Britain and the Papacy in the Age of Revolution, 1846-1851 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

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BRITAIN AND THE PAPACY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1846–1851

Saho Matsumoto-Best

THE BOYDELL PRESS

ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY STUDIES IN HISTORY New Series


TO MY PARENTS, TORU AND MIDORI MATSUMOTO

Studies in History New Series Editorial Board Professor David Eastwood (Convenor) Professor Michael Braddick Dr Steven Gunn Dr Janet Hunter (Economic History Society) Professor Aled Jones (Literary Director) Professor Colin Jones Professor Mark Mazower Professor Miles Taylor Dr Simon Walker Professor Julian Hoppit (Honorary Treasurer) This series is supported by an annual subvention from the Economic History Society

‘Roman Punch’


Saho Matsumoto-Best

THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY THE BOYDELL PRESS

© Saho Matsumoto-Best 2003 All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner First published 2003 A Royal Historical Society publication Published by The Boydell Press an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. PO Box 41026, Rochester, NY 14604–4126, USA website: www.boydell.co.uk ISBN 0 86193 265 X ISSN 0269–2244 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Matsumoto-Best, Saho, 1965– Britain and the papacy in the age of revolution, 1846–1851 / Saho Matsumoto-Best. p. cm. – (Royal Historical Society studies in history. New series, ISSN 0269–2244) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–86193–265–X (Hardback : alk. paper) 1. Great Britain – Foreign relations – Italy – Papal States. 2. Church and state – Great Britain – History – 19th century. 3. Great Britain – Foreign relations – Catholic Church. 4. Catholic Church – Foreign relations – Great Britain. 5. Papal States – Foreign relations – Great Britain. 6. Great Britain – Foreign relations – 1837–1901. 7. Papacy – History – 19th century. I. Title. II. Series. DA47.9.P34M38 2003 327.41045'6'09034 – dc21 2003004937

This book is printed on acid-free paper Printed in Great Britain by St Edmundsbury Press Ltd, Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk

Contents Page List of illustrations ix Acknowledgements xi Abbreviations xiii Introduction 1 1 From 1815 to the election of Pius IX 9 2 The pope’s liberal reforms, 1846–1847 33 3 The origins of the Minto mission 50 4 Britain and the 1848 revolution in Rome 71 5 Britain and the rise and fall of the Roman republic 111 6 The restoration of the Catholic hierarchy and anti-Catholicism 137 in Britain Conclusion 172 Bibliography 177 Index 191

Publication of this volume was aided by a grant from the Scouloudi Foundation, in association with the Institute of Historical Research.

List of Illustrations Frontispiece/jacket illustration: ‘Roman Punch’, Punch, 2 October 1847 1. ‘The thin end of the wedge: daring attempt to break into a church’, Punch, November 1850

148

Maps 1. The Italian peninsula in 1815 2. Central Italy and the papal states, 1815

10 13

Photographic Acknowledgements The frontispiece/jacket illustration and plate 1 are reproduced by permission of

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Acknowledgements My decision to focus on Anglo-Vatican relations in the period of the Risorgimento for my PhD thesis was made when I found a number of articles on Pius IX in The Times and some cartoons in Punch, which led me to wonder why Britain was so obsessed with this particular pope? It was even more puzzling that a British diplomatic representative called him ‘A good Pope’. Pius IX has the reputation of being one of the most controversial popes in modern European history, due to his declaration of papal infallibility and the immaculate conception of Virgin Mary, and his opposition to Italian unification. Why then at any time in his reign could he have been regarded as such a positive figure by a traditionally anti-Catholic state? This simple and curious question was the basis of my original PhD thesis and has now led to this book. I could not have completed this book without help from numerous individuals and institutions. Therefore I would like to thank the staff at the following institutions for their assistance in my research: the Public Record Office in Kew; the Hartley Library at the University of Southampton; the Bodleian Library, Oxford (including the Modern Manuscript Room); the British Library (including the Modern Manuscript and the Newspaper Archive in Colindale); the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh; Ushaw College in Durham; Westminster Diocesan Archives in London; Archbishop’s House in Dublin; the Vatican Archive in Rome (Archivio Segreto Vaticano) including the Archivio Storico Congregatio pro negotiis ecclesasticis extraordinariis; the Archives of the Sacra Congregazione di Propaganda Fide, Piazza Spagna, Rome; the Archive of the English College in Rome; the State Archive in Rome; the Italian Foreign Ministry Archive in Rome; the Biblioteca Nazionale Storico Moderno e Contemporeneo, Via Gaetano, Rome, and the Instituto di storico per Risorgimento, Piazza Venezia, Rome. For access to the Vatican Archives, I am grateful to Sister Tesuko Nakagawa, former President of the University of the Sacred Heart in Tokyo from which I originally graduated, and to Padre Pittau, President (Chancellor) of University of the Gregoriana in Rome. I would also like to thank the staff of the libraries at the University of Warwick, the Institute of Historical Research, the London School of Economics and Keio University. Records from the Public Record Office by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationary Office. I would like to acknowledge the permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to use quotations from the papers in the Royal Archive; Ushaw College for the Wiseman papers; the trustees of the Broadlands Archives Estate for the Palmerston papers; the Bodleian Library for the Clarendon papers; the Public Record Office for the Russell papers; the National Library of Scotland for the Minto papers, and His Eminence, xi

Desmond Cardinal Connell, Archbishop of Dublin, for the Murray, Hamilton, and Cullen collections in the Dublin Diocesan Archives. I would like to express my acknowledgement to Professor Takao Matsumura who first gave me the opportunity to study in England, to Professor John A. Davis who supervised my thesis and provided numerous references on my behalf, to Mrs Ros Lucas for motherly support, and to Professor Gwyn Lewis and the other members of staff at the Centre for the Study of Social History at the University of Warwick in 1991–6. During my writing I was inspired by a number of stimulating seminars and conferences which were organised by the staff and members of the Institute of Historical Research. Members of ASMI (the Association of Modern Italian Studies) also provided me with useful information; among them I particularly owe my gratitude for her extremely helpful suggestions to Dr Lucy Riall. In this respect I also wish to thank Dr Rohan McWilliam, Professor Miles Taylor and Dorothy Thompson, the late Professor Harry Hearder and the late Professor Emilia Morelli who have all helped me to clarify my argument. In addition, I am grateful to Dr David Laven, who acted as the external examiner for my PhD, for his advice. For financial assistance I owe a debt of gratitude to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who provided me with a grant as a Borsa di Studio in Rome in 1996–7, and the Japanese Organization for the Promotion of Science for providing me with post-doctoral research funding in 1997–9. I also cannot forget to thank my present colleagues and the members of the administrative staff in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Nagoya City University who have been patient whenever I have disappeared off to Europe since 1999. I would like to thank the Royal Historical Society for giving me the opportunity to turn my thesis into a book, and Professor David Eastwood for his kind support and patience. I would also like to express my thanks for their intellectual and personal assistance to Marinella Piccari, Lauro Versari and Keiko Inoue, who have always provided me with accommodation and good company in Rome and in Dublin, and to Gabriella Rienzo, Mauro Battocchi, Mire Tanaka and Ayumi Yamaguchi for their friendship. Finally I would like to express my deepest love and appreciation to my parents, Toru and Midori Matsumoto, to my parents-in-law, Philip and Muriel Best, who have supported and encouraged me, and to my husband, Dr Antony Best, not only for his warm personal support but also for his intellectual advice as a fellow historian. Saho Matsumoto-Best December 2002

xii

Abbreviations ADM ASME ASPF ASR ASV BL BPSP FO HO NLS PRO QVJ RA SUL UCA

Admiralty Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Roma Archivio Storico della Sacra Congregazione di Propaganda Fide Archivio Storico di Stato di Roma Archivio Segreto Vaticano British Library British parliamentary sessional papers Foreign Office Home Office National Library of Scotland Public Record Office Queen Victoria’s Journal Royal Archive, Windsor Southampton University Library Ushaw College Archive

xiii


Introduction

Introduction On 19 November 1847 the earl of Minto, the British lord privy seal and father-in-law of the prime minister, Lord John Russell, wrote from Rome to Sir George Hamilton, the British minister to Florence, about the policies of Pope Pius IX. He included in his letter a number of positive comments about Pius’ attempts to reform the papal government and referred warmly to him as ‘the good Pope’.1 This favourable view was not expressed in isolation, for other politicians used similar language and the British press too joined in the chorus of acclaim. Even Punch, which was renowned for its radical sympathies and its sarcasm towards the pope, described Pius IX in the same period as the embodiment of ‘Rational Liberty’ who was giving the ‘Roman Punch’ to despotism.2 It is surprising to find in the mid-nineteenth century this wave of governmental and public enthusiasm for the sovereign pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church, and indeed there cannot be many times since the Reformation when British politicians and the media have written in such complimentary terms about the occupant of the papal throne. The traditional attitude in Britain towards the papacy was in contrast very negative. The British government’s normal view of the pope’s role in European diplomacy and politics was that he acted as a supporter of the conservative powers and in particular of Austria. This support for the forces of reaction arose in part out of the need for Catholic unity, but in addition was necessary because of the nature of papal government and administration. The Vatican’s rule over its temporal possessions was so reactionary that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century it inspired a series of revolts within the Papal States. These required foreign intervention to suppress them, which in turn led the papacy to lean towards Austria. British dislike of the pope also arose from the awareness that every time his maladministration of the Papal States caused a fresh internal crisis, it threatened to provoke French intervention in the Italian peninsula. This was dangerous because each crisis had the potential to develop into a Franco-Austrian clash and thus possibly a new European war. At both the international and Italian domestic level, therefore, the pope was a symbol of autocracy and a potential threat to stability. For the British public the pope was the embodiment of Catholic despotism, which contrasted with the Protestant constitutionalism of Britain. The

1

Lord Minto to George Hamilton (Florence), 19 Nov. 1847, in F. Curato (ed.), Gran Bretagna e Italia nei documenti missione Minto, I: 1830–1848, Rome 1970, no. 118, p. 213. 2 Punch xiii, 2 Oct. 1847, 135. See frontispiece.

1

BRITAIN AND THE PAPACY, 1846–1851

modern British political system had its roots in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and it was not forgotten that the ousting of James II had been a victory over Catholicism. Moreover, the legacy of the Reformation was that Roman Catholicism and the pope’s claim to temporal and spiritual power were seen as a fundamental threat to British freedom. The antipathy of the British people to the pope was regularly displayed. Every year Guy Fawkes Day was an occasion for the public to vent its hostility, but in addition hatred for Catholics and Catholicism was sometimes expressed in a much more violent manner, most notably in the infamous Gordon Riots of 1780. The favourable view of the pope in 1847 was thus a significant shift from the previous period, and it is surprising that it has not been studied in much detail. This is mystifying considering that there have been many works on both the international and the domestic impact of the papacy of Pius IX, who was one of the most important holders of that office over the past two centuries. It is even stranger considering the fact that in 1850–1 the calm of Britain was disturbed by the ‘no-popery’ movement that arose in response to the re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy. This movement, which was seen as a reaction to an act of ‘papal aggression’, has been extensively covered at the levels of high politics and public attitudes and behaviour. However, few of these studies have attempted to put the ‘no-popery’ movement in the context of the changing British perception of Pius IX over the previous four years, which saw him travel from being viewed as a benign anti-Austrian liberal and Italian nationalist to being characterised as a despotic enemy of Britain and threat to the queen’s sovereignty. What literature does exist on anglo-papal relations tends to deal with specific areas rather than the whole. It is well known that Pius, on taking office, initiated a policy of reforms, and many accounts have been written about his ‘liberal’ period. There are a number of studies of his diplomacy with the European Catholic powers, particularly with France and Austria, and of his internal reform programme. Among them, Giacomo Martina’s Pio IX, 1846–18503 and Frank Coppa’s Pope Pius IX4 and Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli and papal politics in European affairs,5 about his secretary of state, are important for Pius IX’s domestic and foreign policies. Ivan Scott’s The Roman question and the powers, 1848–18656 concentrates on Franco-Roman relations. However, little has been written on relations between Britain and the Papal States in this period, and what has been published discusses the British government’s interest in the papacy almost solely in terms of British foreign policy towards the Risorgimento and its competition with France and Austria for influence in the Italian peninsula. The lack of research on relations between Britain and the Papal States has 3 4 5 6

G. Martina, Pio IX, 1846–1850, i, Rome 1974. F. J. Coppa, Pope Pius IX: crusader in a secular age, Boston 1979. Idem, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli and papal politics in European affairs, New York 1990. I. Scott, The Roman question and the powers, 1848–1865, The Hague 1969.

2

INTRODUCTION

in part been due to the fact that there was no direct diplomatic communication between the two governments in this period, except through the papal nuncios in Paris and Vienna, However, there are also two other reasons why the study of anglo-Roman relations has been neglected. First, because of the traditional emphasis in historical studies concerning Britain and the Risorgimento on Britain’s good relations with Piedmont, the course of anglo-Roman relations has largely been ignored, except in terms of examining the papal opposition to unification. Second, it seems that Britain’s anti-Catholicism has meant that there has been a marked reluctance to examine its relations with the Vatican. For example, it is notable that the few books and articles that have been published on this area very often have been written by Catholic scholars and have appeared from Catholic presses or in Catholic journals.7 An important if limited contribution has been made by Ottavio Barie in his two-volume L’Inghilterra e il problema italiano, 1846–1848, 1848–1849,8 which is the only study extensively concerned with anglo-Italian relations in the period of the 1848 revolution. However this text mainly discusses Britain’s interests in southern Italy and Piedmont, being based on the papers of Minto’s mission which is generally regarded as having had a more significant effect on politics in Turin and Naples than in Rome. Two important works on Britain and the internal politics and the diplomatic position of the Papal States do exist, but they do not deal directly with this period. From the Roman perspective Emilia Morelli’s La politica estera di Tomasso Bernetti9 looks at the period of the 1831 five powers conference, while C. T. McIntire’s England against the papacy, 1858–186110 is significant but concentrates exclusively on the period of Odo Russell’s mission to Rome during the war of Italian unification. Another area of studies which is relevant to anglo-Roman relations is the history of the Roman Catholic Church in Britain. The key volume in this field is that by Edward Norman11, but also useful are the works of Derek Holmes and George Ian Thomas Machin.12 Research on the leading Roman 7

J. F. Broderick, The Holy See and the Irish movement for the repeal of the union with England, 1829–1847, Rome 1951; M. Buschkühl, Great Britain and the Holy See, 1746–1870, Dublin 1982; J. Reynolds, ‘Politics vs. persuasion: the attempt to establish anglo-Roman diplomatic relations in 1848’, Catholic Historical Review xci (1985), 377–8. An exception is L. P. Wallace, ‘Pius IX and Lord Palmerston, 1846–49’, in L. P. Wallace and W. C. Askew (eds), Power, public opinion and diplomacy, Durham 1959. 8 O. Barie, L’Inghilterra e il problema italiano, 1846–1848, i, Milan 1954, and L’Inghilterra e il problema italiano, 1848–1849, ii, Naples 1965. 9 E. Morelli, La politica estera di Tomasso Bernetti: segretario di stato di Gregorio XVI, Rome 1953. 10 C. T. McIntire, England against the papacy, 1858–1861: Tories, Liberals and the overthrow of papal temporal power during the Italian Risorgimento, Cambridge 1983. 11 E. Norman, The English Catholic Church in the nineteenth century, Oxford 1984. 12 J. D. Holmes, More Roman than Rome: English Catholicism in the nineteenth century, London 1978, and G. I. T. Machin, Politics and the Churches in Great Britain, 1832 to 1868, Oxford 1977.

3


Catholic figures in England, such as Newman and his age by Sheridan Gilley,13 Nicholas Wiseman and the transformation of English Catholicism by Richard Schiefen,14 and The life and times of Cardinal Wiseman by Wilfrid Ward,15 is also central to an understanding of religious relations between Britain and Rome. In addition, Donald Kerr’s works on the British government’s policy towards the Irish Catholic Church, Peel, priests and politics16 and ‘A nation of beggars?’,17 include references to the British government’s attempts to use intervention by the pope to restrain the priests of the Irish Catholic Church from their political activities. In addition, as noted above, there has been a great deal of work on the ‘no-popery’ movement of 1850–1, including books and articles by Robert Klaus, George Machin, Denis Paz and Walter Ralls.18 However, these studies concentrate on domestic politics and religion without paying much regard to the diplomatic situation. Another field in which the literature is influenced by British perceptions of Rome, and of Italy as a whole, is that of the study of the role of political radicalism in mid nineteenth-century Britain. Works in this area, by historians such as Margot Finn, Gregory Claeys and Miles Taylor, have looked in passing at the impact of the Italian nationalist leader Guiseppe Mazzini and the Roman republic on British radicalism and how their activities influenced the Chartist attitude towards Catholic despotism on the continent.19 Here too, however, the link between Mazzini and the Chartists has been dealt with from a narrow perspective without any reference to the full range of issues and controversies that existed between London and Rome. The main thesis of this book is, however, that when dealing with anglo-Roman relations during the period 1846–51 it is vital to remember that diplomatic, political and religious elements were all exerting their influence at one and the same time. This volume therefore seeks to integrate the two

13 14

S. Gilley, Newman and his age, London 1990. R. J. Schiefen, Nicolas Wiseman and the transformation of English Catholicism, Shepherdstown 1984. 15 W. Ward, The life and times of Cardinal Wiseman, London 1897. 16 D. A. Kerr, Peel, priests and politics: Sir Robert Peel’s administration and the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland, 1841–1846, Oxford 1982. 17 Idem, ‘A nation of beggars’? Priests, people and politics in famine Ireland, 1846–1852, Oxford 1994. 18 R. J. Klaus, The pope, the Protestants, and the Irish: papal aggression and anti-Catholicism in mid-nineteenth century England, New York 1987; G. I. T. Machin, ‘Lord John Russell and the prelude to the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, 1846–1851’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History xxv (1974), 277–95; D. G. Paz, ‘Popular anti-Catholicism in England, 1850–1851’, Albion xi (1979), 331–59; W. Ralls, ‘The papal aggression of 1850: a study in Victorian antiCatholicism’, Church History xliii (1974), 242–56. 19 M. Finn, After Chartism: class and nation in English radical politics, 1848–1874, Cambridge 1993; G. Claeys, ‘Mazzini, Kossuth and British radicalism, 1848–1854’, Journal of British Studies xxviii (1989), 225–61; M. Taylor, The decline of British radicalism, 1847–1860, Oxford 1995.

4

INTRODUCTION

strands in the relationship with Rome that are usually kept separate – religion and diplomacy. The aim is to demonstrate that a full understanding of anglo-papal relations can only be reached by following the development over time of the various different aspects of that relationship and seeing how these issues influenced each other. In such a study it is obvious that some aspects of a relationship will appear more significant than others. Consequently emphasis will be placed on a number of major themes. First, the effect on anglo-Roman relations of the political developments within the Papal States and the significance of Pius’ reforms on the Italian peninsula. Second, the British government’s concern about the growth of the repeal movement in Ireland and its links with the Roman Catholic Church. Third, the desire of the Roman Catholics in England to see a re-establishment of the Catholic hierarchy. Fourth and finally, the effect of public opinion in Britain, both radical and conservative, on the development of British policy towards the papacy and the Italian question. The analysis of these themes is based upon a number of different archival sources. The material on ‘high politics’ and diplomacy has used documentary evidence from both British and papal government sources, contemporary published documents and correspondence from a variety of private papers. On the whole these sources have underlined the argument behind this book, namely that it is impossible and unrealistic to attempt to draw a line between religious and political diplomacy. The correspondence of the leading actors in this book, Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Lord Minto and Cardinal Wiseman, demonstrates time and time again that in their minds no such division existed. There are, however, some problems with these sources, for it is difficult to tell how complete a record of events and opinions they contain. In particular, it has long been acknowledged that Russell’s private papers are, in the words of his biographer, ‘a disappointment to historians’.20 In regard to sources on British public opinion, there are greater problems. It is obviously difficult in this period to extrapolate what exactly the British public thought. However, an attempt has been made, by viewing Home Office and Metropolitan Police records on public activities and analysing contemporary newspapers and pamphlets, to give at least some idea of how British opinion reacted to the issues raised by British relations with the Vatican. Naturally the most sizeable quantity of material on public opinion exists for 1850–1 when anti-Catholicism revived with a vengeance due to the re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy. The book has a chronological rather than a thematic structure, because this helps to bring out the complex interaction between the various issues present in anglo-papal relations. The first chapter thus discusses the back-

20

J. Prest, Lord John Russell, London 1972, 433.

5


ground to the election of Pius IX. It begins by analysing Britain’s involvement in the five powers conference in Rome in 1831, which discussed the need for political reforms in the Papal States. It then goes on to study what effect Gregory’s XVI’s failure to implement reforms had on the political and social situation in the Papal States and other parts of the Italian peninsula, and what implications this had for British interests. It also discusses anglo-Vatican relations over the Irish issue in the early 1840s and the link between this and the presence of Mazzini as a political exile in England. The chapter concludes by looking at the election of Pius IX, and the British government’s diplomatic and domestic reaction to this dramatic event. The second chapter deals with the introduction of Pius IX’s popular political reforms in 1846–7, such as the introduction of the civic guard and the new press law, and analyses what problems these measures created for the future. Linked to this it covers how these reforms were perceived in Britain and looks at the thaw in anglo-papal relations that developed in this period. It also discusses how Austria responded to the pope’s liberalism by occupying the city of Ferrara, thus threatening to throw the whole of the Italian peninsula into crisis, and how the British government reacted to the Austrian threat. The third chapter analyses the motives behind the British government’s decision to send Lord Minto on his mission to Rome in the autumn of 1847. It assesses the relative importance of Italian factors, British public opinion, and the simultaneous problems brewing in Ireland in influencing the Russell administration. It also looks at the role and the motivations of English Catholics, such as Bishop Nicholas Wiseman, in facilitating a closer relationship between Rome and London. The fourth chapter examines the course of events in the Papal States in 1848, and analyses British reactions to the establishment of a constitution in Rome, and the battle for power between the pope and the political parties. It also covers the British government’s attempt to open diplomatic relations with the papacy and the reasons for the failure of this policy. It concludes by looking at the reasons for and consequences of the revolution that led Pius IX to flee from the Papal States to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in November 1848. The fifth chapter looks at the establishment of the Roman republic, and reactions of the British government and radical public opinion to the policies propounded by Mazzini. In particular, it examines the British government’s response to the pope’s call for support and the resultant French intervention in Rome. It also covers the British response to the anti-clericalism of the Roman republic and the effect that the arrival of refugees from the republic had on British politics and society in the autumn of 1849. The sixth chapter discusses the British view of the restoration of papal authority in Rome, the subsequent clash between the pope and Piedmont and the dilemmas that this posed for British interests. It then deals with the re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy, and analyses the rise of the ‘no-popery’ movement in both high politics and public opinion. It shows how the Russell government mishandled the episode thus forcing itself to 6

INTRODUCTION

bring in legislation that alienated its own supporters. It also examines how, despite the domestic crisis, Palmerston continued with his policy of trying to use the pope’s authority to curb the activities of the Irish Catholic Church. A conclusion then draws together the arguments that have been made in the main text of the book.

7


1815 to the Election of Pius IX

1

From 1815 to the Election of Pius IX The election of Pius IX as pope in July 1846 was a critical event in the development of Italian nationalism, for after years of inept government a champion of reform at last took charge of the most reactionary of the Italian states. The new pope inherited a state that was poorly administered, full of corruption and averse to social and political progress, and began in the first year of his pontificate to initiate policies that led to substantial change. This in turn led to growing interest in the pope in Britain and a desire to assist him in his mission. However, before discussing Pius IX’s election and the subsequent reforms, it is necessary to study the historical background to his succession to the papacy. In particular it is important to examine the circumstances within which the two principal proposals for reform were made prior to this date, namely the memorandum presented by the five European great powers in 1831, and the Manifesto di Rimini drawn up by Luigi Carlo Farini, the Romagnolo intellectual, in 1844. These memoranda are significant because, although Pope Gregory XVI largely ignored their contents, after July 1846 Pius IX attempted to act on their recommendations. This in turn helps to explain Britain’s positive attitude towards the new pope: the British government was pleased that the principles behind the memorandum had finally been adopted. The 1831 memorandum In May 1814, after years of imprisonment on the orders of Napoleon, Pope Pius VII returned to Rome to reclaim his temporal power over the Papal States. Two great powers had assisted in the recovery of his fortunes – Catholic Austria and Protestant Britain. The pope felt gratitude towards both, but political considerations as well as religious ties led him to rely upon Austria to support him in the difficult task of reasserting his rule over Rome. Austria was after all set to be the key power in the Italian peninsula, for the Congress of Vienna of 1814–15 established Austrian control over Venice and Lombardy, and placed members of the Habsburg family in the duchies of Parma, Modena and Florence. Austria also maintained direct influence in the Papal States, for the Congress decreed that Austria would withdraw its military force from central Italy only on condition that it was allowed to annex a small section of the Legation of Ferrara that lay on the left bank of the Po river, and main9


The Italian peninsula in 1815

10

1815 TO THE ELECTION OF PIUS IX

tained the right to garrison the citadel of Comacchio, both of which were important for strategic reasons. Britain was happy to acquiesce in this strong Austrian presence in Italy, for it was seen as a guarantee that French power would be contained. Britain did, however, have some interest in establishing good relations with the papacy and in particular in developing its commercial interests and thus in 1816 a consul was appointed to what were referred to as ‘the Roman States’. This was a deliberate piece of wording, for British law meant that the government could only maintain relations with the pope as the temporal ruler of Rome and could not do anything that smacked of recognition of papal spiritual authority. To reinforce the point, the consul in question, a man called Parke, was ordered not to reside in Rome itself, and was placed under the supervision of the legation at Florence.1 The British presence was thus strictly limited. The major task facing Pius after the restoration of his power was to decide how to administer the Papal States. The conservative elements in the Curia supported a wholesale return to the pre-Napoleonic form of government, but Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, Pius VII’s secretary of state, rejected this stance, knowing that it would prove unacceptable to the general population. Following his skilful negotiations for the restoration of the papal territory and the Austrian evacuation at the Congress of Vienna, Consalvi collaborated with Prince Metternich, the Austrian chancellor, on political reforms, by building on the centralised administrative structure introduced by the French, and introducing more modernised finance, an efficient military and police system to maintain law and order, and a rationalisation and simplification of the judiciary. These measures led to the Motuproprio of 6 July 1816 that partly secularised the papal administration, gave each province (a delegation or legation according to its governor’s title) a consultative council of local notables to advise the governor and abolished torture and arbitrary arrest. Reinerman argues in his Austria and the papacy in the age of Metternich, that even though limited in degree Consalvi’s reforms brought tranquillity to the Papal States between 1816 and 1823, at a time when Piedmont and Naples were convulsed by the revolutions of 1820–1. Metternich too expressed his satisfaction with Austria’s relations with the papacy around this period.2 In spite of the efforts of Pius VII and Consalvi, the ultra-conservative elements in the Curia, the zelanti, remained as a major obstacle even to gradual and moderate reforms. When Pius VII died in 1823 Consalvi and the other moderates failed to win over the conclave to their point of view and Leo XII, who was close to the zelanti, was elected. He alienated public opinion and popular discontent increased, to the extent that even 1

H. A. Smith, ‘Diplomatic relations with the Holy See, 1815–1930’, Law Quarterly Review xlviii (1932), 378–83; Buschkühl, Great Britain, 59. 2 A. J. Reinerman, Austria and the papacy in the age of Metternich, I: Between conflict and co-operation, 1809–1830, Washington, DC 1979, 42.

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Metternich was concerned about the new pope’s reactionary policy.3 Leo declared his own Motuproprio on 5 October 1824 in which he removed many of Consalvi’s reforms and brought the provincial councils firmly under the control of the nobility. In order to offset the unpopularity of these measures he decided to lower the tax burden on the lower classes. This, however, did not have the desired result, for it had the effect of reducing government revenue thus forcing cutbacks in expenditure on the police. The result was a rise in robbery and bandit activity that naturally did not endear the pope to the general population.4 After Leo’s death in February 1829, Cardinal Cappellari was elected as Pius VIII. He was relatively moderate and was welcomed by Austria. After six years of zelanti rule, the new pope attempted once again ‘to pursue Cardinal Consalvi’s policy of conciliatory diplomacy and moderate political reform’.5 Even more than had Pius VII, Pius VIII relied heavily on Austria. In particular, the papacy closely co-operated with Metternich in suppressing revolutionary activities by the Carbonari in Italy which had arisen as a consequence of the social discontent that had accumulated during the period of Leo XII and continued even under Pius VIII. Although Pius VIII was more moderate than his predecessor, he kept strict control over the political malcontents, but during this time revolutionary groups were plotting beneath the surface, waiting for the appropriate time for an uprising.6 An opportunity arose when revolution broke out in France in July 1830 and soon spread into Belgium and other parts of Europe. French radicals openly encouraged revolution in Italy, but Austria was determined to protect the existing order in Europe against revolt and reinforced its Italian army.7 As a protest against the new revolutionary regime in France, Pius VIII declared that the papacy would not recognise Louis Philippe, and he urged Austria to increase its forces in Italy, particularly in the Papal States, in order to prevent an Italian revolution. The Italian revolutionaries, however, were given a promising opening when the pope died on 30 November 1830. Taking advantage of the long drawn-out conclave to elect the new pope, early in February 1831 Ciro Menotti, a leading member of the Carbonari, started an uprising in the duchy of Parma which overthrew the local ruler. This was soon followed by uprisings in Parma and in cities within the Papal States such as Bologna, Forlì, Ravenna, Imola, Ferrara and Ancona. In particular, Bologna became the centre of the revolutionary movement, which proclaimed the union of all the 3

Idem, ‘Metternich and reform: the case of the Papal States, 1814–1848’, Journal of Modern History xlii (1970), 541. 4 C. S. Hughes, Crime, disorder and the Risorgimento: the politics of policing in Bologna, Cambridge 1994, 94–102; Reinerman, Austria and the papacy, i. 127–8. 5 Reinerman, Austria and the papacy, i. 159. 6 Ibid. i. 167. 7 Ibid. i. 173.

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Central Italy and the papal states, 1815

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insurgent provinces under one government, calling itself ‘the United Provinces of Italy’. Encouraged by the revolutionary rhetoric emanating from France, the insurgents in Italy hoped for French military support against Austria, but this was not forthcoming. When this became apparent, the new pope, Gregory XVI, who had taken office in February, called for Austrian military intervention to restore order. Austria quickly reoccupied the states of Parma and Modena and then crossed the papal frontier to enter Bologna. Subsequently, on 27 March, the revolutionary government was forced to surrender.8 The revolution of 1831 attracted the attention of the great powers to the Papal States, and papal affairs became for a time a major issue in European affairs. This was an important and sensitive matter for all the great powers, for there was a general fear that events in the Italian peninsula could lead to a clash of interests between Austria and France, and maybe even war between the two states, which might in turn bring about a general European conflict involving Russia and Prussia on the Austrian side. In April 1831, in order to avoid further unrest, a conference of the five European great powers was held to restore papal authority, and to discuss how security in the Papal States could be guaranteed. The conference witnessed division among the European powers, and in particular hostile relations between Austria and France.9 However, this was not simply a two-sided confrontation, because the presence of Britain as an agent of reform complicated matters further. A British representative, Sir Brook Taylor, was sent to Rome in April 1831 to discuss the reform programme in the Papal States with the representatives of the other four powers. As Britain did not have diplomatic relations with the papacy, Taylor’s status was termed as being ‘without any official diplomatic duty’. His mission was to prevent either the French or the Austrians from increasing their influence in the Papal States and to encourage reform.10 Britain’s policy towards reform was designed to establish the foundations of ‘good government’, and focused on specific issues such as legal reform. As George Seymour, the British minister in Florence, noted to Lord Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary, on 25 April 1831 the greatest failing of the papal government was the lack of any code of laws, which meant that papal subjects were at the mercy of the pope and the cardinals.11 Taylor’s task was difficult, for not only was it hard to persuade the papacy to accept reforms but also the French–Austrian rivalry made it almost impossible for the great powers to come to any agreement. His instructions were to stay above the international competition and to work solely to secure reforms, co-operating with any delegation that wished to achieve the same aim. Palmerston noted in his despatch 8 9 10 11

J. F. Coppa, The origins of the Italian wars of independence, London 1992, 16–17. C. Webster, The foreign policy of Palmerston, 1830–41, i, London 1951, 210. Lord Palmerston to Brook Taylor (Rome), 2 Apr. 1831, PRO, FO 43/24. George Seymour (Florence) to Palmerston, 25 Apr. 1831, Palmerston papers, Hartley Library, Southampton University, GC/SE/106/1–3.

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to Taylor on 2 April 1831 that even if the French minister, Count de Saint-Aulaire, was withdrawn, he should continue to co-operate with the Austrian minister, Count Lützow, in encouraging the reform programme, as his primary duty was to assist the interests of the papal subjects.12 This advice demonstrated that the desire for reform rather than any pro-French sentiment was the major influence on British policy. Palmerston’s dictum that ‘Britain had no permanent friends or enemies, just interests’ can thus be seen to have operated at the conference. Nevertheless it was expected that Taylor would find the greatest support for reform from the French. After a month’s discussion of a reform programme the conference submitted a memorandum to the pope on 21 May 1831. It included proposals for greater local government, that the central giunta should be opened up to elected representatives from local councils, that laymen should be admitted to all positions within the administrative and judicial system and that financial reform should take place. It also asked the pope to agree to the evacuation of Austrian troops.13 The memorandum was greeted with enthusiasm by the British government, and on 23 June 1831 Palmerston expressed his satisfaction that the Roman government was being pressed to introduce ‘those measures of conciliation and internal improvement which have been considered essential to the future contentment and tranquillity of the Papal states’.14 However, the main contents of the memorandum, which were a reflection of French and British liberal ideas, were opposed by the pope and his secretary of state, Cardinal Bernetti. On 5 July the pope made his response. He adopted some of the financial and judicial provisions of the memorandum and the ideas for the political reform of local councils, but rejected the proposal for a central giunta and the entry of laymen into the administration.15 With this, and the virtually simultaneous withdrawal of Austrian forces from the legations, the conference broke up having only achieved some of its aims, and only then if the pope kept to his promises.16 With the absence of a strong reform programme it was only a matter of time before further trouble broke out. Early in the winter of 1832 disorder occurred once again in the legations provoking an Austrian reoccupation of Bologna and, in response, the French seizure of Ancona. The French declared that they would remain until the Austrians left Bologna and the pope introduced the promised liberal reforms. There was, however, no chance of such concessions being made and thus the occupation became permanent.

12 13

Palmerston to Taylor, 2 Apr. 1831, FO 43/24. A. J. Reinerman, Austria and the papacy in the age of Metternich, II: Revolution and reaction, 1830–1838, Washington, DC 1989, 63. 14 Palmerston to Taylor, 23 June 1831, FO 43/24. 15 Reinerman, Austria and the papacy, ii. 58. 16 Ibid. ii. 75–6.

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The British government’s response to this new crisis was to try to persuade both Austria and France to withdraw. At the same time Seymour was instructed to go to Rome to revive the reform programme which had been proposed in the 1831 memorandum. In particular Palmerston emphasised in his own reform memorandum for Seymour the need to press for the establishment of elected local councils that would also be represented in a central giunta, and for the legations to be autonomous.17 Clearly, as Reinerman has pointed out, the foreign secretary desired to create the foundations of a parliamentary system, even though this would probably lead to the break-up of the Papal States.18 Not surprisingly, Britain’s negotiations with the papacy and Austria were not successful, and Palmerston’s relations with Metternich over the papal issue became seriously strained. Palmerston was convinced that the reform programme in the Papal States had failed owing to Austrian support for papal maladministration, and in July, faced with Metternich’s unbending opposition, he ordered Seymour to withdraw from Rome. Metternich was offended by Palmerston’s decision to remove Seymour and his anger only became worse when The Times published an exchange of notes between Seymour and Lützow which contained insulting references by Seymour to Metternich and the papal administration.19 The papacy would have, in fact, to wait until 1838 to see Austria and France withdraw, which had less to do with Britain’s mediation than with changes within the papacy. The zelanti forced the ‘liberal’ Bernetti to resign in 1836, replacing him with the ultra-conservative, pro-Austrian, Cardinal Lambruschini, who negotiated the withdrawal with Metternich.20 With the defeat of anglo-French calls for reform the social and political situation in the Papal States would not improve until 1846. This episode did, however, have an interesting conclusion. In 1832 Palmerston, struck by the inconvenience of not having a permanent diplomatic representative in Rome, asked the solicitor-general if a minister could be sent to Rome without breaking British law. The solicitor-general indicated in response that as long as the minister did not act as a channel for the pope’s religious communications the law would not be broken. Palmerston then speculated about whether it would be possible for the minister to Tuscany to be accredited to the Papal States too, and for an attaché to reside permanently in Rome.21 In the end Palmerston backed away from fully implementing this arrangement, but he did go beyond the position taken when Parke was appointed by deciding that an unaccredited diplomatic agent attached to the legation in Florence could reside in Rome. This led in August 1832 to the 17

Palmerston to Seymour, 8 Apr. 1832, Palmerston papers, GC/SE/378/1–2; Webster, Foreign policy, 213. 18 Reinerman, Austria and the papacy, ii. 160–1. 19 Webster, Foreign policy, 219. 20 Reinerman, Austria and the papacy, ii. 316–25. 21 Webster, Foreign policy, 218.

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appointment of Thomas Aubin. Relations with the papacy were not however to prove easy, for Gregory, as well as Metternich, resented the contents of Seymour’s letter.22 Mazzini and the impact of the 1831 revolution The disturbances in central Italy in 1831–2 raised two preoccupations among the European powers; first, concern that papal maladministration was the cause of unrest, and second, disquiet over the activities of the Italian revolutionaries, in particular the rise of Mazzinian republicanism, which threatened not only the Italian states but also the European monarchical powers. Britain’s natural sympathy towards the cause of Italian nationalism did not extend to the leading Italian nationalist figure Giuseppe Mazzini, whose brand of revolutionary activity was the antithesis of the British desire for gradual reform within the Italian states. Britain saw reform as a means to avoid revolution, and hence to avert the likelihood of Austrian and French armed intervention and possible war.23 After the failure of the February 1831 revolution in central Italy, including the Papal States, Mazzini escaped to Marseilles with another thirty or forty revolutionaries, and founded the association, Young Italy (Giovine Italia), in July 1831. In 1832 he tried to encourage insurrections in Naples and the Papal States and, in order to further his campaign, launched a periodical likewise called Young Italy in 1833. Copies of the periodical inspired young Italian nationalists, such as Vincenzo Gioberti, Luigi Carlo Farini and Antonio Rosmini, to support his cause.24 Meanwhile the governments in Vienna, Paris, St Petersburg and London collaborated to collect information about Mazzini’s activities. In 1833 some of his letters were intercepted by the duke of Tuscany and their contents passed to Sir Augustus Foster, the British minister in Turin. They revealed that Mazzini was attempting to convert to his movement people from many different backgrounds, including aristocrats and priests.25 After being expelled from France in 1833, Mazzini arrived in Switzerland and in the spring of 1834 he founded a new association called Young Europe (Giovine Europa) with other European political exiles including Poles and Germans. Even before this, in the winter of 1834, David Morier, the British minister in Berne, reported on Mazzini’s link to a plot to overthrow the Sardinian 22 23

Buschkühl, Great Britain, 73–5. For Mazzini’s admiration of the revolution in Belgium see D. Mack Smith, Mazzini, New Haven 1994, 6. 24 G. Bozzetti, Rosmini: priest, philosopher and patriot, London 1956; G. F. H. Berkeley, Italy in the making, 1815–1846, Cambridge 1932, 145, 154. 25 Augustus Foster (Turin) to Palmerston, 1 July 1833, in BPSP, 1845/LII: Despatches having reference to Mr Mazzini, 1837–44.

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government. On 8 February 1834 he informed the Foreign Office that a movement organised by Polish nationalists in Switzerland was connected with a conspiracy to overthrow the present government in Geneva, and to attack Savoy. However, this self-styled ‘Provisional Insurrectional Government of Savoy’ failed due to Mazzini’s impatience.26 Expelled by the Swiss government, which came under pressure from Austria, Mazzini in 1837 escaped to England where he had some contacts with sympathisers with Young Italy. It is obviously a coincidence that this year also saw the rise of Chartism, but it is known that Mazzini had second-hand knowledge of the English social and labour movement through his contacts with radical friends. In July 1839 he re-launched the periodical Young Italy in London and in 1840, inspired by Chartism and the activities of the Polish political exiles, he started a mutual aid society for Italian artisans in London as a branch of his movement.27 Mazzini’s arrival in England was significant as his link with the radicals helped to persuade this group to give active support to the cause of revolutionary Italian nationalism, which was in marked contrast to the cautious policy pursued by the British government. In particular he developed a close relationship with the historian and essayist Thomas Carlyle, whom he greatly admired, as evidenced by his article ‘On the genius and tendency writing of Thomas Carlyle’ which was published in the British Foreign Review in October 1843.28 In 1843 Mazzini once again was linked to organised conspiracies in Italy and, although they too failed, his reputation as ‘one of the most dangerous men in Europe’ was confirmed.29 It was at this point that Mazzini first really came to prominence in Britain, for in 1844 it was revealed in the radical press that his revolutionary activities had led him to come under surveillance by the British government. This revelation deeply embarrassed the Conservative administration of Sir Robert Peel, for it aroused considerable criticism. Indeed, Hansard spent more than 500 pages alone on this issue, and the home secretary, Sir James Graham, became a particular target of public hatred.30 On the surface the decision by Graham to authorise the General Post Office to open Mazzini’s private letters in London and to use the Metropolitan Police to trace his whereabouts and pass any relevant information to Vienna was due to the common desire among the great powers to contain revolution.31 These activities after all came about after a series of meetings between Graham and Count Neumann, the Austrian ambassador in London, 26 27 28

David Morier (Berne) to Palmerston, 8 Feb. 1834, ibid. Mack Smith, Mazzini, 33–8. W. Clarke (ed.), Essays: selected from the writings, literary, political, and religious of Joseph Mazzini, London 1887, 109–49. 29 Mack Smith, Mazzini, 40. See also W. Roberts, Prophet in exile: Joseph Mazzini in England, 1837–1868, New York 1989, 6. 30 The opening of Mazzini’s mail by the British General Post Office was reported in the Westminster Review cli (1844), 225–50, with the title ‘Mazzini and the ethics of politicians’. 31 E. Morelli, L’Inghilterra di Mazzini, Rome 1959, 47–65. For the attempt to locate Mazzini

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in which the latter expressed Metternich’s desire to see Mazzini’s letters.32 However another dimension also existed to the letter scandal which helps to demonstrate how for Britain the issue of the Papal States was a complicated one that touched on both foreign and domestic policy, and that is the link of this episode to the problem of Ireland. The Irish repeal movement One of the issues that directly connected Britain and the Vatican was the Irish Catholic question. During the 1830s and 1840s the British government was very much concerned with Irish issues because of the repeal movement and eventually the famine which made Ireland more problematic than ever. In order to explain the importance of Ireland it is necessary to outline briefly the background to the Irish Catholic issue. Religious concessions to the Catholic Church in Ireland and the rest of the British Isles started with the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829. Catholic emancipation was related to a series of political reforms in British politics. Although the Parliamentary Reform Act itself was undertaken in 1832 during the Whig ministry, reform had already started in the 1820s under the Tory prime minister, the duke of Wellington. In particular this period saw the passage of legislation related to religious toleration, including the emancipation of Unitarians, Nonconformists and Dissenters.33 The most significant piece of legislation was the Catholic Emancipation Act, which extended the franchise for the first time to Catholic voters.34 Before the act was passed the open practice of Catholicism had been illegal and could be punished under the penal law. The act was, therefore, designed to allow Catholics freedom of speech and association in England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland, and the right to stand for parliament in Britain. However, not all Catholics in the British Isles were satisfied with this legislation, most notably Irish Catholics in the form of the Catholic Association led by Daniel O’Connell, which, with the support of the Irish Catholic Church, had been the main pressure group lobbying for enfranchisement. Once the law was passed the Catholic Association still believed that Irish rights had not been fully recognised, for the franchise qualification in Ireland was substantially higher than in other part of the United Kingdom and they therefore sought more concessions.35 Moreover disputes about tithes, see Nicholas Pearce (HO) report, 12 Jan. 1844, and Metropolitan Police report, 4 Feb. 1844, HO 45/751. 32 Kerr, Peel, 99. 33 Machin, Politics and the Churches, 22. 34 P. Adelman, Peel and the Conservative Party, 1830–50, London 1989, 6. 35 F. O’Ferrall, Catholic emancipation: Daniel O’Connell and the birth of Irish democracy, 1820–1830, Dublin 1985, 39–40.

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Protestant evangelical missions and provision for the poor continued to ensure that the Irish Catholic Church remained in the political arena. Encouraged by a new surge of popular interest in politics in the late 1830s, O’Connell decided in 1840 to form the Repeal Association and began a campaign for repeal of the Union with England. As with the issue of emancipation he sought to mobilise clerical support, although not all of the Irish Catholic clergy responded with enthusiasm. At first the repeal movement failed to gather momentum, but in the spring of 1843 a series of large-scale meetings, at which some Catholic clergy made speeches, bolstered support, and brought Ireland once more into crisis.36 In response Peel sought to pacify agitation in Ireland by appealing to the Vatican.37 This was a policy that had been tried before by Britain, although usually to little avail. In 1814, when Cardinal Consalvi had visited London for talks with the British foreign secretary, Lord Castlereagh, the two men had discussed Ireland and the position of the Irish Catholic Church. More significantly Britain had tried intermittently to influence the appointment of Irish bishops. This policy had worked during the brief papacy of Pius VIII but Gregory XVI proved far less willing to listen to British entreaties and in 1834 had appointed the intensely nationalistic John MacHale, the first prelate to be wholly educated in Ireland since the Reformation and Daniel O’Connell’s most important clerical supporter, as archbishop of Tuam.38 In 1844 there was little likelihood that British lobbying would be any more effective than before, for Britain still did not have diplomatic relations with the papacy, and the English Catholic College in Rome was in a much weaker position than its Irish equivalent. Moreover the British government faced the problem that MacHale was influential in Rome because he had close links with the secretary of state, Cardinal Lambruschini.39 It was this need to tackle the Irish question that provided the hidden agenda to the Mazzini affair in 1843–4, for Britain needed something to offer to the papacy in order to overcome the influence of the Irish College in Rome. The arrangement reached with Austria in the autumn of 1843 was therefore a quid pro quo. On the one hand the British government would pass information about Mazzini to Metternich and in addition act to quell the activities of Italian revolutionary exiles in Malta whose propaganda threatened to destabilise the states on the mainland. In return Austria would press the pope and Lambruschini to stop clerical participation in the Irish repeal movement. The British government hoped that by using this bait it could persuade Metternich, given his concerns over Mazzini’s revolutionary movement and O’Connell’s radicalism, to exert his influence upon Lambruschini 36 37 38

Kerr, Peel, 76–81. Ibid. 94. Buschkühl, Great Britain, 70–7; P. Gray, Famine, land and politics: British government and Irish society, 1843–50, Dublin 1999, 172. 39 Kerr, Peel, 95.

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and the pope and thus undermine the repeal movement in Ireland.40 In order to make this policy work Britain also asked its ambassador in Vienna, Sir Robert Gordon, directly to approach the papal nuncio to Austria, Cardinal Altieri, and to make clear to him that the papacy should condemn the clergy’s involvement in the repeal movement and that in return Britain would suppress the agitation in Malta.41 However, although Britain acted to check the Maltese agitation and provided the papacy with ‘evidence’ of the Irish clergy’s political activities, Cardinal Lambruschini declined to meet his side of the bargain. In April 1844 he claimed that ‘whereas the government in Malta had the power to enforce the law of the land, the Holy See had no such power in Ireland’.42 The British were naturally disappointed by this response, as was Metternich, and no attempt was made to pursue this path any further.43 Thus, instead of solving the Irish problem, the Mazzini incident brought nothing but domestic embarrassment to the British government. The Peel administration also tried another route in its effort to blunt the threat from the repeal movement, which was now attracting support in America, Europe and among British Chartists. It offered political compromises on a number of religious issues relating to Ireland in order to assuage Catholic opinion. These efforts again led to attempts to appeal to the pope. Peel began in February 1844 with the reform of the law governing charitable bequests to the Catholic Church in Ireland. This was a move intended to win over the Irish clergy but it soon met with resistance from those close to MacHale. Consequently the British government once again appealed to Rome. By this point Aubin had died and therefore it was necessary to find a diplomatic agent to serve in Rome. The man chosen by Aberdeen and Peel in September 1844 was William Petre, a member of a well-known Essex Catholic family, who, it was hoped, would make a favourable impression on the papal authorities.44 Once in Rome Petre attempted to press Britain’s case but he failed to make much progress. This revealed a fundamental problem for British policy: any attempt to restrain the Catholic clergy in Ireland could only be successful if papal approval was given, but due to its lack of official diplomatic representation there was little Britain could do to influence the pope.45 Further to this, in 1845 Peel decided to treble the annual parliamentary grant to the Maynooth Catholic College in Ireland. The first Maynooth Act 40 41

Ibid. 102. Cardinal Altieri’s report on ‘Affari d’Irlanda’, 15 Nov.1843, ASV, Archivio della Nunziatura in Vienna, no. 280, fo. 1823. 42 Cardinal Lambruschini to Hundom (London), 27 Apr. 1844, ASV, Segreteria di Stato, Affari ecclesiastici straordinari, sezione per i rapporti con Inghilterra, posizione 54, fo. 23. 43 Broderick, The Holy See, 182. 44 Ibid. 149–50. Aubin died in May 1844. 45 This impression can be extrapolated from Petre’s correspondence with Aberdeen throughout 1845: FO 43/38.

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of 1795 had established a college funded by the British government to provide for the education of Irish priests from poor backgrounds.46 However the Maynooth grant, which had been intended to placate Irish opinion, ironically gave more opportunity for repeal supporters to study in the college. To distract them from the repeal movement, Peel was forced to consider increasing the grant to Maynooth substantially, even though he realised that this would be very controversial and might create difficulties for his government.47 He was convinced that the Maynooth grant was important if Ireland was to be subdued, and hoped that it would conciliate a large section of the Irish Catholic community. His policy was to appease rather than confront. However, it was his misfortune that any good that this reform achieved was swept away by the famine. The issue of the Maynooth grant was also significant because it brought about deep divisions within the Conservative Party. Some indeed would claim that it was not just the repeal of the Corn Laws that caused the final split within the Tory party but that the Maynooth Bill, which became law in April 1845, also contributed.48 The Maynooth grant also had the unfortunate effect of provoking widespread anti-Catholic sentiment among the British public, leading to the formation of a Central Anti-Maynooth Committee. This committee, which was led by Sir Culling Eardley Smith, organised a number of large public meetings and indirectly helped in the creation of the Evangelical Alliance.49 This growth of anti-Catholic agitation would also over time have an unfortunate effect on anglo-Vatican relations The rise of liberal ideas and the Manifesto di Rimini British frustration with Gregory XVI was not limited to his refusal to help over the Irish issue; there was also increased dissatisfaction with his rule over the Papal States. The period between 1844 and his death in 1846 saw the rise of civil strife within the Papal States, which spread to Tuscany, but Gregory ignored all calls for reform. These years however also saw a more welcome development, the flourishing of liberal views emphasising the need for reform rather than revolution. The development of a liberal reform agenda was largely due to increased disillusionment about the revolutionary path. In 1843 the aforementioned agitation in Malta spread to the turbulent regions of Calabria in the Kingdom of Naples, Romagna and Bologna, but none of these insurrections was

46 47 48 49

Kerr, Peel, 3. Ibid. 248. Ibid. 282. D. G. Paz, Popular anti-Catholicism in mid-Victorian England, Stanford 1992, 35, and J. Wolffe, The Protestant crusade in Great Britain, 1829–1860, Oxford 1991, 204–5.

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successful.50 This was enough to give a formidable impression of Young Italy’s activities to the Papal States and other European monarchical states such as Austria and Britain, but to some in the nationalist movement the continuous stream of failed revolutions suggested the need for a different approach. Several important writers holding moderate liberal ideas emerged around the early 1840s. These included activists such as Vincenzo Gioberti and Carlo Luigi Farini, both former supporters of Mazzini who had moved to a more moderate liberal position, and the leading liberal Catholic thinker, Antonio Rosmini, who is known as the founder of the Rosmini Charity foundation.51 Rosmini and Gioberti shared similar neo-Guelf ideas that Italy should be united under the pope’s leadership. They also arrived at the idea of establishing a consultative monarchy under a constitution, which raised the possibility that the pope could become constitutional monarch. In 1843 Gioberti, who was Piedmontese, published a book entitled Del primato morale e civile degli italiani which advanced the proposal that the pope should become the leader of a ‘united Italy’ under a federal system. The Primato was very successful and had considerable influence upon other moderate writers and thinkers, such as Massimo d’Azeglio and Cesare Balbo, and was also read by Cardinal Mastai-Feretti in Imola, soon to become Pius IX.52 Its effect on Farini was particularly significant, because two years later he published the Manifesto di Rimini. Farini came from the Romagna and was to have an important role in the Risorgimento both as an intellectual and a politician; he eventually became prime minister of Italy between 1862 and 1863. Farini’s initial disillusion with revolution came after a series of unsuccessful plots starting with the Moto di Savigno in 1843. Finally, in 1845, surrounded by unsuccessful revolutionary movements, and against the background of yet another failed insurrection, this time in Rimini, Farini suggested in his Manifesto di Rimini, or to give its full title, Manifesto of the inhabitants of the Roman States to the princes and nations of Europe, an alternative to revolution. Drawing upon the ideas suggested in the 1831 memorandum, as a way of appealing to the five great powers, he recommended a reform programme comprising an amnesty, administrative reform in the Papal States and the creation of a civic guard.53 In essence, it was a bourgeois document; the main elements contained within it were typical of the constitutional changes demanded by the middle classes throughout Europe, that is the introduction of a modern civil and criminal code of law and the establishment of a representative assembly which would have control over the collection of taxation. The Manifesto was inspired by several Italian liberals, and included ideas from Gioberti, d’Azeglio, Balbo and Rosmini.54 The document 50 51 52 53 54

Berkeley, Italy in the making, 1815–1846, 217. Martina, Pio IX, i. 63. Ibid. i. 64. L. C. Farini, Lo stato romano dall’anno 1815 al 1850, Rome 1851, 126–7. Martina, Pio IX, i. 67.

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attracted the attention not only of the Italian states but also of the European powers, in particular France and Britain.55 Other reformers were also at work. In 1844 Cesare Balbo published Delle speranze d’Italia (Of the hopes of Italy), while in 1846 the prominent Piedmontese liberal, Massimo d’Azeglio, wrote Degli ultimi casi di Romagna (The most recent events in Romagna). In 1846 Lord Holland, the British minister in Florence, forwarded to the Foreign Office a copy of another address to the pope written by an anonymous Italian nationalist. This document was particularly interesting in suggesting how Britain was perceived as a model for development. It included the observation that A revolution costs too much for people to plunge into it without most cogent reasons, and these reasons wise rulers seek to remove. . . . What is Protestant England doing for unhappy Ireland: she furnished her instead with a medium of communicating her beliefs with great order and legality. Britain knows that the people agitate with more tranquillity when it is ruled in equity.56

Although somewhat naive in its assessment of the Irish situation, this passage is an interesting reflection of Italian liberal views. The only problem with this outpouring of neo-Guelf views and calls for liberal reform in documents such as the Primato and the Manifesto was that it failed to strike a chord with Gregory XVI who continued with the same reactionary policies. On 26 January 1846 Holland reported that a meeting between the pope and the legates of Ancona, Forlì and Bologna was being held to discuss administrative reform and other matters, but he concluded that ‘no measures of real advantage and importance are likely to be adopted’.57 We can see from this that the political and social situation in the Papal States had not changed since 1831. Gregory also showed no interest in the papacy becoming the basis for an Italian constitutional monarchy.58 Indeed he acted to try to curb the revolutionary unrest that disturbed the peace of the Papal States, even at the cost of destabilising Tuscany. Tuscany in crisis The failed uprising in Rimini in 1845 not only inspired Farini’s Manifesto but also posed a new problem for the papal authorities – how to deal with the several hundred people involved in the largely non-violent insurrection and particularly its leader, Pietro Renzi, who had fled to Tuscany after its 55 Farini, Lo stato romano, 129. See, for example, the French journal, Journal des débats, which had links with Guizot. 56 Peter Scarlett (Florence) to Lord Aberdeen, 28 Apr. 1846, in BPSP, 1849/LVII (pt 1, 1846–7): Correspondence respecting affairs of Italy. 57 Lord Holland (Florence) to Aberdeen, 26 Jan. 1846, FO 79/118. 58 George Moore (Ancona) to Palmerston, 29 Sept. 1845, FO 43/37.

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collapse.59 In January 1846 the fact that Renzi had returned to Florence secretly, using a false name, was discovered by the papal and Austrian representatives in Rome and they started to put pressure on the Tuscan government, insisting that Renzi should be handed over to the papal government in accordance with the treaty of extradition between Tuscany and Rome of 21 January 1846.60 The British government showed interest in this issue because it feared the negative consequences of Gregory’s policy, not only on the Papal States, but also on Tuscany itself. On 21 January Holland noted in a letter to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen that, ‘Frequent acts of insubordination testify to the prevailing spirit of disaffection throughout the country’ and referred to the assassination of the principal police officer in Forlì and the large number of political prisoners in Cività Castellana.61 Furthermore he lamented that ‘the laws of humanity are outraged and public opinion disregarded’.62 However, in spite of Holland’s efforts to urge caution and his collaboration with the French minister in Florence, the grand duke of Tuscany agreed to Renzi’s extradition to the Papal States. This caused tremendous anger among the people in Tuscany against the grand duke and the papal government, especially as the Tuscan government ignored a petition for Renzi’s release.63 Matters were not helped when it was also discovered that the minister who had organised Renzi’s arrest in Tuscany was closely linked with the Jesuits.64 Increased hostility against the pope and the Jesuits led to strong protests in Tuscany against plans to found a nunnery of the conservative Sacred Heart order in Pisa. Holland was informed on 16 March that a petition signed by thirty-five of the forty professors at the University of Pisa had been sent to the governor of Pisa. This insisted that ‘The Sisters of the Sacred Heart be refused permission to found in Pisa a house for the education of girls’, for the order was linked to the Jesuits and it was feared that Pisa was ‘intended to become a centre of Jesuitical activity’.65 Holland reported that the governor of Pisa greeted this petition with disdain and that he had denied that the Tuscan government had the ‘ultimate sinister intention, namely the future return of the Jesuits’.66 Coming so soon after the Renzi incident, this affair caused Holland to express his dissatisfaction with the authorities and his sympathy for the protests against the Sacred Heart project. He realised, however, that the Tuscan government faced great difficulties in this situation. Holland’s concern became even greater in March when a new crisis

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

Farini, Lo stato romano, 127. Ibid. 135; Holland to Aberdeen, 26 Jan. 1846, FO 79/118. Holland to Aberdeen, 21 Jan. 1846, ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Holland to Aberdeen, 9 Mar. 1846, ibid. Ibid.

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emerged. On 15 March 1846 Holland was approached by an Italian ‘of high standing and reputation in his own country’, and asked to help some refugees from Romagna who were hiding in Tuscany, as they had been threatened with arrest by the Roman government.67 These political exiles had entered Florence secretly, and the place in which they were hiding had not yet been discovered. However, within the previous few days, the Tuscan authorities had become increasingly concerned to find them. Holland told London that he had heard that the men were desperate and ready to die resisting arrest rather than return to the Papal States.68 The Tuscan government was in a difficult position over these refugees, and the Tuscan foreign minister, Monsignor Humbourg, called upon the British minister to show that he shared Holland’s concern for their safety. On 17 March Holland reported to Aberdeen that it would be best if the political refugees could escape from Tuscany, but it was not easy to find somewhere for them to go.69 For Aberdeen’s information Holland sent him a confidential letter he had written to Humbourg on 15 March stating that he would be willing to give the men passports to allow them to leave Tuscany, as he had done at his previous post in Vienna in 1836 for Polish political refugees who had desired to leave Austria.70 Holland realised that such action might compromise the Foreign Office and asked Aberdeen to approve his decision, explaining that ‘I have been actuated merely by the anxious desire of preventing any effusion of blood, as well as by the hope of assisting the Tuscan government out of difficulty which must be painful and might become very serious in the present state of public feeling in the country.’71 Despite Holland’s efforts to save the Tuscan government from further embarrassment, its problems continued, and its treatment of the refugees from Rimini even affected its relations with Piedmont. When Massimo d’Azeglio, who was in Tuscany to propagate his liberal ideas, criticised the behaviour of the pope and his collaborator, the grand duke of Tuscany, over the Renzi issue, he was asked by the Tuscan authorities to leave Florence. Holland reported to Aberdeen on 1 April 1846 that, despite protests from Piedmont, d’Azeglio had been expelled due to his authorship of the pamphlet on the Romagna, which severely criticised the grand duke’s conduct in the Renzi affair. Holland noted that, ‘The expulsion from Tuscany of a man whose works are so popular – whose language and opinions are not violent and who is so much looked up to throughout Italy, has created considerable sensation here.’72 This incident aroused anger among the people of Tuscany

67 68 69 70 71 72

Holland to Aberdeen, 17 Mar. 1846, ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Holland to Aberdeen, 15 Mar. 1846, ibid. Ibid. Holland to Aberdeen, 1 Apr. 1846, ibid.

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as well as in other parts of Italy and even abroad, because d’Azeglio was, like Renzi, a moderate liberal rather than a revolutionary. Another sign of Gregory’s reactionary attitude was the invitation to the Russian emperor, Nicholas I, to visit Rome in January 1846, despite Russia’s brutal treatment of Catholics in Poland. This caused consternation in the Foreign Office and led The Times to express its anxiety in an article on 26 January 1846: ‘if Russia’s own government acquired a footing in southern Europe, they would in course of time become masters of the whole. In truth, it is manifest that Europe could not in case of a war, fight the Russians on their own ground’. It also noted ‘Let Catholics have at least the same liberty in Russia that the Russians will enjoy in Rome, and let us have a Nuncio in Petersburg.’73 The little hope that remained for the regime of the present pope was thus completely extinguished; neither political reform nor any social improvement could be expected. Both within and outside the Papal States there was increasing hostility towards Gregory, whose rule over his domains seemed to epitomise the backwardness of the social and political situation in most parts of the Italian peninsula. At the same time however, should a moderate come to power after the death of the elderly and infirm Gregory, there was much goodwill to be tapped, for Italy was ready for a reforming, nationalist pope. Indeed the rise of neo-Guelf thought suggested that such a figure could provide greater unity to the Italian cause than the only alternatives, the conservative King Carlo Alberto of Sardinia, or the dangerous radical Giuseppe Mazzini. A new pope June 1846 opened with the death of Gregory XVI.74 In the potentially volatile climate of the time this news was received with some trepidation. Fearing a repeat of the events of 1831, the British government had two main concerns: first, the possibility of revolt in the Papal States, and second, fear of Austrian military intervention and a possible French reaction.75 Almost as soon as the news of Gregory’s death was announced the Hon. Peter Scarlett, the secretary of the legation in Florence, observed to the Foreign Office that the Austrians had increased their garrison at Ferrara and gathered a force at Sinigaglia. Regarding the mood of the people, he noted that since the pope’s death, discontent was prevailing in the area of Ancona and extending into Umbria.76 He also described his fear that insurrection might break out in the future, noting that the likelihood of such an event depended upon who 73 74 75 76

Times, 26 Jan. 1846. William Petre (Rome) to Holland, 1 June 1846, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1). Moore (Ancona) to Aberdeen, 7 July 1846, ibid. Scarlett to Aberdeen, 18 June 1946, ibid.

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replaced Gregory and argued that if the new pope did not follow a different policy to his predecessor even military action might not be able to suppress the people’s discontent.77 George Moore, the consul in Ancona, similarly described his anxiety about Austrian movements, reporting that the Austrian ship Bellona had appeared off Ancona harbour.78 Neither Scarlett nor the other British diplomats in the Italian states publicly criticised Gregory’s regime, although the late pope’s attitude towards the 1831 memorandum and his failure to initiate reform had disappointed the British government. However, strong hopes existed in official circles for the better administration of the Papal States. The press was more forthright. On 9 June The Times, in an obituary for the late pope, clearly expressed its disapproval of the policies followed during his papacy: he foresaw, and would by concession have obviated, the overwhelming storm, that cannot otherwise be prevented bursting upon Rome . . . ; but he was overborne by the Cardinals, who to the repeated entreaties of France and Austria, and it is said England, refused concurrence in even the slightest amelioration of the civic and political condition of His Holiness . . . but sooner or later, and the latest time is not far distant, the whole Italian peninsula will be one flame of insurrection.79

The British government and the press were thus both keenly interested in the election of the new pope. Over the following month the press maintained its interest in the papacy. Indeed it seemed to be more keen and efficient about uncovering the background to the papal conclave than the Foreign Office. Petre reported to Scarlett on 15 June all the names of the candidate cardinals, but The Times went much further in its reports to its readers, describing the background and political tendency of all candidates in detail, matters which the government correspondence did not mention.80 The conclave had always been a place where foreign interests came into conflict; in particular, although most of the cardinals in this period were Italians, the Catholic great powers, France and Austria, could exert considerable influence upon the election of the pope in order to try to secure a favoured candidate. On this occasion Metternich put pressure on the Curia to try to prevent it from electing a pro-French liberal pope, and attempted to ensure that Lambruschini, who as secretary of state had been Gregory’s closest adviser, would be the new pontiff. On the other hand the French ambassador to the Vatican, Pellegrino Rossi, who had been appointed only a few days before Gregory’s death, tried to counteract Austrian influence, and had

77 78 79 80

Ibid. Moore to Aberdeen, 7 July 1846, ibid. Times, 9 June 1846. Petre to Scarlett, 15 June 1846, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1).

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instructions to act in a liberal but anti-revolutionary manner and prevent the election of any ally of the Jesuits and Austria.81 On 16 June the conclave finally announced its decision to the world. The new pope was Cardinal Mastai-Feretti, who took the title of Pius IX. He was known to be a man of moderate views and was considered to be pro-French. Within a few days it became clear that his election was well received by both British official and public opinion. On 21 June Scarlett informed Aberdeen of his favourable impression of the new pope, saying that with his ‘moderate and liberal character some improvement is expected in governing the country’.82 On 6 July The Times contained a long article explaining all the details about the background to the election, and in particular the conflict between French and Austrian interests, which was again absent from Foreign Office documents. According to the article there were a number of candidates, on one side was Cardinal Micara who was popular with the lower class, and on the other was Cardinal Altieri, the former nuncio in Vienna, who belonged to the high-class nobility. However what people wanted was neither of them, but ‘the Juste Milieu’, someone in the middle, such as Cardinal Gizzi or the present pope. In the beginning Gizzi ran at the head of election, but it was felt that his opinions went beyond the bounds of ‘the Juste Milieu’, and therefore Feretti, who ‘combined all the qualities possessed by the other, with a temperament more subdued, and a reputation for practical good sense’, was elected.83 The Times was pleased with the conclave’s choice, described Pius IX as ‘an excellent man’ and stated that ‘In England these qualities will be duly estimated’. It noted with satisfaction that, despite the recent visit of Tsar Nicholas to Rome, Russia had not influenced the election of the new pope and also took comfort from the victory of the pro-French candidate, although it feared that Austria was working hard to regain its position, and ‘some people say that it is impossible for the new Pope not to succumb’.84 The role of the Catholic great powers in influencing the result of the election also led The Times to broach an important question, namely whether it was not appropriate for Britain to establish formal diplomatic relations with the papacy. Its correspondent argued on 6 July that it was matter of regret not to have any formal British representative in the Holy See in spite of the fact that Britain had a representative accredited to the sultan in Constantinople. The article continued to report that the new pope already had positive views on the sending and accepting of representatives from all sides, and that it would be a great advantage to Britain to open diplomatic relations because then, without the interference of French and Austrian interests, British advice could 81

G. F. H. Berkeley and J. Berkeley, Italy in the making, June 1846 to 1 January 1848, Cambridge 1936, 18. 82 Scarlett to Aberdeen, 21 June 1846, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1). 83 Times, 6 July 1846. 84 Ibid.

29


directly influence papal policy. It noted in this respect that ‘not only must our position with regard to Irish and Canadian Roman Catholics be strengthened, but the sacred cause of constitutional liberty all over the world be . . . advanced’.85 Furthermore The Times observed that the temporal power of the papacy could not be ignored. The Times’s noticeably positive view of the election of Pius contrasted with the attitude of the Chartist and radical newspapers, such as the Northern Star, which did not pay much attention to the election because they were politically opposed to the Roman Catholic Church. An article in the Northern Star on 4 July explained the history of the pope’s predecessors, and provided the following statement: Among the French Popes is found, in the Thirteenth century, the son of a poor cobbler of Troyes in Champagne, Jacques Panteleon, who took the name of Charles VI, and in the Fourteenth Century the son of a baker, of the country of Foix (now department of the Ariega), Jacques Fourinier, known by the name of Benedict XII.86

It is amusing to see that the Northern Star, because of its political stance, tried to put emphasis on popes who came from poor backgrounds. On 17 July, a month after his election, Pius engaged in his first progressive act by granting an amnesty to political prisoners and exiles. As a result hundreds of potential revolutionaries were freed. These included Angelo Brunetti, also called Ciceruacchio, a Carbonaro and supporter of Mazzini who later became a leader of the revolution in Rome, and Carlo Luciano Bonaparto, prince of Canino, who was the son of Napoleon’s brother Lucien. Moreover, a large number of exiles returned to the Papal States, including Carlo Armellini who would be one of the triumvirs of the Roman republic in 1849.87 As John Freeborn, the British consul in Rome, observed, the amnesty was greeted by popular demonstrations and enthusiastic applause in Rome and in the cities of the legations and the Adriatic provinces where anti-papal feeling usually dominated.88 To those who had put their faith in the neo-Guelf hope that Italy could be saved by the papacy, Pius now appeared as the saviour that they had been waiting for. However, not all observers were so pleased. On 17 July Baron Cowley, the British ambassador to France, reported to the Foreign Office on the Austrian reaction to the amnesty, stating that Metternich disapproved because it might disturb the public peace in the legations, and that if an amnesty were carried out, it should be strictly limited. The pope, however, showed no sign of changing his policy. This in turn led Metternich, who was ‘strongly impressed with the danger which may result from the too liberal policy of the 85 86 87 88

Ibid. 26 June 1846. Northern Star, 4 July 1846. H. Hearder, ‘The making of the Roman republic, 1848–49’, History lx (1975), 173–4. John Freeborn (Rome) to Palmerston, 18 July 1846, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1).

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Pope’, to ask the French government to instruct Rossi to put pressure on the pope.89 In Britain the amnesty was greeted with enthusiasm. On 29 July 1846 The Times reported that a ceremony had taken place in Rome and that a procession of 40,000 people had marched joyfully with torches to the Quirinal Palace, and noted approvingly that ‘there is not this day in Rome a single discontented person’. It also added that reform was being considered for other parts of the administration such as taxation and the reduction of duties to prevent smuggling.90 Another article in The Times, on 31 July, mentioned that Renzi was one of the liberated political prisoners, and noted that ‘The Pope was the idol of the people’.91 Even the Northern Star on 9 August wrote in favour of the amnesty, arguing that the new pope’s liberal policy seemed to give universal satisfaction to his subjects, and had led him to become very popular. It also explained in detail that people had gathered to march in procession through the main streets and reached the Quirinal Palace to cheer the pope, and ‘Subscriptions were opened in favour of the poor political prisoners’.92 It therefore appears that both liberal and radical public opinion in Britain was at least initially impressed with the new pope. The British government was more circumspect. In part this was because this period saw a change of administration, for at the end of June Peel resigned and was replaced as prime minister by Lord John Russell at the head of a new Whig government. Russell’s premiership saw Palmerston, the advocate of papal reform in 1832, return to the Foreign Office. It might be thought that this would automatically have led to a more activist policy, but at first Palmerston was cautious in his response to the amnesty. He knew that Austria had tried to prevent the pope from issuing a full amnesty for political offenders and he desired to know the French government’s opinion before making his attitude public. In response to Cowley’s correspondence, Palmerston asked the Count de Jarnac, the French ambassador in London, on 21 July 1846, ‘if the French Government should be of opinion that it would be wise and proper of the Pope to signalise his accession to the Papal Chair by an act of general grace’. In order to aid the French deliberations he indicated that if Pius was willing to introduce the reforms recommended in the 1831 memorandum in order to introduce stable government in the Papal States ‘the British government would be willing to . . . co-operate with France’.93 To understand Palmerston’s view of the situation within the Papal States and its relation to the general European situation it is necessary to look at the letter which he wrote to Lord John Russell, the prime minister, on 30 July 89 90 91 92 93

Lord Cowley (Paris) to Palmerston, 17 July 1846, ibid. Times, 29 July 1846. Ibid. 31 July 1848. Northern Star, 9 Aug. 1846. Palmerston to Cowley, 21 July 1846, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1).

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1846, which included a copy of the 1831 memorandum. Palmerston came to the heart of his concern when he observed that ‘Italy is the weak part of Europe and the next war that breaks out in Europe will probably arise out of Italian affairs’.94 He noted that during the reign of Gregory XVI there had been no attempt at reform and that as a result the Papal States were threatened by revolution; and if a revolution broke out there was a possibility that it could lead to a clash between Austria and France. Palmerston foresaw that the French liberals would support a revolution in the Papal States, and would be very likely to come to the aid of the rebels if Metternich should attempt, or be invited, to suppress the rebellion. He then observed apocalyptically that the crisis would soon escalate, ‘France and Austria would then object to each other in Italy and France would have all the Italians on her side. But the war began in Italy would probably spread to Germany’. This would be disastrous for Britain, for ‘at all events we can have no wish to see Austria beaten down’.95 Palmerston concluded that Britain could only avoid these circumstances by adopting a firm policy to support the papacy in its reform programme. The alternative, he noted to Russell, was that If these things should happen and they may not be so distant as many may suppose, people will naturally ask what the Whig government of 1846 was about and why they did not take advantage of the liberal Institutions of the new Pope to encourage and induce him to make reform which if then made might have prevented such events.96

Palmerston added that support for Pius’ reforms would benefit the Papal States as well as British interests. He observed that ‘I believe we shall be doing a thing agreeable as well as useful to the Papacy and shall strengthen and support him in effecting reform which every enlightened member of the Roman government has long . . . acknowledged to be necessary’, and continued that even if the other great powers did not support the new pope’s policy ‘we shall at least stand justified’.97 Palmerston thus adopted a policy of cautious optimism towards the new pope predicated on the belief that Pius was of a liberal disposition and that he should be encouraged to introduce reforms. By doing so the pope could stave off the threat of revolution and, it was hoped, also reduce the Vatican’s reliance on Austria and France. Here then lay the seeds of the policy that Britain was to follow for the next two turbulent years.

94 95 96 97

Palmerston to Lord John Russell, 30 July 1846, Russell papers, PRO, PRO 30/22/5b. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

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The Pope’s Liberal Reforms

2

The Pope’s Liberal Reforms, 1846–1847 Palmerston’s conviction that Pius should receive limited support from Britain was reaffirmed in the year following his election, for the new pope quickly followed the amnesty with other liberal measures, such as the new press law of 15 May 1847 and the establishment of the civic guard on 3 July. In Rome there were public demonstrations of support with cries of ‘Viva Pio Nono’ in the streets. However, the emergence of Pius as a progressive figure not only meant more enlightened government for the Papal States, but also acted as a stimulus to the growth of Italian nationalism and the concomitant development of anti-Austrian sentiment. Thus, even beyond the borders of the Papal States, ‘Papa Angelico’, as he was sometimes called, became a heroic figure. Even in Protestant Britain both the government and public opinion greeted these rapid changes in the situation at Rome with acclaim. The year 1847 therefore saw the unlikely emergence of the leader of the Catholic Church as a symbol of liberalism, nationalism and the struggle against Austrian despotism. The first reforms After the amnesty in July 1846 there was high expectation that reforms of the political system in the Papal States would soon follow. However, in order to introduce his reform programme, Pius IX needed somebody capable of assisting him, because the ultra-conservative zelanti still stood as a powerful obstacle.1 It had initially been expected that Cardinal Lambruschini would be elected secretary of state again, but Pius needed to remove the ultra-conservatives from the Curia and therefore decided to appoint a figure more sympathetic to his own beliefs. On 13 August 1846 Hamilton sent Palmerston the good news which he had received from Petre in Rome that the noted moderate Cardinal Gizzi had been appointed secretary of state, with Cardinal Massimo as the prefect of the congregation of rivers and roads.2 The appointment of these two cardinals was important for Britain as both were considered to be liberals and in favour of reform. However their taking office did not mean that reforms would follow immediately or automatically, and Gizzi had to act to dampen the people’s expectations. Petre reported to 1 2

Coppa, Pius IX, 50. Petre (Rome) to Palmerston, 13 Aug. 1846, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1).

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Hamilton on 31 August 1846 that a circular had been issued by Gizzi to counter some of the more extreme hopes expressed by the people. This, he noted, contradicted the idea that there would be ‘organic changes in the whole system of government; such as the secularisation of nearly all the chief offices, and the disbanding of the Swiss troops’. Petre, who had a good understanding of the peculiarities of the Papal States, was not surprised by this, for he had always doubted the reports that exaggerated the ‘liberal’ views of the new pope, because the main source for this speculation was foreign journals and correspondence.3 An example of the repetition of the rumours that were circulating within the Papal States appeared in the Northern Star, which produced on 10 October 1846 a rather premature announcement of a new constitution in the Papal States that would ‘comprise provincial councils with the principle of election, and consultative senate to be assembled at Rome every two years’. It also referred to a list of improvements, including a national guard, and stated its approval of the appointment of Gizzi as he was seen to be ‘favourable to the new system’.4 Apparently even the Northern Star perceived Gizzi to be a liberal. Petre, with his realistic view of the situation, was supportive of the caution shown by Gizzi and the pope, and told Hamilton on 10 November that a reform programme in the Papal States needed careful consideration before it was implemented. He reported that the political situation was certainly getting better although major changes had not yet taken place, and that the pope had shown his intention to promote administrative reform by appointing several commissions and urging them to come up with proposals.5 The remit of these commissions included a review of civil and penal law, care of the poor and the provision of education, and members included laymen as well as ecclesiastics. Hamilton, however, believed that reform in the Papal States was vital and urgent if the situation was to remain under control and when he forwarded Petre’s report to London he noted that reform needed to take place without any further delay.6 Although Gizzi’s liberal policies were as yet only intentions, they were enough for the new pope to receive praise from his subjects and sympathy from the British government and the liberal and radical end of political opinion. However, while Britain was keen to applaud the first tentative steps taken by Pius towards reform of the domestic situation, another matter of more immediate and direct interest was the plan for constructing a railway in the Papal States. Since the Papal States occupied the central part of the Italian peninsula 3 4 5

Petre to Hamilton (Florence), 31 Aug. 1846, ibid. Northern Star, 10 Oct. 1846. Petre to Hamilton, 10 Nov. 1846, BPSP, 1949/LVII: Italy (pt 1); H. Hearder, Italy in the age of the Risorgimento, 1790–1870, London 1983, 111. 6 Hamilton to Palmerston, 14 Nov. 1846, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1).

34

THE POPE’S LIBERAL REFORMS

no railway network from north to south could be built without the permission of the papal authorities. This was a matter of some importance for Britain, for it was keen to encourage railway building in Italy; it would benefit mediterranean trade and provided a useful link in the communication route to India. The new railway project, which was a symbol of modernisation, was also expected to improve the backward economy of the Papal States. The British government favoured the idea of a railway starting from the port of Brindisi in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies which would run along the Adriatic coast and finally reach Bologna.7 A plan for railway development had been put forward earlier, in 1846, but no progress had been made as Gregory XVI was firmly opposed to permitting any railways, whether foreign or locally owned, to be built in the Papal States.8 As soon as Pius became pope British interest was renewed, for there were soon signs that the papacy might agree to railway development, because of the need to put papal finances in order. It was not until 10 November 1846 that a concrete plan emerged. Petre reported to Hamilton that Gizzi had announced authorisation for constructing four railway lines: from Rome to the Neapolitan frontier near Ceprano, from Rome to Porta d’Anzio, from Rome to Civitàvecchia, and a line running through the most populous parts of Umbria to Ancona and Bologna. Petre’s report also stated that it was a possibility that in the future ‘Companies approved of by the Government’ would also be allowed to compete for railway contracts.9 Discussions about this issue were held in Rome between John Freeborn and the papal authorities. Freeborn explained in one of his letters how Britain might directly benefit from the construction of railways in the Papal States, referring to his conversation with the papal treasurer, Cardinal Antonelli. On 11 November 1846 Antonelli indicated that a railway that began at Brindisi and ran through the Papal States would be viewed favourably. He even added that ‘the Roman government would place no obstacle in the way of an English Engineer examining, and reporting upon the practicability of the line decided upon for the purpose of conveying the mail from India’. Freeborn’s report emphasised that this new communication system would contribute to speeding up the mail service between England and India.10 This good news from the Papal States was mirrored by the success of the representations made by the British chargé d’affaires in Naples, Mr Waghorn, who had persuaded the Neapolitan king of the benefit of a railway from Brindisi. The only problem now was deciding whether to take the route from Bologna through Trieste or Marseilles. The preference was for the Austrian route, and on 11 December 1846 the British ambassador in Vienna informed

7 8 9 10

Ralph Abercromby (Turin) to Palmerston, 25 Oct. 1846, FO 67/137. Holland (Florence) to Aberdeen, 18 May 1846, FO 79/118. Petre to Hamilton, 10 Nov. 1846, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1). Cardinal Antonelli to Freeborn (Rome), 11 Nov. 1846, FO 43/39.

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Metternich that the British desired permission to link the railway from Brindisi to the Austrian railway system.11 While the railway issue could not be completely solved until the Austrian government had made its decision, there was still relief in British circles that the pope had shown a more liberal attitude towards railway development. This more moderate approach was also in evidence when, for the first time, the new pope permitted subjects of the Papal States to attend the Italian Scientific Conference at Genoa. Among the papal subjects who participated was the prince of Canino, who sent his thanks to the pope after the successful conference.12 This moderate step, like his interest in the new railway project, indicated the pope’s desire for the social and economic improvement of the Papal States in such fields as the development of technology and science and the reduction of unemployment.13 As 1847 began British officials continued to laud Pius’ attempt at reform and his removal of the reactionaries who had held power under Gregory. In particular they were enthusiastic when this practice began to spread to the appointment of papal legates. The British minister in Turin, Ralph Abercromby, was especially positive about these changes. In a letter to Palmerston on 12 January 1847 he reported that the removal of the ultraconservative elements from the mainstream of the Curia had been ‘followed by the adoption of a line of policy which proves the disposition of the present Papal Government to be of a liberal tendency’.14 In regard to the replacement of the legates, he observed that under the previous pope they had been a major cause of papal maladministration and unrest, and thus noted their removal with pleasure. In Abercromby’s opinion administrative reform was more urgent in the provinces than in the city of Rome, for the abuse of power in the legations was the most serious threat to the stability of the Papal States. This was particularly the case in Bologna, where political disorder was widespread and where improvement was a matter of some urgency, as the only way to prevent insurrection would be the carrying out of reforms.15 However, he believed that the recent replacement of the cardinal legate in Bologna by Cardinal Amat, a liberal from Piedmont, gave some hope that stability would return, as Amat was thought to be in favour of reform. Most significantly Abercromby perceived that the appointment of Bologna’s new cardinal legate might also create a liberal political alignment between Sardinia and the papal government which could be crucial for the creation of a liberal Italy. He noted optimistically to Palmerston that, ‘The past year appears therefore to have been marked, in the states of Sardinia and of the Church by a desire on the part of the sovereigns of these two countries, 11 12 13 14 15

Cowley (Paris) to Palmerston, 11 Dec. 1846, FO 67/137. Berkeley and Berkeley, Italy in the making, 1846–1848, 45. Abercromby to Palmerston, 30 Sept. 1846, FO 67/137. Abercromby to Palmerston, 12 Jan. 1847, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1). Ibid.

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to better the condition of the people and to consult more extensively their general interests.’16 Furthermore, he observed that an alliance between the two liberal states in Italy might contribute to the peace of Europe and that, ‘it is by a steady prosecution of such a system that Italy is gradually to be brought to assume her proper influence amongst the other nations of Europe’.17 Although the replacement of the old Gregorian faction by liberal ministers made concrete administrative reform possible, Abercromby realised that the extent of the intended administrative reforms could lead to difficulties. This was especially the case with any legal reform that aimed at preventing the abuse of ecclesiastical power and protecting the rights of the pope’s secular subjects. Nevertheless Abercromby was fairly optimistic, and observed to Palmerston that, although there was a lot to be done to improve the political and financial situation in the Papal States, the present Roman government had made a promising start.18 The welcome given by British officials in Italy, such as Abercromby, to the pope’s policies was also shared by Palmerston. The foreign secretary was positive about the prospects for reform in the Papal States and believed that the pope had an important political role to play in Italy as well as in Europe. Accordingly, he persuaded the government to move towards more active support for the Papal States. In part Palmerston’s willingness to take a greater role in supporting the new reforms in the Papal States came about because of changes in the diplomatic environment. As noted above, initially in July 1846 Palmerston had wanted to act in league with France in bolstering Pius and persuading him not to bow down to Metternich’s demands. However, by the end of 1846 and into 1847 anglo-French relations entered into a precipitate decline due to Palmerston’s opposition to the policy of the French prime minister, François Guizot, over the issue of the ‘Spanish Marriages’. As a result France began to play down its liberalism in an effort to win over Metternich, and thus was more reluctant to interfere against Austrian interests in Italy.19 Britain therefore stood as the only real supporter of Pius’ reforms and if it decided only to express its approval in a passive form, there was every chance that Pius might be discouraged. Moreover, Britain had little to lose by taking a more assertive course, for its relations with Austria were going through their own period of crisis due to the latter’s brutal suppression of the uprising in Cracow in the autumn of 1846, and its efforts to intervene in Switzerland. The British government began to follow a more assertive and interested policy from the spring of 1847. On 25 March Palmerston, after receiving a report regarding a meeting between the pope and the prominent free-trade 16 17 18 19

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. F. R. Bridge and R. Bullen, The great powers and the European states system, 1815–1914, London 1980, 83–4; Coppa, Origins, 28.

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supporter, Richard Cobden, noted that Freeborn and Petre, on the behalf of British government, should compliment the pope on the series of improvements which he had made since his election.20 This advice was promptly relayed to the representatives in Rome and Freeborn took it upon himself to convey this information immediately to Gizzi, despite the cautious tone of Palmerston’s original instructions. Freeborn’s initiative had an interesting result as Gizzi told the pope of Britain’s approval of papal reforms, and the pope duly offered his thanks to Freeborn in June. Palmerston only learnt of these events in July and was rather surprised but pleased at Freeborn’s actions.21 Although there is no clear evidence to prove it, one can postulate that Freeborn’s report to Gizzi of Palmerston’s support helped to spur a papal initiative towards Britain. On 19 April 1847 the papal nuncio in Paris, Cardinal Raffaele Fornari, held a meeting with the marquis of Normanby, the British ambassador to France, during which he stated that the pope wished to have closer relations with England, as he was troubled by ‘the jealous interference of Austria’ and the lack of support from France. Fornari insisted to Normanby that British assistance would be of the ‘greatest possible service to the progress of social improvement in Italy’.22 Palmerston in turn suggested to Normanby on 27 April 1847 that he should reply to the papal nuncio by asking His Excellency to explain more precisely the way in which he thinks that the British Government could give more active moral support to the Pope; and you will state to the Nuncio that Her Majesty’s Government have every desire to do whatever may probably be in their power to comply with any wishes which the Pope may express.23

Normanby met Fornari again on 30 April, told him of Palmerston’s views and asked how Britain’s moral support could be expressed. The nuncio replied that ‘there could be no efficient moral support without direct communication’, and stated that if a formal diplomatic representative could not be sent to Rome, the pope would be willing to meet someone in the confidence of the British government.24 In this exchange lay the first tentative foundations of the Minto mission. Paris was not, however, the only place where contacts between the two governments were taking place, although this is the view commonly expressed in histories of the period. In fact an equally significant exchange of views was taking place in great secrecy in Vienna between the papal nuncio and the British ambassador, Lord Ponsonby. In this case the talks were not 20 21 22 23 24

Palmerston minute, 25 Mar. 1847, FO 43/41. Freeborn to Palmerston, 24 Apr., 11 June 1847; Palmerston minute, 7 July 1847, ibid. Wallace, ‘Pius IX and Lord Palmerston’, 14. Palmerston to Lord Normanby (Paris), 27 Apr. 1847, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1). Wallace, ‘Pius IX and Lord Palmerston’, 14.

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concerned with a mutual outpouring of goodwill, but with a far more concrete issue, the perennial problem of Ireland. The details of this initiative are not entirely clear. The exercise began on 11 February when Russell sent a private letter to Ponsonby ordering him to see the nuncio. At this meeting Ponsonby was to deliver the message that Britain would be grateful if the pope would order the hierarchy in Ireland to tell Catholics to live in peace and respect governmental authority. Ponsonby duly delivered this message which the nuncio promptly communicated to Rome.25 The pope reacted positively to Russell’s request and when he issued an encyclical on 25 March calling for Catholics to aid the victims of the famine in Ireland, he simultaneously sent a letter to the Irish clergy asking for peace and an end to discord.26 This was a marked victory for Russell, for Britain had achieved its desired result without making its request public, thus making it seem that the pope was acting on his own initiative. Following this contacts between Ponsonby and the nuncio continued into the spring and summer of 1847 with a further exchange of views on Ireland. The secrecy of these contacts proved useful for both sides, for it allowed the papacy a means of indicating to the British government what it felt was acceptable policy towards the Catholics in Ireland and gave Ponsonby a channel through which he could present Russell’s speeches and actions in relation to Irish issues in the best possible light. For example, the nuncio indicated to Ponsonby in their talks that Rome recognised that it would take time for Britain to act to improve conditions for Catholics in Ireland but that as long as it did not engage in any anti-Catholic acts delay was acceptable. In particular the nuncio stated that the papacy would not accept state endowment of the Church in Ireland, as this would curtail the clergy’s freedom of action. In one of his letters to the prime minister Ponsonby enthused that ‘we have established . . . the mode of communication with Rome so as to be able to prevent the anger or folly of R. Catholics in England & Ireland misleading that Court’.27 Moreover he noted that the fact that Rome was willing to exchange views in this matter revealed that it looked ‘with more confidence to support of the English govent [sic] than to the support of any continental power’.28 The situation by the spring of 1847 was therefore that Anglo-Vatican relations were becoming much closer, although there were limits to the bonds between them due to the fact that all diplomacy had to be directed through nuncios in foreign capitals, a cumbersome and unsatisfactory process. Moreover there was a distinct feeling in British circles that more could be expected of Pius in the future. To a large degree the British government’s positive view of Pius was influenced by the belief that his reforms would steer the Papal 25 26 27 28

Lord Ponsonby (Vienna) to Russell, 21 Mar. 1847, Russell papers, PRO 30/22/6B. Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 89. Ponsonby to Russell, 5 May 1847, Russell papers, PRO 30/22/6C. Ponsonby to Russell, 3 May 1847, ibid.

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States towards peaceful and gradual political change rather than revolution. This was encouraged by the apparent popularity of the pope among his people. Abercromby, for example, reported on 28 April 1847 that six days previously more than 20,000 people had marched to the Quirinal Palace ‘for the purpose of expressing their gratitude to His Holiness the Pope and to his Eminence the Cardinal Gizzi for this new boon’ crying ‘Viva Pio Nono’.29 This view of events was, however, too optimistic. In reality the political situation in Rome was far more volatile than British officials in Italy perceived. The period between January and April 1847 witnessed the emergence of liberal political groups that would subsequently divide into radical and moderate factions. For example, on 21 April Pietro Sterbini, who became a representative of the radicals, organised a political banquet, at which d’Azeglio, who had come to the Papal States to encourage links between the moderates in Rome and Turin, was the principal orator and spoke with eloquence about the ancient glories of Rome soon to be renewed under Pius. Sterbini, one of the most influential men in Rome through his presidency of the inflammatory political club, the Circolo Popolare, also made a patriotic speech.30 Sterbini had had a long career as a political radical. After joining the rebellion of 1830 he had fled to Paris and became a member of Mazzini’s Giovine Italia. In 1846, as a result of Pius’ amnesty, he and his colleagues were pardoned and returned to Rome. He was a radical democrat, but in 1847 he viewed Pius’ first concessions with apparent gratitude, and seemed ready to accept the idea of an Italian federated nation with the pope as president.31 Sterbini played an important role in the rise of the radical press and was the editor of a radical newspaper, the Contemporaneo, which along with other journals agitated for political reform and in particular for an end to censorship. The call for press freedom met with a positive response from the papal government, which little realised that the relaxation of press censorship might nourish revolutionary opinion among the Roman people. As there had been many restrictions on publishing any kind of political and religious work, it was thought that a change to the press law would simply be regarded as a measure to extend people’s rights.32 The press law The press law of 15 March 1847 was an important step in the birth of the 1848 revolution. It was largely a consequence of popular pressure on the papal government. Gizzi recognised that he had to respond but remained cautious and acted to ensure that the liberal parties would not be able to abuse their 29 30 31 32

Abercromby to Palmerston, 28 Apr. 1847, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1). Berkeley and Berkeley, Italy in the making, 1846–1848, 114. Ibid. 105. Petre to Palmerston, 9 Apr. 1847, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1).

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new freedom.33 In fact the new press law retained considerable restrictions on publication about political and religious subjects in the Papal States. Under the new law a Council of Press Censorship was established in Rome under the presidency of the Master of the Sacred Place, to be composed of no more than five members nominated by the pope. In addition, within each of the papal legations and delegations local councils of press censorship were to be set up. These had to subordinate themselves to the council in Rome regarding publishing on political as well as religious subjects. Gizzi was very careful about selecting the members of the council in Rome as he intended to concentrate power in its hands, and give it direct links with the judiciary and the police.34 He hoped to suppress any abuses and illegal publishing, to control the authorisation of new publications, and also to check and modify articles in Rome and the provinces. The result was that the new press law was not so much an exercise in liberalism as an attempt to rationalise the papal bureaucracy. Instead of appeasing the people it marked the beginning of political conflict between the authorities and several political journals and publications. Nevertheless after the relaxation of censorship political newspapers burgeoned in Rome. The Contemporaneo, which was initially progressive but moderate and respected the fundamental tenets of papal government and the Catholic religion, immediately benefited, but soon became increasingly hostile towards papal authority. The Bilancia was established on 29 April, partly as a reaction against the increasingly progressive views of the Contemporaneo, and this was followed soon after by the establishment of the Contra-Bilancia, which provided a platform for liberals who were alarmed at the moderate view of the Bilancia.35 The press law thus had the result of splitting the liberal bloc in Rome, but this was not necessarily to the pope’s advantage, for it led to increased radicalism and the expression by extremists of frustration at the slow rate of reform. In spite of the still relatively tight control over the press and the friction between the censors and political journals, the British government welcomed Pius’ relaxation of press censorship. In part this was because it failed to read the situation accurately. The problem was that Petre failed to understand the true nature and complexity of the press reform issue, and seemed unaware that it was leading to increasingly acrimonious debates in Rome that in the long term would threat Pius’ reforms. For example, he wrote enthusiastically to Hamilton, on 23 June 1847 that ‘the best proofs of . . . the honest intention of His Holiness to effect improvement in his Government, is the liberty with which reforms are discussed in the newspapers’.36 Unfortunately Petre

33 34 35 36

G. Ponzo, Le origini della libertà di stampa in Italia, 1846–1852, Milan 1980, 56. Ibid. 61–77. Petre to Hamilton, 27 Mar. 1847, FO 43/41. Petre to Hamilton, 23 June 1847, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1).

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showed the same lack of understanding in his reports on the other significant issue raised in the summer of 1847, the establishment of the civic guard. The civic guard The campaign for the creation of the civic guard began in Bologna. Late in 1846 the city of Bologna had won the right to maintain law and order through the establishment of citizen patrols. This, however, was not enough to satisfy local opinion, which now pushed for the setting up of a civic guard that would be able to police the rural areas of the legate as well as the city itself. In addition, the civil guard was desired as an assertion of Bologna’s right to control its own affairs and clearly looked back to the previous period when a civic guard had existed, in the turbulent autumn of 1831. Once Bologna began to agitate, other cities and towns, such as Ancona, Forlì and Ferrara demanded the same privileges and thus a general movement came into being.37 Two main groups – property-owners and radicals – called for the creation of a civic guard. Many property-owners saw it as a protection against crime and disorder, while radicals regarded it as an armed force that could be used as a political instrument.38 Thus while the former wanted the civic guard to prevent disorder, the latter saw it as a means to increase disorder and encourage more radical political reform. During the spring and summer of 1847, the pope weighed the advantages and disadvantages of setting up a civic guard, and finally on 3 July approved its establishment. In part his decision came about because recent events in Rome had clearly disappointed the people and led to fears that Pius had abandoned reform. The initial spark for this crisis was Pius’ Motuproprio of 12 June by which he established a council of ministers entirely made up by ecclesiasticals. This was then followed on 22 June by the issuing of a proclamation by Gizzi which affirmed the pope’s special status as head of the Church and warned that there were definite limits to the extent of his liberal reforms. This proclamation, which was made because of Gizzi’s fear that many people had overestimated the country’s capacity for change, generated much resentment and hostility, even among the moderates. Needing to win back public opinion Pius therefore decided to gamble on allowing the civic guard to be established.39 As Steven Hughes has pointed out in his book, Crime, disorder and the Risorgimento, Pius hoped to restrict membership of the guard to the upper class and bourgeoisie, with the aim of recouping his popularity with the moderates, while strengthening the forces of law and order so as to deal with popular disturbances. This policy largely worked in Bologna, where after a 37 38 39

Hughes, Crime, disorder and the Risorgimento, 169–71. Ibid. 170. Coppa, Antonelli, 37–9.

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brief political storm the moderates were able to see off an attempt by radicals to broaden the membership.40 In other areas, however, and particularly in Rome, the civic guard passed out of the control of the propertied class and became a hotbed for agitation and eventually the foot soldiers of the revolution of 1848.41 Britain had a generally positive view towards the establishment of a civic guard in the Papal States. One of the main reasons was that the British government did not have enough knowledge about the social context of or the background to the campaign that had led to its establishment. Its information was merely that the campaign for its creation had arisen recently due to the outbreak of demonstrations in Rome and was organised by a moderate faction concerned to maintain law and order. This was partly true, but it ignored the fact that some radicals clearly intended to use it as a revolutionary force. Lacking this perspective Britain therefore thought that the establishment of the civic guard would improve social stability and counter the radical ideology stimulated by the discord between the classes, thus avoiding a repeat of the revolution of 1831. For example, in a despatch to Palmerston on 5 July 1847 Freeborn emphasised the need for a civic guard in the Papal States in order to protect lives and property from possible violence. He thus explained Pius’ decision as being due to the fact that ‘the military and police did not think it prudent to interfere, and therefore this protection could only be afforded by a powerful national guard’.42 It was also believed that Pius had little choice but to make concessions over the civic guard. In his letter of 5 July Freeborn noted that if the pope agreed to the establishment of the civic guard, the Papal States would remain at peace, but ‘if not, the present state of anarchy will increase, and violent measures will be adopted by the malcontents, which may fall heavily upon the Cardinals, Jesuit, and anti-Progressivists, long before Austrian intervention can save them’.43 He added that already people were wandering the streets with a menacing attitude and shouting ‘Death to the Cardinal Lambruschini [ex-secretary of state], Monsignor Corboli [the present undersecretary of state], and the Pope’s evil counsellors’.44 The British representatives thus had no concerns about the civic guard’s long-term loyalty to the pope and no suspicion that it might be transformed into an armed force for revolutionary contingents in Rome. Thus Petre, when he reported to Hamilton on 8 July 1847 that the pope had established a civic guard, noted naively that this would reaffirm the people’s gratitude and 40 41

Hughes, Crime, disorder and the Risorgimento, 172. A. J. Reinerman, ‘The failure of popular counter-revolution in Risorgimento Italy: the case of the Centurions, 1831–1847’, Historical Journal xxxiv (1991), 21–41; Hearder, ‘The making of the Roman republic’, 175–6. 42 Freeborn to Palmerston, 5 July 1847, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1). 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid.

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loyalty to the pope.45 Nor was there any sign that the danger of recruiting members of the civic guard from the lower classes was perceived by the British representatives.46 Even if Britain did not grasp the danger latent in the decision to set up a civic guard, this should have become apparent from another crucial event, for on the day after the pope’s announcement Gizzi resigned as secretary of state. Only Gizzi, who was not as liberal as many supposed, had foreseen that the establishment of the guard brought with it a real threat of revolution in Rome. However, he had not been able to stop the pope’s approval of the civic guard, and consequently, unable to stand by as it became an armed revolutionary force threatening papal authority, he resigned.47 Gizzi’s action brought excitement and agitation to the Roman people, because it was believed that he had been pressed to resign by ultra-conservative cardinals such as Lambruschini and Corboli, thus opening up the possibility that the pope’s liberal policies might be endangered. Although Petre knew that Gizzi’s resignation arose from his opposition to the guard, he did not fully grasp its significance nor analyse why the secretary of state had been opposed to the measure.48 This lack of insight was also displayed in Abercromby’s reaction to recent events in the Papal States. Abercomby reported to Palmerston on 22 July 1847 that Gizzi’s resignation ‘increases most materially the difficulties of His Holiness’ position’ and that it ‘was a great regret not only for Italy but also for Europe’.49 In particular, he feared that the pope’s liberal policy, which had been shaped by Gizzi, would now be more difficult to pursue, and that the pope was more likely to be influenced by the ultra-conservatives whose corrupt politics had already brought social and economic backwardness and poverty to the Papal States.50 Accordingly Abercromby stressed that he was eager to see someone who could advise the pope and ‘lead him to liberal principles without prejudice and an old-fashioned mind’.51 He therefore hoped that Gizzi’s replacement, Cardinal Ferretti, ‘should show by his acts, that he is animated by the same wise and liberal principles as those of which Cardinal Gizzi has given proof’.52 There was little real awareness in these words of the real political crisis facing the papacy and considerably too much faith put in the belief that Gizzi was a liberal.

45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

Petre to Hamilton, 8 July 1847, ibid. Hamilton to Palmerston, 6 July 1847, ibid. Hamilton to Palmerston, 12 July 1847, ibid. Petre to Hamilton, 8 July 1847, ibid; Coppa, Antonelli, 41. Abercromby to Palmerston, 22 July 1847, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1). Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

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Ferrara and papal diplomacy Another obvious reason why Britain did not fully realise the long-term problems and dangers raised by the civic guard was that in the summer of 1847 it paid greater attention to the immediate short-term consequences of Pius’ dramatic decision, namely the abortive reactionary coup in Rome and the Austrian intervention at Ferrara. Both these events after all suggested that the primary threat to Pius came not from the liberal forces in Italy but rather from the conservatives. Within Rome much of the ecclesiastical establishment was unhappy with the direction of Pius’ reforms, and in mid-July rumours circulated that conservatives were preparing to launch a coup, timed for 17 July, which would force Pius to renounce his liberal policies. The truth of the matter is unclear for, as Petre noted to Hamilton on 24 July, both liberals and conservatives benefited from creating an atmosphere of unease. What is apparent, however, is that it redirected both domestic and international attention away from the establishment of the civic guard and towards the possible conservative obstacles that might block further reform. Of even greater concern was the threat of Austrian intervention. Metternich from the outset had been alarmed by Pius’ liberal policies, such as the amnesty and new press law, and had already sent several warnings to the pope.53 However, when Pius confirmed the creation of the civic guard on 5 July, this proved to be the last straw for an Austrian government which regarded such an institution as a danger to their interests throughout Italy.54 For Metternich the news that Pius had decided to allow the establishment of a civic guard brought back memories of 1831–2 when the Austrians had had to assist the papal army in reasserting its control over Bologna. Thus when Ponsonby informed Palmerston on 14 July of his recent talk with the Austrian chancellor he recorded Metternich as stating grimly that, ‘The Emperor has determined not to lose his Italian possessions.’55 The Austrians talked openly about the possibility of intervention, but tried to create a smokescreen for their own selfish interests by claiming that they anticipated that Pius feared revolution and that he would imminently ask for their assistance. A few days later, on 17 July, the Austrian commander in Lombardy, Field Marshal Count Radetzky, ordered his troops to seize control of Ferrara in response to the pope’s decision to establish a civic guard. Despite Metternich’s rhetoric he had not ordered this action. Radetzky had acted on his own authority, although the chancellor was sympathetic. Ferrara was a garrison town where an Austrian army was stationed, ostensibly to defend the

53 54 55

Ponsonby to Palmerston, 27 July 1847, ibid. George Dawkins (Venice) to Ponsonby, 17 July 1847, ibid. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 14 July 1847, ibid.

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pope.56 In such a place the formation of the civic guard was a direct challenge to Austrian authority. Moreover it gave the Austrians a good pretext to show that their army was there to protect the pope from revolutionary forces.57 The entry of Austrian forces into Ferrara immediately disturbed the peace and order of the Papal States, for it was considered to be a gross insult to the pope.58 Since the pope himself had established the civic guard, he naturally protested against the Austrian display of ‘support’. He was of course justified in taking a strong line, for when the Papal States, which were supposed to be a neutral institution, were attacked it was his duty to defend them. In August the crisis deepened. On 8 August Count Auersperg, the Austrian commandant, wrote to Cardinal Ciacchi, the legate of Ferrara, to order that no civic guards be placed on the piazza or at the city gates in Ferrara, otherwise the Austrian troops would increase the strength of their detachments at those same posts. On the following day, the cardinal replied that His Holiness had every right to exercise his temporal power in his town of Ferrara and forwarded his protest against Austrian actions to Rome.59 Following this latest incident, on 18 August, Cardinal Ferretti, the new secretary of state, wrote a formal note of complaint to the Austrian ambassador in Rome60 and similar notes and enclosures were addressed by the papal government to all foreign embassies and representatives, including Petre.61 This protest failed to have any effect on the Austrians who over the next few days sealed their control over Ferrara by placing guards in all areas bar the legate’s palace.62 Austria also moved to caution Tuscany not to follow the pope’s example and establish a civic guard, warning that this could lead to Austrian occupation. Moreover it sent a copy of this communication to Piedmont in a bid to intimidate Carlo Alberto. Pius did receive some offers of assistance. The French ambassador to Rome, Pellegrino Rossi, indicated that his government was willing to offer help and protection, but the pope, aware that the French were now attempting to win Austria’s favour in their struggle against Britain, had no faith in Guizot. Guizot’s reluctance to act was also apparent from his conversations in Paris with Lord Normanby.63 A more sincere offer of assistance came from Piedmont, which replied positively to

56 57

Ibid. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 20 July 1847, ibid. See also A. Sked, The survival of the Habsburg empire: Radetzky, the imperial army and the class war, 1848, London 1979, 96. 58 Moore to Palmerston, 21 July 1847, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1). 59 Ibid. A formal protest about the incident was also recorded in the Diario di Roma of 10 Aug. 1847; it was passed by Petre to Hamilton on 11 August, and sent by Hamilton to Palmerston on 13 August. 60 Ibid. enclosing a copy of Cardinal Luigi Ciacchi’s protest of 18 August 1847. 61 Abercromby to Palmerston, 19 Aug. 1847, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1). 62 Abercromby to Palmerston, 23 Aug. 1847, Palmerston papers, GC/AB/110. 63 Normanby to Palmerston, 21 Aug. 1847, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1).

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the pope’s request for sanctuary in the event of Austria occupying the Papal States.64 Despite French hesitancy to support Pius against Austria, the British government felt that it had to take a strong stand over the occupation of Ferrara. Palmerston believed that Austria’s action was imprudent and likely to be counter-productive. Even before the occupation took place it was apparent that anti-Austrian sentiment was growing in the Papal States. As early as 6 July Sir George Hamilton had reported to Palmerston about an incident in Rome, in which the Austrian ambassador had been berated by a mob.65 Palmerston therefore feared that the Austrian intervention in Ferrara would only exacerbate the situation within the Papal States, leading to the threat that reform might turn into revolution. Moreover, in such unstable circumstances there was a danger that France might see a chance of breaking out of the cordon sanitaire established at Vienna in 1815, renounce its recent alignment with the Habsburgs and decide instead to intervene in Italy. The most important way in which Palmerston could aid the pope and calm the situation was by putting pressure on the Austrian government to withdraw from Ferrara. Metternich’s position on Ferrara, as outlined by the Austrian ambassador to London, Count Dietrichstein, to Palmerston on 11 August, was that the occupation had been necessary in order to prohibit the unlawful scheme put forward by some revolutionaries for the unification of Italy, which threatened the political status quo and Austria’s treaty rights as laid down by the Congress of Vienna. Palmerston refused to accept this argument, for while he recognised that Austria had not acted with the intention of altering the territorial arrangement of Italy, he observed that every state had the right to make its own reforms for internal improvement and that there was no evidence of any move towards Italian unification.66 Furthermore he stressed that the pope’s reforms would actually be of benefit to the great powers and therefore that Pius should be encouraged and assisted by Austria and the other four great powers in order to remove the possibility of revolution. To underline this point, he noted that Pius’ reform programme was designed to introduce those proposals that the great powers, including Austria, had collectively recommended in 1831–2.67 Metternich appeared at first to accept Palmerston’s argument, confirming his general agreement to Ponsonby on 23 August.68 However at the same time he vigorously rejected the formal Roman protests against the Austrian occupation of Ferrara and forwarded copies of these notes to London for Palmerston’s attention.69 Faced with Metternich’s inflexibility, on 11 September 64 65 66 67 68 69

Abercromby to Palmerston, 18 Aug. 1847, Palmerston papers, GC/AB/109. Hamilton to Palmerston, 6 July 1847, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1). Palmerston to Ponsonby, 12 Aug. 1847, ibid. Ibid. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 23 Aug. 1847, ibid. Baron August Koller (London) to Lord Addington (FO), 3 Sept. 1847, ibid.

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Palmerston issued a further warning about the unjustified Austrian action, in which he stated that an Austrian intervention in either the Papal States or Piedmont would not be met with British ‘indifference’. Furthermore he emphasised again that Austria should end its occupation of Ferrara.70 Palmerston’s policy did not, however, just rely on sending protests to Vienna. Encouraged by his representatives in Italy to believe that an active British policy would be welcomed, he sought to devise other more positive ways of indicating Britain’s interest in encouraging reform. In particular Abercromby’s despatches from Turin influenced his thinking. From late July onwards Abercromby warned of the threat to Pius’ position from the ecclesiastical conservatives among the cardinals and from Austria, and stressed the need for Britain to champion the pope’s liberal reforms for the sake of the Papal States and more broadly for Italy itself. On the one hand Abercromby emphasised with great skill the depth of the crisis in the Italian peninsula, stressing the potential for disaster, but on the other he also emphasised the opportunities offered for the furthering of Italian unification. In particular he pointed to the fact that whereas in the past the cause of Italian unification relied on ‘unorganised partisans’, it could now look to the support of reforming governments such those in Piedmont and the Papal States. Moreover he emphasised that the recent crisis showed that these states were prepared to cooperate and to stand firm in the face of Austrian bullying.71 In addition he suggested that Britain could take advantage of these opportunities, because it was clear that the Italians had no faith in France. For example, on 23 August he observed to Palmerston in a confidential letter that ‘The distrust felt towards those on our left [the French] is equal to that shewn [sic] towards those on our right [the Austrians], for there is the conviction that they are acting in concert.’72 By emphasising the disillusionment with France, Abercromby naturally hinted at the expectation that existed in the Italian states that Britain instead would side with the liberal, nationalist cause. Moreover he urged that much advantage would be gained if Britain could send a high-ranking representative to Italy, and noted his regret that diplomatic relations did not exist with Rome. Abercromby’s letters thus forced Palmerston and Russell to consider what Britain could do to stabilise the situation in the Italian peninsula. The seriousness with which they viewed the situation is evident from a letter that Russell sent to the queen on 31 August in which he asserted that the only way to stop new political disturbances in the Italian peninsula was to give Britain’s support to the local rulers. In dramatic language he conjured up an image of Italy’s perilous condition and Britain’s responsibilities: 70 Palmerston to Prince Metternich, 11 Sept. 1847, in BPSP, 1847–8/LXV: Communications from the Austrian government as to territorial arrangement and political condition of Italy, with reply of British government. 71 Abercromby to Palmerston, 24 July, 19, 25 Aug. 1847, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 1). 72 Abercromby to Palmerston, 23 Aug. 1847, Palmerston papers, GC/AB/100.

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It is to be feared that before anything can be done the rash and intemperate conduct of the Court of Vienna may have set fire to the inflammable matter in Italy. The only course by which a convulsion can be prevented is by the support given by England and if possible by France to the Pope, the Duke of Tuscany and the King of Sardinia. These Sovereigns may thus have the means of keeping in check the ardent republicans of their states.73

There was therefore much at stake. It was against this perilous background that Russell and Palmerston took the momentous decision to send a special representative to Italy, including the Papal States.

73

Russell to Queen Victoria, 31 Aug. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 8, p. 43.

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The Origins of the Minto Mission

3

The Origins of the Minto Mission Faced with the mounting crisis in the Italian peninsula in the late summer of 1847 the response of the British government was to decide to send the lord privy seal, Lord Minto, to visit the Italian states. At first glance it might appear that this decision can be explained solely by reference to British interests in Italy and the threat posed by the fear of revolution and of possible Austrian and French intervention. This motive clearly did exist and was very significant; after all the peace of Europe was at stake. However, there were also other reasons for the despatch of Lord Minto, for the summer of 1847 saw the convergence of a number of disparate factors that made the idea of a mission to Rome very attractive. These other factors, namely Britain’s continuing desire to use the papacy to legitimate its policies towards Ireland and control the Irish clergy, and the debate over the re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy, were concerned not with the fortunes of Italian nationalism and the Austrian threat to the pope’s temporal power, but rather with the ecclesiastical side of papal affairs. It is only by looking at all of these areas that an understanding of how and why the Minto mission took place may be reached. Minto and the Austrian threat to Italy The origins of the Minto mission and its intended goals have been a matter of debate ever since its inception. As early as April 1847 there had been conversations in Paris between the British ambassador, Lord Normanby, and the papal nuncio, Cardinal Fornari, in which the latter had said that the pope would be willing to meet a special representative of the British government. Some historians have contended that in this exchange lay the seed of the Minto mission.1 Palmerston himself, however, denied that this was the case. When Fornari himself claimed early in 1851 that he had been the catalyst, Palmerston observed in a letter to Normanby that the nuncio’s overtures had not been crucial, and that the advice that had persuaded him of the need to send a representative to Rome had rather come through a completely separate channel.2 It might be thought that Palmerston was referring here to the 1

See, for example, Reynolds, ‘Politics vs. persuasion’, 377–8, and Wallace, ‘Pius IX and Lord Palmerston’, 14–15. 2 Palmerston to Normanby (Paris), 20 Jan. 1851, Russell papers, PRO 30/22/9A.

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THE ORIGINS OF THE MINTO MISSION

entreaties he received from Abercromby in August 1847 to send a ‘handy discreet traveller’ to Italy to represent Britain’s views.3 However, in reality the foreign secretary was referring to another private channel of communications, namely a letter from Rome, dated 8 August, from the leading English Catholic ecclesiastic, Bishop Nicholas Wiseman, the newly appointed vicar-apostolic of the London District, to the Catholic nobleman, Lord Shrewsbury, which was forwarded by him to Palmerston on 19 August. In his letter Wiseman described the great difficulties that the pope was up against and in particular the hostility of Austria and France, and observed that The strong feeling on the part of the government and its sincere friends is that the appearance of an English envoy here, would both greatly neutralise the intrigues of foreign parties, would secure the Papal states from foreign interference and would give strong moral support and encouragement to the government in its measures of reform.4

He suggested that a representative would have the same effect whether his mission was official or not and that in addition much good would come about if the British navy in the Mediterranean should send a vessel to Civitàvecchia as a symbol of British support. In forwarding this letter to Palmerston, Shrewsbury reinforced Wiseman’s argument by noting that the opinions of his son-in-law, the Roman nobleman Prince Doria Pamphili, entirely coincided with those of the bishop.5 It appears that Wiseman’s letter was not his own initiative, but rather that Pius had ordered him to act. Some accounts claim that Pius was already aware that the British government intended to send Minto on ‘a roving commission to visit the various governments’ and therefore wrote to the British government to ensure that Rome would be on his itinerary.6 This, however, was not the case, for it was Wiseman’s letter, written at Pius’ request, that started the process moving in London. Palmerston forwarded these letters to Russell on 21 August and suggested that the most suitable individual to send to Rome was the prime minister’s father-in-law, Lord Minto, who held the post of lord privy seal in the Cabinet. Minto already had plans to visit Europe on a holiday which would include a visit to Turin as his daughter was married to Abercromby. It was therefore not difficult to prevail upon him to add a political angle to his visit. Minto himself first heard of the proposal on 24 August when he visited Russell at

3 4 5 6

Abercromby (Turin) to Palmerston, 23 Aug. 1847, Palmerston papers, GC/AB/110/2. Nicholas Wiseman to Lord Shrewsbury, 8 Aug. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 9, p. 46. Shrewsbury to Palmerston, 19 Aug. 1847, ibid. no. 9, p. 45. B. Ward, The sequel to Catholic emancipation, 1830–1850, London 1915, 190, and Reynolds, ‘Politics vs. persuasion’, 381.

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Pembroke Lodge. Having gained Minto’s agreement, Russell then put the idea to Queen Victoria on 26 August.7 At first the queen was wary, declaring it ‘a very grave question requiring much consideration’.8 This cautious attitude was in large part due to the fear held by Victoria and her consort, Prince Albert, that a blustering British intervention in the Italian peninsula might bring about exactly the result that Britain wished to avoid; namely war. It is important to understand that this did not mean that they wanted Britain to do nothing or that they approved of Austria’s behaviour, even though Lord Ponsonby, the ambassador in Vienna believed that Metternich was relying on the court to curb Palmerston.9 On 29 August Albert produced a long memorandum on the dangers of sending a mission in which he argued that ‘The probability is that Lord Minto will have very little real influence and will be made responsible for every act of a doubtful nature, and of which he may have been totally ignorant.’10 Moreover he had doubts about the legality of such an exercise, since for religious reasons Britain had no diplomatic relations with the papacy. Instead Albert advised that the government should make a public, moderate and reasoned complaint to Austria about its conduct towards the independent Italian states in the hope that this would convince Metternich that the Austrian action was misguided. Russell and Palmerston were therefore obliged to persuade the queen that they saw the mission’s aims to be in line with her desires. In a letter to Victoria on 29 August Palmerston stated that Minto’s mission should be enlarged to include Switzerland, Piedmont and Tuscany. He described the primary goals of the mission as encouraging the cause of reform, furthering Britain’s relations with the Italian states and advising them against pursuing precipitous domestic or foreign policies that might have the effect of making the present crisis even worse and thus give Austria and France a pretext for further intervention. It is noticeable that no mention was made at this stage of any intention to open diplomatic relations with Rome; indeed Palmerston emphatically noted that Minto would be given credentials to present to Piedmont and Tuscany but in Rome would only be authorised to communicate confidentially with the papal authorities.11 In addition there was no expressed desire to further the cause of Italian unification. Indeed at a later date Russell made it clear to Minto that Britain disapproved of such a goal

7

Palmerston to Russell, 21 Aug. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 1, p. 45, and Russell to Victoria, 26 Aug. 1847, no. 4, pp. 38–9; Minto diary, entry for 2 Sept. 1847, in F. Curato (ed.), Gran Bretagna e Italia nel missione Minto, II: 1848, Rome 1970, 212–13. 8 Victoria to Russell, 29 Aug. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 5, p. 40. 9 Ponsonby (Vienna) to Palmerston, 3 Sept. 1847, BPSP, 1847–8/LXV: Austrian government. 10 Prince Albert memorandum, 29 Aug. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 5, p. 40. 11 Palmerston to Victoria, 31 Aug. 1847, ibid. i, no. 9, pp. 43–5.

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‘whether in the shape of kingdom or republic’.12 With Minto’s orders clarified the queen finally expressed her approval on condition that Vienna and Paris be informed of Britain’s intention.13 From these official papers it might appear that the aim of the Minto mission was concerned solely with Italian affairs and moreover that his despatch was entirely a matter of high politics. Certainly the decision about whether or not to send Minto was discussed largely against the background of what effect it would have on Italian politics and the position of the interested great powers. Moreover, the idea that Britain would benefit from having a senior representative on the spot had, as noted above, already been suggested by Abercromby as a way of building up British influence and contributing to the stability of the Italian peninsula. The importance of Italian considerations is also underlined by other decisions taken at the same time in support of Minto’s mission. One important element in British policy was that it was decided, in line with Wiseman’s original suggestion, that the fleet in the Mediterranean, under the command of Admiral Sir William Parker, should be sent to the western coast of the Italian peninsula to indicate Britain’s support for the small states. Parker was not however to despatch any vessels to the Adriatic as it was thought that the Austrians would find this too provocative.14 In addition action was taken in line with Prince Albert’s suggestion that a clear but friendly warning should be expressed to Austria. The role of public opinion It would be a mistake to assume, however, that the British government’s support for the papacy and the sending of Minto to Rome was merely the result of a debate about Italian affairs at the highest levels, for the role of public opinion also needs to be studied. It is evident that in the summer and early autumn of 1847 the British public on the whole shared the government’s views on the crisis in Italy, opposing Austrian absolutism and expressing support for the pope. This was noted by Minto himself who observed in his diary in early September 1847 that ‘the public press and public opinion is strongly arrayed in favour of the liberal states and independence of Italy’.15 So far as the general public’s perception of the pope was concerned this represented an interesting shift of opinion, for traditionally papal politics were strongly associated with Austrian absolutism. However in 1847 the idea that the pope was a symbol of Italian nationalism and liber12 13 14

Russell to Minto, 22 Sept. 1847, ibid. i, no. 26, p. 76. Victoria to Russell, 3 Sept. 1847, ibid. i, no. 12, p. 50. Russell to Palmerston, 22 Aug. 1947, ibid. i, no. 3, p. 38; Russell to Victoria, 1 Sept. 1847, no. 10, p. 47. 15 Minto journal, entry for 2 Sept. 1847, in Missione Minto, ii. 213.

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alism spread even to Britain. British public opinion therefore warmed to Pius’ liberal reform policy because it was believed that he could lead the way in eradicating Austrian influence from the Italian peninsula. Sympathy for Pius was expressed across a broad spectrum of political opinion. One of the most notable commentators on events in Italy was The Times. On 28 July The Times received news of the Austrian occupation of Ferrara and noted in passing the offensive attitude of the occupying troops.16 At this stage, however, it was concentrating on the outcome of the general election in Britain and thus did not produce an editorial. It became more concerned with events in Italy on 5 August when it received a letter from an Englishman in Rome, who called himself ‘anglo-Romanus’, that described the events of July including the occupation of Ferrara and the abortive plot in Rome by the reactionaries. This letter was similar in tone to that sent to Shrewsbury, which was not a surprise for it appears that ‘anglo-Romanus’ was none other than Wiseman.17 The Times reacted with alacrity to Wiseman’s warnings about the possible fate of Pius’ reforms. In an editorial it commented that ‘The real danger of Italy is not anarchy, but intervention; and the confusion which may occur in these exciting scenes alarms us only in as much as it may lead to an abuse of foreign power, and the introduction of foreign force.’18 It did not shy away from naming the power that might intervene, for it noted the coincidence that the abortive plot in Rome was due to have taken place on the same day as the occupation of Ferrara and observed that ‘Austria alone has . . . interest in fomenting dissatisfaction in Italy. She knows that the pacific progress of reform, and the development of the national character of Italy, are fatal to her ascendancy.’19 The article concluded by observing that it trusted that Palmerston would act vigorously to defend the rights of the minor Italian states. After this The Times published a further letter from ‘anglo-Romanus’ on 18 August, and then on 26 August produced a second editorial. Noting that ‘the liberal policies and avowed projects of Pope Pius IX have alarmed the senile conservatism of the Court of Venice’ and that Austria may use violence to get its way, it stressed the need for Rome and London to enter into full diplomatic relations.20 It observed that it was the papacy that was obstructing any such act, for its claim to have both temporal and spiritual authority over Catholics was unacceptable to the British people, and called on Pius to renounce any claim to temporal sway over Britain. The Times repeated its views on the need for diplomatic relations with Rome on 15 September when the news of the British government’s decision to send Minto to Rome was officially announced, but this time put the onus for action on London as well. The 16 17 18 19 20

Times, 28 July 1847. Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 90. Times, 5 Aug. 1847. Ibid. Ibid. 26 Aug.1847.

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opening of relations, it declared, was vital because ‘The Pontifical dominions promise to be the birthplace of that enlightened and liberal policy which is to retrieve the long degradation of the Italian Peninsula, and which it is the interest of all philanthropists to promote.’21 Thus one could say that even The Times had become an organ expressing neo-Guelf views. Enthusiasm for the pope was also taken up by other publications. Perhaps most surprising was that Punch, a journal that often took pleasure in goading Catholics, also joined in the chorus of approval. In its edition of 25 September the pope was depicted as expelling the Austrian Eagle from his territory and shrugging off the French Cockerel’s attempt to restrain him, while the British Lion looked on with a smile on its face. A column in the same edition of Punch scolded the Austrian emperor calling him a despotic monarch and blamed Metternich for the Austrian occupation of Ferrara.22 Punch warned the Emperor Ferdinand: You have no business in Ferrara whatever. I therefore not only protest against your occupation of that place, but request you to get out of it without delay. If you do not, I give you notice that I shall make arrangements to smack you, independently of those which will be entered into by Palmerston. I have made up my mind to take Pius’s part: so I tell you, you had better leave him alone.23

In another edition Pius was depicted in a cartoon as a national leader and hero of ‘rational liberty’, giving the ‘Roman Punch’ to Austrian despotism.24 Indeed Punch displayed a remarkably positive attitude towards the pope going as far in one piece, entitled ‘Important demonstrations at Madame Tussaud’s’, as to call the pope ‘heroic’.25 Anti-Austrian and pro-Italian sentiment also existed among British radicals. For example, the Northern Star gave extensive coverage to events in the Italian peninsula in the summer and autumn of 1847. In its edition of 28 August it published in full Cardinal Ciacchi’s protest at the Austrian occupation of Ferrara and noted the positive response that it had received from the Roman population.26 A week later it wrote with enthusiasm about the efforts to resist the Austrian aggressor, observing, for example, that The rural population of the papal states are fired with the same enthusiasm as has been manifested in the towns. The peasants everywhere flock to register themselves in the rolls of the national guard, and loudly proclaim their hostility to the Austrians.27

21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Ibid. 15 Sept. 1847. Punch xiii, 25 Sept. 1847, 120. Ibid. Ibid. 2 Oct. 1847, 135. See frontispiece. Ibid. 9 Oct. 1847, 140. Northern Star, 28 Aug. 1847. Ibid. 4 Sept. 1847.

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Over the following weeks the Northern Star continued to follow events, reporting among other matters that the pope had been greeted at one fête in the Piazza del Popolo with the cry of ‘Long live the President of the Roman Republic’, and that the arrival at Ancona of vessels of the British fleet had met with acclaim.28 At the same time, however, it observed that the Austrians were still doing all in their power to suppress Italian nationalism and its drive towards liberty. Support among radicals for the Italian cause, and thus implicitly for Pius IX’s resistance to Austria, can partly be attributed to the propaganda of Mazzini and his supporters in England. By 1847 Mazzini was convinced that public opinion in London not only supported his idea of Italian independence from Austria, but that it had even begun to consider Italian unification as a possibility. In England Mazzini concentrated on working to influence public opinion through the People’s International League, an organisation that had been established by the Chartists W. J. Linton and James Watson in the spring of 1847 to support nationalist causes in Europe.29 Mazzini hoped that through this forum and his own publications he could encourage the government’s foreign policy to be favourable to Italian nationalism.30 In order to further the appeal of his cause Mazzini was even prepared to take a relatively positive attitude towards the pope in line with the general view. On 8 September Mazzini wrote a long open letter to Pius from London, begging him to unite Italy under papal leadership: ‘Unification would come anyway, because it was part of God’s providence, but better if under Papal patronage with you at its head. Our struggle will take on a religious aspect and liberate us from the risks of reaction and civil war.’31 Mazzini subsequently stated that he had little faith that this letter would produce the intended result and that it was purely a pragmatic exercise. It does, however, appear that his words were more sincere than he was ready to admit, and that with republicanism in decline, he saw the unity of Italy under the pope as preferable to any move towards federalism.32 The government could not afford to ignore this broad degree of support for Pius within British society, for Russell’s administration only had a fragile hold on power. The election of July 1847 saw the return of Russell’s ministry, but it was a weak government because it had to rely for support on a coalition, including the radicals, Irish Catholics and Dissenters.33 Limited support for the papacy and measured hostility towards Austria was therefore a policy that

28 29

Ibid. 18, 25 Sept. 1847. On the PIL see H. G. Weisser, ‘Chartist internationalism, 1845–48’, Historical Journal xiv (1971), 49–66; Claeys, ‘Mazzini’, 229–30; Finn, After Chartism, 71–3; Taylor, British radicalism. 30 Mack Smith, Mazzini, 52. 31 G. Mazzini, Scritti editi ed inediti, xxxii, Imola 1907, 225. 32 Ibid. xxxii. 304–6; B. King, The life of Mazzini, London 1912; Mack Smith, Mazzini, 52. 33 Machin, Politics and the Churches, 183.

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could appeal to these audiences. Indeed Russell recognised the importance of the Catholic vote. During the 1847 election, Catholic voters in general supported Liberals and Peelites, and Russell himself emerged at the head of the poll in the City of London in part with the help of their votes, having won their approval by supporting the Maynooth Bill.34 There were, however, strict limits to how far the government could go in support of the papal cause. In particular, it was clear that the Peelites, whom Russell wished to woo, did not share the general enthusiasm for Pius IX. For example, in a letter to Peel on 18 September the former foreign secretary, Lord Aberdeen, defended Austria’s position and observed of recent events in Italy: What an outcry has been raised, and what a crusade preached against Austria, for having done that which she had a perfect right to do under the very Treaty which gave Ferrara to the Pope! . . . The policy of Austria in Italy is strictly defensive, and is such as has been adopted by all nations, when their safety or essential interests were at stake.35

In addition Russell had to be wary of the court, for while Victoria and Albert had been persuaded to agree to the Minto mission, they were still not convinced that this was the wisest course of action.36 Public opinion and domestic politics therefore helped to push Russell towards the decision to send Minto to Rome, but at the same time indicated that care had to be taken to avoid being seen as too pro-Roman or anti-Austrian. The Irish issue Beneath the surface of the desire for an improvement in anglo-Vatican relations was another vital issue, the Irish question. This was not a factor that was discussed publicly, but the private papers of those involved in the diplomatic overture to the papacy reveal the importance of the Irish angle. This is particularly apparent in the correspondence of the earl of Clarendon, lord-lieutenant of Ireland, for as soon as he heard of the intention to despatch Lord Minto to Rome, he immediately emphasised its potential Irish dimension, noting in a letter to Russell in late August 1847, ‘I should like to know in what form and to what extent you mean to entamer Irish subjects with His Holiness.’37 Clarendon’s concern was not surprising, for at this time the Irish situation was desperate. It has been argued that the Irish issue was, in terms of British foreign policy towards Italy, not of major concern in the first half of the nine34 35 36

Ibid. 185. Aberdeen to Robert Peel, 18 Sept. 1847, Peel papers, BL, MS Add. 40599, no. 442. B. Connell (ed.), Regina v. Palmerston: the correspondence between Queen Victoria and her foreign and prime minister, London 1962, 62. 37 Lord Clarendon to Russell, n.d. [Aug. 1847], in Missione Minto, i, no. 10, p. 48.

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teenth century, and that policy towards Italy was primarily determined by international interests in the papacy and the Risorgimento.38 However, 1847 was a watershed year in the history of Ireland, and one during which the British government could not ignore the Irish angle to anglo-Roman diplomatic relations. It was the worst year of the famine in Ireland following the original failure of the potato crop in 1846. The famine produced the most desperate conditions. In a letter to Minto of 20 December, Lord Shrewsbury wrote that he heard from a priest in Galway that the famine in that area was much worse than in the previous year. The priest had told Shrewsbury that it was intolerable to see the poor dying of ‘exhaustion for want of food and clothing’, even after fever and dysentery had almost disappeared, and observed that, ‘The Irish landlords are the most heartless wretches in creation!’39 Most informed observers realised that the root of the problem lay in the distribution of land. Large tracts of land were let at a fixed rent to a single individual on a long lease and he sublet as he chose.40 The result was a land tenancy system which discriminated against the tenant farmer, for even when crops failed or the market was depressed rent still had to be paid. The famine brought about a change in the attitude of the British government towards Ireland. It was impossible any longer to deny that something was dangerously wrong. On 10 October Clarendon observed to Palmerston that, ‘A great social revolution is now going on in Ireland, the accumulated evils of misgovernment and mismanagement are now coming to a crisis.’ In this troubled atmosphere it was not surprising that the British government was deeply concerned about the attitude of the Irish Catholic Church towards the current crisis and also about the position of the papacy. The British perception, as Clarendon noted on 1 October in a memorandum destined for Minto, was that over recent years in Ireland the Catholic clergy, due to the desire ‘to acquire and maintain influence over their flocks’, had been required by the weight of public opinion to support the nationalist cause.41 Those who failed to toe the line ended up like the parish priest in Dundalk, who during the recent election had been ‘insulted . . . and spit upon’ because he had given his support to a liberal anti-repeal candidate. There was therefore a need to try to use the power of the papacy to persuade the clergy that they should refrain from involvement in political matters. As Clarendon observed, this was a matter of urgency, as the situation was ‘rapidly

38

D. M. Schreuder, ‘Gladstone and Italian unification, 1848–70: the making of liberals?’, English Historical Review lxxxv (1970), 475–501. 39 Shrewsbury to Minto, 20 Dec. 1847, Minto papers, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, MS 12082, fos 105–14. 40 C. Woodham-Smith, The great hunger: Ireland, 1845–1849, London 1962, 22. 41 Clarendon to Russell, 1 Oct. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 30, p. 81.

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becoming worse and demands the remedy which the Pope alone can supply’.42 To persuade the pope to take such action was not however an easy matter, for as Clarendon insisted to Russell, accurate information regarding Irish affairs was often distorted by the Irish College in Rome. Thus: Even if facts be correctly transmitted from Ireland (and the reverse is often the case) they are metamorphosed in the Irish College at Rome and the Pope is required to exercise his judgement upon evidence either one-sided, or garbled to meet the political more frequently than the spiritual purposes of the party in Ireland from which the Irish College receive its inspirations.43

In confirmation of this assertion, Clarendon referred to the move by some members of the Irish Church and Irish College in 1846 to persuade Pius to condemn the non-denominational colleges (the Queen’s Colleges), which Peel’s government had decided to establish in Ireland. This case was particularly disturbing for, although the most senior figures in the Irish hierarchy, Archbishop Crolly of Armagh and Archbishop Murray of Dublin, had been prepared to support the colleges, MacHale and his supporters had nevertheless determined to resist. In the early autumn of 1847 no papal decision had yet been taken on this subject, although the Congregation of Propaganda Fide had recommended condemnation.44 What Britain saw as the disturbing tendency of the Irish College in Rome to engage in anti-British propaganda was also evident in the circumstances surrounding the death of Daniel O’Connell early in the summer of 1847. In the first months of the year O’Connell had decided to make a pilgrimage to Rome but only got as far as Genoa where he died on 15 May. O’Connell’s death stirred up much outpouring of sympathy, for in the last year of his life he had exerted himself to the full to publicise Ireland’s plight under the famine. His body was returned to Ireland but his heart was taken to Rome. The Irish College, according to Petre, tried to have the heart publicly paraded through the streets, but this request was turned down by the papal authorities. However, a funeral service was held in Rome, at which Cardinal Ventura made a moving oration. The pope personally approved Ventura’s text, for he admired O’Connell and had already in March issued an encyclical calling on Catholics to assist famine victims.45 The Irish nationalist movement naturally made the most of this gesture, which they perceived as evidence of the pope’s sympathy for Ireland. Given these considerations it is no surprise to discover that from the very beginning of the conversations about sending Minto to Rome the subject of 42 43 44 45

Ibid. 82. Ibid. Kerr, Peel, 302–51. Petre (Rome) to Hamilton (Florence), 5 July 1847, FO 43/41; Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 53–5.

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what he could do for British interests in Ireland was discussed. Only two days before receiving Wiseman’s initial letter, Palmerston wrote to Russell declaring that the support the priests had given to repeal candidates in the election showed the need for ‘a very good & sensible man’ in Rome, and in his letter to Russell regarding Wiseman’s proposal on 21 August Palmerston directly referred to the Irish angle.46 Then, on 31 August, when seeking to persuade the queen to agree to Minto’s mission, he stated that one of the aims should be to ask the pope to exert ‘his spiritual authority over the Catholic priesthood of Ireland to induce them to abstain from repeal agitation’.47 Around the same time, Clarendon, on learning of the mission, noted that in addition it would be a good idea to approach the pope about the Queen’s Colleges.48 Over the next month Clarendon concentrated on preparing material which Minto could use in Rome. On 1 October he sent his memorandum on Ireland to Russell and enclosed with it a number of documents, which as he explained, ‘afford ample evidence of the inflammatory language and the personal abuse in which the Clergy freely indulge both in speeches and letters’.49 Clarendon observed that raising the issue of Ireland with the pope would undoubtedly stir up controversy, and warned that Not only the slightest interference on the part of the Pope to aid the government, but the very appointment even by England of an accredited agent at Rome will be made a perpetual handle for agitators to influence the popular mind with the notion that the British minister is interfering with the Pope for the purpose of making him subservient to the political project of England.50

However, on the grounds that, ‘Ireland is a nettle to be grasped boldly, or handled not at all’, he argued that something had to be done. Moreover he recorded his belief that, with O’Connell dead and Irish opinion divided, there was, ‘Never a more convenient season for the experiment.’51 As Minto journeyed to Rome, the Irish aspect of his mission became ever more central. The first problem that emerged was that on 9 October 1847, while Minto was still at Turin, the pope, on the advice of Propaganda Fide, finally issued a statement opposing the British government’s plan for non-denominational Queen’s Colleges in Ireland. This was an unexpected reverse, considering that Britain had made clear its diplomatic support for the pope, and confirmed that in the competition between the English and Irish Catholic Churches through the English and Irish Colleges in Rome, the Irish 46

Palmerston to Russell, 19 Aug. 1847, Russell papers, PRO 30/22/6e; Palmerston to Russell, 21 Aug. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 1, p. 45. 47 Palmerston to Victoria, 31 Aug. 1847, ibid. i, no. 9, pp. 43–5. 48 Clarendon to Russell, n.d. [Aug. 1847], ibid. i, no. 10, pp. 48–9. 49 Clarendon to Russell, 1 Oct. 1847, ibid. i, no. 30, pp. 83–4. 50 Ibid. 84. 51 Ibid.

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were more influential and thus more successful. Consequently, on 27 October, Russell told Minto that he hoped that he would do all in his power to persuade the pope not to be misled by the Irish party which aimed at ‘rebellion and separation’ and that Pius should denounce the use of revolutionary language.52 Palmerston was also keen to see the pope aid Britain, and in a letter to Minto on 29 October he noted that as there were by this time indications that the Austrians were keen to reduce tensions in Italy, ‘The Pope ought to feel grateful to us for this; and if he does so, he ought to give us some tokens of his thankfulness. I send you a copy of memorandum sent some little time ago by Clarendon for your use. It is the main good.’53 The Irish success over the Queen’s Colleges was largely credited to MacHale and the head of the Irish College in Rome, Dr Paul Cullen, who, it was alleged must have misled the pope. Over the following month Palmerston and Clarendon raged about the malign influence of MacHale. On 26 November Clarendon noted to Minto that ‘MacHale is a dangerous demagogue whose proceedings as a citizen, and irrespective of their ecclesiastical indecorum, no government in the world but our’s would tolerate’, and insisted that his true character should be revealed to the pope.54 The desire for papal action was made all the more urgent by the increase in acts of violence in Ireland and the apparent complicity of the Irish clergy. During the autumn, in a series of assassinations, seven landlords were shot in less than two months, six being killed outright and the seventh horribly injured. Famine had suddenly brought the suppressed anger of centuries to a head. On 29 November Sir George Grey, the home secretary, introduced the Crime and Outrage (Ireland) Bill in the House of Commons. Under its terms the lord-lieutenant was given the power, at his discretion, to draft any number of police into any district; moreover, the districts were required to repay the cost of the draft immediately.55 There has been controversy over whether or not the peasants’ violence against the landlords was organised and integrated into the mass revolutionary and Irish nationalist movement. Woodham-Smith has asserted that the popular rising, which the British government feared, was not being planned, and that when a revolutionary movement did come about it originated not among the starving masses but with the intellectuals and the middle class. However, there is an another argument that contests this thesis, which states that the murders which horrified and alienated public opinion had no insurrectionary significance and were not related to any political conspiracy.56 Although the facts are still a matter of debate, it is clear that the British 52 53 54 55 56

Russell to Minto, 27 Oct. 1847, ibid. i, no. 60, p. 124. Palmerston to Minto, 29 Oct. 1847, ibid. i, no. 64, p. 129. Clarendon to Minto, 26 Nov. 1847, ibid. i, no. 127, p. 227. Woodham-Smith, The great hunger, 321–4. Ibid. 373–4.

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government believed that the successive outbreaks of violence against landlords in Ireland were associated with the Irish nationalist movement. Moreover, rumours linked the Catholic clergy directly to these outbreaks of violence, citing the supposed tendency of the more radical priests to denounce the worst of the landlords from their pulpits, thus legitimising their assassination. This was reported to be the case in the murder of Major Denis Mahon on 2 November, a cause célèbre in the English press.57 Writing from a troubled Dublin on 21 November Clarendon informed Palmerston that the situation was so bad that ‘sedition and murder are now all but openly recommended by certain priests’ and insisted that the pope had ‘to forbid the practice . . . of denouncing people by name from the altar or in other words issuing their death warrant’.58 As this implies, by the end of 1847 the Minto mission had became vital to Britain not only for Italian affairs but also for the peace of Ireland. The religious aspect of Wiseman’s approach to London In addition to the importance of Italian and Irish issues and pressure from public opinion, another facet of the origins of the Minto mission was its link to the issue of the future of the Catholic Church in England. In lobbying the government to support the papacy in the summer of 1847 Wiseman and Shrewsbury had more than one motive in mind, for while they clearly hoped that British diplomacy would keep Austria at bay, they also wanted to further the cause of the re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy. This aspect of Wiseman’s diplomacy has not been fully explored by historians and yet it was extremely significant.59 The issue of the re-establishment of the hierarchy arose in 1847 for a variety of reasons. Probably the most significant was that conditions in Britain were very favourable due to the rapid increase at this time of the Catholic population. Between 1801 and 1851 the Roman Catholic population in England expanded almost ten times in number, from 80,000 to 750,000. This occurred in part due to the general improvement in public health, but most significantly because of the influx of poor Irish immigrants into Britain, which markedly raised the number of Catholics living in urban areas. The problem with this rapid growth in the Catholic population was that it made it increasingly difficult for Propaganda Fide in Rome to exert control using the existing eight vicar-apostolics. Appeals to Propaganda by one bishop against another were frequent and time-consuming, and often occurred because of a lack of acquaintance with Roman procedures and protocols. It therefore was clearly necessary to expand the number of vicar57 58 59

Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 92–6. Clarendon to Palmerston, 21 Nov. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 123, p. 219. D. R. Gwynn, Cardinal Wiseman, Dublin 1950, 103.

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apostolics.60 From this premise it was but a small step to say that the logical action to take was to revive the hierarchy. The second important factor in arguing for the restoration of the hierarchy was that in the aftermath of the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829 a number of aristocrats and middle-class intellectuals were stimulated by the Catholic revival movement to convert from Anglicanism. Converts around this time included such figures as the earl of Oxford, the earl and countess of Abingdon, the countess of Gainsborough and the countess of Kenmore.61 This process was particularly linked to the emergence of the High Church Oxford or ‘Tractarian’ movement within Anglicanism. By the 1840s some figures within the Oxford Movement felt that the Church of England could not satisfy their spiritual curiosity and turned instead to Roman Catholicism. The most notable event came in 1845 with the famous conversion of John Henry Newman. This trend suggested that the Catholic Church might be on the verge of winning a large number of recruits from Anglicanism and thus added to the strength of the argument for the restoration of the hierarchy. These rapid changes in the Catholic Church, namely the influx of the Irish and of the Anglican converts, produced some unease among ‘old Catholics’, particularly the aristocratic elite, such as the Arundels and Norfolks, who prized their relative independence from Rome.62 For Wiseman, however, who held pronounced ultramontane views and who had spent much of his adult life in Rome at the English College, the Catholic revival both in terms of numbers and the ‘quality’ of some of the new conversions provided ample justification for restoration.63 Rumours that the restoration of the English Catholic hierarchy was being contemplated circulated in Catholic clerical circles from the spring of 1847. On 7 March Newman, who was then in Rome, observed in a letter to a friend that he had heard that the pope had taken up the idea of restoration and ‘will not rest till he has put Catholic affairs in England on a better footing’.64 Restoration was, however, a contentious matter for Propaganda Fide, as it was feared that the English bishops were too independent and that the British government might attempt to interfere with ecclesiastical appointments. In order to overcome these obstacles, in July 1847 Wiseman, as the representative of the English vicar-apostolics, travelled to Rome to report on the condition of the English Catholic Church. On his arrival he sent a letter to the pope entitled ‘Condition of the Catholic population and the more positive attitude of the public towards Catholicism in England’, and reported to 60 61

Bishops’ appeals to Propaganda Fide, 16 Oct. 1850, ASCPF, Anglia, prima serie, no. 12. W. L. Arnstein, Protestant versus Catholic in mid-Victorian England: Mr Newdegate and the nuns, Columbia 1982, 43. 62 Norman, The English Catholic Church, 70. 63 Holmes, More Roman than Rome, 72. 64 J. H. Newman to J. W. Bowden, 7 Mar. 1847, in C. S. Dessain (ed.), The letters and diaries of John Henry Newman, xii, Edinburgh 1962, 59.

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Propaganda Fide on the increased number of Catholic priests, churches, colleges, nunneries, monasteries and communities of Christian Brotherhood from 1840 to 1846.65 Wiseman’s visit also coincided with his elevation to the position of vicar-apostolic of the London District: he was determined to use his new post as a springboard to push ahead with the restoration of the hierarchy as soon as possible.66 This would entail a reconfiguring of the existing dioceses in England, in which Wiseman, as the head of the hierarchy, would assume the position of archbishop of Westminster. It is these new circumstances that provide a clue to the motives behind Wiseman’s willingness to enter the world of diplomacy in July and August 1847. While clearly genuinely concerned for the security of Rome, it also appears that he wished to show how useful it was to have a trustworthy channel of information between London and Rome in the hope that this would support his wider ambitions. Moreover, in order to overcome Propaganda Fide’s doubts about the British government, he wished to present Russell and Palmerston in as positive a light as possible. Wiseman’s role was not limited to his original letter to Shrewsbury. On 24 August he left Rome and arrived in London on 11 September, which was just a week before Minto’s departure. He lost no time in bringing the pope’s arguments for better relations before the British government, as well as establishing his own credentials as a reliable channel to the papacy. Immediately on arriving in London he went to the Foreign Office, where he informed the parliamentary under-secretary, Lord Addington, that he had been sent by the pope who was anxious to exchange views with the British government about ‘the affairs of Rome and of Italy in general’ and to gain support for his reforms.67 On 13 September Wiseman met Russell, and left with him a long memorandum explaining the situation in Rome and describing how Britain might assist Pius. On the same day he wrote a letter on similar lines to Palmerston.68 In his memorandum Wiseman began by describing the reform programme undertaken by Pius IX. He noted that, although the ‘ardent liberal’ party was always impatient for more, the reforms and the benign personality of the pope meant that revolutionaries no longer had a constituency in the Papal States. He stressed rather that the threat to Pius came from the conservatives who, with the support of Austria, were involved in plots against the pope. Asserting that Pius put no faith in France, he spoke of the importance of British assistance to the papacy, and observed that, as Palmerston in 1831–2 65

Wiseman to the Vatican, 30 July 1847, ASV, Archvio Segreteria di Stato, Inghilterra, rubrica 278; Wiseman to Propaganda Fide, 5 Aug. 1847, ASCPF, Acta sacrae congregationis, ccx; Norman, The English Catholic Church, 99–101. 66 William Riddell to Wiseman, 7 Aug. 1847, Wiseman papers, UCA, no. 504. 67 Addington to Russell, 11 Sept. 1847, Russell papers, PRO 30/22/6F. 68 Wiseman to Russell, 13 Sept. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 15, pp. 55–60; Wiseman to Palmerston, 13 Sept. 1847, Wiseman papers, UCA, no. 507.

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had been the most vocal in calling for reforms and that as the pope was now implementing those measures, it was only right that Britain should support him. He also insisted that direct diplomatic communication with the papacy was not illegal, as Britain had after all taken part in the Five Powers Conference in Rome in 1831 so that ‘Whatever extent of communication with the Papal government was then lawful, must be so still nor could merely the degree of secrecy then observed or the more open avowal now required make a difference in the legality of the act.’69 The law as it stood, he contended, had little to recommend it, and indeed bore the appearance almost of panic legislation; there was little threat to the Protestant Ascendancy from diplomatic contacts, and an exchange of views would be helpful to both sides. Moreover, he noted that as long as there was no papal nuncio in Britain, and official diplomatic communications had to pass through the papal nuncio either in Paris or Vienna, the situation was open to interference by the Catholic powers, Austria and France.70 Wiseman also argued that Britain’s aid to the Papal States would facilitate Italian unity, observing that ‘His Excellency added that a more active moral support from England would be of the greatest service to the progress of social improvement in Italy.’71 These were obviously powerful arguments as far as diplomatic relations were concerned, but there can be little doubt that behind Wiseman’s appeal to the government in these terms, there was obviously a religious motive, which was to obtain the government’s support for an improvement in the status of the English Catholic Church and of the English College in Rome.72 In the Vatican archives one can find a letter from Wiseman to Pius IX about his meeting with Palmerston and Russell in London on 24 September, in which he confessed to the pope that, although he had not indicated this to the British ministers, it was his intention to improve Catholic status in England that lay behind his diplomacy.73 To achieve this goal Wiseman was obliged to assert how advantageous it would be to the government for him to provide a channel for direct communications with the papacy. In his letter to Palmerston he emphasised this point, noting ‘I feel sure His Holiness will receive with perfect confidence any communication which it may please your Lordship to transmit through my means.’74 In addition to winning the British government’s confidence, Wiseman also attempted to improve his own standing with Pius by convincing him of Britain’s good intentions and again emphasising the significance of his own role. In a letter to Pius on 9 October Wiseman gave the pope a positive impression of Palmerston and of Lord Minto’s diplomatic strengths. He 69 70 71 72 73 74

Wiseman to Russell, 13 Sept. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 15, p. 59. Wiseman to Propaganda Fide, 27 Aug. 1847, ASCPF, Anglia, no. 12. Wiseman to Russell, 13 Sept. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 15, p. 60. Wiseman to Shrewsbury, 10 Sept. 1847, ASCPF, Anglia, no. 12. ASV, Archivio Particolare di Pio IX, sovrani e particolari, no. 10, 9 Oct. 1847. Wiseman to Palmerston, 13 Sept. 1847, Wiseman papers, UCA, no. 507.

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observed of the former that, ‘Palmerston seems to be the kind of person who has encouraged a positive opinion about political events in the Papal States among the other ministers in Parliament’.75 Furthermore he encouraged the pope about the prospects for anglo-Vatican relations by mentioning a letter from Shrewsbury to Russell concerning the possibility of the queen’s conducting direct diplomatic communication with the papacy.76 In respect of his own position he noted that the British government had actually referred to his original suggestions when in the process of making policy on the Papal States, and that therefore he believed that he could influence the government further on this issue. To stress the point, he informed the pope, ‘I really feel satisfied with seeing my ideas so well reflected in those of the government.’77 He also emphasised that he was fully trusted by the British government, ‘as they can be confident about my position under your sovereign, they [Russell and Palmerston] showed their confidence about my suggestion’.78 He moreover reported that Palmerston had even asked him unofficially to go to Rome to support Minto’s mission. Wiseman thus attempted to convey the British government’s positive perception of developments in the Papal States, and also to demonstrate the tremendous confidence the British government had in him. It is clear that his brief was to mediate between the two states, emphasising the pope’s intention of eliciting British support in order to improve anglo-Roman relations. Wiseman’s efforts to improve relations between Britain and the Vatican for the purpose of improving the standing of the English Catholic Church were supported by Lord Shrewsbury. In the autumn of 1847 Shrewsbury continually lobbied Minto and other interested parties to be favourable to the papacy, stressing the common interests of London and Rome and the advantages that would accrue from ‘a splendid alliance between the first spiritual and the first temporal sovereignty in the world!’.79 He also attempted to take advantage of the British government’s concern about Ireland and the influence of the Irish College in Rome by stressing that Wiseman represented the anti-Irish faction in the English Catholic Church and that the British government had much to gain from his becoming archbishop of Westminster. In the past Wiseman had had some links with the Irish cause, for in the 1820s he and Daniel O’Connell had worked together during the struggle for Catholic emancipation, founding the Dublin Review. However, over time Wiseman had become wary of the divisiveness of the Irish issue and had disassociated himself from O’Connell.80 In particular, of O’Connell’s later 75

Wiseman to Pius IX, 9 Oct. 1847, ASV, Archivio Particolare di Pio IX, sovrani e particolari, no.10. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Shrewsbury to Charles Hamilton, 4 Nov. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 128, p. 232. 80 Schiefen, Wiseman, 163–4.

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campaigns, he noted to Shrewsbury in 1847 that ‘I can see no Catholicity in the repeal movement: I fear it is thoroughly of this world.’81 Shrewsbury held similar views and recognised that this perspective on Ireland could be used to advantage when making representations to the British government.82 In making his case Shrewsbury therefore stressed Wiseman’s anti-Irish credentials by observing that the strength of feeling that the famine had aroused made it very likely that the Irish College would attempt to use its influence in Rome to torpedo Wiseman’s elevation to the archbishopric of Westminster. He therefore presented the English Catholic Church’s struggle as being broadly similar to that of the British government, and urged that there was much to gain from sponsoring Wiseman. On 4 November Shrewsbury wrote to Charles Hamilton in Florence, the brother of the British minister in the city, about Wiseman and the Irish issue and asked him to forward his observations to Minto, who in turn passed the letter on to Palmerston. In his letter Shrewsbury noted that the despatch of Minto to Rome, while a positive move, could not entirely overcome Britain’s problem and emphasised that it was enormously important to make sure that the pope should be well informed about Ireland. On this subject he observed that ‘Lord Minto may be suspected of partiality, of a one sided view of the case as a party man; still I hope he will prevail by persevering assiduously in his Mission.’ Shrewsbury explained that only Wiseman’s appointment to the archbishopric of Westminster could help Britain’s cause, for he was a worldly man used to communicating with governments and thus could counter the influence of the Irish College. He therefore contended that it was vital that Wiseman should be appointed. This would, however, not be easy, for the Irish Catholics realised the danger that Wiseman posed for them: The Irish are strong and active; we are weak and idle. Dr Wiseman’s appointment to the Metropolitan See of Westminster will be the struggle and the trial. He is presumed to be anti-Irish and as such will be assailed, in all probability by a host of Clamorous malcontents.83

Shrewsbury warned that if Wiseman lost this battle, the Irish party’s triumph would be complete and that they would use their influence in Rome to portray England as ‘a bigoted tyrant, and a ruthless enemy of Catholicity’. Moreover he underlined his point by observing that the only alternative to Wiseman as archbishop of Westminster was Bishop John Briggs, the pro-Irish vicar-apostolic of the Yorkshire District.84 He therefore argued that there was much to lose and much to gain in the battle over Wiseman’s appointment. Wiseman himself was also not averse to using the Irish issue to argue the case for the need for better anglo-Roman relations. In early December 1847 81 82 83 84

Ibid. Shrewsbury to Minto, 20 Dec. 1847, Minto papers, MS 12082, fos 105–14. Shrewsbury to Charles Hamilton, 4 Nov. 1847, ibid. MS 12081, fos 149–53. Ibid.

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he met Sir Charles Greville, the secretary to the privy council, and emphasised that the presence of a British ambassador in Rome would be the best way of curbing the extreme elements in the Irish Catholic Church. Greville duly passed on this view to Russell, whose sympathies were already moving in the same direction.85 The contribution of the English Catholics was therefore significant in paving the way for the anglo-Vatican entente. Wiseman’s importance in this period was that he provided a direct channel to the pope, thus avoiding the need to work through the papal nuncios in Paris and Vienna, and that he facilitated the development of mutual understanding. In the summer of 1847 the inconvenience of having no regular channel of communication between England and Rome had been keenly felt; by the autumn, however, this problem had to a degree been overcome. The opening of diplomatic relations? The overtures made by the pope through Wiseman, added to the growing seriousness of the situation in Ireland and the success of the Irish College in frustrating British policy, not only raised the issue of what Minto could do in the short term, but also the matter of whether it was in Britain’s long-term interests to open diplomatic relations with the papacy. This subject was avoided in the initial official correspondence about the mission, but had been discussed in the meeting between Palmerston and Wiseman and seems to have been part of the informal briefing given to Minto before he left London. On his arrival in Rome early in November Minto immediately sought guidance from Russell about how to broach this subject. His understanding was that any British minister to Rome must be a Protestant and that the pope’s representative in London would have to be a layman rather than an ecclesiastic.86 Within the British government there was some division about this matter, for while Russell agreed with Minto, Palmerston emphasised that there was no need for the pope to have a representative in London, noting that this would follow the practice in papal relations with the other non-Catholic great powers, Prussia and Russia.87 Palmerston was more sensitive than Russell to the problems that might arise from the opening of relations, which would require a bill to be passed by parliament. In particular, with Protestant opinion so outraged by the supposed role of the Catholic Church in the Irish assassinations, he feared that such legislation would meet 85

Charles Greville diary, entry for 7 Dec. 1847, in H. Reeve (ed.), The Greville memoirs: a journal of the reigns of King George IV, King William IV and Queen Victoria, vi, London 1903, 111–12. 86 Minto to Russell, 7 Nov. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 86, p. 164. 87 Russell to Minto, 17 Nov. 1847, and Palmerston to Minto, 17 Nov. 1847, ibid. i, nos 110, 109, pp. 203, 202.

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substantial opposition.88 This was of course the government’s great dilemma. It sought to use the pope to control affairs in Ireland, but in doing so it risked provoking the powerful anti-Catholic lobby in England, which was in turn so vociferous in its attitude because of its dislike of the Irish Church’s activities. This was a vicious circle that would prove difficult to break. However, before any reply could be sent to Minto, he had already discussed the subject of diplomatic relations with the pope. On 14 November he informed Palmerston that he had told Pius that if the Vatican sent a representative to London this individual should be a layman. Pius had protested that the sort of affairs that would need to be dealt with would mainly be ecclesiastical and that if an ecclesiastic was unacceptable he would make do without any representative. This, Minto noted, would probably not be displeasing to Palmerston. In the same letter Minto observed that the pope deeply regretted having caused any offence in sanctioning the critical report on the Queen’s Colleges. In this matter he claimed to have been misinformed and stated that Britain had every right to ask the Irish Catholic clergy to stay away from politics and concentrate solely on spiritual matters.89 From Minto’s letters it therefore appeared that the future of anglo-Roman relations was beginning to look distinctively promising, and the government in London was determined to build quickly on these foundations. Accordingly, on 14 December, during a discussion on Minto’s mission in the House of Lords, the lord president of the council, Lord Lansdowne, announced publicly that the government was contemplating the opening of diplomatic relations with the papacy.90 Clearly this was now a matter of some importance and urgency, for as The Times observed early in 1848, ‘The Court of Pius IX, viewed as that of a temporal Prince, is at this moment the very centre of the most important movement that has taken place in Europe since 1815.’91 In the autumn of 1847 the British government, through a curious combination of international politics and religious circumstances, became the defender of the pope’s temporal power in spite of its traditional and historical anti-Catholicism and anti-papal feeling. This unlikely event took place for a variety of reasons. At its heart was the fact that, fortunately for the Vatican, both Palmerston and British officials in Italy supported Pius’ reform programme and regarded it as an important step in the development of the Papal States and Italian nationalism. A significant element in the British attitude was a failure to appreciate fully the actual and potential danger of the reforms – the new press law and the establishment of the civic guard – even though they had been granted as a result of the radicals’ pressure upon the pope. As has been pointed out, Britain’s naïvety about the civic guard was in 88 89 90 91

Palmerston to Minto, 3 Dec. 1847, ibid. i, no. 132, p. 240. Minto to Palmerston, 14 Nov. 1847, ibid. i, no. 103, pp. 190–1. Hansard, 3rd ser. xcv. 1052 (14 Dec. 1847). Times, 18 Feb. 1848.

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part due to its hostile feelings towards Austria, which brought the British government to support the papacy after the Ferrara incident in August. This was, however, not the only issue at stake, for while diplomatic and religious studies of anglo-Roman relations have usually been kept separate, it is evident that in fact political and religious concerns were equally important and were intricately interwoven in Britain’s negotiations with the papacy. This is particularly the case with regard to the decision in August 1847 to send Lord Minto to Rome, a decision inspired by religious as well as political considerations. The nature of the link between the Minto mission and Dr Wiseman has not hitherto been recognised by many historians. On the face of it, the two men were negotiating over separate issues, but some collaboration between the English government and Italian and British religious bodies can be uncovered in Minto’s papers as well as in the Vatican archives. These documents reveal that the British government and Dr Wiseman, as a representative of the English Catholic Church, worked in parallel in Britain’s political and religious negotiations with the papacy, with one side seeking to establish formal diplomatic relations with Rome, and aiming to solve the Irish question, while the other attempted to improve the status of the English Catholic Church. Since British fears about Austrian ambitions had begun to subside by the time Minto arrived in Rome on 4 November 1847, it was the Irish issue that came increasingly to dominate British policy. Towards the end of the year the situation in Ireland was becoming a matter of great concern and Britain looked to the papacy for help, hoping that Pius would bar the Irish Catholic Church from political activities. In order to show its sincerity Britain began work on a diplomatic bill to legitimise the opening of relations with Rome. British optimism about the chances of an improvement in relations with the papacy was, however, based on a false premise. The British government failed to see that the pope was in fact being pushed into reforms which created dangerous expectations, both within the Papal States and in Italy as a whole, which he could not fulfil.

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the 1848 Revolution in Rome

4

Britain and the 1848 Revolution in Rome By the end of 1847 British foreign policy towards the papacy had a number of clear aims: to encourage further liberal reforms, to counter Austrian influence and to win papal approval of Britain’s policy towards Ireland. All of this was to be achieved by the mission of Lord Minto. However, despite her good intentions, Britain’s timing was to prove disastrous, for in 1848 revolutions broke out over almost the whole of continental Europe. This upsurge in revolutionary activity naturally affected the nature of political debate in the Papal States, for the growing demands and strength of the radicals made it far more difficult for Pius to continue with his incremental reform policy. This was not the only difficulty caused by the wave of agitation. In addition the spread of revolution over virtually the whole of the peninsula sparked a surge in Italian nationalism and opposition to the Austrian presence in Italy. This, added to Austria’s brutal attempt to suppress rebellion in its Italian possessions, led to calls for a crusade to evict the Habsburgs in which Piedmont played the leading role. The war issue was to cause grave difficulties for the pope, for it raised the question of whether Pius, as head of the Catholic Church as well as an Italian sovereign, could sanction a war against Austria. The question that faced Britain was how to deal with this changing situation and how in these circumstances to achieve the goals laid down in the autumn of 1847. It was not in British interests to see revolution in Rome, nor was there any wish to see a war in Italy that might lead to an Austro-French confrontation. Therefore British policy was to encourage the pope to pursue constitutional reform, and to attempt to force mediation between Piedmont and Austria. In addition, in order to show support for the pope and to forward British interests in Ireland it was decided to push forward with the diplomatic bill. The problem that arose with this policy was that in the revolutionary atmosphere of the Italian peninsula it proved impossible for Britain to control the course of events. Pius IX and political reform As Lord Minto made his way to Rome in the autumn of 1847 one of the key questions facing him and the papacy itself was how the political reform process in the Papal States could be carried forward safely without encouraging unrealistic hopes among the people. Due to the reforms implemented since the summer of 1846 political expectations within the Papal States had 71


begun to grow, as the pope’s lead had awakened popular hopes for a constitution and encouraged the rise of radical political movements. The pope, however, had at first no intention of going as far as to grant a constitution, for he saw the culmination of his reforms as the introduction of the consulta di stato on 14 October 1847. The consulta, a consultative assembly with no legislative powers, consisted of a cardinal, nominated by the pope, as president, a prelate as vice-president and twenty-four lay councillors. This latter element opened up the possibility for lay liberal contingents to have limited participation in the papal government.1 This was a great liberal step for the pope because previously lay participation in papal politics had not been allowed. Pius nominated Cardinal Antonelli to be the head of the consulta and hoped that it would work smoothly under his leadership.2 Pius was soon to be disappointed, for the establishment of the consulta failed to satisfy the liberals and even the councillors themselves pressed for more powers. On the advice of Antonelli the pope made a further reform; on 29 December he reorganised the council of ministers, which had originally been established in June 1847, in order to allow it a greater role in the running of the state.3 The British government gave a limited welcome to the creation of the consulta and the reform of the council of ministers and recognised them as a development of liberal politics.4 The idea of a consulta had after all been one of the recommendations contained in the reform programme of 1831. British hopes for the future were reflected in the report of Lord Minto who had arrived in Rome on 4 November 1847. On 18 November he noted enthusiastically to Lord John Russell that the establishment of the consulta was ‘a great political event’ and that its lay members were aware of the need to allow time for the body to grow in influence.5 This was a somewhat misguided reading of the situation within the Papal States, for it assumed that the pope intended the consulta to gain more power over time, whereas in fact Pius saw it as having only a strictly limited role. Minto’s optimism was a reflection of his faith in the British model of evolutionary political reform and his hope that this could be applied to the Papal States. Indeed it was to be one of Minto’s weaknesses that he consistently believed that reforms would necessarily strengthen the government of the Italian states. For example, he noted to Lord Napier, the British chargé d’affaires in Naples, on 9 December that ‘from Turin to Rome . . . the effect of the popular reforms, slight as they are . . . has been to rally round the government the great mass of sound and liberal

1 2 3

Berkeley and Berkeley, Italy in the making, 1846–1848, 321. Coppa, Antonelli, 48. D. Demarco, Pio IX e la rivoluzione romano del 1848, Rome 1961, 17; Martina, Pio IX, i. 215. 4 Coppa, Antonelli, 46. 5 Minto (Rome) to Russell, 18 Nov. 1847, in Missione Minto, i, no. 155, p. 209.

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THE 1848 REVOLUTION IN ROME

opinion, and to leave the restless faction of Young Italy in a helpless and discredited minority incapable of evil’.6 Minto’s optimism continued into late December when the pope introduced his reform of the council of ministers. On this occasion he informed Palmerston on 28 December 1847 that it now appeared that the pope had broken with the advice of the more reactionary elements within the papal administration and put his trust in Antonelli’s more moderate approach. Minto also affirmed that there was a good understanding between the government and the moderate party.7 Minto, however, began to change his views early in 1848. He increasingly felt that the present reforms would not suffice in themselves and was critical of the pope for his failure to do more. His doubts particularly surfaced when in January the pope refused to allow the consulta to make its proceedings public.8 Minto still hoped that, when events revealed that the reforms did not go far enough, Pius would have the sense to realise the need to go even further. On 16 January he wrote to Palmerston stating that the members of the council of ministers were ‘of notorious incapacity’ and that the pope needed to call upon better men.9 The political parties in Rome Minto was right to be cautious about the political situation in the Papal States, for the pope’s reforms had encouraged the political groups in Rome to become more active. Two different approaches were taken by the political parties, one constitutional and the other revolutionary, and this division could be seen in the two main political parties, the Circolo Romano, a moderate liberal party, and the Circolo Popolare, a radical revolutionary group. Both parties operated within the Papal States and also had links with broader national political networks in Naples and Piedmont.10 The Circolo Romano’s political ideas were based on Gioberti’s writings. The Giobertian moderates, such as Count Terenzio Mamiani, Francesco Orioli and Marco Minghetti, wanted to preserve the sovereign power of the papacy, but sought the introduction of a moderate enlightened government within which the pope would function as a constitutional monarch; a typically neo-Guelf solution.11 In their view it was necessary that the people should gain predominant power in the papal government and that this power should 6 7 8 9 10

Minto to Lord Napier (Naples), 9 Dec. 1847, ibid. i, no. 141, p. 251. Minto to Palmerston, 28 Dec. 1847, ibid. i, no. 154, p. 266. Minto to Palmerston, 16 Jan. 1848, ibid. i, no. 178, p. 309. Minto to Russell, 16 Jan. 1848, ibid. i, no. 181, p. 312. G. F.-H. Berkeley, Italy in the making, 1 January 1848 to 16 November 1848, Cambridge 1940, 105–12. 11 Martina, Pio IX, i. 71–2.

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then be used to promote a federation of the small states of Italy, which could be used to drive out the Austrians. Indeed the connection between moderate political parties in Rome and Piedmont was one of the key factors in persuading the pope to establish a constitution in 1848 and in building up the status of the Circolo Romano. The Circolo Popolare, the radical revolutionary Mazzinian party, included figures such as Sterbini, the prince of Canino, his secretary Dr Luigi Masi and Angelo Brunetti, better known as Ciceruacchio, who was a working-class hero in the Trastevere district of Rome. These men were all more or less Mazzinian radicals who believed that their political goals, which included the abolition of papal temporal power and the foundation of a united Italy, could be obtained through street demonstrations and popular armed uprising. They were, however, sometimes prepared to compromise, and during the early period of papal liberal reforms they believed that if Pius was successful as a liberal pope, he might be able to save the Papal States.12 1848 opened in Rome with widespread political demonstrations by the Circolo Romano as they pressed the pope to make more significant political reforms. At this stage it was this more moderate group among the Roman political parties that exerted the greatest influence.13 The existence of more radical parties such as Circolo Popolare was, however, significant, making a sharp contrast with the ultra-conservative ecclesiastical rulers. The extreme political contrasts in Rome between the radicals and the ultra-conservatives attracted Britain’s attention because the government in London feared that the radicals might be able to take advantage of the Roman people’s dissatisfaction with ecclesiastical maladministration to launch an insurrection.14 The Romagna was, in fact, already a hotbed of political discontent and insurrection within the Papal States, especially in Bologna where politically motivated crimes took place frequently, thus heightening political tensions.15 Within Rome too the political atmosphere was becoming tense. Increasingly agitators organised by representatives of the civic guard and deputies of the provinces in the Papal States demanded greater secularisation of the council of state.16 Their agitation threatened public order in the city of Rome. On 13 January Minto reported to Palmerston on the demonstrations which had taken place over the new year, noting that the ultra-liberals were engaged in ‘a good deal of active agitation . . . among the lowest classes’.17 In particular Ciceruacchio emerged as the leading orator of the revolutionary cause and pressed persistently for further political changes in Rome. 12 13 14

Berkeley, Italy in the making, Jan.–Nov. 1848, 77. Demarco, Pio IX e la rivoluzione romano, 42. Minto to Palmerston, 13 Jan. 1848, in BPSP, 1849/LVII (pt 2, Jan.–June 1848): Correspondence respecting affairs of Italy. 15 Hearder, Italy in the age of the Risorgimento, 199. 16 Hughes, Crime, disorder and the Risorgimento, 168–9. 17 Minto to Palmerston, 13 Jan. 1848, in Missione Minto, i, no. 168, p. 298.

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Minto’s initial impression of Ciceruacchio was surprisingly positive. On 19 November, in a letter to the marquis of Lansdowne, lord president of the council, he noted that ‘in Rome and its neighbourhood Ciceruacchio . . . exercises his extraordinary influence with the populace in aid of Pio Nono and for the maintenance of order’.18 He also described Ciceruacchio’s background, that he was wine tradesman and had established unbounded authority over the people, and assisted the pope, being ready to sacrifice his own interests. At this point, Ciceruacchio still supported and defended Pius IX, but only as far as the pope continued to exercise his liberal policy. Ciceruacchio’s high profile meant that he frequently became a subject of criticism in the conservative English press, such as the Westminster Review and other journals. For example, the periodical, the Quarterly Review, emphasised his humble origins and shabby appearance.19 An English traveller, Alexander Baillie Cochrane, who in 1850 produced his own record of events in Rome, also stressed Ciceruacchio’s popularity at the start of 1848. He wrote of the following incident on 1 January 1848 when the pope ventured out of the Quirinal Palace: He [Ciceruacchio] jumped up behind the Pope’s carriage, unfolded a scroll, on which was written, in large letter, ‘Have courage holy father! The people are with you!’ and amid the discordant yells, the wild enthusiasm, the licentious expression, which greeted this triumphant insolence of Ciceruacchio, the Pope fainted.20

He also noted that ‘the next morning the republican papers said he fainted for joy!!’21 Despite Minto’s personal enthusiasm for Ciceruacchio, both he and the British government tended to disapprove of the Circolo Popolare’s activities, and instead put their faith in the Circolo Romano’s political support for the pope’s liberal policy. Lord Minto made it a part of his mission to associate with the moderate liberal faction. For example, on 15 January he observed to Palmerston that the Circolo Romano was ‘a political society exercising great influence here and having amongst its members those who hold the highest station in rank or talent’.22 Minto had thus noticed that the Circolo Romano was beginning to influence the political agenda. This influence was to grow in the early months of 1848 as the issue of a constitution began to appear on the horizon.

18 19 20 21 22

Minto to Lord Lansdowne, 19 Nov. 1847, ibid. i, no. 117, p. 211. Quarterly Review lxxxv (Apr.–July 1849), 581. A. B. Cochrane, Young Italy, London 1850, 80. Ibid. Minto to Palmerston, 15 Jan. 1848, in Missione Minto, i, no. 172, p. 302.

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The establishment of the papal constitution Adding to Pius’ problems was the fact that political events in the Papal States were not happening in isolation, for much of the Italian peninsula was in crisis. The most dramatic events in early 1848 were taking place in the Kingdom of The Two Sicilies; in both parts of the state, Sicily and Naples, popular movements were demanding a constitution. Such demands automatically raised the question of how soon the pope would be faced with a similar situation and how he would react. Minto raised the issue of the agitation in the Two Sicilies with Pius IX on 23 January. When Minto stated that King Ferdinando should grant a constitution to Sicily but only introduce liberal reforms in Naples, the pope expressed his agreement. He observed to Minto that, ‘the constitution in Sicily . . . seemed inevitable, and what remained for them therefore, was to endeavour to place the Neapolitan institutions as nearly as might be in harmony with those of adjoining states’.23 The pope’s hope that the granting of a constitution would be limited to Sicily was soon dashed. On 29 January Ferdinando gave way to the people’s demands and promised constitutions for both parts of his kingdom. The British government on the whole welcomed this as a positive development, which widened the possibility of the establishment of a constitution in Rome and the other Italian states.24 On 3 February Palmerston expressed his approval of the constitutional movement, noting that ‘if it was not for fear of Austrian interference I should say the sooner they all get constitutions the better’.25 Radical opinion in Britain also applauded the constitutional revolution in Naples. On 12 February the Northern Star printed a letter from a correspondent in Italy which rejoiced at the news of the revolution in Naples and Palermo: You can have no idea of the joy and excitement threatened here. People go out for miles to meet the courier on the Via Appia and extraordinary supplements are issued hourly by the newspapers. . . . Long live the civic guard, long live the Pope, long live the men of Palermo.26

English radicals hoped that Rome would have a constitutional revolution as well, which revealed that enthusiasm for Pius among the British public was likely to be conditional on his continued willingness to advance the cause of reform. As might be expected the granting of the Neapolitan constitution on 7 February was followed swiftly by similar reforms in other Italian states. On 9 February Carlo Alberto announced his intention to introduce a constitu23 24 25 26

Palmerston to Minto, 23 Jan. 1848, ibid. i, no. 198, p. 330. R. Romeo, Il Risorgimento in Sicilia, Rome 1989, 324. Palmerston to Minto, 3 Feb. 1848, in Missione Minto, i, no. 228, p. 368. Northern Star, 12 Feb. 1848.

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tion in Sardinia-Piedmont on the model of that operated in Louis Philippe’s France. In Tuscany the grand duke Leopold II promised a constitution which was duly granted on 17 February.27 This left the question of how the pope would react. It was clear that the constitutional revolution in Sicily would have a tremendous influence upon the Papal States, inspiring the people’s enthusiasm for a constitution and presenting the pope with a choice between granting the people’s wishes or facing the possibility of revolution. To Palmerston, the solution was obvious, and on 12 February he advised Minto, who was by then in Naples, to inform the papal nuncio there that it was better for a government to introduce reforms gradually than to be forced by events to act precipitously in a way that might damage the ‘permanent harmony between the Crown and the people’.28 This comment encapsulated the British view that political evolution was the best means to achieve reform and avoid revolution. However, at this time the British style of political development was not applicable to the Papal States, as events in Rome were moving too fast for the timely deliberation recommended by Palmerston. Even as Palmerston was writing this letter to Minto, the political map of Rome was changing. Already in January the situation in Rome had become increasingly tense due to fear of an Austrian expedition to quell the revolution in Sicily. Despite the Austrian withdrawal from Ferrara in December 1847, anti-Austrian sentiment remained high, and concern about Austrian intentions led to mounting pressure for the reform of the papal army. In early 1848 the Circolo Romano lobbied the consulta to persuade the pope to reinforce the army. The consulta supported this initiative, but the council of ministers, in its new enhanced role, rejected the proposal.29 This decision led to popular unrest, for the people were convinced that clerical influence was behind the council’s decision, and in an angry demonstration on 8 February they shouted, as Petre informed Hamilton, ‘Down with the Ministers!’, ‘No more priests!’ and ‘No more moderation!’30 The Roman people’s eagerness to see military reforms was combined with their strong hostility to ecclesiastical government, and their desire to obtain a constitution.31 Their demand for further concessions from the pope was organised by the Circolo Popolare’s leaders. On 8 February Ciceruacchio, supported by the dissatisfied elements among the people, persuaded Senator Corsini to press the pope to authorise military reforms and accept more secular members in his government. Petre informed Hamilton that

27 28 29 30 31

Martina, Pio IX, 129. Palmerston to Minto (Naples), 12 Feb. 1848, in Missione Minto, i, no. 248, p. 28. Coppa, Antonelli, 47. Petre (Rome) to Hamilton (Florence), 9 Feb. 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2). Hearder, Italy in the age of the Risorgimento, 121–2.

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Before night-fall, thousands in regular order, and amongst them hundreds of civic guards, not in uniform, but wearing their military greatcoats, began to collect on their way to the Piazza del Popolo, where they said they would await the answer of His Holiness, to be delivered to them by the Senator. Ciceruacchio here told them that if the answers were unfavourable, they must take the affair into their own hands.’32

In order to soothe the hostility of the people towards the papacy, Pius promised Corsini that he would consider further reforms. Corsini then reported to the waiting crowd that the pope had decided to introduce greater secularisation of ministerial and other offices and that he was prepared to consider defence treaties with the other Italian states.33 On 10 February Pius fulfilled his promise and issued a declaration expressing his support for military reform and his acquiescence in the introduction of more lay persons into the council of ministers. He added an ambiguous comment about his support for the Italian cause. His call for ‘God to bless Italy’ has been a matter of debate ever since, some observers believing that the pope had given his benediction to the cause of Italian nationalism. However it is important to note that when he discussed the condition of Italy his wording was very careful. What he said was that one of the greatest benefits for Italy was that it had at its core the papacy, which meant that in times of trouble Italy could look for its defence not only to the Italian people, but to Catholics world-wide.34 He observed in his proclamation that A great gift of heaven is this amongst the many by which it has favoured Italy; that hardly three millions of our subjects should have two hundred millions of brothers of every nation and of every language. This was in far other times, and in the overthrow of the whole Roman world, the safety of Rome. For this the ruin of Italy was never total.35

In other words the pope’s rhetoric was designed primarily to emphasise the importance of papal temporal and spiritual power to Italy and to defend his own authority. On 11 February the pope, in front of a large crowd in the Piazza Quirinal, gave a vague hint that he might be willing to consider further constitutional reform, and on the next day he reformed his government by allowing three lay ministers to take positions within the administration. Advocate Sterbinetti was made minister of public works, Count Pasolini, deputy for Ravenna, was made minister of commerce, and Don Michelangelo Gaetani, prince of Teano, became minister of the police.36 32 33 34 35

Petre to Hamilton, 9 Feb. 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2). Ibid. Martina, Pio IX, i. 199–200. The pope’s proclamation of 10 Feb. 1848 was forwarded by Petre to Hamilton on 11 Feb. 1848: BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2). 36 Petre to Hamilton, 13 Feb. 1848, ibid.

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There is some controversy about whether the pope made these concessions as part of his liberal policy, or whether he was forced to do so. Berkeley considers that Pius’ liberal programme had ceased by the end of 1847, and that the further concessions he made in 1848 were therefore due to the pressure of events and increasing agitation in Rome.37 Coppa, however, paints a picture in which it seems that the pope and Antonelli still held some of the political initiative.38 Martina goes even further and asserts that the introduction of secular ministers was a genuine part of his reform process, because he was deeply influenced by Gioberti and liberal Catholicism.39 The view of the British government at the time very much supports Berkeley’s interpretation. There seems to have been little belief in British circles that the pope was in control of events, although some felt that he might be wise enough to grant sufficient reforms to avoid revolution. From Naples Minto reported to Palmerston on 19 February that his information was that, ‘enough would be done by him [the pope] (and that is not a little) to secularise and liberalise the constitution of his government sufficiently to satisfy the country’.40 Palmerston was, however, doubtful and observed to Minto on 24 February his fear that the pope was now out of his depth, describing him as ‘the poor Pope’, and observing that ‘Events have gone too fast for such a slow sailor as he is.’41 A detailed study of the events of early February would support the conclusion that the pope’s actions were not at his own initiative but were in reality the accomplishment of Ciceruacchio and his Circolo Popolare. Certainly Petre felt that the demonstration of 8 February was the most threatening that had yet taken place.42 However, it does seem that following this agitation the pope and Antonelli decided in mid-February that it was necessary to take back the initiative by convening a commission of cardinals to consider a constitution. Coppa notes that the constitution that followed was largely the work of Antonelli and that he considered that such a step was essential if a revolution were to be avoided.43 A constitution was finally introduced in March. On 6 March Senator Corsini had an audience with the pope and asked for the establishment of a representative government in the Papal States. Pius IX accepted this demand, ordered that all papal ministers should resign and that a new administration should be formed to oversee the promulgation of the constitution.44 On 10 March Pius appointed Antonelli as secretary of state and thus presi-

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

Berkeley and Berkeley, Italy in the making, 1846–1848, 328. Coppa, Antonelli, 47. Martina, Pio IX, i. 198. Minto to Palmerston, 19 Feb. 1848, in Missione Minto, ii, no. 267, p. 58. Palmerston to Minto, 24 Feb. 1848, ibid. ii, no. 276, p. 76. Petre to Hamilton, 8 Feb. 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2). Coppa, Antonelli, 48. Idem, Pope Pius IX, 76.

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dent of the council of ministers and head of the new government. This was a significant choice. It indicated that Pius realised that he needed a safeguard to protect his position while at the same time satisfying the Roman people’s request. He therefore sought security by appointing a new government that contained both ministers whom he could trust and ministers who were popular among the Roman people. He believed that Cardinal Antonelli, whose political skills and loyalty were beyond doubt, was vital to the administration. Under Antonelli a ministry of seven laymen and three clerics was formed.45 Moderate lay figures took over many posts within the government, for example Luigi Carlo Farini became the deputy minister of the interior and Marco Mingetti the minister of public works. Following this, on 14 March, the constitution was officially promulgated.46 The pope had thus made a careful choice; he had reinforced his own authority by appointing Antonelli, but at the same time had gone some way towards satisfying the people by raising the number of secular ministers from three to seven. There was, however, a danger in this, for the process of expanding the power of the liberal parties inside the government threatened papal authority. The Roman constitution and the crisis of papal temporal power It might seem at first sight that the constitution was intended as a genuinely liberal gesture designed to open a new chapter in the history of the Papal States. To an extent this was the initial impression given to both the Roman people and to the British government. However, it was not long before the Roman people and the British government realised its limitations. To assess the pope’s intentions in introducing the constitution it is necessary to look at its terms. The new constitution was a carefully contrived document that was formulated in such a way as to protect much of the pope’s power. In its preamble, the pope declared that he had abandoned his first idea of a consultative chamber and, like neighbouring sovereigns, wished to establish a meaningful legislature. Under the new constitution, there were to be two chambers, besides the College of Cardinals: a council, whose members were to be nominated by the pope for life, and a chamber of deputies with one deputy for every 30,000 people. The franchise was strictly limited to those with wealth or in the professions. Under this system, the College of Cardinals was to be constituted as a senate inseparable from the pope, and would continue to advise him on ecclesiastical matters. The two deliberative councils were established to pass laws and deal with secular affairs, such as budgetary issues and treaties of commerce. They were, however, prohibited from 45 46

Ibid. Abercromby (Turin) to Palmerston, 15 Mar. 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2).

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discussing any issue that might encroach upon the pope’s spiritual power. Article xxxvi of the constitution stated that ‘the councils can never propose any law, 1. Which regards ecclesiastical or mixed affairs, 2. Which is contrary to the canons or the discipline of the church, 3. Which tends to vary or modify the present status’. In addition, Article xxxviii stated that ‘All discussions on the foreign diplomatic-religious relations of the Holy See are prohibited in the two councils.’ With regard to ‘mixed matters’ the councils would be consulted but would not be allowed to propose legislation.47 In Rome popular reaction to the new constitution was somewhat critical because of the safeguards for the pope and the restrictions placed upon secular ministers. These various measures were clearly designed to prevent the pope’s concessions over his temporal power from affecting his position as head of the Church, and were thus subject to vigorous contention. In time they would lead to major confrontation between the people and the pope.48 The liberal parties were also upset that under the constitution political rights were given only to Catholics and that complete freedom of religion was not allowed. In short, the new constitution failed to satisfy those who wanted to see the Papal States become a constitutional monarchy.49 There was even a suspicion among liberals in Rome that the new chamber of deputies would remain very exclusive, and would be dominated by ecclesiastical interests. Petre observed to Hamilton on 22 March 1848 that initially the new constitution was well received but that once the people realised the intention of article xxxvi they demanded its modification.50 Petre did not, however, envisage that Roman disappointment would necessarily lead to renewed agitation, for as he noted to Hamilton on 20 March ‘the Romans are not so wild as the French and if the Pope knows how to manage them we may go on quietly for a while’.51 Just as the Roman people could see the problems with the constitution, so, after some reflection, were its limitations apparent to British representatives in Italy. Minto, on hearing that the pope had proclaimed a constitution, was initially enthusiastic. He noted to Palmerston on 21 March that he was glad that the pope had announced the constitution, and that ‘we may begin to cry Viva Pio IX again, which was rather getting out of fashion’.52 However, when Minto travelled to Rome in mid-April for his last meeting with the pope his enthusiasm was blunted. He found that the pope was struggling to defend his authority and was opposed to anything that might threaten his spiritual power. Minto wrote to Palmerston on 13 April that the Pope . . . himself attaches wonderfully little value to his temporal sovereignty, except as it may serve his spiritual supremacy. . . . And it is his desire to 47 48 49 50 51 52

Martina, Pio IX, i. 199–217. Ibid. 218. Coppa, Antonelli, 50. Petre to Hamilton, 22 Mar. 1848, FO 43/43. Petre to Hamilton, 20 Mar. 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2). Minto to Palmerston, 21 Mar. 1848, in Missione Minto, i, no. 320, p. 153.

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be recognised as supreme head of the Catholic Church and not as sovereign – that is at the bottom of all the difficulties he now makes.53

Although the pope could not separate his temporal power from his independence as head of the Church, the British government did not sympathise with the distinction that Pius was keen to make between the position of the pope, who was both a sovereign and a religious leader, and other temporal princes. Minto had already indicated in an earlier conversation with Pius on 23 January that ‘the separate interests of the Church’ should not interfere with civil administration or ‘good government’. Minto had on this occasion told the pope that in Britain Ecclesiastical affairs are conducted by ecclesiastics, and if the Queen interferes with them . . ., it is only as head of the Church. Why should not the same separation exist here, the Pope retaining his position as head of the state.54

Pius’s protection of his own powers suggested, however, that he had not followed Minto’s advice and that he still put the interests of the Church before the state. Pressure on the pope for war against Austria The establishment of a constitution in the Papal States coincided with dramatic events elsewhere. On 22 February a revolution broke out in Paris leading to the collapse of Guizot’s government and the flight of Louis Philippe to England. On 13 March revolution spread to Vienna, bringing about the fall of Metternich, and this was followed on 18 March by insurrection in Milan and then by revolt in Venice on 22 March. On 24 March, encouraged by this revolutionary atmosphere, Carlo Alberto declared war against the Austrian empire, declaring that the God who had delivered ‘Pio Nono’ would now set Italy free. Against this turbulent background the establishment of a constitution in Rome had implications at both the international and domestic levels. On the international level, Pius’ granting of a constitution meant that the pope himself posed a challenge to Austrian absolutism, and it was believed by many that he would now be willing to be the leader of an Italian federation in a war against Austria. On the domestic level, the constitution raised the important issue of whether the pope would be able to declare war against Austria or not. Over the coming months this issue was to divide the papal government; the high council, which consisted of ecclesiastical ministers,

53 54

Minto to Palmerston, 13 Apr. 1848, Minto papers, MS 12072. Minto to Palmerston, 23 Jan. 1848, in Missione Minto, i, no. 199, p. 333.

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consistently set its face against the war, while the council of deputies, which consisted of secular ministers, enthusiastically supported the idea.55 As noted above, the political situation within the Papal States had already been influenced by the rise of anti-Austrian sentiment, and Pius had hired some Piedmontese officers to lead the army. In addition, events in the early months of 1848 had led to the revival of the idea of an Italian League formed from Tuscany, Piedmont, the Papal States and Naples. As early as 3 November 1847 the first three of these states had agreed to a customs union but in early March attention began to be focused on a defensive alliance, which would also include Naples. However, the Piedmontese declaration of war against Austria changed the nature of the debate, for it meant that if the pope now agreed to federation it would automatically lead him into conflict with Austria.56 With the victories of Piedmont against Austria at Goito on 8 April and at Pastrengo on 30 April, the political movement for independence from Austria gathered force in all the Italian states, and particularly in the cities of Milan and Venice. Britain’s expectation was that Rome and Tuscany would probably participate in the war against Austria that had already been launched by the Piedmontese. However, for the pope to wage war against Austria was not as simple as Britain believed. Although there was now more enthusiasm among the states for completing the Italian League, it was difficult for Pius to provide military assistance to Carlo Alberto, despite the fact that his ministers pressed him to declare war, as did the Piedmontese officers who controlled the army. On 23 March one of these officers, General Giovanni Durando, was appointed supreme commander; although Pius did not entirely approve of him, Durando was supported by his Piedmonte Albertini colleagues in Rome and the Circolo Romano.57 The issue of the pope’s participation in the war against Austria was complicated by the existence in Rome of the moderate liberal group, which had a direct link to the pro-war faction in Piedmont. As mentioned above, the political activities of parties like the Circolo Romano and the Circolo Popolare were aimed at Italian independence from foreign domination as well as the dissemination of liberal ideals in the Italian peninsula. These groups were concentrated in Rome but were connected with similar factions throughout Italy. The Piedmontese therefore had no doubt that the pope could be persuaded to collaborate in the war against Austria.58 Indeed the Piedmontese felt that, in order to pursue a successful war against Austria, they needed Roman military forces and the pope’s support as a spiritual leader. The pope was thus faced with a terrible dilemma. On 27 March Petre 55 56 57 58

Petre to Hamilton, 23 Mar. 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2). Martina, Pio IX, i. 226. Ibid. 230. P. Pirri (ed.), Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato, I: La laicizzazione dello Stato Sardo, 1848–1856, Rome 1944, 1–2.

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informed Hamilton that in his opinion ‘The Die is cast. His Holiness will be called upon to proceed with energy in giving his countenance and assistance to the “Crusade”, if he does not the very existence of the government will be placed in great jeopardy’.59 The outcome of the war policy clearly depended upon Pius, but every option had its own problems. If he tried to halt the army, there would be revolution in Rome, and yet if he proclaimed war he might only encourage revolution among his Catholic subjects throughout most of Italy. Moreover, while as a temporal ruler sympathetic to an independent Italy, the pope might be thought to welcome the outbreak of a war against Austria, he could not forget that his first responsibility as the head of the universal Church was to defend its independence and preserve intact the powers of the pontiff. He also could not ignore the fact that Austria itself was a Catholic country. Therefore, for religious reasons, he hesitated to implicate himself in a war which the Piedmontese had initiated and whose course they largely controlled. Matters came to a head when on 22 April Durando actually crossed the frontier of Lombardy. Seven days later, on 29 April 1848, Pius issued his famous allocution, which stated that he could not declare war against the Austrians.60 This came as a crushing blow to people throughout Italy, who considered that war against Austria, without the pope’s approval, was not practicable. The allocution seemed to demonstrate that the pope’s major concern was to secure the unity of the Catholic Church. There is some controversy surrounding the pope’s refusal to sanction the war. Coppa has argued that the pope was more enthusiastic for the Austrians to leave Italy in 1848 than is usually realised, even though he would not countenance the idea that he might himself go to war with Austria.61 Martina argues that the pope was in a dilemma, but still wanted to remain the Italian liberal national leader.62 The fairest assessment seems to be that the outpouring of nationalist sentiment in 1848 raised serious problems for the heads of the various Italian states, and that their attitude was ambiguous and dependent upon the degree to which they – the pope, the king of Naples, the grand duke of Tuscany – were in the grip of revolutionary forces, or, as in the case of Carlo Alberto, feared a revolution.63 As with Carlo Alberto’s decision to go to war, Pius’ allocution proved to be a crucial turning-point for both Italy and himself, for in one declaration he revealed that the hopes of the neo-Guelf party were in vain. From this point only two paths lay open if Italy was to achieve its independence – unity under the House of Savoy or republicanism. For Pius himself the repercussions were 59 60

Petre to Hamilton, 27 Mar. 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2). Petre to Hamilton, 30 Apr. 1848, enclosed in Hamilton to Palmerston, 3 May 1848, ibid. 61 H. Hearder, editor’s foreword to Coppa, Origins, p. vii. 62 Martina, Pio IX, i. 225–54. 63 Hearder, editor’s foreword, p. viii.

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to lead to the long-drawn-out haemorrhaging of his regime that would end in his flight from Rome in November. The pope’s attitude towards war was not just of great interest to Italians for it also affected the policy of the British government. Palmerston’s hope once the northern Italian war broke out, and particularly following the battle at Goito, was that the Austrians would accept their defeat in Lombardy and Venice and withdraw from Italian territory.64 This would avoid the possibility of France’s entry into the conflict and would allow Austria to remain as a great power. On 28 March Palmerston observed to Minto that Austria should withdraw from Lombardy and Venice because the loss of northern Italy would not be a substantial setback for her. His hope for Italy was that a commercial and political confederation could be formed similar to that which existed in Germany.65 However, the pope’s allocution undermined this policy, for it threatened to abort the development of the Italian nationalist movement and risked provoking the people’s anger thus creating the danger of further destabilising revolutions. This was certainly the opinion of Abercromby, who warned Palmerston on 4 May that the pope’s allocution had dealt a heavy blow to the cause of Italian unity and that it might lead to the overthrow of his temporal and ecclesiastical power.66 Thus, just as Italian nationalists turned away from the pope, the allocution marked the moment when Britain began to see Pius as less important and instead concentrated its attention and favour on Piedmont. As Britain feared and anticipated, Pius’ allocution provoked a number of insurrections and disturbances on the part of radical political factions in the city of Rome, increasing the tension between the war party and the pope. The power of the clubs and political societies, which were eager for a conflict with Austria, from this point increased both outside and within the Roman government. In particular the radical Circolo Popolare, which had exercised significant pressure on the pope to grant liberal political concessions ever since the beginning of 1848, grew in importance and its revolutionary fervour deepened. The political chaos resulting from the allocution was first reported by Petre when he wrote to Hamilton on 29 April that the possibility of appointing a provisional government to carry on the war was being discussed openly.67 In fact throughout the three days following the allocution, Rome was in a state of great agitation, and the papacy only just succeeded in avoiding a revolution. The slide towards chaos began when the Antonelli

64 A. E. Ashley, The life and correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, London 1876–9, ii. 83. 65 Palmerston to Minto, 23 Mar. 1848, in Missione Minto, ii, no. 333, p. 171. 66 Abercromby to Palmerston, 4 May 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2). 67 Petre to Hamilton, 29 Apr. 1848, ibid.

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ministry resigned, observing that it could no longer be responsible for maintaining order given the public mood.68 The resignation of Antonelli was important in a number of ways. One significant fact was that, as Antonelli was the head of the ecclesiastical ministers, his resignation discouraged other ecclesiastics from taking office, and indeed, as Coppa notes, many cardinals now fled Rome.69 In addition, the fall of the Antonelli ministry had the effect of exacerbating the tensions that already existed in Rome following the pope’s allocution. The level of the people’s anger began to rise dangerously, threatening the security of the city. On 1 May a meeting was held at the Palazzo Teodoli by the Circolo Popolare, which called for the creation of a provisional government and for the pope to be deposed. The following day the Circolo Popolare’s campaign peaked, when it and the civic guards, under the general leadership of Ciceruacchio, took military action together. The whole city was caught up in revolutionary violence, and the civic guard was turned into a political body in order to establish a provisional government. Now the Circolo Popolare was not a potential, but a real revolutionary threat. The fear of a revolution was expressed by Petre to Sir George Hamilton on 2 May when he reported that the cardinals were being watched over by guards in their houses, and that some were not allowed to proceed to the palace when summoned by the pope.70 An extraordinary situation had now come about; the cardinals were virtually hostages of the civic guard and the Circolo Popolare, which threatened to exert its influence over the secular and the ecclesiastical ministers. The Circolo Popolare appeared to have power within its sights, and it was clear that the result of such an outcome would be for the pope to be relegated to being a mere bishop of Rome. Sterbini now openly demanded a government without cardinals as ministers, the consequence of which could only be the erosion of the pope’s power. The only means by which revolution could be avoided was for the pope to reach an accommodation with the Circolo Romano, which still adhered to its original position of advising the pope to enter the war. In fact the Circolo Romano, under the influence of Count Mamiani, who had emerged as one of the leaders of the moderate faction, on 1 May presented the pope with its own petition which asked for entry into the war against Austria. The pope finally realised that he had little alternative but to invite Mamiani to join a new ministry as the minister of the interior and to accept his terms, which were that the policy on Italian unification should continue and that the Foreign Office should be divided into two parts in order that secular and

68 69 70

Hamilton to Palmerston, 8 May 1848, ibid. Coppa, Antonelli, 58. Hamilton to Palmerston, 2 May 1848, FO 79/132.

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ecclesiastical affairs could be deal with separately, the latter remaining in the hands of the cardinals.71 The crisis in Rome was a matter of great concern to the local British representatives. On 1 May Freeborn reported to Napier that Rome was in ‘a most serious and alarming state’ and concluded that ‘the Pope’s temporal power is gone’. Napier forwarded this letter to Admiral Sir William Parker, the commander-in-chief of the mediterranean fleet, and added that he had heard rumours that the pope intended to abdicate and had asked for sanctuary in Naples. Parker was disturbed by this news and on his own initiative ordered HMS Sidon to proceed to Civitàvecchia where it was, if the pope should flee Rome, ‘to receive under the protection of the British Flag His Holiness the Pope and entertain him with that respect due to his exalted office‘.72 Although this gesture was in the end not needed, it was significant that the British government’s usual hospitality towards exiled monarchs was extended to the pope. This would be the first in a series of politically-motivated visits by British ships to Civitàvecchia during 1848. In addition, events attracted the attention of the British press. On 9 May The Times lamented this ‘revolting instance of popular ingratitude’ and declared that the people of Rome had proved unworthy of the pope’s enlightened reforms.73 The political crisis in Rome came to an end, at least for an interval, when Mamiani agreed to the pope’s offer and took office as war minister and minister of the interior in a government nominally led by Cardinal Altieri. Laymen filled most of the other ministries, including that for secular foreign affairs, although the president of the council of ministers was still a cardinal.74 The ultra-liberal nature of these new appointments clearly brought the pope’s temporal power into question. On the surface it appeared that Pius and Mamiani might work in harmony to establish a new government in Rome. However, a huge gulf existed between them, as their political ideas were profoundly different. The new government came increasingly under Mamiani’s control, for the new administration formed by the political parties and the clubs tended to act without the pope’s sanction, while previously his approval had been necessary to conduct any political proceeding. From this point Pius appeared to be a constitutional monarch, but while he had lost much of his temporal power his spiritual power remained intact. Pius was supported in his desire to retain his power by a number of loyal followers, of whom the most important was Cardinal Antonelli. As Coppa argues in his book, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, after Antonelli’s resignation Pius still consulted the cardinal, who was appointed to head the congregation for extraordinary ecclesiastical affairs. Although no longer part of the govern71 72

Hamilton to Palmerston, 6 May 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2). Freeborn (Rome) to Napier, 1 May 1848; Napier to Sir William Parker, 3 May 1848; Parker to Admiralty, 11 May 1848, PRO, ADM 1/5588. 73 Times, 9 May 1848. 74 Coppa, Pope Pius IX, 85.

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ment, Antonelli remained in the confidence of Pius and, as Coppa notes, ‘unexpectedly, Antonelli’s position as private counsellor made him more powerful than he had been while the head of a constitutional ministry’.75 Coppa supports this view by stating that it was Antonelli’s suggestion that Mamiani replace him as effective head of the papal government on 3 May 1848. Antonelli also played a significant role in encouraging Pius to write on 3 May 1848 to the Austrian emperor calling upon him to recognise the national existence of the Italian people and proposing that the papacy mediate a peace between Austria and Sardinia.76 According to Antonelli, the fact that the pope found it difficult to participate in the war did not necessarily mean that he had to oppose Italian nationalism. Thus the pope could call upon Austria to give up its domination over northern Italy, which was based ultimately on force, even though he could not support a lay minister who was eager to fight Austria. However the pope’s plan to mediate did little to appease the Italian people. Nor was the British government convinced that papal mediation would work. Abercromby’s opinion was that the political division between Pius and ‘the Roman people’ was now so easily recognisable that the pope could not act as a serious mediator, for even if he tried to act as a neutral channel, the problem was that he could not control the military activities of the Papal States.77 Indeed, the situation in Rome was so bad that in late May Count Lützow, the Austrian ambassador, decided to leave the city and was given passage on the British ship, HMS Locust.78 Faced with the pope’s inability to mediate, Palmerston decided that Britain must take this role upon herself. This was particularly important, for by early May the foreign secretary had evidence that French troops were massing along the Alps.79 Mamiani’s endeavour to conciliate the pope and his ministers Relations between Pius and his ministry were strained by the pope’s failure to mediate, for the lay ministry still pursued a policy of war against Austria and rejected Pius’ view that Italian unity could not be achieved through conflict. In addition, disagreements over the role of the civic guard increased tension in Rome. Pius’ position was becoming increasingly untenable. The pope and Mamiani clashed in particular over the issue of the position of the foreign minister. Mamiani insisted that the foreign minister should be a layman, at least for secular affairs, while Pius was afraid that a layman might involve him in war. In addition he was concerned because the whole of the 75 76 77 78

Idem, Antonelli, 58. Hamilton to Palmerston, 4 May 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2). Abercromby to Palmerston, 1 May 1848, ibid. Lieutenant-Commander Edward Power (HMS Locust) to Parker, 24 May 1848, ADM 1/5588. 79 Palmerston to Abercromby, 8 May 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2).

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pontifical diplomatic service, the Nuncio, consisted of cardinals or other churchmen and nearly all its business was related to ecclesiastical matters.80 Clearly the Catholic Powers could not accept that the Nuncio would be taken over by the lay officials of the Papal State, as these officials would have to act as the accredited representatives of the Catholic Church all over the world. On 5 June, the day on which the first parliament was opened, the confrontation between Mamiani and the pope came to the fore when Cardinal Altieri, the pope’s representative, gave a speech to open parliament which made no mention of the government’s programme. Mamiani reacted to this by drawing up his own speech which, with the pope’s reluctant approval, he delivered to parliament on 9 June. In his speech he referred to the pope’s proper position in regard to the Italian cause as being that of a mediator. However, some passages in his speech certainly did not reflect the views of the pope; in fact it seemed that the programme of Italian independence, which was a justification for war, was being advanced in the pope’s name but without his approval.81 In parliament Sterbini and Canino, the leaders of the Circolo Popolare, were demanding even more radical policies than Mamiani on issues such as changing the constitution, going to war, the civic guard and the lay foreign minister.82 In his reply to the deputies on 10 July the pope defended his authority and that of his ecclesiastical ministers and protested against the destruction of papal authority by the political parties.83 The situation within the Papal States became even more complex when, on 17 July, Austria began a brief reoccupation of Ferrara. This event once more threw Rome into disarray. On 18 July Pius tried to win back some support by issuing a formal diplomatic protest to Vienna against the Austrian occupation, which was also distributed to the other European powers. Mamiani and the pope agreed over this but the pope’s action did not satisfy the radicals. On 19 July the Circolo Popolare, supported by the radicals in the civic guard, broke into a meeting of the council of deputies and presented a petition demanding that the civic guard be allowed to occupy the city gates.84 Faced with increasing disorder, Britain lost any hope it had that Mamiani could reconcile secular and ecclesiastical powers, or maintain papal authority even in name. It was clear that Mamiani’s ministry had failed to preserve order, and Petre was forced to report in his letter of 22 July that ‘In a country

80 81 82

Martina, Pio IX, i. 217. Hamilton to Palmerston, 27 June 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 2). S. J. R. Graham, Vatican diplomacy: a study of Church and State on the international plane, Princeton 1959, 138–40. 83 Petre to Hamilton, 27 June 1848, enclosed in Hamilton to Palmerston, 1 July 1848, in BPSP, 1849/LVIII (pt 3, July–Dec. 1948): Correspondence respecting affairs of Italy. 84 Petre to Palmerston, 22 July 1848, ibid.

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where there is not a remnant of authority, nor of military discipline, it is impossible to foresee what may happen from day to day.’85 It was at this point, with Roman politics once more thrown into crisis, that news arrived of the Piedmontese defeat at the hands of Austria on 25 July at the battle of Custoza. Shortly afterwards Pius wrote a letter of sympathy to Carlo Alberto, but this was not enough to satisfy the radicals, who wanted action rather than words.86 This was particularly the case in early August when Austrian troops advanced to seize Bologna. The radicals now urged Pius once again to commit himself to war, but the pope’s response was to appeal to the great powers and to announce his reliance on ‘Divine Justice’, which constituted just one more feeble answer to the calls of his people. His position was weakened even further after the final resignation of Mamiani and his colleagues. The new administration, led by Count Fabbri, was clearly little more than a caretaker government. The Papal States looked increasingly unstable. Meanwhile Palmerston reacted to the Piedmontese defeat at the battle of Custoza by continuing to try to persuade Austria that the best course of action was for it to pass control over Lombardy to Carlo Alberto. To his pro-Austrian critics in Britain, such as Queen Victoria, it appeared that Palmerston now saw Piedmont as a favoured client state. However, Palmerston’s support for Piedmontese control over northern Italy was not a matter of sentiment, but rather one of how to stabilise the status quo. He was convinced that if Piedmont’s claims were not satisfied it would turn to France for armed support, which was the last thing that he wished to see. Moreover, he saw that a strengthened Piedmont would be able to act as a buffer to French expansion more convincingly than a weakened Austria. Palmerston thus clearly saw Piedmont as the key state in Italy, but only for very practical reasons. In contrast, by the late summer of 1848, the pope had become virtually insignificant as a political figure.87 The failure of the diplomatic bill with the papacy While the dramatic events that took place in the Italian peninsula in the first seven months of 1848 had clearly diminished the political importance of the pope as a figure in the national movement, the British government was throughout this period still trying to open diplomatic relations with the Papal States. The pope, after all, might have been steadily losing his prominence in 85 86

Ibid. C. Baudi di Vesme (ed.), La diplomazia del regno di Sardegna durante la prima guerra d’indipendenza, II: Relazioni con lo Stato Pontificio (marzo 1848–luglio 1849), Turin 1951, ii. 216 (2 Aug. 1848). 87 D. Southgate, ‘The most English minister’: the policies and politics of Palmerston, New York 1966, 228–31.

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Italy, but he was still the head of the Catholic Church. As noted in the previous chapter the issue of the opening of diplomatic relations with Rome had its roots in Wiseman’s advice to the British government in the summer of 1847 and had been discussed by Minto and the pope in November of that year. Following Lord Lansdowne’s statement in December 1847 on the government’s intention to open relations with the papacy, Russell moved quickly to prepare legislation for parliament’s approval and debated with his ministers who among the diplomatic corps would best be suited to service in Rome.88 The diplomatic bill to restore formal relations with the papacy was introduced for the first time in the House of Lords on 7 February 1848.89 It was unusual for parliament to pass legislation on the opening of diplomatic relations as this was a royal prerogative, but the government felt that in this case the complex and controversial legal ramifications meant that it was necessary to get the legislature’s approval. Russell did not envisage that the bill was likely to face serious opposition, but the debate in the House of Lords saw the raising of some important issues and objections.90 The bill finally passed on 28 February with two amendments attached. The first, introduced by the duke of Wellington with the government’s approval, reconfirmed the sovereignty of the queen and stipulated that Britain was only opening relations with the ‘Sovereign of the Roman States’.91 In justifying this approach the duke observed on 18 February that the words ‘Sovereign of the Roman States’ should be used instead of ‘Sovereign Pontiff’ as the diplomatic bill was intended to open political rather than religious relations, between the two states. Wellington’s amendment was acceptable to the government and passed by a large majority.92 This amendment, however did not go far enough to satisfy the opposition members of the house, and a further amendment was proposed by Lord Eglintoun which would expressly prohibit the pope from sending an ecclesiastic to London as his diplomatic representative.93 The motive behind this amendment was to ensure that the pope would only be able to send a lay diplomat rather than a papal nuncio. This argument won some prominent supporters. On 18 February the former foreign secretary, Lord Aberdeen, noted that the religious responsibilities and pre-eminent diplomatic rank of a papal nuncio would cause embarrassment. He warned that a papal nuncio had to be an archbishop, and as such he would have influence over the Catholic Church in the country to which he was accredited, and concluded 88 Russell to Clarendon, 29 Dec. 1847, Clarendon papers, Department of Modern Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford, box 43. 89 Hansard, 3rd ser. xcvi. 169 (7 Feb. 1848). 90 Russell to Clarendon, 8 Feb. 1848, Clarendon papers, box 43. 91 Hansard, 3rd ser. xcvi. 1688 (28 Feb. 1848). 92 Ibid. 875–6 (18 Feb. 1848). 93 Ibid.

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with the statement that, ‘with the power which he would possess, and that dignity, rank and precedence which we could not refuse him, it would be by no means desirable to receive him in this country’.94 Even though discussions between ministers in the autumn of 1847 had already demonstrated their clear opposition to the appointment of an ecclesiastic, Russell opposed this amendment. He did so on the grounds that the amendment would formally introduce restrictions on relations with the pope rather than allow for a private diplomatic agreement. As Russell noted to Clarendon on 14 February such a clause ought ‘not to be put into the Act of Parl, as it would be affronting to the Pope’.95 Moreover, as one supporter of the government observed, the clause was unnecessarily provocative because the papacy was not in the practice of sending nuncios to non-Catholic states.96 The Times also opposed the amendment by dismissing the idea that relations with Rome would facilitate a surge of Catholic propaganda into the country.97 However, when put to the vote on 19 February the amendment passed by a very narrow margin as the House of Lords felt that it was necessary to reassure the general public that there would be no danger to the state. Once the bill was passed in its amended form it was put to one side, because of the problem of whether it would be unacceptable to the pope with Eglintoun’s amendment attached to it. The amendment presented the government with a major dilemma, for it was clear that the opening of relations would be an important step in the drive to use the pope to control Ireland. Minto’s mission to Rome had already achieved a small success for British policy in Ireland. In January 1848 Minto had persuaded Pius IX to pass a rescript to the Irish hierarchy which criticised their involvement in political matters. The British government was much encouraged by this move. On 9 February Lord Clarendon congratulated Minto noting that ‘the letter of enquiry which the pope at your suggestion addressed to the archbishops is excellent, and perfectly well suited to its object’. He also said that it was satisfactory to Dr Crolly and Dr Murray, and a great discouragement to MacHale.98 Following this, on 26 February Minto, who was now in Naples, urged Petre in Rome to keep up the pressure on Pius IX over Ireland, and subsequently on 5 March Petre informed the pope that the British government was very grateful for his action.99 There was therefore the hope that this development could be built upon. Indeed it appears that during Minto’s visit to Naples in the winter of 1848, it was proposed that his place in Rome

94 95 96

Ibid. 881. Russell to Clarendon 14 Feb. 1848, Clarendon papers, box 43. Henry Greville diary, entry for 10 Feb. 1848, in Viscountess Enfield (ed.), Leaves from the diary of Henry Greville, London 1883, 216. 97 Times, 18 Feb. 1848. 98 Clarendon to Minto, 9 Feb. 1848, in Missione Minto, ii, no. 242, p. 12. 99 Minto to Petre, 26 Feb. 1848, ibid. ii, no. 277, p. 77; Petre to Minto, 5 Mar. 1848, no. 294, p. 109.

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should be taken by the governor of Malta, Richard More O’Ferrall, a wealthy Catholic landowner from Country Kildare and one of the leading Irish Whigs, who would be able to brief him on the government’s view of the situation in Ireland.100 It was clear, however, that it would be difficult to achieve further progress over Ireland and other issues if there were problems over the diplomatic bill. The highest echelons in the government were divided about what to do next. Russell and Clarendon were tempted to fight back against the amendment because they feared that it would wreck plans for better relations with Rome. On 24 March Russell expressed his concern about the bill to Minto and observed that it was important to find out how far the pope resented Eglintoun’s amendment. He feared that Pius would not accept the bill in its present shape because it would be offensive to him.101 He also noted that until the situation was clear, ‘We shall hang up the bill for the present.’ In a further letter to Minto on 28 March, Russell observed that if the pope did object to Eglintoun’s amendment ‘we may try to alter it, but I have some doubts of our success’.102 Palmerston, however, favoured retaining the amendment. He told Clarendon on 9 March that if a papal nuncio were appointed to London I am convinced by my diplomatic experience that there would be no end to the embarrassments and inconveniences which we should suffer from having a Roman priest invested with diplomatic privilege holding his court in London, surrounded by English and Irish Catholics and wielding a power of immense though secret extent and capable of becoming an engine of political intrigue to serve all kinds of foreign interests. . . . As for the idea that we could manage the Irish priests by means of a Roman priest in London, I am convinced that the presence of such a man would only have given the Irish priests an additional means of managing us.103

Moreover, Palmerston felt that the government stood no chance of rescinding the clause if it put the bill before the House of Commons, for it could only argue against Eglintoun’s argument by stating that Britain would be prepared to accept a priest as the papal envoy, which was clearly not the case.104 Palmerston therefore took a very tough line, and supported his argument by noting that the pope was presently under pressure to secularise his government and that the amendment therefore fitted the current political mood in Rome.105 Implicit in his thinking was that the pope was in a weak position and that he needed Britain more than Britain needed him. 100 101 102 103 104 105

Shrewsbury to Clarendon, 27 Feb. 1848, Clarendon papers, box 58. Russell to Minto, 24 Mar. 1848, in Missione Minto, ii, no. 325, p. 157. Russell to Minto, 28 Mar. 1848, ibid. ii, no. 157, p. 172. Palmerston to Clarendon, 9 Mar. 1848, Palmerston papers, GC/CL/1362. Palmerston to Clarendon, 18 Mar. 1848, ibid. GC/CL/1363. Palmerston to Clarendon, 9 Mar. 1848, ibid. GC/CL/1362.

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The original sponsors of the anglo-Roman rapprochement, Wiseman and Shrewsbury, were not so complacent, for they were aware that Minto’s arrival in Rome, the British denunciations of the Irish clergy for encouraging assassinations and the pope’s warning against political activities had led to a fierce counter-attack from the Catholic Church in Ireland. Even before the pope’s strictures against the clergy’s involvement in politics a group of Irish and pro-Irish English bishops, including Briggs, had in December 1847 sent a letter to Pius warning him that England was still inherently anti-Catholic. The pope’s warning in January 1948 confirmed their fears about Minto’s influence and in response the nationalist elements in the Irish Church despatched another letter refuting the British government’s accusations and prepared to send a delegation including MacHale and Briggs to Rome. In addition, during Minto’s absence from Rome, the Irish College under the leadership of Cullen attempted to use its influence over Propaganda Fide, as well over the Jesuits, to argue against Britain’s case.106 Shrewsbury and Wiseman believed that in the face of this powerful Irish onslaught Britain could not afford to alienate Pius by insisting on a conditional opening of diplomatic relations. On 22 March Shrewsbury warned Clarendon that the restrictive clause of the diplomatic bill has produced a very unfavourable impression on the Roman government and which has been taken advantage of by the Repealers to prove the insincerity of ministers. I believe it quite certain that if the bill passes as it now stands, it will be altogether abortive, for the Pope cannot, even if he would, subscribe to his own humiliation.107

He followed this by writing to Palmerston on 1 April, informing him that the pope desperately needed British support in order to resist the ‘retrograde party’, but that he would only turn to Britain if diplomatic relations were opened on terms acceptable to him. In this regard he warned that ‘It is surprising how much English influence has lost, and the English character been depreciated in Rome by that fatal clause of Ld Eglintoun’s.’108 Wiseman had a similar impression of affairs. On 6 March 1848 he told the English College in Rome that he had heard at second-hand that the pope ‘would not receive any minister if Britain could not have an ecclesiastic nuncio in London’.109 Shrewsbury’s pleading was, of course, not enough to impress the British government, who knew that he was hardly an unbiased observer of affairs. More reliance was put on Minto who in mid-April, having finished his duties in Naples, set off on his return journey to Britain via Rome. On 12 April he 106 107 108 109

Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 102–10. Shrewsbury to Clarendon, 22 Mar. 1848, Clarendon papers, box 58. Shrewsbury to Palmerston, 1 Apr. 1848, Palmerston papers, GC/SH/158. Wiseman to Shrewsbury, 6 Mar. 1848, ASV, Archivio Segreteria di Stato, affari ecclesiastici straordinari, sezione per i rapporti con Inghilterra, posizione 54, fo. 24.

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discussed the diplomatic bill with the pope. The conversation revealed that the pope was totally opposed to diplomatic relations being opened on the terms stipulated by the bill in its current state. Minto observed in a letter to Palmerston of 13 April that the pope said that establishing diplomatic relations under such terms would not be possible because ‘it was contrary to all usage that one government should prescribe to another the class of person from whom its representative might or might not be selected – and that in this case the exception taken was peculiarly offensive and unreasonable’.110 Minto tried to placate the pope by reminding him that in a previous conversation he, Minto, had made it perfectly clear that Britain could not accept an ecclesiastic as a representative, and therefore that Pius should not be so sensitive about Eglintoun’s amendment. The pope dismissed this argument and, in a comment that sheds light on his understanding of the anti-Irish intentions of the British government, said that with ‘the object of our intercourse bearing chiefly on religious interests he could only confine them to Ecclesiastical hands’. Minto denied that this was Britain’s sole purpose, and replied that the opening of relations was necessary due to the confused state of Europe. In regard to the future Minto informed Palmerston that the pope had stated that it would be better to abandon the bill for the present.111 After this conversation the future of the opening of diplomatic relations was clearly in disarray, although the government could not publicly admit this. When on 14 May Russell was asked in the House of Commons about the diplomatic bill all he could say officially was that it was the government’s intention to seek relations with the papacy, but that at this time the legislative load in the House of Commons was too great to allow for the discussion of such an important issue.112 This excuse might have had some truth in it, particularly given the perilous state of Ireland, but it is difficult to believe that the pope’s opposition was not the major factor. Despite the problems raised by the pope’s attitude, the British government still desired to open diplomatic relations, in large part because of the continued problems in Ireland. In particular, there was concern about the renewed efforts of MacHale to press the pope not to accept the British government’s proposals for the Queen’s Colleges.113 In this regard Clarendon, with the support of Daniel Murray, the Catholic archbishop of Dublin, had decided to send Francis Nicholson, the archbishop of Corfu, to Rome to present the government’s case to the pope. The government in London sought to take advantage of Nicholson’s intended visit by using him as a channel through which to assure the pope of their continuing support. On 6 June Palmerston wrote to Normanby that he should inform Nicholson, who at this point was still in Paris, that he was to tell the pope that the reason for 110 111 112 113

Minto to Palmerston, 13 Apr. 1848, Minto papers, MS 12072. Ibid. Hansard, 3rd ser. xcvii. 855 (14 Mar. 1848). Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 116–18.

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delaying the bill was that the government had to attend to pressing domestic issues, but that it would still be brought forward later in the parliamentary session. Palmerston also asserted that Nicholson should tell the pope that, ‘our friendly sentiments towards him remain unchanged and we take as great an interest as ever in the prosperity and welfare of his government’.114 Nicholson was happy to pass this information on to the papal authorities. On 19 June he sent a letter to Lord John Russell expressing his appreciation of the British government’s good intentions towards the pope, and informed the prime minister that he had told the papal nuncio in Paris of the British government’s interest ‘in the independence of Italy and of its anxious desire for the permanent union of the temporal and spiritual authority of the Sovereign Pontiff’.115 The use of Nicholson as a channel for presenting Britain’s good intention to the pope was in reality only a form of flattery. Palmerston’s real view on the future of the diplomatic bill was revealed in a letter to Russell on 20 July. This letter was written in response to advice from a number of moderate Catholics, presumably including Wiseman and Shrewsbury, that the government should try to change the Eglintoun amendment. Palmerston noted to Russell that as the present papal government had become entirely secularised there was no need to fight to preserve the bill’s ecclesiastical character. Moreover, he observed that The truth is that all the arguments used to induce us to try to reverse the decision of the Lords are in diametrical contradiction with the arguments upon which we propose the bill. We ask Parliament to allow diplomatic relations with a Temporal Sovereign and these Catholic correspondents say we must have an ecclesiastic because the Pope will only send us a minister in his capacity of head of the Church. We cannot argue the matter on such grounds, consistently either with our own reasons, or with the oaths we have taken at the Table.116

This was a considerable shift from the government’s previous position and is interesting not only in displaying optimism about the future of anglo-papal relations but also in its reading of events in Rome. What this letter reveals is that the British government’s enthusiasm for the development of a system based around a liberal pope, which had strengthened after the establishment of a constitution in March, had led it to underestimate how much papal power still existed. The British government failed to comprehend the limits of secularisation, and in particular ignored the fact that the reform of the diplomatic apparatus of the Papal States was strictly limited. The pope had fought hard to defend his original stance that no concession should be made which in the slightest degree touched upon his 114 115 116

Palmerston to Normanby, 6 June 1848, Palmerston papers, GC/NO/461. Francis Nicholson to Russell, 19 June 1848, Russell papers, PRO 30/22/7c. Palmerston to Russell, 20 July 1848, ibid.

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spiritual power, and that no change should be attempted which transferred his power to a secular authority. In the eyes of the pope, the foreign office could not be secularised since the functions of the nuncios were not only diplomatic but also religious. As the pope’s foreign representative, a nuncio could not divide his spiritual and temporal roles. The people’s demand for the secularisation of the Foreign Office was therefore inconceivable to the pope, and therefore he rejected anything resembling a policy-making function for the secular council since this would have been a violation of the rules of spiritual power.117 It seems, however, that Palmerston, basing his views on reports from Petre and Freeborn which stated that the pope’s absolute temporal power had come to an end, failed to realise that Pius, in order to maintain his spiritual power, had fought hard to defend his diplomatic prerogatives. Regarding the status of the pope, the British government’s belief was that the pontiff now acted as a constitutional monarch in Rome as well as the spiritual leader of the Catholic Church, and that political reform in the Papal States had led to the secularisation of the papal administration. This was a naive simplification that failed to recognise the true nature of the crisis facing the Papal States, which was that, although the pope could liberalise the administration of his temporal possessions, he could never go far enough to satisfy the people without compromising his leadership of the Catholic Church. British hopes that the pope’s spiritual and temporal powers could be separated ignored the fact that any such separation would fatally undermine papal authority, reducing the pope’s role to that of ruler of a small provincial state in Italy rather than of the entire Catholic world. Indeed the fact that the pope was so determined to protect his spiritual power made it even more likely that he would reject the opening of relations with Britain on the latter’s terms. This was not just an abstract argument, as the problems that arose from the pope’s spiritual authority were already apparent in the debate about war with Austria. Moreover, the idea that Britain could open relations with the pope as the ‘Sovereign of the Roman States’ was misconceived and hypocritical in that the main intention was to use the pope’s spiritual power to help British interests. After all it was largely the fact that the pope had 200 million Catholic subjects all over the world that persuaded Britain to open diplomatic relations, rather than prizing the pope as the ruler of the Papal States in the Italian peninsula.118 For the opening of relations to have any real benefit to Britain it had to recognise papal temporal and spiritual power, which contradicted the idea that these two functions could be separated. The fact that the British government acted as if the pope were already a constitutional monarch was not only an interesting comment on British perception of events within the Papal States, but was also fatal to the success 117 118

176.

Martina, Pio IX, i. 211–18. London to Vatican, 8 May 1848, ASV, Archivio Particolare di Pio IX, ogetti vari, no.

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of the policy of opening diplomatic relations. Perhaps, however, it was understandable in late July and early August, when Pius was being challenged by both the radicals and the Austrian army, for Palmerston to have imagined that the pope had no choice but to accept the diplomatic bill. It was not until 17 August that Lord Palmerston presented the bill to the House of Commons. As one might expect a number of issues in anglo-papal relations that had been aired over the last two years were used to justify this dramatic move. In his first speech, for example, Palmerston said that the opening of diplomatic relations would benefit British commerce and referred specifically to Britain’s interests in developing a railway system that would traverse the Papal States. This was not, as some contemporaries noted and indeed later historians have contended, an insignificant matter. It was clearly useful, as Palmerston insisted to the house on 17 August, for Britain to obtain more rapid communications with India by acquiring railway transit rights through the Papal States.119 In addition it was a common understanding during the debate that the bill was, like Minto’s mission to Rome, intended to help the British government to use the pope’s authority to curb the activities of the Irish clergy. Many backbenchers referred to Ireland in the Commons debates and indeed many Irish MPs opposed the bill because they suspected the government’s intentions. The government, however, never admitted officially that this motive existed, although it was undeniably in the background. Palmerston also justified the bill by referring directly to the contemporary situation within the Papal States. He emphasised that it was the secularisation of the papal administration in the summer of 1848 that had led the government to accept Eglintoun’s amendment. At the committee stage of the bill on 25 August Palmerston observed to the house that the government in Rome was constitutional and secularised, apart from the Office of Foreign Affairs which was still ecclesiastical, and that it was hoped that the lay advisers of the pope would recommend the appointment of a lay noble man as the Roman government’s representative to Britain.120 The flaw in the British government’s perception of the pope’s position was recognised by all strands of Catholic opinion. By this time the Catholic lobby in England had organised itself to protest against the Eglintoun amendment, and both Shrewsbury and Lord Arundel had produced pamphlets warning against the provision that the papal nuncio to the court of St James could not be an ecclesiastic.121 However, while Shrewsbury, Wiseman and other English Catholics disapproved of Eglintoun’s amendment, they agreed that it would be possible to support the legislation, viewing it as at least a means of improving the status of English Catholics. Their view of the bill was 119 120 121

Hansard, 3rd ser. ci. 203 (17 Aug. 1848). Ibid. 521 (25 Aug. 1848). F. Nielsen, History of the papacy in the nineteenth century, London 1906, 186–204; Reynolds, ‘Politics vs. persuasion’, 372–93.

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supported in August by some moderate Catholic MPs, such as Mr M. Power and Sir H. W. Barron, who also argued against the amendment although they were in the end willing to vote for the bill. Power stated on 24 August that, ‘He was himself a Roman Catholic, and he would not hesitate to tell the pope, that though he owned him obedience in spiritual matters, he would exercise independently the rights of conscience on all civil question.’122 The most significant warning during the debate came, however, from an Irish member of the House of Commons, John O’Connell, the son of Daniel O’Connell, who had inherited leadership of the Irish repeal movement from his father. He said on 24 August, knowing that the British government intended to control the repeal movement through direct diplomatic relations with the papacy, that the British government wished to bribe the papacy in order to control the Irish clergy, but that ‘the Sovereign Pontiff would thrown back their bill with contempt’.123 Opposition to the bill not only came from Catholics who considered that it did not go far enough, there were also a number of Protestant MPs who considered that, even with the Eglintoun amendment, the bill went much too far. Some of the speeches in the debates revealed a fundamental distrust of papal motives and fear that the very fabric of British society was at stake. For example, Richard Spooner, the MP for North Warwickshire, told the House of Commons on 25 August that Britain had for too long agreed to make concessions to popery and insisted that to accept the bill would be ‘a further and most dangerous step in dereliction of the Protestant religion’.124 However, despite the complaints of the anti-papal faction and O’Connell’s warning that the pope would not accept relations on Britain’s terms, the diplomatic bill passed through the House of Commons with a healthy majority. The future of diplomatic relations now rested with the pope. That the matter lay with the pope might have led to some optimism, because by the time the bill passed his position was weaker than ever and the chance of his needing to call upon British support consequently higher. This was evident from one of the most important outcomes of Nicholson’s mission. In late July Nicholson had finally arrived in Rome and in a meeting with the pope handed him a copy of Palmerston’s declaration of 11 June.125 During their conversation Nicholson learned that the pope was deeply worried about the situation in Rome and that he wanted the British to send a ship to Civitàvecchia in order to guarantee his security. On learning this Nicholson wrote to More O’Ferrall at Malta suggesting that Britain should meet the pope’s request. He told O’Ferrall that ‘The Pope cannot make such a request at least at present but you may be quite sure that your complying with my request will make him grateful to the British govern122 123 124 125

Hansard, 3rd ser. ci. 500 (24 Aug. 1848). Ibid. 495. Ibid. 519 (25 Aug. 1848). Nicholson to Palmerston, 16 May 1849, FO 43/44.

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ment and to you.’126 O’Ferrall promptly sent a letter to Admiral Parker, who on 21 August ordered HMS Bulldog to proceed immediately to Civitàvecchia. Parker gave Commander A. Cooper Key, the officer in charge of the ship, instructions that he was ‘to receive the Pope on board for conveyance to any port in the Mediterranean, should commotions occur which might make it advisable for His Holiness to take refuge in one of Her Majesty’s ship’.127 Key arrived at Civitàvecchia on 24 August and through Nicholson’s good offices it was arranged for him to have an audience with the pope the next day. At this meeting Key emphasised Britain’s regard for the pope and stated that Admiral Parker had ‘sent the Bulldog with the idea that the person of HH [His Holiness] – of such importance to the peace of Europe – was in danger and that she might afford him a refuge’. The interview went very well and the pope informed Key that he had only asked unofficially for assistance as he was afraid that a formal request through Petre would have aroused suspicion in Rome.128 News of Key’s visit to Rome and his favourable reception by the pope might well have encouraged the British government to believe that the pope would accept diplomatic relations along the lines of the diplomatic bill. In addition there was other evidence to suggest that, despite the Eglintoun amendment, the opening of diplomatic relations might be possible. On 8 September Hamilton informed Palmerston that he had received many messages from the pope through the papal nuncio in Florence, which included the fact that ‘that he wished to have me as the English Representative at Rome’.129 However, there was still an active lobby in Rome that opposed the presence of a British minister. In April, following Minto’s interview with the pope, MacHale had arrived with the vicar-apostolic of Yorkshire, John Briggs, to petition the pope to reject Britain’s overtures. They stressed in particular that the British terms for opening diplomatic relations were an insult to the pontiff and the Catholic Church. In the summer of 1848 pressure was maintained by the members of the Irish College. The result was that the British decision to sanction the opening of relations with Rome met neither with acceptance nor rejection from the papacy. The British government, however, acted as if progress was possible and continued to try to devise means of using the pope to calm the situation in Ireland. In particular Russell decided in the summer of 1848 to propose a new policy for Ireland under which the British government would pay the wages of the Irish clergy and provide funds for the maintenance of church property. This was a controversial move and was opposed by those close to MacHale, who saw it as an attempt to silence and pacify the anti-English priesthood. 126

Nicholson to Richard More O’Ferrall (Malta), 11 Aug. 1848, Russell papers, PRO 30/22/7d. 127 Parker to A. Cooper Key (HMS Bulldog), 21 Aug. 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVIII: Italy (pt 3). 128 Palmerston to Russell, 27 Aug. 1848, Russell papers, PRO 30/20/7d. 129 Hamilton to Palmerston, 8 Sept. 1848, Palmerston papers, GC/HA/126.

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Once again it was felt by the British government that the pope’s assistance could be useful, even though the papal nuncio in Vienna had warned against such a policy in 1847. Russell prepared a memorandum for the pope which explained the benefits for the Church of this new policy. The memorandum assured the pope that ‘No interference with the spiritual independence, or ecclesiastical arrangement of the Roman Catholic Church is in contemplation.’130 It also explained that the measure was being introduced because the government believed that the poverty of the Roman Catholic clergy in the southern part of Ireland made it desirable that the government should provide some kind of relief to them to maintain their chapels.131 Once the wording had been agreed between Russell and Palmerston the memorandum was translated with great care by the foreign secretary into Italian, as Palmerston believed that the pope had little understanding of the English language. He proposed to Russell on 27 October that the term ‘memorandum’ should not be used and that instead it should be replaced by the world ‘proposition’. He also observed to the prime minister that it would be wise to avoid leaving any copy of the British proposal with the Vatican: I should be inclined to think that it would be best that the memorandum should be read to the Pope as often as he may think necessary to engrave the contents on his memory, but that no copy should be left with him. If given him it might find its way back into the English newspapers prematurely and do harm.132

However this plan, like the diplomatic bill itself, was stillborn, for the pope was too involved with maintaining his own authority in Rome to worry about external affairs.133 In addition to this new proposal Britain also kept up its pressure over the Queen’s Colleges. During the autumn of 1848 Nicholson continued to act as a conduit for the expression of the British view to the pope, and he himself felt that Pius trusted him and that he had been able to achieve some success.134 However, here too it was difficult to make any real progress, because of the skilful way in which the Irish College wielded its influence in Rome. Thus the pope could not be persuaded to reverse the criticism that he had made of the colleges in the previous autumn.

130 131 132 133 134

Russell memorandum, Oct. 1848, Russell papers, PRO 30/20/7d. Palmerston to Russell, 27 Oct. 1848, ibid. Ibid. See Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars?’, 175–95. Nicholson to Carlo Bussi, 24 Oct. 1848, ASV, Segreteria di Stato, affari ecclesiastici straordinari, sezione per i rapporti con Inghilterra, posizione 55, fo. 25.

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The postponement of the hierarchy Just as decisions over the future of diplomatic relations and of Ireland were suspended due to deteriorating conditions in Rome, so was the matter of the re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy. Although Wiseman and Shrewsbury had expressed great hopes for their plans in the autumn of 1847, the following year saw only slow progress made in this area. In part this was because it was a laborious administrative business, but in addition their fortunes were not helped by the fact that English Catholics could hardly rely on their own Protestant government to lobby on their behalf, and that they themselves were burdened with internal divisions. The situation by the autumn of 1847 was that Propaganda Fide was in favour of the re-establishment of the hierarchy and had in November drawn up draft apostolic letters nominating bishops to sees in England. This indeed had been reported, without comment, in The Times.135 Delays, however, had then occurred. In part these were due to the feeling in Rome that Wiseman was too junior to take up the position of archbishop of Westminster and that he did not have solid enough roots within the English Church as he had spent so much of his career in Rome. In addition there was some concern about the reaction of the British government.136 Another problem was that this period saw important divisions within the English Catholic Church. As is evident from the fact that Briggs joined MacHale in his mission to Rome to protest about the British government’s condemnation of the Irish Catholic clergy, the English Catholic Church was deeply divided over Ireland. Shrewsbury and Wiseman represented the faction that supported the British government’s coercive measures, but they were opposed by those, such as Briggs, who believed that the government was still deliberately discriminating against the Irish Catholics because of their religion. The leading mouthpiece for the latter view was the Catholic periodical, The Tablet, which was edited by an English Catholic, Frederick Lucas. For Wiseman and Shrewsbury The Tablet was an embarrassment, for its pro-repeal views revealed the divisions within the English Catholic Church and were hardly likely to make the British government or even the papacy favourable to the hierarchy.137 The correspondence between Wiseman and Shrewsbury in 1848 indicates the scale of their concern. For example, on 7 March Shrewsbury wrote to Wiseman that the recent dissension in English Catholic ranks over Ireland meant that ‘we shall be in as serious a state as they are in Ireland – the clergy against the laity and all divided amongst ourselves’.138 Making the matter worse were rumours that Wiseman had intimate links with The Tablet and 135 136 137 138

Times, 27 Oct. 1847. Norman, The English Catholic Church, 101. On F. Lucas and The Tablet see ibid. 192–3. Shrewsbury to Wiseman, 7 Mar. 1848, Wiseman papers, UCA, no. 914.

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agreed with the opinions it expressed. Ironically it was this rumour that led to Minto’s only involvement in the hierarchy issue while he was in Rome, for early in January 1848 he received a letter from Shrewsbury’s priest, Father Conolly, criticising Wiseman for his alleged link with The Tablet, and thus opposing his appointment to the see of Westminster. Minto reluctantly passed this information on to Cardinal Ferretti, but made it clear that this was only for information and that he had no opinion on the subject.139 Wiseman knew that these rumours existed and felt that they would damage his cause. He therefore endeavoured to clear his name by writing in early February to Monsignor Santucci, the under-secretary of state, asking him to inform Ferretti that he had ‘no connection with The Tablet’.140 Concern about the divisions over Ireland and, moreover, their abiding fear of the power of the Irish College was what led Shrewsbury and Wiseman to continue in the spring of 1848 to try to use the British government to further their cause. Notwithstanding the tensions that existed, work on the hierarchy did continue. In May 1848 Bishop William Ullathorne, vicar-apostolic of the Western District, was sent to Rome to assist Propaganda Fide in drawing up plans for the hierarchy. The result was that on 17 July the commission of cardinals approved the scheme, but before anything further could be done events were overtaken by the burgeoning political crisis in Rome.141 However, even if the papacy had moved to establish the hierarchy at this point, it would in all likelihood have led to a crisis as bad as that which eventually developed in 1850–1. Signs that this was the case were evident when the diplomatic bill was discussed in the House of Commons. On 17 August 1848, when the bill was read for the second time, Sir Robert Inglis, a prominent anti-Catholic, raised the issue of the pope’s ecclesiastical intentions towards Britain, such as the establishment of archbishoprics. Russell’s response was to categorically deny that the bill would allow any papal interference in Britain’s affairs, and he informed the house that he would not consent to the formation of new dioceses.142 This statement made it clear that any hopes that the English Catholics had of the British government were misplaced. 1848 thus promised at its start to see a marked change in the nature of anglo-Vatican relations, with both the opening of diplomatic relations and the re-establishment of the hierarchy on the agenda. During the year progress was made on both these issues, but this proved to be a slow process due to the political problems that afflicted the papacy. However, in the autumn of 1848, as revolution came to Rome, all the progress that had been made turned to dust.

139 140 141 142

Minto to Palmerston, 16 Jan. 1848, Russell papers, PRO 30/20/7d. Wiseman to Cardinal Vincenzo Santucci, 5 Feb. 1848. ASCPF, acta, ccxi. Norman, The English Catholic Church, 102. Hansard, 3rd ser. ci. 220 (17 Aug. 1848).

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The pope’s flight from Rome After Mamiani’s failure to pacify the people or to end the conflict between ecclesiastical and lay power, the radicals intensified their political attacks, and ‘republicanism’ began to emerge as a serious force. The pope, fearing that his authority might be overthrown, was therefore obliged to nominate a new interior minister in order to defend his position. The new minister was to be elected from the liberals, and the intention was to choose a moderate who would protect papal and ecclesiastical interests. The man chosen by the pope to fill this role in September 1848 was Pellegrino Rossi, who was more conservative than Mamiani. Rossi saw his position as that of a minister defending papal temporal power. He had once supported the revolutionary cause, but, after some years in exile in France, had become sceptical of radical and revolutionary rhetoric. While in France he had established a friendship with Guizot, and this had led to his appointment as French ambassador to Rome in 1845, but after the February Revolution in Paris he had become persona non grata with the French republican regime.143 Once in Rome as French ambassador, Rossi had acted as an unofficial adviser to Pius IX, who learned to trust his opinions. On 22 September, when he took office as minister of the interior, Rossi announced that his policies would be based on the existing constitution and that the safeguards for the ecclesiastical ministers would be preserved. In foreign affairs Rossi negotiated with Piedmont over a new idea for a ‘confederation’, which had been proposed by the Abbé Rosmini Servati on 4 August.144 Talks did not, however, go well, because Rossi’s ideas about Italian national unification differed from those proposed by Piedmont. He was opposed to war with Austria and was suspicious of the idea of a political association on Piedmont’s terms, which would have led to a military league of Tuscany, Piedmont and Rome. Rossi’s own views were dismissed by Piedmont, which condemned Pius and accused him of betraying the Italian cause. Most federal nationalists were against Rossi’s foreign policy, because his scheme said nothing about nationality. Also people who were eager for a war to free Italy from foreign occupation hated Rossi because his policy was principally based upon peace. In domestic affairs Rossi used his influence, especially in financial and military matters, to preserve the temporal power of the papacy. In order to remove the revolutionary elements from the Roman Cabinet, he abolished the ministry of police and placed it under the minister of the interior; this allowed him to get rid of Galletti, the minister of the police and a radical republican, and his two ex-Carbonari subordinates.145 With Rossi in control it 143 144 145

Coppa, Pope Pius IX, 87. Idem, Antonelli, 60. Berkeley, Italy in the making, Jan.–Nov. 1848, 399.

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appeared that Pius had finally found a figure who could bring stability to the country. However, as Rossi’s power increased so did the opposition to his policies. Due to his programme of eliminating all the radicals and republicans from the Cabinet, and his disagreement with Piedmont over the confederation, Rossi only succeeded in antagonising the secular political opposition. In addition, his commitment to maintaining the pope’s liberal reforms meant that he was unable to win the support of ecclesiastical conservatives. Rossi’s political position as a moderate suggested that he might have been able to reorganise the papal administration along the lines of English constitutional government. Indeed the British government hoped that Rossi would be able to reconcile papal authority with a liberal political system through reform. In retrospect this was too optimistic for, as the English traveller Alexander Baillie Cochrane noted, ‘he had not sufficiently studied the characters of the papal government or of the Roman population’. It seems that as far as Cochrane was concerned, Rossi’s ability and talent as a moderate minister might have enabled him to achieve his liberal political reforms in a secular state, but in the context of Roman politics, where the secular existed alongside the ecclesiastical, they were doomed to failure.146 On 8 October, motivated by the new revolutions in Vienna and Hungary, Sterbini and his supporters called for the north Italian states, Tuscany, Sicily, Rome and Naples to unite in a national confederation to attack Austria. Pius, however, with Rossi’s support, fundamentally disagreed with this idea. As a result Sterbini and his colleagues decided to bring about Rossi’s fall from power and began to renew their agitation.147 On 12 November Rossi was informed of a plot to take the pope prisoner and proclaim a republic, and he was thus forced to use the carabinieri to maintain order. On 14 November Rossi attempted to use argument to silence his critics and in an article in the Roman Gazzetta he referred to ‘Italian independence’ as nothing more than an ‘episodia’ and called upon the carabinieri to be loyal to their sovereign.148 However, his efforts to control the situation proved to be insufficient. On 15 November Rossi was murdered. The circumstances are still controversial, particularly whether Sterbini was involved in the plot. It is, however, clear that his death was a turning-point in the history of the Papal States. Petre particularly was upset by Rossi’s death, for he had invested considerable hope in his abilities as a realistic reformer. Petre observed to Hamilton on 16 November that it was obvious that Rossi’s murder was the work of a particular party rather than an individual. He lamented that ‘Rossi’s death is an irreparable loss – he was the only man in Italy fit to rescue . . . things to order both in government and Finance – Talent is not wanting in Italy but

146 147 148

Cochrane, Young Italy, 221–9. Coppa, Pope Pius IX, 88. Petre to Palmerston, 16 Nov. 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Italy (pt 3).

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there is a total absence of . . . experience’. He concluded sadly that ‘Rossi’s death seems to satisfy the liberal mad caps’.149 Cochrane too wrote in sadness in 1850 when he recalled Rossi’s murder, noting that The seeds of the Christian religion were nurtured with the blood of martyrs; the blood of Rossi had left an indelible stain on the city of the church; but we must hope that from his blood may spring men fit and able to guide its destinies.

In his opinion, this tragic and horrible incident should not be forgotten, and represented one of the most dishonourable events in the history of Rome. Cochrane exhorted his readers to remember that Rossi was ‘a bright example of self sacrifice’ who ‘would redeem the errors of a Christian people’.150 He realised that Rossi was the last hope for a compromise between the conflicting secular and ecclesiastical interests. However, Rossi became a victim of the radical Mazzinian party in Rome, whose political tenet was that ‘Violence could be used for the liberation of the people’.151 Cochrane believed that these radical political parties in the Papal States were nourished by the Roman people’s discontent with the corruption of the ecclesiastical politics. Such an explanation reflected British antagonism to the pope’s temporal power as well as to the Catholic Church. After Rossi’s death, Pius was abandoned by all his ministers, because without Rossi it was difficult to take prompt action to stem the flood of revolution. Pius tried vainly to retain his temporal power but he was now faced with irresistible pressure from the Circolo Popolare, which had the support of the civic guard. On 16 November the deputies demanded the formation of a new government that would declare war against Austria. With the support of the Swiss Guard the pope tried to resist, but it was hopeless. On 17 November Pius was forced to accept a new administration led by Rosmini and Sterbini, with Galletti as the minister of the interior. On the following day the Swiss Guard, the traditional defenders of the pope, was disarmed and sent away, and the civic guard was put in charge of security at the Quirinal Palace.152 As the city of Rome was placed under the control of the Circolo Popolare, Pius no longer had any legal authority and the government was left in the hands of the radical party. British representatives in Italy were horrified by these events, not only because of concern for the position of the pope who had lost his final defender, but also because of fear for the consequences for the Italian peninsula. Parker’s reaction to the ‘atrocious assassination’ of Rossi was on 149 150 151 152

Ibid. Cochrane, Young Italy, 241–7. Mack Smith, Mazzini, 9. F. J. Coppa, ‘Papal Rome in 1848: from reform to revolution’, Proceedings of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750–1850 (1979), 92–103.

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19 November to send HMS Bulldog to Civitàvecchia once again in order to provide the pope with refuge if this should be necessary.153 His offer to provide passage was delivered by Petre to the pope, but was declined. Hamilton reported to Palmerston on the same day that the catastrophe in Rome was strongly felt and that the influence of the war party there was very likely to spread to Tuscany.154 Fear of the prospect of further revolution and of renewed war against Austria was echoed by Abercromby in Turin. He noted to Palmerston on 22 November that the confusion which prevailed in Italy would probably lead to a renewal of war with Austria, with possibly deleterious effects for an already weakened Piedmont.155 The pope’s flight and its impact The pope was now confined to the Quirinal Palace and considered himself a prisoner. In this situation he felt that he could no longer remain in Rome. A ministry which had emerged against his wishes sought to impose a programme that conflicted with his beliefs. The pope also feared that the anti-Austrian sentiments of the new government could provoke a schism in the Church. In these conditions he realised that the wisest plan was to leave Rome. Already several states, including Britain, had offered him passage or sanctuary, and he decided that the best course of action was to cross the border into Naples, and set up his residence at Gaeta. He escaped from Rome on 24 November with the assistance of the French, Bavarian and Spanish ambassadors, and some days later issued a statement from Gaeta explaining his flight. Moreover he called upon the great powers to come to his assistance, even to the extent of writing personally to Queen Victoria. In his letter of 4 December he observed rather pathetically that we do not in the least doubt that, in conformity with your exalted magnanimity, your justice, and your known desire to maintain order in public affairs, you will by no means suffer this same to be wanting to us at this most lamentable time.156

At this point, however, it was France that seemed more likely to come to the pope’s aid: a French expedition to Civitàvecchia was being openly discussed.157 Within Britain the pope’s dramatic departure was widely and extensively reported in the press with a number of different opinions being expressed. The Times was sympathetic to the pope’s situation. On 27 November it emphati153 154 155 156

Parker to Petre, 19 Nov. 1848, FO 43/42. Hamilton to Palmerston, 19 Nov. 1848, BPSP, 1849/LVIII: Italy (pt 3). Abercromby to Palmerston, 22 Nov. 1848, ibid. Pius IX to Victoria, 4 Dec. 1848, in A. C. Benson and Lord Esher (eds), The letters of Queen Victoria, 1837–61, II: 1844–1853, London 1908, 205. 157 Scott, The Roman question, 19–20.

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cally denounced the murder of Rossi by declaring that ‘The Italians have sacrificed their own cause to their passions and ignorance, and in the place of Rossi and Pius IX, we shall see men like Mazzini and Mamiani borne on the shoulders of the fickle mob.’158 In the following days it praised the pope and the reforms that he had introduced and stated that his flight was a reasonable decision in order to free him from his physical imprisonment and enable him to exercise the supreme power of the Holy See.159 The Whig newspaper, the Examiner, explained on 23 December that the pope was declared to have forfeited his temporal power, and that Sterbini had declared that he could return to Rome as a bishop but not as a cardinal. The Examiner stressed the gravity of the pope’s loss of temporal power, and the implications of his returning to Rome simply as a bishop. On the other hand the Spirit of the Age, a radical weekly newspaper, advanced a very different view on 16 December, noting that The revolutionary spirit is ready to burst out at the first favourable opportunity. Unless the Pope calls in Austrian aid, which we doubt much, we see nothing but for him to accept the revolution as an inevitable necessity and form his temporal policy accordingly. He may depend upon it, the day has gone by when his spiritual anathema would be of any service in arresting the progress of political change.160

The Spirit of the Age had a decidedly radical viewpoint, and believed that political change would inevitably coincide with the reduction or elimination of the pope’s temporal power. From this it is clear that any residual sympathy among radicals for the pope had by this time completely dissipated.161 Undoubtedly British opinion was interested in the flight of Pius IX, but its attitude to the pope was not always coherent, because the reaction of the English differed according to their political position. In spite of being fundamentally anti-Catholic, the British government supported the retention of temporal power within the context of a constitution for diplomatic reasons, and recognised that the existence of the pope was necessary if social order in Rome were to be maintained. Some newspapers, such as the Examiner, accepted this belief in the nominal temporal and political power of the pope, while others, such as the Spirit of the Age, believed in the complete secularisation of modern society. While British opinion deliberated, the situation in Rome remained fluid. The pope’s flight was followed by a power struggle between the moderate and radical political parties over the form the new government of the city should take and who should provide its leadership. Accordingly, it took more than

158 159 160 161

Times, 27 Nov. 1848. Ibid. 4, 12 Dec. 1848. Examiner, 23 Dec. 1848. Spirit of the Age, 16 Dec. 1848.

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two months for a Roman republic to be proclaimed. However, with its formation the secularisation of government in Rome was completed. 1848 had begun for the papacy and Britain with great hopes for the future, but by the end of the year that optimism had ended in disaster. The pope had fled Rome, and no notable advance had been made in relations between Britain and the papacy, despite the effort that the British government had put into the passage of the diplomatic bill. To a degree Pius had helped to create the situation that led to his flight. He had introduced a series of reforms that suggested a genuine belief in liberal government and on a number of occasions seemed to give his blessing to the ideal of Italian unification. In so doing he raised expectations that he was not able to fulfil. The fundamental issue in 1848 was that as a temporal ruler he might have been willing to make war, but, as the spiritual head of the Catholic Church he had to pursue policies based on adherence to peace. This posed a dilemma for Pius and also brought him into confrontation with the Roman people and with Italian nationalism as a whole. In the end the conflict over his two roles led to his decision to flee from Rome. The problem for British policy in this period was that it overestimated the chances for a peaceful resolution of the political situation in Rome. In particular, after the promulgation of the constitution in March 1848 Britain’s expectation that the Papal States could work as a secular constitutional state increased, and there was a failure to realise the fundamental problems involved in developing a constitution in a state in which the sovereign held both spiritual and temporal positions which could not be separated. This kind of perspective was also reflected in the diplomatic bill when it was presented to the House of Commons in August; Palmerston clearly stated his belief that the administration of the Papal States had been secularised and that the bill, with the Eglintoun amendment, was therefore acceptable. This was a misconceived reading of the true nature of papal government, which still in fact reserved considerable power in the hands of the pope. It was also contradictory, for while Palmerston argued that a secular administration would accept relations with Britain, it was clear that the major motive for having a diplomatic representative in Rome was to use the pope’s spiritual power to control the situation in Ireland. To a degree it might be argued that it was the urgent desire for papal assistance in Ireland that blinded the British government to the difficulty of opening diplomatic relations with Rome on its own terms. Ironically it was the fact that the pope still had spiritual power and that the Irish College was so influential in ecclesiastical politics in Rome that led to Britain’s defeat. Palmerston’s failure to develop satisfactory relations with the papacy was not, however, the only setback in his Italian policy. By the end of 1848 his support for Sicilian independence had come to nothing, Piedmont lay defeated, and the Austrians, who had recovered their position, expressed 109


bitter resentment at British intervention. Moreover, at home Palmerston found himself under attack from the court. In September 1848 the queen called upon Russell to dismiss him, observing that one of the counts against him was that ‘all that had been done in Italy last winter had . . . done harm’.162 The next year was not to prove any easier.

162

Connell, Regina v. Palmerston, 97.

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the Rise and Fall of the Roman Republic

5

Britain and the Rise and Fall of the Roman Republic The establishment of the Roman republic on 9 February 1849 presented Britain with a dilemma. How should she respond to this new regime? The preferred policy was to attempt to find some way of reconciling the pope with the Roman people by restoring him to power, but at the same time insisting upon the necessity of constitutional government. However it was not easy to achieve this goal because a matter as important as the future of the head of the Catholic Church was clearly not an issue that would be settled simply through negotiations between the pope and his former subjects; it had international ramifications. Due to Pius’ request for foreign assistance, the British government was under pressure from the Catholic powers to intervene in Rome in some way in order to restore the pope and to ensure social and political order in the Papal States. Britain however was uncertain about the whole issue of intervention, whether diplomatic or military. Traditionally in this period Britain always hesitated between choosing a policy aimed at encouraging social tranquillity through reform, or one of intervening to suppress internal insurrection in order to avoid a general war in Europe.1 In this case the British government’s choice was even more difficult than usual, for this crisis raised the very real prospect of military confrontation between France and Austria. The other major issue raised by the establishment of the Roman republic was how to deal with the consequences of the loss of the pope’s temporal power. In particular, after Mazzini entered the city of Rome on 6 March, his political, social, financial and religious reforms, based on anti-clericalism, brought forward a number of controversial issues, such as the nationalisation of the property of the Catholic Church. The problem for the British government was not just how to react to these policies but also whether it should take account of the sympathy for the Roman republic’s anti-clerical policy of a significant section of the British public.

1

K. Bourne, The foreign policy of Victorian England, 1830–1902, Oxford 1970.

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British reactions to the proclamation of the Roman republic After his flight from the Vatican in November 1848, the pope launched a series of complaints against his enemies in Rome, which culminated on 1 January 1849 in his excommunication of all those had taken part in the proceedings of 16 November and those who had participated in the Roman constituent assembly proceedings. This declaration was signed by the pope in his own handwriting so that there might be no doubt of its authority. When this became known in Rome there was a good deal of derision. For example, Freeborn observed to Lord Minto on 8 January that most people laughed at the pope’s excommunication and that its only effect would be to prevent any religious people from voting for ‘the violent party’.2 Minto, because of his previous experience in Rome, was sympathetic to the pope’s situation, but complained that excommunication was not effective against republicans, who were indifferent to any religious imposition by the pope and cardinals. As excommunication, which the pope considered the last attempt to restore his authority, failed, the only remaining measure was to defend his authority by relying on the Catholic powers.3 While the pope attempted to overawe the new leaders in Rome, the drive towards a new system of government proceeded. On 29 December 1848 the Roman Giunta issued an edict regulating the criteria for the forthcoming elections to the Roman constituent assembly. This decree stated that the constituent assembly should exercise full sovereign power, and that the election was to take place on 21 January by manhood suffrage and secret ballot.4 At the same time increasing numbers of republican nationalists, from all over Italy, such as Giuseppe Garibaldi, Enrico Cernuschi and Giovanni La Cecilia, arrived in Rome, and effectively increased the strength of the republican movement. Republican demonstrations became a daily occurrence, and it was decided by the leaders to get rid of the existing government, and to realise the aspiration of the Giovine Italia.5 After being shocked by the flight of the pope, the British government was very curious to see what would happen next and who would seize power. When they realised that the republicans were prevailing and that the moderates were powerless, their anxiety about the political consequences, not only for Rome but also for the other states of central Italy, particularly Tuscany, could not be hidden. Sir George Hamilton expressed his fear of the Mazzinian party to Palmerston on 25 January 1849 noting that recently Mazzini had arrived in Florence in order to ‘continue his intrigue in form of republican principles’, and that he aimed to unify the Papal States and Tuscany in a large 2 3 4 5

Freeborn (Rome) to Minto, 8 Jan. 1849, Minto papers, MS 12035. Freeborn (Rome) to Minto, 8 Jan. 1849, ibid. MS 12069. R. M. Johnston, The Roman theocracy and the republic, 1846–1849, London 1901, 226–7. E. Morelli, ‘I verbali del comitato esecutivo della repubblica Romana del 1949’, 29–96, Archivio della Società romano di storia patria lxxii (1949), 3rd ser. fasc. 1, 41–2.

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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

republic of central Italy.6 The British government’s support for the Sardinian government contributed to its hostility towards the republican and Mazzinian parties. Palmerston wrote to Abercromby in Turin on 31 January that the British government should encourage the government in Turin and the moderate party in Italy to resist the ultra-liberal faction which had a republican agenda and followed the ‘disorderly policy of Mazzini’.7 In contrast to the British government, radical opinion in Britain was notably sympathetic towards the republican movement in Rome, and carried enthusiastic reports on the course of events. For example, the Northern Star reported on 20 January on the ceremony to celebrate the opening of the constituent assembly that took place on the Piazza Venezia in which a deliberate attempt was made to imitate the manner of the original Roman republic. The newspaper stated that All the banners were ranged round the equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius, and amid solemn silence and intense cold, all heads being uncovered, the decree convoking the constituent assembly was read. Then up rose the Abbate Rumbalidi, and said – Roman people! Your fathers from this hill originated civilisation amid barbarous Europe, and you have to begin the work again this year of our Lord, to rescue Italy from dark intrigues and brutal despots; and I as a clergymen, call on you from the capital to vindicate your independence and your right to self-government – principles whose root is in the gospel.8

These words, the newspaper observed, were received with enthusiastic applause; the speech calmed and satisfied the people. On 21 January 1849 the elections were held and on 5 February the Roman constituent assembly met. The task of opening it fell to the elderly minister of the interior, Carlo Armellini, but his speech failed to provide any kind of lead. Indeed, despite the fact that the republicans had seized power, the Roman republic was not proclaimed immediately because there was conflict between the various radical parties. For example, Sterbini was concerned to settle first other matters that required attention, such as the choice of a president, a role which eventually fell to Galletti. On 7 February the debate on the constitution of the Roman state finally opened.9 Mamiani declared himself to be strongly in favour of the suppression of the temporal power of the pope, but argued that the best course for the future was not to proclaim a republic but to await the convocation of an Italian federal assembly. His ideas did not, however, win much sympathy and, amid scenes of great excitement, on 8 February 1849 the Roman constituent assembly declared the establishment of a republic. Moreover, once moder6 7

Hamilton (Florence) to Palmerston, 25 Jan. 1849, Palmerston papers, GC/HA/37. Palmerston to Abercromby (Turin), 31 Jan. 1849, in BPSP, 1849/LVIII (pt 4, 1849): Correspondence respecting affairs of Italy. 8 Northern Star, 20 Jan. 1849. 9 Johnston, Roman theocracy, 231.

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ates, like Mamiani, had withdrawn, and the ultra-conservative ecclesiastical ministers had been excluded from the assembly, the republicans decided to adopt the Mazzinian slogan ‘God and the people’, and to give Mazzini citizenship.10 The first act by the assembly after the proclamation of the republic was to reform the executive power of the state. Accordingly Armellini and two other figures were appointed as members of an executive committee. Their first task was to discuss proposals for a new constitution, the matter then to be referred to a special committee. The general consensus was that the question of the constitution of the state demanded urgent attention. In addition it was vitally necessary to deal with the financial situation which was looking increasingly desperate.11 There were, however, other serious problems for the new regime. The proclamation of the republic in Rome coincided with the flight from Florence early in February 1849 of the grand duke of Tuscany, which led to calls from Mazzini and the Giovine Italia to unify Tuscany and the Roman state into the central nucleus of Italian democracy. In addition, the Roman republic was pushed to take an overt stance against Austria, for Carlo Alberto, disturbed at the success of republicanism in central Italy, decided to reassert his claim to be the leading Italian political figure by renewing the war to liberate Lombardy. On 12 March he therefore denounced the armistice with Austria and his forces advanced once more towards Milan. This time, however, the campaign proved brief, for on 23 March his forces were soundly defeated at the battle of Novara. Humiliated for the second time, Carlo Alberto duly abdicated in favour of his son, Vittorio Emanuelle II, and went into exile. As these dramatic events swept over the Italian peninsula, Mazzini finally arrived in Rome to stamp his distinctive republican beliefs on the new regime. He entered the city on 6 March and that evening was introduced to the assembly by Galletti and made a short speech extolling the virtues of the ‘Rome of the people’. Following this, on 29 March, Mazzini, along with Armellini and Aurelio Saffi, was made one of the triumvirate of the Roman republic.12 The papacy, the republic and the dilemma of the British government The dramatic changes taking place in Rome had serious implications for Britain. Just after the proclamation of the Roman republic, the state of anglo-Roman relations was still undecided. As far as Armellini was concerned, the republic should seek to maintain favourable relations with 10 11 12

Morelli, ‘I verbali del comitato’, 60. Johnston, Roman theocracy, 236 S. Woolf, A history of Italy, 1700–1860: the social constraints of political change, London 1979, 399–404.

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Britain, as well as with France and the Piedmontese. On 10 February Freeborn informed Hamilton that Armellini had told the assembly that their relations with Britain were satisfactory and that he hoped that the British government might even support the new regime.13 However, this was an optimistic view of the British government’s attitude and indeed that of Britain as whole. It was rather the case that British opinion was confused and divided about how to react to events in Rome. The trend among radical opinion certainly regarded the expulsion of clerical power from Rome as the necessary continuation of the constitutional revolution, but the radicals were not in power. Instead authority rested with the Whig-dominated government of Russell and Palmerston. The British government’s position was that it desired neither to see a return to the corruption of papal temporal politics nor the continued existence of Mazzini’s republican state. Its preferred solution therefore was to see a return to the state of affairs that had existed prior to the pope’s departure from Rome, namely papal rule within a constitutional system. This policy faced one major problem, which was that Britain’s influence over the Roman issue was very limited, for it was not a Catholic power and still, despite the diplomatic bill, did not have formal relations with the papacy. It therefore did not have the power to persuade the pope to compromise and naturally was excluded from negotiations between the Catholic states and the papacy. Moreover, other problems existed. First, even if Britain were invited to attend an international congress on the Roman question, Palmerston feared that she would find herself in a minority and thus be forced to accept policies with which she profoundly disagreed. He therefore wished, as had been the practice of British foreign policy in the 1820s, to stay aloof from such disagreeable gatherings.14 Second, Palmerston had to be careful in his diplomacy, for his Italophile foreign policy had already led to problems with the queen and Prince Albert. He was therefore constrained from adopting too blustering a manner, lest it lead to his own dismissal.15 The initial position taken by Palmerston was therefore that the differences between the pope and the people of Rome were a matter for those two parties to solve and that foreign powers should not get involved. The best solution, he foresaw, was for the pope to agree to accept the need to maintain the constitutional reforms of the previous year; on that basis he could negotiate his return to Rome. Palmerston believed that this was the best solution, for, as he observed to Normanby on 5 January, it was important to maintain the pope as an independent sovereign who could exercise his spiritual authority free from foreign pressure. Accordingly Palmerston felt that there was not

13

Freeborn to Hamilton, 10 Feb. 1849, in BPSP, 1849/LVII: Correspondence respecting affairs of Rome. 14 Palmerston to Russell, 29 Mar. 1849, Palmerston papers, GC/RU/1052. 15 Connell, Regina v. Palmerston.

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much justification for foreign intervention, and in particular for any kind of armed interference, to assist the pope.16 These sentiments duly influenced the contents of the letter that Palmerston drafted for the queen to send to the pope in response to his request of December 1848 for British assistance. The letter noted the queen’s regret at the circumstances which had forced Pius to flee from Rome and praised his efforts at reform, but instead of promising British aid stressed the hope that the pope and the people in Rome could be reconciled.17 However, in the face of the increasing likelihood that the pope and the people would not be able to achieve a reconciliation by themselves, Palmerston came to the conclusion that the powers should intervene but only as mediators rather than as an armed force. His fear of military intervention arose partly because of his concern that this method would allow the pope to be restored as an autocratic ruler. In addition, however, there was the ever-present fear that such intervention could lead, even inadvertently, to a confrontation between France and Austria. In a letter to Ponsonby on 1 February, Palmerston instructed him to tell the Austrian government that any move south of the River Po by the Austrian army would inevitably lead either to a French force crossing the Alps or one landing at Civitàvecchia. This, he warned, would not only delay a solution of the Roman problem but also threaten the peace of Europe which was the matter of the greatest concern to all the European powers.18 Unfortunately for Palmerston the formal proclamation of the Roman republic in February 1849 made the situation considerably worse; the republic was clearly unacceptable to Austria and made military intervention even more likely. The only possible solution was to hope that the French republic under its new president, Louis Napoleon, would take a similar view of the situation and use its influence to restore the pope as a constitutional monarch. The position of France was indeed similar to that of Britain in that it too agreed that the major cause of social disorder in the Papal States was misgovernment and maladministration by the ecclesiastics, and strove to restore papal temporal power on a constitutional basis. In addition, it concurred on the need to avoid giving Austria any pretext for military intervention. However, although there was a consensus between Britain and France on the best form of government in Rome, there were differences over how this could be achieved. One problem was that Louis Napoleon was determined to use the Roman issue to enhance his position with French Catholics by strongly supporting the pope: he was also disposed to use force to raise French military prestige. The use of French troops had been contemplated in 16 17

Palmerston to Normanby (Paris), 5 Jan. 1849, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Rome. Victoria to Pius IX, 8 Jan. 1849, in Benson and Esher, Letters of Queen Victoria, iii. 210; ASV, Archivio Particolare di Pio IX, sovrani, no. 1. 18 Palmerston to Ponsonby (Vienna), 1 Feb. 1849, BPSP, 1851/LVII: Rome.

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Paris even before Louis Napoleon’s appointment, but once he was in power his domestic political concerns made intervention even more likely.19 Another blow to Palmerston’s desired outcome was that the conservative cardinals, of whom Cardinal Antonelli was the most influential, were not at all enthusiastic about co-operation with France, as they were opposed to the French conditions for intervention. The cardinals had no intention of agreeing to a restitution of constitutional government after the restoration of the pope, and instead favoured Austrian intervention, for this came without disagreeable preconditions.20 The French intervention The first of the Catholic powers to press for a united response to assist the pope was Spain, which in January 1849 called for a conference of the Catholic powers in Madrid to discuss the Roman problem. The papacy agreed on the need for a conference, but rejected the idea of holding it in distant Madrid and instead arranged with King Ferdinando of the Two Sicilies for it to be held in the much closer and more convenient city of Naples.21 On 2 February the Neapolitan minister in London, Prince Castelcicala, informed Palmerston that Ferdinando was keen to see Britain and the other major non-Catholic powers involved in this meeting. The Sicilian government’s official note stated that it sought Britain’s participation in the congress because of its influence on ‘the political circumstances and on the harmony of the Sicilies and of all Italy’.22 Palmerston was pleased to receive this invitation, but said in reply that Britain did not feel free to attend without a direct request from the pope.23 While talks continued about the conference, the papacy made clear its own position, for on 18 February, after prompting from Vienna, Pius called upon Austria, France, Spain and the Two Sicilies to provide him with armed assistance in order to liberate Rome ‘from that faction of bad men, who . . . exercise in it the most atrocious despotism’.24 In addition, Pius ordered this communication to be passed to the British government through the papal nuncio in Paris and asked for Britain to range itself on his side.25 The pope’s request naturally did not endear itself to Palmerston. On 9 March he told Normanby that Britain still favoured a negotiated solution, either through direct talks between the pope and the republic or by international mediation, 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Scott, The Roman question, 8. Coppa, Antonelli, 74. Scott, The Roman question, 35–6. Napier (Naples) to Palmerston, 2 Feb. 1849, BPSP, 1851/LVII: Rome. Palmerston to Prince Castelcicala (London), 10 Feb. 1849, ibid. Cardinal Antonelli to the representatives of the foreign powers, 18 Feb. 1849, ibid. Archbishop of Nicæa to Normanby, 6 Mar. 1849, ibid.

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and that he hoped that France would use its influence to support this line. He also affirmed that the basis of British policy was that it was ‘desirous, . . . that the Pope should be placed in such a temporal position as to be able to act with entire independence in the exercise of his spiritual functions’.26 Furthermore, on 27 March Palmerston ordered Normanby to communicate in the same vein with the papal nuncio in Paris.27 Unfortunately Palmerston’s wishes carried little weight. Of much greater significance was that the Austrian government was thoroughly opposed to a policy of mediation, for it wished to see the pope restored to power as an autocratic ruler and this could only be achieved through military intervention. It was, however, not prepared to intervene unilaterally. It was already over-stretched due to its confrontation with Piedmont, but it was willing to act in conjunction with France. This policy was highly attractive to Vienna, for it would diminish any chance of a general war, separate France from Piedmont, and wreck Palmerston’s hopes for anglo-French mediation in the affairs of Italy. In addition, Piedmont expressed its opposition to mediation by the non-Italian powers, as it was keen to reopen the war with Austria and hoped for support from the Roman republic.28 The conflicting ambitions of Austria and Piedmont therefore further complicated the situation by threatening to lead either to a combination that would freeze Britain out of Italian affairs altogether or to a Franco-Austrian confrontation over northern Italy. Events therefore were increasingly beyond Britain’s control. On 30 March the conference of the Catholic powers of Naples, Spain, Austria and France finally opened at Gaeta. From the start the first three of these powers were sympathetic to the call by Antonelli for immediate military intervention against the Roman republic, but the French government prevaricated.29 It did not, however, take France long to change its position, for in late March news arrived of the Austrian victory at Novara. The Piedmontese defeat changed the situation, for with Austrian authority confirmed in the north there was now nothing to stop it moving south of the Po into the Romagna, restoring the grand duke’s authority over Tuscany and destroying the Roman republic.30 Faced with the prospect of Austria reasserting its control in Italy, Louis Napoleon was determined to act in a way that would demonstrate French influence and power. He therefore decided in mid-April that France should act unilaterally to reinstate papal authority in Rome, and on 16 April the French assembly voted to support a military expedition to be led by General Nicolas Oudinot. In preparing for this vote, Louis Napoleon realised that a simple military intervention was not feasible, for he knew that if he did act to restore Pius to 26 27 28 29 30

Palmerston to Normanby, 9 Mar. 1849, BPSP, 1849/LVII: Rome. Palmerston to Normanby, 27 Mar. 1849, ibid. Scott, The Roman question, 38–9. Coppa, Antonelli, 69. Johnston, Roman theocracy, 257–8.

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Rome he had to ensure that the pope would still pursue constitutional reform, otherwise he would lose the support of the French assembly. It was for this reason that France insisted that its intervention was designed to bring about a mutually acceptable reconciliation between the two sides. For example, on 19 April Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys, the French foreign minister, informed the British that the force that would shortly land at Civitàvecchia was intended to maintain . . . the balance of power; to protect the independence of the States of Italy; to secure a liberal and regular administration for the inhabitants of the Roman States, and to save them from the dangers of a blind reaction, as well as from the excesses of anarchy.31

A broader and vaguer list could hardly have been drawn up. France’s liberal intentions were not shared by the pope, who was opposed to any restrictions on his temporal power. Pius wished to have full liberty in his relations with foreign powers, but his freedom of manoeuvre would be worthless if the powers were allowed to regulate his relations with his subjects. It was this internal liberty which he believed would be compromised by French insistence on constitutional government. As early as 12 March this had been clear to the British government, as Petre reported from Gaeta that ‘there was to be no concession, no mitigations of ecclesiastical monopoly and privilege’, and that the pope had declared that ‘he will return as absolute master or not at all’.32 In his allocution of 20 April 1849, which was made before the French forces arrived at Civitàvecchia, the pope went even further, stating that the constitutional settlement that he had proposed in December 1848 was incompatible with his personal liberty as head of the Church.33 This allocution proved to be the turning-point for the pope, as far as the constitutional issue was concerned. Opposition to the French plans was not restricted to the pope. When the French army landed in Civitàvecchia on 24 April and then marched towards Rome, Mazzini confronted Oudinot and asked him to explain the reasons for sending an armed force to occupy the territory of the republic. The invasion baffled the members of the Roman republic, because they had counted on French support. Indeed, Mazzini, the most important republican leader, believed that France was the principal model of republicanism. The reply received from Oudinot, as reported by a British naval officer, Lieutenant George Willes, was that the motive for intervention was to protect Rome from Austrian invasion and to achieve reconciliation between the pope and the Roman republic as the sentiment of the people required.34 This explanation failed to satisfy the Roman assembly which decided to resist the French, and on 30 April fighting broke out. The French were repulsed and subse31 32 33 34

Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys to Normanby, 19 Apr. 1849, BPSP, 1851/LVII: Rome. Petre (Gaeta) to Palmerston, 12 Mar. 1849, FO 43/44. Martina, Pio IX, i. 357–8. George Willes (Civitàvecchia) to Stirling, 1 May 1849, BPSP, 1851/LVII: Rome.

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quently a new attempt at mediation with the Roman republic was begun, led on the French side by Viscount Ferdinand de Lesseps. However, before these talks opened the republic’s position became even more precarious for news arrived on 8 May that the Austrians were moving on Bologna. The talks between de Lesseps and Mazzini continued throughout May, but in the end no breakthrough was achieved, for the latter was not willing to sacrifice his republic in return for vague promises about constitutional reforms. In addition, Mazzini maintained the hope until the end that the ultra-republicans in Paris would come to his rescue. On 29 May French– Roman hostilities resumed and although the republic put up a stubborn defence it was finally forced to surrender on 3 July. During the period from April to July, Palmerston did not protest against the French intervention but continued to stress that it was important that constitutional reforms should be introduced. At first the foreign secretary worked to achieve this aim by trying to encourage the negotiations between the Roman republic and de Lesseps. He even insisted to some representatives of the republic who appeared in London that a quick compromise with the French was the best policy to pursue. At the same time he put pressure on the Austrian government to limit its occupation of the legations in order to avoid any Austro-French confrontation.35 One of the main reasons why Palmerston followed this course of action was that, although Britain had decided to connive at the French military intervention in Rome, he still worried that restoration of papal government might only renew political and economic corruption in the Papal States.36 From a number of sources there came reports of opposition within Rome to the return of the cardinals, although not to the restoration of the pope himself. For example, Freeborn observed to Palmerston on 1 May that ‘the mass of the people are ill-disposed to the restoration of the ecclesiastical Government’.37 Palmerston therefore felt that it was vitally important to make it clear to the French government that it should not compromise over the need for a settlement that would contain some measure of constitutional guarantees for the Roman people. At the same time some British observers doubted whether a restoration of the papacy was at all viable. For example, on 10 June Sir George Lewis, under-secretary of state at the Home Office, noted to a friend that I confess that I have great doubts whether the Pope will ever recover his temporal power. This seems to me to be one of the changes which is likely to be permanent. The Pope cannot become a constitutional sovereign, negotiating

35 36 37

Scott, The Roman question, 53; Johnston, Roman theocracy, 304. Palmerston to Normanby, 12 June 1849, BPSP, 1851/LVII: Rome. Freeborn to Palmerston, 1 May 1849, ibid.

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with a parliament, and he can hardly recover his despotic powers, together with an ecclesiastical set of ministers.38

Palmerston to a degree shared these fears. On 3 July he asked Normanby to ascertain from the French what they thought would happen if it proved to be impossible to bring about a reconciliation between the pope and the Romans on the basis of ‘the restoration of the government of the Pope with constitutional guarantees’.39 His particular concern was that, encouraged by the Austrians, the pope would refuse to make any concessions. On 7 July he pressed his brother Sir William Temple, the Minister in Naples, to meet Pius and insist on the need for constitutional reform. In the same letter he noted, however, that he did not believe the French would force the pope on Rome, and that therefore the republic might survive, in which case he would be willing to recognise it. He even stated, in contradiction to his expressed opinions earlier in the year, that the loss of the pope’s temporal power and the diminution of his spiritual power ‘was surely a good thing for Europe . . . and will be a material step in the progress of human society’.40 After the fall of the republic early in July Palmerston was under pressure from public opinion to make the British voice heard. For example The Times insisted that it was necessary for British influence to be felt, its correspondent in Civitàvecchia noting on 11 July that Palmerston should try to influence international policy on papal affairs to show ‘the weight of Great Britain’.41 Palmerston hoped that he could indeed use the prestige of Britain to effect a reasonable compromise between the pope and his people by making his views clear both to Paris and Vienna. Part of his problem, however, was that by the summer of 1849 it was clear that, although France controlled Rome, it held little sway over the pope, and that the only effective channel would be to exert pressure on the Austrian government. On 13 July Palmerston informed Ponsonby in Vienna that he should stress to Schwarzenberg that once foreign forces withdrew from Rome disturbances would break out again. Therefore if Austria’s interest was to maintain tranquillity in Italy, it should persuade the pope to maintain the constitutional concessions in order ‘to pave the way for his resumption of the papal throne’.42 Palmerston was, however, being far too optimistic if he thought that this would work, for the Austrians were intransigent and the French commitment to a constitution was increasingly fragile. On 16 July Normanby observed to Palmerston that it was unlikely that Austria would accept his argument, and

38

George Lewis to Sir Francis Head, 10 June 1849, in G. F. Lewis (ed.), Letters of the Right Hon. Sir George Cornewall Lewis to various friends, London 1870, 209. 39 Normanby to Palmerston, 3 July 1849, BPSP, 1851/LVII: Rome. 40 Ashley, Palmerston, i. 122. 41 Times, 11 July 1849. 42 Palmerston to Ponsonby, 13 July 1849, BPSP, 1851/LVII: Rome.

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also noted that the French government was anxious to end the occupation of Rome and accordingly were moving away from insistence on a constitution. He therefore proposed that Palmerston should be satisfied with a return to the consulta that had been established in October 1847.43 The situation was in fact even worse than Normanby imagined. On 27 July Schwarzenberg responded to Palmerston’s proposal. He noted sarcastically that two years before Palmerston had asked Metternich to agree to the encouragement of reform in Italy and observed that since then, ‘The princes who were the first to grant to their country constitutional guarantees have been the first victims of the vicissitudes of popularity.’44 In the light of this Austria could not accept the need for a constitution in Rome and would only go so far as to recommend to the pope that he should introduce the reforms recommended in the 1831 memorandum of the five great powers: the maintenance of municipal councils, the creation of provincial councils and the establishment of a central giunta in Rome. To the foreign secretary’s dismay it was not just Austria that proposed this course of action. In late July Drouyn de Lhuys, who was now the French ambassador in London, stated that French policy was to recommend the 1831 memorandum to the pope. In reply to this news Palmerston protested that ‘such a limited arrangement . . . would not lay the foundation for contentment among the Roman people’.45 But his words were in vain. Even before his meeting with Drouyn de Lhuys and the communication from Schwarzenberg, Palmerston was pessimistic. On 24 July he noted to his brother in Naples that the pope would be restored on an unsatisfactory basis. He was, however, prepared to see this move in a positive light, adding that if it occurred, ‘As soon as the Pope returns to Rome we must think of sending a minister to him.’46 British efforts to halt the retreat from constitutional government were indeed roundly ignored. By August it was clear that the policy that Palmerston had pursued since January was in disarray. The news from Rome also confirmed that a return to constitutional government was unlikely. Commander Key, of HMS Bulldog, reported to Admiral Parker on 22 August that the triumvirate of cardinals intended to restore the system of government which had existed even before Pius IX’s election, and therefore the Roman people began to regard the French as their only hope.47 On 6 September the pope went to Naples and celebrated mass at the cathedral, after which he gave his benediction to the people assembled in front of the church. The following day he received at Portici the members of

43 44 45 46 47

Normanby to Palmerston, 16 July 1849, ibid. Prince Felix Schwarzenberg to Franz Graf Colloredo (London), 27 July 1849, ibid. Palmerston to Normanby, 7 Aug. 1849, ibid. Ashley, Palmerston, 127. Key (HMS Bulldog) to Parker, 22 Aug. 1849, BPSP, 1851/lVII: Rome.

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the diplomatic corps accredited to the court of Rome.48 Pius, however, showed no desire to return immediately to Rome. This was largely due to continued disagreement with the French. In French eyes, stable government could only be obtained if the papal government were to be based upon the principles of the general amnesty, secularisation of the administration, the application of the code Napoléon and liberal institutions. Despite this pressure from Paris, Pius declared that a general amnesty was impossible, refused to base his laws on the code Napoléon and opposed the secularisation of the administration.49 Having already concluded in April that constitutionalism was incompatible with his personal liberty as head of the Church, the pope now broadened his opposition and condemned freedom of the press and constitutional government as intrinsically evil. By September he had further clarified his position, stating that liberalism tended to mislead the masses in those countries in which it held sway.50 The Motuproprio of 12 September 1849, drawn up by Antonelli, promised administrative and judicial reforms in line with the 1831 memorandum, but said little about specific political liberties and failed to mention the constitution of 1848.51 In addition, Pius granted a strictly limited amnesty to those who had taken a minor role in the revolution. It was the reactionary policy of the cardinals which shaped this policy; in particular Antonelli acted as the main influence behind the scenes. Sir George Hamilton observed to Palmerston on 6 October of the pope’s recent pronouncement that ‘From being too hasty and energetic a reformer he is supposed to have became opposed to any changes, and to countenance the ancient hierarchical absolutism.’52 Hamilton’s perspective on the pope’s political inclinations was deeply pessimistic, for there seemed to be no chance of constitutional government returning.53 The British government’s effort to shape the nature of the papal restoration in Rome thus came to end in an ignominious fashion which revealed its lack of influence over papal affairs. Palmerston’s frustration at the course of events was evident in a letter he wrote to Normanby on 3 September in which he discussed the recent attacks on French policy in the British press. He observed to Normanby that, as he could not stop the British press such as The Times, the Morning Chronicle and the Daily News from attacking him, there was little chance that he could prevent them from criticising what the French were doing in Rome.54

48 49 50 51

Temple (Naples) to Palmerston, 8 Sept. 1849, ibid. Coppa, Antonelli, 74. Scott, The Roman question, 66–7. Freeborn to Palmerston, 20 Sept. 1849, enclosing the proclamation of Pope Pius IX, 12 Sept. 1849, BPSP, 1851/LVII: Rome. 52 Hamilton to Palmerston, 6 Oct. 1849, ibid. 53 Hamilton to Palmerston, 23 Nov. 1849, ibid. 54 Palmerston to Normanby, 3 Sept. 1849, ibid.

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The French government, still influenced by Louis Napoleon’s desire to appeal to French Catholics, continued to try to reach agreement with the papacy on the system of government in Rome and steadily turned its back on the need for a liberal administrative system. The discussion over this question took a long time and the pope would not, in fact, return to Rome until April 1850. Public opinion and the Roman republic In order to understand why Palmerston followed the policy he did in 1849 towards the Roman republic it is necessary to see what kind of pressures he was under, not just from the European powers, but also from British public opinion. The most important fact to note in this respect is that, apart from the Catholic population, there were few elements in Britain that were now sympathetic to the increasingly conservative pope. The euphoria about the ‘Good pope’ of 1846–7 had definitely died away. The opinion of the political elite in Britain was broadly in line with the policy pursued by Palmerston. It favoured the peaceful restoration of the papacy, but only if it entailed the simultaneous re-establishment of constitutional government. Again The Times acts as a good illustration of orthodox thought on the subject. For example on 16 June, at the height of the debate about whether it would be possible to restore the pope’s temporal power, an article in The Times criticised the Catholic powers for confusing the issues of the return of the pope and the restitution of the ecclesiastical government. As far as The Times was concerned the former would be possible for purely religious reasons, but the latter should not be allowed because any political power linked to the Church would only see a return to despotism.55 What this illustrates is that because of the British political context Palmerston was expected to argue for an acceptable solution based on a constitution and to use Britain’s political prestige to persuade the other powers to agree. However, as Britain was increasingly isolated over the Roman republic issue and found it difficult to project its power unilaterally, this policy was doomed to failure. Palmerston also had to make policy in the knowledge that the moderate stand taken by The Times, and put into practice by the British government, was not enough to satisfy the calls among the radicals within British politics for the pope to be deprived of all temporal power. The establishment of the Roman republic and the pope’s rejection of his former liberal policies led the radicals to sympathise with the anti-clerical policies espoused by Mazzini and they became overtly hostile to Pius IX. This provided a clear contrast with the British government’s strong reservations over both the creation of the 55

Times, 16 June 1849.

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republic and Mazzini himself. In particular, it is important to note here that since the French Revolution the idea of revolution and the freedom of Europe had in radical circles often been discussed in the context of liberation from Catholic despotism. Within Britain radicals and middle-class intellectuals were attracted to revolutionary causes in continental Europe, simply because of their traditional opposition to Catholic absolutism. This applied as much to the events of 1848 and 1849 as it had to earlier revolutions such as that in Belgium in 1830. The Italian revolutions, in particular, provoked the admiration of English radicals.56 In part the attraction of the republic lay with the fact that during his years of exile in London Mazzini had constructed strong relations with radicals, including the Chartists.57 Radical support for him was reflected in the Chartist newspapers, including the Northern Star, the Spirit of the Age and Reynolds Newspaper, which tried to mobilise support for the Roman republic in 1849. On 3 March 1849 the Spirit of the Age suggested triumphantly that, ‘The proclamation of Roman republic had startled those who were consoling themselves with the comfortable theory that revolution had run its race, and that the star of kings and priests was again in the ascendant.’58 Opposed to the conservative opinion of The Times and the Morning Chronicle, it further asserted that the constitution, political equality and the emancipation of labour were important consequences of the revolution in Rome and the establishment of a republic and proclaimed that ‘The Republic is the spontaneous act of the whole Roman people and as such ought to command the sympathy and support of all liberal minded people.’59 English liberal opinion was also reflected in Punch, which on a number of occasions in 1849 produced poems in praise of the republic and critical of the lack of support offered by the government. When the French placed Rome under siege Punch sarcastically explained the government’s problem in its poem entitled ‘The ‘‘True Blues’’ Dilemma or the Pope or the Republic?’, which stated that the government’s abhorrence of republicanism and desire for friendship with France had mistakenly led it to forego the more desired end of bringing the papacy down.60 Punch reacted to the eventual demise of the Roman republic by praising its leader: Through brutish force the game was won, Triumvir, thou haste noble done; Calm courage in a rightful cause Gains thee a loftier world’s applause;

56 57

Finn, After Chartism, 112. E. F. Biagini, Liberty, retrenchment and reform: popular liberalism in the age of Gladstone, 1860–1880, Cambridge, 1992, 46–50. 58 Spirit of the Age, 3 Mar. 1849. 59 Ibid. 60 Punch xvi, 23 June 1849, 259.

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And Rome’s old heroes from their spheres Shout, chiming in with British cheers, Bravo. Mazzini!61

It does not appear that radical support for the republic affected the substance of Palmerston’s policy, but it did have some influence on the way in which he presented his views on Rome to the British public. It is important to recall that in 1848 Palmerston had garnered much public support for his perceived championing of the Italian cause.62 Naturally he was tempted to continue to court such popularity, and thus presented his policy in a manner that appealed to the radical constituency. For example, when he was challenged in the House of Commons by liberal MPs, such as James Roebuck and Joseph Hume, over whether Britain had sanctioned the French intervention, Palmerston was careful to say that Britain had been informed rather than consulted about France’s decision. Asked by Roebuck on 22 June to condemn the French action, the foreign secretary demurred on the grounds that it would not be appropriate to comment at a time when the French assembly was discussing the matter, but did manage in passing to refer to the intervention as ‘a most unfortunate proceeding’.63 While Palmerston played to the liberal and radical gallery, he was also exposed to other pressures, for the anti-clerical reforms introduced by the new regime in Rome managed in a number of ways to undermine its cause by creating practical problems that affected British interests. The Roman republic and anti-clericalism One of the most important issues raised by the establishment of the Roman republic was the anti-clerical policy followed by the government in Rome. Despite the fact that Britain was not a Catholic country it could not remain indifferent to this policy as British Catholic subjects owned property in Rome and it was therefore on occasion forced to take action to defend their interests. There had been a strong desire among the Roman people for lay participation and control of the temporal government of the Papal States even before the declaration of the Roman republic. Once in power Mazzini insisted that his government was based upon this desire, and that his authority rested upon the will of the people who had elected the constituent assembly and not of the pope and the cardinals. The Roman republic, therefore, deposed the 61 62

Ibid. xvii, July 1849, 35. M. Chamberlain, Lord Palmerston, Cardiff 1987, 68–9. On the same theme see A. Taylor, ‘Palmerston and radicalism, 1847–65’, Journal of British Studies xxxiii (1994), 157–79. 63 Hansard, 3rd ser. cvi. 738–9 (22 June 1849).

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papal government, and announced that the new constituent assembly would create a new regime. The clash between the government and the Catholic Church was reflected in the decree of 8 February proclaiming the Roman republic, which declared: The temporal power of the Popedom is suppressed de facto and de jure in the Roman States. The Roman Pontiff will have all the necessary guarantees in the independent exercise of the spiritual power.64

This most important decree went on, in articles 3 and 4, to proclaim the virtues of democratic, secular government and its support for a united Italy. The constituent assembly built on this basis when on 21 February it declared ‘That our glorious Repubblica Romana declared that all ecclesiastical riches are nationalised, and now become state property.’65 The intention behind this reform was to redistribute wealth and liberate economic activity. In order to achieve this, a major part of the public debt was guaranteed by the mortgaging of ecclesiastic property, but the enormous amounts involved proved difficult to administer. The state assumed the administration of clerical property, and allowed clergy in the employ of the state to be its temporal administrators. As a consequence of this policy, the government introduced its system of salaried clergy.66 In the days of the triumvirate further serious attacks were made upon the Church by the revolutionary government in Rome. Mazzini, Garibaldi and other ardent republicans desired nothing less than the end of papal Rome. The expropriation of ecclesiastical property was complemented in this period by agrarian reform. Although the Roman republic emerged as a liberal– bourgeois regime, its agrarian policy was more radical so far as the peasantry was concerned than that of any of the other Italian states in 1848–9. The major plank in its agrarian reforms was the transfer of ecclesiastical land from the Church to the peasantry. Given the short life of the republic the reforms could not be completed, and therefore it is impossible to say whether the distribution of national property in the Roman States would have been different from that in the Mezzogiorno under the Napoleonic period, but it is evident that this measure was popular as there was no mass peasant rebellion in 1849. In addition, anti-clerical hostility was displayed by agitators outside the Roman government. On the whole attacks upon the clergy were more widespread in the provinces than in the city of Rome. Among the most notorious were the murders carried out by the Congregate d’Inferno at Sinigaglia, and the feud between the republicans and the Centurions at Ancona. The 64 65 66

Petre to Hamilton, 8 Feb. 1849, BPSP, 1851/LVII: Rome. Declaration of republica romana, 21 Feb. 1849, ASR, Busta 1279, no. 49504. Petre reported to Palmerston about the communication between him and Sig. Busconi, minister for foreign affairs of the Roman republic, on 24 February 1849, FO 43/44.

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latter reached such proportions that Mazzini was obliged to send his follower Felice Orsini to restore order.67 Obviously such policies and incidents provoked difficulties in and outside Italy. The policy towards ecclesiastical property was in particular one of the most controversial political reforms carried out by the republican government, and caused a hostile reaction from the European powers as well as the other Italian states. This was not just true for the Catholic powers, but was also the case in Britain, particularly among English Catholics. On 14 March the Catholic periodical the Rambler informed its readers that the republican government had ordered all religious establishments to send an inventory of their property in order to nationalise the goods which belonged to the Church, and took a very critical line over this and other related issues. The Rambler also criticised the Roman republic’s policy towards ecclesiastical matters, expressed its sympathy with a number of priests who had been unreasonably treated by the republicans and revealed in one story that two fathers, Cesarini and Concha, had been locked up in the Inquisition. The correspondence on the Roman republic in the Rambler also revealed how it had seized ecclesiastical property, for example the bells of basilicas and religious houses. The whole experience, the Rambler noted, had the effect of alienating Catholics, although this did not necessarily lead to sympathy for the pope.68 Already by this date the British government had cause to be concerned about the Roman government’s designs on British ecclesiastical property. As a result of the pope’s flight from Rome, Dr Wiseman had as early as December 1848 written to Palmerston asking for the protection of the property of British Catholic establishments in Rome, and particularly those devoted to education under exclusively British administration. Wiseman stressed that the government should issue instructions to its agents in Rome, stating that the property of the English College was the property of British subjects and that it was therefore guaranteed by the protection of the British Crown. He noted that Catholic subjects in England feared that the revolutionary government would ‘lose little time in laying heavy imposts, perhaps confiscating, ecclesiastical property’. Wiseman received assurances from the Foreign Office that the British establishment in Rome, belonging to the English Catholic Church, would be given ‘the same privileges in regard to property held by them as are allowed to similar establishments at Rome belonging to the subjects of other countries’.69 Wiseman realised that if he brought this issue to the government’s attention it was bound to take action, as the sanctity of property was a fundamental principle of British government. Britain did not act to defend only English 67 68 69

G. Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia moderna, II: 1848–49, 2nd edn, Milan 1990, 428. Rambler, 14 Mar.–Apr.1849, vol. iii, pt xvi. Schiefen, Wiseman, 165.

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Catholic property but also to protect British commercial holdings. This was particularly the case when in mid-February the Roman republic called on all property-owners to contribute to a forced loan. On 24 February Freeborn informed Palmerston that he had discussed the application of this order to British property-holders with government officials including the minister of foreign affairs, Signor Carlo Busconi. They informed Freeborn that they ‘only considered British subjects holding landed property as liable’.70 The threat to church property was, however, complicated by the existence in Rome of holdings belonging to the Irish College. Freeborn told Palmerston on 10 February that John Ennis, the head of a group of Irish Augustinian monks, had asked the British government to protect all church land whether it belonged to the English or Irish Catholic Church. Ennis’s letter noted that the Irish Catholic religious establishment at Rome was the property of British subjects and therefore had to be considered as national property at least to the same extent as commercial and other private property.71 Due to the principle of the sanctity of property the British government had no choice but to comply with this request for protection, even though the Irish College in Rome was seen as an enemy of Britain’s Irish policy.72 The British protection of the Irish Church was not the only irony caused by the Roman republic’s anti-clericalism, for the whole issue of church property led the British government to exhibit an inconsistent attitude towards the ecclesiastical issue. The basic position of the British government was that it supported the secularisation of ecclesiastical offices but at the same time opposed the secularisation of ecclesiastical property in the Papal States. British problems over property were exacerbated by the fact that the Roman government found it difficult to control the anti-clerical activities of the people. On 10 July, after the fall the republic, Petre noted to Palmerston that the number of seizures of British property had been high because the government had no real authority and was not able to protect the seals against the people and their leaders who did not understand the difference between public and private property in this cause and to construe the affixing of the English seals into an act to protect the property of the Neapolitan government as the English were then becoming very unpopular on account of its protection of French subjects and of the supposed countenance given by the English government to the French intervention.73

While it would be an exaggeration to say that concern for property, both commercial and ecclesiastical, dominated British diplomacy towards the Roman republic, clearly the seizure of British holdings in Rome contributed to the desire to see the republic overthrown and law and order restored. 70 71 72 73

Petre to Temple, 24 Feb. 1849, FO 43/44. Petre to Hamilton, 10 Feb. 1849, ibid. Ibid. Petre to Lord Eddisbury, 10 July 1849, ibid.

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The issue of ecclesiastical property, especially landed property, was also related to the issue of the pope’s temporal power. When his temporal power was under attack, Pius IX emphasised in his pronouncements that the property of the Church was sacrosanct and could not be renounced. There was therefore no doubt that the pope and his cardinals could not accept the principle of the nationalisation of ecclesiastical property. Indeed, one of the reasons why the pope was determined to be restored to his throne in Rome was because of the threat to the possessions of the Catholic Church.74 Catholic subjects in Britain agreed with the pope. In April 1849 an article in the Rambler asserted that all Catholics conceded that the pope’s temporal power as ruler of Rome was inseparable from his spiritual power as bishop of Rome, and stated that it was impossible to modify this position. This meant that it was impossible for the pope to act as a constitutional monarch, ‘For what is a constitutional sovereign, such as the Queen of the British Empire? In very truth, a constitutional monarch is no independent monarch at all.’75 The argument continued to contrast the queen with the pope saying that the pope’s position was totally different from that of any other temporal ruler (sovereign) in the world, because, ‘He has relations with the rest of the nation of mankind which are unknown to the merely secular potentate.’76 This argument, by comparing the status of the queen in Britain with that of the pope, made a mockery of the contention that if Pius followed the advice of the British government he would still be an independent sovereign. It noted that in fact the status of the pope was that of an independent sovereign, superior to any other temporal monarchy on earth and thus any compromise of his power was impossible. In the eyes of the Rambler, the exile of Pius IX to Gaeta was a result of the circumstances in 1848 that had led to him becoming a limited sovereign.77 The Roman question and political refugees in Britain Arguments about the Roman republic did not end with its demise at the hands of the French government, but continued to reverberate during the rest of 1849 and into 1850. One of the subjects arising from the fall of the Roman republic which has attracted little attention, despite available documentation, is the arrival in Britain of Roman political refugees from July 1849 onwards. At the time this became a major topic of interest in British newspapers and periodicals, and is also reflected in contemporary private correspondence. Britain, as a liberal state that had accepted Mazzini and the other Italian 74 75 76 77

Candeloro, Storia dell’ Italia moderna, ii. 451. Rambler, Apr. 1849, vol. iii, pt xvi. Ibid. Ibid.

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political exiles after the 1831–2 revolutions in Italy, was a logical destination for the refugees. However, the arrival of large numbers of senior figures, such as Orsini, Spola, Aurelio Saffi and before long Mazzini himself, did prove to be something of an embarrassment for the government, for it led to a heated internal debate and problems with the other European powers. The escape of the majority of the political refugees was made possible by the British consular agent at Rome, John Freeborn, who issued on his own initiative, some 500 passports to revolutionaries who were trying to escape. As soon as Palmerston learnt of Freeborn’s action he realised that it could cause serious problems if such a large number of destitute refugees appeared at British ports. He therefore reproved Freeborn for granting these passports, stating that he had over-stepped his authority and observing that in any case ‘it does not appear what imminent or great personal danger threatened those 500 persons to whom you gave passports’.78 Responding to Palmerston on 5 August, Freeborn regretted that he had earned the foreign secretary’s disapproval. However, he asserted that, as Rome was in a state of confusion following occupation by the French army, a number of Roman people were in danger and sought safety. He therefore, with the assistance of some friends, established a fund to aid the refugees and decided to provide them with passports.79 Freeborn estimated that the actual number destined for England would be fewer than five hundred, and emphasised that these individuals were not poor immigrants, but were political exiles belonging to Italian noble families.80 Freeborn also wrote a private letter to Lord Minto concerning Palmerston’s criticism and the press’s accusation against him. Following the completion of his special mission to Rome in March 1848, Minto continued to be interested in Italian affairs. It might therefore be presumed that Freeborn intended to obtain Minto’s favour concerning the Italian refugees, hoping that he would have some influence with Russell and Palmerston.81 If Freeborn hoped that Minto could assist him he was mistaken, for Minto was widely seen as having failed in his mission of 1847–8. The Times on 6 August criticised him for failing in his endeavours to move the Italian people towards constitutional liberalism, stating that he had encouraged ‘extravagant ideas’ that could not be realised.82 Unfortunately for Freeborn, his actions soon became public knowledge, for some of the Roman political refugees surfaced in Malta, where the governor was still Richard More O’Ferrall. O’Ferrall caused controversy when he refused to accept the validity of the passports that Freeborn and other foreign consuls had issued to some of the Roman exiles. This incident soon 78 79 80 81 82

Palmerston to Freeborn, 23 July 1849, BPSP, 1851/LVI: Rome. Freeborn to Palmerston, 5 Aug. 1849, ibid. Ibid. Freeborn to Minto, 18 July 1849, Minto papers, MS 12035. Times, 6 Aug. 1849.

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reached the ears of the British press and was reported in widely differing ways. Punch, which had already expressed its sympathy for the Roman republic, led the charge against O’Ferrall reporting that when 200 Roman refugees, who had been granted English passports by the English consul in Civitàvecchia, arrived in Malta, the governor had not allowed them to land, even though there were sick and wounded among them. It went on to reveal that one fifth of the 200 refugees found means to sail in the Pipon for England, and the rest of them were still in the Mediterranean.83 The Times, referring to the same incident, took the opposite view. It noted in an article on 6 August that one personage among the Roman political refugees was a dangerous revolutionary, and that despite this fact, a British consul had provided him with a passport. The passport was, the article claimed, made out under a false name, that of an English nobleman, which raised the question of whether the consul himself was aware of this falsehood. If this was the case, it argued that this would constitute an abuse of consular privilege and that in turn raised the issue of why such an act should have been committed and whether the consul had acted alone. Suspecting the worse, The Times asserted that for a British diplomat to act on behalf of Roman republicans implied collaboration with the rebellion against the papal sovereign.84 The hint in The Times that Freeborn’s action might have had higher sanction fitted the suspicions of the time, for although the British government had officially opposed the Roman republic, it was suspected in conservative circles that figures such as Palmerston and Minto still personally sympathised with the republican political exiles. Indeed, the Quarterly Review, a conservative periodical, went so far as to suggest in September that Palmerston himself would take pleasure from the presence of the exiles in Britain, and that Mazzini would benefit as he would, ‘now have the advantage of a personal communication with Lord Palmerston, who will have the best opportunity of ascertaining the views of leading republicans from the fountain-head, and of communicating to them in return the intentions of Her Majesty’s Cabinet’.85 It can be seen from the Freeborn and Malta incident that British policy towards the Roman republic had provoked a widening gap between the conservative and radical elements in British public opinion. In particular English radical intellectuals who had political links with Mazzini and other Italian republican exiles in his circle, now began to express strong support for the refugees. On 8 September the Northern Star reported that an Italian Refugee Fund had come into existence. Its committee members included old friends of Mazzini, such as James Stansfeld and William Ashurst, but also writers such as Charles Dickens and W. M. Thackeray, and MPs including 83 84 85

Punch xvii, Aug. 1849, 56. Times, 6 Aug. 1849. Quarterly Review (1849), 608.

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Richard Cobden and Joseph Hume. The fund called for money to be raised for the refugees who were praised for their bravery and devotion to liberty. The same edition of the newspaper also published a letter that Mazzini had sent to an English friend in which he railed against the British government for not having done more to assist the republic.86 The radicals were not, however, the only group that lobbied on behalf of the exiles, for in addition the anti-Catholic policies of the Roman republic led British Protestant associations also to become involved. The most vocal of the Protestant groups involved in support of the republican and anti-papal cause was the Evangelical Alliance. This was an ultra-Protestant group, which held countless public meetings, lectures and sermons on the evils of popery. Its anti-Catholic position was also developed in printed sources, most notably in the pages of The Record, an evangelical journal. The Evangelical Alliance was different from other Protestant groups in that it was well connected both domestically and internationally, and was able to put pressure on government to listen to its views.87 The Achilli affair The growing strength of anti-clerical opinion and the central role of the Evangelical Alliance was particularly important in the events surrounding the arrest and subsequent release of Dr Giacinto Achilli. Achilli was a former Dominican priest who had converted to Protestantism in 1842, and was involved as a republican in Rome in speaking out against the corruption of the Catholic Church. After his conversion Achilli had settled in Britain, and in the summer of 1848 had joined the Evangelical Alliance. However, in January 1849, inspired by the pope’s flight, he returned to Rome to take part in the republic as a member of the Circolo Popolare. He was very enthusiastic about what he saw in Rome and wrote on 7 February to Sir Culling Eardley, one of the executive members of the Evangelical Alliance, about the festival to celebrate the opening the constituent assembly saying that, ‘I have never seen so much joy among the people on this occasion’, and asserted that ‘the Romans desired no more Pope and no more Popery. Let God protect us and we shall advance in his truth’.88 Achilli regarded the Roman constituent assembly as a fulfilment of this movement, and was pleased to find that his anti-clerical ideas were similar to those proposed by the Circolo Popolare. He became involved in forwarding his opinions to the press and told Eardley on 7 April that his writings were about 86 87 88

Northern Star, 8 Sept. 1849. Wolffe, Protestant crusade. Giacinto Achilli to C. E. Eardley, 7 Feb. 1849, in C. E. Eardley, The imprisonment and deliberation of Dr Giacinto Achilli with some account of his previous history and labours, London 1850, 9–14.

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the true meaning of Christianity and were ‘against the opposite errors of the papal system’. He also observed to Eardley that the fall of papal authority had revealed the true character of the Catholic Church’s despotism, as visitors to the papal prisons had witnessed ‘the horrid dungeons, where the victims of the papacy have been incarcerated’.89 Achilli was still in Rome when it fell to the forces of General Oudinot, and was subsequently arrested in late July and held in detention by the French army. No sooner had the news of Achilli’s arrest arrived in England on 2 August than members of the Evangelical Alliance took prompt measures, in France as well as in Britain, to obtain his release. The statement circulated by the leadership of the Alliance to its members noted that two days after General Oudinot had ceded his authority to the cardinal vicars of Rome on 27 July, Achilli was arrested and incarcerated within the wall of the inquisition.90 The committee of the British branch of the Alliance decided to lobby Palmerston, and in addition, the committee of the Italian Society of London, an associated group of Italian exiles, had an interview with Drouyn de Lhuys. The British branch of the Evangelical Alliance, which held its annual meeting at Glasgow from 12 to 14 October, adopted a resolution in which British Christians expressed their sympathy with Dr Achilli. They agreed to condemn the conduct of the inquisition for bringing accusations against a prisoner without allowing him to communicate with his friends, and without any evidence being heard in his defence, and expressed confidence that the French government would regard Achilli’s liberation as justice.91 To put pressure on the French government it was decided that a deputation should be sent to Paris, which if necessary would go even to Rome. Lord Wriothesly Russell, the half-brother of the prime minister, and the Revd Edward Bickersteth, both members of the Evangelical Alliance, were chosen to form part of this deputation. Eardley recorded in an account of the Achilli affair published in 1850 that they contacted the French branch of the Alliance which co-operated with them to rescue Achilli, and that the British ambassador in France had helped to mediate with the French minister of foreign affairs.92 In defending Achilli from the charges against him Eardley asserted in his book that it was natural that Achilli should sympathise with the republican movement in Rome for it stood against the corruption of the Romish Church, and that he could not help but ‘rejoice in the overthrow of the most hateful government in Christendom’. Eardley added a comparison between the cases of Rome and Ireland stating that ‘he [Achilli] refrained from any participation in secular politics. It would be well if the Roman Catholic 89 90 91 92

Achilli to Eardley, 7 Apr. 1849, ibid. 19. Eardley to Evangelical Alliance members, 14 Aug. 1849, ibid. 29. Ibid. 37–47. Ibid. 49–51.

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priests in Ireland could say as much! The reader in perusing these letters will make allowance of the position of the Christian man in the so-called ‘ “State of the Church” ’.93 Even Petre, who as a Catholic might have been expected to sympathise with Achilli’s arrest, commented in a letter to Palmerston on the danger of any vindictive proceedings against a man so well known, and whose case was taken up by thousands. On 25 September Petre informed Palmerston That when Protestant writers and speakers accused the church of Rome of holding persecuting tenets, they were always met by the assertion that religious persecution had been the sin of imperfect civilisation and enlightenment, and that nothing of the sort was or could be, practised now. If Achilli lost his liberty, and perhaps his life for conscience sake what would the world say?94

As it turned out Achilli’s case did not deteriorate into a grave issue involving political relations between Britain, France and Rome, partly because Achilli himself was not a leading figure in the Roman republic, but also because France did not regard Achilli’s detention as a major issue. In fact the French authorities, in collaboration with British representatives in Rome and in defiance of the papal authorities, conspired in January 1850 to set Achilli free. By the autumn and winter of 1849–50 the situation therefore was that while a few in the British elite felt sympathy for the exiled pope, most English people expressed anti-papal feelings. After Achilli’s appearance before the English public in 1850, revealing the maliciousness and corruption of the Catholic Church, and the publication of Eardley’s account of his incarceration, this sentiment would grow apace, laying the ground that would lead eventually to the anti-papal movement of 1850. Although the British government was very reluctant to get involved in military intervention against the Roman republic, it eventually had to agree to the French expedition. It was discovered during the crisis that Britain could do little itself to prevent a clash between France and Austria, which was avoided simply due to the Austrian realisation of the need for caution and not because of Britain’s diplomatic contribution. In addition, Palmerston’s hope that, despite the use of military power, the French would still favour the installation of the pope as a constitutional monarch, was disappointed. In the April allocution of 1849 Pius IX declared that the adoption of a constitution and liberal politics in the Papal States was impossible because of the difficulty of co-ordinating papal spiritual power with constitutional liberalism. Ultimately he clarified his anti-constitutional

93 94

Ibid. 57. Petre to Palmerston, 25 Sept. 1849; Palmerston to Petre, 28 Sept. 1849, BPSP, 1851/LVII: Rome.

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inclination in public in September after the collapse of the Roman republic. Neither the British nor the French governments could persuade the pope to compromise. The Roman republic’s declaration of the end of papal temporal power brought divergent reactions from the British government and radical public opinion. The British government was faced with a difficult situation. It was restricted by its inability to do anything but support the restoration of the pope as the legitimate sovereign ruler of the Papal States; to have followed a different policy would have been to break with the order established under the Concert of Europe which would set a dangerous precedent. In addition, the Roman republic’s radical and anti-clerical policies, such as the nationalisation of Catholic Church property, was not acceptable to the British government, because this policy directly affected the interests of British subjects, including those of the English and Irish Catholic Church. There were therefore a number of pressures that forced the British government to follow an essentially cautious policy, even though Palmerston had his doubts about French policy and feared that Pius would turn his back on his previous reforms. At the same time an important segment of the British public increasingly expressed anti-Catholic sentiments and supported the abolition of the temporal power of the papacy. The British radical public identified the power of the Catholic Church with despotism, and expressed admiration for Mazzini’s republicanism, which was based upon their support for the goal of a liberal and democratic society. These ideas were transferred to Britain when republican exiles to Britain exacerbated the English public’s anti-Catholic prejudices. The stage was thus set for a confrontation between the government and the public over policy towards Rome, which would reach a climax in 1850–1.

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The Restoration of the Hierarchy

6

The Restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy and Anti-Catholicism in Britain The restoration of papal authority in Rome in 1850 led to new problems for the British government. Initially the difficulties were confined to the Italian peninsula where the pope’s increasing conservatism led to a clash with Piedmont, which was trying to curb the power of the Catholic Church within its borders. The year 1850, however, was also to have domestic ramifications for Britain, for it saw not only the restoration of papal authority, but also the re-establishment of the Catholic hierarchy in England. It was no coincidence that these two incidents took place in the same year, for the return of the pope to Rome was a precondition for the achievement of Cardinal Wiseman’s ambition. Wiseman’s elevation to the rank of cardinal and archbishop of Westminster was significant for British politics, for by provoking the spectre of a Roman Catholic threat to Britain, it had the effect of shifting the issue of papal temporal power from foreign to domestic affairs. Moreover, the timing of this move was highly unfortunate for the British government because at this point the question of the Queen’s Colleges in Ireland was once again coming to centre stage and thus Britain needed to influence papal thinking on this issue. Torn between the desire to placate the domestic ‘no popery’ lobby and the need not to burn its bridges with Rome, Russell reacted to the re-establishment of the hierarchy by introducing the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, beginning a legislative battle that would lead to the fatal weakening of his administration. The restoration of papal authority in Rome After the French army seized Rome in order to restore papal authority, it took a considerable time for the pope to return to the city, because he thought that the conditions for his restoration suggested by France were inadequate. One reason for this was Pius IX’s continued resistance to French demands that he support liberal reforms.1 Another was that it was necessary to wait until the people in Rome had been pacified following the intervention and the collapse of the Roman republic. 1

Martina, Pio IX, i. 391.

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In August 1849 a French emissary, C. F. Corcelle, was sent from Rome to Gaeta to persuade the pope to consider an early return, but failed to overcome his doubts. Negotiations were then transferred to Paris and by January 1850 the pope had agreed in principle to return. On 28 January 1850 the French government sent a letter to the pontiff congratulating him on his intention. This, however, proved to be premature, since Cardinal Antonelli, the secretary of state, was still not convinced of the wisdom of an immediate papal restoration. He regarded this as a new intervention by the French and therefore turned back to his old project for concerted action by the Catholic powers.2 After further negotiations between the pope, the European powers and the other Italian states, Pius IX finally decided to return to Rome on 11 April. Following his return, the triumvirate of cardinals that had exercised authority in his absence was dissolved, and power was concentrated in the hands of Cardinal Antonelli.3 Petre witnessed the enthusiastic response to the papal procession into Rome, and observed to Hamilton on 13 April that Pius had been received ‘remarkably well, and most respectably . . . in a manner . . . widely different from that in which he used to be greeted by the hireling mobs of the Clubs’.4 Petre also observed that ‘the poorest of the population joined in the rejoicings’, which was not surprising since 25,000 dollars had been distributed to the poor on the order of the pope. The English traveller Cochrane recorded the same events, noting that ‘It seemed to me that the population never slept; they were perambulating the streets chanting Viva Pio Nono all night; there was the same crowd, with the same excitement.’ He lamented, however, that ‘The history of the late two years has taught us to set very little reliance on any demonstration of public opinion’, and recorded his belief that the future was uncertain: Thus far prognostications have been defeated. The Pope is in the Vatican. Let us hope the prophets of evil may again find their predictions falsified; but alas! It is impossible to be blind to the fact that within the last few days the happiness of many homes has been destroyed and that the triumph of the one has been purchased by the sorrow of the many.5

Freeborn’s opinion on the return of the pope was equally pessimistic. He told the Foreign Office that he expected that the reactionaries would neutralise the ‘good intentions of His Holiness’ and that consequently ‘tranquillity . . . must depend upon foreign bayonets’.6 This pessimism was not misplaced. Buttressed by the French and Austrian 2 3 4 5 6

Ibid. 412. Coppa, Antonelli, 80–1. Petre (Rome) to Hamilton (Florence), 13 Apr. 1850, FO 79/143. Cochrane, Young Italy, 290–304. Freeborn (Rome) to Palmerston, 13 Apr. 1850, FO 43/49.

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military presence in Rome and the legations respectively, the pope became increasingly reactionary and rejected all reforms that seemed likely to weaken papal government. Pius returned to the Holy See, unencumbered by any conditions other than his published Motuproprio of 12 September 1849, but was slow to introduce, even to a limited degree, the reforms promised in that address. Relying on France and Austria to maintain him in power, he was in any case no longer an independent temporal sovereign and thus preferred to enhance his authority by using his absolute power over the Catholic Church.7 Louis Napoleon was content to allow this and accepted the philosophy of reactionary conservatism that the cardinals now imposed upon the Church. Resigned acceptance that the pope would not introduce any reforms was not limited to Louis Napoleon, but can also be seen in the practical attitude of Palmerston.8 Realising that the papacy would be unresponsive, and that in any case the pope was in thrall to the Catholic concert of powers, Palmerston no longer bothered to urge the need for reform. If any further evidence were needed that British advice on papal domestic matters was unwelcome, it arrived in the continuing controversy about the role Britain had taken in the summer of 1849 in assisting some of the leading republicans to flee from Rome. In the aftermath of the fall of the republic the papal authorities soon discovered that Freeborn, as the British consular agent in Rome, had fabricated a number of passports to enable Roman republicans to escape from the Papal States to Malta. The pope was deeply offended by Freeborn’s imprudent action, and in July 1849 the papal nuncio in Paris had put pressure on Lord Normanby to have Freeborn withdrawn and prosecuted for his irregularity.9 Normanby admitted in this conversation that Freeborn had been culpable, but stated that he was protected against dismissal by Lord Minto and the Foreign Office.10 Palmerston’s position was that he agreed that Freeborn had been in error, but he asserted that it was necessary to find out more about the political situation in which this incident had occurred. After one year the issue had still not been resolved, and on 10 August 1850 Antonelli decided, in the light of the failure of the Paris talks, to negotiate confidentially with Palmerston by passing correspondence to London through Petre. Antonelli insisted that Freeborn had acted against the interests of the Papal States, and therefore asked the British government to replace him. Antonelli particularly emphasised Freeborn’s assistance to Dr Achilli, who since his escape had become an outspoken critic of the papacy

7 8 9

Martina, Pio IX, i. 391–2. Scott, The Roman question, 83. Antonelli to Normanby (Paris), 7 July 1849, ASV, Archivio della Nunziatura in Parigi, no. 74. 10 Martina, Pio IX, i. 351.

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in England.11 Petre, who as a Catholic was keener to avoid offending the pope than Freeborn and Palmerston, duly informed the Foreign Office. Palmerston’s reply to Antonelli’s request was harshly dismissive. On 24 August the foreign secretary wrote to Petre that he had no intention whatsoever of relieving Freeborn who had had acted in perfect accordance with his duty.12 Palmerston attempted to justify Freeborn’s action against the Vatican’s accusation. To Petre, in a further letter of 28 August, he stated that ‘Freeborn acted in perfect accordance with what Lord Palmerston considered to have been his duty and all his acts have either been the result of previous instructions or have been sanctioned by subsequent approval.’13 Palmerston even defended Freeborn’s action saying that because of the French army’s occupation of Rome, people who were involved in the Roman republic could not have escaped and would have been killed without the passports that Freeborn had issued. What is noticeable about this issue is that although Palmerston had in 1849 admonished Freeborn over his conduct, he was not willing in 1850 to give in to papal pressure to remove him as consular agent. This was a matter of diplomatic principle that outweighed the need to curry favour with the papacy. However, in other areas of policy the British government was still prepared to do what it could to conciliate the papacy. This was not easy for the existence after 1849 of a concert of the Catholic powers, whose major concern was ‘the Roman question’, meant the exclusion of Britain from international consultations about the future of the papacy. However, the need to provide a counter-balance to French and Austrian influence and the continuing desire to influence the papacy in regard to Irish issues meant that Britain maintained its interest in Rome and this influenced its diplomacy on continuing problems in Italy. British concern was manifested in attitudes towards the growing antagonism in 1850 between the papacy and Piedmont over ecclesiastical rights in the latter kingdom. The specific issue that led to confrontation between the two was the dispute about the Siccardi laws that arose in March 1850. In this month the Piedmontese minister of justice and ecclesiastical affairs, Count Giuseppe Siccardi, presented legislation to the parliament in Turin, which included the introduction of civil matrimony and the termination of the clergy’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The papal authorities reacted angrily to this move. In a formal protest Antonelli responded to Siccardi’s legislation by observing that the pope could not remain indifferent to the harm done to the Church’s power and that Piedmont’s actions violated the concordat, for a Catholic state could not unilaterally introduce changes which might prove

11 Petre to Palmerston, 10 Aug. 1850, Palmerston papers, GC/PE/117; Martina, Pio IX, i. 403–4. 12 Palmerston to Petre, 24 Aug. 1850, Palmerston papers, GC/PE/118. 13 Palmerston to Petre, 28 Aug. 1850, ibid. GC/PE/118/1.

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detrimental to the Church.14 This protest did not, however, have any effect and in April the Siccardi laws passed through the Sardinian senate. The next step in the crisis came when towards the end of April the archbishop of Turin, Luigi Fransoni, forbade his priests from appearing before lay courts without permission from a superior. The Piedmontese authorities reacted to this provocation by imprisoning Fransoni for one month. On his release he again stirred up trouble, this time by ordering that the last rites should not be administered to the dying minister of agriculture unless he denounced the Siccardi measures. Such intemperance led in August to his arrest once again and a short term in prison, after which Fransoni went into exile. Rome reacted with fury to the course of events in Piedmont and when Fransoni was arrested for the second time asked Austria, France and Spain to assist in bringing Piedmont to heel. Moreover, on 2 September Antonelli wrote to Turin stating that using judicial law against the archbishop was a clear insult to the Church, and expressing his intention of sending a formal complaint under the pontiff’s name in order to demand compensation.15 In response to the Vatican’s threatening letter, Piedmont did not hesitate to show its strong hostility to papal authority and, in line with public opinion, refused to compromise.16 France tried to encourage reconciliation between the two parties, but Piedmont refused to accept the French suggestion that the anti-clerical legislation should be withdrawn. Abercromby informed Palmerston on 19 September 1850 that the Piedmontese prime minister, Massimo d’Azeglio, had told the French government that he and his colleagues were eager to settle things with Rome, but only on condition that the king’s sovereignty and the constitution be maintained.17 Abercromby also observed that the French secretary in Turin, M. Pirest, whom he described as ‘an insincere ambitious intriguer’, had advised d’Azeglio to sacrifice Siccardi, but that d’Azeglio had firmly rejected the French suggestion. Abercromby was very critical of the French intervention, in spite of the fact that Britain had originally co-operated with France to restore papal authority, saying that ‘The French at Turin are acting a very shabby part’ in their effort to persuade Piedmont to surrender almost unconditionally.18 As the religious rivalry between Piedmont and Rome developed into political antagonism, their confrontation became of interest not only to France but also to Britain. Drawing on the traditional historiography of this period it might be assumed that, with Rome lost to reaction and Piedmont appearing as the last remaining beacon of liberalism in Italy, Britain would have taken 14 15

Coppa, Antonelli, 78–80. Antonelli to Turin, 2 Sept. 1850, ASV, Archivio Segreteria di Stato, epoca moderna, no. 219. 16 Abercromby (Turin) to Palmerston, 19 Sept. 1850, FO 67/170. 17 Abercromby to Palmerston, 19 Sept. 1850, Palmerston papers, GA/AB/225. 18 Ibid.

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an avowedly pro-Sardinian attitude in this dispute.19 Certainly British radicals were more favourable towards Piedmont, which reflected the growth of anti-papal sentiment after the restoration of the papal authority in Rome.20 However, the British government’s attitude towards the crisis was more ambivalent. In late May d’Azeglio tried to involve Britain directly when he wrote to Palmerston asking for Britain’s military protection and co-operation in the diplomatic field. Palmerston made a positive response to d’Azeglio on 4 June with regard to the proposal for general diplomatic co-operation, and recorded that the British government wished to see the continued independence of the Sardinian monarchy.21 However, after this fairly supportive statement, Palmerston expressed his reluctance to assume any obligation to come to Piedmont’s defence, stating that, ‘It is the habitual policy of the Government of Great Britain to keep itself free with regard to future events.’22 In the end Palmerston thus rejected any hint of an alliance. Palmerston’s lukewarm attitude arose not only from Britain’s traditional reluctance to commit itself to alliances, but was also due to the knowledge that Piedmont still intended to wrest northern Italy from Austria, which would, if an alliance were signed, involve Britain in war.23 In addition, his hesitation sprang from his desire to restrict French influence over both Piedmont and the Papal States. Within the Foreign Office it was believed that France was partly responsible for the reactionary tendency in papal policy and that it was also attempting to give conservative political advice to Piedmont. Against this background it was assumed that obvious British support for Siccardi’s legislation might damage anglo-Roman religious relations and thus strengthen French influence over the Vatican. Therefore the only way to counter France was to maintain reasonable ties with both Italian states but not to favour either one. Hence Britain could make only limited gestures of support towards Piedmont, most notably in signing a commercial entente on 6 July 1850.24 Apart from its concern for the balance of power in Italy, Britain also had other considerations in mind, notably its continuing efforts to counter the influence of the Irish College in Rome. By the start of 1850 the situation regarding Irish affairs was more desperate than ever, for in February the head of the Irish College, Paul Cullen, was made bishop of Armagh and thus primate of all Ireland. This was a disaster for the British government because Cullen was viewed as an inveterate enemy of the Queen’s Colleges, as an ally of MacHale, and was clearly close to key figures in the papal administration. 19

See, for example, the summary of British attitudes towards Italy in D. Beales, England and Italy, 1859–60, London 1961, 19–35. 20 Northern Star, 28 Sept. 1850; Reynold’s Newspaper, 6 Oct. 1850. 21 Palmerston to Massimo Azeglio, 4 June 1850, ASMAE, La legazione sarda in Londra. 22 Ibid. 23 Scott, The Roman question, 95. 24 Abercromby to Palmerston, 18 Aug. 1850, Palmerston papers, GC/AB/223.

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This appointment therefore seemed to make it even less likely that the Catholic Church in Ireland would agree to accept British policy. Such an assessment proved to be correct, for in September 1850 a synod at Thurles organised by Cullen voted to condemn collaboration with the colleges. In this troubled atmosphere it was clear that Britain had once again to try to influence the papal attitude towards the Queen’s Colleges and that this could only be done by sending a special diplomatic mission to Rome. In April, in his last talk with the pope before Pius returned to Rome, Temple had received the impression that this would be an acceptable exercise. In August, faced with the convening of the Synod of Thurles, Palmerston and Russell decided to act. Palmerston favoured employing a pro-Whig Irish Catholic politician, Richard L. Sheil, who had been a friend of Daniel O’Connell, as the special envoy. Sheil, Palmerston noted to the queen, was ‘a man of great ability and of very agreeable manners; He is a Catholic but not a Bigot; and he is intimately acquainted with Irish affairs and parties’.25 In order to pave the way for Sheil, in mid-August Russell met Dr Wiseman, who was apparently about to travel to Rome to receive his cardinal’s hat. Russell stressed his desire for good relations with the papacy and asked Wiseman to see if the pope was as well disposed as before to the idea of a British mission to present Britain’s views on Ireland. While waiting for a reply to this overture another avenue appeared, for early in September Sir George Hamilton died, thus leaving a vacancy at Florence. Russell and Palmerston agreed that Sheil should be offered the post and should combine it with the special mission to Rome. Russell did not, however, hold out much hope that such a mission would be successful. On 1 October he observed wearily to Clarendon that ‘I fear that an angel from Heaven would have little effect at Rome if he brought credentials from our Queen.’26 Russell’s pessimism was well-founded, for the new campaign to influence Pius soon ran into an obstacle that surpassed any to date. In October the restoration of the English Catholic hierarchy was announced and consequently by November 1850 anglo-papal relations were in turmoil. To understand why this sudden shift took place it is necessary to look at the Catholic question in the context of British domestic policies. The re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy As has been demonstrated in chapter 3, an important aspect of anglo-Vatican relations in this period was the issue of the re-establishment of the English Catholic hierarchy. In 1848 this subject had remained on the periphery of the relationship, its major significance being that it inspired Wiseman and 25 26

Palmerston to Victoria, 18 Aug. 1850, Royal Archives, Windsor, VIC/J10/66. Russell to Clarendon 1 Oct. 1850, Clarendon papers, box 26.

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Shrewsbury to support Russell’s diplomacy in Rome. However, in 1850–1 Wiseman’s success in restoring the hierarchy came to occupy centre stage. Since 1847 Wiseman had been involved in negotiations with Propaganda Fide in Rome to seek sanction for the re-establishment of the hierarchy. His goal became a reality on 29 September 1850 when, after an intermission of nearly 300 years, the privilege of being governed directly by Rome was restored to English Catholics. The re-establishment of the Catholic hierarchy in England entailed the expansion of the number of dioceses from eight to twelve, the promotion of the vicar-apostolic of the London district, Cardinal Wiseman, to the position of archbishop of Westminster, and meant that the English Catholic Church which had up until then been indirectly ruled by Propaganda Fide was now to be governed by the Vatican directly. News of the papal bull was first published in The Times on 9 October. Over the next few days a number of hostile editorials appeared in the British press but it was not until the publication of Wiseman’s first pastoral letter in The Times on 29 October that British opinion became really enflamed. The language used by Wiseman in his letter to English Catholics was widely regarded as arrogant, for he made a number of provocative statements regarding Catholicism’s bitter history in England and its potential for the future, noting at one point that Your beloved country has received a place among the fair churches which are normally constituted from the splendid aggregate of Catholic Communion: Catholic England has been restored to its orbit in the ecclesiastical firmament, from which its light had long vanished, and begins now anew its course of regularly adjusted action, round the centre of unity, the source of jurisdiction, of light and vigour.

He also referred controversially to what he considered to be England’s ‘past sorrows and past ingratitude’.27 This letter has been cited by some historians as Wiseman’s greatest mistake. His error was that he stressed not only the spiritual side of the restoration of the hierarchy, but also its temporal element which created fear among the more extreme members of the British establishment and the people that the pope intended to exercise both political and spiritual sovereignty over Britain. In phrasing his letter in this way Wiseman undermined the activities of his fellow clergy who had tried to dampen down Protestant fears. For example, on 22 October the new bishop of Birmingham, William Ullathorne, who had played a leading part in the negotiations in Rome, had written to The Times stating categorically that ‘For my part, engaged as I have been in the negotiation throughout, I know that no political objects are contemplated in it.’28 27

6, 7 Oct. 1850 on the restoration of hierarchy, Wiseman papers, Westminster Diocesan Archives, ser. 15, pope and bishop, item 7 (220), I pastorals, 1–6. 28 Times, 22 Oct. 1850.

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One of the reasons then why the restoration became so controversial was that Wiseman’s Roman style of Catholicism created more enemies than necessary, because of his ultramontane sympathies and his lack of knowledge about the situation of the Catholics in Britain.29 Ironically, however, his triumphant language was mirrored by some in the Catholic Church who held more liberal religious views. For example, on 27 October Newman, whom Wiseman had criticised for his liberalism as recently as September, gloried in the restoration and proclaimed in a controversial sermon that God was leading England back to ‘the true church’.30 It was not, however, only the way in which the restoration was carried out that caused hostility, for in addition it has to be said that the decision to reestablish the hierarchy at this particular time was a grave error considering recent events both in the domestic as well as the international context. Within Britain in the 1840s anti-Catholicism, inspired by events in Ireland and dislike of Irish immigration, and hostility towards what were seen as ritualistic neo-Catholic practices or ‘Tractarianism’ within the Church of England had become two of the main issues within politics and society. In particular by 1850 Tractarianism had become a very controversial issue, symbolised by the Gorham case. This dispute centred upon the struggle between the bishop of Exeter, a reputed Tractarian, and the Revd George Gorham over the style and meaning of baptism. The privy council, which delivered its verdict in the summer of 1850, supported Gorham and attacked the bishop of Exeter for being too ritualistic and too close to Catholicism. The case become a symbol of anti-Tractarianism and meant that strong hostility against the Tractarians already existed just prior to the reestablishment of the hierarchy. With regard to the international context, as noted above, the destruction of the Roman republic had outraged radical public opinion in Britain and led to a revival of anti-papal sentiment. In addition anti-Catholic sentiment was stirred up by Louis Napoleon’s pandering to the Catholic vote in France, and the Habsburg’s brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolt. Moreover, anti-Catholics in Britain could not help but draw a parallel between the pope’s aggression towards Britain and his recent attempts to browbeat Piedmont into submission and renounce its anti-clerical legislation.31 Another problem, again of Wiseman’s own creation, was that he had not prepared the British government for this dramatic re-establishment of the hierarchy. This was a dire mistake, for by acting in the way that he did, Wiseman made the government look foolish and pushed them on to the defensive. In doing so he virtually guaranteed that the government as well as 29

R. J. Schiefen, ‘Anglo-Gallicanism in nineteenth-century Britain’, Catholic Historical Review lxiii (1977), 89. 30 J. H. Newman, Sermons preached on various occasions, London 1898, 121–59. On the Wiseman–Newman dispute see Holmes, More Roman than Rome, 72. 31 Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 245.

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the general public would greet the hierarchy with hostility. In later years Wiseman claimed that he had in fact raised the issue in his meeting with the prime minister in August 1850 and gained the impression that the government would not oppose the hierarchy.32 However, there is no evidence that the matter was even discussed at this interview; indeed Wiseman informed Sheil in November that he had not mentioned anything to Russell about the hierarchy.33 When news of Pius’ and Wiseman’s actions reached London, recent controversies over Catholicism and Tractarianism helped to stir up attacks against the new hierarchy. Subsequently there was a great outpouring of anti-Catholic sentiment in Britain directed at what was termed the ‘papal aggression’. The restoration was categorised as being equivalent in a religious sense to a ‘papal invasion of England’ and was represented in political and legal terms as being an attack upon the queen’s sovereignty as head of the Church of England as well as of the state. Indeed, the queen wrote indignantly in her diary on 29 October that the papal bull had stated that ‘England was again returned to the member of Catholic powers’ and that Wiseman has asked the faithful to pray for the pope ‘before me’.34 Accordingly senior figures and bodies within Britain immediately acted to protest against the papal action and defend the sovereignty of the queen. Most notably on 4 November Lord John Russell wrote an open letter to the bishop of Durham in which he vigorously attacked the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy, criticised the Tractarians, and promised to defend the position of the Anglican Church.35 His action was widely applauded by the press and was soon followed by a flow of protestations of loyalty to the crown. For example, in early December deputations from the corporation of London and the universities of Oxford and Cambridge went to Windsor to petition the queen, with Prince Albert in his capacity as chancellor of Cambridge University presenting the petition on behalf of that institution.36 When Wiseman returned to London early in November he tried to calm the situation by issuing his famous ‘Appeal to the English people’ in which he replied to attacks on the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy. Wiseman asserted that the internal nature of the reorganisation of the Catholic Church in England would not affect the royal prerogative, insisted on tolerance as a right and argued that the establishment of a canonical hierarchy was essential to Catholicism. In one passage, for example, Wiseman noted that, ‘The Royal supremacy is not more admitted by the Scottish Kirk, by Baptists, Methodists, Quakers, Independents, Presbyterian, Unitarians, and other dissenters, than 32 33 34 35

Machin, Politics and the Churches, 216. Clarendon to Russell, 19 Nov. 1850, RA, VIC/J10/28. RA, QVJ, entry for 29 Oct. 1850. On Russell’s letter see Paz, Popular anti-Catholicism, 10–12, and Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 246–51. 36 Northern Star, 14 Dec. 1850.

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by the Catholics.’37 However, Wiseman’s appeal was also aggressive, and illustrated the extent to which he was capable of showing contempt for the Church of England, which he attacked on several occasions. He accused the Anglican bishops and clergy of using anti-papal feeling to regain lost influence, because of a fear of increasing Catholic influence in England. Naturally this did little to placate anti-Catholic opinion. Public opinion and the ‘papal aggression’ The establishment’s counter-attack against the ‘papal aggression’ and Wiseman’s controversial reaction provoked and encouraged the rise of a ‘no popery’ movement among the wider public. In the months following the restoration there were many demonstrations, petitions and pamphlets attacking the papacy. At the local level it was feared that the Anglican parishes would be taken over by the newly-established Catholic dioceses, and that at the national level Catholicism would become the national religion meaning that the Church of England and its head, the queen, would be abolished. It was held that the Catholics, who had been used to a weak position before, were now stronger, and it was believed that they aimed to take revenge after a history of 300 years of persecution. Much of the material published emphasised the patriotic duty of Englishmen to resist Rome and repeated the sort of anti-Catholic rhetoric that had become part of British culture, such as attacks on Catholic superstition and intolerance. For example, ‘The pope’s bull!’: an address to the people of England by a Protestant patriot, published in December 1850, announced that The real objection is to be found in the true and genuine character of Popery, which renders it entirely different from all forms of Protestant Dissent; it is the dark design in the background of this measure; it is the intolerance of Popery; it is the claim it has often asserted and never abandoned to grasp territory for the purpose of governing it.38

This kind of feeling was also expressed in items such as the eighteen pamphlets on the Anglican versus Roman Catholic controversy entitled ‘Is the pope coming to England?’ and in many satirical articles, poems and cartoons in Punch, including one entitled ‘daring attempt to break into a church’, in which the pope and Cardinal Wiseman could be seen as two burglars making a forced entry into the Anglican Church.39 These ideas and reactions went far beyond the reality of the situation, but the problem was

37 38

Times, 21 Nov. 1850. The pope’s bull!: an address to the people of England by a Protestant patriot, in Dec. 1850, London 1850, 5. 39 Punch xix, Nov. 1850, 207. See p. 148 below.

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‘The thin end of the wedge: daring attempt to break into a church’

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that Wiseman’s first pastoral letter and his subsequent ‘Appeal to the English people’ implied an intention to subvert the state. As well as anti-Catholic pamphlets and newspaper articles there were also clear manifestations of anti-papal sentiment by ordinary people, as we can see in the Guy Fawkes Day demonstrations of 1850. A most unfortunate aspect of the Catholic Church’s timing for the restoration was that it took place in the early autumn: Wiseman’s pastoral letter was dated 7 October, but was not read in London churches until 28 October. This was particularly inopportune for it was just eight days before Guy Fawkes Day (5 November) which was traditionally the day when the British displayed and revelled in their anti-Catholic traditions. In 1850, in the light of the above events, Guy Fawkes Day saw a particularly virulent outpouring of anti-papal sentiment. In southern England there were several large-scale ‘no popery’ demonstrations. These protests featured many characteristics – elaborate effigies of Pius IX and Wiseman dressed in full pontifical robes and sometimes horned; men dressed as monks and nuns; a torchlight procession; anti-Catholic, patriotic and sometimes anti-Tractarian banners; and a ceremonial burning in a public place, accompanied by patriotic songs. In some places there was also a more violent side to the protests; Owen Chadwick records that a number of Catholic churches were stoned and that fireworks were thrown on to the roof of the Catholic Oratory in London.40 The Chartist newspaper, the Northern Star, reported in detail in its edition of 9 November 1850 the people’s enthusiasm for the ‘no popery’ movement in several parts of London. It recorded that particularly large processions and demonstrations had taken place in the centre of London, where effigies of Cardinal Wiseman were carried around the West End and the East End, but that other protests had taken place in Richmond, Hampton Court, Kensington, Blackheath Park, Guildford and Godalming. It noted that generally ‘The Guys were received with more than usual welcome by the populace’, and that, with the return of Cardinal Wiseman, his ‘red hat’ had become one of the symbolic targets: This pageant included an animate effigy of the new Cardinal Wiseman attired in the gaudy canonical robes of the Romish Church, and wearing the red and broad-brimmed hat appertaining to his office, St Imprudence.41

The greatest insult to the pope and Cardinal Wiseman was the use of animals dressed in Catholic robes: Whilst the fireworks were being let off, a large figure, representing His Holiness on a donkey was lead into the ground. The animal wore a cardinal’s hat and round his neck was hung a large bill on which was printed ‘Wiseman’.

40 41

O. Chadwick, The Victorian Church, i, London 1966, 294. Northern Star, 9 Nov. 1850.

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Several persons, representing ‘right rev. fathers’, walked at the side of the animal.42

In another case Wiseman’s dress was mocked with an ostentatious crown symbolising the corruption of the Catholic Church. The important point about these demonstrations was that their targets were clearly Cardinal Wiseman and Pius IX; they were not merely anti-Irish. In addition, the fact that they concentrated so much on the papacy meant that these mass protests must have been highly organised. These then were not just a series of mass demonstrations arising out of an abstract idea of anti-Catholicism, but rather a coherent anti-Wiseman and anti-Pius IX campaign. The Bonfire Night processions marked the beginning of a series of popular, large-scale ‘no popery’ demonstrations that sometimes erupted into violence and continued into 1851. If anything, after 5 November 1850, political activities against the ‘papal aggression’ became more organised with a series of petitions being drawn up by town and county assemblies and presented to the crown. For example, Paz notes that between October and December 1850 some 2,616 memorials were sent to the queen, bearing 887,525 signatures, which represented about 4 per cent of the English population.43 The depth of feeling generated can be seen in many contemporary diaries, letters and newspapers. For example, James Greville, brother of the secretary to the privy council, Charles Greville, noted in his diary on 7 November that, in the wake of Russell’s letter, meetings were being held all over the country and that he had ‘no doubt that this religious movement will engross the public for some time’.44 Meanwhile the historian Thomas Babington Macaulay noted that the walls of Burlington Gardens in London were covered in anti-papal slogans, and that he himself was ‘becoming, somewhat of the latest, a No Popery man’.45 Moreover, in just one edition, The Times of 29 November reported on ‘no popery’ meetings that had been convened in Glasgow, Dumfries, Newcastle, Carlisle, Hereford and Reading.46 Anti-Catholic violence Protests against the ‘papal aggression’ continued on into 1851, but although they provided the backdrop for the dramatic political developments of that year, they never developed into a particularly coherent or well-organised 42 43 44 45

Ibid. Paz, ‘Popular anti-Catholicism’, 340. Greville diary, entry for 7 Nov. 1850, in Diary of Henry Greville, 367. Thomas Babington Macaulay to Adolphus, 8 Nov. 1850; Macaulay to Macaulay, 15 Nov. 1850, in T. Pinney (ed.), The letters of Thomas Babington Macaulay, v, Cambridge 1981, 132, 133. 46 Times, 29 Nov. 1850.

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movement. There were a number of reasons for this. One was the way in which the state reacted to the movement as a possible threat to public order. Demonstrations against the papacy were not always very rational or peaceful, and there were some violent incidents. One aspect of this was that Wiseman appears to have received letters threatening him with assassination.47 The most notable examples, however, were the riots that took place in Liverpool and Birkenhead on 20 November and 27 November 1850 respectively. In both cases meetings held by Protestants to demonstrate against the hierarchy led to violent protests by local Irish Catholics during which fighting broke out between Catholics and the police who were protecting the anti-papal meeting. Paz has categorised the Liverpool and Birkenhead riots as ‘pro-Catholic anti-police riots’, as much of the violence was committed by Irish Roman Catholics against the police.48 Certainly it was a clash between the police and the Irish, which reflected the bitter sectarian divisions in the Merseyside area, but it is noticeable that the original spark that led to the disturbances was the campaign against ‘papal aggression’. While acknowledging other background factors, the fact that it was ‘no popery’ meetings that led to the violence shows the depth of feeling that this issue generated, and it is indicative that after the second meeting was disrupted a petition with 1,000 signatures was sent to the local magistrates calling for the punishment of the ‘misled and misguided Romanists’.49 The riots on Merseyside were, however, the exception rather than the rule, brought about by the severity of the sectarian divide in the region, for elsewhere the ‘no popery’ campaign of 1850–1 did not lead to many other serious outbreaks of violence. The reason for this is a matter of debate. Paz has argued that anti-Catholic violence during this period has been over-emphasised as a phenomenon, and instead has contended that violence in these years was more often associated with economic and domestic issues rather than religious ones. He has asserted that the crime rate related to violence against persons and property declined during the 1850s and 1860s, and in particular, to prove his point, has drawn attention to the relatively small number of reported attacks on Catholic priests.50 One can agree that the number of such attacks was small, but the contention that this was a result of the public’s reluctance to commit violence against Catholics is open to question. Evidence from Home Office sources suggests that one has to look closely at the government’s role in deterring violence. There are a number of examples of attacks on Roman Catholics 47

Cox to Paul Cullen, 18 Nov. 1850, Cullen papers, Dublin Diocesan Archives, section 39/1, file 1, no. 123; Edward Norman, Anti-Catholicism in Victorian England, London 1968, 125. 48 Paz, Popular anti-Catholicism, 247. The official correspondence about the riots can be seen in HO 45/3140. 49 Report on Birkenhead riot, 30 Nov. 1850, HO 45/3140. 50 Paz, Popular anti-Catholicism, 264.

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leading to the government’s sending police to keep order. As early as Guy Fawkes Day 1850 there were police on duty around St George’s Church in Southwark in order to deter violence and later on in the same month a constable was sent to the Tractarian church in Pimlico, St Barnabas, in order to maintain peace after a service had been disturbed by protesters.51 Another such case took place in August 1851, when the Home Office decided, in response to complaints about violence from local Roman Catholics, to send twenty-five special constables promptly to protect the East Church in Sittingbourne, Kent.52 Further evidence can be seen in December 1851 when the Metropolitan Police produced a report on the scale of violence against Catholic priests in London. This report was in response to a request for information from the Foreign Office.53 In November 1851 Palmerston received a letter from the Vatican regarding anti-papal violence against Catholic priests in England, which was based on reports which had been received by Propaganda Fide.54 This matter obviously required investigation and prompted the Foreign Office to request information from the Home Office. Their letter of 27 November 1851 reads: I am directed by Lord Palmerston to state to you that reference has been made by a Foreign government to violence and insult alleged to have been committed in London towards the ministers of the Catholic Church on the occasion of the institution of Roman Catholic bishoprics by the Pope in the course of the last twelve months, and Lord Palmerston is desirous of knowing whether anything took place at the time and on the occasions alluded to, which bore the character of violence or of insult to Roman Catholic Priests or to their religion.55

After the Metropolitan Police had provided the necessary information, the Home Office forwarded to the Foreign Office on 6 December 1851 the reports of enquiries by each superintendent within London. Horatio Waddington noted in his covering letter that I beg to state that whenever application was made for the aid of police for the protection of any place of the Roman catholic or of any Roman catholic ecclesiastic and wherever there was any apprehension that violence or insult to

51

For Guy Fawkes Day see R. D. Storch, ‘Please to remember the fifth of November: conflict, solidarity and public order in southern England, 1815–1900’, in R. D. Storch (ed.), Popular culture and customs in nineteenth-century England, London 1982. For St Barnabas see Reynolds Weekly, 1 Dec. 1850. 52 Burton report, 4 Aug. 1851, HO 45/3272. 53 Metropolitan Police report, 6 Dec. 1851, HO 45/3783. 54 There are a number of reports on violence against the Roman Catholic Church in England in ASPF, Anglia; there is also one letter from the Vatican to the British Foreign Office dated 26 Dec. 1850. 55 FO to HO, 27 Nov. 1851, HO 45/3783.

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Roman catholic priests on their religion might be committed special and effective arrangements of police were made to prevent them. No complaints have been received at this office that the police failed in the performance of this duty and I believe the Roman catholic priests felt assured that full protection was given them.56

The reports from the Metropolitan Police demonstrated that, thanks to their protection, there were no major incidents of insult and violence towards Roman Catholic priests and that even when minor disturbances took place the police were quick to act. A summary of the superintendents’ reports shows the level of incidents in different parts of London. There were, for example, no serious disturbances in many areas of London, such as Marylebone, Holborn, Covent Garden, Whitehall, Whitechapel, Stepney, Lambeth and Southwark, but special care and attention was given to Wiseman in February 1851 when he had said mass in the Catholic chapel in Tottenham. This area had the reputation of being strongly anti-Catholic, and had seen disturbances in 1850 as a result of Wiseman’s appeal during the restoration of the English Catholic hierarchy, and it was therefore decided that two constables should be sent to the chapel to ensure order. There had also been an incident in October 1851 when a large crowd had gathered outside Wiseman’s house in Golden Square shouting ‘No popery’, but it had been quickly dispersed by the police, and a constable stationed to keep the peace.57 The same report noted that there were always police situated around Finsbury, especially during mass times, because of the large number of foreign immigrants that resided in the area. The report observed that In Finsbury area, Mr Ferrati, a Roman catholic priest was assaulted by 3 Men supposed Italians between 9 and 10 Pm on the 25th Nov while passing along Baldwin’s Gardens his eye blackened and nose cut. In this neighbourhood a great many foreigners reside and it is specially watched by a constable. At the Roman Catholic Chapel in Rosamon Street a constable is always on duty during divine service and Wilmington Square in which the minister resides is frequently patrolled by the Police.58

However, there was one incident when a man insulted a Catholic priest. He had been arrested by a constable and charged with making a disturbance in a Catholic church. In addition, in Camberwell a disturbance had taken place during which a priest was insulted with the result that ‘a constable is always near the church on Sundays and the Commissioners have sworn in a local constable for the place’.59

56 57 58 59

Waddington (HO) to FO, 6 Dec. 1851, ibid. Metropolitan Police report, 6 Dec. 1851, ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

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Within a few days of this report being sent to the Foreign Office another incident had taken place. The Metropolitan Police reported on 12 December 1851 that a problem had arisen in Greenwich because of demonstrations against the building of a new Catholic church. On 2 December protests organised by respectable tradesmen took place in Blackheath Lee and Lewisham in which ‘colossal’ effigies of the pope and Wiseman, which appeared to have been constructed at ‘considerable expense’, had been burnt. Once again the Metropolitan Police was forced to take action to reassure local Catholics that they would not be attacked.60 Paz has used the Home Office document of 6 December 1851 as an example that there were in fact very few anti-popery riots during 1850–1.61 Although this was true to some extent, the fact is that the government was fully aware of the danger of this phenomenon. The reason why there were not many violent ‘no popery’ disturbances was not because it was not significant socially, but rather due to the government’s prompt intervention to control such outbreaks. In particular, the number of incidents was low around this period, because the government managed to stop several potentially violent ‘no-popery’ protests by sending in special constables. The problem with Paz’s approach is that it relies too much on statistics and figures to analyse a social phenomenon; this is especially a problem in regard to religious matters because figures do not show the complexity of the religious and social background of the anti-Catholic and anti-papal movements. In addition, Paz has failed to recognise the way in which the government used the police force as a means of social control; the government used its power to protect Catholic subjects and suppress the anti-Catholic riots, thus maintaining law and order. The evidence therefore demonstrates that the government’s response to social disturbances associated with ‘no popery’ agitation was very prompt and effective. In particular it seems that special care was taken of Wiseman, not just because he had become the main target of ‘no popery’ aggression in England, but also because he was still closely linked with the Vatican. In fact it was Wiseman who had informed the pope about the anti-papal attacks on Roman Catholic priests in England. The government did not want any more embarrassment in its diplomatic relations with the papacy, and therefore any possible offence against the Catholics had to be prevented.62 Nonconformists, radicals and the ‘papal aggression’ As well as the reaction of the state there were other reasons why the ‘no popery’ movement failed to have a bigger impact. One of the most important was that there were many different strands in public reaction to the ‘papal 60 61 62

Metropolitan Police report, 12 Dec. 1851, ibid. Paz, Popular anti-Catholicism, 264. FO to HO, 27 Nov. 1851, HO 45/3783.

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aggression’ and these sometimes reflected more contemporary concerns than traditional anti-Catholicism and raised issues that helped to dissipate the effects of the movement. It is here significant that various groups, such as the Evangelical Alliance, the Nonconformists and the Chartists, became involved in the activity surrounding ‘no popery’, but acted in accord with their own agenda. This not only pitted one group against another but also led to division within individual groups. The religion-based protests against the ‘papal aggression’ were not the result of mass spontaneous demonstrations, but were highly organised and institutionalised by several political and religious societies such as the Protestant Association, the Dissenters, Voluntaryists and the Free Church Organisation. Among these Protestant societies were both Anglicans and Dissenters, but the most influential group was the evangelical movement, including the Evangelical Alliance, which used its periodical, the Record, to disseminate anti-Catholic propaganda.63 By the spring of 1851 Sir Culling Eardley, now the head of the Evangelical Alliance, was attempting to set up a broad anti-papal league that would embrace both Anglicans and Dissenters and channel Protestant hostility towards Catholicism.64 However, there were severe problems within the Alliance. Some members made the target of their criticism not just Catholicism but also the growth of Tractarianism within the Anglican Church. The Tractarians, it was held, followed Catholic practices and thus threatened to infect the whole of the Anglican Church. This meant that a papal threat existed not only outside of the Anglican Church but also inside it. They thus demanded that the Anglican Church should take action to purify its own ranks as well as combating the external enemy. This became a consistent trend in some pamphlets written from the Low Church and Nonconformist perspective, but it did little to unify Protestants as some Anglicans construed it as an attack upon their own Church. The clash over Tractarianism was important because there was already an undeniable division within the Alliance over the Established Church. Many members of the Evangelical Alliance still belonged to the Anglican Church, and resented the presence of the Nonconformists who wished to abolish the whole idea of a state Church and who opposed any kind of state intervention on religious issues as well as economic activities. These divisions within the Evangelical Alliance blunted its ability to lead the anti-Catholic cause and helped to dissipate its energies into internal squabbling.65 In addition, opinion was divided because a substantial element within the dissenting Churches felt that the anti-Catholic mood of the country contravened the principle of religious tolerance. As early as 30 October, just as the 63 64 65

Wolffe, Protestant crusade, 112, 307. Nonconformist, 16 Apr. 1851. See J. Wolffe, ‘The Evangelical Alliance in the 1840s: an attempt to institutionalise Christian unity’, in W. J. Sheils and D. Wood (eds), Voluntary religion (Studies in Church History xxiii, 1986), 333–46.

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Church of England began to react to the Catholic challenge, one of the voices of dissenting opinion, the Nonconformist, noted in an editorial that We do hope that earnest-minded Christians will not meddle in this rivalry of assumptions equally offensive in both parties, and equally unfounded in reason or Scripture. The pope is merely giving our prelates and clergy a taste of the treatment they themselves have thought good enough for Dissenters.66

The Nonconformist continued with this editorial line throughout the autumn of 1850 and even used the ‘papal aggression’ to push forward its own belief that all state Churches should be abolished. Its opinions met with opposition from some of its readers, but others showed sympathy and expressed their concern that fellow Dissenters could join in the general agitation against Rome, thus playing into the hands of the established Church.67 Such was the division in Protestant ranks that meetings could at times descend into fighting. For example a gathering of Protestants in Islington in November saw Edward Miall, a writer for the Nonconformist, being assaulted by a Anglican priest for expressing disestablishment sentiments.68 The political radicals, including some of the Chartists were another group that became involved in the anti-papal movement. However, many of the radicals were not stirred into action because of any inherent anti-Catholic sentiment based on religious intolerance, but rather because they felt obliged to oppose the attack on Britain from Catholic political despotism. This led to the pages of radical newspapers, such as the Leader, the Northern Star, and Reynolds Weekly, making clear their dislike of the papacy and the growth of Tractarianism but at the same time mirroring the Nonconformist in deploring the religious bigotry shown by the Anglican Church, and pointing out that the intolerance displayed was equivalent to the very thing that Anglicans criticised in Catholicism.69 Thus on 9 November the Northern Star observed that the established Church’s tolerance of Puseyism had done much to encourage the pope, and noted its regret that ‘the fear of being thrust under the domination of an irresponsible and infallible priesthood may drive the people of England once more back upon measures of repression . . . to which it will be very easy to give the name of persecution’.70 Meanwhile Reynolds Weekly on 24 November noted that recent incidents, such as the outburst by Alderman Challis of the City of London who declared Wiseman’s actions illegal, only proved ‘how easily weak-minded men are converted into despicable bigots’.71 The letters 66 67 68 69

Nonconformist, 30 Oct. 1850. See, for example, letters ibid. 18 Dec. 1850. Northern Star, 16 Nov. 1850. For the general similarity of views between the Leader and the Nonconformist see Taylor, Decline of British radicalism, 116–17. 70 Northern Star, 9 Nov. 1850. 71 Reynolds Weekly, 24 Nov. 1850.

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sent in to the radical press generally supported this stance. One in Reynolds Weekly on 1 December from ‘A friend of true religion’ consisted of a long tirade against the Anglican Church accusing it of never doing anything for the people, while letters were sent in to the Leader deploring ‘the storm of bigotry’ and the ‘detestable hubbub’.72 One writer, ‘A Cambridge Graduate’ summed up the general view in a letter of 27 November 1850, which noted that My principles are as far removed from Popery as can possibly be; but my spirit burns within me at the shameless manner in which the Press and the Premier have thrown over all sympathy with freedom and justice. . . . Let all good Liberals raise their voice in public and private against this senseless cry of ‘No Popery’.73

Similar views in favour of political tolerance were also espoused by some of the Chartists. For example, from December 1850 to January 1851 Ernest Jones delivered a series of lectures on the subject of ‘Canterbury versus Rome’ in which he attacked the Anglican Church as much as he criticised the papacy.74 Despite the general disdain for religious intolerance among the radicals, they were, however, prepared to use ‘no popery’ to press forward their own agenda. Just as some in the Evangelical Alliance used the anti-papal campaign to attack the Tractarians’ domination of the Anglican Church, the radicals attempted to use it to interest the British public in the cause of Mazzini and Italian nationalism. Even Mazzini himself, who was in Switzerland in the autumn of 1850, recognised the potential of the disturbances in Britain and wrote on 24 November to Thomas Duncombe: could anything be done to transform the actual useless, senseless sectarian anti-popish agitation into a political, logical one? . . . and to remind them that the Pope would not enthrone a Romish hierarchy in England from Gaeta or from any other place of refuge?’75

The Leader was particularly active in trying to redirect attention away from the domestic agitation to the Italian issue. On 9 November, in a review of Mazzini’s book Royalty and republicanism in Italy, the writer noted caustically that those who were now most outraged about the re-establishment of the hierarchy had been the ‘bitterest opponents of the Roman people in the spring of 1849’.76 Then on 16 November it was observed at the end of an editorial regarding Mazzini’s Italian National Committee that it was a ‘disrep72 73 74 75

Ibid. 1 Dec. 1850; Leader 23 Nov., 28 Dec. 1850. Leader, 23 Nov. 1850. These sermons were reported in the Northern Star from 2 Dec. 1851 to 15 Jan. 1852. T. H. Duncombe, Life and correspondence of T. S. Duncombe, late MP for Finsbury, ii, London 1868, 232–3. 76 Leader, 9 Nov. 1850.

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utable morality’ to oppose the papacy at home but not to support democratic opposition to it abroad.77 Support for Mazzini did not, however, mean that the radicals wished for government support for their cause. When in November 1850 The Times suggested that Palmerston should in retaliation support the Italian nationalists, the Northern Star opposed this proposal on the grounds that however anxious the latter might be ‘for the emancipation of their beautiful country from political and spiritual thraldom, they will never become the cat’s paw of an oligarchical minister’.78 This passage indicated that as far as the radical press was concerned their hostility towards the papacy did not lead them towards any reconciliation with the government. If anything they regarded the pope’s intervention in England as having been encouraged by the government’s tacit acceptance of the restoration of the hierarchy. These efforts to highlight the Italian cause eventually culminated in Mazzini’s return to Britain in February 1851 and the subsequent establishment of the Society of the Friends of Italy (SFI) in May. The SFI’s opening address explicitly noted the link between the ‘papal aggression’ and Mazzini’s cause. In line with the liberal beliefs of its members it argued that Britain itself should not take the ‘retrograde step’ of introducing domestic discrimination against the Catholic Church, but noted that When a country is invaded by a military force, it is sometimes accounted a noble thought in the general of the invaded country to change a defensive into an aggressive war. . . . Let us imitate this strategy. Let us meet the Pope where he is weakest and will feel it most – in his own dominions. Let us make a war . . . of intellect, of sentiment and of political action – on the papal misgovernment of Central Italy.79

Although most members of the SFI were liberals and radicals who moved in mainly political circles, there were two members from Birmingham, George Dawson and Brewin Grant, who made and published lectures on the ‘papal aggression’ that mixed religious and political issues. For example, George Dawson argued in a lecture in Birmingham at the end of 1851 that Mazzini tells us ‘papacy excluded from Rome is . . . papacy excluded from Italy.’ Place the Pope at Lyons or Seville – he will no longer be Pope: he will be a dethroned king. Well may he say Protestantism has not understood this: because Mazzini believes as an Italian national leader, that Church and State need to be separated elsewhere too. Not in England only but in Rome. What political danger there may be to us in Romanism lies chiefly in the fact of the Pope being a prince in Rome.80

77 78 79 80

Ibid. 16 Nov. 1850. Northern Star, 2, 9 Nov. 1850. Address of the Society of the Friends of Italy, London 1851. G. Dawson, Two lectures on the ‘papal aggression’ controversy, Birmingham 1851, 13.

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The effort to encourage support for Mazzini, however, did not prove to be very successful. In part this was due to infighting within radical circles where Mazzini’s rejection of socialism caused a schism among his backers. By 1851 it was increasingly clear that Mazzini opposed the British radicals in regard to a number of key issues such as class conflict and universal suffrage. In particular, there was severe disagreement over the suffrage, which was a fundamental issue for the Chartists. Even within the radical circle around the Leader, there were tensions with Mazzini. David Masson, who was one of the founders of the SFI, disagreed with Mazzini over Louis Blanc’s socialism and found his political theorising on republicanism unconvincing and lacking in material substance.81 These divisions did not, however, deter the Home Office and Metropolitan Police from keeping a close eye on Mazzini’s activities and particularly his efforts at fund-raising. In addition, there was little likelihood of Mazzini receiving a great deal of support from the broad Protestant opposition to the papacy as politically his stance as a revolutionary republican was likely to alienate all but a few. This scepticism towards Mazzini might seem surprising, though, when one recalls that two of the most popular ‘no popery’ speakers of the time, Alessandro Gavazzi and Giacinto Achilli, were former members of the Catholic Church who had been present in Rome during the period of the republic. However, it is important to note that both these preachers were involved in supporting the ‘no popery’ cause not because of their desire to generate support for Mazzini’s political leadership in regard to the Italian nationalism question, but because of their passionate anti-papal beliefs. Gavazzi had been chaplain to Garibaldi’s forces during the Roman republic but he had never been a Mazzinian in the pure sense as he disliked republicanism and was suspicious of Mazzini’s religious views. From January 1851 he delivered a number of addresses in London on the subject of the papacy which proved to be very popular; his audience on one occasion included Palmerston, but it is noticeable that in these speeches he largely focused on religious issues rather than political ones, and that in all of his talks there was only one mention of Mazzini and one of Garibaldi.82 The same reluctance to raise political issues can be seen in the case of Achilli. Achilli, as noted above, was a figure of some controversy as he had been imprisoned after the fall of the Roman republic, and there had been much petitioning on his behalf by the Evangelical Alliance. However, the Alliance was keen to emphasise that Achilli was a figure of religious rather than strictly political persecution. As Culling Eardley explained in a book published in 1850 entitled The imprisonment of Dr Achilli, during his period in 81

See Claeys, ‘Mazzini’, 231–7; Finn, After Chartism; Taylor, Decline of British radicalism, 211. 82 For Gavazzi see B. Hall, ‘Alessandro Gavazzi: a Barnabite friar and the Risorgimento’, in D. Baker (ed.), Church, society and politics (Studies in Church History xii, 1975), 303–56. The text of Gavazzi’s addresses is reproduced in the Nonconformist for Jan. to Apr. 1851.

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Rome in the days of the republic Achilli was more committed to the religious duty of distributing copies of the Bible than he was to engaging in political activities.83 After his escape from Rome in early 1850, Achilli had publicised the evils of the papacy using his own position as an ex-papal prisoner to sharpen his attacks, but at no point did he try to engage in propaganda to support Mazzini’s political initiatives. Even when Achilli published his memoirs in 1851, following the establishment of the hierarchy, he stayed shy of political issues only noting vaguely his support for Italian nationalism but never mentioning Mazzini or Garibaldi.84 Achilli was not the only notable Italian that the Evangelical Alliance presented to its members. In September 1851 there was also an address by Aurelio Saffi, who had been a member of the triumvirate of the Roman republic and was very close to Mazzini politically, but in his talk he only mentioned religious discrimination by the papacy in Italy without referring to political matters or to Mazzini’s possible influence.85 Indeed in a number of ways Achilli directed attention away from Italian nationalism due to his controversial character. Even before the re-establishment of the hierarchy, Achilli had been a thorn in the side of the English Catholic Church. As early as June 1850 Wiseman had attempted to counter Achilli’s anti-papal propaganda by revealing in an article in the Dublin Review that Achilli had not left the Catholic Church for high, moral reasons but for sexual irregularities. This attack inflamed Achilli, who later stated in his memories that the article ‘stigmatises me to the religious world, as a mere political adventurer, while to the political world it represents me as a religious enthusiast, changeable, inconsiderate, and inexperienced, and an immoral person, and a hypocrite to boot’.86 In the summer of 1851 in a speech in Birmingham Newman repeated this account of Achilli’s background, which led the latter to bring libel proceedings against him and in 1852 the infamous Achilli v. Newman trial took place.87 We can thus see that there were many different reactions to the ‘papal aggression’ and that the history of the period is far more complex than simply asserting that all organised groups were fanatically anti-Catholic and thus tried to encourage anti-papal agitation. Although the anti-Catholic movement in 1850–1 was largely a direct reaction to the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy and was formed as an anti-popery movement, there were other factors in play too. This meant that it was not simply anti-Catholic, but that anti-Tractarian and pro-Mazzini sentiments were also important. Each group had a different attitude towards the anti-popery movement and 83 84

Eardley, Imprisonment of Dr Achilli. G. Achilli, Dealings with the inquisition: or papal Rome, her priests, and her Jesuits, London 1851. 85 Nonconformist, 3 Sept. 1851. 86 Achilli, Inquisition, 370. 87 I. Ker, John Henry Newman: a biography, Oxford 1988, 372–5.

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followed its own agenda. Therefore the idea that the anti-papal cause could be used to unify political and religious groups failed. Although middle-class radicals were very much divided over reactions to the anti-papal movement, the masses were stirred up by anti-papal sentiment, as we have seen in the Guy Fawkes Day demonstrations which focused on their own targets, Cardinal Wiseman and Pius IX. Yet here too the scope of the no-popery movement was contained, for the government acted very promptly to prevent any social disorder which could develop into serious violence and riots. What this emphasises is the complexity of the anti-Catholic movement, and the fact that while anti-Catholicism reflected a broad religious and historical tradition in society, incidents such as the no-popery movement were the result of specific social, economic and political forces at the particular historical moment. The ‘no-popery’ movement between 1850 and 1851 lends itself well to the idea that anti-Catholicism was a complex phenomenon for it displayed many different faces and there were many reasons for supporting the same ends. Russell and the ‘papal aggression’ The rapid rise of the powerful and emotional ‘no popery’ movement in November came as something of an embarrassment to the government. Faced with an indignant public, the government was forced to consider how it should respond to the ‘papal aggression’, which proved to be no easy matter for an administration that still wished to use the Vatican to curb Irish Catholics but at the same time needed Catholic votes to survive in the House of Commons. Unfortunately the first substantial move by the government made the situation worse rather than better. This was of course Russell’s famous letter of 4 November to the bishop of Durham. The first thing to note with respect to this letter is that Russell’s role in exacerbating the public mood was more of an accident than anything else, for his main goal at this time was to use the controversy to attack Tractarianism. For example, on 25 October Russell wrote to the queen stating that he was not greatly concerned at the pope’s action over the hierarchy, but was alarmed at ‘the growth of Roman Catholic doctrines and practices within the bosom of the [Anglican] Church’.88 Further to this, in the letter itself he concentrated most of his fire on the Tractarians, stating that while the pope’s ‘pretension of supremacy over the realm of England’ did not scare him, he was concerned about the threat posed by the ‘unworthy sons of the Church of England’.89 Moreover, Russell was not 88 89

Russell to Victoria, 25 Oct. 1850, in Letters of Queen Victoria, ii. 273. Prest, Lord John Russell, appendix 3, 429–30. On Russell and Tractarianism see also Machin, ‘Ecclesiastical Titles Bill’, 278–84.

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alone in his disdain for the Tractarians. For example, Queen Victoria noted in her journal on 29 October that she was sure that the pope had been encouraged by the behaviour of those who leaned towards the Romish Church.90 Despite this being his primary concern, Russell did, however, include comments in the Durham letter that he thought were necessary in order to show that the British government could not be insulted by Rome and that Protestantism would not be supplanted.91 This included the observation that ‘the present state of the law shall be carefully examined’ in order to determine the legality of the assumption of territorial jurisdiction.92 It is also possible that Russell felt that it was necessary to act in an emphatic way because the papal brief establishing the hierarchy claimed that Minto had been informed of the Vatican’s intentions in the autumn of 1847. Minto asserted that this was not true and that his only involvement in such matters was that he had passed to the papal authorities the letter from Father Conolly criticising Wiseman.93 Despite Minto’s protestations of innocence, this was a potentially damaging accusation and it may therefore have reinforced Russell in the belief that he needed to take a resolute stand in public. Russell has been widely attacked by both contemporaries and historians for the violence of his language in the Durham letter and has been accused of rashness and of betraying his belief in religious liberty. Charles Greville, for example, noted on 10 November that it had ‘filled with stupid and fanatical enthusiasm all the Protestant bigots’.94 It is, however, important to note here that he had not committed himself to legislate at this point and indeed he observed to Clarendon on 16 November that he had ‘no intention of departing in any way from the principles of religious liberty which I have always held’.95 The problem then was not that the Durham letter was intended to inaugurate a period of discrimination against Catholics, but that Russell almost inadvertently whipped up the full force of Britain’s latent anti-Catholic sentiment. Indeed Benjamin Disraeli observed to Lord Stanley on 18 November that ‘Lord John already repents of indulging in his hereditary foible, to wit, having a shy at the Papists’.96 While Russell ‘repented’ the country was swept by anti-Catholic feeling and accordingly it became clear that the government would have to take some kind of action in order to satisfy public opinion. The alternative was that the situation would deteriorate further and that Russell’s administration, which was already losing its momentum, would be further undermined. 90 91 92 93

RA, QVJ, entry for 29 Oct. 1850. Russell to Clarendon, 13 Nov. 1850, Clarendon papers, box 26. Prest, Lord John Russell, appendix 3, 429–30. Minto to Russell, 23 Oct. 1850, in G. P. Gooch (ed.), The later correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1840–1878, London 1925, i. 47–8. 94 Diary entry, 10 Nov. 1850, in The Greville memoirs, vi. 375. 95 Russell to Clarendon, 16 Nov. 1850, Clarendon papers, box 26. 96 Benjamin Disraeli to Stanley, 18 Nov. 1850, in M. G. Wiebe (ed.), Benjamin Disraeli letters: 1848–1851, Toronto 1993, no. 2063.

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Disraeli, for example, clearly recognised that if the government failed to satisfy the clamour that Russell had helped to provoke this would play into the hands of the Tories, who would not hesitate to take up ‘no popery’ as their own cause.97 Part of the government’s difficulty lay in determining what action it could take. It could hardly nullify the papal bull, as previous bulls that applied to Britain had not been challenged, and according to the government’s law officers there were no grounds for prosecution at present. This left the option of introducing a bill that would make it illegal for a Catholic bishop to assume a territorial title. By the end of November Russell was leaning towards this policy and on 13 December, after discussing the various alternatives, the Cabinet agreed to legislate, although a number of ministers were inclined not to act at all.98 The attraction of this legislation, which levied a £100 fine for infringement, was that it directed the government’s ire against the Roman Catholic clergy alone, but did not discriminate against the laity. This was important because there was no desire to infringe the civil liberties of ordinary Catholics. Indeed by this point the queen and others were becoming disturbed at the level of intolerance being shown towards Catholics by the general public. For example, the queen wrote with sadness in her journal on 10 December that There is such foolish bigotry & such a spirit of intolerance abroad that I am quite disgusted at it. The people at large are exciting themselves about a thing, which had the Pope done without noise, no one would have minded.99

This legislation was therefore seen as a necessary and appropriate minimum. As Palmerston observed in late January the intention was to introduce legislation that was ‘as gentle as possible’, even if this risked outraging the ‘violent Protestant party’.100 Once the government had decided to legislate, another potential option emerged, which was that it appeared that it might be possible to persuade the pope to revoke his action. The idea that the best way forward might be to exert pressure on Rome was discussed from the start of the crisis, but had not followed a smooth path. The initial supporter of this line was Palmerston, who in late October had used the crisis as a way of securing Sheil’s appointment to Florence and Rome, which was announced at the beginning of November.101 During November Palmerston was further encouraged when he received a letter from the chargé d’affaires at Florence, Peter Scarlett, stating that the pope had acted entirely on the advice of the English Catholic 97 98 99 100 101

Ibid. RA, QVJ, entries for 28 Nov., 14 Dec. 1850. Ibid. entry for 10 Dec. 1850. Ashley, Palmerston, i. 248. Palmerston to Victoria, 25 Oct. 1850, RA, VIC/J10/61; entry for 1 Nov. 1850, in Diary of Henry Greville, 366.

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Church and that he had no intention of repudiating the queen’s sovereignty.102 Armed with this evidence, early in December Palmerston pressed both Russell and the queen to agree to Sheil proceeding unofficially to Rome as soon as he arrived in Florence. Sheil, he observed to Russell, could ask the pope to revoke the establishment of the hierarchy, or as a more moderate measure, press him to make clear that the territorial jurisdiction only applied to ‘willing Catholics’.103 The queen, however, was not enthusiastic about this course of action, remarking to Russell on 8 December that ‘to ask the Pope for a favour’ was ‘unbecoming’ and ‘undignified’.104 With that Palmerston’s initiative came to nothing and Sheil proceeded to Florence and no further. However, within a month the idea of a direct appeal to the pope, which could now be backed up with the threat of legislative action, was revived through two totally different channels. The prospect of using the threat of legislation was first raised by Abbé William Hamilton in his correspondence with Minto in December 1850. Hamilton, who was now residing in Rome, had long been an opponent of the restoration of the hierarchy, which from the first he had feared would lead to a hostile reaction in Britain. His continuing concern about this matter led him to suggest to Minto on 28 December that a copy of the legislation that Britain was preparing should be despatched to Petre in Rome. Petre could then show it to the pope and say that the bill would be put forward unless Pius transferred the bishops to non-territorial dioceses. Hamilton warned that it was only by acting in this coercive way that Britain would be able to force the pope to act, for he was surrounded by Irish clergy who made him impervious to mere negotiation. Hamilton hoped that if Pius was forced to retreat in the face of British pressure this might in turn prejudice him against the Irish and lead him to follow a more reasonable policy over the colleges.105 Hamilton’s proposal arrived in Britain just as similar ideas emerged from another quarter. The re-establishment of the hierarchy had caused a good deal of division amongst the leading Catholic families in England. Some of the more influential, such as the duke of Norfolk and Lord Camoys, disapproved of the pope’s action, which they felt was unnecessary and badly timed and presented.106 Other leading figures, however, such as Lord Arundel, supported the restoration and made it clear that they would speak out against any anti-Catholic legislation. The division in Catholic ranks led more moderate figures to work for reconciliation and in that spirit in January 1851 John Abel Smith and Lord Edward Howard persuaded Arundel to go to Paris

102 103

Scarlett (Florence) to Palmerston, 18 Nov. 1850, FO 79/144. Palmerston to Russell, 6 Dec. 1850, RA, VIC/C51/49; Palmerston to Victoria, 7 Dec. 1850, VIC/C51/48. 104 Victoria to Russell, 8 Dec. 1850, in Letters of Queen Victoria, ii. 279. 105 Hamilton to Minto, 28 Dec. 1850, RA, VIC/C51/102. 106 RA, QVJ, entries for 11, 24 Dec. 1850.

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and meet with the comte de Montalambert, a leading French Catholic, who insisted that the pope did not desire confrontation.107 This information about the pope’s wish for reconciliation with Britain was duly passed to Russell by Abel Smith and Howard when they met him on 10 January. From this conversation there arose the idea that, if the queen approved, Arundel might proceed to Rome and ‘advise the pope to adopt some means to conciliate public opinion in England’.108 Russell communicated this proposal to Prince Albert who saw some advantage in a formal agent going on a mission to Rome to make Britain’s objections clear and to ask the pope to remove Wiseman. The prince noted that even if Pius rejected Britain’s advice this would not be a bad thing, for when the government introduced the intended legislation, it could silence its critics by referring to the pope’s intransigence. Albert was not, however, convinced that Arundel was the best man for the job and recommended Lord Camoys instead. In addition, he proposed to Russell that Britain’s voice might be amplified if King Leopold of Belgium wrote to the pope in the same vein.109 Further encouragement for this scheme came on 16 January when Howard wrote from Paris confirming that Montalambert felt that the pope was willing to act on Britain’s complaints.110 The scheme for tackling ‘the papal aggression’ by way of Rome soon, however, met an immovable obstacle, which, surprisingly considering his support for such a venture a month earlier, came from Palmerston. On 16 January Palmerston wrote to Russell after receiving copies of Albert’s letters on the subject and affirmed his belief that a mission to Rome would achieve nothing and might only embarrass the government. To support his views Palmerston argued that Britain could not hold out any real inducement to the pope to revoke the hierarchy as the government had to satisfy public opinion with some kind of legislation. Even if Britain did make an offer he feared that the pope would not reject it outright but would wish to negotiate. The government did not, however, have time for long drawn-out talks, for it had to have legislation ready for the opening of the new parliamentary session in February. It could hardly announce that the house would have to wait while the government sought a mutually acceptable compromise with Rome, for that would provoke the Protestant lobby and public opinion into fury. In addition, Palmerston mentioned at the end of his letter a further criticism, which was that he had no desire to see private individuals undertake diplomacy on behalf of the government.111 Palmerston’s spoiling action stopped the private mission in its tracks and led to a characteristic outburst from the queen who wrote in her journal that ‘The whole affair concerning 107 108 109 110 111

Russell to Albert, 10 Jan. 1851, RA, VIC/C51/95. Ibid. Albert to Russell, 12 Jan. 1851, RA, VIC/C51/99. Lord Edward Howard to Russell, 16 Jan. 1851, Russell papers, PRO 30/22/9a. Palmerston to Russell, 16 Jan. 1851, in Correspondence of Russell, i. 55–7.

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the proposed mission to the pope, has foundered on the ever lasting rock – Ld. Palmerston – the obstacle to everything that is good and right.’112 Palmerston, however, did not finish there. In an effort to stop all attempts at private diplomacy he persuaded the Cabinet to let him send instructions for Normanby to communicate to the papal representatives in Paris. These instructions, which were despatched on 20 January, laid out the options available to the pope, namely an announcement that his sovereignty extended only to Catholics, renunciation of the ‘territorial delimitation’ of the bishoprics, removal of Wiseman or a return to vicar-apostolics. These alternatives were to be communicated to the papal nuncio, Garibaldi, but were not to be presented as demands or one side of a bargain, but merely as measures that the pope could take to ‘allay that . . . ferment which now unhappily exists in the public mind of this Country’.113 Normanby, who was aware of Howard’s meeting with Montalambert, was aghast at this intransigence and replied to the foreign secretary that he did not think in the light of the government’s position that there was any point meeting the nuncio, a view with which Palmerston concurred.114 Why Palmerston acted in January 1851 to prevent any dialogue with the papacy over the future of the hierarchy is not exactly clear. For example, his argument that Britain should simply tell the pope what he could do to alleviate matters but not attempt to enter into negotiations was not in essence very different from the position that Prince Albert had taken. Moreover, his argument that there was little point in communicating such a message to the papacy is belied by the fact that in a private letter to his brother in Naples on 27 January he stated that the latter could communicate the British terms to the local nuncio.115 Furthermore on the next day he indicated to Sheil that he could communicate Palmerston’s thinking to Rome through a convenient informal channel.116 It is therefore difficult to say that the argument was over the conditions that Britain should present. Far more convincing is the theory that Palmerston simply desired to prevent any private diplomacy, which would undermine his own position. In this context it is noteworthy that on 28 January Palmerston reassured Russell that relations with the papacy would improve when Sheil could appear in Rome on an unofficial mission and explain the intentions behind the British legislation. What is clear, however, is that with the decision not to engage in talks with Rome the stage was set for the introduction of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill.

112 113 114

RA, QVJ, entry for 16 Jan. 1851. Palmerston to Normanby, 20 Jan. 1851, Russell papers, PRO 30/22/9a. Normanby to Palmerston, 23 Jan. 1851, RA, VIC/C52/15; Palmerston to Russell, 25 Jan. 1851, Russell papers, PRO 30/22/9a. 115 Ashley, Palmerston, i. 249. 116 Palmerston to Richard Sheil, 28 Jan. 1851, Palmerston papers, GC/SH/152.

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The Ecclesiastical Titles Bill While Russell, Palmerston and the British court were arguing about the wisdom of a mission to Rome, work was being done on drafting the legislation that the Cabinet had agreed to in December. The main issue that arose was whether the ban on territorial titles should apply to England alone or to other parts of the United Kingdom. In the end it was decided that the ban should apply in England and Ireland but not in Scotland, which did not yet possess a hierarchy.117 The decision to include Ireland was a controversial one, for over the last few years the government had entered into a de facto acceptance of the territorial titles of the Irish Catholic bishops. To legislate against those titles therefore smacked of hypocrisy. The decision to include Ireland appears, however, to have been a response to the recent appointment of Cullen as archbishop of Armagh and the government’s resentment of his role in the Synod of Thurles.118 The government saw this legislation as necessary but relatively unprovocative and did not contemplate that it would lead to any problems in parliament, except perhaps from the more extreme evangelicals. On 28 January Palmerston described the intended bill to Sheil as being ‘as moderate as we can make it consistently with doing something that may satisfy reasonable men’.119 In reality, the extension of the bill to Ireland was to prove to be a disastrous mistake. Already in late 1850 and early 1851 the hostility shown towards English Catholics had led to a rapprochement with their Irish brethren in a process which saw even Wiseman attempting to build up Irish support. Thus, even before the terms of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill were known, Irish Catholics were stirring themselves. On 11 January John O’Connell told Cullen that he would try to get his fellow Irish MPs to support the English Catholics, and on the following day MacHale adopted a similar attitude.120 The result of this interest was that when at the state opening of parliament on 4 February the full extent of the bill became apparent there was consternation among Irish Catholic MPs, who immediately turned against the government. Indeed such was the level of anger that More O’Ferrall resigned as governor of Malta. Their opposition could not stop the first reading of the bill, for such a measure was strongly supported by Protestant opinion, but their newly-found unwillingness to support Russell could and did damage the government’s handling of normal parliamentary business. In the following days the Russell government narrowly avoided defeat on a number of motions

117 118 119 120

Russell to Victoria, 17 Jan. 1851, RA, VIC/C51/113. Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 259–60. Palmerston to Sheil, 28 Jan. 1851, Palmerston papers, GC/SH/152. John O’Connell to Cullen, 11 Jan. 1851, Cullen papers, sec. 39/2, file 2/131; MacHale to Cullen, 12 Jan. 1851, sec. 39/2, file 1x/6.

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and when a vote was finally lost in a poorly attended house Russell decided to resign.121 Russell’s problem was not just that he had lost the support of the Irish Catholics but that he had also alienated the radical members of the House of Commons, who objected to the religious intolerance displayed in the bill. For example, Roebuck observed to the House on 7 February that future generations would note the ‘display of stupid bigotry manifested by the people out of doors’, but moreover be astonished by the fact that Russell as prime minister ‘should be found to yield himself up to the control of the ignorant multitude’.122 Russell thus saw two key groups that had previously been willing to vote for his government withdraw their support. Moreover, the punitive nature of the bill meant that the only other option available to strengthen his government was also unattainable, for leading Peelites too were dismissive of the need for penal legislation. Ironically, at the same time the legislation failed to satisfy many Protestants. For example, on 8 February 1851 The Times observed that after Russell’s inflammatory letter to the bishop of Durham the bill was inadequate to the task.123 The collapse of the Russell government did not, however, lead to the Protectionists forming a ministry for they lacked sufficient strength in the house and were unable to piece together a coalition. The result was that the bill’s effect on British politics was to bring about a period of paralysis, which only ended early in March when Russell re-formed his discredited government. Despite the problems caused by the bill, Russell’s re-formed government did not dare to consider dropping it, but in order to strengthen the administration the new government did discuss whether it should damp down the controversy by removing the clauses referring to Ireland. A number of ministers, such as Sir William Somerville, the chief secretary in Ireland, and Sir George Lewis, the under-secretary of state at the Home Office argued that, as the papal bull referred only to England, Ireland should be exempted. However, the home secretary, Sir George Grey, was adamantly opposed to any such concession. In the end the only compromise made was that clauses 2 and 3 of the bill, which referred to the illegal status of documents containing the name of a see and the forfeiting to the crown of any bequest to a see, were abolished. These two clauses were controversial because if applied they could have greatly complicated the administration of the Catholic Church in Ireland, and therefore had stirred up great opposition among Irish Catholics. However, with these changes a new problem emerged which was that the new bill now had the disadvantage that while it still alienated Catholic opinion, particularly in Ireland, it also failed to satisfy the Protestants in England. During the spring and summer of 1851 the bill slowly made its controver-

121 122 123

Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 264–8. Hansard, 3rd ser. cxix. 218 (7 Feb. 1851). Times, 8 Feb. 1851.

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sial journey through parliament. During its passage it came under attack from a number of prominent figures. In the House of Commons it was challenged by John Bright, Richard Cobden and most notably by William Gladstone who made a two-hour-long speech attacking the bill’s failings.124 In the House of Lords the most prominent opponent was Lord Aberdeen, whose principled resistance led him to present a petition to the Lords drawn up by the Irish Catholic bishops.125 Outside parliament the English and Irish Catholics continued their activities which now focused on the need to establish a Catholic Defence Society. This resistance could do nothing but delay the bill which, in the absence of the Irish MPs who walked out in protest, passed its third reading on 4 July.126 Overtures to Rome During the debates on the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill not all of the attacks came from the Catholic standpoint, for the Tories also tried to undermine Russell’s standing. One of the arguments used to attack him was that it had been his policy towards the papacy that had encouraged Rome to restore the hierarchy in the first place. The leading proponent of this view was Benjamin Disraeli, who in his speech of 7 February noted that the prime minister’s argument that the restoration had come as a surprise was untenable. As Russell had, ever since 1846, taken a favourable stand towards Catholic issues, Disraeli asked the House when the Pope was aware that these were the opinions of so eminent a personage – when the representative of our Sovereign was himself indecently communicating with him in a tone of deferential homage – when he might read in the records of the Irish court that his archbishops and bishops took the highest precedence . . . I ask the house, is it just, is it fair, is the noble Lord authorised to state, to-night, that the conduct of the Pope was ‘a blunder on the sudden?’127

Such an accusation was, of course, understandable, particularly in the light of Minto’s supposed knowledge of the pope’s plans, but Disraeli neatly overlooked the fact that the main reason why Russell had attempted to woo the papacy was to pursue a goal common to all British governments, namely control over Ireland. The desire to converse with Rome about Ireland even continued during the debates about the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill. In January Sheil had finally taken up the position of minister in Florence and in the following month 124 125 126 127

Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 278. Aberdeen to Cullen, 19 May 1851, Cullen papers, sec. 39/2, file 1x/86. Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 279. Hansard, 3rd ser. cxiv. 259 (7 Feb. 1851).

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opened communications with the papacy. By the time that Sheil arrived a number of issues, apart from the hierarchy, had come to disturb anglo-papal relations. Most of the problems arose from the activities of Protestant Free Church supporters who were engaged in the practice of distributing bibles in central Italy. A number of these men had been arrested and the British representatives were engaged in trying to arrange their release. Despite these irritations Sheil found the papal nuncio in Florence, Massoni, to be receptive to his overtures. In their conversations together Sheil explained to Massoni that the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill was necessary to remove the government’s embarrassment and pacify Protestant anger, but that ministers such as Clarendon had been reluctant to introduce it. Their discussions also dealt with the subject of diplomatic relations between the two states, but it was agreed that the problem of the bar on the papal representative in London being an ecclesiastical was still an insurmountable obstacle. Sheil did, however, manage to give the impression that the British government was still keen to maintain amicable relations with the Vatican in spite of the problems over the English Catholic Church.128 Sheil found through his talks with Massoni and from Petre’s conversations with Antonelli in Rome that the Vatican had not yet decided what to do about the decision taken at the Synod of Thurles to oppose the Queen’s Colleges, although it leaned towards accepting the synod’s views. Sheil therefore argued in a letter to Palmerston on 18 March that Britain should attempt to delay the papal decision by offering to negotiate about specific terms. Moreover, he suggested that it should be made clear to Garibaldi in Paris that if the pope made a decision on the colleges in line with the synod’s recommendations this would further exasperate British public opinion.129 Over the next two months Sheil continued with his diplomatic efforts, and felt that he was making progress. In a letter to Russell on 7 May he asserted that he had been able to delay a decision on the colleges and that through Massoni he had been able to ‘shew the cardinal secretary of state the importance of not closing the doors against reconciliation with England’.130 However, before Sheil could build any further on these foundations, he fell ill and died in Florence in late May. This was a grave setback for Palmerston, but the importance of having an anti-Irish Catholic voice in Rome had by no means diminished and therefore his thoughts turned to who could replace Sheil in Florence. After some deliberation he recommended to the queen in November 1851 that the former minister to Madrid, Sir Henry Bulwer, should be appointed and that he also be given either an official or unofficial mission to Rome.131 Bulwer was, of course, a skilled diplomat and the hope 128

Ecclesiastical hierarchy in England, n.d. [around 1851?], ASV, Archivio Particolare di Pio IX, oggetti vari, no. 612. 129 Kerr, ‘A nation of beggars’?, 286–7. 130 Richard Sheil to Russell, 7 May 1851, in Correspondence of Russell, 65. 131 Palmerston to Victoria, 14 Nov. 1851, RA, VIC/B11/221.

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was that he could use his experience to valuable effect. This was important for Britain’s two existing representatives in Rome were largely ineffective. As Russell observed to Clarendon in December 1851, ‘I am glad Freeborn will sink in importance when Bulwer goes, & as for Petre’s insignificance, it cannot be increased.’132 But before Bulwer could reach Florence, the Russell administration was plunged once more into crisis when the prime minister, after much pressure from the queen and Prince Albert, finally dismissed Palmerston. This led to Palmerston’s faction joining the opposition and in February 1852, after losing a crucial vote in the house, the Whig government was finally forced to resign. The period following the pope’s return to Rome thus saw British policy towards the papacy mired in difficulties. At one level there were still many reasons, despite Pius’ renunciation of liberalism, for Britain to cultivate its relationship with Rome, for it continued to desire to balance Austrian and French influence in Italy and to curb the activities of the Irish Catholic Church. During 1850–1 the British government therefore persevered with its efforts to show a conciliatory face, even to the extent of not backing Piedmont over the Siccardi reforms. Moreover, despite the storm created by the restoration of the English Catholic hierarchy, it continued to use its diplomats to present Britain’s case over Ireland to the papacy. The problem, however, was that by this time the mutual warmth that had existed in 1847–8 was completely extinguished. The restoration of the hierarchy, following shortly upon the brutal suppression of the Roman republic, meant that this was little desire within Britain for close relations with the pope, who now again came to epitomise Catholic despotism. The key to this process of alienation was Wiseman’s inept actions. If the restoration had been announced in a less provocative manner it would not have done so much more harm to anglo-Vatican relations, but Wiseman’s pronouncements showed a fundamental lack of tact and common sense, for all he did was arouse the British public’s latent hatred and suspicion of Catholic pretensions. Further damaging the ties between London and Rome was the pope’s unwillingness to do anything to thaw relations, for he no longer needed Britain’s support and thus had no reason to respond positively to the British call for his support in Ireland. The anglo-papal relationship that had appeared to promise so much at the time of the decision to send Minto to Rome thus returned to a more traditional pattern of mutual suspicion and frustration.

132

Russell to Clarendon, 13 Dec. 1851, Clarendon papers, box 26.

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Conclusion

Conclusion During the years of Italian unification between 1859 and 1861 Britain was the state outside the Italian peninsula that did the most to undermine and bring to an end the temporal power of the papacy. Indeed, as McIntire has noted, Britain’s assistance in the destruction of the Papal States was one of the most important of its contributions to the process of unification.1 In the light of this it is remarkable to find that only a few years earlier the British reaction to the early years of the papacy of Pius IX was enthusiastic, and that there was a surprising degree of British interest in and governmental support for the pope. For a period of two years between 1846 and 1848 the pope was a central figure who influenced not only the course of Britain’s foreign policy but also generated a great deal of interest and support within its domestic politics. There are a number of ways in which to explain this unexpected entente between Britain and the pope. It is tempting at first glance to assume that British enthusiasm for the pope during these years was due solely to the relief that at last a ‘good’ pope had taken charge in Rome and the hope that his subsequent reforms would transform the government and administration of this stronghold of autocracy. This is true to an extent; there was indeed a genuine welcome in 1846 and 1847 for the concept of a liberal pope. Moreover, it was genuinely believed that Pius could set a positive example to the monarchs of Italy and demonstrate that reform rather than reaction was the best means to avoid revolution, which was, of course, in line with the prevailing Whig orthodoxy that existed in Britain. The positive response to the pope was also, however, due to the recognition on the part of the British government that Pius’ liberalism could be useful in terms of the balance of power within the Italian peninsula. The abiding British fear in this period, and particularly of Palmerston, was that the next general European war would break out as the result of a FrancoAustrian confrontation over an Italian issue. In this context support for the pope was a means of opposing Austrian domination and of encouraging an indigenous nationalist movement that did not rely on France. The holding of this view meant that the British government in essence espoused a neo-Guelf perspective on Italy that had something in common with the ideas of Gioberti and Farini. The appearance of an enlightened pope was not welcome only to the British government, it also appealed to a significant element of the British 1

McIntire, England against the papacy.

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CONCLUSION

public as well. Suddenly newspapers and periodicals began to treat the pope as a fighter against despotism and as a hope for the future of Italy. Even radicals, including Mazzini, joined in the chorus of support and acclaim. An important aspect to the pope’s popularity was clearly that he was more than a reformer: in the autumn of 1847 he stood as the single most important opponent of Austria and its reactionary chancellor, Metternich. In the wake of the brutal seizure of Krakow in 1846 and the contemporaneous intervention in Switzerland, this apparently won Pius plaudits from across the political spectrum. The events of 1848, however, served to demonstrate that the hopes that had been placed in the pope were based on a misconception of what Pius intended to achieve. He may have wished to see a less corrupt system of government within the Papal States, but this did not mean that he was willing to sacrifice any of his temporal powers to achieve it, particularly if such concessions encroached on his spiritual authority. He was not therefore prepared to act as a figurehead constitutional monarch, nor would he agree to declare war on Austria. As such he lost his leadership role in the struggle to construct a new Italy and his rule over Rome came to be challenged by both moderate and radical nationalists. It would be logical to assume that his failure in the summer of 1848 to act as a rallying point for Italian nationalism and his opposition to further constitutional reform meant that Britain’s positive policy towards the pope then ended. To a degree this was the case, for British public opinion forgot its previous enthusiasm and retreated back into its more traditional attitude of suspecting the worst of the pope and Catholicism. Indeed radical opinion found a new champion in the shape of the Roman republic. However, it could not be said that the British government turned its back on the papacy completely, for although, due to its concern for the Italian balance of power, it began to transfer its support to Piedmont, attempts to keep on relatively good terms with the pope continued until 1851. That the British government did not give up on Pius demonstrates that it was not just his ‘liberalism’ that attracted its support and interest, but that other motives were in play. In part one can explain British policy by stating that Britain was reluctant to abandon the pope even when he had renounced reform for fear that he would become the political puppet of the French or the Austrian government. This was evident in 1849 when Britain supported the restoration of the pope to his seat in Rome and opposed the Roman republic, and also in 1850 when Britain was reluctant to give its unequivocal backing to Piedmont in its clash with the papacy. There was, however, an even more significant factor that required Britain to show favour to the papacy – Ireland. From the autumn of 1847 onwards the rise of political tensions in Ireland meant that a consistent theme of British policy towards Rome was that the pope had to be persuaded to take action to help to control the Irish Catholic Church. This policy included pressing the pope to give his sanction to British reforms, such as the Queen’s Colleges and the endowment of the Irish Cath173


olic Church, and to use his power to quell the pro-repeal activities of the Irish clergy. Above all, this came to be the issue that dominated British thinking. For example, even when it was clear that the pope’s power in Italian affairs was haemorrhaging away in the summer of 1848, the British government continued on regardless with the diplomatic bill in large part because Ireland rather than Italy was its chief concern. Moreover, the prospect of papal support in Ireland was still exerting its attraction in 1851 when R. L. Sheil was sent as the British minister to Florence. The need for a solution to the Irish question was so serious that unfortunately it blinded the British government to reality and led it to enter avenues that in fact only prejudiced the chances of its diplomacy succeeding. Two problems emerged as Ireland came to dominate British thinking. The first was that the government showed a fundamental lack of understanding of Pius’ position, believing that relations could be opened with Rome on a temporal but not a spiritual level in a manner that insulted the dignity of the Holy See. This coincided with a second failure, which was an inability to recognise that support for the pope could not be reconciled with the pressures of British domestic politics. The clearest example of the contradictory approach of the British government was evident in the diplomatic bill of 1848, which was designed to open the way for diplomatic relations with the papacy in order to balance the influence of the Irish College. This was a worthwhile goal, but, due to the weight of conservative anti-Catholic sentiment in parliament the government was prohibited from dealing with Rome on anything but a temporal basis, although it was the pope’s spiritual power which the government hoped to make use of in Ireland. This may have been expedient in terms of domestic politics, but the result, not surprisingly, was the pope’s failure to take up the British overture, for he found its terms derogatory. A second example of this failure of perception and political wisdom came in the way in which the British government took advantage of Wiseman’s good offices but failed to make it clear that the restoration of the English Catholic hierarchy was unacceptable. The use of unofficial channels to make contact with Rome was, of course, unavoidable in the absence of formal relations, but the way in which this policy was carried out was naïve. In the end it did nothing to help Britain in Ireland, but it did encourage, albeit unintentionally, Wiseman to press ahead with the restoration, and by so doing helped to create the ‘papal aggression’ movement, which was to seal the fate of Russell’s government and destroy all hopes of better relations with Rome. By the summer of 1851 it was clear that five years of diplomacy had achieved very little. The papal reforms of 1846 and 1847 were reneged upon, Austria and France still vied for control of the Italian peninsula, and no solution to the Irish problem was forthcoming. In time the image of the ‘good pope’ would be consigned to memory, and when he died Pius IX would be remembered not for his early liberalism but for his opposition to Italian unification and his promulgation of papal infallibility. In addition, the fact that there had once been a high point in anglo-Vatican relations and that a diplo174

CONCLUSION

matic revolution had been attempted between 1846 and 1848 disappeared from view. Instead the image that now exists of anglo-Vatican relations in the mid-nineteenth century is the furore over the re-establishment of the hierarchy. However, the fact that nothing substantial was achieved in the end does not mean that the period of British support for the papacy is insignificant and can be dismissed as a mere aberration. In the context of British policy towards Italy, these years illustrate the fact that the attempt to seek a solution to the Italian national question was an evolutionary process and that before the rise of Piedmont an alternative to unification by Turin did exist. It thus stands as a useful corrective to the orthodox view of Britain and the Risorgimento espoused by Beales and Hearder that emphasises the Piedmontese angle alone, and builds upon the work of Emilia Morelli who stressed the significance of the interest shown by Britain in the 1831–2 conferences on papal reform. This period also acts as a reminder of the way in which, for Britain, policy towards the papacy could never be divorced from the vital issue of how to manage Ireland. Indeed, this is the area of greatest consistency in British policy, for both before and after the flowering of relations that took place in the early years of Pius IX’s reign the British government attempted to influence the papacy over Irish issues in the hope that the spiritual weight of the pontiff could curb his flock’s subversive activities. This was always an illusion, but, as it was one of the few cards that Britain had to play, London never stopped imagining that it would someday prove to be fruitful. Britain’s representatives in central Italy in the 1850s and 1860s, men such as Bulwer, Lord Lyons and Sir Odo Russell, would all come to be very familiar with this argument.2 These years are also important because they tell us much about the influence of public opinion on foreign policy in the nineteenth century and the difficulty of pursuing a line that ran contrary to the mass of public opinion. Clearly public opinion does not explain all of Palmerston’s and Russell’s actions and one also needs to take into account what might be seen as more traditional diplomatic concerns such as the balance of power in Europe. In addition in the case of Palmerston, one has to take note of his determined efforts to keep foreign policy under his own control. It was, after all, this jealous concern that led him in January 1851 to oppose the plans put forward by Prince Albert and Russell for making informal overtures to Rome. However, it is a truism in studies of Palmerston’s diplomacy that he was always watchful of public opinion and prepared to be guided by its desires. The case of policy towards Rome both proves and contradicts this image. Certainly in 1847–8 Palmerston’s willingness to support Pius ran in line with public opinion, but after the pope’s flight from Rome in November 1848

2

I would like to thank Scott Cairns for information about Lord Lyons’s diplomatic dealings with the papacy.

175


British policy towards the papacy, influenced to a large degree by Irish considerations, moved away from popular sentiment. Indeed by 1850–1 it is hard to believe that there would not have been a public outcry had it been known that the government was still attempting to conciliate the papacy. Palmerston was aware of this problem, which helps to explain why in public he was keen to disassociate himself from French intervention in Rome and was cautious in his dealings with the papacy in 1850–1. The need to satisfy public opinion also explains why the government felt it had to respond with punitive legislation to the ‘papal aggression’ crisis. The long-term ineffectiveness of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill and the idea that Russell betrayed his liberal principles by introducing such a law has blinded historians to the fact that in the atmosphere of the autumn and winter of 1850–1 the government had to act, even at the cost of alienating the papacy and its Irish Catholic supporters in parliament. This was not a matter merely of party politics and Russell’s attempt to revitalise his government’s fortunes, but a necessary action designed to appease an unruly and potentially dangerous public movement, while at the same time not discriminating against the Catholic laity. In the final analysis it was this inability to construct policy towards the papacy without taking note of public opinion that meant that all Palmerston’s skill and patience could not produce a satisfactory result, for in the case of anglo-Vatican relations, the religious dimension meant that he was unable to square the circle of satisfying both the public and the pope. The problem he faced was that there was consistently a complex interplay between political and religious issues and that, despite all the pressing political reasons for seeking better relations with Rome, the fundamentally anti-Catholic nature of British society made this impossible to achieve. Britain’s attempt to use papal influence in Italy and over the Catholic clergy in Ireland to suit its own interests failed because Britain could never overcome its aversion to formal and complete recognition of the pope. In the end there was a basic contradiction between religion and politics.

176

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190

Index Abercromby, Ralph, ambassador to Sardinia–Piedmont, see Palmerston Aberdeen, George Gordon, earl of, foreign secretary, 21, 26, 29, 57, 91 Achilli, Giacinto, Italian radical, 133–5, 159–60 Albert, Prince, prince-consort of Queen Victoria, 52–3, 165–6, 171, 175 Altieri, Cardinal Lodovico: head of government, Papal States, 87, 89; papal nuncio to Austria, 21, 29 Ancona, 12, 15, 24, 27–8, 35, 42, 56, 127 Antonelli, Cardinal Giacomo: exiled to Gaeta, 117, 123, 138; return to Rome, 138, 139–41, 170; Vatican secretary of state, 79–80, 85–8; Vatican treasurer, 35, 72–3 Armellini, Carlo, Italian radical, 30; republican minister of the interior, 113–14; triumvir of the Roman republic, 114–15 Arundel, Henry Fitzalan-Howard, earl of, Catholic MP, 98, 164–5 Austria, 61, 82, 90, 105, 145; anti-radical cooperation in Europe, 17–18, 25; and Britain, 6, 16–17, 19, 20–1, 37, 47–8, 52–3, 56, 69–70, 71, 110, 120–1; interests throughout Italy, 37, 45, 47, 71, 118; military intervention in Italy, 46–8, 50–2, 71, 77; military intervention in Papal States, 6, 14–15, 27–8, 45–8, 54–5, 89–90, 138–9; and papacy, 2, 11, 20, 28–32, 88, 121–2, 141; proposed military intervention in Roman republic, 116–18, 120; and Sardinia–Piedmont, 46, 48, 71, 118; and Switzerland, 18; war with Sardinia–Piedmont, 82–4, 90, 114, 118. See also Austro-French rivalry in Italy; Metternich Austro-French rivalry in Italy, 1–2, 11, 14–15, 27, 51, 111, 116, 118, 120, 135, 171, 172–4 Bologna, 12–15, 22, 36, 42, 45, 74, 90, 120 Bonaparto, Carlo Luciano, prince of Canino, Italian radical, see Canino

Briggs, John, Roman Catholic vicarapostolic of northern district, 68, 94, 100, 102 Britain: anti-Catholicism, 1–2, 4, 5, 6, 22, 68–9, 94, 135, 137, 142, 145–63, 165, 174, 176, attacks on Catholics, 151–4, Evangelical Alliance, 133–4, 155, 157, 159–60; anti-Tractarianism, 145–6, 149, 152, 155, 157, 160, 161–2; diplomatic bill, 90–6, 98–101, 103, 109, 115, 174; Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, 137, 166–9, 176; Italian radical exiles in, 6, 18, 56, 130–3; radicalism, 4, 18, 30, 56, 124–5, 136, 142, 145, 156, 157–9, 161, 173, Chartism, 4, 18, 21, 56, 125, 155, 156, 157, 159; Royal Navy, 51, 53, 56, 87, 100, 106–7. See also Ireland; Roman Catholic Church in England Britain, government: 1–2; antipathy towards Italian radicalism, 6, 74; anti-radical cooperation in Europe, 17–18; and Austria, 6, 16–17, 19, 20–1, 37, 47–8, 52–3, 56, 69–70, 71, 110, 120–1; Foreign Office, 27–31, 128, 139–40, 142, 152, 154; and France, 120–1, 142; Home Office, 151–2, 154, 159; and papacy, 3–6, 50–7, 117, 136, 139–40, 172–6, attempt to open formal relations, 29–30, 52, 65–71, 90–101, 103, 109, concerning Ireland, 19–22, 60, 142–3, 169–71, support for liberal reforms, 9, 16–17, 37–40, 64–5; and Roman republic, 111–15, 126–30, 173; and Sardinia–Piedmont, 113, 142, 171, 173; support for Italian liberalism, 16, 29, 34–8, 43–4, 47, 77; and trans-Italian railway, 34–6, 98; and Tuscany, 52. See also Britain: diplomatic bill; Ireland; Palmerston; Papal States: international conference on reform; Roman Catholic Church in England Britain, public opinion: 5–6, 173, 175–6; The Daily News, 123; The Examiner (liberal), 108; The Leader (radical), 156–7, 159; The Morning Chronicle (conservative), 123, 125; The

191


Nonconformist, 156; The Northern Star (radical), 30, 31, 34, 55, 76, 113, 125, 132, 149, 156, 158; Punch, 1, 55; The Quarterly Review (conservative), 75, 132; The Rambler (Roman Catholic), 128, 130; The Record (evangelical), 133, 135; Reynolds Newspaper (radical), 125; Reynolds Weekly (radical), 156–7; The Spirit of the Age (radical), 108, 125; support for Italian liberalism, 29, 31, 34, 54–7, 76, 124; support for Italian radicalism, 108, 113, 115, 124–6; The Tablet (Roman Catholic), 102–3; The Times (conservative), 27–31, 54–5, 69, 87, 92, 102, 107–8, 121, 123–5, 131–2, 144, 150, 158, 168; The Westminster Review (conservative), 75 Brunetti, Angelo, see Ciceruacchio Canino, Carlo Luciano Bonaparto, prince of, Italian radical, 30, 74, 89 Carbonari, revolutionary secret society, 12, 30, 104 Carlo Alberto, king of Sardinia–Piedmont, 27, 46, 76, 82–4, 90, 114 Chartism, see Britain Ciacchi, Cardinal Luigi, papal legate at Ferrara, 46, 55 Ciceruacchio (Angelo Brunetti), Italian radical, 30, 74–5, 77–9, 86 Circolo popolare, radical party in Rome, 40, 74–5, 77, 79, 83, 85–6, 89, 106, 133 Circolo romano, liberal party in Rome, 74–5, 77, 83, 86 Cività Vecchia, 51, 87, 99–100, 107, 116, 119, 132 Clarendon, George Villiers, earl of, lord-lieutenant of Ireland, 57–62, 92–5, 170. See also Palmerston; Russell Cochrane, Alexander Baillie, traveller in Italy, 75, 105–6, 138 Comacchio, Austrian garrison at, 11 Consalvi, Cardinal Ercole, Vatican secretary of state, 11–12, 20 Corsini, Senator, 77–9 Crolly, William, Roman Catholic archbishop of Armagh, 59, 92 Cullen, Paul: bishop of Armagh, 142–3, 167; Rector of Irish College in Rome, 61, 94 Curia romana, see Vatican Daily News, see Britain, public opinion d’Azeglio, Massimo Taparelli, marchese,

Italian liberal nationalist, 23–4, 26–7, 40; prime minister, Sardinia–Piedmont, 141–2 Drouyn de Lhuys, Édouard, French foreign minister, 119, 134 Eardley, Sir Culling, MP, executive member, Evangelical Alliance, 32, 133–4 Eglintoun amendment, see Britain: diplomatic bill English College in Rome, 20, 60, 63, 65, 128 Examiner, see Britain, public opinion Farini, Luigi Carlo, Italian liberal, 9, 17, 23–4, 80, 172 Ferdinando, king of the Two Sicilies, 76, 84, 117 Ferrara, legation of, 9, 42; Austrian occupation of, 6, 27, 45–8, 54–5, 89 Ferretti, Cardinal Gabriele, Vatican secretary of state, 44, 46, 103 Florence, see Tuscany Forlì, 12, 24–5, 42 Fornari, Cardinal Raffaele, papal nuncio to France, 38, 50 France, 37, 82, 145; ability to influence the papacy, 28, 31, 32, 135–6; antiradical cooperation in Europe, 17; and Britain, 120–1, 142; military intervention in Italy, 1, 49, 50, 52, 85, 88, 90; military intervention in Papal States, 6, 15–16, 107, 138–9; military intervention in Roman republic, 116–20, 135, 137, 140, 176; official support for Italian liberals, 25; opposition to reform in Papal States, 124; and papacy, 122–4, 138, 141; political intervention in Roman republic, 121; popular support for Italian radicals, 12–14; unwillingness to support Pius IX against Austria, 37, 46–8, 64 Fransoni, Luigi, archbishop of Turin, 141 Freeborn, John, consul in Rome, 30, 35, 87, 112, 115, 131–2, 138, 139–40. See also Palmerston Galletti, Giuseppe, Italian radical republican: minister of the interior, Papal States, 106; minister of police, Papal States, 104; republican president, 113, 114

192

INDEX

Lambruschini, Cardinal Luigi, Vatican secretary of state, 16, 20, 28, 33, 44 Leader, see Britain, public opinion Leo XII, pope (1823–9), 11–12 Leopold II, grand duke of Tuscany, 77, 84, 114 Lombardy, 9, 82, 84–5, 90, 114 Louis Napoleon (Charles-Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte), president of France, 116–19, 124, 139, 145

Garibaldi, Giuseppe, Italian radical nationalist, 112, 127, 159–60 Gioberti, Vincenzo, Italian liberal nationalist, 25, 33, 34, 125, 133, 172 Giovine Italia, 17–18, 23, 40, 112, 114 Gizzi, Cardinal Tommaso, 29; Vatican secretary of state, 33–4, 35, 38, 40–1, 42, 44 Gregory XVI, pope (1831–46): and Britain, 17; innate conservatism, 6, 9, 22, 24–8, 32, 35; and Ireland, 20; request for Austrian military aid, 14 Guizot, François, French prime minister, 37, 46, 82, 104 Hamilton, Sir George, minister to Tuscany, see Palmerston; Petre Hamilton, William, abbé, 164 Holland, Lord, minister to Tuscany, 24–6. See also Palmerston Howard, Lord Edward, Roman Catholic MP, 164–5, 166 India, improved communication with, 35, 98 Ireland, 6, 19, 57, 66, 95, 145, 175; British approaches to Pius IX concerning, 39, 50, 71, 92–3, 95, 109, 173–4; British compromises re Roman Catholics, 21–2, 100–1, 173–4; famine (1846–7), 19, 22, 58–9, 61, 67; Irish College in Rome, 20, 59–61, 66–8, 94, 100–1, 103, 109, 129, 142, 174; Maynooth, 21–2; political activities of Catholic priests, 4, 20–1, 58, 60–2, 68–70, 94, 98–9, 174; Queen’s Colleges (nondenominational), 59–61, 69, 95, 101, 137, 142–3, 146, 170, 173; repeal movement, 5, 19–22, 99; revolutionary nationalist movement, 61–2; Roman Catholic Church, 7, 19–20, 58–60, 68–9, 94, 143, 167–8, 171. See also Britain, government and papacy Italy, 9, 89; Italian league (proposed 1848), 83; liberalism, 22–4, 33; nationalism, 33, 50, 56, 69, 71, 78, 88, 109, 157; proposed unification, 23, 40, 47–8, 52, 56, 73, 82, 84–5, 105, 109, 127, 172, 174–5; revolutionary activity, 12–14, 17, 71, 83–5. See also AustroFrench rivalry in Italy; Roman republic Jesuits see Society of Jesus

MacHale, John, Roman Catholic archbishop of Tuam, 20–1, 59, 61, 92, 94–5, 100, 102, 142, 167 Malta: Italian radicals in, 20–2, 132, 139 Mamiani, Count Terenzio, Italian liberal, 73; effective head of government, 87–90, 104; excluded from republic’s assembly, 113–14; war minister, minister of the interior, Papal States, 86–7 Manifesto di Rimini, 9, 22–4 Mastai-Feretti, Cardinal Giovanni, see Pius IX Maynooth Bill, see Ireland Maynooth College, see Ireland Maynooth Grant, see Ireland Mazzini, Giuseppe, Italian radical, 4, 6, 17, 27, 124–5; exile (1831–48), 6, 17–18, 20–1, 56, 130, 172; exile (1849), 131, 133, 157–60; return to Italy (1849), 111, 112, 114; triumvir of Roman republic, 114–15, 119–20, 127–8 Metternich, Prince Clemens, Austrian chancellor, 11–12, 82, 172; opposition to Pius IX’s liberal reforms, 16, 28–30, 37, 45, 47 Minto, Gilbert Elliott, earl of, lord privy seal, 106, 131–2, 164, 169; mission to Italy, 50–4, 57–62, 66–7, 71, 112, 139; in Naples (Feb.–Apr. 1848), 77, 79, 81, 85, 92–3; in Rome (Nov. 1847–Jan. 1848), 1, 68–70, 72–3, 76–6, 92, 103, 162, 171; in Rome (Apr. 1848–9), 81–2, 94–5. See also Palmerston; Russell Morning Chronicle, see Britain, public opinion Murray, Daniel, Roman Catholic archbishop of Dublin, 59, 92 Naples, 3, 11, 17, 73, 76, 83 Newman, John Henry, 63, 145, 160

193


Nicholson, Francis, Roman Catholic archbishop of Corfu, 95–6, 99, 101. See also Russell Nonconformist, see Britain, public opinion Normanby, Lord, ambassador to France, 38, 50, 139. See also Palmerston Northern Star, see Britain, public opinion O’Connell, Daniel, Irish nationalist, 19–20, 59, 66 O’Connell, John, Irish nationalist, 99, 167 O’Ferrall, Richard More, governor of Malta, 93, 99–100, 131–2, 167 Palmerston, Lord, 8, 110; and Abercromby, 36–7, 44, 48, 51, 53, 85, 88, 107, 113, 141; and Austrian activities in Italy, 47–9, 84, 88, 90, 120, 172; and Clarendon, 58, 62, 93; failures in 1848, 97, 109–10; foreign secretary (1830–4) 14–16, (1846–51) 136, 142, 163–7, 171, 175; and Freeborn, 38, 43, 97, 120, 129, 131; and Sir George Hamilton, 33, 47, 100, 107, 112, 123; and Holland, 25; and Ireland, 7, 61, 101, 109, 143; and Minto, 61, 67, 69, 74, 77, 79, 81, 85, 95; and Normanby, 121, 123, 166; and Papal States, 68–9, 93, 98; and Petre, 129, 135, 139–40; and Ponsonby, 45, 121; and public opinion, 123–4, 126, 132, 175–6; and Queen Victoria, 52; and Russell, 31–2, 51, 60, 96, 165, 166; and Scarlett, 163; and Seymour, 16–17; and Sheil, 170; and Shrewsbury, 94; support for liberal reforms in Italy, 33, 37, 47–9, 64, 76, 120–1; and Taylor, 14; and Wiseman, 51, 64–5, 68, 128; Wiseman’s assessment of, 65–6 papacy, 1–2, 16, 27; as constitutional monarchy of united Italy, 33–4, 45, 66, 125; separation of secular and religious power, 159–60 Papal States: administration, 1, 17, 22, 27, 82, 89–90, 97, 120, council of deputies, 80–1, 83, 89, council of ministers, 72, 74, 77–8, 80, 87, 97, introduction of lay ministers, 78–80, office of foreign affairs, 86–7, 97, reform, 2, 5–6, 11, 23, 24; army, 77, 83–4; and Austria, 2, 11, 20, 28–32, 88, 121–2, 141; and Britain, 2, 11, 20, 28–32, 88, 121–2, 141; international conference on reform in (1831), 6, 14–16, 65, 72, 175,

memorandum prepared at, 9, 23, 28, 31–2, 47, 122–3; liberal reform in, 30–1, 33–49, 69, 105, 109, civic guard, 6, 23, 33, 42–6, 69, 74, 86, 88–9, 106, constitution, 76–7, 79–82, 89, 109, consultà di stato (consultative assembly with lay representation), 72–3, 77, councils of press censorship, 41, European importance of, 14–15, 31–2, military reforms, 77–8, press law, 33, 40–1, 45, proposed confederation with Sardinia–Piedmont and Tuscany, 104, representative government in, 79; papal nuncio in Austria (1847), 38–9; possibility of reactionary coups in, 45, 48, 54, 64; proposed membership of Italian League, 83; proposed war with Austria (1848), 82–6, 89–90, 97, 104–7, 109, 172; radicalism, 1, (1830–2) 12–15, 17, (1843–6) 22, 24–5, 27, (1846–7) 40, 42–34, 64, 69, 72, 77, (1848) 71, 84, 86, 98, 104, 106–7; trans-Italian railway, 34–6, 98; and Tuscany, 25. See also Roman republic; Vatican Parker, Admiral Sir William, naval commander in Mediterranean, 53, 87, 100, 106 Peel, Sir Robert, prime minister, 20, 21–2 Petre, William, diplomatic agent in Rome, 21, 79, 89, 92, 97, 105, 119, 164, 170; and Sir George Hamilton, 33–5, 41, 43, 77, 81, 83–6, 105, 138, 140; and Scarlett, 28. See also Palmerston Piedmont, see Sardinia–Piedmont Pio Nono, see Pius IX Pisa, 25 Pius VII, pope (1800–23), 9–11 Pius VIII, pope (1829–30), 12 Pius IX, pope (1846–78): as Cardinal Giovanni Mastai-Feretti, 23; elected (June 1846), 6, 9, 29; ‘moderate and liberal’ (1846–8), 1–2, 5–6, 9, 29–49, 51, 54–7, 69–84, 87, allocution against war with Austria (29 Apr. 1848), 84–6, Motuproprio (12 June 1847), 42; constitutional monarch? (May–Nov. 1848), 87–93, 96–101, 104–7; exile in Gaeta (24 Nov. 1848), 6, 107–9, 111–12, 115–19, allocution against reform (12 Sept. 1849), 119, 135; restored (11 Apr. 1850), 6, 137; ‘increasingly reactionary’ (Apr. 1850– ), 137–40, 145–7, 163–6, 171,

194

INDEX

Nicholson, 96; and Ponsonby, 39; and Queen Victoria, 48, 52, 110; and restoration of English Roman Catholic hierarchy, 103, 137, 146, 161–9, 174; and Sheil, 170; and Shrewsbury, 66; and Wiseman, 64, 68, 143, 146. See also Palmerston Russia, 25, 27, 29

174, 176. See also Britain, government: and papacy; Ireland: political activities of Catholic priests; Roman Catholic Church in England: restoration of hierarchy Ponsonby, Sir John, baron, ambassador to Austria, 38–9, 52. See also Palmerston; Russell Punch, see Britain, public opinion Quarterly Review, see Britain, public opinion Rambler, see Britain, public opinion Record, see Britain, public opinion Renzi, Pietro, Italian liberal, 24–7, 31 Reynolds Newspaper, see Britain, public opinion Reynolds Weekly, see Britain, public opinion Rimini, 23, 24, 26 Risorgimento, 2–3, 23, 58, 175 Romagna, 22, 26, 74, 118 Roman Catholic Church in England, 62–3, 65–7, 70, 102–3, 128, 136, 146, 163–4, 167, 169; consultations on restoration of hierarchy, 50, 62–4, 102–3; expansion of Catholic population, 62; restoration of hierarchy without consultation, 2, 5–6, 137, 143–7, 151, 153, 158, 160, 162, 164, 171, 174; vicars-apostolic, 62–3, 166 Roman republic, 6, 109, 111–16, 124–5; anti-clericalism in, 126–30, 133–4, 136; and Austria, 114, 171; and Britain, 115, 126–30, 173; and France, 115; proposed unification with Tuscany, 114; and Sardinia–Piedmont, 115; war, 119–20 Rome, 3, 42–3, 74–5, 77, 79, 127; radical disturbances in, 85–6, 89–90 Rosmini, Antonio, Italian liberal nationalist, 17, 23; joint head of government, Papal States, 106 Rossi, Pellegrino: French ambassador to Vatican, 28, 31, 46; interior minister, Papal States, 104–5; murdered, 105–6, 108 Russell, Lord John, prime minister, 5, 49, 56–7, 131, 171, 175–6; and Clarendon, 57, 59, 60, 92, 143, 162, 171; and diplomatic relations with the papacy, 91–3, 95; and Ireland, 101, 143; and Minto, 51–2, 61, 68, 72; and

Saffi, Aurelio, triumvir of the Roman republic, 114, 131, 160 Sardinia–Piedmont, Kingdom of, 6, 17, 47, 52, 85, 90, 104, 107, 118, 175; and Austria, 46, 48, 71, 118; and Britain, 113, 142, 171, 173; constitution, 76–7; support for Italian reform, 48, 71, 73–4; and Tuscany, 26; war with Austria, 82–6, 89–90, 114, 118 Scarlett, Hon. Peter, secretary of legation at Florence, 27–9. See also Palmerston Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix zu, Austrian prime minister and foreign minister, 121–2 Seymour, George, minister in Florence, see Palmerston Sheil, Richard, minister to Tuscany, 143, 146, 163–4, 166, 169–70, 174. See also Palmerston; Russell Shrewsbury, Lord 51, 62, 94, 96, 98, 102–3, 144; and Clarendon, 94; and Minto, 58, 66–7. See also Palmerston; Russell Siccardi, Count Giuseppe, minister of justice and ecclesiastical affairs, Sardinia–Piedmont, 140, 142, 171 Sicily, 76–7, 110 Sinigaglia, 27, 127 Smith, John Abel, Roman Catholic MP, 164–5 Society of Jesus, 25, 29, 94 Spain, 117, 141; proposed military intervention in Roman republic, 118 Spirit of the Age, see Britain, public opinion Sterbini, Pietro, Italian radical, 40, 74, 86, 89, 105; joint head of government, Papal States, 106, 108, 113 Switzerland, 17–18, 37, 157, 172 Tablet, see Britain, public opinion Taylor, Sir Brook, representative at 1831 conference, 14–15. See also Palmerston Temple, Sir William, minister to Kingdom of Two Sicilies, 121, 143 Times, see Britain, public opinion

195


Tuscany, Austrian grand duchy, 83, 104, 107; anti-radical cooperation in Europe, 17, 24–5; and Austria, 25, 46, 118; and Britain, 52; constitution, 77; and Papal States, 25; proposed unification with Roman republic, 114; radical activity in, 22, 112; and Sardinia–Piedmont, 26 Two Sicilies, Kingdom of: constitution, 76; Pius IX’s flight, 6, 107; proposed military intervention in Roman republic, 117–18; radical activities in, 22, 76; and trans-Italian railway, 35–6. See also Naples; Sicily Ullathorne, William, bishop, vicar-apostolic of western district, 103, 144, 169 Vatican: College of Cardinals, 80, 103; Congregation for extraordinary ecclesiastical affairs, 87; Congregation of Propaganda Fide, 59, 60, 62–4, 94, 102, 103, 144, 152; Curia romana, 11, 28, 33, 36, zelanti, ultra-conservative

members, 11, 16, 33, 36, 44, 74; Nuncio (diplomatic service), 89 Venice, 9, 82, 85 Victoria, Queen, 52–3, 66, 90, 107, 110, 116, 146, 162–5, 171. See also Palmerston; Russell Westminster Review, see Britain, public opinion Wiseman, Nicholas, 5; Roman Catholic bishop of Melipotamus in partibus, vicar apostolic of the London region (1840–50), 6, 51, 54, 62–8, 70, 94–6, 98, 102–3, 143, 174; cardinal-archbishop of Westminster (1850–65), 64, 66–7, 102–3, 137, 144–51, 153–4, 156, 160–1, 165–7, 171; support for Irish reform (1820s, 1830s), 66. See also Palmerston; Russell Young Italy, see Giovine Italia zelanti, see Vatican: Curia romana

196

Britain and the Papacy in the Age of Revolution, 1846-1851 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

The Allotment Movement in England, 1793-1873 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

English Public Opinion and the American Civil War (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Cornwall Politics in the Age of Reform, 1790-1885 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Protection and Politics: Conservative Economic Discourse, 1815-1852 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Peace through Law: Britain and the International Court in the 1920s (Royal Historical Society Studies in History)

Nature and Artifice: The Life and Thought of Thomas Hodgskin, 1787-1869 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

The Labour Party and the Planned Economy, 1931-1951 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Science, Religion and Politics in Restoration England: Richard Cumberland's De Legibus Naturae (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Massacre at the Champ de Mars: Popular Dissent and Political Culture in the French Revolution (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Kingship and Crown Finance under James VI and I, 1603-1625 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Sport, Economy and Society in Britain 1750-1914 (New Studies in Economic and Social History)

Health and Society in Britain since 1939 (New Studies in Economic and Social History)

Franco-Irish Relations, 1500-1610: Politics, Migration and Trade (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Electoral Reform at Work: Local Politics and National Parties, 1832-1841 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Latin and the Vernacular Languages in Early Medieval Britain (Studies in the Early History of Britain)

Constructing Paris in the Age of Revolution

Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages

Plotting History: The Russian Historical Novel in the Imperial Age

Northern Danelaw (Studies in the Early History of Britain)

A History of Sociology in Britain: Science, Literature, and Society

Murder in the New Age

Public Health and Politics in the Age of Reform: Cholera, the State and the Royal Navy in Victorian Britain

Britain in Revolution, 1625-1660

Britain in Revolution: 1625-1660

Britain in Revolution: 1625-1660

The Experience of Revolution in Stuart Britain and Ireland

The First Professional Scientist: Robert Hooke and the Royal Society of London (Science Networks. Historical Studies)

The History of Britain

Britain and the Papacy in the Age of Revolution, 1846-1851 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

The Allotment Movement in England, 1793-1873 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

English Public Opinion and the American Civil War (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Cornwall Politics in the Age of Reform, 1790-1885 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Protection and Politics: Conservative Economic Discourse, 1815-1852 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Peace through Law: Britain and the International Court in the 1920s (Royal Historical Society Studies in History)

Nature and Artifice: The Life and Thought of Thomas Hodgskin, 1787-1869 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

The Labour Party and the Planned Economy, 1931-1951 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Science, Religion and Politics in Restoration England: Richard Cumberland's De Legibus Naturae (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Massacre at the Champ de Mars: Popular Dissent and Political Culture in the French Revolution (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Kingship and Crown Finance under James VI and I, 1603-1625 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Sport, Economy and Society in Britain 1750-1914 (New Studies in Economic and Social History)

Health and Society in Britain since 1939 (New Studies in Economic and Social History)

Franco-Irish Relations, 1500-1610: Politics, Migration and Trade (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Electoral Reform at Work: Local Politics and National Parties, 1832-1841 (Royal Historical Society Studies in History New Series)

Latin and the Vernacular Languages in Early Medieval Britain (Studies in the Early History of Britain)

Constructing Paris in the Age of Revolution

Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages

Plotting History: The Russian Historical Novel in the Imperial Age

Northern Danelaw (Studies in the Early History of Britain)

A History of Sociology in Britain: Science, Literature, and Society

Murder in the New Age

Public Health and Politics in the Age of Reform: Cholera, the State and the Royal Navy in Victorian Britain

Britain in Revolution, 1625-1660

Britain in Revolution: 1625-1660

Britain in Revolution: 1625-1660

The Experience of Revolution in Stuart Britain and Ireland

The First Professional Scientist: Robert Hooke and the Royal Society of London (Science Networks. Historical Studies)

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