Britain, Portugal and South America in the Napoleonic Wars: Alliances and Diplomacy in Economic Maritime Conflict (International Library of Historical Studies)

Martin Robson is a Visiting Lecturer at King’s College London, Defence Studies Department at the Joint Services Command...

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Martin Robson is a Visiting Lecturer at King’s College London, Defence Studies Department at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Defence Academy of the UK. He specialises in the military and maritime history of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. He completed his PhD in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London and is a former Caird Senior Research Fellow at the National Maritime Museum. He is the author of The Battle of Trafalgar, and co-author of Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal.

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The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the JSCSC, the UK MOD or any other government agency. Published in 2011 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com Distributed in the United States and Canada Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © 2011 Martin Robson The right of Martin Robson to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. International Library of Historical Studies 68 ISBN 978184885 196 2 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress catalog card: available Printed and bound in India by Thomson Press (India) Camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

For Horatio Arthur

CONTENTS

List of illustrations Acknowledgements Maps Preface

viii ix xi xiii

Introduction: British War Aims 1. The Strategy of the Talents Ministry 2. The Importance of Portugal 3. The Portuguese Crisis of 1806 4. The Rosslyn Mission to Lisbon 5. The Talents and South America 6. The Strategy of the Portland Ministry 7. The Portuguese Crisis of 1807 8. The Smith Expedition to Lisbon 9. The Embarkation of the Portuguese Royal Family 10. The Blockade of Lisbon 11. The Portland Ministry and South America in 1808 12. The Spanish Insurrection and British policy 13. Conclusion

1 21 27 41 60 83 101 113 137 154 174 196 214 226

Appendices Notes Bibliography Index

241 263 315 328

List of illustrations

1. ‘Napoleon on his Imperial throne’. This image of Napoleon in his coronation costume portrays his imperial power. (Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres, 1806, Musée de l’Armée). 2. Dom João (depicted in 1815 as King João VI of Portugal) with his wife Carlota Joaqunia of Spain. In 1806-1808 João was acting as Prince Regent, the effective head of the Portuguese government. (Manuel Dias de Oliveira, 1815, Acervo do Museu Histórico). 3. Sir William Sidney Smith, the Hero of Acre who foiled French ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1799 prompting Napoleon to remark of him ‘That man made me miss my destiny’. (John Eckstein, pub. 1808, © Crown copyright: UK Government Art Collection). 4. ‘A sketch of the River Tagus from the bar of Alcacova up to Coffin’s Hole’ showing the dangerous Cachops at the mouth of the river, forts St. Julian and Bugio, the city of Lisbon and the spacious inner harbour. (Anon, 1800, © National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London). 5. ‘A draught of the Portuguese Ship Rainha de Portugal of 74 guns as taken off dimensions’. The Rainha de Portugal sailed with the Portuguese fleet to Brazil. (Sketch made at Portsmouth Dockyard, 1809, © National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London). 6. ‘His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal and all the Royal Family embarking at Belem quay, Lisbon for Brazil on 27th November 1807 at 11 o’clock in the morning’. Much controversy would surround the precise events of the evacuation and exactly who deserved the credit. (Henry L’Évêque, 1815) 7. ‘Arrival of the Portuguese Royal Family in Brazil, 7 March 1808’. At centre is the 84 gun Portuguese flagship Principe Real, carrying the Prince Regent, HMS Marlborough (to the left) fires a salute. (Geoff Hunt, 1999). 8. Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, who was tasked with blockading Lisbon during the crucial months of 1808. (James Ramsay, pub. 1812, © Crown copyright: UK Government Art Collection). Every effort has been made to trace and contact copyright holders prior to publication. If notified, all reasonable efforts will be made to rectify any errors or omissions in subsequent printings.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is impossible to write a book like this without assistance and guidance and I am indebted to a number of people who have helped make it possible. The manuscript had its origins in my PhD thesis, completed under the supervision of Professor Andrew Lambert at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. As an undergraduate registered on the War Studies BA course it was Andrew who first opened my eyes to the role of navies in warfare, in particular the links between naval power, trade and empire. Over what is now nearing two decades he has been a ready source of advice on a whole host of matters, from academic to personal guidance and support; as well as a sounding board for ideas, not all of which have managed to see the light of day, yet. Professor Charles Esdaile, who acted as external examiner for my thesis, made a number of suggestions and provided extremely helpful and constructive feedback which allowed me to explore various issues in a little more depth in this work. Dr Thomas Munch-Petersen provided much useful information relating to the Copenhagen expedition of 1807 and the transfer of the secret intelligence from Tilsit in 1807. Professor Malyn Newitt fielded a number of my queries relating to Portugal and the organisation of the Portuguese military, while proving an extremely patient source of guidance on a number of related issues. My colleagues at King’s College London’s Defence Studies Department at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Defence Academy of the UK provide a constant source of inspiration and a ready source of expertise and advice. In particular, Professor Geoffrey Till read parts of the introduction and I am thankful for his kind comments and support, it is always good to know one is on the right tack, particularly when utilising theoretical frameworks proposed by colleagues. Professor

x

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

Till is Director of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, which is part of the Defence Studies Department, and I am thankful to fellow ‘Corbettians’, notably Professor Greg Kennedy and Drs Jon Robb-Webb and Andrew Gordon, for the open and wide-ranging conversations such an organisation thrives upon and which ultimately bear relevance and have an impact upon one’s work. I studied with a number of my now colleagues and possess a shared heritage of the entire PhD process, in particular the endless trips to the Public Records Office (now The National Archives) with Dr Chris Tripodi who enlivened the daily ‘experience’ of the London transport system. I would like to thank staff at a number of archives and libraries including The National Archives, the British Library, the National Maritime Museum, Durham Palace Green Library, Cambridge Country Record Office, the Institute of Historical Research and the West Yorkshire Archive Service for their helpful assistance in my research. I am also grateful to King’s College London for the award of a small grant to visit the George Canning Papers and I am grateful to Lord Harewood for permission to quote from the same. The production of this book has been greatly assisted by a number of people. Robert Jones (GAC) and Julie Cochrane (NMM) helped with the sourcing of images while Geoff Hunt very kindly supplied his splendid painting of the Portuguese arrival in Brazil. Pearson Education Limited kindly granted permission to reproduce the map of Europe in 1806. Tanya Phillips helped me with some of the more convoluted translations, Malcolm Day proved a diligent copy-editor and Diana LeCore an excellent indexer, while Jo Godfrey at I.B. Tauris displayed unbelievable patience as well as coming forward with valuable comments, support and feedback. Of course, any errors that remain in the work are entirely my own. I am extremely grateful to the trustees of the Scouloudi Foundation, in association with the Institute of Historical Research, who provided a grant to assist with the publication of this book. I would not even have been in a position to undertake my studies, let alone to write this book, without the kind and generous support of my chosen career from my parents. Finally, and certainly most importantly, Charlotte and Horatio provide a constant source of inspiration and a welcome distraction from the intricacies of the British maritime economic empire of the early nineteenth century. Martin Robson, Ide, August 2010

Europe in 1806. (© Pearson Education Limited, reproduced from Dwyer, P. G., Napoleon and Europe, (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2001)

Preface The Death of Pitt

‘Oh, my country! How I leave my country!’1 The last reported words of William Pitt, aged just 46 years and 8 months, uttered in the early hours of 23 January 1806 seem a suitable point with which to begin this study. His passing, set against the backdrop of French hegemony of Western and Central Europe, left Britain in a dire situation: without a leader, without a strategy and, seemingly, without allies. For Britain, Pitt was the war leader. Not, perhaps, a great war leader in the mould of his father William Pitt the Elder or, taking a more recent example, Winston Churchill, but a leader nonetheless, a personality capable of bringing some continuity and focus to the British political situation, both domestic and foreign. Pitt had been in office as Prime Minister for the majority of his adult life. Accepting George III’s proposal to form a government on 19 December 1783 aged just 24, Pitt held office for the next 17 years, resigning over Catholic Emancipation in March 1801. These years had witnessed his careful management of the fiscal challenges facing Britain, though the strategic challenges posed by the French Revolution were far more difficult to combat. Pitt’s war strategy had been to balance the requirements of overseas security against the formation of Continental coalitions to achieve British war aims in Europe. Continental policy had already been twice trumped by French military success. It had been the Austrians who, in the face of French military success, made peace with Revolutionary France in the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797, thereby signalling an effective end to the First Coalition. The Second Coalition suffered a similar fate, with the Russians already opting out due to disagreements with Britain over maritime rights. French success and Austrian defeats led the latter to make peace at Lunéville in February 1801. Britain and France agreed to a short-lived peace at Amiens in 1802. With the war renewed in 1803 and with Pitt back in office in May 1804 he was again the driving force behind British

xiv


strategy. Now Pitt resolved to concentrate his efforts solely on the war in Europe.2 Pitt’s careful diplomacy was given added impetus when Nelson won his greatest naval victory at Trafalgar on 21 October 1805, but British success at sea was countered by French military prowess on land. If the surrender of an entire Austrian army at Ulm on 19 October was bad enough, worse was to follow. The Battle of Austerlitz on 2 December 1805 over the combined Austro-Russian army was, perhaps, Napoleon’s greatest victory. Austerlitz knocked Austria out of the war. Following the Treaty of Pressburg, 26 December 1805, Austrian security was now defined by France. Russia, however, still possessed the means to continue fighting but would do so on her own terms retreating eastwards from central Europe. As Paul Schroeder has succinctly noted, it took Pitt two years of diplomacy to create the Third Coalition – it took Napoleon four months to smash it.3 Austerlitz therefore marked the end of Pitt’s last attempt at building a European coalition to fight France. News of the significant events in Europe trickled into Pitt in the weeks before his death, though the details and implications were not entirely clear until the last days of 1805 when news of an armistice reached London.4 Once digested the situation became clear: Austria was now out of the war (and would stay there until 1809). Prussia had, for all intents and purposes, remained out of the war. Although there had been plans for a British army to operate in Northern Germany, French military success put paid to any hope of cooperation with Prussia (though she would fight and be defeated in 1806). To the east the Russians remained active but isolated and on the defensive; unable to influence the situation in the heartland of Europe. France had achieved hegemony in Western and Central Europe. Pitt had failed. Where did all this leave Britain? We cannot be sure when, where or even if Pitt, in response to the news of Austerlitz, asked for a map to find the obscure place name and, upon finding it, really did utter the prophetic words ‘Roll up that map: it will not be wanted these ten years’.5 Pitt’s health had been in decline since 1797; heavy drinking had left him suffering from gout and various digestive ailments. Visits to take the waters in Bath, where he received news of Austerlitz, provided temporary respite but the strain of the premiership eventually took its toll. He initially met the reverse of his great plan with stoicism, though this could not hide the fact he had received a mortal blow. Close friends now noticed his degenerating health, yet the shock of his death was profound

PREFACE

xv

and was, perhaps, symptomatic of his withdrawal from sociable company. The challenges facing the ministries that followed Pitt’s death, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents’ and the Portland Ministry, were considerable. How they met those challenges is the subject of this work. In order to assess British policy in these years it is first necessary to address the issue of British war aims: essentially what Britain fighting for and what she was not. Once those aims have been identified the means of achieving them can be examined. This question of aims and means will be examined with the framework of the concept of maritime economic war, thereby contextualising British policy towards Portugal and South America, which is at the heart of this study. …

Introduction BRITISH WAR AIMS

Set against the maelstrom of Napoleonic Europe, British policy towards Portugal and South America in the years 1806-1808 might seem a sideshow, albeit an interesting one, to the main events.1 The years following Admiral Lord Nelson’s crushing tactical and operational naval victory over the combined Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar on 21 October 1805 were marked by successive military defeats inflicted on Austria, Russia and Prussia by Napoleonic France. Following the collapse of Pitt’s final attempt at coalition building British statesmen initially hoped to salvage something from the situation in Europe, even engaging in tentative (if unsuccessful) peace talks with France. But the French victories of 1805-1807 culminated in the Treaties of Tilsit where Russia, Britain’s last continental hope, allied with France. British ministers faced a situation of diplomatic and strategic isolation akin to that of 1940; it ‘marked the end of an epoch in British strategy’.2 On the other side of the Channel, unable to mount an invasion attempt, Napoleon tried to use the power of Continental Europe to hit Britain where it would hurt most: in the pocket. The Continental blockade was designed to ruin the British economy by excluding British goods from European markets. To achieve this, France would have to control the coastline of Europe, an aim ‘central to French policy from 1807 onwards’.3 On 21 November 1806 Napoleon issued the Berlin Decree, declaring the British Isles under blockade and prohibiting all commerce between European areas under his control with Britain and her colonies. French forces occupied the ports of the Papal States and the Hansa towns of Hamburg, Lübeck and Bremen, while declaring that the Bourbons of Naples had ceased to reign. The following year Napoleon consolidated

2


French control of the Kingdom of Etruria. The strategy of excluding British economic activity from the continent would reach its zenith during late 1807 and early 1808. The signing of the Treaties of Tilsit in July 1807, between France and Russia, seemed to confirm Napoleon’s dominance of Continental Europe and left Britain strategically isolated with no major allies in Europe.4 British strategic isolation had previously occurred during the American War of Independence with disastrous results. The failure to prevent French intervention had ultimately cost Britain the American Colonies. Strategic isolation had occurred again in 1795 and again in 1800; this latter period culminating in the temporary Peace of Amiens of 1802. In 1806-1808 the outlook was bleaker than ever before; ‘England faced the choice of protracted, and indecisive or perhaps disastrous maritime warfare, or an immediate peace’.5 It seemed as if Napoleon would not settle for a compromise peace comparable to Amiens but wanted to reduce Britain to a minor power. In response the British war effort was refocused away from coalition building in Europe and instead towards a strategy designed to limit French military and commercial gains in Europe while protecting British overseas interests, vital to the long-term prosecution of the war and any post-war reconstruction. Or, in Paul Schroeder’s words, Britain ‘concentrated...on surviving and winning over the long haul’.6 Without Continental allies and isolated from Europe, Britain continued to fight. According to convention this defensive phase of British strategy lasted until the Spanish nation erupted in open revolt against French occupation in May 1808 and Britain once more looked to Europe for offensive action. The impression is that the period under consideration here does not, at first glance, seem like particularly fertile ground for the British historian. Yet, an examination of the conduct of the war during 1806-1808 provides ample evidence of what the war was actually about for Britain. How strategy contributed to the achievement of British war aims: ‘according to what methods and above all, with what conception as to how a war was to be brought to a successful conclusion’.7 There was a clear link between the means adopted by Britain and the desired end state: …wars tend to take certain forms each with a marked idiosyncrasy; that these forms are normally related to the object of the war and to its value to one or both belligerents; that a system of operations which suits one form may not be that best suited to another.8

INTRODUCTION

3

The conduct of war, as pointed out by Julian Corbett, can vary from nation to nation depending on a number of factors. Wars between major continental powers in Europe were decided in battle or by siege on land. But for Britain, an island nation, with overseas possessions, maritime trade and the Royal Navy, the nature of war was inherently ‘maritime’. British strategy in this period was, therefore, naturally a maritime strategy, defined by Corbett as ‘the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor’.9 This is more than a petty argument about semantics; defining exactly what we do and do not mean by ‘maritime’ is important as the term has been used in a number of ways. The term maritime activity, Geoff Till points out: …is sometimes taken to concern only navies, sometimes navies operating in conjunction with the ground…forces, sometimes navies in the broader context of all activities relating to the commercial, non-military use [sic] the sea, and sometimes inevitably the word ‘maritime’ covers all three possibilities!10 Terminology is important because the conduct of British strategy in this period has been labelled as ‘maritime’ but without suitable definition and this has impacted upon the debate surrounding how Britain fought the wars. The debate surrounding these issues will be considered in some depth below but in order to contextualise the concept of ‘maritime war’ we must realise that for Britain, an island nation, just about every war had a maritime dimension – the key was how this maritime dimension contributed towards the war aims for, as Corbett noted: Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided – except in the rarest cases – either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.11 Maritime strategy is, in a narrow sense, how to make effective use of land and sea forces; how they can contribute towards achieving the aims of the war. Yet for Britain the wars with France were maritime in the wider sense of the term. Maritime power was, and is, more than just the ability to use force or diplomacy to achieve aims. This begs the question, what makes

4


up maritime power – what are its elements? Mahan identified six key constituent components: • • •

• • •

Geography (access to the main trading routes) Physical conformation (number and nature of good ports and harbours) Extent of territory (not too much to defend, but enough to provide resources and infrastructure – of course this could include overseas territory) Population (enough people to build, crew and sail ships) Character of the people (i.e. are they a ‘seafaring’ people) Character of the government (naturally inclined to the maritime as a policy decision)12

Of course, Mahan was writing with the history of Britain and the Royal Navy in mind and took the ideal case, but his checklist provides a useful illustration of the array of elements that must be factored in. The sea is more than just a medium for the passage of warships and for fighting sea battles. The sea is a resource, a medium for transportation and exchange of goods and ideas; to exploit the sea requires a matrix of skills and resources. It requires infrastructure: support from central administration, insurance, access to quality resources in suitable quantity, robust and sustainable ships, skilful sailors, officers and artisans. It also requires elements Mahan identified, such as maritime geography and, above all else, maritime trade for it is oceangoing maritime trade that provides the finance to fund all of the above. Maritime trade lucrative enough to provide the necessary funds is also an obvious target for a potential enemy; hence maritime security is a prime concern of maritime powers and led to the development of naval force, which of course can be funded by maritime trade creating a maritime cycle.13 Approaching the subject in this wider sense highlights the relationship between the military and non-military use of the sea and how such a maritime approach contributed towards achieving war aims, or to paraphrase Till, how maritime power influences the behaviour of others by what you can do at or from the sea.14 It is this wider aspect that forms the theoretical framework of this study. To build on this theoretical discourse ‘maritime war’, as proposed in the widest context by Till, provides an explanation as to why Britain fought a long (twenty-two years) and expensive war against France and her various allies and why it was

INTRODUCTION

5

fought in a manner different to the campaigns that took place in Continental Europe. For, as a maritime power at the centre of a maritime trading economy, Britain was fighting for something different to the Continental powers and therefore would use different means to achieve aims. Unlike the Continental powers Britain was not fighting an aggressive, territorial war for chunks of land but was fighting to preserve her own maritime security and maritime trading interests in Europe and overseas. Maritime trade was at the heart of the system (and it is worth pointing out for an island nation all trade with other states is maritime to some extent) providing the money and credit which allowed for long term fiscal planning: ‘British naval power ensured that Britain gained this wealth and her opponents lost it, and this was vital to the ability to the British state to finance its actions in peace and war’.15 As we shall see, this maritime approach has been branded as blatant imperialism. But France had territory and possessions susceptible to the exercise of maritime power in many areas of the globe. It was only natural that Britain would attack her enemy in the areas where British ministers thought they themselves could fight at an advantage: the maritime. The problem was all this provided perfect ammunition for Napoleonic propaganda to claim Britain fought only for British objects and ignored the fate of their continental allies. Mention of objects brings us back to a fundamental question: what were British war aims? Only once this fundamental question has been addressed, using the wider framework of ‘maritime war’ proposed here, can we then contextualise why Portugal and South America occupied an important role in British strategy during 1806-1808. Britain and Europe The French Revolutionary Wars began in April 1792 when France declared war on Austria and Prussia; this was followed in February 1793 by a declaration of war against Britain. The British response was not to grab territory in Europe, restore the Bourbon monarchy, defeat the French militarily or restore order in France.16 Many factors contributed to British active participation in the war, but the prime reason was defensive: French expansion into the Low Countries threatened British maritime security.17 Although Britain had interests in the Baltic, the Mediterranean and overseas, French attempts to control her Northern neighbours impinged on this major, traditional, British security concern. French control of the Low Countries was a threat to Hanover, the electorate of King

6


George III; gave France access to the Dutch navy, commercial shipping and colonies; prevented British shipping from utilising the Rhine and Meuse to access the markets of central Europe; and, most importantly, posed a direct threat to the security of the British Isles.18 The Low Countries were the most favourable location in Europe from which to launch an invasion of Britain. The French Channel coastline was opposite the south coast of England, relatively protected by tides, currents, high cliffs and the fleet bases at Plymouth and Portsmouth. But directly opposite the River Thames, Britain’s main commercial artery, and the open flat countryside of Essex, are the Scheldt, Rhine and Mass estuaries and the shipbuilding deep water ports of Antwerp and Flushing. This was the ideal location from which to launch an invasion of mainland Britain. The Spanish Armada of 1588 was supposed to pick up the Duke of Parma’s army from Flanders before landing them on the Kent coast while the Dutch had launched their attack on the Thames and Medway from the Mass in 1666. The successful French conquest of the Low Countries in 1795 and the foundation of the Batavian Republic as a satellite state also addressed a French strategic weakness. French fleets were traditionally focused at the main fleet ports of Brest and Toulon; French expansion into the Low Countries ‘put an end to one of their ancient weaknesses at sea. Hitherto, France had possessed no naval base, where a fleet might shelter, north and east of Brest. But from 1749 [sic, 1794] she had Antwerp’.19 This undermined a key naval component of British maritime power: the Western Squadron which was designed to negate enemy fleets in Europe by fleet battle and blockade. By concentrating her fleets off Ushant Britain could use the prevailing winds from the south-west to prevent (at least in theory) any enemy naval force from entering the Channel. The Western Squadron also protected incoming trade, could attack enemy trade and served as a strategic reserve. Hence, even for the great historian of the British army Sir John Fortescue, Antwerp in French hands was ‘a standing menace to England’s safety’.20 ‘In the Napoleonic wars’ Howard argued ‘the British fought in the Low Countries whenever they had allies to fight for’.21 The reason was simple: maritime security. Pitt began the war by sending direct military assistance to help the, ultimately unsuccessful, defence of Austrian possessions in the Low Countries. The fact that Austria had legitimate territorial claims to territory in the region was an added complication, especially when that coun-

INTRODUCTION

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try proposed to France exchanging the area for control of Bavarian territory: a nightmare scenario for Britain. Although France founded the Batavian Republic in 1795 the area remained a prime theatre for British military operations. In 1799 an Anglo-Russian expedition was despatched to the Helder while a decade later in 1809 a massive amphibious operation was launched against the French naval facilities at Walcheren. In 1813 Castlereagh would write that to leave Antwerp in the hands of the French, ‘is little short of imposing upon Great Britain the charge of a perpetual war establishment’.22 Famously, of course, the battle of Waterloo was fought on the road to Antwerp. As long as France occupied the Low Countries Britain could never feel safe. Though an independent Low Countries, or at least a state free of French influence, was the prime British war aim, there was some need to tie British, or British subsidised, military and naval forces to other British interests. In Europe the Baltic and Mediterranean had to be kept open to British shipping. Of crucial importance for British maritime power, the Baltic was the single most important source of naval stores, such as iron, tar, timber for masts, planking and decks, pitch, tallow and linseed, while Russia supplied 90 per cent of the navy’s hemp.23 To take just one example of this maritime trade, 1,011 British ships left Russian ports in 1794.24 The river Elbe was a major artery into Central Europe for British trade and in return a conduit for important grain shipments from Prussia. British exports in 1806 to Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Prussia and the German States totalled £9,375,000.25 British maritime trade was also important in the Mediterranean, to the Ottoman Porte and Italy, though with the Levant Company imports only valued at £175,000 in 180326 and the entire value of exports to Southern Europe totalling £2,684,000 in 1806;27 it was obviously of less importance than the Northern European markets. A key interest was strategic: the British Mediterranean fleet could blockade the French fleet base at Toulon, but, denied access to Port Mahon, Minorca, utilised the harbour at Valetta, Malta. But as Malta could not feed itself it was important to have friendly relations with Sicily to provide a ready source of victuals. The region also had important diplomatic considerations for Britain. With Austria the main anti-French protagonist and many of the campaigns of the French Revolutionary Wars taking place in Northern Italy it provided an important communications route for British diplomacy with Austria and Russia. The Mediterranean theatre took on increased strategic importance to Britain as France intervened and expanded di-

8


rectly in the region, though loss of access would not be, and was not in 1796-1797, a crushing blow to Britain. At the western end of the Mediterranean, for commercial and naval reasons Britain was interested in the fate of the Iberian nations. Both Spain and Portugal had naval capabilities, excellent harbours at Cadiz and Lisbon, and major overseas possessions, notably in South America. The crucial issue was how could Britain secure all such interests in Europe? Due to political, economic and demographic restraints Britain could only recruit a small army compared to the Continental powers. In 1789 the British army numbered 40,000 men, compared to 170,000 Frenchmen under arms. By 1803 Britain had managed to raise the total to 130,000 and a remarkable 250,000 by 1813-1814. Yet, during the Empire France alone managed to sustain an army of 600,000: clearly the British army could not simply land on the continent and force a decisive pitch battle, in the Napoleonic style.28 Rarely could a major force of British soldiers be spared for European operations. This was understood by ministers, for instance in September 1806 William Windham admitted ‘Our force in the present case can be little in the scale of continental armies’.29 In 1807 Britain could only spare 10-12,000 men for offensive operations.30 Forces could and were sent to campaign in Europe, for example to preserve British interests in the Low Countries in 1793, 1799, 1809 and again in 1814.31 But only in the summer of 1809 were two major armies of 40,000 men committed to Europe, one in the Peninsular and the other around Walcheren Island, and only because the latter force could be easily evacuated.32 Moving and maintaining such expeditions was an expensive business, not just transporting them to the theatre of operations but also paying for the necessary logistical support.33 With a small army unable to guarantee British interests, diplomacy was vital to organise continental alliances to fight France. Central to this policy was one of the great European powers accepting responsibility for the defence of the Low Countries. Prussia would not agree, Russia was not interested and so Britain looked to Austria. The hope was for permanent tension between Austria and France, which Britain could exploit to preserve the balance of power in Western Europe.34 The difficulty here was the Austrian desire for the Netherlands-Bavaria exchange, an event that would legitimately hand control of the Low Countries over to the French.35 As the war progressed and it became clear Austria could not be relied upon to assist with British aims it was Russia who became:

INTRODUCTION

9

…the most important single factor in British grand strategy. With Russia’s co-operation the British government could plan in terms of decisive victory. Without it, Britain must carry the burden alone, sealing off her maritime empire and searching – for long in vain – for some theatre where her military strength could be exerted in an independent effort. To create and preserve the Russian alliance was for many years the principal object of our military policy and diplomacy.36 Britain’s main war aim in Europe centred on the desire for an independent Low Countries to be achieved through coalition warfare created by British diplomacy and underwritten with British cash in the form of subsidies. Such subsidies could only be afforded as long as British maritime trade continued to provide the necessary finance. A coalition strategy was not without problems. In this period none of the Great Powers were fighting exclusively for the overthrow of Napoleonic France, every power had specific regional concerns. It was not until 1813-1814 that all the states of Europe would put aside their own interests in what they regarded as their own spheres of influence in order to unite to defeat the particular problems posed by Napoleon. In the meantime, Napoleon could pursue expansionist policies and build a barrier of satellite states by exploiting the differences between the Great Powers. In the east, parcelling out Polish territory was a key policy driver for Prussia, Austria and Russia. Austria also had concerns in Italy and, along with Prussia, in the German states, and with Russia, in the Balkans. Russia also had major interests in the territory surrounding the Black Sea, in particular the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Britain was no different; the problem for British statesmen was apart from the Low Countries and maybe Hanover, there were no interests inherently linked to European territory. British interests lay in the continued growth of her maritime economy and could argue that despite all the financial and military aid she supplied, the Continental powers continued to pursue independent objectives. An example will highlight the problems of using subsidies to enhance British diplomatic leverage. In 1805-1806 Pitt had planned to send £7,000,000 to the Continental powers; in 1806 Alexander asked for £6,000,000 just for the sacrifices Russia was making. British ministers thought the Russians unappreciative, and promised to send Alexander £500,000 owed from an earlier agreement.37 Britain was mistrustful of Russian intentions in the east, especially as Russia had provoked wars

10


with the Ottoman Empire and in the Caucasus in order to make territorial gains. Britain also wanted influence at the Porte, to prevent Russia or France from gaining the upper hand, and so sent a fleet. In the event the mission failed and the British went to attack Egypt, which ‘further convinced the Russians that Britain cared about nothing but its own interests’. A statement that could in fact apply to relations between any two powers in Europe at this time.38 In essence the Continental powers thought Britain now owed them a ‘debt of gratitude’ and wanted compensating for their losses.39 The major problem for British diplomacy was that repeated attempts to encourage the European powers to take up arms in offensive campaigns against France ended on the battlefields of Europe. Austerlitz, Jena and Friedland impacted on the policy of European powers in a way that British money and alliances could never achieve.40 As Muir notes, despite all the financial aid given to her allies subsidies seemed to give little real return: ‘Britain lacked the leverage to influence significantly the policy of any of the great Continental Powers’.41 The Atlantic Economy There was another, controversial, strand to British strategy: maritimebased colonial expeditions. As we shall see, starting with Napoleon himself the case is often put forward that Britain was responsible for the continuation of the wars. While the European powers mobilised their manpower to fight bloody campaigns against France, Britain ignored their needs, especially their financial ones, and instead concentrated on overseas empire building.42 At first glance there appears to be little connection as to how an aggressive overseas policy would contribute towards achieving key British war aims in Europe. As Geyl’s assessment shows, many French writers, such as Armand Lefebvre, were convinced Britain suffered from an insatiable lust for power.43 Or as Albert Vandal, Arthur-Lévy and Albert Sorel contended, that Napoleon really wanted peace with Britain but the latter’s overseas aggrandisement policy prevented this,44 an argument repeated by Vincent Cronin.45 As George Lefebvre has argued, after the Peace of Amiens broke down in 1803: England broke the treaty and took the initiative to wage preventative war….Britain’s justification was the preservation of the European balance of power, but this grave concern did not extend to the sea, since in her eyes God had created the oceans for the Eng-

INTRODUCTION

11

lish. The conflict between Bonaparte and England was in reality a clash between two imperialisms.46 For Lefebvre ‘Britain’s main concern, as always, was to profit commercially from her maritime supremacy by laying claim to a monopoly of trade’. The spirit of aggression against France was fostered in part by ‘England’s economic interests and policy of maritime imperialism’.47 Criticism of Britain climaxed during 1806-1808 when British actions seemed to give some credibility to the arguments put forward above. For instance in January 1807 Howick wrote: …if the great Powers now at war, or threatened by France, cannot find in themselves the means of such exertion, it is in vain to expect that this country, by any supplies which we could afford, would be able effectually to support them. It is now indeed more than ever necessary that we should husband our own resources.48 Or the statement made by Lord Henry Petty: ‘It was ridiculous to talk of saving Europe, if Europe could not save herself’.49 It is not surprising that such an attitude left the European powers convinced of feeling betrayed by Britain. The very fact Britain was believed to have provoked the renewal of war in 1803 by refusing to hand over Malta to the French and often stood alone against France might be seen as evidence of Britain’s supposed real intentions to exploit perpetual conflict in Europe to enrich herself. ‘The idea that it was Britain, rather than Napoleon’, Simms has argued, ‘which stood against the world had a wide currency, and was encouraged by Napoleonic propaganda’.50 Certainly, British actions provided much fertile ground for critics of British attitudes and no one was more critical than Napoleon himself.51 He wrote after the breakdown of peace talks in 1806: ‘One wonders what England will gain….It could recover Hanover keep the cape of Good-Hope, preserve Malta, make a honourable peace and render tranquillity to the world’. Instead England wanted to ‘excite Prussia against France’, Prussia would be ruined and the continent placed in a state of blockade against Britain. ‘Is this the blood with which the English hope for to feed their trade and to revive their industry?’52 By December 1806 he noted to his brother Louis, on the throne of the newly created Kingdom of Holland, British disasters and impotence on the Continent had led them instead to attacking the

12


colonies of France and Spain.53 On 3 May 1807 Napoleon wrote to Fouché: ‘The English make fun of the Russians’. While the Russians fought, ‘the English made expeditions important for their particular account. They have just taken Montevideo’.54 Such accusations may seem justified. For after 1806 a British overseas strategy in response to the European situation: …appeared to gain wide currency as a cheap, profitable alternative to ruinous subsidies and land warfare….Indeed, it is a curious fact that during the Napoleonic period Britain – supposedly fighting for the defence of European liberties against French hegemony – actually found herself at war with almost all of the major and middling powers of Europe, at some point before 1815.55 Therefore a key question is whether the strategy as enacted by Britain was a strategy of choice or necessity. Duffy has argued maritime strength, commerce and the fleet, ‘became the fall-back defensive strategy for successive British governments’.56 For Esdaile it was Britain’s manpower problem which led to governments adopting a strategy of ‘blockade and colonial aggrandisement’, a form of war that ‘could not but antagonise potential partners on the Continent whilst at the same time continuing suspicions that the British were determined to avoid the sort of commitment they required of their allies’. Moreover, this method was not particularly cost-effective, ‘colonial offensives were notoriously wasteful in terms of lives’.57 Hall questioned the concept of using colonial acquisitions to gain territorial concessions in Europe: ‘It was impossible to think in terms of a peace with Napoleon based on colonial exchanges in return for a balance of power in Europe’.58 Napoleon would not concede territory won in battle; especially as the European territory likely to be at the centre of any discussions was the Low Countries, key to both British and French war aims. Although ministers did look at the bargaining value of colonial seizures from time to time, it was not the prime object behind their seizure: Britain did not go to war in 1793 to conquer French colonies.59 What Britain did go to war for in 1793 was maritime security and this again raises the issue of what the war was about and how those aims would be achieved. Right from the start of the war Secretary of State for War Henry Dundas had been convinced Britain should retreat from Continental entanglements and fight a purely maritime war for British inter-

INTRODUCTION

13

ests. The experience of the war only reinforced his views as outlined in a memorandum of 1800.60 Ehrman has pointed out that even for Dundas this maritime strategy was not one of territorial acquisition but the establishment of ‘Commercial Stations’ to promote overseas trade.61 As we shall see, it was always claimed by British statesmen that an overseas strategy was a measure of self-defence, to prevent maritime, strategically important, positions from falling into French hands. The enlarged empire Britain had gained by 1815 ‘was not the triumphant fulfilment of any detailed master plan’,62 though the argument could be put forward that it most certainly was part of a master plan for Britain to come out of the wars with an enhanced maritime economy. The key point here is not to think, as Paul Schroeder has pointed out, of Britain as a part of the European system but rather as ‘only marginally a European country’.63 Using the definition of ‘maritime’ already proposed we can push this assertion to its logical, contrary conclusion. Britain during the wars with France was not a European country, but was at the centre of an Atlantic Empire, encompassing possessions in the West Indies, East Indies and Canada that provided a maritime trading system fundamental to the well-being of the British economy and the skills, knowledge and resources necessary for effective utilisation of maritime power.64 The British Atlantic Empire was based on maritime commerce and protected by the Royal Navy. It was only natural that in fighting Napoleon, Britain should rely on those advantages granted to her by an insular strategic position at the centre of the maritime economic system. For Britain the successful outcome of the wars was largely built on her maritime power, vis-à-vis her two main rivals in economic maritime conflict: Spain and France. The Low Countries might fall into the hands of France, as in 1795, the Baltic may be closed to British shipping, as in 1801 and 1807, the Mediterranean might be evacuated, as in 1796-1797, Spain might ally with France and Portugal might be invaded. But none of these events prompted Britain to accept defeat. What might have had a catastrophic effect on the British war effort was the potential impact upon the British economy posed by the loss of overseas commercial possessions, in particular the valuable West Indian colonies. The West Indies During the eighteenth century a significant shift had occurred in British trade. European trade for the year 1700-1701 had comprised 82 per cent

14


of domestic exports and 62 per cent of imports, but by 1797-1798 the figures were 21 per cent and 29 per cent respectively. In comparison trade with American markets, including the West Indies, which in 1700-1701 had taken 10 per cent of domestic exports and provided 20 per cent of imports (including re-export goods), by 1797-1798 had grown to 57 per cent and 31 per cent respectively.65 If financial strength gave Britain an advantage, it was also an obvious target for her enemies. At the height of Napoleon’s Continental blockade British exports to northern Europe fell drastically from £10.3 million in 1805 to £2.2 million in 1808.66 British reexport trade as a whole also suffered a major decline, from over £14,419,000 in 1802 to £7,862,000 in 1808.67 But this only exacerbated the trend pushing British trade to areas outside of Europe, as total official British exports to the region fell from £22,662,000 in 1802 to £13,216,000 in 1806.68 It was British possessions in the West Indies that provided for the long-term financial strength of the economy. By the 1790s the West Indian trade was of such value the region was where British administrations feared ‘a war for maritime supremacy might be lost and also where they hoped to achieve the ultimate victory’.69 The area had a massive influence on the British economy supplying cocoa, sugar, coffee, cotton and rum. The West Indies provided four fifths of the income from British overseas investments.70 In the years 1802-1808 the value of British export trade to the region doubled to just under £7 million. At one fifth of the entire value of British export trade, the West Indies export trade was the most valuable for 1808.71 Imports into Britain from the region totalled just over £7 million, with sugar accounting for over half of this amount.72 As Ehrman has argued, they were ‘almost universally regarded as still the most desirable facet of empire’.73 Moreover, long distance oceangoing trade also provided a pool of highly skilled seamen and officers which naval forces could draw upon in time of war. A number of groups had vested interests in the region, such as shipping agents, sugar plantation owners, cotton manufacturers, financiers and insurers. West Indian merchants had ‘wealth and influence, votes and pocket-boroughs’. Investing in the West Indies was an expensive affair, so the merchants had formed two powerful organisations, the Society of West India Merchants and the Meeting of West India Planters and Merchants, to remind government of the vulnerability of the Islands. This provided them with a strong voice in domestic politics, for instance through direct access to the President of the Board of Trade.74

INTRODUCTION

15

Alongside those with a direct interest other contemporaries understood the value of the British possessions in the West Indies; and the threat from France. In 1805 when Napoleon wanted Nelson’s fleet distracted from intercepting a possible invasion attempt, he directed Villeneuve to sail for the West Indies.75 And of course Nelson, worried at the havoc the French might cause, followed. Nelson’s correspondence references his concern several times during May and June 1805: I was in a thousand fears for Jamaica, for that is a blow which Buonaparte would be happy to give us…kind Providence, may some happy day, bless my endeavours to serve the public weal, of which the West India colonies form so prominent and interesting a part. I ever have been, and shall die, a firm friend to our present colonial system. I was bred, as you know, in the good old school, and taught to appreciate the value of our West India possessions.76 The fears for Jamaica were well founded, the island accounted for half of all British investments in the region.77 The value was understood and impacted upon British thinking right from the start of the war. During 1794-1797 major British offensives were launched as Dundas ‘looked to destroy French naval power and France’s long-term means of rebuilding it while proportionally expanding British power’ by attacking French colonies in the West Indies followed by those in the East Indies.78 British offensives in the West Indies would increase security for British commerce in what was a key region. Britain, by expanding commerce through colonial conquest, ‘would become dominant in both naval power and overseas trade for many years to come’.79 This would fund loans and subsidies to the European powers, an essential part of British coalition building. Despite the region’s economic importance, in human and military terms, the British West Indian campaigns have come in for some vehement criticism. Fortescue, quite rightly, bemoaned the appalling casualties, blaming Dundas for practically destroying the British Army. Fortescue estimates around 50,000 dead and the same number invalided whilst campaigning in a region already feared for high mortality rates, chiefly through yellow fever.80 For Esdaile ‘colonial offensives were notoriously wasteful in terms of lives’.81 Schroeder has argued although the region offered the best chance for easy British victories, ‘British leaders did not

16


expect victories there to bring France down, only to help pay for the war and make it popular, and exhaust and demoralize the enemy’.82 The main criticism, apart from the terrible human toll, is that the troops devastated in the West Indies could have been better used to secure British interests in Europe. Fortescue called the campaigns, ‘the darkest and most forbidding tract’ in the whole of British strategy while apparent British impotence in Europe was caused by ministers’ obsession with the region.83 Esdaile has pointed out Britain always seemed to be able to find troops for overseas operations while acting perfidiously with regard to support for her European allies, sending 4,000 men to the Low Countries in 1793 yet dispatching 33,000 to the West Indies in 1795.84 On the other hand Duffy has argued during the 1790s British involvement in Europe actually drained resources away from West Indian campaigns, ‘the needs of the European war had a greater effect in taking British troops from the Imperial war than vice-versa’. Reinforcements earmarked for the Caribbean were instead sent to the campaign in the Low Countries during 1794-1795.85 While criticism of the butcher’s bill can rightly be justified, set against the context of a maritime war the value of the West Indian campaigns was not just what Britain protected and gained. Attacking French colonies had a number of wider effects. The French West Indian colonies provided two-fifths of total foreign trade, two-thirds of its oceangoing shipping tonnage, and a third of its registered seamen. Exports from the West Indies to France were valued around £8,250,000 between 1784 and 1790, compared with a French domestic export value of £11,500,000 in 1787. By 1787 re-exports of colonial produce to Europe totalled just over a third of total French exports. The loss of colonial trade would severely damage the French economy, it was hoped, thereby impacting on the amount of finance available for naval development.86 French oceangoing trade would decline so the strategy would also deprive the French navy of experienced seamen, by perhaps as much as a third, ‘thus securing to Britain a decisive margin of superiority over its major naval rival’.87 British ministers could also argue by fighting France in the West Indies they were diverting troops away from metropolitan France, therefore helping her European allies. In early 1806 Napoleon ordered Decrés to reinforce Martinique with an extra battalion.88 While criticising the British for their colonial policy in June 1806 Napoleon was making plans to prevent a British attack on Martinique. ‘The loss of Martinique’ he told Decrés ‘would be the greatest failure which we could receive in the

INTRODUCTION

17

current moment’.89 By August he was hoping to send 2,000 men to Martinique and Guadeloupe.90 But, in reality, all this was small fry and made little impact upon French military capabilities in Europe. Of more importance, as Duffy has argued, clearing out French possessions inherently increased British security in the region. French West Indian commerce ‘was widely recognised as one of the fundamental sources of French naval power’.91 At the start of the French Revolution there had been bloody revolts in their West Indian possessions, many descending into absolute anarchy. Plantation owners were massacred, while many Europeans fled the islands. Moreover, in 1794-1795 there had been major disturbances, leading to revolt, in British possessions caused by French revolutionary propaganda from neighbouring islands. Removing this threat was an important consideration.92 It has been argued the massive casualties incurred in the West Indian campaigns prompted a re-orientation of British strategy away from the Caribbean towards Europe, evidenced by a lack of interest in colonial warfare after 1803.93 Certainly, the collapse of allies in Europe and particularly high cost of the 1795-1796 expedition led to a change in West Indian strategy after 1797.94 No major expeditions were sent from England, the aim was to hold what was already in British hands. When coming back to office in 1804 Pitt made the conscious decision to try to build one last continental coalition to force a resolution to the war in Europe – major offensive operations in the West Indies played no part in his strategy. Instead, enemy possessions might be seized on an opportunistic basis, but only using local forces. Alongside seizing French colonies Britain attacked the colonies and trade of Spain, Portugal and Holland. With French forces overrunning the United Provinces in January 1795, British troops were dispatched to seize Dutch bases that could now threaten the British position in India and the Far East. The Cape of Good Hope was captured in September 1795, Trincomalee and Malacca in August 1795, Ceylon in February 1796. In 1799 Portuguese Goa was occupied to prevent the French seizing it as a base to support anti-British factions in India.95 In 1801 and again in 1807 the Portuguese island of Madeira was occupied to prevent the French from gaining a cruiser base in the heart of the Atlantic trade routes. In 1804 a Spanish treasure fleet was attacked. After Trafalgar any remaining enemy colonies were attacked, for instance the Cape of Good Hope in 1806, Curaçao and the Danish islands of St. Croix and St. Thomas in 1807, Martinique in 1809, Guadeloupe in 1810. By 1811 all

18


French overseas possessions were in British hands. These actions gave excellent material for French propaganda to build on continental military success, which could be compounded by British belligerence leading in some instances to European states effectively siding with France. The League of Armed neutrality of 1800-1801 and the Russian rapprochement with France in 1807 were only the most obvious examples.96 For those who argued for British forces to be committed to Europe such operations frittered away precious British resources, the ‘filching of sugar islands’, to use the radical Whig Richard Sheridan’s words. This was contrary to the Clausewitzian doctrine of concentration of force at the decisive point to defeat the enemy and for France the decisive point was her armed forces. France had to be defeated in battle on the European Continent. Britain, the argument goes, was involved in the post war peace discussion because ‘some of those battles had been won by British troops under the Duke of Wellington’.97 Certainly France could only be decisively defeated this way, but such an argument approaches the issues facing British strategists from the wrong perspective. French strength lay in her territory and population, providing a large army, which was used to devastating effect during the Revolution and Empire. The British army could not pursue a Napoleonic style campaign to decisively defeat the French in battle and force them into agreeing to British war aims at the peace table. Instead, for military, social, economic and doctrinal reasons, British strategy was subtle, relying on the nation’s strengths. An insular position, limited European interests (besides the key Low Countries), an economy heavily involved in overseas trade and a powerful navy provided Britain with distinct advantages in a long term maritime war of financial strength. This was the key reason why colonial operations were undertaken – they were part of a particularly unique way of waging war available to maritime powers. One of the main proponents of this theory, Julian Corbett, argued the British response to the developing economic conflict with France was ‘to capture new markets, and to destroy the elements of his new navy [Napoleon’s] in its ports by combined operations’. He rebuts the Continental argument with a flourish: ‘For us there was no decisive theatre anywhere within reach of the enemy’s main forces, except the sea’. The reason was simple: with the Royal Navy dominant Napoleon could not strike a decisive blow against Britain, and of course Britain could not strike a decisive blow back. Therefore until a new coalition could be built, the war must be one of exhaustion:

INTRODUCTION

19

How, then, could our small army have been more profitably used than working hand-in-hand with the navy to prevent Napoleon from ever being able to strike the decisive blow, and by protecting and fostering our trade to give us the means of endurance.98 Corbett was not the only writer to see this. Liddell Hart argued Britain fought with ‘economic pressure exercised through sea power. This naval body had two arms; one financial, which embraced the subsidising and military provisioning of allies; the other military, which embraced seaborne expeditions against the enemies vulnerable extremities’.99 For Duffy the considerations were: …fundamentally defensive, financial, and naval rather than aggressively Imperial and territorial: the strategy was dominated by memory of the alarms and humiliations of the War of American Independence, in which the old Empire had come closer to annihilation and Britain closer to invasion than ever before in the century.100 Overseas operations provided Britain with ‘a solid commercial base from which to continue the wars’.101 For Baugh, ‘blue water warfare was a form of technically advanced warfare emphasising economic pressure’.102 In the Napoleonic wars ‘whatever was said and hoped by Englishmen who day-dreamed of quick victories, the method pursued in the end was financial attrition’.103 As Esdaile has argued, even with the cost of the war spiralling from £29,000,000 in 1804 to over £70,000,000 in 1813, ‘Britain was able to sustain a level of expenditure that far outstripped that of every other country in Europe’.104 Britain could only manage this level of expenditure by preserving and enhancing her maritime security and this issue brings us back again to the question of maritime power. By protecting their own overseas trade and colonies, attacking those of her enemies and expanding into untapped markets British ministers increased revenue through higher and wider taxation and expanded and increased duties on overseas commerce thereby providing the fiscal stimulus to the British economy. It also paid for the expansion of the Royal Navy to protect such investments as aptly described in Till’s ‘virtuous maritime circle’ of maritime trade leading to increased maritime resources funding naval strength which provides maritime security (Till uses ‘supremacy’) which in turn stimulates increased maritime trade and so on.105

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It is this conceptual circle which underpinned British success in the wars against France and highlights the true value of overseas maritimebased expeditions. By 1806, however, Napoleon was determined on a course of action that would lead to British involvement in other regions of commercial interest. In the face of increased French economic warfare through Napoleon’s Continental blockade, what Britain needed was not just to enhance existing markets but to open up new markets to keep the maritime cycle going. With this theoretical framework laid out we can turn to the strategic situation in 1806 to understand exactly why Britain was so interested in the fate of Portugal and South America. …

1 THE STRATEGY OF THE TALENTS MINISTRY

The Whig administration, formed after the death of Pitt, is known to posterity as ‘The Ministry of all the Talents’. Pitt’s cousin, Lord William Wyndham Grenville served as Prime Minister with Charles James Fox as Foreign Secretary.1 Taking up the post of Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was William Windham. Charles, 2nd Earl Grey (from April 1806 Viscount Howick) served as First Lord of the Admiralty, then replaced Fox at the Foreign Office in September. Howick was succeeded at the Admiralty by Thomas Grenville. Henry Addington, 1st Viscount Sidmouth served as Lord Privy Seal and then Lord President of the Council. Master General of the Ordnance was Lord Moira while George John, 2nd Earl Spencer was Home Secretary. Lord Auckland was President of the Board of Trade. The situation they found upon taking office in early 1806 was not promising. Napoleon’s military dominance on the Continent was the major factor in European diplomacy. Of the major powers, Spain had been an ally of France since Britain had attacked her returning treasure fleet in 1804, although there would be shady attempts in 1806 to try to get the Spaniards to change sides as rumours of difficulties in the relationship surfaced. The Third Coalition had been destroyed at Austerlitz in December 1805 forcing Austria to make peace with France. Prussia had apparently taken a pro-French stance by occupying Hanover, increasing Grenville’s already notable dislike of that power and leading to the Talents declaring war on Prussia. As 1806 progressed Prussia would again take up arms against France but would be crushed. Of course one name missing from the above is Russia, and an alliance with that power offered the best chance for

22


continued operations on the continent but the immediate priority for the Talents was to start talking to Napoleon. The Search for Peace Fox was a long-term proponent of peace with France and with a less than promising European situation it was unsurprising the ministry began tentative peace talks with France. There were also fiscal considerations; faced with the spiralling cost of the war the Talents looked to reduce expenditure on the armed forces2 and tried to raise funds by the sale of church lands.3 Peace had an obvious attraction. The first feelers were put to the French Foreign Minister CharlesMaurice de Talleyrand by Fox in February.4 Initially conducted through Francis Charles Seymour-Ingram, Lord Yarmouth, he was later supported by James Maitland, 8th Earl of Lauderdale, who eventually took over sole responsibility for the negotiations. Lauderdale was certainly a more experienced and robust negotiator than Yarmouth and hence the peace talks stumbled along with a decreasing chance of success.5 As early as April Fox had recognised the peace talks had as their object ‘the intention of France to exclude us if possible from all connection with Europe’.6 Napoleon demanded French occupation of Sicily, a measure the Talents would not agree to due to concern over French Mediterranean ambitions and the knock on effect for Malta’s security. A SicilyHanover exchange was offered by Napoleon in July but refused. In fact the decision was taken by the Cabinet to reinforce Sicily with 6,000 men. A half-hearted counter offer to exchange Sicily for Dalmatia came to nothing.7 With Fox increasingly ill (he would die in September), rumours of French demands on Portugal and British attention shifting to South America, the talks wound down.8 Napoleon was now moving against Prussia9 and it seemed Russia would support the latter. With the prospect of another continental campaign the peace talks finally collapsed on 6 October.10 Why had the peace talks failed? At this time peace with France was not unthinkable, only unlikely. Peace had been a reality in 1802-1803 when Britain had effectively accepted Napoleonic rule in France, many French European conquests and had been willing to hand back the majority of captured French colonies.11 Peace would remain a possibility in 1806 and 1807. But, without the inclusion of Austria, Prussia and Russia, this could never be a general peace, rather another compromise peace

THE STRATEGY OF THE TALENTS MINISTRY

23

like Amiens. In 1803 Britain was not willing to compromise on basic issues concerning her maritime security, even when it meant probable war, for instance not evacuating Malta. By 1806 neither side could offer up much at the peace talks. Aware a balance of power on the Continent was out of the question with Napoleon, Britain seemed willing to adapt to strategic reality: the key war aim of a friendly or independent Low Countries was currently unattainable.12 As Schroeder has argued, the Talents were attempting to formulate policy within three distinct competing dynamics in European power politics: Britain with naval and colonial supremacy, Russia with control over east and northern Europe, and France with her influence over Western, Central and Southern Europe. Britain might, and indeed would, engage in peace talks with France and Russia, but it was always with the proviso that ‘peace was desirable, but if the war had to go on, sooner or later something would turn up’.13 Esdaile has argued Napoleon would only have to wait for Britain to sue for peace due to commercial, domestic political, international pressure.14 But this policy was dependant on the attitude of Napoleon himself. Britain and Russia, who had been brought into the talks, had taken the process seriously but Napoleon continued his plans for further offensive moves in the Balkans and Mediterranean while apparently treating for peace.15 Moreover, Britain demanded Russia be included in the talks, but Napoleon wanted to treat with Britain and Russia as separate powers. Fox would not budge on this fundamental issue and became increasingly disillusioned with Napoleon. As Schroeder has concluded, ‘Britain and France never came close to an agreement, even with Fox in charge’.16 Britain was uninterested and unwilling to discuss and become involved in central and eastern European issues, vital to both France and Russia. ‘Britain’s insularity, ignorance of Europe, and indifference to its needs were prominent among the causes of the absence of peace’, Schroeder contends, ‘Thirteen years of war had brought no sign of a change for the better – if anything, the reverse’.17 Yet, for Britain, it appeared impossible to treat with Napoleon whose policy appeared to be based on ‘bullying, aggression and bad faith’.18 Napoleon’s seizure of more European territory after Amiens was evidence he could not be trusted, hence Britain continued to fight him in order to impose limits on his power. In other words, what Britain could not tolerate ‘was the idea that he [Napoleon] could simply trample the principles of legitimism and international law under foot’.19 It appeared Napoleon had no clear policy save imperial expansion and control by

24


breaking the international rules necessary for a general peace to work. British perceptions would be seemingly justified by his attitude to peace talks in 1806 and his Berlin decree of 21 November 1806 declaring war on British commerce. Following on from the British Order in Council of 16 May 1806, which declared the coast from the Elbe to Brest under blockade, it might seem that Napoleon was responding to British aggression.20 In fact Napoleon had acted first in April, forcing neutral Prussia to close her coastline to British commerce.21 Further evidence would come with Napoleon’s intervention in Iberian affairs which ‘symbolised everything that Britain was fighting against’.22 The point can also be made that Britain only had to wait for Napoleon to fall out with one of the continental powers for a new European war to commence. If the Talents strategy was to hang in and wait for something to turn up, then they only had to look to the experience since 1793. The European powers had been beaten only to resume the war if it was in their interests or if backed into a corner, such as Austria and Russia in 1805, Prussia and then Russia during 1806-1807, (of course, something would turn up in Spain during 1808 and with Austria in 1809). When we consider the strategic situation in 1806 the Talents decision to secure British aims and preserve British resources was, theoretically, a wise one. French military success in 1806 and 1807 brought the war to Prussia and Russia’s doorstep and impacted on policy in a way British diplomacy and military support could not. Britain, protected from French military power by the Channel and the Royal Navy, had the option to withdraw from Europe. Britain was now concerned with ‘surviving and winning over the long haul’.23 Hence in light of the strategic realities British efforts were, according to Hall, concentrated on ‘objectives of obvious benefit to Britain…a policy avoiding direct confrontations with France on land’.24 This strategy involved preserving those parts of the Continent not under French control for British trade, acting to defend British maritime security and by looking to overseas operations where a small British army could act in conjunction with a dominant navy in order to safeguard and expand the maritime-based economic foundations of British power. For, as Esdaile notes, although Britain was ‘supreme at sea’ after Trafalgar she was ‘far from unassailable’.25 The problem with the Talents strategy was they badly handled the implementation, infuriating Tsar Alexander and contributing to degenerating Anglo-Russian relations. Once the 1806 peace talks had broken down the Talents looked to preserve British interests in the Mediterra-

THE STRATEGY OF THE TALENTS MINISTRY

25

nean. With the strategically important island of Sicily already reinforced earlier in the year26 and the British victory over French forces at Maida on 4 July apparently enhancing security,27 attention turned to the east. Preventing the growth of French influence at the Porte remained a major factor in the Talents policy. In November 1806 a naval force under Vice Admiral Sir John Duckworth was dispatched to lend weight to negotiations between the Turks and the Russians. Upon reaching Constantinople he could not engage in talks or force the Turks to fall in with British policy. His expedition had no troops with which to occupy the forts guarding the Straits and so he retreated under fire from Turkish batteries. Exiting the Dardanelles he was joined by a Russian squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Seniavin.28 The dissipation of British resources by the Talents continued in November 1806 when an expedition, under the command of Major General Alexander Mackenzie Fraser, was sent to secure Alexandria from a possible French attack. This task would be accomplished on 16 March 1807.29 All this ensured that within the framework of the Britain-FranceRussia power dynamic there was little room for the aims of the smaller European states. They had begun to realise resisting France was futile, while accepting support from her enemies was folly.30 This led to the majority of the minor states, including Portugal, placing their hopes in neutrality and appeasement to preserve their independence. Even this could not be enough to satisfy France, as Schroeder has noted. Napoleon’s definition of neutrality was not that states stand aside, but that they ‘get out of his way and present no obstacle to his will’. Neutrality entailed complete compliance with French wishes. The alternative was to lose independence through diplomatic or direct military control, usually resulting in either Napoleon or one of his close friends or family becoming the new sovereign. For example Napoleon crowned himself King of Italy in 1805; Genoa and Naples were annexed; demands were made upon the Papal States to close their ports to British shipping and expel British residents.31 Taking all the above into account it comes as no surprise the Talents have received scathing criticism. Muir and Esdaile have pointed to the fundamental weakness of the ministry; cobbled together from different factions it ‘lacked cohesion and common purpose’.32 For Holland Rose the administration clung to a ‘plan of doing nothing and of doing it expensively’.33 Their policy ‘does appear short-sighted in its approach to the thorny problems of Napoleonic France’, argues Hall, ‘Supposedly

26


putting Britain first, the Talents failed to recognise that what Britain needed most of all was freedom from Continental threat’.34 Muir concludes they ‘showed little ability or inclination to help their allies’.35 For Simms the administration was an ‘unhappy interlude’.36 Esdaile has criticised the Talents for not being entirely committed to the struggle in Europe,37 while Glover highlights their failure to launch diversionary raids along the French and German coastline to draw French troops from the conflict in the East.38 Fortescue called them the ‘Ministry of all the Blunders’.39 For Derry the administration ‘proved to be a singularly unfortunate one. Almost everything it attempted ended in frustration and disappointment’.40 The Talents reacted to events in a piecemeal way. Their legacy was a ‘dispersal of effort’ as expeditions were sent to Egypt, Calabria, South America and the Dardanelles. All this led to a ‘succession of embarrassing defeats’.41 Gray argues ‘there was a British expeditionary force nearly everywhere, except where there ought to have been one’.42 Sitting in the middle of this dispersal of British military force was Portugal, a country becoming increasingly important in the economic maritime war between Britain and France. Unable to force Britain to admit defeat by direct means, such as invading the British Isles, Napoleon wanted to plug the gaps in his European commercial system. Lisbon was an important entrepôt into Europe for British goods and the Portuguese refused to close their ports to this trade. Seizing Lisbon also fell into a strategy of threatening British naval interests at their weakest points. For example the French considered attacking Egypt again in 1800 and 1801, the Cape of Good Hope in 1805 and schemes were even mooted for an assault on India in 1807-1808. Key to these plans was continued French naval rebuilding, but, as Dwyer and Simms have noted, while France was unable to compete with British power at sea the only way Napoleon could get at Britain was through an expansionist policy on the Continent. Portugal had provided naval assistance and victuals to the Royal Navy throughout the wars (see Appendix III). There was also the Portuguese navy, an important consideration as Napoleon attempted to rebuild the French navy. Finally Portugal with her weak government and notoriously poor army seemed to present few problems to a French conquest.43 …

2 THE IMPORTANCE OF PORTUGAL

During the years 1806-1808 the small country of Portugal became the frontline in the deepening politico-economic conflict between Britain and the French Empire. At the heart of Anglo-Portuguese relations was a mutually beneficial maritime trade. In the face of French attempts to close Europe to British trade, it was important that Lisbon, an important entrepôt, remained open. In the wider naval context during 1806-1808 the port of Lisbon and the Portuguese Navy became increasingly important in the Anglo-French conflict. Finally, Portugal had an important colonial possession in South America: Brazil, with its raw materials and potential markets, was a region with attractive opportunities for British commerce. The main strategic concern for Portugal was the attitude of her powerful neighbour Spain. Due to her geographical position with regard to Spain and the position of Brazil with regard to Spanish America the politics of Portugal were, according to one contemporary, ‘interwoven with the politics of her neighbours’. A major problem for the Spaniards was their slender hold over their territories in South America. The supremacy of the Royal Navy prevented communications between the old and new worlds; in 1804 Royal Navy warships seized a Spanish treasure fleet which, unsurprisingly, was followed by a declaration of war from Madrid. To compensate for this weakening hold on her colonies it was thought Spain would naturally console ‘herself with the prospect of possessing Portugal’.1 As Corbett noted, ‘In every war we had with Spain the security of our ancient ally had always been a serious preoccupation’.2

28


Anglo-Portuguese Commercial Relations There was a long history of commercial interaction between Britain and Portugal stretching back to the twelfth century.3 It was The Methuen Treaty of 1703 which gave Britain a foothold in Portuguese markets. It was the defining moment in Anglo-Portuguese relations and until 1806 Portugal ‘was an important pawn on the chessboard of European History’.4 The Treaty confirmed the dominance of imported Portuguese wines over the traditional French wines imported into England. It also confirmed an imbalance of goods traded. Portuguese imports were mainly necessities from Britain, such as textiles and cereals, while British imports from Portugal consisted of mainly luxury items, especially wine. The growth of the British textile industry and corresponding rise in cotton imports helped the Portuguese economy. In the closing years of the eighteenth century Brazilian cotton imports accounted for more than 20 per cent of total British cotton imports.5 Portugal’s expansion as a wine producer brought benefits but ‘enchained Portugal to England’. By 1798-1807 the Portuguese were exporting around 44,487 barrels of wine to Britain per annum.6 Portugal bought back manufactured woollen goods from Britain for export to Brazil, with the imbalance made up by specie shipments, direct from Brazil to England by the Royal Navy and the Falmouth packet service. By the middle of the eighteenth century over £1,000,000 per year was estimated to enter Falmouth alone; adding yet more weight to the perception that South America was awash with gold.7 The flow of gold from Brazil to Britain now ensured English naval support would be forthcoming ‘if it appeared…that Portugal was seriously threatened by either Spain or France’.8 As early as 1713 ‘the opinion was firmly entrenched among a powerful class of Englishmen’ that the ‘Portugal trade was the most advantageous English trade anywhere’. A strong body of Portuguese commercial interest was now allied with the City of London. This created a very powerful group who influenced British domestic politics by pushing for intervention in Portuguese affairs.9 The European and South American territories of Portugal witnessed an economic revival in the middle of the eighteenth century.10 Repressive policies were implemented in Brazil to ensure Portuguese exports would have a guaranteed market. By 1750, according to Williams, the Iberian Peninsula offered ‘the greatest outlet on the Continent for British manufacturers’.11 For the first time Portuguese trade with Britain changed from a negative balance to a trade surplus: ‘the period 1796-1807 appears

THE IMPORTANCE OF PORTUGAL

29

to have been a new Golden Age for Portuguese trade’.12 In 1802 British exports to Portugal had been worth £1,171,000. Despite falling to a low of £452,000 in 1803, by 1806 the figure was back up to £1,194,000.13 Despite the value of trade with European Portugal it was widely recognised that Brazil dominated all Portuguese economic issues: ‘Portugal could not have survived if it had been reduced to its European territory alone’.14 The discovery of gold in Brazil had transformed the fortunes of the Portuguese Court, who regarded their South American possessions as a ‘milch-cow’ and who derived a substantial part of their income from a tax, called the ‘Royal Fifth’, of 20 per cent on all Brazilian gold.15 Oliveira has argued from ‘the late 1600s to 1822 Brazil was the essence of the Portuguese Empire. With some exaggeration one might even say that Brazil was the essence of Portugal itself’.16 The Brazil trade produced the majority of Portuguese income, stimulated foreign connections and trade, provided commercial balance and allowed investments in the arts. Direct trade with Brazil from other nations was restricted to prop up the re-exportation of products through the ports of Portugal. This trade was a major contributor to the Portuguese economy, in particular sugar and tobacco, and the export of home produced salt, wine and fruit. Cereals and cloth products made up the bulk of imports.17 The Portuguese themselves realised how important Brazil was; a 1711 book by André João Antonil had stated as much.18 Martinho de Melo e Castro, the Minister of Marine in 1779, remarked ‘The conservation of Brazil…is absolutely essential, as it is demonstrably certain that Portugal without Brazil is an insignificant power’.19 In October 1797 a discussion regarding the relationship between the Portuguese Empire and the mother country concluded ‘the strength of the Portuguese Empire lay not in Europe but in the new world’.20 There were growing concerns in Portugal that Brazil might follow the precedent set by Britain’s colonies in North America and the French colonies in the West Indies. The policy of suppressing Brazilian trade and internal development led to two Brazilian revolutionary conspiracies in 1788-9 in Minas Gerais and in 1798 in the Bahia region.21 The importance of Brazil was also a major strategic weakness for the Portuguese as Brazil was exposed to a power with maritime capability. This was an important consideration for British ministers who could offer protection or threaten attack. It also ensured there was a continual fear France might intervene in the region. The one remedy to solve this inherent strategic vulnerability was to move the seat of Portuguese gov-

30


ernment to the New World. Such a move would entail a fundamental reorganisation of the Portuguese structure of government and would be a frank admission that Portugal was too weak to remain as an independent country. This idea had been discussed in Portugal as early as 1580, but the plan would only be seriously considered after the outbreak of the French Revolutionary war in 1793. If Portugal did defy France by transferring the Royal family and fleet to Brazil, only the Royal Navy could guarantee the voyage and subsequent defence of that country. Britain would then be in a strong position to press for the freedom to export directly to Brazil. If the Portuguese closed their ports, Britain could retaliate by commencing direct trade with Brazil without consent, which would compensate for the loss of trade with Portugal.22 The Naval Situation: Fleet Battle and Blockade European Portugal was also important to Britain within the context of the Anglo-French maritime struggle. The Royal Navy was central to British maritime security and economic expansion in this period. The British battle fleet was designed for aggressive, offensive strategy and tactics, to destroy the enemy in battle or negate by blockade. Battle was preferable to destroy the threat, but it was actually quite rare. There were only six major fleet battles during the wars, Glorious First of June, St. Vincent, Camperdown, Nile, Copenhagen, Trafalgar, with perhaps another half dozen squadron-size fleet actions. If enemy fleets avoided battle and would not come out of port blockade prevented any enemy fleet movements. The major British naval force was the Channel Fleet, which provided the ships to blockade the French fleet base at Brest. It also acted as a strategic naval reserve, for if enemy fleets managed to escape, a not uncommon occurrence, they were aggressively hunted down by Royal Navy squadrons. This had been applied in the Seven Years War leading to ultimate victory over France in North America. During the American War of Independence control of home waters had been lost and the French had made a decisive contribution to the war in the rebellious colonies. This was a reminder that British home and colonial defence was best assured by keeping enemy fleets bottled up in port. As Morris has noted: …the blockade of Brest consequently came to complement the great expeditions to the West Indies that characterised the Revolu-


31

tionary War. After 1795 the principal of maintaining the blockade was consistently applied. Even though the resources that could be devoted to it were at times limited by deployments to other stations, there was full recognition that the blockade was indispensable to the maintenance of the British war effort in other theatres.23 Although Esdaile has argued that ‘blockading Europe’s coasts inflicted immense wear and tear on the Royal Navy’24 the Admiralty had largely managed to compensate for this. By regularly rotating ships between blockade duties and time in port, wear and tear could be repaired. Ships were supplied on blockading station by a regular victualling system.25 The blockade not only locked up French fleets in port but it allowed the Royal Navy to use frigates and flying squadrons to project power worldwide. Blockade was, however, not infallible. There was always a possibility the Royal Navy might be blown off station and French or Spanish fleets escape to wreak havoc upon colonial possessions and commerce. James notes even while in port the French and allied fleets would ‘occupy the attention of an equal number of British ships’ while any French squadron that escaped blockade would be pursued by at least ‘two squadrons of equal force’.26 After Trafalgar French naval forces still posed a threat. Not, perhaps, to take on the Royal Navy in battle but to influence the course of the conflict by their actions in the wider maritime war. In late 1805 a French fleet had escaped from Brest. This split into two squadrons, the first under Admiral Leissegues headed to Santo-Domingo to reinforce the French position. In response Sir John Duckworth headed for the Leeward Islands, caught and defeated Leissegues on 6 February at SantoDomingo.27 According to Lord Barham, the first Lord of the Admiralty, Duckworth’s victory ‘puts us out of all fear from another predatory war in the West Indies’.28 The second squadron under Rear Admiral Willaumez was to sail for either St. Helena or the Cape, then to cruise in the West Indies attacking British commerce. In June 1806 intelligence arrived in Lisbon that a French squadron of six sail-of-the-line and a frigate, had put into the Brazilian port of St. Salvador, Bahia, on 4 April, remaining there until the 21st. While the enemy were stationed in the port they refused to let any shipping leave the place.29 This in fact was Willaumez’s squadron that had been cruising between South America and the coast of Africa intercepting British trade. After their short stay in St.-Salvador to re-provision they headed to Cayenne, and then Barbados.30

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On 25 September 1806 Commodore Samuel Hood intercepted a French frigate squadron from Rochefort bound for the West Indies and laden with troops, stores, arms, ammunition and provisions, capturing four fine 40 gun frigates, all of which were added to the Royal Navy. Again in 1806 a French squadron under Commodore L’Hermitte had cruised off the African coast and then proceeded to Brazil to refit.31 ‘Though largely ineffective and ultimately costly to the French’, one source has noted ‘here was clear evidence of the ‘the potential danger to British trade from the West Indies, India and China posed by their presence at large in the Atlantic’.32 In 1807, while blockading Cadiz, Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood expressed concern that the French and Spanish fleets would escape, perhaps heading for the Mediterranean, East or West Indies. After the British attack on South America (see below), the Spaniards were ‘impatient to get a reinforcement out to their colonies, the security of their Southern provinces depends upon it, and they will probably sail whenever the coast is clear’.33 In February 1808 a fleet of 10 French battleships sailed from Toulon, and cruised at will around Corfu, the Ionian Islands, Sicily and Sardinia, before finally anchoring in Toulon on 10 April.34 Here was the real danger of French naval actions after Trafalgar. The French navy would compound the exclusion of British commerce from Continental Europe by disrupting the sea lines of communication to interrupt British maritime trade with the object of undermining the British economy. If predatory cruises by existing enemy squadrons were transitory threats to British maritime security, a long-term danger was posed by French naval building plans. Although Napoleon had seemingly abandoned his plans to invade the British Isles by marching the Grande Armée to the East in 1805, there was a continued threat that France might gain local naval superiority at some point vital to British interests. Napoleon’s determination to reconstruct his naval forces would be achieved in two ways: an ambitious rebuilding programme and attempts to seize the navies of the European neutral powers.35 In the years immediately after 1805 Britain had a total of 296 ships (136 ships-of-the-line and 160 frigates) while France and her allies could only muster 167 ships (96 ships-of-the-line and 71 frigates).36 But French rebuilding plans began to bear fruit during 1806-1808 when 24 ships-ofthe-line were launched or acquired.37 France continued to lay down new ships at an alarming rate: in 1806 eight to the five laid down by the Royal Navy; in 1807 the figures were 12 and 11 respectively. It was only in


33

1808 that French shipbuilding slackened, laying down only three new battleships to the seventeen laid down for the Royal Navy. Overall in the years 1804 to 1808 Britain laid down 50 battleships to the 45 laid down in French and Dutch ports.38 By 1807 Napoleon could theoretically call on 62 French and allied ships-of-the-line for action against British interests. Apart from the escape of squadrons noted above, the French fleet was mainly held in port and, importantly, gained little sea-going experience after 1805 although Glete has noted this served to preserve the fleet as there were no serious losses, unlike in 1794-1805. The French navy, along with those of her allies, still posed a long term threat, not just in the war but possibly in a post-war situation. This threat had to be countered by British statesmen to preserve and guarantee the future of British maritime supremacy and the commercial life of the nation.39 There was another factor for British statesmen to consider: the emergence of the American Navy as an influence in global politics. Considerable debate in the new republic centred on the question of a navy to protect US interests in America and Europe. Founded in 1794, in 17971799 the US Navy was strengthened in consequence of deteriorating relations with France and an increasing number of incidents with the various North African states. Anglo-American relations deteriorated during 1806-1808 over the British Orders in Council. The British enforcement of the right to search neutral vessels, which interrupted American trade and was regarded in Washington as a provocative measure against American interests, increased the possibility of anti-British Franco-American naval co-operation as did the British policy of stopping and searching American ships for British nationals.40 The Swedish, Danish and Portuguese navies were all vulnerable to French ambitions, while the Treaties of Tilsit added the services of the Russian navy. James has argued Napoleon could feasibly call upon a French, Dutch, Swedish, Danish and Russian fleet of at least 60 sail-ofthe-line operating in Northern waters, while only half this number were needed to convoy a possible French invasion of Ireland.41 Clearly, if Napoleon could gain access to the minor European navies to add to his shipbuilding programme battleship parity with the Royal Navy could be achieved. Of course the bare facts do not tell the whole story as a lack of sea time, effective leadership, discipline and potential problems with command would certainly hamper any sea-based expeditions. Yet, it was clear to British statesmen they could not let Napoleon

34


expand his naval forces for the impression is clear: during the years following Trafalgar ‘Napoleon had not given up using his fleet to good effect’.42 Table 1: The European Navies, 1805-181043 1805 Battleships Cruisers The Royal Navy 135 192 French Navy 41 46 Spanish Navy 40 50 Russian Navy 47 16 Danish Navy 20 16 Swedish Navy 12 11 Dutch Navy 15 13 Portuguese Navy 12 18

1810 Battleships 152 46 28 35 2 13 13 11

Cruisers 245 38 27 14 8 9 14

The Importance of Lisbon and the Portuguese Navy Set against the wider context of an Anglo-French maritime war it was vital the naval base of Lisbon and the Portuguese navy did not fall into the hands of Napoleon. British naval assistance to Portugal had been confirmed in the Methuen Treaty. In the event of Spain or France declaring war on Portugal, Britain and Holland would declare war on those powers and supply a military force of 12,000 men for the defence of the country. Britain also committed herself to despatching a Royal Naval squadron of equal or greater strength to any hostile fleets that might be off the coast of Portugal and to help defend Portuguese colonies. In time of peace it was agreed Britain and Holland would each be allowed to station six ships-of-the-line in the ports of Portugal.44 Throughout the wars the Portuguese navy varied little in strength, fluctuating between 11 and 13 battleships in service. Apart from a 74 gun ship launched in 1802 there were no additions to battlefleet strength in the years prior to 1807. As Glete has argued ‘the Portuguese navy had changed little in either size or operational tasks since the early 16th century’. In 1805 the Portuguese navy totalled 54 ships, with the battleship force made up of one 80 gun ship, six 74s and five 64s. In September 1807 it comprised 13 ships-of-the-line, eight frigates and 18 smaller vessels.45 The main role of the navy was to safeguard Portuguese maritime interests, in particular the trade with Brazil.


35

Lisbon was the main fleet base of the Portuguese navy and, with its close proximity to Spain, Gibraltar and Cadiz, it was of vital interest to Britain as a base for naval and commercial activity in the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Fisher has pointed to: Lisbon’s unparalleled strategic location for major involvement in Atlantic and European commerce….Vessels proceeding southwards from northern European countries, or sailing homewards from the Mediterranean, Africa, the East and West Indies, even if not directly interested in Portuguese commerce might use Lisbon as a port of call, for a little trade, for supplies, repairs or commercial intelligence.46 ‘All through the long imperial struggle between England and France’, Corbett noted, ‘Lisbon, the womb of the Oceaninc expansion of Europe, had been recognised as a point beyond price’.47 Lisbon has one of the best natural harbours in the world; a visitor described it in 1755 as ‘one of the most commodious in Europe’.48 The French General Foy who was there in 1807 thought the inner harbour 12-14 leagues in circumference ‘in which fleets may anchor and sail without being exposed to the cannon on the shore’. Fisher notes the width of the Tagus at Lisbon ranges from one and a half to four miles while the deep water allowed great ships to sail right into the harbour.49 Heading down to the sea, a distance of around nine miles, Foy described the Tagus contracting abruptly ‘before the western part of the city of Lisbon, in such a manner that it is but eight hundred and six fathoms wide between the Tower of Belem and the Old Tower’. This channel ‘is three leagues long; its average width is fourteen hundred fathoms’ and it is flanked by ‘two calcareous chains, of similar form, but of which the northern chain extends beyond and to the west of the southern chain’. At the mouth of the Tagus ‘is the bar of Lisbon, intersected by a shelf of submarine rocks, called os cachopos. Of the two passes by which ships of the line enter the Tagus, the best is that which is nearest to the right bank’.50 The Tagus was well protected at the bar by the St. Julien and Bugio forts and along the length of the river by numerous batteries and forts. All this presented a formidable crossfire to any ships trying to force passage upriver. The bar itself offered great natural protection to Lisbon, and could be very difficult to pass even with local pilots. The Tagus has a very strong ebb tide which, if combined with a sea wind, could make

36


ships entering the river virtually unmanageable. Running aground on the bar was a very common occurrence, the Portuguese Admiral Niza suffered this inconvenience in 1794. Several Royal Navy vessels shared his fate, the Camel storeship grounded and the 3rd Rate 74 gun Bombay Castle was wrecked in December 1796. In January 1797 the 90 gun 2nd rate St. George ran aground on the shoals and the following December the Brig sloop Kingfisher ran aground and was wrecked on the bar, a fate shared by the Weymouth transport in January 1800.51 As far back as 1657 the Portuguese had played up the value of Lisbon to Britain describing it as an ideal base for operations against Spain. This was a ‘potent argument’ for the Portuguese for the next 150 years. England needed an ally in southern Europe to support Mediterranean naval policy: Portugal fitted the bill precisely: her empire was vast and overflowing with riches which were only in part fabulous and imaginary; her ports were ideal for bases in South European Atlantic and Mediterranean waters; and she was an irritating and effective foil to be used against Spain. From England’s point of view she would also serve equally as well as a base of operations against France.52 This was a key consideration. With Spain as an enemy, Lisbon was the only friendly harbour south of the British Isles offering the necessary facilities for a fleet base to project power into the Mediterranean. Facilities were available at Genoa, Naples and Sicily but French military success removed the former two, while the latter was always under threat and was of little use against the enemy fleet bases at Cadiz (Spain) and Toulon (France). In 1796 Grenville had thought ‘the defence of H. M. F. m’s dominions, of the Port of Lisbon in particular, [and] of the commerce of Portugal in all it’s branches, will always form a leading consideration in H.M. naval arrangements’.53 After the Spanish declaration of war that year, the Admiralty decided the Mediterranean fleet: …be stationed from Cape Finisterre to Gibraltar, making its headquarters at Lisbon, and acting in conjunction with the Portuguese fleet for the protection of Portugal, there keeping up a communication with Gibraltar, and taking every opportunity of annoying the enemy…


37

The fleet would be ‘placed in the most advantageous manner for the protection of our outward- and homeward- bound trade, and for the cutting up that of Spain’. The presence of British naval forces at Lisbon ‘would probably be the means of preserving to us the friendship and ports of Portugal, without which we shall in a very short time have no port in Europe freely open to our trade south of Emden’.54 Sir John Jervis, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, agreed there was ‘no port on the coast of Portugal, except the Tagus, which will admit even a large sloop of war’, if Lisbon could not be utilised then he could not ‘advise the continuance of the fleet in these seas, because the public will be led to expect what cannot be performed, and with every possible exertion the preservation of the health of the crews, nay, even the maintenance of them, is very doubtful’. Gibraltar was not an option, its repair facilities were not on a par with Lisbon, victuals and stores would not be secure, and the Royal Navy’s very presence there would provide a focus for Spanish attacks and bombardments. It could also be difficult for ships to enter the Mediterranean from Gibraltar. Another option was basing the fleet at the Bayona Islands off the port of Vigo, but again there were problems with supply, it ‘would require greater resources and exertions that your lordship can possibly be aware of, or indeed any one who has not been employed in a co-operation with troops’. Also, a fleet stationed there would be too distant to watch over Cadiz.55 Jervis had in fact utilised the facilities at Lisbon for the repair of his ships in late 1796.56 In March 1797 Commissioner Libra, formerly of the Naval Department at Porto Ferraio, now took a similar position at Lisbon.57 In April 1797 Jervis praised the Royal Navy representatives at Lisbon. In particular Captain Isaac Coffin, the former Navy Commissioner at Leghorn, was now overseeing the repairs at Lisbon. Jervis also recommended Mr Churchill ‘the master shipwright at Lisbon’ as an officer who ‘will not disgrace any situation you may think fit to place him in’. By their efforts, and those of the Portuguese Minister of Marine, all Jervis’ ships had been repaired.58 Lisbon provided British merchant ships and convoys with a place of refuge if enemy fleets were at sea or if, as happened in 1796, the coast of Portugal was swarming with Spanish and French privateers.59 Especially troublesome were the Spanish row boats, which could operate out of any river or bay. With the Royal Navy withdrawn from the Mediterranean in 1797 John Turnbull, the Chairman to the Merchants trading to the Medi-

38


terranean wrote to the Admiralty impressing upon them that Lisbon was the most convenient rendezvous for merchant ships bound for Italy and the Levant. The Admiralty asked Jervis for his views on the practicality of this.60 In 1800 a French fleet of over 40 ships-of-the-line in Brest threatened the Mediterranean, Ireland, Portugal or even mainland Britain if it escaped. The Admiralty utilised Lisbon as a central strategic rendezvous for its fleets. Moreover, the near continual presence of Royal Navy and merchant vessels in the river during this period provided an important source of intelligence regarding French naval movements.61 Corbett summed all this up rather well, asserting ‘it is interesting to note that in the eyes of this fighting admiral [St. Vincent], and indeed of everyone else, the preservation of the base at Lisbon took precedence as a strategic object over the attempts to bring the enemy’s fleet to action….the whole episode of the struggle for the Tagus scarcely finds a place in our histories, but it will seem that at a time when we were threatened with isolation, it was considered vital to our ability to continue the war’. Corbett’s passage, noting the importance of Lisbon and other strategic positions in the British war effort and the creation of the British Empire, is worth repeating: …the result of our long war experience had been rather to enhance than diminish the strategic importance of such naval positions. The men who knew what naval war was were dominated by the idea that though battles might place in our hands the command of the sea, the exercise of that command was impossible, without advance bases rightly distributed. The view that the alliance of Portugal, or at least her benevolent neutrality, was essential, as St. Vincent points out, to our being able to exercise control of the great Mediterranean and oceanic trade routes was of course a tradition of our foreign policy already two centuries old, but age and experience had only increased its vitality.62 The Dangers of Lisbon under French Control Apart from denying Britain all the advantages detailed above, if the French seized Lisbon and the Portuguese navy the impact upon British maritime security would be significant. France had major problems projecting seapower in the age of sail due to her basic geography. The main French fleet bases were at Brest and Toulon. To concentrate naval forces in either the Atlantic or the Mediterranean entailed major fleet move-


39

ments, it was simple for Napoleon to do this on paper but it was immensely difficult to coordinate fleet movements in practice due to weather conditions, problems with communications and the activities of the Royal Navy. The capture of Lisbon and a French-controlled fleet in the Tagus, close to the Spanish base of Cadiz and the entrance to the Mediterranean, would provide a secure central naval base from which French fleets could operate. The French could and did use the Spanish base at Cadiz, but the harbour there could be susceptible to attack from both land and sea while Napoleon viewed Spain as not the most reliable of allies. The conquest of Portugal would grant France permanent possession of Lisbon. This situation would have impinged on the operational effectiveness of the Royal Navy requiring a permanent blockading squadron, restricting British offensive strategy by decreasing the number of ships available for furthering British maritime interests. In 1795, when the Brest fleet put to sea, one French commentator, Rear Admiral M Kerguelen thought it should attack Lisbon and seize British goods: This enterprise would gain for France 200 millions, in cash or British merchandise; England would receive a terrible shock, which would produce bankruptcies and a general consternation; our fleet, without being buffeted about the sea, [as in 1795] would return to Brest, loaded with riches and covered with glory; and France would once more astonish Europe with a new triumph.63 In 1796 with a French squadron laden with troops at Brest Jervis thought the Tagus as ‘the probable real object of the interprise…they may by stealing a march possess themselves of Lisbon; from whence it will be very difficult to drive them out; especially if they enter Portugal with an army through Spain’.64 ‘As a naval base’, Corbett succinctly noted, ‘the Tagus was far too valuable to be allowed to fall into the enemy’s hands’.65 Lisbon was adjacent to the sea lines of communication to and from South America, the West and East Indies and could serve as an excellent base for French and Spanish privateers to threaten British maritime trade. If the French gained possession of Lisbon, ‘Every river and creek in the kingdom will be filled with privateers and the British trade harassed and obstructed to such a degree that no one will insure upon it’.66 Napoleon himself realised the value of Lisbon. In 1808 he wanted three

40


ships-of-the-line, three frigates and nine Russian vessels ready for offensive operations;67 and in May 1808 was inquiring whether there were enough transports to undertake an expedition to Brazil.68 This latter statement raises another key point about the importance of Portugal. The Portuguese navy was potentially useful to French maritime strategy and Lisbon was ideally placed for a war against British trade. But if Napoleon could add control of Portugal to his existing alliance with Spain it raised the spectre of French claims to the entire American possessions of those powers. For, by 1806, that was a region both Britain and France looked to with much interest. The key question, therefore, was would the Portuguese nation be able to offer up any resistance to French attempts to gain political control of their country? …

3 THE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1806

If many contemporary commentators are to be believed, there really was not much hope of the Portuguese resisting Napoleon. Dom João, the Prince of Brazil, had ruled Portugal as Regent in the name of his mother Queen Maria since 1799. João was married to the Spanish Infanta Carlota Joaquina, daughter of Charles IV of Spain, which contributed to the Portuguese conciliatory attitude towards Madrid. Henry Brougham thought them as ‘feeble beyond all description’,1 while Admiral Campbell was of the opinion Dom João possessed an ‘assemblage of vanity, indolence, diffidence and fear’ and was ‘ambitious of being thought a Statesman…but loth to apply, and even doubtful of his own capacity, he is ever consulting, but never deciding’.2 John Hookham Frere was in Lisbon in early 1807 and remarked ‘this Prince has given himself up to me all at once like a girl’; with regard to the Portuguese Court he confessed ‘I do not know what to do with them all’.3 The official British Minister Plenipotentiary in Lisbon from 1802 to 1806, Lord Robert Stephen Fitzgerald, highlighted the ‘mal-administration of a feeble, corrupt, and degraded ministry’4 and thought the Regent ‘a most weak and timid Prince, yet obstinate and bigotted’.5 These views were not just prevalent in English circles, according to the French historian Thiers, ‘This race of Braganza, grown old, like its neighbour, the race of the Spanish Bourbons, sunk like the latter in ignorance, effeminacy, cowardice’.6 Until recently historians, such as Fortescue who described him as a ‘poor creature’, have ridiculed Prince João, but a recent assessment by Macaulay presents a picture of the Regent trying to do the best for his country in a difficult situation. His major failing was chronic indecision.7 There is less disagreement about Carlota. For Francis she ‘remained a

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Spaniard first and foremost’ and although she was only ten at the time of the marriage ‘she grew up to be a positive witch’.8 Others are even more scathing: ‘perhaps the ugliest royal personage that ever existed….4 feet and 6 inches tall with bloodshot, malevolent eyes’ and possessing ‘an atrocious temper’. Her fierce Spanish pride added another layer of complexity and uncertainty to Portuguese policy.9 João excluded the Portuguese nobility from any decision-making, relying on a small group of confidential advisors who, according to Fitzgerald, were susceptible to French bribery.10 In the years immediately previous to 1806 the Regent had been steadily falling under the influence of subsequent French ambassadors especially General Jean Lannes who had arrived in Lisbon in April 1802 and held the post spasmodically until July 1804.11 The divisions and inefficiency of the Portuguese Court were exacerbated by the fact that in 1805 João had discovered a plot, originating with his wife, to remove him and seat her on the throne. He mistrusted everyone, saw treason everywhere and retreated into his palace at Mafra.12 In January 1806 Fitzgerald raised concerns about the Regent’s mental health; it seems João was convinced he would become afflicted by the same illness incapacitating his mother. This resulted in a loss of authority (though the Prince was not that confident of his rule anyway) compelling the Portuguese to discuss the possibility of forming a Regency Council composed of the ministers currently in office, though the Portuguese dismissed all this as mere rumour.13 During the crises of 1806-1807 ‘the man in whom rested the ultimate authority and responsibility for the Portuguese nation permitted only a meagre contact with his ministers and the diplomatic corps at Lisbon and remained out of touch with developments in Europe’.14 The Situation in Portugal Writing his dispatches from Lisbon during March 1806 Fitzgerald did not see any signs of impending danger to continued Portuguese independence.15 This optimism was not shared by the wine merchant and British Consul in Oporto William Warre. Intelligence reports detailed ‘various outrages’ upon Portuguese ships in the Spanish ports of Galicia, especially at Vigo where their ships had been ordered to leave the port. Fitzgerald thought Spain might be about to declare hostilities against Portugal.16 Although the Portuguese ministers had lodged an official complaint in Madrid, they were little concerned with the Spanish actions. Further rumours concerned Spanish forces at Ferrol, where a possible

THE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1806

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expedition had been foiled from sailing by the appearance of a British squadron. The Portuguese made light of additional rumours that troops were being made ready in Spain and France for an invasion of Portugal.17 In fact on 14 April Napoleon had inquired whether the Spaniards ‘wished to try an enterprise against Portugal’ and if assistance from French troops would be needed.18 With Lisbon a hotbed of rumour, accurate intelligence was at a premium. The Portuguese themselves were convinced there would be no hostilities from Spain or France and looked favourably on all incidents supporting this belief. With Spain and Britain at war, they reasoned Spanish ships would be seized by the Royal Navy. In this context, Fitzgerald noted, Portugal could maintain friendly relations with Spain through ‘the great utility which she proves herself to be of to her neighbour, in the facilities afforded by means of her flag, and a variety of other ways, of covering the property and produce of the Spanish American Colonies and of conveying the same to Europe’. South American commerce was a key factor in relations between the two European powers and Fitzgerald was convinced ‘this individual object forms the basis of a pacific arrangement and compromise between the two courts, lately negotiated at Madrid’. Meanwhile the French chargé d’affaires was pressing for the payment of the last instalment due on an indemnity of 1803, which the Portuguese had paid to preserve their neutrality (see Appendix III). To meet the payment, the Portuguese government were emptying all public coffers and raising forced loans.19 Despite believing France and Spain were not interested in the country, the Portuguese were extremely worried British violations of their neutrality might lead to punishment from Paris and Madrid. On 16 April the Portuguese Foreign Minister Antonio Araujo e Azevedo expressed alarm that a British frigate from the Mediterranean Fleet (under the command of Vice Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood) had appeared off Lagos Bay demanding a large amount of provisions. Araujo wanted Fitzgerald to impress upon Collingwood ‘to avoid all immediate chance of compromise which certainly would be attended with the displeasure of His Royal Highness’.20 Collingwood, understanding the delicate nature of the Portuguese situation, had avoided sending British ships into the Portuguese ports but vociferously defended the right of British ships to procure victuals and water from a neutral, supposedly friendly, nation.21 By 2 May Fitzgerald could report that, while there was no specific threat, Portuguese ministers expressed ‘distant apprehension in regard to

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the fate which may be reserved for this country’.22 In mid May, however, a rumour circulated regarding a convention signed at Madrid on 29 March where Portugal agreed to ‘certain facilities to be afforded to the Spanish American trade and colonial intercourse with Europe’ in return for Spain not yielding to French demands to attack.23 On 17 May Fitzgerald received news he could take a leave of absence24 and four days later was ready to leave for Ireland. In a hurried note to Fox he declared the reported convention of neutrality between Portugal and Spain was just a rumour. It was, however, obviously not unlikely as Fitzgerald believed it possible, while the incident also shows poor state of intelligence in Lisbon upon which to implement British policy.25 Fitzgerald left Lisbon on the 22nd under convoy with the Scout brig.26 Clearly the fate of Portugal was inherently linked to Spain and both countries’ relationships with France and Britain. The intelligence coming into Fitzgerald seemed to suggest that Spain might look to secure their interests by offering to preserve the peace with Portugal in the face of French pressure. The Spaniards were acutely aware of the vulnerability of their South American colonies and wider maritime trade from the Royal Navy; the capture of a Spanish treasure fleet off Cadiz in 1804 providing a recent example of British maritime power (and leading to a Spanish declaration of war on Britain). Iberian rivalries were mirrored in South America where the Portuguese had long-held ambitions, perhaps with help from Britain, for extending the borders of Brazil at the expense of the Spanish possessions along the River Plate. The British had also been looking at commercial penetration of the closed markets of South America, and would strive to achieve this object during these years. British commercial expansion, backed up by the Royal Navy, was a clear threat to the whole existence of the Spanish Empire. This was an important factor in Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish-Portuguese relations during 1806-1808 (and will be considered in some depth below). With Fitzgerald absent the duties of the British Minister at Lisbon were now delegated to the 27-year-old Irish peer and poet Percy Clinton Sidney Smythe, sixth Viscount Strangford. Strangford had arrived in Lisbon during 1804 as Secretary of the Legation. Strangford was well acquainted with the workings of the Portuguese court. He was well liked in Lisbon society for his translations of the Portuguese poet Camoes and socialised in Portuguese literary circles as well as with the many British families and individuals in Lisbon. Lord Byron chastised Strangford’s literary character imploring him to ‘Mend, Strangford! mend thy morals


45

and thy taste’.27 Brougham drew attention to his ‘childishness in doing business’ and lamented his ‘total want of that first-rate quality which gives a man’s words the right to be believed’ and thought him ‘flighty and uncertain in his movements’.28 Sir John Moore confided in his diary that Strangford, ‘a very young man’, was one of those ‘who upon leaving [education] without any intermediate intercourse with mankind become statesmen and diplomatists’.29 Historians have also not been too kind to Strangford; Napier highlighted his lack of experience and influence while accusing him of collaborating with Canning to ‘doctor’ official dispatches.30 He has also been described as nearsighted, absent minded, vain and childish and that he was extremely lucky that events of 1807 ran so much in his favour that he could not have failed.31 In November 1806 he would be promoted to Minister Plenipotentiary and became the official Foreign Office representative; it will become evident Strangford played a pivotal role enacting British policy. During June and July relations between Britain and Portugal deteriorated, as the latter appeared more concerned with placating Spain and France than assisting her traditional friend. The most visible example was an incident involving Lieutenant Henning of the Richmond brig. Henning had hailed a Portuguese ship whose conduct he thought ‘most suspicious’, and with good reason, for on boarding he found she was Spanish-built and laden with Spanish produce from the port of Bilbao. Furthermore, she had no certificate from the Portuguese consul in that port to prove the cargo was Portuguese property. Finding the ship, which he now considered to be a prize of war, had sprung a leak, Henning put into Lisbon whereupon the Portuguese authorities embargoed the Richmond. Henning, out of respect to Portuguese neutrality, handed the brig over to the authorities.32 What marked out the affair was that the Portuguese had seized a British warship, accused the officer in charge of firing upon a Portuguese vessel wounding one man, and then changed their reason for holding the ship once this was proved to be false. Araujo insisted the embargo would continue until the British government apologised for insulting Portugal. Strangford did not commit himself to any reply on this point, assuring Fox that Henning was blameless.33 In London the Portuguese minister Marquis Domingos de Sousa complained to Howick about the actions of British vessels in Portuguese waters, noting several incidents of a ‘melancholy and distressing nature’.34 Howick retorted the Portuguese embargo of the Richmond must be ‘regarded as prejudicial to the friendship subsisting between the two

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powers’. As noted above, despite the odd disagreement, Royal Navy vessels had been active in Portuguese waters for many years but this latest incident, when added to Portuguese unease at providing victuals and water to British ships, seemed to suggest a change in Portuguese policy. If this was accurate, what particularly annoyed Howick was the lack of warning from the Portuguese. Clearly the Portuguese brig had been carrying enemy goods but if suitable notice had been provided such incidents could have been avoided.35 With the peace talks still progressing in Paris, Britain did not want to provoke a crisis with France and Spain. Therefore Collingwood was specifically instructed to avoid any further incidents or actions that would provide them with a causus belli against Portugal.36 The Richmond was eventually released, but Strangford noted the incident had delighted the French and Spanish ministers in Lisbon. He clearly saw their hand, and those members of the court who were hostile to Britain, behind the affair.37 Although the Richmond affair in itself is of minor historical importance, it was symptomatic of the Portuguese policy of trying to guarantee their security through appeasement of France and Spain. Seemingly the land-based military threat posed by a belligerent France or Spain carried greater gravitas than British diplomacy and maritime power. This was recognised by Strangford who was increasingly worried about the Portuguese policy of appeasement. On 21 June he heard further rumours of an impending alliance between the Infanta of Portugal and the Prince of Asturias.38 By 1 July he had received news from Madrid that the Portuguese minister had given assurances that no Portuguese merchant ships would provide intelligence to British vessels, under penalty of forfeiting half their cargo. Though Strangford thought this justifiable from a neutral nation, the problem, he saw, lay with issuing such news ‘with a degree of indiscreet and unnecessary publicity’.39 Further evidence was provided by the Portuguese embargoing the Harbinger, a British transport vessel. His discussions with the Portuguese regarding this ship convinced Strangford the ‘devotion of M d’Araujo to the interests of France becomes every day more apparent’. Araujo was very friendly with M. François Gérard, Conte de Rayneval, the French chargé d’affaires in Lisbon, and he had just received a present of fine furniture from France. Strangford had little ‘certain intelligence’ respecting a rumoured convention concluded between Portugal and France but thought ‘some arrangement hath actually been made; and that Madrid has been the scene of negotiation’. Adding to the confusion, Strangford


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thought Araujo might be unaware of these negotiations due to the lack of confidence displayed in him by the Conde de Villa Verde, the Prince Regent’s chief minister. The conditions of the rumoured agreement were: Portugal to grant ‘certain facilities’ to the trade of France and Spain through the medium of her ships (a measure clearly aimed at the South America trade) and Portugal to immediately pay the arrears from the 1801 indemnity due to France and to pay another six million cruzados in quarterly instalments. There were also rumours of certain territorial demands made on Portugal relating to the Bay of Lagos and the island of St. Catherine’s off the coast of Brazil.40 Against this background on 19 July orders were received at the Consul General’s office in Lisbon notifying that the Royal Navy Victualling Board would be ready to contract for supplying British warships off the Portuguese coast on 2 September. This order caused ‘much uneasiness’ in the Portuguese government, who, as noted above, had complained of the supply of Royal Navy vessels from Portuguese ports for the best part of a year. The underlying factor was ‘violent remonstrances and cavils on the part of the Spanish and French Ambassadors at this court’. Araujo and Fitzgerald had actually implemented a remarkably successful supply system to operate in secret to avoid the wrath of France and Spain. As a result, Strangford noted, the protestations from the French and Spaniards ‘have almost totally ceased, although supplies have constantly been afforded to ships requiring them’. If a formal contract was agreed the advantages of the ‘informal’ system would end, ‘the various articles which hitherto have been privately shipped by the British commissary (who is a native of Portugal and acts under the secret sanctions of his own government), must in case of a contract, pass publicly through the customhouse, a proceeding which will excite much observation’. The French and Spanish would renew their complaints, leading to either the prohibition of the contract or implementing such measures as to make it impracticable. In conclusion Strangford advised the current arrangement be allowed to continue.41 To support this he included copies of a number of testimonials addressed to the contractor, Miguel Satarro, from British naval officers, including Nelson and Collingwood, highlighting the effectiveness of the ‘informal’ system.42 Yet, as apparent Portuguese appeasement gathered pace, there were rumours of trouble in the Franco-Spanish alliance. Although Araujo continued to deny any conversations had taken place with Spain, Strangford had been informed during June 1806 there had been a definite ‘temporary

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misunderstanding’ between France and Spain. It was believed France had demanded territory in North East Spain and Spanish support in French involvement in Etruria; Spanish compensation would come at the expense of Portuguese territory.43 By the end of July Strangford had received confirmation from Madrid there certainly had been a ‘misunderstanding’ between France and Spain and the two countries had not resolved the problem (see Chapter 4). According to the Portuguese ambassador, France had demanded the town of Porto Rico in Spanish America as well as Spanish territory in Europe, while the Spanish King was to give up his claim to the throne of Naples. In response it was rumoured the Spanish had mobilised their armed forces, but then suspended the activity due to the abundant harvest. In Lisbon the Portuguese had been scrabbling around trying to raise money with which to pay off the French indemnity, and had recently made some payment. Finally, senior French naval officers had arrived at Madrid, en route to Admiral François Étienne de Rosily-Mesros’ five sail-ofthe-line sheltering in Cadiz since Trafalgar; it was rumoured these ships would shortly put to sea.44 Strangford’s next communication with London was not until 10 August, when he reported the arrival of three British warships and a convoy of merchantmen off Lisbon on 2 August. Two Spanish frigates were loitering in the area, but did not attack due to the strength of the British escort, and the convoy entered the Tagus on the 4th. After an unsuccessful attempt to meet with Araujo, Strangford reported he was sure the Portuguese were in negotiations with the French and some additional demands had been made by Napoleon. In consequence the Portuguese were trying every effort to procure more money, including the raising of a forced loan. John Hunter, the Consul General in Spain during 18021803 had seemingly remained in Madrid while diplomatic relations were suspended during 1804-1808. He now provided an important piece of intelligence to Strangford: Hunter was sure a French army was assembling at Bayonne to march into Iberia.45 On 15 August Strangford reported the arrival off the River Tagus of a Royal Navy squadron under the command of the Earl of St. Vincent comprising the powerful three-decked flagship Hibernia (110), Donegal, Defiance, Kent, Illustrious (74s) and the Lavinia frigate (40).46 With Strangford aware of degenerating Anglo-Portuguese relations and rumours abounding in Lisbon that Portugal was to be invaded, it is a suitable moment to explain why a British fleet appeared off the Tagus in early August and what it was supposed to achieve.


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The Talents React While intelligence from Fitzgerald and Strangford had kept the British government informed of events in Portugal, it was a source in Paris that brought Portugal to the forefront of British strategy. During the peace talks Talleyrand had accused Britain of not taking the discourse seriously and playing for time until the season was too late for France to act against Britain or other targets. Although the other targets were not specified ‘some movements of troops towards Bayonne might excite apprehension that Portugal was one of them’. Talleyrand then argued nothing would be gained by Britain delaying the talks and two or three months hence Britain would be perhaps obliged to consent to the conquest of Portugal, as she had consented to the conquest of Naples.47 According to Butterfield, Yarmouth’s dispatches were filled with the threat: ‘If we do not make peace before 15 August, Portugal will probably be seized’.48 Napoleon certainly had a history of following up his threats with aggressive action: seizing Hanover in 1803 and installing Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples in February 1806, as Talleyrand had alluded to. As we shall see during the Portuguese crisis the British government would make constant reference to Yarmouth’s intelligence as the key factor in reading Napoleon’s intentions. It has been argued the French declarations against Portugal might have been a ruse, as Grenville himself admitted,49 to force Britain into sending troops to Lisbon and hence preventing reinforcements going to Sicily or Northern Germany.50 Or they were, perhaps, to tempt Yarmouth into agreeing to a peace treaty before the arrival of a special diplomatic mission from Russia.51 In fact Yarmouth turned out to be a less than scrupulous individual. He had been held in France as a prisoner of war and only recently released, arriving in London on 6 June. Ten days later he was sent back to his former captors to negotiate with Talleyrand.52 By 28 July ministers were concerned about Yarmouth’s inexperience and were keen to provide him with ‘explicit and positive directions’ not to commit to anything outside his instructions.53 Preoccupied with affairs in Naples and a desire to seize Sicily, it seems, at least during the summer of 1806, Napoleon had no concrete plans for Portugal. There are no further references to Portugal in his correspondence until September when, as part of a possible campaign, 60,000 French and Spaniards were to march on Lisbon.54 In London, however, the Talents took Talleyrand’s words, as communicated by Yarmouth, as a direct threat and reacted with surprising vig-

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our. On 24 July Howick felt ‘uneasy’ about the possibility of a French squadron of six ships ‘pushing for Lisbon’. He feared such a force might seize the Tagus forts while ‘the march of the army from Bayonne would make the thing certain’. As was expected for Britain, a power heavily reliant on her maritime security, the main danger was the possibility of France seizing the Portuguese fleet. Hence, the first response was to swiftly place a naval force off Lisbon, not just as a visible support to the Portuguese, in essence showing the flag, but to act as a floating diplomatic mission, a centre for intelligence gathering and a very potent symbol of the power of the Royal Navy, providing leverage to British diplomacy. Howick raised this plan with Grenville, and both agreed it would be a prudent course of action.55 The government had already quizzed Lieutenant General James St. Clair Erskine, Earl of Rosslyn as to the likelihood of Portuguese resistance to a French or Spanish invasion. Rosslyn had gained first hand experience of the Portuguese military, serving as Brigadier General and Adjutant General to the British army in Portugal from November 1796 until leaving as a Major General in 1798.56 Howick himself was convinced that, due to the poor state of the Portuguese navy and army, it would not be difficult to seize the Tagus forts. He stressed to Grenville 5-6,000 men might be easily landed and brought off again. There was some risk involved, but the question was to balance it against the chance of success. He was confident enough to state ‘even without a land force we may by means of our fleet be able to save the Portuguese navy, or at least the greater part of it’.57 Windham had also been seeking advice, this time from John Gambier, the British Consul General to Portugal. Gambier was a nephew of Admiral Lord Gambier and a friend of Pitt. He had taken up the post in 1803 and since 1804 had worked closely with Strangford. Francis has described him as ‘rumbustious’ but efficient, noting with Strangford they ‘made a good team’. Gambier had asked for leave from Portugal in January 1806 and had returned to England. Gambier now warned the government about the conduct of the leading Portuguese ministers, who were more inclined to France than Britain. He also raised doubts over the readiness of the Portuguese navy, most were in ordinary (not in commission) and would need time to prepare for sea, but he thought 3-4,000 men a suitable number to send to Lisbon. Windham himself was inclined to make an attempt against the Portuguese fleet.58 The cabinet and the Admiralty agreed that St. Vincent would com-


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mand the naval part of the mission. A man of vast experience (he had entered the navy in 1749) and forceful personality, as already noted he had extensive experience of Portuguese waters having served off Lisbon as Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean fleet in 1796-1797 and again in 1798. He had won the battle of Cape St. Vincent in 1797 for which he gained his peerage, a factor that would undoubtedly annoy the Spaniards. Moreover, he had acquired experience of maritime expeditionary warfare in the West Indies during 1794-1795 and this played an important part in his selection for the task at hand. This was an important consideration for the Admiralty, who noted ‘the unanimity from which the country has derived so much advantage, in the joint operations in which your lordship has formerly been employed, will not fail to distinguish the present service’. The Portuguese mission was one of ‘peculiar delicacy and importance’ and ultimate success would require ‘the utmost harmony & good understanding between all the persons entrusted with it’s execution’. The Admiralty clearly thought St. Vincent was the man to provide unity of purpose between the naval, military and diplomatic levers of power.59 The certainty that a French army was assembled at Bayonne to invade Portugal, the Admiralty informed St. Vincent on 4 August, necessitated him proceeding ‘with as little delay as possible to Lisbon’. He was to form a squadron ‘as you shall judge necessary’ and to remain off the Tagus until joined by an expeditionary force of troops. The main object was to provide a highly visible military presence to ‘afford the means of counteracting the success of the intended French invasion of Portugal, which their own declarations do not any longer give room to consider as doubtful’.60 St. Vincent was provided with clear orders: 1st. If the Portuguese government should, contrary to the expectations, entertained in this country, be willing and able to make effectual exertions for their own defence, either singly or in cooperation with Spain, His Majesty will be willing to afford them such assistance as may be in his power and for this object, the presence of a respectable British squadron in the River Tagus may be of essential use. 2nd. If the government, convinced that resistance is impracticable, shall take the resolution which is said to have been in contemplation last war, of moving themselves with their ships, forces, stores

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BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA etc to the Brazils which can only be done with the aid of a British fleet, your Lordship will be able to cooperate with them for that purpose. 3rd. If there should not be sufficient decision in the court of Lisbon to adopt either of these resolutions, His Majesty’s ministers must in such extreme case, look to the preventing as far as possible, the great accession of force, particularly of naval force, which the enemy would receive, were they allowed without resistance to possess themselves of the port of Lisbon in its present state, and which must therefore at all events be prevented, and strict measures adopted as will enable your Lordship in this last case to bring away the Portuguese ships of war, together with the Brazil ships and others capable of being made serviceable for the like purposes, and also the persons, ships and property of the British factories, as well as the court, if even in the last moment they should so decide.61

The Admiralty conveyed a note of caution, just in case the intelligence from Paris was inaccurate and perhaps reflecting the British government’s unwillingness to force matters by antagonising the French or providing them with an excuse for military intervention. Yet, with an expeditionary force set to sail from England ‘with the least possible delay’, the unexpected arrival of 10,000 British troops off Lisbon would initially grant St. Vincent the element of surprise, perhaps providing the opportunity for a decisive strike to secure the Portuguese navy. Secrecy would be key, hence he was instructed to be: …most careful, not to give any inclination, before their actual arrival, of your expecting them, nor take any measures, nor hold any language, that may alarm the French Minister at Lisbon, or the French party in the government there, so as the lead to any measures of preparation or precaution against what your Lordship may ultimately be obliged to do. It was possible the troops would have to act immediately upon their arrival in the Tagus ‘in order to establish themselves in a secure position’, therefore St. Vincent was to keep the marines and boats in his fleet in a state of readiness to assist the landing of the troops, though again he was to take care not to alarm the Portuguese. As first on the scene he was to collect any information ‘that may in addition to the knowledge which


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you already possess of that place & the people’ assist the commander of the land forces.62 In contrast to their reputation for ineffective military expeditions, the Talents were certainly acting with decisive intent to resolve the apparent impending crisis in Portugal. Howick pressed the matter with Grenville again on 7 August noting ‘every thing depends upon time, and that it would be better to risk a failure in an attempt at a coup de main, than to make a failure almost certain by delay’. It was impossible to place British troops off Lisbon sooner than the 21st and his concerns turned to the possibility of having to besiege Lisbon before the French arrived.63 In order for ministers to gain a clear impression of the situation in Lisbon, and perhaps unwilling for Strangford, a junior diplomat, to negotiate with the Portuguese, it was decided a special diplomatic mission under Rosslyn, with Henry Brougham as secretary, would go to Portugal. Although the naval and military force would be under the respective commands of St. Vincent and General John Graves Simcoe, Rosslyn was granted full powers to negotiate with the Portuguese on ‘all matters that may concern the joint interests of the two courts in the present conjuncture of affairs’.64 To ensure all parties in the mission were clear about the objectives, on 9 August joint instructions were drafted for Rosslyn, Simcoe and St. Vincent. The decision to send a British expedition to the Tagus was ‘founded on no light surmises, but on the declaration of the French government itself’. ‘Intelligence has been received by His Majesty’s ministers of an intention on the part of France immediately to invade the Kingdom of Portugal, and the French govt has by its own declarations left little or no room to doubt the truth of that intelligence’. It was clearly stated the French government had informed the British Minister conducting the negotiations in Paris ‘an army, said to be composed of 30,000 men, is actually assembled at Bayonne for this purpose’. The object was ‘nothing less than that of dethroning the present Royal Family and destroying the very existence of the Portuguese monarchy’. This declaration was taken seriously due to the ‘habit of that government thus previously to announce its acts of violence – that other measures of a like nature were in like manner announced, & have actually been since carried into execution’. Though the French might temporarily postpone the actual attack it would be unwise for Britain to delay any response. Once occupied by the enemy the Kingdom of Portugal would be partitioned, as had been agreed in talks between France and Spain in June and

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July. One part would go to Spain, one, including Lisbon, to either the Prince of the Peace or to the Queen of Etruria. The government thought it right to send a military expedition to the Tagus, there to join with a ‘competent naval force’. The Talents were not afraid to commit additional troops, as ‘the land force appropriated to this service should receive successive augmentations as fast as the means of transport can be provided’.65 The Talents instructed Rosslyn to press the Portuguese to make arrangements for the defence of the country ‘an object which it ought not to be difficult for Portugal to provide for, if the invading force should not exceed the numbers stated by the French government’. If Portugal either by itself, or with the assistance of Spain, ‘where it is probable the plans of France will create much more alarm than pleasure’, should decide to oppose a French invasion, Rosslyn was to support them ‘to the full extent of such means as His Majesty may be able to apply to the object’. But he was reminded words were not enough, the instructions only applied if ‘vigorous and effective measures, bonä fide adopted by the Portuguese Govt for its own defence’. The British government hoped the ‘urgency of the present crisis’ would ensure they might ‘look with some confidence to its adoption’.66 Only if the mission found either ‘the means or energies of the Court of Portugal are inadequate for such a purpose’, Rosslyn was to urge: …a resolution which they are understood formerly to have entertained, & which, in the case supposed, is the only one that could be adopted either with dignity or prudence; that namely of withdrawing at once from their European territories & removing themselves with all that they can carry with them to their possessions beyond the Atlantic’. St. Vincent’s squadron would ‘protect and secure such retreat’ and then guarantee ‘the independence of its dominions in the Brazils’.67 There was of course a different case, ‘unhappily not the least probable’, whereby the Portuguese would abandon all ideas of defence or evacuation and await their fate. In this case Britain would have to prevent ‘the enemy from acquiring that accession of force, particularly of naval force, which the possession of the port of Lisbon in such circumstances would give him, & which may have had a principal share in prompting him to the present intended outrage’. Rosslyn was to devote


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all his conduct to this aim, ‘not by negotiation, but by demonstrations, & possibly by actual measures of force’. Even if it came to this, Rosslyn was to impress upon the Portuguese ‘the steps resorted to are taken with no feelings or object of hostility toward them’. They were the result of the ‘injustice and violence of the enemy and the weakness of Portugal’.68 Ministers hoped Portugal could continue in ‘secure and undisturbed neutrality’, so Rosslyn was to take care not to offend the Portuguese or provide the French and Spanish with any justification for intervention. It was a matter of great regret that Britain should look to employ force against a friendly power to secure her own interests; such feelings should be made patently clear to the Portuguese. Rosslyn was instructed to circulate a manifesto in Portuguese stating Britain was acting solely to deny Portuguese military resources ‘which the enemy has openly evinced & formally declared his intention of seizing for his own purposes’. It was to be made clear Britain had no desire to gain any advantage other than ‘depriving his enemy of means of annoyance which are intended to be used both against the interest of this country and for the purpose of attack against the colonies of Portugal herself’.69 As the man on the spot Rosslyn was, naturally, granted a degree of independence in his actions. He could agree ‘to any plan by which the Portuguese ships of war if placed in his custody by that Govt without the necessity of resorting to measures of force, shall be either retained in trust for Portugal or shall be purchased from that Govt by H.M. according to their full estimated value’. Though ministers were desperate to prevent France gaining the use of the Portuguese navy, they were keen it should be achieved with the ‘least offensive to the dignity or injurious to the interests of an ally’. But at the same time Rosslyn was to threaten the Portuguese if they submitted to France the consequence must be ‘the loss of the Brazils, which in such event this country must occupy for its own safety’ (as we shall soon see, this threat would soon benefit from enhanced gravitas – at least in the short term). It was entirely possible the march of the French troops, which the British government had been informed would commence on 15 August, might be delayed. This would add to the Portuguese ‘state of indecision’ and Rosslyn must ‘naturally expect that the existence or at least the urgency of the danger will be denied to you’.70 A force of 10,000 men, under the command of Simcoe, was ordered to join with St. Vincent off the Tagus. They were only to be landed if the Portuguese intended to defend the country or to operate in conjunction

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with St. Vincent’s naval force to seize the Portuguese ships. They could also provide assistance if the Portuguese decided to flee for Brazil. The disembarkation was to be swift, to prevent the Portuguese from preparing any possible resistance. Once the troops were landed and deployed in a position of safety the Portuguese must place their ships ‘in such a state as to be capable of being immediately removed on the approach of an enemy’. If the Portuguese argued landing troops would violate their neutrality and provide the French and Spanish with a pretext for an attack, Rosslyn was to state ‘the neutrality of that country is at an end from the moment that a design of invading its territory & subverting its government is openly announced by one of the belligerent parties’. The Talents were implementing a strategy of pre-emptive intervention because they could not wait ‘for the actual execution of such a menace before we take measures for averting or lessening the evil. And experience has but too plainly shown in too many instances with what facility the French government finds or make pretences for such measures when once announced’. If the Portuguese did not want help, Simcoe would proceed to the Mediterranean.71 On the same day Windham penned this extensive and exhaustive explanation of British policy, the Admiralty sent additional instructions to St. Vincent by the Kingfisher (18). This sloop had been detached from a force under Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Louis, comprising the Canopus (if ready) (80), Malta (84), Captain, Ganges, Theseus, Repulse, (74s) and the Resistance frigate (38), with transports containing the troops and victuallers, which was to join with St. Vincent off the Tagus. St. Vincent was to communicate to Louis appropriate orders regarding the projected proceedings at Lisbon. Once the objects had been achieved or as soon as Louis could be spared, St. Vincent was to direct him to proceed with the ships under his command, excepting the Resistance, which St. Vincent was to add to his command, to join with Collingwood off Cadiz.72 On 12 August, almost as an afterthought, Windham wondered whether the government should inform Sousa of the government’s plans. Howick, upon questioning from the Portuguese minister, admitted Rosslyn had left England, but Windham, quite wisely, thought it not ‘desirable to tell him all that was intended’.73 The same day, taking advantage of contrary winds preventing the convoy from rounding the Downs, Windham wrote to Rosslyn and Simcoe advising them they would probably find St. Vincent already in the Tagus. As they would arrive before the troops, Rosslyn was instructed to communicate his arrival to St.


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Vincent, and then land in Lisbon to commence his mission. Simcoe was to wait with the fleet for the troops. Most of the instructions in this dispatch were similar to the orders of 9 August except that the French plans and the preparations for implementing them, ‘has been confirmed by additional intelligence received since you left London’.74 The government continued to justify their pre-emptive actions by pointing out they could not wait ‘till the hostile army is put in motion or till some decree of the French government publishes to the world the partition of Portugal’. To hesitate ‘would be to expose the Royal Family, the government and the country to the certainty of that ruin with which they are openly menaced’. With an invasion seemingly imminent, the question was ‘whether to defend or abandon the country’. If the Portuguese were to flee, they would need to do so ‘with vigour and decision, in order to preserve to the House of Braganza at least its American possessions’. If the decision was made to defend the country, the Portuguese must mobilise the army and organise a suitable defence. If such measures were implemented Britain would help with money, troops and ships. With all these measures ‘the attack of a much more powerful army than that now said to be assembling at Bayonne, might be successfully resisted’. The French were currently constrained by the possibility of further military operations against Prussia and Russia in central Europe and hence, at this time, would not be able to send more troops than those already at Bayonne.75 Windham placed his faith in Araujo, who once convinced of the immediate danger, ‘would exert himself to inspire more energy into the councils of His Court, to remove some of the least efficient of his colleagues, and to enable his country to avail itself, in this extreme case, of the proffered assistance of His Majesty’. Rosslyn was to impress upon Araujo the French invasion would not be caused by the arrival of a British force, ‘but only the execution of a determination taken and announced antecedently to them’. There was one recurring danger to the success of any British plans to assist Portugal: the perceived weakness of the Portuguese government. Windham recognised this was the major obstacle to the success of the Rosslyn mission, and urged him to combat the ‘desire of procrastination so natural to a weak power, and the delusive hope that by perseverance in the temporizing system, the evils which they fear may yet be averted. This must be met by strong representations of the immanency of the danger & of the mischief of delay’.76

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Windham also reiterated if the Portuguese declined the assistance of British troops from the fear of offending France, Rosslyn was not to give any intimation troops were actually on the way. On the other hand, if the Portuguese did undertake to defend the country, Rosslyn was to specifically state he was expecting an expedition of 10,000 men; ‘they will of course cheerfully accept this proffered aid’, Windham optimistically wrote. Although assembled ‘with a view to a different destination’, on any request from the Portuguese for assistance ‘orders would be given to these troops and to others which might successively follow them, to sail immediately to Portugal’. When the troops did arrive in the Tagus, Rosslyn was to state their arrival was due to information received in London as to the immediate threat from France. He was to insist the Portuguese could not refuse the disembarkation of the troops, except if they decided to abandon all measures of defence. The time for the Portuguese to comply with British diplomacy was limited; the actual timescale to be decided in conjunction with Simcoe and St. Vincent. Once troops had been landed, Rosslyn was to reassure the court of Lisbon they would only remain ashore for the current period of danger. If the Portuguese did refuse permission for the British troops to disembark, then the instructions on the relevant course of action had already been made clear to Rosslyn, Simcoe and St. Vincent in the orders of 9 August.77 Strangford had already informed the government of the possibility of Franco-Spanish disagreements and now Windham instructed Rosslyn on the role the Spaniards might play in the crisis. Once in Lisbon, Rosslyn was instructed to gather additional intelligence regarding the possible intentions of the government in Madrid. Although the Franco-Spanish partition of Portugal gave Spain one half of the country, France had an ulterior motive. Windham believed Spain had agreed to cede to France Navarre, Catalonia and ‘it is surmised, something in South America’. ‘There is little reason to believe that such exchanges can really be acceptable at Madrid, tho’ the weakness of the government may induce an acquiescence, or the personal ambition of the Prince of Peace [Godoy] find it’s account in them’. Drawing on a recent example, Windham hoped the fate of Naples must have some influence on the future conduct of the court of Madrid, ‘nor can the subversion of the crown of Portugal be indifferent to them on the same grounds. If any indication could be found there of a disposition towards a concert and secret understanding with this court & that of Lisbon, either for general purposes, or even for the limited object of preserving Portugal, it ought to be met with all possible encouragement’.78


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The Talents were clearly convinced the information supplied by Yarmouth in Paris was accurate. With a French army apparently collected at Bayonne and an invasion of Portugal seemingly imminent, the Talents had acted with swift fortitude to assemble a diplomatic mission to head for Lisbon and impress upon the Portuguese the great danger facing their country. Moreover, the Talents backed up diplomacy with a naval force under St. Vincent and re-directed a suitable land force to the Tagus in an attempt to pre-empt any French attack. Finally, they hoped to persuade both the Portuguese and the Spaniards that Napoleon was not to be trusted. The ministry had done all they could; success of the mission now depended upon the situation in Lisbon and the actions of Rosslyn, St. Vincent and Strangford. …

4 THE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

St. Vincent had been stationed off Brest when, on 8 August, he received instructions ‘to fly to the protection of the sacred power and dominions of Her Majesty the Queen of Portugal’.1 He could not have been surprised by his mission. According to intelligence reports a crisis was brewing in Iberia, Lieutenant Ramage of the Hibernia stating at Bilbao in June ‘a strong rumour prevailed that an army of 25,000 French was expected at Bayonne, that preparations were making for their reception’.2 Further intelligence came on 6 August from Thomas Usher of the Colpoys hired brig who had heard the French were marching 40,000 men to the frontier with Spain for the purpose of invading Portugal; in response, it was alleged, the Spaniards had moved reinforcements towards the region.3 On 15 August St. Vincent’s fleet of five sail-of-the-line and a frigate arrived off the Tagus. He placed his fleet under eight-day quarantine, preventing any contact with the shore and ensuring the Portuguese could not gain knowledge of British intentions. Strangford managed to obtain an interview with the Admiral where the object of his mission was explained. At the time of St. Vincent’s arrival the Portuguese court were absent from Lisbon; Strangford was not even sure where they had gone.4 Two days later, while trying to arrange a meeting with Araujo, Strangford received news from a messenger that the Portuguese court had decamped to Nazaro, 90 miles distant from Lisbon.5 Strangford reassured Fox when the Princess of Brazil heard of the arrival of St. Vincent she exclaimed ‘so, the true friends of Portugal are at last arrived’.6 Next day Strangford received a letter from Araujo informing him the French and Spanish ambassadors had presented a ‘strong and decided’ note and

THE ROSSLYN MISSION TO LISBON

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threatened to withdraw their passports unless the Portuguese demanded the removal of the British squadron.7 A lack of instructions from the British government left Strangford in a tricky situation. It was Rosslyn who would lead the mission and hence assume diplomatic authority over Strangford but it seems the Talents did not inform the latter of their intentions. Strangford received the details of British policy direct from St. Vincent. Apart from protecting himself against censure by his government in case he mishandled the negotiations, the lack of direction left Strangford unsure of how far Britain would go in protecting her ally. He resorted to using Sousa’s last despatch from London, which contained reports of a conversation that minister had with Howick, to regulate his replies to Araujo. Strangford expounded the danger in which Portugal was now placed and the folly of trusting the continued existence of the country on the chances of a general peace being concluded at the talks in Paris. Araujo stated British concerns appeared to come from the conclusions drawn by Yarmouth after his conversations with Talleyrand. Araujo pointed to other rumours originating from this source that had failed to come true, noting such exaggerated alarms had been the cause of the current war between England and Spain. He played down the notion of a French squadron trying to enter the Tagus, while ridiculing the plan of a Royal Navy fleet attempting to defend Lisbon by sea should France or Spain attack by land. ‘Of what use would be a British fleet in the Tagus which is commanded by the neighbouring heights, and where every adjacent hillock could silence a ship of the line?’ If Britain did send troops to defend the country ‘she ought to undertake it in full or not at all’ arguing Spain and France would match in triplicate any troops sent by Britain. Araujo also pointed to the poor state of the Portuguese Army as ‘little more than a nominal establishment, in want of arms or clothing, and necessaries of every sort, and unpaid and undisciplined assemblage of not more that 13,000 effective men’. In a barbed comment, Araujo criticised British policy for sending troops on a diversity of missions, now ‘she could not spare too great a number of troops as would be necessary for the preservation of this country’.8 Even if Britain could send assistance it might provide France and Spain with a casus belli: ‘an English garrison in Lisbon, and an English fleet in the Tagus, would be sufficient pretext to France & Spain to commence hostilities’. Hence Araujo hoped St. Vincent would leave Lisbon ‘where his presence was unnecessary and alarming to the neutrality pro-

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fessed by his Royal Highness’. It was not in Britain’s interest, he asserted, for Portugal to be dragged into the war as an enemy of France and Spain, accelerating the fall of the entire continent to Napoleon. Araujo insisted the current situation, for Portugal at least, was no worse than it had been during the previous war and pointed out if Portugal decided to purchase ‘her own security at her own expense she is accountable to no other state for measures which do not violate any established engagements’. A British squadron in the Tagus, Strangford replied, could never be considered as sufficient pretext for hostilities since a French squadron under Admiral Jean-Baptiste-Philibert Willaumez had recently entered Bahia in Brazil. He also pointed to the selection of St. Vincent whose ‘moderate conduct’ contrasted with the policy of France and Spain.9 Rosslyn arrived in the Tagus on the evening of Monday 25 August to find Charles Cotton, stationed off Ushant in the San Josef, seemingly corroborate all the previous intelligence regarding a French army of 30,000 men collected at Bayonne.10 While St. Vincent forbade his men to go ashore, he appealed to the hearts and minds of the ordinary Portuguese inhabitants by allowing them to visit his ships. According to Brougham the ‘multitudes never ceased pouring through the vessels, lost in admiration of their beauty, their force, and the discipline of their crews’.11 Early on the morning of the 26th Rosslyn conversed with St. Vincent before going ashore to conduct a long conference with Araujo. In this meeting Rosslyn stated the British government’s concern regarding Portugal from the ‘extreme danger arising from…the intelligence respecting the plans of the French’. In reply Araujo claimed he had sent several individuals to Bayonne to ascertain the facts and discovered no major French army was assembling there; a view supported by intelligence from Madrid and also Paris, where the Portuguese Minister Laurenço de Lima had no reason to apprehend any danger. Araujo, rather naively, highlighted the difference between a declaration from the French government and a personal statement from Bonaparte, with the language of Talleyrand, which was ‘mere device or threat to induce Lord Yarmouth and His Majesty’s Ministers to consent to the terms of peace proposed’.12 Rosslyn witnessed in Araujo ‘a due apprehension both of the power and ambition of the French Government…which he was aware aimed at nothing short of the entire subjugation of Europe’. It was also clear Araujo was trying to placate the Spaniards, who were nervous enough over their relationship with France. The Spanish minister in Lisbon had expressed ‘surprize and jealousy upon the arrival of Lord St. Vincent’, to


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which Rosslyn retorted the placing of Spanish troops on a war footing, especially those on the Portuguese border had caused a ‘just and natural alarm’ in the British government for the safety of their ally. Rosslyn informed Araujo he could communicate the information passed onto him to the Spaniards ‘relative to the apprehensions that England entertains of France in consequence of Mr Talleyrand’s declaration’. Araujo declined, remarking he ‘could not attribute the arrival of Lord St. Vincent to preparations which he did not believe to exist, nor to declarations of which he had received no account, and which had not been made and were not known to the Portuguese minister at Paris’. Araujo was clearly worried the ‘sensation produced by Lord St. Vincent’s arrival, would have the worst effects upon the interests and safety of Portugal’ and it would ‘provoke an attack not otherwise intended’. It was not just the number of ships, Araujo reasoned, but sending St. Vincent would greatly annoy the Spaniards by the ‘the consequence attached to His Lordship’s exalted character’.13 Rosslyn countered Araujo’s arguments by playing a trump card: British troops had been diverted ‘from other objects of the first importance’ and were ready to sail ‘for the Defence of Portugal’. He reiterated the British desire to offer ‘every assistance that the case might require or His resources afford, as well in ships and money as in troops’. It was made clear Britain had gone out of her way, risking other strategic objects, to assist a friend in danger. With his experience of Portuguese affairs Rosslyn was not to be fobbed off by protests stating assistance was not needed or would compromise Portuguese neutrality.14 The Portuguese were pinning all their hopes on a general peace agreement in Paris, and Araujo ‘seemed almost to believe that the terms had already been settled’. Rosslyn responded by informing Araujo the British government ‘were in full possession of everything that had passed at Paris’ and urged the necessity of taking precautions ‘without delay’ pointing to the time it would take to prepare the country for defence. Rosslyn added the French could arrive in Lisbon ‘almost as soon as the succours now offered could be sent for from England’. Araujo agreed in the event of a breakdown of the peace talks, ‘the situation of Portugal would become dangerous in the extreme’, but he always returned to the assertion that ‘a few days more would determine the question of peace’. Rosslyn declared if peace came, Portugal would be secure, but if it did not, then the French would not delay the invasion. If Portugal accepted British assistance and prepared her own defences, this would not ‘increase their

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danger or provoke an attack’ but would ‘profit by the short interval to improve their means of resistance’.15 Hence whatever happened at Paris Rosslyn urged a quick decision from Araujo regarding the British troops, pointing out if they were not required they must swiftly proceed to other objects. It was impossible to have troops cooped up on board transports in the Tagus for an indefinite period. Rosslyn gave clear warning if British assistance was rejected now, it might not be forthcoming in the future. Araujo then complained if British forces were used in other expeditions ‘Portugal would be exposed to the utmost danger and left totally defenceless’. He remained convinced the arrival of a British expedition in the Tagus would violate Portuguese neutrality and draw upon Portugal ‘the resentment of France’. Rosslyn remarked Britain had allowed Portugal to pay subsidies to France as long as there remained a hope of preserving their neutrality. Araujo reiterated a general peace was the only hope of preserving Portugal.16 Rosslyn was engaged in another lengthy conference with Araujo on the 27th in which the Portuguese minister restated all the arguments from the first meeting. When Rosslyn mentioned the French plan to give Lisbon to the Prince of the Peace, Araujo ‘laughed at it as an idle rumour’ while the report of the Queen of Etruria receiving the city ‘as a ridiculous story of the same kind’. Araujo then read out all the dispatches received from Lima in Paris and the Portuguese minister in Madrid, the Condé da Ega, in an attempt to persuade Rosslyn there were no French troops at Bayonne and no intention of a French attack. Despite this Araujo considered the current situation ‘a most alarming crisis for Portugal’, with the danger increased greatly by the presence of the Royal Navy. Araujo therefore informed Rosslyn he had instructed Sousa to ask for the withdrawal of St. Vincent’s fleet.17 Rosslyn now took the opportunity to quiz Araujo on the state of the Portuguese army and the finances of the country. Araujo, contrary to his earlier assertion to Strangford, declared the army to number 30,000 men but did admit pay was in dreadful arrears and there were severe deficiencies in clothing and arms. There was no logistical support to move the army, no magazines, provisions or hospitals. The cost of the army was £1,330,000 per annum, but had only two thirds of this amount allotted to it in the budgets. Even this had not been supplied as the Portuguese finances were ‘in a state of absolute ruin’; not a surprising situation when faced with paying a huge indemnity to France. According to Araujo a ‘vigorous, intelligent and active administration’ would have few problems


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in addressing these issues, but Rosslyn lamented he did not find any hope of ‘energy, intelligence or cordial cooperation’ from the Portuguese administration.18 Araujo also tried to refute the suggestion he was a Francophile, arguing the French similarly accused him of continually favouring the English. He declared he was neither, but was only doing his duty to his country. Rosslyn replied Britain did not want him ‘to be English’ but only desired him to be a good Portuguese and follow the ‘true interests’ of the country. Rosslyn now hinted to Araujo: …the designs of France upon the Brazils were well known, that her intrigues had been seen at work in preparing the means of a revolution there and that the facility which the possession of the mother country would afford to any attempt on the colonies, chiefly by giving a command of shipping, were most probably the chief inducement to the threatened invasion. Araujo ‘ridiculed this supposition’ adding Britain would never allow Brazil to fall under French control. He also recognised ‘in case of real danger’ Britain would not hesitate to use naval force to remove the Portuguese ships from the Tagus.19 Considering the poor state of the Portuguese army, Araujo admitted if Portugal was attacked there was no other option but to abandon the kingdom. But it would not be easy. The Regent had a ‘horror of the sea…the situation of the Queen and the Royal Family presented the greatest obstacles to such a design’. Although the plan had often been talked of, Araujo seemed convinced the discussions were never serious. Araujo finished the discussion by declaring if war came, it should be carried on offensively into Spain to ‘secure a stronger and better frontier to defend’. After three hours of negotiations Rosslyn laconically noted he ‘did not think it necessary to enter into that discussion’.20 On Friday 29th Rosslyn and St. Vincent finally gained a personal audience with the Prince Regent. Rosslyn spent some time describing the exact nature of the intelligence the British government had received from Paris, stressing the urgency of the threat, which had led directly to his mission and the offer of British assistance. He also pointed out St. Vincent had been specifically chosen for the command of the naval forces ‘from a persuasion that he was peculiarly agreeable to His Royal Highness’. Rosslyn then stated British policy to the Regent, as he had

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already made clear to Araujo. To avoid any misunderstanding in the course of the meeting, Rosslyn presented a written statement outlining the objects of his mission, leaving copies with Araujo and the Count of Vila Verde.21 In this diplomatic note Rosslyn was a little more detailed than he had been in conversation with Araujo. He informed the Regent the French government had specifically notified the British minister at Paris that 30,000 men would march from Bayonne on 15 August to begin the invasion of Portugal. The British government had also received news from other parts of the continent, supporting the belief an invasion was imminent. Rosslyn argued ‘even the details of the plan have transpired and that they embrace the entire disposition of the Portuguese monarchy and the partition of its provinces’. This was entirely consistent with the French policy of announcing acts of intended aggression. In response Britain would not act precipitately as long as Portugal could maintain her neutrality ‘and did not even oppose the subsidies in money which Portugal granted to his enemies’. But now, set against the wider Anglo-French economic struggle, French aggression backed up by military force could not be allowed to succeed: any prospect of Portuguese neutrality was out of the question.22 In order to determine what resources to devote to the defence of the country the British government requested a full and frank account of the state of the Portuguese military. Rosslyn informed the Regent a force of 10,000 men with artillery and ready to sail for ‘a service of the greatest importance’ would now detour to Lisbon. Further reinforcements would arrive once suitable transport tonnage could be hired, the orders for which had already been given. All this would not upset the French as they had already decided to invade Portugal. The British government pointed out ‘experience has shown the promptitude with which a French army assembles and the rapidity with which it moves’, drawing attention to the speed of the French 1805 campaign and the resulting defeat of Austria as a recent example.23 Rosslyn dashed Portuguese hopes for a general peace, stating there was little chance of agreement between Britain and France. In the unlikely event of peace Britain would watch over the interests of Portugal. This promise must have cut little ice with the Portuguese who were still upset about the lack of British support at Amiens (see Appendix III). The key factor in any British defence of Portugal would be diplomatic moves to determine the true state of Franco-Spanish relations. The Brit-


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ish government wanted a communication opened with Madrid to find out if they would actively resist the French plans or even just refuse to assist. The hope was to ‘to bring back the councils of His Catholic Majesty to a just and wise consideration of what he owes to himself and to the House of Braganza’. The Talents clearly recognised the only way to guarantee the future security of Portugal was to separate Spain from her alliance with France.24 Throughout Rosslyn’s conversation the Regent made several expressions of his desire to continue the friendship and the attachment of Portugal to the interests of Britain. The Regent was ‘particularly struck with the intimation and overture touching the sentiments and future conduct of the court of Madrid and asked if it was desired that he should make any particular proposition’. Rosslyn replied the preservation of Portugal was the ‘principal motive’ behind that suggestion. It was up to the Portuguese, who were more intimate with Madrid, to judge how the true sentiments of the Spaniards might be discovered and of the means to be taken in impressing upon them their own interests that were intrinsically linked to supporting Portugal in the present crisis.25 During the course of the visit Rosslyn had tried to sound out Vila Verde, but worryingly, when Rosslyn began by stating the object of his mission, ‘he flew from the discussion immediately’. When Rosslyn mentioned the declaration of the French government, Vila Verde interrupted him with ‘a loose and idle story of some late news spread at Cadiz, respecting the preliminaries of peace…in short he was so determined to avoid or interrupt this discussion that I found it impossible to force him to it’.26 On 1 September Rosslyn received a written response from Araujo which commenced with the statement: ‘there exists no military force there [Bayonne] or in its neighbourhood’. British intelligence was false and contrary to what the Portuguese had received from their ambassadors and agents. The Portuguese had received reports of a conversation in Paris between Yarmouth and Lima, whereby Yarmouth had related his conversation with Talleyrand. The Portuguese claimed at the last date of news from Paris, 9 August, ‘Yarmouth had not communicated to him [Lima] the determination of the French government to march from Bayonne an army of 30,000 men as stated by Lord Rosslyn’. The Portuguese did not consider rumours from Paris as official French policy, noting they had occurred many times since 1793 and had not been carried into effect.27

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The Prince pointed out a Royal Navy squadron was useless against an invasion of Portugal by land. In fact, they argued, St. Vincent’s presence ‘embarrasses all friendly intelligence with Spain’ and gave the appearance of collusion between England and Lisbon, thereby jeopardising Portuguese neutrality. Not only would this excite the jealousy of France, but also of Spain, who would probably undertake preparations for her own security. The Regent thought it impossible to make preparations to receive British aid in this situation, as it would immediately provoke a war. The only way to stop the danger to Portugal was for Britain to conclude a general peace and urgently withdraw the fleet. The Prince thought British assistance was ‘utterly insufficient for the defence of Portugal’ and threw back the example of Naples, remarking British forces had not prevented the invasion of that country. In a remarkable assessment he noted: The rapidity of the French in marching their troops without baggage, is only practicable in thickly peopled countries like Italy & great parts of Germany, and not in Spain, where the want of provisions and the distance from which they must be brought, would impede quick marches undertaken by numerous columns. And therefore there would be sufficient time for succours to arrive from England for dispositions to be made to receive them, and also for putting the forces of this kingdom in the best possible state of preparations. To this Rosslyn did not think it prudent to do any more than state neither he nor St. Vincent had the authority to withdraw the squadron.28 Franco-Spanish Problems Key to the success of any French invasion of Portugal was the support, or at least indifference, of Spain. The Portuguese believed in the event of war Spain, as an ally of France, would assist in the attack on Portugal; not just out of duty to the alliance, but also due to the hold France had over the Spaniards. The Portuguese Regent informed Rosslyn this forestalled any attempts to sound out Madrid over resistance to a French invasion. In this situation ‘such a project, instead of producing the desired effect, would be the most dangerous negotiation that Portugal could undertake’.29 But it does seem as if Spain might have been more receptive to a communication with Britain than the Portuguese officially stated. In late


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August Araujo had shown a letter to Strangford from the Portuguese minister at Madrid recounting a conversation with Manuel Godoy. In this the Prince of the Peace had expressed his displeasure with the peace talks underway in Paris and hoped Britain might treat with Spain to prevent the latter being placed in a ‘critical & dangerous situation in case the expected peace between England & France should not prove permanent’.30 Clearly all was not well between Madrid and Paris; a conclusion supported by Rosslyn after several conversations with Araujo. Spain herself, Rosslyn pointed out to Araujo, must view the ruin of Portugal as a precursor to her dependence on France. The current French plan to allot part of Portuguese territory to Spain was to be countered by a surrender of Spanish territory to France. Rosslyn thought this entirely hostile to the interests of Spain and hoped Madrid might be induced to follow the views of England respecting the defence of Portugal or might remain neutral.31 The next day Araujo handed Rosslyn a letter from Ega, dated 16 August, relating another conversation with Godoy. It included a request that, in the present state of peace negotiations or even if they came to an end, the Spaniards would find it extremely useful if a person possessing the confidence of the British government were sent to Madrid to open discussions. If such a person arrived after the conclusion of a peace, Godoy hoped to establish relations ‘in such a manner that Spain should never again find herself in the critical circumstance in which she had been placed’. Araujo added Godoy believed peace preliminaries had actually been concluded at Paris and ‘It would be useless to attempt at present in Spain any approach to conciliation whatsoever’.32 Rosslyn remarked the British approach to Madrid was not founded on the agreement of a general peace with France, but instead on continued hostilities and the resulting danger to Portugal. Rosslyn was, however, satisfied Godoy had articulated himself in a manner consistent with the views Britain wished him to take. Araujo communicated this information to Rosslyn under a promise of strict secrecy, no intimation of it was sent to Sousa in London.33 In the meantime Strangford had employed a person to travel to the Spanish frontier town of Badajoz to observe the state of military preparations. This source reported there were no Spanish military preparations taking place on the frontier and troops were actually moving east from Badajoz, back into central Spain suggesting a possible confrontation with France rather than Portugal. Strangford also enclosed intelligence from

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the Swedish envoy at Madrid dated 26 August 1806, noting the arrival of the British squadron in the Tagus and describing the apparent disgust of the Prince Regent with his wife for wanting to establish a separate government with the assistance of France and Spain. It was reported the Prince was now resolved to transport ‘himself, his riches and friends to the Brazils, there to establish a new monarchy & with the aid of England to conquer part of the Spanish main, an object which he pretends that court to have very much at heart. Indeed he makes no secret of his knowledge of the designs of England upon South America’. The Swedish diplomat concluded by remarking that once the Prince had fled the Spaniards would take advantage and seize Porto.34 By 2 September Rosslyn reached the conclusion France was unlikely to invade Portugal in the immediate future. While this was good news for ministers in London, Rosslyn’s thoughts regarding the defence of Portugal made for depressing but familiar reading: I am sorry to say that I cannot see the least grounds to expect vigorous efforts from this nation in its own defence and it is evident that no force G. Britain can possibly furnish, would of itself be adequate to arrest the progress of a French invasion. Even in the hands of a Portuguese minister who possessed absolute authority combined with energy and talent, such as Pombal, it would still take much time before any improvements could be made to the Portuguese military and infrastructure. Even if reforms were implemented the French could overrun the country long before the finances and army were improved. Rosslyn thought the Portuguese administration ‘perhaps the weakest that this nation has seen for a long time’, describing Vila Verde as ‘a man of no talents, no strength of mind’. Araujo expressed a benevolent attitude towards Britain and maybe it is of no surprise Rosslyn regarded him as ‘the ablest man in the present council’. There was a strong conflict between him and Vila Verde, the latter possessing the confidence of the Regent and believed by many contemporaries to be pro-French.35 Rosslyn believed if France did attack Portugal, Spain would be compelled to participate, even if it was with much reluctance. If the British government did send troops to help defend Portugal, Rosslyn expected the Regent would strongly protest against the infringement on his neutrality. Though the Portuguese would probably give permission for a


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force to land, as transports could not remain safely off the bar, any request to take possession of the Tagus forts, a vital consideration for the safety of any fleet operating in or off the river, would be refused.36 Rosslyn clearly felt some sympathy with the Portuguese and urged caution in future British policy towards Lisbon. Although Britain herself was faced with a difficult situation, ministers ought not to depart from cordial relations while the Portuguese maintained a friendly disposition. The one exception to this would be if an enemy force marched upon Lisbon. In this case only, Rosslyn stated, would there be reason for ‘seizing the forts and ships…and those measures so necessary for the security of Great Britain be carried into execution’. Rosslyn resolved to use every argument ‘short of absolute threats’ to persuade the Portuguese to let British troops into the Tagus forts. But he thought it would be impossible to remove the fleet ‘till after the French army shall have made some progress in its march’.37 Rosslyn also pointed out a fundamental problem with the strategy of sending British troops, once deployed it would be impossible to remove the squadron and troops without severely damaging relations with the Portuguese. Instead, akin to the recently reinforced garrison on Sicily, they would have to remain there ‘as long as France and Spain may choose to make demonstrations without actually carrying the attack into effect’. Napoleon had the power ‘of confining to the Tagus in a state of inactivity as long as it shall choose the squadron now under Lord St. Vincent, or a large part of it, and the whole of the troops sent’. Of course, it could have been Napoleon’s intention to tie up British military force in static defence, thereby limiting the troops available for operations in support of Prussia or Russia, overseas operations or for amphibious descents upon his coastline. Simply put it was impossible to keep 10,000 British troops and a squadron of warships in Lisbon for an indefinite period to the detriment of other strategic issues.38 As well as strategic considerations there were problems at an operational level for the force could not be withdrawn ‘without entirely abandoning the object for which it was sent and leaving the ships of war and Brazilmen behind’. Rosslyn and St. Vincent thought possession of the Tagus forts alone would be insufficient to fulfil the mission and would not provide the Portuguese with confidence to rebut pressure from France and Spain. Even if the forts were under British control, additional troops were needed to act ‘in the field’ to dissuade the Portuguese from using their military to interfere with British operations, to control the

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civilian population and to secure access to the aqueduct, granaries and arsenal.39 There remained the possibility of installing British troops into the forts without Portuguese consent but this would, Araujo argued to Stranford on 8 September, lead to conflict. The Regent had been advised by Vila Verde and M de Vascomcalles ‘to prevent, even by force, the entry of English troops into Lisbon’. ‘Araujo himself had expressed his ‘utmost alarm’ at the plan. Strangford thought that the moment a fleet of British transports arrived off the Tagus the Portuguese would hold a council of war, a measure not implemented for several years. The ten members of this council would either decide British troops should be admitted, thereby incurring the wrath of Spain and France, or deny the troops entry, thereby showing immense ingratitude to Britain. Strangford resolved to employ himself in trying to secure the former outcome.40 Rosslyn also wrote to Fox on 8 September reiterating he was ‘convinced from all the resources I can collect that no such armament has existed’ at Bayonne; there was no French threat to Portugal. After outlining how the squadron had received supplies from the Portuguese, a sign of continued good day-to-day relations, he turned his attention to diplomatic issues, for Sousa’s report of a conversation with Grenville and Windham (dated 22 August) had arrived in Lisbon. Sousa’s ‘unexpected intelligence’ that 10-12,000 British troops had already sailed for the Tagus filled the Portuguese court with the ‘utmost alarm’. They feared it breached their neutrality and would provoke an immediate declaration of war from Spain in an attempt by Godoy to prove his devotion to France.41 The Portuguese Crisis Alleviated While Rosslyn was questioning the reasoning behind his mission, ministers in London also received intelligence casting doubts over the alleged French threats.42 The first, dated 7 August from Lauderdale, informed Grenville of rumours implicating Yarmouth in very extensive financial speculations involving French funds.43 Next day Lauderdale was even more convinced Yarmouth had been colluding with the French, noting Lady Yarmouth had been intriguing with Monsieur de Montron ‘the creature and tool of Talleyrand’. Lauderdale believed Yarmouth was passing information to the Talleyrand’s, ‘they know everything I allow him to know within half an hour’.44 According to the Russian negotiator, Yarmouth spent morning to night drinking with Montron.45


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It was now clear Yarmouth’s dispatches detailing the French threats to Portugal portrayed a false view of the situation. Lauderdale thought they represented the French ‘in a greater state of forwardness in point of preparation that I really believe to be the truth’. Lauderdale had talked to Lima who thought there was an army at Bayonne ready to march on Portugal, but upon quizzing him further, the Portuguese minister could not name any of the commanders or regiments, but insisted provisions had been collected for 20,000 men (Lauderdale asserted Lima was ‘perfectly under the dominion of M. Talleyrand’). Lauderdale had also talked to the American minister, who thought there were moves to assemble an army but ‘no great number of troops was hitherto collected there’. Eager to clarify matters, Lauderdale contracted a gentleman (he does not give the name) to find out the true state of affairs at Bayonne. Lauderdale received a report from his agent that same night: ‘he holds the idea of an invasion of Spain for the purpose of marching to Portugal, perfectly cheap’. The Portuguese had been correct all along.46 On the 14th Lauderdale received a report from ‘A friend to his country’ providing full details of Yarmouth’s actions. Yarmouth had been contacted by Montron about a scheme for using the peace talks as cover for speculating on the French Bourse and the London Stock Exchange. Since agreeing to the plan Yarmouth had been ‘open to the insinuations, and the surveillance, if I may call it, of De Montron, who is known to be an intelligent diplomatic spy, the active and dangerous agent of M. De Talleyrand’. Yarmouth’s activities were now common knowledge in Paris. On 14 August Grenville replied to Lauderdale informing him of Yarmouth’s recall. He was also keen to hear any more news regarding French designs, or lack of them, on Portugal.47 Yet, in London, ministers were still receiving mixed intelligence. On 17 August Howick received news from the Rosario sloop, which had been ordered to reconnoitre the Biscay coastline around Bayonne and Bilboa. Though the Rosario reported that no vessels suitable for transporting troops were collected anywhere, ‘He confirms the accounts of an army being at Bayonne, and ready to march for the purpose of attacking Portugal; and adds…that the Spaniards were preparing to resist them’.48 On 25 August Howick received St. Vincent’s initial dispatches from Lisbon, but noted they contained ‘nothing very material’. Those with trading interests in Portugal were also uncertain, one Leeds merchant wrote privately to Fitzwilliam to ascertain ‘if they may risk their trade to Portugal, ships now loading and preparing to sail early next month’. The

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merchants wanted an unofficial hint as to government policy, but delayed sending an official memorial to the government to prevent their concerns appearing in the newspapers. Grenville refused to give any guarantee of safety and was perplexed as to why the merchants would think that by sending an expedition to the Tagus the government would endanger trade with Portugal. The troops were still at Plymouth, detained by unfavourable winds, and Grenville had ‘almost decided to keep them there till we hear from Lisbon’. Grenville’s comment ‘almost decided’, pointed to the uncertainty Lauderdale’s information had cast over the state of French preparations at Bayonne.49 On 28 August Windham wrote to Rosslyn, St. Vincent and Simcoe informing them since they had sailed the government had received information ‘which induces them to believe that the preparations for the attack of Portugal are in a less forward state than had before been supposed’. The troops at Plymouth would be detained until Rosslyn could provide accurate information ‘of the state of affairs at Lisbon’. Ministers now hoped with the apparent change in French plans, there was a prospect of the mission achieving its aims ‘without the necessity of resorting to measures of force’. Although the government were adapting their response, they were still worried about French ‘plans for the conquest and partition of Portugal’. They did not entirely rule out sending the expeditionary force; it would be ‘kept in constant readiness to sail’.50 On 6 September Howick received dispatches from St. Vincent and Strangford containing details of the communication made by Spain. Howick was not optimistic about the possibility of ‘exciting that government to shake off the yoke of France’ but he realised ‘no chance, however small, which might lead to the accomplishment of so desirable an object should be neglected’. He was still awaiting the arrival of Rosslyn’s first dispatches, which he believed would probably confirm Portuguese accounts of the state of French and Spanish preparations. By 10 September he thought the best way to approach the Spaniards was by sending Brougham to Madrid ‘with an ostensible appointment of commissary of prisoners, to hear what they have to say and to judge the situation’.51 The question now was where to utilise the troops at Plymouth. News of the British success at Maida arrived in London on 4 September52 and four days later Spencer, in agreement with Howick and Tom Grenville, lobbied for the troops to be sent onto Sicily ‘without a moment’s loss’. ‘The accounts from Lisbon are (as I understand from Lord Howick) such as very much to justify this measure’.53


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In the meantime Lauderdale provided more news from Paris. A dinner held by Lauderdale on 7 September was attended by Talleyrand, Champagny, Clarke, Metternich and Lima, ‘quite a creature of Talleyrand’s’. Lauderdale stated he wanted ‘a written report of the Emperor’s declaration in relation to Portugal, such as he described it to be’. He knew the British government would like to receive such words in writing ‘not as adding to the security of Portugal, but as furnishing an authentic document of the treachery of this court, in the event of things going wrong’.54 This insinuates Napoleon had given some kind of verbal declaration he would not attack Portugal, something the British government wanted in writing in case the Emperor changed his mind in the future. But it was Rosslyn’s dispatches of 30 August, 1 and 2 September that arrived in London on 12 September which provided final confirmation regarding Portuguese security. Windham noted ministers had devoted ‘very careful attention’ to the ‘interesting picture which your lordship has drawn of the present situation of Portugal, and of the actual disposition of the court of Lisbon’. The strong wish expressed by the Regent and Araujo for the British troops not to enter the Tagus had ‘already been anticipated’. Rosslyn’s dispatches supported Araujo’s assurances and the British government’s information that ‘there is no immediate menace of attack from Bayonne’. As the Portuguese were concerned about the British squadron in the Tagus, it was now decided to ‘withdraw, for the present, that assistance’. Rosslyn was informed his mission was at an end and Strangford would continue as the British chargé at Lisbon. Rosslyn himself was praised for his ‘zeal and ability’ during a ‘delicate and difficult business’.55 It was now decided the expedition at Plymouth could be ‘much better employed in effectual operations against the common enemy’. The Portuguese were to be made aware it was impossible ‘to keep in reserve for the possible wants of Portugal, a body of troops and a squadron of men of war already previously destined to active operation against the enemy, already offered to the defence of Portugal, & declined by them’. Rosslyn was to declare the force was offered upon ‘friendly and generous principles’ and it was now removed due to the court of Lisbon declining it ‘in the present moment’. He was to make patently clear a strong desire remained in the government ‘to support the interests of Portugal…by all practicable means to assist & sustain any efforts she may be compelled to make in her own defence, if France or Spain should violate the assurances now given of not invading her territories’. Clearly there were suspi-

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cions the day of reckoning for Portugal had not been completely averted, only, perhaps, delayed.56 The End of the Rosslyn Mission On 11 September Rosslyn received news that the sailing of the troops had been delayed until the government received firm intelligence regarding French designs. He immediately informed Araujo of the change in British plans.57 By 14 September it was known in Portugal that a stop had been put on any troops sailing from England for the Tagus, news which the Portuguese greeted with much satisfaction.58 With regard to Spain Rosslyn thought it clear Araujo did not trust Godoy, and was afraid to make any British prompted overtures to Madrid. Araujo also believed if Prussia had joined with the allies in 1805 and if Napoleon had suffered any considerable reverse, then Spain would have broken with France. Rosslyn, however, thought Godoy was ‘reduced to the most perfect subjection to the will of France’. Worryingly, Rosslyn also discovered Ega in Madrid had been making assurances to Spain he could not guarantee, including promising St. Vincent’s squadron would be removed. Here, as in other cases, Rosslyn found the Portuguese ministers short-sighted ‘with very little consideration of the future consequences either of their declarations or their measures’.59 While Rosslyn had been negotiating in Lisbon, Brougham, in the absence of Simcoe who had returned to England ill, inspected the military preparations undertaken by the Portuguese. While in Oporto during September, he persuaded Warre to provide intelligence regarding the state of preparations at Bayonne. Brougham and Warre despatched three agents to Bayonne and San Sebastian, while Warre had already sent a person to Bilbao. It was hoped this would provide early intelligence of any French moves towards Portugal. The French consul in Oporto denied any attempt would be made on Lisbon, a belief apparently supported by intelligence from Spain. At Viana on 29 September Brougham interviewed the crew of a Portuguese schooner recently arrived from Bayonne. Although it had been reported there were 35-38,000 troops to be expected in Bayonne for the invasion of Portugal, the actual force there consisted of two Italian and a single French invalid regiment. He argued ‘this account quite confirms our former information as to the non-existence of actual preparations’.60 With the assistance of Warre, Brougham managed to place two British agents in Bayonne and Ferrol. Brougham was pleased he had managed to improve the intelligence


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situation; the correspondence was now passed through various channels and was ‘likely to be regular and full’.61 On 27 September Rosslyn received dispatches from London informing him of the capture of Buenos Ayres by British forces (see Chapter 5) and the death of Fox.62 On 30 September Rosslyn wrote to Araujo informing him orders had been sent to St. Vincent for the withdrawal of the squadron. As Rosslyn clearly pointed out, although Britain had sent a squadron and had a body of troops at hand to help defend the country, the Portuguese had expressed alarm and declined this help. If Portugal was threatened again Britain would certainly examine all possibilities for assisting its ancient ally. But, with other strategic commitments, it would be impossible for Britain to keep a body of troops ready to fly to the assistance of Portugal whenever the country was threatened. Rosslyn pointed out the Portuguese had wanted a body of British troops to be ready to help them but had not taken a single measure to improve the finances or the military force of the country.63 St. Vincent received his orders to leave the Tagus on 26 September and the fleet set sail on the morning of Sunday 28 September.64 In the Tagus on board the frigate Lavinia on 7 October 1806, two days after the Regent had graciously received him at an audience of leave at Mafra, Rosslyn penned his last dispatch from the mission to Lisbon. He concluded the Portuguese would not defend themselves and any British troops that were sent out would not have any impact upon a French invasion. One of the key problems Rosslyn had identified was the lack of accurate intelligence regarding the military movements of Spain and France. With the establishment of an intelligence channel through Warre in Oporto he hoped a flow of more accurate information would assist future British policy regarding Portugal.65 In October Strangford was instructed to inform the Portuguese only the suspension of preparations at Bayonne and ‘the appearance of the attention of France being suddenly diverted to other quarters [war with Prussia]’ led the British government to halt the military expedition. Strangford was to assure the Portuguese whenever danger threatened the country ‘no effort military or pecuniary, which her resources will allow her to make, shall be wanting on the part of G. Britain’. There was a caveat, however, as any British efforts should be ‘seconded by those of the Portuguese government’. The British government expected the respite granted to Portugal by the distraction of France should be seen as an opportunity not to be wasted. Measures should be implemented to ‘add

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to the internal strengths of the kingdom and insure the direction of the resources of the country to the great object of a vigorous and effectual defence’.66 In a second letter of the same date, written after Strangford’s dispatches of 14 September had arrived at the Foreign Office, this important point was again impressed upon Strangford. Most important was the need to promote a ‘cordial union between Dom Rodrigo de Sousa and Mr d’Araujo and to exert all your influence in enforcing such measures as may be concerted between them for adding to the internal strength of the kingdom’.67 Though Strangford was to continue to press the Portuguese to make effective preparations for the defence of the country, on 22 October Howick lamented there was little actual hope for any effectual measures being made. But it had been decided to try and safeguard Portugal by making a direct proposition for the conclusion of peace through the Russian minister in Madrid. It was, however, impossible upon any terms that would not guarantee sufficiently ‘against the renewal of the influence of the French govt over that of Madrid, at any future period, during the continuance of the present war’.68 In mid October Strangford had a meeting with Araujo during which he was informed the Spanish were mobilising their army and militia; ‘there was every appearance of hostile designs on the part of Spain’. But the question was mobilisation against whom? It seemed certain ‘from many circumstances that such designs were not directed against this Kingdom’. Instead Godoy, upset over the conduct of his ally, had decided to mobilise against Napoleon and intimated to Ega that, in order to conceal her real intentions from the French and obtain a plausible pretext for mobilising the army, Spain might pretend to engage in hostilities against Portugal. Godoy hoped the Portuguese would go along with this idea, ‘that a deep and secret game was thus to be played, and that Spain, apparently arming against Portugal, would watch an opportunity of throwing off the yoke of France, and assisted by Portugal & England, of reassuming her ancient rank among the Powers of Europe’. Araujo had wanted to communicate the details of this plan to the British government but did not have the time and instead asked Strangford to provide the brief outline to his government, but to ensure de Sousa did not find out. Strangford and Araujo were both concerned this plan would be leaked from Madrid to the French.69 In late October Strangford noted military preparations were still taking place in Spain, with an army of 120,000 rumoured to be assembling.


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There was no intelligence as to where they would be stationed. Araujo confirmed no military movements of any description had taken place in Portugal, while ‘the preparations making by Spain, are viewed with quiet and unaccountable apathy’. All this pointed to the possibility the Portuguese knew what the Spanish were intending and might explain their horror at the arrival of a British fleet in the Tagus. Strangford included an edict, dated 5 October 1806, from Godoy calling for the Spaniards to rouse themselves for military service to defeat the enemy and thereby provide for the salvation of the country through a lasting peace. This call to arms did not identify the intended foe, though the implication was clear enough: France.70 Reports of a disagreement between Paris and Madrid were true. Still smarting from the loss of naval power at Trafalgar Godoy had become increasingly unhappy with his ally. While Britain was engaged in the summer peace talks in Paris, France and Spain had discussed a plan to partition Portugal. Godoy had already turned his thoughts to such a plan in 1805 desiring a principality of Portugal to rule as his own and approached the French again in May 1806.71 In June and July this began to take shape into a clear plan to divide up Portugal between the two powers. But by October France had instead launched a war against Prussia disappointing Godoy’s ambitions. Of course with France distracted Godoy was not one to miss an opportunity and issued the 5 October proclamation.72 The scale of French military success against the Prussians forced Godoy into a swift and humbling volte-face but his actions had long-lasting repercussions as Napoleon became ever more determined to solve the many problems posed by his Spanish ally. They also provided the British government with an opportunity to exploit the frosty relations between Madrid and France. Godoy had apparently made an approach to the Russia minister in Madrid, Baron Stroganoff. This backed up the information supplied to Strangford by Araujo. British ministers wanted to send a diplomat to Spain, ‘not only to treat for peace, but for a concert with the allies against France’, but Howick realised this was dependant on the continuance of war in the north of Germany. French success against Prussia would, and did, lead to continued Spanish subservience to France. The Spanish mobilisation might then be used against Portugal ‘if the threat of the French government shd be renewed, at the same time that the means of enforcing them are increased’. Strangford was to press Araujo on the danger of this policy and to urge him to restore ‘the ener-

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gies of the Portuguese government and securing its means of defence, which whether they are to be called upon to resist the attack of Spain, or to join with that power in support of their mutual independence against the common enemy, are equally indispensable’.73 On the same day, Howick wrote to Strangford with the news he had been promoted to Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of Lisbon during the absence of Fitzgerald.74 On 9 November Strangford informed Howick he had spoken to Araujo about reforming the Portuguese military but thought the minister’s support ‘too frequently rendered ineffectual by the system of jealousy and opposition adopted towards him by his colleagues’. The prime blame lay with Vila Verde, whose influence with the Regent and within the court, added to his own ‘unaccountable obstinacy’ towards military reform.75 On the same day Strangford passed on information that the French chargé d’affaires at Madrid had presented two notes to the Spanish demanding an explanation regarding the Spanish troop movements.76 Though the French danger to Portugal had passed, at least for the time being, Strangford had to deal with other problems caused by French actions. In December he wrote to Howick regarding ‘Very serious unease has been excited amongst the British merchants of this city in consequence of the third article of the [Berlin] Decree [of 21 November] prohibited by the French Government’. There was a possibility France might use the military preparations undertaken in Spain to enforce the decree. There had also been a report that ‘the French Government had resolved to compel the several neutral powers of Europe to declare positively either in favour of France or against her’. Strangford looked for government confirmation on this point and what line of conduct he should take with the Portuguese court. The French ambassador was on his way to Madrid, and his arrival there ‘may be considered as preparatory to some very decisive measures on the part of France’.77 On 28 December Strangford confirmed 25-28,000 Spanish troops would be cantoned in the very centre of Spain. The Portuguese court had also discussed the expediency of communicating with France regarding the Berlin decrees but Araujo argued it would be ‘unwise to hazard any declaration which might betray the uneasiness felt by the Portuguese government at the prospect of being obliged to violate their neutrality’. Araujo hoped Britain would realise they would gain more by a plan of forbearance and consideration for the rights of neutral countries than by retaliating. If Britain was to implement this plan towards Portugal, not


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only would she gain benefits in general opinion but ‘actual and real benefits of other sorts’. This might have been a Portuguese attempt to dangle the carrot of trade with Brazil in exchange for a British understanding of their neutrality. Araujo told Strangford he intended to write to the Portuguese minister in Paris with dispatches containing ‘friendly and confidential representation to the French Government of the danger with which this country is menaced on the side of Spain’. The Portuguese hoped the French would not ‘suffer any insult to be shown to a power which had hitherto preserved relations of amity’.78 Strangford argued against this as it ‘gave France a right to set her own price upon the protection which virtually she was thus invited to afford Portugal’. Moreover, it was clear if this policy was implemented, ‘Portugal might be called upon to pay for that protection by hostility to England’ and it was unwise to consider Spain as acting purely as a subsidiary of France. Araujo insisted his talks with France were to show Portuguese attempts to reform the military were purely in consequence of the hostile appearance of Spain.79 Howick received Strangford’s despatches up to No.47 on 23 December. He was annoyed Araujo had taken no means to press upon the Regent the ‘calamitous state into which Portugal has fallen, and the absolute necessity of a radical change in the measures of the government’ or to attempt to form an administration that would make suitable efforts for the defence of the kingdom. So long as the new arrangements in Portuguese affairs were unsettled, Strangford was to press the Portuguese ‘to bring the Court of Lisbon to a due sense of the dangers of its present situation’.80 In early 1807 Strangford conferred with Araujo. Looking back over the events of 1806 the Portuguese minister was convinced ‘Portugal will be spared, since there is no French army in her vicinity, since England will protect her by sea, and since France has given a positive promise that she will not suffer Spain to attack her by land’. In March Strangford declared he would ‘omit no opportunity of continuing to urge the necessity of such measures as may place this Country in a state of defence, wherein her own means shall be principally employed’.81 It is clear that, although France had long-standing designs on Portugal, there was no plan to invade the country in 1806. Napoleon had not organised an army at Bayonne nor had the Spaniards mobilised their forces to invade. The British had based their policy on information provided by Yarmouth in Paris which proved to be entirely false. Yet, Na-

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poleon’s past conduct, in particular with regard to Naples, had set a pattern of activity which Britain could not ignore. The outbreak of war between Prussia and France in Northern Europe shifted focus away from Portugal, at least for the time being. Yet by reacting to a perceived threat to Portuguese independence, the Talents had shown themselves more than capable of moving swiftly to protect British interests. One reason for this was the availability of an expeditionary force, which had originally been destined to reinforce Sicily. While reacting to the perceived French threat to Portuguese neutrality, however, a multitude of possibilities had opened up on the other side of the world. …

5 THE TALENTS AND SOUTH AMERICA

With Napoleon attempting to ruin the British economy by means of the Continental blockade during 1806-1808 South America became a key region for expanding British commerce. This strategy remains controversial and has provided fruitful ground for critics of British policy. Napoleon himself began the propaganda campaign mocking British dabbling in South America, declaring while European powers mobilised their manpower in futile resistance to his ambitions Britain turned her back on Europe and concentrated on overseas empire building.1 Following their leader some French historians point to Britain’s overarching lust for imperial power,2 while Lefebvre called it a ‘policy of maritime imperialism’.3 Certainly there was a long held belief in Britain that South America was ripe for commercial exploitation. The problem was Portuguese and Spanish reluctance to give up their monopolies over South American trade and specie; this could only be reversed by opening up the markets through the use of British military force. This was particularly true of Spanish Latin America during the years that country was allied with France. Hence there was little interest in the early years of the war and British operations were concentrated in the Low Countries and the West Indies. But with Spain changing sides in 1796 the colonial possessions of that power became fair game. As Secretary of State for War, Henry Dundas planned expeditions to Chile in 1796, Venezuela in 1797 and Buenos Aires in 1800. In 1801 Venezuela was considered by the Addington ministry and again by Dundas after the war with Spain broke out in 1804.4 In 1803 an unsigned memorandum had been submitted to Addington; in the same year Sir Home Popham RN had expressed the need to remove the wealthy Spanish colonies from the influence of European Spain.5 In

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October 1804 William Jacob, the statistician and astronomer, told Pitt that British commercial penetration would ‘encrease our powers of opposing that rival [France], by making conquests or alliances, which our naval superiority would enable us to preserve’. But sensibly he advised the intention should be to benefit from ‘commercial intercourse [rather] than the mere achievement of unproductive conquest’.6 In 1804 Pitt, uncertain about the future course of the war in Europe as Anglo-Spanish relations deteriorated, was receptive to various schemes for opening the markets of Spanish America. Franciso Miranda, a perennial Venezeluan patriot, in London from 1798 until 1804, and Popham, who had met Miranda in 1803, were his most vociferous and influential advisers on South American issues. At a meeting on 14 October 1804 Miranda and Popham presented detailed plans for British intervention in the region to Dundas, now Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty. Popham believed South America shipped 50 million dollars per year to European Spain; the deprivation of such a sum would remove any future maritime threat from the Spaniards. The meeting had a profound effect upon future British policy in the region as it left a favourable impression on Popham, who possibly believed he had tacit government approval for the schemes. In November Popham was actually at Spithead expecting Miranda to arrive and, possibly, undertake an operation but nothing materialised.7 According to Duffy this was typical of the subordination of Latin American projects to European considerations. South American projects were shelved to progress peace talks in 1796 and 1800-1801; for strategic reasons, such as removing the French from Egypt in 1801; or to assist Pitt’s coalition building in 1804-1805.8 As already noted, British interest in South America was intrinsically linked to the European situation, and in particular relations with Spain and Portugal. It is interesting to note the dates for possible military operations above all occurred when Spain was at war with Britain. There were no plans before Spain changed allegiance in 1796 or after the peace of Amiens, until British actions forced the Spaniards to declare war in late 1804. Of course, after 1808 Spain was fighting with Britain against France, and, though this did cause problems in the relationship over conduct in South America, they are beyond the scope of this study. There was a key difference between Portuguese Brazil and the South American colonies of Spain. Brazil had remained in contact with Portugal (and would be the seat of Portuguese government from early 1808).

THE TALENTS AND SOUTH AMERICA

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But from 1796-1806, except during the peace of Amiens, Spanish South America had been isolated from Spain, leading to a growing sense of political and commercial independence. This had encouraged an illicit trade in British goods. What Britain really wanted was legitimate access to South American markets and specie. What she did not want was a South American revolution against Spanish control, which might lead to French or American intervention. Either of these would shut off the possibilities for British trade in the region.9 This commercial driver became more pressing by 1806 when there was a clear need to open up new markets to enable Britain to continue the war. Unlike France, Britain could not invade another power and set huge reparations to make war pay for war. Money had to come from expanding trade and South America seemed to fit the bill perfectly. Nonetheless, there were dissenting voices questioning the value of South American markets.10 Admiral Campbell estimated the population of Brazil had increased from 1.5 million in the 1770s to 2.5 million by the end of the eighteenth century to an estimated four million by 1804. But only 500,000 were white of European extract.11 Wealth was concentrated in the cities of Rio de Janeiro (60,000 people in 1808), Buenos Aires (3040,000 in the 1800s) and Montevideo (10,000 in 1807). ‘Away from the main cities and seaports’, Platt argued, ‘the population was sparse, transport conditions appalling, and the marketing of imported goods expensive and unrewarding’.12 Alongside commercial considerations, Britain was interested in South America for naval reasons. With Europe increasingly hostile to Britain, the Baltic could not be solely relied upon for naval stores. Brazil provided an alternative source. The Bahia region provided straight timber, Rio Grande could supply hemp and flax while in Pernambuco ‘the very best crooked timber in the world’ could be found, an essential form of timber for ships knees. Campbell thought Brazil would make an excellent naval base due to the abundance of raw materials and the sizeable coasting and fishing trade, which would act as a nursery for skilled seamen. Brazil embraced ‘almost every useful production that is to be found in natural history’.13 The French Threat to South America There was another key argument to justify British intervention in South America: the fear that France would either seize territory in the region or gain access through the conquest of Spain or Portugal. Certainly, as Ellis

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has argued, the image of Napoleon as a ‘pacifist imperialist, driven to fight defensive wars against the enemies of reason, is perhaps the most absurd concept in the historiography of the subject’.14 For Sparrow, with Spain allied to France after 1804 ‘the fear that France would reap the gold of El Dorado was very real’.15 But what were French intentions towards the region? In September 1796 intelligence had been received in Lisbon regarding French demands on Portuguese territory on the banks of the Amazon and Rio Negro, along with proclamations insisting navigation of the Amazon should be free to French and Spanish ships. The Portuguese should allow French ships to use Portuguese ports and pay an indemnity of 25 million livres to France. In exchange France offered ‘friendship’.16 Nothing came of the demands but France retained a keen interest in the region. In January 1801 when the French Brest squadron escaped, St. Vincent thought the likely destination was Brazil (it was in fact Egypt).17 The Chatham Papers contain an unsigned memorandum dated 26 November 1803 discussing possible French plans to seize the River Plate. French occupation of this river, according to the author of the memorandum, would ‘counteract all our operations’, and ‘certainly with great facility if he once had possession of the Brazils’. If British troops could take Buenos Aires ‘it would make any attempt by France on the Portuguese settlements a serious consideration’. Dundas was apparently ‘fully convinced of the importance of this point’.18 In 1804 Campbell reminded ministers of the events of 1711 when the French had captured Rio de Janeiro by landing troops in the Bay of Rio and successfully assaulting the city from the rear. They had also made off with a reported haul of £4 million in cash. With appropriate measures, Campbell thought, Rio could be defended to prevent a repeat occurrence.19 But he warned Rio de Janeiro’s harbour, ‘perhaps one of the best in the world’, near the trade routes to the East Indies and China, would make an excellent cruiser base for Britain’s enemies and once the defences were strengthened it could be defended ‘against any naval force’.20 Campbell’s wise words were suitably highlighted by Admiral Willaumez’s cruise of 1806 which displayed the danger posed by French cruising squadrons to British trade using the South Atlantic shipping routes. His use of Bahia as a resupply base was a worrying development pointing to the possibility of French warships and privateers using a South American port as a base from which to threaten British maritime trade. In 1806 reports reached Lisbon of nine English merchant ships taken by


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a French privateer and sold along the coast of Brazil to various individuals not as prizes but as Spanish ships.21 It was events in Europe that provided a new impetus to French interest in the region. The campaigns of 1805 left the French economy in ruins. The French Minister of the Treasury, Barbé-Marbois, had been involved with speculators headed by Gabriel Julien Ouvrard who had borrowed from the Bank of France, with his security being the Spanish debt, which that country would pay upon receipt of specie from Mexico. Ouvrard estimated there were 71 million piastres waiting for shipment to Europe. The finances of European Spain were, however, also in a terrible state, the annual subsidy payable to France was already 32 million francs in arrears by 1804. The British blockade prevented the sailing of the Spanish treasure ships, prompting accurate rumours that the Bank of France was running out of cash, causing a run on the bank as people withdrew their money. This situation had been compounded by the British seizure of the Spanish treasure ships in early October 1804. The Bank of France was soon running out of gold and issued paper money, which declined in value. By the end of September 1805 the Bank of France had only 1.5 million francs as a cash reserve. The French financial crisis lasted until 27 January 1806 when Barbé-Marbois was removed. Spain was lumbered with a debt of 60 million francs which Ouvrard guaranteed against the gold from the Spanish American colonies, as had been promised by Godoy.22 The crucial evidence of French intent comes from Napoleon himself. In September 1806 he composed a plan for an invasion of Portugal while an expedition of 8-9,000 men would sail to Brazil to prevent, he hoped, the Portuguese from evacuating Lisbon for Brazil. This would probably cause the British to send a force in response, distracting the reinforcements planned for Sicily.23 In the Convention of Fontainebleau of 1807, France and Spain would agree that the King of Spain would become ‘Emperor of the two Americas’. The colonies, islands and overseas possessions of Portugal were to be divided between France and Spain.24 France was not the only threat to British interests in South America. Dundas also saw danger from the United States fearing their involvement would unleash revolutionary forces. He therefore urged for direct British intervention to oversee the change from Spanish rule into some kind of self-government.25 The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 had provided a much needed financial stimulus to the French economy. In return for the 60 million francs paid to France the United States acquired a huge

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area of land (over 800,000 square miles) stretching from New Orleans in the South to the Canadian border in the north. The purchase removed a barrier to American expansion westward into the Spanish Viceroyalty of New Spain and provided the US with a maritime base at New Orleans. In 1807 Canning would view American interests in Mexico as dangerous for Britain, for if the government ignored the region ‘America will force her into Independence, and herself become the carriers’. British intervention in Mexico would, he hoped, inspire many of the citizens of Louisiana to join with Britain; Canning was convinced that ‘they hate the Americans’. Seizing Mexico, whether by force or installing a member of the Bourbon family on the throne, would help protect British possessions in the West Indies from American encirclement.26 Clearly for France, Spain and Britain by 1806 the finance provided by South American gold and commerce was seen as a key part of funding the war in Europe. Moreover, denying such resources to the enemy or even a third party was another factor. As Sparrow has argued, if a little dramatically, ‘The race to gain control of South America was on’.27 But control and access to South America riches could only be secured by a nation able to exercise maritime power. Sir Home Riggs Popham Shortly after taking office in the Talents ministry Auckland, President of the Board of Trade, was pressing Grenville to ‘encourage and multiply our licences as much as possible for the export of British produce and manufactures to the Spanish settlements and to St. Domingo’.28 In June Auckland and Grenville were discussing a project to ship 10 million Spanish dollars from South America in neutral vessels. This scheme had originated with Pitt, to ship quicksilver to Vera Cruz, while the ships returned to British port laden with dollars, to the account of the Spanish government.29 While governments had dabbled in South America it was Popham who brought the subject to the forefront of British policy. In September 1805 he had been ordered to sail from Cork to capture the Dutch Cape of Good Hope.30 After failing to procure necessary victuals at Madeira, Popham had put into St. Salvador, Brazil, to obtain provisions before sailing onto the Cape. After the successful completion of his mission Popham, believing the meeting of 1804 had provided him with official support for South American operations from Pitt, decided to implement a daring plan. He collected 1,500 troops under the command of Major


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General William Carr Beresford in four transports. With the Diadem, Raisonnable, Diomede, Narcissus and Encounter gun brig on 14 April 1806 Popham set sail. Just under two months later, on 12 June, this force anchored in the River Plate and by the 28th had seized the Spanish town of Buenos Aires.31 Popham’s dispatches from the Cape (and a stop-over at St. Helena) outlining his intentions arrived at the Admiralty on the morning of 24 June.32 Nobody in the government was exactly sure what he was up to. Howick wondered what measures to adopt ‘in consequence of so an unexpected event’.33 It seems as if Windham at least had been considering some as yet undefined plan regarding South America. Writing to the King he declared Pophams’s actions ‘affect a question which has for some time anxiously engaged the attention of your Majesty’s servants, while they have been endeavouring to frame an opinion such as It might be fit humbly to submit’.34 Ministers reacted speedily to the news. At a cabinet meeting of 26 June (conducted without Fox) it was decided to recall Popham to give an account of his actions while a reinforcement of 2,000 men would be sent to Buenos Aires.35 In late July the Admiralty decided upon Rear Admiral Stirling as Popham’s replacement. Stirling sailed at the end of August.36 Ministers could only sit and wait for the next batch of dispatches to arrive. The question of expanding initial intervention in the region was already playing on ministers’ minds. On 11 September Windham considered seizing Spanish South American territory as a foothold. Part of the force at Plymouth, destined for reinforcing Sicily but detained in case it was needed at Lisbon, should be applied ‘not to the revolutionizing, but to the obtaining possession of part of the Spanish settlements in South America’. Once a British expedition had been established there the continent would fall under British influence ‘by a mild and gradual operation’. If the Spanish Americans did turn against the mother country, ‘we should equally be in a situation to secure a great portion of the advantages which such an event is supposed likely to produce’. But for Windham, ‘what is of most consequence of all, to prevent probably the French from establishing themselves there’. Windham saw British involvement in South America as part of the wider struggle with France: With Calabria well supported, with the discontents in France described in Lord Lauderdale’s letter, and with an establishment on the continent of South America, followed by a hearty support of

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BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA the war in this country, the period may not be far distant, nor exceed the term to which we can afford to wait, when the power of Bonaparte may begin to totter; and, if once thrown out of it’s balance, fall to the ground with very little strength.37

The very next day, Popham’s report of the capture of Buenos Aires and of the fantastic profits to be made reached England. It was accompanied by a very visible example of the riches available in the region. A procession of eight wagons escorted by thirty sailors from HMS Narcissus made its way from Portsmouth to London, firing a salute at every major town on the route. With captured Spanish flags and suitable martial music provided by a Royal Marine band this triumphal carnival parade also contained around a million dollars in hard cash, prize money from Buenos Aires, some of which had been seized from the Viceroy who, according to Popham, had ‘absconded with all the treasure from the town’ until intercepted and relieved of his burden by a British force.38 Ministers heard the news on the 13th and the next day the King voiced his approval informing ministers that although the mission had been unauthorised ‘it is impossible not to approve of the manner in which it was planned and executed….His Majesty trusts from the reports made, that the acquisition of Buenos Ayres [sic] will prove very advantageous to this country’.39 Popham’s dispatches arrived at a crucial time. With the Talents attempting to open a rift between France and Spain the news would certainly not help that process. Yet, in every other respect it offered opportunity. The Austrians and Russians had been smashed at Austerlitz, Austria had left the war, Prussia remained fearful of French ambitions in Germany, the French had overrun Naples and were apparently threatening Portugal. Grenville was now directing the stumbling peace talks (Fox finally succumbed to his illness the same day Popham’s dispatches arrived in London), which eventually collapsed. The Holy Roman Empire was dissolved by Napoleon and the Confederation of the Rhine established, though French activity in Germany would force Prussia into war in August 1806. Finally, there was the looming prospect of economic warfare confirmed in Napoleon’s Berlin Decree of November. In this situation Popham’s actions had major strategic effects. They provided the French with great propaganda value, vis-à-vis Britain’s potential allies. The Talents refused to send help to Prussia and Russia, reinforcing the belief Britain acted out of her own self-interests. It


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dashed any hope of thawing of relations with Spain; that country now feared Britain would attempt a complete take over of its South American possessions. Their fears were well founded; until Madrid broke with France and joined with Russia and Britain at the conclusion of a general peace, Britain would keep all territorial gains it had made at Spanish expense.40 For the Talents, facing the Continental blockade, it was access to the specie and markets of Latin America that overrode all other considerations. There was one fundamental problem, however: ministers clearly misunderstood what territory Popham had actually seized. Popham had taken the city of Buenos Aires. In London it was believed he had control of the entire province of Buenos Aires: in other words, a huge tract of land encompassing the modern states of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia. Popham maintained his forces were well received wherever they went and this along with the promise of trade with the specie-rich region was just too much to give up.41 Essentially, Popham presented the government with a fait accompli by bringing South America to the forefront of British strategy for the next two years, until the Spanish uprising of 1808 provided the opportunity for British intervention in Europe and removed the spectre of the Iberian South American empires falling under the control of France. Policy of the Talents Despite Windham’s earlier musings the Talents had given Miranda short shrift and generally tried to avoid entangling themselves in South America for fear of starting a revolt against Spanish control.42 Now, however, Grenville was unwilling to give up any colonial gains. On 12 September he informed Lauderdale in Paris: The possession occupied by His Majesty are so circumstanced that France cannot hope to regain them by war, and cannot, if she be really disposed to peace, reasonably object to their being retained by his Majesty as a very small counterbalance to the immense acquisitions of territory and influence on the continent.43 The capture of Buenos Aires might ‘facilitate peace, or to afford an opening for measures that will make a deep impression on France’.44 This hope initially seemed to be borne out by Mr Goddard, attached to Lauderdale’s mission in Paris, who wrote on 19 September ‘The news of

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Buenos Ayres [sic] is exactly what they dreaded here, and it had made a great impression’.45 Yet, just a week after writing to Lauderdale, Grenville admitted he was caught in a quandary. Although expressing a ‘great reluctance to the embarking in South American proposals because I know it was much easier to get into them than out again’, in reality he realised it would be extremely difficult to give up Buenos Aires ‘trumpeted up as it has been by Popham…unless one could get much more for it in the way of security in Europe than I know how to shape or expect’.46 A week later he considered a British withdrawal from Buenos Aires in exchange for free trade in the region and a French withdrawal from Naples. It is difficult to counter the accusation, however, that British ministers were already thinking in terms of territorial conquest. Thanks in part to misunderstanding Popham’s dispatches, Grenville seemed to have a completely unrealistic impression of the situation in the region, believing ‘rather than see all Spanish America fall into our hands, as it must do in twelve months more of war, France would willingly give up Naples’. Moreover, a British occupation of South America would ‘cut off her [France] best resources for carrying it on [the war]’.47 On 1 October Grenville had made up his mind, British possession of South America must be reckoned into any peace arrangement, on the grounds of uti possidetis. If Britain was compelled to follow up the initial success she would not be willing to give anything back. Ministers were already running way ahead of themselves, caught up in the dreams of a permanent conquest of South America.48 So the ‘imperialist’ accusers seem to have won the argument, or have they? Quite simply, Popham’s clever manipulating of the situation made it almost impossible for the government to consider giving up the South American conquests. Accompanying his official dispatches had been an open letter to English merchants describing the value of the South American markets in such glowing terms, around two million per annum, that Lloyd’s immediately resolved to present Popham with a £200 inscribed vase. The triumphal landing of the captured specie at Portsmouth must have contributed to the belief that the region was fabulously rich and ripe for British trade.49 Lord Lowther noted the trade in Lancashire, Glasgow and Carlisle ‘is become very brisk in consequence of the Capture of Buenos Aires’. Responding to a letter Popham had addressed to them from Buenos Aires, the merchants of Manchester and Salford recognised that due to the French attempts to remove British trade from


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Europe, the commercial advantages of Popham’s actions were ‘extensive beyond calculation’ and resolved to impress their views upon Auckland.50 ‘Visions of new markets, boundless wealth and relief from the terrible burden of taxation rose before the eyes of all’, Fortescue reasoned, ‘Napoleon’s great plan for excluding British commerce from the continent of Europe could be laughed at if the whole of South America were thrown open as a new market’.51 This was appreciated in government; on 19 September Auckland estimated imposing duties on trade in Buenos Aires might produce between one and two million sterling.52 By November he was convinced ‘that in the actual predicament of Europe, the extension of our commerce is become the most efficient measure of war’.53 The result, as Hall argues, was that, unable to overlook the military and commercial implications of Popham’s actions, the government were caught up in a ‘fever of plans for New World conquest’.54 Hence, British intervention was not to be based on liberal commercial intercourse but by direct British conquest, a policy which, as Esdaile notes, ‘laid her wide open to the charge that she was interested solely in the expansion of British naval, economic and commercial dominance’.55 As plans to exchange Spanish America for French-held European territory floundered in the Paris peace talks, Grenville’s mind turned to large-scale conquest informing his elder brother, the Marquis of Buckingham, he was ‘revolving in my mind a project…to attack Mexico on both sides’!56 On 15 October Buckingham, admitting he had no documents describing the South American interior, mooted his own idea for an attack on Panama and pressed for a squadron to be based off the coast of Peru to intercept Spanish specie shipments.57 Clearly ministers were having severe problems understanding the situation in South America; their own ignorance of the region compounded the misunderstanding over what Popham had actually seized.58 In August Ministers had set aside a reinforcement of 2,000 men under Sir Samuel Auchmuty to go to South America but they had been delayed to deal with the crisis in Portugal. Once the danger to Portugal faded, these troops could resume their original mission and Auchmuty sailed on 12 October.59 Contemporaries certainly questioned this ‘imperialist’ policy, Sidmouth querying the prudence of sending 4,000 men to South America ‘with a view to interests separately and exclusively our own’ when it was in Britain’s interests to help Prussia.60 Nevertheless, there was a strong body in the Cabinet, led by Grenville and including Windham and Moira, supporting further intervention in South America. Windham, himself

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sometimes sceptical of Grenville’s plans, came up with what Fortescue called ‘one of the most astonishing plans that ever emanated from the Brain even of a British Minister of War’.61 Writing to Brigadier Robert Craufurd on 30 October Windham noted the success attended on the east coast of South America and the experience the indigenous peoples would by now have gained of ‘the benign protecting government of His Majesty’ as opposed to the ‘oppressive dominion of Spain’. Craufurd’s object, therefore, was ‘the capture of the sea ports and fortresses and the reduction of the province of Chili’. To achieve this he was provided with just 4,000 men, which Windham thought adequate for the task ‘from a just inference drawn from the success at Buenos Aires’. This force was then expected to open up overland communications with the force in Buenos Aires!62 Everyone was clearly getting carried away. Grenville had already proposed an audacious plan whereby troops from India would seize the Spanish position at Manila and then go on to invade Mexico while a second force, drawing extra troops from the West Indies, would also sail for Mexico, joining with the first in Panama.63 Noting that very soon there would be more than 6,000 British troops at Buenos Aires and assuming this force ‘will, of course, have taken Monte Video’, not more than 3,000 would be necessary to hold the city. The rest could go onto India. If the forces in South America were insufficient then 5,000 Bengal Sepoys could provide reinforcements from India.64 Windham poured cold water on these schemes, pointing out the complete impracticality of moving forces between India, the Pacific and South America. Instead he thought of attacking the west coast with forces drawn from Buenos Aires.65 On 10 November the Admiralty wrote to Rear Admiral George Murray ordering him to escort Craufurd’s expedition to Chile, either by rounding Cape Horn, or by heading east, via New South Wales. The unfavourable weather and problems collecting transport tonnage delayed the sailing of the expedition until New Year’s Eve 1806.66 It seems as if, perhaps bewildered by his own plans and uncertain of the weather and geographical conditions, Grenville sought professional opinion and turned to Sir Arthur Wellesley. Wellesley had gained important experience leading the 33rd Regiment during the 1794 campaign in the Low Countries where, he later recalled, ‘I learnt what one ought not to do, and that is always something’.67 Wellesley then had a successful career in India from 1797 until 1805, winning a notable victory over Maratha forces at Assaye, 23 September 1803.68 His experience of inde-


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pendent command in India and his strong political and familial links placed him in a position of influence high above his seniority. Wellesley scotched the plan for a two-pronged attack on Mexico. In order to sail from Manilla to Latin America, the attack on Manilla must be made in July, but the weather conditions on the East and West coast of the continent were completely different. December and January were the fair season on the East coast of Mexico but at the same time the West coast would be suffering rains in the sickly season. The defending forces would have the strategic upper hand, operating on interior lines the Spaniards could concentrate their forces against one of the two British expeditions, crushing it before moving against the other. Instead what Wellesley envisaged was the option of removing all the men for the attack on Mexico and basing them at Jamaica, ready for an assault in the proper season.69 By 20 November Wellesley was considering an attack with a force from the east; troops from the west would only serve as reinforcements once the initial conquest had been achieved. He wanted 6,000 European infantry, 3,000 Negro infantry, 2,000 artillerymen, 1,400 cavalry and field and siege guns to sail from Buenos Aires in September, while the appropriate logistical support vital for expeditionary warfare sailed from England in April, with the rest of the troops leaving in June. The idea was to achieve a concentration of force in Jamaica so the expedition could sail for Mexico in November, arriving there in December. 3,000 Sepoys and 500 European troops from India would sail in October, to arrive on the west coast of Mexico in February.70 This memorandum was followed by a discussion of possible points of attacking Mexico and instructions for the Ordnance, Victualling and Transport boards.71 Compared to ministers’ schemes Wellesley’s plan was a master class in military planning. He had learned his trade well in India. Ministers seemingly deferred to Wellesley’s superior knowledge. On 25 November the Marquis of Wellesley informed Grenville that Sir Arthur was ‘highly pleased with the discussions which have passed between you respecting the proposed expedition…if it should be prosecuted he would prefer that employment to all others’.72 It also fitted in with government policy. In early November 1806, with Prussia apparently humbled by France, Earl Fitzwilliam wrote to Grenville arguing Britain must look away from Europe. ‘The disasters in Germany, I find, exceed even the French reports; these are only preparations to the destruction even of the Russian empire; there is an end of the old world, we must look to the new’.73

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Central to all the varied plans put forward at this time was a belief the populace of Spanish America were ready to throw off the yoke of imperial control and would welcome British forces with open arms. What they failed to realise was the indigenous population would not want to swap control by one empire for control by another. This explains some of the bewilderment that greeted the arrival in London during January 1807 of the news Popham’s initial expedition had sparked a popular uprising, not just against the British but also against Spanish control. The outnumbered British troops had been attacked and forced to surrender Buenos Aires on 12 August 1806.74 The first account of the recapture of Buenos Aires ‘after a bloody contest, wherein many had fallen on both sides & the remainder of the English troops had been made prisoner’ arrived in London on 2 January 1807.75 New orders were immediately sent out to Murray. He was to head for either Rio de Janeiro or Buenos Aires, whichever he judged best, and, if he was still there, provide any assistance possible to the force already sent out under Auchmuty. If Auchmuty had been ejected and had retired to the Cape, Murray was to try to retake Buenos Aires if his force was sufficient. If not, he was to wait for reinforcements from the Cape under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Backhouse.76 Though the government could not confirm the news until the receipt of more definite intelligence or dispatches from Buenos Aires, Grenville for one believed the reports were accurate.77 On the 17th the Admiralty received a telegraph message from Plymouth stating ‘Buenos Ayres [sic] taken, and Army prisoners. August the 12th’.78 By 20 January there was so little definite news that Tom Grenville began to express doubts as to the validity of the reports, especially as no intelligence had arrived from one of the many Royal Navy ships now operating in South American waters.79 All doubts were removed when Popham’s account of the capture of the city by the Spaniards arrived in London on 25 January.80 Having already made a major commitment to attacking Spanish America, the Talents reacted to this unwelcome intelligence by drawing up new plans for the polyglot of forces already on the way to the region. The difficulty of coordinating troop and fleet movements thousands of miles away was clearly coming home to roost.81 First off the mark was Wellesley who, on the very same day the news arrived in London, again raised the question of the Mexican expedition.82 Four days later he submitted a confidential memorandum forecasting the likely proceedings of the various forces in South America, and the possi-


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bilities for the recapture of Buenos Aires. He surmised the force under Backhouse would have reinforced Popham and Beresford. Wellesley thought Backhouse would not attack Montevideo, but should remain in Maldonado. The combined force, once Auchmuty arrived, would be just over 5,000 men. Wellesley thought Auchmuty would then attack Montevideo with this force. This would be the likely situation Craufurd found when he arrived with his troops, bringing the force up to 9,500 men. Such a concentration would enable the attack on Buenos Aires to commence; once completed the troops would remain there until further orders arrived from London. Wellesley advised the government to send out two general officers of sufficient rank to assume command. He estimated the Spaniards would be able to call on 18,889 troops to oppose British operations, therefore no less than 5,200 infantry and 2,100 cavalry were needed for the conquest and possession of Buenos Aires, including the town itself, Montevideo, Maldonado and Cordova.83 In February Wellesley submitted another detailed memorandum for an attack on the Spanish American provinces of Venezuela, Maracaibo, Cumana, Guiana and St. Marguerite. The total Spanish force in these areas was estimated to be a little over 13,000, but after the experience of Buenos Aires this number might not be accurate. Wellesley thought it would require as large a British force to keep the area under British rule as it would for the initial conquest. This convinced him ‘the gain which Great Britain will derive from the possession of this colony, under present circumstances, will not compensate for the loss which may be sustained’. The only viable reason to seize territory was to prevent the French claiming them in a peace settlement. Wellesley could only suggest achieving the object through the establishment of an independent government.84 By now there were disagreements in the cabinet over South American policy. Reacting piecemeal as already out-of-date news arrived in London, Thomas Grenville summed up the state of the government to Buckingham on 17 February: I am more than ever convinced that all these distant operations are of necessity subject to so many chances that I have little stomach for them; but in spite of my feeble opposition, our military projectors are running after one expedition and one general with another and another.85

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Yet, as he realised, those who succumbed to the benefits, real or imagined, to be gained, outnumbered him.86 In February Grenville had composed a minute, perhaps for circulation at cabinet, outlining what the Talents would now try to achieve. A further reinforcement under Lieutenant General John Whitelocke would be sent to the River Plate ‘with the utmost practicable expedition’. As was usual in distant operations, Whitelocke was to be allowed the freedom to exercise his judgement. The main object was to seize a strong position as an entrepôt for British goods and from which to spread political influence. If he thought seizing Buenos Aires was possible and could be retained by 6-7,000 men, he should attack and remain there until receiving further orders. It was up to Whitelocke to decide if, once Buenos Aires had been captured, Montevideo could be destroyed. In essence Whitelocke was only to occupy strategic positions that could be easily captured and garrisoned.87 In one of their last decisions in power, the ‘Talents’ consolidated all the forces in South America under the command of Whitelocke. The combined expedition would now total 11,180 men. This was a major commitment to South America; as Duffy has noted, it was the second largest single force committed outside of Europe between 1796 and 1814.88 On 24 February Whitelocke was given the option of dispatching a portion of his force for operations in Peru, while Windham considered occupying Panama and establishing communications across the isthmus to the West Indies.89 Whitelocke’s expedition was a catastrophic failure for direct British intervention in South America. Auchmuty arrived in the region first and, finding Buenos Aires had fallen, attacked Montevideo, seizing the city in February 1807 for a loss of 350 men. Whitelocke arrived off Montevideo on 10 May with Craufurd appearing ten days later. Whitelocke now decided to retake Buenos Aires, assaulting the city on 5 July. British forces became separated in desperate street fighting and were surrounded and isolated by a numerically superior enemy. Whitelocke lost 3,000 men killed, wounded and captured. There was no choice but to agree to a humiliating surrender. British forces retreated and agreed to evacuate the River Plate. The Talents policy had ended in utter disaster.90 While the reputation of the Talents can be rescued somewhat by their response to the Portuguese crisis of 1806, it is clear their strategy towards South America was fundamentally flawed. Their confusion over what constituted Buenos Aires was only compounded by general igno-


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rance of the geography of the region. The very nature of Popham’s actions, however, forced ministers to react in support of the supposed commercial opportunities he had created. In approaching this they failed to decide what they wanted from intervention in the region. Grenville initially saw conquering territory as a bargaining tool at the peace talks, but then changed his mind to conquering the entire region and holding until a more permanent settlement. All those involved wrote about the oppression of the indigenous people and expressed a desire to free them from their Spanish overlords. But Grenville’s plan for a multi-pronged attack on Spanish America was a clear attempt at seizing territory.91 Those who have criticised the Talents for ignoring the European war must, however, remember that operations in South America occupied around 15,000 British troops; in fact almost the entire military force Britain had for offensive action. At Ulm and Friedland the French inflicted 100,000 casualties on the Russians and Prussians. British troops would not have made any difference to slaughter on this scale. But with the Royal Navy thrown into the mix Grainger noted: …in a way, Lord Grenville was quite justified in devoting himself to the prospect of empire overseas instead of activity in Europe, for small British forces exerted a power wholly disproportionate to their numbers the further they were from Europe, whereas not one of Napoleon’s 200,000 strong Grande Armée got salt water on his boots. But the problem with the Talents intervention was ‘aiming to involve itself in unending warfare on a continental scale’. The majority of those Britons involved had a ‘sheer ignorance of South American geography, population, distances and attitudes’, one of the main elements in the failure of the policy.92 Just one example will illuminate this point. In November 1806 Buckingham wrote to Grenville informing him he had just received ‘a very valuable and interesting work….a bird’s eye view of all the ports, bays, roads, rocks and shoals’ by William Hack, covering the whole of the West Coast of South America from California to the Strait le Maire. Buckingham hoped it might prove useful and was searching for a copy of a book on hydrography by the same author.93 All in all this added up to the inevitable conclusion expressed by Grainger that ‘a better knowledge of the Spanish empire would have convinced everyone, from Po-

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pham onwards, not to meddle’.94 A viewpoint Grenville himself had expressed before being entangled in the question of how to react to Popham’s actions. Therefore, it seems as if on balance Napoleon was right: under the Talents Britain did follow an ‘imperialist’ maritime strategy while turning her back on potential allies in Europe. Taken at face value the weight of evidence against the Talents seems to support this theory as they looked to the area to gain bargaining leverage at the peace table. When the talks broke down the conquest of the region to counterbalance French hegemony in Europe was certainly on the agenda. But commercial opportunities also impinged heavily on strategy; when faced with the actions of Popham and the domestic pressure for new markets, could they realistically have done anything else? Hall argues after this ‘sudden, apparently heaven-sent, opportunity to expand British imperial power’95 the Talents looked to South America as a region where ‘British interests at their most blatant, could be pursued’.96 Of course, British interests at this point were securing new markets and money to keep the war effort going. The problem with the Talents strategy was one of focus and clarity; they just did not get to grips with strategic and operational difficulties. Wellesley brought some sound military advice to the table but it was probably too late. The Talents lack of strategic understanding was brought to a head by the appointment of Whitelocke and his consequent bungling in the region, all of which helped convince the local populace they had little to fear from further British military intervention or their imperial masters in Madrid.97 The Talents did not have to deal with the consequences of these events. After just over a year in office, the administration collapsed.98 The issue of British aims in South America would be discussed at length by the next administration leading to a distinctly different approach. …

6 THE STRATEGY OF THE PORTLAND MINISTRY

The fall of the Talents in March 1807 was followed by the return to power of a ministry comprising Pitt’s friends and followers. William Henry Cavendish Bentick, 3rd Duke of Portland, became head of the new government as First Lord of the Treasury. The leader of a group of Whigs that had joined Pitt in 1794, Portland was now sixty-nine, infirm and continually fortified with laudanum. He was no more than a figurehead,1 but his experience ensured him genuine respect.2 Also in the Lords were Henry Phipps, 1st Earl Mulgrave as First Lord of the Admiralty, and General John Pitt, 2nd Earl of Chatham as Master General of the Ordnance.3 Henry 3rd Earl Bathurst was the least experienced member of the Cabinet and took office as President of the Board of Trade. These individuals had amassed a great deal of ministerial experience, but the real centre of the Portland government lay with several promising younger ministers, none of whom were old or experienced enough in 1807 to become leader. Also sitting in the Lords was the Home Secretary Robert Banks Jenkinson, Lord Hawkesbury (after 17 December 1807, Lord Liverpool).4 Perhaps the most promising member of the Cabinet was, at thirty-six, also one of the youngest. George Canning took the seals at the Foreign Office. Canning had worked under Grenville in the Foreign Office from 1796 bringing him into regular contact with Dundas, Windham and Pitt.5 Robert Stewart, who had the Irish courtesy title of Viscount Castlereagh, became Secretary of State for War and the Colonies,6 the only holder of that post ‘in this whole period to be widely praised’, according to Muir and Esdaile.7 The final important member of the Cabinet sitting in the Commons was the forty-four-year-old practising lawyer Spencer Perceval.8

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Just as historians have had plenty to say about the Talents the Portland administration has also come in for some stern criticism. A strong believer in the Whig cause, William Napier savaged the Portland administration often vilifying Tory ministers while playing up the achievements of fellow Whigs. Highlighting the Talents offer to help defend Portugal with a British army in 1806 he thought the Portland government ‘did not evince as much foresight and ready zeal’.9 Fortescue directed invective against the Portland administration, though most of it was aimed at Canning’s treatment of Sir John Moore, rather than the government as a whole.10 Oman criticised the Portland administration for concentrating on overseas operations, only redeeming themselves by their prompt and united intervention in Iberia in 1808.11 In some way, the Portland ministry has never recovered from these early attacks; Watson writing in 1960 argued there was ‘no cabinet policy…it staggered along like a motor firing intermittently on different cylinders as first one then the other of its members took the initiative’.12 A recent work notes the cabinet’s ‘strategic drift’ as it could do nothing to prevent Napoleonic hegemony.13 Recent re-assessments have provided a more balanced view. Muir and Esdaile point out the Cabinet had no strong leader and the debate could drag on for months, though this ensured strategic questions were discussed at length leading to at least some ‘boldness and decision’ on certain issues.14 As Glover notes, though Portland may have been pompous and indecisive, the administration contained the men of the future, Perceval, Castlereagh, Liverpool and Canning.15 Certainly with Portland ill, the direction of the war effort would fall upon Canning and Castlereagh, advised noticeably by Wellesley (who sat as MP for Rye, was appointed a Privy Councillor, and held the position of Chief Secretary in the Irish Government), in much the same way as strategy during the period 17941801 was defined by Pitt, Dundas and Grenville. Pitt’s legacy greatly influenced the early months of the Portland Cabinet. From March 1807 until late June, when news of the defeat of the Russians at the battle of Friedland filtered through to London, the Cabinet tried to resurrect another European coalition.16 But, unlike Pitt’s coalitions when British money in effect hired troops, now financial aid would only be forthcoming once countries had actually taken up arms against France. Yet, the prospects were not too promising. With Austria on the sidelines, Prussia and Russia were most obviously threatened by French military prowess and British efforts concentrated on those two powers. An initial subsidy of £100,000 was sent to Prussia and a treaty

THE STRATEGY OF THE PORTLAND MINISTRY

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was later signed in which Britain agreed to pay £1,000,000 in return for a promise that Berlin would throw all resources into war with France. Assurances along those lines were reiterated in May as Canning was prepared to provide £2.6 million in aid to both Prussia and Russia. Even the difficult King Gustavus IV of Sweden was promised £50,000 if he added 4,000 men to his army. With the Continental blockade causing problems to the distribution of British financial aid Canning was keen for the powers to receive arms as part of the subsidies. This policy had some success, 100,000 British muskets being sent to allies by June, though even here there were problems as the Ordnance Office was not in a position to meet the continued demands, as the British arms industry was not yet self-sufficient.17 British hopes of raising another coalition would be supplemented, if possible, by direct military support in the shape of British maritime-based expeditionary forces. Upon taking office Castlereagh examined the strategic situation. With troops tied up in the Mediterranean and South America, others set aside to reinforce positions in the East and West Indies and the requirement for home defence, there were 33,622 troops for overseas service. With 3,000 reinforcements to go to the East Indies, 2,000 to the West Indies and 5,000 to support policy in South America, Castlereagh concluded it would not be prudent to send more than 10-12,000 infantry to Continental Europe. On 3 April he asked permission from the King to organise 12,000 men into an expeditionary force to be ‘held in readiness to move at the shortest notice….for the purpose of cooperating with, or effecting a diversion in favor of your Majesty’s allies’.18 With available manpower constraining strategy on 12 May Castlereagh proposed measures for increasing the total military force available for operations and on 26 May drafted a detailed memo for the Cabinet. He voiced concern over the numbers available for home defence and questioned the advisability of committing troops to Europe. One major problem was the lack of sufficient transport capability to convey troops to an area of operations, but by raising the hiring rate paid to contractors he managed to increase the tonnage available for overseas service from the 21,727 tons in February to 115,586 tons in June, despite complaining the expense involved was great.19 With the transport capacity increasing, ministers could seriously consider the options for committing British troops on the periphery of Continental Europe, where maritime power carried an inherent advantage. One such theatre was the Baltic, where, alongside traditional maritime

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trading concerns, British operations could provide much needed support to Prussia, Russia and Sweden. In May ministers were informed Sweden and Prussia had agreed to undertake joint operations and station a force of 24,000 men at the Baltic fortress of Stralsund, in Swedish Pomerania.20 Canning was delighted to hear Russia and Prussia had signed a treaty of concert on 26 April committing both countries to the joint prosecution of the war until a general European peace and confirming the continuance of the war in Poland.21 Sweden had asked specifically for British troops to be sent to Stralsund. In this promising situation ministers were optimistic the time was right for a British force to be sent to the Baltic and on 1 June 10,000 troops under Lieutenant General William Cathcart were ordered to Stralsund to assist the Northern powers.22 Alongside a policy of assisting those powers still fighting Napoleon, maritime security remained at the forefront of British thinking, particulary in the Mediterranean. The cabinet hoped to utilise the Sicilian garrison for operations along the Italian coast. Castlereagh judged 8,000 British troops could act in conjunction with Neapolitan forces and discretionary instructions were forwarded to General Fox the commander at Sicily. In May 1807 the Sicily garrison was reduced to reinforce the position at Alexandria, then in June it was decided to evacuate Alexandria with the troops going back to Sicily. These orders arrived at Sicily in July along with orders for Fox to return to England handing over command of the British garrison to Sir John Moore.23 Preventing enemy warships from sailing to wreak havoc on British trade and overseas possessions was still a major concern and Castlereagh’s thoughts turned to the 22 French and Spanish battleships sheltering in Cadiz since Trafalgar: …if the means can be found before the close of the year, there is every motive for not adjourning it over the spring; as we can hardly flatter ourselves that, in the present of his power, Buonaparte will suffer any maritime point of such moment to remain long exposed to attack: and I can no doubt that, within the period requisite to move the troops from a distance, we shall see French garrisons in Ferrol, Cadiz, Lisbon, and Carthagena. Although he thought the defence of the city might be weakened by the removal of a Spanish force to Hanover, Castlereagh was unsure whether a British force could be spared for such an attack with the commitment


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to the Baltic. The arrival at Sicily of Fraser’s troops from Alexandria would free up 7,000 men who could be stationed at Gibraltar to act as a strategic reserve for the Iberian and Mediterranean regions. Castlereagh was keen to look at every contingency which could ‘improve our chance of bringing the effort [on Cadiz] within the scope of our power’. He did not look to destroy Cadiz, but ‘a temporary occupancy of the harbour above the fortress…as would secure the surrender or destruction of the fleet’.24 By 14 August, with the strategic situation in Northern Europe degenerating, Castlereagh thought the force to be stationed at Gibraltar was in a position to be brought home, sent to the colonies or ready to annoy French designs. These troops could be spared because, in a clear policy statement, Castlereagh concluded a ‘disposable force [was] no longer necessary in the Mediterranean for offensive operations’.25 Yet, in the eastern Mediterranean Canning was determined to prevent the continued growth of French and Russian influence at Constantinople, which would allow them to make gains at the expense of the weak Ottoman Empire. Canning, like Grenville before him, was concerned Russia was becoming distracted from the contest with France. In this respect British interest ‘clearly is that Russia should be devoted, in heart, and soul, and strength, to the one object of the contest with Bonaparte’. Therefore ‘an accommodation now with the Porte is infinitely desirable’ and a ‘pacific policy with respect to Turkey the wisest that we can adopt under the present circumstances’.26 With troops at a premium if diplomacy did not work Mulgrave pressed for naval operations arguing ‘it appears to me highly important that the Russians shou’d be induced to block up the Bosphorous with their Black Sea squadron whilst we stop up the entrance to the Dardanelles’ and in May Sir Arthur Paget was ordered to the Porte to ‘treat for peace, whenever the Porte comes to it’s senses’.27 Reaching the Dardanelles on 28 July Paget found news of the French victory over Russian forces at Friedland on 14 June had completely changed the regional and wider strategic situation. While the diplomatic moves of the Cabinet were faltering, a joint Anglo-Russian fleet was blockading Constantinople. The Russian contingent was under the command of Vice Admiral Dmitri Seniavin. He had entered the Royal Navy in 1783 as a youth and served on the North American station for six years. He left the Royal Navy in 1789 and served as a Captain in the Russian navy, retiring from the service when Czar Paul allied himself to France. When Russia joined the Third Coalition Seniavin had rejoined

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the navy.28 Collingwood noted ‘Admiral Sinavin [sic] and I were great friends: he seemed to like me, and I had a kind of regard for him, because he professed to hate the French’.29 Seniavin had achieved the only major success of the whole operation, defeating a Turkish fleet off Lemnos on 1 July. News of increasing Franco-Russian co-operation (see below) altered the situation. Seniavin, now supposedly commanding a hostile fleet, withdrew his force from co-operating with the British squadron and sailed westward along the Mediterranean, his eventual aim being to reach the Baltic.30 The South American Issue It fell to the Portland ministry to deal with the fallout from the Talents South American policy. In light of the ‘disastrous consequences’ of the Talents strategy Hall suggests Castlereagh harboured serious reservations regarding the region.31 Fortescue, naturally, lambasted the government for even considering further intervention: ‘It seems incredible at this distance of time that British ministers should have given serious consideration to so wild a design’. Such an attitude could be expected, but South America remained on the agenda due to, Fortescue believed, ‘how desperate the situation in Europe must have appeared to them’.32 We shall soon see how British strategy developed during this period but it is important to note Napoleon continued to develop plans for French intervention in the region. Apart from drawing away British troops from the European theatre, Napoleon hoped that entangling Britain in a South American war might prove just too costly for London. In August 1807 he thought with a great number of English speculators in Montevideo it might be wise to station five or six French frigates off the coast to intercept trade.33 ‘Brazil is not important for war’, Napoleon wrote in September 1807, it was the commercial ports of Oporto and Lisbon that ‘must fix all our attention’.34 Yet two months later he clearly saw Lisbon as a launchpad for future maritime operations, ordering 200 naval officers to Portugal on 8 November 1807.35 At the same time he was again quizzing Decrès whether it would be possible to employ a couple of frigates off the coast of Brazil.36 With Napoleon certainly interested in South America, in May Castlereagh drafted a detailed memo to consider the mode of future British South American policy. He criticised the Talents for lacking direction in their policy and compounding their errors by dithering for three months before sending reinforcements. The key problem with the 1806 occupa-


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tion, in Castlereagh’s view, was the Spanish Americans wanted Britain to help them gain independence from Spain but Popham had stated he was taking possession Buenos Aires for Britain. This had angered the people who did not want to be freed from the Spanish yoke only to be governed from London. The principal Spanish individuals had fled the city and assembled troops to retake Buenos Aires. Now with Whitelocke’s force on the way to the region, the sensible question for the Cabinet was whether the value of Buenos Aires, ‘either during war, or upon a peace, is such as to compensate for the drain and incumbrance it must prove upon our other military operations and on our population’. If it was not, then was there ‘some principle of acting more consonant to the sentiments and interests of the people of South America’, which would not involve Britain in ‘conquering this extensive country, against the temper of its population’. Whatever the Cabinet decided he lamented Whitelocke’s force was not adequate to defeat the population, to protect them from Spain or guarantee their independence at a peace table. He also noted the Talents had been assembling an expedition of 8,000 men under Wellesley destined for Mexico.37 Castlereagh wanted a wider discussion about British aims in the region, recognising the importance of a clear policy. Such a policy had to operate on some ‘enlarged principle which shall be intelligible and captivating to the country [South America]’. If not, military operations ‘cannot well be expected to lead to any permanent national advantage’. Instead, he raised the option to spread British ‘soft’ power and influence in the region: ‘the silent and imperceptible operation of our illicit commercial intercourse with that portion of the world during war would not be more operative and beneficial, if we approached it only as traders, than… as enemies’. He was extremely worried that if Britain guaranteed independence of the colonies ‘we might, in destroying a bad government, leave them without any government at all’. There were two extremes he wanted to avoid, ‘that of conquest, with a view to permanent possession in ourselves, or to endeavour to dissolve the existing government, without any precaution as to the system which is to replace it’. One alternative which the Cabinet were ‘driven to consider’ was whether the resources of Spanish America could be mustered by ‘creating and supporting an amicable and local government, with which those commercial relations may freely subsist which it is alone our interest to aim at, and which the people of South America must equally desire’. Castlereagh examined the options in the wider context of the war. ‘Under any fa-

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vourable prospect of restoring Europe to something like its former system, the temptation to risk much in any attempt of this nature would be proportionally diminished’. But, in the face of French hegemony in Western Europe and the consequent economic exclusion from Europe, ‘if we are to carve out a separate existence for ourselves, and to seek to replace those channels of commerce which may be interrupted or shut against us, by opening others less exposed to French power, new and greater efforts must be made’.38 In any scheme for liberating the region, Britain must not be simply ‘protectors’ but should be prepared to pursue objects with native forces ‘to be created under our countenance’. The aim was clearly commercial, of ‘depriving our enemy of one of his chief resources, and the opening to our manufactures the markets of that great Continent’. Britain could not involve the country in ‘anarchy and confusion’. Castlereagh wanted something more subtle, ‘the separation of that continent from its indirect subjugation to France [via the French alliance with Spain], and the establishment within it of a local government, by which the interests of the inhabitants may be better consulted than they now are’. What he wanted was a Bourbon Prince, perhaps the Duke of Orleans, placed on a South American throne. Once installed such a ruler could be governed by Britain and a new administration created which could build a credible military force and ‘speedily dispense with the presence of a British army’. As always, South American policy depended on events in Europe: ‘The determination whether we ought to prosecute the object of South America seriously and upon system may perhaps, in a considerable degree, depend on the turn things shall take in the next three months on the Continent’. In submitting the memo, Castlereagh wanted to ‘provoke discussion’ and admitted his own mind was ‘by no means settled’.39 Canning responded warmly to Castlereagh’s thoughts on 19 May, ‘I am quite sure that you are right in principle’, however, he differed over ‘the precise mode of executing your plan. I doubt a Bourbon Establishment’. Instead he envisaged a plan ‘to combine an arrangement for evacuating South America (reserving at the same time a few military posts, and commercial stations) with some attempt at a separate peace with Spain’. Castlereagh then raised the idea of an expedition to Mexico and sent Miranda to the West Indies to procure information.40 Yet, as Castlereagh admitted, British policy depended to a large part on the situation in Europe – and that was about to undergo a dramatic change.


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The Treaties of Tilsit, July 1807 As ministers assessed all the strategic options open in Europe and decided to commit troops to the Baltic, dramatic events were already taking place that would drastically alter British priorities. The defeat of the Russian army at the battle of Friedland brought the war to Russia’s doorstep. On 20 June Canning could report to the King he was unaware of any change in the disposition of the Russian court towards Britain.41 But on 29 June, after the dispatch of Cathcart, Canning received news of the crushing blow to the Russian forces. He still hoped Russia would fight and promised British support. In early July, Canning received more worrying intelligence from the Continent. Although not official he confessed to Mulgrave it ‘hardly leave[s] a doubt of the disaster of the allies’ and in response he wanted the Baltic squadron strengthened. By 7 July he was aware Napoleon and Alexander had begun peace negotiations. Canning finally received official confirmation on 11 July with the arrival of dispatches from the British representative at the Court of Russia, Lord Granville Leveson Gower. The next day Captain Harvey, sent from Friedland by Sir Robert Wilson with a letter for Canning, arrived in London confirming negotiations were underway.42 French military success had proved to be the decisive factor and a far more potent lever of state power than British diplomacy, finance and maritime-based expeditions. Napoleon and Czar Alexander had signed the Treaties of Tilsit between 7 and 9 July. The articles implied the formation of a maritime confederacy designed to force Britain into a general peace by aligning the whole of Continental Europe against her. If this failed to produce peace then the navies of Sweden, Denmark and Portugal would be forced to cooperate with French plans. Russia would enforce the Continental blockade and declare war on Britain.43 Canning could not be sure of what was contained in certain secret articles but supposed intelligence caused him to surmise, in the words of Mowat, that ‘the two Emperors were plotting a continental and maritime coalition against England, that Denmark was the nodal point, and that the Danish fleet was to be their chief engine’.44 Mackesy has argued with Britain now isolated once again, ‘the alternatives of 1798 and 1803 were reopened to Napoleon’. By using the ‘ports of Western Europe from Cadiz to Copenhagen, and the fleets of many countries, he could revive the invasion plans and issue forth against England and Ireland’. In this context it was essential for British ministers to prevent France from seizing the neutral navies of Denmark and Portugal, totalling over 30 battleships.45

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The British Response Canning had already outlined his views on war policy while serving as an under secretary at the Foreign Office during 1796-99 in Pitt’s ministry. He realised Britain was in a precarious situation when isolated from the Continental Powers. In 1797 there had been little option but to engage in peace talks with France and he played a significant role in preparing the British representation. After the talks failed, Canning was convinced of the impossibility of a negotiated peace with France favourable to British interests. The war had to be continued.46 A decade on Tilsit marked the zenith of Napoleon’s European Empire and left Britain strategically isolated. Further additions to regenerating French maritime power from Denmark and Portugal would have seriously limited British strategic options. ‘With Napoleon in control of much of the European coastline’ Esdaile has argued, ‘the future was distinctly uncertain’.47 In August 1807 Canning explained British insular policy was designed to protect the pillars of maritime power: commercial and naval superiority. This policy ensured ‘we are hated throughout Europe – and that hate must be cured by fear’. ‘We have now, what we have had once before and once only, a maritime war in our power’, in which Britain was unencumbered ‘by any considerations of whom we may annoy, or whom we may offend - And we have...determination to carry it through’. ‘Our interest is that till there can be a final settlement that shall last, every thing should remain as unsettled as possible’. The object of British foreign policy was ‘to teach the world’ that while Britain accepted any offer of peace mediation, ‘whenever the true balance of the world comes to be adjusted, we are the natural mediators for them all, and it is only through us alone that they can look for secure and effectual tranquillity’. Without allies and threatened by French naval ambitions, British strategy, with no commitments to Continental allies, would concentrate upon British objects.48 Canning was not the only member of the cabinet who recognised that, after Tilsit, Napoleonic France posed a unique and fundamental threat to British maritime security. Mulgrave agreed, arguing ‘I have so often expressed my opinion that Buonaparte is to be checked and suppressed only by the adoption of his own system’. This would be achieved ‘by the full exercise of power for the attainment of the object to which it can be applied, and that the old course of proceeding which we still value in morals and have hitherto adhered to, must give way


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when a question of power and means between France and Great Britain is at issue’.49 With a clear approach to the threat posed by French Continental hegemony outlined, Canning began to implement policy. Despite all that had happened Canning viewed Russia as the power Britain should court and he wanted to pursue a policy of moderation, avoiding actions that might sour long-term Anglo-Russian relations. He believed the policy taken towards Russia, ‘that of managing the Emperor’s feelings, but at the same time showing that we are not afraid of him is most likely to succeed in bringing him to reason’. His long-term hope was for the disposition of the Czar to ‘change for the better in time’. Canning was convinced the ‘Emperor of Russia had agreed to force Denmark to shut the Sound’, but British policy would not be too belligerent. ‘I do not want war with Russia’, he assured his wife Joan, ‘but to frighten the Emperor, and soothe him back into good counsels’.50 Certainly Canning viewed Russia as a lapsed friend, who could return to a pro-British stance with time. Canning’s hope came under immediate strain as relations degenerated with the court of Denmark. By 10 July he was certain Denmark would shortly accede to French demands to close the sound to Britain and place her navy under French control.51 Cathcart’s force at Stralsund was supposed to help defend Sweden, join with Prussian troops in Germany or be available for other operations in the Baltic in support of Russia. In the post-Tilsit situation these troops were unable to fulfil their original objectives. In July, with Denmark apparently ready to hand over its fleet to France, the Cabinet decided to attempt a diplomatic solution but also planned for a pre-emptive strike upon Danish naval power. A British fleet under Admiral Gambier, comprising 22 sail-of-the-line with 19,000 troops and including a brigade commanded by Wellesley, was dispatched to Copenhagen. The Cabinet also ordered Cathcart to move his force from Stralsund to Copenhagen. Once the decisions had been made and the forces embarked, ministers could do little but wait for news. An attempt to resolve the crisis through diplomatic channels failed and as a result the city of Copenhagen was subjected to a ferocious three-day bombardment by British forces. On 7 September Copenhagen capitulated, giving up the whole of the Danish navy of 18 sail-of-the-line and 52 smaller vessels along with at least 20,000 tons of valuable naval stores. Despite the fact only four of the Danish battleships and some of the smaller craft were used by the Royal Navy the expedition was a complete success. The object of the operation had been to deny France the use of

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the Danish ships.52 The Danish navy in this period never recovered from this crushing blow. Numbering a total of 63 ships in 1805 the Danish navy in 1810 comprised only four ships.53 The Danish expedition provided a very visible example of British aims in the post-Tilsit era; maritime power would be utilised to prevent French naval aggrandisement. During the early months of the Portland administration British policy had adapted and reacted to the post-Tilsit strategic situation in the Baltic and the Mediterranean by addressing the legacy of the Talents policy. Canning wanted to take a moderate line towards Russia, hoping for a gradual improvement in Anglo-Russian relations in time. Militarily it was decided to withdraw some commitments, notably at Alexandria, in order to create a responsive strategic reserve, the maritime expeditionary force Castlereagh sought. This would be either based in Britain or at Gibraltar. Cathcart’s force at Stralsund was unable to undertake its original operations but was in the right place at the right time to form the nucleus of an expedition to safeguard the Danish navy from French aggrandisement. As Britain reacted to French policy after Tilsit and reorganised commitments in the Baltic and the Mediterranean another crisis arose to draw on the meagre resources available to the Portland Cabinet. Free from military commitments in northern and central Europe Napoleon could turn his attention to a long considered project: the conquest of Portugal. …

7 THE PORTUGUESE CRISIS OF 1807

Napoleon’s objectives in Portugal were to force the country into the Continental blockade, seize Lisbon and the Portuguese navy and open up Brazil to French influence. Intervening in Portugal also gave him the opportunity to commence dabbling in Spanish affairs: placing the Spanish navy under French control, removing the Bourbons from the throne, increasing the worth of the country as an ally and opening up Spanish America to France thereby increasing the flow of money into French coffers. In 1805 a proposed Franco-Spanish assault on Portugal was cancelled due to war with Austria and Russia. In 1806 the apparent French threat was allayed by war with Prussia, so Napoleon enlisted Spanish help, agreeing with Godoy to partition Portugal into three provinces. The events of late 1806, when it appeared Spain would again change sides, had caused Napoleon great concern. Once Prussia had been defeated, the Spanish backtracked, proffering friendship to France, but the damage had been done. Napoleon forced Spain into the Continental blockade and ordered her to send 15,000 men to Germany. During the summer of 1807 Napoleon was again preoccupied with events in the German states and relations with Russia.1 On 19 July 1807 Napoleon decided to deal with Portugal once and for all. He wrote to Talleyrand demanding Portugal must enforce the Continental blockade by closing all her ports to English commerce, confiscate English property, detain all English subjects and declare war by 1 September. Talleyrand was to make this declaration to the Portuguese Minister Lima in Paris and to the French chargé d’affaires Rayneval in Lisbon. At the same time Talleyrand was to converse with the Spanish minister in Paris with the aim of concluding a convention to secure the assistance of

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the Spaniards. If the Portuguese failed to implement the demands, France would declare war and a French army of 20,000 men would march from Bayonne to link up with a Spanish army for the invasion of Portugal. On 29 July Napoleon ordered the formation of the Army of Portugal at Bayonne.2 At this point Napoleon viewed Spain as an essential ally in the subjugation of Portugal and wanted Spanish troops to assist the invasion. Once this object had been achieved, however, Napoleon wanted to introduce French troops into the strategically important areas of Spain as a prelude to the reorganisation of the Spanish state.3 When the deadline of 1 September passed, Napoleon waited for firm news from Lisbon regarding the Portuguese response. In the meantime Champagny was to clearly state to Lima once a French army had entered Portugal it would not be withdrawn.4 The Portuguese Crisis Renewed On the morning of 5 August, while the Portland ministry was concerned about events in the Baltic and the Mediterranean, dispatches from Lisbon dated 25 July arrived at the Foreign Office. Napoleon had demanded four Spanish infantry regiments ‘to be immediately marched into France’, and had ‘required the admission of...troops into Spain’. The reason was to give ‘weight to some demands upon this Country which the French Government is about to make, which will be highly hostile to the interests of Great Britain’. Strangford thought just 2,000 French troops on Spanish soil would ‘compel this court to accede to any demands which Bonaparte might think proper to make, however derogatory to the Honour of Portugal, or injurious to the interests of her Ancient ally’. The Portuguese government would, he thought, comply with any demands while secretly granting Britain commercial concessions at the conclusion of a general peace. He also warned Canning that Sousa might not be informed of this plan.5 A further communication from Strangford arrived in London on 25 August. The French and Spanish ministers in Lisbon, Rayneval and D. Manuel José António, 2° conde de Campo-Alegre respectively, had issued a formal ultimatum to the Portuguese court on 12 August. This note ordered Portugal to close her ports to British commerce, confiscate British property and declare war by 1 September. The Portuguese did not take the demands seriously as they were certain London would be ‘obliged to enter into negotiations for a general peace’ and Sousa would


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be instructed to stress this point. Strangford was convinced the Portuguese court would not respond to the ultimatum until made aware of the British response. Until that was clear the ‘Portuguese Government is resolved to use every effort to gain time’.6 This communication reached Canning on 26 August, while he was anxiously awaiting information of the Danish expedition. He immediately identified what line Britain would take, lamenting to Joan ‘we have more work upon our hands. Lisbon ought to be another Copenhagen. Would our fleet and army now come back and ready to start again! Never was a time of so much anxiety!’7 Canning was eager to confirm the composition of the Portuguese navy and, like the Talents before him, turned to John Gambier. Upon taking office in March Canning, possibly sensing Portugal would play a major role in his foreign policy, had asked Mulgrave for his assessment of Gambier. Mulgrave replied ‘I can only say that I believe Gambier to be a clever man and that he did the whole of what business was done while Lord Robert Fitzgerald was at the Court of Lisbon’.8 Unfortunately, Gambier had mislaid the paperwork detailing the exact composition of the Portuguese navy, but in a rough guess he estimated 12 ships-of-the-line, 14 frigates and 12 sloops and brigs. He drew particular attention to the poor condition of these ships as ‘not more than two of these sail of the line [are] in commission; The rest lay in a state of Ordinary, most of them in tolerable repair’.9 Three days later Canning sent Joan ‘a very curious paper’ that had been discovered in the Foreign Office ‘some weeks ago but long after my instructions to Jackson [envoy to Copenhagen] were written and the fleet [destined for Copenhagen] actually gone’. This paper detailed ‘a similar prank that our predecessors had played with respect to Portugal last summer but failed’. According to Canning it was in Grenville’s hand, due to Fox being too ill to write at the time. ‘This accounts for the Morn [in]g Chron[icle] not being saucy’ over the expedition to Denmark.10 This is a revealing letter on several counts. Aware of the 1806 crisis, Canning may have been looking back through the correspondence in the Foreign Office to find out exactly what discussions had taken place. He was also drawing similarities between the Talents 1806 mission to Lisbon and the current Danish expedition. This information would prove essential in countering opposition attacks if the situation at Copenhagen were resolved by force, as this is exactly what the Talents had considered at Lisbon. The line taken by the Morning Chronicle backed up this assertion. The Talents mission to Lisbon also provided recent information that

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Canning could refer to, along with previous memoranda and the actual orders and aims of the 1806 expedition and, perhaps, intelligence regarding the situation in Portugal and Spain. In late August Eldon, the Lord Chancellor, argued Portugal ‘cannot resist, and in the state in which we are, what can we do by the first of September?’ He asserted to Canning if ‘we cannot lay hold of her fleet (and how can we do that at this moment?) have we any choice but to look to her possessions in other parts of the world’.11 Writing to the King on 27 August Castlereagh assumed a more dynamic attitude noting the ‘importance of having a force disposable to prevent if possible the Portuguese navy from falling into the hands of France’. He displayed a sound understanding of the value of flexible and rapidly deployed maritime-based forces set against the limitations of land based logistics. A French force marching overland could not get there ‘for a considerable length of time’. Maritime mobility would enable Britain to place a seaborne force at Lisbon before the French, marching overland, could reach the Tagus: ‘if the means of sending a respectable force into the Tagus be prepar’d with secresy [sic] and dispatch it may be in your Majesty’s power to anticipate the enemy in that attempt’. Fitzgerald informed Canning the Portuguese might be playing for time until the November rains made a French invasion impracticable until the spring of 1808. He was convinced if Britain devoted a sufficient force the ‘Portuguese fleet would be secured by us before an army marching by land could take possession of it’.12 To have a force ready to intervene in Portugal Castlereagh instructed Cathcart that, if circumstances in the Baltic allowed, ‘at least 10,000 men and, if possible, one half of your force of 25,000 men, should be detached with the utmost possible expedition with a view to a particular service, this force to proceed to the Downs there to receive further orders’.13 The force withdrawing from Sicily under Moore was ordered to proceed to England after touching at Gibraltar, to be available for further operations.14 On 29 August Castlereagh, obviously well informed about conditions in Iberia, told the King a French invasion force would take 100 days or three months to arrive outside Lisbon. He was convinced efforts to strengthen the French army in Poland had left the southern and western departments stripped of troops. If the government could react with vigour and speed to secure the Portuguese fleet ‘your Majesty will not have reason to apprehend any very formidable resistance from the forces of Portugal alone’.15


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Further reports arrived at the Foreign Office on 30 August. The first, dated 20 August, informed Canning the Portuguese had been apprised Britain would not enter peace negotiations. Their hopes were now placed in the ‘tolerance and generosity’ of Britain as they were ‘unable…to help themselves’. If England could assist ‘the only sort of defence which she could supply, is precisely that of which they least stand in need, namely protection by sea….England cannot undertake the total defence of Portugal by land’. As the Talents had found the previous year, the inability of Britain to prevent the Spanish invasion of 1801 was clearly uppermost in Portuguese minds. Whatever the number of troops Britain could spare for the defence of the country France and Spain could bring forth superior forces and ‘Portugal would fall’. The only policy available to the Portuguese government was to agree to a convention ‘to take place at a general peace, permitting the establishment of English commercial houses in the Brazils’.16 Strangford noted the Portuguese were ‘determined to resist the demands of France, respecting the confiscation of British property, and the detention of British subjects in Portugal’, but seemed to be in ‘much readiness to accede to the other propositions of Bonaparte’. All Portugal wanted was to prevent her colonies and commerce being destroyed by Britain. In return, Araujo assured Strangford, Britain had ‘nothing to dread from the mock warfare in which we [Portugal] may be compelled to engage’. Britain could ‘take and destroy our ships of war wherever they may find them employed against her, a circumstance which it will be our promise to prevent’. Strangford thought ‘any attempt on the part of England to save Portugal by military succours, would be utterly unavailing. No system could be adopted, of which the national resources of the Country [of Portugal] would form an effective part’. He thought Napoleon was determined to act, concluding ‘I cannot help believing that he will not carry his menaces into immediate execution’.17 In London Sousa had only received a copy of the French ultimatum in late August, and on the 28th wrote a lengthy letter to Canning stating Portugal hoped to ward off the French threat while engaging in secret negotiations with Britain over the course of policy the Portuguese should follow. Canning transmitted a personal letter received in London by Sousa from the Regent addressed to King George III on 1 September, which confirmed the above intentions.18 Initially Canning attempted to resolve the Portuguese crisis by diplomatic means. He hoped Portugal could be made to realise the strategic

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situation on the Continent had been altered drastically by events leading up to and as a consequence of Tilsit. In response, Sousa was told on 7 September, British policy and strategy had also changed. Canning recognised Portugal was a pawn in a wider French strategy as had been the case with Denmark. Although he expressed the ‘liveliest indignation [with] the unprincipled and extravagant demands which have been made by France’, British policy was now firmly centred on self-preservation. He communicated the belief in the British cabinet that the French object ‘now in view, is not to distress, but to annihilate Great Britain, that the determination to force Portugal into war is but part of a system involving the whole of those nations who had hitherto preserved their neutrality’. If France succeeded ‘Britain may find herself under the hard necessity of first overpowering [them] as enemies, with the purpose of hereafter reestablishing them as independent States’. This was a clear warning to Portugal that the consequences of complying with the demands of France would be war with Britain. The one course of action Portugal could follow to preserve her independence, and in which Britain would provide assistance, would be for the Regent to sail for Brazil with his fleet. This would preserve Portuguese sovereignty while removing their navy from French designs. If the Regent decided upon this course then ‘The fleets of H[is] M[ajest]y are ready to cooperate with those of the Prince regent to convoy H.R.H. to his destination’. Canning impressed the ‘essential importance of having recourse to this measure without delay’.19 An unofficial letter of the same date allowed Canning to take a more flexible stance. If, in the present state of Europe, France could ‘bona fide acquiesce in the shutting of the ports of that country as the sole and extreme measure of its hostility to us’, then there would be ‘the same disposition to forebearance, on the part of this government, to which had been shewn on former occasions’. But Canning was convinced Napoleon wanted more than the shutting of the ports; rather the measure was ‘a prelude, or accompaniment to others of a more decidedly hostile character’. Canning recommended Sousa amend his dispatches, including ‘some expression which should shew that this case [Portuguese compliance placating France] is not thought to be a probable one; lest by shutting it, without such precaution, you should mislead your court as to our opinion of its probability’.20 The threat to Portugal was clear to many. In August 1807 Harriet Slessor, an English national living in Oporto, decided to keep a regular diary of events. On 7 August she confided:


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While Lord St. Vincent was last year in the Tagus with his squadron, this Government had little reason to be at their ease with regard to French plans for the pretended future good of Portugal. She will now I fear be made to pay dear for her constant and time immemorial alliance…. Those deeply concerned in the event, because they ardently wish it, flatter themselves that it may again blow off. Alas, appearances are not for certain in favour of so desirable an event.21 In London Brougham, still a keen observer, suspected ‘something is in agitation with Portugal’ remarking to Howick, ‘Souza has been frequently in town, and full of something, but exceedingly afraid of being talked to….The English connected with Portugal seem to believe that their last danger is now come’.22 While negotiating with Sousa British ministers also had to consider the dénouement of the Danish crisis. After the military expedition had sailed on 30 July, Canning was faced with a frustrating wait for news. In August he had been growing increasingly anxious over the fate of the operation and was suffering many restless nights. On 11 September he was still awaiting information regarding the expedition, although he noted news must come soon and ‘it must be good’. It was not until 16 September that news of the success of the operation reached Canning, who was naturally overjoyed and overlooked the moral objections voiced by critics of the bombardment of Copenhagen. With the major part of the operation now resolved the cabinet could devote more attention to the crisis in Portugal.23 New South American Policy Yet, just as one crisis was resolved another one blew up. Intelligence reached London on 11 September of Whitelocke’s failure and was published in the London ‘Gazette Extraordinary’ of 13 September.24 This humiliating reversal cast doubt over the effectiveness of British forces in the region - a point appreciated by the Portuguese court in Lisbon. For Hall it was a final defeat for British strategy in the region,25 for Napier it signalled the end of South American conquest.26 ‘After 1807’, Schroeder has argued, ‘Britain sought trade, not colonies, in the New World’.27 In 1807 and 1808 the possibility of widespread conquest was shelved and, according to Muir, ministers ‘decided to attempt to forestall the French by reviving their South American strategy in a different form’.28

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As we have seen, however, Castlereagh had already come to the conclusion that it would be hopeless to conquer South America against the will of the indigenous population. Whitelocke’s failure only reaffirmed the belief that attempts to conquer the region would be pointless.29 Instead Castlereagh viewed the growing French threat to Portugal as a glorious opportunity to spread British influence throughout South America. If the Portuguese Royal Family, government infrastructure, fleet and treasury could be plucked from the clutches of France and transported to Brazil it could ‘lay the foundations of a mighty and magnificent empire which would speedily compensate for the loss of Portugal, and preserve (if it be considered worth preserving) the Portuguese name’. What ministers were thinking of was the possibility of bringing all the population of South America under one friendly government. This new Empire would not only provide huge demands for British goods, but could also be a source of naval stores. ‘In fact’, he concluded ‘the occupation of the Brazils by Great Britain, or her ally, under the present circumstances of the Continent of Europe, seems to be indispensably necessary for our salvation’.30 An alternative option, already considered by the Cabinet, was placing a Bourbon monarch on a South American throne. Canning, initially sceptical, now wrote: ‘As the advantages to be derived from Sth America have been universally discussed and admitted…it may be acceptable to HMM’s to have it suggested to them the possible means of recovering it. It has occurred to me to look into the connection of the House of Bourbon with the Spanish branch’. He found Louis XIII had married Anne of Austria, daughter of Philip 3rd of Spain. This marriage produced Louis XIV and ‘the Duke of Orleans, grandfather of the present one’, although Canning marked ‘impossible’ in the margin. Louis XIV married Maria Theresa, daughter of Philip IV, and produced the Dauphin, grandfather of Louis XV. In 1700 Charles II, the last male of the Spanish branch had died without issue, therefore the Dauphin became the legitimate heir to the crown of Spain, ‘and next to him the duke of Orleans’. To prevent the two crowns uniting, Louis XIV caused the right of succession to the Spanish throne in the Duke d’ Anjou, the second son of the Dauphin, and Spanish Princes with claims to the French throne and French Princes with claims to the Spanish, ‘mutually exchanged renunciations’. This was guaranteed in the Treaty of Utrecht and ‘thus the D. of Orleans would be received and acknowledged by those colonies if they wish independence, the other Bourbons can only hope it through conquest, which


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England is not Quixotic enough to attempt’.31 The idea for placing a Bourbon monarch on a South American throne gathered momentum with the arrival in England of Louis XVIII on 2 November. Ministers were not certain, despite Portland’s views, that a Bourbon restoration in France was the best policy. The South American project was an ideal way to get Louis XVIII out of the way.32 The Situation in Lisbon Of course, a vital part of Castlereagh’s first plan was actually persuading the Portuguese court to evacuate Lisbon and sail for Brazil. Accurate intelligence regarding the situation in Portugal and the likely course of Portuguese policy was at a premium for Canning. But with English merchants expelled from the majority of the Continent the only channels of information open were via Strangford, Gambier and Sousa. Due to the passage of communications dispatches from Portugal tended to arrive in batches. Canning was naturally hesitant towards Sousa; he did not really think the Portuguese government were being open and honest with him. It was, therefore, sensible for Canning to wait for an accurate assessment of Portuguese policy before committing himself to a course of action. In an attempt to improve the intelligence situation he hoped to introduce a spy into the Portuguese court. This was Mr Piuma, a Genoese Franciscian monk in the service of the Government. Piuma was recommended to Canning by the Count D’Antraigues, an important figure in the British intelligence network, who wanted the monk to be introduced into Spain via Lisbon for the purpose of ascertaining Spanish policy on behalf of Austria. Canning wrote to Strangford on 12 September informing him Piuma was to stay in Lisbon for a while ‘collecting whatever information he can through the channel of the Prince Regent’s confessor’. If Strangford had no use for him he was to proceed to Spain. On 13 September Canning stressed to him the need to ‘impress upon the Portuguese Government the expediency of adopting those measures which have been recommended by His Majesty to the Prince Regent’; namely the removal of the Portuguese court and navy to Brazil. It is unclear whether Piuma actually went to Lisbon or was dispatched to Havana on another mission.33 Further information from Lisbon arrived in London on 14 September. On 27 August the Portuguese council had ‘resolved that the most determined resistance should (at all events) be made to the demands of France respecting British property and residents’. No French troops would be allowed into garrisons in Portugal and ‘no measures really or

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apparently affecting the relations between England and Portugal, would be carried into execution’. If the Prince did flee to Brazil he looked to the ‘support and assistance of England in the execution of this great and commendable project’. According to Fortescue, at this time Strangford was negotiating with the court of Lisbon without explicit orders from Canning as to how he could proceed. Strangford himself wrote of his ‘ignorance of the present intentions of his Majesty’s government with respect to Portugal’. This is not true as Canning had replied to Strangford’s communications on 31 August and on 12 and 13 September.34 With regard to the Portuguese navy, Strangford reported orders had recently been sent to prepare and refit some of the ships, and a great deal of activity had ‘begun to be manifested in the Dockyards and arsenal’, though he supported Gambier’s assessment that ‘many months would be necessary in order to equip for sea an inconsiderable portion of it’. This was not a great problem due to the ‘backward state of hostile preparations in Spain…much time must elapse before the actual appearance of danger’. Rumours pointed to preparations at Bayonne to accommodate 21,000 French troops; they would enter Spain to replace a similar force that may be brought by that country against Portugal. If the Portuguese were to evacuate, Strangford argued, ‘the presence and protection of an English squadron might be of importance to the success of the measure’. This would also provide a good reason for a British squadron to appear off Lisbon without raising undue concern in the Portuguese court. This was an important consideration as the Regent had voiced his concern a British squadron would come and seize his ships.35 Strangford also reported a courier had arrived in Lisbon carrying dispatches from Lima in Paris containing an account of a conversation between that minister and Napoleon on 2 August: The Emperor came up to me…and in a low voice, so as not to be heard by those near us, said, “Have you written to your Court? Have you dispatched a courier with my final determination?” I replied in the affirmative. “Very well”, said the Emperor, “then by this time your Court knows that she must break with England before the first of September. It is the only way to accelerate peace”. Lima responded ‘“I should think, Sire, that England must now be sincerely anxious to make peace.” “Oh,” replied the Emperor, “we are very


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certain of that-however, in all cases, you must break with England or France before the First of September”’.36 Unsurprisingly the Regent did not wish to flee his country until an invasion force was on its way. Therefore accurate intelligence regarding French preparations was vital. At Bayonne it was reported the French had collected 23,611 men in readiness for operations. On 2 September the Portuguese decided that, in the event of an invasion, they would retire to the fortress of Peniche while ‘the forces of Portugal undertake the defence of the kingdom, which, however imperfect and, too probably, unsuccessful, must nevertheless be attempted’. Araujo assured Strangford that military preparations taking place in Lisbon were solely designed to facilitate an emergency evacuation of the Royal family to Brazil. Strangford was optimistic, assuring Canning ‘this exact project is in the serious contemplation of his Royal Highness’ and would be ‘carried into execution should France insist upon the adoption of those measures which she has so spiritedly and so honorably determined to oppose’.37 Fortescue dryly noted one advantage the Portuguese possessed: if they sided with France ‘the ships of war would be useful to defend Lisbon against the British; if England were too strong or too clever…they would serve as…[a] convoy to Brazil’.38 Once the fleet had been made ready it would enable the Portuguese to hold their hand until the last minute. Unlike the courts of Austria and Prussia, maritime mobility would allow the Court of Portugal to escape from Napoleon. Araujo had declared the Regent ‘was willing to give any security to His Majesty, that “not a boat belonging to the Marine of Portugal should be permitted to fall into the hands of His Majesty’s enemies”’. In commission on 4 September were seven ships-of-the-line, two frigates and six brigs and smaller vessels in the Tagus. Added to this were two 74s, one frigate, one schooner and a brig cruising off Algerines, between Algeria and the Algarve. In ordinary there were four 74s and five frigates plus nine smaller vessels.39 Fitzgerald, still on diplomatic leave, sent his thoughts to Canning on 11 October. The Portuguese interest ‘forces them to be our friends….they will assuredly manage their matters with France with utmost dexterity, and with a better prospect of success, by being left to their own choice of the means and mode of treating with us’. If the Portuguese ‘still possess the means of bribery, they will assuredly again succeed in corrupting the French civil and military agents who may be employed against them’. By implementing a policy of appeasement designed

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to frustrate the French and Spanish ministers the Portuguese might gain time ‘until the season is too far advanced for the rapid approach of a French army to Lisbon’. Fitzgerald hoped the Portuguese might be persuaded to allow Britain free intercourse with Brazil if they were diverted from their ‘narrow-minded jealousies and groundless suspicion of us’. He continued to lament that ‘could one ever hope that the Prince Regent might be brought to act by the counsels of honest enlightened ministers, instead of the pernicious suggestions of low domestics, menials and priests’. If instead of relying on these advisors the Prince decided that ‘Dom Rodrigo de Sousa and Don John d’Almeida be recalled to his councils, they are our friends, and there might be a prospect of his adopting such a resolution’ as fleeing to Brazil.40 Fitzgerald was not the only observer concerned over the deepening crisis. The Naval Chronicle reported it was widely believed in England the Portuguese ships in the Tagus were to be seized by the Royal Navy and Madeira occupied.41 Writing to Leveson Gower, Lady Bessborough commented ‘little Souza says in London he is sure his Prince will not yield, but believes in his whole Govet going to the Brazils’. She hoped ‘we could get some ships there time enough to assist them: they say six sail are going, but I am afraid that it is too late’.42 In Lisbon Strangford had impressed upon the Regent the demands on Portugal were ‘conducted on a different principle and aim at different objects’ from previous occasions. Britain had done everything a friend and ally should and offered assistance in ‘a safe and honorable mode of preserving his existence’. The Regent confirmed he was worried about British commercial motives in transferring the court to Brazil, realising it would compensate for lost markets in Europe. All Portugal wanted was to remain neutral in the conflict; France would be appeased and the invasion forestalled by implementing a ‘phoney war’ with Britain. This met with little sympathy from Strangford who argued it was ‘impossible since no such practical arrangements could supercede the Authority of those laws which justified all captures made subsequently to a declaration of war’. Furthermore ‘that according to our system, the sword must be entirely sheathed, or entirely drawn’.43 Prince João informed Strangford he would offer conciliatory measures to France although Strangford reported the ‘Portuguese ministers have declared these demands to be entirely inadmissible. They have offered however to shut the Ports of Portugal against the commerce of England’. ‘The French and Spanish ministers are however completely


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dissatisfied’ Strangford continued, to those countries nothing would be acceptable ‘short of a total [and] hearty cooperation with the designs of France’. In addition the French minister had sent dispatches to Junot at Bayonne ‘who in consequence of their content, will probably march without delay’. The Regent again stressed to Strangford he would flee to Brazil if all the measures to prevent a French invasion failed. In order to convince Strangford of his determination to resist France, João had consented to the departure of his son, the Prince of Beira, for Brazil. Strangford, familiar with the customs of the Portuguese Court distributed 100 Moidores among the members in order to press the Regent on the subject of the departure of Beira.44 Strangford now pointed to ‘the daily increasing probability that part of the Portuguese navy will fall into the hands of France’. He requested Canning to pay particular attention to Sousa’s answers regarding ‘the eventual disposal of the Portuguese Navy, and the possibility of a portion of it being demanded by, and given up to Bonaparte. I have had much conversation upon this matter with the Portuguese ministers, [and] I confess that I am not entirely satisfied with their expectations and mode of reasoning concerning it’. He warned: Sousa will also be instructed to urge in the strongest manner the fatal consequences which would result from the presence of an English squadron in the Tagus….should [it] be necessary to afford protection to the retreat of the Prince to the Brazils, it is asserted that the most prudent mode of doing so would be the application of a particular squadron for that purpose, directing it to join the Blockading squadron either at Ferrol or Cadiz.45 While Strangford tried to persuade the Portuguese to flee to Brazil, Gambier concentrated on minimising losses to British commerce. While Gambier was in London Canning had informed him British merchants should be ready to remove their property from Portugal at very short notice. Gambier headed back to Lisbon, arriving on 21 September convinced the threat to British commerce and property in Portugal was real. Once informed of the Portuguese desire to close their ports to British ships, Gambier immediately wrote to Canning declaring as ‘long as the French shall show a disposition to carry into execution their threats there can be no permanent security for British property in Portugal’. He intended to instruct British residents in Portugal to reduce their capital in

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preparation for the eventual closure of the ports and the possible need to evacuate the country. This message was conveyed at a meeting of the British factory in Lisbon on 25 September when Gambier warned the assembled merchants to be on their guard and ready for the possibility of the Portuguese implementing anti-British measures. In early October after receiving notice from Strangford, Gambier recommended to British subjects resident in Portugal they should ‘lose no time in removing their persons and property’. Gambier then issued certificates to neutral vessels, allowing them to carry British persons and property. Despite these prompt actions he recognised some would lose property and a few would be ruined due to outstanding debts from the Portuguese.46 In late September it was reported in London that Napoleon had demanded naval aid from Portugal. The Naval Chronicle stated a force of ten sail-of-the-line was apparently in the process of preparation to comply with French demands.47 In fact on 25 September Rayneval repeated the French demands announcing ‘if they were not acceded to before the end of five days, he must take his departure and war be immediately declared against Portugal’. Accordingly he had demanded his passports so that he could leave the country.48 Initially this gesture appeared to lack sincerity; Rayneval and Campo-Alegre did not actually leave Lisbon until October. On several occasions in September and October powerful tirades were directed towards foreign envoys in Paris. Lima was apparently informed by Napoleon that ‘if Portugal does not do what I want the House of Braganza will no longer be on the throne in two months time’.49 In fact Napoleon had already decided Portuguese compliance was not enough and in September, in the aftermath of the British attack on Copenhagen, began to accelerate his scheme to ‘bind the Spaniards to his plans even more closely’.50 In early October Napoleon informed King Charles IV of Spain their two countries, along with Russia, were ‘united in an attempt to exclude the English from the continent, and to exact all possible vengeance for the crime that they have just committed against Denmark’. He realised the importance of Lisbon to Britain. In her possession it was ‘an inexhaustible spring of wealth, and a constant resource, both as a port of call, and as a base for naval expeditions’. In the wider situation Napoleon stressed peace could not be secured without ‘isolating England from the continent, and by shutting every European port against her commerce...for England must be forced to make peace, if tranquillity is to be restored to the world’.51 To back up his threats to Portugal on 12 October he gave orders for Junot to begin his march


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within 24 hours. These moves were entirely consistent with previous French policy towards a number of states including the Hanseatic towns, Naples and the Italian provinces.52 Junot had been chargé d’affaires at Lisbon for a short time from February to October 1805 and knew the character of the Portuguese court and the country. His force comprised 20,000 French infantry and 2,000 cavalry with 36 artillery pieces. He was ordered to take the northern invasion route into Portugal; marching initially to Burgos, then onto Salamanca, Ciudad Rodrigo and Alcantara, following the right bank of the Tagus to Lisbon. Spain would contribute an auxiliary force of 14,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and four artillery pieces to invade Portugal from the southern route via Badajoz.53 Napoleon believed ‘Portugal has declared war on England and dismissed the English ambassador’, but thought it was a ploy to allow English troops to be transferred from Copenhagen. Therefore Junot was to begin his march towards Portugal and enter Lisbon ‘like friend or like enemy’.54 Foy argued any doubts about French intentions were removed by placing Junot in command of the army at Bayonne. A highly ambitious, tempestuous character, Junot was one of Napoleon’s favourite generals, an old friend who had served with him at the siege of Toulon in 1793. He arrived at Bayonne in early September and on 17 October received Napoleon’s orders to cross the river Bidossa within 48 hours; the next day the van of the army crossed into Spanish territory.55 Napoleon declared war on Portugal on 20 October and two days later a formal declaration was sent to the Portuguese embassy in Paris stating ‘Le Portugal veut la guerre: Le Portugal aura la guerre’. The remaining Portuguese legation was ordered to leave Paris within twenty-four hours.56 Already fearful Britain would utilise the inherent strategic mobility provided by command of the sea, Napoleon thought Portuguese answers to his demands had been drafted in concert with Britain to gain time for British troops to be transported from Copenhagen to Lisbon to thwart his plans. In further orders of 31 October he warned Junot that England would pre-empt the French attempt to seize the Portuguese navy and urged him to greater speed, remarking that ‘Lisbon is everything’.57 Complete Portuguese compliance with French demands would probably have had little effect upon Napoleon’s policy. Franco-Spanish cooperation in the partition of Portugal was confirmed when the two countries signed the Convention of Fontainebleau on 27 October. This treaty envisaged a Franco-Spanish conquest and partition of Portugal. The

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country would be divided into three parts of which Spain would get one region. Annexed to the treaty was a convention in which Napoleon resolved to concentrate a second army of 40,000 at Bayonne. This force was to provide assistance to Junot’s force in case Britain intervened in Portugal, though it was agreed the second force would not enter Spain without the permission of Madrid.58 There was another aspect to further complicate Anglo-Portuguese negotiations. In late September Strangford had raised the question of the Portuguese island of Madeira. The island’s main harbour at Funchal was an important staging point for ships sailing to and from the West and East Indies and South America. In 1801, when Spanish forces invaded Portugal, a British expedition had forcibly seized the island; the Portuguese court was naturally worried about another possible occupation. Strangford had promised the Portuguese no expedition would be sent to the island or any other colony ‘until due [and] formal notice of that intention shall have been given to the government of Portugal’. He reminded the cabinet João was still bitter about the last occupation because the expedition had been kept secret from him until it was underway, ‘a repetition of it would be highly injurious to His Majesty’s interests’. He informed Canning that Sousa would receive orders to speak with him regarding the occupation of the island by British troops.59 Castlereagh, worried Madeira might fall into French hands, had already communicated to the King ‘that a force of about 2,000 men should be sent to take possession of that Island, under a declaration that it is to be restored to Portugal whenever her independence is properly respected by France’.60 Initially the Portuguese governor of Madeira had been instructed to make a show of force if a British expedition appeared. In early October Portuguese policy changed emphasis. As far as Strangford could ascertain the governor was now ‘instructed to urge a capitulation, on the appearance of the British troops’ but he urged Canning to exercise caution warning ‘the Portuguese Government seem to expect that no expedition should be sent to Madeira, unless French Troops should march into this country’.61 The Portuguese court regarded an occupation of Madeira as a consequence of an invasion of Portugal by France or Spain. Concerned at this, Canning resolved to make some ‘more effective stipulations respecting Madeira’ and was convinced Sousa had not been informed of all the events in Lisbon and the real policy of the Portuguese Court. The Portuguese had also not informed British merchants in Madeira of the impending danger. Canning, writing to Sousa, was ‘very uneasy’ regard-


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ing Araujo’s request that Britain should not send an expedition to the island until all matters between the French and Portuguese had been resolved.62 The Anglo-Portuguese Convention of 22 October Fully apprised of Portuguese intentions to close their ports and the situation in Lisbon and Madeira, Canning pressed ahead with diplomatic negotiations with Sousa. On 27 September the Regent had informed Sousa he was provided with full powers to conclude a convention with Britain.63 By 17 October Canning was ready to write to the King asking for powers to conclude a convention with Sousa. On 19 October he warned Sousa that ‘I cannot engage for what we may be compelled to do by the navigation of any neutral for the next three weeks, I should be loth to engage for a forebearance which may not be possible to shew’. The following day he informed Sousa ‘you know we do not wish to encourage the shutting of the ports: in preference to going to the Brazils – But the contrary’.64 By 21 October Canning was in a position to approach George III to gain permission for a formal convention and the following day he signed a secret convention with Sousa guaranteeing if a French force invaded Portugal the Portuguese royal family and navy would flee to Brazil. This secret convention had to be ratified in Lisbon to have any effect and Canning realised maritime power could influence the Portuguese decision.65 The Convention began with a statement of intent from João, signed on his behalf by Sousa, to transfer the royal family, the government and the treasury to Brazil rather than comply with the full extent of the French demands, in particular those regarding the seizure of British subjects and the confiscation of all British property. The Regent then stated ‘at the same time, in order to avoid war with France (if it is possible), (has) agreed to close the ports of Portugal to the English flag’. The Regent realised such an act could justify Britain to: …seek reprisals by military occupation of the island of Madeira or of all other colonies of the crown of Portugal; or by forcing entry into the port of Lisbon and employing hostile means which are the most effective against the military and merchant navy of Portugal; equally considering that the only well founded apprehension of the ports of Portugal could bring the temporary occupation of the Portuguese colonies by the British forces, and that a hostile action

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or declaration from France against Portugal could not fail to bring about the same effect. João voiced his appreciation for the sentiments of friendship and good faith expressed by Britain and the desire to help the transfer of the Portuguese court to Brazil. In return for João’s pledge to flee, Canning promised to respect Portuguese feelings and interests and to act with moderation towards Portugal while preventing ‘the colonies, the military and merchant navies of Portugal, in its entirety or partially, to fall into the hands of France’.66 The first article of the convention confirmed no British expedition would be sent against Madeira, or any other Portuguese possession, until there was ‘certainty of some hostile move or declaration of France against Portugal, or that Portugal, in order to avoid war with France, will have consented to commit to some sort of an act of hostility against Great Britain by closing its ports to the English flag’. When it was deemed necessary for any such expedition, it would be discussed with Sousa. The Portuguese were not to send any reinforcements to Brazil or Madeira, unless in agreement with Britain. The Portuguese also agreed to transmit secret orders to the governor of Madeira informing him not to resist any English expedition ‘in which the commandant is announced on his word of honour that the fixed/arranged expedition has been prepared with the full agreement of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent’.67 In the second article the Regent agreed if he left Lisbon of his own free will, Britain would assist the evacuation by sending six transports to Lisbon and organising ‘an army of 5,000 men who will be sent to Portugal at the first request of the Portuguese government’. It was agreed that, although one unit of this force might go to Madeira, it would not garrison the island until after the Regent had arrived there or passed the island. The third article stated if the Portuguese closed their ports the Regent agreed to ‘the admittance of English troops to the Island of Madeira immediately after the exchange of the ratification of this convention’. Britain would hold the island for Portugal until the conclusion of a definite peace with France.68 In article four João promised ‘never to surrender in any case, whether completely or partially, his military or merchant navy, or to reunite them with those of France or Spain, or of any other power’. If the Regent fled to Brazil, his navy and merchant vessels would accompany him. Those ships unfit for the voyage would be handed to Britain for safe keeping.


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Article five committed the Portuguese to despatching to Brazil ‘half (of the navy) (roughly five or six transport vessels, and eight or six frigates semi-armed at least)’ once the Portuguese ports were closed. This naval force could ‘unite with the British squadron also designated for this end, to serve as transport for His Royal Highness and the royal family to Brazil’. Command of the Portuguese fleets would be given to ‘officers whose political principles are approved by Great Britain’. Canning committed Britain to never recognising ‘any Prince who is not the heir and legitimate representative of the royal family of Braganza’ on the throne of Portugal and to continuing the ‘friendly relations’ with the Regency council to be left behind in Portugal after the evacuation. The convention was to be ratified and the ratification exchanged in London in secrecy within six weeks.69 There were two additional articles. The first guaranteed, in the event of the ports being closed, the opening of a port to allow ‘all the English merchandise which are currently admitted into Portugal’ to be ‘imported freely in the payment of bills which are paid at the present time according to the same articles in the ports of Portugal’. More importantly the second additional article stated: …the moment that the Portuguese ports are closed to the English flag, and for as long as it continues, the existing treaties between Great Britain and Portugal must be considered as suspended as far as they agree to the Portuguese flag (having) the privileges and exemptions which the other neutral nations enjoy. According to the right of the people, it will not be a neutral state.70 On the same day the convention had been agreed, Canning wrote to the Chevalier Dom Joâo de Almeida. Almeida had been the Portuguese minister in London during the Revolutionary wars from 1796 until his recall in July 1799 and Canning, as Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, was in ‘habits of intimacy’ with him.71 Upon returning to Lisbon Almeida became Minister for Foreign Affairs and War. He had criticised the British occupation of Madeira in 1801, ironically noting how an expeditionary force was available for that operation while the British government had insisted there were no troops available to defend Lisbon. Almeida was generally regarded as an Anglophile and may have voiced his criticisms to prevent attacks from members of the Portuguese court who looked to France for security. He had been removed from government

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in August 1803 as part of the Portuguese policy of appeasing France but remained at court trying to promote British influence.72 Canning now wrote to Almeida admitting ‘the uncertainty which has hung over the affairs of Portugal’ had made him unwilling to ‘express a more decided opinion upon them’. Canning hoped Almeida and others would do their utmost ‘to save not only the independent existence, but the honour and credit of your country’. ‘I hope, and am willing to believe’, Canning continued, ‘that every member of your Government has been acting with the same good faith and openness which you, I am confident, will have inspired and recommended’. On this point Canning suspected Sousa may have been misled by Lisbon. ‘I am sure he has told us all that he knew’, but he lamented ‘I do not feel quite so sure that he has been enabled to tell us all that he ought to know’. British forbearance of Portuguese policy was, in spite of ‘every strong impression of distrust, created by representations of such apparent authenticity as nothing but our confidence in those whom the Prince Regent has recently called to his councils could have warranted us in disregarding’.73 Canning impressed upon Almeida not to let the evacuation plan be ‘laid aside’ arguing if: …the apparent remission of Bonaparte’s demands lulls the Prince Regent into a false security, you are lost. All that has passed in the last two months, your spirited counsels, your unexpected determinations, the zeal which you have shewn, and which you have been able to communicate to others, (and or at least to force them to assume the appearance of it) will, in that case, only ensure your ruin. He warned if the Portuguese did not execute the plan as agreed in the convention Napoleon ‘will never forgive you having conceived it’. Canning was convinced even if the present crisis abated, it would arise again in the future due to the important economic and strategic position Portugal occupied in the ongoing Anglo-French conflict. There was one solution the Portuguese should implement, to ‘execute at least in part the resolution which had been taken. Establish the Portuguese Empire in the Brazils – leave a vice-royalty or a Regency in Portugal’.74 With the convention agreed upon, Canning could fully inform Strangford of British intentions. In four separate dispatches of 22 October he replied to Strangford’s request for precise instructions on how to pro-


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ceed, providing a full explanation of government policy while considering all circumstances that might arise. If Portugal shut her ports, but there were no other hostile measures, Strangford was to remain in Lisbon. If anything did arise that made his residence in Lisbon inexpedient he was to leave for England. If the Regent adhered to his promises to evacuate Lisbon and asked for Strangford to accompany him, he was to accompany the Portuguese and act as minister to that court in Brazil.75 Canning forwarded a copy of the convention particularly directing Strangford’s attention to the 2nd Article, which ‘stipulates for military aid from this country to protect the embarkation at Lisbon’. Without guarantees of safety from the Portuguese ‘it is impossible that either a military or even a naval force of His Majesty’s should be safely trusted in the Tagus’. Canning had received assurances from Sousa that Portugal would not consent to ‘any measure unfriendly to the interests of this country’, but was unsure whether João would resist the demand to shut the ports, particularly as Sousa had signed the statement of intent declaring the Regent would close the ports if it was thought France could be appeased. If Portugal did shut the ports, Canning realised all Europe would be closed to British commerce and he would be ‘compelled to treat them all as one common enemy’. He thought the Portuguese experience of apparent danger followed by salvation, as had recently happened in 1806, instilled a large degree of complacency in the court. If João did evacuate, Canning mused, it might be possible to establish a Regency Council which, with British assistance, could organise the defence of the country.76 On 22 October Canning informed Strangford an expedition would sail for Madeira as soon as the Portuguese closed the ports. Next day he detailed an ‘abundance of rumours…of the most alarming nature’, including reports of French troops marching through Spain, that an embargo had been laid on British shipping and the Portuguese navy was ceded to France. Despite these rumours Canning had ‘on the faith of the Prince Regent’s letter, of your Lordship’s dispatches, and of M de Souza’s readiness to give every security that treaty could give, proceed in the course in which we set out and I have accordingly signed the Convention’. He was worried Sousa had not received official instructions on two points: the admission of British goods into Brazil, which had been promised in the convention, and the nature of instructions sent to Madeira. With regard to the evacuation Strangford was to work together with Almeida. It was ‘the one point to press: and almost equally whether the Prince is forced to it by the advance of the French army, or is en-

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abled to do it more at his leisure by the suspension of Bonaparte’s measures against Portugal’.77 By the end of October Canning was ‘tired to death’ with the negotiations and had heard another rumour ‘Portugal has made its peace with France, shutting her ports’. If this was so then he informed Sousa ‘the expedition to Madeira must sail forthwith’.78 On 4 November Canning received intelligence that the whole of the Portuguese navy was now collected in Lisbon. Strangford, worried and complaining of illness, presented a note to Araujo, advising several shipsof-war should accompany the Prince of Beira to Brazil. It was not necessary they should go as far as Brazil, but ‘they may remain in safety at Madeira...or even at Gibraltar’, out of the reach of French influence. Araujo assured him the Regent would ‘never permit a single ship…to be added to the fleets of his enemies’. In reply Strangford delivered a warning to the Portuguese government. If they continued to keep their ships in the Tagus, ‘courting the demands of France’ Britain would be ‘justified in any steps which it may think proper to pursue’. He also reported the Portuguese were strengthening the Tagus forts, orders had been given ‘for the equipment of some gun boats’ and ‘for the construction of forges for the purpose of heating shot’ at the arsenal. These preparations would seem more appropriate for repelling a sea-borne assault rather than a land invasion and added to the uncertainty with which ministers regarded the future actions of the Portuguese.79 Strangford was also worried that the five French and six Spanish warships sheltering in Cadiz were, it was rumoured, ‘completely ready for sea, victualled for six months and…[had] about 4,000 troops on board’. Eight Spanish ships including four frigates ‘victualled in the same manner’ were at Carthagena and there were three ships-of-the-line and three frigates at Ferrol. Although Britain had deployed Royal Navy squadrons to blockade these remaining isolated units if any escaped ‘they might make an attempt to enter the Tagus’ in support of a French overland invasion.80 Strangford communicated to Canning, and to Admiral Purvis blockading Cadiz, that the Portuguese policy of appeasement was gathering pace as a result of a heightened fear of France and the belief British military support would be ineffective. Strangford thought the political relations between England and Portugal were on the point of a considerable change and the latter would ‘be very shortly compelled to shut her ports’. The Portuguese seemed convinced such a move would save them, believing ‘Bonaparte has relinquished his design of invading Portugal’.


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Contributing to the Portuguese delusion was the assumption ‘it is certain that the French Troops have not yet begun to pass the Spanish frontier’. In fact four days after Strangford wrote to Canning Junot would cross the Bidossa into Spain on his long march to Portugal.81 Completely oblivious to the changed strategic situation, it seemed to the Portuguese cabinet that by adhering to French demands they had yet again preserved their independence. They believed Brazil could be defended against attack from France by their own forces and in any such event Britain would provide assistance. Crucially, the arrival in Lisbon of news of Whitelocke’s humiliating surrender gave the Portuguese confidence if they eventually sided with France that Brazil would be secure from British attack. According to Francis the Portuguese felt ‘if the Spaniards could beat off a British attack by land, they could do so equally well’.82 The news of this reverse certainly added to the perceived incompetence and ineffectiveness of military operations undertaken by the British army. In consequence, Fortescue asserted, the Regent ‘began to waver’ in his determination to resist France.83 As the crisis in Portugal escalated Macaulay has suggested the British government ‘did not categorically reject the idea of a simulated war...as a means of buying time while preparations were made to transfer the Portuguese court to Brazil’.84 The Regent may have felt he was justified in this request as Britain had tolerated ‘mock warfare’ with other countries under certain circumstances. In 1801 an agreement had been reached with the Northern Powers.85 Canning would also make such a ‘mock war’ offer to Sweden in January 1808: Britain would not regard a Swedish agreement with France, Russian and Denmark, designed to prevent a Franco-Russian invasion of Sweden, as an overtly hostile move. The unbalanced Gustavus IV refused the offer. According to Ryan, the refusal ‘wrecked the slight possibility which, despite the hostile declarations, existed at the end of 1807 that the state of formal war between the Baltic powers and Britain might not necessarily result in belligerent action’. This situation would have been acceptable and extremely beneficial to Britain and Russia in the Baltic.86 A similar agreement with Portugal would not have safeguarded the Portuguese navy from France. As Fortescue noted Canning had been ‘apprised of the change of attitude in the Portuguese Government’ and in consequence ‘was determined to endure no trifling’.87 Writing to Strangford Canning hoped Araujo was not ‘so infatuated with the absurd notion of a “nominal war”’ and declared that as soon as the idea had

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been put forward by Sousa ‘it was rejected at once as wholly inadmissible’. In the draft for the above dispatch he had declared the suggestion of mock war was ‘rejected with the contempt it deserved’. This statement underlined Canning’s growing frustration at the vacillations of the Portuguese court; ‘in the present state of the world’ Britain could not allow nations to ‘declare war…with impunity’. To accept such an arrangement would ‘encourage all the other neutral nations to enlist themselves on the side of France, without fear of the resentment of Great Britain’. Such a situation would have had dire effects on British commerce and the ability to fund the war against France if other neutral nations, in particular the United States, demanded similar arrangements. Canning wanted to make an example of Portugal and send a clear message to the remaining neutral nations regarding British intentions. Consequently there would be no mock hostilities with Portugal, the Regent must choose one way or the other; France or Britain.88 …

8 THE SMITH EXPEDITION TO LISBON

One source has erroneously claimed the decision to send a Royal Navy squadron to the Tagus was not made until 9 November.1 This is untrue; the decision had already been made before Strangford’s communication of 14 October reached London on 4 November. In the second article of the Convention of 22 October it had been agreed a British naval force should, to use Canning’s words, ‘assist -i-e in a certain sense to compel the embarkation for the Brazils’.2 The very same day the convention was signed Canning informed Strangford the ‘squadron destined for this service will sail immediately under the command of Sir S. Smith’.3 On 27 October the Admiralty decided on the vague instruction that a commission be made out ‘for Sir Sidney Smith as commander in chief of a squadron for a particular service’.4 On 29 October Castlereagh confirmed Rear Admiral Sir Sidney Smith was to proceed to the Tagus.5 Sir Sidney Smith, Rear Admiral of the Blue, was probably the most famous and dashing British naval officer alive. He was the famous ‘Hero of Acre’ who, it was generally believed and claimed by Smith himself, had foiled Napoleon’s plans to expand the French empire in the east at the siege of Acre in 1799. Napoleon himself would later claim of Smith’s actions at Acre: ‘that man made me miss my destiny’.6 He was experienced in the art of diplomacy having promoted British influence at the Sublime Porte. He also had a long and successful record in littoral warfare, serving with Swedish forces at Svenskund in 1790 and had been knighted by the King of Sweden for his services. At Toulon in 1793 he organised the burning of half the French fleet sheltering in the harbour. He saw further employment at Boulogne and on the Neapolitan coast where he became embroiled in an argument with Sir John Moore, which

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may have affected his judgement in the unfolding crisis in Portugal. In 1796 he had been captured and imprisoned in Paris but had escaped; leaving a personal message to Napoleon inscribed on a shutter. Smith was part of the squadron under Duckworth that failed in an attack on Constantinople after forcing the Dardanelles in 1806. His high public profile, reputation and extravagant character were ideal for dealing with the impressionable and archaic Portuguese court. He was also available for active service; after the Dardanelles he had returned to England in June and had been recuperating at Bath. Once outside ministerial influence the outcome of this crisis would depend upon a close working relationship between Smith and Strangford and this may also have played a part in the selection of Smith. The Dictionary of National Biography states: ‘it has been supposed that the name Sidney referred to a kinship with the Strangford family of Smythe, which had intermarried with the Sidneys’.7 It appears Smith had contacted Canning in July, possibly offering his services for an expedition to the Baltic due to his experience in the region. Canning replied on 5 July, thanking Smith for ‘ideas on the subject of our naval operations in the Baltic’. ‘I trust and believe they will be carried into effect’, Canning continued, ‘while I agree with you in regretting that the means of executing them, in the extent to which they ought to be carried, should be now to be in a great measure created’. Canning assured Smith he understood the ‘motives and feelings by which you profess to be activated, with a view to the publick: at the same time that I thankfully acknowledge those of personal kindness and good opinion which you are so good as to express towards myself’. He ended this communication by impressing upon Smith ‘the existence, on my part, of sentiments perfectly reciprocal’.8 A further consideration may have played on Canning’s mind. In 1807 most of Smith’s close political friends were in opposition to the Portland Cabinet, most notably Grenville and Windham. After Smith was censured for his conduct at Sicily in 1806 Grenville wrote to Windham declaring he had ‘every reason to agree with you in the wish of making the censure on Sir Sidney Smith as mild as possible’.9 Despite his close links to the Whigs, Smith, a Member of Parliament from 1802, did not exclusively attach himself to any single political party; his political beliefs were centred on policies beneficial to the English nation. For example, in 1802 he had addressed the House on the naval estimates and, having no friends in the Tory government, criticised the budget cuts.10 The Portland Cabinet expected attacks from the commons and some sections of

THE SMITH EXPEDITION TO LISBON

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the press in the aftermath of the Copenhagen expedition. Such criticism would be intensified by a similar occurrence at Lisbon. Portugal was England’s ‘Ancient Ally’ and to attack Lisbon could have stretched the support of many members of the commons. In September 1807 Auckland remarked of the Copenhagen expedition ‘a strong opinion of the national injustice and outrage of the act is very prevalent’. For the Portland administration, in office only a few months, to have a Whig friendly officer in command of such an action could have deflected some of the possible outrage from the opposition benches and press.11 Smith was provided with very clear orders. Immediately upon arrival off the Tagus he was to contact Strangford and ‘conform yourself to such intimations and recommendations as his Lordship may from time to time transmit to you’. Ministers still hoped for a successful diplomatic resolution to the crisis and Smith was explicitly ordered ‘not to enter the Tagus except upon the express requisition of His Majesty’s Minister at the Court of Lisbon, intimating to you the expediency and prudence of your so doing’. If Smith found ‘assistance may be wanted for fitting out the Portuguese Fleet, you are to furnish it from your squadron to the utmost of your power’. If the Portuguese decided to flee, Smith was to accompany them ‘with the whole or such part of your squadron as may be necessary on the occasion’. He was ordered to take particular care not to leave behind: …any portion either of the military or commercial marine of Portugal which it is possible to convey to the Brazils, or to remove to any British port, or within the protection of any British squadron, and whatever cannot be so removed, it is material should with the concurrence of the Portuguese Government be immediately destroyed. Smith was to implement every possible measure in his power to protect ‘persons and property of British subjects, so as to favour their removal in safety from Portugal if circumstances should render the same necessary’.12 On 30 October the Admiralty forwarded instructions to Smith ordering him to sail for the Tagus with the London (98), Marlborough, Elizabeth, Bedford, Monarch (74s) and the Solebay frigate (32) from Plymouth while the Admiralty directed the Hibernia (110) to be detached from the Channel Fleet to join him off Portugal.13 As the Cabinet formulated its response to Napoleon’s threats to Portugal Castlereagh fell seriously ill. As early as 19 September Lady Bess-

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borough had seen Lady Castlereagh who had talked of ‘Ld. Castlereagh’s encreasing debility’.14 Hinde has surmised this may have been due to the physical and mental strain of his job; he had been: …showing signs of fatigue during the summer, on one occasion in July being too exhausted by 8 o’clock in the evening to introduce to the Commons his proposals for increasing the army. For the next two months he carried on, as usual taking more than his full share of the anxiety and labour of the war. But sometime towards the end of October he collapsed.15 At first it was believed he would be unable to continue at the War Office and ministers should look for a permanent replacement. With Castlereagh convalescing at Brighton Hawkesbury undertook his duties. On 2 November Hawkesbury informed the King that Castlereagh was a little better though still confined to his room but a few days later he seems to have had a relapse; it was thought his constitution was broken due to internal bleeding.16 Hence for a number of weeks one of the key drivers of British strategy was removed from Whitehall. Castlereagh did remain up to date with Portuguese policy while recuperating in Brighton but it was not until 15 December he could inform Hawkesbury he was feeling better and was ready to return to London and only in late December was he well enough to return to the War Office.17 By 6 November Canning was convinced Smith’s original orders of 30 October were far too lenient. He now asked Hawkesbury if Smith’s force ‘can be made up to 8 sail of the line…for the purpose of dashing into the Tagus if necessary…[and] destroying the Portuguese Fleet if the government persisted in keeping it there against the Treaty (see art 4 & 5)’. The intention was that Smith, upon arriving off the Tagus, should send a note to the Portuguese stating: …in pursuance of those articles of the treaty, which he takes for granted will have been ratified by the Prince Regent & in consequence of the casus fadeius the shutting of the ports being certain he is instructed to require that one half of the Portuguese navy shall forthwith set sail for the Brazils: that upon compliance he has orders to protect it to a certain latitude but that a refusal will be considered as a declaration of war & if the treaty has not been ratified the refusal of this ratification is to be considered also as war.


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‘Upon either of these refusals’ Canning continued ‘he must proceed instantly to take measures of force’. Ministers realised this was to be a joint force; to attack the Tagus Smith was to have 5-6,000 troops which, although enough ‘to enable him to execute this service…he ought to have 10,000 rather than fail’.18 Canning wrote directly to Smith informing him of the change in orders. He also included an optional paragraph, which was not to be forwarded to Strangford unless he found delays in sending the Portuguese ships to Brazil. In this case he would inform the Court he would consider such delays as an ‘infringement of the convention and to act accordingly’.19 The next day Canning transmitted to Hawkesbury the draft additional instructions to Smith, ‘with that of a note to be presented by him on his arrival’. With regard to the British land force it should be ‘collected & ready to embark at a moment’s notice…if there is no embarkation, & if upon investigation it is thought there cannot be a successful attack the army will have no business there at all’. In either of these cases the troops were to head for Gibraltar; though if the force could not attack the Tagus, Canning raised the possibility of sending it to Brazil while leaving a suitable naval force to blockade Lisbon.20 Canning also wrote to Strangford, noting ‘many circumstances stated in your Lordships last dispatches, contribute to excite considerable suspicion and alarm’. The seemingly hostile preparations in Lisbon ‘appear to indicate a disposition to yield to the demands of France beyond what has been avowed to His Majesty’. Although Strangford was convinced of Portuguese sincerity, Canning viewed the unfolding situation with pessimism. He confessed ‘it seems hardly to be doubted that the Portuguese Gov[ernmen]t [ent]ertain a notion of carrying their compliance with the Demands of France farther than the mere shutting of their Ports’. The overriding concern of the Cabinet remained the Portuguese fleet, Canning stressing articles 4 and 5 ‘which provide for the safety of the military and commercial Marine of Portugal are by far the most important’. Strangford should employ ‘any means whether of persuasion or menace to procure their instant execution’. Canning further stipulated to Strangford the part of the Portuguese fleet to go to the Brazils which was agreed in the Convention ‘should forthwith sail from the Tagus upon the notification of the arrival of Sir Sidney Smith’.21 The Portuguese preparations to repel a naval assault brought a clear and concise statement from Canning. Strangford should:

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…give it to be understood, that the continuance of hostile preparations, manifestly pointed against a supposed attack from a British naval force…can be considered in no other light than as an indication of the consciousness on the part of that Court, of having given or being about to give, some just ground of offence to Great Britain. This was a clear indication ministers in London were worried Portugal would eventually side with France. The Cabinet concluded the Portuguese were not making suitable efforts to prepare their fleet for a voyage to Brazil and thought this was symptomatic of a change in policy towards Britain. With the growing threat of a French invasion the Cabinet wanted the Portuguese fleet removed from the Tagus. If diplomatic measures failed to ensure the agreements were carried out, Canning was prepared to allow Smith to ‘menace’ the Regent and use military means against Portugal to implement the articles agreed to in the convention. This authorisation was conveyed to Strangford by Canning; he again stressed the need to carry out the 4th and 5th articles and if the intended voyage to South America was being delayed by ‘insufficient preparations’, then Strangford was to ‘procure the surrender of the fleet to the custody of Great Britain’. In a mood of desperation he suggested the ‘fleet might sail from the port of Lisbon, as if for the purpose of proceeding to the Brazils, and might fall into the hands of H Mys squadron stationed off the Tagus’.22 To Sousa, who had his own doubts regarding the ratification, Canning admitted he had ‘not been without my suspicions for some time’ over the conduct of the Portuguese court. He was also annoyed with Sousa and could not agree with the Portuguese minister ‘that the sending of a squadron at the time when you recommended it, would have had any good effect. Earlier it might have done much: and we had made preparations for the purpose, But then you deprecated it: then you wished us to trust – and I am sure that to trust by halves is never wise’. ‘The convention was everything – or nothing’. Canning had ‘believed with you, and upon the credit of your beliefs, that it was everything. If it turns out nothing, I have been deceived, but so have you too, I have no doubt – and I shall never reproach you with the deception’.23 Writing to Leveson-Gower, he described the convention as ‘either the best, or the worst measure ever adopted’. With a fleet on the way to the Tagus and an army at Gibraltar, ‘a few weeks, perhaps days, must determine the question’.24


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One recent study has argued that ‘Britain refrained from precipitating the crisis’.25 The orders of 30 October to Smith preventing him from entering the Tagus unless Strangford thought it expedient, certainly give that impression. By early November, however, Canning was growing impatient with the Portuguese court and had taken the decision to force the situation. If the Portuguese fleet did not sail to Brazil as stipulated in the convention of 22 October, Strangford would demand its surrender. If this was refused, force would be used to capture or destroy it. Portugal had been informed of the changed strategic situation on the Continent and Britain, as had been the case with the Danish navy, would never let neutral naval forces fall into the hands of Napoleon. Smith Sails for Lisbon On 9 November Smith raised his flag at Cawsand Bay, Plymouth, in the powerful 98-gun three-decked HMS London. After being delayed by contrary winds for 48 hours, he set sail for Lisbon. With him he took the Elizabeth, Marlborough, Monarch, Bedford, all 74s, and the frigate Solebay.26 At Plymouth Admiral Young was ordered to instruct the Plantagenet and Conqueror, both 74s, to sail for the Tagus.27 Despite the confidence displayed by Canning, some members of the Cabinet expressed concerns about Smith’s likely conduct. By instructing Smith to present a note to the Portuguese Canning was investing him with diplomatic powers. Hammond informed Canning that, according to Hawkesbury, the Cabinet were aware of previous problems with Smith’s interpretation of orders in 1806, and were ‘decidedly of opinion that Sir Sidney Smith should not be invested with any powers or possess any political discretion whatever’. Hammond therefore deferred drafting the full instructions to Smith until Canning could return to London.28 The problem for ministers and Canning in particular was that Smith would have to be invested with certain credentials if, upon arrival off the Tagus, he found Strangford had either demanded his passports or been told to leave Lisbon. In such a case Strangford would cease to act as the official minister to Portugal and could only await the arrival of Smith who would convey more diplomatic leverage than Strangford due to the threat posed by the naval force under his command. Ministers strived to ensure if Smith needed additional troops to those already set aside then they would be available. They faced a number of difficulties, however, related to the dispersal of forces by the Talents and the inherent constraints of maritime operations. As noted, Moore had

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been ordered to withdraw 7,000 men from Sicily and sail for Gibraltar in the first instance and then back to England. He had commenced this process in early October, finally embarking 7,258 rank and file by 29 October. Ministers now wanted to make use of this force as it withdrew from the Mediterranean, hoping it could call at Lisbon and offer assistance. In early October Castlereagh had been unsure where Moore actually was and whether he would arrive in time to contribute to government plans.29 On 7 November Hawkesbury summed it all up: We want a reinforcement for the Mediterranean in the event of Moore having left it, we want a force eventually to occupy the forts in the Tagus, and to secure the retreat of the Royal family of Portugal and we want a force for Madeira.30 On the same day he forwarded orders to Gibraltar for Moore. They contained a discussion of the situation in Portugal and instructions to be ready to head for the Tagus if Strangford or Smith requested his force. He was specifically directed not to land at Lisbon unless the important forts of St. Julian and Bugio were delivered into his possession. If the Portuguese had acceded to French pressure and closed the ports he was to detach 3,000 men to Madeira and proceed to England with the remainder of his force.31 Hawkesbury was concerned Moore might not have left Sicily or may not actually reach Gibraltar in time to react to the additional instructions and provide assistance at Lisbon or Madeira.32 As a contingency ministers decided to organise another force of 7,000 men, under the command of Major General Brent Spencer, to sail from England for the Tagus and ‘be put in possession of the Forts commanding the Tagus, or whatever other spot, from which that embarkation is to take place’. Once the Portuguese fleet had been secured Spencer’s force would divide: 3,000 men heading for Madeira while 4,000 would reinforce Sicily. If Moore was at Gibraltar or the Tagus then all of this additional force was to head for Sicily.33 Even ministers found the situation a little confusing, Hawkesbury quizzing Canning whether he had ‘made myself intelligible’.34 Canning was doubtful the Regent would follow the course of evacuation agreed in the convention: …in the other [event], and I cannot but apprehend the more probable course, of the project of the migration to the Brazils being laid


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aside, and in either of the cases provided for in my other dispatch of this date, of a refusal on the part of the court of Lisbon, either to ratify the convention, or to act up to it when ratified, or any other hostile step or Declaration against this country;- should it appear to Rear Admiral Sir Sidney Smith and to your Lordship, possible that the Portuguese fleet might be either captured or destroyed by a bold and sudden attack by his Majesty’s land and sea forces - it is left to your Lordship’s discretion in conjunction with Rear Admiral Sir Sidney Smith to direct the operations of the army to such an object.35 Many British observers agreed with Canning. ‘Our Portuguese paradise’, Auckland lamented to Grenville, ‘seems to have gone to the infernal regions’. He added ‘Liverpool had quite persuaded himself (and indeed seemed to have ministerial authority for it) that the Braganza dynasty would be transferred with all the ships to Brazil’. Auckland also criticised the government for a ‘want of due decision and foresight’.36 Writing to Howick, Brougham regarded the emigration of the Portuguese Royal family as ‘a step which I never will suspect of till I see him there’. To Rosslyn he lamented the Brazil scheme ‘never will be done as we desire it without our interference. They may send a part of the family over, but it will be to keep us out of concern’. He realised the need for British maritime intervention to force a decision deploring ‘ministers are stark mad if they do not make Sir Sidney call in his way out; but Lord St. Vincent would have been the man for that business’.37 In Lisbon the Regent was increasingly worried a British expedition would arrive off Lisbon. He stressed to Strangford the necessity of the Portuguese navy remaining in the Tagus to escort him to Brazil, but did recognise ‘the expediency of blockading the Tagus by an English squadron, to prevent the Port of Lisbon from becoming a naval station for the Enemies of Great Britain’. Although the Regent hoped this would prevent the French capturing his navy, he warned a ‘forcible attempt to seize our fleet, which in support of our own character as a Sovereign we must resist, would certainly tarnish the unsullied reputation which England has hitherto enjoyed amongst nations’. Using a recent and relevant example he pointedly remarked Portugal was ‘not in the same situation with regard to England, as Denmark’.38 Such determination to resist a British assault was seemingly backed up by military preparations taking place within Portugal. The Portuguese

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army was divided into three corps of around 6,000 men each, concentrated in and around Lisbon and the coast. Gambier concluded this deployment ‘is evidently intended to defend any attack which may be made from the Sea; and not for the purpose of opposing the advance of the French or Spanish troops on the frontiers. The state of the Portuguese navy, the repair of the batteries, and other circumstances tend to show that such is the object’.39 On 29 October Gambier expanded on this report detailing the deployment of individual Portuguese regiments in and around the River Tagus.40 Writing after the event, Foy also concluded the Portuguese had positioned troops on the banks of the Tagus to repulse a sea-based attack. The Regent had tried to raise a levy of recruits by increasing the establishment of the Infantry Regiments to 1,200 men while ordering the forts on the banks of the Tagus to be repaired and armed. ‘Still more animation was manifested in the naval service’, Foy argues, ‘Squadrons were required to defend the entrance of the Tagus against the English fleet’. ‘Every vessel in the navy that was thought sea-worthy, was refitted, equipped, and provisioned without a moments delay’. Foy thought these moves were ‘More of show than reality’. Preparing the fleet was a sensible move for the Portuguese as they could use it to transfer the Royal Family to Brazil. The Portuguese Ambassadors had been expelled from Paris and Madrid and Lima, now back in Lisbon ‘gave additional weight to the arguments with which he had filled his correspondence’.41 Ministers in London must certainly have viewed the actions of the Portuguese with concern. For all their protestations of friendship, preparations in Portugal seemed to be directed more at repelling a British amphibious assault than a French invasion from the Spanish border. In early November accounts were reaching London of French troops marching on Portugal, while in an attempt to prevent invasion the Regent had closed the ports. Information had been received from Paris that the official French paper, the Moniteur, declared ‘the House of Braganza shall cease to reign’.42 On 10 November Canning received intelligence from Strangford stating the decree ordering the closure of the ports had been signed and would shortly be made public. The intention of Portugal to accede to French demands had been communicated by Araujo to Strangford on 17 October. The Prince would not send his navy away because the French would immediately declare hostilities and he needed the ships to evacuate Lisbon, a move he would not implement until danger was imminent.43


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Ministerial uncertainty regarding Portuguese intentions was removed on 11 November when the Foreign Office received confirmation the Regent had indeed closed his ports to British ships: I have judged it proper to accede to the cause of the continent by unifying myself to his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy and to his Catholic Majesty, in order to contribute as far as may be in my power, to the acceleration of a Maritime Peace. The Regent ordered ‘the ports of this kingdom be shut against the entry of all ships of war and merchant vessels belonging to Great Britain’. Strangford remarked France would ‘not be satisfied with the measures of hostility towards England which Portugal had been compelled to take’.44 Although Strangford reported the Portuguese had made some efforts to prepare their fleet, British apprehensions regarding the earlier agreement to send the Prince of Beira to Brazil were well founded; no attempt had been made to implement this plan. The Regent now wanted an assurance from Strangford that an ‘English squadron should not enter the Tagus with hostile intentions, providing he sent away the Prince of Beira without delay’. Strangford assured Canning he would not give such a promise and noted the Regent was again acting under the influence of several pro-French advisors who convinced him further appeasement would save the country. Clearly playing on the Regent’s paranoia after two recent revolutionary conspiracies in Brazil during 1788-89 and again in 1798, the pro-French advisors argued those ministers who did urge flight were engaged in a plot to overthrow him once the Royal Family had reached Brazil.45 Along with these discouraging reports Canning did receive some good news. On 17 October Gambier had organised the sailing of a convoy of 64 vessels from Lisbon, evacuating most of the English residents of the city, with a further 46 ships leaving Oporto. On 28 October he reported the forts at the entrance of the Tagus had not been furnished with the necessary instructions to prevent the entrance of British trade and as a consequence several British merchant vessels had managed to gain access to the harbour.46 On 1 November Harriet Slessor confirmed ‘The English are gone, and safe at sea’ but ‘the French do not appear satisfied’. To her it seemed obvious that ‘great preparations are making, and in all haste, to get a Squadron ready, in case it should be wanted, to take

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off the Royal Family to the Brazil. But no one is allowed to think it, much less give a hint of the kind’.47 The British response Upon learning of the Portuguese decision to close their ports Canning immediately forwarded further instructions to the Admiralty for Smith. On arrival off the Tagus he was to ascertain from Strangford if the Portuguese court had ratified the 22 October convention. If so and ‘preparations are actually making for the bona fide execution of the articles which relate to the Portuguese fleet’ Smith was to declare his readiness to cooperate. If the convention had not been ratified, or the preparations were not made with due haste, or if there were any circumstances that in the opinion of Strangford required immediate action, or if the British minister had left Lisbon, then Smith would implement hostile measures. Canning was keen to have the Portuguese crisis resolved as quickly as possible; ‘if there should not exist any circumstances which, in the judgment of Lord Strangford...may make it desirable not to push matters at once to an extremity’ then Smith was ‘immediately to institute a strict blockade of the Tagus, which he is to declare to the Portuguese government that he has orders to enforce in the most rigorous manner’. Once implemented: …he has no authority to relax the [blockade] in any degree on any other condition whatever than that of the surrender to him of the Portuguese ships of war and Brazil ships now lying in the Tagus; These ships Sir Sidney Smith is to declare his readiness to take in deposit for H.R.H. the Prince Regent; pledging his Majesty’s word for their restoration at the conclusion of a definitive peace. If the Portuguese court refused to hand over the ships Smith was instructed ‘to continue the Blockade in its utmost rigour’, and ‘seize, capture or destroy every Portuguese ship or vessel that he may fall in with’. Portugal had been given ample opportunity to either remove her ships or hand them over to Britain. If the Portuguese Court refused their ships would be forcibly seized for the British Cabinet were determined not a single Portuguese ship, whether naval or commercial, would fall into French hands.48 Implementation of policy was left to the discretion of Smith and Strangford who, as the men on the spot, would be in full possession of


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the facts. If they thought the task could be achieved by the force at their disposal, Smith was ‘not to hesitate to force his way into the Tagus, and to seize and bring away the whole of the Portuguese shipping, or to destroy such part of it as he may find it impossible to remove’. If the task could not be accomplished Smith was to inform the Admiralty of the force required while confining his operations ‘to maintaining and enforcing a strict blockade’.49 These orders were transmitted to Smith on 12 November.50 At the very least Smith could prevent hostile warships from entering the Tagus and was on hand to escort the Regent to Brazil, which was the official pretext for his presence there. On the same day Castlereagh, now recovering from his illness in Brighton and continually updated as to the state of affairs, wrote informally to Cooke, one of the two Under Secretaries at the War Office. Highlighting an expression in a previous letter from Cooke: ‘I don’t quite understand the expression in your letter, “Nothing settled as to giving up their fleet”; Castlereagh outlined remarkably similar views to those expressed by Canning: Our relations with the Court of Portugal are become so critical, and the ultimate determination of that Government, whether to throw themselves with their fleet into our hands or those of France, may so much depend upon a momentary impulse, and the possibility of giving an instant support to a party in their councils, that I cannot but seriously lament that any minor considerations of convenience should be suffered to stand in the way of our having a powerful squadron off the Tagus, with such a proportion of land forces on board as might enable us, at any moment, to enter that river, and perhaps decide the question in our own favour. We can never hope to accomplish this by corps acting from a distance. With regard to the importance of having a naval force ‘with land forces on board, to be immediately stationed off the Tagus, I should still be disposed to look to Moore’s force’, with the reinforcements to be ordered from Britain to the Mediterranean. With the return of 20 sail-of-the-line from Copenhagen, he wanted 4,000 men to be embarked in ten of these ships and sent to the Tagus, freeing the ships under Smith for employment elsewhere.51 ‘I cannot help feeling anxious on this subject’ Castlereagh continued, ‘I think we shall have a bad case if Portugal slips through our fingers, if

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our friends in the cabinet or Portugal can justify their submission to France by any colour of pretence to a want of timely support from us’. ‘This charge might have been inconvenient when all our means were employed in the Baltic’ he remarked, but now: …when they are now altogether disposable, I do not see that any satisfactory answer could be made to it; nor do I conceive that we could contend that six sail of the line off the Tagus, without troops, could afford us any chance of being effectually useful in supporting the British party in the Portuguese councils; or that the arrangement we had made for securing a co-operation with our land forces in aid of our squadron afforded any reasonable hope of their assistance being procured at the moment it might be required. ‘The arrangement which appears to be decided on’, and in which Castlereagh appears not to have had much input, of sending naval force and land forces separately ‘may satisfy the terms of the secret treaty; but I do not think it will in any degree satisfy either the spirit of our relations with that State, or our own separate views and interest’.52 Castlereagh believed what was required was a true amphibious force; this would have allowed Smith to: …apprize Lord Strangford that he was prepared to enter the Tagus the first moment his lordship could reconcile the Portuguese Government to his doing so, with adequate means both to keep down popular commotion, to assist in completing the equipment of their fleet, and to put the Government in that state of independence which might best enable them, if France did not acquiesce in their views of compromise, to retire in safety to the Brazils. The fundamental problem for the Portland administration was ‘The whole of this arrangement in regard to Portugal may now, perhaps, come too late in point of time’ he lamented, ‘France may have prevailed’. ‘I think’ he continued, ‘it would be a satisfaction to our own feelings, and essential to our public justification, to have made, as early as the return of our forces from the Baltic would permit, arrangements which, in their nature, we could contend to be adequate and applicable to the case on which we had to act’.53 Impatience was growing in the British cabinet, particularly with Can-


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ning and Castlereagh, who now appeared to be distancing himself from Canning’s policy. On 12 November Canning expanded his instructions to Strangford of 7 November to the form of an ultimatum. The time for the Regent to decide had come; he could either oppose French demands or face a conflict with Britain. If the convention had not been ratified, or, once ratified, it was not being abided to, it would be interpreted as a sign of ‘determined hostility’. In this instance Strangford was to instruct Smith ‘the time is arrived for his execution of the instructions with which he is furnished, for the purpose of carrying into effect any measures of hostility against Portugal, which may be in his power’. The ‘most effectual of those measures would undoubtedly be, the direct attack upon the Portuguese fleet in the Harbour of Lisbon,’ if this was not practical then he was to establish and enforce ‘the most rigorous Blockade of the mouth of the Tagus’. The blame for this situation would lie solely with the Portuguese as a ‘consequence of their refusal or hesitation to fulfill their engagements with his Majesty’.54 Canning believed the Portuguese had been given ample opportunity to fulfil their obligations as agreed in the convention and was prepared to act if they were not. By implementing a blockade in the mouth of the Tagus he wanted to starve the population of Lisbon hoping this would provoke civil unrest and force the Regent to accede to the articles of the convention or to give up his navy. In a revealing communication he argued if Portugal declined to avert ‘the calamity attendant of a blockade,’ then this measure would have consequences ‘when directed against a country of which the inhabitants derive a principal part of their sustenance from foreign supply’. This blockade would not be lifted ‘by any concession short of the absolute and unconditional surrender of the whole Portuguese marine’.55 During these years Portugal imported 15-18 per cent of its grain;56 Admiral Campbell had considered the vulnerability of Lisbon to a blockade in 1804. The main source of grain imports was the Barbary Coast and Portugal needed specie from Brazil to pay for this trade. A strict blockade to prevent the arrival of both the specie and food would have a disastrous effect. He estimated ‘Portugal cannot subsist above three months in the year’ without the Barbary imports.57 It is clear from the official records Canning was using every available form of pressure to further foreign policy whether it was diplomatic, military or economic. Once the decision had been made to send forces to the Tagus and all preparations were completed, all ministers could do was to wait nerv-

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ously for news of the expedition. The successful completion of the operation would depend on the actions of Strangford and Smith. Madeira With the Portuguese closing their ports Canning now ‘looked to an immediate occupation of Madeira’.58 On 6 November he informed Hawkesbury the ‘time for the Madeira expedition is now clearly come… not a moment ought to be lost in sending the force prepared at Cork. I hope there are three Regiments though perhaps two would do’. Canning was concerned ‘you can hardly trust to finding Moore at Gibraltar’ and therefore ‘a detachment from Spencer might be the shortest & most secret method?’ The commander of the expedition was, upon arrival off the island, to ‘transmit to the Gov[eno]r a summons inclosing a copy of the letter, or rather perhaps a summons stating that he has a letter to communicate to him, & desiring him to send some confidential person on board to receive it, and then to state that he demands possession of the Island on the terms stated in that letter’.59 Canning pressed Sousa to send the order for the capitulation to the governor of Madeira, as agreed in the convention: You say that you will give it equally whether the Convention be ratified, or no….Undoubtedly you will. But this expression seems to imply that you do not intend to deliver it, till that point is ascertained. Now this delay, my dear Sir, is perfectly idle and useless – useless, according to your own account – for the event is to make no change in your purpose of delivering it – and idle because if the order is good for anything it must be given now. He warned if a British force ‘presents itself before Madeira without the order, perhaps it may be resisted; and if taken after resistance, you cannot suppose that we ever will restore the island’. Canning also wondered if ‘more, much more hostile steps may not have been taken by your government before we hear again? And is it not therefore your duty to your country to save Madeira to Portugal by giving it up to us under the order, rather than to risque [sic] losing it altogether by forcing us to undertake the expedition without it? The expedition itself cannot be delayed any longer’. Initially Canning had trusted the Portuguese government ‘but now, knowing all that we know, and fearing all that we fear’, it would be ridiculous to suspend British operations, ‘till all our fears are realized’.60


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He wondered to Hawkesbury if ‘provision is made for a sufficiently early occupation’. If the Portuguese ignored the treaty or went against it they would notify the Governor of the island, ‘We should then arrive too late to get quiet possession & a forcible attack and bombardment of Funchal is the necessary destruction of British property’. Canning was becoming increasingly frustrated by Portuguese inactivity and sent Hawkesbury ‘two private letters of Souza’s by which you will see that he apprehends the worst’. If Moore was to go to Madeira, ‘it is indeed absolutely indispensable that a copy of the order should be sent to him now. But it is not possible to send the Regts now ready at Cork, to Madeira to save if possible the chance of the order being revoked before we get there?’ ‘The 3000 now in course of collection might go to the West Indies, or might relieve those at Madeira, if it is necessary that they should be sent on, within a month after their arrival there. But a month or even a week gained in taking possession of Madeira is a great deal’.61 Canning’s fears were alleviated a little on 10 November when Hawkesbury informed him he had unconditionally ‘obtained from Sousa this morning the official order for the surrender of Madeira’.62 As always, extended lines of communication, strategic overstretch and the vagaries of wind and weather all played a part in maritime-based strategic decision making, hence Castlereagh agreed with Hawkesbury and Canning that Madeira ought now to be seized by a separate force. On 11 November he wondered to Cooke if the Madeira expedition could be completed using the troops at Portsmouth, instead of the force at Cork. ‘I should think Beresford a very good person to go to Madeira, with the three regiments from Portsmouth, having fully considered the subject’. On 13 November Castlereagh informed the King that instructions would be given to Beresford to occupy the Island with 3,000 men and to proceed without delay to avoid a change of mind by the Portuguese government. The following day Beresford was informed a British force must appear ready to attack the island to justify the Portuguese surrender. He was to take 3,658 troops and appear off the island, fully prepared to commence the attack; but this was a ruse, he was informed a secret agreement had been made whereby the Portuguese Governor would surrender the island on the appearance of a military force. On 16 November a firm decision was made; Moore was not to send any troops to the island.63 …

9 THE EMBARKATION OF THE PORTUGUESE ROYAL FAMILY

While British ministers in London reacted to the growing crisis in Portuguese affairs, Napoleon had been making detailed plans for the conquest of the country. It was surely no coincidence that an essay appeared in the Paris Moniteur of 6 November describing the major topographical features of Spain and Portugal.1 The Franco-Spanish Treaty of Fontainebleau had dictated how Portugal was to be partitioned between the two allies; the political settlement was a cover for the seizure of the Portuguese navy. On 2 November Napoleon ordered Decrés to assemble 200 naval officers for service at Lisbon.2 Further orders were sent to Junot on 8 November noting the Portuguese ports had been closed, but it was not enough. Napoleon was increasingly concerned British troops would arrive at Lisbon to thwart his plans.3 On the 12th Napoleon wrote yet again to Junot, this time enclosing ‘a list of the naval officers who are under orders to join you’ and hoping ‘in any case you will seize the Portuguese fleet’. Once Lisbon had been occupied and the fleet seized 200 infantrymen were to be placed on board each ship, the naval officers distributed throughout the fleet while a battalion of naval gunners would arrive to man the guns. Napoleon wanted the Portuguese fleet readied for offensive operations and Junot was to arm ‘such vessels as are fit for it, [to] keep the crews on board at full strength, and provision them, so that I may have 7 or 8 battleships ready to sail anywhere’.4 After being foiled at Copenhagen, Napoleon was desperate to acquire the Portuguese fleet. His aim was to maintain a fleet in being of 111 warships, ready to threaten British interests in Ireland, Surinam, Brazil, Algiers, Tunis, Egypt, Sicily or South America.5

THE EMBARKATION OF THE PORTUGUESE ROYAL FAMILY

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While Napoleon expanded his plans, the political and diplomatic situation in Lisbon in late October and early November continued to degenerate. The populace of Lisbon, worried about the possible arrival of a Royal Navy squadron and angry at the thought of the Regent deserting them for Brazil, had begun to voice their opinions. Strangford was also concerned some were urging a revolt against the ‘Traitor Prince’, observing ‘alarm and confusion are every where visible’.6 Strangford was concerned Sousa’s dispatches had misinterpreted British policy and hence the Portuguese Court were acting on inaccurate information about British intentions.7 The uncertainty lifted a little on 2 November when Strangford received Canning’s dispatches of 22 October, detailing government policy and the signing of the secret convention. Strangford thought the convention would be ratified ‘but not in total’. The Portuguese Court would not retire to Brazil unless French troops moved against Portugal and the materialisation of this threat had been warded off by the closure of the Ports – or so they believed. Also, although Araujo denied it, Strangford believed Napoleon had made demands regarding the Portuguese navy.8 In a personal communication of the same day Strangford noted Lima, recently arrived in Lisbon, had declared Napoleon ‘was resolved on destroying the house of Braganza if the Prince did not…comply with his demands to their full extent…[this] has produced the most terrible consequences. It has awakened the Prince’s fear, and I fear, destroyed all the courage which had been infused into him’. Although the Prince Regent would probably flee on the appearance of a French army, Strangford thought João believed there would be no French invasion and hence his ships were not in any danger. The Portuguese expected a British naval force would confine itself to blockading the Tagus. Strangford perceptively lamented to Canning that ‘this deceived and misguided Sovereign seems not to be aware that the entire Peninsula is but as one country in the eyes of Bonaparte’. All this left Strangford with the uneasy feeling the ‘conduct of this court is beginning to assume a very suspicious appearance’.9 The events of 6 November seemed to reinforce Strangford’s interpretation of Portuguese policy. While attempting to enter the Tagus the brig HMS Raven was fired upon by Portuguese batteries. This prompted a nearby British privateer to capture a Portuguese ship. Strangford was certain the Portuguese had fired first. Further evidence of Portuguese hostility was provided by the implementation of an embargo on all Eng-

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lish vessels in the Tagus. To this Strangford inquired if the Regent would limit hostilities to the exclusion of British ships from the Tagus and was told that depended on the future conduct of Britain. On 8 November orders were circulated for the arrest of British nationals and the seizure of their property while Araujo requested Strangford and Gambier collect their passports and leave Lisbon. It was widely rumoured Spain would shortly declare war on Portugal, although the Portuguese were convinced the actions implemented against British commerce and warships would placate the Spaniards.10 Yet, despite all the apparent and highly visible hostility towards Britain, behind the scenes at a Council of State on 9 November the Regent confirmed his determination to flee to Brazil. Strangford complained there could be no certainty of the actions of the Regent as Portuguese policy seemed to fluctuate wildly.11 He seems to have missed the point, for the Portuguese policy of appeasing France required apparent compliance with French demands to prevent the occupation of the country and the inevitable British assault on Lisbon which would follow – Copenhagen displaying the lengths to which Britain would go to prevent naval forces falling into French hands. Appeasement would also avoid the need to evacuate Lisbon leaving the kingdom at the mercy of French forces. Hence Portuguese policy had a public face to appease France and a private dimension, in which the Prince Regent could be a little more candid about his intention to evacuate for Brazil. So while he assured Britain the court would indeed flee should the French invade, the Regent tried a desperate last attempt to buy off France sending Don Pedro-JoseJoaquim Vito de Menezes, Marquis of Mariovola, on a mission to Paris. It was hoped Mariovola would convince Napoleon of the favourable disposition of the Portuguese Court by offering him the chance to gain control of the Portuguese throne without resorting to force. This would be achieved by a marriage between the Bonapartes and the house of Braganza. To sweeten the deal Mariovola was provided with Brazilian diamonds to present to Napoleon; in the event Mariovola only ever got as far as Madrid.12 On 10 November Lisbon was thrown into near panic as a rumour that France had declared war swept through the city. In fact, as already noted, France had issued the declaration regarding Portugal on 22 October. Hence though Strangford only learned on 21 November this specific rumour was unfounded and had been started by Araujo, the fact he was unaware of the French declarations illustrates the lack of accurate intelli-


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gence in Lisbon upon which he could base his implementation of government policy.13 By the time Strangford had confirmed it was just a rumour, the tension in Lisbon had increased even further. For, as the Portuguese became increasingly desperate to prevent an invasion from French land forces, the possibility of the city becoming the scene of a British attack increased with the arrival of Smith and his squadron of six sail-of-the-line on 16 November. His force was strengthened by the arrival of two powerful ships the three-decked 110-gun Hibernia and the 80gun Foudroyant. Smith interpreted the Portuguese order to seize British persons and property as evidence of ‘the distinct avowal on the part of the Portuguese Government of the relinquishment of neutrality’. The appointment of John Bell to perform the functions of ‘agent for British prisoners of war’ confirmed Portuguese intentions.14 Smith’s force was an imposing battle fleet sent to browbeat, or perhaps bluff, the Portuguese into implementing the convention of 22 October. It was certainly of sufficient strength to allow the Portuguese to surrender with grace or provide an escort for the Portuguese fleet to Brazil and it was certainly strong enough to defeat the Portuguese fleet, which was twice the size of Smith’s force. There were, however, a number of problems which quickly became evident to Smith. Although a strong battle fleet, his squadron lacked bomb vessels and gun boats which, as the attack on Copenhagen made patently clear, were essential in an amphibious assault. Secondly, as will be discussed below, he was also lacking troops to conduct such an assault or at least to seize the Tagus forts. Finally, Smith did not have any sloops or brigs and only a single frigate; hence his ability to send vessels into the Tagus to gain intelligence, communicate with Strangford or to enforce a blockade was seriously compromised. On 17 November Smith had to utilise a local fishing vessel to send his secretary, Mr Spence, up the Tagus. Spence discovered Strangford had received his passports on 9 November. On the evening of 18 November, accompanied by Spence, Strangford left Lisbon in the fishing vessel and reached the squadron the following night. Gambier remained in the city trying to obtain the release of British persons and property; in this he was unsuccessful and he retired to the squadron.15 The Russian Mediterranean Fleet There was another issue to complicate matters. Ministers in London were becoming increasingly worried over the actions of the Russian Mediterranean fleet and the potential for Russo-Portuguese or Franco-

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Russian co-operation at Lisbon. In 1780, during the American War of Independence, a Russian squadron had entered the Tagus and, recognising the strategic importance of Lisbon, made an unsuccessful request to utilise the city as a base for operations in the Mediterranean. The Russians had also successfully lobbied the Portuguese to join the League of Armed Neutrality in 1782.16 At Tilsit Russia had ceded her key Mediterranean bases in the Ionian Islands to France removing the necessary facilities to project maritime power in the region and leaving the Russian Mediterranean Fleet isolated and exposed. The two possible routes back to a friendly port for the Russian Admiral Seniavin were both dangerous. He could not enter the Black Sea without forcing the Dardanelles (and Duckworth’s failure provided a recent example of how difficult that would be) while to return to the Baltic involved sailing the length of the Mediterranean, passing the Gut at Gibraltar, before transiting the English Channel. With the Turks hostile in the east and the Royal Navy prevalent in the west, finding a neutral port was perhaps the best Seniavin could hope for. British Ministers were aware Seniavin was sailing through the Mediterranean, possibly headed for the Baltic, but were unsure of his orders and intentions. With Russia taking a pro-French stance at Tilsit and rumours of the formation of a maritime confederacy aimed at Britain, the movements of Seniavin’s fleet combined with French demands on Portugal all added up to rather sinister circumstances. In September Collingwood, shadowing the Russian fleet, thought Seniavin had been ordered to surrender his ships to France and accordingly informed Purvis of their movements. But, as Collingwood informed Mulgrave, contact between the British and Russian fleets ‘to the last hour of their being with us, was perfectly friendly’. The Russian officers had ‘lamented the misfortune that had befallen their Country….they had no suspicion of any hostile intention of their court towards us’.17 Collingwood had considered the possibility of Franco-Russian operations aimed at Sicily but with Seniavin heading west it appeared more likely the Russian fleet might be acting in concert with the French forces destined for Lisbon, or to join with the Franco-Spanish fleet in Cadiz (though Hawkesbury’s concerns the Russians may combine with French forces for an attack on India were, perhaps, less likely). On 5 November Canning, angry at the Russian handover of the Ionian Islands to France, pressed upon Hawkesbury the importance of taking ‘provisional, precautionary and amicable possession of the Russian fleet….What Russia has


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actually done in the Mediterranean [giving up the Ionian Islands to France] is quite enough to justify this measure if we chose to take it as a measure of war’.18 On 13 November 1807 Canning received confirmation of measures ‘adopted by the Court of St. Petersburg for the purpose of forming a Maritime Confederacy against this Country’. Russia would unite with France and had proposed to Sweden to join against Britain ‘on the principles of 1780 and 1800’.19 Canning now wanted to intercept the Russian Mediterranean fleet and to convey it to a British port, stressing to Chatham it was ‘impossible that we should let the Russian fleet which is now returning from the Mediterranean to proceed either into the Baltic, or to any port of the enemy’.20 Canning had received intelligence from Purvis of a Russian frigate arriving at Gibraltar and announcing the imminent appearance of the remainder of the fleet. The captain of this frigate informed Purvis that Seniavin hoped to winter at Portsmouth. Taking this new development into consideration, Canning determined not to actually intercept the fleet unless it attempted to pass Portsmouth and head for the Baltic. The Czar had, however, refused an offer to winter the fleet in Portsmouth and Seniavin would find it difficult to head for the Baltic due to the advanced stage of the year. Canning informed the Admiralty if Seniavin tried to enter an enemy port he was to be warned off ‘and in case of an attempt to force such entrance’ it should be ‘oppose[d] by force’.21 These orders were despatched to Smith on 14 November.22 Canning, discussing his plan with Chatham, wanted to ‘assemble a sufficient force to overpower them [Seniavin’s fleet], as soon as they shall have passed Portsmouth, and to bring them by persuasion, or by force if necessary, into a port of Great Britain’.23 In reply Chatham thought the Russians intended to put into Lisbon or a French or Spanish port.24 Portland supported these moves, admitting to Canning on 13 November the ‘measure proposed of bringing Admiral Seniavin’s fleet into a British port has so often entered my thoughts, that I have no hesitation in continuing in it’. He was convinced ‘if properly represented it will not injure our interests in the feelings or opinions of the Russian nation’. In another letter of the same date he mooted ‘holding Seniavin and his fleet as a deposit until the Russian government reverts to its anterior system of politiks’.25 Uncertainty over the actions of the Russian fleet lifted a little on 16 November when Smith found four 80s, four 74s, one 64, one 44 and a

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32 gun transport, sheltering in the Tagus (see Appendix IV). Seniavin had passed Malta on 7 October with orders to join the French ships at Cadiz but, after passing Purvis at Gibraltar, had headed for the Atlantic. His fleet had then been scattered by a gale and his ships entered the Tagus in an ad hoc manner between 10 and 17 November where the Portuguese offered assistance to his somewhat battered fleet.26 It was reported the squadron intended to winter in Lisbon but Smith was suspicious of Russian intentions and was ‘anxious for precise instructions how to act’ from the Admiralty. A second force (two 80s, two 74s, a 36-gun frigate and a 20-gun sloop) was rumoured to be approaching Lisbon from Gibraltar and Smith had already warned off a Russian frigate from entering the Tagus. He concluded it was ‘not unlikely that they may combine with the Portuguese navy and cooperate with it in endeavouring [sic] to oppose His Majesty’s forces in their efforts to attain the objects for which they were sent’.27 This intelligence arrived in London on 25 November and appeared to confirm British fears Seniavin’s movements were timed to coincide with the expected arrival of French troops. Next day Canning ordered Smith should ‘forcibly detain’ the Portuguese and Russian ships if they tried to put to sea and wanted the Royal Navy squadron reinforced to make it ‘fully equal to the combined Russian and Portuguese squadrons’, which on paper made a total of 22 ships-of-the-line. He also urged Smith should prevent any other ships entering the Tagus.28 British concerns over Russian policy reached new heights on the morning of 2 December when Sir Robert Wilson arrived in London with dispatches from St. Petersburg containing a formal declaration of war on Britain. Horward has dramatically argued once the British government received this declaration ‘the Lords of the Admiralty began working on plans to capture the Russian squadron at Lisbon’; yet, as we have seen, such action had already been discussed within the cabinet.29 In response to the declaration a Russian frigate lying off Portsmouth was immediately seized; Canning quipping to Camden he hoped ‘Seniavin would be so good as to come to Portsmouth to look for it’. Chatham thought Seniavin never intended to head for Portsmouth and was optimistic if ‘he quits Lisbon for any other destination, I do not conceive he has much chance of success, in his undertaking’.30 Portland raised the difficulties of dealing with this force if it left the Tagus: ‘is it not a question, and one that will not admit of a moments delay, whether it should not be taken possession of?’ By 4 December he had ‘a prodigious asking to get


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hold of Seniavins fleet. The court of Lisbon can not be in a more desperate plight than they are at present’.31 With the Cabinet resolved to implement hostile measures against the Russian fleet in the Tagus, Mulgrave raised the question of the command of British naval forces off Portugal. Writing to the King he recognised ‘the character of that service has so materially changed by the arrival of the Russian squadron’. With the desire of the cabinet to increase the blockading force Mulgrave wanted to send an officer senior to Smith out to take command. He recommended Sir Charles Cotton, Vice Admiral of the Red.32 The choice of Cotton has met approval from contemporaries and historians alike.33 In November 1807 his good friend Collingwood had heard many rumours Cotton was to go to the Baltic or America.34 Mulgrave had actually offered Cotton provisional command of the Copenhagen force in early July if a more senior admiral refused, but Cotton had already turned down several commands in 1807 due to ill health; it seems the Baltic command would have come too soon into his convalescence.35 Also, the force destined for the Baltic operation grew so large as to require an officer senior to Cotton. Nevertheless, his professional handling of this unusual offer and his conduct in the discussion seems to have impressed Mulgrave who informed the King that Cotton was an ‘officer highly qualified to discharge the duties of that command’ off Portugal and this doubtless appealed to the King who highly approved of the choice.36 On 4 December, Cotton was appointed ‘Commander in Chief of a squadron of his Majesty’s ships and vessels employed on the coast of Portugal’.37 Plans to Attack Lisbon Meanwhile Castlereagh, now recovered and back at the War Office, informed Spencer he was to proceed to Lisbon and place himself under Moore’s command. Spencer’s force would be used for ‘securing, and carrying from Lisbon the Prince Regent and Royal family of Portugal, or for bringing off the Portuguese and Russian navy’. If this was impossible the Portuguese and Russian ships were to be destroyed. Spencer was specifically instructed not to land his force unless the Tagus forts were given up to him or if they could be seized with the minimum of effort. If Moore’s force was strong enough to execute the tasks then Spencer was to reinforce Sicily.38 Moore had already turned his thoughts to the Russian ships, which had passed Sicily while he had been on the island.

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In response to their ambiguous conduct he had directed they should not be permitted to enter any of the ports of Sicily where British troops were stationed.39 Castlereagh now informed Moore of the ‘recent conduct of the Court of Russia, in renouncing all connexion with His Majesty’, therefore, ‘the capture of the Russian fleet in the Tagus is to be considered as one of the principal objects to which you are to direct your exertions’.40 Evidently a conversation had taken place between Captain George McKinley and William Wellesley-Pole, Secretary to the Admiralty, on 5 December regarding the actual practicalities involved in such a project. McKinley had gained first hand experience of the Tagus forts while with St. Vincent’s fleet in 1806. He wrote to Pole on 7 December: ‘Agreeably to your directions I have the honour of stating to you the observations I have been able to make relative to the destroying or annoying the Enemy’s ships in the River Tagus’. McKinley immediately ruled out a suggestion from Pole regarding fire-ships. If the Portuguese and Russian ships were anchored at Belem, with the strong tide and winds, they were too distant for such an attack. McKinley thought the forts guarding the entrance to the Tagus ‘strong and well situated to command the entrance of the river as to prevent the fleet from proceeding to attack’. When McKinley had left the Tagus in October 1806 he thought an attack on Cascais had been possible ‘with sea forces, having a strong body of troops ready to land in a very fine bay’. This force could then march on to fort St. Julien ‘which is not fortified on the land side, nor either is Cascaes fort or any of the forts within St. Julien’s and they are all commanded by hills very near them’. These views reinforced the necessity of devoting a substantial land component to seize the forts as a precursor to any naval operations in the Tagus. McKinley offered to head for Lisbon to take part in any attack, emphasising the significance of his local knowledge.41 McKinley also confirmed the belief Lisbon was vulnerable to maritime blockade. During his time there in 1806: …[a] great number of ships entered the Tagus from the Mediterranean and Baltic laden with grain and many from the Western Islands with pulse, none of which was ever sent from Lisbon again, which corroborates every information I could ever receive that Lisbon even after a good harvest could not ensure more than five months provision.


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He was convinced ‘no port or coast can be more easily or closely blockaded than Lisbon and Portugal’. He envisaged a loose blockade; the majority of the ships would never have ‘any occasion to be nearer the Rock of Lisbon than ten or twelve leagues’. This would provide the fleet with sufficient seaway ‘against a heavy gale of Westerly wind’ which would blow the fleet towards the dangerous Catchops and the shore. With a frigate and several smaller vessels stationed in the bay closer to Lisbon, the fleet would be in a position ‘to reach in three or four leagues to the Northward of the Rock, and communication kept up between them and a frigate and smaller vessels stationed in the bay’. McKinley was convinced enemy fleets would ‘never attempt to come out in the night and it very seldom occurs that they can come out against the flood in the day’. More likely, thought McKinley, would be an attempt at dawn ‘at the first of the ebb’. If northerly gales buffeted the blockading squadron ‘the bay of Lisbon will afford shelter to our fleet without the range of shells, and lye in smooth water and good holding ground’. A single frigate, supported by a sloop and two smaller vessels, stationed between the Rock of Lisbon and Cape Espichel, would ‘effectually stop all supplies from entering the Tagus’. To prevent supplies entering St. Ubes, two small cruisers could be stationed to the south of Espichel. Another pair of small cruisers should be stationed between the Burlings and Peniche with two more ‘off Cape Mondego and three off Oporto and its vicinity and a frigate to range the coast’. With such force distributed, McKinley argued, the coast of Portugal would be blockaded effectively.42 Two days after McKinley submitted his report the Admiralty forwarded further orders to Cotton. After arriving off the Tagus he was to assume command and take the Hibernia as his flagship. Smith was to ‘hoist his flag on board such other one of the ships under your command as he shall fix upon’. Cotton was informed of the Franco-Russian alliance and the arrival in the Tagus of the Russian squadron. New orders, taking into account all these changes, had also been forwarded to Smith requiring him to seize ‘all Russian ships of war and merchant ships’.43 There remained a possibility the Russian squadron might try to forcibly prevent a Portuguese evacuation. In this situation Cotton was to first demand possession of the principal forts necessary for the safe passage of his squadron up river ‘for the purpose of attacking the Russian squadron, and conveying the Portuguese fleet out of the Tagus’. If the Portuguese fleet attempted to put to sea ‘in company with the Russian squad-

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ron’ Cotton was ‘forcibly to detain the whole of such combined squadron’. As a consequence of the volte-face of Russian policy ‘the capture of the Russian squadron in the Tagus has become an object of the greatest importance’. If the Tagus could not be forced, he was to implement a strict blockade, which could only be relaxed if the entire Portuguese and Russian fleets were surrendered to him. If the Portuguese fleet escaped from the Tagus, Smith was to be detached to escort them to Brazil. Spencer’s troops would assist his operations, while another force under Moore could be expected. When Cotton had completed his mission he was to return to Spithead and report his proceedings to the Admiralty, having left a suitable force off the Tagus to blockade any ships left behind in the river.44 The Portuguese Crisis Resolved Lying off the Tagus with his squadron, Smith moved his flag from the London onto the Hibernia on 20 November. With Strangford now on board his new flagship Smith decided circumstances dictated the squadron could not be used for peaceful measures. Strangford suggested ‘the expediency of establishing the blockade of the Tagus’ as soon as French or Spanish troops entered Portugal and once the invasion commenced, Portugal should be regarded as part of French territory.45 Portuguese intentions were apparently confirmed when the sloop Confiance (18) arrived off Lisbon on 21 November and attempted to join the fleet but was prevented by fire from a Portuguese battery. The following day it succeeded in joining the squadron and communicated Canning’s dispatches of 7 and 12 November containing instructions relating to the Russian fleet.46 With the approval of Strangford, Smith had already sent notification to Araujo of the decision to blockade the river and issued a clear threat arguing his squadron ‘cannot have been assembled for the mere purpose of demonstration or simple blockade...my government requires and expects something more from such a force’. Smith hoped the recent example meted out to the Danes would ‘operate on the reasonable and dispassionate part of the Prince Regents council and prevent Lisbon becoming the theatre of similar scenes of horror with the additional evils of famine, insurrection and the presence of a foreign permanent garrison’. By fleeing to Brazil the Regent would ‘spare himself the regret now felt at Copenhagen that the offered alternative was not accepted, since the result cannot be otherwise than similar’. As the Portuguese court seemed to be driven by the apprehension of ‘a land


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attack to close with the French requisitions’, Smith hoped ‘the greater apprehension of one from the opposite quarter may have the effect of producing a contrary decision and conduct’. Despite the bluster, Smith allowed the Regent a little room for manoeuvre noting diplomatic measures could achieve the desired result and knowing ‘the character of the ministers and the real disposition of the Prince, Lord Strangford keeps the door of negotiation open’.47 Strangford confirmed the blockade prevented food supplies from entering the Tagus. When added to the pressure on food supplies already caused by the arrival of the Russian squadron and the increased numbers of Portuguese troops in the city, the Portuguese were forced to impose restrictions on food made with flour, bread excepted. This, Strangford thought, caused ‘the greatest distress and alarm in Lisbon’ as Canning had intended.48 ‘Thus’, Fortescue noted, ‘matters were brought to a crisis at last’.49 But resolving the crisis was not as simple as this comment might suggest. From the start Smith found the blockade difficult to maintain. Strong westerly winds were blowing into Tagus preventing his big ships-of-the-line from closing to the lee shore. His ‘absolute want of more frigates [and smaller vessels], which...can venture, and remain near the bar’ and hence tighten the blockade was now clearly limiting his ability to fulfil the mission. Smith hoped if the weather lifted the blockade would ‘be rendered more close by the ships being able to keep nearer the shore’. Conducting a close blockade on a dangerous lee shore in bad weather with ships-of-the-line was a risky business.50 On 22 November Smith’s force was augmented by the arrival of the Plantagenet and Conqueror (74s). With the squadron thus strengthened, Smith and Strangford discussed the possibility of attacking the Portuguese fleet and both reached the same conclusion. According to Smith, Strangford regarded it as ‘perfectly practicable...if the efforts of His Majesty’s ships be joined to those of an efficient cooperative body of troops by land’ while Smith himself was of the opinion ‘the Portuguese fleet is quite out of the reach of any attack to be made by a fleet alone however superior in number and efficiency’. Even after passing the forts of St. Julian and Bugio a fleet alone trying to force the inner Tagus would be ‘more or less disabled...[from] a very considerable crossfire, the entrance and sides of the passage all the way up to the town being lined with batteries and forts….The fleet would have no anchorage out of the range of enemy shot, as was same case in sea of Marmora’. Clearly Smith, who had been an eyewitness to the embarrassing failure of Duckworth’s

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aborted attack on Constantinople the previous year, had taken on board the lessons regarding the limitations of pure naval forces and concluded a successful attempt to force the Tagus and assail the forts would need ‘a combined land and sea force’.51 Strangford agreed with Smith; the Portuguese fleet might be attacked but the retreat from the Tagus ‘would be too uncertain, and too much at the mercy of accidents and chances, that it would be wise to provide for it, by the occupation of the adjacent forts’. The force needed would be no more than 9-10,000 troops, as long as the operation was implemented before the arrival of the French and the Russians remained neutral. Accordingly he ordered Moore’s force to sail for Lisbon, where it would join with the troops coming from England, prior to any attack on the Portuguese fleet. To achieve this communication he had to go through Smith, as one of his ships would have to carry the dispatch to Gibraltar where Moore was expected. He stressed the need for Smith to send for Moore ‘without delay’.52 Strangford concluded a blockade of Lisbon throughout the winter would present great difficulties with attendant troopships, thus the first force to arrive would be landed by Smith at Peniche to await the other. Smith agreed, stressing there was ‘little prospect…of a successful close blockade in the winter months’ and, characteristically, noted ‘the good policy of devoting an adequate land force immediately, to the object in question and thus to finish the affair at once’.53 According to Gambier, the Portuguese had now collected 18,000 troops in and around Lisbon and ‘evidently intended to defend any attack which may be made from the sea and not for the purpose of opposing the advance of the French’. Deployed as they were a British land force was required to drive off the Portuguese troops prior to taking possession of the Tagus batteries in order to guarantee a safe passage for Smith’s fleet. There was an opportunity for swift action as Gambier thought few of the Portuguese forts and batteries guarding the harbour were of regular construction. He also reported it was only a few days since ‘General Gomes Freire was called by M de Araujo and his opinion required in regard to the military arrangements. He was asked whether the object was to defend the country or the port, M de Araujo answered that it was the port they wished to defend’.54 Despite Portuguese preparations Strangford resolved to make one last diplomatic effort. If this failed he would urge ‘the surrender of the military and commercial marine of Portugal’ to Britain. He forwarded a letter to Araujo demanding a personal audience with the Regent. While he was


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in Lisbon on this mission the blockade of the Tagus would be maintained.55 Smith accordingly organised a flag of truce under which Strangford could safely sail upriver. He left the fleet in the early afternoon of 27 November in the Confiance and arrived at Lisbon the next night after a tedious passage.56 He found ‘a great and rapid change has taken place in the conduct of the Portuguese government’. Preparations were under way ‘for the execution of those articles of the convention which relate to the disposal of the Portuguese navy…[the] Regent and all of the Royal family are embarked and propose to sail instantly, as a French army is within nine leagues of Lisbon’.57 Sir Sidney Smith’s nephew, Lieutenant G S Smith, differs slightly in the dates stating on 28 November ‘the admiral sent the Confiance into Lisbon with a flag of truce, Lord Strangford went also, and my Uncle ordered me to accompany him as signal officer. Owing to contrary winds and the tide we did not get up to Lisbon till the 29th at night’. ‘When we arrived Lord S. went immediately to the Court, but did not see the Prince till next morning’, when ‘At 8 in the morning we came away again. Lord Strangford found the Prince on board ship, I followed him out in the boat’.58 Onboard Hibernia, Smith had no knowledge of Portuguese intentions, writing to Strangford on 28 November ‘I need not tell you how impatient I am to have a word or sign from you….Send me from moment to moment a word by Telegraph on any card or scrap of paper. The signal officer can convey it from any staff or mast. This state of suspence is unbearable’. Captain James Lucas Yeo in the Confiance was ordered in case the ‘flag of truce is no longer required for its original use, to hawl it down, and act against the French, and immediately occupy the batteries within his reach that are tenable’. Smith implored Strangford, ‘send me pilots, let my marines occupy the forts, and I will come up abreast of, or above the town, the moment the wind will let me; then I shall be more than at par with Junot’. He hoped the Prince would call a levee en masse to defend the city. Added to this letter was: A hasty P.S. to a dispatch from Lord Strangford to Sir S.S. dated Lisbon 29 November “Much difficulty is made about giving up the forts. The soldiers won’t give them. You had better stand in as near as possible without passing them. Orders have been given to treat the English as friends and protectors. An alliance has been declared with England. The powder has been taken out of the forts. Make your appearance or all is lost. Le Prince chancelle tryoms”.59

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The Embarkation of the Portuguese Royal Family At daybreak on the morning of 29 November Confiance sighted a fleet under sail. By 8 a.m. Strangford was back on the sloop and could confirm the Portuguese fleet was coming downriver. On board the Hibernia, Smith observed the Portuguese ships ‘coming to sea at 11.30’. Hibernia shortened sail and ‘made various signals to the Squadron’. Unsure of Portuguese intentions Smith took no chances and prepared his fleet for action. The Bedford ‘answered signal to prepare for action [and] formed line of battle ahead of the Hibernia’. The Elizabeth cleared for action at 11.40 a.m. and Foudroyant answered a signal ‘to prepare to salute [and] to prepare for battle, beat to quarters [and] cleared ship for action’. The signal to prepare for action was also recorded in the logs of London, Marlborough, and Monarch. The Plantagenet log records Marlborough making a signal at 6 a.m. informing the squadron seven sail were coming out of Lisbon. At 8 a.m. the Plantagenet observed they were part of the Portuguese fleet and at 10 a.m. ‘cleared ship for battle’.60 The fleet was carrying the Portuguese Royal family as they commenced their voyage to Brazil. On board were the contents of the treasury, the bureaucratic infrastructure of the Portuguese state and a host of individuals fleeing the city; possibly up to 15,000 people. The fleet comprised the Principe Reale (84); the Conde Henrique, Medusa, Principe de Brazil and Rainha de Portugal, (74s); and the Alfonso d’ Alberquerqe, Don João de Castro and Martim de Freitar, (64s). The frigates were: Minerva (44), Golfino (36), Urania and an unnamed ship (32s). Three 20-gun corvettes and a 12-gun schooner completed the naval part of the flotilla. Remaining in the Tagus were 20 Portuguese vessels including the 74-gun Vasco de Gama, which, although undergoing repairs, was nearly ready for sea. Smith stated that another three 74s including the Maria the First were ‘mere hulks and the one on the stocks the Principe Regente is only in frame’; five frigates and corvettes also left were either unserviceable or in need of repairs (see Appendices V and VI).61 In order to guarantee the Vasco de Gama and any remaining ships a safe passage, Smith was anxious to take possession of Fort Bugio at the mouth of the Tagus which he thought ‘tenable against all that can be brought against it for a long time’. Again, Smith realised the forts were the keys to the Tagus but the Portuguese refused his request and, as his squadron had not forced the Tagus, this circumstance was not covered by the convention of 22 October. Accordingly Smith detached the marines of the London, Hibernia and Marlborough ‘to obtain possession by


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force or otherwise’ of the forts ‘during the momentary interregnum or cessation of all authority’. But on the night of 30 November a gale blew up and the marines were recalled to the fleet. Smith felt the frustration of his plan, as it would not be practical ‘when the fort is garrisoned by the French without a series of land operations’.62 Prince João had been caught between two menacing forces: invasion by land or assault from the sea. Portuguese policy had always hoped appeasing Napoleon would remove the spectre of a French invasion. The Regent accepted any concession to France but, as Francis notes, ‘not to tolerate an invasion of his country, and he stuck to his point’.63 So many times before the threat of French military action had failed to materialise, but now a combination of factors forced the Prince to make a firm decision. The shock of finding out Napoleon really did intend to remove the House of Braganza from the Portuguese throne; the threat Lisbon might be destroyed by a French attack and the pressure, backed up by thinly veiled threats of Lisbon becoming another Copenhagen, applied by Smith, all helped push the Prince into activity. The precise catalyst for the evacuation was, however, the arrival of Junot’s army at Abrantes on the morning of 24 November, where a permanent bridge of boats provided the last crossing point on the Tagus 75 miles away from Lisbon.64 After consulting his ministers João followed the course of action he had already stated many times to Britain: evacuation to Brazil. Dealt a poor hand, João had played what advantages he had rather well. Time and distance provided warning of a French advance while support and threats from Britain were offered in equal measure. By buying time João had kept his options open right to the last minute. Junot had reached Ciudad Rodrigo on 19 November and found further orders to hurry onto Lisbon. Napoleon’s concerns again centred on the belief British troops were on their way from Copenhagen to Lisbon and the Regent was simply trying to buy time for this movement to be completed.65 As they approached Lisbon, Foy later recalled, the French were in good spirits; they realised if the Portuguese were going to put up any resistance they would have done so at Abrantes. Pushing on towards Lisbon, the van of Junot’s force reached Sacavem, two leagues from Lisbon, at 10 p.m. on the evening of 29 November. The next day, 1,500 French troops, the vanguard of Junot’s force, entered the city unopposed. These men ‘were in bad order and worn out with fatigue’, Junot was ‘at the head of the skeletons or rather the wrecks of his four picked battalions’.66 Oman has argued there was ‘certainly no example in history

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of a Kingdom conquered in so few days and with such small trouble as was Portugal in 1807’.67 Despite the ease of the invasion Junot had missed his main target of the Portuguese fleet and as a result he also missed his chance to gain a marshal’s baton. Aftermath of the Portuguese Evacuation Anxiety had been increasing in Britain over the probable outcome of the Portuguese crisis. In late November Lady Bessborough lamented ‘All Port Drinkers are groaning over the fate of Portugal’.68 The Duke of Northumberland, believing the situation was so bad it could only get better, was concerned Strangford had not been able to ‘write me a single line these two months’. He had feared the want of exertion on the part of the government had presented Bonaparte with an opportunity of seizing the Portuguese fleet.69 The apparent lack of Government activity also brought criticism from Auckland who informed Grenville there had been ‘uneasiness approaching to consternation in the Cabinet on learning that the Russian squadron had got in’. He bemoaned ‘in truth the measures of “the vigorous Government” have in this affair been inexplicably late’.70 According to The Times of 18 December important intelligence was circulated that the ‘PRINCE REGENT and government of Portugal had at length been driven to the expedient of emigrating from their country’. All uncertainty was removed on Saturday 19 December when news of the evacuation was published.71 On Monday 21 December The Times provided details of a communication from the Admiralty made on the afternoon of 19 December describing the events. ‘Lord Strangford’, it continued, ‘has discharged the arduous and delicate duty imposed upon him with honour to himself, and in a manner worthy of the Sovereign he represents’. Readers were assured the ‘Russians remained idle spectators of the embarkation, and no act of hostility took place between the Russian and English ships of war’.72 Canning was certainly overjoyed when he heard the operation had been a success. He wrote to his uncle ‘Huzza! Huzza! Huzza! We have saved the Portuguese Royal Family and the Portuguese navy...Denmark was saucy and we were obliged to take her fleet. Portugal had confidence, and we rescued hers, and will protect her’. Relieved the Russians were ‘quiet spectators of the whole transaction’, he displayed his natural aggressive spirit: ‘I wish they would come out’.73 On the following day the King congratulated Canning rejoicing ‘at the escape of the Royal family


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of Portugal from the clutches of the French and no less the removal of the Portuguese navy from their reach’. With the Portuguese now on the way to Brazil, he also noted it would lead to ‘the opening of new and very extensive channels of commerce for England’.74 It appeared Canning’s direction of policy was a key factor in the successful outcome and Richmond wrote to ‘sincerely congratulate you on the success in the Tagus’. It gave him great pleasure that Strangford, a fellow Irish peer, ‘who is I understand a very young man seems to be a very promising recruit to your services’ had conducted the business in ‘a masterly way’. ‘I cannot allow myself to receive an envelope, with your name in the corner’, Harrowby wrote to Canning, ‘without thanking you for the delicious moral it contain’d. It will make us eat our mince pies with double relish, & Buonaparte’s Bologna sausages sit heavy on his stomach’. Portugal had been ‘an object of great anxiety, knowing nothing of what had been, or could have been done – but the result which we now know is the strongest of all’. George Rose, MP and Treasurer of the Navy, wrote to Canning congratulating him on the evacuation wondering if it might be one of the most important events of the war.75 Despite the four ships-of-the-line and five frigates left behind in Lisbon the evacuation removed the majority of the Portuguese commercial and military marine from the reaches of France. Although France gained the port of Lisbon it was virtually useless without an active naval squadron to exploit its proximity to British trade routes and on this point Seniavin had already displayed his intention to remain neutral. As Herbert Richmond noted, ‘a base without a fleet is as useless as a sentry-box without a sentry’.76 Smith himself had recognised the ‘necessity of preventing the Tagus becoming the central position of a French naval force to be created by the simple change of the colours on board the Portuguese fleet’.77 For Pocock it was ‘a repeat of Nelson’s rescue of the Bourbons from Naples in 1798 on an oceanic scale’. British success would have been complete if the remaining ships could have been destroyed.78 Richmond correctly states ‘But for all the haste with which Junot moved Napoleon’s design was forestalled, as it had been at Copenhagen, by Britain’s sea power’. ‘By these two actions at Copenhagen and Lisbon the Cabinet deprived Napoleon of the service of no less than twenty-five capital ships. Even if some of them were old, this was no inconsiderable force; it was a force which Napoleon greatly desired to acquire’.79 With the crisis in mainland Portugal resolved, in late December a British expedition under Beresford headed for Madeira. As he approached

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the island Beresford despatched a frigate to gather intelligence. On 23 December he learned the inhabitants had spent the previous two months preparing for a British attack; ‘very considerable’ works had been constructed to defend Funchal, the regular garrison had been increased and the militia called out. By 1 p.m. on 24 December, Beresford’s force of the Centaur, York and Captain, (74s), and the 64-gun Intrepid, with the Africaine, Alceste, Shannon and Success frigates under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, was clearly in position to mount an attack on Funchal. Beresford was aware news of the evacuation of Lisbon had arrived on the Island a few days before causing all the defensive activities to stop. His intelligence now reported the people were not ‘disinclined to receive the English’. He called upon the governor, Pedro Fagundes Bacellar d’Antas e Meneres, to surrender the island. This was agreed and British troops were landed. The articles of capitulation were signed by Meneres and Beresford on Boxing Day 1807, Madeira was to be kept by Britain until Portugal, and the Regent, were free from control or influence of the French.80 Despite the success at Lisbon and Funchal, the task of securing British maritime security was not complete. Measures had to be implemented to blockade the nominally hostile Russian fleet remaining in the Tagus. In the aftermath of the Portuguese evacuation, Smith was faced with a dilemma: it was essential to provide an escort for the Portuguese fleet transferring the Regent to Brazil but the Russian squadron necessitated a Royal Navy blockading force. To implement the former duty, on 5 December Smith directed Captain Graham Moore (brother of Sir John Moore) of the Marlborough to proceed to Brazil with the ships Bedford, London and Monarch. Moore was to protect Portuguese territory and provide visible support to the Portuguese government. Smith would then send frigates and smaller vessels to enable Moore to protect British trade while attacking the commerce of France and her allies. Moore was provided with the option of reducing his squadron to three line-of-battle if it were adequate for these objects, because if a substantial enemy force were directed to South America from Europe an appropriate British force would follow it. On 6 December Moore, with the nominal rank of Commodore, joined with the Portuguese fleet headed for Brazil.81 Severe storms hit the convoy on the 8th and again on 11 December during which Bedford and the principal Portuguese ships carrying the royal family were separated from the main force. On the afternoon of 22 January after a voyage of eight weeks the Regent reached All Saints Bay on the


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coast of the Brazilian province of Bahia. He expressed great thanks for the service provided by Bedford, which had assisted the Portuguese ships during the storms. The other British ships Marlborough, London and Monarch had arrived at Rio on 17 January. Bedford escorted the Portuguese ships down to Rio, arriving there on 7 March and finally joining with the rest of the British squadron and the Portuguese convoy.82 Unlike the crisis of 1806 the danger facing Portugal in 1807 was real. Napoleon had clearly outlined his intentions to close Portuguese ports to British commerce and utilise the Portuguese navy for offensive operations. Having crushed Austria, Prussia and then Russia he also had the opportunity to use military force to extend his Continental blockade to the extremities of mainland Europe. Intervention in Portugal also provided cover for the reformation of a troublesome French ally: Spain. Finally, control of the Iberian powers would provide Napoleon with access to their South American possessions and a source of commerce and hard cash. For Britain, the Portland administration had reacted swiftly to prevent France gaining additional naval forces. The unexpected arrival of the Russian fleet, however, added another complication to frosty relations with St. Petersburg and almost left London back at square one: as 1807 drew to a close there remained a threat to maritime security in the Tagus. The French were in possession of one of the best natural harbours in the world with suitable facilities for repair and victualling naval forces, and Junot’s army, once recovered, would be available for maritime-based operations. The French position in Lisbon, therefore, posed a threat to British interests in the Mediterranean, the West Indies, South America and the perennial danger of a French landing in Ireland. This threat to British maritime security had to be negated by a strict blockade of the Tagus. Yet, in commercial terms the operation to transfer the Portuguese government to South America, as Castlereagh had hoped, was a fabulous opportunity for British trade to gain legitimate access to the region without the need to intervene militarily while preventing Napoleon from laying legitimate claims to the region. These two fundamental strands of British maritime strategy, blockading enemy ships in Europe to protect overseas trade, were at the centre of the Portland administration’s policy as 1807 ended and a new year began. …

10 THE BLOCKADE OF LISBON

The Portland Cabinet had not been responsible for the British expeditions that had met with repulse and humiliation at Buenos Ayres and Constantinople - yet they had to deal with the fallout. Where they could claim credit for the successful exercise of British maritime power, the Cabinet’s swift and decisive action at Copenhagen, it had provoked considerable anger across Europe. The operation to evacuate Lisbon had also been a success, but had illustrated the limitations of pure naval forces acting alone. Despite the success at Copenhagen and Lisbon, historians agree the wider strategic situation remained pretty bleak.1 With Austria and Prussia out of the war, Russia allied with France, Portugal occupied by Junot and Spain falling under gradual French control, Britain’s only remaining European allies were Sweden and Sicily. Hence, there was little chance of any of the major European powers facing up to French control of western and central Europe.2 All this left Britain, Richmond succinctly argues, ‘practically singlehanded in the great struggle’.3 Now in possession of a central strategic position at Lisbon and with naval forces at Cadiz, Napoleon could potentially utilise his 80 sail-of-theline, currently collected in various ports along the European coastline, for a number of objects. Access to both Iberian ports might solve the age-old French problem of dividing their naval forces between Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets and therefore serve as the assembly points for the collection of sizeable fleet concentrations. Lisbon and Cadiz were the traditional maritime gateways to South America and hence the threat of French and Spanish maritime intervention in that region was enhanced. Napoleon might use also naval forces to launch an invasion of the British Isles, or for an offensive thrust into the Mediterranean. Finally, and un-

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derlying all the above, while France and Spain retained naval forces there was the danger they would take Napoleon’s Continental Blockade to the logical next level by attacking British commerce overseas, and French access to Lisbon and Cadiz, both adjacent to the vital trade routes to the West and East Indies and South America, posed an acute threat.4 The danger posed by French naval forces moved from the theory to reality in early 1808 when, taking advantage of a gale which blew the blockading Royal Navy squadron off station, the Rochefort squadron under Admiral Allemand put to sea and entered the Mediterranean with five ships-of-the-line. On his way to Toulon, where he anchored on 6 February, Allemand seized one Portuguese and six British merchant ships. Now falling under the command of Admiral Ganteaume, a squadron of ten ships-of-the-line, three frigates, two corvettes and seven armed transports carrying munitions, provisions and French troops set sail on 7 February. Just over two weeks later on 23 February Ganteaume arrived off Corfu (handed over to France by Russia at Tilsit) and landed the reinforcements and stores. With his departure delayed by contrary weather, Ganteaume hauled anchor on 23 March and, sailing by Sicily and the North African coastline, anchored in the safety of Toulon harbour on 10 April. Collingwood had given chase but for a number of reasons, including poor weather and the failure of his frigates to pass timely intelligence, had missed the opportunity to catch Ganteaume. Although Collingwood deeply regretted not bringing Ganteaume to battle he was at least satisfied his enemy had not achieved much of note.5 During these years of isolation and faced with resurgent French naval activity and the economic effects of the Continental blockade, Britain reacted to, rather than shaped, events. Yet, in reacting, ministers in London did have a coherent response: they would continue to wage an allout maritime war for national survival.6 In this sense the value to Britain of the successful operations at Copenhagen and Lisbon now became patently clear. French naval plans had to be neutralised by the continued blockade of enemy ports. The removal of Danish and Portuguese ships added little to the capabilities of the Royal Navy but did damage Napoleon’s plans for naval aggrandisement. Moreover, removing the threat at source also removed the requirement for a Royal Navy blockading force, thereby freeing up naval resources for other operations. Where there were enemy naval forces, such as at Lisbon with the arrival of the Russian ships and at Cadiz and a number of other ports, French and Spanish naval forces would be block-

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aded thereby protecting the flow of British overseas trade which was vital to the British economy and war effort. But, as we have seen with Allemand’s escape from Rochefort and Ganteaume’s cruise into the Mediterranean, the system was not infallible. Hence there was the requirement to hunt down enemy naval forces when they managed to put to sea, as indeed Collingwood had done. Although Collingwood had failed to bring Ganteaume to battle his pursuit pressurised the latter into returning to Toulon without causing much material damage to British interests. After Trafalgar Britain was certainly dominant at sea but the Royal Navy did not always have everything its own way. It was not a complete ‘command of the sea’; instead British naval power provided a workable command of the sea (based on battle, blockade and denying France additional naval power) as a means to an end. This allowed existing British trade to prosper and provided the security to open up new markets thereby maintaining the economic well being of the nation. The Royal Navy also provided the means for maritime expeditionary warfare and here ministers found a more vexing problem, for collecting enough troops together to provide the land contingent to react to strategic necessities was problematic. In early 1808, thanks to Castlereagh’s reorganisation of British strategic commitments, a body of troops were available for overseas operations. On 1 February he noted an extra 22,000 men could be added to those available for military operations. He now wanted a rapid reaction force totalling 30,000 men with sufficient transports to be based at Cork, the Downs, Harwich and Portsmouth. Out of this total, a force of 10,000 men would be reserved for overseas service. Castlereagh assured his colleagues he would not release any transport tonnage until the Cabinet had decided on a strategy for the coming year.7 This, of course, was the key issue as the strategic options for ministers were extremely limited, hence British maritime expeditionary warfare, combining both land and seapower, would be limited to restricting the spread of French power on the periphery of Europe.8 The problem with this strategy was that the key partners, Sweden in the Baltic and Sicily in the Mediterranean, were both lightweight compared to the military might of France. It could be argued they were both in fact security risks to Britain as they required British money, ships and troops for protection.9 Supporting any state that opposed France was, however, important to Britain for as Castlereagh recognised ‘our character is most deeply involved in not abandoning Sweden in favor of separate objects’. ‘What


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was at stake’, Muir and Esdaile have noted, ‘was Britain’s very credibility as an ally’.10 In the Baltic the first commitment was financial as Gustavus IV of Sweden was paid £1.2 million to continue fighting France. But supporting Sweden had further problems, for not only was Gustavus mentally unstable but Britain risked incurring greater hostility from Russia. The situation between Gustavus and Russia degenerated into a RussoSwedish war in February. The second British commitment was a squadron under Admiral James Saumarez sent to the Baltic on 20 February to protect Sweden, though he was delayed in sailing until 24 April.11 The reason for the delay was the addition of 10,000 troops under Sir John Moore who, it was hoped, could garrison Gothenburg freeing Swedish troops to undertake operations against the Russians and hence avoiding direct Anglo-Russian military conflict. Moore was specifically ordered not to operate under Swedish command. Yet, at the same time Saumarez was sent further instructions confirming that whilst his main object was to help defend Sweden, he was also to seriously investigate the possibility of destroying the Russian Baltic fleet based at Kronstadt to prevent France utilising this naval force.12 The implementation of the Baltic expedition was a disaster. Saumarez arrived off Gothenburg on 7 May with Moore joining him ten days later. Moore clashed with Gustavus over the employment of the British expedition leading to Gustavus ordering Moore’s arrest; the latter evaded capture to return to England with his force. The fundamental problem was ministers were unsure of how to deal with Sweden and Gustavus. As an advocate of war with France Gustavus was potentially a useful ally, but this opened up the problem of further antagonising Russia as reflected in the orders sent to the respective British commanders. As Hall has argued, ‘Britain’s Baltic strategy was falling between two stools’, Moore could not fight the Russian land forces but Saumarez could engage the Russian fleet. The removal of Moore’s force from the Baltic signalled an end to offensive operations in the region. For the remainder of the year British activity would be restricted to naval operations by Saumarez’s squadron.13 To the south, British strategy in the Mediterranean would also be defensive for on the last day of 1807 Castlereagh had concluded ‘the present state of the continent, is strongly against undertaking any offensive operations in that quarter’.14 Sicily again remained at the forefront of strategic thinking in January though Castlereagh noted with troops re-

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quired for other operations the garrison would be limited to 16,000 men.15 Collingwood, off Syracuse in February, voiced his concerns regarding French activity on the mainland which pointed to a possible attack. Collingwood also drew attention to the very poor state of the Neapolitan forces on Sicily.16 Throughout early 1808 the Cabinet remained worried about the French threat and considered reinforcing the island but the Sicily garrison remained constant (numbering 16,185 effectives on 1 April).17 Certainly, as recent events had shown, Napoleon coveted Sicily but his plans for conquest were delayed as he looked to the East and the Ottoman Empire.18 Yet, garrisoning the island and providing naval protection to deter a French invasion was a necessary burden for Britain as Sicily, and indeed Malta, were essential to projecting maritime power in the western and eastern Mediterranean.19 Further to the west there remained unresolved issues in Iberia. Accurate intelligence from Spain was at a premium and at least one attempt was made to introduce a British agent, James Burke, into the Spanish court at Madrid.20 Spain had certainly supported the French invasion of Portugal as agreed in the Treaty of Fontainebleau, but was uneasy about the presence of French troops in Portugal and those poised at Bayonne. Yet, the Spanish government’s apparent willingness to turn against France, most recently displayed in 1806, left room for long term optimism on the part of British ministers.21 What they knew only too well, however, was while Spain was an ally of France there remained a naval threat in the region. A French squadron of five sail-of-the-line, Neptune (80), Algésiras, Argonaute, Héros, Pluton (74s), with the Cornélie frigate and a brig corvette, were still blockaded in Cadiz by Rear Admiral Purvis.22 While Cadiz was uppermost in ministers minds Spanish naval forces at Ferrol, Vigo and Cartagena were also kept under blockade.23 One of Castlereagh’s pet schemes was for an attack on the Spanish fortress of Cueta in Morocco, a plan already considered the previous year. Cueta dominated the Barbary coast, a vital source of victuals for the Royal Navy squadrons blockading Cadiz and Lisbon. On 29 December 1807 he wanted ‘a discretionary instruction’ sent to Moore to attack Cueta if on arriving at Gibraltar he found his force was not required at Lisbon. Ministers were already planning an operation in the River Plate (see Chapter 11) and the force for this service would be sufficient to reduce Cueta on the way to South America if Moore could not seize the fortress.24 Spencer’s force, originally destined for Sicily via Lisbon and which had been delayed in sailing, was also now available for operations.


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Castlereagh thought French forces in Spain might attack Gibraltar or Cueta and hoped Spencer could make a swift, decisive pre-emptive attack on the latter, garrison the fortress and proceed to Sicily. If Spencer found the fortress too strong he was to proceed to Gibraltar where ministers hoped to base a strategic reserve of 9,000 men. On his way to Cueta, Spencer was to call in at the Tagus and examine whether his force was sufficient to occupy the Tagus forts ‘to facilitate the entrance of His Majesty’s fleet with a view to the capture of the Russian squadron, together with the remaining ships of the Portuguese navy’.25 By 30 January Castlereagh had added Port Mahon, Minorca, to the list of objects that Spencer was to examine. It was also made clear to Spencer that he was to position his forces to allow them to be withdrawn and redeployed on another service.26 The Blockade of Lisbon There remained unfinished business at Lisbon, for having succeeded in ‘persuading’ the Regent to sail for Brazil with his fleet British ministers were still faced with a threat in the Tagus.27 The presence of Seniavin’s Russian ships in the river seemed a suspicious event perhaps designed to coincide with the arrival of the French. It was widely believed Junot had been expected to utilise the naval forces at Lisbon to make a landing in south-west Ireland, repeating the achievement of 1796 when the Brest fleet of 17 ships-of-the-line and 13 frigates had actually managed to transport 18,000 French troops to Bantry Bay but could not land them due to poor weather. In early 1808 it was believed a repeat of this project had been deferred due to the failure of Junot’s force to capture the Portuguese ships in the Tagus.28 In fact, as we have already seen, Napoleon did have plans to utilise the naval forces in Lisbon for offensive operations hence Sir Charles Cotton would continue the blockade instigated by Smith throughout 1808. The blockade of Lisbon was a vital part of British strategy; neutralising French maritime forces in Europe allowed the Royal Navy a free hand in projecting British maritime power on a global scale. In late 1807 Canning had ordered the Admiralty to increase Smith’s force to match the combined strength of the Portuguese and Russian fleets. After the Portuguese had evacuated Lisbon Smith divided his force to continue the blockade and to provide a safe escort for the Portuguese royal family. With a diminished fleet in late December 1807 Smith had been ordered, in his own words, ‘to seize and send into port

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all Russian ships of war and merchant vessels’.29 Reinforcements were on the way. On 11 December 1807, before the news of the successful evacuation of Lisbon arrived in England, Cotton hoisted his flag at Spithead on the Minotaur (74) and took in with him the Antelope (50) and Nautilus (18) sloop. His force was increased by the frigate Nymphe (36) and Milbrook schooner (12) on 19 December. On the following day this fleet, convoying 62 transports containing Spencer’s troops, finally put to sea.30 Unfortunately, the fleet was hit by a gale on 28 December and completely scattered, Cotton himself heading for Falmouth.31 On 7 January 1808 he received the Admiralty’s instructions of 28 December including a copy of Strangford’s letter detailing the arrival of the Russian squadron in the Tagus and a report intimating the Russians may be short of provisions.32 Two days later he received a duplicate of the Admiralty’s orders of 1 January detailing him to secure or destroy the Russian ships. Cotton received further orders on 9 January instructing him to take possession of the Burlings Islands, several fortified islets lying off Peniche, and to garrison them from his squadron.33 Cotton did not put to sea again until 10 January, nearly a month after he had received the Admiralty’s original orders. After a swift passage he arrived off the coast of Portugal on 14 January, joining Smith at the mouth of the Tagus the next day. In addition to the Hibernia, Foudroyant, Ganges, Conqueror, Plantagenet, Minotaur, Nymphe, and the Talbot, the Defence and Alfred (both 74s), and Agamemmon and Ruby (both 64s) strengthened the squadron. Cotton forwarded to the Admiralty a list of the Russian ships in the Tagus on 17 November 1807. On this date Admiral Seniavin’s force comprised four 80s, four 74s, one 64, and two frigates. An additional squadron of two 80s, two 74s with a frigate and a sloop were expected to arrive off the Tagus after passing Gibraltar. With the French in possession of the Tagus forts Cotton’s squadron was not strong enough to force the river, and his actions would have to be confined to blockade.34 As the senior officer in the fleet, Cotton shifted his flag into the Hibernia. Smith remained with the squadron contrary to his orders to escort the Portuguese court to Brazil, a decision the Admiralty later approved. Cotton now had to find Smith a suitable ship and the ‘ensuing friction’ between the two men led to ‘outright disagreement’ over the condition of the ships in the squadron. Smith initially moved into the Minotaur but she was in need of repair, and he thought wholly unfit for his rank. On 18 January a gale further damaged the Minotaur and Smith


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moved into the Foudroyant, taking the ship to Gibraltar in late January for repairs.35 Krajeski has criticised Smith for ignoring orders when it suited him and that some ‘of his actions while off Portugal implied that he wanted to reap the credit for what had transpired there since November’.36 Certainly, one admiral was enough for a squadron of this size. There remained a distinct possibility of naval action in the Tagus. On 24 January the Russian squadron was moored and fitting out for sea, though it was not yet ready to come out of the Tagus.37 According to Foy when Junot arrived these ships were actually moored in order of battle behind the bar but there was little cooperation between the supposed allies; ‘Seniavin was a Muscovite of the old stamp, who spoke no language but that of his country. His officers loudly censured what they called the infatuation of their Emperor for Napoleon’. Of the 20 Portuguese ships left behind, in the best condition and soon fitted out for service were the Vasco de Gama and the Maria the First, three frigates, and seven lesser vessels. Such preparations were, however, hampered by the exhaustion of naval stores to fit out the fleet that had sailed for Brazil and the evacuation of the majority of sailors and officers with the Regent. Despite the non-cooperation of the Russians and the problems with the Portuguese ships, Junot succeeded in organising ‘a small squadron, which, though not capable of venturing to sea, assisted in preventing the English from forcing the bar of Lisbon’.38 In this situation Cotton objected to the Admiralty instructions to send three ships onto Purvis Cadiz, instead keeping his fleet together off Lisbon.39 Plans for a Maritime Convention Alongside the naval blockade to neutralise Junot’s force and the Russian ships in the Tagus, there was a plan to put certain proposals to Seniavin, Junot and the Portuguese Regency Council (comprising five nobles presided over by the Marquis of Abrantes), left behind by the Prince Regent to govern Portugal in his absence. Schneer has argued these plans were at the core of the Convention of Cintra, which would later cause so much controversy in Britain.40 At Cintra, Junot’s army would be granted the same rights as were offered in these earlier plans to the Russian fleet in the Tagus. The details of this scheme were later raised in the House of Commons during February 1809 with regard to the Convention of Cintra. Lord Henry Petty stated:

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It appears that so late as the year 1807, it had been suggested by Lord Strangford, that it might be possible to reduce the Russian fleet by blockade, to such a state as would in all probability lead to a maritime convention. This was followed up by a letter from the Admiralty to Sir C. Cotton, authorising him to conclude a maritime convention upon the terms in which this convention was concluded.41 As Schneer argued, ‘no one knew that the much criticized treaty concluded with the Russians had been authorised in Whitehall nine months before’ the signing of the Convention.42 The plan, as developed by Canning, was actually a response to intimations from Strangford and Sousa. They surmised, as had Campbell in 1804 and McKinley in late 1807, that a blockade of the Tagus would cause great distress in Lisbon. Portugal was an importer of foodstuffs, in particular African and American grain, fish from Newfoundland and meat from the Azores. All of this trade could be stopped by a British blockade. On 25 December 1807 Canning outlined to Castlereagh certain proposals to be put to Junot and Seniavin. The first argued the distress in Lisbon could be alleviated by relaxing the blockade ‘on condition of the French General consenting to withdraw his army from Lisbon’. The blockade might be suspended altogether ‘on condition of the French evacuating Portugal’. Although Canning was ‘without any very sanguine hope of the success of any such proposal’, he thought Cotton ‘should be instructed to make this conditional proposal – either to the Regency of Portugal, or directly to the French General’.43 Relying on information from Strangford, Canning wrote to Castlereagh suggesting ‘a proposal for the surrender of that fleet upon honourable conditions might be listened to by the Russian Admiral’ due to the privations of the blockade. If the fleet was surrendered ‘the officers and men shall not be considered as prisoners of war – but shall be conveyed to Russia by the earliest opportunity, at the expense of Great Britain’.44 Horward has argued Cotton received a secret dispatch from the Admiralty containing Strangford’s report and was instructed to open communication with Seniavin.45 Similarly Krajeski has emphasised Cotton received ‘several dispatches from the Russian minister in London addressed to Seniavin and for the Russian minister in Lisbon’, and he used these as a ‘pretext for opening communication’.46 In fact, as would be expected in a parliamentary government, this plan had been outlined by


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Canning in London. He believed the French would not allow Cotton to communicate with the Russian fleet and therefore forwarded the dispatches mentioned in the Admiralty instruction to Cotton to be conveyed to the Admiral who could then pass them to Seniavin under a flag of truce.47 In a third letter of 25 December, Canning responded to a representation from Sousa claiming there would be a great number of Portuguese persons, many of them officers and men of the Portuguese army, who would wish to flee to Brazil if the opportunity arose. All they needed was transportation. Canning wanted transports stationed off Porto or Viana in the north and Lagos in the south, for the purpose of carrying off any Portuguese who wished to emigrate. Sousa had drawn up a proclamation, which he hoped would be distributed along the coastline of Portugal to inspire the inhabitants to leave the mother country and head for the new seat of government in Brazil. Canning forwarded this proclamation to Castlereagh to convey onto Cotton.48 After consulting the King, it was left to Castlereagh to forward two separate communications to the Admiralty with regard to the first two of these proposals.49 On 28 December, secret instructions were transmitted from the Admiralty to Cotton: The Rt Honble Lord Castlereagh, one of His Majesty’s principal secretaries of State, having transmitted to us an extract of a letter to His Lordship from Mr Secretary Canning, suggesting in consequence of information received from Lord Strangford a mode of procuring the surrender of the Russian fleet to His Majesty, and his Lordship having at the same signifies to us His Majesty’s pleasure that we should issue such orders as we might think most likely to effect this desireable object, We transmit to you herewith a Transcript of the extract of Mr Secretary Canning’s letter above referred to, and do hereby require and direct you to take such measures as you may judge most proper towards carrying His Majesty’s pleasure on this subject into execution.50 On 29 December the Admiralty expanded on the initial orders sent out to Cotton: …the delivery of the accompanying Packets (which were received from Mr Alopeus, the Russian minister at this court by Mr Secre-

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tary Canning) addressed to Admiral Seniavin and the Russian Consul General at Lisbon, may be the means of opening a communication for the purpose of making the proposal above mentioned. Cotton was allowed to take such measures as he thought ‘expedient for the delivery of the said packets, and to avail yourself of the opportunity to convey to the Russian Admiral a proposal for the surrender of the fleet to His Majesty on the condition referred to in our order aforesaid’. He was also ordered to distribute Sousa’s proclamation inducing Portuguese naval and military officers and men to flee to his squadron. In another order of 29 December, in response to a letter from Castlereagh and perhaps acting on the advice proffered by McKinley, the Admiralty instructed Cotton to blockade the ports of St. Ubes and Porto and to ‘stop all neutral vessels destined for these ports’.51 Strangford, now in London, voiced his concerns over the situation in the Tagus in a memorandum to Canning of 18 February 1808. He wanted the British minister appointed to the Brazils, a post that he indeed wished for, to call in at Lisbon on his way to South America. Rather naively, he believed using a flag of truce the minister could communicate with the Portuguese Regency. The object was to persuade the Portuguese ‘the true and sole origin of the calamities which now desolate Portugal, is the presence of a French army and a Russian squadron’. Upon the ‘retreat of the French troops beyond the Portuguese frontier and the surrender of the Russian ships, the admission of provisions into the port of Lisbon would be restored, and it’s inhabitants be suffered to renew their accustomed relations of commerce with England and the Brazils’. Although Strangford did not envisage much success, he hoped an ‘official representation’ with a ‘due appearance of studious solicitude for the independence of Portugal’, would prevent Napoleon from ravaging the country.52 Off the Tagus in late January, Cotton enacted his orders attempting to open up an avenue of communication with Seniavin but, at first, failed. He informed the Admiralty ‘all intercourse with the squadron under my command’ was ‘entirely forbidden’ by the French. Cotton hoped Captain Erskine of the Defence would be able to pass a message to a Spanish or Portuguese officer while conveying Spanish prisoners to St. Ubes. This plan failed when the Defence was detailed to investigate several strange sails. Due to the poor weather in the Tagus at the time of year Cotton found it impossible to carry out the Admiralty’s orders re-


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specting the Burling Islands. With a dangerous lee shore he found it difficult blockading the Tagus during the winter months, a point repeatedly made by Smith in 1807. A north north east wind acting in concert with a lee current temporarily drove the squadron off their station. Aware of the wider naval situation, Cotton was worried the French Rochefort squadron might escape and attempt to join with the Russian ships in the Tagus.53 On 31 January a boat bringing two English nationals, John Carpenter and William Ford, came upon the squadron. They had remained in Lisbon to collect debts after the evacuation of British nationals and now provided Cotton with copies of various edicts and decrees issued by the French. While his force recovered from the privations suffered on the march to Lisbon Junot appealed to the inhabitants of the city not to fear the French forces but to remain calm, arguing the Regent had sacrificed the interests of the population for his own escape. By 14 December, with his troops rested, Junot’s confidence grew and he took the initial repressive step of prohibiting the population from assembling. The merchants also brought news of Seniavin who had offered any remaining English nationals a place of retreat and protection from the French. The Russian squadron had ‘on board some English families:- the Russian officers are by no means on terms of friendship with the French’. In fact relations were worsening between the French and Russians as the former complained of the latter’s consumption of provisions. In Lisbon the Portuguese were ‘extremely dissatisfied’ and they reported the city had only enough wheat to last until March.54 The situation in Lisbon had remained remarkably calm. After his arrival Junot had granted the Regency Council a degree of respect while his forces recuperated. He had divided his army into three corps to exercise control over the country; the main French force remained in the vicinity of Lisbon with further divisions situated around Porto in the north and Setuval in the south. Junot could not afford to lose control of the situation while his forces were thus dispersed. Then, in late December 1807, with his forces not only rested but concentrated, Junot seized control of the government, on 1 February suppressed the Council and replaced the flag and arms of Portugal with the symbols of the French Empire. The Portuguese army was reduced from 37 regiments of cavalry and infantry to 6 foot and three horse, 5,000 men were amalgamated into the French army and 8,000 men were sent to Bayonne (of which 2-4,000 men deserted on the march through Spain). The remaining troops were dis-

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banded. To pay for the conquest and the reforms, on 23 December Napoleon imposed an indemnity of 100 million francs on the country.55 Informed of these developments on 31 January Cotton managed to pass a letter to Seniavin.56 While waiting for a reply, on 2 February he received additional intelligence from nine people who had escaped from the fort of St. Julien. They informed Cotton of Junot’s seizure of power, his self proclamation as Governor General of Portugal and the receipt of 4,000 French reinforcements. This seemed a clear signal that Portugal, similar to other conquered territories such as the Kingdom of Naples, would be turned into another French satellite state. Further intelligence regarding the dispositions of the Russian fleet reached Cotton on 7 February from McKinley now back on active duty in the Lively (38) and who had carried out a reconnaissance of the Tagus. He observed eight large ships-of-the-line and a frigate drawn up in a line between Cassilis point and Belem with a line-of-battle abreast of the arsenal and two frigates at Belem; all were flying French colours (and were presumably the refitted Portuguese vessels mentioned by Foy).57 Despite the reports from Carpenter and Ford regarding Seniavin’s reluctance to assist the French, Cotton remained unsure as to the Russian’s real disposition. Some illumination came on 7 February when two Russian officers, accompanied by a French officer, came upon the squadron under a flag of truce. Seniavin had received Cotton’s letter of 19 January and had sent the two officers. One was Le Conseiller de Cour Poletica, ‘a person who possesses all my confidence, and whom I have charged to receive all letters to my address’, Seniavin stated. Seniavin confirmed all the previous intimations of his character, stating ‘that I am not less afflicted at the actual state of the relations between our two august courts - Those regrets can not be otherwise than reciprocal, between two nations who have so long been accustomed to esteem each other’.58 While one of the Russians distracted the French officer the other passed on important information. From this conversation Cotton found the Russians ‘to be extremely dissatisfied with their station’. They were ‘subject…to the immediate control of the French. Who have possession of all the Old Batteries on the banks of the Tagus and are daily erecting new ones’. He concluded ‘however disposed the Russian officers might be to quit the Tagus the thing was not practicable, closely watched as they are by the French’. Here again, control, or lack of it, of the Tagus forts was a critical factor influencing the situation in the river.59


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With regard to Strangford’s plan for the starvation of the Russians the two officers provided worrying intelligence: the Russian fleet was not short of victuals and actually carried supplies for at least ten months.60 Furthermore, as Foy noted, Junot had procured 10,000 barrels of flour from Cadiz to provision the forts and vessels and to make a reserve supply of 500,000 rations of biscuit; ‘daily subsistence was secured, without its being necessary to resort to any extraordinary measure’.61 As Krajeski has noted this news ‘made capitulation of the Russian squadron unrealistic without the use of force’.62 It also supports Napier and Fortescue’s assertions that Strangford’s plan never had any chance for success. With little hope for an immediate Franco-Russian maritime capitulation Cotton voiced optimism on one point: there remained the possibility of a Portuguese uprising. With the Russian fleet and the French army provisioned they might not care too much if the Portuguese populace starved and with the Portuguese already deeply unhappy at French occupation it might be possible for the Royal Navy to covertly initiate an uprising in Lisbon. Cotton had therefore distributed pamphlets to the Portuguese urging them to quit Lisbon and to flee to the safety of the fleet. But, he lamented, the effect had been ‘trifling’.63 In fact Junot, although isolated in Lisbon, had been making the best of his situation. With plentiful supplies from the arsenal and a ready supply of labour by the spring of 1808 his army had recovered from the forced marches of November 1807 and was in a state of military readiness. He could now muster 24,000 French, 15,500 Spaniards and 5,000 Portuguese with which to defend the country. Of this force around 15,000 French were available for field operations. Junot had deployed his troops to reinforce French dominance over the Portuguese and prevent insurrection while sealing off possible landing points for a British expeditionary force. French engineers had strengthened the Tagus forts and batteries installing long-range mortars and furnaces for the heating of shot thereby keeping the Russian ships under guard and, perhaps, dissuading a British attempt to force the river.64 Junot had moored the Russian and refitted Portuguese ships across the Tagus to protect the entrance to the river and hoped to utilise the ships for offensive operations. Horward asserts that Junot contemplated interfering with the dispositions of the British squadron by sending vessels down the Tagus until the plan was scrapped once Cotton received reinforcements. Krajeski has argued the aggressive French naval plans ensured Cotton’s blockade ‘would not go unchallenged’ and Cotton had

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to ‘employ aggressive naval tactics to contain Junot and maintain the blockade’s viability’. Although Seniavin’s squadron was involved in the defence of the harbour, he refused to land marines to strengthen the garrison of Lisbon; although allied with France Russia had not declared war on Portugal. Junot also pressed Seniavin to sail from the Tagus and attack Cotton, but as Foy notes, ‘Neither for the purpose of attack nor of defence, could the French reckon upon the aid of any force but their own’.65 Collingwood now provided useful information to Cotton regarding Seniavin’s character. Writing on 1 February he thought Russian Admiral ‘a good kind of man – perhaps not very brilliant and as obstinate as a Russian can be, he hates the French – and never yet was near them without dispute, and quarrel – at Corfu they were bickering all the time’. He also expressed his disappointment at Cotton’s appointment: ‘I wish you had something more promising before you than the blockade of the Russians at Lisbon’. Knowing the depth of Seniavin’s anti-French feelings Collingwood was concerned Cotton could not enhance his reputation as he was ‘convinced they never will come out’.66 On 9 February Cotton received further intelligence regarding the situation in the Tagus from McKinley and Captain Smith of the Nautilus. This was not much different from before but all of the Russian ships were now observed to be lying above Belem. The report from Captain Smith contained more valuable information regarding the French dispositions in Portugal and Spain. Napoleon was expected to arrive in Bayonne near the border with Spain, which was an indication as to French intentions in the Iberian Peninsula. Smith then gave the strength of Junot’s force in Lisbon as 28,879 infantry and 3,653 cavalry. In Spain Dupont had 23,979 infantry and 3,121 cavalry while Moncey’s force comprised 17,983 infantry and 3,330 cavalry. It was expected the French forces in Spain would be augmented to a total of 140-150,000 men. The objectives of this force were to place a strong garrison at the fortress of Cueta and to undertake a siege of Gibraltar. He also expressed the opinion the Spanish nation was apathetic to the French forces now stationed in their territory. All this created an air of unease for the future of Franco-Spanish relations.67 Cotton now decided it was safe to send McKinley in the Lively to take possession of the Burling Islands. McKinley approached the islands on 12 February in company with the Viper (14) schooner and called on the main fort to surrender. After receiving the garrison’s refusal, the order


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was repeated, whereupon the fort ‘hoisted Portuguese colours and fired’. McKinley returned fire upon which ‘they struck their colours’. Foy, playing down this action, calls the Portuguese troops ‘invalids’. Cotton then garrisoned the forts, which he considered ‘strong and well situated’, and placed Lieutenant George Huskinson of the Royal Marines in command. Unfortunately, McKinley dashed Cotton’s hopes the islands could provide fresh water for the squadron; he had found a spring but it could only supply about a butt of water per day.68 The aggressive blockade of the Tagus continued. On 13 February Captain Yeo in the Confiance, which was closer to Lisbon than the main part of the squadron, thought he saw the Russian squadron preparing for sea. Seeking confirmation he sent in two ships boats under the command of the master’s mate Robert Trist. Upon entering the Tagus this force encountered a French gunboat at anchor off fort St. Pedro, between the forts of Belem and St. Julien. According to Yeo’s account, Mr Trist ‘instantly boarded in a most gallant manner’ the gunboat and ‘after an ineffectual resistance on the part of the enemy captured her’. This was certainly a remarkable achievement as the force on the French gunboat numbered 50 men and Trist was accompanied by only 16 sailors. The ship turned out to be La Cannonier No. 1 armed with one 24lb gun and two 6lbrs and detailed to protect the Tagus fishing vessels. Such smallscale operations were symptomatic of the aggressive ethos of the Royal Navy, whether in boat work, blockade or fleet actions. Moreover, such operations were carried out where possible by Cotton to gain intelligence from Lisbon and information regarding the Russian fleet while providing some interference with French attempts to strengthen their naval position in the Tagus.69 Cotton received the Admiralty order confirming his position as Commander in Chief of Royal Naval forces from Capes Finisterre to St. Vincent on 18 February. Three days later he reported on French propaganda circulated by Junot declaring the Prince Regent had ‘renounced all his rights to the sovereignty of this Kingdom’. Echoing Napoleon’s famous declaration in the Paris Monituer Junot stated the ‘House of Braganza, ceases to reign over Portugal’. In its place the country would be administrated and governed by the French through a Council of Government.70 Realising naval forces must possess the ability to project power ashore in order to be truly effective, the Cabinet in London had tried to ensure troops were available to Cotton. Spencer’s force had finally put to sea for the second time on 21 February heading for the Tagus. He came upon

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the blockading squadron five days later and transferred to the Hibernia to converse with Cotton. On the same day Cotton received Admiralty orders instructing him to send Spencer onto Gibraltar if his force could not be productively employed off the Tagus. Castlereagh had directed Spencer to consider an attack on the Russian ships in the river but thought it was probably too large a task for his 5,000 men. With Junot having 36,000 French troops in Portugal, 16,000 of which were stationed in and around Lisbon, Cotton and Spencer agreed an attack was impractical. Spencer also confirmed Junot had succeeded in strengthening the forts: St. Julien and Cascais contained 156 guns, there were another 43 in Belem and Bugio, and a further 183 along the Tagus. As Spencer did not expect any assistance from the Portuguese inhabitants in an attack, Cotton informed the Admiralty it was not possible ‘from the existing state of things to employ the force under Major General Spencer with any effect in offensive operations in the Tagus’. On 16 March Cotton received the Admiralty orders of 22 January enclosing the instructions for Spencer detailing him to proceed to the Spanish fortress of Cueta and examine the possibilities for an attack.71 Spencer sailed onto Gibraltar and on 18 March discussed the options with the Governor of the rock, Sir Hew Dalrymple. Both men agreed the fortress of Cueta was too strong for Castlereagh’s envisaged coup de main.72 Smith, who had opened the Admiralty instructions to Spencer of 22 January containing Castlereagh’s secret orders of 15 January, had also reached a similar conclusion.73 With such a small force under his command there was little Spencer could achieve in the region. He remained at Gibraltar awaiting reinforcements which might provide the opportunity to undertake offensive operations. In May he received instructions to join with Purvis off Cadiz to investigate the possibility of attacking the French ships sheltering there.74 It was also known to Cotton that several British nationals were serving as officers in the Russian fleet. With the two countries now supposedly at war this situation could not continue. He wrote to Seniavin on 29 February requesting such officers be conveyed to the blockading squadron, arguing there should be no obstacles to this as Russian officers serving in the Royal Navy had been allowed to resign their commissions. Cotton ended his private letter by thanking Seniavin for protecting the British subjects that had sought shelter on his fleet.75 Seniavin replied on 7 March apologising for the delay as Cotton’s letter had been detained, presumably by the French. With regard to the


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British officers only seven remained on board Russian ships: Rear Admiral Alexander Grieg, the Commander in Chief of Russian forces in the Ionian Islands prior to Seniavin’s arrival, William Krove and Robert Elphinstone both Post Captains, Commander Thomas Chandler, Lieutenant Samuel Moffet and two men called Birt and Lind who were Surgeons. Seniavin was unable to comply with Cotton’s request, however, as on 22 February he had received instructions to remove these officers and send them overland to St. Petersburg ‘after having expressed to them the kind thanks of the Emperor My august Master for the services which they have rendered’. Seniavin made it clear to Cotton all the officers ‘will soon be on their road furnished with every necessary for their safe conveyance’. He was pleased to report all the officers had received ‘marks of honourable distinction’ from the Czar and they were to be withdrawn to prevent embarrassment in the present state of affairs between the two countries. By 4 March Cotton could inform the Admiralty all British officers in the Russian squadron had resigned their commissions.76 The sloop HMS Swallow (18) joined Cotton’s force on 5 March in company with eight victuallers carrying around five months supply of provisions. There remained a problem sourcing fresh water. To replenish the squadron Cotton had to detach a ship-of-the-line thereby reducing his force. In the early days of March he was unwilling to do this as reports had reached Cotton ‘of the enemy’s intention to put to sea’; but by mid-March he was receiving reports of ‘little cordiality’ between the French and Russians, which, if true, reduced the possibility of a combined enemy force putting to sea. Cotton’s predicament was alleviated to some extent on 13 March when the Elizabeth re-joined the squadron. Previously on 8 March Cotton had sent home the Minotaur after he had taken the Resolution (74) under his command. This enabled him to send Alfred to the Bayonnes to collect much needed supplies of water for the squadron.77 On 29 March a vessel flying the Portuguese flag came out from the Tagus and joined the blockading squadron. On board was Mr Satarro, formerly the agent for supplying British ships with provisions. Now he was acting as commissary to the French. After boarding the Hibernia he explained the object of his mission was to gain permission for the importation of flour into Lisbon to feed the Portuguese population. He argued the French had secured a supply for themselves which would last around six months but the supply for the populace could only last for a further two to three weeks. Cotton flatly denied this request, as it was in direct

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contradiction to his orders. Satarro then asked permission for a number of merchant vessels carrying several Portuguese nobles on board, to leave the Tagus and sail for Britain. Cotton acceded to this second request but only on the condition the ships were thoroughly examined upon exiting the river. News of these developments was forwarded to the Admiralty with additional information regarding to the enemy forces in Lisbon. There were 15,000 French troops in Lisbon and its environs and the Russian ships lying in the Tagus, according to Cotton’s judgement, did not ‘indicate a disposition to come from thence, but remain as when last reconnoitred’.78 This important intelligence arrived at the Admiralty on 9 April and was forwarded to the War Office.79 Krajeski has argued Castlereagh had seen Cotton’s dispatch of 29 March and ‘subsequently drafted a detailed memorandum for the admiral. Essentially, Castlereagh used Satarro’s request as a catalyst for negotiating the surrender of Seniavin’s squadron’.80 Horward has similarly argued the receipt of the information regarding Satarro’s requests led to the Lords of the Admiralty resolving ‘to use the opportunity to open negotiations for the surrender of the Russian squadron’.81 In fact the Cabinet viewed Satarro’s request as a means with which to follow a policy already decided upon. After laying Cotton’s letter before the King, Castlereagh wrote to the Admiralty with amended orders for Cotton. He was instructed to open a communication with ‘the existing government at Lisbon, in consequence of the application made to him thro’ Mr Sataro [sic]’. It was not clear from Cotton’s dispatch on whose authority Satarro was acting when he asked for the importation of flour into Lisbon. Castlereagh thought it wise Cotton should communicate with the Portuguese Regency, the Portuguese military commander, Admiral Seniavin and Junot. Cotton was to impress upon the Portuguese the British blockade was solely a measure of self-defence as the French occupation of Lisbon now threatened the British Isles with invasion. Any suffering of the population in Lisbon was due to the French presence; hence Britain was motivated to alleviate this perceived suffering by offering to end the blockade in return for a French capitulation of their maritime forces.82 Although Castlereagh drafted the convention that Cotton was now to offer to the French, Russians and Portuguese, the terms had in fact been already laid out by Canning in his communications with Castlereagh in December 1807. Britain wanted the Russian ships in the Tagus to be


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delivered to Cotton and held as a deposit until six months after the conclusion of a definitive peace between Russia, Sweden and any other powers. Seniavin and his men would be returned to Russia without ‘any condition or stipulation respecting their future services’. All enemy merchant vessels in the Tagus would be taken as deposit and returned to their rightful owners at the conclusion of peace. Neutral ships would be allowed to sail with their cargo for Britain or Brazil but would be subject to examination either by Cotton or upon reaching their destination. In return Cotton would allow the entry of provisions into the ports of Portugal. Castlereagh was concerned Seniavin would not consider himself in a position to negotiate a surrender of his fleet. In this case if all the other points were agreed upon Cotton could conclude a convention excepting the articles relating to the Russians but Castlereagh accepted this arrangement would ‘still render it necessary to maintain a large force off the port of Lisbon to watch the Russian squadron, to the manifest detriment of other important services’. Cotton was to consider this latter arrangement only as a last resort ‘in the event of the failure of the more general surrender of the maritime means collected in the Tagus’.83 While ministers decided upon policy in London, Cotton was faced with a further problem. Perhaps due in part to his distributing pamphlets, a number of Portuguese nationals had fled Lisbon seeking refuge with the British squadron. On 5 April he had dispatched 173 refugees to sail to England in the Hindustan only for a further 175 to arrive two days later. Again, Cotton resolved to transport them to Plymouth. Most of the refugees were members of the Portuguese armed forces or the professional trades who had not fled to Brazil in November 1807. The influx posed several problems. They were extra mouths to feed and water, a major consideration for a squadron on blockading duty. Cotton could not decrease his force and had to wait for merchantmen to convey the refugees to Britain. Some of the refugees were Portuguese officers and the captains of the fleet complained to Cotton of the expense incurred in having to entertain these men. Compounding Cotton’s problems on 25 March the Milbrook was wrecked on the Burlings Islands. Although the crew was saved, this loss impaired Cotton’s ability to enforce the inshore blockade that relied on small, fast manoeuvrable ships.84 It was not until late April that the flow of refugees slackened. On 11 April Cotton had received an edict dated 5 April, signed by Junot, which stated any British ships entering the Tagus, even if they were under a flag of truce, were to be fired upon. Anyone fleeing from Lisbon to the

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squadron but captured by the French would be imprisoned for at least six months and possibly face the death penalty. These terms would be applied to persons either assisting others to leave Lisbon or inciting revolt among the populace. Hence Cotton remarked on 16 May there had been very few refugees arriving at fleet during the preceding three weeks. Such measures implemented by Junot could have prevented Cotton from gaining any independent knowledge of events in Lisbon or opening up a communication with the French or Portuguese. Yet, as Harriot Slessor noted, the lure of a ‘good fee’ ensured there was some information passed between the Portuguese and the British fleet.85 The aggressive blockade continued. On the evening of 23 April an attack by ships boats from Nymphe and the Blossom (18) was launched upon the Garrota brig corvette under the command of Lieutenant Lebland-Plasson. This was a 20-gun vessel manned by 150 Frenchmen and now lying above Belem. Two previous attempts had not even reached the brig and now, approaching with 150 men in eight boats, Captain Conway Shipley of the Nymphe had decided to personally lead the attack. Pulling against the tide, Shipley found the Garrota to be additionally defended by a floating battery of 24pdrs. The British force boarded the French vessel only to be repulsed as Shipley was killed. Several of the British boats fell foul of each other in the confusion that followed the loss of their commander as fire from the floating battery and the guns in the fort of Belem killed two and wounded another two members of the attacking party. The boats retreated to their ships.86 The gun-brig Cheery (12) arrived off the Tagus on 27 April carrying the important instructions Castlereagh had forwarded to the Admiralty. Cotton was ‘immediately to open a communication by a flag of truce with the existing government at Lisbon’. Communication was to be made with the civil government, the Portuguese military commander, Seniavin and Junot. In the light of the recent French edict Cotton was not optimistic about the feasibility of contacting the French and Russians or even the populace of Lisbon. Cotton, like Smith in November 1807, decided to use Portuguese fishing vessels as a means to contact all the groups mentioned except the French command. He was pessimistic about the chances of success noting ‘there is nothing like any authority existing in Lisbon either civil or military, but what is immediately under the command of General Junot’. Cotton decided to distribute a proclamation throughout Lisbon, which would allow him to judge the disposition of the parties. According to Krajeski he wanted to pressure the au-


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thorities in Lisbon from below by appealing to the general populace. In the pamphlet he communicated British policy: the blockade of Lisbon was a measure of self-defence designed to prevent French forces from using the Tagus as a base from which to launch an invasion of the British Isles. Cotton offered an option to resolve the privations Lisbon was suffering, which would entail the ‘most liberal terms of Maritime capitulation, by which the blockade may be removed and the people entirely relieved from distress’.87 The British strategy of blockading enemy naval forces in their European ports was largely a success. At Lisbon the Russian ships and those Portuguese vessels left in the river, if not negated, posed a threat to British trade routes to the West Indies, East Indies and the Mediterranean. Cotton’s blockade removed the threat such ships could post to British overseas interests at source. This was entirely in accordance with traditional British practice; enemy squadrons were concurrently blockaded along the French and Spanish coasts. The system was not infallible, but it worked, as any that did escape were vigorously pursued. This had more than a defensive effect. Cotton’s blockade of the Tagus, Purvis’ blockade of Cadiz, Saumarez’s presence in the Baltic and Collingwood’s deployment in the Mediterranean plus the other British squadrons blockading enemy ports all removed enemy naval forces from the seas allowing Britain to exercise a workable command of the sea to further the prosecution of the war by expanding overseas maritime-based commerce. We shall shortly return to Cotton and the situation in the Tagus but only after examining the wider effects of blockading enemy naval forces in Europe to provide a safe overseas environment for the free flow and expansion of British maritime trade by returning to the controversial and tangled web of British South American policy. …

11 THE PORTLAND MINISTRY AND SOUTH AMERICA IN 1808

While ministers tried to resolve the situation in the Tagus during the spring of 1808, the vexed question of South America remained on the political agenda. As with the Talents South American policy, historians have tended to dismiss the Portland government’s strategy towards South America in 1808, regarding it rather fortunate military commitments to the region were not undertaken.1 Of course, with the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious a commitment to South American operations would have limited the British ability to react to the Spanish uprising of May 1808. Yet, as we have seen, ministers had already considered the options available in South America and decided on a strategy of spreading British trade and influence rather than direct military intervention. The military option only returned to the agenda as Spain fell under French military and political influence increasing the likelihood of Napoleon laying claim to all of Spanish Latin America and the prospect of direct French intervention in the region. British ministers had good reason to be worried. In the Convention of Fontainebleau France and Spain had agreed the King of Spain would become Emperor of the two Americas. The colonies, islands and overseas possessions of Portugal were to be divided between the two allies. During the early months of 1808 French policy towards Spain became increasingly belligerent. Troops occupied ever more Spanish territory culminating in Napoleon’s declaration of 24 February denouncing the Spanish Royal Family. As relations degenerated the Spanish court made a half hearted attempt to flee after which it fractured between the supporters of Charles IV and Godoy, and those who supported Charles’ son Ferdinand, who argued for a Francophile policy. With the nation slipping

THE PORTLAND MINISTRY AND SOUTH AMERICA IN 1808

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towards outright revolt against Charles and Godoy, it was Ferdinand who maintained the support of the army and acceded to the Spanish throne on 19 March following Charles’ abdication.2 With enhanced influence over Spanish affairs Napoleon hoped to utilise the links between the Old and New Worlds as the whole of the Spanish Empire was now, at least theoretically, at his command. In April he asked Decrés to employ a few brigs and frigates off the coasts of Mexico, Cayenne and the River Plate. The aim was to introduce agents into Mexico and Montevideo to inform the Spanish Americans of the transfer of power in Madrid. Napoleon believed the population would be delighted at the potential advantages of a Francophile policy.3 On 11 May Napoleon was thinking of mounting an expedition to Montevideo to ship arms to the Spaniards. With a squadron stationed at Montevideo, the French would possess an excellent base for future operations in the region. On this point, Napoleon inquired exactly how many French ships Decrés had actually despatched to Spanish America.4 A second letter followed the very next day, ‘I think that you comprehend my system of war’, he informed Decrés, ‘England this year has borrowed billions. It should be harassed with expenditure and tiredness’ achieved by basing French commerce raiding squadrons in South America to interdict British maritime trade. One crucial component, so Napoleon thought, was the force in Lisbon, now numbering three battleships, three frigates, and nine Russian ships.5 Later in May he inquired if Junot had the necessary ships, transport tonnage and plans and charts to commence an expedition to Brazil, if of course he could evade the British blockade of the Tagus.6 During the summer of 1808 Napoleon’s head was full of various plans to seize South American territory, Mexico, Havana and the Philippines.7 A New British Strategy? For ministers in London the transfer of the Portuguese government to Brazil presented a glorious opportunity. The uprising against British forces of 1806 had shown it would be impossible to conquer territory, thereafter the main object was not large-scale military conquest, but to ‘occupy strategic points from which to establish commerce with Spanish America…in this way British influence could be established without requiring the burdens of direct rule over the whole continent’.8 Hence by 1807 the strategy of conquest had been abandoned. According to Muir, ministers ‘decided to attempt to forestall the French by reviving their

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South American strategy in a different form’ to foster unrest in the Spanish colonies.9 Ministers had also considered placing a Bourbon on a South American throne but the establishment of a friendly government in Brazil opened up a range of options including the potential for developing that country as an entrepôt for British trade into the wider region. With this in mind it was vital to ratify the Anglo-Portuguese convention of 22 October 1807. Canning had delayed the process due to objectionable clauses inserted by the Portuguese. The evacuation removed such obstructions and the convention was ratified on 4 January 1808. With the tedious negotiations out of the way Canning indulged the Regent granting João £20,000 credit in London while £80,000 in gold was to be shipped to Brazil to help in the establishment of the new Portuguese government.10 It was also important for Britain to have a presence at the new court of Portugal and Francis Hill, formerly Secretary of the British legation at Copenhagen, was appointed Secretary of the Legation to the mission to the Court of Portugal and the Brazils on 16 January. Canning informed Hill he was to act as the British chargé d’affaires until the arrival of the British Minister. Hill would sail with the gold but was to make clear the money was to be repaid out of any loan Sousa managed to raise on the credit of the Portuguese court.11 As for diplomatic representation, on Christmas Day 1807 Canning rebuked Fitzgerald, who had been lobbying for the mission to Brazil, informing him the King had approved of Strangford’s nomination for that post, and ‘signified his approbation in so strong a manner as to leave on my mind the conviction that His Majesty, would not have approved of any other choice’.12 Portland now suggested a mark of Royal favour would add additional weight to Strangford’s mission, stressing the ‘advantage which would be derived to the management of your Majesty’s concerns at the court of Brazil by his returning there with the decorations of the Order of the Bath’. Portland was ‘aware of the impression which such marks…never fail to make on the publick mind in foreign courts’ and Strangford duly received this honour on 16 March 1808 (though, as we shall see below, he did not actually sail until April).13 Where British trade went it had to be protected by force and, of course, such forces could provide passive, or perhaps, offensive assistance to the new seat of Portuguese government. On 25 January 1808 Smith was ordered to proceed to Brazil as Commander-in-Chief of a squadron that would eventually be increased to six ships-of-the-line. For the time being he was to take two ships-of-the-line and the sloop Confi-


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ance from the squadron blockading the Tagus and to proceed to Rio or the nearest port on the Brazilian coast to the seat of Portuguese government. His object was to remain in Brazil ‘for the permanent protection of the coasts of the Portuguese dominions’. Canning stressed to the Admiralty the delicate nature of the political situation between Britain and Brazil while negotiations were progressing in London for the establishment of commercial treaties and this information was forwarded to Smith. Hence Smith was warned to preserve the strictest discipline with regard to intercourse between the inhabitants of the Brazils and the crews of all British ships; Brazil was an attractive proposition for sailors wishing to desert and the resultant problems might have impacted upon the negotiations. The British Minister appointed to Brazil would have to ‘obtain the full and undivided confidence of that sovereign’ so Smith was instructed ‘to take particular care to communicate on all points relating to the interests and protection of the court of Brazil with H.M. minister resident at that court, and to attend to his suggestions in the execution of the important service hereby entrusted to your care’. It is clear that from the outset Smith, with a history of independent action, would be subordinate to the British minister at the Brazilian court.14 With a maritime commitment to protect British trade and assist with the security of the Portuguese government, the Portland Cabinet, like the Talents before them, did, initially, consider the options for a British military expedition to the region. In essence, Brazil could be utilised as a launch pad for providing direct assistance to the forces of independence in the Spanish colonies. Imperial conquest was not now the British aim, instead the objective was to seize, or gain access to, maritime bases.15 As early as 20 December the Duke of York was arguing for Britain to obtain a South American port.16 Next day Castlereagh quizzed selected members of the Cabinet regarding South American strategy. With over 20,000 men at Sicily but no plans for offensive operations in the region and it becoming increasingly clear Spain was subject to French occupation he looked to British operations in the River Plate. Importantly, Castlereagh had looked into the official records and read Campbell’s ‘able paper on the Brasils’ from 1804. He agreed with Campbell’s concerns that France would attempt to found an empire in South America utilising the Spanish colonies. The link between Spanish imperial and domestic issues was obvious and Castlereagh wanted to pre-empt French plans to utilise her erstwhile ally by examining the possibility of setting aside 8,000 men to seize Montevideo. Alternatively, 5,000 men could be stationed at Buenos

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Ayres to assist the Portuguese in securing their vulnerable southern border and ‘influence’ any changes in the governance of Spanish America. British troops would establish a commercial post for manufactured goods in a region with 4 million Portuguese and 10 million Spanish inhabitants. Portland and Camden approved of the plans and hoped other members of the Cabinet would agree.17 Lord Liverpool certainly did, having the idea of recapturing Montevideo and presenting it to Brazil.18 There was another factor at play. A clash between HMS Leopard and the USS Chesapeake on 22 June 1807 had been only the most obvious manifestation of degenerating relations between Britain and the United States. The affair had its root cause in disagreements over the impressment of British nationals on board American ships and the seizure of American ships trading with the West Indies. US President Thomas Jefferson responded with the Embargo Act, passed by Congress on 22 December 1807, which forbade all American trade with Britain and France. Before news of the act reached London George Rose had already submitted a long memorandum to Canning on Christmas Day 1807 arguing, as a sensible precaution in case of a rupture with America, Britain could use Brazil to introduce manufactured goods into Spanish America. Rose submitted further ideas to Canning on 31 December 1807 and 26 January 1808.19 In this complex strategic situation the Portland Cabinet, like their predecessors, turned to Wellesley, who again acted as a special advisor on military matters. After examining the official papers relating to South America, on 8 February he submitted a memorandum to the Cabinet. Pointing to the failures of 1806-1807 he argued attempts to conquer the region would fail: ‘the only mode in which they can be wrested from the Crown of Spain is by a revolution and by the establishment of an independent government within them’. It was a common belief the new seat of Portuguese government would encourage the Spanish colonies to fight for independence but Wellesley had not seen any proof in the official papers of a desire from the Spanish colonies to break with Madrid, but he thought it probable some yearned for independence. As a first step he recommended Britain should secure Buenos Ayres to enhance Brazilian security. Finally, he thought an attempt against Mexico required too substantial a force and would be difficult to defend against possible American aggression in that theatre.20 Of course, policy towards South America was one of a number of strategic issues discussed within the cabinet during the spring of 1808.


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Set against the background of military requirements for the Baltic, Sicily and other various operations, on 2 April Canning penned a memorandum probably designed for circulation prior to a Cabinet meeting. In it he turned his thoughts to the potential benefits offered by intervention in the region. Agreeing with Castlereagh he argued ‘South America has been too much irritated to be immediately attempted – time and conciliation must be applied to them’. He had conversed with the Duke of Orleans ‘on the subject of a former plan of mine for placing some of the Bourbon family on a Throne in America’, noting that the ‘Bourbons can never make peace with the usurper of their Throne, this makes them ours’. Despite Wellesley’s advice he hoped attention could be moved from South America northward to the province of Mexico where Canning wanted to ‘create a government…that cannot fail being dependent upon Great Britain’. Such a change in policy would have several benefits: ‘Mexico cannot become a maritime power, either for war or commerce’, therefore ‘England would have the carrying trade of it’. British intervention would also prevent American aggrandisement in the region for ‘If England will not assist Mexico in these objects, America will force her into Independence, and herself become the carriers’. This was an important consideration set against worsening Anglo-American relations due to the British enforcement of the Orders in Council. Hostilities between London and Washington were certainly not inconceivable. In this case, Canning thought, British intervention in Mexico might inspire Louisiana to join with Britain as ‘they hate the Americans’. Seizing Mexico, whether by force or installing a Bourbon on the throne, would also help protect British possessions in the West Indies from American encirclement. Canning hoped the ‘expedition for Mexico should commence preparation and sail in August’.21 Canning’s plans had a long-term object: British commercial dominance of the South American continent. The reasons were obvious: faced with the Continental blockade, lacking Continental allies, an embarrassment in Sweden, stalemate at Lisbon and unable to collect sufficient forces to attack Spanish possessions, Britain did not have any strategic or commercial openings in Europe. But now, with a friendly government in Brazil and the potential for stirring up trouble in Spanish America, Canning thought Britain must look to the Americas for allies, though in the context of degenerating Anglo-American relations this policy was not without risk. In his remarkable memorandum he envisaged British control of global commerce. Russia had voiced concerns

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Britain was pursuing an imperialistic policy while the Continental nations bled themselves white fighting France. All this was to Britain’s advantage and would lead to British dominance of global trade. It was a belief not without foundation for as Canning argued ‘England must see the necessity and the means of braving all the maritime powers of Europe’ in her quest for markets. ‘The system I have proposed’ Canning concluded: …makes England the carrier of the commerce of the continent of Europe, as, no other could, under the above circumstances, trade to the W. Indies and Spanish America but herself; this would annihilate the marine of all the powers in Europe, as, in a few years for want of employment, it would sink into insignificance. In this case ‘England would, by adopting these measures with prompitude and vigour, become mistress of the seas’. In this memorandum, Canning perceptively outlined and laid the foundations for the post-war situation, which would be dependent on the expansion of overseas commerce. Canning was also perhaps looking to a post-war situation in which British goods remained out of the European markets. Global operations to spread commerce were a real option for British ministers if there was no way back into European markets or if they decided to forsake European commerce and turn to the New World.22 Here is a clear statement of intent; British strategy was certainly to be ‘imperialistic’, but not in ‘realist’ terms of conquest. Britain’s position as the global superpower would be achieved by the spread of a ‘liberal’ maritime empire through commercial influence, or ‘soft’ power, facilitated by the world’s largest merchant marine and protected by the world’s largest naval force, the Royal Navy. This would provide the finance necessary to continue to fight Napoleonic France. Canning’s memorandum was obviously presented to the Cabinet because on April 10 Castlereagh submitted a further memorandum to the King in ‘compliance with the desire expressed at the last meeting of the Cabinet on the South American question’. This memorandum outlined the state of British forces at home and abroad and provided the Cabinet with information as to the force that would be available for overseas operations. On 1 April 1808 there were 114,445 men overseas and 198,656 stationed in the British Isles, giving a total force of 313,101. This was a vast improvement on the 265,827 total forces as stated on 1 January and is testament to Castlereagh’s efforts to improve manpower


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strengths during 1807 and early 1808. He concluded the army exceeded the total force required by 29,441 men, including 20,000 men set aside for operations. Accordingly an expeditionary force of 16,000 men, drawn from Gibraltar, the West Indies, North America, Madeira and from the troops in Britain, would be available to implement government policy in South America.23 With South American operations discussed and now clearly decided upon by the Cabinet on 17 April Canning finally informed Strangford he was to proceed to Rio de Janeiro as British Minister. The young diplomat would be isolated on the other side of the world so Canning provided precise instructions. He began by stating the benefits the Portuguese would find in Brazil as the transfer of government placed them in a ‘position perhaps even better calculated for extending and improving the intercourse of their respective subjects’. Canning stressed the need to look forward to the time when Brazil ‘shall have acquired strength and consideration far superior to that which Portugal enjoyed among the nations of Europe’. Strangford was instructed to give formal support to ‘this growing empire and…establish the relations of the two countries on a permanent footing of mutual cordiality and of equal and reciprocal advantage’.24 On this point he was instructed to conclude two treaties with the Brazilian court. The first would be a general treaty of friendship and alliance; the second would be a more specific treaty of commerce. Canning viewed the establishment of a friendly court in South America with optimism. British policy towards this area had been traditionally driven by economic factors; the markets of the area would be flooded with British manufactured goods in return for specie. This trade would always be balanced in the favour of Britain.25 Canning was not interested in embroiling Britain in Portuguese politics stressing the ‘general political relations of the British and Portuguese Monarchies are not altered by the removal of the Portuguese Government’. Strangford was not to negotiate on any political matters until the Regent was firmly established in Brazil ‘and until the fate of Portugal itself shall have been definitively settled’. Any negotiations and treaties would be solely conducted on commercial matters. Canning also brought up the subject of the Convention of 22 October 1807. It was possible the Regent might want to turn this convention into a public treaty, especially the unfulfilled articles. To this there would be no objection but Canning urged a note of caution that if such a treaty was to be agreed, Strangford should ensure all existing treaties with Portugal ‘however

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inapplicable they may be’ to the situation in Portugal and Brazil should be renewed.26 Canning also wanted a specific agreement on the future role of the Royal Navy squadron situated off Brazil. Originally there was no timescale for this squadron remaining in Brazilian waters and Canning was keen to ensure a continued naval presence in the area to back up British diplomacy. Strangford was provided with two options: he could stipulate it would stay for a fixed period subject to renewal on the expiry of this period or he could qualify a period of time by a ‘conditional expression’. Canning suggested an example of this latter option, ‘so long as HRH the Prince Regent shall continue to desire the presence of Hmy’s squadron, and as the various and important services of Hmy’s Navy shall enable Hmy to afford it’. In return for the security afforded by the squadron the Portuguese court must agree to the admission of all Royal Navy warships into Brazilian ports for repair and victualling.27 In a third and secret despatch of the same date Canning provided an overview of British policy. Brazil was now seen as the seat of Portuguese government and the economic reform of the much-neglected country was to be an initial object. Strangford was specifically instructed to ‘direct the attention of the Brazilian Government to the care and cultivation of those ample and improveable resources which it’s American Dominions afford’. With regard to Portugal, although Britain would not acknowledge the right of any usurper to the throne, she was not ‘prepared to engage for it’s restitution to it’s lawful sovereign’. Canning could not ‘imagine that there is any near prospect of the Prince Regent’s reestablisment there in perfect independence’. Any return to Europe would be based on a compromise with France and ‘must lead, after no long interval, to a recurrence of the same difficulties and dangers from which HRH has recently rescued himself by a noble effort’, an effort that would be very difficult to repeat. If the Regent wanted to return to Portugal then it would lead to ‘great mischief’ and such an outlook would ‘not fail to induce a comparative neglect of the internal resources of that country in which HRH now resides’.28 Canning wanted to exploit the commercial opportunities opened up by the transfer of the Portuguese government, recognising a ‘formal and definite agreement…is indispensible’, but was willing to give the Regent some time to settle in Brazil before pressing for firm commercial agreements. Hence any made ‘in the first instance’ should be general and agreed to by the Portuguese ‘without hesitation’ and should not extend to


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any other objects than those necessary for the immediate opening of Brazil to British commerce, subject to duties agreed on, although it was not necessary to fix a precise scale. Ideally Canning wanted ‘a distinct preference’ for British imports though this demand was not to be pressed too much. It would be sufficient ‘to stipulate reciprocally that each government should treat the other on the footing of the most favoured nation’. Despite this Canning was keen to dissuade the Regent from setting high duties; such a policy would eventually ruin Portuguese revenue, which ‘in a great measure depend[s] upon the import trade of the Brazils’. With the removal of Portuguese manufactures from the Regent’s influence there was no reason to repress the manufactures of Brazil so that those in Portugal could flourish. Instead, Brazil would benefit from a flourishing trade with Britain which would increase to ‘an almost unlimited extent, if the intercourse between the two countries should be wisely and judiciously placed on such a footing, as to induce the British merchant to make the Brazils an emporium for the British manufactures destined for the consumption for the whole of South America’.29 Many goods exported by Brazil, such as coffee and sugar, were similar to the staple exports of the British West Indies. This posed a problem. João would probably desire preferential agreements with his possessions in the Portuguese East Indies in a similar way that Britain treated the West Indies. Canning hoped to grant the same arrangement to the importation of British East India goods into Brazil as Portuguese West Indian goods into Britain. Therefore, he would only apply import restrictions on sugar and coffee. Other Brazilian exports, such as dye, tobacco, hides, drugs and cotton, would find unlimited markets in Britain while the requirements for naval stores such as hemp and timber was of increased importance given the situation in the Baltic. Canning was especially interested in the importation of Brazilian cotton; if imported in Brazil ships it would be granted the same duties as British ships, but Britain would desire a similar concession in Brazil. Canning hoped these measures would suppress ‘the existence in any quarter of a suspicion that this country might be desirous of depressing Brazilian navigation, for the purpose of extending her own’. One obstacle to a trade agreement with Brazil was the retention in British ports of several Portuguese ships. After comparing the value of the granting of cotton licences in Brazil with the value of these ships Canning did not see any advantage in condemning the latter as prizes and asked for advice from Bathurst, President of the Board of Trade, and Perceval, Chancellor of the Exchequer.30

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In yet another separate communication to Strangford, Canning stated government policy on a point requiring delicate consideration. Brazil was an excellent entrepôt for British manufactured goods to enter Spanish America. In fact an illicit trade between the two empires had developed over a number of years. But with Brazil and Spain now nominally at war Canning expressed concern over the ‘interception likely to be given to any direct intercourse between the South American dominions of Portugal and Spain’. Madrid opposed direct entry of British goods into its colonies hence Canning specifically argued the illegal trade should be encouraged. He presumed ‘the wants of the inhabitants of those [Spanish] provinces might induce the local governments to connive at a trade carried on with the port of the island of St. Catherines’. This illegal trade could be carried ‘either in Brazilian or even Spanish ships provided security from British capture were to be assured to them’. Canning thought it right Strangford be given the power to ‘grant licences, free of any expenses or charges whatever, to protect from British capture Spanish vessels or, if required, Portuguese vessels, trading between the ports of Brazil and the Spanish colonies’.31 This was not an isolated case as Russia, Sweden, Spain and even France all looked to the illegal import of British goods. While Canning looked to open direct commercial links with Brazil, Sousa remained in an obstructive mood. He was unwilling to grant export licences and argued for the punishment of Beresford over the occupation of Madeira. Of course Canning would not agree to this and Sousa eventually dropped the condition, but it caused a fourmonth delay in organising exports. Canning was also concerned about ‘half a dozen ulterior demands all of which, as I understand from your [Sousa’s] “Most Secret”, open note…are to be conceded to you exactly as you please to dictate them’. Canning had prevented the sudden export of goods from Britain to Brazil on the understanding the Regent would grant licences once settled into his new home. Already frustrated and angry, Canning informed Sousa it was ‘five months since I have seen my family, and after the fatigues of the last three months I had hoped to get a few days holidays during the recess. I have already lost about one third of it. If we are to go on discussing it all next week I must lose it all. What I beg therefore is a decisive answer’.32 If Sousa continued to be ‘impracticable’ Canning concurred with the opinions voiced by Bathurst and would:


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…tell Souza plainly that his licence is no longer wanted nor shall be taken for any thing ; but that the British Government will licence without scruple every export that the British laws do not prohibit; leaving his Government to act as they please. The only reason Sousa’s arguments regarding the limiting of licences had been adhered to was to prevent the overflowing of the Brazilian markets. The Portuguese would have then prohibited imports and caused goods to return to Britain in circumstances similar to the aftermath of the seizure of Buenos Ayres in 1806 when British goods flooded the market. Bathurst argued what is ‘most to be apprehended is the system of exclusive monopolies which existed in Lisbon, and may be revived in the Brazils’.33 Canning was convinced Sousa was ‘playing all sorts of tricks: and that he is in very bad hands. But I still think it important to manage him, if we can, and to get out of him the cotton licences by any process of wheedling or any reasonable degree of concession’. He thought the British seizure of various Portuguese ships and cargo since the closing of the ports in 1807 had been harsh on the Portuguese. The total value of the property detained was £306,500 of which £39,500 was from the ships and the remaining £267,000 from the cargo. Canning had attempted to gain the release of the ships and cargo but the ‘Admiralty has resisted this release so strenuously that I have three of four times returned to the charge and been driven back with loss’. The refusal made Canning ‘more disposed to say that all that has been captured subsequently to the emigration of the Portuguese court ought to be restored unconditionally’.34 British concerns over French intentions in South America heightened with Napoleon’s seizure of Charles IV. Portland wrote to the King on 21 April stating ministers had ‘long entertained the most anxious apprehensions that the growing influence of France must at no distant period give to that power the command of the wealth and resources of the Spanish provinces of South America’. Ministers had not previously considered loosening the ties between Spain and her colonies, but it was now ‘probable that the interval may be short between the seizure by France of the Spanish Government at home & the occupation by the same power of its colonies abroad’. The Cabinet viewed with alarm the ‘possible union of all the wealth and power both of the New and Old World concentrated in the hands of France & directed against…[British] dominions’. The question now was ‘what may be necessary to prevent the inordinate

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growth of a tyrannical usurped power’. The Cabinet were convinced ‘no time should be lost in exerting every endeavour to prevent the dominion of France from being extended over the Spanish colonies’. Portland hoped this could be achieved by impressing upon the Spanish colonies that their Sovereign had been betrayed with a view to precipitating an uprising against the French-controlled mother country. He urged for swift British pre-emptive action against the Spanish colonies to safeguard them from French attacks.35 After the tribulations of 1806 and 1807 the King was understandably cautious and asked for more detailed proposals, recognising the danger of sending forces to South America without clear aims and long-term objects. With the Cabinet desiring troops be withdrawn from Sicily and re-deployed in the Baltic, he expressed concerns over the number of men required for the expedition to South America, hoping a substantial force would not be needed to execute the plan ‘at a moment when it has been deemed adviseable to detail ten thousand men to assistance of Sweden’.36 The Situation in South America While Cotton continued the blockade of Lisbon, Canning engaged in commercial negotiations with Sousa, and ministers tried to balance a number of strategic options and pressures, Francis Hill arrived in Brazil on 9 March to find the Regent had opened his ports to commerce of all nations on 28 January. Less than a week later Sousa Coutinho, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, talked to Hill about the strategic situation in the region. Hill informed Canning the Portuguese ‘entertain sanguine hopes that the Spanish settlements in South America may be induced to declare in favour of the Prince Regent’. On 6 April Hill conversed again with Sousa Coutinho and informed Canning he had ‘scarcely sat down, when he began to converse upon the subject of the possessions in South America belonging to the Crown of Spain’. The main object of Portuguese policy, Hill now concluded, was to persuade the Spanish colonies to declare in favour of the Regent who would then become sovereign of the entire continent. The Portuguese would try fair means, but if this failed they would ask Britain for military assistance. Already they had sent a confidential person to Buenos Ayres to sound out the Spaniards, but Hill saw little chance of success. Hill deferred from commenting upon these plans until he received directions from Canning, although he failed to inform Canning of the full extent of the Portuguese designs. By


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2 June Hill was aware the officer sent to Buenos Ayres, Brigadier General Corredo, had returned to Rio. The Spaniards had informed him they feared a joint Portuguese and British attack but were unwilling to join with the Portuguese crown. Hill again deferred from expressing an opinion in case it was construed as official British policy.37 In the meantime Sir Sidney Smith in the Foudroyant had arrived at Rio Janeiro on 17 May, a full two months before Strangford was expected. After switching his flag to the three-decker London he gave a dinner on 4 June to celebrate the seventieth birthday of King George III. The majority of the Portuguese royal family, ministers and court of attended. The Regent expressed his gratification for the invitation and the presence of the British squadron. Smith cultivated the ‘most perfect understanding with every individual member of this government…for the advancement of the alliance and the good of his Majesty’s service’. He also reported the Regent thought the squadron essential to prevent the ‘arrival of any French force in the River Plate’ and would assist with keeping the ships in a proper state of health and efficiency.38 Strangford himself arrived in Brazil on 22 July 1808 after a voyage of 77 days. Two days later he wrote to Canning with the results of his first audience with the Regent on Brazilian soil. On the subject of a return to Portugal the Regent ‘conceived it to be a matter far beyond the range of probability’. He feared the ‘eternal alienation of Portugal from the House of Braganza’ and hoped Britain would realise her interests and security ‘required that the ports of Portugal should not be left in the power of France’. Strangford was specifically requested by the Regent to emphasise his willingness to help Britain in any attempt to free Portugal from France and in return ‘there was nothing which he was not ready to cede to Great Britain’ for the attainment of this object.39 The Portuguese government had expressed a desire to take advantage of the confusion and disarray in Spain to expand the Brazilian frontiers at the expense of Spanish South America. Portuguese plans to expand the southern borders of Brazil had long been voiced and would dominate Brazilian policy for the next twenty years. In 1675 the limits of the province of Rio were defined as reaching the River Plate. Three years later the Portuguese sent an expedition to occupy ‘their’ territory, settling at Sacramento, opposite Buenos Ayres. During the following decades the Spaniards launched several attempts to destroy the settlement, finally succeeding in 1704 although it was restored in the treaty of Utrecht of 1713. The 1750 Treaty of Madrid granted Sacramento to Spain, but the

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Portuguese did not evacuate it and Pombal denounced the treaty in 1761. During the Seven Years War Spain again ousted the Portuguese but the Treaty of Paris returned the colony to Portuguese control. The Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1777 put Sacramento, and control of the River Plate estuary, back in Spanish hands.40 Such plans were given enhanced clarity and focus with Brazil now at the centre of the Portuguese state and on 25 July Strangford outlined official Portuguese policy to Canning. The Portuguese argued their plan for seizing Spanish possessions along the River Plate was designed to pre-empt any French attempts to do likewise. Although Sousa had apparently tried to negotiate with the local Spanish commanders (as communicated to Hill in March) this approach had failed and Strangford concluded the Portuguese would use force to achieve their aims. The Spanish colonies were a vulnerable and tempting target, hence the Portuguese planned to launch an attack as soon as November. If the plan went ahead and succeeded at least Britain could benefit, Strangford argued, as ‘it would be highly desirable to retain for His Majesty, either Montevideo or Buenos Ayres’.41 Unlike Hill and Strangford, who had deferred from expressing a firm opinion regarding Portuguese plans for territorial expansion, Smith was a keen supporter of the schemes and had, in fact, already turned his energetic mind to possible future developments in South America. Writing to the Admiralty during his voyage to Brazil Smith had noted the region was important for British commerce and a good source of naval stores, and wondered whether the whole population, sharing a common language and religion, might be united under one form of government. He also began to consider spreading British influence to the Spanish colonies through the medium of Portuguese Brazil, thereby bringing the whole of South America under the control of one government. He raised the potential danger France posed to South America and concluded he needed more vessels to cover the 1,000 miles of Brazilian coastline; of course such an increase in his available force might also prove useful for assisting the Portuguese to expand the borders of Brazil.42 In August Smith seemingly backed up Strangford’s assessment of 25 July. The Portuguese, he reported, had opened communications with the Viceroy of Buenos Ayres with a view to continuing the commercial relations between the two regions. They also hoped to gain territory on the River Plate as the price of the continuing commerce. If this could not be achieved peacefully then it would ‘immediately become necessary to oc-


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cupy the posts on the north shore of the River Plate with Portuguese troops as the only means of preventing the French from doing it’. To implement this plan the Regent had asked Smith to support operations with his naval force and intimated that he should take overall command of the operation. The Regent apparently stressed to Smith the advantages of commerce and independence of the Spanish government achieved through the new Portuguese court in Brazil and noted the disposition of the descendants of the original Portuguese settlers who naturally looked to Portugal for their protection.43 Smith used the view common to all who supported operations in South America ‘that attack is the best mode of defence where attack is expected from any quarter’. If the Portuguese did not occupy the territory along the River Plate with troops the ‘French may, and probably will, make an effort to do it’. Smith could not guarantee the security of this region as a naval blockade ‘necessarily interrupted and distant at this season on a very bad coast’ might not provide effective security against a French attempt. He could not guarantee the success of his mission until the size of the force destined for these operations was clear. The current size of his own squadron was ‘little applicable to attack or covering coast operations’, though he professed his readiness to ‘cover that vulnerable part of the frontier of our ally’, and did ‘not refuse the command of the Portuguese part of the force, as there is no British army officer here to direct the land part’. He thought there would be ‘no difficulty in the enterprise against the enemy we have to deal with, if we have adequate and applicable means’. Smith hoped for a few of the Irish catholic regiments and smaller naval vessels to navigate the River Plate.44 The Regent had asked Smith if it would be necessary for him to declare war on his neighbours, to which Smith replied it was not as the Spaniards had withdrawn their ambassador from his court and had cooperated with the invasion of Portugal. Smith advised all Spaniards should be expelled from Brazil. In August Smith met with Sousa Coutinho and Strangford to discuss the possibility of a Portuguese invasion of the Spanish colonies. Smith again reported he had advised caution; he had not seen the Portuguese troops who were destined for this service and could not pass judgement on their effectiveness. On the whole Smith thought the plan ‘well-calculated for the occupation of the country’ if the governing councils followed the proposal for a change of political system put to the Spanish colonies by the Portuguese. If an occupation was to be achieved by force then Smith preferred a close blockade of Montevi-

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deo, which the inhabitants were already starting to evacuate, while Portuguese forces would be landed at Sacramento from where they would be able to threaten Buenos Ayres. ‘To execute all this’, Smith continued, ‘a few corps of British troops would certainly be necessary’. British troops would be vital to garrison Montevideo once that place had fallen either by blockade or agreement. On this point Smith had directed Captain Lee of the Monarch to open up a line of communication with the Spaniards in that area. The object of this was to induce the garrison and inhabitants ‘to combine their means with ours to repel the menaced French occupation of their territory’.45 Just as these plans began to gather momentum, rumours of an uprising in Spain against the French occupation reached Brazil in August, completely changing the situation in South America. Smith planned to inform the Spaniards of the changes in the politics in their mother country, which he hoped would ensure an amicable reception for any Portuguese or British expedition. In stating to the Admiralty he had decided not to fall in with any Portuguese until ‘the means disposable, and the mode of applying them proposed, were more fully detailed to me’, Smith was a little disingenuous.46 Although the Portuguese dropped their ambitious plans for attacking Spanish America, the Regent remained keen to extend Brazilian territory to include the River Plate. The difference was now he wanted to appoint his wife Carlota as Regent of the Spanish colonies. After the events at Bayonne it was believed Carlota, as Ferdinand’s sister, was now the legitimate ruler of the Spanish colonies. Smith raised the possibility of Carlota taking over the Spanish crown in South America to the Admiralty and may have voiced his personal support for her claims. Smith was certainly a proponent of a Portuguese expansionist policy and had been keen to lead the Portuguese troops himself alongside the naval support provided by his squadron and admitted as much in his dispatches.47 Smith’s continued dabbling and plotting with Carlota would lead to his rather unseemly and convoluted recall in May 1809.48 Taking advantage of the ‘wonderful, and wholly unexpected, opportunity’ that seemed to be opening up in Iberia British policy was now to be orientated back towards Europe.49 Plans for intervention in South America, which were still being mooted as late as June 1808, were dropped. A British attack was now impracticable and troops destined for service in South America under Wellesley were instead earmarked for Iberia. As Hall argues, while Spain was in revolt, ‘Napoleon could make no credible


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claim to rule that country’s colonies, so removing the need for British action against them’. Perhaps more importantly, it would be extremely difficult for Britain to justify attacking Spanish possessions while the two countries were fighting a common foe.50 This point was recognised by Canning when, in September 1808, he finally ended any thoughts of further British involvement in Spanish South America. Due to dramatic changes in the strategic situation in Spain, he informed Strangford, Britain could not now ‘countenance any design hostile to the peace and independence of the Spanish Dominions in South America’. Any attempts by Portugal to seize Spanish territory would have serious implications for British policy in Iberia. Again the fortunes of the two regions were inextricably linked as Canning emphasised the ‘ties of common interest and friendship by which Spain and Portugal are now united in Europe’.51 A continuation of British interventionist policy in South America would have provided excellent propaganda for those convinced Britain was pursuing an imperialistic policy of conquering the colonies and other choice possessions of the globe while the European powers devoted themselves to the bloody wars against France. Certainly, this had been a component of British policy while France dominated continental Europe, excluding British commerce. Britain certainly had seized, and would continue to seize, the possessions of its enemies, but once Spain moved from foe to potential friend British policy moved swiftly to provide support to Iberian uprisings against France. …

12 THE SPANISH INSURRECTION AND BRITISH POLICY

Just as British ministers looked to the New World when the strategic situation in Europe was less than promising, when that situation changed, as it did in Spain and Portugal during the summer of 1808, British policy was re-orientated back to the Old World. As we have seen it was an increasingly belligerent French policy towards her Spanish ally which lay at the root of this change. Charles’ abdication on 19 March and Ferdinand’s accession provided Napoleon with an opportunity to solve many Spanish issues once and for all. Refusing to accept Ferdinand as King of Spain, Napoleon called father and son to Bayonne. There, on 5 May, Napoleon forced both to relinquish their claims and hand over the throne to him. News of these developments spread, adding to the rebellious tinderbox which had already sparked the violent uprising in Madrid of 2 May. The brutal suppression by French troops under the command of Marshal Joachim Murat of that initial revolt was followed by a widespread Spanish uprising against the French occupation, organised and supported, on a provincial level.1 In London, British ministers began to receive information about such developments in May but the lack of reasonably accurate intelligence from Spain and Portugal left a degree of uncertainty regarding the degenerating situation in Iberia. Relying on the French and indigenous press was unsatisfactory and there were few official avenues through which news could reach London. At Gibraltar, Dalrymple kept ministers in London informed of the events in Spain but received no official response on what he should do. It was not until 25 May that Castlereagh replied to Dalrymple’s requests for orders. As Hall has argued ‘the Cabinet, already preoccupied with plans for attacking Spain’s colonies and some European

THE SPANISH INSURRECTION AND BRITISH POLICY

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possessions as well, was uncertain how to regard a Franco-Spanish conflict’. Set against a history of recent French military prowess in Europe ministers, quite naturally, decided to wait and see how events turned out before making a firm commitment; in Muir’s words, the cabinet ‘suspended rather than abandoned its previous plans’.2 There was a small British force under Spencer already in the region and Castlereagh hoped it could be utilised in Iberia before any possible operations in South America were undertaken. Spencer was again to examine the possibility of attacking Cueta as ministers did ‘not consider this temporary appropriation of M.-Genl. Spencer’s corps, as likely to interfere with operations in South America….the state of the seasons in that quarter [South America] would not render it desireable to move them from Gibraltar before the middle of August with a view to such a service’. Dalrymple suggested British troops could be used to support the Spaniards and Castlereagh gave permission for 10,000 men to be made available from Gibraltar but made it very clear this force would be best used to occupy a position where the Royal Navy could support it from the sea, thereby freeing Spanish troops to take the field. On this point Dalrymple was instructed to ‘particularly direct your attention to Cadiz’. Spencer was in the vicinity of Cadiz and could have fulfilled this role but unsurprisingly the Spanish were hostile to the idea and it would take a further two years before any such arrangement would be consented to.3 On 1 June Castlereagh submitted to the King arrangements for an expeditionary force, though the Cabinet were undecided where this force would serve, Castlereagh noting the options as ‘the coast of Spain or eventually in South America, should no favourable opening present itself in Europe’. Ministers were hoping for a campaign in Europe, but if there was no change in the situation regarding Spain then Castlereagh, agreeing with Canning’s assertions, looked to operations ‘both in the River of Plate and the Northern Provinces [Mexico]’. He considered the latter more important, remarking of the ‘possible expediency of directing the whole force against Mexico’. On the same day, Wellesley submitted a memorandum detailing the equipment required for a South American or Mexican expedition.4 The Spanish Insurrection and Cotton’s Blockade While ministers employed a wait-and-see policy, news of the events in Spain reached Cotton off the Tagus on 13 May, passed on by Captain

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Smith of the Nautilus, stationed off Oporto and corroborated by Purvis on 16 May.5 Suitably informed Cotton again received Satarro on 18 May. This time he brought the French response to the English proclamations of 28 April and 12 May stating Junot had informed Napoleon of the proposals and was awaiting instructions. Cotton would not discuss the terms with Satarro, insisting no official business could be conveyed through a middleman. Instead he thought Junot should have sent a French officer to talk about terms and Cotton expected this to happen once Satarro had returned to Lisbon. He therefore drafted the convention between Britain and the groups in Lisbon, as had been directed in the Admiralty despatch of 16 April ‘without any alteration whatsoever’. Cotton displayed a good grasp of the wider strategic context: Although the circumstances of a revolt in Spain, and its probable consequence in Portugal, might perhaps justify some alteration, did not the importance of acquiring immediate possession of the Russian squadron in the Tagus (by any means) so as to deprive the enemy of their assistance, and supersede the necessity for maintaining so large a British force off Lisbon (in conformity to their Lordships suggestion in the order above mentioned) appear paramount to every other consideration.6 Horward has argued as the revolt spread across Spain the value of the Russian squadron to Junot increased as he became more isolated from possible supporting forces. But according to Satarro the French had asked Seniavin what his line of conduct would be if Napoleon suffered disaster in Spain and Portugal. Seniavin apparently replied ‘Russia not being at war with Spain or Portugal, the fleet would not act in any manner hostile to either of those countries’. Then Seniavin was asked what he would do if the British attempted to force the Tagus, to which he replied ‘unless a very commanding and superior force rendered such a measure improper- fight them’. Whether Cotton thought the reports from Satarro were accurate is not certain. He did inform the Admiralty there had been in riots in Madrid on 2 May where 30,000 French were now cut off from reinforcements.7 The last week in May was eventful for Cotton. He received the Admiralty orders from 9 April to 13 May, which included the news he had been promoted to Admiral of the Blue on 28 April.8 In May the importance of occupying the Tagus forts as a precursor to forcing the river was


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again evidenced with the loss of the Rapid (12) gun-brig, sunk by fire from the French occupied batteries.9 The loss of the brig was balanced by the opening of a new source of intelligence. Mr Wilson, formerly a British merchant in Lisbon, had found a small boy abandoned in the streets of Lisbon and sent him out to the squadron, whereupon Captain Pigott of the Blossom wrote to Wilson asking him to provide information. Wilson acquiesced and sent a report to Pigott on 31 May stating the French had ‘about four thousand in the forts and environs of Lisbon’. The people of Lisbon were suffering at the hands of the French because of the British blockade, and ‘every hour threatens insurrection’. The French now had 13 vessels in various states of readiness and, although the Russian ships had all been repaired, Seniavin’s flagship had recently suffered lightning damage to its mast.10 Wilson managed to escape from Lisbon and arrived on board the Hibernia on 8 June, reasserting his previous intelligence report. Cotton thought him ‘an intelligent man’ and was convinced there were only ‘3 to 4,000 French troops…now in Lisbon’ along with 5-6,000 Spaniards. Wilson confirmed reports from Captain Creyke of the Eclipse sloop that French forces in Porto had been taken prisoner by their former Spanish allies. Realising the effect this may have upon the situation on Lisbon Cotton penned a proclamation to be distributed throughout the city: Inhabitants of Lisbon!!! Your enemies and oppressors the French, have been driven out of Oporto by your loyal Countrymen, and the brave Spaniards, the government instituted by the Prince Regent is reestablished and the Portuguese colours again flying upon your forts. All the assistance His Britannic Majesty’s fleet can afford, shall be readily given to you, and your generous allies the Spaniards, in the noble attempt to emancipate your capital from the severe oppressions it has suffered since the French army marched into it. Wilson’s estimates regarding the size of the French forces in and around Lisbon were based on the amount of bread baked in Lisbon for distribution to the French. His figures were corroborated by reports from a Spanish officer, Don Sebastian Solis who arrived on board the Hibernia after escaping from Lisbon. He had been sent by the Spanish Junta at Seville to incite the Spanish troops in Lisbon to rebel against the French and asserted there were only 1,200 Spanish and 4,000 French in the city.

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The French had disarmed the Spanish contingent when they heard the news of unrest in Porto and Spain.11 According to Krajeski Cotton ‘believed that now was the time to send British troops back to Lisbon’.12 Cotton informed the Admiralty that because there were no more than 4,000 French in the city, ‘five or six thousand British troops might effect a landing, gain possession of the forts on the banks of the Tagus, and, by cooperating with His Majesty’s fleet give to our possession the whole of the maritime means now collected in the Tagus’. He contacted Dalrymple at Gibraltar asking for the use of Spencer’s 5,000 men.13 This incorrect information would have a great influence on subsequent events and has attracted criticism from Krajeski. He argues Cotton’s estimate of the number of troops needed to force a landing ‘reveals a measure of naiveté about landing operations’.14 This ignores the fact that the presence of a small British force of 5-6,000 men might have proved the catalyst for a general uprising in Lisbon or if placed in a position of strength ashore could have provided a bridgehead for the arrival of more substantial forces if the estimates had been correct. The reports of the French forces in Lisbon seemed to be borne out by the activities of the Portuguese. Cotton remarked ‘the fishing boats, and others having fruit, now hold communication with the fleet without reserve’. They also provided another source of intelligence: ‘among various reports brought by such vessels it is stated by Dom Gomes Freres, is at the head of a numerous body of Portuguese and on his march towards Lisbon’. But Cotton was forced to admit the blockade of the Tagus, designed to force the French or Russians into a maritime capitulation through starvation, had been a failure. There was ‘no appearance of any want of provisions…on the contrary the boatmen bring bread for sale of an excellent quality, the barley harvest is I understand already begun, and the first week in July the commencement of their wheat harvest’. Despite this on 20 June Cotton was optimistic about the situation in Lisbon after a further communication from Satarro. Cotton was convinced the ‘manner he now comes forward together with the allusion to Junot’s intention of putting himself in a situation to obtain an honorable capitulation - induces me to hope that things are approaching to a crisis’.15 In response to the developing situation across Iberia Cotton sent the Antelope to monitor events in Porto. In southern Portugal it seemed as if the inhabitants were willing to rise against the French occupation while a request from Coimbra for assistance in seizing French positions was


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received. ‘Grasping the consequence of the uprising’, Horward has argued ‘Cotton decided to extend his resources to the limit in order to capitalize on the Portuguese patriotism’. Portuguese troops under the command of a student José Correra Felles had captured the French held fort of Santa Catarina at Figueira at the mouth of the river Mondego, approximately half way between Lisbon and Porto. Cotton sent Captain Bligh of the Alfred with 200 Royal Marines and 20 officers to strengthen the position. After receiving a further dispatch from Castlereagh detailing the intention to send a British military force to Iberia, Cotton added another 100 marines to the garrison at Figueira.16 Cotton had heard reports ministers were hoping to commit a force to Spain but was convinced British intervention in Portugal offered the greatest chance of immediate success. ‘Portugal will be recovered to its lawful Prince without much difficulty’, the country could be secured and held ‘if aided by the assistance of a British force equal in number’ to that in apparent preparation. With the possibility ministers in London may be preparing to intervene in Portugal Cotton made promises to the Portuguese that a British army was on the way to liberate them from French rule. There was a caveat, however; a British force would only assist an uprising, not occasion it. The Portuguese would have to help fight for their own liberty.17 In fact during April and May Junot had been expecting a British amphibious landing, although he believed a more immediate threat came from Spain. Napoleon’s orders for him to dispatch 7,500 troops for service in Spain seemed to back this assertion up and hampered his defence of Portugal.18 Initially, Junot managed to keep the threat of a Portuguese revolt under control but the interruption of grain supplies from Spain now added to the effects of the Royal Navy blockade. Junot was isolated and, according to Napier, with ‘a hungry army gnawing at its vitals, the nation could not remain tranquil’. News of the insurrection in Spain spread and the number of assaults and assassinations of French soldiers in Portugal increased. Then, on 9 June, news reached Lisbon that the commander of the Spanish troops stationed in Porto had arrested the French forces in the city. Junot immediately disarmed the Spanish troops in Lisbon, confining them aboard hulks in the harbour. He could now only count on 28,000 effective men. To alleviate the situation he asked Seniavin to land some of his crews but the Russian refused, stating he was not at war with Portugal. In July Junot had to further reduce his force by sending General Loison with 8,000 men to suppress a rising at

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Evora, close to the southern main communication route into Spain. By the end of July Junot was completely isolated in a country rapidly growing in hostility to the French presence. Furthermore, there had been many rumours of English forces destined for Portugal. Then, on 29 July, a fleet of British transports appeared off Mondego Bay. Junot headed north to meet the new threat leaving 6,500 men to defend Lisbon and the Tagus forts.19 British Intervention in Portugal, June-August 1808 Throughout 1808 ministers had been faced with a number of options as to where a limited number of British troops could be committed. Maritime-based forces might be dispatched to South America, Spanish possessions in Europe could be attacked and an expedition had already been sent to the Baltic. Events in Spain and Portugal would prove the catalyst for a firm commitment to one theatre of operations. From the beginning of the Spanish uprising intelligence regarding the situation in Iberia had been at a premium, and hence the response from the British Cabinet was naturally tentative. Cotton was blockading Lisbon and Spencer was in the right place at the right time but, not strong enough for offensive operations and unable to gain access to Cadiz, there was little tangible he could do with his force of 5,000 men. The possibility of large-scale British military intervention in Spain or Portugal was brought to the fore with the arrival in London on 8 June of two delegates from the northern Spanish province of Asturias. They requested military supplies, arms and munitions, a Royal Navy squadron stationed off the Asturian coast and the importation of British goods into the province. They were shortly followed by a delegation from the province of Galicia. The response from the press and the public was extraordinary; as Muir states, ‘London was caught in a Spanish fever which lasted until the end of the year’. Across the political spectrum there was widespread support for the Spaniards with only a few voices speaking against sending aid to the Peninsula.20 On 12 June Canning decided Britain would ‘afford every assistance and support to an effort so magnanimous and praise-worthy’ by supplying arms and providing naval support.21 This was a clear commitment of support from the Portland cabinet to any nation willing to take up arms against the French. With a history of failed coalitions and abortive expeditions to Continental Europe, however, British military commitments would be in support of, rather than in lieu of, those willing to fight


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France. The mood was encapsulated by Canning’s famous address to the Commons of 15 June stating that ‘there exists the strongest disposition on the part of the British government to afford every practicable aid in a contest so magnanimous’. He continued: We shall proceed upon the principle, that any nation of Europe that starts up with a determination to oppose a power which, whether professing insidious peace or declaring open war, is the common enemy of all nations, whatever may be the existing political relations of that nation with Great Britain, becomes instantly our essential ally.22 The intention was clear and designed to be heard in Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburg. Canning was committing British help not only to the Spaniards, but any other country who took up arms against France. The cabinet was keen to make a firm military commitment to the region and on 14 June 1808 Wellesley was informed he had been appointed to the ‘command of a detachment…to be employed upon a particular service’.23 Castlereagh still considered defending the cause of independence in Spanish America, but only if the war in Europe became hopeless. He was supported by Wellesley, who looked to Gibraltar and then South America if nothing could be done to support Spain.24 On 21 June Castlereagh could confirm Wellesley’s destination would be Spain, but his final instructions would be formed on the receipt of more definitive intelligence from Iberia.25 On 30 June the Cabinet came to a firm decision. Wellesley’s force based at Cork would be sent to assist the Spanish and Portuguese nations ‘in throwing off the yoke of France’. The deputies from Galicia and Asturias were, however, unwilling to allow British forces into any of their garrisons or to embark on coordinated operations with a British army. Instead, they impressed ‘the importance of directing the efforts of the British troops to the expulsion of the enemy from Portugal’; to which object Wellesley was to direct his attention. British forces would be essential to support the insurrection in that country so it ‘may thereby become general throughout that Kingdom, as well as Spain’. Foremost in Castlereagh’s mind was the French and Russian naval forces in the Tagus. If the French were too strong for an attack on Lisbon, Wellesley was to move his force by sea to Vigo and await reinforcements. In case extra troops were needed Castlereagh was preparing 10,000 reinforce-

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ments to sail in three weeks’ time. Castlereagh ordered an officer of engineers to observe and prepare information ‘with respect to the execution of the proposed attack on the Tagus’.26 After Castlereagh wrote this dispatch Mulgrave received Cotton’s estimate stating French strength in Lisbon was not more than 4,000 men. Mulgrave informed the King it was the confident opinion of Cotton that 5-6,000 British troops ‘might effect a landing, gain possession of the of [sic] forts on the Tagus’. Mulgrave was optimistic a combined force could ‘gain possession of the whole of the maritime means in the Tagus’. But the only change Castlereagh made to Wellesley’s original instructions was to instruct him to head for the Tagus in person to assess the situation.27 Important information now arrived in London. On 24 June Spencer had conferred with Cotton about the possibility of landing troops in the Tagus. Spencer thought the Portuguese were ‘in a ripe state to throw off the French yoke’, and Cotton reported at Oporto on 16 June the populace had risen against the French opening the depots and arming themselves. In addition the provinces of Minho, Entre Douro, and Tras des Montes had also revolted against the French occupying forces. But on 22 June Cotton received intelligence from three Hanoverian deserters who reported Junot had now concentrated 10,000 French troops in the vicinity of Lisbon. Cotton realised this force rendered ‘success in landing with so small a corps of forces [as Spencer’s]…very doubtful’. Cotton and Spencer both concluded the chance of a landing had gone and Spencer sailed for Cadiz.28 Although these reports confirmed ‘a general spirit of animosity against the French in Portugal’,29 Castlereagh now informed Wellesley that Junot’s force ‘appeared much more considerable that it was before reported to be by Sir Charles Cotton’.30 In response a firm decision was now made to commit a larger force than originally intended. Castlereagh informed the King on 14 July that ministers had decided to employ ‘such an amount of force in that quarter as may provide not only for the reduction of the enemy’s force in the Tagus, but also may admit of such a detachment being made towards Cadiz’. The Spaniards had fired on the French ships in Cadiz harbour, forcing their surrender. Once again it was hoped a British garrison could enter the town, freeing Spanish forces to take the field. To accomplish this dual strike Castlereagh wanted to send an additional 5,000 troops to the Tagus and to supplement them with Moore’s 10,000 men. These measures would allow a force of 30,000 men to initially operate off the


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Tagus, a sufficient number to permit the subsequent detachment of a force of 10,000 men to Cadiz.31 As Muir has pointed out if the Cabinet succeeded in concentrating this number of men in the Iberian Peninsular it would be ‘the largest British army to take the field for many years’.32 A British force of this size could not remain under the command of Wellesley; he was too far down the seniority list of Lieutenant Generals. The Cabinet envisaged the total force acting as two separate entities under the overall command of Dalrymple, with Lieutenant General Sir Harry Burrard as his second-in-command. Army headquarters would be stationed either at Lisbon or Cadiz ‘as the service might require’. This arrangement would ‘admit of the most active and distinguish’d young officers being brought forward under them’. It would not go against the rules and traditions of the service but would allow certain favourite officers, such as Wellesley, to be given a prominent role in operations. The King approved committing additional troops and the command structure of the force. He thought Dalrymple would be ‘well calculated for the general direction of affairs’ and in Burrard he could not ‘have a more zealous and more steady second in command’.33 Wellesley arrived off Coruña on 21 July to discover the French forces in Portugal totalled 15,000 with 12,000 in and around Lisbon. With Junot isolated in Portugal Wellesley, even without Spencer’s force, had ‘no doubt of success’ once he could land his troops.34 After finding his fleet on 22 July, Wellesley reached Oporto two days later and gained a clearer picture of the situation in Portugal. All the areas to the north of the Tagus were in arms against the French. He had also heard from Cotton who informed him of his occupation of Figueira, it would be here or at Peniche where Cotton thought it ‘most advisable’ for Wellesley to land. While he visited Cotton, Wellesley decided to send the fleet to Mondego Bay and prepare to disembark. He hoped by the time he returned from the Tagus ‘all will be ready to go on shore, either at the Mondego or Peniche, or farther to the southward if the Admiral thinks it advisable’.35 On 26 July Wellesley wrote to Spencer ordering him to proceed to the Tagus and await his arrival.36 On the same day he joined Cotton off the Tagus. ‘Upon consulting with the Lieutenant General’, Cotton informed the Admiralty, ‘it was determined the troops should disembark at Figueira (a place about 16 leagues to the northward of the Burling Island’. Wellesley proceeded to Figueira on 27 and on 3 August Cotton heard that ‘the disembarkation commenced the 1st instant’.37 Wellesley informed Cotton he would not advance until he received news of the rein-

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forcements from England or from Spencer. Wellesley hoped to be able to attack the fortress of Peniche but required heavy 24lb guns and asked Cotton to allow the Alfred to remain with the army. He would not detain the ship if ‘the moment shall arrive at which you may have it in your power to attack the fleet’. If the reinforcements from England or Spencer’s force arrived off the Tagus, Cotton was ordered to direct them to Wellesley’s position.38 On 30 July Wellesley received Castlereagh’s orders informing him of the reinforcements expected from England tempered with the news he had been superseded. By this time Wellesley had gained a detailed picture of events in Spain and Portugal and decided to press ahead with the landing, ordering Spencer to head for the Mondego. Although he had received Castlereagh’s despatch of 15 July intimating it was desirable to assist the Spanish in Andalusia he decided against changing his orders to Spencer to withdraw his forces from that region. Wellesley had received intelligence from Cotton on 31 July that a French force in southern Spain had surrendered to the Spanish at Bailén on 26 July.39 Spencer arrived off Wellesley’s headquarters at Lavaos on the night of 5 August. Wellesley had commenced the initial landing on 1 August and by 5 August his forces were ashore. Spencer’s forces were all landed by 8 August. Wellesley now had just over 15,000 men and began to advance towards Lisbon to cover the landing of the brigades of Generals Anstruther and Acland, which arrived on 17 and 20 August respectively. An advance force from Junot’s army was driven back at Roliça on 17 August. Then, on 21 August, a force of 13,000 men under Junot attacked his command at Vimiero and again the French were beaten back, this time with the loss of 2,000 men. Dalrymple and Burrard now arrived as Junot entered into negotiations for the surrender of his force; an armistice was agreed on 22 August. The armistice was turned into the notorious Convention of Cintra. The French army was to evacuate Lisbon and be returned to France in British ships accompanied by all the property they had seized.40 The Russian ships were secured in a separate convention between Cotton and Seniavin. The officers and men would be returned to Russia without any stipulations on their future conduct. The ships would be held by Britain until six months after a general peace. Seven were sent to England, arriving at Spithead on 6 October. Two ships were unfit for sea, the Raphael (80) and the Yaroslav (74), and were to be repaired in the Tagus. Seniavin stayed in England until heading back to Russia in August


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1809. Two ships were returned to Russia in 1813, Silnyi (74) and Moshtchnoi (66), the others, in a very poor state, had been sold with the Russians reimbursed at their original value.41 Despite the furore that greeted the news of the convention in England, the objects of the operation had been achieved; Portugal was free of French troops and the naval threat from Lisbon had been removed. By the end of August the Portland Government had made a major commitment to Iberia, with 30,000 men available for operations in Portugal, and the strategically important city of Lisbon providing an excellent base for future operations in Portugal and, possibly, beyond. …

13 CONCLUSION

At first glance British policy towards Portugal and South America seems to offer little opportunity for a wider understanding of British involvement in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Certainly British commitments in Portugal and South America could have helped to limit French territorial expansion, but how did they contribute to winning the wars against France? How did involvement help achieve British war aims of a friendly Low Countries, continued access to the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas and European markets? Without the military means to take on France such aims could not be secured by British efforts alone. In this wider context, examining British policy towards Portugal and South America during 1806-1808 highlights much about how ends, means and ways were largely understood and implemented into a cohesive package; that is, once the nature of the conflict for Britain is understood. For Britain the wars were not about seizing huge tracts of European territory, instead they were about maritime security and hence the means and ways to achieve those aims were maritime: the aim was maritime security, the way was maritime economic-based conflict and the means was maritime-based expeditionary warfare. Of course this is only one side of the story and British policy cannot be studied in isolation. During these years France attempted to dominate the European markets and hit the British economy by excluding British commerce through the Continental blockade. But France also needed to fight aggressive wars in order to make war pay, through booty and placing indemnities on defeated powers. Moreover, her massive army could not be sustained on French soil and had to live off other nations. Finally, Napoleon himself had little long-term strategic vision other than French

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hegemony at the expense of the other powers of Europe.1 All this created an expansionist dynamic which would eventually lead to further European conflict. In this situation Britain needed cash, not just for her own ever-increasing expenses, but to provide financial assistance to European allies when they took up arms against France. To guarantee her own security, Britain could not and would not follow the French model. British economic strength was built on overseas trade and colonies, protected by the might of the Royal Navy. By blockading enemy fleets in ports and aggressively pursuing them if they escaped and by launching maritime-based expeditions in Europe and overseas to preserve maritime supremacy, Britain continued to fight. For the Talents, this key issue – of continuing the fight – was high on the political agenda during the early months of their ministry. Peace with France was a serious option, although the prospect of a lasting peaceful arrangement with France was remote (even more so after the death of Fox). Once it became clear neither side was completely committed to the Paris peace talks the Talents concentrated on limiting the spread of French power; a noble aim badly implemented leading to a dispersal of British maritime-based military power. In reacting to everything, the Talents failed to recognise what was central to achieving British aims and what was on the periphery, and criticism of their European policy seems justified. Muir has argued their policy in the Mediterranean and South America ‘squandered their resources in futile expeditions’.2 In particular, the ill-treatment of Russia contributed to a breakdown of relations that would lead to the Franco-Russian alliance of 1807. But is it possible for a ministry to have achieved absolutely nothing of strategic worth in over a year in office? As we have seen, with the weight of historical opinion against the Talents it may seem so.3 But in one respect the Talents strategic thinking can be rescued from opprobrium. The Portuguese Crises During 1806-1808 Portugal became one of the major theatres in the conflict between France and Britain, and both the Talents and Portland administrations moved to safeguard British interests in Portugal with great speed and determination. The crises were generated by French policy. For Napoleon it was essential to close the entrepôt into the Continental blockade Portuguese ports, in particular Lisbon, had become. Intervening in Portugal also provided the opportunity to increase French naval power and to seize the harbour and facilities of Lisbon, while providing

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an excuse for introducing troops into Spanish territory for future use. Finally, Napoleon had clear, though ill-defined, designs on Brazil and the South American possessions of Spain. It was essential for Britain to prevent all this. Lisbon was essential for commercial and Royal Navy activities in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, as well as being an entrepôt for British goods. It was also important the Portuguese court remained independent, preventing France from laying claim to Brazil. All the Portuguese wanted was to be able to continue their peaceful existence and trade with Brazil and Britain, hence their policy was reactive and largely depended on the line of action taken by Napoleon. As Oliveira has succinctly argued: From 1801 to 1807 (as before) Portugal’s external policy wavered between the pressures of England (whose assistance was indispensable both economically and militarily) and those of France. Partly supported by the latter, Spain tried to be given a free hand and help in Portugal, which might enable her to invade the country and possibly to rebuild the Iberian unity lost in 1640.4 Yet in 1806 it appeared Spain, frustrated with the French alliance, was seemingly less hostile to Portugal. Napoleon was occupied in central and northern Europe applying only diplomatic pressure on Portugal. This policy had some success as Franco-Portuguese relations thawed due to the state of relations between Lisbon and London. British inability to prevent the Spanish invasion of 1801 and failure to support Portuguese interests at the Peace of Amiens created dissatisfaction in Lisbon. With Britain unable to guarantee Portuguese security, the Portuguese implemented a strategy aimed at appeasing France. In this situation both the Talents and Portland administrations reacted to threats, real or perceived, to British maritime security concerns. The Talents sent a special mission under Rosslyn and the Portland administration agreed a diplomatic convention with the Portuguese. Diplomatic pressure could not work in all circumstances, however, and both administrations dispatched Royal Navy forces to poise off the Tagus. The inherent advantages of maritime power allowed British naval power to be rapidly placed on the spot, providing highly visible leverage to British diplomacy by acting as a floating diplomatic mission while retaining the capacity for violent action. A presence in the Tagus also allowed for valuable intelligence gathering for ministers making decisions back in

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London. In 1806 the arrival of the Royal Navy seemed to complicate matters, St. Vincent’s fleet alarming the Portuguese and the Spaniards. In 1807 Smith’s threats to attack Lisbon in a similar way to Copenhagen may (even if he could not back them up) have had some impact on the Prince Regent. After the evacuation of the Portuguese court a naval force under Cotton remained off the Tagus blockading hostile naval forces. Both administrations, however, also found naval forces alone could not guarantee successful outcomes. Any hostile fleet in the Tagus could not be attacked without first securing the Tagus forts. Rosslyn, St. Vincent, Smith and Strangford all thought land forces were vital to any assault on the Tagus while in 1808 Cotton pointed to the difficulties in attacking the forts when they were occupied by French troops. One of the key limits on British strategy was the small numbers of troops available for such operations. The Talents, unlike the Portland government, did consider defending Portugal and having an expeditionary force at hand offered to send it to Lisbon.5 But once it was obvious the Portuguese did not want assistance, due to their belief there would be no invasion, the Talents looked to the transfer of the Portuguese court and naval forces to Brazil. Moreover, the poor state of the Portuguese army precluded any possible combined operations to defend Lisbon. When it became obvious to London the supposed threat to Portugal, largely emanating from Yarmouth’s correspondence, was in fact false, the Talents swiftly moved onto other objects. As noted, the threats may have just been a French ruse, to keep British troops tied up in Lisbon while Napoleon undertook offensive operations against Sicily or Prussia. The problem of recalling troops once they had been committed to Portugal was clearly recognised by the Talents (it is one of the unique attributes of maritime forces that they are inherently easier to withdraw than a landbased commitment). The surprise and alarm expressed by the Portuguese may also give some credence to claims that they knew something of the Spanish plans to break with France. For the Portland government, providing troops for a possible assault was a major problem in part due to the Talents dispersal of effort in sending troops to South America and the Mediterranean. The only force available to the Portland administration had been sent to the Baltic to safeguard British naval interests in that theatre. As the danger to Portugal escalated, Castlereagh withdrew troops from the Baltic after the successful operation at Copenhagen and from the Mediterranean, concluding there

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would be no opportunities for offensive operations in the region. Certainly British maritime preponderance granted a degree of mobility to British land forces, a factor Napoleon himself recognised. But it also had problems. It proved difficult to recall troops once they were ordered overseas and despite the best efforts of Canning and Castlereagh, when matters came to a head in Lisbon in November 1807 there were no troops at hand to force an entry into the Tagus if the Portuguese decided to side with France. As Corbett noted, in order to make a truly effective contribution to war, navies must have the ability to project power ashore.6 After the evacuation of the Portuguese court in November 1807 there remained the threat posed by Junot in Lisbon and the Russian fleet in the Tagus. But British ministers did not consider sending British troops to free Portugal from French occupation. This was made clear to the Portuguese in April 1808. Instead, ministers looked to South America and Spanish possessions in Europe as the key targets for offensive operations while naval force would be used to negate the threat of the Russian fleet and the captured Portuguese vessels escaping from the Tagus. Canning and Castlereagh did look to attack the Tagus, but deferred to the opinion of Cotton that forcing the river would be a dangerous proposition. The nature of the river, highlighted by the failed boat attack on the Garrota in April 1808, the extensive defences strengthened by the French in 1808, evidenced by the loss of the Rapid in May 1808 and the presence of the Russian fleet, all combined to make a successful attack unlikely. In order to resolve the situation and free Cotton’s ships for other operations, ministers decided to implement a different policy. Proposals would be made to the Russians, French and Portuguese for a maritime capitulation. The men of Junot’s army and Sinivian’s fleet would be allowed to return to their countries. Sinivian’s ships would be held for six months after a general peace. In return Britain would allow supplies into Lisbon. These efforts were based on the opinion, provided by well informed individuals such as Strangford and Captain McKinley, that Lisbon was vulnerable to blockade. It seems Junot’s decision to gain a source of supply from Cadiz prevented the success of the blockade, at least in the short term. Efforts to negate the Portuguese and Russian ships were part of a wider policy to secure dangerous warships from the clutches of Napoleon. It worked. In the years 1806-1810 Britain added 101 captured warships to the Royal Navy, prompting Glete to argue the ‘naval consequences of the Tilsit agreement...were thus largely favourable to Great

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Britain’.7 Comparisons between the action at Copenhagen and the Portuguese crises are inevitable but history tends to concentrate on the spectacular, such as Copenhagen, to the detriment of the more mundane, such as Lisbon. Although aggressive at an operational military level both were essentially defensive in nature: to protect British maritime security. It could be argued such operations were, with regards to British maritime preponderance, more important than fleet battles. Temperley succinctly noted ‘Nelson destroyed nearly twenty men-of-war at Trafalgar. Canning obtained over thirty from Denmark and Portugal.’ The successful transfer of the Portuguese Court, Temperley continues, ‘is in reality one of the most important of the time’ but has ‘been obscured by the greater notoriety of the Danish expedition’.8 Such aggressive actions could, however, have wider detrimental diplomatic effects. After Copenhagen one British commentator noted: ‘The entire front of Europe from the Bosphorus to the North Cape is in hostile array against us, and our court must have been very badly informed of the tempers and feelings of the continent towards us if it has yet to learn that we are everywhere detested’.9 In 1807 Canning helped to explain the reasoning behind such actions; ‘we are hated throughout Europe – and that hate must be cured by fear’. He viewed such operations as reminding the powers of Europe what British naval power could achieve.10 But Canning’s bluster did not blind him to the fact that alliances, particularly with Russia, were essential for Britain. By acting out of self-interest Britain certainly was enhancing her maritime security, but at what price? Isolated from Europe both the Talents and Portland administrations looked to South America, thereby opening up their policies to the charge Britain ignored the needs of Europe and instead concentrated on overseas Empire building. South America So the crucial question is: was Napoleon right? Did Britain follow an ‘imperialist’ maritime strategy while turning her back on potential allies in Europe? Taken at face value the weight of evidence seems to support this theory. Yet, British involvement in overseas colonial operations was a central part of war strategy and South America had been on the agenda for some time as a theatre where major military and naval operations might be implemented, but nothing concrete came of the many plans. This all changed in 1806 and for the next two years the region played an important role in British strategy. Hence, after ignoring calls for British

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intervention in northern Europe and attempting to promote British interest at the Ottoman Porte, it was the key region where the Talents undertook offensive operations. As Hall has argued Popham’s actions were a ‘sudden, apparently heaven-sent, opportunity to expand British imperial power in South America’12 for it was a region where ‘British interests at their most blatant, could be pursued’.13 In the words of one popular historian: ‘The seriousness of Britain’s long term desire to add the supposedly suppurating Spanish Empire to her dominions – thereby making good the losses in North America – should not be underestimated’.14 A key problem for the Talents, however, was the implementation of this policy. The very nature of Popham’s actions caused problems right from the start. The Talents admitted to the King they had looked to the region and they did threaten the Portuguese that Brazil would be seized if they sided with France, but the cabinet had not made any firm decisions as to wider British involvement, Grenville recognising once involved it would be difficult to wriggle free from the region. Then Popham presented a fait accompli, which for commercial and domestic reasons could not be ignored. After Pophams’s trumpeting up of the value of South America, and the landing of a large amount of cash as evidence, the Talents could not just evacuate the region. After the failure of peace talks with France ruled out South American exchanges for security in Europe and distrustful of Russia and Prussia, for a brief period of time the Talents lost themselves in the dream of conquering the entire region and founding a new empire in South America to replace the North American empire lost in 1783 to balance against European Napoleonic hegemony. There was another driver behind their policy: the fear of France or America becoming the dominant power in the region. The Talents, therefore, decided to build on Popham’s initial success. But the inherent difficulties in communicating with the region caused the Talents to react to events rather than to try and shape them. By the time orders had arrived in theatre the situation could be completely changed. Compounding this was the administration’s clear lack of understanding of the nature, people and geography of the Spanish Empire. Windham initially looked to spreading British influence ‘by a mild and gradual operation’, but the degeneration into wild schemes for conquering the whole continent in various ways reveal a government desperate for success but without little experience of actually forming clear aims and then implementing them. Grenville clearly informed Lauderdale South America, once conquered, would never be restored in any peace treaty. There

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were dissenting voices, but Grenville and Windham pushed on with an aggressive imperialistic land-grab policy. Eventually realising the problems faced, the Government turned to Wellesley who injected a degree of focus, clarity and realism into the plans but it was probably too late. The Talents complete lack of strategic direction regarding South America was brought to a head by the appointment of Whitelocke and his consequent bungling in the region. Although the Talents were spared the fall out of their and Whitelocke’s failure, it comes as no surprise that history has not been kind to their dabbling in South American projects. Fortescue described Windham’s ‘project for the invasion of South America upon both coasts’ as a warning that ‘a man of exceptional ability…may be a mere child in his conception of the operations of war’.15 Glover points to the ‘feckless strategy’ made worse by Whitelocke’s shambolic attack on Buenos Aires.16 While even Napier thought the Whig ministry ‘remarkable for unfortunate military enterprises’, in particular for assembling 9,000 men for ‘permanent conquests in South America...perhaps in imitation of the Roman senate, who sent troops to Spain when Hannibal was at the gates of the city’.17 For Hall the Cabinet ‘allowed itself to be sucked into the morass of South America’.18 The in-coming Portland administration were also critical of their predecessors, Castlereagh noting the Talents lack of a coherent strategy towards South America and their indecision in not following up Popham’s actions sooner.19 South America was now too agitated against Britain for direct military intervention, hence, as Duffy has recognised, the main object after the Talents failure was not large-scale military conquest, but to ‘occupy strategic points from which to establish commerce with Spanish America…in this way British influence could be established without requiring the burdens of direct rule over the whole continent’.20 Castlereagh clearly did not see conquest leading to permanent possession as a viable option and was particularly concerned the entire region might erupt in rebellion, leaving no semblance of government. This was a real fear; after the revolt against Popham in 1806 what South America wanted was independence from all imperial control. Carefully assessing the situation, the Portland administration looked to the benign spread of British influence or soft power through the growth of illicit commerce with South America. This is patently clear in Canning’s memorandum on Mexico: to call in the strength of the New World to counter French dominance of the Old World. Canning clearly viewed the war with

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France as a global economic struggle for survival and that at the end of conflict the accounts would have to be balanced. If Britain ended the wars as the carrier of global trade it would compensate her for the sacrifices made in the same way the European powers would want territorial compensation for their war efforts. To assist the spread of British commerce the Portland ministry looked to exercise influence throughout the region by placing an Anglophile Bourbon monarch on a South American throne. This latter scheme came to nothing, but ministers grasped at the opportunity presented by the flight of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil to achieve their ends in a slightly different way. Set against the maelstrom of Napoleonic Europe the transatlantic voyage of the Portuguese court to Brazil seems rather small fry but it was crucial in providing, for the first time, a friendly and receptive government in South America. As with the Talents, one thing pressed greatly on the Portland cabinet: the dire possibility Napoleon might concentrate the power of the New and Old worlds against Britain. With the Prince Regent installed in Brazil Napoleon could make no legitimate claim to Portugal or Brazil. Britain, on the other hand, could cultivate the relationship with Brazil as the conduit for the spread British maritime-based commerce in the region. Only when it seemed increasingly likely Napoleon was determined on a takeover of Spain, did ministers consider sending troops to South America. But once rebellion broke out in Spain the Portland administration held back, waiting to see if British troops could be utilised in Iberia. South America was still on the agenda right up until late June 1808, but the arrival of the Spanish deputies and the realisation that the revolt was widespread caused ministers to make a firm commitment to Europe. This, of course, suggests interest in South America was part of what might be termed the British ‘Plan B’ in the period. Duffy for one has argued British ‘imperial’ policy ‘became the fall-back defensive strategy for successive British governments’.21 South American projects were always subordinate to European considerations as expeditions were shelved to progress peace talks in 1796 and 1800-1801; for strategic reasons, such as removing the French from Egypt in 1801; or to assist Pitt’s coalition building in 1804-1805.22 With Prussia teetering on the brink of destruction in November 1806 Earl Fitzwilliam wrote to Grenville noting ‘these are only preparations to the destruction even of the Russian empire; there is an end of the old world, we must look to the new’.23 Hence, British intervention in South America was intrinsically linked to

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the European situation, and in particular relations with Spain and Portugal. It is interesting to note that the dates for considered military operations Duffy mentions above all occurred in periods when Spain was at war with Britain. There were no firm plans to intervene in the region before Spain changed allegiance in 1796, or after the peace of Amiens, until British actions forced the Spaniards to declare war in late 1804. Of course, after 1808 Spain was fighting with Britain against France, and, though this did cause problems in the relationship over conduct in South America, they are beyond the scope of this study. All this seems to add weight to the ‘Continental’ interpretation of the wars, the mainstay of which is that France could only be defeated in battle in Europe. But such an argument misses one key point. French strength lay in her territory and population, providing a large army, which was used to devastating effect during the Revolution and Empire. British statesmen could not pursue a Napoleonic Clausewitzian doctrine to decisively defeat the French in battle and force them into agreeing to British war aims at the peace table. Instead, for military, social, economic and doctrinal reasons, British strategy was more subtle, relying on the nation’s rather unique strengths. An insular position, limited European interests (besides the key Low Countries), an economy heavily involved in overseas trade and a powerful navy provided Britain with the advantage in a long-term maritime war of financial attrition. If British intervention in South America was about spreading influence and commerce, then the figures show it was worthwhile.24 On 22 January 1808 the Regent opened the ports of Brazil to all friendly nations, in effect ensuring Britain would dominate trade with the new seat of Portuguese government. Commercial and diplomatic representatives were despatched to press for British concessions. By the end of 1808 there were estimated to be around 100 British merchants resident in Rio; soon ‘Britain rapidly and completely replaced the mother country in commerce’.25 An additional treaty was later signed in Rio on 19 February 1810, setting the import duties on goods entering Brazil at 15 per cent for British goods, 16 per cent for Portuguese and 20 per cent on other countries. This in effect was ‘economic capitulation, an acknowledgement of the shift of Brazilian dependence from Portugal to England’.26 This had the effect of discontinuing the British factories that had transferred to Brazil whereas those that had remained in Portugal were free to resume their business in the aftermath of Junot’s expulsion from the country in 1808.27 By 1812 British exports to Brazil alone were worth

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over £2,000,000 whereas in 1807 they had been valued at £1,200,000. This compensated for the loss of trade with Portugal, which in 1806 had a value of nearly £1.2 million. In 1808 official trade with Portugal only amounted to £811,000,28 while direct British exports dropped to a low of £431,000. Exports to Madeira and the Azores, which in 1807 had been worth £264,000, more than doubled to a total value of £643,000 the following year.29 Although trade with Brazil was certainly important the expansion of commerce could never replace the European markets. Instead, the key factor in combating the Continental blockade was the transfer of the Portuguese government which allowed Britain to penetrate the more lucrative markets of Spanish America. Although South America was never as valuable as contemporaries believed, Popham had optimistically estimated South America shipped 50 million dollars per year to European Spain when trying to gain approval for his plans,30 the value of the trade has to be seen in the context of the struggle between Britain and France. Platt’s figures show that British exports to areas in the Americas outside of the US, valued at £7.8 million in 1805 and £10,440,000 in 1807, increased following the arrival of the Portuguese royal family in Brazil to £16,590,000 in 1808.31 With the traditional European markets denied to British goods: Latin America, with Spain, Portugal and Gibraltar acting largely as entrepôts for Spanish America and Brazil, was providing the main outlet for new trade during a period in which the important European and North American markets were particularly lean. It is hard to argue with Platt’s assessment that for a few years South America ‘really was important to Britain’.32 There is one final issue to consider: a key argument from British statesmen to justify intervention in South America was the fear that France would either seize territory in the region or gain access through the conquest of Spain or Portugal. France had landed troops near Rio de Janeiro in 1711. A repeat performance might leave France in possession of an excellent cruiser base near the trade routes to the East Indies and China.33 In September 1796 British intelligence reports had indicated French pressure on Portugal to hand over Brazilian territory, declare the Amazon open to French and Spanish ships and pay an indemnity of 25 million livres.34 The threat seemed to increase when Spain allied with

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France in 1804.35 Moreover, despite her military success, the campaigns of 1805 had left the French economy in ruins. Napoleon viewed Spain and her empire as a ‘milch cow’ and lumbered her with a debt of 60 million francs.36 In 1806 Napoleon composed a plan for 60,000 French and Spaniards to invade Portugal, with a French expedition of 8-9,000 men heading for Brazil to prevent the Portuguese court fleeing there.37 In the Convention of Fontainebleau of 1807, France and Spain agreed the King of Spain would become Emperor of the two Americas. The colonies, islands and overseas possessions of Portugal were to be divided between France and Spain.38 In August 1807, with a great number of English speculators in Montevideo, Napoleon thought it might be wise to station five or six French frigates off the coast to intercept trade;39 he returned to the subject again in November.40 During the course of 1808 Napoleon would consider numerous plans for operations in South America.41 In April he asked his Minister of Marine, Denis Decrés to employ a few brigs and frigates off the coasts of Mexico, Cayenne and the River Plate. The reason was to introduce agents into Mexico and Montevideo and to inform the Spanish Americans of the transfer of power in Old Spain, which Napoleon naturally thought would be advantageous to the colonies.42 In May he wrote to Decrés ordering him to send a shipment or arms to Montevideo, a port which he considered an ideal base for French expeditions, and inquired how many French ships had actually been despatched to Spanish America.43 It appears he was thinking of sending an expedition to Montevideo demanding that the French forces now occupying Lisbon were to make ready three ships of the line, three frigates and the nine Russian vessels there ready for offensive operations.44 By the end of May he was inquiring if there were enough transports and if the fleet could escape a British blockade and make for Brazil.45 Believing that Britain was approaching financial exhaustion he wanted French commerce-raiding squadrons based in South America.46 After his takeover in Spain, Napoleon thought the whole of the Spanish Empire was at his command and during the summer of 1808 considered plans to seize South America, Havana, Mexico and the Philippines.47 Despite all the potential for bluster and propaganda from Napoleon, there was some substance to the British belief in the French threat to South America. Hence, during the vital years 1806-1808 when Britain stood, largely alone, South America became a key consideration in the British ability to

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stay fiscally sound and, consequently, in the fight against France. With little hope of raising another coalition in Europe the opportunity presented by Popham was just too good to turn down. Clearly British statesmen were tempted by the supposed rich resources of the region and were fearful of French intentions. But it must be remembered the strategic situation was dire during these years as ministers looked to use the meagre British land forces available for operations in a theatre where, in conjunction with the exercise of maritime power, they could really make a difference to the British war effort. The British War Effort and Economic Maritime Conflict Clearly during the years under consideration here Britain was not fighting to overthrow Napoleon or even to decisively defeat France. British war aims were to safeguard the Low Countries, preferably through Austrian control, and to limit French expansion in Western Europe while retaining access to the Mediterranean and Baltic seas. These aims could only be achieved with the help of Austria, Prussia and Russia. During 1806-1808 there was little chance for the formation of a coalition of European powers to achieve these objects. French military success knocked Austria, Prussia and Russia out of the wars during these years. Even peace with France was not ruled out, though the Talents and Portland governments realised this could never be a general peace, but rather another breathing space such as Amiens. With peace unlikely Britain continued to stand alone facing the combined might of Imperial France aligned alongside virtually the whole of Continental Europe. Britain was ‘more than ever before dependent upon her naval superiority for her own security, for strategic action in the one field where the initiative was hers’.48 Therefore, as Schroeder has stated, the ‘year 1807 must therefore rank with 1940 (perhaps even surpass it) as Britain’s finest hour’.49 Britain would continue to fight to preserve and expand maritime strength upon which ‘depended the vigorous life of the great nation which supplied the only power of motive capable of coping with the demonic energy that possessed the spirit of the French’.50 It was maritime trade, the lifeblood of the nation, which allowed her to come out of the war in a favourable position. Not favourable in narrow strategic terms of conquest, or formal empire, but favourable in terms of maritime trade and finance. In other words, as the nineteenth century developed, what would be recognised as the fundamentals of an informal empire.

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While France could and did carry on the war if her trade fell due to her ability to draw on the resources of conquered countries British statesmen simply could not allow the economy to be a victim of French Continental hegemony. It was widely recognised Britain’s ability to continue the war depended on foreign trade and especially exports of manufactured goods and it has been estimated if British trade fell by one third then the capacity to carry on the war would have been greatly if not fatally damaged.51 Long-term borrowing and taxation, to pay for increasing British war expenditure and to provide the means to subsidise European allies, was the cornerstone of British fiscal strategy. This could only work if British trade continued to flourish in a secure maritime environment to provide the finance to fund ever increasing war expenditure. Though Britain was willing to accept some spheres of influence within Europe, France in Western and Central Europe and Russia in the East, any actions which threatened the British Atlantic economy were resisted with vigour. Moreover, Britain could not let her enemies steal a march in these regions. The importance of opening new markets in South America can only be viewed in this light and British interest in overseas trade was entirely dependent on naval supremacy. Clearly Napoleon had short and long-term ambitions to contest British maritime power through the acquisition of naval force and extensive rebuilding plans. Attempts to prevent the Portuguese navy from falling into French hands, and the subsequent blockade of the Russian fleet in the Tagus were part of this. The British Atlantic economy could only be protected by a chain of key strategic naval bases, allowing the Royal Navy to project power. Some of these bases were in British hands, such as Gibraltar, Malta, Bermuda and English Harbour in Antigua, but others were under the control of other powers, such as Port Mahon, Palermo, Livorno and of course Lisbon. The operations of British maritime commerce and the Royal Navy, as Corbett noted, were dependent on such bases. With Europe falling under French military and economic hegemony during 1806-1808 the Talents and Portland administrations reacted swiftly and decisively to safeguard the elements that were integral to British maritime power: a healthy and secure Atlantic economy, based as it was on maritime commerce, protected by the supremacy of the Royal Navy, and supported by a network of naval and commercial bases. Though the Talents will still be criticised, and in some respects justifiably, their policy towards Portugal was strikingly similar to that of the Portland administration, which has received praise for its actions. Yet the

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Talents policy of imperial expansion in South America, even if the implementation was flawed, at least provided the Portland administration with a clear example of how not to approach the problem; something the Portland administration clearly understood and took to heart. Just as Napoleon’s actions had prompted British intervention in Portugal and Popham’s actions presented an opportunity for the muchvaunted intervention in South America, so the Spanish uprising was the catalyst to re-orientate British strategy back towards Europe. Faced with the decision of sending Sir Arthur Wellesley to Latin America or Iberia the cabinet made a firm commitment to the European theatre. With 30,000 men committed to Iberia by the summer of 1808, Britain had made a major Continental commitment but the mainstay of Britain’s national well-being remained maritime security (and how Wellesley’s ultimately successful campaign in Portugal and Spain fits into a wider maritime-based assessment of Britain’s role in the Napoleonic Wars is perhaps for a future volume). Suffice to say for now, with a foothold in Portugal, given the expeditionary and transitory nature of previous British commitments to mainland Europe the key question for many observers was how long they would stay there? …

APPENDICES

Appendix I The Ministry of the Talents, January 1806 – March 1807 First Lord of the Treasury Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Privy Seal Lord President of the Council Lord Chancellor Home Secretary Foreign Secretary Secretary of State for War and the Colonies First Lord of the Admiralty Master General of the Ordnance President of the Board of Trade

Lord William Grenville Lord Henry Petty Viscount Sidmouth (from Sept Lord Holland) Earl Fitzwilliam (from Oct Sidmouth) Lord Erskine Earl Spencer Charles James Fox (from 24 Sept Howick) William Windham Charles Grey [April Visc Howick] (from Sept Tom Grenville) Earl of Moira Lord Auckland

[italicised = sitting in the House of Commons] Source: Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 4, pp.xlvi-xlvii.

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BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Appendix II The Portland Ministry, March 1807 – September 1809

First Lord of the Treasury Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Privy Seal Lord President of the Council Lord Chancellor Home Secretary Foreign Secretary Secretary of State for War and the Colonies First Lord of the Admiralty Master General of the Ordnance President of the Board of Trade

Duke of Portland Spencer Perceval Earl of Westmorland Earl Camden Lord Eldon Lord Hawkesbury (from 17 Dec Liverpool) George Canning Viscount Castlereagh Lord Mulgrave Earl of Chatham Earl Bathurst

[italicised = sitting in the House of Commons] Source: Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 5, pp.li-lii.

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APPENDICES

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Appendix III Portugal, 1793-1806 In 1793 Portugal agreed a defensive and offensive alliance with Spain to protect her land frontiers, declared war on France and sent a division to aid her new allies fighting in Catalonia. An agreement for mutual cooperation and aid with Britain guaranteed the security of Portugal and her colonies from the sea. This was confined to cooperation between the Portuguese Navy and the Royal Navy. After the collapse of the offensive in Catalonia, the Spaniards were forced to make peace with France, and Portugal immediately became vulnerable to French and Spanish ambitions.1 On 19 August 1796 the Treaty of San Ildefonso created a FrancoSpanish offensive alliance aimed at Britain and Portugal. On 5 October Spain declared war on Britain and the Portuguese engaged in peace talks with France. In August 1797 the Portuguese minister in Paris, Antonio Araujo e Azevedo, signed a treaty with the French, by which Portugal agreed to follow a course of neutrality and to close her ports to British shipping. The British reaction to these developments was one of consternation and suspicion, even after the Portuguese Court rejected the treaty.2 The British reaction to San Ildefonso was to stage a strategic withdrawal from the Mediterranean and to base the Mediterranean fleet under Admiral Sir John Jervis at Lisbon to prevent enemy fleets from entering the English Channel. The Portuguese minister in London asked for 10,000 British troops to help defend the country against possible invasion. Lieutenant General Sir Charles Stuart was ordered to take 5,000 men from the evacuated Mediterranean garrisons, proceed to Lisbon and examine Portuguese defensive preparations. While stationed at Lisbon Jervis attacked a Spanish fleet off Cape St. Vincent on 14 February 1797. This famous victory resulted in Jervis being raised to the peerage as Earl St. Vincent. He attempted to promote British influence at Lisbon by convincing the Portuguese they had more to fear from British maritime power than from a possible Franco-Spanish invasion.3 During the French expedition to Egypt of 1798 a Portuguese fleet under the command of the Marquis of Niza served alongside the Royal Navy leading Napoleon to threaten that Portugal would weep tears of blood for her actions.4 Nelson’s success at Aboukir Bay isolated the French in Egypt

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giving Britain the upper hand in the Mediterranean. The threat of an invasion of Portugal temporarily receded; Stuart and St. Vincent were withdrawn from Lisbon, as maritime forces were now required to undertake offensive operations against Naples and the Italian provinces. During the Second Coalition (1798-1802) further French pressure was brought to bear on Spain in the hope Madrid would declare war on Portugal. The Spaniards responded by ordering the Portuguese to abandon the alliance with Britain, close their ports to British shipping and pay indemnities. If Portugal failed to meet these demands Spain would invade. The Portuguese again asked for 10,000 British troops to help defend the country.5 The British response was favourable; assistance should be given, even though this could not be considerable, to ‘prove to the government of Portugal the disposition of your Majesty to do everything in your power to protect them’. If the country could not be protected then the royal family and fleet should be escorted to Brazil.6 Although it was clear Portugal would be threatened at some time the French army in Egypt was to be the main object for a British expeditionary force. A secondary force would defend Portugal. The force in Portugal was downgraded to the point where the British contingent was negligible and its commander returned to England. On 24 May 1801 Spain declared war on Portugal and with assistance from French auxiliary troops, launched an invasion. In London the Portuguese question was debated in Parliament. The ministry decided a squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Sir James Saumarez should be detached from the Channel Fleet to proceed to the Tagus. Saumarez reached Lisbon in late June only to discover the Portuguese military had been completely incapable of defending the country and preliminary peace negotiations with France and Spain were underway. Although not actually finalised until September, the so-called ‘War of the Oranges’ had effectively ended on 6 June with the peace of Badajoz. The Portuguese bought off France and Spain by closing their ports to British shipping and paying an indemnity to France, but the latter rejected the treaty as it did not admit French garrisons into Portugal.7 British ministers were also worried about the Portuguese island of Madeira astride the vital trade routes to the West and East Indies. To prevent the French seizing and utilising the island as a cruiser base the cabinet sent a detachment of 1,000 infantry with 50 artillerymen to take possession of the island and forestall French designs. This action angered the Portuguese who criticised the occupation of the island when

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Britain had argued there were no troops available to assist in the defence of mainland Portugal. Events had moved too quickly in 1801 for Britain to offer any assistance to Portugal or to react once the Portuguese desire for peace was known.8 Britain viewed the Peace of Amiens, concluded on 27 March 1802, as vital breathing space and a chance for recovery in the struggle with France. An agreement from Napoleon to guarantee Portuguese neutrality removed the immediate threat and as long as it held, Britain could place Portuguese affairs into the background. In Lisbon the Portuguese court were aggrieved by Britain’s attitude at the talks. They had wanted concessions at Amiens especially for the losses incurred in the Peace of Badajoz. On this latter point they were extremely angry over the Spanish retention of Olivença, a town that to this day remains a part of Spain. Feeling betrayed by Britain, the Portuguese adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards France in an effort to prevent further attacks.9 In early 1803 France appeared to be making naval preparations to undertake another attempt to exclude Britain from the Mediterranean. Napoleon also demanded Britain surrender the island of Malta, recaptured from the French in 1800, as had been agreed at Amiens. This demand was refused and Britain began to make preparations for war. All confusion over British determination to oppose Napoleon was removed by the declaration of war on France of 18 May 1803. With war renewed Portugal was again vulnerable to Franco-Spanish aggression. Britain consented to a declaration of Portuguese neutrality in June and the following month the Portuguese raised the question of British assistance. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Stewart was dispatched to Lisbon to assess Portuguese military preparations. As evidenced by the events of 1801, on previous occasions Portuguese reports regarding their military effectiveness had been inaccurate. If this was still true there would be no British aid forthcoming to a country that did not wish to help itself.10 Stewart found the Portuguese army under strength, badly equipped, dispirited due to the defeats at the hands of the Spanish in 1801 and discontented with unfulfilled promises of increases in pay.11 Concluding his report Stewart thought if Britain was to intervene, a substantial military commitment would have to be made, the whole of the Portuguese military reorganised and the whole Portuguese infrastructure reformed.12 Stewart’s report proved to be of little use.13 With Napoleon assembling a flotilla in the Channel ports and rebellion flaring up in Ireland, all resources were needed in England as extensive preparations were undertaken

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across the country to repel any French invasion attempt. In September 1803 additional French demands were made on Portugal to close her ports while Spain made diplomatic moves towards Napoleon. In this situation ministers had to confine themselves to thinking of a small pre-emptive strike on Brazil. When it was decided that even this could not be achieved they urged the Portuguese to deliver their fleet to Britain for safekeeping or to transfer the royal family and fleet to Brazil. If Portugal did not comply ministers threatened attacks on her colonies. In no position to offer direct assistance Britain could only watch as the Portuguese paid another subsidy to France thereby preserving their immediate security.14 In late 1804 Britain captured a Spanish treasure fleet, a move unsurprisingly followed by a Spanish declaration of war. This raised the possibility of another Spanish invasion of Portugal. British ministers were particularly concerned after the 1803 Portuguese pay off; it seemed to confirm France was gaining leverage over Portugal. The powerful arguments put to the Prince Regent by Jean Lannes, French ambassador to Portugal, were backed by the threat of the seemingly invincible French army and had a great influence on Portuguese policies. Lannes had persuaded the Regent the only way to remove the threat of a British maritime expedition taking Brazil (or possibly attacking Lisbon) was to downgrade the importance of the colony.15 French designs towards Britain and Portugal were halted by the diversion of forces to war with Austria and Russia. Spanish support for French proposals wavered after the crippling defeat of their naval forces at Trafalgar. It seemed to the Portuguese their policy of appeasement had again, at least temporarily, succeeded.16 …

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Appendix IV The Russian Mediterranean Fleet ‘List of the Russian Squadron now at anchor in the River Tagus from a most authentic source November 17th 1807’ Name

Guns

Commander

Jverdoi

80

Silnoi Raphael Mostuoi Elene Jaroslaw Selaphael Ratvisan

80 80 74 74 74 74 64

Vice Admiral Seniavin / Captain Maleef Captain Maligin (acting) Captain Bourtchensky (acting) Captain Crowe Captain Bouitchensky

Skoroi Venus Kilduine

80 44 32

Captain Rojnoff Rear Admiral Grieg / Captain Artishiff Captain Skeltin Transport

Ships expected from Gibraltar Seid el Badar St Peter Orel Mosco Leochy Spitzbergen

80 74 80 74 36 20

Captain Bailie (Turkish Prize) Commodore Baratnisky Captain Bouitchensky Captain Etssen (Frigate) (sloop)

Source: Smith to Pole, No. 2a4, 18.11.1807, ADM 1/19.

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BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Appendix V The Portuguese Fleet

‘List of the Portuguese fleet which sailed from the river Tagus on the 29th of November 1807 and joined with the squadron under the orders of Rear Admiral Sir Sidney Smith’ Name

Guns

Ships-of-the-line Principe Real Rainha de Portugal Conde Henrique Meduza Alfonso d' Albuquerque D João de Castro Principe de Brazil Martim de Freitar

84 74 74 74 64 64 74 64

Frigates Minerva 44 Golfinho 36 Urania 32 And one other name not known Brigs Voador Vinganca Lebre

22 20 22

Schooner Curioza

12

(Signed) Joaq m Joze Monto Torres Major General, Copy W Sidney Smith Source: Smith to Pole, No. 2a10, 1.12.1807, ADM 1/19.

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Appendix VI The Portuguese Ships left at Lisbon ‘List of the Portuguese ships of war that remained in Lisbon 29th Nov 1807’ Name

Guns

Comments

Ships-of-the-line St Sebastiaõ

64

Maria Prima

74

Vasco de Gama Princera de Beira

74 64

Unserviceable without a thorough repair Ordered to be made into a floating battery but not yet fitted Under repair and nearly ready Condemmed ordered to be fitted as a floating battery

Frigates Fenix Amazona Perola Tritaõ Venus

48 44 44 40 30

In need of thorough repair " " " " past repair " "

Copy furnished by the Portuguese Admiral unsigned W. Sidney Smith Source: Smith to Pole, No. 2a9, 1.12.1807, ADM 1/19.

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BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Appendix VII The Strangford-Smith Controversy

Controversy and confusion have surrounded the roles Strangford and Smith played in the actual embarkation of the Portuguese royal family. Both sides of the political divide tried to claim credit for themselves through the actions of their respective representative. On 23 December The Times published the dispatches of both Strangford and Smith and on Christmas Day reported the beginning of a dispute between the government and the opposition as to the ‘degree of merit which may be claimed by the present Ministry’. The newspaper believed the ‘merit of bringing about this great political occurrence…particularly depends on BUONAPARTE himself’. The reason was his ‘premature declaration that the House of Braganza should reign no longer, as well as the general terror which is inspired by his relentless and ferocious character’. These factors caused the emigration of the Court of Portugal which was ‘an act of the Prince himself, and not of either the British Ministers at home, or of Lord STRANGFORD or Sir SIDNEY SMITH abroad’. It concluded: ‘ministers are neither to be censured, nor indeed greatly praised, for an act, in the execution of which they could have but a small share’.17 Contemporary opinion in the navy believed Smith had been cheated of his rightful share of the credit. One correspondent to the Naval Chronicle stated: We sailors remember with just pride that the sole conqueror of Buonaparte was our leader, and an Englishman; however it may suit the policy or the temper of this or that administration to forget that the MAN is Sir Sidney Smith. Whereas Smith had been ignored by the government Strangford had been rewarded by Canning for ‘what he did not do’. The dispatch published in the newspapers had been doctored by ‘a diplomatic pen…so eloquently narrated to the country gentlemen by a ministerial orator’. The opinion of the men in Smith’s squadron was that Buonaparte and Smith had effected the evacuation.18 In fact the Admiralty had examined Smith’s dispatches outlining the events off Lisbon and delivered to them by Yeo on 28 December. Pole wrote to Smith informing him their Lordships expressed ‘high approbation

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of your judicious and able conduct in the management of the service entrusted to your charge; and in the execution of the various orders you have received from time to time’. They were also ‘strongly impressed with the propriety of the whole of your conduct towards the Royal F of P. The respectful attention which you appear to have shewn to the illustrious H. of Br. has been in strict conformity to their L wishes and they have directed me to express their compleat satisfaction at the manner in which you have in this, as well as in every other respect, obeyed their instructions’.19 Fitzgerald thought Strangford played no part whatever in bringing about the evacuation, instead the ‘mad conduct of Bonaparte’ was responsible. Strangford was ‘fortunate in having become an eye witness to an event so anxiously desired, and so favourable to the interests of our country’. Fitzgerald was certainly upset Canning had not sent him to Lisbon to influence events and was jealous of the praise and rewards Strangford would receive, admitting to Canning on 21 December ‘Should I myself…not have had to boast of that which may now, perhaps, be ascribed as a deed of merit to another’.20 On 24 December Canning replied, arguing ‘Strangford has been eminently instrumental in this business: and such is my opinion, and that of his Majesty’s Government in general of the ability which Lord Strangford has shown in the management of it, and of the share which he has had in bringing it to a successful termination’.21 One recent writer, who takes a dim view of Strangford’s correspondence on the subject, suggests Canning did not object to him taking credit for the operation.22 Strangford had departed from the fleet in Tagus on 7 December and arrived at Milford Haven in the Confiance at 11 a.m. on 17 December and was given a 19-gun salute upon leaving the ship.23 Strangford later admitted some collaboration certainly took place and that he was in London on 19 December. Canning supported Strangford in his claim for the credit and tidied up the dispatches for publication, a point later conceded by Strangford. This may be partly explained by a private letter he received from Sousa dated 22 December, in which Sousa hoped Strangford would receive a demonstration of value for his services. He concluded by stating Canning’s plans ‘would have failed without the personal influence of Lord Strangford with the Prince Regent, without his wonderful exertions in carrying your plans to a sure and safe issue’.24 Portland wrote to Canning on 22 December informing him of the ‘sense I have of Ld Strangfords services makes me desirous of conferring

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that honor upon him which will be the most…beneficial to him’. An Irish Earldom would be ‘more likely to have an effect upon the courts of Portugal & I believe from what I colluded from two or three of our colleagues, would be more generally approved by them’. Canning replied stating he had talked to Strangford about the Earldom but Strangford requested to be provided with a British peerage. Canning himself thought Strangford should ‘rather have the Blue, the Irish Blue’ but noted to Portland ‘that your Grace seemed to think impossible among the conflicting claims for it.’ Canning had conversed with the independent Whig Lord Moira, whose views he respected, and would later press for the appointment to command forces in Portugal in 1808, whose opinion was ‘clearly in favour of Red Ribband’. Mulgrave thought if Strangford had ‘the Red Ribband, and Sir Sidney an increase of his pension, the rewards will be pretty fairly distributed’. On 30 December Portland informed Canning the King had consented and Strangford would receive the Red Ribband.25 And there the matter rested until events brought the debate back to life by the historian William Napier in 1828. He thought Strangford ‘a young man of no solid influence or experience’, whose ‘efforts to make the royal family emigrate, had entirely failed’ and accused Strangford and Canning, both Tories, of collaborating together on dispatches to denigrate the role played by Smith. In particular he argued: Strangford’s despatch, relating this event, although dated the 29th of November, on board the Hibernia, was written the 19th December, in London, and was so worded, as to create a notion that his exertions during the 27th and 28th had caused the emigration, a notion quite contrary to the fact.26 Napier made strenuous efforts to get to the truth behind the events of the war and was also an officer and a gentleman and would not consciously lie but by attacking Strangford he was attacking the Portland Cabinet of 1807-1808. Napier was still bitter about the cabinet’s treatment of Moore, his great hero. By sending Moore to Sweden in 1808 the Cabinet ‘had no other object, than the factious one of keeping an excellent general…at a distance from the only country where their services were really required’.27 Canning and Castlereagh were responsible for Moore’s appointment to serve under Lieutenant Generals Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard in Portugal in 1808 to which Napier la-

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mented ‘The secret springs of this proceeding are not so deep as to baffle investigation ; but that task scarcely belongs to the general historian, who does enough when he exposes the effects of envy, treachery, and base cunning, without tracing those vices home to their possessors’.28 Napier attacked Canning and Castlereagh for plotting to drive Moore ‘into private life’ by forcing his resignation, at the least ‘ministers were resolved at any cost to prevent Moore from commanding the army destined for Portugal’.29 Certainly Canning was not keen on Moore going to Iberia and seemed to sway to opinion in the Cabinet, perhaps supported by the King. Furthermore, Napier blamed them for the tragic outcome of the 1808-1809 Corunna campaign culminating in the death of Moore. He called their plans ‘immature’; the plans, and in intimation the individuals, only became ‘mature, on the 6th of October [1808 when] sir John Moore was finally appointed to lead the forces into Spain’.30 Napier’s other hero was Napoleon, whom he considered a military genius. Canning, a staunch Anti-Jacobin, and Castlereagh both refused to accept Napoleon’s right to be Emperor of the French. Napier attacked the governments ‘shifts and subterfuges’ and criticised their ‘ridiculous denial of Napoleon’s titles’.31 Napier’s two main political targets were both dead (Castlereagh in 1822 and Canning in 1827) by the publication of his monumental work in 1828, hence Strangford was the next best target. While Napier was writing two major issues dominated European politics. The Greek War of Independence (1821-1833) impinged on wider Anglo-Russo-Turkish relations. Britain was concerned over Russian ambitions at the expense of Turkey while the latter attempted to suppress Greek independence movements. The main calls for British intervention came from the opposition Whigs, but Castlereagh as Foreign Secretary until 1822 and Canning his successor until 1827 formulated British responses to the conflict and the wider Eastern Question. Both decided on official nonintervention in the conflict. Strangford was British ambassador at Constantinople 1821-1824 and then to Russia 1825-1826. Canning’s cousin Stratford-Canning was British Minister to Turkey in 1826-1827. Napier’s older brother, Lieutenant General Sir Charles James Napier, was Governor of Cephalonia, one of the Ionian Islands, from 1822 until 1830, and was a keen supporter of the Greek independence movements. By attacking their handling of the Portuguese crisis in 1807, Napier, a Whig, was also calling into question Canning and Strangford’s handling of recent and current international issues.32

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The second issue was the Portuguese succession. João had become João VI of Portugal in 1816 upon the death of his mother and his reign lasted until his death in 1826. João had returned to Portugal in 1821 to rule over the dual monarchy of Portugal and Brazil but his son Pedro had different ideas declaring Brazilian independence in 1822. Miguel, Pedro’s brother, had tried two abortive attempts at rebellion in Portugal to unseat his father and was eventually banished in 1824. Hence, upon João’s death Pedro acceded to the throne of Portugal and Brazil but resided in the latter, hence Miguel saw his opportunity and was proclaimed King of Portugal in 1828. Although the main conflict did not erupt until 1831, three years after the publication of Napier’s first edition, when Pedro abdicated in Brazil and sought British help in removing Miguel from the Portuguese throne, the problems surrounding the Portuguese and Brazilian successions stretched back to the very events Napier was describing and in which Strangford had (or had not) played a key part.33 Strangford attempted to rebuff Napier’s arguments in Observations on Some Passages in Lieut-Col. Napier’s History of the Peninsular War, published in 1828. Strangford claimed his dispatches ‘were originally written, as their date proclaims, on board His Majesty’s Ship Hibernia’ but admitted they were rewritten in London at the request of Canning who thought it ‘quite impossible to publish the whole of my letters as they then stood’. According to Strangford, Canning wanted to protect individuals remaining in Lisbon after the evacuation and who would be at the mercy of French reprisals and to ensure the despatches contained no information regarding a possible British attack on the French held forts in the Tagus. Moreover, Strangford had ‘too strongly expressed the feelings which had been excited in my mind by the conduct of some of the Portuguese ministers’. Such revelations would prove offensive to the government Strangford would soon be re-accredited to and would harm negotiations with the Portuguese over the opening of Brazil to British trade.34 Napier asserted the evacuation was down to Smith’s actions after Strangford had been forced to leave Lisbon. He argued when Strangford was on board the Hibernia he had the intention of returning to England. Then ‘Smith, seizing the favourable moment, threatened to bombard Lisbon, if the Prince Regent hesitated any longer’. Strangford maintained during the time off the Tagus ‘Smith had no negotiations whatever, with the government of Portugal. The whole of that Officer’s transactions with the Portuguese government, at that period, was limited to one solitary letter to Mons. d’Araujo, the minister for foreign affairs;

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which letter, dated on the 22nd of November, proclaimed those measures of hostility’.35 Strangford was convinced neither the hostile measures implemented or Smith’s letter ‘had the slightest effect in producing the Emigration, which had been definitvely resolved upon at a Council, held at Mafra, on the 24th of November, before Sir Sidney Smith’s communications or mine were received by the minister to whom they were addressed’. Smith’s letter was dated 22 November but it was not delivered until 24 November, ‘the very day on which the Council was held, and the determination to embark taken, in consequence of intelligence that the French had actually advanced’. Strangford was naturally keen to protect his former patron and argued the evacuation was: …the result of that admirable work of political providence and sagacity, the Convention, signed in London by Mr. Canning, on the 22d October, 1807. It was the result, most assuredly not of anything that I said or did, during my brief visit to Lisbon, on the night of the 28th November, when the Royal Family were already embarked, but of the information received at Mafra on the morning of the 24th, that the invasion had begun, and that the case had thus occurred, on the actual arrival of which the Prince Regent had, from the first to last, stated His departure to depend’.36 Regarding the actual events of 28-29 November Strangford stated again he ‘arrived at Lisbon on the night of the 28th of November, and almost immediately saw M. d’Araujo, who was already on board ship’. He then ‘proceeded to the vessel in which the Prince Regent was embarked, and, notwithstanding the assertion to the contrary in Colonel Napier’s “Note,” I had a long and a most confidential interview with His Royal Highness’. Strangford stated the Regent was apprehensive ‘but “fully determined” (I use his own words) “to throw himself on His Majesty’s forgiveness, and, at all events, to prefer the noble enmity of England to the false insidious friendship of France.” His resolution to depart was irrevocably taken. It required no confirmation from me’.37 Strangford concluded: ‘1°. That the emigration was not owing to the “negotiations of sir Sidney Smith.” 2°. That it was not owing (what assuredly I never pretended) to my visit to Lisbon on the 28th November. 3°. That it was owing to a series of transactions and engagements which had taken place in the interval between the 13th of August and the 17th of November’. It

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was, according to Strangford, achieved by the power of diplomatic intercourse rather than the menaces of Smith’s Royal Navy squadron.38 With Strangford’s view now in the public domain, Napier reasserted his original attacks. Strangford responded with Further Observations on Some Passages in Lieut-Col. Napier’s History of the Peninsular War also published in 1828. He reasserted the contentious despatch ‘was, as far as manual operation was concerned, undoubtedly written in Bruton-street, but I repeat, that it was a mere compilation and arrangement of my original dispatches, all and every one of which were written and dated on board the Hibernia’. It was rewritten ‘under the special directions of the Secretary of State – that it contained nothing that was not contained in them’.39 Napier then reasserted the Moniteur declaration and Smith’s letter caused the emigration.40 Strangford argued there was no allusion ‘to the House of Braganza in the Moniteur of the 2d of November’. He drew attention to the ‘minor and scarcely official paper, the Journal de l’Empire, of the 31st October’ in which appeared ‘some remarks on His Majesty’s declaration relative to the Copenhagen Expedition. In this long paper, which was copied into the Moniteur of the 1st of November, there is the following passage, describing the supposed fatal policy of England towards her allies. “England would have lost (or ruined) Denmark, if that court had yielded to fear. It is thus that she will have lost (or ruined) Portugal, and that the House of Braganza, IF it makes common cause with England, WILL HAVE ceased to reign.”’41 In fact these demands by Napoleon had been known in Lisbon on 23 October, when news arrived of Napoleon’s outbursts at the diplomatic levee in Paris. Napier was convinced more praise should have gone to Smith for offering assistance while threatening menace if the convention was not implemented. He now concluded praise for the success should be split three ways between Strangford, Smith and the declaration in the Paris Moniteur. In the end the Regent behaved as he always said he would and fled to Brazil with his fleet. One recent commentator has perceptively noted with ‘consummate skill, Dom João had played the weak hand that fate had dealt him’.42 While another concluded neither Smith or Strangford ‘played the decisive part in bringing about the final decision. This was left to Junot’s troops’.43 By examining the movements and correspondence of Smith and Strangford from 24 to 29 November a clear picture of Strangford’s involvement emerges. According to Smith, Strangford remained with the squadron blockading the Tagus until Smith received Araujo’s reply, dated

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25 November, on 27 November informing him preparations for emigrating were underway and the Regent would embark the next day. Smith then sent Strangford ‘back to Lisbon, accompanied by his Flag Lieutenant, on board the Confiance under a flag of truce’. Strangford did not reach the Portuguese fleet until ‘the morning of the 29th when the fleet was actually under way, and coming out to place itself under the admirals protection’.44 On 6 December Smith confirmed Strangford had been landed ‘after M d Araujo’s answer on that subject was obtained’.45 According to Strangford, upon his arrival he had a ‘most interesting communicating with the Court of Lisbon’, during which the Regent ‘wisely direct all his apprehensions to a French army and all his hopes to an English fleet’. Strangford provided assurances Smith’s squadron would protect the retreat from Lisbon.46 In a later dispatch dated 30 November/2 December, however, Strangford made the following statement: ‘I have the Honour and Happiness of being able to inform you that the result of my communications with the Prince Regent has been the actual departure of His Royal Highness and family for the Brazils’.47 He stressed the reason was his visit to the Regent on the night of 28 November and his offer of assistance and friendship during the embarkation. He did admit that when he initially arrived at Lisbon that night he found the Portuguese royal family already embarked and ready to sail. It has been suggested the meeting on the night of 28 November had not been with the Regent but with Araujo. At this meeting it was agreed Strangford would meet the Regent at 8am the following day but the royal family sailed the next day and this projected meeting ‘never took place’ as Strangford was back on board the Confiance at the appointed time.48 Smith had already intimated that when the Portuguese fleet came out of the Tagus he was unsure of Portuguese intentions; if they were evacuating he would not have cleared for action. The actual decision to evacuate Lisbon had been made on 24 November when the Regent had approved orders for the embarkation to begin. On the previous day he had received two important pieces of information: news of Napoleon’s famous declaration the house of Braganza had ceased to reign, and intelligence Junot had entered Portuguese territory. According to Fortescue these facts ‘were sufficient to throw the Portuguese Government into hopeless panic and confusion’.49 The declaration by Napoleon appeared in the Paris Moniteur on 15 November. Traditionally it is supposed to proclaim the ‘House of Bragança has ceased to reign’. The Moniteur of this date states the ‘Prince

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Regent of Portugal lost his throne’, and this ‘fall of the House of Bragança remains proof of the loss of anyone attached to England’.50 Foy argues the Portuguese government was unaware of the French advance until 24 November, the same day the infamous Paris Moniteur allegedly arrived at Smith’s squadron. Now the Regent had nothing to expect from France as had been made clear in the Moniteur: After all, it was better to reign in America than to be a prisoner in Europe. To make such an evident fact as this clear to the dullest understanding, did not require the vehemence of Sir Sidney Smith, or the rhetoric of Lord Strangford. It was a more eloquent counsellor that the two Englishmen, it was fear, that at last overcame the perpetual fluctuation of the Prince Regent: he resolved to embark. Therefore on 25 November the Regent gave orders to receive the French in a friendly manner to hopefully delay the advance and provide time for the embarkation. The following day he published a decree announcing his decision to flee to Brazil and by the 27th the Regent and royal family were embarked, but two days of bad weather prevented the fleet making sail until 29 November.51 Some English historians have surmised Strangford presented the Moniteur to the Regent and that it was the catalyst for embarkation. Oman was convinced Strangford received a copy of the Moniteur on 25 November containing the proclamation, which then influenced the Regent. One historian of Latin American history has even argued Strangford ‘arranged the successful escape…largely on his own initiative’, a statement not supported by the evidence of ministerial involvement contained in the Foreign Office files. Unsurprisingly for a committed Tory and critic of Smith, William James stated the reason for the embarkation was the Moniteur and ‘the reasoning of Lord Strangford’ while for Fortescue ‘but for the firmness of Strangford, the Emperor [Napoleon] would have had his desire’.52 In fact there is no mention of the Moniteur in either Strangford’s or Smith’s official correspondence on the matter. The only reference seems to be in the wording of the letter Smith sent to Araujo on 22 November where he states he wanted to avoid ‘language of menace, indeed while that of France as well as its conduct is of the most menacing description tending to nothing less than the subjugation of the European territory of

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the ancient Royal House of Braganza’. Strangford says nothing of a Moniteur in any of his Foreign Office correspondence. This does not necessarily mean a copy was not present at Lisbon, but simply if there was Smith and Strangford did not think it important enough to mention it to the Admiralty or the Foreign Office.53 Strangford could not feasibly have conversed with the Regent until the night of 28 November at the earliest if he managed to meet the Regent at all. His influence upon the timing of the evacuation was not as great as he, or Canning, thought. Even if a declaration from Napoleon did help influence the Regent he had already made a decision on 24 November several days before Strangford could possibly gain a personal audience. Once the Court of Lisbon had been embarked Strangford may have eased the pain experienced by the Regent at abandoning his country and people to a French occupation by remaining with the Portuguese court until the ships had passed the mouth of the Tagus. He also provided a visible presence of British friendship and assurances the Portuguese fleet would not be attacked by Smith. It is open to debate whether the Prince would have fled without the diplomatic prompting of Strangford and the menaces threatened by Smith. Using the inherent flexibility of a maritime force, the British fleet poised off the Tagus threatened the Prince Regent with a repeat of the ‘horror’ experienced at Copenhagen while at the same time offering salvation. But, ultimately, it was the Regent who had made the final decision. …

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BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Appendix VIII Sir Sidney Smith and Sir John Moore

Historians have vilified Strangford and especially Smith for not sending for Moore’s force at Gibraltar. Fortescue argued his neglect ‘in this instance appears almost criminal, for the entire issue at Lisbon might well have turned on the arrival of Moore’s battalions’. Fortescue ascribes this to Smith’s ‘incorrigible jealousy and selfishness’. Moore reciprocated the ill feeling on the part of Smith, which dated from the operations along the coast of Naples in 1806-1807. Sailing with a detached squadron Smith, according to John Knox Laughton, carried on a ‘bitter and not so successful, [war] against the English military officers, with whom he was supposed to be cooperating’. This was especially directed against Moore, ‘who was quite unable to understand the real merit hidden beneath so much extravagance and vanity’. During this period Moore confided his feelings towards Smith in his diary. ‘I am not obliged to account for the motives of such a man. From experience, I know that nothing is too absurd for his folly, nothing too mean or wicked where his vanity or his interest is concerned’. With two officers displaying immense loathing for each other it is not surprising difficulties arose.54 Smith explained his decision in a letter to the Admiralty on 1 December arguing he, along with Strangford, agreed it would have been difficult to keep the transports off the lee shore in bad weather due to the lack of a safe anchorage outside the Tagus. The sand bars at the entrance of the Tagus were notorious. In 1796 Jervis lost the use of the Bombay-Castle (74) for seven days after it ran aground on the Catchops. Bad weather had prevented the evacuation of the Portuguese fleet and in 1808 several more ships would be lost in the Tagus. Furthermore, Smith saw no design to which Moore’s troops could be applied now the Tagus forts were in the hands of the French. Strangford, however, informed Canning he had sent for Moore on 24 November. To do this he had to inform Smith who could detach a ship to sail for Gibraltar. As already noted Smith was extremely short of frigates and smaller ships. From a naval point of view without a safe anchorage and with the French in possession of Lisbon Moore’s force would have had to conduct an opposed landing, a risky proceeding in bad weather. Smith made an informed decision but his behaviour was unprofessional in many respects and it is interesting he seemed to be over anxious to justify his decision in the dispatch of 1 December.55

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Moore had waited at Sicily for the forces from Egypt, which arrived on 17 October. His command left Sicily on 29 October with 7,258 rank and file, but due to contrary winds did not reach Gibraltar until 1 December. Upon his arrival he found two sets of confused instructions from London. The first, dated 8 October, was signed by Castlereagh and instructed him to leave two regiments at Gibraltar and return with the rest of his force to England. The second set, dated 7 November, were from Hawkesbury and ordered him to remain at Gibraltar as his force might be needed to assist in the Tagus. If this were the case he would receive appropriate instructions from Smith or Strangford. Moore found no such instructions at Gibraltar and, taking the initiative, decided to sail to the Tagus where he could ‘communicate more satisfactorily’ with Strangford and Smith. Once he had firm information on the situation in Portugal he would return to Gibraltar to collect the troops who were waiting for water and provisions.56 At sea on 6 December Moore encountered HMS Bulwark, one of the ships blockading Cadiz, and spoke to Captain Fleming Elphinstone. Moore was informed (falsely as it turned out) the Regent had refused to embark for Brazil, would not allow British ships into the Tagus and that French and Spanish troops had occupied Lisbon. Smith was off the Tagus and Strangford had sailed for England. Two days later Moore came across HMS Foudroyant and received more accurate details of events and the evacuation whereupon he returned to Gibraltar where he expected to find Strangford or Smith ‘or to find letters from them: in this expectation I have been disappointed’. Most damning to Smith was neither Purvis nor Dalrymple had been informed of events at Lisbon. Moore was certainly not impressed by this lack of professionalism, complaining to Castlereagh it was ‘difficult...to account for such a strange proceeding and that in eleven days with every means in their power, neither...Smith or Lord Strangford should have communicated to me events, in which they knew by my instructions I was so materially interested’. Whether Moore was needed or not, it was certainly a blunder on the part of Smith not to inform Moore, Purvis and Dalrymple. One explanation, which might hold some truth, is summed up by one of Smith’s sympathetic biographers ‘his failure to keep Moore informed was deliberate and that he hoped, in this way, to win all the credit for himself’.57 Ministers had been desperately trying to ensure an adequate land force would be available to Smith and Strangford but they had been unsure where Moore was. On 4 December Castlereagh expanded on previous

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orders to Spencer and Moore. Spencer was directed to Sicily but to stop in at the Tagus; if he found Moore there then he was to put himself under his command. If Moore was not there, he was to communicate with Strangford or if the minister had returned to England then with Smith. He was to help in the evacuation of the Portuguese royal family, fleet and Russian ships from the Tagus. If this could not be achieved he was to attack and destroy the naval forces. He was not to land his troops unless he gained access to some of the Tagus forts by consent or force, or alternatively, gained a position that would allow him to re-embark and proceed to Sicily.58 Upon reaching the Tagus Moore was ordered to take command of Spencer’s force and to remain at Lisbon if they were needed for any operations. In fact Moore left Gibraltar on 15 December, anchoring at St. Helens off Spithead on 28 December.59 At Portsmouth Spencer experienced immense problems with victualling his force and had to wait for sufficient transport vessels and finally managed to put to sea on 18 December.60 Once news of the successful resolution of the crisis arrived in London on 19 December further instructions were immediately forwarded to Spencer. He was still to proceed to Lisbon under the convoy of Cotton and if his services were required to cooperate with Cotton ‘in order to capture the Russian fleet’. Castlereagh thought Spencer would be unable to accomplish any objects in the Tagus due to ‘the accumulation of force which the French have been able to collect there’, and he was instructed to proceed to Gibraltar. Castlereagh was, for once, aided in these transactions by inclement weather as Spencer, having been hit by gales on 25 December and which scattered his transports, had put into Falmouth. When informed Castlereagh ordered him to wait there and gather the transports but not to put to sea until he received further instructions from the War Office.61 …

NOTES

Abbreviations ADM BL Add Ms. Cirencester CC CNP Dropmore FO HAR GC CMN CN Naval Papers PD WO WD WSD

Admiralty, The National Archives British Library, Additional Manuscripts Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst preserved at Cirencester Park Correspondence, Dispatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquis of Londonderry Cotton Naval Papers Reports on the Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue Preserved at Dropmore, 1892-1927 Foreign Office, The National Archives George Canning Papers. By kind permission of the Earl and Countess of Harewood. Correspondance Militaire de Napoléon Ier Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée ordre de l’Emperuer Napoléon III Naval Papers respecting Copenhagen, Portugal, and the Dardanelles, presented to Parliament in 1808 Cobbett’s Parliamentary Debates War Office, The National Archives The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington, during his various campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington

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1 2 3 4 5

1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Preface Stanhope, P. H., Life of the Right Honourable William Pitt, 4 Vols., (London: John Murray, 1867), Vol. 4, p.382; also cited in Ehrman, J., The Younger Pitt, Volume Three: The Consuming Struggle, (London: Constable, 1996), p.829. See Ehrman, The Consuming Struggle, p.796. Schroeder, P., The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p.276. See Ehrman, The Consuming Struggle, chtps xx and xxi for Pitt’s efforts. Canning to Pitt, 31.12.1805, Stanhope, Pitt, Vol. 4, pp.364-5; Ehrman, The Consuming Struggle, p.817. Stanhope, Pitt, Vol. 4, p.369; see also Rose, J. H., William Pitt and the Great War, (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1911), pp.548-549 and Ehrman, The Consuming Struggle, p.822. Introduction There is no full account of British policy towards Portugal and South America 1806-1808. Francis, D., Portugal, 1715-1808, (London: Tamesis Books, 1985) provides a satisfactory narrative of events in 1806-8 but does not cover all British ministerial planning and discussions. Macaulay, N., Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), Oman, C., A History of The Peninsular War, 7 Vols., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902-30), Napier, W. F. P., History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, 6 Vols., (London: Thomas and William Boone, 1828-45), Fortescue, J. W., A History of The British Army, 13 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1899-1930), Light, K., The Migration of the Royal Family of Portugal to Brazil in 1807-08, (Rio de Janeiro: Kenneth Light, 1995), Mahan, A. T., The Influence of Seapower upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812, 2 Vols., (London: Sampson Low and Co., 1892), James, W., The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV, 6 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1837), all concentrate on events in 1807. Hall, C. D., British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), p.126; see also Simms, B., ‘Britain and Napoleon’, in Dwyer, P. G., Napoleon and Europe, (London: Longman, 2001), p.195. Broers, M., Europe under Napoleon, 1799-1815, (London: Arnold, 1996), p.144; see also Esdaile, C., Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, (London: Penguin, 2007), pp.276-277. Schroeder, P., The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp.311-331. Mackesy, P., War Without Victory: The Downfall of Pitt, 1799-1802, (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1984), p.122; see also Glover, R., Britain at Bay: Defence Against Bonaparte, 1803-14, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1973), p.21. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.314. Baugh, D. A., ‘Great Britain’s ‘Blue-Water’ Policy, 1689-1815’, International History Review, Vol. 10, (1988), pp.33-34, 52-3. Corbett, J. S., Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988, original published by Longman Green and Co., 1911), p.9.

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9 Ibid., p.15. 10 Till, G., Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, (London: Routledge, 2009), p.20. Till prefers the term ‘seapower’. 11 Corbett, Some Principles, p.16. 12 Mahan, A. T., The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, (New York: Dover Publications, 1987, original published by Boston: Little Brown, 1890), pp.28-29 for the basic list and pp.29-89 for a more detailed assessment of the elements of maritime power. 13 Till, Seapower, pp.84-85. 14 Ibid., p.83. 15 Black, J., Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815, (London: Routledge, 1999), p.221. 16 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 4, part 1, p.86; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.128-9; Esdaile, C., The Peninsular War: A New History, (London: Allen Lane, 2002), p.89-90. 17 Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.113; Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 4, part 1, pp.73-74; Simms, ‘Britain and Napoleon’, p.198. 18 Hall, British Strategy, pp.83-85; Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, p.77. 19 Glover, R., Britain at Bay: Defence Against Bonaparte, 1803-14, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1973), p.18. 20 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 4, part 1, part 1, p.74. 21 Howard, M., The Causes of Wars and other essays, (London: Temple Smith, 1983), p.179. 22 Citation in Hall, British Strategy, p.86. British war aims were achieved in 1815 when the Congress of Vienna created the independent United Kingdom of the Netherlands. 23 Ibid., p.89. 24 Blanning, T., The Pursuit of Glory: Europe 1648-1815, (London: Penguin Books, 2007), p.105. 25 Emsley, C., The Longman Companion to Napoleonic Europe, (London: Longman, 1993), p.132. 26 Mackesy, P., The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957), p.9. 27 Emsley, Napoleonic Europe, p.132. 28 Esdaile, C., The Wars of Napoleon, (London, Longman, 1995), pp.144-5; Duffy, M., ‘‘Science and Labour’: The Naval Contribution to Operations ashore in the Great Wars with France, 1793-1815’, in Hore, P., (ed.) Seapower Ashore, 200 years of Royal Navy Operations on Land, (London: Chatham, 2001), p.39. For a detailed discussion of manpower problems see Hall, British Strategy, pp.1-9. 29 Windham to Grenville, 22.9.1806, Grenville to Windham, 23.9.1806, Historic Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq. preserved at Dropmore, 10 Vols., (London: HMSO, 1892-1927), (hereafter Dropmore), Vol. 8, p.353 30 ‘Memorandum for the Cabinet’ -.3.1807, Vane, C. W., (ed), Marquis of Londonderry, Correspondence, Dispatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquis of Londonderry, 12 Vols., (London: William Shoberl, 1851),

266

31 32 33

34 35 36 37

38

39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA (hereafter Castlereagh Papers), Vol. 8, pp.46-52; Castlereagh to the King, 3.4.1807, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 4, p.552; Hall, British Strategy, pp.153-4. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.117-118; Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 4, part 1, pp.84-132, 141-150. Hall, British Strategy, p.9. Windham to Grenville, 22.9.1806, Grenville to Windham, 23.9.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.353. As a cost cutting measure in 1806 Windham tried to downsize the Waggon Train, an essential part of any British expedition to Europe. Windham also estimated transports for 10,000 cavalry for three months would be £2.4 million and argued the government should pause for a minute before sending troops to the continent. Grenville agreed, replying the expense was ‘so very far beyond any idea I could have formed’. Though as Hall notes, this might have been an attempt by Windham to prevent forces destined for South America going to Europe and shows Grenville’s lack of knowledge in the cost of shipping troops abroad. Hall, British Strategy, p.136. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.129. Ibid., pp.130-131; Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 4, part 1, p.87. Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, p. ix. Sherwig, J. M., Guineas and Gunpowder, British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793-1815, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp.179-181. Certainly under Grenville it seems that Britain ‘doled out subsidies by the spoonful’. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.313, quotation from p.317; see also pp.270-1 for Russia’s treatment of Austria in 1805: ‘an ironic commentary on Russia’s constant claim that, invulnerable itself, it was acting solely to help others’; and p.275-6 ‘At Constantinople the Russians made no pretence of acting disinterestedly for the common cause, but set out openly to destroy French influence and make their own dominant’ in September 1805. See Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, pp.156-158 for more on the problems of subsidies, allies and British strategy; and Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, passim, for an unsurpassed in-depth study of the issues. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.264. Duffy, M., ‘World-Wide War and British Expansion, 1793-1815’, in Marshall, P. J., (ed), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume Two, The Eighteenth Century, (Oxford: OUP, 2001 pbk ed), pp.190-1. Muir, R., Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p.191. It was not just French writers who were critical; Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 4, part 1, pp.206-8, was immensely disparaging of Dundas’ West Indian strategy drawing resources and focus away from Europe. See also Esdaile, The Wars of Napoleon, p.155. Geyl, P., Napoleon: For and Against, (London: Penguin Books, 1965), pp.51. Ibid., pp.217, 229, 253 respectively. Cronin, V., Napoleon, (London: Readers Union, 1971), p.236. Lefebvre, G., Napoleon: from 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, (Stockhold, H. F., trans),

NOTES 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

267

(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p.179. Ibid., pp.194-5, 212. Citation from Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, p.182. Citation from Hall, British Strategy, p.139. Simms, ‘Britain and Napoleon’, p.194. Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, pp.160-161. 11064, 15th Bulletin of the Grand Armee, 23.10.1806, Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée ordre de l’Emperuer Naopléon III, (Paris, 1858-1869), (hereafter CN), Vol. 13, pp.489-491. 11377, Napoleon to the King of Holland, 3.12.1806, CN, Vol. 14, pp.33-34. 12517, Napoleon to Fouché, 3.5.1807, CN, Vol. 15, pp.224-5. Simms, ‘Britain and Napoleon’, pp.194-5. Duffy, ‘World-Wide War’, pp.190-2. Esdaile, Peninsular War, pp.3-4; see also Esdaile, Wars of Napoleon, pp.2-3. Hall, British Strategy, p.79. Duffy, ‘World-Wide War’, p.186. Ibid., (see also Duffy, M., Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), passim, for a masterful examination of the role of the West Indies in British strategy); Mackesy, P., War Without Victory: The Downfall of Pitt, 1799-1802, (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1984), especially pp.8-15; Matheson, C., The Life of Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville, (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1933), pp.176-90; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.118, 127; Memorandum by Henry Dundas, 31.3.1800, Hattendorf, J. B., Knight, R. J. B., Pearsall, A. W. H., Rodger, N. A. M., Till, G., (eds), British Naval Documents 1204-1960, Navy Records Society, No. 131, (1993), pp.344-5. Ehrman, The Consuming Struggle, p.421. Duffy, ‘World-Wide War’, p.184. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.298. Recent research has shown that by 1815 the emphasis of the Empire had shifted from the Atlantic to a very different kind of empire centred in the East Indies and India in particular, see Duffy, ‘World-Wide War’, pp.184-207. Deane, P., and Cole, W. A., British Economic Growth, 1688-1959: Trends and Structure, (Cambridge: CUP, 1962), p.34 Platt, D. C. M., Latin America and British Trade, 1806-1914, (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1972), p.28. Hall, British Strategy, p.95-6. Emsley, Napoleonic Europe, pp.132-33. British export trade suffered an overall decline from £41,412,000 to £36,527,000 in the same period. Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, quotation from p.5, see also p.10. Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, (London: Fontana Press, 1991, 3rd ed), p.152. Emsley, Napoleonic Europe, pp.132-3. Horsfall, L. F., ‘The West Indian Trade’ in Northcote Parkinson, C., (ed), The Trade Winds: A Study of British Overseas Trade during the French Wars, 17931815, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1948), p.163. Ehrman, J., The Younger Pitt, Volume One: The Years of Acclaim, (London:

268


Constable, 1984 pbk ed, originally published 1969), p.332. 74 Quotation from Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 4, part 1, p.79; see Auckland to Grenville, 6.6.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.181; Horsfall, ‘The West Indian Trade’, pp.158-161. 75 Collingwood to Carlyle, 2.7.1805, remarks ‘I believe their object in the West Indies to be less conquest, than to draw our force from home’, Hughes, E., (ed), The Private Correspondence of Admiral Lord Collingwood, Navy Records Society, No. 98, (1956-7), p.159. 76 Nelson to Simon Taylor, 10.6.1805, Nicolas, N. H., (ed), The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson, 7 Vols., (London: Chatham, 1997, originally published London: Henry Colburn, 1844), Vol. 6, pp.450-451. See also Nelson to Davison, 7.5.2805, ibid., p.427. 77 Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, p.19. 78 Duffy, ‘World-Wide War’, p.186; see also Ehrman, J., The Younger Pitt, Volume Two: The Reluctant Transition, (London: Constable, 1983), pp.262-4; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.118, 127; Black, Britain as a Military Power, p.241-243. 79 Duffy, ‘World-Wide War’, p.187. 80 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 4, part 1, pp.384-5, 565. 81 Esdaile, The Peninsular War, pp.3-4. 82 Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.127. 83 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 4, part 1, p.325. 84 Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, p.156. 85 Duffy, ‘World-Wide War’, pp.188-9. 86 Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, pp.7, 12 and ‘World-Wide War’, p.187. 87 Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, p.23. 88 9767, Napoleon to Decrès, CN, Vol. 12, p.21. 89 10364, Napoleon to Decrès, 14.6.1806, CN, Vol. 12, p.570. 90 10703, Napoleon to Decrès, 29.8.1806, CN, Vol. 13, p.139. 91 Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, p.20. 92 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 4, part 1, pp.425-438. 93 Hall, British Strategy, pp.77-8. 94 Ehrman, The Consuming Struggle, pp.424-5. 95 For Goa see Cooper, R. G. S., ‘Amphibious Options in Colonial India: Anglo-Portuguese Intrigue in Goa, 1799’ in Cogar, W. B., (ed), New Interpretations in Naval History, Selected Papers from the Twelfth Naval History Symposium, (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 1997), pp.96-8, 108; Oliviera, Marques, A. D., History of Portugal, 2 Vols., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Vol. 1, p.477. 96 Simms, ‘Britain and Napoleon’, p.194. 97 Howard, The Causes of Wars, pp.173, 184-6, quotation from p.184. 98 Corbett, J. S., ‘Napoleon and the British Navy after Trafalgar’, Quarterly Review, 1922, pp.243-243. 99 Liddell Hart, B. H., ‘Economic Pressures or Continental Victories’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, No. 76, (1931), pp.495-500, quotation from p.500; Liddell Hart, B. H., The British way in Warfare, (London: Faber and Faber, 1932), p.7.

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100 Duffy, ‘World-Wide War’, p.184. 101 Ibid., pp.190-2. 102 Baugh, D. A., ‘British Strategy During the First World War in the context of Four Centuries: Blue-Water versus Continental Commitment’, in Masterson, D. M., (ed), The Sixth Symposium of the U. S. Naval Academy, (Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1987), p.87. 103 Baugh, ‘Great Britain’s ‘Blue-Water’ Policy’, p.56. 104 Esdaile, The Wars of Napoleon, p.156. 105 Till, Seapower, p.34. 1

2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Chapter 1: The Strategy of the Talents Ministry For Grenville see Jupp, P., Lord Grenville, 1759-1834, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) and Jupp, P., ‘The Aims and Achievements of Lord Grenville’, in Bossy, J., and Jupp, P., (eds) Essays Presented to Michael Roberts, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1976), for Fox, Derry, J. W., Charles James Fox, (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1972) and Mitchell, L. G., Charles James Fox, (Oxford: University Press, 1992). Hall, C. D., British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), p.131. Auckland to Grenville, 10.6.1806, Historic Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq. preserved at Dropmore, 10 Vols., (London: HMSO, 1892-1927), (hereafter Dropmore), Vol. 8, p.182. Fox to Talleyrand, 20.2.1806, Cobbett’s Parliamentary Debates, (London: T. C. Hansard, 1808), (hereafter Hansard), 22.12.1806, Vol. 8, p.92. Grenville admitted they may have been a ruse to keep Britain occupied while Napoleon made military plans for conquest in the East. Grenville to Lauderdale, 4.9.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.304-5; see also Esdaile, C., Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, (London: Penguin, 2007), p.244; for an in depth account see Butterfield, H., Charles James Fox and Napoleon: The Peace Negotiations of 1806, (London: The Athlone Press, 1962). Fox to the King, 19.4.1806, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 4, p.435. Schroeder, P., The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp.294-7; Hall, British Strategy, p.132. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.294-7. News of the Prussian declaration of war on France reached London on 19 October. Howick to Grenville, 19.10.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.392. Hall, British Strategy, p.132. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.243; Esdaile, C., The Peninsular War: A New History, (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp.89-90. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.297. Ibid. Esdaile, Peninsular War, p.5. Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, pp.244, 246. Fox to the King, 19.4.1806, enclosing Cabinet minute and the Kings reply, 20.4.1806, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, pp.435-6; Minute of Cabinet, 15.7.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.235-6. This continued during

270

17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28

29

30 31 32

33 34 35 36 37 38

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Fox’s illness see Cabinet minute, 7.9.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.312. Quotation from Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.297. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.298. Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, p.245. Quotation from Esdaile, Peninsular War, pp.89-90, see also Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, pp.77-82 for earlier examples of the French ‘riding roughshod over treaties and frontiers as she thought fit’. See Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.232-9 for Napoleon’s actions after Amiens in Switzerland, Germany and Italy. Esdaile, Peninsular War, pp.89-90; and Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, pp.77-82. Rose, J. H., The Life of Napoleon I, 2 Vols, (London: George Bell and Sons, 1904), Vol. 2, p.104. Esdaile, Peninsular War, pp.89-90. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.314. Hall, British Strategy, p.130. Esdaile, Peninsular War, p.3. See Fox to the King, 2.3.1806, and enclosed ‘Cabinet Minute’, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, pp.404. Windham to the King, 20.4.1806, ibid., p.436. Sicily remained in British hands throughout the war. See Gregory, D., Sicily, The Insecure Base: A History of the British Occupation of Sicily, 1806-1815, (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1988), passim, for the full story. Mackesy, P., The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp.154-182; Tracy, N., (ed), The Naval Chronicle: The Contemporary Record of the Royal Navy at War, (London: Chatham, 1999, consolidated edition), (hereafter Naval Chronicle), Vol. 4, pp.12-36; Hall, British Strategy, pp.141-3. Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, pp.154-182; Hall, British Strategy, pp.141-3; Hinde, W., George Canning, (London: Collins, 1973), pp.163-4; Pocock, T., A Thirst for Glory: The Life of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, (London: Pimlico, 1998), pp.199-206; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.311-7; Naval Chronicle, Vol. 4, pp.12-36. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.287. Ibid., pp.268-9. See also Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, p.199. Muir, R., and Esdaile, C., ‘Strategic planning in a time of Small Government: The Wars Against Revolutionary France, 1793-1815’, in Woolgar, C. M., (ed), Wellington Studies 1, (Southampton: University Press, 1996), p.11 and quotation from p.17. Rose, Life of Napoleon, Vol. 2, pp.115-116. Hall, British Strategy, pp,148-9. Muir, R., Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p.7. Simms, B., ‘Britain and Napoleon’, in Dwyer, P. G., Napoleon and Europe, (London: Longman, 2001), p.196. Esdaile, Peninsular War, p.4 and see Esdaile, C., The Wars of Napoleon, (London, Longman, 1995), p.155. Glover, R., Britain at Bay: Defence Against Bonaparte, 1803-14, (London: George

NOTES

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Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1973), p.23. 39 Fortescue, J. W., A History of The British Army, 13 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1899-1930), Vol. 6, p.38. 40 Derry, J., Politics in the Age of Fox, Pitt and Liverpool: Continuity and Transformation, (Macmillan: London, 1990), p.134. 41 Quotation from Muir and Esdaile, ‘Strategic planning’, p.17; see also Glover, Britain at Bay, p.23. 42 Gray, D., Spencer Perceval, The Evangelical Prime Minister, (Manchester: University Press, 1963), p.160. 43 Dwyer, P. G., ‘Napoleon and the drive for Glory: Reflections on the making of French Foreign Policy’, in Dwyer, P. G., Napoleon and Europe, (London: Longman, 2001), pp.122-3; Simms, ‘Britain and Napoleon’, p.193; Esdaile, Peninsular War, p.5. 1 2

3

4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Chapter 2: The Importance of Portugal Campbell to Harrowby, London, 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, p.200; -.7.1804, FO 63/44. Corbett, J. S., England in the Seven Years War: A Study in Combined Strategy, 2 Vols., (London: Longmans Green and Co., 1907), Vol. 2, pp.189, 252, 297; see also Baugh, D. A., ‘Withdrawing from Europe: Anglo-French Maritime Geopolitics, 1750-1800’, The International History Review, Vol. 20, (1998), p.19. See Ward, A. W., and Gooch, G. P., (eds), The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919, (Cambridge: University Press, 1922), Vol. 1, p.15; Manchester, A. K., British Preëminence in Brazil Its Rise and Decline: A Study in European Expansion, (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), pp.7, 12-13, 15-18. Ibid., p.1. Ibid., pp.18-19; Francis, D., Portugal, 1715-1808, (London: Tamesis Books, 1985), pp.1-2; Sideri, S., Trade and Power: Informal Colonialism in Anglo-Portuguese Relations, (Rotterdam: University Press, 1970), pp.19, 105; Shillington, V. M., and Wallis Chapman, A. B., The Commercial Relations of England and Portugal, (London: Routledge, 1970), pp.205-226. Oliveira, Marques, A. D., History of Portugal, 2 Vols., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Vol. 1, p.385. Miller, R., Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (London: Longman, 1993), p.32. Boxer, C. R., The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825, (Manchester: Carcarnet, 1991), p.173. Manchester, British Preëminence, pp.30-31, 33. Oliveira, History, Vol. 1, p.383. Williams, J. B., British Commercial Policy and Trade Expansion 1750-1850, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p.148; Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p.196; Bethell, L., (ed), Colonial Brazil, (Cambridge: University Press, 1987), p.277. Bethell, Colonial Brazil, p.279. Emsley, C., The Longman Companion to Napoleonic Europe, (London: Longman, 1993), p.132. Bethell, Colonial Brazil, p.244. Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p.157. See also Cavaliero, R., The

272

16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35 36 37

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Independence of Brazil, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p.2. Oliveira, History, Vol. 1, p.431. Ibid., p.380; Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p.150. Cavaliero, Independence of Brazil, p.2. Citation in Francis, Portugal, p.204. Barman, R. J., Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, 1798-1852, (Stanford University Press, 1998), pp.10-11, 34, 42. Campbell to Harrowby, London, 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, pp.200-1; .7.1804, FO 63/44; Oliveira, History, Vol. 1, p.453. Campbell to Lord Harrowby, 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, pp.204-228, an unsigned copy of Campbell’s report dated July 1804 exists in FO 63/44. See also Bethell, Colonial Brazil, p.244; Hall, British Strategy, pp.97-8, 144-9; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.295. See Morris, R., (ed), The Channel Fleet and the Blockade of Brest, 1793-1801, The Navy Records Society, No. 141, (2001), pp.1-6, quotation from p.6; Duffy, M., ‘The establishment of the Western Squadron as the linchpin of British naval Strategy’, in Duffy, M., (ed), Parameters of British Naval Power, 1650-1850, (Exeter University Press: Exeter, 1992), pp.60-81. Esdaile, C., The Peninsular War: A New History, (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp.3-4. Goodwin, P., Nelson’s Ships: A comprehensive history of the vessels in Which he Served, (London: Conway, 2002), p.188. James, W., The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV, 6 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1837), Vol. 4, p.283. Ibid., pp.184-191. Citation from Woodman, R., The Victory of Seapower, Winning the Napoleonic War, 1806-1814, (London: Chatham, 1998), p.24. Strangford to Fox, no.4 [?], 18.6.1806, FO 63/50, (received 2.7.1806). James, Naval History, Vol. 4, p.203. Ibid., p.264-265. Woodman, Victory of Seapower, p.18. Collingwood to Purvis, 17.2.1807, Hughes, E., (ed), The Private Correspondence of Admiral Lord Collingwood, The Navy Records Society, No. 98, (1956-7), pp.201-202. James, Naval History, Vol. 5, pp.3-9; Mackesy, P., The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp.244-258; see also Mackesy, P., ‘Collingwood and Ganteaume’, Mariners Mirror, Vol. 41, (1955). For Collingwood’s frustration at not locating the French fleet see Collingwood to Lady Collingwood, 15.5.1808, Collingwood, G. L. N., (ed), A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, (London: James Ridgway, 1829), pp.355-7. Corbett, J. S., ‘Napoleon and the British Navy after Trafalgar’, Quarterly Review, (1922), pp.241-242; Harding, R., Seapower and Naval Warfare, 16501830, (London: UCL Press, 1999), p.270. Harding, Seapower, p.270, table 10.1. Marthinsen, S., ‘French Sail-of-the-Line in the Napoleonic Wars, (1792-

NOTES

38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45

46 47 48 49 50 51

52 53 54

55 56 57 58 59

273

1815)’, Roberts, J., (ed), Warship 1994, (London: Conway Marititime Press, 1994), pp.15-21, James, Naval History, Vol. 4, p.283. Glete, J., Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860, 2 Vols., (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1993), Vol. 2, pp.386-387. Ibid., p.389; James, Naval History, Vol. 4, p.283. Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 2, pp.394-5. James, Naval History, Vol. 4, pp.283-4. Harding, Seapower, p.273. Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 2, pp.396-400. Brazâo, E., The Anglo Portuguese Alliance, (London: Sylvan Press, 1957), pp.4244; Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 3rd edition, (London: Fontana Press, 1991), p.124; Mahan, A. T., The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, (New York: Dover Publications, 1987, original published by Boston: Little Brown, 1890), pp.315-6. The 1805 figure comes from Glete, Navies and Nations, Vol. 2, p.376 and Table 23:51, p.400, the quotation is from p.393, original emphasis. The composition of the Portuguese navy in 1807 is enclosed in Strangford to Canning, 8.9.1807, FO 63/54, ff.151. Fisher, S., ‘Lisbon as a Port Town in the Eighteenth Century’, Fisher, S., (ed), Lisbon as a port town, the British Seaman and other Maritime Themes, (Exeter: UEP, 1988), p.15. Corbett, J. S., The Campaign of Trafalgar, (London: Longmans, 1910), p.100. M Postlethwayt, citation in Fisher, ‘Lisbon as a Port Town’, p.16. Foy, M., Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, 1807-1808, (Felling: Worley Publications, 2000), p.65; Fisher, ‘Lisbon as a Port Town’, p.16. Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, p.65. Hepper, D. J., British Warship Losses in the Age of Sail, 1650-1859 (East Sussex, Jean Boudriot Publications, 1994), pp.82, 89, 94; see also ADM 51/1219; Clowes, W. L., The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present, 7 Vols., (London: Sampson, Low Marston and Company, Ltd, 1897-1903), Vol. 4, p.305; James, Naval History, Vol. 2, p.392. Manchester, British Preëminence, pp.12-13, 15-18. Grenville to Walpole, No. 11, 24.8.1796, FO 63/23. Spencer to Dundas, 31.10.1796, Corbett, J. S., (ed), The Private Papers of George, second Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1794-1801, 4 Vols., The Navy Records Society, Nos. 46, 48, 58 & 59, (1913-1924), (hereafter Spencer Papers), Vol. 1, No. 46, pp.323, 325, 327-8. St. Vincent to Spencer, 10.1.1798, ibid., Vol. 2, No. 48, pp.429-430. Jervis to Nepean, No. 210, 22.12.1796, ADM 1/395. Copy of Jervis to Nepean, No.222, 31.12.1796, ADM 1/395. Admiralty to Commissioner Libra, Lisbon, 9.3.1797, ADM 2/922, pp.169-170. St. Vincent to Spencer, 6.4.1797, Corbett, Spencer Papers, Vol. 2, No. 48, pp.384-5, 387. See Walpole to Grenville, No. 37, 25.8.1796 (received 15.9.1796), Koster to Grenville, Lisbon, Friday 26.8.1796 (received 15.9.1796), Koster to Grenville, 3.9.1796 (received 16.9.1796), FO 63/23; Admiralty to Hyde

274


Parker, 15.9.1796, ADM 2/922, pp.133-4. 60 Extract of Turnbull to Nepean, 13.1.1797 enclosed in Nepean to Canning, 16.1.1797, FO 63/24; Admiralty to Jervis, 26.1.1797, ADM 2/922, p.151. 61 Admiralty to Gardner 12.1.1800; Admiralty to Gardner, 20.2.1800; Admiralty to Bridport, 17.3.1800, Morris, Channel Fleet, pp.426-7, 432, 435-8. See also Corbett, Campaign of Trafalgar, pp.29, 96, 100. 62 Corbett, Spencer Papers, Vol. 2, No. 48, p.367. 63 Citation in James, Naval History, Vol. 3, pp.111-112. 64 Jervis to Spencer, 3.9.1796, Corbett, Spencer Papers, Vol. 2, No. 48, p.51. 65 Corbett, ‘Napoleon and the British Navy after Trafalgar’, p.248. 66 St. Vincent to Spencer, 21.11.1797, St. Vincent to Spencer, 10.1.1798, Corbett, Spencer Papers, Vol. 2, No. 48, pp.418-419, 431. 67 13873, Napoleon to Decrès, 12.5.1808, Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée ordre de l’Emperuer Naopléon III, (Paris, 1858-1869), Vol. 17, pp.123-125. 68 14023, Napoleon to Junot, 29.5.1808, ibid., pp.271-2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Chapter 3: The Portuguese Crisis of 1806 Brougham, H., The Life and Times of Henry Lord Brougham: Written by Himself, 3 Vols., (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1871), Vol. 1, p.325. Campbell to Harrowby, London, 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, p.248. Frere to Canning, 18.2.1807, HAR GC, 64. Fitzgerald to Mulgrave, No. 7, 11.2.1806, FO 63/49. Fitzgerald to Canning, 21.8.1807, HAR GC, 143. Thiers, L. A., History of the Consulate and the Empire of France Under Napoleon, 12 vols, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1894, Campbell, D. F., and Stebbing, J., trans), Vol. 5, p.135. Fortescue, J. W., A History of The British Army, 13 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1899-1930), Vol. 6, p.89; Macaulay, N., Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), chpt 1. Francis, D., Portugal, 1715-1808, (London: Tamesis Books, 1985), pp.213-4. Cavaliero, R., The Independence of Brazil, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p.3. Fitzgerald to Canning, 21.8.1807, HAR GC, 143. See Chrisawn, M., ‘A Military Bull in a diplomatic China shop: General Jean Lannes’ mission to Lisbon, 1802-1804’, Napoleonic Scholarship, Vol 1, No. 2, (1998) for Lannes’ period in Lisbon. Manchester, A. K., British Preëminence in Brazil Its Rise and Decline: A Study in European Expansion, (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), pp.57-58; see also Cavaliero, Independence of Brazil, p.4. Fitzgerald to Mulgrave, No. 1, 9.1.1806, FO 63/49 (received 24.1.1806). Manchester, British Preëminence, pp.57-58. Fitzgerald to Mulgrave, No. 11, 1.3.1806, Fitzgerald to Fox, No. 13, 24.3.1806, FO 63/49. Warre to Strangford, 30.3.1806, enclosed in Fitzgerald to Fox, No. 15, 5.4.1806, FO 63/49. This is the elder William Warre not the younger William who served in the British Army. Fitzgerald to Fox, No. 15, 5.4.1806, FO 63/49. 10092, Napoleon to Lacépède, 14.4.1806, Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée ordre

NOTES

275

de l’Emperuer Naopléon III, (Paris, 1858-1869), (hereafter CN), Vol. 12, p.339. 19 Fitzgerald to Fox, No. 19, 22.4.1806, FO 63/49. 20 Araujo to Fitzgerald, 16.4.1806, Fitzgerald to Fox, No. 19, 22.4.1806, FO 63/49. 21 Collingwood to Fitzgerald, 26.04.1806, Collingwood, G. L. N., (ed), A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, (London: James Ridgway, 1829), (hereafter Collingwood Correspondence), pp.216218. British warships had an agreement to procure victuals and water from Lagos Bay yet the Portuguese had recently been obstructing British ships in order to placate the Spaniards, see Nelson to Strangford, 3.10.1805, Nicolas, N. H., (ed), The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson, 7 Vols., (London: Chatham, 1997, originally published London: Henry Colburn, 1844), Vol. 7, pp.67-69. Lagos Bay was an important source of victuals and water for British ships transiting in and out of the Mediterranean and those blockading the main Spanish fleet base at Cadiz. 22 Fitzgerald to Fox, No. 20, 2.5.1806, FO 63/49. 23 Fitzgerald to Fox, No. 21, 17.5.1806, FO 63/49. 24 Ibid. 25 Fitzgerald to Fox, 21.5.1806, FO 63/49. 26 Strangford to Fox, No. 1, 27.5.1806, FO 63/50. 27 Citation in Macaulay, R., They Went to Portugal, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1946), pp.360-1 and Francis, Portugal, p.249. 28 Brougham, Life and Times, Vol. 1, pp.355-62, 368-9. 29 Maurice, J. F., (ed), The Diary of Sir John Moore, 2 Vols., (London: Edward Arnold, 1904), Vol. 2, p.198. 30 Napier, W. F. P., History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, 6 Vols., (London: Thomas and William Boone, 1828-45), Vol. 1, p.167. 31 See Macaulay, Dom Pedro, p.11. 32 Henning to Strangford, 5.6.1806, FO 63/50. 33 Strangford to Fox, No. 5, 17.6.1806, (received 6.7.1806), FO 63/50. 34 Sousa to Howick, 27.6.1806, FO 63/50. 35 Draft to Strangford, 1.7.1806, FO 63/50. 36 Marsden to Collingwood, copy to Strangford, 28.6.1806, FO 63/50. 37 Strangford to Fox, No. 5, 17.6.1806, (received 6.7.1806), FO 63/50. 38 Strangford to Fox, No. 6, 21.6.1806, (received 6.7.1806), FO 63/50. 39 Strangford to Fox, No. 7, 1.7.1806, (received 17.7.1806), FO 63/50. 40 Ibid. 41 Strangford to Fox, No. 8, 19.7.1806, (received 1.8.1806), FO 63/50. 42 Ibid., which encloses copies of the testimonials. 43 Strangford to Fox, No. 10, 19.7.1806, (received 1.8.1806), FO 63/50. 44 Strangford to Fox, No. 12, 29.7.1806, (received 14.8.1806), FO 63/50; Neptune (86), Héros and Algesiras, (80s) Pluton and Argonaute (74s), with the Cornélie frigate (44). 45 Strangford to Fox, No. 13, 10.8.1806, (received 25.8.1806), FO 63/50. 46 Strangford to Fox, No. 14, 15.8.1806, (received 25.8.1806), FO 63/50. 47 Thiers, History, p.199.

276


48 Citation from Butterfield, H., Charles James Fox and Napoleon: The Peace Negotiations of 1806, (London: The Athlone Press, 1962), p.22. 49 Grenville to Lauderdale, 4.9.1806, Historic Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq. preserved at Dropmore, 10 Vols., (London: HMSO, 1892-1927), (hereafter Dropmore), Vol. 8, pp.304-5; see also Butterfield, passim. 50 Francis, Portugal, p.266. 51 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 5, p.326. 52 Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 4, p.436, n.1. 53 Grenville to the King, 28.7.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.248. See also Butterfield, Fox and Napoleon: The Peace Negotiations of 1806, p.9 54 10752, ‘Plan de campagne de maritime pour cette annee’, 8.9.1806, CN, Vol. 13, pp.193-195. 55 Howick to Grenville, 24.7.1806, Grenville to Howick, 25.7.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.243-4. 56 Phillipart, J., (ed.), The Royal Calendar, or Army service And Commission book, 5 Vols., (London: J. Valpy, 1820), Vol. 2, pp.19-20. 57 Howick to Grenville, 30.7.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.250. 58 Windham to Grenville, 30.7.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.251; Francis, Portugal, quotations from pp.249, see also pp.258-9. 59 Tucker to St. Vincent, 9.8.1806, FO 63/52. See also James, W., Old Oak: The Life of John Jervis, Earl of St. Vincent, (London: Longmans, 1950), p.204. 60 Nepean to St. Vincent, 4.8.1806, FO 63/51. Extracts from this dispatch were published in Admiralty to St. Vincent, 4.8.1806, Naval Papers respecting Copenhagen, Portugal, and the Dardanelles, presented to Parliament in 1808, (London: A Straman, 1809), pp.87-9; see also ‘Extract from the instructions to Lords Rosslyn and St. Vincent and General Simcoe’, undated, Earl Grey Papers, Papers on Portugal, B49/4, No. 4, p.2. 61 Nepean to St. Vincent, 4.8.1806, FO 63/51. 62 Ibid. 63 Howick to Grenville, 7.8.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.259-261; Hall, C. D., British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), p.133. 64 Foreign Office to Rosslyn, St. Vincent, Simcoe, 9.8.1806, FO 63/51. It is probable, from examining Strangford’s reply to a dispatch from the Foreign Office of the same day, that the author of this was Windham as Fox was increasingly ill, though extracts of this extensive dispatch were published as Fox to Rosslyn, St. Vincent and Simcoe, 9.8.1806, Cobbett’s Parliamentary Debates, (London: T. C. Hansard, 1808), (hereafter Hansard), Vol. 10, pp.53843; extracts also exist in ‘Extracts from the Instructions to Lords Rosslyn and St. Vincent and General Simcoe’, Earl Grey Papers, Papers on Portugal, B49/4, No. 4. Foreign Office to Brougham, 12.8.1806, FO 63/52. See also Brougham, Life and Times, Vol. 1, p.335; Schroeder, P., The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p.338. 65 Foreign Office to Rosslyn, St. Vincent, Simcoe, 9.8.1806, FO 63/51. 66 Ibid.

NOTES 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

277

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Also Hansard, Vol. 10, p.543. See Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 5, p.366 for the breakdown of Simcoe’s force. Tucker to St. Vincent, 9.8.1806, FO 63/52. Windham to Grenville, 12.8.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.272. Windham to Rosslyn, Simcoe, 12.8.1806, FO 63/51. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Manuel de Godoy y Álvarez de Faria, Prince of the Peace, First Minister of Spain 1792-1797 and 1801-1808. Chapter 4: The Rosslyn Mission to Lisbon St. Vincent to Strangford, 14.8.1806, enclosed in Strangford to Fox, No. 17, 24.8.1806, FO 63/50. ‘Intelligence’, undated, FO 63/52. Usher to St. Vincent, 6.8.1806, FO 63/52. Strangford to Fox, No. 14, 15.8.1806, (received 25.8.1806), FO 63/50; see also Brougham, H., The Life and Times of Henry Lord Brougham: Written by Himself, 3 Vols., (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1871), Vol. 1, p.332. Strangford to Fox, No. 15, 17.8.1806, (received 1.9.1806), FO 63/50. Strangford to Fox, No. 16, 18.8.1806, (received 1.9.1806), FO 63/50. Ibid. Strangford to Fox, No. 17, 24.8.1806, (received 6.9.1806), FO 63/50. Ibid. Cotton to St. Vincent, 18.8.1806, FO 63/52. Brougham, Life and Times, Vol. 1, p.332. Rosslyn to Fox, No. 1, 30.8.1806, FO 63/52. This dispatch contains an addendum, dated 2.9.1806, and so was not sent until that date. It must have arrived in London with Rosslyn’s later dispatches on 12.9.1806. See also Cobbett’s Parliamentary Debates, (London: T. C. Hansard, 1808), (hereafter Hansard), Vol. 10, pp.547-9. Rosslyn to Fox, No. 1, 30.8.1806, FO 63/52. St. Vincent’s name would undoubtedly upset the Spaniards: he had won his peerage by defeating the Spaniards at Cape St. Vincent, 14.2.1797, and was a patron of Nelson who had defeated the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar on 21.10.1805. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Enclosing copy of Rosslyn’s diplomatic note. Diogo José António de

278

22 23 24

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Noronha Camões de Albuquerque Sousa Moniz (1747–1806), 8th Count of Vila Verde. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. The Portuguese had wanted concessions at Amiens in recompense for Spanish demands incurred in the Peace of Badajoz, 6.6.1801, in particular the Spanish retention of Olivença. Feeling betrayed by Britain, the Portuguese adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards France in an effort to prevent further attacks. See also Francis, D., Portugal, 1715-1808, (London: Tamesis Books, 1985, pp.246-7. Rosslyn to Fox, No. 1, 30.8.1806, FO 63/52. Ibid. Ibid., enclosing Araujo to Rosslyn, 31.8.1806. Rosslyn to Fox, No. 1, 30.8.1806, FO 63/52. Ibid. Strangford to Fox, No. 18, 24.8.1806, (received 6.9.1806), FO 63/50. Roslyn to Fox, No. 2, 1.9.1806, (received 12.9.1806), FO 63/52. Ibid., enclosing ‘Translation of extract from Ega to Araujo’. Ibid. Strangford to Fox, No. 19, 2.9.1806, and enclosing extract, 26.8.1806, (received 12.9.1806), FO 63/50. Rosslyn to Fox, No. 3, 2.9.1806, (received 12.9.1806), FO 63/52; see also Hansard, Vol. 10, pp.549-50. See Francis, Portugal, pp.260-261 for more on Vila Verde and Araujo. Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, 1st Marquis of Pombal. As Minister of the Kingdom 1750-1777 Pombal had effectively governed Portugal pushing through a series of wide-ranging economic reforms. Rosslyn to Fox, No. 3, 2.9.1806, (received 12.9.1806), FO 63/52. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Strangford to Fox, No. 21, 8.9.1806, (received 30.9.1806), FO 63/50. Rosslyn to Fox, No. 4, 8.9.1806, (received 30.9.1806), FO 63/52. Memorandum by Grenville, 14.8.1806, Historic Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq. preserved at Dropmore, 10 Vols., (London: HMSO, 1892-1927), (hereafter Dropmore), Vol. 8, p.273. Lauderdale to Grenville, 7.8.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.273-275. Lauderdale to Grenville, 8.8.1806, 11.8.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.275-277; Yarmouth had a lively private life and was rumoured to be friends with Talleyrand see Lloyd, E. M., ‘The Anglo-French Peace Negotiations of 1806’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 27, No. 108, (1912), passim. Butterfield, H., Charles James Fox and Napoleon: The Peace Negotiations of 1806, (London: The Athlone Press, 1962), p.21, was convinced that at least one of Yarmouth’s dispatches was composed while he was drunk. Lauderdale to Grenville, 12.8.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.271. A Friend of his country to Lauderdale, 12.8.1806, original emphasis, Grenville to Lauderdale, 14.8.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.271-272, 278. Howick to Grenville, 17.8.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.285; see also Hall, C. D.,

NOTES

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

279

British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), p.134. Howick to Grenville, 25.8.1806, Fitzwilliam to Grenville, 25.8.1806, Grenville to Fiztwilliam, 27.8.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.294, 296. Windham to Rosslyn, St. Vincent, Simcoe, No. 3, 28.8.1806, FO 63/51; see also Hall, British Strategy, p.134. Howick to Grenville, 6.9.1806, 10.9.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.309, 315. Windham to the King, 4.9.1806, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 4, p.467. Spencer to Grenville, 8.9.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.312-3. Lauderdale to Grenville, 8.9.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.311. Windham to Rosslyn, No. 4, 13.9.1806, FO 63/51. Ibid.; see also Hansard, Vol. 10, pp.546-7, 551-3; Francis, Portugal, pp.267-8. Rosslyn to Fox, No. 5, 12.9.1806, (received 2.10.1806), FO 63/52. Strangford to Fox, No. 22, 14.9.1806, (received 2.10.1806), FO 63/50. Rosslyn to Foreign Office, No. 7, 25.9.1806, (received 13.10.1806), FO 63/52. Brougham to Rosslyn, Oporto, 21.9.1806, 24.9.1806, Brougham to Rosslyn, Viana, 29.9.1806, Brougham, Life and Times, Vol. 1, pp.350-5. See also Extracts of Warre to Rosslyn, 25.9.1806, 30.9.1806, enclosed in Rosslyn to Spencer, No. 10, 7.10.1806, (received 17.10.1806), FO 63/52. William Warre was the nephew of the great Oporto Consul, John Whitehead, see Macaulay, R., They Went to Portugal, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1946), pp.339-406, Francis, Portugal, pp.257-8. Brougham to Rosslyn, Oporto, 3.10.1806, Lisbon 11.10.1806, Brougham, Life and Times, Vol. 1, pp.355-62. Rosslyn to Earl Spencer, No. 9, 27.9.1806, (received 23.10.1806), FO 63/52. Rosslyn to Araujo, 30.9.1806, enclosed in Rosslyn to Spencer, No. 10, 7.10.1806, (received 17.10.1806), FO 63/52. Enclosure in Strangford to Spencer, No. 30, 14.10.1806, (received 24.10.1806), FO 63/50. Rosslyn to Spencer, No. 10, 7.10.1806, (received 17.10.1806), FO 63/52. Draft [Howick] to Strangford, No. 1, 7.10.1806, FO 63/50. Howick to Strangford, No. 2, 7.10.1806, FO 63/50. Howick to Strangford, No. 3, 22.10.1806, FO 63/50. Strangford to Spencer, No. 30, 14.10.1806, (received 24.10.1806), FO 63/50. Strangford to Howick, No. 32, 26.10.1806, (received 5.11.1806), FO 63/50. Lefebvre, G., Napoleon: From Tilsit to Waterloo, 1807-15, (Anderson J. E., trans), (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p.13. Schroeder, P., The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p.338; Esdaile, C, Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, (London: Penguin, 2007), pp.308-309. Howick to Strangford, No. 4, 5.11.1806, FO 63/50. Howick to Strangford, No. 5, 5.11.1806, FO 63/50. Strangford to Howick, No. 33, 9.11.1806, (received 18.11.1806), FO 63/50. Strangford to Howick, No. 34, 9.11.1806, (received 18.11.1806), FO 63/50. Strangford to Howick, No. 48, 20.12.1806, (received 2.1.1807), FO 63/50. Strangford to Howick, No. 51, 28.12.1806, (received 10.1.1807). FO 63/50.

280


79 Ibid. 80 Howick to Strangford, No. 7, 23.12.1806, FO 63/50. 81 Strangford to Howick, 25.1.1807, original emphasis, 13.3.1807, FO 63/54, ff.17. 1

2

3 4

5

6 7

8 9

Chapter 5: The Talents and South America Just a few examples will suffice, all from Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée ordre de l’Emperuer Naopléon III, (Paris, 1858-1869), (hereafter CN). England wants to ‘excite Prussia against France’, Prussia would be ruined and the continent placed in a state of blockade against Britain. ‘Is this the blood with which the English hope for to feed their trade and to revive their industry?’, 11064, 15th Bulletin of the Grand Armee, 23.10.1806, CN, Vol. 13, pp.489491. British disasters and impotence on the continent had led them instead to attacking the colonies of France and Spain, 11377, Napoleon to the King of Holland, 3.12.1806, CN, Vol. 14, pp.33-34. ‘The English make fun of the Russians’. While the Russians fought ‘the English made expeditions important for their particular account. They have just taken Montevideo’, 12517, Napoleon to Fouché, 3.5.1807, CN, Vol. 15, pp.224-5. See also Esdaile, C., The Wars of Napoleon, (London, Longman, 1995), p.155. Geyl, P., Napoleon: For and Against, (London: Penguin Books, 1965), pp.51, 217, 229, 253. Cronin, V., Napoleon, (London: Readers Union, 1971), p.236. Of course they tend to view Napoleon’s lust for a Napoleonic Empire in a more favourable light. Lefebvre, G., Napoleon: from 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, (Stockhold, H. F., trans), (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), pp.194-5, 212. Dundas to the King, 23.1.1797, King to Dundas, 24.1.1797, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 vols, (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 2, pp.537-538, 537, n.1; Duffy, M., ‘World-Wide War and British Expansion, 1793-1815’, in Marshall, P. J., (ed), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume Two, The Eighteenth Century, (Oxford: OUP, 2001 pbk ed), p.193, provides an overview of the various projects. Unsigned memorandum, 26.11.1803, PRO 30/8/345, pp.83-4, the author is probably Popham. See also Sparrow, E., Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-1815, (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), p.315; see also Popham, H., A Damned Cunning Fellow, The eventful life of Rear-Admiral Sir Home Popham 1762-1820, (Tywardreath: The Old Ferry Press, 1991), pp.133-4. ‘Plans for Occupying Spanish America’, William Jacob, 26.10.1804, PRO 30/8/345, pp.101-104. See also Kaufmann, W. W., British Policy and the Independence of Latin America, 1804-1828, (Hamden: Archon Books, 1967), pp.5-8. The £50 million figure is from Hall, C. D., British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), pp.97, see also 112-113; Kaufmann, British Policy, pp.10-13; Popham, A Damned Cunning Fellow, pp.133-134; Fortescue, J. W., A History of The British Army, 13 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1899-1930), Vol. 5, p.312. Duffy, ‘World-Wide War’, p.194; Ehrman, J., The Younger Pitt, Volume Three: The Consuming Struggle, (London: Constable, 1996), p.796. Graham, G. S., and Humphreys, R. A., (eds), The Navy and South America, 1807-1823, Navy Records Society, Vol. 104, (1962), pp.xxv-xxvi.

NOTES

281

10 Hall, British Strategy, pp.97-8. 11 Campbell to Harrowby, London, 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, pp.204, 208-14, 219 and 228; an unsigned copy dated July 1804 exists in FO 63/44; see also Oliveira, Marques, A. D., History of Portugal, 2 Vols., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Vol. 1, p.453. 12 Platt, D. C. M., Latin America and British Trade, 1806-1914, (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1972), pp.4-7; see also Hall, British Strategy, p.97. 13 Campbell to Harrowby, London, 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, pp.204, 208-14, 219 and 228; an unsigned copy dated July 1804 exists in FO 63/44; see also Oliveira, History, Vol. 1, p.453. 14 Ellis, G., ‘The Nature of Napoleonic Imperialism’, in Dwyer, P. G., Napoleon and Europe, (London: Longman, 2001), p.99. 15 Sparrow, Secret Service, p.315. 16 Walpole to Grenville, No. 37, 25.8.1796, (received 15.9.1796), FO 63/23. 17 Bonner-Smith, D., (ed), Letters of Admiral of the Fleet the Earl St. Vincent, 18011804, 2 Vols., Navy Records Society, No. 55, Vol. 1, pp.159-60, 165-8. 18 Unsigned memorandum, 26.11.1803, PRO 30/8/345, pp.83-4, the author is probably Popham; Sparrow, Secret Service, p.315; see also Popham, A Damned Cunning Fellow, pp.133-4. 19 Campbell to Harrowby, London, 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, pp.214-6. 20 Ibid., pp.214-6, 241. 21 Enclosed in Strangford to Fox, No. 22, 14.9.1806, (received 2.10.1806), FO 63/50. 22 Lefebvre, Brumaire to Tilsit, pp.232-237, 243; Sparrow, Secret Service, p.315. 23 10752, Plan de campagne de maritime pour cette annèe, 8.9.1806, CN, Vol. 13, pp.193-195. 24 Convention of Fontainebleau, 27.10.1807, articles 12 and 13, http:// www.Napoleonseries.org/reference/diplomatic/spain.cfm accessed on 31.7.2003. 25 Duffy, ‘World-Wide War’, pp.193-4. 26 Memorandum by Canning, 2.4.1808, HAR GC, 46a. 27 Lefebvre, Brumaire to Tilsit, pp.232-237, 243; quotation from Sparrow, Secret Service, p.315. 28 Auckland to Grenville, 9.4.1806, Historic Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq. preserved at Dropmore, 10 Vols., (London: HMSO, 1892-1927), (hereafter Dropmore), Vol. 8, p.87. 29 Auckland to Grenville, 5.6.1806, Ibid., p.178. It seems as if the original plan went ahead, though in October 1806 Grenville was against repeating the venture, possibly due to Popham’s exploits in South America. See Auckland to Grenville, 28.10.1806, Grenville to Auckland, 28.10.1806, Ibid., pp.405-6. 30 See Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 5, pp.306-310. 31 Ibid., pp.316-318; Popham, A Damned Cunning Fellow, pp.146-151; Grainger, J. D., (ed), The Royal Navy in the River Plate, 1806-1807, Navy Records Society, Vol. 135, (1966), pp.3-8. 32 Howick to Grenville, 24.6.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.117; Howick to the King, 24.6.1806, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, pp.457-8. Popham’s intentions are in Popham to Marsden, 13.4.1806, Grainger,

282

33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49

50 51 52 53

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.19. See also Popham, A Damned Cunning Fellow, pp.144-151. Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 5, p.318 states late July. Howick to the King, 24.6.1806, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, pp.457-8. Windham to the King, 24.6.1806, ibid., p.458. Cabinet Minute, 26.6.1806, ibid., p.458. Navy Board to Popham, 28.7.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.118. Windham to Grenville, 11.9.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.321. The quotation comes from Popham to Marsden, 8.7.1806, and the figure of one million from same to same, 12.7.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.40, 46. Popham, A Damned Cunning Fellow, p.151-152, states 1.1 million dollars cash. See also Windham to Buckingham, 12.9.1806, T. Grenville to Buckingham, 13.9.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.122. Windham to the King, 13.9.1806, King’s Reply, 14.9.1806, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, pp.469-470. Cabinet Minute, 20.10.1806, ibid., p.482. See also Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.x, 19 and Popham, A Damned Cunning Fellow, pp.144-151. Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.111-112. Popham made it clear in his dispatch of 12.7.1806 that ‘Great Britain is now in the possession of the capital of one of the richest provinces of South America’, Popham to Marsden, 12.7.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.45. Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 5, p.374; Hall, British Strategy, p.144. Grenville to Lauderdale, 12.9.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.321-324 Grenville to Lauderdale, 14.9.1806, ibid., pp.332-3. Goddard to Grenville, 19.9.1806, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.343. Grenville to Lauderdale, 22.9.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.123-4 and p.xi; and also Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.352. Grenville to Howick, 29.9.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.126 and also Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.366-8; Hall, British Strategy, p.133. Grenville had already considered the South America-Naples exchange on 25 July, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.245. Grenville to Lauderdale, 1.10.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.126-7 and also Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.368-9. Popham, A Damned Cunning Fellow, p.152; Hall, British Strategy, p.144. The figures regarding trading potential are from Popham to Melville, 12.7.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.45-46. See Popham to the ‘Mayor and Corporation’ of Manchester, 19.7.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.123, for an example of the open letters. When estimating the trading potential Popham did not clarify if he was referring to the province or just the city and if the value was dollars or sterling. Lowther to Camden, 28.9.1806, Resolutions from Manchester, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.124-5. Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 5, pp.372-4. Auckland to Grenville, 19.9.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.339. Auckland to Grenville, 25.11.1806, ibid., pp.441-2.

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54 Hall, British Strategy, pp.145-6. 55 Esdaile, C., Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, (London: Penguin, 2007), p.264. 56 Grenville to Buckingham, 3.10.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.128-9, see also p.112. 57 Buckingham to Grenville, 15.10.1806, ibid, p.130 and also Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.386-7. 58 A point succinctly made by Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.115. 59 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 5, pp.366, 372; Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.112. 60 Sidmouth to Grenville, 25.10.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.401. 61 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 5, p.375. 62 Windham to Craufurd, 30.10.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.136-7. Though by December Windham was having reservations about Grenville’s plan, see Windham to Tom Grenville, 30.12.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.150-1. 63 See ibid, pp.111-3, and 135; Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 5, p.377. 64 Grenville to Buckingham, 31.10.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.139 and also Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.415-6. 65 Windham to Grenville, 2.11.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.140 and Dropmore, Vol. 8, pp.418-420. 66 Admiralty to Murray, 10.11.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.143. 67 Stanhope, P. H., Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, 1831-1851, (London, John Murray: 1888), p.182. 68 Muir, R., and Esdaile, C. J., ‘Strategic planning in a time of Small Government: The Wars Against Revolutionary France, 1793-1815’, in Woolgar, C. M., (ed), Wellington Studies 1, (Southampton: University Press, 1996), pp.27-28; see also Wellington, 2nd Duke, (ed), Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K.G., 15 Vols., (London: John Murray, 1858-72), (hereafter WSD), Vol. 6, pp.35-82. 69 Wellesley to Grenville, 2.11.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 9, pp.481-485. 70 Wellesley to Grenville, 20.11.1806, ibid., pp.485-487. 71 Ibid., pp.487-493. 72 Marquis Wellesley to Grenville, 25.11.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.442. In fact it seems as if ministers had decided to give Arthur Wellesley the command, see Windham to Tom Grenville, 30.12.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.150-151, even Popham had heard rumours to that effect, Popham to Baird, 16.12.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.196-197. 73 Fitzwilliam to Grenville, 3.11.1806, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.140. Grainger, p.xi., remarks this ‘prescient remark…about the new world being called in to balance the old which Canning appropriated fifteen years later in somewhat similar international circumstances’. In fact, as we shall soon see, Canning was a keen proponent of this policy during his time in the Portland cabinet. 74 For details see Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 5, pp.368-372; Popham, A Damned Cunning Fellow, pp.154-8; Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate,

284


pp.10-13. 75 Strangford to Howick, No. 49, 20.12.1806, (received 2.1.1807), FO 63/50. 76 Admiralty to Murray, 2.1.1807, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.153; see also Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 5, p.379. 77 Grenville to Buckingham, 14.1.1807, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.155. 78 T. Grenville to the King, 17.1.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.505. 79 T. Grenville to the King, 18.1.1806, ibid., p.506; T. Grenville to Buckingham, 20.1.1807, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.155. 80 T. Grenville to the King, 25.1.1806, Windham to the King, 25.1.1806, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, pp.507-8; T. Grenville to Collingwood, 27.1.1807, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.155-6. 81 For example see ‘Memorandum on Sailing Times’, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.156-157. 82 Wellesley to Grenville, 25.1.1807, Dropmore, Vol. 9, pp.22-5. 83 ‘Confidential Memorandum’, 29.1.1807, ibid., pp.479-481. 84 Wellesley to Grenville, 17.2.1807, ibid., pp.40-44; WSD, Vol. 6, pp.35-82. See also Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.115. 85 T. Grenville to Buckingham, 17.2.1807, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.161-2. 86 Hall, British Strategy, p.148. 87 Minute in Lord Grenville’s hand, Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.157, n.83, dates this to February 1807. With support from the sea such garrisons could also be easily evacuated. 88 Duffy, ‘World-Wide War’, p.194; see also Hall, British Strategy, p.147. 89 Windham to the King, 8.3.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.523. 90 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 5, pp.414-432; Hall, British Strategy, pp.147-8; Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.253-258. See also Fletcher, I., The Waters of Oblivion: The British Invasion of the Rio De La Plata, 1806-1807, (Stroud: Spellmount, 2006), chtps, 7 and 8. 91 Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, pp.5-6. 92 Ibid., p.xi. 93 Buckingham to Grenville, 16.11.1806, Dropmore, Vol. 8, p.435. 94 Grainger, Royal Navy in the River Plate, p.xi. 95 Hall, British Strategy, pp.143-4. 96 Ibid., p.139, and p.147. 97 Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, pp.268-269. 98 See Hall, British Strategy, p.57-8. 1

Chapter 6: The Strategy of the Portland Ministry ‘Portland was so ill all yesterday as to be little capable of taking on business’, Chatham to the King, 23.3.1807, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 vols, (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 4, p.533; see also Hinde, W., George Canning, (London: Collins, 1973), p.155; Gray, D., Spencer Perceval, The Evangelical Prime Minister, (Manchester: University Press,

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1963), pp.91-2. Muir, R., and Esdaile, C. J., ‘Strategic planning in a time of Small Government: The Wars Against Revolutionary France, 1793-1815’, in Woolgar, C. M., (ed), Wellington Studies 1, (Southampton: University Press, 1996), p.17; Sparrow, E., Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-1815, (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), pp.334-5. Chatham has been described as ‘notoriously lazy and dilatory; yet he was not without ability and – at least in the Portland government – his views had some influence’, Muir and Esdaile, ‘Strategic Planning’, p.19. See Gash, N., Lord Liverpool, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1984). Dixon, P., Canning: Politician and Statesman, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), pp.30-31; Hinde, Canning, pp.43-51; Watson, S. J., The Reign of George III, 1760-1815, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), pp.444-445. See Bartlett, C. J., Castlereagh, (London: Macmillan, 1966); Derry, J. W., Castlereagh, (London: Allen Lane, 1976); Hinde, W., Castlereagh, (London: Collins, 1981). Muir and Esdaile, ‘Strategic Planning’, p.11; Muir, R., Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p.22; Glover, R., Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809, (Cambridge: University Press, 1963), pp.7, 32; Watson, George III, p.444. Watson, George III, p.444; see Gray, Spencer Perceval, passim. Napier, W. F. P., History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, 6 Vols., (London: Thomas and William Boone, 1828-45), Vol. 1, pp.142, 167. Fortescue, J. W., A History of The British Army, 13 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1899-1930), Vol. 6, pp.193, 323. Oman, C., A History of The Peninsular War, 7 Vols., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902-30), Vol. 1, pp.220-3. Watson, George III, p.446. Pope, S., Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars, (London: Cassell, 1999), p.244. Muir and Esdaile, ‘Strategic Planning’, p.17. Hall, C. D., British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), pp.153-179, and Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, pp.9-13, 21-59 have both provided detailed assessments on the achievements of the Portland ministry. Glover, R., Britain at Bay: Defence Against Bonaparte, 1803-14, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1973), p.23. See Derry, Castlereagh, pp.106-8; Hall, British Strategy, p.153; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, pp.21-23. See Hall, British Strategy, p.154; Hinde, Canning, pp.162-3; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p.21-22; Sherwig, J. M., Guineas and Gunpowder, British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France 1793-1815, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp.186-8. ‘Memorandum for the Cabinet’ -.3.1807, Vane, C. W., (ed), Marquis of Londonderry, Correspondence, Dispatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquis of Londonderry, 12 Vols., (London: William Shoberl, 1851), (hereafter Castlereagh Papers), Vol. 8, pp.46-52; Castlereagh to the King, 3.4.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.552; see also

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Hall, British Strategy, pp.153-4. 19 Cabinet Memorandum by Castlereagh, 26.5.1807, WO 1/903, p.449; ‘Measure proposed for Improving the State of the Military Force’, 12.5.1807, Castlereagh Papers, Vol. 8, pp.53-66; see also Hall, British Strategy, pp.153-4. 20 ‘Memorandum of the Language which may be held to the allies on the subject of Military and Naval succours’, undated, probably May or June 1807, Castlereagh Papers, Vol. 8, pp.66-68. 21 Canning to the King, 17.5.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5, p.579. 22 Castlereagh to the King, 1.6.1807, ibid., p.587; see also Hall, British Strategy, pp.154-5. 23 Castlereagh to the King, 22.5.1807, 12.6.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.583, 590; ‘Memorandum of the Language which may be held to the allies on the subject of Military and Naval succours’, undated, probably May or June 1807, Castlereagh Papers, Vol. 8, pp.66-68; see also Maurice, J. F., (ed), The Diary of Sir John Moore, 2 vols, (London: Edward Arnold, 1904), Vol. 2, pp.180-1; Hall, British Strategy, pp.155-7; Mackesy, P., The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957), p.205; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p.27. 24 Castlereagh to Collingwood, 21.5.1807, Castlereagh Papers, Vol. 5, pp.153-157; Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, p.216. Alexandria was evacuated on 14 September 1807. Collingwood did not receive this letter until 15 October, by which date the cabinet had already committed themselves to other operations. His reply confirmed that nothing could be attempted in the region during the winter months, Collingwood to Castlereagh, 16.10.1807, Castlereagh Papers, Vol. 5, pp.157-160. 25 Castlereagh to The King, 14.8.1807, 15.8.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.617; see also Maurice, Diary of Sir John Moore, Vol. 2, p.177; Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p.88; Hall, British Strategy, pp.166-7; for the idea to evacuate Sicily see Mackesy, War in the Mediterraean, p.215. 26 Canning to Castlereagh, 5.5.1807, HAR GC, 32. 27 Canning to Mulgrave, 5.5.1807, Mulgrave to Canning, 6.5.1807, HAR GC, 31. 28 See Francis, D., Portugal, 1715-1808, (London: Tamesis Books, 1985), pp.277-8; James, W., The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV, 6 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1837), Vol. 4, pp.298-315; Tracy, N., (ed), The Naval Chronicle: The Contemporary Record of the Royal Navy at War, (London: Chatham, 1999, consolidated edition), (hereafter Naval Chronicle), Vol. 4, pp.62-5. 29 Collingwood to Lady Collingwood, 20.8.1807, Collingwood to J E Blackett, 24.10.1807, Collingwood, G. L. N., (ed), A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, (London: James Ridgway, 1829), pp.302-3, 318-9. 30 See Saul, N. E., Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp.219-220; Clowes, W. L., The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present, 7 Vols., (London: Sampson, Low Marston and Company, Ltd, 1897-1903), Vol. 5, pp.230-31; Hinde, Canning, pp.164-5; Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, pp.206-11; Muir, Britain and the

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Defeat of Napoleon, pp.27-8. 31 Hall, British Strategy, pp.97-8 32 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p.120. 33 13024, Napoleon to Decrès, 12.8.1807, Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée ordre de l’Emperuer Naopléon III, (Paris, 1858-1869), (hereafter CN), Vol. 15, pp.617-8. 34 13105, Napoleon to Champagny, 4.9.1807, CN, Vol. 16, p.8. 35 13340, Napoleon to Junot, 8.11.1807, ibid., pp.174-5. 36 13331, Napoleon to Decrès, 6.11.1807, ibid., pp.166-7. 37 Memorandum for the Cabinet, relative to South America, 1.5.1807, Castlereagh Papers, Vol. 7, pp.314-319. Interestingly, in 1806 he had been the recipient of a letter from Popham outlining his actions, see Popham to Castlereagh, 14.7.1806, Grainger, J. D., (ed), The Royal Navy in the River Plate, 1806-1807, Navy Records Society, Vol. 135, (1966), p.47. 38 Memorandum for the Cabinet, relative to South America, 1.5.1807, Castlereagh Papers, Vol. 7, pp.320-321. 39 Ibid., pp.321-323. 40 Canning to Castlereagh, 19.5.1807, HAR GC, 32; see also Gray, Spencer Perceval, p.161. 41 Canning to the King, 20.6.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.593. 42 Canning to Mulgrave, 7.7.1807, HAR GC, 31; Canning to the King, 10.7.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.601; MunchPetersen, T., ‘Lord Cathcart, Sir Arthur Wellesley and the British attack on Copenhagen in 1807’, in Woolgar, C. M., (ed), Wellington Studies 2, (Southampton: University Press, 1999), p.105. With regard to the transfer of intelligence from Tilsit see Munch-Petersen, T., ‘The Secret Intelligence from Tilsit: New Lights on the events surrounding the British Bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807’, in Historisk Tidsskrift, Vol. 102, part 1, (2002); Gray, Spencer Perceval, pp.162-7; Sparrow, Secret Service, pp.340-344. 43 See Schroeder, P., The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp.320-2; Esdaile, C, Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, (London: Penguin, 2007), p.297; Hinde, Canning, pp.1656; Mowat, R. B., The Diplomacy of Napoleon, (London: Edward Arnold, 1924), p.182; Sparrow, Secret Service, p.344; Thiers, L. A., History of the Consulate and the Empire of France Under Napoleon, 12 Vols., (London: Chatto & Windus, 1894, Campbell, D. F., and Stebbing, J., trans), Vol. 4, pp.576-577. 44 Mowat, Diplomacy of Napoleon, p.186; see also Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.327-8; Hinde, Canning, p.167. 45 Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, p.212; see also Glover, Britain at Bay, pp.28-9. 46 Colleyer, C., ‘Canning and the Napoleonic Wars’, History Today, Vol. 11, No. 4, (1961), pp.230-1; Dixon, Canning, pp.31-33, 36-38. 47 Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, p.300. 48 Canning to Granville, 25.8.1807, PRO 30/29 8/4, ff.179. See also Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.330, original emphasis; Colleyer, ‘Canning and the Napoleonic Wars’, pp.231-3.

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49 Mulgrave to Canning, 20.9.1807, HAR GC, 31. 50 Canning to Joan, 29.8.1807, HAR GC, 22; see also Colleyer, ‘Canning and the Napoleonic Wars’, p.233; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.328-331. 51 See Canning’s ‘Minute for the Cabinet’, 10.7.1807, HAR GC, 41a. 52 For the Copenhagen operation see James, Naval History, Vol. 4, pp.284-295; Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, pp.60-77; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, pp.23-25; Ryan, A. N., ‘The Navy at Copenhagen in 1807’, Mariners Mirror, No. 39, (1953); Ryan, A. N., ‘Documents Relating to the Copenhagen Operation, 1807’, in Rodger, N. A. M., (ed), The Naval Miscellany, Volume 5, Navy Records Society, No. 125, (1984); Tracy, Naval Chronicle, Vol. 4, p.87; Munch-Petersen, ‘British attack on Copenhagen’, pp.104-121; Hall, British Strategy, pp.157-63; Hinde, Canning, pp.173-177. 53 Glete, J., Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860, 2 Vols., (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1993), Vol. 2, p.376. 1

2

3

4 5 6

7

Chapter 7: The Portuguese Crisis of 1807 See Tone, J. L., ‘The Peninsular War’, in Dwyer, P. G., Napoleon and Europe, (London: Longman, 2001), p.227; Esdaile, C., The Peninsular War: A New History, (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp.1, 10; Esdaile, C, Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, (London: Penguin, 2007), pp.303-310; Schroeder, P., The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p.338. 12928, Napoleon to Talleyrand, 19.7.1807, Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée ordre de l’Emperuer Naopléon III, (Paris, 1858-1869), (hereafter CN), Vol. 15, pp.541-2; 12947, Napoleon to Dejean, 29.7.1807, CN, Vol. 15, p.560; Thiers, L. A., History of the Consulate and the Empire of France Under Napoleon, 12 Vols., (London: Chatto & Windus, 1894, Campbell, D. F., and Stebbing, J., trans), Vol. 4, pp.580, 588, and Vol. 5, pp.12-13; Esdaile, Peninsular War, p.5; Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, p.324. Lefebvre, G., Napoleon: from 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, (Stockhold, H. F., trans), (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), pp.254-7; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.338-9; Oman, C., A History of The Peninsular War, 7 Vols., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902-30), Vol. 1, pp.3-7; Foy, M., Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, 1807-1808, (Felling: Worley Publications, 2000), p.5. 13105, Napoleon to Champagny, 4.9.1807, CN, Vol. 16, p.8. Strangford to Canning, 25.7.1807, (received 5.8.1807), FO 63/55, pp.58-60. Strangford to Canning, 13.8.1807, (received 25.8.1807), FO 63/55, pp.80-84; Extract, Strangford to Canning, 13.8.1807, HAR GC, 48; see also Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.338; Light, K., The Migration of the Royal family of Portugal to Brazil in 1807/08, (Rio de Janeiro: Kenneth Light, 1995), p.38; Fortescue, J. W., A History of The British Army, 13 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1899-1930), Vol. 6, pp.87-8; Francis, D., Portugal, 1715-1808, (London: Tamesis Books, 1985), pp.270-1; Esdaile, Peninsular War, p.5-7. Canning to Joan, 26.8.1807, HAR GC, 22; also cited in Hinde, W., George

NOTES 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26

289

Canning, (London: Collins, 1973), p.180. Mulgrave to Canning, 31.3.1807, HAR GC, 31; see also Francis, Portugal, pp.248, 258-9. Gambier to Hammond, 26.8.1807, FO 63/62, pp.31-34. Canning to Joan, 29.8.1807, HAR GC, 22. Eldon to Canning, 26.8.1807, HAR GC, 34a. Castlereagh to The King, 27.8.1807, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 vols, (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 4, pp.620-1; Fitzgerald to Canning, 21.8.1807, HAR GC, 143. Castlereagh to Cathcart, 27.8.1807, Ryan, A. N., ‘Documents Relating to the Copenhagen Operation, 1807’, in Rodger, N. A. M., (ed), The Naval Miscellany, Volume 5, Navy Records Society, No. 125, (1984), pp.318-9. Castlereagh to the King, 27.8.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, pp.620-1; Castlereagh to Moore, 8.10.1807, WO 1/305, pp.349-351. Castlereagh to the King, 29.8.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.621. Strangford to Canning, 20.8.1807, (received 30.8.1807), FO 63/55, pp.87-89. Strangford to Canning, 21.8.1807, (received 30.8.1807), FO 63/55, pp.95-98. Copy of a note from Rayneval, 12.8.1807, Sousa to Canning, 27.8.1807, 28.8.1807, FO 63/57; Canning to the King, 1.9.1807, HAR GC 35; see also Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.622. Canning to Sousa, -.9.1807, FO 63/57; Canning to Sousa, 7.9.1807, HAR GC, 47. Canning to Sousa, 7.9.1807, HAR GC, 47, original emphasis. Hayther, A., (ed), The Backbone: Diaries of a Military Family in the Napoleonic Wars, (Bishop Auckland: The Pentland Press, 1993), pp.113-114. Brougham to Howick, 13.9.1807, Brougham, H., The Life and Times of Henry Lord Brougham: Written by Himself, 3 Vols., (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1871), Vol. 1., pp.382-5. Canning to Leigh, 11.9.1807, HAR GC, 17; see also Hinde, Canning, pp.172-5. Castlereagh to the King, 11.9.1807, Vane, C. W., (ed), Marquis of Londonderry, Correspondence, Dispatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquis of Londonderry, 12 Vols., (London: William Shoberl, 1851), (hereafter Castlereagh Papers), Vol. 8, p.83; Tracy, N., (ed), The Naval Chronicle: The Contemporary Record of the Royal Navy at War, (London: Chatham, 1999, consolidated edition), (hereafter Naval Chronicle), Vol. 4, pp.67-74; Hall, C. D., British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), pp.147-8; Muir, R., Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), pp.7, 30; Miller, R., Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (London: Longman, 1993), p.35; James, W., The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV, 6 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1837), Vol. 4, pp.354-6. Hall, British Strategy, p.97. Napier, W. F. P., History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, 6 Vols., (London: Thomas and William Boone, 1828-45), Vol. 1, p.178.

290


27 Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.295. 28 Muir, Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, pp.30-31, 35. 29 Castlereagh to the King, 11.9.1807, Castlereagh Papers, Vol. 8, p.83; see also Tracy, Naval Chronicle, Vol. 4, pp.67-74; Hall, British Strategy, pp.147-8; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, pp.7, 30; Miller, Britain and Latin America, p.35; James, Naval History, Vol. 4, pp.354-6. 30 ‘On the Transfer of the Portuguese Government to the Brazils’, Castlereagh Papers, Vol. 6, pp.357-8. See also Oliveira, Marques, A. D., History of Portugal, 2 Vols., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Vol. 1, p.455. Castlereagh was clearly worried about the possible closure of the Baltic to British shipping and the consequent loss of Baltic wood and hemp, in the event the attack on Copenhagen removed the Danish fleet from possible French control and the Baltic remained open with the presence of a Royal Navy fleet. 31 ‘Extract from a letter by Canning’, 28.9.1807, HAR GC, 46a. 32 Sparrow, E., Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-1815, (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), pp.335, 349-350. 33 Canning to Strangford, No. 5, 13.9.1807, FO 63/55, p.11. Strangford received these dispatches between 21.9.1807 and 26.9.1807; Canning to Strangford, 12.9.1807, HAR GC, 48. I am grateful to Dr Tom MunchPetersen for providing me with information on Piuma, see D’Antraigues to Canning, 6[?].8.1807, HAR GC, 59; D’Antraigues to Canning, 12.8.1807, 15.8.1807, 1.9.1807, 6.9.1807, HAR GC, 59b. 34 Strangford to Canning, 29.8.1807, (received 14.9.1807), FO 63/55, pp.11013; Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p.90; Francis, Portugal, p.271. 35 Strangford to Canning, 29.8.1807, FO 63/55, pp.116-124, 129; Francis, Portugal, p.274. 36 Lima, Paris, 7.8.1807, enclosed in Strangford to Canning, 29.8.1807, HAR GC, 48, pp.2-3. 37 Strangford to Canning, 8.9.1807, (received 24.9.1807), FO 63/55, pp.144-9, 153; Francis, Portugal, p.274. 38 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p.89. 39 Strangford to Canning, 8.9.1807, FO 63/55, pp.145, 151. 40 Fitzgerald to Canning, 11.10.1807, HAR GC, 143. 41 Tracy, Naval Chronicle, Vol. 4, p.104. 42 Lady Bessborough to Leveson-Gower, 17.10.1807, Granville, Countess, (ed), Lord Granville Leveson Gower Private Correspondence, 1781-1821, 2 Vols., (London: John Murray, 1916), Vol. 2, p.294. 43 Strangford to Canning, 26.9.1807, (received 12.10.1807), FO 63/55, pp.207-8. 44 Strangford to Canning, 26.9.1807, 27.9.1807, (received 12.10.1807), FO 63/55, pp.225-6, 235; Strangford to Canning, 3.10.1807, HAR GC, 48; see also Macaulay, N., Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), pp.12-13; Francis, Portugal, p.273. 45 Strangford to Canning, 27.9.1807, 3.10.1807, (received 12.10.1807, 15.10.1807), FO 63/55, pp.232-9, 258-61. 46 Canning to Gambier, 28.8.1807, FO 63/62, pp.7-8; Gambier to Canning,

NOTES

291

No. 1, 23.9.1807, No. 2, 28.9.1807, No. 3, 4.10.1807, FO 63/62, pp.35-40. 47 Tracy, Naval Chronicle, Vol. 4, p.50. 48 Strangford to Canning, 25.9.1807, FO 63/55, p.203. 49 Napoleon citation from Lefebvre, G., Napoleon: From Tilsit to Waterloo, 1807-15, (Anderson J. E., trans), (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p.8; see also Chandler, D., The Campaigns of Napoleon, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), p.597; Francis, Portugal, pp.273-4; Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, p.322. 50 Esdaile, Peninsular War, p.7. 51 Napoleon to Charles IV, No. 151, 12.10.1807, Thompson, J. M., (ed), Letters of Napoleon, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1934), pp.204-5; Esdaile, Peninsular War, p.7-8. 52 13237, Napoleon to Clarke, 12.10.1807, CN, Vol. 16, p.94; Lefebvre, Tilsit to Waterloo, p.13; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.290, 308; Thiers, History, Vol. 5, pp.132-133; Esdaile, Peninsular War, p.7; Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, pp.326-327. 53 13257, Napoleon to Clarke, 16.10.1807, CN, Vol. 16, p.106-7. 54 13267, Napoleon to Junot, 17.10.1807, ibid., pp.115-117 and Napoleon I, Correspondance Militaire de Napoléon Ier, (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1893), (hereafter CMN), Vol. 15, pp.87-8; Thiers, History, Vol. 5, pp.133-4. 55 Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, pp.6-10, 17; Esdaile, Peninsular War, p.8. 56 Champagny to Alvarez, 22.10.1807, citation in Light, Migration of the Royal family, p.39; see also Oman, History of The Peninsular War, Vol. 1, pp.7-8; Thiers, History, Vol. 5, p.134. 57 13314, Napoleon to Junot, 31.10.1806, CN, Vol. 16, pp.151-154 and CMN, Vol. 15, pp.100-103; see also Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, pp.92-5; Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, p.19; Thiers, History, Vol. 5, pp.133, 136-7. 58 13300, Convention of Fontainebleau, 27.10.1807, CN, Vol. 16, pp.140-144; see also Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p.93; Lefebvre, Tilsit to Waterloo, p.14; Oman, History of The Peninsular War, Vol. 1, pp.8-10; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.339; Thiers, History, Vol. 5, pp.134, 145146; Esdaile, Peninsular War, pp.7-8; Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, p.326. 59 Strangford to Canning, 21.9.1807, 27.9.1807, (received 11.10.1807, 12.10.1807), FO 63/55, pp.174-176, 232; see also Francis, Portugal, p.243. 60 Castlereagh to the King, 4.9.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.623. 61 Strangford to Canning, 3.10.1807, (received 15.10.1807), FO 63/55, pp.2556; see also Francis, Portugal, p.273. 62 Canning to Sousa, 20.10.1807, HAR GC, 47. 63 Declaration by João, 27.9.1807, FO 63/57. 64 Canning to the King, 17.10.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.638; Canning to de Sousa, 19.10.1807, 20.10.1807, HAR GC, 47. 65 Canning to the King, 21.10.1807, HAR GC, 35; ‘Secret Convention signed at London of 22 October 1807 between Great Britain and Portugal’, FO 93/77 [1B]. 66 Convention of 22 October 1807, FO 93/77/ [1B]. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid.

292 69 70 71 72

73 74 75 76 77 78 79

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

1 2 3 4

5 6

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Ibid. Ibid. Canning to Strangford, 23.10.1807, HAG GC, 48. Francis, Portugal, pp.249-252; Livermore, H., ‘Portugal on the Eve of the Peninsular War’ in Griffith, P., (ed), A History of the Peninsular War, Volume IX: Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814, (London: Greenhill, 1999), p.396. Canning to Almeida, 22.10.1807, HAR GC, 48. Ibid. Canning to Strangford, No. 7, 22.10.1807, FO 63/56, p.4-5 and FO 179/6. Canning to Strangford, Nos. 9-10, 22.10.1807, FO 63/56, p.9-23 and FO 179/6. Canning to Strangford, No. 8, 22.10.1807, FO 63/56, p.7 and FO 179/6; Canning to Strangford, 23.10.1807, HAG GC, 48. Canning to Sousa, 31.10.1807, HAR GC, 47. Strangford to Canning, 14.10.1807, (received 4.11.1807), FO 63/55, pp.25861, pp.270-1; Strangford wanted to remain in Portugal for a few weeks, even if the ports were shut, lamenting that due to the work in Portugal ‘My health is in a very precarious state’, Strangford to Canning, 14.10.1807, HAR GC, 48; see also Francis, Portugal, p.276. Strangford to Purvis, 10.10.1807, enclosed in Strangford to Canning, 14.10.1807 (received 4.11.1807), FO 63/55, pp.285-6; Hall, British Strategy, p.90. Strangford to Canning, 14.10.1807, Strangford to Purvis, 10.10.1807, FO 63/55, p.278, 288. Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, p.326. Strangford, Viscount, P., Observations on Some Passages in Lieut-Col. Napier’s History of the Peninsular War, (London: John Murray, 1828), pp.14-15; Francis, Portugal, p.269. Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p.90; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, p.597. Macaulay, Dom Pedro, p.12; see also Francis, Portugal, p.272. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.218-221. Ryan, ‘Documents Relating to the Copenhagen Operation’, p.xvi. Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p.98. Canning to Strangford, No. 11, 7.11.1807, FO 63/56, pp.28-29, 40-41 and for the draft p.29. Chapter 8: The Smith Expedition to Lisbon Light, K., ‘Britain and the Portuguese Navy, 1760-1810’, The British Historical Society of Portugal, Twenty Second Annual Report and Review, (1995), p.42. Canning to Granville, 5.11.1807, PRO 30/29 8/4, ff.183, original emphasis. Canning to Strangford, No. 9, 22.10.1807, FO 63/56, p.20. Admiralty Board Minutes, 27.10.1807, ADM 3/162; ‘Table of Events’, Drake Papers, Vol. 16, British Library, Add Ms. 46837, (hereafter BL Add Mss.), p.147; see also Howard, E. G. G., Memoirs of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, 2 vols, (London: Richard Bentley, 1839), Vol. 2, p.82. Castlereagh to Admiralty, 29.10.1807, ADM 1/4206, ff.40. Mackesy, P., The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957), p.121; quotation from Russell, Lord, Knight

NOTES

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

293

of the Sword: The Life and Letters of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1964), p.87. Laughton, J. K., ‘Smith, Admiral Sir William Sidney’ in Stephen, L., and Lee, S., (eds), Dictionary of National Biography, (Oxford: University Press, 1917), Vol. 18, p.571. Canning to Smith, 5.7.1807, HAR GC, 39. Lord Grenville to Windham, Private, 9.9.1806, Benjamin, L. S., (ed), The Windham Papers, (London: Herbert Jenkins Limited, 1813), pp.315-6. Pocock, T., A Thirst for Glory: The Life of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, (London: Pimlico, 1998), pp.156-7. Lord Auckland to Lord Grenville, 2.9.1807, Historic Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq. preserved at Dropmore, 10 Vols., (London: HMSO, 1892-1927), (hereafter Dropmore), Vol. 9, p.137. Castlereagh to Admiralty, 29.10.1807, ADM 1/4206, ff.40; Admiralty to Smith, 30.10.1807, Cambridge County Record Office, Cotton Naval Papers, (hereafter CNP), 588/041A/1. Pole to Smith, 30.10.1807, ADM 2/1365, pp.28-30; Admiralty to Smith, 30.10.1807, CNP, 588/041A/1. Lady Bessborough to Leveson Gower, 19.9.1807, Granville, Countess, (ed), Lord Granville Leveson Gower Private Correspondence, 1781-1821, 2 Vols., (London: John Murray, 1916), Vol. 2, p.284. Hinde, W., Castlereagh, (London: Collins, 1981), p.140-1. Hawkesbury to the King, 2.11.1807, Tierney to Howick, 6.11.1807, 12.11.1807, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 4, pp.644-5, and n.1. Castlereagh to Hawkesbury, 15.12.1807, Wellington, 2nd Duke, (ed), Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K.G., 15 Vols., (London: John Murray, 1858-72), (hereafter WSD), Vol. 5, pp.278-9; see also Gash, N., Lord Liverpool, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1984), p.70. Canning to Hawkesbury, 6.11.1807, HAR GC, 32. Canning to Smith, 6.11.1807, FO 63/56, pp.53-8. Canning to Hawkesbury, 7.11.1807, HAR GC, 32. Canning to Strangford, No. 11, 7.11.1807, FO 63/56, p.32 and FO 179/6; see also Fortescue, J. W., A History of The British Army, 13 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1899-1930), Vol. 6, p.98. Canning to Strangford, No. 11, 7.11.1807, FO 63/56, pp.32-49 and FO 179/6. Canning to Sousa, 8.11.1807, HAR GC, 47. Canning to Granville, 5.11.1807, PRO 30/29 8/4, ff.183; Canning to Hawkesbury, 8.11.1807, HAR GC, 32. Muir, R., Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p.30. Smith to Pole, No. 2a2, 9.11.1807, ADM 1/19; Journal of Sir W.S. Smith, No. 5, ADM 50/50. Pole to Young, 12.11.1807, ADM 2/1365, p.36. Hammond to Canning, 10.11.1807, HAR GC, 76. Castlereagh to Hawkesbury, 8.10.1807, Vane, C. W., (ed), Marquis of

294

30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46

47 48 49 50

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Londonderry, Correspondence, Dispatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquis of Londonderry, 12 Vols., (London: William Shoberl, 1851), (hereafter Castlereagh Papers), Vol. 8, pp.89-91. Hawkesbury to Canning, 7.11.1807, HAR GC, 69. Hawkesbury to Admiralty, No. 36, 7.11.1807, ADM 1/4206; Hawkesbury to Moore, 7.11.1807, WO 1/305, pp.395-402; Orders to Moore, 7.11.1807, enclosed in Canning to Strangford, No. 13, 9.11.1807, FO 179/6; Maurice, J. F., (ed), The Diary of Sir John Moore, 2 Vols., (London: Edward Arnold, 1904), Vol. 2, pp.193-4. Hawkesbury to Canning, 7.11.1807, HAR GC, 69. Canning to Strangford, No. 13, 9.11.1807, FO 179/6. See Hawkesbury to Canning, 7.11.1807, HAR GC, 69. Canning to Strangford, No. 13, 9.11.1807, FO 179/6. Auckland to Grenville, 14.11.1807, Dropmore, Vol. 9, p.143. Brougham to Howick, 7.11.1807, Brougham to Rosslyn, 8.11.1807, Brougham, H., The Life and Times of Henry Lord Brougham: Written by Himself, 3 Vols., (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1871), Vol. 1, pp.387-90. Strangford to Canning, 20.10.1807, (received 10.11.1807), FO 63/55, pp.299-301. Gambier to Canning, 20.10.1807, (received 10.11.1807), FO 63/62, pp.79-83. Gambier to Canning, 29.10.1807, enclosed in Bagot to Cooke, 12.11.1807, WO 1/751, pp.293-305. Foy, M., Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, 1807-1808, (Felling: Worley Publications, 2000), pp.37-40. Tracy, N., (ed), The Naval Chronicle: The Contemporary Record of the Royal Navy at War, (London: Chatham, 1999, consolidated edition), (hereafter Naval Chronicle), Vol. 4, p.104. Araujo to Strangford, 17.10.1807, Strangford to Canning, 20.10.1807, (received 10.11.1807), FO 63/56, pp.82-92. Strangford to Canning, 27.10.1807, (received 11.11.1807), FO 63/56, pp.101-3, 112-4. Strangford to Canning, 28.10.1807, FO 63/56, pp.115-126. For the revolutionary conspiracies see Campbell to Harrowby, London, 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, pp.200-1, and -.7.1804, FO 63/44; see also Oliveira, Marques, A. D., History of Portugal, 2 Vols., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Vol. 1, p.453. Gambier to Canning, No. 9, 20.10.1807, No. 10, 28.10.1807, (received 11.11.1807), FO 63/62, pp.84, 94; Chamberlain to Stanhope, 20.10.1807, FO 63/58, p.72; Francis, D., Portugal, 1715-1808, (London: Tamesis Books, 1985), p.275; see also Hall, C. D., Wellington’s Navy: Sea Power and the Peninsular War, 1807-1814, (London, Chatham Publishing, 2004), p.14. Hayther, A., (ed), The Backbone: Diaries of a Military Family in the Napoleonic Wars, (Bishop Auckland: The Pentland Press, 1993), pp.120-121. Draft, Canning to Admiralty, 11.11.1807, FO 63/58, pp.78-9; Canning to Admiralty, No. 33, 11.11.1807, ADM 1/4206. Ibid. Admiralty to Smith, 12.11.1807, CNP, 588/041/A/1.

NOTES

295

51 Castlereagh to Cooke, Brighton, 11.11.1807, Castlereagh Papers, Vol. 6, pp.359-61. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Canning to Strangford, No. 14, 12.11.1807, FO 63/56, p.76 and FO 179/6. 55 Ibid., pp.76-78 and FO 179/6. 56 Oliveira, History, Vol. 1, p.381. 57 Campbell to Harrowby, 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, p.252. 58 Canning to Leveson-Gower, No. 183, 5.11.1807, PRO 30/29 8/4. 59 Canning to Hawkesbury, 6.11.1807, 7.11.1807, HAR GC, 32. 60 Canning to Sousa, 8.11.1807, HAR GC, 47. 61 Canning to Hawkesbury, 8.11.1807, HAR GC, 32. 62 Hawkesbury to Canning, 10.11.1807, HAR GC, 69. 63 Castlereagh to Cooke, Brighton, 11.11.1807, Castlereagh Papers, Vol. 6, pp.359-61; Hawkesbury to the King, 13.11.1807, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.646; Castlereagh to Beresford, 14.11.1807, WO 6/68; Hawkesbury to Moore, 16.11.1807, WO 1/305, pp.407-410. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14

Chapter 9: The Embarkation of the Portuguese Royal Family Moniteur, 6.11.1807. 13320, Napoleon to Decrés, 2.11.1807, Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée ordre de l’Emperuer Naopléon III, (Paris, 1858-1869), (hereafter CN), Vol. 16, p.159. 13340, Napoleon to Junot, 8.11.1807, ibid., pp.174-5 13351, Napoleon to Junot, 12.11.1807, ibid., pp.184-7; see also Thompson, J. M., (ed), Letters of Napoleon, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1934), p.205. 13738, Napoleon to Decrés, 12.4.1808, CN, 16, pp.580-1 Strangford to Canning, 20.10.1807, FO 63/56, p.82. Strangford to Canning, 27.10.1807, 29.10.1807, FO 63/56, pp.101, 134. Strangford to Canning, 2.11.1807, 5.11.1807, FO 63/56, pp.136-39, 143-45, 151-3, original emphasis. Strangford to Canning, 2.11.1807, HAR GC, 48; see also Francis, D., Portugal, 1715-1808, (London: Tamesis Books, 1985), pp.275-7. Strangford to Canning, Nos. 87-89, 6.11.1807, (received 26.11.1807), FO 63/56, pp.158-173; see also Foy, M., Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, 1807-1808, (Felling: Worley Publications, 2000), p.41; Light, K., The Migration of the Royal family of Portugal to Brazil in 1807/08, (Rio de Janeiro: Kenneth Light, 1995), p.40. Strangford to Canning, 9.11.1807, 10.11.1807, (received 25.11.1807), FO 63/56, pp.178-9, 190-3. Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, p.41; Francis, Portugal, pp.276-7; Macaulay, N., Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 1798-1834, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), pp.15-16. Strangford to Canning, 10.11.1807, 17.11.1807, 21.11.1807, FO 63/56, pp.200, 212, 246. Return of Smith’s squadron, 1.12.1807, ADM 8/94; Smith to Pole, No. 2a4, 18.11.1807, ADM 1/19; see also Francis, Portugal, pp.277-8; James, W., The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the

296

15

16 17

18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Accession of George IV, 6 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1837), Vol. 4, p.316; Tracy, N., (ed), The Naval Chronicle: The Contemporary Record of the Royal Navy at War, (London: Chatham, 1999, consolidated edition), (hereafter Naval Chronicle), Vol. 4, pp.62-5. Strangford to Canning, No. 96, 17.11.1807, No. 99, 20.11.1807, FO 63/56, p.211, pp.234-6; Smith to Pole, No. 2a4, 18.11.1807, ADM 1/19; ‘Table of Events’, Drake Papers, Vol. 16, British Library Add Ms. 46837, (hereafter BL Add Mss.), p.147; Francis, Portugal, p.278. Writing to Canning on 14 November Gambier ascertained Strangford had quit Lisbon on the 13th. He must have remained ashore as Smith had not yet arrived. Gambier to Canning, No. 15, 14.11.1807, FO 63/62, p.120. Francis, Portugal, pp.188-9. Collingwood to Purvis, 22.9.1807, Hughes, E., (ed), The Private Correspondence of Admiral Lord Collingwood, Navy Records Society, No. 98, (1956-7), p.223; Collingwood to Mulgrave, 16.10.1807, Collingwood, G. L. N., (ed), A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, (London: James Ridgway, 1829), pp.314-5; Mackesy, P., The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957), p.227. Hawkesbury to Canning, 4.11.1807, HAR GC, 69; Canning to Hawkesbury, 5.11.1807, HAR GC, 32. Although seemingly far-fetched, Hawkesbury’s concerns perhaps stemmed from Russian operations against the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire in the Caucuses. With Napoleon possessing a track record of dabbling in Eastern affairs perhaps Hawkesbury had valid reasons for his views. See also Horward, D. D., ‘Portugal and the AngloRussian Naval Crisis (1808)’, Naval War College Review, No. 34, (1981), p.49; Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, pp.225-227; Saul, N. E., Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p.222. Canning to the King, 13.11.1807, HAR GC, 35. Canning to Chatham, 14.11.1807, HAR GC, 31. Canning to Admiralty, No. 34, 13.11.1807, ADM 1/4206; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.49; Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, pp.225-227; Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, p.222. Admiralty to Smith, 14.11.1807, Cambridge County Record Office, Cotton Naval Papers, (hereafter CNP), 588/041/A/1. Canning to Chatham, 14.11.1807, HAR GC, 31. Chatham to Canning, 15.11.1807, HAR GC, 31. Portland to Canning, 13.11.1807, 2 letters, HAR GC, 33. See Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.49; James, Naval History, Vol. 4, p.315; Francis, Portugal, p.279; Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, pp.225-227; Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, p.222. Smith to Pole, No. 2a4, 18.11.1807, and No. 2a9, 1.12.1807, ADM 1/19. Canning to the King, 26.11.1807, HAR GC, 35; Canning to Admiralty, No. 41, 26.11.1807, ADM 1/4206. Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.51; see also Sparrow, E., Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-1815, (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), p.346.

NOTES

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30 Canning to Camden, 2.12.1807, Chatham to Canning, 1.12.1807, Canning to Chatham, 2.12.1807, HAR GC, 31. 31 Portland to Canning, 2.12.1807, Portland to Canning, 4.12.1807, HAR GC, 33. 32 Mulgrave to the King, 3.12.1807, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 4, p.654. 33 Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.51; Krajeski, P. C., In the Shadow of Nelson: The Naval Leadership of Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, 1753-1812, (London: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp.52-6, the latter arguing Cotton was an ‘experienced and highly competent sea commander’. 34 Collingwood to Cotton, 20.11.1807, CNP 588/074. 35 Mulgrave to Cotton, 11.7.1807, 16.7.1807, CNP 588/073. 36 Mulgrave to the King, 3.12.1807, King’s reply, 4.12.1807, Aspinall, The Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.654. 37 Admiralty to Cotton, 4.12.1807, CNP 588/039. 38 Castlereagh to Spencer, 4.12.1807, WO 1/226, pp.5-9. 39 Maurice, J. F., (ed), The Diary of Sir John Moore, 2 Vols., (London: Edward Arnold, 1904), Vol. 2, p.195. 40 Castlereagh to Moore, 4.12.1807, WO 1/226, pp.1-3. 41 McKinley to Pole, London, 7.12.1807, CNP 588/041A/5. 42 Ibid. 43 Admiralty to Cotton, 9.12.1807 CNP 588/041A/1. 44 Ibid. 45 Journal of Sir W S Smith, No. 5, 20.11.1807, ADM 50/50; Strangford to Canning, Strangford to Smith, 20.11.1807, FO 63/56, pp.234-41. 46 Confiance Log, 21.11.1807 and 22.11.1807, ADM 51/1966. 47 Smith to Pole, No. 2a5, 22.11.1807, original emphasis, enclosing Smith to Araujo, 22.11.1807, ADM 1/19. 48 Strangford to Canning, 17.11.1807, FO 63/56, pp.213-14. 49 Fortescue, J. W., A History of The British Army, 13 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1899-1930), Vol. 6, p.100. 50 Smith to Pole, No. 2a5, 22.11.1807, No. 2a6, 22.11.1807, ADM 1/19; Light, Migration of the Royal family, p.43; Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p.100. 51 Smith to Pole, No. 2a5, 22.11.1807, No. 2a6, 22.11.1807, ADM 1/19. See Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, pp.166-181 for Smith at the Dardanelles. 52 Strangford to Smith, 24.11.1807, Strangford to Canning, 24.11.1807, FO 63/56, p.258. For a full discussion of the Smith/Moore controversy see Appendix VIII. 53 Strangford to Canning, 24.11.1807, FO 63/56, pp.249-256; Strangford to Smith, 24.11.1807, in Smith to Pole, No. 2a5, 22.11.1807, ADM 1/19. 54 Report by Gambier enclosed in Smith to Pole, No. 2a5, 22.11.1807, ADM 1/19. 55 Strangford to Canning, 24.11.1807, FO 63/56, pp.251-3. 56 Smith to Pole, No. 2a9, 1.12.1807, enclosing Strangford to Smith, 1.12.1807, ADM 1/19; see also Barrow, J., The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, 2 Vols., (London: Richard Bentley, 1848), Vol. 2, pp.270-1; Confiance Log, 27.11.1807 and 28.11.1807, ADM 51/1966. See also Francis, Portugal, pp.280-1; Light, Migration of the Royal family, pp.45-6.

298


57 Strangford to Smith, at night, 28.11.1807, FO 63/56, p.287. For a full account of the Strangford/Smith controversy see Appendix VII. 58 ‘Extract of a letter from Lieutenant S. to his father dated Hibernia at sea 7 December 1807’, Drake Papers, Vol. 16, BL Add Ms. 46837. 59 Smith to Strangford, 28.11.1807, Drake Papers, Vol. 16, BL Add Ms. 46837. 60 Confiance Log, 29.11.1807, ADM 51/1966; Logs of Bedford, Elizabeth, Foudroyant, Hibernia, London, Marlborough, Monarch and Plantagenet, in Light, Migration of the Royal family, no pp. 61 Smith to Pole, No. 2a9, 1.12.1807, ADM 1/19, further details are in FO 63/56 p.289; James, Naval History, Vol. 4, pp.317-8; Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, pp.67-68 who found 20 Portuguese warships of various sizes in the Tagus. See also Francis Portugal, p.282; Cavaliero, R., The Independence of Brazil, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p.8. 62 Smith to Pole, No. 2a9, 1.12.1807, ADM 1/19. 63 Francis, Portugal, p.280. 64 Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, pp.33-34. 65 Napoleon to Junot, 31.10.1807, Napoleon I, Correspondance Militaire de Napoléon Ier, (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1893), (hereafter CMN), Vol. 15, pp.100-101. 66 Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, pp.52-54, see also Macaulay, Dom Pedro, p.19; Thiers, L. A., History of the Consulate and the Empire of France Under Napoleon, 12 Vols., (London: Chatto & Windus, 1894, Campbell, D. F., and Stebbing, J., trans), Vol. 5, pp.190-193. 67 Oman, C., A History of The Peninsular War, 7 Vols., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902-30), Vol. 1, pp.26-9. 68 Lady Bessborough to Leveson-Gower, 21.11.1807, Granville, Countess, (ed), Lord Granville Leveson Gower Private Correspondence, 1781-1821, 2 Vols., (London: John Murray, 1916), Vol. 2, p.308. 69 Northumberland to Col. McMahon, 18.12.1807, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Correspondence of George, Prince of Wales 1770-1812, 8 Vols., (London: Cassell, 1969), Vol. 6, p.235. 70 Auckland to Grenville, 28.11.1807, Historic Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq. preserved at Dropmore, 10 Vols., (London: HMSO, 1892-1927), Vol. 9, p.152. 71 The Times, Saturday 19.12.1807. 72 The Times, Monday 21.12.1807. 73 Canning to Leigh, 19.12.1807, HAR GC, 17; also cited in Aspinall, The Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 4, p.661 n.1, original emphasis. 74 The King to Canning, 20.12.1807, HAR GC, 48. 75 Richmond to Canning, 26.12.1807, HAR GC, 31; Harrowby to Canning, 20.12.1807, HAR GC, 34a; Rose to Canning, 20.12.1807, HAR GC, 76. 76 Richmond, H. W., Statesmen and Sea Power, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p.221. 77 Smith to Pole, No. 2a10, 1.12.1807, ADM 1/19; Barrow, Correspondence of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, Vol. 2, p.274; see also Light, Migration of the Royal family, p.48. 78 Pocock, T., A Thirst for Glory: The Life of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, (London:

NOTES

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Pimlico, 1998), p.208. 79 Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, p.234. 80 Beresford to Castlereagh, 29.12.1807, WO 1/354, pp.29-31, 37-40; see also Hall, C. D., British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), p.168; James, Naval History, Vol. 4, p.350. 81 Smith to Moore, 5.12.1807, Graham, G. S., and Humphreys, R. A., (eds), The Navy and South America, 1807-1823, Navy Records Society, Vol. 104, (1962), pp.3-4; see also Light, Migration of the Royal family, p.48; James, Naval History, Vol. 4, p.318. 82 Light, Migration of the Royal family, pp.54-5; Macaulay, Dom Pedro, pp.21-3. 1

2 3 4

5

6 7

8 9

Chapter 10: The Blockade of Lisbon For Hall, C. D., British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), ‘the strategic situation at the start of 1808 was a poor one’, p.168; and for Muir, R., and Esdaile, C. J., the ‘strategic situation facing Britain in early 1808 was gloomy’, ‘Strategic planning in a time of Small Government: The Wars Against Revolutionary France, 1793-1815’, in Woolgar, C. M., (ed), Wellington Studies 1, (Southampton: University Press, 1996), p.43. Muir and Esdaile, ‘Strategic Planning’, p.43. Richmond, H. W., Statesmen and Sea Power, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p.235. 13873, Napoleon to Decrés, 12.5.1808, Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée ordre de l’Emperuer Naopléon III, (Paris, 1858-1869), (hereafter CN), Vol. 17, pp.123-125 and 14023, Napoleon to Junot, 29.5.1808, CN, pp.271-2. See also Mackesy, P., The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp.231-234, Appendix 8, pp.406-7; Thiers, L. A., History of the Consulate and the Empire of France Under Napoleon, 12 Vols., (London: Chatto & Windus, 1894, Campbell, D. F., and Stebbing, J., trans), Vol. 5, pp.31-33; James, W., The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV, 6 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1837), Vol. 5, p.2; Schroeder, P., The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p.343. James, Naval History, Vol. 5, pp.3-5; Collingwood to his wife, 15.5.1808, Collingwood, G. L. N., (ed), A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, (London: James Ridgway, 1829), p.355. See also Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, chpt 9. Esdaile, C, Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, (London: Penguin, 2007), p.315. Note, 1.2.1808, Vane, C. W., (ed), Marquis of Londonderry, Correspondence, Dispatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquis of Londonderry, 12 Vols., (London: William Shoberl, 1851), (hereafter Castlereagh Papers), Vol. 8, pp.160-166. Collingwood to Mulgrave, 11.1.1808, Collingwood, Collingwood Correspondence, pp.334-5; Smith to Pole, No. 2a28, 28.2.1808, ADM 1/19; Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, Appendix 1, p.398, Appendix 5, p.403. Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, p.316.

300


10 Castlereagh to Canning, undated probably early 1808, HAR GC, 34; Muir and Esdaile, ‘Strategic Planning’, pp.43-44. 11 Mulgrave to Saumarez, 20.2.1808, Ryan, A. N., (ed), The Saumarez Papers: Selections from the Baltic Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, Navy Records Society, No. 110, (1968), (1968), p.7. The squadron comprised Victory (100), Centaur, Superb, Implacable, Brunswick, Mars, Orion, Goliath, Vanguard (74s) Dictator and Africa (64s) and five frigates. See also Voelcker, T., Admiral Saumarez versus Napoleon: The Baltic, 1807-1812, (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008), pp.34-38. 12 Castlereagh to the King, 17.4.1808, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 5, pp.65-6; Admiralty to Saumarez, 16.4.1808, 22.4.1808, Ryan, Saumarez Papers, pp.11-14; see also Hall, British Strategy, pp.163-4; Muir, R., Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p.26; Voelcker, Saumarez, pp.34-38. 13 Hall, British Strategy, p.165; see also Napier, W. F. P., History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, 6 vols, (London: Thomas and William Boone, 1828-45), Vol. 1, p.168; see also Muir, Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, p.26; Parkinson, R., Moore of Corunna, (London: Hart Davis, 1976), pp.147-15; Voelcker, Saumarez, pp.38-42. 14 Castlereagh to Canning, 29.12.1807, Castlereagh to Canning, 31.12.1807, HAR GC, 34. 15 Castlereagh to the King, 30.1.1808, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5, p.13. 16 Collingwood to Drummond, 6.2.1808, Collingwood, Collingwood Correspondence, pp.340-342. 17 Canning to Castlereagh, 13.3.1808, HAR GC, 32; Collingwood to Mulgrave, 11.1.1808, Collingwood, Collingwood Correspondence, pp.334-5. The figure is from Castlereagh to the King, 10?.4.1808, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5, p.61. 18 Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, p.335. Napoleon’s plans had been thwarted in 1806 at the battle of Maida and in early 1808 by Collingwood at sea. See Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, chpt 9. 19 Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, p.256. 20 Sparrow, E., Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-1815, (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), pp.358-360. 21 Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.338-341. See Campbell’s earlier thoughts, Campbell to Harrowby, London, 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, pp.202-3. 22 James, Naval History, Vol. 5, p.10. 23 Five ships-of-the-line, six frigates and five smaller vessels were in Ferrol, two ships-of-the-line and a frigate were in Cartagena. Hall, British Strategy, p.408. See also Hall, C. D., Wellington’s Navy: Sea Power and the Peninsular War, 18071814, (London, Chatham Publishing, 2004), pp.8-11. 24 Castlereagh to Canning, 29.12.1807, Castlereagh to Canning, 31.12.1807, HAR GC, 34. 25 Castlereagh to Spencer, 16.1.1808, WO 1/226, pp.131-43.

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26 Castlereagh to the King, 30.1.1808, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5, p.13. 27 Hall, C. D., ‘The Royal Navy and the Peninsular War’, The Mariner’s Mirror, Vol. 79, No. 4, November (1993), p.407 devotes a single sentence to the blockade and that in relation to the terms of the Convention of Cintra, while Napier believed the aim of starving the Russians into submission ‘never had the least chance of success’ (History, Vol. 1, p.173). Recent studies such as Krajeski, P. C., In the Shadow of Nelson: The Naval Leadership of Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, 1753-1812, (London: Greenwood Press, 2000) and Horward, D. D., ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis (1808)’, Naval War College Review, No. 34, (1981), examine Cotton’s role to the detriment of ministerial involvement. 28 Buckingham to Grenville, 3.1.1808, Historic Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq. preserved at Dropmore, 10 Vols., (London: HMSO, 1892-1927), Vol. 9, pp.9, 164-6; see James, Naval History, Vol. 2, pp.4-10 for the 1796 expedition. 29 Smith to Pole, No. 2a17, 26.12.1807, ADM 1/19. 30 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma2, 11.12.1807, No. Ma8, 19.12.1807, No. Ma9 20.12.1807, ADM 1/339; see also Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.52-6. 31 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma7, 31.12.1807, ADM 1/339. 32 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma10, 7.1.1807, ADM 1/339. 33 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma12, No. Ma13, 9.1.1808, ADM 1/339; Admiralty to Cotton, 6.1.1808 (received 9.1.1808), CNP 588/041A/11; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.51; Foy, M., Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, 1807-1808, (Felling: Worley Publications, 2000), p.77. 34 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma16, 16.1.1808, ADM 1/339. 35 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma18, 24.1.1808, ADM 1/339. 36 Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.59-60. 37 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma18, 24.1.1808, ADM 1/339. 38 Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, pp.67-68; see also Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.59-60. 39 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma18, 24.1.1808, ADM 1/339. 40 Schneer, R. M., ‘Arthur Wellesley and the Cintra Convention: A New Look at an Old Puzzle’, The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, (1980), pp.1078; see also Napier, History, Vol. 1, pp.172-3. 41 Speech by Petty, 21.2.1809, Cobbett’s Parliamentary Debates, (London: T C Hansard, 1808), (hereafter Hansard) Vol. 12, p.914. 42 Schneer, ‘Arthur Wellesley and the Cintra Convention’, pp.107-8. 43 Canning to Castlereagh, 25.12.1807, WO 1/751, pp.349-51; see also Hall, Wellington’s Navy, p.6. 44 Canning to Castlereagh, 25.12.1807, WO 1/751, pp.353-7. 45 Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, pp.51-2. 46 Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, p.61. 47 Canning to Castlereagh, 25.12.1807, WO 1/751, pp.353-7; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, pp.51-2; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, p.61. 48 Canning to Castlereagh, 25.12.1807, WO 1/751, p.359.

302


49 Unsigned to ADM, -.12.1807, WO 1/716, pp.231-241, [the author is Castlereagh]. 50 Admiralty to Cotton, 28.12.1807, CNP 588/041A/7. 51 Admiralty to Cotton, 29.12.1807, (received 7.1.1808), CNP 588/041A/8; Admiralty to Cotton, 29.12.1807, (received 7.1.1808), CNP 588/041A/9. 52 Memorandum by Strangford, 18.2.1808, HAR GC, 48. 53 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma20, 25.1.1808, No. Ma23, 31.1.1808, ADM 1/339; see also Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.61-2. 54 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma26, 1.2.1808, Containing Edicts and Decrees issued by Junot, undated and 14.12.1807, ADM 1/339; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.52; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, p.62. 55 Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, pp.72-74; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, pp.50-1, 54; Lefebvre, G., Napoleon: From Tilsit to Waterloo, 1807-15, (Anderson J. E., trans), (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), Vol. 2, p.15; Oliveira, Marques, A. D., History of Portugal, 2 Vols., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Vol. 1, pp.428; Oman, C., A History of The Peninsular War, 7 Vols., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902-30), Vol. 1, pp.31-2. 56 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma26, 1.2.1808, ADM 1/339; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.52; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, p.62. 57 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma30, 2.2.1808, Cotton to Pole, No. Ma36, 7.2.1808, ADM 1/339. 58 Seniavin to Cotton, 25.1.1808/6.2.1808, CNP 588/041A/52. 59 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma39, 8.2.1808, ADM 1/339; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.52; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.62-3. 60 Ibid. 61 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma39, 8.2.1808, ADM 1/339; Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, p.69. 62 Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.62-3. 63 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma39, 8.2.1808, ADM 1/339; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.52. 64 Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, p.66; see also Napier, History, Vol. 1, pp.148-9, and Appendix 28, p.631; Oman, History, Vol. 1, pp.206-9. 65 Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.53; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.63-5; Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, pp.78. 66 Collingwood to Cotton, 1.2.1808, CNP 588/042. 67 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma40, 9.2.1808, ADM 1/339; see Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, p.337-340 for what was afoot. 68 McKinley to Cotton, 15.2.1808, Cotton to Pole, No. Ma45, 16.2.1808, ADM 1/339; McKinley to Cotton, 15.2.1808, CNP 588/041A/19; see also Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, p.77; Hall, Wellington’s Navy, pp.21-22. 69 Yeo to Cotton, 14.2.1808, Cotton to Pole, No. Ma46, 17.2.1808, ADM 1/339; see also Clowes, W. L., The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present, 7 Vols., (London: Sampson, Low Marston and Company, Ltd, 1897-1903), Vol. 5, p.407; Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval

NOTES

70 71

72 73 74 75

76

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

85

303

Crisis’, p.53; James, Naval History, Vol. 5, pp.20-21; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.63-5; Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, p.77. Trist found 100 small arms on board her. Admiralty to Cotton, 8.2.1808, CNP 588/040; Cotton to Pole, No. Ma49, 18.2.1808, Edict by Junot, enclosed in Cotton to Pole, No. Ma54, 21.2.1808, ADM 1/339. Cotton to Pole, No. Ma64, 26.2.1808, 27.2.1808, No. Ma80, 16.3.1808, ADM 1/339; Spencer to Castlereagh, 21.2.1808, 29.2.1808, WO 1/226, pp.245-51; Admiralty to Cotton, 16.1.1808 (received 26.2.1808), CNP 588/041A/12; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.52; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p.35. Purvis to Pole, No. Ma80, 16.3.1808, ADM 1/339; Spencer to Castlereagh, 18.3.1808, WO 1/226, p.263. Smith to Purvis, 26.3.1808, enclosed in Cotton to Pole, No. Ma85, 26.3.1808, ADM 1/339. Spencer to Castlereagh, 5.4.1808, 14.5.1808, WO 1/226, p.263, pp.305-6; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p.35. Spencer to Castlereagh, 29.2.1808, WO 1/226, pp.251-2; Cotton to Seniavin, 29.2.1808, Cotton to Pole, No. Ma67, 4.3.1808, ADM 1/339; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.56; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.65-7. Cotton to Pole, No. Ma67, 4.3.1808, No. Ma72, 13.3.1808, No. Ma88, 28.3.1808, enclosing Seniavin to Cotton 24.2.1808/7.3.1808, ADM 1/339; Seniavin to Cotton, Lisbon, 24.2.1808/7.3.1808, CNP 588/041A/53; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.56; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.65-7. Cotton to Pole, No. Ma69, 5.3.1808, No. Ma72, 13.3.1808, ADM 1/339. Cotton to Pole, No. Ma90, 29.3.1808, ADM 1/339; Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.54; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.66-7. Pole to Stewart, 9.4.1808, Enclosing Cotton to Pole, 29.3.1808, WO 1/717, pp.237-244. Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.68-9. Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.55. Castlereagh to Admiralty, 16.4.1808, WO 1/717, pp.257-272, quotation from pp.257-258. Ibid., pp.257-8; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.54. For the refugee problem see Cotton to Pole, No. Ma102, 7.4.1808, ADM 1/339; for the loss of the Milbrook Cotton to Pole, No. Ma103, 8.4.1808, ADM 1/339, Clowes, Royal Navy, Vol. 5, p.552 gives the date as 26.4.1808; for the captain’s complaints, Cotton to Pole, No. Ma111, 18.4.1808, ADM 1/339; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.54; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.67-9; Hall, Wellington’s Navy, pp.24-25. Cotton to Pole, No. Ma104, 11.4.1808, No. Ma134, 16.5.1808, ADM 1/339; see also Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, p.68; Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, pp.54-5; Hayther, A., (ed), The Backbone: Diaries

304


of a Military Family in the Napoleonic Wars, (Bishop Auckland: The Pentland Press, 1993), p.151. 86 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma120, 23.4.1808, ADM 1/339; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, p.68; Clowes, Royal Navy, Vol. 5, p.415; James, Naval History, Vol. 5, pp.38-40; Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, p.77 says the vessel was attacked on 22 April and was the corvette La Gavotte. 87 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma126, 27.4.1808, No. Ma127, 28.4.1808, ADM 1/339; Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.55; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.69-70. Chapter 11: The Portland Ministry and South America in 1808 For example see Muir, R., Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p.31; Glover, M., Britannia Sickens: Sir Arthur Wellesley and the Convention of Cintra, (London: Leo Cooper, 1970), p.21. 2 Convention of Fontainebleau, 27.10.1807, articles 12 and 13, http:// www.Napoleonseries.org/reference/diplomatic/spain.cfm accessed on 31.7.2003; Esdaile, C., The Peninsular War: A New History, (London: Allen Lane, 2002), p.7, 31-34 and Esdaile, C, Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, (London: Penguin, 2007), p.325-326, 342. 3 13779, Napoleon to Decrés, 25.4.1808, Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée ordre de l’Emperuer Naopléon III, (Paris, 1858-1869), (hereafter CN), Vol. 17, p.47. 4 13854, Napoleon to Decrés, 11.5.1808, ibid., pp.106-8. 5 13873, Napoleon to Decrés, 12.5.1808, ibid., pp.123-125. 6 14023, Napoleon to Junot, 29.5.1808, ibid., pp.271-2. 7 See 13828, Napoleon to Decrés, 8.5.1808; 13854, Napoleon to Decrés, 11.5.1808; 13873, Napoleon to Decrés, 12.5.1808; 14023, Napoleon to Junot, 29.5.1808, ibid., pp.86, 106-8, 123-125, 271-2; see also Schroeder, P., The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p.343. 8 Duffy, M., ‘World-Wide War and British Expansion, 1793-1815’, in Marshall, P. J., (ed), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume Two, The Eighteenth Century, (Oxford: OUP, 2001 pbk ed), p.193. 9 Muir, Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, pp.30-1, 35. 10 ‘Ratification signed on 4 January 1808 between George Canning and The Chevalier de Sousa Couthinho of the treaty of 22 October 1807’, FO 94/163; see also Sherwig, J. M., Guineas and Gunpowder, British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France 1793-1815, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p.191. 11 Canning to the King, 5.1.1808, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 5, p.5; Canning to Hill, 16.1.1808, pp.3, 9-10, FO 63/63. 12 Canning to Fitzgerald, 24.12.1807; Canning to Fitzgerald, 25.12.1807, HAR GC, 39. Canning cut Fitzgerald down to size with a typical flourish: ‘your Lordship may possibly have considered your not returning to Portugal as a matter of self-congratulation. As things have now turned out you may very naturally regret the having missed an opportunity of distinction’. Fitzgerald 1

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was retired from the diplomatic service in May. 13 Portland to the King, 26.2.1808, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5, pp. 24-5. 14 Pole to Smith, 25.1.1808, Graham, G. S., and Humphreys, R. A., (eds), The Navy and South America, 1807-1823, Navy Records Society, Vol. 104, (1962), p.5. 15 Oliveira, Marques, A. D., History of Portugal, 2 Vols., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Vol. 1, p.455. 16 Muir, Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, p.31. 17 ‘Memorandum for Cabinet Measures suggested respecting South America’, 21.12.1807, Portland to Castlereagh, 21.12.1807, Camden to Castlereagh, 22.12.1807, Vane, C. W., (ed), Marquis of Londonderry, Correspondence, Dispatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquis of Londonderry, 12 Vols., (London: William Shoberl, 1851), (hereafter Castlereagh Papers), Vol. 8, pp.96-101. 18 Muir, Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, p.31. 19 Rose, Memorandum on the Brazils, 25.12.1807, Rose to Canning, 31.12.1807, Notes relative to the Brazils, 26.1.1808, HAR GC, 48. 20 Memorandum of 8.2.1808, Wellington, 2nd Duke, (ed), Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K.G., 15 Vols., (London: John Murray, 1858-72), (hereafter WSD), Vol. 6, pp.61-65. 21 Memorandum by Canning, 2.4.1808, HAR GC, 46a. 22 Ibid. For Russian interpretations of British policy see Lieven, D., Russia against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814, (London, Allen Lane, 2009), p.70. 23 Castlereagh to the King, 10.4.1808, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5, pp.60-62. 24 Canning to Strangford, No. 1, 17.4.1808, FO 63/59, pp.4-5. 25 Canning to Strangford, No. 2, 17.4.1808, FO 63/59, p.7. 26 Ibid., pp.7-9. 27 Ibid., p.10. 28 Canning to Strangford, No. 3, 17.4.1808, FO 63/59, pp.12-14. The Portuguese had purposefully stifled Brazilian economic development to maintain their control over the country and to preserve Portuguese manufacturers. 29 Canning to Strangford, No. 4, 17.4.1808, FO 63/59, pp.16-21. 30 Ibid., pp.22-26; Canning to Bathurst, 24.4.1808, Historic Manuscripts Commission, Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst preserved at Cirencester Park, (London: HMSO, 1923), (hereafter Cirencester Park), pp.71-2. 31 Canning to Strangford, No. 5, 17.4.1808, FO 63/59, pp.32-33. 32 Canning to Sousa, 13.4.1808, 15.4.1808, HAR GC, 47. 33 Canning to Bathurst, 19.4.1808, HAR GC, 34a; Cirencester Park, pp.70-1; Bathurst to Canning, 22.4.1808, HAR GC, 34. 34 Canning to Bathurst, 23.4.1808, HAR GC, 34a. 35 Portland to the King, 21.4.1808, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5, pp.67-8. 36 The Kings reply, 22.4.1808, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5,

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pp.68-9. 37 Hill to Canning, 14.3.1808, (received 18.5.1808), FO 63/63, pp.20-25, 27-28; Hill to Canning, 6.4.1808, (received 11.8.1808), FO 63/63, pp.37-38, 74-75. See also Cavaliero, R., The Independence of Brazil, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p.33. See Manchester, A. K., British Preëminence in Brazil Its Rise and Decline: A Study in European Expansion, (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), pp.114-116, n.29, p.116, for the allegation that Hill did not fully inform Canning of the plans. 38 Smith to Pole, 2a32, 26.3.1808, ADM 1/19; Smith to Pole, 20.6.1808, Graham and Humphreys, The Navy and South America, p.6. 39 Strangford to Canning, No. 1, 24.7.1808, FO 63/59, pp.122-125. 40 Manchester, British Preëminence, pp.110-113; Oliveira, History, Vol. 1, pp.449450. 41 Strangford to Canning, No. 2, 25.7.1808, FO 63/59, pp.132-135; Manchester, British Preëminence, pp.117-118. 42 Smith to Pole, 2a35, 13.4.1808, enclosing Smith to Pole, 2a36, 13.4.1808, (received 11.8.1808), ADM 1/19; Smith to Keith, undated, citation in Russell, Lord, Knight of the Sword: The Life and Letters of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1964), pp.172-3; Pocock, T., A Thirst for Glory: The Life of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, (London: Pimlico, 1998), p.209. 43 Smith to Pole, 2a46, 5.8.1808, ADM 1/19; Smith to Pole, 5.8.1808, Graham and Humphreys, The Navy and South America, pp.8-10. 44 Ibid. 45 Smith to Pole, 7.8.1808, enclosed in Smith to Pole, 5.8.1808, Graham and Humphreys, The Navy and South America, pp.10-12. 46 Ibid. 47 Smith to Pole, 2a58, 24.8.1808, ADM 1/19; Strangford to Canning, No. 12, 24.8.1808, FO 63/59; Manchester, British Preëminence, pp.118-119. 48 Smith to Pole, 5.8.1808, Graham and Humphreys, The Navy and South America, pp.8-10. Cavaliero, The Independence of Brazil, pp.32-35. For Smith’s recall see Russell, Knight of the Sword, pp.177-185 49 Muir, Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, p.31. 50 Hall, C. D., British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), pp.98-9. 51 Canning to Strangford, No. 18, 2.9.1808, FO 63/59, pp.83-4. It seems as if Smith refused to abandon the plans and colluded with Carlota until he was recalled in 1809, see Manchester, British Preëminence, pp.119-125. 1

2

Chapter 12: The Spanish Insurrection and British Policy See Hall, C. D., British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), p.169; Schroeder, P., The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp.341-2; Esdaile, C., The Peninsular War: A New History, (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp.30-40; Esdaile, C, Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, (London: Penguin, 2007), pp.342-343. Hall, British Strategy, p.169; Muir, R., Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, 18071815, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), pp.34-7. See also Glover, M., Britannia Sickens: Sir Arthur Wellesley and the Convention of

NOTES 3 4

5 6

7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15 16

17 18

19

307

Cintra, (London: Leo Cooper, 1970), pp.21-3. Castlereagh to the King, 16.5.1808, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 5, p.76; Glover, Britannia Sickens, p.25; Hall, British Strategy, p.169. Castlereagh to the King, 1.6.1808, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5, p.82; Memorandum by Wellesley, 1.6.1808, Wellington, 2nd Duke, (ed), Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K.G., 15 Vols., (London: John Murray, 1858-72), (hereafter WSD), Vol. 6, pp.68-72. Captain Smith to Cotton, 1.5.1808, 3.5.1808, enclosed in Cotton to Pole, No. Ma133, 13.5.1808, Cotton to Pole, No. Ma136, 16.5.1808, ADM 1/339. Cotton to Pole, No. Ma137, 18.5.1808, ADM 1/339; see also Horward, D. D., ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis (1808)’, Naval War College Review, No. 34, (1981), p.56; Krajeski, P. C., In the Shadow of Nelson: The Naval Leadership of Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, 1753-1812, (London: Greenwood Press, 2000), p.69. Cotton to Pole, No. Ma137, 18.5.1808, ADM 1/339; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, pp.56-7; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, pp.33-4. Admiralty to Cotton, 28.4.1808, CNP 588/043. Cotton to Pole, No. Ma.138, 25.5.1808, ADM 1/339; see also Clowes, W. L., The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present, 7 Vols., (London: Sampson, Low Marston and Company, Ltd, 1897-1903), Vol. 5, p.552. Wilson to Pigott, 31.5.1808, enclosed in Cotton to Pole, No. Ma146a 3.6.1808, ADM 1/339. Cotton to Pole, No. Ma155, 9.6.1808, No. Ma156, 11.6.1808, ADM 1/339; Creyke to Cotton, 7.6.1808, (received 9.6.1808), CNP 588/041A/28; see also Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.58; Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.79-80. Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.80-1. Cotton to Pole, Nos. Ma157, Ma158, 12.6.1808, ADM 1/339. Krajeski, In the Shadow of Nelson, pp.80-1. Cotton to Pole, No. Ma163, 18.6.1808, No. Ma164, 20.6.1808, ADM 1/340. Cotton to Pole, No. Ma183, 4.7.1808, No. Ma195, 14.7.1808, ADM 1/340; quotation from Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.59; Foy, M., Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, 1807-1808, (Felling: Worley Publications, 2000), p.98. Cotton to Pole, No. Ma193, 10.7.1808, ADM 1/340; Horward, ‘Portugal and the Anglo-Russian Naval Crisis’, p.60. See Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, pp.78-9, 83; Napier, W. F. P., History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, 6 Vols., (London: Thomas and William Boone, 1828-45), Vol. 1, pp.148-9, and Appendix 28, p.631; Oman, C., A History of The Peninsular War, 7 Vols., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902-30), Vol. 1, pp.206-9. News of the Oporto rebellion is in Creyke to Cotton, 7.6.1808, (received 9.6.1808), CNP 588/041A/28; see also Foy, Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, pp.88, 112, 120-125, 138; Napier, History, Vol. 1, pp.152-5; Oman, History, Vol. 1,

308


pp.210, 242. 20 Vega to Canning, 9.6.1808, FO 72/66, pp.5-6; see also Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p.39; Hall, British Strategy, p.170; Glover, Britannia Sickens, pp.26-8; Oman, History, Vol. 1, pp.220-222. 21 Canning to the Envoys from the Asturias, 12.6.1808, FO 72/66, pp.7-9. 22 Speech by Canning, 15.6.1808, Cobbett’s Parliamentary Debates, (London: T C Hansard, 1808), (hereafter Hansard), Vol. 11, p.890; see also Hall, British Strategy, p.170; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p.39. 23 Castlereagh to Canning, 12.6.1808, HAR GC, 34; York to Wellesley, 14.6.1808, Gurwood, J., (ed), The Dispatches of Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington, during his various campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France, 8 Vols., (London: Parker Furnival and Parker, 1844), (hereafter WD), Vol. 4, p.1; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p.42. 24 Castlereagh to Canning, 12.6.1808, HAR GC, 34; Memorandum by Wellesley, -6.1808, WSD, Vol. 6, pp.80-82. 25 Castlereagh to Wellesley, 21.6.1808, WO 1/228, pp.1-2; also WD, Vol. 4, p.4. 26 Castlereagh to Wellesley, No. 1, 30.6.1808, WO 1/228, p.5-10; also WD, Vol. 4, pp.8-9; see also Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, pp.42-3; Oman, History, Vol. 1, p.227. 27 Mulgrave to the King, 30.6.1808, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5, p.93; Castlereagh to Wellesley, 30.6.1808, WD, Vol. 4, p.11; Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p.43. 28 Spencer to Castlereagh, 24.6.1808, WO 1/226, pp.491-5; Cotton to Pole, No. Ma172, 24.6.1808, ADM 1/340. 29 Mulgrave to the King, 11.7.1808, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5, pp.102-3. 30 Castlereagh to Wellesley, 15.7.1808, WO 1/228, pp.33-40; also WD, Vol. 4, p.15; see also Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p.46. 31 Castlereagh to the King, 14.7.1808, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5, pp.103-4. 32 Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p.44. 33 Castlereagh to the King, 14.7.1808, the King to Castlereagh, 15.7.1808, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 5, pp.103-5. 34 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 21.7.1808, WD, Vol. 4, pp.23-28. 35 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 25.7.1808, 26.7.1808, WD, Vol. 4, pp.30-31; see also Oman, History, Vol. 1, p.229. 36 Wellesley to Spencer, 26.7.1808, WD, Vol. 4, p.32. 37 Cotton to Pole, No. Ma204, 3.8.1808, ADM 1/340; Wellesley to Castlereagh, 26.7.1808, WO 1/228, p.85. 38 Wellesley to Cotton, 30.7.1808, WD, Vol. 4, pp.38-9. 39 Cotton to Wellesley, 31.7.1808, CNP 588/041A/63; Wellesley to Castlereagh, 1.8.1808, WD, Vol. 4, pp.39-41; Collingwood to Cotton, 2.7.1808, 22.7.1808, CNP 588/074; Collingwood to Cotton, 29.7.1808, CNP 588/042; see also Oman, History, Vol. 1, pp.229-231. 40 Wellesley to Castlereagh, 8.8.1808, WD, Vol. 4, pp. 52-3. For Cintra see Glover, Britannia Sickens, passim; Schneer, R. M., ‘Arthur Wellesley and the Cintra Convention: A New Look at an Old Puzzle’, The Journal of British

NOTES

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Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, (1980), pp.93-103. Moore’s 11,000 men reinforced the British army on 24 August. 41 Convention between Cotton and Seniavin, 3.9.1808, CNP 588/041A/74; see also Hall, British Strategy, pp.171-172; Mackesy, P., The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957), p.227; von Pivka, O., Navies of the Napoleonic Era, (London: David and Charles, 1980), p.106. 1 2

3

4 5

6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13

Conclusion Esdaile, C., Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, (London: Penguin, 2007), pp.563-565. Muir, R., Britain and The Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p.8. He is not alone, for Holland Rose the Talents ‘did little or nothing except send fruitless expeditions to Alexandria and the Dardanelles’; a policy which ‘was fast rendering Britain contemptible alike to friends and foes’. Rose, J. H., The Life of Napoleon I, 2 Vols., (London: George Bell and Sons, 1904), Vol. 2, pp.115-116. Hall, C. D., British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), does concede that the administration ‘were not lacking in determination and energy in their strategy respecting Sicily and Portugal’, p.134. Oliveira, Marques, A. D., History of Portugal, 2 Vols., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Vol. 1, pp.425-7. Napier even gave the Talents a back handed compliment by arguing their concentration on South American operations had a surprise effect. By assembling a force at Cork for colonial operations, when the crisis in Portugal appeared critical, they actually had a suitable force ready and offered its assistance to the Portuguese. Napier, W. F. P., History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, 6 Vols., (London: Thomas and William Boone, 1828-45), 3rd edition, Vol. 1, pp.167. Corbett, J. S., Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1988, Original published by Longman Green and Co., 1911), p.16. Glete, J., Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860, 2 Vols., (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1993), Vol. 2, pp.384-5. Temperley, H. W. V., Life of Canning, (London: James Finch and Co. Ltd., 1905), p.81. Miles, C. P., (ed), The Correspondence of William Augustus Miles on the French Revolution 1789-1817, (London: Longmans, 1890), Vol. 2, p.358. Canning to Granville, 25.8.1807, PRO 30/29 8/4 ff.179; Schroeder, P., The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p.330, original emphasis; Colleyer, C., ‘Canning and the Napoleonic Wars’, History Today, Vol. 11, No. 4, (1961), pp.231-3. Canning to Joan, 29.8.1807, HAR GC, 22; Colleyer, ‘Canning’, p.233; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.328-331. Hall, British Strategy, pp.143-4. Ibid., p.139, and p.147.

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14 Harvey, R., Liberators: Latin America’s Struggle for Independence, 1810-1830, (London: John Murray, 2000), p.9. 15 Fortescue, J. W., A History of The British Army, 13 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1899-1930), Vol. 6, p.38. 16 Glover, R., Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809, (Cambridge: University Press, 1963), pp.56-57. 17 Napier, History, Vol. 1, p.178. 18 Hall, British Strategy, pp.148-9. 19 Memorandum for the Cabinet, relative to South America, 1.5.1807, Vane, C. W., (ed), Marquis of Londonderry, Correspondence, Dispatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquis of Londonderry, 12 Vols., (London: William Shoberl, 1851), Vol. 7, pp.314-319. 20 Duffy, M., ‘World-Wide War and British Expansion, 1793-1815’, in Marshall, P. J., (ed), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume Two, The Eighteenth Century, (Oxford: OUP, 2001 pbk ed), p.193. 21 Ibid., pp.190-2. 22 Ibid., p.194. 23 Fitzwilliam to Grenville, 3.11.1806, Grainger, J. D., (ed), The Royal Navy in the River Plate, 1806-1807, Navy Records Society, Vol. 135, (1966), p.140. 24 By 1801 British export trade accounted for 18% of national income, Blanning, T., The Pursuit of Glory: Europe 1648-1815, (London: Penguin Books, 2007), p.111. 25 Bradford Burns, E., A History of Brazil, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 3rd ed.), pp.112-3. 26 Ibid., p.113. 27 Walford, A. R., The British Factory in Lisbon and its closing stages ensuing upon the Treaty of 1810, (Lisbon: Instituto Britânico em Portugal, 1915), pp.85-8. 28 Hall, British Strategy, p.94, the 1808 figure is from Francis, D., Portugal, 17151808, (London: Tamesis Books, 1985), p.284. 29 Emsley, C., The Longman Companion to Napoleonic Europe, (London: Longman, 1993), p.132, Table 5. 30 The £50 million figure is from Hall, British Strategy, pp.97-98, see also 112113; Kaufmann, W. W., British Policy and the Independence of Latin America, 1804-1828, (Hamden: Archon Books, 1967), pp.10-13; Popham, H., A Damned Cunning Fellow, The eventful life of Rear-Admiral Sir Home Popham 17621820, (Tywardreath: The Old Ferry Press, 1991), pp.133-134; Platt, D. C. M., Latin America and British Trade, 1806-1914, (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1972), pp.4-7. 31 Platt, Latin America and British Trade, p.28, Table 1. 32 Ibid., p.28. 33 Campbell to Harrowby, London, 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, pp.214-6, 241. 34 Walpole to Grenville, No. 37, 25.8.1796, (received 15.9.1796), FO 63/23. 35 Sparrow, E., Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-1815, (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1999), p.315. 36 Lefebvre, G., Napoleon: from 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, (Stockhold, H. F., trans), (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), pp.232-237, 243. 37 10752, Plan de campagne de maritime pour cette annèe, 8.9.1806, Napoleon

NOTES

38

39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49 50 51

1 2 3

4 5 6

311

I, Correspondance de Napoléon I publiée ordre de l’Emperuer Napoléon III (Paris, 1858-1869), (hereafter CN) Vol. 13, pp.193-195. In 1806 reports reached Lisbon that nine English merchant ships had been taken by a French privateer and had been sold along the coast of Brazil to various individuals not as prizes but as Spanish ships, see Strangford to Fox, No. 22, 14.9.1806, (received 2.10.1806), FO 63/50. Convention of Fontainebleau, 27.10.1807, articles 12 and 13, http:// www.Napoleonseries.org/reference/diplomatic/spain.cfm, accessed on 31.7.2003. Esdaile, C., The Peninsular War: A New History, (London: Allen Lane, 2002), p.7. 13024, Napoleon to Decrès 12.8.1807, CN, Vol. 15, pp.617-8. 13331, Napoleon to Decrès, 6.11.1807, ibid., pp.166-7. See Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.343. 13779, Napoleon to Decrès, 25.4.1808, CN, Vol. 17, p.47 13854, Napoleon to Decrès, 11.5.1808, ibid., pp.106-8. 13873, Napoleon to Decrès, 12.5.1808, ibid., pp.123-125 14023, Napoleon to Junot, 29.5.1808, ibid., pp.271-2. 13873, Napoleon to Decrès, 12.5.1808, ibid., pp.123-125; 14023, Napoleon to Junot, 29.5.1808, ibid., pp.271-2. See 13828, Napoleon to Decrès, 8.5.1808; 13854, Napoleon to Decrès, 11.5.1808; 13873, Napoleon to Decrès, 12.5.1808; 14023, Napoleon to Junot, 29.5.1808, ibid., pp.86, 106-8, 123-125, 271-2; see also Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.343. Colleyer, ‘Canning’, p.232. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.326. Mahan, A. T., The Influence of Seapower upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812, 2 Vols., (London: Sampson Low and Co., 1892), Vol. 2, p.381. Gray, D., Spencer Perceval, The Evangelical Prime Minister, (Manchester: University Press, 1963), p.170. Appendices Francis, D., Portugal, 1715-1808, (London: Tamesis Books, 1985), pp.216-218. Ibid., pp.226-228; Schroeder, P., The Transformation of European Politics, 17631848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp.162-3. Crimmin, P., ‘John Jervis, Earl of St Vincent’, in Le Fevre, P., and Harding, R., (eds), Precursors of Nelson: British Admirals of the Eighteenth Century, (London: Chatham Publishing, 2000), pp.333-336; Francis, Portugal, pp.216-8, 224-7; Livermore, H., ‘Portugal on the Eve of the Peninsular War’ in Griffith, P., (ed), A History of the Peninsular War, Volume IX: Modern Studies of the War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1814, (London: Greenhill, 1999), p.387; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, pp.162-3, 175. Francis, Portugal, pp.216-8; Livermore, H., A New History of Portugal, (Cambridge: University Press, 1966), p.246. Francis, Portugal, p.238; Sherwig, J. M., Guineas and Gunpowder, British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France 1793-1815, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p.191. Hawkesbury to the King, 11.5.1801, Aspinall, A. A., (ed), The Later

312

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

BRITAIN, PORTUGAL AND SOUTH AMERICA Correspondence of George III, 5 Vols., (Cambridge: University Press, 1962-1970), Vol. 3, pp.534-5. Ibid., pp.186-191, 195-8; see also Francis, Portugal, p.241; Livermore, A New History of Portugal, pp.246-7; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p.224. Hobart to the King, 21.6.1801, Aspinall, Later Correspondence of George III, Vol. 3, p.560; see also Francis, Portugal, pp.243-4; Mackesy, P., War Without Victory: The Downfall of Pitt, 1799-1802, (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1984), p.123. Francis, Portugal, pp.246-7. Unsigned to Stewart, -.7.1803, Secret, WO 1/223, pp.51-7; Francis, Portugal, p.252 who mistakenly thought it was Richard Stewart who was sent; Livermore, A New History of Portugal, pp.247-8. Stewart to Hobart, Lisbon 8.8.1803, WO 1/223, pp.119-120, 125-7; Stewart to Hobart, Lisbon 28.8.1803, WO 1/223, pp.168-170; Stewart to Hobart, London 25.9.1803, WO 1/223, pp.281-5. Stewart to Hobart, London, 25.9.1803, WO 1/223, pp.286-7; Francis, Portugal, p.25; Livermore, ‘Portugal on the Eve of the Peninsular War’, p.391. Francis, Portugal, p.252, notes that British interests in reforming the Portuguese army had a long history and when implemented later in 1809 would be modelled on the lines suggested by Stewart in 1803. Hall, C. D., British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester: University Press 1992), pp.104-6; Livermore, A New History of Portugal, pp. 247-8. Campbell to Harrowby, London 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, pp.202-3; .7.1804, FO 63/44; Francis, Portugal, pp.253-4; Chrisawn, M., ‘A Military Bull in a diplomatic China shop: General Jean Lannes’ mission to Lisbon, 18021804’, Napoleonic Scholarship, Vol. 1, No. 2, (1998), passim. Campbell to Harrowby, London, 14.8.1804, PRO 30/8/345, pp.202-3; .7.1804, FO 63/44; Hall, British Strategy, pp.112-8; Livermore, ‘Portugal on the Eve of the Peninsular War’, pp.392-3. The Times, Friday, 25.12.1807. Tracy, N., (ed), The Naval Chronicle: The Contemporary Record of the Royal Navy at War, (London: Chatham, 1999, consolidated edition), Vol. 4, pp.116-7. Pole to Smith, 28.12.1807, BL Add Ms. 46837, ff.144. Fitzgerald to Canning, 21.12.1807, HAR GC, 143. Canning to Fitzgerald, 24.12.1807, 25.12.1807, HAR GC, 39; Fitzgerald to Canning, 2.1.1808, 30.5.1808, HAR GC, 143. Macaulay, N., Dom Pedro: The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal, 17981834, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), pp.17-19 and n.47, pp.309-310. Confiance Log, 7.12.1807, 17.12.1807, ADM 51/1966. Sousa to Canning 22.12.1807, FO 63/58, pp.140-41; Strangford, Viscount, P., Observations on Some Passages in Lieut-Col. Napier’s History of the Peninsular War, (London: John Murray, 1828), pp.4-6. Canning to Portland, 23.12.1807, 30.12.1807, HAR GC, 32; Portland to Canning, 22.12.1807, 30.12.1807, HAR GC, 33; see Hinde, W., George Canning, (London: Collins, 1973), p.212 for the Moore / Moira issue. Napier, W. F. P., History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, 6 Vols., (London: Thomas and William

NOTES

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48 49 50

51 52

313

Boone, 1828-45), 3rd edition, Vol. 1, quotations from pp.142, 167, see also pp.327, 512-515, 522-524. His reply to Strangford’s Observations is in the 4th edition, 1, pp.7-18. Napier, History, 3rd edition, Vol. 1, p.168, see pp.506-511 for his hero worship of Moore. Ibid., p.181. Ibid., pp.522, 524. Ibid., p.512-515. Ibid., p.327. Brewer, D., The Flame of Freedom: The Greek War of Independence, 1821-1833, (London: John Murray, 2001), pp.140, 199. See Macaulay, Dom Pedro, chpts 6, 7 and 8. Strangford, Observations, pp.4-6. Napier, History, 3rd edition, Vol. 1, p.142; Strangford, Observations, pp.8-9. Strangford, Observations, pp.9-10. Ibid., pp.22-23. Ibid., pp.23-24. Strangford, Viscount P., Further Observations on Some Passages in Lieut-Col. Napier’s History of the Peninsular War, (London: John Murray, 1828), pp.6-7. Napier, History, 4th edition, Vol. 1, pp.xiv-xv. Strangford, Further Observations, pp.16-17. Macaualy, Dom Pedro, p.19. Francis, Portugal, p.282. ‘Table of events’, Drake Papers, Vol. 16, BL Add Ms. 46837, p.147; Araujo to Smith, 25.11.1807, ADM 1/19 and entry for 27.11.1807, No. 5, Journal of Sir W.S. Smith ADM 50/50; Barrow, J., The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, 2 Vols., (London: Richard Bentley, 1848), Vol. 2, p.270. Smith to Pole, No. 2a13, 6.12.1807, ADM 1/19. Strangford to Canning, 29.11.1807, FO 63/56, pp.266-77. Strangford to Canning, 30.11.1807, 2.12.1807, FO 63/56, p.280. Confiance Log, 29.11.1807, ADM 51/1966; Light, K., ‘Britain and the Portuguese Navy, 1760-1810’, The British Historical Society of Portugal, Twenty Second Annual Report and Review, (1995), p.45. Macaulay, Dom Pedro, p.16; Light, ‘Britain and the Portuguese Navy’, p.44; Fortescue, J. W., A History of The British Army, 13 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1899-1930), Vol. 6, p.101. Moniteur, 15.11.1807; Chandler, D., The Campaigns of Napoleon, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967), p.598, gives the source as the Moniteur of 13 November while Oman, C., A History of The Peninsular War, 7 Vols., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902-30), Vol. 1, p.30, gives the source as the Moniteur of 13 October. Foy, M., Junot’s Invasion of Portugal, 1807-1808, (Felling: Worley Publications, 2000), pp.44-48. Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p.102; James, W., The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in 1793 to the Accession of George IV, 6 Vols., (London: Macmillan, 1837), Vol. 4, p.317; Miller, R., Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (London: Longman,

314


1993), p.39; Oman, History, Vol. 1, p.30. 53 Smith to Araujo, 22.11.1807, enclosed in Smith to Pole, No. 2a5, 22.11.1807, ADM 1/19; FO 63/56. 54 Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p.103; Laughton, J. K., ‘Smith, Admiral Sir William Sidney’ in Stephen, L., and Lee, S., (eds), Dictionary of National Biography, (Oxford: University Press, 1917), p.574; Moore’s diary entry for 22.11.1806, Maurice, J. F., (ed), The Diary of Sir John Moore, 2 Vols., (London: Edward Arnold, 1904), Vol. 2, pp.138-9; see also Pocock, T., A Thirst for Glory: The Life of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, (London: Pimlico, 1998), pp.192-4; James, Naval History, Vol. 4, pp.216-219. 55 Smith to Pole, No. 2a9, 1.12.1807, ADM 1/19; Strangford to Canning, No. 102, 24.11.1807, FO 63/56, p.255; see James, Naval History, Vol. 1, p.318 for the Bombay-Castle. 56 Moore to Castlereagh, -.10.1807, 4.12.1807, WO 1/305, pp.377-8, 435-6; Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p.103; Maurice, Diary of Sir John Moore, Vol. 2, pp.194-7; Oman, C., Sir John Moore, (London: Hodder and Stroughton, 1953), p.439; Hall, British Strategy, pp.74-5. 57 Moore to Castlereagh, 11.12.1807, WO 1/305, pp.439-442; Maurice, Diary of Sir John Moore, Vol. 2, pp.198-9; Russell, Lord, Knight of the Sword: The Life and Letters of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1964), p.172. 58 Castlereagh to Spencer, 4.12.1807, WO 1/226, pp.5-9. 59 Castlereagh to Moore, 4.12.1807, WO 1/226, p.1; Maurice, Diary of Sir John Moore, Vol. 2, p.200. 60 Spencer to Cooke, 13.12.1807, 14.12.1807, WO 1/226, pp.11-12, 17; Cooke to Spencer, 17.12.1807, WO 1/226, p.23; Spencer to C Stewart, 18.12.1807, WO 1/226, pp.25-31. 61 Castlereagh to Spencer, 19.12.1807, 6.1.1808, WO 1/226, pp.43-4, 95-6; Spencer to Cooke, 1.1.1808, WO 1/226, pp.51-4.

…

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INDEX Figures in bold indicate Tables. Aboukir Bay, Battle of (1798) 243–4 Abrantes, Marquis of 181 Acland, General 224 Acre, siege of (1799) 137 Addington, Henry, 1st Viscount Sidmouth 21, 83, 93 Admiralty and the Mediterranean Fleet 36 use of Lisbon as fleet rendezvous 38 and St Vincent 51 Africaine 172 Agamemnon 180 Alceste 172 Alexander I, Tsar asks for subsidies from Britain 9 infuriated by the Talents strategy 24 signs Treaties of Tilsit 109 Alfonso d’Albuquerque 168, 248 Alfred 180, 191, 219, 224 Algésiras 178 Allemand, Admiral 175, 176 Almeida, Chevalier Dom João de 131–2 Alopeus, Mr (Russian minister) 183 Amazona 249 American War of Independence (1775-83) 2, 19, 30, 158 Amiens, Peace of (1802) xiii, 2, 22–3, 66, 84, 85, 228, 235, 238, 245 Anjou, Philip, Duke d’ 120 Ansthruther, General 224 Antas e Meneres, Pedro Fagundes Bacellar d’ 172 Antelope 180, 218 António, D. Manuel José 114 Araujo e Azevedo, Antonio 48, 60–61, 243, 254–5, 256–7

Portuguese Foreign Minister 43 embargo on the Richmond 45 relations with the French 46 and secret supply system 47 Windham’s faith in 57 on the Portuguese Army 61 and Portuguese neutrality 61–2 meetings with Rosslyn 62–5, 69 confers with Strangford 81, 117, 123, 134, 146 Argonaute 178 Army of Portugal 114 Artishiff, Captain 247 Assaye, Battle of (1803) 94 Asturias, Prince of 46 Auchmuty, Sir Samuel 93, 96, 97 Auckland, William Eden, 1st Baron 21, 88, 93, 139, 145, 170, 241 Austerlitz, Battle of (1805) xiv, 10, 21, 90 Backhouse, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas 96, 97 Badajoz, Peace of (1801) 244, 245 Bahia region, Brazil 85, 86, 173 Bailie, Captain 247 Baltic 7, 85, 103–4, 109, 138, 161, 177, 229 Bank of France 87 Baratnisky, Commodore 247 Barbé-Marbois, François, marquis de 87 Barham, Lord 31 Batavian Republic, foundation of (1795) 6, 7 Bathurst, Henry, 3rd Earl 101, 205, 206, 207, 242 Bayonne French troops assemble 122, 123, 127, 128

INDEX Portuguese troops sent to 185 Bedford 139, 143, 172, 173 Beira, Prince of 125, 134, 147 Bell, John 157 Bengal Sepoys 94, 95 Beresford, Major General William Carr 88–9, 97, 153, 171–2, 206 Berlin Decree (1806) 1, 24, 80, 90 Bessborough, Lady 124, 139–40, 170 Birt, Surgeon 191 Bligh, Captain 219 Blossom 194, 217 Bombay Castle 36, 260 Bouitchensky, Captain 247 Bourbon monarchy, and a South American throne 120–21 Bourtchensky, Captain 247 Brazil an important Portugese possession 27 gold in 28, 29 major contributor to Portuguese economy 29 revolutionary conspiracies 29 Portuguese ambition to extend borders 44 remains in contact with Portugal 84 seat of Portuguese government from early 1808 84, 197, 229 population 85 Napoleon’s plans 113, 197, 228 British object in 199 cotton licences 205 import duties 235 independence (1822) 254 Brest blockade 30–31 British army, size of 8, 203 British Atlantic Empire 13 British Empire, creation of 38 Brougham, Henry 41, 45, 53, 62, 74, 76–7, 119 Buckingham, Marquis of 93, 99 Buenos Aires expedition to (1797) 83 wealth in 85 Popham seizes (1806) 89–94, 107, 207 confusion over area captured 91, 98–9 loss of (1806) 96, 107, 174 Wellesley’s plan for its recapture 96–7 British plans 199–200 Bulwark 261 Burke, James 178 Burling Islands 188–9, 193

329

Burrard, Lieutenant General Sir Harry 223, 224, 252 Byron, George Gordon, Lord 44–5 Cadiz 215, 222, 223 Purvis blockades 134, 178, 195 Camden, Earl 242 Camel 36 Camões, Luís de 44 Campbell, Admiral 41, 85, 86, 151 Camperdown, Battle of (1797) 30 Campo Formio, Treaty of (1797) xiii Campo-Alegre 126 Canning, George 242 views on war policy 110 and Strangford 45, 132–3 and Mexico 88 Foreign Office 101 and direction of the war effort 102 and subsidies 103 attitude to Russia 111 Anglo-Portuguese Convention 130, 131 and Almeida 131–2 and vacillations of Portuguese court 136 annoyed with Sousa 142 Regent’s evacuation 144–5 and the Madeira expedition 152–3 and the Russian fleet 158–9 delighted that Portuguese Royal Family saved 170–71 and Brazil mission 198 memorandum on South America 201–2, 233 commits British help to those opposing France 221 Canning, Joan 115 Canopus 56 Captain 56, 172 Carlota Joaquina, Spanish Infanta (Princess of Brazil; later Queen Consort of Portugal) 41–2, 60, 212 Carpenter, John 185 Castlereagh, Lady 140 Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount 7, 104–5, 242 Secretary of State for War 101 and direction of the war effort 102 examines strategic situation 103, 176 South American question 120, 202 serious illness 139–40, 149 Madeira expedition 153 withdraws troops 229–30

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Cathcart, Lieutenant General William 104, 109, 111, 116 Catholic Emancipation xiii Centaur 172 Champagny, Comte de 75, 114 Chandler, Commander Thomas 191 Channel Fleet 30, 139, 244 Charles II, King of Spain 120 Charles IV, King of Spain 41, 126, 196, 197, 207, 214 Chatham, General John Pitt, 2nd Earl of 101, 159, 160, 242 Chatham Papers 86 Cheery 194 Chesapeake, USS 200 Churchill, Sir Winston xiii Clarke, Henri 75 Clausewitzian doctrine 18, 235 Coffin, Captain Isaac 37 Coimbra, Portugal 218–19 Collingwood, Admiral Cuthbert 32, 43, 46, 47, 56, 106, 158, 175, 176, 178, 188 Colpoys 60 Conde Henrique 168, 248 Confederation of the Rhine 90 Confiance 164, 167, 168, 198–9, 251, 257 Conqueror 143, 165, 180 Constantinople 174 Continental blockade 1–2, 14, 20, 83, 91, 103, 109, 113, 173, 175, 201, 226 Convention of Cintra (1808) 224 Convention of Fontainebleau (1807) 87, 127–8, 129–33, 137, 144, 145, 148, 154, 178, 196, 198, 203, 237 Copenhagen 115, 119, 126, 127, 139, 154, 157, 164, 171, 174, 175, 229, 231 Copenhagen, Battle of (1801) 30 Cornélie 178 Corredo, Brigadier General 209 Correra Felles, José 219 Corunna campaign (1808-1809) 253 Cotton, Vice Admiral Sir Charles 62, 161, 163, 164, 179–95, 208, 215–19, 222, 223, 224, 229, 262 Crauford, Brigadier Robert 94, 98 Creyke, Captain 217 Cronin, Vincent 10 Crowe, Captain 247 Cuerta fortress, Morocco 178 Curioza 248 Dalrymple, Sir Hew 190, 214, 215, 218,

223, 224, 252, 261 Danish expedition (1807) 115 Danish navy 33, 109, 111–12, 143, 170 de Lima, Laurenço 62 Decrés, Admiral Duke Denis 16, 106, 154, 197, 237 Defence 180, 184 Defiance 48 Diadem 89 Diomede 89 Domingos de Sousa, Marquis 45 Don João de Castro 168, 248 Donegal 48 Duckworth, Vice Admiral Sir John 25, 31, 138, 158, 165–6 Dupont, General 188 Eclipse 217 Ega, Condé da 64, 69, 76, 78 Egypt, removal of French from (1801) 84 Elbe River 7 Eldon, Lord 116, 242 Elene 247 Elizabeth 139, 143, 168, 191 Elphinstone, Captain Fleming 261 Elphinstone, Robert 191 Embargo Act (1807) 200 Encounter 89 Erskine, Captain 184 Erskine, Lord 241 Etruria, Queen of 64 Etssen, Captain 247 European Navies, 1805-1810 34 Evora rising 219–20 Fenix 249 Ferdinand VII, King of Spain 196, 197, 212, 213 Ferrol, Spain 42–3, 134 First Coalition xiii Fitzgerald, Lord Robert Stephen 41, 42, 47, 49, 115, 116, 123, 198, 251 Fitzwilliam, Richard, Viscount 73, 234 Ford, William 185 Foudroyant 157, 168, 180, 181, 209, 261 Fox, Charles James 21, 22, 23, 60, 72, 77, 90, 115, 241 Fox, General 104 Foy, General 35 Franco-Russian alliance (1807) 18, 227 Franco-Spanish problems 68–72 Fraser, Major General Alexander

INDEX Mackenzie 25 French army 185, 187 French navy 26, 32–4 French Revolution xiii, 17, 18 French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802) France declares war 5 threat to British security of French expansion into Low Countries 5–6, 7 Mediterranean theatre 7–8 Britain’s small army 8 British alliance with Russia 8–9 Britain’s main war aim in Europe 9 Britain goes to war for maritime security 12 great expeditions to the West Indies 30– 31 Frere, John Hookham 41 Friedland, Battle of (1807) 10, 99, 102, 105, 109 Gambier, Admiral John 111, 115, 122, 125–6, 147, 157, 166 Ganges 56, 180 Ganteaume, Admiral 175, 176 Garrota 194, 230 George III, King xiii, 6, 117, 129, 170–71, 209, 222 Gibraltar 190, 214, 260, 261 Glorious First of June (1794) 30 Goddard (in Lauderdale’s mission) 91–2 Godoy, Manuel de, Prince of Peace 58, 64, 69, 72, 76, 78, 79, 87, 196, 197 Golfinho 168, 248 Gomes Freire, General 166 Gomes Freres, Dom 218 Gower, Lord Granville Leveson 109 Grande Armée 32, 99 Greek War of Independence (1821-1833) 253 Grenville, Thomas 21, 74, 96, 97, 101, 241 Grenville, Lord William Wyndham 21, 36, 49, 72, 74, 88, 90, 91, 92, 94, 98, 102, 115, 138, 232, 233, 241 Grey, Charles, 2nd Earl see Howick, Viscount Grieg, Rear Admiral Alexander 191, 247 Gustavus IV, King of Sweden 103, 135, 177 Hack, William 99 Harbinger 46 Harvey, Captain 109

331

Havana 197 Hawkesbury, Lord see Liverpool, Lord Henning, Lieutenant 45 Héros 178 Hibernia 48, 60, 139, 157, 163, 164, 167, 168, 180, 190, 191, 217, 252, 254 Hill, Francis 198, 208, 209, 210 Hindustan 193 Holy Roman Empire 90 Hood, Rear Admiral Sir Samuel 32, 172 Howick, Viscount (1806-7; from 1807 2nd Earl Grey) 11, 21, 241 Portuguese embargo of the Richmond 45 presses for decisive action over Portugal 53 and Rosslyn 56 Hunter, John 48 Huskinson, Lieutenant George 189 Illustrious 48 Intrepid 172 Ionian Islands 158, 159, 191 Jacob, William 84 Jamaica, British investments in 15 Jefferson, Thomas 200 Jena, Battle of (1806) 10 João, Dom, Prince of Brazil (later João VI of Portugal) 41, 42, 65–8, 77, 80, 81, 117, 118, 121–5, 128, 129–30, 132–6, 140, 144–8, 169, 172–3, 185, 189, 198, 203, 204, 205, 211, 234, 235, 245, 251, 254–9 Joseph Bonaparte, King of Naples 49 Junot, Jean-Andoche 126–7, 128, 154, 169, 170, 174, 179, 181, 182, 185–8, 190, 192, 194, 197, 216, 219, 220, 222, 224, 230, 235 Jverdoi 247 Kent 48 Kerguelen, Rear Admiral M 39 Kilduine 247 Kingfisher 36, 56 Krove, William 191 La Cannonier No.1 189 Lannes, General Jean 42, 246 Lauderdale, James Maitland, 8th Earl of 22, 72, 73, 91 Laughton, John Knox 260 Lavinia 48, 77

332


Le Conseiller de Court Poletica 186 League of Armed Neutrality (1800-1801) 18, 158 Lebland-Plasson, Lieutenant 194 Lebre 248 Lee, Captain 212 Leissegues, Admiral 31 Lemnos, Battle of (1807) 106 Leochy 247 Leopard 200 Levant Company 7 L’Hermitte, Commodore 32 Libra, Commissioner 37 Lima, Chevalier de 67, 73, 75, 113, 114, 122, 126, 155 Lind, Surgeon 191 Lisbon importance of 26, 27, 34, 35, 39, 40, 106, 126 harbour 35, 36, 151, 227 Mediterranean Fleet based in 36–7 British merchant ships in 37–8, 48 dangers of Lisbon under French control 38–40 a hotbed of rumour 43 Napoleon aims to seize 113 vulnerability to blockade 151 Smith expedition 137–52 plans to attack 161–4 blockade 164–7, 179–81, 182, 187–8, 189, 192, 194, 195, 197, 199, 208, 217, 218, 230 Lively 186, 188 Liverpool, Robert Banks Jenkinson, Lord (previously Lord Hawkesbury) 101, 102, 242 deputises for Castlereagh 140 and the Smith expedition 143 and the Madeira expedition 152, 153 and the Russian fleet 158 Loison, General 219–20 London 139, 143, 164, 168, 172, 173, 209 Louis, Dauphin of France 120 Louis, Rear Admiral Sir Thomas 56 Louis XIII, King of France 120 Louis XIV, King of France 120 Louis XV, King of France 120 Louis XVIII, King of France 121 Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland 11 Louisiana Purchase (1803) 87–8 Lunéville, Treaty of (1801) xiii

Mackenzie-Fraser, General Alexander 105 McKinley, Captain George 162–3, 184, 186, 188, 189, 230 Madeira 128–9, 133, 152–3, 171–2, 206, 244–5 Madrid, Treaty of (1750) 209–210 Maleef, Captain 247 Maligin, Captain 247 Malta 56 Manilla 95 Maria I, Queen of Portugal 41, 60 Maria the First 168, 181 Maria Prima 249 Marlborough 139, 143, 168, 172, 173 Martim de Freitar 168, 248 Mediterranean Fleet 36–7, 43, 51 Medusa 168, 248 Meeting of West India Planters and Merchants 14 Melville, Henry Dundas, 1st Viscount 12– 13, 15, 83, 84, 86, 87, 102 Methuen Treaty (1703) 28, 34 Metternich, Prince Klemens von 75 Mexico: Napoleon’s plans 197 Mexico expedition 95, 96, 108 Miguel of Portugal 254 Milbrook 180, 193 Minerva 168, 248 ‘Ministry of All Talents’ (1806-7) xv, 61, 102, 227 members of 21, 241 situation found on taking office 21–2 the search for peace 22–6 reaction to Portuguese crisis (1806) 49– 59, 82, 229, 239 attempts to open up a rift between France and Spain 90 in South America 98–9, 106–7, 196, 199, 231, 232, 233 assessed 100 collapse of the administration 100, 101 Minotaur 180, 191 Miranda, Francisco 84, 91, 108 Moffet, Lieutenant Samuel 191 Moira, Lord 21, 93, 241, 252 Monarch 139, 143, 172, 173, 212 Moncey, Marshal 188 Montevideo 85, 197, 199, 211–12, 237 Montron, M. de 72, 73 Moore, Captain Graham 172 Moore, Sir John 45, 102, 104, 137, 143–4, 152, 161, 166, 172, 177, 222, 252, 253, 260

INDEX Mosco 247 Moshtchnoi 225 Mostuoi 247 Mulgrave, Henry Phipps, 1st Earl 101, 105, 109, 110–111, 115, 161, 222, 242, 252 Murat, Marshal Joachim 214 Murray, Rear Admiral George 94 Napier, Lieutenant General Sir Charles James 253 Napoleon Bonaparte expansionist policies 9, 23, 26 builds a barrier of satellite states 9 criticism of Britain’s actions 11–12 and the West Indies 15, 16–17 military dominance on the Continent 21 and neutrality 25 crowns himself king of Italy 25 reconstruction of naval forces 32, 33–4 realises the value of Lisbon 39 mocks Britain dabbling in South America 83 absurd concept of 86 plan for an invasion of Portugal (1806) 87 Berlin Decree 1, 24, 80, 90 interest in South America 106, 113, 197, 228 signs Treaties of Tilsit 109 objectives in Portugal 113 orders Junot to march on Portugal 126–7 plans for the conquest of Portugal 154– 5, 169 denounces the Spanish Royal Family 196 seizure of Charles IV 207 as Emperor of the French 253 Narcissus 89, 90 Nautilus 188, 216 Nelson, Admiral Lord Horatio 15, 47, 171 Neptune 178 Nile, Battle of the (1798) 30 Niza, Admiral, Marquis of 36, 243 Northern Powers agreement (1801) 135 Northumberland, Duke of 170 Nymphe 180, 194 Olivença 245 Oporto (Porto), Portugal 76, 77, 106, 147, 217, 218, 219, 223 Orders in Council 24, 33, 201 Ordnance Office 103 Orel 247

333

Orleans, Duke of 201 Ottoman Empire 178 Ouvrard, Gabriel Julien 87 Paget, Sir Arthur 105 Parma, Duke of 6 Paul, Czar 105 peace talks 1796 84 1800-1801 84 failure of (1806) 22–3, 24, 93, 227 Pedro I of Brazil (Pedro IV of Portugal) 254 Perceval, Spencer 101, 102, 205, 242 Pernambuco region, Brazil 85 Perola 249 Petty, Lord Henry 11, 181–2, 241 Philippines 197 Pigott, Captain 217 Pitt, William, the Elder xiii Pitt, William, the Younger 102 becomes Prime Minister (1783) xiii French Revolutionary Wars 6 and Third Coalition xiv, 1, 17, 84 after Austerlitz xiv Continental subsidies 9 opening markets of Spanish America 84, 88 death (1806) xiii, xiv-xv, 21 Piuma, Mr (Genoese Franciscan monk) 121 Plantagenet 143, 165, 168, 180 Plate River 44, 86, 98, 178, 197, 199, 209, 210–211, 215, 237 Pluton 178 Pombal, Sebastiao José de Carvalho e Melo, Marquis of 70 Popham, Sir Home, RN 83, 84, 88–93, 96, 97, 99–100, 107, 232, 233, 236, 238, 240 Portland Ministry xv, 101–112, 227, 239 members 101, 242 attacks on 102 re-assessed 102 in South America 106–8, 196–213, 229, 231 Portland, William Henry CavendishBentinck, 3rd Duke of 101, 102, 198, 207, 208, 242, 251–2 Portugal 243–6 major overseas possessions in South America 8 Britain attacks colonies and trade 17

334


neutrality issue 25, 38, 43, 44, 45, 55, 61– 2, 64, 80, 82, 245 appeasement policy 25, 46, 47, 123–4, 134, 228 weak government 26, 65 Anglo-Portuguese commercial relations 27, 28–30 importance of trade with Brazil 29 considers moving seat of government to New World 29–30 indemnities 43, 48, 64, 186 crisis alleviated 72–6 told to improve its defences 77–8 crisis of 1807 113–36 crisis renewed 114–19 the Regent closes the ports 146, 147, 148 crisis resolved 164–7 embarkation of the Royal Family 168–70, 229 aftermath of the Portuguese evacuation 170–73 British intervention in (1808) 220–25 Portugal, Infanta of 46 Portuguese army poor state of 26, 61, 64, 65, 229 reform issue 80 deployment of 146 Infantry Regiments 146 French treatment of 185–6 Portuguese Fleet 248 ships left at Lisbon 249 Portuguese navy 33, 116, 122, 125, 135, 170 importance of 26, 27, 40 size of 34, 109, 115 role of 34 Napoleon aims to seize 113, 154 Pressburg, Treaty of (1805) xiv Princera de Beira 249 Principe de Brazil 168, 248 Principe Reale 168, 248 Principe Regente 168 Prussian Campaign (1806) 77, 79, 82 Purvis, Admiral 134, 159, 160, 178, 190, 195, 216, 261 Rainha de Portugal 168, 248 Raisonnable 89 Ramage, Lieutenant 60 Raphael 224, 247 Rapid 217, 230 Ratvisan 247

Raven 155 Rayneval, François Gérard, Conte de 46, 113, 114, 126 Regency Council 181, 185 Repulse 56 Resistance 56 Resolution 191 Richmond 45–6 Rio de Janeiro captured by France (1711) 86 wealth in 85 Rio Grande region, Brazil 85 Rosario 73 Rose, George, MP 171, 200 Rosily-Mesros, Admiral François Étienne de 48 Rosslyn, Lord 59 instructions to (1806) 53–8 leads mission to Lisbon 61 meetings with Araujo 62–5, 69 meetings with the Portugese Prince Regent 65–8, 77 end of the Rosslyn Mission 76–82 Rosslyn/Danish missions compared 115–16 Royal Navy protects British Atlantic Empire 13 expansion of 19, 32, 33, 230 and Portugal 26 supremacy of 27, 202 central to British maritime security and economic expansion 30 workable command of the sea 176 squadron in Brazilian waters 204 Royal Navy Victualling Board 47 Ruby 180 Russia rapprochement with France (1807) 18 declares war on Britain (1807) 160 Russian Baltic fleet 177 Russian Mediterranean Fleet 157–61 Russian navy 33 Sacramento 209–210, 212 St George 36 St Peter 247 St Sebastiao 249 St Vincent, Battle of Cape (1797) 30, 51, 243 St Vincent, Sir John Jervis, 1st Earl of 38, 59, 243, 244 commands Mediterranean Fleet 37

INDEX commands a fleet off the Tagus 48, 55–7 instructions to (1806) 51–3, 54, 56 ordered to protect the Queen of Portugal 60 Araujo wants him to leave Lisbon 61–2 ‘moderate conduct’ 62 San Ildefonso, Treaty of (1777) 210, 243 San Josef 62 Satarro, Miguel 47, 191, 192, 216, 218 Saumarez, Rear Admiral Sir James 177, 195, 244 Scout 44 Second Coalition xiii, 244 Seid el Badar 247 Selaphael 247 Seniavin, Vice Admiral Dmitri 25, 105–6, 158–61, 171, 179–83, 185, 186, 188, 190, 192, 193, 194, 216, 217, 219, 224–5, 230, 247 Seven Years War (1756-63) 30, 210 Shannon 172 Sheridan, Richard 18 Shipley, Captain Conway 194 Sicily 161–2, 177–8, 261 Sidmouth, Viscount (later Lord Holland) 241 Silnoi 247 Silnyi 225 Simcoe, General John Graves 53, 55–8, 76 Skeltin, Captain 247 Skoroi 247 Slessor, Harriet 118–19, 147–8, 194 Smith, Captain 188, 215–16 Smith, Lieutenant G S 167 Smith, Rear Admiral Sir Sidney 248, 249 expedition to Lisbon 137–52 battle fleet 157 finds part of Russian fleet 159–60 ordered to seize Russian ships 163, 179– 80 resolution of the Portuguese crisis 164–7 embarkation of Portuguese Royal Family 168–9, 172, 250–59 ignores orders 180, 181 sent to Brazil 198–9, 209–212 and Sir John Moore 260–62 Society of West India Merchants 14 Solebay 139, 143 Solis, Don Sebastian 217 Sousa, Dom Rodrigo de 56, 61, 64, 69, 72, 78, 114–15, 117, 118, 119, 133–4, 136, 142, 152, 153, 183, 198, 206, 207, 208,

335

210, 251 Sousa Coutinho, Rodrigo de 208, 211 South America 231–8 a key region for expanding British commerce (1806-1808) 83, 85 reasons for projects being shelved 84 French threat to 85–8 Talents’ fundamentally flawed strategy 98–9 Spain major overseas possessions in South America 8, 44 Britain attacks colonies and trade 17 declares war after British seize a Spanish treasure fleet (1804) 27, 44, 83, 84 Franco-Spanish problems 68–72 mobilisation 78–9 Charles IV’s abdication 214 Napoleon takes over the throne 214 uprising against French occupation 212, 214–20, 234 Spanish Armada (1588) 6 Spanish Empire 44, 99–100, 197, 232, 237 Spanish Latin America 83 Spanish South America 85 Spencer, Major General Brent 144, 161, 178, 179, 189–90, 215, 218, 222, 223 Spencer, George John, 2nd Earl 21, 74, 241 Spitzbergen 247 Stewart, Lieutenant Colonel Robert 245 Stirling, Rear Admiral 89 Strangford, Percy Clinton Sidney Smythe, 6th Viscount Irish peer and poet 44 criticism of 44–5 and Portuguese appeasement 46 and secret supply system 47 reports from Portugal 48 works with Gambier 50 as a junior diplomat 53 and intelligence 69–70 presses the Portuguese to improve the country’s defences 77–8 told of Spanish mobilisation 78 confers with Araujo (1807) 81, 117, 134, 146 tries to get the Portuguese to flee Brazil 123–5 the Brazil mission 198, 203–4, 209, 210 Portuguese Royal Family embarkation 250–59

336


and Sir John Moore 260 Stroganoff, Baron 79 Stuart, Lieutenant General Sir Charles 243, 244 Success 172 Swallow 191 Swedish navy 33 Talbot 180 Talleyrand, Charles-Maurice de 22, 49, 61, 62, 63, 67, 72, 73, 75 Napoleon’s instructions to 113–14 Theseus 56 Third Coalition xiv, 1, 17, 21 Tilsit, Treaties of (1807) 1, 2, 33, 109, 110, 118, 158, 230 Toulon, siege of (1793) 127 Trafalgar, Battle of (1805) xiv, 1, 24, 30, 79, 176, 246 Trist, Robert 189 Tritao 249 Turnbull, John 37–8 Ulm, Battle of (1805) xiv, 99 Urania 168, 248 Usher, Thomas 60 Utrecht, Treaty of (1713) 120, 209 Vandal, Albert 10 Vasco de Gama 168, 181 Vascomcalles, M. de 72 Venezuela, expedition to (1797) 83 Venus 247, 249 Vila Verde, Conde de 47, 66, 67, 70, 72, 80 Villeneuve, Vice-Admiral Pierre-Charles 15 Vinganca 248 Viper 188 Voador 248 ‘War of the Oranges’ (1801) 244 Warre, William 42, 76, 77 Waterloo, Battle of (1815) 7 Wellesley, Arthur (later 1st Duke of Wellington) 18, 94–7, 111, 200, 201, 212, 215, 221, 223–4, 240 Wellesley-Pole, William 162 West Indies economic importance 14–15 British casualties 15–16, 17 value of campaigns in 16 Western Squadron 6 Westmorland, Earl of 242

Weymouth 36 Whitelocke, Lieutenant General John 98, 100, 107, 119, 120, 135, 233 Willaumez, Admiral Jean-Baptiste-Philibert 31, 62, 86 Wilson, Mr (a former merchant) 217 Wilson, Sir Robert 109, 160 Windham, William 8, 21, 56, 57, 58, 72, 75, 89–90, 91, 93–4, 98, 138, 232, 233, 241 Yarmouth, Francis Charles SeymourIngram, Lord 22, 49, 59, 61, 62, 67, 72– 3, 81, 229 Yarmouth, Lady 72 Yaroslav 224 Yeo, Captain James Lucas 167, 189, 250 York 172 Young, Admiral 143

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