Between the Rule of Power and the Power of Rule: In Search of an Effective World Order

Between the Rule of Power and the Power of Rule

International Relations Studies Series

VOLUME 1

Between the Rule of Power and the Power of Rule In Search of an Effective World Order

By

Alfred van Staden Leiden University

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2007

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

ISSN ISBN

1570–6451 978 90 04 15703 3

Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS

Foreword ..................................................................................... List of Abbreviations .................................................................. Chapter One

vii ix

Introduction: setting the stage ..........................

1

Chapter Two International or world order? The balance between stability and justice ...................................................

15

Chapter Three Universalism and Regionalism: competition or concurrence? ......................................................................

39

Chapter Four Models of international order: from utopia to reality .......................................................................................

61

Chapter Five World order and the global distribution of power: the balance between legitimacy and effectiveness .....

101

Chapter Six An agenda for a world order: from national security to human security .....................................................

135

Chapter Seven International order “writ-small”: the role of the European Union ...............................................................

171

Conclusion ..................................................................................

213

Bibliography ................................................................................

229

Index ...........................................................................................

243

FOREWORD

This treatise on world order builds on the paper Power and legitimacy. The quest for order in a unipolar world, which I wrote during the nal stage (2004–2005) of my directorship at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael in The Hague. The publication attracted a large number of responses, and these encouraged me to expand the paper into a fully edged book. In doing so, I was able to elaborate my key arguments and include more historical references. Furthermore, I added some sub-themes, such as the relationship between universalism and regionalism, the dialectics of international law and power, and the differences between state security and human security. Released from managerial responsibilities, which had been a central part of my professional duties for many years, I found in the Law School of Leiden University (Department of International Law) a conducive academic environment to nish the task. The study of world order is at the heart of international studies. The area concerned here focuses on power, law and legitimacy. Therefore, this study is at the interface of international politics and international law, but is written from the perspective of a student of international relations. Among all international actors, the role of the United States and, to a lesser degree, the European Union in building a sustainable world order is highlighted. The book analyzes not only the institutional dimension of world order, but also the underlying substantive issues. Ever since taking political science classes at the University of Amsterdam in the rst half of the 1960s, I have noticed, with increasing astonishment, the rise and fall of pre-theories, theories, models and paradigms in the study of international relations. Many of them were short-lived and turned out to be fashions or, even worse, fads. Over the past decade or so we have seen the emergence of a new body of thought; it is called social constructivism, or constructivism for short. In my view, this new theoretical current represents a research program at best, calling for the study of ideational, non-material forces in world politics – such as social identity, culture, and ideas. At worst, it is yet another fad, repeating most of the epistemological arguments wielded in the acrimonious debate between “classicists” and “scientists” some forty years ago – the dispute about the possibility to observe social events objectively and the constitutive power of concepts and theories. The

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reader will nd no references to “social constructivists” in this work. I confess to be a moderate realist. Thus I believe that states are still the main actors on the global stage and that power and power congurations largely continue to affect the outcome of political processes – the processes that control the distribution of interests and allocation of values for a society. To avoid false expectations and policy disasters, internationalist zeal should be combined with realist prudence. Institutions are important in that they can reduce and mitigate the effects of power inequalities. However, they lack the strength to eliminate these effects. At the same time, I share the belief of those who contend that democratic governments will lose the essential public support if they pursue a foreign policy devoid of ethical considerations. I also endorse the view that respect for basic international rules (including standards of human rights) is in the long-term interest of all states, large and small. The exercise of power without legitimacy, i.e., power which is based on arguments which are not seen as “righteous” and “proper”, is likely to incur high political costs that may prevent even the strongest states from achieving their objectives. Finally, in my opinion, the classic realist indifference to the domestic order of states is untenable in an age when the fates of nations are increasingly intertwined. Most of my materials for writing this book were drawn from scholarly books and articles in elds related to the leading subject of this study. In addition, I gratefully made use of policy reports that, amongst others, were drafted to feed the debate about the reform of the United Nations and other issues prominent on the current international agenda. I owe much to the authors of these reports. As a passionate reader of the international quality press, I have also assimilated some of the valuable thoughts provided by prominent journalists and columnists. A few acknowledgements are in order. I am deeply indebted to my mentor Peter Baehr and my former Clingendael colleague Jan Rood for scrutinizing the whole draft of the manuscript. Their critical comments and suggestions have been very valuable to me. I am also grateful to my present Leiden colleague Nico Schrijver for reviewing the chapters 2 and 5, particularly as regards the exposition of the legal subjects and arguments. Finally, I would like to thank the E.M. Meijers Research Institute of the Leiden Law School for funding the work of the two native speakers who have edited “my” (American-)English of the text. In this respect, I pay tribute to Tony Langham and Plym Peters who did a superb job. Alfred van Staden Leiden, November 2006

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM ACP APEC ARF ASEAN ASEM AU BWC CACM CAP CFSP CTBT CTC CTR CWC DDA EC ECOSOC ECOWAS EDA EDF EEAS ENP EPA ESDP EU EUPM FDI FTA FTAA GATS GATT GCC G-8

Anti-Ballistic Missiles African Caribbean and Pacic countries Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation Asian Regional Forum Association of South Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meeting African Union Biological Weapons Convention Central American Common Market organization Common Agricultural Policy Common Foreign and Security Policy Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Counter-Terrorism Committee Cooperative Threat Reduction Chemical Weapons Convention Doha Development Agenda European Community Economic and Social Council Economic Community of West African States European Defence Agency European Development Fund External European Action Service European Neighborhood Policy Economic Partnership Agreement European Security and Defense Policy European Union European Union Police Force Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Direct Investment Free Trade Agreement Free Trade Area of the Americas General Agreement on Trade in Services General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gulf Cooperation Council Group of Eight

x GDP GSP HDI IAEA ICC ICCPR ICJ IMF IUCN LRA MERCOSUR MDG MFN NAFTA NATO NGO NBC NPT NTA OAE OECD OEEC OIC OPWC OSCE PSI P-5 R&D SACU SADC SCO SFOR TAFTA TEP UK UN UNDP

list of abbreviations Gross Domestic Product Generalized System Preferences Human Development Index International Atomic Energy Agency International Criminal Court International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights International Court of Justice International Monetary Fund International Union for the Conservation of Nature Lord’s Resistance Army Common Market of the South Millennium Development Goals Most Favored Nation North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organization Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Non-Proliferation Treaty New Transatlantic Agenda Organization of African Unity Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for European Economic Cooperation Organization of the Islamic Conference Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Proliferation Security Initiative Permanent Members of UN Security Council Research and Development Southern African Customs Union Southern African Development Community Shanghai Cooperation Organization Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina Trans Atlantic Free Trade Area Transatlantic Economic Partnership United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United Nations United Nations Development Program

list of abbreviations UNESCO

xi

United Nations Educational, Scientic, and Cultural Organization UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force UNSAS United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States of America WHO World Health Organization WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WOMP World Order Models Project WTO World Trade Organization WW I First World War WW II Second World War

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE STAGE

This study is about the problem of order in the present world system. To the ordinary spectator of world events, the subject matter in question is by no means self-evident or unquestionable. On the face of it, we are living in a chaotic and disorderly world where turmoil, turbulence and threats seem to be the order of the day. Gruesome images of bloody conicts capture people’s attention and stir up deep emotions. Not surprisingly, treatises on international relations have frequently described the domain of world politics as basically anarchic, in view of the absence of a central authority – “a government above governments”. Apart from the option of creating military alliances led by great powers, states have to rely on themselves for their own protection, since there were no institutions powerful enough to enforce rules and regulate disputes between them. The presumed requirement for “self-help” was believed to create a security dilemma for all of them. Since states could never be sure about each other’s intentions, they were forced to take precautionary measures in order to prepare for the worst. But in a world of distrust and miscommunication these measures were easily mistaken by others as unfriendly or even hostile acts, leading to counter-measures and setting in motion competitive arms races. Similarly, in non-military elds – e.g., trade, monetary affairs, and the physical environment – international anarchy was held responsible for the self-destructive decisions of governments, making everyone worse off in the longer run. The beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s are a sharp reminder of short-sighted (and ill-fated) denitions of national interest, as is the overuse of common pool resources and depletion of scarce materials today. Over the past decades, the traditional image of international relations as a realm of conict and collision has been challenged, among others, by Hedley Bull. While acknowledging that the condition of anarchy looms as large – or larger – than the condition of order, the British scholar nevertheless argued in his seminal book The Anarchical Society.

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A Study of Order in World Politics1 that the latter concept is an inextricable part of the historical record of international relations. To clarify Bull’s position it is useful to point out that his thinking is part of the so-called Grotian tradition of world politics. This tradition occupies a middle position between the Hobbesian realist tradition, on the one hand, and the Kantian liberal, on the other. The Grotian tradition, of course, builds on the writings of Hugo Grotius, who – as an early seventeenth-century jurist – had laid the foundations of modern international law. The Dutch scholar did not ignore the existence of international anarchy, but was less pessimistic than Hobbes, decades later, about its consequences. Whereas Hobbes raised the specter of the proverbial war of all against all (bellum omnium contra omnes), Grotius focused on the possibilities for international cooperation and coordination.2 He and his followers held that international anarchy exists side by side with all sorts of bonds and institutions which bring individual states together. In spite of the absence of a central authority with coercive power, states felt bound in their interactions – including armed conicts – by the rules and institutions of the society of which they are part. The institutions of this “society of nations” (or “international society”) include diplomacy, international law, trade, the balance of power, and numerous informal rules of the game. Taken together, these phenomena were believed to create some degree of order within the anarchy.3 At the same time, Grotians distinguished themselves from cosmopolitan thinkers in that they did not embrace the Kantian view that the transformation of individual consciousness, republican constitutionalism, and a federal contract between states could abolish – as Kant had put it – “the lawless state of savagery” and institute “perpetual peace” in international relations. Grotians allowed for the possibility of war – both normatively and empirically – and were not convinced that states were no longer the main building blocks and sources of political legitimacy in international politics.4

1

2

3

4

Published for the rst time by The Macmillan Press (London and Basingstoke) in 1977. Cooperation refers to joint efforts for achieving positive outcomes, coordination is related to joint efforts for preventing negative outcomes. See Hedley Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’, in Herbert Buttereld and Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations. Essays in the theory of international politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1967), pp. 51–73. See Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

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Recurring patterns of behavior shape the expectations of the actors in the international system now, as much as they did in the past. They may create conventions and common understandings, and even if they are short of customary law, they often have great (or perhaps greater) political signicance. This is the case because conventions that have developed among states guide foreign policy and limit potential conicts. An interesting instance of such a convention which developed during the Cold War was the tacit agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union not to intervene in each other’s sphere of inuence. The fear of an armed confrontation between the superpowers leading to a nuclear war stopped the Western countries sending troops to Hungary (1956) and – the then – Czechoslovakia (1968), when democratic movements in these countries staged an insurrection to overthrow the local communist regimes.5 Conversely, the Moscow leadership was reticent about fuelling internal unrest in France (May 1968), as it was about exploiting to its advantage the political turmoil following the so-called Carnation Revolution in Portugal (1974).6 The claim of Bull7 and other Grotians that order can exist even without formal rules or with only a primitive system of rules was later reinforced and elaborated by the so-called regime theorists.8 This group of scholars concurred with the Grotian view that although the international system is anarchical, it has never been completely anomic or without rules. In their view, states in the modern world have become increasingly enmeshed in complex sets of institutions, rules and procedures, which regulate international relations around the world and which are dened as regimes. By setting standards for behavior and lowering transaction costs such regimes may enable governments to overcome obstacles to collaboration, such as a lack of trust or information that usually breeds uncertainty and suspicion. The argument goes on to say that the establishment of an institutional framework for negotiations, conict resolution and overseeing state action will reduce the likelihood of actors opting for defecting strategies, such as cheating and freeloading, while fostering habits of cooperation. Whatever the 5

6

7 8

On this subject, see J.H. Leurdijk, Armed intervention in international politics. A historical and comparative analysis (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006), pp. 134–135. The Cuban missile crisis (1962), which broke out after the discovery by the US of the deployment of offensive nuclear weaponry on Cuban soil, seems to contradict Soviet prudence to avoid a direct showdown with its rival. The Anarchical Society, p. 27. Leading representatives are Stephen Krasner, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.

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merits of these and other claims of regime theorists,9 it is important to recognize, once again, that the codes of conduct that affect international behavior are broader than the formal rules of international law. Regimes, for example, in the eld of arms control and disarmament, can be created by a highly formalized agreement, but may also emerge from informal understandings and diplomatic practices. Even in the absence of formal rules, the expectations of actors may converge in a given area of international relations,10 as was revealed by the notion of mutually assured destruction which underpinned strategic stability in the post-Second World War bipolar world.

A new world order? In an important contribution to the debate on the conditions of the international order, Kalevi Holsti shows that the end of major wars in the system of states following the Westphalian Treaties of 1648 led to attempts to create international orders intended to manage, control, or prevent new conicts and crises. In his judgment, the orders established by the great peacemaking efforts of 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919, and 1945 have been fairly effective at resolving the issues of the past, although few successfully anticipated those of the future.11 One obvious lesson to be drawn is that peacemakers will create the breeding ground for a new war if they fail to rehabilitate the defeated powers. Indeed, peace settlements that are not considered legitimate by the vanquished, are bound to be short-lived. They are likely to sow the seeds of revenge. Desperation, humiliation, disenfranchisement and deprivation tend to be main causes of violence. One way of avoiding the pitfalls of punitive peace arrangements which impose humiliating demands on the defeated party leading to resentment, is to assimilate this party into 9

10

11

A devastating criticism of the argument was launched by John Mearsheimer in his article ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, published in International Security, 19 (3), 1994/5, pp. 5–56. Mearsheimer argues that institutions are not powerful enough to induce governments to redene their national interests. Krasner’s much utilized denition of regimes reads as follows: “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. See the book he edited International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and war: armed conicts and international order 1648–1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

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the postwar order. There are good grounds for assuming that a stable order cannot be founded upon inequity and repression, and another lesson to bear in mind is that at least some principles of justice must be incorporated into the postwar settlement. Holsti refers to notions of self-determination, self-abnegation by the military victors by forgoing extensive territorial control, as well as to modest reparations, where appropriate, based on some objective analysis of war responsibility.12 In today’s world no international order seems to be acceptable, and therefore legitimate, without provisions for basic human rights and poverty reduction. The end of the Cold War has been widely compared to the end of “hot wars” in the past. Will the present generation of world leaders fare any better in removing the obstacles on the path towards a new stable order? Experience to date does not give much cause for optimism. Admittedly, the collapse of the Soviet empire raised expectations that a “New World Order” – using the words of George Bush, Sr.13 – could be built with the potential of eliminating the fear of large-scale war. The consensus among the great powers in the UN Security Council on punishing Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait in the early 1990s seemed to vindicate the belief that such a new order might be led by the United Nations. However, the newly gained consensus turned out to be very precarious. Thus it did not take long for tensions arising from deeply ingrained distrust to emerge between the United States, Russia and China. These reached a climax during the Kosovo crisis of 1999. The crisis provoked a debate about the legality and the legitimacy of the NATO intervention in Serbia. Could an unlawful action still be necessary? Meanwhile, the world organization had hardly proved to be effective in dealing with the breakup of Yugoslavia, just as it had been unable to prevent or stop the humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Rwanda (1994) and other parts of Africa, such as the Congo.

12 13

Holsti, op. cit., p. 338. When the American President tried to explain the concept to a Joint Session of the US Congress on 11 September 1990, he outlined “A new era – freer from the threat of terror, stronger in pursuit of justice and more secure in quest for peace, an era in which nations of the world (. . .) can prosper – a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibilities for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. . . .” Transcript of President’s Address, The New York Times, September 12, 1990, at A20.

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However, rather surprisingly, it was not the accommodation of the Russian Federation – the successor state of the “vanquished” Soviet Union – to the post-Cold War reality that became the major obstacle to building a new international order. In fact, some unforeseen challenges,14 such as the rise of Islamic radicalism, were to create deep fault lines in the international landscape. The utopian notion of expelling the West from the Islamic world and recreating the Islamic empires of the Middle Ages (the so-called Caliphate), particularly appealed to many disenchanted Muslims in the Middle East and Asia, making the general acceptance of new arrangements and rules even more difcult than would otherwise have been the case. The unprecedented terrorist attacks on targets in New York and Washington, 11 September 2001, brought an abrupt end to the “holiday from history” that followed the fall of the Soviet Union. Immediately after the attacks, the US declared the “war on terrorism”. President George W. Bush made it clear that anyone who was not be willing to follow the US in that battle was seen as being against it. Through American eyes, 9/11 – the shorthand description of the September drama – was a turning point or watershed in evolving events, closing the post-Cold War period. Once again, the American people became sensitive to all kinds of threats and enemies representing “evil”. It also led to a revival of the belief that notwithstanding globalization (see below), the state remained the only political organization capable of taking effective measures to protect the security of its citizens – to many in the US inevitably at the price of a reduction in civil liberties (for example, as a result of the Patriot Act). Far from uniting nations in a common front against terrorist organizations and states that sponsored them, the US-led counter-terrorism campaign, with a strong emphasis on military intervention and head-on confrontation, was to become a source of international disagreement, also straining the relations on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the call for a new international order did not diminish; it continued to be at the forefront in the political debate as conducted by members of the political elites and non-governmental organizations in the West and beyond. In the academic community, students of international relations and international law, such as Richard Falk, 14

Samuel Huntington’s prophesy, in the early 1990s, of a “clash of civilizations” in the context of the relations between western liberal democracies and militant Islamic countries and groups encountered at rst a great deal of disbelief and criticism, especially in intellectual circles.

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who had been associated with the so-called World Order Models Project (WOMP),15 renewed their efforts with new vigor in the light of new developments. They widened the focus of the goals of world order from the classical objective of the elimination of war to the alleviation of the fate of the world’s most vulnerable people and the protection of the natural environment.16 Various political motives and forces kept the political ideal of a new international order alive. One of these was the challenge of globalization, loosely dened as the growing interconnectedness between human societies across the world, rendering national borders less relevant. Globalization provoked a variety of reactions, varying from enthusiasm and acceptance, to skepticism and outright rejection. To be sure, globalization is not an entirely new phenomenon in world history. Some authors, such as Immanuel Wallerstein,17 have analyzed it as a secular historical process with which human civilizations have managed to create a single world-system in three distinct waves. In the rst wave, the age of discoveries (15th and 16th centuries), globalization was shaped by the expansion and conquest of European powers, such as Portugal and Spain. The second wave (1870 –1914) saw a major expansion in the spread and entrenchment of European colonial empires. It also led to a signicant increase in trade between the leading European industrial powers, i.e., Great Britain and Germany. The third wave started in the 1960s, with the revolution in information and communication technology as the main driving force, and was accelerated by the end of the Cold War. However, what makes contemporary globalization new is the pace and scale of economic transformation, with exports of global merchandise currently above 20 per cent of world gross product, compared to 8 percent in 1913 and 15 per cent as recently as 1990.18 The predominant role played by transnational (or multinational) corporations in the world economy is also a novelty.

15

16

17

18

The WOMP project was set up in 1968 to explore and promote alternatives to the current inter-state system. Their unit of analysis has been the individual and their level of analysis the global. See Saul Mendlovitz, On the Creation of a Just World Order (New York: The Free Press, 1975). See Richard Falk, On Human Governance: Toward a New Global Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). See his magnum opus The Modern World-System. Vols 1, 2 and 3 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1974, 1980 and 1989). Figures mentioned by Martin Wolf in his article ‘Share gains with globalisation’s losers’, Financial Times, September 5, 2006.

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At the beginning of the 21st century such corporations accounted for between 25 and 33 per cent of world output, 70 per cent of world trade, and no less than 80 per cent of international investment, while overseas production by these entities considerably exceeds the level of world exports.19 Another new development is that information technology, and the internet in particular, has made it possible to restructure production across borders. As a result, many once non-tradable services, such as accounting and medical analysis, can be provided at great distances, exposing more sectors in the developed world to competition from emerging countries. Should globalization be seen as a blessing or a curse? Many freemarket oriented economists have pointed out that the best hope for humankind was not less globalization but more, and that the escape route from poverty in particular lay not in isolationism but in greater economic integration. This argument did not alter the fact that the problems arising from the spread of interdependencies throughout the world were increasingly weakening the capacity of national governments to deal with cross-boundary transactions and movements, such as the rapid circulation of “hot” money. What is the point of holding national elections, when elected ofcials have to cope with structures of power that are rmly rooted in the global context? Social movements operating beyond national borders sought to extend democratic practice by making international organizations more accountable and transparent. Since the mid-1990s, several crises had rocked the global economy: irresponsible nancial policies leading to the Asian nancial crisis, the collapse of the new economy bubble, the Enron asco, and the nancial collapse of Argentina. This reinforced the tendency to emphasize the dark side of globalization, as was apparent in the Declaration issued at the end of the so-called Millennium Summit of the UN in September 2000. World leaders stated on this occasion: We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people. For while globalization offers great opportunities, at present its benets are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed. We recognize that developing countries and countries with economies in transition face special difculties in responding to this central challenge. Thus, only

19

See Anthony McGrew, ‘Globalization and Global Politics’, in Baylis & Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, p. 21.

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through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can globalization be made fully inclusive and equitable.20

There was a widespread feeling that containing the negative effects of globalization required the strengthening of the system of international governance, i.e., to create a system of effective public regulation. The negative effects that were perceived not only included the unwarranted political inuence of transnational corporations, downward pressures on labor and environmental standards (“race to the bottom”) and growing inequality, but also the impact of borderless ows such as the spread of infectious diseases, drugs and illicit human trafcking, organized crime, and turmoil on the nancial and energy markets. Another important stimulus for the quest for international order came from new conceptions about security (“human security”) and the obligations of states, especially in the eld of the protection of human rights and the treatment of minorities, which led to a reappraisal of the idea of national sovereignty.21 Furthermore, the decision of President Bush, Jr. to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein by force in the spring of 2003 was widely perceived as a blatant manifestation of American unilateralism, even though the US administration stressed the concept of the “coalition of the willing”. The decision intensied the debate on the prospects of a system of rules-based multilateralism as an alternative to unrestricted US hegemony. In the aftermath of the American invasion, fresh attempts were made to reform the United Nations – attempts that were particularly directed at restoring the authority of the Security Council and countering American disengagement from the world organization.

Dening the concepts The concept of international order is not without ambiguity; its interpretations vary signicantly. Sometimes the concept is confused with the notion of power structure or conguration, as revealed by awed

20 21

UN Doc. A/RES/55/2, 18 September 2000, par. 5. See Alfred van Staden and Hans Vollaard, ‘The Erosion of State Sovereignty: Towards a Post-Territorial World?’ in Gerard Kreijen (ed.), State, Sovereignty and International Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 165–184.

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descriptions or references, such as the bipolar or unipolar order. The clarity of the concept is also adversely affected by the mixture of empirical and normative elements in attempts to dene it. In principle, the concept should be understood as an analytic tool, the primary function of which is to help describe and explain international phenomena. In practice, however, it also serves as a program for political action directed at the advancement of particular values, for example, individual justice or freedom. The concept of order, in general, can be briey dened as any regular or discernible pattern of relationships that are stable over time. International order, in particular, is taken here to mean the whole range of institutions, principles and norms that states and other autonomous political units develop in their mutual relationships for achieving collective goals, such as security, the rule of law, free trade, and the protection of the global commons. Key elements of the concept include: principles dening the rights and obligations of the units that make up the international system (such as sovereignty and non-intervention); the codes circumscribing the use of force (such as the right to self-defense); and modes of governance, i.e., the formal and informal steering mechanisms (such as hegemony, great power caucuses, and diplomacy) to regulate and coordinate the behavior of the constituent units. While international law is a major component of international order, the latter has a far broader meaning than simply pertaining to law. Much of what determines an international order is outside the domain of international law and cannot be dealt with by legal regulations. This means that to account for the existence of an order it is necessary to acknowledge the place of informal rules (e.g., moral rules, state practices that are not part of customary law, and “operational rules”).22 Many rules on preserving the balance of power, such as preventive war to forestall a bid for hegemony or counter-city strategies instead of counter-force postures, are outside the range of international law or

22

Bull points out that past international systems were able to achieve international order without the institution of international law, such as the Greek city-state system, the system of Hellenistic kingdoms that arose after the death of Alexander the Great, and the ancient Indian system of states, as brilliantly analyzed by Kautilya. See Bull, op. cit., p. 142. In mediaeval Europe, the rulers of efdoms (e.g., principalities, duchies, and baronies) had to share power with vassals beneath them, and were answerable to an authority above them, with the emperor as the supreme authority. Order was based on personal loyalties to superiors and subordinates, common faith and social rituals.

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even in conict with it. Moreover, some conicts, especially more ideology-driven conicts, are not suited to being framed or resolved in legal terms. Those conicts can end in “holy wars”, ghts to the last man or armed stalemates. Sectarian conicts in which each party consists of multiple competing factions, such as the present one in Iraq, may not be amenable to negotiations at all, since one cannot trust the other side to stick to a deal. Legitimacy and necessity, rather than legality, will dictate how political settlements are found for less intractable conicts. Furthermore, legal considerations are subordinate to political expediency when it comes to the mutual acceptance of territorial spheres of interest. In general, international stability may depend – as in the Cold War – on the capacity to deploy effective military power or to retaliate in kind under all circumstances, regardless of whether this situation is regulated by law. Consequently, the management of many parts of international politics is likely to depend quite directly on hierarchy and an unequal distribution of power in ways that are not consistent with the principle of legal equality.23 As for the concept of governance, governance at the international level does not necessarily imply centralized legislative, administrative, and police powers. Like the political order that has evolved within the connes of the European Union, international orders need not be designed on the basis of a domestic analogy of nation-states.24 Systems of governance are made up of more than formal governments. They may comprise permanent government structures but also international ad-hoc coalitions and informal groups, transnational public-private networks, and non-governmental organizations. The Commission on Global Governance described the concept more than a decade ago as “[t]he sum of the many ways that individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. (. . .) It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to, or perceive to be, in their interest”.25 The loose framework of global regulation concerned here not only determines what constitutes

23

24 25

For this point of view, see Andrew Hurrell, ‘International Law and the Changing Constitution of International Society’, in Michael Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 334. Holsti, op. cit., p. 337. See the report of the Commission, entitled Our Global Neighbourhood (Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 2.

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acceptable behavior among international actors and, consequently, the constraints on international (or transnational) conduct, but also facilitates cooperation by creating conditions for collective action. The focus of the concept of governance tends to be on the process through which conicting or diverse interests can be accommodated and cooperative action can be taken, rather than on the role of agents or institutions.26 Finally, international orders may be composed of several international regimes performing functions in areas concerned with specic issues, such as disarmament and arms control, economic development, the environment, and human rights. As mentioned earlier, those functions include setting of standards for behavior, the collection of information and knowledge, and the supervision of state action. Some regimes are weak and lack the capacity to monitor situations and identify abuses and violations of agreements, or the avoidance of payments; others are strong, in that they are built on a reasonable consensus with regard to the nature of the problem and how to deal with it. The human rights regime in particular tends toward the weak end of the spectrum because apart from the Council of Europe, there is no formal and effective international monitoring mechanism, and because the sanctions are relatively soft.

Outline of the study Although the notions of international order and power structure should be kept separate in any analysis, the main thrust of the argument elaborated in this study is that any viable or sustainable international order will be affected by the prevailing power structure and, to some degree, reect it. International orders can be seen as a magnifying mirror which – as suggested by Stanley Hoffmann – “faithfully and cruelly” reects the realities of world politics.27 Signicantly, this implies that for international orders to be effective, they should not be built against the strongest powers, but with them as much as possible. The main reason

26

27

Also see James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littleeld, 1998).

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is that institutions lack the strength to equalize power disparities; they can only mitigate or at best reduce them. Nor are institutions able to banish the struggle for power from the world stage; they can only make it more civilized and less nasty and brute. Furthermore, institutions that lack supranational authority need leading nations to bolster collective action, so that sanctions against aggressors or freeloaders can be effectively enforced. At the same time, the thesis of this study is rooted in the belief that the strongest state also needs to legitimize the exercise of its political power in order to reduce the political costs incurred. The costs of the use of force are especially high for democracies, since freely elected governments are extra vulnerable to moral reproaches by domestic groups about the loss of innocent lives. The inclination of the lesser powers to accept the right of the strongest to make far-reaching decisions with implications for many other countries will ultimately depend on the willingness of the strongest to be constrained by international norms, and to take the views of others into account. Political leaders of powerful nations will nd out, sooner rather than later, that in an interdependent world no state with global responsibilities can afford to dispense with the collaboration of allies and friendly states to achieve its goals.28 Indeed, the more the strongest powers are prepared to involve other countries in their decisions, the more legitimate and effective these decisions are likely to be. The central question of this study is whether unipolarity, as epitomized by American ascendancy or predominance in the world today and probably in the future, is to be regarded as an obstacle or, rather, a prerequisite for building a stable and just international order. This question will be discussed in the wider context of the relationship between power and law, peace and justice, and the foreign policy of the United States compared with that of former dominant powers. The study starts by raising a preliminary semantic problem. Some prefer to speak of international order; others see compelling reasons to use the phrase “world order”. At rst glance, this is just a matter of words, but on second thoughts the difference is very signicant in terms of the scope of the goals to be achieved and the political actors involved in 28

Thinking of the failure of American policies today to introduce democracy in the Middle East, especially Iraq, some may be tempted to recall the quip ascribed to Winston Churchill: “the US will always do the right thing in the end – after it has exhausted every other possibility”.

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the search for order. Therefore, the next chapter considers the arguments for and against the terms concerned, to be followed by a brief exposition of the competing claims of universalism and regionalism with regard to the best road towards creating order in international relations. Subsequently several models of international (or world) order – world government (federation), global policy networks, and the Pax Americana – are discussed. The study departs from the proposition that the only realistic way to create a viable order that meets minimum standards of stability and justice is to strengthen, streamline and supplement the existing body of international institutions and regimes, while at the same time trying to engage – or reengage – the US in the management of global problems. The study also concludes that the US is not able to shoulder the burdens of empire, nor are the American people willing to do so – no more than non-American peoples are prepared to accept a hegemonic order. While American ascendancy is too limited to rule the world independently, it is strong enough to provide necessary leadership functions for organizing collective action on many areas where such action is required. In that respect, the present power conguration in the world, characterized by unrivaled American preeminence, may be called a blessing in disguise. Without the active involvement of the US, the quest for order is bound to fail. While it would be self-defeating to establish a world order which is ruled by power only, it is equally futile to build one which is powered by mere rules. The notion of effective multilateralism is regarded as the most practical concept to achieve the overriding goal of matching American power with international legitimacy, without which no order can take root or survive. After putting forward a policy agenda for the international (world) order, based on the transition from national security to human security, the study closes with observations about the role of the European Union in the development of international (world) order. The EU represents a new political order itself on a regional scale, and has articulated clear views on how to promote the cause of global values.

CHAPTER TWO

INTERNATIONAL OR WORLD ORDER? THE BALANCE BETWEEN PEACE AND JUSTICE

In the preceding introduction, the concept of order was dened as any regular or discernible pattern of relationships that are stable over time. In other words, there is order when, and to the extent that, human relations are predictable and controlled. This shorthand denition focuses on stability as the main characteristic of the concept, as well as the overriding goal of policies which pursue this. In an international context, stability can be taken to mean peaceful relations among states and the absence of major upheavals, large-scale violence or chaos in the international system. The notion of order may, however, also be conceived more broadly, namely as a condition for the achievement of wider goals, for instance, the advancement of – whatever version of – justice and democracy in the world. Along these lines – order as a goal in itself or as a condition for something else, Ian Clark makes a distinction between an international order, on the one hand, and a world order, on the other. International order, as already indicated, is directed at stable and peaceful relations between states; it is primarily concerned with military security – the elimination or repression of physical state violence. In Clark’s view, world order is a larger category. It takes as its units of order not states, but individual human beings. The degree of order is assessed on the basis of the delivery of certain benets for humanity as a whole – security, human rights, basic needs, or – indeed – justice.1 Parallel development of international relations and international law The distinction coincides, to a large extent, with the evolution or transformation2 of the discipline of international relations from the study of

1

2

Ian Clark, ‘Globalization and the post-cold war order’, in John Baylis & Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics. An introduction to international relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 2005), pp. 728–29. Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf dene transformation as “a change in the

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international politics to the study of world politics. The principal focus of the study of international politics is on the actions and interactions of states, which are regarded as the most signicant single type of actor in international relations. States are seen as standing out amongst other political organizations (like parties or interest groups) since they have control over territory, dominion over the people, enjoy a monopoly over the legitimate use of military force within that territory, and regulate international relations. They are also assumed to have a great deal of autonomy, as xed borders separate the domestic sphere from the world outside. In contrast, the scope of the study of world politics is wider. It encompasses the multicentric world of individuals and group actors of many different types: not only state actors but also transnational organizations, multinational corporations, private organizations and subnational units that may try to inuence the foreign policy of governments, at home and abroad. Challenging the traditional image of the state as a unitary actor (“the individual writ large”), the study also encompasses transgovernmental relations, i.e., the relations between semi-autonomous bureaucratic organizations of two or more states.3 A similar development occurred in the study of international law, where states are no longer the sole legal subjects.4 Traditionally, the scope of international law was conned to questions of order, in the narrow sense of stability. Its main objective was to maintain peace and security – the leading Westphalian principle being the mutual respect for each state’s territorial integrity and domestic jurisdiction. Issues of human rights, human security and distributive justice fell outside its scope. In recent decades, there has been a strong movement in international law towards broadening the scope of legal ambitions. The movement reected a shift away from the communitarian to the cosmopolitan perspective of international law. At the heart of communitarian thinking is the belief that justice, rights and responsibilities emanate from the

3

4

characteristic pattern of interaction among the most active participants in world politics of such magnitude that it appears that one ‘global system’ has replaced another.” See their textbook World Politics. Trend and Transformation (Boston/New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 8th ed. 2001), p. 6. See Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr and David Kinsella, World Politics. The Menu for Choice (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson, 7th ed. 2004), p. 17. According to the Dutch professor of international law, Ramses A. Wessel, the study of international law was far behind the study of international relations at recognizing the signicance of non-state actors. See his article ‘Internationale organisaties als regelgevers’ (International organizations as rule-makers), Vrede en Veiligheid, 35 (1), 2006, p. 17.

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historical, cultural, and religious experiences shared by the members of a political community (i.e., the nation, with the state as its legal expression). In contrast, cosmopolitans hold that individuals are, rst and foremost, members of the community of humankind, thereby stressing the moral principles that world citizens have in common. After outlining his ideas about the Republican (democratic) constitution and Federation of free states, Immanuel Kant formulated “the law of world citizenship” as follows in his Perpetual Peace more than two centuries ago: The people of the earth have [. . .] entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the part is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity.”5

In this view, it is the citizens of the world who have an inherent moral standing, not states. States’ rights to sovereignty and non-interference are believed to derive from their willingness and capacity to respect and defend the security and welfare of their citizens.6 The cosmopolitan view made headway, inter alia, in as much as states have been actively engaged in the development of an expansive body of international human rights law, the establishment of international war crimes tribunals, and attempts to regulate the global commons, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the subsequent introduction of human rights conventions prompted René Cassin – the principal founding father of the aforementioned Declaration of 1948 and the 1968 Nobel Peace Laureate – to say, for the rst time, “the individual becomes a subject of international law both in respect of his life and his liberty”.7 In addition, the UN Security Council has crossed the threshold of infringing on national sovereignty by declaring gross violations of human rights as threats to international peace and security. In places as varied as Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan, the Council authorized international intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing for enforcement actions. In view of these

5

6 7

Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 105–108. Russett, Starr and Kinsella, op. cit., pp. 288–289. René Cassin, ‘How the Charter on Human Rights Was Born’, UNESCO Courier, 21, January 1968, pp. 4–6.

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developments, it would be justied to speak of a transformation of international law to world or global law.8 Inconclusive outcome As regards the central topic of this study, i.e., the search for order in relations between relatively autonomous political units, the parallel development in the study of international relations and of international law – as briey referred to – seems to justify the decision to keep the notion of “international order” as a description of the past and reserve the notion of “world order” as one for the future. However, this decision raises an important objection. Most fundamentally, it suggests a deterministic view of human existence – the belief in the ultimate triumph of world morality over the selsh interests of individual states. This is dubious. It is one thing to strive for human progress – however it is dened; it is quite another to take it for granted. There are no linear developments in history; counter-movements, backlashes, setbacks, and interruptions should also be taken into account. Many twists could affect the course of current trends. International relations may be in a state of transformation, but the uneasy balance between contending forces – globalization and political fragmentation, secularism and religious revival – makes its outcome uncertain. Although there is nothing preordained in the shape of the world to come, more often than not, the future direction of international events is beyond the control of statesmen. Moreover, the issues concerned – justice and human welfare – are employed not only as descriptions of empirical reality, but also as political symbols and sources of inspiration for political action. One should be aware that both the nature and scope of the goals to be achieved in the quest for order are subject to profound political disagreements and divisions. Thus there are different conceptions of order, particularly regarding one vital issue: the relationship between peace (stability) and justice.

8

Instead of “word law” Christian Reus-Smit suggests to use the label “supranational law” to capture new legal developments. See his chapter ‘International law’, in Baylis and Smith, op. cit., pp. 358–59. This denotation seems to be rather confusing since EU law is regarded as the typical branch of supranational law. See also Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Kollision. Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkampf, 2006).

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These conceptions will be discussed in this chapter, with the aim of nding some balance or synthesis. Although the title of this study contains the term “world order”, the confusion of elements of international and world order in the current state of international relations inevitably leads to the two terms being used interchangeably in the following chapters. Conicting trends and contradictory characteristics make it is very difcult, if not impossible, to give a straightforward answer to the question of whether it is more appropriate or adequate to use the term “international order” or “world order”. Sovereign states continue to constitute the main actors in the international system, but the principles that govern their behavior no longer exclusively reect the precepts of power for the sake of preserving exclusive control of national territories.

Revisiting an old debate The extension of the goals of international order beyond the traditional domain of peace and stability, as suggested by the notion of world order, raises the fundamental problem of the compatibility between different conceptions of order. Is it possible to achieve both justice and peace, or are the two mutually exclusive? Three different positions could be adopted in this respect.9 There is the position of the conservatives, who assume that there is an inherent conict between the values of order and of justice in world politics. Seeing the former as having priority over the latter, the conservative view conceives of international society as a society in which “minimum order” or coexistence is the most that can be expected. Appeals to “optimum order”, i.e., an order that seeks to create justice, are likely to threaten the limited consensus on which coexistence is built. The second position is the view of the revolutionary. Revolutionaries agree with the conservatives about the basic incompatibility between order and justice. However, they see disorder as the necessary price that has to be paid to break away from an unjust status quo and to recreate an order that meets the requirements of justice. Thirdly, there is the view of the progressive reformists, who are reluctant to accept any necessary conict between the two goals. Those

9

See Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 94.

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who support the latter view try to nd ways of reconciling order with justice, believing that redressing injustices can strengthen international order, at least in the long run. Realists and liberals The wisdom of pursuing universal values in a nation’s foreign policy, and at the same time, founding the international order on ideals of justice and democracy, has been at the core of the long-standing debate between “realists” and “liberals” in international relations.10 The conservative and the progressive reformist position referred to above are closely related to one of these schools of thought.11 Realists, stressing the competitive nature of politics among nations, claim that the moral standard for individual citizens living in the state does not apply to the state in its external relations. They believe that international anarchy still makes it necessary for the government to sacrice moral principles to the requirements of national survival. Rulers, seen as agents of their subjects rather than principals following their personal moral impulses,12 are under an obligation to do whatever is required to advance the interests of the national society they represent. Individuals may adopt ideals of self-denial and sacrice themselves for their beliefs; rulers may not. Charles Krauthammer, the articulate American columnist of the political right, defended the initial reluctance of the US government to intervene in the Yugoslav wars of the early 1990s as follows: In private conduct, altruism is the ideal. For a nation, it can mean ruin. (. . .) Nations are not individuals. Nations live in a state of nature. There is no higher authority to protect them. If they do not protect themselves,

10

11

12

For a general survey of the realist tradition, see Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986) and Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics’, in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1997). For a similar survey of the liberal tradition, see Michael Joseph Smith, ‘Liberalism and International Reform’, in T. Nardin and D. Mapel (eds), Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 201–24 and J.L. Richardson, ‘Contending Liberalisms: Past and Present’, European Journal of International Relations, 3 (1), 1997, pp. 5–33. The position of the revolutionary may be read as the radical offshoot of the liberal school of thought. The distinction between “agent” and “principal” was made by George Kennan in his article ‘Morality and Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 64, 1985–86, pp. 205–218.

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they die. Ignoring one’s interests, squandering one’s resources in ts of altruism, is the fastest road to national disaster.13

In contrast, liberals (or idealists) maintain that members of the human race have come to share the Kantian dream of a cosmopolitan morality, as mentioned earlier. They hold that both governments and citizens have duties beyond their borders.14 A universal community has evolved to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The natural order is corrupted by the policies of undemocratic state leaders and ignorance, as well as by outdated state practices such as seeking to create or keep the balance of power. Realists have criticized liberals on several counts. First of all, they take issue with them for leaning towards an ethics of conviction (Gesinnungsethik), as once identied by Max Weber. This ethical orientation is criticized because it stresses the moral quality of political intentions without taking into account their consequences. Realists often refer to the famous statement ascribed to Ferdinand I, the 16th century Holy Roman Emperor, “Let justice be done, even if the world perish” (Fiat justitia, pereat mundus), to warn about the dangers of turning foreign policy into a boundless quest for good. The historical archetype of a European statesmen who was aware of those dangers and who is held in high esteem by realists for that reason is Richelieu. The French Cardinal ranks among the rst powerful practitioners to reject any moral responsibility by the State, except to do whatever must be done to protect the interests of its citizens. Thus, for example, during the Thirty Years’ War he sided with the Protestant states against the Catholic states in the interest of opposing the European supremacy of the House of Habsburg. His shrewd statecraft was directed at replacing the medieval concept of universal moral values by the notion of raison d’état as the guiding principle of secular French foreign policy. Richelieu’s classical pronouncements, “Man is immortal, his salvation is hereafter”, and “The state has no immortality, its salvation is now or never”,15 should be understood in the sense that states will not be praised for doing what is right, but are only rewarded for being strong enough to do what is necessary. The ultimate goal of diplomacy, in 13 14

15

Krauthammer’s words appeared in a column published in Time, May 17, 1993. See Stanley Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders. On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981). Quoted in J. Strayer, H. Gatzke and E.H. Harbison, The Mainstream of Civilization since 1500 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 420.

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his view, was “a community of reason”, shaped not by legal, but by rational and moral constraints. Aiming at universal legal rules fails to appreciate the inevitability of political expediency; the central imperative of policy should be to cause the least possible harm.16 A modern echo of Richelieu’s belief that states live by standards and rules that are different from those which apply to individuals can be found in Hans Morgenthau’s classical work Politics among Nations. According to this intellectual founding father of modern realism, the merits of universal principles of justice and human solidarity can be judged only by ltering them through the concrete circumstances of time and place. In other words, the responsible statesman must take into account of the variable and particular nature of circumstance. By implication, what makes good sense in one set of circumstances may be well futile or ruinous in another. For example, Great Britain was right to help restore the independence of Belgium after the German attack in 1914 and not to assist the Finns in the struggle with their powerful neighbor during the Winter War of 1939–40. In the former case the European balance of power was at stake; in the latter case the conict was on the periphery of Europe and military help would have been technically highly complicated. And yet, from a moral point of view, the two cases barely differ. The bottom line is that universal principles should never compromise more existential concerns: rst and foremost, the preservation of peace and security.17 A foreign policy guided by abstract morality will be lacking in restraint because it is difcult, if not impossible, to negotiate where values are concerned. A rm belief in the one true good may induce the powerful to embark on a crusading, messianic foreign policy, leaving no room for making compromises or agreements on a modus vivendi. As Robert Cooper, the British diplomat-writer, succinctly puts it: “You cannot do business with the Great Satan”.18 Incidentally, that is why the foreign policy of president George W. Bush, describing countries such as Iran and Syria as belonging to the “Axis of Evil”, was also criticized by traditional realists. The demonizing of opponents – “We don’t talk to evil” – narrowed the options of American diplomacy to control the crisis

16

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18

See in more detail Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, Ethical Realism: A Vision for America’s Role in the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006). Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 5th ed. 1973), pp. 10 –11. Robert Cooper, ‘The Morality of Amorality in Foreign Policy’, Project Syndicate, February 2003.

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of Lebanon which broke out in the summer of 2006. To the realist, talking to your enemies on the basis of common or complementary interests is not a mark of appeasement. Advocates of the liberal point of view tend to see the leaders who are responsible for the conduct of foreign policy as representatives of the human race; in fact, realists say, most citizens would expect them to give prime consideration to the interests of those they serve. Those interests cannot be allowed to be jeopardized by indulging in acts of universal human compassion. Using an appropriate analogy with loan practice, it has been said that “if compassion were to become the guiding principle of a bank, it would go bust”.19 Thus, a state, however powerful, that seeks to eliminate all forms of evil in the world is likely to overstretch its own resources, making its people vulnerable to the resentment of adversaries. Well-meaning countries which are forced to choose between countries in distress because of the limitations of their capacity to intervene will be accused of hypocrisy, selective indignation, as well as employing double standards. This is certainly the case when economic interests or strategic calculations seem to dictate decisions for intervention. Cosmopolitan morality and universality of international law Another aspect of the liberal position that has attracted criticism from realists concerns the assumption of a cosmopolitan morality characteristic of a world community to which all individuals belong, and to which their interests should be subordinate.20 People may be willing to accept duties beyond their borders and care about the plight of nationals of other states, but this does not mean that their sense of involvement with human tragedies is not affected by geographic distance or cultural barriers. In fact, the position concerned does not state that there is such a thing as universal acceptance of human rights. To be sure, an impressive body of international human rights law has developed, and it is widely accepted to label human rights as universal and indivisible. Thus, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on human rights (1993) states (par. 5):

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This view was expressed by Owen Harris. See his article ‘Power and Morals’, Prospect, 109/2005. For a recent plea of the universalist position, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, Ethics in a World of Strangers (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006).

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chapter two All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. (. . .) While the signicance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote all human rights and fundamental freedoms.21

However, the fact of the matter is that states belonging to different civilizations have divergent interpretations of the rules concerned and differing priorities with regard to their implementation. Thus, against the backdrop of the debate on how Asian values relate to western values, Asian countries have dened their own position. For example, in the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) it was agreed that while human rights are universal in character, implementation in the national context should remain within the competence and responsibility of each country, having regard for the complex variety of economic, social and cultural realities.22

This view was developed further in the Bangkok Declaration of 1993,23 which challenged the applicability of “universal”, taken as western, human rights standards to Asian societies with their distinct cultural, religious and economic backgrounds. The Declaration also emphasized the point that the formulation and implementation of these standards should generally be a domestic matter, within the sovereignty of a particular nation. Similarly, Islamic countries whose law is based on the divine authority of the Koran are claiming their own conception of the distinct rights of men and women, and of freedom of expression. Universality by no means amounts to uniformity.24 The fundamental challenge to international law is whether it is capable of accommodating other rules and value systems than those rooted in Western traditions. Javaid Rehman concludes that “while legitimate variations exist between

21

22

23

24

Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Adopted by the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, 25 June 1993 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1993). Joint communiqué of the Twenty-Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 19–20 July 1991, pp. 23–24. Declaration of the Ministers and Representatives of Asian States, Bangkok, 29 March–2 April 1993. The Declaration was the nal document in the preparatory meeting of Asian states to the UN World Conference in Human Rights in Vienna, 4–25 June 1993. See also Willem van Genugten et al., The United Nations of the Future. Globalization with a Human Face (Amsterdam: KIT-Publishers, 2006), p. 44.

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diverse views of human rights, there is a central core of all human rights values. This central core represents the most fundamental of human rights from which no derogations are permissible”.25 Realist objections to the liberal position are especially politically relevant in the context of humanitarian intervention, which can be dened as the forceful interference by a state, group of states or an international organization in the domestic affairs of another state to protect endangered people from gross violations of human rights and from mass murder. Realists nd it hard to believe that states will interfere on the basis of humanitarian reasons, one of the criteria which must be met to justify a breach of national sovereignty of another country whose government fails to protect its own people (or itself may be the main perpetrator of human atrocities). They argue that it is legitimate for intervening states to risk the lives of their armed forces on foreign soil only when strategic and/or economic interests are at stake, at least to some extent. That was precisely the reason why, for example, the Clinton administration was reluctant to deploy ground forces during NATO’s air campaign against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999.26 The humanitarian motive with regard to the fate of Muslim refugees, in conjunction with the hidden motive of saving the credibility of the Western Alliance, was not strong enough to persuade the US to have American foot soldiers exposed to enhanced risks. Realists add that insisting on the right of humanitarian intervention opens the door to abuse and an unwanted increase in the use of military force. Powerful countries may pursue their hidden agenda concerned with more mundane interests under the guise of humanitarian intervention. As Richard Bilder pointed out, Historically, claims of humanitarian intervention have typically served simply as a pretext for what are, in fact, selsh assertions of national interest, power, and greed . . .27

Despite the prescribed rule of proportionality and observance of international humanitarian law in the use of force, there is always the risk that the stated goal of humanitarian intervention will be compromised 25

26

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Javaid Rehman, International Human Rights Law. A Practical Approach (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2003), p. 6. Admittedly, operational considerations related to the problems of conducting a ground offensive in a mountainous area also played their part. Richard B. Bilder, ‘Kosovo and the “The New Interventionism”: Promise or Peril?’, Journal of Transnational Law & Politics, 153 (1999), pp. 160 –61.

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by the unforeseen loss of innocent lives as the result of military coercion. Indeed, in some cases, the remedy may be worse than the disease. Many people see the US intervention in Iraq in this light. Apart from the fear of manipulation by states of almost any imaginable criteria for intervention, there is no reason to be optimistic about the likelihood of achieving an international consensus on what level of human suffering should trigger intervention.28 The community of humankind that liberals are counting on may exist potentially; it is by no means a reality. The solidarity most people feel with the citizens of their own state is much stronger than to human beings in other states. This applies even in the European Union, whose proponents have tried to foster bonds of solidarity across the borders of member states. The spread of democracy Furthermore, realists argue that the record of recent attempts to spread democracy to other regions, for example in the Middle East, proved that a morality of the lesser evil, rather than of absolute principles, should guide statesmen on the road towards order.29 The Wilsonian goal of “making the world safe for democracy”, which ironically regained popularity among Neo-Conservatives in the US at the beginning of the 21st century, is a very laudable one. But two important reservations must be made. First, any democratic rules and procedures imposed on non-democratic countries from outside are likely to provoke nationalist backlash and resistance. This is not only the reality which the Bush, Jr. administration has had to face, it was also the lesson Napoleon learned two centuries ago from his campaigns to forcibly export the ideals of the French revolution across Europe. Every soldier in the army of the French emperor carried a copy of “The Rights of Man” in his rucksack,30 only to nd out that his presence on foreign soil was, in the end, resented. Recently, American Neo-Conservatives have seemed to believe, quite erroneously, that there is an American-style freedom-lover inside every non-Western man and woman, and that it is the mission of the US

28

29

30

See John F. Murphy, The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 162–63. For an elaboration of this point of view, see Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). As recalled by Jonathan Power, ‘In the name of democracy’, International Herald Tribune, February 14, 2006.

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to drag it out by any means possible. This has been denounced as the fallacy of an ideology that assumes American ideals to be universal, waiting to be embraced if only the political constraints and repression can be removed. Secondly, the absence of oppression cannot be equated with the existence of democracy. This is a cartoon version of democratization. Free elections in countries lacking the institutions and organizations that are necessary to guarantee the independence of the judiciary, a free press and decent treatment of minorities, may backre, as they lead to populist dictatorships or – in Islamic countries – to theocracies.31 While no people is genetically or intrinsically incapable of democracy, there are political, historical and cultural reasons why, for example, Arabs are less prepared for this system of government than other peoples. Efforts at advancing democracy therefore should be grounded in a clear knowledge and understanding of local history, culture, and political traditions. The legacies of geography, history and culture set clear limits on what can be accomplished in any place. The superimposition of democratic models on “inimical” social structures, such as tribal social networks and indigenous forms of authority, is likely to generate repulsive forces. Without strong constitutional constraints and viable rules of political accountability, new democracies may provide fertile ground for political entrepreneurs to consolidate their power by running on a populist ticket. Moreover, democracy and democratization alone are not the panacea to root out all social evils. As recent research suggests, belligerent nationalism and religious extremism may get a boost in emerging democracies and modernizing states respectively.32 In some cases, the trade-off between the promotion of democracy and the creation of stability will come into play. Realists suggest that sometimes it will be more prudent to push autocrats in the right direction rather than depose them.

Reviewing the arguments As far as the relationship between order and justice is concerned, realists make an important point by explaining that any responsible 31

32

On this subject, see Fahreed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: illiberal democracy at home and abroad (London: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004). The author calls for a restoration of the balance between liberty and democracy. See Edward Manseld and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

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foreign policy must be aware of the dangers of moral crusades, the adverse consequences of the application of universal moral principles or a commitment to justice which rules out concessions or compromises. Besides, one has to accept a sense of inevitability of tragedy. Richard Holbrooke, who served in the Clinton administration as US ambassador to the UN, is on record for having said: “Foreign policy is one damn thing after the other”. Indeed, foreign policy is the domain where choices have to be made between bad options and worse ones. Either way, no cause can be pursued in isolation from other objectives. As Peter Baehr and Monique Castermans note: No government can afford to pay attention only to human rights in its foreign policy. There are always other issues to consider. Only NGOs can afford to be single-minded in the sense that they need not have other concerns to deal with. What it boils down to is that governments are continually faced with the dilemma of making the right choices at the right time. Where and when to work for the promotion and protection of human rights in the world is one of these choices. It is a continuous weighing process.33

No general formulas or guidelines are available to facilitate painful choices. The judgment of specic decisions is very much in the eyes of the beholder. The discrepancy between intentions and results An additional consideration is that ambitious schemes to remake the world are doomed to fail, and often produce unintended consequences. Good intentions may founder in the face of human frailty, the tenacity of social institutions and traditions, as well as the complexity of international politics. Good versus evil, neatly dividing the world into good and bad nations, does not work as a principle of foreign policy, because it leads to a Manichean approach. It ignores the many gray ethical zones – for example, the need to cooperate with autocrats in order to defeat more brutal tyrants. It was Winston Churchill – a politician with outspoken anti-socialist credentials – who alluded, in a very characteristic way, to his readiness to conclude a pact with the devil, i.e., Joseph Stalin, during the Second World War. His remark,34 33

34

Peter R. Baehr and Monique Castermans-Holleman, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 third ed.), p. 67. In a conversation with Brigadier Stewart Menzies, known as “C”, chief of M.I.6.

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made at the beginning of 1941 (well before the German invasion of the Soviet Union), that if Hitler had invaded Hell, he would at least have made “a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons” is remembered as a classical defense of Realpolitik up to this very day. Such utterances must shock Global Salvationists, but they should remember Pascal’s words that “he who plays the angel ends up as the beast”35. Similarly, the former president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, recently stated in an interview36 that everyone who wants to save the world for whatever lofty principle, should be considered dangerous. These and other pronouncements which take into account the condition humaine warn against far-reaching ethical ambitions. They seem to justify the conclusion that the creation and preservation of order has to be the primary objective of any international order which must be built in an anarchical environment of jealous and selsh nations. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that political leaders have often felt compelled to sacrice moral and legal principles to mundane considerations of self-preservation. Thus, they have often refrained from providing active support for the cause of national self-determination or human rights, because they were afraid to compromise the more limited goals of stability and security. Modern history is littered with examples of people’s inherent right of self-determination and expression of popular will being sacriced to “higher” considerations of peace and stability. They range from the three partitions of Poland in the 18th and 19th centuries in the interests of the European balance of power, the treason of Munich (1938), the acquiescence of western countries to the post-WW II division of Europe (the so-called order of Yalta), to rejecting the claim of the Kurdish people on building a state of their own in spite of their distinct national identity.37 Fearing even greater instability as the result of the former Yugoslavia disintegrating in the early 1990s, the British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd declared at the

35

36 37

See Martin Kitchen, ‘Winston Churchill and the Soviet Union during the Second World War’, The Historical Journal, 30 (2), 1987. Quoted by Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 3. See also Francis X.J. Coleman, Neither Angel nor Beast. The Life and Work of Blaise Pascal (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986). NRC Handelsblad (Rotterdam), January 21–22, 2006. The Kurds number about 25 million in the four countries that host them: Turkey has at least 14 million, Iraq more than 5 million, Iran some 4 million and Syria nearly 2 million. They claim to be the world’s largest ethnic group without a state of their own.

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time: “I hope we do not see the creation of any more nation-states.”38 In making this statement, he was echoing the sentiment expressed by Robert Lansing many years earlier at the Versailles negotiations after the First World War. Clearly offending “his” president, Woodrow Wilson, the then US secretary of state, with great prescience, warned that the concept of national self-determination was loaded with dynamite: “It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives . . . What a calamity the phrase was ever invented! What misery it will cause!”39 The tensions between stability (and economic interests!) on the one hand, and justice on the other, also made themselves felt in the approach of democratic countries to present-day China. The inclination to condemn the emergent superpower for grave violations of human rights is muted, if not completely suppressed, by fear of endangering international stability and harming economic interests. Economic greed is the natural enemy of human rights. The need for popular support However, the realist position, despite its strong appeal to common sense and history, is not without its aws either.40 The idea of an amoral foreign policy seems to be short-sighted since foreign policy cannot be value-free. Choices have to be made about whether to dene interests in a broad or narrow way, to pursue them by negotiation or by violence; these choices are not morally indifferent.41 The need to include an element of morality in any version of world order was also recognized by Edward Carr on the eve of the outbreak of World War II: If [. . .] it is utopian to ignore the element of power, it an unreal kind of realism which ignores the element of morality in any world order. Just as within the state every government, though it needs power as a basis of its authority, also needs the moral basis of the consent of the governed, so an international order cannot be based on power alone, for

38 39

40

41

Quoted by Fred Halliday, ‘Nationalism’, in Baylis & Smith, op. cit., p. 530. Quoted by Robert Horvath, ‘False hope is rightly deed’, The Age, January 6, 2003. See Alfred van Staden, ‘How Realistic is the Realist’s Position on Human Rights?’, in M. Castermans, F. van Hoof and J. Smith (eds), The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp. 443–451. Cooper, op. cit.

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the simple reason that mankind will in the long run always revolt against naked power. Any international order presupposes a substantial measure of general consent.42

As for the place of human rights in particular, even a realist thinker and practitioner like Henry Kissinger regards the growing international concern with human rights as one of the achievements of our age and “certainly a testament to progress toward a more humane international order.”43 What does worry him is not the promotion of human rights as such, but its separation from all traditional notions of foreign policy. In his view, the morality of states cannot be disputed; however, it must be limited to what is compatible and consistent with the protection of their own interests and those of their citizens. Another major weakness of realist thinking is the assumption that the internal conditions of states are largely irrelevant to the shaping of foreign policy, because international anarchy is believed to be overriding. This assumption is completely wrong. The foreign policy of democratic countries needs popular support. For such support to be forthcoming, a nation’s foreign policy must somehow reect the values and aspirations of its citizens. Otherwise it will lack public appeal and eventually democratic legitimization. The history of US foreign policy in the 20th century reveals that it is impossible to justify decisions on war and peace without referring to core values. An American group of leading policy-oriented thinkers, seeking to develop a sustainable and effective national security strategy for the US in the future on a bipartisan basis, correctly concluded that “America must . . . pursue a values-based foreign policy to be true to itself – the cold calculations of realism, in its eternal quest for a balance of power, can never long satisfy the American people”.44 A

42

43

44

Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939 (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed. 1946), pp. 235–36. In the preface of the 1946 edition of his book, Carr explains that he had chosen to retain the content of the 1939 edition with only a few minor modications. Like many others in the immediate post-war period he was struck by the general expectation of the demise of the nation-state, writing that “the small independent nation-state is obsolete or obsolescent and that no workable international organization can be built on a membership of a multiplicity of nation-states” (p. viii). Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century (New York etc.: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 271. G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds), Forging A World of Liberty Under Law. U.S. National Security In The 21st Century. Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security (Princeton: The Princeton Project Papers, September 2006), p. 58.

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pragmatic consideration may be added to this historical argument. As John McCain, the inuential Republican senator of Arizona stated: there is always a tension between Realpolitik and a Wilsonian commitment to spreading democracy. But he warns that, “nine times out of 10 when we prop up dictatorial regimes, over time we pay a price for it”.45 This was the lesson the US learned in post-Franco Spain and in Greece after the rule of the colonels (1967–74). In both cases it aroused strong sentiments against NATO because of American complicity with the former non-democratic regimes. Another painful lesson emerged with regard to political developments in the Middle East. In a speech, delivered at the American University in Cairo on 20 June 2005, US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice ruefully acknowledged: “For 60 years, the United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in the Middle East – and we achieved neither.” As many other political units have experienced since the days of Athens in Greek antiquity, policies merely guided by calculations of power and self-interest, without any consideration of moral and ethical principles, often lead to self-defeating results. Taking account of the causes of disorder Moreover, a realistic policy directed at sustaining peace and stability in the international system cannot afford to overlook the causes of disorder and instability. Realists are probably right in maintaining that peace and stability are the prerequisites for the achievement of moral ends, and that the survival of the state is a moral end in itself. But another aspect of reality is that lasting peace may depend on the recognition of rights of groups and individuals, and greater justice in the distribution of wealth. Clearly, a peace that is based on political repression and discrimination between states is likely to be challenged by states and groups seeking to redress their grievances. In the UN framework, the systematic violation of human rights has been dened as a threat to international peace and security, the underlying thought being that large-scale domestic eruptions are likely to have negative repercussions across national borders. However, historical evidence shows that not all wars arise from violations of human rights, nor do domestic regimes that are oppressive and lack political legitimacy always pose a threat to

45

Interview with the Financial Times, June 20, 2006.

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surrounding countries. The obvious examples of the latter are Spain under the rule of Franco and Chile in the years of Pinochet’s military dictatorship. Nevertheless, it is also true that states which respect international human rights standards rarely design and embark on aggressive foreign policies. The recent case of Uganda is a perfect illustration that there are no easy answers when the interests of peace and justice collide. Does the pursuit of justice help efforts to create peace, or does it – by scaring potential cooperators away – undermine the reconciliation process? The Ugandan government has been engaged in peace talks with the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which waged a vicious guerrilla war since the midst of the 1980s. These talks are seen as the best opportunity to end the clashes between government forces and the LRA, having caused the devastation of the northern part of the country and claimed the lives of innumerous innocents. The LRA, led by Joseph Kony, is held responsible for the unleash of an unspeakable reign of terror. In 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants against Mr. Kony and four of his top commanders. The participation of the charismatic LRA’s leader, who commands wide support among his followers, is regarded as essential for the success of the peace talks. As expected, Joseph Kony and his deputy made their cooperation dependent on the ICC decision to drop prosecutions. A very difcult dilemma emerges along the following lines. On the one hand, as Nick Grono writes,46 it is hard to maintain that criminal accountability and the need to establish an effective ICC to deter future war criminals should take precedence over the immediate suffering of the northern Ugandans. On the other hand, it is equally inconceivable that those directly responsible for the horrendous crimes that have been committed in the region should escape being held accountable. Yet, the realist will be inclined to put the prosecutions on hold and have the interest of peace prevail over justice. The debate on the so-called root causes of terrorism may also serve as a reminder of the complex relationship between peace and justice. No doubt, transnational terrorism is a source of instability which poses a challenge to any idea of an international order. Governments of 46

Nick Grono, ‘What comes rst, peace or justice?’, International Herald Tribune, October 27, 2006. The author is vice president of the International Crisis Group. See also Nikki Tait, ‘UN war crimes trials may be off to timid start’, Financial Times, November 6, 2006.

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civilized nations, then, have no other choice but to protect the security of their people by ghting the symptoms of terrorism as effectively as they can. But, as experience suggests, this approach is unlikely to deter young people from lling the open places in terrorist cells or from establishing new cells. This means that jihadists and other would-be terrorists must not only be prevented or stopped from committing acts of violence. In addition, it is necessary to eliminate the factors which encourage oppressed and underprivileged people to regard terrorism as the appropriate and legitimate weapon to advance their political causes. To paraphrase a political slogan from British domestic politics on crime: “tough on terrorism, tough on the causes of terrorism”. As for the causes of terrorism, it must be emphasized that its roots are manifold: varying from social exclusion and marginalization to the rise of religious fanaticism and deprivation linked to a resentment of the West.47 Therefore it would be wrong to believe that a practical commitment to alleviating the plight of the poor or, for that matter, solving profound disputes like the Israeli-Palestinian conict, would be sufcient for “drying the swamps in which terrorism thrives”. Yet there is often at least an element of injustice in existing political and economic arrangements which drive desperate people into the arms of terrorist organizations and provide popular support for these organizations. It is this dimension that is also affecting the long-term stability of the international order. This complex issue will be revisited in chapter 6, which deals with the agenda for world order. To summarize: an international order that does not respond to large-scale human atrocities and is totally indifferent to the needs of humankind as a whole will lack the minimum moral appeal which is necessary to attract popular support in liberal democratic societies. Nor would such an order endure if it were to remain passive with regard to the causes of instability.

47

On this subject, see for example Charles Kegley (ed.), New Global Terrorism. The Characteristics, Causes, Controls (Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 2002), Walter Laqueur, No end to war: terrorism in the twenty-rst century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), and T. Børgo (ed.), Root Causes of terrorism: myths, reality and ways forward (London: Routledge, 2005).

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In conclusion: the balance between peace and justice How can the above-mentioned considerations help to nd the balance between peace and justice? An international order cannot be sustained and will not gain sufcient support from governments and peoples if it limits its goals to short-time stability and the absence of violence. Values are an intrinsic part of political life. The realist argument that these should be kept separate from the domain of interstate relations sounds hollow in reference to international anarchy. The survival of states is affected as much by the economic forces of globalization and non-military threats as by invading armies and the use of weapons of mass destruction. Dozens of governments have accepted the responsibility to help other countries in their struggle towards higher levels of political and economic development. However, it would equally be naive to believe that peace automatically ows from justice. Once again, there is no consensus whatsoever as to what justice involves, even when this concept focuses on the rights of individuals. Indeed, there are many views and interpretations of justice, and the commitment of states to achieve their own brand of justice may lead to political strife, sometimes even to war. The Israeli-Palestinian conict has been dened as the clash between two different conceptions of justice. War itself has been described48 as “a way of administering justice in which each party is at the same time the victim, the prosecutor, the witness and the criminal”. Meanwhile, Michael Walzer has suggested a fruitful approach to deal with the problem of cultural pluralism.49 Recognizing the difculty of establishing specic moral standards on the basis of universal agreement, it may be easier to nd general acceptance by shifting the focus of the political debate to what is unjust rather than what is just, i.e., identifying specic human wrongs. Walzer uses the words “thick” and “thin” to qualify the substance of the moral code. A thick moral code is a code to which all local codes conform. By contrast, the scope of a thin code is more limited: to delegitimize some evil actions, such as genocide, war crimes and torture. This position is in line with Locke’s

48

49

By Juan B. Alberdi, a prominent 19th century Argentine jurist, after the devastating experience of the War of Paraquay in 1870. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1994).

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notion of natural rights, as “non-derogable”, that is to say rights that may not be deviated from, even in times of emergency.50 Legally, they have the status of ius cogens, i.e., peremptory law. Limiting rights in this way will satisfy the “minimalists”, the advocates of a stability-oriented conception of the international order, who call for prudence in renouncing the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention, for fear of opening the door to international chaos. However, to gain the support of the “maximalists”, who favor a justice-oriented conception of international order embracing all peoples on the earth, the thin code must be “thickened” so as to also include some social goals, such as the eradication of extreme poverty and the prevention of man-made environmental disasters. This will be discussed in more detail in one of the following chapters. The widely acclaimed new concept of “the responsibility to protect”, which is rooted in the conviction that a responsibility for the fate of one’s fellow men and women transcends national borders, clearly underpins the approach outlined here. Charles Beitz was one of the rst of all the contemporary theorists of international relations to put forward the idea that statehood should not be unconditional.51 The right of states to exist should be dependent on criteria of performance with regard to the welfare of their citizens. Sovereignty is not a license to kill. The concept concerned marks the transition of a stability-oriented international order to a justice-oriented world order. It recognizes the political reality of an international system which is still mainly made up of territorially organized states, with national governments generally reluctant to cede political authority to international organizations or institutions. Therefore, its strength is not to abolish national sovereignty, but to make it conditional. Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. Should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to provide protection, member states of the United Nations must be willing “to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with regional organizations as appropriate”.52 The chances 50 51

52

See van Genugten c.s., The United Nations of the Future, pp. 44–45. Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979). This is the key part of the Resolution adopted by the High-level Plenary Meeting

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of implementing the concept involved will depend to a great extent on the level of the threshold for international intervention. Some countries may seek to lower this threshold by justifying intervention beyond the extreme cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Clearly, the further the criteria for intervention are extended to generalities like the “general welfare of the people”, the greater the risk of abuse and political dissension. In conclusion, the international order cannot aim to achieve either human perfection or absolute justice. During the Cold War, international law needed to maintain a minimum order between two hegemonic poles; acts that could cause a major confrontation between the antagonistic blocs had to be characterized as “illegal” acts. In the post-Cold era, with the primacy of the United States in a looser and more complex international system, there seems to be more room for the pursuit of goals that are outside the domain of minimum order, notwithstanding the emergence of new challenges such as the rise of the political Islam. Nevertheless, the objectives within reach of responsible political action in today’s pluralistic world, with many conicting interests and value systems, are more modest: predictability, continuity and some decency. When he quotes the classic words of the former American UN Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, “while the United Nations may not be able to take humanity to heaven, it must act to save humanity from hell”, Ko Annan aptly captured the spirit of realistic idealism or idealistic realism (no oxymoron), which offers the best chances of achieving practical results in the search for an international order.53

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of the General Assembly of the UN on 20 September 2005 (2005 World Summit Outcome). The concept of “the responsibility to protect” was put forward for the rst time in the landmark report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa, 2001), borrowed by both the so-called High-level Panel report A more secure world: Our shared responsibility (New York, 2004) and the UN Secretary-General’s report In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all (March 2005). ‘Annan urges the Security Council to take action against killings, displacement in Darfur, Sudan’, UN News Centre home page (18 February 2005). Ko Annan, having served a second term of ve years as UN Secretary-General, was due to resign his ofce at the end of 2006. For ten years Mr. Annan was at the head of an organization in rapid transition, struggling – after the deep internal divisions over Iraq – to be at the center of global issues again. Commanding much personal charisma he achieved the status of secular pope and popular stardom alike. His high-prole style offered a striking contrast to his aloof and intellectual predecessor Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In 2001, Ko Annan was awarded the Nobel peace prize. He was praised for his commitment to make the United Nations about people; not just about states and governments. He was criticized for his lack of managerial skills, failing to protect

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the world organization against nancial scandals such as the illicit sale of Iraqi oil during the UN’s oil-for-food program. On balance, his legacy seems stronger than his opponents have suggested. The world organization had concluded a lengthy period of internal soul searching and re-emerged as the primary forum for discussing global security and development. Ban Ki-moon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Korea, was appointed Ko Annan’s successor. For a sympathetic account of Mr. Annan’s performance as UN secretary-general, see James Traub, The Best Intentions: Ko Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006).

CHAPTER THREE

UNIVERSALISM AND REGIONALISM: COMPETITION OR CONCURRENCE?

Efforts to create order in international relations are made alternately at both the world and the regional level. In those cases where both options are available, a choice sometimes has to be made between global and regional approaches. At rst glance, this choice is mainly a practical one, lacking the ideological overtones that permeate the debate about the role of interest and morality in foreign policy, as discussed in the previous chapter. What could be more obvious than to argue that it is the nature of the problem at hand to divide tasks and responsibilities over the different levels? Thus, if the problem is of a regional nature and susceptible to regional management, then the regional approach would be the most appropriate. On the other hand, problems that threaten the security of all nations and touch on the welfare of humankind as a whole should be treated by global organizations. The case for pragmatism appears to be strong enough to defy the claim that one approach is inherently superior to the other. However, on second thoughts, one is likely to encounter a number of unforeseen difculties when grounding the implementation of a division of labor between global and regional organizations simply in the nature of the problem.1 First of all, regionalism can be dened as the development of institutionalized cooperation among states (and other actors) on the basis of regional contiguity. This chapter deals with both the security and the economic dimension of regionalism. In terms of security, regionalism refers to the responsibilities and actual performance of regional actors with regard to the maintenance of peace and security. In economic terms, regionalism can be dened as “the disproportionate concentration of economic ows or the coordination of foreign economic policies among a group of countries in

1

See Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random House, 4th ed. 1971), pp. 103–04.

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close geographical proximity to one another”.2 These denitions seem to be self-evident, but the point is that the geographic range of the impact of problems and actions to deal with them are often hard to measure. Some problems may be typically regional in nature, but their management tends to have important implications for other parts of the world, thus requiring action on a global scale. Thus, for example, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Community/ Union is a social policy whose primary purpose is to provide a decent standard of living for European farmers. However, this policy is obviously affecting the economic position of tens of millions of people in developing countries as well. This and many other cases lead to the conclusion that in any scheme of a division of labor external factors (“externalities”) should be taken into account. Most external factors – positive and negative – are the result of particular policies that neighboring states pursue in relation to one another. More particularly, they relate to problems of collective action arising from mutual dependencies that are a major characteristic of the contemporary international system. However, externalities may also result from the perception of external challenges – such as a common threat – or limitations on the domestic autonomy of smaller states resulting from the hegemony of an ascendant power. A special case of negative effects spilling over from one continent to others concerns the so-called “wars by proxy” at the height of the Cold War. The contending superpowers exported their rivalries to regions in Africa and Asia for fear of a direct showdown between their armies in the central European theater which might have led to a nuclear standoff. Client states or revolutionary movements in strategically peripheral areas waged wars with one another on behalf of and with the material and non-material support from one of the superpowers. Many of these wars simply ended with the collapse of Soviet communism. In general, regional cooperation will be directed to maximize the positive and to minimize the negative externalities. But the problem is that external effects are often unanticipated and – as indicated above – their geographical scope is too hard the determine, making it difcult to offer a clear criterion for dividing responsibilities. Furthermore, rational economic criteria are often contaminated by political considerations.

2

Edward D. Manseld and Helen V. Milner, ‘The Political Economy of Regionalism: An Overview’, in Edward D. Manseld and Helen V. Milner (eds), The Political Economy of Regionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 3.

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Regions as social constructions Even if it were possible to delineate global and regional responsibilities, another difculty looms on the horizon because the world – to borrow Claude’s words – does not break easily along neatly perforated lines.3 Regions are imprecise and impermanent. Geography, culture, economic and geo-strategic considerations are different criteria giving rise to different denitions. The problems of dening the nal boundaries of EU enlargement or of dividing the Arab world between Africa and Asia illustrate the point that rational regional divisions are difcult to establish. Levis and Wigen even speak of “the myth of continents”, explaining that regions appear and disappear as they are transformed by various economic, political, and cultural factors.4 Moreover, a complication arises from the fact that the creation of forms of transcontinental (or transregional) cooperation like NATO in the Euro-Atlantic area, has been fostered by political and security motives. The composition of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with the membership of countries from North America and Central Asia, is also a clear reminder of the intertwining of the geographical and the political dimension. In fact, regional groupings of states are largely social constructions. The geographical orientation of a country is often subject to political debate, driven by conicting preferences. Is the United States still primarily an Atlantic power or increasingly a Pacic one? Is Russia’s identity based on its allegiance to Europe, or not? For a long time, the Netherlands – to mention a smaller country – was perceived as an Atlantic nation, rather than a (continental) European nation.5 Differences between regions Among the regions that can be identied there are signicant differences with regard to the depth of their organizational and managerial capacity. Particular regions, for example the Euro-Atlantic area, have been successful in building common institutions. Europe, in particular,

3 4

5

Claude, op. cit., p. 104. Martin W. Levis and Karen E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). The famous Dutch historian Johan Huizinga asserted that the boundary between West and Central Europe ran over the – articial – line Delfzijl-Vaals (two towns located in the north-east and the south-east of the Netherlands, respectively). See his essay Nederlands Geestesmerk (Dutch cultural identity), published in 1935.

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may be called over-organized, giving rise to complaints about the alphabet soup of international organizations, “interblocking” rather than “interlocking” institutions, as well as the overlap and duplication of operations. A clear case in point of the latter is the competition between NATO and the EU in developing rapid response/reaction forces. Another instance is the parallel involvement of the OSCE and the Council of Europe in the question of human rights and the position of minorities. In the Middle East, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are both weak; no institution represents all the countries in the region. Other regions, East Asia, for example, have proved even less able to organize themselves. Reasons for this include the absence of a shared ideology, a lack of trust among political leaders of nations concerned, and the wide diversity of geopolitical interests. In all likelihood, the future of this part of the world will be determined by evolving economic and political relationships in which China, Japan, India, as well as the US, are the principal actors. Attempts to achieve hegemony by any of the Asian powers are likely to lead to countervailing pressures on the part of others to maintain the balance of power. This could increase the tensions in the region, in a way similar to the great power rivalries that emerged in Europe before the outbreak of the First World War. The establishment of “ASEAN + 3”6 and the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), which added a security dimension to economic cooperation, can be interpreted as a sign that Asian leaders are aware of this danger. This widening scope may be welcomed from the perspective of international order, but in comparison with rmly entrenched European structures the forms of cooperation concerned are very loose and non-committal.7 Therefore it is very doubtful that they will be able to exorcise the ghosts of the past which still haunt the relations of Japan, especially with China and Korea. Despite expressions of remorse and apologies on the part of Japan for the suffering it caused between 1937 and 1945 and its post-war commitment to democracy and respect for human rights, suspicions and grievances still linger in China and Korea related to Japan’s militaristic past. The lack of trust between these Asian countries is in stark contrast to the evolution of post-WW II relations

6 7

The three countries with a link to ASEAN are: China, Japan and South Korea. Chapter 6 will explore the differences between European integration and Asian forms of cooperation in further detail.

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between Germany and France, erstwhile arch enemies in Europe which are now hailed as a paragon of political reconciliation.

Claims of superiority On further reection, the choice between universalism and regionalism is actually even more difcult, for the very simple reason that claims that one is superior to the other, are not only made on practical, but also on more principled grounds. Among the arguments that have been advanced to plead for universalism – the notion of one-world, as it were – are the following: 1. the growing interconnectedness of human societies across the whole world as the result of globalization, 2. the indivisibility of world peace and the need to organize economic sanctions against (potential) aggressors on a worldwide scale, 3. the possibility that regional organizations may give rise to military rivalries and economic competition between different regions, 4. the view that only a universal organization can provide an adequate check on the power of a large state, often dominating the other members of a regional arrangement, and 5. the belief that regional resources are often too limited to resolve the problems in particular regions.8 Taken together, these points form an impressive political and intellectual arsenal to make the case for universalism. However, the advocates of regionalism have been able to put forward strong arguments in the debate as well. Their arguments can be summarized in a number of counter-propositions: 1. universalists fail to take into account the diversity of political, economic, social, and geographical factors throughout the world that prevent a global approach, 2. common interests, loyalties, traditions and values, as well as the similarity of national problems, are strong enough to allow for a sense of common involvement and joint responsibility only in limited geographical areas, 3. for that reason, political, economic, and social integration is more easily achieved at a regional than at a global level, 8

See A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations. Principles and Issues (Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980 2nd ed.), pp. 368–69. Reecting a typical third-world perspective, the Indian scholar Rajni Kothari had made proposals in the rst half of 1970s for a reorganization of world politics on regionalist lines, which were aimed at insulating regions from global conicts and penetration by the then superpowers. See his book Footsteps into the Future: Diagnosis of the Present World and a Design for an Alternative (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1974).

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4. governments are more willing to deal promptly with regional threats to peace than to act on a global scale, since their interests are more directly affected, and 5. nations are not ready to surrender sovereignty for the establishment of global authority which can maintain world peace and promote global welfare.9 These propositions allegedly apply to larger and smaller states to the same degree. However, the interests of different categories of states in establishing or joining regional organizations are not necessarily the same. While larger states may seek to acquire dominance in the region by bringing smaller states from the neighborhood together under their leadership, smaller states may try to oppose attempts to achieve regional hegemony either by creating supranational institutions (constraining the leverage of the larger states) or by relying on the protection of global power at a distance. Politically the strength of the universalist position lies in its appeal to the solidarity of the human race and, economically, in current trends towards an integrated world market. Its weakness lies in the fact that the cohesion and potential for the integration of any organization diminish, as membership becomes larger, more scattered and diversied. This is the lesson that already can be drawn from the enlargement process of the EU, which applies even more for attempts to integrate countries of different parts of the world, given their cultural diversity and unequal levels of development. However, the regionalist position may be reconciled with the universalist position by stressing the usefulness of regionalism as a stepping stone or intermediary stage in cooperation towards universalism. In this view, regional agencies are not seen as substitutes for a world organization but as laboratories for developing habits of collaboration and gradually building up areas of consensus, to eventually achieve global coordination and integration. This intermediary position may attract sympathy and understanding, but cannot preclude the use of regionalism to insulate against the broader challenges in the world, and particularly the construction of fortresses against global economic competition. Indeed, as Michael Smith writes, “(. . .) regional groupings can become introspective and protectionist in their leanings, closing themselves off from the world economy”.10 This may happen in spite of the fact that the principle of

9 10

Le RoyBennett, ibidem. See Michael Smith, ‘Regions and Regionalism’, in Brian White, Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds), Issues in World Politics (London: Palgrave, 2nd ed. 2001),

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non-discrimination has been enshrined in WTO rules, thus explicitly prohibiting regional protection by raising tariff walls. Goods produced at home and abroad must be treated in the same way for import and export agreements. Thus article XXIV of the GATT11 requires that regional trade agreements do not include provisions which raise barriers with non-members. It also stipulates that regional agreements should eliminate restrictions on regional trade, and that there should be substantial progress toward further-reaching economic integration. At the same time, applicable rules allow for a few exceptions for the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle,12 the most notable being for customs unions and free trade areas.

Relationship between globalization and regionalization An interesting controversial issue in the debate concerns the relationship between globalization and regionalization. Do the two trends represent opposite forces or, rather, are they two sides of the same coin? It might be argued that the need to develop regional institutions is itself a manifestation of globalization, like the rise of the sovereign state can be seen as the product of the rst wave of globalization. Globalization demands governance, since markets need stability and predictability to be provided by law and regulations. The early European states helped to sustain the expansion of capitalism by removing barriers to trade and by creating stable expectations through law enforcement. However, a great deal would depend on the modalities of regionalization and the political agendas of regional actors involved – are they open to global liberalization or not? In more concrete terms: should the preferential free-trade areas and customs unions that were established in the 1980s

11

12

p. 56. See also Louise l’Estrange Fawcett and Ondrew Hurrell, Regionalism in world politics; regional organizations and international order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). GATT has been supplemented with the General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS). The GATT rules have been incorporated into the WTO, the institutional body which serves as a multilateral framework for negotiations about the further liberalization of world trade, the settlement of trade disputes, and the enforcement of rules. The MFN principle prescribes unconditional non-discriminatory treatment in trade: tariff preferences granted for one nation must be granted to all others exporting the same product.

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be considered stumbling blocs or building blocs for the multilateral economic order? Jagdish Bhagwati, for one, clearly supports the rst position. He argues that, as the result of the prevailing effects of diversion in trade, regionalism became an obstacle, slowing down progress towards multilateralism.13 In contrast with the advocates of regionalism, Bhagwati and other economists14 do not seem to share the view that globalization as such gives rise to regional responses. On the other hand, there are empirical studies showing that regional arrangements are compatible with, or even pave the way for, multilateral trade liberalization. Thus, regional preferences can strengthen export constituencies (determining what products are exported), provide insurance against failure, lock in or limit unilateral liberalization, and encourage competitive liberalization. For example, Marc Busch and Helen Milner point out that, within regions, industries in which export-oriented companies are dominant have a greater interest in achieving returns to scale and in promoting regional and international liberalization of trade.15 Since there are also counter-indications, the picture is complex and mixed. On balance, however, the main thrust of the available evidence supports the conclusion that regional and global trading arrangements are mutually compatible.16 In that respect, the EC/EU offers a highly instructive case history. Loukas Tsoukalis recalls that for many years the European bloc had been one of the worst, if not the worst, offenders against the principle of multilateralism. The main reason was the large number of preferential agreements concluded with other, mostly developing countries. Old colonial ties are dying hard, and the desire of some former colonial powers – above all, France – to retain a foothold in ex-colonies made its inuence felt. But European attitudes and policies have evolved. As many EU protective barriers came down and preferences began to fade, it has

13

14

15

16

Jagdish Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) and of the same author ‘Regionalism versus Multilateralism’, The World Economy, 22, 1992, pp. 477–511. For example, Anne O. Krueger, ‘Are Preferential Trading Arrangements Liberalizing or Protectionist?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13 (4), 1999, pp. 105–124, and Arvind Panagiriya, ‘The Regionalism Debate’, The World Economy, 22, 1999, pp. 477–511. Marc Busch and Helen V. Milner, ‘The Future of the International trading System’, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). This conclusion is drawn from Raimo Väyrynen’s extensive article ‘Regionalism: Old and New’, International Studies Review, 5, 2003, pp. 25–52.

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become more compatible with the multilateral system. It is now generally recognized that trade creation resulting from European integration has far outweighed trade diversion, “thus having a positive welfare effect for those inside the regional bloc as well as for those outside it”.17 The main exception to this nding is the trade in agricultural goods, as indicated above. The CAP, accounting for almost half of the total EU budget, operates partly at the cost of outsiders, with trade diversion being much greater than trade creation.

The rise of “new regionalism” Whatever the further merits of the arguments in the debate, there has been an upsurge of regionalism in world politics over the past fteen years or so.18 The phrase “new regionalism” was coined to denote an emerging regionalized order of political and economic blocs.19 In the rst half of the 1990s Paul Taylor noted that “governments were becoming relatively more involved with regional than with global organizations”.20 This observation has been borne out by the facts. Not only are regional institutions playing a more important role in conict containment and peacekeeping, but their numbers have expanded signicantly in the eld of trade, prompting Bhagwati, who was quoted above, to speak of a “spaghetti-bowl proliferation” of free – preferential – trading agreements.21 A range of different conditions has contributed to the rising prominence of regionalism. First of all, the disappearance of bipolar rivalry created more room for regional forms of cooperation. Thus, Richard Rosecrance claims that “an end to the bipolar cleavage [has led] to a restoration of regional sovereignty” and the establishment

17

18

19

20

21

Loukas Tsoukalis, ‘Managing interdependence’, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 236. See Michael Pugh, ‘The World Order Politics of Regionalization’, in Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds), The United Nations and Regional Security. Europe and Beyond (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Riener Publishers, 2003), pp. 31–38. See Björn Hettne, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (eds), Studies in the New Regionalism. Volume I–V (London: Macmillan Press, 1999/2001). Paul Taylor, International Organizations in the Modern World: The Regional and the Global Process (London: Pinter, 1993), pp. 24–26. Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘The Agenda of the WTO’, in Pitou van Dijck and Gerrit Faber (eds), Challenges to the New World Trade Organization (The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 49.

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of “several regional powers dominating their geographic areas”.22 The former East-West conict extended far beyond the European theater. As mentioned above, local proxies waged wars, for example in Somalia and Angola, on behalf of one of the rival superpowers. As a result of the end of the Cold War, other regions were no longer in the grip of the former superpowers. The transformation of their relationship took “the lid off ” of a number of intractable regional problems, inviting intervention by regional actors.23 Cases in point include the involvement of the EU with the armed conicts in former Yugoslavia and the military interference of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the civil war in Liberia. The new regionalism has also been stimulated by the EU’s decision to enlarge to a community of 25 to 2724 member states, thus aligning the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Cyprus and Malta, with the objectives, instruments, and policies of the evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In addition, the European neighborhood, encompassing the Union’s Eastern and Southern border (or adjacent) states, is to become the preferred area for EU stabilization action with regard to non-members. As a consequence, Europe and the EU have become increasingly identical, although the membership of Ukraine and certainly Russia remained remote, if the latter can be considered a serious contender at all. Moreover, the EU started to expand the complex web of preferential agreements to the effect that it has come to encompass most of the globe. Thus, after signing regional association agreements based on the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean partnership it became actively interested in negotiating regional agreements with a variety of other countries, mostly in Latin America. (These developments will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7.) Overstretch of the United Nations Another condition accounting for the rise of regionalism is the overstretch of the world organization. As the UN became overburdened with peacekeeping missions after the Cold War and its competence to lead complex and large-scale military operations was seriously called

22

23 24

Richard Rosecrance, ‘Regionalism and the Post-Cold War Era’, International Journal, 46, 1991, p. 373 and p. 375. See Smith, op. cit., p. 69. Bulgaria and Romania are expected to join the EU-25 early 2007.

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into doubt, regional organizations were called upon to relieve the UN in fullling its duties. The attitudes of leading representatives of the world organization clearly moved away from the prevailing opinions in the formative years of the UN when regional arrangements were seen as competing with and detrimental to the universal approach embodied in the UN.25 Thus, having rejected the regionalist schemes favored by Winston Churchill and others, the authors who framed the UN Charter attributed only a secondary role to “regional arrangements or agencies”; they emphasized the primacy of the world organization over regional organizations. In other words, the position of the latter was not to compromise the exclusive authority of the UN Security Council to take mandatory decisions on the use of military force.26 No denition whatsoever was given of a regional arrangement or agency.27 The phrase “mild discouragement” seems appropriate to characterize the attitude of the drafters of the Charter with regard to regional cooperation. However, it is now widely accepted that global and regional institutions can and should work together in promoting world peace and – for that matter – a balanced expansion of world trade. One important milestone in the reappraisal of the contribution of regional organizations to international security was the report An Agenda for Peace (1992), in which the then UN Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali spelled out the advantages of action at the regional level: regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the [Security] Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.28

25

26

27

28

See Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Regional arrangements, the UN, and International Security: A Framework for Analysis’, in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), Beyond UN Subcontracting. TaskSharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 3. Article 53 (1) of the UN Charter stipulates that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council”. The subordination of regional organizations to the UN Security Council was the main reason why the drafters of the Washington (NATO) Treaty declined to dene the Atlantic Alliance as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The lack of denition created confusion in the 1990s as to whether the OSCE, which has no treaty basis, qualied as a Chapter VIII organization. Meanwhile, it has been agreed that the OSCE does. The formal position of NATO has not changed, despite the fact that the organization has embarked on stabilization operations outside the treaty area. An Agenda for Peace, par. 64.

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The document reected the growing sense that the world organization was in danger of becoming overburdened if it were to assume responsibility for a growing number of peace support operations. “Subcontracting” by regional organizations was seen as an essential part of the solution. An additional argument for this was the experience with peacekeeping operations led by the UN. Such operations proved to be successful only when they operated in relative peace and quiet; for example, when deployed to support a formal peace agreement between rival states or groups. UN-led operations have proved to be unsuitable in cases where they were confronted with serious military challenges, requiring robust interventions. The case for the regionalization of the operations for maintaining peace and security was also reinforced as the pattern of violent conicts shifted away from wars between states to intra-state conicts. It was felt that the localized nature of the latter type of conicts demanded a knowledge of the region and deep awareness of the cultural sensitivities. With good reason regional organizations were believed to have these.29 Expansion of regional trade alliances In the domain of international trade, two important factors were responsible for the expansion of regional economic alliances. The rst was the political desire to control access to a particular region in order to protect it against the process of globalization and the resulting foreign penetration. The second was the slow progress of multilateral negotiations in the framework of GATT/WTO that were aimed at the further liberalization of world trade. It took more than eight years to conclude the so-called Uruguay Round in 1994, while the successive Millennium Round did not result in any new breakthroughs. Subsequently, the dragging Doha trade talks prompted trade ofcials to shift from multilateralism to regionalism. In mid-2006 there were as many as more than 250 bilateral and regional trade agreements, double the number of a decade before, and many more were being negotiated.30 This complex network of overlapping agreements may lead to conicts of regulatory standards and undermine both transparency and

29 30

See Michael Pugh, The World Order Politics of Regionalization, p. 31. The Economist, July 8, 2006, p. 14. It is the task of the WTO’s Committee on Regional Trade Agreements to review the regional arrangements.

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predictability. Fragmentation as the result of a further drive towards preferential agreements would provide lower global gains and mainly benet key economic trade “hubs” (such as the EU and the US) compared to other countries.31 The protection of intellectual property, the reduction of barriers to trade in services, and – predictably – subsidies on agriculture were major obstacles in multilateral trade negotiations. Another factor which accounted for the increased regionalism in foreign trade concerned the initiatives taken by the US to establish regional arrangements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Apparently, the American intention was to respond to the challenge of the emergence of a Europeanwide common market.32 Some authors related the new regionalism to the alleged decline of the power of the US, which had been the guarantor of the multilateral system since 1945.33

Mutual support In determining the balance in the roles of universal and regional organizations, the major task is clearly to make sure that the relationship between regional organizations and universal organizations is not antagonistic, but mutually supportive. In order to achieve this objective, regional organizations are required to make an unequivocal commitment to open regionalism, i.e., acting as a forum where members undertake trade liberalization in concert and extend it worldwide on a MFN basis. Despite their desire for identity and a distinctive character in the global system, and the perceived duty to look primarily after the interests of their own regions, no viable international order is conceivable if leaders of regional organizations are not prepared to consider the broader 31

32

33

See for this point of view Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi, The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025? (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006), pp. 33–34. On the difcult path towards worldwide trade liberalization, see Hans Labohm, ‘Trade Liberalization: Sisyphus in Action’, in Alfred van Staden, Jan Rood and Hans Labohm, Cannons and Canons. Clingendael Views of Global and Regional Politics (Assen: Royal Van Gorcum, 2003), pp. 308–329. See, for example, Marc L. Busch and Helen V. Milner, ‘The Future of the International Trading System: International Firms, Regionalism and Domestic Politics’, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 259–260 and 263–266.

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needs of humankind as a whole and be ready to adapt to them. From this point of view, zero-sum strategies towards other regions should be considered an anathema. International economy In calculating the results of regional trade formations the main obstacle to be removed is the trade-off between short-term and long-term-interests. Short-term economic interests and deteriorating economic conditions may lure regional formations into the trap of closing themselves off from the world market in order to fend off foreign competition. Present-day mercantilists hope to maintain domestic employment by erecting import barriers. However, as a result, they deprive consumers of cheaper products and, given the likelihood of outsiders taking retaliatory actions, reduce the opportunities of beneting from the returns of new investments and exports to emerging economies. While the World Trade Organization commands a rather weak constituency among people in the world, the special interests of protectionism in Europe, North America, Japan and elsewhere are much better organized than the general and rather diffuse interest of free trade. Consumers in western countries seldom make their voice heard. Changes in the patterns of production are likely to threaten the livelihoods of some categories of workers and the prots of some categories of rms, even when these changes lead to greater productivity and output overall, increasing the wealth of the greatest number. This explains why the losers of free trade make themselves heard more frequently than the winners. Moreover, the WTO’s mission to create worldwide trade liberalization and establishing a predictable and transparent trading system has been strongly criticized by the anti-globalization movement. Thus, non-governmental organizations have accused the trade organization of clearing the way for a global “race to the bottom”, especially as regards the alleged weakening of labor and environmental standards, and of neglecting the interests of poor countries in general. Whether or not these accusations are supported by the facts, one of the ironies of the WTO is that it can be seen as potentially the strongest buffer against the emergence of a world divided into a few regional centers, leaving developing countries out of the system. In this context, Robert Gilpin, dramatically raised the specter of a more regionalized world economy “composed of a few islands of pros-

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perity in a turbulent sea of global poverty and alienated societies.”34 In the framework of WTO, the big players lock horns with each other, then – in compliance with the MFN principle – extend their concessions to the other WTO members, including the weakest. However, outside the multilateral system the strongest powers are free to pick off smaller economies one by one. This may give rise to fears of the emergence (or re-emergence) of trade patters in the mold of the classic center-periphery model35: a system of “hubs and spokes”, in which small economies (the spokes) are drawn into agreements with big ones (the hubs), but not with each other. Obviously, such a system is highly advantageous to the rich-country hubs. When making agreements they can play off the poor-country spokes against each other. The hubs can import goods from wherever they like, whereas the spokes – by lowering tariffs on the rich countries’ goods – are tricked into buying from the hub, rather than from cheaper producers elsewhere.36 On the other hand, it could be argued that the traditional distinction between the “core” and the “periphery” – to use two similar concepts – is becoming less and less relevant. Whereas in the 19th century the core countries of western Europe exported manufactured goods and surplus savings to the colonial periphery, emerging markets today export manufactured goods to the developed world in general, and the surplus to the US.37 Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that more than one third of world trade currently takes place within four major regions (North America, South America, Europe and Asia Pacic), with nearly half

34

35

36

37

Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 400. See for example Johan Galtung, ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’, Journal of Peace Research, 8 (1), 1971. The World Bank calculated that a hub-and-spoke trading system would cost developing countries more than $20 billion a year. See the article “Least favoured nation’, The Economist, August, 5, 2006, p. 64. However, referring to a new discussing paper released by the Centre for Economic Policy Research written by Richard Baldwin, Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Trade, the article notes that the future of world trade is unlikely to conform to the neat, radial pattern as suggested by the “hub-and-spoke” model. It points out that many of the spokes have deals with each other, and that the trading blocs overlap. Thus, for example, Mexico is a member of NAFTA and party to a free-trade agreement with the EU and others. This is the view expressed by Ben Bernanke, the current chairman of the US Federal Reserve System. See Krishna Guha, ‘Bernanke calls for fairer globalisation’, Financial Times, August 25, 2006.

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of all Asian exports going to other Asian countries, and exports within the EU accounting for 60 percent of all EU members’ trade.38 Apart from the vulnerable position of the poor countries there is another consideration which makes a strong case for an integrated world market strong: the cost of development of high technology industries and their scale (such as the aviation and space industry) probably requires an expansion of demand beyond the boundaries of regional economic blocs. For all these reasons, a world trade organization, which is able to counter the negative effects of economic integration on a regional scale and is sensitive to the concerns of developing countries, must be considered an essential ingredient of a viable international order. Either way, technological advances continue to be a powerful ally of WTO in facilitating global economic integration. One of the newest developments in the world economy is the broadening of the range of “tradables” – economic activities and transactions which are not restricted to domestic economies – that now extends to the domain of services, as well as goods. International security It is just as important to balance the needs of universalism and regionalism in the eld of peace and security. Regional security organizations have come to play a vital role, particularly in high-intensity peace operations, but a regionalization that is too radical may undermine the moral authority of the UN. After all, as mentioned above, the world organization is grounded in the idea of indivisibility of peace, offering equal protection to all member states, regardless of their geographic location, size, and political orientation. In Marrack Goulding’s opinion, the ethics of universalism are difcult to reconcile with the quality of protection for people in particular regions depending on the widely divergent capacity of regional organizations in those regions.39 He is afraid of the emergence of a “peacekeeping apartheid”, believing that it is not worthwhile, and is actually pointless to shed one’s blood in countries belonging to other continents, and raising the specter of a contemporary version of the pre-WW II slogan: “Pourquoi mourir pour Dantzig?” (Why to die for Danzig?). However, his view seems to be unnecessarily pessimistic. First, leaders

38 39

Source: WTO data. Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 218.

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of Western states are aware that the security of their countries may be affected by lengthy periods of insecurity in countries belonging to other continents. This applies particularly to failed states which can serve as save havens for terrorist organizations and criminal syndicates. Consequently, western countries have an interest in stabilizing zones of turmoil “in places far away, of which they know little”. Secondly, current variations in the capacity of regional organizations to maintain peace and security can be diminished by equipping weak organizations with the necessary resources to make them more effective. NATO and the European Union are already in the business of lending assistance to the African Union (AU)40 and more limited regional organizations in Africa. Thirdly, the authority of the UN can be protected by upholding its right to supervise the implementation of peace support operations by regional organizations. To this end, these organizations should fulll the obligation to report periodically to the UN. Wider arrangements need to be worked out for mutual support and the modalities of mutual consultation on the basis of progress reports. Similarly, there should be a clear understanding of what the UN and the regional organizations can expect of each other. Meanwhile, world leaders have recognized the importance of forging predictable partnerships and arrangements between the UN and regional organizations, as they indicated in the 2005 UN World Summit document.41 Depending on fresh experience with peacekeeping operations in the Middle East (Lebanon) and Africa (Congo and Sudan), a workable division of labor, avoiding unmanageable tensions and duplication of efforts, may be within reach.42

Final considerations Early post-Cold War expectations that regions and regional concerts would form the foundation for a new international order have proved

40

41 42

In the Spring of 2004, the AU decided to establish its own peacekeeping force, whose size was too moderate for the time being: 15,000 troops divided over ve regional brigades. Par. 93. On this subject, see Michael Pugh, ‘The World Order of Regionalization’, in Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds.), The United Nations and Regional Security. Europe and Beyond (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, p. 2003), p. 39. On the relationship between the UN and NATO, in particular, see Dick Leurdijk’s contribution to this book ‘The UN and NATO: the logic of primacy’, pp. 57–74.

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to be untenable.43 The brand of regionalism which may be called “counterbalancing regionalism” in particular turned out not to be an option. Admittedly, the US, as the dominant global power, was unable to effectively control all the regional security processes and was reluctant to participate in African and Asian conicts. Nevertheless, smaller or second-tier states in each region that were at the mercy of larger neighbors (“regional bullies”) preferred to align with the unipolar center of power rather than oppose it. They were less afraid of the preponderant external power than of the dominant regional state. For example, this explains why, faced with the rise of China, Japan decided to strengthen its security links with the US, just as had Pakistan done previously in the face of its adversary relationship with India. Conversely, Canada, living in the shadow of American power, has sought to nurture relations with the EU in order to keep its foreign policy prole distinct from that of the US. Similarly, Mexico has tried to reduce its dependence on the powerful state on its northern border by politically turning to the states of the southern hemisphere.44 Another interesting observation is following its enlargement with the countries form Central and Eastern Europe, the EU has become more continental European in a geographical sense, but more Atlantic in a political sense, as Poland and the Baltic states in particular still fear a resurgence of the Russian threat and consequently favor close cooperation with the US.45 The limits of regionalism on security matters are also paralleled by those on trade concerns. Despite the rapid growth in trade between the countries of east Asia in the past few years, many of these countries still retain strong trading links to the US. Close economic ties of Asian states with the latter country can be seen as a strong deterrent to the creation of an Asian-only customs union, which would impose the same tariff on imports from any non-member. Members within such a regional trading area are likely to demand for low tariffs with their biggest costumer, i.e., the US. A similar problem has emerged within the Latin American MERCOSUR customs union. Uruguay has threat-

43

44

45

This is Raimo Väyrynen’s conclusion in his article ‘Regionalism: Old and New’, in International Studies Review, 5, 2003, pp. 25–52. Mexico has become an associate member of MERCOSUR. It also signed free-trade agreements with the EU and Japan. The motive of regional counterbalancing also accounts for the strong allegiance of the Netherlands towards the US over the past decades. See this author’s ‘Small State Strategies in Alliance. The Case of the Netherlands’, Cooperation and Conict, 30 (1), 1995, pp. 31–51.

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ened to leave this bloc, because it wants a deeper bilateral agreement with the US.46 The establishment of a concert of regional powers to replace global hegemony was also unattainable, because the disparities in the balance of strength between the central and regional powers were simply too large. On the other hand, the case for the continued development of mutually reinforcing working arrangements between world and regional organizations is overwhelming. As indicated at the outset, it makes sense to base these arrangements on the comparative advantages of the two kinds of organization, in spite of the practical difculties that were also mentioned above. However strong regional organizations may be, the contribution of global organizations is essential for reasons that have already been explained. Regionalism should be seen as a component of multilateralism, not a substitute for it. Even so, veiled claims on the superiority of regionalism continue to be heard. Thus, the cooperative agreements concluded by the European Union with counterparts in Africa, Latin America and Asia (see chapter 6) inspired Hettne and Söderbaum to present “multi-regionalism” as a practical and alternative model of world order.47 Multi-regionalism (or inter-regionalism) is a description of a highly decentralized world order, based on interregional arrangements and cooperation between regional groups. Although it may be supercially attractive, the concept does not qualify as a serious candidate for a sustainable world order. One reason was already referred to above: there are signicant differences worldwide in the degree to which continents and regions have been able to organize themselves. Inter-regionalism as a model for world order presupposes the presence of an organizational and managerial capacity in every important region. This is not the case. Moreover, those parts of the world that are actually covered by regional and sub-regional agencies provide a rather confusing picture of a plethora of organizations that widely vary in their statutory mandates, goals (unifunctional or multifunctional) and membership requirements. When regions organize themselves, a great variety of ambitions is revealed. Indeed, forms of regional cooperation range from the highly institutionalized, dealing with a wide scope of policy 46

47

See Alan Beattie, ‘East Asia exposes the limits of the regional’, Financial Times, November 12, 2006. Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, ‘Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 10 (2005), p. 549.

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elds, to very loosely organized associations with a limited mission. Again, the comparison between Europe and East Asia springs to mind. The large variation in organizational power explains why there is no balanced input from all regions in multilateral decision making on a global scale. It requires a lot of imagination to expect this situation to change in the near future. Another reason why the concept falls short of serving as a serious candidate for a model of world order is the relatively high level of interdependence between the different parts of the world. Bull already noted that “no vision of the future is realistic which does not take account of the existence of social, economic, diplomatic and strategic interaction on a global scale”.48 The condition of global interdependencies raises the problem of the integration of actions taken in different regional settings. It would require the creation of an overarching or all-encompassing structure of governance that is more extensive and comprehensive than the group-to-group arrangements envisaged by the advocates of inter-regionalism. The problem of vertical coordination which emerges in the implementation of inter-regionalism can be compared with the problem of horizontal coordination in another approach to the international order, namely the functional approach. Functionalism aims at the establishment of non-territorial organizations and specialized agencies with a single purpose. It is based on the assumption that the successful international economic and social cooperation will eventually contribute to the solution of political conicts and the elimination of war.49 But the activities of these so-called technical organizations and agencies also need to be geared to each other, given the interconnections between social sectors in advanced societies. The strong sense of autonomy they tend to develop, as well the growth of vested interests within them, has proved to be an obstacle to the implementation of policies that link different policy dimensions. However, the successful management of politically sensitive issues across different regions, rather than of technical problems in specic domains, is likely to be even more difcult. The attempts to conclude the necessary federalist arrangements between regional organizations will probably become bogged down in problems and complications 48 49

Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 262. The classical sources of the theory of functionalism are David Mitrany’s, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966; rst published in 1943), and Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

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arising from the transfer of authority from national and regional powers to world bodies. In conclusion, the concept of inter-regionalism does not meet the test for a fully edged model of world order. Nevertheless, elaborating the concept in more detail for more limited goals could contribute to securing an outward-looking posture by regional organizations, and indirectly serve the cause of world order, as it benets from effective antidotes to unhealthy competition between regions.

CHAPTER FOUR

MODELS OF WORLD ORDER: FROM UTOPIA TO REALITY

This chapter looks at several models of world order that t the denition of the concept under discussion. They vary from the traditional and idealistic idea of world government to newer versions such as policy networks and effective multilateralism. Among these models, the notion of a Pax Americana occupies a special place; it is based on the exclusive role of the United States as a global stabilizer and enforcer exercising predominant inuence over other actors. It raises the contentious question of whether the US has the strength and the commitment to act as a quasi-world government or world government in disguise. It also raises the question of whether there are serious challengers to the American primacy. The models as a whole represent different images (visions) of world politics, reecting particular institutional arrangements, values, and rules to achieve collective goals. Seen as scenarios or blueprints of the future, they can serve as frames of reference or signposts for making long-range foreign-policy decisions. However, the models by no means should be taken as sets of predictions of what is likely to happen in world affairs. The total number of conditions and variables that affect the direction of global politics is simply too large, and there is too much uncertainty to justify any claim that the shape of the international system can be foreseen beyond the immediate future. The future is not pre-determined, and there will always be surprises – the certainty about uncertainty. Within limits, human choices can make a difference. The pattern of actions and reactions that is so characteristic of the evolution of world history does not allow for the identication of linear developments. The ways in which the models differ from each other particularly concern the degree of autonomy of the constituent units, the correspondence of the envisaged distribution of power with the prevailing international hierarchy, as well as the level of ambitions with regard to the reallocation of values and interests between strong and weak powers, highly developed countries and developing countries.

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In what way is the most powerful engine driving present world politics, i.e. globalization, interfering with the discussion about models of world order? In the introduction, globalization was identied as a secular force, increasing the need to strengthen the system of global governance, which should be considered an essential part of the world order. Globalization is widely believed to render the concept of national sovereignty obsolete or outdated. The emergence of a single world market does not seem compatible with a fragmented and decentralized political system, rejecting overarching structures of authority. Economic integration and political autonomy are antithetical. However, there is the paradox of national sovereignty. The decline in material sovereignty which is imposed on states by the globalization of the economy, mass migration, and the development of instant communication technologies does not necessarily lead to a decline in formal sovereignty. At least, this decline is not accepted by national constituencies in the name of global or regional governance, let alone international solidarity. Although the control of national governments is being increasingly eroded by borderless trade and mass capital ows, many people in our part of the world turn to the shelter of their national institutions. They seek protection against the new insecurities, whether they result from foreign competition, the inux of cheap labor and immigrants or organized crime. Clearly, globalization has created uncertainty about the preservation of national identity, keeping jobs and the economic future in general. The fear of outside penetration and loss of national values has led to a renewed emphasis on national identity and the devolution of power towards regional administrative levels, apparently conrming Amitai Etzioni’s thesis that the nation-state is too small for the big problems, but too big for the small ones.1 This seems to be borne out by present developments. The more globalized the world becomes, the more people treasure their traditions, languages and differences. On the one hand, the global ow of ideas, information and images boost interconnectedness. On the other hand, the rise of new satellite channels, such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, have opened up possibilities to view world events from more regional and local perspectives. Against this backdrop, globalization may become less Westernized, more plural

1

Amitai Etzioni, From Empire to Community. A New Approach to International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

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and more regional, for which development the phrase “glocalization” has been coined.2 To state the obvious: globalization has a nameless face, and because of that the public at large is under the impression that anonymous social forces have taken over the direction of their lives. The possibility of a (further) backlash against globalization to emerge should be taken into account. A vehement reaction could take three main forms: political and economic nationalism, religious fundamentalism and grassroots protest.3 The resurgence of nationalism in inward-looking societies in particular would place narrow limits on any scheme of world order that seeks to drastically reduce the role of national sovereignty. The tension between sovereignty and internationalism must be considered the main theme in the debate about the world order. Continuing this theme, this chapter therefore begins by comparing two models that are rooted in opposing views of the problem of sovereignty: the traditional model of world government and the modern concept of global policy networks.

World government The model of world government represents a radical departure from national sovereignty. It identies national sovereignty as the main cause of international anarchy and war, and therefore considers the creation of a central authority to be the simple and logical solution to relieve humankind of its predicament.4 Nations would no longer face a security dilemma when the newly created world government was entrusted with the monopoly over the legitimate use of military force, and succeeded in disarming national military establishments to the level necessary to carry out domestic police functions. The prescription of world government relies on the domestic analogy: by concentrating the power of different individual countries in one center, national law can be enforced and people will be deterred from breaking the rules. Resorting to war as a means of settling disputes would not be allowed 2

3 4

See Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson, Global Modernities (London: Sage, 1995). Gnesotto and Grevi, The New Global Puzzle, p. 194. A classic text on the subject is Grenville Clarke and Louis Sohn, World Peace through World Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2nd ed. 1960). The two authors elaborated an impressive scheme of world federalism.

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in international society any more than the private use of violence is permitted in domestic society. The rule of law would prevail. Just as the state of nature was abolished by governments in civil society, the state of war in international society must be ended by the establishment of a world government. The solution dates back to 17th-century Lockean ideas that postulate social contracts, rst among citizens in order to establish an organized political community (state), and secondly between citizens and rulers for the transfer of power from the former to the latter, dening their mutual rights and obligations. As Inis Claude wrote some decades ago, world government (or world federalism) amounts to “an apocalyptic leap out of anarchy into social order”.5 Feasibility and desirability Such a bold vision of world order instantaneously raises the question of both the feasibility (or practicality) and the desirability of the solution on offer. No less a person than Albert Einstein once stated that “there is no salvation for civilization, or even the human race, other than the creation of a world government”.6 He, as well as others who supported that idea, assumed that people would willingly transfer their loyalty to a supranational authority in order to dismantle the anarchical system of competitive territorial states that produces war, once they rationally recognized that the survival of humanity was far more important than the advantages which the individual state might gain over its rivals. In the language of game theory, people will redene the pay-off structure when political “games” are iterative and consequently the shadow of the future enters into their calculations.7 However, some authors look beyond considerations of self-interest. For example, Ferencz and Keys wrote that world government is not only possible but also inevitable, because it appeals to the patriotism of people who “love their national heritages so deeply that they wish to preserve them in safety for the common good”.8 This view is reminiscent of the argument of those who are

5

6

7

8

See Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random House, 1971 4th ed.), p. 418. Quoted by Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics. Trend and Transformation (Boston and New York: Befdford/St. Martin’s, 2001 8th ed.), p. 633. On this subject, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). Benjamin B. Ferenc and Ken Keys, Jr., Planet-Hood (Coos Bay, Ore.: Love Line Books, 1991).

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in favor of European integration in order to rescue the nation state. However, few believe that a system of world government is a realistic objective; to put it more crudely, some regard it as a pipe dream. The reluctance, if not outright opposition, of most states to yielding their sovereignty to a supranational authority is a common argument against the radical transformation entailed by the idea. The fear of being cheated by other states that may conceal elements of their destructive power, in combination with the lack of agreement about how to tackle global problems, explains their aversion of taking steps towards world government. Notwithstanding the alleged emergence of a “global village”, the world simply lacks the minimum of sense of community and political consensus required to establish a single government. The weaker the common bonds in the political community, the greater the coercive power that would be required to hold the different parts together. Zbigniew Brzezinski rightly argues that the only “world government” that is remotely possible at the moment would be an American global dictatorship. However, in line with the arguments discussed below, this travesty of the concept would make “an unstable and ultimately self-defeating enterprise”.9 For many, a system of world government not only seems to be an unattainable ideal, but is actually a nightmare scenario. The centralization of power inherent in any version of world government, including federalist systems, is a cause for concern. Federalism has been put forward as the most palatable form of world government, because it is limited in the scope of powers to be exercised. However, the command of armed forces, the most sensitive and essential attribute of state sovereignty, is one of the powers that would be transferred to the central level in any federal scheme of global governance. The promise that matters of low politics such as culture, health and education will be kept at the national (or even sub-national level) is not likely to persuade those who are afraid of losing authority over the use of force. In the public mind, the difference between a federal state and a super-state is easily missed. Many ask themselves whether the Lockean dream of civil government could in reality turn out to be the Hobbesian nightmare of creating a super-Leviathan. The inuential American neo-conservative writer Irving Kristol’s position is very clear: “World government is a

9

Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 218.

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terrible idea since it can lead to world tyranny”. Therefore, international institutions that point to an ultimate world government “should be regarded with the deepest suspicion”.10 The Hobbesian paradox is that the social contract may produce a tyrant who is worse than the state of nature. Centralization of power at the global level is seen as a threat to individual liberty because of the nearly insurmountable problems that must be overcome to organize a form of democracy, or at least an accountable system of government on a worldwide scale. If there is reason to harbor doubts about the existence of a demos in the context of the European Union because of the diversity of the peoples to be governed, how much doubt must be expressed about its existence at the global level? To cite Inis Claude again: The international community is, and seems likely for the indenite future to be, characterized by a very precarious unity, a minimal consensus, sharp conicts, and profound disharmonies. Given this circumstance, it appears that the project of establishing a world government capable of exercising forcible restraint over any and all potential violators of the peace would entail the concentration of really formidable power in the central agencies of the community.11

These words seem to be self-evident, and still valid. Furthermore, there is also reason to be skeptical regarding the ability of the world authority to effectively monopolize the use of military force. The simple truth is that while the establishment of world government would, by denition, terminate interstate wars, it would not affect the threat of civil war. Clearly, in today’s world, with so many instances of violent domestic upheaval, the latter threat is at least as relevant for global stability as the incidence of interstate war. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a clear shift away from interstate wars to intrastate wars, from regular (conventional) warfare to irregular (unconventional) warfare. Indeed, internal armed conict is nowadays more prevalent than interstate conict. Thus, for example, the Uppsala Conict Data Project reports that during the year 2000 there were 33 separate armed conicts in progress in 26 states. Only two of these were interstate conicts.12

10

11 12

Irving Kristol, ‘The Neoconservative Persuasion’, The Weekly Standard, 25 August 2003. Claude, op. cit., p. 429. See Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, Armed Conict, 1989–2000, Journal of Peace Research, 38, September 2001, pp. 629–644.

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Security communities The fundamental assumption which the model of world government makes about the relationship between the absence of central authority, on the one hand, and insecurity, on the other, has to be challenged. This is the assumption that peace is impossible without a single supreme authority that can settle quarrels among those under it. Is international anarchy really at the root of the problem of war? Can zones of peace, characterized by the absence of preparation for war or the serious expectation of war, be created only by a powerful international organization? Half a century ago Karl Deutsch and his associates elaborated the concept of security community to denote a group of states whose high level of interdependence, mutual consideration and trust, and responsiveness to each other’s needs, result in those states believing that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change”, and not by the use of military force against each other.13 A typical example of such a security community is the group of thirty countries that belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the club of highly developed economies in Europe and North America, which also comprises Mexico, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The likelihood of any violent conict arising between the countries in the OECD area is practically non-existent. The only instances of violence have been conicts about the status of particular regions (for example, Northern Ireland and the Basque country) – conicts that were initiated by terrorist organizations. Apparently, low expectations of war do not necessarily require the creation of a single political entity, or the development towards – to borrow Deutsch’ phrase – an “amalgamated” security community. Indeed, the US, Japan, Australia and EU countries are not tied by strong political institutions. The fact of the matter is that states may be able to form a “pluralistic” security community, while retaining their sovereign independence to a large extent. Apart from the perception of common enemies, often the glue that hold self-interested nations together, the occurrence of peaceful and harmonious relations between nations can be explained by the common attachment to democratic institutions and

13

Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5 and p. 36.

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values as well as by high levels of economic interdependence.14 However, given the close correlation between democracy and economic development, one has to be careful about establishing simple causal links. The possibility that lasting peace is the result of high-level economic interdependence, rather than of democratic institutions and values cannot be ruled out. Both notions, “democratic peace” and “interdependence bans war”, have gained wide currency in ofcial policy thinking. They suggest that the case for world government must – in any case – seek a wider platform than the issue of peace and war.

Global policy networks Unlike the model of world government, the model of global policy networks envisages only limited encroachments on the authority or power of national government. Furthermore, it is not based on any pre-conceived political idea or doctrine, let alone an idealist movement with a grand design of a better world. Rather, it is a reection of new trends in international relations revealing the fragmentation of formerly unitary state structures, increasing direct contacts across national borders between representatives of more or less autonomous bureaucratic institutions (“transgovernmental politics”), as well as growing involvement of non-state actors in public policies. It also corresponds with patterns of non-territorial governance. A leading proponent of this model, Anne-Marie Slaughter, pointed out that it is not only terrorists, arms dealers, money launderers, drug dealers, trafckers in women and children, as well as the pirates of intellectual property who operate through global networks; government ofcials, such as police investigators, nancial regulators, and even judges and legislators, also work in such networks. In her judgment, they increasingly exchange information and coordinate activities to combat crime and address common problems on a global scale.15 Transgovernmental networks may develop to become wider public policy networks in which private parties also play a role on issues which are critical in the global public interest. This leads to the emergence 14

15

See Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001). Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 1.

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of loose alliances connecting government agencies and international organizations with elements of civil society such as non-governmental organizations, professional associations or religious groups. A distinction can be made between “horizontal” networks, only linking national ofcials and representatives of national organizations across national borders, and “vertical” networks, connecting supranational ofcials (international judges, regulators, and legislators) with their domestic counterparts. The inclusion of groups of experts and professionals (for example, in the eld of environmental security and education) in alliances means that the networks are difcult to distinguish from what has been called “epistemic communities”, i.e., transnational groups “united by a belief in the truth of their model and by a commitment to translate this truth into public policy, in the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a result”.16 On the basis of their knowledge, these experts and professionals are believed to develop a shared understanding of a problem on the global agenda and a set of preferences for responding to it.17 Epistemic communities composed of legal experts may also act as “interpretative communities” that resulting in a shared understanding among states of the legal relevance of different kinds of behavior in different situations. Furthermore, advocates of governance based on network argue that involving private actors as partners in the framing and implementation of policies of public sector agencies will increase both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of these policies.18 Private actors may not only have a stake in the outcome and often possess better information than public actors, but they also cover a boundless range of activities. Moreover, groups of civil society which were once ignored could gain a greater voice in international decision-making, which could narrow the participatory gap for which international organizations are often criticized.19 Policy networks, bringing together public and private actors, can be found in the eld of public health, environmental protection, crime

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See Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 41. See Peter Haas, Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, International Organization, 46, Winter 1992, pp. 1–36. See Wolfgang H. Reinecke, The Other World Wide Web: Global Public Policy Networks, Foreign Policy, 117, 1999–2000, pp. 44–45. The case for a wider role of civil society in international decision-making is made by Jan Aart Scholte in his book, Civil Society and Global Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).

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ghting, human rights, sheries, dual-use technology, and the control of capital ows. Concrete examples include the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, the Roll Back Malaria Initiative, the World Commission on Dams, and the Global Environment Facility.20 As already suggested above, in a networked world order political authority would remain primarily at the national level; only in specic cases could national governments delegate their authority to international organizations. A viable alternative? Does the model of global policy networks deserve to be judged more highly than the traditional model of world government? Supporters of that model of world order actually claim that transgovernmental networks offer the best of two worlds: coordinating and harmonizing governmental action without paying the price of the centralization of power. Anne-Marie Slaughter, whose important work on the topic was referred to above, laments the fact that the global networks are “underappreciated, undersupported, and underused to address the central problems of global governance”.21 Is she right? In order to examine the validity of her claim that a networked world order does represent a promising approach, it is necessary to scrutinize some specic characteristics of the model. The strength of the model lies in the assumption about the composition of states, which to a large extent corresponds with present political reality. Indeed, states are not unitary actors that conduct ofcial diplomatic relations across the full spectrum of national interests. Rather, they are relatively autonomous bureaucratic organizations that interact intensively with each other on specic areas of interest, largely without interference of any central authority. The state is not disappearing, but it is disaggregating into its component institutions. Moreover, in a world of porous national borders, foreign and domestic policy are ever more intertwined. An important implication of this development is that diplomats and foreign ministries are no longer the nation’s sole representatives on the international stage. They are joined by fellow ofcials from the home departments, as well as representatives of regulatory agencies, courts and legislatures.

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See Jan Martin Witte, Wilhelm H. Reinecke and Thorsten Benner, Beyond Multilateralism: Global Public Policy Networks, International Politics and Society, 2, 2000. Slaughter, op. cit., p. 1.

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A second assumption regarding the model of a “networked” world order is perhaps not unrealistic either. It concerns the idea that government representatives are often engaged in adopting codes of best practices while seeking informal agreements on coordinated solutions to common problems, rather than negotiating formal legal agreements with one another and implementing them from the top down. The last few decades have witnessed the widespread use of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and even less formal agreements. Clearly, the advantage of agreements that have no legal force is that the ofcials who negotiated them can directly implement those agreements.22 The disadvantage, of course, is that they are not subject to parliamentary review and control, at least as far as parliamentary systems are concerned. While the informal agreements involved are most commonly bilateral by nature, they may also evolve into multilateral arrangements offering greater exibility than traditional international organizations.23 Another assumption concerns the nature of global policymaking as it has developed over the last decades. The model conceives global policymaking in terms of complex systems, comprising a large variety of interactions between governments and non-state actors, such as business corporations, NGOs, and transnational movements. It may be true that nowadays international relations cannot be understood as the exclusive domain of state actions; policy outcomes are also affected by the activities of non-state actors. But that does not necessarily mean that the non-state world has political signicance in its own right, i.e., without the decisions made by governments. At any rate, the inuence of non-state actors on public policies will vary from policy area to policy area. This raises the question of how effective and how relevant global policy networks are in practice. First of all, these networks can place new issues on the global agenda. Similarly, they can be expected to play a useful role in the transfer of information and the informal coordination of governmental actions, particularly in rather technical policy domains involving little political controversy. Thus, for example, it is interesting to note that in the ght against terrorism, law enforcement ofcials from the European Union and the United States are working together to improve information-sharing

22 23

Slaughter, op. cit., p. 263. Slaughter, ‘Governing through Government networks’, Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics, p. 179.

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and exchange experts, training and best practices.24 Sometimes networks pave the way to formal negotiations between governments and help to prepare the settlements of disputes or the drafting of treaty texts. By the same token, they improve compliance with international treaties and customary law. Besides, as the commotion over the publication of cartoons by a Danish newspaper, ridiculing the prophet Mohammed, showed at the beginning of 2006, cultural and religious networks are a particularly potent force in mobilizing public opinion in various countries. But can transgovernmental networks really be relied on to perform the functions that any viable world order should perform, viz. to constrain nations in their pursuance of power and interests, to enforce international rules, and to secure the supply of collective goods by taking effective action against the free riders in the world? It is not very likely that they could. It is hard to imagine that such channels could serve as the vehicle for reaching agreement in political arenas where vital national interests clash and, for example, military campaigns must be staged in order to outlaw aggressors. It is hardly surprising that policy networks have taken root especially in the relations between highly industrialized or post-industrial countries with open societies, among which no grave geopolitical conicts exist that might violently erupt. Apart from the questions about the output legitimacy, i.e., the capacity to deliver policy outcomes that meet people’s needs, it is also necessary to question the policy networks’ input (or process) legitimacy, in the sense of their accountability and transparency. The networks could lead to a global technocracy, raising the prospect of secret governance by non-elected ofcials and experts. The claim that the involvement of non-governmental organizations narrows the participatory gap in global governance does become rather hollow if representatives of these organizations are not clear about the questions on whose behalf they are acting and to whom they are responsible. It does not require much imagination to foresee the emergence of shadowy decision-making forums to which only those who are “connected” or “in the know” have access. There is also the risk that policy networks will serve as the vehicle for the pursuance of special interests. For all these reasons,

24

On this subject, see the article of the then U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands Clifford M. Sobel, ‘Trans-Atlantic security cooperation is thriving’, International Herald Tribune, September 30, 2004.

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the question arises whether the informality and exibility of networks outweigh the formal constraints imposed on global governance by traditional international organizations, with their voting rules and elaborate negotiation procedures.25 A false analogy It should be explained that supporters of the new model, Anne-Marie Slaughter in particular, draw their optimism from the successful example of European integration after World War II. However, the nature of the problem-solving arrangements and mechanisms that have evolved within the connes of the European Community/Union, differs from the main features of the global policy networks in some essential respects. The EC/EU has certainly developed new forms of governance through transgovernmental channels. It may also be true that European institutions, rst and foremost the European Commission, cannot function adequately without the active cooperation and participation of national government ofcials, the so-called comitology system. It is therefore misleading to dene the relationship between Commission and national governments in zero-sum terms. The Commission thrives when national leaders are self-condent and strong. But contrary to what is suggested,26 this does not mean that most of the power in the European Union rests with networks of national ministers and lower-level ofcials. Nor can the European model serve as an example for the world as a whole without taking into account essential features of European history. The EU represents much more than a loosely organized policy network. As an international organization with state-like characteristics, the Union is unique because it is composed of a complex combination of supranational and intergovernmental elements. Parts of national sovereignty have been transferred to the European level, other parts pooled by the member states, whereas still other parts are kept at the national level.

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These objections to the model have been fairly recognized and described by AnneMarie Slaughter herself. See her contribution ‘The Power and Legitimacy of Government Networks’ to Susan Stern and Elisabeth Seligmann (eds), The Partnership Principle. New Forms of Governance in the 21st Century (London: Archetype Publications, 2004), p. 31. One of her potential solutions is to recognize all government ofcials as performing both a domestic and an international function. Such recognition, she says, “would automatically hold them accountable for their activities both within and across borders” (pp. 31–32). Slaughter, A New World Order, p. 264.

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Binding rule making and other formal mechanisms of policy coordination (“command and control methods”) coexist with the open method of coordination, which employs peer-pressure, benchmarking, best practices and score-boarding as steering techniques.27 While it may be impossible to attribute the achievements of the integration process to particular decision and coordination mechanisms, it is highly unlikely that the EU would have ever reached the present level of integration without the driving force of European institutions and the possibility of imposing decisions on reluctant member states.28 Thus, for example, the record of the soft method of open coordination in such a vital area as the implementation of the so-called Lisbon Agenda (directed at transforming EU members’ economies to become the most competitive knowledge-based economies in the world by 2010) is not very impressive.29 As regards the implementation of the rules set by the Stability and Growth Pact, it has become clear that peer pressure does not work in a system in which sinners (members who have failed) sit in judgment of sinners (others who have failed). In any case, none of the regional integration experiments outside Europe have succeeded in emulating the EU in terms of the intensity of mutual cooperation, or the scope of voluntary limitations to national sovereignty. For this reason, we should not have any illusions about the readiness of nations to accept these limitations in a global context, even though they might be less radical than under a system of world government. In conclusion, global policy networks are not comprehensive and not effective enough to justify the claim of those who argue that they can constitute the backbone of a viable system of world order. Rather than serving as a substitute for the existing infrastructure of multilateral institutions, they can at most complement and strengthen them. Among other things, the world needs effective force to discourage or deter regional powers from striving for hegemony or military dominance in their neighborhood. The next section will address the question whether the United States passes this decisive test.

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About the nature of the EU as a political system, see Gary Marks et al, Governance in the European Union (London: Sage, 1998), Liesbet Hooghe, Multi-level governance and European integration (Lanham: Rowman & Littleeld, 2001), and Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). For a defense of this view, see Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). See for example Anna Michalski, Lack of Commitment. Hard Choices and the Search for Political Will (The Hague: The Clingendael Institute, December 2004).

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A Pax Americana? By all accounts, the United States is by far the strongest power in the world at the beginning of the 21st century. Thus, while the US share of the world population is less than ve percent, its share of global economic output is at least one quarter, more than 60 percent of world foreign exchange reserves are held in US-denominated assets (with most international transactions denominated in US dollars), its defense budget accounts for almost one half of total military expenditure in the world,30 and its achievements in the eld of higher learning, research and development (R&D) are second to none. Thus, US expenditure on R&D amounts to roughly one third of the world total,31 37 of the world’s top 50 universities are located in the US32 while the country benets tremendously from an unparalleled inow of scientists from all over the world. American dominance is even more striking in such areas as life-style and mass culture (movies and television entertainment), and the use of the internet.33 It has become commonplace to say that the US is the sole remaining superpower. In line with this, Michael Mastanduno notes: Even without precise measurement, to focus on a range of power attributes leads to the conclusion that the United States is now in a category by itself. Only the United States currently excels in military power and preparedness, economic and technological capacity, size of population and territory, resource endowment, political stability, and ‘soft power’ attributes such as ideology.34

At the same time, many would agree with Christopher Layne’s thesis that “unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own demise because the hegemon’s unbalanced power creates an environment conducive to the

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World military expenditure exceeded $1 trillion in 2004. The US accounted for 47 per cent of this spending. Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2005. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, June 2006). See the OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2005 – Towards a knowledge-based economy (Paris: OECD, October 2005). See Academic Rankings of World Universities 2005 (Shanghai: Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2005). The only eld of popular culture in which the US is not dominant is soccer, the world’s most popular sport. US marginality in this respect is underlined by its failure to export typical American sports, such as (American) football and baseball. Michael Mastunduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar moment’, in Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastundono (eds), Unipolar Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 141.

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emergence of new great powers”.35 Nevertheless, this study presumes that American primacy is not a passing phenomenon. In other words, the United States is likely to remain by far and away the world’s preponderant power for many years to come, retaining signicant leads in economic output, military prowess, and technological and educational achievements. In fact, it will continue to be the only global power, probably for another half a century.36 A recent report of the international security think tank of the European Union is somewhat more restrained but admits that “[t]he United States will remain the world’s leading superpower for the foreseeable future, especially when its status is measures by the classical indicators of economic and military power”.37 America’s potential contenders But what about China, which is widely seen as America’s major contender? Yes, China’s drive to modernization is impressive. And so, perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent, is India’s. An extrapolation of the present growth rates of the two Asian countries shows that China and India can be expected to evolve into formidable economic powers in the future.38 Their rise to the status of world power is a serious possibility, though by no means a certainty. First of all, extrapolation has not always proven to be a reliable guide to the future. Bottle-necks (e.g., roads, airports and electricity) will tighten as the economy grows. Air pollution, social congestion, an ageing population or even systemic crises pertaining to the fabric of Chinese society may reverse economic trends. Japan and South Korea also saw a long period of unprecedented high growth levels, only to be followed by years of stagnation from the early 1990s. 35

36

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Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion. Why New great Powers Will Rise, International Security, 17, 1999, p. 7. See also the same author’s book The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy From 1940 to the Present (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2006). See for instance Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World’s Government in the 21th Century (Washington, DC: Public Affairs, 2005). Gnesotto and Grevi, The New Global Puzzle, p. 141. See the special survey of India and China (‘The tiger in front’) in The Economist, March 5th–11th 2005, pp. 3–16. China’s economy is estimated to be three times larger than India’s. See IMF Survey, 35 (12), June 26, 2006, p. 192. On India in particular, see also Roel van der Veen, India’s Road to Development (The Hague: The Clingendael Institute, June 2006) and the July/August 2006 issue of Foreign Affairs, 85 (4), which is mainly devoted to the rise of India, and Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICS: The Path to 2050, Global Economic Paper no. 99, Goldman Sachs, 1 October 2003.

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But a more important consideration is that becoming an economic heavy-weight is not tantamount to reaching the status of a military power with global reach. An ofcial American report maintains that China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the US and that it is determined to achieve parity with the US. It also says that it is about to become “the preeminent power among regional states in East Asia.”39 But after all, China was in this position throughout most of its long history. The current military expansion of China may be able to alter regional balances of power in East Asia. Nonetheless, it is hard to believe that the country will soon be able to acquire the wide range of power-projecting capabilities that is required to match the US with regard to bringing pressure to bear in almost any corner of the world. China has yet to put its rst aircraft carrier into commission. This applies even more to India, whose overall military might is weaker than China’s. Furthermore, neither China nor India espouses a body of political ideas and social values which is attractive to other countries. In the past, under Mao’s leadership, China posed itself as an alternative to the imperialist West. Many poor nations were inspired by it. Their affection of China may have been based on a romantic and distorted view of the real situation there. China was perceived as being on their side, from their struggles against colonial rule to their ghts for development in a global economy that appeared unfair to the poor. At the moment, the country’s main goal in its relations with the outside world is to secure energy resources and advantageous trade agreements; it does not seem to care at all for the moral improvement of regimes in such places as Zimbabwe, Burma and Uzbekistan.40 China’s ruling party is not trying to spread an ideology, simply because it has none to spread.41 Nor does it serve as an economic role model. It is paradoxical

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Military Power of the People’s Republic of China. Annual Report to the Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 2006). On the other hand, China is now the 13th-largest contributor of UN peacekeepers, providing almost 1,700 troops, police and military observers to ten nations, mostly in African countries, including Congo, Liberia and southern Sudan. In November 2006, China offered to send 1,000 peacekeepers to southern Libanon to help enforce a cease-re between Israel and Hezbollah. The UN accepted less than half. See Column Lynch, ‘China Filling Void Left by West in U.N. Peacekeeping’, Washington Post, November 24, 2006. The Chinese aims of the rst Sino-African Forum (summit), which took place in Beijing, November 2006, and was attended by leaders of 48 of the 53 African states, were more directed at acquiring commodities than gaining inuence. By trying to secure Africa’s supplies of oil, copper and cotton at the lowest possible prices,

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that notwithstanding China’s supposed economic miracle and its reputation for being one of the most successful economies, no country of any importance seems eager to copy China’s system of political and economic governance, which could be described as “Leninist capitalism”. The circumstance that the Chinese do not have a deeply entrenched sense of national identity is another factor to be taken into account. China is divided by competing regional, ethnic and class identities. This may explain why anti-Japanese sentiments are utilized by the Chinese leadership as an instrument to foster national unity. As regards to the attraction to other countries, the European Union fares much better, even though the current state of European integration does not augur well for its ability to act. The Union is seen as a role model in different parts of the world, because of its successful market integration and its ability to establish a legal community. However, the EU is also overshadowed by America’s strategic power, while the majority of its member states are reluctant to surrender sovereignty to a political union whose creation should be regarded as a necessary condition for conducting a single foreign policy or for gaining military clout. Moreover, the majority of European citizens are not prepared to foot the bill to sustain the status of a world power. The EU seems to be too weak to lead, but too strong to follow. The latter especially applies to its relationship with the US. The international role of the Union will be further discussed in the last chapter. Finally, what about the Russian federation, the heir to the once powerful Soviet empire that instilled fear in the West for so many decades? While China and India must be considered the emerging powers of the future, Russia is a typical power in decline, with all the spasms resulting from this position. To be sure, it can command substantial bargaining power on the basis of its vast energy reserves and nuclear weaponry. However, the country is struggling with a shrinking population (resulting from a low birth rate, poverty, alcoholism and low male life expectancy) and its economy, despite the soaring prices of oil and gas, is seriously handicapped by an outdated industrial infrastructure. Moreover, the Russian army lacks the investments and professional-

China’s agenda probably is not unlike European goals in Africa 150 years ago. See the articles ‘Never too late to scramble’, The Economist, October 28, 2006, pp. 53–54, and Joseph Kahn, ‘China aims to increase its clout in Africa’, International Herald Tribune, November 3, 2006. On this subject, see also Joshua Eisenman and Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘China’s Africa Strategy, Current History, May 2006, pp. 219–224.

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ization to qualify as a combat-ready expeditionary force. Although president Putin would presumably like to see his country serve as a bridge between the West and the two leading powers of “rising Asia”, the main focus of Russian foreign policy is on the post-Soviet space – the former Soviet republics. What about the possibility of Russia seeking partners to counteract American hegemony? Since the mid-1990s some modest attempts have been made in this direction. Thus the Russian minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov, advocated the creation of an international platform that was to be based on several autonomous centers of power. His “grand design” was to create a strategic triangle comprising Russia, China and India, apparently with the aim to hold in check America’s global diplomatic maneuvers and military might. At the beginning of the new century ( July 2001), Russia and China concluded the so-called Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Moscow.42 In the same year, the two countries established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), with four former republics of the USSR – Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.43 The combination allowed for cooperation on economic and security matters. However, the two treaties cannot be taken as the bold geopolitical maneuver that they would appear at rst sight. They fall far short of a military alliance in the mold of NATO. The objective of the Shanghai Pact, in particular, seems to be limited to opposing US predominance in Central Asia. The underlying reality is that the interests of Russia and China only partly converge. Admittedly, they need each other, particularly to deal with centrifugal and destabilizing forces in their countries – rst and foremost religious extremism – which could lead to separatism and weaken the central leadership’s hold on power. However, in other areas, especially trade and technology, they are much more dependent on the West than on each other.

42

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See this author’s ‘The Challenge of the “American Empire”: The Response of the Lesser Breeds’, in Alfred van Staden, Jan Rood and Hans Labohm, Cannons and Canons. Clingendael Views of Global and Regional Politics (Assen: Royal Van Gorcum, 2003), p. 8. See Benjamin Goldsmith, Here there be the Dragons: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2005). The June 2006 summit of the SCO was also attended by India, Pakistan, Mongolia, Afghanistan and, controversially, Iran. The latter country is a major supplier of oil to China, and China has been keen to ensure that the country is spared UN sanctions over its nuclear program.

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Limits to American power Does it follow, from the above considerations, that the future world order could be or – some might hope – should be an extension of the present US preeminence to become a Pax Americana? In other words, could it be built solely on American power and the readiness of the US administration to use this power for the benet of mankind as a whole, as dened in Washington? This seems highly dubious. It is true that the idea of an American order is consistent with the tenets of the hegemonic stability theory. This theory states that a dominant state, commanding a disproportionate share of military and economic resources in the world, is indispensable to enforce international cooperation, maintain international rules and agreements, and keep the peace and uphold other values.44 In the absence of a leading state, public goods may not be available, because too many states are tempted to indulge in free riding while passing the buck to others. High levels of interdependence practically rule out the possibility of excluding non-paying states from the benets of collective action. In his classical treatise The Twenty Years’ Crisis, in the same vein, written more than half a century ago, Edward Carr contended that every approach to international order in the past has been the product of the ascendancy of a single power. Ignoring the Concert of Europe – an international order in the rst half of the 19th century that was based on a multipolar power structure, not the hegemony of a single state – he refers to the position of Great Britain in the second half of the same century. British supremacy was epitomized by the British eet policing the high seas and providing equal security to all, the London money market establishing a single standard for virtually the entire world, and British commerce securing a widespread acceptance of the principle of free trade. These conditions, Carr wrote, “created the illusions – and to some extent the reality – of a world possessing

44

See Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr and David Kinsella, World Politics. The Menu for Choice (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 7th ed. 2004), p. 96. The theory of hegemonic stability was criticized by Robert Keohane in his book After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Keohane argued that international regimes fostering stability and cooperation can survive and grow in a post-hegemonic era. Rather than weak substitutes for world government he sees regimes, at least in the world political economy, as devices for facilitating decentralized cooperation among egoistic actors.

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interests and sympathies in common”.45 It is an adequate description of the so-called Pax Bittannica. While there are, apparently, similarities between the present-day position of the US and that of the Pax Brittannica a century and a half ago, the concept of an American order as model for a future world order provokes a welter of divergent objections and counter-arguments. First, critics of the concept point to the fact that power is multifaceted. Certainly, American power is by no means one-dimensional. Thus, as indicated above, in addition to the military domain, it also has an impact in the eld of trade and nance, and because of the degree of attraction of its political values, scientic knowledge and mass culture, the so-called “soft power” dimension. However, while the economic vitality and technological dynamism of the US are beyond dispute, American power only remains unchallenged in strategic warfare and large-scale military conicts. Even in this domain hegemony does not bestow omnipotence. Joseph Nye, for one, never tires of pointing out that power relations have grown complex, and that the world of today resembles a three-dimensional chess game. Nye argues that on the top board of classic interstate military issues, the US is certainly the only superpower with global military reach. Therefore it makes sense to speak in traditional terms of unipolarity or hegemony, even though in unconventional conicts weaker powers may effectively use the weapon of asymmetric warfare to reduce American military superiority. However, a different picture emerges on the middle board of interstate economic issues. Here the distribution of power is multipolar (or at least tripolar), because the US cannot obtain the outcome it wants on trade, antitrust, or nancial regulation without the consent of the European Union, Japan and others. After all, the US has become the world’s biggest debtor nation. Nye correctly holds that it makes little sense to call this American hegemony. Furthermore, in his model of a three-layered power structure he identies a bottom board that relates to transnational issues such as terrorism, international crime, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases. In this transnational arena, power is widely distributed and chaotically organized among state and non-state actors alike. Nye concludes that it makes little sense to call

45

Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939 (London: Macmillan, 1946), p. 232.

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this a unipolar world or an American empire.46 Similar considerations prompted Samuel Huntington to pronounce that we are living in a “uni-multipolar” rather than a “uni-polar” world.47 Secondly, in an interdependent world, the US also needs allies and friendly states. In dealing with threats arising from terrorism, nuclear proliferation, organized crime, and the spread of infectious diseases, cooperation with others is essential. In spite of the temptation to use military power unilaterally, solitary national security is a chimera.48 More generally, the US can hardly ever “go it alone” to achieve important international objectives. The belief that the US can rely on its own power reects a awed understanding of the nature of today’s international politics. As Michael Reisman argues, the overwhelming superiority of American power means that while the US can sometimes control the “fate” of other international actors, it cannot control the “behavior” of others or compel them to act.49 Thus, the American war in Iraq has amply demonstrated that it is one thing to swiftly defeat an enemy in battle, but that it is quite another thing to create peaceful conditions in a religiously and ethnically deeply divided Islamic country. The hubristic notion of the US in believing that it could – perhaps also had the right – to rearrange the world at will has met its nemesis in Iraq. In any case, the hyperpower that the US is said to be can barely sustain in that country a military force of about 150,000 troops. With a total strength of 1.4 million the US armed forces are clearly overstretched, hardly able to wage two regional wars simultaneously. Furthermore, the limits of US military power became visible in struggles with opponents who engaged in asymmetrical warfare, such as terrorist groups and guerrilla organizations. These groups and organizations deliberately refuse to play the war game by the rules of the strongest party, directing their attacks on the soft belly, i.e., the most vulnerable targets of the strongest party. They have proved to be capable of making up for much of

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Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 4. Samuel Huntington, ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs, 78 (2), March/April 1999, p. 35. For this point of view, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Gobal Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 214. For a similar view, see Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington: Committee to Protect Journalists, 2004). Michael Reisman, ‘A New Haven Look at Sanctions’, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 95, 2001, p. 27.

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the disparity in military resources. Al Qaeda and like-minded groups have employed a strategy of the weak. Although not remotely able to match the US in military muscle or economic resources, they have sought to inict unacceptable damage on the US and its allies through random dramatic violence. As the saying goes, the weakest party will win if it does not lose; the strongest party will lose if it cannot prevail. American power has proved to be most effective when it is latent, i.e., when it does not have to be used, but casts its shadow on the behavior of others who realize it might be used if necessary. Thirdly, despite the belief in American exceptionalism, dening a special mission for the US in the world, the American people have no real appetite for swallowing the material and non-material burdens of empire. Embarrassed by, rather than proud of their unprecedented power, they have no stomach for constantly being on the frontline to ght thugs, insurgents and rogue states, making high sacrices for the interests of other peoples. Notwithstanding the repeated appeals by American leaders to their international responsibilities and duties, we can still hear the echo of John Quincy Adams’ famous words from 1821 that America “goes not abroad, in search of foreign monsters to destroy”.50 Many authors reminds us that, unlike in Great Britain before the two world wars, there is no culture of imperialism or a “white man’s burden” complex in the US.51 Whatever the current perceptions of other nations regarding the motives behind US actions throughout the word, the American self-image of being a former colony, the rst to liberate itself from overseas rule, is not consistent with the very idea of empire. At any rate, the US has never planned to govern the world, with all the duties entailed by that status. Rejection of the unilateral use of power However benevolent American hegemony may be in comparison with historical antecedents, the majority of nations are not willing to accept the unilateral use of power. For this reason, US power lacks the legitimacy that is needed to reduce the cost of exercising it. Other nations feel humiliated when their future is determined by the decisions of a

50 51

In The Concept of Empire. See Niall Ferguson, Colossus. The Price of America’s Empire (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004).

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foreign government. Despite the fact that the hegemon is carrying the disproportionate share of the cost for the supply of public goods, its motives will be questioned. Many view the US as less benign and altruistic than it is perceived to be by its representatives. President George W. Bush’s rather self-congratulatory characterization of the US as “the greatest force for good on this earth” is in stark contrast with the regular ashes of anti-American feeling in many capitals of the world. Not surprisingly, America’s primacy fuels resentment and envy on the part of less developed countries, particularly in the Arab world. Those who want to entrust the planet’s destiny to the US seems oblivious to the age-old question: Who guards the guardian?52 Henry Kissinger has cogently summarized the arguments against an American empire: “Dominant power evokes nearly automatically a quest by other societies to achieve a greater voice over their decisions and to reduce the relative position of the strongest. (. . .) Some Americans, exulting in their country’s power, urge the explicit afrmation of a benevolent American hegemony. But such an aspiration would impose on the US a burden no society has ever managed successfully for an indenite period of time. No matter how seless America perceives its aims, an explicit insistence on predominance would gradually unite the world against the US and force it into impositions that would leave it isolated and drained. The road to empire leads to domestic decay because, in time, the claims of omnipotence erode domestic restraints.”53 The conclusion should be clear: American power is not sufcient to provide the vast amount of resources required to perform the Herculean task of world policeman or global stabilizer. Nor is this task desired by most Americans or widely accepted by other nations. While America is clearly preponderant in the world, it does not have the power – nor the domestic inclination – to both impose and then sustain its will in the face of protracted and costly resistance. That is certainly the lesson taught both by Vietnam and the more recent experiences in Iraq. In today’s global environment, the cost and complexity of one nation trying to control the political situation in broad stretches of the world are too great for this to be possible. Or to borrow Michael Doyle’s words, the

52

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See Michael J. Glennon, ‘Why the Security Council Failed’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003, p. 29. Kissinger, Why America needs a foreign policy, p. 287.

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cost of imperialism has risen to an unacceptable level.54 At the same time, American power is necessary for the enforcement capacity of any realistic system of world order. Without the active involvement of the US, global institutions would lack the teeth to punish violators of international law. At this point, two rather fundamental questions arise. First, will the US choose to exercise its pre-eminent power through multilateral institutions, and seek international consensus? Secondly, are other nations prepared to accept America’s legitimate security interests and resist the temptations of free riding? These questions strike at the heart of the central topic of this study and will be addressed below.

Effective multilateralism If a system of world government is unfeasible (or perhaps undesirable), a “networked order” of informal institutions is not sufciently strong enough to muster the political clout required for securing peace and stability, an American order is widely contested, and global anarchy is intolerable, what alternative is left to advance the cause of world order? As it has proved futile to outline grand designs or masterplans in the domain of international politics, the only practical way to serve the purpose is to try to reform, strengthen and amplify the existing family of global organizations, regimes and informal arrangements (such as “contact groups”) that have evolved in interstate relations. This is also the position adopted in a study conducted by the Belgian Institute for International Relations.55 Focusing on the governance dimension of world order, the study rightly contends that global governance is not about creating new powerful institutions. Rather, it is about “enhancing the coherence, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the existing ones, about identifying and lling the gaps in the multilateral institutional and regulatory architecture and, nally, about imagining new institutions only where needed”.56 Whatever their shortcomings, the panoply of

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Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1986). See also Craigh Calhoun, Frederick Cooper and Kevin W. Moore (eds), Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power (New York: New Press, 2006) and Charles S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2006). Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB), Global Governance: The Next Frontier (Brussels: Egmont Papers No. 2, April 2004). Ibidem, p. 9.

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international institutions created since the end of World War II, ranging from general-purpose organizations, such as the United Nations, to organizations dedicated to a single mission, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has been instrumental in curbing conicts, enhancing human welfare and promoting international cooperation in general. For all the tyranny, poverty and casual brutality that still exist, a body of rules has grown within the system of multilateralism which states can hold states accountable for particular forms of behavior and make states feel obliged to defend their position on, for example, the use of armed force and the respect for human rights. This development can be considered history’s most powerful civilizing force. At the same time, no one can fail to recognize that yesterday’s global architecture does not meet the needs of today’s world. In some instances, institutions created over the past decades have outlived their usefulness. Others have struggled to adjust to new conditions set in after the end of the Cold War. Elsewhere, as testied by the failed attempts to secure radical reform of the UN, the interests of the incumbents clash with those of aspirants as the world’s rising powers challenge the prevailing distribution of diplomatic privileges. Clear cases in point include the outdated composition of the UN Security Council and the allocation of voting weights in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which give disproportionate inuence to European states. The process of twisting and adapting existing institutions to changing circumstances may increase tensions between insiders and outsiders to such a level that it could threaten the survival of the multilateral system. The way to safeguard the postwar settlement is to give emerging powers, most obviously China and India, but also countries such as Brazil and South Africa, a greater stake in the system. The need for streamlining the multilateral system Over the past years, there has been a proliferation of international institutions which is most apparent in the domain of international economics. If there is a need to streamline the myriad agencies, it is actually in that eld. Special attention should be devoted to the IMF, the World Bank, the G-8 and lastly, the OECD, which was already touched on in the context of the discussion about security communities. The IMF, in particular, is badly in need of a radical overhaul, and not only because of its outdated system of weighted voting, which is detrimental

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to the interests of emerging economies.57 Along with the World Bank and the GATT (the precursor to the WTO), it was established following meetings at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, towards the end of World War II. They were set up as part of a postwar nancial system aimed at avoiding a repetition of the economic crises of the late 1920s and 1930s which contributed to the outbreak of the war. Once seen as a guardian of the global economic system, the IMF – for a long time the unquestioned province of the US and Western Europe – has been overtaken by events. Its oversight of a xed exchange rate system came to an end with the advent of oating currencies in the early 1970s. In an era of free capital ows, the markets force errant governments back into line. It is very dubious whether there is any longer a place for the big lending programs once used by the IMF to apply orthodox nancial therapies in the developing world. Since it helped rescue Thailand, South Korea and several other Asian countries from insolvency in the late 1990s, the IMF has had no major crisis to deal with.58 Yet the Fund, with its vast bureaucracy, has ploughed along as if nothing much in the world economy has changed. One option is to transform the IMF to a center of multilateral consultations on frictions in the global economy and spillovers of national policies, so that – like some sort of watchdog – it can give early warning of upcoming crises. In this role, it is not the management of crises which should be the primary focus, but their prevention. This sort of a reorientation seems to be in line with the Fund’s own medium-term

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Voting at the IMF Executive Board of 24 directors is determined by a quota system that calculates how much a country must contribute to the Fund and how much it can borrow in emergencies. The US has a 17 per cent share of the quota system. While this share is much lower than America’s relative economic strength (with US GDP about 25–30 per cent of the world economy), this position is crucial, because a 85 per cent vote is required for many IMF matters, such as amending bylaws and changing the quota shares. The Dutch share of 2.39 per cent is higher than India’s share (1.93%) and Brazil’s share (1.41%). The Netherlands heads a constituency of a dozen countries (most of them belonging to Central and Eastern Europe, plus Israel, Cyprus and Georgia). Country votes as of June 2006. The annual IMF meeting in Singapore, September 2006, nally decided to slightly readjust the quota system at last in favor of China, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey, at the cost of European countries. The re-weighting of voting power was considered a “down payment”, paving the way for more power to be given to other developing countries at the Fund. See IMF Survey, 35 (18), October 2, 2006, pp. 275–280. Also see Steven R. Weisman, ‘Swing in global order is apparent’, International Herald Tribune, September 18, 2006. See Steven R. Weisman, ‘U.S. seeks bigger China role in IMF’, International Herald Tribune, August 30, 2006.

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strategy which calls for stronger surveillance of the global, regional and national economies in order to identify and promote prompt and effective responses to threats to economic stability.59 Another option is to reduce IMF’s task to a small secretariat serving a new (and larger) economic steering group to replace the present Group of Eight Nations. The G-8 was originally conceived as a forum for reside chats between leaders of big western democracies. The rst meeting, convened by Valérie Giscard d’Estaing, the French president, and Helmut Schmidt, the German chancellor, in Rambouillet, was arranged in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. Its original role has been left behind by political and economic change. The G-8’s focus has broadened in recent years from discussing the state of the world economy to talks on climate change, poverty and pandemics. Russia is still excluded when nance ministers of the other seven nations meet to discuss the world economy and exchange rates. So too are China, India and other rising economic powers whose decisions are central to the overall stability of the economic system. As indicated above: if there is to be a serious effort to tackle economic imbalances in the world (i.e., the diverging current account positions of the world’s main economic regions), these countries must have a seat at the High Table. Were the Fund to be reformed along the lines of the second option (secretariat of the G-8)60 its remaining functions could be largely transferred to the World Bank, which could also have a special link to the G-20 group of developing countries. Another organization whose reason for existence in its present form has been called into doubt, is the Paris-based OECD. The OECD is rooted in a strong tradition of consensus. It was founded in 1961 as the successor to the organization61 that administered the Marshall Plan, the American aid program to rebuild the economies of European countries ravaged by World War II. Rather than lending money, as the World Bank does, to bail out countries as the IMF did, pushing trade liberalization and arbitrating international trade disputes like the World Trade Organization (WTO), the main task of the OECD is to gather data and narrow policy differences among its members by means of informal coordination methods. It promotes dialogue to exchange best practices 59 60

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See IMF in Focus, September 2006, p. 7. In the Spring of 2006 the G8 had already charged the IMF with policy coordination regarding balance of payments and exchange rates disequilibria. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

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on raising living standards and competitiveness. The rather exclusive club of rich market-oriented countries which the organization represents is in danger of becoming irrelevant, as current members will represent just 40 per cent of global output by 2020, down from the current gure of about 60 per cent.62 Indeed, if it fails to open its door to the emerging economic powers beyond Europe, the prospects for the OECD do not look very bright. However, the future of the organization cannot be assured merely by embracing more countries; its mission needs to be revitalized. One idea is for the OECD to become involved in the management of globalization. Another is to transform it to become a permanent advisory body for the Group of 8. This is in line with the suggestion of turning the IMF into a secretariat of this group. In addition to improving the efciency of the multilateral system by making the institutions less extravagant or adjusting them – in opposition to vested interests – to meet present and future needs, attempts to improve their performance should focus on the three dimensions mentioned above: coherence, legitimacy and effectiveness. Increasing coherence, legitimacy and effectiveness The rst concept, i.e., coherence, refers to the degree that international institutions are interlocked, and their missions are mutually reinforcing or supportive. In this respect, one of the weaknesses of the UN system is the lack of coherence between the operations of the UN Security Council and important economic and nancial institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank and IMF. Strategies of conict prevention and peace building require a coordinated approach to security and economic development. However, the reality is that the Security Council has no leverage with regard to economic aid and nancial rescue programs, whilst decision making over these programs is often completely out of touch with security considerations. As a result, security sector reform in developing countries as part of good governance (accountability, transparency and democratic control), which is vital to any policy of conict prevention and human rights protection, have fallen between two stools.

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See James Kanter, ‘When a club of winners loses its way’, International Herald Tribune, February 10, 2006. In addition to the 30 members countries, more than 70 developing and transition economies are engaged in working relationships with the OECD.

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The report of the UN Secretary General’s High-level Panel recognizes that decision-making on international economic matters, particularly in the areas of nance and trade, has left the United Nations for a long time. At the same time, the UN Charter allowed for the creation of specialized agencies independent of the principal UN organs, reducing the role of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to one of coordination. Nonetheless, the Panel does believe that ECOSOC is in a position to provide normative and analytical leadership at a time of intense debate on the causes of, and interconnections between, various international threats. To that end, it recommends that ECOSOC establish a Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Security Threats.63 However, it would be extremely optimistic to expect such a Committee to enforce coordination between the Security Council and the policies of the economic and nancial institutions. On reection, the problem could only be dealt with by increasing the authority of the Security Council so that it has the power to impose binding guidelines on these institutions. Obviously, this is a tall order. In this connection, the reaction to a less radical proposal made in the mid-1990s by the Commission on Global Governance (the so-called Carlsson64 Commission) is signicant. The Commission proposed the creation of an Economic Security Council, with a status as regards international economic matters equal to that of the Security Council in peace and security affairs. The main purpose of the new body would be to achieve consistency between the policy goals of the international economic institutions.65 The proposal shared the fate of so many similar proposals: it was shelved. The second dimension, i.e., legitimacy, raises serious problems. At the national level, there is legitimacy to the extent that people accept the right of political authorities to make binding decisions. The acceptance by the people also includes the rules and procedures for taking those decisions. In David Easton’s classic formulation the belief in legitimacy stems from the conviction that it is right and proper “to accept and

63

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A more secure world: Our shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General’s Highlevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004), pp. 86–87. Ingvar Carlsson was the prime minister of Sweden. See the Commission’s Report Our Global Neighbourhood (1995). The Commission was not an ofcial body of the UN; however, it was endorsed by the UN Secretary General.

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obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime”.66 The distinction between output and input (or process) legitimacy has already been made. It concerns government for the people (which may create output legitimacy) and government by the people (which may engender input legitimacy). But who is supposed to accept and obey the decisions at the global level? Does this apply only to national governments or should non-state actors and even ordinary people also be considered? The concept of cosmopolitan democracy has emerged in connection with a stronger sense of responsibility for the global environment and for the human race. The above-mentioned Commission on Global Governance recommended the creation of an Assembly of the People (World Assembly), composed of representatives elected by existing national legislatures, and a Forum for Civil Society that allowed for the direct participation of world citizens. The latter body would consist of 300 – 600 representatives of non-governmental organizations accredited to the General Assembly. The Forum was to meet annually prior to the meeting of the General Assembly.67 Supporters of the concept of cosmopolitan democracy like David Held68 maintain that national democracies have little control over global markets and are only able to inuence decisions taken by transnational corporations to a limited extent. They argue for democratizing international organizations such as WTO to make sure that transnational corporations are held accountable for decisions that may harm weak parties (groups and individuals). The vision of cosmopolitan democracy can easily be dismissed as utopian. It is awed because there is nothing equivalent to the nation which can evoke the same sense of community, nor is there a world 66

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David Easton, A Systems Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2nd print 1967), p. 278. See the report OurGlobal Neighbourhood. The idea of NGO participation in global governance is hardly new. Julius Huxley, who founded the United Nations Educational, Scientic, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1946, also founded the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) two years later. The IUCN effectively lobbied the UN General Assembly in 1968 to adopt Resolution 1296, which established a policy for “accrediting” (i.e., receiving consultative status) certain NGOs. By 2006, the UN had conferred the “consultative status” on more than 2,700 NGOs, varying from Amnesty International to the National Rie Association of the US. For a survey of the involvement of NGOs with the UN system, see Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker (eds), NGOs, the UN, & Global Governance (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996). David Held, Democracy and the Global order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

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authority which should be tamed.69 To say that “the development of a cosmopolitan law-enforcement and coercive capability” is required to realize the ideal,70 is tantamount to saying that the concept of cosmopolitan democracy is not the appropriate solution to the present problem of global governance. Nations are still a long way off accepting centralized law-enforcement, if they would ever accept. From a different perspective, the idea of “internet democracy” is also a misnomer because sophisticated means of communication can serve as a channel of political mobilization, but not as a substitute for creating communities. Democratic citizenship cannot simply be a matter of taking part in the transnational exchange of information. It is also a matter of afliation and identication with groups that are less anonymous than people from various countries who share – often temporarily – a particular concern. One of the critics of cosmopolitan democracy, David Miller, points out that democracy requires a level of trust and a commitment to the public good which, up to this point in human history, only existed between people sharing a common nationality.71 Transnational non-governmental organizations cannot be considered carriers of incipient world democracy, or as spokesmen or caretakers either. One of the previous sections has already questioned the view of NGOs as the spokesmen or caretakers of ordinary citizens. The argument can be extended further. Achilles Skordas refutes the claim of NGOs that they are the source of the “dictates of public conscience”,72 not only because they generally lack democratic legitimacy themselves, but also on the ground that NGOs tend to be heavily dependent on governments for nancing and guidance. He suspects that states fund these organizations to promote their foreign policy objectives by having these legitimized by groups in society. Skordas points to the fact that NGOs which enjoy a consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) may have that status suspended or withdrawn if they engage in “politically motivated acts” against UN

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See Jaap de Wilde, ‘De illusie van internationale democratie’ (The illusion of international democracy), Vrede en Veiligheid, 33 (1), 2004, pp. 45–60. David Held, ‘From executive to cosmopolitan multilateralism’, in David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds), Taming Golbalization: Frontiers of Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), p. 178. David Miller, Bounded Citizenship, in Kimberly Hutchings and Roland Danreuther (eds), Cosmopolitan Citizenship (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). This expression is the second element in the famous Martens clause, a general principle of law that was rst included in the Hague Convention II of 1899.

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member states. His conclusion seems justied that, with some notable exceptions (such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch), elitism and an absence of real personal cost often render transnational NGOs untrustworthy as representatives of “world opinion”.73 The most practical way to increase the legitimacy of any system of global governance would be to aim for a more balanced and equitable representation of countries in international bodies (rst and foremost the composition of the UN Security Council) whose decisions affect their vital interests. In the above-mentioned report of the High-level Panel, practical proposals were made to ensure that the line-up of the Security Council would be more in keeping with the reality of present-day world politics. In advocating extension of the number of the Council’s seats from 15 to 24, it presented two alternatives to achieve that goal.74 While the reform of the Security Council is long overdue, it is rather premature, if not inappropriate, to discuss democratic blueprints as models for global governance in a world where dozens of countries are still under the yoke of authoritarian regimes. However, there is a great deal to say for making international decision-making more transparent and accountable to a wider group of countries than those represented in international bodies with limited membership (such the UN Security Council) or weighted voting (such as the IMF/World Bank). Similarly, it makes sense to create channels to international organizations to offer non-governmental organizations the opportunity to state their case and enter into dialogue with representatives of governmental organizations at the global level. Multilateral bodies such as the UN and WTO could make their meetings more transparent, posting detailed briengs on agendas and issues under discussion. More public information on key ofcials would help as well, as would more deliberate policies of consultation.

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Achilles Kordas, ‘Hegemonic custom?’, in Byers & Nolte, ‘United States hegemony and the Foundations of International Law’, pp. 321–322. The rst alternative (“Model A”) provided for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas (Africa, Asia and Pacic, Europe and the Americas). The second alternative (“Model B”) provided for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year nonpermanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas. See the High-level Panel’s Report, pp. 80 –81. In his report In larger freedom Secretary-General Ko Annan refrained from choosing between the two models. The report urged member states to consider the two options or “any other viable proposals in terms of size and balance that have emerged on the basis of either model”. (p. 43)

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For all its obvious aws – more often the fault of governments than its own bureaucracy – the UN remains the essential source of international legitimacy (this point will be further discussed in the next chapter). Under the present circumstances priority should be given to increasing the effectiveness of the multilateral institutions, the last of the three dimensions that have been identied. After all, the general acceptance of these institutions depends not only on the possibilities for governments and world citizens to inuence international policies and be part of them, but also on the ability of institutions to impose solutions that address people’s concerns. In many capitals there is growing awareness of the need to strengthen multilateral institutions. The term “effective multilateralism”, which was coined to deal with institutions that indulge in pious declarations but are unable to turn words into deeds, has emerged in foreign policy documents of western countries. It could be considered one of the cornerstones in the security strategy of the European Union. Thus, in a paragraph, entitled “An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism”, the EU document states: In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.75

The meaning of the word “effective” is quite simple in this context: institutions must be able to do what they say, and powerful enough to enforce the decisions they have made. In other words: effective multilateralism is about making multilateralism work. Several approaches could be taken to strengthen the present multilateral system. However, leading up to the central thesis of this study, none of these approaches will be successful unless the US commits itself to the goals of the major global institutions, particularly the UN. It is impossible to manage any of the world’s problems without the commitment of the US. The challenge of building a world order today lies in matching the power of the US with the legitimacy of the UN. (This theme will be addressed extensively in the next chapter). Before embarking on this discussion some preliminary observations are presented here. First of all, from a

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A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy (Document proposed by Javier Solana and adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003), p. 14.

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historical perspective, the strongest powers are reluctant to accept international regimes unless they can dominate them. This is illustrated by the fact that the US embraced the UN from its foundation, as long as Washington commanded a majority of pro-western member states, but turned against the world organization in the 1970s when the General Assembly “began to churn out anti-American votes in the manner of an assembly line”.76 Secondly, in this respect, the attitude of the weaker powers is the opposite. In ancient times, as Thucydides reminds us in the world-famous Melian dialogue, these powers tend to resort to arguments grounded in God and justice to escape from their fate dictated by the rule that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept”.77 It is the weaker powers that traditionally turn to international law and organization in order to make up for their lack of physical power. Support for international regimes by these countries may be called balance-of-power politics in disguise, since it is the only way in which they can curb the inuence of the strongest. Dening the national interest Therefore Robert Kagan had a point when he argued that the rift between Europe and the United States that became so manifest during the administration of Bush, Jr., was mainly caused by the disparity in power between the Atlantic partners and to a lesser degree by the political views of the incumbent American president. He writes: In an anarchic world, small powers always fear they will be victims. Great powers, on the other hand, fear rules that may constrain them more than they fear the anarchy in which their power brings security and prosperity . . . [Europeans’] tactics, like their goal, are the tactics of the weak. They hope to constrain American power without wielding power themselves. In what may be the ultimate feat of subtlety and indirection, they want to control the behemoth by appealing to its conscience.78

A militarily powerful US was loath to become embroiled in what many hardliners saw as a jumble of collective decision-making that was likely

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See Josef Joffe, ‘Who’s afraid of Mr. Big?’, The National Interest, 64, Summer 2001, p. 48. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin Classics, 1954), pp. 360 –365. Robert Kagan, ‘Power and Weakness’, Policy Review, no. 113, June 2002, pp. 6–7.

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to impose all sorts of conditions on the use of force. In their view, relying too heavily on an international consensus might entail the serious risk of pursuing a policy of doing exactly nothing. In contrast, at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century a militarily impotent Europe had no other choice but to place its trust in the multilateral institutions and the peaceful settlement of disputes. It was not able to make a difference on the battleeld, and made a virtue out of this weakness by supporting policies of persuasion rather than of coercion. In the 19th century the situation applied the other way around. When Britannia ruled the waves, Michael Glennon writes, “Whitehall opposed limits on the use of force to execute its naval blockades – limits that were vigorously supported by the new United States and other weaker states”.79 Even though the US may have short-term interests in steering clear of the UN system and other multilateral institutions, its long-term interests dictate that American policies should converge with those of other nations.80 Even Donald Rumsfeld, the champion of hawkishness during the Bush, Jr. administration, has ruefully acknowledged: “There is nothing important in the world that we [the US] can do alone.”81 The price of collective legitimization by the world organization may be high: loss of time and watering down of its own position as a result of concessions to others. But the price of unilateralism is likely to be higher in the long run: loss of global respect, the need to use hard power rather than soft power, and an outburst of international resentment and envy. The ganging up of potential rivals is by far the greatest risk for a hegemon that refuses to multilateralize its power. The best way for the US to prevent any serious challenge to its pre-eminence is to ensure that there is no need to do so. If the US, unlike former hegemons, is prepared to give other nations a voice in its policies and sustain the institutions that provide the public goods whose benets are widely shared, then there is no reason for potential rivals to try to emulate American power, either by forming coalitions or by embarking on a course to catch up with it. As Josef Joffe aptly remarks, the

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Michael Glennon, op. cit., pp. 29–30. For an elaboration of this view, see Joseph Nye, The paradox of American power: why the world’s superpower can’t go it alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also see Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Tactical multilateralism: coaxing America back to the UN’, Survival, 46 (3), pp. 103–114. As quoted by Philip Stephens, ‘Reshaping the postwar settlement’, Financial Times, February 23, 2006. Rumsfeld was forced to resign as US defense secretary after the mid-term elections of November 2006.

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proper maxims for a hegemon that wants to preserve its dominance are: Pursue your interests by serving the interests of others, and transform dependents into stakeholders.82 However, for making active participation in the UN system a sufciently attractive option to the US again in the years ahead, the world organization must be able to deal with the more immediate concerns about national security that has emerged in the US since the 9/11 attacks. UN Secretary General Ko Annan hit the mark when he addressed the General Assembly in September 2003 with the following often quoted words: But it is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the concerns that make some States feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns that drive them to take unilateral action. We must show that those concerns can, and will be addressed effectively through collective action.83

Unnished business The Secretary-General’s words, stressing, “we have reached a fork in the road”, were generally taken as a vigorous appeal to the member states to rescue the world organization from falling into irrelevance. The overall reaction to this appeal has been muted and halfhearted, at least as measured by the modest results of the 2005 World Summit Outcome. As the London Economist wrote, the Declaration of the General Assembly “has turned into such a pale shadow of the sweeping package of proposals that Ko Annan himself had put forward”,84 referring to the Secretary-General’s March 2005 report In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. Thus, the 35-page “outcome document” was silent on sensitive issues such as disarmament, nonproliferation, and the International Criminal Court. The agreement did not address the many changes required to make the organization more efcient and accountable. The important section on collective security and the use of force no longer even mentioned the vexed issue of pre-emptive strikes; meanwhile the section on terrorism condemns it

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Joffe, op. cit., p. 52. Secretary General’s address to the General Assembly, Ofce of the Spokesman, 23 September 2003. The Economist, September 17th, 2005, p. 51.

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“in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes” but failed to provide the clear denition the US and other member states wanted. Nevertheless, the document is not wholly devoid of substance. Thus, it called for the creation of a Peace Building Commission to supervise the reconstruction of countries after wars. The task of this Commission is to provide coherence and consistent nancial support for rebuilding societies after conicts end (see chapter 6). The World Summit also decided to replace the highly discredited UN Commission on Human Rights with a supposedly tougher Human Rights Council. The Council, which was to consist of 47 members (the majority of them countries from Asia and Africa), started operations in June 2006. However, the experience with the newly established body up to now is not encouraging. According to NGO-observers, the Council did not overcome one of the greatest deciencies of the former Human Rights Commission: the subversion of the cause of human rights for blatant political purposes. While the new Council – dominated by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) – continued to launch politically motivated and one-sided attacks on Israel, it paid only scant attention to the massacres in Darfur.85 On the other hand, the recognition of a new “responsibility to protect” peoples from genocide and other atrocities when national authorities fail to take action or lack the capacity to do so is extremely important. In subscribing to this view, world leaders for the rst time endorsed every sovereign state’s responsibility to protect its citizens from grave harm, and afrmed the right of other nations to take action, including – if necessary – the use of force, to prevent atrocities when states fail to meet their responsibilities to their own citizens. This development tempted UN Under-Secretary-General and UNDP Associate Administrator Ad Melkert to pronounce rather optimistically that the world organization is shaping “a new landscape, where ‘iron gates’ around territorial sovereignty are being replaced by ‘glass ceilings’ between

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See Hillel C. Neuer, ‘So far, a profound disappointment’, International Herald Tribune, September 7, 2006. The author is executive director of UN Watch in Geneva. See also the highly critical editorial of the Washington Post, ‘Reform Run Amok. The U.N.’s new Human Rights Council makes the old one look good’, October 12, 2006. See also Marc Bossuyt, ‘The New Human Rights Council: A First Appraisal’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 24 (4), December 2006. This author takes a “too-early-to-tell” position.

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networks of worldwide connectivity”.86 This topic, too, will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. As regards the composition of the Security Council the document carefully stated: We support early reform of the Security Council as an essential element of our overall effort to reform the United Nations in order to make it more broadly representative, efcient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions.87

The chances of achieving a breakthrough in this divisive matter remain slim. Understandably, the continuing lack of progress towards UN reform in general has caused frustration among many member states.

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In a speech, entitled An Agenda for Human Security: The UN in its Next Stage, delivered for the Netherlands Society for International Affairs, The Hague, October 16, 2006. Draft resolution referred to the High-level Plenary Meeting of the general Assembly by the General Assembly at its fty-ninth session, 20 September 2005, par. 153.

CHAPTER FIVE

WORLD ORDER AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

The conclusion of the previous chapter was that effective multilateralism can be regarded as the most promising and workable concept for the establishment of a sustainable world order. The concept is adopted in principle by most European governments and is at the core of the security strategy of the European Union. The implementation of the concept is centered mainly on strengthening the United Nations Organization and multilateral treaty regimes, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The starting point of this chapter is the belief that the ill-fated attempts that have been made up to now to radically restructure the UN and, in a wider sense, to make the present system of multilateralism more effective, are just the symptom of an enormous underlying problem: a profound disagreement between the parties concerned about the nature of the relationship between the goals of world order and the reality of the global distribution of power. Any world order that wants to be more than a catalogue of good intentions requires the stakeholders to agree on whether the proposed scheme of cooperation should reect the existing inequality in international relations or whether it should attempt to check the power of the strongest nations. If a world order serves only the interests of the strongest, it will lack the legitimacy which is necessary to gain the acceptance by the weaker states. At the same time, if these weaker states attempt to constrain the strongest to the extent of depriving them of their privileged status, the latter will lack the motivation to support any body of rules that is beyond their control. As will be seen below, there is no easy way out of this dilemma. Choosing for either extremely will probably open a Pandora’s box of intractable political disputes: either it will lead to a failure to satisfy the demands of the large majority of nations or it will fail to stand the test of political feasibility. A balance has to be found.

Law cannot rule alone It is only realistic to recognize that power is a necessary precondition of every political order. It may be true that power without justice is

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likely to lead to tyranny, but it is equally true that justice without power amounts to impotence. International orders that depend on not much more than merely a general moral commitment of nations to uphold the peace in order to fulll their objectives will be based on a shaky foundation and bound to be short-lived. The old adage: “Covenants without swords are just words” is pertinent in this respect. Nonetheless, it would be quite wrong to dismiss international law as something little more than intellectual curiosity, or suggest that its political relevance is wholly determined by the material interests of states. When states act outside or even against the law, they often pay a high price as regards their reputation and perceived legitimacy. Therefore it is not surprising that more often than not governments – including those of powerful states – go to considerable lengths to justify and rationalize their actions in legal terms. Indeed, if international law did not matter, it is hard to understand why states and other actors would devote so much effort to negotiating new legal rimes and extending existing ones. Several motives, varying from a fear of chaos in the international system to reprisal, the expectation of reciprocity,1 to the need for developing a reputation as law-abiding state and a general dislike to become subject to the “mobilization of shame” by NGOs in the case of human rights violations, lead – to quote Louis Henkin – “almost all nations [to] observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time”.2 Of course, this observation needs some qualication, because it applies especially to relations between states that generally maintain friendly relations and that are engaged in actions and transactions in issue-areas primarily involving commercial, technological, and cultural matters, as well as private interests. Furthermore, in “routine” matters between two states, government decisions almost always conform to both substantive and procedural norms.3 But it remains true that laws cannot rule on their own; even voluntarily negotiated rules require power for their enforcement when the stakes are high. If states are under threat and

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Reciprocal agreements on the humane treatment of prisoners even withheld the Nazis from sending captured Jewish American soldiers to Auschwitz or other extermination camps along with Polish, German and Dutch Jews. See Robert Kuttner, ‘Rebelling against torture and Bush’, International Herald Tribune, September 18, 2006. Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2nd ed. 1979). See K.J. Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 7th ed. 1995), p. 298.

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are defending their existential interests and core values in situations of manifest conict, then governments are likely to opt for “effective action” rather than legal obligations and UN resolutions, if the two are perceived to be incompatible.4 Modern history can be interpreted as a tale of man’s efforts to establish international norms and rules dealing with peace and security, but these have not had any practical effect, because they lacked the coercive mechanisms to ensure compliance. The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), which outlawed going to war for the solution of international controversies, is a clear case in point. As a gesture indicative of a new ethical attitude to war, it served as a magnicent demonstration of the peaceful disposition of the world after the First World War. However, as it was dependent on nothing more solid than the good faith of the signatory nations, the treaty foundered because it imposed no sanctions on those who disregarded its pledges.5 As Beyers and Nolte rightly note: Until a utopian world comes into being where laws rule alone, some semblance of order will need to be maintained by one or more Great Powers.6

Power, however, is a rather abstract notion whose interaction with law cannot be properly analyzed without taking into account the patterns in the global distribution of political resources.

Dominance or equilibrium? What power structure is most conducive to effective international law and, more in general, the viability of the international order? The general view that a unipolar conguration offers the best chances in this respect, is supported by prominent personalities. One of them is Wilhelm Grewe, the German scholar-diplomat. His thesis that successive hegemons have shaped the foundations of the international legal system, developing concepts and principles that suited their special interests, has particularly gained currency in the legal community.7 Outside this community, 4 5

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Ibidem. See G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs 1920 –1939 (London/ New York/Toronto: Oxford University Press, 4th ed. 1950), pp. 183–184. Michael Beyers and Georg Nolte (eds), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 36. Wilhelm Grewe, Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1984).

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Edward Carr, who was referred to in the previous chapter, argued that every approach in the past to develop an international order, be it the Pax Romana or the Pax Brittannica, has relied on the ascendancy of a single power that is “sufciently coherent and sufciently strong to maintain its ascendancy without being itself compelled to take sides in the rivalries of the lesser units”.8 His position deserves further consideration. If the attempt to ignore power as a decisive factor in every political situation is called “purely utopian”, then it is scarcely less utopian to imagine an international order built on a coalition of states. In Carr’s view, such a coalition is likely to founder because each member will strive to defend and assert its own interests.9 This argument undermines the feasibility of the concept of collective security as the foundation of international order, since the concept assumes that states share an equal interest in deterring would-be aggressors and punishing rule-breakers. It also presupposes that they agree on who should be considered the perpetrators of violence and who are the victims. Obviously, they disagree about this fundamental question more often than not. It is not possible to take their belief in the indivisibility of peace for granted. For better or worse, governments do differentiate between threats in their immediate neighborhood and contingencies far away. Their readiness to put the lives of the nation’s soldiers in harm’s way will be largely determined by the extent to which strategic and economic interests are at stake.10 The classical balance of power The claim of Carr and others11 that an international order can be built only on the primacy of a single state contradicts the view of those

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Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 235. Ibidem. The literature about the fallacies of collective security as the cornerstone for international order is extensive. See for instance Inis L. Claude, Swords into Ploughshares. The problems and progress of international organization (New York: Random House, 1964 4th ed.), Chapter 12, Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), Collective Security in a Changing World (London: Lynne Rieder, 1993) and John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, 15 , 1994–95 (1), pp. 5–49. One of them is Robert Gilpin who also holds that international cooperation is possible only when a state is capable of imposing order on the international system. When there is a clear hierarchy of power, there is a low likelihood of clashes of interests erupting into violence. See his book War and Change in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). See also A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 2nd ed. 1968).

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who maintain that international law, unable to constrain a powerful state on its own, depends on a balance of power to be effective. By denition, such a balance can only exist if there are rivaling powers that hold one another in check. The classical balance of power of the 18th and 19th century operated in a multipolar setting, with power at the upper level of the international hierarchy dispersed among ve to seven great powers. Great Britain kept its distance from the European continent, but at the same time pursued global imperial interests, was believed to maintain the balance by playing the special role of balancer.12 Regardless of the nature of the political regime of the states involved, it was expected to throw its weight in the balance in order to protect the weaker party or parties subject to threat. After World War II the balance of power made a remarkable come-back in quite a different global power conguration: bipolarity. Lacking the exibility of its historic counterpart, and with the constant possibility of realignment of alliances (renversement des alliances), the new balance of power was based on the mutual fear of nuclear retaliation and assured destruction. It was, therefore, appropriately called a balance of terror.13 Hans Morgenthau is one the authors who believe that the effectiveness of international law is inextricably linked to the existence of a balance of power. His intellectual legacy was already referred to in the second chapter. He explains that international law owes its effectiveness to two objective social forces: identical or complementary interests of individual states and the balance of power. If one of these is lacking, there is no international law. In support of this, he quotes Lassa Oppenheim, who described the balance of power as “an indispensable condition of the very existence of international law”.14 The underlying argument of 12

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See about this subject Edward V. Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955. See also Alfred van Staden, ‘A Return of the Classical balance of Power?’, Studia Diplomatica Vol. XLIX (6), 1996, pp. 77–92. Joanne Gowa argues that in bipolar systems agreements between states are stable and durable because alignments are structurally determined. By contrast, alignments in multipolar systems are the result of choice among multiple options and for this reason change over time. Cooperation is inhibited because today’s friends may be tomorrow’s foes. See her article ‘Bipolarity, Multipolarity and Free Trade’, American Political Science Review, 83 (4L), 1989, pp. 1245–1256. Kenneth N. Waltz and John Lewis Gaddis have also argued that the likelihood of peace is higher in bipolar power distributions than in multipolar ones. See Waltz, ‘International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of Power’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XXI, 1967, pp. 215–231and Gaddis, ‘The Long Peace: elements of stability in the postwar international system’, International Security, Vol. 10 (4), Spring 1986, pp. 99–142. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 274.

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this distinguished early 20th – century scholar of international law is clear: “If the Powers cannot keep one another in check, no rules of law will have any force, since an overpowerful State will naturally try to act according to discretion and disobey the law.”15 However, it is ironic that, once the notion of the balance of power was totally discredited after the outbreak of World War I, Hersch Lauterpacht, the editor of the later editions of Oppenheim’s treatise, deleted this positive reference to the balance of power as the foundation of international law. With regard to the nature of the relationship between the distribution of power in the world and the prospects of international law, it is possible to conclude that there is a clear dichotomy between those who fear the abuse of power by the strongest state, and those who believe that superior power is necessary to make collective action possible, by providing leadership and imposing discipline on lesser states. The historical record is not unambiguous on this crucial matter. It may be true that power has an addictive quality and that the tendency of power to corrupt itself affects the way in which the holders of power behave. As the American historian Harold James reminds us: “Even if the wielder of power resists the addiction, other people suspect the addiction is there.”16 On the other hand, it is hard to nd clear examples of stable balance-of-power systems in which the great powers have succeeded in overcoming mutual suspicion and were able to act jointly. These systems have an in-built tendency to get out of balance because parties attempt to achieve absolute security by being slightly stronger than the others. The Concert of Europe of the rst half of the 19th century is sometimes cited as a successful example of an improved and workable balance-of-power a system, as it produced periodic conferences and military interventions to defend the status-quo. Characteristic of the concert model is a commitment of its members to common goals and policies, based on a sense of shared values, while at the same time allowing members to pursue their own particular interests.17 However, despite the dynastic consensus on which it was based, the Concert of 15

16

17

Lassa Oppenheim, International Law (London: Longman, Green and Company, 1912 2nd. ed.), Vol. I, p. 193. Harold James, ‘Modern America in a Roman predicament’, Financial Times, February 20 January 2006. By the same author, also see the book The Roman Predicament (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). See David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

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Europe was not strong enough to survive for long, since the participating states were divided on how to respond to the rising tide of nationalism in Europe and how to deal with the decline of the Ottoman Empire.18 The diplomatic historian René Albrecht-Carrié rightly observes: “It [the Concert of Europe] functioned successfully for a while, though not for long, roughly it may be said so long as the fear of France and revolution persisted”.19 But in the post-Napoleonic era revolutionary movements were put down, particularly in the south of Europe, and a weakened France was no longer in a position to impose any conception of order on other states. It was not until 1848 that a new wave of popular, nationalistic revolution swept anew across Europe. The Crimean War (1854–56), dividing Russia from Great Britain and France, dealt a nal blow to the Concert. The present predicament In today’s world, as there are no real prospects of any development towards a world authority, one could conclude that the world has to steer a course between an unacceptable hegemony by any one power and the risk of destabilizing rivalries between powers of equal strength. However, for the prospects of world order the debate about the merits of unipolarity is rather academic in as much as US predominance – as was argued in the previous chapter – will probably last for another two generations. In other words, for the foreseeable future it is futile to put the debate of world order in the context of an evolution towards multipolarity beyond the domain of economic and nancial relations. In order to make a well-founded judgment on the practical possibility of the present demand for world order corresponding with the reality of US predominance, it is necessary to take a closer look at the attitude of powerful states to international law, in general, and the position of the US in a world of interdependencies, in particular.

18

19

See Paul W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) and Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York etc.: Simon & Schuster, 1994), chapter four. For a discussion about the relevance of the concept of the ‘concert’ to contemporary Europe, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, ‘Concerts, collective security, and the future of Europe’, International Security, 16 (1), Summer 1991, pp. 114–161. René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper & Row, rev. ed. 1973), p. 24.

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Are political predominance and international law irreconcilable? Will a pre-eminent power naturally try to act according to discretion and disobey of law, as Oppenheim suggested? True, dominant states appear to be reluctant to use the forms and to abide by the rules of international law, as these tend to constrain the dominant states’ freedom of action. Reecting on the position of the US with regard to the concept of war in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, already referred to, Carl Schmitt stated with a lot of foresight in 1932 that “no great power and even less an imperial power will bind itself to a set of strict norms and concepts that someone could use against it”.20 From this perspective, international law may be seen as an obstacle to the exercise of power. But, as Nico Krisch points out, there is another side to this: international law may also be considered an instrument of power, since it is an important source of legitimacy. It is a double-edged sword. He cogently analyzes the dilemma facing international law. In order to give legitimacy international law should distance itself from any predominant power; indeed, it will lack credibility when it only serves the interests of the predominant. If prevailing rules are perceived as being arbitrary and unjust because they reect the imposition of particular interests in a high-handed imperial display of power, there will be an increasing tendency on the part of the weaker powers to reject these rules and obstruct to the rule-based order. At the same time, international law cannot depend merely on moral appeal; it is always in need of power in order to enforce its norms.21 If establishing a balance of power is not a realistic or desirable way-out of this dilemma, then self-restraint of the strongest power is the only remaining alternative.

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Carl Schmitt, ‘USA und die völkerrrechtlichen Formen des modernen Imperialismus’ (Königsberg, 1932), p. 127, cited by Nico Krisch, ‘Hierarchy, equality and US predominance’, in Byers & Nolte, United States hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, p. 155. For a comparison of the thoughts of Carl Schmidt and Hans Morgenthau, see Martti Koskenniemi’s chapter ‘Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the Image of Law in International Relations’, in Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics, pp. 17–34. Nico Krisch, ‘International Law in Times of Hegemony’, European Journal of International Law, 16 (3), 2005, p. 370.

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Motives of the strongest powers As was pointed out several times before, there can be legitimacy to the extent that the exercise of power is accepted as righteous, proper and necessary by those who are subjected or exposed to it. Acting in accordance with the rules of law means that the policies concerned are likely to be perceived as being justied and deserving support. Unfortunately, it is not possible to state in general terms to what degree the strongest power is willing to pay the price of restraint in the exercise of its power in return for its policies being accepted. It is obvious that specic circumstances will always make their inuence felt. But the strongest power would also recognize that the implementation of policies initiated by decisions which are not regarded as legitimate is likely to incur high political cost – at any rate, higher than the sort of policies considered to be legitimate. Andrew Hurrell correctly observes: “Even imperfectly legitimated power is likely to be much more effective than crude coercion.”22 For that reason enlightened self-interest may motivate the strongest power not to systematically violate the prescriptions of international law. The inclination of the strongest to comply with international law may be strengthened by taking long-range considerations into account. The predominating power may enjoy ascendancy for a long period of time, but pre-eminence in international affairs never lasts for ever. If the strongest power is perceived by the weaker states to have a very low regard for the authority of international law and particularly the rights of weaker states, this is likely to stimulate these states to organize countervailing power or promote the rise of challengers in the international system. One of the founding fathers of the American Constitution, James Madison, explained why the powerful should have any incentive to obey the law. This is because of what he called the “uncertainty of their condition” – the possibility that the strong may one day become weak and need the protection of the law. This shadow of the future incites the strong to play by the rules today.23 It is reminiscent of what Rousseau had stated before Madison’s writings: “The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless 22

23

Andrew Hurrell, ‘International Law and the Changing Constitution of International Society’, in Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics, p. 344. See for a discussion of Madison’s argument, Michael J. Glennon, ‘Why the Security Council Failed’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003, p. 29.

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he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty.”24 Madison may be too optimistic in assuming that long-term considerations will prevail over short-term calculations based on a narrow denition of the national interest. He seems to confuse expectations of what could actually happen with statements about what ought to happen according to a broader interpretation of the national interest. The dual nature of international law Krisch points out that the dual nature of international law, being both an instrument of power and an obstacle to its exercise, tends to create signicant tensions and results in negotiations between dominant states and the protagonists of the international legal order. Typically, it leads to a – what he denotes as – four-tiered response on the part of the dominant states.25 This is illustrated by the attitude and actions of the US after WW II.26 The rst response is instrumentalization, which is dened as the regulation as well as pacication and stabilization of dominance. Dominant states will attempt to convert their ascendancy into legal superiority. Thus, the US has been successful in weakening the rules of formal equality (as enshrined in Art. 2.1 of the UN Charter) by gaining a privileged position as a permanent member of the Security Council, as one of the few states in the NPT which were entitled to keep nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament,27 and as the state with the largest voting weight in the Bretton Woods system. However, dominant states often see their demands for superior legal status rejected by the lesser breeds. This may prompt them to resort to the second response, viz. withdrawal from the legal order, at least in particular areas. Since the US has failed to have its ascendancy recognized with regard to acquiring special rights in new rules and institutions (such as the Law of the Sea Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the Landmines Convention), it has decided to distance itself from them. In addition, the US abrogated the

24 25 26

27

Jean-Jacues Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762), ch. III: ‘The Right of the Strongest’. Krisch, op. cit., p. 371. For the American attitude to international law, see in particular John F. Murphy, The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). It was no accident that the ofcial nuclear-power states of the NPT were the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

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Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, for a long time widely regarded as a showpiece of classical bilateral arms control. It also inserted reservations in multilateral treaties, such as the Civil and Political Rights Covenant (ICCPR) and the Racial Discrimination Convention, to make sure that no change would be required in American law and practice. Michel Cosnard emphasizes that when a state prefers not to be bound by an international obligation, it chooses not be above international law, but beside international law. Because international obligation is rooted in consent, “opting-out” has always been an option both for larger and smaller states. Traditionally, the most important aspect of sovereign equality is the capacity of states to be involved in the creation of their legal obligations and not to be subject to rules to which they have not agreed. Following this positivist logic, no rule is totally universal. According to Cosnard, the principle of sovereign equality (in the sense of equality before the law, not within it) would be really endangered only if the US, and the US alone, enjoyed systematic exception or exemption from the law. This is obviously not the case.28 A full retreat from international law by powerful states is highly unlikely. In an age of interdependence, creating increasingly the need for the coordination of state action, international law is indispensable for powerful states as well. The reason is simple: cross-border transactions have grown so tremendously, especially in the eld of commerce and nance, that negotiations for each of these transactions would be far too costly. Private companies involved in international transactions depend on stable expectations that can be created only by rules. The clear interest of dominant states in sustaining a rules-based system of cross-border interactions may tempt them to consider a third response, the imposition of their domestic law on other states. Krisch notes that US foreign policy relies heavily on law, “but it is domestic rather than international law that is preferred”.29 Thus, for example, American certication mechanisms have become a common tool for the US to dene rules for other states and monitor their observance. Examples can be found in areas as diverse as abortion, arms control, environmental protection, human rights, narcotics, and terrorism. The certication practice is believed to gain further strength through its combination 28

29

Michel Cosnard, ‘Sovereign equality – “the Wimbledon sails on” ’, in Beyers & Nolte, United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, pp. 125–126. Nico Krisch, ‘More equal than the rest? Hierarchy, equality and US predominance in International Law’, in Beyers & Nolte, United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, p. 155.

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with unilateral sanctions. For several decades, such sanctions have been an integral part of US foreign policy. They have provoked erce criticism, particularly when accompanied by claims on extraterritorial jurisdiction. Similarly, the use of US courts as important forums for cases of an international nature, and the application of indirect means of creating norms and governing the operation of markets (for example, the global reliance on the standards of the US Security and Exchange Commission and the Federal Aviation Administration) can be taken as clear instances of domestic law being imposed. A serious bone of international contention is the extraterritorial application of American law for political purposes. In 1996 the US Congress adopted two laws that were denounced almost unanimously. The rst law was the “Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act”, better known as the Helms-Burton Act. In order to serve the political objective of overthrowing the Castro regime, this law imposed rules of conduct for any person in the world. No physical or legal person, whatever their nationality or residence, was allowed to deal in property that belonged to Americans (or Cubans who later became US citizens) and was expropriated by Cuba after the revolution of 1959, or to engage in any economic dealings with Cuba. Persons who violated this ban became subject to sanctions imposed by American courts. The second law which was a cause for great concern was the “Iran and Libya Sanctions Act”, commonly known as the D’Amato Act, which sought to deprive the two states concerned of the funds to sponsor international terrorism and expand their military capabilities. Any person anywhere in the world investing more than forty million dollars in either of the countries’ oil industries had to accept strict rules of conduct, in this case also on penalty of American sanctions. Both acts were universally rejected because a state cannot, quite obviously, set rules for the whole world, but only for persons, property, and acts having a certain link with that state. Consequently, the adoption of an extraterritorial rule or decision is contrary to international law, unless it has a reasonable link with the state enacting such a rule or making such a decision.30 Nevertheless, American courts punished non-compliance with the acts concerned. In a completely different policy domain, the natural environment, these courts have claimed to have the right to regulate foreign companies operating legally under foreign law in foreign lands, if an

30

See Brigitte Stern, ‘How to Regulate Globalization’, Byers (ed.), The Role of Law in International Politics, p. 257.

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American court concludes that the companies involved have harmed the American environment.31 The fourth and last response by powerful states that Krisch identies is concerned with the reshaping of international law. Apart from the shift from multilateral to bilateral treaties attempts by these states to reshape international law essentially take two forms: a drift towards soft international law and the deformalization of international lawmaking.32 Soft law is tantamount to weak, centralized enforcement and adjudication. In areas where American interest in international law is greatest the US has agreed to strong judicial mechanisms, such as the WTO and NAFTA anti-dumping and investment disputes. By contrast, in other areas there has been reluctance, if not opposition, to judicial bodies and enforcing mechanisms. Again, the US rejection of the Rome Statute of the ICC springs to mind, and so does the withdrawal by the US of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice following Nicaragua’s application to institute legal proceedings against the US before the World Court. The obstacles in American domestic law regarding the supervision mechanism of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the blockade of a verication protocol to the Convention on Biological Weapons (CBW) are other cases in point. Finally, the de-formalization of law-making refers to attempts to replace strict legal norms and concepts with more general humanitarian principles and exible political categories, such as humanitarian emergencies as an excuse to justify the use of military force or using high-minded language about “a new world order” or “an international community of shared values”. By the same token, dominant powers try to maximize the discretionary powers of policymakers with regard to the application of legal principles and rules. It is clear that the responses discussed can undermine the authority and weaken the progressive development of international law. However, the overall picture is not as bleak as it seems. If the attempts by the

31

32

Thus, in a case involving a Canadian smelter and an American tribe a US federal appeals court in California applied US law to a foreign company. It issued the opinion that the Canadian company, Teck Cominco (located 10 miles north of the Canadian border), had violated American regulations by discharging pollutants into the Columbia river for decades. See Patti Waldmeier, ‘Unwanted: a global pollution policeman’, Financial Times, September 6, 2006. The author does not fail to recognize the irony that the same country that refuses to participate in a global warming deal is, through its domestic courts, irting with the idea of establishing its own world court for pollution claims. Krisch, ‘International Law in Times of Hegemony’, pp. 389–394.

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strongest power to entrench and justify its dominance in legal terms go too far and are without limits, international law would certainly lose its credibility and therefore its value as a source of legitimacy for the strongest power. The strongest power is for that reason both the master and the servant of international law.

The impact of domestic regimes In the discourse thus far, observations have been made about the behavior of the strongest power without any regard as to its political identity or domestic structure. Should the actions of hegemons or quasi-hegemons be seen as the more or less autonomous responses to the demands of a struggle for power in a relatively anarchical environment,33 or do they (also) reect the strongest power’s values and aspirations? In other words, does it make sense to differentiate between liberal and authoritarian hegemons? Authors as different as John Ruggie and Robert Gilpin argue that it does.34 Liberal hegemons will be inclined to prefer more benign (or benevolent) forms of leadership, whereas dominant states whose domestic political system is autocratic (or even despotic), may be coercive or exploitative hegemons. Thus, the two authors maintain that the domestic sources of foreign policy cannot be neglected with impunity. As suggested by them, one of the most important of these sources is the nature of the domestic regime. In the view of US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, “the fundamental character of regimes matters more today than the international distribution of power”.35 This statement, which runs counter to one of the fundamental assumptions of Waltz’s theory of international politics,36 may be going too far, but the relevance of national constitutional orders cannot be disputed. While all hegemons are tempted to indulge in superpower hubris and 33

34

35

36

For this view, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York/ London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution’, in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 3–47 and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). As cited by Joseph Nye in his article ‘Why America must be pragmatic with Putin’, International Herald Tribune, April 10, 2006. Kenneth Waltz assumes that the structure of the international system shapes all foreign policy choices. See his inuential book Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

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from time to time demonstrate the arrogance that accompanies power, leading to widespread resentment, some hegemons are much more oppressive and intolerant towards other nations than others. National attributes (particularly the nature of the political system and foreign policy traditions) do actually account for the diversity in hegemonic styles to a great extent. Despite the familiar criticism of the George W. Bush administration in particular regarding its alleged unilateralist tendencies and lack of respect for international law, the United States stands out as a relatively benign hegemon in comparison with all the other dominant powers in modern history. This statement will be challenged by erce critics of the US intervention in Iraq who, apart from operational incompetence in pursuing an allegedly ill-conceived intervention doctrine, wonder how the US of Franklin Roosevelt has managed to slide into the “lawless world” of the prisons of Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.37 However, even those critics should acknowledge that domestic democracy does constitute an important moral restraint as far as the exercise of national power is concerned. Whatever its defects and imperfections, throughout the period after the Second World War, American democracy has proved that it could correct abuses of power inicted on foreign nations. Vietnam was a clear case in point. While the jury is still out with regard to a nal verdict on Iraq, the US administration faces growing domestic pressures to observe the rules of international humanitarian law. Explaining the argument that the US is a hegemon different from all its European predecessors (for example, the Habsburgs, the Bourbons and the Hohenzollerns), Josef Joffe species that America annoys and antagonizes, but does not conquer. He is stating the obvious when he says that “it makes a difference whether the rest of the world faces a huge, but usually placid elephant or a carnivorous tyrannosaurus rex.”38 The supply of public goods The reason why the US is a rare animal in the historical zoo of hegemons not only lies in the fact that the country is a democracy while its historical counterparts were not, but also in its being a major provider

37

38

See, for instance, Philippe Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules (London: Penguin Books, 2005). Josef Joffe, ‘Who’s Afraid of Mr. Big’, The National Interest, 64, Summer 2001, p. 49.

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of public goods. The more interdependent the world has become, the more collective rather than individual action was required to achieve foreign policy objectives. The logic of collective action does entail the risk of parties involved being tempted to play the game of free riding, and in doing so, jeopardizing the supply of the public good. Indeed, irrespective of the size of their contribution, parties cannot be excluded from the benets of public goods once these become available.39 In the past, the US made a disproportionately large contribution to the provision of public goods in several elds, rst and foremost in international security, nancial stability, openness of trade, and access to energy resources. It did so for two basic reasons: as the largest country it had the greatest interest in the actual supply of the public goods, and by being generous to the weaker states it was able to attract their support. This support was deemed necessary in the struggle with the rival Soviet Union, but it does not mean that with the demise of bipolarity the US, as the sole remaining superpower, no longer needed allies or friendly states. The truth is that in an interdependent world the weaker states cannot survive without the dominant state, but the hegemon cannot achieve its foreign policy goals without the help of these states either. It may be able to go it alone, but the power to act is not necessary the power to control outcomes or achieve core objectives. In concrete terms, the US cannot make much headway in the so-called war on terrorism, combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or the development of nation-building and democracy in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, if other countries are not willing to provide intelligence and keep would-be terrorists under close surveillance, interdict the export of sensitive materials, agree to the use of economic sanctions or lend nancial assistance to poor countries and take part in peace stabilization operations. The necessary support of allies and friendly states gives the US a major incentive to go on performing the crucial task of intervener and lender of last resort, also in the future. The transformation of power Henry Kissinger formulated the need for American foreign policy to be rooted in legitimacy when he wrote that “America’s ultimate challenge is to transform its power into moral consensus, promoting its values not

39

For the theoretical underpinnings of the logic of collective action, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

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by imposition but by their willing acceptance in a world that, for all its seeming resistance, desperately needs enlighthened leadership”.40 Effective action in the world requires power as well as legitimacy. American power does not legitimize itself; only international institutions can do it. Certainly, as was pointed out before, seeking international legitimacy is tantamount to accepting limitations on the national freedom of action. An infringement of sovereignty is the price that must be paid for legitimacy. However, it would be wrong to suggest that power and legitimacy are wholly antithetical. Rather, they can be seen as being complementary. To the degree that rulers succeed in legitimizing their policy, they convert power into authority. In doing so, they not only satisfy their own conscience, but they also strengthen their position because the implementation of their policies is likely to meet less resistance. As Inis Claude claims: “Legitimacy (. . .) not only makes most rulers more comfortable but makes all rulers more effective – more secure in the possession of power and more successful in its exercise.”41 However, it is one thing to contend that, contrary to popular mythology, American people do care what the rest of the world thinks about them, particularly what the rest of the Western liberal world thinks,42 but it is quite another to assume that any US administration, whether Republican or Democratic, would totally submit to the decision making of an international body claiming to represent the world community, when the national security of the US is at stake. Krisch emphasizes that international law puts most constraints on dominant states, and certainly also on the US at present, when it includes strict limitations on its use of force. Since restrictions on military action affect powerful actors more than weaker states (which usually have little hope of any military strength anyway) it is in this area that dominance tends to be most pronounced. On the other hand, if the use of force is widely tolerated, powerful actors will accept the international order though, at the same time, raise fears among the lesser states of allowing the abuse of force.43 How can a balance be achieved?

40 41

42

43

Kissinger, Does America need a foreign policy?, p. 288. Inis L. Claude, Jr., ‘Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations’, in Friedrich Kratochwill and Edward D. Manseld (eds.), International Organization. A Reader (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994), p. 193. Robert Kagan, ‘The Unraveling of the Transatlantic Partnership’, in Susan Stern & Elisabeth Seligmann (eds), The Partnership Principle (London Archetype Publications, 2004), p. 266. Krisch, op. cit., p. 388.

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chapter five Reconsidering the (il)legality of the use of force

The rules governing the use of force can be seen as one of the main ingredients of any security order. It is generally known that the UN Charter – which is the basic law of the present security order – expressly prohibits under Article 2.4 member states from using or threatening force against each other. The two well-known exceptions are enforcement measures authorized (or mandated) by the Security Council under Article 42 of Chapter VII and the “inherent right” of individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack under Article 51 of the same chapter. Thomas Franck reminds us that the provision on the right of self-defense was included in the Charter, because the drafters feared that the system of standby military forces envisaged in Article 43, to be deployed by the Security Council in pursuance of collective security tasks, might not come into being. Accordingly, states would have to continue to resort to their right of self-defense, if necessary. The concern of the drafters turned out to be well founded since Article 43 languished. Thus, no standby forces were ever created, let alone deployed “against any of the approximately two hundred armed attacks that have taken place since 1945, leaving States’ security in their own hands and that of willing allies”.44 The legal regime of the UN underpins the primary responsibility of the Security Council for maintaining international peace and security. The obsolescence of deterrence Should the rules regarding the use of military force be adapted in view of the new security threats? There are several considerations which deserve careful reection. To start with the terrorist threat, terrorist organizations can now inict the kind of damage only states ghting wars used to be able to achieve. Clearly, the traditional policy of containment and deterrence applied against states does not offer sufcient protection against attack by these organizations. Terrorists whose hatred towards others is stronger than love of their own life cannot be deterred by threats of retaliation, even if these threats could be implemented in the rst place. To deter a party you need to have an address. Indeed,

44

Thomas Franck, ‘Comments on chapters 7 and 8’, in Byers & Nolte, United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, p. 268.

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terrorists do not represent a state that can be hit by attacking its territory and/or population. Responsible governments cannot be expected to wait passively for a terrorist attack to destroy one or more valuable targets in their country. The US National Security Strategy document of September 2002 boldly stated: The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the U.S. will, if necessary, act preemptively.45

This position is quite understandable in as much as governments’ political fortunes will depend on their ability and resolve to forestall clear and immediate dangers. Nevertheless, the document triggered much criticism, particularly as the US administration reserved the right to act alone in the exercise of self-defense, without specifying the circumstances in which the right of self-defense would be exercised. Thus, for example, the question was raised whether the simple fact that a state harbors terrorists on its territory could be a valid reason to invoke the right of self-defense and justify an armed attack against such a state.46 However, the tendency in the George W. Bush administration to reserve the right to take unilateral action and to broaden the interpretation of self-defense, as became clear in the decision to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the horric events of 9/11, hardly represented a new departure in US foreign policy. Thus, in a speech in early January 1993, reecting the main characteristics of the American military doctrine , outgoing president Bush, Sr. had already stated:

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The National Security Strategy of the United States, Chapter V, p. 15. See http://www. state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/c7889.htm. The updated March 2006 version of The National Security Strategy upholds the US claim on preemptive action with an almost identical formulation as the last of September 2002. Referring to a terrorist attack with WMD it states: “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. The United States will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. Our preference is that nonmilitary actions succeed. And no country should ever use preemption as a pretext for aggression.” (p. 18). The 2006 report was received with less hostility because other countries have had more experience with the emerging new threats – and partly because a more conciliatory American diplomacy has left new scope for consultation. See Marcelo G. Kohen, ‘The use of force by the United States after the end of the Cold War, and its impact on international law’, in Byers & Nolte, United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, pp. 204–210.

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chapter five The United States can and should lead, but we will want to act in concert, where possible involving the United Nations or other multinational grouping (. . .) A desire for international support must not become a prerequisite for acting, though. Sometimes a great power has to act alone.47

In the 1980s the US had argued self-defense in cases where the legality of American military action was questioned by many governments: the invasion of Grenada (1983), the bombing of Libya (1986), and the intervention in Panama (1989). The succession of père Bush by a Democratic president did not lead the US to revert to a strict interpretation of Article 51. On the contrary, in June 1993 president Clinton decided to launch an aerial attack against the Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad, in response to an alleged failed plot to assassinate his predecessor during a visit to Kuwait more than two months earlier. Five years later, the right of self-defense was invoked by the American administration to justify missile attacks against Osama bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan and a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant. This was done in response to the bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salam on 7 August 1998. These military actions provoked mixed reactions from members of the Security Council and beyond. The impact of 9/11 The question of whether self-defense might be exercised against acts of non-state actors, and not only against acts by states, became particularly relevant after the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001. Although Article 51 does not qualify “armed attacks”, it is not self-evident that it applies to attacks from any source, whether carried out by a state or not. After all, in the present international system the territorial sovereignty of states is still a dominant principle. Nevertheless, the case for a general application appears to be strong. The attacks carried out by Al Qaeda on 9/11 were dened by Security Council resolution 1368, under Article 39 of Chapter VII, as “a threat to international peace and security”. That cleared the way for taking measures in accordance with Article 41 and 42 “to maintain or restore international peace and security”. These measures were actually taken

47

Public Papers of the presidents of the United States. George Bush, 1992–93 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1993), pp. 2230 –2231.

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soon afterwards.48 Thomas Franck justiably takes the view that it is “inconceivable that actions the Security Council deems itself competent to take against a non-State actor under Articles 41 and 42 in accordance with Article 39 should be impermissible when taken against the same actor under Article 51 in exercise of a State’s ‘inherent’ rights of selfdefense”.49 His conclusion seems inescapable: if the Security Council can act against Al Qaeda, so can an attacked state. In the same vein, Adam Roberts notes that “there has been recognition that actions by non-state entities can fall within the concept of ‘armed attack’ ”.50 At the same time, he points to the responsibility of regimes which fail to prevent and punish acts of terrorism by a movement operating on their soil. In his view, the legal community also recognizes that an attack on such regimes themselves might be permissible in exceptional circumstances.51 In assessing the legal position of a state subject to a threat which is short of an actual armed attack an important distinction is the one between preemptive and preventive action. The distinction boils down to the following questions. Is the threat imminent, or not? Are there clear signals or indications that a would-be attacker is on the verge of launching an attack, or not? If so, invoking the right to self-defense in anticipation of an attack should be endorsed, as the required approval by the Security Council of using military force would certainly arrive too late. The June War of 1967 is often referred to as a striking example of a justied preemptive action in response to an imminent threat. Israel decided to attack its neighboring states because an attack by Arab states on Israel was widely deemed to be imminent. However, from a strictly legal point of view Israel’s action was highly contentious. Thus, Marcelo Kohen takes the view that recent state practice does not provide the widespread, nearly unequivocal support for a change to a well-established customary rule.52 Peter Kooijmans shares this 48

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It is important to recognize that the Security Council had already taken measures, including a sanctions regime, against the Taliban regime and Al Qaida (Resolutions 1267 and 1333). Thomas Franck, “Comments on chapters 7 and 8’, in Byers & Nolte, United States hegemony and the Foundations of International Law, p. 270. Adam Roberts, ‘The Use of Force’, in David M. Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council. From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 148. Ibidem. Kohen, ‘The use of force by the United States after the end of the Cold War’, pp. 229–230.

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view, adhering to a strict interpretation of the rule of self-defense. The former ICJ judge points out that the right to anticipatory self-defense is precluded by Article 51 of the UN Charter, since it only allows for self-defense in case of an armed attack, even if that concept is interpreted rather exibly. He even argues that the notion of anticipatory self-defense is entirely contrary to the post-World War II criteria for the ius ad bellum.53 The right to anticipatory self-defense The obvious counter-argument is that these criteria are outdated; they do not fully recognize the new security environment and should certainly be adapted. First, as argued earlier, international law actually accepts that an attack such as that of 11 September 2001 falls under the terms of article 51 of the UN Charter, even though the wording in the Charter referred to aggression between states, rather than to attacks by armed groups.54 Furthermore, as reason and common sense dictate,55 in a world where the price of inaction might be written in uncountable numbers of victims and physical destruction, the right of states to defend in order to preempt attacks on their territory cannot be disputed.“56 Preemptive strategy involves an inherent dilemma. The scope for action is greatest when very little is known about possible attacks. But by the time there is more knowledge, the scope for preemptive action has often disappeared. If every nation claims the right to dene preemptive rights, the absence of any rules would spell international chaos. Universal, generally accepted principles should correspond with the way in which they are put into operation. The so-called Caroline doctrine, dating back to 1837, when a British armed force destroyed an American ship, allegedly in self-defense, enumerates ve criteria that still can be adopted as a valuable guideline for determining when Article 51 may be invoked to

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Peter Kooijmans, ‘Is There a Change in the Ius ad Bellum and, if so, What does it Mean for the Ius in Bello?’ in Liesbeth Lijnzaad, Johanna van Sambeek and Bahia Tahzib-Lie (eds.), Making the Voice of Humanity Heard (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, pp. 228–229. See van Genugten, The United Nations of the Future, p. 133. At issue is here the so-called opinio necessitatis (in contrast to the opinio juris), the sense of necessity which obliges a state to act. Henry A. Kissinger, ‘American strategy and pre-emptive war’, International Herald Tribune, April 14 2006.

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deal with new threats.57 The doctrine assumes that a state is entitled to act in anticipatory self-defense if there is a necessity of self-defense in view of a threat which is instant and overwhelming, “leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation”.58 Preemption applies to an adversary with a capacity to do great damage coupled with the demonstrated will to do so imminently. The right to use force unilaterally in such circumstances is more or less accepted. The bipartisan report of The Princeton Project on National Security states unreservedly that preemption in the face of an imminent danger “has always been widely accepted as legitimate and appropriate”.59 The most obvious targets for preemptive strategy are terrorist organizations. These cannot be deterred because they have nothing tangible to lose. Nor can they be dealt with by diplomacy, because in general their objective is not compromise but the destruction of their adversary. The deeper issue concerns preventive use of forceful measures to forestall the emergence of a threat which could, at some point in the future, be overwhelming. Here the issue of proliferation emerges as one of the key tasks of preventive diplomacy. The High-level Panel referred to a weaker legal foundation, rather than to a fundamental principle of law, to reach more or less the same conclusion: the evolution of customary law. It considered that the development of this branch of international law unambiguous enough as to renounce the option of rewriting Article 51 of the UN Charter. Recalling that Chapter VII fully empowers the Security Council to deal with every kind of threat that may confront states, it literally said that this article needs “neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope”.60 While preemptive action is considered lawful under some circumstances, preventive action is denitely not. The latter type of action entails starting military operations against a state that might, at some future point, pose a threat. The preventive use of force may engender serious costs 57

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This is the opinion stated by the Advisory Council on International Affairs and the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International law in a joint report to the Netherlands’ government, entitled Pre-emptive Action (The Hague, July 2004), p. 20. Letter from Daniel Webster (US secretary of state) to Mr. Fox, April 24, 1841, British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 29, pp. 1137–1138. Ikenberry and Slaughter (eds), Forging A World Of Liberty Under Law, p. 31. A more secure world, p. 61. A similar position is taken in the report In larger freedom. The report states (p. 33): “Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves against armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has already happened (italics added)”.

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and risks. Thus, intelligence can be awed and the resulting military action can cause the death of numerous innocents. Others could abuse a policy of prevention as an excuse to justify actions that are unrelated to legitimate security concerns. The unlawful nature of preventive force raises quite understandably concerns about safeguards.61 The Panel gave short shrift to those who argue that also non-imminent or nonproximate threats could also justify military action as the potential harm from terrorists or rogue states armed with nuclear weapons is so great that one simply cannot risk waiting until such threats become imminent. If there are good arguments for preventive military action, rooted in solid evidence, “they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by denition, time to pursue other strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment – and to visit again the military option.”62 The responsibility to protect It is very difcult, if not impossible, to nd a way out of the quandary that exists as a result of the Security Council’s incapacity to act when action is imperative. However, it is one thing to block the road to unilateral decisions by member states when it comes to dealing with future threats. It is quite another to acquiesce in the fact of the paralysis repeatedly demonstrated by the Security Council in the past as a result of the lack of consensus among the Permanent Members (P-5). Furthermore, the failure of the Security Council to act is particularly relevant in the face of acts of genocide or large-scale violations of human rights. The principle of non-intervention, as the logical corollary of state sovereignty, was one of the main pillars of the Westphalian statesystem.63 Over the past decades, there has been growing recognition that state sovereignty not only implies the exclusive jurisdiction over a particular territory, but also the responsibility of the state to protect

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Ikenberry and Slaughter, op. cit., p. 31. A more secure world, p. 63. Apparently, representatives of China believe that the principle of non-intervention is still the bedrock of the present international system. One of the country’s former ambassadors, Zhan Shiliang, wrote an article, entitled “Non-interference in Other Nation’s Internal Affairs is the Most Important Principle of the New Order (italics added) of International Relations”. See International Studies ( Journal of the China Institute of International Studies), Vol. 5, September 2004, p. 1.

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the people living within its national borders against physical and nonphysical violence.64 In the event of a state being unwilling or unable to fulll this responsibility or, even worse, being the main source of acts of brutality, the international responsibility to protect people must override state sovereignty. The legal basis for setting aside the principle of non-intervention in cases of ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity can be found in the Security Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24 of the UN Charter. It was a major step forward when – as indicated in the previous chapter – the principle of “responsibility to protect” was adopted by world leaders at he UN Summit of September 2005.65 It has been a point of debate whether brutalities arising from political repression in a particular country can be conceived as a threat to the security of other countries. Did the Pinochet regime of Chili in the 1970s or Franco’s Spain much earlier, refusing to join the Axis powers in their battle against Western democracies, really pose a threat to adjacent countries? While these specic historic references may not be convincing to make the point of any causal link between human rights violations and war, it can be argued that the world as a whole would be a much safer place if states complied with standards of human rights law. Either way, the High-level Panel took the view that genocidal acts or other atrocities “can properly be considered a threat to international security”.66 Reviving the ancient doctrine of the just war, the Panel identied a set of guidelines, basically ve criteria of legitimacy, which should always be addressed in considering whether to apply or authorize military force: (1) seriousness of threat, (2) proper purpose, (3) last resort, (4) proportional means, and (5) balance of consequences.67 Of course, 64

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On this subject, again see the groundbreaking Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001). In the 2005 World Summit Outcome world leaders stated that “we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” (p. 31, paragraph 139) A more secure world, p. 65. Ibidem, p. 67. The criteria of the High-level Panel largely corresponds with the guidelines proposed by Barend ter Haar in his Clingendael study Peace or Human rights? The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention (August 2000). The author identies the following seven criteria for a decision to intervene: (1) grave and massive violations

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the problem with applying criteria like these is that armed interventions usually give rise to unforeseen and unintended consequences, and it is not always easy to make sound judgments regarding the necessary means to be used or the likelihood of success.68 Experience suggests that the success of military interventions has many fathers; by contrast, their failure is an orphan.

The position of the UN Security Council Should the UN Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the world, remain the nal arbiter on the use of force in all circumstances? The once legally unassailable position of the most important body of the world organization to determine the lawfulness of military actions has become under attack, especially by those who question not only the Security Council’s capacity to act, in view of the veto-holding power of the permanent members, but also its very legitimacy. In this respect, they argue not only that the composition of the Security Council hardly reects the balance of political and economic forces in today’s world, but also that too many of its members could themselves be criticized for their poor human rights record. Their argument that, morally speaking, the community of democratic nations constitutes a better forum than a UN council to serve as arbiter for distinguishing between the perpetrators and the victims of international aggression is particularly attractive, since the judgments of those nations reect popular preferences – at least indirectly.69 Moreover,

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of fundamental rights or of the threat of such violations, (2) a clear urgency to act and other means not being available, (3) the primary purpose of the intervention is to stop the violations, (4) the action is supported by those for whom it is intended, (5) the opinions of the countries in the region have been taken into account, (6) the action has a reasonable chance of success at acceptable costs, and (7) the action is not likely to lead to larger problems. Nonetheless, in the report In larger freedom Ko Annan recommends that the Security Council adopt a resolution setting out the criteria of the High-level Panel and “expressing its intention to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorize or mandate the use of force.” (p. 33) For a strong defense of this view, see Ivo Daalder, ‘After the UN, what?’ www.tpmcafe.com/story/2005/8/21/132355/837. See also his article in Dutch, ‘Nationale soevereiniteit is geen werkzaam uitgangspunt meer – vroegtijdig ingrijpen moet’ (National sovereignty is no longer a helpful basic principle – preemptive action is a “must”), NRC Handelsblad, 3–4 December, 2005. The above-mentioned report of The Princeton Project on National Security adopts a less radical approach. It proposes the

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there are grounds for the claim that democratic polities are inherently peaceful; at any rate, the historical record shows that democratic states do not ght each other.70 In addition, there is a positive correlation between democratization and the protection of human rights. Hence, the aforementioned Vienna Declaration, accepted by the World Conference on Human Rights in June 1993, clearly endorsed the support of the “international community” for the promotion of democracy throughout the world in relation to the development and respect for human rights.71 Despite its intuitive appeal, the case for sidelining the UN in favor of platforms outside the world organization is, on reection, not persuasive. While the democratic nature of their constituent parts’ political regimes may be an important source of legitimacy of international organizations, the scope of their representation is no less important or may even be more important. As a world organization, the UN derives its legitimacy rst and foremost from its universality, i.e., from the fact that it can speak and act on behalf of all nations in the world, and that all those nations are answerable to it on matters of international peace and security, and – for that matter – increasingly also in the domain of human rights. In this respect, the UN signies a major step forward in comparison to the pre-Second World War League of Nations, which – with the US standing aside – clearly fell short of the standard of universal membership. In practical terms, the UN is based on a set of ground rules that really can be shared by democratic and non-democratic states alike. Transferring the authority with regard to the application of military force from the Security Council to organizations that – like, for example the Western Alliance – represent only a special category of nations, is putting the horse behind the cart.

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establishment of a global “Concert of Democracies”, “functioning as a focal point for efforts to strengthen liberty under law around the world”. This body is not thought to be a substitute for the United Nations as long as there is still a chance to reform the world organization. However, if the restructuring of the UN Security Council in particular proves impossible by the end of the decade, “the Concert could become an alternative forum for the approval of the use of force in cases where the use of the veto at the Security Council prevented free nations from keeping faith with the aims of the U.N. Charter”. (p. 26) See, for example, Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle and Michael Weinstein, The Democratic Advantage: how democracies promote peace and security (New York: Routledge, 2005). See Willem van Genugten a.o., The United Nations of the Future. Globalization with a Human Face (Amsterdam: KIT Publishers, 2006), p. 20.

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Such a shift would create more political damage than bring any advantages. It would be perceived as a form of selectivity and unilateralism and, for this very reason, would certainly be rejected by countries which did not belong to the exclusive club of prosperous countries. It would also send the wrong message to brutal dictators who could be encouraged to take the law into their own hands. Apparently, this danger was recognized by the NATO allies that had used military force in the spring of 1999 to stop Serbia from committing violent attacks on the Muslim population in Kosovo. The military action was taken without the prior approval of the Security Council because of the threat of the Russian (or Chinese) veto. However, a Russian resolution denouncing the NATO intervention hardly won support, giving Western states the opportunity to argue – on the basis of counterfactual reasoning – that the large majority of the Security Council had supported the intervention.72 The right of veto Despite complaints about the lack of resolve on the part of the Security Council, it is understandable that in the discussion about the reform of the Council the right of veto of the permanent members was not seriously challenged. Although the rule, more than any other single factor, has proved to be the biggest cause of the UN’s multiple failures, it was originally designed to keep the potentially unilateralist Great Powers inside the UN tent. Now no less than in the past, it is far better to allow any of the permanent members to be obstructionist than for it to walk out. Paul Kennedy argues73 that the decision of the United States to go it alone over the Iraqi war, without explicit UN approval, should not be seen as a failure of the UN system, but rather that it had worked by allowing the US, although much criticized, to do what it wanted to do without having to leave the organization. At any rate, it would have been quite unrealistic to produce proposals to amend the UN Charter

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An independent international panel had concluded that the use of force was legitimate even though it was not approved in advance by the Security Council. See The Kosovo Report: Report of the Independent Commission on Kosovo (Oxford: Oxford University Press). In his latest book The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations (New York: Random House, 2006). It is interesting to note that the subtitle of the British edition of this book (published by Penguin/Allen Lane) deviates from the American. It reads The United Nations and the Quest for World Government. Apparently, the publisher wished to take into account the sensitivities of American conservatives to encroachments on US sovereignty.

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on this politically sensitive subject, if only because changing the Charter would require the support of each permanent member. At rst glance, the veto problem has been reduced to manageable proportions after the eclipse of the divide between the Soviet Union and the Western countries. Thus, the post-Cold War era is marked by a sharp decline in the use of veto. While as many as 193 vetoes were invoked during the rst 45 years of the UN’s history, there were only twelve substantive vetoes from January 1990 to June 2003.74 However, this does not mean that the threat of the use of the veto no longer affected the Security Council, as testied by the Council’s dealings with the Kosovo conict and with Iraq prior to the Anglo-American invasion. The rule of anticipated reaction explains why permanent members refrained from introducing resolutions that did not stand a chance of being passed. Nowadays, the permanent members appear to want to avoid public showdowns regarding their disagreements, a far cry from the propaganda battles in the Security Council at the height of the Cold War. The High-level Panel recommended that the use of veto be limited to matters of vital interest. It also called on the permanent members to pledge themselves to refrain from its use in the case of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses.75 Given the serious nature of the problem of seeking collective legitimacy for military intervention, formulas aimed at limiting the exercise of veto power should remain on the agenda, at least for longer than the immediate future. In line with the more radical proposals advanced by The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty76 it is possible to imagine a code of conduct which stipulates that the permanent members can justify the use of veto only if they claim that their supreme national interests are at stake in matters of peace and security. Any permanent member invoking a national interest clause would be required to provide proof of the alleged harm to its national interest. The Security Council could judge how reasonable this claim by the veto-using member was in a special declaratory resolution.

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See David M. Malone, ‘Introduction’, in Malone (ed.), op. cit., p. 7. A more secure world, p. 82. Even this modest suggestion was not adopted in the 2005 World Summit Outcome. Again see the report The Responsibility to Protect, pp. 51–54. The more radical proposals put forward by the International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention may be explained by the simple fact that, unlike the High-level Panel, no representative of China was on the Commission.

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The report of The Princeton Project on National Security, denouncing the veto as “a license for prevarication, obstructionism, and disillusionment”, emphasizes the possibility of developing rules and procedures for authorizing the use of force retroactively “in cases demanding immediate action or in which political stalemate has effectively blocked all action”.77 It proposes replacing the veto by a supermajority vote – of perhaps three-quarters of voting members – in an enlarged Security Council.78 Of course, another way-out of the decision making stalemates in the Security Council is the application of the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism by the UN General Assembly, as adopted in November 1950 at the time of the Korean War.79 The use of this mechanism can especially be considered when regional organizations reach a consensus on the need for military coercion in their particular region, but only one of the Permanent Five refuses to endorse authorization by the Security Council under Article 53.1 of the UN Charter. In a political setting in which the Security Council fails to act, a resolution adopted by the General Assembly by at least two-thirds of its members, however non-binding, can be seen as an important source of legitimacy for military action. Needless to say, any attempt to constrain the veto power of the P-5 requires a positive and accommodative approach by the US. In the run up to the Iraq War, the George W. Bush administration has castigated the Security Council for its indecisiveness and lack of action to meet the challenge of Saddam Hussein. Indeed, more than a dozen resolutions were passed, yet not one of them was fully enforced. But the expression “you cannot have your cake and eat it” also applies to the US. In other words, should the US be given the opportunity to benet from more exible voting rules, thereby circumventing the vetoes of others, it could not be exempted from limitations on its veto power itself. While short-term considerations of the national interest could lead to the conclusion that the cost of limiting the national freedom to act outweighs the advantages of international legitimacy, in the long term the balance of costs and benets could change as resentment of 77

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This suggestion was adopted from Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, ‘The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal’, Ethics and International Affairs, 18 (1), Winter 2004, pp. 1–12. Ikenberry and Slaughter, op. cit., p. 25. On this subject, see Nico J. Schrijver, ‘The Future of the Charter of the United Nations’, in A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 10, 2006 (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill N.V., 2006), pp. 14–15.

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the unilateral use of American power increases throughout the world.80 Apart from spreading the nancial burden, the support of others is likely to be helpful in sharing the political and other risks of military intervention. Besides, the US has often been keen to push the Security Council to take action, rather than not. Consequently, it is less dependent on the veto mechanism than other permanent members.81

Conclusion In their contributions to the publication The Security Council and the Use of Force 82 Nico Schrijver, Michael Wood and Juta Brunnée are in agreement that UN members are not well advised to relax the ban on the use of military force which was so difcult to achieve. They argue for caution with regard to creating more room for unilateral military action. In their judgment, non-military instruments are often more effective. They support the position taken by the High-level Panel that the existing exceptions in provisions of the UN Charter regarding the ban on military force is exible enough to allow for military coercion in new crisis situations, if necessary. Two comments could be made in this respect. First, whatever the usefulness of military coercion (and obviously there are clear limitations),83 this issue has become pressing in the context of the ght against terrorist organizations and the states that support them. Secondly, seeking authorization for the use of military force through multilateral channels, particularly the Security Council, may lead to indecisiveness or even procrastination. A practical understanding of the right of self-defense can be formulated along the following lines. The claim by the US to the preemptive use of force might be accepted by other countries, if this option were restricted to situations of imminent threat. This means an extension

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The Pew Global Attitudes Project, in which 15 countries are surveyed, provides data about the global image of the US. The results of the opinion poll released by the Pew Research Center on 13 June, 2006, showed a further weakening of international respect for the US. For this argument, see Ikenberry and Slaughter, op. cit., p. 25. Full title The Security Council and the Use of Force. Theory and Reality – A Need for Change? (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005) edited by Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver. See, for example, Rob de Wijk, The Art of Military Coercion. Why the West’s Military Superiority Scarcely Matters (Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2005).

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of the right of self-defense to anticipatory self-defense, a development that appears to be supported by many international lawyers. Some might argue that the right of anticipatory self-defense is already part of customary international law. Of course, the US would continue to be obliged to explain, beyond any reasonable doubt, why the use of force was necessary and why there is no longer time to obtain multilateral authorization. Strikes should be proportionate to the scope of the threat and based on intelligence whose degree of truthfulness is also beyond any reasonable doubt. In return for allowing a certain latitude in the use of force the US would have to agree that preemption would be reserved for special cases and not form the centerpiece of American strategy.84 In all cases other than those involving an imminent threat, international authorization of the use of force would be required even for the most powerful states. In this respect, the distinction between the preemptive and the preventive use of force remains essential. In the latter scenario, where there is no pressure of time, the demand for multilateral approval is imperative. In conclusion, the most prudent way of nding the balance between effectiveness and legitimacy in the use of military force is not to weaken the formal authority of the Security Council, but to extend the right of self-defense in the light of the changing security threats. Although every American president since the UN’s establishment has acted at one time or another without the approval of the Security Council, unilateral American operations should remain the rare exception, not the basic rule of US strategy. This is the obvious lesson of Iraq. The other major nations have a similar responsibility to take the new challenges seriously, and not to treat them as being beyond the sole responsibility of America. This position seems to be consistent with Richard Gardner’s view, expressed in his thought provoking article “Neither Bush nor the ‘Jurisprudes’ ”, that the US “needs to claim no more from international law”, and that the rest of the world “should concede no less”.85 As elaborated in this chapter, hegemonic powers cannot systematically break the law without impunity. As president Harry Truman stated at the UN’s founding conference in San Francisco: “We all have to recognize, no matter how great our strength, that we must deny ourselves 84

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This formulation is drawn from the report of Council on Foreign Relations, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership (New York, 2004), p. 18. Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush nor the ‘Jurisprudes’, American Journal of International Law, 97 (3), 2003, p. 590.

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the license to do always as we please.”86 This is a far cry of the Bush doctrine’s reservations about “submitting to the objections of a few”. At the same time, weaker powers are forced to keep a ne line of according a degree of deference to the hegemon and tolerating occasional demonstrations of unilateralism, on the one hand, and defending the wider interest of keeping the hegemon – at least partially – integrated in the legal system and protecting the legal system by constraining the self-interested impulses of the powerful, on the other.

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www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/un’large/documents.

CHAPTER SIX

AN AGENDA FOR WORLD ORDER: FROM NATIONAL SECURITY TO HUMAN SECURITY

As pointed out in the rst chapter, the traditional concept of international order is very much centered on national security. Security threats were assumed to emanate from external sources, in particular as the result of international anarchy. The overriding concern of national security was the protection of the state, specically its boundaries, people, institutions and values, against foreign attacks. The focus of security policies was largely on the military capabilities that should be built in order to offset the match of potential enemies, as well as on the design of appropriate strategies to link these capabilities to political objectives. More recently, the common understanding of the notion of security and the nature of threats has broadened. In addition to securing borders and people from outside aggression, there is a growing awareness of dangers arising from internal situations. The concept of security has been widened to include economic and social threats, such as poverty, infectious disease, nuclear meltdown, and environmental degradation.1 While these threats are not politically motivated, in contrast with belligerent nationalism and religious extremism, they are equally dangerous. It has become fashionable to speak of human security in juxtaposition with national or state security. Human security refers to the security of individual human beings which includes not only their physical safety, but also their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity, and the protection of their human rights. The concept represents a people-centered approach to foreign policy which is based on the belief that lasting stability cannot be achieved until individuals are protected against physical and non-physical threats. It is about both “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”, expressions dating back to president Franklin Roosevelt’s famous four freedoms.

1

The High-level Group considers these threats to be on an equal footing with interstate conict, internal conict, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and organized crime. See the report A more secure world, p. 2.

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The report of UN Commission on Human Security, chaired by Sadako Ogata (the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and Amartya Sen (the receiver of the 1998 Nobel Memorial Prize for economics), submits that human security complements state security, promotes human development and enhances human rights. Thus, it focuses on basic human needs and on insecurities that have not been considered state security threats.2 In view of this comprehensive approach to security, this chapter does not limit itself to a discussion of threats that are some of the most acute security threats in today’s world, namely the challenge posed by international (or transnational) terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Certainly, it is widely recognized that terrorist organizations in possession of WMD could produce a horric scenario of unknown proportions. But to do justice to the idea of human security, the chapter also includes a discussion of the so-called Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that link the goal of economic development to peace, security and human freedoms.

Combating terrorism The phenomenon of terrorism understandably stirs up many emotions, which makes it difcult to reach agreement on a common denition. However, the essence of terrorism is politically inspired violence. Determining what use of violence is legitimate under what circumstances is a source of deep dissent. It is a cliché to say that one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom ghter. After several failed attempts the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution in October 2004, in the following terms dening terrorism on the basis of existing treaties: “. . . criminal acts, including against the civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and all other acts which constitutes offences, 2

The report of the Commission was issued in New York, 1 May 2003. For an interesting attempt to apply the concept of human security to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, see Marlies Glasius & Mary Kaldor, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. Project, Principles, Practicalities (Oxford: Routledge, 2005).

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within the scope of and as dened in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature . . .”3 This long-winded formulation reects the political sensitivities and divisions in relation to terrorism. One of these was whether or not to include “state terrorism” in the denition. Five core elements stand out (1) physical action, (2) intended to cause death or serious bodily harm, (3) to civilians or non-combatants, and (4) with the purpose of intimidating a population, or (5) compelling a government or an international organization. Terrorism is an asymmetric instrument or tactic of violence – it is the weakest form of irregular warfare. Terrorism as such does not represent a hostile organization or party. Incidents of terrorism date back to the years immediately after the French revolution. Terrorism has been applied by revolutionaries in late 19th century Russia and many other places. But the rise of catastrophic terrorism, characterized by largescale horric acts, occurred only in the last quarter of the 20th century. The technologies associated with globalization have enabled terrorist groups to conduct operations that are more lethal, more dispersed, and more difcult to combat than those in the past. Three specic factors have led to the growth of transnational terrorism: (1) the expansion of air travel, (2) the wider availability of televised news coverage (“the oxygen that sustains terrorism”), and (3) broad common political and ideological interests. James Kiras points out that these changes allowed terrorism to grow from a local and regional phenomenon to an international threat.4 Modern communication technologies also offered terrorists the opportunity to sustain a global network of participants and sympathizers. Their organizations range from a fully functioning state such as Iran to small groups (“cells”) in Western cities. As indicated above, the more terrorists can exploit technological advantages, the more difcult it becomes to combat them. Combating terrorism involves anti-terrorism efforts and counter-terrorism efforts. The former are related to measures to protect against or mitigate future terrorist attacks; the latter refer to more proactive actions designed to retaliate against or forestall terrorist actions. The expression “combating terrorism” suggests the existence of a unied terrorist movement with a

3 4

S/RES/1566, 8 October 2004. James D. Kiras, Terrorism and Globalization, Baylis and Smith, op. cit., p. 482.

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common ideology and strategy. Nothing could be further from the truth. Audry Kurth Cronin has identied four types of terrorist organizations currently (or recently) operating around the world, categorized mainly on the basis of the source of their motivation: (1) left-wing terrorists (such as the German Red Army Faction and the Italian Red Brigades), (2) right-wing-terrorists (such as the racist Weathermen in the US), (3) ethnonationalist/separatist terrorists (such as the Irish Republican Army and the Basque separatist ETA movement), and (4) religious or “sacred” terrorists (such as the Islamic Jihad Organization).5 Explaining the phenomenon The factors that motivate groups to use violence indiscriminately for political ends largely correspond to the direction of the explanations that have been sought to come to grips with the growth of terrorism as a global phenomenon. First, there are economic explanations, rooted in the idea that globalization has created a new form of imperialism that favors the US and the post-industrial states of Western Europe, and harms the interests of underdeveloped countries. Higher standards of living and greater educational opportunities may create rising expectations among members of under-classes that, if unfullled, could lead to their embracing extreme political views and support for action against the vested political institutions. Secondly, there are cultural explanations, assuming that movements which reject Western modernism with its secular, materialist values and attempt to protect their own unique cultural identity, are the main driving forces behind terrorism. The struggle between fundamentalism and modernism is likely to determine the future of Islam in particular. A clear instance of this kind of explanations is Samuel Huntington’s famous “clash of civilizations” thesis, suggesting that there is a major cultural fault-line between two civilizations based on a universalistic creed: the liberal Western civilization and an Islamic one which is “humiliated and resentful of the West’s military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West’s overwhelming military dominance, and . . . [unable] to shape their own destiny”.6 Thirdly and nally, explanations have been developed linking present-day terrorism to religious movements, particularly the global

5

6

Audry Kurth Cronin, ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism’, International Security, 27 (3), 2002, p. 39. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, 72 (3), 1993, p. 32.

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jihad which is accepted by radical Islamic sects. These movements are believed to seek the resuscitation of the Islamic caliphate of the 14th century, purging Islam of all modernist inuences. To those who support the holy war against Western countries, terrorism is legitimized because of the perceived oppression of Muslims worldwide and the spiritual bankruptcy of these countries.7 The use of the word “war” as a metaphor for the ght against international (or transnational) terrorism is misleading in as much as this ght cannot be won in the same way as wars can. Like common crime it can probably never be completely rooted out, but can only be contained and redressed. In this context, “winning” means creating a secure environment inside of which a government and people can function. Presumably, the real ght against terrorism is carried not as much as with big armies and ghter planes as with the protracted mobilization of law enforcement ofcials and intelligence experts. The second chapter, which dealt with the complex relationship between peace and justice, made some observations on how to ght terrorism. It was argued that for this to be effective, both the symptoms and underlying (“root”) causes would have to be addressed. This means that would-be terrorists must not only be prevented or stopped from committing acts of political violence, but that the reasons why oppressed and underprivileged people regard terrorism as the appropriate and legitimate weapon to advance political causes must also be examined. It was also pointed out that the roots of terrorism are manifold. Different contexts breed different threats. Antiterrorism strategies Nonetheless, it is possible to make a few generalizations on the general direction of combating terrorism. Thus, if the threat of terrorism is to be related to poor living conditions in developing countries or the marginalization of particular groups in countries where there many immigrants (“home-grown terrorism”),8 then economic growth and a fairer distribution of wealth in the former and a policy of social

7 8

Kiras, op. cit., p. 486. In his book Globalized Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006) the French Islam expert Olivier Roy analyzes the process of alienation and radicalization of Muslims belonging to the second and third generation of immigrants in Western European societies. Increasingly, terrorist networks are recruiting their members from those categories.

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integration in the latter could provide an effective cure, at least in the long term. If, on the other hand, the threat arises from opposition to modernization and cultural differences, and if Islamist terrorism only really recruits members by appealing to a sense of Muslim humiliation and rage against the West, another strategy must be employed – a strategy of dialogue with moderates and ideological confrontation with radicals, many of whom see themselves as victims. At any rate, counter-terrorism should not be conducted along only one line with only one type of protagonist. It does not make any sense either to confront terrorists with highly publicized campaigns in which counter-terrorism features as “war”. These campaigns are likely to backre because they play into terrorists’ preferred conception of an apocalyptic struggle between good and evil. They lend the terrorists’ cause legitimacy that it does not deserve. According to the report of the Princeton Project on National Security: A smarter counter-terrorism strategy would remind people around the world at every opportunity that al Qaeda and other global terrorist networks are criminal enterprises run by people who are no better than gangsters. They may be criminals with a cause, but they are still criminals – the plotters, aiders, abetters, and perpetrators of deliberate mass murder of innocents.9

This advise, which is in stark contrast with the ofcial rhetoric of American policies, seems to be well-founded. Jessica Stern explains10 that jihadi terrorists often start out as “true believers” who are seduced and sometimes victimized by a false notion, i.e., the idea that the West is deliberately aiming to destroy the Islamic world, thus deliberately striving to harm and humiliate Muslims. She admits that military action, provided it is kept to a minimum and is carefully planned and implemented, may be necessary to combat Islamic terrorism. But she forcefully makes the point that the tools to defeat terrorism are neither bombs nor torture chambers. In fact, the appropriate weapons are ideas and stories that counter the terrorist “narrative”. Whether Stern’s view is right or wrong, it is clear that the ght against jihadi terrorists can only be won by making western values more attractive to hundreds of millions of Muslims than those of its

9 10

Ikenberry and Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty Under Law, p. 40. In her book Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper Collins, 2003).

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fanatical opponents. It is also clear that groups of terrorists need to be isolated from the masses on whose behalf they claim the right to indiscriminately kill innocent human beings with the sole purpose of undermining people’s trust in their government or political leaders. It is imperative to separate extremists, the hard-core ghters, from moderates and erode the popular support for the terrorist camp. As has often been noted, the overwhelming majority of Muslims do not recognize their religion in the image of Islam projected by Al Qaeda (“The Base” or “The Foundation”). Muslim leaders should be encouraged to speak out in ways that de-legitimize terrorism as a tool for advancing political causes and shame its supporters. In his 2006 report Uniting against Terrorism, the UN Secretary-General spelt out ve key elements for a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy: (1) sending clear signals to dissatised groups and malcontents that terrorism is no legitimate instrument to achieve political objectives, (2) denying violent groups the means to commit terrorist acts, (3) deterring states to lend support to terrorist groups, (4) improving the capacity of states to combat terrorism and (5) securing the respect for human rights while conducting this combat.11 The last element was included to address the concern, especially in Western democracies, that the balance between security and civil liberties might be tilting too much towards disproportionate and illegitimate infringements of human rights. This comprehensive strategy corresponds with the notion of human security which was discussed in the introduction to this chapter. In this approach, the focus should not only be on the physical security of citizens but also on social security and individual rights. The involvement of international organizations As terrorism will become more and decentralized and spread their networks of cells like Al Qaeda across dozens of countries, connecting with regional and separatist struggles (like those in Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir, Mindanao and southern Thailand),12 international cooperation and coordination is increasingly essential. As many as 13 anti-terrorist conventions and protocols have been concluded in the framework of

11 12

Doc. A/60/825, 27 April 2006. See Rik Coolsaet and Teun Van de Voorde, The evolution of terrorism in 2005, a statistical assessment (Gent: Department of Political Science, February 2006).

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the General Assembly of the United Nations. These treaties deal with a wide spectrum of activities related to terrorism. The most important obligations are those which oblige states to adopt internal enforcement measures and outlaw any assistance to terrorist organizations.13 In addition to measures adopted in the UN framework, actions have been taken at the regional level. Thus, for example, the OECD-supported Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering issued eight special recommendations on terrorist nancing. Immediately after the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, the EU adopted the so-called Plan for Action on Combating Terrorism. One of the objectives of this Plan was to increase the European intelligence capacity and improve cooperation between the national intelligence services of EU member states, which are jealously guarded bastions of national sovereignty. Another part of the Plan was the proposal to monitor suspect banking transactions in real time. In May 2005, the Council of Europe adopted a Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. This treaty deserves special attention because, amongst other things, it penalizes the so-called “public provocation” of terrorist acts, giving rise to discussions about the limits of the freedom of speech.14 However, as pointed out in the Report of the UN High-level Panel,15 far too many states have chosen to remain outside the international conventions which were concluded and not all the countries which ratied the conventions implemented the treaty obligations. Most of these states are located in Africa and West Asia – regions that are prone to terrorism. The governments concerned justied their decision to stay outside the treaties regime by referring to the lack of provisions that recognize the right of resistance to occupying powers, or criminalize state terrorism. They are clearly accusing Israel in this respect. Although the great majority of Western governments recognize the objections of the Palestinian people to Israeli policies, they nd it hard to accept these objections as an excuse for failing to support counter-terrorism efforts in general. From this point of view, the conclusion appears to be clear: the countries involved must be urged, and if necessary pressured by the 13

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See Nico Schrijver, ‘September 11 and Challenges to International Law’, in Jane Boulden & Thomas G. Weiss (eds), Terrorism and the UN Before and After September 11 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 58–61. See Christian Tomuschat, Further Steps of the Council of Europe with a view to Combating Terrorism, in Human Rights Law Journal, 26 (5–8), 2005, pp. 157–160. A more secure world, p. 49.

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large majority of states with economic sanctions, to assume their responsibilities in the international regime being developed. Furthermore, it would be sensible to put the different treaties together in a single, wide-ranging treaty. This would create better conditions for implementing one coherent strategy rather than the current fragmented approach based on so many disparate legal documents. The Security Council has come to play a leading part in lling the gaps in counter-terrorism strategy. Even before the terrorist attacks of September 2001 the UN body applied sanctions against individuals and states that supported terrorism.16 Immediately after 9/11, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, imposing uniform, mandatory counter-terrorist obligations on all states and establishing a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor compliance and to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to states. Although these actions led to some member states ending their support for terrorism while mobilizing other states in the ght against it, Council sanctions against Al Qaeda and the Taliban suffer from a lack of support and implementation by other states. Moreover, a number of states are not yet in full compliance with the directives of the CTC.17 Since UN-facilitated assistance is limited to providing technical expertise, states seeking operational support for counter-terrorism activities have no alternative but to seek bilateral assistance. To facilitate this the High-level Panel proposed extending the authority of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate of the UN Secretariat to act as a clearing-house for the state-to-state provision of military forces, police ofcers and border control assistance to develop domestic counter-terrorism capacities.18 This proposal may be useful, but it does not address the problem that the CTC itself has no authority to impose sanctions. It can only blacklist states which support terrorism by “naming, shaming and praising” them, which in the context of counter-terrorism is all but an admission of weakness.

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For a summary of related UN Security Council resolutions, see Dick A. Leurdijk and Geert Steeghs, Decision-making by the Security Council: Terrorist Acts which threaten international peace and security, 1989 –2004 (The Hague: The Clingendael Institute, 2005). See David Cortright, A Critical Evaluation of the UN Counter-Terrorism Program: Accomplishments and Challenges (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, April 2005). By adopting Resolution 1267 the Security Council had already established the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee and the subsequent Resolution 1540 created another separate Committee dealing with Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction. A more secure world, p. 50.

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Finally, the collapse of the state structures in some countries or the limited capacity of governments in other countries to provide even the most basic services to their people offer opportunities to terrorist groups to use those countries’ territories as safe havens and staging grounds for their operations. Building viable political institutions in so-called failed or failing states, aimed at regaining territorial control, must for that reason be part of a long-range counter-terrorism strategy. It is signicant that the UN Charter is no longer seen as a barrier to international interference in states with weak institutions. Thus, since the mid-1990s, the Security Council has authorized military interventions in states unable to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe (Somalia), following the deposition of the elected head of government (Haiti), and in the wake of economic collapse and social disorder (Albania).19 In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the attention of the UN was focused immediately on another state with a weak central government, Afghanistan. Taking the security concerns of the US seriously, the Council adopted a resolution paving the way for the US-led operation “Enduring Freedom” against the Taliban regime because of its support to Al Qaeda. However, the core problem at present lies not as much in obstacles to take action against states that are unable to undertake their obligations. The problem is the lack of political resolve to do so against states that, in spite of their having effective institutions, refuse to comply with their commitments. Clearly, this shortcoming has encouraged the US and other countries to embark on unilateral actions.

Non-proliferation The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, that is to say the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (NBC),20 poses a growing threat to international stability. This applies particularly to nuclear weapons. To be sure, there are those who hold that the proliferation of those weapons is not such a bad thing, as it could act as restraint on 19

20

See Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, Making States Work. From State Failure to State-building (New York: International Peace Academy, July 2004), p. 8. Radiological weapons (“dirty bombs”) may be added to the three categories. These weapons, which can rely simply on radioactive materials, are more weapons of mass disruption than mass destruction. Their immediate destructive effect is only as great as a conventional explosive while their radiation effects are likely to be limited.

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parties in conict-prone regions. In the early 1980s Kenneth Waltz, for one, argued that new nuclear states will feel the constraints imposed by nuclear weapons, creating a sense of responsibility and a strong degree of caution with regard to their use. In his opinion, the likelihood of war decreases as nuclear deterrent capabilities increase.21 In fact, he argued for a mega-balance of power of all against all. However, the majority view is that further nuclear proliferation is likely to increase the potential for conict between states. A compelling argument is that deterrence becomes impossibly complicated, when many balances of power have to be considered by many different actors at the same time, thus increasing the likelihood of accidental wars as the result of misperception or miscalculation. Another consideration is that new nuclear powers, especially if they concern less developed countries, will lack the resources to manage the elaborate command and control systems required to stabilize strategic relationships. A vocal critic of Waltz, Scott Sagan, submits that future nuclear-armed states cannot be expected to have the positive constraining mechanisms of civilian control, since they will be controlled by the military or have unstable governments.22 Furthermore, since new nuclear states are not likely to possess reliable second-strike forces in the form of assured retaliatory capabilities, they may be under strong pressure to strike rst in crisis situations. This doomsday scenario could be relevant in the present strategic relationship between India and Pakistan. All these arguments for the destabilizing impact of nuclear proliferation carry more weight in the face of nuclear terrorism. As emphasized in the previous chapter, the combination of terrorism and NBC weapons poses one of the main threats today. It is useful to remember that terrorist groups had carried out attacks using NBCs even before September 2001, the best-known being the Sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995. The threat of nuclear terrorism differs from the threats of the protagonists during the Cold War in that deterrence is not likely to work against the network-like structures of present-day transnational or global terrorist organizations, which are not rooted in a particular territory and whose members do not seem to care much for their own

21

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Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better. Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). Waltz made the caveat that the nuclear proliferation must be gradual to serve this purpose. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1995).

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lives. Therefore the transfer of nuclear weapons to these organizations must be prevented, if necessary by force, as a last resort. Motives for acquiring WMD weapons What are the motives of states to have an arsenal of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction? Strategic reasons or security considerations are often cited as the main justication. States have sought to produce or acquire NBC weapons either to deter the use of these weapons by other parties or to compensate for their shortcomings in conventional weaponry – the rationale for the deployment of theater nuclear weapons in European NATO-countries during the Cold War. Insofar as states also wanted to have nuclear capabilities in order to conduct coercive diplomacy, i.e., the strategy to force political concessions from opponents by intimidating them with the threat of these terrifying weapons, the post-WW II record does not include any convincing examples of successful atomic diplomacy.23 In the present case of Iran, it is widely speculated that the leaders in Tehran regard the development of their own nuclear force as the best protection against outside military intervention, believing that the US would not have attacked Iraq if Saddam Hussein had possessed a nuclear bomb. As Mark Leonard succinctly formulates: The lesson that the Iranians drew from the Iraq war is that the only way to be safe from American invasion is to have a nuclear deterrent – and the challenge is to develop it quickly while American troops are still bogged down in Iraq.24

However, apart from strategic and security reasons states are also motivated to go nuclear by other considerations. They expect to gain from it political and prestige benets. Like colonies in the late 19th century, nuclear weapons are still believed to be the symbols of the status of great power; they are considered to be the entrance ticket to the High Table of international affairs. It is no coincidence that the permanent members of the Security Council are nuclear powers. In addition, 23

24

Early November 1956, the Soviet prime minister, Nikolai Bulganin, threatened to atten the capitals of Great Britain and France with atomic weapons, if they refused to withdraw their troops from Egypt after invading the country. However, it was not this threat but American economic pressure that made the two European countries withdraw. Mark Leonard, Why Europe will run the 21st century (London: Bloomberg, 2005).

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the availability of nuclear technology, bureaucratic pressures and the encouragement of the national community of nuclear scientists may propel a state towards nuclear weapons.25 Good and bad news The good news is that the number of states to acquire NBC weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, over the last few years is far lower than predicted during the Cold War.26 More than four decades ago, the US president John F. Kennedy warned that within a decade fteen to twenty-ve states might obtain nuclear weapons.27 Apparently, this warning acted as a self-denying prophecy. To date, the number of nuclear states is limited to ve “ofcial” nuclear weapons states (the US, Russia, China, Great Britain and France), and three de facto ones (India, Pakistan and Israel).28 A number of positive developments have occurred since the early 1990s. Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons and acceded to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), placing their nuclear programs and materials under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Of these countries, South Africa even dismantled existing nuclear devices. Furthermore, the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan) were willing to transfer inherited arsenals to Russia and agreed to sign the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. As far as addressing the threat of chemical weapons is concerned, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force in 1997. Since then, twelve states (among them the

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27 28

See Darryl Howlett, ‘Nuclear proliferation’, in Baylis & Smith, op. cit., pp. 508– 509. The factual summary in this section largely derives from the report of the International Peace Academy Weapons of Mass Destruction and the United Nations: Diverse Threats and Collective Responses (New York, June 2004). The author wishes to acknowledge the drafters of the report. The New York Times, March 22, 1963, p. 4. Iran and North Korea are widely believed to have covertly developed the capacity to build nuclear weapons. On February 10, 2005, the government of North Korea announced that the country had developed a nuclear capability. On October 9, 2006, it claimed to have successfully detonated an underground nuclear explosion, fueling fears of a destructive new arms race in East Asia. The – putative – test amounted to the breaking of a de facto global moratorium that has been in place for nearly a decade. On October 14, 2006 the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against North Korea (Resolution 1718) under article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

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US, Russia and China) have declared their intention to destroy existing chemical weapons production facilities. Libya’s decision in 2004 to dismantle its NBC programs under the terms of the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was hailed as yet another victory in the non-proliferation campaign. The bad news is that NBC weapons have become more accessible. As regards nuclear weapons, ample time has passed for signicant dissemination of nuclear technology and know-how. A black market has emerged. Since the NPT actually promotes the peaceful use of nuclear equipment and materials, states cannot be blamed for pursuing this option. But the main problem arises from the fact that technological advances have further blurred the distinction between the use of nuclear technology and materials intended for peaceful and for military purposes. More countries have made determined efforts to acquire technology to produce the ssile material which can be used in nuclear weapons. At present, around 40 countries are assumed to have the ability, in theory, to develop nuclear weapons. Advances in chemical and biological research have also revealed the dilemma of dual-use technology, creating new opportunities for their malicious purposes. As pointed out above, the prospect of terrorist organizations gaining access to NBC weapons has added a special dimension to the threat of man-made mass destruction. Terrorists are more likely than governments of established states to use these weapons as soon as possible after acquiring them, rather than maintaining them for deterrence.29 Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty The NPT should be regarded as the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, i.e., the total complex of treaties, commitments, institutions, norms and practices for the prevention of nuclear weapons. The Treaty, which entered into force in 1970, is based on four principles: (1) the obligation of each nuclear-weapon state not to transfer nuclear weapons to any other state or to assist other states in manufacturing those weapons, (2) the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon states not to receive the transfer of nuclear weapons from any nuclear state nor to manufacture those weapons itself, (3) the right of all parties to the

29

International Peace Academy Report, p. 3.

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Treaty – nuclear states and non-nuclear states – to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and (4) the obligation of all parties “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament” (Article VI). Basically, the NPT is a trade-off between the interests of the nuclear states (the “haves”) and the non-nuclear states (the “have-nots”): in return for the commitment to refrain from trying to obtain nuclear weapons the “have-nots” receive technical assistance in developing their nuclear industry and an undertaking by the “haves” to engage in nuclear disarmament. For many non-Western states the right to the unconditional peaceful use of technology, including the prospect of receiving assistance from technologically advanced states was a powerful motive for acceding to the Treaty.30 One of the inherent weaknesses of the NPT is that while pretending to comply with treaty obligations, state parties can develop all necessary components for a nuclear weapons program, including the stockpiling of ssile materials, and then withdraw from the treaty – as North Korea did in 2003 – to develop nuclear weapons. This option for state parties to withdraw (the so-called breakout capacity) should make us aware of the limitations of judging political intentions on the basis of technical advances. Another weakness of the Treaty stems not only from its lack of a permanent administrative body,31 but from the incongruity of the objectives of the Treaty and the IAEA, which limit the role of the Security Council. State compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements is not identical to compliance with obligations under the NPT. Thus, for example, the IAEA safeguards are not applied to technology that could be used for the development of a nuclear device. Moreover, the Agency cannot inspect beyond what has been declared by member states. Consequently, while the safeguards system may be able to detect inconsistencies in state declarations, safeguards cannot prevent proliferation. On the other hand, the NPT does not directly

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(Netherlands’) Advisory Council on International Affairs, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. The Importance of an Integrated Multilateral Approach (The Hague, January 2006), p. 7. A poor substitute for supervising the implementation of the treaty, every ve years a so-called review conference takes place, which tends to be burdened by the pressure of reaching a consensus on a nal document. The last NPT Review Conference took place in New York, May 2005.

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assign a responsibility to the Security Council in cases of possible non-compliance with its safeguards agreements. Certainly, the IAEA Statute allows the Board of Governors of this organization to refer such cases to the Council, but the Chinese and Russian representatives on the Board have frequently objected to referrals to the Security Council. Sending the Iranian case to the Council at the beginning of 2006, after lengthy political haggling, should be seen as the exception rather than the rule. In contrast with the NPT as well as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the CWC has established a robust implementation framework outside the United Nations. It has developed its own restrictions on the export of dual-use technology and set up a comprehensive verication framework. However, a great deal of implementation work remains to be accomplished, while many components of the regime remain untested. Moreover, only a fraction of the global chemical weapons stockpile has been destroyed and many countries of concern (including Egypt, Israel, Syria and North Korea) have chosen to remain outside the Treaty. The forecast for the implementation of the BWC, which amounts to “little more than a gentleman’s agreement”, is very gloomy. In spite of advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering, disagreements over proper investigative approaches have prevented any agreements on strengthening verication measures. Initiatives outside the framework of the treaties The weaknesses in the non-proliferation regime prompted the US and its allies to put greater emphasis on so-called ad-hoc initiatives and unilateral responses to address gaps in the treaties until these could be closed in the negotiations process. Examples are the Nuclear Suppliers Group, focusing on further restrictions on the exports of nuclear technology and materials to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the Australia Groups which have introduced licensing measures to try to ensure that the exports of certain chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment do not contribute to the spread of chemical and biological weapons. Another example is the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Program, commonly known as Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR). The purpose of CTR is to reduce threats posed by poorly guarded NBC arsenals of the former Soviet Union, inter alia, by destroying outdated stockpiles. From the point of view of strengthening the treaty regimes, it is a cause of grave

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concern that, more recently, unilateral responses have become even more common as alternatives to strengthening the multilateral framework.32 The US became reluctant to engage in any multilateral negotiations stressing the importance of acting promptly and forcefully against proliferating states. It formally retreated from a number of international nonproliferation frameworks, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Ad Hoc Group for the BWC. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 fuelled a urry of new unilateral initiatives. They included the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), involving efforts to interdict maritime and air shipments suspected to contain NBC-related cargoes,33 and the G-8 Global Partnership, committing the members of the G-8 to spend up to $20 billion for threat reduction projects over ten years. Finally, in March 2006 the US concluded an agreement with India on a strategic partnership. American recognition of India’s status as a nuclear power was a key element of the agreement. In return for accepting IAEA safeguards for its civilian nuclear facilities, India was permitted to buy nuclear materials and technology that it had not been entitled to receive because it had not signed the NPT. In fact, the deal permitted India to have all the advantages of being a signatory to the NPT without actually acceding to it. The US move was criticized by other governments on the grounds that it undermined condence in the Treaty and sent the wrong signal to countries like Iran and North Korea.34 In dealing with the threat of nuclear proliferation the American policy had started to make a distinction between friendly and adversary countries. In fact, the US has acquiesced to the development of nuclear weapons technology in India, Pakistan and Israel because the intentions of these states were believed to be compatible with long-range American objectives. At the same time, the US strongly opposed the spread of nuclear weapons to Iran and North Korea because these countries were governed by hostile autocratic

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Ibidem, p. 7. South Korea had not joined the PSI, concerned that intercepting North Korea cargo ships containing military equipment might lead to a military confrontation. Despite this criticism the US Senate, in November 2006, gave overwhelming approval by a vote of 85 to 12 to the American deal for nuclear cooperation with India. Clearly, the vote expressed the American sentiment that the goal of nurturing India as an ally outweighed concerns over the risks of spreading nuclear skills and bomb-making materials. See Thom Shanker, ‘Nuclear Deal With India Wins Senate Backing’, The New York Times, November 17, 2006.

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regimes. Thus, under the George W. Bush administration America’s anti-proliferation policy was concerned not so much with the fact of proliferation as with the nature of the regime. Inspections in Iraq The direct involvement of the Security Council with international weapons inspections in Iraq after the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War of 1990–91 had become a source of great controversy. While the UN Charter highlights the authority of the Security Council to address threats to international peace and security, the Council was not believed to have a direct mandate to deal with specic NBC proliferation threats.35 Any enforcement role required either a formal resolution by the Council itself, declaring its authority to address nonproliferation violations, or specic recommendations by the General Assembly. When it established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in 1991 and the United Nations Monitoring, Verication and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in 1999, the Security Council was entering new territory. Special Security Council Resolutions authorized both UNSCOM and UNMOVIC to uncover and dismantle Iraq’s NBC and ballistic missile programs. Disagreements among the ve permanent – and veto wielding – members of the Council, the so-called P-5, about the effectiveness of the inspections carried out by the two Commissions, as well as how to respond to the alleged lack of cooperation on the part of the Iraqi authorities in implementing the Resolutions, resulted in the US decision to bring military force to bear on Iraq in March 2003. This development was generally taken as a clear sign of the failure of the UN system to ensure peace and stability in cases where the strongest member state could not be brought in line with less powerful states. Dissent among the P-5 about the appropriate action to be taken against other countries suspected of committing arms proliferation (rst and foremost, North Korea) led to the selective enforcement of the NPT treaty, which weakened its moral authority.

35

Security Council Resolution 1540, criminalizing NBC proliferation to non-state actors, assigns the Council with a clear enforcement role on this issue.

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Remedies for shortcomings What can be done to remedy the numerous shortcomings in the campaign to counter proliferation? The report of the High-level Panel advocates a comprehensive approach that comprises (1) better strategies to reduce demand for NBC weapons, (2) better strategies to reduce supply, (3) better enforcement capability, and (4) national and international civilian and public health defense.36 This approach was also adopted by the Netherlands’ Advisory Council on International Affairs in its report to the Dutch government.37 The report emphasizes that nuclear-weapon states must honor their commitments under Article VI of the NPT to move towards nuclear disarmament. It takes the view that the 17,000–20,000 operational nuclear weapons that will be left in the year 2012 (quite apart from the tactical and non-operational nuclear weapons) still far exceed what is necessary for credible deterrence. The report also highlights the need for the US to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as this is considered to be considered a vital part of the non-proliferation regime. The negotiations on this Treaty were completed in 1996, but it has not yet formally entered into force. Nevertheless, it serves as an important international standard. The CTBT places strong constraints on the development of nuclear weapons. This development involves the vertical progression from rst-generation ssion designs and more advanced ssion weapons to second-generation thermonuclear designs with increasingly sophisticated yield-to-weight ratios, and then to exotic “third-generation” technologies, such as nuclear explosion-pumped x-ray lasers and enhanced radiation weapons.38 The reason the American administration gave for not joining the Treaty (yet) is that it needs nuclear tests to assess the reliability of its nuclear stockpiles; however, the US was (and is) suspected of working on the development of miniaturized weapons.39 As far as other measures are concerned, nuclear-weapon states should reafrm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states (so-called negative security guarantees). At

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A more secure world, pp. 41–46. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. See John M. Shalikashvili, Report on the Findings and Recommendations Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (Washington DC, January 2001). See, for instance, the Nuclear Posture Review Report, submitted to the US Congress on 31 December 2001.

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the same time, the Security Council should explicitly pledge to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such an attack on a non-nuclear weapon state (so-called positive security guarantees). Furthermore, putting a hold on additional facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation could also diminish the threat of proliferation. After all, the nuclear industry has more than enough capacity to fuel its power plants and research centers. World security may also be strengthened by speeding up existing efforts to modify the research centers worldwide operating with highly enriched uranium, especially those with metal fuel that could be readily employed as bomb material. It is technically possible to convert these reactors to use low-enriched uranium.40 From the perspective of the development of world order, an attractive option would be to bring all enrichment operations under multinational control, making it far more difcult for any country to divert enriched uranium for use in weapons. This idea is reminiscent of the Baruch Plan ( June 1946), which called for international control of atomic power and led to President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech (December 1953), proposing the transfer of a certain amount of ssionable materials to an atomic energy agency where they would be used for peaceful purposes. However, a more realistic approach is to persuade all countries to agree to stop producing ssile material for use in nuclear weapons. The building blocks for such an agreement are already in place in the form of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The purpose of this Treaty, which was called for by a resolution of the UN General Assembly as long ago as 1993, is to ban the production of weapons-grade uranium. The US, the UK, France and Russia have announced a moratorium on its production; China did not follow suit. As regards inspection and verication rules, it is generally agreed that the rules that governed the IAEA through the mid-1990s, have proved to be increasingly inadequate. For that reason, the Agency initiated more stringent inspection rules in the Model Additional Protocol. The IAEA safeguards system is actually based on the goodwill of the states

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Both proposals, in addition to other proposals, have been made by Mohammed ElBaradei (the director-general of the IAEA). See his article ‘Seven steps to raise world security’, Financial Times, February 2, 2005. See also the article ElBaradei wrote with the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, ‘How the world can combat nuclear terrorism’, Financial Times, June 14, 2006.

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concerned, since the Agency’s inspections are dependent on what these states themselves declare. By contrast, under the Additional Protocol a state is obliged to provide information and to allow the IAEA inspectors access to all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle and all other locations where nuclear material may be found. There is also an obligation to allow inspections at “all relevant sites”, for which only 24 hours’ advance notice is required. Environmental samples may be taken in the area around the declared sites. While the IAEA believes that the Additional Protocol provides a watertight verication system, by 2005 only one third of the states parties to the NPT had ratied the Protocol. Following the example of President G.W. Bush and others, the High-level Panel urges the IAEA Board of Governors to employ the Model as today’s standard for the Agency’s safeguards. Finally, the case of Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s rule illustrates the importance of the capacity of the Security Council to generate credible information about potential instances of proliferation. To strengthen that capability, the Council should invite the directors-general of IAEA and OPCW to report to it twice a year on the status of safeguards and verication processes, as well as on any serious concerns they have. Insofar as these concerns are related to the problem of possible withdrawals, the Highlevel Panel maintains that a state’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT should prompt immediate verication of its compliance with the Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. Last but not least, it reects the view of many that the Security Council must be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance in these and other cases. Again, the question arises whether there will be enough political unity and resolve among the P-5 for the Security Council to take forceful action, including the authorization of military force to be used by member states. In that respect, Iran – apparently playing a high-risk game of chicken (bluff ) – is obviously an important test-case.

Human development Since the turn of the 21st century the debate on economic development in a broader context of health, security, environmental concerns and universal rights has been dominated by the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For the international political system, these goals are, at least in the opinion of the American economist Jeffrey Sachs, “the fulcrum on which development policy is

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based”.41 The MDGs are derived from the United Nations Millennium Declaration adopted by world leaders gathered in New York, September 2000. The Declaration put forward eight goals, ranging from halving the proportion of people in the world whose income is less than one dollar a day and providing universal education to children in developing countries, to halting the spread of infectious disease (such as HIV/AIDS) and reversing the loss of environmental resources. A target date was set for 2015.42 According to UN Secretary-General Ko Annan, the MDGs constituted “an unprecedented promise by world leaders to address, as a single package, peace, security, development, human rights and fundamental freedoms”.43 There are four reasons why this program is believed to be different from similar attempts to advance human development in poor countries in the past: 1. the goals are people-centered, time-bound and measurable, 2. they are based on a global partnership, stressing the responsibilities of developing countries for getting their own house in order, and of developed countries for supporting those efforts, 3. they have unprecedented political support, embraced at the highest levels by developed and developing countries, civil society and major development institutions alike, and 4. they are achievable.44 Too little progress It is clear that the Millennium Declaration represents a bold and comprehensive vision. It addresses the many dimensions of extreme poverty – low incomes, hunger, disease, lack of adequate shelter, and exclusion – while promoting gender equality, education, and environmental sustainability. But can the document be taken as a real commitment to change, or could it be just promises on paper? In other words: are the sense of urgency and political resolve strong enough to achieve the MDGs? Five years after their launch The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005, drafted by the UN Secretariat, showed that in spite

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Jeffrey D. Sachs a.o., Investing in Development. A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (London: Earthscan, 2005), p. 2. United Nations Millennium Declaration. General Assembly resolution 55/2 of 8 September 2000. Other goals concern the promotion of gender equality, the reduction of child mortality, the improvement of maternal health, and the development of a global partnership for development. Ko A. Annan in his foreword to The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005 (New York: United Nations, 2005), p. 3. Ibidem.

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of the progress made in some areas, an enormous effort is still needed to meet the MDGs in others. The report found that if current trends persist, there is a risk that many of the poorest countries will not be able to meet many of the stated goals. Of all the geographic areas, sub-Saharan Africa is the main source of concern. Thus, while extreme poverty fell in much of Asia, the average income of the very poor in sub-Saharan Africa has declined since 1990 and fewer than two thirds of children were enrolled in primary school. In this part of Africa AIDS is the leading cause of premature death and is the fourth largest killer worldwide. In the European countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and parts of Asia, HIV is spreading at an alarming rate. Furthermore, nearly one billion people live in urban slums because the urban population is growing faster than improvements in housing and the availability of productive jobs.45 Similarly, the Human Development Development Report 2005, published by the United Nations Development Programme, concluded that there is little cause for celebration, as most countries are failing to achieve most of the MDGs. To be sure, people in developing countries have, on average, been healthier, better educated and less impoverished since 1990 – and they are more likely to live in multiparty democracy. Furthermore, life expectancy in developing countries has increased by two years. There are three million fewer child deaths annually and 30 million fewer children out of school. More than 130 million people have escaped extreme poverty. According to the World Bank, the proportion of the world’s population living on $1 a day or less was 22% in 1993, or 1.2 billion people. By 2001, the proportion had fallen to 17.8%, or just over a billion people.46 However, at the same time, in 2003 eighteen countries with a combined population of 460 million people registered lower scores on the human development index (HDI) than in 1990. Qualifying this as an unprecedented reversal, the report adds that in the midst of an increasingly prosperous global economy, every year more than ten million children do not live to see their fth birthday, and more than one billion people survive in abject poverty on less than one US dollar a day. Not surprisingly, the report condemns the scale of inequality in the world. The world’s richest 500 individuals have a 45

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The Millennium Development Goals Report (New York: the United Nations, 2005), pp. 6–41. Figures mentioned by Bill Emmott in his valedictory article, ‘A long goodbye’, The Economist, April 1, 2006, p. 13.

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combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million. Beyond these extremes the 2.5 billion people living on less than $2 a day – 40% of the world’s population – account for 5% of global income. The richest 10%, almost all of whom live in high-income countries, account for 54%.47 Human development gaps within countries are as stark as the gaps between countries. Income inequality has increased in countries that account for more than 80% of the world’s population.48 It is self-evident that income inequalities are related to other life chance inequalities. Thus, children born into the poorest 20% of households in Ghana or Senegal are two to three times more likely to die before age 5 than children born into the richest 20% of households. Pointing to the discrepancy between the slow progress on human development and the high ambition set out in the Millennium Declaration, the report passes a very harsh verdict on the failure of the developed countries to implement the MDGs: “The promise to the world’s poor is being broken.”49 The corollary of this judgment is predictable: without a renewed commitment to cooperation backed by practical action the Declaration will go down in history as just one more empty promise.50 What sort of practical action is needed? The report makes a large number of suggestions that should be taken seriously. It focuses on three interrelated areas, viz. development assistance, international trade and violent conict. Action in these areas must be carried out simultaneously; failure in any one area will undermine the possibility of progress in the others. Development assistance International aid should still be considered an indispensable weapon in the war against poverty. Far from being a one-way act of charity, in a world of interconnected threats and opportunities aid is not only a moral imperative but an investment in shared prosperity and collective well-being. It may be true that the total amount of ofcial development aid currently only constitutes a small part of the total stream of money

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48 49 50

Human Development Report 2005 (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2005), p. 4. Ibidem, p. 6. Ibidem, p. 2. Ibidem.

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going to developing countries ($80 billion out of $3,000 billion),51 but for the poorest countries this aid can have a major impact on their chances of development. An important reason is that foreign investment capital cannot be attracted to nance non-marketable parts of the national economy and social investments, as will be elaborated below. However, for aid to be effective, at least three conditions must be met. First, it has to be delivered in sufcient quantity to make a real start on human development (the so-called take-off stage). Secondly, aid has to delivered on the basis of a predictable, low transaction cost, and value for money. Thirdly, effective aid requires “country ownership”. This means that developing countries have primary responsibility themselves for creating the conditions under which aid can yield optimal results. Only a handful of smaller nations have gone above and beyond the long-standing UN target of spending 0.7 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) on development assistance: Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. In 2005, rich countries collectively spent about 0.25 per cent of their GDP on aid. This level is lower than in 1990, but the developing countries followed an upward trend since 1997.52 Thus, for example, the European Union has committed itself to reach a 0.51 per cent threshold by 2010.53 Nevertheless, there will be a large aid shortfall for nancing the MDGs. In view of the crucial role that this study ascribes to the US in achieving world order goals it is an anomaly that the world’s largest aid donor contributes one of the lowest shares of all the 22 countries of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, with only 0.15 per cent of its GDP. The US’s failure to follow through repeated promises to give a much larger proportion of its annual output to ofcial development assistance reveals a misplaced skepticism about the usefulness of aid. Indeed, the “money down the drain” argument is heard most frequently in

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In 2005, the total ow of private capital streaming to developing countries amounted to $490 billion, of which $237 billion in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) and $61 billion in the form of equity capital. The total amount of private transfers (remittances) by migrant workers to their home countries was estimated to be about $167 billion. See Global Development Finance (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2006), p. 3. Op. cit., p. 7. This percentage includes both the direct funding by the EU and the funding by individual member states.

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the US.54 The prevailing view in the US that removing barriers to trade and investment, and promoting entrepreneurship in an open market are better ways to stimulate economic growth and development than to increase the funds for anti-poverty initiatives. This view fails to appreciate the fact that development aid plays an essential role complementing other sources to nance development. The argument in question applies particularly for those countries which are at least able to attract private direct investment. Aid can help a poor country to mobilize adequate levels of resources in an appropriate time scale, while the human capital, productive sectors, and export capacities are growing. Furthermore, it can be critical for improving the environment for private sector activity, paving the way for robust growth. Finally, ofcial aid is also a crucial instrument for supporting education, health, public infrastructure development, agriculture, and rural development, and to improve food security.55 As indicated above, in order to rescue the MDGs it is necessary not only to increase the quantity of international aid, but also the quality. World Bank studies from 1995 to 1999 showed that the economic, legal and political institutions of a country account for more than 80 per cent of the variation in real income in more than 130 countries.56 Therefore, improving good governance in developing countries must be a primary target of aid programs sponsored by donor countries. The latter countries must observe the ne line between conditionality, on the one hand, and strengthening the sense of national ownership of developing countries, on the other. Aid conditionality must be streamlined in order to achieve this balance. It should be directed at duciary responsibility and the transparency of reporting through national systems. Although its use has decreased over the past years, tied aid remains “one of the most egregious abuses of poverty-focused development assistance”.57 By linking aid to the provision of goods and services supplied by the donor 54

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See for instance William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (London: Penguin Press, 2006). For a rebuttal, see Amartya Sen, ‘The Man Without a Plan. Can Foreign Aid Work’, Foreign Affairs, 85 (2), March/April 2006. See also Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty (London: Penguin Press, 2005). Text drawn from the so-called Monterrey Consensus, the declaration adopted by world leaders convened at the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey (Mexico), March 2002. See, for example, the landmark study, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why (Washington, DC: Oxford University Press, 1998). Human Development Report 2005, p. 8.

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country, instead of allowing aid recipients to buy in the open market, tied aid represents a signicant fall in value for money. The costs of tied aid for low-income countries are estimated at $5–$7 billion; the share of sub-Saharan Africa amounts to $1.6 billion.58 In addition to ending tied aid, the provision of stable aid ows greatly improves the quality of development assistance. For this reason, aid should be dispensed in accordance with predictable, multiyear nancial frameworks. International trade From a human development perspective, trade is a means to development, not an end in itself. Successful exports have not always increased human welfare at every level. Mexico, which embarked on an exportled growth strategy, is a clear case in point. It was able to achieve economic successes but the revenue hardly trickled down to the lower social strata of Mexican society. Yet, trade, like aid, has the potential to be a powerful catalyst for human development. Arguably, the human development potential inherent in trade is diminished by unfair trade practices and export subsidies, creating profound market distortions. The word’s highest trade barriers (particularly for textiles, footwear and clothing) have been erected against some of the poorest countries, depriving them of signicant amounts of hard currency. Agricultural protectionism is another cause for grave concern. Two thirds of all people surviving on less than one dollar a day live in rural areas. Their livelihoods and their prospects for escaping poverty are directly affected by the rules governing agricultural trade. In spite of their promises to cut agricultural subsidies, rich countries have actually increased them. While they spent over $1 billion on aid for agriculture annually in the early years of the 21st century, they spent just under $1 billion a day to subsidize agricultural overproduction at home. The Human Development Report 2005 dryly remarks that “a less appropriate ordering of priorities is difcult to imagine”.59 Big cuts in the subsidies on agricultural commodities in rich countries, and a further reduction of tariffs on industrial imports from poor countries are part of the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda (DDA), the Doha Round of

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Ibidem. On page 10.

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trade negotiations originally scheduled to conclude by the end of 2006.60 Many independent experts agree that high-income countries should be prepared not only to open their markets to developing countries exports, but also to help least developed countries raise export competitiveness through investments in critical trade-related infrastructure, including electricity, roads, and ports.61 In view of the uncertainty of the eventual outcome of these negotiations (if any!), WTO rules should not impose obligations on developing countries that are inconsistent with national poverty strategies. As long as rich countries continue to subsidize their farming sectors, the right of developing countries to protect agricultural producers against unfair competition should in particular be respected by multilateral rules. Violent conict The interaction between poverty and violent conict in many developing countries is destroying lives on an enormous scale. Notwithstanding the fact that the number of armed conicts around the world has fallen by 40 percent since the early 1990s,62 armed struggles are still one of principal sources of systematic violations of human rights and hampering progress towards the realization of MDGs. While the threat of terrorism and WMD proliferation is affecting rich countries in particular, the absence of freedom from fear is most marked in developing countries. This is because the nature of armed conict has changed. In the twentieth century there were rst two unprecedented, large-scale wars between coalitions of states and then fears of a nuclear conagration between two superpowers. The former Cold War fears have now given way to fears of local and regional wars fought predominantly in poor countries within weak or failed states and with small arms as the weapon of choice.63 As regards the latter, discussions on terror and non-proliferation have gravitated, quite understandably, towards weapons of mass destruction. But this cannot be an excuse for neglecting the great havoc which is caused by the widespread use of small and light arms. This 60

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In July 2006, the Doha negotiations collapsed and were indenitely suspended, sparking off a new round of recriminations between the US and the EU over farmtrade subsidies and barriers. This recommendation is made in the report Investing in Development, p. xxii. See the report of the Canadian-based Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2005). Human Development Report 2005, p. 12.

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category of weapons is currently claiming the lives of about 300,000 people per year.64 The AK-27, better known as the Kalashnikov, has become the world’s most prolic and effective combat weapon. This rie is so cheap that it can be bought in many countries for less than the cost of a live chicken. The alarming gures about the spread and use of small and light weapons have led to growing pressure for the conclusion of an international Arms Trade Treaty. Huge parts of Africa in particular are trapped in the vicious circle of poverty and war. In addition to deep horizontal socio-economic inequalities between regions and the exclusion or subordination of ethnic groups, the growing scarcity of natural resources (arable land and water) and the scramble for precious metals (especially diamonds) are the principal causes of violent conicts. The underlying human drives fuelling these conicts have been aptly described with the catch-words “grievances” and “greed”. Furthermore, in an increasingly interconnected world the threats posed by a failure to prevent conict inside states are likely to cross national borders. In some cases, these threats have also prompted external powers to intervene in pursuit of their own strategic interests. The imports of weapons and the control of the ows of nance from the sale of natural resources by narrow interest groups help to sustain and intensify conict.65 While the MDGs have provided a framework for progress towards “freedom from want”, there is still no coherent agenda aimed at realizing “freedom from fear”.66 Such an agenda should be targeted at the dual task of post-conict reconstruction (peace building) and conict prevention. As regards the rst part of the task, it should not be forgotten that peace settlements are often a prelude to renewed violence. About half of all countries go back to war within ve years after the

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See Small arms survey (2004). Closely related to the control of small and light weapons is the problem of humanitarian demining, which covers the range of activities aimed at the removal of mine and unexploded ordnance hazards. On this subject, see the report Identifying Synergies between Mine Action and Small Arms and Light Weapons, published by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (2006). On the causes of conict in Africa and Asia, see Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinge and Paul Sciarone (eds), Between Development and Destruction: An Enquiry into the Causes of Conict in Post-Colonial States (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: MacMillan Press, 1996). For an analysis of conicts in South Asia, West Africa and Central America, also see Pyt S. Douma, The Origins of Contemporary Conict. A Comparison in Three World Regions (The Hague: The Clingendael Institute, 2003). Human Development Report 2005, p. 13.

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end of a conict.67 Breaking this conict cycle requires a long-term political and nancial commitment to ensure security. It also needs an efcient administrative system to oversee reconstruction and create the conditions for the development of competitive markets and private sector investment in the long term. Most developed countries lack the patience or interest to follow through the time-consuming process of reconstruction. The horizon of most politicians is rather short when it comes to time. There is a tendency among governments to withhold nancial aid from conict-prone or post-conict countries. Private investors are understandably reluctant to pour money in unstable regions or countries. To counter these adverse effects donor countries must be persuaded to earmark part of their development funds for post-conict reconstruction. Private companies could also be encouraged to start operations in these countries with the creation of ofcial credit facilities and compensation arrangements in case of havoc breaking out again in former warring countries.68 Regarding the second part of the task, conict prevention is obviously the most cost-effective route for addressing the threats posed by violent conict. By focusing on military enforcement in the previous chapter, it is not intended to suggest that efforts to prevent the outbreak of deadly conicts and other forms of man-made catastrophes are only of secondary importance. On the contrary, the atrocities that have occurred in the Balkans and many African regions since the early 1990s have once again underlined the fact that conict prevention is the primary task in any multilateral framework that seeks to achieve the goal of peace and security. Conict resolution is increasingly about the early and precise deployment of small forces to forestall or defuse trouble, rather than the use of overwhelming force by powerful armies which takes many months of preparation. But the point is that the readiness of the UN system to enforce international obligations, if necessary by military means, is in itself an important condition for the effectiveness of preventive strategies. Furthermore, the main obstacle to the success of such strategies is not the lack of information about incipient conicts

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Ibidem. About the conditions for success of post-conict reconstruction, see Gerd Junne & Willemijn Verkoren (eds), Postconict Development: Meeting New Challenges (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005). See also James Dobbins a.o., The UN’s Role in Nation Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Washington, DC: RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, 2005).

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or rising tensions between and within states, nor the lack of earlywarning and analysis capacity. Research institutions – both private and those attached to international organizations – have at their disposal a plethora of data about the political fault lines in the world and are able to identify escalating and de-escalating trends. Rather, it is the lack of political resolve on the part of UN member states to become actively involved in the early stages of the conict cycle – i.e., before hostilities break out – that is hampering attempts to forestall deadly conicts.69 Therefore, the proposal of the High-level Panel to strengthen the Ofce of the Secretary-General, so that it can integrate the information inputs of different agencies and departments more effectively,70 does not strike at the heart of the problem. This is the lack of a sense of urgency regarding tension-prone situations that apparently do not look threatening yet but are highly to become explosive in the near future. Perhaps the other institutional proposal by the Panel which was already mentioned in chapter 4, i.e., the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission with a direct link to the Security Council, can be taken as a rather larger step in the right direction. Peacebuilding may be dened as the total set of activities that are normally conducted by civilian agencies, with military support if required, to address the underlying causes of conict and the longer term needs of the people. An important ingredient of peacebuilding is security sector reform. The main mission of the Peacebuilding Commission, which was ofcially inaugurated in June 2006 (and started operations four months later), is to advise and propose integrated strategies for post-conict recovery, focusing attention on reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development, in countries emerging from conict. To carry out this mission, the relatively small body would have to bring together the UN’s capacities and experience in conict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping, respect for human rights, the rule of law, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and long-term development. In addition to the development of best practices on issues that require extensive collaboration among military, humanitarian and development actors, an important task of the Commission would be to help ensure predictable nancing for early

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For a critical evaluation of the institutional record on conict prevention, see David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), Conict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? (New York: United Nations University, 2003). A more secure world, p. 37.

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recovery activities and sustained nancial investment over the medium to long term.71 At present, around 40 percent of post-conict countries fall back into ghting because of the lack of adequate support for matters such as policing, the organization of elections, training new judges, and so on. Moreover, recent experience in Afghanistan reveals that conict resolution and development do not succeed to each other in a neat sequence. Thus, security stabilization tasks and development missions have to performed in parallel, making the phrase “post-conict peacebuilding” less appropriate to describe the real situation. For these and other reasons, it makes sense to involve the newly established Commission in preparing high-prole debates in the Security Council, with the participation of countries that have suffered recently from armed conicts, about potential escalatory crises in the world. The debates, to be conducted on the basis of sound risk-assessments presented by the Secretary-General, could be instrumental in mobilizing general support for policies of conict prevention. Currently there is an outright imbalance between the resources the UN uses for dealing with the consequences of armed conicts and resources used for preventing them. Thus, in the fall of 2006, the world organization had deployed almost 80,000 peacekeepers – military and civil police ofcers – in sixteen missions around the world. Seven were conducted in Africa, two in Asia, three in Europe, three in the Middle East and one in Latin America.72 However, none of these “blue helmets” missions was concerned with preventive deployment; in every case the purpose was to make sure hostilities did not start again, while helping the conict-ridden country or region to become stable. In theory, the Security Council commands a vast arsenal of instruments for conict prevention, varying from fact nding-missions, diplomatic missions, economic sanctions, and the stationing of military troops. However, the fact of the matter is that a culture of reaction to crises, rather than anticipating them, still pervades the deliberations of the Security Council. Moreover, when the UN does commit troops keep the peace in violence-prone countries, their staying power tends to be limited. Unfortunately, there is a “quick in and quick out mentality”

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See www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding. For a survey of current UN peace operations, see www.un.org./Depts/dpko/text.htm.

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in the world organization. East Timor is an example of this.73 Like in Kosovo, the UN assumed executive powers in this country. In May 2005, it pulled out the last of the peacekeepers, who had been highly instrumental in restoring peace in that ravaged land since 1999. A small group of civilian advisers was left behind. Less than a year later, East Timor’s hard-won peace broke down. Clearly, the UN troops had left too soon. In general, a longer and deeper commitment during the period of recovery after conict will have to be ensured, particularly to address economic and employment concerns. Elizabeth Cousens has analyzed the limitations and constraints of the available instruments. She identies four main causes of UN weakness: normative limitations, strategic uncertainty, limits to operational capacity and political restraints.74 The rst thing to recognize is the resistance in the world organization to taking over the responsibility of national governments for the maintenance of domestic peace and order, particularly when this concerns an intervention in one of the larger member states. As indicated before, gradually the notion has gained momentum of an international responsibility to act in order to protect the people of a country when the government of that country itself has abdicated responsibility. However, a large number of member states still staunchly defend the concept of national sovereignty. The repeated refusal of the government of Sudan to allow a UN peacekeeping force on its territory to provide protection to the persecuted people in Darfur is only one example out of many to prove the point. In addition, there appears to be insufcient knowledge of what forms of UN involvement with impending crises are likely to be effective in specic cases or not. What political models and pacication strategies can be expected to create long-term stability in deeply divided societies such as Sri Lanka or Sudan? Is it power-sharing, federalization, partition or are other solutions available? How can the core functions of political authority be established in failing or failed states such as Somalia and Liberia? Tim Sisk points out that protagonists and negotiators involved in peace talks directed at peacebuilding through democratization are

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Named ofcially Timor Leste. Elizabeth M. Cousens, ‘Conict Prevention’, in David M. Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council. From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), pp. 111–114.

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faced with four types of dilemmas.75 First, there are horizontal dilemmas that relate to the question of the inclusion or exclusion of particular actors in the negotiating and electoral process, including potential “spoilers” such as rebel factions and warlords. Secondly, vertical dilemmas, arising out of the elite-mass nexus, refer to the trade-off between the demand for effectiveness on the one hand, and the demand for legitimacy on the other. Thirdly, in as far as the inevitable external recognition of certain parties is at odds with the legitimation criterion of local ownership systemic dilemmas may emerge. Fourthly, it is possible to think of temporal dilemmas referring to the sequencing puzzle of whether security is a necessary condition for the instatement of the electoral process, or – rather – whether the latter is itself conducive to establishing a sustainable peace. No easy answers can be given. Furthermore, in spite of the existence of the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), under which a number of member states have accepted the obligation to make troops available for UN operations at short notice, there is a lack of rapid-reaction forces that can be deployed at great distance. Obviously, this reduces the options of the UN to take effective action, when this is necessary. Once incipient escalation is inevitable, speed is of the essence.76 Another obstacle stems from the reluctance of the larger countries, the Permanent Five in particular, to permit any UN interference in conicts raging in their sphere of inuence. The examples of Russia’s dealings with Chechnya, China’s position on the Islamic minorities in the Western part of the country, and Great Britain’s attitude towards the conict in Northern Ireland in the past, are highly signicant in this respect.

Concluding remarks Different kinds of collective and individual action are required in order to achieve the agenda for the world order, that was described above. As for the human development dimension of the agenda, achieving the 75

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See Conference report of workshop, Establishing the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. Towards a more comprehensive approach to post-conict reconstruction (Geneva: The Graduate Institute of International Studies, July 2006). In November 1994, before the 49th General Assembly of the UN, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van Mierlo, launched the idea of a standing UN military force that would be available to the Security Council. The suggestion fell on deaf ears.

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development goals largely depends on the ability of the rich countries to prioritize their long-term interests over short-term, domestic concerns. Understandably, democratically elected leaders do not tend to commit electoral suicide by asking the voters to make sacrices here and now for the benet of future generations. Therefore, shared visions of the common good which transcends national borders badly needs strong constituencies. However, it is up to political leaders to persuade their followers that helping the world’s poorest is not simply an act of charity or a public relations gesture. Rational arguments will have to prevail over parochial attitudes and sentiments. “Narratives for change” must focus on the undeniable fact that higher export revenues, resulting from greater access to the markets of the highly developed countries, will also enable developing countries to attract more investment in domestic infrastructure and education, helping their business to grow, and nally opening more opportunities for foreign companies. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the paradigm shift from state security to human security, should not obscure the fact that it is hard to imagine human security without the absence of violence and stability in the wider environment of the state. In that respect, state security and human security are interrelated. Both forms of security depend on the viability and health of the state institutions. To quote Ko Annan again: We will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced none will succeed.77

Furthermore, the breakdown of central authority and the disturbance of the core functions of the state, so characteristic of failed (or failing) states in Africa and other parts of the world (such as Haiti and East Timor), is likely to have disastrous consequences for every part of the security agenda. Many of the root causes of state failure lie in the fact that during the postwar process of de-colonization the right of statehood prevailed over any tests of viability, such as the existence of a developed political community (i.e. nation), adequate economic performance, a defense capability, or the prospect of guaranteeing the population a decent living for citizens. Robert Jackson, rather provocatively, lays the blame of the weak statehood particularly of African states to a large

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Ko Annan, In larger freedom, par. 88 and par. 16–17.

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degree on a revolution in legal thought that outlawed colonialism and upheld self-determination. The result was a shaky political structure of formally equal and independent states which lacked the capabilities to exercise effective control over their territory and population, but nevertheless laid full claims to sovereignty.78 The legal revolution emphasized the legal aspects of statehood while neglecting the substantive parts. Jackson depicts most of the sub-Saharan states as “juridical” or “quasistates”.79 They are regarded as sovereign states, but unable to satisfy the basic needs of their peoples. Whether or not it was politically wise or expedient to drop the requirement of effectiveness to facilitate the process of de-colonization,80 it is clear that state failure may encourage extremist organizations to create safe havens serving as the staging ground for terrorist actions, stimulate arms dealers to continue their illicit trade, and obstruct people of good will in the implementation of social programs aimed at enhancing the welfare of the local population. As was stated on the subject in a report of the (Netherlands) Advisory Council on International Affairs: . . . a failing state does not offer its citizens security. There is unavoidable suffering and erosion of human dignity. Human rights are no longer guaranteed and impunity is widespread. (. . .) various cross-border effects mean that conicts in failing states can jeopardize regional stability and security. The vacuum of authority in a failing state van attract countless criminal elements from the region. (. . .) failing states sometimes poses a threat to security beyond their own region. They are often a safe haven for criminal organizations and a base from which terrorist networks can theoretically exercise exert inuence worldwide.81

That is why anti-terrorism and non-proliferation policies should be directed not only at countries with obnoxious regimes, but also at countries that are badly in need of any political regimes at all. There cannot be an effective world order without effective regimes operating in its constituent parts. 78

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The unconditional right to independence of peoples subject to colonial rule was enunciated in the General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Gerard Kreijen describes the decolonization of sub-Saharan Africa as “precipitate”. He concurs with Jackson’s view that the traditional test of effectiveness for state recognition was sacriced to the right to self-determination. See his book State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness (Leiden: Ph.D. thesis, 2003). Advisory Council on International Affairs, Failing States. A Global Responsibility (The Hague, May 2004), p. 29.

CHAPTER SEVEN

INTERNATIONAL ORDER “WRIT-SMALL”: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The postwar European integration experience is highly relevant to the search for a world order. In Filippo Andreatta’s words, European integration represents an experiment in the construction of a different international order, “in which conict is replaced by cooperation and suspicion by mutual trust”.1 The Union can be seen as a rule-based system which was developed to manage bonds of interdependence and increase the capacity for political action in the face of the perceived need to coordinate and even harmonize national policies. By the sheer force of its economic and demographic weight the European Union2 has also an impact on the rest of the world. But the Union claims to be more than just a “presence” on the global stage. Indeed, it seeks to perform a unique role in helping to shape a better and more secure international order – it asks to be a “force for good” in the world. As already pointed out in Chapter 4, the attainment of “effective multilateralism” is one of the main objectives of the European Security Strategy, as nalized in December 2003. This document deserves further consideration since it has become the main benchmark of EU’s vision of the world. The security strategy sets out guidelines for political action that are realistic but ambitious at the same time. On the one hand, it recognizes that in its foreign relations the EU needs to become “more active, more coherent and more capable”. At the same time, it is based on a conviction that the EU has the potential to make a signicant contribution to the management of international crises and challenges posed by particular states. As regards the appropriate ways to do this, it recommends the development of a strategic culture “that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention”. The emphasis is on the use of non-military means (e.g., preventive diplomacy and economic assistance)

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Filippo Andreatta, Theory and the European Union’s International Relations, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 32. The terms, “European Union” and “Europe” are inevitably used interchangeably.

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in situations and at moments “before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise”.3 The approach is called preventive engagement, in contrast to the US doctrine that relies on the option of the pre-emptive use of force. Although the exercise of military coercion is not ruled out, the security strategy underlines the desirability of nding the right balance between resorting to force too precipitately and too belatedly. The strategy appears to attempt to charter a middle course between the views of the US and non-western countries. While recognizing that well functioning multilateral institutions are an important source of international legitimacy and that military force should always be used only as an last resort, most EU member states are also aware of the necessity for a rule-based world order to be based on American power to make it effective. Consequently, if there is any chance of reintegrating the US in the multilateral system and reconciling it with international law, the EU is in the best position to contribute to this. In particular, the Union could help the US to bridge the gap between the rhetoric of international organizations and their actual performance. Therefore, the nal section of this chapter discusses the relationship between the EU and the US in some detail. This will be preceded by an exposition of the EU’s model of governance and by a summary of its contributions to the pursuit of the goals of the world order. It will be demonstrated that the EU has several tools to substantiate its international presence: enlargement and association/stabilization policies towards states on its eastern and southern borders, inter-regional cooperation, and dialogue with particular countries.

Actor in its own right The principle of subsidiarity in the context of European integration suggests that member states should take collective action only at the European level if action at the lower level – national and sub-national – were to deliver sub-optimal results or no results at all. It is paradoxical that of all integrated policy domains, the autonomy of EU member

3

A Secure Europe in a better world, p. 18. For a general discussion about this document, see Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy. A Global Agenda for Positive Power (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).

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states is largest in the eld of classic foreign policy, while the economies of scale which could be achieved with closer cooperation are potentially highest especially in that eld. It appears that foreign policy strikes at the heart of national identity, making rulers and people alike averse to surrender sovereignty. Thus, the former British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, contends that if EU members give up their veto right on vital questions of foreign policy they “would do away with the sinews of their own nationhood, the very basis on which the independence of an individual state is based.”4 A capacity for autonomous action Nevertheless, the Union can claim to be an international actor in its own right.5 It commands political resources that are essential for the conduct of foreign policy, even though its effectiveness – particularly on sensitive political issues – very much depends on the ability of France, Great Britain and Germany to reach a consensus. Thus, the EU has set up new institutions for making common decisions. The EU Council Secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General who is at the same time the High Representative for the CFSP, has a multinational planning (and early warning unit) and a military staff. It has established a system of external representation in many capitals outside the EU, and commands the capacity to negotiate with other actors in the international system. As the world’s largest trading power and the world’s largest donor of aid to poor countries, the EU may use trade and development instruments for political purposes. Furthermore, the military dimension is not lacking, either. Ever since the Treaty of Maastricht entered into force (1993), a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has evolved, which has come to include military cooperation. At the Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999, it was decided that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”.6

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David Owen, ‘An effective CFSP for the future’, in Mark Eyskens et al., How can Europe prevent conicts? (Brussels: The Philip Morris Institute, 1997), p. 37. See Wolfgang Wessels, ‘The EU as a Global Actor: Concepts and Realities’, in John Leech (ed.), Whole and Free. NATO, EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Relations (London: The Federal Trust, 2002), pp. 141–161. European Council meeting, Cologne, June 1999.

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Three years later, it was agreed to establish a European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency, commonly known as the European Defence Agency (EDA), which was commissioned to dene the EU’s military capability needs and to promote collaboration regarding military equipment between EU member states. Concrete schemes for pooling national military capabilities for the implementation of common European goals will be outlined below. Moreover, the Constitutional Treaty,7 which was proposed in order to enhance the efciency, transparency and democratic legitimacy of the EU, called for the appointment of a European Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, combining the present ofces of the High Representative for the CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations. Although the fate of the Treaty has become highly uncertain after its rejection by French and Dutch voters in national referenda, the idea of a single European foreign minister is still alive. If a formula can be found to put this into practice, the future incumbent will chair the monthly meetings of the 258 foreign ministers and also sit in the European Commission as a vice-president. The rationale of combining the two ofces is to achieve better coordination between European diplomacy in the domain of intergovernmental cooperation and those parts of the EU’s external relations that are formally embedded in EU’s community framework, i.e., foreign trade and international development. Furthermore, the Treaty proposed the creation of an European External Action Service (EEAS), an EU diplomatic service composed of ofcials of the Commission, the Council General Secretariat and national diplomatic services. The EEAS would operate under the authority of the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs. The scope of the EU’s ambition The ambition of the EU is not only to shape Europe’s regional environment, but also to inuence the global system. By adopting the view that the nature of international society depends on the quality of the governments of its constituent units, the EU in fact embraces the concept of “democratic peace” which has become so familiar in international relations theory. To cite the security strategy document again: “[the]

7 8

The ofcial name of the treaty is Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. 27 after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania early 2007.

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best protection for our society is a world of well-governed democratic states”.9 On this important question, Brussels and in Washington think along the same lines. But policy makers in Europe and the US have different ideas about the nature of security and insecurity in today’s world. Most European leaders gravitate towards the assumption that security should not be viewed exclusively in military terms, but should be seen in the wider context of eliminating the underlying causes of economic and social threats. It is in this domain that the use of force is really rather irrelevant. Cynics might argue that Europe’s predilection of employing non-military instruments is “by default”, not based on conviction, since the EU, lacking massive military power, has no other option but to rely on soft-power tools. An anonymous article revealing American neo-conservative views of the true nature of Europe’s attitude stated: Under the far-reaching shadows of U.S. leadership and the looming threat of Soviet aggression, Europe operated from a position of weakness, and had to master the art of subtle diplomacy, using charm, stealth, guile, compromise and appeasement to secure their (sic) political interests.10

For obvious reasons this sort of reasoning cannot be rejected out of hand, but it does not do justice to the impact of the post-WW II European experience. The European lesson was and is that spreading good governance and supporting social and political reform, as well as establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order. This lesson was also appreciated by some Americans. In his provocative book The European Dream, the social thinker Jeremy Rifkin argues that on the basis of their integration experiment the countries of the EU have been able to develop the rst really transnational vision which, although still in its adolescence, is far better suited than the American Dream to meet the challenges of an increasingly interconnected world. While the American dream emphasizes economic growth, personal wealth and independence, the new European Dream focuses on sustainable development, quality of life and interdependence. The American dream pays homage to the work ethic. In contrast, he argues that the European dream is more attuned to leisure and “deep play”. The American Dream is inseparable from

9 10

European Security Strategy, p. 16. The European Counterweight, in The Real Truth (www.realtruth.org/articles, visited on 15 June 2006).

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the country’s religious heritage and deep spiritual faith. The European Dream is secular to the core. The American dream depends on assimilation; the European is based on preserving one’s cultural identity and living in a multicultural world. The American dream is wedded to love of country and patriotism. The European Dream is more cosmopolitan and less territorial.11 Rifkin’s attering view of Europe corresponds with the EU’s selfimage of being a normative power. This grandiose notion sees the EU’s external relations as designed to promote the values and principles underlying the European integration process, as well as norms that are vital to EU policy regimes.12 In seeking to establish a new world order, it attempts to project its own preferred model of civil power, dialogue, respect for different interests within a pluralist framework built on democracy, social justice and equality, multilateralism and international law. The EU can therefore be seen as a civilian power, pursuing a norm-driven foreign policy which rst and foremost stems from the values promoted internally within the Union, such as social pluralism, the rule of law, democracy, and market economy. As Mary Farrell has emphasized, the specic nature of the EU model of governance is also what characterizes the Union’s inuence on the international scene, within candidate countries and in the EU’s immediate neighborhood, as well as in its relations with other regions and in multilateral forums like the United Nations.13

A role model? The EU itself could be considered the most advanced and successful application of the idea of effective multilateralism to date. Admittedly, the EU governance model is complex and many layered, embracing supranational institutions such as the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice, and at the national level, the governments, ministries, national legal systems and the sub-national governmental and administrative entities. But the system

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Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream (New York: Tarcher/Penguin, 2004). Anna Michalski, ‘The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion’, in Jan Melissen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations (Houndmills/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 126. Mary Farrell, ‘EU External Relations: Exporting the EU Model of Governance?’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, 2005 (5), p. 458.

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has enabled states to overcome the disincentives to cooperation and has generated practical results in many elds that are unprecedented in the history of international relations. The EU has been called a “post-modern” polity which is based on transnational negotiation and consensus building governed by institutional rules and procedures. For example, Robert Cooper is one those who share the vision of the EU as a postmodern system because it “does not rely on balance [of power]; nor does it emphasize sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs.” He adds that the Union is “a highly developed system for interference in each other’s domestic affairs, right down to beer and sausages”.14 Law-enforcement does not depend on physical coercion but on the acceptance of the adjudication of supranational rules. Pooling national sovereignty The EU embodies extensive cooperation among a large group of states that have been willing to pool their sovereignty in several elds of public policy. As already indicated, its system of governance vertically links several levels of political action – European, national and subnational – in a fairly non-hierarchical way. European integration engages member states in a multilevel system of sectoral governance, which is quite exible at a territorial and organizational level. As noted in an earlier section of this study, the autonomy of the EU’s constituent parts is much greater than in state-like formations, but much less than in a normal international organization. Yet the EU has increasingly taken on “state-like” features and responsibilities. From this idealistic point of view, the European project also serves as a role model because it demonstrates that interstate relations are not doomed to exist in a perennial state of anarchy, as power realists would insist. Provided important conditions are met, regional groups of countries can be organized through strong, negotiated and enforceable multilateral regimes. This is the signal that the EU, by its very existence, seems to send to the world, despite the fact that the successful launch of the European integration experiment in the early 1950s was very much affected by specic historic conditions: the legacy of WW II and the impact of the outbreak of the Cold War.

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Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 27.

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The uniqueness of the European experience: a comparison Can the EU model of codied and institutionalized integration be successfully applied to other regions in need for developing schemes of joint problem-solving? Probably not. In many respects the EU is unique, if for no other reason than that it has created a level of economic and political integration which is simply unattainable in other parts of the world. The case of regional cooperation that is most frequently compared to the European Union is NAFTA, the scheme which brings together the economies of the US, Canada and Mexico.15 NAFTA has created a free trade area but no customs union, and there is no coordination of economic and scal policy, or anything remotely resembling the monetary union in Europe. The differences among the EU member states pale into insignicance compared to the economic dominance of the US in North America and particularly the vast economic gulf between Mexico and its two northern NAFTA partners. NAFTA is concerned with trade matters and does not provide collective action in the eld of high politics like diplomacy. The coordination of external relations is limited to participation in multilateral trade negotiations. As for the institutional arrangements, there is only a small secretariat consisting of national ofces in the three capitals. Essentially the administration of the agreement relies on national ministers – meeting in the Free Trade Commission – or on their appointed representatives in more specialized working groups and committees. There is nothing like the presence of autonomous supranational institutions that initiate and enforce common policies, which is highly characteristic of the EU. True, there are provisions for dispute settlement, but as in the WTO, this takes place in the setting of arbitration panels when individual cases are raised. In contrast with the EU, there is no permanent court system.16 In Africa, the African Union (AU) unites all the African states. It was launched in 2002 as the successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which has a long record of intra-African cooperation but suffered from the great diversity of its membership and lack of political leadership.17 The AU has established an extensive framework of

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See Robert A. Pastor, Toward a North American Community: Lessons from the Old World for the New (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2002). See Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA: A Seven-Year Appraisal (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2002). On this subject, see Klaas van Walraven, Dreams of Power. The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963–1993 (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 1999).

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permanent institutions; there is an AU Assembly, Commission, Peace and Security Council, Pan-African Parliament, and an African Court of Justice. However, there are no indications to date that member states are willing to accept the constraints on their autonomy to the same degree that EU member states have done so. The AU relies on purely intergovernmental decision making. Moreover, in practical terms, the focus of the organization is very much on conict management.18 Intra-African economic cooperation has been organized on a smaller geographical scale. Thus, in West Africa there is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has sometimes beneted from the leadership of a regional hegemon such as Nigeria. In Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been established with its offshoot, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Although these sub-regional organizations are potentially more cohesive and effective than the AU, their similarity with the EU is no more than supercial. One important difference is that the agreements concerned were signed by states that engage in relatively low levels of trade with one another. While the percentage of intra-bloc trade in the EU is over 60, this percentage is hardly more than 10 in the case of ECOWAS and SADC.19 Clearly, this reality set very narrow limits on the prospects of real economic integration in the mold of the EU. The need for more cooperation in East Asia was already mentioned earlier in this study in chapter 3. Indeed, a compelling case could be made for EU-style integration in that part of the world. In the rst place, China, Japan and South Korea are tied to one another by increasing trade and investment ows, but political animosities among them could threaten long-term stability in the region. The central strategic issues in the Asian-Pacic region are the management of the rise of China, the

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Thus it had deployed, though without much practical effect, a 7,000 –11,000 strong contingent of peacekeepers in Darfur. In August 2006, the UN Security Council voted to send 20,000 UN troops to replace the AU force. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, despite heavy international pressure the government in Khartoum initially refused to let UN peacekeepers to Darfur. In November 2006, the Sudanese government was reported to nally agree in principle to allow a joint (“hybrid”) UN-AU peacekeeping force in the war-stricken region, reversing its longstanding refusal to let UN troops in. It was understood that the UN component would be predominantly composed of troops from African countries. Later reports called the Sudanese government’s change of position into question. Data from World Bank, 2005 World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005).

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peaceful reunication of the two Koreas, and the reemergence of Japan as a “normal” military power.20 As for the latter, there is growing support in Japan for rewriting Article 9 of the “pacist” constitution to permit the country to use force in UN peacekeeping operations.21 Secondly, an economically integrated East Asia would enable Asian governments to bargain more effectively in international forums such as the WTO, settle frictions between their countries, and tackle problems such as poverty, environmental pollution, water shortage, and deforestation in wider Asia. Thirdly, a more integrated Asia could work out plans to cover the rising energy needs of the fastest growing economies. Different styles of integration: Europe and Asia In all likelihood, the implantation of the EU model in the Asian context will also be extremely difcult, if not bound to fail. First, the shadow of China’s power makes smaller Asian countries highly suspicious of forms of cooperation with the former Middle Kingdom. More importantly, there are wide discrepancies between European-style of integration and Asian-style of cooperation, resulting in obstacles that are hard to overcome. While institutions which impose legally binding rules on member states are one of the hallmarks of European integration, institutionalization is not considered benecial by Asian countries because it may lead to loss of sovereignty in key policy areas. In the Asian context, sovereignty has not lost its absolute nature. The Asian countries share a feeling of distrust that regional bureaucratic structures will become independent of their state sponsor. From an Asian perspective, integration must remain exible, maintain its legally non-binding status and be limited to the establishment of free trade agreements, not leading to a new polity with parliamentary oversight at the supranational level, as in the EU. Their main function is to support export-led growth regimes and economic strategies aimed at attracting foreign direct investment. The term “soft integration” was coined to characterize the Asian

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See Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a “Normal” Military Power. Adelphi Paper 368–369 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004). Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 “peace constitution” holds that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or the use of force, as a means of settling international disputes.” The section continues: “In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

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approach to integration, with open borders and cooperation based on informal understandings rather than written agreements.22 On the other hand, the lack of an adequate organization structure may eventually be regretted. Thus, as regards South-East Asia in particular, ASEAN’s plans to accelerate the establishment of a common market for goods, services, and investments in the region were hampered by the absence or weak development of formal agencies.23 A single market must have agencies to monitor and implement decisions, and impose sanctions on recalcitrant members.24 Joseph Grieco attempts to explain the difference in the institutionalization of regional cooperation between the EU and East Asia from another perspective. The main thrust of his argument is that the relative equality and stability of the distribution of political resources in the EU has alleviated fears about the regional dominance of Germany and has therefore facilitated institutionalization. The traditional German question – Germany being too weak to dominate Europe from its geographic center (Mittellage), but too strong too accept other European powers as equals – has been transcended in the web of European institutions. By contrast, in East Asia, the stronger and increasingly dominant role of Japan (and later China) is believed to have been an obstacle to institutionalization. Grieco suggests that the failure to institutionalize cooperation in East Asia despite the increase in regional “trade encapsulation”, refutes the institutional-functional theory which suggests that the development of institutions will follow a growing concentration of interactions.25 Nevertheless, the EU as an institution that embodies certain principles, including democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and free markets, offers a set of standards for the members to follow and incorporate within the national structures.

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See Yong Deng, Promoting Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation: Perspectives from East Asia (London: Routledge, 1997). In October 2003, the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali had decided to create a so-called ASEAN Economic Community, aiming for a common market. See John Burton, ‘Doubts cast on Asean speeding single market’, Financial Times, August 23, 2006. Joseph M. Grieco, Realism and Regionalism: American Power and German and Japanese Institutional Strategies during and after the Cold War, in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

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chapter seven Enlargement and the immediate neighborhood

Enlargement has turned out to be the EU’s most successful foreign policy endeavor. It may be called an atypical part of foreign policy because it is conducted mainly by extension of domestic policies rather than with traditional foreign-policy instruments.26 By offering the membership of the organization to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the EU has been able to persuade post-communist states to implement radical political and economic reforms. It was in the position to do so because the EU could exploit its enormous “power of attraction”; the post-communist governments had repeatedly declared their desire to “return to Europe”. It is difcult to overestimate the Union’s contribution to the transformation of Europe. The old dividing line between the Western and the Eastern part had been removed as a result of enlargement. One of the main purposes of enlargement was to build a secure environment. The security community that was developed in one half of the continent, leading to the elimination of expectations of war between nations, had to be expanded to the other half. Other aims were the spread of prosperity and democracy. A sense of shared identity and historical guilt towards the people “on the other side” – having twice been the victims of totalitarian aggression in the 20th century – added an emotional appeal to the case for enlargement in the old member states.27 The Copenhagen criteria The criteria for EU membership had been determined by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, nearly four years after the fall of the Berlin wall. They included (1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities, (2) a functioning market economy with the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU, and (3) the ability to take on the obligations of EU membership including adherence to the aims of economic and political union (the so-called acquis communautaire). By 1999, the EU had formally added

26 27

See Andreatta, op. cit., p. 36. Marise Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

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“good-neighborliness” to the set of conditions, stating that candidate countries must peacefully resolve outstanding border disputes.28 With EU pressure, potentially explosive minority problems in candidate member states have been resolved by new constitutional arrangements or bilateral agreements between the countries involved. The Pact for Stability, a multilateral negotiating framework led by the EU, was an important tool, inducing countries such as Romania, Hungary and Slovakia to mend their ways. The carrot of future membership and the stick of exclusion proved a powerful lever for encouraging democratization and liberalization. Further enlargement would stretch not only to Turkey, a predominantly Islamic country, but also encapsulate regions, such as the Balkans, that were torn apart by bloody wars not so very long ago. The EU’s proven power of transformation on the European continent belied the contention that the Union represents a political force that is wedded to the status quo. In Karen Smith’s words, the EU has contributed signicantly to shaping the post-Cold War European order. Thus, it has actively set the “rules of the game” and the norms of domestic and international behavior that should guide European states. It has also shaped the institutional structure in which these states are increasingly embedded.29 Deepening and widening But is the EU capable and ready to enlarge further? Previous enlargements rounds had sparked off lively debates between the so-called “deepeners” and “wideners”. The former argued that the EU should enlarge only if it integrated further in order to strengthen its capacity to absorb new member states, whilst the latter maintained that enlargement should occur rst because further integration would raise the bar for the newcomers. With the benet of hindsight, the “wideners” could boast that each round of enlargement had given rise to new integration initiatives. But at this juncture there is a growing awareness that the EU has reached the limit in terms of its capacity to absorb new sources

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The Treaty of Rome (1958) stated that “Any European state may apply to become a member of the Community” (Article 237). The 1999 Amsterdam treaty added that any European state that respects the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, may apply to become a member of the Union (Articles 5 and 49). Karen E. Smith, ‘Enlargement and European Order, in Hill & Smith, op. cit., p. 271.

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of instability. Many fear that the EU, with 25 member states since May 2004,30 will be overstretched and lose its coherence if it goes on to expand ever further. There is another factor which places narrow constraints on further enlargement and creating – what has been commonly referred to as – enlargement fatigue, viz. the changed public mood. Up to now the Union has lived up to the adage that it is better to “Brusselize” unstable regions outside the borders than to be “Balkanized” inside. The underlying motive is clear: if poverty and social distress cannot be eliminated from neighboring countries, they are likely to export their problems to the home territories of EU member states. The EU cannot escape from chaos beyond its borders. It goes without saying that organized crime, illegal immigration and trafcking of different sorts, could undermine the fabric of European societies. However, the anxiety about the inux of cheap labor from new member states was one the reasons why a majority of the French and Dutch voters rejected the constitutional treaty in the spring of 2005.31 European political elites failed to convince the general public that the European integration project was the only avenue for European economies to meet the challenge of globalization, and in fact many ordinary European citizens believed that European integration had become part of the putative conspiracy of globalization. As public resistance to further enlargement started to grow in member states, the EU made increasingly high demands for membership on (potential) candidate countries. The sensitive issue of Turkish membership raised the unanswered question of the EU’s identity. Should the idea of “Europe” still be dened in terms of Christian and humanistic values – the spiritual legacy of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome, in which an Islamic country had no part? What was more important: the value of geography (i.e., Europe as a geographical concept) or the “geography of values” (i.e., common political ideals across articial geographical borderlines)?32 William 30

31

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As mentioned before, Bulgaria and Romania are expected to join the EU as full members in 2007. For an analysis of the Dutch situation, see Kees Aarts and Henk van der Kolk (eds), Nederlanders in Europa (Dutchmen in Europe) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2005), and Hans Vollaard and Bartho Boer (eds), Euroscepsis in Nederland (Euroskepsis in the Netherlands) (Utrecht: Lemma, 2005). After an acrimonious debate as to whether or not express reference should be made to the Christian roots of European civilization, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe took refuge to a very general formulation. Article 1–2 stated (Part I, Title I): “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member

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Wallace has cogently argued that, paradoxically, the European Union is unworkable without clear boundaries, but that among EU member states wide disagreements exist how to dene Europe as a cultural and geographic region. The diversity of images of the continent is simply too wide “to provide a sense of identity common to citizens of Lisbon and Madrid, Helsinki and Stockholm, Prague and Warsaw, Thessaloniki and Palermo”.33 The European neighborhood policy As a result, the EU had to tread a ne line between internal consolidation and external stabilization. On the one hand, the EU could not be expected to enlarge itself into extinction. There are justiable concerns that ever growing numbers of member states, with big disparities in standards of living and political divisions among them, would fail to reach agreement, in particular on policies related to distribution of funds. On the other hand, any decision to withdraw the prospect of accession would deprive the Union of the most effective instrument to bring pressure to bear on surrounding countries to change domestic conditions. An anecdote circulating in Brussels some time ago suggested: “Once a country applies to join the EU, it becomes our slave.” How to square the circle? The European Commission has tried to nd a middle way by designing special forms of partnership and association as an alternative to full-edged membership. These special links have become the foundation of the EU’s assistance programs to countries on its eastern and southern borders. Embarking on a so-called European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which was launched in May 2004, it built on partnership agreements that were concluded in the past with the Mediterranean countries (the “Barcelona process”) and Russia and Ukraine.34 Comprising as many as 16 countries (including those in the south Caucasus) and the Palestinian Authority, the Policy is aimed at stabilizing countries across the Union’s borders by creating zones of

33

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States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” William Wallace, ‘Where does Europe end? Dilemmas of inclusion and exclusion’, in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound. Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 79. See the European Commission’s strategy paper European Neighbourhood Policy (Brussels, 12 May 2004), and Karen E. Smith, ‘The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy’, International Affairs, 81 (4), 2005, pp. 757–773.

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economic prosperity and security. In this way the Union hopes to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors. The basic principle of ENP is the idea of positive conditionality. It implies that negotiations are conducted on a bilateral Action Plan with every target country. In this plan political and economic reforms are linked to a freer movement of persons, goods, services and capital.35 However, for the new ENP to be effective and not merely a restyling of existing policies, stronger incentives for cooperation probably need to be introduced than those in the various Action Plans drawn up by the Commission. The EU’s neighbors are particularly interested in greater access to the internal market, easier passage for their citizens across the borders, and receiving more technical aid. Therefore, in return for an unequivocal pledge by these countries to implement domestic reforms, the Union must be willing to make signicant concessions in each of those areas. Of course, greater access to the internal market is a euphemism for the elimination or reduction of export subsidies on agricultural products and for lowering import barriers on basic manufactures, such as textiles. However, the costs and benets of such measures are unequally divided among EU members states, and this is a source of internal friction. In principle, member states have the same interest in regulating the movement of people from non-member states. But if the Union wants to be a role model for bordering states, it also has to make efforts not to be seen as a fortress under siege. A serious problem arises from the fact that the principle of free movement of people and goods within the Schengen zone requires tighter controls on the externals borders of new member states. This requirement is in conict with the core objective of the ENP to achieve closer ties and cooperation between the neighboring countries and EU member states. To reduce the contradiction, the EU would be well advised to agree to exible arrangements for local crossborder trafc whenever this is feasible.36 In practical terms, it makes sense to ease trade and travel restrictions, particularly by making visas to nationals from neighboring states cheaper and easier.

35 36

Biscop, op. cit. This was one of the recommendations of the (Netherlands) Advisory Council on International Affairs in its report The European Union’s New Eastern Neighbours ( July 2005), p. 46.

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An examination of the further implementation of the ENP reveals that EU member states’ concerns about the sources of instability and cross-border problems are very much dependent on geographical proximity. Thus, the southern European members have been concerned about developments across the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, thereby stressing the importance of the Barcelona process. By contrast, the group of Nordic, Baltic, and Slavic countries focused attention primarily on the regions in their vicinity, worried about issues such as environmental pollution, transnational criminal networks, the storage of nuclear waste, and the volatile political situation in particular countries (e.g., Ukraine). Clearly, the predominant orientation of groups of member states to adjacent regions has weakened EU solidarity towards all surrounding states; it challenged the policy coherence of the Union, all the more so as members have proved to be lukewarm, if not outright reluctant, about supporting programs directed at neighbors outside their geographical scope for fear of resources not being allocated for their more immediate and favored neighbors. At the same time, the EU could not fail to recognize the need to differentiate between neighbors as these countries’ needs and aspirations with regard to the EU were (and are) by no means identical. Thus, the people in the countries to the east of the EU thought of themselves as European. They wanted policy advise as much as money, believing they stood a chance of entering into the EU one day. In contrast, there were the countries to the south which would never join the EU. Here the main European concerns were immigration and Islamic radicalism. Not only because of the different concerns and interests of the countries involved but also from a practical point of view, it was almost inevitable that the entire group of neighboring countries were divided into smaller groups belonging to a particular region. The need for differentiation particularly made itself felt in the relationship with the Russian federation. For obvious reasons, Russia was loath to be lumped together with minor countries outside the EU. It claimed a special status, seeking to establish a relationship with the EU on the basis of equality. To this end, the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement had already been concluded in 1994,37 but this project has continuously been in search of substance and relevance. Nevertheless, the two parties decided to develop their strategic further through the creation of

37

The agreement will come up for renewal in 2007.

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four common spaces, as dened at the 2003 St. Petersburg summit.38 Furthermore, the growing dependence of the EU on Russian gas and oil and increasing competition in the international energy market as the result of increasing demand from China and India, was a powerful incentive for the EU to put its relations with Russia on a new footing. One of the stumbling blocks concerned Russian misgivings about the EU’s efforts to equally strengthening relations with countries that were once part of the former Soviet Union, such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. In Moscow’s eyes, these countries are part of the Russian orbit, and should not to be tempted to join another political and economic bloc. Russia itself is torn between wanting to be seen as, in President Putin’s words, “a natural member of the European family”, and pride in being an independent great power which is prepared to use energy prices, and the threat to cut off supplies, as a lever to exert pressure on other countries. The dilemma for the EU seems to be clear: its long-term economic interests dictate that it must not offend Moscow’s ambition to be accepted as a major player on the international stage in its own right, but the Union’s credibility requires that its principles not be sacriced towards countries which Russia considers to be its “near abroad”.39

Interregional cooperation As indicated above, the foreign policy efforts of the EU are not conned to enlargement with new member states and establishing “a ring of friends” around its borders. The Union also attempts to inuence 38

39

The four spaces concern (1) a common economic space (to create an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia, (2) a common space of freedom, security and justice (the underlying principles are democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Combating terrorism, organized crime and corruption also fall within this space), (3) a common space of external security (the road map for this space underlines the shared responsibility of the EU and Russia for the development of an international order based on effective multilateralism. The proliferation of WMD has been identied as a main common concern), and (4) a common space on research, education and culture (encouraging close cooperation in the elds involved). Also see James Hughes, ‘EU relations with Russia: partnership or asymmetric interdependency?’, in Nicola Casarini and Constanza Musu (eds), The EU’s foreign policy in an evolving international system: the road to convergence (London: Palgrave, 2006), and Katinka Barysch, The EU and Russia: From Principle to Pragmatism? (London: Centre for European reform, November 2006).

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developments far outside Europe and surrounding regions. Subscribing to universal values, the Union is committed to advancing the cause of human rights and good governance in different corners of the globe. In accordance with its reputation of being predominantly a civilian power, the EU’s main instruments to achieve these goals are, besides diplomacy, trade preferences (access to markets), humanitarian and economic assistance. One important focus is inter-regionalism, which can be considered a genuine innovation by the EU. A large proportion of the Union’s international actions have resulted in numerous interregional arrangements, especially with more distant counterparts in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The EU’s ambition is to strengthen and formalize the relations between regional bodies and regions. The third chapter referred to the view of some authors that the growing links between the EU and other regions does represent a pattern of governance, with its own characteristics and the potential to become a world order. This model of world order could be described as “multiregionalism”. Doubts have been expressed about whether this view is tenable. It is one thing to assert that the relevance of the European experience may in itself be a force for contributing to multi-regionalism. It is quite another to claim that a system of global governance could be built on the basis of interregional relations. The point is repeated that such a system would demand an overarching structure to cope with extra-regional effects and problems that are common to all nations. Nonetheless, the wide range of relations which the EU maintains with other regions allows it to play the role of a global actor. Nicole Alecu de Flers and Elfriede Regelsberger summarize the signicance of EU’s group-to-group approach: Inter-regional cooperation has turned out to be one of the most attractive frameworks for both the EU and third countries to meet their respective foreign policy interests. It corresponds to the EU’s own wish to pool national resources and to resolve conicts through dialogue and negotiation, with all parties having an equal standing. It offers support to processes of regionalization elsewhere in the world and enables the participating groupings to respond more effectively to globalization, thus improving their proles as collective actors.40

40

Nicole Alecu de Flers and Elfriede Regelsberger, The EU and Inter-regional Cooperation, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 317–318.

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Relations with ACP countries A large variety of institutionalized ties have developed between the EU and regional formations outside Europe, giving rise to the notion of interregional dialogues. This concept covers a rather confusing diversity of formats, which differ as regards the objectives, the legal basis, the actors involved and the agenda to be followed. One meaningful way to come to grips with the interregional dialogues is to differentiate them in terms of the degree of symmetry in mutual relations.41 Symmetric relations are characterized by dialogue and consensus-building, giving equal weight to the interests and views of the parties involved. In contrast, imposing norms and setting conditions are the hallmarks of relations between stronger and weaker parties. Another related perspective to assess EC/EU’s relations with regional formations in different parts of the world is what some authors have termed “a pyramid of privilege” within the broader system of North-South relations.42 The African, Caribbean and Pacic (ACP) group of countries were at the apex – many of whom are former colonies of EU member states. They have often been described as a clear example of asymmetric relations. Those relations were formalized in special association treaties, the so-called Lomé Conventions originating in the mid-1970s. The treaties provided special privileges for the ACP countries in their trade relations with the then European Community and they became eligible for more aid from the European Development Fund (EDF). A second tier was formed by the non-member Mediterranean countries. Their strategic proximity to Europe and traditional economic ties with especially the Southern European countries led to the negotiation of a series of bilateral trade agreements to protect market access in both directions. Another objective was to cushion the effects and slow the pace of adjustments required as a result of European integration.43 The countries concerned are now targets of the ENP, as discussed in the previous section. The rest of the developing world was at the base of the pyramid, i.e., all those countries that were eligible for Generalized System Preferences

41 42

43

As was suggested by Hettne and Söderbaum, op. cit., pp. 538–539. See P. Mishilani, A. Robert, and A. Westan, ‘The Pyramid of Privilege’, in Chris Stevens (ed.), EEC and the Third World: A Survey (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981), pp. 60–82. See James Mayall, ‘The shadow of empire’, in Hill and Smith, International Relations of the European Union, p. 298.

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(GSP) which make goods from developing countries duty-free,44 and those which received development aid from individual EC member states. As will be shown below, the EC/EU extended its relations to regional groups in Asia, the Gulf region and the Western Hemisphere throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Despite the preferential position conferred on the ACP countries, the EC’s relations with this group of developing countries have often been referred to as a clear instance of asymmetric relations. Thus, in the balance of rights and obligations with regard to those countries there was a strong emphasis on their commitment to live up to human rights standards and to implement domestic reforms to the satisfaction of the EC at the time. At the beginning of the new century, the Lomé IV Treaty was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement.45 In drafting this agreement, the EU tried to counter criticisms of its alleged conduct of soft forms of imperialism towards the ACP countries by emphasizing the reciprocity and equality in the mutual relationship. The Union decided to support regional-based economic cooperation and integrating, using the new agreement as a framework for establishing Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the geographically more focused regional organizations of Africa, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which was mentioned above. The underlying idea was “to help the ACP countries integrate with their regional neighbors as a step towards global integration, and to help them build institutional capacities and apply principles of good governance. At the same time, the EU will continue to open its markets to products from the ACP group, and other developing countries”.46 EU sees their further integration into the world economy as a condition for the further development of the countries and regions involved, as well as the best way towards promoting future trading relationships. The EU’s self-congratulatory rhetoric was exposed by observers who argued that, on reection, the Cotonou Agreement and the partnership strategy reveal an extension of the ideology of economic liberalization in the interests of the Union, rather than a deliberate strategy to implement 44 45

46

As of 2006, 133 developing countries beneted from GSP. On 23 June 2000 the post-Lomé IV Agreement was signed in Cotonou (Gabon) between 77 ACP countries and the EC. It entered into force in 2003 and lasts for ten years. See Elisabeth de Vos, ‘The Cotonou Agreement. A Case of Forced Regional Integration?’, in Kreijen, op. cit., pp. 497–518. European Commission, A World Player: The European Union’s External Relations, DG for Press and Communication, July 2004, p. 27.

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the EU’s normative goals.47 It is also contended that although norms and principles such as human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance were already mentioned in the Lomé Conventions, the Cotonou Agreement contains clauses with a greater force of international law behind them in the event of non-compliance.48 Nevertheless, as James Mayall concludes, Cotonou marked another stage in the folding of the EU system back into the global order established under the auspices of WTO.49 Relations with Latin American countries In contrast to the ACP countries, the relations of the EU with Latin America had not been intensive until the early 1990s. The marginal position this region took in Europe’s in external relations reected the relatively low level of trade between Europe and Latin America for quite a long time, as well as the aversion in European capitals to the non-democratic nature of political regimes in several Latin American countries. The changing attitude of the EU was brought about by the democratic governments in the South American continent that succeeded previous dictatorships. Another reason for the growing interest in Latin America was the increasing pressure inside the EU itself after Spain and Portugal joined the European Community. Both countries had deep historic roots in the continent, and were strong advocates of closer ties between Europe and Latin America. In addition, the establishment of the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur, or Mercosur) acted as a catalyst in the EU’s reorientation. For example, in comparison with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mercosur is more ambitious in that it has the aim of forming a common market and not merely a free trade area or a customs union. There is one nal reason for the rapprochement between

47

48

49

See Stephen R. Hurt, ‘Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention’, Third World Quarterly, 24 (1), 2003, pp. 161–176, and O. Babarinde and Gerrit Faber (eds), The European Union and the Developing Countries. The Cotonou Agreement (The Hague/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005). Mary Farrell, ‘A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation between the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention’, Journal of European Integration, 27 (3), 2005, p. 271. Mayall, op. cit., p. 301.

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the EU and the Latin American countries. From the perspective of the latter countries, the link with the EU could also serve as a useful counterweight to unwanted American inuence in their continent. Washington tried to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a project which met with a great deal of distrust in the Western Hemisphere. Many South Americans believed that it would predominantly serve US interests. The EU’s expanding relations with Latin America took shape in partnership agreements with actors in all relevant regions. The Union concluded such agreements not only with Mercosur (encompassing Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay),50 but also with the Andean Community (a free-trade area consisting of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) and the Central American Common Market organization (CACM, composed of all Central American countries except for Panama).51 Nevertheless, the relationship with Mercosur carried most economic and political weight. Originally limited to an interregional free trade agreement, the basis of cooperation between the EU and this organization has broadened to include economic cooperation in general and development cooperation in particular, as well as political dialogue. This now also encompasses social issues, education and the international implications of the Lisbon strategy for a knowledge-based economy.52 In spite of the emphasis on these non-economic dimensions the EU’s interest in strengthening the ties with Latin American countries was mainly motivated by the desire to gain access to fast-growing economies in the continent. The partners in Latin America were not able to persuade the EU, any more than the ACP countries were, to remove or even lower its high non-tariff barriers with regard to agriculture, the area where Latin Americans also have most to gain from access to the European market. The very fact that the access of the Latin-American countries to the EU was more restricted than the access of the EU countries to the Latin-American market can be taken as an indication that the partnerships involved were actually not based on equality.

50

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Chile and Bolivia have concluded limited trade agreements with Mercosur. In July 2006 Venezuela joined the trade bloc as a full member. This country has observer status. See Hettne and Söderbaum, op. cit., p. 547.

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Relations with Asian countries As far as relations with Asian countries are concerned, EU’s ties with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has served as a kind of model for relations with other regional organizations. Thus, the rst ministerial conference between ASEAN and the then EC and its member states in 1978 has often been hailed as the real start of the concept of a group-to-group dialogue.53 Two years later, the EC and ASEAN concluded a Cooperation Agreement, envisaging ministerial conferences every two years, as well as meetings of senior ofcials between ministerial meetings. On the basis of this agreement the EU also took part in the ASEAN Regional Forum, in which the Asian group meets regularly with its most important partners in the region and beyond. In addition to economic matters, it offered the EU a special occasion to discuss issues of a mainly political and security nature. However, the cooperation between the EU and ASEAN occasionally gave rise to tensions. The tabling of human rights and good governance issues met with reservations from the EU’s partners. The debate about “Asian values” gained wide prominence. The participation of Myanmar (Burma) in ASEAN was strongly resented on the European side.54 Ever since the mid-1990s, EU-ASEAN relations have been rather marginalized. The main reason for this is the establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. ASEM consists of a rather informal but high-level process of dialogue and cooperation between the EU countries (and the European Commission), on the one hand, and the ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and South Korea, on the other. Reecting the relative power positions of the EU towards its counterparts, the Union’s relationship with ASEM is characterized by a high degree of symmetry. Thus, it may be regarded as an interesting case of inter-regionalism among equals. The ASEM dialogue covers a wide spectrum of subjects, devoting equal weight to political, economic and cultural dimensions. However, as in the ASEAN framework, the EU’s Asian partners were reluctant to discuss human rights and good governance issues. Emphasizing the equality of the two sides, the joint venture eschewed any “aid-based” relationship in favor of a more general process of dialogue and cooperation. In that respect, it clearly

53 54

See Alescu de Flers and Regelsberger, op. cit., p. 322. The EU has, thus far, refused to sign an extension of the Cooperation Agreement to Myanmar.

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distinguished itself from the cooperative links which the EU maintained with ACP and Latin-American countries. Another difference is the involvement in ASEM of a great number of non-governmental actors, ranging from representatives of the business community to cultural organizations. The ASEM initiative cannot be assessed in isolation from the development of the Asia Pacic Economic Cooperation (APEC), which involves the US and Asian countries in an effort to establish a free trade area along the Pacic Rim. France and other EU countries felt the need to make a European response to the prospect of an economic alliance emerging between the US and Asian countries. Recognizing the growing importance of Asia in global affairs, the European Commission announced in 2001 the EU’s Asia strategy. The continued development of EU-Asian relations has taken place in the context of increasing the Union’s role as a global actor: There is one clear core objective to guide the further development of EU-Asia relations into the coming decade: we must focus on strengthening the EU’s political and economic presence across the region, and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU.55

These lofty intentions notwithstanding, the EU’s efforts to make its inuence felt on the Asian scene were hampered by two major factors: the lack of strategic clout and the tendency among the larger EU member states to embark on a policy of going it alone. As regards the EU’s strategic weakness, it is true that European soldiers took part in the UN peacekeeping operation in East Timor and that the Union, jointly with ve ASEAN countries, carried out the international mission to monitor the fragile Aceh peace agreement. It may also be true that Chinese leaders shared the dream of neo-Gaullist politicians in Europe that the EU evolve to being a counter-weight to the US, and that any expansion of European-Asian relations would be conducive to creating a multipolar world. Bu the point is that the EU is irrelevant from a military point of view when it comes to the management of potentially explosive issues such as the Taiwan dispute or the problem of containing the nuclear ambitions of North Korea. The Union has no military presence in East Asia, and cannot deploy a sizeable military

55

European Commission, Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships (Brussels, COM (2201) 269, 4 September 2001), p. 15.

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force in the region. It is therefore not surprising that the EU has not been part of the so-called six-party talks dealing with the security of the Korean peninsula. The second factor explains why both the temptation of diplomatic grandstanding and the possibility of using diplomatic relations as a lever for obtaining lucrative trade deals account for the solo policies of the larger European states. Unlike the US, European nations in general were inclined to view developments in Asia primarily through the looking glass of economic opportunities and threats. In other words, there was not much concern about the geopolitical implications – the impact on security and territorial control – of the rise of China and, for that matter, India.56 At the beginning of the 21st century the EU had already become China’s leading trade partner, and China was the second-largest destination in the world for EU exports. EU-China trade doubled between 2000 and 2005.57 In 2004, the two sides decided to move beyond economic cooperation and to give the Sino-European relationship a genuinely strategic dimension. Europe and China had a common interest in promoting strong, effective multilateral institutions and in seeing a more prominent Chinese voice and presence in a range of different areas, from the UN reform debate to the promotion of Chinese diplomats to key posts in international bodies. Non-proliferation has been identied as a priority area in the strategic cooperation. In this context, the EU can be expected to support Chinese membership of the MTCR and the Australia Group, including discussion about Chinese participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.58 Relations with countries in the Middle East In view of growing concerns about “energy security”, the EU’s relations with the countries from the Gulf region call for special attention. In 1989, a Cooperation Agreement was signed with the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), establishing regular diplomatic links. Obviously, safe-

56

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58

See David Shambaugh, ‘The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and European Reactions to China’s Rise’, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2005. See the European Commission’s policy paper on EU-China trade and investment, Competition and Partnership (Brussels, 24 October 2006). See the Centre for European Reform’s publication, A Compact between China and the European Union (London, 5 September 2006).

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guarding energy supplies is essential to European economies. The European interests at stake were balanced by the considerable interest on the part of the oil-supplying states in gaining access to European markets. In view of their moderate political leanings the Gulf countries were together perceived by the EU as an attractive intermediary to assist the Union’s policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conict and other key actors in the region, such as Iran and Iraq.59

Support for the United Nations and international peacekeeping In accordance with the view that the UN Charter is the fundamental framework for today’s international relations, the European Union considers strengthening the world organization a European priority. This is not just a pious intention. The Union provides the bulk of nancial contributions to the UN. While the EU-25 represents barely 13 per cent of the UN membership, EU member states pay about 38 per cent of the UN regular budget (in comparison: the US 22 per cent and Japan 18 per cent), and about half of all voluntary contributions to the UN Funds and Programs. In addition, they fund more than two fths of UN peacekeeping operations.60 The overall EU contribution does not limit itself to merely diplomatic and nancial support. Although, as pointed out above, the Union is still predominantly a civilian power, it began to formulate a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as the logical complement to the CFSP. Two developments drove European leaders into this project: the prospect of US disengagement from the European theater as the result of Europe’s reduced geopolitical weight in the American military strategy and the reemergence of insecurity and instability on the EU’s periphery.61 Thus, as mentioned earlier, by the end of the 1990s the EU’s heads of state and government entered new territory when they decided that

59

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See N. Saleh, ‘The European Union and the Gulf States: A Growing Partnership’, Middle East Policy, 7 (1), 1999, pp. 50–71. See Martin Ortega, ‘The EU and the UN: Strengthening Global Security’, in Espen Barth Eide (ed.), Global Europe. Report 1.‘Effective Multilateralism’: Europe, Regional Security and a Revitalised UN (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, December 2004), p. 11. See Jolyon Howorth, ‘From Security to Defence: The Evolution of the CFSP’, in Hill and Smith, International Relations and the European Union, pp. 183–184. See also Willem van Eekelen, From Words to Deeds. The Continuing Debate on European Security (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006).

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the EU should develop a military capacity to back up diplomatic action. This ambition was translated in the so-called Helsinki Headline Goal (December 1999), calling for the establishment of European military forces of up to 50,000 to 60,000 troops to perform, within 60 days, various military tasks short of high-intensity warfare. These so-called Petersberg tasks comprise humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and crisis management operations. Given the need to rotate soldiers every four months or so, the EU would need to have 180,000 troops at its disposal every year. Although most EU member states volunteered to commit national contingents to achieve the Headline Goal, ve years after approval of the Headline Goal there was widespread skepticism about whether the EU was able to deploy a coherent ghting force at army corps level or the equivalent. In view of serious shortcomings in critical military areas (such as command and control systems, air surveillance and intelligence, and strategic lift capabilities), European leaders were forced to scale down the EU’s ambitions. They tried to give a new lease on life to the edging ESDP by adopting the so-called “battle-group” concept. The concept allowed for the creation of a dozen of high readiness military units of 1,500 men to be deployed at short notice and on a short-term basis. Underlining the EU’s commitment to strengthen the world organization, the battle-groups were expressly designed to respond to UN requests.62 In addition to the military capabilities, the European Council in Santa Maria de Feira ( June 2000) decided that the ESDP would have a civilian component at its disposal of up to 5,000 policemen for the protection of the local population and humanitarian organizations in crisis areas. Finally, on the basis of the decision made at the NATO summit in Berlin in June 1996, the EU gained access to NATO assets and capabilities to carry out regional crisis management missions (the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements). The assets and capabilities concerned refer to allied command and planning structures, as well as communication facilities. As these facilities are mainly owned the US, there was some fear among

62

See Burkard Schmitt, ‘European capabilities: how many divisions?’, in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy. The rst ve years (1999–2004) (Paris: EU Institute of Security Studies, 2004), pp. 98–99. As NATO took command in the southern regions of Afghanistan in the Summer of 2006 total troop numbers of ISAF reached the level of 23,000. In October 2006, NATO assumed full command of peacekeeping in Afghanistan, taking charge of (an additional) 10,000 American troops in the east of the country.

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EU member states of American interference with EU-led operations in the event that the EU had to make use of the facilities. Reviewing the record The EU’s actual contributions to the UN peace support operations have to be seen in perspective. Since the sobering experiences in the rst half of the 1990s with UNPROFOR, the UN-led peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia (with its complex command and control arrangements), EU member states have been reluctant to deploy their forces under direct UN military leadership. As a result, the participation of EU member states in UN peacekeeping has been relatively low in recent years. Thus, in April 2004, the contribution of EU members amounted to only 10.7 per cent of the total military personnel engaged in UN operations. By contrast, these states contributed about 25,900 soldiers to the NATO-led forces in the Balkans (KFOR and SFOR), and 6,500 soldiers to the NATO-led force in Afghanistan (ISAF ).63 The EU followed the NATO model of subcontracting peace support operations authorized by the UN Security Council under the terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, when it assumed leadership over small-scale military operations for the rst time. In 2003, after launching the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), the Union was put in charge of the military operation Concordia in Macedonia – with NATO assets – and the operation Artemis in Bunia (Congo) – without NATO assets.64 At the end of 2004, it took over NATO’s operational responsibility for the military stabilization force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (which has been codenamed operation Althea since then). After the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip in August 2005, EU monitors have managed the Rafah crossing point between Israel and the area concerned. In mid-2006, the EU sent a military mission (2,000 soldiers) to Congo to reinforce the 17,000-strong UN force already in place. The purpose of the deployment was to create a safe environment for the elections in that country. Germany and France provided more than

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See Alexandra Novosseloff, EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management: Developments and Prospects (New York: International Peace Academy, June 2004), p. 7. Operation Artemis can be considered the EU’s rst ever autonomous operation, since the Union did not draw on NATO’s planning and command (particularly communication) facilities.

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two thirds of the EU mission, with the remaining third contributed by a total of 16 other European states, including the non-EU member Turkey. Shortly afterwards, following the cessation of hostilities between Israel’s armed forces en Hizbullah ghters in August 2006, EU member countries decided to send nearly 7,000 soldiers to Lebanon in order to beef up the UN peacekeeping force there (UNIFIL). The European-led force was to create conditions for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory and deter Hizbullah from new attacks on Israel. Formalizing the EU-UN relationship Underlining the growing ties between the Union and the world organization, the “Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in CrisisManagement” was signed in September 2003. In this – non-binding – declaration, the two organizations agreed to establish a joint consultative mechanism to enhance mutual coordination and compatibility in planning, training, communication and best practices. The EU sought to exploit the comparative advantage of the comprehensive nature of its toolbox for crisis management. With both civilian and military tools, it aspired not only to maintaining and enforcing peace, but also to building peace, i.e., laying the foundations for lasting cooperation and harmony between formerly warring factions by supporting reconstruction and development programs. In June 2004, the European Commission and one of the UN agencies, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), announced a strategic partnership which focused on conict prevention and post-conict reconstruction. It remains to be seen, however, whether the EU’s evolving military and civilian capacities will provide real added value for UN crisis management. It cannot be denied that the sub-contracting model favored by the EU sets clear limits on the degree of cooperation between the UN and the EU in peace operations. In spite of the commitment to report to the Security Council, the EU does not allow the UN any control over its operations.65

Partnership with the United States The EU has developed a series of bilateral relationships with the US, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Brazil, Japan, Brazil, India, South Africa, and – 65

Ibidem, p. 8.

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as was mentioned before – Russia and China. In some cases, these complete and in other cases, they replace region-to-region links. This is most evident in the transatlantic relationship, one of the few bedrocks in an otherwise impermanent world. The European Community has been intimately entangled with the US right from the start of the European unication movement. On the other hand, the US could be described as the catalyst of European integration, since it made its readiness to help the war-ridden European economies dependent on a clear commitment by the European governments to follow the path of regional cooperation. However, over the course of time the general attitude of the US towards the goals of European integration became rather ambivalent. Successive American administrations continued to give ofcial backing to the integration project. At the same time, though, as Geoffrey Edwards points out: “US support for European integration had frequently been tempered by spats over trade (. . .) and concerns over burden sharing in terms of security”.66 The US did not hide its apprehension that the edging European Community could evolve to become a serious rival, rather than a trusted partner. It was used to Europe playing second ddle; it had become accustomed to European attempts to walk alone again. As early as the mid-1960s Henry Kissinger observed: European unity is not a major cure-all for Atlantic disagreements. In many respects it may magnify rather than reduce differences. As Europe gains structure, it will be in a better position to insist on differences whose ultimate cause is structural rather than personal.”67

Apparently, Kissinger was alluding in the nal part of this statement to Charles de Gaulle under whose presidency France was to leave the military organization of the Atlantic Alliance. Ambiguity is also the appropriate term for describing the nature of the relationship between the to partners. In the economic eld, the EU-US relationship has become a partnership of equals ever since European economies have regained strength. In the framework of GATT/WTO the two sides were occasionally on a collision course on trade disputes. On the other hand, in the domain of military-strategic affairs, Europe is still dependent on the US should any major military

66

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Geoffrey Edwards, ‘The Pattern of EU’s Global Activity’, in Hill and Smith, International Relations and the European Union, p. 48. Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York etc.: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 232.

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conagration break out involving European countries. Europe’s structural dependence on American protection in the past has been seen as one of the main reasons why the European Community did not succeed in achieving much progress towards the development of a Political Union.68 However, it has also been argued that it was only because of the protective shield raised by the US that the former warring states of Western Europe were able to burry their hatchets and successfully pursue their integration aspirations.69 Turning to the present, one cannot fail to acknowledge the aggregate strength of the two parties. Together, the EU and the US account for about one half of the global economic output and about 70 per cent of the military expenditure in the world,70 making their combined political weight in world affairs potentially overwhelming. Therefore attempts to create a more secure and just international order are very much affected by the state of transatlantic relations. Any deterioration of the transatlantic relationship is bound to have negative repercussions on the international system as a whole, diminishing the chances of nding solutions for the most pressing world problems. As Dominique Moïsi, one of the most astute French observers, writes: “The messages Europe and America send to the world are based on the same values, freedom and democracy. But because of their different cultures, histories, and above all means, their shared values are expressed in very different styles, with very different emphases.”71 Counterbalancing or not? It cannot be denied that the relations between Europe and America became increasingly strained when NATO started to lose its strategic purpose after the end of the Cold War. Europe was no longer at the heart of US security concerns and had become less dependent on American protection. Furthermore, differences regarding the value of arms control treaties, the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal

68

69 70

71

See David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987). See Josef Joffe, ‘Europe’s American Pacier’, Foreign Policy, 14, 1984, pp. 64–82. Sources: economic data from publications of the IMF (Washington) and the OECD (Paris) and military data from The Military Balance 2004–2005. International Institute of Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 353–358. Dominique Moïsi, ‘A rosier future for the actor and the model?, International Herald Tribune, March 21, 2005.

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Court were exacerbated after the election of President George W. Bush in November 2000. The newcomers in Washington regarded the latter two treaties as just another intrusion on American sovereignty, whereas European governments professed their beliefs that the interdependence of a shrinking world demanded more global governance rather than less. The war in Iraq, three years later, served as the crystallization point of profound European objections to some of the premises of US policies. Europeans especially took issue with the assumption of the Bush administration that tyrannical and autocratic regimes were the main source of instability, and that democracy and freedom could be imposed in the Middle East by force.72 Another source of friction was Washington’s inclination to see NATO as a military auxiliary to take on jobs Americans did not want to do. The transatlantic divide, in juxtaposition with the continued development of the common foreign and security policy, have forced European governments to redene Europe’s relationship with the US, the single pole in today’s world. What is the most promising way to tame, harness and inuence that single pole? How can the US best be persuaded of the advantages of multilateralism and the need to nd international legitimacy for foreign interventions? The options for Europe seem to be clear: either to balance the US by creating a competing pole, or to side with it and invest in a more balanced partnership in the Atlantic Alliance. The option of developing a European counterweight to the US is probably both harmful and futile. It is harmful because attempts at balancing will only aggravate the transatlantic tensions and rekindle unilateralist tendencies in Washington. Balancing is a strategy which is part of the foreign policy arsenal of powers that see each other as adversaries rather than as partners. The option also seems futile because the majority of EU member states are opposed to lending muscular power to the Union, nor are European taxpayers in the mood to drastically increase defense budgets for the sole purpose of catching up with America’s military might. As Timothy Garton Ash eloquently remarked regarding the French and German position towards the US over the Iraq war: “The neo-Gaullist vision of a unipolar Europe in a multipolar world ended with a multipolar Europe in a still unipolar

72

See Philip Gordon and Joan Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2004).

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world”.73 Moreover, a European defense union or a European army, which seems to be an unalienable attribute of full power status, would require the establishment of a full-edged political union or European government. As the saying goes, one cannot wage war by committee. But the creation of a political union, with a clear structure of political leadership on a supranational footing, is simply not an attainable goal for the foreseeable future. Member states are just not willing to surrender sovereignty on matters of life and death. The case for the second option, siding with the US and attempting to establish a more balanced partnership, can be made on the basis of the common interests Europe and America continue to share, despite disagreements about the sources of international insecurity and the appropriate methods to deal with them. Even though mutual solidarity has declined and the security of NATO members is no longer invisible, Europeans remain the natural partners of Americans. Furthermore, Europe still needs the US because the military capabilities the EU is developing are too weak to defend European interests across the entire political spectrum. American military power serves as Europe’s “lender of last resort”, as was clearly demonstrated in the nal stage of the Balkan wars. It is one thing to assist countries along the road towards democracy and economic prosperity, while luring obstinate regimes, like that in Libya, with the carrots of trade preferences and economic aid to accept nuclear anti-proliferation norms. It is quite another to change tyrannical regimes (e.g., North Korea), which repeatedly show contempt for international agreements, without the stick of physical coercion. When soft power is the only option in foreign affairs, a policy of appeasement towards potential proliferators is not far away. This observation seems to be relevant in judging European efforts74 to curb the Iranian nuclear program. Conversely, the Iraq experience after the fall of Saddam Hussein has taught Americans that military superiority is relatively meaningless when it comes to supporting programs for nation building and democratic transformation. Soft power instruments are required to make these programs successful. Indeed, non-military tools of statecraft – such as preventive diplomacy, international monitoring, economic

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Timothy Garton Ash, Free World. Why a crisis of the West reveals the opportunity of our time (London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 94. Joined later by the US, Russia and China.

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assistance, trade preferences, and educational campaigns – are more effective levers to achieve long-term stability in turbulent countries than strategic weaponry. In several domains of soft power the US is weaker than the countries of the EU. Thus, for example, European funds on international development are at least three times as large as those of the US. In fact, Europe (i.e., the European Union and its member states) can boast that it is the biggest aid donor in the world. In 2004, total European net ofcial development assistance amounted to more than $ 40 billion, which was about 55 per cent of total aid ows to more than 160 countries and organizations world wide.75 In addition, the European contribution to peacekeeping operations is about ten times greater. Furthermore, American economic power is declining because of the dual decit of the federal budget and the foreign trade balance. Heavy-handed US diplomacy has also undermined another important dimension of soft power: the attraction of American ideas and values. This was reected in the majority opinion in the UN Security Council on particularly Iraq and adherence to international treaties in deance of the US. Over the past years, there has been a great deal of speculations about the American disengagement from Europe as the changing balance of forces has changed in the world. Admittedly, from an American perspective “the old world” has lost much of its geopolitical signicance since the struggle for mastery in Europe has ended with the collapse of the Soviet empire. The overriding American interest in stopping or preventing any European power from dominating the continent and controlling its wide resources was at the root of the US engagement with Europe. Such a development would have challenged the position of the US as the world power. With the progress of European integration and the crippled status of Russia new bids for dominance in Europe are highly unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future. In the rst half of the 1990s, Henry Kissinger made the point that a retreat from Europe would oblige future US administrations to conduct a pure Realpolitik, which was difcult to reconcile with the American idealistic tradition.76 By the end of the previous decade another intellectual heavyweight, Samuel Huntington, ventured the thought that healthy cooperation of the US

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See Gustav Lindstrom, EU-US burdensharing: who does what? (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper no. 82, September 2005), p. 63. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 123.

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with Europe could be seen as the prime antidote for the loneliness of superpowerdom.77 The value of these arguments can be seriously called into question in the light of the experience with the American foreign policy under the present Bush administration. However, for several reasons strategic withdrawal from Europe is still an unattractive option to the US. First, as will be shown below, there are strong (and still growing) economic bonds between the two sides of the Atlantic. Secondly, by withdrawing from Europe, Washington would lose its leverage on the course of European integration. Needless to say, the future direction of the integration process could have a substantial impact on American interests. Thirdly, for American foreign policy to be successful the US needs European soft-power instruments. Towards a new transatlantic bargain American hard power and European soft power are not antithetical but complementary.78 This may be a truism but is not any the less true for all that: Europe and the US are stronger when they cooperate than when they march alone. While it might not be possible for the EU and the US to take on everything together, it is essential to make sure that taken together they do everything. In view of the long-term challenge posed by China and India, it seems appropriate to recall Benjamin Franklin’s famous words: “we must . . . all hang together, or most assuredly, we shall all hang separately”.79 This is not to suggest that Europe should be America’s unconditional associate in every endeavor, nor that it must share the black and white view of the world that was so characteristic of American policies over the past few years. What is needed is not the popular good cop-bad cop role differentiation, but a common strategy based on a new transatlantic bargain, setting out general principles and guidelines, linked to resources and capabilities, to ensure a better coordination of the employment of civilian, peacekeeping, and military instruments. American dependence on European soft power gives European governments potential leverage over the

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Samuel Huntington, ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs, 78 (2), March/April 1999, p. 48. For a similar view, see Andrew Moravscik, ‘Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain’, Foreign Affairs July/August 2003, pp. 74–89. Warning issued at the signing of the American Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia, August 2, 1776.

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US administration, provided these governments are prepared to work with the US. Obviously, the US alone can decide its future role. But Europeans can help to reinstall NATO as Washington’s rst choice as a partner in security operations, by becoming more effective as allies and more united as critics. As Andrew Moravcsik has said: “In the end, the best way for Europe to play a world role is to play with, not against, the United States”.80 Furthermore, this study concludes that the only opportunity European countries have to affect American power, viz. to moderate and constrain it, lies in complementing American military power with indispensable non-military tools. The Bush administration’s recent playing down of the cleansing role of military force and its recognition that the battle against Islamist extremists can be won only by supporting “democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world”81 can in part be attributed to European advocacy. Europeans have been fairly successful in explaining that force is not terribly useful against loosely organized militias that are well armed and accepted by their local population, or against terrorists who are prepared to die for their cause. The reality of overall symmetry of military and civilian asymmetries between the US and Europe could justify and stimulate the development of a more balanced relationship in the NATO Alliance, giving European allies a greater say in joint security policies. A more balanced relationship would also be consistent with the reality of the US and Europe’s far-reaching economic interdependence. In spite of the hype of the emerging markets in Asia and the often mentioned economic reorientation of the US from Europe to Asia, the economic relationship between the US and Europe is the deepest and broadest between any two continents in history by a long way. Thus, the US and the EU are each other’s biggest source of foreign investment: two-thirds of European and American companies’ investment abroad is on the other side of the Atlantic. There is more European investment in Texas alone than total US investment in China and Japan put together. Europe is America’s most important commercial market, while European rms are key sources of employment and wages for American workers. Almost 60 per cent of foreign afliate sales of US

80 81

Ibidem, p. 83. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006.

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companies take place in Europe. Despite the fact that the trans-Atlantic relationship was, politically speaking, pushed to the brink during the rst term of the Bush presidency, the trade in goods between Europe and the US signicantly increased.82 In that respect, Robert Kagan’s Mars and Venus metaphor was wrong: the US and Europe are both from the planet of Mercury. As regards the institutional dimension of the transatlantic relationship, during the 1990s there was a consistent effort on both sides of the Atlantic to formalize EU-US relations and to provide a framework of rules and procedures to manage them. Some broad principles of organization were set out by the Transatlantic Declaration in 1990, which established a formal relationship between the EU’s predecessor, the EC, and the US. Five years later this declaration was followed by the so-called New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), which greatly expanded not only the scope of transatlantic cooperation, but also included more detailed areas of joint action between the EU and the US. Subsequently, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) was concluded in 1998, focusing more specically on the achievement of mutual recognition agreements and other technical understandings dealing with the management of trade and competition. In addition to these ofcial arrangements, initiatives were taken to develop transatlantic dialogues and networks between business, environment, consumer, and labor groups.83 However, the US was occasionally still tempted to working through individual member states rather than with the EU, giving rise to divideand-rule accusations on the part of some European governments. The creation of a trans-Atlantic free-trade area (TAFTA), more or less on the model of the European internal market, could provide the foundation of a new and stronger economic partnership. There are good reasons to direct such an advanced form of partnership towards the development of a common regulatory policy, a common code of competition law and real integration of European and US capital markets. It is hard to overestimate the importance of the latter goal. A single trans-Atlantic capital market could reduce the cost of trading by more than a half, which would trigger a signicant rise in the volume

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See for data on trans-Atlantic trade and investment ows, Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, Partners in Prosperity: The Changing Geography of the Transatlantic Economy (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2004). See Michael Smith and Rebecca Steffenson, The EU and the United States, in Hill and Smith, op. cit., pp. 351–352.

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of trade.84 Another possibilities to lend substance to a rejuvenated form of partnership are common projects on renewable energy production, nanotechnology, and the protection of the environment and climate change. These (and other) forward-looking projects might help to uphold the economic base of Europe and North America against the dynamism of Asia. However, in view of the diminished role of the Western Alliance as a forum for political consultations and the enhanced foreign policy prole of the EU, the most pressing problem in transatlantic relations85 is how to organize the political dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic. Some of the reasons why this problem seems rather intractable are the reluctance of the US to accept a European caucus in NATO, French insistence on giving priority to dialogue between the EU and the US rather than consultations in NATO, as well as the complexities arising from the fact that not all EU-members are members of NATO and not all European NATO allies are members of the EU (with Canada in an outsider position). Obviously, the stakes are very high: the risk of American disengagement with Europe and a regression into global unilateralism. Given the circumstances, a dual-track approach is needed. In order to regain their former relevance NATO consultations must be refocused from narrow military-strategic concerns (particularly shortcomings in military capabilities) to wider political-strategic issues (particularly the linkage between the security of the euro-Atlantic area and threats outside this area). However, at the same time, the periodic encounters between the EU and the US must be politically upgraded and be given a new impetus as they tend to be rather bureaucratic in form and predictable in substance. The proposal for an informal, twiceyearly strategic dialogue (in the mold of the EC/EU Gymnich formula) with the US administration consulting with the foreign ministers of the EU member states deserves serious consideration. One of the practical questions is whether all EU member states should be represented at such encounters. The full representation of large and small member states alike, will weaken interest on the part

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The German lawmaker Matthias Wissmann mentions an increase by even 50 percent. See his article “Time for ‘TAFTA’ ”, International Herald Tribune, October 25, 2006. As raised in (former) Chancellor’s Schröder’s speech for the annual Wehrkunde Conference in Munich, 12 February 2005. The controversial observation was made that NATO “is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies”.

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of the US. For this reason, Charles Grant and Mark Leonard suggest limiting representation to the “Big Three”, the Commission and the High Representative. They also propose that the EU and the US set up joint “contact groups” to discuss specic issues, such as problems in the Mediterranean or the Baltic region. Those groups should consist of the foreign ministers of the relevant EU countries, the High Representative, plus the US Secretary of State “and perhaps other Americans”. This formula would exclude smaller EU members that lack the capacity to contribute to nding solutions, especially for regional problems.86 The two authors realize that many small members will balk at the idea of forums dominated by big countries. But they rightly argue that the small countries might be reconciled to the idea if the really relevant small countries were included in the contact groups and by making it clear that the groups would not be decision-making bodies. Finally, strategic planning in the two organizations can be better coordinated by strengthening the ties between NATO’s North Atlantic Council and the EU’s Political and Security Committee. At present, the main ofces of the two organization are located in the same city barely eight kilometers from one another, and yet NATO and the EU appear to live on different planets. The two bodies have been compared with Siamese twins awkwardly joined together.87 They share many organs – soldiers, equipment and military planners – but their separate heads do not get on. NATO and the EU are particularly engaged in a clear competition as far as the missions of their rapid reaction/response forces are concerned. This competition harms the credibility and effectiveness of both NATO and the EU. Neither organization can achieve its security objectives without the other. NATO has none of the civilian components of the EU, whereas the EU still lacks heavy military capabilities.88 The successful restructuring of the transatlantic dialogue is likely to have a positive impact on the prospects of effective multilateralism as a whole. While Europe and the US cannot determine all the rules of the game of global politics, they can do a lot to create conditions

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Charles Grant and Mark Leonard, What New Transatlantic Institutions? (London: Centre of European Reform Bulletin, April/May 2005). See the Special Report on NATO’s future in The Economist, November 25, 2006, p. 26. See Judy Dempsey, ‘EU and NATO bound in a perilous rivalry’, International herald Tribune, October 4, 2006.

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for reaching understandings that can be endorsed by all the relevant players (including China and India). This applies particularly in the domain of world trade where the weight of Europe and America is still overwhelming.

What future for the EU? In this chapter Europe’s international role has been described in rather positive terms. Of course, whether the EU will be able to pursue an ambitious agenda is very much dependent on the evolution of European integration as a whole. Short-term trends do not give much cause for optimism. The impact of the migration issue and the failure of EU countries to integrate foreign minorities into their societies have resulted in large sections of European population turning inward, and turning against far-reaching international engagements. As a result of the revolt of electorates in many member states against future EU expansion, the engine of enlargement – which was responsible for a great deal of the heavy work involved in reforming the former communist states – has almost reached its limits. Enlargement “fatigue” is an appropriate phrase to characterize the mood in many member states. Furthermore, the inability of European governments to restore the balance between EU institutions and decision-making rules, and the demands of increased (and still increasing) membership, may undermine the Union’s overall ability to act, opening the door to centrifugal tendencies. On the other hand, the process of European integration is not entirely an internal (endogenous) matter in that the current level of cooperation determine future levels, as suggested by the theory of neo-functionalism. This theory raised expectations of successful integration in one policy eld spilling over to another.89 However, far from being an insular process depending on intra-European variables, external (exogenous)

89

Neo-functionalism can be interpreted as the scientic elaboration of the SchumanMonnet method. Jan Rood points out that this method approaches the integration process “as a functional-technocratic process that derived its legitimacy from the higher economic benet that it generated for the parties involved”. It is the inherent dynamics of integration, facilitated by the interconnections between policy sectors and fueled by assertive actions of European institutions, that determines the direction of integration. See Jan Rood, ‘A Federation in the Making? The Dynamics and Future of the European Union’, in Van Staden, Rood and Labohm, Cannons and Canons, pp. 110–111.

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causes also play a part in it; perhaps they are more important. As the history of European integration demonstrates, new external challenges could make European countries aware of the need to put the EU house in order and contain the risk of economic re-nationalization. Against the background of the weakened capacity of individual states to act as the result of globalization, European governments need to explain that they need more, not less, regional integration if they are to successfully address the worries of their voters. In the political debate in EU’s member states, the European project features as both a protective shield against the negative “fall-out” from globalization and as its agent and accelerator. These two contradictory positions are hard to reconcile. How can an open attitude to the opportunities of globalization be combined with actions to ensure physical and economic security against its threats? The outcome of the debate will have an impact not only on the future direction of European integration, but indirectly it will also affect the prospects of strengthening world order since moving away from an open attitude to the outside world in any way is likely to have negative repercussions in other regions. It is an open question whether greater competition at the global level will drive members states closer together or apart. Either way, the EU cannot credibly claim to represent an international order “writ-small”, if such an order resembles a Fortress Europe.

CONCLUSION

Is, after all, the quest for a sustainable world order that provides not only stability, but also meets minimum standards of justice, like whistling in the wind – vain, wishful thinking about changing the human condition? Although there are good grounds for skepticism about grand schemes to recreate the world to eliminate the enormous social and economic inequalities, the previous chapters do not point in that direction. No matter how many conicts are unavoidable in particular situations – ruthless dictators, aggressive groups and expansionist states do exist – the world is not inexorably doomed to live with a Hobbesian tragedy. Certainly, the foreign policy of a large majority of nations will remain focused on serving the interests of its own citizens and therefore fall short of the standard of moral perfection idealistic world reformers are looking for. Cosmopolitan morality will not be achieved merely through the exercise of reason, the creation of constitutional-democratic states or the development of international institutions. As long as most people base their political identity on their membership of national communities and lend their loyalty primarily to the institutions of the state, global solidarity is likely to remain relatively weak. The very notion of global values has been challenged by those who raised the specter of a “clash of civilizations”. At the same time, increasing interdependence in so many elds means that the fortunes of nations are growing ever more closely interconnected. In matters of security, economics, and environment (particularly climate change), all nations are, to some extent, in the same boat. When some nations are thriving, others are likely to ourish as well. There will be growing demands for common policies at both the global and regional level, for example, to ensure energy security, to protect the environment and to control migratory ows. If the increasingly interdependent world is to function well, governments need to cooperate. The best way to achieve this is through multilateral institutions with clear objectives. Whether they strive for absolute or relative gains, a bone of contention in the debate between neo-realists and neo-liberals,1

1

See David Baldwin (ed.), Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

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states have a common interest in building institutions that can settle disputes, developing norms that set standards for appropriate behavior, and upholding rules that help to coordinate individual actions. In a globalizing world the gap between the long-term interests of nations and the collective interests that are connected with world order, narrows.

US preeminence and beyond However, institutions, norms and rules – the main ingredients of world order – cannot survive on their own. Any practical application of the concept of world order to real-life international relations will be affected by the prevailing power structure and, to some degree, reect it. This means that serious attempts to transform the present international system towards effective multilateralism – the most realistic model of political order in the world today – must recognize the reality of American preeminence in global affairs. In spite of the clear limitations on its capacity to produce desired outcomes the US remains the only truly global power. The failure of the present Bush administration to democratize the Middle East with outside intervention should not be confused with structural decline of American power. The US is still second to none, and will continue to be so, at least in the foreseeable future. While the US is too weak to dominate the world, it is strong enough to take the lead. It is the only power with global reach, i.e., with strategic interests in nearly every region in the world and the capabilities to defend those interests. Regional powers in East Asia and the Middle East depend on the US to ensure their security. The US used to be the external balancer of Europe; it still plays that role in those vital regions. American foreign policy is not opposed by an adversary of equal strength at the global level, but despite the rhetoric about “the war on terror”, it now lacks a single organizing principle like the doctrine of “containment” in the years after the Second World War. The central question of this study was whether unipolarity, as epitomized by American predominance, must be taken as an obstacle or, rather, an opportunity towards the development of world order. In the scholarly and political debate, there is a wide gulf between those who fear abuse of power by the strongest state (or hegemon) and those who are anxious about the risk of destabilizing effects caused by powers of equal strength in multipolar congurations. Although the historical record seems to be rather ambiguous on this complex issue, there is a compel-

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ling argument that in a system of world order, ascendancy of power is essential to perform critical leadership tasks. If it is already difcult for the United Kingdom, France and Germany to reach a strategic consensus to represent the views of the EU to the outside world, what can one expect of far more diverse powers in this respect at the world level? Moreover, regardless of the merits of unipolarity and multipolarity, from the viewpoint of stability or justice, speculations on the development towards a global balance of power or concert of powers are premature as long as the US continues to be the “last resort” when it comes to the enforcement of global peace and security. It is simply impossible to deal effectively with any of the world’s challenges without US engagement. Therefore this study tends to conclude that US predominance offers an opportunity, rather than posing an obstacle. As will be further elaborated below, this opportunity can be welcomed provided that American foreign policy is guided by the spirit of selfrestraint in the exercise of power and motivated by enlightened selfinterest. In the eyes of many people in the world, the US has failed this crucial test over the past years. It is widely felt that the US, particularly the George W. Bush administration, has exceeded in unprecedented unilateralism while showing a blatant disrespect for international law. This criticism is justied up to a point.2 However, the same sense of realism that inspires this study suggests that as a power with unsurpassed military and economic weight, the US could claim a certain leeway in how it operates internationally. It is also understandable that Washington takes offence when it is lectured on human rights by Lilliputian dictatorships. Hegemonic powers in the past have sought to construct an international order that was compatible with its own international objectives and domestic structures. It is in the interest of smaller countries to constrain the stronger ones in institutions and norms. They are the demandeurs. The lessons of modern history also suggest that stronger 2

However, it is misleading to put the blame for the weakening American commitment to international law fully on the advent of the Bush administration. The Clinton administration was also responsible for acts of contempt. For example, before NATO bombed Yugoslavia in March 1999, UK foreign secretary Robin Cook informed his American counterpart Madeleine Albright of problems “with our lawyers” over using force in the absence of approval by the Security Council. The US secretary of state is reported to have suggested: “Get new lawyers”. See the article of Albright’s press secretary James P. Rubin, ‘Countdown to a Very Personal War’, Financial Times, September 29, 2000. Albright’s response supports speculation that legal advisers attached to foreign ministries are expected to produce legal justications, if not rationalizations, for the politically expedient position of their countries.

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powers have a natural aversion to being restrained by lesser breeds, especially if the latter take the moral high ground, aware they are not the ones being called upon to bear the brunt. The point, of course, is that the US distinguishes itself from former hegemons by the nature of its political regime. It has invited criticism by failing to live up to the ideals it has embraced ever since the American revolution: the rights of men and the rule of law. In a sense, it has become a victim of its own high-minded rhetoric. Nevertheless, the proven capacity of the US political system for political catharsis, to redeem itself from its “sins”, gives cause for optimism for building a post-Bush foreign policy that is more amenable to the goal of world order. Whatever the shortcomings of America’s policies in the past (and perhaps the future), it is reassuring that today’s preeminent power is a democracy. The past has shown the ugly face of alternatives.

The need for legitimacy The United Nations remains the world’s principal forum for addressing the most difcult international security issues.3 It is the main source of collective legitimacy. While the UN must be considered pivotal in the multilateral system and has a unique capacity for conferring legitimacy to state action, it is hard to imagine circumstances where the world organization would be capable to preserve international peace and security in opposition to the US. For better or worse, the UN cannot stand above the most powerful member states. This applies not just for the US but also for countries such as China and Russia. The latter countries, no less than the US, have reserved the right to keep the UN well away from issues where their vital interests are at stake. It is the member states that determine the limits of political relevance of the world organization, not supranational bureaucrats, non-governmental organizations or eminent personalities. This explains why proposals to reform the UN are either radical but not feasible or attainable but not bold and imaginative. The Iraqi crisis of the early 1990s raised expectations about a new window of opportunity to adjust the world organization to the demands of the 21st century. These expectations 3

This formulation is borrowed from the report of the Princeton Project on National Security (September 2006), p. 7.

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were only partly met. Post-Cold War euphoria which had prompted predictions of a new world order with the UN at its center descended into disillusionment and recriminations following humanitarian crises in Somalia, Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. Once again, efforts to bring the line-up of the Security Council more in accordance with the present balance of strength in the world failed. The reshufing of the UN organization did not amount to any great changes. Competing demands of great and small powers, nations with open and closed societies, as well as rich and poor countries, did founder calls for innovation. The sole exception was the adoption of the notion of “responsibility to protect”, which can be seen as a conceptual breakthrough, as it redened national sovereignty by constraining the jurisdiction of governments. However, time will tell whether the world organization will be able to respond more promptly and effectively to manmade humanitarian emergencies. This would probably require abolishing the veto for all Security Council resolutions authorizing direct action in response to such emergencies. At any rate, criteria will be needed to determine the threshold to justify international intervention. If the problem of world order today is basically the problem of managing American power, what road should be taken? It is not this study’s conclusion that simply because the UN cannot work without full American backing, the world organization can be relevant only if it is America’s tool. Although no American president, however liberal, will accept the idea that the UN could constrain America’s ability to protect its national security as it sees t, the US cannot be allowed to take the law into its own hands. The fact that American global leadership is indispensable does not mean that the world will accept the US as master. The view that American leaders can be trusted to use a monopoly of power has never been shared outside the US. Sensible Americans have been mindful of this sobering fact as well. Thus, Kenneth Waltz, the leading representative of the neo-realist school of international relations, thoughtfully observes: “I believe that America is better than most nations but fear that it is not as much better as many Americans believe. In international politics, unbalanced power constitutes a danger even when it is American power that is out of balance”.4

4

Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective’, Political Science and Politics, 24 (4), 1991, p. 670.

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To the extent that the US is still ill at ease with the entanglements and complexities of multilateral institutions, it is essential that the American administration rediscovers the potential value of these institutions as a source of international legitimacy, as well as the opportunities they may offer to share burdens with friendly states that believe in the virtues of multilateral cooperation. A new commitment by the US to multilateralism is less fanciful than is often suggested. The combined weight of persuasion by others who share America’s security concerns and the force of circumstances pointing to the limits of American power may be stronger than the impact of anti-internationalist belief systems. Assessing American foreign policy since the reelection of president Bush, Jr., Philip Gordon notes: Although the administration does not like to admit it, U.S. is already on a very different trajectory than it was in Bush’s rst term. The budgetary, political, and diplomatic realities that the rst Bush team tried to ignore have begun to set in. (. . .) By overreaching in Iraq, alienating important allies, and allowing the war on terrorism to overshadow all other national priorities, Bush has gotten the United States bogged down in an unsuccessful war, overstretched the military, and broken the domestic bank. Washington now lacks the reservoir of international legitimacy, resources, and domestic support necessary to pursue other key national interests.5

Regarding international legitimacy in particular, as was underlined in this study, the exercise of power that is not rooted in legitimacy involves political costs – material and non-material – that are likely to rise prohibitively high as campaigns to enforce democracy and modernization meet rm local resistance. Yes, the US still needs no permission slip to act; it has the capacity to intervene unilaterally and directly.6 But it depends on the world’s support for its aims to succeed. To deal with problems in a globalized world, it is not possible simply to bully recalcitrant leaders in Beijing, Moscow, Paris or Berlin into signing treaties and lining them up in military campaigns. The Iraqi imbroglio is a clear case in point. As one authoritative commentator wrote: “. . . the hubristic notion that [the US] had the ability and right to rearrange the world at will has met its doom in Iraq”.7 Indeed, in 5

6

7

Philip H. Gordon, ‘The End of the Bush Revolution’, Foreign Affairs, 85 (4), July/August 2006, pp. 75–86 (citation is a summary of the article). For an elaboration of this argument, see Richard Haass, The Opportunity: America’s Moment to Alter History’s Course (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2005). Martin Wolf, ‘US foreign policy needs “liberal realism” ’, Financial Times, June 13, 2006.

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spite of the strong belief in American exceptionalism – the sense of having a special vocation and a manifest destiny to exorcise the forces of evil – the US has discovered through bitter experience that it cannot impose its vision for world order alone. The struggle of the US armed force in Iraq shows that the power to destroy is not the same as the ability to build. The distinction between two forms of power that Keohane and Nye made in what has become one of the classics in the international relations literature, Power and Interdependence, remains highly relevant. It is the distinction between “resource power” (having the capabilities that are usually associated with the strength of nations) and “behavioral power” (the ability to obtain outcomes you want).8 While the US has plenty of the former form of power, it has proved to be rather “short” of the latter. In other words, the US is powerful but not omnipotent. In exchange for international support (diplomatic and material) the US must accept the obligation to respect some basic rules concerning the rule of military force, such as circumscribing the right of self-defense and adhering to the principles of humanitarian law and proportionality. The distinction between short-term political gains and long-term national interests is important. If history has taught us anything, it is that the use of power within the framework of an institution or legal system is more efcient in the long run than resorting to unauthorized military force or economic sanctions. Clearly, the Iraq war has drained credibility and respect for American foreign policy. It is one thing to support the promotion of democracy, it is quite another to forcefully export it. Unless the moral authority of the US is restored, the present president Bush’ successors will fail to show that, to borrow the words of the American historian John Lewis Gaddis, the world is better off with America as the dominant power than with any other power.9 Self-centered unilateralism must be replaced by a more enlightened approach of working through multilateral institutions and building alliances whenever possible. It is not likely that in the aftermath of the Iraqi asco, the US will bury its Wilsonian principles altogether and turn to some form of pure realism, without a hint of optimism or idealism. Robert Kaplan rightly remarks that this “would immobilize our mass immigrant democracy, which has always 8

9

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 3rd ed. 1981), p. 220. John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Grand Strategy in the Second Term’, Foreign Affairs, January/ February 2005, p. 15.

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seen itself as an agent of change”.10 After all, the pursuance of a foreign policy blind to any values led the US to arm the jihadists in Afghanistan during the 1980s, actually leaving the country to the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and to adopt, at least initially, an attitude of aloofness as the Balkans succumbed to ethnic slaughter in the early 1990s. Abandoning the agenda of promoting democracy because of the failure to understand the preconditions and the mistakes of its application would be tantamount to throwing out the baby with the bathwater. In the more distant future, China and perhaps India may pose the most serious challenge to American preponderance. Apart from the evolution of domestic politics in the countries concerned, the willingness of the US to recognize the legitimate interests of its potential contenders will largely determine whether China, India, and for that matter Russia, will behave as a responsible “stakeholder” or an obstructive “spoiler” in the international system. In the short term, the European Union – pictured as an international order “writ-small” – is in the best position to help the US engage with international institutions, modulate its exercise of power, and moderate its worst impulses. It will only be able to do so if the EU remains faithful to the ideal of an “open” Europe, engaging with the rest of the world and defying the cheap applause of populism at home. Another condition that must be met is an increase in the strategic consensus among the major European players, i.e., Germany, Great Britain and France, which is not self-evident. With 27 member states (as of January 2007), the EU faces mounting problems in taking prompt united action, and there is likely to be an increase in coalitions of the willing – according to need or ambition. While the EU is no match for the US in terms of military capabilities, its experience of supporting nascent democracies demonstrates that the Union has something to offer America which its clearly needs: an extensive arsenal of civilian foreign policy tools. Although the Atlantic Alliance cannot be taken as a substitute for the UN when it comes to the collective legitimization of force, it is denitely one of the main pillars of the international order. Consequently, the survival of NATO should be of immediate concern to all those who care about a more peaceful world. Plainly, the Alliance has no future, if it became a vehicle for passing the buck from one group of states to another. European allies cannot

10

Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Interventionism’s Realistic Future’, The Washington Post, November 22, 2006.

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be expected to take on tasks the US wishes to pass on, nor can the US be expected to accept such moves on the European side. NATO must be based on the principle of “all for one and one for all”. It must also be grounded in the principle of the complementarity of American hard power and European soft power, giving due weight to the increased foreign policy role of the EU. For a more symbiotic relationship to develop, existing mechanisms for consultations and dialogue need to be reviewed. The idea of organizing regular meetings for open-ended dialogue between European and North American foreign ministers is a step in the right direction. As for the role of the larger and the smaller nations in trans-Atlantic consultations, smaller allies realistically have to accept their position of junior partner in areas where they cannot make a signicant contribution. If it is true that there cannot be a duty to pay taxes without representation, then the opposite is also true: there cannot a right of representation without taxation. The magnitude of the task ahead, however, can hardly be exaggerated: restoring American interest in achieving a transatlantic consensus on the appropriate response to major security threats while at the same time granting Europeans an equal voice in the Alliance by making them “partners in leadership” with the US. The real litmus test will be American readiness to accept the idea of leadership sharing. The problem here is not only a sense of American superiority stemming from ascendancy of power, but also the American experience in dealing with the outside world. The pendulum of American foreign policy has swung from long periods of isolationism to intervals of active international interventionism, with the US calling the shots. There have been few years when America was cooperating with other countries on an equal footing. At the same time, European governments can only substantiate their claim to equality vis-à-vis the US, if they are prepared to take their full share of the common burdens, i.e., the burdens of containing, stabilizing and transforming countries that are not in their direct neighborhood but may nevertheless pose a danger to the security of the euro-Atlantic area (e.g., by providing a safe haven for terrorist organizations). Afghanistan and some African countries are examples which spring to mind.

Challenges to the United Nations The effectiveness of the UN system depends very much on combining American power with international legitimacy. Legitimacy has

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been described as the hard currency of future international relations, “possibly the most important asset to ensure the long term-success of specic initiatives”.11 By denition, it requires multilateral consensus. But legitimacy is not only an issue with regard to the exercise of US power, it also applies with respect to the outdated composition of the UN Security Council. The authority of the Council could be questioned in view of the fact that the UN’s power structure has been frozen since 1945. The UN’s deputy secretary-general Mark Malloch Brown has called the lack of Security Council reform a “cancer” in the whole UN system.12 The tendency of the larger powers to discuss global matters in rather informal groups like the G-8, which has widened its agenda from economic to political issues over the past few years, is a direct threat to the political standing of the Security Council. Suggestions that are circulating to expand membership to include countries such as China, India, Brazil en perhaps Mexico and South Africa,13 will gain momentum as the Security Council in the end fails to put its own house in order. Another crucial test will be the ability of the world organization as a whole to deal with the global threats of international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. As regards the menace of the indiscriminate use of violence for political ends, efforts have been made to explain the current manifestations of terrorism from different analytical angles: religious, cultural, economic, social and political. Terrorism is multifaceted phenomenon and its breeding grounds are manifold. An explanation can be found for any terrorist act. But to understand is not to excuse. The need to look at the root causes of both foreign and home-grown terrorism cannot be a reason to give less weight to combating the consequences of the indiscriminate and politically inspired use of violence here and now. After all, terrorism is a threat to the most basic human right, i.e., the right to life. However, a counterterrorism strategy using only military means is bound to fail. It is pointless

11 12

13

Gnesotto and Grevi, The New Global Puzzle, p. 198. Quoted by Gideon Rachman in his article ‘Change in the US will not solve UN’s crisis’, Financial Times, November 13, 2006. See the article of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Bot, ‘Met overtuiging en berekening: van zuiver naar realistisch multilateralisme’ (With conviction and calculation: from pure to realistic multilateralism), Internationale Spectator, 60 (11), November 2006, pp. 547–551. The Dutch minister believes that the continued strengthening of the tendency towards the development of informal big-power directorates could lead to a concert model of global governance.

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to confront terrorists with highly publicized campaigns in which counterterrorism features as “war”. Rather, it makes more sense to remind people around the world that global terrorist networks, whatever the underlying political motives, are criminal enterprises run by people who are no better than gangsters. It is essential to send clear signals to dissatised groups and malcontents that terrorism is no legitimate instrument to achieve political objectives. Other considerations apply with regard to the threat of nuclear proliferation. The arguments that have been advanced in favor of the gradual spread of nuclear weapons are not convincing. In other words, proliferation is to be considered a threat to international stability, if only because deterrence is ineffective against rulers and groups who believe that they have nothing to lose. Strategic relationships will be inherently unstable in a world where new nuclear states lack an assured secondstrike capability backed up by hardened missile silos or submarines at sea. Whatever the underlying motives of states to acquire nuclear weapons – deterrence, compellence (i.e., blackmail and intimidation) or prestige, a strategy of denial is essential to prevent further proliferation in the short term. But the responsibility cannot be exclusively that of the non-nuclear weapon states which may contemplate the nuclear option. There is also a responsibility for the nuclear weapon states under article VI of the NPT – the obligation of eventual nuclear disarmament. This requires them to take concrete steps to decrease their dependence on nuclear weapons. If the UN fails the dual test as referred to above, then there is little future for the world organization as a security organization. By repeatedly adopting resolutions that are un-enforced or under-enforced it would indeed be in danger of “fading into history as an ineffective, irrelevant debating society”, in the words of President George W. Bush.14 A large number of proposals and suggestions have been tabled to avert such an ill-fated development. Priority should be given to strengthening the legal regimes that have been established to combat international terrorism and to counter WMD proliferation. Thus, countries that have chosen to remain outside the anti-terrorist conventions must be pressured, if necessary by economic sanctions, to overcome their objections and to accede to the international regime as yet. All too often political grievances

14

Pronounced in a speech for US sailors at Naval Station Mayport, February 13, 2003.

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against particular states, e.g. Israel, are used as a pretext to cover a lack of commitment to accept international obligations. The same conclusion applies with regard to those countries that are not in full compliance with the directives of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, established by the Security Council. The putative nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran have put the survival of the NPT in jeopardy. The development of nuclear weapons with adequate delivery systems by the two countries could prompt other countries in East Asia and the Middle East respectively to follow suit, on the basis of fear or the belief that nuclear weaponry is the best protection against externally imposed regime change. That is why most governments agree that Pyongyang and Tehran must certainly be stopped. Attempts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime should focus on rapidly concluding a ssile material cut-off treaty and converting nuclear reactors to low-enriched uranium use, thereby reducing the risk of the development of all the necessary components for nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful application. To this end, article IV of the NPT must be revised to allow non-nuclear states nuclear energy but not a nuclear capability. Ideally, a global system of nuclear enrichment must be worked out to take place in designated centers under international control. The option of the breakout capacity must be made unattractive to aspiring nuclear states by confronting them with the prospect of becoming subject to prompt verication, if necessary mandated by the Security Council, in response to these states’ notication of withdrawal from the NPT. Moreover, the Additional Protocol ought to be established as the general norm for verifying compliance with the Treaty. Any illicit trading in nuclear material and technology should be prosecuted and punished. In addition, to increase both the credibility and the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime a legally binding universal ban on nuclear testing must be introduced with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Last but not least, the Security Council must be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance, whether or not these cases have been referred to it by the board of the IAEA. In addition, the ground rules concerning the use of military force should be adapted to the radically changed circumstances. In a world where terrorist attacks cannot by prevented by classic methods (i.e. containment and deterrence), and pressing the button could result in nuclear annihilation without warning, the right of carrying out preemptive strikes in self-defense cannot be disputed. It is unreason-

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able and unrealistic to expect a state faced with such a threat to wait for the threat to materialize. However, for any appeal to the right of self-defense to be legal and legitimate, the threat concerned must be imminent, in other words, there has to be a clear and present danger. It is up to the state that justies unilateral military action by referring to the right of anticipatory self-defense, to convince the Security Council of the high-level of urgency of the threat. It should also be understood that, in contrast with preemptive strikes, preventive strikes would require the prior authorization by the Security Council. Those strikes are in response to threats that could materialize in the future, but lack the urgency to justify unilateral action.

The linkage between security and development Another important conclusion is that security must be placed in a broader context than just responding to physical threats. A world order which aims only to maintain stability and the preservation of the status quo will not last. Security is much more than the mere absence of inter or intrastate conict. The notion of human security encompasses the idea that physical security is interrelated with socio-economic development and human rights, as well as the preservation of the natural environment. Reducing poverty and protecting human rights do not guarantees a safe world, but they do lower the risk of instability and violence. Achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 is therefore in the interests of both developed and developing countries. These goals represent a bold endeavor to break through the vicious circle of poverty, starvation, gender inequality, mother and child mortality and pandemic disease. The injustice of the present world trade system is one of the obstacles to achieving the MDGs. For one thing, high income countries should provide greater market access to the products of the poor countries. For another, the former countries must be prepared to help the least developed countries raise export competitiveness through investments in critical trade-related sectors. At any rate, it is essential to focus on capacity-building in low-income countries and emphasize the long-term commitments of donors. As far as global and regional approaches are concerned, political leaders should realize that the potential economic gains from global trade agreements would exceed the effects of regional deals that include only a few countries. While such deals can help expand trade, in the

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absence of global agreements, they are likely to create conicting and overlapping rules and increase tensions between the participating and non-participating countries, i.e., between the “ins” and “outs”. The poorest countries in areas like sub-Saharan Africa, which can be expected to benet most from multilateral talks in the WTO framework, will probably lose out because they have the least to offer. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the UN organization could be strengthened if the fragmentation in the entire family of its institutions were redressed. There is a striking lack of connection between different branches of international governance, resulting in policy incoherence, institutional competition and the duplication of programs. In particular, there is a wide gap between decision-making on traditional peace and security concerns in the Security Council and on nancial and economic affairs in the boards of the World Bank and IMF. This problem is even worse because with their outdated Bretton Woods labels the last two organizations have failed to accommodate the up and coming powers of the new economies, i.e., China, India, and Brazil. The fragmentation of the global governance system ignores the interrelationship of the problems involved, as is recognized by the notion of comprehensive security. Any solution which fails to extend the mandate of the Security Council beyond its traditional domain is likely to fail. Priority should also be given to fostering a culture of anticipating crises rather than that of reacting to them. Members of the Security Council should feel a sense of urgency to take action before conicts escalate and get out of control. The newly established Peacebuilding Commission, a body charged with managing the transition from keeping a peace to building a stable society, could play a useful role in this area. It is important to consolidate a hard won peace, but it is even more important to prevent violence breaking out again. Many conicts are up again because the peace has proved to be too fragile and unsustainable; therefore the two tasks are interrelated. Thus, in addition to helping bolster the economies and political institutions of countries emerging from conict, the Commission could be charged with periodic reporting to the Council and the Secretary-General about potential hostilities in the world. The release of such reports should be followed by high-level debates on the practical implications of threat assessments, with the aim of raising the general awareness of the need for conict prevention. In addition to strengthening mechanisms for conict prevention, there is a clear need to

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establish the capacity to allow for a more decisive response to humanitarian crises and natural disasters. Finally, in view of the weak UN capabilities for planning and commanding large-scale peace operations, the world organization is on the right track to concentrate on empowering regional organizations, especially in Africa (such as the African Union and ECOWAS), if possible with EU assistance. Admittedly, regionalization could undermine the moral authority of the UN, since this authority is based on the ethics of universalism and the principle of the indivisibility of peace. However, the public standing of the world organization will certainly be damaged if it cannot live up to the expectations created upon its foundation or deliver on the promises made later because of a lack of effectiveness. This applies especially to the pledge made in September 2005 “to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, the principle of the responsibility to protect. When there is a genuine humanitarian emergency, such as that unfolding in Darfur, and domestic rulers are unwilling to alleviate the plight of their people, military force should not be used only as a last resort. The difculty of gaining international consent for the use of force summarizes the dilemma of world order: whereas its goals should be based on voluntary cooperation and moral persuasion in order to secure legitimacy, it actually needs a lot of coercive power to succeed.

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INDEX

Abu Ghraib prison 115 Adams, John Quincy 83 Advisory Council on International Affairs (Netherlands) 123 n. 57, 149 n. 30, 153, 170, 170 n. 81, 186 n. 36 Afghanistan 17, 79 n. 43, 116, 119–120, 144, 166, 198 n. 62, 199, 220–221 Africa 5, 40–41, 55, 57, 78 n. 41, 86, 93 n. 74, 98, 142, 147, 157, 161, 163, 163 n. 65, 166, 169, 178, 189, 191, 227 African Caribbean and Pacic (ACP) countries 190–191, 191 n. 45, 192, 192 nn. 47–48, 193, 195 African Union (AU) 55, 55 n. 40, 178–179, 179 n. 18, 227 Albania 144 Albrecht-Carrié, René 107, 107 n. 19 Alecu de Flers, Nicole 189, 189 n. 40 Al Qaeda (see terrorism) 83, 120–121, 140–141, 143–144, 220 Amnesty International 91 n. 67, 93 Andreatta, Filippo 171, 171 n. 1, 182 n. 26 Angola 48 Annan, Ko 37, 37 n. 53, 38, 93 n. 74, 97, 126 n. 68, 156, 156 n. 43, 169, 169 n. 77 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 111, 151 Arab League 42 Argentina (nancial crisis) 8 arms control and disarmament (see international security) Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 194–195 Asia Pacic (East Asia) 42, 53, 56, 57 n. 46, 58, 77, 147 n. 28, 179–181, 195, 214, 224 Asian nancial crisis 8 Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation (APEC) 195 Asian Regional Forum (ARF) 42 Assembly of the People (World Assembly) 91

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 24, 24 n. 22, 42, 42 n. 6, 181 nn. 23–24, 194–195 Axis of Evil 22 Baehr, Peter R. 28, 28 n. 33 balance of power 2, 10, 21–22, 29, 31, 42, 95, 104–105, 105 nn. 12–13, 106, 108, 145, 215 Bangkok Declaration (1993) 24 Bhagwati, Jagdish 46, 46 n. 13, 47, 47 n. 21 Beitz, Charles 36, 36 n. 51 Belgium 22 Belgian Institute for International Relations (KIIB/IRRI) 85, 85 n. 55 Beyers, Michael 103, 103 n. 6, 111 n. 28 Bilder, Richard 25, 25 n. 27 bipolar system (bipolar world) 4, 105 n. 13 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 37 n. 53, 49 Brazil 29, 86, 87 n. 57, 147, 193, 200, 222, 226 Brunnée, Juta 131 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 65, 65 n. 9, 82 n. 48 Bull, Hedley 1, 2 n. 3, 10 n. 22, 19 n. 9, 58, 58 n. 48 Burma (Myanmar) 77, 194, 194, n. 54 Busch, Marc 46, 46 n. 15, 51 n. 33 Bush, George H. 5, 119–120 Bush, George W. 6, 9, 22, 26, 95–96, 115, 119, 130, 152, 155, 203, 206–208, 214–215, 215 n. 2, 218–219, 223 Bulgaria 48 n. 24, 174 n. 8, 184 n. 30 Caliphate (Islamic) 6, 139 Canada 56, 178, 200, 209 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 29 Carlsson, Ingvar 90 n. 64 Carr, Edward H. 30, 31 n. 42, 80, 81 n. 45, 104, 104 n. 8 Cassin, René 17, 17 n. 7

244

index

Castermans-Holleman, Monique 28, 28 n. 33, 30 n. 40 center-periphery (hub-and-spoke) model 53, 53 n. 36 Central American Common Market organization (CACM) 193 Chechnya 141, 168 Chile 33, 193 n. 50 China, the People’s Republic of 77 n. 39 Churchill, Winston 13 n. 28, 28, 29 n. 34, 49 Clark, Ian 15, 15 n. 1 Claude, Jr., Inis L. 39 n. 1, 41 n. 3, 64, 64 n. 5, 66, 66 n. 11, 104 n. 10, 117, 117 n. 41 Clinton administration 25, 28, 215 n. 2 Clinton, William J. 120 coercive diplomacy 146 Cold War 3, 5, 7, 11, 37, 40, 48, 66, 86, 119 n. 46, 129, 145–147, 162, 177, 181 n. 25, 202 collective action, the logic of 116, 116 n. 39 Commission on Global Governance 11, 90–91 Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) 56, 56 n. 44, 192–193, 193 n. 50 communitarian thinking 16 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (see non-proliferation) Concert of Europe 80, 106–107 Conicts causes of 163 n. 65, 165 conict prevention 89, 163–165, 165 n. 69, 166, 200, 226 ideological conicts 140 sectarian conicts 11 Congo, the Democratic Republic of 5, 55, 77 n. 40, 199 Cooper, Robert 22, 22 n. 18, 30 n. 41, 177, 177 n. 14 cosmopolitanism (cosmopolitan view) 17 Cosnard, Michel 111, 111 n. 28 Council of Europe 12, 42, 142, 142 n. 14 counterbalancing (the strategy of ) 56, 56 n. 45 counter-force postures 10 Cousens, Elizabeth 167, 167 n. 64 Crimean War (1854–56) 107

Cyprus 48, 87 n. 57 Czechoslovakia 3 D’Amato Act (Iran and Libya Sanctions Act) 112 Deutsch, Karl 67, 67 n. 13 development assistance 158–161, 205 Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 161 Doyle, Michael 20 n. 10, 84, 85 n. 54 Easton, David 90, 91 n. 66 East-West conict 48 East Timor (Timor Leste) 17, 167, 167 n. 73, 169, 195 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 48, 179, 227 economic development 12, 35, 68, 89, 136, 225 Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 191 Edwards, Geoffrey 201, 201 n. 66 effective multilateralism 14, 61, 85, 94, 101, 171, 176, 188 n. 38, 196, 210, 214 Enduring Freedom operation 144 Einstein, Albert 64 Enron asco 8 epistemic communities 69, 69 n. 17 ethnic cleansing 36–37, 125, 125 n. 65, 227 Etzioni, Amitai 62, 62 n. 1 European Community (see European Union) European Union Actor in its own right 172–173 comitology 73 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 40, 47 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 48, 173–174, 197 Constitutional Treaty 174, 184 contribution to peacekeeping 205 Copenhagen criteria 182 Cotonou Agreement 191–192 Council (of Ministers) 73, 88, 174, 178, 209–210, 221 deepening and widening 183 enlargement 41, 44, 56, 172, 182–184 European Commission 73, 174, 176, 185, 194–195, 200 Euro-Mediterranean partnership enlargement 48

index European Council 94 n. 75, 173, 182, 198 European Court of Justice 176 European Defence Agency (EDA) 174 European Parliament 176 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 197–198 European Security Strategy 171 External Action Service 174 Fortress Europe 212 governance system 226 Headline Goal 198 High Representative for the CFSP 173–174 Lisbon Agenda 74 Lomé Conventions 190, 192, 192 nn. 47–48 normative power 176 open method of coordination 74 Petersberg tasks 198 Political and Security Committee 210 positive conditionality 186 postmodern polity 177 relations with Africa 56, 77, 190 relations with Asia 194 relations with Latin America 193 relations with the Middle East 196 relationship with the US and NATO 78, 203 relationship with Russia 188 role model, the EU as 77–78, 176–177, 186 Stability and Growth Pact 74 Treaty of Maastricht 173 externalities 40 failed (failing) states 55, 144, 162, 167, 169–170 Falk, Richard 6, 7 n. 16 Farrell, Mary 3, 176 n. 13, 192 n. 48 Ferdinand I 21 Ferenc, Benjamin B. 64 n. 8 First World War (WW I) 30, 42, 103 Forum for Civil Society 91 France 3, 43, 46, 107, 146 n. 23, 147, 154, 173, 195, 199, 201, 215, 220 Franck, Thomas 118, 118 n. 44, 121, 121 n. 49 Franco, Francisco 33, 125 Franklin, Benjamin 206 free riding (free riders) 80, 85, 116

245

Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 51, 193 functionalism 58, 58 n. 49, Gaddis, John L. 105 n. 13, 219, 219 n. 9 Gardner, Richard 132, 132 n. 85 G-8 (Group of Eight) 86, 88, 151, 222 Garton Ash, Timothy 203, 204 n. 73 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 45 n. 11 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 45, 45 n. 11, 50, 87, 201 genocide 35–37, 98, 124, 125 n. 65, 129, 227 Germany 7, 43, 173, 181, 199, 215, 220 Gesinnungsethik (ethics of conviction) 21 Gilpin, Robert 52, 53 n. 34, 104 n. 11, 114, 114 n. 34 Giscard d’Estaing, Valérie 88 Glennon, Michael 84 n. 52, 96, 96 n. 79, 109 n. 23 global governance 11, 62, 65, 70, 72–73, 85, 90–91, 91 n. 67, 92–93, 189, 203, 222 n. 13, 226 globalization 6–9, 18, 35, 43, 45–46, 50, 62–63, 89, 137–138, 184, 189, 212 good cop, bad cop 206 Gordon, Philip 203 n. 72, 218, 218 n. 5 Goulding, Marrack 54, 54 n. 39 governance, the concept of 11–12 Grant, Charles 210, 210 n. 86 Great Britain (United Kingdom) 7, 22, 80, 83, 105, 107, 146 n. 23, 147, 168, 173, 220 Greece 32 Grenada, intervention in 120 Grewe, Wilhelm 103, 103 n. 7 Grieco, Joseph 20 n. 10, 181, 181 n. 25 Grotian tradition 2–3 Guantánamo Bay prison 115 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 42 Gulf War (1990–91) 152 Gymnich formula 209 Habsburg, House of 21, 115 Haiti 144, 169 Held, David 91, 91 n. 68, 92 n. 70

246

index

Helms-Burton Act (Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act) 112 Henkin, Louis 102, 102 n. 2 Hettne, Björn 47 n. 19, 57, 57 n. 47, 190 n. 41, 193 n. 52 High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 90 n. 63 Hitler, Adolf 29 Hobbesian tradition 2 Hoffmann, Stanley 12, 12 n. 27, 21 n. 14 Holbrooke, Richard 28 Holsti, Kalevi 4, 4 n. 11, 5, 5 n. 12, 11 n. 24, 102 n. 3 Human Development Index (HDI) 157 Human Development Report (2005) 158 n. 47, 160 n. 57, 161, 162 n. 63, 163 n. 66 humanitarian intervention 25 human rights Human Rights Council (see UN) human wrongs 35 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 111 “thick” and “thin”moral code 35 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 17 universality of 23–24, 127 Vienna Declaration (1963) 23, 127 Human Rights Watch 93 human security 9, 14, 16, 135–136, 136 n. 2, 141, 169, 225 Hungary 3, 183 Huntington, Samuel 6 n. 14, 82, 82 n. 47, 138, 138 n. 6, 205, 260 n. 77 Hurd, Douglas 29 Hurrell, Andrew 11 n. 23, 109, 109 n. 22 informal rules 2, 10 interlocking institutions 42 international anarchy 1–2, 20, 31, 35, 63, 67, 135 International Atomic Energy Agency (see non-proliferation) International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 37 n. 52, 125 n. 64, 129 International Court of Justice (see UN) International Criminal Court (ICC) 33, 113 international law attitude of the great and the small powers to 95, 217

Caroline doctrine (1837) 122 compliance of 72 customary law 3, 10, 72, 123 distribution of power and 23, 61, 81, 101, 106, 114 duality of 70, 110 extraterritorial application of American law 112 instrumentalization of 110 ius ad bellum 122 ius cogens 36 rule of proportionality 25 soft law 113 international regimes 12, 80 n. 44, 95 international relations, the study of 16 n. 4, 18 international security anticipatory self-defense 122–123, 132, 225 arms control and disarmament 4, 12, 111, peacebuilding 165–166, 166 n. 71, 167, 226 peacekeeping (peace support) operations 50, 55, 180, 195, 197, 199, 205 preemptive and preventive action 121 small (light) weapons 163, 163 n. 64 international trade free trade agreements 51, 53 n. 36, 56 n. 44, 180, 192–193 Generalized System Preferences (GSP) 191, 191 n. 44 most favored nation (MFN) principle 45, 45 n. 12, 51, 53 protectionism (mercantilism) 52, 161 trade liberalization 46, 51, 51 n. 32, 52, 88 internet democracy 92 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 86–87, 87 nn. 57–58, 88, 88 n. 60, 89, 93, 226 international order versus world order 15, 19, 36 interregionalism 57, 189–190, 193 Israel 98, 121, 142, 147, 150–151, 199, 200, 224 Israeli-Palestinian conict 34–35, 197 Iran 112, 137, 146, 151, 155, 197 Iraq 11, 13 n. 28, 26, 29 n. 37, 37 n. 53, 82, 84, 115–116, 129, 132, 141, 146, 152, 155, 197, 203–205, 218–219

247

index Jackson, Robert H. 169–170, 170 n. 79 James, Harold 106, 106 n. 16 jihadists 34, 220 Joffe, Josef 95 n. 76, 96, 97 n. 82, 115, 115 n. 38, 202 n. 69 justice, as a goal of the international order 16, 35–37 Kagan, Robert 95, 95 n. 78, 117 n. 42, 208 Kant, Immanuel 2, 17, 17 n. 5 Kantian tradition 2, 21 Kashmir 141 Kazakhstan 79, 147 Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) 103, 108 Kennedy, Paul 128 Keohane, Robert O. 3 n. 8, 80 n. 44, 130 n. 77, 219, 219 n. 8 Keys, Jr., Ken 64, 64 n. 8 Kissinger, Henry A. 31, 31 n. 43, 84, 84 n. 53, 107 n. 18, 116, 117 n. 40, 122 n. 56, 201, 201 n. 67, 205, 205 n. 76 Kony, Joseph 33 Kooijmans, Peter 121, 122 n. 53 Korea 42 Korean War 130 Kosovo crisis 5 Krauthammer, Charles 20 Krisch, Nico 108, 108 nn. 20–21, 110, 110 n. 25, 111, 113, 113 n. 32, 117, 117 n. 43 Kristol, Irving 66 n. 10 Kurdish people 29 Kuwait, intervention in 5, 120, 196 Kyoto Protocol 110, 202 Kyrgyz Republic, the 79 Landmines Convention 110 Lansing, Robert 30 Latin (South) America 48, 53, 57, 166, 189, 192–193 Layne, Christopher 75, 76 n. 35 League of Nations 127 Lebanon 23, 55, 200 legitimacy (input and output legitimacy) 72, 91 Leonard, Mark 146, 146 n. 24, 210, 210 n. 86 Levis, Martin W. 41, 41 n. 4 liberals 20–21, 26 liberal view 23 Liberia 48, 77 n. 40, 167 Libya 112, 120, 148, 204

Lockean ideas 64 Lodge, Henry Cabot 37 Lord Resistance’s Army (LRA)

33

Madison, James 109–110 Malloch Brown, Mark 222 Malta 48 Mastanduno, Michael 75, 181 n. 25 Melkert, Ad 98 Mexico 53 n. 36, 56, 56 n. 44, 67, 87 n. 57, 160 n. 55, 161, 178, 200, 222 McCain, John 32 Middle East 6, 13 n. 28, 26, 32, 42, 55, 166, 187, 203, 214, 224 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 136, 155–160, 162–163, 225 Millennium Summit (see UN) Miller, David 92, 92 n. 71 military force, the use of 16, 25, 49, 63, 66–67, 113, 118, 131–132, 224 Milner, Helen 40 n. 2, 46, 46 n. 15, 51 n. 33 Mindanao 141 Moïsi, Dominique 202, 202 n. 71 Moravscik, Andrew 206 n. 78 Morgenthau, Hans J. 22, 22 n. 17, 105, 105 n. 14, 108 n. 20 multipolarity, the power structure of 107, 215 multiregionalism 189 Munich, the treason of 29 Mayall, James 190 n. 43, 192, 192 n. 49 Napoleon 26 Netherlands 41, 41 n. 5, 56 n. 45, 72 n. 24, 87 n. 57, 123 n. 57, 149 n. 30, 153, 159, 170 New World Order 5, 113, 176, 217 Nolte, Georg 93 n. 73, 103, 103 n. 6, 108 n. 20, 111 nn. 28–29, 118 n. 44, 119 n. 46, 121 n. 49 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 28, 71, 91 n. 67, 92–93, 102 non-intervention 10, 36, 124–125 non-proliferation Additional Protocol 155, 224 Atoms for Peace speech (1953) 154 Baruch Plan (1946) 154 causes of the proliferation of weapons 136, 144 of mass destruction (WMD) 119 n. 45, 136, 162, 188 n. 38, 223

248

index

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 113, 147, 150 Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 151, 153 Convention of Biological Weapons (CBW) 113 Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 150 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 154 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 86, 147–151, 154, 154 n. 40, 155, 224 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 101, 110, 110 n. 27, 147–149, 149 n. 31, 150–153, 155, 223–224 nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) weapons 144–148, 150–152, 152 n. 35, 153 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 148, 155 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 151, 151 n. 33 UN Monitoring, Verication and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 152 UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) 152 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 51, 53 n. 36, 113, 178, 192 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign against Kosovo 25 balanced relationship 207 New Transatlantic Agenda 208 new transatlantic bargain 206 North Atlantic Council 210 rapid response force 42 relationship with the EU (see EU) transatlantic divide 203 Nye, Jr., Joseph S. 3 n. 8, 81, 82 n. 46, 96 n. 80, 114 n. 35, 219, 219 n. 8 Ogata, Sadako 136 Oppenheim, Lassa 105–106, 106 n. 15, 108 order, the concept of 10, 15 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 67, 75 n. 31, 86, 88–89, 89 n. 62, 142, 159 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 98

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 41–42, 49 n. 27 Osama bin Laden 120 Ottoman Empire 107 Owen, David 173, 173 n. 4 Pakistan 56, 79 n. 43, 145, 147, 151 Panama, intervention in 120 Pax Brittannica 81, 104 Pax Romana 104 Pascal, Blaise 29 Patriot Act 6 peace, as a goal of the international order 15, 164 Pinochet, Augusto J.R. 33, 125 Poland 29, 56 policy networks, global 14, 63, 68, 70–71, 73–74 Portugal 3, 7, 192 Primakov, Yevgeny 79 Princeton Project on National Security 31 n. 44, 123, 126 n. 69, 130, 140, 216 n. 3 proxy wars (wars by proxy) 40 public goods, international 80, 84, 92, 96, 116 Putin, Vladimir V. 79, 188 quasi-states

170 n. 79

Rambouillet 88 realignment of alliances (renversement des alliances) 105 realists 20–23, 25–27, 32, 177, 213 realist view 25, 30 Regelsberger, Elfriede 189, 189 n. 40, 194 n. 53 regime theorists 3–4 regional organizations 36, 39, 43–44, 49, 49 n. 26, 50–51, 54–55, 57–59, 125 n. 65, 130, 191, 194, 227 Reisman, Michael 82, 82 n. 49 responsibility to protect 36, 37 n. 52, 98, 125, 217, 227 Rice, Condoleezza 32, 114 Richelieu, cardinal 21–22 Rifkin, Jeremy 175, 176, 176 n.11 Roberts, Adam 121, 121 n. 50 Romania 48 n. 24, 174 n. 8, 183, 184 n. 30 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 115, 135 Rosecrance, Richard 47, 48 n. 22 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 109, 110 n. 24

index Ruggie, John 114, 114 n. 34 Rumsfeld, Donald H. 96, 96 n. 81 Russian Federation (Russia) 5–6, 48, 78–79, 88, 107, 137, 147–148, 154, 185, 187–188, 188 nn. 38–39, 201, 204 n. 74, 205, 216, 220 Rwanda 5, 217 Sachs, Jeffrey 155, 160 n. 54 Saddam Hussein 9, 130, 146, 152, 204 Sagan, Scott 145, 145 n. 22 Schmidt, Helmut 88 Schmitt, Carl 108, 108 n. 20 Schrijver, Nico J. 130 n. 79, 131, 131 n. 82, 142 n. 13 Second World War (WW II) 28, 29 n. 34, 110, 115, 177, 214 security communities 67, 86, 182 self-defense (right of) 118–119, 119 n. 45, 120, 131–132, 219, 225 Sen, Amartya 136, 160 n. 54 Serbia 5, 25, 128 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 79, 79 n. 43 Skordas, Achilles 92 Slaughter, Anne-Marie 31 n. 44, 68, 68 n. 15, 70, 70 n. 21, 71 nn. 22–23, 73, 73 nn. 25–26, 123 n. 59, 124 n. 61, 130 n. 78, 131 n. 81, 140 n. 9 Smith, Karen E. 41 n. 4, 183, 183 n. 29, 185 n. 34 Smith, Michael 44 n. 10, 47 n. 17, 171 n. 1, 189 n. 40, 208 n. 83 society of nations 2 Söderbaum, Fredrik 57, 57 n. 47, 190 n. 41, 193 n. 52 soft integration 180 soft power 75, 81, 96, 204–206, 221 Somalia 48, 144, 167, 217 South Africa 86, 147, 200, 222 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 179, 191 sovereignty (national) 9, 17, 25, 36, 62–63, 73–74, 126 n. 69, 142, 167, 217 Soviet Union 3, 6, 29, 29 n. 34, 116, 129, 147, 150, 188 Spain 7, 32–33, 125, 192 stability, as a goal of the international order 11, 14, 30, 32, 34, 36, 144 stabilization force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR) 199 Stalin, Joseph 28 Stern, Jessica 140

249

Sub-Saharan Africa 157, 161, 170 n. 80, 226 Syria 22, 29 n. 37, 150 Tajikistan 79 Taliban regime 119, 121 n. 48, 144 Taylor, Paul 47, 47 n. 20 terrorism Al Qaeda 83, 120–121, 140–141, 143–144, 220 anti-terrorism strategies 141 Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) 43 denition of 33–34, 81–82, 97, 111, 121, 136–137, 139, 141 explanations 138, 222 international conventions 137, 142 root causes 33, 139, 169, 222 9/11 terrorist attacks 6, 97, 119–120, 143–144, 151 types of terrorist organizations 138 Thailand 87, 141 Thucydides 95, 95 n. 77 Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) 208 transgovernmental networks (see policy networks) transnational (multinational) corporations 7, 9, 16, 91, 120, 154, 173 Truman, Harry S. 132 Tsoukalis, Loukas 46, 47 n. 17 Turkey 29 n. 37, 87 n. 57, 183, 200 Ukraine 48, 147, 185, 187–188 unipolarity, the power structure of 13, 81, 107, 214–215 United Nations (UN) authorization for the use of military force 131–132, 155 UN Charter 17, 49, 49 n. 26, 90, 110, 118, 122–123, 125, 128, 130–131, 144, 147 n. 28, 152, 197, 199 Security Council (responsibility, composition, and veto right) 86, 93, 99, 118, 126, 150, 222 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 90, 92 General Assembly 37 n. 52, 91, 91 n. 67, 95, 97, 130, 142, 152, 154, 156 n. 42, 168 n. 76, 170 n. 78 Human Rights Council 98, 98 n. 85

250

index

International Court of Justice (ICJ) 122 Millennium Summit 8 P-5 (Permanent Five) 124, 130, 152, 155, 168 Peace Building Commission 98 reform of the world organization 127 n. 69 secretary-general 37 nn. 52–53, 38, 49, 141, 156 Uniting for Peace resolution (1950) 130 UN Development Program (UNDP) 98, 200 UN Educational, Scientic, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 91 n. 67 UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 200 UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 199 UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) 168 World Health Organization (WHO) 86 World Summit (September 2005) 37 n. 52, 55, 97–98, 125 n. 65, 129 n. 75 United States (US) American exceptionalism 83, 219 foreign policy 3, 13, 16, 20–23, 28, 30–31, 39, 56, 61, 78–79, 92, 94, 111–112, 114, 114 n. 36, 115–116, 119, 135, 173, 176, 182, 188–189, 197 n. 60, 203, 206, 209, 213–216, 218–221 Federal Aviation Administration 112 hegemony 9–10, 40, 42, 44, 57, 74, 79–81, 83–84, 107 impact of the domestic regime 114

intervention in Iraq 26, 115 lender of last resort 116, 204 national security strategy 31, 119 Pax Americana 14, 61, 80 US Security and Exchange Commission 112 Vietnam experience 84 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see human rights) universalism 14, 43–44, 54, 227 Uzbekistan 77, 79 Wallerstein, Immanuel 7 Waltz, Kenneth N. 105 n. 13, 114, 114 n. 36, 145, 145 nn. 21–22, 217, 217 n. 4 Walzer, Michael 35, 35 n. 49 weapons of mass destruction (see non-proliferation) Weber, Max 21 Westphalian Treaties 4 Wigen, Karen E. 41, 41 n. 4 Wilsonian 26, 32, 219 Winter War (1939–40) 22 war crimes 17, 35–37, 125 n. 65, 227 Wood, Michael 131 World Bank 53 n. 36, 86–89, 93, 157, 159 n. 51, 160, 179 n. 19, 226 world government (federation) 14 World Order Models Project (WOMP) 7, 7 n. 15 World Trade Organization (WTO) 45, 45 n. 11, 50, 50 n. 30, 52–54, 54 n. 38, 87–89, 91, 93, 113, 161–162, 178, 180, 192, 201, 206 Yalta, the order of 29 Yugoslavia, the former 29, 48, 199, 217 Zimbabwe

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