Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism (Toronto Studies in Philosophy)

CHASING REALITY: STRIFE OVER REALISM

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MARIO BUNGE

Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

www.utppublishing.com © University of Toronto Press Incorporated 2006 Toronto Buffalo London Printed in Canada ISBN-13 978-08020-9075-1 ISBN-10 0-8020-9075-3 Toronto Studies in Philosophy Editors: Amy Mullin and Donald Ainslie

Printed on acid-free paper

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Bunge, Mario, 1919– Chasing reality : strife over realism / Mario Bunge. (Toronto studies in philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8020-9075-3 1. Realism.

I. Title.

B835.B87 2006

II. Series.

1499.2

C2005-903842-X

University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support for its publishing activities of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP). This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Aid to Scholarly Publications Programme, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

In grateful memory of my teachers Guido Beck (1903–1988) who initiated me into scientific research and Kanenas T. Pota (1890–1957) who taught me how to philosophize

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Contents

preface

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Introduction 3 1 Reality and Hylorealism 9 1/ Thing 9 2/ Fact 15 3/ The World: The Totality of Facts or the Maximal Thing? 4/ Enter the Knower 21 5/ Subject / Object Separability 24 6/ Materialism 26 7/ Reality 27 8/ Realism 29 9/ Objectivity and Impartiality 31 10/ Concluding Remarks 33 2 Phenomena, Phenomenalism, and Science 34 1/ Phenomenon and Noumenon 35 2/ Primary and Secondary Properties 37 3/ Phenomenalisms: Ontological and Epistemological 38 4/ Qualia in Materialism 40 5/ From the Scientific Revolution to Locke 40 6/ The Counter-Revolution, Phase 1: Berkeley 43 7/ The Counter-Revolution, Phase 2: Hume 47 8/ The Counter-Revolution, Phase 3: Kant 50 9/ Kant Concluded: Neither Nature nor God 51 10/ Concluding Remarks 53

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3 Antirealism Today: Positivism, Phenomenology, Constructivism 56 1/ Logical Positivism 59 2/ Worldmaking 63 3/ Phenomenalism and Quanta 67 4/ Ptolemy Redux 72 5/ To Phenomena through Noumena 72 6/ Interlude: Reduction 77 7/ Psychological and Social Appearances 79 8/ Scientists in the Crib? 82 9/ Science and Technology Are Realist 85 10/ Concluding Remarks 87 4 Causation and Chance: Apparent or Real? 88 1/ Causation 90 2/ Chance: Types 94 3/ Objective Probability 100 4/ Probability in Science and Technology 103 5/ Chance as Ignorance 106 6/ Uncertainty 109 7/ Bayesianism Is Confused 110 8/ Beliefs Are Not Bayesian 111 9/ Bayesianism Is Hazardous 114 10/ Concluding Remarks 118 5 Behind Screens: Mechanisms 119 1/ A Handful of Examples 119 2/ System and Systemism 124 3/ Mechanism 129 4/ Causal and Stochastic Mechanisms 132 5/ Mechanism and Function 133 6/ Mechanism and Law 134 7/ Guessing Mechanisms 137 8/ Explanation: Subsumptive and Mechanismic 9/ Realism versus Descriptivism 142 10/ Concluding Remarks 143 6 From Z to A: Inverse Problems 145 1/ Preliminary Sample 147 2/ The Direct–Inverse Relation: Generalities 3/ Logic and Mathematics 150

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4/ Interlude: Induction 152 5/ Mathematical Problems to Find and Problems to Prove 153 6/ Astronomy and Microphysics 155 7/ Reading Diffraction Patterns 157 8/ Invertibility 159 9/ Inverse Probabilities 162 10/ Concluding Remarks 163 7 Bridging Fact and Theory 165 1/ Induction Again 165 2/ Abduction Again 167 3/ Biology: Evolution 168 4/ Medicine: From Symptoms to Diagnosis 170 5/ Psychology: Behind Behaviour 171 6/ Social Studies: From Individual to Society and Back 7/ Figuring Out Social Mechanisms 175 8/ Reverse Engineering 178 9/ Bridging Theory to Fact 182 10/ Concluding Remarks 182 8 To Reality through Fiction 188 1/ The Need for Abstraction 189 2/ Fictionism 191 3/ Four Kinds of Truth 193 4/ Mathematics Is Ontologically Neutral 196 5/ Mathematics, Brains, and Society 198 6/ How to Make Ontological Commitments 200 7/ Responding to Some Objections 203 8/ Conventionalism and Physicalism 205 9/ Metaphysical Fictions: Parallel Worlds 209 10/ Concluding Remarks 214 9 Transcendentals Are Of This World 218 1/ Universal 218 2/ Kind 223 3/ Possibility 226 4/ A Surfeit of Worlds 228 5/ Many-Worlds Metaphysics Is Inexact 232 6/ Counterfactuals 236 7/ Disposition 239

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8/ Space and Time 244 9/ Free Will and Liberty 247 10/ Concluding Remarks 249 10 From Plato’s Cave to Galileo’s Hill: Realism Vindicated 250 1/ Ontological Realism: Brain and History 251 2/ Epistemological Realism: Kicking and Exploring 254 3/ Semantic Realism: Reference and Correspondence 257 4/ Methodological Realism: Reality Check and Scientism 263 5/ Axiological Realism: Objective Values 266 6/ Ethical Realism I: Moral Facts and Moral Truths 267 7/ Ethical Realism II: Testability of Moral Norms 273 8/ Practical Realism: Efficiency and Responsibility 277 9/ Scientific Hylorealism 279 10/ Concluding Remarks 280 Appendix: Fact and Pattern 283 1/ Thing, Property, and Predicate 284 2/ State and State Function 287 3/ State Space and Event 290 4/ Process 293 5/ Objective Pattern and Law-Statement 295 6/ Lawful State Space 297 7/ Concluding Remarks 300 references 303 index of names 327 index of subjects 335

Preface

Nowadays billions of us spend long hours watching screens of various kinds. But of course we all know that the most interesting and important facts and ideas are behind screens. This is why we look for objective fact behind appearance, for cause or chance below event, for mechanism behind behaviour, and for system and pattern underneath particulars. All these tasks require rigorous imagination – in particular, disciplined fiction rather than myth making. Although we are immersed in reality, our knowledge of it is not immediate. The ancient atomists and the founders of modern science and philosophy, in particular Galileo and Descartes, knew that the senses deliver superficial appearances rather than deep realities. They went after real things with primary or mind-independent properties; and some of them made use of mathematical fictions, such as functions and equations, to account for facts. Not that the secondary properties or qualia, such as colour, taste, and smell, are unimportant for organisms: quite the contrary. But qualia reside in nervous systems, not in the physical world around them: the universe is colourless, soundless, insipid, and inodorous. Besides, the scientific investigation of qualia, in particular their explanation in terms of primary properties, had to wait for the emergence of cognitive neuroscience in the twentieth century. For instance, it has only recently been learned that optical and auditory illusions are dysfunctions of the corresponding brain subsystems. And yet some of the most influential early modern philosophers, namely, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, as well as their neo-Kantian, positivist, neopositivist, phenomenological, hermeneuticist, conventionalist, and constructivist-relativist heirs, have been teaching exactly the opposite. Thus, the phenomenalists claim that only appearances count, and the hermeneuticists or textualists (or general semioticians) that only symbols matter. Indeed, the

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former repeat Ptolemy’s contention that the goal of science is “to save the phenomena”; the textualists claim that “the word is the abode of Being” (Heidegger), whence “there is nothing outside the text” (Derrida); and that facts, or at least the social facts, “are texts or like texts” (Charles Taylor). And neither the phenomenalists nor the textualists know where to place the mathematical objects – for which they have no use anyway. Given these serious lacunae in contemporary philosophy, it is clear that the nature of facts, appearances, and fictions deserves further investigation. This book is about hard facts, superficial appearances, and fictions both tame like the number ␲ and wild like Cockaigne. The concepts of fact, appearance, and fiction constitute a family, since neither of them makes full sense in isolation from the other members of the triad. Indeed, appearances are facts as perceived by sentient beings; and fictions are either large distortions of facts or inventions unrelated to facts. Facts, in turn, occur whether or not someone perceives them or fantasizes about them. This is a realist postulate, which everyone presupposes but few philosophers adopt explicitly and consistently. I will argue that this postulate underlies, albeit tacitly in most cases, the exploration and deliberate alteration of the real world. I will also argue that, paradoxically, no such exploration succeeds without fictions, particularly those of mathematics. The fact-appearance-fiction triad occurs in all walks of life. Indeed, when trying to understand or control a piece of the world, one must often distinguish and interrelate three layers: those of fact, appearance, and fiction. For instance, some politicians and media invent fictions about the public life, and these fictions contribute to shaping our perceptions of society. Meanwhile, the political and economic currents continue to flow underneath fictions and appearances, largely unaffected and undetected, and therefore beyond our control. The unwary citizen may thus unwittingly become a casualty of what have been called weapons of mass deception. By contrast, the alert and responsible citizens are constructive sceptics: They start by peeling off superficial layers of reality, so as to uncover the hidden social mechanisms and so be able to act upon them. They are philosophical realists. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the fact-appearance-fiction triad is at the centre of some of the oldest and toughest philosophical problems. For instance, how can we know that there are things outside our minds? How are we to proceed from observable fact to conjectured cause? How did Newton solve the so-called problem of induction, of jumping from data to hypothesis – a problem usually attributed to Hume? Does appearance differ from reality, and if so how? Are “raw feels” (or qualia), such as scents and tastes, irreducible to processes describable in terms of primary properties, such as those of odour molecules

Preface

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and olfactory receptors? Can possibility and disposition be real? What if any is the ontological status of mathematical objects? How do they differ from mythical and artistic characters? Are causation, possibility, and chance real despite being unobservable? Is probability a measure of the strength of belief, or else a measure of real possibility? And are there objective laws, or only data packages? In addition to the above ontological and epistemological problems, we shall tackle the following methodological ones. How may we find out the way things actually work behind appearances? What is the use of speculating about alternative worlds? Why wonder about the truth-value of contrary-to-fact statements? How can we best handle inverse problems, such as going from desired output to both requisite input and mechanism? Is there more to explaining than subsuming particulars under generalities? Can scientific theories be directly confronted with facts? What is the status of indicators such as vital signs and pointer readings? And why is it still respectable for philosophers to question the independent reality of the external world at the same time that scientists are discovering ever deeper layers of it, and practical men are altering it for better or for worse? We shall also ask whether it makes any sense to extend realism to embrace values and moral principles. In other words, we shall ask whether there are objective values, moral facts, and moral truths. Besides, we shall ask how far realism can be advanced without making certain assumptions about the nature of things. In general, is epistemology independent of ontology? In particular, can scientific realism thrive independently of materialism? And can their synthesis – which I call hylorealism – account for mathematics and other imperceptible cultural objects? Finally, in the course of our investigation we shall meet a few historical problems. In particular, we shall ask whether it is true that, as most historians of philosophy have assured us, Hume and Kant were the philosophers of the Newtonian revolution. Next: Have the modern-day subjectivists added anything to Berkeley’s teaching? And have the social constructivists succeeded in constructing anything resembling real life? Another such question is whether the logical positivists’ professed love of science has been reciprocated, and did they solve any of the philosophical problems raised by contemporary science and technology? For that matter, did any other contemporary philosophical schools, in particular dialectical materialism, phenomenology, and linguistic philosophy, improve on the ways to chase reality? If not, why not relearn the lesson that the ancient Greek and Indian atomists taught two and a half millennia ago: that the familiar is best explained by the unfamiliar, data by constructs, and facts by ficta, rather than the other way round? In

xiv Preface

short, why not chase reality instead of either taking it for granted or attempting to elude it? This book is part of a lifelong effort to update philosophy with the help of science, and to unmask unsound philosophy posing as science. What started me on this road, as I was finishing high school, were some of the best-selling popular science books in the 1930s – those of the famous astrophysicists Sir Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans. Eddington, the first to confirm Einstein’s theory of gravitation, was a subjective idealist: He claimed that we only find what is already in our minds. And Jeans was an objective idealist: He taught that the universe is a mathematical text written by God. I wished to refute them, but was unable to for lack of the requisite knowledge: this is why I decided to study physics. However, at the beginning of my research work in quantum physics, in the early 1940s, I swallowed the standard or Copenhagen interpretation, which is operationist, hence semi-subjectivist. My realist epiphany came only a decade later, during a break of a meeting of the Argentine Physical Society: I suddenly realized that, when describing a free electron, or calculating the energy levels of an atom, one uses exclusively variables describing properties of a thing that is not being observed by anyone – that is, a thing-initself. That experience suggested to me that much of what passes for the philosophical output of science is actually stale philosophy that plays only a decorative role in scientific research. I thank Joseph Agassi, Carlos F. Bunge, Eric R. Bunge, Silvia A. Bunge, Marta C. Bunge, Carmen Dragonetti, Bernard Dubrovsky, Michael Kary, Richard L. Hall, Martin Mahner, Michael Matthews, the late Robert K. Merton, Greg Mikkelson, Martin Morgenstern, Storrs McCall, Andreas Pickel, Héctor Vucetich, Sérgio B. Volchan, and Per-Olof Wikström for interesting questions, insightful remarks, sharp criticisms, or pertinent information. I am particularly indebted to Martin Mahner, who read the whole of an earlier version and lodged many complaints, many of which I listened to. I am also grateful to John St James for his patient copy-editing, and to Lennart Husband and Frances Mundy for their diligent editing.

CHASING REALITY: STRIFE OVER REALISM

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Introduction

The central theme of this book, namely, the search for reality, may be introduced through three short stories. The first is this. The Sun sunk beyond the horizon, and all animal life seemed to come to a standstill. The little girl asked: Did the Sun really sink, and did all the animals die? Teacher: No, it just looked that way. What really happened was that the Earth spun eastward until we were no longer facing the Sun. It also happened that, because of the ensuing darkness, the diurnal animals went to sleep. In sum, sundown, just like sunrise, are only in the eyes of the beholder: the Sun takes no notice of the Earth’s spin. Incidentally, did you know that the Aztecs believed that they had to kill some people to ensure that the gods would make the sun rise the next day? And do you think they would have abandoned this custom had they learned the truth? Wait. Before answering, let me warn you that some famous people still believe that all we can know is the way things look, never the ways things really are. The second story concerns a little boy who, one summer night, tried to catch a firefly between flashes. One may conjecture that, not having heard of Berkeley, Kant, Bohr, or the logical positivists, the child assumed that the insect kept moving between flashes. And, being not only a spontaneous realist but also curious, the child chased the insect with a flashlight, to try and spot it between flashes. Eventually he caught the bug and took it to school. The teacher told him that the intermittent light emission is involved in the firefly’s mating ritual. And his uncle the chemist tried to explain to him the chemical reaction involving an enzyme that emits light. But of course not even the brightest fifth-grader knows enough organic chemistry to understand that reaction. The third and last story is a realistic one, and it concerns the ambiguities and deceptions of social life. When the Nazis seized power, Max Planck, the grandfather of quantum physics, kept his job as the top German science

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Chasing Reality

administrator. Once, during a state ceremony, he was seen to timidly raise his right arm in the Nazi salute (Heilbron 1986). True, Planck did not join the Nazi party, and he never denounced “Jewish science.” Moreover, he protected what little good science had been left, and defended both rationality and realism. Yet again, Planck rebuked Einstein for resigning his membership in the Prussian Academy of Sciences; and during the war he lectured around the country and in the occupied territories. So, he legitimated the regime by his mere presence in visible places. In sum, Planck, along with millions of fellow Germans, looked nearly black outside, but seems to have been nearly white inside. What colour was he then actually, in fact, really? Or is this an ill-conceived question since colour, far from being a primary property, is in the eye of the beholder? At all events, we all know that appearance, simulation, and dissimulation, as well as misperception and self-deception, are part of social reality. The preceding stories involve not only the ontological concepts of appearance and reality, but also an ill-disguised preference for scientific realism over phenomenalism. The first two stories also involve the methodological concepts of observation, assumption, reality check, and explanation by way of unveiling mechanisms. All of this is quite normal for smart children, craftsmen, scientists, and technologists. It takes a philosopher with his head in the clouds to hold that observation is unnecessary (Plato, Leibniz, Hegel); that there is nothing behind phenomena (Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Renouvier); that no hypotheses should ever be framed (Bacon, Comte, Mach); that guesses need not be checked (Bergson, Husserl, Goodman); or that explaining is just subsuming particulars under generalities (Mill, Popper, Hempel). It may be objected that I am poised to beat a dead horse, since most philosophers are at least as smart as the little boy who chased fireflies. However, such optimism is unwarranted, since antirealism is still alive and well in academia. The following random sample of highly regarded contemporary views should show why. 1 In a much-quoted book, Bas van Fraassen (1980) tells us that the aim of science is “to save the phenomena [appearances]” rather than to account for an independently existing reality – something he places in “metaphysical baggage” to be jettisoned. Likewise David Lewis (1986), an influential philosopher famous for assuming a plurality of real worlds, adopted Hume’s view that there are neither objective connections nor laws proper: that the universe is a vast mosaic of disjointed phenomena. 2 Nelson Goodman’s (1978) fantasies about “worldmaking,” and in particular “star-making,” have been commented on respectfully and profusely, if

Introduction

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at times critically, as if they were important contributions to knowledge– and as if Berkeley had written in vain. Most textbooks on quantum mechanics still pay lip service to the BohrHeisenberg or Copenhagen interpretation, according to which that theory refers only to facts under experimental control, in particular phenomena. As the physicist d’Espagnat (1981: 22) said approvingly, one of the consequences of this view is that it destroyed what Copernicus had accomplished: “It has put man back at the center of his own representation of the universe, from which Copernicus had expelled him.” Most biologists, psychologists, and social scientists teach that every scientific project starts from some theory-free observation, that data alone drive research and exude hypotheses, and that theoretical speculation is dangerous. The Nobel laureate Gerard Debreu (1991) claimed that the moment he axiomatized the theory of general economic equilibrium, this theory became part of mathematics, and is therefore impregnable to empirical data. The practical moral is obvious: Economists must be trusted just as much as Euclid, regardless of economic reality. The Bayesian statisticians and philosophers believe that all probability assignments must be subjective, so that none of them can be said to be either true or false. In fact, they hold that a probability value is a measure of the strength of someone’s belief in something, rather than either a pure number or the measure of real possibility, such as the probability an atom will jump between given states within the next minute, whether or not it is being observed. Most mathematicians believe Plato’s thesis that the mathematical objects, such as numbers, sets, functions, and the statements about them, exist on their own and are therefore discovered rather than invented. The social constructivist-relativists deny the difference between thing and idea, fact and fiction, law and convention, research and conversation, empirical test and horse-trading with colleagues. Likewise, the hermeneuticists claim that everything social is a text or “like a text” to be interpreted rather than a fact to be observed, described, explained, or altered. Obviously, neither school has any use for the dual concepts of truth and error – without which scientific research would be pointless. “Influenced by ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the [Vienna] Circle rejected both the thesis of the reality of the external world and the thesis of its irreality as pseudo-statements” (Carnap 1950b: 32–3). Yet, Wittgenstein is as influential as ever.

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10 The radical relativists, fictionists, and conventionalists deny the existence of objective and therefore cross-cultural truths, such as those of mathematics, chemistry, and genetics. The very idea of an objective test is alien to them. Which allows them to state whatever they please. The preceding sample should convince anyone that ontology and epistemology are going through a crisis (see Bunge 2001). What can one do in a crisis but either flee or fight? Upon despairing of solving certain crucial philosophical problems, the famous Harvard philosopher Hilary Putnam (1990: 118) wrote: “[T]he time has come for a moratorium on Ontology and a moratorium on Epistemology.” Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger concurred (Rorty 1979: 6). I prefer to keep on doing ontology and epistemology, because I believe that a philosophy without them is like a body with neither trunk nor head. Philosophy can and must be criticized and reconstructed unceasingly. Criticism is never enough, for we need constructive ideas in addition to weeding out falsities if we care for truth. Here are some of the theses to be expanded upon and defended in this book. 1 Scientific realism – the thesis that the universe exists on its own, can be explored, and is best explored scientifically – is not just one epistemology among many: it is the one presupposed and confirmed by scientific and technological research. By contrast, phenomenalism, that is, the view that “the world is a sum of appearances” (Kant 1787: B724), or at least that only appearances can be known, is shallow and false. In fact, light emission, chemical reactions, infections, biological evolution, intentions, political tricks, and almost everything else, occur even though they are imperceptible. It is therefore no accident that Galileo and Descartes, two of the founders of modern science, emphasized the difference between primary and secondary properties, and proposed that science should focus on the former. Ironically, the phenomenalists – notably Hume, Kant, and the positivists and logical positivists – in their eagerness to refute supernaturalism and speculative metaphysics, would have killed science as well had they been taken seriously. 2 Although appearances are only skin-deep, they are part of reality rather than its opposite, for they occur in the subject’s brain, which is part of the total world. Inner experiences (qualia), such as feeling cold, seeing blue, hearing a creak, or smelling mint, are not basic but derived: they are processes in the central nervous system, not in the external world. Yet they are not to be discarded, because they are real and moreover indispensable for animal life.

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3 An intelligible, scientific, and useful phenomenology, like the one sketched one generation before Kant by the polymath Johann Heinrich Lambert (1764), would explain the secondary (sensory) properties in terms of primary properties. As a matter of fact, this is one of the tasks that cognitive neuroscience is currently performing: it has begun to explain appearances in a scientific way and as brain processes. 4 To explain a fact is to exhibit the law-abiding mechanism(s) that caused it, as when blushing is explained as the last link in the chain Stimulus Perception Conception Activation of an emotion organ such as the amygdala Stimulation of the motor strip in the brain cortex Relaxation of facial muscles Dilation of the capillaries that irrigate the cheeks. Because it overlooks mechanism, the so-called covering-law model of scientific explanation, though not incorrect, is only partial: it just accounts for the logical aspect of explanation. 5 Causation and chance, though not manifest, are objective modes of becoming. And, though neither is reducible to the other, they are related to one another, as when an increase in gas pressure is explained as an increase in the frequency of the random molecular impacts on the walls of the gas container. 6 The sciences and technologies use the realist (often misnamed “propensity”) interpretation of probability, namely, as a measure of real possibility. By contrast, Bayesianism, which interprets probability as credence, is conceptually fuzzy and has no empirical support in psychology. And the realist interpretation of probability necessitates a broadening of determinism, to include probabilistic laws. 7 The inverse problems, such as “inferring” (guessing) axioms from theorems, causes from effects, and mechanisms from functions, have been sadly neglected in the philosophical literature, with the sole exception of the so-called Hume’s problem (Data Hypothesis). Yet, they are far more challenging and rewarding than the corresponding direct problems. The most promising strategy for tackling inverse problems is to try and transform them into direct problems, as when Newton postulated his laws of motion to deduce the orbits of bodies. 8 Induction is neither everything nor nothing. It occurs in low-level (empirical) generalizations as well as in the confrontation of theoretical predictions with relevant data. This confrontation involves some statistical processing. But there is no such thing as probabilistic inductive logic (or probabilistic epistemology), because propositions, not being random items, cannot be assigned probabilities except arbitrarily; and also because hypothesizing is not a rule-directed activity but an art.

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Chasing Reality REALITY THEORIES REALITY

PHENOMENA

PHEN OM ENA

(a)

(b)

Figure I.1M(a) Ontological perspective: Phenomena (appearances) constitute but a small part of reality. Theorists are a part of reality, but the theories they construct are not in the outer world if conceived of in themselves, that is, apart from the processes of thinking and applying them. (b) Epistemological perspective: Reality can be understood and altered efficiently only through theories prompted and checked by phenomena.

9 Scientific theories are seldom if ever contrasted directly with the relevant empirical data: one must first enrich them with indicators, such as fever as an indicator of infection, and GDP as an indicator of economic activity. Indicators are independently checked hypotheses that relate hypothetical variables to observables. To be reliable, the underlying mechanism must be unveiled. This is why ammeters and brain-imaging devices are reliable, whereas crystal balls and dream almanacs are not. Yet indicators are seldom examined in the philosophical literature. 10 Although fiction is not fact, paradoxically we need some fictions, particularly mathematical ideas and highly idealized models, to describe, explain, and predict facts. This is not because the universe is mathematical, but because our brains invent or use refined and law-abiding fictions, not only for intellectual pleasure but also to construct conceptual models of reality. Hence, moderate mathematical fictionism – the view that, although mathematical objects have no independent existence, we may feign that they do. This restricted version of fictionism, unrelated to instrumentalism, is inconsistent with naive realism but compatible with scientific realism. The preceding theses may be compressed into figure I.1. So much for the aperitif.

1 Reality and Hylorealism

We deal with facts all the time, yet there is no consensus on the meaning of the very word ‘fact,’ particularly since in ordinary language it is often confused with either ‘datum’ or ‘truth.’ This confusion is likely to stem from Sanskrit, whose word satya means both “existent” and “true.” So, there is room for puzzling. Are laws and rules facts? Are there general facts? Are social constructions, such as legal codes, facts? Is it a fact that 2 + 2 = 4? How do propositions relate to facts in the external world? And what did Wittgenstein (1922: 1.13) mean when he wrote that “[t]he facts in logical space [?] are the world”? Such puzzles about the meaning of the term ‘fact’ are not just lexicographic quibbles, because the right way of dealing with an item X depends crucially on the nature of X. If X is in the outer world, we may have to act upon X, whereas if X is a construct, we may have to subject X to conceptual analysis. In this chapter we shall only deal with a few of the many problems centred on the concept of a fact, namely, some of those that relate to the central theme of the book. (More on ontology and semantics in the author’s Treatise, 1974a, 1974b, 1977a, 1979a.) More precisely, we shall examine briefly the concepts of thing, property, state, change of state, law, and appearance, as well as the materialist and realist doctrines and their contraries. 1 Thing In dealing with facts we must start by examining the concept of a thing, because a fact is anything involving a thing. This is why, as the great sociologist Durkheim (1988: 78) put it, “every scientific object is a thing, save perhaps the mathematical objects.” In a scientific worldview, then, the world is constituted by things. This was also the view of the ancient Greek and Indian atomists, the medieval nominalists, and the Enlightenment materialists.

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The statement that the world is the collection of things is hardly controversial. However, no word is more vague than ‘thing.’ It is therefore advisable to try and elucidate it. Let us start with the broadest of all nouns, the neutral term object. It is generally admitted that objects can be either material (concrete), like birds and schools, or immaterial (abstract), like concepts and theories. Concrete objects are also called ‘things’ or ‘existents,’ and abstract objects ‘ideal’ or ‘constructs.’ Correspondingly, the properties of concrete objects, such as viscosity and productivity, may be said to be substantive, whereas those of ideal objects, such as consistency and transitivity, may be said to be formal. However, the thing/construct and substantive/formal distinctions may be taken to be methodological rather than ontological. This is because, in a nonPlatonic philosophy, constructs are human creations, hence dependent on the concrete things called ‘thinkers.’ Besides, whereas some constructs, such as those of deity, cloven knight, and parallel universe, are wild fictions, others, such as the concepts of set and function, are tame fictions, and moreover indispensable to understand and handle concrete things. For instance, the natural kinds, such as the chemical and biological species, may be regarded as sets; and many properties of concrete things, such as speed and population, can be analysed as functions. Thus, we face the paradox that we need fictions (of the tame kind) to account for real things, just as we may use wild fictions to create the illusion of escaping from reality. In short, fiction is the path to and from reality. (More on fiction in chapter 8.) So far we have used the word ‘thing’ as if it designated a clear and distinct idea, but it is not, since it is often confused with ‘object.’ We must therefore attempt to define it with some precision. The traditional view is of course that of Descartes: A concrete thing, unlike an abstract one, is a res extensa. But, while spatial extension applies to solid bodies, it does not to electrons, fields, biopopulations, families, corporations, and many other things. Neither of them has a precise position, volume, and shape. Besides, in a relational theory of physical space, the latter is the structure of the totality of things. As for the vulgar characterization of “material” in terms of shape, mass, and solidity, it is even less adequate, because solids are exceptional in the universe. I submit that Plato got it right in this case. According to him, whereas ideas are immutable (when considered in themselves), material entities are “corruptible” (changeable). But of course he was mistaken in restricting changeability to the sublunary world: change is universal. In other words, I submit that mutability is the one property shared by all concrete things, whether natural or artificial, physical or chemical, biological or social, perceptible or imperceptible. In other words, I assume Postulate 1.1 For all x: (x is material = x is changeable).

Reality and Hylorealism

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Note that materiality is not predicated exclusively of things or entities: properties too qualify. For instance, position in spacetime, density, and productivity may be said to be material properties because they are properties of concrete objects. Likewise relations, whether binding such as “attraction” or non-binding such as “above,” can be said to be material if they hold among material objects. However, properties and relations can be material only derivatively, that is, by virtue of the materiality of the things involved: there are neither properties nor relations in themselves, except by abstraction. The same holds for events and processes: the changes of these kinds may be said to be material if they occur in material things. Thus, heat propagation, metabolism, and ideation qualify as material since they are processes in material things. By contrast, logical consistency, commutativity, and differentiability can only be predicated of mathematical objects; likewise, omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience apply exclusively to certain gods. However, whereas an entity is either material or ideal, some properties are possessed by entities of both kinds. Thus, finiteness and countability apply to abstract sets as well as to collections of pebbles; and continuity is a property of both certain functions and the trajectories of bodies. In other words, the set of material properties overlaps partially with that of formal properties. Equivalently: Whereas the domains of certain predicates are homogeneous, those of other predicates consist in unions of sets of material and ideal objects. Incidentally, Joseph Dietzgen (1906: 300ff.), the tanner and self-taught philosopher highly praised by Marx, held that thought is material. Lenin (1947: 251) criticized this statement, arguing that, if it were true, then there would be no difference between materialism and idealism. This argument may have originated in Lenin’s conflation of materiality with reality: since he defined “material” as whatever exists independently of any subject, he could not accept that thinking, which is private, is also material. Lenin’s criticism of Dietzgen seems to have been the root of the dualist philosophy of mind official throughout the Soviet empire. This amazing deviation from the materialist tradition was added to the further dualistic division of every society into its material infrastructure and its ideal superstructure previously postulated by Marx and Engels (e.g., Engels 1954). Such double dualism might have been avoided if Marxists had bothered to think clearly instead of imitating Hegel’s convoluted prose. They might then have realized that it is possible to distinguish thought processes and cultural processes from others without dematerializing them. However, let us go back to the peculiarity shared by all material entities. Like all universals, changeability (or materiality) can be conceived of in an extensional way. That is, we can define “matter” as the set of all material objects present, past, and future:

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Chasing Reality

Definition 1.1 Matter = {x Î W x is material} = {x Î W x is changeable}, where W denotes the collection of objects of all kinds. Being a collection, matter (the concept) is immaterial. So are hydrogen, the collection of all hydrogen molecules, and humankind, the set of all humans. (More on species in chapter 9.) Since the technical word for ‘changeability’ is energy, formula (1) can be rewritten as Postulate 1.2 For all x: (x is material = x has energy). Depending on the scale, which is conventional, an energy value may be positive, negative, or null. Besides, there are many kinds of energy: mechanical and thermal, kinetic and potential, electric and magnetic, nuclear and atomic, gravitational, chemical, elastic, and so on. This variety is such that it overflows every single chapter of physics. Indeed, physics does not define the general concept of energy. This is why Richard Feynman claimed that physics does not know what energy is. Which suggests that the general concept of energy, like the general concepts of thing, fact, and law, is ontological (Bunge 2000a). To repeat, energy is not just a property among many. Energy is the universal property, the universal par excellence. Moreover, energy is a universal in re: it inheres in things instead of being either ante rem (prior to them) or post rem (after them). My view is then neither idealist (in particular Platonist) nor nominalist (vulgar materialist). In the Middle Ages it would have been characterized as immanentist realism. (More in chapter 9.) Parenthetically, energy, the property of all things, must not be confused with the various concepts (predicates) used in science and technology to represent it on the conceptual plane. We shall come back to the property-predicate distinction in section 4. Because energy is a universal, it is just as insufficient as “being,” “existent,” or “thing” to characterize any particular thing. To this end, further properties are needed. In fact, every time we describe a particular thing we list some of its properties, as when characterizing a certain fruit as round, juicy, and of colour orange when illuminated by white light. Moreover, properties do not conjoin haphazardly. Thus, in the preceding example, roundness and juiciness are concomitant with solidity: liquid and gaseous fruits are impossible. Likewise, democracy works best with equity and liberty, and not at all with extreme inequality and tyranny. In sum, properties cluster. More precisely: Every property conjoins with some other properties. In other words, properties come in bundles or systems. However, the properties in a property-cluster are not all on a par: whereas some of them are essential, others are accidental; whereas some are basic, )

)

Reality and Hylorealism

13

others are derived (or dependent upon basic properties); and whereas some properties are primary (or inherent in things), others are secondary (or dependent upon some sentient being). For example, having cylinders and a transmission are essential to a standard car, whereas its colour and price are both accidental and secondary, because they can be altered without the thing ceasing to be a car. In other words, the accidental properties of a thing can, unlike its essential properties, be added or subtracted one-by-one. Again: The essential properties of a thing constitute a system; they come in bundles. Equivalently: Every one of them is related to at least one other property of this kind. Hence, any change in one of them is bound to alter some of the others. Another philosophically interesting distinction is that between invariant (or absolute) and non-invariant (or relative) properties. The former are the same in (relative to) all reference frames, such as laboratories and star constellations. Therefore these properties are also the same for all observers moving relative to one another. Paradigmatic examples are real existence, the electric charge and entropy of a physical thing, and the composition and structure of a system. Other properties, such as mass and frequency, as well as position and velocity, depend on the reference system. For example, the mass of a body increases with its velocity; and the frequency of light decreases as its source moves away from the reference frame (Doppler effect). Frame-dependence is objective: it occurs whether or not the reference frame in question is inhabited by a sentient being. Moreover, although some quantitative properties are frame-dependent, their corresponding qualities are not. Thus, being localized, in motion, or massive, and having an age are absolute. Only having certain coordinates, moving with a given speed, possessing a certain mass, and being so many years old, are relative – but the relation in question is to a physical reference frame, not to an observer. In short, relativity does not involve subjectivity. Does having different velocities relative to different frames of reference count as so many facts or as a single fact? If we decide on the former, we will have to put up with an unnecessary multiplication of facts. It seems more reasonable to relativize fact to reference frame and say, for instance, that my walking around the block is a single fact with as many projections as reference frames – by analogy with the shades projected by a body on different surfaces by different light beams. On the other hand, the secondary properties, such as taste, smell, colour, and heat, are subject-dependent: The world in itself is neither coloured nor hot, and it neither tastes nor smells. Another obvious example is social order, which is “perceived” differently by different people, even if some of its features, such as the distribution of wealth and the degree of citizen participation, are per-

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fectly objective. Likewise, values are subject-dependent, even though some of them have objective roots. For example, beauty is in the eye of the beholder, but nutritive power and peace are not. As with properties, so with their changes. Whereas some changes, such as displacement and mixing, are quantitative, others, like the chemical combination and the formation of new organizations, are qualitative. Equivalently: These changes involve the emergence (gain) or the submergence (loss) of certain properties. Regrettably, most dictionaries misinform us that ‘emergence’ means impossibility of explaining qualitative novelty in terms of the constituents of the whole in question and their bonds. In fact, this is only the irrationalist (in particular holist and intuitionist) version of the emergence doctrine. Such epistemic pessimism is certainly not countenanced by the physicist who investigates phase transitions (such as from liquid to solid, and from magnetic to non-magnetic); the chemist who studies the formation or dissociation of molecules; the neuroscientist who wishes to understand the genesis and death of neurons; or the historian intent on explaining the emergence or dissolution of social systems and the norms inherent in them. All such cases point to the promise of emergentism as the corrective and complement (not necessarily the enemy) of reductionism (Bunge 2003a). Now, the laws of nature and the social norms are invariant relations among properties and their changes. Here, ‘invariant’ means both constant in time and independent of any particular choice of reference frame. (Strictly speaking, only the basic laws are the same relative to all reference frames of some kind: see Bunge 1967b.) Hence, to say that the essential properties of any thing come in bundles, or constitute systems, amounts to saying that every one of them is lawfully related to other properties. And, since laws conjoin properties, they are (complex) properties themselves. It is therefore to be expected that they will be formalized by more or less complex propositions, such as the postulates of electrodynamics, which relate such properties of the electromagnetic field as its electric and magnetic intensities, and the intensity of the electric charges and currents that accompany the said field. Because properties cluster, it has sometimes been suggested that things are nothing but bundles of properties. This view, reminiscent of Plato’s Theory of Ideas (or Forms), is mistaken for two reasons. The first is that, as Aristotle argued against his teacher, there are no properties without substrata: Every property is a feature, trait, or aspect of some object or other. This is why we measure or calculate the metabolic rate of organisms, the population densities of cities, and so on. And this is why energetism, the doctrine that all is energy, and nothing material, is false.

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The same holds for informationism, or the thesis that the world is the maximal computer: that every concrete thing is made from bits (Wheeler 1996). Indeed, all the information-processing systems, such as computers, are material. By contrast, bits – the amount of information content – are properties of signals or symbols, not entities. This is why computer hardware is designed with the help of physics, not information theory. Hence Wheeler’s cute maxim, “it from bit,” is every bit as wrong as both traditional (individualist) subjectivism (“it from me”) and social constructivism (“it from us”). (More in Deutsch 2004.) A second reason that the bundle-theory of things is false is that it suggests writing formulas such as P{P,Q}, where P and Q stand for two (substantive) properties, such as price and quantity. This formula is not well formed because the set {P,Q} has only mathematical properties, such as that of having two elements. Sets can have no substantive properties, such as that of being able to move. The usual way of characterizing a particular thing is to list its salient properties, such as sex, age, and occupation in the case of persons. (Actually what we list when individuating or identifying an individual is property instances or “tropes,” such as thirty years of age.) This procedure is at variance with Quine’s celebrated formula “No entity without identity.” This formula is suitable for sets and for the mathematical objects constructed with sets, by virtue of the axiom of extensionality: “Two sets are identical if and only if they have the same members.” But Quine’s formula is irrelevant to the study and handling of material objects, for no two such things can be exactly identical, although the elementary particles may be exchangeable. This result should not be surprising because logic, even when enriched with set theory, is insufficient to build ontology, since it does not describe the world. In sum, a reasonable ontology must start with the concepts of thing and its properties. And if it is to be compatible with modern science and technology, that ontology will conceive of concrete things as changeable. Consequently, it will be able to give a reasonable account of facts, such as a thing being in a given state or going over to a different state. 2 Fact In ordinary language the word ‘fact’ denotes pretty well anything. Even some famous philosophers have used it carelessly. For instance, the idealist Husserl proposed the slogan “Zurück zu den Sachen,” that is, “Back to facts.” But, since Husserl (1931) “bracketed out” the external world, and regarded realism as absurd, presumably what he meant by ‘facts’ were phenomena such as

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sights and smells, rather than either physical objects such as atoms, or social ones such as families. In any event, given the ambiguity of the word ‘fact,’ it will be convenient to try and elucidate its meaning. Suppose this cat is in fact (actually, really) on that mat. That the cat is on that mat is a fact that involves at least three concrete (or material) things: the cat, its mat, and the floor underneath. (If the environment does not change appreciably during the time of interest, or if its changes are of no significant consequence to cat, mat, or floor, we need not refer to it explicitly.) A moment later the cat gets up and walks away. The first fact, that the cat is on the mat, pivots on the state of the cat, whereas the second fact revolves around the animal’s motion, which is a particular change of state. We call such changes events if swift, processes if protracted. In sum, we ordinarily distinguish facts of two kinds: Static fact = Thing(s) in a given state. Kinetic fact = Change(s) of state of thing(s). Note that in both cases the facts in question consist in either states or changes of state of concrete things. No such things, no facts. Thus, the analysis of any fact should start by identifying the thing(s) involved, such as reagents in the case of a chemical reaction, and brains in that of a mental process. What holds for empirical analyses also holds for conceptual, in particular semantic, analyses. This analysis starts by identifying the referents of the constructs in question. That is, we begin by stating what is being talked about. For example, the referents of the statement “Buildings are taller than people” are buildings and people. And the statement describes a fact, or rather a whole collection of facts, even though the relation “taller than” is non-binding. In general, the statement that thing b stands in R-relation to thing c, or Rbc for short, describes a fact if the statement is true. Neither the relation nor the corresponding relata are independently real: what is real is the fact that Rbc. To paraphrase Hegel, in cases like this, das wirkliche ist das Ganze: the whole is real. This is not to be taken as a profession of holistic faith but as a warning against the temptation of reifying relations and unrelated individuals: these are only analytical devices. However, the fact-thing distinction is only an analytical device since, as stated above, in reality there are neither states nor changes of state in themselves. Nor are there things that fail to be in some state or other, or that undergo no changes. (The fact that many a thing, such as a plucked guitar string or an electron, may be in a superposition of elementary states, such as harmonics and eigenstates respectively, constitutes no counter-example. Whether simple or complex, all states are states of concrete things.) Likewise, the distinction between static and kinetic facts is rather coarse,

Reality and Hylorealism

17

because nothing stays forever in the same state. For instance, the cat mentioned above undergoes thousands of chemical and physiological processes while sleeping on its mat, and the latter changes too as it interacts with the cat, the floor, and the air – as we find out when cleaning it. Another distinction that should not be confused with a dichotomy is that between natural and social facts – or between “brute” and “institutional” according to Searle (1995: 27). True, there are purely natural facts, such as earthquakes, that happen independently of the state of society, and whether or not we perceive them. Likewise, there are purely social facts, such as economic downturns and crusades. All such facts are macrosocial; moreover, they are “brute” in the sense that they are beyond the control of the individuals involved. But at the level of the individual there are only (a) natural facts, such as breathing and eating, and (b) biosocial facts, such as walking on a public street and buying a newspaper. We can distinguish the biological from the social aspects of an individual action, but we must not detach them, because they come together, for the simple reason that everything social is the work of animals. Finally, the event/process distinction, though clear in ordinary knowledge, is not obvious in science. Here one attempts to analyse events into processes. In principle, even quantum jumps can be regarded as swift processes. In sum, a fact is the being of a concrete thing in a certain state, or changing from one state into another. There are neither states nor events in themselves for the simple reason that, by definition, every state (or state of affairs) is a state of some thing or other, and every event is a change in the state of a concrete individual. Therefore, Armstrong (1997) notwithstanding, the concept of a state of affairs is not an independent category. We have known this since Aristotle criticized Plato for writing about movement in itself rather than about moving bodies. All of the preceding may suffice for everyday life and ordinary-knowledge ontology, but it is too imprecise for science, technology, and scientific metaphysics. In these domains we need more precise concepts of state, event, and process. Now, the most exact and general analysis of these concepts is the one inherent in the state (or phase) space approach, familiar to natural scientists and engineers (e.g., Bunge 1977a). It is the most general because, being stuffindependent, it can be used in any discipline dealing with facts, from physics to ecology to sociology to ontology. However, the reader uninterested in formal matters may skip the balance of the present section, whereas the reader interested in learning more about it may wish to consult the appendix. To introduce the state space approach, consider the simplest possible case: that of a thing with only two salient properties, such as position and momen-

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Chasing Reality

N2

q

p

N1 (b)

(a)

Figure 1.1M(a) The state (or phase) space for a classical linear oscillator with position q and momentum p. Each ellipse represents a possible motion with constant energy. (b) The possible states of a system composed of a prey in numbers N1 and a predator in numbers N2.

tum, blood pressure and heartbeat, population and GDP, or quantity and price. Call them P1 and P2, and represent these by mathematical functions F1 and F2 respectively, called ‘state functions.’ For definiteness, these may be regarded as depending only on the time variable t. Next, form the ordered pair F(t) = . This point may be pictured as the tip of a vector in a twodimensional Cartesian space, namely, the Cartesian product of the codomains of F1 and F2. As time goes by, F(t) moves in this space, generating a trajectory that summarizes the history of the thing represented. This motion is constrained by the law(s) that relate F1 to F2. For example, if the thing is a linear oscillator, such as the tip of a pendulum, the abstract point <position, momentum> in the state space represents a possible state. The state space is S = {F(t) t Î }, where designates the real line. The corresponding lawful state space is the proper subset SL of S of all the points that satisfy the constraint “Energy = constant.” For each value of the energy, SL is an ellipse. That is, SL = { E(q,p) = const.}. See figure 1.1a. Figure 1.1b represents the possible states of an ecosystem constituted by two populations of organisms, one of which preys on the other. Caution: Since the state space is abstract, so is every trajectory in it; it represents a process but not a trajectory in physical space. The generalization of the above to things with n properties, where n > 2, is immediate: SL = {, where g: S ® S is compatible with the laws in question. For a particular transformation g we may focus on the end points of the net change, that is, on the initial and final states of the process. The ordered pairs <s, s'> in Sg × Sg constitute the space of events of the things considered for the transformation g, or Eg for short. In general, Eg is a proper subset of Sg × Sg, because g may exclude certain conceivable but physically impossible changes. 4 Process A process may be defined as a string of events, for instance, p = e1 * e2 * e3 * ... * en . However, this definition only works for finite state systems such as digital computers – or rather the idealized models of computers that occur in mathematical computer science, as different from the models used by computer engineers. Indeed, even the simplest physical thing, such as an electron or a photon, can be in any of a non-denumerable set of states, and it can undergo continuous changes in addition to quantum jumps. This is one of the many reasons that the computer metaphor of the brain and its mental functions is so shallow and misleading. A more realistic definition of a process, applicable to all state spaces, is this: A process is a lawful sequence of states. More precisely, we adopt Definition 3. LetF : A ® V be a state function for things of a certain kind, and SL the set of lawful states that those things can be in. Then the sequence p = of states is a really possible process occurring in the things in question if it proceeds along a trajectory g: SL ® SL compatible with the laws of the things of the kind in question. If A = T = Time, then p = is a temporally ordered sequence of states. Upon reversing the sign of t we get p– = , which is the time-reversed image of p. It would be mistaken to interpret p– as representing a thing plunging into the past, or as involving “the backwards flow of time.” (See Bunge 1959b for a critique of the literal interpretation of the Feynman diagrams, which involve such fictitious travel backwards in time.) The exchange of -t for t, and consequently the substitution of negative velocities for positive ones, and conversely, is only a paper-and-pencil operation that need not represent a real process. When reference to a real process is intended, what is meant by ‘time reversal’ is not operating Wells’s time machine, but just inverting the velocities (and spins if any) of the entities concerned. (More on this and the following in Bunge 1968a.) It is well known that Newton’s equations of motion for point particles are T)

)

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invariant, that is, they do not alter under the substitution of –t for t. By contrast, Fourier’s equation for the flow of heat in a body is not T-invariant. The trajectories of ideal (perfectly elastic) billiard balls on an ideal (frictionless) pool table are T-invariant – as long as the balls do not fall into any of the pockets of the table. In other words, their time-reversed images are physically possible. By contrast, scrambled eggs do not unscramble, and alpha particles do not re-enter the nuclei that emitted them. There are, then, laws and processes that are T-invariant and others that aren’t. A process or history is said to be T-invariant, or reversible, if its timereversed image is really possible. Otherwise it is said to be irreversible. A lawstatement is T-invariant if it does not alter upon the substitution of –t for t. The relation between T-invariant processes and T-invariant law-statements is this: If a process is T-invariant, then its laws are T-invariant as well. The converse is false, whence the two kinds of T-invariance are not equivalent – contrary to popular belief. In other words, some irreversible processes, such as radioactive disintegration, can be described with the help of T-invariant law-statements. There are two reasons for the inequivalence of T-invariant processes with Tinvariant laws. The first is that a process, or history, is usually accounted for by some logical consequences of the basic law-statements concerned, and the former may lack the symmetry properties of the latter. For example, Maxwell’s equations are T-invariant but, whereas the electric field intensity does not change upon time reversal, the magnetic induction is inverted. A simpler example: a sinusoidal oscillation is not T-invariant even though it solves a Tinvariant equation of motion. The second reason for the inequivalence in question is that processes are described by logical consequences of basic law-statements together with constraints, boundary conditions, and constitutive equations, any of which is bound to further restrict the set of really possible trajectories. A simple example is that of a rain droplet falling onto the middle of a sliding roof. The reversed motion, resulting from the inversion of the velocity, would take the droplet past its point of impact, to the top of the roof and beyond. We exclude this conceptually possible trajectory by adding the condition of continuity of the velocity (not only the trajectory). A spatial analogue is this. Maxwell’s field equations have solutions representing incoming (convergent) electromagnetic waves as well as outgoing (divergent) waves. Since no convergent waves have been observed, one discards such solutions by imposing an additional condition on the asymptotic behaviour of the solutions (Sommerfeld’s Ausstrahlungsbedingung). A moral of this story is that, to judge whether a conceptually possible event or process is really possible or else impossible (miraculous), we must check

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whether it satisfies its laws together with all of the pertinent subsidiary conditions. Interestingly enough, the latter are often afterthoughts prompted by a negative result of the comparison of the theory with reality. An antirealist would never hit on such subsidiary conditions and would insist on making contrary to fact predictions. Being averse to distinguishing theory from reality, he is bound to condone miracles. Realism, then, is a necessary condition for doing genuine science and avoiding bogus science. 5 Objective Pattern and Law-Statement Realists distinguish objective patterns from the propositions (e.g., equations) representing them. This allows them to explain a typical endeavour of scientists: that of attempting to uncover regularities. The same distinction helps explain a good portion of the history of science as the history of successive approximations to the truest possible representation of objective patterns. Objective patterns, be they natural, social, or mixed, are supposed to be regularities or constancies with broad scopes, namely, entire species of concrete things or even genera of such. Every such pattern can be conceptualized in a number of ways – in fact, in as many as there are choices of state functions. Such conceptualizations are called law-statements. In short, we distinguish (objective) laws or patterns from their conceptual representations. And we assume that the objective patterns do not change when their conceptual representations alter. In particular, scientific revolutions may impact society, but they do not change the universe. In addition to objective laws (patterns) and law-statements, there are higherlevel principles concerning either patterns or law-statements. Instances of these are the requirement of Lorentz-covariance, and the philosophical principle that all facts satisfy some laws (Bunge 1959b). In sum, the word ‘law’ denotes three different concepts, which we identify by a subscript each: L1 = Objective pattern. L2 = Law-statement = Proposition representing an L1. L3 = Metanomological statement = Proposition about some L1 or L2. Let us focus on L2. A law-statement may be regarded as a restriction on certain state functions for things of a certain kind. Such a restriction is neither stray nor arbitrary: it must belong to a system (theory), and it must have been confirmed to a reasonable degree with the help of observations, measurements, or experiments. The first condition disqualifies empirical generalizations, and the second untested or false formulas. Law-statements may take a number of forms, depending not only on the things they refer to but also on the state of knowledge and even on the

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mathematical ability and the goal of the scientist who proposes them. All of the following are conspicuous simple forms of law-statements. Example 8. RF = V, where RF is the codomain of state function F, and V some well-defined set. Thus, nothing can travel faster than light, and the prices and quantities of goods cannot be negative. Example 9. ¶F/¶t ³ 0, where t is in T, and T is a subset of the real line occurring in the domain of F and representing time. Example 10. dF/dt = g(F,t), with g a specific function of t. t2

Example 11.

* F(q,dq/dt,t)dt = extremum, with t1 and t2 two designated t1

elements of T. Example 12. F2(x,y) = * du dv F1(u–x, v–y), with F1, F2: E3 × E3 ® ¶2F

R

C.

Example 13. = F2 , with F1, F2: ® . 1 The preceding considerations suggest adopting the following Definition 4. Let F be a state function for things of a given kind. A restriction on the possible values of the components of F , or a relation between two or more such components, is called a law-statement if (1) it is included in a consistent factual theory, and (2) it has been satisfactorily confirmed (for the time being). If only condition (2) is met, the restriction is called an empirical regularity. Consider now the collection LK of law-statements for things of kind K. Calling L an arbitrary member of that collection, L(x) may be regarded as the value that the predicate “law function” L takes at x Î K. This function has the form L: K ® LK. Since at each stage in the history of science we only know a finite subset of LK, this collection is variable, it is not a set proper. For example, in the elementary theory of electric networks, a batteryresistor circuit with a single loop and at room temperature (an individual of class K) satisfies a single law, namely Ohm’s. (This law-statement is not true for all conductors, and it is only a first approximation for conductors at very low temperatures. Further, the particular law for the ohmic resistance of conductors of a given kind is called a constitutive equation.) Ohm’s law can be written as follows: For every x in K: L(x) = “e(x) = R(x) ? i(x),” where e, R, and i represent the electromotive force, the resistance, and the current intensity respectively. Thus, in this case the law predicate L is the function L: K ® LK such that, for every x in K, L(x) equals Ohm’s formula. This manner of writing shows clearly that laws interrelate properties, and are themselves properties of things. That is, they are “possessed” by things instead of hovering above them. That is, laws are universalia in re (recall chapter 9). If /¶x2

E3

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a more explicit evidence for this claim is called for, one may write Ohm’s law in even more detail: e, i, R : K ® , and L: K ® LK, such that the above condition (Ohm’s) holds. This shows also what Ohm’s law is about, namely, physical things of a certain kind K. Which suffices to refute the views that physical (or other) laws are subjective or else social constructions. Occasionally one reads about natural objects, such as brains, whole organisms, or even molecules, behaving in accordance with algorithms, such as “evolutionary algorithms” and algorithms for “computing” limb movement, perception, or even emotion. This idiom betrays ignorance of both science and algorithm. Indeed, algorithms are, by definition, rules for computing something, such as the squares or the square roots of numbers. By contrast, the natural laws are thoroughly natural: they emerged along with the things they inhere in. This is why the expression ‘natural algorithm’ is an oxymoron. So much for laws or natural regularities. Let us now deal briefly with norms or artificial regularities, such as the moral and legal norms. We propose Definition 5. A norm or rule is a man-made restriction on the possible values of the components of a state function, or a man-made relation between two or more such components, compatible with the law-statement(s) satisfied by the state function. This definition incorporates the idea that, no matter how stupid, brutal, and powerful humans may be, they cannot violate the natural laws. In other words, every norm or rule involves in some way or other the pertinent natural laws. In particular, the efficient norms for assembling or operating a machine or a social organization must satisfy the laws possessed by the components of either system.

R

6 Lawful State Space The point of constructing mathematical models of things of a certain kind is to represent as accurately as possible the really possible (lawful) states of the things in question, and perhaps their really possible (lawful) changes of state as well. Hence, every such model is centred on a state space for the things referred to. A few typical examples should give us a feel for this matter. Example 14. In the elementary theory of the ideal gas, the state function is the triple consisting of the pressure, volume, and temperature functions. The domain and codomain of each of these functions are the set of (ideal) gas bodies and the positive real line respectively. Hence, the corresponding state space is a box contained in ( +)3. Example 15. In the genetics of populations, three state functions are often

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employed: the size N of a population, the frequency (or rather probability) p of occurrence of some particular gene, and the adaptive value v of the latter. Each of these is a real-valued function. Hence, for a system composed of two interacting populations, A and B, the state space is the region of ( +)6 spanned by the vector in the course of time. Example 16. In my theory of social structure (Bunge 1974d), the instantaneous state of a community may be construed as the distribution of its population among the various social groups in the community. Hence, the component Fi of the total state function may be taken to be the column matrix i Nij i for a fixed i, the elements of which are the populations of the (mutually disjoint) social groups resulting from the partition of the total population (at the given time) by the ith equivalence relation with a social significance, such as equal occupation or similar educational level. Example 17. In chemical kinetics, the instantaneous state of a chemical system is described by the values of the partial concentrations of reactants and products. Therefore, the state space of the system is inside ( +)n, where n is the number of system components (reactants, catalysts, and reaction products). Example 18. In electrostatics, the state function is F = , where r represents the electric density and j the potential of the electric field. The domain and codomain of both functions are E3 and respectively. Hence, the local state of the given field is the value of F at x Î E3, and the entire state space is the set of ordered pairs { Î 2 ) x Î V}, where V denotes the region of E3 occupied by the field. Example 19. In quantum mechanics, the state of a thing is represented by a ray in the Hilbert space associated with the thing in question. Since a thing of this kind typically is not attributed a point-like location, but is assumed instead to be spread over some spatial region V in three-space, with a definite probability distribution, the state of the thing is the set of all the values its state vector y takes in V. Before attempting to draw general maxims let us emphasize a point of method made earlier. We may certainly assume that, whether we know it or not, every isolated thing is, at each instant, in a definite state relative to some reference frame. (That the state may be a superposition of eigenstates is true but beside the point.) Yet our representation of such a state will depend upon the state function chosen to represent the thing, and this choice depends in turn upon the state of our knowledge as well as on our goals. What holds for every single state holds a fortiori for the entire state space for a thing. That is, far from being something out there, like stars and people, a state space for things of a certain kind stands with one leg on the things it refers to, a second on a reference frame, and a third on the theorist or modeller. To

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persuade oneself that this is so, suffice it to take another look at Example 18 above, where a reference frame at rest relative to the field source was tacitly assumed. If now the same system of electrically charged bodies is considered relative to a moving reference frame, a four-vector current density will have to replace the single charge density, and a four-vector potential will take the place of the single scalar potential. (“Seen” from a moving frame, a charge is a current surrounded by a magnetic field.) Alternatively – and this is where the scientist’s freedom comes in – the four-vector potential can be replaced by an antisymmetric tensor representing the electric and magnetic components of the field relative to the new frame. (Incidentally, the problem of finding an adequate vector potential is of the inverse kind. For instance, given A, H equals the curl of A; but there is no rule for finding A from H.) Having emphasized the conventional ingredient of every representation of the states a thing can be in, let us now stress that every such representation has an objective basis as well – as long as the representation has a grain of truth. For one thing, a state function may not take values in its entire codomain, but may be restricted to a subset of the latter, and this by virtue of some law. Indeed, recall that law-statements are restrictions on state functions (section 5). Therefore, for every component of a state function for things of some kind, the focus of our concern will be the range of the function rather than its entire codomain. If we now take all the components of a state function for things of a given kind, and form the Cartesian product of their respective codomains (in tune with Definition 1), we obtain the conceivable state space for those things. This is precisely what we did in the examples that led off the present section. However, this restriction is insufficient to identify the really possible states of a thing, as should become apparent from the following examples. The total population of organisms of a given kind, in a given territory, is constrained not only by the carrying capacity of the latter but also by the birth and death rates, as well as by such additional factors as sunshine, rainfall, and plagues. Again, although the codomain of the speed function for a body is the entire interval [0,c), the speed of an electron travelling in a transparent medium will not come close to the upper bound c (the speed of light in a vacuum), for such a body is subject to further laws, such as those concerning the radiation emitted by the electron travelling through a transparent medium. In general: Only those values of the components of a state function that are compatible with the laws, constraints, and initial and boundary conditions will be really (not just conceptually) possible. In other words, because the law-statements impose restrictions upon the state functions and their values, hence upon the state spaces, only the states in certain subsets of the latter are

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accessible to the things in question. We shall call the accessible region of a state space the lawful state space for the things in question (in the given representation and relative to a given reference frame). To say that a thing of a certain kind behaves lawfully amounts then to saying that the point representing its (instantaneous) state cannot wander beyond the bounds of the lawful state space chosen for the things of the kind in question. The preceding remarks can be summarized into Definition 6. Let F = : A ® V1 × V2 × ... × Vn be a state function in a theoretical model for things of kind K, and call LK the (variable) collection law-statements of the Ks. Then the subset of the codomain V1 × V2 × ... × V of F restricted by the conditions (law-statements, constraints, and n initial and boundary conditions) in LK is called the lawful state space of such things, or SL for short. Example 20. In Example 18 above, the conceivable state space of an electrostatic field was S = { Î 2 ) x Î V}, where V is included in E3. Since the two components of the state function F = < r , j> are linked by the Poisson law-statement “Ñ2f = 4pr” and the boundary condition that the potential vanishes at infinity, the lawful space state for the thing (electrostatic field) is SL = {< r(x), f(x)> Î 2 ) x Î V & [Ñ 2f(x) = 4pr(x)] & f(¥) = 0}, a set that is properly included in S. What holds for the state spaces of natural and social things holds also for the state spaces of technical systems such as machines, factories, and armies. Indeed, all artefacts satisfy not only laws but also norms or rules, which amount to new restrictions on the state functions for the things concerned. (Recall Definition 5 in section 5.) However, artefacts (including formal social organizations) have (emergent) properties that their natural components lack – this being why we care to design, build, and use them. Hence, the work of technologists, managers, and planners does not boil down to shrinking state spaces for natural things. It involves setting up new state spaces not found in the natural sciences.

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7 Concluding Remarks The category of facts is very broad: it includes a property having a given value, a thing being in a given state, a change of state, whether a point event (or instant transition from one state to another) or a protracted process (or sequence of states), and a fact fitting a given pattern. Things, by contrast, are not

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facts: they are the supports or bearers of facts, as in “this car started” and “that car passed by.” Whatever involves a thing is a fact, and nothing that fails to involve concrete things is a fact. For example, it is a fact that this is a printed page, but it is not a fact that twice two equals four. All facts are singular: there are no general facts. Some facts are composite, but there are neither negative nor disjunctive facts: negation and disjunction are de dicto, not de re. A pattern, regularity, or constancy can be of either of the following kinds. It can be objective like the law of gravity, or conceptual like the associative law. If objective, a pattern can be a law of nature or a norm, custom, or convention in force in some social group. A conceptual pattern can be either purely logical or mathematical, such as “p or not-p”; or it may represent an objective pattern – in which case we call it a ‘law-statement.’ It is a tacit ontological principle of scientific research that all concrete things behave in accordance with laws. This, the principle of lawfulness, cannot be proved, but it animates all modern scientific research, which to a large extent is the search for or application of laws and norms (see, e.g., Bunge 1967a). Lawfulness is often mistaken for uniformity. Actually, these are different though related concepts, and so are the corresponding principles. The lawfulness principle states that every state or change of state of an arbitrary thing satisfies some laws. By contrast, according to the principle of uniformity, the laws are the same across space and at all times. Put negatively: No laws would ever emerge or disappear anywhere. In a stronger version, this principle states that the same events recur everywhere and at all times: that there is never anything new “under the sun.” This strong uniformitarianism is false. It was falsified in natural science in the mid-nineteenth century, with the emergence of evolutionary geology and biology, but it is still going strong in social science. In particular, it is inherent in all of the rational-choice models, for they assume the constancy of both human nature and personal preferences. Every law-statement is about concrete things of some kind or other. It consists in a restriction on the possible values of the state functions of the things in question, or on the possible relations among components of such state functions. The same holds for norms or rules. Since the values of a state function represent possible states of the corresponding things, a law-statement tells us which are the possible states a thing can be in, and which are the changes (events or processes) it can undergo. Since every concrete thing is in some state or other, is engaged in some process or other, and is assumed to satisfy some set or other of laws (or else norms), the concepts of thing, property, state, event, process, fact, law, and norm are intimately connected with one another. Yet they are usually treated, if at all, in separation from each

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other. Worse, most of the definitions of these concepts proposed by philosophers are at variance with their meanings in science and technology, which is where they are used every day, if mostly in a tacit fashion, and in the most precise and consistent way. When in Rome, do as the Romans do. When in scientific territory, speak the language of science.

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Index of Names

Agassi, Joseph 128, 263 Alembert, Jean Le Rond d’ 156 Ampère, André-Marie 99, 283 Anderson, Arthur S. 122 Anderson, Roy M. 123 Aquinas, Thomas 135, 270 Ardila, Rubén 142 Aristarchos of Samos 155–6 Aristotle 14, 41, 43, 94–5, 220–1, 223–4, 239, 280 Armstrong, David M. 17, 20, 99, 283 Ashby, W. Ross 125 Atran, Scott 123 Augustine, St 44 Averroës 220 Ayer, Alfred Jules 46 Bacon, Francis 165 Barber, Elinor 96 Barkow, Jerome H. 172 Barnes, Barry 66 Barnett, Arnold 110 Barraclough, Geoffrey 54 Bateson, C.D. 77 Bauch, Bruno 56 Becker, Gary S. 277 Bellarmino, Cardinal 61

Beller, Mara 72 Bergson, Henri 31 Berkeley, George xi, xiii, 34, 43–7 passim Berlyne, David 267 Bernard, Claude 89 Bernardo, José M. 256 Bernays, Paul 151 Bernoulli, Daniel 96, 106 Bernoulli, Jacques 106 Berry, B.J.L. 130 Berry, Donald A. 116 Berzelius, Jöns Jacob 142 Blakemore, Sarah Jayne 172 Blanke, Olaf 23, 121 Blitz, David 36 Bloor, David 199 Bohm, David 69, 97 Bohr, Niels 36, 45, 67, 69, 142, 214 Boltzmann, Ludwig 29 Bolzano, Bernard 27 Boole, George 89 Born, Max 67 Boudon, Raymond 200, 266 Boulding, Kenneth E. 125 Bourdieu, Pierre 66 Boutroux, Émile 99, 283

328

Index of Names

Braithwaite, Richard Bevan 139 Braudel, Fernand 125 Bridgman, Percy W. 45, 70–1, 243 Brink, D.O. 268 Brown, James Robert 66, 200, 263, 284 Brown, Robert 96 Brown, Stephanie L. 77 Brush, Stephen G. 97 Buddha 34, 36 Burawoy, Michael 81 Buridan, Johannes 188, 224 Bush, George W. 66, 137 Cabanac, Michel 172 Cajal, Santiago Ramón y 248 Calvin, Jean 276 Cantor, Georg 216 Carnap, Rudolf 5, 57, 58, 61–2, 65, 83, 107, 111, 113, 207, 243 Cassirer, Ernst 57 Chabanov, Vladimir M. 158 Chisholm, Roderick M. 236 Chomsky, Noam 82 Chrysippus 94 Churchland, Paul M. 78 Clark, Austen 40 Clough, Sharyn 261 Clutton-Brock, Tim 77 Cockburn, Andrew 77 Cohen, Hermann 57 Collins, Harry M. 66 Collins, Randall 46, 199 Comte, Auguste 57 Condillac, Étienne Bonnot de 252 Condorcet, Marquis de 264 Conel, J.L. 82 Copernicus, Nicolaus 5, 61 Cosmides, Leda 172 Counter-Enlightenment 125 Cournot, Antoine-Augustin 99, 102, 105

Covarrubias, Guillermo, M. 155 Craver, Carl F. 144 Cresswell, M.J. 227 Crick, Francis 157 Dalton, John 156 Damasio, Antonio 76 Darden, Lindley 144 Darwin, Charles 59, 120, 142, 224 Davidson, Donald 62–3, 197, 261 Dawkins, Richard 77, 137 Debreu, Gerard 5, 200 de Finetti, Bruno 106, 114 De Morgan, Augustus 106 Dennett, Daniel 74 Derrida, Jacques xii, 257 Descartes, René xi, 10, 41–2, 48, 142, 201, 214 d’Espagnat, Bernard 5 Deutsch, David 15 de Waal, Frans B.M. 77, 171, 172 Dewey, John 6, 85 Dietzgen, Joseph 11 Dijksterhuis, Eduard Jan 41 Dilthey, Wilhelm 27, 54, 57, 64, 75, 174 Dirac, Paul Antoine Marie 202 Dobzhansky, Theodosius 120 Dragonetti, Carmen 105 Duhem, Pierre 72, 143, 155, 200 Dummett, Michael 209 Du Pasquier, L.-Gustave 105 Durkheim, Émile 9, 54, 81, 263 Earman, John 113 Eble, G.T. 98 Eccles, John C. 135, 280 Eddington, Arthur 14 Eddy, Charles 115 Einstein, Albert 20, 69, 153, 202, 210, 242, 246, 247, 263, 275, 276

Index of Names Elias, Norbert 50, 128 Elster, Jon 134–5 Engels, Friedrich 12, 32, 142 Epicurus 97 Euler, Leonhard 87, 202 Everett, Hugh, III 97–8, 210 Faraday, Michael 25 Fehr, Ernst 271 Feigenbaum, E.A. 180 Feigl, Herbert 59 Feldman, Marcus W. 98 Feller, William 102, 109 Fensham, Peter J. 85 Feyerabend, Paul K. 34, 56 Feynman, Richard 12 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 57, 235 Field, Hartry H. 198 Fine, Arthur 71 Fisher, Ronald A. 114 Fleck, Ludwik 66 Fodor, Jerry A. 219 Fogel, Robert W. 238 Ford, Henry 125 Foucault, Michel 79 Frank, Philipp 61 Frankfort, H. 49 Frankfurt School 31 Friedman, Milton 192 Friedrich Wilhelm II 52–3 Frayn, Michael 35 Fréchet, Maurice 105 Frege, Gottlob 196, 215, 234, 284 Friedman, Milton 192 Gale, David 159 Galilei, Galileo 41, 61 García-Sucre, Máximo 141 Gasparski, Wojciech W. 277 Gellner, Ernest 221

329

Gergen, Kenneth J. 58 Ghiselin, Michael T. 225 Gibson, J.J. 247 Giddens, Anthony 125 Gigerenzer, Gerd 96 Gillies, Donald 107 Gilson, Étienne 224 Giza, Piotr 185 Glennan, Stuart 126 Gödel, Kurt 207 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang 280 Goffman, Erving 79 Good, Irving John 107 Goodman, Nelson 4–5, 65, 221, 236 Gopnik, Alison 82 Gould, Stephen Jay 95, 121 Granovetter, Mark 140 Grassmann, Hermann 193 Greene, Brian 245 Griffin, Donald R. 77 Gross, Paul R. 66 Haack, Susan 216, 266 Habermas, Jürgen 31 Hacking, Ian 113 Hadamard, Jacques 153 Haeckel, Ernst 58 Hall, Richard L. 159 Hamlet 34, 234 Harman, Gilbert 168, 268 Harris, Marvin 54 Harvey, William 142 Hayek, Friedrich A. 264 Hebb, Donald O. 74, 142, 248, 253, 264 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 16, 27, 38–9, 57, 221, 234 Heidegger, Martin xii, 6, 58, 280 Heilbron, J.L. 4 Heisenberg, Werner 45, 67–9, 106, 202, 279

330

Index of Names

Helmholtz, Hermann von 75 Hempel, Carl G. 139 Henri, Victor 97 Herodotus 237 Hesse, Mary 192 Hilbert, David 155 Hippocrates 116 Hiriyanna, Mysore 220 Hobbes, Thomas 141, 263 Hobson, John A. 122 Hogarth, Robin M. 176 Holbach, Paul-Henry Thiry, Baron d’ 124 Horwich, Paul 260 Howson, Colin 115–66 Hubel, David H. 84, 252–3 Hughes, G.E. 227 Hull, David L. 225 Hume, David xi, xii, xiii, 47–9, 58, 88, 164, 166, 267, 276 Humphreys, Paul 101 Hunt, Shelby D. 263 Huntington, Edward V 155 Husserl, Edmund 15, 31, 44, 75, 86, 153, 211, 235, 253

Kahneman, Daniel 111, 176, 271 Kaila, Eino 37 Kant, Immanuel xi, xiii, 6, 22, 36, 50–3, 56–8, 60, 226, 245–6 Kaplan, Edward H. 110 Kary, Michael 142 Kasarda, John 142 Keuth, Herbert 263 Keynes, John Maynard 92, 106, 125 Kim, H. 130 Kim, H.-M. 130 Kim, Jaegwon 283 Kirchhoff, Gustav Robert 143 Knetsch, Jack L. 271 Knorr-Cetina, Karen D. 46 Kolmogoroff, Alexander N. 155 Kotarbisnki, Tadeusz 277 Koza, John R. 180 Kraft, Julius 65 Kraft, Victor 59 Krechevsky, I. 82 Kripke, Saul A. 167, 211, 229 Kuhl, Patricia 82 Kuhn, Thomas S. 34, 56 Kurtz, Paul 124

Ingenieros, José 276 Inquisition 61

Laing, Ronald 79 Lakatos, Imre 153 Laland, Kevin N. 98, 121, 137 Lalande, André 264 Lambek, Joachim 216, 246 Lambert, Johann Heinrich 7, 246 Lanczos, Cornelius 228 Lange, Friedrich 56 Laplace, Pierre Simon 106, 108 Lashley, Karl 82 Laszlo, Ervin 128 Latour, Bruno 46, 66, 283 Laudan, Larry 262

Jacob, François 5 Jains 220 James, William 41 Jeans, James xiv Jefferson, Thomas 248 Jeffreys, Harold 106 John, St 280 Johnson, Samuel 254 Jordan, Pasqual 156 Jung, Carl Gustav 95

Index of Names Lazarsfeld, Paul F. 32 Lederberg, J. 180 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 27, 29, 43, 193, 225, 231, 244–6 Lenin, Vladimir Ilich 12, 60, 75, 263 Leonardo da Vinci 75 Leontief, Wassily 125 Levi-Montalcini, Rita 45 Levins, Richard 220 Levitt, Norman 66 Lewis, Clarence I. 230 Lewis, David 4, 48, 78, 88, 93, 197, 211, 219, 229–36 Lewontin, Richard 220 Lieberman, Matthew D. 172 Lindley, D.V. 113–4 Lipset, Seymour Martin 122 Locke, John 42–3 Loptson, Peter 197 Lovinbond, Sabina 268 Lowe, E. Jonathan 211, 229 Lucretius 96 Luhmann, Niklas 125 Luria, Alexander Romanovich 83 Lycan, William G. 230 Lyotard, Jean-François 250 Mac Lane, Saunders 194 Mach, Ernst 36, 57, 58, 66, 143 Machamer, Peter 144 Machiavelli, Niccolò 275 Mahner, Martin 121, 133, 142, 179, 266 Mandela, Nelson 225 March, James G. 176 Marsicano, Giovanni 121 Marx, Karl 12, 32, 142 Massey, Douglas S. 77 Matthews, Michael 85 Maxwell, James Clerk 25, 214

331

May, Robert M. 123 McCall, Storrs 212, 237 McCloskey, Donald M. 192 McGinn, Colin 268 McTaggart, John 245 Medawar, Peter 138 Meinong, Alexius 197, 229, 234 Melia, Joseph 229 Mellor, D.H. 99 Meltzoff, Andrew N. 82 Menger, Karl 59 Mermim, N. David 68 Merricks, Trenton 231 Merton, Robert K. 46, 80, 84, 121, 132, 133, 135, 267 Michelangelo 239 Mill, John Stuart 57, 60, 143 Monod, Jacques 98 Montessori, María 85 Moore, G.E. 266 Murphy, Edmond A. 115 Nagel, Ernest 139 Nagel, Thomas 74 Natorp, Paul 57 Neurath, Otto 59 Newton, Isaac xii, 25, 42, 75, 164 Newton, Roger G. 185 Newton-Smith, W.H. 263 Nicod, Jean 245 Nielsen, François 122 Nietzsche, Friedrich 56, 275 Niiniluoto, Ilkka 263 Nino, Carlos S. 268 Novick, Peter 254 Oberschall, Anthony R. 32 Ockham, William 219, 223 Ochsner, Kevin 172

332

Index of Names

Odling-Smee, F. John 98, 121, 137 Ostwald, Wilhelm 143 Pappus 153 Parsons, Talcott 125 Pasteur, Louis 95 Pauli, Wolfgang 67 Pavlov, Ivan 247 Peano, Giuseppe 206 Pearson, Karl 67 Peirce, Charles Sanders 99, 105, 117, 138, 153, 168, 239 Pérez-Bergliaffa, Santiago E. 68, 155 Perrin, Jean 97 Piaget, Jean 46, 89 Planck, Max 3–4, 30, 69 Plato 5, 10, 14, 27, 29, 200, 223, 234 Platt, John R. 167 Platt, Mark 268 Poincaré, Henri 96, 105, 206 Polya, George 146, 208 Popper, Karl R. 60, 93, 99, 102, 103, 105, 111, 115–16, 117, 153, 163, 214, 221, 256 Porter, Theodore M. 96 Portes, Alejandro 140 Premack, David 171 Press, S. James 113 Preston, Stephanie D. 171 Prilepko, Aleksey 151 Protagoras of Abdera 34, 36 Ptolemy xii, 155–6 Putnam, Hilary 6, 34, 209, 253, 261 Quadri, Goffredo 220 Quine, W.V. 15, 28, 195, 197, 199, 201, 207, 209, 221, 232, 262 Raffaelli, David 115 Ramsey, Frank P. 260

Ranke, Leopold 32 Ratner, Carl 75 Reichenbach, Hans 57, 61, 71, 111 Renouvier, Charles 38 Rescher, Nicholas 30, 31, 185, 256 Restivo, Sal 199 Revonsuo, Antti 136 Ricardo, David 32 Rickert, Heinrich 56 Ricoeur, Paul 192 Rilling, James K. 77, 137, 270 Rockenbach, Bettina 271 Rodríguez-Consuegra, Francisco 207 Romero, Gustavo E. 68 Rorty, Richard 6, 74, 284 Rosenfeld, Léon 69 Ross, James F. 212 Rottschaeffer, William 268 Roughgarden, Jonathan 121 Routley, Richard 216, 229 Rømer, Olaf 71 Russell, Bertrand 28, 219, 245 Sagemore, Marc 181 Saki 48 Sampson, Robert J. 142 Savage, Leonard J. 106 Scheler, Max 266 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm 57 Schelling, Thomas C. 133 Schlick, Moritz 57, 58 Schopenhauer, Arthur 56 Schönwandt, Walter L. 131 Schrödinger, Erwin 69 Schumpeter, Joseph A. 127 Schutz, Alfred 56 Scott, Theodore K. 188 Searle, John R. 17, 90, 142 Sellars, Roy Wood 36 Sellars, Wilfrid 263

Index of Names Sextus Empiricus 36, 245 Shannon, Claude 101, 109 Shorter, Edward 79 Siegel, Harvey 263 Simon, Herbert A. 176 Sklar, Lawrence 107 Skinner, Burrhus F. 75, 247 Slovic, Paul 176 Smart, John J.C. 263 Smith, Adam 32 Smith, Adrian F.M. 256 Smoluchovski, Marian 97 Sokal, Alan 66, 284 Spencer, Herbert 58 Spinoza, Benedict 36 Stangl, Dalene K. 116 Stove, David 263 Suppes, Patrick 93 Susskind, Ron 66 Swift, Jonathan 49 Szasz, Thomas 79 Szent-György, Albert 85 Sztompka, Piotr 128 Tarski, Alfred 155 Taton, René 95 Taylor, Charles 12 Tegmark, Max 210 Teller, Paul 71 Thagard, Paul 117, 168 Thaler, Richard M. 271 Thucydides 32 Tilley, Christopher 144 Tilly, Charles 141 Tocqueville, Alexis de 32, 54, 142 Tola, Fernando 105 Tolman, Edward C. 82 Tooby, John 172 Torretti, Roberto 51 Trigg, Roger 263

333

Trigger, Bruce G. 54, 74, 79, 128–9, 173 Tversky, Amos 176 Uhlmann, Gunther 154 Urbach, Peter 115–16 Vacher, Laurent-Michel 263, 280 Vaihinger, Hans 56, 191 van Fraassen, Bas C. 4, 62, 72, 262 van Inwagen, Peter 234 Venn, John 106 Vienna Circle 5, 59–60, 143 Ville, Jean 107 Vitzthum, Richard C. 207 Volchan, Sérgio 102 von Glasersfeld, Ernst 84–5 von Mises, Ludwig 121, 277 von Mises, Richard 59, 107 von Weizsäcker, Carl F. 67 Vrba, Elizabeth 169 Vucetich, Héctor 68 Waddington, Conrad Hall 275 Watson, James 157 Watson, John B. 75, 247 Weber, Max 31–2, 50, 64, 174, 214, 238, 256, 263 Weinberg, Steven 26 West, Stuart A. 137 Wheeler, John A. 15, 210 Whewell, William 167, 210 White, Hayden 192 Whitehead, Alfred North 245, 283 Whiten, Andrew 171 Wiener, Norbert 94, 179 Wiesel, Thorsten N. 84, 252–3 Wiggins, David 268 Wikström, Per-Olof 177 Wilkins, Adam S. 177

334

Index of Names

Willis, Thomas 42 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 5, 6, 9, 20, 58, 150, 283 Wolff, Christian 50, 246 Wolin, Sheldon S. 280 Wolpert, Lewis 84 Woodbury, Keith A. 154, 161 Woodger, Joseph Henry 219 Woodruff, Guy 171 Woods, John 216

Woolgar, Steven 46, 66, 284 Wulff, H.R. 115 Yaglom, A.M. 110 Yaglom, I.M. 110 Yamazaki, Kazuo 106 Zakhariev, Boris N. 158 Zeki, Semir 80, 267 Zimmer, Carl 42

Index of Subjects

Abduction 138, 153, 167–8. See also Guessing Abstraction 188–91, 197 Accident 94–8. See also Chance Action 91 Agathonism 273 AIDS 79, 116–17 Algorithm 142, 160–1, 297 Altruism 77, 137, 141, 270–1 Analogy 134, 144, 167–88 Analysis 16, 19 Antipsychiatry 79 Antirealism 56–87, 281. See also Constructivism, Idealism, Irrealism, Phenomenalism, Phenomenology, Positivism, Subjectivism Appearance 3–4, 6, 21, 23. See also Phenomenon Approximation 30, 158, 213–14 Approximationism 30 Apriorism 39, 58 Archaeology 173 Artefact 300 As if 188, 203. See also Fictionism Astronomy 155–6 Atomism xiii, 97, 156 Axiology 266–7

Axiom 206, 275 Axiomatization 68, 155, 232 Babies 35, 82–3 Bayesianism 5, 7, 106–17. Bayes’s theorem 112–13 Belief 112 Bell inequalities 25 Biconditional 90 Biology 134, 168–70 Biostatistics 116–17 Bit 15, 26 Black box 125, 136, 160 Bond 104. See also Structure Brownian motion 96 Buddhism 87 Capitalism 127 Carbon dating 159 Causal principle 92 Causality 88, 247 Causation 88–94, 118; counterfactual analysis of 238; criterion of 94; as energy transfer 91; probabilistic theory of 93 Cause efficient 88–94; final 89, 94 CESM model of a system 126

336

Index of Subjects

Chance 89, 94–118. See also Accident, Disorder, Probability, Randomness Changeability 10, 26–7, 129. See also Energy, Material Chemistry 120, 132, 180 Classicism in quantum physics 69 Class 222. See also Kind, Species Cognition 24 Cognitive neuroscience 169, 171–2, 186 Cohesion, social 140–1 Commitment, ontological 200–2 Composition of a system 126 Computationalism 142–3 Computer 142, 180–1, 189 Conditional 237 Consistency, external 117, 168 Construct 10, 188–9, 195. See also Concept, Proposition, Theory Construction, social 79 Constructivism: ontological 43–7, 66, 253–4, 283 – see also Subjectivism; pedagogical 47, 84–5; psychological 47; social 46–7 Constructivism-relativism 5, 65, 199– 200, 253–4 Contingency. See Accident Convention 289 Conventionalism 156, 191, 206–7 Cooperation 137–8 Copenhagen interpretation 5, 36, 45, 59 Correlation, statistical 123–4 Correspondence theory of truth 260–1 Counter-Enlightenment 125 Counterfactual 212–14, 236–9; analysis of causation 93–44, 238; history 93, 237–8; question 238 Counter-intuitive 84, 265 Counter-norm 267 Counterpart theory 98, 230–1

Counter-Revolution, scientific 43–53. See also Berkeley, Hume, Kant Covering-law model 7, 139. See also Subsumption Criminality 177 Criterion 94, 243 Data 19 Deception 81 Deduction 167 Definition 206 Democracy 122, 130 Denotation. See Reference Descriptivism 53, 142–3. See also Positivism Design, experimental 114 Designation 205 Determinism 88, 99, 108 Diagnosis, medical 170 Diffraction 157–8 Discovery 146, 203 Disinterestedness 32 Disorder 95–6, 104. See also Chance Disposition 213, 239–44; conditional 242; unconditional 242 Distinguishability 24 Doxastics 112 Drake formula 106 Dualism 11 Ecology 98, 115 Economics 5, 92 Economy of thought 60 Effect 91 Efficiency 274, 277 Emergence 14, 78, 92, 120, 224, 248, 290 Emotion 80 Emotivism, ethical 276 Empiricism: classical 33, 45, 58, 245;

Index of Subjects logical 59–63 – see also Positivism, logical Energetism 14 Energy 12, 91, 119, 222 Engineering, social 279 Entanglement 25 Entropy: information-theoretic 109–10; physical 161 Environment of a system 126 Epidemiology 123 Epistemology 6, 33, 59, 251, 254–7 Epoche 44 Equality 206–7. See also Identity Equivalence relation 225 Error 30–1, 99, 262 Ethics 267–77 Event 16, 90–1, 291–3 Evidence 46, 72–3, 261 Evolution: biological 98–9, 120, 131, 224; social 131 – see also History Evolutionary biology 168–9, 224 Evolutionary developmental biology 120 Exactification 107 Exaptation 95 Existence 28–9, 197–8; criterion 28; formal 28, 197, 234; hypothesis 229– 30; mathematical 192; predicate 28; real 28–9, 45, 51, 197, 234 Existential quantifier 28, 197–8 Experiment 69–72, 82, 98; crucial 165–6 Explanation 160; causal 89; mechanismic 139–42; subsumptive 139 – see also Covering-law model Explorer Argument 256 Extension of a predicate 222, 225 Extinction 224 Fact xii, 9, 15–17, 224, 283–302; moral 268–71 Fact-appearance-fiction triad xii

337

Factual/formal distinction 193, 202 Fact/value gap 268–9 Fallibilism 30, 255 Falsificationism 256 Feedback loop 94, 123 Feynman diagram 293 Fiction 9, 188–217; artistic 194; mathematical 196–209; metaphysical 209–13; scientific 213–14; tame 10 – see also Mathematics; wild 10 – see also Many-worlds metaphysics Fictionism 190–3 Fluctuation 97 Forecast 160 Formalism in a theory 202 Foundations 216 Free trade 122 Free will 247–8 Frequentism 107 Function 133–4, 179, 221 Functionalism 125, 133–4 Gambling 96, 102–3, 108–9 Geisteswissenschaft 56. See also Cultural science, Social science Genetics 136, 169–70 Globalization 122 Glossocentrism 58. See also Hermeneutics, Wittgenstein Goal 131–2 Gravitation, theory of 25, 61, 155, 205 Grue 76 Guessing 137–8. See also Abduction, Inference to the best explanation, Theory of mind Heisenberg’s inequalities 68, 69 Hermeneutics xi, 54, 56–7, 63–4, 174– 5, 265 Hindcast 160

338

Index of Subjects

Hinduism 34 History 73, 91, 168, 222, 253–4 Holism 128–9 Homo clausus 50, 128 Hume’s problem 7 Hylomorphism 27 Hylorealism xiii, 27, 33; scientific 279–80 Hypothesis 117, 167 Hypothetico-deductive: method 182–4; system – see Theory Idealism, philosophical 191, 218–19; objective xiv, 27, 198 – see also Platonism; subjective xiv, 211 – see also Subjectivism Ideal object 27–8 Identity 78, 206–7. See also Equality Ideology 31–2 Illusion 23 Illusionism 34 Imagination 86 Immunology 123 Impartiality 32 Imperative 272 Imperialism 122 Indeterminism 99 Indicator 8, 46, 72–3, 141, 182–6, 243 Indirect proof 146, 153 Individual 284 Individualism, methodological 50, 63–4, 174–5, 290 Induction xii, 7, 116, 145, 146, 152–3, 165–7 Inductivism 165–6 Inference: horizontal 152; vertical 153 Information 92; theory of 101–2, 109 Informationism 15. See also Computationalism Instrument, measuring 69–71, 183 Intelligence (spying) 59

Inter-phenomena 71 Interpretation: psychological 63, 81, 174 – see also Theory of Mind, Verstehen; semantic 201–2 Intersubjectivity 255–6 Intuition 175 Intuitionism: axiological 266; ethical 267–8; mathematical 208–9, 215; philosophical 31, 129 Invariance 252, 294 Invention 99, 146, 169, 178–81, 203 Invertibility 159–62, 185 Irrealism 34. See also Antirealism Islam 139 Kicking 28, 254 Kin selection 77 Kind 223–6. See also Species Knower 21–3. See also Subject Knowledge 24; by acquaintance 78; by description 78 Law 14, 51, 134–7, 166, 219–20, 222–5, 235 Lawfulness 48, 136, 222, 293, 301 Law-statement 21, 220, 252, 295–7 Learning 84, 139 Level of organization 96–7 Liberty 248–9 Likelihood 110 Linguistics 78, 82, 188 Logic: deductive 58, 197, 202; deviant 216; dynamic 202; free 216; inductive 117, 145; modal 19, 211, 227 Long waves 130 Macroproperty 137 Management science 136 Many-worlds: interpretation of quantum

Index of Subjects mechanics 97–8, 210; metaphysics 209–14; semantics 212 Market 121–2, 177 Material 10–12, 27, 129 Materialism 26–7; emergentist 27; historical 54; systemic 125; vulgar 26, 207 – see also Physicalism Mathematics 138, 149–55, 188–217 Matter 11–12, 129 Meaning: psychological 56–7, 265 – see also Goal; semantic 188–9, 209 – see also Reference, Sense Measure 100 Measurement 68–71, 183 Mechanics 49 Mechanism 7, 119–44, 126, 170; causal 132; essential 131; latent 133; manifest 133; parallel 130–1, 166; social 122, 131, 175–8; stochastic 100–4, 132 Mechanismic 140 Mechanist worldview 43, 48 Medicine 129, 170 Meliorism 30, 255 Mereology 21 Metaphysics. See Ontology Method, scientific 205, 265 Microeconomics 122, 176 Microproperty 137 Micro-reductionism 77–8 Mind, theory of 138 Miracle 48–9, 262 Model: probabilistic 101–2; theoretical 182, 201–2 Model theory 101 Monism: methodological 264; ontological – see Idealism, Materialism Naming 188–9, 221–2 Naturalism 268. See also Materialism Natural-law theory 270

339

Necessity, nomic 101, 167 Negativism 100 Neo-determinism 105 Neo-Kantianism 50, 56–7 Niche construction 98 Nihilism 87 Nominalism 188, 207, 219–24 Non-referential 257 Nonsense 39 Norm 135, 267–72, 207, 273–5 Noumenon 36. See also Thing-in-itself Novelty. See Emergence Objectivism. See Realism Objectivity 32, 256 Observable 72–3 Observation 67 Ontology 6, 33, 59, 211–12, 238–9, 251 Operationism 36, 45 Opinion 106, 115 Out-of-body experience 23 Parapsychology 121 Particular 221 Pattern. See Law Pauli principle 290 Perception: psychological 75, 78–81; social 78–81 Phenomenalism xi, 6, 38–9, 156–7 Phenomenology 7, 44, 64–5, 86 Phenomenon 33, 35–6. See also Appearance Physicalism. See Materialism, vulgar Physics 12, 38, 119, 158–9 Planning 159–60 Platonism 191, 198, 203, 215, 223, 279–80. See also Idealism, objective Plato’s cave 38 Plausibility 117

340

Index of Subjects

Plausible reasoning 208. See also Abduction, Analogy, Induction Political science 278 Positivism 30, 156–7; classical 57; logical 57–63 Possibility 210–14, 226–39; conceptual 227–9; real 19, 227 Possible world: metaphysics 19, 210– 14, 229–39; semantics 212–14, 257 Postmodernism 250 Pragmatism 191, 215 Praxiology 277–9 Predicate 23–4, 194–6, 219, 284. See also Property Probability 7, 100–18; of causes 162; conditional 93, 101, 112; inverse 162–3; objective 100–5, 241–2; prior 113; of propositions 106–9, 110–11; subjective – see Bayesianism Problem 145–64; direct or forward 150; to find 153; Hume’s 164; ill-posed 154 – see also inverse; insoluble 161–2; inverse or backward 7, 145–64, 185– 6; Newton’s 145, 164; to prove 153 Process 16, 293–5 Proof 199 Propensity 103 Property 11–14, 23–4, 219–22, 284–6; absolute – see Invariant; accidental 13; actual 239; basic 86; blunt 69, 242; cluster or bundle 14; conditional 242; derivative 86; dispositional 239 – see also Disposition; essential 13; general 286; individual 286; invariant 13, 14; manifest 239; phenomenal 35; primary 13, 37–8, 41–2, 86; secondary 13, 37–8, 41–2, 86 – see also Quale; sharp 69, 242 Proposition 188–9, 193, 237 Propositionalization 272

Pseudoscience 280 Psychiatry 79 Psychoanalysis 124 Psychology 75–6, 111; cultural 75; evolutionary 172; folk 174 Pyrrhonism 191, 257 Quale, qualia xi, xii, 35, 40, 73–5. See also Secondary property Quanta 67–72 Quanton 144 Quantum chemistry 132 Quantum mechanics 25, 67–72, 88, 97–8, 105, 108, 158–9, 210, 242, 290 Random choice 102 Randomization 96 Randomness 102, 162–3. See also Chance Ratioempiricism 33 Rational-choice theory 175–6, 277 Rationalism 33 Reaction, chemical 120, 132 Realism xii; axiological 30, 266–7; critical 30; epistemological 29, 251–4; integral 250; internal 271; methodological 30, 263–6; naive 30, 75; ontological 29, 251–4; Platonic – see Idealism, objective; practical 30, 277–9; scientific 29–30; semantic 29, 257–63 Reality: local 25; test 36, 263–4 Realpolitik 250 Reduction 77–8, 186 Reductionism 36. See also Level of organization Reference 16, 72–3, 108, 195–8, 257; class 196–7, 202; frame 13, 61, 235, 252 Reform, social 279 Relativism 6, 270

Index of Subjects Relativity 291 Religion 49, 52, 79, 194 Representation, semantic 205, 288–9 Research 135, 145 Reverse engineering 178–81 Risk 114 Romanticism 43 Rule 151 Say’s law 91 Scepticism xii, 42, 49 Science 30–1; biosocial 264–5; cultural 56–7; factual 193; formal 193; social 64, 173–8, 221 Scientific Revolution 40–1, 96 Scientism 30, 264, 280 Semantic assumption 155, 201 Semantics 212 Semigroup 284 Sensation 60, 75, 156 Sense 207 Sentence 188–9, 237. See also Proposition Separability: subject/object 24–6 Serendipity 95 Signal 91–2 Simplicity 150 Someness 198 Space 51, 244–9 Speciation 120, 224 Species 224–6. See also Kind Spectroscopy 147 Spontaneity 92, 97, 248 State 16, 287–91; of affairs 17, 283; function 287–90; space 17–19, 91, 290–300 Statistical mechanics 104, 107, 136 Statistics 96, 107 Structuralism 101 Structure of a system 126

341

Subject 21–6. See also Knower Subjectivism 34, 66 Subsumption 135–6. See also Coveringlaw model Supervenience. See Emergence Symbol 188 Syndrome 170 System 21, 121, 124–9; hypotheticodeductive – see Theory; social 63–4, 125–8, 138 Systemicity, conceptual 168 Systemism 124–9 Technology 30–1, 123–4, 150, 178–81; social 178 Terrorism 59, 123, 127–8, 181 Theology 147, 231 Theory 8, 62, 82–3, 173, 188; confrontation with data 182–6; ethical 275–6 Theory of mind 146, 171 Thermodynamics 104, 156 Thing 9–11, 27, 37–8, 60; thing for us 22–3 – see also Phenomenon; thing in itself 22–3, 60 – see also Noumenon Thomas theorem 80 Thought experiment 214 Time 51, 244–9; reversal 293–4 Transcendental 218–49 Translucent box 137 Trope 15, 286 Truth: artistic 194; criterion of 261; factual 192, 193–4; formal 193–4, 206; moral 194, 259, 267–73; partial 111, 232, 260; theories of 258–63; value 237, 259 Tychism 99 Uncertainty: objective 109–10; relations – see Heisenberg’s inequalities

342

Index of Subjects

Underdetermination of theory by data 185 Uniformitarianism 301 Universal 12, 218–23 Universe 20, 210 Utilitarianism 276 Value 31–2, 266; individual 267; social 267; theory – see Axiology Variance 109 Variational principle 228–9 Venus 78 Verification theory of meaning 46

Vérité de fait 231. See also Factual truth Vérité de raison 231. See also Formal truth Verstehen 56, 63, 171, 174–5. See also Interpretation, psychological Virtual 228 Word 219 World 21, 64–5; parallel 97–8, 167, 209–14, 227–36 Worldmaking 63–7. See also Subjectivism