert, 2004, in Germany).4 We also believe that the EFFNATIS results provide important information relevant to all children of international migrants in Western Europe. This is partly because the allochthonous sub-samples were drawn from the largest ethnic/nationality migrant groups in each of the three countries and partly because international immigrant groups in Western Europe have shared similar experiences of initial upheaval and immigration (see Papastergiadis, 2000; Nielsen, 2004). Indeed, several authors have highlighted the common processes of

8


immigrant insertion and incorporation that have occurred in a wide variety of different historical contexts (see Alba & Nee, 2003; Nauck, 1994).

Comparative research studies In this book we present the EFFNATIS data as a major resource for studying children of international migrants. Hitherto, relatively few European empirical analyses have focused on children of international migrants as a distinct group. Previous sociological research on the circumstances of children of international migrants who were born, or raised from a young age, in the host country has tended to be concentrated in the United States (see Chapter 2). The lack of empirical research dealing with the children of international migrants results, in part, from a shortage of suitable representative survey data. One reason for this is the chronology of immigrant movements to Western Europe. Children of the major post-war immigrant groups have become adults in large numbers only during recent years. There are also institutional reasons for the lack of appropriate survey data. Many surveys have not collected the specific information on own, and parental, country of birth which are necessary for the identification of children of international migrants. This practice is well established in France where there has been long-standing political opposition to the collection of such data (see Tribalat, 1995; Favell, 2003). However, it is also evident in Britain and Germany where researchers often collect data on ‘ethnic identity’ and ‘nationality’ but not on parental country of birth (see Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, 2003; Lambert, 2005). In addition, many surveys which did record sufficient information to identify children of international migrants, did not conduct a sufficient number of interviews with children of different international migrant groups to permit effective analysis. This is particularly the case in crossnational, harmonised, comparative survey research. Most existing cross-national datasets contain relatively small national representative sub-samples which do not incorporate sufficient numbers of respondents from minority ethnic/nationality migrant communities (see Lambert, 2005). The theoretical preferences of European sociologists also help to explain the limited extent of previous empirical research about


9

children of international migrant groups in Britain, France and Germany. In these countries, sociological attention has focused overwhelmingly on ‘racial’, ‘ethnic’ and ‘judicial’ differences between individuals. However, by giving primacy to such divisions, many accounts have failed to identity the descendants of international immigrants as distinctive groups. British research into ‘ethnic minorities’ has overlooked immigration-cohort effects when studying ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’ (see Modood et al., 1997; Mason, 2003). Recent research on religious differences in Britain has also overlooked immigrant status (see Brown, 2000; Peach, 2006). Several French and German studies have also given primacy to measures of nationality and citizenship to the neglect of any consideration of immigrant generational status (see Hargreaves, 1995; Dustmann, 1996; Kalter & Granato, 2002). However, this is increasingly being addressed with the recent publication of studies which pay greater attention to immigrant generational cohort effects (see Loury et al., 2005; Heath & Cheung, 2007; Thomson & Crul, 2007).

Autochthonous and allochthonous The EFFNATIS research examined three groups of young adults within each country. In total nine different ‘ethnic/nationality’ groups were analysed. Two groups in each country were children of international migrants who had been born in the host country but whose parents came from the specified overseas country. In addition, we classified a few respondents who were born abroad to foreignborn parents but who had arrived in the host country prior to the age of 6, as children of international migrants. The term autochthonous was used to describe respondents who had been born in the country of study and whose parents had also been born there. The term originated from geology and refers to rocks that remain fixed geographically.5 Children of international migrants were classified as allochthonous (this refers to rocks that move over time). Their parents had migrated from overseas to Western Europe. Classification as either allochthonous or autochthonous was based upon respondents’ answers to questions on their parent’s and their own country of birth. Of 2,414 respondents successfully interviewed, 2,227 were unambiguously assigned to 1 of the 6 allochthonous or 3 autochthonous categories.

10 Children of International Migrants in Europe

Major characteristics of the EFFNATIS sample Age and gender Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of respondents from different ethnic/nationality groups within the EFFNATIS sample by gender and age. There is some variation in the proportion of autochthonous and allochthonous groups by gender. More interviews were achieved with young women than young men in most ethnic/nationality groups. This is consistent with higher female response rates to voluntary surveys across contemporary Western Europe. The two exceptions were Turks and Maghrebians in Germany and France, where slightly fewer female than male interviews were achieved. Figure 1.1 also provides information on the average age of male and female respondents. Across all ethnic/nationality groups, interviews were conducted evenly across the eligible age range between 16 and 25 years. However, there were some differences in the age range of achieved interviews within the British sample. Male respondents in

250

200

150

100

50

Figure 1.1

au

au

to

Yu Fo go rm sl er av

th

ch to

to au

Male

ch Ge th rm on a ou n s Tu rk is h

Fr on enc ou h s Po rtu gu es e M ag hr eb ia n

an di In

ch

th Bri on tis ou h s Pa ki st an i

0

Female

Age (age in years × 10)

Gender and age characteristics of EFFNATIS respondents

Source: EFFNATIS survey 1999, N = 2210. Age shows mean and inter-quartile range.


11

Britain were somewhat older than EFFNATIS respondents in other countries, while female respondents in Britain tended to be relatively younger. This pattern was particularly evident among Indians and Pakistanis. Small variations in the numbers within each of the ethnic/nationality groups were, in themselves, of relatively little importance. However, they do raise two methodological issues. First, both age and gender were expected to correlate with many of the attitudinal and socio-economic responses studied throughout this book. To accommodate this we controlled for both age and gender when analysing differences between the nine ethnic/nationality groups in subsequent substantive chapters.6 Second, the unevenness of the different ethnic/nationality groups was also relevant for calculations of statistical significance. Given that the total number of interviews was relatively small, modest variations in the number of respondents from each ethnic/nationality group could easily have affected the balance between statistical significance and non-significance. Language and citizenship Figure 1.2 illustrates two important features of the sample which are particularly relevant to contemporary debates on modes of immigrant incorporation. The extent to which the descendants of international migrants hold full citizenship in their host country is a crucial barometer of legal incorporation. The degree to which descendants of international migrants adopt the host country language is one of the most powerful indicators of cultural and social incorporation. Data on citizenship were obtained by questioning respondents in each country. Those who did not hold full citizenship in their host country were also asked which country or countries they were citizens of. In almost all instances this was the country of parental origin. Figure 1.2 shows that full citizenship was held almost universally by respondents in Britain and France (see Chapter 3). Both countries operate immigration policies based upon the principles of ius soli7 (see Brubaker, 1992; Smith & Blanc, 1995). This means that children of immigrants are usually entitled to full citizenship. Indeed, the small number of Portuguese and Maghrebians who did not hold French citizenship were youths under the age of 18: the age at which

12


1.0

Proportion

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0 Pakistani

Indian

Portuguese

Citizen of host country Figure 1.2

Maghrebian

Turkish

Former Yugoslav

Some use of non-host language

Citizenship and language use amongst EFFNATIS respondents

Source: EFFNATIS survey 1999, all allochthons, N = 1289.

they were entitled to opt to become French citizens (see Hargreaves & Leaman, 1995; Sayad, 2004). In Germany, on the other hand, where citizenship was overwhelmingly based upon ius sanguinis, most young Turks and former Yugoslavs were not German citizens. The EFFNATIS survey collected data on language use from a set of questions that asked respondents about which other languages (apart from the host country language) they used with a variety of different people. These data are analysed more fully in Chapter 5. Figure 1.2 8 reveals that non-host country language use was very high among children of international migrants in both Britain and Germany but somewhat lower in France. There were few differences between the two allochthonous groups in Britain and France. However, in Germany the use of non-host country languages was significantly higher among Turks compared to former Yugoslavs. Religion The religious background of descendants of international migrants has become increasingly prominent in political debates on immigrant


13

incorporation (see Abbas, 2005). However, empirical research in this area has faced two problems: a relative paucity of data on religious participation and a large overlap between religious and ethnic/ nationality identities.9 The EFFNATIS data featured a number of questions about religious affiliation and participation. These offer exciting new evidence on the religious behaviour of children of international migrants in Western Europe. These data are reviewed in greater detail in Chapter 7. However, the overlap between religion and ethnic/nationality group remained pronounced. Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of respondents based upon a simplified measure of religious affiliation that was designed for comparative analysis of the three countries. Religious affiliation was divided into three categories: ‘Muslim’, ‘Religious non-Muslim’ (a category which was predominantly, but not exclusively, Christian), and ‘Not religious’. Figure 1.3 reveals that four ethnic/nationality groups were overwhelmingly Muslim in character. There were considerable national

British autochthonous Pakistani Indian French autochthonous Portuguese Maghrebian German autochthonous Turkish Former Yugoslav 0

0.25

0.5

0.75

Proportion of all achieved interviews Not religious Figure 1.3

Muslim

Religious, non-Muslim

Religious affiliation amongst EFFNATIS respondents

Source: EFFNATIS survey 1999. N = 2211, valid data on religion = 2182.

1.0

14


variations in the category ‘not religious’, particularly among autochthons. This probably reflected a combination of genuine differences in the extent of their religiosity and differing interpretations of the survey between countries. In the analyses reported subsequently in this book, religious differences proved to be strongly associated with a whole range of variations in respondents’ socio-economic, demographic and attitudinal characteristics. Educational track and educational level In Chapter 6 we explore evidence on the socio-economic circumstances of EFFNATIS respondents and focus particularly upon educational and early labour market outcomes. In other chapters, we make frequent use of harmonised measures of educational and occupational position. Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of four key measures.

(1) Post-16 educational track Britain France Germany 0

0.25 Academic Vocational

0.5

0.75 1.0 Lower academic (B) Left school at 16

(2) Educational attainment Britain France Germany 0

0.25 Highest level (4th) 2nd level

Figure 1.4

Continued

0.5

0.75

3rd level Lowest (1st)

1.0 Age < 19


15

(3) Parental occupational class

Britain

France

Germany

0.25

0

0.5

Owner Skilled work Long-term unemployed

0.75

1.0

Professional/managerial Routine work Never worked

(4) Educational-occupational situation 1

0.75 (7)

(7)

(7)

(6)

(6)

0.5

0.25

0

(6)

(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)

(5)

(5) (4) (3) (1)

(4) (2) (3) (1)

Britain

France

(1) Higher education + Full-time permanent job + higher ISEI (3) FTP − HE + ISEI (5) HE − FTP

Germany (2) HE + FTP − ISEI (4) FTP − HE − ISEI (6) − HE − FTP (7) Still in education

Figure 1.4

Harmonised occupational/educational measures

Source: EFFNATIS all ethnic/nationality groups. Bars incomplete due to missing data.

16


The two upper panels of Figure 1.4 show the distribution of two ‘broad brush’ measures of education. Given the age range of the sample, many respondents remained within the educational system itself. To cater for this feature of the data, measures were constructed that summarised both current and prospective educational situations of respondents. Educational ‘track’ was used to provide a classification of respondents’ educational situation at 16 years of age. Three tracks were identified. The first included academic courses which would be expected to lead, or had led, to higher or further educational qualifications. The second included vocational and training courses which would be expected to lead, or had led, to vocational or technical qualifications. The third track, ‘left school at 16’, included respondents who had left the educational system at that age. This tripartite classification of educational track was based upon the German system, which features an early selection of pupils at school into academic and vocational streams. It has been argued that this broad classification applies to other countries across Western Europe (see Brauns et al., 2003). In our analysis the academic track is regarded as the most advantaged and leaving school at age 16 as the least advantaged. Educational ‘level’ was used to approximate a hierarchical coding of educational attainment generally achieved between the ages of 16 and 18. This measure ranked educational attainment into four ordinal categories within each country. In all three countries qualifications obtained during this period are key influences upon subsequent educational attainment and future occupational careers. In Britain the classification was based upon the results of compulsory GCSE examinations undertaken at age 16. In Germany, the classification was based upon a combination of examination data at age 16 and information on subsequent courses undertaken between the ages 16 and 18. In France the classification was based upon results from courses which were usually completed by ages 18 or 19. French respondents under the age of 19 could not be reliably classified10 and were excluded from models utilising this measure. The precise mechanics of the classification of respondents to educational track and educational level are described in greater detail in the Appendix at the end of this book. The EFFNATIS measures of educational level and track had high criterion validity. Both measures were significantly correlated with


17

other measures of educational attainment (see Chapter 6). These included whether the respondent had attended pre-school kindergarten classes in France and Germany, and also the achievement of subsequent higher educational qualifications. The measures were also strongly associated with other correlates of educational attainment such as parental background and differences in attitudes and behaviour. As can be seen from panels 1 and 2 in Figure 1.4, the distribution of educational level and track was not the same in the three countries. In Germany far more respondents were classified into the vocational track than in Britain and France. More respondents in Britain were classified at the lowest level of education than was the case in France or Germany. These two measures emphasise different facets of education. The measure of ‘track’ was intended to capture differences in educational experiences in a cross-nationally consistent way. The measure of educational ‘level’ was intended to reflect relative positions within each country. Occupational measures The two lower panels in Figure 1.4 show the distribution of two harmonised measures of labour market position. The EFFNATIS project collected data on both current and past occupations of respondents, as well as asking questions about the occupations of respondents’ parents. The standard sociological approach to analysing occupational data involves the location of individuals within an occupationally based social classification, such as a social class measure or a stratification scale. Many of these are available (see Ganzeboom & Treiman, 2003; Lambert et al., 2007). However, given the age range of the EFFNATIS sample, many respondents were not in employment since a significant number remained in full-time education. Moreover, many of those who did report occupations had not reached a mature position in their occupational career. It is clear, therefore, that their position on any occupationally based social classification scheme would not have adequately reflected their longer-term stratification position (see Abbott, 2006). Occupational data were coded within the EFFNATIS project by means of internationally standardised occupational unit group schemes and employment status measures. This meant that they


could be translated into a number of alternative occupationally based social classifications. Our use of such classifications was mainly limited to data on parents’ occupations. A four-fold occupational classification was used. This was based upon the ‘Lancaster Class Model’ (see Penn, 1985, 1996, 2006) and used a broad hierarchy of three categories ranked from more to less ‘advantaged’ (professional/managerial, skilled, routine work). This sat alongside an additional category for the self-employed. Self-employment is usually associated with relative advantage but is disproportionately high within some allochthonous ethnic/nationality groups. In many cases selfemployment among such ethnic/nationality groups was an indicator of relative labour market exclusion and disadvantage (see Kalra, 2000; Sayyid et al., 2005). This overall scheme had the attraction that it captured categorical differences in employment relations alongside differences in employment advantage. Most of our analyses also included categories for those respondents who had parents who had never worked or who were long-term unemployed (according to respondents’ descriptions of their parents’ situation). Occupational data were also available for respondents’ mothers and fathers. Panel 3 in Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of the Lancaster Class Model for parental occupational position. This is the measure most often used. It was obtained by taking the occupational position reported for the father, but, if the father’s occupational information was missing, the occupational position of the mother (where available) was used. When analysing the socio-economic circumstances of the respondents themselves, a number of different measures were used (see Chapter 6). These measures included information from several aspects of respondents’ lives, including their housing situation, their level of educational attainment and their educational track, as well as their occupational experiences. Panel 4 in Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of ‘joint educational-occupational situation’, based upon a combined index of occupational level and educational situation. The seven categories were derived from permutations of three criteria. The first was whether a respondent currently held a full-time permanent job (respondents stated that they worked for more than 30 hours a week and held a job contract which was not fixed-term). The second was whether the job held was ranked above or below the median value of occupational socio-economic status within the


19

sample for the country concerned (we used the ISEI index of Ganzeboom & Treiman, 2003). The third criterion was whether the respondents still participated in the educational system or, if they had left full-time education, whether respondents had achieved above average educational qualifications. This measure aimed to identify a number of discrete locations that indicated relative socioeconomic advantage among respondents. The seven categories in this measure comprised the following permutations: 1. Higher educational qualifications, full-time permanent job with a higher ISEI (International Socio-Economic Index). 2. Higher educational qualifications, full-time permanent job with a lower ISEI. 3. Full-time permanent job with higher ISEI but no higher educational qualifications. 4. Full-time permanent job with lower ISEI but no higher educational qualifications. 5. Higher educational qualifications but no full-time permanent job. 6. No higher educational qualifications and no full-time permanent job. 7. Still in education. The darker-shaded bands in panel 4 indicate greater relative advantage and the lighter-shaded bands relative disadvantage. The advantaged categories include those where respondents held a full-time, permanent job in combination with higher level educational qualifications and a higher status job. It also included those where respondents held higher level educational qualifications but were not employed in a full-time permanent job. Overall, Figure 1.4 summarises a series of educational and occupational measures that reveal the relative advantages and disadvantages experienced by EFFNATIS respondents.

National and regional contexts There was a broad correspondence between the EFFNATIS subsamples and comparable national patterns. The most important exception concerned Indians in Britain. They were not typical of the

20


wider Indian population in the United Kingdom, which is generally relatively advantaged across most dimensions of social and economic life (see Modood et al., 1997). The Indians in the EFFNATIS survey were descended predominantly from poorer, Gujarati, Muslim immigrants and had a far less advantaged socio-economic profile. Indian respondents, moreover, were also far more likely to be Muslim than younger Indians in Britain generally. Several studies in Britain have highlighted the regional aspects of the internal heterogeneity within the overall ‘Indian’ ethnic group (see Modood, 1991).11 The most significant factor that differentiated EFFNATIS respondents from their respective national populations in Britain, France and Germany was the regional basis for the sampling. The drawing of a parallel sample of autochthons from the same localities provided a control group that was subject to the same regional-level influences.

The localities where the EFFNATIS surveys were conducted Germany Nürnberg Nürnberg is the second largest city in Bavaria with a population of 480,000 in 2000 (Stadt Nürnberg, 2007). It has a large financial and commercial services’ sector, including a major university. It was also home to a substantial and diverse manufacturing sector including both metal working and chemicals. Siemens remained the largest local private sector employer in the city. Like many major German cities, Nürnberg received a large influx of foreign ‘guest workers’ during the 1950s and 1960s. In Nürnberg’s case, they came largely from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece. Residential segregation by ethnic/nationality origin was not marked in Nürnberg (as is generally the case in most German cities, with the exception of Berlin). Schools in Nürnberg featured moderate levels of ethnic/nationality segregation. By 2000 there were 22,686 Turkish nationals and 13,946 former Yugoslavs living in the city (Stadt Nürnberg, 2007). Turkish nationals constituted 7.1% of the population of Nürnberg below 40 years of age, while 3.5% were former Yugoslavs (Stadt Nürnberg, 2007).


21

France Vitry-sur-Seine Vitry-sur-Seine is an outer suburb of Paris lying to the southeast of the main city centre with a population of 82,300. In the 1950s it was famous as a traditional working-class area with strong historic links to the French Communist Party. Today it remains a centre for the production of chemicals and lighting and heating equipment. Like many Parisian ‘banlieux’ (deprived outer suburbs), Vitry expanded considerably during the post-war period of inward international migration, particularly from North Africa (the Maghreb) and Southern Europe (especially Portugal). By 1999 27.1% of the population was born outside Metropolitan France. Residential segregation by ethnic/nationality group in Vitry was intense, with international migrants and their descendants concentrated in high-rise blocks within deprived districts. However, educational segregation was far less pronounced in the town. Tours Tours is a city of 137,000 inhabitants in the Loire valley in central France (approximately 150 miles to the south-west of Paris). It was traditionally a regional administrative and agricultural centre. In the early twentieth century it developed into a centre for metal working and chemicals as well for the manufacture of textiles. Over the past 30 years it has become a major centre for services. It is a centre for distribution and logistics due to its geographical location. It is also a major centre for tourism. It received a significant inward migration from Portugal and subsequently from the Maghreb during the 1960s and 1970s. It was less segregated in terms of residential patterns than Vitry. Britain Rochdale Rochdale lies 15 miles to the north east of Manchester and was one of the earliest industrial centres in Britain. By 1850 it had a large factory workforce in the textile industry (see Penn, 1985). Subsequently it became a major centre for manufacturing, with a large machinerymaking and chemical industry alongside traditional textiles (see

22


Penn, 2006). In the 1950s and 1960s there was a large inward migration of people from the Indian subcontinent mainly attracted by employment opportunities in textiles. Since the 1970s the textile industry in Rochdale has collapsed, and many of the migrants from the Indian subcontinent (and their descendants) have experienced considerable difficulties in finding employment in other sectors (see Penn et al., 1990). The town is characterised by significant residential ethnic segregation. The Local Education Authority deliberately designed school catchment areas to counteract these tendencies by drawing boundaries to ensure that each secondary school had a more or less similar ethnic mix (see Penn & Scattergood, 1992). In 1991 Rochdale’s population was 202,164 and included 11,054 Pakistanis, 1,642 Bangladeshis and 804 Indians (1991 Census Ethnic Group and Country of Birth, Vol. 2, 1993). In Britain, the age structure of South Asian minorities is generally considerably younger than the autochthonous population. By 1999 Pakistanis comprised 10.4% of the total population of 16–25 year olds in Rochdale (as projected from the 8–17 year age group in 1991). Blackburn Like Rochdale, Blackburn was also a major industrial centre in the nineteenth century based upon textile production, but it also included significant engineering and paper manufacturing sectors. The 1950s and 1960s witnessed significant international migration from South Asia, particularly of Gujarati Muslims from India. National studies have shown that Blackburn has featured particularly high levels of residential ethnic segregation. Wards and enumeration districts in Blackburn have among the highest indices of segregation for Indians and Pakistanis in the United Kingdom (see Peach, 1996; Rees & Phillips, 1996). Unlike Rochdale, Blackburn had a bifurcated secondary-school population in terms of the ethnic composition of pupils. Several schools were, and remain, almost entirely South Asian while others are almost exclusively ‘White’ (see Penn & Berridge, 2008). The population of Blackburn was 136,612 in 1991. This included 10,483 Indians and 8,039 Pakistanis. By 1999 Indians and Pakistanis comprised 25.4% of the total population of 16–25 year olds in Blackburn (as projected from the 8–17 year group in 1991).

2 Sociological Models of Immigrant Incorporation

There is an enormous sociological literature on the incorporation of international migrants. Much of this literature originates from North America, partly because the United States has witnessed two enormous waves of international migration since the mid-nineteenth century and partly because of the sheer weight of American sociology numerically. Recently a fruitful dialogue has developed between sociologists of international migration on both sides of the Atlantic (see Portes & DeWind, 2007). The central purpose of this chapter is to present the various models of incorporation that co-exist within contemporary sociological discourse. Subsequent chapters will examine their empirical plausibility in the light of the evidence collected during the EFFNATIS project.

Assimilation Assimilation theory is, in many respects, the classic formulation of the process of incorporation of international migrants into a host society. It was first propounded by two of the founders of the Chicago School in the early twentieth century. Park and Burgess (1921) characterised assimilation of international migrants as a process ‘in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments and attitudes of other persons and groups and, by sharing their experiences and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life’. Park and Burgess saw assimilation as having a series of stages but as ultimately inevitable. This was encapsulated in their famous ‘concentric 23


ring’ model of spatial mobility based on their research in Chicago. This suggested that international migrants and their descendants moved over time from their initial insertion in poor, inner-city areas through working-class neighbourhoods to suburban middle-class districts. This process was facilitated by the educational attainment and ensuing occupational mobility achieved by the children and grandchildren of the original international migrants. Ultimately, such descendants became absorbed into the dominant culture of American society and became incorporated into the American ‘mainstream’. Subsequently, Gordon (1964) provided a much more systematic analysis of the various dimensions of assimilation. Gordon argued that complete assimilation by immigrants and their descendants would cover seven elements: 1. Changes of cultural values towards the host society. 2. Large-scale entrance into the voluntary associations and institutions of the host society. 3. Widespread intermarriage between immigrants and host population. 4. Development of a sense of people hood based exclusively on the host society. 5. Disappearance of prejudice. 6. Disappearance of discrimination. 7. Disappearance of conflict over values and power. Source: Adapted from Gordon, 1964.

Gordon further argued that ethnic group identity could be preserved by ‘a network of organisations and informal social relationships which permits and encourages the members of an ethnic group to remain within the confines of the group for all of their primary relationships and some of their secondary relationships’. Such a situation was seen by Gordon as a form of cultural pluralism whereby the ‘cultural norms’ from the country of origin (especially those associated with religion) were preserved. He argued that ‘acculturation’ (the process whereby one group adopted the ‘cultural’ patterns of another) typically came first. Such assimilation into the ‘core culture’ of the host society was unidirectional. Gordon believed that ‘structural assimilation’ came later. This was the process whereby international migrants and their descendants became incorporated into mainstream forms of social life,

Sociological Models of Immigrant Incorporation

25

through membership of clubs and the development of friendships with members of the host society. The apotheosis of this process involved intermarriage between members of the host society and international migrants and their descendants. Gordon also claimed that such structural assimilation would march hand in hand with increasing ‘identificational’ assimilation whereby migrants and their descendants would develop a ‘sense of peoplehood based exclusively in [the] host society’. Gordon’s seminal publication has been subject to considerable criticism. The most important omission in his seven-dimensional model was the role of socio-economic assimilation. Nonetheless, despite Glazer’s opinion in 1993 that ‘assimilation today is not a popular term,’ assimilation as an heuristic model received renewed and reinvigorated support from Morawska (1994) and particularly from Alba and Nee (2003). The latter argued strongly that assimilation was a coherent sociological model for the incorporation of international migrants and their descendants and that there was considerable empirical evidence for its continued relevance in the contemporary United States. For Alba and Nee assimilation involved the ‘decline of an ethnic difference’. In other words, as a group enters a new territorial space, it becomes assimilated to the extent to which it becomes indistinguishable from other groups across the spectrum of social inequalities within the receiving society. An example of more or less complete assimilation would be the case of Scots in contemporary England. In the eighteenth century, there was enormous hostility to the influx of Scottish migrants into England, particularly in London. This was fuelled by a range of contemporary writers including Smollett (1748), Wilkes (see Rudé, 1962) and Boswell (1791) and reached its nadir around the time of the Gordon Riots in 1780 (see Rudé, 1956; Rogers, 1998). Nowadays Scottish immigrants and their descendants in England are generally indistinguishable from the majority population. ‘Scottishness’ is rarely seen as an issue in England other than for occasional jokes. Indeed, many of those with Scottish surnames currently living in England regard themselves as English. We have represented the essential characteristics of the assimilation model in Figure 2.1. This can be seen as a pure type whereby over time international migrants become totally incorporated into the host society and completely disappear as a separate entity. This


Time 1

Figure 2.1

Time 2

Time 3

Classic assimilation

Note: Migrant group enters receiving society as a group. It is generally inserted at the bottom of the pile. Over time, the migrant group disperses within the receiving society and becomes ‘invisible’.

process is traditionally encapsulated in the metaphor of the ‘melting pot’.1 There has been a great deal of criticism of assimilation as a model for the incorporation of international migrants and their descendants. Much of this has been aimed at public policies connected with forced assimilation, such as the Americanisation movement in the first three decades of the twentieth century (Higham, 1981; Kraut, 2001) or the humiliation of non-French speakers in schools during the Third Republic (Weber, 1976). As Brubaker (2001) has emphasised, it is important to distinguish two senses of the notion of assimilation: the first involves a process whereby two groups become more similar, whereas the second involves the complete absorption or acculturation of one group into another. The latter entails ‘unilateral assimilation’ whereby one group relinquishes its own beliefs and behaviour patterns and takes on the culture of another. This can be contrasted to a process of ‘reciprocal fusion’ which involves a new culture emerging from the blending of the two groups. This model will be assessed later in this chapter in the section on hybridity. Multiculturalism Glazer and Moynihan announced in 1963, ‘the point about the melting pot is that it did not happen.’ The period since has been characterised as one in which there has been an increasing acceptance of pluralism and diversity with a strong sensitivity to ethnic ‘difference’, particularly among official agencies dealing with post-1945 international immigrants and their descendants in Western Europe and North America (see Back, 1996; Watson, 2000; Kelly, 2002; Kivisto, 2002; Modood, 2007).


27

This can be seen in a variety of contexts. In Britain official leaflets come in a wide variety of immigrant languages other than English and Welsh. These include Urdu, Punjabi, Gujarati, Bengali, Turkish, Polish and French. The school curriculum in Britain has been modified to allow for the sensibilities of followers of religions other than Christianity and Judaism, especially Islam, Hinduism and the Sikh religion (see Baumann, 1999; Penn et al., 2000). In both Holland and Britain, Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus have been permitted to open ‘faith schools’ catering for children from such denominations. Mosques and temples have burgeoned in Britain, France and Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe. Recently this multicultural model has come under sustained criticism (see West, 2005; Browne, 2006). In Holland the traditional ‘pillarisation’ of society which dates from the seventeenth century has led to a situation whereby the principle of ‘integration with maintenance of one’s own identity’ is seen by many Dutch commentators as dysfunctional. The Muslim pillar in particular – sustained by Islamic schools and Mosques – is seen as poorly integrated into Dutch society. Cantle (2001), in his official report into the urban riots in the North of England in 2001, argued that ‘multiculturalism is failing to bring Britain’s races together.’ His report stated that Asians and Whites in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham lived ‘parallel lives’ and concluded, ‘our review found in some areas no contact at all between different communities, not just in housing, but socially and culturally.’ This was reinforced across the generations by increasingly segregated schools and patterns of housing. Malik (2002) emphasised the negative symbiosis between selfappointed religious leaders and local councils in his indictment of multiculturalism: ‘Multiculturalism did not create militant Islam, but it created a space for it within British Muslim communities that had not existed before. It fostered a more tribal nation, undermined progressive trends within Muslim communities and strengthened the hand of conservative religious leaders.’ The putative sensitivities of Muslims have been pivotal in the emergence of a negative multiculturalism across Western Europe.

28


Since the bombings in Madrid and London in 2005 there has been a growing cultural self-censorship exemplified by the cancellation by the Deutsche Opera in Berlin of their production of Mozart’s Idomeneo and by the reaction to both the Danish cartoons of Mohammed and to a subsequent article in Le Figaro in 2006 claiming that Mohammed was a ‘master of hate’. A climate has emerged which has increasingly adopted the multiculturalist axiom that people from minority cultures should not be ‘upset’, irrespective of the case being made. Ethnic exclusion Nonetheless, there are a variety of alternative scenarios to assimilation for describing the articulation of international migrants and their descendants within a receiving society. One such possibility involves ethnic exclusion (see Figure 2.2). This is a situation whereby international migrants and their descendants remain concentrated in the most disadvantaged positions within the stratification system of the receiving society. Examples of this include the Roma in many Eastern European countries today (Ringold, 2000; Tanner, 2004) and Armenians in Georgia (Chaliand & Berret, 1983) over several centuries. Ethnic incorporation Another possible outcome involves the model of ethnic incorporation (see Figure 2.3). Within such a scenario, international migrants and their descendants attain the same socio-economic profile as the host society but do not lose key identificational and cultural aspects of their ethnic identity as postulated by assimilation theory. This is the ideal of most multiculturalists (see Parekh, 2005; Modood et al., Time 1

Time 2

+

Time 3

− Figure 2.2

Ethnic exclusion

Note: Migrant group enters the receiving society as a group. It is generally inserted at the bottom of the pile. Over time the migrant group becomes locked into the lowest positions within the stratification system of the receiving society.


Time 1

Time 2

+

29

Time 3

− Figure 2.3

Ethnic incorporation

Note: Migrant group enters the receiving society as a group. It is generally inserted at the bottom of the pile. Over time the migrant group develops an identical profile to the non-migrant, autochthonous population within the receiving society’s stratification system but retains aspects of its original culture and identity.

2007): ethnic difference is maintained and celebrated but it has no direct effect on such factors as educational attainment and socioeconomic status. Ethnic enclaves Portes (2001) argued that the best strategy for some international migrant groups (such as Cubans in Florida) involved the maintenance of strong physical, linguistic and cultural barriers within the receiving society. He suggested that, rather than following an assimilationist strategy or the weak form of ethnic ties involved in the model of ethnic incorporation, international migrants maximised their social and cultural capital by remaining within an ethnic enclave. Such enclaves embodied strong ties based upon a common language and culture and also upon shared residential propinquity. They facilitated the maximisation of group resources through the extensive use of coethnic networks. A classic example of such an ethnic enclave is East Los Angeles where Spanish is the predominant language of everyday discourse and the bulk of the population has origins in Mexico. Such views have been strongly challenged (see Woo, 2000) because they ignore the ‘glass ceiling’ created by such self-segregation (see Figures 2.4 and 2.5). While it may well be the case, for instance, that Mexican-Americans in East Los Angeles can generate businesses and create a wide range of professional and commercial services, lack of proficiency in English severely limits their access to higher educational institutions and, as a corollary, to occupational opportunities within the dominant economic, political and cultural institutions of the United States.


Time 1

Time 2

+

Time 3

− Figure 2.4

Ethnic enclave

Time 1

Time 2

+

Time 3

− Figure 2.5

Ethnic enclave with a glass ceiling

Segmented assimilation Portes and Zhou (1993) argued forcefully that differing groups of international migrants have been incorporated into host societies in radically different ways. One pathway in the United States involved classical upward assimilation into the mainstream ‘White’ middleclass while another offered downward assimilation into the predominantly ‘Black’ underclass. These divergent modes of incorporation of international migrants and their children were termed ‘segmented assimilation’ in their model (see Figure 2.6). A major strength of this way of conceptualising the relationship between modes of incorporation and differing international migrant groups is that it opens up the possibility of multiple forms of articulation between host societies and incoming migrant communities. Transnationalism Theories of transnationalism developed within anthropology in the 1990s (see Glick Schiller et al., 1992; Basch et al., 1993; Levitt, 2001; Glick Schiller & Fouron, 2002) to describe social processes whereby international migrants operated within social fields that transcended geographical and political borders. Central to such imagery was the notion that international migrants are not ‘uprooted’ but rather that


Time 1

Time 2

+

31

Time 3

− Figure 2.6

Segmented assimilation

Note: Several migrant groups enter the receiving society. They are generally inserted at the bottom of the pile. Over time one migrant group raises itself collectively within the receiving society while the other becomes permanently incorporated into the ‘underclass’.

Time 1

Time 2

+

Time 3

− Figure 2.7

Transnationalism

Note: The migrant group is only partially inserted into the receiving society. It lives in both the receiving and sending societies.

Time 1

Time 2

+

Time 3

− Figure 2.8

Segmented transnationalism

Note: Migrant groups are only partially inserted into the receiving society. They live in both the receiving and sending societies. However, they are very different in terms of their relative status within the stratification system of the receiving society.

they move backwards and forwards across national borders relatively freely. This de-territorialisation of the boundaries of the nation-state is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.7. The transnational model can also be re-specified to take account of segmentation processes (see Figure 2.8). Highly skilled migrants (see OECD, 2002; Favell et al., 2006; Favell & Smith, 2006) such as corporate financiers and accountants as well as those employed in


creative business services like advertising, market research and consultancy (see Penn, 2000) occupy a relatively privileged position across national spaces. Many of the American and Japanese migrants to London over the last 30 years epitomise such a structural location, as do the growing numbers of administrative and professional cadres employed by international organisations like the European Union and the United Nations. These migrants are very different from the low-skilled migrants described by Glick Schiller and Fouron in their monograph (2002) on Haitians in the United States or from the Senegalese street traders currently found in most Italian cities (see Vertovec, 2001; Riccio, 2001). Hybridity The final model of incorporation, hybridity, breaks with one of the key assumptions of the previous models described above. These all assume that international migrant groups encounter a fairly homogenous, if stratified, host society. They differ in their representations of how international migrants and their descendents are incorporated (or not incorporated) within such societies. The hybridity model emphasises how the migrant group interacts with the host, autochthonous population (see Bhabha, 1990; Pieterse, 1995; Manzanas & Benito, 2003; Kalra et al., 2005; Kuortti, 2007). Such interconnections change both the host society and the incoming international migrants. This process of interaction produces a new, hybrid fusion of elements (see Figure 2.9).

Time 1

Time 2

+

Time 3

− Figure 2.9

Hybridity

Note: The migrant group enters the receiving society and is generally inserted at the bottom of the pile. Over time the migrant group interconnects and fuses with the autochthonous population to produce a new type of hybrid society (i.e. both elements interact/fuse to produce a different whole).


33

Classic examples of hybridity can be seen in the area of cuisine: chicken tikka masala was invented for British tastes by ‘Indian’2 restaurants in the 1970s (see Warde & Martins, 1998) and is now the most popular national dish. Popular music is also an arena for cultural fusion (see Papastergiadis, 2000; Aparacio & Jáquez, 2003) with an interplay of American (both Black and White), South Asian and British styles evident in both recordings and in the mixed tracks played in clubs frequented by young adults in the United Kingdom. There has been considerable debate among sociologists about which elements of the incorporation of international migrants and their descendants come first chronologically. Gordon (1964) argued explicitly that structural integration was a precondition for ‘acculturation’ (cultural incorporation). Heckmann (1992) argued similarly that the material elements within a new country are accepted earlier, and more easily, than cultural values and norms. Seifert (1996) reported that structural integration of migrants within Germany had increased over the preceding ten years while social integration had not. There is a reverse theory, however, associated with notions of ‘post-industrialism’ (see Bell, 1973; Kumar, 1995) which has suggested that cultural integration is developing much faster among children of international migrants in Western nations than structural integration. This is primarily the result of powerful homogenising tendencies within contemporary mass consumption culture. In this account, children of international migrants are seen to be adopting a common lifestyle based upon Nike, McDonalds and MTV far more quickly than can achieve parity with the autochthonous population in terms of educational attainment or employment possibilities (see Holton, 1998).

3 International Migration to Britain, France and Germany

International migration before 1945 Industrialisation produced successive waves of international migration into Britain, France and Germany from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. In Britain there was an enormous immigration of people from Ireland, partly as a consequence of the starvation associated with the 1846 Potato Famine (O’Grada, 1995) and partly as a result of the burgeoning urban centres in England and Scotland (see Jackson, 1963). Later in the nineteenth century large numbers of Jewish immigrants also migrated to Britain – particularly to London – from Eastern Europe and Russia (see Garrard, 1971). In Germany there was large-scale Polish migration to the Ruhr in the second half of the nineteenth century. Stirn (1964) estimated that, by 1913, 164,000 of the 410,000 coal miners in the Ruhr were Polish. Workers from Italy (see Merx, 1962) and the Low Countries also played an important role in early German industrialisation. By 1907 there were almost 1 million foreign workers in the German Reich (Dohse, 1981). The Inter-War years witnessed a sharp fall in international migration within Germany. By 1932 there remained only 100,00 foreign workers in the country (Dohse, 1981). The proportion of foreign workers in France increased rapidly during the second half of the nineteenth century from 1.1% of the population in 1851 (381,000) to 3.0% in 1911 (1.2 million). Most came from countries contiguous to France – Italy, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and later from the Iberian peninsula (see Bernard, 1993; Noiriel, 1984). 34

International Migration to Britain, France and Germany

35

The Inter-War years proved to be rather different demographically in France than in Germany or Britain. The massive loss of Frenchmen during the First World War (approximately 3 million were either killed or permanently disabled) encouraged the emergence of a series of bilateral national labour recruitment agreements with countries like Poland, Italy and Czechoslovakia (Noiriel, 1984). As a result almost 2 million foreign workers migrated to France between 1920 and 1930 (Decloîtres, 1967). It is clear that international migration has been a longstanding feature of British, French and German societal development throughout the modern era. Prior to 1945 most migrants came from elsewhere in Europe, generally from nations proximate to the three countries.

International migration since 1945 Since 1945 international migration to Western Europe has increased considerably and changed significantly in its geographical nature. In Germany migration of workers from outside Western Europe increased significantly through the ‘guestworker’ system. However, European immigration to Britain and France has been dwarfed by the migration of workers from their respective ex-colonies in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. West Germany experienced significant inward migration after 1945. The largest wave (around 8 million) consisted of German citizens from the former Reich in Eastern Europe. These expellees (Heimatvertriebene) were followed by 3 million refugees (Flüchtlinge) from East Germany during the 1950s. All these migrants were ethnically German and received immediate German citizenship. From the mid-1950s onwards, West Germany signed a series of bilateral agreements for the recruitment of ‘guestworkers’ (gästarbeiter) with governments in the Mediterranean region. The first was with Italy in 1955 and this was followed by agreements with Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961 and Yugoslavia in 1968. The Federal Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit; henceforth, BFA) opened recruitment offices throughout the northern Mediterranean region. Employers paid a fee to the BFA, which in turn recruited men to work in Germany.1 Labour conditions for such ‘guestworkers’ were regulated by agreements with the Governments of the sending nations: Italy, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia were the largest. The


number of foreign workers in West Germany rose rapidly from 95,000 in 1956 to 2.6 million by 1973 (see Castles & Miller, 1998). In 1973 Germany ended these agreements as a result of the global recession but many so-called ‘guestworkers’ remained in the country as they realised that, if they left, there would be no future opportunity to return. Paradoxically, therefore, the ending of temporary labour migration cemented the position of immigrants within West Germany and led to the increasing multi-ethnic character of contemporary German society. The predominant official approach to international immigration into West Germany from the early 1950s onwards has been one of outright denial. This was encapsulated in Helmut Kohl’s famous dictum ‘Die Bundesrepublik ist kein Einwanderungsland’ (‘Germany is not a country of immigration’). During the late 1950s and 1960s there was a general consensus, both politically and socially, that the ‘guestworkers’ from Mediterranean counties were temporary migrants. This was based upon the strongly ethnic principles underpinning German citizenship rules prevalent until 2000.2 German citizenship laws have been premised traditionally upon the principle of ius sanguinis (literally the ‘law of blood’ or nationality through descent) as spelt out in the 1913 German Constitution (see Takle, 2007). This was based upon an ethno-cultural concept of the German ‘Volk’: a national community united by culture, language and descent, irrespective of state boundaries (see Meinecke, 1908). Children of foreign parents had no automatic right to German citizenship and naturalisation for such children was extremely difficult, involving a long residence requirement, Byzantine procedures and highly restrictive conditions. One of these involved the obligation to renounce previous citizenship. This was particularly difficult for Turkish citizens as their own government forbade it! The axial official principle of German immigration policy was that migrant workers were temporary. Residence and labour permits were granted for limited periods and entry of dependants was not encouraged. Nevertheless, family reunion and settlement took place and by the late 1960s these restrictions were eased and dependants increasingly entered West Germany. By 1994, Turkish migrants and their children in Germany comprised a population of about 2 million, along with 1.3 million from the former Yugoslavia and 572,000 Italians (data from Staatisches Bundesamt, 31.12.1994). Overall about


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3.4 million foreigners (Ausländer) had lived in Germany for more than a decade by 1994 (see Kurthen, 1995). Nonetheless, as a result of the centralised corporatist nature of post-war West Germany (see Schmitter & Lehmbruch, 1979; Cox & O’Sullivan, 1988), the majority of international immigrants experienced de facto partial incorporation, mainly as a result of labour market regulations insisted upon by the West German trade union movement (see Seifert, 1997). These agreements also involved the inclusion of international migrants into the mainstream state welfare system. As early as 1955, at the time of the first bilateral labour recruitment treaty with Italy, there was a general agreement between the Federal Government, trade unions and employers that international migrants to Germany should receive pay and social security provisions equal to those received by the autochthonous German population. This combination of a corporatist inclusion into the central planks of the post-war Social Market (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) with simultaneous exclusion from full political and citizenship rights remained a core and persistent feature of the incorporation of international migrants and their descendants in Germany (Faist & Häussermann, 1996). In the widest sense, there was no coherent immigration policy in Germany by the time of re-unification in 1990 (see Heckmann, 1994). Indeed, Steinert (1993) argued that there was no political will for an immigration policy throughout the post-war period. This was partly the result of the sensitivity of such issues within Germany as a result of the Nazi era. This sensitivity was despite the highly ethnocultural basis to citizenship in Germany. The main features of the German mode of incorporation of international immigrants since the mid-1950s has involved placing such migrants on an equal footing within civil society, especially in the spheres of employment, training and public housing. This latter policy has prevented the emergence of large ethnic enclaves (see Faist & Häussermann, 1996) within most German cities, including the Bavarian cities of München and Nürnberg. The exception to this general residential pattern has been Kreuzberg in Berlin which became a predominantly Turkish area in that city. By 2001, there were 7.3 million ‘foreigners’ living in Germany, of whom 1.6 million were actually the children or grandchildren of international migrants. These included 2 million Turkish citizens3

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(28% of the foreign population) and 1 million citizens from the former Yugoslavia. France operated a similar system of post-war labour recruitment to that in Germany through its Office National d’ Immigration (ONI). Initially such immigration – primarily from Southern Europe – was also seen as temporary by the French. However, increasingly provision was made for dependants as well; by 1970, around 2 million foreign workers and 690,000 of their dependants had migrated to France. Many of these had initially travelled ostensibly as tourists, particularly those from Spain and Portugal, both of which had Fascist governments until the mid-1970s (see Domenach & Picouet, 1995). France also experienced significant immigration from its former colonies, particularly in Africa. By 1970, there were 600,000 Algerians, 140,000 Moroccans and 90,000 Tunisians in France as well as substantial numbers from Senegal, Mauritania and Mali (see Tribalat, 1993; Le Moigne, 1999). After independence from France in 1962 immigration from Algeria was regulated by a series of special bilateral arrangements between France and the new Algerian government. Large numbers of people (about 300,000 in 1972) also migrated to mainland France from overseas territories and ‘départements’ such as Martinique, Réunion and Guadeloupe. All such immigrants arrived as full citizens of France. After 1945, Britain also experienced significant international migration from overseas. Large numbers continued to migrate from Eire. As a result of arrangements made in 1922 and 1948, citizens of the Irish Free State (subsequently Eire) continued to enjoy virtually identical rights and benefits as British citizens, although they were exempted from compulsory military service. In particular, Irish residents in Britain continued to enjoy the right to vote there. Immigration from the Caribbean, India, Pakistan, Hong Kong and Africa grew rapidly after 1945. A small percentage came as a result of direct recruitment, notably by London Transport and the National Health Service in the Caribbean, but most migrated of their own accord in response to significant labour shortages. Almost all came as British citizens as a consequence of the 1948 British Nationality Act. The post-war period witnessed a significant change in international migration to countries like Britain, France and Germany. Prior to 1945 most international migration was from contiguous countries. In the case of Britain, it was primarily from Ireland; in Germany,


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most came from Poland, while France, with its particularly low rate of autochthonous fertility, attracted migrants from Italy, the Low Countries, the Iberian Peninsula and also from Eastern Europe. After 1945 migration became far less Eurocentric and far more diverse in terms of the countries of origin of international migrants. In the case of Britain, this was consolidated by Britain’s imperial legacy. Indeed, from 1948 to 1962, almost all citizens of its former colonial domain had unrestricted access to the United Kingdom as a result of the 1948 British Nationality Act. This produced a significant increase in the cultural and social heterogeneity of the population living in Britain. In particular, it led to an expansion of religious heterogeneity within the country with an influx of Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and Pentecostal Christians. France also experienced a large-scale influx of peoples from its former colonies in the Maghreb who were both Francophone and Muslim. Though Germany lacked a significant colonial past, it also experienced a widening diversity within its borders after 1945, particularly as a result of migration from Turkey (a mainly Muslim country, with both Sunni and Alevi forms of Islam widespread) and the former Yugoslavia which contained Orthodox Christian, Muslim and Roman Catholic populations. However, it was not just religion that marked the increasing diversity of the populations of Western Europe. Cultural diversity also increased with the juxtaposition of different sets of norms and values. There was also an increasing range of social practices, ranging from dress codes and food to the arrival of populations among whom ‘arranged’ marriages rather than ‘love marriages’ based on romance were the norm. This post-war international migration to Western Europe shared certain common features. Initial migration was primarily among young adult males, attracted by jobs available at the bottom of the labour market as a result of the labour shortages generated by the economic expansion between 1945 and 1973 (see Böhning, 1972). Such an influx of allochthonous groupings also facilitated the collective social mobility of large numbers of the autochthonous population: a process partly facilitated by increasing levels of education and partly by the expansion of non-manual occupations in the service sector (see Penn, 2006). The initial phase of young adult male migration was soon followed by family reunion (see Böhning & de Beijl, 1995). Despite the assumption that such international migration would be


temporary – a view held very strongly in Germany but also to a lesser degree in France and Britain – there existed a significant number of international migrants in all three countries by the mid-1970s. Most were concentrated in the least advantaged occupations and in the worst housing – often in ethnic enclaves within the largest metropolitan areas in these countries. Clearly the increasing internationalisation of migration to Western Europe has generated a set of common issues in these countries. These centred upon the increasing ethnic diversity of such societies. The present research examines the various forms of incorporation of such ethnic minorities that have taken place in Britain, France and Germany. These different policies towards incorporation are centred upon significantly different conceptions of citizenship and of the nation in the three countries (see Brubaker, 1992). French incorporation strategy represents the classic epitome of assimilition (see Gaspard, 1992). It has been labelled the ‘Republican Model’ (see Schnapper, 1994; Withol de Wenden, 1994) and is premised upon a notion of the nation as essentially a political community of ‘citizens’ based upon a common constitution and set of laws. Immigrants can become part of this political community as long as they are willing to assimilate into the national culture and national institutions. As Cesarani and Fulbrook (1996) have stated, ‘France in the modern era pioneered the definition of an active citizenship that was inclusive of all who accepted the principles of the Revolution and French culture.’ One consequence of such a model is that ‘ethnic’ distinctiveness is rarely recognised. Indeed, in contemporary France it is more or less illegal to collect data on ethnicity and French social scientists find the discourse of multiculturalism, popular in countries like Sweden and the Netherlands, highly problematic. Underlying such a political model are strong notions of societal consensus. The twin notions of ‘France’ and ‘French-ness’ are seen as relatively unproblematic and as something to which all incomers would wish to aspire. Paradoxically, though, as Böhning (1972) noted, ‘a policy of deliberate integration is rather conspicuous by its absence’ and immigrants are simply left ‘to find their way around on their own’. The strategy for the incorporation of international migrants in Germany has been very different. It has been based upon a cultural notion of the German ‘Volk’ which defined belonging to the nation


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in terms of ethnicity. When the Federal Republic (FDR) was formed in 1949, its Basic Law (Grundgesetz) retained the ethnic conception of citizenship in the German Reich’s Constitution of 1913. Article 116 of the 1949 Basic Law bestowed automatic citizenship rights in West Germany on those born or descended from the citizens of Germany within its 1937 borders (see Fulbrook, 1996). Common descent (‘blood right’) was the explicit underlying principle of ‘German-ness’. This has had two remarkable consequences in post-war Germany. The descendants of immigrants from countries like Turkey and Yugoslavia born in Germany, brought up in Germany and speaking German have been routinely seen and labelled as foreigners. On the other hand, descendants of German migrants to places like Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and the countries of Eastern Europe who speak no German and whose lineage goes back 400 or 500 years are seen as ‘German’ and entitled to unrestricted access to the ‘Fatherland’ and to full German citizenship. These consequences of the ethnic basis to nationality in Germany are the paradoxical results of its adherence to the principles of ius sanguinis – citizenship based upon ‘blood’. The French case, on the other hand, is an exemplar of ius soli: the notion that citizenship is conferred by territoriality.4 Birth and residence in France almost always transform children of international migrants into French citizens once they reach adulthood. France has not developed specific formal policies towards the incorporation (‘intégration’ in French discourse) of either foreigners or children of international migrants. Formal policies within the spheres of education, training and employment have all had a universalistic focus rather than any ethnic or nationality dimension (see Schnapper et al., 2003). Birth and residence in Germany have little bearing on the citizenship of such children. Indeed, they are labelled as second-generation immigrants despite the fact that they themselves are not immigrants! Naturalisation policies are far more liberal in France than in Germany, with rates around five times greater in the early 1990s. The British case is more complex. In the immediate post-war period, the 1948 British Nationality Act put forward the view that British citizenship was a function of being a subject of the ‘Crown’. In practice this was defined as including any person living in a former colony that accepted the British monarch as head of the Commonwealth or any person living in an existing colony. On this basis residents of

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India and Pakistan had a claim to be British while those from Burma – who did not join the Commonwealth – did not. However, this initial post-war open-door policy towards international immigration changed as a result of successive Acts passed by the UK Parliament in 1964, 1968 and 1971 that progressively restricted access to Britain (see Hansen, 2000). These restrictions culminated in the 1981 Nationality Act which completely abandoned the principles of the earlier 1948 Act. The present situation is based upon a twin-pronged approach, often characterised as ‘Fortress Britain’. This involves a highly restrictive regime for international immigration, with an explicit attempt to promote a pluralist or multicultural approach towards ethnic minorities within Britain. Central to this strategy is the notion of a common political body of citizens whose ethnic differences are explicitly protected by legislation. Underlying this is the view that as long as ethnic minorities adhere to the political mores of British society, cultural differences and the formation of ethnic communities are acceptable and even desirable. This is in marked contrast to the modes of incorporation in both France and Germany. The situation of international migrants and their descendants in Britain are defined neither in an assimilationist nor in an exclusionary fashion (see Penn et al., 2000). The central theme of this book involves a comparison of the contemporary situation of the children of international migrants in Britain, France and Germany. The empirical research was designed to assess the extent to which the national modes of incorporation described above have impacted upon the situation of such children of international migrants. The issue of incorporation has been divided analytically into five empirical areas – linguistic, structural, cultural, social and identificational. The first area includes issues of language use, assessed both in terms of languages spoken on a personal level (with family members at home and with friends) and in the public sphere (language use and provision within the school systems of the three countries). The second examines structural incorporation and focuses on citizenship per se and political behaviour, as well as educational and employment trajectories. The assessment of cultural incorporation involves an analysis of data on norms, values and behaviour. The section on social incorporation examines the extent to which children of international migrants form friendships


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with others from the same ethnic background. In this section we also examine patterns of intermarriage and probe the extent to which traditional marriage practices in the countries of origin of international migrants remain significant in Western Europe. Finally, in the section on identificational incorporation, we examine the variety of ways in which children of international migrants see themselves subjectively. In terms of children of international migrants’ routine use of the language of their parents, we expected that this would be highest in Germany, with its exclusionary approach to incorporation, and lowest in France, with its assimilationist mode of incorporation. In the case of structural incorporation, we expected that all children of international migrants surveyed in Britain would be British citizens and to participate fully in wider political activities. We also expected that such children of international migrants would show a considerable awareness of politics in their countries of origin. Likewise in France we expected that most children of international migrants would be full citizens and to participate in wider political activities. However, given the assimilationist emphasis in France, we anticipated relatively less interest in the politics of their countries of parental origin. In Germany neither did we expect many children of international migrants to be German citizens nor, as a corollary, to have much interest in the wider politics of Germany. Rather we anticipated that their main political interests would focus on the countries from where their parents had emigrated. The situation with regards to education and employment trajectories among children of international migrants is more complex. Given the insertion of their parents into the disadvantaged sectors of the Western European labour market, we would anticipate that their socio-economic background per se or, put alternatively, their social class background, to be the most salient determining factor. We would also anticipate that gender would operate in a variety of ways. In general terms we would expect the gender difference within and between all ethnic groups to be disappearing as part of the wider gender equalisation currently underway in the most affluent, technologically complex societies of Europe and North America (see Berridge & Penn, 2009). On the other hand, many immigrants from outside Europe originate from societies which are highly patriarchal and where gender roles are tightly segregated. In such traditionalistic

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societies, women are neither expected nor encouraged to achieve highly within the educational system nor to participate in paid employment outside the home. Consequently, given the differing degrees of acceptance of ‘modern’ rather than ‘traditionalistic’ gender roles in each of the three countries (see Scott et al., 2008), we would expect somewhat different outcomes in each of the three countries examined. In the case of France, we would expect a higher degree of gender equality based upon the assimilation of modern gender expectations among children of international migrants. In Germany we would expect much greater asymmetry between men and women among children of international migrants. Their exclusion from the wider German societal matrix would, in all probability, encourage far more ‘traditionalistic’ gender outcomes among minority ethnic/nationality groups in Germany. The situation in Britain was harder to anticipate. On one hand, part of the multicultural compromise in Britain involves the assertion of equal rights and a legal prohibition of both ethnic and gender discrimination. On the other hand, both Indian and Pakistani societies (the two largest immigrant communities in Britain currently) are highly patriarchal and based upon very strongly demarcated gender roles (see Ahmad, 1998). Indeed, the encouragement of single-sex Islamic schools in Britain as part of widening multiculturalism within the state educational sector has been seen as reinforcing ‘traditionalistic’ gender roles among children of international migrants (see Parker-Jenkins, 2002; Felzer & Soper, 2004). Our expectations concerning cultural behaviour and cultural norms varied according to the three societal modes of incorporation outlined above. Given the assimilationist model in France, we expected relatively little difference between autochthonous and allochthonous young people. The exclusionary emphasis within Germany led us to anticipate far greater ethnic/nationality group differences and a much greater cultural affinity and connection with countries of parental origin. In Britain, we expected considerable cultural differences between ethnic groups, although multiculturalism has been claimed by some (see Werbner & Modood, 1997) to be producing a growing ‘hybrid’ interpenetration of cultures based upon a mutual acceptance of ‘difference’. In terms of social incorporation we expected that the emphasis on a common French national identity and also the particular role of


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the school in France in promoting social homogeneity would produce a relatively high degree of inter-ethnic friendships and marriages there. In Britain, with its emphasis on multiculturalism and distinctive ethnic communities, we anticipated a far greater level of ethnically homogenous friendships and also the preservation of the arranged marriage structures prevalent within the Indian subcontinent. The latter, by definition, would serve to maintain ethnically homogenous marriages. The situation in Germany was expected to be close to that pertaining in England. We anticipated that the categorization of children of international migrants as ‘foreigners’ and the emphasis on lineage as the criterion for being ‘German’ would serve to encourage both ethnically exclusive friendship and marriage patterns. Finally, in terms of identificational incorporation, we expected that children of international migrants in France would tend to see themselves as ‘French’ rather than as, say, ‘Algerian’ or ‘Portuguese’, as a direct result of the French assimilationist mode of incorporation. We felt that Turks and Yugoslavs in Germany, on the other hand, would be far less likely to see themselves as ‘German’. The societal definition of such people in Germany as ‘foreigners’ and not as ‘German’ would, in our view, be internalized in the self-conceptions of children of international migrants there. Once again, the British situation would almost certainly be more complex. As British citizens, most children of international migrants would see themselves as ‘British’. However, it was less likely that they would conceptualize themselves as ‘English’, despite living in England. Far more likely, in our opinion, was that they would exhibit a dual identity, possibly in a hyphenated form as, ‘Asian–British’ or ‘Pakistani–British’.

4 Theoretical Paradigms for the Sociological Analysis of Children of International Migrants

There are a range of general theoretical paradigms in sociology for the analysis of children of international migrants that run alongside the models of incorporation outlined in Chapter 2. These provided analytical tools that informed the EFFNATIS project and were used both to frame empirical questions and to interpret the results of the research.

Discrimination/prejudice Discrimination and prejudice are complex concepts that describe negative actions and reactions towards ethnic/nationality minority groups. In many ways, the discrimination/prejudice paradigm represents the classical theoretical approach within sociology for analysing the incorporation of international migrants (see Fenton, 1999). Many writers within this framework implicitly assume a causal relationship between prejudice and discrimination but, as Heckmann (1992) demonstrated, both prejudice and discrimination have independent effects. Discrimination itself is notoriously difficult to establish (Alba, 1997), but it has been shown to be a powerful element within Western European societies. Penn et al. (1990) revealed how prejudice and discrimination directly affected the deteriorating economic situation of first-generation Asian migrants in Britain. Subsequently, the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in Britain (Macpherson, 1999) suggested that discrimination and prejudice were implicit 46

Theoretical Paradigms for the Sociological Analysis

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within a range of social practices, a viewpoint encapsulated in its notion of ‘institutional racism’. An additional element within this framework is the idea that perceptions of prejudice, discrimination and racism at the personal level can lead to a reinforcement of ethnic ties and to support for forms of ethnic mobilisation that emphasise group particularities. In contrast to the model of ethnic enclave incorporation discussed earlier, the discrimination/prejudice paradigm emphasises the coercive and forced nature of ethnic segregation and the role of the dominant, autochthonous population in its reproduction over time.

Ethnic asymmetry A dominant theme within recent British research on ethnic differences has been the notion that different ethnic minority groups are characterised by distinctive experiences of social stratification (see Modood et al., 1997; Mason, 2003). This paradigm has been termed the ‘ethnic asymmetry’ approach because the ways in which ethnic minority groups differ from the autochthonous majority vary widely and unevenly. Analyses using the ethnic asymmetry paradigm have proliferated in Britain. Structural differences in incorporation between ethnic groups have been demonstrated by Modood (1997a, 1997b), Blackburn et al., (1997), Owen (1997), Model (1999) and Berthoud (2000). Differences in cultural incorporation have been presented by Modood (1997c), while differences in social incorporation have been outlined by Berrington (1996) and Berthoud and Beishon (1997). Variations in identificational incorporation have been indicated by Modood, Beishon and Virdee (1994) and Virdee (1997). In addition, alongside this predominantly quantitative survey data, an important qualitative literature has also presented versions of the ethnic asymmetry approach. Writers such as Anthias (1992) and Hall (1992) have used ethnographic research to argue that the experiences and behaviour of members of different ethnic minority groups were quite distinct. Theories of ethnic asymmetry tend to be presented in terms of the chronology of immigrant settlement into Britain. Most large ethnic minority groups in Britain can be identified with specific waves of immigration since 1945 (see Penn et al., 2000). These are associated with language differences between different ethnic groups, strong

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patterns of religious and cultural differences and even, in some cases, inherited conflicts with other ethnic minority groups in Britain. These take their strongest form among Indians and Pakistanis and among Cypriots. Ethnic minority groups have been further differentiated by distinctive patterns of initial geographical settlement and also by very different employment patterns (see Penn et al., 2000). Most West Indian women migrated to Britain as single adults with prospective full-time employment in such sectors as the NHS (National Health Service) or manufacturing industry. Most Pakistani women, on the other hand, migrated as wives or fiancées of men already living in Britain and have been economically inactive since arriving (see Penn, 2006). These structural patterns of ethnic differences have tended to reproduce themselves over time: residential segregation remains high (see Ratcliffe, 1996) and employment differences have, if anything, become greater (see Modood et al., 1997; Mason, 2003). There has been considerable debate over whether patterns of ethnic asymmetry have changed in recent years. Some writers who have linked ethnic asymmetry primarily to differences in initial immigration conditions have argued that there has been a progressive reduction in ethnic asymmetry (see Iganski & Payne, 1999), while others, who have based their case for ethnic asymmetry on the continued reproduction of initial structural differences between groups of international immigrants, have argued that there has been a broad continuation in overall patterns of ethnic asymmetry over time (see Modood et al., 1997).

National differences A series of authors (Brubaker, 1994; Withol de Wenden, 1999) have argued that there are distinct sets of national policies or ‘modes of integration’ within contemporary Europe. They emphasise the importance of different national historical trajectories, including the effects of earlier colonial metropolitan–periphery relations, in determining relations between children of international migrants and autochthons in various European countries. As Schnapper (1998) wrote ‘Chacun des pays européens a une tradition nationale forte et une manière specifique de traîter des relations interethniques’ [p. 351]. As was shown in the previous chapter, these historical differences intersect with quite different traditions concerning the core


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nature of citizenship and the degree of tolerance of religious, cultural and political diversity between European countries. However, the notion of persistent and immutable national difference has been challenged by Falga et al. (1994) and more recently by Barou (2001) both of whom have argued that there is an increasing convergence in policies towards citizenship rights and the incorporation of international migrants and their descendants in the three countries. The national difference approach is difficult to assess empirically within cross-national survey analyses. This is because observed differences between countries can be the product of substantive national differences, but they can also be generated by the different conceptualisations used by sociological researchers in different countries. Furthermore, observed national differences can also be the result of differing survey methodologies, involving different sampling frames and differential patterns of non-response.

Social class Within classical sociology it was axiomatic that material differences between families were critical for the relative advantages and disadvantages among their children. This has been labelled in a variety of ways but the central idea is that material differences between families are rooted in the core structural parameters of modern societies. These both involve the ownership or non-ownership of capital (property) and differences associated with the occupational division of labour (see Penn, 1985). Within British sociology these ideas have been configured under the overarching concept of ‘class’. In this tradition intergenerational advantage and disadvantage are conceptualised as being strongly affected by ‘class’ (see Glass, 1954; Goldthorpe et al., 1980; Penn, 2006). This approach has been extended to international migrants to suggest that differences between ethnic groups in Britain are mainly a function of the material, ‘class’ circumstances of ethnic minority families (see Penn & Scattergood, 1992). For some, ethnicity is subsumed within the class structure itself (see Miles, 1982). For others, ethnicity is associated with marginality to the class structure: an idea often characterised by the notion of an ‘underclass’ (see Mingione, 1996). Recently, sociologists have widened the concept of capital from a strictly economic sense to include both cultural and social resources


(see Bourdieu, 1972; Coleman, 1980). This more general notion of capital suggests that the socialisation and incorporation of international migrants and their children are a function of the material, cultural and social resources that families (and individuals) possess. The most powerful factor within the mix of family capital (or resources) is the educational status of parents. This has been shown to have a powerful influence on the integration process: indeed, its influence is often more powerful than occupational status per se (see Alba et al., 1994). Recently there has been a growing recognition that social class and ethnicity interact in complex ways. Penn and Berridge (2008) revealed that the relationship between ethnicity and social class varied significantly at successive stages in the contemporary British educational system.

Gender There has been a revolution in gender roles across the Western world over the last 60 years (see Blau et al., 2006; Scott et al., 2008). This has been linked to a range of factors: the growth of feminism, the impact of the contraceptive pill, increased levels of female educational attainment and, as a corollary, the expansion in the number of women employed in professional and managerial cadres (Berridge & Penn, 2009). The ‘gender revolution’ is also strongly associated with a range of social changes associated with the ‘second demographic transition’ (see van de Kaa, 1987; Lesthaeghe & Williams, 1999). These include decreasing rates of marriage, increasing rates of divorce and cohabitation, declining fertility to below replacement levels, an increasing proportion of childless women (see McAllister & Clarke, 1998) and an increasing proportion of families with one child. A three-stage diachronic model can be identified behind much recent gender theorising. The traditional stage involved marked inequalities between men and women and is generally explained in terms of some version of ‘patriarchy’. The industrial stage involves the progressive equalisation of gender outcomes as a result of egalitarian changes within modern societies (see Penn, 1990). Gender differences decline markedly. The post-industrial stage is only evident in embryo within the contemporary period. It embodies a ‘post-egalitarian’ situation where men and women continue to display significant aggregate


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differences but these are not isomorphic across all societal subdivisions. Women may, for example, outperform men at all levels of the educational system but not within the occupational system. This seems to be the contemporary situation in the Nordic countries and one which other Western European societies are fast approaching (see OECD, 2000; Statistics Finland, 2003). An alternative scenario is that in the post-modern era gender differences simply disappear altogether (see Kimmel, 2000). The gender paradigm suggests that each ethnic group in contemporary societies is structured by distinctive patterns of gender relations. It is important to recognise that not all modern gender theorists claim the exclusiveness of gender as a sole structuring force. Rather, gender theories consistently argue that there is an identifiable role for gender in explaining societal patterns of stratification. An important element, therefore, in the analysis of ethnicity and gender involves their interaction in a variety of contexts (see Dale et al., 2008). Gender theories imply that within every ethnic group there is an important difference between men and women. Furthermore, this gender difference is not isomorphic within differing ethnic groups: the effects of gender and ethnicity are not simply additive but they are also interactive.

Cultural conflict According to cultural conflict theory, international migrants and their descendants suffer from insecure identities which weaken their capacity to achieve structural incorporation within the countries to which they have migrated. This thesis was originally formulated by Stonequist (1937) in his classic study of migrant marginality. It has been reformulated in two ways over recent years by sociologists of international migration. Anwar (1998) argued that children of international migrants were ‘between two cultures’: neither at home within the ethnic culture of their parents nor within the autochthonous culture that they encounter within the educational and employment spheres of the host society. Hämmig (1999) further elaborated this notion by incorporating the Durkheimian concept of ‘anomie’ (as reformulated by Merton [1968] in his study of the social roots of deviance among descendants of Italian migrants in the United States) in his analysis of conflicting normative roles among

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children of international migrants in contemporary Switzerland. Clearly this is a far more negative view of the acculturation of international migrants and their descendants than the model of hybridity outlined earlier.

Ethnic minority trap Wiley (1970) outlined the problematic effects of ethnic ‘self-seclusion’ by international migrants and their descendants for wider possibilities of social inclusion. Schlesinger (1992) elaborated upon this theme and argued that American multiculturalism had gone too far by allowing teaching in Spanish for Hispanic migrants in certain US states such as California and Florida. This heuristic trope has been reiterated forcefully by Huntington (2004) in his negative assessment of contemporary multiculturalism in the United States. He also criticised the idea that ‘ethnic’ businesses offered an alternative to incorporation within mainstream American society as a false prospectus: rather they represented a cul-de-sac in that they tended to lock ethnic minority groups into peripheral, marginal jobs within declining industries and secondary labour markets.

5 Linguistic Incorporation: Patterns of Language Use

All the evidence ... reveals a powerful linguistic gravitational pull that has produced conversion to English monolingualism on a wide scale within three generations. (Alba & Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream, 2003, p. 72) Learning English is a basic step to enable them to participate in the life of the larger community, get an education, find a job, obtain a driver’s license and access to health care and social services. (Portes & Rumbaut, Immigrant America, 3rd Edition, 2006, p. 207) Proficiency in the mainstream language is close to universal in the second generation ... which is educated typically in the public schools of the receiving society. (Alba, ‘Bright vs Blurred Boundaries: Second-Generation Assimilation and Exclusion in France, Germany and the United States’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2005, p. 36)

Linguistic incorporation of international migrants The issue of language proficiency is central to the articulation of international migrants and their children within the social structures of the countries to which they have migrated. As Portes and 53

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Rumbaut (2006) argued forcefully in the above quotation, proficiency in the English language is a sine qua non of the possibility of living successfully in the contemporary United States. In addition to the factors listed by Portes and Rumbaut, we can add a wider range of contexts where an inability to communicate in English would pose a serious problem in Britain. These would include dealing with police, either in relation to driving a car or to wider issues of public order. A similar problem would occur in any dealings with schools. Few of the gatekeepers to such schools have any facility in languages other than English. Moreover very few teachers in such schools would be able to communicate with parents in languages like Urdu, Punjabi or Gujarati. Doctor’s surgeries and accident and emergency (A&E) facilities in National Health Service (NHS) hospitals in Britain reveal a very similar situation, although there have been moves to provide translators in A&E in cities with large international migrant communities like Bradford. Even dealing with check-out assistants in the major British supermarkets would be virtually impossible in 99% of cases if the customer could not speak English effectively. The pressure on international migrants for linguistic assimilation into the host language is often symbolic as well as practical. Communication in a mother tongue is often highly exclusionary, marking a largely impermeable communicative boundary with the host population (see Alba & Nee, 2003). Linguistic conversion to the host language by international migrants shows a willingness to abandon past loyalties to their country of origin and a desire to become part of the new nation to which they have migrated. This is particularly acute in countries where there is dominant assumption (albeit in reality this is often somewhat inaccurate) that such nations are constituted around a shared common language such as is the case overwhelmingly in Britain, France and Germany, as well as in the United States. However, there is another side to the coin. Many aspects of ethnic and national cultures are inherently tied to the use of a specific language. There is concern, often widespread among the initial generation of international migrants, that any loss of fluency in the use of their mother tongue will lead to a progressive and irreversible erosion of their ethnic and national culture. Such everyday practicalities and symbolisms lie at the core of the processes of general linguistic assimilation among children of

Linguistic Incorporation

55

international migrants observed by a wide range of sociologists (see Fishman, 1966, 1972; Nahirny & Fishman, 1965; Veltman, 1983, 1988; Portes & Schauffler, 1994; Bean & Stevens, 2003). The general model of linguistic integration portrayed within this body of literature has a series of determinate stages. The first generation of international migrants from countries where their mother tongue is not the same as that of their host country (e.g. Turkish migrants in Germany, Portuguese migrants in France or Pakistanis in Britain) learned as much of the host language as they needed but continued to speak their mother tongue at home. There is also a large gender effect associated with this pattern. Men tended to learn the host language to a much greater degree than women, mainly as a result of large differences in rates of economic activity by gender outside the home. The children of these international migrants (often referred to by sociologists as ‘the second-generation’) generally speak the mother tongue at home but the host language away from there. This is usually put down to the effects of monolingualism within the compulsory state school systems of these countries. Often parents of children of international migrants will speak the original mother tongue with each other while their children will speak the host language with friends and quite often with their brothers and sisters. The language of interaction between parents and child often involves a mixture of host and mother tongues that vary according to family context and socio-economic background. American sociologists have been in the forefront of examining language use among international migrants and their descendants empirically. This is partly a function of the massive scale of international migration to the United States since the mid-1960s and partly the result of the political sensitivity of language issues, particularly in the main areas of Latino settlement such as California and Florida. Lopez (1982) revealed that, among his 1973 sample of Mexicans in Los Angeles, knowledge of English was near universal among the secondgeneration and that use and preference for English increased consistently over time. By the ‘third-generation’ almost all respondents spoke only English. In a later study Lopez (1996) compared Asian-American migrants with Latinos in Los Angeles and concluded that there had been a ‘rapid intergenerational’ language shift by Asian-Americans, and a less rapid but still substantial shift amongst Latinos’ (p. 160).


Lopez also found that the rate of language transition was positively associated with higher education and socio-economic status. Alba and Nee (2003) reported a pattern of continued bilingualism among the second-generation but a move towards monolingualism (i.e. full linguistic assimilation into the dominant host language) by the third-generation. Espenshade and Fu (1997) also concluded that proficiency in English among immigrants to the United States was a function of their age at migration and the duration of their residence in America. Research conducted by Portes and Schauffler (1994) revealed that ‘English is alive and well in south Florida’ (p. 658). Knowledge of English among the children of international migrants there was ‘near universal’ and the preference for English was very high, even among those educated in Latino bilingual schools. The likelihood of continuing to speak maternal languages varied inversely with length of residence in the United States and was also a function of both ethnic clustering and parental socio-economic status (i.e. social class). Subsequent research by Portes and Rumbaut (2001) and by Alba et al. (2002) also reported substantial decline in mother tongue language use by children of international migrants both over time and across generations.

Language in the state compulsory educational systems of Britain, France and Germany Britain Linguistically, British schools (with the exceptions of parts of Wales and the Gaelic-speaking periphery of Scotland) are monolingual. The medium of instruction is English, and there are no classes provided either within the normal school day or outside such hours in the mother tongues of international migrant groups. Schools with pupils whose first language is not English can apply for funds under Section 11 of the 1966 Local Government Act to assist with teaching English to such students. In practice this generally involves a bilingual tutor who will assist the pupil over a very short period of time to become able to take part in mainstream lessons taught in English by the main class teacher. There has certainly been no attempt in Britain to emulate the bilingualism used in certain States of the United States. Children of


57

international migrants in Britain are not routinely taught through the medium of their ‘home’ language, either partly or wholly. There is no evidence that such bilingual teaching would be welcomed by parents who are international migrants or by their children. Indeed, there is remarkably little pressure from international migrant groups in Britain for their children to be taught how to read or write their mother tongues at all. Languages like Urdu, Gujarati and Punjabi are only available for study as designated ‘foreign’ languages in secondary schools, generally from the age of 14 as a GCSE optional choice. However, most pupils from migrant backgrounds follow their non-migrant counterparts and choose French, German and Spanish rather than an Asian language (Penn & Scattergood, 1992). The prevalence of English among many large migrant groups with roots in the Indian sub-continent may also partially reflect the high status that English still retains there today, particularly within their legal systems and elite educational establishments. There was a short-lived attempt around the turn of the century to use home languages of immigrant groups on school signs and within school foyers, but this experiment foundered on the twin rocks of linguistic diversity (some schools in London have a pupil body with over 200 home languages) and political in-fighting (if the signs were in English, Urdu and Punjabi why were they not in Gujarati and Bengali?). Rex (2003, p. 89) recently wrote that non-English ‘faith’ schools were more likely to foster mother tongue teaching. He provided no evidence for this bizarre claim, neither in the form of his own fieldwork nor in the form of references. Our own research in Rochdale (Penn & Scattergood, 1990, 1992; Penn, 2006) and Blackburn (Penn et al., 2000) demonstrated that he was mistaken. Neither private schools nor statefunded Muslim faith schools in these two towns taught through the medium of ‘mother tongues’, nor were they any likelier to promote mother tongue GCSE choices among children of international migrants. They were, however, much more likely to promote the teaching of classical Arabic in conjunction with their local mosques in order to promote the memorising (and understanding) of the Koran. France The French school system was a major element in the creation of the French nation in the second half of the nineteenth century. As Weber


(1976) has shown, around 25% of the French population could not speak the French language in 1863. Under the subsequent Third Republic a range of inter-connected changes propelled France towards national unity after 1870. These included conscription, the legal system, rail and road links and, most important of all, the compulsory school system. The medium of instruction was French and the French nation was seen as co-terminous with the French language, much to the annoyance of non-French speakers in the western (Breton) and southern peripheries (Basque and Corsican). The centrality of French was reiterated forcibly and unequivocally by the ‘Conseil Constitutionnel’ in 1999 (see Oakes, 2001) when it pronounced the ‘the language of the Republic is French’! This system of tight linguistic uniformity has remained the cornerstone of what Schnapper (1991) has termed the ‘French integration model’. In the post-war period children of international migrants who could not speak French were entered into temporary programmes of study (‘classes d’accueil’) within the mainstream state educational system whose principle aim was ‘intensive training in the French language to enable as rapid integration as possible into the normal curriculum’ (Boyzon-Fradet, 1992, p. 155). In fact a very small proportion of immigrant children required such classes, which suggests an extensive understanding of French by them prior to their entry into school (see Bastide, 1982). The French government also made provision for some children of international migrants to receive tuition in their maternal languages (‘Enseignement des Langues et Cultures d’Origine’: ELCO). These were based upon a series of bilateral agreements between the French government and the governments of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Turkey and Yugoslavia. However, as Schnapper et al. (2003, p. 31) reported, ‘children of immigrants rarely attended these classes.’ The reasons for this appeared to be threefold: parents did not wish their children to be singled out as ‘different’ based upon their linguistic heritage; the teaching was often authoritarian and of poor quality (Oakes, 2001) and countries such as Algeria and Morocco insisted on teaching a highly formalistic version of Arabic that was very different from the Arabic spoken by the children’s parents (see Jerab, 1988). Such an approach also completely ignored the Berber linguistic heritage of many Maghrebian immigrants to France (see Leveau, 1992; Caubet, 2000).


59

The consolidation of French as the essential requirement for all children in French schools was also evident in the ZEP (‘Zones d’Education Prioritaires’) programmes, introduced in 1982 and reinvigorated in 1998. These were targeted at deprived ‘banlieux’, most of which had high concentrations of international immigrant groups for whom French was not their mother tongue. The general lack of interest among children of international migrants in France in learning the language of their parental heritage has been revealed most starkly in the choices made by such pupils in relation to studying a foreign (i.e. non-French) language at school. Boyzon-Fradet (1992) reported that ‘English and German monopolise up to 98% of first choices’ (p. 157). Germany The German educational system is controlled by the various federal states (Länder). Since 1964 children of international migrants have been required to attend schools in Germany. However, this was not extended to pre-school (kindergarten) attendance. This may have had a negative impact on children of international migrants because kindergarten attendance has for long been considered to have a powerful positive effect upon subsequent educational performance and attainment in Germany (Esser, 1990). Recently Diefenbach (2007) has challenged this idea, arguing forcefully that there is a lack of rigorous empirical evidence to demonstrate the existence of such a relationship in Germany. Avenarius et al. (2003, p. 14) also reported only a small difference in participation rates between ‘German’ (91.7% of 5- and 6-year-olds had attended a ‘Kindergrippe’ and/or ‘Kindergarten’) and ‘foreign’ children (88.3% attendance). The general pattern in Germany has been for children of guestworkers to be taught within the mainstream state school system. The main linguistic medium of instruction within schools in Germany is German. Some language assistance is provided for nonGerman speakers in the form of transition classes (Übergangsklassen), but the main aim is to integrate such pupils fully within mainstream classes as soon as possible. Special courses have been provided in the mother tongue of international migrants after school. Kupfer-Schreiner (1996) reported that around one third of children of international migrants participated in such courses in Nürnberg in 1995.

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In addition, within Bavaria there are some ‘national’ or bilingual classes which commence instruction in the mother tongue of international migrants but then introduce German language teaching in progressive stages. The overall aim remains full absorption into the mainstream German language as soon as practical. In fact, relatively few children of international migrants have been taught in this way (see Lederer, 1997). Children in Bavarian schools start learning a second language other than German in the third grade. This is generally English and comprises 1 or 2 hours per week. Foreign language instruction begins in earnest in the fifth grade and is once again generally English. In the ‘Gymnasia’ (elite selective state schools) French and Latin are also often available. Occasionally Russian, Chinese and Italian are available as well. In the ‘Realschulen’ and ‘Hauptschulen’ English dominates the teaching of foreign languages. Turkish and the various languages of the former Yugoslavia do not feature in the school languages’ curriculum in Bavarian schools.

Previous research into patterns of language use among children of international migrants in France, Germany and Britain France The situation with regards to language use among children of international migrants in France is complicated in the case of those with family origins in the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco) by the legacy of French colonialism and also by patterns of linguistic and ethnic diversity in the region. Algeria has been closely connected to France since 1830 and the French language remains central to its school curriculum. It is taught in state schools from the age of 8 years (Marley, 2000). A similar pattern prevails in Morocco (Marley, 2004, 2007). French is also the dominant language of literature and the arts in Algeria (Berger, 1998) and a considerable proportion of its television is also in French. Algeria and Morocco contain a substantial Berber population that speaks Kabyle. This has been savagely repressed by successive Algerian governments since independence from France in 1962 as part of a concerted attempt to promote the Arabisation of the country linguistically. The form of Arabic promoted originates from


61

Saudi Arabia and is, therefore, remote from the Arabic dialects actually spoken in Algeria. As a consequence many Algerian migrants have been proficient in French prior to emigration and are ambivalent, at best, towards Arabic. Indeed, Tribalat (1995) has shown that most Algerian men and women who emigrated to France, after the age of 15 spoke French well. This general proficiency in French among international migrants was also affected by gender: men reported higher levels of speaking French well than women. Those international migrants with parents who had higher levels of educational attainment were also more likely to have a good level of spoken French. Indeed, a higher proportion of Algerians and Moroccans who had migrated to France after the age of 15 reported that they could read and write French than could read or write their respective maternal languages. Arabic is less and less spoken by Maghrebians in France, particularly by the children of the original post-war immigrants (see Lapeyronnie, 1987). Zehraoui (1996) reported that ‘Au sein d’un grand nombres des familles, on voit alors d’instaurer deux niveaux de communication. Le père et la mère communiquent dans la langue d’origine et les enfants, entre eux, en français. Entre parents et enfants, c’est l’usage du mixte linguistique qui prévaut.’ (p. 248) This pattern was also confirmed by Bouamama and Saoud (1996). Simon, in his chapter on ‘Practiques Linguistiques’ within Tribalat’s (1996) large-scale study of international migrants and their descendants, reported that only 50% of Algerians and 55% of Moroccans spoke only Arabic, and 26% of Algerians spoke only Berber as did 21% of Moroccans; Portuguese migrants almost entirely spoke exclusively Portuguese. Immigrants from Algeria, Morocco and Portugal mainly spoke French with their husbands if they had arrived prior to the age of 10. Among those who had migrated after the age of 15, most spoke their home language with their spouse. Very few who had migrated before the age of 10 spoke their maternal language with their own children: overwhelmingly they spoke exclusively French with them. Even among those who had migrated after the age of 15, more spoke French with their children than their maternal language.


Simon (2003) concluded that ‘Au total, sur deux générations, l’abandon de la langue des parents est massif’ (p. 205) and that ‘En consequence, les enfants des jeunes d’origine étrangère sont généralement incapables de parler, même un peu, la langue de leur(s) grand-parent(s)’ (p. 206). Hargreaves (1995, p. 103) also noted that Berber-speaking parents were likelier to speak French ‘usually’ with their children than Arabic-speaking parents. Germany Almost all young children of international migrants born in Germany speak German. Schwippert et al. (2003, p. 278) have shown that only 5.3% of children from ‘migrant’ families had not learned German when they were small. Indeed, many stated that they spoke it ‘very well’ by the late 1990s (see Bender & Seifert, 2000, p. 81; Bender & Seifert, 2003, p. 62). Nauck (2001a) reported that almost half the Turkish families in his study used German as the main medium of communication between parents and children. Moroever, German was used overwhelmingly (around 90% of the time) for communication between young Turks living in Germany and their brothers and sisters. Nonetheless, half of the young Turkish male respondents studied by Nauck also reported that they spoke Turkish ‘very well’. The equivalent proportion for young Turkish females was less than a third (Nauck, 2001a). Nauck further reported (2001b, p. 184) ‘a quite strong and positive effect of the parents’ educational level on family language retention’. As Nauck himself noted, this finding contradicted classical assimilation theory (based as it is almost entirely on US examples and data) according to which children from more advantaged educational and socio-economic backgrounds assimilated the fastest linguistically. Nonetheless, there are significant differences in proficiency in German between different ethnic/ nationality groups in Germany. Research has shown that Turks have consistently lower proficiency rates than Yugoslavs (see Dustmann, 1994, 1997; van Tubergen & Kalmijn, 2005; Esser, 2006). Several authors have suggested that Turks in Germany are better integrated socio-economically than Maghrebians in France (see Todd, 1994; Tucci, 2004; Alba, 2005). This is partly explained as the result of the higher continued use of their respective mother tongues. However as Alba himself noted, such theories remain essentially


63

‘impressionistic’ (Alba, 2005). Indeed, both the leading sociologists of language in contemporary Germany have criticised the lack of systematic empirical research into language patterns among international migrants and their descendants in Germany. Esser (2006, p. 15), in his recent magnum opus on language and integration, wrote that ‘Mindestens aber kann gesagt werden, dass es deutliche Defizite im Wissen über das Zusammenspiel der mit Sprache und Integration verbundenen Prozesse und Bedingungen gibt.’ While Diefenbach (2007, p. 155) has written concerning the notion that proficiency in German language is seen as essential for the success of children of international migrants in Germany that ‘Es ziegte sich, dass für das Argument der mangelnden Deutschkenntnisse nicht viel mehr als seine hohe Plausibilität spricht’ (Italics in the original quote). A particular strength of the EFNATIS data reported subsequently in this and later chapters involves the ability to examine both patterns of language use among children of international migrants in Germany and France (as well as in Britain) and the effects of variations in such patterns on educational trajectories and cultural orientations. Britain The issue of language use among children of international migrants in Britain is complicated by a series of factors. The first, and undoubtedly most important, is the enormous variety of home languages spoken by children of international migrants. In Hackney, for instance, around 200 different home languages are spoken (see Penn & Kiddy, 2008). Even among Pakistanis and Indians in Britain there is a kaleidoscope of linguistic complexity (see Linguistic Minorities Project, 1988; Moseley & Asher, 1994). India has 17 official languages, one of which is English. In Pakistan there are upwards of 100 different linguistic groups (see Breton, 1997) and considerable debate, and often fractious disagreement, among linguists over the status of Kashmiri and Kutchi as either separate languages or sublanguages/dialects (see Ahmar, 1996; Rahman, 1997). Brown (1984) in the mid-1980s revealed that many immigrants from the Indian sub-continent were not fluent in English but that only 10% had attended English classes since their first arrival in Britain. Nonetheless an overwhelming majority of South Asian

64


immigrants at that time favoured the continuation of the use of their mother tongue among their children (Brown, p. 131). Modood et al.’s (1997) more recent research showed that most Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men spoke English ‘fluently or well’. However, this was not the case for Bangladeshi women (only 40% spoke English ‘fluently or well’) or for Pakistani women (54% spoke English ‘fluently or well’). They also revealed that fluency in English was affected by age and the extent to which respondents lived in ethnically homogenous areas: ‘there is a clear pattern that those who live with more people from their ethnic group are progressively less likely to speak English fluently or fairly well’ (p. 62). Nevertheless, while Modood et al. noted in passing that ‘nearly all the young speak English well’ (p. 61), they provided no data on ability to either read or write English among such children of international migrants. They also found clear of evidence of ‘linguistic decline’. Only 51% of Punjabi-speaking Pakistanis spoke their home language with younger family members and less than half the Indian Punjabi speakers used their mother tongue with younger family members. As we mentioned earlier there has been, and continues to be, remarkably little pressure from South Asian parents for the teaching of their home languages in Britain. This is partly due to the large numbers of such languages which would make it extremely difficult to teach them all. In practice most are not taught at all and, even where available, few children from such linguistic heritages avail themselves of the choice in practice.

Language use among EFFNATIS respondents As we have seen, language use is central to debates concerning immigrant incorporation. International migrants often originate from societies where the language of the destination country is not spoken. The choice made by their children between using the language(s) of their parental-origin country and using the language of the new host country is seen as a powerful symbol of acculturation and assimilation. In this section we evaluate evidence from EFFNATIS on language use among children of international migrants in Britain, France and Germany. All six ethnic/nationality minority groups examined within the EFFNATIS research had origins in societies in which a language other


65

than the host country language is widely spoken. There has been no tradition of German language use in Turkey or in Yugoslavia nor of French in Portugal. However, for Pakistani and Indian respondents in Britain, it is important to recognise that the colonial experience within the Indian sub-continent involved the official use of English, which remains a powerful force in both countries today.1 The same also applied, as we have seen, with French in the Maghreb. The EFFNATIS project collected data on host country language facility and non-host country language use from a range of individual questions. All respondents in Britain and France were asked to name up to three non-host country languages that they could speak fluently, irrespective of the extent to which they used these languages. In Britain, almost all children of international migrants reported speaking at least one language associated with their parental- origin country (see Figure 5.1a). Among Pakistanis, the predominant languages spoken were Urdu and Punjabi, while Gujarati and Urdu were the main languages spoken by Indians. Such linguistic heterogeneity mirrored that reported both in the Indian subcontinent (Moseley & Asher, 1994; Breton, 1997) and by other surveys in Britain (see Modood et al., 1997). British autochthons by contrast overwhelmingly spoke only English (a few reported speaking French and German, the two most popular foreign languages taught in English secondary schools). The French data also indicated that multi-language use was much higher among children of international migrants than among autochthons, although relatively more French autochthons reported speaking another European language. This was mainly English. Almost all Portuguese respondents reported speaking Portuguese. Most Maghrebians spoke Arabic (see Figure 5.1b). The German questionnaire did not ask German autochthons questions about language use. Data on the particular language used by children of international migrants were not recorded either. Figure 5.1c is based upon responses to a question about ‘use of the language of parents’ with their mother. A large majority of both former Yugoslavian and Turkish respondents used the language of their parental-origin with their mothers. There was little evidence to suggest that British or French autochthons were adapting linguistically to the increasing diversity around them. There was no hint of linguistic hybridity among

66


Indian

Pakistani

Punjabi

Gujarati Mirpuri Kashmiri Other Asian e n No Gujarati

Kutchi Bengali Arabic None

Urdu Urdu Punjabi N = 127 (3 cases with missing data).

N = 176 (2 cases with missing data).

Autochthonous

Arabic Swahili Other European

German

French None

Bengali

N = 405 (10 cases with missing data). Figure 5.1a

Non-host language use in Britain

Note: Response to ‘What other language do you speak?’ (First non-English language mentioned).

autochthons: English and French respectively remained dominant and exclusive. Nonetheless, children of international migrants in all three countries remained proficient in speaking the languages used by their parents. Clearly, there is a fundamental asymmetry at work here: autochthons rarely learned the languages used by


67

Maghrebian

Portuguese

Other None None English German Spanish Arabic

Portuguese

English German Spanish

Arabic


N = 217 (1 case with missing data).

Autochthonous

English German Spanish Arabic Portuguese Other None

N = 273 (0 cases with missing data). Figure 5.1b

Non-host language use in France

Note: Response to ‘What other language do you speak?’ (First non-French language mentioned).

children of international migrants in these three countries. Almost all ‘mixing’ linguistically was taking place within the international migrant communities. The EFFNATIS research also posed questions about languages spoken with a variety of people. In France and Germany these were ‘father, mother, siblings, children, friends’ referred to here subsequently as ‘contact categories’. In Britain the five groups were slightly different: ‘father, mother, brothers, sisters, friends’. For comparative

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Former Yugoslav

Turkish

Depends on situation

Depends on situation German

German

Language of parents

N = 278 (5 cases with missing data). Figure 5.1c

Language of parents


Language used with mother in Germany

Note: Response to ‘What language do you use with your mother?’ (Language type not specified).

purposes, these data were coded into a hierarchical measure of linguistic ‘participation levels’. The first level (the most linguistically assimilated) was when the respondent only mentioned speaking the host country language; the second was when the respondent only mentioned speaking a non-host country language with their mother; the third tier was when the respondent mentioned speaking a nonhost country language with both of their parents; the fourth was when the respondent mentioned speaking a non-host country language with their wider family members and the fifth level was when the respondent mentioned speaking a non-host country language with their friends (the least linguistically assimilated). This hierarchy assumes that non-host country language use is increasingly more likely with closer and older family members and is relatively less likely with more distant social contacts. The results strongly followed such a pattern. Respondents using the origin country languages with more distant contacts also used the origin country languages with closer family in almost every case.2 The operationalisation of this measure was complicated by the number of different languages that could be mentioned by respondents.


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In Britain respondents could name up to three languages spoken with the relevant contact categories, whereas in France only two languages were named. Respondents in both countries provided no indication of the extent to which these languages were used. Mention of a language might simply have implied that the respondents could speak the language if they wanted to, or it could have implied that they used it regularly, or even exclusively. Two alternative measures of language use with contact categories were constructed which used the presence or absence of mention of other languages. These two measures comprise the two columns (marked ‘L1’ and ‘L2’) in Figure 5.2. The first definition (‘L1’) included all those who mentioned using the specific parental-origin language, regardless of whether or not they also mentioned using other languages (including the host country language). The second definition (‘L2’) included those who mentioned using the parentalorigin language, but only when they did not mention using the host language (English or French) with the relevant contact categories. In Germany, respondents only provided one answer to language used

1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0

L2 L1 Portuguese

L2 L1

L2 L1 L2 L1 L2 L1 Pakistani Indian Maghrebian Former Yugoslav

Host language with all Parental-origin (parents) Parental-origin (family + friends) Figure 5.2

L2 L1 Turkish

Parental-origin (mother) Parental-origin (wider family)

Proportions using non-host language by extent of use


with each contact category, namely, ‘German’, ‘language of my parents’ country’ or ‘a mixture of languages’ (see Figure 5.1c). Again this was coded into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions: the weak measure covered anyone who mentioned either their parental-origin language or a mixture of languages, while the ‘strong’ version covered those who only mentioned the language of their parents’ country of origin. Children of international migrants in each country revealed a gradation of language use, with some only ever using their host country language, while others used their origin country language with various different contact categories. Columns ‘L1’ and ‘L2’ reveal marked differences between ethnic/nationality groups in their use of non-host country languages. Indeed, ethnic/nationality groups have been ranked in Figure 5.2 according to the proportion using parental-origin country language with family and friends – the category suggestive of the widest use of parental-origin country language. The Turks were the least likely to use the host country language with family and friends, while the Portuguese were the most likely. All respondents were proficient in the respective host languages used in England, France and Germany. As we have seen in the earlier section on schooling in the three countries, it could hardly have been otherwise. Schools in England, France and Germany are all essentially monolingual arenas in terms of teaching and everyday interaction. This basic similarity across the three countries is irrespective of the differing national models of incorporation outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. Indeed it is part of a wider set of social practices which assume that public life in these three countries routinely takes place in English, French or German. Language use among children of international migrants is restricted to the private sphere, particularly within the family. This centrality of host languages in Britain, France and Germany was reflected in the self-rated ability in writing these languages among EFFNATIS respondents. It is clear from Table 5.1 that most EFFNATIS respondents had a relatively high self-assessment of their ability to write their respective host country language. These selfassessments were highest in Britain, where half the respondents rated their ability as ‘excellent’ and lowest in France where around a quarter assessed their ability as ‘average’ or ‘poor’. These national variations were virtually identical across the ethic/nationality


Table 5.1

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Self-rated ability in writing host country language (%)

French autochthons Portuguese Maghrebian British autochthons Pakistani Indian German autochthons Turkish Former Yugoslavian

Excellent

Good

Average

Poor

29 23 22 40 48 52 N/A 34 46

48 55 54 46 45 42 N/A 51 46

21 20 21 14 6 6 N/A 13 8

2 2 3 0 1 0 N/A 2 0

groups in each of the three countries. They probably reflect national differences in how young people learn to define their capabilities within the respective school systems. Figure 5.2 revealed high levels of non-host country language use by all six allochthonous ethnic/nationality groups. Most children of international migrants were fluent in speaking their respective parental-origin country languages. More than half of all children of international migrants spoke the language of their parents’ country of origin with at least two different people. In Germany and France, an additional question asked respondents to rate their ability in speaking and/or writing these non-host country languages. Around 80% of all four groups of children of international migrants in these two countries rated their ability as either ‘excellent’ or ‘good’. These results provide strong support for a broadly assimilationist process of language acquisition among children of international migrants in all three countries. There is no evidence of any systematic lack of proficiency in host language use by allochthonous groups in Britain, France or Germany. There can be, therefore, no a priori expectation that language per se acts as a negative factor preventing the full incorporation of such groups. There is, furthermore, little evidence of linguistic hybridity: autochthons overwhelmingly lack any proficiency in the languages used by immigrant ethnic/ nationality groups. However, the strong evidence of a continued ability to communicate in parental languages means that transnational links with these parental-origin countries remains a possibility. These will be explored empirically in later chapters.


These results suggest that the general process of linguistic assimilation over three generations identified by socio-linguists like Fishman (1966) and Veltman (1983) is almost certainly underway in Britain, France and Germany. Ultimately, this will become known for certain in another 20 to 30 years. We expect that the children of EFFNATIS respondents in all three countries will only communicate in their respective host country languages. Our results also indicate that the patterns of language use among many Latinos in the United States are exceptional and unusual. They reflect the proximity of major Spanish-speaking countries to the long US border with Mexico and the high levels of illegal (‘undocumented’) immigration to the United States. Places like East Los Angeles or Miami do not represent the linguistic future for British, French or German cities.

6 Structural Incorporation: Education, Training and the Labour Market

In this chapter we examine the educational and occupational situation of ethnic/nationality groups in Britain, France and Germany. We include descriptive analyses of the circumstances of each group in terms of education, training and the labour market.1 Multivariate analyses are also presented which compare the experiences of the two groups of children of international migrants within each country in the context of other explanatory factors. This chapter focuses on educational attainment, patterns of training and early labour market position, and examines the extent to which these can be explained by other factors such as language use, social networks, attitudes and parental socio-economic background.

Methods for analysing the current circumstances of EFFNATIS respondents The structural circumstances of EFFNATIS respondents were complicated by their relative youth. Chapter 1 presented a number of crossnationally harmonised measures of structural circumstances (see Figure 1.4) which covered educational track at age 16, educational level, parental social class background and joint educational and occupational situation. These harmonised measures were used in the analyses reported below alongside other explanatory variables.2 Some of these were specific to the country under scrutiny. 73


Figures 6.1a, 6.2a and 6.3a show the distribution of the harmonised measures of structural circumstances for ethnic/nationality groups in Britain, France and Germany. Within each country, there were significant differences between autochthons and children of international migrants. These are discussed further in the following sections. In addition, Figures 6.1b, 6.1c, 6.2b, 6.2c and 6.3b show a selection of nationally specific measures for each country. Figures 6.4a and 6.4b report the extent to which educational level and educational track at age 16 were correlated with a range of other factors using multinomial logit regression models for each country. These showed some important features. First, there were moderate correlations between age and both educational measures among all ethnic/nationality groups. These were partly the result of younger

(1) Post-16 educational track Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Pakistani M Pakistani F Indian M Indian F 0

0.25

0.5

Academic Lower academic

0.75

1.0

Vocational Left school at 16

(2) Educational attainment Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Pakistani M Pakistani F Indian M Indian F 0

0.25

0.5

Highest level (4th) 2nd level Figure 6.1a

Continued

0.75 3rd level Lowest (1st)

1.0

Structural Incorporation 75

(3) Parental occupational class Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Pakistani M Pakistani F Indian M Indian F 0 Owner Routine work

0.25

0.5

Prof./managerial Long-term unemployed

0.75

1.0

Skilled work Never worked

(4) Educational-occupational situation 1.0 0.75 0.5 0.25

Figure 6.1a

F In di an

M In di an

Pa ki st an iF

Au to ch th on ou s Au M to ch th on ou s F Pa ki st an iM

0.0

(1) Higher education + Full-time permanent job + higher ISEI

(2) HE + FTP − ISEI

(3) FTP − HE + ISEI

(6) − HE − FTP

(5) HE − FTP

(7) Still in education

(4) FTP − HE − ISEI

Harmonised measures for Britain

Note: Data for Britain, N = 723. Bars incomplete due to missing data. ISEI: International Socio-Economic Index; HE: Higher Level of Education; FTP: Full-Time Permanent job (see p. 17ff for further details on these measures).


GCSE points score

60

40

20

Mean GCSE points score

F In di an

M In di an

Pa ki st an iF

Au to ch th on ou s M Au to ch th on ou s F Pa ki st an iM

0

Std Dev. GCSE score

Any formal/organised post-school training Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Pakistani M Pakistani F Indian M Indian F 0 Higher level training Figure 6.1b

0.25

0.5

Lower level training

0.75

1.0

No post-school training

Britain: Local measures

Note: Data for Britain, N = 723. Bars incomplete as result of missing data.

respondents not having had sufficient opportunities to complete their education.3 Accordingly, we also show residual correlations net of age and gender. The size of the pseudo-R 2 in Figures 6.4a and 6.4b was not large. Relationships were generally statistically significant but not strong. This suggested that there was relatively little systematic structure to the internal heterogeneity of educational outcomes within each ethnic/nationality group.


1

ISCO-88 unit group

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Autochthonous Father's ISCO88

Figure 6.1c

Indian

Pakistani

Respondent's ISCO88 (if working)

Occupations of parents and children in Britain

Regression models are presented in Tables 6.1a, 6.1b, 6.2 and 6.3 which used a mixture of harmonised and nation-specific measures (see Appendix for full details of these). These models illustrate the combined effects of a range of factors related to educational and occupational attainment. The models showed that, after controlling for other factors, the residual effect of ethnic/nationality group was either very small or non-significant. This evidence provided strong support for the existence of a general process of structural incorporation of different ethnic/nationality groups within each of the three countries. While there was descriptive evidence of strong differences between different ethnic/nationality groups, multivariate analyses revealed that most of these differences were the result of other social factors. Britain In Britain, there was strong descriptive evidence of ethnic/nationality differences in educational and occupational experiences (see Figures 6.1a, 6.1b and 6.1c). Indian males were particularly likely to have disadvantaged educational profiles4 (see sub-graphs 1 and 2 in Figure 6.1a). In general Pakistanis and Indians were relatively disadvantaged when compared to autochthons of the same gender.5

78


Figure 6.1a sub-graph 3 shows that Pakistanis and Indians in Britain had very different socio-economic backgrounds. They had far fewer ‘professional/managerial’ parents and relatively more parents who were ‘routine workers’ or who were long-term unemployed. Pakistani, and to a lesser extent Indian, parents were also more likely to be self-employed. Figure 6.1a sub-graph 4 shows that all respondents in Britain displayed low levels of current labour market activity. However, among those in employment, autochthons were distinctively advantaged when compared to Pakistanis and particularly to Indians.6 Pakistani participation in education after age 16 was similar to that of autochthons. However, despite such participation, Pakistani

(1) Post-16 educational track Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Portuguese M Portuguese F Maghrebian M Maghrebian F 0

0.25 Academic

0.5

0.75

Left school at 16

1.0 Vocational

(2) Educational attainment Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Portuguese M Portuguese F Maghrebian M Maghrebian F 0

Figure 6.2a

Continued

0.25

0.5

0.75

Highest level (4th)

3rd level

2nd level

Lowest (1st)

1.0 under 19


(3) Parental occupational class Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Portuguese M Portuguese F Maghrebian M Maghrebian F 0

0.25

Owner

0.5

0.75

Prof./managerial

Routine work

1.0

Skilled work

Long-term unemployed

Never worked


(5) HE − FTP Figure 6.2a

F hr M ag

hr

eb

eb

ia

ia

n

n

M

F e es gu

(1) Higher education + Full-time permanent job + higher ISEI (3) FTP − HE + ISEI

M ag

rtu Po

tu

es e gu

no ho ch t to

Au

Po r

F us

M us no ho ch t to Au

M

0

(2) HE + FTP − ISEI (4) FTP − HE − ISEI (6) − HE − FTP (7) Still in education

Harmonised measures for France

Note: Data for France, N = 694. Bars incomplete due to missing data.

80


Academic qualifications (Aged 18 and above, n = 521) Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Portuguese M Portuguese F Maghrebian M Maghrebian F 0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1.0

Father's academic qualifications (n = 629) Autochthonous Portuguese Maghrebian 0

0.25

None or basic school only Baccalauréat Figure 6.2b

0.5

0.75

1.0

CAP-BEP Diplôme de l'enseignement

France: Local measures I


educational attainment was marginally worse than for autochthons. Indians had substantially worse educational profiles (see Figure 6.1a, sub-graphs 1 and 4). They were much more likely to have left the educational system at age 16 and subsequently to have been in relatively disadvantaged employment. These patterns suggested greater structural incorporation among Pakistanis than among Indians. Figure 6.1b shows two further local educational measures. The same broad ethnic/nationality profile as reported above can be seen in the pattern of GCSE scores: strong relative disadvantage among Indians and slight disadvantage among Pakistanis. These patterns were important because we used GCSE points score as an explanatory variable in the regression models summarised in Tables 6.1a and 6.1b. Figure 6.1b also shows marked inequalities within the British


Employment sector for those in work (n = 225) Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Portuguese M Portuguese F Maghrebian M Maghrebian F 0

0.25

0.5

Une Administration

Une Collectivité Locale

Une Entreprise

Une Association

Living arrangements in France (n = 694) Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Portuguese M Portuguese F Maghrebian M Maghrebian F 0

0.25 Lives with parents Lives alone

Figure 6.2c

0.5

0.75

1.0

Lives with partner Lives with others/friends

France: Local measures II


occupational training system. The second sub-graph in Figure 6.2b reveals that autochthons enjoyed far greater relative advantage in this sphere. Pakistanis, in particular, were much less likely to have undertaken higher level occupational training. Women achieved significantly higher levels of academic attainment across all ethnic/nationality groups in Britain. Males, on the other hand, undertook relatively more vocational education.7 This indicated the salience of the gender paradigm for understanding educational and labour market outcomes in Britain. Overall, it was evident that children of international migrants and autochthons in Britain had distinctive and unequal experiences of the British education and labour market systems.


Waldinger and Lichter (2003) have argued that ‘second-generation’ immigrants were substantially less concentrated occupationally than their parents in the United States. This indicated a strong movement away from an earlier ‘niche’ economy (see Light, 1983). Figure 6.1c shows differences in occupation between employed respondents and their fathers. The vertical axis represents the numerical value of the 4-digit ISCO 88 code (ILO, 1990).8 The graph shows no distinctive clustering among Pakistanis and Indians.9 All three ethnic/nationality groups in Britain were employed across the full range of occupations. There were greater differences in the occupational profiles of fathers from different ethnic/nationality backgrounds. These results indicated that there was less occupational segregation among the younger generation of children of international migrants in Britain

(1) Post-16 educational track Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Turkish M Turkish F Former Yugoslav M Former Yugoslav F 0.25

0

Academic

0.5

0.75

Left school at 16

1.0 Vocational

(2) Educational attainment Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Turkish M Turkish F Former Yugoslav M Former Yugoslav F 0 Highest level (4th) Figure 6.3a Continued

0.25 3rd level

0.5

0.75 2nd level

1.0 Lowest (1st)


(3) Parental occupational class Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Turkish M Turkish F Former Yugoslav M Former Yugoslav F 0.0

0.25

Owner Routine work

0.5

Prof./managerial

0.75 Skilled work

Long-term unemployed

Never worked


Tu rk Fo is h rm F er Yu go sl av Fo M rm er Yu go sl av F

Au to ch th on ou s Au M to ch th on ou s F Tu rk is h M

0

(3) FTP − HE + ISEI

(2) HE + FTP − ISEI (4) FTP − HE − ISEI (6) − HE − FTP

(5) HE − FTP

(7) Still in education

(1) Higher education + Full-time permanent job + higher ISEI

1.0

Figure 6.3a Harmonised measures for Germany Note: Data for Germany, N = 847. Bars incomplete due to missing data.


Proportion attending kindergarten Autochthonous M Autochthonous F Turkish M Turkish F Former Yugoslav M Former Yugoslav F 0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1.0

Occupational position in Germany

Occupational units

180

120

70

10 Autochthonous

Turkish Males

Figure 6.3b

Former Yugoslav

Females

Germany: Local measures

Note: Data for Germany, N = 785.

than among their fathers. Such findings suggested significant change across the generations and provided no support for the ethnic niche model. In Britain, there was some evidence of ethnic asymmetry (see Figures 6.4a and 6.4b). Academic track was more strongly determined by gender among Indians. Among Pakistanis and Indians in Britain, academic track, educational level and entry to university were all influenced more by parental social class than was the case among autochthons. Regression models were used to explore two measures of structural advantage within each country. In Britain the first analysed examination performance in the last year of compulsory schooling (GCSE points score).10 At the time of the EFFNATIS survey GCSEs were compulsory in England.11


The second model examined the joint indicators of occupationaleducational situation. Individuals were defined as ‘advantaged’ if they held either a full-time permanent job of higher occupational status (using the ISEI) or if they had obtained higher level educational qualifications or if they were still in education but had a higher than average GCSE score. The proportion of ‘advantaged’ 16 year olds in the sample was much higher than that for older respondents. Analysis of this measure was, therefore, restricted to those aged 17 and over. Using these criteria, 56% of the British sample aged 17 and over was defined as ‘advantaged’ using these criteria. The results of the regression models predicting the two outcomes were presented in Tables 6.1a and 6.1b. A wide range of explanatory variables were included in the model, including social background and demographic factors.12

Correlations with academic track at 16 by ethnic group; Use of the parental country language 0.1 0.05

Gender

In di an

Pa ki st an i

au B to ri ch tis th h on ou s

au F to re ch nc th h on ou s Po rtu gu es M e ag hr eb ia n

F Yu or go me sl r av

Tu rk is h

au G to er ch m th an on ou s

0

Gender and age

Correlations with social class, religion and language use (residual after controlling for gender and age) 0.1 0.05

Parental occupational class

Figure 6.4a group

Religion

In di an

Pa ki st an i

au to ch B th ri on tis ou h s

Po rtu gu es M e ag hr eb ia n

au to ch F th re on nc ou h s

Yu Fo go rm sl er av

au to ch Ge th rm on a ou n s

Tu rk is h

0.0

Use of the non-host country language

Correlations with educational track by ethnic/nationality

Note: Values are pseudo-R2 from multinomial logit model of categories post-16 educational track. Source: EFFNATIS Survey, 1999; N = 2,216.

86


Correlations for educational level 0.1 0.05

Parental class

Gender

di an In

to Bri ch tis th h on ou s Pa ki st an i Au

F Yu or go me sl r av Au F to re ch nc th h on ou s Po rtu gu es e M ag hr eb ia n

ki sh Tu r

Au

to

G e ch rm th an on ou s

0.0

Religion

Language use

Correlations for entry to university 0.1 0.05

Gender

Figure 6.4b

Parental class

di an In

ki st

an

i

s Pa

to Bri ch tis th h on ou Au

to Fre ch nc th h on ou s Po rtu gu es e M ag hr eb ia n Au


ki sh Tu r

Au

to


0.0

Religion

Language use

Correlations with educational level by ethnic/nationality group

Note: N = 2,216. Values are pseudo-R2 from multinomial logit model of educationallevel categories. Values for bars 2–4 are residual R 2 net of gender and age correlations.

The various models of immigrant assimilation outlined in Chapter 2 suggested very strongly that there was a long-term decline in ethnic/nationality differences. These may, nevertheless, coexist with continuing patterns of inequality at any given point on this overall trajectory. Table 6.1a showed the relative impact of ethnic/ nationality status in the context of other explanatory factors. It revealed a number of strong bivariate correlations between sociodemographic measures and educational and occupational situation (see columns A and B). They also showed that these direct ethnic/ nationality effects diminished when the influence of other social factors were considered. In models (1) and (3) there were no strong differences between Pakistanis and autochthons (the contrast group) after controlling for gender and age. Indians, on the other hand, had significantly lower educational attainment and educationaloccupational situation.13 However, when additional factors were


Table 6.1a

Regression models for Britain: 1–4

GCSE points score (A)

1

2

Advantaged educationaloccupational situation age 17–25 (B)

Constant

–

55.76**

24.92**

Pakistani

2

2.47

4.20

1

–5.40

Indian

–29

–10.60**

Female

19

5.95**

–21

–0.88**

Age in years Female* Pakistani Female* Indian

–

–3.32

–

3 1.60*

4 –1.22*

–0.08

–0.32

–14

–0.75*

–0.82

–5

–0.34*

–0.44

–7

–0.05

–

–

–

–

–

–

4.62**

0.37*

–

0.91

–

–

–

14

–

0.56

9

–

–

–19

–

–0.08

–9

–

0.03

Family educational advice

–1

–

1.04

–1

–

–

Public educational advice

1

–

–

3

–

–

Rochdale Use of non-host language

Not a UK citizen Religion: Islam

–5

–

–

–3

–

–

–20

–

–1.23

–10

–

1.13*

Religion: Christian

24

–

2.03

14

–

0.55**

Parental ISEI

23

–

0.11**

19

–

0.02**

Parental higher education

24

–

3.37**

20

–

0.47* –0.41*

Cohabits

–9

–

–1.35

–13

–

–11

–

0.10

–5

–

–

Sees parents less than once a week

9

–

4.01*

10

–

0.64*

Strong identification Britain

3

–

–

2

–

0.07

Strong identification foreign

–14

–

–

–12

–

–0.63*

Friend from different ethnic group

7

–

4.62**

8

–

0.54

Future: ‘like to stay in locality’

–23

–

–5.11**

–15

–

–0.67**

Future: ‘I’ll achieve my goals’

17

–

5.47**

11

–

0.64**

School GCSE score

22

–

0.21**

13

–

0.01

–

801

–

752

723

Number of siblings

Number of participants

745

Continued


Table 6.1a

Continued Advantaged educationaloccupational situation age 17–25

GCSE points score (A)

1

2

(B)

3

4

R-squared

–

0.139

0.251

–

0.024

0.107

ICC for schools (rho)

–

0.302

0.326

–

0.116

0.045

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Variables not included were non-significant in the extended model. (A) = (bivariate correlation with GCSE points score) ⫻ 100. (B) = (bivariate correlation with advantaged educational-occupational situation) ⫻ 100. General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) score reflects school-level averages of aggregated examination attainment of pupils (see also Appendix 1); ISEI score is an occupationally based International Socio-Economic Index for parents’ job; ICC (rho) refers to the Intra-Cluster Correlation statistic summarizing the proportion of variance at the school level in a two-level random effects multilevel model.

Table 6.1b

Regression models for Britain: 5–7 Age 19 and above

Constant GCSE points score Pakistani Indian Female Age in years Language use (5 categories) Parental ISEI Parental higher education Future plans: ‘Like stay in local area’ Future: ‘I’ll achieve my goals’ School GCSE score N R-squared

GCSE points score

Entry to university

Type of university attended

(5)

(6)

(7)

37.16** – 2.52 ⫺8.08** 4.57** ⫺0.75** ⫺0.30

⫺8.96** 0.09** 1.22** 0.73 ⫺0.26 0.19** ⫺0.11

– 0.11** 1.54* 1.59 ⫺1.06** 0.51* ⫺0.31

0.13** 3.37**

0.01 0.22

0.04**

⫺6.42**

⫺0.46

6.02**

0.36

–

0.17** 758 0.25

0.01 414 0.30

– 173 0.15

⫺1.56*

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Variables not included were non-significant in the extended model. Model (7) is a stereotyped ordered logistic regression on a four-fold categorisation of university type. The rankings included the following: ‘traditional university’ = 1.00; ‘new university’ = 0.82; ‘college’ = 0.38; ‘former polytechnic’ = 0.


considered, these became non-significant. Differences were rather the result of parental background, gender and social attitudes rather than ethnic/nationality per se. Table 6.1b summarised regression models that explored the various stages of education in Britain. The first model examined GCSE score; the second entry to higher education conditional upon prior GCSE success and the third examined university degree results conditional upon entry. The models revealed smaller ethnic/nationality effects in these later stages of the educational system than for GCSE results. Ethnic/nationality had a negative influence on GCSE score but little negative effect (and a positive premium for Pakistanis) at subsequent stages of education. This indicated that international immigrant background had the most negative effect on educational outcomes during compulsory schooling and that there was increasing structural incorporation of minority ethnic/nationality groups within the later stages of the British educational system. France The French data revealed similar patterns to Britain. There was evidence of marked structural inequalities co-existing with evidence of structural incorporation among children of international migrants. There were greater differences between Portuguese and Maghrebians in France than between Pakistanis and Indians in Britain.14 There were few differences in educational circumstances between Portuguese and French autochthons (see Figure 6.2a, panels 1 and 2). However, Maghrebians displayed a distinctively more disadvantaged profile, with a lower proportion in the ‘academic’ track and lower average levels of educational attainment.15 Portuguese and Maghrebians shared very similar patterns of parental occupational background (panel 3 in Figure 6.2a). However, these similarities in background translated into markedly different educational-occupational outcomes (Figure 6.2a, panel 4). Maghrebians were much more disadvantaged, with Maghrebian males disproportionately excluded from privileged jobs and Maghrebian females unlikely to have secured advantaged employment despite better educational qualifications. The same patterns can be seen in Figures 6.2b and 6.2c. Maghrebians were much more likely to have basic school qualifications or the relatively lower level CAP-BEP qualification. Their educational situation was much worse than the Portuguese, despite their having similar patterns of parental background.


Table 6.2

Regression models for France: 1–5

Constant Maghrebian Portuguese Female Age in years Female* Maghrebian Female* Portuguese Vitry Use of non-host language Lives at home with parents Family educational advice Public educational advice Not a French citizen Religion: Islam Religion: Christian Parental ISEI Parental higher education Cohabits Number of siblings Sees parents less than once a week Strong identification France Strong identification: parental country of origin Friend from different ethnic group Future: ‘like to stay in locality’

Higher educational level

Advantaged educationaloccupational situation

Age 19–25

Age 19–25

(A)

1

2

(B)

3

4

5

– ⫺23 –10 23 30 –

⫺6.95 ⫺0.74** ⫺0.02 1.16** 0.35** 0.33

⫺9.38 0.87 0.83* 1.12** 0.41** –

– ⫺24 8 25 26 –

⫺5.67 ⫺1.04** ⫺0.15 1.15** 0.29** ⫺0.03

⫺6.07 0.76 0.70 1.21** 0.32** –

1.85 ⫺0.77 ⫺0.88 1.17** ⫺0.13 –

0.07

–

–

⫺0.40

–

⫺4 ⫺14

– –

– 0.02

⫺1 ⫺17

– –

– ⫺0.04

– ⫺0.15

⫺15

–

–

⫺15

–

⫺0.72*

⫺0.80

⫺6

–

–

⫺6

–

–

–

⫺7

–

–

⫺8

–

–

–

⫺11

–

⫺0.61

⫺14

–

⫺0.82

⫺0.45

⫺24 14 23 17

– – – –

⫺1.41 – 0.39** 0.79**

⫺26 14 20 16

– – – –

⫺1.23 – 0.27** 0.55

⫺0.10 – ⫺0.10 ⫺0.68

6 ⫺18

– –

– –

5 ⫺19

– –

⫺0.76* –

⫺0.79 –

⫺3

–

0.51

⫺3

–

⫺0.83*

⫺0.86

10

–

–

12

–

–

–

⫺13

–

–

⫺17

–

⫺0.46

⫺0.71

⫺6

–

⫺0.42

⫺4

–

⫺0.28

0.05

⫺6

–

⫺0.14

⫺7

–

⫺0.48

⫺0.23

–

–

Continued


Table 6.2

Continued

Future: ‘I’ll achieve my goals’ Liberal attitude to homosexuality CAP/BEP qualification Baccalauréat Diplôme Supérieur N R-squared


Advantaged educationaloccupational situation

Age 19–25

Age 19–25

(A)

1

2

(B)

3

13

–

21

4

0.71*

11

–

–

–

22

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

0.73

– – – –

– – 447 0.149

– – 414 0.260

– – – –

– – 448 0.137

– – 448 0.213

0.71**

5 ⫺0.07

5.80** 7.03** 446 0.690

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Variables not included were non-significant in the extended model. (A) = (bivariate correlation with higher education) ⫻ 100; (B) = (bivariate correlation with advantaged educational-occupational situation) ⫻ 100. See Appendix (p. 157) for further details on measures used in Table 6.2.

Figure 6.2c sub-panel 1 shows powerful gender differences in the employment profiles of French respondents in work. Public sector employment was more pronounced among autochthons and Maghrebians than among the Portuguese. Given that Maghrebians generally had lower status occupations, it is probable that autochthons had secured more advantaged jobs within state employment than Maghrebians.16 Figure 6.2c: sub-panel 2 shows that there were large differences between the living arrangements of children of international migrants and autochthons. The latter were much more likely to have left their parental home and live independently or with a partner.17 The French data revealed important differences in the structural situation of the three ethnic/nationality groups there. This was most evident among Maghrebians.18 Figures 6.4a and 6.4b probed these structural differences in further detail. There were significant differences between ethnic/nationality groups. Language use had a greater influence on educational level among the Portuguese while religion had a greater influence among Maghrebians. Parental social class had more influence upon the Portuguese than the Maghrebians.

92


Table 6.3

Regression models for Germany: 1–5

Constant Turkish Former-Yugoslav Female Age in years Female* Turkish Female* former Yugoslav Attended kindergarten Use of non-host language Family educational advice Public educational advice Non-German citizen Religion: Islam Religion: Christian Parental ISEI Parental higher education Cohabits Number of siblings Sees parents less than once a week Strong identification: Germany. Strong identification: parental country of origin Friend from different ethnic group Future: ‘like to stay in locality’ Future: I’ll achieve my goals’ Liberal attitude to homosexuality

Higher educational Level

Advantaged educational/ occupational situation

All ages

Age 20–25

(A)

1

2

(B)

3

4

5

– ⫺21 ⫺7 11 ⫺13 – –

⫺6.13 ⫺1.08** ⫺0.70** 1.01** ⫺0.11** ⫺0.82* ⫺0.90**

1.31 0.15 0.22 1.03** ⫺0.04 ⫺0.81 ⫺0.77*

– ⫺19 ⫺2 15 3 – –

⫺0.40 ⫺1.38** ⫺0.86* 0.41 0.04 0.28 0.06

0.32 ⫺1.15 0.77 0.69** – – –

⫺5.84 1.63 1.04 0.30 – – –

20

–

0.46*

11

–

0.04

⫺0.51

⫺28

–

⫺24

–

⫺0.26

⫺0.14

9

–

1

–

–

–

⫺13

–

⫺8

–

–

–

⫺30

–

⫺0.94**

⫺25

–

⫺1.02**

⫺0.37

⫺21 19 24 33

– – – –

– – 0.13 0.74**

⫺23 20 15 23

– – – –

⫺1.03** – – 0.58*

⫺1.11 – – ⫺0.02

⫺22 ⫺24 ⫺7

– – –

⫺1.07** ⫺0.16* –

⫺17 ⫺20 ⫺4

– – –

⫺0.74** – ⫺0.48

⫺0.15 – 0.01

5

–

–

6

–

–

–

⫺4

–

0.64**

1

–

0.75**

0.23

⫺3

–

0.09

0

–

0.19

0.15

⫺14

–

⫺0.23

⫺13

–

⫺0.24

15

–

12

–

0.37**

⫺0.09

7

–

11

–

–

–

⫺0.05 0.33*

0.53** –

⫺0.03

Continued


Table 6.3

Continued

Educational level (4 levels) N R-squared


Advantaged educational/ occupational situation

All ages

Age 20–25

(A)

1

2

(B)

3

4

5

–

–

–

69

–

–

2.30**

753 0.133

– –

446 0.057

442 0.147

441 0.420

– –

780 0.056

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Variables not included were non-significant in extended model. (A) = (bivariate correlation with higher education) ⫻ 100; B = (bivariate correlation with advantaged educational-occupational situation) ⫻ 100.

Unlike Britain, these data suggested a pervasive impact of ethnic/ nationality group on educational attainment in France. Indeed, we concluded that educational outcomes in France were determined by ethnic/nationality to a greater extent than in Britain. The role of parental social background was of particular interest. France has been traditionally characterised as a society where there is a strong relationship between educational attainment and social class (see Bourdieu, 1984). There was indeed a strong correlation between parental educational background and educational level (see Figures 6.4a and 6.4b). However, there was also evidence of broad similarities in the educational experiences of the Portuguese and of French autochthons, despite large differences in their parental educational backgrounds (see Figures 6.2a and 6.2b). This indicated that the relationship between educational capital and educational attainment in France was more complex than is generally considered. The determinants of relative attainment in France were examined in more detail in Table 6.2. This summarised regression models for two measures.19 Models (1) and (2) showed regression coefficients for a dichotomous measure of educational attainment.20 Models (3) to (5) in Table 6.2 explored the determinants of educational and occupational levels.21 An advantaged position was categorised as either employment in a relatively high status job and/or above average educational attainment.22 Model (1) revealed strong ethnic/nationality effects on educational attainment.23 However, these effects diminished when other


explanatory factors were considered (see Model 2). Patterns were similar to those in Britain: differences other than ethnic/nationality group were more influential for the determination of educational and occupational attainment than ethnic/nationality per se. In France, neither ethnic/nationality, language use nor religion were significant. While it was clear that structural disadvantage was pronounced in France, much of it arose from a constellation of factors other than ethnic/nationality group. Germany In Germany, differences in educational and labour market experiences between autochthons and children of international migrants have been strong historically (see Fertig, 2004; Kogan, 2004). Figure 6.3a sub-panel 3 confirmed dramatic differences in parental social background between ethnic/nationality groups in Germany. Figure 6.3a sub-panel 1 showed that Turks and former Yugoslavs experienced much lower levels of academic participation and higher levels of vocational training. There was a substantial minority of Turks in Germany who had left education at age 16 (see Figure 6.3a, subpanel 1). Moreover, very few Turks had secured advantaged employment (see Figure 6.3a, sub-panel 4). These structural differences in Germany were deep seated. Autochthons were more likely to have attended a kindergarten24 (see Figure 6.3, top panel). Gender differences in educational outcomes in Germany were not the same across all ethnic/nationality groups. Among German autochthons, female educational attainment was considerably higher than male. However, this pattern was not repeated for Turks and former Yugoslavs. This indicated that the relationship between gender, ethnic/nationality and educational attainment was different in Germany and that the general pattern of female educational success in Western Europe is not universal (see Berridge & Penn, 2009). The second sub-panel in Figure 6.3b explored occupational position among those respondents in Germany who had undertaken vocational training and subsequently entered employment. This panel showed the jobs held by respondents (there are 190 titles listed ordered by industrial sector). It revealed that, despite dramatic educational inequalities, respondents who had entered employment were fairly evenly dispersed across the occupational structure, irrespective


of their ethnic/nationality background. This suggested that the educational inequalities experienced at school in Germany were not translated into high levels of subsequent occupational segregation. The determinants of educational and occupational position were modelled in Table 6.3 using an ordered logit for educational level (Models 1 and 2) and a binary logit for joint educational/occupational position.25 The models showed a reduction in the direct effect of ethnic/nationality group for both measures when other social factors were taken into account. Citizenship, parental education, aspirations and national identification proved to be the strongest of these. Of course, several of these measures were structurally related to ethnic/ nationality. Our analysis revealed less progress towards structural incorporation in Germany than in France or Britain. Nevertheless, some evidence of assimilation was present, as model (5) in Table 6.3 showed that advantaged educational/occupational position, conditional upon previous educational attainment, was subject to no net ethnic/ nationality effect.

Conclusions The EFFNATIS data revealed a number of marked differences between the experiences of ethnic/nationality groups in the spheres of education, training and the labour market. Some of these inequalities were the result of immigrant origins. Structural disadvantages persisted well into the ‘second-generation’ for immigrant communities. Nevertheless, many of these apparent differences diminished substantially after controlling for other social factors. We also observed important differences within the three countries. Children of international migrants in Germany, especially Turks, had experienced significant educational and occupational disadvantage. The Portuguese in France had achieved almost complete equality with their French autochthonous counterparts, but Maghrebians were disadvantaged relative to both these groups. Indians in Britain were distinctively more disadvantaged than Pakistanis. Britain’s multiculturalist policies had fostered high levels of educational participation among Indians and Pakistanis. Overall, these results strongly supported the ethnic asymmetry paradigm

96


outlined in Chapter 3. Different groups of children of international migrants had experienced distinct patterns of structural incorporation within Britain, France and Germany. Differences between the three countries can be attributed partly to the distinctive incorporation policies pursued in each. The policies of exclusive ethnic nationalism in Germany were associated with pronounced inequalities between autochthons and children of international migrants there. Turks and former Yugoslavs experienced major structural disadvantages. The pattern in France also revealed inequalities between ethnic/nationality groups, but these were very different between Maghrebians and Portuguese. This suggested that the much-vaunted French assimilationist policy of incorporation had met with different levels of success. It had worked well for the Portuguese but much worse for Maghrebians. The multiculturalist approach pervasive in the British educational system had been relatively successful, in comparison to both France and Germany, in that there were much greater equalities in educational outcomes in Britain. In each of the three countries, language use was not a significant determinant of educational or occupational circumstances. Gender and social class background, on the other hand, were consistently significant factors. We concluded that a considerable amount of these structural inequalities between ethnic/nationality groups in Britain, France and Germany could be explained by other social factors, particularly by their social backgrounds. This indicated that social class differences strongly underpinned ethnic/nationality differences in the three countries.

7 Political and Religious Incorporation

Political incorporation The EFFNATIS research focussed upon the widespread popular belief that children of international migrants are politically marginalised in Western Europe. In particular, children of migrants are often characterised (see Koser & Lutz, 1998; Gallis, 2005; Bawer, 2006) as less interested in the internal politics of countries like Britain, France and Germany than in the politics of their parents’ country of origin. Commentators have suggested that children of international migrants are more concerned with events such as the ongoing tensions in Kashmir (see Schofield, 1996) or the civil war in Algeria (see Silverstein, 2004) than in domestic autochthonous politics. In its most extreme form this can translate into membership of political parties based in parental countries of origin rather than membership of, or support for, autochthonous political parties. The overall political situation of young people from migrant backgrounds in Britain, France and Germany was heavily affected by the respective national citizenship laws of the three countries. In both Britain and France most residents enjoy the same political rights as the autochthonous population: voting in national elections is a right for those aged 18 and older. In Germany, on the other hand, most children of international migrants are classified as ‘foreigners’ and thereby excluded from the German franchise. The EFFNATIS research asked about voting behaviour in the respective 1997 elections in 97


France and in Britain and a series of general questions about political attitudes and orientation in all three countries.

Voting in the 1997 French and British elections Portuguese and Maghrebians reported lower levels of voting than French autochthons (see Table 7.1). This was particularly so in Tours, where less than a third of Portuguese and less than a quarter of Maghrebians had voted in 1997. Overall, there was a marked degree of political indifference, and possibly of political alienation, among these minority ethnic/nationality groups in France. Table 7.1 Voting in the 1997 French Legislative Election in Vitry and Tours (respondents aged 20 or over in 1999)

VITRY

Vote

TOURS

Vote

French autochthonous

Portuguese

Maghrebian

Yes No

48 (67.6%) 23 (32.4%)

35 (43.2%) 46 (56.8%)

39 (44.8%) 48 (55.2%)

122 (51%) 117 (49%)

71 (100%)

81 (100%)

87 (100%)

239 (100%)

Yes No

60 (65.9%) 31 (34.1%)

8 (32%) 17 (68%)

4 (23.5%) 13 (76.5%)

72 (54.1%) 61 (45.9%)

91 (100%)

25 (100%)

17 (100%)

133 (100%)

Total

Total

Total

Table 7.2 Voting in the 1997 British General Election in Rochdale and Blackburn

Rochdale

Vote

Blackburn

Vote

British autochthonous

Pakistani

Indian

Yes No Too young

47 (56.6%) 28 (33.7%) 8 (9.6%)

54 (75%) 16 (22.2%) 2 (2.8%)

5 (71.4%) 2 (28.6%) –

106 (65.4%) 46 (28.4%) 10 (6.2%)

83 (100%)

72 (100%)

7 (100%)

162 (100%)

Yes No Too young No response

65 (59.6%) 39 (35.7%) 5 (4.6%)

5 (71.4%) 2 (28.6%) –

26 (44.8%) 27 (46.6%) 4 (6.9%)

96 (55.2%) 68 (39.1%) 9 (5.2%) 1 (0.6%)

Total

Total

–

–

1 (1.7%)

109 (100%)

7 (100%)

58 (100%)

Total

174 (100%)

Political and Religious Incorporation

99

In Britain there was a more complex pattern (see Table 7.2). A high proportion (more than 70%) of Pakistanis had voted in the 1997 British General Election in both Rochdale and Blackburn. The voting behaviour of British autochthons in the two towns was broadly in line with known national patterns for turnout among young people (approximately 55%). Indians in Rochdale also had a high propensity to vote, but their overall numbers were very small. In Blackburn, however, less than half of the Indians voted in the 1997 General Election. Overall, it was clear that Pakistani respondents were highly committed to voting in Britain, far more so indeed than other young people. Neither the French nor the British results revealed any appreciable differences in voting behaviour between men and women among any of the ethnic/nationality groups. In France young people from Maghrebian and Portuguese origins had not participated in national elections to the same degree as the French autochthonous population. This confirmed the earlier findings of Wihtol de Wenden (1994) who reported that younger Maghrebians were less interested in French politics than their elders. Portuguese respondents had also not participated in the 1997 French elections to the same degree as French autochthons. In Britain, on the other hand, Pakistanis were far likelier to vote than either British autochthons or Indians. These results, therefore, provided no support for the ‘gender’ paradigm but considerable support for the ‘ethnic asymmetry’ paradigm in Britain and for the ‘discrimination/prejudice’ paradigm in France. They also provided strong support for the ‘national difference’ perspective, particularly (as we shall see) when the German situation was taken into account.

Political party membership and support within Britain, France and Germany Political party membership In all three countries, there were hardly any members of political parties or organisations (see Table 7.3). This reflected the age of the EFFNATIS respondents. The typical age profile of membership within Western European political parties is well over the age of 30 (see Zittel & Fuchs, 2006). Age rather than any structure of disadvantage was the salient factor at work here.


Table 7.3

Membership of a political party (all respondents) France

Member of a party

Britain

Germany

Total

Yes

9

12

20

41

No

714

677

815

2206

723

689

835

2247

Total

Political party support Germany Most respondents in Germany expressed support for a German political party (see Table 7.4). This was perhaps surprising given the fact that most Turks and Yugoslavs in the survey did not have citizenship rights in Germany. Children of international migrants were further to the left of the political spectrum than German autochthons, with Turks particularly supportive of left-of-centre parties. This was paradoxical: Turkey has not been a strong bastion of left-wing support over recent decades, while Yugoslavia was controlled by the Communist Party between 1948 and the late 1980s. The strong preference for leftwing political parties among young Turks in Germany can be partly explained as a rational response to the ethos of the CDU and CSU1 (Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union, respectively) and partly as a consequence of their disadvantaged economic situation. The pattern among former Yugoslavs was more complicated and reflected the substantial internal heterogeneity within this category which included Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and various other smaller nationality groups. Nevertheless, more former Yugoslavs supported left-of-centre parties than autochthonous German respondents. It was significant that, despite their lack of the franchise, most children of international migrants in Germany supported one of the mainstream German political parties. This strongly suggested that, once the franchise is extended to such minority ethnic/nationality groups, they will almost certainly participate in mainstream German politics very much as the German autochthonous population currently do. France In France, a high proportion of all groups expressed support for a political party, and in many cases this was for ‘left-wing parties’.


Table 7.4

101

Party supported (Germany)

None Social Democrat/Green CDU/CSU/FDP Other Total

German autochthonous

Turks

Former Yugoslav

Total

42 (20.0%) 67 (31.9%)

72 (26.5%) 148 (54.4%)

66 (23.6%) 120 (42.9%)

335 (44.0%)

66 (31.4%) 35 (16.7%)

20 (7.4%) 32 (11.8%)

73 (26.1%) 21 (7.5%)

159 (20.9%) 88 (11.5%)

210 (100%)

272 (100%)

280 (100%)

762 (100%)

180 (23.6%)

* Christian Democratic Union (CDU); Christian Social Union (CSU); Free Democratic Party (FDP).

Table 7.5

Party voted for in 1997 election (France) French autochthonous

Portuguese

Maghrebian

Total

No party/answer Far left (PC, ‘extrême gauche’, écologistes) Socialist (PS) Centre right (UDF, RPR, RPF) Far right (FN, ‘extrême droite’)

10 (10.6%) 20 (21.3%)

17 (34%) 2 (4%)

9 (21.4%) 12 (28.6%)

36 (19.4%) 34 (18.3%)

13 (13.8%) 39 (41.5%)

2 (4%) 24 (48%)

6 (14.3%) 15 (35.7%)

21 (11.3%) 78 (41.9%)

12 (12.8%)

5 (10%)

Total

94 (100%)

50 (100%)

– 42 (100%)

17 (9.1%) 186 (100%)

However, among older respondents who had voted in the 1997 French Legislative Election there was a marked tendency to support right-of-centre political parties (see Table 7.5). This suggested a degree of volatility within the political orientation of young people in France, irrespective of their ethnic/nationality group. Portuguese respondents had voted for predominantly right-wing parties while Maghrebians were further to the left. This paralleled the earlier findings of Muxel (1988) who reported that Franco-Maghrebins were more left-wing than the rest of the French population. Britain In Britain, Pakistanis were more left-of-centre in their party political allegiance than other respondents. Indians were less likely to express

102


Table 7.6

Party supported (Britain) British autochthonous

Pakistani

Indian

Total

Labour Conservative/ Right wing Liberal/Green None No response

101 (24.2%) 42 (10.0%)

72 (40.4%) 4 (2.2%)

37 (28.5%) 14 (10.8%)

210 (28.9%) 60 (8.3%)

46 (11.0%) 83 (19.9%) 146 (34.9%)

15 (8.4%) 26 (14.6%) 61 (34.3%)

1 (0.8%) 14 (10.8%) 64 (49.2%)

62 (8.5%) 123 (16.9%) 271 (37.3%)

Total

418 (100%)

130 (100%)

726 (100%)

178 (100%)

Table 7.7 Party that respondent would vote for, if there was an election tomorrow (16–25 year olds: weighted) Party Labour Conservative/Right wing Liberal/Green Regional, Nationalist and other None No response Total

Percentage 40.6 15.2 13.6 2.4 15.0 13.3 100.1

Source: BHPS wave 8 (1998–1999) for Great Britain.

party support; indeed, almost half gave no response at all (see Table 7.6). The overall pattern of party support among the autochthonous British respondents roughly followed that observed at the national level in 1999 in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the same age cohort, although the EFFNATIS sample was characterised by a much higher non-response rate (see Table 7.7).

Level of interest in politics Level of interest in politics in Germany, France and Britain Most respondents were ‘somewhat’ interested in national politics (see Table 7.8). However, a large proportion of young Britons expressed no interest in politics, as did (although to a lesser degree) Turkish respondents in Germany.


Table 7.8

Level of interest in politics Considerable

German autochthonous Turkish Former Yugoslav French autochthonous Portuguese Maghrebian British autochthonous Pakistani Indian Total

Table 7.9

Turkish Former Yugoslav Pakistani Indian Total

103

Somewhat

Not at all

Total

37 (17.1%)

136 (63.0%)

43 (19.9%)

216 (100%)

34 (12.1%) 51 (18.0%)

154 (54.6%) 173 (60.9%)

94 (33.3%) 60 (21.1%)

282 (100%) 284 (100%)

35 (12.4%)

170 (60.3%)

77 (27.3%)

282 (100%)

14 (6.8%) 22 (10.5%) 36 (9.0%)

131 (63.6%) 128 (61.2%) 204 (50.9%)

61 (29.6%) 59 (28.2%) 161 (40.1%)

206 (100%) 209 (100%) 401 (100%)

18 (10.8%) 6 (5.3%)

90 (53.9%) 51 (45.1%)

59 (35.3%) 56 (49.6%)

167 (100%) 113 (100%)

253 (11.7%)

1,237 (57.3%)

670 (31%)

2,160 (100%)

Interest in politics of parental country of origin Considerable

Somewhat

Not at all

Total

54 (19.3%) 57 (20.1%)

152 (54.3%) 140 (49.5%)

74 (26.4%) 86 (30.4%)

280 (100%) 283 (100%)

15 (8.7%) 1 (0.8%)

83 (48.3%) 35 (28.2%)

74 (43.0%) 88 (71.0%)

172 (100%) 124 (100%)

129 (10.2%)

437 (34.6%)

696 (55.2%)

1,262 (100%)

Level of interest in politics of Turkey or Yugoslavia (for German respondents) and Pakistan or India (for British respondents) Most children of Turkish and former Yugoslav parents in Germany were ‘somewhat’ interested in the politics of their parents’ country of birth (see Table 7.9). This also applied to many Pakistanis in Britain. However, most Indians were ‘not at all’ interested in Indian politics. This indicated an overall lack of interest in any politics, whether British or Indian, among many Indian respondents in Britain. This was probably unsurprising given that most Indians in the EFFNATIS sample were Gujarati Muslims and that their collective experiences

104


of ethnic cleansing and virulent ethno-religious political parties in India would – in all likelihood – not have generated positive attitudes to political parties of any kind.

Knowledge of prime ministers/presidents in various countries Almost every respondent knew the Prime Minister or President of the country in which they currently lived (see Table 7.10). In Germany, well over three quarters of minority ethnic/nationality group respondents also knew the leader of the country from which their parents had emigrated. In Britain, almost all autochthonous respondents were unaware of the name of the Prime Minister of Pakistan or of India. Most Indian respondents could not name the Prime Minister of India

Table 7.10 Percentage of sample knowing names of political leaders by ethnic/ nationality group

France


Portuguese

Maghrebian

France USA Germany Britain Italy Algeria Morocco Tunisia Portugal

99.3 92.7 37.8 50.3 2.4 21.0 16.4 3.5 2.1

100.0 89.6 34.0 49.5 2.8 10.8 11.8 0.9 63.2

99.5 93.1 23.4 39.0 1.8 69.3 56.4 22.5 3.7

Germany


Turkish

Former Yugoslav

Not asked Not asked

72.2 76.3

84.9 84.2

Britain


Pakistani

Indian

Britain Pakistan India

93.1 2.2 0.5

93.1 78.1 10.1

79.2 28.5 2.3

Germany Country of parents’ birth


105

either, but almost one third could name the Prime Minister of Pakistan. This reflected the fact that most Indians in the sample were Gujarati Muslims whose parents had been as much political as economic migrants. The majority of Pakistani respondents could not name the Prime Minister of India, but almost 80 per cent knew the name of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, indicating the strong ties that still exist between Pakistanis in Britain and their homeland. The relative indifference of Indian respondents to British politics cannot be explained, therefore, in terms of a counterbalancing interest in the politics of India. All in all, Indian respondents displayed far less interest in any kind of national level politics than other ethnic/nationality groups in Britain. In France, virtually all respondents knew the name of the French President and almost two thirds of Portuguese respondents could name the Prime Minister of Portugal. Most Maghrebians knew the names of the Prime Ministers of Algeria and Morocco but not of Tunisia. Overall, there was a marked asymmetry in the political orientations of children of minority ethnic/nationality groups to their parents’ country of origin when compared with their respective autochthonous counterparts. Very few British, German or French autochthons showed any interest in, or knowledge of, the political situation in these overseas migrant countries. There was no evidence of a lack of political interest in (or awareness of) their country of residence among children of international migrants. Nor was there any evidence that they were more interested in the political situation of the countries from where their parents originated. German children from minority ethnic/nationality backgrounds lacked formal citizenship rights and, as a corollary, were effectively disenfranchised. However, German children of international migrants mostly supported mainstream German political parties, although they were more likely to support parties towards the left of the political spectrum than their autochthonous German counterparts. This was hardly surprising given the recent political debate in Germany about incorporating such migrant groups, where the parties on the right of the political spectrum have been far less generous in their approach than those on the left. In Britain most eligible young people in the sample voted in the 1997 General Election. Allochthonous respondents were more likely

106


to have voted than the British autochthonous group. A sizeable proportion of the entire British sample stated that they were ‘not at all interested in British politics’. This did not vary significantly by ethnic/nationality group and almost certainly reflected the high levels of political indifference among electors at the time of the survey in 1999. The situation in France approximated the ‘political marginalisation’ thesis to the largest degree. Most eligible children of international migrants in France had not voted in the 1997 French Legislative Election, particularly in Tours. However, most respondents in 1999 expressed support for a French political party. Indeed, almost all expressed support for parties on the left of the political spectrum at that time. This overall incorporation of most children of international migrants in France, Germany and Britain into mainstream domestic politics was combined with a continued interest in, and awareness of, the politics of the country from where their parents originated. However, this general level of interest was not translated into membership of political parties based in these countries of parental emigration. These results provided little support for the transnational model discussed earlier in Chapter 2. They indicated a widespread process of assimilation into the mainstream political cultures of Britain, France and Germany. This paralleled Guarnizo et al’s. (2003) results for New York City which found that children of international migrants were weakly articulated to transnational immigrant politics there. Most respondents in all three countries were interested and involved in domestic politics. Very few autochthons were interested in the politics of the countries from where the international migrants groups surveyed had originated. Pakistanis in Britain were interested in the politics of Pakistan, which indicated powerful transnational links, but Indians in Britain (predominantly Gujarati Muslims) were indifferent to politics in India and, to a lesser extent, in Britain. This supported both the ethnic asymmetry paradigm outlined in Chapter 4 and suggested a high degree of alienation and anomie among this group. Overall, the results revealed a process of political assimilation in all three countries combined with national differences in the general level of interest in the politics of the host country and significant differences between ethnic/nationality groups


107

within each country in respect of interest in the politics of parentalorigin countries.

Religious affiliation The data on religious affiliation were categorised into three broad groupings: ‘Islamic’, ‘Religious: non-Islamic’ and ‘non-Religious’. Patterns of religious affiliation varied significantly between the three countries (see Table 7.11). Most autochthonous respondents in Germany reported that they were ‘religious’. Most of these were Catholic. Almost all Turks were Muslims and most former Yugoslavs were Orthodox Christians, although some were Muslim. In France, the autochthonous respondents were more or less evenly split between ‘religious’ (Catholic) and ‘non-religious’. Maghrebians were overwhelmingly Muslim while the Portuguese were mainly Catholic. In Britain most of the autochthonous population reported that they were nominally Christian but almost every Indian and Pakistani was Muslim. There was also clear evidence in France and Britain that the autochthonous population were more secular than children of international migrants. The autochthonous populations in France, Germany and Britain generally did not attend a place of worship regularly (see Table 7.12). Table 7.11

Ethnic/nationality group of respondent by religious affiliation None


Religious (non-Islamic)

Islamic

Total

20 (9.3%)

194 (89.8%)

2 (0.9%)

216 (100%)

15 (5.3%) 10 (3.5%)

2 (0.7%) 239 (84.5%)

265 (94.0%) 34 (12.0%)

282 (100%) 283 (100%)

120 (44.1%)

147 (54.0%)

5 (1.8%)

272 (100%)

18 (8.7%) 11 (5.1%) 97 (23.4%)

187 (89.9%) 6 (2.8%) 315 (75.9%)

3 (1.4%) 198 (92.1%) 3 (0.7%)

208 (100%) 215 (100%) 415 (100%)

– 1 (0.8%)

1 (0.6%) 4 (3.1%)

177 (99.4%) 124 (96.1%)

178 (100%) 129 (100%)

811 (36.9%)

2,198 (100%)

292 (13.3%)

1,095 (49.8%)


Table 7.12 Attendance at a place of worship by ethnic/nationality group


Regularly

Sometimes

Never

Total

19 (8.8%)

108 (50.2%)

88 (40.9%)

215 (100%)

31 (11.0%) 34 (12.1%)

145 (51.4%) 169 (59.9%)

106 (37.6%) 79 (28.0%)

282 (100%) 282 (100%)

26 (9.7%)

78 (29.2%)

163 (61.0%)

267 (100%)

85 (41.7%) 39 (18.1%) 43 (10.4%)

86 (42.2%) 60 (27.8%) 136 (32.8%)

33 (16.2%) 117 (54.2%) 236 (56.9%)

204 (100%) 216 (100%) 415 (100%)

68 (38.4%) 75 (58.6%)

83 (46.9%) 43 (33.6%)

26 (14.7%) 10 (7.8%)

177 (100%) 128 (100%)

420 (19.2%)

908 (41.5%)

858 (39.2%)

2,186 (100%)

However, there was a much wider variation among children of international migrants. Pakistanis and Indians in Britain and Portuguese respondents in France were the most likely to attend ‘regularly’. Maghrebians in France and Turks and former Yugoslavs in Germany were far less so: their patterns of attendance approximated those of their respective autochthons. Young Turks in Germany and Maghrebians in France did not use their Islamic religion as a social resource in the ways Indians and Pakistanis did in Britain. Interestingly, the Portuguese in France were much more likely to attend a place of worship (a Catholic church) regularly than French autochthons. This confirmed the earlier picture presented by Volovitch-Tavares (1999) in her analysis of the reception of post-war Portuguese immigrants by the French Catholic Church. EFFNATIS respondents were also asked a range of other questions on religion. Membership of religious associations was asked about in Britain and Germany but not in France (see Table 7.13). The importance of religious festivals was also asked about in Britain and Germany. Few of the children of international migrants in Britain and Germany were members of religious associations/organisations. This was unexpected given the dominance that Islamic religion is often supposed to hold among Muslim groups in both countries (see Klausen, 2005; Ramadan, 2005). It certainly provided no support for


109

Table 7.13 Membership of religious associations/organisations by ethnic/ nationality group Membership Yes German autochthonous Turkish Former Yugoslav British autochthonous Pakistani Indian Total

Table 7.14 group*

No

Total

93 (44.1%)

118 (55.9%)

211 (100%)

15 (5.3%) 42 (15.0%)

266 (94.7%) 238 (85.0%)

281 (100%) 280 (100%)

18 (4.4%)

387 (95.6%)

405 (100%)

14 (8.1%) 19 (15.4%)

159 (91.9%) 104 (84.6%)

173 (100%) 123 (100%)

201 (13.6%)

1,272 (86.4%)

1,473 (100%)

Importance of own religious festivals by ethnic/nationality

Very important

Quite important

Unimportant

180 (63.8%) 133 (47.3%)

77 (27.3%) 105 (37.4%)

25 (8.9%) 43 (15.3%)

282 (100%) 281 (100%)

127 (31.4%)

404 (100%)

Turkish Former Yugoslav British autochthonous Pakistani Indian

80 (19.8%)

197 (48.8%)

147 (83.5%) 120 (93.0%)

28 (15.9%) 7 (5.4%)

Total

661 (51.9%)

415 (32.6%)

Total

1 (0.6%) 2 (1.6%) 198 (15.5%)

176 (100%) 129 (100%) 1,274 (100%)

* Question only asked of children of international migrants in Germany.

the hypothesis that international migrants tend to become more religious in the diaspora when compared with their homelands. Indeed, all groups, other than German autochthons, revealed low levels of membership of religious associations/organisations. The relatively high membership level among German autochthons was probably a factor in the political support for the CDU/CSU outlined earlier (see Broughton & ten Napel, 2007). Most children of international migrants in Britain and Germany regarded their own religious festivals as very important (see Table 7.14).

110


This was particularly pronounced among Indians and Pakistanis in Britain and, to a lesser degree, among Turks in Germany. However, these views were not translated into membership of religious associations or organisations. Religion was clearly important among young Muslims, but formal membership of religious associations or organisations was not. Overall the picture in terms of religion among EFFNATIS respondents was complex. There were large differences between groups in terms of religious affiliation and religiosity. Autochthons were far more secular than children of international migrants. Pakistanis, Indians and the Portuguese were much more likely to attend places of worship than Maghrebians or Turks. There was no evidence of widespread cultural assimilation by migrant ethnic/nationality groups into secular values. Rather, there was evidence of continued and marked differences between groups in terms of the degree to which religion played an important part in their lives. Nevertheless, very few respondents were members of religious associations or organisations. The picture of radicalised Muslims in Western Europe is essentially mythical. None of the paradigms or models assessed earlier captured this complexity. There were wide differences between children of international migrants as postulated by the ethnic asymmetry paradigm, but there were also substantial differences between autochthons as well. Overall, we concluded that religion among young adults in Britain, France and Germany was a complex matter and in need of further research. We found no evidence of alienated, radicalised Muslims in any of the three countries.

8 Cultural Incorporation: Lifestyle, Media and Identity

Introduction In the previous three chapters we have emphasised the differences between children of international migrants in Britain, France and Germany. There was considerable evidence of systematic differences between children of international migrants and autochthons in each country. These differences centred upon typical economic experiences, patterns of language use, religious behaviour and political values. There was also evidence of important variations between different descendants of international migrant groups within each of the three countries. We have used such evidence to support a model of immigrant incorporation which is far from complete but which is consistent with a general process of assimilation. In this chapter we examine whether different ethnic/nationality groups had different lifestyles, consumed different media and had distinctive identities when compared to autochthons in the three countries. Globalisation theorists (see Tomlinson, 1999; Cowen, 2002; Pieterse, 2003) have argued that cultural assimilation proceeds at a rapid rate among descendants of international immigrants as a result of decreasing social constraints and increasing individualism within the youth cultures of contemporary Western Europe and North America. Moreover, this model of progressive assimilation also claims that the greater the level of cultural affinity with their host country among children of international migrants, the more incorporated they will be in other spheres, such as education and the labour market. 111

112


Multiculturalist and transnationalist models of incorporation, on the other hand, challenge this scenario of cultural convergence between allochthons and autochthons. Rather, such theories expect children of international migrants to maintain distinctive cultural traditions, influenced by the cultures of their parents’ country of origin. Maintenance of these parental cultural traditions is not necessarily associated with disadvantage within the transnationalist account. On the contrary, participation in minority ethnic/nationality cultural practices and traditions is seen to be associated with relative advantages in other arenas of social life. In this chapter we review evidence on cultural incorporation. The EFFNATIS research asked respondents to describe their lifestyle, media consumption and subjective identities. The harmonisation of these questions proved challenging. The data revealed strong patterns of cultural incorporation among allochthons and many similarities between autochthons and children of international migrants within the cultural sphere. The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that lifestyle patterns, media consumption and subjective identities are at the forefront of immigrant incorporation in Western Europe. Indeed, it offers some of the most compelling evidence in this book of an overall trajectory towards longer-term assimilation.

Cultural and structural incorporation The sociological study of leisure and consumption traditionally emphasised the influence of structural constraints upon what might otherwise be seen as largely free, voluntary and unconstrained activities. Veblen (1899) provided an early account of individuals’ conscious and unconscious uses of leisure activities to define and reinforce social boundaries rooted in structural and economic inequalities. More recently Bourdieu emphasised how leisure preferences acted to sustain economic and social inequalities within the contemporary period (Bourdieu, 1984). Empirical studies in Britain, France and Germany have uncovered a powerful relationship between social class, educational differences and cultural behaviour (see Tomlinson, 2003; Katz-Gerro, 2004; Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007; Lemel & Coulangeon, 2007). Earlier sociological accounts of leisure and consumption placed considerable emphasis on the joint effects of social class and ethnicity

Cultural Incorporation

113

in influencing lifestyles (see Packard, 1959). Contemporary American studies of youth lifestyles indicate that such inequalities persist. Many youths from minority ethnic/nationality groups risk negative cultural incorporation1 into racially-based ‘countercultures’. These are characterised by both criminality and a cycle of economic deprivation (see Wilson, 1987). It has also been argued that members of some minority groups (such as the Chinese and Koreans) have adopted ascetic lifestyles and leisure preferences which have underpinned their relatively high levels of educational and occupational attainment (see Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). In Europe, there has been little systematic empirical research on the leisure and consumption patterns of different ethnic/nationality groups. Modood et al. (1997) focused upon ethnically oriented cultural behaviour, including clothing and food. They found powerful ethnic differences in Britain. However, as Aparicio (2007) noted for Spain, the mere participation in traditional cultural activities does not, in itself, indicate separatism in lifestyle. More important is the extent to which dominant, majority patterns of consumption are reproduced within minority ethnic/nationality groups. In the sections below, we analyse lifestyle patterns, media preferences and social identities. We explore differences between ethnic/ nationality groups and also examine the extent to which these differences are related to other structural factors.

Lifestyle patterns The EFFNATIS survey collected information on a number of aspects of the daily lifestyles of young adults. Questions were asked about food and drink and about respondents’ preferred leisure activities. Much of these data were originally recorded in qualitative form (respondents were asked to name their ‘favourite meals’ and to describe ‘what activities they tended to do with their friends on a Saturday night’). Table 8.1 shows the three ‘favourite dishes’ reported by respondents according to the national origins of these dishes.2 Allochthonous respondents were much more likely to name a dish associated with their own national origins as one of their favourite meals (65.1% of Maghrebians and 66.9% of Indians). In Britain and France, moderate numbers of autochthons mentioned dishes from minority ethnic/

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Table 8.1

Favourite food types reported by EFFNATIS respondents

Germany Autochthonous Turkish Former Yugoslav Britain Autochthonous Pakistani Indian France Autochthonous Portuguese Maghrebian

German

Turkish

Balkan

International

36.9 16.3 27.4

3.7 45.9 7.4

0.9 1.1 14.4

81.1 65.4 77.2

British

Asian

Mediterranean

International*

47.1 25.8 22.3

28.2 56.2 66.9

58.9 32.0 21.5

78.7 46.6 35.5

French

Portuguese

Maghrebian

International

70.3 47.6 32.1

0.3 25.9 0.0

14.3 15.1 65.1

77.3 77.8 77.1

Note: Percent mentioning type of food as one of three favourite dishes by ethnic/nationality group. * Category included those who named a Mediterranean dish as one of their favourites.

nationality groups in their countries as among their favourites. Only a minority of former Yugoslavs and Portuguese mentioned that their favourite dishes included one from their parental-origin country (14.4% of former Yugoslavs and 25.9% of Portuguese). For all ethnic/ nationality groups, other than Indians and Pakistanis, the most popular dishes were ‘international’ meals such as pizza and burgers. This indicated a very high degree of similarity in food preferences among respondents, including children of international migrants, in the three countries. This was primarily the result of the globalisation of certain types of food, much of it originating from the United States (see Ritzer, 1993). Figure 8.1 shows the proportion of people from ethnic/nationality groups in Britain and Germany3 who said that halal4 meat was ‘important to them’ and the proportion who reported that they drank alcohol ‘often or occasionally’.5 It also shows the proportion of meat eaters.6 The figure reveals major differences between ethnic/nationality groups in the two countries. Alcohol consumption was very common among British autochthons but very uncommon among Indians and Pakistanis. Given the centrality of public houses (pubs) within British society – many social clubs meet regularly in pubs where almost all customers drink alcohol – this reinforced the social segregation between Muslim minority groups and autochthons in Britain.7


115

1.0

0.75

0.5

0.25

0 British Pakistani autochthonous

Indian

Halal % Female

Alcohol

Turkish

Former Yugoslav

Eats meat

Figure 8.1 Food and drink preferences for the British sample and German allochthons Note: Halal = ‘eating halal is very/somewhat important’; Alcohol = ‘drinks alcohol often/occasionally’. Source: Data for Britain and German allochthons.

Figure 8.1 also shows that Pakistanis and Indians in Britain attached considerable importance to eating halal meat. Most Turks in Germany also regarded eating halal meat as important. This indicated that cultural-religious taboos concerning meat-eating remained powerful among Muslims in both Britain and Germany. Data were also collected in Britain on the clothing preferences of respondents (see Table 8.2). This should be seen within the context of intense feelings about the right to wear distinctive ethnic and religious clothes in contemporary Britain (see Joppke, 2009). Wearing jeans and trainers were common among all males but a moderate proportion of Pakistanis (17%) and Indians (28%) also reported wearing the Salwar/Kameez.8 Among women there were much greater differences between ethnic/nationality groups. Female autochthons were far more likely to report wearing jeans, trainers and short skirts. Most Indian and Pakistani women in Britain reported that they normally wore the traditional Salwar/Kameez. Clothes constitute a highly visible indicator of lifestyle difference, and there was clear

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Table 8.2

Clothing preferences of British EFFNATIS respondents Autochthons

Pakistanis

Indians

Women Jeans Trainers Short length skirt Long dress/skirt Salwar/Kameez

76.1 60.6 65.6 47.5 0.0

56.6 36.8 4.7 57.5 76.4

29.2 25.0 6.9 63.9 76.4

Men Jeans Trainers Salwar/Kameez

89.3 76.1 0.0

94.4 87.5 16.7

82.8 51.7 27.6

Note: Data on the basis of response to the question, ‘When you go out, do you normally wear any of the following?’

evidence from these data that young female autochthons and allocthons frequently wore quite different and distinctive clothing in Britain. Figure 8.2 summarises answers to questions about lifestyle. Respondents were asked what they usually did on a Saturday night and whether they participated in organised sport. Figure 8.2 shows that there were relatively few differences between ethnic/nationality groups in each of the three countries. In Britain there was a substantial difference between autochthons, who were far more likely to go out on Saturday evenings, than Indians and Pakistanis.9 There were significant gender differences between ethnic/nationality groups. Men were more likely to participate in sport. Female participation in sport was consistently lower among the four predominantly Muslim ethnic/nationality groups (Turks, Maghrebians, Pakistanis and Indians). This suggested a continuation of disadvantages experienced by Muslim women as a result of the persistence of traditionalistic, conservative norms about appropriate female behaviour in Britain, France and Germany (see Berridge & Penn, 2009). However, it is important to recognise that large numbers of respondents from different ethnic/nationality groups in all three countries were undertaking similar leisure activities. These data show (with some exceptions noted above) that different ethnic/nationality groups ate similar meals, wore similar clothes and


117

1.0

0.75

0.5

0.25

Goes out Saturday evenings

an di In

to Bri ch tis th h on ou s Pa ki st an i au

to Fre ch nc th h on Po ous rtu gu es e M ag hr eb ia n

is h rk Tu


au

au

to


0.0

Plays sports

% female

Figure 8.2 Social activities amongst EFFNATIS respondents Note: Data on whether respondent ‘usually goes out on Saturday night’ and ‘plays sports regularly’.

enjoyed similar leisure pursuits. These aspects of cultural behaviour were differentiated more by gender than by ethnic/nationality group.

Media consumption Media consumption is often considered by sociologists to have considerable influence on the experiences of minority ethnic/nationality groups (see Koopmans et al., 2005; Abbas, 2005). Within the segmented assimilation model, media consumption based on ethnicity acts to solidify and cement differences between descendants of international migrants and the dominant autochthonous population. It can also exacerbate nascent tendencies towards absorption into deviant sub-cultures. Ethnic media also play an important role in the functioning of local labour markets within the ethnic niche model (see Waldinger & Lichter, 2003). From a multiculturalist perspective, ethnic media serve to legitimate and generate respect for minority ethnic/nationality communities.

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The EFFNATIS project collected detailed information on media consumption. Respondents were asked to list their three favourite radio stations, singers or bands, types of music, TV stations, newspapers read and the last three films they had watched (other than on TV). The results are summarised in Figure 8.3 and Table 8.3. These show whether any of these forms of media were based in the ethnic/ nationality cultures of the parents’ country of origin.10 Table 8.3 shows that there was a moderate, but highly uneven, degree of interest in media related to parents’ country of origin among children of international migrants in Britain, France and Germany. Patterns varied considerably across countries and between ethnic/ nationality groups. These variations reflected differences in the relative success of different minority media within the three countries. In France, Maghrebian music is widely available within mainstream French media, while Turkish and Yugoslav music is rarely heard on mainstream German media outlets. Consumption of any ethnic media Male

Turkish

Female

Former Yugoslav French autochthonous Portuguese Maghrebian British autochthonous Pakistani Indian 0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1.0

Bars show proportion for whom favourite media were classified as 'ethnic minority' (includes Radio, TV, Films, Newspapers, Music type and Singers/Bands)

In di an

B au ritis to h ch th on ou s Pa ki st an i

M ag hr eb ia n

F au ren to ch ch th on ou s Po rtu gu es e

F Yu orm go er sl av

0.0

Tu rk is h

Correlations with ethnic media consumption

−0.2 R with academic track at age 16 R with having a friend from another ethnic/nationality group

Figure 8.3 Patterns of consumption of ‘ethnic’ media Note: R is pseudo-R from logistic regression predicting consumption of ethnic media.


Table 8.3

119

Use of ‘ethnic’ media amongst EFFNATIS respondents Music preferences: favourite

Radio station

Type of music

Singer or band

Other media preferences Favourite TV stations

Newspapers read

Last 3 films seen

Percent for whom media preferences were categorised as ‘ethnic’* German autochthonous

–

–

–

–

–

–

Turkish Former Yugoslav French autochthonous Portuguese Maghrebian British autochthonous Pakistani Indian

5.6 0

23.0 9.9

25.1 8.1

15.7 1.4

21.3 4.2

10.5 1.1

1.4

23.1

32.2

0.7

1.0

0.3

4.7 18.3 0.2

25.9 66.5 0.5

34.4 62.8 5.0

1.4 3.2 0

7.1 1.8 0.5

0.5 0.9 0.5

25.2 15.3

32.0 7.8

23.0 12.3

12.9 18.5

17.4 3.8

7.3 6.9

* ‘Ethnic’ implied Turkish or Yugoslav in Germany; Portuguese or Maghrebian in France and South Asian in Britain. Popular international media (e.g. ‘rap’) were not classified as ‘ethnic’.

Three important features are apparent in Table 8.3. First, moderate numbers of minority ethnic/nationality respondents regularly consumed media oriented to their parental country of origin. This indicated the preservation of some degree of connectivity with their parental country of origin.11 Second, allochthons nearly always reported consuming more host country media than media from their parents’ country of origin. Maghrebians in France were the exception: they generally reported a preference for Maghrebian music. The detailed responses to these questions highlighted the fact that for allochthons, as well as for autochthons, the most popular media were mainstream American outputs such as MTV and Hollywood films. Very small numbers of autochthons in Britain and France reported consumption of minority ethnic/nationality media. The main exception was the popularity of Maghrebian music among French autochthons. To explore the effects of these variations in media consumption, an overall index of exposure to minority ethnic/nationality group media was constructed (see Figure 8.3, panel A). This shows clear differences


between ethnic/nationality groups.12 Panel B in Figure 8.3 reveals the magnitude of the relationship between this index of exposure to minority group media and indicators of educational track at age 16 and of friendship with members of a different ethnic/nationality group. The correlations were all negative. Among all ethnic/nationality groups, those who consumed ethnic media were less likely to have an advantaged educational profile and were less likely to report having a friend from a different ethnic/nationality group. However, these correlations were also very small.13 These findings revealed the complex role of media consumption in the cultural incorporation of the descendants of international migrants. There was some evidence of consumption of ‘ethnic media’ and structural and social disadvantage. This refutes a central tenet of the segmented assimilation model. Nonetheless, the dominant pattern was one of cultural incorporation of children of international migrants into mainstream national and international media.

Identity The EFFNATIS research also probed issues surrounding identities and discrimination. These are often presented as important aspects of successful incorporation.14 Respondents from all ethnic/nationality groups15 reported that they had experienced discrimination and racial abuse. The detailed responses to these open-ended questions revealed a wide range of such phenomena, ranging from reports of prejudicial treatment by police and school teachers to experiences of racial abuse and assaults by gangs of youths from different ethnic/ nationality groups. Tables 8.4 and 8.5 provide summaries of these responses. Table 8.4 Experiences of discrimination and racial abuse (all respondents) % yes At school Looking for a job In employment Other social settings Racial abuse

19.1 8.7 5.3 16.7 24.4


Table 8.5

121

Perceptions and experiences of discrimination and racial abuse Perceived discrimination at school

Experience of racial abuse

Discrimination in two or more areas

Percentage yes German autochthonous Turkish Former Yugoslav French autochthonous Portuguese Maghrebian British autochthonous Pakistani Indian

n/a

n/a

n/a

29.6 18.0 2.1

40.2 37.1 10.1

38.7 33.6 3.1

15.1 31.4 10.0

16.5 35.0 14.8

10.4 34.6 8.4

48.3 35.4

46.6 31.5

34.3 22.3

Table 8.4 highlights the different types of discrimination. Most were experienced in the educational sphere and the least in employment. Such findings undoubtedly reflected the age profile of respondents. A high proportion was still in education and relatively few were employed at the time of the surveys (see Chapter 6). Table 8.5 shows the experiences of discrimination and racial abuse reported by different ethnic/nationality groups. All four Muslim minority ethnic/ nationality groups were much more likely to report discrimination and racial abuse. Former Yugoslavs in Germany also reported relatively high levels of discrimination and racial abuse (though lower than for Turks). Autochthons in Britain and France and the Portuguese reported significantly lower levels of discrimination and racial abuse. Nevertheless, a sizeable minority of these three groups reported both (15% of British autochthons reported that they had been the victims of racial abuse). These figures were probably influenced by the relatively deprived and ethnically segregated localities where the majority of British and French respondents lived. These results provide disturbing evidence of underlying ethnic tensions within all three countries. Respondents were also asked to indicate the extent to which they felt a sense of identification with their host country and with their


Self-reported sense of identification Host country

Origin country

German autochthonous Turkish Former Yugoslav French autochthonous Portuguese Maghrebian British autochthonous Pakistani Indian Not at all Figure 8.4

Average

Very strong

Patterns of national identification among EFFNATIS respondents

Note: Responses to ‘How strong is your sense of being ...’ (Nationality inserted). Box plots summarise Likert-type response scales from 6 (‘not at all’) to 1 (‘very strong’).

parents’ country of origin. Identification with the country of parentalorigin was stronger among allochthons in all three countries (see Figure 8.4). In Germany host country identification was significantly lower among Turks and former Yugoslavs.16 These patterns of national identification in Germany paralleled the data on citizenship presented elsewhere in this book. They were not surprising given that most Turks and former Yugoslavs were excluded from German citizenship (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 7).

Conclusions These results reveal strong evidence of cultural incorporation among children of international migrants in Britain, France and Germany. This was most evident in the spheres of food, television and films. Some of this can be seen as part of a wider process of cultural homogenisation associated with globalisation, particularly as it affects young people. Large numbers from all ethnic/nationality groups examined in the three countries undertook similar leisure activities. There was evidence that children of international migrants in Britain,


123

France and Germany identified with their parents’ country of origin but this was generally in addition to, rather than opposed to, strong identification with their own country of birth. There was some evidence of consumption of newspapers and music based in the countries of parental-origin but the overwhelming pattern was one shared media preferences among all ethnic/nationality groups.

9 Social Incorporation: Friendship and Marriage

Sociologists have generally seen social interaction as one of the key benchmarks of incorporation among the descendants of international migrants. Gordon (1964), as we have seen earlier, saw ‘widespread intermarriage’ as a central element in the process of American assimilation. A prominent theme in Portes and Rumbaut’s (2001) study of the situation of children of international migrants in the United States concerned the use of social networks by different ethnic groups. Portes and Rumbaut argued that social interaction with people outside an individual’s own ethnic group had a substantial influence upon ‘successful’ acculturation and incorporation. More broadly, sociologists have long argued that patterns of social interaction provide powerful insights into the nature of social divisions within contemporary societies. Some commentators (see Eriksen, 1992) have suggested that modernisation is producing a ‘post-ethnic’ form of society where inter-ethnic social interaction is becoming increasingly the norm. Others, such as Nave (2000), have argued that no such teleology exists and that ethnic boundaries remain strong within advanced societies. However, such ideas have seldom been subjected to contemporary empirical scrutiny within a European context. In this chapter, we evaluate patterns of social interaction within and across ethnic boundaries among the nine groupings of young adults in Britain, France and Germany.

The study of social interaction Historically, sociological studies of social interaction patterns have concentrated upon two key aspects: ‘marital endogamy’ and ‘friendship 124

Social Incorporation

125

homogamy’.1 Notions of marital endogamy2 featured prominently in the classical sociological accounts of Weber (1968) and Sorokin (1959). Giddens (1973) and Parkin (1979) subsequently stressed the importance of ‘social closure’ in determining the degree of ‘structuration’ within class relations, while Lévi-Strauss (1973) argued forcefully that intermarriage constituted a ‘deep structural’ element in the reproduction of patterns of social inequality over time. Parsons (1975) claimed that ‘ethnic groups are traditionally mutually exclusive’ and that this exclusivity was maintained and reproduced via ethnic marital endogamy. Such approaches clearly diverge from more populist notions of marriage and partnerships in Western Europe, embodied in the conventional ideology of ‘romantic love’ (see Giddens, 1992). The ‘deep structural’ perspective advocated by Lévi-Strauss suggested that Cupid’s arrows did not land at random! European sociology has made limited use of such insights until recent decades, with most attention restricted to structures of educational and occupational marital endogamy (Smits et al., 1999, 2000; Blossfeld & Timm, 2003). Research in the United States has more consistently investigated how various social factors determine partnership selection (see Kalmijn 1998). These include ethnicity,3 residential propinquity,4 occupation,5 and educational level.6 Indeed, Nave (2000) claimed that ‘no other act is as central to the reproduction and maintenance of ethnic group boundaries as [marital] endogamy’ (p. 332). The study of friendship homogamy parallels this discourse on marital endogamy and romantic love. Fischer (1982), in his classic study of friendship in the United States, argued that friendships were ‘voluntary’ within modern societies. People preferred to enter into friendships with individuals who shared similar norms and values. Indeed, as Bellah et al. (1985) argued, ‘friends must enjoy one another’s company’ (p. 115) and friendship crucially involves shared moral sentiments. There is strong empirical evidence that ethnicity is a powerful determinant of friendship patterns (Hamm, 2000; Smith & Schneider, 2000; Quillian & Campbell, 2003), often in combination with gender (Way & Chen, 2000). Equally, other social factors have also been shown to be strongly associated with friendship choices, most prominently divisions associated with ‘social stratification’ or ‘class’ (see

126


Laumann & Guttman, 1966; Stewart et al., 1980; Ayalon et al., 1989; Wright & Cho, 1992; Bottero & Prandy, 2003). Friendship patterns offer a parallel insight into the ‘deep structural’ contours of social interaction and social boundaries within contemporary societies. Both marriage and friendship are formed according to values that embody ‘closeness’ and mutual ‘affinity’. This has been called the ‘homophily principle’: similarity breeds connection (McPherson et al., 2001). Indeed, Penn (1985), Prandy (1990, 1999) and Prandy and Lambert (2003) have all argued that friendship and marriage patterns provide the best and most reliable indicators of the overall matrix of social stratification within contemporary societies. The EFFNATIS research collected information on the gender and ethnicity of respondents’ two best friends and the ethnicity and religion of respondents’ spouses, fiancés and ‘partners’. Friendship patterns Gender was the most powerful axis of friendship among EFFNATIS respondents (see Table 9.1). This reflected a much wider social phenomenon: most friends are of the same gender in contemporary advanced societies (Way & Chen, 2000). Table 9.1 also revealed small differences in the propensity for homogamous gender friendships between different ethnic/nationality groups. Mixed-gender friendships were slightly more common among autochthons in all three countries. This was only marginally so in France and Germany, but it was more substantial (and statistically significant) among British respondents. If same-gender friendships are taken as an indicator of ‘traditionalistic’ friendship patterns, it is evident that Indian and Pakistani respondents in Britain were significantly more ‘traditionalistic’ than the rest of the EFFNATIS sample. The ethnic/nationality characteristics of friends were more complex, with each country exhibiting different patterns (see Table 9.2). In Britain, most respondents reported friends from the same ethnic group while very few reported friends from other ethnic groups.7 In Germany, however, the autochthonous were far more homogamous in terms of ethnic/nationality friendship patterns when compared to Turks and former Yugoslavs. Two thirds of former Yugoslavs had at least one friend from a different ethnic/nationality group and over half the Turks also had at least one friend from another ethnic/nationality


Table 9.1

127

Gender of first friend** (count and row percentages) Same gender

German autochthonous Turkish Former Yugoslav French autochthonous Portuguese Maghrebian British autochthonous Pakistani Indian

Opposite gender

Unknown

Total

183 (85.1%)

29 (13.5%)

3 (1.4%)

215

250 (87.1%) 250 (88.3%)

29 (10.1%) 28 (9.9%)

8 (2.8%) 5 (1.8%)

287 283

218 (76.2%)

65 (22.7%)

3 (1.0%)

286

171 (80.7%) 172 (78.9%) 321 (76.8%)

40 (18.9%) 39 (17.9%) 92 (22.0%)

1 (0.5%) 7 (3.2%) 5 (1.2%)

212 218 418

155 (87.1%)* 113 (86.9%)*

19 (10.7%)* 7 (5.4%)*

4 (2.2%) 10 (7.7%)*

178 130

* Statistically significant difference from the corresponding autochthonous grouping at the 95% level. ** The patterns for second friends very closely resembled those for first friends and are not reported here.

Table 9.2 Ethnicity of friends by ethnic/nationality group (count and row percentages)


At least one friend from a different ethnic group

Both friends from same ethnic group

Total

44 (21.6%)

160 (78.4%)

204

152 (56.9%) 183 (66.8%)

115 (43.1%) 91 (33.2%)

267 274

124 (44.0%)

158 (56.0%)

282

154 (74.8%) 117 (56.5%) 19 (6.7%)

52 (25.2%) 90 (43.5%) 264 (93.3%)

206 207 283

30 (23.4%) 17 (18.9%)

98 (76.6%) 73 (81.1%)

128 90

Note: All allochthonous groups were significantly different from their respective autochthons at the 95% level.


group. In France, there was also a high degree of heterogamous ethnic friendships. Almost half the French autochthonous respondents had at least one friend from another ethnic/nationality group. Around three quarters of Portuguese and over half of Maghrebian respondents also reported a friend from a different ethnic/nationality group. Britain stood out as particularly ethnically homogamous in terms of friendship choices. British autochthons had higher rates of ethnic friendship homogamy than their French and German counterparts. Both Pakistani and Indian respondents were markedly more homogamous than the minority ethnic/nationality groups in France and Germany.8 It has been argued (e.g. by Reardon & Firebaugh, 2002) that measures of multigroup segregation – such as homogamy and endogamy – suffer from problems of comparability. This arises because friendship choices are strongly influenced by the ‘pool’ of available friends within a local area (or, more relevant to this age group, the ‘pool’ of potential friends within local educational institutions). In situations where the proportions of people from different ethnic/ nationality groups are unequal, then the likelihood of forming a friendship with a person from a different group is correspondingly uneven. However, there are a number of reasons why the EFFNATIS data can be considered relatively robust, particularly for comparisons between different minority ethnic/nationality groups. First, the sampling design minimised this problem by selecting localities for the research that had large numbers of both allochthonous and autochthonous respondents. Second, our analyses adopted a ‘broad brush’ approach and concentrated on relatively large differences between different allochthonous groups. Third, our aggregate-level findings on patterns of social interaction persisted even when a more extended multivariate approach was adopted (see the following section). The EFFNATIS research collected additional information on respondents’ friendship patterns. Data were collected on where friends first met (although the coding of this differed between Britain, France and Germany). It was clear that most respondents in each country had first met their friends within the educational system (see Table 9.3). A few respondents in Germany had also met their friend via an ‘ethnic’ association or organisation. Work played a


Turkish

Former French Yugoslavian autochthonous

British Portuguese Maghrebian autochthonous

Pakistani

Indian

Count and column percentages Education Work Sport Church/ mosque Pub/club/ party/leisure Friends/ neighbours Relatives/ family Ethnic association Other

134 (65.0%) 8 (3.9%) 10 (4.9%) 3 (1.5%)

152 (54.9%) 12 (4.3%) 13 (4.7%) 4 (1.4%)

137 (49.6%)* 8 (2.9%) 16 (5.8%) –

103 (52.0%) – – –

100 (58.5%) – – –

71 (43.3%) – – –

294 (71.7%) 22 (5.4%) 6 (1.5%) 3 (0.7%)

138 (82.6%)* 6 (3.6%) 1 (0.6%) 1 (0.6%)

93 (80.9%) 4 (3.5%) 3 (2.6%) 6 (5.2%)*

5 (2.4%)

5 (1.8%)

7 (2.5%)

22 (11.1%)

11 (6.4%)

5 (3.0%)*

21 (5.1%)

1 (0.6%)*

–

17 (8.3%)

25 (9.0%)

35 (12.7%)

27 (13.6%)

16 (9.4%)

3 (1.8%)*

22 (5.4%)

1 (0.6%)*

–

12 (5.8%)

47 (17.0%)*

42 (15.2%)*

7 (3.5%)

11 (6.4%)

3 (1.8%)

15 (3.7%)

1 (0.5%)

–

6 (2.2%)

–

–

–

–

–

–

39 (19.7%)

33 (19.3%)

27 (6.6%)

7 (4.2%)

6 (5.2%)

16 (7.8%)

19 (6.9%)

25 (9.1%)

82 (50.0%)*

* Statistically significant difference from corresponding autochthonous grouping at the 95% level.

10.1057/9780230234604 - Children of International Migrants in Europe, Roger Penn and Paul Lambert

12 (7.2%)

3 (2.6%)

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Table 9.3 Where first friend was met by ethnic/nationality group


relatively small role in all three countries. This was not surprising given the relatively young ages of respondents. Neighbours were common sources of friends in France and Germany, and family connections were particularly important in Germany. Overall, there was a common pattern to friendship in terms of where friends had been first met in all three countries: friends came predominantly from contacts first made in the educational system. Information on the activities shared with closest friends was also collected. It was evident that activities shared with friends were largely similar for males and females. For both men and women, ‘going out’ and ‘socialising’ were the most popular activities and, by and large, most other activities were also evenly distributed by gender. The two exceptions were that ‘sport’ was a noticeably more popular activity with friends among men in Britain and Germany when compared to women there, and in France (where the response options varied slightly from those for Britain and Germany) females had a greater tendency to socialise at home or at their friends’ homes. Table 9.4 indicated that leisure activities among young adults from different ethnic/nationality groups in Britain and Germany were largely similar. One noticeable exception concerned drinking alcohol, which was far more common among British than German autochthons. This reflected the longstanding historical importance of alcohol consumption as a vehicle for socialising in Britain (Trice, 1962; Burnett, 1999). Drinking alcohol was a very infrequent activity among Indians and Pakistanis in Britain, most of whom were Muslim. The disparity between the autochthonous and allochthonous groups was consequently much greater in Britain than in Germany. The French data revealed clear differences in activities shared with friends between different ethnic/nationality groups. Autochthons were likelier to socialise within the domestic arena while children of international migrants, particularly those from the Maghreb, tended to do so outside their home (see Table 9.5). Overall, the EFFNATIS results revealed much greater ethnic segregation to social life in Britain. This was evident both in terms of greater friendship homogamy and of separate and distinct patterns of leisure activities with friends there.

Activities shared with friends in Germany and Britain by ethnic/nationality group German autochthonous

Turkish

Former Yugoslavian


Pakistani

Indian

Counts and Column Percentages Going out, socialising Shopping Sport Talk Music/cinema/ clubs Religious Drink coffee Drink alcohol At home Club/society Other

62 (30.0%)

101 (36.6%)

94 (34.7%)

107 (26.8%)

39 (23.5%)

48 (42.5%)*

8 (3.9%) 41 (19.8%) 21 (10.1%) 41 (19.8%)

6 (2.2%) 63 (22.8%) 24 (8.7%) 46 (16.7%)

9 (3.3%) 49 (18.1%) 14 (5.2%)* 47 (17.3%)

23 (5.8%) 78 (19.5%) 7 (1.8%) 40 (10.0%)

23 (13.9%)* 40 (24.1%) 8 (4.8%) 27 (16.3%)

9 (8.0%) 18 (15.9%) 6 (5.3%) 10 (8.8%)

– 3 (1.4%) 5 (2.4%) – – 26 (12.6%)

2 (0.7%) 11 (4.0%) – – – 23 (8.3%)

– 7 (2.6%) 3 (1.1%) – – 48 (17.7%)

3 (0.8%) – 93 (23.3%) 22 (5.5%) – 27 (6.8%)

– – 2 (1.2%)* 9 (5.4%) – 18 (10.8%)

1 (0.9%) – 2 (1.8%)* 1 (0.9%)* 3 (2.7%) 15 (13.3%)

* Statistically significant difference from corresponding autochthonous grouping at the 95% level.

10.1057/9780230234604 - Children of International Migrants in Europe, Roger Penn and Paul Lambert

Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of Wollongong - PalgraveConnect 2011-01-28

Table 9.4


Table 9.5 Activities shared with friends in France: First activity mentioned

Activities Remain in the neighbourhood to talk Go for a walk, stroll or drive around the town Go out in the evening (cinema, restaurant, club) Go to various people’s homes Do various things together (e.g. sport, music) Other Total


Portuguese

11 (4.5%)

14 (8.1%)

32 (19.0%)*

11 (4.5%)

19 (11.0%)

31 (18.5%)*

46 (18.8%)

40 (23.1%)

33 (19.6%)

115 (46.9%)

60 (34.7%)

42 (25.0%)*

53 (21.6%)

34 (19.7%)

25 (14.9%)

9 (3.7%) 245

6 (3.5%) 173

Maghrebian

5 (3.0%) 168

* Statistically significant difference from the corresponding autochthonous grouping at the 95% level.

Multivariate analysis of friendship patterns Patterns of friendship homogamy were clearly determined by ethnic/nationality grouping in all three countries, but a range of other factors influenced them. These in turn may have differed between respondents from different ethnic/nationality groupings. The dichotomous response variable was whether or not both friends were from the same ethnic/nationality group as the respondent. Table 9.6 summarises the results in terms of three alternative models. A number of factors could have determined friendship patterns. These included country of residence, gender, age, educational level of respondent, educational track of respondent, the liberalism of a respondent (as measured through attitudes towards homosexuality), whether a respondent had experienced ethnic discrimination, language used at home by the respondent, social class background, educational level of the respondent’s parents, the locality in which the respondent lived and ethnic/nationality group (see Appendix for further details on our measures of these concepts). Model 1 shows the coefficients from an a priori model that included indicators of all these factors (the contrast category in this initial model was German autochthonous male respondents aged 20, with


133

Table 9.6 Logistic regression models for the probability that both friends were from the same ethnic group as respondent

France Britain Turkish Yugoslavian Portuguese Maghrebian Pakistani Indian Identify with host country Identify with parental country Support foreign sports team Non-host language at home Religious, not Muslim Muslim Female Age (centred) Highest educational level Medium educational level Academic track at age 16 Left school at age 16 Liberal attitude to homosexuality Parent(s): Higher education Parent(s): Owner Parent(s): Professional Parent(s): Routine worker Parent(s): Not working Family educational advice Public educational advice

Model 1

Model 2

Paradigm

0.47** 5.52** 0.09** 0.07** 0.15** 0.29** 0.14** 0.16** –

0.39** 4.46** 0.06** 0.04** 0.07** 0.23** 0.07** 0.13** 1.05

National difference Ethnic asymmetry

–

2.01**

2.17**

–

1.31

1.42*

1.87**

1.87**

1.76**

–

1.78**

1.58

– 1.01 0.99 0.76

1.29 0.81* – –

Gender

Model 3 0.52* 7.03** 0.05** 0.03** 0.07** 0.19** 0.06** 0.09** 0.97

1.28 0.97 1.00 0.61

0.92

–

0.80

1.13

–

1.20

0.95

–

0.86

0.94

–

1.00

0.83

0.86

0.92

0.98

1.00

0.75

0.83

0.80

1.10

1.10

1.06

1.67

1.26

1.92*

–

1.41*

1.27

–

0.80

–

Social class

0.86

Continued


Table 9.6

Continued Model 1

Number of siblings See parents rarely Discrimination two or more situations Multiple national identification Vitry Rochdale Constant Nagelkerke R 2 N

Model 2

Paradigm

Model 3

–

1.01

Social class

–

– 1.17

1.15 1.27

Discrimination

–

0.98

0.69 0.48 5.46** 0.33 1,463

– 1.22

Cultural conflict

– – 2.39* 0.36 1,397

0.70 0.44 3.45** 0.38 1,234

Note: Blank cells marked (–) were not included in the model. (Significance levels: ** indicates < 1% and * indicates < 5%)

a low level of educational attainment who had entered a vocational track at age 16, with parents from a lower education level and from a ‘skilled worker’ background). Listwise deletion of cases with missing data was used, which substantially reduced the size of the sample.9 Both country of residence and ethnic/nationality group were significant determinants of whether a respondent was likely to report that both their friends were from their own ethnic/nationality group. British respondents were the most ethnically ‘isolated’, but within each country the autochthonous groups were relatively more segregated. These patterns persisted even after controlling for the effects of other explanatory factors. Gender and age were not significant predictors in this initial model; neither were educational attainment levels nor educational track. Parental educational and occupational background were generally not significant determinants of homogamous ethnic friendships. The one exception involved a weakly confirmed association between having parents whose socio-economic background involved either long-term unemployment or not working at all and homogamous ethnic friendships. Liberal social attitudes and experiences of discrimination were also not significant. However, there was evidence that people who spoke a language at home other than the host country language were more ethnically isolated. This is an important result because this variable applied almost exclusively to


135

respondents from international migrant backgrounds. It suggested that language preferences and usage marked an internal division within minority ethnic/nationality groups in terms of their relative ethnic isolation. The model also revealed some weak locality effects to friendship patterns in France and Britain: there was greater isolation in Tours and in Blackburn. As discussed in Chapter 4, various sociological paradigms provide differing explanations of the factors that affect the incorporation of ethnic/nationality groups in contemporary societies. Model 2 in Table 9.6 assessed patterns of friendship homogamy explicitly in terms of these frameworks. The explanatory factors covered the ‘social class’, ‘discrimination/prejudice’, ‘cultural conflict’, ‘ethnic asymmetry’, ‘gender’ and ‘national differences’ paradigms. Many of the effects were similar across the two models, but there were some interesting differences. The effect of gender in Model 2 was marginally significant (men were more likely to form ethnically homogamous friendships). This suggested that one of the variables in Model 1 had acted as a proxy for gender. Parental background was again insignificant. However, it was evident that another indicator from the ‘social class’ paradigm, namely whether a respondent mentioned their family as important in giving them advice on their educational choices, was a significant predictor in the model. Those taking such advice were significantly more segregated ethnically in their friendship patterns. The number of siblings made no difference to ethnic isolation. Neither did experience of discrimination nor whether an individual identified both with their host country and their country of parental origin (an indicator of cultural conflict). On the other hand, reporting a sense of identification with a foreign country was associated with a significant increase in ethnic isolation in this model. Identification with the host country made no difference, while supporting a foreign country in sports had a modest but non-significant effect. Speaking a language at home which was not that of the host country was once more a significant predictor of greater ethnic homogamy. Model 3 presents coefficients from a ‘saturated’ model that combined the two previous models. The results indicated that the combination of effects from Model 1 and Model 2 was primarily additive. In most cases, the parameter estimates followed similar patterns and the combined model improved upon the overall predictive power.


Model 3 revealed powerful national differences in patterns of ethnic friendship homogamy. All three countries were significantly different. Britain had particularly strong ethnic segregation in terms of friendships. Ethnic/nationality differences within countries were also significant. However, gender, age and the educational characteristics of respondents were not. Parental educational and class backgrounds were also not important, with the exception that respondents from families where the parent(s) were unemployed or not currently economically active (often taken as an indicator of socio-economic disadvantage) tended to be more ethnically homogamous. Speaking a non-host language at home increased the likelihood of ethnically homogamous friendships. While there was no discernible separate effect for Muslim respondents (any possible Muslim effect would probably have been captured by ethnic/nationality effects) nonMuslim religious respondents (in practice Christians) were far likelier to form ethnically homogamous friendships when compared to their non-religious counterparts. Overall, these multivariate models provided a very similar story to the earlier descriptive data on friendships. All autochthonous and allochthonous groups had a marked tendency to form friendships among their own ethnic/nationality group, but homogamy was most marked in Britain. The multivariate analyses indicated that these basic patterns were robust when examined in the context of the influence of a number of other explanatory factors. However, they also served to highlight the importance of a range of attitudes which were associated with ethnic friendship homogamy. These included several measures which indicated positive orientations towards the country of parental-origin. Marriage and partnership patterns The majority of EFFNATIS respondents were not married (see Table 9.7). This was not surprising, given the age range of the participants in the sample. Nonetheless, patterns of marriage did vary both between countries and between ethnic/nationality groups. Three of the four predominantly Muslim ethnic/nationality groups (Indians, Pakistanis and Turks) had higher marriage rates than their autochthonous counterparts. French Maghrebians were the exception. German and British allochthons had slightly younger mean ages of marriage.


Table 9.7

137

Marital/partnership status and age at marriage of respondents


Valid N

% Married

% Living with partner

% With a boyfriend/ girlfriend

Mean age at Marriage

215

3.3

11.6

35.8

21.9

285 282

12.6* 8.9

26.7 30.1

20.3 20.1

279

1.8

36.6

20.0

205 213

4.4 3.3

6.3* 7.0*

47.3* 45.5

21.9 21.5

398

4.8

8.3

47.7

21.6

173 127

14.5* 13.4*

0.6* 1.6*

37.0 52.0

21.0 19.9

1.8* 7.1 22.9

Note: Mean ages at marriage were not significantly different between any two groups at the 95% level. * Statistically significant difference from the corresponding autochthonous group at the 95% level.

In light of the low numbers of respondents who were married, the analyses below also included other types of relationships. ‘Partners’ in our definition included spouses, cohabiting but unmarried partners, and partners who the respondents did not live with such as girlfriends and boyfriends. Table 9.7 shows the proportion falling into each category by ethnic/nationality group. It was evident that many respondents did not live with a partner but did report having a boyfriend or girlfriend. When we examined the non-married cohabiting partners some interesting patterns emerged. Three of the predominantly Muslim groups had much lower levels of living with an unmarried partner. Once again the exception was Maghrebians in France. Non-cohabiting relationships, on the other hand, were common among all groups. Respondents were asked whether their partners were from the same ethnic group (Table 9.8). There were high levels of missing data, particularly in France where this question was considered particularly sensitive. Table 9.8 shows the percentage of ethnically endogamous partnerships defined alternatively with, and without, boyfriends and girlfriends. The differing definitions of a ‘partner’ as either any relationship (cohabiting or not) or, more strictly, as only cohabiting partners


Table 9.8 Partner from a different ethnic/nationality group to respondent Proportion where partner is from different ethnic group ‘Partner’ includes boyfriend/girlfriend

Percent German autochthonous Turkish Former-Yugoslav French autochthonous Portuguese Maghrebian British autochthonous Pakistani Indian

Number with a partner

‘Partner’ includes spouse/cohabitee only

Percent

Number with a partner

8.5

106

9.4

32

32.7* 54.4* 22.2

110 125 27

14.6 37.8* 11.0

41 45 9

67.9* 56.7* 5.4

28 30 56

40.0 33.0 6.1

5 6 33

0.0 2.3

51 43

0.0 0.0

25 16

Note: There were high levels of non-response to the question on partner’s ethnicity. Missing cases were excluded. * Statistically significant difference from the corresponding autochthonous grouping at the 95% level.

(including spouses) affected the degree of ethnic endogamy (see Table 9.8). Endogamy was greater using the more strictly defined relationship among allochthonous respondents in France and Germany. Exogamy was also lower among French autochthons when cohabitation per se was compared to wider partnership patterns. This suggested that closer partnership ties were associated with greater ethnic endogamy among most ethnic/nationality groups. The differences in levels of endogamy between ethnic/nationality groups were substantial. Allochthonous groups in France and Germany were more exogamous than comparable autochthonous respondents. There was also a clear ordering among the three countries. French respondents exhibited the greatest exogamy, with respondents in Germany intermediate and British respondents from all three ethnic/nationality backgrounds by far the most endogamous.


139

There were also considerable variations between the four predominantly Muslim groups. Indians and Pakistanis in Britain had very high endogamy rates (they were almost exclusively endogamous). Turks in Germany occupied an intermediate position. The most exogamous Muslim group were French Maghrebians. From an assimilationist perspective, these results revealed marked national differences, with French respondents the most ‘assimilated’ and British respondents the least. In order to assess the relative effects of a number of factors influencing endogamous partnerships, we used logistic regression to model the probability that a respondent who had a partner and gave data on their ethnicity was in a relationship with someone from a different ethnic group (contrasted to the probability that their partner had the same ethnic/nationality characteristics). Table 9.9 presents the results of two models with alternative sets of explanatory variables. In order to maximise sample sizes, our analysis here used the ‘looser’ definition of partnerships (namely, the one that included non-cohabiting relations). The first model in Table 9.9 was based upon the various theoretical models of incorporation specified earlier. It also incorporated indicators of the various sociological paradigms.10 The estimated odds ratios indicated whether explanatory factors tended to increase (value over 1.0) or decrease (value less than 1.0) the overall probability of an endogamous relationship. The model used the same contrast group as in the earlier modelling of friendship homogamy.11 Despite the earlier descriptive evidence that there was a very strong tendency in Britain for higher ethnic/nationality group marital endogamy, net national effects could not be detected in these models. This was due to two competing factors. First, the inclusion of other relevant main effects reduced the net, distinctive national effects associated with France and Britain (as compared to Germany). Second, the relative sparsity of the data may have affected the results. Within Germany and France, each minority ethnic/nationality group exhibited less partner endogamy than the respective German and French autochthonous groups. In Britain no ethnic/nationality effects could be estimated. Model 1 provided support for the notion of a net Muslim effect, with Muslims substantially more likely to have endogamous partnerships than non-Muslims. Similarly, whether a respondent spoke

140


Table 9.9 Logistic regression models for the probability that partner is from the same ethnic/nationality group as respondent Model 1 France Britain Turkish Yugoslavian Portuguese Maghrebian Pakistani Indian Identify with host country Support foreign sports team Non-host language at home Religious, not Muslim Muslim Female Age (centred) Highest educational level Medium educational level Liberal attitude to homosexuality Parent(s): Owner Parent(s): Professional Parent(s): Routine worker Parent(s): Not working See parents rarely See siblings rarely Discrimination 2+ situations Multiple national identification

0.71 1.69 0.03** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** n/a n/a 1.18 1.30 2.54** 1.70 5.26** 1.18 – – – – 1.46 0.94 1.34 3.73 1.71 0.57 1.31 1.54

Constant Nagelkerke R 2 N

4.58* 0.45 446

Paradigm National difference Ethnic asymmetry

Gender

Social class

Discrimination Cultural conflict

Model 2 0.99 2.52 0.03** 0.02** 0.01** 0.01** n/a n/a 1.03 1.50 2.77** 2.09 5.65** 1.21 1.10 0.84 0.87 1.12 1.34 0.79 1.36 5.80* 1.71 0.60 1.20 1.58 4.08 0.48 427

Note: Columns show odds ratios compared to the contrast category. Blank cells were not included in the model. Coefficients for Pakistani and Indian groups could not be estimated as a result of substantial multicollinearity. Significance levels: **indicates

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