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BRITAIN ANDTHE (lUESTIO EASTERN Missolonghi to Gallipoli

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8. The Sbuggle for Supt€orcy in th€ Bsltic 100G.I725 JII]L tlax

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6. Ihe First Boubon Century in Ffi,nce rf. 3. BBOWNrr.]r. 7. The IndustriBl Revolution r7fl>185{) BOBIN Ii. E,EEYE U.A.

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ADVISORY PANEL W. G. BeI. u.a. College,Oxford Exeter History, in Modem and Tutor Fellow of Oxford University History, Lecturer in Modem Alun Davies !d.A of Swsnsea' College Professorof Modem Ilistory, Univelsity M. R. D. Foot l[,a. !.Lrrt. Prcfessorof Modem llistory, ltctoria University of Manchester C. P. Ilill M.a. Senior Lecturer in Ealucation, Unive$ity of Exeter Marjone Reevesu,l. ra.o, St Anne's Coll€ge,Oxfod History, in Modem Fellow and Tuto? Lecturer in Modern Ilistory, University of Oxford O. A. Williams u.r. Ps.u. Professolof Ilistory, UniYersity of York

Britain and xHl,lt006mEtI the EasternQuestion: Missolonghi to Gallipoli G. D. CLAYTON ar.a.

UNIVEESITY

OF I,ONDON ?RESS LTD

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CONTEN T S

TNTRODUCTIOI( _ TIIII EASTDNN QUESTION r\ND BIrITAIN TI{E EASTIIRN QUESTION UP TO r82r 1. nrkey's Decline 2 The Interests ofthe Powers: hinciPal E ents ttltssia Austr;a - pran t-,trrain Reading up to 1821 Further fr\RT

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I

22

CANNING AND THE GRDEK WAR I,ABT II OI INDEPNNDENCII 3. Ceneral Considelatiolts Rsised by the lyar 4. Greet I'ower Rcactions, l8?r 5 5. The Wor Itself, to 1825 0. Caning's Policy, 1825-? 7. Nava no, tle Russo-Turlish \Yar and rhe Trcaty ol Ad anople 8. Uniinished Business' :!nd PointeN to the Future Pri cipal Events,l82r io PAIIIERSTON, UNIIIAR PATI'I III 'T'HE STRAITS CONYENTION

SIIELESSI AND

!. I'aimerston's Ttisk, and the Conpletion of Greck Indcpend€nce 10. Tire Egyptien Advence end Ilnkiar Skclessi 1r. tsrit in's Stntegic Int€rests in the llediterranean during the Palmerston DIs 12 The New Polmclston Policy toweds Turkey, snd Increasing British Involv€ment in the Middle E&st 13.'Ihe 1839-41 Crisis 14. The Straits Convention Principal Events, 1880-41

I'ART IV PALIIERSTON AND THE CNI}IEA 15. Genersltractors,and British Ecoromic Intercsts 16. Turkish Refom, and Stratford CaMing 1?. British Relations$ith Franceand Russia,r84l-54 r8. The Iloly Places,and the Russo-TurkishWsr 19. The crimean IVar 20. The TrcstY of Paris I'rincipal EveDts,1841-56 Futher Rcading

8S

CONTENTS

PART V CLADSTONE, DISRAEI,I AND TIIE BALKANS TO TE?6 2r. DevelopmentB,1856-75 22. The Crisis, 18?6-E: 1815- 1818- 1877- 18?828. The Clisisat Home: ?& quen and,Disrazli - DerW - Disraaw - Aadsttnz Aadrlzry Principal Events, 1856-78 Furthe! R€ading

tzl

PART VI SALISBURY, TIIE AI]LIANCE SYSTEMS. AND GERMANYiS DRIYE TO THE EAST r68 24. The Esstern Question after 1878 25, Britsin erd the Continentsl A.lliances 26. Eg}-I't 97, Th€ Sudan 2S.Afghanistan 29. The Medit€nanan Agreements 80. I'he Armenians, end Sslisbuy's New Line on the Straits 81. The Bagdad nailway 82. Anglo-JapaneseAlliance end Frenco-BritbhEnterte Itincipal Events, 1878-1907 Furth€r Rading PART VII TEE ANGLO,RUSSIAN ENTENTE ANI) ITS LIMITATIONS, 1907-r4 84, Ceneral Fscto$ 84. The Anglo-Russian Entent€ 86. The Bosnisn Crbis, r9o8-9 86. Mscedonie and the Balkan IVaIs 87. Sarsjevo and the Dritt to We! Principal Eventu, 1907-14 PART VIII THE GREAT WAR AND AFTERWARDS 88. British War Airl3 and t}te Middle East 89, the Dardme[6 Bnd Gellipoli 40. Psrtition SchemesaI. Pslestine snd Meeopotsmb 41. Pe8cellesties and Msndhtes 44. Chsnek snd Lau$nne 44. Afterthoughts PrinciFl Events, 1914-28 tr\sther Reading

MAPS The Middle East ir 1821 The GreeL War o{ hd€pendence Eg}?t ond Sl'Tie, r881--ar The Crimean Wa,r The 1876-8 Balksn Clbis Anglo-Russian Rivslry: The Cdticsl Ares, 1870-1907 After the Bslkan Wars, 1912-18 Psltition Schemes,1915Fr7 Savles, anil the B tish and Frcnch MaDdates Constantinople, the St$its snd the Lsusanne Chang€s

40 60 6a llt 141 189 214 228 247 242

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The autho! alld publishe$ wish to thaDk Routledge and Kegatr Paul Ltd, Mscmillstr ard co Ltd; Ginn and Co, and Eyle and Spottiswood€ Ltd for FunissioD to quota copyrtht mat€riel.

INTRODUCTION The Eastern Question and Britain

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'lhe Eastem Question becameone of the gr€&t diplomatic prcoccupationsof the nineteeEthcentury. Eminent statesmenof all the g"eat pow€rswerefascinsted, honiffed, infiristed by it. Not only wes the ploblem ine6capa.ble,it was also apparently insoluble. Even some historians - anil siuilents - have r€g&rded jt as an impenetrable tangle of unlikely and far-ofr events, baffiing, ard yet somehow impo*ant. Ihe Balkan area, with its seethingdiscontents,has thus been seenas 'Europe's powder keg', e 'diplomatic time-bomb', myst€riousand da[gerow. Yet the r€ality is Iessfomidable. The possibility of baffem€nt drisessimply becausethe Eastem Questionwas, in a sense,'openended'. It meant difreEnt things to different powels at different pedods of the nineteenth century; but the heart of the problem rcmained unchanging.The decline and pmbable collap8eof the Turkish empire was a diplomatic co[st€nt throughout the period. It had a)ready provoked rivel embitions smong the powels by 1821 (the opening of the Gle€k IndependenceWar). It was still e ms.jorsourceof dispute whenthe Creat War opeded in 1914.Doubts there were&lwaysabout the mte of declirc t,obe cxpected, and sbout whether ffnol collepseshould be hastetred or deLayed.But the eventual diseppealanceof Tbkey's empire, if not of ethnical Turkey itself, wss generally a foregoDeconclusion - cheerfully admitt€d by some powers and. ffercely denied by othe$, eccordingto their pr€vsiling interests, The difficulty was that the decline of Turkey openedup too many possibilities ol advanteg€to too meny powers.It thereforc becemea matter of precisecalculation for esch power to decide

lo

INTNODUCTION

whether the sltineial preservation of Turkey might not be more advantageous than a total colls.pse - in *hich all povcrs would goin something, but none would gain enough to satisfy its 'minimal' needs. Thmughout thc area of Turkcy's empire, the Bdtish, French, Russians,Aust ans werc developingimportant nilitary, political and commerci&linterests by 1821; and th€se intercsts were basically incompatible. The appearance of German and even Italian interest in the alea by the end of the century incrcasedthe possibility of disagreement.Always ther€ was the dangcr of a najor war if any one power seemedto be gaining exclusive advantages from Turkey's decline. The Crimean War wss fought to pre\rent just such an increase in Russion po{'er, The Middle East. over most of which the Turks still nrled in 1821, was, anal is stitl, an area of great strategic and cconomic importance. While the Turkish empire still existed, the powers could happily 1rie with each other in exploiting its wcakness; political iniuence, minor tenitorial gains, ffnancial profft were thei$ more or lcss for the taking Collapse of the Sultan's sutho iy, ho$ever, would m€an a total disintegrstion of the 'was strong enough to dsrc to take it empirc, for no one power over complete. The inevitable result must be an orderly - or more probably disorderly - partition of its lanils among intcrcsted psrties; but dis&ppointment and war seemedthe only ccfiain 'scnmble'. So ffnal a solurewards of any such Midalle Eastern tion, not surprisingly therefore, the powers were rcluctant to press. Mutual fcars and suspicionkept their ambitions secuely in check; and the Turkish empire eventually survived into tlte twentieth century Iargely because it *'as allowed to. Though admittedty sick, it \vas more convenient alive than dead. The Easten Question produced a number of quite distinct quarels betw€en the powcrs over particulsr areas of the Turkish empirc. Dsch one of these is almost an Eastem Question in its own right, 1\4ren Sir John Maniott wrote ir 101?, it very much s€emedto him thax the major issuewas the removal ftom Europe's 'an slien substa.nce . . . soil of a forcign body, or, as he put it, cmbeddedin the fle6hofEurope'- th€ Asietic Turk. The concept of the Turks as eastern barbarians wrongly occupying a corner

'IHE EASTERN QUASTION AND BRITAIN

1l

of Europe was still stmryly held - especially since the Turks wcre, by 1917,open enemiesof the B tish. Crusading spirit hed not quite been forgotten; indeed Gladstonehad done his best to ensure its tdumphant survival. But the nther more prosaic rcality in south-eastem Eurcpe (the Balkan rcgion) was the basic struggle between Russians and Aust ans for control of the lorver Danube anal the Aegean coastline. Ttis continued throughout the period from 1821to the Greot War.Interludes ofeppsEnt cooperation betreen Russia and Austria vere actually forced upon them by their need to combine against Polish or Hungodan or, more sigrificantly in the second half of the period, Bs.lkan nationalism. Balkan nationalists werc prcsumptuous enough to want the Balkans forthemselves, folloving the expectedTurkish retreat. They found to their cheedn thtrt Russia end Aushia \r'erc quite willing to ect together in 1876-7, say, and 1912-14, to disappoint theirhopes ond to ensue that real decision-making rcsted with the great polvers still. Nevcrtheless, this AustmItussian padnership was an afrair ofconvenience,not love. 'I'heAustro-Russianconflict in the Balkans was one ofthemore obvious aspectsoftbe Eastem Question. It lvas sometimeseven of special intercst to the British, vhenev€r thcy lelt the need to l{}nd support to the Austrians or to keep thc Russians out of Constantinople.Of rather morc real intercst to B tain, however, was the conflict with France over North Africa, especiallythe NiIc valley and the Suez isthmus. Navsl strstegy and control of trade mutes were at issue here. The }feditenancan and the Red Sca (or the Euph€tes Persian Gulf alt€rnative) Fovided the 'short rcute to India'. about which so mDch B tish concern wa.6 cxpressedduring the nineteenth century (and cven until 1947). Fears for the safety of this route also bmught the British into conflict with the French - and with Russians and finally Germans too - in the area of Turkey-in-Asia, particularly Sltia, Armenia, tr{esopotamio.After the B tish occupied Egl pt in 1889, the future of Turkey-in-Asis was their only scrious interest. \Yhat for long ye&rs seemcd the crucial issue, however, especialty in Arglo-Russisn relations, was the question of who should control Constantinople.This geat city was both Turkish capital

t2

INTRODUCTION

and gnaralienofthe nar?ow se&route between th€ Black Seaand the Mediternnean. Controlling Constantinople might simply gaining influence over the Sultsn's government; it might fmean also mean expelling the Sultan and taking po$ession of the 1 I Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardoneltcs). \Yhcthcr or not the Su.ltsnrcmained at Constentinople,both Britsin And Russia felt ir the nineteenth century thot they rnust be oblc to control the passageoI wa$hips and merchent ships through thc Stroits; or et the verv least each felt it must DrevcDt thc othcr from geining such control, This was partly e rnntter of guanntceing the freedom of trade routes ; it wos rather nrore a mattcr of bcing able to epply diplomatic prcssure by thc usc of coercion at a the lugular vein' or 'Achillcs hecl' $pproach. decisive point The Bleck Seaformed a sort of natural arcna rvhcrc Britain and Russia could most conyeniently wage their power strugglcs.The B tish wsnted to get their warships in, and to stop the Russians getting out. The Russians wanted to get their wa.rships out ond to stop the British getting in. By controlling the passsgcof thc Straits, the Black Seacould bemsde eithelinto an €xtcndcdpart of the Mediterranean or irlto an enclosedinland lake, $hichever best suited the neeals of the successful po\r€r. It v.os al$ays a great dis&dvantageto the British, Lowevcr, that Constantinople, r the ossumedkey to this magic predominance,was built on the inslcadof on. say. lhc A\;al ic I eulopeanshor. of the Bosphorus. I bhore of the Dardanelles.Jf onlv Constantine had cho*en I difrerently, the Sultan's capital miiht then have bee,n so much t--fess rrnnerable to Russien atteck, and so much more accessible to British influence. It was partly this sad faci ol histoly - or geogaphy - which p€rsuaded the British at last to modify their attitude to Russia over Constantinople.By the end of the nineteenth century, the fate of the Sultan's capilal no longer aroused great passionsin London. By 1915, Constantinople lvas being offered by the B tish (who did not yet possessitl) to Russia. In addition to the strategic conflicts in European, Asiatic aDd Aflican provinces of the Turkish cmpire, the ninet€enth centuy s&w a growing intemational ivalry therc prcvoked by economic imperialism. Dade was groving with the empirc itself, cnd there

'IHD E.4.STERN QUESTION AND BRITAIN

l8

was, too, en expanding tlsde which passed through it en route for eastern Europe, Centrsl Asia, Persia, India, China. Goode from the Far East and eastem Europe (including Russia) also passed via trgypt or Mesopotamia or the StEits to westem Iturope, The British werc determined to hold on to, and perhaps extend, the major shsrc they hed aheedy securedin this tDde, in spite of possible Frcnch or German - or erren Austria or llussian - competition. They were equally prepared to join in the msh to exploit the investment possibilitiesin the Ttrkish empire, an aspect of economic impedalism that developed especiallyin the second hslf of the nineteenth century. Besides lending money to the govemment, opportunity for forcign ba.nkers snd construction lirms could make exciting proffts out of nilway, canel, industrilrl snd shipping developments. Only in the last twenty yesrs of the century, when the B tish were losing faith in Turkey's ability to survive at all, did they allow the initi&tive in iDvestment to fill to their chicf rivals, the Frcnch and the Germans. The e.onomic clem.nt in the East m Qucstion was probably never uppemost in the calculations of the geat powels. Strategic intcrcsts, thc military exploitation ofland and searoutes through thc Middle East, genenlly predominated. Yet it is hard, perbaps impossible,to assessprecisely the relative importance ofall the factors - military, political, commercial, religious, nationalist \\.hich influenced the goyemments oi the gr€at powers from time to time in making their d€cisions on the Eastem Question. Whs,t is certain is tbat intercst in tmde and military mutes ws.s very closcly linked. The British, for example, lyanted to control t,lre short route to India both becawe it gave them a decisive military advantage over oth€r poweN, and also because continued tnde Nith India was thought vital to British prosperity. The decline of the Turkish empire would clearly have aroused far less concem but fo} the culious geogEphy of the Middb Aast. fhe Darmw $€terways - the Aegean Sea, the Stmits, the PeNian (:ull and the Euphmtes, the Real Sea and the Suez Canal - weft ,)f cmciel interest to a seapowcr.If the Bdtish wished both to kcepthe cosstsof Europe under closesupervision(the distinctive nrilitary threat on $hich much of tlrcir diplomatic weight really

J I

l I

14

INTNODUCTION

depended)and to eafeguard accesst,o India, then, it was essum€d, they must control these $'eterways. Th€ use of steam ships made this even more imperative - since sailing vessels had not s.lways been able to make use of them in conditions ol contmry wind or curent. Whjle there are nenow waterways in the Middle Eost, there are also narrow land-bridges, which must be of spccial interest to major land powers like France, and especially, Russia and G€rmany. A seapower'scommunicationsin the Middle East depend on its ability to keep such land-bridges in friendly hands. This explains why there was so much British interest in the Suez isthmus (even before the building of the canal), in S]'ria (between the M€diterranesn and the Duphrat€s) and in Armenia (betweer the Black Seaand the Euphratcs). Strong, and generallysuccessful, efforts were made in 1840, 18?8 1907 and 1914-18 to keep exactly these areas out of Fr€nch, Russian or German contrcl. Besides geographical factors, racial and religious issues w€re also important in the decline of Turkey, palticularly in the B&lkans. In thi6 r€spectRussiahad a quite specialposition, since many of Turkey's Belkan subjects were, like the Russians, of Slav mce, and most of them were also Orthodox Christians !r'ho expected 'Iloly' Russia to fulfil her spiritusl mi$ion a.nd frce them from rule by Itloslem Turks, Consbntinople was not only the Sultan's capital, it was still, conveniently, the Holy City of the Orthodox Chureh. Even the French had rediscovered spiritual duties in the Middle East, where the Latin monks in Palestine and the Christian Arabs of the Lebanon looked for Fr€nch support. The British, horvever, had no very obvious racial or religious connections to provide the necessary spur. Itey did, nevertheless,decide - suddenly, in 1914 - that'the noble Arab' end not 'the good old Turk' was the proper reprcsentative of the Moslem faith, and that the Ara.bs of Syria and Mesopotsmia oughi therefore to be freed fiom Turkish lule. Awareness of Old Testarnent lorecasting also pe$uaded them - fs.irly suddenly, in lgu - thst the Jews ought to have a British-iNpired home itr Palesiine, Ther€ was never sny indication ftom the Arabs of Sltia and Mesopotamia, or the returning Je\,vsin Palestine, that they were hoping to enjoy the benetits of Bdtish nrle once the Tmks had

THE EASTERN QUESTION AND BRITAIN

beenexpelled. Nor did the Orthodox Slavs in the Balksns look forwerd to the day when they could sewe Russian, instead ol Turkish,mssters.Yet that is what happenedto A-rabsand Jews in 1920,end to the Balkan peopl€s,aft€r 1945particularly. Ilscial and religiousfactors were of €specialv&lue to Russiein her drive towerds the Straits, IIer position es e Black Seapo$,er with no assuredsccessto the Medit€naneangaveher, also,stmng military and economicmotives for 'lvishingto end l\rkey's rule ovcr Constartinople. Yet the Russianspreferred to sees *eak, and preferably dependent,Turkey suryivc there,mther than have anotherpower- Britain, say, or Germany- establisha Middle East€rn suprcmacy following the disappearence of Turkey. Clearly, the Eastem Question could not be solved until all the powers could agreeamong themselveson what they lsanted to seercplacing the Turkish empire; and such agreement proved quite impossibleto reach,excepttempom ly in 1919 20. The C meanlvar, the 1878Congressol Berlin and, in part, the Creat War of 1914-18a[ illustrutedifferentpowers'attemptsto settle the Eestem Questionon their o1'1rr terms. None ofthem had any lasting success,and th€ Middle East power struggle is still going on - though the Turkish empire itself cameto an end in 1920. I'or B tain, as for othels,there wereobviouslymsny'Eastem Questions'during the nineteenth century; and at any one time there could be severaldifferent interpretationEof what Turkey's dccline might mean to Bdtsin. In these circumstances,policymaking was often reduced to a sort of inspircd guess-vrorkin decidingbetweenvariouspossiblecoursesof action. Successive statesmenafter 1821produc€da diversity ol (temporory)solutions, varying from alliance with Russia against Turkey to alliance with Turkey agsinst Russia.Canningprefcrred a careful policyoflimited coopemtionwith the Russians againstthe Trrks which was meant to weaken lurkey (by helping the creeks) without strengtheningRtrssia. Welington, however, could proposenothing beyond a sort of apprehensiveneutrality. Both Palmerston and Disr&eli committed themselvesto s policy of contsining Russia, and both were prepared to lend conditional

r 16

INTRODUCTION

support to Turkey to achieve this. Gladstone wantcd to use the Eastem Question to produce a new quality of common pupose emong the povers, basedupon (his own) higher moral principles, which would be strongly criticat of Turkish (anti-Christian) barbadties. Salisbury and his successors wcre prcpared to be coldly realistic, and to begin a cautious discngagement from any profftless responsibilities in the Middle East, while ot the samc time vigorously pursuing 1That they su1vas truer Bdtish interests there. This might well me&n (and did) that Britain rnust make limited agreements with other powers, allorving them to take t€rito al or economic compensstion for the Bdtish gains ir EglTt, the Sudan and the Persian Culf. Ilventually, the collapse ofTurkey, Germany, Austria and Russia, and the near-collapse of France, in the Great War (together'lvith U.S. isolationism) alowed the B tish s, freel hand in the 0na1 partition than the rildest dreamer in the Salisbury period could possibly have hoped, Changingconditions diplomatic,military, technical also entailed considerableshifts of emphasisin policy. The problems of Palmerston's day, for exemple, rver€ in several respects quite differcnt fmm those faced by Salisbury. The relative strengths of the powers hsd chenged markedly between, say, 1850 and 1890. Technical adyancesin land and seatraDsport and in navel and militsly wespons had greatly altcred both the prospect of war-making and the patt€m of intemational trading; but thc initial difficulty often wss to peNuade ministeN and public to accept these fsct6 and to avoid providing yesterday's answels to today's questions. Two fairly constant attitudes csn be idcntified, ho\vever,in the British vicw of the Eastem Questionthroughout the pedod from the Revolutionary War to 192a. Th€ first is eoncern for the maintenance of a balance of power in [urope. The second is concern for the safety of India. If &ny one pow€r France or Russia in the early nineteenth becamc centuy, Russia or Germany in the early twentieth msster of Turkey, then its strength as s Europ€an state might increase beyond Britain's power to control, even with allies The B tish answer to this d&nger between 1798 and 1833 was n&vol conttol of the eastem Meditenanean, based on posscssion

AHE EASTERN QUESTION AND BRITAIN

l7

of Malta and the Ionian islands. th€ answer alt€r 1888, and until about 1806, was naval contml plus friendship with Turkey, in an attempt to slow down the rat€ of Turkish decline. Bet\reen 1815 and 1907, the gre&te6t single threat to the Eumpean balance appear€dto be Russia. To deny Russia possessionof Constant! nople, and a safe passage into the Meditenanean, seemed to be the eesiest way open to Britain of rest cting Russian expansion. But by 1896, it wss accepted that the fleet on its own was no longer able to keep the Russiansout ol Constantinople,and thst the Turks, wilfully unreformed and barbarcus still, were unworthy of British friendship. In any case, Russian expansion in Centml Asia snd the Far East was now arousing far more concem, New policies had to be adopted theEfore, the more so as Cermen contrcl of Turkey also became increasingly apparent. The answer agreed to by Salisbury was to withdraw fmm involvement in the affeirs of th€ Balknns and the Straits, to eccept the inevitebility (cven desilability) ofe Turkish collapse, and meanwhile to occupy those parts of Turkey which controlled the routes to Inalie, Paradoxicaly, by 1900it wasBritain's Asietic 16le- her possession of India - which seemed to give her most stetus as a European power, and so helped her to naintain a Euopean balance, Defence of Indi& in the fust half of the nineteenth centurv v.a6 .hiefly a matler of ensuring tbat the sca routes to it were 6afe ftom attack. In the second halt with India,s importance to Bdtsin increasing, and with Russian forces moving mpidly into CeDtral Asia, it was also a matter oi guarding the Indis[ frontiels fmm lendward attacks which might be launched through persia and Afghanistan. After the 1820s, naval conhol of the trfediterranean was not only concemed with the Eumpean balance. The development ol steamships and lail.lvays meant that the Meditermnean and the Red Sea and Persian Gulf also became the chief routes to India fiom Bdtain. The opening of the Suez Canel in 1869 emphasized this importsnce. Tbe policy of preser-ving a friendly Turkey seemedto Palmerston the best means of pueranteeing thF ssfety of thoserouLes.So Britain !cfed aeainsfFrance rnd Mehemet Ali in 1840(as she had against Bonap;rrc in rZ98). ond against Russia in 1854, 6. Disraeli, still ffghting Palmerstonian

d=

l8

INTRODUCTION

battles, opposedRussia again in 1878; but by this time, others in Britain were beginning to accept that Herat, in northern Afghanistan, and not Constantinople,was thc ncw'key to India'. After this, B tish policy on thc Eastern Questionwas increosingly a matter of seeling off othcr powels' land routes to India by assumins responsibility for the defence of Turkish Armenia (tempola ly), Palcstine and Mesopotamia.Occupation ol Eg}?t in 1882 1vss perhrps th€ biggest single reeson for Britoin's diminished concern in the fate of Constantinople. Practical coDtrol of the SuezCem.lgaveBritishforcesaflexibilityposs€ssed by no otLer powcr. TIrerc seemealflrr less puryose in pursuing a doubtful stntegic advantege st the Straits now thrt such :L massive one had been goined in Egypt, There was. as has bcen said earlier. an obvious economic interest (in addition to political and strat€gic conccms) bchind B tain's involvement in thc Eostem Question. The rout€s to Indio wer€ tradc rcutes, as well as routes for warships and armies ; and the expanding China trade followcd the samc route through the Midtlle East. In addition, there was a valuable trade between Bdtain and the 'I'urkish empire itself (establishcdin 1553, but basically a nineteenth-centuy development) which the collapsc of the empire might well end. llany British goods bould for eastern and central Europe passedvia Constantinople into thc Danube. Political upheavals in the trIiddle East were not good for hade, nor dial they make for sound investments - and British investment in the Turkish empire declined siglriffcgntly in the leter yeers of the nineteenth centuly. In the twertieth century, however, oil from the PeNisn Gulf provided an important ne]Y rceson why Britain wished to keep other powers out of the area. Oil was not only profitable to refine analsell, it also providcd the bosic tucI of th€ Royil Navy efter 1912. Technical and militery developments,it has been indicated, helpcd greatly to change the nature of the Easteln Question du ng thc nineteenth century. The appe&nnce ofmass conscript armies, and the building of the Suez Canal, stret€gic raihvays and steam-driven iron-hull€d varships altercd the balaDce of forces available in thc Middle East, IfcontraN winds and currents,

THE EASTERN QUESTlON AND BRITAIN

19

for exsmple, were no longer a considemtion in forcing a passage of the Dardanelles, torpedoes and mines soon were. Again, conscript armies vere something Britsin could compete*'ith only by bringing trcops from India via the SuezCanal. By the end of the century completely nerl' vie$s of naval ancl troop movements in the tr{iddlc Erst htrd to be sccepted. British policy had to be constantly adjusted to meet these j clrnging circumstances.It could not be both static and successful but it was for ovcr fffty y€ars tumly weddcd to the belief that Russian contrcl of Constantinople must always be prcvented. An exaggcratcdfear of Russia !r'asst the root ofmany ofBritain's decisionson theEastemQuestionoverthelengthy period between 1891 and 1907; and the Anglo-Russian clash came to dominate all other intcmational rivalrics produccd by Turkey's decline, Russiawas fearedeveryx hereand for everything; as the oppressor of Poland, as an anti-liberal autoqacy, as an insatiably expaniionist power in Central Asia and the Far East as well as Turkey. It cost the Libenl party much heart-searchingfls late ss 1914 to eccept th&t Britain should fight alongsideRussia and against Germany in the Great War. Yet, the British troops in Galliloli ilr 1915 were fighting against Germans and Turks ]argely for the benefit of Russis - in order to give her Consiantinolle. And hen Lod Blron died st Missolonghi in 18?4, he and other British volunteers vere fighting ,with Russie'6 approval to free Greeks fmm Turkish nrle, NevertLel€ss, the involvement of Britain in the Eastem Question meant a century of Anglo-Russiar hostility, ftom lfissolonghi to Galipoli, punctuated by only short pe ods of coopcmtion. Wherc cooperation did occur, it ?s usuelly the rcsnlt of n Russian initiative. For the sad truth is that the East€m QuestjonitsclfmigLt lvell have beenrcsolvcd even bclore 1850 by means of an agr€ed and realistic partition of Turkey if only Russian suggcstions to Britain had not met with an almost automatic reiection. In the end, thc B tish did take what the Russianshad earlier been rccommcnding; by her occupstion of Cyprus and Egypt, it g'as Britain herselfvho really begenthe fin€|, piecemealpartition of Turkey. The progressof her &mries

20

INTRODUCTION

in Palestine and lfesopotamia during the Cr€ot War - 6nd the remarkable, though temporary, absencc of serious rivals ensuredan almost total B tish control of the Middle East by the time the Turkish empire ]trasdissolvedin 1920. Russia,following her rcvolutions and defeat in the var, did not gain eveDCoDstsntinople. Much has been writte[ on the various aspects of the Eestern Question, but only two major works in English try to cover mole or les6 the whole story, Sir John trIarriott's ?r, Ea,stzrnQuestion: an Histpri,cal Studg ifu Ewopan Diplamacg, publisLcd in t9l7, deals at length with the Turkish problem from its bcginnings iD the fourtecnth and ffftcenth centuries through to the Greot War. M. S. Arrderson's balanccd and autho tative book The Ea$tetn Qaestrion,published in 1966, begins with the treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774 ana continues as far as the Lausanne tr€aty of 1023. Apart from these two genenl works, th€re is s lerge number of works on spccializcd themes, dealing with individu&l pe ods or problems. Biographical stat€smen and pafiicdar studies of Canning, Palm€rston, Gladstone, Disraeli, Salisbury can be of much value in clarifying different approaches to the Eastem Question. trIajor works like H. W. V. Temperley's on ihe pre'C mean Wsr period, or B. H. Sumner's on the 1870s are immensely useful; so are the appropriate sections in recent studies ol British foreign policy such as C. J. L owe's The Reluctant lrnperialists (1a7a 1902) and D. C. M. PLrLtt\ Finance, Tmdz and, Poriticr (1815-1914),and sectionsin the older works of Temperley and Penson and R. W. Seton-Watson. Ceneral diplomatic histories, A. J. P, Taylor's Thc Struggh Jor Maslerg in Europe and the two W. L, Langer volumes, for €xample, prcvide a detailed an8.lysisof the forces motivating all the powers in dealing with the Eastem Question, and help to s€t the B tish 16l€ in its proper perspective. Special studies of sea-porver, Suez, oil, economic impedalism, Middle Eastern nationalisn, and succinct investigations into Britain's activities in the l{iddle East - like those of Sir Reader Bullad, Elizabeth l{onroe, Ann Willians are extremcly worthrvhile aids to understanding. Relevant

THE EASTERN QUDSTION AND BRITAIN

chapters in the 'New Cambridge Modem History' sre always worth reading. J. C. Hurewitz has provided a most illumiDating collection of documcnts in Diplamatg in lhe Near and Midd,le tair, cove ng the period 1585-1956,while M. S, Anderson has now published a shotef collcction i^ Ihe Great Pouen anil thc Neat East, 1774-1923. St'teral useful articles in learned journals are not included in the recommended reading lists, simply because such lists c:ln easily become unleslistically long. Itefercnce to them c6n certeinly be found, hovevcr, in the excellent biblio$aphies contained in e number of the books that are listed. The Eastern Questionhad already beenadiplomotic issueolsome importance in the eighteenth ccntury. Turkey's decline haal become apprrent as early os the treaty ol Carlorvitz in 1699. Though Britnin's concem in the Eastem Question wa6 slight bcfore 1798 (the battle of the Nile), the Austrians and Russisns had aheady by then fought Turkey with $eat success and had lrrcn important terdtorics and privileges from her in the Block Seasrea and the Balkans. Part I in this book vill briefly exsmine the condition of th€ Turkish cmpire before the Greek Independence War - in ordcr, primarily, to demonstrate the nature of British. Russian. French and Austrian interests in the Middle East up to that point. The attitudes adopted by thc powe$ before 1821 v€ry largely governed their policies &fterwards - by which time thc Eastern Question had becomea subject of major concern in internationsl afisirs,

7 TURKE!'S

PART I The Eastern Ouestion up to 1821

[1]

TURKEY' S

DECLINE

The decline of Turkey in the eightcenth century was mrde apparent by her regular fs.ilure to win wars against Austria and lossofher EuroRussia;and defeo.fiD rvarmeanta progrcssive pean ter tory. The aggrcssivcnilitary spirit of the Turks had twice broughtthem to the gotcsoi Vienna,the secondtime as recently as 1688;but they advancedno further. By 1718the Ilabsburgs had becn able to cxtend their po\ter from Austria eastwsrds acmss Hungary and Transylvania. The treaty of Carlowitzin 169$markcd the tust Habsburg advancesjthat of Psssurowitzin 1718contumedtheir captureof vast areasof Turkey-in-Europc. The Russians, meanwhile, had bcgun a grodual progresstowards Constantinopleand the Meditcranean. Men Azov was captured by Peter the Great in 1696,Turkey's control o{the Black Scacoastalregionswasaheadythreatened. Thoughthe Turks rccapturcdAzov in 1?ll, it rvasrcstorcdto Russiaat the €nd of yet anothe war ir 1739. The pftttcm wasnow established.In two morc wals later in the century, Turkcy's lorces could achieve no more than gallsnt retreats. Further stretchesof her European lands passealinevitably into Russianor Austrian coDtml.By the important Kutchuk Kainardi treoty of u74, Russia.scquir€d s lengthy Black Sea coost,rnd won useft ly impreciserights to protect Chlistians

I

DECLINE

within the Sultan's dominions. So confiilcnt were the Russians and Austrians of ultimate success that Tsarina Catherine and Joseph II were able, in 1782, to prcpose a complete partition .-, plan for the Turkish empiF. The Crimca bccamc Rus\ian in l783. ( But &lready it was app&rent thrt too much Austrc'Russian successmight well produce friction betwcen the tllo padners. The ddngcr would particulsrly arise when the future status of tle Dsnube delta and of routes through to the Aegean csme to be settl€d. The Turks quickly rcalizcd that their best hopes for surviv!.1 lay in playing off their enemies.Such tactics served them wetl throughout the nineteenth ccntury. Double-dealing and infuristing obstinacy beeame the esscntial chamcte stics of their diplomacy. For most of the eighteenth century, and particr arly bet'iveen 1740and 1798,the only power on whom the Turks could generally rely for diplomatic support wes France. From France, too, they rcceived much-needed military advice, thougb there was never any direct military assistance.Bonaparte's invasion of Dg)?t in 1798 broke these ties, howev€r, and Turkey for a time found herselftoking part in the Revolutionary War as an ally ofRussia rnd Austria against France, But her loyalties inevitobly wavered, and by 1806, she was once more at war (unsuccessfully)sgainst Russia. \Vhen thc treaty of Bucharcst was signed in 18u,--l / Bcssarabia pessedfrom Tukey to Russia - lvhich meant that v RussianBlack Seatcrritory now stretched as far as the mouth of I the Danube. Serbia also became autonomou By this time, however, the Turks had acquired a new (though as yet somewhat undecjded) supporter, in the form of Britain. Whereas in 1??0 the B tish activcly encouraged a Russian victory ov€r Turkey's fleet, by 1791, Wiliam Pitt had beguDto worry about the exteDt of Russian anrbition in the Black Sea aree. In l?99 and agein in 1809, the British bound themseh'es (temporarily) to defend Turkey from France, In 1798, when defeating a Frcnch fleet in the battle of tLe Nile, the B tish ndvy had won control of the eastem trIedi tenancan ; and Britain rias now able, therefore, to ioin Russia, Austria and France in dcciding the future of the Turkish empirc. Thc morc interest

24

TUAKEY'S DECLINE

THE EASTDRN QUESTION UP TO T82T

that France end Russia,particularly, norv took in scizingTurkish liend6,the more likely was it that B tain might lcnd military a66istanceto Turkey - in order to ftstrain thc continent poweN. By the beginning ofthe nineteenth century, tllen, thc continued diminution of Turkish tenitory was perhsps o littl€ lessincvitable then it had seemed. In the decline of Turkey, extcrnal prcssurcs werc oLviously a decisive factor. Intelnal wes.kness,however, ensurcd th&t she could not rcsist her enemiesmore effectively. In thc nineteenth ce$tury, much hung on whether this int€mal weakness were permanent, or whether it could be removcd by a vigorcusly refoming Sllltrn. Eighteenth-century Turkey was in the grip of a total conscrvatism- political, spiritual and military. Sultans and their Gland VizieN wer€oftenthe merepuppets of€ntr€nched fsctions. Zealous trIoslemsin the rcligious hierarchy felt it thcir duty to rcsist all forms of change. The Janissaries, a powerful clique in the army originally mude up of capturcd Ch stians, {ere quite rcady to rcmove a Sultan, or any of his ministc$, who dared to propose reforms. Both the army and th€ lravy, not surprisingly, began to fall far behind the new standards of elfrciency pmctised by the European powen. Complacency, conuption and place-seeking were the distinguishing leatures of Turkish s.dministration. Selim III, Sultnn ftom 1787 to 1807, began a deliberate reforming programme, holv€ver, designed to increase his control over the provinccs of the empirc and to bring Turkey idto iine with European standards of government. For his intempemnce, he was deposedand murdered by conservative opponents. His cousin trIahmud II (r8o8-39) beganmore cautiously.Ile did not presume to introduce his oun reforms until he hsd org&nized the murdcr ofat lcast 5,000 Janissaircsin 1826. With e little foreign advicc for such a promising Sultan, horvevcr, it was apparent that Turkey might yet be modemized and taught to rcsist her €xtemal enemiesmore successfrly. Such was the hopc of Lod PalmeNton aft€r 1833; but it was a major difficulty still to txy to ensure that Turkey could control her outlying provinces,and

I

l I

i

to encoura.ge the Turks to discover o method of disciplining their lray$r's,rd Christian subjccts oth€r than the traditional periodic massacre. To the annoyance of the Turks, their Sultans increasingly became the puppcts, not of Turkish factions, but of one or other of the great powers, who chosc to educate, or exploit, or intimidate, as the occasiondemanded. The growth of separatist feeling in all perts of the Ttrrkish empire was another sfnptom of general decline during the eighteenth century, The sheer size of the empire and the diversity of its subjects had always made centralized administration diflicult; but by the 1780s,large areas had already obtained, or vished to obtsin, practical indepcndenccftom Constantinople. Whelever therc was a sepamtist movement, and a minimum of cont.ol by the Sultan, the way was also open to int€rvention by an interested Eurcpean power. In North Afiica, Algier6, Tunis snd Tripoli were sutonomous, and th€ Manluk beys were running Egypt. In sll those areas, France hoped to establish her influence. Bonaparte's attsck on Egrut \vas thc beginning of the process, ond Algiers was eventually occupied in 1840 and Ttrnis in 1881. The strategic importance of Egypt, however, meant that French hopes there werc continually countcred by the Bdtish, who backed the Msmluk beys unsuccessfully against the ftench puppet Mehemet Ali (1804 r0), but ev€ntually occupicd the country in 1882, having already tamed lfehcmet Ali in 1840. In Durcpe, the Rumanians ol Moldavia and Wallachia very lareely lan their own afrails ulder a Greek Eospoderj but the Russians obtain€d special protective rights therc in 17?4, and thetu armics occupied these two Principalities six times b€tween 1774 and 1878, The Selbs, too, Ivon autonomy - with general diplomatic support from Russia-by 1812.In their case,lreedon vus gained by ffghiing the Turks; snd, ir spite of fierce rivalry betn'e€n the two lcading families (Kars George and Obrenovich), Serbia remaincd autonomous until 1878.In that year, when the llussians had once agoin defeated Turkey, Serbia became nominally independentj but she rcmained until 1914 a satellite of either the Habsbugs or tlle Russians.Other Selbs living ir llosniu ruere a.iu"lly under Hsh.burg conlrol frcm 1878

7 2B

TIIE EASTERN QUESTION UP TO IA2I

to 1918 - as a rcward for their rebellior agoinst Turkey in t475. The fiIst of all Turkey's Buropean subjects to win complete independencewere the Crceks.Rich, well-organized,with a large mcrchant fleet a.nda prominent palt in the Sultan's government, teading Greeks rverc ready to press for frccdom in the u90s' Ho$'cm, tbe Greeknationalist society(Prild[, Zrkidd)foundcd in 1814,was basedin Russia, not Greecc,and the Rtssians were only too willirg to support tlte Grcek determination to recapture Constantjnoplc for the Orthodox Church; but the geogroPhical position of Greccc meant tlDt Russia could not tske all the responsibility forfrecing Greeksfrom Turks. F€nce and Britain, who could bring sea po{er to bcar, were also involved; ond Creecevery taxgelyo{ed her completeindependence,as opposed to autonomy, to the fact that she did Dot foll neatly into any onc po{'er's assumed sphere of influence. Indeed, by the time the Gr.eekIndepcndence War began in 1821, the British werc already det€rmincd to lemit no turthel ext€nsions of Russian thc Turks could not hold had bctter bccome power, $lnt inrlependent,espcciallyif it had Mcditerranean s€acoasts\r'hich could provide the Russians with naval bases. Future losscs of terdtory by Turkcy v'ere evidently going to be thc rcsult, not of isolated \var6 and trcaties, but of carefully balsnced adjustments {Lgreedupon by the pow€rs. Turkey's declin€ might not necessarily be helted, but at least it would no longer bc un' controlled,

[2] THE INTERESTS OF TIIE POWERS Rrusia Gcogr:Lphy and a sense of spidtual destiny explain Russia's involvement in the Eastem Question during the eighteenth ccntury. In 1700, Russia tas still virtualy a landlocked state. IIcr Arctic coast was frozen for over half the year; and her toe_

TIIE INTERESTS

OF TI{E POWERS

27

hold on th€ Seaof Azov did not give her occessto the Black Ser, since the Turks still held the Strsits ol Kcrch. Peter the Creat wtrs detennined to traDsform Russia into a maritime tr&ding nation, however. His successs.gainstthe Sweaesallowed him to sain a Boltic coast and to build St Pcte$burg as a pod as well as & new capital. Yet the Baltic also frcezcs.Uninterrupted access to the oceans of the $orld could only come by gaini g control of the Bleck Sca and the rcute tluough to the Mediterraneen, Not until th€ secondhalf of the eighteenth centuly did Russia 'Ihe developmake significant progressin this direction, hov'ever. ment of grain cxports from thc Ukraine after 1772:rnd the foundDti(n! of Od€ssain u9{ then gnve an economicjustification for h€r pressureegainst TurLey. IIcr mcrchant ships could sail on thc Black Se:Lafter Kutchuk Kainardji, It wss important to ensure that thcy could always pass through the Bosphorus and the Dards.nclles into the trIcditermnean, After 1783, she also kcpt wa$hips on the Black Sca; but these the Turks would not allow to pass through the Stnits, eicept es a temponry measue during the allisnce against France in 17sg. Unlll-Russian warsl,ipslvercable to usat he Strairsfreely.il,cy.ould nol p)ayafull po"i ii' ;nt.-rnurion,rtivars or dip)omacy, Equ" y imporlrnl, to Russiarvas lhe dcs'trabilityof keeping lhe ivanlrips of other por-eri oui of ihe BLc[ Sea. Russian control of Constantinolle could then be either a cciuld achiive boih otjects. fhtsar:'its iaffi-iorf oi iin