Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration

Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration Also by Alpaslan Özerdem DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: Ear...

Author: Alpaslan Özerdem | Sukanya Podder (Editors)

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Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration

Also by Alpaslan Özerdem DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: Earthquake Relief in Japan, Turkey and India (co-authored with Tim Jacoby) POST-WAR RECOVERY: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES IN DEVELOPMENT AND POST DISASTER/CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION (co-edited with Richard Bowd)

Also by Sukanya Podder SRI LANKA: Search for Peace (co-edited with Alok Bansal and M. Mayilvaganan)

Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration Edited by

Alpaslan Özerdem Professor and Chair in Peacebuilding, Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies (CPRS), Coventry University, UK

Sukanya Podder Lecturer in International Politics and Development, Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK

Introduction, selection and editorial matter © Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder 2011 Individual chapters © contributors 2011 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–24196–1 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Child soldiers : from recruitment to reintegration / edited by Alpaslam Özerdem, Sukanya Podder. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978–0–230–24196–1 (hardback) 1. Child soldiers. 2. Child soldiers—Rehabilitation. 3. Children and war. I. Özerdem, Alpaslan. II. Podder, Sukanya. UB418.C45C38 2011 355.3 3083—dc23 2011021116 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

This book is dedicated to two very special people in our lives Mehpare Demir and Sipra Podder, a sister and mother par excellence, who have dedicated their lives to their children.

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Contents

List of Tables and Figures

x

Acknowledgements

xi

List of Abbreviations

xii

Notes on Contributors

xvi

Part I 1 The Long Road Home: Conceptual Debates on Recruitment Experiences and Reintegration Outcomes Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder

3

Part II 2 Why Do Children Fight? Motivations and the Mode of Recruitment Scott Gates

29

3 Child Soldier Recruitment in the Liberian Civil Wars: Individual Motivations and Rebel Group Tactics Sukanya Podder

50

4 Group Cohesion and Coercive Recruitment: Young Combatants and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone Krijn Peters 5 Girl Soldiers in Guatemala Wenche Hauge

76

91

6 Resilience Amidst Risks for Recruitment: A Case Study of ‘At Risk’ Children in Colombia Ryan Burgess vii

104

viii Contents

7 How Voluntary? The Role of Community in Youth Participation in Muslim Mindanao Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder

122

Part III 8 Neither Child nor Soldier: Contested Terrains in Identity, Victimcy and Survival Sukanya Podder

141

Identity 9 ‘But I’m a Man’: The Imposition of Childhood on and Denial of Identity and Economic Opportunity to Afghanistan’s Child Soldiers Steven A. Zyck 10 Socialization and Reintegration Challenges: A Case Study of the Lord’s Resistance Army Lotte Vermeij

159

173

Victimcy 11 Social Navigation and Power in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone: Reflections from a Former Child Soldier Turned Bike Rider Myriam Denov

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12 Victimcy as Social Navigation: From the Toolbox of Liberian Child Soldiers Mats Utas

213

Survival 13 Mozambique Life Outcome Study: How Did Child Soldiers Turn Out as Adults? Neil Boothby 14 Exclusion or Reintegration: Child Soldiers in Angola Jaremey R. McMullin

231 246

Part IV 15 Child Soldier Reintegration in Sudan: A Practitioner’s Field Experience Patrick Halton

269

Contents

16 Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Nepal: Grassroots Reflections Dilli Raj Binadi and Pratisha Dewan Binadi

ix

284

Part V 17 Mapping Child Soldier Reintegration Outcomes: Exploring the Linkages Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder

309

Index

323

List of Tables and Figures

Tables 3.1 Profile of armed groups in Liberia (1995–1996) 3.2 Affiliational distribution in respondent sample 3.3 Ethnic disaggregation of respondent sample by armed faction 3.4 Why did you join? (1990–1996) 3.5 Why did you join? (1999–2003) 3.6 Child recruitment and armed groups (1990–2003) 3.7 Armed group recruitment tactics 7.1 Respondent averages 9.1 Age of recruitment into Mujahideen group in Afghanistan 9.2 Adult reintegration options via ANBP and level of uptake

51 55 56 58 61 65 68 123 161 167

Figures 12.1 Photo from the production of ‘Johnny Mad Dog’ (Courtesy: Nonstop Entertainment) 15.1 Management Arrangements Diagram for DDR in Sudan 16.1 Gender-wise distribution of CAAFAG 16.2 Reasons for joining 16.3 Political map of Nepal 16.4 Map of Cantonment sites during DDR in Nepal

x

216 273 286 288 289 295

Acknowledgements

This volume originated during one of our many lunches at the university cafeteria, marking a convergence of ideas from recent field expeditions, our interest in the area of ex-combatant reintegration and child soldiers seemed well-poised to converse with the growing literature on rebel group recruitment. In time, this idea unleashed a momentum of its own. The volume became possible as a collection of original papers based on empirical work, which were thematically organized to bring together a host of leading scholars and practitioners we had worked with and were interested in collaborating. Acknowledgements are due to several people, first, we would like to thank our publishers Palgrave Macmillan and the British Academy which funded our research in Mindanao, Philippines. We are also thankful to the contributors of this volume for their time, patience and cooperation; our field work partners, research assistants and research subjects for their trust, consent and support for our research. Thanks are due to our families and friends for their love and support which make such academic ventures and field trips possible. We hope that this volume on child soldiers will bring forward fresh insights pertaining to civil conflict and post-conflict reconstruction in the future.

xi

List of Abbreviations

AFP AFRC ALP ANBP ANP APC AREA ARMM ASG ATU BDF BRAC CAAC CAAFAG CAAFAG WG CAFF CAGFU CBR CCWB CDF CID CNRSPDD CPA CPAs CPN CPN-M CRC CREPS CVICT

Armed Forces of the Philippines Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Accelerated Learning Programme Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme Afghan National Police All People’s Congress Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao Abu Sayyaf Group Anti-Terrorist Unit Bong Defence Force Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee Children and Armed Conflict Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups Working Group Children or minors Associated with Fighting Forces Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit Community-Based Reintegration Central Child Welfare Board Civil Defence Forces Corporación Infancia y Desarrollo Comissão Nacional de Reintegração Social e Productiva does Desmobilizados e Deslocados Comprehensive Peace Agreement Child Protection Agencies Child Protection Network Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists Convention on the Rights of a Child Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools Centre for Victims of Torture xii

List of Abbreviations xiii

CWIN CZOP DCWB DDR DPA DRC DSWD ECOMOG ECOWAS EGP ELN FAA FALA FAO FAPLA FAR FARC FGDs FGT FLEC FMLN FNLA FRELIMO GoL GRP GTZ HRW ICBF ICCs ICRC IDDRP IDDRS IDPs IHRICON

Child Workers in Nepal Concerned Centre Children as Zones of Peace District Child Welfare Board Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Darfur Peace Agreement Democratic Republic of Congo Department of Social Welfare and Development Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres National Liberation Army Angolan Armed Forces Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola Food and Agriculture Organization Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Focus Group Discussions Fundación Guillermo Toriello Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front National Liberation Front of Angola Liberation Front of Mozambique Government of Liberia Government of the Republic of Philippines German Agency for Technical Cooperation Human Rights Watch Instituto Colombia de Bienestar Familiar Interim Care Centres International Committee of the Red Cross Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards Internally Displaced Persons Institute of Human Rights Communication Nepal

xiv List of Abbreviations

ILO INGO INPFL INSEC IR IRC IRSEM KIIs LDF LDRCs LNH LPC LRA LURD MDDTs MILF MIM MNLF MoA MODEL MoU MPIGO MPLA NCDDR NPA NPFL NPRC NSDDRC OAG OAU ORPA P/RRA PGT PLA RENAMO RNA

International Labour Organisation International Non-Governmental Organization Independent NPFL Informal Sector Service Centre International Relations International Rescue Committee Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Military Personnel Key Informant interviews Lofa Defence Force Local Demobilization and Reintegration Committees Liberia New Horizons Liberian Peace Council Lord’s Resistance Army Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy Mobile Demobilization Documentation Teams Moro Islamic Liberation Front Muslim Independence Movement Moro National Liberation Front Memorandum of Agreement Movement for Democracy in Liberia Memorandum of Understanding Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand-Ouest People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration New People’s Army National Patriotic Front of Liberia National Provisional Ruling Council North Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Other Armed Groups Organization for African Unity Organización del Pueblo en Armas Participatory and Rapid Rural Appraisal Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo People’s Liberation Army Mozambican National Resistance Royal Nepalese Army

List of Abbreviations xv

RSM RUF SAB SAF SBU SCF-USA SLA SLA SPLA SPLM SSDDRC SSS STC SZOP TPO UCEP ULIMO-K UN UNAMID UNAVEM-II UNCRC UNDDR UNDHA UNDP UNDPKO UNICEF UNMIN UNMIS URNG WACA

Raja Solaiman Movement Revolutionary United Front Solidarité Afghanistan Belgium Sudan Armed Forces Small Boys Unit Save the Children USA Sierra Leone Army Sudan Liberation Army Sudan People’s Liberation Army Sudan People’s Liberation Movement South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Special Security Service Save the Children School as Zone of Peace Trans-Cultural Psychosocial Organization Underprivileged Children Education Programme United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy Kromah United Nations United Nations and African Mission in Darfur United Nations Angola Verification Mission United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Unit United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs United Nations Development Programme United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund United Nations Mission in Nepal United Nations Mission in Sudan Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca War Affected Children Association


Dilli Raj Binadi is a development worker in the area of child protection particularly in the reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (CAAFAG) in Nepal. He has managed several projects focusing on peacebuilding and child protection, that is, Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC), Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Nepal, Education for Youth; Youth for Peace and Development during Conflict and Post-conflict settings in Nepal. He also has experience conducting research, project evaluations and situational studies. He has experience of working with government and non-government (both national and international NGOs) sectors for more than ten years. Currently, he is associated with Save the Children in Nepal as a Project Coordinator. He holds an MA in Peace and Reconciliation Studies from Coventry University, UK and an MA in Sociology from Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal. Neil Boothby is a Professor of Clinical Population and Family Health at Columbia University, USA and Director for the Program on Forced Migration and Health. His most recent book – A World Turned Upside Down: Social Ecological Approaches to Children in War Zones (2006) – reframes from the common perceptions of children as victims of war-induced trauma to provide a holistic understanding of children’s experiences. He is the recipient of a number of awards for his work with war and refugee children, including the Red Cross Humanitarian of the Year Award, the Mickey Leland Award and Golden Globe Award from the United Nations. Dr Boothby served in senior level positions for the United Nations and international non-governmental agencies in Geneva, Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Ryan Burgess is currently an education consultant with the InterAmerican Development Bank based in Trinidad and Tobago. Ryan has a doctorate in International Educational Development (IED) from Teachers College, Columbia University (TC), USA and a Masters in Education from TC in IED, specializing in Curriculum and Teaching. Ryan was a Peace Scholar with the United States Institute of Peace, which supported xvi


xvii

his dissertation writing. His dissertation focused on analysing how formal and non-formal education in Colombia address the psychosocial factors that influence the resilience and coping mechanisms of children at risk of recruitment into armed groups. Previously, Ryan worked with the International Rescue Committee on analysing programmes for former child soldiers; Forefront, a human rights defenders organization, offering technical programme support to grassroots organizations in various countries; and Catholic Relief Services as Program Manager for education programmes in Southeast Europe and Armenia. He has also conducted research on the relationship between policy reform and fieldbased approaches to formal and non-formal education programmes for street children and children associated with fighting forces in Latin America, Africa and Asia. He has conducted field work in Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica and Tanzania. Myriam Denov obtained her PhD from the University of Cambridge, UK where she was a Commonwealth Scholar. She is presently an Associate Professor in the School of Social Work at McGill University, Canada. Her research and teaching interests lie in the areas of children and youth at risk, with an emphasis on war and political violence and war-affected children. She has published widely in the realms of children and armed conflict, children’s rights and gender-based violence and has worked with vulnerable populations internationally including former child soldiers, victims of sexual violence and people living with HIV/AIDS. Her current research, supported by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, is exploring the militarization and reintegration experiences of former child soldiers in Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. Myriam Denov has presented expert evidence on child soldiers and has served as an advisor to government and NGOs on children and armed conflict, and girls in fighting forces. She is author of Child Soldiers: Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (2010). Scott Gates is Research Professor and Director of the Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW), International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and Professor of Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Norway. He received his MA and PhD degrees in Political Science from the University of Michigan and an MS degree in Applied Economics from the University of Minnesota, USA. From 1989 to 2003, Gates was at the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University, where he chaired 14 doctoral dissertations. His books include Working, Shirking and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response

xviii Notes on Contributors

to a Democratic Public (1997), Games, Information, and Politics (1997), Game Theory Topics: Incomplete Information, Repeated Games, and N-player Games (1998) and Teaching, Tasks, and Trust: The Functions of the Public Executive (2008). Gates has also published in the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Review of Development Economics, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, inter alia. He is an Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and serves on the editorial board of International Studies Quarterly. Gates’s current research interests include: organization theory, post-conflict governance, civil war, mobilization and recruitment and child soldiers, as well as terrorism and other forms of political violence. Patrick Halton is Child Protection Specialist for UNICEF. He is based in Manila, Philippines where he works with children associated with armed forces and groups. He holds a postgraduate degree in Post-War Recovery Studies from the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit at the University of York, as well as a degree in Human Geography and Tamil Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, UK. He has worked with disadvantaged children for a social welfare NGO in South India, as a delegate for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Project Officer with UNICEF in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Sudan. As an ICRC delegate Patrick has fielded many cases of escape and surrender by underage soldiers from Tamil guerrilla forces, and in 2004 was central to UNICEF’s involvement in the Action Plan for Children Affected by War in Sri Lanka, helping conceptualize social recovery initiatives and working with community-based organizations to establish appropriate and sustainable programmes for reintegration. In 2005, he spent a year running the UNICEF Child Protection section on the island of Nias, North Sumatra, during which tenure he gave a presentation to the South East Asia Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers on principles and processes for child disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). Since 2007, Patrick has focused on children affected by war in Sudan, formulating a reintegration strategy for Blue Nile state and monitoring and reporting on child rights violations in North Darfur and is now engaged with CAAF reintegration associated with armed groups in the Philippines. Wenche Hauge holds a PhD in Political Science and is a Senior Researcher at Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway. Her dissertation, Causes and Dynamics of Conflict Escalation: The Role of Economic


xix

Development and Environmental Change. A Comparative Study of Haiti, Guatemala, Bangladesh, Senegal, Madagascar and Tunisia, was defended in September 2002. In addition to her work on the roles of economic development and renewable resources in conflict causation, she has also been involved in several projects on peace processes and conflict resolution. She was also involved in the Utstein Peacebuilding Project, a study of the peacebuilding experiences of four countries – Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK – who together constitute the socalled Utstein Group. She is currently working on a project on Domestic Capabilities for Peaceful Conflict Management, a comparative study of peaceful conflict management in Ecuador, Madagascar, Tunisia and Venezuela, funded by the Norwegian Research Council. Jaremey R. McMullin is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of St Andrews, Scotland. He holds a DPhil from Oxford, UK and earlier studied at Georgetown University, USA. He is interested in the nature of internal conflict and the process of post-conflict transition, particularly as they relate to states in sub-Saharan Africa. His primary research interest is the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, given the critical importance of DDR to the consolidation of post-conflict security and development. His research seeks to analyse the impact of reintegration programmes on post-conflict security and explore the consequences of incomplete reintegration. Additional research interests include the role of the United Nations in post-conflict peacekeeping and peacebuilding; the tension between norms of intervention and sovereignty during conflict and post-conflict transition; the regional security implications of conflict and post-conflict transition in areas such as West Africa and the Greater Great Lakes region of central Africa; and the impact of transitional justice on post-conflict security. He has published articles and book chapters on ex-combatant reintegration in Namibia and Mozambique as well as on the role of non-state criminal groups during conflict. Alpaslan Özerdem is Professor of Peacebuilding at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University, UK. With field research experience in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Turkey, he specializes in the politics of humanitarian interventions, security sector reform, reintegration of former combatants and post-conflict state-building. He has initiated and managed consultancy

xx


and commissioned research projects for a wide range of national and international organizations. He is co-author of Disaster Management and Civil Society: Earthquake Relief in Japan, Turkey and India (2006), author of Post War Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (2008) and co-editor of Participatory Research Methodologies in Development and Post Disaster/Conflict Reconstruction (2010). Krijn Peters is a rural development sociologist, working at the Centre for Development Studies, Swansea University, Wales. He specializes in armed conflict and post-war reconstruction. His main interests are in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes for ex-combatants, child soldiers, youth marginalization and exclusion, and rural and agrarian development. He has over ten years of research experience in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Sukanya Podder is Lecturer in International Politics and Development, Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University, UK. With field research experience in Liberia, Mindanao, Sri Lanka and India, Sukanya specializes in qualitative research methods and participatory action research. Her next book is Youth in Conflict and Peacbuilding: Mobilization, Reintegration and Reconciliation (with A. Özerdem) (2012). She is co-editor of Sri Lanka: Search for Peace (2007). Pratisha Dewan Binadi is a development worker and has experience of more than six years in the field of child protection. She has experience working with non-governmental sectors, international organizations and the United Nations. She has managed various projects related to the Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAFAG) in Nepal, Elimination of Worst Forms of Child Labour and Combating Silent Sufferings of Children, and Child Sexual Abuse. Currently, she is working for the United Nations. She holds a Masters degree in Sociology, and a degree in Women Studies from Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal having earlier completed a Bachelor’s degree in Social Work from Kathmandu University, Kathmandu, Nepal. Mats Utas is Associate Professor at the Nordic Africa Institute and the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities, Sweden. He received a PhD in Cultural Anthropology from the University of Uppsala, Sweden in 2003 and has since published numerous journal articles and book chapters on themes such as youth, civil wars, gender


xxi

and media. Utas is the co-editor of Navigating Youth, Generating Adulthood: Social Becoming in an African Context (2006). He has conducted field work in Ivory Coast (1996), Liberia (1998) and most recently Sierra Leone (2004–2006). His current research centres on socio-economic networks of street-corner youth in post-war Sierra Leone. Lotte Vermeij is a PhD candidate in Disaster Studies at Wageningen University, the Netherlands, and an affiliate of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). Lotte received her BA from University College Maastricht, the Netherlands, and studied Political Science at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada. She completed an MPhil. degree in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Oslo, Norway, and then relocated to Africa where she is currently researching on the socialization of child soldiers within rebel groups. Steven A. Zyck is at the NATO office in Virginia, USA. For the past several years, he has worked with and advised think tanks, foreign governments, international NGOs and intergovernmental organizations in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, the USA, the UK and the Pacific. In 2006, Zyck conducted an evaluation of former combatant reintegration in Afghanistan on behalf of a major international organization. He specializes in the social and economic recovery of conflictaffected societies with dual emphases on the reintegration of former combatants and rural livelihoods. He has a Bachelor’s degree with high honours from Dartmouth College, USA, and, as a Fulbright Scholar, earned a Master’s degree with distinction in Post-war Recovery from the University of York, UK. Zyck has published on a variety of issues pertaining to former combatant reintegration, gender, peacebuilding and foreign policy.


Part I


1 The Long Road Home: Conceptual Debates on Recruitment Experiences and Reintegration Outcomes Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder

Recruitment experiences and reintegration outcomes: The missing link? This volume is about the important processes involved in young people’s participation in civil conflict. It seeks to define the trajectories of children’s lives in war zones, and highlights the interlinkages, connections and mediated impacts of recruitment into rebel groups, in-group socialization, training and indoctrination. In particular, the authors show how these can influence post conflict return and reintegration outcomes for youth who live through conflict. Immersion into the fighter’s world is an important disjuncture in the ‘normal’ prewar life of children who become part of armed groups. On account of children’s incomplete socialization and maturation process within family settings, in-group experiences are important processual influences which impact on young minds, involving elements of identity transformation, and rebirth into the world of being a rebel or child soldier. Relationships within these groups with commanders and peers create a semblance of regularity and stability in a world where every moment is insecure. Children adopt new norms and ways of life in the fighting world with little resistance, developing deep loyalty for commanders who maltreated and abused them, in a radical inversion of values. Irrespective of whether recruits enter an armed organization with homogeneous or disparate norms and beliefs, socialization processes after induction provide the glue for group cohesion, reorienting cultural norms and beliefs through a mix of violence, submission and selective incentives. Rebel 3

4

The Long Road Home

groups vary in their socialization practices, from using mass killing, ceremonial induction, ritualistic initiation to gang rape, to reinforce the public image of ‘rebel’ as a killer, as destructive and dissociated from the norms of community in which these small soldiers grew up as children. While issues of recruitment, of volition-coercion, structure and agency in the organization of rebellion have received considerable academic attention, the markers and cues for ensuring a safe and successful transition to civilian identity, gainful livelihoods and socially acceptable, conducive return remains a little understood terrain. Recent efforts to tabulate adult ex-combatant reintegration outcomes and recruitment patterns through survey techniques in Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004b, 2006, 2007), Liberia (Pugel, 2006), Colombia (Kalyvas and Arjona, 2007) and Burundi (Taylor et al., 2006) are exclusive in their omission of child-specific concerns. At the same time large number of children who have fought in civil conflicts in the past decade and some 200,000 (UN, 2009) who continue to live through war present considerable post conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and identity transformation challenges for donors, international agencies and national governments. Here we view the entire process of recruitment, time spent in the group, issues of cohesion, identification, affiliation, membership and the post demobilization experience of return, resettlement and reintegration as an interrelated continuum. There are different theoretical approaches to the recruitment–reintegration relationship in civil war literature. Recruitment can be approached in terms of the various schools of thought on civil war onset, especially organization theory, which addresses mobilization of armed factions in terms of how rebellions and insurgencies are financed, organized and sustained in terms of resources and manpower (Gurr, 1970; Gates, 2002; Weinstein, 2005). It subsumes the greed-grievance (Collier, 1994; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), social needs (Burton, 1990) and cultural–ideational explanations which explain individual participation in civil conflict. Reintegration, on the other hand, is essentially a ‘theory less field’ (Nilsson, 2005). Prevailing reintegration discourses underline the need for conceptualizing or approaching the reintegration process as constituted by distinct social, economic, psychological, political and security considerations (Berdal, 1998; UNDP, 2000; Kingma, 2000; Lichem, 2006; Pugel, 2008a). Reintegration approaches are at present focused on divergent targeting strategies which in turn seem informed by angular lines of thinking. If reintegration is combatant focused, then the preferential treatment argument (Özerdem, 2008) is leveraged; on the other hand, community-based and community-driven reintegration justifies

Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder 5

the widening of target groups and beneficiaries. Recent approaches also advocate the use of critical and problem-solving theory (Jennings, 2008d) wherein reintegration is viewed as part of post conflict social reform processes (Jennings, 2008c). The other debate pertains to how far participation in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes per say can contribute to reintegration. For sceptics (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004a; Nilsson, 2005) reintegration is essentially a social process, and unrelated to DDR programmes, which have little to contribute towards the return process and in most instances the family, and the home community of ex-combatants bear the onus of responsibility for reintegration success at an individual level. Besides these, a huge body of work on ex-offender reintegration and juvenile justice looks at this return to civilian/social living from the prism of social deviance (Özerdem, 2010). Prevailing reintegration discourses underline the need for conceptualizing or approaching the reintegration process as constituted by distinct social, economic, psychological, political and security dimensions/considerations (Berdal, 1998; UNDP, 2000; Kingma, 2002; Pugel, 2008a). These are contested domains mired in ambiguity. Trajectories and dynamics in child soldier reintegration and measurement of its outcome presents a significant gap in the literature which needs to be addressed to fully grasp the nuances of their reintegration and return. Central to this endeavour is the need for disaggregating experiences across gender, age and spatial characteristics. Experiences of war differ depending on the individual location, motivation, group membership, age and gender dimensions and hence transitions to civilian life at war’s end mandate a deeper understanding of this diversity. Given the limited timeframes and resources available for DDR programmes, together with the political and security risks which predominate in post war environments, recent studies (Jennings, 2007; Porto et al., 2007) have sought to impart leverage to the significance of the reinsertion stage. In this line of thinking, a better use of international community resources lies in possibly de-linking disarmament and demobilization from reintegration, relegating reintegration programming to the developmental realm and expanding the role of reinsertion assistance within DDR to provide necessary and targeted support within a practical and time-bound mandate following disarmament and demobilization. This has resulted in more recent DDR programmes, for instance, in the Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and Sudan, developing the reinsertion segment as a separate stage in the sequence of processes involved in DDR.

6

The Long Road Home

Researching youth participation in conflict and post conflict outcomes At present, some academic and policy-specific research focuses on distinct categories of the recruitment-reintegration continuum. Countryspecific literature (Boothby et al., 2006; Wessels and Monteiro, 2006; Uvin, 2007; Annan et al., 2007) seeks to identify causal variables in terms of recruitment and enlistment motivations, the results of reintegration programming and its impact on longitudinal research designs and explorations into the psycho-social and community dimensions of reintegration processes. Some study the impact of abuse within an armed group and its impact on reintegration outcomes (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004a); others examine how coercive recruitment, especially abduction (Amone, 2007; Annan and Blattman, 2008), impact on reintegration outcomes. In a more psycho-social flavour several studies (Kohrt et al., 2008; Betancourt et al., 2010a, 2010b) examine the mental and psychological impacts of coercive recruitment and participation, while some invoke the social ecology and well-being frameworks to look at recuperative and regenerative capacities in post war contexts. Within this body of literature some research (Honwana, 1998) has also examined the specific role of tradition and culture in reintegration success. But on the whole the literature appears scattered and disjointed with few studies exploring the entire spectrum and the intrinsic linkages between recruitment experience and reintegration outcomes. Few systematic efforts have been made to evaluate the determinants of successful reintegration by ex-combatants after conflict (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004a, p. 3). Veering around the participation-nonparticipation axis, an important question that has come to be addressed by recent studies (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004a, p. 2) pertains to the extent to which participation in internationally funded DDR programmes impacts upon the success of post conflict reintegration? In the absence of this knowledge a culture of liminality prevails, decentring the role of youth from being critical actors during conflict to mostly overlooked and marginalized entities in peacebuilding (Utas, 2005b). Hence the potential for return to violence and volatility makes it imperative to undertake a closer study into the deeper underpinnings of reintegration success for child soldiers in post conflict and transitional contexts. Given that the physical and social environment into which settlers return has been affected by intangible, invisible changes, both the host communities and the returnees must relearn the principles of community living. Hence reintegration involves on the whole a complex series


of interrelated processes, through which people who have experienced different things and developed different conceptions and attitudes must renegotiate and rebuild identities and livelihoods. Some of the discursive challenges which remain and need to be tackled involve the identification of factors which contribute to, or hinder, reintegration, together with the intended and unintended outcomes of reintegration policies and strategies; the responses of returnees to their new environment; and finally the impact of the political environment on reintegration. Nilsson (2005) makes a significant point here, namely that the reintegration process stands apart from the reintegration programme itself. The main tug of war in current reintegration programming appears to be polarized between the choices of vocational training versus a return to education or catch up education modules. Given that many former child soldiers demobilize as adults or are matured in terms of their personal and social responsibilities with child and family, they often find a return to formal education unremunerative and hence a less preferred choice in light of their economic needs. Vocational training modules too have drawbacks. In the recent past, several attempts in West Africa, for instance, in Sierra Leone, have presented good lessons on the need to be far more careful with planning such initiatives. The primary consideration is market analysis to understand the underlying economic structure – for instance, in a predominantly agrarian economy with unclear rights over land and limited access to cultivable land, farming can be a problematic choice. Similarly, with limited urban areas, skills like carpentry and motor mechanics can also result in too many people competing for relatively few openings in these areas. Hence the critical question pertains to the kind of training and the prevalent market for these skills which should guide programmes for former combatants and child soldiers. Repeatedly this has been a major drawback of reintegration programmes, namely that training provided is often easier for the programme but irrelevant to the context and of little use to combatants in the long term. For instance, the DDR programme in Sierra Leone overlooked the importance of an agricultural package for providing sustainable livelihoods to returning combatants. Former combatants who were forced to join agricultural activities in light of poor employability in other sectors in Sierra Leone did so without the implements and tools that would have been at their disposal had they been able to receive help under the DDR programme. This oversight suggests that the agricultural sector and allied tools and benefits (vouchers for seeds,

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The Long Road Home

fertilizers) should be a key area of emphasis in reintegration programmes for agrarian economies (Peters, 2007). Recent ethnographic research in Liberia reveals that social reintegration outcomes of ex-combatant youth varied across the rural–urban spatial divide; in many ways processes of reintegration also offset a process of remarginalization for marginalized youth who participated in conflict to change monopolistic, corrupt and gerontocratic structures entrenched in Liberian society (Utas, 2005b, pp. 137–138). Former combatants who returned to a rural life, and opted for agriculture, were over time more self-sustainable and integrated within their communities compared to ex-combatants who remained in Monrovia, and opted for vocational training schemes, since skills like carpentry had limited demand in the labour market (Peters, 2007; Maclay and Özerdem, 2010). Land redistribution challenges have also problematized post conflict community rebuilding in El Salvador (Dickson-Gomez, 2002) and in Mindanao, Philippines. Another crucial issue with the reintegration process is that of beneficiaries. There is a mistaken tendency to regard the caseload of former combatants as homogeneous, overlooking the significant variations based on gender, age, disability, ethnicity, military ranking, education and vocational skills which even small caseloads encompass. In fact the range of needs, capacities and expectations of former combatants tends to be wide depending on these specificities/characteristics (Özerdem, 2008). Timing of support is also important, for instance, in Angola many former combatants left the province of Uige because of the lack of sustainable living conditions (Porto and Parsons, 2003, p. 56). Gender dimensions of reintegration are also relevant and often overlooked in several conflicts like in Eritrea where 25 per cent of former combatants were women, with more than 35 per cent of households of ex-refugees female headed, their problems were unique, and unfortunately neglected by policy makers (Mehreteab, 2004, p. xiv). At the same time DDR programming has evolved over the years to encompass broader agendas, and ambitious mandates, expanding the focus from the ex-combatant group – male, women and children – to include the wider civilian community, the disabled, refugees and the internally displaced through indirect linkages with other kinds of transitional assistance programming in the post war recovery phase. One of the correlates of DDR planning here which is often overlooked is the overall economic situation in which programmes are attempted. Much of the literature on reintegration discusses the inevitability of conflict recurrence if ex-combatants return to abject poverty (McMullin,


2004). This raises critical issues of sustainable livelihoods and socioeconomic well-being for both the caseload of combatants and their receiving communities. The challenges posed by poverty in this context is a critical factor to consider as it would be decisive in the way reintegration benefits will be needed and translated into programmes. As discussed above, benefits of newly gained vocational skills or microenterprise schemes created as part of reintegration could only be realized if there is a sufficient demand and absorptive capacity in the economy. The issues of corruption, economic insecurity and infrastructural challenges in the financial system can also undermine the utility of certain types of reintegration assistance. Therefore, it is essential to consider macro-economic indicators and issues of poverty in planning DDR responses (Özerdem and Podder, 2008, p. 14). Looking closely at the loci of youth in this landscape, it has to be conceded that in post conflict settings youth face a dual and complex transition, while life-stages preceding adulthood are characterized by complex and challenging transitions, conflict exacerbates the transition to adulthood by breaking down social norms and cultural practices, disrupting education systems and employment opportunities and for many youth, promoting a sense of identity based on the exertion of power through violence. This reality on the ground has been theoretically complemented by an incipient discourse on children and armed conflict which approaches the concept of children and youth from a protectionist-vulnerability axis, youth are empowered with a wide range of non-negotiable rights; on the other hand, there is the security perspective, which approaches children and youth within a threat dynamic. Youth combatants in this framework need to be contained, reformed, disarmed, demobilized and rehabilitated with economic, educational choices and vocational training opportunities. These two prongs have now come to be mediated by the developmental lens, which engages the broader perspective on youth participation in conflict, and in post conflict recovery, by placing emphasis on youth participation, agency, empowerment and positive capacities. One of the hybrid analytical frameworks invoked to conceptualize/theorize youth’s role in a post accord environment transmutes between overlapping categories of victims/perpetrators, violence producers/peace producers and conflict reproduction/conflict transformation (McEvoy Levy, 2006, pp. 12–15). These are contested domains mired in ambiguity, hence there is a need today to collate and compare findings on child soldier recruitment experiences and reintegration outcomes across disciplinary and

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The Long Road Home

methodological particularities, which can help inform policy makers and planners with the essential prerequisites for ensuring successful reintegration of child participants in armed conflict and in designing interventions. Trends in reintegration outcome seem critical to making the transition complete, offering meaningful opportunities which can undermine the lure of a return to arms and criminality. In the absence of this knowledge a culture of liminality, decentring the role of youth from being critical actors during conflict to mostly overlooked and marginalized entities in peacebuilding dominates (Utas, 2006). Hence the potential for return to violence and volatility makes it imperative to undertake a closer study into the deeper underpinnings of reintegration success for child soldiers in post conflict and transitional contexts.

Case evidence and new insights on recruitment and reintegration Trajectories and dynamics in child soldier recruitment and measurement of reintegration outcomes presents a significant gap in the literature and a methodological challenge which needs to be addressed to fully grasp the nuances of former combatants’ reintegration and return. Central to this endeavour is the need for disaggregating experiences across, gender, age and spatial characteristics. Experiences of war differ depending on the individual location, motivation, group membership, age and gender dimensions and hence transitions to civilian life at war’s end mandate a deeper understanding of this diversity. Taking account of the fact that both recruitment and reintegration can be variously conceptualized, instead of adopting any one particular perspective, this volume will adopt an inclusive framework. By weaving together diverse perspectives, it would be possible for different contributors to the volume to present their case-related analysis, findings from a particular angle. However, those different issues will be brought together in a cohesive way by the theoretical chapters in each part and in the conclusions. Part I of the book conceptually develops the recruitment experience and reintegration outcomes linkage and reviews the available literature on the subject, by weaving them into an inclusive framework. This framework is elaborated through the remaining chapters in the second and third parts, which develop the recruitment and reintegration dimensions, respectively; the theoretical chapters (Chapters 1, 2, 8 and 17) in the volume act as links between them and help illustrate the recruitment-reintegration relationship further.


In Part II, the chapters are organized as follows. Gates provides an overarching theoretical framework within which to locate the different precipitants, motivations and contextual specificities of child recruitment and participation in civil conflict. Podder examines the dynamics of child recruitment in the Liberian civil wars from the dual prism of individual motivations and rebel group tactics. Podder’s analysis suggests that recruitment in Liberia as in every context was a product of overarching structural conditions, amidst pressures of displacement, homelessness and familial separation and loss, which created challenges for physical survival. While coercive recruitment, abduction and pressganging have been played up in current renditions on child soldiering in Liberia, her field results suggest that recruitment and re-recruitment in various armed groups and phases of the conflict were mediated both by the push of war-induced hardships and the pull of recruitment appeals. War in some respects became an opportunity for rise to prominence, something which pre-war Liberian society did not allow for youth. This empirical evidence aligns with the reality of active agency, social navigation and deliberate tactical choice in surviving a dangerous landscape. The child soldier problem also increasingly defies gender boundaries. While girl soldiers fall within the larger issue of child soldiers primarily because both boy and girl soldiers legally belong to the special category of minors or children, there exists an additional and disturbing gendered component to the girls’ experiences, which needs to be addressed separately. In many respects girls are fundamental to the war machine and to warscapes, yet by virtue of being children and on account of their femininity are relegated to standard victim images, as camp followers, wives and sex slaves, soldiering as a role remains a muted reality for most. This imagery results in the invisibility and marginalization of their participation narratives, perpetuating a peripheral and muted return to pre-war patrimonial structures of domination and control and results in their neglect and exclusion in DDR programmes (Denov, 2008; Mackenzie, 2009, p. 294). As a result, new roles and capacities that girls adopted or developed during wartime are undermined (McKay, 2005). But both inside groups and in post war societies girl soldiers, especially former commanders, have been noted for their military skills, and for tactical agency in striking alliances, liaisons and often performing the role of recruiters themselves for regional mercenary groups (HRW, 2005; Utas, 2005b). In line with such considerations, Hauge’s chapter on girl soldiers in Guatemala provides a more nuanced, and gendered perspective on

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youth recruitment. Given that the conflict was a prolonged contest between the government and the main guerrilla faction of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Gautemalteca (URNG) the demobilization and reintegration process in the post 1996 period of peace witnessed the return from guerrilla ranks of youth who spent over a decade in the group. From the perspective of gauging long-term social consequences of youth participation, Hauge’s chapter highlights the reflective voices of mature demobilized women fighters and reveals the true agency and initiative in their participation narratives. Ideologically laced conflicts usually present more voluntary scenarios for enrolment; this trend is well-represented in Guatemala. The URNG was hesitant to recruit by coercion and preferred to involve children only under the garb of protection with a cut-off age of 12 years. Field findings suggest that familial loss, political disappearances and desire for avenging the death or assassination of family members appear to have been the primary trigger for recruitment of young girls. Participation motives are complex; social justice, reform and desire for change can be important underlying reasons for military and political involvement. Political allegiance and loyalty to the group flowing from membership of family and peers was also evident. Some of the prominent concepts which animate the recruitment debate pertain to issues of risk, resilience and coping. Burgess’s chapter on Colombia argues in favour of leveraging these in the context of displaced children who often provide a rich and easily accessible pool of recruits. In war zones, social structures are uprooted, and family’s estranged, presenting difficulties for survival. Given the high number of refugees in Colombia, and concomitantly high numbers of children involved in armed groups, this case presents important insights into how displaced children display resilience in avoiding the risks of recruitment. Drawing on the psycho-social literature, Burgess argues that ways in which children respond to stressful situations are related to sociological and cultural variables of social relationships, especially family and peer group mediation. Care and coping both at individual and family levels are undermined in conflict zones. Community itself can be a site for violence, as evident in social cleansing practices involving the targeted killing of child delinquents. These risks are accompanied with high levels of poverty which makes educational opportunities difficult to access. Aides to coping come in the form of community role models or peer mentors, and coping mechanisms may vary from living on the streets to getting pregnant, deserting school and also joining an armed group.


Transcending the coercion-volition debate on recruitment, Peters looks at the mechanisms through which group cohesion is forged amongst youth abducted and coerced into combat. He argues that loyalty, coherence and allegiance were forged in the main rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), through socialization processes involving isolation and enculturation into the identity of fighting during an extended bush phase. Given the agrarian dimensions of the conflict, the RUF was predominantly a forest-based guerrilla movement with a systematic sensitization process which employed a combination of ideology and motivation to make abductees willing recruits. Peters illustrates how abduction though shocking created a radical break from normality and rebel camps initiated a new life in the bush. The hardship, violence and indoctrination helped define a new identity as rebel. Alienation and realignment of beliefs was the other fallout of sensitization. But at the same time agency of child soldiers was evident in their negotiation of peer pressures and new power relationships, of forging deep loyalties and bonds with combat fathers, with publicly decided punishments acting as sufficient deterrents to desertion. Is this an issue of fear or is loyalty the main debate here? Recruitment and participation in the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao, Philippines, offers fresh insights on the nature of the community role in supporting and facilitating youth participation in civil conflict. As explored by these authors, the concept of childhood in Muslim society is culture specific and unrelated to the 18-year norm entrenched in international legal protections. Indigenous tribes have their own home-grown concepts of community defence where military training becomes a way of socialization into adulthood. Proximity to MILF camps creates community conditions which support children’s enrolment into armed groups. This stems from a conciliatory and unproblematic relationship between MILF and ancillary communities often inhabited by extended families, or relatives of past and present MILF members. Hence the coercion argument in child soldier recruitment, which dominates much of the literature, is untenable in the Mindanao case, and a deeper study of this conflict offers important alternative perspectives. Part III engages with conceptual issues surrounding the child soldier phenomenon which can be discerned from the recruitment experiences section and attempts to engage how contemporary humanitarian perceptions impact on reintegration efforts through thematic case studies selected to illustrate different timeframes in terms of reintegration efforts for child soldiers, programming strategies and role of agents in

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influencing outcomes. More specifically Podder interrogates the concept of the child soldier in theory and practice, to present the overarching dichotomy which has resulted in humanitarian approaches advocating a Westernized protected vulnerable childhood far removed from the lived realities of children’s lives in war zones where participation in armed groups is motivated by a range of factors of which coercion is only one possible route. Survival, agency and issues of identity are prominent themes which seem to be overlooked in much humanitarian engagement with the subject. Zyck’s chapter interrogates the imposition of Western discourses of childhood on Afghan youth, which results in a denial of their identity as agents and actors in a landscape dominated by masculine images of adolescent transition into adulthood through early engagement with the labour market and through the attributes of warrior skills. Tracing origins of child soldiering in the long history of warfare in Afghanistan, Zyck argues that most fighters in this war-torn country began life as adolescent youth. Through decades of mujahideen resistance as well as later under Taliban rule, recruitment tactics have targeted schools, madrassas laced in a systematic process of ideological and military training fomenting a culture of youth engagement in fighting. The DDR process in Afghanistan was mired in the complexities of identity, especially over how to define a caseload of child soldiers and whether a 18-year cut-off would be contextually tenable, and in deciding ways in which reintegration assistance could be tailored for Afghan youth. The programme for child soldiers led by the United Nations Children’s (Emergency) Fund (UNICEF) was flawed in structure and design, and suffered from duplicity and lapses both at the institutional and implementational levels. As in most cases DDR programming encapsulated educational and vocational training options, drug abuse prevention and mine risk education, but did not translate into viable and sustainable employment. While child soldiers received economically relevant training, their assistance packages were not accompanied by materials of seed capital for livelihoods. Cash stipends and in-kind assistance provided via the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) was insufficient to start a small enterprise or revitalize a farm in many parts of Afghanistan; lack of micro-credit scheme support, and duality in assistance plagued the effectiveness of programme delivery for child soldiers and resulted in them not having adequate economic opportunity. Vermeij’s chapter on child soldier reintegration tackles a more processual problem of how in-group socialization engenders a new fighter identity that may inhibit return and reintegration efforts. Using


empirical evidence from Northern Uganda and through interaction with former Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) child soldiers, Vermeij argues that in the context of extreme violence and coercion, drawing on a systematic strategy of abduction, group cohesion, loyalty and allegiance within the LRA is based on a well-developed process of socialization. Besides, recruitment of children in its ranks also appears to be a systematic policy on part of the LRA. The vulnerability and purported malleability of children makes socialization and resulting cohesion issues of prime importance in tracing the operatives behind identity transformation within rebel groups. Initiation rituals and ceremonial induction creates a social space of rebirth as soldiers. Acquired social skills, understanding of power, hierarchy and norms of war, together with emotional responses to issues of physical violence, torture and death create dysfunctionalities which could result in trauma-related symptoms and hinder reintegration later. On the issue of victimcy, Utas and Denov present two sides of the victimcy narrative, how it can be a tool in absolving agency for child soldiers and aid in accessing reintegration support as well as how victimcy is a myth in reintegration processes, where active agency is evident in navigating evolving spaces amidst post conflict reconstruction modes. Utas illustrates how the humanitarian discourse on child soldiers premised on the victim logic has in fact become a card or tool at the disposal of child soldiers in contexts such as Liberia, where voluntary enlistment and participation in armed groups is highlighted through a narrative of coercion, and limited choice, rendering Western concepts of child and child soldier prominent in the psyche and life stories of young combatants in Africa. This response using the victimcy card is tactical, and used as a deliberate tool to navigate the delicate post conflict spaces littered with issues of justice, reconciliation and at times post hoc trials for crimes committed during war. This deliberate reordering of the truth results in hiding key variables which encourage participation in the first place, and remarginalizes youth in the post war space devoid of pre-war agency and post war choices outside of programmes or support designed in their benefit and for their ‘reintegration’. Denov uses empirical research with child soldiers in Sierra Leone to look at issues of social navigation and power in post conflict contexts using a life history narrative to illustrate the turnings and epiphanies, or constructive moments in the life of a child soldier who rides motor bikes to survive in a country under recovery. While warscapes present a terrain in extreme motion, post war contexts are often equally dynamic, volatile and precarious as her chapter illustrates. Child soldiers are often

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returned or reintegrated into norms and institutions from which they had been isolated for years due to conflict and displacement. These in turn present issues of renegotiation of identity, of power and of status in a society which may fear child soldiers for their military experience or be distrustful of their motives in peacetime, equating them with deviants, and lost to social norms. Renegotiation of power is of critical importance here, especially for youth who may rise from a relatively marginal status prior to war, to take up powerful leadership positions within armed groups, being promoted for skill in warfare to commanding positions and this fluid notion of power comes to be deconstructed in the post war reimposition of traditional and gerontocratic domination, to which youth may not be amenable. How then do child soldiers navigate this altered social space? Bike riding in Sierra Leone created routes to ex-combatant behaviour with respect to access to money, women and ability to dominate a certain space in which civilian riders were intimidated and post war solidarity among ex-combatants as a group was maintained together with the adrenaline of an element of risk in traversing difficult country roads or busy streets. Ex-combatants often find leadership opportunities in the Bike Rider’s Association as well for conflict resolution and mediation regarding issues of traffic violations, replaying elements of structure and hierarchy within rebel group units of self-mediated justice or justice during wartime in the absence of government or legal structures. On the theme of survival, Boothby and McMullin look into earlier cases of child soldier involvement and reintegration in the contexts of Mozambique and Angola. Using a longitudinal study approach, Boothby’s chapter uses experimental evidence collected in three phases to track the life outcome of a group of 40 former Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) fighters. The study began in 1988, in a post conflict rehabilitation centre in Maputo, where these captives of the government forces were monitored and their life histories collected. RENAMO related experiences (events, severity and duration) and behavioural assessments including aggression, trauma and pro-social behaviour were recorded at the time. Following reunification with family members, a second round of follow-up research was conducted during 1990–1992 to look at issues of post war reintegration and survival aids. Findings from this research indicate that family reunification was overwhelmingly positive as was community acceptance, there was community support for recovery and protection, and traditional ceremonies on return to villages was prominent. Results suggest that retributive justice and post conflict restorative justice issues in Mozambique were mediated through


the use of traditional ceremonies. How far these helped child soldiers overcome time spent away from fulfilling their normal life milestones and regain a foothold in the normative life cycle was linked to socioeconomic productivity through engagement in farming, household ownership, income generation and familial responsibilities especially marriage and parenting duties; also relevant was community acceptance, and non-involvement in illegal activities, or lack of problems with police and similar authorities. Ritualistic cleansing enabled child soldiers to repair estranged relationships with families and communities and sought to realign the boys’ well-being with the spirit world. The rituals enabled these boys to deepen their sense of acceptance and helped to ameliorate guilt and shame over past misdeeds. They also represented a form of protection for community members who feared these returning youth, and fostered their acceptance and forgiveness. Employment, housing and marriage were helpful activities for reintegration. However the extent to which return to pre-war social structures and parental supervision or gerontocratic control actually created positive spaces for reintegration seems to have been ambiguous. McMullin’s chapter on Angola looks at the theme of survival in the context of exclusion of child soldiers from formal DDR support. The Angolan government was wary of being seen as having recruited child soldiers into its national army, and had relegated underage fighters to the status of dependents, excluding them from direct benefits under the formal programme. Following successive DDR attempts flowing from different peace agreements at Bicesse (1991) and Lusaka (1994), some 9000 child soldiers were registered for demobilization, and of these more than half were demobilized. Cantonment and demobilization payments were accompanied by reinsertion packages pertaining to food, and clothing and transportation to communities of origin. Delays compounded a smooth return, and interrupted delivery of services with many youth returning home before securing reinsertion support. Amnesty offered to National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) fighters created routes for their absorption into the new Angolan army and subsequent demobilization – these strategic plans were aimed at keeping track of UNITA fighters and minimizing their re-recruitment. This process also excluded child soldiers since the army recruited only adult UNITA fighters. Later efforts under the Leuna DDR process (2002) saw those excluded from support under the Bicesse and Lusaka agreements were targeted partially under the Angolan Demobilization and

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Reintegration Programme (ADRP) and the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) projects later. Given the difficulties in accounting for the actual number of child soldiers who took part in various phases of the conflict, exclusion was the predominant theme with myriad overlaps between adult and child fighters. Employment trends suggest low absorption in the job market, most self-employed or unemployed, with return to agriculture and stable family life as prominent indicators of reintegration success in the opinion of child soldiers themselves. Hence survival issues in this context were largely informal or offset by the broader benefits of adult ex-combatant reintegration and community recovery efforts under various phases of reintegration support. Exclusion of child soldiers in Angola evidenced by half-hearted and short-term mop up efforts which did not mainstream the reintegration needs of child soldiers is an important case to review weaknesses in the normative and institutional responses to child soldier reintegration. Empowerment is a key issue in targeting, and while the exclusive focus on child soldiers cannot be justified, they are a critical group whose needs must be leveraged and has been better addressed in later programmes. The final two chapters of Part IV offer interesting practitioner perspectives from Sudan and Nepal. These contexts are recent cases of child soldier reintegration and represent third generation DDR contexts with attempts made for securing release and rehabilitation of child soldiers amidst ongoing conflict. Halton reflects on the issue of identity, recruitment and reintegration of children in Sudan where DDR was a nationally owned process drawing on peace agreements, and presents a case where strong enforcement of local level child protection mechanisms have been attempted with a view to providing follow-up care for individual demobilized children complemented by principles of an inclusive, community-based approach. Drawing on first-hand experience as child protection specialist with UNICEF during 2008–2009, some of the important findings that Halton offers include how overlaps between children associated with armed forces (CAAF) and non-CAAF, displaced children who engaged in combatant, auxiliary or support roles are intrinsic part of communities in Darfur, with recruitment into armed groups a common form of survival, and part of a broader commitment to family and community security. DDR efforts made in 2001 with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) posed difficulties in interim care centres. Phase II from 2001 to 2003 represented a major policy shift in this respect and resulted in the demobilization of more than 14,000 children. On the whole efforts have been made


to coalesce reintegration of child soldiers with community recovery, family tracing efforts have been undertaken in conjunction with school structures making these a focal point for monitoring and follow-up of children returning to home communities and is a way forward with community-based reintegration strategies in the context of child soldier reintegration in contexts of tentative peace. These incremental efforts at demobilization are an important feature of the Sudan DDR effort together with a strong national ownership component creating a supportive role for international institutions and child protection agencies. In Nepal, practitioner perspectives suggest that use of children in the Maoist ranks has resulted in repeated efforts to secure demobilization and release of cadres especially since 2002. National and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have coordinated efforts for leveraging child rights issues and implementing child protection mechanisms resulting in prominent advocacy efforts, accompanied by monitoring, reporting, raising awareness and capacity building of communities to support the return and reintegration of released Maoist cadres. This has resulted in the creation of a national coalition for children as zones for peace comprising 36 child rights organization including UNICEF. This has also resulted in schools being declared as zones of peace. Reflecting on child protection interventions undertaken by agencies like Save the Children, Dili and Pratisha Binadi argue that the need for uniformity and joint efforts offered a wider coverage and common programmes for successful reintegration through psychosocial support, livelihood training and catch-up education programmes. Only targeted programmes for child soldiers who underwent formal release, as well as targeted support for informally released child soldiers who returned to their home communities, have been attempted. Despite flaws in the reintegration support, the socio-economic and cultural aspects have played a vital role for the successful reintegration of child soldiers in Nepal. However the main drawback has been a lack of government support for the child reintegration process and overreliance on non-governmental intervention, thereby limiting capacities and approaches. Part V draws conclusions from the recruitment and reintegration debates explored in the volume and seeks to conceptualize and summarize angularities in the debate over reintegration outcomes in post conflict peacebuilding. The collection of authors and cases in this volume brings together a vibrant canvas of cases highlighting recruitment and reintegration experiences of child soldiers in diverse contexts.

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The Long Road Home

They provide insight into the multifarious dimensions of participation, release and reintegration and discuss the need to leverage social and economic aspects in ensuring a successful and sustainable civilianization process, with the help of external donors, national institutions, community structures and family support in a comprehensive bid to rebuild damaged livelihoods in a post war context. Given the sheer complexity and range of issues involved, one of our main conclusions in this volume is that, similar to the disarmament and demobilization phases, reintegration is also an intensely political process, perhaps more intensely so given that reintegration entails a comprehensive involvement in political, economic and social reconstruction. Reintegration subsumes several proto-processes which in turn aid in addressing and perhaps resolving the root causes of a given conflict. Hence while reintegration needs to be conceptualized as a social process, individual reintegration outcomes are often unrelated to assistance offered under the auspices of DDR programmes, due to limited access, or participation, hence often the family or home community of former child soldiers bear the onus of responsibility in assisting the transition to civilian life. Hence success at a macro level in terms of DDR programmes and their implementation is distinct from reintegration outcomes at a micro level for an individual former combatant and child soldier. The mapping of reintegration experiences we feel is largely contingent on the selected loci of analysis. By focusing on the recruitment, participation and reintegration experiences of former child soldiers in a cross-cultural setting and within an inclusive framework with voices from the different schools of thought and methodologies in explaining the content of child soldiering, this volume addresses a neglected area in academic writing on former combatants. It engages with this problematic binary operative between the individual micro-analysis of a combatant’s reintegration outcome and the broader macro-level interaction between the ex-combatant group or social network and the distinctly civilian, non-combatant community group and seeks to make it policy relevant.

References Achio, F. and Specht, I. (2003). Youth in Conflict. In E. D. Bah, ed. Jobs After War: A Critical Challenge in the Peace and Reconstruction Puzzle. Geneva: ILO. Ahearn, F. ed. (2000). Psychosocial Wellness of Refugees. Issues in Qualitative and Quantitative Research. London: Berghahn Books. Amone-P’Olak, K. (2007). Coping With Life in Rebel Captivity and the Challenge of Reintegrating Formerly Abducted Boys In Northern Uganda, Journal of Refugee Studies, 20 (4), 641–661.

Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder 21 Annan, J. and Blattman, C. (2008). Child Combatants in Northern Uganda: Reintegration Myths and Realities. In R. Muggah, ed. Security and Post Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. London: Routledge, pp. 103–126. Annan, J., Blattman, C., Carlson, K. and Mazurana, D. (2007). Survey of WarAffected Youth (SWAY) Research Brief: Making Reintegration Work for Youth in Northern Uganda. 11 Online. Available at www.sway-uganda.org/SWAY.researchbrief. Reintegration.pdf (accessed 14 March 2008). Annan, J., Blattman, C. and Horton, R. (2006). The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern Uganda: Findings from the Survey of War Affected Youth. Kampala, Uganda: UNICEF. Arnett, J. J. (1998). Learning to Stand Alone: The Contemporary American Transition to Adulthood in Cultural and Historical Context, Human Development, 41, 295–315. Ayalon, O. (1998). Community Healing for Children Traumatized by War, International Review of Psychiatry, 10 (3), 224–233. Barenbaum, J., Ruchkin, V. and Schwab-Stone, M. (2004). The Psychosocial Aspects of Children Exposed to War: Practice and Policy Initiatives, Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 45 (1), 41–51. Berdal, M. R. (1998). Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars. Adelphi Paper 303. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Betancourt, T. S. et al. (2010a). Past Horrors, Present Struggles: The Role of Stigma in the Association between War Experiences and Psychosocial Adjustment among Former Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone, Social Science & Medicine, 70, 17–26. Betancourt, T. S. et al. (2010b). Sierra Leone’s Former Child Soldiers: A Follow-up Study of Psychosocial Adjustment and Community Reintegration, Child Development, 81 (4) (July/August), 1077–1095. Bledsoe, C. (1990). No Success without Struggle: Social Mobility and Hardship for Foster Children in Sierra Leone, Man, 25, 70–88. Bøås, M. and Hatløy, A. (2008). ‘Getting In, Getting Out’: Militia Membership and Prospects for Re-integration in Post-War Liberia, Journal of Modern African Studies, 46 (1), 33–55. Boothby, N., Strang, A. and Wessells, M. eds. (2006) A World Turned Upside Down: Social Ecologies of Children and War. New York: Kumarian Press. Bragg, C. (2006). Challenges to Policy and Practice in the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation of Youth Combatants in Liberia. Sussex Migration Working Paper 29 (March). Online. Available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/migration/documents/mwp29.pdf (accessed 16 June 2008). Brandon, A., Kohrt, M., Jordans, J. D., Wietse, A., Tol, A., Speckman, A., Maharjan, S. M., Worthman, C. M. and Komproe, I. H. (2000). Comparison of Mental Health between Former Child Soldiers and Children Never Conscripted by Armed Groups in Nepal, Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), 300 (6), 691–702. Brocklehurst, H. (2006). Who’s Afraid of Children?: Children, Conflict and International Relations. London: Ashgate. Burton, J. W. (1990). Human Needs Theory. In J. W. Burton, ed. Conflict: Resolution and Provention. London: Macmillan, pp. 36–48.

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CCF (2007). Revitalization of War Affected Communities and Reintegration of Women and Children Associated with the Fighting Forces. RWAC Program Evaluation Report (September). Online. Available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/ PDACK459.pdf (accessed 10 January 2009). Colletta, N., Kostner, M. and Wiederhofer, I. (1996b). Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda. Washington, DC: World Bank. Collier, P. (1994). Demobilisation and Insecurity: A Study in the Economics of the Transition from War to Peace, Journal of International Development, 6 (3), 343–351. Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers. Online. Available at oep.oxfordjournals.org/content/56/4/ 563.full (accessed 14 May 2008). Cox, R. (1981). Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, Millennium, 10 (2), 126–155. CSUCS (2008). Child Soldiers Global Report. Online. Available at http://www.childsoldiers.org/resources/global-reports (accessed 10 June 2009). Dawes, A. and Donald, D. (2000). Improving Children’s Chances: Developmental Theory and Effective Interventions in Community Contexts. In D. Donald, A. Dawes and J. Louw, eds. Addressing Childhood Adversity. Cape Town: David Philip, pp. 1–25. Denov, M. (2008). Girl Soldiers and Human Rights: Lessons from Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Northern Uganda, International Journal of Human Rights, 12 (5), 813–836. Dickson-Gomez, J. (2002). Growing Up in Guerrilla Camp: The Long-Term Impact of Being a Child Soldier in El Salvador’s Civil War, Ethos, 30 (4), 327–356. Erikson, E. H. (1950). Childhood and Society. New York: Norton. Farr, V. (2003). The Importance of a Gender Perspective to Successful Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Processes, Disarmament Forum, 4, 25–35. Foucault, M. (1990). The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction. London: Penguin. Fox, M. J. (2004). Girl Soldiers: Human Security and Gendered Insecurity, Security Dialogue, 35, 465–479. Gates, S. (2002). The Micro-Foundations of Rebellion, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46 (1), 111–130. Grover, S. (2008). Child Soldiers as ‘Non-Combatants’: The Inapplicability of the Refugee Convention Exclusion Clause, International Journal of Human Rights, 12 (1), 53–65. Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Higson-Smith, C. and Killian, B. (2000). Caring for Children in Fragmented Communities. In D. A. Dawes and J. Louw, eds. Addressing Childhood Adversity. Cape Town: David Philip, pp. 202–224. Hoffman, D. (2003). Like Beasts in the Bush: Synonyms of Childhood and Youth in Sierra Leone, Postcolonial Studies, 6 (3), 295–308. Honwana, A. (1998). Okusiakala ondalo yokalye: Let Us Light a New Fire. Local Knowledge in the Post-War Healing and Reintegration of War-Affected Children in Angola. Angola: Christian Children’s Fund (CCF).

Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder 23 Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2005). Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Legacy of West Africa’s Regional Warriors. New York: Human Rights Watch. Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. M. (2004a). Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration. Online. Available at http://www.-igec.ucsd.ed/publications/conference_papers/ cphumphreysweinstein.pdf (accessed 20 May 2008). Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. M. (2004b). What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone. June–August 2003. Interim Report: July 2004. Online. Available at http://www.columbia.edu/∼mh2245/SL.htm (accessed 15 January 2008). Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. M. (2006). Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War, American Political Science Review, 100 (3), 429–477. Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Demobilization and Reintegration, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51 (August), 531–567. Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. M. (2008). Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War, American Journal of Political Science, April, 436–455. James, A. and Prout, A. (1990). Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Study of Childhood. London: Falmer Press. Jareg, E. (2005). Crossing Bridges and Negotiating Rivers: The Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces. Norway: Save the Children. Jennings, K. M. (2007). The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR through the Eyes of Ex-combatants in Liberia, International Peacekeeping, 14 (2), 204–218. Jennings, K. M. (2008a). Seeing DDR from Below: Challenges and Dilemmas Raised by the Experiences of Ex-combatants in Liberia, Fafo, Oslo. Online. Available at http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/20045/20045.pdf (accessed 18 January 2009). Jennings, K. M. (2008b). Securitizing the Economy of Reintegration in Liberia. In M. Pugh, N. Cooper and M. Turner, eds. Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Jennings, K. M. (2008c). Unclear Ends, Unclear Means: Reintegration in Postwar Societies: The Case of Liberia, Global Governance, 14, 327–345. Jennings, Kathleen M. (2008d). The Political Economy of DDR in Liberia: A Gendered Critique, Paper presented at the International Studies Association annual conference, 26–29 March, San Francisco, CA. Kalyvas, S. and Arjona, A. (2007). Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Recruitment: An Analysis of Survey Data from Colombia. Paper presented at the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago. 28 February. Online. Available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_ citation/1/7/9/5/6/p179565_index.html (accessed 2 August 2008). Kempner, Y. (2005). Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions Approaches of International Organizations. Berghof Report 10. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Online. Available at http://www.berghof-center.org/ publications/ reports/complete/BR10e.pdf (accessed 19 June 2008). Kingma, K. ed. (2000). Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impact. New York: St Martin’s Press. Kingma, K. (2002). Demobilisation, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa, International Peacekeeping, 9 (2), 181–201.

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Kohrt, B. A., Jordans, M. J. D., Tol, W. A., Speckman, R. A., Maharjan, S. M., et al. (2008). Comparison of Mental Health between Former Child Soldiers and Children Never Conscripted by Armed Groups in Nepal, Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), 300 (6): 691–702. Kuper, J. (1997). International Law Concerning Child Civilians in Armed Conflict. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lichem, Walther. (2006). DDR Processes and Societal Development. Address to the Conference on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: Assessing DDR Process. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, Accra, Ghana. August. Mackenzie, M. (2009). Securitisation and Desecuritisation: Female Soldiers and the Reconstruction of Women in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone, Security Studies, 18 (2), 241–261. Maclay, C. and Özerdem, A. (2010). ‘Use’ Them or ‘Lose’ Them: Engaging Liberia’s Disconnected Youth through Socio-political Integration, International Peacekeeping, 17 (3) (June), 343–360. Mazurana, D. and Mckay, S. (2001). Child Soldiers: What about the Girls? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 57 (5), 30–35. McEvoy Levy, S. ed. (2006). Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post Accord Peacebuilding. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. McKay, S. (2005). Girls as ‘Weapons of Terror’ in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leonean Rebel Fighting Forces, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28, 385–397. McMullin, J. (2004). Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique? International Peacekeeping, 11 (4), 625–643. Mehreteab, A. (2004). Wake Up, Hanna! Reintegration and Reconstruction Challenges for Post-War Eritrea. Asmara: Africa World Press. Nilsson, A. (2005). Reintegrating Ex-combatants in Post-Conflict Societies. Paper Commissioned by Sida to the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. Özerdem, A. (2008). Post War Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. London: I. B. Tauris. Özerdem, A. (2010) Social Reintegration of Former Combatants: A Re-conceptualisation. Paper presented at the ISA Annual Convention, New Orleans, 18–22 February. Özerdem, A. and Podder, S. (2008). Reinsertion Assistance and the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in War to Peace Transitions. Thematic Working Paper 4, DDR and Human Security: Post-Conflict Security-Building and the Interests of the Poor, University of Bradford. Peters, K. (2005). Re-examining Voluntarism: Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Online. Available at http://www.iss.co. za/pubs/ Monographs/No100/Contents.html (accessed 26 April 2008). Peters, K. (2006). Footpaths to Reintegration: Armed Conflict, Youth and the Rural Crisis in Sierra Leone. PhD Thesis. Netherlands: Wageningen University. Peters, K. (2007). Reintegration Support for Young Ex-combatants: A Right or a Privilege? International Migration, 45 (5), 35–59. Piaget, J. (1999). The Construction of Reality in the Child. London: Routledge. Porto, J. G., Alden, C. and Parsons, I. (2007). From Soldiers to Citizens: Demilitarisation of Conflict and Society. London: Ashgate.

Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder 25 Porto, J.G. and Parsons, I. (2003). Sustaining the Peace in Angola: An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration. Paper 27. Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion. Pugel, J. (2006). What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia. UNDP Liberia. Online. Available at http://www.lr.undp.org/ undpwhatfighterssayliberia-2006.pdf (accessed 10 May 2008). Pugel, J. (2008a) Deciphering the Dimensions of Reintegration in Post-conflict Liberia. In A. Knight and C. Marshall, eds. Assessing DDR Processes in Africa. Conley, Edmonton: University of Alberta Press. Pugel, J. (2008b) Disaggregating the Causal Factors Unique to Child Soldiering: The Case of Liberia. In S. Gates and S. Reich, eds. Child Soldiers: Children and Armed Conflict in the Age of Fractured States. Pittsburg: Ford Institute for Human Security, University of Pittsburgh Press. Pugel, J. (2008c). Measuring Reintegration in Liberia: Assessing the Gap between Outputs and Outcomes. In R. Muggah, ed. Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. London: Routledge, pp. 70–102. Richards, P. (2005). To Fight or Farm? Agrarian Dimensions of the Mano River Conflicts (Liberia and Sierra Leone), African Affairs, 104 (417) (September), 571–590. Robertson, C. and McCauley, U. (2005). The Return and Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Sudan: The Challenges Ahead. Online. Available at http://www. fmreview.org/fmrpdfs/FMR21/FMR2111.pdf (accessed 10 January 2008). Rosen, D. M. (2005). Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism. New Jersey: The Rutgers Series in Childhood Studies. Sanford, V. (2006). The Moral Imagination of Survival: Displacement and Child Soldiers in Guatemala and Colombia. In S. McEvoy-Levy, ed. Troublemakers or Peacemakers?: Youth and Post Accord Peacebuilding. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, pp. 49–80. Save the Children (2003). When Children Affected by War Go Home: Lessons Learned from Liberia. Summary of Findings, UK. Online. Available at http://www.essex.ac. uk/armedcon/story_id/000169.pdf (accessed 10 March 2008). Shepler, S. (2004). The Social and Cultural Context of Child Soldiering in Sierra Leone. Paper presented at the Techniques of Violence in Civil War Workshop. Oslo: PRIO (accessed 1 February 2008). Shepler, S. (2005). The Rites of the Child: Global Discourses of Youth and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone, Journal of Human Rights, 4, 197–211. Stovel, L. (2008). There’s No Bad Bush to Throw Away a Bad Child: TraditionInspired Reintegration in Post-War Sierra Leone, Journal of Modern African Studies, 46 (2), 305–324. Taylor, G., Samii, C. and Mvukiyehe, E. (2006). Wartime and PostConflict Experiences in Burundi: An Individual Level Survey. Online. Available at http://www.columbia.edu/∼cds81/burundisurvey/burundi/Taylor_ Samii_Mvukiyehe_Burundi_APSA06_061003b.pdf (accessed 13 March 2008). UNDP (2000). Sharing New Ground in Post-Conflict Situations: The Role of UNDP in Support of Reintegration Programmes (January). Online. Available at http:// www.undp.org/eo/documents/postconflict_march2000.pdf (accessed 10 March 2008).

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United Nations (UN) (2007). Paris Principles. Online. Available at http://www. un.org/children/.../parisprinciples/ParisPrinciples_EN.pdf (accessed 10 January 2010). United Nations (UN) (2009). Secretary General Report on Children and Armed Conflict. A/64/254. Online. Available at http://www.un.org/docs (accessed 20 March 2010). USAID (2000). Roundtable Report: Community-Based Reintegration and Rehabilitation in Post-Conflict Settings. Office of Transition Initiatives and UNDP/Emergency Response Division. Online. Available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/transition_initiatives/pubs.html (accessed 10 July 2009). USAID (2006). Community Focused Reintegration. Online. Available at pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF305.pdf (accessed 9 July 2008). Utas, M. (2003). Sweet Battlefields. Youth and the Liberian Civil War. Uppsala: Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, Uppsala University. Utas, M. (2004). Fluid Research Fields: Studying Ex-combatant Youth in the Aftermath of the Liberian Civil War. In J. Boyden and J. de Berry, eds. Children and Youth on the Front Line: Ethnography, Armed Conflict and Displacement. London: Berghahn, pp. 209–236. Utas, M. (2005a). Victimcy, Girlfriending, Soldiering: Tactic Agency in a Young Woman’s Social Navigation of the Liberian War Zone, Anthropological Quarterly, 78 (2): 403–430. Utas, M. (2005b). Building a Future? The Reintegration and Re-marginalisation of Youth in Liberia. In P. Richards, ed. No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. London and Ohio: James Currey and Ohio University Press, pp. 137–154. Uvin, P. (2007). Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why They Joined, Why They Left, How They Fared. MDRP Working Paper 3. Online. Available at http://www. reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900sid/KHII-78C3N7?Opendocument (accessed 12 October 2008). Verhey, B. (2001). Child Soldier: Prevention, Demobilisation and Reintegration (November). Africa Region Working Paper 23. Online. Available at http://www. worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp23.pdf (accessed 19 July 2008). Verhey, B. (2003). Going Home: Demobilising and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo. London: Save the Children UK. Watson, A. M. S. (2006). Children and International Relations: A New Site of Knowledge? Review of International Studies, 32, 237–250. Weinstein, J. M. (2005). Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (4), 598–624. Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wessels, M. G. (2006). Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Wessels, M. G. and Monteiro, C. (2006). Psychosocial Assistance for Youth: Toward Reconstruction for Peace in Angola, Journal of Social Issues, 62 (1), 121–139.

Part II


2 Why Do Children Fight? Motivations and the Mode of Recruitment Scott Gates

Introduction Recruitment and retention are essential for any group. To be viable, a group must have members, whether a labour union, a political party, a football club or a rebel army. A group must convince people to join and to persuade them to continue participating in the group. For a violent organization engaged in military conflict, failing to retain members could be fatal – threatening the survival of the group itself as well as its leadership. Understanding the mechanisms driving the processes of recruitment and retention is critical to understanding why some groups recruit children as soldiers and others do not. Moreover, this approach also allows us to determine why some children voluntarily join, while other children are forced to join such organizations. Recruitment and retention are separate processes that are driven by material and non-material incentives. Much of the existing civil war literature tends to overemphasize the material rewards as drivers of war, and further assumes retention to be a mere continuation of recruitment (see Collier, 2000 or Weinstein, 2007). Furthermore, most works have neglected ‘noninstrumental factors, such as norms and emotions’ (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 13) and the role they play in recruitment. In this chapter I follow the argument modelled in Gates (2002) and further developed in Gates and Nordås (2010) that mechanisms of retention, ‘such as training, group socialisation, monitoring, and commitment escalation, are critical components of retention that cannot be explained by extending the logic of the initial decision to join’ (Gates and Nordås, 2010, p. 2).1 Thus a child might join a violent group for 29

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a particular set of reasons, but stay on for others. Moreover, the factors that induce a child to stay in the organization may not work as effectively for adults. At the very least, what compels a child not to desert is likely to be different for an adult. While a number of studies have examined the (voluntary and involuntary) recruitment of child soldiers (Brett and Specht, 2004; Singer, 2005; Gates and Reich, 2009), few have studied why children stay in a group. As a result, the scholarly community has a pretty good understanding of the patterns of recruitment, while patterns of retention within these groups have been ignored. By ignoring issues of retention, we fail to address fundamental issues of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). After all, DDR programmes are designed for those who are members of a fighting group. By focusing on why someone joined a group rather than why they remained in the group, we ignore potentially critical information for designing effective DDR programmes. All violent groups face the critical problem of desertion and other forms of non-compliance. Desertion threatens the lives of other members of the group. Non-compliance too can lead to defeat. Punishment schemes only go so far in mitigating these problems. So how do insurgency groups maintain allegiance among their members? The puzzle is especially perplexing in situations where children have been forcibly abducted to fight. Forced conscripts certainly would not be expected to be loyal and would be expected to desert at the first opportunity. Yet, even in Uganda, where the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has abducted tens of thousands of adolescents with an average age of 14 years, a large number of these children grow up and remain loyal to the organization well into adulthood (Vermeij, 2009; Beber and Blattman, 2010). The solution to this puzzle lies in understanding the processes of socialization that transform a recruit into a full-fledged member of an organization. Allegiance stems from a process of organizational socialization. Punishment and rewards (both material and non-material) play a critical role in ensuring compliance in an organization, but the costs of maintaining the allegiance of members is substantially reduced through a process of socialization, by inducting members into the norms and rules of the organization or community (Checkel, 2005). To the degree to which socialization processes lead to an internalization of these rules and norms will depend on how the group succeeded in transforming the preferences of inductees.2 Violence permeates these socialization processes, affecting ‘compliance, role adoption, internalisation of

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group norms, cognitive dissonance reduction, habituation to violence, diffusion of responsibility onto the group, deindividuation, and dehumanisation of the victimised group’ (Wood, 2008, p. 546). Socialization is a transformative process changing fresh recruits to instruments of violence. Indeed, ‘[a]n army’s ability to succeed depends on its ability to recruit and motivate its soldiers to fight and kill’ (Gates, 2002, p. 112). To understand recruitment and socialization processes, we must focus on the organization itself. Therefore, to understand the recruitment and retention of child soldiers we must focus on the armed groups themselves. By ‘looking inside rebel groups – new dynamics and mechanisms have been invoked, including community building and allegiance (Gates, 2002), socialisation (Cohen, 2007; Wood, 2010), social norms (Wood, 2008), emotions (Petersen, 2001, 2002; Wood, 2003) and social networks (Tarrow, 2007), among others’ (Checkel, 2009, p. 24). Exploring these mechanisms and how they differ between adults and children provides new insights into understanding group allegiance. And in turn, by better understanding why a child stays in a rebel group, we are better able to adapt DDR policies to the needs of ex-child soldiers. By understanding the different mechanisms affecting children and adults in an organization can also help improve DDR policies tailoring them to the specific needs of the ex-combatant.

Children or adults A child soldier is defined as a child who participates actively in a violent conflict as a member of an organization that applies violence in a systematic way. A child soldier may serve as a spy, scout, cook, messenger, porter or even a sex slave. They need not brandish a gun. But, what is a child? United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and most non-governmental organizations (NGOs) define a child legally, as a person below 18 years old (Goodwin-Gill and Cohen, 1994; Brett and Specht, 2004). From the perspective of a Brazilian urban Favela gang member, a child is any person too young to handle guns and contracts; some time around 12–14 years, a child becomes an adult. In other contexts, one is still a child until he marries and has a place of his own to live (Shepler, 2004). As an anthropological concept, childhood is culturally relative. From the perspective of development psychology, a child – more particularly an adolescent – is a person undergoing relatively rapid (and fairly predictable) changes in preferences and task-solving abilities related to age. For the purposes of this chapter, I want to draw the

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distinction between the recruitment of children as opposed to adults. From an analytical perspective, I shall therefore define a child to be a person younger than 15 years old, in terms of development psychology a young adolescent and preadolescent. In terms of physical or psychological development the differences between an early adolescent and an adult are profound. Extremely few 12 year olds possess the strength, endurance and agility of a well-trained 22-year-old male soldier. Moreover, early adolescents’ technical and decision-making capabilities are not fully developed. In head-to-head combat there simply would be no contest. So, why would a military organization recruit a child as a soldier? The remainder of this chapter examines the differences in recruitment and retention of adults and young adolescents (that is, children).

Recruitment of children Civil war is the most common form of armed conflict today. Unlike interstate war, which is fought by two uniformed armies using conventional tactics, intrastate war is characterized by guerrilla warfare. Such unconventional tactics involve small groups of combatants engaged in ambushes, raids and sabotage. Soldiers rarely face each other in combat. Such tactics minimize the difference between an adult and a child soldier. Indeed, the type of war for which children tend to be recruited typifies the wars of today – ‘a stalemated guerrilla war confined to a rural periphery of a low-income, post-colonial state’ (Fearon, 2005). Very little systematic cross-national data on child soldiers have been collected. Three exceptions are Høiskar (2001), Achvarina and Reich (2006) and Beber and Blattman (2010). These data sets show profound variation in the recruitment of child soldiers. From one armed conflict to another the numbers and proportion of children employed by the belligerent parties varies widely. Beber and Blattman (2010) further demonstrate significant variation in the degree to which recruits are abducted or join more voluntarily. This wide variation in the degree and manner in which children are recruited to armed military groups leads to the following question: Why are there so many children participating in some military organizations and few or none in others? To ascertain how children come to be associated with an armed military organization, the contextual factors that would induce a child to voluntarily join an armed group should be studied. In the same manner, the factors that would put a girl or boy in a position of being abducted also need to be examined. Most importantly, we must look at the groups themselves.

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Some groups tend to recruit children instead of adults, others only recruit adults. Indeed, the contextual factors that expose children to recruitment to armed groups vary little from one war zone to another. In contrast, the characteristics of groups vary considerably.

The context of children in armed conflict Throughout the world, children tend to enter the labour market at an earlier age than is accepted in the West. As noted by Iversen (2005, p. 11) regarding his research on child migration in India: ‘boys aged 12–14 regularly made labour migration decisions independently of their parents and often without the consent or even informing the parents about their departure’. This is also the age when children may seek to join a military group. Where one finds the recruitment of children into armed groups, child labour is prevalent. Note however that the incidence of child labour is not causally related to child soldiering. In a cross-national analysis of child labour, Høiskar (2001) concludes that child employment reduces rather than enhances the recruitment of children, possibly because child labour works as a better and safer alternative to child soldiering. Many contextual factors, poverty, war, religious or ethnic identity, family or its absence and friends, play a role in making a child willing to join an armed group (Goodwin-Gill and Cohen, 1994; Brett and Specht, 2004; Reich and Achvarina, 2006; Andvig and Gates, 2009; Becker, 2009; Singer, 2009). In terms of recruitment to a rebel army, the degree to which the government indiscriminately targets the civilian population may also affect the willingness of participants, particularly when government actions provoke grievances and a desire for retribution. Most of these factors, however, are unlikely to affect children and adults differently. Factors that are more likely to affect a differential effect on children and adults are the following: the distribution of land ownership and prospects of inheritance for children (Richards, 1996), the stock of orphans,3 family cohesion, child poverty levels (which will be influenced by differential birth rates by different sectors of the population), child unemployment rates (which relates to Høiskar’s (2001) findings) and so on. Children’s expectations about their welfare after joining the violent organization also may be important and may differ from those of adults. Situations also may arise for a military force that is losing; Nazi Germany and the American Confederate Army both employed child soldier volunteers as well as senior citizens when these odious regimes were no longer able to recruit young adults (Singer, 2009).

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Such contextual factors are indeed important, but they neglect the organizations that are recruiting. In the language employed by Andvig and Gates (2009), these contextual factors explain supply, but they neglect demand. To understand why some groups recruit children and others do not, we must study the characteristics of the violent organizations, as well as examine the factors that serve to motivate the children themselves. Moreover, many of the contextual factors that shape supply do not vary across the conflicts; organizational ‘demand is what determines the actual number of children who are asked to kill’ (Andvig and Gates, 2009, p. 1).

Violent organizations and their demand for children A child will not join an organization unless the organization can offer a ‘payoff’ over time that is greater than what he would earn otherwise. This condition can be satisfied when the rebel movement can offer greater rewards through wages from loot-seeking activities or from the intangible rewards that stem from fighting for a religious, ideological or ethnic separatist cause. From the perspective of economics, the leadership of a military organization must be able to find a way to recruit adequate soldiers to maximize the probability of winning (or sustaining a ‘profitable’ conflict) with the lowest financial costs. Hence the leadership may employ children if they are sufficiently cheap to compensate for their (potentially) lower military efficiency. But children might not necessarily be less effective than adults when considering the type of combat in which they will probably be engaged. A Congolese rebel officer reported why children make good soldiers: ‘they obey orders; they are not concerned with getting back to their wife and family; and they don’t know fear’ (The Economist, 10 July 1999, p. 22). ‘Children may offer a higher possibility for rebel groups to meet the so called reservation level of benefits that a recruit demands in order to join, as this level is proposed to be lower for children than adults’ (Gates, 2002). In addition, children might more easily be recruited only on the basis of a promise of future delivery of benefits. For example, in Liberia, children from marginalized economic groups were promised free access to education after the end of the war. This promise was enough to convince some of them to join Charles Taylor’s armed forces (Gates and Nordås, 2010). In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), former child soldiers have also reported that they joined to receive payment or a job after the war (ILO, 2003, p. 30). The prospect of even marginal

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payment therefore seems to be a strong incentive for children to enlist, particularly in situations when their parents are missing or they have a hard time providing for themselves in terms of basic security and food (Achvarina et al., 2009). Hence, child soldiers can mean cheap labour for rebels with limited resources. The scale and type of fighting will also tend to affect the number and proportion of children recruited. If heavy, expensive and complex weapons or the disciplined coordination of large units of soldiers are necessary, children will be less useful. ‘Research on child labour in general suggests that children have rarely been given responsibility for technically complex and expensive equipment. There is no reason to believe it will be otherwise in child soldiering. Indeed, when a group does possess advanced technology, children are not put in charge. Kids do not pilot helicopters. Furthermore, if the group is engaged in low-intensity guerrilla war, it is easier to organise consumption in the military units in the same way as in ordinary households, so they will include many tasks that are ordinarily performed by children and will demand more children for non-combatant tasks’ (Andvig and Gates, 2009, pp. 86–87). It is, however, important to note that there are important exceptions to this negative relationship between military sophistication and the reliance on child recruits. Gutiérrez (2009) in his analysis of child soldiers in the National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the paramilitaries in Colombia demonstrates clearly that the FARC and the paramilitaries extensively recruited children while also engaged in direct, technologically advanced, fierce combat. Gutiérrez, however, notes that no child below 15 years old is recruited and that the children are indeed less effective as fighters. But because of manpower shortages, due to an inability to recruit young adults, FARC recruits children regardless of their relative ineffectiveness. The need for soldiers is too great.

Forced recruitment Violence is an essential element of armed conflict. Death and displacement are the products of violence. Everyone in a warzone is affected whether or not they belong to one of the armed groups. Armies fight one another, but they also target non-combatants for strategic purposes (Azam and Hoeffler, 2002; Eck and Hultman, 2007; Lyall, 2009; Wood, 2010). Violence also permeates the social fabric, involving not just military organizations, but war affected areas more generally. In addition

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to killing and threatening to kill, armed groups also recruit. Violence defines not just war, but the process of recruitment to the belligerent groups as well. With regard to children, intimidation and force play a significant role in the recruitment of children. Many groups, indeed, abduct or depend on fear and intimidation as the principal means of recruitment. For almost all principal-agent models, the choice of whether or not to participate in an organization is voluntary. Nevertheless, voluntary labour is not always the case – slavery, indentured servitude and other non-modern economic institutions serve as stark examples (Chwe, 1990). Participation is often forced at gunpoint or at least through coercion. This is particularly true among rebel groups that abduct children (Gates and Reich, 2009; Beber and Blattman, 2010). The manner of forcible recruitment varies. It may come in the form of armed soldiers entering a refugee camp (Achvarina and Reich, 2006; Lischer, 2009), a school (Becker, 2009) or villages and forcing them to join their group at gunpoint. Alternatively, a group may require all households under their control to provide one soldier; the household thereby decides who will serve or not, but the choice is forced (Becker, 2009). In situations in which a group is unable to recruit enough manpower, they may resort to forced recruitment. In such cases, the degree to which an armed group recruits children also will be influenced by ‘the characteristics of the accessibility of recruits: the number of usable children vs. adults in the area; the ease of capturing a child compared to an adult; the existence of exceptionally good “fishing grounds” such as refugee camps or secondary schools; and so on’ (Andvig and Gates, 2009, p. 90). In Northern Uganda where the LRA has been relying on forced recruitment for two decades, the leadership appears to prefer young recruits, as the average age of recruitment is 14 years old (Beber and Blattman, 2010). Other groups have a mixed recruiting strategy. In Colombia, for example, Gutiérrez (2009) has determined that the FARC has abducted approximately 20 per cent of its recruits (p. 122), the paramilitaries relied on voluntary or forced recruitment varying by region (p. 132), while most of the ELN recruits were voluntary (p. 132). In Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) forcibly recruited approximately 23 per cent, while Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) forced about 20 per cent to join (Pugel, 2009, p. 171); interestingly, Pugel finds no significant difference between adults and children in the rates of abduction. In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary

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United Front (RUF) is estimated to have abducted 87 per cent of its recruits (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). Groups may also shift from voluntary to forced recruitment. When the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) was receiving substantial economic support from South Africa, they made extensive use of economic incentives to induce primarily adults to join the organization. When that financial support dried up, RENAMO began to rely on forced recruitment and to recruit children, some very young. In fact, almost 9 per cent of the recorded, demobilized RENAMO soldiers were ten years old or younger (Weinstein, 2005). Any group that relies on forced recruitment faces a difficult situation: how does such a group induce compliance when the members never wanted to participate in the first place? The next section provides an answer to this question.

Retention, desertion, compliance To maintain compliance, a group has at its disposal an array of instruments, including: threatening violent punishment, offering pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits (with more emphasis on non-material rewards appealing to the psychological well-being of the agent, which are often linked to ideology, religion or ethnicity) or altering recruits’ preferences through a process of socialization and indoctrination, or some combination of the above. Non-material rewards can consist of private benefits for the individual (security, self-esteem) and solidarity4 benefits related to fighting for a collective, a cause or a principle. For instance, a rebel organization can provide a sense of community and camaraderie, beliefs in the moral and/or religious good of the organization and thereby induce compliance with the collective goals and ensure high retention. When force is applied in recruitment, force is likely to be used to keep a person in the organization, but not exclusively. Both non-pecuniary and pecuniary incentives also may be applied to some degree to reduce the desertion rate. More significantly, a group will also engage in indoctrination through a process of socialization. In this respect, children and adults may possibly differ significantly. As a result of the re-framing and altering of preferences incumbent in socialization processes, children may ‘forget’ relatively more quickly that they were recruited by force. Hence, young adolescents may have relatively lower desertion rates than adults recruited by force.

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Desertion poses one of the most significant threats to the leaders of a military, paramilitary or rebel organization. For a small guerrilla army or terrorist band, desertions could spell doom for the group. A deserter may be able to reveal valuable information to the enemy regarding the location of troops, headquarters, leadership of the group, the group’s commitment levels, weaknesses or particulars relating to strategy or tactics that would put the group at a serious disadvantage to governmental forces. Throughout the ages, military organizations have attempted to address the threat of desertion, especially in battle. Even the most modern and powerful armies in the world today reserve their harshest punishment for desertion under fire. Basic training and indoctrination are also oriented towards instilling solidary norms and functional preferences with a basic orientation towards preventing desertion and the breakdown of authority. In the fog of war centralized monitoring is difficult. Problems of symmetric information dominate. Latent opportunism abounds. Asymmetric information makes it difficult to reward efforts and punish defection. The use of force to prevent desertion is obviously necessary and remains necessary even when most soldiers are recruited on an ideological, ethnic or religious basis and they possess a strong sense of solidarity. When combined with a corresponding intrinsic motivation inculcated through a socialization process, political conviction can mitigate defection. In general, non-pecuniary rewards motivate actions when motivation is needed, and they are relatively inexpensive to distribute once an organization is endowed with social factors that promote solidarity and functional benefits. Moreover, functional rewards, solidarity norms and socialization processes can substantially reduce the need for harsh physical punishment.

Fear and punishment Given the very nature of armed groups engaged in deadly political conflict, violence constitutes one of the primary outputs of such organizations, and it is tempting to apply the violence apparatus for other purposes. Violence may be used both for recruitment of soldiers and as a (negative) incentive for controlling the behaviour of the members after recruitment. It may be applied selectively in the sense that it is meted out to defecting individuals, but it also can be employed to create an environment of fear either among members or the population at large. While inducing widespread fear may reinforce the original selective effects of the organization, they are obviously imprecise. A general

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state of fear may make soldiers more obedient or it may induce them to desert. Punishment can take on a wide variety of forms, ranging from a simple reprimand to slow painful death.5 Punishment in rebel groups and pro-government militias is often harsh. For example, in some units of the RUF in Sierra Leone, all soldiers were paired with a ‘buddy’ (typically not a friend). If you failed to sound the alarm when your buddy deserted, the penalty was execution (The Economist, 1999, p. 22). In such cases, the punishment extended beyond the individual. Members of the defector’s family and friends might suffer or be under threat of suffering material, social and/or physical retribution. Punishment thereby functions as a deterrent. Punishment might be limited to only those who have defected, but it also can be randomized to increase the terror within the organization and thereby decrease the risk of defection. Moreover, the individual who disobeyed orders may not be the only one affected by a harsh punishment. The comrades of the wrongdoer may be forced to carry out the brutal public execution. In this way, the deterrence effect of the punishment is sure to be registered. A horrific tale told by a young girl who had recently been forcibly recruited into the LRA along with other children vividly describes how such public executions are riddled with symbolism and terror: One boy tried to escape, but he was caught. They made him eat a mouthful of red pepper, and five people were beating him. His hands were tied, and then they made us, the other new captives, kill him with a stick. I felt sick. I knew this boy from before. We were from the same village. I refused to kill him and they told me they would shoot me. They pointed a gun at me, so I had to do it. The boy was asking me, ‘Why are you doing this?’ I said I had no choice. After we killed him, they made us smear his blood on our arms . . . (Ehrenreich, 1998, p. 79) Enforcing such ghastly and highly symbolic punishment early on in a recruit’s involvement with the group can serve as a deterrent and thereby decrease the need for costly punishment in the future. Rumours of horrific punishments that await those who do try to leave can keep retention rates high. What matters is both the severity of the punishment that can befall a defector, as well as the perceived probability that it will be carried out. In organizations where forced recruitment is typical, a regime of harsh punishment and fear among the children often prevails. Fear serves as a cause for staying as well for joining. The punishment for even rather

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minor infractions may be death. Indeed, groups that rely on abduction tend to rely on harsh penalties. In organizations where voluntary recruitment predominates, punishment tends to be much milder. In a study of ex-combatants in Mindanao, children were asked what happened if they did not follow orders: 62 per cent said that nothing would happen (Cagoco-Guiam, 2002). This figure, it should be noted, seems quite remarkable. Other groups that rely primarily on voluntary recruitment, nonetheless, are reputed to rely on extremely harsh punishments for non-compliance (Singer, 2006; Gutiérrez, 2009). Punishment and fear not only serve as a means of motivating members of an organization to cooperate and comply, but also serve a transformative role. The transformative role of fear and punishment is discussed below in the section on socialization. Pecuniary rewards All groups mix pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards. Pecuniary rewards consist of wages, one-shot monetary rewards (often associated with loot) and other tangible rewards such as drugs or alcohol. ‘Indeed, drugs have played a large role in several civil wars (e.g. Liberia and Sierra Leone)’ (Andvig and Gates, 2009, p. 81). Money too is a common reward. In a study of ex-combatants in Liberia, Pugel (2009) finds that ‘money was the major motivator for both the child and adult soldiers loyal to Charles Taylor’ (p. 170) in Liberia. Money also played a significant role in motivating the soldiers in the RUF in Sierra Leone. Based on the statistical analysis of ex-combatants, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) find that ‘individuals offered money or diamonds were six times more likely to participate in the RUF’ (pp. 448–449). Selective economic incentives, however, are expensive. Most rebel organizations are poor. Restricting the number of members allowed to share the net income of the organization means more for the leaders. In this respect, child soldiers tend to be much cheaper than adults. They tend to be satisfied with a disproportionate share of the loot; thus organizations that rely on economic incentives have more to gain financially by employing children. Functional preferences A non-pecuniary reward can come in the form of the satisfaction associated with performing a given task. In a military organization, such functional rewards can come with participating in the ‘good fight’. In stark contrast, groups may appeal to the sadistic tendencies of certain

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elements of any population (thugs and hooligans) by giving them licence to commit acts of extreme violence. Joining a military group might be seen to be exciting, particularly for an adolescent male whose life otherwise would most likely to be filled with boring idleness or drudgery. Indeed, when asked why they became soldiers 15 per cent of the children selected for interviews in DRC, Congo and Rwanda who had joined one of their violent organizations told that fascination with the military was their main reason (ILO/IPEC, 2003, p. 29). Security is another strong non-material reward. As noted to me by a Tuareg who had been mid-grade commander of the rebel forces in northern Niger, ‘Listen, I am a Tuareg. Anyone from the south can see that I am a Tuareg. If during the war a government soldier spotted me, he would probably kill me without asking whether I was a rebel. I had no option of standing aside and not participating in the war. It was safer to join the rebellion than to remain outside’ (personal interview, 2000). In wars involving visible minorities, joining a large fighting force is certainly going to offer more security. Indeed, the insecurity of being left outside the group is likely to compel people to join and to stay in the organization. In such a situation, war itself serves as a strong motivation for recruitment and retention. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) examine the role of security in Sierra Leone, where there was no easy way to identify who belonged to the RUF and who did not. This made it easier to desert as one could more easily blend into the crowd once one got sufficiently far enough away from one’s platoon. In their analysis they find substantial differences between those who volunteered for the RUF and those who were abducted. Those abducted, as might be expected, did not feel safer inside the organization. Although in the case of the war in Sierra Leone, the threat of desertion was much greater. Security can also be extended to the family. In Liberia, Pugel (2009, p. 170) finds that 40 per cent of the MODEL child soldiers were offered family protection. An opportunity to seek retribution or revenge is another type of non-pecuniary reward associated with participating in a violent armed group. Pugel (2009, p. 170) finds that the opportunity to seek revenge was offered to MODEL recruits. Ideology, religion and shared ethnicity serve as powerful functional preference motivators. The notion of ‘fighting for your brothers’ can be a powerful incentive. Participating in groups with a cause allows the person to actively engage in the pursuit of broader interests. Groups that rely on such functional preferences are likely to handle collective action problems better and therefore tend to rely less on force. In turn,

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ceteris paribus, if a group can solve collective action problems and promote compliance and cooperation, through religious or ethnic identity or through ideology, they will tend to be able to retain an adequate number of adults and will not need to rely on children. But not all factors are necessarily the same, due to the lack of a rural population, despite being a strongly religious organization FARC has found it difficult to maintain enough manpower for its army (Gutiérrez, 2009).

Solidarity norms, socialization and personalized leadership Non-pecuniary benefits can also be seen in the comradeship shared by members of an armed group. Spending day and night together in life-threatening situations can create strong bonds between fellow soldiers. Identity-based groups (based on ethnicity or religion) also tend to be characterized by higher solidarity preferences than other types of groups. Leaders have an incentive to inculcate a sense of membership and solidarity and thereby construct an identity for their organization. Indeed, all effective militaries depend on such non-pecuniary rewards. For the most part, we should not expect to see a big difference between children and adults in establishing bonds in environments of polarized ideology or identity. In situations where identity politics are less salient, it may take less effort on the part of the organization to create solidarity norms for children due to their greater tendency towards altruism and bonding to a group (Blattman, 2007). Another important organizational ‘variable’ is the degree to which the structure of an armed organization is personalized. Authority in a formal organization derives from the position itself. Loyalty towards a superior in a personalized organization is focused on the person himself. Children may more easily adapt to personalized forms of management. Shepler (2004) describes how personal ties to commanders fostered intense loyalty and devotion both in the recruiting and management of children in Sierra Leone. This personal loyalty serves to bind children to the group. Commanders serve as surrogate fathers. In the absence of a family, children’s need for security, to have someone to love and respect may be transferred to military commanders. Armed groups that recruit children are much more likely to be personalized rather than be characterized by a formal organizational structure. Loyalty, trust-building and the development of solidarity relate to processes that bind a member to an organization. Together they serve in the development of an emotional attachment to the group. Desertion becomes unthinkable and non-compliance less likely.

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Socialization ‘Socialisation refers to the process of inducting new actors into the norms, rules and ways of behaviour of a given community. Its end point is internalisation, where the community norms and rules become taken for granted . . . [It is a] social process of communication that involves changing beliefs, attitudes, or behaviour, in the absence of overt coercion’ (Checkel, 2009, p. 12). Changes in beliefs, attitudes and behaviour can be affected in two different ways. Such change can be actualized through learning or through teaching. Learning is the process of adjusting behaviour or actions on the basis of one’s experiences. One can learn about the general environment, about the behaviour of others or even about one’s own preferences (learning what one likes or does not like). Economists have formally modelled this process and refer to it as ‘learning games’. ‘The basic idea is that players play a game repeatedly, and adjust their play based on their experience. Equilibria then correspond to the long-run outcome (e.g. steady state) of the adjustment process’ (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Fudenberg, 2009, p. 1), which need not follow a hyper-rational updating process as would be modelled in Bayesian updating. An organizational environment will affect the nature of learning in the organization. A new recruit will learn norms and rules from others, through processes of emulation, imitation and experience. Leaders in an organization can also take a more proactive role in affecting change in preferences of subordinates through a process that can be referred to as teaching. More specifically leaders help subordinates discover an appropriate course of action. ‘Teaching becomes especially relevant when agents operating in environments of great uncertainty must make decisions; supervisors in this way help inform subordinates as to what choices to make’ (Brehm and Gates, 2008, p. 42).6 Training and indoctrination sessions serve to inculcate a set of values and norms that fit the organization’s culture. Such socialization instruments are hardly limited to armed groups engaged in violent conflict. They are basic features of the modern workplace – where workshops and training sessions are ubiquitous. In a changing environment, teaching serves as a tool for organizational adaptation. For an armed group, these two processes of socialization, teaching and learning, play a critical role in ensuring the survival of the organization. A key element of socialization is the process of internalization of an organization’s norms, rules and culture. Re-identification is one of the most powerful socialization mechanisms, whereby a new identity is constructed. This pattern of rebirth is particularly powerful for children and for young adolescents, and

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parallels other coming-of-age ceremonies that are part of most cultures. Slim (2008) describes the transformative role of rituals, uniforms and (even) mirrored sunglasses in creating an altered state, enhancing a sense of toughness. Children in particular are often given nicknames or ‘jungle names’ that loudly echo those used in urban gangs of the Central American and the United States – ‘Blood Never Dry’, ‘Laughing and Killing’, ‘The Castrator’ or ‘Bad Boy’ are not uncommon (Vermeij, 2009, p. 39). The use of nicknames serves to disassociate children from their intensely violent actions with little remorse (Singer, 2006, p. 73). Tattoos, scarring, head-shaving and other ways of designating themselves to be part of a group are also employed by groups that rely on child soldiers – just as they are employed by urban gang members. ‘Training and socialisation to the armed group take place both formally, through the immersion experience of “boot camp”, and informally, through initiation rituals and hazing. The powerful experience of endless drilling, dehumanisation through abuse at the hands of the drill sergeant, and degradation followed by “rebirth” as group members through initiation rituals typically melt individual recruits into a cohesive unit in which loyalties to one another are felt to be stronger than previous loyalties, such as those to family’ (Wood, 2008, p. 546). Religious or spiritual groups often tap into rituals as a means of transformative socialization. Through a process of cleansing or rebirth a new recruit is inducted into the group. Hazing plays a similar role. In the LRA, a combination of Christianity and animist spiritualism holds the organization together. Joseph Kony in particular is believed to possess great spiritual power. As noted by Vermeij (2009), interviews with former rebels indicate an incredibly strong belief in Kony’s spirits among LRA rebels; none of them denied the existence of the spirits and believed Kony could predict the future (p. 46). Socialization in the LRA focuses a significant degree of attention on these aspects of faith. Fear and belief serve as powerful motivators. Ideological indoctrination is a classic form of socialization. Indoctrination plays a big role in ideological groups. The Maoists in Nepal and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka relied heavily on indoctrination programmes. Indeed, the process of indoctrination would begin before an individual would join the group. Children were targeted, especially through the school systems to take part in indoctrination programmes (Becker, 2009). Through indoctrination processes, the group attempts to instil a sense of fighting for a cause, and thereby creates value for functional preferences that might not have been there before.

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Socialization works differently for children and adults. For the LRA, which has relied extensively on the abduction and socialization of children, they have found it much easier to change the views of children. As noted by a former LRA commander, ‘it was easy to make the newly abducted children participate with us. We taught them to become loyal and do what we said. They listened. This was difficult with the grownups; we could not change their minds easily. They were always thinking about going home to their families. It was much easier to make the children become good, integrated rebels’ (Vermeij, 2009, p. 27). Cultivating a culture of fear is an incredibly powerful means of socialization. As noted by Wessells (2006), ‘through violence or threat of violence, young children can be trained to obey commands that many adults would contest or find ways around’ (pp. 34–35). Ritualized violence, particularly the killing of close relatives soon after being recruited, severs a child’s connections to his family and community (Singer, 2006, p. 74). Preparations for mass killings can be achieved through three specific mechanisms. The first step is authorization – through approval, encouragement or explicit orders. The second step is routinization, which assures the continuation of violence. Once violence becomes routine, it becomes easier for it to be employed on a regular basis by members of the organization. The third step to mass violence is dehumanization. By creating a sense of victims being inhuman makes it easier for children ‘to disregard the moral implications of the violence inflicted’ (Kressel, 2002; Vermeij, 2009, p. 40). Through both mechanisms of teaching and learning, armed groups socialize their recruits and transform them. By inculcating changes in beliefs and norms, socialization can fundamentally alter a recruit’s behaviour. Thus, even a recruit who has been abducted from his home can be made a loyal soldier through this complex process of initiation and indoctrination.

Conclusion Children become associated with violent groups for a variety of reasons. They may join voluntarily or they may be forced to join, literally at gunpoint. While contextual factors are important for predisposing a young adolescent to recruitment, factors such as poverty and lack of educational opportunities fail to account for the great variance in the proportion of children that constitute members of armed groups. What can account for this variation is an organization’s demand for children.

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Groups that are unable to recruit adequate adult manpower will recruit children. A significant portion of children are forcibly recruited. The factors that induce a child to stay in the organization are often different than the reasons that got them to join in the first place. Organizations draw on a variety of tools to retain members and induce compliance. For an armed group engaged in violent conflict with the state, preventing defection and desertion are critical to the survival of the group. Rewards (pecuniary and non-pecuniary), punishments and socialization serve to motivate the recruit to stay in the organization. In many respects, socialization mechanisms often employed by armed groups may not work as effectively for adults as they do for children. For the forced recruit a pattern of socialization and fear, both particularly effective in motivating children, serve to keep them loyal to the group. By understanding the mechanisms that served to keep a child tied to a group, post-conflict re-integration policies can be better designed. By understanding how different socialization mechanisms affect adults and children differently, we should be able to tailor DDR policies to better account for the different needs of children.

Notes ∗ Many thanks for the financial support provided by the Research Council of Norway, Poverty and Peace Program, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the EU 7th Framework Program of the European Union. I also thank Jens Andvig and Ragnhild Nordås for our many conversations and our joint research related to issues of recruitment and retention.

1. Also see Brehm and Gates (2008), which features such varied mechanisms as the distribution of prerequisites and trust-brokering in a public bureaucracy. In addition, see Polo (1995), which examines recruitment and retention in mafias. 2. Some readers, particularly those with an economics background, will undoubtedly react to the notion of changing preferences. In economics, preferences denote the ranking of alternative outcomes or payoff streams and they are presumed to be fixed. To some extent this is done for mathematical convenience and tractability, but it is not a necessary assumption as long as some parameter is held constant. Holding preferences constant is a convention. 3. Achvarina and Reich (2006) find that orphan rates are not statistically related to child soldier ratios in African conflicts. This result, however, should be interpreted with caution. Since the number of orphans is most likely influenced by the conflict itself, the analysis suffers from a statistical identification problem, particularly so since the variance of the child soldier ratio is large compared to the variance of the orphanage rate; while the child soldier ratio varies between 0 and 50 per cent, the orphan rate varies between 10 and 17 per cent.

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4. Solidarity is used in the sense that it was used by Durkheim (1893/1997) and refers to social cohesion based upon the interdependence of individuals. It has to do with ‘the feeling of camaraderie and the sense of being part of a team or community’ (Brehm and Gates, 2008, p. 155). 5. See Gates and Nordås (2010) where penalties are examined in the context of a religious organization. In such cases shunning is a common form of punishment. 6. Brehm and Gates (2008, pp. 41–60) develop a dynamic principal-agent model of teaching, the process through which supervisors alter the values of subordinates.

References Achvarina, V., Nordås, R., Østby, G. and Rustad, S. A. (2009) ‘Armut und die Rekrutierung von Kindersoldaten: Neue Evidenz aus einer disaggregierten Analyse der afrikanischen Regionen’ (Poverty and Child Soldier Recruitment: A Disaggregated Study of African Regions), Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderhefte 43, 386–413. Achvarina, V. and Reich, S. (2006) ‘No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers’, International Security, 31, 127–164. Andvig, J. C. and Gates, S. (2009) ‘Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict’ in S. Gates and S. Reich (eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press), pp. 77–92. Azam, J.-P. and Hoeffler, A. (2002) ‘Violence against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror?’, Journal of Peace Research 39, 461–485. Beber, B. and Blattman, C. (2010) ‘The Industrial Organisation of Rebellion: The Logic of Forced Labor and Child Soldiering’, working paper. Yale University, New Haven, CT. Becker, J. (2009) ‘Child Recruitment in Burma, Sri Lanka, and Nepal’ in S. Gates and S. Reich (eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press), pp. 108–120. Blattman, C. (2007) ‘The Causes of Child Soldiering: Theory and Evidence from Northern Uganda’. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL (March). Brehm, J. and Gates, S. (2008) Teaching, Tasks and Trust: The Functions of the Public Executive (New York: Russell Sage Foundation). Brett, R. and Specht, I. (2004) Young Soldiers. Why They Choose to Fight (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers). Cagoco-Guiam, R. (2002) Child Soldiers in Central and Western Mindanao (Geneva: ILO/IPEC). Checkel, J. S. (2009) ‘Causal Mechanisms and Civil War’, working paper. School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, BC (April). Checkel, J. T. (2005) ‘International Institutions and Socialisation in Europe: Introduction and Framework’, International Organisation 59 (4), 801–826. Chwe, M. S.-Y. (1990) ‘Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model’, Economic Journal 100, 1109–1121. Cohen, D. K. (2007) ‘Explaining Sexual Violence during Civil War: Evidence from the Sierra Leone War (1991–2002)’. Paper presented at the

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Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (August). Collier, P. (2000) ‘Rebellion as Quasi-Criminal Activity’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, 839–853. Collier, P., Elliott, V. L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M. and Sambanis, N. (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap (Washington, DC: The World Bank). Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004) ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 56, 563–595. Durkheim, E. (1893/1997) The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press). Eck, K. and Hultman, L. (2007) ‘One-Sided Violence against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data’, Journal of Peace Research 44, 233–246. The Economist (1999) ‘Children under Arms’, 10 July, 21–23. Ehrenreich, R. (1998) ‘The Stories We Must Tell: Ugandan Children and the Atrocities of the Lord’s Resistance Army’, Africa Today 45, 79–102. Fearon, J. D. (2005) ‘Civil War since 1945: Some Facts and a Theory,’ Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA (draft, 25 August). Fudenberg, D. (2009) ‘Learning in Games’, OxMan Institute, 18 September. Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D. K. (1998) The Theory of Learning in Games (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Gates, S. (2002) ‘Recruitment and Allegiance. The Microfoundations of Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, 111–130. Gates, S. and Nordås, R. (2010) ‘Recruitment and Retention in Rebel Groups’, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2–5 September. Gates, S. and Reich, S. (2009) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press). Goodwin-Gill, G. and Cohen, I. (1994) Child Soldiers. The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Guichaoua, Y. (2006) ‘Why Do Youths Join Ethnic Militias? A Survey on the Oodua People’s Congress in Southwestern Nigeria’, working paper. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, Oxford (March). Gutiérrez, F. C. (2009) ‘Organising Minors’ in S. Gates and S. Reich (eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press), pp. 121–140. Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. M. (2008) ‘Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War’, American Journal of Political Science 52, 436–455. Høiskar, A. H. (2001) ‘Underage and under Fire: An Enquiry into the Use of Child Soldiers 1994–98’, Childhood 8 (3), 340–360. ILO/IPEC (International Labour Organization) (2003) Wounded Childhood: The Use of Children in Armed Conflict in Central Africa. Geneva, Switzerland: ILO (April). Iversen, V. (2002) ‘Autonomy in Child Labor Migrants’, World Development 30, 817–834. Kalyvas, S. (2006) The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Kressel, N. J. (2002) Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror (Boulder, CO: Westview Press).

Scott Gates

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Lischer, S. K. (2009) ‘War, Displacement, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, in S. Gates and S. Reich (eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press), pp. 143–159. Lyall, J. (2009) ‘Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, 331–362. Petersen, R. (2001) Resistence and Rebellion. Lessons from Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Petersen, R. (2002) Understanding Ethnic Violence. Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Polo, M. (1995) ‘Internal Cohesion and Competition among Criminal Organisations’ in G. Fiorentini and S. Peltzman (eds.) The Economics of Organised Crime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 87–108. Pugel, J. (2009) ‘Disaggregating the Causal Factors Unique to Child Soldiering: The Case of Liberia’ in S. Gates and S. Reich (eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press), pp. 160–182. Richards, P. (1996) Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: Heineman). Shepler, S. (2004) ‘The Social and Cultural Context of Child Soldiering in Sierra Leone’, Workshop on Techniques of Violence in Civil War, PRIO, Oslo, 20–21 August. Singer, P. S. (2005) Children at War (New York: Pantheon). Singer, P. S. (2009) ‘The Enablers of War: Causal Factors behind Child Soldiers’ in S. Gates and S. Reich (eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press), pp. 93–107. Slim, H. (2008) Killing Civilians: Methods, Madness, and Morality in War (New York: Columbia University Press). Tarrow, S. (2007) ‘Inside Insurgencies: Politics and Violence in an Age of Civil War (Book Review Essay)’, Perspectives on Politics 5, 587–600. Veale, A. and Stavrou, A. (2003) ‘Violence, Reconciliation and Identity: The Reintegration of Lord’s Resistance Army Child Abductees in Northern Uganda’, ISS Monograph 92. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Vermeij, L. (2009) Children of Rebellion. Socialisation of Child Soldiers within the Lord’s Resistance Army. MA Thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo (July). Weinstein, J. M. (2005) ‘Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, 598–624. Weinstein, J. M. (2007) Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press). Wessells, M. (2006) Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Wood, E. J. (2003) Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (New York: Cambridge University Press). Wood, E. J. (2008) ‘The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks’, Annual Review of Political Science 11, 539–561. Wood, E. J. (2009) ‘Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When is Wartime Rape Rare?’ Politics and Society 37, 131–162. Wood, R. (2010) ‘Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians’, Journal of Peace Research 47, 601–614.

3 Child Soldier Recruitment in the Liberian Civil Wars: Individual Motivations and Rebel Group Tactics Sukanya Podder

Introduction Involvement of children and youth in civil conflict is a multidimensional theme for disaggregating experience of conflict processes and its impact on participants and broader civilian communities. This chapter will analyse field data on individual experiences of war and fighting to identify two sides of the recruitment and mobilization spectrum for child soldiers in the Liberian civil wars. First, it provides an overview of the conflict, the main actors and armed groups, before examining the various push and pull factors behind recruitment of children and youth to glean individual motivations and compulsions. It then focuses on the recruitment strategies of six main armed groups: the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Independent NPFL (INPFL), the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy Kromah faction (ULIMO-K), the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Taylor militia elements, the Government of Liberia (GoL) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) to explore inter-group variance. The chapter concludes by de-coupling how individual and group level motivations relate in the Liberian context to present a more nuanced understanding of recruitment and mobilization dynamics in instances of high incidence of youth participation in civil conflict. 50

Sukanya Podder 51

Conflict background The first phase of the Liberian conflict traced its roots to the rise of an Americo-Libero elite strengthening an oligarchy and related discrimination in public life with the progressive consolidation of the True Whig party regime. Shifts under President Tubman and the subsequent overthrow and coming to power of Samuel Doe’s Krahn rule, marked the beginnings of ethnic discrimination in Liberian politics. Following the failed coup attempt by Captain Qwiwonkpa and the persecution of the Gios and Manos in Nimba county, the NPFL insurgency found fresh ground for support in Nimba, with many young men joining voluntarily in revolutionary spirit. However, with growing splits and factional inter-competition, economic greed and contest over control and exploitation of natural resources, ethnicity gave way to a predominantly political economy of war logic. Eight different factions and splinter groups were active during the first civil war (1989–1995) (Table 3.1). Apart from the NPFL headed by Charles Taylor and its splinter faction the INPFL, formed under the leadership of Prince Yeomi Johnson, there was also an anti-Krahn faction of the NPFL called the NPFL-Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC) formed by Tom Woewiyu (Sesay, 1996b). Ethnicity played an important role in the configuration of factions, the Krahn–Mandigo alliance, forged under the regime of Samuel Doe, was reunited in the form of a joint opposition rebel front of the ULIMO formed from amongst exiled Krahn and Mandingo soldiers, politicians and civilian

Table 3.1 Profile of armed groups in Liberia (1995–1996) Faction

Leader

Territory

AFL ULIMO-J ULIMO-K LDF LPC NPFL

Lieutenant General Hezekiah Bowen Roosevelt Johnson Alhaji Kromah Francois Massaquoiy George Boley Charles Taylor

ECOMOG

ECOWAS

Barracks within ECOMOG zone South-west North-west Lofa county, North-west Eastern Counties Nimba, Bong and adjacent areas Monrovia and surrounding areas from Kakata to Buchanan

Source: Outram (1997a, p. 356).

Combatants 8734 7776 12,460 750 4650 25,000 7269

52

Child Soldier Recruitment in the Liberian Civil Wars

refugees in Sierra Leone in 1994. The ULIMO received the patronage and support from the government in Freetown as well from the Nigerian components of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The Sierra Leonean government also recruited from amongst these refugees to bolster its weak army and augment its counter-insurgency strategy. It provided logistical support and bases from which ULIMO first undertook a cross-border strike on NPFL troops in August 1991 (Ellis, 1995, p. 183; Sesay, 1996a, 1996b; Outram, 1997a). Some informants who were organizers and commanders of ULIMO-K revealed the story of the ULIMO’s formation. After the killing of Doe, the AFL was dissolved and army lost command and control, I escape that time into political asylum, and went to Sierra Leone where ULIMO was formed. I was recruited only because I wanted to come back to Liberia and fight against Taylor, there was no money that time. The Liberian Ambassador to Sierra Leone was the brain behind reorganising ex-AFL soldiers into ULIMO-K with the help of the Sierra Leone government, while Taylor was backing the RUF insurgency. Hence a game of competition was going on.1 There were also the Doe government’s own forces, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) composed primarily of ethnic Krahn soldiers. Sesay (1996b) suggests that it functioned in the nature of a rebel faction and was primarily entrusted with defending and protecting ethnic Krahn people. The Liberian Peace Council (LPC) was formed in 1993 by George Boley, a former minister in the Doe government, who recruited a cohort of dissatisfied Krahn soldiers formerly with the AFL. It was essentially an anti-Taylor outfit which launched attacks on the NPFL in select areas, with the support of the ULIMO and the AFL. The Lofa Defense Force (LDF) was formed in Guinea in 1993, and sponsored by Taylor to fight the ULIMO-K. The latter responded by aiding the creation of another anti-Taylor force called the Bong Defense Force (BDF). Another small faction called the Liberia New Horizons (LNH) was formed by ethnic Krahns in the USA; it made a failed bid under the leadership of former AFL commander General Charles Jolo, to overthrow the interim government in 1994 (Adeleke, 1995; International Crisis Group, 2003). During the first Liberian civil war (1989–1996) regional intervention under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) supported by the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and the United

Sukanya Podder 53

Nations (UN) led to 14 short-lived peace accords between 1990 and 1995 (Nyakyi, 1998), which culminated in the signing of five sets of peace agreements that preceded the 1996 Abuja II accord.

Second civil war Taylor’s electoral victory in 1997 provided fertile proximate conditions for conflict resumption (Skocpol, 1979; Goldstone, 1991; Goodwin, 2001). Economic downturns facing the Liberian state aligned with internal and external factors in favour of a shift in power. While elections in 1997 eliminated the problem of dual sovereignty, the brief, hasty and incomplete Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process, together with inadequate implementation of the terms of the Abuja Peace accord, following the departure of the 10,500 strong ECOMOG force in October 1999, impinged on the tenability of a fragile peace. Internally, the Taylor government continued in the form of his earlier personalized warlord economic dealings, and the delivery of public services was minimal. This laxity in governance was accompanied by a policy of brutal elimination of opposition and reprisals against opponents on his advent to presidency. Most Krahns faced persecution, hostile behaviour and neglect during Taylor’s elected political leadership. Opposition to Taylor also crystallized at an international level, with US and regional governments especially Sierra Leone and Guinea taking the lead in financing and providing bases for operations by anti-Taylor elements which resulted in the formation of two new insurgencies between 2000 and 2002, namely, LURD and MODEL. The LURD movement emerged essentially from the ashes of the first Liberian civil war and the ethnic persecution that followed, particularly against ethnic Mandingos and Krahns, after Taylor’s electoral victory in 1997. Many of them were ex-fighters of the ULIMO-K faction forced into exile for fear of reprisal under Taylor’s new government. As part of the shifting matrix of regional political alliances, the Guinean government also provided logistical support to LURD in retaliation to Taylor’s support of Guinean dissidents who were trying to overthrow Lasana Conté in 2001 (Jaye, 2003a). Taylor’s difficult relations with the regime in Guinea also created roadblocks to a successful diplomatic settlement. The leadership of LURD, including Chairman Sekou Koneh, were based in the Guinean capital Conakry to liaise with Guinean President Lasana Conté. Lofa county in the north-west was at the centre of the LURD uprising, because of its contiguity

54


with the Guinea border where a considerable number of anti-Taylor Mandingo tribes-people had taken refuge (Brabazon, 2003; Reno, 2004). Other regional shifts included a reversal in the trend of Taylor’s relations with Côte d’ Ivoire. Following the death of his initial Ivorian patron, President Houphouët-Boigny, Taylor’s ties with that country were strengthened under the regime of General Robert Guei who was in charge of the army during the onset of Taylor’s rebellion against the Doe government. However, after Guei’s fall from power a new Ivorian leadership under President Laurent Gbago found Liberian (Taylor) and Burkinabe support for two new rebel factions on the western corridor, especially the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand-Ouest (MPIGO) faction (formed to avenge the killing of Guei) as the main reason for its support for MODEL.

Individual experiences of the war: Recruitment and fighting Recruitment in Liberia, as in every context, was a product of overarching structural conditions created by what Hoffman (2006) calls ‘warscapes’, pressures of displacement, homelessness, familial separation or loss, which create challenges for physical survival. This was accompanied by instances of targeted coercive recruitment, personal agency, volition and compliance to tactically navigate a violent landscape. This chapter draws on data collected in two phases of field work conducted over five months during 2008–2009. The pilot study in December–January 2008 involved a total of 25 former child soldier interviews, and 24 interviews with policy makers and elites in UN agencies, ministries, and with programme managers, child protection workers in local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and child protection agencies (CPAs). The second leg of my field work involved an intense data collection exercise for ten weeks during September–November 2009 in select communities of Liberia’s six counties, namely, Lofa, Grand Gedeh, Bong, Sinoe, Montserrado, Margibi and the capital Monrovia. A consolidated caseload of 101 former child soldiers was interviewed using a six-part in-depth semi-structured qualitative questionnaire. Forty-two elite and policy level interviews were conducted, together with participatory and rapid rural appraisal (P/RRA) exercises in select communities of Bong, Nimba, Lofa, Margibi, Montserrado and Grand Gedeh. Five focus group discussions (FGDs) together with 25 key informant interviews (KIIs) with former commanders to learn about armed group organizational dynamics were also conducted.

Sukanya Podder 55

In my total interview caseload with former child soldiers 41 per cent (52/126) took part in the first civil war; of these 67 per cent (35/52) child soldiers also took part in the second civil war, while 33 per cent (17/52) did not rejoin an armed group in 1999. The remaining caseload of 89 per cent (74/126) took part only in the second civil war and of these only six had been re-recruited in the post 2004 period to fight in Côte d’Ivoire or Guinea. I will first engage with individual experiences of the Liberian wars, in terms of recruitment and fighting to unravel the decision to participate by exploring the ‘push’ of war-induced hardships and the ‘pull’ of recruitment appeals. Table 3.2 shows armed faction distribution in the respondent sample. The strongest representation of 22 per cent is from the NPFL (28/126), followed by the Taylor militia (23/126) at 18 per cent; then LURD (22/126) and MODEL (21/126) both at roughly 17 per cent. The respondent sample represents 15 out of 16 main ethnic groups in Liberia (Table 3.3). Ethnic disaggregation among the armed groups suggests that major groups like the NPFL/GoL, Taylor militia, ULIMO-K, LURD and MODEL were ethnically mixed factions, although they show predominance of certain tribes. The Mano and Kpelle groups were mostly part of Taylor factions; Mandingos dominated ULIMO-K and LURD, while Krahn, Sarpo and Kru dominated MODEL. I used Brett and Specht’s innovative strategy of focusing on young soldiers’ perceptions of their own reasons for enlisting with armed

Table 3.2 Affiliational distribution in respondent sample Armed Group/Factional Affiliation NPFL INPFL ULIMO-K ULIMO-J GoL (Taylor) AFL (Doe) LDF LPC RUF LURD Taylor Militia MODEL Multiple Factions

Data Composition Split (N = 126)

Years of Operation

28/126 2/126 13/126 2/126 12/126 6/126 1/126 2/126 2/126 22/126 23/126 21/126 8/126

1990–1996 1992–1994 1994–1996 1994–1995 1997–2003 1980–1996 1994–1996 1994–1996 1993–1998 1999–2003 1998–2003 2003 –

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Table 3.3 Ethnic disaggregation of respondent sample by armed faction Armed Group

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

NPFL INPFL ULIMO-K ULIMO-J GoL AFL (DOE) RUF LURD LPC LDF INPFL Taylor Militia MODEL Multiple Factions

15 1 1 – 5 – – 3 – – – 5 2 5

2 – 3 – 1 – 1 2 – – – 2 – 3

1 – – – 1 – – 1 3 – – – 5 4

4 – – – 1 2 – 1 – – – 2 3 4

5 – 1

– – – – – – – – – – – – 11 –

2 – – – 2 – – – – – – 9 – 1

– – 4 – 1 1 – 6 – – – – 1 3

1 – – – – – – – – – – – – –

2 – – – 2 – – 1 – – – 1 2 2

– – – – – – – – – – – – 2 –

2 – – – – – – 1 – – – 3 – –

1 1 – – 2 – – – – – – – – 2

1 – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – 3 – – – 2 – –

3

1 1 3 1 5

Note: 1 = Kpelle, 2 = Gbandi, 3 = Sarpo, 4 = Kru, 5 = Loma, 6 = Krahn, 7 = Mano, 8 = Mandingo, 9 = Gola, 10 = Bassa, 11 = Grebo, 12 = Gio, 13 = Vai, 14 = Mende, 15 = Kissi.

groups by selecting six main pre-war characteristics namely war as environment, poverty, education and employment, family and friends, politics and ideology and culture and tradition to understand why youth choose to fight (Brett and Specht, 2004, p. 10). Trends in the pre-war family situation suggest that loss or separation from family and displacement (12) and (25)2 in the two phases was an important push factor for voluntary recruitment, making life inside the armed group better than the insecurities of war. With respect to pre-war educational attainment, 49 per cent of my respondents were attending primary level education while 8 per cent had never been to school at the time of their recruitment. With respect to employment trends, barring 6 per cent, a miniscule number, none of my respondents had any gainful employment prior to the war; this meant poverty rates were also significantly high. Eighty per cent came from households with a single income earner supporting on average five to eight dependents, nearly 60 per cent attested to not having money to attend school and expressed pre-war dependence on extended family for help with food. Pre-war characteristics of political and ideological sympathies reinforce ethnic persecution narratives detailed in the conflict analysis. Culturally being a soldier appeared to be traditionally coveted, and joining the AFL a much-desired career. In some instances they volunteered to avenge the death of a close family member or to

Sukanya Podder 57

defend their community. Amongst my respondents (Table 3.4) who took part in the first conflict, only 25 per cent (14/56) were forcibly recruited, which suggests that coercion though prevalent was not the main theme at least in this phase. More robust reasons for joining were support for political objectives, desire to protect one’s family and having an acquaintance in the group; these coalesced to encourage voluntary enlistment. Children also joined to bring back food for the family or other material goods to support them. One of my respondents in Sinoe recalled his experiences of the first war, ‘To see food that time was difficult, there were no medical facilities, everything had ceased.’3 Several respondents with the NPFL explained that they had joined to defend the country, suggesting an overtone of ethnic patriotism at play amongst Nimbadians during the early part of the first civil war. I join in Nimba on my own, the rebel came to free us so I took gun and they gave me training in Gborplay town near the border with Côte d’Ivoire.4 I became part of the NPFL due to the death of my two brothers; I wanted to fight against the Doe people who kill my family.5 I just went there for my people that die. I told myself, even if I die now, I will go behind them now, if any person bothers with me, I know what to do.6 During that time my uncle who I considered my father was killed by LPC boys. I got angry and the only way I could protect the rest of my family members was to join the force.7 In 1990, my parents went to Guinea and I was left behind in Liberia, one of the guys in the town by the name of Saye Kokei he was a soldier man with NPFL, he just carry me with him, I was 15–16 years old, took me as his small boy.8 War in some respects became an opportunity for a rise to prominence, something which pre-war Liberian society did not allow for youth. Being daredevil and ruthless as a fighter was a much-coveted role, and often entrusted a responsibility for protection of the family and community on youth who otherwise would have been dependent for schooling and daily survival on older ‘big big’ (influential, resourceful) men in the extended family. Becoming a fighter was also a form of freedom, there was/were free food, free drugs, alcohol, girlfriends; everything youth often did not or could not have access to during the pre-war period due to low levels of education, high unemployment and economic

58

Table 3.4 Why did you join? (1990–1996) N = 52 I supported their political goals I joined to protect my family I knew someone in the group I wanted to join I was captured Separation from family Gain/profit/ looting/offered money To avenge death of family

NPFL (28)

ULIMO-K (13)

LPC (2)

ULIMO-J (2)

INPFL (2)

LDF (1)

MULTIPLE (4)

18

6

1

–

1

–

–

12

5

–

–

1

10

4

1

1

1

–

–

12 8 4 –

6 6 2 –

2 – – –

2 – – –

2 – – –

1 – – –

– – – –

3

2

1

–

–

–

–

–

Sukanya Podder 59

dependence. The gerontocratic, patrimonial nature of Liberian society underwent a reversal and created ‘routes’ for traversing erstwhile blocks to political power, leadership, clients, land and wives. This theme of youth empowerment is strongly resonated in the work of Richards (1996), Utas (2003) and Peters (2007) for the West African context. With growing awareness of the benefits of being a soldier, with ‘loot from raids, bribes during security assignments, payoffs from protecting locals and the acquisition of power in local communities’ (Utas, 2004, p. 212), powerless youth were transformed into ferocious fighters. Violence and the symbolic power of the gun became a source of authority over parents and elders, often at the behest of obedience, compliance and respect which for generations had been inculcated into youth to perpetuate a gerontocratic hierarchy. Freedom and power of the gun is a recurrent theme in the voices of youth. During the war I was on my own and doing things my way, taking drugs and killing people. I fought in Monrovia . . . the group was around 150, small boys were 60 but I cannot remember the number of girls, but we had girls fighting in the group. We were not given pay but we got our pay by looting.9 The nature of recruits also varied; the conflict attracted a mix of participants, ranging from high commitment recruits, to floaters and free-riders, that is, some invested more, others were consumers, and less useful for the rebel group. There were also some instances of coercive recruitment especially in the post 1994 period, a proliferation of groups meant greater demand for manpower especially youth. A typical raid would involve 20–25 rebels entering a village, arresting civilians, looting valuables and food and ordering young and old to tote the looted load at gunpoint. In other scenarios, able-bodied men and boys were rounded up, beaten mercilessly and given a choice to either join the group or be killed. Civilian narratives of how rebel groups attacked the villages also corroborated stories of my respondents of being caught in ambush or captured. There was no room for refusal or resistance, a sheer desire for survival pressed many to take up the gun. The troops attack a village; they loot plenty, arrest all the boys, tabay10 them, beat them, kill their parents. They rape women, small girls in front of their husbands and fathers. They stay for a couple of weeks and then move on. They would beat, tabay, rape and then say, you will have to join us, or we will kill you.11

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At the same time forced recruitment in Liberia is an extremely fluid concept, and the distinction between forced and voluntary involvement is a conceptual one at best, for instance, youth who were captured or those who started following the group willingly to save themselves from harassment by other soldiers began life as forced labour. Over time, to escape the hardship, and abuse that toting load entailed, some would decide to take up guns and fight. As one child soldier with ULIMO-K suggested, ‘You will have to walk at times ten hours and some of the people fall down from hunger and thirst, it is better to hold gun, no one can harm you or beat you with gun in hand.’12 In my in-depth interviews, I could trace a rich proof of tactical agency13 both on the part of young boys and girls. Some youth joined armed forces to escape the hardship of living in flight or in the bush or bad conditions in refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. I was part of Taylor forces; really I was very young, because of the advantage taking place over here I was forced to join because I could not stand it at the time. The rebel come they beat you, they take your things, they tabay or make you tote their load, to get rid of the disadvantage so I took gun and went at the front.14 I joined the LPC because of some war advantages, in my presence there was some maltreatment of my parents and that encouraged me to join.15 NPFL boys enter our village [Yeasu], Bong and started killing people, killed my father’s cattle and tied my father and took him to the town, they tabay us, some of my friends also treated bad, took their cash, when they left, I felt so bad and willingly went on the base [Cuttington] to join. I say to myself what my friends could do, I could do.16 Factions in the second war were made up of a core group of veteran fighters from the various armed outfits active in the first civil war especially ULIMO-K, NPFL and LPC. Similar motivations were at play for youth to join or rejoin. Victimcy images have been important in post war contexts to facilitate reconciliation and secure forgiveness (see Utas, 2005b). Most child soldiers on a first meeting admit to being forced but with familiarity tend to shift their story to one of opportunism and volition. As one young boy, who lives in Monrovia, at first explained his lack of complicity in things ‘When war was on, I was compelled to do things, bad things, but not out of my will . . . I made to do so . . . to fight, to beat, to loot and kill plenty.’17 After meeting him for the third time and having forged a rudimentary friendship over shared soft drinks and

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biscuits, he later confided the he had willingly joined in 2003 when he saw friends bring back ‘. . . food and other things when they go with LURD, everywhere people looting stores in Monrovia’, so he enjoyed being there. In answer to the question why did they join (Table 3.5) respondents admitted that they faced both compulsions and choices. Respondents from LURD and MODEL exhibited a high level of sympathy for their group’s political goals; separation from family and revenge of familial loss figured less prominently in decision-making. Economic benefits from looting and profit motives were negligible for MODEL, and moderate for the Taylor militia, GoL and LURD respondents. A larger number of respondents, roughly 30 per cent (24/78), reported being forcibly conscripted. These campaigns of recruitment at gunpoint occurred during raids into video clubs, schools, playgrounds, even on roads and in refugee and IDP camps, where children were simply caught and press ganged into trucks. In 2000–2002, I was in a displaced camp near Gbarnga called Mayanmu, we had left our home in Gbaota when the LURD come that way, I join them, people that refused were massacred.18 The time LURD enter in Monrovia, I was selling for my aunty in Caldwell Farm, Montserrado, the rebels ask me if I want to live, I said yes, so they carry me from Caldwell to Gardnersville and give me twodays training, I was given gun and taken to the frontline to fight.19

Table 3.5 Why did you join? (1999–2003) N = 78 I supported their political goals I joined to protect my family I knew someone in the group I wanted to join I was captured Separation from family Gain/profit/ looting/offered money To avenge death of family

LURD (22)

MODEL (21)

GoL (12)

Taylor Militia (23)

10

15

2

1

2

5

3

3

5

2

8

10

– 12 5 7

13 4 4 2

– – – 6

− 8 5 5

3

2

–

1

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Several child soldiers admitted to have joined willingly since life inside the group was secure and also qualitatively better than hiding in the bush or in IDP camps under a constant fear of being attacked, captured and beaten. Apart from physical security, there was also, as earlier, an issue of food, which often served as an incentive for voluntary enrolment. A girl soldier with MODEL, in River Gee, shared ‘me and my sister, we joined because no food that time, only rebels have food, they take from civilian. In the bush we walk for days without good food, we eat food without salt, and sometimes eat them raw (fish/snail) just to survive.’20 Respondents with MODEL had mostly joined voluntarily to protect their family or to defend the Krahn. Offer of physical security together with the promise to defend their people was a prominent theme with this group. In 2003, MODEL entered Grand Gedeh, and I was in rebel territory, controlled by Junior Gaye. The MODEL people enter town and say we come here to free you from Taylor and all the young boys were encouraged to become part of the group; there was no option so I took up gun.21 Sexual violence, abuse and exploitation were a recurrent theme in the narratives of girl soldiers that I interviewed. Some were coerced, raped and then taken with the group by force, others voluntarily sought soldier men as bush husbands to survive or be safe from the predation of other men, thus living at the behest of powerful commanders. At least that is the picture they recounted. I feel nonetheless that this victim image must be accepted with reservation. The most authentic imagery of the Liberian conflict is that of a complicated, violent social space where sexual liaisons/partnerships for survival, social navigation and privilege was/were common (see Utas, 2005a). My observations from these responses is that in Liberia if one could not escape the fighting or leave the country, there were few choices but to join an armed group, partly on account of threats to physical security and food shortages. These were exacerbated by ethnic targeting, familial loss and desire for revenge. Profit from looting and economic incentives was also more significant in this phase. Nonetheless it is difficult to accurately establish coercion from willingness, because, as LURD and MODEL advanced from twin fronts, it made participation for those who could not escape an exercise in tactical agency. A Taylor militia recruit now living at WestPoint slum shared his story of pure opportunism with little hesitation, he was neither coerced nor wanting to flee, his brother’s

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involvement in the Taylor militia created a window for participation as a way to profit. He recalled, ‘My big brother was with the Taylor militia so I know them boys, I go sometimes in their jeep around town. I never fought . . . we just go to the Vai Town area and Freeport, loot plenty and sell them in US dollars.’22 I agree with a growing school of scholars (Utas, 2003; Bøås and Hatløy, 2006) that recruitment in Liberia for the most part was without much coercion. The primary variable explaining whether youth joined or not relates to the opportunity for escape versus a lack of it. Close interaction with my research assistants and boys who worked in the Catholic bed and breakfast where I stayed for months in Monrovia made it clear that those in and around Monrovia especially in Bomi and Bong made every effort to pull some resources together to escape the country or found and sought refuge either in the bush or safe havens inside the capital itself. Economic background was also an important determinant, with participation greater among boys and young men from poorer backgrounds who lacked the resources to seek refuge outside the country: they stayed, fought, survived. There was fear, there was displacement, but those who joined mostly did so willingly. The structural realities of a country living under constant cycles of conflict with warlords competing for control of resources produced an entire generation of youth who were socialized into little other than the rules of war. Being a strong fighter was prestigious, coveted and aspired to. Hence when war broke out again in 1999, most trained soldiers saw it as a natural return to ‘war business’, others joined to protect themselves and their families from abuse, some saw an opportunity to profit and exiles were motivated by a desire to return home. These lures were well-integrated into rebel group recruitment strategies as the next section reveals.

Rebel recruitment in the first and second civil wars The other side of the story is the recruitment methods of the rebel group itself: what can it offer to potential recruits to attract their voluntary enlistment, or do they resort to coercion and systematic socialization to build group cohesion amongst abducted recruits? The choice of recruitment incentives are based on the mix of resource endowments that rebel groups have. Groups stronger in social endowments would offer selective non-material incentives based on ethnic, religious, cultural and ideological goals to be achieved over the longue durée compared to economically sound groups which can use their resources to pay

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salaries, uniforms, food and other supplies (Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989; Lichbach, 1998; Woods, 2004; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006, 2008; Weinstein, 2007, pp. 98–99). Future promises of land, property or political position and even gain from looting may be used to defer immediate payoffs, while threat of persecution and punishments serve as selective disincentives to mitigate the free-rider problem. But where do children figure in this matrix? Gates and Andvig (2006) emphasize that the supply of child soldiers remains invariant across conflicts; it is the demand side of the equation on the part of rebel organizations which explains child recruitment ratios. But why would a rebel group target a caseload which is seemingly less physically able as recruits (Blattman and Annan, 2007; Arjona and Kalyvas, 2008; Pugel, 2008; Bjørkhaug, 2010)? Variance stems from leadership styles, organizational structures and resource endowment of groups. It is estimated that around 40,000 to 70,000 combatants were active during the first phase (1990–1997); child soldiers constituted 10–40 per cent of this caseload. According to the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) office, child soldiers accounted for 24 per cent of the total demobilized in 1996–1997. Of the various groups, LPC had the highest number of child soldiers, nearly 37 per cent of its total headcount (Utas, 2004, p. 213). While children and youth were part of the overall recruitment targets in both phases of the conflict, I feel it was more often expediency rather than preference that informed rebel groups. Liberia has a strong tradition of child labour, youth commonly assist in household work, farming and apprentice roles. As the next section on the nature of participation will elucidate, the majority of child recruits were camp followers serving ancillary roles in line with socio-culturally acceptable roles for children. Reverting now to the recruitment narrative, rebel groups in the first phase were backed by some level of popular support, often declaring themselves as protectors of the interests of specific ethnicities. At the onset of war, the people in Nimba viewed the NPFL insurgents as liberators, and rallied their support behind the group, ethnic appeals and recruitment mediated through friends, family and kin networks mobilized. Both ULIMO-K factions and LDF followed this ‘ethnic protection’ logic of recruitment. The first was a Mandingo outfit, seeking to defend this group from NPFL abuses. The latter was formed to protect the Loma from Mandingo attacks. Gradually a shift in strategy became evident, as manpower needs expanded high levels of terror, violence and abuse against civilians was unleashed to recruit by threat, coercion and kidnapping. Groups like LPC, Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and BDF which

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proliferated in the post 1994 period were small outfits of local fighters, recruited through a mix of economic incentives including salary, food and loot combined with coercion and capture of civilians (Table 3.6). Refugee camps were an important site for recruitment by force as well as by persuasion. NPFL forces recruited from amongst Liberian refugees in camps located inside the Côte d’Ivoire between 1990 and 1994; ULIMO reportedly did the same inside Guinea (Achvarina and Reich, 2006, p. 154). With respect to resource endowments, ethnic appeals based on group identity markers gradually made way for natural resource extraction: illegal timber logging, gold rubber and diamond mining was a major source of collecting rents. NPFL, LPC and ULIMO-K, the three main groups in the first phase, engaged in looting of both natural resources and civilian, public property to sustain dwindling war objectives and waning external support structures especially following the ECOMOG intervention. When the LURD insurgency was launched in Lofa in 1999, the main Taylor militia and paramilitary groups like the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) and the Special Security Service (SSS) began to remobilize their former soldiers and also sought out new recruits to arrest the attack. In most cases, the rebel recruitment process would involve a mid-level

Table 3.6 Child recruitment and armed groups (1990–2003) Armed Group

Methods of Child Recruitment

NPFL

Ethnic appeals∗ , friends, coercion, economic incentives Family, friends, coercion, economic incentives Ethnic appeals, family, friends, coercion, economic incentives Ethnic appeals, family, friends, coercion Family, friends, economic incentives Friends, family, coercion Coercion, ideology Ethnic appeals, political mobilization, coercion Family, friends, coercion Family, friends, political mobilization, limited coercion

INPFL ULIMO-K ULIMO-J GoL [Taylor] LPC RUF LURD Taylor Militia MODEL

Time Period 1990–1996 1992–1994 1994–1996 1994–1995 1997–2003 1994–1996 1993–1998 1999–2003 1998–2003 2003

Note: ∗ By ethnic appeals I mean promise of defending a particular ethnic group, for instance, the Mano and Gio by NPFL, the Mandingo by ULIMO-K, the Loma by LDF and the Sarpo and Kru by LPC.

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commander acting as the mobilization officer, getting in touch with former fighters in his kin groups amongst friends and acquaintances living in the same village or district and even in IDP camps, before offering a contract or mission to professional soldiers and mature fighters. LURD, on the other hand, was essentially a mix of former RUF, ULIMOK and Burkinabe fighters. The presence of 524 foreign combatants in the recent DDR process testifies to a cross-border recruitment element during this period. National Commission for DDR reported that 38 foreign child combatants (twenty-three from Guinea, six from Côte d’Ivoire, eight from Sierra Leone and one from Burkinafaso) had registered under the 2004 DDRR (NCDDR Statistics, 2008).23 Children were necessary to augment numbers and useful in protecting this small core of seasoned fighters in every group. Abduction of child recruits into LURD was conceded as a proactive decision by Master General, former Defence Minister for the group in Voinjama. He agreed that during the war, a small group of commanders would systematically capture children and force them to go to the frontline under the influence of drugs and alcohol.24 A former ATU sergeant also admitted that GoL and militia units regularly recruited children in its many paramilitary units in the post 2000 period, since there was no new recruitment to induct adult soldiers into the organization since the group was losing manpower in Lofa.25 MODEL, which launched its insurgency in 2003, after parting ways from LURD in 2002, had a smaller number of child soldiers, many joined willingly in exchange for an offer of protection, or to defend their communities. A former general of MODEL now based in Panama, Sinoe explained, the process of recruitment and mobilization into the group. MODEL was like partner to LURD, those same people that founded LURD, also organised the MODEL, the former chairman from MODEL, the Marco man, and Charles Jolo26 are senior brothers who regrouped; the same group that went to Guinea to fight that war, they were re-recruited and sent to Côte d’Ivoire. The reason was if we attacked Taylor from both areas he will get weak, and it was how some of our men went to start from that end [Grand Gedeh]. We were many that were recruited, some of us knew each other, and many times we sat together and our discussion was on how to come to Liberia and get Taylor out.27 All three main groups evidently used a mix of recruitment strategies. Promises or the initial offer varied; while for adult combatants political,

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social and financial benefits were important incentives, for child soldiers, security, family protection or the hope of returning home to Liberia (for RUF captives) were significant. Seasoned fighters who were re-recruited from the LPC and AFL units as part of MODEL were not offered pecuniary benefits, as one respondent indicated, ‘We were not receiving specific salary from our organisers, they were only giving us ammunitions, and facilitating our trip, but we were not getting salary. We were many that came from Côte d’Ivoire, over thousands, and had lot of commanders, about thirty to forty.’ NPFL/GoL offered a salary to regular soldiers; higher ranked soldier or commanders close to Charles Taylor reaped additional benefits from the warlord’s largesse. One informant suggested that NPFL would give roughly LD 500, in quarterly payments. Child soldiers were usually not paid and survived on small money, captured items, loot and food from civilians. One Taylor militia Small Boys Unit (SBU) member made this evident, ‘I was not paid by my commander, because we were in the forest and five years I could not see my parents, so when we see people we took their money and other things, because we were not paid by the government.’28 Elaborating the voluntary recruitment process further, meetings were organized with small boys in the village to encourage them to join, sometimes group members would meet in a refugee camp to persuade youth to join, at other times raids would take place and recruits captured at gunpoint from roads, schools, playgrounds, video parlours and IDP camps. Occasionally, child soldiers themselves approached former commanders to re-enlist, lured by a promise of pay and the benefit of looting. Another set of incentives for voluntary enlistment included return to Liberia especially for exiles in Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Table 3.7 summarizes trends in recruitment tactics used by various factions in the second civil war as coded in my respondent sample. Coercion is prominent as a technique for LURD which also made more promises of gain from looting compared to the other three groups. MODEL shows higher incidence of recruitment through family, friends, voluntarily and through offer of family protection and food. Taylor militia recruits similarly were recruited through family and friends, although coercion is also evidenced. Refugee and displaced children were a regular target for recruitment during the last stages of the 2003 war by Taylor militia and LURD forces in the five main IDP camps in and around the capital in Montserrado county, then host to more than 100,000 people, roughly half of the Liberian IDP population. Rick’s Institute, Jahtondo, Plumkor and Wilson Corner IDP camps were the main raiding grounds for these rebels. Some

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Table 3.7 Armed group recruitment tactics Armed Group

LURD (22) MODEL (30) GoL (15) Taylor Militia (32)

Coercion/ Mediated Promises Offer of Return Contract Abduction through of Gain Family from with Family/ from Loot Protection Exile Money Friends and Food 12 4 − 8

5 15 8 10

10 4 − 5

2 20 3 3

3 4 − 1

2 5 4 5

of my respondents testified to being captured at gunpoint and taken to Bomi for training by LURD, before being sent to the front within a short span of two weeks following abduction. In Grand Gedeh the normal narrative in communities is that ‘MODEL people come to save us, they our brothers, they treat us good, we join MODEL to fight Taylor’,29 making it evident that political mobilization against Taylor was strong. The same MODEL, however, used widespread coercion and extreme violence in non-Krahn areas of south-eastern Liberia, especially Sinoe, Grand Bassa and Maryland to augment its manpower. Mano and Gio tribes in Nimba were attacked by MODEL in 2003, which raided refugee and IDP camps bordering Côte d’Ivoire and Toulepleu in Grand Gedeh for coercive recruitment. According to informants, MODEL did not have a small boys unit (SBU); children would cook and wash clothes for the fighters in groups which did not have girls. A former commander indicated that children were given a gun ‘from 13 years up and only if they were able to tote it’.30 Organizationally, these groups were loosely structured, had less to offer and spawned a ‘pay yourself’ culture, with looting, abuse and violence of civilians being a prominent feature to inculcate fear and minimize resistance. As the conflict progressed, captured recruits became more common, to augment dwindling manpower. Captives were illtreated and there was no issue of monetary payments to them, some who managed to loot and learn the art of in-group survived the difficulties while others suffered greatly. Youth in these groups would also themselves act as mobilizers, often persuading friends in their home communities to join through promises of benefit from stealing, loot and food supplies. One respondent formerly with the Taylor militia based in Monrovia revealed that he was head of the unit fighting near Vai Town

Sukanya Podder 69

Bridge; he knew people in his area and recruited from his acquaintances, asking them to join. The main offer was the opportunity for looting, ‘what you see is yours we say’. As LURD advanced towards Monrovia during 2002, GoL and Taylor units had little choice but to shift their recruitment strategy from offering salaries to abduction. The Taylor units lacked a coherent political agenda and were fighting in defence, as a result the pattern of incentives on offer and the strategy of recruitment shifted dramatically. Many children who fought with the government from 2000 to 2003 were picked up in round-ups on the streets, travelling to and from schools and at their homes. This was confirmed both by my respondents as well as school teachers, in Nimba, Bong and slum residents at Westpoint in Monrovia. Girls would usually be raped or threatened with rape, subduing all resistance and then taken with the group as followers, to cook, clean or serve as sex slaves. Some would make the transition into fighters, or seek solace in the position of wife to a single commander simply to escape sexual abuse at the hands of many. This was how several of my female respondents especially with LURD and Taylor militia came to be conscripted during 2000–2002. This strategy of coercive recruitment reinforced the absence of any coherent social bonds. Besides, as the ethnic disaggregation table illustrates (see Table 3.3), LURD, MODEL and Taylor militia units were a mix of ethnicities. The leadership of these groups did not engage in propagating strict ideology, although both LURD and MODEL had a strong political agenda aimed at expelling Taylor from the helm. The initial ULIMO fighters, who formed the core of LURD later, were brought together both by opportunity and conviction in the need to defend and protect the Mandingo people in Lofa. Apart from an overarching anti-Taylor feeling which permeated into the rank and file of LURD and MODEL, there were few efforts to check the commitment levels of opportunistic joiners. All three factions towards the end of the second war lacked the social resources to adopt an alternative to abduction and coercion which became the most feasible strategy of recruitment. Voluntary recruits into the rebel ranks, in contrast, were brought together by opportunity rather than conviction, payoffs to opportunistic participants involved looting, which became an important economic incentive. The main drawback of this random selection was a lack commitment among members, resulting in an ill-trained, motley crew of opportunists who were mostly child soldiers.

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Conclusion Empirical evidence gathered in Liberia in the course of this research suggests that children, young people and adults face similar situations in the context of war; children join or follow adults as aides, as labour, for food and for security much more than by force. Force exists: violence is an important source of establishing control over people, places and things. War is all about control of spaces and humans. Nevertheless, children are actors in this space, they navigate, they succumb and they respond. Similarly there are strong warrior traditions in some African societies (Richards, 1996) where patron–client relationships involved intergenerational transfers of knowledge and assets. This was one of the motivating variables for joining rebel groups, even if at gunpoint, the objective was to receive training in the art of warfare and meet with the exigencies of war. Hence in some respects ‘child soldiering’ became a socially sanctioned means of acquiring skills training, and social protection in the volatility of warscapes and neither abhorrent nor abusive of children’s rights as is normally perceived by the West (Lee, 2009). Hence coercion as a concept in recruitment narratives has to be closely examined and contextually located. At the other end of the recruitment spectrum is the tactics employed by rebel groups as part of their war fighting approaches. Critical to understanding the employment and recruitment of children in fighting units is the element of child labour. In affluent Western societies, adolescence is usually a period of liminality, lack of responsibility and education. Elsewhere in the globe, however, adolescence can be a period of responsibility, child labour is often intrinsic to these local contexts (Bledsoe, 1990; Ferme, 2001; Shepler, 2004; Francis, 2007; Stovel, 2008). Children engage in domestic labour from an early age from farming to running errands, they are important participants in the workforce, besides youth are expected to fend for themselves and most work part time to support their schooling or their own families (Lee, 2009). Hence, in the context of war, they are not peripheral participants, rather, ancillary roles of spying, toting load or playing bodyguard are contiguous to their pre-war secondary labour functions (Shepler, 2004). There was also an important element of foster care and living away from parents for purposes of schooling or apprenticeship training (Bledsoe, 1990, cited in Utas, 2003, p. 134) intrinsic to a patrimonial setup, where ‘big big’ men would offer youth opportunities, in exchange for unquestioned loyalty and support in local political and

Sukanya Podder 71

socio-economic proceedings. This in some form was replicated during the war, with commanders taking smaller boys under their patronage as bodyguards or to tote guns. They would care and feed them in exchange for loyalty and labour support. Attempts to de-couple individual motivations and group tactics in the Liberian context reveal several overlaps rooted in expedience and survival. Being a soldier offered important advantages and routes for surviving a dangerous warscape. Rebel groups operated in a relatively low technology warfare through the use of available manpower (mostly youth) together with systematic violence against civilians intended to augment ranks, enhance fear, encourage support and voluntary enlistment and minimize opposition/resistance. Thus recruitment at both the individual and group levels operated through a complementary set of rationale undermining the ‘coercion’ element and enhancing willingness and expedience in decision-making and choices.

Notes 1. Interview with XCSL11, Mandingo Quarter, Voinjama, 22 September 2009. 2. This corresponds to the number of respondents in each phase of the conflict under study. 3. Interview with XGSS4, Panama, Sinoe, 29 September 2009. 4. Interview with XCSN4, Ganta, Nimba, 9 October 2009. 5. Interview with XCSN6, Saclapea, 10 October 2009. 6. Interview with XCSB10, Gbarnga, Bong, 6 October 2009. 7. Interview with XCSS8, Camp 2, SRP, 30 September 2009. 8. Interview with XCSL10, Kabata, Voinjama, 19 September 2009. 9. Interview with XCSM10, YMCA Monrovia, 10 November 2009. 10. Tabay is a form of torture in which ‘a person’s elbows are tied behind their back and the rope is pulled tighter until the ribcage separates’ (Ismail, 2002, p. 126). 11. Interview with XCSB6, Bangshu village, Bong, 5 October 2009. 12. Interview with XCSM9, YMCA, Monrovia, 10 November 2009. 13. Tactical agency is narrow and opportunistic; it is ‘exercised to cope with concrete, immediate conditions of their lives in order to maximise the circumstances created by their violent military environment’ (Honwana, 2006, p. 71). 14. Interview with XCSN10, Flumpa, Nimba, 8 October 2009. 15. Interview with XCSS8, Panama, Sinoe, 28 September 2009. 16. Interview with XCSB11, Bong Agro Farm, Gbarnga, 6 October 2009. 17. Interview with XCSM3, Monrovia, 3 September 2009, 10 October 2009, 13 November 2009). 18. Interview with XCSB12, Gbaota, Bong, 4 October 2009. 19. Interview with XCSM5, DBH, Monrovia, 23 September 2009. 20. Interview with XCSS10, Panama, Sinoe, 29 September 2009.

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21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

Interview with XCSGG8, Zwedru, Grand Gedeh, 26 October 2009. Interview with XCSM15, Duala Market, Monrovia, 12 November 2009. Interview with Jean Thompson, NCDDR, Monrovia, 18 December 2008. Interview with Master General, Voinjama, Lofa, 15 December 2008. Interview with XCSM7, YMCA, Monrovia, 10 September 2009. KII2, with a former LURD organizer in Voinjama City and he corroborated this partnership between LURD and MODEL, 22 September 2009. Ibid. Interview with XCSB 12, Bong Agro Farm, Gbarnga, 6 October 2009. Interview with XCSGG13, Bartejan Gold Camp, 27 October 2009. KII15, Panama, Sinoe, 29 September 2009.

27. 28. 29. 30.

References Achvarina, V. and Reich, S. (2006). ‘No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers,’ International Security, 31 (1), 127–164. Adeleke, A. (1995). The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Ecowas Operation in Liberia. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 33(4), 569–593. Arjona, A. and Kalyvas, S. (2007). Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Recruitment: An Analysis of Survey Data from Colombia. Paper presented at the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention. Chicago. (February 28). [on-line]. Available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_ citation/1/7/9/5/6/p179565_index.html (Accessed 2nd August 2008). Bøås, M. and Hatløy, A. (2006). After the Storm: Economic activities among children and youth in return areas in post war Liberia: The case of Voinjama. Fafo Report 523 [on-line]. Available at www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/523/523.pdf [Accessed 13 March 2008]. Bjørkhaug, I. (2010). Child Soldiers in Colombia: The Recruitment of Children into Non-state Violent Armed Groups. MicroCon Research Working Paper 27. [on-line] Available at http://www.microconflict.eu/publications/RWP27_IB.pdf [accessed 19 August 2010]. Blattman, C. and Annan, J. (2007). The Consequences of Child Soldiering (August). HiCN Working Paper 22. [on-line] Available at http://www. chrisblattman.org/ [accessed 10 June 2008]. Bledsoe, C. (1990). No Success without Struggle: Social Mobility and Hardship for Foster Children in Sierra Leone, Man, 25, 70–88. Brabazon, J. (2003). Liberia: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Africa Programme Armed Non-State Actors Project Briefing Paper 1. [on-line] Available at www. chathamhouse.org.uk/file/3733_brabazon_bp.pdf [accessed 18 January 2009]. Brett, R. and Specht, I. (2004) Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ellis, S. (1995). Liberia 1989–1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence, African Affairs, 94, 165–197. Ellis, S. (1999). The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War. London: Hurst & Company.

Sukanya Podder 73 Ferme, M. (2001). The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Francis, D. J. (2007). Paper Protection Mechanisms: Child Soldiers and the International Protection of Children in Africa’s Conflict Zones, Journal of Modern African Studies, 45 (2), 207–231. Gates, S. and Andvig, J. C. (2006). Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict. Paper presented at the Dutch Flemish Association for Economy and Peace (June 22). Available at http://www.stichtingvredeswetenschappen.nl/Andvig_Gates_ Hague.pdf [accessed 1 February 2008]. Goldstone, J. A. (1991). Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Goodwin, J. (2001). No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements: 1945– 1991. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goodwin, J. and Skocpol, T. (1989). ‘Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World,’ Politics and Society, 17 (4), 489–509. Hoffman, D. (2006) ‘Disagreement: Dissent Politics and the War in Sierra Leone’, Africa Today, 52 (3) (Spring), 3–22. Honwana, A. (2006). Child Soldiers in Africa. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. (2006). Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War, American Political Science Review, 100 (3), 429–477. Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. (2007). Demobilization and Reintegration, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51 (August), 531–567. Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. (2008). Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War, American Journal of Political Science ,52 (2) (April), 436–455. International Crisis Group (2003). Liberia: Security Challenges. Dakar/Brussels, Africa Report No. 71 (3 November). [on-line] Available at www.crisisgroup. org/∼/. . ./liberia/Liberia%20Security%20Challenges.ashx [accessed 10 May 2009]. Jaye, T. (2003a). Briefings Liberia: An Analysis of post-Taylor Politics, Review of African Political Economy, 30 (98), 643–686. Jaye, T. (2003b). Liberia Setting Priorities for Post Conflict Reconstruction, Journal of Security Sector Management, 1 (3) (December) [on-line]. Available at http://www.ssronline.org/jofssm/issues/jofssm_0103_jaye_liberia.pdf?CFID= 2580194&CFTOKEN=86349561. Kalyvas, S. and Arjona, A. (2007). Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Recruitment: An Analysis of Survey Data from Colombia. Paper presented at the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention. Chicago. [on-line]. Available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/ 1/7/9/5/6/p179565_index.html [accessed 2 August 2008]. Lee, A. (2009). Understanding and Addressing the Phenomenon of Child Soldiers: The Gap between the Global Humanitarian Discourse and the Local Understandings and Experiences of Young People’s Military Recruitment. Working Paper 52. Oxford University. Refugee Studies Centre. [on-line] Available at www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/rscworkingpaper52.pdf [accessed 16 May 2010]. Lichbach, M. (1998). Contending Theories of Contentious Politics and the Structure – Action Problem of Social Order, Annual Review of Political Science, 1, 401–424.

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Nyakyi, A. 1998. Untitled paper. Presented at Learning from Conflict Resolution in Africa: Workshop on the Experience of Individual and Institutional Mediators, Mwalimu Nyerere, Foundation and the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Arusha,21–23 January. Outram, Q. (1997a). It’s Terminal Either Way: An Analysis of Armed Conflict in Liberia 1989–1996, Review of African Political Economy, 24 (73) (September), 355–371. Outram, Q. (1997b). Cruel Wars and Safe Havens: Humanitarian Aid in Liberia 1989–1996, Disasters, 21 (3), 189–205. Outram, Q. (1999). Liberia: Roots and Fruits of the Emergency, Third World Quarterly, 20 (1) (February), 163–173. Peters, K. (2007). Reintegration Support for Young Ex-combatants: A Right or a Privilege? International Migration, 45 (5), 35–59. Pugel, J. (2008). ‘Disaggregating the Causal Factors Unique to Child Soldiering: The Case of Liberia’, in S. Gates and S. Reich eds. Child Soldiers: Children and Armed Conflict in the Age of Fractured States. Pittsburgh: Ford Institute for Human Security. University of Pittsburgh Press, 160–182. Reno, W. (1995). Reinvention of an African Patrimonial State: Charles Taylor’s Liberia, Third World Quarterly, 16 (1), 109–120. Reno, W. (2004). Reconstructing Peace in Liberia. In Ali, T. M. and Matthews, R. O. eds. Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Inc. pp. 115–141. Richards, P. (1996). Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone. London: James Currey. Sesay, M. A. (1996a). Bringing Peace to Liberia. Accord 1. [on-line] Available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/liberia/index.php [accessed 15 September 2008]. Sesay, M. A. (1996b). Politics and Society in Post-War Liberia, Journal of Modern African Studies, 34 (3) (September), 395–420. Sesay, M. A. (1996c). Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia, Review of African Political Economy, 23 (67) (March), 35–52. Shepler, S. (2004). The Social and Cultural Context of Child Soldiering in Sierra Leone. Paper presented at the Techniques of Violence in Civil war workshop. Oslo: PRIO (20–21 August). [on-line] Available at http://www.prio.no/ cscw/pdf/micro/techniqes/shepler%20child%20soldiers.pdf [accessed 1 February 2008]. Shepler, S. (2005). The Rites of the Child: Global Discourses of Youth and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone, Journal of Human Rights, 4, 197–211. Skocpol, T. (1979). States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China. New York: Cambridge University Press. Stovel, L. (2008). There’s No Bad Bush to Throw Away a Bad Child: TraditionInspired Reintegration in Post-war Sierra Leone, Journal of Modern African Studies, 46 (2), 305–324. Utas, M. (2003). Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War. Uppsala: Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, Uppsala University. Utas, M. (2004). ‘Fluid Research Fields: Studying Ex-combatant Youth in the Aftermath of the Liberian Civil War’, in J. Boyden and J. de Berry eds. Children and

Sukanya Podder 75 Youth on the Front Line: Ethnography, Armed Conflict and Displacement. London: Berghahn, pp. 209–236. Utas, M. (2005a). Victimcy, Girlfriending, Soldiering: Tactic Agency in a Young Woman’s Social Navigation of the Liberian War Zone, Anthropological Quarterly, 78 (2), 403–430. Utas, M. (2005b). ‘Building a Future? The Reintegration and Re-marginalisation of Youth in Liberia’, in P. Richards (ed.) No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. London and Ohio: James Currey and Ohio University Press, pp. 137–154. Weinstein, J. (2007). Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge University Press. Woods, E. J. (2003). Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador. New York: Cambridge University Press.

4 Group Cohesion and Coercive Recruitment: Young Combatants and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone Krijn Peters

Introduction Armed factions need recruits to wage their struggle, and when voluntary conscription does not provide sufficient manpower, armies, militias and rebel movements can resort to forced conscription of adult and underage recruits. But where recruits do not join out of conviction or free will, armed groups need to find ways to initiate feelings of loyalty to the movement to minimize the risk of desertion. Moreover, they need to increase the group coherence because, after all, fighting is a social activity. Threats, punishments and rewards are the most straightforward ways to prevent desertion and nurture feelings of loyalty. Socialization and indoctrination can further contribute towards this and intend to make conscripts perceive the rebel’s struggle as their struggle and the faction’s ideology or agenda as their agenda. It is generally assumed that children are more receptive to these loyalty and group binding processes. For instance, Michael Wessells (2006, p. 53) points out that: Teenagers are susceptible to manipulation by propaganda because they lack the broad life experience needed to think issues through critically, particularly in contexts where they have had little education or education that does not favour critical thinking. 76

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But Jason Hart (2008, p. 281) warns us to be cautious with generalizations, arguing that the social and political environment is critical in the child’s cognitive development: . . . it is likely that a child who grows up in a politically fragile environment requiring her or him to negotiate serious threats on a daily basis will develop the competence to grasp issues around the use of military power, the morality of such usage and its consequences at a younger age than a child in a more stable socio-political setting. This chapter looks into the recruitment of young and under-age fighters by the main rebel movement during the conflict in Sierra Leone (1991–2002), and explores the ways in which loyalty was obtained and group coherence was achieved after their violent recruitment, paying attention to structural mechanisms, but without neglecting the agency of young people, as referred to by Hart above. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone – an infamous rebel movement widely known for its terror-tactic of amputating the limbs of its victims – did exist mainly out of young and sometimes ultra-young fighters (Richards, 1996; Gberie, 2005; Keen, 2006). Many, including some of its most loyal fighters and those who did rise to senior ranks during the conflict, were conscripted by force at a young age. It is argued below that two characteristics of the RUF made the socialization of recruits particularly effective; firstly, during a number of years the RUF was based in isolated jungle camps, and cut off from the wider society, the movement became a micro-society in itself. Secondly, the RUF was based on meritocratic values – the better one fought, the quicker promotion would be taking place – which proved to be quite attractive to the mainly young and socio-economic marginalized Sierra Leoneans who had limited opportunities within the traditional gerontocratic organized villages and the patrimonial organized state (Richards, 1996). Interview material presented in this chapter has been collected over a decade long period, both during and after the war (Peters and Richards, 1998; Peters, 2004, 2006, 2011). Interviews with ex-child combatants and young fighters were qualitative in nature and careful consideration was given to build up rapport. Field visits varied between a number of weeks and several months in a row. Field locations included the capital Freetown, provincial towns, remote villages and diamond mining areas.

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Group Cohesion and Coercive Recruitment

Conflict in Sierra Leone and its youthful combatants In March 1991, a small insurgency group – calling themselves the ‘Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone’ (henceforth RUF) – entered Kailahun district in Eastern Sierra Leone from neighbouring war-torn Liberia. The insurgents assumed that local populations would join their ‘revolution’ en masse, given the widespread resentment that was experienced among the population against the government of the day: Sierra Leone did become a one-party state in 1978 and its Presidents – first Siaka Stevens and later Joseph Momoh – were known for their patrimonial way of governing the country, combined with extremely high levels of corruption and considerable oppression of in particular the Mende1 people. Some voluntary conscription did indeed take place, but it was predominately the young and sometimes under-age people who already were in marginalized positions before their conscription, rather than the peasantry, who joined the RUF ranks. These youngsters typically had dropped out of school because fees could no longer be paid or they were surviving from day to day without a job. Others were on the run from the traditional village courts after being fined for breaking some customary rule while still others joined to escape on overly exploitative patron (known as ‘stranger-father’ or Hokatee). What support the RUF did have initially among the peasant population quickly eroded, mainly due to the brutal behaviour of in particular the Liberian Special Forces (Richards, 1996). Still the RUF rapidly expanded its grip over eastern Sierra Leone, threatening the diamond-rich Kono and Kenema districts and moving towards the urban centres of Bo and Kenema. One year into the war, the army staged a coup and 27-year-old Captain Valentine Strasser was put in charge of a military junta, calling itself the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). The new President – the youngest ever in the world – and his youthful cabinet were popular among in particular the younger generations in Freetown and other urban centres (Gberie, 2005). Although at first it looked like a peace-deal could be made with the RUF – both the RUF and NPRC were opposed to the All People’s Congress (APC) and were somewhat popular among marginalized youths – soon the war continued and the NPRC embarked on a massive recruitment exercise; thousands of predominately urban youths, again often those who found themselves in deprived positions with few prospects for a proper education or job, joined the NPRC. By now both the rebels and army were dominated by youthful fighters of which many were under the age of 18.

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Whether the army was not capable of providing protection to civilians – many of its new soldiers had received limited training at most – or just unwilling,2 the rebels seemed to find little resistance in their way. In fact, the civilian population accused the soldiers of being ‘sobels’: soldier by day, rebel by night. To provide better protection against both the rebels and rogue elements in the army, local populations started to establish defence units, based on the guild of the traditional gamehunters: the so-called Kamajors. These Kamajors were directed by the village chiefs and operated through an apprenticeship system, just as they did during more peaceful times (Muana, 1997). Each experienced Kamajor had a small number of young apprentices, who joined him on his patrols and in defending the village. In time, and with the increasing threat by the armed groups, village chiefs ordered for ever-larger number of Kamajor fighters. Many village youth did join the Kamajors – either because they considered it their duty or because they had to follow the order of the chief. So another faction with a fair number of young and under-age fighters was added to the conflict. By the end of 1993, the RUF was almost defeated by the combined forces of the NPRC, the Kamajors, United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO)3 and Guinean soldiers4 and retreated into the Gola forest reserve – a strip of primary rainforest along the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia. It re-emerged early in 1994 and entered the so-called ‘bush’ phase – which will be the focus of the discussion hereafter.

The ‘bush’ phase Following their near defeat by the end of 1993, the remaining few hundred RUF fighters ‘disappeared’ into the forest and transformed themselves into a forest-based guerrilla movement. Soon the RUF created a string of camps in inhospitable terrain from where it launched its ambushes and hit-and-run attacks. No longer was it interested in controlling large territories, but instead aimed to destabilize the country and undermine the government’s legitimacy and authority by showing that it was not capable of protecting its citizens anymore. But isolated in the deep forest, the movement did not have easy access to potential new recruits. Before, some voluntary recruitment had taken place following the RUF’s proclamation of its popular agenda for change in the villages they passed through. Or it recruited by coercion or blunt force in the villages and towns under its control. But now it had to rely on different methods to recruit new manpower, and perhaps even more important,

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find ways to prevent desertion of its recruits who had not joined the rebel movement out of their own will and conviction. Although it is difficult to give exact figures, it is probably safe to say that well over 70 per cent of the RUF5 was below the age of 25 and should therefore be considered as youths. The exact number of child combatants is even more difficult to estimate, but can be put between 30 and 50 per cent. A considerable number of these child soldiers must have ‘grown up’ in the rebel movement, that is, entering as an underage fighter but demobilizing as an adult fighter five, six or seven years after their moment of recruitment.6 Most of the child combatants were in the age range 14 to 18, but it is well-known that the RUF had a good number of ultra-young fighters within its ranks, who were part of the so-called Small Boys and Small Girls Units (Restoy, 2006). During the RUF’s bush camp phase some young people may have drifted towards the rebels and joined them more or less voluntarily (Peters, 2004) while others were ‘forced by circumstances’: for instance, because of extreme hunger or lack of protection. But most children who were conscripted by the RUF between 1994 and 1997 were done so by force. Abduction was the main way to recruit both children and young fighters. How the tactic of abduction for recruitment purposes was perceived by the RUF is illustrated by the following comment of a former RUF commander: We got our manpower mainly via capturing people. It was not easy for civilians in the government territory to get accurate information about the RUF and its aims and objectives, so they were not likely to join out of free will. But once we captured them we started to sensitise them and people started to join the movement because of the ideology and because they were not harassed any more.7 While the ex-commander frankly admits that recruitment took place by force, he still believes – several years after the war at the time of the interview – that once the RUF explained – sensitise is the word he uses – its motives and ideology, the abductees then turned into willing recruits. While this may sound unlikely to happen – and in many cases abductees never turned into loyal RUF fighters – there is some truth in this. A combination of psychological and sociological processes – as will be discussed hereafter – did turn a considerable part of the forcible conscripted combatants into loyal RUF fighters. This is particularly true for those who were abducted at young ages. Recruitment through abduction did take place when, for instance, a small group of rebels raided a village and if it encountered significant

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amounts of food or useful items. The fighters then ordered young people to head-load looted items and bring these to the camps. But once these forced carriers knew the way to the camp, it would have been too dangerous for the RUF to let them go again and run the risk that they would inform the army or Kamajors. Instead they were conscripted: . . . if we attacked a village or town, we assembled some civilians who had to carry the captured items to the base. These we cannot release afterwards because of security reasons. So they join us to go to the base and receive training there. (Peters, 2006, p. 60) In other cases, RUF platoons encountered young people while being on a mission and – not willing to take the risk that the young people would inform the Kamajors – left the unlucky ones with the choice to be killed or to join. There are also instances where the RUF specifically targeted villages or schools with the intention to forcibly recruit children and pupils within their fighting ranks (Peters and Richards, 1998). In all cases the experience of being abducted must have been overwhelming and perhaps even surreal or incomprehensible at first. But at the same time it was not something completely new to many rural youngsters. As part of their passage rites, children in rural Sierra Leone are taken away – sometimes quite violently – from their village and family by the so-called ‘Bush Devil’. This ‘creature’ – wearing a wooden mask and an impressive raffia costume – takes the not-yet-initiated children to the so-called Poro bush (for males) or Sande bush (for females) in the forest where they will undergo weeks or months of initiation rites and practices. The kidnapping and isolation in the bush results in, among others, a strong bonding process with one’s fellow initiates.8 A number of authors have suggested a relation between the kidnapping and initiation of children as practised by the RUF and that of the country’s Secret Societies (Jackson, 2004; Shepler, 2004). Those who have been initiated during the same initiation cycle often have life-long bonds and commitments to each other.9 As such it is likely that the violent abduction of these groups of children by the RUF was a first step in forging some group cohesion or commitments – or at least to each other. Following the shocking moment of abduction, the abductees were marched to one of the rebel camps or training bases. As mentioned, these were located deep inside the bush, sometimes several days of walking away from the place where the young people were abducted, crushing any hopes they had that they could escape and easily find their way back home. What added to the isolation of these camps was the fact

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that the RUF created a so-called ‘dead-zone’ around these camps: the villages nearest to the camps were forcibly de-populated and RUF fighters were based to both protect the main camp from intruders as well as to make sure nobody was able to leave without permission. Mental barriers must also have been put up by the recruits: the outside world – including the places from where they were abducted – must have become a dangerous place in the minds of the abductees after some time: one that was constantly under the threat of attacks by different fighting forces, including that of the RUF forces itself. It was populated by Civil Defence Forces and government army soldiers who maltreated or even executed everyone who they suspected to be affiliated with the rebels (that is, everyone who came from the rebel territory or who was a stranger in place – that is, with nobody willing to be accountable for him or her).10 According to the following ex-RUF commander: The reason for their [the RUF conscripts] loyalty was that when you are away from your brothers or family during the war for a long time, they will consider you as their enemy, especially if the people hear that you are rebel. No sooner you come to your home town they will kill you. So that was why we from the RUF stayed together to continue fighting till we were getting peace. (Peters, 2006, p. 63) The rebel camp offered some stability in a highly volatile world (this was underscored – as a self-fulfilling prophecy – each time the young people went on a mission themselves). For the younger child combatants, their combat-father – and his wife – to whom they were assigned, must have been perceived as a kind of surrogate parents at some stage and the camp itself likely become the equivalent of their village. Older commanders – sometimes by just a few years – became ‘father’ figures to the under age conscripts. This is, for instance, illustrated by the following statement of a 16-year-old ex-RUF child combatant: I demobilised together with my commander. He was a nice commander. But he could punish me if I had no permission to go out. Now I am living with my commander and his mother, [but] they are no family of mine. The mother of the commander is responsible for him. She is also in Kenema. My commander is 18 years of age.11 RUF commanders often had a number of under age bodyguards who served and accompanied them on their missions, while in return some level of protection was offered by this commander – or at least against

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the exploitation by other fighters and commanders. When the RUF’s overall control started to erode from 1997 onwards, it was often these bodyguards who were, by order of their commander, involved in warcrimes and atrocities. So much becomes clear from the following extract of an interview with an ex-RUF fighter: What caused these atrocities was that some of these commanders gathered these small boys, these bodyguards, around them, so that they looked powerful. These boys behaved bad and looted, and were backed up by their commanders.12 It is here where one aspect of the agency of child soldiers becomes clear, since these relationships were often actively nurtured by the underage combatants to obtain protection and if not satisfactory anymore, some child soldiers looked out for other combat ‘fathers’ (Peters, 2005). A more distant – but nevertheless quite strong – loyalty was developed to the RUF’s leader, Foday Sankoh. Sankoh was both a distant leader – based in the main RUF camp, the Zogoda, during the bush phase few child soldiers had actually seen him more than once or twice, although they may have heard his voice on the SSB radio on several occasions – and an ‘allknowing and caring’ father figure; Sankoh insisted that he was informed of everything that was going on in the movement and he was generally referred to as ‘Papei’ or ‘Pappy’ or ‘Pa’: an informal way of addressing one’s father. The above is illustrated by the following memory of a Vanguard13 fighter who later became a battalion commander: I remember one time during the morning parade [in the Zogoda] that, when the Pa [Sankoh] asked if anybody had something to say, a small boy stepped forward and asked permission to speak. So the Pa gave the permission. The small boy accused the Pa of forgetting about the Small Boys Unit because whenever the food was prepared, the Small Boys Unit was the last to get. And were they not also true to the revolution and fighting for it, the boy said. So the Pa admitted that he was wrong and from that time the Small Boys Unit was treated equally. (Peters, 2006, p. 61) The fact that relations within the RUF developed (also) along patrimonial lines is at least interesting, since many of the RUF recruits were victims of a contracting patrimonial system before their conscription. Moreover, the RUF ideology criticized the political system where the right contacts were more important than the right qualifications or

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skills.14 However, there were few opportunities for the RUF to implement its ideology – a mixture between socialism and Gadaffi’s Green Book – if it was genuine in this in the first place: societal reform often takes place only after the armed phase of revolution.15 And since the movement’s internal checks and balances system did not fully function,16 lower ranks and under age fighters fell back on a much more familiar system which could offer protection: patrimonialism. There was, however, an important activity in the RUF which was based on meritocratic principles rather than on patrimonial or aged-based hierarchies, as already suggested above.17 Where it concerned its military campaigns – whether small food or weapon finding missions or large-scale attacks – promotion was given on the basis of whether a mission was successfully completed. Hence it was possible for under age combatants – if fighting without any fear and successful in accomplishing the mission’s targets – to rise to senior ranks. This opportunity to command people and achieve a senior position – something completely unthinkable in peace-time Sierra Leone – for under age fighters and young fighters originating from weak lineages, did enhance feelings of loyalty to the movement. The following ex-RUF fighter explains: The RUF promotes by ability, so some have really joined. . . . small boys can be promoted above you. Some were my juniors at school. A small boy can order you ‘fuck you, go get water for me’. He is your superior. (Peters and Richards, 1998, p. 205) This single-minded focus on successful fulfilment of military missions had however a very grim downside: the RUF promoted the toughest and ruthless fighters, who were willing to fulfil the mission at whatever cost. During the bush phase the RUF command did keep the personal possessions of its fighters to a minimum – it was not allowed, for instance, to have more than the equivalent of a few dollars in one’s possession at any time – but small items – cigarettes, soft drinks, batteries for tape-recorders were handed out to loyal fighters. Moreover, the main camps – particularly during the second half of the bush phase – become well-stocked with all kinds of looted items, including generators and television sets. Clearly, for many rural children, the camps must have been experienced as quite luxurious. Those who were forcibly conscripted were well guarded, but after some time they changed and were willing to stay with the RUF because of the food and loot that was available in the camps.

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To become a loyal fighter they will encourage you by giving you a high position and they will convince you of the good cause they are fighting for. (Peters, 2006, p. 65) Following the destruction of most of the bush camps in 1996, the RUF leadership was not able (or willing) to control the possessions of individual fighters to the same extent. From 1997 and onwards, the RUF child soldiers could more easily exploit the power of their gun and – manning checkpoints or taking patrols – confiscate items they liked. Becoming a ‘somebody’ who can demand respect by means of a gun and the ability to take whatever one wants were listed as reasons by some young people why they liked to be part of a fighting force. It probably strengthened their commitment to a fighter’s life, knowing that if they decided to desert, they would lose these powers. The practice of punishing recruits and fighters must be discussed to deepen our understanding of how the RUF further integrated its young fighters into the movement. Clearly, punishments do not enhance feelings of loyalty – although where their own commander protected his ascribed fighters from punishments given out by other commanders, this may have further strengthened feelings of loyalty towards him18 – but it is a common way to compel obedience.19 Punishments were often given publicly – and publicly decided – and were meant to be an example to everyone. Sometimes – as has been the case with other guerrilla movements – under age combatants in the RUF were ordered to punish – torture or kill – a fellow platoon mate who had attempted to desert. Desertion was perceived as betrayal to the movement, the cause and to one’s fellow comrades in arms and the group should take responsibility for that by executing the widely known penalties for that. A final aspect that should be discussed here is that of ‘indoctrination’ – a much-debated term, as we have seen in the introduction. Conscripted children were trained both in the military and in the ideology of the RUF. There were special ‘ideology officers’ tasked with this, who provided ideology classes in the morning and evening. This process could take several weeks to months. The extent to which these classes were effective becomes clear from the two statements below: one of them is a former Sierra Leone Army (SLA) child soldier, who later joined the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)/RUF (he talks about this particular moment) and one of a young RUF fighter: According to them [the RUF], because at that [time] we made friends with [them] and interviewed them, the reason that made them to

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fight against the government of Sierra Leone, is due to the situation of the country. Things were not going on normal[ly] and not as it was expected to happen. They said that the government was not doing its job. They talked about changes that were needed in certain areas, like for instance the educational area. The education was very poor. That made them to fight against the government. (Peters, 2006, p. 76) They [the RUF fighters] started to explain to us about their ideology about the land, the peace, unity and justice. The RUF really believed in themselves, that they were there to whip out the rotten system, which was the government. (Peters, 2006, p. 75) The ideology of the RUF was based on rather simplistic ideas of how society functions, but at the same time it was quite correct in its critique of society and articulated the demands of a (rural) underclass. Sierra Leone as a state was more or less bankrupt prior to the war (Reno, 1995) and corruption and nepotism were present. Both (formal) jobs and education were a privilege rather than a right to its young citizens. The country’s wealth, through its abundant mineral resources, mostly disappeared into the private pockets of a few political and economic elites. To this extent it must have been relatively easy to mobilize young people – who themselves had experienced some of these malfunctions themselves – not able to go to school because of lack of school fees, a proper building or just a teacher willing to work in remote locations without any guarantee of receiving a monthly salary or find someone willing to invest in some small-scale business. The alternative offered by the RUF – with its agenda for free education, free medical care and an equal and fair share of the natural resources – must have sounded attractive to many. Whether or not the RUF was genuinely committed to implementing such an agenda and, even if so, whether or not it had the capacity and the skills to do so, is a question that should be debated elsewhere (Peters, 2006, 2011) but was probably of less importance to the effectiveness of the ‘sensitization’ process.

Conclusion From the above it is clear that the RUF invested significantly and by a series of different means in making under age conscripts loyal and obedient to the movement. It had to because it (also) conscripted by means of abduction and could therefore not assume that its recruits were loyal or willing. Even in the case where young people joined voluntarily, these loyalty enhancing processes were important since those

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who joined initially out of their own choice may have found their commitment to the cause and the movement undermined once they experienced the hardships and the horror of a combatant’s life. But there is another reason why strong group cohesion was important. Fighting is foremost a social activity: it is a coordinated activity where one has to rely on each other to bring a mission to a successful end. While the violence committed by the under age and young fighters of the RUF often did look disorganized and anarchistic, in reality it was often devilish, well-calculated and effective, with the ‘wild and barbaric’ behaviour no more than a deliberate tactic to inflict fear upon the minds of the enemies, within a context of poorly equipped and limited manpower. Through its strategy of abduction and socialization of children, the RUF denied many to be socialized by the norms and values of their village which are normally strengthened further when adolescents undergo initiation into the omnipresent Secret Societies. However, the rebel movement created new sodalities,20 in which – after some time – a high level of solidarity21 was experienced by the fighters. Being part of a peer group represents important social capital and is important and common in more peaceful settings as well. It is important to understand that the social capital a group has can be used for both negative purposes (e.g., coordinating fighting and plundering activities) as well as positive ones (e.g., reconstruction, skills-oriented labour and peace making activities). This then leaves ex-child combatants at least with something useful from their years as combatants. The challenge is to create opportunities for demobilized ex-child soldiers in which the social capital generated as part of having many years of experience in groupbased activities – that is, fighting, patrolling, ambushing and so on – can be used for positive and constructive purposes rather than not being utilized at all.22

Notes 1. There are about 14 different ethnic groups in Sierra Leone. The Mende and the Temne are the dominant groups with both having about 30 per cent of the population belonging to one of these groups (Opala, 1996). 2. The NPRC did send some of army commanders loyal to the APC to the frontline to let them too taste the war but the extent to which these commanders were willing to fight and protect the Mende population should of course be questioned. 3. ULIMO is a rebel movement created by Liberian exiles in Sierra Leone opposed to the RUF and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia headed by Charles Taylor.

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4. Guinean soldiers were in Sierra Leone as part of a mutual defence agreement between the two governments. 5. The RUF started – as mentioned – with only a hundred or so fighters. Halfway through the conflict it had about 3000 to 4000 fighters while by the end of the 2002 disarmament and demobilization programme almost 25,000 RUF fighters had registered (NCDDR, 2004). 6. When I did research on Sierra Leonean ex-child soldiers in 1996/1997, only a few ex-RUF child soldiers were among the hundred or so demobilized child soldiers who stayed in the so-called Transit Care Centres, awaiting family tracing and reunification. Total numbers of RUF child fighters over the decade-long conflict must have been much higher than the few thousand that disarmed and demobilized in 2000/2001. 7. Interview by Krijn Peters, November 2006, Kenema district. 8. Dorjahn (1961, p. 37), referring to the Temne Poro describes the different ways of initiation into the Poro society: ‘Kabangkalo, in which those to be initiated are seized together publicly and taken to the bush where they may be kept several years, [and] amporo dif, which is begun in secret and where the boys are seized one by one and taken to the bush . . .’. 9. The French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) already noticed that moments of great collective excitement or catastrophic events created an initial sense of group identity (1995 [1912]). 10. Amnesty International (1992). 11. Interview by Krijn Peters, November 2001, Kenema district. 12. Interview by Krijn Peters, December 2006, Freetown. 13. Vanguards were those who were among the initial insurgents in March 1991. 14. See RUF/SL (1995). 15. For a discussion of the ‘free education’, ‘free medical care’ and ‘communal farming’ practices of the RUF, see Peters (2006) and Peters (2011). 16. The RUF had a number of bodies created to monitor the fighters’ behaviour and their behaviour to civilians, including a Military Police (MP) branch, an Internal Defence Unit (IDU), an Intelligence Officers (IO) branch, a G5 branch responsible for civil or public affairs. For a detailed discussion of these mechanisms, see Peters (2011). 17. Sierra Leonean villages are organized along gerontocratic principles, although not all old people also became ‘elders’, that is, holding some political and social power. 18. This would then be a classical example of the so-called ‘Stockholm Syndrome’. 19. See, for example, Wessells (2006), pp. 70–71. 20. A sodality is a non-kin group organized for a specific purpose. 21. Durkheim would describe this as ‘mechanical solidarity’ since most people are like each other (with little division of labour) resulting in a strong collective conscience. This is opposite to ‘organic solidarity’ which emerges in societies with a high division of labour (Collins and Makowsky, 1993, p. 106). 22. For an example of agrarian-oriented group-based reintegration projects for ex-combatants, see Peters (2006). For a more urban-oriented activity, see Peters and Burge (2010) who discuss the phenomenon of motorbike taxis in Sierra Leone – an activity that started after the war and was initially

Krijn Peters 89 dominated by young ex-combatants – to show how group modalities and social capital (including trust and social networks) built up during the war were crucial to this Sierra Leonean success story.

References Amnesty International (1992) Sierra Leone: The Extrajudicial Execution of Suspected Rebels and Collaborators (London). Chauveau, J. P. and Richards, P. (2008) ‘West African Insurgencies in Agrarian Perspective: Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone Compared’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 8 (4), 515–552. Dorjahn, V. (1961) ‘The Initiation of Temne Poro Officials’, Man, 61, 36–40. Durkheim, E. (1995) [1912] The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (trans. Karen E. Fields) (New York: Free Press). Gberie, L. (2005) A Dirty War in West Africa. The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone (London: Hurst & Company). Hart, J. (2008) ‘Displaced Children’s Participation in Political Violence: Towards Greater Understanding of Mobilisation’, Conflict, Security & Development, 8 (3), 277–293. Jackson, M. (2004) In Sierra Leone (Durham, NC: Duke University Press). Keen, D. (2006) Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (Oxford and Basingstoke: James Currey/Palgrave Macmillan). Muana, P. K. (1997) ‘The KamajOi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-insurgency’, Africa Development, 22 (3), 77–100. Special Issue: ‘Lumpen Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leone Civil War’. NCDDR (2004). National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Final Reports, http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/5_gov/5_ 3ncddr.htm. Opala, J. (1996) Sierra Leone. A Brief Overview, Report to the Japanese Government on the Situation in Sierra Leone. International Crisis Group. Peters, K. (2004) Re-examining Voluntarism. Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone (Institute for Security Studies Monograph 100, Pretoria). Peters, K. (2005) ‘Reintegrating Young Ex-combatants in Sierra Leone: Accommodating Indigenous and Wartime Value Systems’, in J. Abbink and I. van Kessel (eds) Vanguard or Vandals. Youth, Politics and Conflict in Africa (Brill, Leiden and Boston). Peters, K. (2006) Footpaths to Reintegration. Armed Conflict, Youth and the Rural Crisis in Sierra Leone (unpublished Wageningen University Thesis). Peters, K. (2011). War and the Crisis of Youth in Sierra Leone (Cambridge and New York, International African Institute and Cambridge University Press). Peters, K. and Richards, P. (1998) ‘Why We Fight: Voices of Under-Age Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone’, Africa, 68 (2), 183–210. Restoy, E. (2006) ‘Sierra Leone. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) Trying to Influence an Army of Children’ working paper, http://www.child-soldiers.org/ childsoldiers/CSC_AG_Forum_case_study_June_2006_Sierra_Leone_RUF.pdf, accessed 26 April 2010. Richards, P. (1996) Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone (reprinted with additional material 1998) (Oxford: James Currey).

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RUF/SL (1995) Footpaths to Democracy: Towards a New Sierra Leone. No stated place of publication. The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone http://www.fas. org/irp/world/para/docs/footpaths.htm, accessed 22 October 2010. Shepler, S. (2004) ‘The Social and Cultural Context of Child Soldiering in Sierra Leone’, Paper for the PRIO sponsored workshop on Techniques of Violence in Civil War held in Oslo, 20–21August. Wessells, M. (2006) Child Soldiers. From Violence to Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

5 Girl Soldiers in Guatemala Wenche Hauge

Introduction In 1996, a peace agreement was signed between the government of Guatemala and the guerrilla movement Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG). The armed conflict in Guatemala had then lasted for 36 years. Its main character was that of a war fought between a small guerrilla movement and a strongly superior national army. The armed conflict was extremely bloody during the period 1980– 1983, when the army carried out its major counterinsurgency campaign and slaughtered large parts of the indigenous population in the western and central highlands. The Guatemalan armed conflict has been fraught with foreign intervention, access to weapons and military training, mainly in the context of the Cold War. During the demobilization and reintegration process that followed the peace accord of 1996, the URNG elaborated its own survey on the status of its members.1 The survey revealed that many of the URNG members were still quite young, even after 10–15 years as guerrilla soldiers, indicating that they had entered the movement as children or teenagers (FGT, 2006; URNG, 2007). The long period of their life that these children and teenagers spent as guerrilla members – some of them up to 20 years – provides a unique opportunity to study the long-term social consequences of joining an armed movement at a young age. It also gives possibilities to receive mature and reflective answers to questions about why the now grown-up guerrilla soldiers once joined the URNG. Based on a series of interviews, this chapter seeks to explain why these children and teenagers joined the guerrilla movement and what kind of challenges this type of recruitment poses to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. 91

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The chapter is structured as follows. It begins by reviewing some of the main theories on the onset of armed conflict – and debating how these apply to the recruitment of children as guerrilla soldiers. After an overview of the methodology, focusing particularly on the selection of interviewees and their background, the analytical part builds on the results of the interviews and on observation of the context within which they were conducted. Finally, the chapter ends with a conclusion.

Theory and policies on child recruitment The body of theory on the causes of armed conflict is rich, spanning from the role of economic development, socio-economic disparities, natural resources, environmental degradation, political system, democratization and ethnic configuration to the role of identity and religion in causing conflict – to mention some of the most important (Gurr and Moore, 1997; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Diehl and Gleditsch, 2001; Stewart, 2001; Hauge, 2003; Gates et al., 2006). In general, the theories may be categorized into two broad groups, depending on whether they refer to push-forces, such as grievances, repression and discrimination, or to pull-forces, for example, that a guerrilla group can provide security, life sustenance, a sense of belonging or group identity and even profit. However, the question is how applicable these theories on conflict causation and mobilization in general are to the recruitment of child soldiers. The difference between a child and an adult is the adult’s ability to reason and reflect, to understand complicated causalities and to use his or her own life experiences. A child would be more affected by the actual situation, by the immediate threats and obvious possibilities to escape from it. Unless children are recruited by force, or strongly manipulated, it is likely that direct attacks against their family or village, whereby they easily can identify the perpetrator, would be strong push-forces. Direct contact with guerrilla members (if perceived of as positive) or through family members and networks that the children trust could be possible pull-forces. The intensity of the causes is thus relevant here. The United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) states the following about child recruitment: Despite wide condemnation and response over the last decade, girls and boys continue to be recruited or used by armed forces and armed groups. Recruitment is defined as the compulsory, forced or voluntary conscription or enlistment of children into any kind of armed

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forces or organised armed group(s). Once recruited, children might be used as fighters or for non-combat purposes, including sexual ones. (UNICEF, 2009, p. 21) This is probably a correct picture of the situation in many cases, but wars and war contexts also differ around the world. In some armed conflicts, children seek protection with the guerrillas from repression and atrocities by the armed forces. This issue is further elaborated in the quotation below, and the two quotations together contain descriptions and arguments that beg for some further questions and discussion. In the same UNICEF report from 2009, it is stated that: Children forced into combat or non-combat roles risk being killed, injured or permanently disabled. They may be forced to witness or participate in atrocities. They are deprived of their homes and families and, with that, the opportunity to develop physically and emotionally in familiar and protective environments. (UNICEF, 2009, p. 151) The problem with this description is that it neglects the contexts within which children already are victims of atrocities by armed forces and seek protection, for example, with a guerrilla movement. The problem is furthermore that in some contexts there is no other or better alternative. This means that what is stated in the Machel Report to the United Nations (UN) from 1996, that one of the most urgent priorities is to remove everyone under 18 years of age from armed forces, is somewhat problematic (United Nations, 1996). Should this be an absolute requirement, even if the alternative for children in some contexts is worse? How and at which age children are recruited to armed groups, and not the least for how long a time they are staying there, furthermore needs to be reflected in DDR programmes. There is a problem with neglect of child soldiers that have stayed with an armed group beyond their childhood. As stated by UNICEF, most child protection initiatives are specifically focused on children. Although many young people were recruited and used by armed forces or armed groups when they were children, they may be older than 18 by the time of demobilization. However, they still require assistance in the transition to adulthood. Recently, collaboration has expanded among key UN agencies, including the International Labour Organisation (ILO), UNICEF and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) along with NGOs to

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develop more coherent programmes for young men and women aged 15–24 years at demobilization (UNICEF, 2009, p. 156). In long-lasting wars such as what happened in Guatemala – many guerrilla soldiers were aged above 30 when they demobilized (FGT, 2006). These persons had joined the movement at a very young age, below 15. Thus, even new efforts to reach persons aged between 15 and 24 at demobilization would not encompass these soldiers. This is so, even though this category of ex-fighters is in a particular need of assistance to be able to adapt to a completely new reality – after so many years away from a normal life. In light of the theory and policy introduction above, this chapter will in the following highlight the particular causes and context that brought so many children into the guerrilla movement in Guatemala during the late 1970s and the 1980s. It also seeks to draw a lesson from this on the particular needs of grown-up child soldiers participating in DDR processes.

Method This chapter builds on 52 interviews with ex-combatants from Guatemala conducted during two different projects. Of these interviews, 29 were with former child soldiers. The projects applied qualitative method, mainly consisting of in-depth semi-structured interviews, but supplemented with focus group discussions, and with a rich variety of observations. In addition to this, sources included URNG – and government documents, and a range of secondary literature. The selected interviewees for the two projects included participants from all the four different guerrilla organizations in Guatemala, Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP), Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), Organización del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA) and Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), to be able to observe any differences in behaviour of the ex-combatants that possibly could be linked to dynamics and leadership within their own organization. The first project focused on the DDR process and the fate of former combatants in Guatemala in general, and included semi-structured interviews with key actors from the guerrilla movement, URNG, including the leadership, intermediate and grassroots levels and with other key actors in the DDR process (Hauge and Thoresen, 2007). The fieldwork for this project was conducted in April–May 2005, and included visits to Guatemala City, Chimaltenango and Petén. Several meetings were also held with groups of former guerrillas during this project and with the internally displaced that had been close to the guerrillas.2

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The second project focused on the reintegration and political participation of female ex-combatants of the URNG guerrillas in Guatemala (Hauge, 2008). The fieldwork for this project was conducted in November–December 2006. The method used in this study was also mainly qualitative, with semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, although some quantitative data gathered by Fundación Guillermo Toriello (FGT) – the guerrillas’ own organization responsible for the reintegration process – was referred to. The interviews with the female ex-combatants were conducted with a view to covering combatants reintegrating into different geographical areas of Guatemala. Thus interviews were conducted with women that reintegrated into Petén (northern Guatemala), into Chimaltenango, Guatemala City and San Martin Jilotepeque (central Guatemala) and into the department of Retalhuleu (southern Guatemala). In accordance with the conclusion of the former study by Hauge and Thoresen (2007) – emphasizing that it is of importance for the level of social and political activity of ex-combatants whether they reintegrated individually or collectively – interviews were conducted both with female fighters that reintegrated individually and with female fighters that reintegrated collectively, that is, settling in cooperatives. The group of female ex-combatants interviewed encompassed both indigenous women and mestizo women, reflecting the large number of Maya indigenous groups that participated in the URNG. Altogether 70.8 per cent of the URNG members were indigenous, and 474 of the 766 female fighters that formally demobilized were indigenous (URNG, 1997, pp. 5, 42). Also female ex-fighters that did not demobilize formally were included among those interviewed for this study. As more than ten years have passed since the demobilization process took place, former URNG members are now spread all over Guatemala. Therefore, one of the greatest challenges during the fieldwork was to get an overview of the location of the representatives from the four former guerrilla organizations. However, once this difficulty was overcome, many ex-guerrillas were interested in sharing their experiences. As mentioned initially, the analysis in this chapter builds on in total 52 interviews out of which 44 were with female ex-fighters and 8 with male ex-fighters. In the group of female ex-fighters, 27 were child soldiers, whereas among the male ex-fighters, only 2 were, totalling 29 ex-child soldiers. Altogether 12 of the girl soldiers were aged below 15 when they became guerrilla members. It was actually not a deliberate intention to include many former child soldiers among the interviewees. However, when analysing the results of the project, it became obvious that the high number of former

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child soldiers happened to constitute an important characteristic of its outcome. The following section gives an overview of how ex-fighters answered the question about their reasons for joining the guerrillas, distinguishing the answers by age groups.

Child recruitment in Guatemala The armed conflict in Guatemala broke out in 1960, but the guerrilla movement was almost decimated in a major anti-guerrilla campaign that started in the mid-1960s (Hauge and Thoresen, 2008). However there was a new wave of recruitment to the movement in the late 1970s and in the period 1980–1982, when lots of persons sought refuge with the guerrillas to escape from the army’s bloody repression and massacres (ODHAG, 1998a, 1998b). Many of the interviews referred to in this chapter were conducted with people that were recruited to the guerrillas during this period. In contrast to the documentation from African countries like Uganda and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) where children have been forced, manipulated or abducted into armed groups, the documentation from Guatemala reveals a reality in which the guerrillas were relatively reluctant to receive children, unless the children severely needed protection (Barea, 2008; Corbin, 2008). The ex-commander of ORPA, Rodrigo Asturias, informed in an interview in 2005 that the guerrilla leaders at some points were worried because the recruitment to the movement was too large, and they did not have enough arms to provide people with to protect themselves.3 Therefore they had to try to restrict the entry into the guerrilla movement. One of the interviewed female ex-combatants, who was a child when she first tried to join the movement, told that the guerrilla leaders had asked her rather to stay at home with her family and help her brothers and sisters to survive than to join the guerrilla movement.4 The guerrillas in general practised a threshold of 12 years before they would allow a person to enter the movement. At this age the children were armed only to protect themselves and to participate in vigilance activities under extreme conditions. They were not allowed to participate in battles until they had reached the age of 16 years, and an additional condition was that they should be considered to have the physical capacity for it. Taking the interviews with the 44 female ex-fighters as a point of departure for the analysis, many of the interviewed women told about their father’s disappearance or assassination. The context of repression, atrocities and massacres was present in most of these women’s stories.

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In some cases their mother, brothers and sisters had been assassinated by the army. The political violence was a key reason for joining the guerrillas. Altogether 25 of those interviewed explicitly mentioned that someone in their family had been abducted and/or assassinated, or that they had witnessed and fled from massacres. Women with a rural background experienced the worst atrocities, but also some of the women with an urban background had been persecuted. The reasons why the female fighters became guerrilla members are complex. However, the following factors were frequently mentioned by the interviewed: they had reached a high level of social conscience and awareness about injustice in their society and wanted to work for changes; they had witnessed and escaped torture and massacres – or they had ties to the guerrilla movement through other family members. The reason given for their membership was often a mixture of these factors. The former study on the DDR process in Guatemala by Hauge and Thoresen (2007) reveals that in this aspect the differences between the two sexes were not significant, as most of the interviewed male combatants reported having joined the guerrillas for the same reasons as the female fighters. In the following I will highlight the marked differences in the answers given by the different age groups. The youngest child soldiers had a distinctly clear profile in their reasons for joining the movement. Of the total 52 interviewed, altogether 23 said that one of the reasons for becoming a guerrilla member was that another family member (a father, a sister or even an uncle) already was. Among the 29 former child soldiers, 20 said that they already had a family member or more in the guerrillas; and out of these, 12 of the answers came from the youngest group – those that were under 15 when they became guerrilla members. This is how one of them expressed herself: I am from Peten, Dolores. When I was six years old, the army came and burnt our house. This was in 1982. We had to flee, and were moving around for two years. My father disappeared. After this we could not sustain being on the run anymore, and we were able to cross the border to Mexico. There we stayed in the refugee camp in Campeche. I was now 13 years old. My sisters were guerrilla members. I wanted to be with them. I joined my sisters in the mountains.5 The former child soldiers were also particularly hard hit by experiences of repression and atrocities. Out of the 29 ex-child soldiers, 15 explicitly mentioned that they had been subject to – or had witnessed – family

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members or village members become victims of atrocities by the army. As many as 9 out of the women that were aged below 15 when they joined the guerrillas had such prior experiences. Quotes from two of the interviews illustrate the importance of repression as a reason for seeking refuge with the guerrillas: I incorporated into the guerrilla movement in 1987, when I was 17 years old. At that time I lived in Chimaltenango. My sister had disappeared, and we were persecuted. I joined the guerrillas because of this difficult and dangerous situation we lived in. My mother had died early, and our father did not live together with us. It was very difficult.6 In 1980 the army came. They massacred 75 persons around Comalapa. Afterwards they threw the bodies into the dry corn harvest and burned them. Now the army came more and more often. Some of the murderers still live in the local communities. The army behaved ruthless. They surrounded the area, and killed everybody, women, children and animals. First they abused the women and afterwards they killed them. The survivors had to flee and we were hiding in places where it was difficult to find food. We finally thought that if we send women with small children to a village to get food, they would be spared. 18 women with small children left on this expedition. They managed to get some food, but on their way back the army came and killed all of them. Only one woman escaped. They killed, violated and tortured. They took the small children and threw their heads against the stones on the road to kill them. Only one woman survived. This made me take my decision. I went with my mother to join the guerrillas.7 Most of the ex-child soldiers stayed with the guerrillas for a long time. Out of 52 persons interviewed, 32 stayed with the movement for more than 8 years. Of these, 23 were former child soldiers, indicating that this group makes up a high percentage of veterans within the movement. The figure is strongest for the youngest among the interviewed, as 9 out of 12 recruits aged below 15 when recruited stayed with the guerrillas for more than 8 years. Some of the former girl soldiers had extremely long trajectories as guerrilla members. One girl who entered the movement when she was 12 years old stayed for 30 years. Another girl who became a guerrilla member when she was 14 years old stayed for 24 years. It is thus easy to estimate the importance of identity in this context.

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Finally, there is also a clear pattern with regard to age and preference for type of reintegration. These data only cover the female group. Out of 27 former girl soldiers, a majority of 18 preferred to reintegrate into cooperatives – together with other female and male ex-fighters. This included 9 girls aged below 15 when recruited. The female fighters from poor families were in general younger than educated women when they became guerrilla soldiers. Several of the women from poor families were 14 years when they joined the guerrillas, whereas 95 per cent of the educated women in the selection were above 17 years old when this happened. In general the interviews showed that the younger the recruits, the more important their direct experiences of atrocities and the desire to reunite with family members. These findings confirm the assumption that the intensity of the concrete experiences has been particularly important in influencing the youngest’s decision to join the guerrilla movement. There is also another group that is important to include when analysing child soldiers in the Guatemalan civil war. This is the children born to guerrilla members during the war. The interviews reveal that pregnant women and younger children were as far as possible sent to Mexico. However, during the extreme conditions of massacres and strong counterinsurgency activity in the early 1980s, this was not always technically possible, and some pregnant women and younger children stayed with the guerrillas seeking protection. For many of the female combatants the situation with small children was difficult to handle. Some of them left their children with grandparents or friends for many years, whereas others stayed in Mexico until their children were old enough to come with them back to Guatemala, and to participate in the non-combat activities of the guerrillas. In some cases where women left their children with others, the reunion after the war was very difficult, whereas for others it went somewhat more smoothly. During the demobilization phase, the gender team of the FGT conducted a survey, showing that out of a selection of 167 demobilized female excombatants, 91 were mothers, with a fertility rate of 1.29 per cent. One woman had thirteen children, whereas the majority (sixty-four women) had one or two children (FGT, 2006). When comparing the two different categories of children within the guerrilla movement, those that had joined the guerrillas at a young age to seek protection and reunite with other family members, and those that were born to guerrilla soldiers during the war, the overall experiences differ. None of the former child soldiers interviewed had been

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abducted or forced into the guerrilla movement, and some of them almost had to insist to be able to join the movement, because of the overwhelming recruitment caused by the repression in the early 1980s. The general impression from the interviews is that, whereas the first group gives a very positive record of their time with the insurgency movement, the second group’s experiences is somewhat more mixed. This is particularly so because some of these children were away from their parents for long periods, as it was too dangerous to move around with small children in the mountains or in the jungle. Some of these children – and also some parents – revealed sadness and difficulties about the situation. What should be the ethical and political consequences of the information gained from interviews with former child soldiers in Guatemala? The interviews, and the analysis building on these, show that these children mainly came to the guerrillas to seek protection and to reunite with their family members. Most of them had experienced severe repression against their family and/or their village. They were victims of the atrocities of the Guatemalan army. The guerrilla movement for many of them was the only available alternative to survive, get protection and be taken care of, and also in terms of primary needs, such as food and life sustenance. The universal condemnation of recruitment of child soldiers needs to take the issue of alternatives into consideration. What if the alternative is worse than becoming a child soldier? This is the same problem that those criticizing child labour have encountered. Sometimes closing down a factory of child workers only forces the children into prostitution, because the reality is such that they have to work anyway. The experiences of the child soldiers in Guatemala are quite different from the experiences of child soldiers elsewhere, like for example in the African countries Uganda and the DRC (Barea, 2008; Corbin, 2008). The Guatemalan child soldiers were relatively well taken care of; and seldom combating at a young age. This also highlights the need to distinguish one war context from another, and one guerrilla army from another. There are large differences between how the guerrilla commanders treat their members – including children. A long-lasting war like the Guatemalan in general raises some difficult challenges with regard to grown-up child soldiers, their identity and how they are treated in the DDR process. Most of the interviewed referred to in this chapter stayed more than ten years with the guerrillas, which means they spent most of the formative years of their teens and youth there. This strongly influenced not only their identity but

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also their education level, skills and experiences. Some of them had developed important skills during the war, but these were not intended, formalized or documented during the reintegration period, leaving many of them frustrated and without employment facilities. These are new issues that those designing DDR and reintegration processes in the future should take into account.

Conclusions This chapter has focused on the recruitment of child soldiers during the civil war in Guatemala. Based on a series of interviews with ex-fighters that were children and teenagers when they joined the guerrilla movement, the analysis has sought to explain their motivation for joining the movement and the particular challenges that this poses to the DDR process. None of those interviewed had been abducted and they all deliberately joined the armed movement. These ex-child soldier fighters gave mainly two reasons for their recruitment – that they were trying to escape from atrocities and massacres by the army and that they already had family members in the guerrillas. This means that they principally sought protection and reunification with their family. In general those interviewed that entered the movement as children or teenagers gave the impression of having been well taken care of by the guerrillas. They also received some basic education during the war and spoke of their experiences with the armed movement in relatively positive words. The Guatemalan case is different from other cases where children have been abducted, threatened or forced into an armed movement. In addition, the Guatemalan case is special in the sense that many of the ex-child soldiers had extremely long trajectories as guerrilla soldiers and were grown-up when they demobilized. Thus, there are two important lessons learnt from the Guatemalan case. These lessons challenge current views on – and structures of – the solutions to the child soldier problem. The first of these lessons is that every war has its particular context, also with regard to the reality of the child soldiers participating in it. Consequently the solution given to the child soldier problem also has to be adapted to the reality of each conflict in question. In some conflicts, such as in Guatemala, becoming a child soldier may simply be the best available alternative for survival. The second lesson learnt concerns the DDR programmes, and particularly the reintegration phase. There is a need for these programmes to widen their focus to encompass the particular challenges that grown-up

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child soldiers face as they try to adjust to a society they have been away from for decades. Isolation, alienation and group identity are key words that should be part of the understanding that form the design of DDR programmes for these groups. Some facts may be difficult to digest, but they are nevertheless quite important to take into account: children participating in some wars perceive of the adult guerrilla soldiers and commanders as brutal perpetrators of violence against them. However, other children in other wars perceive of these same adult soldiers and guerrilla commanders as protectors and part of their larger family. These huge differences will have to make their way into the design of reintegration programmes for child soldiers and grown-up child soldiers.

Notes 1. The survey covered issues like age, gender, education, health, economic activity and capacity building. It was conducted in 1997 and financed by the European Union (URNG, 1997). 2. One of the meetings, held on 6 May 2005, was with a large group of demobilized ex-FAR members, now living in a cooperative in El Horizonte, Petén. Another important meeting, held on 8 May 2005, was with a group of formerly internally displaced, enjoying protection by the guerrillas during the war, the Comunidades de Poblaciones en Resistencia (CPR-Petén), living in Salvador Fajardo, Petén. 3. Interview with Rodrigo Asturias, ex-commander of ORPA, on 2 May 2005. 4. Interview conducted on 29 November 2006, in Guatemala City. 5. Interview conducted on 11 December 2006, in El Progreso (in the south of Guatemala). 6. Interview conducted on 27 November 2006, in Guatemala City. 7. Interview conducted on 3 December 2006, in Chimaltenango.

References Corbin, J. N. (2008) ‘Returning Home: Resettlement of Formerly Abducted Children in Northern Uganda’, Disasters, 32 (2), 316–335. Diehl, P. F. and Gleditsch, N. P. (2001) Environmental Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press). Fundacion Guillermo Toriello (FGT) (2006) La Incorporacion de la Guerrilla Guatemalteca a la Legalidad (Serviprensa: Guatemala City). Gates, S., Hegre, H., Jones, M. P. and Strand, H. (2006) ‘Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800-2000’, American Journal of Political Science, 50 (4), 893–908. Gurr, T. R. and Moore, W. H. (1997) ‘Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s’, American Journal of Political Science, 41 (4), (October), 1079–1103. Hauge, W. (2003) Causes and Dynamics of Conflict Escalation: The Role of Economic Development and Environmental Change. A Comparative Study of Bangladesh,

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Guatemala, Haiti, Madagascar, Senegal and Tunisia. Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Oslo, December 2002 and defended in September 2003. Hauge, W. and Thoresen, B. (2007) El Destino de los Ex Combatienes en Guatemala: Obstaculizadorez o Agentes de Cambio? (Guatemala City: Magna Terra). Hauge, W. (2008) ‘Group Identity – A Neglected Asset: Determinants of Social and Political Participation among Female Ex-fighters in Guatemala’, Conflict, Security and Development, 8 (3), 295–316. Homer-Dixon, T. F. (1999) Environment, Scarcity and Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHAG) (1998a) Guatemala Nunca Mas II: Los Mecanismos del Horror. ODHAG, Informe Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperacion de la Memoria Historica (San José: Litografia e Imprenta LIL, SA). Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala (ODHAG) (1998b) Guatemala Nunca Mas III: El Entorno Historico. ODHAG, Informe Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperacion de la Memoria Historica (San José: Litografia e Imprenta LIL, SA). Philip, B. (2008) ‘Commander of Child Soldiers to be Put on Trial’, 19 November. Accessed at http://war-crimes.suite101.com/article.cfm/. Stewart, F. (2001) Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development. WIDER Annual Lectures 5 (Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research, UNU/WIDER). Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) (1997) Diagnostico SocioEconomico. Personal Incorporado. A study by Fundacion Guillermo Toriello carried out with support from the European Union (Guatemala: URNG). United Nations (1996) Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General, Ms. Graca Machel, submitted pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 48/157. UN Document A/51/306. 26 August (New York: United Nations). United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (2009) Machel Study 10-Years Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing World (New York: UNICEF).

6 Resilience Amidst Risks for Recruitment: A Case Study of ‘At Risk’ Children in Colombia Ryan Burgess

Introduction Children are often displaced and/or recruited into armed groups due to large-scale, global conflicts and the estimated 56 internal conflicts (UN General Assembly, 2007). Over 25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) exist in the world today making displacement one of the primary effects of war (IDMC, n.d.). As a result of displacement, IDPs experience estrangement and loss; children and their families lose the majority of their belongings, including their home and land; social structures break down; family relationships are strained; distrust and fear increases; social norms may change; members of receiving territories may discriminate against newly arriving IDPs; and IDPs can lose their sense of normalcy (Working Group on Children Affected by Armed Conflict and Displacement, 1996; Bello et al., 2000; Arias, 2002; Cuéllar, 2004). IDPs also tend to have limited access to nutrition, health, education, water and employment (Bernal et al., 2004). These conditions also increase the risk of a child’s recruitment into an armed group (Achvarina and Reich, 2006). In fact, over 250,000 children are currently estimated to be active participants in the ranks of armed groups globally. In Colombia, there are over 4 million IDPs, which is the second highest number globally after Sudan (IDMC, n.d.). Internal displacement has become one of the top humanitarian crises in Colombia, where IDPs come from 87 per cent of the country’s national territory. Of those who are displaced, 44 per cent are under the age of 18 and 48 per cent are women, who often become heads of household due to their partner’s death or recruitment into an armed group (Bello, 2004). Colombia also has one of the highest numbers of children involved in 104

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state and non-state armed groups (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008). Their recruitment is often related to a number of factors, such as displacement, poverty, limited access to basic services and limited employment opportunities, to name a few. In this chapter, I argue that a community approach plays a critical role in strengthening the resilience and improving the psychosocial well-being of violence-affected children. By participating in an education programme, strengthening family relations, having role models or through their own coping mechanisms, ‘at risk’ children may increase their protection and reduce risk factors, including the risk of recruitment into armed groups. Findings stem from a qualitative study that analysed the risk and protection factors displaced, ‘at risk’ children faced in La Comuna Cuatro of Soacha, Colombia, a marginalized, illegal territory near the nation’s capital. In this chapter, I first explain the theoretical foundation of the study, which is grounded in a psychosocial framework. Second, I discuss the setting of the study and outline the methodology. Based on the qualitative data collected, I then explore the risk and protection factors children faced, and analyse their resilience and coping mechanisms.

Theoretical framework The theoretical foundation of this study is situated within a psychosocial framework. The term ‘psychosocial’ refers to the relationship between psychological and social factors, which continuously influence each other and affect a child’s development, and the effects of economic factors on the well-being of individuals and communities. The psychological refers to behaviour, cognitive development, as well as a child’s ‘capacity to perceive, analyse, learn and experience emotion’ (Arntson and Knudsen, 2001, p. 4). For example, as a result of war and violent conflict, children can experience long-lasting psychological problems, including fear, night terrors, mistrust, depression, aggression and lack of concentration (McConnan and Uppard, 2001; Duncan and Arntson, 2004; Boothby et al., 2006). A child’s response to stressful situations, however, depends upon numerous variables such as their temperament and their own coping mechanisms. Sociological aspects refer to a child’s ability to develop and maintain relationships with peers, family and others, and to learn social codes and norms within their culture and environment (Arntson and Knudsen, 2001; McCallin, 2001; Duncan and Arntson, 2004; Shah et al., 2005). For example, a child may increase his or her protection through support

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from a caring family, peer role models, teachers and institutional features in the community such as schools, health care and basic services (Osofsky, 1999; Wessells, 2002; Cove et al., 2005). A psychosocial framework also entails having a community perspective since violence affects all community members. For instance, parents may be negatively affected by violence and unable to properly care for their children (Osofsky, 1999; Bello et al., 2000; Wessells, 2006); and trust among neighbours may be compromised affecting interactions and traditional coping mechanisms (Martín-Baró, 1994; Hollander, 1997; Robben and Suarez-Orozco, 2000; Duncan and Arnston, 2004). To strengthen these coping mechanisms and offset the negative effects of war, psychosocial approaches may be implemented through a community approach. Case study in La Comuna Cuatro, Soacha, Colombia This chapter is based on data collected from a larger qualitative study focusing on the role of education in strengthening violence-affected children’s resilience and in undermining their risks encountered, including the risk of recruitment into armed groups.1 The study was conducted in La Comuna Cuatro of Soacha, Colombia, an illegal, semi-urban area to the south of Bogota. Over 70 per cent of the 66,000 inhabitants are believed to have been displaced due to the violent conflict. La Comuna Cuatro is also neighbour to Ciudad Bolívar, a neighbourhood composed of nearly two million inhabitants, a large percentage of which have been displaced. Between 1999 and 2005, between Soacha and Bogota, over 275,000 displaced persons have inhabited the area. Community members encountered a number of challenges in La Comuna Cuatro. There was minimal state presence and illegal armed groups have controlled La Comuna Cuatro since the 1980s, when the area started to become populated. As the director of the Defensoría del Pueblo2 explained: The state does not operate here. This is the only government office in a community of 66,000 inhabitants. There is only one police patrol car [offering security and support] to those 66,000 inhabitants. [The police patrol is composed of] eight individuals and at any given time, four are resting and four are working. The four [on duty] are in a truck driving as fast as they can so that [members of an armed group] do not throw a grenade at them or steal the truck from them, so really there is no order here. So in order to address the need for order, the people end up asking the leader of a gang for a favour thinking that the person is a paramilitary leader. [The community member] asks for

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help in resolving a problem or asks for protection, so these criminal groups are creating more disorder in the name of order. (Personal communication, 8 February 2007) The armed groups in the community also recruit children and youth. In fact, Colombia is recognized as having one of the highest numbers of children involved in one of the armed groups, all of which are known to use children as active combatants, porters, mail-carriers or in other capacities (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2004; WatchList, 2004). Most children in Colombia, including in La Comuna Cuatro, who joined, did so ‘voluntarily’. Although a number of risk factors often lead children to make such a choice (Human Rights Watch, 2003), deciding to join an armed group is usually a consequence of economic, cultural, social or political pressures children experience (Machel, 2001; McConnan and Uppard, 2001). Inhabitants in La Comuna Cuatro have limited access to basic services including nutrition, health, education, water and employment. For example, the unemployment rate is over 50 per cent, only 33 per cent of inhabitants have access to water and 30 per cent of school-age youth do not attend school. Access to education in La Comuna Cuatro is limited beyond ninth grade and drop-out rates begin increasing in sixth grade when more children begin working. The diverse subcultures in La Comuna Cuatro also contribute to aggression and violence among peers in school (Corporación Infancia y Desarrollo, 2004). Numerous risk factors in La Comuna Cuatro, such as poverty, limited basic services, violence, limited access to education and the presence of armed groups, also increase the risk of a child’s voluntary recruitment into armed groups (Brett and Specht, 2004). According to community members and a former paramilitary member, most youth in armed groups were not enrolled in school; nevertheless, a number were participating in an education programme. The data collection strategy had two phases and took place in 2006– 2007 in collaboration with a non-formal education programme, la Corporación Infancia y Desarrollo (CID), which focused on providing education to the displaced population, and a formal school, Colegio la Isla (IE), which was open to all children in the community depending on space availability. A review of relevant texts also took place during both phases. The first phase of the study consisted of semi-structured interviews to gain a greater understanding of the background of La Comuna Cuatro, and grasp the risk factors children faced at home and in the community, the role of armed groups and education programmes


in the community. I interviewed representatives from the community, government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and school staff. In the second phase, I conducted participant observation of selected children at the CID programme and IE school over an eight-month period, which included interviews with the children’s family members and teachers. Through purposive sampling, a core group of 12 children who agreed to participate in the study were selected based on the following criteria: (a) age (between 12 and 15 years of age); (b) residence in La Comuna Cuatro; (c) families recently displaced to prevent the children’s recruitment into an armed group or protect them from violence or (d) displacement within the past three years; (e) half of the children enrolled in the IE school, and the other half in the CID programme; and (f) equal gender representation. Those displaced to prevent the recruitment of the children into an armed group were automatically selected. The other qualified students were selected randomly.

Children in La Comuna Cuatro The concept of childhood in La Comuna Cuatro differs in comparison to internationally accepted definitions. According to the Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC), a child is anyone under 18 years of age (Emergency Education Assistance Unit, Global Action Programme on Education for All, 1998). Although I refer to this definition of a ‘child’ in my study, it is necessary to understand the common traits of a child in La Comuna Cuatro. All of these children experienced chronic violence. The majority were displaced as a result of violence. Many took on adult roles commencing at a young age, including caring for siblings; girls as young as 14 caring for their baby; children who were head of household; children as young as four working in the informal sector; children as young as ten making decisions regarding staying in school or deserting. Children took on adult roles at an early age, thus giving a different perspective of childhood. These children came from nearly all regions of Colombia and represented the diverse cultures of the country. Although there were differences among the various regions in the country, these children and youth were displaced due to the violence resulting from the armed conflict, and have come from predominantly rural areas, where their familial livelihoods revolved around agriculture. The 12 prime respondents in the study were all displaced because their families felt it necessary to leave their homes to protect

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the children. In nearly all cases, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group threatened the families of the focal children, thus leading to their displacement; others were displaced by the paramilitary depending on where the children lived and which armed group was strongest in the area. Most of the children in my focal group previously lived in areas surrounded by illegal armed groups. At times, fighting between guerrilla groups, the paramilitary and the military occurred near their homes. Prolonged exposure to violence can lead to a normalization of violent actions. ‘Violence and killing are normalised because they are daily occurrences in the streets, markets, and communities. Children’s values may be skewed in such contexts as they adapt to a world suffused with violence’ (Wessells, 2006, p. 44). The children in La Comuna Cuatro expressed such normalization of violence. These children, whose exposure to violence began prior to their arrival in La Comuna Cuatro and continued in their new community, often spoke excitedly about the violence. Those working with children in the community often cited high levels of aggression in the children and referred to violence as a mainstay in their lives and present within the community and family environments of the children. Behaviour, or acts considered to be aggressive, also varies depending on context. My definition is based on how community members, including the school principal, a representative from the ICBF,3 teachers and parents, used the term ‘aggression’ when describing the children. Aggressive children in La Comuna Cuatro are those who provoke fights, push and shove so as to instigate a reaction, which occurred daily during recess at the IE school, or verbally lash out against their friends, family members or others. Within my focal group, 5 of the 12 children exhibited forms of aggression, primarily towards their siblings. Although siblings often argued, parents mentioned that the level of aggression or number of fights increased after displacement, and decreased over time. This behaviour may also be a normal response in conflict settings due to the increased stress and trauma experienced. When there is a history of conflict and crisis, social norms can change and violence becomes suffused within society (Martin-Baró, 1994). Also, limited space to run and play imposed restrictions on children, which could add another element that increased aggression (Garbarino and Kostelny, 1993). According to their family members, half of the children demonstrated traits of aggression or increased anger after displacement. To my knowledge, none of the children were involved with an armed group. While in La Comuna


Cuatro, the children were directly affected by numerous risk factors they faced in their community. However, children also developed coping mechanisms and built their resilience to counter the risks. Risk factors to recruitment in the community and in the home Children in La Comuna Cuatro faced numerous risk and protective factors, but the risk factors seemed to dominate in this area. Within the community, the violence and restrictions targeted children and youth, especially those considered to be delinquents.4 Others targeted by the armed groups included those not abiding by the paramilitary-imposed rules on children. These rules included: no groups of three or more children gathered outside, especially at night; no video games; a curfew of 8 pm or 9 pm; no throwing rocks at cars or people; no long hair or ear rings for boys; and no short skirts for girls. Children were also targets of the limpieza social (social cleansing). A limpieza social involved the killing of children or youth believed to be delinquents in the community. These social cleansings were similar to the work of death squads in Brazil, which primarily targeted street children (Dimenstein, 1991). In La Comuna Cuatro, the children targeted were considered to be delinquents or troublemakers; those children were rumoured to be placed on the list naming those to be killed during the limpieza social. As one of the students stated: For example, three children arrive, and one of them is not a delinquent or anything, and two of them are, but if they find the three of them, even though one is not involved in any vices, they kill all three. (Personal communication, 13 September 2006) The children were well aware of the violence and how close they were to it, as is expressed in the following statements from two children: There are people in the Santo Domingo [neighbourhood] and one day they dragged a man over here. We were over there at home. I was watching from a hole in the corner of the house, where they could not see me. It was a guy and they got him and killed him with a shot in the head. (Personal communication, 18 September 2006) Yesterday around nine o’clock about seven of us where playing video games over there in los Robles [neighbourhood] near the [CID] . . . building. Then a man pulled up on a motorcycle and shot [our friend]. All of us ran away and the guy on the motorcycle took off. (Personal communication, 6 February 2007)

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Children were directly affected by the violence in the community. In the home, children experienced neglect, physical violence and other family tensions. Family conflicts tended to occur between the children and their stepbrothers, stepsisters or stepparent. Physical violence was also a common feature in the homes of those living in this area. According to the ICBF representative, physical violence was common among rural Colombian families; many of the displaced families continued that practice in La Comuna Cuatro (interview, 11 December 2006). Of the 12 children in my focal group, I learned that four had experienced, or were experiencing, violence at home. When disagreements arose between children and their parents, children in my focal group felt unable to discuss the situation with their mother or father. Also, families imposed rules that reflected the paramilitary’s rules for children. Children were restricted at home and in the community. As one parent stated, ‘I cannot let the children go out since I do not know what will be waiting for them’ (personal communication, 18 October 2006). In some cases, however, protection did come from family, as well as from education programmes and other services available to the children. Due to the high unemployment rate in La Comuna Cuatro of approximately 52 per cent, and high levels of poverty, children as young as 11 often found themselves torn between working and going to school. According to the IE school principal, parents often took their children out of school to send them to work involuntarily (interview, 15 February 2007). In numerous cases, however, the children had a strong desire to work and searched for employment opportunities, at times at the objection of their parents. Children’s desire to work may have also increased when their parents were unable to find employment in an urban setting. The director of the Defensoría del Pueblo5 stated that when children arrived in the urban area of La Comuna Cuatro from rural areas, they took on adult responsibilities and seemed better able to adapt to the new society than their parents (interview, 16 November 2006). Coping mechanisms Role models and mentors One of the protective mechanisms of children in the violent conflict setting of La Comuna Cuatro was the development of a relationship with mentors or role models, which often were family members, school teachers or community leaders. In complex emergencies, the Psychosocial Working Group emphasizes family as the most protective factor for children, supporting them to meet their needs, since their


material and other physical resources may have been depleted (Shah et al., 2005). However, in La Comuna Cuatro, families often posed as a risk factor for the children or offered limited protection. Five of the children in the study seemed to have close families ties, although only two of them had open discussions with their mothers; one of these two did not discuss personal issues with her mother. Even though personal discussions were often limited, children built their relationships with family members by doing chores at home, grocery shopping or going on short excursions when possible. All students referred to family members as those most important in their lives. Interestingly, four of the 12 focal children looked to those outside the family for support and mentorship. One of the four also searched for support within the family. Of the remaining eight, possibly two had some open discussions with their grandmother or mother. The others from the focal group did not seem to speak openly with anyone. One of the most apparent cases of a child–mentor relationship was Rolando6 and his relationship with a FARC commander when Rolando lived in Meta. Rolando was often taken to a training camp with the FARC and he began learning more about their ideology. He also received other benefits, such as not needing to follow all of the rules (that is, he had long hair and played billiards with FARC members); and he ate well and enjoyed outdoor activities at the training camp. He thought about joining the group, but the commander prevented him from joining several times and stressed how the decision changes one’s life economically and psychologically (field notes, 24 October 2006). Ultimately, he followed the commander’s advice and did not join the group. At the other end of the spectrum, Yolanda did not seem to have any mentors or role models. Her best friend in school, Ana, did not understand Yolanda’s actions nor did they discuss her problems, such as Yolanda’s desire to drop out of school. At home, Yolanda’s father was usually away working, and her mother often went back to Tolima to visit her grandmother. While at home, Yolanda spent time with her siblings and slept. When her parents were away, Yolanda’s older sister was her caretaker and the closest thing to a role model for Yolanda. However, this influence was not enough to convince Yolanda to stay in school, especially since Yolanda’s sister had dropped out of school in her early teens. Teachers were also instrumental figures for a number of students. Rolando’s girlfriend and Ericka, for example, discussed their personal dilemmas with one of their CID teachers and asked for their advice. Both of these girls had strained relationships with their mothers and

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experienced surmounting difficulties, and both turned to their teachers for support. Ana also developed a close relationship with one of her CID teachers, whom she saw as a father figure (her father passed away in 2005). Another CID student (not in the focal group) moved in with one of the CID teachers to escape violence at home. Elvin turned to one of his teachers when he had problems with his family. These children saw their teachers as mentors and supporters, as well as being their teachers. Schooling as a protective factor was not only about giving students a space to learn, study and socialize, but also to offer students a caring support system. In addition to the CID teachers, children in the community developed other key relationships increasing their protection. Developing ties with community leaders or others in La Comuna Cuatro served as a coping mechanism to increase protection. For example, it was well-known that the limpieza social targeted children. To become aware of the rules, community events or when a limpieza social would take place, Rolando befriended the president of the community board. Rolando had this to say of a social cleansing taking place in September 2006: Rolando: I go out to play near the military base, in the small courtyard. That’s where we play or if not here on this side then down below in another neighbourhood, but the courtyard was damaged when it rained a lot. The ground broke and it moved the ground underneath [the courtyard] and it got ruined. RB: Until what time can you play? Rolando: One can be outside until 7:30 pm, but now I have to go in early because of the limpieza. I don’t like to be outside. I stay in the house and listen to music or watch TV. RB: They’re doing a limpieza now? Rolando: Yeah, it sucks. (Rolando, personal communication, 18 September 2006) During the discussion, Rolando mentioned that he learned of the limpieza social as well as the community rules from the president of the community board. In November 2006, Rolando and Ericka discussed the social cleansing issue and understood that it often occurred during the holidays (personal communication, 15 November 2006). By staying aware of community issues, these children demonstrated an ability to increase their protection in the community. Befriending the paramilitary also proved to be a useful strategy to increase protection. For example, a man who was robbed in the


community contacted his friend in the paramilitary for assistance. Since former CID students became paramilitary leaders, protection of the CID programme, its staff and students may have increased. Developing relationships with others in the community, those in the school programme, as well as with family members seemed to increase protection of the children and foster children’s resilience and coping mechanisms. A final demonstration of resilience that greatly increased the children’s protection was the support the children showed to each other. The following story illustrates how Rolando’s girlfriend and her brother defended themselves and protected other children in the neighbourhood. In this story, I refer to Rolando’s girlfriend as Elena and her brother as Orlando: As I was walking to one of the NGO programs in La Comuna Cuatro, one of the students from the CID program, Orlando, called to me from his home on the mountainside. I visited Orlando and his sister Elena, another CID student who was also Rolando’s girlfriend. When I arrived, a young man around 18 years old, who was mentally disabled, was threatening the neighbours. His mother cursed at him; the young man cursed back; the mother left to look for the police. Since he was attacking two young children next door, Elena called the children to her house for safety. I entered as well. We were in an open patio surrounded by walls of metal sheeting, which was the construction of the entire house. After insulting us, the young man pounded on the door and threw rocks at us. Elena and Orlando yelled back at times and then threw water at him. According to Orlando and Elena, he is afraid of water and that is the only way to calm him down. Eventually the young man walked away and began sobbing. The police never arrived. (Field notes, 18 December 2006) By working together, Elena and Orlando were able to prevent the young man from hurting the children or breaking into their home. Admittedly, the scene made me nervous. The children, however, remained calm and collaborated successfully. I was impressed by how the brother and sister handled themselves and took care of the situation. Although it was obvious that the young man attacking the home needed special support, it was not available in the neighbourhood. Lacking a police presence or sites for psychological counselling, the children developed a strategy to defend themselves during these outbursts illustrating resilient behaviour, which was common in this neighbourhood.

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Children and youth in the community were known to collaborate together at a larger level. For example, four children developed a successful band, the Black Brothers, and have given a number of concerts in La Comuna Cuatro and around the country. A group of girls started a radio programme; a former paramilitary member started a band with others who were involved in armed groups. In the first two cases, the children participated in NGO programmes that ended abruptly due to lack of financing; at the programme’s end, these children (8 of the 32 in the programme) decided to keep working together (CID youth teacher, personal communication, 29 November 2006). Although involvement in an education or other programme seemed to protect the children, often these were short-term solutions. Without the children’s decision to seek other programmes or to collaborate towards a common goal, the children could end up on the street when the programmes end. Overall, key coping mechanisms the children used to increase their protection successfully included staying at home or in school, developing key relationships, staying informed, observing others, participating in education or other types of programmes and collaborating with other children. Of these, building relationships and having role models seemed critical. Children also used coping mechanisms that could protect them from some risks while increasing others.

Coping mechanisms: Increasing protection or risk? Children’s coping mechanisms often increased their protection from risk factors within the community or home. However, at times, children’s coping mechanisms protected them from certain risk factors, while at the same time increased children’s risks in other areas. These coping mechanisms included staying in the streets, getting pregnant, deserting school or joining an armed group. For example, living on the streets to escape violence at home protected the children from domestic violence, but it also placed them at risk of being targeted by the armed group. They also faced other challenges such as lack of food and shelter. Once again, their vulnerability depended upon their resilience and ability to cope well under difficult circumstances. Although none of the children in my focal group ran away from home, others from the CID programme were known to do so periodically. One boy, who was often physically beaten by his father, ran away from home and spent much time on the streets. Other times, he stayed with one of his teachers for days at a time to escape the violence.


Another CID student that ran away ended up on the streets for several days. Although leaving home protected children from their family, it also increased the risk of recruitment, drug use and of becoming victims of violence. Pregnancy was another tool children used to increase their protection and it was usually due to two reasons: to escape domestic violence at home or to gain financial support from their partner to address poverty issues. A CID teacher mentioned that within the CID programme, several girls became pregnant to have an excuse to leave home and move in with their boyfriend. One boy was also planning on getting his girlfriend pregnant to live with her (CID teacher, personal communication, 8 October 2007). In other cases, pregnancy was used to seek financial support from partners, as in the case of Yolanda’s older sisters. However, this strategy was risky. In both cases, the men left them and the girls dropped out of school to seek employment and care for their babies (Yolanda’s sister, personal communication, 14 December 2006). Pregnancy was another coping mechanism used for protection that often led to additional risk factors. School drop-out rates, for example, often increased when girls became pregnant, as in the case of Yolanda’s sisters. In response to the risk factors, students dropped out of school in search of a better avenue to improve their livelihood. Yolanda from the IE group lived in abject poverty was not encouraged by her parents to study and felt embarrassed to go to school in old clothes and torn shoes. Following the experience of her brother and two sisters, she dropped out of school and hoped to work. Even if no job opportunities surfaced, CID staff did not believe she would return to school since she was sometimes withdrawn from her peers and did not show motivation to study (CID senior staff, personal communication, 1 October 2007). Considering the number of risk factors the children faced, dropping out of school could often be seen as necessary, as a short-term solution, to meet current needs, such as finding work to feed one’s family. Rolando, for example, changed his plans of finishing school and joining the military when he learned he was having a baby. With his girlfriend’s pregnancy, Rolando said he left school to work to provide for his girlfriend and baby. As illustrated in this section, children’s coping mechanisms were often influenced by a variety of risk and protection factors. Children also seemed to weigh community rules differently. Understanding which rules held more weight allowed children an approach

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for learning the limits since not all rules were enforced equally. For example, breaking the community rules at times had no consequences; in other cases, children were threatened and either ignored the threats or heeded them. In the case of the CID focal group, Rolando pierced his eyebrow after arriving in La Comuna Cuatro and shortly thereafter, the paramilitary threatened him; a threat that he ignored on more than one occasion until they finally left him alone. He did not feel threatened since the paramilitary members were drunk when they harassed him (field notes, 24 October 2006). In the discussion with Rolando, it was evident that he followed some rules yet ignored others. One of the CID youth teachers (referred to as CID in extract below), who was 19 years old and had lived in the community for 7 years, had a similar story: CID: teacher One time they threatened me for wearing a hood. RB: Why? CID: teacher for having a hood, for wearing a hood, imagine that. RB: Oh really? CID: teacher Yes, and they told me that the next time they saw me with it on they would kill me, supposedly, but it was a lie. Imagine that? Yes, I keep wearing my hood. If I take off the hood, I end up worse off. It’s that they are unjust, you understand? RB: And then what happened? CID: teacher They haven’t said anything else to me since I have continued as normal, you understand? RB: That was better? CID: teacher Of course, I kept [wearing it]. I didn’t pay any attention to them when they told me that. I did not plead with them or anything . . . I simply stayed quiet and continued. . . . [would I] follow that [threat]? No, never. Although if I got into a really bad situation I would have to report it to the Defensoría del Pueblo or something like that, tell them [the paramilitary] wants to take off my hood with a bullet. (CID youth teacher, personal communication, 27 September 2006) The CID youth teacher explained that it would be better for him to do nothing than to try to plead with the armed group. By staying quiet and not showing fear, he felt he could avoid a more precarious situation and he continued wearing the hood as usual. If one showed fear, then the paramilitary may increase their harassment further. Also, it was less common for the paramilitary to kill a person on the street without giving a prior threat. The CID director gave a similar response when


discussing the threat against her by a paramilitary member for reporting a theft to the police in June of 2007: After the CID notified the police, a youth, who was believed to be a member of the paramilitary, threatened the CID director. The person threatened her for reporting the theft to the police. The director told the youth that they did not report him or any armed group; they reported the theft. When the youth threatened to kill the CID director, she responded by saying, ‘If you want to kill me, then go ahead but then you will also be killed by the armed group’ (CID director, personal communication, 27 September, 2007). The director explained to me that when receiving threats you cannot show fear. Afterwards, everything went back to normal. (Field notes, 27 September 2007) It seemed that showing fear was an illustration of weakness and the paramilitary would gain additional power over the person, which could increase a person’s risk. These three individuals demonstrated a high level of resilience or an ability to do well under stress. Their coping mechanism of assessing the threat and how they were threatened to determine whether or not to ignore or heed the threat proved successful. There were other cases in which children were threatened for more serious actions, such as fighting or using drugs. In these situations, most of the children changed their behaviour. Nicolás was threatened by a member of the paramilitary for fighting too much; his sister was threatened for getting involved with drugs, drinking and staying out too late (personal communication, 14 November 2006). Both changed their behaviour and changed schools. In the story of the 17-year-old boy who was shot while playing video games on a Sunday night, he did not heed the threat, which related to drug use. In his situation, the threat was carried out and he was added to the list of hundreds of children who have been killed in the past several years.

Conclusion Children that are at risk of recruitment into armed groups also face additional risk factors, including drug use, prostitution and dropping out of school, which may compromise their safety and life choices. In La Comuna Cuatro, displaced children experienced the violent conflict in their home prior to being displaced and found themselves in a community that place children at high risk of violence. Although the

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children faced numerous risk factors, they also developed a number of coping mechanisms to offset the risk and increase protection. Nevertheless, some coping mechanisms increased their protection in some areas, while increasing their risk in others. Analysing the different risk factors within families, the challenges children experienced in the community, and the links between risk factors from the home and community could lead to developing approaches for better protection of children. As is evident, the interplay between various risk and protection factors influenced children’s resilience and coping mechanisms. Findings from this study illustrate the importance of broadening the unit of analysis from the individual to community or societal levels. This study demonstrates that utilizing a community approach when working with violence-affected children seems paramount. Such an approach entails fostering the relationship between the children, their family and teachers, the two critical support systems that seem vital for their psychosocial well-being. In Colombia, violence-affected children and their families have never known peace. The entire population is affected by the traumatic experiences (Martín-Baró, 1994; Hollander, 1997; Brett and Specht, 2004). As a result, it may be necessary to work with entire communities and focus on rebuilding the social fabric and relations among community members (Martín-Baró, 1994; Lykes, 2000). Although current psychosocial theory emphasizes working with children, families and communities, practical implementation of these programmes in La Comuna Cuatro has worked with these different groups separately, as opposed to uniting the different actors within a psychosocial framework. Through a community approach, the risk factors of the children may be addressed, and their resilience and coping mechanisms fostered, which may decrease their risk of recruitment into armed groups.

Notes 1. The study was supported by a number of institutions including the US Institute of Peace, Teachers College, Columbia University, Institute for Latin American Students at Columbia University, as well as technical support from Fundación Dos Mundos. 2. The Defensoría del Pueblo is a government agency that offers free services to those in economic and social difficulties who are unable to exercise their rights. Assistance includes increasing awareness of rights, protecting human rights as well as representing individuals in judicial proceedings (Defensoría del Pueblo, n.d.). 3. In a Human Rights Study (2004), the majority of former child soldiers interviewed in Colombia joined at the average age of 13.

120 Resilience Amidst Risks for Recruitment 4. ICBF stands for the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar, which is the organization responsible for providing children and family services. 5. Delinquency refers to children involved in drugs, drinking or fighting. 6. All interviewee names have been changed for confidentiality.

References Achvarina, V. and Reich S. (2006) ‘No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers’, International Security, 31(1) (summer), 127–164. Arias, F.J. (2002) ‘Desplazamiento Forzado en Colombia: Reflexiones Sobre su Implicación Emocional’, Palimpsestvs = Palimpsesto: Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2, 128–135. Arntson, L. and Knudsen, C. (2004) Psychosocial Care and Protection of Children in Emergencies: A Field Guide (Westport, CT: Save the Children Federation). Bernal, E. C., Convers, A. M. and Paz, M. G. (2004) Equidad, Desplazamiento y Educabilidad (Paris: UNESCO). Bello, M. N. (2004) Desplazamiento Forzado: Dinámicas de Guerra, Exclusión y Desarraigo (Bogota: Universidad Nacional de Colombia). Bello, M. N., Cardinal, E. M. and Arias, F. J. (2000) Efectos Psicosociales y Culturales del Desplazamiento (Bogota: Universidad Nacional de Colombia). Boothby, N., Crawford, J. and Mamade, A. (2006) ‘Mozambican Child Soldier Life Outcome Study: Lessons Learned in Rehabilitation and Reintegration Efforts’, Global Public Health, 1(1) (February), 87–107. Brett, R. and Specht, I. (2004) Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers). Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2004) Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004 (London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2008) Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008 (London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). Corporación Infancia y Desarrollo (2004) Protegemos la Infancia y Promovemos el Desarrollo (November) (Soacha: la Corporación Infancia y Desarrollo). Cove, E., Eiseman, M. and Popkin, S. J. (2005) Resilient Children: Literature Review and Evidence from the HOPE VI Panel Study (December) (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute). Cuéllar, J.E.B. (2004) ‘Internally Displaced Colombians: The Recovery of Victims of Violence within a Psychosocial Framework’ in K. Miller and L. Rasco (eds) The Mental Health of Refugees: Ecological Approaches to Healing and Adaptation (Mahweh, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), pp. 229–262. Defensoría del Pueblo (n.d.) La Defensoría del Pueblo. http://www.defensoria.org. co (La Defensoría), date accessed 10 November 2007. Dimenstein, G. (1991) Brazil: War on Children (London: Latin American Bureau). Duncan, J. and Arntson, L. (2004) Children in Crisis: Good Practices in Evaluating Psychosocial Programming (London: Save the Children Federation). Emergency Education Assistance Unit, Global Action Programme on Education for All (1998) Basic Texts on the Right to Education and Protection of the Child (Paris: UNESCO).

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Garbarino, J. and Kostelny, K. (1996) ‘The Effects of Political Violence on Palestinian Children’s Behavior Problems: A Risk Accumulation Model’, Child Development, 67, 33–35. Hollander, N.C. (1997) Love in a Time of Hate: Liberation Psychology in Latin America (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press). Human Rights Watch (2003) You’ll Learn Not to Cry: Child Combatants in Colombia (New York: Human Rights Watch). IDMC (n.d.) IDMC: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre: Global Statistics, http://www.internal-displacement.org (Statistics), accessed 20 January 2009. Lykes, M. B. (2000) ‘Possible Contributions of a Psychology of Liberation: Whither Health and Human Rights?’, Journal of Health Psychology, 53, 383–397. Machel, G. (2001) The Impact of War on Children (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan). Martín-Baró, I. (1994) Writings for a Liberation Psychology (London: Harvard University Press). McCallin, M. (2001) ‘Discussion Guide 3: Understanding the Psychosocial Needs of Refugee Children and Adolescents’ in M. Loughry and A. Ager (eds) The Refugee Experience: Psychosocial Training Module, Revised Edition (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre), pp. 73–102. McConnan, I. and Uppard, S. (2001) Children Not Soldiers: Guidelines for Working with Child Soldiers and Children Associated with Fighting Forces (London: Save the Children). Osofsky, J. D. (1999) ‘The Impact of Violence on Children’, Domestic Violence and Children, 9 (3) (winter), 33–49. Robben, A. and Suarez-Orozco, M. (2000) Cultures Under Siege: Collective Violence and Trauma (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press). Shah, S., Graidage, G. and Valencia, J. (2005) Youth on the Streets: The Importance of Social Interactions on Psychosocial Well-Being in an African Context (May) (Washington, DC: USAID). UN General Assembly (2007) Report of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Children and Armed Conflict (13 August), http://www.un.org/ children/conflict/english/reports.html (A/62/228), accessed 2 March 2008. Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict (2004) Colombia: La Guerra en los Niños y las Niñas (February) (New York, NY: Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict). Wessells, M. (2002) ‘Recruitment of Children as Soldiers in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Ecological Analysis’ in L. Mjøset and S. Van Holde (eds) The Comparative Study of Conscription in the Armed Forces (Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd), pp 237–254. Wessells, M. (2006) Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Working Group on Children Affected by Armed Conflict and Displacement (1996) Promoting Psychosocial Well-Being Among Children Affected by Armed Conflict and Displacement: Principles and Approaches from the International Save the Children Alliance (November) (New York, NY: Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies).

7 How Voluntary? The Role of Community in Youth Participation in Muslim Mindanao Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder

Conflict in Mindanao Three major insurgent groups have waged armed struggle against the forces of the Philippine military since the 1960s. These are the communist-oriented New People’s Army (NPA), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its breakaway faction, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The latter two groups were organized by Muslim revolutionary leaders, convinced that armed struggle is the only way to express the right to self-determination for the Bangsamoro Muslims in Mindanao. Late in the 1980s, a group of ragtag armed youth, mostly from the Yakan and Sama ethnic groups based on the island province of Basilan emerged to become the country’s foremost bandit and kidnap-for-ransom group. The group, known as the Abu Sayyaf (‘Bearer of the Sword’) has lately been reported to have recruited several minors into their fold. Our research focus was on recruitment and participation into the MILF in the Lanao provinces from amongst the Maranao tribe, and the role of identity, ideology and community in this decision. The field study conducted over three weeks involved a total of 40 interviews with Maranao families and communities, civil society groups, government officials both in Manila and Iligan city, Lanao del Norte and some 20 in-depth interviews with child soldiers and former child soldiers affiliated with the MILF for oral histories. In terms of respondent averages, Table 7.1 provides an overview of the interviewees. Two focus group discussions with families and community groups at Kauswagan village incorporated group-level insights. Interviews were conducted in Tagalog through interpreters and notes were transcribed 122

Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder 123 Table 7.1

Respondent averages

Gender Total Age average Years spent in MILF Desire to leave/never to return Role in MILF Non-combatant (Communications/espionage/ camp orderly) Combatant (combat support/frontline combat) Civilian supporter

Male

Female

15 15 3 7

5 18 2 3

13

5

2 –

– –

and later translated because there are 85 languages and dialects. The most dominant are Tagalog, Cebuano or Visayan and its related variants, Hiligaynon also known as Ilonggo, Bicolano, Waray, Pampango, Batangueno, Ifugao and Kalinga among others. Permission for recording interviews was granted in most cases, except with the child soldiers. Several ethical concerns were central to the conduct of this research, first was the issue of access in an ethical and safe manner. This hurdle was negotiated with the help of our local non-governmental organization (NGO) partners Kapamagogopa Inc. and Pailig Development Foundation Inc. in Iligan city. Both were implementing assistance for displaced- and conflict-affected people in the aftermath of fresh government offensive against leading MILF commanders in August–September 2008. They had well-established links with former child soldiers who grew up in MILF camps or in communities close to them, and who at that juncture were displaced following the fall of Camp Poona Paigapo. To ensure accountability and honesty, we debriefed informants about the academic nature of the research and chose to rely on small tokens of appreciation like pens, key chains and a box of assorted food items, to make participants feel rewarded for their participation. We used a semi-structured questionnaire which focused on the nature of voluntary participation in the MILF, by probing issues like (a) the internal value of recruiting children for the armed groups (e.g., communications, combat support, espionage, camp orderlies); (b) incentives offered to children and youth for voluntary participation; (c) influence of culture (e.g., the politico-religious invocation of the MILF and the religious-cultural tradition of communities); (d) impact of structural variables such as displacement, poverty, unemployment and a lack of educational opportunities; and (e) nature of community mediation,

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its role as facilitator by creating social pressure for youth to be part of a cause rooted in community ideals and beliefs. The research process was also interwoven with certain challenges and limitations which need to be discussed at the outset and will help illustrate and share our findings better. The fieldwork was plagued by issues of security risk and limited physical access to some of the Lanao del Sur areas where we initially planned to visit. This also affected our findings in terms of offering greater nuance about command and control, hierarchy within the MILF and also issues of punishment/persecution and retribution to enforce group discipline. Given that access to our limited sample was negotiated through intermediaries, that is, local NGOs, this strategy of sampling in a situation of widespread displacement and fear also involved inherent biases. Triangulation of findings was attempted by interacting with different groups of actors and stakeholders to address these issues; however the results are far from complete. Hence the chapter analyses preliminary themes in the youth-community interaction in Mindanao.

Identity, community, ideology and conflict in Muslim Mindanao The contextual basis for this study entails a detailed inquiry into the moorings of separatist resistance amongst the Muslims in Mindanao. The ‘Bangsamoro people’ comprise historically 13 Islamized ethnolinguistic groups (Tan, 1995; Kamilian, 1999, pp. 7–9; Abinales, 2000; Carino nd Christian, 2005).1 In terms of demographic distribution the Muslims in Mindanao are concentrated in Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi provinces.2 The non-Muslim indigenous tribes are collectively called the ‘Lumads’ and comprise more than 20 ethno-linguistic groups (Kamlian, 1999, pp. 4–5). Islam traces a long lineage in the region. Introduced by Muslim traders in the late fourteenth century, it imparted structure and unity amongst the diverse ethnolinguistic groups of western Mindanao, and enabled the establishment of control over non-Muslim inhabitants. Islam also created a dialectical opposition to Western influences with the advent of Spanish and American influence in the archipelago. Subsequent demographic shifts created by the advent of Christian settlers resulted in distinct fault-lines between these entities, namely, the Christians, the Muslims and Lumads or indigenous tribes and created distinct hurdles towards the creation of an integrated Philippine nation (Chalk, 2001, pp. 241–249; Salim, 2004, pp. 80–91; Carina and Christian, 2005).


According to one estimate in 1903, Muslims comprised 76 per cent of the population in the islands of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan, but by 1990, this had gone down to 19 per cent; conversely, the non-Muslim population grew from 24 per cent to 81 per cent during the same period (Jubair, 1999 in Quitoriano and Theofelize, 2004, p. 12). At present, the Muslims are a minority population estimated to be 4 to 7 million strong (Tuminez, 2007, p. 8). These demographic changes were accompanied by other shifts under the colonial policies of Spain and the United States. Under Spanish rule, the ‘Regalian doctrine’ did away with the Moro tradition of communal land ownership, mostly in the control of clan chiefs, or datus, who were responsible for distribution of land under their jurisdiction. Communal access to water, forests, land and other natural resources which were free and equal prior to the doctrine came to be regulated thereafter. Significantly the sultanates were undermined and the rights of Moros and other indigenous peoples in terms of traditional land holdings and occupancy were invalidated (Tuminez, 2005; Erasgam, 2008, pp. 34–44).3 Apart from this dispossession, resettlement policies and attempts at acculturation and assimilation by the Christian Filipino majority only triggered revivalist responses amongst the Muslim tribes which transformed over time from the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) to the MNLF (Quitoriano and Theofelize, 2004). Over time, Muslim resistance has splintered with some groups demanding autonomy and others calling for independence. For example, the MNLF abandoned their call for independence in favour of autonomy, and more radical members broke off to create the MILF, which continues to demand independence. The only groups that could be classified as jihadist, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Raja Solaiman Movement (RSM), were offshoots of these separatist groups. Many Muslims view the Philippine conflict as a legitimate jihad, but inside the country jihad largely serves to create a common Moro-Muslim identity. The main proponents of violence in the Philippines, the MNLF and the MILF, have linked with supporters from the Middle East at different times, but any discussion of jihad is primarily used as a mobilizing tool for the local ethnic campaign. However, the ASG and the offshoot RSM deviate from this pattern.4 Peace negotiations and a policy of accommodation on the part of the central government over the years resulted in a progressive dilution of the MNLF’s stand and culminated in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement which created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) composed of 13 provinces as a democratic palliative for Muslim aspirations. Later the Jakarta Peace Agreement of 1996 launched a Disarmament,

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Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process for the integration of the MNLF cadre into the mainstream of Philippine polity and civilian life was expected to bring about a marked de-escalation in tensions (Muggah, 2004). This agreement, however, gave impetus to a renewal of separatist aims of the Muslims under the banner of a rival Maguindanaobased group – the MILF, for which socio-economic inequalities faced by Mindanao have played a significant role. According to the 2006 official poverty statistics more than half of households in the ARMM are classified as poor and poverty in the region reached 55.3 per cent in 2006, a 9.9 per cent increase from 45.4 per cent in 2003.5 Further, the post independence Philippine state is best described as premature and weak, devoid of a cohesive national consciousness and relative autonomy from the parochial interests of dominant Filipino social classes and powerful elites (Gutierrez, 1992; Rivera, 1994; Krinks, 2002; Yegar, 2002; McCoy et al., 2009). Hence the state failings in the arena of democratic, egalitarian social service delivery and governance seem intrinsically related to the political economy of conflict in Mindanao. There is a vast literature covering the Islamist dimension and moorings of the separatist conflict in Mindanao. There is relatively sparse academic literature on the MILF’s organizational and logistical capacities (McKenna, 1998; Milligan, 2003; Donnelly, 2004; Abuza, 2005, pp. 453–479; Abuza, 2008). The group has an estimated strength of 8000–11,000 men, and is structurally organized into 6 divisions of its military wing; the Bangsamoro Islamic Army (BIAF) (Abuza, 2005).6 It has remained a formidable outfit, partly on account of external funding and support from countries like Malaysia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan among others (Abuza, 2005). Despite its more explicit, avowed espousal of Islamic tenets, as an organization the MILF presents a pragmatic and adaptive entity (Loiw, 2006). Under the initial leadership of Hashim Salamat, the MILF has made ideology and identity issues flexible; tailoring both territorial and group objectives to meet exigency and advocating the incorporation of the non-Muslim indigenous Lumad population as part of its Bangsamoro homeland ideal. These traits have resulted in cooperative endeavour with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in a bid to dissociate itself from ‘terrorist’ organizations like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the ASG in the post 9/11 global environment (Abuza, 2005). While there has been much discussion on the role of ideology and religion in providing content to the Bangsamoro struggle, yet the workings and significance of Islam in the life of communities in Mindanao, and how it permeates into their educational discourses


creating socio-cultural markers of difference amidst a common overarching belief system is little understood. Like all Muslims in the Philippines, the Maranao concentrated in the Lanao provinces follow a different set of laws than their Christian neighbours. This law had been established in 1977 and is called the Code of Muslim Personal Law of the Philippines. It deals with inheritance and family rights of Muslim people according to the Quran and is implemented through Sharia courts in Mindanao. Education in particular has been at the centre of contestation between trends in secularization by the Christian majority government and Islamization by local ulamas and educators in Mindanao (Majul, 1999; Vitug and Gloria, 2000; Milligan, 2004). While in the past, most Maguindanaon and Iranun parents feared to send their children to public school to minimize the risk of them losing the purity of ‘being Muslim’. This attitude is based on the perception that the Western educational system implemented in the Philippine public school system will orient them to Western, ‘Christian’ ways (Milligan, 2004). The educational system of the Muslims in the country comprises several options. There are public schools, private religious schools that are mainly Christian and Madrassa which used to have its focus only on religious knowledge. However, recently not only have the Madrassa changed their programme to adapt to the needs of the Muslims, but also the public schools in the ARMM started to integrate Islamic and Arabic studies into their programmes (Milligan, 2004). On the issue of identity, recent explorations into the role of religion in identity conflicts suggests that ‘religion is often more comprehensive and potent in strengthening the requisites of distinct group or individual identity compared to other repositories of cultural meaning in the construction and maintenance of individual and group identities’ (Seul, 1999, pp. 553–569). This has been strongly the case in Mindanao. To grasp the intricacies of community among the Muslims in Mindanao, a linguistic approach into their spatial and social organizational dynamics offers interesting insights. The ‘community’ in the simplest connotation is called the kawalayaan, that is, a group of houses. This definition is devoid of kinship genealogies, and is based on physical proximity issues (Hautecloque, 2000, p. 92).7 Amongst the Maranaos, kin-related ties refer to inged, suku and pongampong which in turn define size and spread of the clan (Seul, 1999, p. 95). ‘Community’ in this context is also often replicated in ‘camps’ and this is a seemingly unique phenomenon in Mindanao. The issue of MILF camps has always been a matter of contention, given that these have become the basis for territorial claims in Mindanao and constitute pockets of

128 How Voluntary?

autonomous areas outside of government control and self-sustainable communities in themselves. During the Ramos administration the MILF were permitted to retain control over their camps as a measure towards mutual confidence building, with a shift in policy evident under the Estrada administration, many of these camps were run over in 2000, including Camp Abubakar, which was the main camp extending up to 5000 hectares, with many villages and communities displaced (Tuminez, 2007, p. 83). Moreover, studies on the Maranao suggest that the family is the basis of culture (Lacar, 1995, p. 43) with reliance on the clan instead of the state for basic needs. Financial support by elders in the kin structure is common practice, especially with educational support for younger siblings. Family is also crucial in personal decision-making, premised on two principle concepts for the Maranao, namely, marabat (honour) and rido (blood feud). In Mindanao, inter-group conflict as well as the conflict between the Government of the Republic of Philippines (GRP) and the MILF and other groups like the New People’s Army (NPA) and Abu Sayyaf is reinforced by intra-tribal rido which draw on such traditional concepts as marabat, which also define relations between the various Islamic and non-Islamic tribes. These clan feuds tend to perpetuate a cycle of vengeance and retaliation with frequent civilian killings, political rivalry, land disputes and crimes like theft, non-payments of debts and elopement.8 This source of conflict perpetuation and escalation is disruptive for civilians since with the initiation of a rido conflict, the members of the kin group or the community are often immobilized, on account of them being potential targets for retaliation.9 Every year rido conflicts in Lanao are on the rise, and today activists in the Maranao community are increasingly concerned since these are considered to be contrary to the teachings of Islam.10 Finally, as far as the involvement of youth in the conflict is concerned, an accurate picture on the number of child soldiers in the Philippines is difficult to obtain because of the invisible nature of the problem. Most data are drawn from regional statistics on child soldiers who have self-demobilized, escaped or been arrested by the AFP, and been turned over into the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Nevertheless the numbers are unreliable and differ between DSWD and AFP records on surrenderees from groups like the MILF and the NPA. The other source of estimates is field studies undertaken in different sectors like non-governmental, military, media and by academe (PCSUCS, 2007). The best working estimate with some revisions applicable is the International Labour Organization


(ILO)/International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) study which calculated that there may be a child population of 1000–1500 in rebel group areas and surrounding communities with between 100 and 450 of them children associated or engaged in combat with these groups. In the Philippines, a unique dimension in the phenomenon of children involved in armed conflict (CIAC) is the seeming absence of force in their membership in various armed groups which was voiced by cadres, former cadres and civil society activists alike (Cagoco-Guiam, 2002).11 The 2009 report on Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) lists the MILF, NPA and the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAGFU) as violators of the child soldier norm. Of these the MILF has agreed with the United Nations (UN) Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, to enter into an action plan, to ensure the separation of children in their ranks and their return to civilian life in 2009 (UN, 2008). During her visit to the MILF Camp Ghazali Jafar, the Vice Chairman for Political Affairs of the MILF Central Committee insisted that children with the MILF were not recruited and used for combat; they simply took care of orphaned children, while children of MILF commanders living inside the camps with their families were given military training for their initiation into adulthood (CSUCS, 2008, pp. 277–278). But for our purposes it was interesting to explore life within these camps and relate it to our broader investigation of recruitment experience and reintegration outcomes.

Family and community as agents In grasping the role of family and community as agents, proximity to MILF camps created general community conditions making it easy and viable for children to join armed groups. Interviews with the village school master and several of the village elders at Kauswagan12 validated the support which families and communities in areas near MILF camps offer to the group.13 This support also points towards the conciliatory and unproblematic relationship between the MILF and these ancillary communities, which are often extended families; kith and kin of current or past MILF members. Hence the element of coercion which dominates much literature on child recruitment together with the notoriety of child soldier combat behaviour as reflected in African cases was missing in this context. Displacement and disrupted education have been overarching impacts of the recent recurrence of the conflict. Most families in these

130 How Voluntary?

areas have relatives who are part of the MILF command structures or offering support externally. The presence of the AFP-MILF camp structures and also remnant MNLF camps especially in Lanao del Norte communities create a competing power axis in local and provincial governance, premised closely on notions of loyalty and support from civilian inhabitants. Even if enrolment into the MILF is not encouraged by the family, it may seem the best possible route out of poverty for some youth, in other instances, joining the CAFGU ranks can ensure a steady income, since they act as the AFP’s representatives in these communities and are selected by the Barangay Chairman in each village, who coordinated with the MILF and the AFP, are members of the former and loyal to the latter, and hence rewarded with leadership positions at the local level. This was a rather confounding situation. In our observation lack of education seemed to be the primary trigger encouraging easy routes to enrolment due to few alternative with respect to livelihoods and lifestyles, resulting in conformity and privileging of traditional beliefs in rural pockets. At the same time variance in intensity of support was evident between the Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur communities.14 While in Maguindanao and Cotabato communities support from families is philanthropic, they usually give more than zakat, some donate rice, others give money, especially amongst the wealthier families in these provinces. The AFP presence or nearness to AFP camps presents a reverse situation especially in Lanao del Norte where it is unsafe to be openly supportive of the MILF or to send youth for training in their camps. Most community members felt that they were being extorted to give more than their means to the movement, and felt that with the AFP presence in their areas, there was little need to fear the MILF or look for security from their commanders. This angle of physical security and of the AFP versus the MILF as providers of security for civilian communities was an interesting underlying logic for conflict persistence.

Life in the armed group The majority of our respondents and informants testified that immersion into the world of armed conflict as MILF cadres, combatants seems to be the product of a fluid process which incorporates community mediation, family support and ease of release. In terms of our points of inquiry, among our sample of 20 child soldiers, 18 were engaged in non-combatant roles like espionage, camp orderly and communications, food delivery and so on, and only 2 had experienced frontline


combat and risen to the rank of commanders in their group. With regard to incentives offered to children and youth for voluntary participation and the influence of culture, religion, political ideology and issues of Islamic identity, especially duty to Allah were evidenced as a strong motivational variable in all of our respondents. In terms of family’s role in mediating participation, while 5 of the young boys demonstrated individual enthusiasm and will, the rest (15) were in some way supported, encouraged by their family or members of the community where they lived. In terms of structural influences, proximity to MILF camps, low educational attainment, poverty, displacement and economic uncertainty and unemployment were important compulsions for almost every respondent. The life of these child soldiers revealed continuity, in terms of persistent contact with family during their stay at MILF camps, which was unique. At the point of release, lack of formal reintegration efforts limits projections about future reintegration trajectories. In our interviews, we could gather several self-demobilization experiences which presented unfulfilled life aspirations and reliance on the family for establishing new livelihoods, with little expectation from the government for support. All of the interviews with child soldiers indicated that they had joined the MILF voluntarily, either egged on by their parents or as part of the duty to Allah. Economic motivations were practically non-existent, although they have been reported in the case of groups like the CAFGU (PhilRights, 2005, pp. 37–39).15 Exposure to the activities of the MILF through parents or relatives who are part of the group shapes choices, ideas and conviction of youth. It also creates continuity in life choice across generations. This was echoed in the voices of our respondents. My father is my inspiration. He was an MILF fighter. My own parents are keen on seeing me grow into a brave man (15 year old) I was not pressured by my parents to join the MILF. It was my own decision. I fancied being with an armed group, holding a gun and looking brave and strong (14 year old) I joined the MILF when I was 12 years old. My two older brothers joined the group ahead of me. Except for my father, all my uncles are also fighters of the MILF. Joining the group has been my wish. It is a sacrifice and the ultimate fulfilment of my desire to serve the struggle (17 year old) I joined the MILF when I was 15. Before then, I already served the MILF as food courier and caretaker of their horses. I joined the

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group due to my belief in Allah and to express myself as someone who can decide on his own (23 year old) There are five of us siblings. I am the eldest. I got as far as first year high school. That was it. My parents could not afford to send me to school anymore. I joined the MILF in 2005 when I was 10 years old. My father himself persuaded me to join the group. I was also eager to join for economic reasons. During my stay with the MILF my family had one less mouth to feed (15 year old) Evidently the concept of childhood in Muslim society is culture specific and unrelated to the 18-year norm entrenched in international legal protections. Indigenous tribes too have their own home-grown concepts of community defence where military training and arms become a way of socialization into adulthood. Overall, the child soldiers interviewed in this study strongly identify with the Bangsamoro cause, and their parents do not hesitate to allow or even encourage the participation of their youth. At the same time this was not a universal truth, some of the relatively better-off families did appear to favour peaceful alternatives for their children, opting to send them to schools and colleges in more peaceful pockets like Iligan city where the Mindanao State University is based. Hence family and community we found were a major factor in facilitating participation. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it was difficult to make a sharp distinction between life with the MILF and the home life of the child, as they seemed to move seamlessly between the two contexts, and there was evident overlap, with recruitment in some cases supported and encouraged by the family. Hence the distinctness of this case is reinforced compared to West Africa, where children unless they successfully ran away from the armed group often would lose contact with family and return processes were difficult especially if they had engaged in or were coerced into committing atrocities near their home communities. Nonetheless, the community into which former combatants return differs across conflict contexts. Hostility and rejection are important responses which often make the reintegration experience of former combatants including child soldiers a difficult process, triggering the need for discovering new social contexts and communal sites away from home communities to begin a new civilian existence. While in several contexts home communities have been documented as being initially hostile as in West Africa, in Mozambique and Angola traditional spiritual healing rituals helped re-embrace lost members within the community’s


fold. In Mindanao since, most young soldiers remain in their communities and fight occasionally, the community-combatant interaction is unproblematic. However, return to these presumably ‘protective environments’ often results in reintroduction into different forms and levels of violence especially rido conflicts because of its links to family honour. This is reinforced by periodic inter-group clashes between the Christian and Muslim population as well as governmental strikes on MILF camps and related civilian communities. Hence return of child soldiers from the MILF into a home community which is accustomed to multiple levels of conflict makes reintegration less of a civilianizing process and does not ensure the abdication of violent behaviour in future.

Conclusions As our study reveals, the role of religion in fostering a separate identity is played out strongly in the case of the MILF and the ideology underlying ‘Bangsamoro’ continues to be rooted in primordial notions of homeland, which find voice in the name of Islam both in terms of the territorial connotations rooted in the pre-Hispanic influence of Islam as well as the Islamic governance character later evident in the life of the sultanates. Youth in communities which display such traits of indoctrination, social marginalization, historical displacement and belief in colonial and post-colonial majoritarian subordination pose the greatest source of instability in evolving democracies. We strongly feel that linkages between macro-level issues of governance and economics need to be borne in mind and linked with the strategies of child soldier reintegration. The routine practice of reunification or return to the family and community may not be the best approach for reintegration in Mindanao; unless key factors – land reform, ownership, autonomy and cultural recognition of the Moro struggle – are honored within the contours of a mutually accommodative agreement, the grievances and potential for recruitment and participation will remain. Besides, any DDR paradigm of the government will remain at best one-sided policy rhetoric, since the MILF is disinterested in disarming at the moment unless the overarching problems of ancestral domain are addressed. In 2009, an estimated 700,000 people have been reported displaced following government efforts to capture ‘rogue’ MILF commanders like Bravo and Umara Kato. The MILF itself has been held responsible for some 40 attacks during 2008–2009, according to AFP estimates. Besides with an impending change in leadership awaiting the archipelago with President Arroyo’s end of term in 2010, the policy of negotiating with

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the MILF may evince a possible shift creating greater uncertainty over the ancestral domain question. In August, the government unilaterally announced suspension of military attacks, which was reciprocated by the MILF but in light of attacks undertaken by the three commanders against Christian villages in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s rejection of the memorandum of agreement (MOA) on Ancestral Domain, the government has delinked the issue of its attempt to capture these perpetrators from the broader tenor of the peace process in the South. While some quarters mandate greater international involvement to provide much-needed impetus to the nearly stalled peace process, talks in August did not add any substantive progress to resolution efforts. Prominently the issue of factionalism in the MILF remains, with Chief Murad Ibrahim openly acknowledging perils to a negotiated peace in light of a more radical younger generation of commanders.16 Now with the formation of the International Contact Group comprised of Britain, Japan, Turkey and several international NGOs for monitoring agreements that might be reached in the upcoming talks between the peace panels of the MILF and the government at a meeting scheduled in Kualalumpur, Malaysia, early in December,17 and brokered by the Malaysian government, the peace card is back on the table and might pave the way for highlighting the issue of youth involvement in the MILF on the part of the international and national actors. Hence in our analysis we feel the problem of child soldiers in Mindanao is one of perception and a complete lack of solutions at the reintegration end of the spectrum. Therefore, reintegration strategies for this context would require greater innovation than standard child soldier reintegration packages, which are still largely absent. Our research has shown that the MILF case and the Mindanao experience pose an important outlier which questions established orthodoxy about family and home community as undisputed caregivers and protective environments and the best place for child soldier reintegration. In drawing on contemporary wisdom it will be very difficult to address child soldier recruitment and reintegration problems in Mindanao. The role of the community in this context can be best harnessed to help de-escalate conventional cycles of violence at the three distinct levels, namely, between the GRP and various armed groups, inter-group conflict between Christians and Muslims and rido or intra-tribal conflicts. Involvement and participation is often encouraged, and lauded as chivalrous and brave, together with notions of being in the service of God. These cannot be deconstructed without a political peace and resolution of the underlying problems of the Moros in Mindanao.


Notes 1. The Bangsamoro people include the Badjao, Sangil, Palawani, Iranun, Kalagan, Tausug, Jama-Mapun, Samal, Kaligbugan, Yakan, Molbog and the more well-known Maguindanao and Maranao. 2. The Muslim population also lives in some parts of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Norte and Davao del Sur. There have traditionally been high concentrations of Muslim population in Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, Zamboanga del Sur and Palawan. 3. The Lumad tribes include Ata, Bagobo, Batak, Bla-an, Bukidnon, Dibabawan, Higuanon, Mamanwa, Mandaya, Mangguangan, Manobo, Mansaka, Matigsalug, Palawan, Subanen, Tagakaolo, Tagbanua, Tboli, Teduray and Ubo. Other groups like the Tigwa, the Isamal, the Kamayo and Talaandig are generally regarded as sub-tribes. The Lumad groups constitute approximately 5 per cent only of the entire population of the Bangsamoro homeland. 4. This displacement and marginalization was exacerbated under American rule through the passage of restrictive and exclusive legislation such as the Land Registration Act (1902), the Philippine Commission Act 718 (1903) and the Public Land Act (1905). These legislative measures were reinforced by large-scale resettlement drives beginning in 1911 together with economic variables which resulted in displacement, most prominently introduction of the plantation economy such as rubber and coconut plantations in Basilan and Zamboanga. These processes of demographic reorganization continued under the post-colonial Philippine government until the 1960s and significantly altered the demographic map of Mindanao and accompanying property ownership and governance institutions. 5. The beginnings of the ASG trace back to training camps in Afghanistan during the 1980s. In 1987, Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani travelled to Pakistan and made contact with Osama bin Laden, Abdur Rab Rasul Sayaaf and Ramzi Yousef. The experience introduced Janjalani to jihadist ideology, and motivated him to start a jihadist group in the Philippines. From its inception, the ASG defined itself according to its ethnic Moro identity, but its goals extended further than independence. 6. See the latest poverty statistics of the Philippines at their official website http://www.nscbp.ph/poverty (accessed 13 September 2009). 7. Following camps of the MILF, namely, Camp Abu Bakar as Siddique (North Cotabato border with Maguindanao); Camp Bushra Somiorang (outside Butig in Lanao del Sur); Camp Bilal (outside Ansar in Lanao del Norte); Camp Rajamuda (Northern Cotabato near Maguindanao border), Camp Darapanan/Usama bin Zaid (outside Sultan Kudarat town, Maguindanao), Camp Omar Ibn al-Khatab (Maguindanao) and Camp Badre (Maguindanao) were the main centres of training and community life for MILF supporters and cadres. 8. Camp Busrah, and later Camps Bilal, Rajamuda, Darapanan, Omar Ibn Al – Khattab and Badre and Camp Abu Bakr were some of the prominent MILF camps. 9. Interview with Abdul H. T. Atar, RIDO Inc., Iligan city, 27 September 2008. 10. Interview with Mr Pancho Guevera, Manila, 21 September 2008.

136 How Voluntary? 11. It appeared from group discussions we conducted that rido conflicts have proliferated largely because of an absentee government which prompts resolution of disputes and other conflicting issues through clan violence. Interview with Professor Jamial Kamilian, Department of History, MUS-IIT, Iligan city, 26 September 2008. 12. Interviews with Ms Joeven Reyes, SULONG CARHRIHL, Quezon city, Manila, Philippines, 30 September 2008; Mr Ryan Silverio, PCSUCS, Quezon city, 30 September 2008; Mr Neil Paulin, lawyer, Iligan city, 27 September 2008; Ms Myriam, Director, Kapamagogopa Inc., Iligan city, 28 September 2008; Ms Tina Lomjlo, BIRTH-DEV, Iligan city, 26 September 2008. International protocols on protection of CIAC are augmented by national provisions including but not limited to the Republic Act 7610 (Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination); Republic Act 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act); and the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement on the Handling and Treatment of Children in Armed Conflict. Among other legislative protections, in November 2001, the President issued Executive Order 56, known as the Comprehensive Framework Program for CIAC and initiated cooperation between NGOs, armed groups and the government. The Executive Order 56 led to the formation of the Inter-Agency Committee for CIAC, composed of national line agencies of government. This committee drafted a MOA outlining procedures for treatment of children who surrender or are rescued by the AFP or police, and later placed under governmental custody, namely the DSWD. There is no clarity on whether civil society actors are part of the Executive Order 56 process. In fact, the CIAC does not form part of any peace talk with any group. Besides the government has also been reluctant to raise this as a topic due to sensitivity of the issue especially given that all conflict parties are responsible for recruitment, and use inconsistent with legal provisions. 13. A traditional target for MILF and GRP clashes, it has been attacked, burned and occupied in 2000 mainly due to its majority Christian population. 14. Interview with Ustad Karim, teacher, Madrassah Evacuation Center, Iligan city and focus group discussion, Kauswagan, Mindanao, 28 September 2008. 15. These are paramilitary units attached and subsidized by the Philippine Army. It consists of civilians led by a ‘cadre’ or a regular soldier from the Philippine Army (usually the rank of a sergeant). 16. Simon Roughneen, ‘Peace Dances in the Philippines’, available online at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KH01Ae02.html (accessed 12 September 2009). 17. In June 2010, we returned to implement a household survey in select communities of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao and Cotabato provinces.

References Abinales, P. N. (2000) Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation – State (Manila: Ateneo De Manila UP). Abuza, Z. (2005) ‘The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 28 (6), 453–479.

Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder 137 Abuza, Z. (2008) ‘The Philippine Peace Process: Too Soon to Claim a Settlement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front?’, The Jebsen Center for CounterTerrorism Studies Research Briefing Series, 3 (3) (February). Available online at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/jebsencenter/pdfs/JCCTS_ResearchSeries_3.3_Abuza_ 02-2008_FINAL.pdf (accessed 29 September 2009). Cagoco-Guiam, R. (2002) Child Soldiers in Central and Western Mindanao, Philippines (Geneva: ILO). Carino, J. and Christian, E. (eds.) (2005) Indigenous Peoples and Local Government: Experiences from Malaysia and the Philippines (Manila: IWGIA). Chalk, P. (2001) ‘Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao and Aceh’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 24, 241–269. Child Soldiers Global Report (2008), available online at http://www. childsoldiersglobalreport.org. (accessed 14 November 2008). de Hautecloque, G. L. (2000) ‘Community among the Maguindanaons and Other Muslim Ethnic Groups’ in Charles J. H. Macdonald and Guillermo M. Pesigan (eds.) Old Ties and New Solidarities: Studies on Philippine Communities (Manial: Ateneo de UP). Donnelly, C. (2004) ‘Terrorism in the Southern Philippines: Contextualising the Abu Sayyaf Group as an Islamic Secessionist Organization’, available online at http://www.coombs.anu.edu.au/SpecialProj/.../2004/DonnellyC-ASAA2004.pdf (accessed 10 October 2009). Erasga, Dennis S. (2005) ‘Ancestral Domain Claim: The Case of the Indigenous People in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)’, Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, 8 (1), 33–44. Gutierrez, E. U. (1992) All in the Family: A Study of Elites and Power Relations in the Philippines (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy). Kamlian, J. A. (1999) Bangsamoro Society and Culture: A Book of Readings on Peace and Development in Southern Philippines (Iligan City: Iligan Center for Peace Education and Research/MSU-IIT Press). Krinks, P. (2002). The Economy of the Philippines: Elites, Inequalities and Economic Restructuring (London: Routledge Studies in the Growth Economies of Asia). Lacar, L. C. (1995) ‘Familism among Muslims and Christians in the Philippines’, Philippine Studies, 43 (1), 40–48. Liow, J. C. (2006) Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology and Politics, Policy Studies 24 (Washington, DC: East-West Center), available online at http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/ PS024.pdf (accessed 8 September 2009). McCoy, A.W., Olds, K., Sutton, R. Anderson and Thongchai, W. (2009) An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines, New Perspectives in Southeast Asian Studies (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press). McKenna, T. M. (1998) Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines (Berkeley, CA and London: University of California Press). Mercado, E. R. (1999) Southern Philippines Question – The Challenge of Peace and Development, Center for Policy Advocacy and Strategic Studies at the Notre Dame University, Occasional Paper Series, 1 (Cotabato City: Notre Dame Press). Milligan, J. A. (2003) ‘Teaching between the Cross and the Crescent Moon: Islamic Identity, Post-coloniality and Public Education in the Southern Philippines’, Comparative Education Review, 47 (4), 468–492.

138 How Voluntary? Milligan, J. A. (2004) ‘Islamization or Secularization? Educational Reform and the Search for Peace in the Southern Philippines’, Current Issues in Comparative Education, 7 (1), 30–38. Muggah, R. (2004) Assessing the Prospects for DDR of the MILF in Mindanao: A Desk Review and Evaluation for the UNDP (New York andManila: UNDP). Philippines Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (PCSUCS) (2007) Development of a Community-Based Demobilization Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DRR) Framework for CIAC in the Philippines (Quezon City: PCSUCS). PhilRights (2005) Deadly Play Grounds: The Phenomenon of Child Soldiers in the Philippines (Quezon City: PhilRights) pp. 37–39. Quitoriano, E. L. and Theofelize, F. M. (2004) Jubair, 1999 cited in Their War, Our Struggle: Stories of Children in Central Mindanao (Quezon City: Save the Children, UK). Rivera, T. C. (1994) Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family and State in Philippine Manufacturing (Quezon City: UP Centre for Integrative and Development Studies and University of the Philippines Press). Salim, A. (2004) ‘ “Sharia from Below” in Aceh (1930s–1960s): Islamic Identity and the Rights to Self-determination with Comparative Reference to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)’, Indonesia and the Malay World, 32 (92), 80–91. Seul, J. R. (1999) ‘ “Ours is the Way of God”: Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, 36 (5), 553–569. Tan, S. K. (1995) Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle (Quezon City: University of Philippines Centre for Integrative and Development Struggle). Tuminez, A.S. (2007) ‘This Land is Our Land: Moro Ancestral Domain and its Implications for Peace and Development in the Southern Philippines’, SAIS Review, 27 (2) (Summer–Fall), 77–91. Tuminez, A. S. (2008) Ancestral Domain in Comparative Perspective, USIP Special Report 151 (Washington, DC: USIP September 2005). United Nations (2008) Report of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Philippines, S/2008/272, 24 April, available online at http://www.un.org/ Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm (accessed 12 January 2009). Vitug, M. D. and Gloria, G. M. (2000) Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and Institute for Popular Democracy). Yegar, M. (2002) Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar (New York: Lexington Books).

Part III


8 Neither Child nor Soldier: Contested Terrains in Identity, Victimcy and Survival Sukanya Podder

We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. (Foucault, 1990, p. 101)

Introduction Elaborating on the theoretical position underlying this study, the discursive and conceptual engagement presented here takes issue with the contemporary image of the child soldier. The label of ‘child soldier’ is mired in conceptual inconsistencies, vacillating between innocence and agency positions; this is confounded by more populist images propagated in the media and journalistic writings. Child soldiers in the Western media are commonly portrayed with qualities which children and societies ‘ought not to have’ as Utas suggests later in this volume. Cumulatively the Western media has advanced and popularized a pejorative, wasted image of youth in conflict, and tended to portray a dramatized and sympathetic account of the processes and experiences involved in the life of a child soldier. For a practitioner, academic or humanitarian worker who has lived and worked with child soldiers these are far from the truth. They seem to revolve around a coercive recruitment and vulnerable axis, with most youth voices and lives embedded in ‘neglect’, as part of the vulnerable group, that is, women, disabled and children. This creates a problematic, often incomplete categorization/definition. In this chapter I urge that flowing from this dichotomy of projected truths and lived realities, there is an urgent need to reconceptualize 141

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the child soldier in language, law and human imagination. This can enable a more realistic and nuanced understanding of the true compulsions, and motivations, underlying youth participation in civil conflict, which in turn will result in a more informed programming for child soldier rehabilitation and reintegration efforts. It is my assertion that a victimhood-innocence lens which presently underlies humanitarian accounts of child soldiering and much humanitarian response for them needs to be filtered through an agency-capabilities perspective by drawing on local narratives of recruitment, and the return experiences of child soldiers in disparate conflict contexts. I begin by invoking the conceptual debates surrounding the ‘child’ and ‘child soldier’ to elaborate nuances.

Reconceptualizing the child and child soldier There is an ongoing theoretical project within sociological discourses and international relations (IR) theory to re-evaluate construction of the ‘child’ and ‘childhood’ as concepts. In sociology, for instance, recent efforts to attach theory and reorient ‘childhood studies’ has witnessed the rise of a variety of approaches that critique both extant and emergent debates about children. In epistemological terms, this can be viewed as an attempt to deconstruct established notions of child and childhood within a culturally uniform and normatively universal paradigm. As a consequence, this theoretical overhaul is necessarily hermeneutic, inviting engagement and simultaneously forbidding closure. Four distinct pre-sociological models of the child exist – these are the ‘evil child’, the ‘innocent child’, the ‘naturally developing child’ and the ‘unconscious child’. Mediated by interrelated dichotomies pertaining to ‘structure and agency’, ‘identity and difference’, ‘continuity and change’ and ‘local and global’, these have come to be displaced by four sociological discourses on the ‘social-structural child’, ‘the socially constructed child’, ‘the minority group child’ and ‘the tribal child’ and best illustrate the transition from a pre-sociological genre to a sociological understanding of children (James and Prout, 1990; Rosen, 2005; Brocklehurst, 2006; Watson, 2006). In IR theory, children’s true power in the context of international politics, war, resistance and nation-building is relegated to anonymity because of the liminal spaces that children inhabit. This location at the fringes and in apolitical spheres has also relegated children’s contribution to parameters outside of military analysis. As a result there exists a categorical oversight of both the contemporary participation

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and historically substantial involvement of children in armed conflict. This creates an important power vacuum in the mainstream structuralist and state-dominated discourse on IR and provides the loci from which reorientation efforts are gaining momentum (Brocklehurst, 2006; Watson, 2006). The two competing approaches to children in armed conflict within IR and security studies literature is poised round the humanitarian and cultural relativist accounts of childhood. The more entrenched and normatively influential humanitarian discourse on children and armed conflict enunciates that although there are culturally specified notions of adulthood, the 18-year norm is the internationally accepted benchmark around which demarcation between children and adults has come to be consecrated in the language of law, and accepted as a global norm. This universal criterion is embodied in Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) (1989) that provides, ‘[f]or the purposes of the present Convention a child means every human being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’. Ontological roots of this humanitarian account implicitly or explicitly derive from the orthodox developmental models of childhood set forth by Piaget and his intellectual progeny. Positing that the transition from childhood to adulthood takes place in universal, naturally determined and fixed steps, developmental models are based on the belief that children are basically immature, incompetent and irrational. As children grow older, nature mediated by enculturation and socialization transforms the child into a competent, mature and rational adult. This has in turn spawned universalization of a predominantly Western conception of childhood which privileges innocence, vulnerability and decision-making incapacity of children (Piaget, 1999). Informed by a historically nuanced nationalist perspective, the cultural relativist school, on the other hand, argues that while children’s immaturity remains an undeniable biological fact, conceptualization of this immaturity along with the meanings attached to it is essentially a fact of culture (James and Prout, 1997, pp. 10–14). Hence the notion of childhood as a universal institution is widely challenged. Childhood for cultural relativists is essentially a social construction, its role as a heuristic device stems from the interpretive frame it offers for contextualizing the early years of human life. Ethnographic and empirical evidence from anthropology, sociology and cultural studies adds teeth to the critical endeavour of the cultural relativists, for them age categories like ‘child’, ‘youth’ and ‘adult’ are situationally defined and context specific, hence


any fixed legislative determination of age provides only a deceptive appearance of permanence, one that belies a constant social and political struggle over the cultural, legal and moral dimensions of childhood. Despite this interesting tug of war the preferred construction of children in IR continues to fall within the ‘innocence-victimhood’ and ‘vulnerability’ paradigm, one that projects the image of an ‘ideal child’, widely employed in propaganda and security discourse as an iconographic symbol of what is being ‘protected’. This provides the necessary backdrop to begin understanding complexities of the ‘kindered space’ in international politics (Watson, 2006) and opens up important avenues of investigation. Definitionally the concept of child soldier is mired in complexity given that while international law clearly defines who is a child, as well as a combatant, there is no category for someone who is both a child and a combatant. ‘Combatant’ under international law denotes someone ‘who: a) is not a (protected) civilian and b) has an unqualified right to directly participate in hostilities and whose participation is therefore lawful (Article 43, Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (1977)’ (Grover, 2008, p. 54). The term ‘child soldier’ can be quite distinct from that of ‘child combatant’. As the law stands, once a minor wields a weapon, he or she is considered a legitimate target (Fox, 2004, p. 15). Interestingly therefore the concept of child soldier or child combatant does not exist in international law. At a theoretical level too, the concept of child soldier presents a contradiction in terms. A ‘child’ is perceived as a young person in the transition between infancy and youth, with underlying connotations of immaturity, simplicity and absence of full physical, mental and emotional development. ‘Soldier’ generally refers to men and women who are skilled warriors (Kuper, 1997, p. 13; Rosen, 2005, p. 3). Another important issue which continues to be neglected today is the experiences of children who demobilize as adults. While the 18-year norm serves as an important threshold for demarcation it conflates experiences which are fluid and transcends age categories such as child, youth and adult. Given this broad canvas, a relatively expansive definition of children (or minors) associated with fighting forces (CAFF) has come to be adopted by the international community to avoid narrowing the field prematurely and relegating ancillary participation to anonymity (Rosen, 2005; Wessels, 2006). A child associated with an armed force or armed group refers to any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used

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by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys, and girls used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities. (Paris Principles, 2007, p. 7) Flowing from this definition, one of the central pillars of the contemporary discourse on child soldiering is the victim paradigm. All children, by virtue of incomplete development, are coerced into conflict, and this dictates that they be rescued, protected from adult manipulation and reintegrated in their families and communities. How realistic is this discourse? As the cases below drawing on empirical research highlight there are deviances from this received wisdom, which need to be centred and mainstreamed into the international community’s response to youth reintegration in post-conflict recovery. Clearly there is no one ‘childhood’ experience, besides do youth in Africa, Asia and South America have Western childhoods? What is in a name, a concept, that too, a transitory one at best? All children grow up, become adults. There is no cut-off point in nature, and to conceptually demarcate child soldiers as below 18 years is perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the present discourse. Children, young people and adults face similar situations in the context of war; children join or follow adults as aides, as labour, for food, for security much more than by force. Force exists; violence is an important source of establishing control over people, places and things. War is all about control of spaces and humans. Nevertheless, children are actors in this space, they navigate, they succumb and they respond. The other stereotype on child soldiers is that they are manipulated, numb, drugged agents and sent to fight. They kill, they maim, but they also cry and repent. This is not only traumatic – it is also a renegotiation of self, of identity, of how war changes a person’s life. For youth these are impressionable years and their coping strategies may or may not be greater than adults, but they are completely aware of these subjective experiences. Vulnerability of a young man is no less than a small boy; both fear death, both fear violence. Children succumb easily – perhaps, but what I think is more relevant in young people’s experiences of war is how quickly they bond, trust and gradually forgive their own captives. It is their willingness to embrace the worst as best possible under extreme difficulty which is the key to understanding agency issues of


why young people join. Safety, security and survival these three terms in my view should replace protection, release and care in the discourse on youth participation in civil conflict. Children are defined as vulnerable and victims lacking any concrete social, political agency, and similarly devoid of any significant moral, physical and mental competence, so all become clubbed as ‘victims’. But in a sense war victimizes everyone, some may choose to escape war, others choose to profit from it, few get embroiled without wanting to. There is hardly any clarity on how participation works. It’s a mix of circumstance, will and agency, as well as familial, socio-economic background. Coercion is only one possible mode of recruitment, but has been a dominant thread in studies on child soldiering. There are evidently competing and complementary models of childhood. In affluent Western societies, adolescence is usually a period of liminality, lack of responsibility and education. In that case, it makes certain sense to collapse younger children with adolescents in the single category of ‘children’, as the global humanitarian discourse does. However, elsewhere in the globe, adolescence can be a period of responsibility, and thus to conceptualize adolescents as vulnerable children in need of adult protection is to disregard the lived realities. As the first part of the volume has illustrated, there exists a rich diversity of participation narratives in the literature on children and armed conflict. In Nepal, Colombia and Guatemala, for instance, children who joined the guerrilla ranks had volunteered mainly to seek protection or to reunite with their family members, hence underlying reasons were survival, protection and food. There was an important element of foster care, apprenticeship training and wartime dependence on commanders in line with West Africa’s patrimonial set-up, where older and more powerful or ‘big’ men have traditionally provided routes for upward social mobility in exchange for loyalty and support from youth. Hence the range of compulsions and choices which animate the decision to enlist are far more complex and dependent on both individual decisions as it is mediated by actors and circumstances as well as pre-war personal characteristics. These make it difficult to rely on any stereotypical images of child soldiers as being facilitated by a set array of parameters, as victims, coerced and devoid of choice.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration efforts and child soldiers A review of the existing literature on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes and child soldiers reveals several

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broad themes. The systematic exclusion of child soldiers from DDR programming because of age, gender or function, the need for greater resource commitment on the part of international donors for successful execution and completion of DDR programmes and the need for better planning and inclusivity of programming are the prominent strands which find emphasis. Some studies underline the need to make DDR processes more gender-sensitive (Farr, 2003) and harp on the inadequate attention given to the needs of girl child soldiers in DDR processes. Emphasis on the disarmament aspect requiring the surrender of a weapon or explicit evidence of military life also excludes child soldiers including girls from DDR benefits since they are mainly engaged in support roles, are used for forced labour or sex, or simply do not possess a weapon at the time of DDR (Mazurana and McKay, 2001, p. 33; Fox, 2004, p. 473). While the need for trauma healing through Western-oriented counselling or traditional practices is widely acknowledged, self-demobilized children are often not provided psycho-social healing, although their need is as urgent as those who undergo formal demobilization (Verhey, 2001, pp. 15–18). In DDR design and programming for child soldiers several practices have now come to be filtered by drawing on previous experience and lessons learnt. So far DDR of child soldiers has focused on trauma healing, catering to educational needs, family tracing and reunification, short stay in interim care centres (ICCs) or with foster families, vocational training and small amounts of cash and in-kind reinsertion assistance paid to the family or host family to help ease the process of return. The thrust areas include preference for community based rather than targeted support, avoiding cash payments or demobilization funds, separation from adults in demobilization programmes, compulsive demobilization and reintegration attempts even in ongoing conflict situations, preventing re-recruitment and providing vocational training and livelihood skill support (Verhey, 2001). Several studies within the domain of psychology (Ayalon, 1998; Barenbaum, Ruchkin and SchwabStone, 2004) have studied the psychological impact of war and violence on children. These highlight the fact that the issue of child soldier DDR overlaps with diverse yet interconnected fields of psychology, sociology, political and security thinking. Both survey and ethnographic research have testified to the importance of family in reintegration success (Ayalon, 1998; USAID, 2000, 2006; Kostner et al., 2003; Verhey, 2003; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004b, 2006, 2007; Jareg, 2005; Utas, 2005b; Weinstein, 2005, 2007; Blattman et al., 2006; Boothby et al., 2006; Bragg, 2006; Porto et al., 2006; Pugel, 2006; Robertson and McCauley, 2006; Sanford,


2006; Wessels and Monteiro, 2006; CSUCS, 2008) for the broader excombatant group and more specifically with child soldiers. Recent international agency programming emphasizes centrality of the family and community, along with culture-specific social reintegration, as complementary to vocational training and indigenous healing and psychosocial rehabilitation. Agency approaches for youth revolve around three specific interventions, a human security-rights based preventive framework emphasizing a passive, vulnerable and innocent agent, with reintegration focus on psycho-social care, family reunification and educational supports adopted by the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and Save the Children (Kemper, 2005, p. 5). A more short-term response, rooted in an economic paradigm, and concerned with a return to stability, socio-economic reintegration, vocational training and catch-up education is advocated by the World Bank and the International Labour Organization (ILO) (Achio and Specht, 2003, pp. 153–156). Finally, the social–political approach is invoked by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) among others, which emphasizes reconciliation, and approaches the role of children and youth not as rational agents but as spoilers with the potential to destabilize and thwart peacebuilding processes (Kempner, 2005). Following from this, recent practice in DDR of child soldiers has shifted tangentially from economic to social and community based reintegration. Ongoing debates on the content of the community approach to reintegration suggest a mixed recipe which involves family reunification or other appropriate extended or foster family situation; social support, notably the role of community members in advising, mediating and facilitating reintegration. This is complemented by the opportunity to participate in civil life, including educational opportunity, for instance, reinsertion into formal schooling or, more likely, informal literacy or accelerated learning opportunities; livelihood opportunity – participating in the livelihood of their family facilitates a positive role and a path to the future for the child. Another key feature of social reintegration is the criticality of a permanent follow-up role of the child’s family, extended family and key community members (Save the Children, 2003; USAID, 2006; CCF, 2007). Community focused reintegration draws on several intersecting conceptual elements. The ecological approach (Dawes and Donald, 2000; Boothy et al., 2006) views development processes as mediated by micro-, meso- and macro-level transactions with agents such as family, peers, community groups and wider institutions (Wessels and Monteiro,

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2006, p. 309). The agency approach emphasizes capacities of youth as actors, the transitional nature of their situation, the importance for youth of defining identity and a place within society and the differences between rural and urban areas of developing countries (Erikson, 1950; Arnett, 2000; Wessels and Monteiro, 2006, p. 309). These approaches coalesce to offer the community approach which views the family and community as the specific site for developing youths’ capacities, and crafting a positive role and image. Countering these arguments, scholars aligned with the social disruption analysis of war school (Higson-Smith and Killian, 2000), however, argue that conflict destabilizes the social set-up, hence the ideal–typical pre-war community does not exist when ex-combatant, child soldiers return home (Wessels and Monteiro, 2006, pp. 309–310). While this is true, individual targeting of benefits for youth who had committed war crimes and atrocities against their own kith and kin is documented to have negative trade-offs (Verhey, 2003; Peters, 2005; Richards, 2005). It results in animosity, exclusion and labelling and often makes the process liable to corruption and cheating (Shepler, 2005). By contrast, a well-being framework (Ahearn, 2000) avoids pathologizing war-affected youth, and emphasizes the importance of resilience, and views community empowerment and collective action as a means of re-establishing people’s sense of control and ability to rebuild their lives. Thus these two elements, namely, the re-establishment of community and the strengthening of collective planning and action, by engaging youth in normal activities amidst public spaces has come to be mainstreamed into international agency programming for former child soldiers (Save the Children, 2003; USAID, 2006).

Identity, victimcy and survival: Navigating complex post-warscapes The argument developed throughout the case study chapters in Part III of this volume unpack nuances in the reintegration of child soldiers both with respect to context and programming specificities, representing a gradual development in both international and local efforts to deal with a traditionally neglected caseload. This in turn underlines that inclusion and exclusion are important themes in the reintegration of child soldiers. Identity issues, especially the juxtaposition of Western conceptions of childhood in culturally disparate contexts, highlight a critical weakness of the present discourse on child soldiers and definitional criteria used in deciding eligibility for targeted support as


part of DDR programmes. Zyck and Vermeij explore these themes in Afghanistan and Northern Uganda, respectively. Identity as they approach it is complex, both in availing reintegration support based on the child-adult demarcation, and also as a product of socialization processes within armed groups. Ritualistic initiation imbibes an identity of soldier which creates behavioural spaces removed from the norm, liberating children from adult control, parental supervision and in a perverted sense empowers them through use of violence in a revised trajectory of power and control. These complicate the return and reintegration processes by disempowering and undermining the value of youth’s role as important, and relegating it to being a mere aberration or deviance. The next theme in Part III is that of victimcy; focus on protection and enhanced vulnerability of children in a Western developmental childhood model also enables duplicity through use of this ‘victim’ card as an important token and label for absolving agency, responsibility and culpability in complicated post-war landscapes. The propagation of a Western model of childhood embedded in care, protection and innocence through the work of child protection and humanitarian agencies in post-war contexts has spawned a specific discourse on victimcy, whereby child soldiers adopt a specific image of being ‘victim’ aligned with the global policy discourse to benefit from reintegration support, absolving them of culpability and agency in tactical ways. ‘Victimcy [is] a form of self-representation by which a certain form of tactic agency is effectively exercised under the trying, uncertain, and disempowering circumstances that confront actors in warscapes’ (Utas, 2005a, p. 403). This in turn has negative consequences on social dynamics at local community levels by rendering child soldiers as privileged recipients of humanitarian aid in the context of extreme incapacity and want. These issues are examined by Utas and Denov in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone, they highlight two ends of the story. Utas focuses on how recruitment narratives are coloured through victim images to create the rationale for support. Denov elaborates further on this agency element by investigating how child soldiers in the post-war period re-establish lives and livelihoods traversing between the victim and agency mode. The main reflection here is that navigating evolving spaces of post-war landscapes involves an element of manipulation and agency on the part of child soldiers themselves which is overlooked in international donor support and nongovernmental organization (NGO) programming. The final theme here pertains to survival, especially to issues of resilience and coping in the context of weak reintegration support. A less understood dimension here pertains to identifying the structures,

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agents, institutions and social relationshi ps which can facilitate successful or positive reintegration in the absence of targeted programmes for child soldiers. Boothby and McMullin deal with the cases of Mozambique and Angola, respectively. Using data from a longitudinal study of a small group of 40 former child soldiers, Boothby’s results indicate various factors which help in reintegrating into civilian live, and use life outcome indicators to inform practice on identifying variables that aid return in the absence of formal support. These include positive reception by family and community; personal characteristics of marriage, children and employment together with ritualistic cleansing which helped restore estranged relationships due to conflict related displacement and destruction. McMullin examines policy level responses to child soldiering in Angola, identifying overarching political factors for exclusion and how this impacted on child soldier reintegration by presenting a comprehensive review of policy assessments of the programme and process.

Conclusions Drawing from the case studies in Part III, it can be concluded that child soldiering theory today is situated in an extant discourse highlighting three key themes – need for protection, vulnerability and victimhood; this in turn leverages the forced recruitment logic and lack of agency of youth combatants. Empirical evidence however suggests that children have historically been intrinsic to warscapes; there is nothing new or abhorrent about child soldiering. Child soldiering is always a choice, for some it’s an optimal choice amidst structural compulsions, for others it’s an exercise in tactical agency and a tool of survival. This theme needs to be mainstreamed into humanitarian understanding of the phenomenon of children and youth involvement in armed conflict. Everything has hierarchy – power itself is hierarchal, by rendering child soldiers as victims, coerced and vulnerable, we are disempowering youth and remarginalizing them. At present there exists a disjunct between macro and micro levels in the theory on child soldiering, between the global policy discourse and academic discourse supported by in-depth in situ empirical work. Contemporary policy and popular narratives on child soldiering appear to be polarized between capabilities/agency and the incapacity/vulnerability dichotomy. Even terminologies such as ‘child soldier’ have come to connote a specific discursive content and pejorative connotation which needs to be balanced with more nuanced and


contextualized perspectives. No longer can children be approached from a simplistic protectionist and vulnerability lens. Fieldwork with child soldiers as represented in the case-specific evidence in Part III complements a growing body of ethnographic evidence (Hoffman, 2003; Shepler, 2004; Utas, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Richards, 2005; Bøås and Hatloy, 2007; Jennings, 2007, 2008c; Peters, 2007; Stovel, 2008) that strongly support the agency elements of children’s decision to participate in an armed faction. Repeatedly evident is the ways in which issues of tactical agency impinge and combine to provide a distinctive template of ability, action and strategic choice both prior to recruitment, during conflict and in post-war landscapes. Thus contemporary theory and global policy rhetoric on child soldiering needs to renegotiate with these lived realities, and engage in a vibrant conversation with the local. The present model of childhood in the global policy discourse is flawed, is not universal and is only one version of childhood, it needs revision, it needs to be critical of itself.

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Sukanya Podder 155 Rosen, D. M. (2005), Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism (New Jersey: The Rutgers Series in Childhood Studies). Sanford, V. (2006), The Moral Imagination of Survival: Displacement and Child Soldiers in Guatemala and Colombia, in S. McEvoy-Levy ed. Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post Accord Peacebuilding (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame), pp. 49–80. Save the Children (2003), When Children Affected by War Go Home: Lessons Learned from Liberia. Summary of Findings. UK. Online. Available at http://www.essex.ac. uk/armedcon/story_id/000169.pdf (accessed 10 March 2008). Shepler S. (2004). The Social and Cultural Context of Child Soldiering in Sierra Leone. Paper presented at the Techniques of Violence in Civil War workshop. Oslo: PRIO (20–21 August). Online. Available at http://www.prio.no/ cscw/pdf/micro/techniqes/shepler%20child%20soldiers.pdf (accessed 1 February 2008). Shepler S. (2005), ‘The Rites of the Child: Global Discourses of Youth and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone’, Journal of Human Rights, 4, 197–211. Stovel, L. (2008), ‘There’s no bad bush to throw away a bad child: traditioninspired reintegration in post-war Sierra Leone’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 46 (2), 305–324. United Nations. (2007), Paris Principles. Online. Available at http://www.un.org/ children/.../parisprinciples/ParisPrinciples_EN.pdf (accessed 10 January 2010). USAID (2000), Roundtable Report: Community-Based Reintegration and Rehabilitation in Post-Conflict Settings. Office of Transition Initiatives and UNDP/Emergency Response Division. Online. Available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/transition_initiatives/pubs.html (accessed 10 July 2009). USAID (2006), Community Focused Reintegration. Online. Available at http:// www.pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF305.pdf (accessed 9 July 2008). Utas, M. (2003), Sweet Battlefields. Youth and the Liberian Civil War (Uppsala: Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, Uppsala University). Utas, M. (2004), Fluid Research Fields: Studying Ex-combatant Youth in the Aftermath of the Liberian Civil War, in J. Boyden and J. de Berry eds. Children and Youth on the Front Line: Ethnography, Armed Conflict and Displacement (London: Berghahn), pp. 209–236. Utas, M. (2005a), ‘Victimcy, girlfriending, soldiering: tactic agency in a young woman’s social navigation of the Liberian war zone,’ Anthropological Quarterly, 78 (2), 403–430. Utas, M. (2005b), Building a future? The reintegration and re-marginalisation of youth in Liberia, in P. Richards ed. No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (London and Ohio: James Currey and Ohio University Press), pp. 137–154. Verhey, B. (2001), Child Soldier: Prevention, Demobilisation and Reintegration (November). Africa Region Working Paper 23. Online. Available at http://www. worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp23.pdf (accessed 19 July 2008). Verhey, B. (2003), Going Home: Demobilising and Reintegrating Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (London: Save the Children UK). Watson, A. M. S. (2006), ‘Children and international relations: a new site of knowledge?’ Review of International Studies, 32, 237–250.

156 Neither Child nor Soldier Weinstein, J. M. (2005), ‘Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (4), 598–624. Weinstein, J. M. (2007), Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press). Wessels, M. G. (2006), Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press). Wessels, M. G. and Monteiro, C. (2006), ‘Psychosocial assistance for Youth: toward reconstruction for peace in Angola,’ Journal of Social Issues, 62 (1), 121–139.

Identity


9 ‘But I’m a Man’: The Imposition of Childhood on and Denial of Identity and Economic Opportunity to Afghanistan’s Child Soldiers Steven A. Zyck

Introduction No one wears a winter coat in July, not in Helmand, thought the Afghan National Police (ANP) officer manning his post on the outskirts of Laskhar Gar, the provincial capital, as a 13-year-old boy approached him. The heavily cloaked child – preparing to detonate the ball bearingstudded explosives strapped beneath his coat – smiled at the officer. The officer ordered for the boy to halt. Unheeded, the youth continued towards the officer, who opened fire. The wounded, teenage would-be suicide bomber, however, was yet to complete his mission. His brother, all of eight years old, who had watched these events unfold from only a few yards away, pressed the failsafe switch as he had been taught and detonated the bomb strapped to his slain brother’s chest. Stories such as this, which was reported with a surprising level of detail in Britain’s Telegraph newspaper (Rayment, 2008), have shocked the international community. For humanitarian aid workers and child protection advocates, they represent a troubling and internationally outlawed practice of utilizing children in combat. The bomb-wearing boy and his trigger-squeezing brother are victims of a human rights abuse which many have waged a decades-long campaign to prevent. For security professionals, the international and Afghan militaries and police forces, they are a growing threat and a reminder of the need for vigilance as well as the prospect of previously unthinkable acts of selfdefence (Roggio, 2008). Both, however, agree that means must be found 159

160 ‘But I’m a Man’

to tackle this emerging trend both by dissuading the use of child soldiers and by successfully reintegrating them into society at war’s end.

Child soldiering in Afghanistan: A brief history While child suicide bombers, like suicide bombers in general, are a relatively recent phenomenon in Afghanistan, the country has long been home to child soldiers (see Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2004, 2008). They have been involved within the string of conflicts in that country over the course of the past three decades. First, as Soviet forces intervened in 1979 in support of a fledgling, Afghan communist movement, child soldiers emerged both to support and, in particular, to oppose them. The mujahideen, Afghanistan’s valorized, anti-Soviet resistance, sought all resources at its disposal to fight off its technologically superior foe. As Chrobok (2005, p. 16) describes, [a]ll across the country, local [mujahideen] commanders ‘drafted’ one young man from each household or family for military training to provide an agreed quota of fighters to the provincial commanders. Those families who were not able to present a young recruit had to face serious repercussions and were charged with sanctions in form of a monetary tax. This form of child combatant recruitment challenged simplistic divisions between voluntary and involuntary recruitment. Child soldiers were in many respect forcibly recruited, though families often celebrated their sons’ participation in what came to be viewed as a historic and ultimately successful campaign to expel occupying Soviet forces. Few wished to see their children fight or work as porters, scouts, spies or cooks within armed groups, though doing so was often considered a sign of honour in a country in which honour is ‘the rock upon which social status rests’ (Dupree, 2002, p. 978). The use of child soldiers was to continue and evolve following the victory of the mujahideen in 1989, when their campaign of asymmetrical warfare impelled the departure of the Soviets and the disintegration of their Afghan communist collaborators over the ensuing three years (Dorronsoro, 2005). The launch of a veritable civil war in Afghanistan from 1992 to 1996 included the continued use of child soldiers, though little corroboration is available. Indeed, data paucity poses a challenge for those attempting to study child soldiers within Afghanistan. Beyond the insecurity and limited access available to the international

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community and researchers over the previous decades, many Afghans are uncertain as to their precise date of birth and when they ‘officially’ began their involvement with armed groups. While individual combatants may think little of noting that they began their fighting careers when below the age of 18, higher-level commanders, aware of international conventions and sensibilities, have increasingly tended to deny the use of child soldiers. What is clear, however, is that the situation of child soldiers did not dissipate following the mujahideen’s victory against Soviet and communist forces. For many families, participation in the mujahideen had become a way of life which, like any skilled trade or valorized identity, was passed from father to sons, oftentimes at a very young age (Table 9.1). As Table 9.1 indicates, approximately half of combatants in Afghanistan may have begun their fighting careers as child soldiers, having been recruited below the age of 18 or even 16 years. The international advocacy group Human Rights Watch (HRW) claims that up to 30 per cent of Afghans had served as child soldiers (Becker, 2004). My own research (Zyck, 2006), which included a survey of 864 demobilized adult combatants in 2006, also showed that the mobilization of combatants as children was not uncommon though indicated lower rates of child soldiering. For instance, 19.0 per cent of survey respondents noted having joined an armed group below the age of 18, and only 9.8 per cent indicated that they were lower than 16 at the time

Table 9.1 Age of recruitment into Mujahideen group in Afghanistan Province or Region Ghor

Paktia

Kandahar

Northeast

Jalalabad

Hazarajat

Mean age of recruitment

18.8

18

18

17.1

17

19.2

% recruited under age of 18 years

47

40

49

59

55

43

% recruited under age of 16 years

30

30

37

49

38

35

Note: The total sample size for the figures provided is 237. Source: Bhatia and Muggah (2009), p. 144.


of becoming a mujahid (Zyck, 2006). As in all debates regarding child soldiers within Afghanistan, such figures should be accepted with caution not only given the aforementioned data limitations but also given the likelihood that an Afghan youth may have participated in combat – whether by fighting or by supporting combat operations – before formally considering oneself to have become a combatant, soldier or mujahideen. Regardless of which figures one accepts, child soldiering was far from uncommon in Afghanistan. The phenomenon of child soldiers in Afghanistan perhaps achieved its peak upon the emergence of the Taliban movement. The Taliban’s initial membership and recruitment focused upon Islamic schools, or madrassas in western Pakistan which had developed to serve that region’s estimated 3.5 to seven million Afghan refugees (Kronenfeld, 2008). The Taliban’s recruitment from schools, which they themselves had established and operated, suggests their intent not only to use child soldiers but to systematically cultivate them. Child soldiering among the Taliban was widely noted, despite formal statements by the group’s leadership to the contrary. Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s founder and leader, decreed in 1998 that boys unable to grow a beard were forbidden from fighting alongside the Taliban. However, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) reported one year later that between 2000 and 5000 Afghan youth were regularly being transported from their schools in Pakistan to join Taliban offensives (Singer, 2004, p. 571). As Singer (2005, p. 26) notes, ‘Taliban recruitment of children tended to be cyclical, coinciding with school holidays and major offensives or defeats . . . These “temporary” child soldiers would then return to school after one or two months of fighting experience.’ The short-term or seasonal mobilization of fighters within Afghanistan was common among child as well as adult soldiers and reflected the limitations posed by Afghanistan’s harsh winters, in which combat was rarely conducted amidst fluctuating rhythms of its agricultural cycle (Zyck, 2009). More recently, in the near decade following the US-led intervention in late 2001, Afghanistan’s so-called ‘winter lull’ in fighting has begun to disappear, as the Taliban-led insurgency gains momentum (Barakat et al., 2009; Barakat and Zyck, 2010). Fighting continues year-round and, as before, continues to include child soldiers. The first American soldier killed in Afghanistan was felled by a child sniper (Singer, 2004, p. 561; Sullivan, 2008). Boys as young as six years old have been used as suicide bombers. In one now well-known case, a would-be child suicide bomber was prevented from completing his mission only after asking a nearby police officer to remind him how to detonate the explosives strapped

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to his body (IRIN, 2007; Morin, 2007; Owens, 2008). Despite the evocative nature of such incidents, the greatest controversy surrounding child soldiers did not focus upon the Taliban but upon those armed groups, commonly referred to as the Northern Alliance or United Front, which aided the United States and its Coalition partners in routing the Taliban in late 2001 and early 2002.

Demobilizing and reintegrating Afghanistan’s child soldiers The international engagement which followed the post-9/11, US-led intervention into Afghanistan brought renewed focus upon the plight of child soldiers. The introduction of ‘child soldier’ discourses and programming into Afghanistan, however, clashed with a unique cultural environment in which the very definition of ‘childhood’ was virulently contested. Two core issues soon emerged: first, how to define and measure child soldiers within Afghanistan and, second, how best to assist their reintegration into civilian life. Defining and counting child soldiers in Afghanistan To understand the debate which surrounded assistance for child soldiers, one must appreciate the culturally and contextually situated line between childhood and adulthood within Afghanistan. Afghan children and adolescents from at least the age of 12 are expected to serve as breadwinners and are considered to be eligible for marriage (Poulton, 2003). Under such circumstances, many in Afghanistan questioned international norms under the Cape Town Principles (1997) which defined child soldiers as individuals below the age of 18 years who are affiliated with armed groups. Should, under such circumstances, a definition of adulthood rooted in Western notions of extended childhoods and even more protracted periods of adolescence apply? In addressing this question, Dupree (cited in Chrobok, 2005, p. 21) writes that ‘the young Afghan boy from 10–12 (or even younger) moves directly into an adult world. Adolescence is primarily a function of a literate, pluralistic society, which can afford to waste half a man’s life in socialisation.’ The notion of childhood and adolescence within Western and non-Western societies has long been a subject of psychological, sociological and anthropological inquiry, particularly in light of the globalization and merging of cultural norms (Arnett and Taber, 1994; Arnett, 1999, 2002). Such debates proved far more than academic given the institutional bifurcation of responsibility for child soldiers between the United


Nations Development Programne’s (UNDP) ad hoc subentity responsible for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), known as Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), and the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). As ANBP began developing its demobilization and reintegration methodology in 2003, the issue of those combatants under the age of 18 years emerged as a source of contention. ANBP and UNICEF agreed to a division of labour whereby the former would oversee the demobilization of all combatants yet reintegrate only the adults, with child soldiers being handed over to UNICEF for distinctive reintegration support. This agreement, however, proved short-lived once it came to counting the number of child soldiers qualifying for assistance within the scope of the DDR process. While ANBP had estimated that fewer than 1 per cent of to-be-demobilized combatants were children – which would amount to no more than 1000–2000 children being included within the UNICEF reintegration programme – a rapid assessment conducted by UNICEF generated an estimate of 8010 (Chrobok, 2005). The methodology employed by UNICEF ‘included field visits in randomly selected communities in 26 out of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces and meetings with provincial government authorities and commanders’ (UNICEF, 2003; Chrobok, 2005, p. 26). Individuals within ANBP and in other segments of the international community raised concerns regarding the unscientific methodology adopted by UNICEF. Of particular concern was the inclusion of recently recruited child soldiers and children affiliated with armed groups in non-combat roles within UNICEF’s assessment. An inter-agency disagreement over this issue revolved around the accusation that UNICEF had attempted to inflate the number of child soldiers to access funding and expand its programmatic area of responsibility. Yet others viewed UNICEF’s estimates not in terms of opportunism but as a reflection of, first, UNICEF’s desire to use the DDR process as a means of aiding as many children as possible and, second, international norms and standards which count all individuals affiliated with armed groups as qualifying for demobilization and reintegration assistance (UNDPKO, 2006, p. 2). Tensions flared to the point where Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Afghanistan, intervened and fully cut the cord between ANBP and UNICEF’s child-centred demobilization and reintegration programme. Under this arrangement, UNICEF, with autonomous responsibility for aiding child soldiers, was able to proceed with its estimate of 8010 child soldiers.

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Assisting Afghanistan’s child soldiers The debate over the number of child soldiers within Afghanistan was not, however, purely a matter of inter-agency jockeying. It also reflected an underlying disagreement over the relative appropriateness of the ANBP and UNICEF models of reintegration, with concerns being voiced that the needs of child soldiers were largely, if not completely, the same as those of combatants aged 18 years and older. Familiar with UNICEF’s child soldier reintegration method from previous experience in other war-torn contexts, ANBP as well as a select number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) grew concerned that UNICEF’s responsibility for a large former combatant caseload might result in a primarily social rather than economic approach which was deemed, by some, as less appropriate for the Afghan context. The IRC, most notably, declined an invitation from UNICEF to become involved in its child soldier reintegration programme, citing the widely held belief that child soldiers’ conditions and needs varied little from that of their adult counterparts (Chrobok, 2005). Still others bristled at the thought of aiding child soldiers without being able to assist the larger and, in many respects, similarly vulnerable children who had not been affiliated with armed groups. UNICEF, through implementing partners such as the Christian Children’s Fund (or Child Fund Afghanistan, as it is known locally), Save the Children-Sweden, Solidarité Afghanistan Belgium (SAB), the Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA), Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Intersos, pursued a multifaceted demobilization and reintegration process with US$5.3 million in funds contributed by the United States, Japan and Germany, among others from 2004 to 2007 (Striuli and Termentini, 2008, p. 7). This process started with an initial verification and datacollection phase. Local Demobilization and Reintegration Committees (LDRCs) identified potential programme beneficiaries and assessed the validity of names submitted to UNICEF by commanders. Following additional corroboration by Mobile Demobilization Documentation Teams (MDDTs), child soldiers were notified when and where to assemble for demobilization (USDOL, 2009, p. 28). At particular demobilization sites, child soldiers were provided with information regarding reintegration assistance, underwent a physical examination and were offered voluntary testing for sexually acquired infections (Chrobok, 2005, pp. 33–34). After this brief event, a community-based ceremony was organized for each child soldier in which he or she was provided with information on drug abuse, civil responsibilities, hygiene and HIV/AIDS before signing


a code of conduct in front of a local village council, or shura (Chrobok, 2005, pp. 33–34). Following demobilization, reintegration assistance for child soldiers revolved primarily around ‘software’ such as basic education, vocational training, drug abuse prevention and mine risk education (UNICEF, 2004). Training activities, which were provided for one year, revolved around either trades such as carpentry and tailoring or, given the largely rural context of Afghanistan, agriculture (WFP, 2006). In addition, child soldiers were offered optional athletics programmes as well as artistic opportunities to facilitate their psychosocial recovery and social integration (Chrobok, 2005, p. 36). Despite UNICEF’s earlier emphasis on the unique nature of challenges faced by child soldiers, UNICEF’s reintegration programme expanded to incorporate youths who had not participated in combat. For instance house holds headed by children, returnee children, out-of-school children and youth engaged in labour were included (Chrobok, 2005, p. 32). Doing so is not uncommon given the need to utilize reintegration as an opportunity to build connections between former child soldiers and their non-soldiering peers (Nübler, 1997). However, the methodology through which other ‘war-affected’ youth were identified, like the previous estimation of child soldiers themselves, proved controversial. As Chrobok (2005, p. 32) notes, ‘the (estimated) numbers of underage soldiers in different target provinces were simply doubled to account for war-affected youth’ in a process which ultimately appeared rather arbitrary to many observers. Not all ‘war-affected’ youth were included in a particular village, and even additional child soldiers encountered by UNICEF’s partners during implementation of the programme were excluded by UNICEF to the frustration of at least Child Fund Afghanistan, Save the Children-Sweden and the United Methodist Committee on Relief (Chrobok, 2005, p. 59). The inclusion of ‘war-affected’ children increased the total number of programme beneficiaries, though the number of child soldiers aided by UNICEF ultimately fell short of the initial estimate of 8010. As of June 2007, the most recent date for which data are publicly available, 5042 underage combatants had received assistance alongside 7548 other ‘war-affected’ youth (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008, p. 41). The adult DDR process run by ANBP included an overlapping process of verification which was similarly followed by mobile disarmament and centralized briefings on reintegration options. While adult combatants did not have access to community reintegration ceremonies, counselling or other psychosocial activities (arts and athletics, among others) on

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par with child soldiers, they were offered a more robust array of livelihood options (Sedra, 2003). Former combatants over the age of 18 years received, initially, demobilization payments of US$200 as well as a brief period of training, generally two to three days, related to the livelihood option which they had selected: agriculture, small business assistance, vocational or on-the-job (OTJ) training, or specialized programmes to aid combatants in becoming teachers or de-miners (CMI, 2006; see Table 9.2). ANBP’s reintegration process included a per-beneficiary level of assistance of US$700, which was provided either in the form of in-kind materials for small businesses or farms or as training fees, living stipends and ‘toolkits’ for individuals undergoing vocational or OTJ training (Zyck, 2006, 2009). For instance, individuals engaged in agriculture commonly received high-quality seeds and fertilizers, while an individual undergoing OTJ training on metalworking might receive a portable generator to enable him to become a welder following his apprenticeship. Here the difference between the two options comes into relief. While child soldiers received economically relevant training, their assistance packages were not accompanied by materials of seed capital for livelihoods. While the US$700 in stipends and in-kind assistance (e.g., fertilizer, generators, freezers, stocks for shops and so on) provided via ANBP was usually insufficient to start a small enterprise or revitalize a farm in many parts of Afghanistan, this amount – which nonetheless was more than twice the country’s per capita Gross National Income (UNDATA, 2009) – helped to significantly defray the capital investments required. As Chrobok (2005, p. 56) notes, ‘the main difference between reintegration options for youth and adults seems to be the superior benefits included in the adult reintegration packages, which would have also been highly beneficial for soldiers below the age of 18’.

Table 9.2 Adult reintegration options via ANBP and level of uptake Reintegration Option Agriculture Small business Vocational/OTJ training De-mining training Teacher training Source: Zyck (2009), p. 119.

% Selecting 42.90 25.54 21.03 1.51 0.67


My own research highlights that, in addition to material assistance, adult combatants were often linked with microcredit schemes which were not available via UNICEF’s child soldier reintegration programme (Zyck, 2006, 2009). While it may not be possible to accurately quantify the value of educational and psychosocial support provided to child soldiers in Afghanistan, it appears that, relative to their adult peers, they were deprived of a substantial level of material resources by virtue of being classified as children. With the widely accepted need for former child soldiers to serve as breadwinners and to, in essence, face the same challenges which exist for adult combatants, one might rightly wonder whether the label of child soldier should apply and, in particular, whether it should have been accompanied by material or financial resources. Indeed, while further research into the impact of UNICEF’s child-oriented demobilization and reintegration programme is necessary, it seems at least plausible that child soldiers may have finished their one-year rounds of assistance with a mindset incongruous with their families’ and communities’ expectations. For example, the following was noted of child soldiers by a Belgian aid worker working with a UNICEF implementing partner (Mitani, 2004): When they arrived here six months ago, many were sad and even depressed. They worried constantly about the money for their families . . . Now, they enjoy playing volleyball, catching up with their education, learning some marketable skills . . . They learn gradually how to relate to other children and adults in daily life, not in the context of making money. While perhaps innocuous, the sort of social integration implied within this statement appears somewhat at odds with the cultural and economic realities of Afghanistan. What, if any, psychosocial reintegration or readjustment is necessary when transitioning from a programme such as UNICEF’s which emphasizes holistic well-being, artistic expression, athletics, education and some vocational training to a family or community which values and demands obedience, labour and primarily economic notions of well-being? Have child soldiers in Afghanistan been acclimatized to a childhood identity which they would soon be asked to abandon when faced with the economic realities of Afghan adulthood? One might be well-advised to consider that assistance programmes for former combatants as well as for refugees and others are intended to integrate their beneficiaries into the societies and economies which exist rather than into those which Western agencies wished existed.

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Conclusion: Decoupling international standards and programming The situation of child soldier reintegration in Afghanistan raises questions regarding both the imposition of identity and, perhaps more importantly, the uneasy coupling of ‘childhood’ with predetermined programmatic responses. It remains apparent that, despite the fluidity and culturally situated nature of childhood, adolescence and adulthood, international standards and conventions must be applied consistently. To undermine or successfully challenge the legal designation of child soldiers would be to contravene a body of international law which is beneficial in preventing human rights abuses and, potentially, safeguarding children from those who wish to use them as tools of war. However, the international legal designation of childhood does not necessarily require the imposition of such an identity in the course of child soldier reintegration programming. In other words, how one views child soldiers for legal purposes and how one assists them need not correlate to the degree presumed by, for instance, UNICEF in Afghanistan. Decoupling international standards and programming would have allowed child soldiers to have been recognized as a distinct population under international law without separating them from the bulk of adult combatants in the country or from the ‘core’ DDR programme run by ANBP. In practical terms, enabling child soldiers to be treated much in the same way as adult combatants would have allowed them to remain in some ways more stable in terms of identity and self-perception by ensuring that the message and expectations communicated to them by the international community during the DDR process matched those already present within their own families and communities. To ensure that the most useful, distinct elements of the child soldier reintegration process in Afghanistan, particularly medical and psychosocial care, were not fully lost, ANBP may conversely have considered more fully integrating some such activities within all aspects of the adult DDR programme. Indeed, research (Zyck, 2006, 2009) has demonstrated the emotional vulnerabilities and suicidal thoughts prevalent among adult combatants in Afghanistan and, hence, the benefits of selected psychosocial strategies which were only provided for child soldiers. Indeed, the differential approaches adopted for child and adult combatants perhaps have as many implications for adult combatants, who were perceived as economically focused and immune from psychological or social stressors, as for children, whose economic roles were underappreciated. In Afghanistan and presumably beyond, approaches


to child and adult soldier reintegration may require greater rationalization and integration based on the reconceptualization of childhood and adulthood within international discourses surrounding DDR. Democratizing reintegration options for child soldiers Perhaps more effective than any reconceptualization, however, would be the democratization of DDR. As in many sectors of intervention, the international community’s thinking regarding former combatant demobilization and reintegration has far too frequently focused upon prescriptive, universal solutions to locally situated challenges. In some respects, a relief mentality whereby needs are urgent and presumed (that is, for life-saving medical care or food) by international organizations has bled into ‘early recovery’ and post-conflict transitions (Barakat and Zyck, 2009). The participation of beneficiary populations in identifying needs and outlining expectations for international assistance, as one might expect more fully in a development intervention, is hence rarer than one might otherwise hope. In the case of DDR, particularly in Afghanistan, where the process was launched between two and three years following the onset of the international intervention, time for beneficiary-led planning processes would certainly seemed to have existed (Zyck, 2009). Needs assessment may have been conducted and could have focused more upon identifying beneficiaries’ needs and expectations rather than merely counting their numbers. Doing so could have perhaps identified the economic and material needs and desires of child soldiers and their families (as well as the psychosocial needs of adult combatants). Finally, advanced, beneficiary-directed planning may have helped to overcome the sorts of organizational disputes between UNICEF and ANBP which ultimately served the programmatic desires and financial interests of the international agencies involved more than the aspirations of those they were instituted to serve.

References Arnett, J. J. (1999) ‘Adolescent storm and stress, reconsidered’, American Psychologist, 54 (5), 317–326. Arnett, J. J. (2002) ‘The psychology of globalisation’, American Psychologist, 57 (10), 774–783. Arnett, J. J. and Taber, S. (1994) ‘Adolescence terminable and interminable: When does adolescence end?’, Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 23 (5), 517–537. Barakat, S. and Zyck, S. A. (2009) ‘The evolution of post-conflict recovery’, Third World Quarterly, 30 (6), 1069–1086.

Steven A. Zyck 171 Barakat, S. and Zyck, S. A. (2010) ‘Afghanistan’s insurgency and the viability of a political solution’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33 (3), 193–210. Barakat, S. et al. (2008) A Strategic Conflict Assessment of Afghanistan (London: Department for International Development). Becker, J. (2004) Children as Weapons of War (New York: Human Rights Watch). Bhatia, M. V. and Muggah, R. (2009) ‘The Politics of Demobilisation in Afghanistan’ in R. Muggah (ed.) Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War (London: Routledge), 126164. Cape Town Principles (1997) Cape Town Principles and Best Practices (New York and Cape Town: UNICEF). Chrobok, V. (2005) Demobilising and Reintegrating Afghanistan’s Young Soldiers: A Review and Assessment of Program Planning and Implementation (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion). CMI (2006) Partnership for Peace: Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Program (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute). Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2004) Child Soldiers Global Report 2004 (London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2008) Child Soldiers Global Report 2008 (London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). Dorronsoro, G. (2005) Revolution Unending – Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present (New York: Columbia University Press). Dupree, N. H. (2002) ‘Cultural heritage and national identity in Afghanistan’, Third World Quarterly, 23 (5), 977–989. Giustozzi, A. (2007) Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press). IRIN (2007) Afghanistan: Child soldiers operating on several fronts, http://www. irinnews.org/report.aspx? ReportID=75904, date accessed 20 April 2009. Kronenfeld, D. A. (2008) ‘Afghan refugees in Pakistan: not all refugees, not always in Pakistan, not necessarily Afghan?’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 21 (1), 43–63. Mitani, J. (2004) ‘Real Lives: Afghanistan’s former child soldiers are eager to embrace the future’, United Nations Children’s Fund, http://www.unicef.org (home page), date accessed 10 June 2006. Morin, M. (2007) ‘Taliban recruiting Afghan children for suicide bombings’, Stars and Stripes, 27 June, http://www.stripes.com (home page), date accessed 10 June 2006. Nübler, I. (1997) Human Resources Development and Utilization in Demobilization and Reintegration Programs (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion). Owens, N. (2008) ‘Child soldiers trained by the Taliban to kill British soldiers’, Mirror, 2 August. Poulton, R. E. (2003) ‘Honour, guns and Jihad – improving childhood and communications in Afghanistan would promote peace’, Conflict, Security and Development, 3 (3), 407–416. Rayment, S. (2008) ‘Child suicide bomber threat to British troops’, Telegraph, 13 December. Roggio, B. (2008) ‘Taliban rebuild children’s suicide camp in South Waziristam’, Long War Journal, 6 October. Sedra, M. (2003) ‘New Beginning or Return to Arms? The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Process in Afghanistan’, discussion paper for

172 ‘But I’m a Man’ the ZEF-LSE workshop on State Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan, Bonn, 30 May. Singer, P. W. (2004) ‘Talk is cheap: getting serious about preventing child soldiers’, Cornell International Journal of Law, 37, 561–586. Singer, P. W. (2005) Children at War (New York: Pantheon). Stohl, R. (2001) Children on the Front Line: Child Soldiers in Afghanistan, http:// www.cdi.org, date accessed 17 June 2006. Striuli, L. and Termentini, F. (2008) Afghanistan: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (Rome: Analisi e Ricerche Geopolitiche sull’Oriente). Sullivan, J. P. (2008) ‘Child soldiers: despair, barbarisation, and conflict’, Air and Space Power Journal, 20 March.online at http://www.airpower.au.af. mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2008/1tri08/sullivaneng, date accessed 12 December 2010. UNDATA (2009) Country Profile: Afghanistan, http://data.un.org, date accessed 20 March 2010. UNDPKO (2006) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) 1.20 Glossary: Terms and Definitions (New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations). UNICEF (2003) Rapid Assessment on the Situation of Child Soldiers in Afghanistan (New York: United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund). UNICEF (2004) Education Afghanistan’s former child soldiers, http://www.unicef. org.uk, date accessed 10 June 2006. USDOL (2009) Faces of Change, Second Edition (Washington, DC: United States Department of Labor). WFP (2006) ‘Saving former child soldiers from Afghan terror groups’, http://www. wfp.org, date accessed 10 January 2010. Zyck, S. A. (2006) An Evaluation of the Social Impact of IOM’s Reintegration Assistance for Former Combatants in Afghanistan (Kabul and Geneva: International Organisation for Migration). Zyck, S. A. (2009) ‘Former combatant reintegration and fragmentation in contemporary Afghanistan’, Conflict, Security and Development, 9 (1), 111–131.

10 Socialization and Reintegration Challenges: A Case Study of the Lord’s Resistance Army Lotte Vermeij

Introduction What challenges do former child soldiers face when reintegrating in their societies? And what disrupts their attempts to readapt to civilian life? The answers to these questions appear to be a complex mixture of variables. Recent empirical research on reintegration of former child soldiers (Machel, 2001; Wessells, 2004, 2006; Borzello, 2007; Blattman and Annan, 2008; Dunson, 2008; Eichsteadt, 2009) provides only incomplete insights into the true underpinnings of successful return. Many of these children still face severe problems when it comes to their reintegration (Wessells, 2004; Borzello, 2007; Vermeij, 2009). In this chapter I argue that many of these problems arise due to socialization processes within rebel groups. More specifically, this chapter will highlight how socialization processes within the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) challenge the reintegration of child soldiers. During 3 months of field research in Northern Uganda I conducted 65 interviews with former child soldiers and commanders from the LRA in Uganda. The respondents, of which 34 males and 31 females were accessed through the War Affected Children Association (WACA) in Gulu, and the interviews consisted of 12 open questions. Based on this field research, this chapter will reveal that socialization within the LRA jeopardizes the reintegration of its child soldiers. It will illustrate the large extent to which socialization within the LRA remains an influence in the life of many former child soldiers after they have returned from the bush. 173

174 Reintegration Challenges as a Result of Socialization

The Lord’s Resistance Army Since 1987 Northern Uganda has been suffering from a violent conflict involving three main parties: the LRA, the central Ugandan government and the local population which mainly consists of the Acholi tribe. The LRA, led by self-proclaimed prophet Joseph Kony, has often been portrayed as an insane and barbaric cult due to its targeting of children to increase its forces. The LRA has abducted more than 60,000 Northern Ugandan children, with a particular preference for young adolescents (Blattman, 2007; Vermeij, 2009). Estimates claim that approximately 60–80 per cent of the LRA consists of child soldiers which explains why it is often characterized as an army of children (Bøås and Dunn, 2007). Throughout the two decades of conflict it has remained unclear what the exact roots of the ongoing violence are. As Blattman and Annan claim: Twenty years after its birth, the strategy, organisation and motives of the LRA remain shrouded in mystery and supposition. What little we know is drawn almost entirely from interviews with former participants, commanders, and civilian victims. What emerges is a patchwork of motives, methods, and structure, with different accounts sometimes in direct conflict. (2008, p. 7) Besides, on account of its use of extreme violence, the LRA has lost support in Northern Uganda and heavily depends on child soldiers to continue its struggle. To achieve this, it uses a set of efficient tactics to recruit these children and create allegiance to the group. Once children are recruited to be part of the rebel group, whether this is forced or voluntary, its commanders aim to ensure children remain with the rebel group and function as effective soldiers. To achieve this, the process of socialization is a determining factor. My research was focused on the issues of how socialization represents an essential aspect in creating allegiance. The interviews with former LRA rebels revealed that socialization facilitated bonding within the group and played a determining role in the creation of loyalty and dependency on the group. Besides that, the LRA turned out to practise socialization processes to such an effective extent that it often led to significant problems once child soldiers had returned to the Northern Ugandan society and tried to reintegrate. For more than two decades the LRA has been fighting in Northern Uganda. Due to his suspicion of the international community and his

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fear of being captured, Joseph Kony refused to speak with representatives of the international community until the 2006 peace talks (Borzello, 2007). This has caused a poor understanding of the LRA and its use of child soldiers. According to estimates, the rebel group relied heavily on the use of child soldiers; interviews with experts and former LRA rebels indicated that 60–80 per cent of the group consists of children. Thorough research has been carried out to find out how these children end up with the LRA. This revealed that abduction and the use of force is the main method of recruitment (Blattman, 2007). Still, even though they are forced to join the group, field research indicated that these children often remain with the LRA for long periods of time. This seemingly contradicting phenomenon raises the question: what exactly keeps these children in the group and creates a cohesive unit? Allegiance is relatively high among LRA rebels; abducted children often become loyal to the group and decide to stay. Given the fact they are initially abducted, a fundamental puzzle is established. This indicates that the LRA uses efficient mechanisms to engage their members and create allegiance. By practising these mechanisms, the LRA has managed to remain a cohesive group which continues its violent struggle. After being chased out of Northern Uganda in 2006, the LRA is now scattered and poses significant security threats to the Central African region. Since December 2008, Operation Lightning Thunder has attempted to put a halt to the LRA’s increasingly vicious attacks and aimed to eliminate the entire organization. However, this joint military operation by the government forces of Uganda, Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) and South Sudan has not been successful in achieving its goals. The LRA’s current presence in South Sudan, eastern DRC and the Central African Republic still poses severe threats to civilians and leaves traces of death and destruction all over the region. Moreover, recent months have seen a major re-escalation of atrocities and abductions committed by the LRA, particularly in eastern DRC (International Alert, 2009). The question rises: how it is possible for a rebel group largely consisting of abducted children to become this resilient? Since the LRA manages to create allegiance among their abducted recruits, one can assume they use a highly efficient socialization mechanism. My research, as this chapter will argue, finds that socialization indeed represents the ‘glue’ that keeps the LRA together as a cohesive group. In addition to problems tackling the LRA as an organization, the reintegration of former LRA rebels into society turned out to be a highly challenging task as well. Rehabilitation programmes often mismatch the needs of former rebels, resulting in failing reintegration of these


individuals (Borzello, 2007). Field research indicated that former child soldiers are often poorly understood; they become outsiders in their communities, which challenges both their individual development as well as the development of their society. When these children return home, it often seems as if they have changed their identity and abandoned all their societal norms and values. In the following sections of this chapter I argue that these changes are caused by socialization processes within the LRA and that this jeopardizes their reintegration.

Socialization within the Lord’s Resistance Army Although there is little known about socialization within rebel groups, these processes play a significant role in the creation of allegiance. Socialization has proved to be a highly efficient tool to engage children with the LRA. In comparison to adults, children are generally considered to be vulnerable, naive and susceptible to outside influences. Thus, when growing up within the LRA, socialization teaches them to become part of the group and creates a sense of belonging. A variety of socialization mechanisms are used to achieve this. According to Grusec and Hastings . . . socialisation refers to processes whereby naive individuals are taught the skills, behaviour patterns, values and motivations needed for competent functioning in the culture in which the child is growing up. Paramount among these are the social skills, social understandings, and emotional maturity needed for interaction with other individuals to fit in with the functioning of social dyads and larger groups. Socialisation processes include all those whereby culture is transmitted from each generation to the next, including training for specific roles in specific occupations. (2007, p. 13) As such, the LRA practises military socialization to create a cohesive unit in which children are ‘reborn’ as soldiers. Abductees are socialized in the use of violence for group purposes resulting in a strong hierarchical organization. This process of formal and informal socialization starts from the moment children are abducted by the LRA. Formal socialization is achieved by ‘boot camp’; an intense military training which drills the newly abducted children as soldiers. In addition, informal socialization takes place through a ‘welcome ceremony’ of initiation rituals and having to register its new members. Newly abducted children are caned or beaten with a machete. Also, a ritual with shea nut butter is performed which has spiritual significance for the LRA. The butter

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is smeared on the body of the abductees to protect them from bullets and enable the rebels to locate their new recruits. As spirituality is a significant part of the Northern Ugandan society, this has a strong impact on child recruits. After completing the shea butter ceremony, boys are not allowed to wash themselves for three days and girls cannot wash themselves for four days. During these three or four days, the newly abducted children are guarded and have to eat and sleep separately from the rebels who have stayed in the bush for longer periods of time. This has an important symbolic value in the Acholi culture of Northern Uganda; when a baby is born it is not taken to the outside world until it is three or four days old (depending if it is a boy or a girl). This implies that the shea nut butter ritual leads to the ‘rebirth’ of abductees as group members. According to LRA terms, the civilian spirit is erased and the children become ‘integrated rebels’. These formal and informal socialization processes within the LRA show the beginning stages of how individual recruits are melted into a cohesive unit and start their reidentification as rebels.

Skills As Grusec and Hastings (2007) emphasized, socialization processes transmit culture from each generation to the next, for instance, by training for specific roles in specific occupations. This can be seen in the particular types of training carried out by the LRA. Abductees are grouped and trained in different fields in order to eventually carry out a variety of roles. This is an important part of the socialization process. Children who have become involved with the LRA are taught a large variety of skills. They generally undergo an intense military training through which they are taught how to operate and dismantle arms, lay land mines, learn how to target the enemy and how to march. In case children are selected to become bodyguards for commanders, they are taught the skills to protect their superiors. Besides that, child recruits are taught about military strategies and tactics. Children who are not selected to become combatants are taught a variety of different skills. Integrated rebels teach them a range of skills needed for escorting, porting of looted goods, cooking, nursing and babysitting. In addition, a selected group of rebels is trained to become medical personnel within the LRA. Commanders assess the intelligence of their recruits and the ones who seem capable are sent to do medical training at the ‘sickbay’ (a place where sick and wounded rebels are sent to recover).


The assignment of tasks is discussed by commanders; they decide what kind of role a newly abducted child will perform and which skills they are to be taught. This is a common process within rebel groups which is also described by Andvig and Gates (2007, p. 4) who describe that ‘officers of an armed force that employs children assess the relative capabilities of children and adults both in their recruitment and when allocating tasks’. By assessing their capabilities and allocating the tasks, commanders ensure that recruits are taught the right skills and perform maximally. As one boy soldier expressed during several interviews in Gulu, Northern Uganda: ‘the rebels would take us to the bush and look at our performance when we were training. The strong boys and girls were selected to go to the battle field, the weak ones were punished or had to stay in the camp and take care of the commanders and their wives.’ A girl soldier in Gulu explained that the allocation of tasks was decided upon their physical strength. She said: . . . when me and the other girls were with the rebels, they sent me to sickbay. I had to take care of the child of the wife of a commander. I was not strong enough to fight but I was good with domestic work. But there was a girl who could only cry. They killed her because she was of no help to the group. My other friend was bigger and she was told how to use the gun so she could go fight the enemy. These examples clearly show how LRA commanders assess the capabilities of newly recruited children and allocate tasks accordingly. Behavioural patterns and values Teaching new recruits appropriate behavioural patterns is an important aspect of socialization within the LRA. New recruits are taught a large set of rules when they become part of the group to make sure they behave correctly. Interviews revealed that the LRA top commanders designed a large set of specific rules to control behaviour of their recruits. Besides that, the LRA integrates their rebels according to longstanding values. Newly abducted children are registered as LRA members by caning and several spiritual rituals. Kony is believed to be a disciple from God and thus all LRA members are to follow his orders. The orders come from several spirits by which Kony is possessed. Most importantly, it is believed by LRA rebels that Kony possesses a Holy Spirit which tells the LRA what to do and gives directions and orders. Rebels are to obey

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all orders given and express a sincere belief in Kony’s spirits. Interviews revealed that the LRA becomes the abductees’ new family; it will take care of abductees, and gives them a new outlook on life. Former rebels express the importance of avoiding tension within the group. Tension among rebels is not allowed and should be solved right away so as not to form a threat to group cohesion. The rebels become each other’s brothers and sisters and should treat each other like that; they must protect and take care of each other. A boy soldier expressed that: . . . my commander was my father. We were all friends and listened to what Kony told us. The spirits told him where to go and this is how we escaped the enemy. It was good. He protected us, we were his family. We took care of each other and later we would get a position in the government and have a good life. New abductees are at the bottom of the hierarchical system and should always show respect to integrated rebels. The integrated rebels will show them how to live in the bush. Once newly abducted children become real integrated rebels (by showing correct behaviour) they are given their own group of new abductees which they are supposed to integrate in the LRA. Respect for each other is a key factor and rebels who do not behave according to expectations are to be reported and punished. There is relatively high social control among the rebels which, in combination with their shared values, melt them into a cohesive group. Motivations Looking at the circumstances of their recruitment into the LRA, it may be hard to imagine child soldiers becoming motivated to fight with the rebels. Andvig claims that ‘intrinsic motivation cannot be either bought or forced, it is either present or not’ (2006, p. 32). This assumption is incorrect. Socialization within the LRA has made child soldiers change their norms, values and even identities to such a large extent that their motivations have become intrinsic, even after being forced to become part of the LRA. The LRA has created a sophisticated socialization mechanism which creates allegiance and fierce loyalty among many of its rebels. For instance, LRA rebels are generally motivated to remain part of the group by promises of Kony and their commanders. One of the most important motivators is the promise they will get a position within the government once the Ugandan government is overthrown by the LRA. As these


rebels come from very poor backgrounds and miss out on education during their stay in the bush, this seems the most viable option for most of them. The rebels are promised that if they fight hard, they will get money when they overthrow the government and that they will rule the country together to realize better life standards for the Acholi population in the north. This motivates them in their struggle with the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and contributes to a shared feeling of ‘us versus them’. Another significant factor contributing to motivation is the achievement of ranks. Getting a rank will give a rebel control and power; he or she will be given their own group of soldiers. These soldiers have to fight for the rebel and carry out tasks like cooking, washing and fetching water. This gives the rebel a sense of power which is not likely to be experienced in their old village. In addition, male rebels are given wives. They start a new family within the LRA, have children and establish friendships. This contributes to the development of strong ties among LRA rebels. Besides that, the rebels have almost constant access to food and other supplies since they loot what is needed in the bush. The fact that everything is ‘free’ in the bush turns out to be a significant motivating factor to remain with the LRA. Overall, many child soldiers expressed the feeling that life in the bush had significant advantages from life in their villages or internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. At home they simply did not have anything due to high levels of poverty. There were few future expectations and opportunities, which made staying with the rebels a good alternative. They were not that hungry anymore and believed they would take over the government one day. This would provide them with a much brighter future compared to when they would stay at home. Therefore, many former child soldiers expressed high levels of motivation when they were part of the LRA. This shows the efficiency of socialization within the LRA; it turned many scared, abducted children into motivated, allegiant fighters.

Indoctrination Several means of indoctrination are used to create the necessary social skills, social understandings and emotional maturity among child soldiers within the LRA. Interviews with 65 former LRA child soldiers in Northern Uganda between January and April 2009 revealed that the constant exposure to violence played a significant role. All their constraints disappeared due to the exposure to constant violence. Violence wielded, suffered and observed turned out to be an integral part of the

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process of socialization of LRA combatants. As a result of this traumatic socialization, many child soldiers started viewing the LRA as their family and their commanders as father figures. Forty-six of my 65 respondents expressed that the LRA had become their new family and considered their commander as a new father figure. The LRA purposely displaced and transformed the socialization processes of civilian life. In many cases ties with the LRA became so strong that it replaced family ties. During interviews former child soldiers often expressed a sense of belonging to the LRA. They had friends and a new family in the bush, and could loot whatever they wanted. They had been given guns now which gave them power, while at home they did not have anything. They were living and fighting together as a group; they were taking care of each other and there seemed no point in returning home. A boy soldier explained: I started feeling like I belonged in the bush. My commander took care of me, I had many friends and I was given a gun. We cooked together and we had soda. At home I never had soda, I was hungry too. I liked it in the bush and I wanted to stay. After the war I would have a good future and get paid so I wanted to fight for that. I was a real rebel. In addition to violence, fear and punishment are important means of indoctrination within the LRA. If child soldiers do not successfully acquire the skills they are taught, they are heavily punished by caning or strokes with a machete. Most of the time they are killed to set an example of what happens if you are not a ‘good’ rebel. The same types of punishment are carried out when rebels break the rules they are taught or show a lack of motivation. For instance, it is common to kill a couple which fell in love in front of their group as this is inappropriate behaviour. Also, commanders have rebels killed who do not show active behaviour and do not eagerly fight the UPDF. This sets examples for other group members who adjust their behaviour to avoid punishment. In addition, rebels are told they will be punished anyhow, even if their misbehaviour is not discovered by fellow rebels. They are told that the bullet will find them at the battlefield and they will be killed by the UPDF. Although these are prominent factors, fear and punishment are not the only important means of indoctrination. The LRA uses group meetings, assemblies and spiritual beliefs as well. Each battalion of the LRA has its regular group meetings and assemblies. These often take place when they have received a message from Kony on how to proceed


with their struggle. All the rebels are informed of the new expectations and are supposed to act accordingly from that moment on. If they fail to do this, punishment will follow. According to former child soldiers, these meetings motivated the rebels to continue the fighting and be ‘good’ rebels, aiming to destroy the enemy. A boy soldier expressed: ‘in the bush we got together with the groups. Kony would tell us about the new strategy and where we were going to get the enemy. We cheered after the meeting and we wanted to fight. We are good rebels, fighting for our cause.’

Socialization as a challenge to reintegration According to Checkel (2005), socialization leads to Type I or II internalization. The first type refers to . . . learning a role – acquiring the knowledge that enables them to act in accordance with expectations – irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it. The key is the agents knowing what is socially accepted in a given setting or community. Following a logic of appropriateness, then, means simply that conscious instrumental calculation has been replaced by conscious role playing. (Checkel, 2005, p. 804) Following a logic of appropriateness goes beyond role playing and implies that agents accept the norms of the community or organization of which they are part, as ‘the right thing to do’. This is Type II internalization or socialization, which implies that agents adopt the interests or even the identity of their community. ‘Conscious instrumental calculation has now been replaced by “taken-for-grantedness” ’ (Checkel, 2005, p. 804). Interviews have revealed that socialization within the LRA has indeed led to internalization. Overall, a clear majority of the total number of interviewees reached Type II internalization while they were with the LRA. They expressed feelings that they were indeed doing the right thing by fighting with the LRA. They particularly expressed the motivation to be fighting for a better future for the Acholi. As one girl soldier explained: ‘I was fighting for our future. It was not good in the village before the war and I was fighting with the rebels to make things good and have a good life. The Acholi can no longer live like this and the rebels were making a better future for them.’

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This internalization caused severe problems when LRA child soldiers attempted to reintegrate into society. Many of them were rescued by the UPDF and placed back into society involuntarily. This has led to numerous escalations and violent encounters. Anna, who had spent 8 years with the rebels, was rescued by the UPDF when she was 17 years old and brought back to her home community. She did not understand the way of life in her village and according to which standards people behaved towards each other. She explained: . . . after the UPDFs brought me home, I was living with my family. It was very difficult. I was not used to them and I did not like it in the village. People looked at me and they did not want to talk with me. They were making fun of me. I wanted to go back to the bush, back to my friends and fight. One day my father was angry at me because I wanted to go back. He did not understand being a rebel is good. My mother took me into the hut and we started cooking. She asked me to go out and get some cassava from the field. She gave me the panga [machete]. When I came out of the house my father was sitting there. He made me so angry. I took the panga and cut his head. He fell on the ground and I finished him. People were screaming and crying. My mother cried and yelled to me. She said I had to stop. She asked me what I was doing. I did not understand why all these people screamed so much, this is what we do in the bush. He was not a good man and I am a good rebel. This account reveals why many former child soldiers were looked upon as dangerous criminals by their communities and often felt rejected. For this reason their reintegration was challenged and former child soldiers often moved to different communities. When becoming part of a new community, they describe feelings of only slowly starting to see they were not fighting for the right thing with the LRA. This was also acknowledged by community members in Awach, Northern Uganda who expressed to . . . be fearing these wild children when they come back from the bush. They take whatever property they want. If we do not cooperate they become violent, telling us they are the soldiers in charge and we are to listen. It takes a long time before they start behaving like civilians again. If at all, because many of them never change.


This indicates the extremely strong effects of socialization within the LRA, particularly when Type II internalization is achieved. Once returning to society, LRA socialization led to concerns about the transition to civilian life. This mostly related to the children’s identity as a soldier and uncertainties about how they would be regarded in their village. Looking at these outcomes of socialization processes within the LRA, they turn out to be truly effective. They do not only have far-reaching consequences regarding their self-perception, but child soldiers who have experienced socialization processes within the LRA also show behaviour which is very different from actors who have not been subject to LRA socialization. One should keep in mind their allegiance was not achieved by pecuniary rewards; it is purely a result of non-pecuniary rewards and socialization. As Blattman pointed out, pecuniary rewards were basically absent in the LRA and ‘indoctrination into the LRA was a complex process of spiritual training, misinformation, and the strategic use of fear and violence’ (2007, p. 18). This shows how powerful socialization mechanisms can be in changing behaviour and even identity; within the LRA these mechanisms changed abducted children into motivated rebels with high allegiance to the group. Gates argues that ‘the more a rebel leader can appeal to the provision of non pecuniary rewards, the better he is able to recruit and maintain the allegiance of his rebel soldiers’ (2002, p. 127). This is certainly the case with Kony as the leader of the LRA. Once his combatants are going through the socialization process, interests and motivations are being created to remain with the group. Both their identity and behaviour shift from a civilian child to that of a well-trained rebel. The developments that come about during the socialization process have serious consequences; they lead to a variety of reintegration challenges once these child soldiers attempt to return to society. Given the fact that children change their identity within the LRA due to socialization processes, these children will not be the same person if they return from the bush. They have drastically changed from the abducted child they once were and have actually turned into soldiers. Socialization implies that individuals acquire the culture of their group. The process inducts actors into the norms and values of the community and results in sustained compliance. This indicates that actors acquire new identities through socialization, leading to new interests which are not likely to be shared by their societies and thus result in challenges to reintegrate. Moreover, socialization creates bonding between the members of the LRA. It manages to mould children into soldiers and melts their identity

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into the group identity of the LRA. This change of identity poses one of the biggest burdens to reintegration. Socialization processes drastically change the behaviour and identity of child soldiers by teaching them new skills, roles, norms, values, motivations and rules. The resulting internalization transforms them into members of the LRA with a sense of belonging in the bush. When returning to society, this causes confusion and leads to ambiguous feelings. These children know how to be combatants and fight. After years of being with the LRA, they do not remember how to be a civilian and people look upon them as dangerous troublemakers. For many LRA child soldiers ‘going home’ has become meaningless as the bush and their fellow rebels have become their home. When returning to society they experience a large difference from others and are frequently stigmatized, which is seriously jeopardizing their reintegration. Reintegration is made even more difficult by the challenge of acceptance and willingness. It may be balked by the society or children themselves due to mutual fear and anger. A girl soldier expressed: ‘when I came home people were fearing me. The children yelled at me, calling me the rebel who destroyed the village. People told me to leave and not come back.’ A boy soldier said: ‘I was a rebel, I did not want to be in the village. The people are not good, they don’t fight for our future and are not brave. They make me angry, I don’t want to live with them in the village.’ Stigma and stereotypes need to be overcome for communities to be willing and prepared to accept former child soldiers and re-socialize them. Yet, reintegration is not only challenged by the society’s perception of former child soldiers. These children may very well refuse to reintegrate as they sincerely believe they are a rebel now and no longer belong to civilian life. Interviews indicated that their new identities often persist once child soldiers have left the LRA. This implies that the effects of socialization need to be reversed to successfully reintegrate: they need to be resocialized into society. Moreover, if socialization within the rebel group is not addressed when attempting to rehabilitate and reintegrate former child soldiers, this may erupt in severe problems for the child as well as its community. This indicates the importance of rightly targeting rehabilitation and reintegration programmes which need to address the personality changes coming about during the period spent within the LRA. Drawing from field research, this is currently not sufficiently taken into account, which results in limited success or even failure of attempts to reintegrate former child soldiers.


As one girl soldier expressed Our future is already spoiled, we do not have opportunities to develop. The rehabilitation only helped us in the beginning; they gave us food and a place to sleep. But now we have nothing. They did not integrate us in the village. People do not understand us, we missed out on school and our communities are afraid of us. There is no job for us. We do not have a future, we can only hope for our children. This is the only reason why we are still alive; we have to try to make the future of our children brighter. This account is just one of many that illustrates how our limited understanding of the child soldiering phenomenon is failing to offer these returnees opportunities to successfully reintegrate in their communities.

Conclusion The conclusion we can draw from this chapter is that socialization turns out to be an incredibly powerful mechanism which changes children into soldiers. The recovery of their lost childhood turns out to be one of the most difficult challenges to be tackled. Growing up within the LRA estranges children from life outside war and challenges their reintegration once they have come out of the bush. For them to reintegrate into society, the effects of socialization within the LRA need to be reversed. Only then their future can be restored. As seen throughout this chapter, socialization is used by the LRA to achieve internalization of the norms and values by their new members. This leads to interest convergence and building bridges within the LRA, aiming for an effective organization and high allegiance among its rebels. Besides that, LRA socialization seeks to strip away the personal characteristics of its recruits and rebuilds the recruit’s self-image based upon new assumptions. The LRA seeks to erase the civilian spirit from its recruits and turns them into integrated rebels. Children enter the LRA with a self-image which is completely rebuilt by the socialization process they undergo within the LRA. During the time they spend with the rebels, new recruits discover they are able to carry out extreme types of violence, kill people, loot villages and so on. This explains why socialization is used by the LRA; it leads to high levels of allegiance because its recruits take on new identities and become loyal to the group. Not surprisingly, these new identities lead to severe challenges once child soldiers have returned to their societies and attempt to reintegrate.

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The effects of LRA socialization therefore need to be reversed for their reintegration to be successful. This chapter has shown the importance of supporting child soldiers in creating a new civilian identity and in finding a new, respected and meaningful social role. Just as being socialized when entering the LRA, this process needs to be repeated when reentering civilian life. Only reversing the process of socialization within the LRA and aiming for a reconstruction of the child’s place and role in the civilian world will take them on the road to a brighter future.

References Andvig, J. C. (2006) Child Soldiers: Reasons for Variation in Their Rate of Recruitment and Standards of Welfare, [704] Paper, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Andvig, J. C. and Gates, S. (2009) ‘Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict’ in S. Gates and S. Reich (eds.) Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Blattman, C. (2007) The Causes of Child Soldiering: Theory and Evidence from Northern Uganda. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL. Blattman, C. and Annan, J. (2008) ‘Child Combatants in Northern Uganda: Reintegration in Myths and Reality’ in Muggah, R. (ed.) Securing Protection: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. New York: Routledge Press, 103–125. Borzello, A. (2007) ‘The Challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army’, Conflict, Security and Development, 7 (3), 387–415. Bøås, M. and Dunn, K. (2007) African Guerillas: Raging Against the Machine. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Checkel, J. T. (2005) ‘International Institutions and Socialisation in Europe: Introduction and Framework’, International Organisation, 59 (4), 801–826. Dunson, D. H. (2008) Child, Victim, Soldier: The Loss of Innocence in Northern Uganda, NY: Orbis Books. Eichstaedt, P. (2009) First Kill Your Family: Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army, Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books. Gates, S. (2002) ‘Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of Rebellion’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46 (1), 111–130. Grusec, J. E. and Hastings, P. D. (2007) Handbook of Socialisation; Theory and Research, New York: Guilford Press. Machel, G. (2001) The Impact of War on Children, Vancouver: UBC Press. Vermeij, L. (2009) Children of Rebellion: Socialization of Child Soldiers within the Lord’s Resistance Army, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Wessells, M. (2004) ‘Psychological Issues in Reintegrating Child Soldiers’, Cornell International Law Journal, 37, 515. Wessells, M. (2006) Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection, Harvard: Harvard University Press.


Victimcy


11 Social Navigation and Power in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone: Reflections from a Former Child Soldier Turned Bike Rider Myriam Denov

Introduction Social navigation is a concept increasingly being used by scholars to capture the complexities of young people’s wartime experiences, and simultaneously dispel portrayals of child soldiers as powerless, passive and/or pathological. In his discussion of youth and armed conflict in Guinea-Bissau, Vigh (2006) defines wartime social navigation as the way in which war-affected young people assess the changes within their socio-political environment, evaluate the emerging possibilities within this environment and, accordingly, direct their lives in the most beneficial and advantageous ways. Challenging frameworks of victimhood and taking into account elements of both broader structures and individual agency, social navigation encapsulates the ways in which agents such as child soldiers navigate the terrain of war – a terrain that is constantly moving and changing: [A]gents seek to draw and actualise their life trajectories in order to increase their social possibilities and life chances in a shifting and volatile social environment . . . They navigate an unstable political landscape where the shifts, tows and underlying dangers require strategy and tactics to be constantly tuned to the movement of the immediate socio-political environment as well as to its future unfolding . . . [Social navigation means] simultaneously navigating the immediate obstacles in front of you, plotting and getting ready to navigate the next and keeping an eye on one’s imagined 191

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trajectory . . . Social navigation may thus involve detours, unwilling displacement, losing our way and not least, redrawing trajectories and tactics. Social navigation in this perspective is the tactical movement of agents within a moving element. It is motion within motion. (Vigh, 2006, pp. 8, 10–11, 14, 131) While authors have explored young people’s social navigation tactics and agency in relation to the wartime context (Richards, 1996; Peters, 2004; Rosen, 2005; Utas, 2005, 2008; Vigh, 2006), less attention has been paid to social navigation in the post-war period. Yet while war embodies a terrain in extreme motion, which makes navigation difficult, the post-war context may be equally dynamic, volatile and precarious, making careful navigation essential. In a short time span, many former child soldiers are compelled to shift from a highly militarized environment that has been extremely circumscribed, to a civilian existence where individual independence may be fraught with uncertainty and anxiety. Former child soldiers are faced with the need to be reintegrated into norms and institutions from which they had been isolated, often for years. In some contexts many may face social rejection from family and community, as well as economic hardship due to structural factors such as a lack of educational and employment opportunities (Honwana, 2006; Coulter, 2009; Denov, 2010). Others may also be at risk of extreme frustration when the conflict, which in many ways defined their lives, ends and they must redefine themselves all over again (Honwana, 1999; Denov and Maclure, 2007). War may also have provided opportunities, status, financial rewards and meaning. When the guns fall silent former child soldiers may find themselves in a grim world of boredom, poverty and disillusionment (Denov and Maclure, 2009). Navigating such post-conflict realities takes effort, insight and innovation on the part of war-affected youth, and thus merits further attention and study. Entangled in this ever-moving post-war terrain is the notion of power. Power and status hold important and complicated meanings for former child soldiers. Many young people may go from a relatively marginal status prior to war, to take up powerful leadership positions within armed groups. During conflict, some may act as commanders and leaders of other child soldiers, and hold authority over civilians. In the aftermath of war, however, some of these young people may return to a society where they may find themselves marginalized for their wartime affiliations (McKay, 2004). Contrary to traditional ‘top-down’ conceptions of power, whereby armed groups, governments and/or individuals are seen

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to act upon child soldiers through various forms of domination and control, power both during and following war instead appears fluid and amorphous. While negotiating power is deeply entwined in the experience of war and its successful navigation, the ways in which former child soldiers seek out, gain, maintain, lose and use power in the post-conflict context has been largely unexplored. To shed greater light on these issues, this chapter examines youthful social navigation and negotiations of power in post-conflict Sierra Leone. The chapter begins by outlining the socio-economic and political context of post-war Sierra Leone, highlighting the backdrop within which young people must navigate and ‘reintegrate’. The chapter then introduces readers to Joseph – a 25-year-old former child soldier living in Eastern Sierra Leone. Drawing upon Joseph’s narratives and reflections, the chapter explores the ways in which he continually negotiated and navigated a highly precarious and volatile post-war terrain. Contrary to being passive or powerless, as is often assumed of former child soldiers, and despite significant structural barriers and challenges, Joseph carefully, thoughtfully and deliberately navigated the post-war terrain, actively assuring his own survival and well-being. Joseph’s narratives ultimately highlight the importance, role and complexities of power, agency and social navigation in the aftermath of war and its linkages to post-conflict reintegration.

The context of navigation: Structural realities in post-war Sierra Leone The decade-long civil war in Sierra Leone (1991–2002) was marked by extreme violence and brutality against civilians leading to the death of an estimated 70,000 people, the displacement of more than two million people, the amputation of more than 10,000 people and the destruction of the country’s limited infrastructure (Hanlon, 2005). During the conflict, the recruitment of children into armed groups, by force and non-force, was widespread1 and was carried out by numerous fighting factions including the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), Civil Defence Forces (CDF), Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Sierra Leonean Army (SLA). In the war’s aftermath, in addition to the monumental challenges of reinstating democratic governance, rebuilding the country’s infrastructure and civil society, destroying stockpiles of weapons, and facilitating peacebuilding and reconciliation, all levels of Sierra Leonean society were left with the daunting task of ‘reintegrating’ thousands of ex-combatants, both children and adults.


The complex transition from a militarized life in an armed group to a civilian life has been well-documented (Marlowe, 2001). While Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programming2 is increasingly being utilized as a technical solution to militarization and a means out of organized violence, it is the process of reintegration whereby ‘ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income’ (UN, 2006, p. 19) that remains a significant long-term challenge. The concept of ‘reintegration’ tends to be a loaded one, and its successful implementation has garnered considerable debate and criticism (McKay and Mazurana, 2004; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007). Moreover, it remains largely unclear what it means to be ‘successfully reintegrated’ in a post-conflict context. Nonetheless, when assessing the process of reintegration, it is critical to examine the wider socioeconomic and political context into which young people must reintegrate. Particularly salient are broader structural factors such as the economy, opportunities for education and employment, as well as social structures of power and influence and intergenerational relations. These factors, examined further below with regards to Sierra Leone, are deeply embedded in, and provide a backdrop to the ways former child soldiers negotiate the complexities of power and navigate the post-conflict terrain. Economic realities The depressed post-war economy of Sierra Leone has remained a major source of concern in the context of reintegration of returnee populations (Hanlon, 2005). Loans and grants were designated for rebuilding Sierra Leone and some debt forgiveness was announced. However, as Silberfein (2004, p. 231) notes: Sierra Leone has evolved into an AID-dependent state that has not been able to wean itself off foreign assistance. The economy grew about ten per cent from May 2001 to April 2002 and prices fell as well, but much of this phenomenon was the result of an unsustainable level of aid money. It has also been argued that international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have been active in reconstruction and yet have also compounded the country’s economic challenges. In particular, the IMF’s insistence on privatization of public enterprises has made rebuilding the country’s infrastructure

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a challenging task for a government whose budget is comprised of 65 per cent foreign aid (Freeman, 2008). A report assessing Sierra Leone’s National Recovery Strategy highlighted the poor economy, inequality, and corruption and its impact on marginalized groups in Sierra Leone, including former child soldiers: There are more jobless youths, women and men roaming the streets of major towns and in the countryside today than before the war . . . Economic inequities continue to exist. The national economy cannot engage ex-combatants who have been demobilised and other jobless citizens. Economic disparities and inequalities, fuelled by blatant corruption and decision-makers that seem trapped in crisis management mode, continue to characterise social dynamics in the country. (Moore et al., 2003, pp. iv, vi) Employment In relation to issues of employment, Hanlon (2005, p. 466) notes that ‘there is a total lack of job opportunities’. An estimated 70 per cent of youth are unemployed or underemployed (United Nations Development Programme, 2008). Male idleness (defined as not in school or working) begins at a very young age. By age 9–14, one in every ten young males is inactive, rising to three in ten by age 20–24 (World Bank, 2007). Importantly, a quarter of these 20–24-year-old men say that there are no jobs available, so it is not even worth looking for work. Women and girls’ no-school and no-work status increases rapidly: by age 15–19, 2 of every 10 females are not working nor in school. Their greater inactivity is partly, but not fully due to motherhood, as by the age of 20, most inactive young women cite labour market reasons as the main reason that they are not working or looking for work (World Bank, 2007, p. 23). Furthermore, according to the World Bank (2007) Sierra Leonean youth3 assert that jobs are awarded through connections, rather than skill and this is borne out by evidence that demonstrates that adults have higher employment levels even if they have the same level of education as youth. Education Rapid educational reconstruction in the wake of severe and prolonged civil strife is widely considered essential for cultivating societal reconciliation, peaceful civic relationships and the reinvigoration of war-torn economies (Kagawa, 2005). In place of violence, fear and uncertainty,


the re-establishment of schools and other forms of education can be a significant ‘life-affirming activity’ that restores hope and purpose for war-affected young people (Machel, 1996, p. 92). The government of Sierra Leone has made significant efforts to improve access to education in the post-conflict context (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 2007). The Ministry of Education undertook several measures to increase primary school enrolments and retention rates: a reduction in the duration of regular primary schooling from the pre-war seven-year span to six years; the free provision of core textbooks and learning materials for all pupils; a universal school feeding programme; and the abolition of primary school enrolment fees and payments to sit for the national primary school leaving examination (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 2003). For older children who were forced out of school because of the war, the government established the Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools (CREPS), a programme enabling young people to complete primary school equivalency within a three-year period. International aid agencies, including the World Bank and United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) also rallied to directly assist in rebuilding the country’s shattered school system. Moreover, numerous faith-based organizations and international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have likewise been actively involved in establishing community schools, hiring teachers and providing teaching and learning materials (Maclure and Denov, 2009). Despite such successes, important limitations remain. In comparison to educational opportunities in other developing countries, Sierra Leone continues to lag behind. According to the World Bank (2006) in Sierra Leone, at the age of 12 only 68 per cent of children are in school compared to more than 85 per cent of all children in developing countries. The World Bank (2007) also notes that 25–30 per cent of primary school-aged children (more than 240,000) are currently out of school and girls, children living in rural areas, children living in the poorest households and those from the Northern region continue to be particularly disadvantaged. A United Nations (UN) report notes that just half of Sierra Leone’s primary schools are functioning, many of them in inadequate conditions and secondary school attendance is only at 44 per cent (IRIN, 2008). Furthermore, an assessment of the country’s National Recovery Strategy found that the numbers of primary school teachers nationwide remained insufficient and pupil to teacher ratios have reached 118:1 in some parts of the country (Moore et al., 2003; Hanlon, 2005).

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Patrimonial relations Alongside a challenging economic context, the realities of a patrimonial system must also be considered. The connected realms of violence, oppression and patronage feature prominently in Sierra Leone’s history (Murphy, 2003). As Jackson (2006, p. 101) has noted: ‘Political patronage . . . has been a defining feature of Sierra Leone over the last 20 years, in that exclusion from patronage networks created the raw material for the violence of the 1990s.’ Over time, institutionalization of what Reno (1995) has referred to as the ‘shadow state’, characterized government conduct and activities. Through a patrimonial system of rationed favours, theft of public funds, illicit payments, as well as bribes, state corruption became institutionalized and regarded as an important antecedent to the war. In the war’s aftermath, there have been growing fears that the culture of deference, authoritarianism, elitism and patronage is returning to Sierra Leone’s system of governance. In 2003, the International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that the government’s ‘performance has been disappointing and complacency appears to have set in . . . there are consistent signs that donor dependence and the old political ways are returning’ (International Crisis Group, 2003, p. 1). In the pre-war context, a system of patronage was also a reality within the chieftaincy system. Chiefs sought the moral and political support of local citizens to win chief’s elections. In the aftermath of an election, it was regarded as commonplace that these support groups be provided with ‘benefits’ – ranging from advantageous results in chieftaincy courts, appointments to positions of power, or access to land or resources (Jackson, 2006). It has been suggested that poor governance at the chiefdom level was an important factor in the eventual revolt against authority (Hanlon, 2005). Importantly, the chieftaincy system, largely destroyed during the war with the death of many chiefs, was reconstructed by a Department for International Development (DFID)funded programme (the Paramount Chiefs Restoration Program). It has been argued that the reinstatement of the Paramount Chiefs will create ‘new platforms for the old politics, and that the rural poor will be locked, as before, into a desperate scramble for elite patronage’ (Fanthorpe, 2005, p. 47). The structural realities of Sierra Leone’s poor economy, lack of infrastructure, diminished opportunities for education and employment, and embedded inequalities provide the ever-shifting backdrop and context to the ‘reintegration’ of former child soldiers. Yet how do these structural realities play out in their everyday lives? Moreover, how do former


child soldiers navigate this precarious and volatile terrain? This will be explored through the narratives and reflections of Joseph – a former child soldier. While Joseph’s experiences and perspectives are in no way generalizable to all former boy soldiers in the country, or to the unique experiences of girls,4 his narratives nonetheless demonstrate the importance, role and complexities of power in Joseph’s post-war life, and the ways in which his search for empowerment was deeply rooted in his everyday social navigation. Joseph’s story Joseph5 is a 26-year-old former child soldier who I interviewed over the course of a 2-year period (2008–2010) as part of a larger research project exploring the long-term reintegration of former child soldiers in Sierra Leone. Joseph reported being associated with the CDF as early as 1993 at the age of nine. As is now well-documented in the history of Sierra Leone’s conflict, the CDF forces were locals working alongside the government who sought to provide protection to civilians and local communities, and stage offensives against the rebels. Among the Mende, these local men were known as the kamajors. While ‘kamajor’ is a Mende word meaning ‘hunter’, the term eventually came to refer to anyone initiated into the militia, whether they had prevously been a hunter or not (and most had not) and was used to describe more broadlybased civil defence organizations (Ferme and Hoffman, 2004). Joseph remained affiliated with the CDF as it became a formalized civil militia, and remained affiliated with the group until the end of the war in 2002. During the war, both Joseph’s mother and father were killed, as well as other family members. In the post-war context, while he had extended family members living nearby, the relationships with them were reportedly strained (‘they don’t treat me like family’) and he felt that he could not turn to them for financial support or assistance. Like many youth in post-conflict Sierra Leone, Joseph was entirely responsible for his economic survival and well-being. Reflecting upon his life immediately following the war, he explained his frustration with not being able to benefit from DDR programming or educational opportunities: When the war came to an end, the DDR programme was on, but it was unfortunate for me that my gun was with my brother when he was killed, so I couldn’t go through the DDR process.6 I then decided to find some money and enrol in school. I survived by carrying loads for people. After raising some money, I was able to enrol myself in a primary school.7 But life still continued to be difficult for me. I was

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quite aggressive and I got into a lot of fights at school. Once, a boy called me ‘rebel’ and I beat him up. I was sent to the headmaster, and during our meeting, I told him about my situation. He told me to forget about violence and to focus on learning. To encourage me, he assisted me with school support until I sat the NPSC exam.8 When I got to secondary school, life remained difficult and I was not able to raise the money for fees, so I dropped out. I then went to the diamond mining field. I couldn’t make much money at the mines and I realised that there was no future for me there. I then returned to [town]. I would have loved to continue my education . . . In town, Joseph eventually met a man (who he referred to as ‘his boss’) who took him in to be his ‘errand boy’. For a time, Joseph lived with the man and also rented a motorbike from him. It was through bike riding that Joseph began to earn his living: I am not engaged in stealing or in any bad conduct. I am only engaged in bike riding. I survive by the 2,000–3,000 Leones [less than $1USD] that I earn from the bike each day. In Sierra Leone, motorbike taxis are increasingly replacing the fourwheeled conventional taxi. Conventional taxis, which almost completely disappeared after the war in provincial towns due to burned or ambushed vehicles, tend to be owned by ‘big men’, who recruit a driver. Motorbikes have become an important alternative to conventional taxis as they are less expensive to buy and can be acquired on credit from Guinean suppliers at a payback rate of one million Leones per month for six months (Richards et al., 2004). Although largely unknown to Sierra Leone prior to the war, the phenomenon of motorbike taxis has emerged as one of the most visible post-conflict changes. Peters (2007, p. 14) notes the advantages and disadvantages of the motorbike taxi phenomenon: The advantages are that these motor bike taxis literally criss-cross the towns in search of passengers and even on the back streets it is only a few minutes before a taxi arrives. It then takes you straight to the preferred destination, without detours to hunt or deliver other passengers, or losing time in traffic jams. The disadvantages are that costs are two to three times higher than a car taxi, you get wet when it is raining (although many passengers somehow manage to keep an umbrella above their head during their journey) and it is less safe,


since no helmets are (yet) provided for the passengers . . . Nevertheless the motor taxis have become an institution . . . Significantly, former combatants make up most of the motorbike riders. In fact, three quarters of the 300 motorbike riders in Makeni were combatants during the war, most of whom were associated with the RUF (Peters, 2007). In Bo and Kenema, former CDF fighters are in the majority as riders. Former combatant riders have managed to carve out a high-demand niche that does not compete with existing trades such as tailoring or carpentry (Peters, 2007). Typically, riders do not own their own bikes, but rent bikes for a fee from motorbike owners, as was the case with Joseph.9 Joseph explained how his relationship with his boss began: At one time, my uncle and I got into an argument and he embarrassed me in front of several people in the street . . . [my boss] was one of the people present . . . I was very upset . . . When my uncle left, the man approached me and asked me what was wrong. I then explained everything to him – that I had no money, my parents had been killed in the war, and that I had no place to stay. He told me that he would help me out if I’d be willing to work for him. He asked me if I could ride a [motor] bike. I said no, but he told me that he would teach me. Since then, I became his ‘borbor’ [boy]. In exchange for a place to stay, and rental of the bike, Joseph was required to carry out domestic chores for his boss and had to provide him with nearly all of his daily earnings from the bike: I ride his bike, and I am his errand boy. He asks me to go and buy wood for his mother and do other things like laundering and ironing. As for the bike, I am required to raise 25,000 Leones [approximately $6USD] for my boss everyday at all cost. On average, I keep 2 to 3,000 Leones per day for myself [50-75 cents US]. I do this just to prevent myself from stealing. Joseph underscored the precarious nature of the relationship with his boss, his dependence upon him and the uncertainty of his economic situation as a whole: My present trouble is that I don’t have a bike of my own and am just making money for someone else . . . My boss owns the bike. He can ask me to leave at any time because there is really no

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guarantee in the relationship – there is no blood relation to keep us together . . . My relationship with my boss is not 100 per cent okay. Sometimes when I’m unable to raise 25,000 Leones from the bike, he abuses me verbally and insults me . . . He threatens that he will take the bike from me, as if our relationship is just tied around the bike . . . [When this happens] I try to talk to him and beg him to return the bike to me, as I can’t survive without it for now . . . When his anger subsides, he usually returns the bike to me . . . but he doesn’t care about me or my situation. All he cares about is the money . . . He is arrogant and disrespectful. When asked if his boss ever beats him, he replied: Well he pushes my head all the time like this [motions to his head]. I consider that even more humiliating than beating. It makes me feel very bad . . . Sometimes when this happens, I argue with him or think about physically attacking him . . . The war had a big impact on me in that I am now very hot-tempered and I just act [impulsively] . . . But people around always talk to me to calm down. What makes me cool off is when I think about my future, which is partly in his hands now. The structural realities discussed earlier, a poor economy, lack of educational and employment opportunities, and patrimonial relations are evident in Joseph’s post-conflict daily life. Forced out of school because of a lack of resources, and unable to find gainful employment, Joseph found himself largely at the mercy of his boss for his well-being, security and livelihood. Joseph’s overall sense of marginalization has, perhaps not surprisingly, led to a feeling of nostalgia for the conflict period, and a longing for the sense of independence, power and control that he held during the war: Even though it was war, my life at that time was better than now because I was able to do everything for myself . . . Now I depend on other people to earn my living . . . When I was in the CDF, I was my boss’ [commander’s] right hand man . . . When my boss was not feeling well, he would ask me to lead the troops to go on attack and I would take responsibility as the only person competent enough to report to the boss . . . When my boss got angry, I was the only one who could talk to him and calm him down. He listened to me. During that period, I liked the type of life I was living. I belonged to a class that I liked so much. Even elders were bringing cases and complaints to me, which I settled. I had the power to stop someone


from being killed. At that time I had opportunity to meet with important and high figures in the society. I handled important cases and made major decisions. I was treated like a chief. I was in control of many things . . . Now, I’ve lost all those powers and this is quite disturbing to me. These realities highlight the shifting and challenging context in which former child soldiers like Joseph must navigate to ensure their own ‘reintegration’ and survival. Constantly looking ahead to his future security and livelihood, Joseph was compelled to navigate rough waters carefully. Navigation involved efforts to attend school, and when forced to drop out of school, find alternative means of survival through diamond mining and bike riding. It was also necessary to ensure calm and cordial relations with his boss and his boss’ family, and assure his daily economic survival through the bike. Importantly, this navigation was occurring within a context of relative powerlessness as compared to the war.

Social navigation and post-conflict power Losing, gaining and maintaining power was highly important to Joseph and it was a theme that he brought up frequently. Within a post-war context where he felt marginalized, dependent upon others for survival, and unable to attain his goals of secondary school education or transcending poverty, ensuring his own empowerment was integral to and rooted in his everyday social navigation. The following section explores the ways in which Joseph sought and attempted to maintain a sense of power and control in a volatile and fragile environment, and carefully and deliberately navigated the post-war terrain. Living within a realm of risk and uncertainty, Joseph focused upon engaging in activities that brought him a sense of power and control. These included bike riding, mercenary activities and mystical forms of power.10 Power and bike riding In spite of the strained and dependent relationship with his boss, while on the bike, Joseph was able to, albeit temporarily, escape his boss’ authority and domination. The independence, power and control that bike riding elicited were clearly illustrated by Joseph: I love bike riding. When I am on top of my bike, I become the boss. I choose who to carry on the bike and who not to carry. I am in total

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control in the absence of my boss . . . The bike gives me authority and I’m someone that likes authority so much. Joseph took advantage of the fact that community members and customers were generally unable to determine who owned his bike: The community has positive perceptions of bike riders, they think they have money and it’s difficult to tell whether the bike is owned by the rider or not . . . Interestingly, bike riding became a realm where the notions of power, masculinity, courtship and wealth actively played out. According to Joseph, bike riding was an important way to attract girls and women: Girls and women are easily attracted to bike riders. As long as you are on top of the bike, any woman you propose love to will accept your proposal. When I see young girls, I show them the money that I receive from the bike to gain their attention, but I don’t give it to them because the money really belongs to my boss. It was also a realm where the wartime power dynamics between ex-combatants and civilians were often re-enacted and replayed. When asked if it was possible for a civilian to engage in bike riding, Joseph responded: Yes you could ride a bike, but as a civilian it would be very risky for you. We [ex-combatants] can easily recognise you as a civilian and we will threaten you . . . even tell you that we will break your legs. Civilians still fear us . . . Once you get on the bike, we can identify [civilians]. The way and manner in which civilians ride is quite different from ex-fighters. We can even tell from the way you talk. We are much rougher. We talk with force and command. For example if [a civilian] and I are competing for a passenger, I’ll say a few harsh words [and they will back off]. The way you respond can tell me who you are. Yet despite the seeming solidarity among riders and the fact that both ex-CDF fighters and ex-RUF fighters (who were ‘enemy’ factions during the war) were riders, there continued to be informal power struggles and conflicting allegiances. Bike riding was a context in which


these affiliations, power relations and wartime struggles continued to play out: There are no formal differences within the [Bike Riders] Association relating to CDF or RUF. We don’t really care about your background. But I still have grievances against RUF riders. Joseph emphasized the importance of maintaining his wartime allegiances and supporting other former CDF riders: There are traffic laws that govern us. For example, you should not overload [your bike], and you should wear [proper footwear] while riding. If it happens that I break the law at the time when the [Bike Riders Association] chairman is [a former] CDF, he can easily take up my case and advocate for me, because I was his colleague or ‘borbor’ [his boy]. But if the chairman is RUF, it will be difficult for me to relate to him. [That’s why if there is a vote in the Bike Riders Association] I can’t abandon my CDF colleague and vote for someone in the RUF . . . he will take money from me when I’m in trouble. Further illustrating his ongoing loyalty to the CDF, when asked whom he would vote for if two equally qualified individuals in the Bike Riders Association were running for the same leadership position, one being formerly RUF and the other being formerly CDF, he replied: Even if the RUF [candidate] has more qualities and competencies than the CDF candidate . . . I would vote without a doubt for the CDF candidate. The Bike Riders Association was important to Joseph and he was on the Association’s Executive Council. A voluntary position that he held for nearly four years, Joseph acted as a mediator, settling disputes that arose between riders and their bosses, riders and the police concerning traffic violations, and other emerging issues. As he stated earlier, settling disputes was not new to him and he felt both comfortable and natural in this role. Moreover, being on the Executive and settling disputes gave him both status and power: There are many benefits to settling disputes. If you help settle a dispute for a fellow rider, that person will like you and respect you. When other riders see me in the street, they often tip me and give me up to 5,000 Leones because of the job that I’m doing.

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For Joseph, bike riding and being part of the Association’s Executive became activities where he was able to build a sense of power and independence. Navigating a life involving riding enabled him to (temporarily) escape his subservient relationship with his boss, hold increased power over civilians, settle disputes and help him to regain some of the power that he perceived to have lost at the war’s end. The power of the gun: Mercenary activities Several authors have documented the reality of former child soldiers turned mercenaries. In 2005, Human Rights Watch identified a migrant population of young West African fighters who, acting as mercenaries, travelled back and forth across the borders of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea,and Côte D’Ivoire. Referring to this population as ‘regional warriors’, Human Rights Watch (2005) noted that these youth viewed war as mainly an economic opportunity and the best option for economic survival. Similarly, Ismail (2002) noted that as former child soldiers struggling to support themselves within the war-shattered economy at home, they are often enticed by recruiters back to the frontlines – this time to a neighbouring war. In the aftermath of the war in Sierra Leone, Joseph reported being hired as a mercenary: It was a contract job . . . I was taken to [country] to fight after the war and I spent some time there. I went there for a particular mission and I operated as a mercenary. It was time bound. I was then paid afterwards . . . I was paid 450,000 Leones [approximately $120 USD] per month and anything that I came across at the warfront was mine. Aside from the money earned, which was significantly higher than the money he obtained through bike riding, the mercenary activities provided Joseph with yet another means to attain power, control and leadership: The fighting makes me independent. It makes me live by myself and be in control of things . . . When I was hired as a mercenary, I was the patrol commander for the mission. My boss . . . made me troop commander and I led the troops to the warfront all the time . . . On the ground, we had several patrol units and I was the commander of our own patrol unit.


Given the power and money attached to the practice, Joseph noted that he would welcome another opportunity to engage in mercenary activities: When I went to fight in [country], it was a contract job and the contract ended, [but if there is a similar opportunity] I’ll go for it anywhere possible . . . If there is any opportunity for me to make more money than what I get from the bike, I’ll leave the bike. Returning to the gun, this time for hire, not only allowed Joseph to revisit the authority and control that he spoke of during the war, but also dramatically improved his standard of living. However, navigating this terrain came at a potentially great cost, and Joseph was well aware of the dangers and risks surrounding combat and the potential to lose his life. However, in a context of continual poverty and marginalization, when weighing those risks, Joseph chose to navigate towards war. Mystical power Negotiating and navigating power in the aftermath of the war was also linked to the world of the supernatural. Importantly, during the war, the CDF/kamajors were revered for their invincibility and mysticism (Muana, 1997). Through the use of native herbs, charms, sacred attire and prohibitions such as particular foods, having contact with a woman while in battle dress, looting villages and committing rape, kamajors were said to be protected and impervious to bullets. As Ferme and Hoffman (2004, p. 81) note: The moral resonances of kamajor identity were made manifest in a series of taboos and restrictions imposed on individual combatants by their initiation into the militia. Every kamajor was required to pass through a series of instructions designed to instil the rules and behaviour expected of an initiate, and most importantly to provide them with the medicine that makes their bodies impervious to enemy fire. During the war, their perceived invincibility invoked fear and many rebels refused to face the kamajor militia men, fearful of their supernatural powers (Muana, 1997). In the war’s aftermath, Joseph discussed his ongoing mystical powers that were intimately connected to his former CDF status:

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I have mystical powers that tell me what to do or what not to do . . . I acquired it from [the kamajors] and am still using it . . . Even as we sit here, if anyone plans something bad against me, I’ll know without anyone telling me. When asked whether all CDF fighters are able to maintain such powers, Joseph replied: Everyone who joined the kamajors had the powers, but there were rules to uphold. Those who couldn’t maintain the rules would have since lost their powers . . . I was initiated [into the kamajors] by a very powerful man – which explains the strength of my powers . . . I still need the powers even though I’m not currently involved in any wartime fighting. It is for my personal defence. Joseph explained how, since being initiated into the kamajors, the mystical powers have changed his status and his life: Before the war, I was an ordinary man. Now, since being initiated into the kamajors, I am much more powerful and no man can conquer me. Before, few men in my community knew me or respected me. Now that I have strong mystical powers, so many important men try to know me and try to find out where I am.

Conclusion: Navigating a smooth space through dangerous waters Deleuze and Guattari (2002, pp. 380–381) refer to the concept of navigating as ‘imagining, plotting and actualising a “smooth space” through dangerous waters’. Post-conflict Sierra Leone continues to be a precarious and volatile space within which former child soldiers must ‘reintegrate’. The structural realities of a fragile economy, limited opportunities for educational advancement and gainful employment and patrimonial structures that reflect hierarchy and inequality provided the shifting backdrop to reintegration. It took impressive navigational skills to survive the post-conflict context, requiring innovation, thoughtful planning and tactical manoeuvring. Within this context, Joseph was anything but passive or powerless. When facing the challenges of poverty and the inability to pay school fees, he chose to work in the diamond mines. After realizing the lack of sustainability of life in the mines, he made his way to town and took on bike riding. Within the context of


riding, Joseph carefully managed relations with his boss, his fellow riders and his customers. He constantly made choices and adjusted his tactics in response to the social and economic opportunities and constraints that emerged in the post-war context. His narratives reveal the complexity of strategies, roles and options available as former child soldiers confront the post-war context, and long-term reintegration. Using, losing, maintaining and gaining power was intrinsic to and deeply entrenched in post-conflict navigation. Despite feelings of marginalization, Joseph actively negotiated, sought out and maintained modes of power, status and authority. Joseph’s search for and expressions of power, whether through bike riding, through mercenary activities or through mysticism, illustrates that power is never just top down – it is instead scattered and fragmented. As Foucault (1980) has noted, power is not simply the province of privilege or legitimate authorities; it is a feature of those who resist forms of domination as much as those who enforce or apply it. Joseph’s tactical manoeuvring, thoughtful navigation and his conscious efforts to seek out forms of power exemplifies Foucault’s conceptualization. As Layder (1994, p. 130) articulates: ‘power is something that reaches into the finest capillaries of society . . . facilitating new discourses and practices, rather than simply limiting or repressing existing ones . . . power operates within people’. Demonstrating the constant flux, motion and the required navigation of the post-conflict context, as well as the fluid nature of power and resistance, when I met with Joseph in February 2010, he had decided to leave bike riding. He had, without warning, dropped off the bike to his boss and left without an explanation. While he said that no particular event had incited the sudden move, the accumulation of stress, anger and frustration at his boss, who he saw as greedy, abusive and ungrateful, was largely at play. While he missed riding, he pledged that he would only return to bike riding if and when he owned the bike and it was on his terms. At our last encounter, he had returned to his village, where he was working on a cocoa plantation. He was also enrolled in a distance education course to finish his secondary school education, eventually hoping to work towards a teacher-training course. In the meantime, he had been approached to fight in another context and was considering the possibility.

Notes 1. Significant discrepancies exist in the reported number of implicated children and appear to vary according to organization and range from 6000–48,000

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3. 4.

5. 6.

7. 8. 9.

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(McKay and Mazurana, 2004; The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004). As noted by the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2004, p. 235), ‘while the total number of children associated with fighting forces will in all probability never be completely accurate, the submissions of the various agencies to the Commission attest to the widespread use of children in this conflict’. Disarmament refers to the collection, control and disposal of all weapons including small arms, explosives, light and heavy weapons of both fighters and civilians. Demobilization refers to the process by which armed forces either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Reintegration refers to the process ‘by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance’ (United Nations, 2006, p. 19). Here, reflecting Sierra Leone’s national definition of youth, youth is defined by the World Bank (2007) as anyone between the ages of 15 and 35. It is important to note that this chapter focuses upon the experiences and perspectives of a former boy solider. The post-conflict challenges and opportunities available to boys and girls are unique (McKay and Mazurana, 2004; Coulter, 2009). Just as the life history and experiences of this boy soldier cannot be generalized to all former boy soldiers in Sierra Leone, it can also not be extended or generalized to former girl soldiers. Please see Denov (2008) and Denov and Maclure (2006) for a more in-depth discussion of the challenges and opportunities in relation to girls. Not his real name. In the early phases of the DDR programme in Sierra Leone, an individual was required to turn in a gun to enrol in the DDR programme and receive benefits. During this period, free primary school had not yet been established. The NPSC exam is the final primary school public exam that qualifies a pupil to enrol in secondary school. Regional differences are important here. In Bo and Kenema, a businessman normally provides the bike and the rider leases the bike. After a period of time, the rider becomes the owner of the bike. In Makeni, however, the riders only rent bikes from the owners and do not become the eventual owners of the bikes. While these activities do not represent the only sources of power available to Joseph, they were the ones that appeared most predominantly in his narratives.

References Coulter, C. (2009) Bush Wives and Girl Soldiers: Women’s Lives Through War and Peace in Sierra Leone (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

210 Social Navigation and Power in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2002) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London: Continuum). Denov, M. (2008) ‘Girl Soldiers and Human Rights: Lessons from Angola, Mozambique, Northern Uganda and Sierra Leone’, International Journal of Human Rights, 12 (5), 811–833. Denov, M. (2010) Child Soldiers: Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Denov, M. and Gervais, C. (2007) ‘Negotiating (In)Security: Agency, Resistance and the Experiences of Girls Formerly Associated with Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32 (4), 885–910. Denov, M. and Maclure, R. (2006) ‘Engaging the Voices of Girls in the Aftermath of Sierra Leone’s Conflict: Experiences and Perspectives in a Culture of Violence,’ Anthropologica, 48 (1), 73–85. Denov, M. and Maclure R. (2007) ‘Turnings and Epiphanies: Militarisation, Life Histories and the Making and Unmaking of Two Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone’, Journal of Youth Studies, 10 (2), 243–261. Denov, M. and Maclure, R. (2009) ‘Girls and Small Arms in Sierra Leone: Victimisation, Participation and Resistance’ in V. Farr, H. Myrttinen and A. Schnabel (eds.) Sexed Pistols: The Gendered Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Tokyo: United Nations University Press), 51–80. Fanthorpe, R. (2005) ‘On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralisation in Post-War Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 105 (418), 27–49. Ferme, M. and Hoffman, D. (2004) ‘Hunter Militias and the International Human Rights Discourse in Sierra Leone and Beyond’, Africa Today, 50 (4), 73–95. Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972– 1977, edited by C. Gordon (Brighton: Harvester). Freeman, C. (2008) ‘The Failures of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone and the Threat to Peace’. Retrieved 16 February 2009 from http:// www.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/reconstruction_sierra_leone.jsp? nid=6811. Hanlon, J. (2005) ‘Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Preconditions for War in Sierra Leone?’, The Round Table 94 (381), 459–472. Honwana, A. (1999) Okusiakala ondalo yokalye: Let us light a new fire. Local Knowledge in the Post-War Healing and Reintegration of War-Affected Children in Angola. Retrieved 14 October 2008 from http://www.forcedmigration.org/ psychosocial/inventory/pwg001. Honwana, A. (2006) Child soldiers in Africa (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press). Human Rights Watch (2005) Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa’s Regional Warriors, 17, 53(A). Retrieved 9 February 2008 from http:// www.hrw.org/reports/2005/westafrica0405/westafrica0405text.pdf. Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. (2007) ‘Demobilisation and Reintegration’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51 (4), 531–567. International Crisis Group (2003) ‘Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance’, Africa Report 67. Ismail, O. (2002) ‘Liberia’s Child Combatants: Paying the Price of Neglect’, Conflict, Security and Development, 2 (2), 125–134.

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Jackson, P. (2006) ‘Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards? The Politics of Local Government Reform in Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 106 (422), 95–111. Kagawa, F. (2005) ‘Emergency Education: A Critical Review of the Field’, Comparative Education, 41 (4), 487–503. Kemokai, A. (2007) The Role of Young People in Local Governance and Accountability Particularly Regarding their Education and Employment in Sierra Leone. Report for the Young Men’s Christian Association, Sierra Leone. Kuterovac, G. J. and Kontac. K. (2002) ‘Normalisation: A Key to Children’s Recovery.’ In Children and Disasters: A Practical Guide to Healing and Recovery, eds. W. N. Zubenko and J. A. Capozzoli (New York: Oxford University Press), 135–158. Layder, D. (1994) Understanding Social Theory (London: Sage). Machel, G. (1996) The Impact of War on Children (New York: United Nations). Maclure, R. and Denov, M. (2006) ‘ “I Didn’t Want to Die So I Joined Them”: Structuration and the Process of Becoming Boy Soldiers in Sierra Leone’, Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, 18 (1), 119–135. Maclure, R. and Denov, M. (2009) ‘Reconstruction versus Transformation: PostWar Education and the Struggle for Gender Parity in Sierra Leone’, International Journal of Educational Development, 29, 612–620. Marlowe, D. (2001) Psychological and Psychosocial Consequences of Combat and Deployment with Special Emphasis on the Gulf War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND). McKay, S. (2004) ‘Reconstructing Fragile Lives: Girls’ Social Reintegration in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leone’, Gender and Development, 12 (3), 19–30. McKay, S. and Mazurana, D. (2004) Where are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After War (Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development). Ministry of Education Science and Technology (2003) National Report on the Development of Education in Sierra Leone for 2003 (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone). Ministry of Education Science and Technology (2007) Sierra Leone Education Sector Plan: A Road Map for a Better Future, 2007–2015 (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone). Moore, K., Squire, C. and Mac Bailey, F. (2003) Sierra Leone National Recovery Strategy Assessment, Final Report (Freetown: United Nations Development Programme and Government of Sierra Leone). Muana, P. (1997) ‘The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-Insurgency’, Africa Development, 22 (3/4), 77–100. Murphy, W. (2003) ‘Military Patrimonialism and Child Soldier Clientalism in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean Civil Wars’, African Studies Review, 46 (2), 61–87. Peters, K. (2004) Re-examining Voluntarism: Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone. Retrieved 12 November 2008 from http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/ No100/Contents.html. Peters, K. (2007) ‘From Weapons to Wheels: Young Sierra Leonean Ex-combatants Become Motorbike Taxi-riders’, Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, 10, 1–23. Reno, W. (1995) Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

212 Social Navigation and Power in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone Richards, P. (1996) Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey). Richards, P. (2003) The Political Economy of Internal Conflict in Sierra Leone. Working Paper 21. Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. Conflict Research Unit. Rosen, D. (2005) Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press). Silberfein, M. (2004) ‘The Geopolitics of Conflict and Diamonds in Sierra Leone’, Geopolitics, 9 (1), 213–241. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2004) Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Retrieved 7 January 2009 from http://www.trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/index. shtml. Tidwell, A. (2004) ‘Conflict, Peace, and Education: A Tangled Web’, Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 21 (4), 463–470. UNICEF Sierra Leone (2005) Education Programme. Retrieved 14 October 2008 from http://www.dac-sl.org//encyclopedia/4_part/4_2/icef_edu_may05.pdf. United Nations (2006) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards. Retrieved 15 October 2008 from http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/ framework.php. United Nations Development Programme (2008) Draft Country Programme Document for Sierra Leone 2008–2010. Retrieved 15 October 2008 from http://www. undp.org/africa/programmedocs/sierra%20leone%20CPD%20-%202008– 2010%20_english.pdf. Utas, M. (2005) ‘Victimcy, Girlfriending, Soldiering: Tactic Agency in a Young Woman’s Social Navigation of the Liberian War Zone’, Anthropological Quarterly, 78 (2), 403–430. Utas, M. and Jorgel, M. (2008) ‘The West Side Boys: Military Navigation in the Sierra Leone Civil War’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 46 (3), 487–511. Vigh, H. (2006) Navigating Terrains of War: Youth and Soldiering in Guinea-Bissau (New York: Berghahn). World Bank (2003) Sierra Leone – Strategic Options for Public Sector Reform (Washington, DC: World Bank). World Bank (2007) Sierra Leone: Youth and Employment (West Africa: Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Unit).

12 Victimcy as Social Navigation: From the Toolbox of Liberian Child Soldiers Mats Utas

Introduction Child soldiers receive quite extensive attention in the Western world. In our media they are commonly portrayed with qualities which children ought not to have and as products of societies with qualities that societies ought not to have. From each African conflict zone (and commonly from elsewhere in the world as well) there are popular books written by journalists or researchers on this topic and there will be books written by child soldiers themselves, like Ismael Beah’s acclaimed A Long Way Gone (2007), from the West African country Sierra Leone. There are films with child soldiers, such as the Hollywood blockbuster ‘Blood Diamond’ (Zwick, 2006), also from Sierra Leone, or of a more independent character such as the 2008 movie ‘Johnny Mad Dog’ (Sauvaire, 2008) with a direct child soldier focus. The latter film is equally played in West Africa but in Liberia, with former combatants as actors. It shows according to the Guardian film reviewer Bradshaw that: Child soldiers [are] – just like adult soldiers, only better. They’re fitter, more agile, more fanatically ready to obey orders, as good if not better with weapons, only hazily subject to international law and crucially unencumbered with the adult’s fear or indeed understanding of death. This is the world of Africa’s infant warriors in Jean-Stéphane Sauvaire’s intestine-dissolvingly brutal and thrilling film. (Bradshaw, 2009, p. 7) And he goes on to conclude that: The power of this movie lies in persuading you that these children are entirely able to do the work of adults, including pillage and rape. 213

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Some of them have bizarre kiddy mannerisms: one has angel wings, another puts on the wedding dress of the woman whose husband he has just executed. But everything they do in the movie could easily be done by young men five or 10 years their senior (Bradshaw, 2009, p. 7) An obvious problem with the review is that it is blurring fact and fiction when discussing the film in a documentary frame. I have been researching child soldiers and the Liberian Civil War since 1997. In 2003, I defended my PhD thesis, named Sweet Battlefields (Utas, 2003), with child and youth soldiers in Liberia as the principal focus. It was based on a year of fieldwork during 1997–1998 in the capital Monrovia and in the rural town of Ganta. This was during a semi-peaceful time between the two wars. The first war took place between 1989 and 1996 and the second started in 1999. The film ‘Johnny Mad Dog’ is supposedly sequenced on the end of the second part of the war and concerned with the 2003 Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) rebel invasion of Monrovia that came at the very end of the war that consequently opened up for peace and democratic transformation.1 I have, after my work in Liberia, spent two years in neighbouring Sierra Leone, equally researching former combatants. ‘Johnny Mad Dog’ director Sauvaire too spent a year with the young boys, most of whom are ex-combatants who fought in the war, that act in this film. Sauvaire lived under the same roof as his actors. During their time together the former combatants were instructed in acting, went to school and were helped through their various traumas (among others with art therapy).2 The outcome is truly fantastic as cast and acting is seductively authentic. The same goes for the environment; to someone who has lived in Monrovia it is an additional benefit to recognize areas and buildings and sense the local flavour. This is the very opposite from watching ‘Blood Diamond’, filmed in Mozambique and South Africa, but ‘pretending’ to be Sierra Leone. Sauvaire is a master of details and one can easily imagine how much time he has spent finding the right spots. Yet how much does the film really tell us about child soldiers in Liberia? Does it take us beyond the inexplicable images of the post-modern warfare in its Kaldorian new-war suit (Kaldor, 1999)? Is it merely wicked agents preying on hapless victims? Are commanders and soldiers of these civil wars loose molecules only (Kaplan, 1994, 1997)? Are these societies’ social voids?3 We should not forget that this is a fiction film that builds up a good sense of the psychology of warzones, and its paradoxes, but it does not help

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us to explain ‘African wars’ or even the predicaments of child soldiers in Liberia, rather it builds upon and thus cements our ideas, or folk models, of what Africa is. The film, as most other Western media, buttresses Africa as the exotic other (Allen and Seaton, 1999; Richards, 1999; Utas, 2000; Shaw, 2003). This is my vantage point. In this text I will discuss how child soldiers make use of our ideas and conceptions and thus cement stereotypes of the child soldier. My intention is to show how child soldiers use these ideas as part of a tactic response to their social environment, or as social tools in their quest to navigate the delicate social landscape of postwar Liberia. I argue that a key tool in the toolbox of a former child soldier is victimcy – the agency of presenting oneself as a victim and that such victimcy is used in relation to an international audience of journalists, aid workers and academics but equally to a local audience of kin, neighbours and significant others in this landscape. One of ‘Johnny Mad Dog’s’ co-soldiers is a young frail boy in dark blue boots and light blue angel wings (see Figure 12.1 below). His presence throughout the film is passive but simultaneously felt, he appears out of place, but yet still he is very much there. In many ways he embodies the contemporary image of the passive child soldier – an angel in disguise, there to be saved. Below I will try to unravel some of the complexities around him/her. Victim complexity Imageries of child soldiers, even from worlds apart, are spookily similar as if created in an identical cast – is it due to a consistent worldwide socio-cultural set-up of wars? Or are there other factors that should be accounted for? There are sadly enough good reasons for using child soldiers, of which some are accounted for by Bradshaw in the quote opening this chapter (see, for instance, Brett and McCallin, 1996; Utas, 2003; Brett and Specht, 2004; Rosen, 2005; Honwana, 2006; Wessells, 2006). The similarity in recruitment methods is furthermore streamlining stories of child soldiers. Yet I suggest that it is our Western gaze on child soldiers, stemming from media and international nongovernmental organization (INGO) work, which is the main reason for the cyclopean picture of child soldiers. I’ll give two striking examples from the Liberian battlefield. The first one is based on observations of Western media images from 6 April 1996 Monrovia battles. I had myself been stuck in Monrovia during the first days of the 6 April battle – as a privileged Westerner I was however evacuated after a few days. After that experience I followed news events keenly and was struck by how different the war appeared in the Western media from my own


Figure 12.1 Photo from the production of ‘Johnny Mad Dog’ (Courtesy: Nonstop Entertainment)

first-hand experiences. One thing that particularly intrigued me was the fact that young children were more or less playing war in front of the cameras; it had the effect of a slightly choreographed dance. It must have marvelled the journalists as well, or slightly annoyed them, as a voice-over comment in a news clip suggested that ‘when the guns go silent the Liberian child soldiers continue to play war’.

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From my own memories I cannot recall any of this dancing and singing – warfare in Monrovia was as cold and emotionless as one would suspect. Child and adult soldiers alike acted the careful ways that anyone risking their lives would do. When I returned to Monrovia a year later, I started enquiring about these ‘dancing images’ amongst former child and youth combatants. They all agreed that they did not dance during a fight and that their behaviour was rather instigated by the presence of Western camera men and journalists. They stated that sometimes they were asked to ‘perform’ war by international journalists, at other times they just did so because they believed that it was what was expected from them. Thus they conformed to one of our folk models (and media frames) of Africa – in which Africans perpetually dance in shine and rain. They thus acted ‘African warfare’ according to ‘us’, partly the African way, but also Hollywood style warfare; the predominant images they have of ‘our’ warfare. Their acting was typically done in a lull of the fighting where soldiers had time to ‘perform’ war and when journalists were able to move around safely in town to record such action.4 From the child soldiers’ perspective it was done with the hope of getting a few dollars from the journalists. My second example is from the provincial town of Ganta. During the war Benjamin Bone Crusher manned a checkpoint in the outskirts of the town. He had received his nome de guerre from being excessively brutal, he told me when we first met. I had just arrived in Ganta and had started informing people about my interest in talking to child soldiers. One afternoon Benjamin turned up at my door step most willing to tell me about his life as a child soldier in the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) ‘small boys unit’. We found a secluded spot and he narrated a long story with ingredients such as forced recruitment, commanders that demanded military violence from children and the formation of strong loyal ‘fatherly’ bonds between commander and child soldier. He narrated the child soldier story to perfection. However within weeks neighbours of Benjamin pointed out that he had never fought for the NPFL and he had neither served as a porter nor been a junior aide for soldiers within the movement – thus he did not conform even to the broadest definition of a ‘child soldier’ by being a CAFF (Children Associated with the Fighting Forces), as discussed below. Benjamin himself soon admitted that he had made the story up. It was upon his father’s suggestion and the aim had been to enrol in a skills training programme especially directed towards ex-combatants and set up by an international charity. They thought that I, as a ‘white’, would be the perfect


broker. Benjamin did not make his way into the training programme, but in due time his father and I became friends. The forced recruitment story As an opening scene in the film ‘Johnny Mad Dog’, Johnny and his crew are seen entering a house, looking for loot. They capture a young boy in a pink shirt – this is his school uniform and signalling both his young age and him being another ‘type’ of kid than the child soldiers.5 The boy is subsequently forced to kill his own father. This is one of the most forthcoming stereotypes of child soldier recruitment in Liberia and other African wars. The underlying idea is that children would never be recruited into armies were it not for adults in the guise of ruthless commanders forcing them to carry out gruesome atrocities, where the most symbolically laden is the killing of one’s own close kin – an act which in all clarity shows the breach between right and wrong behaviour, social and asocial beings. Commanders are ruthless, no question about that, but my own research in both Liberia and Sierra Leone has showed a quite different picture. At the beginning of my research in Liberia, all child soldiers stated that they had been directly forced to join a rebel army. The forceful killing of the father, or someone else of close kin, was a common story that was narrated to me. Another was the rebel army coming with trucks and just picking children and young men up at gunpoint. However in my own work, after a few months staying with the same group of young people, interacting on a daily basis, I was intrigued by how their stories changed. In the end none of the former combatants that I worked with maintained that they were recruited by direct force. When a deeper trust was established, they simply changed narratives. I am not implying that there is no forced recruitment in African wars, but I can say for certain that it is a lot less common than popular ideas propose.6 It should however come as no surprise that children and young adults are less prone to admit that they joined a rebel army due to lack of other possibilities, some scant hopes for possible prosperity or were sent off by parents prone to locate protection in an unstable and unpredictable situation (Utas, 2003). It should thus be highlighted that child soldiers are more frequently victims of social and military structures, and structural/systemic violence (Galtung, 1969; Žižek, 2008) than of direct force (Utas, 2003). It is also no surprise that children in front of aid donors pretend to be as innocent as possible to get whatever possible advantages in their fragile post-combatant lives. I have called this victimcy – the agency (albeit structurally limited) of

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victims (Utas, 2003) – and have elsewhere given accounts of this phenomenon from a gender perspective (Utas, 2005b, 2005c), but also of what methodological implications it has (Utas, 2004).

Victimcy as a tool in the toolbox of child soldiers Social navigation is, according to Danish anthropologist Henrik Vigh, ‘motion within motion requiring both an assessment of immediate dangers and possibilities as well as an ability to envision the unfolding of the social terrain and to plot and actualise one’s movement from the present into the imagined future’(Vigh, 2006, p. 52). It ‘thus refers to the praxis of immediate survival as well as to gaining a perspective on changing social possibilities and possible trajectories’ (Vigh, 2006, p. 52). Victimcy is clearly a form of social navigation; a navigatory tool used by child soldiers as tactic responses to their socio-economic environment (Certeau, 1984; Utas, 2005b; Honwana, 2006) and thus a response to other social agents and agencies in war and post-war settings. Victimcy is based on social expertise of the environment and a successful navigator must be able to read social expectations and formulate narratives that fit a variety of situations. Although child soldiers are fragile navigators often making practically ‘choice-less decisions’ (Aretxaga, 1997) their success, and at times even their ultimate survival, is dependent on such skills (Utas, 2005a). Above, I gave an example of how child soldiers, with an impressive awareness of Western media expectations, performed war in front of cameras to obtain a few dollars. A young Monrovian street boy that I became to know also told me how he pretended to have been a child soldier when meeting with Western journalists. He had been interviewed, photographed and filmed several time based on his ‘invented’ narratives of his ‘pretended’ life as a child soldier and although he had never fought he still mastered the stories. That his facial appearance conformed to our stereotype of a battle-hardened and aggressive child soldier made story and visual image a perfect match. (I actually have a picture of him with an AK 47 and a teddy bear backpack pinned on my office notice board. The picture is taken by a, to me unknown, photographer and has been widely published in the world media.) His stories conformed to stories of the child victim and the navigatory aspect of it was both to get some instant cash and had the intention of finding a sponsor that could help him with education and resources for personal development. He was part of a group of street kids that skilfully manipulated journalists and INGO people to sponsor them. They generally used an equally standardized war orphan narrative, rather than


the child soldier narrative, to navigate post-war Monrovia. They often had a number of international aid workers sponsoring them at the same time. Although the international aid community was relatively small and knew each other quite well, the children managed, by calling themselves a variety of different names, to keep their sponsors unaware of other INGO colleagues equally sponsoring them. Many of these children, in their turn, aided parents and/or siblings financially. Benjamin Bone Crusher had, just as many of these Monrovian street boys, not fought in the civil war, but he, and not the least his father, had a clear understanding that conforming to a child victim narrative – shaped in a child soldier mould – was a way of gaining access to the educational system in the international Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) framework.7 In addition to monetary benefits that were delivered in relation to handing in guns and ammunition, DDR also included aspects of rehabilitation and partial access for ex-combatants to reintegration programmes. In the fragile peace after the 1996 battles, and more so after the 1997 elections that ended the first war, a plethora of INGOs invested throughout the country into reintegration projects for ex-combatants, as part of a United Nations (UN) directed effort to structurally stabilize Liberia. Many projects focused on training courses for underage soldiers.8 Typically skilled training programmes taught ex-combatants carpentry, masonry and mechanics – thus masculine hands-on skills. I have elsewhere argued that such programmes seldom lead to stable post-training incomes and that the reintegration component frequently leads to socio-economic remarginalization instead of the intended reintegration (Utas, 2005a). Despite this fact many young people fought hard to get admission to these programmes and many ended up disappointed after concluding it. Although the intention to gain admission to free education within the skills training programme at first appeared as a good opportunity for Benjamin, my research suggests that it was quite probably a blessing in disguise for him that he was not admitted because certificates from such institutions may paradoxically be a hindrance because they mark the bearers as ex-combatants rather than holders of important skills. On the other hand, the tactic skills of victimcy hold no guarantees for strategic success. The above cases show the extreme manipulation of a system where children who did not fight pretended to have fought as part of their social navigation in a fragile post-war geography. Commonplace victimcy narratives were however those of children and youth who had fought but severely downplayed their active participation. In these

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narratives the construction of an initial moment of forced recruitment was generally followed by occurrences of forced violence, and/or severe manipulation of the individual, through rituals or political ‘brainwashing’ – media accounts, books and films are all rife with these ingredients. Although all this certainly did occur within Liberian rebel movements, it did not take the extreme shape as suggested in narratives of ex-child soldiers. I suggest it should rather be seen as an outcome of victimcy narratives. So far I have only pointed towards international journalists and aid workers as audience and receivers of victimcy narratives, but there are additional, and even more crucial, audiences. These audiences are from the child soldier’s own family and/or home community – they are from within the communities where child soldiers aim to reintegrate into. If a child was sent away by family, kin or community to fight for them, as was quite normal in, for instance, Nimba County early in the war, or placed in a rebel movement in a bid to improve security for a family, then reintegration and return to home communities worked fairly well (Utas, 2005a). However, for those who joined the rebel movements on a more individual basis it became crucial to come home not just in a better financial or social situation – showing one’s family that after all the war was a worthwhile endeavour (Utas, 2005a) – but also to pronounce the victim status of the self. Family and home communities are probably the most important setting for child soldier victimcy because nowhere else is it more important to dissuade one’s guilt. There are a myriad of cases where ex-combatants have been prevented from returning and reintegrating in their home communities by kin or community. Child soldiers are very much aware of this and victim narratives are thus essential tools in the toolbox of the navigating child soldier to socially reintegrate and locate post-war livelihoods. Child porters: An apprentice culture I briefly want to return to the images of child soldiers playing war in the streets of Monrovia as there is another layer of complexity to unravel here. Remember that the child soldiers were acting war, and remember how they also narrated stories from their participation. There is something more to that story. According to the Cape Town principles (1997): A child soldier is any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and


anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms. Albeit the Cape Town principles, and also the various UN resolutions covering the use of child soldiers, have a broad and inclusive conception of what a child soldier is, we still tend to think of child soldiers as combatants only. This notion is strengthened by the eye-catching images of child soldiers found in our media that I have made reference to earlier. But there is clearly a contradiction between the broad legal child soldier definition and the child combatant proper. Many children fall into this internationally conceptualized category of child soldiers through having support roles to soldiers – sometimes referred to as Children Associated with the Fighting Forces (CAFFs) – and in the processes of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants it is important that they can also benefit from projects of that kind, whether they are always successful is another story (Utas, 2005a). Yet little attention has been drawn to the fact that many of the child soldiers that we see in the pictures (and to some extent hear) have such support roles in rebel and national armies. Child porters within rebel movements frequently carry arms for older soldiers when there are no ongoing battles. Some of the youngest (typically between 9 and 12 years old) are thus, during a lull in the battles, photographed with arms and their stories are given international media attention. They certainly know how to pose and they know the stories of older soldiers by heart and want to tell them, as they aspire to become like them one day. Young children within the armies learn to mimic soldiers to perfection – some of them do not participate in armed battles because they are physically (and often also psychologically) too weak to be efficient soldiers, but they function perfectly as porters, guards at checkpoints and other tasks at the fringes of the spectacle of war. Children from 15 and upwards, however, start to become efficient on the battlefield and are typically promoted within rebel armies. In societies like the Liberian, where national state functionaries have typically worked towards dismantling and have partly managed to destroy more local (some would call it traditional) governing structures, yet at the same time failed, or actively relented to efficiently replace them with something else (Utas, 2009 and for a general African outlook see Chabal, 2009), socio-political networks based on nodal key actors,

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often referred to as Big Men, have become instrumental for individual security arrangements as well as social mobility (Utas, 2008b). Being ‘behind’ Big Men – by others labelled as ‘being for somebody’ (Bledsoe, 1990), and a ‘rights-in-person’ complex (Kopytoff and Miers, 1977) – is on all social levels and abstractions both the politic and economic logic upon which social order is built. It is a fragile, yet extremely fluid and adaptable system. Commanders typically became the Big Men for child soldiers during the war years. However, some of these commanders were Big Men to these children already prior to the war, as they were teachers, football coaches or gang leaders in local communities. At times these Big Men joined rebel armies and brought with them a number of children who were socially ‘behind’ them. At other times, local Big Men expected people who were ‘behind’ them to join, or send a son/daughter to a movement that they sympathized with, or simply connected socially, politically or financially with (Utas, 2008a). Children thus came ‘behind’ a soldier or commander that they were expected to remain loyal to. Big Men/commanders had in their turn certain moral and financial commitments to their followers. Children who were not taken care of by their Big Man tried to find other and alternative Big Men to be ‘behind’.9 The civil war in Liberia transformed social networks as entrepreneurs of violence rose in prominence. Many networks militarized and followers ‘behind’ Big Men found out that violence was a prerequisite quality and that mastering violence became a successful means for social mobility both within network and society. Young people, at times children, who successfully mastered violent means, rose to prominence and became senior commanders, commanding large followings of at times even older soldiers. Yet most children maintained junior positions as rank-and-file soldiers. It has been suggested that by the end of the war these young soldiers should be a group of unruly youngsters controlled by no one. However, this has not been the case; most ex-combatants have remained loyal to their former commanders, staying ‘behind’ them. The few times there have been direct incidents of violence it has not been anarchic and haphazard, but rather planned actions by Big Men – often the old ones, but as networks constantly change new Big Men have also emerged – instigating their followers.10 With a social logic of being ‘behind’ Big Men child soldiers also used victimcy narratives as a way of maintaining positions in such power relations. Showing no agency is a way of bowing in front of power and thus not upsetting the political game plan. Showing agency, or


active participation, would be taken at face value as challenging other political actors and thus no longer being behind somebody, but quite the contrary a person aiming at turning into a Big Man.

Victimcy – What does it teach us? I have in this text presented an alternative reading of why children participated in the Liberian Civil War. I have also showed the victimcy logic behind narrating victim stories. An obvious result of this is that researchers, policy writers and people dealing with practical interventions need to be much more thorough when collecting stories of child soldiers. Furthermore, if child participation has less to do with direct force of commanders and other ruthless adults, and more with social structures, we need to pay much more attention to the social environment. If we aim at successful interventions, we need to unravel the structural/systemic violence of a particular country (region for instance) and counterbalance it to help the individual child to tackle its daily life in a post-war situation. If a child soldier is dependent on a Big Man, it does not work to simply destroy the link to that Big Man, educate him or her in carpentry and reinsert him or her into society with a toolbox in their hand. A hammer and a carpenter’s plane does not make one reintegrated. It is rather the social toolbox with tools to navigate postwar society that is important. Victimcy is, as I have proposed in this text, is such a tool. Albeit victimcy obviously works in relationship to a variety of actors, it is hardly empowering. Quite the contrary, victim narratives strengthen the sentiments of powerlessness and marginality. Child soldier’s active narratives, on the other hand, have an empowering potential and are thus important to build post-war livelihoods upon.11 Finally, I am thinking of another Johnny – hardly a mad dog – whom I encountered in a refugee camp close to the Sierra Leone border. Johnny was about nine at the time. He had recently crossed over the Sierra Leone/Liberia border together with hordes of soldiers from the runaway Sierra Leone Army (SLA). He told me how he had initially got lost when the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) attacked his village in rural Sierra Leone and that he had subsequently not been able to locate his family. To stay alive he had located an RUF soldier who had promised to take care of him. In exchange small Johnny helped him with household chores such as collecting food and cooking, carrying stuff when they were relocating. Johnny never really fought until one day when the SLA attacked the RUF camp. The SLA was the stronger party and pushed the RUF back. In an effort to inflict some

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damage on the enemy forces Johnny was given a gun and instructed to hide in a hole in the ground. He was then supposed to wait until the enemy soldiers had passed and simply attacked them from the rear – it was a classic ambush, but he was alone and just a kid who could hardly push the trigger. Johnny did what he was told, but was instantly captured by SLA soldiers. Johnny was lucky that they did not execute him, yet he was subsequently taken by a SLA soldier to carry out the same tasks as he had previously done for the RUF soldier. When the military junta was ousted in Freetown the rural SLA group he was part of had to escape the country as well. In the Liberian refugee camp Johnny maintained his loyalty to the soldier that had taken care of him. In Johnny’s eyes, as in so many other soldiers and army/rebel followers I have encountered, I chiefly saw emptiness, an emptiness sustained by uncertainty, fear and an extensive abuse of marijuana. Small Johnny, or the fictive child soldier character in blue rubber boots and angel wings in ‘Johnny Mad Dog’, are disturbing images that the world must not be allowed to forget. Yet different attention is needed to the tragic stories of child soldiers in countries like Liberia. In drawing attention to the victimcy of child soldiers, I hope that we in the future can open our eyes to the variety of stories that active, yet structurally limited, if not forced, children in conflict obviously do experience and that we thereby get away from that dominant single narrative victim child soldier mode which currently decides international agendas of how to deal with the problem and that tragically obfuscates, rather than aids, the reintegration of child soldiers worldwide.

Notes 1. The focus on real events is however of secondary importance. The plot is adopted from a book with events played out in the Republic of Congo. Refer Dongala, E. (2006) Johnny Mad Dog (New York: Picador). 2. Subsequently the Johnny Mad Dog Foundation was established (http://www. jmdfoundation.org/). 3. In a seedy bar in downtown Monrovia I once met up with a Greek businessman, basing his income in West Africa on combining arms trade and doing road construction (among others doing work for the European Union). When I told him that I studied the space of child soldiers in the social structure of Liberia, he immediately responded that there is no social structure in Africa, and that I should take that from a person who ‘had killed more Africans than I could ever imagine’. 4. Another curious detail in many photos is that they are shot facing the soldiers. If it would have been during a battle, the photographer would have been situated in between two fronts with limited chances for survival.


5.

6.

7.

8.

9. 10.

11.

Soldiers from the United Nations peacekeeping troops to Liberia have collected a series of pictures in a PowerPoint document from the war where they from a military point of view could point out the absurdity in some of the poses should by rebel soldiers. That he never gets to carry a real gun, but rather a wooden replica also highlights this fact. And that he is killed with this replica in his hand symbolizes that he is killed in a war that is not really his. Yet in reality it was not only those with the least education that became soldiers in the rebel armies. Even from Northern Uganda, where the Lord’s Resistance Army is generally believed to recruit through kidnapping only, new alternative evidence is turning up (see especially Lanken, 2007), but also Finnström (2008). After the second Liberian Civil War the international community added another R to the acronym turning it into a Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) Programme. The number of underage soldiers that fought in the first war is hard to determine, but a guesstimate is that they were around 20,000 (Utas, 2003, p. 25). However, one has to remember that many joined the rebel armies as underage soldiers but were well over 18 at the end of the first war and could thus not demobilize with the benefits of underage soldiers. There is a very similar logic for girlfriends (see Utas, 2005b). See Hoffman (2007) for an instructive example of how these war networks are used in Liberia. See also Christensen and Utas (2008) for an example of how military networks were used by democratic parties in post-war Sierra Leone. In a similar vein psychologists dealing with survivors of sexual abuse commonly focus on issues of participation instead of mere passivity in their work towards re-empowerment.

References Allen, T. and Seaton, J. (1999) The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence (London: Zed Books). Aretxaga, B. (1997) Shattering Silence: Women, Nationalism, and Political Subjectivity in Northern Ireland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Beah, I. (2007) A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux). Bledsoe, C. (1990) ‘ “No success without struggle”: social mobility and hardship for foster children in Sierra Leone’, Man, 25, 70–88. Bradshaw, P. (2009) ‘Johnny Mad Dog (film review)’, Guardian, London, 22 October. Brett, R. and McCallin, M. (1996) Children the Invisible Soldiers (Stockholm: Rädda Barnen). Brett, R. and Specht, I. (2004) Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Certeau, M. d. (1984) The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press). Chabal, P. (2009) Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London: Zed Books).

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Christensen, M. M. and Utas, M. (2008) ‘Mercenaries of democracy: The “Politricks” of remobilized combatants in the 2007 general elections, Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 107 (429), 515–539. Dongala, E. (2006) Johnny Mad Dog (New York: Picador). Finnström, S. (2008) Living with Bad Surroundings: War, History, and Everyday Moments in Northern Uganda (Durham, NC: Duke University Press). Galtung, J. (1969) ‘Violence, peace and peace research’, Journal of Peace Research, 6 (3), 167–191. Hoffman, D. (2007) ‘The City as Barracks: Freetown, Monrovia, and the Organization of Violence in Postcolonial African Cities’, Cultural Anthropology, 22 (3), 400–428. Honwana, A. M. (2006) Child Soldiers in Africa (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press). Kaldor, M. (1999) New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). Kaplan, R. D. (1994) ‘The Coming Anarchy’, Atlantic Monthly, 273 (2), 44–76. Kaplan, R. D. (1997) The Ends of the Earth: A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy (New York: Vintage Departures). Kopytoff, I. and Miers, S. (1977) ‘African “slavery” as an institution of marginality’, in I. Kopytoff and S. Miers (eds) Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press), 1–81. Lanken, C. (2007) Somebody from the Bush: Rethinking Abduction, Homecoming and Story-Making in War-Torn Northern Uganda (University of Aarhus – unpublished Master’s thesis). Richards, P. (1999) ‘Out of wilderness? Escaping Robert Kaplan’s dystopia’, Anthropology Today, 15 (6), 16–18. Rosen, D. M. (2005) Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press). Sauvaire, J.-S. (2008) ‘Johnny Mad Dog’ (France: TFM Distribution). Shaw, R. (2003) ‘Robert Kaplan and “juju journalism” in Sierra Leone’s rebel war’, in B. Meyer and P. Pels (eds) Magic and Modernity: Interfaces of Revelation and Concealment (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), 81–102. Utas, M. (2000) ‘Liberian doomsday carnival – Western media on war in Africa’, Antropologiska Studier, 66–67, 74–84. Utas, M. (2003) Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War (Uppsala: Dissertations in Cultural Anthropology (DiCA), Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, Uppsala University). Utas, M. (2004) ‘Fluid research fields: studying excombatant youth in the aftermath of the Liberian Civil War’, in J. Boyden and J. d. Berry (eds.) Children and Youth on the Front Line: Ethnography, Armed Conflict and Displacement (Oxford: Berghahn Books). Utas, M. (2005a) ‘Building a future? The reintegration and re-marginalisation of youth in Liberia’, in P. Richards (ed.) No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (Oxford and Athens: James Currey and Ohio University Press), 137–154. Utas, M. (2005b) ‘Victimcy, Girlfriending, Soldiering: Tactic Agency in a Young Woman’s Social Navigation of the Liberian War Zone’, Anthropological Quarterly, 78 (2), 403–430.

228 Victimcy as Social Navigation Utas, M. (2005c) ‘Agency of victims: young women in the Liberian Civil War’, in A. Honwana and F. De Boeck (eds.) Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa (Oxford: James Currey), 53–80. Utas, M. (2008a) ‘Abject heroes: marginalised youth, modernity and violent pathways of the Liberian Civil War’, in J. Hart (ed.) Years of Conflict: Adolescence, Political Violence and Displacement (Oxford: Berghahn Books), 111–138. Utas, M. (2008b) ‘Liberia Beyond the Blueprints: poverty reduction strategy papers, Big Men and informal networks’, Lecture Series on African Security, http://150.227.5.137/upload/projects/Africa/Utas%20Liberia%20Beyond% 20the%20Blueprints.pdf, 2008:4, Uppsala: FOI/NAI. Utas, M. (2009) ‘Malignant organisms: continuities of state-run violence in rural Liberia’, in B. Kapferer and B. E. Bertelsen (eds.) Crisis of the State: War and Social Upheaval (Oxford: Berghahn Books), 265–291. Wessells, M. (2006) Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Vigh, H. (2006) ‘Social death and violent life chances’, in C. Christiansen, M. Utas and H. Vigh (eds.) Navigating Youth – Generating Adulthood (Uppsala: NAI Press), 31–60. Žižek, S. (2008) Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (New York: Picador). Zwick, E. (2006) ’Blood Diamond’ (USA: Warner Bros).

Survival


13 Mozambique Life Outcome Study: How Did Child Soldiers Turn Out as Adults? Neil Boothby

War and child recruitment Mozambique’s armed conflict lasted for almost 30 years (Hanlon, 1984; Vines, 1991). It ended in 1992 when a peace agreement was reached between the government, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the principal guerrilla group, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). During this longstanding conflict, the principle method of child recruitment was forced, often coercive and abusive (Boothby et al., 1991). This chapter will outline the four main actors that were involved, describe the impetus and design of the Mozambique Life Outcomes Study, and discuss the process of rehabilitation in a rehabilitation centre in Maputo and reintegration in the first two years after returning from war. In these years, the components of reintegration are explored, including community support and interaction, spiritual recovery, education, livelihoods and social roles. The brutality and longevity of the conflict in Mozambique bring to bear the serious implications for children in war; in what they experience and carry forth as the upcoming generation, but also what they miss, having been removed from a ‘normal’ childhood. As one of the few longitudinal studies of child soldiering, the Mozambique Life Outcome Study offers insights, not only into the negative effects of child soldier, but also into the possibility of ‘good’ outcomes, even in light of severe traumatic events. It further gives a context for viewing the efficacy of reintegration support following extreme traumatic events, though a holistic, multi-faceted lens. 231

232 Mozambique Life Outcome Study

Government forces As the conflict continued without any likelihood of military victory and with conditions in the government army deteriorating, recruitment became more and more difficult, as young people tried to avoid it by fleeing across national borders. To keep up numbers, the military at times resorted to forced recruitment at public places: schools, markets, bus stations and recruitment centres for migrant labourers. These campaigns were publically known as ‘taking shirts off operation’ (operacao tira camisa), as recruiters took the shirts off the boys to avoid them running away. As many young people did not have identity documents to begin with, their physical appearance determined recruitment. The government did not recruit very young children; however, the total number of demobilization soldiers after the peace agreement who had been recruited under the age of 18 showed that significant numbers of children had been recruited by the governmental armed forces. The majority of recruits were forced to stay in the army for over two years.1 RENAMO forces It has been well-documented that the majority of members of the RENAMO armed forces were kidnapped and forcibly trained and integrated into the armed forces, including very young children 8–14 years old (Morgan, 1990; Vines, 1991). In many cases, children would become separated from their families during an attack, and be kidnapped alone, with a brother or with a friend. On other occasions, they would be abducted with their family and sometimes with large parts of their communities. At base camps, boys and girls would be separated from their families. Boys would receive training and be integrated in the armed forces. Girls would serve commanders and soldiers as wives, servants and cargo carriers. The recruitment and use of children as soldiers was more intensive in the south owing to the absence of adult men in rural areas due to the tradition of migrant labour. During the final years of the conflict, RENAMO recruited students or youngsters largely from the north who had dropped out from school, promising scholarships and good jobs within the movement. Militias in the government-controlled areas The use of armed militias to defend communities and infrastructures from armed attacks by RENAMO was widespread in governmentcontrolled areas. They were (in theory) volunteers of the community

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who were not paid. But often coercion was employed and if they refused they could be accused of being a RENAMO supporter and imprisoned or killed. Adolescent males (14–17 years old) with no possibility of continuing their education were included in these militias. Militia protecting key economic and infrastructure interests did get paid. Ex-government soldiers were recruited for these tasks. Naparamas: People’s self-defence forces In some of the northern provinces, particularly Zambezia and Nampula, traditional leaders emerged who proclaimed that they were able to vaccinate people against the bullets of RENAMO. The most noted group was the Naparamas in Zambezia. They did not use firearms. Many people joined these forces of self-defence, including women and school children. These groups were from time to time effective. They managed to liberate extensive zones and populations from RENAMO control, handing them over to the government. Women joined to free their children from RENAMO military bases. In some areas, large numbers of children dropped out of school to join the Naparamas.

The Study The Mozambique Life Outcome Study focused on children abducted and trained for combat by only one of the above groups: RENAMO. It began in 1988 with 40 boys who, after being captured by government forces, were taken to a rehabilitation centre in Maputo, the nation’s capital. Early data collection was thus undertaken in the context of the rehabilitation programme. It included life histories; RENAMO-related experiences (events, severity and duration); and, behavioural assessments, including aggression, trauma and pro-social behaviour. By 1989, all of these boys were reunited with parents or extended family members in Gaza, Maputo and Inhambane provinces (where they had lived before their abductions). A national research team consisting of nongovernmental organization (NGO) staff and university students visited these former child soldiers twice a year for two years (1990–1992). Data collection focused on reintegration issues, including family reunification, community acceptance, educational progress and livelihood pursuits. In 2004–2005, a research team was reassembled (Columbia University, NGO and Mondalane University) to explore adult outcomes. For this final phase of research, a free listing exercise was conducted to better understand what it means to do well as an adult in rural Mozambique (Bolton and Tang, 2002). Based on these results, the


research team collected data on housing, off-frame earnings and their roles as spouses, parents and neighbours.

Findings This section outlines the main findings from this Life Outcome Study. It begins with the boys’ RENAMO experiences, makes general observations about their attitudes and behaviours while at the rehabilitation centre, describes their early reintegration experiences and concludes with adult outcome data. RENAMO Experiences All 40 boys were abducted by RENAMO forces after attacks on their villages or schools. The boys were between 6 and 16 years old when the abductions took place and all were taken to base camps. None of them were accompanied by a parent, while most of them had friends or siblings when the abductions first took place. They remained with RENAMO for between two months and three years. Their functional roles ranged from spies, cooks, cleaners and porters to combatants and junior leaders of combatants. Collectively, the boys’ stories offer insights into how RENAMO socialized them into violence. Their adult captors relied on physical abuse and humiliation as the main tools of indoctrination. In the first phase of indoctrination, RENAMO members attempted to harden the boys emotionally by punishing anyone who offered help or displayed feelings for others, thus conditioning them not to conspire to question the group’s authority. Boys were then encouraged to become abusers themselves. A progressive series of tasks, taking the gun apart and putting it back together, shooting rifles next to their ears to get them used to the sound, killing cows, culminated in requests to kill unarmed human beings. Boys were expected to assist adult soldiers without question or emotion. Those that resisted were often killed. Those that did well became junior ‘chiefs’ or garnered other rewards such as extra food or more comfortable housing. There were three ‘junior chiefs’ among the 40 boys at the Maputo rehabilitation centre. Upon reaching the final stages of training, normally after their first murder, RENAMO marked the occasion with ceremonies that resembled traditional rites of passage. This process of mimicking traditional ceremonies appeared to be aimed at usurping the boys’ ties to their families, communities and traditional ideas of right and wrong.

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Rehabilitation centre One of the rehabilitation team’s initial observations was the range of behaviours the boys exhibited when they first arrived at the centre in Maputo. Some appeared listless and numbed, unable or unwilling to talk or engage in organized activities. Others were anxious and active. Younger boys interacted with adult caretakers as soon as they entered the centre; older ones avoided contact or communication with adult staff altogether. Some did not interact with peers, others engaged openly with one another, a few older boys bullied younger ones and some engaged in fights and high-risk behaviour. Mozambican volunteer caretakers recorded their observations of the boys’ behaviour while they were at the Maputo centre. The following synthesizes volunteers’ observations during the first three months at the centre: [When they first arrived] there was fighting between the different groups of boys from Inhambane, Gaza, and Maputo provinces. Three boys continued to act like the [RENAMO] leaders, ordering other boys to obey or steal things for them. A lot of the boys lied to get their way and stole whatever they could. They did not think if something was right or wrong; they just took what they wanted. At night when the lights went out, several boys pulled out homemade knives to protect themselves. The fighting lasted until the boys went to [the local] school where neighborhood students called them banditos. Then they stopped fighting each other and joined together to defend themselves against other students. We [the caretakers] were frightened of the boys, too. None of us wanted to work with them at first. We thought they were going to hurt us. But day by day, each side began to get to know the other better. After about a month, the situation improved. We think the boys realised that we were different from RENAMO. We also realised they weren’t going to hurt us either. After a while we just started treating them like our own children. We joked with them, watched their football games, encouraged them to do their homework, made the younger ones sit on our lap. It was difficult because some of them insulted us at first, and argued when they did not get what they wanted. A child behaviour inventory protocol was used to record observations of the boys’ behaviour at the centre at one- and three-month time intervals. These observations roughly parallel the descriptive account provided above. Considerable ‘normalization’ of individuals’ behaviour


took place during the initial three months of intervention at the rehabilitation centre. The boys also became more cohesive as a group, demonstrating increasingly supportive and cooperative attitudes and behaviour towards one another. Leadership dynamics shifted as well: the three former RENAMO junior leaders were increasingly marginalized, no longer able to dominate younger boys, who increasingly turned to other older boys for direction and advice. Some programme staff reported that overall aggressive behaviours subsided and pro-social behaviours increased as the boys became increasingly comfortable and attached to their adult caretakers. The length of time spent with RENAMO was a factor related to these boys’ adjustments at the centre. In general, boys who spent six months or less with RENAMO (72 per cent) appeared to emerge with their basic trust in human beings and social values more or less intact. Although all of these boys had been exposed to severe trauma, and some also had participated in abuse and violence, members of this group described themselves as victims rather than members of RENAMO. The following comments are indicative of these boys’ accounts of their relationship with RENAMO: ‘We were forced to do it.’ ‘We did not have a choice.’ ‘They would have killed me if I refused to obey.’ ‘I never would have done any of this if I did not have to.’ A different picture emerged for boys who had spent one year or longer with RENAMO (28 per cent). They continued to exhibit disobedient and uncooperative behaviours during the first three months at the centre. Despite their ability to articulate the belief that violence was wrong, these boys continued to use aggression as a principal means of exerting control and social influence. One 13-year-old boy, for example, told a centre staff that RENAMO was not concerned about people’s well-being; instead, it used them ‘like animals’ to achieve its objectives. He stated that he thought this was wrong. The next afternoon, however, this same boy was observed beating up a smaller child because this child refused to steal food for him. These boys’ self-images appeared to be bound up with the persona of their captors. They rarely described themselves as victims; rather, they tended to identify themselves as members of RENAMO:

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‘I could have escaped but didn’t because I had a good position.’ ‘I was a leader and others respected me.’ ‘I first served as his [a base camp leader] personal servant. Then he made me chief of a group of other boys. I had power.’ ‘They used to follow my orders. Now [at the centre] they don’t.’ Reintegration: The first two years Family reunification All of the boys were reunited with relatives (parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles or older siblings) by April 1989. Assessment reports and videotapes of initial reunifications reveal overt and reserved joy and excitement, as well as tears and words of sorrow over time spent apart. Subsequent follow-up visits in 1989 and 1990 found that all of the boys continued to be well-received by their relatives. Only one boy required an alternative placement. He was initially returned to an uncle who shortly thereafter went to South Africa to work in the mines. The boy’s maternal aunt came forward and took the boy into her family. The following recorded comments are indicative of how these boys viewed family acceptance a year after their reunifications: ‘I was well treated; no one ever said anything bad about my participation in the war.’ ‘I was well received by my family, they made me part of the family and they shared their food with me.’ ‘They were glad to see me because they knew that I had suffered.’ ‘They paid lots of attention to me.’ ‘I was well received. They made a traditional ceremony of welcoming to inform and thank the ancestors for protecting me.’ No negative comments were recorded at that time. Community acceptance In 1989 and 1990, almost all (37/40) these former child soldiers also reported being accepted by their communities, with two exceptions. One boy reported that the community was not happy with his return and accused him of having killed their relatives: ‘A few boys called me a bandito when I came home, but my family stood for me and soon they


stopped saying those things.’ A second boy described how his lack of money led to a poor reception by his community: ‘People in my community did not pay attention to me when I came back. I don’t feel trusted because I am poor and have nothing to give to people when they ask or need things. They just say hello as they pass on the path.’ Here, the boy’s sense of not being accepted was linked to his economic situation, which he blamed on the war, rather than on the specifics of his child soldiering experiences. All other boys reported that they were received without problems or discrimination: ‘I have been well received by the community.’ ‘People came to speak with me and welcome me.’ ‘They received me well because the government brought me and they respected me.’ ‘The community treated me well. They even sacrificed a hen to commemorate my return and inform the spirits of my arrival.’ Community support for recovery and protection All of these boys went through traditional ceremonies upon return to their villages. In Mozambique these ceremonies date from pre-colonial times and are believed to be especially important when events, such as war and population displacement, upset the normal course of life. It is thought that the spirits of the victims of war or those slighted will bring bad luck or death, not only to the perpetrator but also to members of his extended family or community. Ancestral rebuke might come from simply missing a social duty or obligation toward others or might be triggered by contentious relationships among the living. A person might unknowingly activate ancestor action against another by simply harbouring hostile sentiments against that person. Within this belief system, atrocities committed during the course of a brutal war become imbued with layers of spiritual meaning, necessitating such traditional ceremonies. The traditional ceremonies afford individuals a chance to be cleansed of their acts during the war and provide protection for the community from ancestral rebuke that may be brought on because of what the child had done. Interviews in 1992 found that most former child soldiers believed these ceremonies had helped them reintegrate into community life. Their comments indicated that these ceremonies focused on a range of reintegration concerns, including repairing social ills, cleansing those that came home contaminated from the atrocities of war and resolving

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social conflict in cases where normal social roles had been perverted. Not only were these ceremonies important for these former child soldiers as individuals, but they were also reported by former child soldiers, family members and neighbours to be vital for rebuilding community trust and cohesion. These former child soldiers reported that thanking the ancestors was important for community and family cohesion because ancestors have much power over the events of daily life. Because they were highly mobile during the war, moving from base camp to base camp, their protective spirits might become confused and not know they had returned. Thus, it was important to let the spirits know that the child had returned safely, ensuring his further protection. As one former child soldier described: ‘When something special happens, like in this case my return home, it is necessary to give thanks to the ancestors.’ Traditional ceremonies also reportedly endow those returning from war with the ability to forget their experiences and begin a normal life again: ‘Yes, it was helpful because today I am leading a normal life.’ ‘There is a definite difference between before and after the ceremony.’ ‘The war memories never came back after the ritual.’ ‘Before there was something missing in my body and in my life, but after, I am OK. I came back to normal life and now I feel like the others.’ ‘It was helpful because it removed the evil that I was bringing with me. I was able to forget easily all the evils that I had, even though I still dream about it.’ While former child soldiers used the term forgetting to describe the benefits of traditional ceremonies, subsequent discussions revealed that they were referring to the shame associated with their war-related experiences rather than the actual experiences. Forgetting, in this case, was in reference to varying degrees of absolution of painful stigma associated with their participation in the war. Many reported that this internal transformation helped them to become ‘just like everyone else’. Family members and neighbours also reported that the traditional ceremonies were important because they gave the community a defence against problems that returning child soldiers could bring with them. During the war, children were forced to violate social hierarchies, sometimes killing elders and commanding their peers into battle. The righting of these wrongs and the re-establishment of social hierarchies with


deceased ancestors were priorities. While social stigma based on one’s participation in the war appeared to be minimal, family and community members still were concerned that the boys might be disruptive due to their previous indoctrination into violence. Education and economics When reunifications first took place, all receiving families were provided with basic food, seeds and tool supplies to provide some assistance with initial reintegration demands. Each returning boy also was provided with an education stipend that would enable him to return to school and continue his studies through the completion of high school. Two years later, however, none of the boys (now between 12 and 20 years old) were in school. Instead, they had dropped out to pursue other endeavours, including vocational training and apprenticeships in their home districts, as well as migrant labour opportunities in South Africa. It was at this juncture in their lives – when they stopped going to school and began to forge their own economic levies – that almost all of the former child soldiers began to struggle and doubt themselves. As the boys explained at the time (1992), their lives were bound with ‘normative expectations’ which were tied to age-related ‘time lines’. By the time they were 17, 18 and 19 years old, the normative expectation for a male was it was time to find a wife and raise a family. To do so, a male had to have secured his own house and managed some semblance of savings. Normally, this entails spending a period of time in South Africa working in the mines, or for a lucky few, securing a regular (formal sector) government or private sector job within one’s home district. For the older boys, time spent in RENAMO disrupted this normative wage earning time line: there was not enough time to work in South Africa, secure a house and find a wife. Boys who returned to relatives other than parents, especially poor ones, talked about being ‘doubly handicapped’. Compromises had to be made: thatched houses instead of homes with cement floor-tin roof houses were constructed. Marginalized informal sector livelihood strategies, such as reed collecting and fishing, had to be employed. The difficult task of economic reintegration had begun. Adult outcomes To what extent has this group of former child soldiers been able to overcome the time spent away from fulfilling their normal life milestones and regain a foothold in the normative life cycle of rural Mozambique? Several indicators were employed to explore this question: household

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income, housing and food security, children’s health status and educational status. Based on this analysis, the research team concluded that 37 of the 40 former child soldiers had managed to reintegrate into their communities in mostly positive ways, even as they continued to struggle psychologically.2 Housing and off-farm income Despite disruptions to their life trajectories, this group of former child soldiers is faring as well as, and often better than, national averages for these socioeconomic and child welfare indicators. The national average for household ownership is 91.7 per cent, which matches the average of the former child soldiers (91 per cent). While 100 per cent of these former child soldiers are engaged in farming, 63 per cent of them earn additional income from wage-labour endeavours. The national average for off-farm activities of rural inhabitants in Mozambique is estimated at 38 per cent (Amimo et al., 2003). Off-farm wage labour for this population includes working in the mines in South Africa, working as guards, working on local construction projects and doing odd jobs in their communities. Many also are engaged in other informal sector income activities, including making charcoal, cutting and selling reeds from the river for cash and running small kiosks to sell agricultural produce. While these former child soldiers seem to be doing well, all reported that their daily economic situation has been, and continues to be, one of the major obstacles in their transition to civilian life. As noted above, one of the more devastating legacies of child soldiering were the years of lost economic opportunity that, in turn, made difficult the key life-cycle tasks of choosing a wife and building a family. Many of these former child soldiers reported these challenges to be more problematic than the actual experiences of the war: ‘I had no problems choosing a wife, but I have had problems because of a lack of money.’ ‘I had no resources; I had to begin everything from the beginning.’ ‘Those who did not go to the war had the time to earn some money, but I had nothing after the war.’ When asked what external assistance could have been provided by the rehabilitation centre initiative, most reported that they wished they had received a professional skill set that would have made them viable contributors to their family’s economy. Apprenticeships were


highly successful for the few boys who were able to take part; however, apprenticeships and targeted vocational training are not feasible on a national or regional level. Husbands and fathers Eighty per cent (32/40) of these former child soldiers were ‘married’ and, according to research the overwhelming majority of their spouses perceive them to be ‘good husbands’. Wives concurred with the economic hardships, noting that jobs were scarce for everyone, and indicated that they appreciated their husbands’ efforts to earn extra income. They also indicated that this extra income was usually used for food and educational support for their children. Most wives approved of the roles and commitments their husbands had in their relationships, house maintenance and childcare and support. ‘I am happy with my husband. Even though he was in the war, he is just like everyone else.’ ‘My husband helps me with the children. When I ask for money, he gives it to me if he has any. He doesn’t spend it on drinking like some other husbands.’ ‘He often looks for work. Usually, he does not find any, but when he does it helps us a lot.’ ‘I can’t complain. I am fortunate.’ ‘He is a good man. He is kind to me and takes good care of our daughters.’ All of the former child soldiers who were parents spoke, often at length, about their desires for their children to experience a better childhood than they had had. Most, in turn, indicated that the schooling that they had been denied due to their child soldiering experiences was the ‘best way’ to ensure a ‘good future’ for their children. Indeed, 75 per cent of this group’s school-aged daughters and sons were attending primary school, which is considerably above the national average of 60 per cent (UNICEF, 2005). Mozambique is in the midst of a serious food crisis in its rural areas. General estimates suggest one-third of the population is classified as chronically food insecure, mostly in the south and central regions of Mozambique, where this study took place (WFP, 2001). All of these former child soldiers and their families are affected by this crisis. Eighty per

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cent reported that they are not always able to eat or provide their children with balanced meals. A vast majority also said that the adults in their households have reduced portion sizes or skipped meals almost every month during the past year. Despite this food shortage, the weight-for-height of their children (under five years old) is above the national average. All scored above the median using the World Health Organization/National Center for Health Statistics (WHO/NCHS) normalized referenced weight-for-height scale (WHO, 1994). Most of the former child soldiers or their spouses reported their children to be in good health. Neighbours 2003–2004 follow-up research employed a ‘feeling of acceptance’ scale on which the former child soldiers overwhelming reported that they had been accepted by members of their communities. As adults, they largely feel that their friends respect them, that their families care for them very much and that their friends look out for them: ‘I can rely on my friends.’ ‘When I need something, I ask my neighbours and friends, and if they can help me, they will.’ ‘If I died tomorrow, I think that people would miss me.’ ‘Members of my community rely on me and I rely on them. It is how we live here.’ We also found that the former child soldiers’ engagement with the community is quite high. For example, 70 per cent (28/40) participate on a regular basis in community membership groups, such as their child’s school parent committee, district level agricultural cooperatives and emergency health assistant groups), while 40 per cent (16/40) hold leadership positions within these groups. Finally, interviews with neighbours, teachers and community leaders clearly indicated that the majority of these former child soldiers are viewed as valuable and ‘good’ neighbours. The most often sighted measure of being a ‘good neighbour’ is the willingness to help a fellow neighbour in need – be it the provision of money or in-kind payment (e.g., chickens) for medical services that otherwise would go wanting or personal labour to help build a neighbour’s house or a community school. Neighbours were able to provide concrete examples of ‘extending a helping hand’ in the last six months for nearly seven of


ten former child soldiers. The following comments are indicative of comments received through the final phase of our research: ‘We have accepted these boys, and they have lived with us for a long time. There is no difference.’ ‘We live together now. We are all the same.’ ‘What they did (in the past) they were forced to do, so we cannot blame them for such bad things.’ Poor outcomes Three of these former child soldiers did not fare well as adults. One of the boys, a former RENAMO junior leader, got into a fight with civilian police and was shot and killed three years after he returned to his community. He was 20 years old at the time of his death. A second boy, also a junior leader, was aggressive and abusive to his wife and was ‘exiled’ from the community. He moved to a second community where the research team found him to be alcoholic, destitute and living alone. A third boy, the youngest boy at the Maputo centre developed fullblown schizophrenia and continued to live with his mother at the age of 24 years old. All three of the former child soldiers had been with RENAMO for between one and three years. What helped over time? While none of these former child soldiers are truly ‘free’ from their past, a clear majority have managed to return to their communities and ‘take hold’ of life as it is lived in rural Mozambique. Family and community acceptance and spiritual and religious beliefs and practices – so entwined with individual well-being in rural Mozambique – appear to be the wellsprings of their resiliency. At the onset of reintegration, traditional cleansing ceremonies helped to repair relationships with their families and communities and to realign the boys’ well-being with the spirit world. The rituals enabled these boys to deepen their sense of acceptance, and helped to ameliorated degrees of guilt and shame over past misdeeds. They also represented a form of protection for community members who worried about what these boys might do once they came home. Numerous community members recalled the government-led sensitization campaigns organized immediately after the boys’ returns (1989) helped to foster community acceptance and forgiveness.

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Other forms of assistance that supported normative life cycle milestones, such as employment, housing, farming and marriage, were viewed by these former child soldiers as helpful. Apprenticeships, income generation projects, provisional seeds and tools were cited as positive forms of support. Understanding culture, beliefs and normative life-cycle expectations – including key developmental milestones and how the social systems that support them have been affected and maybe realigned – appear to be important lenses to consider when designing reintegration support programmes.

Notes 1. The Law of Obligatory Military Service passed in 1978 limits compulsory service to 2 years for citizens 18 years of age and above. Both age and duration legal protection elements were violated. 2. Mental health findings have been reported elsewhere (Boothby et al., 2006).

References Amimo, O. et al. (2003) ‘The Potential for Financial Savings in Rural Mozambican Households’, 25th International Conference of Agricultural Economists (Durban: Ohio State University). Bolton, P. and Tang, A. M. (2002) ‘An alternative approach to cross-cultural function assessment’, Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 37, 537–543. Boothby, N., Crawford, J. and Halperin, J. (2006) ‘Mozambique child soldier life outcome study: lessons learned in rehabilitation and reintegration efforts’, Global Public Health, 1 (1), 87–107. Boothby, N., Sultan, A. and Upton, P. (1991) ‘Children of Mozambique: The cost of survival’ (Washington, DC: US Committee for Refugees). Hanlon, J. (1984) Mozambique: The Revolution under Fire (London: Zed Books). Morgan, G. (1990) ‘Violence in Mozambique: Towards an understanding of Renamo’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 28 (4), 603–619. UNICEF (2005) ‘Assistance to Ex-Child Soldiers in Mozambique’, UNICEF Child Soldier Project, http://www.ginie.org/ginie-crises-links/childsoldiers/ mozambique2.html, date accessed 24 January 2005. Vines, A. (1991) Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique (London: Villiers Publications). WFP (2001) Visit of WFP Executive Board to Mozambique, 2–9 June. WHO (1994) ‘Assessing Nutritional Status and Recovery’, Integrated Management of Childhood Illness; Management of the Child with a Serious Infection or Severe Malnutrition: Guidelines for care at the first-referral level in developing countries.

14 Exclusion or Reintegration: Child Soldiers in Angola Jaremey R. McMullin

Introduction Reintegration of former fighters in Angola following the end of conflict there in 2002 has occurred against a legal and normative backdrop of increased concern for children as a distinctive category of ex-combatants, or ‘vulnerable group’ in the lingo of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).1 A burgeoning literature on child soldiers has also emphasized the special vulnerability, needs and rights of children.2 Angola’s DDR programmes designed and implemented over the last decade therefore provide a case study of whether the norms, conventions, rhetoric and programming of the child protection regime have benefited the reintegration of underage fighters. A review of Angola’s experience, however, indicates that children have largely been excluded from the formal DDR process there. The Angolan government, wary of being seen to have children absorbed into its national army, which was a precondition for demobilization and reintegration under the recent peace process, therefore opted to treat underage fighters not as fighters but as dependents of fighters, thus excluding them from formal reintegration benefits. Special emphasis on children, therefore, has not equated to targeted programming, but to the exclusion of children from programming. This chapter will analyse the consequences and reasons for that exclusion. Additionally, the chapter argues that what programmes did exist for children were not contextually appropriate and have not facilitated a meaningful post-war reintegration of underage fighters in Angola. Finally, the chapter considers these arguments in the general reintegration context, one in which the reintegration of ex-combatants, adult and children 246

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alike back into basic poverty and political marginalization has been normalized. Before assessing the exclusion of children from formal DDR processes in Angola, this chapter will first examine successive DDR processes and programmes there and will analyse child-specific programmes of DDR support. It draws on evaluations, documentation and the academic literature, as well as original interviews with officials involved with design and implementation of DDR in Angola, to assess the provision of assistance for underage fighters. It concludes that the exclusion of underage fighters from formal DDR is the product of the governance of the reintegration framework (which was jointly conceptualized and managed by the government and the World Bank, with the involvement of other international agencies and implementing partners) and also of the normative pressures of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, which paradoxically created incentives for the Angolan government to de-prioritize the reintegration of underage fighters. Finally, the chapter assesses the effectiveness of Angola’s reintegration approach for children against three criteria of success: United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1379, the UN’s Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) and a critical conceptual formulation of reintegration that prioritizes the social and political dimensions of reintegration as well as the economic one, and that allows for children to be active participants in the reintegration decisions and processes that affect them. Methodologically, the assessment section of this chapter assesses the history of Angolan and international provision for DDR assistance for children vis-a-vis the articulated norms and recommendations for ‘best practice’ in the documents discussed above. Furthermore, it employs available documentary evidence in the form of DDR programme evaluations and audits to reveal the discursive and evaluative exclusion of children from the ‘official record’ of DDR in Angola. Finally, interviews were conducted with two senior World Bank officials with programmatic responsibility for reintegration efforts in Angola. These interviews were instrumental in verifying and unveiling the strategic and programmatic assumptions underpinning choices and actions taken in Angola (both by international and domestic actors) with respect to the DDR of adults and children. The interviews also demonstrated, in the frankness of the interviewees about the institutional limitations of the World Bank when it comes to the design and implementation of DDR programmes, the disjunctures between international norms of child protection and shortcomings of capacity and experience to meet those norms.

248 Exclusion or Reintegration

Ex-combatant reintegration in Angola: 1991–2009 The civil war in Angola began in 1975 when the Portuguese colonial authority left Angola without handing over power to any one of the three pro-independence armed movements active in the country: the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA, led by Augustino Neto), the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA, led by Holden Roberto) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi). The MPLA formed an internationally recognized government, but was met with violent resistance by the FLNA and UNITA. Both groups received significant external support from the United States, South Africa and Zaire during the Cold War.3 Although the MPLA militarily defeated the FNLA in the late 1970s, UNITA continued its armed campaign until 2002, when Savimbi was killed in battle. The conflict continued even after Cold War patronage dried up, ultimately outlasting two peace processes and three UN missions. The 27-year war cost the lives of at least 500,000 Angolans and displaced millions more.4 On 4 April 2002, the government and UNITA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) at Luena, which also served as the basis for resumption of DDR activities in Angola for UNITA combatants and their dependents. The MoU did not end all conflict in Angola: low-level conflict continues in the northern region of Cabinda, where a separatist group, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), is fighting a separatist war against the government. In January 2010, a bus carrying Togo’s football team during the African Nations soccer tournament was ambushed by an offshoot of the FLEC, killing three and inuring several others. Furthermore, tensions between Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have resulted in the forced expulsion of Angolan refugees living in the DRC (including ex-combatants), and have also resulted in retaliatory expulsions from Angola of thousands of Congolese nationals (140,000 since 2003).5 As mentioned, Luena was not Angola’s first peace process. Two previous peace agreements, signed at Bicesse in 1991 and Lusaka in 1994, attempted to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate fighters on all sides of the conflict but failed. The Bicesse Peace Accords called for the cantonment and demobilization of an estimated 200,000 UNITA and government troops and the establishment of a new national army formed of 20,000 soldiers from the Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA, the government army) and 20,000 from the Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola (FALA, UNITA’s army), plus an


air force of 6000 and navy of 4000. In accordance with Bicesse, the UN Security Council authorized the second UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM-II) to oversee the process.6 But by 2 September 1992, with elections only three weeks away, only 41 per cent (just under 62,000) government and UNITA troops had been demobilized.7 Once the elections were held, neither Dos Santos nor Savimbi won a majority and rather than face a runoff, Savimbi’s UNITA denounced the results and returned to war, igniting violence worse than that which preceded the peace process with as many as one thousand people killed a day in early 1992.8 Post-mortem assessments of the Bicesse DDR argued that programmatic failures to prioritize economic reintegration of demobilized fighters, unrealistic timetables for demobilization of troops, UNAVEM-II’s lack of a reliable verification mechanism for the entire DDR process and lack of financial resources all contributed to a context of incomplete DDR at the time of the elections, which facilitated UNITA’s swift remobilization and return to conflict.9 It is difficult to overstate the impact that Angola’s 1991 return to war has had upon assumptions about DDR; it became the impetus for a shift towards the strategic prioritization of DDR in all subsequent peacebuilding missions of the UN.10 Conceptually, pressure to avoid repeating the scenario of Angola in 1991 has led DDR actors to frame the success or failure of their programmes in terms of whether a return to war occurred; success, in other words, is measured as the absence of significant re-recruitment of fighters and not an analysis of the quality and nature of the social, political or economic reintegration of fighters.11 The impact of this will be assessed below with respect to Angola’s more recent efforts to reintegrate former UNITA fighters. The Lusaka process fared no better. Signed in November 2004 after two years of high-intensity conflict, it sought to establish a more flexible timeframe for DDR and provided a more formal role for a successor UN mission, UNAVEM-III.12 Additionally, to prioritize reintegration, an Institute for the Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Military Personnel (IRSEM) was created in March 1995 to administer cash reinsertion payments to demobilized fighters and to coordinate vocational training projects. In another attempted improvement on the Bicesse process, the Lusaka process identified and aimed to provide targeted assistance to underage fighters. Reflecting learning from Mozambique in 1994, where child soldiers complained about exclusion from the DDR process, the Lusaka process allowed child soldiers to receive benefits packages equal in value to those received by adults.13


Just over 9000 children under the age of 18 were registered for demobilization. Of those, 5171 were demobilized.14 Boy soldiers were placed in cantonment areas, and subsequently given a monetary subsidy, a reinsertion package of food and clothing, and transportation to their areas of origin. Boys were meant to stay in quartering areas for six months but the majority languished there for much longer, up to ten months. The delays led many of them to leave the quartering areas without undergoing formal reintegration.15 Several of the same problems that plagued the Bicesse process recurred during Lusaka, once again leaving the DDR of both children and adults incomplete. Principal among these were demobilization delays and lack of resources for UNAVEM-III. When war once again resumed in 1998, only 60 per cent of demobilized soldiers had received their second reintegration payment and only 25 per cent their third payment; most training projects never materialized.16 The UN Security Council terminated the UNAVEM-III mission in February 1999, and war continued until the death of Savimbi and the signing of the MoU at Luena. IRSEM estimates that 191,400 combatants identified for DDR under Bicesse and Lusaka were abandoned as donors withdrew funds for programmes once war resumed.17 These combatants have come to be referred to as ‘old caseloads’ in the parlance of post-Luena DDR. The MoU included a general amnesty for all UNITA fighters and also created a framework for their demobilization and eventual reintegration. This framework stipulated that all UNITA soldiers would first be absorbed into the Angolan army and subsequently demobilized upon receipt of documentation that established their service record. The rationale for this approach was in part strategic (the government thought that processing UNITA fighters through the national army would promote reconciliation and prevent re-recruitment through counting, tracking and monitoring the demobilized) but also financial (the government wanted World Bank financial assistance for DDR but the World Bank, unlike the UN, must channel money through state governments and preferred that reintegration payments go to demobilized government army personnel and not to ex-guerrilla fighters). The Angolan army, in accordance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Optional Protocol, disallowed soldiers under the age of 18. The government also wanted to deflect attention from the use of child soldiers by both UNITA and the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). Consequently, the MoU framework for DDR effectively excluded underage fighters from UNITA’s ranks by denying their absorption into the FAA prior to DDR. Embarrassment over the use of child soldiers therefore led, paradoxically, to their further marginalization in the form


of exclusion from DDR programmes. The government decided to process under-18s as family members and not as soldiers. The negotiations leading up to the MoU also did not address the issue of child soldiers, suggesting a failure on the part of UNITA, the government and observers (including the UN) to anticipate problems and remedies for underage fighters in UNITA’s (and the FAA’s) ranks.18 Also excluded from the Luena DDR process were fighters demobilized under the Bicesse and Lusaka processes, but who did not receive reintegration assistance due to the cancellation of programmes after war resumed. The government’s plan under Luena was for a three-year programme of reintegration support to commence from the demobilization phase in April 2002, but significant delays occurred in financing the programme. Negotiations between the Angolan government and the World Bank over funding for the programme, which the World Bank eventually funded as part of its Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), ended in March 2003, and the official Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP) commenced in March 2004.19 The programme provided for ex-combatants to receive five months’ arrears, a reintegration allowance equivalent to $100, and a reinsertion kit of tools and household items.20 Programme delays occurred throughout the ADRP: by the end of 2004, only 7288 demobilized UNITA fighters were benefiting from ADRP projects,21 and demobilization toolkits were chronically delayed, with only 59.7 per cent of ex-combatants having received them 18 months after demobilization.22 The original beneficiary targets for the ADRP were largely underestimated, with a mere 80 days planned for the completion of the disarmament and demobilization of 50,000 UNITA combatants in 27 quartering areas. These plans did not make any provision for family members and dependents of the fighters. By the end of July 2002, 85,585 UNITA soldiers were already stationed across 35 quartering areas, with 280,261 family members gathered in improvised family reception areas.23 Targets, consequently, were revised upwards to plan for the quartering of 105,000 combatants plus 300,000–400,000 dependents. By the time the ADRP closed, in December 2008, 97,390 UNITA combatants had been demobilized, 52,721 had received reinsertion packages of support and 92,297 had received reintegration allowances.24 The total cost of the ADRP was US$246.3 million, with the Angolan government paying US$157 million, and the rest financed by a World Bank International Development Association (IDA) grant ($38.8 million), the MDRP (US$30.23 million) and a European Commission grant (US$20.3 million).25


A presidential decree created a national commission to manage the process, the Comissão Nacional de Reintegração Social e Productiva does Desmobilizados e Deslocados (CNRSPDD), and revived the Lusakaera IRSEM to be the implementing agency reporting to the CNRSPDD. IRSEM contracted out to larger implementing partners, usually international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as CARE and UN agencies. Often, this two-tiered management system proved unwieldy, resulting in significant payment delays.26 A supplementary joint United Nations Development Programme-Food and Agriculture Organization (UNDP-FAO) project provided agricultural assistance, vocational training, business training and business advisory services, job placement, micro-credit support and employment generation activities to 85 per cent of the total caseload of ex-combatants, although the vast majority of this total (40,716 ex-combatants) received agricultural assistance under the programme, meaning seeds and tools.27 The government, as part of its own reintegration efforts, provided vocational training for 4400 ex-combatants. Additionally, the Health Ministry provided employment for 4100 ex-combatants, and the Education Ministry hired 2360.28 The ADRP closed in December 2008, and by the end of June 2009, the regional MDRP had closed as well. A new mop-up DDR operation has since been planned to target the old caseloads from the Lusaka and Bicesse processes, as well as 33,0000 ex-combatants who, in the words of the MDRP, ‘could not receive reintegration support before the closure of the ADRP’,29 although this rationale is questionable because this number (33,000) synchronizes exactly with the 33,000 FAA soldiers whom the Angolan government had planned to demobilize before the MoU was signed and whose demobilization was postponed so the government could focus on the DDR of ex-UNITA fighters. In March 2007, 30,000 ex-FAA soldiers were demobilized. The government plans to finance the mop-up project with its own funds but international involvement will continue since the government, again according to the MDRP, will ‘rely on expertise from international consultants in the design of the operation’.30 In total, around 300,000 government and ex-UNITA soldiers have been demobilized, not including their family dependents, since the first peace agreement of May 1991.

Child-centred reintegration programmes under Luena Where do underage fighters fit into the reintegration efforts undertaken in Angola? The number of fighters under the age of 18 used by both sides


in a 27-year conflict varies drastically. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers estimates that the different fighting forces abducted 30,000 girls during the conflict, and that 16,000 under-18s were in the forces of the government and UNITA by 2002.31 Government estimates also vary but are consistently lower than this figure of 16,000. The government and the European Community put the number at 11,651 in a 2008 strategy paper.32 Earlier, in March 2003, the government estimated that under-18s had composed 10 per cent of UNITA forces at the end of the war, meaning 10,000 children based on a 1999 estimate of a troop strength of 100,000.33 The variation in figures also reflects the fact that there is no postDDR count of fighters who were under 18 in 2002, precisely because ex-combatants who were under 18 were not sent to quartering areas or absorbed into the national army prior to demobilization, both euphemisms for the exclusion of these ex-combatants from the formal Luena DDR process. For unknown reasons, the government of Angola ultimately settled on the number of 6000 underage UNITA fighters for the planning of targeted child DDR initiatives, of whom half were estimated to have served in combat roles and the other half assumed to be minors who served in non-combat support roles.34 Human Rights Watch has said the number is likely much higher, particularly since following the Cape Town definition of Children Associated with Fighting Forces (CAFF) all those in non-combat support roles should be counted as ‘child soldiers’.35 The government’s own army in 2002 included an estimated 3000 boys who may have served in combat roles during the last years of the fighting.36 Angola has a compulsory recruitment age of 20 and a voluntary recruitment age of 18 for men and 20 for women, but it was known to have included underage fighters in its ranks throughout the conflict with UNITA.37 In March 2003, the government announced that those who had been child soldiers during the war were exempt from compulsory military service, although they could still be recruited on a voluntary basis.38 Mirroring the difficulty of accounting for how many combatants under the age of 18 were present in UNITA’s army in 2002 is the problematic nature of how to define ‘child soldier’ in the context of the 27-year war in Angola, where fighters might have been children when they were recruited but were adults by the time of demobilization, or where children demobilized under Bicesse and Lusaka never received targeted reintegration assistance. Socioeconomic profiling of ex-combatants during Lusaka and Luena confirms the problematic


nature of conceptualizing ‘child soldier’ only as those who were under 18 at the time of the signing of the MoU. During Lusaka, the average age of ex-combatants was 26, with 8 per cent below 18 and 56 per cent aged 18–25, but given the average service of 8 years (i.e., one-third of the life of each soldier), it can be inferred that the majority were conscripted when they were under 18.39 At the time of the signing of the MoU in 2002, Gomes Porto et al. found that the average age of the exUNITA combatants was 36 but that the average of joining UNITA was 17.40 The distinction between adults and children, therefore, loses its salience in the context of a lifetime of fighting. Sensitive to reporting actual numbers of underage combatants (further evidence that norms against the recruitment and use of child soldiers may contribute to the exclusion of children from assistance), the government did not provide for the registration of underage combatants in quartering areas. Because underage fighters and underage individuals in support roles (e.g., boy and girl cooks and porters, and girls in – often coerced – sexual or marital relationships with adult fighters) were not absorbed into the national army, their reintegration process was considerably different from that of adults. Programmes essentially ignored underage females altogether.41 Underage male fighters were separated from adult fighters and evicted from quartering areas (the rationale being to protect them from exploitation by their adult colleagues and to guard against their re-recruitment) and instead were sent to family reception areas designed for the family members of adult combatants.42 Under-18s were therefore processed as family members and not soldiers. In the family reception centres, children had access to forms of reintegration assistance separate from that aimed at adult combatants: family tracing and reunification, family mediation services, temporary assistance in the form of shelter and food and a joint Child Protection Network (CPN)/Angolan Ministry of Social Welfare (MINARS) programme that provided psychosocial counselling, education support and vocational training.43 On paper, the government had a programme for the reintegration of underage UNITA fighters. In May 2002, it adopted a Post-War Child Protection Strategy, which provided children with birth registration and civil identification documents, access to family tracing and reunification services, education and skills training and psychosocial support.44 The problem, of course, was that access to such services was made difficult because formal demobilization of children did not occur, because there was no way to identify or track recipients. Children were also reticent to identify themselves as former fighters.45 The literature on child soldiers


stresses the need for special reception centres for children that make provision for their own reluctance to self-identify.46 In practice, therefore, the Luena policy of reintegrating former fighters after their absorption into and demobilization from the FAA meant the exclusion of underage fighters from reintegration opportunities. Under-18s released from the FAA were similarly excluded from access to reintegration: they were reunited with their families but received none of the other material and financial benefits of their demobilized colleagues who were older than 18.47 Subsequent mop-up efforts aimed to rectify the exclusion of children from formal DDR, but once young fighters fall through the cracks at the demobilization (identification) stage of the process, it is difficult to ‘re-find’ them subsequently.

Assessment of reintegration in Angola The existing assessments of DDR practitioners and academics of reintegration outcomes in Angola following the ADRP have been overwhelmingly positive and have focused on high reported numbers of ex-combatants (90 per cent) who feel accepted by the local communities receiving them,48 relatively high numbers of self-employed ex-combatants (61 per cent) with high percentages having access to land for agriculture (95 per cent)49 and a favourable general security environment (that is, the absence of resumed conflict after the MoU).50 World Bank officials involved with the programme described the ADRP as ‘very successful’ and the MDRP regional programme as ‘daring’, arguing that the Bank’s involvement in DDR in Angola brought a level of accountability and professionalism. But they were frank about the drawbacks of the Bank’s involvement too: the slow pace of delivery of Bank money which exacerbated delays, and the lack of in-house expertise about DDR in the Bank.51 But a closer look reveals a more muddled picture of reintegration. The employment numbers show that only 4 per cent of demobilized fighters post-Luena were formally employed following receipt of reintegration support, with 35 per cent reporting unemployment.52 The 61 per cent who reported being self-employed most often were engaged in subsistence agriculture or petty trading. In 2008, approximately 10,500 ex-combatants were interviewed 3–6 months after receiving their reintegration support. These interviews yielded the following results: 95 per cent have access to agriculture land; 98 per cent have established families; and 93 per cent consider themselves reintegrated into their communities of destination. The vocational training programmes,


not unlike the dismal track record of vocational training efforts in other DDR contexts, have been assessed to have had very little impact or success. Despite high levels of reported acceptance, formal social reintegration efforts (e.g., sensitization of local communities, training in civic rights and responsibilities, and information campaigns about health-related issues such as HIV/AIDS) occurred during the demobilization stage and were not sustained through the longer reintegration period.53 Practitioners and researchers have been sceptical in other regards as well. Evaluation of the joint UNDP/FAO project deemed the economic reintegration component to be ‘moderately unsatisfactory’.54 As with DDR processes in other post-conflict contexts, reinsertion and reintegration were conflated in Angola, meaning that the provision of reinsertion support (cash and toolkits) were allowed to stand in for longer term reintegration programmes and precluded the conceptualization of a community-based programme of economic, social and political support for ex-combatants and communities alike; the same conflation occurs in the measurement of success, with the non-return to war standing in for a longer term assessment of whether positive peace has been built.55 Two final evaluations shed more light on the state of reintegration in Angola today, but do not assess critically the conceptualization of reintegration and its conflation with short-term reinsertion assistance.56 Assessing the impact of reintegration programmes on Angola’s underage fighters is once again complicated by the exclusion of under18s from the MoU demobilization process. Significantly, the Final MDRP Fact Sheet does not mention children at all. Quarterly progress reports of the MDRP similarly evaded the issue, referring vaguely to ‘the delivery of specialised services for vulnerable groups’57 but never assessing the nature of assistance for such groups, or detailing who these groups were or what their particular needs might have been. The World Bank’s initial strategy report for the MDRP, however, stated that children ‘would likely represent a significant target group for national programs under the MDRP’. Furthermore, the report continued: Under the MDRP demobilisation process, children would be afforded priority assistance. Within the framework of national programs, demobilisation would be a civilian exercise conducted by child protection agencies and specialised NGOs in collaboration with the respective governments. Child ex-combatants would be identified through a specific screening procedure. They would be separated


from adult ex-combatants and from the military environment as soon as possible. Reintegration support for children would address the long-term prospects of a child’s livelihood and would be familyfriendly and community-oriented. Assistance would be based on a medium-term commitment rather than remain focused on an immediate reward. Assistance would include, in consultation with the child, family tracing and reunification, community reintegration, trauma counseling and psychosocial care, and facilitation of access to education (formal as well as non-formal) and vocational training in communities of settlement.58 The discrepancy between strategy and outcome is found in the Bank’s relationship with participating states. Although the ADRP received funds from the MDRP’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund, it was largely a nationally designed effort, and the Bank rarely interferes with state governments, preferring to work through rather than independently from them. DDR of child soldiers simply ceased to be a priority for the Bank in Angola. As one MDRP official explained, ‘The Bank doesn’t have DDR policies full stop so it is not surprising that there is no specific Bank policy on child soldiers.’59 This is in contrast to UN-led DDR processes, where the UN is mandated to discuss and monitor its efforts to target and provide programmes for children. The lack of specialized expertise or advocacy on behalf of children in Angola, therefore, is in part a function of the marginalization of the UN (and therefore of the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF)) in the process, itself a product of Angola’s distrust of the UN following the failed UN peace missions of the 1990s. The Bank’s requirement that it work with state governments, and not independently of them, may have also contributed to the lack of monitoring of, and programming for, UNITA combatants under 18. As one World Bank official explained, ‘The UN looks at DDR from a mandate point of view; the Bank looks at it from a business point of view: i.e., what is the demand for DDR from the government?’60 Thus, the Bank is providing a service that fulfils a specific demand, whereas the UN is mandated to approach an issue based on the parameters assigned by the UN Security Council. The Bank, therefore, is arguably an ill-equipped and inappropriate institution to look to for child-centred DDR. The exclusion of children from a more formal DDR process in Angola is not simply a reflection of the joint government-Bank governance of DDR but can also be interpreted as a direct result of the normative pressures of the CRC. The CRC’s norm against child recruitment into a state’s


armed forces influenced the Angolan government’s decision to block the absorption of underage UNITA fighters into the FAA. The resulting exclusion of children ought to raise serious questions about the efficacy of the CRC in addressing real-world issues related to child soldiers: if the CRC did not prevent child recruitment into UNITA or the FAA in the first place, and if it plays a direct role in dissuading governments from allowing children openly to access DDR following conflict, then what benefit is it to child protection during and after war? The CRC framework certainly has benefits, but the silence of the literature and policy documentation on this issue is disconcerting. Finally, it is possible to assess the ADRP’s provision for children against three additional available criteria, each of which revealing that the ADRP failed to provide assistance appropriately and effectively for underage fighters. The first of these is UN Security Council Resolution 1379, which details the Security Council’s commitment to underage fighters. The resolution expresses the intent of the Council ‘to call upon the parties to a conflict to make special arrangements to meet the protection and assistance requirements of women, children and other vulnerable groups’.61 It emphasizes the need for unhindered access of humanitarian personnel and goods to all children affected by conflict.62 It calls on armed parties to ‘provide protection of children in peace agreements’ and to consider the views of children in designing child-focused DDR programming,63 and indicates that special provision for children ought to include counselling, education and vocational opportunities.64 Significantly, the resolution calls on the international financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank) to ‘devote part of their assistance to rehabilitation and reintegration programmes . . . that have taken effective measures to comply with their obligations to protect children in situations of armed conflict, including the demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers, in particular those who have been used in armed conflicts contrary to international law’.65 The UN and the World Bank, in endorsing a Luena DDR framework that excluded children from the DDR process and that inadequately sought to assist them subsequent to that exclusion, failed to comply with the expectations and recommendations detailed in UNSC Resolution 1379. Furthermore, the 2000 Security Council Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the Role of UN Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration stipulates ‘child-conscious DDR programmes’ that include a minimum three-year commitment of resources and staff to ‘ensure child soldier reintegration’ via education and vocational training support.66 To date, there has been no three-year programme of support


for those individuals who were under 18 at the time the MoU was signed. The second assessment standard available to apply to the Angolan case is the integrated DDR standards adopted by the UN in 2006, adopted after the start of the ADRP but in time for any subsequent, mopup programming. According to the IDDRS, child-specific programming should be carried out by specialized child protection agencies, ensure inclusive programming for all war-affected children and ensure ageappropriate interventions for each age group.67 Similar to the SecretaryGeneral’s report (2000), the IDDRS emphasizes the long-term nature of child reintegration, stating, ‘Demobilisation and reintegration programmes for children should be expected to extend over a period of five years or more, and require sufficient funding early on in the process in order to build capacity, especially in the community to which a child returns.’68 To ensure that children gain access to formal DDR processes, the IDDRS encourages those in positions of authority over children to study and monitor their recruitment to understand how to access them: the identification of children ‘should be carried out before any other identification process’.69 None of this occurred in Angola. Finally, the programmatic components of the ADRP can be assessed against what reintegration is meant to entail: that is, the attainment of a viable civilian life for adult and underage fighters alike. Mop-up efforts to target excluded children and youth have prioritized family reunification, counselling and basic economic assistance in the form of short vocational training programmes and provision of shelter, food and tools. Missing is a nationwide conversation about, and investment in, the social and political reintegration of youth. Reintegration, after all, is an interactive process, simultaneously individual and communal that involves not simply earning the acceptance of local communities but the wholesale recreation and reordering of the social, economic and political relationships that govern family, community and national life. Reintegration is a participative process, established in the documents and instruments detailed above as necessarily including children as active agents in that process. Their exclusion from participation in Angola, evidenced by half-hearted and short-term mop-up efforts targeting children and by their initial exclusion from absorption into the FAA and therefore the ADRP, is, however, consistent with broader trends. Ikwir Rabwoni has noted an African-wide political trend towards youth exclusion from meaningful political reintegration. He argues, ‘Young people are forgotten except when politicians need to mobilise them for war or for electoral campaigns. It is very rare that young people are


mobilised in pursuit of other ideals such as peace.’70 Why does a more participative conversation with youth, and investment in the social capital of youth, not occur? The answer lies in the assumption underpinning broader DDR processes; namely, that these processes ‘succeed’ if they manage to return former fighters to lives that are roughly equal to that of the civilian community, which in the post-conflict context implies a reintegration back into poverty. To conceive of a more holistic reintegration process where children participate in decisions about their future will require DDR practitioners to take a more critical look at adult DDR as well. Only when the peacebuilding enterprise can begin to imagine a world where post-conflict reintegration of combatants and civilians, adults and children into something more than a return to poverty and marginalization is possible.

Notes 1. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), 20 November (entry into force 2 September 1990), Articles 3, 39; United Nations General Assembly (2000), Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 25 May (entry into force 12 February 2002); United Nations Security Council Resolution 1379 (2001) S/RES/1379, 20 November; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2006) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), http://unddr.org/ iddrs/ (accessed 10 June 2010); G. Machel (1996) Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, Report of Graça Machel, Expert of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, A/51/306, 26 August. 2. J. Boyden (2007) ‘Children, War and World Disorder in the 21st Century: A Review of the Theories and Literature on Children’s Contributions to Armed Violence’, Conflict, Security & Development 7 (2), 255–279; M. Wessells (2006) Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press); G. Machel (2001) The Impact of War on Children: A Review of Progress since the 1996 United Nations Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (London: Hurst & Company); I. Cohn and G. S. Goodwin-Gill (1994) Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts (Oxford: Clarendon Press); A. Honwana (2006) Child Soldiers in Africa (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press); R. Brett and I. Specht (2004) Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner); A. McIntyre (2003) ‘Rights, Root Causes and Recruitment: The Youth Factor in Africa’s Armed Conflicts’, African Security Review 12 (2), 91–99. 3. For more on the often contradictory role of external actors in fuelling conflict in Angola, see T. Collelo, ed. (1989) Angola: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Library of Congress) p. 39; P. J. Schraeder (1994) United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press); J. Stockwell (1978) In Search of Enemies (New York: W.W. Norton).

Jaremey R. McMullin 261 4. Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (2008) Uppsala University, http://www. ucdp.uu.se/database, date accessed 10 July 2010. 5. For more on the conflict in Cabinda, see H. Almeida (2010) ‘Angola Arrests a Third Rights Activist in Cabinda’, Thomson Reuters, 17 January; IRIN News (2010), ‘Angola: The Death of One Man Does Not End a War’, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 26 April, http://www.irinnews. org, date accessed 17 May 2010. For more on tensions with the DRC, see IRIN News (2009) ‘Angola-DRC: Retaliatory Expulsions Reach a New Peak’, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 13 October, http:// www.irinnews.org, date accessed 17 May 2010. 6. United Nations Security Council Resolution 696, 30 May 1991, S/RES/696. 7. United Nations Security Council (1992) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), S/24245, 7 July, para. 10. 8. Y. C. Lodico (1997) ‘A Peace that Fell Apart: The United Nations and the War in Angola’, in W. J. Durch (ed.) UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 120; United Nations Security Council (1993) Further Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the UN Angola Verification Mission, S/26434, 13 September, para. 5. 9. Lodico (1997), pp. 103, 123; J. Gomes Porto, C. Alden and I. Parsons (2007) From Soldiers to Citizens (London: Ashgate), p. 42; J. Gomes Porto and I. Parsons (2003) ‘Sustaining the Peace in Angola: An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration’, ISS Monograph Series No. 83, April, pp. 20–23; M. J. Anstee (1996) Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992–93 (London: Macmillan), p. 56. 10. As an example of the tendency to view subsequent peace processes in terms of the 1991 return to war, see International Crisis Group (2003) Dealing with Savimbi’s Ghost: The Security and Humanitarian Challenges in Angola, Africa Report No. 58 (Luanda and Brussels: ICG, 26 February), p. 6. Key documents asserting the primary importance of DDR to post-conflict peacebuilding are the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report, which called DDR the ‘key to immediate post-conflict stability’ (United Nations General Assembly and Security Council (2000) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 21 August, A/55/305 and S/2000/809, para. 42]; and the 2004 report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which stated, ‘Demobilizing combatants is the single most important factor determining the success of peace operations’ (United Nations General Assembly (2004) A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December, A/59/565, paras 227–228). 11. J. McMullin (2004) ‘Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?’, International Peacekeeping, 11 (4), 625–643. 12. Gomes Porto et al. (2007) p. 44. 13. Wessells (2006), p. 162; B. Verhey (2001) ‘Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegrating, World Bank’, Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 23, November.

262 Exclusion or Reintegration 14. Human Rights Watch (2003) Forgotten Fighters: Child Soldiers in Angola, 15 (10), April, 7. 15. Ibid. 16. Gomes Porto et al. (2007), pp. 47–48; Gomes Porto and Parsons (2003), p. 30. 17. IRSEM (2005) Sintese Informativa Sobre Reinsercao/Reintegracao Social e Economica dos Ex-Militares, PGDR, O PGDR apos 15 Mese de Implementacao (Luanda: IRSEM, July), cited in Ruigrok (2007). 18. Human Rights Watch (2003), p. 16. 19. I. Ruigrok (2007) ‘Whose Justice? Contextualising Angola’s Reintegration Process’, African Security Review, 16 (1), 84–98. 20. Wessells (2006), p. 163. 21. Ruigrok (2007). 22. Gomes Porto et al. (2007), p. 84 The authors discovered that those not receiving toolkits were less likely to consider themselves ‘reintegrated’ (p. 115). 23. Gomes Porto and Parsons (2003), p. 32. 24. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (2008) ‘Angola – Final MDRP Fact Sheet’, December, http://www.mdrp.org, date accessed 17 May 2010. 25. Ibid. 26. Ruigrok (2007). 27. United Nations Development Programme (2005) ‘Special Project to Support the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Framework of the Peace Process in Angola’, 31 December; MDRP Final Fact Sheet (2008); Gomes Porto and Parsons (2003), p. 63. 28. IRIN News (2004) ‘Angola: More Needs to [Be] Done [sic.] for Reintegration of Former Soldiers’, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 29 October, http://www.irinnews.org, date accessed 17 May 2010. 29. MDRP (2009) ‘Closing a Partnership and Looking Forward’, News and Noteworthy, 7, http://www.mdrp.org, date accessed 17 May 2010. 30. Ibid. 31. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2004) ‘Angola’, in Child Soldiers Global Report (London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). 32. Republic of Angola and the European Community (2008) Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the Period 2008–2013, p. 132, http://ec.europa.eu, date accessed 6 June 2010. 33. Republic of Angola Ministry of Social Welfare, Mesa Redonda sobre os desafios da Protecçao da Criança no processo du Reintegraçao, 7 March 2003; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2004). 34. World Bank (2003) Angola: Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, February, Report No. PID 11534, http://www.worldbank.org, date accessed 7 June 2010; Gomes Porto and Parsons (2003), p. 70. 35. Human Rights Watch (2003) Forgotten Fighters: Child Soldiers in Angola, 15 (10), April, p. 8. 36. Ibid., p. 13. 37. Child Soldiers Global Report (2008). 38. Republic of Angola Ministry of Social Welfare (2003). 39. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH/DRO A) (1995), Identificação das Expectativas Sociais e Económicas dos Militares e Desmobilizados das


40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49.

50. 51.

52. 53. 54.

55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

FAA e da UNITA, Draft Report, Luanda, UCAH/DRO, cited in Gomes Porto et al. (2007), p. 47 (Figure 2.3). Gomes Porto et al. (2007), p. 83. They also note that, because the range varied from age three to 56, reported age probably refers to when individuals were abducted or brought up within UNITA rather than the age at which they assumed combat roles. IRIN News (2003) ‘Angola: UNITA “wives” fear exclusion from government aid’, 10 March, http://www.irinnews.org, date accessed 7 June 2010. Wessells (2006), p. 163; IRIN News (2004). Gomes Porto and Parsons (2003), p. 70. Republic of Angola Ministry of Social Welfare (2003). Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2004). Verhey (2001). Human Rights Watch (2003), p. 3. Gomes Porto et al. (2007), p. 75 (Figure 4.1). The Final MDRP Fact Sheet found that 93 per cent of ex-combatants felt ‘reintegrated into their communities of destination’, but this metric does not necessarily imply that ex-combatants feel reintegrated, only that they find themselves in the community in which they wanted to settle (MDRP, 2008). MDRP (2008). The MDRP numbers are based on a sample of 10,500 ex-combatants interviewed three to six months after receiving reintegration support. Republic of Angola and the European Community (2008). MDRP (2009) ‘MDRP Partners Gather for the Last Time at the World Bank’, News and Noteworthy, 3, http://www.mdrp.org, date accessed 17 May 2010; author’s interviews with MDRP and senior World Bank officials (2010), Washington, DC, 7 April. MDRP (2008). Ruigrok (2007). World Bank (2005) Implementation Completion Memorandum (ICM), Special Project to Support the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Framework of the Peace Process in Angola, TF052486, 31 December. Gomes Porto et al. (2007), pp. 19, 142–143; McMullin (2006); Ruigrok (2007). A. Disch, R. Bezerra, E. Mobekk and A–M. Essoungou (2010) Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation, Final Report prepared for the MDRP Secretariat, World Bank (Oslo: Scanteam, June); World Bank (2010) Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Final Report: Overview of Program Achievements (Washington, DC: World Bank, July). MDRP (2008) Quarterly Progress Report, January–March, http://www.mdrp. org, date accessed 17 May 2010. World Bank (2002) Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration, Report No. 23869-AFR (Washington, DC: World Bank), p. 58. Author’s interview with MDRP official (2010), Washington, DC, 7 April. Author’s interview with senior World Bank official (2010), Washington, DC, 7 April. UNSCR 1379 (2001), para. 4. Ibid., para. 5. Ibid., para. 8.

264 Exclusion or Reintegration 64. Ibid., para. 11(c). 65. Ibid., para.12 (emphasis added). 66. United Nations Security Council (2000) Report of the Secretary-General on the Role of the United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, 11 February, S/2000/101, para. 92. 67. IDDRS (2006), 5.30 5.2. 68. Ibid. (emphasis added). 69. Ibid., 5.30, 7 and 8. 70. O. Rabwoni (2002) ‘Reflections on Youth and Militarism in Contemporary Africa’, in A. de Waal and N. Argenti (eds.) Young Africa: Realising the Rights of Children and Youth (Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press), p. 167.

References Almeida, H. (2010) ‘Angola Arrests a Third Rights Activist in Cabinda’, Thomson Reuters, 17 January. Anstee, M. J. (1996) Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992–93 (London: Macmillan). Boyden, J. (2007) ‘Children, War and World Disorder in the 21st Century: A Review of the Theories and Literature on Children’s Contributions to Armed Violence’, Conflict, Security & Development, 7 (2), 255–279. Brett, R. and Specht, I. (2004) Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner). Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2004) ‘Angola’, in Child Soldiers Global Report (London: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). Cohn, I. and Goodwin-Gill, G. S. (1994) Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflicts (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Collelo, T. (ed.) (1989) Angola: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Library of Congress). Gomes Porto, J., Alden, C. and Parsons, I. (2007) From Soldiers to Citizens (London: Ashgate). Gomes Porto, J. and Parsons, I. (2003) ‘Sustaining the Peace in Angola: An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration’, ISS Monograph Series No. 83, April. Honwana, A. (2006) Child Soldiers in Africa (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press). Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination Unit (1995) Identificação das Expectativas Sociais e Económicas dos Militares e Desmobilizados das FAA e da UNITA, Draft Report (Luanda: UCAH/DRO). Human Rights Watch (2003) Forgotten Fighters: Child Soldiers in Angola, 15 (10), April. International Crisis Group (2003) Dealing with Savimbi’s Ghost: The Security and Humanitarian Challenges in Angola, Africa Report No. 58 (Luanda and Brussels: ICG, 26 February), http://www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/africa/southernafrica/angola/Dealing%20with%20Savimbis%20Ghost%20The%20Security %20and%20Humanitarian%20Challenges%20in%20Angola.pdf. IRIN News (2003) ‘Angola: UNITA “wives” fear exclusion from government aid’, 10 March, http://www.irinnews.org, date accessed 7 June 2010.

Jaremey R. McMullin 265 IRIN News (2004) ‘Angola: More Needs to be done [sic.] for Reintegration of Former Soldiers’, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 29 October, http://www.irinnews.org, date accessed 17 May 2010. IRIN News (2009), ‘Angola-DRC: Retaliatory Expulsions Reach a New Peak,’ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 13 October, http://www.irinnews.org, date accessed 17 May 2010. IRIN News (2010), ‘Angola: The Death of One Man Does Not End a War’, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 26 April, http://www.irinnews.org, date accessed 17 May 2010. IRSEM (2005) Sintese Informativa Sobre Reinsercao/Reintegraçao Social e Economica dos Ex-Militares, PGDR, O PGDR apos 15 Mese de Implementaçao (Luanda, IRSEM, July). Lodico, Y. C. (1997) ‘A Peace That Fell Apart: The United Nations and the War in Angola’, in W. J. Durch (ed.) UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Machel, G. (1996) Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, Report of Graça Machel, Expert of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, A/51/306, 26 August. Machel, G. (2001) The Impact of War on Children: A Review of Progress since the 1996 United Nations Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (London: Hurst & Company). McIntyre, A. (2003) ‘Rights, Root Causes and Recruitment: The Youth Factor in Africa’s Armed Conflicts’, African Security Review, 12 (2), http://www.iss.co. za/pubs/ASR/12No2/E4.html. McMullin, J. (2004) ‘Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?’, International Peacekeeping, 11 (4), 625–643. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) (2006) ‘13.1 Million Euro Grant to Support Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Project’, News and Noteworthy, 2, http://www.mdrp.org, date accessed 17 May 2010. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) (2008a) ‘Angola – Final MDRP Fact Sheet’, December, http://www.mdrp.org, date accessed 17 May 2010. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) (2008b) Quarterly Progress Report, January–March, http://www.mdrp.org, date accessed 17 May 2010. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) (2009a) ‘Closing a Partnership and Looking Forward’, News and Noteworthy, 7, http://www.mdrp.org, date accessed 17 May 2010. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) (2009b) ‘MDRP Partners Gather for the Last Time at the World Bank’, News and Noteworthy, 3, http://www.mdrp.org, date accessed 17 May 2010. Rabwoni, O. (2002) ‘Reflections on Youth and Militarism in Contemporary Africa’, in A. de Waal and N. Argenti (eds.) Young Africa: Realising the Rights of Children and Youth (Trenton and Asmara: Africa World Press), pp. 155–170. Republic of Angola and the European Community (2008) Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the Period 2008–2013, http://ec.europa.eu, date accessed 6 June 2010. Republic of Angola Ministry of Social Welfare (2003) Mesa Redonda sobre os desafios da Proteçao da Criança no processo du Reintegraçao, 7 March.

266 Exclusion or Reintegration Ruigrok, I. (2007) ‘Whose Justice? Contextualising Angola’s Reintegration Process’, African Security Review, 16 (1), 84–92. Schraeder, P. J. (1994) United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press). Stockwell, J. (1978) In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: W.W. Norton). United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2004) Consideration of Report Submitted by Angola, Concluding Observations, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.246, 1 October. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 20 November (entry into force 2 September 1990). United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2006) Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), http://unddr.org/iddrs/, date accessed 10 June 2010. United Nations Development Programme (2005) Special Project to Support the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Framework of the Peace Process in Angola, 31 December. United Nations General Assembly (2000) Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 25 May (entry into force 12 February 2002). United Nations General Assembly (2004) A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 2 December. United Nations General Assembly and Security Council (2000) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305 and S/2000/809, 21 August. United Nations Security Council (1992) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), S/24245, 7 July. United Nations Security Council (1993) Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II, S/26434, 13 September. United Nations Security Council (2000) Report of the Secretary General on the Role of the United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, S/2000/101, 11 February. United Nations Security Council Resolution 696 (1991) S/RES/696, 30 May. Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (2008) Uppsala University, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/database, date accessed 10 July 2010. Verhey, B. (2001) ‘Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegrating, World Bank’, Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 23, November. Wessells, M. (2006) Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press). World Bank (2002) Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration, Report No. 23869-AFR (Washington, DC: World Bank). World Bank (2003) Angola: Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, February, Report No. PID 11534, http://www.worldbank.org, date accessed 7 June 2010. World Bank (2005a) Implementation Completion Memorandum (ICM), ‘Special Project to Support the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Framework of the Peace Process in Angola’, TF052486, 31 December. World Bank (2005b) ‘Angola: From Combatant to Civilian’, 29 August, http://web.worldbank.org, date accessed 17 May 2010.

Part IV


15 Child Soldier Reintegration in Sudan: A Practitioner’s Field Experience Patrick Halton

Introduction This case study provides a contemporary insight to identities, recruitment and reintegration of children in Sudan. The chapter examines ways in which young people become associated with armed forces and groups in Darfur, and the community dynamics and social milieu that may contribute to their decision-making. The chapter looks at the structural basis for a concerted and nationally owned Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process in lieu of two pivotal peace agreements, lessons learned, and how the reintegration of militarized children across a geographically vast, demographically disparate and politically contentious landscape may be enhanced by local-level child protection mechanisms, affording individual follow-up care for individual demobilized children without undermining the core principles of an inclusive, community-based approach. Conflict and child recruitment in Sudan The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) brought to an end one of the longest running civil wars in Africa. The dispute, manifested in clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), raged for at least two decades; and by the cessation of hostilities an estimated two million people had been killed and more than 4.5 million displaced. The conflict in Sudan is notorious for its complexity, and with the promise of the CPA and a referendum on North-South statehood in 2011, it is Sudan’s western states which have now spiralled into 269

270 Child Soldier Reintegration in Sudan

disarray. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006 draws little consensus from the rural masses, and insecurity continues through a plethora of warring factions and convoluted dynamics of allegiance and malevolence. Indeed, Conciliation Resources has called the situation in Sudan ‘a civil war of “interlocking civil wars” ’ (Conciliation Resources, 2006). The war in Sudan has had an extremely debilitating effect on development. Sudan – and Darfur in particular – is characterized by a largely rural population of pastoralists engaged in small-scale crop cultivation and animal husbandry, as well as nomadic peoples of both Arab and indigenous African ethnic groups. The prerequisites of security and livelihoods allied to political ideology create a society that is highly militarized, and the proliferation of small arms means the line between civilian and armed group is extremely unclear. During my tenure as a child protection specialist with the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) in 2008–2009, research and investigative dialogue with demobilized child soldiers in North Darfur revealed barely navigable overlap between those children associated with armed groups and those who are not. Combatant, auxiliary or support roles become an intrinsic part of life for many isolated communities in Darfur, and the notion of ‘recruitment’ is often unrecognized by those subject to it. Many teenagers allude to security in numbers and point to a collective responsibility to take up arms or contribute in some way to protecting one’s family and community militarily, either through direct combat or auxiliary roles, when necessary. In his book Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection, Michael Wessells talks about ‘children with agency’ (Wessells, 2006). He points out the apparent dichotomy between Western objective hypotheses on the use of children by armed forces and the actual reality in many theatres of war on the ground. Wessells suggests that while notions of a ‘lost generation’ of ‘emotionally crippled’ and ‘deluded’ children being sent to their deaths impinge on our liberal democratic mores and justify humanitarian intervention, the stark reality is often quite the opposite – that of ‘functional’, ‘adventurous’ and ‘aggressive’ children ‘willing to commit barbarous acts’ (Wessells, 2006, p. x; Trawick, 2007, p. 71). Applying these labels generically across the spectra of children’s association with armed groups is unhelpful, but it illustrates the difficulty in delineating specific ‘categories’ of child, and is particularly pertinent to the Darfurian context. Also worth considering is the literature review carried by the periodical Conflict, Security and Development in June 2007 in which anthropologist Jo Boyden explores a possible correlation between demographic ‘youth bulges’ and susceptibility to armed conflict. In her article,

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Boyden cites research that has found numerous examples of replication and consensus of violence by disenfranchised male youth striving to gain acceptance as men. ‘The particular appeal of military induction for the young is that it replicates rites of initiation into adulthood and, therefore, it is perceived as a means of achieving adult status’ (Ellis, in Boyden, 2007). However uncomfortable this may be for Western moral discourse, it is important to be aware of the relevance of these dynamics to Darfur, especially if reintegration support for demobilized youth is to be properly targeted. However, not all children associated with armed forces have ‘agency’; during the conference ‘Children in Crossfire: Prevention and Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers’ organized by UNICEF in 2004, Michael Wessells stressed that: ‘In a war zone, children may make a choice, but this choice is set against a background of security worries, pressure and human rights violations that together serve to render the idea of “free choice” meaningless’ (Wessells, cited by Melville, personal communication);1 and it is sensitivity to this balance that child protection practitioners on the ground require in formulating rehabilitative programmes. In Sudan, Save the Children noted that ‘one of the greatest effects of [war on children] is the increased individualism and competition for scarce resources’, a scenario which puts children at a disadvantage because they may not be able to compete equally with adults (Save the Children Sweden, 2007:43). Children who are separated from their family, orphaned or displaced are particularly at risk. Many children are driven to join armed forces out of economic necessity and the need to seek an economic livelihood (McConnan and Uppard, 2001, pp. 37–38), and there may be a lack of educational and vocational resources available to them.

Peace agreements and the beginnings of process The DDR work currently in progress is the third phase of a process begun long before the signing of the DPA and today’s crisis in Western Sudan. Recruitment of children into armed forces has been commonplace throughout the North-South conflict. According to UNICEF ‘Falling Out’ evaluation of child demobilization in South Sudan 2001– 2003, 6665 child soldiers assessed during the period had been engaged as combatants, including three children aged just 7 years and under (UNICEF, 2005), and by 2004, approximately 17,000 children were thought to be still associated with the armed forces of both the government and the SPLM (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,


2004), though throughout both peace processes the SAF have vehemently denied the existence of any minors in any capacity associated with them. The first phase of Child DDR in Sudan in 2001 focused on the demobilization of child soldiers with the SPLA in Northern Bahr El Ghazal from which many lessons were learned including the inherent difficulties associated with accommodating children in interim care centres. Phase II from 2001 to 2003 represented a major policy shift in this respect and resulted in the demobilization of more than 14,000 children (UNICEF, 2005, p. 20). During this time empirical evidence showed that many children are subject to push factors such as poverty, lack of access to livelihoods, separation from primary care-givers and cultural expectations of manhood, and therefore to a certain extent join the armed forces voluntarily. It is the enormous scope of the problem, both economically and geographically, that presents the main challenges to reintegrating children back to civilian life, and has been a core focus in formulating subsequent reintegration strategies. The CPA is a power-sharing arrangement in preparation for a regional referendum on statehood in 2011. The CPA brings together the new Government of National Unity in Khartoum and the Government of South Sudan, and takes into account three Transitional Areas: South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. Within the CPA, the Transitional Areas are an example of how a federal system could work in the new postconflict Sudan and are a genuine test of the parties’ willingness to peace and post-war reconstruction. In military terms, the six-year interim period leading up to the Referendum sees a separation between the SAF and the SPLA, during which time they downsize and make particular provision to the demobilization of children within their ranks. The CPA acknowledges child soldiers in the broadest definition as set out in the Cape Town Principles and for this purpose the CPA calls for the establishment of a North Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NSDDRC), a South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC) and a National DDR Coordination Council. Under the CPA and similarly the DPA, these national structures are supported by the United Nations (UN) by way of an Integrated DDR Unit, with UNICEF taking the lead as focal organization for Child DDR. It is a crucial element of the DDR set-up in Sudan that the national structures ‘own’ the process while ‘international partners shall only play a supporting role in these institutions’ (CPA). The role of the North and SSDDRCs, and the UNDDR Unit, is shown diagrammatically in the Figure 15.1 below.

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Policy-making

National DDR coordinating council

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Concerned government ministries/ authorities

NS/SS DDR commissions State DDR commissions

Secretariat

Implementation NS/SS DDR directorates

Civil society and local traditional authorities

UN agencies and NGOs

Private service providers

State offices and local field offices

Community groups

Figure 15.1 Management Arrangements Diagram for DDR in Sudan Source: Interim Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme.

Acknowledging the protection of children as a vital contributor to the peace agenda, the signing of the DPA on 5 May 2006 was followed by a landmark child protection workshop hosted by UNICEF in collaboration with the Government of Sudan and the National Council for Child Welfare. Despite obvious flaws in the DPA (three influential factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) did not sign),2 the signatory armed movements, as well as UN agencies and other humanitarian actors concerned with protection, drew on independent research and analysis of the current risks and vulnerabilities facing children in Darfur, including but not exclusive to recruitment into armed forces and groups, to garner a collective commitment to mitigating these risks, and initiating thought on possible strategies to address them. The child protection workshop was a major breakthrough in reaching a collective commitment and consensus from parties to the peace process on specifically children’s issues. As with the CPA, the DPA called for the NSDDRC to lead the process of demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers with support from


the UN, especially UNICEF and the United Nations and African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), with its headquarters in El Fasher, North Darfur. In July 2009, three armed movements signatory to the DPA presented to the NSDDRC lists of children within their ranks in preparation for demobilization. While this was a positive step by the armed groups, there was concern for the transparency of the process. At no time was there an unequivocal invitation to either the NSDDRC or UNICEF to access militia camps with a view to independent verification. This important element of the overall registration process, which allows not only for identification of all young people under the age of 18 associated in any way with the armed group, both girls and boys, but it also allows for group and individual dialogue to screen and prepare children for demobilization and managing expectations for reintegration. Furthermore, failure of the armed movements to grant access meant that information required for family tracing had to be obtained through an appointed DDR ‘focal person’. This information could not be wholly relied upon and essentially meant that family tracing could only commence once demobilization had actually taken place; which was the earliest opportunity for the NSDDRC or UNICEF staff to meet the children. A second obstacle was a blurring of distinction between children actively mobilized and ‘living’ with the armed force or group, and those who were less obviously connected, living with their families, yet still contributing to the military agenda. Clearly, different approaches to demobilization were required, not least the potential banana skin of temporary care provision. In the event, stakeholders had to rely on the information provided by the DDR focal person attached to the armed group itself to differentiate, which proved unreliable due either to nefarious motives or lack of understanding, or both. In Malha on 6 August 2009, over 50 children presented themselves for a symbolic demobilization ceremony under the auspices of the Free Will faction of the SLA, after which it was found that several ‘children’ were over the age of 18, and none of the children actually lived full time with the armed group.

Security and stability In late 2009, the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomarasamy, made her second visit to Sudan to meet a number of armed forces and groups in Darfur to advocate for the Rights of the Child and to request that the demobilization of child combatants be reprioritized within the overall peace agenda. This follows the SPLM’s agreement with UNICEF obliging

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the armed wing of the SPLM (SPLMA) to name locations where children associated with them are based, assist UNICEF with verification, allow access to camps and facilitate a monitoring and reporting mechanism. (However, this commitment does not preclude the risk to demobilized children posed by Other Armed Groups (OAGs) which are not party to the formal agreement). This is just one reason why the safety of former child combatants in the community should never be taken for granted and should be factored in to reintegration programmes at all levels. Aligning with the core principles of community-based reintegration, UNICEF works with the North and South DDR Commissions to develop their capacity to lead and coordinate the DDR process. Fundamental to this capacity is a fluidity of communication and coordination between the two commissions, an issue which as recently as 2007 was tenuous, particularly in the Transitional Areas. In April 2007, there were incidences where the SSDDRC was unwilling to provide the NSDDRC with the identities of children registered as associated with the SPLA. The reason for this has been the NSDDRC’s refusal to work with any nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) outside their own ‘consortium’ for family tracing. Many of these children originally came from North Sudan and this lack of communication on cross-border movements was an obstacle to the preparation of a targeted reintegration options plan by the NSDDRC. However, on 6 May 2007 the NSDDRC and SSDDRC came together in round-table talks with the UNICEF Representative in Khartoum to iron out these differences. Among other points for action, the meeting established a bi-monthly ‘working group’ in Blue Nile state to include both NSDDRC and SSDDRC as a forum to share registration information to assist family tracing and reunification. This sort of political commitment, not only reiterated and reinforced in Khartoum but also crucially transferred to regional level, bodes well for DDR in Sudan in 2007 and was so obviously lacking in Sri Lanka. DDR in Sudan has also been designed to maximize communication between the North and South DDR Commissions and the armed forces involved. For example, in Blue Nile, the SPLA have posted a special liaison officer to the Regional NSDDRC Office in Ed Damazin. At the time of writing, it is still unclear what degree of input this individual is allowed by the NSDDRC, but the benefits of such an arrangement are obvious. In 2006, when heavy rain hampered demobilization of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (CAAFAG) in Tonj, South Sudan, contingency arrangements could have been put in place had it not been for poor communication between the SPLA and SSDDRC. While it is pointed out that the DDR Commissions are not child protection


agencies per se, they have a ‘significant role to play’ in incorporating existing national structures, such as ministries and local authorities in supporting community-based reintegration and social development (UNICEF, 2006).

Strategy for reintegration in Sudan Some commentators advocate an unworkable compromise in insecure environments between the immediate protection concerns of individuals and the longer-term development needs of the ‘group’. However, is a compromise necessarily unworkable? Social work with targeted follow-up and support of individual children is an important component of community-based reintegration; and the concept of such an approach, with local ownership, local decision making and community resources does not preclude special support to children formerly attached to armies and militia groups. With this in mind, UNICEF supported the NSDDRC to draw up and establish a National Reintegration Strategy adopted in early 2008. While flexibility remains key, the National Reintegration Strategy enabled stakeholders to the demobilization and reintegration process to follow a predetermined conceptual ‘road map’ which, as has been discussed, recognizes that ‘reintegration of child soldiers [should be approached] in tandem with community recovery’ (Verhey, 2002, p. 1). The Sudan case study shows how these needs might be taken into account within a community-based rubric. One of the more evident challenges for reintegrating children formerly associated with armed forces and groups remains the limited capacity of national and local institutions and communities to absorb and facilitate return. Added pressure is applied by the need to support other disadvantaged groups such as returning internally displaced persons (IDPs). One important finding to emerge from UNICEF’s work in Darfur in recent years is the low consideration at federal level to social welfare issues in terms of budgetary allowance to the Ministry of Social Affairs in the Darfur states. Under funding of the sector and a chronic shortage of human resources, especially in localities beyond the primary administrative hubs of El Fasher, Nyala and El Geneina, conspire to work against any attempt at locally run, sustainable reintegration programmes in the immediate term. Initiatives such as UNICEF’s longrunning ‘Back To School’ programme has enrolled significant numbers of new pupils but highlights the chronic lack of sufficient schools and learning spaces which are crucial to keeping children from the military agenda. This problem is compounded by a limited supply of qualified

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and trained teachers. Furthermore, ‘accelerated learning programmes’ which aim to compress years of missed schooling into a more manageable and realistic timeframe require buy-in at ministerial level and from secondary and tertiary educators. Food security in much of Darfur is another factor. Shortages of food, and the need to produce or locate food sources is a considerable problem in desert areas, and the need for livelihoods and income is frequently cited by communities as a major factor influencing young men’s association with militia groups. As the economy remains weak, so does social service provision. While acknowledging the need for a locally owned DDR process, it is clear that the fledgling state structures, particularly in administrative localities within the Darfur states, currently do not have the capacity to cope fully with returning IDPs and refugees without external support. It is therefore critical that the families and communities of the demobilized children play a central role in supporting these children. One hundred and seventy-seven youngsters under the age of eighteen were demobilized in North Darfur during 2009. With UNICEF on hand to facilitate, the NSDDRC hass also been coordinating a multi-sector reintegration package within a community-based and inclusive rubric, reaching out to all children in the community who have been left vulnerable by the war environment. Implementation of DDR for children in North Darfur began with 32 children associated with the SLA Free Will in the remote area of Torra, some 60 kilometres north-west of the state capital El Fasher. The event saw a symbolic disarmament ceremony in which the children laid down their weapons and amulets, and public reaffirmations by commanders to refrain from using children in all future military agenda. Malha and Kafod areas have also seen demobilization and registration days, which other signatory movements such as Mother Wing and Minni Minawi were slated to be followed in various locations during August and September 2009. The Child DDR programme is led by the NSDDRC in coordination with the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority. UNICEF, the lead agency within the UN system for child protection, continues to provide the necessary support for release and reintegration. In addition, UNAMID has assisted with large-scale logistical support including transportation and security escorts. Government counterparts from the Ministries of Social Affairs and Health are also on board and make a vital contribution with child-friendly orientation, counselling, medical screening and imparting advice on HIV/AIDS.


In the writing of this section, the author has come across much debate on how the rhetoric of community participation is being used by humanitarian agencies. Some critics protest that there is actually very little meaningful participation by local stakeholders in the reintegration process. Is it possible that community-based reintegration is merely jargon for burdening local communities with problems without adequate resources to solve them? Is it possible that humanitarian agencies define community-based reintegration as expecting impoverished communities to ‘reintegrate’ children themselves without creative ways of targeting additional resources? To an extent, this chapter has painted a picture of two extremes. On the one hand, it has presented a picture of ‘before’, namely, intensive case work, database management and follow-up such as that seen during Phase I DDR in Sudan in 2001. On the other hand, is an ‘after’ scenario in which there is no specially targeted social work follow-up for child soldiers at all, and is totally dependent on the capacity of the community environment to protect children. However, in analysis, these two extremes may not be historically true of Child DDR programmes. Perhaps it is safer to suggest that the first picture uses exclusive targeted assistance, possibly by accommodating all children in a special interim care centre or ensuring they all have reintegration ‘comfort’ packages, school books and uniforms. The other extreme is non-targeted assistance, as in Phase II South Sudan, using the rhetoric of community-based reintegration but including elements of social work. But this too is problematic. Children sent home without systematic follow-up and monitoring, with no accurate census as to how many children have returned or to where they have gone, renders them extraordinarily vulnerable. According to the first drafts of UNICEF’s ongoing evaluation of Child DDR in Sudan, it appears that community-based programmes implemented during Phase II in South Sudan are not actually benefiting the majority of returned child soldiers. In other words, the child soldiers are falling through the gaps because the assistance is not targeted enough (Subajini Jayasekaran, personal communication).3 The 2007 strategy in Sudan must therefore be to incorporate a local-level social work component into longer-term efforts to rehabilitate entire communities. As UNICEF’s draft evaluation points out, the Interim Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (IDDRP) asserts that follow-up for individuals will be an integral component of reintegration support to ensure children’s safety and prevent re-recruitment, but it neither defines the term nor suggests

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a specific modus operandi (UNICEF draft, 2007). A possible template for this is UNICEF’s partnership with Save the Children USA (SCF-USA) in South Kordofan, one of the three Transitional Areas under the CPA. SCF-USA has introduced ‘community child protection networks’ where key individuals in the community have been sensitized and trained in how to support children and ensure their referral into local services. Of course, this initiative goes hand in hand with cross-sector rehabilitation of schools, vocational training and apprenticeship schemes, but the basis is the establishment of a child-friendly mechanism within the community. UNICEF’s draft evaluation is right in stressing that ‘follow-up requires a network, it is too overwhelming for any one actor’ (emphasis added). One of UNICEF’s priorities in Sudan in 2007 was to rehabilitate youth-friendly centres and children’s clubs. These initiatives place great emphasis on peer involvement in advocacy, child rights dissemination and counselling. In this way, former combatants can interact with non-combatants and other war-affected children, maximizing their participation in processes which affect them, and empowering young people as stakeholders in their own reintegration and recovery. An example of how local resources have been successfully utilized in Sudan is the Family Tracing Network in South Kordofan. Here, family tracing has been carried out effectively by school teachers without the need for social workers. In Blue Nile, the reintegration strategy in 2007 was conceptualized along the same lines. The follow-up of individuals by ‘external’ social workers would continue, but their focus would be on Especially Vulnerable Individuals and as troubleshooters in extreme cases. Periodic follow-up is important to implementing partners to ensure proper targeting of assistance, but, as the UNICEF draft report stresses, social work as part of a community-based reintegration strategy should be designed to ‘build and utilise [local] child protection networks to fulfill essential . . . functions of follow-up without the . . . supervision . . . of NGOs and UN staff’ (UNICEF, 2007:20). Social workers in Sudan would also be responsible for monitoring and reporting child rights violations under UN Security Council Resolution 1612 on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. Security Council Resolution 1612 is inclusive of, but not limited to, recruitmentrelated abuses, and includes maiming and killing, abduction, denial of humanitarian access, sexual and gender-based violence, and attacks on schools and hospitals, with alleged violations referred to specific responsible agencies. The dual approach of local-level protection safety-nets with a monitoring and reporting mechanism managed by


leading international agencies pays credence to the ethical basis of community-based reintegration while ensuring a continuation of international pressure on armed forces to comply with their responsibilities.

Challenges to child soldier reintegration is Sudan UNICEF has now supported reintegration activities for children in 12 states. These interventions have included youth participation and community-based psychosocial support, working with ‘children’s clubs’, trauma healing through sports and drama and improved educational options. One way in which this has been done is through an Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP) in conjunction with the Ministry of Education. The ALP compresses eight years of schooling into a fouryear curriculum and is therefore highly sought after by youngsters in both North and South Sudan. Incidentally, one of the obstacles faced by the ALP is the language medium of tuition. To date, the programme has been adapted for the Arabic curriculum alone and is not ready for roll-out to English language schools in South Sudan, with obvious consequences for children there. Of course, the language medium for the ALP is not the only challenge. The SAF have repeatedly stated that they do not recruit persons under the age of 18 years, meaning that demobilization of children in North Sudan has been limited. SAF has said there may be children associated with paramilitary groups4 aligned with them, but numbers and locations of these children have not yet been provided. Both UNICEF and the Special Representative to the Secretary General for Children Affected by Armed Conflict have advocated for greater access to assess the situation of children with all military groups in Sudan. The need for the commitment of all parties to the conflict to demobilizing and reintegrating child soldiers is a recurring theme of this chapter. It is interesting to note that local-level protection networks, known as Child Welfare Committees, have also been set up with some success in Sierra Leone (Abu Sesay, personal communication),5 the common denominator between Sierra Leone and Sudan being that both are underpinned by a solid national DDR framework.

Conclusion This chapter has introduced Sudan as a case study of how a communitybased reintegration strategy is currently being designed and implemented under the IDDRP. It discusses how the association of children

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with armed groups in Sudan has been prioritized in the agenda for peace and the strategy for child soldier reintegration in Sudan. Field findings suggest that, despite the CPA, returning children face risks from OAGs, the proliferation of small-arms throughout the country and the highly militarized society. It has therefore examined how reintegration assistance can reach out to individual children who need follow-up and support and to the wider community, including all other vulnerable children and the rehabilitation and regeneration of local government and civil society. One of the important findings here is that communitybased reintegration does not denote an approach which simply ‘throws responsibility onto impoverished and incapacitated communities’ without recourse to follow-up of individuals. It realizes that one does not preclude the other and that a core of social workers with specific responsibilities, such as training, monitoring and reporting, can fit into and complement an inclusive community-based dynamic. These are my reflections as a child protection specialist who has worked with this case load in different contexts, of which Sudan remains an important case. DDR for children associated with armed forces must be viewed as a continuous cycle of disarmament, demobilization and protection from future recruitment, and it therefore calls for what Gamba calls a ‘major overhaul of society’ rather than just a ‘minor correction’ (Gamba, 2003, p. 133). But what is more contentious is the degree to which stakeholders in child protection should pursue the protection of an individual to the detriment of the group or community. Community-based reintegration is too often regarded as a kind of strategic ‘antedote’ – effectively an opposite – to traditional, exclusively case-based reintegration programmes. But the author does not necessarily subscribe to this logic. In fact, it is my contention that the follow-up of individuals can be carried out within the overall framework of community-based reintegration. UN draft policy notes make reference to a strategy which aims to create community-based networks that link children to appropriate services with social workers to coordinate support. This view appears to be shared by the UNICEF consultant who carried out the 2007 evaluation of DDR activities in Sudan. The draft findings show that many actors are at a loss as to how to followup individuals in communities scattered over an area as geographically vast and inaccessible as Sudan, yet the evaluator’s answer is reassuringly simple: protection on a case by case basis requires local services and local resources, pulled together by a core of skilled staff to train and monitor (UNICEF, 2007). As a UNICEF child protection officer puts it,


‘We cannot guarantee one hundred per cent protection [for children]. It’s a question of trying to get as close to that as possible’ (Jayasekaran, personal communication).6 In Sudan, the challenges to community-based reintegration are almost the opposite. While at the time of writing political will appears to be steadfast, it is the enormous size and unforgiving geography of Sudan which makes community-based reintegration such a difficult task. Geographical and economic challenges to community-based reintegration are many but lie well beyond the scope of this chapter, but they are mentioned here to highlight an important principle in communitybased reintegration: The ‘gold standard’ may be unattainable in the short term but this must not excuse meaningful efforts towards this standard. If communities are given appropriate advocacy tools and get support from state and central government, and if they are able to identify, gauge and prioritize needs locally, then they will be able to respond to those needs. It is vital that credence is paid to building this capacity. The author believes that children should return to an environment which offers them an ‘improvement’ to the way things were, either in their communities before they took up arms or in the armed group itself. Interventions must therefore take on a macro-level perspective, looking to address a range of community needs alongside individualized support for those who need it.

Notes 1. Amanda Melville, UNICEF Child Protection Officer, Medan, Indonesia, 5 September 2005. 2. Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Abdul Wahid faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA-MM), and Unity faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA-Unity). 3. Subajini Jayasekaran, UNICEF Child Protection Officer, by email, 12 September 2007. 4. Other Armed Groups (OAG). 5. Abu Sesay, UNDDR Officer, Khartoum, Sudan, 11 May 2007. 6. Subajini Jayasekaran, UNICEF Child Protection Officer, in training session for social workers, Batticaloa, Sri Lanka, 15 October 2004.

References Boyden, J. (2007), Children, war and world disorder in the 21st century: a review of the theories and the literature on children’s contributions to armed violence, Conflict, Security and Development, 7 (2) (June), 255–279.

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Chabar, A. and Palmqvist, E. (2007), Violence Against Children in Southern Sudan: A Participatory Study on PHP, Sexual Abuse and Early and Forced Marriage, Sudan: Save the Children. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS) (2004), Child Soldier Global Report, Sudan Update at http://www.child-soldiers.org/document/get?id=703 (Accessed 15 June 2011). El-Battahani, A. (2006) ‘A Complex Web: Politics and Conflict in Sudan’ in Conciliation Resources, accessed online at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/ sudan.php (Accessed 1 August 2006). Gamba, V. (2003), Manging Violence: Disarmament and Demobilization. In Darby, J and MacGinty, R (eds) Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 125–136. McConnan, I. and Uppard, S. (2001), Children Not Soldiers: Guidelines for Working with Child Soldiers and Children Associated with Fighting Forces. London: Save the Children Fund. Miruka, O. (2007), ‘Protecting Children’s Rights Using Community Based Approaches: Southern Sudan’, Nairobi: Save the Children, Sweden. Simmons, M. and Dixon, P. (2006), ‘Peace by piece: addressing Sudan’s conflicts,’ Accord, Conciliation Resources. Wessels, M. (2006), Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Press. UNICEF (2005), ‘Falling Out: An Evaluation of Child Demobilization in Southern Sudan 2001–2003’. UNICEF (2006), UN Welcomes The Disarmament And Demobilisation Of Children Associated With Armed Forces In S. Sudan, Press Release at http:// www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/ 2549/categoryId/127/UN-Welcomes-The-Disarmament-and-Demobilisationof-Children-Associated-With-Armed-Forces-in-S-Sudan.aspx (Accessed 15 July 2010). UNICEF (2007), Evaluation of the Child Soldier DDR in Sudan (Draft), Author Personal Documents. United Nations Children’s Fund (2006), ‘Advocacy Report on the Findings of the three-day Southern Sudan DDR Commission Review and Planning Workshop, Rumbek, 16–19h November 2006’. United Nations Children’s Fund (2007), ‘Reintegration of Child DDR in North Sudan’ UNICEF draft project note. Verhey, B. (2002), Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegrating. Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 23, Washington DC: World Bank. (www. worldbank.org/afr/wps/wp23.pdf) (Accessed 13 June 2010).

16 Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Nepal: Grassroots Reflections Dilli Raj Binadi and Pratisha Dewan Binadi

Introduction Peace process in Nepal Peace came to Nepal on 21 November 2006 when the government and the Maoist rebels signed a monumental and comprehensive peace agreement, which included stipulations to merge and form an interim government. Both the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M) and the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) agreed to an arms management pact, locking their weapons up under United Nations (UN) surveillance (HRW, 2007, p. 3). Elections for the Constituent Assembly, drafting a new constitution, socio-economic reform, security sector reform, democratization of the RNA, management of arms and army that includes the integration and reintegration of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a coalition government including major political parties are some of the major components of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The peace was fragile, as everyone waited with baited breath for the political actions to be moved forward. The elections were postponed twice, but finally on 10 April 2008, the people of Nepal voted to elect representatives to a Constituent Assembly. An overwhelming majority went to the CPN-M. The assembly was tasked with writing a new constitution and deciding the role of the monarchy. Despite the end of the ten-year long armed conflict, many issues still remain to be addressed especially regarding economic, political and social issues. The damage caused by the violence in Nepal has been unprecedented. It is estimated that some 13,000 Nepalese were killed in the conflict and 100,000 displaced. Approximately 1700 people have ‘disappeared’ (CWIN, 2007; HRW, 2007, pp. 10–12). The conflict only exacerbated Nepal’s economic hardships. With a gross national product of only US $220 per capita, Nepal is one of the poorest countries in 284

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the world. Thirty-eight per cent of the population lives below a dollar per day and millions are engaged in work contrary to International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 182 (HRW, 2007, pp. 10–12; INSEC, 2007). Rates of malnutrition, especially among children, are high. Approximately half of Nepal’s children experience stunted growth due to malnutrition, while 30,000 children under five die each year from diarrhoea (Amnesty International, 2005, p. 2). Life expectancy stands at a mere 60 years, which is much lower than its neighbouring countries. Nepal is beset by discrimination and marginalization based on caste, gender and ethnicity. Health care is poor in rural areas and education rates are low (UNICEF, 2008, pp. 2, 11–12). As a result, Nepal today depends heavily, and unsustainably, on foreign aid. Although peace is moving forward, political groups such as the Young Communist League continue to spread intimidation and violence, and most importantly, hundreds of children remained in cantonments for more than three years with no access from the UN or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This chapter analyses the recent child soldier reintegration efforts in Nepal. It begins by summarizing the armed conflict of Nepal 1996–2006 and analyses the use of children by the CPN-M. The reasons for joining the armed groups by the children and the gender and geographical origin of the children are also discussed in the second section of the chapter. Similarly, the reintegration efforts of the UN, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and local NGOs at the individual level and jointly are discussed in the next section of the chapter followed by a conclusion looking at the recruitment-reintegration relationship in Nepal from a practitioner’s perspective. Recruitment of child soldiers by Maoists in Nepal Though there is no exact data on child soldiers, Children Associated with Armed Force and Armed Group Working Group (CAAFAG WG) estimates that there are around 15,000 to 16,000 CAAFAG in Nepal (CAAFAG WG, 2006). Similarly, Save the Children (STC) estimates that there are around 16,000 CAAFAG who have been living in communities and cantonments across the country between 1996 and 2006 (STC, 2007). Gender An inter-agency child protection information management system (IACP IMS)1 hosted by the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) records 8297 CAAFAG, with the majority of them being boys

286 Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Nepal

GENDER

Male 61%

Figure 16.1

Female 39%

Gender-wise distribution of CAAFAG

Source: Interagency child protection database (2009), p. 1.

(61 per cent) (Figure 16.1). The possible explanation for the larger number of boys compared to the girls lies in that there are more male CAAFAG overall (this coincides with the gender-based data of the CPN-M combatants) and because the boys are easier to identify whilst girls remain hidden due to the problem of stigma. The majority of CAAFAG fall into the age group of above 18 years of age (75.4 per cent) followed by the age group of 15–17 years (19.7 per cent). The age group with the least entries falls into the age group of 9–11years (1.2 per cent) (UNICEF, 2009).2 Tarak Dhital, one of the member of CAAFAG WG and a senior staff of Child Workers in Nepal Concerned Centre (CWIN), a national child rights organization involved in reintegration of child soldiers supports the presented figures and suggests that . . . Although there were news and discussions in earlier days that the ratio of girls was really high compared to boys in Maoists army but once we got the figure the ratio of girls was less than estimated.3 Regarding their roles in the CPN-M, the majority of boys have been engaged in active combat duty. This corresponds well with global trends.4 This is probably one of the most physically difficult and straining duties, and depending on the type and intensity of the warfare, this kind of service does have both physical and psychological consequences for any combatant; with children probably being more affected than adults (Machel, 1996).5 Interestingly, the majority of girls in Maoist ranks were found to be cultural artists. IACP MIS data show that 67 per cent of children were used as combatants and 33 per cent were involved in supporting roles that also includes involvement in cultural programmes. During the time of conflict, schools were strategic places


for the CPN-M to attract young people into their groups through dance, songs and similar cultural propaganda. The other roles played by girls are that of combatant, spy, messenger and fund collector (UNICEF, 2009). Sarita,6 a former child soldier says, I worked for the Maoists for more than two years in different capacities and difficult situation. I joined as an informant, then served as the member of cultural troop and finally as a combatant. I fought two big battles against Nepalese Army. I lost many friends in the battles but I was lucky to survive.7 Similarly, Human Rights Watch (2007, p. 39) reports that . . . regardless of their assigned roles, many children serving with Maoist forces were exposed to armed conflict . . . Some were combatants, but even if children served essentially support roles . . . they were called upon to provide such support during battles or encounters with government forces.8 Despite this, children in support roles or non-combative roles were also exposed to direct and intense confrontations and deployed to the front line. There are indications that regardless of their assigned roles most CAAFAG have received at least rudimentary training in the use of weapons such as, for instance, how to use a grenade or socket bomb, while others have received more sophisticated instruction in the use of firearms (HRW, 2007, pp. 19, 42–46). Seeta, a former child soldier who has been reintegrated with her family and is currently studying at grade nine, shares about her roles while staying with Maoists for more than three years. She recalls that I was abducted when I was 11 years old. During my time with Maoist, I played different roles such as carrying logistics materials, weapons, bombs and also acting as a spy, fund collector and of course combatant. Furthermore, they upgraded me to a section commander to boost my motivation but I never liked it. In fact, they made me sad and hopeless and ruined my life.9 Reasons for enlisting in an armed group There are reservations in reaching this statistical conclusion: respondents might have been indoctrinated to believe they were not forced even if they were; different people might define ‘force’ differently – a


Reasons for joining 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200

A A Fa m rres bdu ily te ct io d m n em /de t Fo ai be ne rc r s ed d i Fr to Fam nvo ie l nd ta ve ily k d pr In s in e p ob te vo a r re le lve t st d/ in tr m in p a e cu in ltu er p ing ra re l ss ur In pro gr te e re am st in me s id La eol bo og y ur ca m p O To th er ok s pa Po rt ve in R r ty an e W an ind ven oc ge te d to trina ea t rn ion m on ey

0

Female Figure 16.2

Male

Reasons for joining

Source: Interagency Child Protection Database (2009), p. 4.

scenario where immense pressure is exerted might not be seen as force, yet such a situation might not present the child in question with any other options but to enlist. It was interesting to probe what motivated children to enlist in the Maoist ranks. There were a wide range of motivations, all presented in the table below (Figure 16.2), but there are a few that are worth highlighting. For both boys and girls it was primarily friends that persuaded them to join (labelled as ‘peer pressure’ in Figure 16.2).10 This would suggest that recruitment of children has a multiplier effect; the more children that are recruited, the more children those children recruit. The effect is a very rapid growth of recruitment. Geographical areas Though the children were recruited throughout the country, data show that more children were recruited in rural areas compared to urban areas. According to the inter-agency child protection database report, 37 per cent in the mid-western region, 31 per cent in the eastern region, 15 per cent in the western region, 12 per cent in the central region and 12 per cent in far-western region were recruited. Moreover,


Figure 16.3 Political map of Nepal c D. Binadi. Source: STC CAAFAG Report (2008), p. 4

more children were recruited in the mid-western region compared to the other regions. The map of Nepal in Figure 16.3 shows the detailed administrative division. Unlike many of the conflicts in Western Africa, the children who have been recruited or used by the CPN-M have not been subjected to mass rape or mutilation, have not been forced to kill their families or to fight under the threat of death. However, the seriousness of crimes against Nepali children should not be underestimated or brushed aside in comparison. All children used in armed conflict are placed in positions of danger, fear, isolation and separation from their families and missed schooling. During my field visit to the CAAFAG reintegration programme, Sangita one of the former CAAFAG shares her experience of working for the CPN-M and says, I was with the Maoists for more than two years. Though I voluntarily joined as a member of cultural troop but they forced me to be active as a combatant. I fought against government security forces for many times but during a gun battle, I was injured and captured by the Nepalese Army.11 Reintegration efforts in Nepal Until 2002, the issue of child soldiers was not revealed as a major problem for children and child protection agencies in Nepal. Therefore,


most of the child protection agencies had accommodated the issues of children affected by armed conflict within their ongoing development programmes/projects. The objectives of those programmes were limited to mitigate the impact of armed conflict on children and the services needed for children particularly education and health. The issue of the use of children in armed activities became alarming after 2002 when the Maoists started to recruit and use children in armed activities massively. Consequently, only after 2002, child protection agencies initiated the interventions focusing on reintegration of children used by government security forces and particularly by the CPN-M. Shiva Paudel, Programme Officer of Save the Children Norway says, . . . Until 2002 our interventions for children affected by armed conflict were limited to mitigate the impact of armed conflict on children at organization’s individual level, since the recruitment and use of children became severe after 2002 we initiated joint advocacy and response against the violations of children’s rights by warring parties.12 Based on Shiva’s view and on my own experience of working under the CAAFAG reintegration programme, the major efforts made for reintegration of child soldiers in Nepal by child protection agencies can be discussed in two categories. Individual efforts by international and national NGOs As an emerging issue, few national and international child protection agencies initiated their interventions focusing on the protection of children affected by armed conflict based on the mandate of the organizations after 2002. All initiatives were the individual-level efforts of organizations. Among such organizations STC, Plan International, SAHARA Nepal, CWIN, Institute of Human Rights Communication (IHRICON), Under-Privileged Children’s Education Programme (UCEP) and Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) were a few with at least one programme intervention for child soldiers (Aryal, 2008, p. 62). These organizations had programmes specially focused on children in armed conflict and the interventions were focused more on child soldiers only after 2005. The individual-level work of child protection agencies related to reintegration of child soldiers can be summed up in three categories, that is, advocacy on release and reintegration of children; monitoring and reporting of violations of children’s rights particularly by the


conflicting parties; awareness raising, capacity building of communities and providing support to CAAFAG for their reintegration. Since 2003, the organizations have been advocating and lobbying for the protection and promotion of the specific rights of the children affected by armed conflict. To make their advocacy effective against the use of children by the security forces and the Maoists, STC and its partner NGOs (CWIN, SAHARA, IHRICON among others) initiated an advocacy campaign which later emerged as a national coalition called the ‘National Coalition for Children as Zones of peace’ (CZOP).13 This entity comprises 36 child rights organizations including UNICEF. CZOP-initiated advocacy measures were conducted jointly at national level and individually at different levels by member organizations, for stronger advocacy. STC together with its partner NGOs worked together with school authorities to declare schools as zones of peace (SZOP) in consensus with most of the stakeholders at village level. Similarly, UNICEF was also promoting this concept through its regular programmes such as education, health and protection. Other INGOs such as Plan International, World Education, World Vision, ActionAid Nepal and a few other organizations were also promoting the concept as the members of the coalition, on the one hand, and individually in the communities incorporating this issue within their ongoing programmes, on the other hand. Few of the above-mentioned organizations had designed programmatic interventions to provide support to the children affected by armed conflict and their communities such as education support, income generation/livelihood support, psychosocial care to children and capacity building of local people on child rights and child protection. Also involved was the establishment of community-based structures on child protection particularly of children affected by armed conflict. National and local NGOs have been implementing the reintegration project at the community level in partnership with UNICEF and INGOs (STC, World Education, Search for Common Ground, International Rescue Committee) while UNICEF and INGOs mostly engaged in capacity building of local NGOs/staff, monitoring and supervision for the quality implementation of the project and assuring donors that their resources has been properly managed through quality reporting, frequent meetings and discussions. Unlike other countries, the role of government is very minimal in child soldiers’ reintegration efforts in Nepal. It is a fact that the disclosure of information or confidentiality has always been a problem in most of the ideological struggles similar to the Maoists’ struggle in Nepal. However, being a person engaged with


the reintegration efforts in Nepal from the very beginning, the writers were privileged to have access to most of the information related to the child soldiers’ reintegration. Moreover, it also further helped us to collect the information from the field and discuss/talk with the former child soldiers during the regular monitoring visits. Furthermore, since it is common in the community that people joined the Maoists during the insurgency, the issue of confidentiality is not as severe in Nepal as it in other ideological conflicts. At the same time, few organizations such as STC and its local partner NGOs (CWIN, Informal Sector Service Centre – INSEC, Himalayan Human Rights Monitors – HimRights) were also monitoring the violations of child rights particularly by the conflicting parties. STC and its partners organizations were also supporting CAAFAG for their reintegration into their family and community but this was not prominent as they were not disclosing the information so as to avoid any conflicts with the parties to the conflict. ‘In Nepal, Save the Children initiated its first concrete project for the reintegration of child soldiers in 2003 based on its global learning’, says Shiva Paudel,14 Programme Officer of Save the Children. A reintegration package, psychosocial care and support to children and their families, awareness rising on child rights, capacity building of staff on child protection and coordination and collaboration with stakeholders were the main components of that project. In partnership with SAHARA, a local partner NGO having experience on child protection, two transit centres were established and all staff were provided with basic training. He further says15 ‘48 children who sheltered in those transit centres for about three to six months were reintegrated into their families successfully.’ Though most of the children were aware about their families, trained staff of STC and SAHARA facilitated the establishment of good communication between children and their families. Proper assessment of the families and the neighbourhood was conducted and a safety net comprising five to seven people of the neighbourhood was formed before reuniting the children with their families. Those families were supported to establish livelihood means based on their skills. Despite well preparation of family and children before reuniting children with their families, supporting to the families for livelihood and linking children with school in their community, I would rather feel that it was lacking in the programme because we could not conduct regular follow up of those children for more than two years. In fact


it is necessary to have follow up for up to five years to ensure that the children are successfully reintegrated based on the international standards.16 Shiva stressed that instead of providing a big reintegration package to children, it is very important to prepare the family, the neighourhood and the child itself for the successful reintegration of child soldiers. We had been working with Save the Children Norway at that time and we started small initiatives to reintegrate child soldiers who were associated with Maoists. STC in partnership with UCEP, a national NGO and well-known in providing vocational training, established a transit centre targeting the child soldiers used by the Maoists. Mainly children who had either run away from Maoists or were captured by the RNA during battle with Maoist combatants were targeted by the project. STC facilitated a smooth relation with the RNA including other security forces to receive the children they captured during battle with Maoist combatants. Through this intervention 14 girls and 39 boys were reintegrated. The individual efforts made by these organizations aided a small number of children but were insufficient and limited in their coverage. Most of the child protection agencies, the UN, international and national NGOs that had been working together under the CZOP coalition realized that the cumulative impact of this initiative was more than any individual efforts to protect the rights of the children affected by armed conflict. This in turn opened avenues for working together under one umbrella for the reintegration of child soldiers in Nepal. Joint efforts Realizing the necessity of uniformity and joint efforts for wider coverage and common programmes for successful reintegration of children associated with armed factions, a group of organizations working for the rights and the protection of children formed a coalition to specifically work on the issues related to CAAFAG.17 The coalition was named the CAAFAG working group (CAAFAG WG). It was established in 2005, and it comprises two UN agencies (UNICEF, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights – OHCHR), six INGOs (Save the Children Alliance, International Rescue Committee, Search for Common Ground, Plan International, Care International and Trans Psychosocial Organization – TPO), three NGOs (CWIN, UCEP and SAHARA) and the CZOP coalition. The International Committee of the Red Cross – ICRC, OXFAM


and The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – GTZ in Nepal participate in all meetings as observers. The CAAFAG WG constitutes a forum to develop and coordinate comprehensive and harmonized responses for the release, return and reintegration of CAAFAG (CAAFAG, 2006, p. 1; UNICEF, 2008, p. 13). Despite the reintegration of children formerly associated with armed forces and groups being a primary responsibility of the government, in the absence of any formal institutional arrangements the reintegration programme is at present being led by UNICEF. Since March 2007, UNICEF and its partners, including the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), UN agencies (UNICEF, OHCHR), INGOs (Save the Children Alliance, International Rescue Committee, Search for Common Ground, PLAN, CARE and TPO-Nepal), local NGOs (CWIN, UCEP and SAHARA) and the CZOP coalition, have been implementing a structured joint programme for children who were associated with any armed force or armed group, aimed at their release and reintegration into civilian life. These organizations meet regularly as the CAAFAG WG. The ICRC, OXFAM and GTZ participate in all meetings as observers (STC, 2007, p. 1; UNICEF, 2008, p. 13). The CAAFAG WG’s mandate is to provide a . . . forum to discuss, to protection issues, to elaborate and to coordinate comprehensive and harmonized responses for the release, return and reintegration of CAAFAG, as well as to design common advocacy strategies with relevant stakeholders (Housden, 2009, p. 5) According to the evaluation report of the UNICEF Programme for the Reintegration of CAAFAG, the following are the components of the reintegration project which has been implemented in 54 out of 75 districts in Nepal since 2007 (UNICEF, 2008, pp. 15–17). • It has involved advocacy at the national and international levels for the recognition of CAAFAG and child protection issues in Nepal. • Facilitating the release and reintegration of children associated with the CPN-M and other identified armed groups and preventing the recruitment of children considered at risk. • Providing immediate care, family tracing and reunification services by supporting interim care facilities and by providing psychosocial training to child protection teams and community leaders. • Sensitizing, informing and mobilizing families and communities to provide protection to these children and supporting full reintegration through national and local community campaigns.


• Promoting children’s participation in all steps of programme implementation. • Building the capacity of NGO partners, community groups and civil society activities in programme implementation as it applies to child protection, through training, workshops and staff support. The whole reintegration efforts of Nepal can be summed up into the following three stages. First phase: Targeted at the child soldiers who were in the cantonment (formal release focused) After signing the agreement on Monitoring of Management of Armies and Arms by the Government of Nepal and the CPN-M in the presence of UNMIN on 28 November 2006, all Maoist combatants were confined within 7 cantonments and 21 satellite camps, obviously together with child soldiers. The map of Nepal in Figure 16.4 shows the seven cantonment sites. Child protection agencies together with UNMIN and UNICEF thought that they would be immediately discharged from cantonment sites.

Figure 16.4 Map of Cantonment sites during DDR in Nepal c D. Binadi. Source: STC CAAFAG Report (2008), p. 5


As a consequence, several transit centres were established, staff were trained on transit centres, tracing and reunification. All child protection agencies were fully prepared for reunification and reintegration of those children coming from the cantonments as part of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process. However, this process did not happen even after three years of agreement. The first registration of all Maoist combatants was conducted by UNMIN in the beginning of 2007, as per the agreement and the second verification of the registered combatants revealed that 8640 combatants had already left the cantonments. Child protection agencies strongly believed that those missing were children. Among those who appeared in the verification process, 2973 were verified as children. Despite many advocacy efforts for the honourable release of those minors, they remained in the cantonments for about three years, together with other qualified combatants, against the international standards in children in armed conflict. The preparation done by the child protection agencies assuming the formal release of the children turned out to be a waste of effort. In this way, all Maoist combatants were disarmed but they remained within the armed structure without demobilization. However, child soldiers started to leave the cantonments informally and child protection agencies created a favourable environment in the community for such children. This phase of the reintegration process in Nepal was from November 2006 to April 2007. Second phase: Targeted at the child soldiers who were informally released and were in the community (community-based/informal release focused) Realizing the fact that most of the child soldiers had been informally released and were in the community, and the community was not positive towards them, child protection agencies focused their efforts to address those issues. Child protection agencies launched programmes for family tracing, efforts to identity and register those child soldiers who had been found in the community and offered them reintegration support. At the same time, informal release of the child soldiers from the cantonments was also encouraged and supported by the child rights organizations. The most important work of this phase was to prepare communities to receive child soldiers and link former child soldiers with the community services. All 8297 children registered in the interagencies child protection database were identified in the community. This phase of the project was started in April 2007 and is still ongoing.


Ram Kumari was one of those child soldiers who was in the Maoist ranks, over two years, and at the time of interview was living with her family, with whom she had been reunited with support from a local partner of STC. She herself says, Previously, I was in despair and in confusion about my life. I felt that everyone was against me. My family was treating me differently. This upset me so much that I got depressed and frustrated. After the NGO staff started visiting me and talking to my family, my situation normalized gradually and I regained confidence and hope. I found the behaviour of my family and the community becomes positive towards me. Furthermore, the support I received from the NGOs has been helping me to run my livelihood. It was only that NGO and its staff who contributed for the drastic change in my life.18 Third phase: Targeted at support to formally released child soldiers from the cantonments This stage is the last stage of the reintegration programme of Nepal which targeted 2973 minors who were supposed to be formally released from the cantonments. Unfortunately around 40 per cent of them left before the formal ceremony took place. While 60 per cent of child soldiers were released through a formal process, they did not accept any kind of support offered by the child protection agencies and the government package for their reintegration. As per the agreement between the Government of Nepal and the CPN-M, the process of formal release started in January 2010 and completed in February 2010. Some of the formally released child soldiers are in contact with child protection agencies and are being linked to UN-facilitated government packages for their reintegration. A UN country team-managed toll-free service system is in place which targets verified minors and late recruits to inform them about packages and referrs them to appropriate agencies for selected services such as educational support, medical support, vocational trainings and so on. The interventions such as capacity building of communitylevel structures on child protection, awareness campaigns on child rights and provision of services for the former child soldiers in the community by the child protection agencies have contributed to creating an encouraging environment in the community for the child soldiers returning formally from the cantonments. Though the whole reintegration effort can be categorized in the above-mentioned three phases, the reintegration programme looks like a single programme.


During the first phase without any doubt the major focus was on formal release but simultaneously UNICEF and other child protection agencies started to work in the community targeting all children affected by armed conflict together with child soldiers. Similarly, in the third phase, there are separate packages for the children who are verified as minors by UNMIN but there are services for other CAAFAG and children affected by armed conflict as well. The evaluation of the Nepal CAAFAG reintegration programme (UNICEF, 2008, p. 4) praises Nepal’s CAAFAG programme as being ‘innovative, ambitious and catalytic and further says that the Nepal programme has much strength and is an example of best practice in terms of community based reintegration’. This is a very positive finding and has encouraged all the CAAFAG WG members. According to the information of the database managed by STC, around 10 per cent of the child soldiers who were formally released in January and February 2010 have come into contact with partner NGOs seeking a reintegration package. A CAAFAG WG member and child rights activist Tarak Dhital also expresses similar views. . . . despite the offering of different support packages and many efforts of the child protection agencies to bring formally released child soldiers in the process of reintegration, we have been able to reach only around 10 per cent to 15 per cent of them. Around 90 per cent are out of contact which is a big challenge for us. But we are hopeful that we will be able to facilitate the reintegration of most of them.19 After three years of implementation, by December 2009, the project had been able to reintegrate 8297 children and of this number, 15 per cent to 20 per cent have been successfully reintegrated within their families and in their communities and their cases closed (STC, 2010). Regular follow-up of the remaining children has been ensured together with the provision of needed support. UNICEF, STC, International Rescue Committee (IRC), World Education, Search for Common Ground are the UN and international NGOs which have been implementing child soldier reintegration programmes in Nepal since 2007 in partnership with national NGOs such as CWIN), UCEP, SAHARA Nepal, HimRights and many other community-based NGOs. GTZ, Australian Aid Program – AusAID, Danish International Development Agency – DANIDA, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – SIDA, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation – NORAD, European Union – EU and Japan International Cooperation Agency – JICA are the major


donors of this intervention in Nepal. In many of the countries like Sri Lanka, Congo former child soldiers have been provided with vocational training and livelihood opportunities whereas in Nepal most of the returned children are continuing their education. Around 80 per cent of the child soldiers have been re-enrolled into formal schooling and are continuing their education, which uniquene to the Nepalese reintegration programme. The education support component has been recognized as the best strength of the reintegration project in Nepal. The support has been of two types, one is individual support comprising tuition fees, stationery, uniforms and so on while the other support is structure support. A certain amount of money is allocated to schools to be used for the benefit of other children in the communities. Children receiving education support are universally positive. This has helped to enrol them at school as well as retain them in school. This support has also helped children to be more confident in their school and many children have been found to use this opportunity to do their best and start a new life. Many children are engaged in various activities as part of child club / group, and this has encouraged a positive reintegration (STC, 2008, p. 15). During my discussion, Raju, one of the former child soldiers who has received support from the programme, said, ‘I sometimes felt like committing suicide. After getting reintegration I am now studying as well as creating environment for acceptance of girl CAAFAG. I now really feel better and content.’20 Similar reflections have been cited in the CAAFAG evaluation report conducted by UNICEF: ‘If I did not have this support, I would leave school and rejoin the Party’ (UNICEF, 2008, p. 37). Similarly, schools getting support have also shared positive experiences of children returning to schools and they have also appreciated that the support helps other vulnerable children as well. Unfortunately, informal education has not taken off very well (STC, 2008, p. 16; UNICEF, 2008, p. 37). Although livelihood programmes have been much appreciated and have helped children to be easily accepted by their families, additional business start-up training has recently been advocated by both of the evaluations conducted by STC and UNICEF for better results (UNICEF, 2008, p. 38). Older children have found that combined livelihood support and education support has been an effective strategy for successful reintegration. In this year more support needs to be provided to ensure the effectiveness of income generation and vocational programmes through additional training, close monitoring of the business enterprise and creation of a business development plan (STC, 2008, pp. 18–19).


Psychosocial support was found to be the strongest component of interventions both during STC’s internal evaluations as well as by UNICEF’s evaluation. According to TPO, psychosocial training or counselling partner of STC, during various psychosocial interventions, children have shared their problems like nightmares, fear of re-abduction, re-recruitment and associated feelings of guilt, regret over association with the Party and fear of losing face on rejoining school as previous Maoist cadres. Difficulties in studying with junior students and behavioural problems pertaining to restlessness, aggression, difficulty in concentration, loss of appetite and irritation were commonly reported ailments. Such sharing helped children to air their feelings and even inspired many of them to attend individual counselling sessions. The children shared that they felt relaxed after airing their deep emotions. After psychosocial support, positive changes have been observed such as being able to mix in the community, getting relief from negative thinking, enhanced self-confidence and feeling accepted in the community (STC, 2008, pp. 16–18; UNICEF, 2008, pp. 40–41). In almost all districts, a trained district-level counsellor is available to provide psychosocial care at district and community level; severe cases are usually referred to national-level psychosocial organizations such as TPO and the Centre for Victims of Torture (CVICT). Lok Bahadur Rana, a field-level staff of one of the partner NGOs of STC who have been involved in the reintegration project explained that being multilayered and with wider community involvement, this programme has really been successful in achieving its objectives. Education support, psychosocial care and support, peer group discussion, normalization activities and promoting community harmony were the strongest components of the programme while the livelihood component was comparatively weaker.21 This is because there were very few opportunities to get a job after completion of the vocational training, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the NGOs who were involved in the reintegration programme did not have the capacity to provide support to those who had received livelihood support. Similarly, there was a lack of a mechanism and capacity with local-level NGOs involved in the reintegration of CAAFAG to address the issues related to gender. Sometimes, it was even difficult to have a female psychosocial counsellor with NGOs to deal with the issues of female child soldiers. Of course there were many positive outcomes of the reintegration project in Nepal which contributed to bring positive changes in the lives of many children whose life had been lost. But there were a few


shortcomings as well, with the absence of those drawbacks, the project might have served child soldiers in a better and more comprehensive way. Tarak Dhital, one of the child rights activists, a staff of CWIN and a member of CAAFAG WG says Despite all our advocacy efforts we have not been able to put enough pressure to the government and the Maoists for the timely release of 2,973 minors verified by United Nations’ Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) from the cantonments which is the weakest part of the entire reintegration programme in Nepal.22 Similarly, he expressed his views that the Government of Nepal had been indifferent throughout the whole reintegration process of child soldiers and short-term funding commitments from the donors were also other shortcomings of the programme.

Conclusion Of course there are important weaknesses of the reintegration programme in Nepal. Firstly, no role has been given to the Government of Nepal in the entire reintegration process and it is a major institutional lacunae. If the Government of Nepal were involved in this process, it would have introduced national voices and local ownership, strengthening community-based reintegration of these children in manifold ways, especially for their long-term return and re-absorption prospects, enabling in turn follow-up efforts by the government and linking them with government services available in the community. Summing up this idea Shiva Paudel, former acting executive director of the Central Child Welfare Board (CCWB), a central-level government structure reflected that . . . being a party to the conflict, the main idea in not involving the government in the whole CAAFAG reintegration process lay in maintaining confidentiality. Given that confidentiality was not a big problem in the context of Nepal; it was unfortunate that the children are now deprived of support that the government could have provided for their successful reintegration.23 Similarly short-term funding was another weakness of the programme which had the greatest impact on the effectiveness of the project.


Despite the programme being in place since 2007 the funding was always only for one year at a time. As a result, there was contingency planning only for a year which caused uncertainly in the minds of children as well as child protection agencies. Tarak Dhital shared that . . . Although we have implemented the CAAFAG reintegration programme for four years, we never got chance for a long term planning. We could not say anything when a child asked us about the next year support. It created frustration among the children who were in the process of reintegration on one hand and on the other hand we could not retain the trained staff who could provide better support to the children. Therefore, I consider that short-term funding was one of the most important weaknesses of Nepal’s reintegration project which impacted its effectiveness.24 In addition to programmatic weaknesses, the socio-economic and cultural aspects also played a vital role for making the reintegration of child soldiers successful in Nepal. Owing to gender discrimination, compared to girls, it is easier for boys to be accepted by the family and community. Similarly, family and community acceptance was easier for children from the so-called untouchable or ‘dalit’ groups compared to the higher ‘Brahmin’ and ‘Chhetri’ castes. Moreover, for a girl child soldier who is from the ‘Brahmin’ caste and from southern Terai part of the country, it was evidently difficult to be reintegrated into her family in her own community. All these socio-economic situations have a huge impact on the reintegration of child soldiers in Nepal. However, increased awareness about rights among the oppressed and discriminated people of lower castes and women has been a positive outcome of the Maoist movement; this has contributed to a smoother reintegration process for many child soldiers especially for girls. However, while the CPN-M was leading the government, they did not show any interest in the release and reintegration of their combatants including children. In fact, they did not agree to deal with the issue of child soldiers separately and demanded to deal with the issue of all the combatants, both adults and children, in a single package, which caused delay for the reintegration of child soldiers living in the cantonments. Most of the youth and children who are associated with the CPN-M are politically indoctrinated very well, therefore, instead of thinking about their own benefit they always talk about the benefit of the Party and the country which is also a big challenge for the child protection agencies themselves in terms of preparing child soldiers for their reintegration.


Notes 1. The inter-agency child protection information system is managed by CAAFAG reintegration implementing organizations in Nepal that includes UNICEF, Save the Children and World Education. This information management system (IMS) is a case management tool for the CAAFAG reintegration programme. UNICEF centrally hosts it. The International Rescue Committee was also part of it until 2009. 2. All the information about child soldiers who have received support from the reintegration programme have been put into a database called the interagency child protection database. The database is hosted by UNICEF in Nepal and contributed to by Save the Children, World Education and the International Rescue Committee. 3. Tarak Dhital, CWIN’s Offfice, Ravi Bhawan, Kathmandu, 24 June 2010. 4. Researchers have observed that ‘increasingly, however, adults are deliberately conscripting children as soldiers. Some commanders have even noted the desirability of child soldiers because they are “more obedient, do not question orders and are easier to manipulate than adult soldiers.” ’ R. Brett & M. McCallin (1996) Children: The Invisible Soldiers (Geneva: Quaker United Nations Office and the International Catholic Child Bureau), April, p. 88. 5. G. Machel (1996) Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. New York: United Nations, paras 48–57. 6. All interviewees’ names (CAAFAG) have been changed for confidentiality. 7. Sarita, Palpa, 12 June 2010. 8. Human Rights Watch (2007) Children in Ranks: The Maoists’ Use of Child Soldiers in Nepal (New York: Human Rights Watch), p. 39. This report offers some vivid accounts of children’s experiences on battlefields across Nepal. 9. Sita, Nawalparasi, 14 June 2010. 10. This confirms the findings of the rapid assessment: ‘. . . the children have been convinced by or have followed their friends and/or their family members.’ CAAFAG WG (2006) Situation of CAAFAG: Nepal: A Communit Assessment and Understanding. Kathmandu: CAAFAG Working Group, p. 6. 11. Sangita, Surkhet, 12 June 2010. 12. Shiva Prasad Paudel, Save the Children’s Office, Kathmandu, 22 June 2010. 13. Children as Zones of Peace is a national campaign and the joint efforts of 36 NGOs, INGOs and UN bodies working to promote and protect the rights of the children affected by armed conflict. During conflict time, the coalition was effective in advocating against the use of children in armed activities. 14. Shiva Prasad Paudel, Save the Children’s Office, Kathmandu, 22 June 2010. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. The definition of CAAFAG includes all children who have been involved in the armed forces and armed groups in any capacity, for example, as a spy, messenger, porter, cook, soldier, fund collector, logistic supporter, artist in cultural groups or those who have been arrested and detained on charges of being Maoist and so on. 18. Ram Kumari, Dang, 18 June 2010. 19. Tarak Dhital, CWIN’s Office, Ravi Bhawan, Kathmandu, 24 June 2010.

304 Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Nepal 20. Raju, Palpa, 12 June 2010. 21. LoK Bahadur Rana, staff of local partner NGOs of Save the Children says, ‘the reintegration project managed by Save the Children was multi-layered having interventions from community to national level which helped it to be successful. At community level, education support, psychosocial care and capacity building and awareness raising on child rights at community level were the strong components, while, being in experienced NGOs livelihood component was comparatively weaker.’ 22. Tarak Dhital, CWIN’s Office, Ravi Bhawan, Kathmandu 24 June 2010. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid.

References Amnesty International (2005) Nepal: Children Caught in the Conflict, London: Amnesty International Secretariat Report, p. 2. Aryal, S. (2008) Use of Child Soldiers in Nepal: A Causal Analysis. Dissertation submitted to Mahidol University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Human Rights) (Thailand: Mahidol University), p. 62. CAAFAG Working Group (2006) Situation of CAAFAG: Nepal: A Community Assessment and understanding (Kathmandu: CAAFAG Working Group), p. 1. CWIN (2007) Fact Sheet: Children in Armed Conflict, http://www.cwin.org.np/ press_room/fact_sheets/fact_cic.htm, date accessed 25 May 2010. Hart, J. (n.d.) Conflict in Nepal and its Impact on Children (Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University), p. 9. Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2007) Children in Ranks: The Maoists’ Use of Child Soldiers in Nepal, 19 (2C) (New York: HRW) pp. 19, 39, 42–46. International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005) Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy. Asia Report No. 104 (Brussels: ICG). Karki, A. and Seddon, D. (2003) ‘The People’s War in Historical Context’ in A. Karki and D. Seddon (ed.) The People’s War in Historical Context (Dilhi: Adroit Publishers), pp. 14, 84. Kattel, M. (2003) ‘Introduction to ‘The People’s War and Its Implications’. In A. Karki and D. Seddon (ed.) The People’s War in Historical Context (Dilhi: Adroit Publishers), p. 50. Machel, G. (1996) Impact of Armed Conflict on Children (New York: United Nations), paras 48–57. Mackinlay, J. (2007) ‘Nepal’s Transition to a Post-Insurgency Era’, RUSI Journal, 3, 42–47. Muni, S. D. (2003) Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The Challenge and the Response (New Delhi: Rupa), p. 37. Nepalnews.com (2006) Chronology of Decade-long Conflict, http://www. nepalnews.com/archive/2006/nov/nov22/news08.php, date accessed 25 June 2010. Pokheral, G. (n.d.) ‘History of Conflict in Nepal’, http://www.fesnepal.org/ reports/2004/seminar_reports/paper_conflict-reporting/paper_gokul.htm, date accessed 20 June 2010.

Dilli Raj Binadi and Pratisha Dewan Binadi 305 Riaz, A. and Basu, S. (2007) Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal (Plymouth: Lexington Books), p. 133. STC (Save the Children) (2007) Release, Return and Reintegration (RRR) of Former CAAFAG (Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups) in Nepal: A Field Guide (Kathmandu: Save the Children), p. 1. STC (Save the Children) (2008) Reintegration of Former CAAFAG in Nepal, Report submitted to AusAID (Kathmandu: Save the Children), pp. 15–19. Thapalia, S. (2006) Nepal at the Political Crossroads: Options for India, South Asian Survey 13:1 New Dehli: (Sage Publications), pp. 51–72. UNICEF (2008) UNICEF Programme for the Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups in Nepal, Evaluation Report December 2007– February 2008 (Kathmandu: UNICEF), pp. 2, 4, 11–13, 15–17, 37, 40–41. Uppsala (2008) Conflict Dataset, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/conflictSummary.php? bcID=203, date accessed 25 June 2010.


Part V


17 Mapping Child Soldier Reintegration Outcomes: Exploring the Linkages Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder

Introduction This volume has attempted to bring together academics, practitioners, policy makers and analysts across a wide spectrum to share their narratives and research findings on mode of child soldier recruitment, motivations behind children’s participation and their reintegration outcomes from a cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary perspective. These empirical cases and narratives were used to illustrate certain theoretical propositions that are developed in this work and to present a culturally sensitive, empirically rich and theoretically viable thesis on the nuances and functioning of reintegration processes for child soldiers in postwar transitions by relating these to their recruitment experiences and participation processes. The volume has sought to weave together the diverse methodological, normative and ethical issues together with technical aspects of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programming for child soldiers to arrive at policy prescriptive inferences by illustrating empirical evidence from cases within these themes. This was geared towards providing a comprehensive overview of what reintegration entails – needs, problems and challenges for child soldiers. By invoking a theoretically inclusive framework the prevalent approaches and models in reintegration practice as they have evolved over the past decade have been captured to establish a useful terminology and accessible taxonomy which attaches value to child soldier reintegration experiences. The chapters have presented the debates and discourses which intersect the rather complex matrix of recruitment and reintegration of child 309

310 Mapping Child Soldier Reintegration Outcomes

soldiers in disparate war zones. A theoretical piece on child recruitment and motivations set the tone for case studies in Part II which dealt with different aspects of the recruitment debate, delving into the motivations, compulsions and overarching triggers which make recruitment in war zones a reality for many youth. War is at once debilitating as it is transformational, for the polity, economy and society of countries in conflict and can in some contexts be a liberating phase creating routes to power, influence and responsibility for youth, of which they may have been deprived in pre-war societies. The chapters attempted to unravel the multiple trajectories of recruitment and in-group experiences by focusing on cross-cultural experiences. The reader was offered snapshots into this complicated matrix by traversing its multiple meanings poised between the recruitment-reintegration nexus. Flowing from this overarching framework, the conceptual debate on child soldiering has sought to locate youth in conflict contexts within the broader victim-agent continuum. The case studies on reintegration outcomes were clustered thematically to explore identity, victimcy and survival narratives. This was complemented with practitioner perspectives from Sudan and Nepal to look at more recent efforts at child soldier reintegration to compare formal, informal, international and institutional responses. As chapters in Part III have revealed, given the complexities and long-drawn processes involved, reintegration can be achieved only over several years; this implies a long-term funding and resource commitment on the part of donors which is often lamentably lacking. It also involves a long-term process built on a much broader array of measures and benefits (including counselling, access to technology, credit, land and other productive assets), which need to be planned carefully to ensure that former combatants are sustainably reintegrated within communities. But what is reintegration in post-conflict countries? Is it a tangible entity or something which defies clear definition and comprehension due to the complexity of its constituents?

Recruitment experiences and motivation underlying recruitment Joining an armed group as an act of agency and volition is often underplayed in contemporary popular accounts on child recruitment. But the element of security and survival is critical to warscapes, and joining either the rebel group or the government forces in a contested territory can become the only mode for survival, offering protection from torture, abuse and politically instigated killings/massacres. In other cases,


family and community itself can be an important agent in encouraging enrolment in response to appeals for manpower, and also as part of military culture, embedded in local concepts of community defence in which adolescent youth play a critical role, one that is expected as a natural and essential part of their transition into adulthood. In a few instances joining a faction could aid in family reunification, especially in a countryside with ‘soldier men’ roaming and raiding, arming oneself with a weapon can ensure that attempts at locating estranged family is successful and also assists in movement when all public services and facilities have ceased. Risk factors to child recruitment can be identified by invoking a community approach, while these triggers are built into the structure of conflicts, it is also important to address the resilience and coping mechanisms that youth evolve which provide important capacities to avoid recruitment. Both the Guatemalan and Mindanao cases highlight the voluntary and community dimensions of youth participation in civil conflict. Another important motivation which is often overlooked is food, access to food in a context where little may be available to quench thirst or satisfy hunger, where poverty, misery and violence define every moment, and the ‘horrors’ of war become part of the accepted and normal, food is a significant need. Socialization practices are mainly designed to ensure internalization of new norms, construct a new self-identity and values and help create group cohesion, effective organization, integration and high allegiance amongst rebel groups. This also encourages, and sanctions, high levels of violence – killing, looting and torture become essential to the acceptability of the soldier image. The socialization processes within armed groups replace initiation rituals commonly practised to mark the transition to adulthood in most African societies. They provide an alternate set of norms creating new sodalities rooted in rebel group membership. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), for instance, invested in important socialization practices that were aimed at forging group cohesion among coerced recruits to enhance feelings of loyalty and belongingness towards the movement. This was a necessary strategy even with voluntary recruits to ensure commitment to the group’s goals and to provide deterrents to desertion in light of hardships and violence which make life inside the group dangerous and difficult. It was reinforced by the essentially social aspects of comradeship and community that rebel groups offer. Barbaric violence and civilian abuse may have been less ambiguous or undirected than perceived, in fact senselessness of violence marked by amputation,


death and rape can be interpreted as a deliberate tactic meant to instil fear in the opponent and undermine resistance in an agrarian set-up of low technology warfare. In-group socialization can be a powerful mechanism for changing the identity of young people, and transforming children into soldiers. This has important implications for post-conflict civilian life, especially with respect to challenges of regaining lost childhoods, family, loved ones and at times norms of social behaviour. In some contexts like Guatemala, Sierra Leone and Liberia, with long-drawn conflicts, members who joined as children demobilized as adults and this longdrawn in-group socialization had important consequences for post-war reintegration outcomes because it impinges on some key post-war behavioural indicators with respect to mental health-related disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), disability and reproductive atrophy. Apart from medical problems, important negative fallouts of life inside armed groups include loss of education, lack of employable skills and stable family life. Becoming a soldier marks a transition away from the normal and accepted, hence returning to a prior set of rules can be a significant challenge, and may need traditional interventions, involving ritualistic cleansing and sacrifice in societies with strong communitarian visions of death, illness and healing to create a socially acceptable return possible. Traditional cleansing rituals, organic interventions as witnessed in Mozambique, can be critical for the onset of reintegration processes informally, meant to spiritually realign well-being with the social world and discard identities and habits imbibed in the fighters’ world. Hence processually, what are the options for resocializing children from their soldier identity? Present approaches to reintegration seem to overlook this element and are weak with respect to the social elements of reintegration, of locating return to the norms and values of society in order to engender greater acceptability. This also creates an inversion of values, killing, amputation and other forms of horrific violence which become accepted forms of behaviour during war, and tend to undermine the roles and courage displayed by youth in becoming fighters. There are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ rebels in some respects. Distrust and fear for child soldiers are common in civilian communities even years after war ends. It is difficult to discard rebel like behaviour and to reorient oneself to the reality, poverty or incapacity of civilian living. At the same time child soldiers remain in some respect victims of their past, violence is an entrenched reality of their lives, and it is the most destructive element, since reliance on violence to secure what


in a free society can be secured institutionally or rightfully remains a key challenge in the identity transformation process. In some contexts, organic approaches, especially traditional cleansing ceremonies, helped repair relationships with their families and communities to realign their well-being with spiritual beliefs of death and rebirth. Such ritualistic rebirth and cleansing eases return and enhances community trust in its own youth who are perceived as spiritually polluted through exposure to violence and death during wartime.

Reintegration outcomes Practitioners and scholars of post-conflict reconstruction remain uncertain about measures for defining reintegration outcomes such as what indicators can explain a successful reintegration. The themes of unemployment and a lopsided inadequate process have been played up in recent studies on ex-combatant, child soldier reintegration. The challenge lies in that while disarmament and demobilization (DD) phases offer statistical references of numbers of weapons collected and persons disarmed, demobilized or reunited with families, reintegration remains essentially a process outside of numeric outputs. Reintegration subsumes insertion of a range of returnees into prewar communities; it includes efforts for rebuilding societies, states and reconciling social differences. It also represents an exercise in renegotiation, that is, of values, norms and attitudes which change over years of conflict. Hence a key issue to bear in mind here pertains to the fact that reintegration does not happen in a vacuum and is not isolated from previous experiences of recruitment and involvement in armed groups. Focus on individual outcomes cannot be unrelated to the recovery and reconstruction efforts of war-torn communities. Although social and communal dimensions of conflict are routinely overlooked in international responses and donor strategies, this relationship between the individual reintegration and communal recovery is played out in all spheres of social, economic and political reconstruction. Moreover, successful individual return to civilian livelihoods can be located only within the broader matrix of community support and acceptance for different groups of returnees competing for limited resources. Another significant issue here pertains to the age criteria; demarcation of DDR benefits and reintegration support in particular continues in policy practice to be aligned along compartmentalized prescriptions which leverages family reunification, and primary or secondary school education for children as opposed to vocational training, catch-up education


and cash payments for adults. This presents problems at both ends, for instance, adults may have started their participation as children and need a more thorough schooling experience; child soldiers in war zones are youth with adult roles, sometimes with familial responsibilities in the post-war period, and may benefit greatly from cash payments and vocational training support especially scholarships for accessing higher education. However, the policy dictates of international agencies may not be able to cater to these needs comprehensively due to limitations of funding and wavering donor commitment which progresses from one post-conflict country to another informed by broader political agendas. From a programmatic perspective, the utility of DDR programmes also needs to be debated. How far can external interventions such as DDR reconcile war-induced divisions, especially between rebel groups, ex-combatants, child soldiers and civilian communities? Two further factors raised in this volume consider first, the content of reintegration support, that is, whether the prevalent combination of family reunification, primary/secondary education, vocational training and cash payments actually offer adequate short-term reinsertion and long-term reintegration support? The other factor here is how far targeting helps. Does the logic of leveraging needs of a particular group under the rubric of security threats result in introducing greater inequality, and invite an abuse of limited resources in an impoverished and dilapidated context? Who should DDR programmes be targeting, everyone, a few, communities, individuals, children, adults, men or women? If support is to be dispersed, how can it be effectively distributed to address the needs of a much broader set of beneficiaries? Child soldiers have traditionally been excluded from DDR programmes and reintegration support in particular; efforts at stop gap programmes have targeted these excluded youth by giving them priority in family reunification, counselling and basic economic assistance in the form of short vocational training programmes and provision for shelter, food and tools. Community-based reintegration (CBR) strategies attempted in the context of child soldier reintegration seem better poised at tackling the need for balance in targeting and mitigating animosities stemming from exclusive focus on any particular caseload. More importantly the criticism of CBR approaches as relegating responsibility for reintegration to impoverished and incapacitated communities is underlined; however, the positives of this strategy lie in ensuring community located follow-up mechanisms and more effective use of donor as well as local resources. If communities are provided with adequate resources and get support from the state and central


government, and if they are able to identify, gauge and prioritize needs locally, then they will be able to respond to those needs themselves. It is vital that credence is paid to building this capacity. Children benefit from returning to an environment which encourages them to normalize life, to return to education and stability, and the primary challenge here is engaging positively as a rich pool of human resources for development rather than remarginalizing child soldiers. The angle of power and agency in youth participation and ways in which post-conflict reintegration strategies impact on elements of individual action and trajectories of empowerment/disempowerment continues to be less investigated. Social navigation can be understood as motion within a fluid space, and requires individual agency in deciding on how to navigate dangers and possibilities as well as involves an ability to locate and creatively traverse a difficult social space. Social navigation and post-conflict power is an important and understudied dimension in the reintegration trajectories of child soldiers. In post-conflict societies, child soldiers in particular are susceptible to disempowerment, marginalization and return to erstwhile structures of traditional leadership, control and domination. How do youth negotiate with this sudden change in status? Bike riding has been explored as a theme contiguous with life in the bush, creating a similar social support network, and similar solidarity where laws of the bush operate, where might is right, where the vocal are strong, important and powerful. This is an interesting and fluid dimension of power, one interlaced with risk and uncertainty, similar to the machismo of being a soldier, which offers escape from domination. Riding on top of a bike can be compared to a momentary release from the realities of control and peripherality which marks the life of most youth in transition. Loss of education, lack of employment and the pejorative label of child soldier is not the best concoction for reintegration success. At the same time where then does reintegration support figure? And more importantly what can it do for youth returning to their dilapidated communities? Support can be directed towards individual child soldiers themselves or seek to develop infrastructure by allocating funds to schools for the benefit of children in the community as a whole. One of the lessons drawn from recent reintegration experiences in Nepal and Sudan is that instead of providing comprehensive reintegration packages for individual child soldiers, it is important to locate that support in the family and community, by providing livelihood support to the family, creating an enabling and empowered environment for the reintegration of returning child soldiers. We return to this theme later.


Emphasizing the recruitment-reintegration link The emphasis in praxis needs to leverage the linkages between recruitment and in-group experiences in measuring the incidence of reintegration success. Some of the key variables for the latter as evident from the case study findings in this volume pertain to family support, community acceptance, economic livelihoods, education, personal security and stability. Elaborating on this recruitment-reintegration link, several factors are of relevance here, such as age, factional affiliation, duration of membership, role and pre-war characteristics especially relating to family, education and socio-economic background. With respect to age of recruitment, the findings here indicate that the younger the age of recruitment, the more prolonged is the exposure to fighting and in-group socialization. Voluntary and long duration recruits or camp followers who rise in the ranks prove to be the most loyal fighters. Development of trust and allegiance among child soldiers results in lasting social networks and bonds flowing from wartime relationships, these in turn make re-recruitment and return more likely for long duration recruits compared to short duration, coerced participants who choose more often to escape or avoid re-recruitment. The longer a child remains within the environment of a rebel group, the habits and lifestyle of being a soldier become more entrenched, and are markedly difficult to renounce. PTSD symptoms are also likely to be more prominent among long duration recruits and less common among short duration fighters. Factional affiliation is another important factor both during and after the conflict, with significant links to reintegration outcomes given that different factions face different circumstances at the end of conflict. Victors integrate easily and often dominate the political scene compared to the vanquished who may be excluded from power structures or could deliberately be left out from the ranks of a new national army. These post-war results impact on trajectories of individual combatants who participated in these groups. Another issue here is of stigma, fear and civilian trust. On the whole child soldiering tends to carry a pejorative connotation, in some instance being a soldier can also be prestigious, and flow from broader religious or ideological beliefs. Affiliation to abusive rebel groups can create difficulties in reintegration, and give rise to negative perceptions, even if at an individual level the combatant may not have been engaged in atrocities. This also complicates the terrain of post-war justice. Of late, there has been increasing interest in how transitional justice processes and reconciliation efforts in post-war contexts impact on the lives of


youth who participated in armed groups. Drawing on local-level analysis and narratives on participation, it can be safely concluded that age is uncontested as a universal indicator of children’s moral agency, and the supposed children’s vulnerability is assumed to require fundamentally different needs and models in addressing the issue of culpability. This complicates the arena of criminal and transitional justice issues further. Though child soldiers commit crimes of war, they are entitled as children to special provision and protection, we believe this landscape of juvenile justice in peacetime needs to be disaggregated from criminal justice during war; some are made to kill, while others kill for expedience, pleasure, power and loot. Truth telling and reconciliation commissions have become an important feature of post-conflict transitions especially in West Africa, but they also create fear of being prosecuted both nationally and internationally for wrongdoing during conflict. This issue of transitional justice also impacts on post-war resettlement choices of child soldiers and ex-combatants. Major fallout of recruitment and participation in armed groups include injuries sustained during fighting, loss of limbs, sexual assault, high levels of exposure to violence and addictive habits such as drug abuse and can have an abiding impact on reintegration trajectories. Unresolved trauma or psychological issues are also particularly difficult for the war wounded and sexually tortured. At the same time, a predominant theme for former child soldiers has been a pronounced loss of power and agency. Youth who gain prominence and authority by wielding guns are often caught in the dilemma of reconciling as compliant returnees into post-war societies dominated and controlled by elders and traditional leaders in continuity to pre-war social structures. The mode of recruitment, that is, coercive versus voluntary, can also be instrumental in defining mental health, physical well-being and return trends. Coerced recruits could return to their home communities using the ‘victim’ card, while willing joiners especially into armed groups unfavourable in their communities chose to resettle away from home communities. Children who had committed crimes and atrocities in their home communities did not wish to return to their villages, for fear of retribution. Others feared the ‘stigma’ of the child soldier label, due to the pejorative images associated with it. Smaller children who do not wish to be identified as having fought willingly to profit or loot often pose as displaced or estranged, to ease their return and reabsorption into home communities. At the same time, those who may have been part of village defence militias, protecting community members from attack, find acceptance of their ‘child soldier/ex-combatant’


label simpler and remain strong individuals in their villages in the postwar period. Ethnicity also matters, in homogeneous ethnic settlements it may be difficult for youth who joined opposing factions to return or be accepted by the community. Reintegration trends also differ depending on the specific loci, influence and leverage that child soldiers had in the rank of their armed group, while some would rise in the ranks, most would remain in ancillary roles. Commanding officers often fare better, some accumulate resources over the conflict years, and are less intimidated by transition compared to lower ranked, shorter span recruits, who find it difficult to cope with changing circumstances. Child soldiers dominate the latter category. Besides, as evidenced from some of the chapters in this volume, participation in DDR programmes per se is often manipulated due to low entry criteria, resulting in a further blurring of the distinction between combatant and civilian. These are some of the important impacts of recruitment and in-group experiences often overlooked in studies on reintegration trends/outcomes.

Conclusion Reflections on the child soldiering debate flowing from conclusions in this volume suggest that children are intrinsic to war and the life of rebel groups, on the whole they have been part of warscapes and are perhaps more prominent in civil wars with limitations of technology and multiplicity of armed groups. At the same time, the victim/perpetrator images and specific age categories used for identifying child soldiers create false stereotypes. There is an important element of choice in child soldiering and agency underlying that choice. Both individuals and rebel groups make a decision about enrolment, participation and recruitment. Issues of child labour are also intrinsic to many civil war contexts, resulting in continuity between pre-war roles of running errands or providing agricultural and apprenticeship support to ancillary roles of spying, toting load and being small soldiers to adult commanders. Recruitment at both the individual and group levels operate through a complementary set of rationales undermining the ‘coercion’ element and enhancing willingness and expedience in decision making and choices. Loyalties and bonds made during the war are also importantly played out in the post-conflict period, especially where support from a big man is important to access benefits and support. War for some is economic opportunity, the best option for economic survival. At times negotiating and navigating power in the aftermath of the war can be linked to the


world of the supernatural. Being a warrior can be rooted in mysticism, tradition and tales of invincibility; in West African conflicts, child soldiers are fabled to have been protected and impervious to bullets which also perpetuated fear of their strength and supernatural abilities. Most post-conflict contexts are volatile, rather than smooth spaces for reintegration, amidst challenges of a fragile economy, limited educational and vocational opportunities and persistence of pre-war socioeconomic inequality, issues of hierarchy of peripherality and loss can be prominent themes. Poverty is also a key challenge, the eternal question is reintegration into what, and this remains an important stumbling block which necessitates a constant reappraisal of this fluid space. The main challenge is instability and constant revision of navigation tactics to ensure better access to socio-economic opportunities. Using, losing, maintaining and gaining power are intrinsic and deeply entrenched in post-conflict navigation. Despite feelings of marginalization, youth excombatants tend to actively negotiate and seek out modes of power, status and authority, and are not ‘victims’ in a blanket representation of half truths. Child soldiers are exposed to the grim realities of war at a young age, this is accompanied by exposure to Western popular images and media portrayals of child soldiering, external influences along these lines also impact on their own self-image and aid in aligning their narratives in what ‘they’ want to hear. ‘They’ involves aid agencies, social workers and foreign researchers. This inherent duplicity makes it much more difficult to locate true stories about child soldiering, and results in tapping partial truths. On the whole the recruitment-reintegration link denotes a new journey, one in which experiences at the initiation of youth participation and the processes involved there have consequences for their reintegration trajectories; however, DDR programmes in different contexts at present reveal a lamentable lack of nuance in reintegration approaches. We wish to argue here that the child soldiering phenomena and especially the issue of child soldier reintegration is more complicated than it seems, in some respects it involves a rescue operation for lost childhoods, restoration of which is difficult given the fluidity of individual circumstances and post-conflict challenges – both structural and personal. While there has been some effort to leverage a culturally sensitive perspective, the overarching lens is premised on a Western-centric definition of childhood, recovery and return. For instance, family reunification is a prominent theme in DDR programmes for child soldiers,


but the merits of the same remains in reality an open-ended question. Empirical evidence from cases and our own field experiences suggest that family may not always be the best site for reintegration, challenges of poverty, economic needs, social inequality and stigma make it difficult for youth ex-combatants to reintegrate easily in home communities. This makes it imperative that they follow a slow trickle back to urban settlements in search of livelihoods or depend on wartime social networks for survival in the post-war landscape. Command and control structures also remain intact in some cases and create the inevitable patrimonial networks which have to be traversed for survival. These are realities for many youth in post-conflict countries today, and on the whole the Western-centric paradigm of recovery for child soldiers as a beneficiary group is not helping their processes of return. In fact in a challenging dichotomy while most children assume adult roles in conflict they remain incapacitated and underprepared for complex post-conflict lives. In these spaces of constant motion, flux, active navigation and negotiation are critical, but at times the choices youth make can be aided and guided by reintegration support, by return to formal education, some form of gainful livelihood, learning to farm, build and repair are proposed as possible short-term skills training options, which can be realistically provided to youth, but do not take into account the inherent aptitudes of this caseload, and rarely are excombatants or child soldiers asked what form of reintegration support they would like. Besides most DDR programming continues to respond mainly to the needs of adult combatants with peripheral attention and funding for children and women. Due to disparities in reintegration support for these groups, cheating and duplicity in DDR programmes is common and makes adult reintegration support more coveted. Forms of useful reintegration support in our view can include employment, housing, farming and capacitating the family environment; however problems with regard to inclusion/exclusion through demarcating different sets of benefits by using age as the differentiating criteria for entitlement can be a source of duplicity and injustice, undermining the economic and livelihood prospects for child soldiers. Understanding culture, beliefs and normative life-cycle expectations including key developmental milestones and how the social systems that support them have been affected and may be realigned appear to be important lenses to consider when designing reintegration support for child soldiers. In most cases, economic livelihood programmes have helped


children to be accepted by family, additional business start-up training has also been undertaken in Liberia and proposed in Nepal. Cash payments though costly are an important form of short-term reinsertion support, however, economic prudence suggests alternatives like food stamps and similar in-kind provision that ensure survival. Access to health care should be another important investment for donors, and is rarely privileged in reintegration programming beyond a basic health screening, and HIV/AIDs awareness capsules. Education is also defined as one of the critical support mechanisms for child soldier reintegration. The focus is on return to regular schooling and infrastructural, capacity building support to schools to enable a war-interrupted educational training to recommence. While education and schooling support are important, in our view there tends to be an overemphasis on educational programmes in post-conflict countries. There is a need to think outside the box, and look beyond traditional support. At times there is a gap with respect to investment in the social and political reintegration of youth nationally and overreliance on international donor support. Reintegration remains an interactive and intuitive process, which subsumes the glocal and involves individual and communal needs in a fine balance of acceptance, return and reconciliation. It is beyond acceptance at the social level, and involves a wholesale recreation and reordering of anaemic social, economic and political relationships that govern family, community and civilian life. It is further a participative process, which flows in practice from policy documents and peace accords, but is a lived process, a microcosm of social life rebuilt from the destruction of wartime violence. In Africa, there has been a prominent trend towards youth exclusion from political aspects of reintegration; youth are mobilized to support political ideas and campaigns but once demobilized are located on the periphery of political power. This is a reality elsewhere in the world as well. One of the key lessons to be drawn from contributions in this volume is the need to undermine stereotypes which blur the truth of young people’s lives in conflict zones. Here we seek instead to adopt a multidimensional approach which privileges their agency, giving youth voice to articulate the truth behind compulsions, motivations and choices. It is necessary to break the water-tight compartments of adult/child, combatant/civilian and look at the entire process as a single endeavour in post-conflict reconstruction; to ensure a more substantive reintegration meant to provide diverse groups of returnees a viable start to rebuild lives.


References Jennings, K. M. (2007), ‘The struggle to satisfy: DDR through the eyes of excombatants in Liberia,’ International Peacekeeping, 14 (2), 204–218. Jennings, K. M. (2008), ‘Unclear ends, unclear means: Reintegration in postwar societies: The case of Liberia,’ Global Governance, 14, 327–345. Johnson, K., Asher, J., Rosborough, S., Raja, A., Panjabi, R. and Beadling, C. (2008), ‘Association of combatant status and sexual violence with health and mental health outcomes in post-conflict Liberia’, Journal of the American Medical Association, 300, 676–690. Paes, W. (2005), ‘The challenges of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in Liberia,’ International Peacekeeping, 12 (2) (Summer), 253–261. Pugel, J. (2008), Measuring reintegration in Liberia: Assessing the gap between outputs and outcomes. In Muggah, R. (ed), Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. London: Routledge, pp. 70–102.

Index

adolescence, cultural origins of, 70, 146, 163, 169–70, 228, 243–4, 247, 250, 253–4, 260, 271, 286, 302–3, 312, 314 adulthood, xxi, 9, 13, 14, 21, 30, 93, 129, 132, 143, 152, 163, 168–70, 228, 271, 311 adults, 7, 30–7, 40, 42, 45, 46, 70, 143–5, 147, 164, 167–8, 176, 178, 193, 195, 213, 218, 224, 231 see also adulthood Afghanistan, 14, 135, 150, 159–77 Afghanistan News Beginnings Programme (ANBP), 14, 164–5, 167, 169–70 allegiance, 12, 13, 15, 30–1, 48, 174–6, 179, 184, 186, 203–4, 270, 311, 316 amnesty, 17, 88, 250 Angola, 8, 16–18, 132, 151, 156, 246–65 Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP), 18, 251–9 apprenticeship, 70, 79, 146, 167, 240–2, 245, 279, 318 armed conflict, xii, 9–10, 32–5, 91–3, 96, 104, 108, 129–30, 143, 146, 151, 191, 231, 258, 270, 274, 279–80, 286–7, 289–91, 293, 296, 298 Beah, Ismael, 213, 215–16, 218, 224–5, 234 see also A Long Way Gone (Beah) benefits, xii, 7, 9, 15, 17, 18, 34, 37–8, 42, 59, 61, 67–8, 112, 147, 149–50, 167, 169, 197–8, 204, 286–7, 289–91, 293, 298 Bicesse Peace Accords, 17, 248–53 Big Men, 70, 146, 199, 223, 228

CAAFAG/Nepal (Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups), 275, 285, 287, 289–95, 298–302 Cape Town Principles, 163, 171, 221–2, 253, 272 childhood, definition of, 13–14, 22–3, 31, 93, 108, 132, 142–5, 149–50, 152, 159, 163, 168–70, 186, 231, 312, 319 child protection agencies, xxi, 19, 54, 256, 259, 289–90, 293, 295–7, 302 Children Associated with the Fighting Forces (CAFF), 144, 217, 222, 253 combatant, 4, 7–9, 15, 18, 20, 32, 51, 64, 66, 76–8, 80, 82–7, 94, 99, 107, 130, 133, 144, 151, 160, 170, 177, 181–7, 193–4, 200 Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (CPN-M), the, xii, 284 community-based reintegration (CBR), 314 compliance/non-compliance, 30, 37, 40, 42, 46, 54, 59, 184 conscription, 76, 78, 83, 92 Convention on the Rights of The Child (CRC), xii, 108, 143, 250, 257–8 defection, 38, 39, 46 deserter/desertion, 13, 30, 37–8, 38, 41–2, 46, 76, 80, 85, 311 Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), xiii, 5–9, 14–19, 30, 46, 53, 66, 93–4, 97, 100–2, 126, 133, 146–50, 163–70, 194, 198, 220, 246–59, 269–80, 295–300, 309–1 displacement, 11, 16, 35, 54, 56, 63, 104–5, 108–9, 123–4, 129, 131, 133, 155, 192–3, 238

323

324 Index economic/socio-economic reintegration, 148, 240, 249, 256 ELN (National Liberation Army), 35, 36 family reunification, 16, 148, 233, 237, 259, 311, 313–14, 319 FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), xii, 35–6, 42, 109, 112 fear, 13, 16–17, 34, 36–40, 46, 53, 62–3, 68, 71, 84, 87, 104–5, 117–18, 127, 130, 145, 175, 181, 184 forced/forcible, 7, 29, 30, 35, 36–9, 45, 53, 60, 69, 76, 80, 81, 92–3, 100–1, 117, 147, 151, 174–9 functional rewards, 29, 30, 34, 37, 38, 40–1, 46, 123, 130, 192, 234, 257, 276 girl soldiers, 11, 62, 91–102, 107 group identity, 65, 92, 102, 185 Human Rights Watch, xiii, 161, 284 identity, 13–16, 33, 42, 65, 92, 98, 100, 102, 122, 124–7, 131, 133, 141–59, 161, 168 Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), xiii, 247, 259 involuntary/voluntary, 12, 15, 30, 36–7, 40, 56–60, 62–7, 69, 71, 76–9, 92, 107, 122–36, 160, 165, 174, 204, 253, 311, 316–17

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), xiv, 36, 50, 53, 55–6, 61–2, 65–9, 72, 214 Life Outcome, Mozambique, 16, 231–4, 236, 238, 240, 242, 244 livelihoods, 130–1, 150, 167, 221, 224, 231, 270, 272, 277, 313, 316, 320 A Long Way Gone (Beah), 213 LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army), xiv, 39, 44–5, 173–87, 311 Luena Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), 248, 250–3, 255, 258 Lusaka Peace Accords, 17, 248–54 media, xxi, 128 mobilization, 50, 53, 65–6, 68, 92, 161–2, 164–8, 170, 194 MODEL (Movement for Democracy in Liberia), xiv, 41, 50, 53–6, 61–9, 336 mujahideen, 14, 16, 160–2 Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), 18, 251–2, 255–7 National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), xiii, 248 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), xiv, 50–2, 55–8, 60, 64–7, 237 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 17, 248–54, 257–8, 312 non-material, 29, 30, 37, 41, 63 non-pecuniary/pecuniary, 37, 38, 40, 42, 46, 184

Johnny Mad Dog (film), 213–14 leadership, 16, 29, 34, 36, 38, 42, 51–4, 59, 64, 69, 85, 94, 126, 133, 136, 192, 204, 205, 243, 335 learning, 43–4, 48, 74, 112, 117, 148, 168, 182, 196, 199, 249, 276, 292, 320 Liberia, 4, 8, 11, 15, 34, 36, 40–1, 50–75, 78–9, 150, 205, 213–28, 312, 321

People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), xiv, 248 persecution, 51, 53, 56, 64, 124 poverty, 311–12, 319–70 psychosocial recovery/psychosocial support/counselling/care, xvii, 19, 66, 105–6, 111, 119, 148, 166, 168–70, 254, 257, 280, 291–4, 300 punishment, 13, 30, 37–40, 46, 64, 84–5, 125, 181–2

Index remarginalisation, 8, 220 RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance), xiv, 16, 137, 231, 232–6, 240, 244 resilience, xvii, 12, 104, 105, 108, 110, 112, 114–19, 150, 311 retention, 29–32, 37, 39, 41, 46, 196 rewards, 29–30, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 46, 76, 184, 192, 234 see also benefits risk, 39, 76, 81, 93, 104–9, 127, 166, 192, 202–6, 217, 235, 271, 273, 275, 281, 294, 311, 315 Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), 275, 285, 287, 289–95, 298–302 RUF (Revolutionary United Front), xv, 39–41, 52, 13, 37, 39–41, 52, 55–6, 65–7, 77–87, 193, 200, 203–4, 224–5, 311 schools, 4, 14, 19, 20, 36, 61, 67, 69, 81, 106, 118, 127, 132, 162, 196, 232, 234, 276, 279–80, 286, 291, 299, 315, 321 seasonal combatants, 162 Sierra Leone, 16, 36, 39, 40–2, 52–3, 66–7, 72, 76–81, 84–7, 150, 191, 208, 212, 214, 218 socialization, 3–4, 13–15, 30–1, 37–46, 63, 76–7, 87, 132, 143, 150, 173–87, 311–12, 316 social navigation, 11, 15, 62, 191–8, 200, 202–10, 213–26, 315 solidary norms, 38 structural violence, 71 systemic violence, 71 Taliban, use of child soldiers, 14, 162, 163 teaching, 43, 45, 128, 178, 185, 195 United Nations Angola Verification Mission, xv, 249

325

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), xv, xviii, 14, 18–19, 21, 31, 92–4, 103, 148, 152, 164–6, 168, 170–1, 196, 212, 242, 245, 257, 270–83, 285–7, 291, 293, 294, 298–300, 303, 305 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), xv, 4–5, 25–6, 138, 148, 154–5, 164, 252, 256 verification, xv, 165–6, 249, 261, 266, 274, 275, 296 victimcy, 15, 26, 60, 75, 141, 149–50, 155, 189, 191, 212–21, 222–7, 228, 310 violence, 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 30, 31, 35, 36, 38, 41, 45, 59, 62, 64, 68, 70, 71, 87, 97, 102, 105–19, 125, 133, 134, 145, 147, 150, 174, 176, 180, 181, 184, 186, 193–5, 197, 199, 217–18, 221, 223–4, 234, 236, 240, 249, 271, 279, 284, 285, 311–13, 317, 321 violent organizations, 34, 41 vocational training, 7–9, 14, 141, 148, 166, 168, 240, 242, 249, 252, 254–9, 279, 293, 297, 299, 300, 313, 314 voluntary/involuntary recruitment, 30, 40, 56, 67, 79, 107, 160, 253 war-affected youth, 21, 149, 152, 166, 192 Western media/journalists, 141, 213, 215, 217, 219, 221–2, 226, 227, 319 see also media World Bank, 22, 48, 148, 153, 195, 196, 209, 212, 247, 250–1, 255–7, 261–3, 265–6, 283

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