British Propaganda to France, 1940-1944 (International Communications)

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Brit Prop to France-jkt

7/11/06

10:37 am

Page 1

International Communications

Dr Simon Kitson, Senior Lecturer, French Studies, University of Birmingham

‘Highly informative and thoughtfully argued, this is the first book in English to focus uniquely on British propaganda to France in the Second World War. Covering radio broadcasts as well as printed leaflets, Brooks analyses in detail how propaganda material was created and distributed but, more importantly, he attempts the difficult task of evaluating its overall effectiveness and the extent to which, as part of Britain’s war effort, it represented a well-directed use of scarce resources.This is a complex story told with clarity and elan.’

Tim Brooks is Project Manager, Graduate School, University of East London.

BRITISH PROPAGANDA TO FRANCE, 1940 –1944 MACHINERY, METHOD AND MESSAGE

Jacket design: River Design, Edinburgh Jacket illustration: Cover cartoon by Leslie Illingworth, the Daily Mail, 7 December 1940.The National Library of Wales. © Solo Syndication/Associated Newspapers.

www.eup.ed.ac.uk ISBN 978 0 7486 2519 2

Edinburgh

EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS 22 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LF

BRITISH PROPAGANDA TO FRANCE, 1940 –1944 MACHINERY, METHOD AND MESSAGE

Tim Brooks This book examines the important issue of British propaganda to France during the Second World War and aims to show the value of the propaganda campaign to the British war effort. British Propaganda to France is a unique contribution to the field, not only in its examination of one of the least well-studied areas of British activity during the Second World War but also in the breadth of its approach. It surveys the organisation, operation and nature of the British propaganda effort towards the French people, including both white propaganda (BBC broadcasts and leaflets dropped by the RAF) and black propaganda (secret broadcasting stations, documents purporting to come from the Germans in France or distributed in France using clandestine methods, and rumours). Finally it examines the contemporary British understanding of the French and German reception of and reaction to this propaganda material, to show whether the campaign was an effective and well-directed use of resources.

Tim Brooks

Dr Valerie Holman, Leverhulme Research Fellow in Book History, University of Reading

BRITISH PROPAGANDA TO FRANCE, 1940 –1944

‘A highly readable account of a very fascinating story.’

International Communications

Tim Brooks

Almost all examinations of British foreign propaganda during the Second World War have focused on propaganda directed towards Germany. British propaganda to France, which in terms of quantity of output was actually the most important area of British propaganda, has never been examined in depth until now. This book adds a further chapter to our knowledge of propaganda in the Second World War, especially in the conduct of psychological warfare. It also touches on better-known areas such as RAF Bomber Command and its Operational Training Units, which handled aerial dissemination of British white propaganda leaflets over France, and the Special Operations Executive in France, which worked closely with the Political Warfare Executive in delivering black propaganda.

british propaganda to france, 1940--1944

i

International Communications Series Editor: Philip M. Taylor

This is the first comprehensive series to tackle the fast-expanding subject of International Communications. This multi-disciplinary subject is viewed as a field of enquiry and research that deals with the processes and impact of the transfer of information, news, data and cultural products as well as other forms of transborder communication between nation-states within the wider context of globalisation. As such it is not only a field of study in its own right but also directly connected to international history, international politics, international affairs and international political economy. Most writers in these more ‘established’ fields are agreed that communications have come to play an ever more significant part in relations between states at the political, economic, diplomatic, military and cultural levels. This series will show how communications serves to influence those activities from the points of transmission to those of reception. Enormous breakthroughs in communications technologies – satellite communications, computer mediated communications, mobile personal communications – are now converging, and the possibilities which this might present are forcing a reconsideration of how established patterns of inter-state relations might adapt to, or be influenced by, this latest phase of the information age. Debates relating to international regulation, censorship, public diplomacy, electronic democracy, cross-cultural communications and even information warfare all reflect the sense that communications are transforming the nature and practice of government, education, leisure, business, work and warfare. Information has become the lifeblood of this globalising set of patterns. Books in the series reflect this phenomenon but are rooted in historical method, even when tackling more contemporary events. They are truly international in coverage. The range of books reflects the coverage of courses and teaching in international communications and they are carefully aimed at students and researchers working in this area. Books available in the International Communications series: Propaganda, Censorship and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War By Robert Cole Nazi Wireless Propaganda: Lord Haw-Haw and British Public Opinion in the Second World War By Martin Doherty British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War By John Jenks Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space Edited by Monroe E. Price and Mark Thomson British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy By Philip M. Taylor

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British Propaganda to France, 1940--1944 Machinery, Method and Message

Tim Brooks

Edinburgh University Press

iii

For Anna

© Timothy William Brooks, 2007 Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh Typeset in Ehrhardt by TechBooks International Delhi, and printed and bound in Great Britain by Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, Wilts A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 0 7486 2519 2 (hardback) The right of Timothy William Brooks to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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Contents

Acknowledgements Figures and Table Translations and Terminology Abbreviations Key Players Preface

viii ix x xi xiv xvii

Introduction: British Propaganda in the Second World War The Beginnings of British Propaganda France in 1940 The Need for Propaganda to France

1 1 3 4

1. Machinery: Background, Planning and Departmental Organisation

7

From World War to World War: British Propaganda, 1914–39 Inter-war Treatment of Propaganda Propaganda Planning The Immediate Pre-war Situation Wartime Development Department EH The Special Operations Executive The Political Warfare Executive Controlling the BBC: The MOI, PWE and Problems of BBC ‘Independence’ Internal Organisation Dividing the Workload Separation for Security: Black Propaganda Coordinating the Workload: Propaganda Planning and Leaflet Production BBC Internal Organisation: Regionalisation and Centralisation Rivals SOE The London Controlling Section The Free French The Americans: OWI and OSS The Operational Propaganda Organisations Conclusion

7 9 10 12 12 12 14 17 19 21 22 24 25 27 29 29 30 30 32 34 34

vi

contents

2. Method: The Distribution of White Propaganda Leaflet Distribution The Air Ministry’s Propaganda Role The RAF’s Attitude to Leaflet Propaganda Problems of Leaflet Dissemination Costs and Benefits of Leaflet Propaganda to the RAF Dissemination Data: RAF Records and Evidence from France RAF Claims of Leaflet Dissemination The Propagandists’ Targets Coverage According to Evidence from France Broadcasting The Scale of BBC Transmissions Geographical Coverage and Evidence from France Availability of Sets and Spares Conclusion

36 36 36 37 38 40 41 42 44 49 52 52 53 54 56

3. Message: The Content of White Propaganda France From Friend to Foe, 1940: Ad Hoc Responses The Fall of France Mers-el-Kébir Propaganda Planning, 1940–4: Defining Long-term Strategy Enter the Allies, 1941 Attack on the USSR Attack on the USA Bombing France and Germany, 1942 Invading North Africa and Europe, 1942–4 Operation Torch and its Consequences Sicily and Italy D-Day and the Liberation of France Conclusion

58 58 58 63 66 70 70 74 82 88 88 95 99 104

4. Reaction: The Impact of White Propaganda The Evidence Leaflets What did the French Think? Covert Circulation German and Vichy Countermeasures Counterpropaganda Broadcasts What did the French Think? German and Vichy Countermeasures Countering the Countermeasures Counterpropaganda Conclusion

107 107 111 111 113 115 116 118 118 119 122 125 127

contents 5. Black Propaganda: Machinery, Method, Message and Reaction Different Shades of Black: Printed Propaganda Distribution Methods Quantity and Nature: White and Grey Propaganda Quantity and Nature: Strictly ‘Black’ Propaganda Feedback Broadcast Black Propaganda Operation and Nature Feedback Rumours Nature and Description Feedback Conclusion

vii 129 130 130 134 137 141 142 142 147 149 149 152 154

Conclusion Machinery Method Message Reaction Evaluating British Propaganda to France, 1940–4

156 156 157 158 159 159

Appendix: Maps

163

Notes

180

Bibliography A Note on the Sources Source Material Archival and Museum Holdings Books, Articles and Unpublished Research Websites, Television and Video Documentaries

206 206 210 210 211 219

Index

220

Acknowledgements

This book would not exist without the doctoral thesis it is adapted from. I am indebted to the University of Sheffield and the Arts and Humanities Research Council for the financial support that allowed me to undertake the necessary research. The following were immensely helpful: staff at the National Archives, Kew, the British Library, St Pancras, and the Imperial War Museum, Lambeth; Julie Snelling, Jeff Walden and colleagues at the BBC Written Archives Centre, Caversham; Peter Elliott, Peter Devitt and colleagues at the RAF Museum, Hendon; and librarians of the University of Sheffield. Staff from various French museums with whom I corresponded also provided useful assistance. Dr Valerie Holman gave valuable early pointers. Michel Girard introduced me to the Psywar Society; and the late Keith Moore, its Publications Manager, sent helpful material. John Taylor, webmaster of ‘World War II Secret Intelligence Activities Around Milton Keynes’, provided advice. Drs Tim Baycroft and Bob Moore – in the latter’s description, my ‘good cop and bad cop’ supervisors – gave patient assistance, while the historical community in Sheffield, staff and postgraduates alike, provided far more than just a place to study. My thesis would never have evolved into this book without the support of Professor Philip Taylor, first my external examiner and now series editor, and Roda Morrison, Stuart Midgley, Eddie Clark and Sarah Edwards at EUP. Paul Johnson at the National Archives, Peter Elliott at the RAF Museum, and Vicky Mitchell at the BBC helped with reproduction rights for leaflets and scripts. Rosemary Cole generously volunteered to prepare the index. My father gave useful editorial advice and a reliable proof-reading service and John’s suggestions further helped to polish the text. Most of all, Anna was an invaluable soundingboard and reader, despite having to put up with ‘the war again’ more often than she must have wished. Dan, Jack, Colin, Janos, Emma and Ross, Victoria, my mother, and other friends and family, especially ‘QP’, contributed more than they know. I owe them all my thanks. Of course, the responsibility for any errors in what follows is mine and mine alone.

Figures and Table

Figures 1.1 1.2

1.3

1.4

2.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 5.1 5.2

Organisation of British propaganda during the First World War Organisation of British propaganda, 1939–40 a. September–October 1939 b. October 1939–June 1940 c. June–July 1940 Organisation of British propaganda, 1940–1 a. July 1940–May 1941 b. May–September 1941 Organisation of British propaganda, 1941–5 a. September 1941–February 1942 b. February 1942–May 1945 White propaganda leaflets dropped over France, 1940–4 Courrier de l’Air, F.50/35 (1941) Courrier de l’Air, F.50/12 (1941) ‘Why this photo concerns YOU’, F.117 (1941) ‘On the orders of Germany’, F.107 (1941) Courrier de l’Air, F.140 (1943) ‘Proclamation’, ZF.3 (1944) ‘More than 1,000 bombers have bombed Cologne’, FU. 57 (1942) ‘Precautions against accidents’, H.134B (1942)

8 13

16

18

42 75 79 84 90 98 102 136 139

Table 2.1

Target and actual dissemination, February and March 1944

48

Copyright Acknowledgements Images in Figures 3.1–3.6, 5.1 and 5.2 are Crown Copyright and reproduced with the kind permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Figures 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4 are reproduced from the RAF Museum, Hendon. Figures 3.2, 3.5, 3.6, 5.1 and 5.2 are reproduced from the National Archives, Kew. All other figures, maps and tables used in this book were prepared by the author. The BBC French Service scripts from which I quote are used with the kind permission of the BBC.

Translations and Terminology

This book makes use of material translated from the original French, especially in Chapters 3 and 5. In a few cases, for example speeches made by Charles de Gaulle, I have used published English translations. In all other examples, the translations are my own. French rather than English spelling is used for French towns, so, for example, Reims rather than Rheims, and Marseille rather than Marseilles. The single exception is Dunkirk, the spelling of which is seared into the British folk memory of the Second World War. I refer to French départements – an administrative division similar to British counties – using the terminology employed at the time. Seven of these départements have since been renamed and an eighth has been divided into six new départements: Basses-Alpes now Alpes-de-Haute-Provence Charente-Inférieure now Charente-Maritime Côtes-du-Nord now Côtes-d’Armor Loire-Inférieure now Loire-Atlantique Basses-Pyrénées now Pyrénées-Atlantiques Seine now Paris Seine-Inférieure now Seine-Maritime Seine-et-Oise now Yvelines, Essonne, Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-St-Denis, Val-de-Marne and Val-d’Oise Code names given to people (for example, SOE agents operating covertly in France) use italics, for example Dieudonné; no special formatting is applied to pseudonyms. All British aerial leaflets were given an identifying number. Leaflets produced for France during 1940 and 1941 used a single sequence, EH(F) XX. At the beginning of 1942 a new sequence was used, F.XX. The sequence was restarted in 1943 and 1944, beginning again at F.1. In this study, the identifying numbers have been standardised, based on the latter format, as F.XX (year). British ‘black’ (clandestine) leaflets for France were given an FU.XX code and/or an H.XX code, the latter being used only by the black production unit. Where these codes remain identifiable, I have given them unchanged.

Abbreviations

British unless otherwise stated ABSIE AC (Eur.S.) AFI AOC-in-C ARP Aud. Sur(s) BBC BBC Eur.I.D. BBC WAC BBFC BCRA BCWD BSC C4 CD CFLN CGT CH or CHQ CIA CID Cie CIO CNR COI COI CP CSDIC D DDG D.Eur.S. DF DOI DoRIS EoR(s)

American Broadcasting System In Europe (BBC) Assistant Controller (European Services) (French) Agence Fran¸caise d’Information Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Air Raid Precautions (BBC) Audience Survey(s) British Broadcasting Corporation BBC European Intelligence Department BBC Written Archives Centre British Board of Film Classification (Free French) Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries British Security Coordination Channel Four Television Symbol of head of SOE (Free French) Comité Fran¸cais de la Libération Nationale (French) Confédération générale du travail (Department EH, SO1 and PWE) Country Headquarters (US) Central Intelligence Agency Committee of Imperial Defence (French) Compagnie Chief Intelligence Officer (Free French) Conseil National de la Résistance Central Office of Information (US) Office of the Coordinator of Information Communist Party Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre SIS sabotage research section (PWE) Deputy Director General (BBC) Director of European Services SOE communications section (First World War) Department of Information Department of Research and Information Services, RAF Museum Hendon Evidence of Reception Report(s)

xii EH F FFI FIS FL FO FTP FU GC&CS GS1 HC DEB 5S Intel. Rept(s) ISSB JIC LCS LPWCC LRC MEW MI5 MI6 MI7 MI9 MI19 MOI MP NA NPC ONA ONE ORB OSS OTU OWI PCF PID POW(s) PPF PRO PWB PWD PWE RAAF RAF RU

abbreviations Electra House SOE French section (Free French) Forces Fran¸caises de l’Intérieur (US) Foreign Information Service Falling Leaf: The Journal of the Psywar Society Foreign Office (French) Francs-Tireurs et Partisans France, Underground (note: this is the probable meaning) Government Code and Cipher School (Bletchley Park) (PWE) Gustav Siegfried Eins, German RU House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series (BBC) Intelligence Report(s) Inter-Service Security Board Joint Intelligence Committee London Controlling Section London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee London Reception Centre Ministry of Economic Warfare domestic security/intelligence service secret intelligence service (also known as SIS) (First World War) War Office propaganda department intelligence branch responsible for assisting POWs intelligence branch responsible for CSDIC and LRC Ministry of Information Member of Parliament The National Archives of the United Kingdom (First World War) Neutral Press Committee (US) Overseas News Agency (BBC) Overseas News Editor Operations Record Book (US) Office of Strategic Services Operational Training Unit (US) Office of War Information (French) Parti Communiste Fran¸cais Political Information Department prisoner(s) of war (French) Parti Populaire Fran¸cais Public Record Office Psychological Warfare Branch Psychological Warfare Department (SHAEF) Political Warfare Executive Royal Australian Air Force Royal Air Force Research Unit (cover name for British secret radio stations)

abbreviations SAS SBC SHAEF SIS SO1 SO2 SOE UP USAAF

Special Air Service Small/Standard Bomb Container Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force Secret Intelligence Service (also known as MI6) SOE propaganda section SOE sabotage section Special Operations Executive Underground Propaganda United States Army Air Force

xiii

Key Players

Leslie Beck Joined SO1 French Region as Chief Intelligence Officer in September 1940; he also managed some of the French RUs. He succeeded Joe Fairlie to become the last PWE French Regional Director. Pierre Bourdan Pseudonym of Pierre Maillaud, a Havas News Agency employee who was one of the earliest recruits to the BBC French Service and worked on Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais. Brendan Bracken Succeeded Duff Cooper to become Minister of Information from July 1941 to 1945, a position which gave him a share of responsibility for SO1 and PWE. Robert Bruce Lockhart Member of Department EH, PID and SO1 Czech Section, he was the Foreign Office representative on and chair of PWE Executive Committee before becoming PWE Director-General in 1942. Reginald Dallas Brooks Royal Marines officer attached to Department EH as head of its Military Wing and liaison with the Chiefs of Staff and other military bodies, positions he retained under SO1 and PWE until his recall by the Admiralty in December 1944. He served on PWE Executive Committee as representative of the MOI, and on PWE Policy Committee. Hugh Dalton Minister of Economic Warfare, July 1940 to March 1942, a position which gave him responsibility for SOE, including SO1, and later PWE. Sefton Delmer Member of the BBC German Service recruited into SO1 to lead its black propaganda operations, particularly for Germany, including numerous secret radio stations. Head of PWE’s Special Operations Directorate from June 1944. Jacques Duchesne Pseudonym of Michel St-Denis. After being evacuated from Dunkirk he joined the BBC as French Programmes Assistant, to run its French Service broadcasting team with particular responsibility for Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais.

key players

xv

Alfred Duff Cooper Minister of Information, May 1940 to July 1941, a post which gave him a share of the responsibility for Department EH and SO1. Anthony Eden Foreign Secretary, 1941–5, a position which gave him a share of the responsibility for SO1 and PWE. Joe Fairlie Fourth PWE French Regional Director, from August 1943. He was seconded to PWD, and wrote a short cumulative report, ‘PWE White Propaganda to France’, in late 1944. David Garnett Member of PWE Secretariat who was asked after the war to write the official history of PWE, published in 2002 as The Secret History of PWE. Darsie Gillie Head of the BBC French Service. He was also in charge of SO1 French Region for a brief period in the late summer of 1940. Andre´ Gillois Former Radio Cité broadcaster brought out of France by SOE in September 1942 to work on Radio Patrie, a PWE RU. He later succeeded Maurice Schumann as official Free French spokesman on the BBC. Arthur Harris Controversial head of RAF Bomber Command from February 1942. Aircraft under his command dropped the great majority of British white propaganda leaflets. Ellic Howe Expert in continental typography who made his way from Anti-Aircraft Command to PWE in November 1941, where he turned his skills to forgery and managed the black printing unit. Ivone Kirkpatrick Foreign Office official seconded first to the MOI and then appointed BBC Controller (European Services) in 1941. He joined PWE Policy Committee in February 1942. Reginald ‘Rex’ Leeper First World War propagandist who was at the forefront of pressure to maintain the British capability for propaganda in the inter-war period. Director of PID, SO1 and, after the formation of PWE, in charge of CHQ at Woburn. He was a member of PWE Executive Committee, representing MEW, and PWE Policy Committee. He became Ambassador to the Greek government, exiled in Cairo, in 1943.

xvi

key players

Jean Marin Pseudonym of Yves Morvan, an early recruit to the BBC French Service and the Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais programme. Following controversy engendered by the ‘deal with Darlan’ in late 1942, he left in 1943 for active service with the Free French. Noel Newsome Became BBC European News Editor shortly after the outbreak of war, and Director of European Broadcasting from 1941. He later moved to PWD. Maurice Schumann Official Free French spokesperson on the BBC until April 1944, when he returned to active service. He was replaced by André Gillois. Campbell Stuart Assistant to Lord Northcliffe at the Department for Enemy Propaganda in the First World War, he founded and ran Department EH. He resigned when it was made part of SOE in July 1940.

Preface

The British employed two main methods to disseminate their propaganda to continental Europe during the Second World War. Nearly 1.5 billion British propaganda leaflets were dropped over Europe between 1939 and 1945. Over the same period the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) more than trebled its European broadcasting commitment, transmitting 295 hours weekly to Europe by May 1945. These ‘white’ propaganda methods were complemented by ‘black’ propaganda, including forty-eight ‘freedom’ radio stations, printed material, and the initiation of rumours. White – official – propaganda was clearly recognisable for what it was. There was no attempt to hide its origins. It was particularly useful for spreading accurate news about the war or Allied activities, simultaneously demoralising the enemy and cheering occupied peoples. Black propaganda, its antithesis, was defined by the wartime propagandist John Baker White as ‘what purported to come from within enemy territory – broadcasts from clandestine stations, leaflets printed on illegal presses, forged ration cards and money, and rumors’. Black propaganda was deliberately subversive, aiming to encourage distrust, suspicion and doubt and cause confusion. This was especially useful to attack the enemy, but could be used to strain relations between the occupied peoples and their governments, or with occupying authorities.1 Propaganda was a complicated, multifaceted and expensive activity. By early 1944 printing alone cost £4,000 daily, using paper that was in short supply anyway because of the constraints of war. Between 1940 and 1945 the government supplemented the BBC’s income by more than £7 million annually, largely to pay for overseas broadcasting. There were other costs too, some financial, such as the cost of fuel for aircraft dropping leaflets, and some human, such as casualties incurred on leaflet raids. British propaganda was directed all over Europe, but more than 676 million leaflets – nearly 45 per cent of the total – were dropped over France. The BBC broadcast more programmes in French than in any other language, and five of the black ‘freedom’ stations broadcast to France – more than any other country except Germany and Italy. France was, therefore, the most important British propaganda target in Europe.2 Propaganda was an extensive activity on which a great deal of effort was expended. But what did it accomplish? Sir Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris, under whom RAF Bomber Command delivered the great majority of British propaganda leaflets, believed that ‘the only thing achieved was largely to supply the Continent’s requirements of toilet paper for the five long years of war’. Right or wrong, Harris’s view is one of the few contemporary conclusions drawn about any part of the British propaganda campaign. While both the Political Warfare

xviii

preface

Executive (PWE) and the BBC compiled summary reports on their propaganda, these appear to have been intended for day-to-day use rather than longer-term assessment. A more comprehensive report, ‘PWE White Propaganda to France 1940–1944’, was produced but, running to only a handful of pages, does not tackle the question in depth and, as the title suggests, largely ignores black propaganda. Apart from these examples, very little thought appears to have been given to the cumulative value of propaganda to any part of Europe.3 Nor has historical scholarship assessed the role propaganda played in winning the Second World War, a surprising omission when for almost every other part of the British war effort, interpretations (and reinterpretations) of the contribution made to victory have been produced. This book examines production and delivery of propaganda, the content of the material and the nature of the reaction to it in France. It explores the extent to which British propaganda to France between 1940 and 1944 was a well-directed use of resources and how effective that propaganda was, as far as it is now possible to determine more than six decades after the campaign ended.

Introduction British Propaganda in the Second World War

The Beginnings of British Propaganda On 1 September 1939, when Germany invaded Poland and a European war became virtually certain, the British government activated its propaganda agencies. A Ministry of Information (MOI) would organise propaganda for domestic, imperial and neutral consumption, while Department EH, originating in the Foreign Office, was responsible for propaganda to enemy countries. On the night of 3/4 September, with Great Britain officially at war, the RAF distributed 5.4 million leaflets over Hamburg, Bremen and the Ruhr, appealing to the German people to demand peace. The RAF had good reason not to drop bombs at this stage – to avoid provoking reprisal attacks – but this and later leaflet raids showed that it could have done. During the Phoney War, British propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied countries was confined to air-dropped leaflets and BBC broadcasts directed by Department EH and the MOI. The main recipient was Germany, although daily broadcasts were made to Eastern European countries, with Poland and Czechoslovakia occasionally receiving leaflets.1 On 10 May 1940 the Germans invaded Western Europe, smashing Holland and Belgium, and then attacking France. Few people predicted German victory, expecting their advance to be halted as both sides dug in, as had happened in 1914. A week passed before the British began considering the possibility of French defeat; only on 25 May was a decision taken on ‘British strategy in the event of a certain eventuality’. The Dunkirk evacuation began the following day. On 22 June the French signed an armistice with Germany. Great Britain lost an ally and her continental foothold. As the British Army needed re-equipping after the escape from Dunkirk, ‘overall military strategy [. . . ] looked to blockade, Bomber Command and propaganda to achieve victory’. In July 1940, Churchill approved the new Special Operations Executive (SOE), famously directing it to ‘set Europe ablaze’. SOE was created from several existing bodies (including Department EH) involved in sabotage, subversion and propaganda. Combining these tasks was sensible – fomenting resistance as a stepping-stone to sabotage required propaganda. This became known as ‘political warfare’, a term that joined ‘blockade’ and ‘bombing’ in British plans.2

2


The propagandists (SOE section SO1) and the saboteurs (SO2) never coexisted smoothly, and the former eventually became independent as PWE. Moreover, issues of competence and conflicting mandates were created by flawed pre-war preparations. A version of the First World War organisational system for propaganda was reinvigorated, ignoring bodies established in the inter-war period and failing to anticipate that the task would be quite different. In 1917–18, propaganda leaflets had been dropped over and behind the Western Front, aimed not only at German soldiers but also at the civilians of Occupied France and Belgium, the latter receiving the Courrier de l’Air news-sheet. Just over two decades later, this title was reused for the flagship news-sheet for France and Belgium, but now alongside hundreds of other leaflets, addressing not only the whole of France but also most of Europe. With radio providing an entirely new propaganda medium, it was altogether a much more extensive scale of operation, adding to the difficulties faced by what was essentially a First World War organisation.3 Whatever the organisational problems, effective control was essential. Contradictions could destroy the credibility of British propaganda and affect the trust placed in it by its recipients. The propagandists were not free agents: their output had to correlate with British and, later, Allied war aims and policy. They had to liaise with other bodies involved in the war effort to ensure that this would be so. As information could cross between Great Britain and Europe, usually via neutral countries, public declarations of policy made domestically could appear in the German or occupied press, revealing contradictions, if they existed. The propagandists also had to keep in touch with military planners. They could not, for example, warn that specific targets would be destroyed if there was no intention to attack them, as this would discredit propaganda in general and render valueless any future warnings. The various methods used had to be coordinated, because inconsistencies and contradictions between different forms of propaganda could also be damaging. Similarly, propaganda to every country had to be in step, especially as the populations of the occupied countries began to circulate leaflets – or copies of them – and résumés of the radio news, not just within their own communities but to other areas as well. While the propagandists could not control the accuracy of these copies, they could at least ensure that the source material was consistent. At the same time, the propaganda organisation had to be well staffed, well supplied with intelligence material, and capable of working to a high standard. A basic message might match policy, but for maximum effect national sensibilities had to be acknowledged, meaning that propaganda had to be produced by people familiar with the target country. The staff also had to be able to prepare material that would inspire the recipients of their propaganda, using an appropriate tone and style. Accurate knowledge of current conditions was important, making intelligence – from hard facts to popular opinion – essential. Production values had to be high, giving an aura of professionalism and building a recognisable image.

introduction

3

France in 1940 Despite the problems and considerations outlined above, after the summer of 1940 there was a massive acceleration in the propaganda campaign, of which France was the major target. But there had been no expectation of the need for propaganda to France beforehand. Even had there been, the problems created by the French defeat could not have been foreseen, which would have limited the value of any preparations. As the possibility of defeat became a certainty, things moved quickly. Even before the armistice had been signed the first steps were taken to create a France-in-exile. Speaking on the BBC on 18 June 1940, a French general, Charles de Gaulle, insisted that France must fight on and asked French people to join him. From his speech grew the Free French movement. Despite estimates of the audience ranging from ‘scattered’ to ‘wide and growing’, de Gaulle’s use of the BBC – which had begun broadcasting to France during the Munich crisis – indicates that it was believed to be a viable communications conduit.4 De Gaulle’s ‘France-in-exile’ was just one possible ‘France’. The armistice created several ‘Frances’ within the French hexagone. An Occupied Zone, divided into several different German administrative areas, covered northern France and the Atlantic coast; the Italians occupied several pockets along the FrancoItalian border. The remainder – the southern half – was the Unoccupied Zone. The distinction between the two zones was important, in propaganda terms, as different nuances were required. The Occupied Zone was run from Paris by a military government, which pervaded all parts of everyday life. The existence of the Occupation was most obviously indicated by the presence of Germans. At any one time there were probably half a million German soldiers and security officials in France, sometimes double that number, plus civilian administrators. The Unoccupied Zone was ruled from July 1940 from Vichy by Marshal Pétain, who had effectively become a dictator. That relations would continue between Vichy France and Great Britain was unlikely. The Vichy leaders were Anglophobic. The British were fighting on, and Hitler had postponed signing a treaty with France until the British were defeated.5 On 23 June 1940 two official declarations were broadcast to France, again demonstrating that using the BBC was believed worth while. The first statement indicated that the British government refused to recognise Pétain’s government. The second indicated that the British would recognise a French national committee willing to continue the war and honour French international obligations – as the Free French were. That the British were apparently encouraging a rival to the legitimate government added to the French sense of betrayal that had been felt even before Dunkirk.6 This sense of betrayal was further heightened by the British attack on the French Navy at Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940. The French Navy was potentially deadly. There was a danger that the Germans would seize it and, despite French promises that this would not be allowed to happen, the British sought a permanent

4


solution. The attack prompted Vichy to sever diplomatic relations. Some secret contacts continued, by personal envoy or through embassies in neutral countries, but all fizzled out by early 1941. Meanwhile, without officially declaring war, French aircraft twice bombed Gibraltar in retaliation for Mers-el-Kébir and for an abortive Anglo-Free French attack on Dakar. Under Admiral Darlan, Pétain’s deputy between February 1941 and April 1942, Vichy policy became increasingly anti-British.7 The British remained at war with Germany and therefore with Germans stationed in France. In practice this meant that, de facto, a state of war existed with France, and particularly with the Occupied Zone, where British bombing soon began. To most Britons, France was now a base for German bombers and a probable invasion. Even after Hitler postponed the invasion, German aircraft continued to bomb Great Britain from French aerodromes and German warships sailed from French ports to attack British oceanic supply lines. French production and resources, some from French colonies remaining loyal to Vichy, became part of the German war effort. Defeating Germany meant invading Europe, almost certainly through France. The Germans, incapable of defending all 2,600 kilometres of France’s coastline in depth, had to rely on rapidly reinforcing limited defences once the invasion began. German defensive strategy depended on mobility, making French roads and railways likely Allied targets during invasion preparations.8 The French themselves also posed a potential military threat. The armistice reduced the army to 100,000, creating a surplus of demobilised but trained French soldiers who might be conscripted or volunteer to fight. What remained of the French Army might also resist an Allied invasion. Furthermore, the French civilian population could hamper Allied activities, for example by fleeing the invasion zone en masse.

The Need for Propaganda to France The British thus found themselves with a major dilemma. France, directly and indirectly and in several different ways, provided a threat that had to be neutralised. This objective was easy to establish, but difficult to pursue. British responses would inevitably have consequences – material destruction, civilian deaths or simply a bad impression. Propaganda could explain why these responses were necessary, justifying British activities particularly by providing accurate news and information about the progress of the war and the war effort. From the British point of view, the goodwill and understanding of the French were essential. The French sense of British betrayal could be countered by presenting a more positive image of Great Britain. French scepticism that anything other than British defeat and German domination of Europe was even conceivable could be overcome by showing that Great Britain would not surrender and that Europe would be liberated, so assisting the Allies would be beneficial. This meant exploring France’s future, to show that it was worth striving for, to insist that

introduction

5

France would be restored, and to promote de Gaulle and the Free French as a leadership free from Hitler, the Nazis, the Vichy regime and, indeed, from British (and later, American) influence. Targets in France would be attacked and it was important to explain why this was necessary, showing that if some French people died, their sacrifice was not for Great Britain but for France. It was also necessary to persuade the French people to aid the Allies. They could be of tremendous use, both actively – for example by gathering information or disrupting the German war effort – and passively, simply by obeying Allied instructions to stay indoors and out of the way when the invasion came. This required direct appeals to them, something that propaganda was capable of achieving. The propagandists had to take into account differences between the Occupied and Unoccupied Zones. For example, propaganda was used to attack the authorities in both zones, but while in relation to the Germans this could be undertaken with no holds barred, any attempt to discredit Vichy had to be carefully planned, as Pétain could not be impugned. He was a hero, the man who had saved France at Verdun in 1916, and in 1940 he apparently intended to save France again. Attacking him might backfire, discrediting the British and their propaganda. As the propagandists recognised, another difference was that in the Occupied Zone the very German presence helped generate a basic desire for Allied victory, whereas in the Unoccupied Zone it was felt that people ‘baulk at action because they know that compared with Occupied France they are better off ’. Until the Germans occupied the whole of France in November 1942, the ‘will to resist’ was weaker in the Unoccupied Zone.9 This book begins by discussing machinery, to show the creation and development of the British propaganda system. It starts with the background provided by the First World War and inter-war treatment of propaganda and its consequences on planning prior to 1939. It then discusses the development of the propaganda organisation after the outbreak of the Second World War, in terms of the array of departments with differing responsibilities, the relevant internal structuring of these departments, the other bodies with some interest in propaganda, and it examines issues of division and conflict, coordination and control within and between them. Chapter 2 examines method, to demonstrate the overall ability of the British propaganda system to deliver its output to the intended recipients in France. First, it discusses aerial distribution of white propaganda leaflets, dealing with Air Ministry and RAF attitudes, as well as costs, benefits and problems encountered with aerial dissemination, contrasting the RAF’s claimed dropping record both with what the propagandists wanted and evidence from France concerning the reception of leaflets. Second, white propaganda broadcasting is examined, in terms of transmitters and wavelengths, coverage achieved and the availability of wireless sets and spare parts in France. The message is discussed in Chapter 3, to establish whether the different forms of British white propaganda were consistent. How close a correlation was

6


there between white propaganda leaflets and BBC radio output? The print and broadcast treatment of a series of key events ranging from the British attack upon the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir to the D-Day landings in Normandy are compared and contrasted. The internal planning by Department EH, SO1, PWE and the BBC which provided a basis for propaganda production is also examined. Chapter 4 addresses the reactions of the French people, the Vichy authorities and the Germans to British white propaganda. First, the nature of the evidence is examined to establish how the British were able to assess reactions in France. Second, the evidence itself is discussed, concerning for example the methods of distribution used by ordinary French people to further circulate British propaganda, the means employed by the authorities in France to prevent them, and more general views about propaganda. Such activities and reactions are a valuable indication of what ordinary French people and the German and Vichy authorities thought of British white propaganda to France. The book focuses on black propaganda in Chapter 5 – the printed material, radio stations and rumours – in order to assess its contribution to the overall propaganda effort for France. The chapter discusses the machinery for the production of black propaganda, the methods of distribution, the messages it carried, and reactions to it. The fact that this examination occupies only one chapter is a reflection of the more limited availability of source material. Finally, the Conclusion highlights the key questions posed throughout this study and confronts the central question: was the British propaganda campaign directed at France between 1940 and 1944 an effective and well-directed use of resources?

1

Machinery: Background, Planning and Departmental Organisation

British propaganda work during the Second World War was carried out neither smoothly nor easily. The MOI, responsible for all domestic and some overseas propaganda, had its fair share of troubles and its very existence was occasionally questioned, especially before Brendan Bracken became its Minister in July 1941. Even more difficult was the gestation of the organisation for propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied countries, which finally became the Political Warfare Executive. Its relationship with the MOI and other departments was restructured six times before the end of European war, and again afterwards. These changes were not easily achieved: the first two years of the war, when most of them happened, witnessed a degree of conflict over competence probably not exceeded in any other departmental field. The legacy of First World War activities affected attitudes towards propaganda and influenced inter-war British planning. In practice, this meant that after the outbreak of the Second World War, Department EH and the MOI conflicted, their responsibilities not clearly defined or divided: both provided guidance to the BBC, for example. The arrangements between Department EH (later SO1, later PWE), the MOI, the Foreign Office and the BBC could not guarantee effective coordination of propaganda: they were no substitute for unitary control. The internal organisation of Department EH and its successors, and the BBC, is also important in assessing how they coped with expansion and achieved a realistic division of the various tasks required while ensuring appropriate coordination. Even once relative stability had been achieved with the formation of PWE, new challenges emerged involving other bodies with an interest in propaganda: American and Free French propaganda organisations, SOE’s activities, ‘operational propaganda’ and the organisation for deception operations. Without the proper coordination, none had an all-encompassing overview and all could be potentially damaging to British propaganda.

From World War to World War: British Propaganda, 1914–39 The British government considered domestic censorship necessary in wartime. Shortly after the outbreak of the First World War, it formed the Press Bureau to prevent domestic publication of sensitive information or anything which might

8


affect morale. But it could not control the foreign press. The Neutral Press Committee (NPC) and the Foreign Office News Department were therefore created to prepare pro-British material for the neutral and Allied press. Meanwhile the War Propaganda Bureau was set up to explain Great Britain’s wartime decisionmaking overseas. It increasingly targeted enemy states. One of its main methods anticipated Second World War ‘black’ propaganda – the Bureau sent material abroad disguised by a commercial publisher’s imprint, so that it would not appear to be officially organised propaganda. The Foreign Office adopted the Bureau’s guiding principle of basing propaganda ‘on accurate information and measured argument’, which also influenced its attitude during the Second World War.1 Having several organisations with similar roles caused coordination difficulties and in any case wasted resources. Figure 1.1 shows the changing organisational system between 1914 and 1918. The Foreign Office clashed with the War Office, which wanted unitary control of propaganda. In response, the Foreign Office took over the War Propaganda Bureau and merged its News Department with the NPC. But War Office criticisms continued, perhaps because it felt that the importance of propaganda was not ‘facts, but the way they were presented’ – a view shared by the SO2 saboteurs in the Second World War – and it created its own propaganda department, MI7.2 After Lloyd George left the War Office to become Prime Minister, he initiated an enquiry which recommended unitary control of propaganda. But the Department of Information (DOI), set up in February 1917, was ‘merely a streamlined version of the original model’ and in practice no more effective. Finally, in 1918, a Ministry of Information was formed, to control domestic propaganda and

1914 Neutral Press Committee

Foreign Office News Department

(merged)

War Propaganda Bureau

(brought under Foreign Office control)

MI7 (War Office)

Press Bureau Department of Information

FO Political Intelligence Department (PID)

Ministry of Information

Department of Enemy Propaganda

Figure 1.1 Organisation of British propaganda during the First World War

1918

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propaganda for allied and neutral countries. Separately, under the press baron Lord Northcliffe, an Enemy Propaganda Department (known as Crewe House after its headquarters) was created to organise propaganda to Germany, Bulgaria and Austria–Hungary. Northcliffe, who saw propaganda as a form of advertising, brought a new impetus. But MI7 retained control of propaganda in military zones, which included the Western Front and Occupied France and Belgium; it merged with Crewe House only in the late summer of 1918. Splitting responsibility between a department for enemy propaganda and an MOI that dealt with the rest was a division that would be replicated in the Second World War.3 Some of the methods employed during the First World War were reused two decades later. Under Crewe House, propaganda became more direct, aimed at the masses rather than at select individuals. This meant, for example, using large quantities of air-dropped propaganda leaflets rather than specifically targeted pamphlets. The War Office section that later became MI7 began experimenting with leaflets in 1915. Its productions included the ‘Courier de l’Air [sic], designed to inform the French and Belgian inhabitants of German occupied areas of events relating to the Allied war effort’. It ran for seventy-eight issues between April 1917 and November 1918 with about 5,000 copies being distributed weekly. Leaflets were also targeted at German soldiers, using balloons and artillery shells: 4 million leaflets were disseminated in August and 5 million in October 1918. Other methods included propaganda disguised by false covers smuggled into Germany, and rumours, spread unwittingly by German POWs in letters home.4

Inter-war Treatment of Propaganda Crewe House was regarded as having been highly successful. Lloyd George praised its ‘invaluable work’. Another conclusion was that its work had been ‘the outstanding achievement of propaganda during the [First World] war’. German records gave ‘striking emphasis [. . . ] to the achievements of Crewe House in undermining the morale of German troops’. Despite its apparent success, however, Crewe House, along with the MOI, was closed after the armistice. This decision was not a surprise in one sense, because both had achieved their objectives, but it also reflected how the government, never entirely comfortable with propaganda, used the end of the war as the ideal opportunity ‘to be rid not only of their propaganda machinery, but also of their reputation for how good at propaganda they were’.5 Propaganda rapidly gained a tarnished image in Great Britain after 1918. It was seen as having contributed to the failure of the Treaty of Versailles to provide a workable peace. During the war, the propagandists had elaborated on vague Allied statements, in the process making promises that the Paris peace treaties did not honour. Hitler blamed British propaganda in his fabrication of the ‘stab-in-theback’ legend of the German Army’s domestic betrayal. Furthermore, Northcliffe admitted that German wartime atrocities his newspapers had reported – stirring up anti-German hatred in Great Britain and worldwide – were largely untrue. These revelations, Northcliffe’s association with them and publications such

10


as Ponsonby’s Falsehood in Wartime strengthened the public perception that propaganda was nothing but a pack of lies. Coupled with government anxiety, this made a significant propaganda commitment unlikely in peacetime. Twenty years that could have been spent improving the propaganda system, removing flaws and incorporating radio broadcasting, were therefore wasted.6 But the need for propaganda remained. Indeed, the First World War had demonstrated both the need for, and the practice of, what Taylor calls ‘public diplomacy’: direct communication between a government of one state and the people of another. After the war, the USSR pioneered radio as a method of mass address to spread Bolshevism abroad. Hitler employed radio to contact parts of Germany detached by the Treaty of Versailles. The British used long-distance broadcasting too: the BBC Empire Service was inaugurated in 1932, and services in Arabic, Spanish and Portuguese in 1938.7 Although Crewe House and the MOI had been closed, the British government had not entirely abandoned propaganda. The Foreign Office retained its Political Intelligence Department, a body which had been transferred to it from the DOI as part of the formation of the MOI. Staff members who survived the post-war cull (particularly Reginald ‘Rex’ Leeper, later of PWE) led efforts to maintain some propaganda capability. PID also incorporated part of the old Foreign Office News Department. Although the Treasury opposed significant expenditure, hampering efforts at every turn, by the 1930s some bodies had been created to project an image of Great Britain abroad. These included the Empire Marketing Board and the British Council, the latter launched (following pressure from Leeper) to distribute cultural propaganda and to liaise with organisations that might assist this task. These were potentially useful structures, but those planning for propaganda in the next war overlooked them, concentrating instead on First World War models and experiences.8

Propaganda Planning Official government preparations for a war propaganda organisation began with the formation of a Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) subcommittee in October 1935, to plan for a wartime Ministry of Information. The subcommittee reported in July 1936, its recommendations being implemented shortly afterwards. In October, Sir Stephen Tallents, formerly of the Empire Marketing Board and by then BBC Controller (Public Relations), was made MOI DirectorGeneral-designate. He was responsible for the detailed planning. It was a difficult task. There was a general suspicion of official propaganda while, in an era of appeasement, steps assuming there would be war were contradictory. It was even feared that, if the preparations became public knowledge, they would be seen by Hitler as a provocation for war, and so the whole process was kept secret. The planners assigned to the prospective MOI retained their existing jobs, preventing full-time concentration on planning. Everything was overshadowed by ‘highly disruptive Whitehall intrigue’ and Tallents was asked to resign in January 1939. His departure effectively brought planning to a full stop. Lord Reith, briefly

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Minister of Information in 1940, later revealed that ‘nothing much was done [. . . ] in the nine months prior to war’, which contrasted with feverish preparations made in other areas.9 Tallents always believed that the MOI would be responsible for propaganda to enemy countries, despite Leeper’s calls for Foreign Office control based on PID. As the Munich crisis developed in September 1938, Tallents planned for propaganda to Germany, including aerial leaflets. He also suggested the MOI should incorporate an enemy propaganda department capable of rapidly beginning work. It never did, however: a Foreign Office section, known as Department EH after its Electra House headquarters, took responsibility. Tallents probably knew nothing about EH, although Bell suggests that Tallents personally approached Sir Campbell Stuart, who had been Northcliffe’s deputy at Crewe House, to head it. If Tallents was unaware, this might explain some of the difficulties encountered later on. EH adopted the Foreign Office’s concept, inherited from the War Propaganda Bureau, that propaganda should be based on truth.10 Another rival emerged in the spring of 1938. Section D of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS; ‘D’ standing for ‘Destruction’) was created to investigate methods of physical and ‘moral’ sabotage. Propaganda was specifically made part of Section D’s mandate in September 1938, probably in reaction to Munich. This potentially brought Section D into conflict with Department EH. Section D was also, in the tradition of the War Office and MI7, more concerned with what propaganda could achieve than with its truthfulness.11 Nor was wartime control of the BBC properly arranged in advance. Founded in 1922, the BBC was intended to operate as autonomously and impartially as possible, and it sought to avoid being regarded as a government mouthpiece. The BBC would have an important wartime role: in 1935 the Ullswater Committee decided that in ‘serious or national emergencies [. . . ] full governmental control [of the BBC] would be necessary’. On the one hand, Labour’s Clement Attlee insisted that nonetheless it must remain impartial, able to express views other than those of the government, while on the other Reith, then BBC DirectorGeneral, secretly agreed to hand significant control of the BBC to the MOI in wartime, a deal modified in detail but not in broad outline before 1939.12 The foreign services introduced during 1938 were seen to require official involvement, in contrast to the Home and Empire services. A system was developed in which ‘the BBC agreed to seek Foreign Office guidance where necessary and to maintain increased contact with the latter on matters of mutual concern’. This foreign transmission work helped the BBC establish an invaluable reputation for truthfulness. Broadcasting to Europe began at the time of the Munich crisis, in English, French, German and Italian, the Foreign Office inspecting scripts of the last two. In November 1938, Tallents argued that the BBC could largely be left to its own devices. At the same time, regarding a dedicated BBC German Service, Reith’s successor as Director-General, F. W. Ogilvie, suggested direct control was unnecessary; regular contact was enough. Later, after the annexation of Czechoslovakia, the BBC declared that Department EH would control its propaganda broadcasting to the enemy. The question of control over the BBC

12


was another issue to be resolved alongside the overlap between Department EH, the MOI and Section D.13

The Immediate Pre-war Situation What all this meant was that, in effect, the First World War system had been reestablished. The MOI expected to run all British propaganda, whether domestic or foreign, to allied, enemy or neutral countries. Department EH anticipated dealing with all propaganda to the enemy. Both believed they had control of the BBC for their task. Section D meanwhile overlapped, particularly with EH, while holding a very different conception of propaganda. Responsibility for enemyoccupied countries had not been assigned, a surprising omission given that propaganda had been disseminated to enemy-occupied Belgium and parts of France in the First World War. In short, the system was a shambles. The nature of the pre-war planning was mostly to blame. Different mandates conflicted, different groups had different ideas and motivations. These problems would not emerge until the organisations were activated at the outbreak of war. Not until they were resolved would British propaganda become effective.

Wartime Development The German invasion of Poland prompted final preparations for war, including in the propaganda sphere. The BBC reduced domestic broadcasting to a single programme, grouping transmitters together to prevent their use as homing beacons by enemy bombers; the pioneering television service was shut down for the same reason. Hundreds of people reported to the MOI’s headquarters at the University of London’s Senate House. By contrast, a handful, forming Department EH, met at the Sugar Loaf Hotel, Dunstable, to be taken to the Duke of Bedford’s Woburn estate. Known as the ‘Country Headquarters’ (CHQ), the ‘Country House’ (CH), or simply ‘the Country’, Woburn was used throughout the war.14

Department EH The first British propaganda was disseminated over Germany only hours after Great Britain had formally declared war. As Tallents had intended for an MOI enemy propaganda section, Department EH began operations immediately. It was staffed by people selected by ability. Few were professional civil servants. Many were journalists with foreign experience but other members included a banker, an MP and a Royal Marine – R. A. Dallas Brooks, who played an instrumental role until late 1944. The actor Noel Coward briefly ran the AngloFrench liaison office in Paris.15 Figure 1.2 shows the links between Department EH and other departments between September 1939 and July 1940. Despite its origins, EH reported initially to

machinery Secret Intelligence Service Foreign Office

13 Section D

Political Intelligence Department

Department EH Ministry of Information

a. September− October 1939

British Broadcasting Corporation

Secret Intelligence Service Foreign Office

Section D



b. October 1939−June 1940


Secret Intelligence Service Foreign Office

Section D



c. June − July 1940 British Broadcasting Corporation

Note: Light-coloured dotted lines indicate unofficial influence.

Figure 1.2 Organisation of British propaganda 1939-40

the MOI, but this arrangement lasted only for six weeks. In October 1939 responsibility was officially transferred back to the Foreign Office, which held on to it until the early summer of 1940. Unofficially, however, the Foreign Office already had some influence through PID, which was also – conveniently – relocated to Woburn, allowing its experts to assist the propagandists. As more countries

14


were invaded by Germany and consequently fell into the purview of Department EH, PID staff took on greater responsibilities, causing the distinction between the two organisations to become blurred. PID also provided convenient cover for EH: in external correspondence, for example, PID stationery was used.16 Department EH initially concentrated on printed material – in part a result of Stuart’s previous experience, which had not included broadcasting; the BBC was an MOI responsibility in any case. Nonetheless, EH had some links with the BBC: a liaison officer was appointed and a joint Planning and Broadcasting Committee met. In the opinion of David Garnett, a member of PWE and author of its official history, the Committee meetings did at least develop consistent attitudes towards propaganda. However, because proposed leaflets were discussed while BBC broadcasts were examined only retrospectively, the BBC, by dint of acting first, played a large part in defining those attitudes. EH’s influence over the BBC was minimal because Woburn was so far from Broadcasting House in central London, its liaison officer was a BBC official, and the MOI, geographically much closer, was competing for control. BBC–EH liaison lasted only until April 1940. Although there were some links in the SO1 period, PWE did not regain control until September 1941.17 Although broadcasting to Germany was the MOI’s responsibility, Department EH had a role in it. Rather than create a dedicated German section, the MOI employed EH staff, part-time, to supervise. This meant that the same personnel controlled both broadcast and leaflet propaganda, but in relation to the former exercised the MOI’s authority rather than its own. Later, the MOI sought firmer control, partly because it felt it received inadequate service: the EH personnel visited only twice a week. The MOI took a different approach when it created its own French Section in July 1940. It clearly wanted to control all foreign propaganda and therefore did not call upon EH to staff it. Liaison between the two bodies, however, remained essential because of the overlap between them. From December 1939 liaison meetings were held which, like the joint Planning and Broadcasting Committee, helped create a common attitude.18 During 1940, Department EH’s propaganda output expanded beyond that intended for Germany to include the enemy-occupied countries. Leaflets for Czechoslovakia and Poland were first disseminated in January and March respectively. Leaflets for Belgium and Holland, invaded in May, were dropped in September and October 1940, while Norway and Denmark received their first leaflets in December 1940 and February 1941 respectively. Much quicker progress was made for France: the first leaflets were distributed in July, less than a month after the armistice.19

The Special Operations Executive In July 1940, SOE was formed, inheriting control over sabotage and subversion from the War Office and the Foreign Office. Alfred Duff Cooper, the Minister of Information, ceded the MOI’s rights over Department EH – returned by the Foreign Office only six weeks earlier – to SOE. Although Duff Cooper intended to

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help, Stenton argues that his actions actually confused boundaries, contributing to later disputes.20 Stuart was on official business in Canada while these changes took place, a trip that may have been intended to sideline him. He resigned shortly after returning, and may have been pushed into it. Not only was Duff Cooper ‘anti-Campbell Stuart’, but Stuart himself was both identified with Chamberlain (and therefore with appeasement) and also considered ‘too old and too obstinate’ to be kept on. Leeper replaced him. Alongside his duties as Director of PID, Leeper headed what was now SO1 which, aside from being renamed and acquiring part of Section D, was largely identical to Department EH. It was split between London and Woburn. Like EH before it, SO1 had no control over the BBC, although in October 1940 various liaison meetings were introduced. SO1’s personnel remained a motley crew – civil servants, barristers, university dons, journalists, army officers, advertising men, diplomats, schoolmasters and even a landscape gardener. The only thing they had in common was that each was something of an expert on one or another of the European countries. Figure 1.3 shows the links between SO1 and other departments involved in propaganda from July 1940 to September 1941.21 SO1 formed one half of SOE, and thus came under the secret control of the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) and its Minister, Hugh Dalton. But SO1 was not solely responsible for propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied countries. The MOI continued to control white propaganda such as BBC broadcasting to Europe, while SO1 was responsible for the secret broadcasting from around Woburn. Leaflets, although dropped from RAF aircraft and indicating their British origin – in other words, ‘white’ propaganda by every ordinary definition – were classified as ‘black’, making them SO1’s responsibility, an aberration in an otherwise sound division of responsibility. In order to put matters right, Duff Cooper wanted his MOI to control aerial leaflets, but Dalton countered by suggesting that SO1 should control BBC broadcasting to enemy and enemyoccupied territories. In mangled form because of the secret status of SO1, the quarrel over responsibility for BBC broadcasting even made it into the British press. Leslie Illingworth’s cartoon, as used on the front cover of this volume, saw the MOI arguing with the Foreign Office over who should throw a lifebuoy containing the BBC, to rescue France from a sea of Nazi lies.22 Neither minister had the better case, but neither would withdraw his claim, even though either plan, by bringing leaflets and broadcasting together, would have improved coordination of British propaganda. What was a ‘silly ministerial squabble’ became a matter for Cabinet action through its Committee on Foreign (Allied) Resistance, which indicated its concern at the lack of unitary control over propaganda. Barely five months after SOE’s birth, Sir John Anderson was appointed to arbitrate the dispute, into which the Foreign Office was also drawn. The resulting ‘Anderson Award’ was agreed on 16 May 1941, and Churchill approved it on 13 June.23

16

british propaganda to france, 1940--1944 Foreign Office

Ministry of Economic Warfare Special Operations Executive



SO1 (Propaganda)

SO2 (Sabotage)

a. July 1940− May 1941


Foreign Office

Ministry of Economic Warfare Special Operations Executive

Ministry of Information SO1 (Propaganda)

SO2 (Sabotage)


b. May− September 1941


Figure 1.3 Organisation of British propaganda, 1940–1

The Anderson Award was ultimately ineffective. Despite being at the root of the dispute, the distinction between control of white and black propaganda was not altered. All that happened was that ministerial oversight was improved: a committee comprising Dalton, Duff Cooper and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was set up to monitor SO1. It was supported by an Executive Committee consisting of a senior official representing each of the ministries concerned, dealing with day-to-day operations and lesser policy questions. Leeper, the Director of SO1, represented the MEW; Brooks, head of the Military Wing, the MOI; and Robert Bruce Lockhart, of SO1 Czech Section, the Foreign Office. These

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appointments, perhaps the most important consequence of the Anderson Award, would be significant later on, but in the short term the conflicts continued.24 Personal difficulties were intertwined with administrative issues. Duff Cooper, a Conservative, and Dalton, of Labour, came from opposing political backgrounds. In July 1941, Bracken replaced Duff Cooper and inherited the conflict with Dalton, which escalated. At the same time Dalton did not get on with Leeper, the kind of civil servant he could not abide, for example assuming Leeper had moved SO1 headquarters to Woburn in November 1940 because he was scared of bombing. The dislike was mutual: Leeper told Bruce Lockhart that he had relocated SO1 because of Dalton’s behaviour. Leeper was also unable to cooperate with Gladwyn Jebb, SOE’s Chief Executive Officer, who was advanced in the Foreign Office hierarchy, leapfrogging Leeper, to take the job. That alone would have made things difficult, even before Leeper’s preoccupation with propaganda is considered. Despite their personal friendship, Leeper and Jebb spent much time at loggerheads. While there is no evidence to suggest that these personal conflicts directly undermined the cohesiveness of SO1, they cannot have helped.25 A second attempt was made during the summer of 1941 to solve the organisational problems, in the form of a draft Cabinet paper. It proposed amalgamating SO1 with parts of the MOI and the BBC into a single organisation for propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied states. Churchill agreed on 19 August 1941, but Dalton objected – the proposal meant ‘the complete disappearance of one half of ’ SOE, his fiefdom. But the three officials argued that without action further conflict was inevitable and they, with Bracken and Eden, outmanoeuvred him. On 11 September 1941, Churchill announced in Parliament the creation of the Political Warfare Executive.26

The Political Warfare Executive The establishment of PWE was ‘the logical outcome of the initial lack of proper planning for enemy propaganda before World War Two broke out’. Figure 1.4 shows the organisation of propaganda between September 1941 and May 1945. The arrangements appeared very similar to the Anderson Award. PWE was responsible to a Ministerial Committee composed of Bracken and Dalton, with Eden in the chair, assisted in day-to-day operations by an Executive Committee consisting of Leeper and Brooks, chaired by Bruce Lockhart. But the Anderson Award had envisaged such committees merely for liaison and ministers could legitimately ignore them, instructing ‘their’ staff to do the same. Under PWE, however, no minister had such control. Pimlott describes this as ‘remote supervision of a pooled propaganda effort by a ministerial triumvirate on which [Dalton] would always be outnumbered, two to one’.27 Dalton’s continued trouble-making ultimately cost him his position and the MEW its participation in PWE. Before the end of September 1941, he was instructing senior PWE staff ‘to ignore paper plans, to consider themselves more important than the ministers or the Executive Committee and to take

18


Foreign Office

Ministry of Economic Warfare


Political Warfare Executive

Special Operations Executive

British Broadcasting Corporation a. September 1941− February 1942

European Services


Foreign Office

Political Warfare Executive


Ministry of Economic Warfare

Special Operations Executive b. February 1942 −May 1945 European Services


Figure 1.4 Organisation of British propaganda, 1941–5

control into their own hands [. . . ] He was quite explicit in his instructions.’ Given the political considerations peculiar to the wartime coalition government, Dalton could not simply be sacked, but he could be promoted out of the way. In February 1942 he became President of the Board of Trade. MEW’s role in propaganda disappeared at the same time, so PWE now became responsible only to the Foreign Office for policy and to the MOI for administration. The Ministerial Committee was abandoned – Bruce Lockhart dealt directly with Eden and Bracken.28

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Dalton’s departure prompted some reorganisation of PWE. Bruce Lockhart became Director-General. The Executive Committee became the Policy Committee, now including Ivone Kirkpatrick, an experienced diplomat who, since the outbreak of war, had served at the MOI and the BBC, becoming BBC Controller (European Services) in October 1941. His appointment, giving the BBC representation at the highest level within PWE, had originally been suggested for the Executive Committee during the formation of PWE, but had been overruled, a decision which Bruce Lockhart described as ‘the most serious mistake [made by PWE] at this stage’.29 This was the last significant top-level reorganisation inside or concerning PWE before the end of the European war in 1945. There were some changes among the senior personnel, however. In January 1943, Leeper resigned, feeling that his role at CHQ no longer existed because of a relocation, examined further below, of PWE’s intelligence functions to London. He became Ambassador to the Greek government, then exiled in Cairo. This was a long-standing ambition, suggesting it was not just changes at PWE that motivated his departure. Besides, Leeper’s involvement with propaganda did not end. He joined a PWE Cairo committee overseeing propaganda to the Balkans. Kirkpatrick returned to the Foreign Office at the end of August 1944 and Brooks left in December, having been recalled by the Admiralty.30 PWE was wound down during 1944. Most of the secret stations broadcasting to Western Europe were closed prior to D-Day. As German-occupied states were freed, aerial leaflet dissemination over them was no longer required, the nature of BBC broadcasting to them changed, and PWE’s responsibilities towards these newly liberated countries came to an end. Oversight of the BBC French Service passed back to the MOI in January 1945, but its importance had been diminishing since the summer of 1944, as French broadcasting recommenced, free of German or Vichy control. After the German surrender in May 1945, PWE operated openly as PID, working on propaganda to the Far East and the re-education of Axis POWs. Bruce Lockhart resigned in August 1945, but PWE continued operating until July 1946, when its re-education division was transferred to the Control Commission for Germany. PWE closed soon afterwards.31

Controlling the BBC: The MOI, PWE and Problems of BBC ‘Independence’ At the outbreak of war both the Ministry of Information and Department EH were seemingly responsible for the BBC: the MOI because it handled overseas broadcasting and Department EH because it controlled propaganda to enemy countries. This created the potential for contradictory output and meant that even simple coordination between leaflets and broadcasts did not happen. A leaflet giving BBC transmission times to Germany was rejected as impractical and not implemented until nearly a year after first suggested. Similarly, although proposed in August 1940, even as late as March 1941 SO1 French Region did not produce leaflets advertising BBC French Service transmission times. It would be several

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more months before the Courrier carried this information as standard, while leaflets for other countries were also slow to include the appropriate schedules.32 To begin with, MOI control of BBC foreign services resembled the hands-off approach used by the Foreign Office in peacetime. Before May 1940, Kirkpatrick, who had recently become Director of the MOI Foreign Division, made only fortnightly visits to the BBC. Gradually, liaison improved and BBC representatives attended a variety of daily and weekly meetings at the MOI. But that was as far as it went: had the MOI wanted even greater authority, it might not have been able to obtain it. In March 1941, Duff Cooper admitted that since the early summer of 1940 the system of foreign broadcasting had needed reorganisation but blamed this on the deficiencies of pre-war planning, commenting that it was ‘difficult to reform your army in the middle of the battle’. The MOI distinguished between ‘political direction’ and ‘broadcasting practice’. This meant that while policy might insist on polite treatment of Pétain but not of other Vichy officials, how the broadcasters did this was their own concern.33 The creation of PWE allowed for better liaison with the BBC, improved further when PWE moved into Bush House, the home of the BBC European Services, in March 1942. Briggs describes how under PWE, the ‘drafting of “directives” and the attempts to secure their implementation became [. . . ] a regular feature of broadcasting policy’. But the distinction between policy and practice remained. PWE Regional Directors produced what they called ‘directives’, but BBC Regional Editors were free to produce their programmes, so long as they followed these guidelines. In practice, PWE Directors had no powers independent of Kirkpatrick and Noel Newsome (the BBC Director of European Broadcasting) to insist that their guidance was complied with. Despite the potential for problems, however, the BBC French Service appears to have cooperated well with its PWE colleagues: Briggs concludes that there was ‘sufficient mutual trust, even admiration, for the [BBC] French Section to operate with vigour and drive’. Darsie Gillie, its chief, had briefly held responsibility for France within SO1 in the late summer of 1940, and it may be that his work in this period laid the foundations for the successful cooperation over the next four years.34 While the distinction between political guidance and broadcasting practice allowed the BBC the flexibility to apply its experience, it also encouraged independent action and created the possibility of conflicting output. One MOI official commented, ‘our chief difficulty is to get the BBC to do what we ask them to do; they have ideas of their own’. One of the most potentially dangerous examples in propaganda terms was the V campaign, initiated in January 1941 by Victor de Laveleye on the Belgian Service. It spread quickly across Europe, with thousands of letter ‘V’s chalked or painted on walls, pavements, posters, wherever there was space. In June, a speaker, ‘Colonel Britton’, began advocating minor acts of disruption and demonstrations. It was in his broadcast of 27 June 1941 that the opening of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony was first used (from a recording by none other than the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra!) because the rhythm indicated a ‘V’ in Morse code.35

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The BBC had been given permission to broadcast advice concerning sabotage or other disruptive activity by the MOI in June 1940, although at that time the request may have received little thought given the distracting threat of invasion. In any case, the MOI was aware of its decision: its criticism of the BBC for not having provoked the ‘revolution’ in Vichy on 11 November 1940 suggests that the MOI believed the BBC should be doing this kind of thing. Nonetheless, neither the MOI nor the BBC had thought the question through. The problem with activities such as the V campaign was that, without coordination with SOE, they could snowball into an uprising that the British were unable to support. Hence, the apparent success of the V campaign was actually very dangerous. An unsupported uprising would fail and the consequences for those involved, for the British and for their propaganda, would be devastating. PWE took over the V campaign at the beginning of October 1941 and closed it down. Propaganda had to be undertaken with an awareness of and capability for action, something the BBC could not do and the MOI was not well placed to do. It was, however, something of which PWE was capable.36 Another potentially troublesome aspect was in the BBC’s attitude to PWE’s guidance. Kirkpatrick, responsible to both the BBC and PWE, was just as determined to maintain the European Service’s independence as he was to ensure effective coordination with PWE, sometimes suppressing directives if he felt that they conflicted with the BBC’s task. With his example at the top, it is hardly surprising that PWE directives were not universally followed. Scripts were often withheld, preventing PWE from finding out what had been broadcast. This conduct had developed when the BBC was under MOI control and may have been encouraged by the MOI’s flexible oversight. Neither the MOI nor PWE was ever able to dictate the content of BBC broadcasts, prompting a former French Prime Minister, Léon Blum, to comment that the BBC was ‘as beautiful as a Beethoven symphony – because the Frenchmen were allowed to express disagreement with the British government’.37

Internal Organisation Propaganda that contradicts itself immediately raises doubts among its recipients about its reliability. Even after the formation of PWE, the BBC remained a potential source of contradiction. Coordination meetings could produce a common approach, but could not ensure adherence to it. But the issue was not just interdepartmental. Given the number of different countries being addressed and the different methods used, it was quite possible for contradictions to arise within the propaganda department itself. Ideally, a single mastermind would ensure that all output conformed and there were no contradictions or discrepancies in or between domestic and overseas output but, given the scale of Second World War propaganda, this would have been an impossible task.38 By August 1941 more than 500 propagandists and support staff were employed and the personnel continued growing for much of the war. Many leading members of PWE,

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including Bruce Lockhart, were absent through ill health brought on by overwork and three people died while employed by the department or shortly after leaving it. Some internal division of the task was therefore essential. Delegation of responsibility was needed to allow some decision-making without reference to senior officials, leaving them free for other tasks, yet without encouraging the kind of independence or isolation that could lead to poor coordination.39

Dividing the Workload Department EH began the war with a fairly simple organisation, with divisions defined by task. The Planning and Editorial sections in Woburn carried out intelligence evaluation and the bulk of propaganda creation. This was perfectly workable: the entire staff numbered around twenty (excluding support staff). The same personnel were also responsible for liaising with the MOI and the BBC German Service. Stuart, his staff, the Chief Printing Officer and the Military Wing were based in London. Stuart’s main role was political: he ensured that EH retained the goodwill of government departments and watched for any developments that might cause difficulties or threaten its existence.40 The Military Wing liaised with the Services and the Chiefs of Staff to maintain awareness of general developments and significant military activities and to have propaganda projects cleared, if necessary. It obtained useful information, either to use as propaganda or as background information to shape propaganda. By the time PWE was formed, the Military Wing had distinct task-based divisions: liaison with RAF reconnaissance to obtain material for propaganda leaflets; liaison with Military Intelligence to obtain intelligence; production of propaganda directed at Axis POWs; and, most importantly, liaison with the Air Ministry to ensure the availability of aircraft to drop leaflets.41 No formal intelligence section had been planned in advance, although some rudimentary steps, such as providing reference material, had been taken. Its creation was one of the Department’s first acts. The intelligence section was not responsible for collecting intelligence – which came from the Military Wing, the BBC Monitoring Service and other sources – but for collating, interpreting and distributing it. Not only was the intelligence section essential for propaganda purposes, but it also provided a useful service to other government departments. It produced a daily ‘News Digest’, eventually sent to more than 1,500 recipients inside and outside PWE. German propaganda was evaluated to determine German strategic intentions: the postponement of the invasion of Great Britain was forecast with only a forty-eight-hour error and the use of V weapons after the D-Day landings was predicted.42 Two inquiries examined intelligence organisation: the Browett Inquiry, initiated after the formation of PWE, and Brigadier Eric Sachs’s investigation after his appointment as Director, Political Warfare (Intelligence) in November 1942. Browett proposed the consolidation of several different intelligence sections at PWE and the BBC, but the latter’s protests eventually meant that the recommendations went largely unimplemented. Sachs was more successful, changing

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responsibilities and relocating services which were based at CHQ to centralise intelligence collection and distribution in London, creating a sophisticated filing system and installing telephone and teleprinter links to keep the Woburn sections fully informed. Sachs’s changes contributed to Leeper’s departure.43 Before May 1940 organisation based on task made sense, but as the war expanded such divisions became impractical. A different structure was essential and the obvious means was by division on regional lines. Nonetheless, some taskbased elements survived until the early autumn of 1940, as the Planning and Editorial sections continued to operate, assisted by PID as required. This may partly have been due to the absence of allocation of responsibility for propaganda to enemy-occupied countries, a flaw of the pre-war planning. Moreover, there was a lack of any real impetus within Department EH to address the problem. Because of the distances involved, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Italy were difficult for the RAF to reach and therefore it made little sense for EH, principally a leafleting organisation, to expend effort on them or to press for an official assignment of responsibility. The fall of France changed that position, as its proximity meant that leaflets could be delivered more easily. Four different leaflets, which EH certainly prepared and largely distributed before responsibility had been assigned and in the absence of any kind of guiding policy, were disseminated over France in July 1940, less than a month after the Franco-German armistice, but this did not represent a significant investment of resources. There was little point in doing more than a minimum until responsibility for propaganda to enemy-occupied countries had been officially allocated.44 In this respect, reorganisation along regional lines was integral to Department EH’s rebirth as SO1. The ‘SOE Charter’ of 19 July 1940 delegated the responsibility for propaganda to enemy-occupied countries to SOE, allowing SO1 to begin expansion. Given the need for War Cabinet approval of the Charter and the consequences of Stuart’s resignation, not to mention the threat of invasion, it was only after 17 August, when staffing increases were agreed, that new sections could be established to take over from the Planning and Editorial sections, each responsible for a specific country or region. PID was an obvious source for new personnel. As we shall see, more time would pass before an official policy was produced to guide SO1 in its propaganda to France.45 Seven regional directorates developed. Under PWE, these covered Germany and Austria, France, Italy, Scandinavia (Norway and Denmark), the Low Countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans. The directorates were expected to undertake region-specific planning, write and edit leaflet propaganda, provide personnel and policy guidance for the secret broadcasting stations and, after the formation of PWE, to advise the BBC. But the ad hoc task-based approach persisted for some time. In the case of propaganda to France, discussions were still held in a general forum in late October 1940, by which time the French Region certainly existed, although the overlap may have been a deliberate move, to allow experienced propagandists to oversee the newcomers. Each Region was headed by a Regional Director, assisted by personnel from a wide background, all subject to MI5 vetting before being employed. Denis Brogan initially led the

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French Region, but resigned in March 1941, claiming Leeper was hampering SO1’s work by attempting to run everything himself. Another four Regional Directors followed him. On the one hand, such a turnover of senior staff cannot have helped the French Region maintain consistency. On the other, the fact that each of Brogan’s successors except the last left because they were asked to take on other important propaganda tasks indicates that they were all good at what they did.46 Regionalisation also affected the intelligence section. Dedicated Chief Intelligence Officers (CIOs) liaised between it and the Regions. Dr Leslie Beck, an Oxford don, joined SO1 as French Region CIO in September 1940, later becoming the last French Regional Director. The CIOs were regional, not intelligence, experts. Someone with regional knowledge – both of the country and the propagandists’ plans – could make better judgements about what material was useful and better identify gaps that needed to be addressed. The intelligence section also developed some regional specialisation. After March 1941, for example, it produced region-specific overviews to define the audience being addressed.47

Separation for Security: Black Propaganda The Browett Inquiry recommended that PWE’s white and black operations should be based in different places, to help maintain the secrecy black propaganda needed for success. Before 1940, Department EH had left both black propaganda and subversion to Section D. After EH and D merged to form SO1, black propaganda use began increasing. By late 1941 it had become important enough to provoke Browett’s recommendation. The arrangements were completed with the creation of the Special Operations Directorate under Sefton Delmer.48 According to Howe, ‘the average member of PWE was totally unaware that the Department was engaged in highly secret black propaganda activities’. Part of the reason for secrecy was the nature of the material. Some of it was fairly tame, such as forged ration cards, intended to undermine the German rationing system, or stamps using Himmler’s likeness, not Hitler’s, but these were so good that they seem to have passed unnoticed, rather than, as intended, to plant the idea that Himmler was plotting to overthrow Hitler. Other material was rather more provocative. One secret radio station, Gustav Siegfried Eins (GS1), broadcast to Germany stories concerning the sexual exploits of senior Nazis and other pornographic propaganda. Moreover, some personnel were aliens – employed to provide authenticity – and should have been interned. This could have caused a scandal if discovered. MI5 certainly preferred PWE’s ‘zoo for foreigners’ to be outside London.49 PWE’s black propaganda to France was less offensive but secrecy remained important. Black propaganda was produced by ‘a number of small and separate groups which [. . . ] operated under conditions of very tight security [. . . ] completely outside and away from PWE’s very large white divisions’. This was not incompatible with the regional structures: black could operate alongside white but whereas black had knowledge of white, the reverse was not necessarily true

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except at higher levels. Even between those who worked on black propaganda, information was guarded: there was disquiet when details of distribution channels to France were shared.50 Security was also strict regarding the black ‘freedom radio stations’, known as Research Units (RUs). The first station, for Germany, began operating in late May 1940. Further stations were opened from October. These activities were kept secret from the public and usually the broadcasting teams, isolated in houses scattered around Woburn, were unaware of each other. Not only could the material that one RU broadcast be anathema to another, but this separation also helped to prevent the kind of mistakes that could have destroyed the pretence that these stations were in different parts of Europe or revealed the common leadership behind them.51 Black printed propaganda was largely unexploited before Ellic Howe’s arrival at PWE in November 1941, partly because there was no distribution method in place, but also because early material was not convincing enough. Howe, a specialist in continental printing, was able to change this. Having discovered that a British company held masters for continental printing types, Howe wrote a paper explaining their use for high-quality forgery and subsequently joined PWE to head a production unit for this purpose. As his unit’s role expanded, Howe became more production manager than master forger – and, because the services of printing, paper-making and ink-producing experts had to be relied upon, his was the only black propaganda section to operate from London. About a tenth of his unit’s 2,000 productions, ranging from a single forged letter to thousands of fake ration cards, for use in their own right or in support of other operations, were destined for France. Howe also produced items for the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Free French. Black printed propaganda was distributed by SOE and other agencies, not by the RAF.52 Black propaganda also used sibs (‘rumours’, after the Latin sibilare), one of the least known aspects of the propagandists’ work. Sibs ranged from the ridiculous (that Great Britain had imported man-eating sharks into the Channel as an invasion counter-measure), to the more plausible (after the Germans had damaged HMS Ark Royal but claimed it destroyed, and later actually did sink it, a rumour was circulated that both claims were true as Great Britain had two Ark Royals, suggesting that there were two of every other capital ship as well). Rumour-mongering was centralised within PWE’s black operations, run by the Underground Propaganda (UP) Committee, which also coordinated other black propaganda work.53

Coordinating the Workload: Propaganda Planning and Leaflet Production The geographical division between London and Woburn hampered the coordination of propaganda output. Liaison during the Department EH period was by regular weekend visits to Woburn by Stuart and Brooks, who often brought with them other ‘interested parties’ – often Foreign Office or BBC personnel. The ministers responsible for SO1 and PWE continued the practice later. Dalton

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was a regular, if somewhat feared visitor (he was famously described as a ‘great booming bully’), while Bracken was more interested in Woburn’s artworks than in the propaganda work.54 A general forum continued meeting after the establishment of the regional sections under SO1 although, because of the expansion, only senior regional staff attended. After PWE’s formation, a similar system was initially used. The Executive Committee and the Regional Directors met to discuss Foreign Office policy and political and strategic developments. But even this became unworkable as the propagandists became busier. When Bruce Lockhart was called away, no meeting was held or guidance issued. A better coordination system was therefore essential. At the same time, PWE was increasingly centred on London, rather than Woburn. A Planning Section was formed during the reorganisation of PWE after February 1942. But it was not a success: effective guidance required an understanding of regional needs and responsibilities, but no Regional Directors were involved. Therefore, in August, a Planning Directorate was created, including a Central Directive Drafting Committee to prepare regular guidance on which the Regions would base their own directives. The Committee included the PWE German and French Regional Directors, Crossman and Sutton, and Newsome from the BBC, to ensure that both PWE and BBC needs were met. Crossman and Sutton were later made Directors of Political Warfare, for Enemy and Satellite countries and Occupied countries respectively, demonstrating that they represented more than their own Regions; this also helped ease Bruce Lockhart’s workload and recognised that Enemy and Satellite countries required different treatment from Occupied states. The Central Directives typically included a strategic appreciation, a reminder of ongoing propaganda campaigns, and appendices giving information on specific subjects. Alongside Central Directives, the Planning Directorate also prepared documents for use as a source by any region. This coordination helped the different Regions produce a coherent body of propaganda but, as a final check, leaflets had to be approved by the appropriate Regional Director and by the senior officials. As we shall see, the Air Ministry claimed the right to veto any leaflet the RAF was expected to drop. All authorisations were given before the leaflets were printed.55 Leaflet-printing activities, centralised from the outset, expanded as the war progressed. A Production Unit based at Woburn set up leaflets but the actual printing, organised by the Chief Printing Officer, was carried out by HMSO until 1941. After this commercial firms took over. They could produce in quantity at speed. The transfer also allowed a change from ‘unsatisfactory’ letterpress printing to rotogravure, which made ‘a far more satisfactory impression from the typographical point of view’. Rotogravure enabled good-quality printing, especially of photographs. Good-quality production had innate propaganda value by demonstrating that the Allies had resources to spare, this argument being backed up by evidence received from France. By mid-1944, production levels were so high that about 80 per cent of British rotogravure printing capacity was employed.56

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While the Regions wrote the text, the Production Unit prepared different layouts and found illustrations. Harold Keeble, from the Daily Express, directed the Production Unit.57 His expertise lay in British publications and he followed British style and layout. This led to some discussion. Should leaflets use a British format or one similar to that used in the target country? In December 1941 it was decided to continue a British style except in propaganda to Germany. This decision was not altered, despite pressure from Garnett and the evidence of Neville Lytton, who returned from France in 1942, that a more regional style would be beneficial. That a non-regional approach was used is a surprising anomaly. Regional attitudes had been adopted throughout PWE, and also at the BBC. On the one hand, the British style was inconsistent with the region-specific tailoring of the leaflets’ content, but on the other Keeble’s methods ensured a common appearance to PWE’s white leaflets, making them instantly recognisable for what they were. As we shall see in Chapter 4, leaflets were seen by some French people to constitute a tangible link with the Allies, to which the use of a British style may have contributed, making them stand out from material being produced clandestinely in France.58 PWE’s printing operations were expensive. In November 1943, the cost per annum worked out at £900,000 and the following April at nearly £1.5 million. This was paid for secretly, like PWE, but financial responsibility was transferred to HMSO in January 1944. HMSO audited PWE’s printing operations and found paper was being wasted because of the size of the Courrier and the type of printing presses used. Various alternatives were suggested, but Keeble believed that they would reduce the intrinsic quality. An annual wastage of about 500 tonnes of paper, worth £24,000, was deemed acceptable to maintain standards. PWE knew paper was in short supply and was trusted not to squander it.59 Separate from Keeble’s Production Unit was John McMillan’s Editorial Unit, which prepared material suitable for dissemination to more than one country, particularly items designed to ‘relieve the intellectual and cultural black-out’ in Europe rather than reporting the latest news or important speeches. The Editorial Unit cooperated with the regional sections on content, but dealt with layout and printing itself. Bruce Lockhart described its productions, ‘miniature magazines and even books [. . . ] reduced to the size of a folded lady’s handkerchief [. . . ] so beautifully printed that the text could be read with ease and comfort by the naked eye’ as ‘the best propaganda productions of any country’.60

BBC Internal Organisation: Regionalisation and Centralisation Like PWE and its predecessors, the BBC divided its task along regional lines, beginning with the creation of the departments of Home and Overseas Intelligence in late 1937. At the same time, the formation of a separate Overseas Service was also discussed, although not carried through until October 1941 when the BBC’s foreign operations were split into European and Overseas Services. Regional sections grew from country production desks in the pre-war BBC European News

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Service: in this the BBC was ahead of SO1 and the MOI, having elements of its French Service in place by early July 1940.61 A regional approach was not universally approved of. Newsome, who became BBC European News Editor shortly after the outbreak of war, and Director of European Broadcasting in 1941, described the regional sections ‘as a series of guerrilla bands or groups of partisans, with no cohesion and entirely self-ordained plans and aims’. Newsome preferred his view that ‘the Service endeavours to speak with a European voice [and] is at the same time predominantly British but no less European for that’. This meant using British speakers to broadcast centrally prepared news and talks, reflecting British attitudes. Partly because he believed that Great Britain would win the war, he was looking ahead to the post-war world. The BBC’s European Services were a substitute for the free broadcasting that the Nazis had swept away, and the temporary audience would listen only until their own national stations became freely available again. In the meantime he felt that the regional approach prevented the BBC projecting an image of Great Britain.62 Newsome therefore issued his own directives, which he instructed the BBC Regional Editors not to clear with PWE. He also broadcast to Europe in English as ‘The Man in the Street’, often quoted in translation on regional programmes, regularly causing indignation in PWE and higher circles precisely because his broadcasts tended to be contradictory rather than complementary. They were therefore precisely the kind of thing that had to be avoided.63 The BBC regional sections disagreed with Newsome. The French Service’s Russell Page believed, ‘whatever directives are issued must in the main be put over by Frenchmen and by intelligent Frenchmen. [The French Service speakers] will not do anything without thrashing out every detail first’, let alone merely accept what was asked of them. Kirkpatrick supported this view. The BBC regional sections attempted to ignore Newsome, especially the French and German Sections which, being significantly larger (in terms of resources and personnel), had more room to manoeuvre. PWE did not discourage them, recognising ‘that the BBC editors could be relied on, usually, either to ignore [Newsome’s broadcasts] altogether or to temper the insularity of any quotations’. Although the BBC sections also tried to avoid PWE guidance, they did at least share a belief in the regional approach. PWE’s plans (based on the Central Directives that Newsome helped produce) did not simply dictate policy. They were often substantially revised in discussions with BBC regional representation.64 The BBC French Regional Editor was Darsie Gillie. He was instrumental in shaping the French Service, selecting its broadcasters, promoting its independence and helping it become capable of challenging German propaganda.65 The administrative staff were largely British, while most broadcasters were French, many using pseudonyms for fear of reprisals against relations in France. Jacques Duchesne (who as French Programmes Assistant ran the team and provided its unique and effective sound) joined the earliest recruits, Pierre Bourdan and Jean Marin, in July 1940. Others included Pierre Lefèvre, Jean Oberlé, and Maurice van Moppès. More French men and women were later recruited.66

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The BBC Sections individually produced their own programmes. The major exception was news, an area in which PWE played little part and which was heavily centralised. The BBC’s Central News Desk collected and prepared stories in English for the regional news editors to turn into news bulletins; these regional bulletins were then approved by the Central News Desk before transmission. Changes were frequently suggested. This system ensured that a consistent approach was maintained and conflicting stories avoided, yet prevented identikit regional news bulletins.67 In addition to the foreign-language news, there were also regular bulletins in English for Europe and a talks programme, London Calling Europe, none of which depended on PWE. After October 1943, these broadcasts were supplemented by general European broadcasts in French. These provided a general alternative to the English-language broadcasts, but created a potentially competing second BBC voice in French, and they were therefore opposed by the BBC French Service.

Rivals The progression from Department EH to PWE streamlined the British propaganda system, getting as close to unitary control as was practical. Yet competition remained. Some of this was the residual legacy of poor pre-war planning and the failure in the SO1–SO2 period effectively to combine propaganda with sabotage and subversion. Most of the other competition – the Free French, the Americans, the needs of operational propaganda and deceptions – developed as a result of the war and being non-propaganda-oriented or non-British in nature could not be dealt with by further reorganisation. That is not to say that these different bodies, their aims or the contribution they could make to winning the war were any more or less valid or important than what Department EH, SO1 and PWE were trying to achieve. However, without proper cooperation and coordination, these potential competitors could bring disaster to the British propaganda effort.

SOE SOE – meaning the saboteurs, known before September 1941 as SO2 – often clashed with PWE (or SO1) about what could be achieved with propaganda. This resulted in part from the different concepts of propaganda that they adopted. SO2 occasionally attempted propaganda work independently. For example, it began propaganda to the Balkans in late 1940, having overridden SO1. It was not until mid-1943 – after the matter was brought to Churchill’s attention – that PWE definitively reasserted control. Allowing SOE to undertake separate propaganda work raised the problem of an additional propaganda ‘voice’ and its potential impact on other British propaganda if not properly coordinated. Furthermore, SOE was expected to operate, at least in sabotage terms, across Europe: if it independently undertook propaganda at the same time, more problems could be created.68 Nonetheless, PWE had to rely on SOE to provide agents for propaganda purposes in Europe. An agreement was reached in the SO1–SO2 period that

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SO2 would control the agents, who would have political warfare training. The main aim of these agents was intelligence gathering (‘political reconnaissance’), broadcasting, leaflet production and public opinion assessment, in order to undertake propaganda work in conjunction with resistance groups. However, the availability of agents for propaganda work was always limited, except in Belgium. To what extent this lack of agents was a result of SOE obstinacy is difficult to assess because of a paucity of evidence. Garnett was certainly unequivocal in attaching the blame to SOE. He concluded that although ‘PWE French section was eager to send agents into the field [. . . ] its efforts were not very effective’, while in Belgium he identified ‘the kind of agents which PWE ought [. . . ] to have had in other countries’. It is telling that SOE’s relations with the Belgian government-in-exile were so bad that it was unable to operate there; PWE was on much better terms with the Belgians, and could. Nor do SOE memoirs tend to mention carrying out propaganda or political warfare training. As we shall see in Chapter 5, PWE, through SOE, did have some agents in France and relied on SOE to deliver some of its propaganda. Yet cooperation between the two bodies was not as good as it might have been. One can only speculate whether SOE might have done more for PWE and how the British propaganda effort could have been augmented, if relations between the two bodies had been better.69

The London Controlling Section Another potential competitor was the London Controlling Section (LCS), which oversaw deception operations. It was founded in 1941 when responsibility for deception policy passed from the Inter-Services Security Board (ISSB) to a dedicated Deception Staff and given the LCS nametag for security. It employed many methods: dummy installations and vehicles to deceive enemy reconnaissance; signals between fictitious army divisions to mislead enemy wireless interception units; and false information fed to the enemy through turned agents.70 The LCS did not directly rival PWE as it did not generate its own propaganda. However, it did ask PWE to circulate rumours and to organise leaflet dissemination over a supposed target area to reinforce deception schemes. In using propaganda for deception it had different aims and objectives from those of PWE. For example, propaganda was employed to help convince the Germans that an invasion of France was imminent. The danger was that this also persuaded the French people of the same thing. Promising something that would never materialise was potentially damaging for credibility. Moreover, if local resistance groups had acted in support of this non-existent attack, revealing themselves to the Germans, the consequences would have been disastrous. Given that the great majority of British propaganda was inherently grounded in truth, it was irreconcilable with deception plans, which by their very nature were misleading.71

The Free French Perhaps the most potentially difficult of the rivals facing PWE and its predecessors were the Free French. This movement had emerged in cooperation with the

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British government at around the time of the Franco-German armistice in June 1940. At least initially, though, such cooperation was a matter of expedience. Between the armistice and the launch of Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, in November 1942, British policy was primarily concerned with avoiding conflict with the Vichy government, partly because it was hoped that Vichy might re-enter the war on the Allied side and partly to prevent Vichy becoming allied with Germany. The relationship with the Free French was secondary. Yet a strong Free French military and political organisation emerged, especially after November 1942.72 From the British perspective, the Free French leader, Charles de Gaulle, was always a difficult, trying figure. He was ‘a dedicated man, his country absorbing his whole being [making] it possible to keep the flame of France alive [but] the fervour of his faith made him at times too suspicious of the intentions of others’. The Free French were a thorn in the Allied side, as de Gaulle strove to safeguard their independence and sovereignty. Relations with the British therefore blew hot and cold. The Americans were also distrustful, for example excluding the Free French from planning the invasion of Madagascar, where ‘there couldn’t have been any question of consulting [de Gaulle] beforehand because no Frenchman can keep a secret’. Although his organisation could be temporarily sidelined, it could never be completely ignored.73 The Free French obviously had an interest in propaganda to France. The British attempted with varying degrees of success to insist that Free French propaganda was coordinated with their own output and authorised before use. The best-known element of Free French propaganda was their broadcasts on the BBC. The partnership began with de Gaulle’s speech on 18 June 1940 appealing for French people to resist, and continued thereafter. From mid-July the Free French were allowed a five-minute daily programme, initially called Liberté, ´ Egalit´ e, Fraternité, subsequently Honneur et Patrie. Although guests or de Gaulle occasionally spoke, the official Free French spokesman, Maurice Schumann (replaced in April 1944 by André Gillois) made most broadcasts.74 Probably because he wished to assert France’s independence from the Allies, de Gaulle set up a Commissariat of Information, akin to the British MOI, under Jacques Soustelle. A London firm, Burrups, printed material – clandestine literature, newspapers, posters and leaflets – which was air-dropped or smuggled into France. With the knowledge of SO1, the Free French even dropped sachets of coffee – in short supply in France – as this, like the high-quality production of leaflets, would show the French that the Allies had resources to spare. Brazzaville, in French Equatorial Africa, the seat of Free France after October 1940, was home to La Voix de la France Libre, a Free French radio station. It was initially inaudible in metropolitan France, but additional transmitters were ordered to increase strength. Eventually, Algiers offered a more capable transmitter, allowing the Free French to create Radio France under the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB), an operational propaganda body attached to Allied headquarters.75 At lower levels, and on an individual basis, the Free French and their British colleagues were mutually cooperative. PWE representatives met weekly with

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the Free French propagandists. Information collected from France by the Free French was shared. PWE’s production units worked for the Free French, and Howe also supplied whatever type, paper and ink the Free French required to undertake projects themselves. There was collaboration to provide material for the clandestine press in France. Free French personnel were seconded to PWE. They included the editor of the Courrier, Robert Mengin, and speakers recruited for PWE’s black radio stations. Ideas were supplied to the Free French for their propaganda, which MOI Press Attachés helped to smuggle into France.76 At a higher level, relations in the propaganda field were not always so smooth, sometimes reflecting larger conflicts between the Free French and the Allies. Understandably, the British and the Free French had different aims and objectives. In purely propaganda terms, de Gaulle ‘was not always happy with the various pamphlets produced at Woburn and would, according to Mengin, have preferred more calls for active hostility towards the Vichy regime’. Such rumblings were common throughout the war. As we shall see in Chapter 5, PWE had to make significant changes to its black station, Radio Patrie, after Free French protests. The Free French also caused trouble for the Allied propaganda organisations abroad: in Algiers, for example, they prepared and distributed over France a leaflet about which they gave PWB no advance information.77 The most significant difficulties arose after Torch. Differences of opinion forced the closure of Radio Gaulle, a joint PWE/Free French RU. More seriously, the Allies made a deal with Darlan, by coincidence in Algiers as the landings began, to order Vichy French troops in North Africa to surrender. This allowed the invasion to be completed quickly and minimised casualties, but Darlan’s links with Vichy made the arrangement unpalatable to the Free French, who, in protest, refused to use their dedicated BBC time for more than a month. Members of the Free French who worked directly for the BBC French Service also went on strike.78 Because de Gaulle’s general policy was to maintain as great a degree of Free French independence in their participation in the war as possible, this made him and the Free French difficult to work alongside, as they refused to compromise their principles for expedience. Nor was accepting British policy guidance compatible. This made the Free French potentially capable of harming the British propaganda campaign and was why the British did their best to insist that the Free French cooperated. When the BBC or British aircraft based in Great Britain provided their only outlets, this was relatively easy to accomplish; once the Free French had an independent capability for propaganda, it became more difficult.

The Americans: OWI and OSS Not all the potential competitors really threatened the efficacy of British propaganda, however. The Americans, like the British, also turned to propaganda, although the gestation period of their organisations was considerably shorter. As in Britain, propaganda acquired a tarnished image in the USA after 1918 but, in contrast to the reluctant British reacceptance of propaganda in the 1930s,

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the Americans remained distrustful. It was not until after the outbreak of war in Europe that President Roosevelt began to change this attitude, creating departments to explain his government’s activities and provide information. In the summer of 1941 the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) and a Foreign Information Service (FIS), nominally part of COI but in practice autonomous, were set up. Their chiefs – Colonel William J. Donovan and Robert Sherwood respectively – had different attitudes towards propaganda, split along ‘black’ and ‘white’ lines in similar fashion to the British experience, and this caused a serious dispute between them. In June 1942, Roosevelt appointed Donovan head of another new organisation, OSS, responsible for secret subversive activities, while merging the COI with other information agencies to create the Office of War Information (OWI), with FIS re-emerging as OWI Overseas Branch. OSS controlled ‘black’ propaganda while OWI was responsible for ‘white’. In effect, OSS was the American version of SOE; OWI was equivalent to the MOI, while its Overseas Branch was the counterpart of PWE.79 Early Anglo-American propaganda coordination was carried out in the USA by British Security Coordination (BSC), a catch-all organisation set up in January 1941 to represent British security and intelligence services, including SOE, in the USA. In March 1942, however, despite opposition from Sir William Stephenson, the head of BSC, and from the Americans, PWE set up its own mission in the USA, which liaised directly with OWI Overseas Branch.80 But working in the USA on propaganda for Europe did not really make sense. FIS liaison officials were posted to London before the USA entered the war but, particularly in response to planning for Torch, preparations began in July 1942 to set up OWI’s ‘main overseas operational base’ in London. OWI and PWE worked closely – although not always smoothly – and coordinated their efforts through committees and, in some cases, integration of certain sections, such as the white production units. Plans were even made for an almost total integration of the two organisations, although these were ultimately abandoned. OSS also had a London branch office and PWE’s black propaganda experts worked in cooperation with it, for example in production. At first, the Americans relied on the British to print and deliver leaflets – four examples were disseminated over France in the first five months of 1942. The first OWI-produced leaflets were delivered in November 1942; in May 1943 the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) began dropping leaflets, including PWE productions. Unlike the RAF, the USAAF had a special squadron dedicated to leaflet dissemination. Along with the Munroe ‘leaflet bomb’, discussed in Chapter 2, this made it, in Garnett’s opinion, ‘a more valuable disseminating agency for printed propaganda than the RAF’.81 Like the British, American broadcasting to Europe began while the USA was still technically neutral, although at least one American short-wave station, WRUL Boston, was British-controlled and was regarded by PWE as similar to the Woburn-based RUs. Control was turned over to the Americans after their entry into the war, although PWE produced directives for WRUL Boston until at least February 1942. In addition, in early 1942, the BBC began rebroadcasting American material in French, German and Italian, and the amount of

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broadcasting time was increased in the spring of 1943 as more transmitters came into service. OWI, meanwhile, developed the American Broadcasting System In Europe (ABSIE), but this never rivalled the BBC in terms of strength of broadcast and reception, audience size and loyalty.82 The cooperation between the British and the Americans in propaganda terms was not always perfect. It was, however, a great deal better than that which existed with the Free French, because American and British aims and objectives were a lot closer. The level of integration that was achieved between PWE and OWI was impressive and demonstrated how different organisations could work together.

The Operational Propaganda Organisations Allied propaganda intended for European civilians was, largely, handled by civilian agencies. The military handled propaganda intended for enemy soldiers. This propaganda, intended primarily to assist military operations, was known as ‘operational propaganda’. Because requirements for the propaganda changed rapidly as military circumstances evolved, it could not be prepared centrally and shipped: it had to be produced near where it was needed. PWB, the Psychological Warfare Branch, was set up in the autumn of 1942 to assist the invasion of North Africa and later played a role in the invasions of Sicily and Italy. PWB was a military unit but took political guidance from OWI and PWE, the need for coordination between them provoking the creation of the London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee (LPWCC) in September 1943. Preparing for the invasion of France, Eisenhower created the Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD, SHAEF), based in London, depriving PWB of ‘the cream of its talent’ in doing so. PWD’s work was coordinated by regular meetings with PWE and OWI, the modus operandi determined in an agreement between them in April 1944. The LPWCC not only oversaw PWD’s operations but also worked out leaflet priorities and allocation of paper supplies. It eventually became ‘the deciding authority on all Political Warfare questions’, not just those relating to PWD but also to PWE and OWI as well.83 In common with the other organisations already examined, the main drawback of the operational propaganda organisations was that they provided another alternative voice, which, without the proper coordination, could be potentially damaging. But, as with PWE’s experiences with OWI, links with PWB and PWD were good, probably because many members of both organisations had PWE or OWI experience. PWD had a different purpose for its propaganda and this too helped minimise conflict.

Conclusion The British government pioneered the large-scale use of propaganda during the First World War, developing a relatively streamlined system and several different

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methods of dissemination. When in 1935 planning for propaganda for another war began, the First World War structure was revived. In hindsight this was a mistake, given the expansion of the task faced, both in terms of the area to which propaganda needed to be delivered and the methods available, to which radio broadcasting had been added. But the inter-war propaganda planners could not necessarily be expected to reach that conclusion and take steps to correct it, hampered as they were by negative attitudes towards propaganda, political intrigue and other issues. Different elements of 1930s planning were carried out in isolation from each other, so that only after the outbreak of the Second World War could the conflicts thus created be revealed and resolved. There were at once difficulties of coordination and development of ill feeling between the organisations. The first two years of war especially were characterised by arguments and conflict as the emerging problems were dealt with. The creation of PWE largely solved the external administrative conflicts, although the BBC remained a potential source of trouble. Internally, too, the propagandists within Department EH, SO1, PWE and the BBC had to try to accommodate the increasing workload and ensure that, at the very least, their own output was internally consistent. But, at the same time, outside the British propaganda system, other bodies with an interest in propaganda were being established and these could not be amalgamated in the same way. While in some cases cooperation was excellent, conflicts arose in others, not least because some issues did not disappear. The machinery for propaganda as a whole did not necessarily appear capable of producing consistent material. There were too many potential areas where contradictions could arise, because overall unitary control of propaganda, mostly achieved within British circles, remained ultimately elusive. It is difficult to establish the extent to which these problems impacted on the propaganda output itself, if it all, but one thing is certain. Without the distractions that must have caused by the external conflicts and the need for internal reorganisation, the propagandists would have had more time and energy to devote to their main responsibilities. Nonetheless, however flawed, the machinery worked. Whether it was capable of producing a consistent message, avoiding contradictions, is assessed in Chapter 3. But, consistent or otherwise, its impact was absolutely dependent on the British capacity to deliver it. Unless British leaflets reached their readers, or BBC broadcasts were received by their listeners, even what was potentially the very best propaganda was in reality completely useless. It is to the question of the effectiveness of the methods of dissemination that we now turn our attention.

2

Method: The Distribution of White Propaganda

Leaflet Distribution

The Air Ministry’s Propaganda Role The Air Ministry was the political master of the RAF. As such, it claimed final authority over all leaflets to be dropped, approval taking place after the leaflet had been finalised but before printing. It demanded this authority for several reasons. During the First World War the Germans had threatened reprisals against Allied airmen responsible for leaflet dissemination. It was feared that the same might happen again, especially if the leaflets incited violence or murder, and the Air Ministry therefore wished to be confident that its pilots were not put in this position. It also wanted to ensure that information concerning the RAF or the Luftwaffe was accurate but that nothing of value to the enemy was revealed or British intelligence sources compromised.1 The Air Ministry had gained this right of veto by the end of October 1939 and it was reconfirmed in December 1940. In practice, it meant that the Air Ministry was able to reject leaflets regardless of larger propaganda policy. On the one hand, given the conflicts over control of propaganda already examined, it is surprising that this position remained unchallenged, especially after the establishment of PWE. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the Air Ministry ever actually exercised this authority. The propagandists were perfectly capable of policing their output. As we shall see, while white propaganda might encourage certain forms of resistance, it never went as far as inciting violence or murder. That was a job left for black propaganda. It is impossible to say if this position directly resulted from the Air Ministry’s attitude or if the propagandists would have adopted it anyway. But as the propagandists relied on the RAF to deliver leaflets – at least until the USAAF began dissemination – being seen to accept the veto could have had value, while any objections could well have been counter-productive.2 The Air Ministry also sought to prevent production of propaganda leaflets that would affect RAF prestige or aircrew morale. This was an extension of a more general attitude. Early in the war, a decision ‘that leaflets were to be kept secret as far as the British were concerned’ was taken. This remained unchanged throughout the war, although sometimes texts of particularly important leaflets were published. Ludicrously, this meant that the British public knew leaflets were being dropped over Europe but were denied knowledge of their

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content, which was available to enemy and enemy-occupied populations. The non-disclosure ruling was maintained to avoid criticism, for example in the press, which would inevitably accompany making these leaflets available, giving enemy counter-propagandists a field day. This contributed to the decision to make them SO1’s responsibility, since a secret department could keep leaflets secret more readily than the MOI.3

The RAF’s Attitude to Leaflet Propaganda The RAF attitude to dissemination directly affected the type of propaganda leaflets produced. Unlike the USAAF, Bomber Command never established a dedicated leaflet squadron, arguing that there were too few aircraft available and that bad weather might ground a special squadron when conditions elsewhere might allow aircraft to operate from another airfield. This attitude meant that stores of leaflets had to be maintained at all airfields so that all opportunities for dissemination could be exploited.4 Leaflet dropping was not, however, regarded as a high priority. Harris, Bomber Command’s chief from February 1942, opposed any diversions from the strategic bombing of Germany. His aircrew similarly disliked ‘nickelling’ – disseminating leaflets, which for security were known as ‘nickels’. It was not an easy job. Even drawing leaflets from stores for loading required a time-consuming ‘complicated secret document procedure’. For operational aircrew, leaflet dissemination sorties did not count towards their thirty-mission tour of duty, as they were not regarded as operational flights. Nor was it the job for which they had trained. The propagandists tried to counter this less than ideal situation in a number of ways. They prepared ‘timeless’ leaflets that remained usable for some time, rather than those that dated quickly. They also tended to avoid leaflets that were too geographically specific (meaning that they would prepare leaflets that were suitable for the whole of France but not, for example, for Brittany alone), as they could not be sure exactly where Bomber Command would drop them.5 In addition, the propagandists embarked on ‘a policy of intensive relations’ to persuade RAF personnel of the value of propaganda. PWE produced a pamphlet for them, ‘RAF Against Goebbels: The Story of the Great Truth Offensive over Europe’. Guidance notes were provided for RAF intelligence officers responsible for briefing trainee aircrews. The propagandists were also asked to provide information about the places they nominated as leaflet targets, to ‘encourage the air crews and stimulate their interest in leaflets’. Nonetheless, it is likely that some aircrews deliberately avoided dropping leaflets as ordered – perhaps because they did not perceive propaganda as being of importance or because they were unwilling to fly over heavily defended areas for the sake of leaflets alone.6 Yet PWE was also sometimes less cooperative than it might have been. To coincide with Bastille Day 1942, the RAF was asked to distribute a special leaflet on the night of 13/14 July. The request reached the Air Ministry only on 10 July. Bomber Command carried out the operation, but understandably complained that PWE could and should have given more notice. On other occasions aircraft

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or balloons were available but there were no leaflets to disseminate, stocks having run out because the propagandists had been taken by surprise by the unusually high quantity of leaflets the RAF had distributed.7

Problems of Leaflet Dissemination Leaflet dissemination was difficult and dangerous. Bruce Lockhart recorded the standard experience of aircrew dropping leaflets in November 1939, which by April 1942 was largely unchanged. Perhaps half a ton of leaflets, equivalent in weight to more than 200 reams of modern A4 paper, were fed through an aircraft’s flare tube by hand, often by the gunners or the flight engineer, usually at more than 12,000 feet above sea level. The leaflets were secured in bundles of 750–1,000, which would scatter once the slipstream broke the string or rubber band holding them together. The limitations of the primitive equipment carried meant that this had to be done without additional oxygen to compensate for the thin atmosphere. It was therefore physically exhausting. More significantly, the gunner’s involvement left the aircraft partly defenceless. Not surprisingly, therefore, sometimes leaflets were dropped over the sea on the pretext of testing the bomb bay doors, where leaflets were often stored during the flight. In normal circumstances, the leaflets presumably could not be released this way because simultaneous dropping would result in an over-concentration, rather than the spread achieved by using the flare tube.8 Things improved after the RAF began packing leaflets in standard bomb containers (SBCs), used for nearly all drops over France by August 1942. These were tin boxes originally designed to carry small bombs weighing up to 40 lbs each. Over the target, the bomb-aimer opened the SBCs, releasing their contents. SBCs solved many of the problems aircrew associated with leaflet dissemination. By September 1943 leaflet dissemination had become routine – so much so that, in discussing whether to suspend operations until new leaflets announcing the Italian surrender were available, it was suggested that doing so would be detrimental, breaking the ‘continuity of habit’. The combination of mechanical assistance with PWE’s activities to convince RAF personnel of the value of leaflet raids had clearly achieved a change in attitude.9 What a standard payload of leaflets might have been, or how many aircraft sorties were required to distribute a certain quantity or weight of leaflets, depended on the capabilities of the aircraft being operated, whether the aircraft was also carrying bombs or supplies for the resistance, and on the leaflets themselves, which varied in size and weight. This makes it impossible to establish exactly how many sorties were undertaken. However, the scale of the undertaking can be estimated. The first leaflet operation of the war involved 5.4 million leaflets, each a single sheet measuring 81/2 × 51/4 inches or one ‘leaflet unit’, weighing 13 tons in total. Ten Whitley bombers were used, each taking an average payload of 1.3 tons. For France, most leaflets consisted of at least two leaflet units, which means that the total weight of leaflets of the 676 million leaflets dropped there during the course of the war was at least 3,250 tons. Using the same 1.3 ton

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average payload, 2,500 sorties would have been required to distribute them. By contrast the half-ton payload recorded by Bruce Lockhart would have meant more than 6,500 separate flights. Whatever the actual figures, it was clearly no small job.10 The extent of dissemination was influenced by the experience of aircrew involved. Most leaflet dissemination over France was undertaken by the Operational Training Units (OTUs), formations in which newly trained personnel gained experience of flying as a crew over enemy territory: France’s air defences were less formidable than those elsewhere. The OTUs were equipped with older aircraft, usually Whitley or Wellington bombers, so although they were theoretically capable of flying as far as the south of France and back again, they never did. The maximum realistic range of a Wellington left insufficient fuel reserves for a trainee crew, more prone to mistakes, to make the trip safely. For more distant targets, fully trained crews in superior aircraft such as Lancaster and Stirling bombers flew special leaflet sorties, or dropped leaflets en route to bomb Germany or Italy. Despite the drawbacks they faced, the OTUs nonetheless did their best and were praised for the high proportion of material issued to them and disseminated.11 Accurate navigation was a problem. In August 1941, the Butt Report showed that fewer than a quarter of operational aircrew got within 5 miles of their target. Where the target was heavily defended, the proportion was even smaller. Trainee personnel would inevitably be even less accurate. Accurate leaflet dropping was also more difficult than accurate bombing. Leaflets fell at around 4 feet per second. In a 20 mph wind, if an aircraft at 15,000 feet released its leaflets 20 miles upwind from the target and if the wind did not change, an hour later they would land in the right place. The SBC did not improve accuracy, as leaflets were still dropped loose. The solution was a leaflet bomb that could be dropped at high altitude, fall accurately towards the target and split at low level. But, despite plans for such devices from the French and an RAF squadron leader, it was left to the USAAF to develop an improved version, named the Munroe bomb after its creator. This device could carry up to 50,000 leaflets, splitting open to release them at 1,500 feet, and it would have revolutionised the RAF’s leaflet efforts. Unfortunately, Bomber Command only adopted it in September 1944, when the greater part of its leaflet dissemination work was done, and in France had ceased.12 Adverse weather conditions, especially in winter, also disrupted operations, affecting OTUs more than experienced squadrons. Conversely, in summer the shorter nights limited the distance that could be travelled under cover of darkness. In 1942 Lyon and Vichy were the furthest places reachable during summer, the latter being a 900 mile round trip from the nearest Bomber Command base, RAF Mildenhall, near Cambridge.13 Bomber Command was not the only leaflet distributor. Army Cooperation Command, Fighter Command, Coastal Command and the squadrons set aside for special SOE duties also assisted. Unmanned gas-filled balloons known as ‘M’ balloons (to give the impression that they had some meteorological purpose) were operated by ‘M’ Balloon Unit. Leaflets were attached to a mechanism intended

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to allow their gradual release, but this could malfunction and drop all the leaflets simultaneously. Each balloon could be used only once, and from 1942 there was not enough rubberised cotton to maintain production. Accurate weather forecasting was essential to predict the balloon’s likely flight path and set the release. By comparison with aircraft, balloons were therefore more haphazard – with good navigation the former could at least arrive in the right place, though neither method was foolproof.14

Costs and Benefits of Leaflet Propaganda to the RAF Early night-time leaflet operations provided opportunities to test Bomber Command’s capabilities in wartime. Essential knowledge and experience was gained, such as the extent of night-time visibility over a blacked-out Europe. Crews learned to fly in difficult conditions in darkness over enemy territory, find the target and return home. The lack of night-time resistance to leaflet dissemination over Germany in 1939 prompted the RAF to switch from day to night-bombing. Leaflet operations allowed otherwise seasoned crews to gain night-flying experience, and were seen as less complicated flights that would provide opportunities for crews who needed refreshers after a period of inactivity, or who had recently returned from particularly arduous operations and needed something a little easier for their next job. Flights over France provided experience of flying extreme distances – to southern French ports, for example – more safely than by crossing over Germany into Eastern Europe, a much more heavily defended route. The RAF also needed reconnaissance information. Leaflet operations, such as those over Germany in 1939, provided an opportunity to gather it, and this trend continued. In 1942 ‘freshman’ crews sent over Occupied Europe combined leaflet dissemination with night photography.15 Leaflet missions were also useful to SOE. Those manning French defences, and the French population, learned to associate aircraft noise with leaflets. In May 1941 the first SOE agent to be parachuted into France, George Noble (code name of Georges Begué) was dropped from an aircraft which was then intended to drop leaflets over Nevers. (Actually, it dropped them over Châteauroux, closer to the parachute site and home.) An aircraft apparently doing nothing might attract attention, but leaflet dissemination would explain away its presence. This became standard practice and, in SOE’s view, essential for security. Because leaflets dropped in the same place or nearby would attract the attention of the authorities, increasing the risk that the agent or supplies dropped would be captured, leaflets were generally dropped as much as 100 miles away. Leaflet dropping was not universally acclaimed by SOE, however: after the RAF dropped leaflets over Condom including on SOE’s ‘best parachute ground’ there, the Germans made the locals, including the chief SOE agent, collect them. Cursed with a bad back, he requested that the RAF ‘drop pamphlets in the sea, next time’.16 There were also costs to the RAF. These included fuel costs and general wearand-tear and, far more significantly, the casualties sustained. At least thirty-four aircraft were lost on leaflet operations over France, eighteen of which can be

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positively identified: twelve Wellingtons and three Whitleys from the OTUs, and two Halifaxes and a Stirling from regular squadrons. Fifty-eight crew members died, twenty-two became POWs, five evaded capture, one was injured over Great Britain and eight escaped unhurt after their Stirling was shot down by ‘friendly’ aircraft while returning home. Five possible identifications can be made: a Whitley and its crew on an SOE mission (probably, therefore, carrying leaflets) and four Wellingtons were lost, killing twelve aircrew, and probably more. At least seventy men died, therefore, to drop leaflets on France during the Second World War. By contrast, the 1943 Dambusters raid alone cost fifty-three members of 617 Squadron killed and three captured, with eight of nineteen aircraft being lost. In the absence of comprehensive figures, total losses for leaflet operations over France cannot be contrasted with RAF losses overall. However, between January and May 1942 Europe-wide leaflet operations suffered a 2 per cent casualty rate, significantly lower than the 3.4 per cent rate experienced overall. Over that period at least, aircraft and crews on leaflet missions were more likely to return safely. This would be scant comfort, however; besides, those benefiting from the better odds of surviving a leaflet operation would soon find themselves on regular bombing duties.17

Dissemination Data: RAF Records and Evidence from France The RAF carefully documented the quantities of leaflets its squadrons disseminated. The Air Ministry collated these figures, forming a detailed record of leaflet dissemination between the beginning of the war and the night of 31 March/1 April 1944. Other leaflet dissemination data is held in the National Archives, including cumulative monthly and annual totals and the only data covering dissemination after the beginning of April 1944. Mostly this is simply confirmatory, but in some cases provides additional or conflicting information. Sometimes, the detailed record shows that dissemination was higher than the cumulative totals record. More commonly, the reverse is true: about 150 million more leaflets appear to have been disseminated than can be accounted for by destination. These additional quantities may relate to non-French-language material, Free French or, after November 1942, American material, all of which falls outside the scope of this book. Some might concern British material dropped by RAF aircraft based outside Great Britain or, after May 1943, by the USAAF. In some cases, comparison between Air Ministry data, the Complete Index and the Bomber Command War Diaries produces additional dissemination data, suggesting which leaflets made up these extra quantities and when they might have been dropped.18 Although it must suffice, given the absence of a comparable source of information, the RAF’s record of leaflet dissemination must be treated with caution. Even if all reports were made in good faith (and doubtless some were not, to disguise known mistakes) navigational errors were common. Moreover, with balloons, only predicted targets and date of release could be reported. After August 1943 balloons were used only to disseminate a special series of black propaganda (known as ‘Q’ leaflets) in German. The ‘M’ Balloon Unit did not distribute

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any white propaganda material after that date. But the cumulative totals include balloon dissemination over France after August 1943 while ‘M’ Balloon Unit records list French targets for ‘Q’ leaflets. These leaflets were probably intended for Germans in France and are therefore excluded from this assessment.19 The RAF record can be contrasted with evidence received from France about the British leaflets found there. How this evidence got to Great Britain in wartime will be discussed in Chapter 4. Some 258 identifiably different source reports, letters and interviews concerning leaflets have survived, or are referred to in ‘Evidence of Reception’ reports. Both PWE and the BBC compiled such reports, under a variety of titles, to draw conclusions about their propaganda output. These reports were, however, intended for short-term operational use, rather than longer-term cumulative assessment of the propaganda campaign. Taken together, the surviving sources and evidential reports allow some 279 places within France to be identified, with some – such as Paris – appearing more than once. Modern information from French museums concerning their leaflet holdings is also useful.

RAF Claims of Leaflet Dissemination More than 676 million leaflets were dropped over France between 16 July 1940 and September 1944. This amounted to sixteen leaflets per person – one leaflet per person per quarter – or nearly 7.6 million leaflets for each of the eighty-nine mainland départements, to which Map 1 (see Appendix) provides a key. But, in practice, distribution was not as uniform as this for the 476 million leaflets for which destinations are known; and it seems unlikely, given the RAF’s limitations, that the other 200 million seriously affected the overall distribution shown by Maps 3 to 7. Nor was the distribution chronologically even. As Figure 2.1 shows, the quantity dropped per quarter increased from the end of 1941 until 1944. 120

Quantity of leaflets (millions)

100 80 60 40 20 0 July− Oct− Jan− Apr− July− Oct− Jan− Apr− July− Oct− Jan− Apr− July− Oct− Jan− Apr− July− Sept Dec Mar June Sept Dec Mar June Sept Dec Mar June Sept Dec Mar June Sept 1940 1940 1941 1941 1941 1941 1942 1942 1942 1942 1943 1943 1943 1943 1944 1944 1944 Time (quarters, July 1940−September 1944) Known destination

Unknown destination

Total

Figure 2.1 White propaganda leaflets dropped over France, 1940–4

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According its own claims, the RAF never visited twenty of the départements, with a combined population of just over 4.5 million, between July 1940 and April 1944. A further sixteen départements received leaflets in just one single quarter over this period. These départements were, almost without exception, in southern, south-eastern and eastern France, at least 500 miles from Great Britain and often further. Over the whole period, there was a clear geographical bias favouring those areas of France closer to British territory. The geographical spread of leaflets ebbed and flowed. Between July and the end of 1940, with a few exceptions, all leaflets were dropped in the northernmost quarter of France. During 1941 dissemination extended into central France. The area of coverage increased further in 1942, with disseminations in southern France, but was patchy, with some central areas being overlooked. In 1943 almost every département within range of the OTUs was reached, the area of coverage similar to 1942 but with a more consistent dissemination within it. Finally, between January and April 1944, although some more distant targets were reached, the bulk of leaflets were concentrated, as in 1940, in the northernmost quarter of France. The geographical spread mostly resulted from the RAF’s capabilities and attitudes, as discussed above. In particular, as the OTUs did not operate over the Unoccupied Zone in 1940 and 1941, leaflet dissemination over this part of France was lacking until regular squadrons took on this task, and then only in early March 1941. By the end of the year arrangements had been made that the OTUs ‘would be flying regularly over Unoccupied France’ and it had been decided to extend OTU leaflet dropping ‘as far as the limit of the area Abbeville–Reims–Troyes–Vichy–Limoges–Rochefort’.20 Demographically, the pattern of distribution makes more sense, although this was a fluke. It resulted from operational priorities unrelated to propaganda, the capability of the aircraft to penetrate into France, or from crews dropping their leaflets over the first part of France they found, but not from deliberate planning. As Map 2 shows, the more populous départements were in the northern half of France. In the broadest terms, the RAF’s concentration on more northerly targets meant that leaflets were generally dropped over the most populous regions. But, within these areas, the RAF remained incapable of a uniform distribution. Sometimes, it was overzealous. In August 1943 the complaint was made that ‘Alençon, with a population of 16,000, received over 800,000 leaflets one night in July [and] a further 1/2 million during other nights in the same month’. Similarly, that September Blois received 1,288,000 leaflets for a population of 24,607 and other leaflets in the same month. By contrast, in April and May 1942, Cherbourg, a town of 37,461, received just 27,000 leaflets; in the first six months of 1942 Douai received 6,000 leaflets to share among its population of 41,598; and in February 1943 Nancy received 66,000 copies of a single leaflet to share between its population of 120,578.21 There was some justification for dropping more leaflets on a town than its known population. It was impossible for anyone in Great Britain to gauge accurately the population of a given French town. They had to rely on information from reference works like the Petit Larousse encyclopaedia, outdated before it

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was published. Neither could such works reveal the proportion of the population incapable of reading leaflets, nor could they take into account the effects of the dislocation of the French people caused by the German invasion and occupation. Moreover, the ballistic properties of leaflets were such that, even when an aircraft was in the right place, it was impossible to be absolutely accurate. It was also impossible to prevent leaflets falling somewhere that rendered them useless, in rivers for example, or in inaccessible places such as on rooftops. The more leaflets that were dropped, the better. But a balance had to be struck. Given that supplies of leaflets were not inexhaustible and the opportunities for dissemination not limitless, excessive over-supply could only deprive other places of leaflets. There was no excuse for disseminating fewer leaflets on a town than its known adult population, although there were explanations why it might have happened. For example, Bomber Command might have intended to send aircraft to a given target on several consecutive nights, only to find that bad weather prevented it from going there more than once. There were also mitigations of the effects of underdissemination, for example that leaflets were circulated on the ground by the French themselves, but these could not necessarily be expected to offset entirely the impact of under-supply. Ultimately, the RAF should and probably could have aimed at a distribution pattern, at least within those areas it was capable of supplying regularly, that mimicked the population distribution as far as it was known.

The Propagandists’ Targets The weaknesses of the distribution pattern discussed above owed everything to the vagaries of the RAF, and nothing to the propagandists. It is no surprise, therefore, that the dissemination claimed by the RAF did not satisfy the propagandists’ needs. At least partly in reaction to the RAF’s inability to disseminate leaflets across France in a pattern that would enable leaflets to reach the most people, the propagandists began to estimate where their leaflets could have the most impact, in order to ask the RAF to concentrate on these areas. For example, because in Occupied France the German presence assisted the British propagandists, they gave it lower priority for dissemination than Unoccupied France (although this directly conflicted with the RAF’s track record of doing precisely the opposite). The propagandists also had a view on what quantities were required in different places, and they often even wanted certain leaflets delivered in preference to others that were held in stock. Systems were developed to keep the RAF apprised of these various different imperatives.22 It is unclear when the practice of prioritising leaflets developed. As early as November 1940, due to limited airfield storage space, leaflets deemed out of date were collected and pulped. Those that were not removed were those to which the propagandists attached most importance. As a means of prioritising leaflets, this worked when only a small number of different leaflets existed, but once more types were available a system that specifically prioritised certain leaflets over others became necessary. This existed by the autumn of 1941. Leaflet priorities were not always respected. In September 1941, Beck complained, ‘on the only dissemination flight which aircraft had made over France for

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a fortnight, they had dropped not a leaflet for which priority had been asked, but a non-priority leaflet’. Similarly, in March 1942, although the Courrier had been prioritised, ‘only 288,000 Courriers were dropped out of a total dissemination of 1,293,250’. By contrast, when in May 1942 PWE enquired why ‘such large numbers of F.41 [“Blackmail of Prisoners Must End”] were disseminated on the night of 5/6 May in proportion to the number of Courriers dropped’ they were told that the RAF Group responsible had already delivered its entire stock of the two priority leaflets. In other words, the RAF had already done what was asked.23 Different areas of France were also prioritised in terms of the receipt of leaflets. This may have developed from early attempts to produce specific leaflets for specific parts of France, about which the RAF had been approached before production began. In late November 1940 the RAF was asked if it could visit Brittany; its agreement resulted in the leaflet ‘Bretons’, disseminated on the night of 20/21 December. Such approaches were not always productive: Coastal Command proved unable to assist in November 1940, while it is unclear if a request made for dissemination over Brittany in late May 1941 resulted in the production of a specific leaflet. And, even though the propagandists tended to prefer general leaflets to region-specific ones, that did not stop them requesting that specific places were targeted. In September 1941 a request was met for leaflets to be dropped over Paris. Dedicated operations were also mounted to disseminate F.26 ‘The Renault Factories Bombed’ and F.125 ‘Churchill’.24 What the propagandists wanted the RAF to achieve was not always practical, especially earlier in the war, although they themselves may have received misleading information or misunderstood the RAF’s capabilities. In October 1940 they were told that the OTUs could drop 6 million leaflets weekly, far more than was actually achieved. They were also told that aircraft would probably visit Bordeaux, a 1,200 mile round trip. Yet the RAF’s response shortly afterwards to a list of targets provided by SO1 was that they were practically all out of range. The list has disappeared, but it seems unlikely that the places suggested were almost exclusively more distant than Bordeaux, in the southernmost third of France, suggesting that somewhere along the line some wires had been crossed. Similarly, responding to a revised priorities list after the complete occupation of France in November 1942, the RAF ‘were not optimistic about reaching some of the “A” and “B” priority targets [nominated by PWE] such as Marseilles, Toulon and Toulouse, etc’, while Army Cooperation Command did not believe it could operate beyond Vichy. There was clearly a divergence between what the propagandists wanted and what the RAF could actually achieve.25 But the RAF was the only means to deliver leaflet propaganda to France and the propagandists pressed on, considering and justifying target priorities. In July 1941, for example, the following ranking was prepared: (i) Paris – no outside news reaches it and [the] BBC is completely jammed (ii) Unoccupied France – (a) Morale is inferior to Occupied France; (b) Population is concentrated in industrial targets e.g. Lyon, Vichy, St-Etienne, Clermont-Ferrand, Limoges.

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british propaganda to france, 1940--1944 (iii) Occupied France – Placed third as it can hear the BBC and morale is better than Paris and Unoccupied France. Main targets Lille, Roubaix, Turcoing [sic], St-Quentin, Valenciennes, Bethune, Doullens (iv) Country districts – objectives limited, consequently would be neglected.

The propagandists also gave the RAF a target for weekly dissemination over France – 6.5 million ‘leaflet units’ (meaning an 81/2 × 51/4 inch sheet, as discussed above).26 But the actual dissemination was rather different. In August and September 1941, 3,667,000 leaflets were disseminated over France. Of these, 1,265,500 leaflets were dropped over Paris. Over the Unoccupied Zone, 291,000 were disseminated, including over Limoges and Vichy but not Clermont-Ferrand, Lyon or St-Etienne. A further 1,960,500 leaflets were released over Occupied France, including St-Quentin but not Béthune, Doullens, Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing or Valenciennes. Finally, 54,000 leaflets were distributed over south-western France, possibly including part of the Unoccupied Zone (but none of the propagandists’ targets), and 96,000 leaflets were lost when an aircraft went missing. The RAF had concentrated on more northerly France, disregarding the propagandists both in terms of the target areas and the target towns within them. The RAF also failed in quantity terms. In August and September 1941 the RAF should have dropped 52 million leaflet units. Unless each leaflet dropped comprised an average fourteen leaflet units, this did not happen. If the leaflets consisted of two leaflet units, like most leaflets dropped over France, the RAF disseminated only about 14 per cent of its target. The targets changed substantially by 1942 but the RAF’s attainment of them did not. In May 1942 the Unoccupied Zone was deemed more important as a leaflet target than the Occupied Zone, with further priorities set within each zone. In the two calendar months following, 34 million leaflets were disseminated. Claimed destinations are known for about 23.5 million, although this includes a number of leaflets that had been carried aboard aircraft that were lost, and it is conceivable that they were disseminated before the aircraft was destroyed, rather than being destroyed with it. Just 2.7 million (11 per cent) of these were dropped over the Unoccupied Zone, which the propagandists saw as more important. The Occupied Zone received nearly 20.6 million leaflets. Within the zones, the RAF managed to hit more of its targets. In the Unoccupied Zone, leaflets were dropped over Vichy and Lyon, the top priorities, and Limoges and Clermont-Ferrand. But the RAF did not claim to have disseminated a single leaflet over Marseille, St-Etienne, Toulon, Toulouse, Grenoble or the other Mediterranean ports, the other requested destinations. In the Occupied Zone, Paris and Lille, the first and second priorities, received the largest and second largest share of the leaflets dropped. No leaflets were dropped over Roubaix and Tourcoing, ranked third and fourth. In Alsace–Lorraine, leaflets were divided between Nancy and Metz, while Strasbourg and Mulhouse, both specified targets, were ignored. Similarly,

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no leaflets were dropped over Bordeaux. More than 10 million leaflets went to towns in the Occupied Zone not stipulated by the propagandists.27 Target priorities were further revised in the summer of 1943, but the RAF’s attitude remained unchanged. In August, the propagandists complained, ‘dissemination is governed entirely by bombing strategy, and bears no relation to political warfare policy. Leaflets are not dropped in accordance with any prearranged plan, but are dependent on the RAF bombing target for the night, and the route taken.’ This was especially true of distribution undertaken by the regular squadrons, which could drop leaflets for the French people only if their routes to the bombing target for the night took them over part of France, and the propagandists’ complaint must therefore relate at least in part to dissemination of leaflets for countries other than France. Indeed, the propagandists acknowledged that France was ‘far better served [. . . ] Leaflets are dropped mainly by OTUs who are not bombing. It has therefore been possible to arrange priority areas [. . . ] Possibly our priority areas could be revised and made more specific.’ The claim that France was better supplied than other countries, thanks to the OTUs, is true. It does not mean, however, that France was actually well served and, given the RAF’s proven inability even to claim dissemination over a nominated target, the suggestion that performance could be improved by making the targets yet more specific seems wildly optimistic.28 Nonetheless, a set of priority targets issued in January 1944, listed in Table 2.1, was a great deal more complex than those that had gone before, verging on a ‘paintby-numbers’ map of France. This complexity may have reflected the suggestion that priority areas should be made more specific, despite the contradiction with the RAF’s track record. The detail may also have resulted from the targets being part of the meticulous preparations for Operation Overlord and because the value of leaflets was expected to increase as the war came to a close. It was believed that ‘when the Allied armies march into France [. . . ] the Germans will resort to every device to prevent the people from hearing our messages and instructions [. . . ] it may well be that nickels will remain our sole means of communication with the occupied peoples – a line kept open by the RAF’. Not only were jamming and other counter-measures considered likely to increase the importance of leaflets but, as discussed below, radio sets would also wear out.29 By the beginning of 1944 the RAF had been transformed, in terms of quality of equipment and in performance as a strategic bombing force, but its performance as a distributor of propaganda did not improve. In February and March 1944 more than 46 million leaflets were disseminated over France, of which destinations for about 29 million are known. As Table 2.1 shows, the RAF again failed to fulfil the propagandists’ wishes concerning both quantity and location. Leaflets were dropped over the three top priority targets but in numbers that did not approach the quantities set (unless the 17 million leaflets for which targets are unknown were also dropped there). Nor were all of the towns specified in the priority area visited – leaflets were not dropped over Brest, Le Havre, Nantes or Reims. The closest performance to the target set was over the area defined as ‘north-east of Seine’, although the RAF delivered about 1.1 million leaflets fewer than it

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Table 2.1 Target and actual dissemination, February and March 1944 Target quantity

Actual quantity

Paris and suburbs North-east France, including Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing Coastal areas, concentrating on Le Havre, Cherbourg, Brest, Nantes, but including large towns in the hinterland, e.g. Angers, Le Mans, Rennes, Rouen, Reims, Amiens Lyon (and suburbs) St-Etienne Vichy Clermont-Ferrand (and suburbs) Grenoble Dijon (and suburbs) Nancy (and suburbs) Toulouse (and suburbs) Bordeaux (and suburbs) Montpellier (and region) Marseilles (and suburbs) Nice Area north-east of Seine (other than Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing) Area Seine to Atlantic (north of Loire) Massif Central Area south of Garonne to Pyrénées South-east France Alsace-Lorraine Unknown, aircraft missing Additional leaflets, dropped on places not in the above categories Additional leaflets, targets unknown

10,000,000 10,000,000

6,458,164 578,114

16,000,000

4,651,693

2,800,000 800,000 800,000 400,000 400,000 400,000 400,000 800,000 2,000,000 400,000 3,000,000 600,000 6,800,000

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,682,125

6,800,000 4,000,000 2,800,000 8,000,000 2,800,000

10,878,036 0 226,000 0 0 164,984 11,200

Total

80,000,000

Priority A B C

D

E

Target

17,357,769 46,008,085

should have. In the area defined as ‘Seine to Atlantic (north of Loire)’, the RAF actually over-performed, delivering 4 million leaflets more than requested. It is no surprise that the area was also close to British territory. As in previous periods, leaflet dropping was biased distinctly towards the more northerly areas of France. The RAF did deliver millions of leaflets to France between 1940 and 1944. A proportion of these leaflets fell – at least, were claimed to have fallen – where the propagandists asked that they should, particularly if these targets were in the northern half of France. Yet, even within these areas, the dissemination was not always as consistent as it might have been, with some areas being starved of leaflets while others were inundated. The regularity that the propagandists

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wanted, both in frequency and quantity, remained elusive. It was perhaps also unattainable – but the RAF was at best never really committed to achieving these targets. At worst, the RAF was actively ignoring them altogether.

Coverage According to Evidence from France The RAF failed to drop leaflets over a large proportion of the targets that had been specified by the propagandists. Did the RAF even drop leaflets where it claimed to have done? Where did the RAF’s leaflets actually fall or get to because of circulation on the ground? As was recognised in 1943 when a list was received detailing leaflet reception in 172 locations across 29 départements, ‘comparison between the actual and estimated destination should provide valuable material for checking [. . . ] dissemination’. The list itself has disappeared, but the technique can be used to gauge the accuracy of disseminations and the effectiveness of the internal circulation of leaflets. As long as evidence actually came from the place it claimed to have done it is possible to verify where leaflets were found, although not the quantity involved.30 No contemporary evidence from British sources specifically relating to 1940 appears to have survived. This suggests that the relatively small numbers of leaflets dropped during that period failed to provoke the sending of any evidence from France. Alternatively, if there was only a small amount of evidence, it may all have been intercepted by French censors, or was not considered worth collating into what was usually called an Evidence of Reception Report by the propagandists so any trace of it has now disappeared from the files.31 Evidence of Reception Reports themselves will be explored more closely in Chapter 4. The evidence they contain, received between 1941 and 1944, demonstrates first that leaflets were found where the RAF claimed to have dropped them. Feedback revealed that in June and July 1941 several different editions of leaflets, including the Courrier, were dropped on Paris. The RAF claimed to have dropped nearly 3.5 million leaflets, of nineteen different types including eight editions of the Courrier, on Paris. Other confirmatory data came from ˆ d’Yeu, Lyon, Nantes, Amiens, Brest, Châteauroux, Clermont-Ferrand, the Ile Pau, Périgueux, Rouen, St-Etienne, Vichy and even fishing boats at sea. Second, it shows that the lack of an RAF claim could be significant: one report stated that no leaflets had been seen in Toulouse between October 1943 and the end of February 1944, during which time the RAF made no claim to have been there.32 Occasionally, evidence can be linked to a specific dissemination. The American radio station WCDA reported in April 1942 that ‘posters with translations of the US pledge [. . . ] to return all colonies to France after the war were pasted on walls and buildings in Limoges. The posters had been dropped in thousands by Allied planes.’ The word ‘posters’ is a misnomer, but the content is exactly that of a leaflet, F.37 ‘To the French People’. On the night of 23/24 April 1942, 108,000 copies had been disseminated over Limoges. In Chartres a man found F.165 ‘Six Pictures of the Year’ on his balcony during February 1943. The RAF claimed two small drops of this leaflet over Chartres, totalling 4,500 copies, in

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that month. Similarly, the Courrier was found at Versailles during July 1943. This was probably the edition coded F.101 (1943), used on the night of 13/14 July in the first recorded drop on Versailles.33 On the other hand, in some cases the RAF was specifically stated to have dropped leaflets – at least, aircraft were heard and British leaflets subsequently discovered – in areas it never claimed to have visited. For example, a letter (received before the end of July 1941) noted ‘after bombing [the German airfield at] Mérignac [near Bordeaux] the RAF planes dropped leaflets over the Dordogne’. Mérignac was bombed on the nights of 10/11 and 12/13 April 1941, while on 11/12 May a single Stirling visited Bordeaux – Mérignac not being specifically mentioned. The RAF did not claim to have dropped leaflets over the Dordogne until November 1941. Similarly, although a ‘secret source’ reported leaflets dropped over Toulouse on 12 September 1941, the RAF did not claim any dissemination before the night of 10/11 October 1941. Aircraft were regularly observed crossing the Jura Mountains, on the French–Swiss border, leaflets being found there afterwards, but there are no claims of dissemination in that area, the Savoie. On the night of 24/25 August 1942 the Courrier was dropped in quantity by aircraft over Châlon-sur-Saône. No leaflet operations are claimed for that night; Bomber Command was bombing Frankfurt and mine-laying in the Frisian Islands.34 Other examples include Bourg de Thizy and Thizy, Cannes, near Dreux, Issoudun, Montauban, Rabastens, St-Amand-Montrond, Tulle, and Vals-les-Bains and Montpezat in the Ardèche.35 Why, if aircraft were heard and British leaflets discovered, was there no corresponding RAF claim? The evidence from France could be wrong, perhaps because an aircraft was heard and when leaflets were found they were automatically associated with it, disregarding the possibility that they had been delivered by another means or at a different time. Air Ministry records could be wrong – perhaps because a dissemination was never reported, or because a claim was deliberately made that a dissemination had taken place somewhere it had not. But the fact that it happened so often and that we know the RAF’s navigation was not always accurate suggests that more often that not the disseminating aircraft simply did not know where it was or that the leaflets had been blown off target. A further explanation, that the USAAF had dropped them, was not valid until after May 1943. Most of the time, the RAF’s navigational failings cannot have seriously affected the intended recipients of leaflets other than by depriving them of the propaganda material. Sometimes, however, it could. In March 1942 leaflets were dropped on Châteauroux warning that the town was to be bombed. The RAF did not record visiting Châteauroux that month, meaning that the leaflets should have been delivered elsewhere, and in fact Châteauroux was not bombed until March 1944. Similarly, a correspondent in the Gers – over which no dissemination was recorded before 1944 – reported leaflets threatening certain towns ‘all of which are a good distance away, thank God’. This could have two consequences: first, the wrong people were unnecessarily warned while the right people were not

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warned at all; and, second, more significantly, the impression was given that the British were crying wolf, undermining any trust placed in British leaflets.36 Nor did ‘M’ Balloon Unit’s disseminations go as expected. If frogs, fish and even jellyfish can be picked up and dropped elsewhere by freak weather conditions, it is hardly surprising that balloons, propelled by the weather, often ended up at a great distance from their intended targets. In July 1941 a report from Montpellier that leaflets were found ‘all over the place, in the park, in the vineyards and in the fields’ was annotated, ‘this must refer to an “M” unit dissemination’. Unless a special operation had gone unrecorded, the annotation must be correct, as Montpellier was out of range of OTU aircraft. Even then, it is clear that Montpellier was not the intended destination. All balloon operations over the previous three months had targeted the more northerly half of France. Like other balloons responsible for unexpected disseminations, this one had travelled much further than predicted. Leaflets in French dropped by balloon were found in Nuremberg in April 1942, nearly 200 miles from French territory. Balloon leaflets identified as ‘Mercantile Navy’ were also found near Bilbao, Spain, probably released on the night of 17/18 June 1942 and expected to land in Paris and other northern French towns.37 The French often appear to have been aware of leaflets or to have seen them, even when there is no corresponding claim by the RAF or evidence from France that leaflets had been dropped. Simple awareness may be indicated by the suggestion from Bordeaux that the RAF, when bombing France, should drop leaflet apologies. Requests received for more leaflets in Lyon, before the RAF first reported visiting, demonstrated that leaflets had been brought there by the French themselves. Similarly a correspondent from Le Havre wrote in March 1941 referring to the Courrier, particularly F.50/5 (1941). The nearest drop claimed by the RAF of F.50/5 was over St-Valéry, probably St-Valéry-en-Caux, 40 miles northeast of Le Havre. Distribution on the ground probably also explains a postcard received from Argenton-sur-Creuse, expressing thanks for the Courrier. The RAF never claimed to have targeted either the town or the département.38 Some of the evidence received from France directly challenged the accuracy of the RAF’s claims, declaring that leaflets had not been seen in places over which the RAF said it had dropped them. Despite numerous RAF claims of dissemination, one correspondent asked for leaflets to be dropped over Paris ‘where the RAF had not yet been’. Information came from Clermont-Ferrand on 9 May 1942 that the RAF had just visited the town on two nights running – yet the RAF claimed to have dropped leaflets there every night from 3/4 to 7/8 May, four nights running. Worse, a letter from Bordeaux proposing airdropped propaganda leaflets ‘if such a scheme is possible’ indicated a total lack of awareness of the millions of leaflets already dropped over France, including Bordeaux. An SOE agent reported in April 1943 that he had ‘never seen a leaflet or met anyone in the [eight French towns] I visited who had seen one’. That he said this of Meung-sur-Loire is understandable, as the RAF never claimed to have been there; in the case of Blois, Dijon, Mer and Poitiers, which received only

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limited attention, it is possible. That he could also say it of Le Mans, Troyes and particularly Paris is surprising, given the quantity of leaflets the RAF claimed to have dropped. This demonstrates that not only must RAF claims be treated with care, but also the evidence from France itself.39 While it is clear that there was circulation on the ground of leaflets, the extent of that circulation cannot be verified. PWE believed that one leaflet might be seen by as many as 100 or 200 people, but no justification for these estimates survives in the records. A lower figure may be more realistic. If every leaflet dropped was circulated to just thirty-five people, it would have been theoretically possible for every Frenchman to have seen each of the 511 leaflets dropped on France between July 1940 and September 1944.40 Taking all this evidence together, the geographical distribution of leaflets appears to have been more widespread than RAF claims suggest. Maps 3 to 7 show dissemination of leaflets as claimed by the RAF, and Maps 8 to 11 show the départements from which other evidence concerning leaflets either originates or concerns. A comparison of these two map series shows that leaflets reached rather more parts of France than the Air Ministry record alone indicates. Also striking is the similarity between the claimed number and locations of leaflet drops and the quantity and origins of evidence. While not all départements are represented, those over which the RAF claimed to have dropped larger quantities of leaflets tended to generate more evidence. Finally, by identifying those départements from which no evidence arrived but to which RAF records show that leaflets were dropped (and vice versa) only thirteen of the eighty-nine mainland French départments appear never to have received any British leaflets. These are along the Spanish, Swiss and Italian borders, in central southern and south-eastern France, in precisely the areas that the RAF could not easily reach.41 Two shortcomings of the RAF’s dissemination operations are obvious: more leaflets were needed, and more of France needed to receive them. The same conclusions emerge from the feedback. Bomber Command could and should have done more to address these deficiencies. But because leaflets, once dropped, were distributed on the ground, the operational range of the RAF alone did not determine the extent of leaflet circulation. Ironically, the targets set by the propagandists were closer to being met than they realised. While French people in northern France did have better access to British leaflet propaganda than their counterparts in the south, the latter had more opportunity than the Air Ministry record of RAF dissemination claims suggests.42

Broadcasting

The Scale of BBC Transmissions In September 1939 the BBC’s facilities allowed only one programme to be broadcast to Europe, and expansion, hampered by limited resources, was slow. From 30 June 1940 it could broadcast two, but by the end of the year, to allow for expansion

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to countries outside Europe, the time the BBC devoted to European broadcasting was reduced (radio was the only way, other than via traditional diplomatic channels, to encourage the non-European nations to remain neutral or to join the Allied cause). This impacted precisely on the major difficulty experienced by the BBC, namely a shortage of transmitters. At the outbreak of war, it operated only twenty-four, of which just five were of 100 kilowatts power or more, including thirteen short-wave transmitters. By the end of the war the BBC had some 121 short- and medium-wave transmitters in service. Long-wave broadcasting, suspended between 1939 and November 1941 because it was impossible to prevent the only transmitter available being used as a homing beacon, was resumed after three additional transmitters were built.43 The development of the BBC’s transmitter capability allowed broadcasting time in French to rise steadily throughout the war. It was 171/2 hours weekly in September 1940, 28 hours by September 1941, 351/2 hours by September 1942, 391/2 hours by September 1943 and 433/4 hours by September 1944. Broadcasts were made on several different frequencies across the short-, medium- and longwave bands. An ‘average’ day’s French Service schedule towards the end of the war included nineteen periods of broadcasting. Between one and ten different frequencies were used for each programme, the average being just over six per programme.44 The European Service broadcasts were not regarded as secret, unlike leaflets, because it was impossible to prevent British people from listening to them, but access to printed scripts and translations was made extremely difficult, even for MPs. Their requests to have examples lodged with the House of Commons Library were refused on the grounds of sheer quantity. An apparent concession was that any MP requiring a specific text could apply to the BBC. In practice this meant that the content of the broadcasts was denied to anyone who could not listen live and who did not speak the language used.45

Geographical Coverage and Evidence from France Unlike RAF aircrew who at least believed they knew where leaflets had been dropped, BBC broadcasting engineers could not know where their transmissions could be received. There is therefore no equivalent of the Air Ministry collation of RAF claims of leaflet dissemination. Evidence giving information about the coverage achieved by BBC broadcasts in France could come only from France, and much did. At first the BBC’s European Intelligence Department used this material to produce a ‘Monthly Intelligence Report: Europe’, partly dealing with France and, after December 1940, a dedicated ‘Survey of European Audiences: France’. These reports are more sophisticated than the SO1/PWE equivalents, dividing and summarising the evidence in various categories: a useful means of dealing with quantities of evidence large enough to prevent quotation from everything, but meaning that only a small proportion of sources are directly quoted or referred to. The BBC’s ‘Evidence of Reception’ Reports show that 3,277 letters were received from France and at least 952 interviews were carried

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out, before other sources are considered. Only 845 letters and interviews can now be separated out from these reports and other documents.46 The widespread origins of the evidence received from France are shown in Maps 12 to 16. During the period from June to December 1940 BBC programmes were reportedly being received from the southern Atlantic coast in the west to the Italian and Swiss borders in the east. The coverage in 1941 and 1942 was apparently greater, with reception being reported by more of the intermediate areas. In 1943 and 1944 a widespread distribution is also shown, with a greater proportion of the evidence received coming from the northern half of France in comparison to earlier years, although the overall quantity of evidence was diminishing. Cumulatively, between July 1940 and October 1944 only nine départements produced no evidence about receiving broadcasts.47 Together their population was less than 2.4 million – under 6 per cent of France’s total – so, in purely demographic terms, they were scarcely the most important départements. Six of the nine produced no evidence concerning leaflets either. With the exception of the Ariège, on the Spanish border, BBC signals reached further than those départements from which no evidence was received. It is also the case that, just as leaflets were circulated on the ground, there were means to spread the contents of BBC bulletins, examined more closely in Chapter 4. The surviving evidence does not allow a discussion of the geographical extent of ground-based circulation of broadcast propaganda as is possible for leaflets, beyond repeating the conclusion that it happened. Such circulation must, however, have increased the impact of BBC broadcast propaganda. Overall, other factors permitting, the BBC could be heard across France.48

Availability of Sets and Spares Receiving BBC broadcasts required wireless equipment. The access the French had to receivers is therefore important. Radio was relatively new and ownership was not universal. Briggs quotes figures showing that in 1938 there were just over 4.1 million radio sets in France, rising to just under 5.6 million by 1946. These figures are probably accurate, because radio sets needed licensing. Despite the war and the Occupation, the number of licences grew until December 1942 and only then fell, dropping to just under 5.2 million by April 1944. Using Briggs’s 1938 and 1946 figures, only 10–13 per cent of the French population owned a wireless set. Of course, many sets were owned within a family or household. Based on the 1936 census of France which identified 13.1 million households, between 31 and 43 per cent of them had a wireless. Even with those figures, therefore, first-hand listening was not ubiquitous.49 There were also unlicensed sets but it is impossible to guess how many. PWE believed that an estimate of 2 million, received in July 1943, was ridiculously high. Possessing an unlicensed set was illegal, but punishments were light: in October 1943 a report showed that police in Finistère conducted raids to find illegal sets, but did not impose punishments beyond requiring the owner to obtain a licence.

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Besides, however many unlicensed sets there were, it was unlikely to have made much difference to the ability of the French people to listen first hand. Even if there really were 2 million unlicensed sets in addition to the licensed sets, only 15–18 per cent of individuals, or 47–58 per cent of households, had a wireless.50 The availability of sets capable of receiving short-wave transmissions was an early preoccupation. In May 1940 a BBC assessment concluded that, across Europe, short-wave gave better range and reception than medium-wave, but ‘the majority’ of listeners did not have short-wave equipment. Perhaps the French people were more likely to own short-wave sets than other Europeans: an August 1940 estimate from Gard suggested that 80–5 per cent of sets were capable of receiving short-wave transmissions. This was also true in Grenoble and near Vichy where sets that could not receive short-wave broadcasts were ‘in a decided minority’. This was important because short-wave broadcasts were less seriously jammed. The popularity of short-wave sets increased as this became known.51 Given the increased popularity of short wave, it was not long before a shortage of suitable sets was reported, after which conversion of existing sets to receive short wave became common – although then the components needed for conversions became rare. Second-hand sets remained available, but became rarer, while new sets could be expensive. General spare parts were also in short supply and people owning American sets were affected earlier than others. What spares were available tended to be of poor quality. A nationwide black market flourished and burglaries were reportedly carried out just to obtain parts.52 The Germans and the Vichy authorities also had an interest in the availability of sets and spares. In the summer of 1941, Radio Paris announced plans to control the supply of spare parts and wireless sets. Other evidence from France indicated that this involved a ban on the sale of sets and spares in the Occupied Zone. In October 1942 the manufacture of new sets was banned. The following February, the Germans imposed a Europe-wide restriction, banning sales to the general public from the end of March 1943. Manufacturing continued, but production was diverted to Germany. There were only three exceptions to these restrictions: the ‘homeless’ (meaning bombed out), young married couples and youth groups were able to purchase sets. In the first two instances – unless a subsidy was also involved – this must have been a largely meaningless concession made for publicrelations value, rather than in the expectation it would be taken up. How many young married couples, or those whose homes had been destroyed, would be able to afford a full-price, brand-new set? Radio repairers were also licensed and were the only ones able to obtain spare parts, at least without resorting to the black market.53 Together, these regulations were expected to make replacement sets virtually unobtainable or extremely expensive, to reduce the access the French people had to servicing facilities and to make repairs, already slow and costly, even more so. By October 1943, 15 per cent of sets in the Hendaye area of the Basses-Pyrénées were unserviceable. It was also estimated that 2–5 per cent of all breakdowns were unrepairable. Precautions could be taken to extend the life of sets, such as turning them off as soon as possible, but it was feared that a lack of spares could have a

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much more significant effect on audiences than the repressive measures used by the Vichy and German authorities to prevent listening, examined in more detail in Chapter 4. In some ways, then, radio propaganda was a race. Could it achieve the ends required of it before the availability of receivers was so depleted as to render broadcasting ineffective?54

Conclusion For British white propaganda to have had any impact whatsoever it had to be read or heard. The evidence from France suggests that British leaflets and radio broadcasts were circulated as widely as circumstances allowed. Of the leaflets the RAF claimed to have disseminated, most were dropped in the northern half of France and the parts closest to England were visited most regularly and received most leaflets. By contrast the BBC could be received all over France, leaving aside meteorological and other factors which affected reception. In theory, the two methods could complement each other in terms of distribution as well as content, as the BBC provided the means of contact with areas over which leaflets could not be dropped. In practice, however, this was not the case. Signal strength naturally diminishes with distance and it was in more distant areas that leaflet coverage was poor. It is also clear that British records cannot be relied upon. Whether intentionally or accidentally, the RAF did not always drop leaflets where it claimed, and PWE’s instructions – for example, to drop leaflets in areas where BBC reception was badly jammed – were ignored. Nor was the BBC’s coverage what it seemed, as only about half the French population had direct access to wireless sets. Despite repeated comments that the French audience of BBC broadcasts to France was large, at times approaching universal, for the population to listen simultaneously to a licensed set, between seven and eleven people would have had to crowd around every single receiver in France. A large percentage of the French population (let us say, the other half) therefore had regular access to the BBC’s programmes only on a second-hand basis and could listen directly only from time to time. Set against all this must be the costs and benefits of the leaflet campaign to the British. Operations over France had, if only roughly, quantifiable costs and benefits other than the direct propaganda element. They gave reconnaissance flights an additional purpose and provided an opportunity for training and refreshing the aircrew. On the other hand, to achieve this there was a cost, both in human and material terms, which can be crudely calculated. Radio had the potential to be more influential than leaflets. One factor above all others was therefore likely to have a lasting effect upon the continuing influence of British propaganda: existing wireless receiving equipment. Electronic devices relied upon vacuum tubes and valves, which were less reliable, had a shorter working life and were more expensive by comparison to the solid-state components which later revolutionised the industry. Set failure was not unexpected. In France, especially as the effects of war began to bite, it became increasingly

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difficult and costly to find spare parts, licensed repairers and replacement sets. This was due to restrictions on the sale and repair of wireless sets, partly to limit access to the BBC but also because of German war requirements. As Briggs notes, the electronic equipment carried on a single ‘thousand bomber’ RAF raid meant that 250,000 valves were in the air. German electronics – radar, for example – were less advanced, but used similar technology, manufactured from increasingly limited industrial resources. As a result, some inoperable sets almost certainly remained so, with a corresponding reduction in the capability of the audience to listen; precautions to preserve the sets may have saved some. If the 15 per cent of sets reported unserviceable in the Hendaye area in October 1943 applied nationally, the availability of sets stood at that time at between 3.5 and 4.7 million and no doubt would have dropped further. Had the D-Day assault failed and the war been prolonged, the disaster would have been compounded by increasing numbers of unserviceable sets, which would eventually have ended the BBC’s influence. Without a significant increase in the commitment shown by Bomber Command to nickelling, leaflets could not make good the difference.55

3

Message: The Content of White Propaganda

France From Friend to Foe, 1940: Ad Hoc Responses

The Fall of France On 10 May 1940 the Germans attacked Western Europe. They reached the English Channel ten days later, trapping thousands of Allied troops and precipitating the Dunkirk evacuation. The French government left Paris for Bordeaux where, late on 16 June, Pétain became Prime Minister, opening negotiations to end hostilities. France was out of the war, swiftly and unexpectedly. For French civilians, life became chaotic. A fifth of the French population fled the German advance. This was not because they feared defeat but because everyone expected the Germans to be halted as they had been in 1914, so they wanted to avoid being trapped behind the lines. The authorities were unable to impose order. The refugee streams were constantly redirected, provoking a sense of aimlessness. Abandoned communities were looted and families separated. Choked roads hampered military movements and soldiers began to appear among the refugees. But much of the population, living outside the war zone, remained distanced from reality. Official communiqués, even in June, conceded only limited defeats, while newspapers reported that Germany lacked the resources to continue fighting indefinitely. Rumours circulated of a substantial French force waiting to decimate the Germans, and Soviet or American entry into the war. Optimism, encouraged by the press, abounded. While some observers began to contemplate defeat, especially after Paris fell on 14 June, they tended to wonder what would happen if, not when, the worst occurred. Defeat seemed to come from nowhere, at tremendous cost: 120,000 French soldiers and civilians dead, 250,000 wounded and 1 million soldiers captured.1 The French people had a simple choice. They could accept defeat and make the best of the consequences or they could take the defeat as a disastrous setback and somehow try to fight on. Pétain chose the first option. His First World War reputation coupled with his assertion of 17 June 1940 that ‘I make to France the gift of my person to alleviate her sufferings’, tempted many to follow him. A few, like de Gaulle, already believed in resistance. But the majority were apathetic, committed to nothing and unable to comprehend what had happened. The propagandists divided the French into three: the apathetic, the anti-British and the pro-British. These categories were flexible – for example, the anti-British might be neither pro-German nor pro-resistance – but they provide a useful basic

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conceptualisation of the French audience for British propaganda from the British perspective.2 Feelings emerged of British betrayal, potentially capable of influencing those unsure where to put themselves. An unjustified accusation that a British retreat from Arras had condemned a French counterattack to failure may have prompted Pétain to ask if France owed Great Britain anything and to blame her for doing so little to stave off the German invasion. Misunderstandings about the Dunkirk evacuation provoked charges that the British had abandoned France, although roughly equal numbers of French and British troops were rescued after 29 May. The British were alleged to have left French troops to cover their evacuation, despite Churchill’s promise of British assistance. On 4 June, Pétain told the American Ambassador that Great Britain intended to fight to the last Frenchman. After Dunkirk, British involvement consisted of exhortation, rather than action: two divisions arrived in France on 12 June but were withdrawn three days later.3 Just as the defeat had not been expected, the propagandists had not expected to be engaging in propaganda to France. They had therefore prepared no plans in advance. In any case, until the armistice was announced no action could be taken. Had the war been continued by a French government in exile, propaganda to France, even if undertaken jointly or delivered with British assistance, would have required that French government’s involvement. The armistice moved France out of the Allied camp, at least as far as propaganda was concerned, although even a week later Department EH’s Planning and Broadcasting Committee agreed ‘that no definite propaganda line over France should be taken pending an official lead from the Ministry of Information’. Meanwhile the MOI Policy Committee heard that ‘the French situation was still very confusing and nothing definite could be said’ and concluded that ‘it seemed desirable to start a Committee’. Even in late August the aforementioned Planning and Broadcasting Committee, now part of SO1, heard that ‘no official policy existed’ for France.4 Even so, it was fairly obvious what the immediate role of propaganda would be: to encourage the French to choose resistance, to oppose the Pétain government and the Germans, and to counter suggestions of a British betrayal. The development of the BBC’s French Service was predicted in a letter from France, which arrived at about the time of the armistice and was equally applicable to leaflets: You must now flood France with truthful news [. . .] to counteract German propaganda [. . .] Such broadcasts from London have a very vital part to play. They must keep up French morale. They must inspire confidence in our final victory.5 The initial propaganda response was by radio. Even without the organisational changes that were taking place, leaflet propaganda would take a lot longer to get started. The BBC, the only organisation with any experience of addressing France, would clearly continue its role. It is no surprise, therefore, that the BBC defined the immediate propaganda response. Joint Anglo-French broadcasts had

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been proposed to shore up relations in the wake of Dunkirk and the associated feelings of betrayal. A new programme, Ici la France, was first broadcast on 19 June. However, the armistice frustrated further cooperation of this type. The BBC took over Ici la France, renaming it Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais in September. It became the flagship BBC French Service production during the Second World War.6 The British government determined the policy that the propagandists would follow. As Bruce Lockhart later commented, ‘we were never allowed to make in our [white] propaganda any commitment which the Government was not prepared to fulfil’. An assessment of events – treating the defeat of France as a terrible setback which would be corrected in the future – was made by Churchill, whose speeches were sometimes both simultaneously policy and propaganda because they were broadcast to France. On 17 June he told the British that I grieve for the gallant French people who have fallen into this terrible misfortune. Nothing will alter our feelings towards them or our faith that [. . .] France will rise again [. . .] We are sure that in the end all will come right. The following day he promised Parliament (excerpts later being broadcast in news bulletins to France) that Great Britain would oppose Hitler and that however matters may go in France [. . .] we in this island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people [and] if final victory rewards our toils they will share the gains, aye, and freedom will be restored to all. In short, he was asking France not to give up; and also, by asserting British friendship, showing that Great Britain had not betrayed France.7 De Gaulle’s contribution to the tone and content of early British propaganda was also important. He was authorised to broadcast by the War Cabinet. This endowed upon him a special legitimacy that allowed his treatment of France to impact on the direction of British propaganda to France. He did not have an entirely free rein but, while scripts had to be approved by the Foreign Office (de Gaulle found the changes ‘perfectly ridiculous’ but accepted them), this cannot have been to ensure that his broadcasts were in line with a propaganda policy, as one did not exist. Rather, the editorial control was perhaps to ensure that de Gaulle did not reveal information useful to the enemy or make promises that could not be honoured, and certainly to ensure that there was consistency between his comments and other British propaganda output. The approval of elements of de Gaulle’s planned broadcasts created precedents which influenced the formation of a propaganda policy. After the Free French were established on 28 June and, like other governments-in-exile, awarded ‘free time’ to broadcast on the BBC, the argument that de Gaulle’s speeches helped form British propaganda policy is less valid. By this time he was speaking as head of the Free French rather than merely with the permission of the War Cabinet and, while his ideas might be adopted by the propagandists, it was an active decision to select them.8

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De Gaulle, like Churchill, also regarded the catastrophe that had befallen France as terrible and predicted its resolution, while he also made the first calls for resistance. In his 18 June broadcast, de Gaulle argued that ‘the cause of France is not lost’, confident that the defeat was not final and victory could be won. He pointed to the potential of the French and British Empires and the USA to continue the struggle, which not merely concerned France but was a world war whose outcome remained undecided. Finally, he insisted that ‘the flame of French resistance must not and shall not die’.9 Similarly, on 19 June the French Ambassador, Charles Corbin, asserted that France has experienced other ordeals in the past. She has always overcome them. However sombre, however distressing the present hours are, be sure that the virtues of our race, again soaked in misfortune, can secure the resurrection of our country. After 22 June these relatively vague expressions of confidence in the future and a favourable outcome to the war were augmented by examination and condemnation of the armistice. The Pétain government was accused of acting against France’s best interests and the French people were encouraged at the very least to be wary, as a first step towards resistance. Broadcasts made on 22 and 23 June focused on the armistice. De Gaulle argued that ‘honour, good sense and the higher interests of the patrie’ meant that many French people did not accept capitulation.10 He repeated many arguments from his 18 June speech to show that considering the fight to be over was absurd. He claimed that the armistice meant that Pétain’s government had become dependent on Germany and Italy. Churchill suggested that only a government deprived of its independence and constitutional authority could have accepted the armistice, declaring that ‘Great Britain constitutes the only possible hope to restore the greatness of France and the liberty of her people’. He echoed de Gaulle’s appeal for resistance, asking ‘all Frenchmen, wherever they are, to do everything in their power to assist the enormous forces of liberation which, under good leadership, will assure victory’. The BBC broadcast the armistice terms, accompanied by an official statement condemning Pétain’s government for failing to honour the Franco-British undertaking not to conclude a separate peace and for refusing to follow other victims of Nazi aggression by continuing the fight from exile. Previous propaganda points were complemented by the suggestion that Pétain’s government was not representative of France. In this respect, it could be attacked as betraying the French people, although the propagandists had to take care as British foreign policy sought to avoid conflict. But if the Pétain government could not represent France, who could? De Gaulle knew. On 19 June he declared that faced by the bewilderment of my countrymen, by the disintegration of a Government in thrall to the enemy, by the fact that the institutions of my country are incapable, at the moment, of functioning, I, General de Gaulle, a French soldier and military leader, realise that I now speak for France.

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The British government was less convinced. De Gaulle’s Provisional French National Committee was regarded only as representative of ‘independent French elements determined on the prosecution of the war in fulfilment of the international obligations of France’.11 France was therefore defined using more intangible elements, already employed by Churchill, de Gaulle and others. France was not a country under occupation by Germany or ruled by Pétain, but a nation which was embodied by an ideal, created through the recall of French historical greatness, military prowess, contribution to liberty and democracy, the arts, literature and so on. This treatment was not universally acceptable, however: the Planning and Broadcasting Committee heard that ‘many Frenchmen’ were disturbed about the composition of BBC broadcasts in French to France [. . .] references were constantly being made to Robespierre and prominent figures of the French Revolution of 1789. This had no current propaganda value and such references were entirely out of date and useless.12 The first leaflets were disseminated over northern France on 16 July 1940. By the time they were dropped, events at Mers-el-Kébir had added a new complexity to the general situation, but the leaflets fitted exactly the radio model: propaganda really was being led by the BBC. On one hand the armistice terms and other events were examined to discredit the Vichy government and stimulate resistance, and on the other the courageous French spirit and the glorious past of France were evoked. This was, therefore, an application of a policy created ad hoc and defined by BBC broadcasting. One of the first leaflets, ‘Frenchmen’ (F.51, 1940), described its contents as ‘the conditions which the enemy imposed upon you and which the Bordeaux government accepted. This is what you have lost.’ It then described the consequences of the armistice before commenting that the Germans and the Italians will be able, when they want, to use a pretext to break the armistice and thus to help themselves to the fleet, to take over the French colonies and even to occupy your whole country. Similarly, ‘Choose and Act’ (F.63, 1940) demonstrated the effects on different groups of Frenchmen, suggesting that, unless the French people refused to cooperate, first French workers, then French ‘peasants’ (literally ‘country-dwellers’) and then the middle classes would find their lives turned upside down. Later in the year leaflets made specific appeals to French workers, French women and French ex-combatants (F.35, F.36, F.37, all 1940). For each, the particular consequences of the invasion and the armistice, and the contribution they could make to a victorious future, were outlined. The courage of the French people and the effort they had put into the struggle were referred to, and the spiritual, timeless France was evoked. ‘French Workers’

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(F.34, 1940) made direct reference to historical France, reminding its readers that this dream of Hitler’s [to subjugate France] will never happen, because you have the taste of liberty in your blood. The peoples of Europe will not tolerate slavery indefinitely, and France, country of the Revolution, even less than the others. ‘England Speaks to You’ (F.59, 1940) commented, ‘England knows the suffering you have endured and the heroism which you have shown’ and urged readers to retain your confidence in the eternal France, the France which was always the champion of liberty, of justice and of truth, the France which tomorrow in a Europe free from totalitarian violence, will be reborn younger and happier! In this initial phase of propaganda, then, several different basic messages had been used: that the French should not give up; that Great Britain was a friend of France and would not betray her; that victory and France’s future were assured; that British and American support was potentially important; and that Pétain’s government and the Germans were not be trusted. These themes would underpin British propaganda over the next four years.

Mers-el-Kébir Barely had the dust of France’s defeat settled than the propagandists had to face the challenge of Mers-el-Kébir. The catalyst was the assessment that, should the Germans seize the French Fleet, the British naval position ‘would be catastrophically injured’ as Great Britain was dependent on oceanic supply routes. However, an acceptable solution had not been found before the French signed the armistice and so the British decided to eliminate the threat by launching Operation Catapult, which on 3 July 1940 sought to neutralise French warships at Mers-el-Kébir, near Oran in Algeria. An attempt was made to negotiate, the French being given several options: join the British outright; sail with reduced crews to British ports; sail to the French West Indies; demilitarise; or scuttle their ships. Otherwise, the British force would attack. The French commander (having misinformed the French Admiralty that his options were either sailing to British waters or scuttling) repeated Darlan’s promise that the Germans would never seize the fleet, but promised a British attack would be resisted.13 In the bombardment, several French warships were destroyed or seriously damaged. Casualties, including some inflicted on 6 July when the British returned to ensure that the remaining ships were permanently neutralised, were heavy: nearly 1,700 French sailors were killed or injured. Elsewhere, hundreds of French ships in British ports were seized and, on 4 July, French ships in Alexandria were peacefully demilitarised after local negotiations. On 8 July the pride of the French fleet, Richelieu, was attacked at Dakar.

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Catapult and the associated actions were not completely successful. Although many ships had been neutralised, some escaped, while Richelieu, though damaged, was able to help repulse a British/Free French assault on Dakar at the end of September. Far more significant was the effect on the French themselves. A recent ally had committed acts of war against them. Furthermore, the French victims, confined in port, had little chance for defence or escape. The attack would have to be justified, lest it added further to the sense of British betrayal. The attack provided Vichy and German propagandists with an excellent opportunity to promote themselves at British expense. A German cartoonist drew Churchill surrounded by the bodies of England’s former allies: the Frenchman, complete with sailor’s hat, had a knife in his back labelled ‘Oran’. Another German cartoon showed a British soldier (probably to provide a link with Dunkirk) about to club an unsuspecting French sailor with his rifle, captioned ‘Mersel-Kébir’. In the Occupied Zone, German-produced newsreels denounced the events. An issue of Actualités Mondiales: Journal No. 13 reiterated German lack of interest in the French fleet and commented on the burial of the casualties that their North African resting place was ‘far from their patrie which, proud of her sailors, weeps for the victims of this revolting act’. French sacrifices at Dunkirk and Mers-el-Kébir were brought together in an epitaph published in Gringoire: ‘Here lies Leading Seaman Jean-Yves. Wounded at Dunkirk on 30 May 1940 protecting the evacuation of the British. Killed at Mers-el-Kébir on 3 July 1940 by the British.’ British propagandists had to counter the enemy response.14 As at the armistice, Churchill’s speeches defined the British position. On 4 July he announced the events ‘with sincere sorrow’ to Parliament. The Cabinet had never discussed ‘so grim and sombre a question’ and the decision had been taken ‘with aching hearts’ while hoping a solution could be found ‘without the necessity of using the terrible force of a British battle squadron’. He acknowledged that the French ships fought, albeit in this unnatural cause, with the characteristic courage of the French Navy, and every allowance must be made for [the French naval commanders] who felt themselves obliged to obey the orders they received from their Government and could not look behind that Government to see the German dictation. Churchill’s speech was not directly broadcast, but it would have been reported. He used similar terms broadcasting to France on 14 July: the ‘sad duty’ and ‘painful task’, that ‘the association of interest between Britain and France remains’ and that ‘subject to the iron demands of the War [. . .] we shall try so to conduct ourselves that every true French heart will beat and glow at the way we carry on the struggle’. Both speeches provided propaganda policy: neutralising the French fleet was justifiable, the attack had been a necessary evil, the British having wanted to avoid using force, but they had had no alternative because of German control of the French government. Meanwhile, the French sailors had been brave and gallant, misguided rather than wrong. The British were still friends, true French people would support the British, while the decision to attack indicated the British determination to fight on.15

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The propagandists had to convey these messages. The immediate response was again by radio and perhaps not as effective as it might have been. While those who had already chosen resistance could believe that the British had good reasons for the attack and those who had chosen to follow Pétain’s example felt that it in turn justified their choice, by far the largest and most important group was the undecided. The impact of the week-old armistice agreements cannot yet have been felt and could not have affected those not yet aware that the Vichy government might be acting under German influence. The British should have particularly addressed this group, justifying the action as a sacrifice for the liberation of France. Instead, initial BBC broadcasts seemed to blame the French themselves. On 5 July a BBC speaker stressed that the Vichy government was now spilling French blood for Germany, despite having ‘brought to an end the fight [. . .] by invoking a reason respectable in itself: the need to stop the carnage’. The options presented at Mers-el-Kébir were explained, the French response there being compared unfavourably to the choice of ‘numerous’ French sailors elsewhere. The French commander’s refusal had condemned the sailors at Mers-el-Kébir to death rather than liberation, intensifying the German enslavement of France, so they had died for Hitler. The Vichy government was accused of breaking agreements with Great Britain to maintain agreements with Germany, something no free government would have countenanced. And finally, quoting a German statement commenting, ‘the Führer has given his permission to France’, the speaker concluded that the Vichy government was not free, continuing an argument that had been used regarding the armistice. Churchill’s speech had indicated Germany’s role as puppet master. It was another matter to blame the French themselves for becoming German puppets controlled through Vichy. The events were enough on their own to create hostility towards the British. To blame the French commander – for whom Churchill had indicated that allowances should be made – for not disobeying a government that the British claimed to be operating on German instructions, was in effect blaming the French themselves for not realising it. This could have turned out to be a serious blunder, exacerbating the already negative effects of the attack. The BBC apparently got away with it – there is no evidence that anyone in France was offended – but it demonstrates that the propagandists needed to be careful about what was said. Two days later, on 7 July, Louis Lévy followed Churchill’s sentiments much more closely in a BBC broadcast. He argued that despite everything, the British remained committed to friendship with the French. Just as earlier propaganda had evoked an intangible France of glory and spirit, Lévy appealed to faith, liberty, democracy and the French will to defeat fascism. He discussed Mersel-Kébir only briefly, blaming ‘perfidious propaganda’ for suggesting that Great Britain aimed to deprive France of her fleet; instead, the British had had to prevent Hitler and Mussolini taking it. He also used the idea of Vichy breaking promises to Great Britain to maintain those to Germany. He looked to the past to demonstrate British commitment: ‘You cannot believe that England has become

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your enemy [. . .] Remember the last war. Look around you at the cemeteries where Britons are buried, fallen on French soil for a common cause.’ Even more usefully, on 9 July a text prepared by Schumann and read by Duchesne brought together elements that had already been featured. Vichy was accused of falling increasingly under German control. The commander at Mersel-Kébir was now simply unlucky in being the commander ordered not to yield ‘to the friendly persuasion of the English’ rather than bearing responsibility himself. Schumann also demolished Vichy’s argument that the armistice terms prevented the French fleet’s use by Germany against England as if France, disarmed and impotent could again, after 1870, after 1914, after the occupation of the Rhineland, of Austria, of Czechoslovakia, of Poland, have faith in the word of a Germany armed to the teeth! The overall emphasis, then, was that the British attack had been regrettable but necessary, that it did not alter the British position towards France, that the Vichy government was a puppet of the Germans, that a German agenda had shaped events and that through Vichy the people of France had been misled. A response was also made in early leaflets. One of these, ‘Frenchmen’ (F.51, 1940), listing the ‘essential conditions of the Armistice’, commented that ‘the French fleet will be disarmed, interned, put under the control of the Germans and the Italians’. Given that it was dropped with ‘Frenchmen! What happened at Oran?’ (F.72, 1940) and together with the suggestion that the armistice could be broken at any time, these arguments can be seen as justifying the British attack. ‘Frenchmen! What happened at Oran?’ followed Lévy’s broadcast of 7 July by denouncing Vichy for continuing the fiction that the only choice offered the Mersel-Kébir fleet was between joining the British or scuttling. The other alternatives were repeated, as had been done on 5 July. As in the BBC broadcasts discussed above, the leaflets referred to the armistice terms concerning the French fleet, the lack of trust that could be placed in Germany’s word and the suggestion that although France had capitulated to save lives, Vichy had now thrown lives away. The BBC was again defining the content of the propaganda. Whether discussing the fall of France or Mers-el-Kébir, the leaflets employed arguments that had already been used on air. This was acknowledged in an SO1 paper noting, ‘those who are writing leaflets have to follow day by day the actual news broadcast to the country for which the leaflets are intended’. This state of affairs stemmed from the organisational arrangements already discussed and from the lack of planning for propaganda to France. The latter, at least, was about to change.16

Propaganda Planning, 1940–4: Defining Long-term Strategy For propaganda to become useful and coherent over the longer term, proper planning was important. Only once SO1 was properly constituted could such planning begin. The earliest surviving (and probably the first) long-term planning

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document dealing with the occupied territories was ‘Propaganda and Political Strategy’, produced by Leeper in September 1940. It analysed propaganda from several angles, compared the British and German systems, examined connections between propaganda and military action and speculated on what might be required of propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied countries. The purpose of the document is not indicated but it may have been intended to stimulate discussion by synthesising views and raising issues about the role of propaganda or, more likely, to provide guidance. Bruce Lockhart recorded Dalton’s reaction to its circulation within SO1: ‘petulant, blaming Rex [Leeper] for sending round a paper on propaganda without his blessing’, even coming to grumble about it while officially on leave. This response suggests that it was a guidance paper: issuing guidance without Dalton’s permission undermined his ministerial responsibilities. Nonetheless, Leeper’s ideas provided the foundation for British propaganda to France throughout the war.17 Leeper began by discussing British propaganda in general, noting that its task is to prepare the way for military operations, both by weakening the morale of the enemy and by raising the morale of potential allies and inciting them to timely action by hampering and harassing the enemy. Given the Air Ministry’s right of veto, already discussed, at least as far as leaflet propaganda was concerned any such action would not involve violence or murder. Leeper went on to examine propaganda to the occupied territories and finally he dealt with France: Propaganda to France must bear a close relation to the strategic possibilities. [The] immediate task is to prevent French morale from slipping back further by providing a running propaganda commentary on the progress of the war, by exposing German methods in the occupied territory and by explaining the results of the policy of capitulation. [It] must prepare the way, steadily and patiently, for an eventual revolt, although there is no immediate prospect of such a revolt.18 Six weeks later SOE’s senior staff discussed policy towards France. Leeper put forward a more elaborately expressed conception of propaganda, complementing his earlier thoughts: The two principles which SO1 were at present applying in propaganda to France were: (i) to make the German yoke more and more intolerable to France, and (ii) to give the French more and more confidence in a British victory. Elements of Leeper’s characterisation can be identified in the propaganda produced after the armistice, led by the BBC. Leeper’s continued use of elements emerging from this early propaganda demonstrates that by and large the BBC had done a good job. The defeat of France and subsequent events damaged morale

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and, although immediate improvement could not be expected, the downturn in French morale could be prevented from becoming more significant. In providing a ‘running propaganda commentary’ – reporting what was happening and why – the BBC’s reputation for honesty was a distinct advantage. At the time of Mersel-Kébir both German methods and the French policy of capitulation had been discussed, for example in suggesting that Vichy had been manipulated and that surrender had meant lives being lost. Stressing the German hold over France, while giving the French confidence in British victory, would boost morale and encourage a willingness to resist.19 In early 1941, SO1 produced another plan for propaganda to France, again a more sophisticated evolution: Hate of the Germans must be absolutely dominant in all our propaganda to France. (1) Hitler means to annihilate France (2) Moment he had your Fleet extermination policy would go into full operation (3) Your prisoners being held to stop one third of French manhood breeding (4) The weapon of starvation against France [is] part of Hitler’s plan. Certainty of British victory is the second major theme. (1) 8,000,000 German army [will be overcome by] quality not quantity (2) Impossible for Hitler to defeat Britain before American aid becomes fully effective (3) Vastness of America’s war potential, now at Britain’s disposal. Victory inevitable. (4) Coming German offensive in Balkans [a] confession of failure on Channel – the vital front (5) War in Africa treated as proof of Britain’s confidence (6) Ridicule Germans for failure to invade by promised date – 15th March [sic]. (7) Germany’s expanding commitments weakening her. Gallantry of Free French Forces [. . .] associate it with growing resistance of ordinary people inside France – to secure emotional identification Methods of German infiltration analysed [is] an extension of [the hate motive to show] snakelike craft and low cunning by which Germans will try to get fleet [and] Exploitation of fear motive against those wishing to collaborate [suggests that lists of collaborators and traitors were being kept across France to be used for retribution in the future].20 A short time later, the MOI (at this time responsible for broadcasting to France) produced its earliest known long-term planning document. It sticks closely to themes already examined: The aim of our propaganda is to stimulate French resistance to the enemy. Propaganda falls under three headings [...]

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(A) News. Though the prompt issue of news is important, accuracy is more so. The advantage we have over the enemy in the belief that ‘the BBC tells the truth’ must not be sacrificed. (B) Negative Propaganda. We must expose German lies and uncover to the French the German propaganda methods [. . .] explain those actions of ours which the Germans attempt to put in an unfavourable light, such as our blockade and the food situation in France [and] repeat that we neither wish to steal the French Empire nor to impose this or that form of government on France. (C) Positive Propaganda. Our object here is to foster an attitude among the French which will serve us increasingly as it is translated into action which hampers our enemies directly or indirectly, limits or prevents their cooperation with the Pétain or any other Government favouring collaboration with Germany and prepares the way for an eventual revolt of the French people. In short, although there had been no general plan for propaganda immediately after the armistice, early propaganda output helped to shape the propaganda planning that came afterwards.21 Bruce Lockhart understood PWE’s role to be ‘to undermine and to destroy the morale of the enemy and [. . .] to sustain and foster the spirit of resistance in enemy-occupied countries’. In content, British propaganda was to be honest and truthful. Its general aims with regard to France were to encourage a desire for, a belief in the certainty of and a willingness to participate in an Allied victory which would have a positive benefit for France, while simultaneously discouraging faith in the Vichy government and the Germans. Leeper had expressed these aims by September 1940 and they underpinned all British propaganda to France thereafter. A ‘short survey’ of BBC broadcasts to France undertaken in late 1942 mentioned all of them.22 The propagandists were not seers: they could not plan for the future except in broad terms. The only exception was that, security permitting, they could plan their initial treatment of major Allied undertakings. But broad plans were important and evolved as the war progressed. For example, the treatment of de Gaulle and the Free French changed. In November 1940 it was recorded that ‘if there was to be a revolt [in France], it must be led by someone of position [. . .] such as Weygand and Noguès’ – de Gaulle and the Free French were clearly not believed capable of providing such leadership at that time. But only four months later, in February 1941, the planners argued that active participation of the Free French should be associated ‘with growing resistance of ordinary people inside France – to secure emotional identification’ and in March the MOI asked that ‘the utmost publicity should be given to General de Gaulle and the activities of his forces’. What the planners could not do was define ‘utmost publicity’ or what should be discussed. Similarly, the planners could ask for other themes – American war production, Atlantic convoy battles or resistance activities across Europe – to be featured, but precisely how was left to those who prepared the

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propaganda. It was very similar to the distinction between ‘political guidance’ and ‘broadcasting practice’ made by the MOI in instructions for the BBC.23 Occasionally, restrictions were placed on what could be said, particularly with regard to sensitive issues. For example, the BBC (and WRUL Boston) were told in early January 1942 to ‘avoid any discussion of St Pierre-et-Miquelon’ after the Free French took control of these islands, particularly upsetting the Americans. In 1943, Generals Giraud and de Gaulle met in North Africa to discuss future cooperation. PWE’s Central Directive stated: ‘await developments [. . . ] Do not speculate. Remember our primary duty is to do everything to encourage French unity.’ The BBC’s instructions insisted: ‘Maintain our self-denying ordinance as regards discussion of the negotiations.’ News of the talks could be given, but not commented upon. Sometimes, concerning particularly important developments (such as the scuttling of the French Fleet at Toulon and Darlan’s assassination), the planners issued yet more specific instructions, detailing even more closely what should and should not be said. Long-term general plans continued to be issued regularly, especially by PWE, which were consistent with one another and with earlier planning documents.24

Enter the Allies, 1941

Attack on the USSR By mid-1941, other than in failing to defeat Great Britain, the Nazi war machine had been tremendously successful. Europe lay under Axis domination. Against this background, the German invasion of the USSR began on 22 June. It was not unexpected in Great Britain and not believed in the USSR. Hitler’s desire for Lebensraum in the East had been made clear in Mein Kampf. British cryptanalysts had deciphered Enigma messages indicating German intentions, of which Stalin was informed. Other evidence also pointed to German invasion plans. But Stalin was convinced they were rumours and that Churchill wanted to bring the USSR into the war. The attack altered British propaganda policy, which derived from pre-war British views of Communism and the USSR. The distrust created by the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 and British involvement in the resulting civil war prevented anything more than distant relations before the Second World War. The British position was not unreasonable, given that Bolshevik calls for worldwide revolution, if successful, would mean the destruction of capitalism. Although the USSR slowly entered the international community, for example joining the League of Nations in 1934, this was largely dictated by circumstances rather than changing attitudes.25 In Great Britain, the Communist Party (CP) was only ever a minority political participant: it held only two parliamentary seats and, even at the height of proSoviet popularity after 1941, had only 55,000 members. Nonetheless, the Communist bogeyman had always been perceived with suspicion: the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) decided in 1925 that ‘Bolshevik propaganda’ was sufficient grounds for intervention; Lord Beaverbrook refused to publish David

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Low’s cartoon apparently highlighting the success of the first Soviet Five Year Plan and questioning capitalism’s future; and the Lord Chamberlain’s Office regularly vetoed ‘dangerously left-wing’ theatre productions. Films depicted the USSR as a murderous police state, politically alien, that threatened British interests. A ‘silent majority’ of Britons were therefore encouraged to see Russians ‘as either anarchists or spies’ during the 1920s and 1930s.26 In August 1939 perceptions of the USSR were further damaged by the Nazi– Soviet Pact. Low responded with a cartoon showing Hitler and Stalin walking along the new border carved between their nations in Poland: the two dictators were as bad as each other. Partridge characterised Hitler and Stalin as snakes, while for Illingworth they were cats, menacing goldfish representing the Balkans. The Soviet reputation sank further after the invasion of Finland in April 1940.27 Although responsibility for domestic and foreign propaganda was split, the two were never entirely divorced and an examination of domestic propaganda in relation to the USSR is instructive. The MOI followed a ‘strategy of nonconfrontation’ before the invasion of Finland. Despite Communist-inspired pacifism, there was no evidence that the Communists actually intended to disrupt British war production and the government preferred not to act pre-emptively because the CP’s stance on social reform had been popular. Despite the MOI seeking to continue its non-confrontation policy, it is unlikely to be entirely coincidental that a month after the invasion of Finland, British Communist (and Fascist) journals were refused export permission, and that in July the Daily Worker, the CP’s newspaper, was warned about its pacifism. In January 1941 it was banned on a shaky pretext, demonstrating that suspicion of Communism, rather than actual Communist activity, was the cause.28 Hitler’s invasion of the USSR caused pro-Soviet feeling to sweep through Great Britain. Anthony Asquith’s film The Demi-Paradise, in which a visiting Soviet engineer encounters different attitudes before and after the German attack, clearly demonstrates the divergence. Communism was still considered dangerous, so Russian motivations for fighting were portrayed as nationalist rather than political, while the promotion of Communist ideals was avoided. It was a battle that could not be won. As Duff Cooper commented, ‘it is difficult to see how we could boost modern Russian culture without implying some approval of the experiment that has been going on there’. Bruce Lockhart recorded that ‘to some extent her military success was attributed to the Russian system of government’.29 The British and Soviet war efforts were linked: the MOI explained that because of German advances across Soviet industrial areas ‘[British] production is the key. Russia’s fight is ours and OUR FIGHT IS RUSSIA’S.’ In contrast to earlier cartoons linking him to Hitler, by 1943 Stalin was shown alongside Churchill and Roosevelt at the ‘Victory Club’ and hunting a Hitler turkey for Christmas. Low characterised the Nazi–Soviet conflict as the ‘Battle for Britain – Part 2’, his main aim being to ridicule the attitude that it was a sideshow. That attitude justified promoting the USSR but, as Duff Cooper predicted, ignoring Communism was impossible. Newsreels showing the Soviet war effort could not avoid promoting positive images of the USSR. Ultimately, fears of Communism

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proved groundless. Pro-Soviet feeling partly resulted from the contrast of Soviet success with British defeat and it dwindled once victories were won in North Africa and elsewhere.30 British views of Communism were reflected in attitudes towards the French resistance. The Parti Communiste Fran¸cais (PCF) was the group most capable of organising resistance, having been forced underground after being proscribed at the outbreak of war. But Nazi–Soviet relations meant that French Communists, while not actively collaborationist, were at least tolerant of the Vichy regime until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. SOE’s distrust of Communism did not change as easily. Arrangements between SOE and Communist resistance groups were driven by expedience and suspicions lingered. The PCF offshoot Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP), an important resistance group, never worked entirely smoothly with SOE or the Free French. Nonetheless, both the PCF and FTP made a valuable contribution to the resistance and they could not be ignored.31 The important resistance groups, such as the FTP, were likely to have strong influence in post-war France. The British never aimed to impose a specific government on France. However, it was believed that a Communist government was unlikely to provide an open society, and the British did want the French people to be free to choose their own form of government. Whatever the actual Communist threat, ‘the Allies and de Gaulle certainly liked to pretend that there was a real danger’. This made it important, as in British domestic propaganda, to avoid promoting Communism.32 The USSR was therefore largely ignored in early propaganda planning and output to France. Just as the MOI had chosen non-confrontation, the BBC avoided criticising Nazi–Soviet cooperation and the Pact between them. Some planning occurred prior to the German invasion: on 16 June 1941 it was decided to treat Russia as a ‘second front’, and argue that the Germans had not reached a decision in the West, that Germany was losing the battle of production, that the USSR was ‘an ersatz USA’ and, particularly in propaganda to France, that Hitler was making the same mistake as Germany during the First World War, while also referring to the Napoleonic parallel. In this light, Georges Boris argued on 17 June 1941 that Hitler’s continued aggression demonstrated his European New Order was unworkable unless he dominated the world. As Hitler’s designs on Iraqi oil had been thwarted, he now saw the Caucasus oilfields as a solution to German shortages.33 After the invasion, the USSR featured regularly, established models being adapted to the new circumstances. It was shown that the Soviets would triumph and that the German invasion would help bring an Allied victory. German advances were assessed in a way optimistic to the Allied cause, and historical parallels drawn, as on 1 July 1941:

Russia’s best protection is her immensity, and her industrial system, split [. . .] between the Caucasus and the Urals because [. . .] it is always in exploiting an organised retreat that Russian armies exhaust their adversary.

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Similarly on 6 July the BBC French Service chief, Darsie Gillie, described the German gains thus far, contrasting them – perhaps tactlessly – with the invasion of Western Europe and arguing that there had been no decisive breakthrough as there had been in 1940. Both on air (1 and 5 July 1941) and in leaflets (F.50/14 and F.50/15, 1941) the obvious parallels with 1812 were drawn, suggesting that Hitler, like Napoleon, might advance but would never triumph. Similarly, the Red Army was compared to the earlier Russian army that, under Marshal Kutuzov, had defeated Napoleon’s Grande Armée. Soviet involvement was important in itself. One leaflet dropped over France (F.50/15, 1941) described the tenacious Soviet resistance and ‘scorched earth’ policy. Just before Bastille Day, on 10 July 1941, an anonymous speaker argued that now was ‘the turning point of the war [. . .] Germany is not invincible. Already on the Russian front [. . .] she has been made to pull back.’ Similarly, on 11 July, Duchesne stated unequivocally, ‘We believe in Allied victory. We see the Russians fight. [They] are the first to have made the Germans retreat on land.’ A later Courrier (F.50/32a, 1941) asked, ‘What is delaying the German advance in Russia?’, and pictured bogged-down vehicles. A caption noted that Hitler blamed bad weather, but that heroic resistance was also responsible. The USSR thus became an ally in the fight against Nazism, although it was not a smooth transition. In its European broadcasting, the BBC had long demonstrated Allied solidarity by playing national anthems. In keeping with the wish to avoid promoting Communism, the Cabinet was opposed to the use of the ‘Internationale’, the Soviet anthem, so initially ‘The Kutuzov March’ was played. The USSR’s Ambassador appealed to Bruce Lockhart (who did not share the Cabinet’s objections) and the ‘Internationale’ took its place ‘after some delay’. That the BBC French Service on 10 July 1941 described the Red Army as ‘the invincible defender and friend of democracy, of humanity and of culture’ must also have related to the wish to avoid promoting Communism.34 Soviet resistance was linked with the fight elsewhere. A Courrier produced soon after the invasion (F.50/13, 1941) repeated Hitler’s statements that he would turn against the USSR only once Germany had won in the West, demonstrating that British resistance had upset his plans. A BBC broadcast on 2 July 1941 acknowledged that, together with the British and French, the Soviets had their part: The Russians at this moment are wearing down the enemy by destroying his forces and his material. The English are wearing down the enemy by meeting him wherever they can strike [. . .] By showing him by their attitude and by their acts that they refuse to submit [. . .] the French are wearing down the morale of the enemy. The USSR’s presence in a free global coalition against Nazism became a common theme, for example in the Courrier (F.50/27a, 1941). The Soviet Union had an important part to play in this united front: the conflict was part of a worldwide battle being fought against Hitler, including within Occupied Europe. A quotation from Soviet radio was also used, and repeated again in two leaflets entitled ‘Why This Photo Concerns YOU’ (F.117 and F.117a, 1941). Another Courrier (F.50/35, 1941) discussed the overall German position, linking the Eastern

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Front and Libya. British confidence in the USSR and in ultimate victory was demonstrated, and the British promise to supply the Russians with as much war material as possible was discussed. Churchill had announced this commitment on the same day as news of the German invasion and it was repeated regularly (leaflets F.50/13, F.50/16 and F.102, all 1941, and a broadcast of 22.9.1941). A later Courrier (F.50/35, 1941), its front and rear reproduced as Figure 3.1, shows many of these different facets. This is a typical example, illustrating the text with maps and photographs. It celebrated the German Army’s first retreat since 1918 and described the position on the Eastern Front. As well as discussing the situation in Russia, the continuing British commitment to the war effort was shown by reporting the decision to declare war on Finland, Hungary and Romania, and the employment of new conscription measures. The war in Africa was also reported, showing the global nature of the fight. Hitler’s predictions of German progress inside Russia were capitalised upon as his forces failed to achieve them. On 10 July, after eighteen days had passed, his promise that German troops would enter Moscow within two weeks was discussed on air. The Courrier (F.50/27a, 1941) suggested that the Red Army was not as near defeat as Hitler claimed; a later edition (F.34, 1942) discussed the inevitability of German defeat in the East: Last autumn Hitler declared that his troops were invincible [. . .] winter quickly buried this legend. Now the Führer has declared that this spring and summer, his armies will be invincible [. . .] We know that the German army is again powerful. Nonetheless, the Führer has found it necessary to mobilise men from 17 to 50 years of age [. . .] The Germans will be on the defensive this spring, as they were throughout the winter [. . .] The Red Army is capable of striking in any season. The strength and resilience of Russian resistance became a very significant theme. For example, British leaflets (F.50/27a and F.116, 1941) explained, ‘Russia will hold – even without Moscow’. That Russia was going to stay in the fight come what may was another reason for the French people to be sure of an ultimate Allied victory.

Attack on the USA On 7 December 1941, Japanese aircraft launched a surprise attack on the USA at Pearl Harbor. As with the invasion of Russia, the Japanese assault was not entirely unexpected. They were known to be planning military action if their grievances against American economic sanctions were not redressed. The question was where and when; Pearl Harbor was not considered a likely target. The attack began a massive assault intended to seize south-east Asia and its resources. The Japanese took control of British and American possessions across the region, and confirmed their supremacy by sinking the British ships Prince of Wales and Repulse three days later. French Indochina was already under Japanese control. Following the German defeat of France, Japan had demanded occupation rights

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Figure 3.1 Courrier de l’Air, F.50/35 (1941)

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Figure 3.1 (Continued )

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over northern Indochina, granted in September 1940, and southern Indochina, granted in July 1941. It became an important point for propaganda that even as both concessions were granted, Vichy was resisting the Allies at Dakar and in Syria. While Hitler’s declaration of war on the USA on 11 December in support of Japan allowed Germany to begin unrestricted submarine warfare against American convoy escorts, it also enabled the Americans to remain committed to the war in Europe. The USA, like the USSR, would help bring about the defeat of Germany. In contrast with the propaganda treatment of the USSR, however, the USA was not ignored before entering the war. Propaganda planning used phrases such as ‘increasing American aid’, ‘impossible for Hitler to defeat Britain before American aid becomes fully effective’, ‘the vastness of America’s war potential, now at Britain’s disposal’ and ‘exploitation of American strength’. The BBC listed the USA alongside Great Britain, the Occupied Nations’ overseas territories and the USSR as a ‘combatant’ – three months before Pearl Harbor.35 Even before the USA entered the war, it was committed to the cause and provided a reason to believe in the certainty of an Allied victory. Churchill spoke obliquely on 21 October 1940 of ‘our friends across the Atlantic’ on air, making a speech reported in ‘Churchill 21.10.40’ (F.41, 1940). Other speakers were more direct. On 18 July 1940, Duchesne had declared that ‘there is not a single American who does not understand that in helping England to win, the United States may perhaps avoid the horrors of war’ and promised that American aid was daily becoming more useful. On 17 September 1940, Bourdan quoted the American Secretary of the Navy’s view that an English victory was more likely than a German victory. At about the same time, ‘Anglo-American Solidarity’ (F.33, 1940) reported the exchange of fifty elderly American destroyers for leases on British naval bases. It concluded: The American people have given by this act a new proof of their firm will to aid England in her fight against the dictatorships. If the Americans were not convinced that the English would win, they would surely not have decided to weaken their own war fleet. Roosevelt’s re-election in November 1940 was presented on air as a success for those opposed to Nazism (broadcasts of 6 November 1940 and 1 February 1941). His characterisation of the USA as ‘the arsenal of democracy’, made in an American domestic broadcast, was used in ‘America Has Taken Her Position’ (F.53, 1941). The leaflet also countered German propaganda about the same speech. Broadcasts regularly discussed American support, such as Lend–Lease arrangements, supply of aircraft and shipping, and other assistance short of war (10, 21 and 24 March and 15 April 1941). Leaflets made similar points: ‘Courage French Friends’ (F.55, 1941), dropped in February 1941, repeated Roosevelt’s promise of assistance made to Congress in January. The Courrier discussed American strength and support, commenting on the military and merchant shipbuilding programme. Other demonstrations of American production capabilities also featured in later leaflets (F.50/12a, F.50/13, F.50/27 and F.50/28, all 1941).36

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The USA participated militarily before entering the war proper, for example by protecting Atlantic shipping. In July 1941, the Americans assumed the defence of Iceland. In November, the Neutrality Act was repealed, allowing American merchant ships to be armed and to travel into war zones. Both items demonstrated the American commitment to defeating Hitler. The Courrier (F.50/15 and F.50/32, both 1941) explained the strategic importance of Iceland and the American naval base there. The decision to arm American merchant ships was reported before the bill actually became law (F.50/27 and F.50/27a, both 1941). On 22 November 1941, after this had happened, its meaning and impact were examined in the BBC’s Quart d’Heure Fran¸cais du Soir. American intentions were also discussed, but the attack on Pearl Harbor and Hitler’s declaration of war swiftly changed matters.37 One issue of the Courrier (F.50/12, 1941) – partly reproduced as Figure 3.2 – dealt with many elements of the contribution made by the ‘neutral’ USA. A diagram demonstrated the importance not only of American war production, but also how small Germany’s resources were by contrast to those available to the Allies. On the back page alone, the leaflet discussed the American contribution to the war in the Atlantic, in particular the conversion of ships into escort carriers; reported German commentary on the danger posed by American involvement; mentioned that Axis funds in the USA had been frozen; and quoted American praise of Canadian participation in the war. Consequently, after Pearl Harbor, propaganda policy did not need to change much. Unlike the Soviet entry into the war – and, indeed, the French departure from it a year earlier – the American entry did not necessitate a new policy. The existing policy of discussing and promoting American involvement in the global war effort, showing how it was changing and how this meant an eventual Allied victory, was continued. At first, the attack on Pearl Harbor was reported purely as news. A few days later a leaflet, ‘America in the War’ (F.131, 1941), examined the facts and gave the responses of Roosevelt, Churchill and the Allied governments; distributed at the same time was ‘Roosevelt–Churchill’ (F.132, 1941), which also reported the two leaders’ reactions. Both leaflets were given priority for distribution.38 As with Soviet involvement, the war in the Pacific was treated as part of a global war. On the BBC’s Quart d’Heure Fran¸cais of 9 December 1941, Marin placed Pearl Harbor within the context of ‘the conflict that was devouring old Europe’. The implied message, repeated the following day, was that wherever it was fought, this was one conflict – even before Germany and the USA were officially at war. A special edition of the Courrier (F.50/36, 1941), produced before the end of 1941, included maps demonstrating that this was a world war and showing its development. Similarly, on 30 May 1942, Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais focused on one week of the war, dealing with Libya, Russia, the Mediterranean, the Far East and European resistance. American unity in support of the war after Pearl Harbor was discussed: beforehand there had been domestic opposition to the USA assisting Great Britain and the USSR. Therefore, the attack would actually contribute to the defeat of

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Figure 3.2 Courrier de l’Air, F.50/12 (1941)

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Germany. On 9 December 1941, Marin quoted leading ex-isolationists, showing their determination to employ all available resources now that the USA was involved. Their views were combined in a leaflet, ‘The American Nation’ (F.133, 1941), which included photographs and brief commentaries about them, alongside similar treatments of important military and political figures involved in running the American war effort. Even before Pearl Harbor, American war production had been an important propaganda topic and this continued. The American rearmament programme and details of planned production in 1942 and 1943 were discussed in the Courrier (F.3, 1942). In late December 1941 an earlier edition (F.50/37, 1941) had reported that in 1942 American naval construction was expected to more than quadruple. The Revue de la Presse Libre (F.127, 1942; hereafter, the Revue) quoted Daily Telegraph figures showing how American naval construction was beginning to outpace losses and that construction rates were expected to be 10 per cent higher than production targets. Aircraft production was also discussed: the Courrier Illustrated (F.33, 1942), a news-sheet which relied on captioned photographs to make its point, revealed that a new American factory could produce one bomber an hour, while a standard Courrier (F.34, 1942) included a comment by the British Minister of Labour, Ernest Bevin, that American aircraft production equalled that of Germany, Italy and Japan combined. Reassurance about American industrial strength was complemented by ‘Churchill’s Speech’ (F.15, 1942), which examined production increases in Great Britain. American military involvement was also reported. Soon after Pearl Harbor, the Courrier (F.50/35, 1941) compared Japanese and American naval strength, showing that the US Navy was significantly stronger. It took time for the Americans to prepare their forces, but such activities were publicised. The Courrier (F.50/37, 1941) discussed the mobilisation of 10 million Americans. The Courrier Illustrated (F.82, 1942) showed Churchill inspecting paratroops during a visit to the USA. After the first American soldiers arrived in Great Britain, the French were informed in a special leaflet, ‘First American Troops’ (F.11, 1942), that these troops were to assist in the liberation of Europe. Photographs contrasted their arrival with that of the first contingent of American soldiers on French soil in 1917. A further comparison was made with the German reaction: in 1917 they had claimed that the Americans had arrived too late and in 1942 they also wanted Occupied Europe to believe that it wouldn’t change anything. The Courrier (F.10, 1942) reported on the arrival of these American troops in similar terms. Musical slogans, often used by the BBC French Service, also mentioned their arrival: They have arrived Music – They have arrived . . .they have arrived! – Who’s that? – The Americans . . .the first American soldiers have just arrived in the British Isles!

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british propaganda to france, 1940--1944 – In 1917, it was at St-Nazaire where they landed! – Don’t worry, they will land at St-Nazaire as well! A voice: 130 MILLION AMERICANS, IT IS CERTAIN VICTORY.39

As with the propaganda treatment of the Russians, what mattered was the contribution that the Americans could make to defeating Germany and liberating France. American involvement meant Allied victory.

Bombing France and Germany, 1942 Prior to an invasion of Europe one Allied means of attack was bombing Germany and the occupied territories. Early Bomber Command raids on France were largely directed against German military targets and were small-scale. But it had been recognised in September 1940 that French factories were producing war material for the Germans and that eventually the British would have ‘to attack selected factories in France, in particular aircraft and aluminium factories’. The first such attack took place in December 1940, when a Bordeaux aircraft factory was bombed. In May 1941 small daylight raids on targets including oil-storage facilities, steelworks, power stations and marshalling yards began, and raids on airfields and ports continued.40 Despite the fact that, until March 1942, bombing across Occupied Europe was restrained to avoid heavy casualties, it was still necessary – as it had been concerning Mers-el-Kébir – to justify the attacks, showing why they were needed and how they would contribute to final victory. It was also important to remind the French that nonetheless the British remained friendly: bombing was a necessary evil. The propagandists oversaw the issue of warnings about planned bombing raids, which also repeated the justifications for them. The idea of issuing warning leaflets was not new: they had been used in the RAF’s inter-war imperial policing role. They evolved into a system of broadcast Porte-Parole and printed ‘Avis’, which by mid-1943 had reportedly ‘acquired authority [. . .] and are an important means by which discipline can be maintained among the French population and such instructions [. . .] can be given by the Allied military authorities’.41 In September 1940 notes for a Strategic Planning Staff meeting suggested that when the time comes to start attacking factories in ‘occupied’ France, we might, by constant repetition, warn all Frenchmen that we are compelled to commence the attack of all armament factories manufacturing war materials for Germany and that if Frenchmen work in these factories they do so at their own risk. This recommendation was implemented in 1941. Between the end of June and early August, two leaflets entitled ‘Message to Occupied France’ (F.103 and F.103a, 1941) were dropped. They explained the decision to attack war industries working for Germany, including French factories, and suggested that the workers

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should evacuate, if possible seeking alternative employment in the countryside. Those unable to leave were asked to demand protective measures and strike if they were dissatisfied. A later Courrier (F.50/14, 1941) repeated the text of these leaflets, and also referred to two BBC broadcasts made at the end of June which had said much the same. On 6 February 1942 the BBC again warned that factories working for Germany would be bombed. Between March and May a further leaflet (F.8, 1942) warned the French people that collaborating factories in the Occupied Zone would be attacked. It conceded that casualties were inevitable, but sought assistance in minimising them by asking workers to take shelter, evacuate their families and demand adequate air-raid protection. The aim of persuading workers to take these steps was three-fold. First, it would highlight the contrast between the concern of the British and the indifference of the Germans. Second, the workers’ activities would be disruptive. And, third, if the Germans did reinforce air-raid protection, it could be achieved only by depriving somewhere else of the same equipment, as supplies were limited.42 The propagandists linked bombing with the resistance of the people of France. The ‘RAF Message’ (F.137, 1941) proclaimed that the RAF would be more powerful in 1942 compared to 1941 (and therefore more capable of destruction) but expressed sympathy with French suffering and admiration for their courage. It closed by wishing them ‘Good luck. Count on us as we count on you.’ The ‘Message to Occupied France’ leaflets promised ‘the RAF will do its best to hit the target and only the target’. A Courrier (F.50/14, 1941) took the point further, conceding that despite the care of our aviators, these bombardments will cause the death of more than one Frenchman. But we know also with what courage the French people will bear the dangers that will finally bring the liberation of France. Not only was enduring the bombing portrayed as a form of resistance, but the effects of British bombing were linked to shortages that workers could create. ‘To Occupied France’ (F.8, 1942) told the French: Your silent work and our bombs have but one aim. [. . .] Today our combined efforts can have their maximum effect. The enemy, who, a year ago, seemed to be all-powerful, today finds himself in a critical situation. Beaten and harassed in Russia and in Africa, he has need of everything to re-equip his armies. The propagandists also sought to use more specific examples to justify the bombing. ‘Why This Photo Concerns YOU’ (F.117 and F.117a, 1941), reproduced as Figure 3.3, was issued in October 1941. It pictured mud-encrusted tanks and vehicles in Russia and explained that these were Renault tanks, and argued that every new tank built in France assisted the Germans and increased the numbers that the Allies had to build in order to overcome them. That justified attacking the factories in which they were produced. It asked French workers manufacturing machinery to help by reducing their effort (‘going slow’).

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Figure 3.3 ‘Why This Photo Concerns YOU’, F.117 (1941)

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Whatever machinery was made in France freed German industries to build military vehicles, so the less the French produced, the better. The warning leaflet ‘To Occupied France’ (F.8, 1942) was delivered too late for Boulogne-Billancourt. On the night of its first dissemination, the Renault factory there, which produced lorries for Germany, was attacked. By contrast with earlier bombing of non-military French targets, this was a night attack, although to minimise damage to surrounding civilian areas, it was a low-level raid illuminated by flares. Forty per cent of the factory was destroyed, interrupting production for a month. Repairs were not completed for several months and the estimated production loss was 2,300 lorries. But 367 French civilians were killed, 341 seriously injured and nearly 10,000 rendered homeless. Only five of the casualties worked at the factory.43 On 8 March, Ford’s Poissy works were raided; on the nights of 1/2 and 2/3 April larger attacks were made on the same factory. On the night of 5/6 April, and again at the end of April and May, the Gnome-et-Rhône engine factory at Gennevilliers was bombed. Afterwards, the propagandists justified the attacks. ‘The Renault Factories Bombed’ (F.26, 1942) used reconnaissance photographs to demonstrate the damage, explaining that these factories had helped France produce 40,000-50,000 trucks annually for the Germans. Renault was also accused of making tanks. The leaflet insisted that the attack had been a military operation, to disrupt production. To reinforce the point further, ‘Why This Photo Concerns YOU’, the leaflet which had indicated the need for the attack in October 1941, was reproduced. Moreover, the impact of the raid upon production was not the only topic. The leaflet also acknowledged the sacrifice made by French civilians: Victory alone can bring a measure of consolation to the families, friends and compatriots of those who lost their life during this operation. It is to bring the day of final and absolute victory closer, that we work day and night. PWE regarded ‘The Renault Factories Bombed’ (F.26, 1942) as being ‘of such importance [. . .] that special disseminations should be arranged’ with the priority of distribution being first Unoccupied France, then Occupied France, and finally Paris.44 After the bombing of the Ford factories at Poissy, three leaflets (F.32, F.35, F.36, all 1942) were produced, using common aerial photographs and text. A comparison was drawn with the Renault attack, which ‘by a single blow has deprived Germany of a production of military trucks estimated at 12,000 a year’ and indicated that Ford production was similar. The leaflets reminded readers of previous warnings, linked bombing and resistance, and stressed that bombing did nothing to reduce the need to obstruct production. That attacks would continue was also made clear: ‘After Renault . . . Ford. After Ford . . . Gnome-et-Rhône. After Gnome-et-Rhône . . . ?’ PWE felt it important enough to decide that the ‘leaflet [which] was being written on the Poissy raid [. . .] should have joint publicity with F.26 [the Renault leaflet]’.45

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The attacks were also reported in the Courrier (F.34, 1942). It compared the damage suffered by Ford at Poissy and by Gnome-et-Rhône with the British loss of four aircraft and twenty-five men during the course of these raids, and repeated that the attacks were military operations. The leaflet also reported how German propaganda had emphasised the destruction of workers’ homes, but had overlooked damage to factory buildings. Workers were again asked to demand better protection. A broadcast made on 13 March 1942 told them: Demand deep, solid shelters everywhere; throw yourselves into these shelters as soon as you believe you hear the sound of a motor or gun; and, if you are reproached [. . .] ask why these German messieurs have often neglected to give the alert during previous visits from the RAF. Demand also a strong fighter force and powerful anti-aircraft defences [. . .] Contrary to what you might believe, you will help our allies at the same time you help yourselves. Because, if the enemy is obliged to reduce the aircraft and guns in Germany, the protection of German territory – which remains the primary objective – will be rendered even more difficult. Your prime watchword is and remains: to refuse to die for Hitler. The BBC was also used to broadcast extracts from letters from France, demonstrating that the courage of the French people, and the necessity of the attacks, were not merely a British propaganda creation. On 8 May 1942 letters read included one which asked when will you come to pay us a call? We are all so pleased when we hear the sympathetic droning of the RAF [. . .] The people of France understand and are with you. Other writers quoted in the same programme commented similarly how the RAF attacks had not changed the views of most French people, that they were ‘a painful necessity of war’ and an essential part of the final defeat of Germany. PWE argued that bombing raids were actually good propaganda – of a sort – and should be regularly undertaken. One report stated, far from damaging morale [such raids] have an exhilarating effect. They have removed the bewilderment in occupied territories as to why essential German factories were left unscathed [. . .] Indeed the publicity given to our recent raids on France [. . .] has led the inhabitants of other occupied territories to expect raids and feel a certain disappointment that they have not had their share [and] may easily be regarded [by them] as a sign of British weakness [. . .] Moreover, there are a number of important forms of passive resistance [such as] the demand for concrete shelters, Civil Defence organisations, the stopping of work when the siren sounds [which can only continue if the raids continue]. An accurate raid on an essential factory in France [. . .] is a far more potent proof of British power than a heavy raid on Hamburg [. . .] of which the effectiveness is doubted in the occupied territory.46

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The propaganda about bombing French targets must be seen alongside that discussing bombing Europe-wide. From the summer of 1940, to demonstrate that the British were continuing the fight, the BBC regularly reported attacks on targets in Germany and the occupied countries (for example, on 13 and 18 July, 18 August, 11 September and 18 October 1940). Leaflets also examined the British bombing campaign. For example, ‘Night and Day the RAF Attacks’ (F.110, 1941) reported Churchill’s declaration of 22 June 1941 (made on the same day as the Germans invaded the USSR) that ‘we will bomb Germany, by day and by night, in a constantly increasing rhythm; we will drop, month after month, heavier and heavier bomb-loads’. The remainder of the leaflet showed that this promise was being kept, by using photographs and descriptions of raids. It acknowledged British losses, but stressed that better aircraft were allowing an increasing tonnage of bombs to be dropped. The changing attitude of the German leaders – from commenting in July 1940 that aerial bombardment would not affect the future of Germany, to admitting in May 1941 that German cities were now on the front line – was demonstrated by quotations from their speeches. The main difference between reportage concerning raids on France and Germany was that the sympathy expressed about French victims was not extended to German casualties. On the night of 30/31 May 1942, Bomber Command sent more than 1,000 aircraft to Cologne. Two nights later, a force nearly as large bombed Essen. Largescale raids continued thereafter. The aims of this new scale of bombing were publicised in ‘Sir Archibald Sinclair’ (F.52, 1942), quoting his speech promising ‘a terrible summer for German aviation’ and that German war industries in the Ruhr and the Baltic ports would be attacked. The reverse showed bomb damage in Lübeck, Rostock and Augsburg.47 On 1 June 1942 news of the Cologne raid was discussed in the BBC’s Quart d’Heure Fran¸cais de Midi, quoting aircrew accounts. The leaflet ‘Biggest Raid Ever’ (F.64, 1942), whose title was large enough to be read without picking it up, announced ‘More than 1,000 bombers at the same time’, alongside diagrams based on aircrew testimony of how visible the fires were and the height of the cloud formed by smoke and dust. An official communiqué about the raid was also quoted. A few days later, ‘More Than 1,000 Bombers’ (F.66, 1942) was dropped. The title was again large and the leaflet reported Churchill’s comments: These two great night bombardments [on Cologne and Essen] inaugurate a new phase in the British air offensive against Germany [. . .] In the course of this year, all German towns, ports and industrial centres will be subdued by an ordeal, of a severity, duration and scale that no country has ever known. A description and commentary on the raids from The Times was reproduced in the Revue (F.68, 1942), showing the massive force involved and comparing it to German efforts against Great Britain in 1940 and 1941. The continuing British raids were illustrated in ‘Don’t Go To Germany’ (F.119, 1942). Reconnaissance photographs of bomb damage, coupled with comments by Harris about the

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increasing bombing, were used to dissuade the French from going to work in Germany, repeating broadcast warnings issued on 27 March 1942. The BBC French Service also used musical jingles, for example that broadcast on 7 June 1942: Vengeance of the RAF (Sound of aircraft) – Warsaw! – Rotterdam! – Belgrade! – Inhabitants of open towns . . . – Refugees on the roads of Belgium and France! – Vengeance has come . . . – The liberation will come soon . . . (Music) Bombing raids on France, Germany and elsewhere continued throughout the war. Reports about them followed similar patterns to those discussed above, demonstrating their success, explaining why they had been necessary acts of war and showing how they would help bring an Allied victory.

Invading North Africa and Europe, 1942–4

Operation Torch and its Consequences On 8 November 1942, Operation Torch, the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, was launched. Anti-Vichy groups had pledged assistance. A French general, Henri Giraud, who had escaped German captivity in April, was intended to assume control of Vichy’s armed forces there. When his authority proved insufficient, negotiations with Darlan, conveniently in Algiers, led to an armistice. The Allies were in absolute control within four days. In dealing with Operation Torch, the propagandists could use previous experience of explaining Allied attacks on French colonial possessions: Operation Menace, the failed attempt to take Dakar in French West Africa in September 1940; Operation Exporter in June 1941 in which, prompted by German plans to assist a coup in Iraq which threatened Egypt, Allied and Free French troops wrested control of Syria from Vichy forces; and, different because the Free French were not involved, Operation Ironclad, which between May and November 1942 saw the occupation of the island of Madagascar, preventing the Japanese from basing submarines there. In its justification of these activities, British propaganda expressed friendship towards the French and attacked the Germans and the Vichy authorities. On 18 September 1940, Duchesne spoke during Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais, promising that the British had no designs upon the French Empire. On 24 September, while Dakar was under fire, he declared, ‘the

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Dark Continent is at boiling point and wants to rally to Free France’. A leaflet, ‘The Truth About Dakar’ (F.37, 1940), suggested the Germans had wanted the fighting and, indeed, had insisted that Dakar be defended – recalling their role at Mers-el-Kébir. ‘To Our Ally the French Nation’ (F.91, 1941) explained that, by allowing German aircraft to use Syrian bases, the Vichy government had broken the armistice and betrayed the people of France, following up BBC broadcasts made on 17 and 31 May 1941. After Syria had fallen, the news was reported in the Courrier (F.50/16, 1941), the assurance that British interest in French possessions was confined to defeating Germany was reasserted (broadcast of 16 July 1941) and a headline in the Courrier (F.50/19, 1941) declared, ‘The prestige of France re-established in Syria’. Finally, after the Madagascan port of Diego Suarez (now Antseranana) had been taken, a leaflet, ‘To People of France’ (F.45, 1942), explained that the operation had been necessary to prevent Japanese occupation and that Madagascar remained French. The Courrier (F.55, 1942) repeated this promise of safeguarding French possessions while BBC programmes and reports of Allied communiqués used similar justifications (for example, on 5 and 7 May 1942). Many of these points were used in the leaflet ‘On the Orders of Germany’ (F.107, 1942), reproduced as Figure 3.4. In its simplicity and lack of images, this is typical of early leaflets with a single point to make. It contrasted Vichy’s acquiescence to Japanese annexations in French Indochina with the strong resistance to the Allied invasion of Syria, arguing that it had come about as a result of obeying German orders and that Vichy had thus betrayed France’s imperial history. Finally, the leaflet closed by predicting that Vichy would put other parts of the French Empire at German or Japanese disposal and that, although Vichy claimed to want to defend the Empire against aggression, only the Free French actually could. PWE’s participation in Operation Torch was broader than this reportage and justification of the events. Its involvement began with a new undertaking, that of deception, designed to suggest that the real target was metropolitan France. In the spring of 1942 the BBC warned that coastal areas were likely to become war zones, starting on 26 April 1942. The French were repeatedly reminded not to revolt before receiving orders from London. Similar instructions were also issued in ‘Avis’ leaflets (for example, F.69, 1942). This was good advice, but hinted at invasion. PWE also initiated rumours about Operation Overthrow, a supposed invasion of France.48 Other broadcasts discussed creating a ‘second front’ in Europe (for example, on 26 April, 4 May, 8 and 14 June and 3 August 1942, and also by leaflet F.69, 1942). Meanwhile, commandos were sent to raid the French coast. The intention was to create an expectation among the French – and the German occupiers – of invasion in 1942, although it probably helped condemn Operation Jubilee, an assault on Dieppe. The operation cost 3,350 Canadian lives and, as the New York Times later put it, proved ‘there is a wrong way to invade’. The Germans, believing that an invasion was coming, were ready and waiting. Conversely, the attack also supported the idea that the claims made in support of the deception were genuine.49

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Figure 3.4 ‘On the Orders of Germany’, F.107 (1941)

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The conduits of propaganda also participated in Operation Torch. On 7 November 1942, the day before its launch, the BBC repeatedly broadcast the phrase ‘Allo Franklin, Robert arrive’, to prompt the anti-Vichy groups to seize key buildings in Algiers. Using the BBC to transmit such code phrases became more important later in the war. On 8 November the BBC told civilians and military personnel how to show Allied troops they had no hostile intentions. PWE’s participation in Operation Torch in strict propaganda terms was extensive, including the translation, printing and recording of proclamations by Roosevelt, Churchill and Eisenhower. These preparations ‘were formidable mainly because they could be entrusted to only a severely limited number of people’ for security reasons and were carried out ‘concurrently with [PWE’s] strenuous daily routine’. Bruce Lockhart had known of plans for the landings since mid-August 1942, but the French Regional Director was not told until early September, and his subordinates later again. Nonetheless, apart from printing the leaflets, PWE was ready by 24 October. Propaganda had an important role to play. It justified the seizure of French North Africa, argued that it would help win the war, and that, as in the treatment of other places where French territory had been taken over, the Allies retained their friendship for France.50 On the night of 8/9 November leaflets concerning the invasion were dropped over France. ‘Warning’ (F.141, 1942) explained that the invasion was the first step towards liberating France, the immediate aim being to defeat Axis forces in North Africa. Metropolitan France was reminded not to rise up in support. The same text had been read on the BBC early on 8 November. Two ‘Eisenhower Declarations’ duplicated leaflets dropped over North Africa during the invasion. The first (F.142a, 1942) reminded readers that the invaders came in friendship (as in ‘Warning’) to protect North Africa from Axis forces and that French sovereignty was not affected. The second (F.142b, 1942) declared that North Africa would provide a base from which to liberate Europe; there were no territorial motivations, as Hitler and Pierre Laval, Pétain’s deputy, wanted the French to believe. A 32-page miniature booklet, the ‘Illustrated Folder’ (F.143, 1942), highlighted links between France and the USA. Similar to ‘First American Troops’ (F.11, 1942) it pictured an American First World War memorial, the Statue of Liberty and the arrival of American troops in 1917, alongside a brief text evoking memories of this arrival and looking forward to victory and French liberation. Of all the Operation Torch leaflets, this was the longest-lived, being distributed until mid-February 1943, as it was a more ‘timeless’ leaflet than the others, which received at most two nights’ dissemination. These leaflets, prepared in advance, did not discuss the invasion itself. New leaflets included a special Courrier (F.144, 1942) reporting Churchill’s Mansion House speech of 10 November in which, assessing the overall war situation, he concluded, ‘this is the end of the beginning’. Excerpts from the speech were also broadcast on the same day it was made. Quotations about the invasion from The Times, the Daily Telegraph and the London-edited francophone newspaper France were reproduced in the Revue (F.145, 1942). On 12 November 1942

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military activity in North Africa having ended, the BBC carried out a lengthy review covering significant facts, important Allied broadcasts, enemy reactions and other relevant information. The Allied invasion of North Africa created two significant propaganda problems apart from the need to explain the invasion itself: the complete German occupation of France and the deal struck with Darlan. On 11 November, in response to the Allied invasion, German troops took control of Unoccupied France, thus making the Vichy government’s puppet status clearer still. This may have been expected. In October 1942 the ‘Joint American–British Plan of Psychological Warfare for France and the French Empire’ speculated that the will to resist in Unoccupied France has appreciably increased, but is not yet comparable to that in Occupied France. If, however, the whole of France was occupied by the Germans, the distinctions would vanish. Similarly a Central Directive dated 5 November noted presciently ‘every region [PWE section] must continue to feature developments in France. The crisis is approaching a climax.’ For the first time, too, the two zones were treated together, rather than separately. Indeed, in an abstract sense the propagandists probably wanted the complete occupation because, just as in the Occupied Zone where the German presence was believed to have a propaganda impact favouring the Allies, the same would now be true throughout France.51 The propaganda response followed existing models, particularly showing that Allied victory remained certain and was now closer. On 11 November 1942, Marin argued that Operation Torch would assist the destruction of Axis forces in Africa, allow the Allies more freedom in the Mediterranean, and give them access to new resources. He suggested that collaboration now more than ever meant working directly for Germany. He also declared that full occupation would unite the French people as never before, complicating the German task and hastening liberation. And, finally, Marin reminded the French not to revolt. That day would come, but not yet; this advice was repeated in an official communiqué issued the same evening. A Central Directive issued two days later stated: The German march into Unoccupied France should be treated as part of the German strategic reaction to our offensive, involving yet further dispersal of German troops and German terror organisations. What was Vichy France, today is unified with Occupied France in active resistance to the invader. The word ‘Vichy’ is now dropped. German occupation also threatened the remnants of the French fleet. On 11 November 1942 the BBC broadcast an Allied communiqué urging French sailors to sail to North Africa or Gibraltar or, if this was impossible, to sink their vessels. In the event, when German troops entered Toulon on 27 November the fifty-eight ships there were scuttled. The propagandists again showed how this brought Allied victory closer. The same night as the scuttling, Bourdan argued that, although the loss of the French fleet was a tremendous blow, Hitler had

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been denied it, which was a step towards victory. On 28 November, PWE issued a special directive stating that France, resurgent and united, has won a major victory in the eyes of the whole world by the heroic self-sacrifice of her sailors [. . .] The reproaches and the doubts of the previous two years are magnificently answered. France, by the act of Toulon, resumes the moral stature of a great power [. . .] Present this as a great victory for the United Nations bought at a great price by France. The story of the scuttling of the fleet was recounted in Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais on 1 December, using statements from witnesses from the five submarines that had been able to escape from Toulon; similar broadcasts had been made on 27 and 28 November 1942. A Courrier (F.154, 1942) focusing on these events commented, ‘the explosions at Toulon have resounded to the four corners of the world’ and hailed the bravery of those involved and the importance of their actions.52 The other significant propaganda problem was the deal struck with Darlan to end hostilities in French North Africa. This was a military decision, made for quick results without consideration of the long-term potential consequences. Darlan’s importance within the Vichy government made the deal politically embarrassing, because it suggested that the Allies might make arrangements if expedient, rather than sweeping away all trace of the Axis. In some ways, it was a betrayal of the occupied peoples. One commentator wrote, ‘Europe was shaken by the cynical use made of Darlan. For [all of Occupied Europe] had their renegades of tomorrow, ready to be made use of.’ Garnett added, ‘it produced a mood of abrupt disillusionment among resistance groups and the BBC audience in occupied Europe’. Darlan’s murder six weeks later resolved the problem, but the larger issues raised may have encouraged the Allied unconditional surrender policy, declared at Casablanca in January 1943, to demonstrate that there was no question of a similar deal with anyone else, as well as to end the war in a way that would prevent a ‘stab-in-the-back’ legend being created as had happened in Germany after the First World War. Promoting the unconditional surrender policy became a long-term propaganda task in planning directives from the end of January.53 In the short term, the deal provoked the most serious crisis ever faced by the propagandists. Initially, it was decided that, as far as possible, Darlan should not be mentioned: instructions were that ‘there should be no discussion of [. . .] Darlan [. . .] without reference. This is extremely important.’ The following week, ‘after President Roosevelt’s declaration has been made known, we should drop the subject’. By 10 December it had been decided ‘criticism of Darlan should be given minimum publicity until further orders’.54 But doing this was often impossible in practice, for example in reporting news in which Darlan was involved. The BBC therefore began telling only part of the truth. For example, Darlan issued a communiqué from which, on 12 November 1942, the BBC excluded his assertion that, ‘I take authority in North Africa in

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the name of the Marshal.’ This created inconsistencies which, given the lack of a clear Allied statement, led to confusion and speculation. Was Darlan an Allied prisoner? Had a deal been struck with him? Only on 17 November did Roosevelt – because Torch was technically an American operation – issue a statement, the gist of which was relayed immediately by the BBC. Roosevelt indicated that the arrangements with Darlan were temporary, justified because they had saved Allied lives. The full text was read the following evening.55 The truth was uncomfortable. However unpalatable Duchesne considered the deal with Darlan, he acknowledged on 24 November 1942 that, in the larger context, it brought liberation closer. Other broadcasters were not quite so level headed. The Free French had already (on 16 November) denied any involvement in negotiations with Darlan. On 22 November they stopped using their BBC broadcasting time in protest, staying silent until after Darlan’s murder.56 The BBC French Service continued operating, although most of its British staff threatened to resign. As revealed on air over 25 and 26 November 1942, the wide-ranging discussions of Les Trois Amis were suspended because ‘it would be [. . . ] inappropriate to hold free discussions when there are subjects that cannot be tackled’, while others also chafed at the constraints.57 On 3 December, Darlan declared himself Head of State in North Africa. This seemed anything but temporary. De Gaulle, already incensed by the deal, was prevented from responding directly on the BBC. When on 6 December a version of his response was broadcast – censoring his reference to ‘giving quarter to the men who symbolise collaboration’ – the BBC’s Free French staff went on strike. As this group included Marin, it was a serious split. They remained silent until 18 December 1942, when Marin obtained permission to explain their position. The deal came close to crippling the BBC French Service. Duchesne barely held things together – he argued that a total break in broadcasting would be disastrous – but the BBC French Service was never the same again, and the Free French became suspicious of it.58 Darlan’s murder, announced on Christmas Day 1942, resolved this ‘deep and dangerous political impasse’. In practice, though, this was a crisis for the propagandists rather than for propaganda, and may not have affected the audience as greatly as was feared. The Allied landings, coupled with the German occupation of France, at least partly deflected the impact of the deal with Darlan. Nonetheless, it was a close shave.59

Sicily and Italy Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily, was launched at dawn on 10 July 1943. Allied deception schemes – the most ingenious of which, Operation Mincemeat, involved a corpse carrying apparently top-secret documents being washed ashore in Spain – had earlier convinced Hitler that Sardinia, Corsica or Greece were likely Allied targets, and even afterwards that the invasion of Sicily was a feint. The island was in Allied hands by 17 August. The invasion of Sicily had significant effects in Italy, where there had long been disillusionment with the war. The Empire had been lost, sporadic bombing

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raids since 1940 had been damaging, and Germany was unpopular. Mussolini – whom Hitler regarded as the only Italian he could trust – was arrested after King Victor Emmanuel regained control in late July. While Mussolini’s replacement, Marshal Badoglio, publicly maintained the Italian intention to remain in the war on the Axis side, negotiations were opened with the Allies. The surrender terms, effectively unconditional, were agreed on 1 September, coming into force a week later. The Allies landed unopposed on the Italian mainland, but the Germans defended stubbornly further north and the war in Italy lasted until May 1945. Propaganda supported the deception schemes covering Operation Husky, as it had with those protecting Operation Torch nine months earlier. PWE planned widespread leafleting to draw attention away from Sicily and participated in Operation Starkey, a deception indicating that a cross-channel invasion was imminent that continued into the autumn. As before, the schemes were potentially costly as both French morale and the credibility of British propaganda would suffer from crying wolf. The deception might make the genuine invasion much harder and provoke members of the resistance into reacting as if it were the real thing, revealing themselves to the Germans. Notwithstanding the dangers, the plans were implemented. On 3 April 1943 the BBC warned that the Germans intended to stage landings to bait the resistance and reminded the French not to act without Allied instructions. The former warning was repeated by leaflet (F.131, 1943), and the latter on air on 9 and 24 April 1943. On 15 May reminders were issued of the impossibility of revealing Allied intentions in advance (although the phrase ‘the campaign of Europe’ was used, which must have been intended to indicate an invasion) and suggesting that the French could increase their preparations but they should not pre-empt Allied instructions. On 23 June residents of the former Unoccupied Zone were addressed, stressing that these warnings applied to them too. Messages were also issued by leaflet, for example ‘Warning’ and ‘Special Warning’ (F.89 and F.92, 1943), of which more than 5 million copies were dropped over Paris and northern France. More than 6 million ‘Discretion and Vigilance’ leaflets (F.110, 1943) were dropped in support of Starkey between August and December 1943. On 18 August on air, and by leaflet (F.121, 1943), it was stated that ‘the liberation of the occupied countries has begun’. The warnings already mentioned above were repeated. In practice, the threats that deception posed to propaganda and morale were at least partially mitigated – PWE’s plans for leafleting to draw attention away from Sicily proved impractical because they required British-based aircraft to fly further than the cover of darkness permitted. To offset the potential damage arising from Starkey, the Germans were blamed for starting invasion rumours, and it was planned to admit that an Allied invasion exercise had been undertaken. In addition, any fall in morale was expected to be countered by the invasions of Sicily and Italy.60 Propaganda reporting the invasion of Sicily and Italy was largely confined to information about what was happening and claims that victory had been brought closer. It was big news: the liberation of Europe itself had begun. On 11 and 12 July 1943, Duchesne reported the invasion of Sicily using British radio and news sources. The first Courrier (F.105, 1943) about Sicily carried a front-page article

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headlined ‘Towards the Liberation’ which reported progress, describing which towns had been freed; a map was included. Inside, a photograph showed troops wading ashore. The first Courrier (F.133, 1943) to report the news of the Allied landings in mainland Italy included the official announcement of the surrender and explained the circumstances of the Italian approach to the Allies. A doublelength edition of the Revue (F.134, 1943) gave Allied press commentary on the Italian surrender. The Allied landings in southern Italy were reported in detail in a later Courrier (F.137, 1943), which pictured Free French naval vessels in action, the surrender being signed, and the arrival of the Italian fleet at Malta. As the Allied (including Free French) forces began to fight the Germans on the Italian mainland, this and other events in Italy were also reported and discussed. Similar themes would continue to be used for the remainder of the war, for example in broadcasts of 25 October 1943, 11 January and 3, 5 and 29 February 1944; and in leaflets such as the Courrier (F.140, 1943). The success of the amphibious operation needed to invade Sicily was emphasised. An invasion of France would undoubtedly require similar techniques and, particularly after the debacle at Dieppe in 1942, it was important to show that the Allies could mount a victorious amphibious landing. Jacques Pécheral spoke in Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais on 11 July 1943 to describe what was (before D-Day, at any rate) ‘the biggest amphibious operation which has ever been tried’, indicating that inter-Service cooperation had been particularly effective. The following week’s Courrier (F.108, 1943) included eyewitness reports and a photograph of a special amphibious truck. The capture of prisoners was also mentioned and some POWs, en route to North Africa, were pictured in the Courrier (F.108, 1943). It was not the first time British leaflets had done this. Courrier (F.50/35, 1941 – see Figure 3.1) showed Axis prisoners in Africa, while a later Courrier (F.140, 1943), the front page of which is reproduced as Figure 3.5, pictured Germans captured at Salerno in September 1943. All contravened the Geneva Convention – Article 2 protected POWs ‘from public curiosity’ – but this was not unprecedented. Images of Italian prisoners taken outside POW camps had been used, largely at Churchill’s instigation, to demonstrate the extent of earlier British victories in Abyssinia. The Courrier (F.140, 1943) juxtaposed a Russian offensive with the beginnings of Corsica’s liberation by French commandos and the recognition of the Comité Fran¸cais de la Libération Nationale (CFLN), showing the conflict’s global nature.61 The fall of Mussolini was not overlooked. He was mocked on the BBC. To the tune of Meunier, tu dors, a well known children’s song, van Moppès put new lyrics, broadcast on 23 July 1943: Musso, you sleep The Allies are very quick, Musso, you sleep The Allies are very strong. Your aeroplanes aren’t fast, Musso, you sleep. Your boats remain in port.

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Figure 3.5 Courrier de l’Air, F.140 (1943)

Two days later, on 25 July, the BBC reported Mussolini’s arrest. His arrest showed again that Allied victory was coming and provided an opportunity to attack German and Vichy broadcasters. The following day the BBC described how the German domestic broadcasting service had made no comment while foreign listeners had been told that Mussolini’s poor health had provoked the change of leadership. On 28 July, Oberlé mocked Radio Paris and other stations, which had declared their intention to stick to official communiqués and described Mussolini’s departure simply as a ‘change of government’. Oberlé gave it more significance: one of two totalitarian dictators had been overthrown.

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But the optimism of these events had to be tempered. Similar to concerns about the BBC’s V campaign, it was important that the French people did not rise unsupported. This consideration cannot be entirely divorced from the deception plans already discussed, which had suggested to them that liberation was imminent, an impression strengthened by events in Italy. PWE issued a Special Directive about the Italian surrender, asking that the occupied peoples be reminded ‘that the defeat of Italy is only the preliminary stage to the defeat of Germany; that the war is far from over; their activities must now be concentrated on the Germans’. Nonetheless, the Italian defeat brought Allied victory another step closer. Geneviève Brissot discussed the news in the BBC’s Quart d’Heure Fran¸cais de Midi on 9 September. She described hearing a German broadcast about the surrender, ‘the voice of the speaker trembling with rage’. Brissot concluded that the Germans knew they had lost and that Allied victory was definite.62

D-Day and the Liberation of France The Allied invasion of northern France, Operation Overlord, began on 6 June 1944. It was a massive undertaking. The Germans reacted slowly, allowing the Allies to hold a relatively secure bridgehead by nightfall. No D-Day objective had been reached, but they could build up their strength before advancing. German resistance was stubborn, but the Allies slowly made progress. On 15 August, Operation Dragoon put forces ashore in the south of France. By late September, France was mostly liberated: the remaining German-occupied parts were slowly overcome, though some were held until the European war ended in May 1945. There was no suggestion that the war would not end in 1944. Again and again it had been indicated that the liberation really was imminent. On 28 December 1943 the BBC repeated Eisenhower’s promise that ‘we will win the war in Europe in 1944’. On 1 January 1944, Oberlé looked forward to a year ‘which will be hard, but the Liberation is at its end’. On 5 and 16 January 1944 ‘peasants’ were asked to assist the resistance and later to take more active steps against the Germans. On 17 April 1944 listeners were told to store food, as supplies were unlikely to be available quickly or in quantity after the Allies had landed. Leaflets gave much the same impression. The first of PWE’s 1944 leaflets, ‘Towards The Final Assault’ (F.1, 1944), carried photographs of Allied commanders, proclaiming, ‘the chiefs of the liberation army are named’. The title phrase was repeated in the Courrier (F.40, 1944), alongside Churchill’s promises of victory. The conduits of propaganda were used extensively before D-Day itself. The problem of having cried wolf during previous deceptions emerged as D-Day planners worried that the credibility of BBC personal messages or ‘Avis’ leaflets had been compromised. These fears were not unfounded: D-Day would be the fourth issue of such alerts and the first time they would be genuine. On 28 February 1944, therefore, the BBC reminded the French of the purpose of these messages, acknowledging that they had not always been followed by the promised operations. On 18 April 1944 a further broadcast admitted that Allied activities

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would be suggestive of invasion, but asked for patience. After PWE issued a Special Directive, a new series of broadcast instructions, the Voice of SHAEF, was launched on 20 May 1944, requesting reports of enemy troop movements, the condition of their equipment and the locations of their arms and fuel dumps. The fourth Voice of SHAEF broadcast, only a week later on 27 May, gave advice on assisting the Allies and asked the French people to take shelter. These directives gave important information but also assisted deception plans, as other languages were used alongside French to suggest the invasion might not target France. PWE prepared the Voice of SHAEF broadcasts and provided the French, Dutch and Flemish speakers. Curiously, Voice of SHAEF instructions were not distributed in leaflet form before D-Day. The only instruction leaflet issued (for France, at least) was ‘Frenchmen be prepared (Invasion Manual)’ (F.55, 1944), first disseminated on the night of 22/23 May 1944.63 On 1 and 2 June 1944 the resistance was mobilised using personal messages or ‘iodoforms’ broadcast on the BBC. This was a system that had been proposed by George Noble based on his experiences in France in 1941. By transmitting a specific phrase that was meaningless except to its recipient, prearranged messages could be passed or plans initiated without requiring two-way communications with the resistance. This minimised radio operators’ vulnerability to location by radio-direction finding. To give a further disguise, the BBC broadcast with them other short phrases, some genuinely intended to convey a personal message to someone in France, and some just invented, to increase the numbers. For the D-Day orders, two messages were involved: the first alerted the resistance group to make ready; the second authorised action. For example, ‘We are going to Paris to see the fireworks’ readied the Parson resistance group to attack railway lines, while ‘Flowers are words of love’ prepared the Headmaster circuit to disrupt communications. The action messages, broadcast on 5 June 1944, were similarly strange: those completing the alert messages quoted were, respectively, ‘During the starry night of 14 July’ and ‘The waltz turned heads’. Instead of the usual five to ten minutes, the messages took twenty minutes to read.64 As hoped, the resistance began to dislocate communications and road and rail movements, hampering German responses. Of 1,050 plans to disrupt the railways activated by message from London, 950 were implemented. This was not the end of the propagandists’ involvement with the resistance or deception: pre-recorded statements by Allied leaders-in-exile to their peoples were broadcast on 6 June partly to confuse the Germans further about the Allies’ intentions. The following day, the BBC broadcast personal messages in support of a deception scheme suggesting a second invasion in the Pas-de-Calais. Alert and action messages were broadcast as late as 24 August, some for SAS units operating behind German lines.65 PWE was ready in advance for D-Day itself. Such was the secrecy, however, that some Regional Directors were not informed until 5 June. Personnel involved in the preparations – for example, translating Eisenhower’s proclamations – were confined to Woburn; and shortly before the invasion two printing presses were put under special security arrangements while they produced the leaflets for

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D-Day and afterwards. Throughout, PWE’s normal work continued. But there was a marked difference. On previous occasions, particularly where French targets had been attacked, explanations and justifications had been required. After D-Day, the very fact that the Allies had landed in strength and the liberation had begun was justification enough. What was really needed was news of what was happening, although the propaganda conduits continued to be utilised to issue instructions and warnings.66 Before, during and after D-Day, PWE also tried to assist civilians caught in the invasion zone and along German routes to it, and to hamper German responses. Late on 6 June 1944, the Voice of SHAEF warned that Allied bombing, previously limited to within 20 miles of the coast, had been extended to any necessary military objective. It announced that leaflets warning of such raids would be dropped when possible: the leaflet referred to was probably ‘Warning Message’ (ZF.4, 1944). This and other instructional leaflets (ZF.1 to ZF.12) were distributed on D-Day and afterwards. Although attributed to PWD (as we have seen, the SHAEF department responsible for operational propaganda) they were in practice prepared, translated and printed by PWE, while PWD merely collected and disseminated them. The first (‘Eisenhower Proclamation’, ZF.1, 1944) carried the headline ‘The Allied Armies are landing’ in text large enough to be read at a distance; the reverse carried an announcement to Europe and particularly France, revealing the news, which had also been broadcast on the morning of 6 June. Another leaflet (ZF.3, 1944), reproduced as Figure 3.6, reported a proclamation asking that Allied orders be followed. It is typical of the series: basic, with no frills, but making its point clearly and simply. The final drop of ZF leaflets took place on the night of 18/19 November 1944.67 The BBC also broadcast instructions. Judging that the landings had been successful, at 9.17 a.m. on 6 June, SHAEF communicated the prearranged phrase ‘Topflite at 0930’ to the BBC. At 9.30 a.m. the BBC interrupted its transmissions on all frequencies with the news of the landings, followed by a communiqué from Eisenhower read first in English, then in French, Norwegian, Danish, Dutch and Flemish. Then the BBC broadcast messages from European leaders-in-exile to their peoples. De Gaulle, predictably, refused to read the speech prepared for him and made his own that evening.68 Special requests, reflecting particular needs, were usually made by radio rather than leaflet. On 6 June 1944, Gillois (who had by now succeeded Maurice Schumann as BBC Free French spokesman) appealed to French police officers to join the resistance, rather than following orders assisting the Germans; those guarding political prisoners were asked to release them, the requests being repeated on 21 August. On 9 June collaborating factories were told they should close, while those doing essential work benefiting France, such as producing food, should stay open. Railway and communications workers who had not clandestinely received instructions were asked to join all French people in pestering the Germans, without going so far as provoking repressive responses or engaging in open warfare. On 17 August 1944, French workers were still being asked to stop working for the Germans but to maintain vital services. However, with final

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Figure 3.6 ‘Proclamation’, ZF.3 (1944)

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liberation in sight, they were also requested to protect the factories, to ease the return to normal life. News and information, following Allied progress through France, was reported. On the evening of 6 June 1944, for example, Oberlé described the landings, discussing the arrival of troops by air and sea, and the German defence. Allied activities and other items of interest were discussed as they occurred, such as visits to France by Churchill and de Gaulle (broadcasts of 13 and 16 June, and 20 August 1944). Free French participation was praised: the work of their navy on D-Day and afterwards, the contribution of their air force, and the participation of the resistance, now officially the FFI – Forces Fran¸caises de l’Interieur (for example, 22 and 23 June, 18, 23 and 25 July, and 17, 18, 19 and 22 August 1944). The massacres of civilians at Oradour-sur-Glane and elsewhere by German troops were reported on 26 June 1944. But the focus was not just on news from France. The launching of V1 missiles against London was discussed: Oberlé argued on 22 June that, as in the Blitz, the British people would not be weakened by this onslaught. The Russian advance towards Germany was reported on 2 and 10 July, and 20 August 1944. The common nature of the fight and the common purpose of all participants across Europe, whether in uniform or not, were discussed on 29 June. Similar broadcasts were made on 16 and 19 August 1944. There was also, eventually, time to begin reporting the return towards normality: butter becoming available again after the liberation of Normandy (3 July 1944); discussions of Parisian daily life (4 July 1944); and, on 20 August 1944, the reopening of Radio Bretagne, the first free radio station on French soil since 1940. The concentration on news is also apparent in the leaflets that were prepared and dropped after D-Day. Almost all were examples of Courrier or Accord, a photographic news booklet. D-Day was a watershed for British propaganda to France. The most immediately noticeable change was to the opening of the BBC’s Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais, which since 22 September 1940 had measured the length of time the French had been resisting oppression and fighting for liberation and also, since 3 December 1943, the length of time since the invasion of Italy had taken place. Speaking on 6 June 1944, Duchesne acknowledged: It no accident, my friends, that you have not heard this evening, ‘Today, 277th day of the invasion’, etc. It is not through forgetfulness that you have not heard, ‘1,444th day of the fight of the French people for their liberation: it has taken 1,444 days for that liberation to begin.’ But you will never hear these two formulas again. The daily litany, the road of ordeal marked by the passing of days without military action on French soil, all of that, in every case, is finished. Since this morning, there are free Frenchmen on a small portion of territory, Frenchmen who no longer wait for the Liberation. It was the beginning of the end. On 20 August 1944, Duchesne promised that BBC French broadcasts would continue until ‘the sovereign voice of France’ could be raised from Paris. Radio Paris was back on air five days later and several

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other stations were broadcasting soon afterwards, as the BBC revealed on 31 August 1944. But, because many French transmitters had been damaged, the BBC maintained its services and relayed programmes while repairs were made. Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais made its final broadcast on 22 October 1944 while BBC news remained important, particularly in the remaining German-occupied areas. But Radio Paris was what most Frenchmen now wanted to listen to.69 Leaflets continued to be dropped after D-Day, but their role was limited. In part this was for military reasons. During the invasion, aircraft had other roles and, after the beachheads were deemed secure, Bomber Command concentrated upon German oil refineries. Bad weather also restricted operations during the first two weeks of the invasion. Alternatives, such as newspapers and formerly clandestine journals now operating openly, took over from PWE’s leaflets. The decline of British propaganda leaflets can be seen in quantitative terms – just under 21 million leaflets were distributed between June and September 1944, compared to 110 million leaflets in the preceding four-month period. Since 1940, British propaganda to France had attempted to put across messages that would assist the Allies achieve victory, and it had also provided a substitute for the free press and radio in France. The removal of Vichy and German control with the liberation of France meant that this task was over.70

Conclusion Despite finding itself responsible for producing propaganda to France without much warning, and notwithstanding the lack of guidance from the Foreign Office or the MOI, the BBC rapidly expanded its broadcasting to France after June 1940, while Department EH (soon SO1) had the first leaflets ready for dissemination a short time later. These two methods underpinned the British propaganda effort towards France during the Second World War. Although the organisational system did not link the BBC French Service closely with the leaflet producers until the formation of PWE in 1941, the content of their output was pretty consistent throughout, probably because of good foundations laid by Darsie Gillie during his brief tenure as both BBC and SO1 French Section chief. One problem that could have hampered British propaganda – that different aims and methods undermined each other – therefore did not materialise. In spite of the escalation of scale as time passed, the two major methods continued to be complementary rather than contradictory. This was because a policy was developed, albeit on an ad hoc basis at first. Initially, this came particularly from speeches by Churchill and, to a lesser extent, de Gaulle. It was led by the BBC rather than by SO1, but in general their approaches correlated. It turned out to work well, so much so that it later shaped basic propaganda strategy. SO1’s first policy documents, albeit pretty basic ones, were produced in September 1940 and corresponded with what propaganda had been output earlier that summer. They underpinned the whole British white propaganda effort towards France for the remainder of the war. Later revisions in planning

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refined, elucidated and occasionally extended policy, but the direction was never radically altered. Given the lack of guidance at the outset and the circumstances in which the first propaganda material was produced, this was an achievement. British propaganda sought from the outset to persuade the French not to give up. This evolved into actively encouraging a will to resist. Part of that meant provoking distrust in the Vichy government and the Germans, making it clear what the French were being asked to resist against, expressing certainty in ultimate Allied victory and in a bright future for France, showing that resistance was worth while. At first, such encouragement could only be exhortative; there was little evidence to show that Allied victory could be achieved. Later on, British, Soviet and American military and civil activities could be used to demonstrate that victory was on its way, whether this was the industrial strength of the USA, the tenacious resistance of the USSR, or the Allied invasions from 1942 onwards. At the same time, the realities of the military situation meant that targets in France or in French colonies would be attacked. The French people could not always be expected to understand, especially given their exposure to enemy propaganda. It was therefore necessary to explain that aggressive acts against French targets were not aimed at France herself but were necessary evils, more tolerable as part of the larger aim of defeating Germany and bringing liberation to the French people. This was particularly the case regarding the attack on the French Fleet and the invasion of French North Africa. It was less so in the case of the D-Day invasion in 1944, because this justified itself by being obviously linked to the liberation of France. It is also notable that the British propaganda organisations overcame the issues that they encountered, whether these came from objectives bringing them into conflict with other bodies prosecuting the war effort or arose from problems encountered in what propaganda had to report. The successful employment of propaganda for deception was ostensibly irreconcilable, as deception by its very nature meant falsehood while propaganda – the white variety at least – was firmly grounded in truthfulness. While luck played its part – for example, as in the deception plans protecting the invasion of Sicily, other factors limited the deceptive employment of propaganda – the issue was handled sufficiently well to overcome it. Rather different was the deal with Darlan, which created the most serious crisis of the war for British propaganda to France. In part this was an external crisis because news of the deal was bound to impact on the people of France, for whom Darlan represented everything that the Allies were trying to overcome. But it was also internal because some propagandists were unable to share Duchesne’s understanding that, although the deal was dislikeable, it brought French liberation closer. It would have been a catastrophe if the BBC French Service had been permanently crippled as a result of this division. Overall, a coherent propaganda policy had been developed. In turn, that policy enabled an effective, non-contradictory message to be used in both major forms of British white propaganda, throughout the war. This remained the case, despite the issues discussed concerning the propaganda machinery and the problems encountered between 1940 and 1944.

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In short, British white propaganda was potentially capable of having an impact on the people of France and therefore on the outcome of the war. Its actual impact must be set against the problems of receiving leaflets and BBC broadcasting. Disregarding any enemy efforts to disrupt propaganda distribution – which will be examined more closely below – the problems of the delivery systems meant that neither leaflet dissemination nor radio reception was geographically or demographically universal. However, propaganda material was being received. Even if the influence is impossible to quantify accurately, the reactions, both of ordinary French people and the German and Vichy authorities in France, provide some clues to the impact of British white propaganda to France.

4

Reaction: The Impact of White Propaganda

The Evidence Both domestic and overseas audiences had long communicated with the BBC, and the letters it received from France formed one of its most important sources of information about its audience there. SO1 was slower to realise the value of such evidence and did so, in the end, at least partly because of the BBC’s experience. In May 1941, Beck stated that the BBC had received many letters about their broadcasts in French to France and said that in view of this, in a forthcoming issue of the Courrier we should invite them to write to us about the material contained in the Courrier. Colonel Chambers agreed to investigate the possibilities since it might involve questions of security.1 There is no evidence to suggest that this invitation was ever issued: none of the Courriers or other leaflets examined during the preparation of this study features such an appeal. Security concerns given SO1’s status as a secret department probably prevented it, though there is no obvious reason why the propagandists could not have given a cover address, perhaps at the MOI or the Foreign Office. A better explanation is that it was feared that dropping a leaflet requesting letters would guarantee extra vigilance from Vichy censors for the address given, so the initiative would be self-defeating. As we shall see below, however, there were reasons why letters might escape the censors. Moreover, the BBC’s address – simply ‘BBC, Londres’, although any address that included ‘radio’ or ‘émissions’ would also do as British censorship redirected such mail – was so easily identifiable that its correspondence should have been similarly affected, yet apparently it was not. While SO1 and PWE were able to obtain information through letters from France, it may be that they could have increased the volume received had they appealed for correspondence. The BBC further stimulated letter writing by acknowledging, on air, correspondence that it received, both as a means of encouragement and to prove that letters could get through.2 Postal communication with France continued after June 1940, although it was limited. There was no direct connection between France or her North African colonies and Great Britain, but correspondence could travel via neutral states, with which relations continued. However, sending letters via such neutral countries as Portugal, Switzerland or the USA increased the delivery time, as did wartime security arrangements. Writers in Occupied France had a

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further obstacle to overcome, as postcards were the only form of correspondence that was allowed across the demarcation line. This restriction was lifted in March 1943, by which time the total occupation of France changed the censorship situation anyway. Before that, correspondence from Occupied France had to be taken over the demarcation line clandestinely. Before 1943 most evidence received from Occupied France came either from départements along the demarcation line or from Paris and its environs. In both areas there was greater scope for material to be smuggled out, thanks either to local knowledge or contacts, than in more distant areas. PWE believed that ‘the lack of administrative staff prevents any internal [postal] censorship worth mentioning in the Occupied Zone’. Regarding international or inter-zone correspondence at least, the ban on sending letters across the demarcation line also made it unnecessary. It does not appear that postcards – sent openly across the demarcation line – were ever used to comment on British propaganda.3 Once in the Unoccupied Zone, letters could be introduced into the French postal system, although they were potentially subject to interception by what PWE described as ‘strict internal censorship’. Before November 1942 a third of a million letters were opened weekly, a figure which doubled afterwards as Vichy authorities began to deal with post from across France. In consequence, the number of letters that reached the propagandists considerably diminished. PWE’s usual Evidence of Reception Reports, produced twice monthly to deal with material received in the preceding fortnight, became monthly. The BBC was similarly affected. It received 80–120 letters monthly until November 1942, a figure that fell to single figures afterwards and never recovered.4 It seems unlikely that the Vichy postal censors opened all correspondence, so some may have got through simply by chance. Subterfuge may have been employed: for example sending an acquaintance in a neutral country a message to relay so that the letter was not obviously addressed to Great Britain. Whether a letter, once intercepted, was passed or not depended on the censor. Some letters received by the BBC had been opened; those not overtly hostile to Vichy were passed. Letters could also be smuggled out of France.5 Once a letter left France, there were further possible controls depending upon the route used. The obvious route was via the British Post Office in Tangiers (a legacy of Tangiers’s pre-war status as an international city) as it was from here that the BBC sent letters to its French audience. MOI enquiries found, however, that letters sent to France via Tangiers – Spanish-occupied for most of the war – were ‘liable to French censorship on arrival and sometimes to French Moroccan censorship in transit’. Directing mail via Lisbon was more secure. It does not seem unreasonable that the same may have applied to material travelling in the other direction. Switzerland was also a possibility but it was more difficult to send material between Switzerland and Great Britain, especially after November 1942.6 Letters not only came from Frenchmen, but also from expatriates living in France. But the evidence does not record to whom letters were addressed. The content sometimes seems intended for those responsible for propaganda – such as one letter that asked that the pilots be thanked. Others are less clearly phrased. For example, a ‘peasant’ wrote a letter asking, ‘I would like you to keep this

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[British propaganda] booklet as a souvenir for my children.’ This was probably intended for a third party, and the reference to it exists because it was intercepted by British censorship. At the outbreak of war, Postal and Telegraphic Censorship, ‘which extracted intelligence for all three Services from the censorship of posts and telegraphs’, was set up. There is no reason why the censors could not also have provided information for the propagandists. British Imperial Censorship sent staff to Bermuda, to censor post and telegraphic communication between Europe and the USA. Letters were opened using undetectable techniques; even diplomatic bags were not immune. Other imperial outposts also provided material: a letter mentioning an RU was intercepted in South Africa.7 How much value can be placed on these letters as evidence? First, there is the question of provenance, particularly important concerning the conclusions drawn in Chapter 2. The available evidence does not make it clear if this was something the propagandists themselves ever actually considered. But there was no means to verify whether a letter originated in the place it claimed to; even the postmark could not be relied upon. It is not unreasonable to assume that writers would not use their full address for fear of being traced. The Evidence of Reception Reports always give the most specific origin available, ranging from zone to town. It seems unlikely that, if not using a full address, correspondents would also give a false origin to their letter. The authorities would be no more able to trace the writer of a letter genuinely originating in ‘Paris’, than a letter that used a false address.8 The value of points of fact or judgements expressed must also be considered. R. Silvey, then head of BBC Listener Research, wrote later regarding domestic correspondence about the Home Service, that the question is not simply whether the points of view [. . . ] can be assumed to be shared by others who remain silent – it is a safe bet that this is always so – but rather of how widely they are shared; how many of the silent majority think the same way [. . . ] Granted that the letters are a sample [. . . ] the difficulty is that there can be nothing in the letters themselves to throw light on the size or nature of this larger whole. To be sure, letters often include the words, ‘everybody agrees with that’ [. . . ] but this isn’t evidence [. . . ] no-one knows what any letter or bunch of letters is a sample of. Such reservations are equally applicable to the letters received from France. No doubt they expressed genuine views, shared by others unwilling to write or whose letters never arrived. Those who wrote must have been the more vocal, willing to write a letter that might incriminate them, and it seems likely that they would hold Anglophile (or at least anti-German, anti-Vichy or pro-Allied) views. Otherwise it made little sense to risk punishment in the first place for possessing British leaflets or listening to the BBC and then to compound that by writing. It also seems unlikely that those who risked writing would deliberately falsify the information they provided. It may, however, have been exaggerated – either by the writer or those whose opinions are reported – without any intent to deceive.9 The conclusions drawn from letters received from France were supported by other evidence. Some of this is described in the Evidence of Reception Reports

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as coming ‘from a secret source’ or similar. Sometimes, different attributions were used in other versions of what is clearly an identical report, shedding light on exactly what was meant. For example, one ‘secret source’ is acknowledged elsewhere as the report of ‘an educated Frenchman’, who travelled extensively in the Occupied Zone between March and July 1941. Similarly, a ‘private source’ can be traced back to a 1942 BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action, the Free French secret service) report. Some evidence, then, was received from secret agents, from the British SIS, its Allied counterparts and SOE, working covertly in France itself.10 The value to the propagandists of evidence collected by SIS was limited. In early 1940, when SIS capability in Europe was largely intact, Department EH concluded that their ‘product’ consisted of ‘fatuous snippets [. . . ] of no value whatever’, or, slightly better, ‘of no great value as sources of information for a propaganda department’. SIS was inevitably affected by the German seizure of Western Europe and recovery was slow. Before 1942, SIS (like SOE) had great difficulties getting agents into France. The flow of intelligence rose and fell: it initially improved during 1941, and then German counter-espionage curbed activities in France, including the SIS network in Vichy. Operation Torch and the consequent total occupation of France caused setbacks affecting not only SIS, but also BCRA and the Polish secret service. By the summer of 1943, SIS had re-established itself and was able, at least in terms of its general acquisition of intelligence, to make a greater contribution. In close collaboration with the other intelligence services, SIS capabilities across Europe continued to improve. The main product obtained by SIS, BCRA, Polish and SOE agents remained military and naval material; sometimes they also obtained information concerning propaganda. SIS’s Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park decoded Vichy French and German signals. Where signals made reference to propaganda (or, indeed, contained information useful for the preparation of propaganda), they were supplied to the propagandists.11 American intelligence services were potentially useful. In September 1940 it was agreed that the Americans would provide relevant information from their diplomatic and consular sources and that Stephenson, as SIS liaison in the USA, ‘would be given every assistance in obtaining information on any topic he might raise’. After the American entry into the war, formal arrangements were established which led to intimate collaboration and, until Operation Torch, the continuing American presence in Vichy France maintained their ability to provide potentially useful information. But the British concluded in late 1940 that the Americans found it difficult to collect reliable information. The only American intelligence product that might have been useful for the propagandists was ‘some dubious diplomatic and consular intelligence about enemy and enemy-occupied Europe’.12 By contrast, no arrangements were made with the Soviets for intelligence exchange. Indeed, unless they needed help, the Soviets were secretive and unforthcoming, to the extent that the best information about their military position on the Eastern Front came from decoded German reports. PWE was just one of

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the agencies that might have benefited from Soviet sources – for example, from Soviet links with French Communists.13 Interviews and interrogations were a more significant source. Foot and Langley comment that ‘both MI9 and MI19 must have been among PWE’s sources of data on the state of enemy and enemy-occupied territory, but just what information Crockatt [head of MI9] passed to Bruce Lockhart, the available files do not show’. But information was at least being shared. Anyone coming from Occupied Europe, whether a refugee, captured enemy soldier, escaped POW, evader or Free French volunteer, was interviewed. MI9, responsible for assisting escapers from Europe, questioned POWs who made a successful ‘home run’ back to Great Britain. The Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC), which interrogated enemy prisoners, was operated by another part of MI9, known after December 1941 as MI19. MI19 also ran the interrogation centre for alien refugees and escapees, the London Reception Centre (LRC), which generated ‘a steady flow of information about conditions in occupied Europe’. PWE provided personnel to carry out these interviews. They were provided with specimens of British leaflets, to allow interviewees to identify ones they had seen.14 Travellers leaving continental Europe were also questioned. For those going to the USA, this happened in Bermuda, the stopping point for liners and flights from Europe. BSC, whose chief saw the island as ‘a main artery in the circulation of transatlantic traffic’, based linguists there to interrogate travellers. Some contact occurred informally – such as the person who left Toulouse and, while in Lisbon, contacted British representatives. SO1 asked British ‘diplomatic representatives in neutral countries [. . . ] to report to us all news of leaflets which could be obtained from people coming from enemy or enemy-occupied countries’.15 Just as some French people used their acquaintances in neutral countries to post their letters to Great Britain, others relied on British embassies in neutral countries to do the same. The British Legation in Stockholm was particularly important in an additional role, passing on information from the Occupied Press. At first this merely involved collecting such newspapers and sending them to Great Britain, but later a Press Reading Bureau was set up to read them and extract information in Stockholm instead. In Lisbon, from May 1941, a MOI representative collected clandestine newspapers and interviewed travellers, and his reports were passed on to PWE. While PWE had also developed contacts with other MOI and MEW representatives in neutral countries mainly to facilitate the dissemination of black propaganda, they could also report useful information.16

Leaflets

What did the French Think? The propagandists recognised that ‘almost all [reports] are highly complimentary’. But as the writers were probably Anglophile, they were predisposed towards the material. Leaflets were described as ‘first rate’, ‘encouraging’, ‘splendid’ and as having ‘cheering value’. An informant was quoted as having reported that

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‘“any piece of paper dropped by the RAF” had a “cachet” all its own and was “more widely believed than any paper printed in France”’. Leaflets were so highly prized that people would fight for them.17 Some French people felt that leaflets were superior to radio broadcasts, as ‘printed news which can be read and passed on had a more permanent effect than the spoken word’. Leaflets provided an alternative for those ‘unable or unwilling to listen to the wireless’ and were considered to be becoming more important as jamming of BBC broadcasts increased.18 Correspondents suggested how to improve leaflets. They wanted specific information, such as ‘figures of what we [the Allies] are doing, whether we are on the road to preparedness and whether we are going to land’. Other requests were for full texts of speeches by Allied statesmen and other documents of importance. Photographs were particularly valued because they removed an element of doubt from purely textual reports but, importantly, they also provided something that the illiterate could understand. The propagandists could include photographs more readily than French editors of clandestine newspapers, one reason why British leaflets were preferred. PWE’s H. A. Paniguian confirmed the value of photographs when visiting Paris after its liberation.19 Very little purely negative comment was received, except an ‘abusively critical’ comment about leaflets from an Anglophobe in Châteauroux. After the RAF bombing of Billancourt in March 1942, when leaflets were also dropped, one correspondent – apparently a German soldier – described ‘seeing Frenchmen stamping those leaflets to shreds or tearing them up, when they discovered they were of English origin’.20 This was probably more to do with the attack than with the propaganda. Leaflets justifying the Allied landings on Madagascar in May 1942 were described as ‘rather harmless’, suggesting that they did not have much effect. Another leaflet – it is not clear which – was described as ‘a poor production’.21 Most negative criticism was constructive, often levelled at problems arising from the RAF dissemination of leaflets. Correspondents often asked for greater quantities to be dropped, and more frequent deliveries. References to the duplication and circulation of British propaganda leaflets further demonstrate that insufficient quantities were available. Sometimes leaflet drops were too concentrated, because packets of leaflets failed to separate, making it easier for the authorities to collect them.22 The repetition of old news was disliked. In late May 1942, for example, the continuing dissemination of a leaflet about Madagascar – its news then over two weeks old – provoked one correspondent to wish that the RAF ‘would drop fresh material such as a news bulletin every day’. An American in Vichy argued ‘an overripe Roosevelt speech or message which comes weeks after it has already been published in the local press is not propaganda. It just convinces [the French] that [the Allies] do not know anything about propaganda’. Nonetheless, another writer, referring to the same example or an identical circumstance, concluded that ‘the leaflets were picked up and passed from hand to hand with glee’.23 Suggestions were made about exactly where leaflets should be dropped – over towns rather than the countryside, and over the suburbs of the bigger cities, rather than their centres. Dropping in this manner would hamper the authorities (and

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aid the French people) in collecting the leaflets, but the debate also concerned whether it was better to address town or country dwellers. The townspeople claimed to be more important because ‘the peasants were not interested and [leaflets] would have little propaganda value’. By contrast, another comment that ‘the peasants aren’t against you [. . . ] but they have no fixed opinion and the Germans often gain their attention’, suggested that targeting them was more important.24 Leaflets had innate value beyond their specific content. One correspondent stated that just being able to touch them ‘gives us pleasure’. Merely receiving leaflets showed that ‘our friends are not forgetting us’, and gave the French ‘a feeling of direct contact with their Allies’. A former résistant echoed this, writing in 2004 that, ‘most importantly, they constituted a sort of material bond with those who were working elsewhere for our liberation’. The paper itself was valuable because, like other commodities, it was in short supply. Although one commentator wrote that because paper ‘is scarce at present it is always useful’ (perhaps, just as Harris was later to suggest, as toilet paper), another disagreed, complaining that ‘about 99% of tracts dropped by the RAF over France have not served any useful purpose [being] used in most cases as kindling by the peasants’. Even the act of leaflet dropping had some value. It gave the impression that ‘if [the Allies] could spare planes and paper to drop leaflets we must be very strong’, and emphasised that ‘the English still had the power and could put out the planes’. As another correspondent put it, ‘even to feel the RAF above us is a real satisfaction and helps to increase the growing funk of the Germans’.25

Covert Circulation Leaflets, once received, were circulated. This was encouraged: the Courrier, for example, carried the legend, ‘Redistributed [later just ‘Distributed’] by French patriots.’ The clandestine press was blunter, stating, for example, ‘Libération isn’t a collector’s item. Pass it to a friend.’ This circulation was undertaken secretly. Inside factories, it became a regular practice for workers to pass leaflets around. Among railwaymen, the Courrier became ‘required reading’, and their jobs allowed them to distribute leaflets over a wide area. Elsewhere, circulation was carried out ‘widely, though not openly’: leaflets were distributed directly to friends, pushed under doors, put through letterboxes, or thrown into gardens when the distributor was ‘not sure of the householder’s reliability’. Sometimes leaflets were deliberately left for the authorities or collaborators to find, perhaps to taunt them that leaflet circulation was continuing under their noses. The German headquarters at Senonches was regularly left unattended, so locals made ‘a point of pushing leaflets under the door for the Germans to find on their return’ – though the Germans may have turned a blind eye to the practice because it aided their efforts to stop leaflet circulation. Another ‘distribution’ method was reading the leaflet and passing on the news orally, which also allowed the illiterate to become second-hand recipients of leaflet propaganda. But others circulated leaflets only to close friends, who destroyed them after reading.26

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More elaborate subterfuges were used. A Frenchman who was interviewed after leaving France commented that ‘every kind of strategy is employed to pass [leaflets] from hand to hand without the knowledge of the police’. In Montpellier, a Food Office messenger inserted leaflets in food cards he posted through letterboxes. A Breton farmer wrapped his butter in leaflets, neatly combining a material ´ use for the paper with a cunning distribution method. In Etroussat, locals employed to collect leaflets surrendered only about a quarter of what they found. Parisian police officers reportedly acted in similar fashion and in other circumstances where they might be expected to intervene to prevent leaflet circulation, ‘shut an eye on every proper occasion’. Elsewhere in France their colleagues, instead of handing [leaflets] over for destruction [. . . ] deposited them with a doctor, who directed a blood transfusion centre. People of every class come as blood donors to this centre and go away the poorer by a pint of blood, the richer by a bundle of leaflets which they then distribute among their friends. Using leaflets as posters was another method. Whoever posted the leaflets took a significant risk: shoving a leaflet through a letterbox took seconds. Pasting up a leaflet took longer and, even if the person responsible was not caught in the act, left the problem of explaining away the posting paraphernalia. Leaflets were also used to barter for cigarettes, giving some idea of the value which the French people perceived in them.27 Leaflets were also copied and distributed. Such copies were usually handwritten or typed, sacrificing photographs or illustrations, though the duplication of a leaflet illustrating four pigs that when folded revealed Hitler’s face demonstrates that copying pictures was not impossible.28 Both individuals and groups duplicated leaflets. In Paris, a ‘concierge, who looked and appeared to be the grimmest of her tribe, was collecting the leaflets dropped by the RAF, at great personal risk, and these she sat up and copied all night, distributing the copies as widely as she could’. In north-eastern France, the Catholic Youth made ‘special arrangements to collect, copy and distribute the leaflets’. Another method was by using chain letters, which reportedly allowed a leaflet dropped in south-western France to appear, copied, in Switzerland only twenty-four hours later. Railway workers ‘perfected a system of rapid communication of all new developments in the battle for liberation’, typing and distributing the latest news; although this relates to events after D-Day, the system probably already existed. The clandestine press (for example, L’Humanité) also extracted material.29 Despite the pleas for circulation made in British leaflets and French clandestine journals, a collectors’ market for leaflets emerged, which PWE nonetheless regarded as ‘a valuable aid to the circulation of leaflets’. Leaflet collecting became a hobby, replacing philately. The leaflet most highly valued (at 150 francs or about 17 shillings) was F.88 (1942) ‘Arc de Triomphe’, which illustrated a British aircraft dropping a tricolour over the monument. Leaflets reporting speeches by Churchill, Roosevelt or Eden were least valuable, while some leaflets were ‘highly prized and unpurchaseable’ – several correspondents referred to leaflets which

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they were ‘treasuring’ or ‘keeping’. A child was reported to have said that ‘Mama has [a leaflet] – she carries it on her as if it were the most important thing she had.’ Despite this ‘hoarding’ of leaflets, PWE concluded that ‘one leaflet is read by a hundred readers’ and later this estimate was doubled. If even the lower estimate is accurate then, making no allowance for uneven geographical distribution, between 1940 and 1944 enough leaflets were dropped to have enabled every French person to have seen around 1,600 leaflets.30 The evidence of collection and circulation shows that it was carried out covertly. Leaflets were rarely seen openly. When they were, it was a reflection of events that gave the French confidence, having revealed weakness in the Germans or the Vichy authorities. One such event was the Billancourt bombing. A waiter waved a leaflet he had found, crying ‘vive l’Angleterre!’ while another correspondent saw restaurant diners ‘near the Elysées produce blue-edged pamphlets dropped by the RAF’. Similarly, after Operation Torch, several reports described tram passengers and conductors in Aix-en-Provence, despite the penalties, openly reading ‘Churchill – Revised’, a supplement to the Courrier dated 11 November 1942.31

German and Vichy Countermeasures While the French attempted to circulate leaflets, the Germans and the Vichy authorities tried to stop them. Both responses indicate the value placed on British leaflet propaganda. In the centre of Paris, and probably other large towns, German plain-clothes police aimed to catch French people picking up leaflets. Collaborators distributed leaflets to trap the French who accepted them. Any leaflet found was supposed to be surrendered to the authorities, although this must also have given those caught in possession a potential excuse. The punishments were heavy, their severity depending on whether the Germans or the Vichy authorities were responsible for meting them out. In Occupied France there was a risk of imprisonment or execution. The Germans automatically sent those caught with leaflets to camps. André Haraux, later a founder of the Musée Historique Itinérant du Havre, was deported for clandestine distribution. The owners of the Château de Mallebois near Dreux were imprisoned after German military police officers found British leaflets when calling there on other business. A man was reported to have been imprisoned at Rennes for picking up leaflets. In the Unoccupied Zone execution was not threatened, but the Montpellier Food Office messenger was jailed for three months for distributing leaflets. Fines were also imposed. Understandably, then, some people felt it was too dangerous to collect, keep or circulate leaflets.32 Attempts to prevent circulation did not rest entirely on punishment. Active measures were also employed. If a drop was observed, the police were sent to collect the leaflets ‘almost before they hit the ground’, so they disappeared ‘before the population is out of bed in the morning’. In Paris and elsewhere, the Germans made the ‘most desperate efforts [. . . ] Special squads of men equipped with long sharp-pronged sticks are sent out before dawn to pick up all the leaflets they can

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find.’ Other reports suggested that, because of the time leaflets took to reach the ground, the police were unable to wait for all of them to fall and as a result leaflets were ‘always found the following morning in the gardens and courtyards’.33 The truth was probably somewhere in between: the long dark winter nights must have hampered any search by comparison with shorter summer nights, so that sometimes many leaflets were missed and sometimes most were found. The diligence of the search also varied – in Châlon-sur-Saône ‘owners of private property were called out of bed to open their gates so as to give the collectors access to their land’, whereas in Paris leaflets that fell on rooftops were overlooked. ´ The police were not the only collectors: schoolchildren in Etroussat and youths from the Camps de Jeunesse in Marseille also gathered leaflets. In some cases the Germans rounded up the local population to clear them, as happened near Condom. Once collected, the leaflets were destroyed.34

Counterpropaganda Another indication of the value of British propaganda was German and Vichy efforts to discredit it. The Vichy authorities displayed posters that reproduced two British ‘leaflets about General de Gaulle and added commentaries on the usual Vichy line of a conspiracy between the Jews, Freemasons and Communists’. Although L’Action Fran¸caise (organ of Charles Maurras’s eponymous Catholic/monarchist group) attacked the Courrier, it conceded that it used ‘good paper, had small but clear typography, and was well-furnished with photographs where we could especially admire the double chin of Mr. Churchill’. Photographs of German warships under attack, taken from the Courrier (F.3, 1942), were used by the ‘Berliner Lokaler Anzeiger of 18.2.42 with derogatory comments about their having reached German ports and safety’, which also shows that British propaganda intended for France even had an impact in Germany. A German-inspired French newspaper, Les Nouveaux Temps, printed ‘an editorial based entirely on an article in [the British propaganda leaflet] Free World’. Similarly, in early 1944, Marcel Déat, the Vichy Minister of Labour, wrote a hostile editorial entitled ‘Les “Justiciers” de Maquis’ in L’Œuvre. While he claimed that it was based on a Courrier dated 16 December 1943, a PWE investigation discovered that none of his material came from the edition he had referred to or, indeed, any other. The investigation concluded that Déat’s article might be dangerous as few French people could check his claims; as a result, special countermeasures were taken. The counterpropagandists also showed that they had long memories. Reporting the RAF raid on Poitiers on 12 June 1944, the Centre et Ouest newspaper referred to a leaflet dropped more than two years earlier, ‘To Occupied France’ (F.8, 1942): You will remember the pamphlet dropped upon Billancourt two years ago that proclaimed, ‘Don’t be afraid, we know our business’? They knew it so well, that two hours later there were six hundred dead. At Poitiers also, the Anglo-American pilots knew their business so well that today we are celebrating the ‘final liberation’ of about a hundred of our people.35

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Counterpropaganda also used radio. In January 1942 a German secret station, Les Français de France, discussed ‘the leaflets containing Churchill’s photograph, and added that “as there is a great shortage of paper in France, these leaflets will come in handy for certain purposes”’ – the toilet paper argument again. The Vichy secret station Radio Révolution also attacked the Courrier, while Radio Paris warned against paying attention to British, American and Russian leaflets. Philippe Henriot, the Vichy Minister of Information, speaking on Radio Vichy, also attacked leaflets.36 The Germans or the Vichy authorities forged British leaflets, particularly the Courrier. An example of this was a forgery of F.3 (1942) – the leaflet from which the Berliner Lokaler Anzeiger had extracted the naval photographs. The forgery, ostensibly Courrier No. 2a, rather than No. 2 (probably to suggest to people who saw both the genuine and the forged versions that the latter was a genuine British updated version of the same leaflet), used newsprint rather than the usual type of paper and, although it reproduced most of the photographs and some of the articles from the original version, a good deal of the content was different. Two articles were edited, putting an alternative ‘spin’ on their contents; two had been extracted from Courrier F.50/38 (1941), one modified and the other not; and two articles had been invented, including ‘Good luck, Frenchmen!’ which discussed RAF raids on France. Such forgeries, apparently air-dropped after the RAF had disseminated the genuine version, were linked to Laval, who was accused of printing them for profit at his Clermont-Ferrand press. In January 1943 a correspondent from Anianc, near Montpellier, forwarded another forged Courrier, of which an analysis was made: At first glance [. . . ] it might appear to be a copy of the Courrier but as even the actual make-up of the paper differs from the real Courrier de l’Air the illusion is rapidly dispelled [. . . ] The clumsiness and inaccuracy of this faked Courrier is astonishing. The English have suffered serious defeats in Africa, and revolts have apparently broken out throughout the British Empire. Jews, Communists and Gaullists are violently attacked, while a heavily sarcastic article entitled ‘Don’t go to Germany’ is added as an encouragement to French workers to visit the terrestrial paradise. Among other items is included an epitaph on de Gaulle which is not conspicuous for its wit: Here lies the General de Gaulle, Of whom the Free French said, He might have saved the land of Gaul, But saved himself, and fled.37 An April 1943 report into leaflet faking shows that the Anianc leaflet was not a forgery but an imitation (meaning, copying the visual style and layout, but not taking a genuine British leaflet and making subtle alterations to its content). The Anianc leaflet used the title ‘Courrier des Français de France’ and employed the format of the Courrier de l’Air for otherwise ordinary pro-Vichy propaganda.

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The report concluded that, given the contents, it was ‘mainly a special means of gaining attention’. The report mentions other examples of fakes of British leaflets but, because these were based on evidence from informants who had not seen but had only heard about them, it is not clear whether these fakes were forgeries or imitations. More concrete evidence came from a French student who had seen a genuine leaflet, F.54 (1943) ‘Advice to Frenchmen’, and on the following day a replica, which reused the layout and headline but with a different text ‘running down the British and de Gaulle’. Another forgery, seen at Le Havre, provoked PWE to comment ‘that the Germans should consider such faking worthwhile is an excellent testimonial’. The Germans also spread ‘false rumours as to the contents of our leaflets’ to discredit them, again showing that British leaflet propaganda worried them. Fakes of British leaflets were also reported from Valenciennes, Lyon, Cannes, Antibes and Nice. OWI’s L’Amerique en Guerre received the same treatment. A BBC broadcast was used to counter one faked Courrier, but it was discovered after the war that this might actually have encouraged a more general suspicion of leaflets, rather than just the one discussed.38

Broadcasts

What did the French Think? The BBC felt that the correspondence it received was not fully representative of the French population, although it was safe to treat it with ‘a fair amount of confidence while remembering it does not give as complete a picture as we might wish’. The reasons for this are clear: as with leaflets, it would be those favourably disposed to the BBC who would write, only a small percentage of the French population did write, and censorship would mean that only a proportion would be received. It was thought that the majority of letters received came from the educated classes – the careful planning exhibited and the ingenuity used to avoid interception indicated ‘enterprise and intelligence’ in the writers. Meanwhile the BBC’s audience was believed to be drawn from all classes. Much of the evidence claimed widespread listening, some expressing amazement that not listening to the BBC could even be conceived of. Paniguian surprised himself with the extent of listening he discovered during his post-liberation visit to Paris, despite being aware of evidence gathered during the war.39 Much evidence was simply favourable, as with that concerning leaflets. The BBC Yearbook 1945 commented that ‘the restoration of the postal service with France resulted in a flood of letters of gratitude to the BBC – at the rate of 4,000 letters a month in December [1944]’. They reflected general comments that had been received throughout the war. BBC broadcasting was ‘precious and comforting’ and ‘warms our hearts’. Transmissions were heard ‘faithfully and eagerly’; formed ‘our daily bread’; brought ‘untold comfort’ and ‘hope’; and ‘greatly helped’ or ‘sustained’ French morale. The flagship programme, Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais, was regularly described as both popular and effective; at one

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stage almost every letter mentioned it. News commentaries and serials such as Les Trois Amis were also well-liked. The evening broadcasts were believed to have the highest audience, especially the programme beginning at 20.15. So many people listened that French streets were reported to be almost deserted at this time. Early morning broadcasts were acknowledged in April 1943 as the second most popular.40 Constructive criticism was received and, increasingly, the letters sent were intended to be of assistance. One Parisian characterised the value of this information, describing BBC speakers as good artillery-men who have been firing blind for months. However accurate their fire may be, they should be guided by observers posted near the target, just to see if their shots are going home and if they should aim at more certain targets. Suggestions included repeating news bulletins and giving more publicity to BBC schedules, as a listener might only learn of the next French Service programme to be broadcast and a trailer for programmes throughout the day would be more useful. The speakers on English-language services were asked ‘to speak very slowly and to articulate the syllables as clearly as possible’ to aid comprehension. On the one hand, regular French Service newsreaders were compared unfavourably to speakers like Schumann and Duchesne, who were more understandable through jamming. On the other hand, a few months later the regular newsreaders were claimed to be the most audible, while Duchesne and the ‘non-professional’ BBC speakers less so. Another suggestion – made by those most affected by jamming – was for leaflets to be dropped instead.41 Purely negative criticism was received. Members of the ‘Pétainist middle class’ were said to object to the BBC’s ‘violent broadcasts in French’, while others began listening to services in other languages because the French Service was ‘going too far, so far that it becomes unbelievable’. Others unkindly described listening as ‘an ingrained habit’ and compared the BBC to an addictive, destructive narcotic. Such hostile criticism was limited, however: it was judged that 99 per cent of the correspondence was favourable towards the BBC and the French Service.42

German and Vichy Countermeasures The Germans considered the BBC French Service to be a threat even before it had been properly organised. One countermeasure was to ban listening, as was done in the Occupied Zone on 30 June 1940. This was partly an extension of German domestic policy, where listening to foreign broadcasts had been proscribed at the outbreak of war, the penalty being imprisonment. Those caught spreading what they had heard were sentenced to hard labour or death. In Occupied France, the penalties were also severe. Correspondents described punishments similar to those inflicted for possessing leaflets: fines, confiscation of sets, deportation to Germany or being shot. By January 1941 the BBC concluded that

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although punishments were nominally drastic, in practice they usually involved confiscation of sets and fines of up to 1,000 francs.43 In the Unoccupied Zone, a listening ban was not so swiftly enacted, although ‘most’ local authorities forbade listening before the Vichy government took action. On 3 November 1940 a ban on listening in public became law, with punishment by imprisonment of six days to six months, fines of between 16 and 1,000 francs, and the confiscation of the offender’s set. At the end of August 1941 a further measure was enacted to prevent circumvention of the public listening ban – for example, as one correspondent did by listening to her private set at maximum volume, leaving her doors and windows open so others could hear. Inevitably, French people denounced each other and there was also increased police surveillance with the aim of catching listeners. A new measure, passed on 29 October 1941, banned all listening to foreign broadcasting, punishable by a 10,000-franc fine or two years’ imprisonment.44 In the Occupied Zone, enforcement of the ban was inconsistent. The bans were regularly flouted, not just by the French people (of whom only the ‘most timorous’ obeyed), but also by German and Italian soldiers, who were reported listening – sometimes guardedly – in cafés, even asking private citizens to tune to the BBC. Prosecutions were reported in Paris and in Brittany, but the BBC believed that some officials turned a blind eye because they themselves were listening. Regular prosecutions were reported only from Alsace – annexed into Germany in 1940 and subject to German domestic law – such as an announcement from the Agence Fran¸caise d’Information (AFI, a Vichy news service) that six men had been imprisoned, the ringleader for fifteen months, with the court stating that foreign listening was ‘rigorously prohibited’. The Vichy and German press made a great deal of these reports, perhaps having been instructed to do so by the authorities in order to reinforce the ban without their having to maintain a physical presence. Indeed, the BBC concluded in late 1942 that the restrictions tended to operate by bluff or intimidation rather than by active enforcement.45 In the Unoccupied Zone, the ban on public listening was also routinely ignored. The BBC believed that it had not caused any loss of audience and had actually encouraged people to listen, even publicly. The complete ban seems to have been just as ineffective as a preventative measure and it may even have rebounded by persuading listeners to take greater precautions against being caught. In practice, too, Vichy enforcement was lax. As in the Occupied Zone, officials turned a blind eye. Only sporadic evidence of punishments arrived, usually involving a fine and confiscation of the offender’s set.46 After the total German occupation of France in 1942, the maximum penalty for listening was raised to death. The Germans had wanted Vichy to do this in October 1941 but the latter had refused, fearing it would only antagonise the population. Other preventative measures were preferred. As Jackson concludes, ‘the escalation of penalties only demonstrated the extent of the problem’. But enforcement remained intermittent. Most prosecutions for illegal listening continued to come from Alsace, and as late as August 1944 a man was reportedly condemned to death there for listening to the BBC. Occasional action was also

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reported in Brittany, Biarritz, Meudon and Reims. Sentences ranged from two to eighteen months’ imprisonment.47 The failure to enforce the listening bans is indicative of the difficulty in proving a person’s guilt. Other than being caught red-handed, there was no physical evidence of listening, so long as the set had not been left tuned to a BBC frequency. Some people therefore felt that listening to the radio was actually safer than picking up leaflets.48 Jamming was used to prevent listening. In the Unoccupied Zone, this was certainly happening by 27 June 1940 and perhaps beforehand, prompted by de Gaulle’s speech of 18 June. The Germans in the Occupied Zone also used it. Jamming stations were said to be based in Bordeaux, Marseille, Lyon, Bourges (probably at Allouis, where the main long-wave jammer was) and Paris (on the Eiffel Tower). Jammers were reportedly being installed in every town, while equipment carried in vans was used in Toulouse. The Bourges jammer was sabotaged during the first half of 1942, giving some listeners a temporary respite. The Germans and Vichy authorities used different jamming methods: a report received in July 1943 suggested the Germans preferred to use several high-powered jamming transmitters based around Paris, whereas in the former Unoccupied Zone five control centres at Lyon, Limoges, Vichy, Toulouse and Marseille operated a network of 100 small jamming stations.49 The level of nuisance caused by jamming fluctuated. In October 1940 a BBC engineers’ report showed that during the evening broadcasts, all short and medium waves in use in broadcasting to Europe were jammed. At no time were BBC broadcasts entirely unmolested. This scale of jamming gives some indication of the German and Vichy desire to block BBC broadcasts. First, a jamming station or its frequencies could not at the same time be used to carry a signal other than the jamming signal, preventing the use of these stations for the jammers’ own propaganda. Second, jamming prevented monitoring, depriving the German and Vichy propaganda and intelligence services of a useful source of information. These losses were clearly considered a price worth paying to block British broadcasts. Jamming also appears to have reflected well upon the British: the jamming was reported by one correspondent to be ‘rude’, demonstrating the difference between the English and the Germans. It certainly encouraged people to continue listening, precisely because jamming made it clear the Germans did not want them to.50 Until mid-1941, most French people were believed to be able to listen, despite jamming. The nuisance factor increased thereafter, but the level of jamming was never constant. Jamming was particularly serious on medium wave, although reception also depended on location, the quality of the receiving set and the patience of the listener. By late 1942 listening on medium wave had almost entirely died out, although only temporarily as there was evidence of good results on some medium-wave frequencies the following spring. The 20.15 programme was always the most heavily jammed, and reception in Paris was always particularly severely affected. In Brittany, by contrast, listening was easy because the strong BBC signal drowned out everything else (and provoked complaints that it was too

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powerful). Short-wave reception was much better and listening was not intolerable even when there was jamming. Overall, jamming across all of the wavelengths remained a fluctuating nuisance, but not insurmountable especially if the listener was willing to search for the clearest frequency. The jammers made a final effort before D-Day: Paris was virtually cut off on all frequencies. Afterwards, the problem rapidly diminished. Ultimately, resources within Europe were too limited to match the increases in transmitter frequencies and power that the BBC, with access to American material and industry, could obtain.51 Confiscation of radio sets was also used as a preventative measure. In August 1940 a Breton woman reported a German decree for all radio sets in Finistère to be surrendered. Both German and Vichy listening bans included confiscation of sets as a penalty, which became a common punishment. Confiscation was also a punitive measure only indirectly related to listening bans: in Lille, sets were seized because of the widespread observance, on BBC instructions, of Joan of Arc’s feast day, while in reprisal for railway sabotage the inhabitants of a Somme village had to surrender their sets. In August 1941 a measure was passed that called for the seizure of all Jewish-owned sets.52 On the other hand, there was no mass confiscation. In part, this was because it would prevent the Germans and Vichy using radio propaganda. They also had different views: Vichy wanted widespread confiscation, but the Germans had other matters to attend to. Another report suggested that in principle the Germans agreed, but believed that there were enough unlicensed sets to render the measure ineffective. The only widespread confiscation took place as the prospect of an Allied invasion approached, mostly in areas where military action was expected. In the same areas, interrupting the electricity supply to prevent listening became a deliberate policy prior to the Allied landings.53

Countering the Countermeasures There were several ways in which jamming could be beaten. Usually at least one frequency was left clear or was less badly affected than the others, perhaps to allow monitoring. Advice was given to search for this frequency on the French Service soon after the armistice and was apparently successful in the long term. Short wave was less badly jammed and, like medium wave, usually clear on at least one frequency. By the spring of 1941 it was the wavelength of choice. Similarly, long-wave broadcasting provided another alternative. Although it was also jammed, there was a corresponding drop in jamming on medium wave. The use of frame aerials increased the ability of sets to receive signals.54 The BBC investigated what types of voices or vocal techniques could best overcome interference and how often wavelengths or frequencies could be changed without losing listeners. Short-term improvement could be provided by a change in schedule. At the same time, however, this could have unwelcome consequences. When a wavelength that formed part of the key 20.15 broadcast to France was changed, PWE protested violently that the change should be reversed. It must

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have been felt that the negative impact of altering the wavelength outweighed the improvements that could be made.55 The relative newness of radio technology was perhaps an unexpected problem: a letter from the Gard suggested that people were unwilling to switch between wavelengths because they were frightened of being unable to find their original tuning afterwards. Frequencies were not mentioned, and although the BBC concluded that a form of ‘listener education’ both on air and by leaflet was needed, no such leaflet appears to have been produced. More capable listeners were likely to have the skill and patience to search for less jammed frequencies, but other reports suggested that only existing listeners would try to find ways around jamming. Casual or hostile listeners would simply switch to a rival station.56 Another means of circumventing jamming was to ‘eavesdrop’ in languages other than French – which the BBC described as ‘cross-listening’ – as these services were less badly affected. A 1941 report showed, predictably, that Alsatians picked up the BBC German service, people living in south-east France listened in Italian, and some Bretons listened to Home Service broadcasts in Welsh. Those who spoke English could listen to any of the BBC’s English-language broadcasts, whether intended for British, European or world consumption and, of course, expatriates living in France could listen to BBC services for their country. Exactly how many residents of France were capable of understanding broadcasts not in their native tongue cannot easily be quantified. French schools were estimated to teach about 130,000 pupils annually a ‘working knowledge’ of English and, added to those who learnt the language elsewhere, it was concluded that ‘there is a large potential audience capable of understanding our broadcasts in English’. A 1942 study concluded, conversely, that ‘the French not being enthusiastic linguists, the potential audience [of broadcasts in English] is probably only 11/2% of 42,000,000, and the actual audience is likely to be much smaller’. A repeat study in April 1944 added that the potential audience in France of the German service was about 4.5 per cent of the population; of the Italian service, about 2.5 per cent; and of Welsh broadcasts, about 0.5 per cent. While these percentages may sound low, this meant that nearly 4 million people were therefore potentially crosslistening. Even though the BBC was aware of the potential for French people to cross-listen by late 1940, the Germans and Vichy authorities took longer to catch on, if they ever did. BBC English and German services were much less severely jammed even as late as 1943, although the German and Vichy authorities were clearly aware of their existence as they used information from them in their counterpropaganda.57 Listening groups were important, particularly during the first year after the fall of France: letters written on behalf of groups indicate their prevalence. Group listening meant that programmes reached people who did not own a set, or who could not receive short wave. Listening groups could post sentries, making it safer to listen in groups than alone. Maintaining security must have been difficult, however, especially when groups as large as seventy were meeting, and this may have contributed to the apparent decline in group listening by the second half of 1941. A variant was to listen individually but compare notes with others

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afterwards to reconstruct segments of the broadcast during which reception had been difficult. This was an especially useful strategy, employed when it was believed that a broadcast was of particular note so that it was important that it was properly received.58 Just as people passed leaflets around, they also circulated the latest BBC news. For example, an expatriate Englishman living in the Unoccupied Zone helped a local blacksmith translate speeches by Churchill and Roosevelt into French, which the blacksmith then passed to the working classes. An Auvergne schoolmistress distributed the BBC news not only locally but also as far as French West Africa. Other similar reports indicate that cross-listening was employed to obtain information. News bulletins were typed and circulated using the chain-letter method, and broadcasts were transcribed to provide material for the clandestine press, including the resistance leader Henri Frenay’s Bulletin d’information et propagande. There was a general willingness to repeat the news to those who had been unable to listen. Although at the end of 1941 there was some indication that this practice had declined, even as late as the spring of 1944 cyclists on their way to work shouted the latest snippets to prisoners in Fresnes jail, Paris, who included SOE’s White Rabbit, ‘Tommy’ Yeo-Thomas.59 Inevitably, the news put out by the BBC was embellished by those who repeated it: second-hand reception of the news, while better than nothing, was less desirable than first-hand listening. Other information circulated orally included means of overcoming jamming, indications of which wavelengths gave better reception, and times of news bulletins. To begin with, this was not necessarily done covertly: there was evidence of BBC broadcasts being discussed quite openly, in both zones. Sometimes this was reported to have taken place on trains or in queues, where anyone could overhear. Later, however, the increasing determination of the authorities to prevent listening, characterised by the more draconian Vichy ban on listening of October 1941, limited open discussion of the BBC news.60 People did their best to prevent confiscations of radio sets being effective. In 1940, before the German advance had halted, a correspondent from a village near Pau commented that if the Germans came that far south it was hoped that a few of the village’s radio sets might be saved from confiscation. Where confiscation took place, it was sometimes possible to dupe the Germans by substituting faulty equipment for the working set they had come for; if all else failed, radios were sabotaged before they were surrendered. Many French people equipped themselves with additional unlicensed sets to provide a spare in case of confiscation and, presumably, breakdown. In the Pau area, resistance groups ensured that listening groups they had formed each had access to at least one spare set. Sometimes sets were concealed – Andre Heintz, a résistant living in Caen, disguised his crystal radio set as a can of spinach.61 The BBC (assisted by PWE’s leaflets F.85 and F.104, both 1943) emphasised the threat of confiscation in order to encourage people to take precautions. It was believed that about 40 per cent of families had done so, but the absence of

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mass confiscation persuaded others that they were unnecessary. Some people acted only if they were convinced of the danger and others considered that the British warnings might actually prompt mass confiscation. Ironically, although precautions were recommended to protect sets from the Germans and the Vichy authorities, none were taken with regard to the Allies after D-Day. They should have been. One French woman, her farmhouse liberated by two British soldiers, proudly revealed the radio with which she had kept herself and others informed of the BBC news; the soldiers promptly purloined it. Of course, ‘one fiercelooking soldier looks very much like another’. Such incidents were probably not uncommon, sadly.62

Counterpropaganda Initially, the Germans actually assisted the BBC to gain an audience. Between 26 June and 4 July 1940, French broadcasters were banned from operating unless the Germans were in control. It took time for the broadcasting stations to reopen after the ban was lifted, so for up to a fortnight French listeners searching for a programme might find the BBC.63 Once the German and Vichy authorities were organised, however, counterpropaganda became an important response. They had at their disposal in France an extensive broadcasting system, comprising twenty-seven medium-wave and two long-wave transmitters. By August 1942, although six medium-wave and both long-wave transmitters were out of action, certainly two and probably four new medium-wave transmitters were in use. In the aftermath of the armistice, Radio Paris was taken over and temporarily rebroadcast German programmes. It was soon returned to French control under strict censorship and called itself Radiodiffusion Nationale de Paris. The Vichy government took control of most of the radio stations in the Unoccupied Zone, which also broadcast as Radiodiffusion Nationale. The remainder joined forces as the Fédération Française des Postes Privés, although this was in practice controlled by Radiodiffusion Nationale and used much of its material, especially news.64 The BBC was attacked on air, for example by Radio Paris and Radio Vichy, as the propagandists continued to refer to them. Radio Paris speakers read letters from its listeners that criticised British broadcasts. It also produced a programme based on the BBC’s Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais, called Les Fran¸cais Parlent ´ aux Emigr´ es. Briggs suggests, however, that Radio Vichy was the greater threat. After the BBC’s V campaign was launched in 1941, the Germans attempted to appropriate the ‘V’ for themselves, linking it with the German word Viktoria and placing their own signs, including a huge ‘V’ on the Eiffel Tower. Their response was successful – or at least caused confusion about what the ‘V’ meant. At one stage a German broadcaster actually accused the British of adopting the German ‘V’ sign for themselves!65 The fact that the BBC broadcast many different services across Europe was a potential vulnerability. The BBC recognised that many listeners engaged in

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cross-listening and that if they heard ‘inconsistent statements [. . . ] not meant for them, showing contempt for them or flattering their enemies, they may cease to trust and follow British leadership’. Indeed, one listener wrote to warn that ‘it is disconcerting to say the least to hear the same item of news given half a dozen different slants in as many hours’. After March 1942, Radio Paris and the other German and Vichy-controlled broadcasters began to exploit this opportunity to attack the BBC, suggesting the different services said different things. This may also, however, have served to encourage the curious to eavesdrop on alternative BBC services to see whether the accusations were true, increasing the awareness that such services were less affected by jamming.66 The BBC was also attacked in print. The newspapers Eclaireur de Nice, Gringoire and Vendémiare among others all carried anti-BBC articles. Paul Allard wrote a 110-page book questioning and demolishing a series of ‘lies’ supposedly broadcast by the BBC. No doubt some of this stemmed from reality, because the BBC was not immune to inadvertently broadcasting, as news, information that subsequently proved inaccurate. But, as with Déat’s attack on the Courrier, the most dangerous thing was that the French people could not check whether the statements that Allard claimed the BBC had made were genuine. The book used a clever title, Ici Londres!, the phrase used to open BBC French Service broadcasts and thus easily identifiable, while the paper wrapper the book was supplied in carried the subtitle ‘A Collection of English Radio Broadcasts’. This may have persuaded French people to buy it, only later to discover its true nature. But it might also have provided some entertainment for those who did. Among the methods used by Allard to expose the BBC was ‘a little dictionary of British fibs’. Entries included: CELLAR – It is necessary to store your provisions in the cellar because of the great aerial offensive of the RAF. RAF – Bombs falling on a railway line near Lille: that’s the RAF. Bombs falling near Lille, on workers’ homes, killing women and children: that’s Luftwaffe aircraft, camouflaged as the RAF. TRUCKS – Three German trucks pass, travelling south: the Germans want to occupy the free zone. Three German trucks pass, travelling north: it’s going badly for the Germans in Russia. V – Magic letter that assures the victory of the English and Gaullist liberating armies, especially if it is chalked on the china of public urinals. Of course, there is no means of verifying the circulation of his book – but if my copy, purchased second-hand in 2002 with its pages uncut and its wrapper intact, is typical, not all that were produced were read. But whatever the success of individual pieces of counterpropaganda, its continuing use was in itself an admission that, despite the restrictions that had been put in place, the French people were believed to be continuing to listen.67

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Conclusion The evidence from France was almost entirely favourable in its judgement of leaflet propaganda and BBC broadcasts. Nearly all criticism was intended to be constructive – for example, the repeated demands for larger quantities of leaflets to be dropped. This is not altogether surprising, as those who wrote were probably pro-British and therefore favourably disposed towards British propaganda. Nonetheless, the fact that they sent their comments, in spite of the difficulties and dangers involved, demonstrates that at least part of the population did not merely hold a favourable view but rated British propaganda sufficiently highly to persuade them to take the chance of writing. For another part of the French population, that the perceived value of British leaflets and radio broadcasts outweighed the potential consequences of being caught is demonstrated by their continued activities, in the face of Vichy and German threats, in receiving and circulating British propaganda. Choosing to defy the listening ban or read a leaflet was, in the first instance, a minor act of resistance. Costly or time-consuming activities, such as paying to obtain a shortwave set or investing the time to scan frequencies to obtain an intelligible signal, indicated a greater commitment. Other activities were more dangerous to life or liberty. Passing on the BBC’s latest news bulletins orally was as likely to be overheard as listening in the first place and was still potentially punishable, as was collecting and distributing leaflets, copying leaflets or transcribing BBC broadcasts, concealing working sets, deliberately surrendering unserviceable receivers, and organising and participating in listening groups. In short, such activities were clearly worth the risk. They also brought French people together. One historian has commented that listening to the BBC ‘eventually created a kind of clandestine community’, a conclusion equally applicable to circulating leaflets.68 Similarly, German and Vichy French measures to prevent people from reading, collecting, hearing and circulating British propaganda indicate the authorities’ fears about the pervasive – and, indeed, persuasive – influence that it could have. The steps taken to minimise the exposure of the French to British propaganda, by demanding that leaflets be surrendered, collecting leaflets at the earliest opportunity, setting up jamming stations and organising police surveillance, indicate not only that British material was believed to be a threat, but also that purely punitive measures were not a sufficient deterrent. Both anti-leaflet and anti-listening laws were failures, as the recurrence of reports that the French people were continuing to circulate leaflets and listen to the BBC demonstrate. Especially in regard to the listening ban, any success was achieved through the threat of heavy penalties rather than their application, as in practice the activity was virtually unstoppable. Enforcement of the listening bans was more difficult than prevention of the circulation of leaflets, where delivery was indicated by the sound of the disseminating aircraft and the authorities had the time to try and clear them away before the French could collect them. Moreover, leaflets themselves were lasting and strong evidence against anyone caught in possession. By contrast, because BBC broadcasts were made several times daily and listeners could choose when

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to tune in, there was far less opportunity for the authorities to catch them in the act, and no damning proof of guilt once the radio set had been turned off. Whether to enforce the listening ban or to collect leaflets, people were needed more than anything else. But they were simply not available, either to snoop at windows and carry out mass confiscations of wireless sets, or for rapid-response large-scale leaflet collection. German and Vichy counterpropaganda, by attacking the contents of leaflets or BBC broadcasts, further demonstrated these authorities’ fear of the power of British propaganda. That Vichy ministers such as Déat had to resort to concocted allegations to discredit British material rather than countering it with meaningful fact and measured argument demonstrates the weakness of Vichy propaganda. Productions of forgeries and fakes, such as the Courrier des Fran¸cais de France, which attempted to use British ‘packaging’ to put across pro-Vichy material, further showed the success of British and the failure of German and Vichy propaganda, not only in terms of content but also in method. Overall, each increase in the level of jamming or attempt to clear leaflets, each tightening of restrictions, escalation of penalties and issue of counterpropaganda, was at the same time both an indication of Vichy and German belief in the power of British propaganda and an admission of their own defeat, a conclusion that was first drawn by the BBC with regard to the effectiveness of radio propaganda in late 1940 and confirmed repeatedly thereafter.69

5

Black Propaganda: Machinery, Method, Message and Reaction

In addition to the millions of white propaganda leaflets and thousands of hours of BBC broadcasting which carried propaganda messages to France that were grounded in truth and produced on behalf of the British government, SO1 and PWE were also responsible for an entirely different form of propaganda, known as black propaganda. Like white propaganda, it existed in both broadcast and printed form, but in addition it made use of rumour-mongering. Bruce Lockhart’s comment that the main tasks of propaganda were ‘to undermine and to destroy the morale of the enemy and [. . . ] to sustain and foster the spirit of resistance in enemy-occupied countries’ applies just as well to black propaganda as to white, but the spirit of the exercise was rather different. In contrast to white propaganda, the origins of black propaganda were kept hidden, because falsehood was an important ingredient and misdirection an objective. This might mean presenting truthful information from a fictitious platform or using deliberately misleading information or invention, such as an apparently resistance-operated radio station that made spurious claims about German plans for France. There was also grey propaganda which, as the name suggests, was a half-way house between black and white, because it concealed its origins only superficially and it was never expected that it could stand up to serious examination. In France, black propaganda techniques were also used to facilitate the distribution of material that was otherwise white or grey propaganda, for example by placing ordinary aerial leaflets into specially prepared envelopes and introducing them into the French postal system.1 Far less evidence has survived concerning black propaganda to France than for white propaganda. This limits the examination of black printed propaganda to the period between January 1942 and mid-1943, in particular the assessment of its content, and requires the inclusion of a study of clandestine distribution (meaning, using black techniques) of white and grey propaganda in order to shed some light on the dissemination issues and processes. Similarly, the assessment of black radio broadcasting, used throughout the war, is necessarily limited. As regards the use of rumour-mongering, while numerous examples of rumours prepared for propaganda purposes are available, little evidence remains to show how they were employed.

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Different Shades of Black: Printed Propaganda Printed black propaganda to France does not appear to have been used before late 1941.2 This is not altogether surprising. Production was initially hampered by inadequate intelligence and a dearth of address directories and examples of letter-headings and envelope imprints needed to camouflage the material.3 In any case, the propagandists lacked the ability to disseminate it. In November 1940 there were ‘no means of distribution for subversive leaflets’ so ‘the [black] activities of the Department are completely blocked’. A later report, discussing black propaganda to Germany, noted ‘that with the collapse of France and the loss of channels this form of activity ceased for a time’. As we shall see, black propaganda leaflets could not simply be dropped from aircraft flying over Europe, but often had to be smuggled to clandestine operatives for distribution. The fall of France not only increased the difficulty of smuggling material into Europe, but also disrupted or destroyed the networks that were capable of disseminating the material. The difficulties of undertaking black leaflet propaganda to Germany would also have been encountered in similar work for France.4 Neither is it clear when black propaganda to France ceased. It is unlikely to have continued much beyond D-Day, after which PWE’s whole propaganda effort towards France was wound down, and it may well have been terminated earlier. In April 1944 it was reported that ‘the production of “black” leaflets has diminished considerably’. As the Normandy invasion approached, PWE’s distributors in France – commonly SOE agents, also responsible for organising resistance – had other roles to fulfil.5

Distribution Methods Black propaganda could not be distributed in the same way as white propaganda. Aircraft noise, dispersal patterns or direct observation would indicate that the leaflets had been air-dropped and were probably British. In November 1940, as the propagandists were beginning to find their feet with regard to France, it was decided that ‘really subversive material cannot be dropped by air (this includes “CD” [SOE] planes and also the Balloon Unit)’. While the restriction had been relaxed sufficiently by August 1943 to allow ‘M’ Balloon Unit to disseminate black propaganda leaflets, it exclusively distributed the ‘Q’ leaflet series already referred to, which were never intended for the people of France.6 Other means of distribution were therefore sought. One method was direct dissemination through SOE, which agreed to be PWE’s ‘sole disseminating agent abroad’. The first SOE agents went to France in May 1941, but were captured or forced into hiding, breaking radio communications until February 1942. This prevented the organisation of container drops to get the material to them. In May 1942, Beck reported that ‘the actual dropping of literature [. . . ] by container is planned to begin about the middle of July [. . . ] At the present moment distribution in France is restricted to postal distribution.’ At this time PWE could call upon at least six active agents in France, about whom varying amounts of

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information has survived: Paul (code name of H. P. Le Chêne) in St-Etienne, Eugene (Victor Pertschuk) and Martin in Toulouse, Menzies in Sarlat, supported by a wireless operator, Dieudonné, and overseen by Valentin. Meanwhile, César was finishing his training and was about to go to Occupied France. In June, Beck reported that there had been no response from agents in France to instructions to organise reception committees for the container drops. But by mid-September they were asking for leaflets, and these requests were fulfilled. On 4 October it was noted that ‘we have received a report from our agents in Unoccupied France that all the material dropped in containers has been safely received’. By the autumn of 1942, Eugene had a comité de propagande in Toulouse and two new agents had appeared: Chalmers Wright arrived in Cannes in early October, while Victor distributed leaflets inside the Michelin factory at Clermont-Ferrand on 15 October. Eugene, however, finding more opportunities for sabotage than propaganda, stopped working for PWE, as did Chalmers Wright.7 Using containers must have been very attractive to PWE as a means to deliver black propaganda for distribution. By December 1941, a white leaflet could be dropped within forty-eight hours of the printer’s receipt of the finalised proof version. However, at least three weeks passed between despatch of black propaganda from Great Britain and delivery in France, using the methods available to PWE, such as posting the material in neutral states. Using containers could – at least in theory – reduce the delay between production and distribution and allow black propaganda to become more topical.8 In practice, containers were not a solution, largely because too few aircraft were available to carry them to France. In late 1943 and early 1944, Bomber Command released only twenty-three Halifax bombers for ‘special duties’ – meaning in particular the support of SOE and SIS – over the whole of Europe. By comparison, the grudging provision of aircraft for white leaflet dissemination was positively lavish. Because containers were dropped to reception committees, they were more seriously disrupted by problems than was the case with white leaflet dissemination. While poor weather was equally likely to ground aircraft intended for either role, container dropping was further affected by the need to reconvene the reception committees, which in any case were limited by a shortage of agents. Although SOE sent approximately 1,200 agents to France from Great Britain, two-thirds were not sent until 1944, too late to have any real impact on the distribution of black propaganda. Over the course of the war, British-based aircraft transported only 5,700 tons of stores (armaments, medical supplies and other material) to France using containers, of which 5,100 tons were delivered in 1944.9 The containers themselves had a fixed capacity and were not devoted to the delivery of black propaganda. They carried many items to France, mostly weapons. Foot estimates that the proportion of warlike material packed into the containers was ‘undoubtedly high, well over 80 and probably over 90 [per cent]’. The balance was non-warlike and might have consisted of propaganda material. However, of SOE’s four standard loading patterns (adopted to ease pressure at the packing stations) none included propaganda material, but neither did they include some items – such as tricolour armbands for résistants to wear, tins of vitamin pills and

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perhaps leaflets – that were stuffed into any remaining spaces. Furthermore, SOE assumed that 20 per cent of all stores dropped would be lost or fall into enemy hands immediately, which would also have reduced the number of propaganda leaflets successfully received.10 Nor, when SOE did load leaflets in its containers, was it immune from misdirecting them. In 1942 ‘a few packets of French leaflets’ were included in a container dropped to what SOE believed was a Dutch resistance group, actually a German counterespionage operation, and immediately captured. Even when SOE loaded leaflets and dropped them to a French resistance group, they were not necessarily circulated as intended: Communist resistance groups, for example, refused to distribute them.11 Very roughly, an absolute maximum of 37.3 million standard single-sheet aerial leaflets (or leaflet units) could have been sent to France by container in 1942–3, when PWE’s black leaflet operations were at their peak. Discounting 20 per cent for loss or capture reduces that figure to about 29.9 million leaflets. The true figure was almost certainly significantly smaller. By comparison, over the same period 453.6 million white leaflets of a variety of sizes were disseminated by air. Overall, the container system was something of a disappointment.12 The French postal system was also used to disseminate propaganda, via the surviving postal links between France and neutral states. Material was either despatched direct from England or sent first via diplomatic bag and then posted. The Free French posted some propaganda in Portugal, an undertaking that PWE distanced itself from ‘owing to possible diplomatic inconveniences’. SOE also smuggled envelopes via Lisbon to post in France, although this took time to become organised: during the winter of 1940–1 the head of SOE’s DF (communications) section discovered that lines claimed to originate in Lisbon to pass ‘letters, parcels and people’ in and out of France, were ‘either non-existent or unsuited to SOE’s purposes’. A Captain Mortimore became ‘sheet-anchor’ for the suitable routes. By April 1942, SOE could theoretically handle 2,000 envelopes monthly, although between December 1941 and April 1942 it averaged just under 750, using posting facilities in Paris, Vichy, Marseille, Toulouse and Perpignan.13 Other methods were also employed to smuggle material into France. This was partly because PWE’s agreement with SOE specified black propaganda and, for reasons which were not stated, SOE was ‘not prepared to despatch or disseminate grey material except when specially asked to do so’. Many of PWE’s ‘black’ productions for France were really grey or white, and SOE was therefore not willing to handle them on a regular basis, requiring PWE to use other distribution routes.14 The alternative smuggling routes mostly came through MOI personnel. In Barcelona, P. H. G. Dorchy (the Press Attaché) and his assistant Captain Harvey had, by late 1940, organised channels to distribute propaganda, although this initially consisted of Free French material. A report from the Barcelona Press Office indicated that for smuggling, ‘RAF leaflets style is excellent’ – because they were small and thin. Dorchy’s name repeatedly appears in the surviving distribution

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records. He used the recaderos (‘a form of daily carrier organisation [. . . ] peculiar to Catalonia’) to pass material from Barcelona into France, reaching Toulouse, Bordeaux, Marseille and Lyon; others then took it further afield. PWE considered that he provided ‘one of our few regular channels to France’ and Dorchy himself reported that ‘we have a very complete organisation for this distribution and a high percentage of the material finds its way into France’.15 In Lisbon, Eileen Reid (formerly of PWE) worked for the Press Attaché and operated channels to France for the distribution of propaganda; someone named Gorlier also assisted. After November 1940 the possibility of ‘circulating subversive leaflets into the Occupied Territories through seamen in neutral ports, particularly Tangier [sic], Lisbon, and the ports of North and South America’ was investigated. This explains distribution via a Captain Andrews, who had contacts with merchant shipping in Lisbon, where he may have been a naval attaché.16 In Switzerland, PWE was aided by Elizabeth Wiskemann, in Bern initially for Department EH and then for the MOI as Assistant Press Attaché between September 1941 and 1945. Links with Switzerland were less regular and secure than those with Barcelona and Lisbon as the country was surrounded by Axis or Axis-occupied territory. Wiskemann recalled that after the fall of France ‘we could not send a King’s Messenger across southern France to Lisbon, but some friendly neutral [. . . ] took our dispatches’ and that after the total German occupation of France, ‘we could only communicate with London by coded telegrams’. Dorchy could supply material to Switzerland; his task was perhaps made easier because the intent was not to supply distribution quantities but masters to copy. PWE also had links through the MEW to Switzerland. Whereas SOE would only smuggle into France material contained in stamped addressed envelopes, the other smugglers did not make this stipulation.17 Much of the subversive material sent by PWE to France consisted of what were in effect white propaganda leaflets, albeit often specially produced for black distribution, perhaps by miniaturisation. This was in part because of SOE’s problems in providing direct dissemination by using containers, leading Beck to report that ‘none of this material is considered as strictly “black” [. . . ] until we have a surer means of distribution than the post, we are keeping to a less subversive kind of literature’. Howe, who ran the black propaganda production unit, was driven to complain to Vischer, chair of the UP Committee, that ‘the French [. . . ] matter is “light grey” or even “white” [. . . ] the “black” technique could be used to better advantage’. But the use of the black technique for the distribution of white leaflets can be justified for two reasons. First, the aim may not only have been to distribute the leaflets but also to suggest that a French resistance group or groups were responsible for the collection and forwarding of aerial leaflets, or for their reproduction, miniaturisation and distribution. Second, the great majority of propaganda smuggled into France must have come across the Franco-Spanish border, into south-western France. This was one of the areas that the RAF had great difficulty supplying with leaflets, and the intention may well have been to exploit any opportunity to introduce propaganda into France, especially to areas that other methods could not reach.18

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The black technique meant, in regard to white or grey propaganda, that the envelopes carrying it were disguised, to avoid interception by postal censorship. Many things could attract the censor’s attention, such as large batches of envelopes addressed in the same way, or numerals formed in the English, rather than the French, style. Every envelope discovered meant the loss of the leaflets it held (one envelope often contained several) and could put those responsible under increased risk of capture by encouraging additional preventative measures. A typical batch of twenty-five envelopes therefore used ten varieties of envelope and six different typefaces or handwriting styles.19 Early envelopes were addressed by a team, recalled by Howe in his memoir, of ‘elderly French ladies [using] the kind of distinctive French handwriting known as “Sacré Coeur” [and] typically French violet-coloured ink’. The envelopes were of French design. From May 1942, using specimens collected as examples, they carried the imprints of real companies known to be collaborating, or Vichy government departments. In November, it was suggested that using a fictitious return address on envelopes without an imprint might be wise. Between July 1942 and April 1943, Howe’s unit produced between 400 and 1,000 copies each of ten designs of imprinted envelopes. At least 50,000 more were produced, but there is no indication if an imprint was used.20 Some envelopes carried French stamps. At first the smugglers returned from France with legitimate stamps, a dangerous operation in itself. Soon after joining PWE, Howe was asked to forge stamps. The first batch was put into production during the spring of 1942. In the second half of 1942, 65,000 stamps ranging in value from 25 centimes to 2 francs were ordered. Even if forging did not protect the smugglers’ lives, it did save money: these stamps would have cost some 61,000 francs. Forgery was more economical.21

Quantity and Nature: White and Grey Propaganda Between January 1942 and July 1943, 3.2 million leaflets were despatched by the black technique to France. This was tiny compared with the 289.9 million leaflets distributed by air over the same period. Almost all of these were, strictly speaking, white or grey rather than black. Some, like the Weekly Times, the Lettre d’Angleterre and La France Libre, were undeniably British in origin but not directly reproduced from aerial leaflets or existing in an aerial leaflet form. Versions of standard aerial leaflets and actual aerial leaflets were also sent to France using black means. The Weekly Times was a miniature version of the regular Weekly Times, printed on India paper (very tough, thin paper) fortnightly between 22 April and 3 June 1942, and weekly thereafter. The miniature version was ready about a week after the original version, so because of the three-week time lag in delivery it was received about a month late. This was clearly acceptable: as Barman comments, ‘people in occupied Europe preferred papers and periodicals produced for the British public to publications specially prepared for them in their own language’. Although he records that the miniature Weekly Times was intended for aerial

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dissemination, it appears only to have been distributed clandestinely. About 1,800 copies of various issues of the Weekly Times are known to have been despatched to France.22 The Lettre d’Angleterre was a monthly open letter. The aim seems to have been to report war-related subjects in depth, perhaps to give the recipient a detailed knowledge which could then be repeated with conviction to others. Issue 12, dated June 1942, discussed the conflict between the Church and the Quisling government in Norway; showed how the enemy contradicted himself when speaking to different audiences (in this case making pronouncements concerning India); and examined the issue of transport in wartime, comparing German transport difficulties with the tremendous Allied strides to increase their merchant fleets. In the distribution records available, the first Lettre recorded is No. 8, despatched in January 1942; earlier editions may have been sent in the envelopes prepared by the ladies mentioned above. The Lettre d’Angleterre does not appear to have been aimed solely at France and may have been sent to other Francophone countries. The surviving data shows that in 1942 nearly 500 copies of various editions were despatched to France.23 La France Libre, a London-based monthly review, was founded in November 1940 independently of the British and Free French. PWE produced a miniature version, although its relationship to the original is unclear. The miniature La France Libre was a forty-eight page booklet in small type, which contained poems, photographs and articles, some of which, after September 1942, came from inside France. The miniature edition could have been one of three things: a copy of that month’s regular La France Libre; a copy of an earlier regular edition; or a dedicated propaganda version, using articles drawn either from regular editions of La France Libre or specially written for the purpose.24 Howe’s printing unit was not responsible for La France Libre and its origins remain unknown. It was probably produced by the Editorial Unit, whose head, McMillan, wrote in May 1943 that ‘having given the printing orders, I know that not more than 3-4,000 copies of La France Libre have ever been sent to France’. But surviving documents show that at least 26,000 copies of La France Libre were distributed. McMillan’s ignorance could well have been due to secrecy – perhaps he simply did not know that it was being smuggled into France. Three thousand copies of one issue of La France Libre (Volume II, No. 2, dated August 1942) were sent to SOE’s agents in Lyon, perhaps in one of the first uses of containers for propaganda delivery. Some were placed on Pétain’s stand at the Lyon Fair in September 1942. Marie (an American woman, Virginia Hall), an SOE agent in Lyon at this time, was probably responsible.25 Other leaflets produced for clandestine distribution reported single events in the same way as some aerial leaflets. These could well have been based on aerial leaflets. The rationale for taking the content of an aerial leaflet and using it for a miniature leaflet may have been to facilitate the production of a leaflet that disguised its British origins, or to suggest that this was the work of the underground press in France. Often such leaflets carried an ‘FU’ code number, probably standing for ‘France, Underground’.

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Figure 5.1 ‘More than 1,000 bombers have bombed Cologne’, FU.57 (1942)

Examples include ‘President Wallace’s speech’, distributed between June and July 1942. It is most likely to refer to US Vice-President Henry Wallace’s ‘Century of the Common Man’ speech of 8 May 1942. He described the war as a ‘fight to the death between the free world and the slave world’ and argued that, to aid economic recovery after the war, America should not erect trade barriers against its debtors. In April 1942 a leaflet entitled ‘Billancourt’ was distributed. This almost certainly discussed the bombing of the Renault factories at Boulogne-Billancourt and may have been based upon the aerial leaflet ‘The Renault Factories Bombed’ (F.26, 1942). Another leaflet, ‘Cologne’ (FU.57), was distributed at the end of June 1942. A copy has survived. Its front and rear, reproduced as Figure 5.1, shows Goering, the Luftwaffe chief, smiling over the words ‘Rotterdam’, ‘Belgrade’ and ‘Londres’ and looking pained over the words ‘Lübeck’, ‘Rostock’ and ‘Cologne’. The leaflet explains the strategic and material importance of Cologne and quotes one of the pilots involved in attacking it. The middle spread (not reproduced) contained a photograph of an undamaged Cologne, captioned ‘Goodbye forever to the Cologne we have known’, as a means of demonstrating the destruction caused by the attack, together with quotations from Churchill’s speech to Parliament on 10 May 1942, promising that the RAF would bomb with greater ferocity than ever before, and a message from Churchill to Harris.26 Aerial leaflets were definitely distributed using black techniques, both unchanged and miniaturised, specifically ‘for infiltration purposes’. Permission to send ordinary leaflets, including the Courrier, to both SOE and the Free French for distribution was sought at the end of August 1941. However, there is no evidence of such leaflets actually being distributed before June 1942 when seventeen copies of ‘More than 1,000 planes’ (F.65, 1942) were sent out, and no further evidence of unmodified aerial leaflets being disseminated until January 1943. Altogether, at least 27,436 copies of standard aerial leaflets were distributed through covert channels between June 1942 and July 1943.27

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While, as the Barcelona Press Office had acknowledged, unmodified aerial leaflets were adequate for smuggling, further miniaturisation must have made concealing them easier. ‘One-off ’ type leaflets specially prepared for clandestine distribution cannot easily be distinguished from miniature versions of ‘one-off ’ white propaganda leaflets, if both dealt with the same subject. Miniaturised versions of white periodical-type leaflets can be more easily identified. For example, in late May 1942, a miniature Revue de la Presse Libre was distributed using black means, a month ahead of the regular aerial version, which was first produced but not disseminated at this time. Just over 7,000 copies of the various miniature Revues were distributed using clandestine means before March 1943, when the standard aerial version began to be used instead. The first miniature versions of the Courrier were distributed in September 1942 and concerned the Dieppe raid of the previous month. Overall, nearly 3.1 million miniature versions of standard aerial leaflets or special productions for clandestine dissemination, but not strictly black propaganda, were disseminated between January 1942 and July 1943. This is the bulk of the distribution for which records have survived. Camouflage was usually limited to disguising the envelope, not the leaflet. There were occasional exceptions. In mid-December 1942, SIS reported that ‘anti-German propaganda pamphlets were circulating in France, in false covers suggesting they were literary works or even Vichy propaganda’. These were probably PWE productions – in September 1942, a miniature edition of the Courrier Illustrated was given the fake cover of a Petit-Dictionnaire Franco-Allemand, to make circulation easier. The same technique was also employed for a leaflet specifically produced for clandestine distribution, the ‘Complot Pétain-Laval’ (part of an attempt to discredit Pétain and Laval), disguised with the cover of the Classiques Garnier edition of Bernardin de St-Pierre’s novel Paul et Virginie.28

Quantity and Nature: Strictly ‘Black’ Propaganda One type of material distributed using the black technique had no aerial counterpart and did not reveal its origins. Unlike the examples of white and grey propaganda distributed using the black technique, this was strictly black propaganda. Leeper stated that the black leaflet proper purports to come from inside the country for which it is intended. It is written and produced [. . . ] as purporting to be German or quisling departmental instructions circulated to cause confusion within the administrative machine. [It] is aimed at a specific administrative target at which SOE or MEW is anxious to strike.29 Such material was distributed with great care. One example was the ‘ARP Circular’ for Parisian hoteliers, despatched to France in mid-March 1942. This document concerned air raid precautions and supposedly came from Luftwaffe

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authorities in Paris, dated 15 May 1942. The advance date would have compensated for the delivery delay. It read: Paris, 15th May 1942 General of the Luftwaffe, Paris Luftwaffenstandortoffizier To the Hotel........ Paris Unfortunately, it will probably be necessary to cut electricity and gas supplies as soon as enemy aircraft are detected over occupied territory, in order to prevent any possibility of a light revealing the location of Paris, and allowing an aerial attack on the town. As a result, it is essential that all hotel proprietors and managers obtain other means of lighting, such as: – – – – –

matches candles petrol or oil lamps oil pocket torches and spare batteries.

This is also applicable to the clients, who must possess or obtain additional forms of lighting. If these instructions have not been observed, and an accident takes place while the hotel is in darkness, the proprietor will be held responsible. Following these instructions is in your own interest. For the General of the Luftwaffe, Paris Der Luftwaffenstandortoffizier.30 This letter was produced using appropriate paper, a forged Luftwaffe letterhead and German envelopes. It was essential that it was accepted as genuine. The instructions made sense at one level, as the blackout was a necessary precaution; but they were also subversive, intended to create discontent and disruption. Threatening to cut the power suggested that the Germans did not trust the French to maintain the blackout. The thought of power cuts without warning would be frustrating. Furthermore, the lighting materials listed would not have been readily available or cheap, perhaps causing some other purchase to be sacrificed. Then, because the power supplies would not be cut, it would indicate German intransigence, annoy hoteliers and clientele who had followed the instructions and, further, suggest that the Germans did not really care about Paris. The message would probably also filter through to others in Paris besides hoteliers, persuading them, too, to take similar precautions and causing just as much

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frustration. The aim was two-fold – to foster distrust of the occupiers and to create economic disruption by encouraging the purchase of excessive quantities of lighting materials. Another example of truly black propaganda was a leaflet that urged workers to take precautions against accidents, reproduced as Figure 5.2. Supposedly

Figure 5.2 ‘Precautions against accidents’, H.134B (1942)

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Figure 5.2 (Continued)

published by the ‘Reich Office for the Protection of Workers, Berlin’, it appears to be aimed at ensuring workers’ safety. The first paragraph declared that it is more important than ever to take precautions against accidents. The acceleration in the pace of work, increased fatigue due to longer working hours than before, and the overwork of the machines, has increased the number of accidents. During the last four months accidents have increased by 52%.

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To underline the point, the third paragraph notes that ‘in April 1942 the number of work-related accidents in German armament factories increased by 160% over April 1941’. The leaflet then illustrated how a worker’s hair was caught in a machine. Ostensibly, the leaflet promoted the safety of the workers for their own sake. But it also suggested that while accidents had to be stopped because they disrupted production, they occurred because the workers were exhausted by very long hours and used overworked machines, and implied that this was all because of German demands. Another sting was the suggestion that foreign workers were particularly affected because they could speak German insufficiently well to follow safety instructions. Its overall effect was to emphasise to French workers the conditions in which they were working and why, and subtly to encourage them to blame the Germans.31 Howe’s printing unit produced the leaflet, describing it as the ‘Accident leaflet, French version’. It was probably prepared in different languages as well: other versions appearing elsewhere would support the impression that it was genuine. The first batch of French leaflets, to add further to the illusion, used envelopes stamped ‘Secretary of State for Industrial Production – French State’ and ‘Office of the Cabinet’. One thousand copies were despatched, most to the Unoccupied Zone, in August and September 1942.32

Feedback Whereas with every other form of propaganda, some indication that it had been received emerged from France during the war, this is not true of clandestinely distributed white, grey or black printed propaganda. Of course, truly ‘black’ material should not have provoked any response: if it succeeded, no connection with Great Britain should have been apparent. As to clandestinely distributed white or grey leaflets, any feedback is unlikely to have differentiated them from similar aerial leaflets. Two pieces of evidence do, however, survive concerning clandestinely distributed white or grey leaflet propaganda. The first concerns La France Libre. It was reported in September 1942 to be ‘one of the most successful leaflets in Unoccupied France’ and SOE agents had requested more copies to distribute. The second is the conclusion drawn in a post-liberation report on PWE’s activities, that using clandestine means to deliver white leaflets had been successful, particularly because leaflets delivered in that way had provided material for the underground press in France.33 Clandestine delivery must have had benefits compared with aerial dissemination. The latter might have involved millions of leaflets, but even skilled pilots encountered difficulties in ensuring they were dropped in the right place and, when they were, they landed safely and could be picked up and read. Although the quantity distributed by clandestine means was much smaller, a larger percentage must have been read. In addition, the use of genuine company or government imprints on some envelopes was potentially troublemaking. If some were intercepted, any attempt by the authorities to find the culprit responsible within the

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company or government department concerned would have been disruptive for the body under investigation and ultimately a waste of time for those conducting the inquiry.

Broadcast Black Propaganda

Operation and Nature PWE ran forty-eight secret radio stations (RUs). The French RUs used short wave, which was preferable to medium or long wave for the purpose. Shortwave transmitters could focus their broadcast in a specific direction. The signal bounced between the atmosphere and the ground: a properly set-up transmitter had a potential range of several thousand miles. They were cheaper to operate than medium- or long-wave transmitters because they required less power – in March 1943 the average RU cost 2 shillings a minute to run, including all engineering costs. Crucially, short-wave transmitters were precisely what a clandestine station might be expected to use so, despite doubts about the availability of short-wave receivers already discussed, credibility required short wave.34 Most programmes were pre-recorded and then broadcast from transmitters separate from the studio. This made controlling output and quality easy: if the broadcasters said something unsuitable (or were unhappy with their performance), the programme could be re-recorded or abandoned. In addition, the broadcast could not be hijacked.35 But pre-recording the broadcast on disc could cause difficulties: needles could jump or skip, in warmer weather pre-echo (or ‘ghosting’) might occur (in which the signal recorded in one groove could be heard faintly as the next groove was played), the transmission could be cut off early, or the discs could be played at the wrong speed. Both the latter certainly affected the French RU F.3, La France Catholique. These problems could betray the fact that the programme was not live. A programme normally lasted 121/2 minutes, because the discs, although capable of recording for 15 minutes, tended to give poorer quality in the final segment. It was also necessary to alter transmitter frequencies between broadcasts. After one engineer was fatally electrocuted doing this, the 21/2 minute gap became mandatory. The most amusing technical catastrophe occurred on the German RU GS1. Delmer decided it was about time the Gestapo caught ‘Der Chef ’, the star speaker, and an elaborate finale was planned in which he was shot dead at his microphone. The transmitter engineer was not informed and, following what had been standard practice throughout GS1’s life, repeated the broadcast an hour later.36 The five French RUs were given the identifying numbers F.1 to F.5. They were sometimes also referred to using the codename of the building housing the respective broadcasters – TM, for example, was The Mount, Aspley Heath, home to the F.1 and F.2 teams. The RUs, as a rule, claimed to be resistanceoperated and based in France – during early planning in September 1940, it was recognised that their fictional location must be either in France or a French

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colony as ‘in France a low opinion was held of Frenchmen who had emigrated either to England or to any other part of the world’. Their transmissions were irregular, to suggest that they operated under dangerous circumstances, but they were made roughly daily to keep audiences interested. No RU was secure from being unmasked because, as Balfour points out, radio-location devices could determine the signal’s source. However, ordinary listeners would not have such equipment and any official announcement that a transmission came from Great Britain might be interpreted as an attempt to discredit a genuine clandestine broadcaster. Although the RUs could operate with more freedom than the BBC – the latter had to tread carefully regarding Pétain, for example, while for the RUs ‘there were no limits to the infamies of which Pétain, the Vichy government and many well-known collaborateurs could be accused’ – their general objectives were the same.37 The fictional identity created for each RU was essential and had to be protected. Yet some of the French RUs broadcast repeats of their programmes. This was standard practice on the BBC, for example, but its use by stations that purported to be resistance-operated and broadcasting under dangerous conditions defies logic. If these RUs were what they claimed to be, then every additional minute spent broadcasting was extra time in which Gestapo radio-location units could track them down, and if they had to take the risk then they should realistically have been broadcasting new material. Moreover, that such a broadcaster might have access to a recording device is unlikely, and even more so that it might have a continuing supply of blank discs – a new recording required a new disc. For these reasons, if listeners heard the same programme twice, they might begin to suspect that the broadcast was not what it seemed. Unless the propagandists believed that the saving in labour of not having to record a second programme outweighed the effect on credibility of hearing the same broadcast twice, there is no obvious explanation why RU programmes were repeated but, as we shall see, they were. The first two stations set up were F.1, Radio Inconnue, and F.2, Radio Travail, which in August 1941 swapped identifying numbers. Radio Inconnue broadcast between 15 November 1940 and 10 January 1944, making it the longest-running French RU. By October 1943 it was making six broadcasts daily, including three repeats. Radio Travail made its first broadcast on 17 November 1940 and was on air until 21 May 1942, when it was closed, having broadcast once daily. F.3, La France Catholique, broadcast daily between early July 1941 and mid-May 1944; it temporarily closed between May 1942 and June 1943 due to personnel issues, discussed further below. F.4, Radio Gaulle, which broadcast from 25 August 1941 to 15 November 1942, was shortest-lived. It did not broadcast daily: it made 426 programmes during its 447-day lifespan. The final RU was F.5, Honneur et Patrie: Radio de la Résistance Française, commonly known as Radio Patrie. It broadcast between 11 October 1942 and 2 April 1944, making two broadcasts daily, one a repeat.38 Both Radio Inconnue and Radio Travail were run exclusively by SO1/PWE. In the interests of security, Radio Inconnue was kept secret from the Free French

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and the American propagandists; the same probably applies to Radio Travail.39 The Free French were aware of La France Catholique, but were content to leave the British to it. Totally different were Radio Gaulle and Radio Patrie. The former was a joint venture between PWE and the Free French, ‘conceived as a medium through which to train certain types of resistance groups’, but it was never successful in this role. The latter was set up in cooperation with Carte, a French resistance organisation with which SOE made contact. However, the Free French found out, argued it was divisive and succeeded in merging it with one of their own stations in May 1943, renaming it ‘Honneur et Patrie de la Resistance Française’. Unlike Radio Gaulle, the collaborative management behind Radio Patrie was effective. It was directed through a weekly meeting, at which are present PWE, SOE, OSS, the delegate of resistance in London and other members of the resistance groups, a representative of the French National Committee and the French Secret Service, the CGT [Confédération générale du travail] delegate and a representative of the Communist Party.40 Each of the RUs had a different target audience. Radio Inconnue broadcast to the ‘petite bourgeoisie’, regularly attacking Pétain and Vichy: it was ‘violent and vulgar in its abuse of Germans and quislings’; it was ‘distinctly subversive’, aiming ‘to create confusion and discord inside the Vichy administration, between Vichy and the Germans, and to act as a general purveyor of rumours likely to create such effects’. After the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, it began advocating minor acts of resistance such as slashing German tyres, and it invented a fictitious organisation, Les chevaliers du coup de balai (‘The Knights of the Sweeping Broom’), to harass the Germans throughout France. It advocated the assassination of Darlan and Ferdinand de Brinon and, after Laval returned to power in 1942, suggested that he should be eliminated too. Jacques Doriot and the Parti Populaire Fran¸cais (PPF) were attacked during an intensive campaign. German exploitation of France, the dissuasion of workers from going to Germany, requisitioning and the associated food queue riots were also important themes.41 Radio Travail was initially intended to appeal to northern French industrial workers, but it increasingly addressed conservative trade unionists. (Meanwhile Radio Inconnue’s politics changed in exactly the opposite direction, which was why their identifying numbers were swapped.) It disassociated itself from the Free French and the Communists, and was a more serious affair than Radio Inconnue, appearing throughout its life to ‘be excellently informed on the subject of internal French politics’. It regularly attacked the Germans and, like Radio Inconnue, encouraged passive resistance after the invasion of Russia. By early 1942 it was urging transport workers to strike as part of a larger campaign to highlight this weakness in German domination and stressing the need for plans for active sabotage to be undertaken in the event of an Allied invasion.42 La France Catholique was aimed at the clergy and the religious in France and was designed ‘to assist priests there by providing materials for their sermons’. Twice weekly, prayers of a strongly propagandist nature were broadcast, for

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example ‘for our children who are starving’ and ‘for our prisoners in captivity in Germany’. Other themes included comparing Hitler with Satan, urging people working for the Germans to remain in employment but to do a deliberately poor job and promising collaborators (including priests) that they would be tried as traitors. Some programmes were purely religious, with no propaganda content, a practice which gave La France Catholique additional plausibility.43 Radio Gaulle’s basic themes were that France should re-enter the war on the Allied side, that French problems were rooted in the armistice with Germany, that the French Empire should take up the fight in place of metropolitan France, and that de Gaulle, who had advocated this since 1940, should be seen as symbolising French resistance. In this respect, for example, when the Riom trials began in 1942 (to try members of the pre-war French government in order to determine the causes of and responsibility for the war), they provided a pretext to attack Pétain and compare his decisions with the foresight of de Gaulle.44 The early broadcasts of Radio Patrie, representing the views of one resistance group, were hostile to the Free French.The Carte resistance group communicated policy: its instructions to SOE were regarded as showing ‘knowledge of existing conditions’. After the merger with Free French, Radio Patrie’s sole purpose was to transmit ‘the orders and directives of the Conseil [National] de la Résistance [CNR] and Comité Directeur Central’ and to instruct ‘the French people in the methods of underground warfare in accordance with these directives’. These instructions ‘either short-term or long-term’ were issued ‘to the rank-and-file resistance and to those members of the general public who are not in contact with any of the resistance groups’, and were usually rebroadcast by the Free French Radio Brazzaville and, later, Radio Algiers, and sometimes by the BBC. Radio Patrie became, in practice, the official voice of the resistance, regarded by some as the true voice of France.45 The scriptwriters and broadcasters on the RUs were a mix of Britons and Frenchmen. The three main participants on Radio Inconnue were British citizens with excellent French. They were joined in November 1942 by ‘a first-class Frenchman [who was] a distinguished lawyer’. Radio Travail’s original speaker was an ex-miner from Lille, later joined by a syndicaliste (a trade union official). La France Catholique’s broadcasters were both Free French priests: Lagrave was the station’s only speaker until it closed because he wanted to train as a pilot in the Free French air force, but he later returned part-time and the station reopened. Florent, also a pilot, assisted him during the station’s second incarnation. Radio Gaulle’s personnel are not named, but they were provided by the Free French and replaced by them in June 1942, a decision which PWE found ‘highly advisable’. Finally, Radio Patrie’s original broadcasting team was sent by Carte, both members escaping from France with Major Bodington of SOE in September 1942. One has remained anonymous. The other was André Gillois, who was well qualified, having worked at Radio Cité; in April 1944 he became Free French spokesman on the BBC when Schumann returned to active service. New speakers for Radio Patrie continued to come from French resistance groups.46

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The RUs were linked to black printed propaganda. During Radio Inconnue’s life, a flyer was produced inviting people to listen, ‘with the permission of the Gestapo and the police’. Five thousand copies were despatched in August 1942, and sent to addresses in Bordeaux, Seine-Inférieure, Paris and Greater Paris. The texts of Radio Patrie’s opening broadcasts were printed as twenty-two-page booklets, which also advertised Radio Patrie, and were camou´ flaged as ‘The hundred best ways to prepare fish’, supposedly by Editions Paul Martin of Paris. At the end of October 1942, 10,000 copies were despatched to France for Carte to distribute. Radio Patrie was also linked to the French clandestine press.47 Radio Travail closed in May 1942 due to a lack of current information on French organised labour; the syndicaliste was using pre-war terminology. Nonetheless, it had usefully filled a niche. When it closed, Beck recommended ‘should a syndicaliste au courant with the present activities of the CGT be got out of France, it might be advisable to start this RU again with more verisimilitude’. Another CGT delegate later joined PWE but the station never reopened, and the new recruit worked on Radio Patrie. Radio Gaulle, as already noted, was never successful. Despite being intended to stimulate resistance, neither PWE nor the Free French evolved any concrete plan in this direction and little was done to direct activity into such channels as gathering information about enemy troops, supply dumps, aerodromes, etc., listing collaborators, forming contact with personnel holding key positions such as telephone operators, police chiefs etc. The station was closed as a result of tensions created by Operation Torch.48 The other three RUs were all closed down before D-Day, but not simultaneously. In mid-April 1944, Bruce Lockhart reported that ‘“black” radio [broadcasting] to the occupied territories had virtually ceased and that it was expected soon to have completely ceased’. If the Germans either knew or suspected that the RUs were British in origin, which is probable, and if the frequencies were needed for the invasion of Western Europe, which is not unlikely, closing the RUs simultaneously would have indicated that something was about to happen. It was actually recommended that Radio Inconnue close ‘as soon as possible, since its effectiveness has ceased, and it may become harmful in view of later developments’; unfortunately this cryptic comment is not further elaborated upon. Other than the need to clear frequencies, there is no obvious reason why La France Catholique or Radio Patrie closed although, regarding the former, Florent served in the Free French Air Force throughout 1944–5 which may have had something to do with it; what happened to Lagrave is unclear. The closure of Radio Patrie did not go unnoticed. On 4 April 1944, Radio Paris commented ‘on the eve of the invasion, they (the Anglo-Americans) reckon they can do without the services of the mercenary Frenchmen who have carried out their work for nearly four years’.49

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Feedback As a means of assessing the RUs, Leeper believed that ‘the only sure method of judging is to examine the competence of the work. A station which falls below standard should be discontinued.’ By this criterion, the longevity of Radio Inconnue suggests that it was considered effective; the fact that La France Catholique was reinvigorated after a year’s absence suggests that this station was also considered valuable; and the difficulties associated with Radio Gaulle must have made it a prime candidate for closure.50 But there were other methods for determining the value of an RU. Beck recommended the closure of Radio Inconnue, explaining that it had become clear that it no longer had a wide audience in France and, indeed, was no longer taken seriously. Such conclusions about the nature of PWE’s audience came from the feedback received from France, for example letters written by French people to third parties or intercepted by British censorship, or interviews conducted with escapees. Such feedback was, however, limited by comparison with that which concerned the BBC because comments could not be directly addressed, but made only in passing.51 Although it was never expected that the RUs’ audience would rival that of the BBC, ordinary French people did listen. At the beginning of January 1943 it was concluded that Radio Inconnue had ‘a considerable working-class audience’ and during the following months indications of reception in the Vosges, the Aveyron, Agen, Grenoble, Lyon, Pau and Toulouse were received. In July 1943, an Englishman returning from northern France reported that ‘the salacious and vulgar nature of these broadcasts [. . . ] made a strong appeal to the workingclass type’. Similarly, in 1941 and 1942, La France Catholique was claimed to have a widespread audience among the clergy and the religious. Beck was also able to report that ‘this RU has the unofficial approval of several Bishops in France’. This was all despite the expectation that the specialised content of La France Catholique would restrict its audience. Radio Gaulle certainly provided feedback before June 1942, because in that month the fact that no evidence had been received recently was considered noteworthy. Later, in September, evidence was received that it was listened to and enjoyed. Radio Patrie got off to a flying start. Reports were received about it from Vichy in October 1942, the month of its launch, and from Paris and Lyon early in November; some police officials approved. Evidence was received of listening to Radio Patrie in Paris and particularly the south of France, reports coming from Agen, Cannes, Lyon, Marseille, Roanne and elsewhere.52 Some of the feedback was unfavourable. Radio Inconnue intended to be vulgar, but it perhaps overdid it. In September 1942 it was accused of ‘extreme vulgarity’ and the question was asked, ‘how a string of “gros mots” [swearwords] could have any appeal’. A French student commented that Radio Inconnue was ‘obscene and unpopular, but definitely anti-German’ while a French policeman felt it was ‘so very coarse as to be bad propaganda for the Allies’ cause’. On Radio Gaulle ‘there is too much padding and telling of little stories of no interest [. . . ] I infinitely

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prefer the English BBC bulletins.’ Radio Patrie was said initially to have been ‘a laughing stock’ because its bomb-making instructions had called for products virtually unobtainable in France. It was reported by an important member of the resistance to have ‘at most one or two per cent of the regular listening audience’, while a French lawyer commented that poor reception in Paris meant it could not be heard properly. Even in 1944, when it was acknowledged that resistance groups were favourable towards it and publicity had made Radio Patrie quite well known, it still did not have a sizeable regular audience.53 The RUs also provoked some listeners to take action, ranging from publicising the RUs to committing sabotage, and indicating that these broadcasts had an effect. Radio Inconnue was mostly responsible, but it is worth noting that Parisian ‘priests had in church advised their congregations’ to listen to La France Catholique, while in Castres stickers were displayed advertising Radio Patrie. Talks and slogans used by Radio Inconnue were reproduced in three clandestine pamphlets sent to England in April 1942. In May, the ‘leader of an underground organisation in the unoccupied zone’ reported that Radio Inconnue’s fictitious resistance group Les chevaliers du coup de balai existed and that the dummy instructions issued to it were being carried out. In June, five of Doriot’s propaganda centres, identified by Radio Inconnue during the campaign attacking him and the PPF, were blown up.54 The Vichy and German authorities certainly considered the RUs a threat and believed they were having an impact, as their use of jamming to try and obliterate these stations shows. All of the stations were jammed, with different degrees of severity. Between May and October 1942 three-quarters of both Radio Inconnue and Radio Gaulle broadcasts monitored by PWE were jammed. In May 1942 alone, Radio Travail was jammed every time, and La France Catholique 75 per cent of the time, when they were monitored to establish the extent of jamming. Radio Patrie was also jammed early on, making reception difficult, and this continued: evidence from Paris showed jamming was ‘very severe’. In January 1944, it was apparently ‘not possible to hear it all over France, and most of the north and coastal regions cannot hear F.5. In addition, it is heavily jammed.’55 Counterpropaganda was also used to discredit the RUs. The Vichy authorities set up Radio Révolution, first monitored in December 1941, in direct response to Radio Inconnue. Broadcasting from Vichy, Radio Révolution suggested de Gaulle wrote Radio Inconnue’s scripts and blamed him personally for the acts of resistance it encouraged. Darlan also broadcast against Radio Inconnue, which was denounced as Gaullist, Communist and broadcasting from London. Radio Révolution also attacked Radio Gaulle’s broadcasts after February 1942, while both Radio Révolution and Radio Paris sought to discredit Radio Patrie in their broadcasts. The Germans attacked La France Catholique too, claiming that it was broadcast from the Vatican in order to obtain an official denial and, although the Vatican thought it might be broadcast from Hungary, it never formally refuted the charge. Even parts of the British government were unaware of the origins of La France Catholique, asking their ambassador to the Holy See to make inquiries in August 1941, although this might have been a ruse to suggest that

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they knew nothing about it.56 After the Free French Radio Brazzaville claimed in early January 1943 that the Free French were not responsible for Radio Patrie – a blunder considering that, in part, they were – the German-operated Radio Brazzaville II commented: Having tried recently to discredit us, Radio Brazzaville I now begins to malign the militant Gaullist station Radio Patrie whose broadcasts have always appealed to our hearers by their resounding call to fight and resist. How right we were in warning you against the machinations of Brazzaville I. As was noted, ‘the wheel has turned full circle when an Axis freedom station gives publicity to one of our own’. Radio Brazzaville made up for its mistake after Radio Patrie closed, paying ‘tribute to the courage and patriotism of this station [. . . ] for many months it had been a thorn in the enemy’s flesh’.57 Counterpropaganda was also produced in print: the French press regularly refuted Radio Inconnue’s broadcasts, while in October and December 1941 several French Catholic newspapers including La Croix and Le Nouvelliste de Lyon were reported to have condemned listening to La France Catholique. Radio Inconnue and Les chevaliers du coup de balai were even mentioned in Allard’s book devoted to ‘exposing’ British propaganda, which suggests that the attempt to portray the RUs as resistance-operated stations based in France was not entirely successful.58 After the war, Fairlie’s brief inquiry into PWE’s white propaganda work touched on three of PWE’s RUs as well. Radio Inconnue was concluded to have ‘reached only a small public’ and could not ‘be proved to have made any major contribution’. More favourably, ‘there was no evidence [that La France Catholique] was ever widely listened to, but it is probable that it made some sort of contribution’. Radio Patrie was ‘never widely listened to’ but this was considered unimportant given that the station had ‘the greatest possible value in bringing together, at its weekly policy meetings in London, representatives of PWE French Region and representatives of French resistance groups visiting England’.59

Rumours

Nature and Description The final propaganda method employed by PWE was rumour-mongering. As with the other elements of PWE’s black propaganda work, the material available today concerning rumours is patchy. Very little of it covers 1942, and all that we can do to uncover some rumours is to reconstruct them from ‘comeback’ reports recording their appearance as news, an outcome which also proves a degree of circulation. Hundreds of rumours were created for use in France; each was given an identifying letter/number code, beginning with S/1. The sequence was later restarted at R/1, then Q/1, etc.60

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Ideas for rumours (‘sibs’) came not only from the propagandists, but also the military, the intelligence services and the Foreign Office; they were collected by the UP Committee. Military rumours were sent for approval by the Inter-Service Security Board (ISSB) or the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and, from early 1941, the Foreign Office approved non-military sibs. Once approved, sibs were returned to the UP Committee, redrafted if necessary and then passed on for dissemination. SOE and SIS agents were mostly responsible, through contacts with neutral travellers but also through neutral journalists and diplomats in London, especially those believed to be communicating with enemy or enemyoccupied countries. The British and American press, letters that foreign censors were intended to open, OSS and the RUs were also employed.61 The rumours can be roughly divided into two types around their objective, ‘to induce alarm, despondency and bewilderment among the enemies, and hope and confidence among the friends’ of the Allies. In France, many rumours were therefore intended to undermine the morale of German occupying forces and to boost French morale. There were also rumours that would have little direct impact on the Germans, but would undermine French confidence in and cause resentment of the Vichy government, the armistice agreement and, indeed, the Germans themselves. An example of the former type – attacking the occupier and cheering the occupied – was R/753 which suggested that ‘French doctors called up to deal with the flow of German wounded seem to go in for surgery for surgery’s sake, and their only cure for anything is amputation. Two French surgeons have been shot for this.’ The reference to the shootings – not uncommon German behaviour – would lend credibility. An example of the second type was S/107 that ‘Laval runs the black food market through his control of the Economats du Centre and Félix Potin’ and R/245 that ‘Pétain was allowed to write the beginning and the end of his speech himself.’ Some rumours were ridiculous and would only raise a cheap laugh. This was acknowledged at least once, when it was suggested that ‘the reason for M. Laval’s sucking up to the Germans is that they have told him that they are going to make the Comte de Paris king [and] Laval is to become Duc de Savoie’. More symbolically threatening, but still comical, was the suggestion that the Germans wanted to dismantle the Eiffel Tower, using its metal to make munitions. The shooting of fifty French hostages in Nantes in October 1941 was not amusing, but it prompted several rumours which might have been (R/788, R/789 and R/836). A ghost was said to have appeared to the German soldiers who had been members of the firing squad, driving them to madness and death. It was recognised that rumours varied in credibility: while they might only ‘induce a certain frame of mind in the general public’ they would not deceive the well informed. Credibility was of course important in most circumstances and, in inventing stories that were realistic enough to be believable, sometimes ideas were put forward that turned out to be true. In November 1940, for example, a rumour was proposed that the Germans were planning to requisition gold in the Occupied Zone and were making arrangements with the Vichy government for similar

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action in the Unoccupied Zone. The rumour was passed, subject to redrafting because this seizure had actually already taken place in the Occupied Zone. Sometimes, however, mistakes were not spotted before circulation. At the beginning of October 1940 one rumour involved releasing convicts from the French Guyana penal colony to launch a crime-wave that the Germans could use to justify invading the Unoccupied Zone. French Guyana had indeed been a penal colony – it included the notorious Devil’s Island – but its use in that role had ceased in 1935. Sometimes rumours anticipated events. Six weeks after the German invasion of Russia, R/248 was circulated suggesting that Hitler had ordered the shooting of all Russian prisoners found to be circumcised – later, the systematic killing of Russian Jews did occur. Also prophetically, R/474 and R/475 suggested that British concrete production was being diverted to build ‘fortress barges’ and described amphibious tanks used successfully in exercises. Both became realities for D-Day, in the shape of the concrete Mulberry harbours and duplex-drive amphibious Sherman tanks. Neither contrivance was even considered until after Operation Jubilee, the 1942 attack on Dieppe; had they already been in development, it is unlikely that the propagandists would have been allowed to make such claims.62 It was for such reasons that rumours were vetted before release – by 1942 the UP Committee included representatives from SOE, MEW and SIS, while the Foreign Office, ISSB and JIC were consulted. In January 1941 proposed rumour S/116 suggested that the RAF had used wooden bombs to attack a dummy airfield in Normandy. It was rejected because ISSB felt it was ‘liable to compromise Intelligence sources’. More likely, it threatened a different truth: extensive use was being made in Great Britain of dummy airfields and factories to protect the genuine article. Later in the same year several rumours (R/260 and R/264–6) suggesting that SIS was operating in strength in France, under the noses of the Germans, were also rejected. No justification survives, but it was perhaps feared they might provoke the Germans into tightening security, making the job of real agents more difficult.63 Specific rumours were often used alongside other forms of propaganda in larger campaigns, some of which were examined in Chapter 3. Concerning German campaigning in Russia, one series of rumours (R/183–7) suggested that the invasion and subsequent German attacks were caused by Hitler’s being affected by some form of brain disease, madness or epilepsy, this diagnosis being supported by stories of his strange behaviour, such as an insistence on shaving his moustache more closely to prevent it looking like Stalin’s, or believing that Ernst Röhm, whom he had had murdered in 1934, was alive and living in Bolivia. Rumours R/337–9 suggested that 250,000 inscribed urns had been ordered from a Sèvres porcelain factory; that because German blood stocks were depleted Jewish blood was being used for transfusions; and that few wounded soldiers survived because Russian guerrilla attacks on German communications prevented effective medical services. The aim of these rumours was to add weight to the idea that Germany was being defeated in the East; they would also affect

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the morale of German troops in France, especially those who were awaiting their turn on the Russian front. Rumours concerning British bombing of targets in France and Germany were also used. Q/337, L/560 and K/95 suggested that German aircraft deliberately dropped bombs on residential areas of French towns shortly after the British had hit legitimate targets there; that German supervisors locked French workers inside factories during air raids; and that rescue work was deliberately bungled to maximise French casualties. It was suggested in R/282 and K/171 that German soldiers who, without permission, had tried to visit relatives not heard of since British attacks on German towns, had been shot for desertion. The effects of British raids on Germany and Italy were also magnified by L/517–19 after the Dams raid in 1943, which suggested that thousands of Todt Organisation workers being transferred to begin rebuilding and described German intentions to use French power stations to make good the energy shortfall. Italian soldiers in France were said in L/992 to have refused to go home on leave because of fear of bombing. Operation Torch and other Allied invasions also provided the basis for rumours. N/684 accused Axis radio stations of having announced Darlan’s murder before it happened – suggesting Axis involvement in it. Allied troops in North Africa were said by N/686, L/364 and L/365 to have discovered war crimes committed against French personnel and children. N/287 claimed the Germans had requisitioned olive oil from French stocks to replace supplies that had been lost to the Allies. After the invasion of Sicily and the events that followed, L/907, L/987 and K/93 suggested that Italian occupying troops in France had freed résistants in their custody, and handed their weapons over to, or even joined, the French resistance. And, although the number of rumours diminished prior to the invasion of France in the summer of 1944, J/250 and J/252, issued shortly after D-Day, suggested that German and Vichy personnel in Paris intended to flee before the Allied advance.

Feedback Rumours could lend credence to deception plans, but could they have any effect in their own right? In late 1942, Leeper concluded that ‘rumours spread quickly in Europe today’ making rumour-mongering a potentially useful method to employ. The use of rumour throughout the propaganda campaign towards France suggests that the propagandists thought it to be a useful method, a view which must have been shared by the members of the UP Committee. That is not to say that rumour-mongering was never questioned – in March 1941, Dalton suggested that the propagandists were putting out too many rumours. These vary in quality and many are not really very good. They also congest our lines of communications which [. . . ] are by no means adequate. [We should] cut down drastically the number of rumours put out and [. . . ] select only the best [to] reduce our recent output to about one third.

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Overall, in 1941 alone, SO1 and PWE produced some 2,000 rumours. They regarded the fact that not one had been traced back to Great Britain as a triumph. Those that had been denied or referred to by the enemy had, without exception, been attributed by them to other sources.64 PWE assessed rumouring by monitoring enemy, occupied, neutral and even British and Allied news media. If a recognisable version of a British-created rumour appeared, it demonstrated that the original had been sufficiently believed or found sufficiently entertaining to be passed on and had been reported by a news-gathering agency. The transition to news added further credibility and, as news reported in one source was often repeated elsewhere, it increased the audience, which would also further spread the story. In comparison to the number of rumours that have survived, records indicate comeback concerning only thirty-two rumours (although some rumours ‘came back’ more than once), almost all dated 1941. It is impossible to determine whether the lack of evidence for 1942–4 is due to an absence of comeback. Later rumours were no less credible than those begun in 1941, so it would seem likely, given the human tendency to gossip, that rumours travelled just as well and it was just as likely that newspapers and radio stations would pick them up and turn them into news. Most available comebacks are press and radio excerpts. For example, S/288, which suggested that two veterans had tried to kill Laval, ‘came back’ in the form of an article in the New York Post quoting the American radio station WRUL Boston. The American press is prominent in the comeback reports – the New York Post, Time, the New York Herald Tribune and the Trib-Herald of Waco, Texas, all feature. These reports are all dated prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, when the USA was still neutral and retained its news-gathering system in Europe. However, the involvement of WRUL Boston in a quarter of the American newspaper reports and acknowledgement of the Overseas News Agency (ONA) in half of these deserves further attention. WRUL Boston was partly controlled by BSC, which acted for SOE in the USA. BSC not only passed on directives from SO1 and PWE to WRUL Boston, but also had other links with the station. BSC was also involved with ONA, providing a subsidy in return for, among other things, assuring ‘wide dissemination of material originated by BSC [and] to channel propaganda outwards’. It is possible, therefore, that SOE used BSC and the American media – ONA and WRUL Boston – to initiate rumours and that the reports collected as evidence of successful circulation represented the beginning, not the end, of that process. In the climate of secrecy that surrounded much propaganda work, this is by no means impossible. Equally, it may just have been coincidence. SO1/PWE directives for WRUL Boston gave general policy guidelines rather than specific instructions. Meanwhile, ONA had foreign representatives, albeit partly paid for by BSC, who could therefore have picked up the rumours as news just as was hoped.65 It was not just American media sources that were used to monitor the spread of rumours. Hungary’s Esti Kurir, Canada’s Montreal Gazette, France’s L’Action Fran¸caise and L’Œuvre and Switzerland’s Arberaten all published stories based upon PWE rumours, as did Great Britain’s Sunday Express, Daily Herald, Evening

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Standard and Evening News. Similarly, non-American radio stations provided some information, such as Radio Zeesen, the Radio Journal de Paris and Germanlanguage broadcasts from Moscow. Reports from SIS and SOE agents abroad, and postal and telegraphic intercepts, could also be used to assess rumour-mongering. For example S/288, which concerned the attempted assassination of Laval, was reported by ‘our agent in Tangiers’. The agent apparently knew it was a rumour, but had heard it in Tangiers – showing the rumour had spread there from its starting point. Similarly an agent sent to initiate rumours reported that they had been repeated to him before he had done anything – proving a degree of circulation and indicating that rumours were given more than one starting point. Postal and telegraphic intercepts included a message from Switzerland to Devon reporting the substance of S/672, that in Alsace wearing berets or speaking French were offences carrying serious punishment; and a letter sent from France to New York opened by Bermuda censorship authorities mentioned S/795, that the Vichy Minister of Food had been imprisoned because of his black market involvement. Sometimes, letters to other sources – such as the BBC or WRUL Boston – also mentioned rumours.

Conclusion Because of its secretive nature, it is more difficult to draw conclusions about the contribution made by black or clandestinely distributed white or grey propaganda than openly disseminated white propaganda. It generated less feedback than white propaganda and, besides, truly black material did not reveal its origin, preventing the possibility of feedback, beyond comments which might occur in letters sent to a third party, or as asides in interviews etc. Similarly, the available evidence does not allow detailed conclusions to be drawn about the content of black propaganda. It is fair to assume that because of the prevalence of aerial leaflets or specially prepared versions of aerial leaflets among printed black propaganda, the direction taken was consistent with British white propaganda. In terms of strictly black propaganda material, the content did not have to fit into the more general pattern of British propaganda precisely because its origins were hidden, so consistency was not the issue it was for white propaganda. As far as the content of the broadcasts made by the RUs is concerned, these were also free of the considerations that affected the BBC, and the available evidence shows their content fitted with larger British propaganda aims and objectives. In general, PWE’s continuing use of the various forms of black and clandestine propaganda throughout the war suggests that the propagandists considered it worth doing. What black leaflet propaganda lacked in quantity was made up for by the accuracy or efficacy of the distribution. Even if, for example, those who delivered leaflets only put them through letterboxes chosen at random in a street chosen at random, this was superior to aerial dissemination, which might drop

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leaflets in inaccessible places. Neither method could guarantee that the leaflet would be read, but a leaflet delivered using the black technique was far more likely to reach its intended target. Rumours are just as difficult to assess: some of those launched by PWE were circulated widely enough to be reported as news, which suggests that they were believed by the news-gathering agencies. But did they serve to dent the morale of the Germans or raise that of the French people? It can be concluded only that the conditions had been created for that to happen. Black leaflets, including the distribution of white leaflets using black techniques, also had a potentially disruptive effect on the Germans or Vichy authorities, because they suggested that they were perhaps the product of a resistance organisation, had been distributed via a particular company whose envelopes had apparently been used, or were even the product of official German or Vichy organisations. This might provoke efforts to find the perpetrator. Similarly, if a rumour was sufficiently circulated it might spark an investigation to determine if it was true or not. Diversion of personnel to such duties would be disruptive both for the investigators and their suspects, while ultimately wasteful. The contribution made by PWE’s black radio stations broadcasting to France is more easily assessed. All of the RUs had, at one time or another, an audience that was generally favourable, although none had universal appeal. The fact that the Germans and the Vichy authorities prepared counterpropaganda material attacking these stations, and jammed them, shows they saw the stations as a threat; by jamming them they were also diminishing their capacity to jam the BBC. They might also have had a disruptive effect similar to leaflets and rumours, though less so and only indirectly, for example in encouraging the Vichy or German authorities to try to stop the fictitious resistance organisations that were claimed to exist, rather than to stop the RUs themselves, as radio-location should have revealed to the authorities, at least, that these stations were not what they seemed. As the RUs were being closed down by the British, one observation was that ‘people have never treated clandestine stations very seriously’. If that meant, as another witness had stated eighteen months earlier, that people ‘listened more for fun than anything else’, the RUs were at the very least raising morale. The impact cannot be measured, but the raising of morale was itself an aim of propaganda.66

Conclusion

Machinery Prior to the formation of the Political Warfare Executive in September 1941, the system for the production of propaganda was disorganised. The British experience of propaganda during the First World War had been an important influence, both in providing an organisational model and in defining inter-war attitudes towards propaganda. When the Committee for Imperial Defence initiated propaganda planning in 1935, it was hampered by the generally negative perception of propaganda, as well as by the fact that those who had fought to maintain the vestiges of British propaganda machinery since 1918 made their own, conflicting, arrangements. Thus, when war broke out in September 1939, Department EH, the enemy propaganda section, found itself briefly responsible to the Ministry of Information, which expected to run all propaganda directly, and was not anticipating the involvement of other agencies. In any case, Department EH was soon taken under Foreign Office control. Meanwhile, although the MOI had control over all BBC broadcasting, Department EH also provided guidance to the BBC. Another Foreign Office department, the Political Intelligence Department, was increasingly assisting Department EH, while Section D of SIS also had an interest in propaganda. The situation changed suddenly in the summer of 1940, after the fall of France and the German occupation of Western Europe. This expanded the propaganda task, raising questions about propaganda policy towards the newly occupied states which required time to answer, and provoking the first in a series of reorganisations that were intended to resolve the deficiencies of the propaganda system. Department EH was transformed into SO1 in July 1940, but control of propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied countries was not centralised – responsibility for the BBC remained with the MOI. When an attempt was made to bring BBC European broadcasting under SO1’s control, the MOI countered by demanding SO1’s control of aerial leaflets for itself. Either outcome would have improved matters by bringing together the major methods of disseminating British white propaganda, but neither plan was accepted. A feud arose which led to SO1’s transformation into the Political Warfare Executive during the summer of 1941. With PWE there came, finally, control of the BBC’s European Services, a move strengthened in February 1942 by the appointment of Kirkpatrick, BBC Controller (European Services) to the PWE Policy Committee. Unitary control of propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied countries, which should ideally have emerged from pre-war planning, had taken two years to come about.

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The core of the department for propaganda to enemy and enemy-occupied countries remained the same, carrying over from EH to SO1 to PWE; but the increasing workload after the summer of 1940 had to be split manageably. A combination of division (often on regional lines but with task-defined sections where appropriate) and separation (particularly of black propaganda operations) was introduced. Both methods required good coordination to prevent disparate sections becoming isolated and producing contradictory output. Centralised functions were sometimes introduced, for example in planning and production, but an effective, centralised planning section was not created until the summer of 1942, nearly a year after the creation of PWE itself. The propagandists’ relationship with the BBC continued to be problematic, as the latter had become accustomed to the laissez-faire approach taken by those overseeing foreign broadcasting before PWE became responsible, while the BBC tried to maintain its independence throughout the war. It was not until the middle of the war that the internal organisation was largely stabilised, and only then had a propaganda organisation been created approaching the ideal, centralised structure that should have been the product of the pre-war planning. In short, British propaganda machinery was not as efficient or well organised as it might have been, and certainly not before the formation of PWE in September 1941.

Method The distribution methods and their effectiveness in ensuring how widely propaganda was received is perhaps the most crucial area of all: no matter how good the propaganda itself, without the means of delivery it could have no impact. Overall, the propagandists regarded their output as ‘an entity giving a full and on the whole well-balanced picture of the war’ but it was no such thing for the French if they did not receive the leaflets and broadcasts intended for them. In respect of leaflets, at least, this issue was a weak link in the operation. Some of this weakness arose from factors beyond British control, but much of it was the responsibility of the British themselves.1 Massive quantities of white propaganda leaflets were dropped, but the RAF never achieved an even distribution across France or met the targets that the propagandists gave them. This was partly because the main leaflet carriers were Bomber Command’s Operational Training Units, whose aircraft and experience did not enable them to fly to southern France and back safely, and partly because Bomber Command rarely allowed regular squadrons to undertake nickelling except as a secondary part of another operation. Within the northern half of France, where the OTUs could roam fairly freely, there was a bias towards areas closer to England. Even when the targets were within range, the aircrews could not always find them, or deliberately chose to drop their leaflets somewhere else. With BBC broadcasting, the picture was different. Whereas with leaflets the British could have improved the distribution, many of the difficulties associated

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with the successful reception of BBC broadcasts were outside British control. In theory, BBC signals could be picked up everywhere in France, and investment in a programme of construction that more than quintupled the number of transmitters by the end of the war can only have improved matters. But the potential audience had to have radio receiver equipment and many French households did not. This was something that the British could do nothing about. Nor, beyond issuing advice, could they combat the problem of obtaining spare parts and replacement sets, whether new or used, supplies of which were depleted by Germany’s war needs. This does not, however, devalue the BBC’s contribution. Radio broadcasting was an important means of communicating with a sizeable part of the French population. Because of the limitations of the aircraft assigned for leafleting and the diminution of signal strength with distance, the potential influence of leaflets and BBC broadcasts was stronger in northern France. Short of an even more massive increase in transmitter strength, little could be done to increase the reception of BBC broadcasting, but more could have been achieved with leaflets. While it is true that Bomber Command’s resources were not underused and doing more with leaflets would have required reassignment to nickelling duties, Harris especially was actively obstructive towards any policy that diverted attention from the strategic bombing of Germany. The distribution of black propaganda is rather more difficult to assess. By comparison with white propaganda dropped from the air, the quantity of propaganda material distributed in France using black means was much smaller, but item for item this material must have been more effective because it was disseminated more accurately. If SOE pushed a leaflet through a letterbox, it had a better chance of being read than a leaflet dropped from an aircraft. PWE’s clandestine broadcasting stations certainly had listeners, but their coverage and audience size cannot be determined to the same extent as it can with the BBC. Rumours, the third form of black propaganda, had no white equivalent. That the evidence shows that some were reported as news does indicate that they had a certain circulation.

Message It might be thought from the confused state of the machinery that its output would also be confused. But in practice the output of a machine is not necessarily the sum of its parts. The main elements of British white propaganda to France, aerial leaflets and BBC broadcasting, certainly put out messages that were largely complementary in their content. Both before and after the creation of PWE there is evidence of consistency of message in handling such challenges as the defeat of France and the British attack on the French fleet; the USSR and the USA before and after their entries into the war; British bombing of targets in France and Germany; and the invasions of North Africa, Sicily and France. Elements of propaganda planning, the use of a sympathetic and friendly tone, and general

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themes that were considered to be important, such as expressing a certainty in Allied victory, remained constant. Black propaganda, by its nature, did not reveal its origins and therefore any lack of consistency, although potentially damaging in a limited context, would not destroy the credibility of British propaganda as a whole. Nonetheless, there was coordination between the various different forms of black propaganda and as senior propagandists knew about both black and white output they were in a position to coordinate them. On the whole, this is what happened.2

Reaction The reactions of the French people and the authorities in France to British propaganda are telling. Leaflets and broadcasts were further circulated within France, whether by word of mouth, in their original forms or as typed copies, using schemes ranging from simple distribution among a close circle through to cunning methods designed to outwit the authorities, and special efforts were made to obtain or distribute the propaganda message. These activities demonstrate the value that recipients placed upon British propaganda because, facing stiff penalties, they risked a great deal in undertaking them. Similarly, the lengths to which the German and Vichy authorities went to minimise or prevent contact with British propaganda, and to create counterpropaganda, indicates the danger they perceived in it. In particular, German and Vichy use in counterpropaganda of styles similar to British productions shows that they considered them to be effective and that they believed that enough French people had access to British propaganda to make it a recognisable format. Every new Vichy or German attempt to overcome British propaganda was also an admission of defeat, showing that their previous measures had not worked.

Evaluating British Propaganda to France, 1940–4 Any nation at war, unless actively seeking self-immolation (as Hitler intended for Nazi Germany as defeat approached), must realistically aim for an end to the conflict that is both favourable and achievable. Any reasonable method that can assist that aim is of use. In the Second World War, a total war that brought entire societies into the conflict, propaganda was one such method, far less ludicrous than some of the other schemes that were conceived to help end the war. Propaganda had the potential to do what was intended of it, albeit not as universally as might have been hoped or expected. General Eisenhower, the Allied Supreme Commander, could have said no more about Operation Overlord prior to initiating it on D-Day. Overlord’s contribution can be easily assessed. Propaganda’s role in the Allied victory cannot be, but at the same time it risked a great deal less. What could propaganda do? For the British, victory in the Second World War required the defeat of Nazi Germany. After the fall of France this meant, first,

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resisting any German invasion of Great Britain, then harassing and weakening the enemy, and finally mounting an invasion of Europe. If the goodwill of the French people could be directed towards the Allies – or at the very least away from the Germans – this would make the process easier and more likely to succeed. Propaganda could help achieve this. It could not force people to take action; it could only help to induce a frame of mind in which action might be taken. As Briggs comments, ‘for many people [. . .] listening to the BBC was the first act of resistance’. The same can also be said of picking up and reading a leaflet.3 Listening to the BBC was widespread and passing on its news common; it is less easy to gauge how many helped distribute leaflet propaganda. Regardless of the content of broadcast news and leaflets, passing it on gave those involved a sense of community, a sense of inclusiveness against the German invaders and those who collaborated with them. That British propaganda gave them this satisfaction was perhaps its most important contribution. It was a starting point from which further participation in Allied victory might come, whether it was simply to follow the Allies’ instructions, or to take more active measures. Paniguian believed that the BBC ‘played a major role in shaping French resistance. It has in fact entered the gateway of French history’ while overall ‘our propaganda has achieved a tremendous result – it has sustained the morale of 40-million people and it has frustrated the enemy’s formidable and at times adroit efforts to dishearten and demoralise the French nation’. Similarly, Fairlie argued, ‘radio was the outstanding contribution of PWE’, having an effect that the French claimed ‘cannot be overestimated’. Resistance groups acknowledged ‘their debt to the British radio for its assistance in preparing and discipling [sic] the French people for the liberation’.4 These are large claims that cannot be fully substantiated, although they are indicative of what might have been achieved. The French could be roughly divided into those who were one, some or all of pro-Vichy, pro-German and anti-British; those who were one, some or all of anti-German, anti-Vichy, proBritish or pro-Free French; and those in the middle, undecided. Propaganda could have an effect on all three groups. It could boost the morale of those friendly towards the Allies, assuring their participation by reminding them that Allied victory would create a future free of Nazi domination and explaining to them the necessity of Allied acts of war against France and her colonies in winning the war. The Allies would receive no assistance from people who did not believe such a victory was possible or deserved but, having achieved this, propaganda could suggest what they could do to help. Propaganda could attack the morale of those who opposed the Allies. If the German occupying forces or the French people collaborating with them became less confident of Axis victory and Allied defeat, not only because of the content of propaganda itself but also because its delivery demonstrated the Allies’ strength and access to resources, their willingness to fight against an Allied invasion would be weakened. Propaganda could have most effect on the undecided – the vast majority – and the balance of probability is that some were persuaded by British propaganda to adopt a pro-Allied frame of mind. If that meant they did whatever they could to hamper the Germans and aid

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the Allies – for example doing poor work in factories producing material for the Germans, hampering their defensive abilities; sheltering Allied airmen, assisting them to return to the fight; or becoming involved in more active resistance which might directly impede German reactions to the invasion, perhaps shortening the war by a few days or saving a few lives – then propaganda was a useful activity. Propaganda was a costly enterprise. Some costs can never be quantified: the contribution the propagandists might have made if otherwise employed; the impact the diversion of aircraft for leaflet dropping had on the strategic bombing offensive; and whether the transmitters used for radio propaganda might have been better used for another task. Other costs, if the records allowed, could be added up: staff salaries and overheads, and fuel used by aircraft dropping leaflets and by the generators powering the transmitters. Finally, there are some known costs. Parliament provided £36.5 million to the BBC between 1940 and 1945, largely to pay for foreign broadcasting, including the French Service. Based on the figures given in Chapter 5, total operating costs of the transmitters for the French RUs were at least £15,100. PWE also spent perhaps £3–5 million on leaflet production between 1939 and 1945. Thirty-four aircraft were lost undertaking leaflet dissemination, at a human cost of seventy Allied airmen killed and twentytwo who became prisoners of war. At home, one engineer died in a transmitter accident, while overwork contributed to illness and death among PWE’s staff. On the other hand, these costs must be set against the total cost of the war, £4 billion in ‘external disinvestment’ and 355,000 Britons killed at home and abroad.5 The propaganda campaign also had benefits beyond what it was expected to achieve. Like many of the costs, these benefits are unquantifiable. Leaflet operations were useful for training new aircrews to work together, giving them purposeful operational experience over enemy territory, and allowing them to collect reconnaissance information. They provided cover for other airborne activities, such as dropping SOE agents into France. Propaganda could also contribute to other areas of the war effort, such as deception operations to cover Allied activities, or by providing a safe method of communications with the resistance, protecting clandestine wireless operators from discovery. Propaganda also created costs for the German and Vichy authorities. Many man-hours and other resources must have been employed in collecting leaflets, trying to stop people listening to the BBC, running jamming stations, preparing counterpropaganda in both broadcast and leaflet forms, and trying to find those responsible for material purporting to come from inside France. The German and Vichy commitment to jamming prevented them from using these frequencies themselves, limiting the quantity of their radio propaganda output. The confiscation of sets, while achieving the aim of preventing their use to receive British propaganda, also prevented them from being used to receive German or Vichy material. It is impossible to state exactly what the resources directed against British propaganda could have achieved had they been used elsewhere, but the fact that they were not must have been detrimental to the enemy’s war effort. Propaganda did, therefore, play a part, whether making a contribution as a persuasive force, for its nuisance value, or its pretext for other activities, whether

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directly assisting the Allied cause or encouraging a German or Vichy reaction that was indirectly beneficial. The cost of the outlay, while not insignificant, was hardly great. It was a well-directed use of resources and an important part of the British war effort. Harris’s suggestion, that the only thing leaflet propaganda provided was toilet paper, was typically provocative. Leaflets were almost certainly used for that purpose – indeed, the German and Vichy authorities suggested that they should be. But, the constraints of war limiting the availability of everyday items, merely having something to use as toilet paper would have been good for morale. The propagandists would have been happy with that.

Appendix: Maps

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

France by département and town Population of France by département Leaflet dissemination, July–December 1940 Leaflet dissemination, 1941 Leaflet dissemination, 1942 Leaflet dissemination, 1943 Leaflet dissemination, January–April 1944 Evidence of reception, leaflets, 1941 Evidence of reception, leaflets, 1942 Evidence of reception, leaflets, 1943 Evidence of reception, leaflets, 1944 Evidence of reception, BBC, June–December 1940 Evidence of reception, BBC, 1941 Evidence of reception, BBC, 1942 Evidence of reception, BBC, 1943 Evidence of reception, BBC, January–October 1944

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Map 1 France by département and town

appendix: maps

Map 2 Population of France by département

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Map 3 Leaflet dissemination, July–December 1940

appendix: maps

Map 4 Leaflet dissemination, 1941

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168



appendix: maps


169

170


Map 7 Leaflet dissemination, January–April 1944

appendix: maps

Map 8 Evidence of reception, leaflets, 1941

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172



appendix: maps


173

174



appendix: maps

Map 12 Evidence of reception, BBC, June–December 1940

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Map 13 Evidence of reception, BBC, 1941

appendix: maps


177

178



appendix: maps

Map 16 Evidence of reception, BBC, January–October 1944

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Notes

In order to minimise the number of notes, I have usually combined references so that a single note appears at the end of a paragraph, rather than placing several notes scattered throughout it: there are one or two exceptions where a comment in the note precludes my adopting this method. Short-title formats are used throughout: full references can be found in the bibliography. Where a chapter relies on three or four sources to which I refer often, I open the appropriate section of notes with a short statement listing them and the appropriate page references, and do not mention that source again in that chapter’s notes unless I quote directly from it. With regard to referencing propaganda leaflets and BBC scripts, particularly within Chapter 3, even where I directly quote from them, I give a general reference explaining where these items will be found unless otherwise stated in the notes.

Preface 1. Cumulative leaflet statistics 1939–45, The National Archives of the UK (NA): PRO FO 898/457; Briggs, War of Words, p. 440; Baker White, The Big Lie, p. 56. 2. Cumulative statistics, NA: PRO FO 898/457; Briggs, War of Words, pp. 440, 481–3; Howe, Black Game, pp. 267–71; Keeble to Bruce Lockhart, 6.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/433; Paulu, British Broadcasting, p. 415. 3. Harris, Bomber Offensive, p. 36; Fairlie, ‘PWE White Propaganda to France, 1940– 1944’, NA: PRO FO 898/420.

Introduction 1. Moore, ‘The First of Billions – An Historic Document’, pp. 126–7; Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries (henceforth BCWD), p. 21; Garnett, Secret History of PWE, pp. 11–13; Anon., Complete Index, pp. 6, 39. 2. Shennan, Fall of France, pp. 27–41; Weinberg, World at Arms, p. 142; Pronay, ‘The News Media at War’, p. 175; Foot, SOE in France, pp. 1–8; Chiefs of Staff paper, November 1941, quoted in Dallas Brooks, ‘The Importance of Leaflet Dissemination’, 24.4.1942, NA: PRO AIR 20/4197. 3. Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, p. 135; Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 107. 4. De Gaulle, Call to Honour:Documents, pp. 11–12; Briggs, Golden Age, p. 601; Briggs, War of Words, pp. 164, 218, 221; ‘British Broadcasting Service to Europe’, 31.8.1940, BBC Written Archives Centre (BBC WAC) E2/206/1. 5. Burrin, France under the Germans, pp. 87–8; Jackson, Charles De Gaulle, p. 13; Bell, ‘Entente Broken and Renewed’, p. 231; Bell, France and Britain, p. 246.

notes

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6. Bell, ‘Breakdown of the Alliance’, pp. 214–15. 7. Gilbert, Second World War, pp. 99, 107–8; Bell, ‘Breakdown of the Alliance’, pp. 217, 220; Bell, ‘Entente Broken and Renewed’, pp. 231–2; Thomas, Britain and Vichy, pp. 88, 119; Jackson, France, pp. 146, 176–7; Melka, ‘Darlan Between Britain and Germany’, pp. 57, 61; Ousby, Occupation, p. 74. 8. Keegan, Second World War, pp. 51, 308–9. 9. Sutton to Brooks, 23.6.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/444; PWE Plan of Political Warfare up to Spring 1942, 18.11.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/303.

Chapter 1 In addition to the sources referenced below, this chapter draws on Garnett, Secret History of PWE, pp. xvii, 2, 6, 9–10, 13–20, 22, 27–8, 36–7, 49–51, 53, 62–73, 76–9, 81–6, 100, 119– 20, 122, 124–31, 133, 136, 150–62, 169–70, 185–7, 190–2, 211, 214–17, 219, 225–9, 234, 264, 275–6, 278, 308–9, 329–31, 336, 338–40, 351, 354–64, 375–8, 406–7, 413, 430–1, 460; Briggs, War of Words, 6, 10, 23, 33, 85–6, 163–4, 222–8, 231, 237, 250, 252, 312–13, 333–43, 379–81, 382–5, 401–4, 408, 411–15, 610, 616; and Cruickshank, Fourth Arm, pp. 12–13, 17, 22, 32–6, 38–9, 43, 65, 103–4, 123. A compilation of the leaflet dissemination data is available in Brooks, ‘British Propaganda to France, 1940–1944’, Annexe I, a PDF version of which is available online at www.eup.ed.ac.uk. 1. Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 7, 18–21, 37, 41, 54; Haste, Keep the Home Fires Burning, p. 31; Taylor, ‘The Foreign Office’, p. 877; Sanders, ‘Wellington House’, pp. 119–21; Buitenhuis, Great War of Words, p. xv. 2. Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 30, 34, 49–53; Sanders, ‘Wellington House’, p. 122; Taylor, ‘The Foreign Office’, pp. 880–4. 3. Buitenhuis, Great War of Words, p. 134; Taylor, ‘The Foreign Office’, pp. 875–93; McEwen, ‘Northcliffe and Lloyd George’, p. 670; Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 72, 90–1, 135, 210–11; Sanders, ‘Wellington House’, pp. 127–8; Jolly, ‘Ungentlemanly Warfare, Part One’, p. 151; Haste, Keep the Home Fires Burning, p. 40. 4. Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 135–6, 211–15; Anon., ‘First World War Leaflets’, pp. 46–7; Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 107; Balfour, Propaganda in War, p. 4; Jolly, ‘Ungentlemanly Warfare, Part 1’, p. 151. Sanders and Taylor spell Courrier with a single ‘r’, the only use of this spelling I have seen. 5. Stuart, Secrets of Crewe House, p. 236; Lutz, ‘Bibliographical Article’, p. 509; Tallents’s Memorandum, 7.11.1938, NA: PRO FO 898/1; Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 5, 66. 6. Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 63–5; Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 106–21; Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 107. 7. Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 64, 66–7, 79; Bell, ‘British Political Warfare’, pp. 8–9. 8. Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 67–77. 9. Fisher to Reith, 27.10.1936, BBC WAC R34/258; McLaine, Ministry of Morale, pp. 12–16; Bell, ‘British Political Warfare’, pp. 27–8; Elkes, ‘Political Warfare Executive’, p. 281; Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 116–20. 10. Taylor, British Propaganda, p. 118; Bell, ‘British Political Warfare’, p. 39. 11. Foot, SOE in France, p. 2; Mackenzie, Secret History of SOE, pp. 4, 34; Philby, My Secret War, p. 42; Bell, ‘British Political Warfare’, p. 47.

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12. Briggs, Golden Age, p. 579; Briggs, The BBC, p. 179. 13. Black, Organising the Propaganda Instrument, p. 7; Stuart, ‘Meeting with the Services’, 13.11.1939, NA: PRO FO 898/6; Tallents’s memorandum, 7.11.1938, NA: PRO FO 898/1; Graves’s report, 29.3.1939, BBC WAC R34/258; Briggs, Golden Age, p. 601. 14. Briggs, Golden Age, pp. 583, 610; Bartlett, I Know What I Liked, p. 133; Stuart, Opportunity Knocks Once, p. 190; Pimlott (ed.), Diary of Hugh Dalton (henceforth Dalton Diary), p. 51. Bartlett recalls how those reporting to the Sugar Loaf were supposed to do so in the strictest secrecy, telling nobody, but the receptionist greeted him with, ‘You’re another of those cloak and dagger fellows?’ So much for secrecy! 15. Bartlett, I Know What I Liked, p. 133; Barman, Diplomatic Correspondent, p. 94; Stuart, Opportunity Knocks Once, pp. 186, 191; Elkes, ‘Political Warfare Executive’, p. 275; Aldgate and Richards, Britain Can Take It, p. 189. Stuart was criticised for appointing Coward. To the suggestion of dropping leaflets containing speeches by Chamberlain and Halifax, Coward responded that ‘there was not going to be time to bore the enemy to death’. 16. Balfour, Propaganda in War, pp. 89–92, 512; Howe, Black Game, p. 42n; Delmer, Black Boomerang, p. 34. After the ‘real’ PID was disbanded in April 1943, PWE continued to use PID as a cover name, while after May 1945 PWE operated openly as PID. As Balfour notes, ‘this has proved a trap for uninitiated writers!’, confusing some historians writing on the subject. 17. Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 18; Balfour, Propaganda in War, pp. 89–90; BBC– MOI interview, 23.4.1940, BBC WAC R34/258. 18. Stenton, ‘British Propaganda’, p. 45; Balfour, Propaganda in War, p. 91. 19. Anon., Complete Index, pp. 3, 6–8, 12, 38–9; Keegan, Second World War, pp. 37–8, 71. The Complete Index dates the first Danish leaflet to February 1940, which must be a typographical error. 20. Stenton, Radio London, pp. 20–1. 21. Stuart, Opportunity Knocks Once, p. 196; Young (ed.), Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, II: 1939–1965 (henceforth RBL Diaries), p. 66; Elkes, ‘Political Warfare Executive’, p. 58; Foot, SOE, p. 22; Balfour, Propaganda in War, p. 90; Rhodes, Propaganda, p. 109. 22. Crossman, ‘Relations of Broadcasting to Subversive Propaganda’, 1.10.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/3; Pimlott (ed.), Dalton Diary, pp. 51–2, 70–2, 108–14; Leslie Illingworth, ‘Let Me Throw It!’, reference ILW0164, University of Kent Cartoon Centre Catalogue. 23. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp. 116–17; War Cabinet Committee on Foreign (Allied) Resistance, 10.3.1941, NA: PRO ADM 116/4448; Pimlott (ed.), Dalton Diary, pp. xxiii, 124, 188. 24. Unsigned memorandum, 19.5.1941, NA: PRO CAB 118/70; Pimlott, Hugh Dalton, pp. 331–2; Stuart, Opportunity Knocks Once, p. 186. Cruickshank, in Fourth Arm, p. 24, incorrectly reverses responsibilities, listing Brooks as MEW representative and Leeper as MOI representative. Roberts, introducing Garnett’s Secret History of PWE, p. xii, somehow makes the same mistake. Garnett gets it right. 25. Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, pp. 287–8; Dalton, Fateful Years, p. 378; Pimlott, Hugh Dalton, pp. 321–3; Gladwyn, Memoirs, p. 102. That Dalton chose Leeper, the most important Executive Committee member, to represent MEW, despite disliking him, is indicative of Dalton’s desire to control SO1. 26. Executive Committee’s Proposals for the Organisation and Conduct of Political Warfare, August 1941, NA: PRO FO 898/10; Pimlott (ed.), Dalton Diary, pp. xxv, 268–9

notes

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35.

36.

37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

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and Dalton to Eden and Bracken, 20.8.1941, Dalton Papers 18/2 (21), quoted therein; Balfour, Propaganda in War, p. 92; Hansard, 374 HC DEB 5S, cols 293–4. Bell, ‘British Political Warfare’, p. 78; Pimlott, Hugh Dalton, p. 333. Young (ed.), RBL Diaries, p. 119; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p. 153; Boyle, Poor, Dear Brendan, p. 286. Kirkpatrick, Inner Circle, pp. 148–50; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p. 127. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp. 330–1; Young (ed.), RBL Diaries, p. 381; Leeper, When Greek Meets Greek, pp. 1–2; Stenton, Radio London, pp. 45, 49. Howe, Black Game, pp. 267–72; Anon., Complete Index, pp. 21, 31; Young (ed.), RBL Diaries, pp. 332, 501; Strong, Intelligence at the Top, p. 221. Planning and Broadcasting Committee, 17.8.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/8; Regional Leaflet Committee, 20.3.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/428; Stenton, Radio London, p. 416; leaflets F.50/12, F.50/27a, F.50/35, all 1941, British Library collection BS 14/1004. Stenton, ‘British Propaganda’, pp. 15, 30; Bell, ‘British Political Warfare’, p. 82; ‘Regular Contacts between the BBC Overseas Division and the M.of.I. and F.O.’, 27.11.1940, BBC WAC R34/258; Briggs, War of Words, pp. 30, 30n., 227. Briggs, War of Words, pp. 33, 402; Bell, ‘British Political Warfare’, pp. 101–2. Law to Strang, 6.1.1941, NA: PRO FO 371/28428; Briggs, The BBC, pp. 196–7; Delmer, Black Boomerang, p. 82; Mullally, ‘Top of the Vox Pops’, p. 43. The V campaign spread as far as Greece, where ‘V’s were cut from paper and put on the seats of German staff cars (Farran, Winged Dagger, p. 118). Stenton, ‘British Propaganda’, p. 34; Cornick, ‘The BBC and the Propaganda War’, p. 336; Briggs, The BBC, pp. 197–8. There was no revolution in Vichy at any point during the war; but there was an anti-German protest in Paris on 11 November 1940. Cornick reports an interview given fifty years after the events and does not elaborate on the discrepancy. Briggs, War of Words, p. 10; Bell, ‘British Political Warfare’, p. 93; Cornick, ‘The BBC and the Propaganda War’, p. 328. The correlation between domestic and foreign material was important, as Germany did have knowledge of events in Great Britain (and vice versa). Germany had no espionage capability in Great Britain after 1939, but was able to gather openly available information. According to Boyle, British and German aircraft met regularly and unofficially at Lisbon airport, to exchange the latest domestic newspapers. Similarly, Barman reports that in the First World War two boats met in the middle of the North Sea (Boyle, ‘A Timely Lesson in Propaganda’, p. 21; Barman, Diplomatic Correspondent, pp. 118–19). Young (ed.), RBL Diaries, pp. 237, 272; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp. 239, 247. Howe, Black Game, pp. 40–1, 51. Stephens, ‘PWE Headquarters’, 17.4.42, NA: PRO FO 898/11. Delmer, Black Boomerang, pp. 168–9; Bartlett, I Know What I Liked, p. 135; Elkes, ‘Political Warfare Executive’, p. 81. Elkes, ‘Political Warfare Executive’, p. 74; Stenton, ‘British Propaganda’, p. 13n. BCWD, p. 28; Richards, Royal Air Force, I, pp. 411–12; Delve, Source Book, pp. 165–206; Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, I, map between pp. 134–5; MOI Policy Committee, 20, 24, 25.6.1940 and 4.7.1940, BBC WAC R34/473/2; Planning and Broadcasting Committee, 20.8.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/8; Stenton, ‘British Propaganda’, p. 44. On 12/13 January 1940, when the first leaflets were delivered to Prague, French airfields were used. From British soil, the flight entailed

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45. 46.

47. 48.

49.

50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55.

56.

57.

british propaganda to france, 1940--1944 a 1,600 mile round trip, out of range of all Bomber Command’s aircraft except the Wellington IC. Lord President of the Council’s Memorandum, 19.7.1940, reproduced in Mackenzie, Secret History of SOE, pp. 753–5. Leeper’s Committee, 7 and 21.9.1940, 19 and 26.10.1940, and SO1 Plan of Organisation, 18.2.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/9; Proposed plan of organisation of PWE, undated, but probably August 1941, NA: PRO FO 898/10; Stephens, ‘PWE Headquarters’, NA: PRO FO 898/11; Cruickshank, Fourth Arm, p. 32; Cornick, ‘The BBC and the Propaganda War’, p. 337; Stenton, Radio London, p. 102. Howe, Black Game, p. 87; Leeper’s Committee, 21.9.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/9. Howe, Black Game, pp. 41, 194–5. Garnett’s Secret History of PWE, p. 128, dates Delmer’s appointment as Director of Special Operations to June 1944. By contrast Jolly states that the Directorate was created in December 1943, but does not give a source; I have seen no evidence supporting his dating nor is it conceivable that anyone other than Delmer would have been placed in charge of such a Directorate (Jolly, ‘Ungentlemanly Warfare, Part 1’, p. 150). Howe, Black Game, p. 2; Delmer, Black Boomerang, pp. 86–7, 186–7; Delmer, ‘H. M. G.’s Secret Pornographer’, p. 64; Bell, ‘British Political Warfare’, p. 83; Stenton, ‘British Propaganda’, p. 45. Delmer recalls how GS1’s activities nearly caused a scandal when Sir Stafford Cripps, having received a copy of one such script, told Eden that ‘if this is the sort of thing we have to do to win the war, I would rather lose it!’ Bruce Lockhart talked him round. Howe, Black Game, p. 2; Beck to Bowes-Lyon, 19.2.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66. Leeper’s Committee, 19.10.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/9; ‘Black Propaganda’, 17.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/61; Adams to Stewart, 2.8.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/51; Report on black propaganda, undated but probably July 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/64; Howe, Black Game, pp. 78–9, 86–8, 267–72. To celebrate Christmas 1940, Radio Inconnue and Radio Travail, the two French RUs then operating – purportedly in different parts of France – planned a joint broadcast, which would have revealed that neither station was what it claimed. Fortunately the broadcast was prevented and stricter security arrangements were put in place. Leeper’s Committee, 2.11.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/9; Draft Paper, unsigned but probably by Howe, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/61; Howe, Black Game, pp. 11–18. Howe to Vischer, ‘French Black Propaganda’, 13.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66. Dalton, Fateful Years, p. 378; Barman, Diplomatic Correspondent, p. 110; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p. 169. Central Directive, 30.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/289; Central Directive Annexes, 20.2.1945, NA: PRO FO 898/287; Bowes-Lyon, ‘Leaflet Production Procedure’, 27.7.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/458. Howe, Black Game, p. 40; Leaflet Report, 4.1.1941–11.1.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/9; Meeting at CHQ , 20.12.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/5; Weekly Report on RAF Leaflets and Black Propaganda, 15.11.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/63; Keeble to Bruce Lockhart, 6.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/433; Holman, ‘Airborne Culture’, p. 199. Holman states ‘a key figure in the design and production of Allied leaflets was Ellic Howe’. While Howe’s capabilities were crucial to black production, he was not involved in white production, which was a much larger concern and is the main thrust of Holman’s chapter. Holman should have acknowledged Keeble. Elkes makes a similar mistake, crediting Howe’s production unit with the creation of ‘the majority’ of PWE’s black and white propaganda and also claiming that Howe’s unit, like Keeble’s,

notes

58.

59.

60. 61. 62.

63.

64.

65.

66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

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was based in Woburn (Holman, ‘Airborne Culture’, p. 194; Elkes, ‘Political Warfare Executive’, p. 89). Meeting at CHQ , 20.12.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/5; Bowes-Lyon, ‘Leaflet Production Procedure’, NA: PRO FO 898/458; Barman memo, 6.3.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66. An anonymous Englishman who returned from France in 1942 – conceivably Lytton – thought the leaflets he had seen ‘may have emanated from Germany, as the general look of the printing had not an English appearance’ (Evidence of Reception Report (EoR) for period ending 31.3.42, NA: PRO FO 898/463). Minister of Information to Chancellor of the Exchequer, undated draft approximately November 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/433; Minister of Information to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 25.11.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/433; Keeble to Bruce Lockhart, 6.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/433; Bruce Lockhart to Bracken, 12.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/433. One alternative was to print the middle pages of the Courrier upside down. ‘Wasted’ paper was pulped and reused, so it was not totally lost. Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 187; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p. 157. Briggs, Golden Age, p. 594; Cornick, ‘The BBC and the Propaganda War’, p. 320; Bell, ‘British Political Warfare’, p. 87. After the liberation of France, BBC broadcasting to France did become ‘wholly British and confined to what is called in propaganda language “the projection of Britain.” ’ (Bruce Lockhart to Harvey, 1.11.1944, NA: PRO FO 371/41911). Hale, Radio Power, p. 55; Newsome, ‘The European Service: Principles and Purposes, Problems and Policy Points’, November 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/41; Bell, ‘British Political Warfare’, pp. 81, 83, 89, 97–8. Garnett, Secret History of PWE, pp. 375–6; Briggs, War of Words, p. 402; WheelerBennett, Special Relationships, p. 155; Kirkpatrick to Mack, 2.5.1941, NA: PRO FO 371/28429. Gillie had been asked in September 1940 to head SO1 French Region, while retaining his BBC position as French Regional Editor. Gillie did both jobs for about a month, during which time he prepared some SO1 policy documents and, using his BBC post as cover, canvassed for recruits for SO1. That combining both posts was considered is indicative of the recognition within SO1 of the need for close coordination; it would also have served to bypass MOI control of the BBC. That it did not happen was in the long run a missed opportunity of the highest order, but it may have been this month of close cooperation that laid the foundations for the successful coordination between the PWE and BBC French Sections (Leeper’s Committee, 14, 21, 28.9.1940, 19.10.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/9). BBC Staff List (December 1942), supplement dated 26.11.1943, p. 38, BBC WAC (open shelves). This did not prevent inadvertent broadcasting of news that later proved false, but in practice the European news provoked few complaints of inaccuracy. Stenton, Radio London, pp. 41–9; Hambro to Bruce Lockhart, 13.1.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/27; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp. 235, 309–10. Garnett, Secret History of PWE, pp. 215, 219. Cruickshank, Deception, pp. 34–5. Cruickshank, Deception, pp. 54–6. Bell, ‘Entente Broken and Renewed’, p. 234; Thomas, Britain and Vichy, pp. 2–3. Eden, The Reckoning, pp. 290, 394, 406, 450, 457, 553; Harvey (ed.), War Diaries, pp. 55, 121, 191; Crawley, De Gaulle, pp. 127–36, 150–7; Bell, ‘Entente Broken and

186

74.

75.

76.

77.

78. 79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

british propaganda to france, 1940--1944 Renewed’, pp. 234, 236; Sainsbury, ‘The Second Wartime Alliance’, pp. 230–1; Sherwood (ed.), White House Papers, pp. 456–66. Memo from A. E. B. (name illegible), 17.7.1940, and Black to AC (Eur.S.), 4.5.1943, BBC WAC E2/9; Duff Cooper to Churchill, 14.2.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/9; Gielgud to Barman, 15.2.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/213; Gillois, Histoire secrète, p. 24. McConnell, At the Sign of the Crane, pp. 34–5; Regional Leaflet Committee, 16.5.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/428; Crawley, De Gaulle, pp. 135–6; Report on Brazzaville transmitter, 28.5.1942, BBC WAC E1/702/3. Gillois, Histoire secrète, p. 287; Holman, ‘The Impact of War’, p. 50; Howe, Black Game, pp. 91–2; Production Reports, weeks ending 14 and 21.1.1943, 25.2.1943, 1.4.1943 and 11.11.1943, Barcelona Press Office General Report 1940–1943, undated, and Beck to Bruce Lockhart, 17.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/66; Paniguian to Leeper, 9.5.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/201; Press Attaché, Barcelona Press Office, to Foreign Division, MOI, 15.1.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/210. Briggs (in War of Words, p. 408) uses the acronym PID, almost certainly falling into the trap identified by Balfour (see Chapter 1, note 16), as a member of PWE would have been more likely to be responsible. Holman, ‘The Impact of War’, p. 50; Paniguian to Keates, 9.2.1943; Soustelle to Keates, 15.2.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/210; Foot, SOE in France, p. 207; Mackenzie, Secret History of SOE, p. 567. Howe, Black Game, p. 268; Crémieux-Brilhac, Les Voix, III, pp. 33, 46; BBC European Services Output Report, 22–28.11.1942, BBC WAC E2/209/1. Winkler, Politics of Propaganda, pp. 1–5, 21–31; Roetter, Psychological Warfare, p. 130; Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, p. 226. The American COI should not be confused with British Central Office of Information (COI), a post-war successor to the MOI. West (ed.), British Security Coordination, pp. xxx, 55, 120; Wheeler-Bennett, Special Relationships, p. 154. References to BSC in Garnett’s Secret History of PWE are blighted with deletions, apparently on national security grounds, for example pp. 121, 135. Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 361; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp. 182, 189; Winkler, Politics of Propaganda, p. 113; Holman, ‘Airborne Culture’, p. 200; Unsigned memorandum, ‘Four Special USA Leaflets’, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/433; Anon., Complete Index, pp. 4, 10, 21, 31, 39; Erdmann, Leaflet Operations, p. 241. Bruce Lockhart says the OWI preparations started in August 1942. Roetter, Psychological Warfare, p. 130; West (ed.), British Security Coordination, pp. 59–65; Weekly French Directive for WRUL, 5.2.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/103. PWE’s view of WRUL is shown by this file’s title – ‘Research Unit New York’. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, p. 232; Roetter, Psychological Warfare, pp. 135–6; Young (ed.), RBL Diaries, p. 258; Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 407; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp. 293–5, 298, 309. A draft agreement between PWE, OWI and PWB (sic) dated 3.4.1944 is at NA: PRO FO 898/433.

Chapter 2 In addition to the references below, this chapter draws on minutes of the Regional Leaflet Committee (22.10.1940, 5 and 21.11.1940, 17.12.1940, 9 and 30.1.1941, 23.5.1941, 5 and 12.9.41, 28.11.1941, 12 and 19.12.1941, 23.2.1942, 2 and 9.3.1942, 6 and 20.4.1942, 11, 18 and 25.5.1942, 7 and 14.9.1942) at NA: PRO FO 898/428; the Air Ministry–PWE

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subcommittee (14.7.1942, 13.10.1942, 17.11.1942, 18.5.1943, 10.8.1943, 14.9.1943, 19.5.1944, 14.7.1944) at NA: PRO FO 898/429; and a series of Progress Reports (weeks ending 10.3.1941, 9 and 23.5.1941, 13.6.1941, 18.7.1941, 1, 8, 22 and 29.8.1941, 24.10.1941, 1 and 8.11.1941) at NA: PRO FO 898/50. 1. Bowes-Lyon, ‘Leaflet Production Procedure’, NA: PRO FO 898/458; Balfour, Propaganda in War, p. 4; Capt. Morris, ‘Distribution of Propaganda by Air, 1914–1918’, NA: PRO AIR 1/678; Garnett, Secret History of PWE, pp. 17, 187. 2. Richards, Royal Air Force, I, p. 53. Hastings, in Das Reich, p. 45, quotes Harris’s superior, the Chief of Air Staff Sir Charles Portal, arguing that ‘the dropping of men dressed in civilian clothes for the purpose of attempting to kill members of the opposing forces is not an operation with which the Royal Air Force should be associated’ as part of an unsuccessful attempt to have SOE personnel dropped in uniform. The RAF’s involvement with SOE may have weakened their hand with regard to the propagandists. 3. Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 128; Bartlett, I Know What I Liked, pp. 134–5; Hansard, 351 HC DEB 5S, cols 567–8; 376 HC DEB 5S, col. 373; 382 HC DEB 5S, cols 19–20; Thomas, Warfare by Words, pp. 39–40; Blackford to AOC-in-C, Bomber Command, 5.1.1940, NA: PRO AIR 14/602. 4. Meeting at the Air Ministry, 4.6.1942, NA: PRO AIR 14/605. 5. Bomber Command Operational Instruction No. 12 to ‘M’ Balloon Unit, 24.9.1939, NA: PRO AIR 14/596; Fighter Command Operational Instruction No. 57/1942, 15.11.1942, NA: PRO AIR 14/605; Hopps to HQ , No. 19 Group Coastal Command, 10.10.1941, NA: PRO AIR 15/490; HQ No. 3 Group to HQ Bomber Command, 23.1.1942; Saundby to HQs, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Groups, 9.2.1942, NA: PRO AIR 14/604; Notes on Leaflet Dissemination, 26.8.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/434; Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 188; Harris, Bomber Offensive, p. 37; Cruickshank, Fourth Arm, p. 85. 6. Steer, ‘Reform of British Wartime Propaganda (Organisation)’, 5.7.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/309; Pamphlet, ‘RAF Against Goebbels’; Brewer to AOC-in-C Bomber Command, 7 and 9.11.1941, NA: PRO AIR 14/604; ‘Why drop Nickels?’, September 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/427; Air Ministry–PWE subcommittee, 10.8.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/429. 7. ‘M’ Balloon Unit Operations Record Book (ORB), entries for November 1942, NA: PRO AIR 29/22; Leaflet Operations, July 1942, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729. 8. Nickels Operations for Quarter ending 31.3.1941, NA: PRO AIR 14/603; Hopps to HQ , No. 19 Group Coastal Command, Appendix, 10.10.1941, NA: PRO AIR 15/490; Ministry of Information, Bomber Command, p. 31; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p. 171; Young (ed.), RBL Diaries, pp. 44, 160; Richards, Royal Air Force, I, p. 50; Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 189. Cruickshank (in Fourth Arm, p. 85) suggests in addition that RAF personnel resented leaflets because ‘the danger of heavy loads affecting the trim of the aircraft or of the leaflets getting caught in the slipstream when they had been pushed out of the aircraft could be disastrous’. Leaflets were lighter than bombs and if properly stowed should not have affected the aircraft’s handling and, as noted, the slipstream was vital in splitting the bundles. The only difficulty I have seen concerning the ‘slipstream’ occurred when an inept crew-member cut the securing strings as he stowed the bundles, so that on take-off an internal draught picked up the leaflets, obscuring the pilot’s vision, forcing him to use his instruments.

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9. Air Ministry–PWE subcommittee, 14.9.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/429; Harris, Bomber Offensive, p. 161; Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, IV, p. 34. 10. Richards, Royal Air Force, I, p. 51; BCWD, p. 21; Moore, ‘The First of Billions’, pp. 126–7. 11. Richards, Royal Air Force, I, p. 411; Notes on Leaflet Dissemination, 26.8.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/434; Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, I, map between pp. 134–5; Bruce Lockhart to Peck, 12.9.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/429. 12. Werrell, ‘The Strategic Bombing of Germany’, p. 704; Hopps to HQ , No. 19 Group Coastal Command, Appendix, 10.10.1941, NA: PRO AIR 15/490; Garnett, Secret History of PWE, pp. 189–90; Ibrahim, ‘Munroe Bomb’, November 1944, NA: PRO AIR 14/604. 13. Meeting at the Air Ministry, 4.6.1942, NA: PRO AIR 14/605; Cruickshank, Deception, p. 55. 14. Fighter Command Operational Instruction No. 57/1942, 15.11.1942, and Meeting at the Air Ministry, 4.6.1942, NA: PRO AIR 14/605; Hopps to HQ No. 19 Group Coastal Command, 10.10.1941, NA: PRO AIR 15/490; Hackett to Gwynne, 23.5.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/25; Richards, Royal Air Force, I, p. 49n; Memo to Ryder, undated but probably mid-November 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/460; Richards, ‘The “M” Balloon Unit’, p. 105. 15. Saundby to Bomber Command Group HQs, 17.1.1942, NA: PRO AIR 14/604; MOI, Bomber Command, p. 30: Harris, Bomber Offensive, p. 36; Richards, Royal Air Force, I, p. 49; Kaplan, Bombers, p. 30; Slessor, Central Blue, p. 215; Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, I, pp. 140, 190, 200–5. 16. Foot, SOE in France, p. 162; Buckmaster, They Fought Alone, p. 19; Gwynne to Hackett, 23.5.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/25; Escott, Mission Improbable, quoted in Falling Leaf (FL), 137 (Summer 1992), p. 44. SOE aircraft bombed communications targets as another form of cover (Halley, The Squadrons of the Royal Air Force, p. 211). 17. Chorley, Bomber Command Losses, II–V, passim; Note on casualties from leaflet operations, 1.1.1942 to 26.5.1942, NA: PRO AIR 20/8159; BCWD, pp. 229–67, 386, 708. My calculations are based upon these figures. Between January and May 1942, Bomber Command lost seven aircraft in 343 sorties on leaflet operations, compared with 392 losses in 11,554 sorties on all operations over this period. 2 per cent losses were also sustained on leaflet raids over Germany during the Phoney War (Neillands, Bomber War, p. 40). 18. Air Ministry Propaganda Leaflets, DoRIS; Nickels Operations for quarter ending 31.3.1941, NA: PRO AIR 14/603; ‘M’ Balloon Unit ORB, NA: PRO AIR 29/22; Cumulative statistics, NA: PRO FO 898/457. 19. Cumulative statistics, NA: PRO FO 898/457; ‘M’ Balloon Unit ORB, August 1943– August 1944, NA: PRO AIR 29/22; Richards, ‘Q-Codes and H-Codes’, pp. 84–99. Both Holman, in ‘Airborne Culture’, p. 212, and Cruickshank, in Fourth Arm, p. 96, include ‘Q’ leaflets. 20. Portal to Bracken, 6.12.1941, NA: INF 1/904. 21. Notes on leaflet dissemination, 26.8.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/434. 22. Sutton to Brooks, 23.6.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/444. 23. Regional Leaflet Committee, 12.9.1941, 2.3.1942, 11.5.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/428. 24. Leaflet Report, week ending 30.11.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/9. 25. Leeper’s Committee, 19.10.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/9; Air Ministry–PWE subcommittee, 17.11.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/429.

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26. ‘Dissemination of Propaganda Leaflets by Aircraft’, 30.7.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/432. 27. FO Record of leaflets dropped over France, Holland and Germany in one week, 5.7.1942, NA: PRO FO 954/23A folios 89–90; PWE Monthly Reports on Propaganda, June and July 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50. 28. Notes on leaflet dissemination, 26.8.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/434. 29. ‘Why Drop Nickels?’, September 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/427; EoR, January 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50. 30. EoR, July 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Leaflet Operations, August 1943, NA: AIR 20/4729. 31. Modern information received from France states that a copy of F.34 (1940) ‘French Workers’, was reportedly found by the Somme Canal in Amiens in November 1940 (Inv. No. 973.238.45, Musée de la Résistance et de la Déportation, La Citadelle, Besançon, France). 32. ‘Leaflet Raids’, 6.10.1942; EoR, undated; Memo to Horner, 28.4.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/469; Sutton to Brooks, 4.8.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/444; EoR, June/July 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/37; Notes on EoRs for weeks ending 26.9.1941 and 17.10.1941; EoRs, period ending 31.3.1942; received 1–15.5.42, 15–30.6.42, 1–15.7.1942, 15.7– 1.8.1942, 1–15.8.1942, 15.9–1.10.1942, 17–30.10.1942, April, July, August, September and December 1943, May 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Interview Report, 13.1.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/467; Leaflet Operations, July 1942, October 1943, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729. 33. EoR, December 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463; EoR, undated; Memo to Horner, 28.4.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/469. 34. The main bomber force passed over Bingen, Mayen and Bad Kreuznach on its approach to Frankfurt. A line running west-south-west from Frankfurt via these towns crosses Châlons-sur-Marne (today known as Châlons-en-Champagne), about 160 miles north-north-west of Châlon-sur-Saône. It is possible that, especially if in original reports just ‘Châlon(s)’ was used, leaflets were actually dropped over Châlonssur-Marne by aircraft on a diversionary approach to Frankfurt. Such a routing is a reasonable possibility and in keeping with Bomber Command tactics. 35. Propaganda Leaflets, July 1941, NA: PRO AIR 20/4865; BCWD, pp. 143–4, 155, 302–3; BCRA Report, undated; Interview Report, 23.8.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/467; Report on leaflet operations, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/469; Leaflet Operations, August, September and November 1942, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729; EoRs, received 15–31.5.1942, 16–31.8.1942, 1–15.9.1942, 15.9–1.10.1942, June 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 36. EoRs 1–15.5.1942 and 1–15.8.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/463; EoR, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/469; BCWD, p. 480. 37. Notes on Reception, week ending 10.10.1941; EoRs, received 1–15.7.1942 and 1–15.8.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 38. Interview Report, 13.1.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/467. 39. EoR, 15.7–1.8.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/463; ‘Leaflet Raids’, 6.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/469; Leaflet Operations, July 1942, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729; Gielgud to Sutton, Beck, Fairlie and Paniguian, 24.4.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/435. Gielgud’s memo relays information from Maurice Buckmaster, head of SOE F Section, without naming the agent. However, a strong candidate is Major J. A. F. Antelme, an F Section agent known as Renaud, who was parachuted near Poitiers in November 1942 and returned

190

40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52.

53.

british propaganda to france, 1940--1944 to England between mid-March and early May 1943. As well as Poitiers, he was certainly in Paris and Troyes, and probably Le Mans. He organised the Bricklayer circuit, which had links with the extensive Prosper circuit and may have afforded him opportunities to visit other areas besides those named. His primary mission was one of political reconnaissance; his March 1943 report dealt with ‘French opinion’ among other things (Foot, SOE in France, pp. 223–4, 259, 291; Mackenzie, Secret History of SOE, pp. 570–1). Leaflet Operations, June 1942, May 1944, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729; ‘The Leaflet Propaganda Front – Propaganda Reactions’, 1.5.1944, NA: PRO AIR 37/241. These thirteen départements were Ain, Basses-Alpes, Hautes-Alpes, Ariège, Aude, Aveyron, Cantal, Jura, Lozère, Hautes-Pyrénées, Haute-Saône, Savoie and Vaucluse. EoR, 28.1.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; Weekly Report on RAF Leaflets and Black Propaganda, NA: PRO FO 898/63; EoRs, received 15.7–1.8.1942, 17–30.10.1942, May 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Interview Reports, 13.1.1942, 13.8.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/467; ‘Leaflet Raids’, 6.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/469; Pamphlet, ‘RAF Against Goebbels’, p. 11, NA: PRO AIR 14/604; Leaflet Operations, July 1942, August 1942, October 1942, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729; ‘Propaganda Leaflets’, July 1941, NA: PRO AIR 20/4865. Briggs, War of Words, pp. 58–9, 160–1, 237, 315; Paulu, British Broadcasting, p. 389. Briggs, War of Words, p. 440; Fairlie, ‘PWE White Propaganda’, Appendix A: Radio: Hours of Broadcasting to France’, NA: PRO FO 898/420. Hansard, 374 HC DEB 5S, cols 2085–6; 383 HC DEB 5S, col. 1673. BBC European Intelligence Department (BBC Eur.I.D.) Intelligence Reports (Intel. Repts), dated 8.7.1940 to November 1940, BBC WAC E2/186/2–4; BBC Eur.I.D., France, Audience Surveys (Aud. Surs), dated 16.12.1940 to 2.10.1944, BBC WAC E2/193/1–6; various letters at BBC WAC E9/16/1; various interview reports and questionnaires at BBC WAC E9/16/2, E9/17, E9/18; letters to the BBC from listeners in France 4.10.1941, 14.10.1941, BBC WAC E20/31; and also various reports held at NA: PRO FO 898/41 and NA: PRO FO 371/36044. These nine départements were Ariège, Aube, Charente-Inférieure, Loiret, HauteMarne, Meuse, Haute-Saône, Deux-Sèvres and Yonne. ‘Radio Eavesdropping’, 15.12.1941, BBC WAC E2/188/1; Aud. Sur., 7.5.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/2. Aud. Surs, 2.2.1944, 2.10.1944, BBC WAC E2/193/6; Briggs, War of Words, Appendix ‘C’; Whitaker, Almanack 1943, p. 883. EoR, July 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Aud. Sur., 6.10.1943, BBC WAC E2/193/6. European Service Medium Wave Transmitters, 14.5.1940, BBC WAC E2/206/1; Intel. Rept, 5.8.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/2; Aud. Sur., 13.1.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/1; Extracts from Political Memoranda for BBC Intelligence, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/41; Interview Report, 3.3.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/467. Aud. Surs: 4.6.1941, 4 and 31.7.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/2; 27.8.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/3; 26.8.1942, 21.10.1942, BBC WAC E2/193/4; 18.6.1943, BBC WAC E2/193/5; EoR, June 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Interview Report, 3.3.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/467. Aud. Surs: 31.7.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/2; 26.8.1942, BBC WAC E2/193/4; 25.2.1943, BBC WAC E2/193/5; EoR, BBC, August 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/50; Notes for pre-Central Directive Meeting, Occupied Territories, 8.2.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/286; EoR Appendix: Regulations designed to stop listening, January-March 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463.

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54. Aud. Surs: 18.2.1942, 21.4.1943, BBC WAC E2/193/5; 11.8.1943, 6.10.1943, 2.2.1944, BBC WAC E2/193/6; EoR, 7.9.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 55. Briggs, War of Words, p. 61.

Chapter 3 This chapter relies on BBC wartime broadcasts and British propaganda leaflets. The primary source of BBC broadcast material is the compilation in Crémieux-Brilhac (ed.), Les Voix de la Liberté. Unless otherwise stated, all broadcasts referred to or quoted from can be found by date, in the original French, in this collection. Similarly, unless an alternative source is given all leaflets used can be found in chronological/coding order in the Air Ministry Propaganda Leaflets compilation. Many are also available in the National Archives and elsewhere. Leaflet titles are taken from Anon., Complete Index, pp. 12–21. Leaflet dissemination data is taken from Brooks, ‘British Propaganda to France, 1940–1944’, Annexe I, a PDF version of which is available online at www.eup.ed. ac.uk. 1. Shennan, Fall of France, pp. 2–9, 14–15; Briggs, War of Words, p. 219. 2. Bolton, Pétain, pp. 43–60, 124–5; Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 170. 3. Thomas, Britain and Vichy, pp. 12–13; Bell, ‘Breakdown of the Alliance’, pp. 207– 8, 214; Cairns, ‘Great Britain and the Fall of France’, pp. 369–73; Bell, France and Britain, pp. 238–40. 4. Planning and Broadcasting Committee, 29.6.1940, 20.8.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/8; MOI Policy Committee, 26.6.1940, 4.7.1940, BBC WAC R34/473/2. 5. Briggs, War of Words, pp. 223–5. 6. Briggs, War of Words, pp. 74, 164, 219–20, 227. 7. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p. 160; Churchill (ed.), Into Battle, p. 224. 8. Briggs, War of Words, pp. 220–1; Gladwyn, Memoirs, pp. 99–100; De Gaulle, Call to Honour: Documents, pp. 19, 158; Gielgud to Barman, 15.2.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/213. De Gaulle recorded that he ‘never admitted any supervision, nor even any foreign advice, over what I had to say to France’. 9. De Gaulle, Call to Honour: Documents, pp. 11–12. 10. Patrie is used untranslated because there is no good English equivalent: it is a fusion of ‘fatherland’, ‘country’, ‘homeland’, ‘motherland’ and so on. 11. De Gaulle, Call to Honour: Documents, pp. 12–14. 12. Planning and Broadcasting Committee, 3.8.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/8. 13. Roskill, Navy at War, pp. 83–5; Churchill, Into Battle, pp. 242–3; Ousby, Occupation, p. 73. The decision to attack was taken by the British political, rather than military, leadership: the orders horrified senior naval officers in the Mediterranean who believed that given time a peaceful solution could be found. 14. Bryant, Cartoons, p. 57; Jackson, France, p. 255; Les Voix, I, pp. 12, 96–7; Ousby, Occupation, p. 75. 15. Churchill, Into Battle, pp. 239–48. 16. ‘BBC Broadcasts in Enemy and Enemy-occupied Countries’, 4.10.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/9. 17. Young (ed.), RBL Diaries, pp. 77–8. 18. Leeper, ‘Propaganda and Political Strategy’, 8.9.1940, NA: PRO CAB 104/205. 19. ‘Policy to France’, Meeting, 17.11.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/9.

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20. Plan of Propaganda to France, Summary, 18.2.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/198, my abridgement. I do not know the origin of the 15 March date. Because white propaganda was grounded in truth, the deadline date would not simply have been invented, and I presume that it must have been publicly announced in order for the propagandists to make use of it. 21. MOI Memorandum on Propaganda to France, 6.3.1941, NA: PRO ADM 116/ 4448. 22. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p. 125; ‘Broadcasts to France: A Short Survey’, extract from BBC European Services Output Report, 13–19.12.1942, BBC WAC E1/702/3. 23. ‘Policy to France’, 17.11.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/9; Plan of Propaganda to France, Summary, 18.2.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/198; MOI Memorandum on Propaganda to France, 6.3.1941, NA: PRO ADM 116/4448. 24. PWE sub-directive for BBC French Service, 4.1.1942, NA: PRO FO 371/31976; PWE Directive for WRUL, week ending 10.1.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/103; Special Directive on Toulon: Resurgent France, 28.11.1942; Special Directive on the Death of Admiral Darlan, 25.12.1942; PWE Central Directive, week beginning 31.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/289; PWE Central Directives, weeks beginning 28.1.1943 and 4.2.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/290; PWE Directives for the BBC French Service, 14– 28.2.1943 and 28.2–14.3.1943, NA: PRO FO 371/36044. 25. King-Hall, Our Own Times, pp. 148–9, 574, 717–18; Overy and Wheatcroft, Road to War, pp. 190–8. 26. Shaw, British Cinema, pp. 7, 13–19; Farley (ed.), Low, p. 38. 27. Farley (ed.), Low, p. 56; Bryant, Cartoons, pp. 26, 40. 28. McLaine, Ministry of Morale, pp. 55–7, 186–92; Taylor, British Propaganda, pp. 162–3. 29. Shaw, British Cinema, pp. 7–9; McLaine, Ministry of Morale, pp. 194–201; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp. 151, 215. 30. Cantwell, Images of War, plate 43; Bryant, Cartoons, p. 105; Farley (ed.), Low, p. 63; Shaw, British Cinema, p. 9; McLaine, Ministry of Morale, p. 209. 31. Foot, SOE in France, p. 135; Foot, SOE, pp. 149, 154, 160–1, 215–18. 32. Foot, SOE in France, pp. 139–40; Jackson, France, p. 528. 33. Les Voix, I, p. 259; Balfour, Propaganda in War, p. 226; Discussion with Regional Heads, Notes, 16.6.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/9. 34. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p. 125. The Russians later ‘produced a new hymn which both in its words and in its martial air conformed fully to the patriotic pattern of national anthems’. 35. BBC Directive for BBC French Service, Week 51, French Policy Meeting, 6.12.1940, BBC WAC E1/702/1; Plan of Propaganda to France, Summary, 18.2.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/198; MOI Memorandum on Propaganda to France, 6.3.1941, NA: PRO ADM 116/4448; BBC Directives for BBC French Service, Weeks 10 and 11, French Policy Meeting, 7.3.1941, and Weeks 37 and 38, French Policy Meeting, 12.9.1941, BBC WAC E1/703. 36. Gilbert, Second World War, p. 148. 37. Gilbert, Second World War, pp. 208, 255. 38. Les Voix, II, p. 1; Leaflet Policy Committee, 12 and 19.12.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/428. 39. Les Voix, II, p. 49. 40. BCWD, pp. 44–95, 113, 157–219; Notes for a Meeting of the Strategic Planning Staff, ‘Plans and Propaganda’, 26.9.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/4.

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41. ‘Bombing Operations in Occupied Territory’, 22.4.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/311; ‘Warnings and Instructions’, 8.6.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/304. 42. Notes for a Meeting of the Strategic Planning Staff, 26.9.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/4. 43. BCWD, pp. 244–5; Gilbert, Second World War, p. 306. 44. BCWD, pp. 246–68; Leaflet Policy Committee, 9.3.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/428. 45. Leaflet Policy Committee, 6.4.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/428. 46. Psychological Aspects of Bombing Policy during the Spring and Summer, 14.4.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/311. 47. BCWD, pp. 269–73. 48. Cruickshank, in Deception, pp. 39–40, shows how deception plans deceived not only the enemy but also Allied soldiers and civilians: in September 1942, PWE was asked by GHQ Home Forces for advice to prepare troops for Overthrow activities in France; PWE responded with a series of recommendations which took the questions seriously. One, both or neither of the correspondents may have known that Overthrow was a deception scheme. 49. Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, pp. 83–7; Atkin, Dieppe 1942, pp. xiii, 256. 50. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp. 195–9; Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 249. 51. ‘Joint American–British Plan of Psychological Warfare for France and the French Empire’, 22.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 660/9; PWE Central Directive, 5.11.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/289. 52. PWE Central Directive, 13.11.1942; PWE Special Directive on Toulon, ‘Resurgent France’, 28.11.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/289; Gilbert, Second World War, p. 383. 53. Garnett, Secret History of PWE, pp. 259, 262; and R. Pierre-Gosset, Algiers 1941– 1943: A Temporary Expedient (transl. N. Hecksher), London, Jonathan Cape, 1945, quoted therein; PWE Directives for the BBC, 31.1.–14.2.1943 and 28.3.–11.4.1943, NA: PRO FO 371/36044. 54. PWE Central Directives, 13 and 20.11.1942, 10.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/289. 55. Les Voix, III, p. 18. 56. Despite the strike, General de Gaulle and Admiral Aubonyeau both spoke in special broadcasts, on 27 and 28 November respectively, to discuss Toulon. 57. Briggs, War of Words, p. 411; BBC European Services Output Report, 22–28.11.1942, BBC WAC E2/209/1; Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 261. 58. The Darlan affair probably contributed to Marin’s departure for the Free French Navy in September 1943, especially as, although he did see active service, he quickly returned to journalism, landing with the Americans at Utah Beach in June 1944 as a war correspondent, directing the first post-liberation broadcasts of Radio Bretagne, and accompanying Leclerc’s troops during the liberation of Paris (Anon., Obituary of Jean Marin, p. 19; Les Voix, I, p. 3, and V, p. 191). 59. De Gaulle, Unity, pp. 58–9; Briggs, War of Words, pp. 402, 411–13, 415; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p. 221. Briggs states that a BBC Home Service news bulletin began with the words ‘Good morning, and a very Happy Christmas to you all. Last night Admiral Darlan was assassinated.’ 60. Cruickshank, Deception, pp. 54–7, 62–6; Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, pp. 318–27. 61. Moore and Fedorowich, The British Empire, p. 25. 62. Special Directive on the Surrender of Italy, 8.9.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/292. 63. Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, pp. 344, 435, 545, 568–9; Cruickshank, Deception, p. 56; Special Directive on the Voice of SHAEF, 19.5.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/294; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp. 306–7; Young (ed.), RBL Diaries, p. 320.

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64. Marks, Between Silk and Cyanide, pp. 486–7; Les Voix, V, pp. 32–5, 41–4; Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, pp. 634–5; Briggs, War of Words, p. 605. 65. Briggs, War of Words, p. 607; Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, pp. 635–6, 648–9, 682; Harrison, These Men Are Dangerous, pp. 137, 218. 66. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp. 296, 299–300, 307. 67. Anon., Complete Index, pp. 23–4; Young (ed.), RBL Diaries, p. 320; Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, pp. 683–4; Robbs, ‘American Leaflets to France’, p. 94; ZF.1 (1944), Boxed Collection: Propaganda Leaflets, French and Duplicates, DoRIS; ZF.3 (1944), NA: PRO FO 898/203. 68. Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, p. 671–5; Les Voix, V, p. 45; Briggs, War of Words, pp. 596–7, 606–8; Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp. 300–1. The morning’s broadcasting timetables are unclear. Cave Brown states that the BBC issued the news two minutes after receiving SHAEF’s communication, at 9.19 a.m., but this does not correlate with the time indicated in the message, or the commentary in Les Voix and Briggs that SHAEF published its first communiqué at 9.30 a.m. Les Voix also suggests that the news statement and the communiqué, in English, were both then repeated in the foreign languages, while Briggs suggests that the communiqué was read in English only. Les Voix also reports that a statement by Eisenhower for the French was read at 10.00 a.m.; Cave Brown suggests instead that it was a general statement followed by a message for France, after which King Haakon of Norway, the Dutch premier and the Belgian Prime Minister spoke to their peoples. Briggs meanwhile suggests that King Haakon and the Dutch and Belgian leaders spoke immediately after Eisenhower’s first statement. Excepting Cave Brown’s suggestion that the first news was broadcast at 9.19 a.m., the explanation would appear to be that either there were two sets of broadcasts entailing an Eisenhower statement in several languages followed by communiqués from the exiled leaders, or that the same set of statements was repeated twice. Meanwhile Bruce Lockhart records that it had originally been planned that the news and the official proclamations would be released at 10 a.m. 69. Briggs, War of Words, pp. 227, 610–11. Les Voix, V, p. 226 suggests that Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais continued to broadcast until November 1944. 70. BCWD, p. 521.

Chapter 4 In addition to the references listed below, this chapter relies on a series of Progress Reports (dated 19.4.1941, 13.6.1941, 18.7.1941, 1, 8 and 22.8.1941, 24.10.1941, 1.11.1941) at NA: PRO FO 898/50; a set of 1942 Interview Reports (dated 13.1.1942, 3.3.1942, 9.4.1942, 13 and 23.8.1942) at NA: PRO FO 898/467; and monthly RAF Leaflet Operations Reports (May–November 1942, January and March–July, October and November 1943, and February 1944) at NA: PRO AIR 20/4729. A compilation of Leaflet Reception Reports from France is available in Brooks, ‘British Propaganda to France, 1940–1944’, Annexe I, a PDF version of which is available online at www.eup.ed.ac.uk. 1. Cornick, ‘The BBC and the Propaganda War’, p. 321; Regional Leaflet Committee, 1.5.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/428. 2. Announcements about correspondence, 3.6.1940 and 27.5.1941, BBC WAC E1/704. 3. Jackson, France, pp. 248, 252; Alexander to Vischer, 20.4.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66.

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4. Alexander to Vischer, 20.4.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66; Jackson, France, pp. 259–60; Various EoRs, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 5. Intel. Rept, 2.9.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/3; Aud. Surs, 4.7.1941, 31.7.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/2. 6. McCann to Delavenay, 14.1.1941, BBC WAC E2/403. 7. EoRs, received 1–15.6.1942, 15–30.5.1942 and 17–30.11.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I, p. 90; McLaine, Ministry of Morale, p. 44; Hyde, Quiet Canadian, pp. 51, 55; Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid, p. 206; Report of letter intercepted by Union of South Africa censorship, 25.6.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/467. 8. Various EoRs, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 9. Silvey, Who’s Listening?, p. 29. 10. Sutton to Brooks, 4.8.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/444; Reports on leaflet reception, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/469; BCRA Report, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/467. 11. Cruickshank, Fourth Arm, p. 61; Hinsley, British Intelligence, I, pp. 275–8, II, pp. 17–19, and III, Part 1, pp. 461–2; Foot, SOE, p. 95; Smith, Spying Game, p. 179; Eytan, ‘The Z Watch in Hut 4, Part II’, p. 60; Thomas, in ‘France in British Signals Intelligence’, pp. 61–5, expands on the source of the intercepted signals intelligence. 12. Hinsley, British Intelligence, I, pp. 311–14, and II, p. 41. 13. Hinsley, British Intelligence, II, pp. 41, 58–9. 14. Foot and Langley, MI9, pp. 35, 41; Hinsley, British Intelligence, I, p. 90, and II, pp. 32–3; Weekly Report on RAF leaflets and black propaganda, 13.9.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/63. 15. Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid, p. 199; Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid, pp. 69–70; Regional Leaflet Committee, 28.1.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/428. 16. EoR, received 1–15.4.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Griffin to Grisewood, 6.8.1942, BBC WAC E2/403; Weekly Report for week ending 11.2.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/66; Cruickshank, Fourth Arm, pp. 62–3. 17. ‘Why Drop Nickels?’, September 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/427; Progress Report, weeks ending 13.6.1941, 22.8.1941; EoR, 28.1.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; ‘Leaflet Raids’, 6.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/469; EoR, received 17–30.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 18. Leaflet Operations, June and July 1942, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729; EoR, September 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 19. EoR, received 15–30.6.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; ‘Leaflet Raids’, 6.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/469; EoR, received 2–16.10.1942, April and November 1943, January 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Paniguian, ‘Notes on a Visit to Paris September 12–October 12 1944’, 17.10.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/199. 20. It may seem odd that a German soldier, more than an ordinary Frenchman, would risk writing. However, it is not improbable, as some German soldiers were discontented with Nazism, or did not believe that Germany should be at war with Great Britain. Although the impression is that the writer’s aim was to gloat, it may actually have been to warn the British authorities that the bombing, the first heavy attack on France, had provoked that kind of reaction and that future raids might do more harm than good to the British war effort. But had he been caught, his punishment would undoubtedly have been severe, as an example to others. It is also possible that a French writer claimed to be German as an additional precaution against discovery. 21. ‘Leaflet Raids’, 6.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/469; EoR, received 1–15.7.1942, 17– 30.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/463.

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22. Pamphlet, ‘RAF Against Goebbels’, NA: PRO AIR 14/604; Propaganda Leaflets, July 1941, and RAF Propaganda Operations, September 1941, NA: PRO AIR 20/4865; EoR, 28.1.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; Weekly Report on RAF Leaflets and Black Propaganda, 13.9.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/63; EoRs, received 1–15.4.1942, 15.7– 1.8.1942, 16–30.8.1942, 17–30.10.1942, August 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463; ‘Leaflet Raids’, 6.10.1942, and Memo to Horner, 28.4.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/469. 23. EoR, received 15–30.6.1942, 15.7–1.8.1942, 15.9–1.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 24. EoR, 28.1.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; EoRs, received 1–15.6.1942, 1–15.8.1942, 16–31.8.1942, 1–15.9.1942, 2–16.10.1942, 17–30.11.1942, October 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463; EoR, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/469. 25. ‘Leaflet Raids’, 6.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/469; EoR, received 1–15.8.1942, January 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Leaflet Operations, May and August 1942, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729. I am grateful to A. Guttin, the former résistant and now involved with the Musée de la Résistance de la Déportation in Joigny, for writing to me with his recollections. 26. Numerous examples of the Courrier, for example F.50/16 (1941) and F.27 (1942); Libération, 145 (7 September 1943), from the collection of the Musée Historique Itinérant du Havre; EoRs, received 1–15.7.1942, 1–15.9.1942, 2–16.10.1942, January– March 1943, April, August and November 1943, May 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Latest report of leaflet reactions from PWD SHAEF, No. 8, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/467; Memo to Horner, 28.4.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/469. 27. EoR, received 17–30.10.1942, January 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/469; EoRs, March and June 1943, February 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Leaflet Operations, March 1943, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729. Max Hastings, in Das Reich, p. 121, comments that an inadequate cigarette supply could bring about the collapse of a resistance group, giving some idea of how important this commodity was in wartime France. 28. I am grateful to Jacques Valéry, the President of the Musée de le Résistance de Limoges, who supplied this information and a copy of the leaflet described. Paul Valéry, Jacques Valéry’s uncle, who formed a resistance group based around Bègles, near Bordeaux, was responsible for copying this leaflet. I have been unable to identify it as British, though it does use English-language instructions (which could equally make it American in origin). Jacques Valéry comments that it was ‘parachuted’, suggesting it may have been a ‘black’ production intended for the resistance to distribute. 29. Progress Report, week ending 1.8.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/50; EoR, received 1– 15.4.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Latest report of leaflet reactions from PWD SHAEF, No. 8, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/467; Memo to Horner, 28.4.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/469. 30. EoRs, received week ending 26.9.1941, 1–15.4.1942, 1–15.5.1942, 15–30.6.1942, 15.9–1.10.1942, 17–30.11.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Leaflet Operations, June 1942, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729; Ryder to Paniguian, 26.3.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/469. 31. EoRs, 1–15.4.1942, 1–15.5.1942, January–March 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 32. EoR, 28.1.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; EoRs, received week ending 26.9.1941, 1– 15.6.1942, 1–15.7.1942, 15.9–1.10.1942, 2–16.10.1942, 17–30.10.1942, April 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Reports on leaflet reception, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/469. I am grateful to J. C. Pigny, President, and J. Liberge, Secretary, of the Musée Historique Itinerant du Havre, who supplied the information about André Haraux. 33. Progress Report, week ending 1.11.1941, and PWE Monthly Report on Propaganda, December 1941; EoR, 28.1.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; Leaflet Operations, May 1944, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729.

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34. BCRA Report, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/467; Escott, Mission Improbable, quoted in FL, 137 (Summer 1992), p. 44. 35. Monthly Report on Propaganda, December 1941, and EoR, 28.1.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; Beck to DDG (for Policy and Planning Committee), 24.1.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/209; EoR, period ending 31.3.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Leaflet Operations, October 1943, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729; Hastings, Das Reich, p. 207. 36. EoR, 28.1.1942, and Monthly Report on Propaganda, March 1942, NA: PRO FO, 898/50; EoR, April 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463; ‘The Leaflet Propaganda Front’ – Propaganda Reactions, 1.5.1944, NA: PRO AIR 37/241. 37. Leaflet Operations, January 1943, NA: PRO AIR 20/4729; Brisebois, ‘The Courrier de l’Air No. 2a’, pp. 136–42. Brisebois never actually answers the central question put forward, although he appears to believe that it was actually a Communist forgery. Keith Moore, late Publications Manager of the Psywar Society, kindly provided photocopies of the genuine and forged versions of F.3. 38. Notes on reception of political warfare output, April–May 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/37; ‘Fakes of PWE Leaflets’, 27.4.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/432; EoRs, April 1943, January, March and May 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463; ‘The Leaflet Propaganda Front’ – Propaganda Reactions, 1.5.1944, NA: PRO AIR 37/241; Interview with Fairlie, 8.11.1944, BBC WAC E41/2/1. 39. Aud. Surs, 13.1.1941, 11.3.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/1; 4.6.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/2, 25.2.1943, BBC WAC E2/193/5, 6.10.1943, 2.2.1944, BBC WAC E2/193/6; Kirkpatrick to Bruce Lockhart, Newsome, Gillie and Griffin, 20.8.1942, BBC WAC E9/16/2; BBC Questionnaire, 19.7.1944, BBC WAC E1/702/3; Reactions to the BBC French Service, 3.3.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/212; EoRs, May and June 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Interview Report, 3.3.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/467; Report by Jean Verger, undated, NA: PRO WO 219/4807; Paniguian, ‘Notes on a Visit to Paris’, NA: PRO FO 898/199. 40. Clark, ‘The Year of Climax’, p. 113; Intel. Repts, 5.8.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/2, 2.9.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/3; ‘Radio Eavesdropping’, 15.12.1941, BBC WAC E2/188/1; various Aud. Surs, 16.12.1940 to 2.2.1944, BBC WAC E2/193/1–6; various questionnaires, BBC WAC E9/17; Letters to the BBC from listeners in France, 14.10.1941, BBC WAC E20/31; PWE Monthly Report on Propaganda, December 1941, NA: PRO FO 898/50; Reactions to BBC French Service, 1.1.1944, 3.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/212; EoR, May 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 41. Intel. Repts, 5.8.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/2, 28.10.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/3; ‘Radio Eavesdropping’, 15.12.1941, BBC WAC E2/188/1; Interview Report, 4.12.1941, BBC WAC E9/16/2; various Aud. Surs, 13.1.1941 to 21.10.1942, BBC WAC E2/193/1–4; BBC European Services Intelligence Extract, 31.10.1944, BBC WAC E41/2/1. 42. ‘Radio Eavesdropping’, 15.12.1941, BBC WAC E2/188/1; Aud. Sur., 13.1.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/1; Reactions to the BBC French Service, 3.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/212. 43. Riess, Joseph Goebbels, p. 224; Intel. Repts, 5.8.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/2, 2.9.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/3; Aud. Surs, 16.12.1940, 13.1.1941, 10.2.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/1. 44. Intel. Repts, 28.10.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/3, November 1940, BBC WAC E2/186/4; various Aud. Surs, dated 16.12.1940 to 5.11.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/1– 3; Jackson, France, p. 275.

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45. Intel. Repts, 5.8.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/2, 2 and 30.9.1940, 28.10.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/3; various Aud. Surs, dated 13.1.1941 to 18.12.1942, BBC WAC E2/193/1–5; EoRs, June and July 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 46. Various Aud. Surs, dated 16.12.1940 to 21.10.1942, BBC WAC E2/193/1–4; Extracts from Political Memoranda for BBC Intelligence, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/41; PWE Monthly Report on Propaganda, December 1941, NA: PRO FO 898/50; Interview Report, 3.3.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/467. 47. Jackson, France, p. 275; Briggs, War of Words, p. 416, quoting the Mülhauser Tageblatt, 11.8.1944; Aud. Surs, 25.2.1943, 21.4.1943, 18.6.1943, BBC WAC E2/193/5; EoRs, May and June 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 48. EoR, May 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 49. Les Voix, I, p. 11; Briggs, War of Words, p. 222; various Aud. Surs, dated 7.5.1941 to 18.12.1942, BBC WAC E2/193/2–5; Notes on reception of political warfare output, April–May 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/37; EoRs, April and July 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 50. Intel. Rept, 28.10.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/3; Aud. Sur., 7.5.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/2. The British considered jamming a waste of resources and ‘an admission of a bad cause. The jammer has a bad conscience [. . . ] He is afraid of the influence of the truth.’ It was also felt that any jamming would cause German reprisals in kind, which would ‘stifle Britain’s voice’ (Briggs, War of Words, pp. 60, 217). 51. Various Aud. Surs dated 13.1.1941 to 2.10.1944, BBC WAC E2/193/1–6; EoRs, April, July and August 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Pamphlet, ‘RAF against Goebbels’, November 1941, NA: PRO AIR 14/604. By 1945 the BBC controlled 121 transmitters; the Germans, despite having taken over transmitters across Europe, had only fifty (Briggs, War of Words, p. 58 and n). 52. Intel. Repts, 5.8.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/2, November 1940, BBC WAC E2/188/4; various Aud. Surs dated 16.12.1940 to 5.11.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/1–3; EoR, June 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 53. Various Aud. Surs dated 4.7.1941 to 2.2.1944, BBC WAC E2/193/2–6; EoRs, July 1943, May 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 54. Various Intel. Repts dated 5.8.1940 to November 1940, BBC WAC E2/186/2–4; Various Aud. Surs dated 16.12.1940 to 18.6.1943, BBC WAC E2/193/1–5; BBC Questionnaire, 19.7.1944, BBC WAC E1/702/3; EoR, August 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Interview Report, 3.3.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/467. 55. Briggs, War of Words, p. 64; Aud. Sur., 7.5.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/2; Sutton to Calder, 3.3.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/304. 56. Various Intel. Repts dated 5.8.1940 to November 1940, BBC WAC E2/186/2–4; Aud. Surs; 11.3.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/1, 7.5.1941, 4.6.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/2; EoR, August 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 57. ‘Radio Eavesdropping’, 15.12.1941, BBC WAC E2/188/1; ‘Radio Eavesdropping’ (Second Study), 24.4.1944, BBC WAC E2/188/2; The European Audience of British Broadcasts in English, 25.8.1942; Extracts from Political Memoranda for BBC Intelligence, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/41; EoR, August 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/50. From the British perspective, while potentially dangerous for much the same reasons, cross-listening was seen as a means for European listeners to improve their English and hence be better able to assist Allied troops after the invasion of Europe. 58. Intel. Repts, 28.10.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/3, November 1940, BBC WAC E2/186/4; Various Aud. Surs dated 16.12.1940 to 5.11.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/1– 3; Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France, p. 283, quoting an interview with Romain Baz of Annemasse (Haute-Savoie).

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59. ‘Radio Eavesdropping’, BBC WAC E2/188/1; various Aud. Surs dated 16.12.1940 to 5.11.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/1–3; Briggs, War of Words, p. 229; Gorham, Broadcasting and Television, p. 194; Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France, p. 121; Marshall, White Rabbit, pp. 148–9. 60. Various Aud. Surs dated 8.4.1941 to 31.12.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/1–3. 61. Intel. Rept, 5.8.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/2; various Aud. Surs dated 11.3.1941 to 2.10.1944, BBC WAC E2/193/1–6; EoR, April 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463; Fenton, ‘Resistance Fighter Recalls “the Best Days of My Life”, p. iv; Ten Days to D-Day, Part 1. 62. Aud. Surs, 11.8.1943, 6.10.1943, BBC WAC E2/193/6; EoR, July 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. I am grateful to Dudley Roessler, of the Bath Royal Literary and Scientific Institute, for the information about the theft of the radio set. He was in Normandy shortly after the D-Day landings and met the French woman, who told him the sorry story. 63. BBC Survey of Broadcasting Organisations, ‘The Administration of French Broadcasting’, 13.8.1942, BBC WAC E2/189; Dunkerley to ONE and D.Eur.S., 20.11.1940, BBC WAC E9/16/1. 64. ‘The Administration of French Broadcasting’, 13.8.1942, BBC WAC E2/189; Aud. Sur., 16.12.1940, BBC WAC E2/193/1. 65. Aud. Surs, 16.12.1940, 13.1.1941, 11.3.1941, BBC WAC E2/193/1; Reactions to BBC French Service, 3.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/212; Briggs, War of Words, pp. 228, 340–1. 66. ‘Radio Eavesdropping’, BBC WAC E2/188/1; ‘Radio Eavesdropping’ (Second Study), BBC WAC E2/188/2. 67. Aud. Sur., 16.12.1940, BBC WAC E2/193/1; Reactions to BBC French Service, 1.1.1944, 3.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/212; Allard, Ici, Londres!, pp. 62–5. On 23 August 1944 the BBC, pressured by the Free French, broadcast ‘Paris is free!’ It wasn’t; the blunder was subsequently described by Gillie as ‘one of the few mistakes of news inside France during the war’ (Briggs, War of Words, p. 609). 68. Jackson, France, p. 281. 69. Intel. Repts, 28.10.1940, BBC WAC E2/186/3, November 1940, BBC WAC E2/186/4.

Chapter 5 In addition to the references given below, this chapter relies on Howe, Black Game, pp. 19, 62–3, 85–92, 193–4, 203, 267–71, and Foot, SOE in France, pp. 110, 132, 155, 161–2, 201, 204–9, 212, 217, 367, 472–7. The black and clandestine leaflet distribution data, and data concerning individual rumours or ‘sibs’ referred to below is taken from Brooks, ‘British Propaganda to France, 1940–1944’, Annexe II, a PDF version of which is available online at www.eup.ed.ac.uk. 1. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p. 125. 2. Surviving Distribution Reports (at NA: PRO FO 898/66) cover only the period between January 1942 and April 1943. Howe describes an envelope-addressing system operating in November 1941 (discussed later in this chapter), suggesting that clandestine distribution was taking place by then. Truly ‘black’ propaganda may have begun in earnest only after the arrival of Delmer in May 1941: he specialised in black

200

3.

4.

5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13.

14. 15.

16. 17.

british propaganda to france, 1940--1944 propaganda to Germany, but his ideas filtered through to other parts of PWE (Jolly, ‘Ungentlemanly Warfare, Part 2’, pp. 23–9). PWE French Section was still pressing for up-to-date address and telephone directories and specimens of original envelopes in April 1942 (Alexander to Vischer, 20.4.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66). Garnett, Secret History of PWE, pp. 43–4; Leeper’s Committee, 2.11.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/9; Memo, signature illegible, 10.11.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/444; Anonymous draft paper, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/61, probably written by Howe, after November 1942. Beck to Bruce Lockhart, ‘French Region, PWE – Black Activities’, 17.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/66. Leeper’s Committee, 2.11.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/9; Richards, ‘Q-Codes and HCodes’, pp. 85–96; Richards, ‘The “M” Balloon Unit’, p. 106. Selbourne to Eden, 9.3.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/28; Weekly Reports on RAF Leaflets and Black Propaganda, 13.9.1942, 4.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/63; Beck to Leeper, Black Reports, France, weeks ending 16.5.1942, 13.6.1942 and 23 October, probably 1943; Mackenzie, Secret History of SOE, p. 249. While an SOE agent was landed in Brittany in March 1941, Foot concludes from the lack of information (the agent is not named in SOE records) that the agent was either captured or joined another organisation shortly after arrival, and I have followed Foot’s example in not regarding him as the first SOE agent to enter France. Meeting at CHQ , 20.12.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/5; Beck to Leeper, Black Report for France, 23 May, no year given, probably 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/62. Foot, SOE, p. 222. Figures are rounded to the nearest hundred tons. Foot, SOE in France, pp. 473–7; Hastings, Das Reich, p. 121. Lauwers, ‘Epilogue’, p. 187. I am grateful to J. H. Houbert for the information about the Communist treatment of British propaganda leaflets. My calculations assume (a) that 15 per cent of the 600 tons of stores sent to France by UK-based RAF aircraft in 1942–3 were non-warlike, probably too high a proportion; (b) that these 90 tons of non-warlike material consisted exclusively of propaganda leaflets, which is unlikely; and (c) that these leaflets were of the double-sided singlesheet type (or one ‘leaflet unit’ each) of which, as noted in Chapter 2, 5.4 million copies weighed 13 tons. Howe, Black Game, p. 193; Black Committee Meeting, 12.11.1942, and Alexander to Vischer, 20.4.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66; Foot, SOE in France, p. 155. E. V. H Rizzo (Aromatic) through Eduoard/Troy, DF’s second largest circuit, probably operated the Perpignan facility. Alexander to Beck, 30.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66. Barcelona Press Office General Report 1940–1943, Weekly Report, week ending 30.4.1943, and various Distribution Reports, NA: PRO FO 898/66; Press Attaché, Barcelona, to Foreign Division, MOI, copied to PWE, 15.1.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/210; Dorchy is not named in the General Report, but he can be identified because he also assisted British personnel escaping through Spain. One of the escapees, an SOE agent, recounts how he introduced himself: ‘My name is Dorchy [. . . ] I am the press attaché to the Consul General’ (Cooper, Adventures of a Secret Agent, p. 174). Leeper’s Committee, 2.11.1940, NA: PRO FO 898/9; numerous documents, NA: PRO FO 898/66. ‘Gorlier’ is also spelt ‘Guerlier’ and ‘Gerlier’. Weekly Report, week ending 30.4.1943, Alexander to Vischer, 20.4.1942, and multiple documents, NA: PRO FO 898/66; Young (ed.), RBL Diaries, p. 187n; Wiskemann, The Europe I Saw, p. 164.

notes

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18. Beck to Leeper, Black Report for France, week ending 16.5.1942, and Howe to Vischer, French Black Propaganda, 13.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66. 19. Alexander to Vischer, 20.4.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66. 20. Howe, Black Game, pp. 193–4; multiple documents, NA: PRO FO 898/62; Black Committee Meeting, 12.11.1942, Howe to Beck, Production Reports, weeks ending between 30.7.1942 and 1.4.1943, and multiple documents, NA: PRO FO 898/66. Imprints used included ‘Le Conseiller du Commerce Extérieur, Palais de la Bourse, Marseille’ in April 1942, ‘Contrôle des Informations R.F.’ in October 1942 and ‘Cie. des Lampes, Mazamet’ in February 1943. Production Reports note a third batch of 12,000 envelopes and a fourth batch of 12,500 envelopes. I assume that the first and second batches, which must have been produced before 30.7.1942, were also of roughly 12,000 envelopes. 21. Beck to Bowes-Lyon, 19.2.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66. The Treasury forbade the forging of French currency. At the exchange rate in use until trading in French francs was suspended in summer 1940, £1 was worth 176.5 French francs, meaning that the total value of the stamps referred to here was approximately £345 12s. This would have paid for 857 fifteen-minute broadcasts on one of PWE’s RUs (‘Exchange Rates’, The Times, p. 10). 22. Barman, Diplomatic Correspondent, pp. 117–18; Howe to Beck, Production Reports, weeks ending 30.7.1942 and 5.8.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66. The regular Weekly Times was a weekly digest of The Times, available in Great Britain. Unless the MOI sent copies to neutral countries, other than in miniature it was not used for propaganda. 23. Lettre d’Angleterre, No. 12, June 1942; Alexander to Vischer, 20.4.1942, p. 3. NA: PRO FO 898/66. 24. La France Libre, Vol. II, No. 5 (November 1942), NA: PRO FO 898/444. 25. McMillan to Fairlie, 12.5.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/435, quoted in Holman, ‘The Impact of War’, pp. 53–5; Mackenzie, Secret History of SOE, pp. 252–3. Holman refers to the miniature version, but apparently believes that McMillan meant the regular version of La France Libre, which was published by Hamish Hamilton. Unless McMillan had worked for Hamish Hamilton before joining PWE and had there placed orders for early editions of the regular La France Libre of which 3,000–4,000 had been sent to France, he must have been referring to PWE’s version. 26. White and Maze, Henry A Wallace, pp. 162–3; FU.57 (1942), NA: PRO FO 898/66. 27. Alexander to Beck, 30.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66; Regional Leaflet Committee, 29.8.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/428. 28. Courrier Illustrated under Petit-Dictionnaire cover; ‘Complot Pétain-Laval’ under Paul et Virginie cover; Weekly Report on RAF Leaflets and Black Propaganda, 13.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/64; Alexander to Beck, Weekly Report, week ending 21.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66. 29. Leeper, ‘Black Propaganda’, 17.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/61. 30. ‘ARP Circular’, NA: PRO FO 898/66. 31. ‘Precautions against Accidents’, NA: PRO FO 898/66. 32. Howe to Beck, Production Report, week ending 13.8.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66. 33. Weekly Report on RAF Leaflets and Black Propaganda, 13.9.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/63; Fairlie, ‘PWE White Propaganda’, NA: PRO FO 898/420. 34. ‘The Uses of RUs to Occupied Europe’, 21.3.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/65; Tangye Lean, Voices in the Darkness, pp. 174, 177. 35. Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 195; E. Halliday, ‘Note on the Operation of PID Research Units’, 4.10.1945, NA: PRO FO 898/51. The only RUs allowed regular live broadcasts were the Atlantiksender and Soldatensender Calais/West, for German

202

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42. 43. 44. 45.

46.

british propaganda to france, 1940--1944 U-boat crews and the German Army respectively; W6, designed to ‘intrude’ on genuine Italian broadcasts during the Allied invasion of southern Italy; and, also, during summer 1941, all RUs, because of a shortage of blank discs for recording. By contrast, BBC broadcasts were live. Their scripts were vetted in advance and a ‘switch censor’ could terminate the broadcast at the touch of a button, but it was always possible that ‘if a trusted performer had suddenly gone berserk and shouted “Peace at any price!” or “The Germans are here”, the damage would have been done before the switch could be used’ (Calder, The People’s War, p. 501). Halliday, ‘PID Research Units’, 4.10.1945, Halliday to Bowes Lyon, 4.1.1942, and Murray to Robin, 28.10.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/51; Delmer, Black Boomerang, p. 76. This story has been dismissed as apocryphal, but nonetheless it demonstrates one danger of pre-recording (Murray, ‘Sixty Years On’, p. 128). It is also possible, although Delmer does not say so, that it was a deliberate mistake, to show the Germans they had been fooled. Leeper’s Committee, 28.9.1940, and Notes on discussions with regional heads, 16.6.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/9; Leeper, ‘Black Propaganda’, 17.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/61; WWII Secret Intelligence Activities around Milton Keynes, website; Balfour, Propaganda in War, p. 97; Howe, Black Game, p. 86. Garnett, Secret History of PWE, pp. 53, 200; ‘Operation of RUs’, 11.10.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/51; Beck to Bruce Lockhart, ‘French Region, PWE – Black Activities’, 17.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/66. Churchill, by contrast, was aware of the RUs and certainly about Radio Travail: Dalton recorded mentioning to him ‘the French miner [Travail’s main speaker], Sicilian sea captain, etc., knowing that he is interested in picturesque detail’ (Pimlott, Dalton Diary, p. 114). Beck to Leeper, Black Report for France, 23 May, probably 1942, and 13.6.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/62; Mackenzie, Secret History of SOE, p. 567; Beck to Bruce Lockhart, ‘French Region, PWE – Black Activities’, 17.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/66. The Carte resistance group was run by André Girard from the French Riviera. Girard claimed links across France and planned to recruit a 300,000-strong private army, so SOE believed that it had found a ‘ready-made secret army’. But the plans led to nothing and poor security allowed the Abwehr to destroy Carte. Monthly Reports on Propaganda, April, July, August 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; ‘Operation of RUs’, 11.10.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/51; Leeper, ‘Black Propaganda’, 17.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/61; Beck to Leeper, Black Report for France, 13.6.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66. Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 53; Howe, Black Game, p. 91; Monthly Report on Propaganda, April 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50. Howe, Black Game, p. 91. Sutton to Leeper, 27.8.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/60; Monthly Report on Propaganda, March 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50. ‘Operation of RUs’, 11.10.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/51; Leeper, ‘Black Propaganda’, 17.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/61; Weekly Report on RAF Leaflets and Black Propaganda, 22.11.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/63; Beck to Bruce Lockhart, ‘French Region, PWE – Black Activities’, 17.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/66; Beck to Brooks, ‘RUs French Region’, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/209; EoR, February 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463. Garnett, Secret History of PWE, p. 54; Mackenzie, Secret History of SOE, p. 567; Gillois, Histoire secrete, p. 24; Monthly Report on Propaganda, August 1942, NA:

notes

47.

48.

49.

50. 51. 52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

203

PRO FO 898/50; Leeper, ‘Black Propaganda’, 17.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/61; ‘Operation of RUs’, 11.10.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/51; Beck to Leeper, Black Report for France, 13.6.1942; Beck to Bruce Lockhart, ‘French Region, PWE – Black Activities’, 17.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/66; Beck to Brooks, ‘RUs French Region’, undated but probably 4.1.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/209. Radio Inconnue flyer, and Black Report for week ending 23.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66; Weekly Report on RAF Leaflets and Black Propaganda, 25.10.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/63; ‘Les cent meilleures façons d’accommoder le poisson’, October 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/64. Beck to Leeper, Black Report for France, 23.5.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/62; Beck to Bruce Lockhart, ‘French Region, PWE – Black Activities’, 17.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/66. PWE/SOE Coordinating Committee Meeting, 14.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/27; Beck to Brooks, ‘RUs French Region’, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/209; EoR, April 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463. Leeper, ‘Black Propaganda’, 17.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/61. Beck to Brooks, ‘RUs French Region’, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/209. PWE Progress Report for week ending 1.11.1941, and Monthly Reports on Propaganda, December 1941 and April 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; ‘Operation of RUs’, 11.10.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/51; Conversation about Radio Gaulle, 20.9.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/60; Leeper, ‘Black Propaganda’, 17.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/61; Weekly Report on RAF Leaflets and Black Propaganda, 22.11.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/63; Weekly Report on RAF Leaflets and Black Propaganda, 3.1.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/64; Beck to Leeper, Black Report for France, 13.6.1942; Beck to Bruce Lockhart, ‘French Region, PWE – Black Activities’, 17.4.1944, NA: PRO FO 898/66; EoRs, January–March, June, July and October 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. Beck to Brooks, ‘RUs French Region’, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/209; EoRs, received 1–15.9.1942, 15.9.1942–1.10.1942, February and March 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463; BBC European Services Division, Intelligence Extract, 12.2.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/467. Monthly Reports on Propaganda, April, May and June 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; Beck to Leeper, Black Report for France, 23.5.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/62; EoRs, received 1–15.9.1942, October 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. Monthly Report on Propaganda, January 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; Beck to Leeper, dated 23 October, probably 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66; Beck to Brooks, ‘RUs French Region’, undated, NA: PRO FO 898/209; EoRs, fortnightly, for period 1.5.1942 to 30.10.1942 and January–March 1943, NA: PRO FO 898/463. The figures for Radio Gaulle include six occurrences of jamming in nine tests carried out between 1 June and 15 July but attributed to F.3, La France Catholique, which had been shut down on 14 May, and I have therefore assumed that this actually relates to F.4, the only other RU operating at the time – unless, of course, PWE was deliberately continuing to monitor, and the Germans to jam, an unused frequency. The Germans must have been able to determine that La France Catholique was broadcasting from Great Britain, and therefore must have specifically wanted an official denial, which would probably have carried more weight among French listeners than a German statement. The American station WRUL Boston, discussed later in this chapter in regard to rumours, also publicised F.3’s link to the Vatican, which might have provided the source of the German belief about its origins (West (ed.), British Security Coordination, p. 62).

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57. Weekly Report on RAF Leaflets and Black Propaganda, 22.11.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/63; Weekly Report on RAF Leaflets and Black Propaganda, 3.1.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/64; Monthly Reports on Propaganda, January and February 1942, NA: PRO FO 898/50; EoRs, January–March 1943, April 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463. 58. PWE Progress Report for week ending 1.11.1941, and Monthly Report on Propaganda, December 1941, NA: PRO FO 898/50; Allard, Ici, Londres!, pp. 46, 87, 95–6. 59. Fairlie, ‘PWE White Propaganda to France’: Summary, December 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/419; Fairlie, ‘PWE White Propaganda’, NA: PRO FO 898/420. 60. ‘Rumours’, 7.1.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/69. This document has been relied on throughout the discussion of rumour-mongering and is not again referenced. Where identifying codes have survived, they have been quoted here for the benefit of the reader. 61. Garnett, Secret History of PWE, pp. 211–12; Cruickshank, Fourth Arm, pp. 108–12. On reading a draft of this chapter, my friend and fellow historian John Tanner commented on the use of the British press to disseminate PWE rumours. Throughout the interwar period, reports made by the intelligence services to the Cabinet were deliberately ‘leaked’ to The Times and other newspapers to discredit government opponents, even when the contents were of dubious origin or faintly ridiculous. Interestingly for this study, his research shows that the influence of The Times meant that such ‘news’ was picked up and repeated by newspapers across Britain and around the world. Given the effectiveness of this approach, PWE may well have used existing links between the state and highly influential London newspapers to initiate the dissemination of rumours at home and abroad. 62. Johnson, The Secret War, pp. 270–1. 63. Cruickshank, Deception, pp. 2–8. 64. Leeper, ‘Black Propaganda’, 17.12.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/61; Dalton to Leeper, 11.3.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/70. 65. West (ed.), British Security Coordination, pp. 58–61; Directives for WRUL, covering the second half of 1941 and early 1942, at NA: PRO FO 898/103. 66. EoR, received 15.9-42–1.10.1942 and February 1944, NA: PRO FO 898/463.

Conclusion 1. Paniguian, ‘Notes on a Visit to Paris’, NA: PRO FO 898/199. 2. Dr Beck was one such senior propagandist. He was the French Region’s CIO and later its Director, was aware of white propaganda output, was in charge of at least one of the secret radio stations broadcasting in French, and received weekly reports on the production of black printed propaganda to France (Howe, Black Game, p. 88; French Production Reports, Howe to Beck, 30.7.1942–1.4.1943 and 11.11.1943, and Beck to Bowes-Lyon, 19.2.1942, NA: PRO FO 898/66; Regional Leaflet Committee, 9.1.1941, 16.1.1941, NA: PRO FO 898/428). 3. Briggs, War of Words, p. 229. 4. Paniguian, ‘Notes on a Visit to Paris’, NA: PRO FO 898/199; Fairlie, ‘PWE White Propaganda’, NA: PRO FO 898/420. ‘Discipling’ is a literary term meaning to teach, to train or to elucidate, and it could well apply. It could also be that ‘disciplining’ was intended.

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5. Paulu, British Broadcasting, p. 415; Briggs, War of Words, p. 481; ‘Operations of the RUs’, 11.10.1943, and Halliday’s ‘Note on the Operation of PID Research Units’, 4.10.1945, NA: PRO FO 898/51; ‘The Uses of RUs to Occupied Europe’, 21.3.1943, NA: PRO FO 898/65; Howe, Black Game, pp. 91–2, 267–70; Garnett, Secret History of PWE, pp. 200, 328–31; Calder, People’s War, p. 586.

Bibliography

A Note on the Sources Among the enormous body of literature relating to the Second World War, propaganda is often mentioned, but almost always only in passing. References to propaganda can be found in works concerning subjects as disparate as naval intelligence, the exploits of an Australian squadron in Bomber Command, SOE code making and SAS operations, as evidenced by McLachlan’s Room 39, Firkins’s Strike and Return, Marks’s Between Silk and Cyanide and Farran’s Winged Dagger. Respected historians – such as Wilmot in The Struggle for Europe and Liddell Hart, Keegan and Gilbert in their respective single-volume works entitled The Second World War or a close variation thereof – mention propaganda only briefly or not at all. Weinberg, in A World at Arms, does more, but of four pages devoted to ‘psychological warfare’ only half a page examines the British contribution and gets no closer to mentioning France than the briefest of references to the occupied peoples of Europe. Nonetheless, these are valuable treatments of the general history of the Second World War and I have relied on them as such. Similarly, the memoirs of the two most important civilians of the period – Churchill and Eden, with The Second World War and The Reckoning, respectively – virtually ignore propaganda. Even historians of SOE, which was responsible for propaganda between July 1940 and the formation of PWE in August 1941, treat propaganda in a similarly cursory fashion as their focus is, understandably, sabotage. SO1 is acknowledged and its origins are discussed by some writers, but its work is not. The official histories – SOE in France and The Secret History of SOE, by Foot and Mackenzie, respectively – are useful because both authors had access to archival material that the government continues to retain or has since destroyed, but other historians of SOE, forced to rely on publicly available material or on personal testimonies, are less so. Cookridge’s Inside SOE, for example, is inaccurate in its treatment of propaganda. Other official histories of bodies or areas of the war effort that had some connection with propaganda, and unofficial, but no less important works focusing on the same, are similarly frustrating as they do not engage as fully with their propaganda roles as might be wished. The history of BSC, British Security Coordination, edited for publication by West, does touch briefly on propaganda. Other accounts of the same organisation, written later and without access to official records, for example Hyde’s The Quiet Canadian and Stevenson’s A Man Called Intrepid, cannot always be relied upon. Other official works, such Richards’s Royal Air Force and The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany by Webster and Frankland, and unofficial research such as MI9 by Foot and Langley and Cruickshank’s Deception in World War II, similarly make some mention of propaganda, but treat it as a relatively unimportant sideshow. Specialised texts concerning Second World War propaganda are usually general in their approach, bringing together examples of many forms of propaganda employed by and for

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many different countries, or they focus in depth on British propaganda to Germany. Foremost among these is Balfour’s Propaganda in War, an excellent comparative study of the British and German propaganda systems. However, it devotes little attention to British foreign propaganda, other than output for Germany. Rhodes’s Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion is really an excuse to reproduce material generated by the main belligerent nations. Roetter’s Psychological Warfare, while more scholarly, also takes a general approach. Some work has also been published looking at British propaganda after 1945. Britain’s Secret Propaganda War by Lashmar and Oliver, and Clark’s The Central Office of Information fit into this category; perhaps the most useful is Black’s Organising the Propaganda Instrument because it does at least allude to British Second World War propaganda. Only two published volumes focus on the entirety of British Second World War propaganda. Garnett’s official work, The Secret History of PWE, written shortly after the war, remained unpublished until 2002, although the manuscript had been available to researchers at the National Archives since the early 1990s. While Garnett covers a great deal of ground, his approach is tempered by the intention that the Secret History should act as a handbook should PWE ever be reconstituted. Garnett’s involvement in propaganda and his unrestricted access to PWE’s files prior to their post-war weeding make this to all intents and purposes a primary source. The other full-length study is Cruickshank’s The Fourth Arm which, like other books already mentioned, concentrates on propaganda to Nazi Germany. Three important monographs deal specifically with aspects of British Second World War propaganda. Stenton’s Radio London and Resistance in Occupied Europe discusses BBC broadcasting to France, although only up to the summer of 1943, and focusing particularly on the creation of active resistance. Delmer’s Black Boomerang and Howe’s The Black Game are both concerned with their authors’ roles in black propaganda, especially that which was intended for Germany. As little archival material is available on this subject, both are particularly useful sources elaborating on the black propaganda work undertaken by PWE. Delmer’s book is based largely on personal recollection; Howe, writing twenty-five years later, was able to add some archival research to support his memory. The gist of their books is repeated in Pether’s ‘Black Propaganda’, a pamphlet prepared for and sold to visitors at Bletchley Park, where the SIS code-breaking department, GC&CS, famously worked to break the Enigma machine just along the road from the propagandists’ base at Woburn. Aside from those of Garnett, Delmer and Howe, there are many other memoirs written by people in some way involved with, and having varying levels of importance within the hierarchy of British propaganda during the Second World War. Two of the top men, Stuart and Bruce Lockhart, heads of Department EH and PWE, respectively, set down their memoirs in Opportunity Knocks Once and Comes the Reckoning. One of Bruce Lockhart’s deputies, Wheeler Bennett, penned Special Relationships, while Leeper was responsible for When Greek Meets Greek. Barman, the Balkans Regional Director, wrote Diplomatic Correspondent. Other participants who produced memoirs include Baker White, author of The Big Lie, and Peskett, whose book Strange Intelligence covered his role in broadcasting with PWE. These all have their drawbacks. Some were written under the constraints of the Official Secrets Act, which circumscribed what they could say; others reflect only limited experience. That being said, Bruce Lockhart’s diaries, edited by Young and published posthumously, are only slightly more forthcoming, even though many of the constraints no longer applied, while Duff Cooper’s diaries, edited by his son, John Julius Norwich, records almost nothing of the war years, because Duff Cooper himself was simply too busy to write.

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The BBC’s role in broadcasting to France during the Second World War has received more attention, probably because none of its activities had to be kept secret. For this reason, any book dealing with France and the Second World War, whether a general work such as Ousby’s Occupation or Jackson’s France, must at least mention the BBC. British assistance to the French resistance has also captured the public imagination through a crop of blood-and-thunder style memoirs and accounts of spies and secret agents, such as Marshall’s The White Rabbit, Buckmaster’s Specially Employed, Minney’s Carve Her Name with Pride, and films and television series based on such works. But the BBC’s role in all of this tends to be accepted rather than analysed. It is also interesting to note that, while SOE agents were supposed to disseminate propaganda, I am aware of only one SOE memoir that mentions it, and even then with reference to French North Africa rather to France itself. This is Dick Cooper’s Adventures of a Secret Agent, which I found by happy chance hidden within the stacks in the University of Sheffield Library, and became the first – to the best of my knowledge – person to borrow it. The most important work concerning the BBC before and during the Second World War is Briggs’s History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, particularly volumes II and III, The Golden Age of Broadcasting and The War of Words. The original editions, published in 1965 and 1970, were based on BBC archives and private recollections and did not make use of PWE and other government documents which, with the exception of wartime copies of these documents retained by the BBC, did not begin to become available until the late 1960s. The content of the revised editions is not radically different. Briggs’s work is monumental in scale, dealing with the entire operation of the BBC in all its many facets, so some details have been overlooked. Paulu’s British Broadcasting and Hale’s Radio Power are useful, though less extensive: Paulu dilutes his study with an examination of television, while Hale discusses different world broadcasters, including the BBC. None of these three authors relate the BBC’s broadcasting work to other propaganda activities. A more recent source is Cornick’s article, ‘The BBC and the Propaganda War against Occupied France’, which is really useful because it includes the transcript of a fascinating interview with ´ Emile Delavenay, wartime deputy head of the BBC European Intelligence Department, a body vital to the collection and collation of information about BBC broadcasting which has virtually been ignored, except by Briggs. Rather different is Crémieux-Brilhac’s fivevolume Les Voix de la Liberté. Unlike the books already mentioned, it does make reference to leaflets, but its major value is that it reproduces hundreds of BBC French Service scripts, which I relied on to provide the great bulk of my source material about the content of BBC broadcasting. Only Holman has dealt specifically with British leaflets for France and the French Empire during the Second World War, in two articles and a book chapter. These are extremely helpful, dealing not only with aerial propaganda but also with some of the organisational difficulties encountered, but her main focus is publishing rather than propaganda. The final printed source is Falling Leaf. This is the journal of the Psywar Society, set up in the 1950s for collectors of aerial leaflets who followed in the footsteps of those French people for whom, as we have seen, this pastime replaced philately during the war. Falling Leaf is produced by Psywar members and the articles are clearly written with great care, although before a change of editor in 1998 some scholarly conventions, such as proper referencing, were overlooked. This caveat aside, it is an invaluable source, not merely for its articles, several of which I quote, but because it reproduces useful documents members have become aware of – notably saving me a trip to Dallas, Texas, to examine Edward Heron-Allen’s notes on the First World War Courrier de l’Air and even more usefully revealing the existence of A Complete Index of Allied Aerial Leaflets

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and Magazines 1939–1945, which became my bible. Falling Leaf is also, of course, a means to contact leaflet enthusiasts: those who I had dealings with were all immensely helpful. In addition to the published material mentioned above, four British theses have studied British Second World War propaganda. The most recent, my own, forms the basis for this book. None of the other three focus on France. The oldest, Stenton’s ‘British Propaganda and Political Warfare 1940–1944’, and Bell’s more recent ‘British Political Warfare 1939–1945’, both deal with the background of British propaganda, but focus upon British propaganda to the Balkans, where SOE and PWE were in conflict over propaganda responsibilities. Finally, Elkes’s ‘The Political Warfare Executive: A Re-evaluation based on the Intelligence Work of the German Section’ examines the role played by the propagandists in intelligence analysis, a useful activity of some importance to the British war effort, but not, of course, the main role for which the propagandists were employed. This material served to support the extensive archival research work I undertook, mostly at the National Archives, Kew, where material has gradually become available since the late 1960s. But PWE’s wartime filing system was inefficient and disorganised, with many documents being disposed of without regard for future needs, especially of historians! At the end of the war, the surviving material filled about 300 filing cabinets, which staff with little or no PWE experience reduced by at least 90 per cent. Howe points out that material relating to some sections has disappeared altogether. The most useful file series is FO 898, which includes 551 separate PWE files. These vary in size, from single pages to reams. They range in quality, from inexplicably blank sheets to carefully structured documents; from appallingly badly handwritten records (or, occasionally, illegible modern copies, made for ‘preservation’ reasons) to clearly typed sheets; and from seriously damaged to pristine items. The material itself can be best described as a farrago of incomplete sets of minutes, correspondence, plans, reports, draft and specimen leaflets and dissemination data, some items duplicated many times and some extremely rare. Much of the organisational minutiae has disappeared or was never recorded. Other useful and relevant files are also held by the National Archives. One feature they have in common, other than their lack of organisation, is the regular appearance of insertions noting the official retention of a specific document for several years to come, or documents that are allowed into the public view only with the addition of heavy black lines to erase the text underneath. To anyone encountering the marker pen, take heart. Very often the civil servant responsible for this censorship does not appear to have realised that a second copy of the same document exists elsewhere, often in the same file! Another significant source of archival material is the BBC Written Archives Centre at Caversham. Its holdings include sets of minutes, directives, reports and surveys; internal BBC documentation, unavailable elsewhere, sheds a different light on propaganda work. Some of the files I used in my research had to be specially vetted beforehand, as I was the first researcher to use them. The BBC Written Archives Centre did not at the time have a computerised catalogue of its holdings: it may be that there are additional treasures waiting to be found. Finally, the Department of Research and Information Services at the RAF Museum, Hendon, holds a collection of leaflets, bound with dissemination data, which is by far the easiest way to handle this material. Loose boxes of leaflets are also held at the RAF Museum, the British Library and the Imperial War Museum, while many single examples turn up in French resistance museums and elsewhere.

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Archival and Museum Holdings The British Broadcasting Corporation Written Archives Centre, Caversham, Reading Files drawn from the following file series: BBC WAC E1, 2, 9, 20, 41 BBC WAC R34 BBC Staff List (December 1942), supplement dated 26.11.43 (open shelves).

The British Library, St Pancras, London A boxed collection of loose leaflets, reference BS 14/1004.

The Department of Research and Information Services, RAF Museum, Hendon, London Air Ministry Propaganda Leaflets Dropped Over Enemy and Enemy-Occupied Territories, 22 vols, September 1939–March 1944 Boxes of loose leaflets, titled as follows: Propaganda Leaflets, French and Duplicates Propaganda Leaflet Duplicates with Translations, French Language and some French and Flemish Propaganda Leaflets, Third Generation Plus.

House of Commons Debates Hansard, 351 HC DEB 5S. Hansard, 363 HC DEB 5S. Hansard, 374 HC DEB 5S. Hansard, 376 HC DEB 5S. Hansard, 382 HC DEB 5S. Hansard, 383 HC DEB 5S.

The Imperial War Museum, Lambeth, London Boxes of loose leaflets, titled as follows: Aerial Leaflets 1939–45: 5(41:44) EH Aerial Leaflets 1939–45: 5(41:44) F1943 F101 to F188 Aerial Leaflets 1939–45: 5(41:44) F1944 Aerial Leaflets 1939–45: 5(41:44) Numeric to 5(41:481) Aerial Leaflets 1939–45: 5(12:438) to 5(12:44).

The Musée de la Résistance, de la Déportation et de la Libération du Lot, Cahors, France Compléments sur les Parachutages, display at the museum. (A printed reproduction was available, undated, purchased by Brooks, August 2001.)

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The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Kew, London Files drawn from the following file series: NA: PRO ADM 116 NA: PRO AIR 1, 14, 15, 20, 29, 37 NA: PRO CAB 104, 118 NA: PRO FO 371, 660, 898, 954 NA: PRO INF 1 NA: PRO WO 219.

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Index

Page references for figures and tables are shown in italics. Accord (photographic news booklet), 103 accuracy of leaflet drops, 51 accuracy of propaganda content see truthfulness of propaganda L’Action Fran¸caise (newspaper), 116 Actualités Mondiales: Journal No. 13, 64 ‘Advice to Frenchmen’, 118 Agen, 147 Agence Fran¸caise d’Information (AFI), 120 agents, 40, 110, 131, 150, 154, 187n, 200n7 Air Ministry approval of leaflet message, 36 collation of data on leaflet drops, 41 liaison with Department EH, 22 political control of RAF, 36 role in leaflet dissemination, 36–7 see also Bomber Command; RAF air-raid precautions, 83, 86, 137–9 aircraft, 38–9, 40–1, 131 Alençon, 43 Algiers, 31 Allard, Paul, Ici Londres, 126, 149, 199n67 Alsace, 120, 123 America see USA ‘America Has Taken Her Position’, 77 ‘America in the War’, 78 American Broadcasting System in Europe (ABSIE), 34 ‘The American Nation’, 81 L’Amerique en Guerre [sic], 118 Amiens, 49 amphibious operations, 97, 151 Anderson Award, 15–16 ‘Anglo-American Solidarity’, 77 Antelme, Major J. A. F., 189–90n39 anti-British feeling, 4, 58–9 Antibes, 118 ‘Arc de Triomphe’, 114 Ardèche, 50 Argenton-sur-Creuse, 51 Armistice 1940, 3–4, 58–63, 66 Army Cooperation Command, 39, 45

Aveyron, 147 ‘Avis’, 82, 89, 99 Badoglio, Pietro, 96 balloons, 39–40, 41–2, 51, 130 Barcelona, 132–3, 200n15 Barman, Thomas, 134 BBC autonomy, 20–1 Central News Desk, 29, 185n67 consistency between sections, 29 contribution to war effort, 160 control of, 11–12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19–21 domestic broadcasts, 12 English language services, 119, 123 European Intelligence Department, 53 European Services, 20–1, 27–8, 53 Foreign Office guidance, 11 and Free French propaganda, 31, 32 internal organisation, 27–9 Listener Research, 109 national anthems, 73, 192n34 overseas broadcasting, 11, 20–1, 52–3, 123 policy, 20, 72 and Political Warfare Executive, 18, 26, 28–9 postal communication, 108 rebroadcasts of American material, 33–4 rebroadcasts of Radio Patrie programmes, 145 reputation for truthfulness, 11, 68, 94–5, 126 scale of transmissions, xvii, 52–3 BBC French Service comparison with Research Unit broadcasts, 147–8 countermeasures to reception problems, 122–5 counterpropaganda, 125–6

index establishment, 28 evidence of reception, 53–4 Free French staff, 32, 95 Les Trois Amis, 95, 119 monitoring by Ministry of Information, 19 and Political Warfare Executive, 20 Porte-Parole, 82 Quart d’Heure Fran¸cais de Midi, 87 Quart d’Heure Fran¸cais du Soir, 78 schedules, 53, 119, 122–3 staffing, 28 transmissions to France, 52–6 see also broadcast message; Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais BCRA (Bureau central de Renseignements et d’Action), 110 Beck, Dr Leslie and black propaganda, 130–1, 133, 204n2 effectiveness of Research Units, 146, 147 joins SO1, xiv, 24 and priority of leaflets, 44–5 Begué, Georges (George Noble), 40, 100 Belgium, 30 Berliner Lokaler Anzeiger, 116, 117 Biarritz, 121 ‘Biggest Raid Ever’, 87 black propaganda broadcasts, 142–6 classification, 15 container drops, 130–2, 200n12 definition, xvii, 129 dissemination compared with white propaganda, 154–5 dissemination methods, 25, 129, 130–4, 142–4 dissemination of white propaganda, 129, 132, 133, 134–7 evidence of reception, 132 Free French contribution, 32 organisation of, 24–5, 142–6 and Political Warfare Executive, 129–34 production, 24–5, 133, 134, 137–41 responsibility of SO1, 129 smuggling, 132–3 see also Research Units black propaganda message, 137–41 encouraging passive resistance, 144–5 feedback, 141–2, 147–9 policy, 154 topicality, 131, 134, 146 ‘Blackmail of Prisoners Must End’, 45

221

Bletchley Park (Government Code and Cipher School), 110 Blois, 43, 51 Bomber Command benefits of leaflet drops, 40 casualties, 40–1, 188n17 navigation accuracy, 39, 41, 50 raids on France, 82–6 raids on Germany, 87–8 role in black propaganda dissemination, 131–2 role in leaflet dissemination, 37–9 see also Air Ministry; Operational Training Units; RAF bombing raids, 82–8, 136, 152 Bordeaux bombing of aircraft factory, 82 dissemination of black propaganda, 133, 146 jamming stations, 121 seat of French government, 58, 62 target for leaflet drops, 45, 46–7, 51 Boulogne-Billancourt bombing of Renault factory, 85, 115, 136 Bourdan, Pierre, 28, 77 Bourges, 121 Bracken, Brendan, xiv, 17, 18, 26 Brest, 47, 49 ‘Bretons’, 45 Brissot, Geneviève, 99 British Imperial Censorship, 109 British press and dissemination of rumours, 150, 204n61 British Security Coordination (BSC), 33, 111, 153 Brittany, 45, 121–2, 123 broadcast message American troops in Great Britain, 81–2 appeal to workers in factories, 83 attack on Pearl Harbor, 77, 78, 81–2 attacked by French media, 125–6 black propaganda, 144–6 bombing raids on France, 82–3, 86, 87 bombing raids on Germany, 87–8 Churchill speech, 92 conflicting output, 20, 183n38 countermeasures to broadcast interference, 122–5 D-Day and the liberation of France, 99–104 Darlan deal, 94–5 embellishment, 124 enemy countermeasures, 119–22 enemy counterpropaganda, 125–6

222

index

broadcast message (Continued ) Fall of France, 59–62 fall of Mussolini, 97–8 French as champions of liberty, 65 French fleet scuttled at Toulon, 94 German control of Vichy government, 65 German invasion of USSR, 73 inconsistencies, 60, 70 invasion of North Africa, 88–9, 92–3 invasion of Sicily and Italy, 96–9 Mers-el-Kébir, 64–6 sacrifice of French fleet, 94 second front in Europe, 89 St-Pierre-et-Miquelon, 70 target audiences, 101–3 topicality, 62 broadcasts compared to leaflets, 104, 112 coordination with leaflets, 19, 62, 66 cross-listening, 123, 198n developing communities of French, 127 dissemination, 52–3, 142–4 evidence of reception, 53–4 feedback, 107, 118–19, 147–9 to Germany, 14 inaccurate information, 199n67 iodoforms, 100 jamming, 55, 119, 121–4, 198n listening bans, 120, 121, 127 monitoring, 121 programme repetitions, 143 punishments for listening, 119–20, 122, 127–8 reception capabilities, 55 repetition, 124 schedules, 122–3 signal strength, 56 transcripts, 53 translations, 53 see also BBC; broadcast message Brooks, Reginald Dallas, xiv, 12, 16, 17, 18 Browett Inquiry, 22, 24 Bruce Lockhart, Robert black propaganda radio stations, 146 Director-General of Political Warfare Executive, xiv, 18–19 on government approval of white propaganda, 60 membership of Executive Committee, 16, 17 role of propaganda, 69, 92 views on USSR, 71

BSC (British Security Coordination), 33, 111, 153 Bulletin d’Information et Propagande, 124 Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action (BCRA), 110 camouflage, 137, 146 Cannes, 50, 118, 131, 147 Carte (resistance organisation), 144, 145, 202n40 cartoons, 15, 64, 71 Catholic Youth, 114 censorship British, 7–8, 70–1, 109 between Europe and USA, 109 French, 107–8 Central Directive Drafting Committee, 26, 70, 93 Centre et Ouest (newspaper), 116 CFLN (Comité Fran¸cais de la Libération Nationale), 97 CGT (Confédération générale du travail), 144, 146 chain letters, 114 Châlon-sur-Saône, 50, 189n34 Chartres, 49 Chateauroux, 49, 50 Cherbourg, 43 Les chevaliers du coup de balai (fictitious resistance group), 148, 149 ‘Choose and Act’, 62 CHQ (Country Headquarters, Woburn), 12, 22–3, 100–1 ‘Churchill’, 45 ‘Churchill 21.10.40’, 77 Churchill, Winston calls for resistance, 61 on Mers-el-Kébir, 64 on Operation Torch, 92 organisation of propaganda, 17 on overall war situation, 92 on RAF bombing, 136 speeches translated from broadcasts, 124 support for the French people, 60 visit to France, 103 ‘Churchill’s Speech’, 81 clandestine dissemination, 129–34, 142–6 clandestine press, 32, 104, 114 clergy, 144–5, 147, 148 Clermont-Ferrand Laval’s press, 117 leaflet reception, 46, 49, 51 Michelin factory, 131

index CNR (Conseil [National] de la Résistance), 145 Coastal Command, 39, 45 Cologne, 87, 136 Comité Directeur Central, 145 Comité Fran¸cais de la Libération Nationale (CFLN), 97 Commissariat of Information (Free French), 31 Committee on Foreign (Allied) Resistance, 15 communications disrupted by resistance, 100 communism, fears of, 70–2 Communist Party (CP) of Great Britain, 70, 71 Communist resistance groups, 132 ‘Complot Petain-Laval’, 137 Confédération générale du travail (CGT), 144, 146 conflict between propaganda organisations, 8, 11, 12, 15–17, 29–34 Conseil [National] de la Résistance (CNR), 145 consequences of propaganda, 21, 127 consistency of British message, 2, 21, 35, 60, 70, 154, 183n38 consistency of dissemination, 48–9 container drops, 38–9, 130–2 control of propaganda see organisation of propaganda coordination of propaganda, 16–17, 21–9 with Free French, 31 with USA, 33 World War I, 7–8, 8 Corsica, 97, 98 costs of propaganda operation, 161 countermeasures by Britain, 122–5 countermeasures by enemy, 115–16, 119–22 counterpropaganda to broadcasts, 125–6 discrediting Research Units, 148, 149 forged leaflets, 117–18 against Germany, 59, 64, 69, 77 to leaflets, 116–18 Radio Revolution, 148 Country Headquarters, Woburn see CHQ ‘Courage French Friends’, 77 Le Courrier de l’Air Anglo-American solidarity, 77 attack on Pearl Harbor, 77, 78, 79–80 black propaganda dissemination channels, 136

223

bombing raids on France, 83, 86 capture of POWs, 97 ‘Churchill - Revised’ supplement, 115 Churchill speech, 92 contribution of USA, 79–80 counteracting German propaganda, 77 counterpropaganda about, 116, 117 covert circulation, 113 D-Day preparations, 99 de Gaulle on Bordeaux government, 79–80 dissemination, 45, 49, 50, 51 editor, 32 factory workers targeted, 83 faked and forged copies, 116–18 feedback about broadcasts, 107 information on BBC schedules, 20 invasion of Corsica, 97, 98 invasion of North Africa, 74, 75–6, 89, 92 invasion of Sicily and Italy, 96–7, 98 invasion of USSR, 73–4, 75–6, 98 Madagascar, 89 miniature versions, 137 post D-Day events, 103 scuttling of French fleet at Toulon, 94 US rearmament, 81 World War I, 2, 9 Le Courrier des Fran¸cais de France, 128 Courrier Illustrated, 81, 137 credibility of propaganda, 25, 96, 150–1 Crewe House (Department of Enemy Propaganda), 8, 9 La Croix (newspaper), 149 cross-listening, 123, 198n57 D see Secret Intelligence Service, Section D D-Day, 99–104 Dakar, 88–9 Dalton, Hugh, xiv conflict with Duff Cooper, 15–17 liaison with CHQ , 25–6 and the Political Warfare Executive, 18 reaction to SO1 guidance leaflet, 67 on rumour-mongering, 152 Darlan, François, 4, 88, 95, 148 negotiation with Allies, 94 de Gaulle, Général Charles approval of broadcasts, 60, 191n8 blamed for acts of resistance, 148 calls for resistance, 61 contribution to British propaganda, 60, 70

224

index

de Gaulle, Général Charles (Continued ) and BBC, 31 prevented from broadcasting on Darlan deal, 95 and Radio Inconnue, 148 visit to France, 103 see also Free French Déat, Marcel, 116 deception schemes aided by propaganda, 30, 152 D-Day plans, 100 Operation Mincemeat, 95 Operation Overthrow, 89, 193n48 Operation Starkey, 96 Delmer, Sefton, xiv, 24, 142 Department EH (EH) assessment of evidence of reception, 110 and BBC, 11–12, 14, 19 organisation, 7, 12–14, 13, 22 Planning and Broadcasting Committee, 14, 59 rebirth as SO1, 23 see also CHQ; SO1 Department of Enemy Propaganda, 8, 9 Department of Information (DOI), 8 Dieppe, 89 Dijon, 51 diplomats and dissemination of rumours, 150 ‘Discretion and Vigilance’, 96 distribution see black propaganda, dissemination; broadcasts, dissemination; leaflet dissemination domestic propaganda, 71 Donovan, Colonel William J., 33 ‘Don’t Go To Germany’, 87 Dorchy, P. H. G., 132–3, 200n15 Dordogne, 50 Doriot, Jacques, 144, 148 Douai, 43 Duchesne, Jacques on Darlan issue, 95 marks start of liberation, 103 on North African campaign, 88–9 oral delivery, 119 recruited to BBC French Service, xiv, 28 reports invasion of Sicily, 96 on US involvement, 77 Duff Cooper, Alfred conflict with Dalton, 15–17 role in organisation of propaganda, xv, 14–17, 20 views on USSR, 71

´ Eclaireur de Nice (newspaper), 126 Eden, Anthony, xv, 16, 18 EH see Department EH Eiffel Tower, 150 ‘Eisenhower Declarations’, 92 Eisenhower, Dwight David, 92, 99, 102 ‘Eisenhower Proclamation’, 101 Electra House see Department EH employment of aliens, 24 enemy-occupied countries, receipt of leaflets, 14 enemy troop movements, 100 ‘England Speaks To You’, 63 envelopes, 134, 137, 138 ´ Etroussat, 114, 116 evidence of broadcast reception BBC, 53–4, 108, 118 reliability of evidence, 109 Research Units, 147 evidence of leaflet drops, 50–2 evidence of leaflet reception, 107–11, 132 Evidence of Reception reports BBC, 42, 53–4, 108 leaflets, 109–10 Political Warfare Executive, 108 and RAF claims, 49 exploitation of fear, 68 factory workers, 82–3, 83–5, 101–3 Fairlie inquiry, xv, 149, 160 fake leaflets, 117–18, 137 Fall of France, 3–4, 58–63, 66 Fédération Française des Postes Privés, 125 feedback BBC broadcasts, 107, 118–19 leaflets, 111–13, 141–2 Research Units, 147–9 validity of, 109 Fighter Command, 39 ‘First American Troops’, 81 Force Fran¸caises de l’Intérieur (FFI), 103 Ford factory, Poissy, 85–6 Foreign Information Service (FIS), 33 Foreign Office authority to de Gaulle to broadcast, 60, 191n8 control of Political Warfare Executive, 18 control of sabotage and subversion, 14 News Department, 8, 8 policy, 8, 26 Political Intelligence Department see Political Intelligence Department

index responsibility for Department EH, 13, 13 and rumour-mongering, 150, 151 forgeries counterpropaganda leaflets, 117–18, 197n37 French currency, 201n21 French stamps, 134 letterheads, 138 see also fake leaflets Les Français de France (German radio station), 117 Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Emigrés, 125 Les Fran¸cais Parlent aux Fran¸cais focus on world war, 78 formerly Ici la France, 60 liberation, 103–4 North African campaign, 88–9 sacrifice of French fleet, 94 value to French, 118–19 La France Catholique (Research Unit) effectiveness, 147 jamming, 148, 203n55 religious programmes, 144–5 secrecy of origin, 148–9, 203n56 transmission problems, 142 La France Libre (newspaper), 134–5, 141, 201n25 Francs-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP), 72 Free French air drops, 31 BBC broadcasts, 31, 60 BBC strike, 95 black propaganda, 32, 132 Commissariat of Information, 31 competition with British propaganda, 29 contribution to war effort, 68, 103 control of St-Pierre-et-Miquelon, 70 and the Darlan deal, 95 defending French empire, 89 dissemination of black propaganda, 136 independence, 29–32 and invasion of Italy, 97 origin of, 3 and Political Warfare Executive, 30–2 and Psychological Warfare Branch, 32 and Research Units, 143–4, 145, 149 and USA, 31 see also de Gaulle, Général Charles freedom radio stations see Research Units Frenay, Henri, 124 French as champions of liberty, 62–3 French Catholic press, 149

225

French civilians, sacrifices, 85, 87 French départements receiving leaflets, 43 French forces, 3–4, 63–4, 93–4, 97, 98 French Indochina, 74, 77, 89, 90–1 French morale, 3–4, 59, 61, 67, 86, 118–19, 155, 160 French National Committee, 144 French North Africa, 63–6, 88–95 French radio stations, 125 French Secret Service, 144 French West Africa, 88, 124 ‘French Workers’, 62–3 French workers, 82–3, 83–5, 86, 88, 101–3, 139–40, 139–41, 147 ‘Frenchmen’, 62, 66 ‘Frenchmen Be Prepared’ (Invasion Manual), 100 ‘Frenchmen! What Happened At Oran?’, 66 GC&CS (Government Code and Cipher School), 110 Geneva Convention, 97 Gennevilliers bombing raid, 85–6 geographical coverage black propaganda, 133–4 broadcasts, 53–4 leaflet dissemination, 39, 43, 45–52 German authorities in France broadcasters, 98 countermeasures to propaganda, 115–16, 119–22 counterpropaganda, 116–18, 148 fear of British propaganda, 128 influence on Vichy government, 65–6 listening bans, 119 propaganda, 64, 122 radio transmitters, 125 rumours about, 152 German forces, morale, 150, 151–2, 155 Germany blamed for invasion rumours, 96 declaration of war on USA, 77 hatred of, 68 Hitler’s need for oil, 72 occupation of all France, 93 unpopularity in Italy, 96 Gers, 50 Gillie, Darsie, xv, 20, 28, 104, 185n65 Gillois, André, xv, 101, 145 Giraud, Henri, 70, 88 Goering, Hermann, 136 gold requisition (rumour), 150–1 Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS), 110

226

index

Grenoble, 46, 147 grey propaganda, 129, 133, 134–7 Gringoire (newspaper), 64, 126 GS1 (Gustav Siegfried Eins) (Research Unit), 24, 142, 184n49, 202n36 handwriting styles, 134 Harris, Arthur T., xv, 37 Hitler, Adolf, rumours about, 151 HMSO (His Majesty’s Stationery Office), 27 Honneur et Patrie: Radio de la Résistance Française see Radio Patrie Honneur et Patrie (radio programme), 31 Howe, Ellic, xv, 24, 25, 32, 133, 134, 141, 184n57 Iceland, 78 Ici la France (broadcast), 60 Ici Londres! (Paul Allard), 126, 199n67 ˆ d’Yeu, 49 Ile ‘Illustrated Folder’, 92 inconsistencies see consistency of British message Indochina, 74, 77, 89, 90–1 industrial targets, 82–7 informers, 120 intelligence, 22, 130, 150, 199–200n2 Inter-Services Security Board (ISSB), 30, 150, 151 interceptions, 108–9, 118 interrogations, 111 interwar period, 9–12 invasion of French North Africa, 88–95 invasion of Sicily and Italy, 95–9 invasion of USSR, 70–4, 151 iodoforms, 100 Issoudun, 50 Italian troops in France (rumours), 152 Italy, 95–9 jamming see radio jamming Japan, 74–7, 81, 89, 90–1 Jebb, Gladwin, 17 ‘Joint American-British Plan of Pyschological Warfare for France and the French Empire’, 93 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 150, 151 journalists and dissemination of rumours, 150 Jura Mountains, 50 justification of British actions, 4–5, 83–5, 92

Keeble, Harold, 27, 184n57 Kirkpatrick, Ivone, xv, 18, 20, 21 Laval, Pierre, 117, 150, 154 Lavelaye, Victor de, 20 Le Havre, 47, 51 Le Mans, 52 leaflet bombs, 39 leaflet dissemination Air Ministry’s role, 36–7 black propaganda, 129, 130–4 by bombing strategy, 47 casualties, 40–1 covert circulation, 113–15 data on numbers reading, 115 effect on Germany, 116 enemy countermeasures, 115–16 to enemy-occupied countries, 14 evidence from France, 49–52 evidence from UK, 46–9 first drops to France, 14, 23 method of drops from aircraft, 38 military considerations, 104 navigation accuracy, 39, 41 oral dissemination, 113 political warfare strategy, 47 problems, 38–40, 43, 44, 50–1, 112–13 RAF data, 41–4, 42 targets, 44–9, 48 Unoccupied France, 43 warnings of Allied bombing, 101 World War I, 9 see also evidence of leaflet reception leaflet message air-raid precautions, 83, 86 Allied instructions, 96 black propaganda, 137–41 bombing raids on France, 82–6, 84 bombing raids on Germany, 87–8, 136 Boulogne-Billancourt bombing of Renault factory, 85, 115, 136 compared to broadcasts, 104, 112 consequences of, 21, 127 coordination with broadcasts, 19, 62, 66 D-Day, 99–101, 102, 103, 104 denunciation of Vichy government, 66 dissemination impact on, 37, 131 encouraging non-cooperation, 62–3 the Fall of France, 58–63 feedback, 111–13, 141–2 French as champions of liberty, 62–3 and the French fleet, 94 friendship with France, 63 Henry Wallace speech, 136

index to hoteliers, 137–9 invasion of Corsica, 97, 98 invasion of North Africa, 88–9, 92 invasion of Sicily and Italy, 96–7, 98 Mers-el-Kébir, 66 reporting speeches, 114 secrecy of contents to British, 36–7 US involvement, 77, 81 US rearmament, 81 use of aerial photographs, 85, 87 leaflets as collectors items, 113, 114–15 copies, 114, 196n28 faked and forged, 116–18 miniature versions, 134, 135, 137 printing techniques, 25, 26–7, 112, 134, 137 punishments for possession, 115, 127–8 Leeper, Reginald (Rex) aims for propaganda content, 69 assessment of Research Units, 147 on black leaflets, 137 effectiveness of rumour-mongering, 152 and Foreign Office, 10–11 ‘Propaganda and Political Strategy’, 66–7 and SO1, xv, 15, 16, 17 letterheads, forged, 138 Lettre d’Angleterre, 134–5 Lévy, Louis, 65–6 liaison see coordination of propaganda liberation of France, 99–104 ´ Liberté, Egalit´ e, Fraternité (radio programme), 31 Lille, 46 Limoges, 46, 49, 121 Lisbon, 108, 111, 132 listening bans, 119–21, 127 London Calling Europe, 29 London Controlling Section (LCS), 30 London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee (LPWCC), 34 London Reception Centre (LRC), 111 Low, David (cartoonist), 70–1 Luftwaffe letter, 137–9 Lyon black propaganda, 133, 135, 147 fake leaflets, 118 jamming stations, 121 leaflet reception, 46, 49, 51 ‘M’ balloons, 39–40, 41–2, 51, 130 Madagascar, 88–9

227

Maillaud, Pierre see Bourdan, Pierre ‘The Man in the Street’, 28 manufacturing targets, 82–7 Marin, Jean, xvi, 28, 93, 95, 193n58 Marseille black propaganda, 132, 133, 147 jamming stations, 121 leaflet reception, 45 Mengin, Robert, 32 ‘Mercantile Navy’, 51 Mers-el-Kébir, 63–6, 191n13 ‘Message To Occupied France’, 82, 83 Metz, 46 Meudon, 121 MEW see Ministry of Economic Warfare MI7, 8, 8–9 MI9, 111 MI19, 111 Michelin factory, 131 military and operational propaganda, 34 military as source of rumours, 150 military considerations, 94, 122 Military Intelligence, 22 miniature versions of leaflets, 134, 137 Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW), 15, 17, 111, 151 Ministry of Information (MOI) contacts abroad with Political Warfare Executive, 111 control of BBC, 19–21 control of Department EH, 13, 14 control of Political Warfare Executive, 18 control of white propaganda, 15, 16, 18 French Section, 14 interwar period, 10–11 Policy Committee, 59 propaganda planning, 68–9 representative in Lisbon, 111 restructure, 7 smuggling black propaganda, 132, 133 strategy regarding USSR, 71 World War I, 8, 8, 9 MOI see Ministry of Information ‘Monthly Intelligence Report: Europe’, 53 Montpellier, 51, 114 morale of enemy, 9, 69, 150, 151–2, 155 morale of French people, 3–4, 59, 61, 67, 86, 118–19, 155, 160 ‘More Than 1,000 Bombers’, 87 Mortimore, Captain, 132 Morvan, Yves see Marin, Jean

228

index

Munroe bombs, 39 Mussolini, Benito, 96–7 Nancy, 43, 46 Nantes, 47, 49 navigation accuracy, 39, 41, 50 Nazi-Soviet Pact, 71 negative propaganda, 59, 64, 69, 77 Neutral Press Committee (NPC), 8, 8 neutral states and postal communication, 131 ‘News Digest’, 22 news media, evidence of rumour-mongering, 153–4 Newsome, Noel, xvi, 20, 28 Nice, 118 nickels (dissemination of leaflets) see leaflet dissemination ‘Night and Day the RAF Attacks’, 87 Noble, George, 40, 100 North Africa, 63–6, 88–95 Northcliffe, Lord (Alfred Charles Harmsworth), 9–10 Les Nouveaux Temps (newspaper), 116 Le Nouvelliste de Lyon (newspaper), 149 NPC (Neutral Press Committee), 8, 8 Oberlé, Jean, 28, 98, 99, 103 Occupied France black propaganda, 150–1 censorship of mail, 107–8 differentiated from Unoccupied France, 3, 5 listening bans, 119–21 messages regarding bombing raids, 82–3 targets for propaganda, 44, 46–7 see also Vichy government Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 33, 144, 150 Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), 33 Office of War Information (OWI), 33, 34, 118 ‘On the Orders of Germany’, 89, 90-1 Operation Catapult, 63–4, 191n13 Operation Dragoon, 99 Operation Exporter, 88 Operation Husky, 95–6 Operation Ironclad, 88 Operation Jubilee, 89 Operation Menace, 88 Operation Mincemeat (deception), 95

Operation Overlord, 47, 99 Operation Overthrow (deception), 89, 193n48 Operation Starkey (deception), 96 Operation Torch, 32, 33, 88–93, 115, 146, 152 operational propaganda, 34 Operational Training Units (OTUs), 39, 41, 43, 45, 47; see also Bomber Command Oradour-sur-Glane, 103 Oran, 63, 66 organisation of propaganda background, 1–2, 7 coordination, 16–17, 21–9 costs of operation, 161 development, 12–21, 13, 16, 18 interwar period, 9–12 and operational propaganda, 34 rivalry, 29–34 summary, 34–5 World War I, 7–9, 8 OSS (Office of Strategic Services), 33, 144, 150 OTUs see Operational Training Units Overseas News Agency (ONA), 153 OWI (Office of War Information), 33, 34, 118 pacifism, 71 Paniguian, H. A., 112, 118, 160 paper shortages, 113, 117 paper wastage, 27, 185n59 Paris black propaganda, 132, 146, 147, 148 jamming stations, 121 leaflet reception, 45, 46, 49, 51, 52 reception of broadcasts, 122 Parti Communiste Fran¸cais (PCF), 72, 144 Parti Populaire Fran¸cais (PPF), 144, 148 Pau, 49, 124, 147 Pearl Harbor, 74, 78 Périgueux, 49 Perpignan, 132 personal messages, 100 Pétain government see Vichy government Pétain, Henri Philippe, 3, 5, 58–9, 150 photographs, use of, 40, 85, 87, 112 PID see Political Intelligence Department pilots, 41, 86, 108 Planning and Broadcasting Committee, 14, 62 Planning Directorate, 26

index planning of propaganda effect of aircraft range, 96 interwar period, 10–12 lack at Fall of France, 59 need for, 4–5 strategic developments, 22, 25–6, 66–70 see also organisation of propaganda Poissy, Ford factory, 85–6 police surveillance, 120 policy consistency of British message, 94–5 determined by British government, 60 encouraging resistance, 59, 68 not inciting violence, 36 principles, 69–70 restrictions, 70 SOE, 67–8 views on de Gaulle, 69 Political Intelligence Department (PID), 8, 10, 13, 13–14, 15, 182n16 Political Warfare Executive (PWE) agents, 30, 130–1 and BBC, 19–21, 28, 122–3 black propaganda, 24–5, 129, 130–4, 142–6 and British Security Coordination, 153 Central Directive Drafting Committee, 26, 70, 93 contacts abroad, 111 contribution to war effort, 160 control of Department EH, 14 coordination with other organisations, 33 D-Day plans, 100–1 dissemination priorities, 45–6, 85 Editorial Unit, 27, 135 Evidence of Reception reports, 42, 108 Executive Committee, 17, 26 Foreign Office control, 18 and Free French, 31–2, 144 leaflet production, 26–7, 104 and London Controlling Section, 30 and Ministry of Information, 7, 18 mission to USA, 33 and Operation Torch, 89, 92 organisation, 17–19, 18, 23–4 planning section, 26 post-Liberation report, 141 and Psychological Warfare Branch, 34 and Radio Patrie, 149 and RAF, 37–8, 45 Research Units, 142–6, 148, 203n55 role in propaganda output, 69

229

and rumour-mongering, 149–52, 153 and SOE, 29–30 Special Operations Directorate, 24 and US news media, 153 see also SO1 population data, 43–4 Porte-Parole (broadcast), 82 post-liberation normality, 103 Postal and Telegraphic Censorship, 109 postal communications, 107–9, 118, 132, 154 POWs, 9, 22, 97 PPF (Parti Populaire Fran¸cais), 144, 148 pre-recording of radio broadcasts, 142, 201–2n35 ‘Precautions Against Accidents’, 139–41, 139–40 press and dissemination of rumours, 150, 153 Press Bureau, 7–8, 8 ‘The Prestige of France Re-established in Syria?’, 89 printing techniques, 25, 26–7, 134, 137 ‘Proclamation’, 101, 102 ‘Propaganda and Political Strategy’, 66–7 prosecutions for listening, 120–1 Provisional French National Committee, 62 Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB), 31, 34 Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (PWD/SHAEF), 34, 101 punishments for listening to broadcasts, 119–21 for possession of leaflets, 115 PWB (Psychological Warfare Branch), 31, 34 PWD/SHAEF, 34, 101 PWE see Political Warfare Executive ‘Q’ leaflets, 41–2, 130 Quart d’Heure Fran¸cais de Midi, 87, 99 Quart d’Heure Fran¸cais du Soir, 78 Radio Algiers, 145 Radio Brazzaville (Free French station), 145, 149 Radio Brazzaville II (German-operated station), 149 Radio France, 31 radio frequencies, 53, 55, 121–2, 142, 146

230

index

Radio Gaulle, 32, 144, 145, 146, 147–8, 203n55 Radio Inconnue, 143–4, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149 radio jamming BBC broadcasts, 55, 119, 121–4, 198n50 jamming stations, 121 Research Units, 148, 203n55 radio location devices, 143 radio ownership (in France), 54–5 Radio Paris, 98, 103–4, 125 Radio Patrie, 32, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149 radio reception, 55, 122, 123–4, 148; see also radio jamming Radio Révolution, 117, 148 radio sets availability, 54–6 confiscation, 119–20, 122, 124–5 licensing, 54–5, 124 reception capabilities, 55 sabotaged, 124 radio stations see names of individual stations; Research Units radio transmitters, 122, 142, 198n51 Radio Travail, 143, 144, 145, 146, 202n39 Radio Vichy, 117 Radiodiffusion Nationale de Paris, 125 RAF attitude to dissemination, 37–8, 187n8 benefits of leaflet drops, 40 casualties, 40–1, 86, 188n17 crew morale, 36 dissemination data, 41–4, 42, 131–2, 200n12 dissemination evidence from France, 49–52 dissemination problems, 38–40 dropping agents, 40, 187n2 inaccurate information about drops, 50, 189n34 navigation accuracy, 39, 41, 50 and Political Warfare Executive, 22 reconnaissance, 22, 40, 85–6 target priorities, 37, 44–9, 48 training of intelligence officers, 37 see also Air Ministry; Bomber Command; Operational Training Units ‘RAF Against Goebbels’, 37 RAF leaflets, suitability for smuggling, 132 ‘RAF Message’, 83 railway workers, dissemination of leaflets, 114

reception committees for black propaganda, 131 reconnaissance, 40, 85–6 Reid, Eileen, 133 Reims, 47, 121 Renault, 83–5, 84 ‘The Renault Factories Bombed’, 45, 85 reprisals for listening to broadcasts, 122 Research Units (RUs), 25, 184n51 assessment of contribution, 155 enemy counterpropaganda, 148 exposure, 149 feedback, 147–9 link to black printed propaganda, 146 operation of, 142–6 pre-recording of radio broadcasts, 142, 201–2n35 see also names of individual radio stations resistance encouraged, 61, 73, 144, 160 resistance groups Carte, 144, 145, 202n40 communist, 132 disillusion with Allies, 94 disrupting communications, 100 fictitious, 148, 149 Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, 72 see also Free French Revue de la Press Libre, 81, 87–8, 92, 97, 137 rivalry between organisations, 29–34 Roanne, 147 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 77, 92, 95, 124 rotogravure, 26 Rouen, 49 rumour-mongering and British press, 153–4, 204n61 credibility of, 25, 150–1 dissemination, 149–52 feedback, 152–4 invasion of Sicily, 95–6 organisation of, 25 and US press, 150, 153 vetting, 150, 151 RUs see Research Units Russia see USSR sabotage, 11, 14, 21, 148 Sachs investigation, 22–3 St-Armand-Montrond, 50 St-Denis, Michel see Duchesne, Jacques St-Etienne, 46, 49, 131 St-Pierre-et-Miquelon, 70

index St-Quentin, 46 St-Valéry, 51 Sarlat, 131 Savoie, 50 SBC (Small/Standard Bomb Container), 38–9 Schumann, Maurice, xvi, 31, 66 secrecy black propaganda, 24–5 broadcasting, 15 D-Day plans, 100–1 leaflet content, 36–7 Operation Torch, 92 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) assessments of rumour-mongering, 154 and dissemination of rumours, 150 evidence of reception reports, 110 Section D, 11, 12, 13 vetting rumours, 151 Seine-Inférieure, 146 SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force), 101; see also PWD/SHAEF Sherwood, Robert, 33 sibs (rumours) see rumour-mongering Sicily, 95–6 ‘Sir Archibald Sinclair’, 87 SIS see Secret Intelligence Service ‘Six Pictures of the Year’, 49 Small/Standard Bomb Container (SBC), 38–9 smuggling black propaganda, 132–3 SO1 and British Security Coordination, 153 clandestine dissemination, 129–34 conflicts, 17 French Region, 19–20 intelligence section, 24 operation of Research Units, 143 organisation, 15–17, 16, 23 policy, 104–5 responsibility for black propaganda, 129, 153 staffing, 15 strategic planning, 66–9, 68, 192n20 targets for propaganda, 45 and US news media, 153 SO2, 16, 30 SOE agents, 40, 131, 150, 154, 200n7 attitude to communism, 72 benefits of leaflet drops, 40 and British Security Coordination, 153 charter, 23

231

cooperation with communist groups, 72 and Department EH, 14–15 dissemination of black propaganda, 25, 130–2, 133, 136 organisation, 14–17, 16, 18 propaganda to enemy occupied countries, 23 and Research Units, 144 rivalry with PWE, 29–30 vetting rumours, 151 Soviet resistance, 73 Special Operations Directorate, 24 Special Operations Executive see SOE Special Operations Executive, SO1 see SO1 Special Operations Executive, SO2, 16, 30 ‘Special Warning’, 96 Standard Bomb Container (SBC), 38–9 Stephenson, William, 33, 110 Stockholm, 111 Strasbourg, 46 Strategic Planning Staff, 82–3 strategy of propaganda see planning of propaganda Stuart, Campbell, xvi, 11, 15, 22 subversion, 14, 33 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, 101; see also PWD/SHAEF ‘Survey of European Audiences: France’, 53 Syria, 89 Tallents, Stephen, 10–11 Tangiers, 108, 154 targets for propaganda dissemination, 44–7 POWs, 9, 22 workers, 82–3, 83–5, 86, 101–3, 139–41, 139–40, 147 telegraphic interception, 154 ‘To Occupied France’, 83, 85, 116 ‘To Our Ally the French Nation’, 89 ‘To People of France’, 89 ‘To the French People’, 49 Toulon, 45, 93–4 Toulouse black propaganda, 131, 132, 133, 147 jamming stations, 121 leaflet reception, 45, 49 ‘Towards the Final Assault’, 99 transcripts of broadcasts, 53 translations of broadcasts, 53

232

index

travellers and dissemination of rumours, 150 Treaty of Versailles, 9 Les Trois Amis (broadcast), 95, 119 Troyes, 52 ‘The Truth About Dakar’, 89 truthfulness of propaganda, 8, 9–10, 11, 21, 36, 59, 129 typefaces, 134; see also printing techniques underground press, 141 Underground Propaganda (UP) Committee, 25, 133, 150, 151 underground warfare, 145 United States Army Air Force (USAAF), 33, 39 Unoccupied France agents in, 131 black propaganda, 141, 150–1 Bordeaux government, 58, 62 differentiated from Occupied France, 3, 5 dissemination of leaflets, 43 listening bans, 120–1 taken over by Germany, 93 targets for propaganda, 44, 45–6 see also Vichy government USA attack on Pearl Harbor, 74, 78 coordination with British propaganda, 33 defence of Atlantic, 78 domestic support for war, 78, 81 and Free French, 31 historical links with France, 92 propaganda organisation, 32–4 rearmament, 81 reliability of intelligence, 110 and Research Units, 143–4 rumour dissemination and US press, 150, 153 subversive activities, 33 troops arrive in Great Britain, 81–2 USAAF (United States Army Air Force), 33, 39 USSR advance on Germany, 103 British view of, 71 invasion by Germany, 70–4 V campaign, 20–1, 125 V1 missile attacks on London, 103 Valenciennes, 46, 118

van Moppès, Maurice, 28, 97 Vatican involvement (rumour), 148–9, 203n56 Vendémiare (newspaper), 126 Versailles, 50 Vichy government, 3 British policy towards, 31, 93 broadcasters, 98 countermeasures to propaganda, 115–16, 119–22 counterpropaganda, 64, 116–18, 148 fear of British propaganda, 128 forces in North Africa, 88–9 monitoring broadcasts, 121 propaganda attacks on, 62, 64, 66 radio transmitters, 125 undermining French confidence in, 150 see also Unoccupied France Vichy personnel in Paris (rumours), 152 Vichy (town) broadcast reception, 147 jamming stations, 121 leaflet reception, 46, 49 posting facilities, 132 uprising 11 Nov. 1940, 21 Voice of SHAEF, 100, 101, 194n68 La Voix de la France Libre, 31 Vosges, 147 Wallace, Henry, 136 War Cabinet authority to de Gaulle to broadcast, 60, 191n8 War Office, 14 War Propaganda Bureau, 8, 8 ‘Warning’ (F.141, 1942), 92 ‘Warning’ (F.89, 1943), 96 wavelengths, 53, 55, 121–2, 142 WCDA (radio station), 49 weather conditions, 39, 40, 44, 51, 131 Weekly Times, 134–5, 201n22 white propaganda classification, 15 definition, xvii dissemination by black means, 129, 132, 133, 134–7 dissemination compared with black propaganda, 154–5 see also broadcast message; leaflet message ‘Why This Photo Concerns You’, 73, 83–5, 84 wireless equipment, 54–6

index Wiskemann, Elizabeth, 133 Woburn see CHQ workers as propaganda targets, 83, 86, 139–40, 139–41, 147 World War I propaganda, 7–9, 8

233

WRUL Boston (radio station) British control, 33 link to Vatican rumour, 203n56 links with propaganda organisations, 153

234

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