•
/I
•
•
j
CONTENTS
PART II. IN PARTICULAR, PALESTINE, 1936-37. IX . PALESTINE
•
•
X. RULERS AND RULED
•
•
...
71 downloads
1638 Views
44MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
•
/I
•
•
j
CONTENTS
PART II. IN PARTICULAR, PALESTINE, 1936-37. IX . PALESTINE
•
•
X. RULERS AND RULED
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
XI. AGENTS OF ORDER AND LAW
XII. REBELLION AND EXTREME MODERATION, MAY
1936
.
.
.
APRU.~
~3
.•
XIII. REBELUON AND EXTREME MODERATION,
1936
•
• •
• •
PRIII''''JlD III' GItJl4!l! BlU'J'Anr nIt BJliH'tl BJI~UV1lD
•
v
•
•
•
COXTEKT S
.-..... xn-. RFBEtI lOX AXD E."\'"TREYE YODERATION, JtTLY
1:936
x,'.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
220
REBEII.IOX AXD E."\'"TRE!\IE YODER.\TION, AUGUST
1:93t'l
•
•
.
•
•
.
•
239
XVI. REBEUION AND INTENSn'E ME.\SURES, SEPTEM-
BER
xvn. xvnl.
1:936
.
.
.
REBELLION
AND
THE
ART
OCTOBER
1936
•
•
ARMISTICE
. OF
.
YIELDING, •
•
ARMED BANDS AND AMNESTY
XIX. ARMISTICE WITHOUT CONDITIONS XX. TIlE PURPOSE
•
•
•
. 252
•
•
274
•
28g
.
•
•
30 4
•
•
·
32I
•
PART 1. IN GENERAL, RULE AND REBELLION
.
•
CHAPTER RULE
A ND
r.
REBELLION.
THE story of rule and rebellion is as old as history and covers most of it. This book, however, deals with no more than a corner of the whole story, but a corner which concerns us and our history, since the Great War ended. During that period of twenty years, there has been encouragement of self-expression and a crop of rebellions, within the sphere of British rule. At the same time, there has been hesitation on the part of the ruler to apply force, in striking contrast to the lack of hesitation on the part of the ruled to appeal to force. The most recent example of this state of affaits was provided in 1936 by Palestine. The ruled clearly do not bar the use of force as an instrument of policy. The with which they have to force and the 'miJarity in the way th(."}, have tJ.Sed it, in
pJaces widely separated, ' J
a
QJe
for:
~
11' I ~ II R. .
L E,
N' l) :R
EIUnl.IO~
th \ 'hI.. I que~tioll n: ~Ii n and raise the " f rule in rul 11 S b m In l't' diffi" ltqu~::;tion Whether b II' . tu 01 le'~ :ffi. ' lOll IS £ann of 'War and e Clent. within th ~ ph I'! of Britisl~ Ire ?rt to force 1 ru e 1 viol ti f o peac where peace should b f a on T '. 1 e a e. wo prmclp es of peace are th t . ,
. d ' eCISlOn of the JU ges m ust be loyally obeyed. Succ . th Ii' ess In e app catIon o~ these two principles depends on redress of gnevance ,and on readiness to oppose force by force, on the part of the ruler. No alleged slowness to redress grievance should be allowed to excuse resort to force on the part of the ruled, or there must inevitably be a spate of excuses and not much peace. The Arabs in Palestine blandly claim that they had to stage a fifth rebellion before steps were taken to judge their dispute with the P alestine Government. Apart from the merits of that claim the fifth rebellion did produce the R oyal Commission, and t he Royal COmmISSIOn produced a r e omm enda,t ion in favour of partitibn. But the Palestine Goyernment had a hand in the rebellion because, without that gavel nment. there might have been 1
•
o:l
RULE
•
•
,
AND
REBELLIO
no rebellion, or on so ~ hort that H.M. Govemm nt would not have been stirred to obtain th appointment of a Royal before it ended. Given a trong govermnent in Palestine the Arabs might never have been allowed to rebel, and H.lVL Government might never have been allowed t o go on ignoring their grievances. In fact, the whole case might then have been submitted to judgment without any resort to force. However, it is questionable whether modern methods of government as practised by Britain would allow the appointment, or the continuance in office, of a governor capable of making H.M. Government appoint judges to hear a dispute in time, and also capable of suppressing a rebellion. Ability to suppress a rebellion without the other ability would not be enough. That, as the Royal Commission makes quite clear, would merely be putting off the evil day. Improvement in the arrangements for disputes is one problem, j mprovement in the arrangements for dealing with resort to force is another. It is with the second of these two problems that thi~ book deals. It woold be difficult to pretend that the 5
B R I TIS H
R U L E,
AND
REB ELL ION
RULE
exist to-day in 1937 for hearing disputes are so bad that delay could be accepted as an excuse for resort to force. It would be no service to peace to make such an admission. To-day, thinking people are deeply concerned with the problem of peace, and practical people may find a solution where pacifists would fail. One direction in which practical people might direct their energies is towards improvement in the arrangements for hearing disputes. Another direction, the one with which we are here concerned, is towards improvement in the methods of dealing with resort to force. There are good reasons for directing attention in the latter direction first. To begin with, the a.rrangements for dealing with resort to force are worse than are those for hearing disputes, and they are more likely to be tested. Then there are in the world people who would resort to force in preference to submitting their case to judgment, if they thought that force would get them b tter terms. There are also people who would resort to force soon r than accept a judgm nt which they did not like. These two types hav given us plenty of rebellions inside the British Empir ~ince th end of the Great War, and there is r tl.!>Ol1 ()
AND
REBELLION
to expect them to give us more. Finally, inefficiency in dealing with resort to force encourages it. The inefficiency displayed in Palestine last year was alarming, but it was not the duty of the Royal Commission to investigate the manner in which rebellion was dealt with by the Palestine Government. The Report makes that point clear in the first paragraph of Chapter IV. There is no indication yet of any intention to hold an inquiry into the methods adopted to deal with rebellion, and that too is alarming, because it entails a regrettable loss of experience. H.M. Forces resist and fight rebels. The Army in particular gains wide experience in constant contact with rebellion. But the policy governing its action emanates on one occasion from one Government Office in Whitehall and on the next from another, with the result that the forces which have to deal practically with rebellion seem alwa's to be controlled by amateurs. Ther ap other good rea 'ons for inquiry into the 'vents of It\st v'ar in Pal 'stine. After all. • sam' thrce hundred peopl 'W 1'0 kill >d in fighting. 01' WCI ~ murdcl"d in th \ Holy Land. and about thirtt.'cn hundred w to wounded. These figu1' s 7
I
BRITISH
RULE,
d.-n
REBELLIO
r
~e probably an underestimate. It is stated m Cha er n. of the Report of the Ro-al . h' ) _ Lat It has been credibly e::.timated ~~ ~: _\.lam lost Olle thousand killed, mostly m ::g-~~. as lay few Arab~ were murdered. The Bnl !~h casualties in the tb,l ce Services we...-e at .lea -.. 2I OIDN>T'S and men killed and I04 u .-\mon the Je\,~. 2 were murdered an
.369
"*ete
8
_u~ loss of life ~'IIS to require some inquiry wht:~ It. happelts m a cOllntry under British m~e m i lilies of inteInational peace. Had any~hlDg mu~ less serious in loss of life occu I red m a colliery disaster in this country, there would have been a searching inquiry. In one r espect there are stronger grounds for inquiry into failure to rule a country than there are fo!, inquiry into. failure to manage a colliery WIthout los~ of . life. In the case of a colliery, o~e wea~ link ill the security plan may bring disaster ill a flash without any warning, and often without indication that the link was weak. In the case of a country which has to ?~ ruled, that lack of warning is rarely a danger. 1 here are always indications of trouble brewing and t hey are 1lsu a lly spread over a long period: Even after resort to anued action has begun, the 8
RULE
A.·D
REBELLION
course of events usually resembles a slow bUllIing rather than a sudden and violent explosion. There is, in fact, still ample time to take steps to establish control. Failure on the part of those for' a and keeping order in a country is therefore relatively inexcusable . Inquiry into the root causes which brought about rebeUion is a thing quite distinct from inqui y into the manner in which rebellion was ' met. Unfortunately, there seems to be a tendency to gloss over the latter and focus attention on the results of the fonn er type of inquiry. There is something hardly straightforward about that policy of glossing things over. It seems likely, however, that it will succeed, because so much time has cdready elapsed since the events which demand in1uiry took place. As long ago as January 1937, 'The Times,' in a leading article dated the 25th of that month, expressed the hope that there might be some explanation of the many failures to preserve reasonable order in Palestine during 1936. The leading article, which was headed" The Palestine Inquiry," in conclusion, said ::" Granted that such uncompromising 9
BRITISH
RULE,
AND
REBELLION
as ~he ~ionists and the Arabs were c rtain to colli~e,. It ~as surely the business of the local AdministratIOn, which represents the Mandatory Po~er, to anticipate and prevent or at least rest net the conflict. The members of the Royal COl~llnission have . doubtless made good use of theIr secret sessions to discover how jt was that a riot followed by a general Arab strike was ~f)t prc.v an idealist, but really is n. rmli 'i , so l11U h til· b'l ter. It is a great at[ ttlltug(' I( haw Ihl' doak of J"('ligioll or 111 sti i~1U to hidt' a ft'll) M"ftj or :t Gandhi. [II an ('. ~l" tlw I olit kal I('adt "s will normlllly prol l st I ha I till' abhur vioiton t' and (\ft doing Iht\r ntnh)st tt t' ntt'll thdr YOllJP mtn tUld tt't'mist•. Th. 1:1 f bh rring vi it'llC ran b~\ t't'liNi t die dl~ any Briti~l r Y mmlnt, \\hkh, r ~ 'll, \ill n "er all w d ti ct] n I.!
SUB-WAR
THE
OTHER
SIDE
to be taken against the political leaders of a rebellion conducted on sub-war lines. It will never adopt the attitude that those who lead a movement which results in murder are themselves liable to be tried and found guilty of murder. Even when political leaders went on the run, as in Ireland, government officials chased after them, not to arrest, but to keep in touch and discuss. In Palestine the political leaders never bothered to go on the run, there was no need. The Government was suffering from a fixed idea that they all abhorred violence, and said so for them. Meanwhile, the militant group should be forcing the pace. To keep its organisation and membership secret, it has to organise intimidation from th' beginning. Intimidation hclps ill th' collection of funds and cnSUf(~S the early isolation of 'traitors' ancl 'informers.' It
"Iso provhks OWl" for III(' difficult businl'ss of 'oIl' 'ting arllls. Thl' coli 'ction of arms shoultl Jlormally b' Ill' most dWicult ()f thc prohll'ms to he sl)lwd. In Irl'land, ven in 1920, the Sinn Fdners Wl'J"C still raiding country for an 'thing in the way of ann the ould find. In ludi , about 1931, large urn' had to hi; paid f r rcvoh'Crs smuggled in by (3
/I
/11} 1/ ' ,
I
"
/1
n /j 1'1 I"" {f
I ~III , j,l ", /' ".,//1' 1 I II' /1''.1 /11//11/'/ 11111/ /11 V I 1",1/, 1 / 1/ 1t/'t1 It fJHlf 1/1//11111 fl y , /t/I //1 WIVI J IIIT1 ·td, /1" ,.. ft /I / I ( tlIII" uf , lTrrl l+, tJ t ilt; /(;(-, / ti" r 11' II 11(1 ItlT/l; I)II JrJ(/I . tn t o (,JV', O~ce u working minimum of arms has been obtmned, these can b used to gain more. Then, as a rule, the next step is to concentrate militant III'
1 ",1, I
l,t
I'I/I'
II
WI
acti:ity against the police, with the object of forcmg them out of the field as police, and, while that move is in progress, of gaining more allIlS. A police force depends for effect on ability to live dispersed in small groups among the people, in order to keep in close touch with them and gain infonnation. When a crime is committed the po1ice send individual men about tl) make in(]uirics, designed to lead to knowledge ~I!'I tf) ,.hlJ pNwn wh() did the df~ed and a~ to whi 1(: hlJ T!Jay /" , '1 ,. ' 11 as ~)(m a~ that know/· 1I1v. ;14 y,:11"u1 ti" J)(,/iq. 'l¥,itt';~H ti(", quickly (.!Iltl Ifl/ Itt II'~'''('' ftlll ':.t II, d · I~;vr IX/;lIt, /" 'It 111," I" fi l" Iml I, I ~ III t .,// II/II/tIll V' I"/1i1 WII'Y. 1111 11111' 1111,/,/1' wl'l/
II/'I'lftl 1/'~1I11 II Ilf"ljl/' I Il lId "/'1,1, IIIIIId l ll' I', /1/1 1 VI I kllllll", /,II I ,,, II kll' , /1 ' H, IlIlIf l,dl",1 "11/"' 81 ,II, It '1111 U/I 1,1,,,, "I Vii W Itl II" II' II 1/1 I"',f//I II/ ,II, Will, / WI/ U';I/I~" til HId 4
/f/lf til
/,1 11'rl/l ~ fil S!, 11/ fit lent
d,e Jlltf!.A:l "
livillt{Ir"dl,dill,lj 'H~I r~·.1/ 1" il) I'.., I wlttl tfl~ I' up,,", i and ~N..AmfIlYf ttl f/rl vent the liC and muling the lllo~t of alleged outrag s committed by the poli e or the militar. The foreign department ",ill be active! extending contacts abroad, with the obj ct of ga.ining as much sympathetic publicit as possible for the cause, raising money and causing emba Ilassment to the enemy government. The parliamentary section will be kept hard at work raising questions and protests. The finance department will be dealing with the task not only of raising funds, but also of disguising accounts so that they are kept secret • and free from attack. An accusation department .is a useful adjunct. It can embroil the police til1lll11 g'
jl '
48
SUB-WAX
THE
OTHER SIDE
and the military in coplQUS CQrIi en.oo ~)Qflt claims fur daroo.ges w property, thclts vtb~n hmJ..l)l;'S a,re flI":archCll, jnterferer~ 'lith r{sJfJ}tjr,ufl, nb~rtl~, a,ruJ th(.-:: Ji~, It can ~lfJpfy witlJ ma,u;riJl,l },(,tft till: r*rli~m'mt~ry ',(>,(",tio:l1 ~lnd
tiJf£t roD',t imfl(Jrtftnt (1(;J~-I,rtm(,'1)tf the dt~ p iLI t l1/(tnt. fIf prrJpftgl1,ltri{,,, Flwdly, then} jli (J1Ie flTlwiWfJK ~tlly /f()m which Uf(' oLhcr ilid(; d(.;tive~ touch b( possiIJlo for someone wa lking' along a I'Itl('('t to S('(~ a car driv('n by tl woman with two Jnt'JI jll it stop to ask a poliecm:lll 011 point-dllty the' way. While the lad y wn.~ ng, ging tlU' PoliC('Tlmll 011. The tlrmed forces aim at the restoration of order. The civil power aims at a compromise, beginning with an armistice. In I920 a very important British Cabinet minister in a speech likened the troubles in Ireland to a legal contest between two obstinate bone-headed litigants. They hammer away and hammer away, progressing from court to court, neither budging an inch, till, at last, the mounting costs cause first hesitation and then loss of nerve. Then the only sensible parties in the dispute, the lawyers, gain at last a hearing, and the case is settled by agreement, as it rrrlght have been settled from the very beginning wlth a ntUe (:'(flf'fTt}(jfi·senw give anrl take. 11 11at UfWitar' suTI rev ~ ls if" min' of the ~t1f :I ,a!Mt · lIitt, t gar 1 V, flIt! 1,"W~r
11
, itg 111
't
It
If
1
j tl
I
II
71 t
'I tl
t1 ~ 'itir~ f ttl
J((/U, '!I
11ft
I
1."11,, .Iii f ill
If
'/
I
I
,
j
'I
I
1 T rIg
P () W :u. k
t1,~
arran~e (.hrttfjtfIJ111W lelt a
h Cahln t managed to
at 11 11 , 'That
~11 ~Wll.ihtt
1 gl( " it f l~ 1(, Ilr. '(:II W, 'Uu;r UUI,t wi ll If!(:an IIt.
11, fXftflfrfllmi been asked for th eir verdict ~llld sentence then, tho answers would have been unanimous, and the lad would have died. If they had been asked, months later, whether they wanted the fellow to be hanged, they would probably have said they were no longer interested, provided that he was kept safe till the war ended. There is a psychological period in such matters. If that period is missed, truth becomes overgrown and hidden by weeds, like false sentiment, special pleading and propaganda,
fn lre1~1 Jd the organhatlfJ!} wa.s bad , in Pakstine ftf~-n ycarl-l J~d£'1" it WM wor~, In l'afc.c;tine, in 19.36, evecytlling eonnected with t1I(; law seemed to suffer from something akin t o arthritis, mental and physical. Why the baWe hetween the civil referee and the legal referee orIginated, goodness knows. However, it not only originated but developed into a war. The Emergency H.egulations for some reason annoyed the legal referee, and, as a result, many of the acts done by the civil power or its agents under them were ruled to be ultra vires in a way which made them appear to be wanton abuse of power rather than illegal use of power. The machine just did not work; its component parts failed to fit . Not only did the law's delays become a byword, but the law's ways aroused ridicule. Some Arabs once threw a bomb into a military
90
91
B R I T IS H
R U L E,
AN D
REB E
LL10N
billet and were caught It tool- bet \. ween thre d f . an . our months to get the case heard b e m.agt trate . By that time, all the a wItnesses had left P alestine for service eIs hary ew ere so t h ese dangerous rebels were let loos I' t k h ' e. t 00 - mont s t o bnng rebels t o trial f th or e mur d er 0 f po li ce or soldiers . . The courts did not ~ppear to be organised at all for the administratIon of speedy justice. The law's peculiar ways gave rise to a story not a tru~ s~o~, but one which aptly illustrat~ the peculiantIes. An Arab, taking part in an engagement with troops, was captured and brought up on a charge of firing on H.M. Forces. The p~~cipal. witness was a corporal, who, after glvmg hIS evidence, was asked from the bench, "Did the prisoner fire at H.M. Forces? " At once the indignant answer rolled out in broad Scots, "No, sir, he was firing at the Cameron Highlanders." The Arab left the court a free man. The difficulties in the way of obtaining a conviction were serious. An Arab taken in a fight was found to be suffering from a wound on the right side of his face. Close by him was found a rifle with blood on the stock. But he was not found guilty of the charge of shooting
mili!
92
SUB-WAR
THE
LAW
at H.M. Forces, because nobody could swear that he saw that particular Arab shooting at him. It is, of course, a little difficult in battle with modern weapons, which have considerable range, to collect impressions of the personal appearance of opponents, the precise nature of the weapons they use, the direction of their aim and the instances of firing, with enough accuracy to satisfy a court of law, if circumstantial evidence is not taken into account. A police sergeant sitting in the front seat of a car was fired at by an Arab standing so close that he could be identified, without any doubt, by his intended victim. The sergeant thought the fellow was shooting at him and was, quite naturally, taking considerable interest. When the shot was fired the driver and not the sergeant was hit and killed. This all took place in a matter of seconds. The murderer fled, pursued by the police. After a hunt round a number of Arabs were collected, and the sergeant noticed among them the wanted man. Just then more police arrived, having with them a police dog. The dog was taken to the place from which the shot had been fired and took up the trail. It followed round in a half-circle and arrived eventually at the group of Arabs collected by 93
Ij III 'I f {f'H
ih~ jlfl/f, :. .I
n IfI, I~J
TIll}
A H II
d/'" w(mt l
It JC I' I'
, , I, /, 1 () 1f
t ,. ' , r, I/ /41' v I I If th" tll'l" lJ~I ,,'I 'f)fJ Jl fI~ JiL",J 1ol11"If d1
I1/.1/ 1J1~ [IITIJp:tWf,) IfJl bitt hd. ItJl(~ dOl; pkkl;(/ (Jut ill/' ""' .... "' ~11,(tl "' "".Ll WJltr iJ1(; /.jI~rgeiil1t kru:w to bo ihl: murder'.... At rn "1 h . .. , ., the t Wt, oweVCf, the (,"V1dence of what the d{J had accept ""'l··t . duL1e WM not ,~. .Ll... redneedg eVlilence of fdentmcation to that of one . unsupported by anything else except a c man, 'fh 'd .' orpse. e eVl ence of one WItness was not considered "
"I
I
M
.'
to be enough, and the Arab departed free. The difficulties were present also in th . f e preparatlOn 0 cases for trial and in the conduct of cases in court by prosecutors. There were in fact, three difficult fences to surmount; first, the preparation and the framing of the charge, which was liable to be on the light side; then the handling of the case by the prosecutor in court, which was liable to be on the light side also; and finally, the verdict and sentence, if any. The case of a relation of the Mufti illustrates the first difficulty. This individual had once been a Government servant, but he became bitten by Arab nationalism and went off to join the armed bands in the hills. One of these bands was known to be somewhere near Bethlehem, so aircraft went up to look for it. One machine 940
IHl H - W A /' 11j(;ftl;i~1
') Ent 1. A VI
ww-. lilt 1n ill(} f)[()(Ali'''', jl.l£.1lt to :move along the crest of a ridge and act as flank-guard.
it
1.1,1'1(1
The ilank-guard platoon, through some slight error in navigation, found itself moving along a valley instead of on the crest of a ridge. In this valley was the armed band, and it saw the platoon coming. The Arab leader at once saw his advantage and quickly posted his men in concealed ambush positions. His orders were that when he gave the signal by opening fire himself, his men, from where they lay on either side of the platoon's line of advance, were to shoot hard and heartily into it. All went according to plan at first. The platoon moved slowly into the jaws of the ambush. The Arab leader fired his signal, and the jaws promptly beat it for home. The platoon then started shooting at the leader and the small party remaining with him. Almost the first shot killed the leader, whereupon the others thought it wise to go. However, the relative of the Mufti was caught. He had managed to get rid of his weapon, but still had several rounds of ammunition on his person. The relative 95
B R I TIS II
,
•
R U L E,
AND
REB ELL ION
proved to be a very voluble prisoner. He held forth on the glories of fighting for one's countr which he had been doing for his, just as ~~ captors were doing for theirs. That, he appeared to assume, created a bond between them. He thought the use of aircraft wa~ a little unfair and explained how h e and his friends had lai~ on their backs and shot at one, only the day before the unfortunate death of his beloved leader. The offence seemed to require a deterrent penalty. However, the prisoner was not charged with firing on the troops, nor with aiding those who had fir d on them, but with being in posses,ion of ammunition. The charge was not a particularly serious one in Palestine. In due curse the prisoner, by now in the hands of the police, was brought before a magistrate, who relea cd him on bail, and that was the last the law aw of him. Sub-war creates a situation which cannot be met by the laws and punishments of ordinary times. There can be no dispute about that fact. Always the civil authorities have to obta.in additional powers. The powers which the Government of Palestine obtained came from the King in Council, in the form of Orders 96
SUB-WAR
•
THE
LAW
in Council. The Emergency Regulations which the Government of Palestine issued were designed to meet the abnormal situation which rebellion had brought into existence. In September 1936 the Cabinet decided that the situation in Palestine was so bad that more troops were needed in the country, and that martial law should be declared at the appropriate moment. To give effect to these decisions and the necessary authority to the Government of Palestine another Order in Council was issued. This Order gave to the High Commissioner in Palestine authority to delegate to the G.O.C. power to make such regulations as necessary to secure public safety and re-establish order. That power was, however, never delegated. Early in 1937 the Courts in Palestine ruled that the September Order in Council had cancelled former Orders in Council, on the authority of which Palestine Emergency Regulations had been issued. Therefore they held that these Emergency Regulations were no longer law. As a result, about a score of rebels awaiting trial were released. Then, in March 1937, yet another Order in Council was issued, this time giving to the High Commissioner power to make regulations 97
G
BRITISH
RULE,
AND
REBELLION
necessary to secure public safety and set up military courts to try cases arising out of them By the March Order in Council the Emergenc; Regulations were reinstated. These facts reveal a considerable amount of confusion in the arrangements, the confusion having a tendency to reduce rather than reinforce power to deal with an abnormal situation. Finally, in March 1937, after the March Order in Council had been issued, the High Commissioner commuted some half - dozen death sentences to imprisonment for life, which in Palestine means something considerably less than a life sentence. The result is that not one Arab rebel captured in alms has suffered death, though some have killed police or soldiers, been tried for the crime, and sentenced to death. A year has not yet elapsed since they killed their victims, but those who killed still live.
98
CHAPTER VII. I
SUB-WAR
MARTIAL
martial law is not law. It is rule by the order of someone with enough force behind him to ensure that his orders will be obeyed. It does not require the issue of a long complicated list of regulations of the nature of D,O,R.A. for the benefit of those who have to obey. It does not even have to be consistent in its action as far as they are concerned. All that is required to start it is a simple decree by the martial law ruler. The shorter the decree the more likely it is to be read and understood by the people. It will inform them that certain persons in the country have banded themselves together to gain by force of anllS, or otherwise by force, what they want, or think that the Government should give them. It will infOI'Ill them also that all persons acting in the manner described, by force of anns, and all persons who assist them REAL
,
LAW.
99
n
I~ TT l S Il
\ U I.
n,
A
'N n
I ~ It
n I~ 1.
I. J
lJro pnlli . tlr{l j ancl ' l 1I1 i1i 1.\t ' (Hilt. 10 11 , \ Rl. 1risitW ClIII'of III \11 ~ 1 ) I " tIll , I \ t 11\ ~ :\ I'dl ( 1'( \ I' 11\ .0lll1 ' 11 Ill( l ~ lIl(" g '\I I tt'~ \ll l tiU t\1'l W\'\{ I -in tll tl
tdegraph">, railwiW'I-, thf; I'n;&~, J(X)t! !« P" plil;: I m(W(,ml;nt ()f j nhabitant'l, including f:flCh things a') immigration and tourist traffic -he iWr/
w()uki have to prepare plans for the ("'Xercise of his control. It it, easy just to say that instead of the military aiding the civil power, the weight is just placed on the other foot and the civil power aids the military. There are, however, all manner of rules for military aid to the civil power, but none yet exist for civil aid to a commander exercising undivided military control. There is a big difference between leaving it to one man to co-ordinate the action of the four parts of rule, \vhen the occasion arises, and having all the main points and difficulties settled before the occasion arises. There is, in fact, a difference this somewhat vague idea of ndivided control with statutotv' ~
J
,as
.at
lad. mag all oaa •
OIM':
rtaft,_
,..
aa
•
OW
parfll
............. ...
SUB-WAR
CONCLUSION
Do~inion ma~dates, within the Indian Empire,
CHAPTER VIII. SUB-WAR
CONCLUSION.
it is easy enough to criticise, it is not so easy to make u eful uggestions about what should be done to meet the evil of ub-war. The e\il of the thing is that it is a violation of peace. The e,il in dealin cr with it i that we peImit armistice. then compromi e. In fact, we make con 'on to agglession, and thereby £e .:; rt -0 force. R - rt t f ICe -0 ~vain an end is ~3inst tht' the world, "hich • Bri:iM in~er; .::t. in th t th • "J: t e ent to J WHILE
3lrnS ..
•
•
or ill Burma, 15 surely rebellion against British rule. Once rebellion has begun, the grievance, even though Britain may have been slow in redressing it, must await consideration till resort to force has been dealt with decisively, and that means dealt with victoriously without concession of any kind. It is better to win first and then give, as we did in uth Africa, than do a we did in Ireland in 1921 and are doing now in Palestine. The evil on our ide i- not onlv due to our • yieldin a attitude, but also to our inability to co-ordinate the four part: of British rule most directly - concerned "~th ht' roblem tht' civil.. the police. the It', . :m th military l' " The n-sponsibility hI' ' ring tht' ri f th.:; four ' \dh tht' "i.il po r. Th i ill \\"er t
. m •
•
•
-
the
If resort
the
-
aad
•
•
F",~,
B.' - -;.
as
be be
I ' L , ......
13 n J T r S n
nUL E,
AN
J)
11 ~ n
n L /, I () N
Ii (JH - WAn
part nor th e military pad. oC HI i Li'lll J 111(\ will
)JrollkJrl of 'I II/)wltr WI)!'/) (;flfl /iil/I:rl:d (l'liil; rq,iuL 110m allY partiwlill (;1.'1: fwd Itdlll;d for W;)II;r;J I il.J!jIHcn.LiIJII in l:tlld hll}lld I!I;I.WHWI rr:!Ji; llillll'i, H WI)I"" III! id(:ld if It (t,IIV(;) tlllr, It chll;f (If III,li r;.':, It jwlW:1 fl,wl It WlJl(;rn,'/, wil,h Tl:Pri!lY:fltlltiw;" lit till; ClAim/ILl O{(i(:(' I/Jy Wf\ }I fnd 11('1' fl 'OIII 1"(111 Ihflll (111111" ()t1/l1h, (II' .)( ll lIflf d( \1I1 i
drLY,
II WM Jlbll:io uul bc L~ li :; 'l3ritaiu \l'llK hl'twil hlvolvl:!d in WOJ' 011 til Ul1ti:ncut when ih r 'be11ian broke out. Britain W(J.S hen i1 iavol ed in wur on th, o11tinent)n 19X6, and in the defence of the Mediterranean and the frontier of Egypt in 1936. It was so because there was unity of purpose. Real co-operation and effective co-ordination of working parts depends on unity of purpose. Given unity of purpose, there still remain difficulties in co-ordination on the physical side. The difficulties, it is suggested, might be 120 •
p,c,I,11 rn
Hwl
IIJltlivitieil rrdlit r~ry clmir(J1 at
l\ 11111(1.
!lOll hl 1 7~!J.
till;
IflrtklJ
n;(;Ofll-
Mlllly (I( 01' 1"lirti lt wil" Wllil;]l tl H'Y wllll ilf 1iii V ' III dl,ltf ({,uld 1I(,f lw,,·tt/r:d by 1\ IldJlI al y (;llInItJ:lfllJI r IJI(1IIIi ,1·d (Ir I,,,(;rc;j.. ill~~
WIt!'!
Il (OP/( I(JIII Ih( "tiddl(l ur I r(\hl'l l (~J'Y 1111 Ibo tIlltldlt' (1f . I'd I to 1!l(iV( IltiUH1, rW"('H fnltll qlJJlI uq~ll tt) IllVl'llI()l4fl wlLhou1' oppoHi.
(,II/I "Ild,'r
WI'lId: I jlIJl H.
LowleJil [0
- CO'NC;J,lJflrON
. I
•
,t di"Uul(,(;,
}I.. ~lll rljn r: thai tlJilll (hO!;l' who hlLVI' Imll C''- PI'!'! 'ut'e, TIII'I't, i~ a l't'UiW'hubl' similaril ,in reC'l1t ' n 1'S, ill the [ann Olld pro edul" of nltn. }{ b fore ' on gOYI:l"l1mel1t, Th ondu t of sub-war by the other side is a new te hnique which does not yary in principle, but anI in details of
•
P
RT II.
IN PARTICULAR, PALESTIl E, 1936-37
application, between place and place. The lID!e of impatient nationalism should not be allowed to produce better staff work than the m ae to flltfil the purpose of British rule. ub-war is an e.;I, a nuisance, and a danger. ThOUGh it may seem to lack power to overthrow a British Go'rernment anp'lhere, even if met in the present «IsBal way, it has power to diveIt H. L Forre; to places in which it "-' mc.st inu..mverofmt (.JT even dangerous to
have t;.~':< griyy-A, Sbould forces haft tlJ k divuv-A in a war, it wau1d be tb ~JW IV')W tfJ delta!. StIb-war quickly. Ja
•
•
CHAPTER IX. PALE STI N E.
•
THE events of I936 in Palestine provide the most recent example of British rule in face of a rebellion conducted on sub-war lines. There is reason to record some of the lessons of that six months of confusion in case they may be forgotten. There is also reason to turn from a general consideration of rule a.nd rebellion, under modern conditions, to the study of a particular case. The difference between the one and the other resembles the difference between reading and seeing a play. Generalities lack the personal element, which counts for 0 much. In generalities one does not feel the moment when the future bangs on a decision. nor long to warn one player that all his mountains are &Del bee him to
stop wringing lUI another calmly and long call hit
One does not see 1lu not sown
at the 111M 111
B R I TIS H
R U L E,
AND
REB ELL ION P ALESTINE
•
admiring the impertinent use he makes of aU his opportunities. However, it is necessary first of aU to take a quick tour round Palestine to see it as it was in early I936, and is, in all essentials, still. Fortunately, there is not much of it, and we need not bother about that long narrow t riangle of almost empty desert stretching away south for a hundred miles to its apex at t he head of the Gulf of Aqaba. What matters is only I3 0 miles long by 70 wide at the south, bet ween the Dead Sea and the Mediterranean, narrowing t o just over thirty miles wide along t he northern frontier. The points of importance are t he t owns and the communications, particularly those which serve as ways in for us, t he main line from Kantara on the Suez Canal along the coast to Haifa, and H aifa itself, the only suitable port of entry . Another point of importance in t he circumstances is t he distribution of the J ewish settlements. With a hu ndred thousand times ten Arabs competing with as many times four Jews for the same country, the ruler had every prospect of doing a deal of ruling. One normally arrives in Palestine from Port Said via Kantara, the journey taking jute
•
•
•
about twelve hours to either Haifa or Jerusalem. After covering more t han half the distance through Egyptian desert comes the frontier, and twenty miles inside Palestine, Gaza. Gaza has an aerodrome, one of the chain to the Far East, but is otherwise a secondary Arab town in a completely Arab area stretching away east to the Dead Sea. All the south of Palestine, in the area Bethlehem, Hebron, Beersheba, Gaza, is Arab, but for two small Jewish settlements, one fifteen miles east of Gaza and the other just south of Bethlehem. It is an extensive area for Palestine, but relatively unimportant. In it desert merges into cultivation and the plain into hills. The communications are poor, all t racks, but for the railway and road leading north along the coast from Gaza, and the road from Beersheba through Hebron to Jemsalem . Soon after passing Gaza northward the country becomes more fertile, and the area of Jewish settlement and orange groves By the time Lydda is an hour and a half by train and about the same by from road, one is in the midst of Jewish settlements, and can see the contrast the squat, solid, grouped stone houses of an Arab 10
132
•
B R I TIS H
R U L E,
AND
REB ELL ION
village and the ramsh~ckle. wooden bungalows of a Jewish one, lookmg like some new place in the once wild West, deserving a name like Medicine Hat. One can see also the contrast between the picturesque flowing garments of the Arabs, capped by the thing like a duster, trailing to three points over the shoulders, which they wear on their heads, held there by what looks like a couple of turns of thin black rope, and the comparative nakedness of the Jews in shirts and shorts, and, as often as not, bare - headed. However, we are just as bad ourselves in most hot countries. Lydda, an Arab town, is surrounded by Jewish settlements; an eight-mile half-moon lies all round the south of it; a ten by five mile egg five miles to the west of it, and south of that again a V with eight-mile legs and a detached egg. Ten miles north-west of Lydda lie the cities and ports of controversy, Jaffa a.nd Tel Aviv, side by side. It takes no time to get there by a first-class road, and there lies contrast that shouts. Jaffa is all Arab, with good streets mixed with warrens, open shop fronts, much sitting about, and not much traffic. Tel Aviv invisibly darned to the north of JaBa, but there is no mistaking it. It witb lU
•
PALESTINE
life, traffic like Hammersmith Broadway, cafes, streets full of people buying from each other's shops, and houses in every stage of construction and of every ultra-modern shape. It looks like the site of a competition, open to architects and builders in concrete. On the northern edge of Tel Aviv, with its back to the sea-front, stands the Levant Fair, a jerry-built White City, and just behind it across the sands is the famous Tel Aviv jetty. The coast of Palestine being a straight line all the way to Haifa, there are no harbours but Haifa. At Jaffa, ships anchored a mile or so offshore and took in and discharged cargo from lighters. The Arabs owned and worked the lighters, employincr lightelIllen expert in handling them in spite of the surf. The lighters were kept in a harbour constructed for them at Jaffa. The Jews of Tel Aviv and the neighbourhood had most of the trade, so when fighting broke out in April 1936 between Arabs and Jews, or, in other words, Jaffa and Tel Aviv, the Arab lighteullen wwt on strike. Furthermore, they stayed on strike throughout the 1936 that tbeir contribution to the cause. "[he then built a jetty Aviv from can be 111
B R I TIS H
R U L E,
AND
REB ELL ION
loaded into or unloaded from lighters. They also built a lighter anchorage, and seem to have been able to blow the bluff off the word expert, as far as lightermen are concerned. They will no doubt, soon have transit sheds on the spot instead of a Levant Fair, and that will be that. Continuing the journey northward from Lydda by train one notices at once that the hills to the east seem to be edging nearer and nearer to the sea, lying somewhere close to the west, hidden by a low ridge covered by orange groves. The train runs on through a wide plain with unfenced fields. Soon fingers from the hills extend closer to the line, with here and there Arab villages of dumpy, solid, flat-roofed, stone houses clustered on their knuckles. Fifteen miles north of Lydda is Qalqilya, an Arab village, and ten miles farther on Tulkarm, another. Up to there all on the right of the line has been Arab, Arab for miles, up into the hills and beyond; all to the left has been Jew, Jew to the sea, four great fat eggs of Jewish settlements, almost continuous, filling the plain. At Tulkarm the bills come right down to the railway line, which retaliates by edging away from them and making for the sea. TweDt, miles north of Tulkarrn the line u .""
..
136
".
PALESTINE
arrives at the sea, but the hills keep chasing after it. Ten miles farther on another nest of three Jewish settlements has been passed, the first two small, only three or four miles across, the third, a regular cuckoo's egg fifteen miles in length. On the left lie sand-dunes, the sea obviously close, then a ruined castle on a knob, and soon the line is almost jostled on to the beach by Mount Carmel. For five miles north of the cuckoo's egg there is nothing but the steep scrub-covered slopes of Mount Carmel on the right and the twinkling Mediterranean, breaking languidly on a straight line of sand, on the left. Then, suddenly, the train finds itself running into the sea, dead ahead, and saves itself by turning east round the curve of another Jewish egg, number thirteen settlement, and so into Haifa. The smokestac~s and masts of ships show over the tops of lines of sheds, on the left the houses thicken and close in, while close and high on the right, Mount Carmel to have allowed itself to be crowned with a kind of Hindhead. If one did not enter Palestine . Gau by train the altUllative would nOllnally be to arrive by sea at Haifa. is a AU the down by the is Arab, lit
B R I TIS H
R U L E,
AND
REB ELL rON PALESTINE
except a neat little Gelman corner . The upper part and the crown on the top of Mount Cann 1 is Jewish. The crown resembles a half-finish ~ hill station, with roads twisting about in 100;s and curves, all ready for more houses to spri up. The price of land up there rivals the pring in the middle of London. The shapes of t~e houses, each one standing in its own plot var; as much as in Tel Aviv. They are of st~ne or concrete, and almost all are new, except for an occasional copper-roofed German bungalow. In the evening the central Jewish part of Haifa is thronged, dense crowds bustling round the cinemas, while below, on the flat, the streets are almost deserted. From Haifa one can go to Syria, hort of Jerusalem the rood run., throu~ the middle of the landing ground whitl. &et'ves the capital, and enterl5 another (:~g-shaped Jewish 'lhere is a little detached nest 01 five of about numbered to largest, a Holy City. • nse,
with fact, tNs
DeW
...
\ \ \ \ \ iii
1\ I \ \, It \ , 111 \
\ II Ii II' \ I \ \ \ f4
\ \11 \\\11\\\\\\ \ Illl h\\l\! ,1\\1\ 1\1 11.1\\111,1\ \.111\\\111 1 \ \\\1\ \ III 11111\ 1 \,1\\\\ -II ~ \1\1 \11111\ 1\\" \ tlllll II
\1'1\\1\ \h~ \\hl \I\\li It \ ' I 1\\ \\\1\\11\ hll II \\\\ );\\\ Itt \111 ~tt~ \It ~h\\\\ 1\\\11 \1\'\ I tl1\11\ \0\\11\\\1 , h(\1 ~I lid th~ill ' Il 1 t~" h\ tt'l, hllll\H 'I lll.'\; \ tit till 1\. 101: ks \)tlt d t\ t tll' l"' window 111 this hQtt'l due :u " thins' old Ull p Oa l' ttl nit \ the western ract' of th ' old Clt wan :U~tI tho
II - \ ,
'
1,.-eep, F ing David's Tower. But 'ven they look surprisingly new, except in shape, and everything in sight beyond them, rising high out of the hidden old city, looks churchy and extremely new. To complete this cursory run round Palestine requires but two short expeditions, each of an hour by road and each downhill. To the west the road runs down to Jaffa on the sea, or to Lydda on the railway. For half the way it twists and turns among the rocky barren hiIls, down to terraces and cultivation, then out through a Darrow curving valley on to the open gentle slopes of the plajn. The run by trajn to Lydda. from Jelllsa1em takes twice as long and offels even better scope to ambushers. The nae rlrops at an even grade, keeping always ffiy fret 9r so above a dry and rocky water· c..":rst;. It: swing;; arc 011 ves «vd through 14.11
I \ I I'
q 'I
I I~ II
II, II h l ~1' ti t "dh,\'q, IIl ltld lll~ II lw VI'! ,II>lilll'l llliltillft Iltll hill .. , fI,1 ,,11'111' fl lld qblll,' d lIy '"l lt~!l Ulltt 1111' 1. '1 IlI,d 111 11'1 1 pi 'q'l fig(l illtl t' I tH' wlltdu w tJ l\t1 IUIII IIp I II 'WI UIf'1r ~k litH',
,"II'
ltj Iht' WI t l rum J ct usat Itl lhc!'o arc lrroll tllul 1ichl~1 but down to the cast thuro is v IJ soon nothing but increasing desert us one goes down and down to thirteen hundred feet below sea-level. Then in a wilderness like a landscape on the moon, the road forks. To the left lies J ericho, an oasis watered by clear streams gushing from the ugly broken face of the barren hiils, a face like that of a colossal crumbling bunker. On beyond Jericho, famous for its bananas and grape fruit, the road runs gently down the slope towards the Jordan into a jumbled mess of SliD-baked mud and sand the moon might blush to own. Here there are a few things green, keeping as close to the river as possible, and here, on either side of Alienby Bridge, are the customs posts of Palestine and Transjordan. The road leads on into better country, up a long valley beside water, up to the tops of the hills and rolling open country to Arnan, the capital of Transjordan, about two hours beyond Jericho. Back in the wilderness where the road forked, J) U\ \I
1'9
BR
I TIS H
RU
L E, AND
REB
ELL ION
the right branch leads to the Dead Sea, five miles away at the foot of a slowly descendin slope. There, at Kallia,. the last of the Jewis~ settlements, number thirty-two, the Palestine Potash Company sucks chemicals out of the heavy waters of the Dead Sea, with the help of Arab labour.
CHAPTER X. RU
L E R SAN D
RU
LED.
TWICE the Army of Britain, the Dominions, and India tried to enter Palestine in the spring of 1917 by Gaza from Egypt, once in March and once again in April. Twice it failed. Not till November of that same year, 1917, did it try again, and by the 7th it succeeded. On the 2nd of November I9I7, before that third attempt had reached success, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs published a statement of policy: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of that object. it being clearly understood that notbing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of ' non-Jewish mnnities in or the rights and status enjoyed by Jews in any other 150
111
--
-~ .= ........ _
-- -- ---
----
~
-+
......
..:~..
---
..----~ - .. -..
--f~-, ,-
.-..a.
". -~ J '!i a,-;- was ;:-E J± ;ilf. ____rl'~;cdJ(i,J' l'-:-Cc by a. I 'a:- .,.hJ (fOr 5,,2.1: F~Lif;' Ie; we of frclarrn ~ f % a::r! :Ire Ei-::.~ ,t of ptCII iatmn 0 people of One race and t:I red in a COl mtry mostly j ubabited
r ?., . T, ~.' -
me
by a people of a different race a.nd creed. The DecIaration ~-as made in the year which followed the f9I6 rebellion in that same Ireland. It was made before Palestine had been conquered, and before the war had been won in the main theatre of operations on the Continent of Europe. It does not matter much now whether the Balfour Declaration was meant to mean anything, or what it means; or whether the British Cabinet dehoerately intended to create a second Ireland in Palestine, before it had solved the problem of the first in Ireland. What docs matter now, in determining the course of the .I'dI'! !l~:. is wbat hM been done Sf tlee in 't:;-;e fhc.e WEer:::: statlC am the tJ'fUP f:ave Core r.:p' tII:lW in . ,.. .t... - if it '.t:"'iii LJ:"" i ....:£- ";;'t ,fe::tJo ~ COIrerSl'!",·
=";
a to _ _ _ 'F:"
,
~
' d: t1'E:: 2:
~s
'
•
wok it fji;"ff;:- WIt (0" I!I!( s,.:0: f:, l1; :r:a~ . COfliU'tLES!:.. of pcrks.-joe we \i,II}.J c a5:1--T:..;ta! by Arab limIer Arah k2dBs. wna hed rebelled against their rule. , Ow eLlA !ly. the Turk. The assistance of these Arabs helped us a great deal, but we would have succee~ed in the end without it. The Arabs of Palestine did not help us. They were voluntarily or forcibly serving the Turk. However, in November I9I8, in agreement with the French, we published a declaration to the Arabs that we were only concerned to ensure, "by their support and by adequate assistance, the regular working of govenoments and administrations freely chosen by the populations themselves." We suffer from too many declarations. They tend to hamper rather than to help nde. In onT of Palest iue we were also by Jews in and by otbc·s from and four' took
part iD
Blltapiawe...ad1lilR
B R 1 TIS H
R U L E,
AND
REB ELL ION RULERS
administration on the correct path regardin questions Jewish. A military administration i~ fair and indeed inevitable, just after a conquest when the country is more or less in balk and it~ future still remains to be determined. But it is quite another matter to let protagonists of a m re fra tion of th whol population of the invad d Stat ,loos t organis \ and urrang' th i-utur of th ir ioll, befof' mOl' lhall half
the
ollnli
Jm
!>1'l)11
OlJ(JW' 1
'd ,
Ilmvl lvt'f,
that L 01\1' o( (ll( 11(' \IIi II' lIIi1l! , WII did, olld til ' Invli Ilwl (\111 n(l\"I1\1 I I or I II IIg . l Id , It WI 1101 ! IJ .lui It '\\, Ihllll}'! !W\ )'1'\1, \\111'1 (11(1 IlId, h,Idl I't\\ dd\11l tlttl \If Pd\'. tillll \1\d , ' 11 I, Ilhll Ihl ",ilil.IlY 01111)111/ , II II \\1\ tlf I I h, tinl 1\ \111\' II .1\\ \ lid , ;I\\d WII . 11'I'IIIt' II 1 \' ;1 I'i il ~\ 1\ ( 11\11\1' 1\( 1It1lkl .1 Iii 11\ ('\l1l\1\\1. 11 1\\ I I h hI . t 11 ' 111 (\\lI1mi .. hllll'l \\' : J '\\ I hat i. \1\ til '\ \( i 1\1 l' Ilh,ll I I \ ",t H \ \ I , it i~ 1\\ ,\1\ h 11,11 in l\ l\ l th 1\ h it n. \ In'1\ I' "I I ,,( th t th \ (
•
m
AND
RULED
from its bag; war debts; the tail end of demobilisation; the peace treaties and ~ll t~e conferences connected with them; stnkes 111 Britain and rebellion in Ireland. When one whole nation was almost (orgollen, th' Tu!,k, Pal'stin ould hardly exp' t l1l1lch oH 'n,tJOJ1 from lIt \ lilll , Ilgl1l , lL II Ml, howcvel', I' 'rcl,veo lIl' uJl 'Illion of a (OIJ1 111j , 1011 fl'O)l! till' Illll'd Sllll'H , wlti " I)1VI"-i lHUll'tI II 11 10111 ('(11 14 I" I 'JI , III U"l ' \ [HII IU I'III ' " IV!' 11 '\ (1]111111 ' 1111111, \/" \/111 ' lilK 111\1 lid Iir' Itl itlliliril HYI II 111111 111 11'
i liitl
lit II
('111111111 , 111 11
1'1111101111111 Illd III "
IlIldlltlhtl ,dly
1111111
"r
IW
111\, 111111110 11 I
1111 II, ,
I Ild"K' Iii VI"
II III
11t"IIt'II , I ldll h, IlIdll'W 1\\11, II \lilt III dtll 1\11 11111\, l\lIHd f{IIYI IIIIIIWIII lilil Id"dl11 II Ii nil, ('11 1 dHI 'lll II. 11111 pllpl1l liil)l),'. !h\llIl
,.1
11\1' pnpIII II t ' ,II :it' ll dl'itll mill Ilhm, Ihl' illkH'. Is "I' Ihl (Ill "I', \\lIn. ,)f littl" 1\\,\1Id,Itt'. pII'y,dll'd, tnt! 1\1) ti)\)ll' W,\~ 1\\,.11 Ii 1)1 I hI' hi' l\\tmd \It' 1'1'1)1" ~ \1. 11 i. ,\1:-;\) 1\\'\'1\"1\1 . h~ t 1\\\ il\ mind tht fil' ~t \\{ ,\ SII\1 kn h \1 fn)tl\ W \1' h) 1 1\'. Pc ' i ,\, hl\\ - IM\ illS thing: \\ r i~ . ',tt '01 1. t'lt ml' . to mamt m tIl \,..\r ~vith ruIns f th m yil' tVl', nml 11 d to 1)' )t h~\n> more ad pt bl to th \ h 'I'.
I
11 , pltll
1)1'
166
B R I TIS H
R U L E,
AND
REB ELL ION RULERS
c cr-changing needs of the moment. The head of the new War Cabinet had a flair for balancing the needs of the moment, and could even accept new contributions, varying, one might say, from tandard lamps to billiard balls, without upetting anything or becoming upset himself. When the war ended he continued to juggle. In fact, a usual tendency in history was much in evidence, to go on doing to-day and planning to do to-morrow what did very well for yesterday_ situations requiring sedate thought "ere juggled in accordance with habit acquired e Dl.,h of war. league of Nations had been in existence ""l"Ir"O vears before the mandate for Palestine granteA to Britain in 1922. Two years be.eJ1 spent in haggling over the terms of ~ - !t:a ft, ..~t ~ a.. pilty, Vf~t.,~ U".e g&.ret'~..iet;~ tJt &~,!tstir.e ;~~ to b6 (/f;1 tJ1 hi f ., ...,. 11'/ (.! fI') -A
i#"
abed the
,
G
rl
i:;.. a.
~y
wEier. :eft
~ &A~t.
r~ir:g 6f
til;:'.. W'0 t'd.. There was nO't rr::ndi. e.ii!e-OC£ of t' i
.
._ .
w
. - ... :1 2~
--
~:-t.~_.
~
~
,
_
...... _
~.
- -;-'
~~
.
;...:, •
-..::.:
"~~ ~
-.
'"
( I l ' . ~es
-
"2-
," ~e;.e
:0
.
2h\ a~
a.
:..~
• ~h-.""-
.... .n....-~....cr-.
UC'5 - '
" ,....
J
._ l: I : . !A.......
.&...;.J..Jt;;
T:' . L ..
~
:;-en.
_
:xt":: .~ 1tz rl to Cea1 " ~~1.. III ..i.LJ.l ar; ;';00 a" ..fe:! 2;:v"! :-,:,' :';;ll a r~HIt..-, :-,'_ SO -:n
."
; •i '
'* -;1>::-
-
Of• ..,..ll>'-
,..-
-
.
,
t. _ _ _ _
-,. •
t
.
ga D~s
0'
Lat
'1 n ... ' "'-I.e IDLJ'tar"· IblS Jed some people to contend that ~~
r
- '
-
L
•
II
Glliles a:x1
UaImncr'Q~ ~
:eep
I l~ 1 I I
It
Hi,II II " II
1\1
I
II
H \t t I ,
\ " ., ) I
1\d 11)1'1 1\1'1' 1 Ill'I III 1\ I11\ 11' II' Ihll \'1\'11 1'1)\\'1 1 \ III I"
IlniH 1l1i' H),
.
1t),lO 11' 1l1'l1!!\))
, 1\
r,lI'
P;\Ml-ihlll
k"Pl'hl/i
I It) II I rlit'! I01l H. '1'1
(\Illplll
Il 11 II I I I I!) 111
1I11 ,' \ ,'II hlll11
I'd
'
\ '
1111'
IV I .IM 1l'lWllt'1\
,\1 III 11111\1 11
•
'II
1,l y 1"1 I't' qllHlI'lIh lt jlllllliK II;
W,tIlI II 1It'd III glirlld A1flLl ,1111 111,1:1 II!ld (0 prol,lwl ;\1'1I.b 1lI'l~jlHtl Jjl'OVt'fl lI.1ld I IOIlII , III 1l1\1t'1l j II« 111111111 wily Wi I , It I
l !lIllrllH 1%
hllll!
lll1PI • 11\'1 111'.\'
fIll'
1ht 1,11 11 III whir Ii (/t"y WI ' II' !jllll'" lI 'd, ull III 1111111111\ IIH)ill WIlli Wl'l'Il Ilf IiVI' 111 lilt' "'II, d'lilll;. r}l ' !"llillHon. 'fhn,l Wil'l 1111 i,lljlll·... ;\)II' III HI 1l/{l' lIl1'll I lil I' II \, I'lnl lllt'l ' lilt' I'll
dill'
IIWdn
·r IIfl fl t.iOJ tl llil,lltlflllll ''IM. rt I'x l lo,'11 HII' "IJlIt;jrd,kll III 1lllllllitililillllll1ll\ i1flP(J ,J'I\:t f H'al 1111111.1\ til) IIii'll'
lilIIIWI'tj
(If
,t',
(II
Illyoll y,
I II -,pilI' of Itil till j ' Iwri.' IlI' III \I 't' I(l1l I 111 HI til' 1',,1. lit,,· it .,If 11'i1>1.' Jl}jl>. Iltt'll IlXIMI't't1 UII ttl t'lIllH' 1111'111, wit h It)' "'1II1)\'tl~ld Ion ('Ii II Ie I IH' IWlllliI·r\ J'II III dll:illw iIlJlI!'" IIJ 111(11ilbMH of 11111 11I11kt' III \I till'" h," \' Wlllllldt·d II I dilly, III It) Ilwlt dl'PI'lUlllllt if tlllv \\11'11' Idlll'd. II' IIl1l y Iltl 11111l'·1II1,'d. \\ith ,olilt dtllilidly. Iintl I hi /HII ll ul! pt·!tsltlll1J HI' 1'{1I!lt1 '·I1II1IKh. '1'1 It' I' h. IJlIWIIVI I , nit .11 ttlv 111/,1 '\' 11\ 1111"'111{ II P' I(" llIl flllIl K," "IIIII" ,IWlltd
.hllill
(lw
pr,dDt! ,)£
1111
II III II lllllllll,t! wlly ..1 III pili I jill{ Ihl IIIIf /'''' of /lId", ",101 II JlIII' I I' II w. Y III jI'"II'iIJl/lf{ 11/1' III Ill" fllIIlIl/l"11iting Jaffa i()r the day could scuttle to safety they were having thdr throats cut and lying grinning and dead about the str(:('{ s. P(JIice rushed to restore oroc't, anlI troops were moved to support them. By the time they had all fini'!hed the score was r6 J ews killed and 75 wounded, against 6 Arabs killed and 7r wounded. A person of n Otillal sense would expect to find the responsible head of the Moslem religion in Palestine exercising all his great powers in the direction of moderation and calm after such an outburst of insanity ; instead, he the occasion to raise rebellion against the government by all t he Arabs in Palestine. Looking at the situation up to the 25th of April from the British side, the question of interest is the amount of warning of rebellion available to the government of Palestine. Those who know Palestine well say that it is seldom possible to have wawing of riot. There appears to have been no watning of riot in Tel Aviv, but that riot was in itself a warning of riot in Jaffa. However, . of riot is one thing, warning of rebellion is something very different. The past records and general tendencies of the 18Q
JI, X 'I' I/J'; M g
M () 1) H R 'rt
N.
A P JI fl .· M J\ Y
I
9 J r,
of 11)(1 olher purtle:;, but it d ,'pw its rhid inHpirnli(J1l f10m rivoJry with th j)n!elitin' Amb Party find Lhp J1usscinis,
Assuming lllf'n that the offer of n legislative ounei! WfL'i not made just to start strife among the Arab parties and bring out a regrouping more likely to co-operate, the government could e;\.-pect the answer that its proposals did not go far enough, In fact, DO proposal short of handing over the govemment of the cOllntry to the stronger group of _-Uab leaders would go far enough. That, hOl;\ ever, in itself would not be ellough to kad the gOVel ",,,ent to expect rebellion, though the action of the Palestine Arab leaders in a strike in sympathy with the Arabs in Syria showed that they were inclined to direct actinD.
The attitude and pa~t record of the Mufti were, of cour%, known to the govemnu.\:nt, which p()s!!ihly knew al ) of the vi'lits to J eroIIftlcm of one F,wzi-cd-Din Kawukj i, wh(J quite f(:CI'lllly Ita , road bl cks ami thl't'Utt'lIill!o\ ('ro\\'d~, in nnkr to mt\kc .nu , l' Ir\' l' . ·nlllpk. In rOlll'l'qm'llrl', oh~ll'uchol\ Iwr HlH.' \ h Ihit am\ Inl til displ'l~al of {(m'l' ily til\' ddl PIlWl"" 01\ HI\' ~rollnd t hat b('~'l\U);l' 1Il\1\,\'lIl1'lIt tlltlk l'O Illl\~, tlt'l wlmwnts llllll't I . pl.II'I'd \11 or "l'r m \1" pllll'l\ whkh might giw ( 1"\1111111'.
Tht'l'\' is littlt' Illmbt th \t, IUlIl tlwrt b n s 'stt'tlI of mIt', h \);t'(1 un pI' iou ' kn wi dg lIUl
~_
-
~ ------= -
.D _ .T --='
' - ftl-~ ~.
.,
-:" . ... _ ,;i _
•
~,..
. , .,.....
__
- ~
RE1H:1.1. JO
sys_
x
.. ... lied ..... .., ~ ' . 0 ..... ~ "'0 ~_ n~ - , " '"'- ~ n .' • ill...... ••' \\~ no m
. bo lead",},,;'" ~ .t~ef}, ut, the method of =upThe resistance WhICh the leaders could hardly be described as just to government. TIle shutting 20(
JUNE
I93 6
of Arab shops, the boycott of Jews, and the strike of the lighter men in Jaffa were not very serious matters, though as strikes they suffered from the objection that they werc political and not industrial. But attacks on communications, /Joth road and rail, shooting at police. and sniping of military posts, were acts of rebeUion. The myfJJtIJ"11i lI))d jlld nut rw~l evitll;DW fA fllUl;;h
S91dl1 1m ihe lJi1rt of Hw 1mtl1~~';mwt in d+':f.I,JfIl~ witll 1tJ~ Jlt(JhIJ'tTI" rrf /4flf, Will'. 'I'l,,; (.;tAw);a! Oll)('! !, 0), I',IJyq rJtflj IIf of PH1Plljj ))'J, iI:Jld JJwit J' Wd ll,dy1'j(1'1j (/III~JJf ") JHW' h()Wil wlJlI.L tv .Ill 11) Aplll !f)'jfl, h,-,I''Il flJItt the milit:,ry IXJwcr assumes a duty IWJ
,
B R I TIS H
R U L E,
A ~'D
REB ELL I 0 ~
~ith regard
to the a. med enemies of the State in the tactical sphere. In all other spheres however, the civil power retains control, and with it rests the initiative in taking action against those, who make use of armed bands out d() n()t take the field with th(;To, whl) pay tll"m and arrange for their armam(;nt and ·mbsi'iiencc. It T(,-sts ~d~() with the civil power tQ d(lal witlJ prisoners captured in action or wl)('Jl h aring arms. If, ,ill in P.ilc,!;tinp, Lhe civil pCJw('r takeR no action within it~ sphere :tnd r. if') to f,(" n. Ollll ctioJ\ b( LW('('n baWes :lnd t hose who support nrnwd rcbrls with words, mOl1l'Y, nrms, r food, then the baWcs jn~ i'vitnbl n1imll'. In fa. t, militnry aid to the iyil power lx'coml' a long and co -tly business if there is inadequate or no i\'il aid to the military power. The two hould a t in close hannony, with one object in "iew. Late one {'yening. after battlin'" all day, the . " _ epped on of the tactical sphere into ~ On :mival in _-ablus ri.. fire b - the o SlIII"'! . com '"a rv1 ing •
-t
•
-
INTENSIVE
MEASURES,
SEPTEMBER
1936
from the roofs of houses in the town. Even if every male inhabitant deserved a bullet , there were women and children to consider. The local representative of the civil power happened to be away fulfilling a social engagement, so the officer commanding sent a polite invitation to the Mayor to come and visit his headq Ilarters to sec how hi!! burg ,Hlier; were lJolmving. lIe was no stranger to Lite Arabs; he know tJlCi r cust.oms and ::;pok til ir language. 111 Mayor Lhought an e::;cort was desirable in case SOI11 • sentry shot him, so an escort was provided, and t.he Mayor arrived. As soon as he arrived all the sniping stopped. He was politely entertained, and informed that it would be perhaps better if he stayed the night. The gue t was then given a bed on the flat roof. Next day, soon after the Mayor had returned to his own house, the sub-war counter-attack began. The local National Committee met and resolutions, telegrams of protest were sent off to the authorities in Jemsalem. and the favor is said to have threatened to band ba - his O~B.E . se ~ 'ho have the unpleasant duty of - orin... order when the authority of the • ci il po«er breaK;; dowIl han', bv law, to 11
-
1111 1'1'1."
j 11:>1 «1l1)\11~1t 'j:1I
y le) :tdti
1/ II I. It,
fOl'"
A N I)
I h:lJl JJ(l«~C!:;. obj(' 'l, lil' t'(ll lI'> JILtd n,.,loJ'(·d orO'r with the J 'a,.,t possible use of
Core " whereas the inhabitants of the town had behaved in an outrageous manner. But, by skilful agitation, extending in a remarkably short space of time as far as the House of Commons, they managed to throw a cloak over their own misdeeds and create the impression that the only villain was the officer commanding the troops. That particular attempt to put the military in the wrong failed. However, it affords an example of what frequently happens when H.M. Forces have to deal with insurrection or rebellion. The immediate result is that those who are trying to maintain or restore ord~r have to divert all their energies to expJa.m and justify their action. It is a question whether we do not allow too much latitude to those who challenge t he action of H.M. Forces. ill By the end of September there w~s st no sign of action on the decisions made m London on the 3rd of the month and no trace whatever in Palestine of intensive measures. The state 27Z
I W I' 1t N Rl V n
M gA S (J lueS,
!; Ii JlTgM Jl hI(
r 93(i
of tJJC .IJ1lntry was, if aJlything, ratller worse. J£very day told the !lamc talc of bombing sniping, cutting of telegraphs, punctures in th~ pipe-linc, explosions of land mines, ambushc.'S, arson, and murder. and almost every other day the troops managed to have a fight with an armed band in some part of the country.
•
273
•
THE
ART
OF
YIELDL-G
one month after the decisions of the British government to reinforce the garrison in Palestine and resort to intensive measures to re-establish its authority in the conntry at the appropriate moment, the situation became interesting, though bewildering. On the 3rd of October there were strong rumours that the strike would soon end. The Arab kings, that is to say the rulers of the Yemen, of Saudi Arabia, of Iraq and of Transjordan had been persuaded, invited, or allowed, it is not. clear which to intervene in the internal affaIrS of Palestine in order to advise the president of the Higher Arab Committee, the Mufti. Th«:y were to advise him about restoring peace JJl the country. He was to restore peace by not doing something, instead of the gove~ent of the country restoring it by doing something.
One of .~ers, the Amir of Transjordan, was a ruler \uthin the mandate. The other three were rulers of foreign Arab States, one of which, Iraq, was allied to Britain and a member of the e of ... T ations. They were then in process of deciding among themselves how to intervene. As they did eventually deliver an agreed letter of advice to the Higher Arab Committee, there must have been negotiations first, among them, regarding the wording of the letter. On that same date, the 3rd of October, the military authorities were ready to apply intensive measures, and by then the reinforcing units had all arrived in the country, except two or three battalions still on their way. The text of the September Order in Council, defining the fmIll which emergency rule was to take should the moment ever become appropriate, had just reached Palestine. Somewhere about this date there began the period of delay due to the decision that, if it became necessary, statutory martial law was to be enforced and not plain martial law. The Order in Council was a complicated document reqniring close study. No doubt some of its . : elucidation. Meanwhile, the Arab appear
274
276
CH_\'PTER XYII. REBELLIO_Y I E L D I ~ G,
A_-D
THE
0 CT0 BE R
JUST
ART
I
OF
9 3 6.
n R I TIS II R U L E, AND RED E L J. ION
TIlE ART OF YIELDING
to have been arranging among themselves the form which their advice to the Higher Arab Committee should take. By that date, the 3rd of October, a confusing medley of forces were in operation, pulling in all directions. Political pressure was, without doubt, being exerted on the Mufti and on members of the Higher Arab Committee. Surely use was made of the threat of military force, and no doubt the horrible consequences which must folJow the imposition of martial law as defined in the Order in Council, which had been p~lbli f\h 'eI , were in no way minir~i s d. To the lIninil in,Lcd, it mi ght s 'cm that It W01,1~d havc h 1, -)) lll()J'll fl trni gl1lfc)I'wnrd jnsi 10 glvc the
correctly. For some reason, British policy seeme -.._-....... to have changed completely between the 3rd of September and the 3rd of October. It was no longer thinking of intensive measures to crush resistance, but of ways and means of avoiding action on its previous decision. There was one factor which did not seem to enter very much into the official calculations, the economic factor, which must have been pulling its weight with the Arab leaders, The time was rapidly approaching when the oranges would be ripening, and it was already almost time to begin ploughing. Soon the normal citizen would be too busy with his Own affairs for practical l1ationalism, and the shopkeepers were sick oL their strike, Nevertheless, the Highcr Arab Committee was Htill holding out Lor a stoppage of jewish illll1lig r atioll a~ a condition of peace. rt aho
Mufti lW( ll1ly fUIII· lW\lI'R or flO, in which to call oH lJi/'l HI dk( or 1nk \ 1.11 JdJlgs, 1101. lfi(~rcly to have its face saved, II the Arab kings were allowed to advise, that meant an admission by Britain that the problem, of the Arabs of Palestine was one which con- \
jllf\IJlltfJpri, 1(' -rot ;III npp I ' lL Iml t;"., .'11wl \\ Wi'l (' b ll'11 011'" I t,,Ill( I'U(1 K Uws' (1IH'stIOIlS ' . , , ' I ' (If 1IH' (>rder In t'('galcliJw lit· Il1lpWn IOJlS ' 'mary • " J 'I j'IJ Ilwy wet(· ckan·d Ill', tbe 1Il1 {Junci , If ' lIy to alllbbti Lh~~ COil IlL not IJl~ (\1'('1I1C([ () loa, rs be I'cady, '\fcn 1£ thcy had gil I!;scd the answe
277
276
•
,
,-
,
BRITISH
RULE,
AND
---, ,
REBE LLION
TH E
cemecl all the Arabs of Arabia, That amounted to a. step on the way to natiollalism, whilo the nov 'nt 01 the Royal Comlll.issi.oll was likely ill tim ' to bring things a step ncn.r r rcpres nta.tivc
go 'rnm nt.
.
So t1wl"() wet'(' tl'u,11
only two qu('stlOl1S onto
st i1It lill~~. lhe immigrn.t:iol\ Q\l\\t4tiO)) , t\,11d ihq ~1ilm't4 1 tl\ll'~t.hm. Sn k' f; or lnnd .hn.d Iw ',011100. til\' iplino, 1It1l\tlltg'I\l1(1 1H\I'I'Y· in.v ('\ft'l' ·thitlg \0 t~n '(\J'ly ~() I lltt(\.n was tho i'(.~ UOlllt · silun.liOlt lIml lilu t\,Pl.lI'()ltch of t~l mill~. whil\\ b 'hill~l a ll tIl ' '()~lrU:-:IOl\ of m'~o ll,~' HOIl \ llH Ih\' wililllr bit-\' Httt'k, r'l~dy £Ol. t1~~ , if till' lligh 't' Arab COll\J1~i~tl'(' .I1'1 pan d in ooopI' mtiou witb th polk ' and h'i} alltllOritk... and then carried out in njulI 'tion. with tbt'lll, lw ansc m\\, of "hat \\, ~ intended im'ariably kakul out. It had also alcd the dlsadY'mtagc of just
rt',-
ARMISTICE
ARMED BANDS AND AMNESTY
going out for the day. So the military authorities agreed to deal with the situation, but in a way of their own, which seemed likely to lead to r esults. On the 22nd of October troops made some prelimina ry movements to block the exits from Palestine leading inlo Trnnsjordan. Fauzi and llis IOl cign legionaries werl' nol likely lo make fol' S rht, as h (' and n doubt som of them W('I(' \VII nl I'd b the Fn'nch. Thl' main operaliollS, ;m'o"'ing till' hulk o( Olt' lroops to b l'lllp lo)"l'd , w('n' nlll dill' to lll'gin till th' 26th. TIII'II l ilt' l>tlsh\l's~ IIC gaining contact with t hI' hands, displ'rsillg tlll'lIl, lIlId, jf poss iblo, It I'('s l illg and disalllliIlg tlll'llI, was io b('gin in
l'a n H'st. Oil 1I1l' ('w ning of t hI' 2211"'jordan. Ihere t;;('y m:t"!net:! fq,;- aboHt ten days, ~till in ~ .... CSTrltrlf:t! rt'i~j~iJC". a;t.rl" becart;
(l)lllli
298
I
I I
ft l'Hll'd nwn fl'Om abrOltd Il11ls1 Goll 'ct al n given pln,c(' awl slo.y Ill!'],l', till aW\l1gem('nls were (·/) /llpJ(·f ·d for Uwil' d('pallll1" from 111 COlln1.t'y wiflt I11 0 ir' (t1111H; '111 n,1, th e AmI> leaders rnn ~ L rtflr('(' 10 Ln.k I n.cl ion in con£: 'It w.iLh 1110 govcmil1l' 11 1, 10 lJnlilIrspotlsm. /I Th Ar(1bs of Palestine Wi'll' made to lace the mobilised forces of Imperial Britain anu the insatiable ambitions of World J ewry. Nevertheless, though a mere handful, ttley have courageously stood their ground, and with unflinching hearts they have neither weakened nor let themselves be crushed. In spite of all this, however, being few in number and illequipped in the modern means of self-defence, they can never keep up their resistance if left to face these gigantic powers alone. " Therefore they send out anew their call for aid to the Arab people, and to the whole world of Moslems and Christians. They must defend 319
B R I TIS H
R U L E,
AND
REB ELL ION
their integrity against the imperil' t' . ~ 1S Ie net Ret out f·or them, and save thcm'!cJv " f J J .. rom, the )arms aTle. dang rs that hanl>' "bov - tl . J TJ , ' " (" ) I r leads
l:~. all Ul~()n 111 Jf brcihr 11 to Hec tlJat Great ir tL. In 1 d d',J{;L iI'Ol j)1J rSldlllf tl)') ' } M !oj III 1I1rtlMI C)1 cr()~ Il ln~ttt U11rl (Jppr'SS!M wlJicll denies them all thIngs.' that Gr -at Brllaill grant to the Arabs theIr natural and political rights' that W.orld J ewry shall learn that Palestine'is not
~nen~less and alone in this world struggle, but IS stIll the centre of hope and aspiration of Arabs, Moslems, and Christians from all the corners of the earth; that the Arab people and the Moslem world shall take no rest until they are assured that Palestine shall maintain for ever its Arab character and blood," HEADQUARTERS.
ARAB
HIGHER
eo"ulI'T'MInEB.
J IUIUSA1.:&III, Felduary 8. 1937,
CfTAPT t.R XX. 'I II:E P U J{ l' 0 S ft.
TmJ: decisions of the Royal Commission on Palestine have now been issued. Soon the final judgment on the future of the country will have been delivered. Deliveries of judgment create situations no sooner created than reactions to them begin to take shape. Some people dislike a judgment, some loathe it, and some regard it as an outrage?us breac~ of promise. Then comes the questIOn, what l~ to be done: submit to the judgment, submIt a new grievance to judgment if there is a new grievance, or appeal to force? In the c~e of India judgment has been delivered, and m t~e case of Palestine it soon will be, The answer m each case should be submission to the decision of the judges. No other answer fits the purpose of British rule, which requires that disputes shall be submitted to judgment and that the decision of the judges shall be loyally accepted. 321
320
x
B R I TIS l!
R U L E,
AND
REB ELL ION
Th British Empir is too oft n praised as a wonderfully vag~e, indefinit , Successful thing, a puzzle to forelgners, who fail to understand why it works. It is high time that the emphasis on the vague and on the indefinite aspects of its nature stopped. It is neither vague nor indefinite. To go On emphasising vagueness only does the Empire harm by surrounding its purpose with fog. Without a clear purpose there can be no impulse in a definite direction and no cohesion among those who should work together. There are three Empires: the Commonwealth Empire, the Colonial Empire, and the Indian Empire and Burma. The spirit which animates the Commonwealth Empire is the spirit of free and loyal co-operation by un equals in service to something greater than self. The States of that Empire are free and self-gov rning. The States in the other two Empires are not yet freely self-governing, but the aim is that they should progress to that degree and then be aninlated by the spirit which animates the Commonwealth Empire. The spirit requires in practice that disputes be submitted to judgment, and that the decision of the judges be loyally accepted. It is a tall order, but the higher the 322
! I
,
I I
,
•
i
THE
PURPOSE
aim the greater the effort to reach up. It is only natural that, with so many people~ in so many different stages of development ~n one organisation, there should be great vanety ~f constitutions and forms of rule, but there IS nothing vague about the purpose. There is nothing new in free and loyal ~oo eration by unequals in service to s?methmg ;eater than self. But the co-operatIon. must ~e free to accord with the spirit which aUlll1a~es co-operatIon the B n't'IS h prpose u . Regimented . . t the same thing. In natIOns governed by IS no . .. d l ' the the regimental system the IlldIVI ua .Ill. . ranks may wish to speak, to assert his ~ndi vidual view of truth, to point wha~ he belIeves a better way. But, being regImented, ~e thinks that he alone wishes to step out ofb t e t . . . All the others a ou ranks to raIse hlS VOlce. . . the him seem to be doing the same thmgs, m . same way, at the word of c~mmand. There ~~ no sign among them of deSIre for. chan?e. the same things in the s~me .wa~: of ~esire for command, and n? SIgn III t tep out of the o he Just canno s . s h c ange. . co-operatmg, ranks, and in the ranks he remams, but not freely. 323
BRITI
II
R U L E,
AND
REB ELL ION
D mo racy allows free co-operation, other v ry efficient yst ms do not. Those Who beli ve in the ot~ler. syst ems dislike democracy, because they see In It an almost chaotic freedom and very little sign of co-operation. That is a point which requires attention on our part, to ensure that there is balance between freedom and co-operation. The freedom is a means to a better type of co-operation and not an end in itself. What is new in the British system of free and loyal co-operation is the spirit which animates the purpose, obedience to the principles of peace, as well as its international scale. Too often the size of the thing rather than the spirit receives the emphasis. Britain and other States in the Empire have between them hoist civilisation one step higher. The problem is to stay there, and the longer we stay, the more hope there is that others may come up too. We have a high purpose and a very long way to go to reach it in a field, in the Empire alone, wide enough to engage all our energies for generations. The difficulties are enormous. The first difficulty is to get the purpose properly understood. The purpose is peace in a practical form, based on the principles of life and on the principles of peace; in fact, life with peace. 324
i
THE
\
,
I
J
PURPOSE
Yet there are thousands of people in Britain who spend their time obscuring the purpose for political reasons. They say that the Empire is governed by me~~ods. which are im~erialist, capitalist, and militanst. They say, In fact, that some of us dominate other peoples by force in order to make money out of them. Yet their own purpose is to divide peoples everywhere into two opposed groups, one consisting of few who possess much, ~nd the oth~r of many who possess little. TheIr purpose IS to divide and rule, and that is not the way to peace. In fact, they are imperialists of the old dominating type, and dwell a step below us on civilisation's staircase. . . There is difficulty also regarding the SUbrr.lIssl~n of disputes to judgment. We still have strikes In 't . d trikes are a fOIm of appeal to force. B n am, an s d 'd In spite of those who say that force eCl es nothing, that form of force .has ~on~ a .grea~ deal of good by securing a farrer distnbution. 0 wealth. But now the arrangements f~r hea.ru: e p both sides in dispute are so mUCh. un : , that it is time to make a clear distinCt~~be b i~~ , 'k ' Some so-ca s strikes and stn es. f . d which reveal the existence of a type ~ ;ent if it would not submit a dispute to )U 825
H I f 'I f
SH
/i IJ f /1
' -,
JI,I,lIi,ld l/ wl II 1("lId
( 111 11 •
'1IIf I III/ It i
A 'N fJ If I"
~. '
J( / ,
IIU,U '
Il
sr. f. f. ( () 1
I
IY . ' ),1 '
'"
.1 .
T If I',
1,1
/l lid 1111'1/' 11J I' VI 11111""
II 1I1,i! / I 11111/ 11111/ • ,( W Il l I I .I,,}',·tI I I / 1 I lilli ' ,I I III( IlI/ VI' lIil ' lI/ I( 111 I ' IllflllIfI ('~ I " IIItL II / 1111 ,(1111 1" 11,(, / II/ (' , • (/ . I r I / I (/1111111 , 1 ('11 11( '(1 · / I I iI ' llI , 1111 II,,, ( I( 1'(/11111 / 1'4 I I II k(ll " ;I A' It" I "" I I, ll I 1,1 Pi/It .., /111( ' W(I ' (I • I ' II' . I • , 1111 III /fI('J,, 'l 111( / / 11 1""
011"
WtI
'
11,1' 1'111 •
If (I ' ) 1('11
1~'II,11l11l' , ll ~ ltld I'tI., r1 y Iw vl'
b( ' I'1l
t ( 1' ;( ' ,
I
lo J 11{\'TrIH ' IlL 'I J, ' ( r ' y l ' M' I J( 'S () 1/ allt! l III ( (s (,11(' iJull ,of il, wus all all 'Illpt ~1Ud ' at an ~J (,ol1:(,l11enl lime lo for e Britain ?tlt of 1 aks tlll ) and kav the Arabs there In ~ontrol Lo dominate ih· popUlation. The Itahan ~l1q uest of Abyssinia was another racke L Jlls L ~he Same type on a still greater seal. I he attItude of mind was similar in all three cases. That attitude of mind cannot be a~ow~d to translate its thoughts into deeds W1t~ Impunity if the British purpose is to be achieved. The science of racketeering has made great strides since 1918, and has taken full advantage of the British predilection for conciliation. Conciliation is useless in dealing with certain types of mind, which are only influenced by a
I
, lIfJllll .,., IOIJ
?:
326
1,[
111'''/';/ III lih· /I,I' /l:dl'~ 1i1l1H1l IlitHll' l ;,r 1/) jl, 11I"tld III' n/lllwl:d III 11 1/, 'I /) III/oW I/If'UI /u 1111 t, l/iul flllt! IIIJIII j',I, 1/11'1 WI tJmt I,'ad("" of
1/(/1
1'1/
L111 ' lo('(d pl'upll', wlio till' f{1"IUir1l' and rltpab l
wld('"
,,('(lIl'd b
"' llIldllld )
(,(,nd"ltf ifill, wJ,klt :tllr,w.., 11M Iillldlll,1 III 11:1