Battles of the Greek and Roman Worlds: A Chronological Compendium of 667 Battles to 31BC, from the Historians of the Ancient World

ROMAN WORLDS A CHRONOLOGICAL COMPENDIUM OF 6 6 7 BATTLES T O 31BC FROM THE HISTORIANS OF THE ANCIENT WORLD Greenhi...

Author: John Drogo Montagu

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ROMAN WORLDS A CHRONOLOGICAL

COMPENDIUM

OF 6 6 7 BATTLES T O

31BC

FROM THE HISTORIANS OF THE ANCIENT WORLD

Greenhill Books

The best single-volume reference book of classical battles, drawn from the histories of the ancient world This comprehensive reference book on the battles of the ancient world covers events from the eighth century BC to 31BC, when Octavian defeated Antony and Cleopatra at the battle of Actium. The author presents, in an exciting and vivid style and complete with battle plans and maps, all of the land and sea battles of the Greek and Roman worlds, based on the accounts by historians of the time. The major Greek wars include the Ionian Revolt, the Persian Wars including the battles of Marathon and Thermopylae, the Peloponnesian Wars, the campaigns of Alexander the Great and the wars of Alexander's successors. The Romans saw action during the Gallic Invasions, the Samnite Wars, the Punic Wars including the disaster at Cannae and the battle of Zama between Hannibal and Scipio Africanus, the Spanish Wars, the Macedonian Wars and the campaigns of Pompey the Great and Julius Caesar. Differing accounts of these and hundreds of other battles are described by ancient historians Continued on back flap

ISBN 1 - 8 5 3 6 7 - 3 8 9 - 7

Greenhill B o o k s

BATTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN WORLDS

T o the m e m o r y of C . H . T . H a y m a n ('Chi T h e t a ' ) A great teacher

BATTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN WORLDS A Chronological Compendium of 667 Battles to 31 BC, from the Historians of the Ancient World

John Drogo Montagu

Greenhill Books, London Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania

Battles of the Greek and Roman Worlds first published 2000 by Greenhiil Books, Lionel Leventhal Limited, P a r k H o u s e , 1 Russell G a r d e n s , L o n d o n N W 1 1 9 N N and S t a c k p o l e Books, 5067 Ritter R o a d , M e c h a n i c s b u r g , P A 17055, U S A C o p y r i g h t © J o h n D r o g o M o n t a g u , 2000 T h e m o r a l right of the a u t h o r h a s been asserted All rights reserved. N o p a r t of this publication m a y be r e p r o d u c e d , stored in a retrieval system or t r a n s m i t t e d in a n y f o r m or by a n y means, electronic, mechanical o r otherwise, w i t h o u t the written permission of the Publisher.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Montagu, John Drogo Battles of the G r e e k a n d R o m a n worlds : a chronological c o m p e n d i u m of 667 battles to 31 B.C., f r o m the historians of the ancient world 1.Battles - Greece - History 2.Battles - R o m e History 3 . R o m e - History, Military 4.Greece History, Military I.Title 355'.02'0938 I S B N 1-85367-389-7 Library of Congress Data available

Cataloging-in-Publication

Typeset by D P P h o t o s e t t i n g , Aylesbury, Bucks Printed a n d b o u n d in G r e a t Britain by T h e Bath Press, Bath

Contents List of Maps and Battle Plans Preface

Page 6 7

Part One: Introduction to Greek and Roman Warfare

Greek Armies Roman Armies Naval Warfare Reliability of Data Principal Sources Glossary

27 28 30 32 33 35

Part Two: The Greek World

Chronological Table of Battles of the Greek World Battles of the Greek World (c.724-145BC)

39 48

Part Three: The Roman World

Chronological Table of Battles of the Roman World Battles of the Roman World (502-31BC)

141 151

Select Bibliography Index of Persons Index of Places

244 245 250

List of Maps and Battle Plans Maps 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Spain Gaul North Italy South Italy Latium and Campania Sicily North Africa Illyria, Macedonia, Thrace North Greece South Greece The Aegean World Asia Minor Persia Palestine Syracuse

Page 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Battle Plans

Battle of Marathon (490) Battle of Salamis (480) Plan of Pylos and Sphacteria (425) Battle of Mantinea (418) Battle of the Nemea (394) Battle of Leuctra (371) Battle of Chaeronea (338) Battle of the Hydaspes (326) Battle of Paraetacene (317) Battle of Raphia (217) Battle of Ecnomus (256) Battle of Cannae (216) Battle of the Metaurus (207) Battle of Ilipa (206) Battle of Zama (202) Battle of the Lesnikia (Dyrrhachium) (48) Battle of Pharsalus (48) Battle of Actium (31)

53 55 67 71 85 91 99 105 109 122 173 181 190 191 194 230 231 241

Preface Even w a r can have a comic aspect on occasions. A n y o n e w h o visualizes the naval antics of Philop o e m e n off G y t h e u m (p. 128) can hardly fail to suppress a chortle. O n a different note, the R o m a n victory at Beneventum in 214BC (p. 184) reads like pure black c o m e d y - with a h a p p y ending f o r the slaves. Episodes such as these have considerably lightened my self-imposed task. T h e p u r p o s e of this b o o k is to bring together in one v o l u m e the ancient literature a b o u t the battles of the G r e e k a n d R o m a n worlds f r o m the start of recorded history to the end of the R o m a n Republic. N o a t t e m p t has been m a d e to treat this material critically, a p a r t f r o m an occasional c o m ment when this seemed to be w a r r a n t e d . T h e work is intended primarily as a source of reference. As far as I a m aware, there has been n o previous publication with a similar p u r p o s e a n d scope. A battle is here defined as any a r m e d engagement, greater t h a n a m i n o r skirmish, which occurred in the o p e n a n d to which it is possible to assign a k n o w n or a p p r o x i m a t e d a t e a n d a t o p o graphical n a m e . N a m e s of sites that are n o w entirely u n k n o w n have been included on the g r o u n d s t h a t they might be identified in time to come. Sieges, which m a y involve specialized m e t h o d s a n d e q u i p m e n t a n d which are a m a j o r subject f o r study in their o w n right, have been excluded except in so far as sallies bring the conflict into the open. In the interest of completeness this b r o a d definition of a battle has been applied with f u r t h e r laxity. S o m e battles within walls have been included, as also have o n e or two a b o r t i v e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s which never fully materialized. If there was any d o u b t a b o u t inclusion, I have erred on the side of acceptance. Regrettably, m a n y actions - even m a j o r ones of great interest c a n n o t be included f o r lack of i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t their date or place or b o t h . Such, for example, are some of the victories of S p a r t a c u s over R o m a n armies, the w h e r e a b o u t s of which are quite u n k n o w n . F o r these reasons the battles listed in these pages represent only a fraction of those that actually t o o k place. The entries in the text have been kept as concise as possible while preserving the essential military material. In general, the causes a n d effects of an action have been stated only briefly a n d then only

if they were considered n o t e w o r t h y . T h e historical context of a war has usually been outlined in c o n n e x i o n with the first episode in the w a r . S o m e of the entries m a y seem to be inordinately scanty. This is not the result of over-zealous p r u n i n g on my p a r t but reflects only the paucity of i n f o r m a tion in the sources consulted. T h e references a p p e n d e d at the foot of each entry d o not pretend t o be exhaustive, but they cover all the m a j o r ancient sources which provide the basis f o r existing k n o w l e d g e in the field. T h e conventional p r e s e n t a t i o n of the usual three-figure reference d e n o t i n g b o o k , c h a p t e r a n d 'verse' has been slightly m o d i f i e d , n o t a b l y by q u o t i n g the 'verses' in brackets. In general, reference has only been m a d e to the extensive m o d e r n literature when a c o n t r i b u t i o n has reconstructed obscure events in the light of recent evidence a n d d e d u c t i o n . In this, 1 have given the credit to the first source which p r o p o u n d e d the new wisdom. A f t e r that, the subject becomes a m a t t e r of m o d e r n dissertation, which is outside the scope of this w o r k a n d could fill a n o t h e r volume. Greek a n d R o m a n chronological tables are entered before the relevant texts. A p a r t f r o m their o b v i o u s role as indexes, they display the battle c o n t e n t of the various wars. T h e warlike instincts of m a n have not always led to a ' n e a t ' result in the eyes of the annalistic chronicler. A string of battles with a c o n n e c t i n g t h e m e m a y have been interr u p t e d in its chronological continuity by some irrelevant act of aggression in a distant land. T h e tables m a y help the reader to extract a war f r o m the e x t r a n e o u s events. T h e total c o n t e n t s of this b o o k - tables a n d text - have been divided sharply between the Greek a n d R o m a n W o r l d s . History is seldom so categorical. W h e n the two worlds meet, in the late third a n d second centuries when R o m e b e c a m e involved with the Hellenistic states a n d Greece itself, there are p r o b l e m s of classification. T h e p r o b l e m has been dealt with here by including all the 'mixed' battles, such as those of the M a c e d o n i a n W a r s a n d the war against A n t i o c h u s , in b o t h the G r e e k a n d R o m a n tables. In the text, on the o t h e r h a n d , they have been described u n d e r the G r e e k W o r l d but with a cross-reference u n d e r the R o m a n W o r l d . Their inclusion in both tables is intended to assist those readers w h o are interested in the 7

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

chronological relationships between events in either sphere. T h e r e were also a couple of similarly 'mixed' battles at a m u c h earlier period of history, at Aricia in 506 for example, but it is considered that these were essentially G r e e k affairs a n d they have been treated accordingly. In the table of R o m a n battles, generals such as Scipio A f r i c a n u s a n d P o m p e y the G r e a t have been entered with their h o n o r i f i c cognomina whenever their n a m e s a p p e a r . T h e title m a y t h e r e f o r e be shown prospectively in relation to battles which t o o k place before the h o n o u r was actually accorded - a liberty which facilitates recognition of the individual c o n c e r n e d . T h e m a p s at the end of this b o o k are devoted almost exclusively to those k n o w n places a n d geographical features which are n a m e d in this w o r k , n o t a b l y those which have given their n a m e s to battles. Only o n e k n o w n battle site h a s been intentionally o m i t t e d , namely N o r e i a [Neumarkt] in w h a t is now Austria. T h e remoteness of this place f r o m the o t h e r entries would have necessitated a m a p to itself, assigning to the battle a degree of u n w a r r a n t e d i m p o r t a n c e . A few of the places a n d features entered in the m a p s have been accorded question m a r k s indicating uncertainty as to their site or, in the case of rivers, their identity. These a r e not the only d u b i o u s entries. M o r e extensive guidance is supplied in Index of Places, in which the m o d e r n n a m e representing an ancient place m a y be noted as q u e s t i o n a b l e or p r o b a b l e . Specific c o m m e n t s such as 'site d i s p u t e d ' are a p p e n d e d where a p p r o p r i a t e . T h e index also cites the n a m e of the relevant present-day province o r d e p a r t m e n t . These divisions, being m a n y times smaller t h a n the ancient ones, a r e correspondingly

8

m o r e informative. T e r m s such as ' H i s p a n i a T a r r a c o n e n s i s ' a n d 'Gallia Celtica' tell o n e virtually nothing. T h e r e is a b o d y of opinion which f a v o u r s the use of G r e e k spellings f o r G r e e k p r o p e r n a m e s . A l t h o u g h in agreement with these sentiments, I have a d o p t e d the m o r e c o m m o n l y used Latinized versions in c o n f o r m i t y with m a n y classical b o o k s of reference a n d all of the classical atlases in m y possession. T h e G r e e k islands are usually, a l t h o u g h not invariably, treated as exceptions. Chius, S a m u s a n d Lesbus are intolerable!

This b o o k is dedicated to the m a n w h o t a u g h t me Greek a n d Latin, with f r e q u e n t digressions into classical history. These 'asides' instilled a lifelong interest in the field but a career in medicine left n o time f o r such indulgences. This project was u n d e r t a k e n only in retirement a n d primarily f o r my o w n edification a n d e n j o y m e n t . T o my friendly publisher, Lionel Leventhal, I express my a d m i r a t i o n of his patience with a r a w a n d sometimes a w k w a r d newcomer. H e tells m e t h a t in his opinion this w o r k should be of wide interest in view of its scope a n d its usefulness as a source of reference. His positive a t t i t u d e a n d the e n c o u r a g e m e n t which went with it did m u c h t o help me see the j o b t h r o u g h . I also t h a n k my wife f o r her tolerance of my p r o l o n g e d absences in my b e d r o o m / s t u d y / l i b r a r y where f o r m a n y years I w a s living in a n o t h e r world. J. D . M .

2000

MAPS

Emporiae

Calagurris Nassica Intercatia

Numantia • Cissis

Termantia? Bilbilis Durius

Cauca Segontia

Contrebia

Segovia BALEARES Is Turba Iliturgi

Toletum r

Saguntum Aebura Valentia

Lauro? PITYUSAE Is Baecul; Corduba

Italica

« Carmone Hispalis

New Carthage

• Astapa Urso

Hasta Gades Carteia Statute Miles

MAURETANIA

1. Spain

9

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK

AND

ROMAN

WORLDS

G E R M A N I A

Axona Lutetia Parisioi

Admagetobriga?

Morbihan Gulf •

Alesia Noviodunum Biturigum

Vesontio

Bibracte

Lemanus L

Gergovia GALLIA CISALPINA

Uxellodunum

Genna

Statute M i l e s

Arausio Sotium

^Vindalii

Massilia

H I S P A N I A

2. Gaul

10

MAPS

Larius L Aquileia

Timavus

Comum

Vercellae

GALLIA

TRANSPADANA A the sis

Padus Clastidium

Placentia

Forum Gallorum Genua

r

J3ALLIA

CISPADANA

Ravenna

Faventia

Rubicon ^VAriminum

Pistoria Ancona

Pisae Arretium Sentinum }

Volaterrae

Trasimenus

Camerini Perusia

Populonia Clusium

Me van k Asculum

Satumia Tel anion Statute Miles Sutrium

Fucinus L

Alalia

ROME

3. North Italy

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

Fucinus L

Praeneste Luceria

Lanuvium Antium

Tarracina

|mrganus

Herdonea

M ,Cannae

Canusium

. Brundisium

Numistro

Tarentum Heraclea

Grumentum

Manduria

Sybaris

Petelia • Carales Croton

LIPARAEAN Is

'

Locri Epizephv

lormus Messan;

Lilybaeum

4. South Italy

12

Tauromenium

Statute M i l e s Rhegium

MAPS

Vadimonis

Alba Fucens

Fucinus L

ROME

Geranium

• Teanum Apulum

Aesernia Privernum Satricum

Luceria

Bovianum

Antium Tarracina AsculumJ

' Teanun^ Sidicinum

Beneventum Saticula?

Capua

Caudium

Aquilonia

Suessula , Gaurus%

Acerrae • fe

Neapolis

Cumaep \

Numistro

Statute Miles

5. Latium and Campania

13

Lipara ITALIA

Messana"

AEGATES Is

0

Eryx

Panormus

Tyndaris

Drepaiium Thermae

Aegusa^^

Rhegium

Abacaenum . Himera

Motya^ Tauromenium

Lilybaeum

Galeria?

Naxos

Scirthaea Hadranum * Inessa Hahcus

Catana

Heraclea Minoa Acragas (Agrigentum)

Leontini Alabus

Ecnomus Pr

SYRACUSE

Camarina 0

6. Sicily

Statute Miles

Locri Epizephyrii

50


LIPARAEAN Is

Statute Miles Statute Miles Aegimurus

I

Hermaeum

Pr

Clupea

Hadrumentum Thapsus

7. North Africa §

PONTUS EUX1NUS Hebrus Scodra

,Dyrrhachium

Lychnitis. Cypsela

Heraclea Lyncestis ..Apollonia

Pelium

Edessa

PROPONTIS

miacJjCia

Amphipoli Thasos

Statute Miles

Lampsacus

Cyzicus

lmbros ASIA MINOR

8. Illyria, Macedonia, Thrace


Salonae

MAPS

I L L Y RI A

Metbor Olynthus Potidaei

Olympus Pythium

MendeJ

Phoenice

Scione

Phalanna Larissa

^mCorcyra ^ CORCYRA

Peiion M

Crannon

Leucimme Pr /.fi Sybota

Pherae Pharsalus*

Nartliacium M)

Propaxos v Idoniei Ambracian Aclium Pr < Medeon ACARNANIA Statute Miles

Strat

x L Pagasean

Sciathos

CrociaiM\ Gulf Plain W n Pepurelhos ArtemisiuirK

Lamia

Malian XJnlf The rmopytie ,Elatea
- Antiochus

HARPASUS R (c. 229)

J

Hierax

These three battles, recorded in the dedicatory inscription of A t t a l u s I to A t h e n a in P e r g a m u m , resulted in victories over A n t i o c h u s Hierax as he was driven f r o m pillar to post. First he was expelled f r o m the Hellespontine region of Phrygia.

WORLD

Next he was forced out of Lydia a f t e r a defeat at Lake C o l o e [ M a r m a r a Golu] near Sardes. T h i r d , he lost C a r i a in his defeat on the H a r p a s u s [Akfay], Friendless, within a couple of years he had lost his life as well. M.M. Austin, T h e Hellenistic W o r l d , 1981, No. 197 P A X O I I S L S (229, spring) - Illyrian Raids T h e Illyrians were masters of piracy with an utter disregard f o r the nationality of their victims, w h o included Italian traders. This led to an increasing n u m b e r of c o m p l a i n t s to R o m e , where the senate sent out t w o commissioners to Illyria to investigate. O n e of these officials s p o k e some w o r d s to Queen T e u t a to which she t o o k exception. She had him assassinated. T h e incident is n o t e w o r t h y because it triggered the first R o m a n intervention in the Balkans. Queen T e u t a , in c o n t i n u a t i o n of her warlike policies, fitted out a large fleet of galleys. S o m e of t h e m were sent to E p i d a m n u s [Durres] where, taking the i n h a b i t a n t s by surprise, they all but c a p t u r e d the city. Rejoining the rest of the fleet, they proceeded to besiege C o r c y r a [Corfu], which appealed to the A c h a e a n s a n d Aetolians f o r help. T h e two leagues m a n n e d 10 A c h a e a n ships, which sailed for C o r c y r a a n d met the Illyrians off the Paxoi islands. T h e Illyrian tactics consisted of lashing their galleys together in g r o u p s of f o u r a n d inviting a b r o a d s i d e attack f r o m a ram. T h e Illyrians would then b o a r d the enemy c r a f t in overwhelming n u m b e r s . In this way they c a p t u r e d f o u r q u a d r i r e m e s a n d sank a q u i n q u e r e m e . T h e rest of the A c h a e a n crews, overwhelmed by the e n e m y ' s success, set sail for h o m e . T h e u n f o r t u n a t e C o r cyreans h a d n o alternative but to capitulate a n d to receive a garrison until the R o m a n s arrived with offers of protection. Polybius, 2: 9-10

L Y C A E U S M (227) - Cleomenean War W h e n Cleomenes III c a m e to p o w e r in S p a r t a he w a n t e d to stir u p the people a n d m a k e big changes. R e c k o n i n g that this would be m o r e feasible in time of war, he engineered hostilities against the A c h a e a n league. W h e n A r a t u s led the A c h a e a n s against the Eleans, w h o were not m e m b e r s of the league, Cleomenes went to the help of the defenders. N e a r M o u n t Lycaeus [Likaori] in A r c a d i a he fell u p o n the A c h a e a n s , slaughtered a n d c a p t u r e d m a n y of them a n d routed the whole a r m y . As a postscript to this rout, r u m o u r s once m o r e circulated to the effect that A r a t u s was d e a d , as h a d 119


WORLDS

h a p p e n e d at Phylacia (233). H e m a d e g o o d use of t h e m by l a u n c h i n g a totally u n e x p e c t e d a t t a c k o n t h e city of M a n t i n e a , w h i c h he c a p t u r e d . Plutarch, C l e o m e n e s , 5(1) and A r a t u s , 36( 1-2); Polybius, 2: 51(3)

the A c h a e a n league, a n d t h e e n e m y . W i t h o u t w a i t i n g he f o r c e d the A c h a e a n s t o fight o n the s p o t , r o u t i n g their p h a l a n x a n d w i n n i n g a p i t c h e d b a t t l e while inflicting h e a v y losses. Plutarch, C l e o m e n e s , 14(2); Polybius, 2: 51(3)

LADOCEIA (227) - Cleomenean War

S E L L A S I A (222, J u l y ) - C l e o m e n e a n W a r T h e A c h a e a n l e a g u e w a s in t a t t e r s , t h e c o n s t i t u e n t cities b e i n g c a p t u r e d by C l e o m e n e s o n e a f t e r a n o t h e r . A r a t u s , the f i g u r e h e a d of the league, h a d only o n e c o u r s e o p e n , a n a p p e a l f o r h e l p t o the M a c e d o n i a n ruler. A n t i g o n u s D o s o n , with w h o m he h a d been c o m m u n i c a t i n g furtively f o r s o m e time. A n a g r e e m e n t w a s r e a c h e d a n d A n t i g o n u s m a r c h e d s o u t h a n d e n t e r e d the P e l o p o n n e s e . T h e f o l l o w i n g s u m m e r he a d v a n c e d i n t o L a c o n i a with a c o m b i n e d M a c e d o n i a n a n d A c h a e a n f o r c e of 28,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 1,200 c a v a l r y . C l e o m e n e s h a d b l o c k e d all the passes except the o n e w h i c h he himself held w i t h 20,000 m e n at Sellasia, a b o u t 8 miles n o r t h of S p a r t a . T h e r o a d t h r o u g h the p a s s f o l l o w e d the river O e n o u s [lints] b e t w e e n t w o hills, o n e called E v a s o n C l e o m e n e s ' left a n d the o t h e r n a m e d O l y m p u s o n the right. O n E v a s he p o s t e d t h e allied t r o o p s u n d e r his b r o t h e r , E u c l e i d a s , while he himself held O l y m p u s with the S p a r t a n p h a l a n x a n d the m e r c e n a r i e s . T h e c a v a l r y w a s p o s t e d by the river with a d e t a c h m e n t of m e r c e n aries. W h e n A n t i g o n u s a r r i v e d , he saw t h e s t r e n g t h of the o t h e r ' s p o s i t i o n a n d held off f o r several d a y s while he e x p l o r e d t h e field. H e c o u l d find n o easy o p t i o n . W h e n he decided to fight, he placed his M a c e d o n i a n i n f a n t r y a n d the Illyrians a g a i n s t E v a s w i t h t h e A c a r n a n i a n s a n d C r e t a n s in s u p p o r t . A n t i g o n u s himself faced O l y m p u s , with the m e r c e n a r i e s in f r o n t f o l l o w e d by a n a r r o w p h a l a n x of d o u b l e the usual d e p t h . His c a v a l r y , with i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t , o p p o s e d the e n e m y ' s . O n the n i g h t b e f o r e the b a t t l e A n t i g o n u s ' Illyrians h a d m o v e d f o r w a r d t o the f o o t of E v a s a n d c o n c e a l e d t h e m s e l v e s in a river bed. Just b e f o r e t h e assault b e g a n next d a y C l e o m e n e s saw n o sign of the e n e m y Illyrians b u t w a s a s s u r e d by o n e of his c o m m a n d e r s t h a t all w a s in o r d e r . ( P l u t a r c h r e c o u n t s the story t h a t this c o m m a n d e r h a d been b r i b e d by A n t i g o n u s b e f o r e h a n d to d e n y t h a t a n y t h i n g w a s amiss.) T h e Illyrians b e g a n the a s s a u l t by s p r i n g i n g i n t o view a n d a t t a c k i n g the hill. A t this p o i n t C l e o n y m u s ' light-armed m e r c e n a r i e s n o t i c e d a g a p in the e n e m y w i n g a n d l a u n c h e d a c h a r g e a g a i n s t the r e a r of t h e Illyrians. This move would have b r o u g h t disaster to Antig o n u s b u t f o r the initiative of a y o u n g M e g a l o p o l i t a n c a v a l r y m a n called P h i l o p o e m e n , later to

C o n t i n u i n g his c a m p a i g n of u n p r o v o k e d aggression, C l e o m e n e s led a n e x p e d i t i o n i n t o the territ o r y of M e g a l o p o l i s w h e r e he c a p t u r e d a f o r t called L e u c t r a . A n A c h a e a n f o r c e u n d e r A r a t u s came out to oppose him and a battle was fought at a site called L a d o c e i a , w h i c h w a s a n o p e n a r e a in f r o n t of t h e city of M e g a l o p o l i s . In t h e early stages of the e n c o u n t e r the A c h a e a n light i n f a n t r y d r o v e the S p a r t a n s b a c k to their c a m p . A r a t u s , h o w e v e r , in l e a d i n g the p u r s u i t with the m a i n b o d y of his t r o o p s , c a m e t o a d e e p r a v i n e . H e r e f u s e d to a l l o w his m e n t o c r o s s it a n d so he p u t a s t o p to the c h a s e . L y d i a d e s , the f o r m e r t y r a n t of M e g a l o p o l i s w h o h a d j o i n e d t h e A c h a e a n s , w a s so i n f u r i a t e d by this t h a t he t o o k m a t t e r s i n t o his o w n h a n d s a n d s p u r r e d his c a v a l r y f o r w a r d . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , they b e c a m e e n t a n g l e d a n d s e p a r a t e d in a difficult a r e a of t e r r a i n w h i c h w a s c l u t t e r e d with vines, d i t c h e s a n d walls. W h e n C l e o m e n e s saw this, he sent in his light c a v a l r y a n d a r c h e r s . L y d i a d e s w a s killed a n d his m e n fled as best they c o u l d . E n c o u r a g e d by this, the S p a r t a n s rallied a n d fell u p o n the A c h a e a n s , p u t t i n g the e n t i r e a r m y t o flight. Plutarch, Polybius,

C l e o m e n e s , 6 and A r a t u s , 2: 51(3)

36(3)-37;

ORCHOMENUS (ARCADIA) (227) Cleomenean War A f t e r s u f f e r i n g t w o d e f e a t s a t the h a n d s of C l e o m e n e s , A r a t u s w a s o n t h e p o i n t of resigning as t h e A c h a e a n leader. H o w e v e r , he h u n g o n f o r a little a n d w a s r e w a r d e d w h e n he led his t r o o p s a g a i n s t O r c h o m e n u s in A r c a d i a , w h e r e he f o u g h t Megist o n o u s , t h e s t e p f a t h e r of C l e o m e n e s . H e killed a b o u t 300 of the e n e m y a n d t o o k M e g i s t o n o u s prisoner. Plutarch, A r a t u s , 38(1)

DYME (225) - Cleomenean War T h e s t a r of C l e o m e n e s w a s in the a s c e n d a n t while the f o r t u n e s of t h e A c h a e a n league w e r e o n the w a n e . T h e A c h a e a n s , u n d e r A r a t u s , c a m e o u t in full f o r c e a n d p i t c h e d their c a m p at D y m e , n e a r the s h r i n e called the H e c a t o m b a e u m . C l e o m e n e s a r r i v e d a n d t h o u g h t it u n w i s e t o pitch c a m p b e t w e e n t h e city of D y m e , a f o u n d e r m e m b e r of 120

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achieve f a m e , w h o rallied his colleagues and charged the S p a r t a n cavalry. This diversion b r o u g h t the S p a r t a n light i n f a n t r y back in defence, leaving A n t i g o n u s ' right wing free to grapple with Eucleidas on Evas. In this, it was completely successful as a result of the S p a r t a n s ' blunder in staying on the t o p of their hill instead of a d v a n c i n g d o w n to meet their enemy on the slope. As it was, the S p a r t a n s could only w i t h d r a w downhill to their great disadvantage. O n O l y m p u s , the light t r o o p s of both sides engaged in a fierce struggle. But when Cleomenes saw t h a t his b r o t h e r h a d been routed off Evas a n d that his cavalry was having a b a d time, he was a f r a i d that he might be s u r r o u n d e d . He led out his whole force f r o m behind his fortifications, a n d the t w o p h a l a n x e s engaged in a h e a d - o n charge. T h e battle seesawed f o r a while until a m a s s charge by A n t i g o n u s with his d o u b l e p h a l a n x in close o r d e r dislodged his o p p o n e n t . T h e whole S p a r t a n a r m y t o o k to its heels a n d fled. In c o n t r a v e n t i o n of S p a r t a n tradition, Cleomenes escaped a n d fled the c o u n t r y to Egypt. Just a f t e r the battle A n t i g o n u s received news that he must r e t u r n h o m e immediately to deal with a local emergency. H a d Cleomenes but k n o w n it, he would have been spared the utter defeat if he could have delayed the e n g a g e m e n t f o r a few days. Polybius, 2:65-69; Plutarch, and P h i l o p o e m e n , 6

Cleomenes,

27(3)-28

A P O L L O N I A ( B A B Y L O N I A ) (220, winter) M o l o n ' s Revolt In 223 the Seleucid d o m i n i o n acquired a new ruler, A n t i o c h u s III (the G r e a t ) , in succession to his m u r d e r e d b r o t h e r , Seleucus III. T a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of the y o u t h of the new ruler, the g o v e r n o r of Media, M o l o n , rebelled. In a victory against a loyalist force on the Tigris, he also w o n Babylonia a n d the rest of Persia. A n t i o c h u s , hearing of this, gave u p his designs against Syria in f a v o u r of bringing M o l o n to b o o k . Assembling his a r m y , he reached the E u p h r a t e s a n d proceeded to A n t i o c h , which he reached in midwinter. Acting on the advice of a brilliant and experienced officer n a m e d Zeuxis, A n t i o c h u s crossed the Tigris a n d severed M o l o n ' s retreat to M e d i a a n d his supplies. A d v a n c i n g f r o m there a n d m a r c h i n g f o r m o r e t h a n a week, he crossed M o u n t O r e i c u m a n d came to Apollonia where M o l o n was, in effect, cornered. H e a r i n g of the king's a p p r o a c h , M o l o n m a d e f o r the hilly p a r t of the territory of Apollonia where his m a n y slingers would be of great a d v a n t a g e . W h e n the king arrived, the two armies

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e n c a m p e d 4 or 5 miles a p a r t . T h e dispositions of the two forces have been detailed by Polybius but are largely irrelevant to the o u t c o m e because, as the armies closed, M o l o n ' s entire left wing went over to the king as soon as they saw him. O n the right wing M o l o n himself, b e c o m i n g completely s u r r o u n d e d , put an end to his life. All the o t h e r plotters escaped but they t o o subsequently killed themselves. Polybius, 5: 51-54(4) C A P H Y A E (220) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League T h e Aetolians, noticing that the A c h a e a n s had b e c o m e idle a n d inactive, invaded Messenia a n d ravaged it. T h e Messenians appealed for help, a n d the A c h a e a n s a n d their allies met a n d sent an u l t i m a t u m to the Aetolians to w i t h d r a w f r o m Messenia a n d to keep off A c h a e a n soil. T h e Aetolians decided t h a t they h a d better c o n f o r m for the time being, but the A c h a e a n s did not trust them. A r a t u s , with a small force of 3,000 foot a n d 300 horse, s h a d o w e d D o r i m a c h u s a n d his Aetolians until D o r i m a c h u s decided to a t t a c k him while the o t h e r was low in n u m b e r s . T h e A c h a e a n s h a d c a m p e d at C a p h y a e a n d o n the a p p r o a c h of the Aetolians they lined up f o r battle in the plain with the river in their f r o n t . T h e Aetolians, avoiding a c o n f r o n t a t i o n , m a r c h e d t o w a r d s some hills a n d were beginning to climb when A r a t u s sent out his cavalry a n d light t r o o p s to harass them. T h e Aetolian cavalry, w h o were still in the plain bringing up the rear, spurred f o r w a r d to join their i n f a n t r y in the foothills. A r a t u s t o o k this to be a retreat a n d led his men f o r w a r d at the d o u b l e . In the m e a n t i m e , the Aetolians h a d turned a b o u t a n d they fell on the A c h a e a n s . As the Aetolians were superior in n u m b e r a n d were c h a r g i n g f r o m higher g r o u n d , they gained the u p p e r h a n d a n d put the A c h a e a n s to flight. M e a n w h i l e the heavy-armed A c h a e a n s , w h o h a d not yet entered the fray, were c o m i n g u p to help. W h e n they saw the flight of their c o m rades, they h a d no idea of w h a t was going on a n d so they turned a n d joined the rout. Polybius, 4: 11-12; Plutarch, A r a t u s , 47(2) P H A R O S I S L (219) - Second Illyrian W a r At the time of the First Illyrian W a r , D e m e t r i u s of P h a r o s was suspected by the Illyrians of duplicity. A f r a i d of their vengeance, he m a d e c o n t a c t with the R o m a n s , w h o befriended him. Ten years later he h a d b r o k e n his treaty with t h e m a n d was sacking Illyrian cities which were subject to R o m e . In 219, Lucius Aemilius was despatched with an 121

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a r m y to deal with the Illyrian p r o b l e m . He c a p t u r e d the city of D i m a l e [Krotina] in a week, a l t h o u g h the Illyrians h a d t h o u g h t it to be impregnable. H e then sailed to the island of P h a r o s [Hvar], off Illyria, to deal with D e m e t r i u s himself. T h e capital t o w n . P h a r o s [Starigrad], was so strongly fortified a n d garrisoned that the consul resorted to a ruse. He sailed in at night with his whole force a n d d i s e m b a r k e d most of it in secluded areas. T h e next d a y he sailed in himself with 20 ships to the t o w n ' s h a r b o u r . D e m e t r i u s responded c o n t e m p t u o u s l y with a sortie but f o u n d the fighting heavier t h a n expected. R e i n f o r c e m e n t s were s u m m o n e d f r o m the t o w n until, eventually, the whole garrison was taking part. At this point the concealed R o m a n force a p p e a r e d on the scene a n d seized a hill between the t o w n a n d the h a r b o u r . D e m e t r i u s b r o k e off his attack in the h a r b o u r a n d directed his men t o w a r d the new threat on the hill. T h e R o m a n s then charged d o w n on them, while the first R o m a n force a t t a c k e d them in the rear f r o m the h a r b o u r . T h e Illyrians turned a n d fled. D e m e t r i u s m a d e his way to a b o a t which he kept for the p u r p o s e a n d in which he escaped in the h o u r s of darkness, eventually reaching the c o u r t of K i n g Philip. Polybius, 3: 18-19

A R I S B A (218) - Gallic Uprising W h e n A t t a l u s I was forced to wage war against the rebellious A c h a e u s , he i m p o r t e d a force of G a u l s f r o m T h r a c e . W i t h their help he regained m a n y of the G r e e k cities t h a t h a d been w o n over by Achaeus. However, the G a u l s in their turn ran out of c o n t r o l a n d started pillaging the t o w n s in the region of the Hellespont, finally a t t a c k i n g Ilium. T h e i n h a b i t a n t s of A l e x a n d r i a T r o a s raised the siege of Ilium a n d threw the G a u l s out. T h e G a u l s then seized Arisba, a few miles f r o m A b y d u s , a n d began to harass the cities in that region. T h e y were b r o u g h t u p short by Prusias, king of Bithynia, w h o led out an a r m y a n d killed all the m e n in a pitched battle, a f t e r w a r d s slaying the w o m e n a n d children in their c a m p . Polybius, 5: 111 R A P H I A (217) - F o u r t h Syrian W a r A f t e r the battle of Ipsus (301), the territory of Syria was allocated to Seleucus. Ptolemy, however, h a d c o n t r o l of the s o u t h e r n p a r t , to which the n a m e Coele-Syria became restricted, a n d he refused to give it up. T h e b o u n d a r y line between Seleucid a n d Ptolemaic Syria became a source of dispute which led to several wars. In 221 the reigning Seleucid, A n t i o c h u s III, was given

B A T T L E O F R A P H I A (217BC)

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g r o u n d s f o r r e c o m m e n c i n g hostilities, which developed into the F o u r t h Syrian W a r . A f t e r a few years spent in finishing o t h e r business, A n t i o c h u s m a r c h e d s o u t h t h r o u g h Palestine with a n a r m y of 62,000 f o o t , 6,000 horse a n d 102 elephants. He passed G a z a a n d arrived at R a p h i a [Rafah], Meanwhile, Ptolemy IV h a d d e p a r t e d e a s t w a r d s f r o m Alexandria a n d h a d also reached R a p h i a , the first city past the Egyptian b o r d e r , with an a r m y c o m p o s e d of 70,000 f o o t , 5,000 horse a n d 73 elep h a n t s . T h e t w o armies were e n c a m p e d just over half a mile f r o m each other. A f t e r several days of m i n o r skirmishes the adversaries decided to fight it o u t . Their d e p l o y m e n t s have been given in detail by Polybius. In s u m m a r y , each c o m m a n d e r placed his p h a l a n x in the centre a n d divided his cavalry between the wings, with various t r o o p s filling the gaps. Both sides positioned their elephants, a p p r o x i m a t e l y divided, in f r o n t of their wings. T h e two generals c o n f r o n t e d each other, Ptolemy on his left wing, A n t i o c h u s on his right. T h e engagement c o m m e n c e d with a c o n f r o n t a t i o n of the elep h a n t s , those of A n t i o c h u s being large Indian beasts while Ptolemy's were of the smaller A f r i c a n variety (according to Polybius).* In consequence, most of Ptolemy's a n i m a l s declined to fight a n d headed back to their own lines where they caused some c o n f u s i o n . Meanwhile, A n t i o c h u s a n d his cavalry r o d e r o u n d the outside of his elephants a n d a t t a c k e d the enemy cavalry, while on the inside of the elephants the G r e e k mercenaries a t t a c k e d Ptolemy's peltasts. T h e whole of Ptolem y ' s left wing was forced back. O n the opposite wing, exactly the same situation developed the o t h e r way r o u n d . P t o l e m y ' s c o m m a n d e r outflanked the enemy's cavalry a n d put it to flight, while the i n f a n t r y routed their opposite n u m b e r s . This left the two p h a l a n x e s facing each other in naked isolation. At this point A n t i o c h u s m a d e his great mistake. He was t o o busy p u r s u i n g the enem y ' s left wing to take note of events elsewhere. Ptolemy, by contrast, a p p e a r e d in f r o n t of his p h a l a n x a n d inspired his m e n . W i t h lowered pikes the p h a l a n x c h a r g e d , a n d the enemy, failing in c o u r a g e a n d s u p p o r t , soon turned a n d fled. Antio c h u s lost nearly 10.000 i n f a n t r y killed a n d 4,000 taken prisoner in c o n t r a s t to Ptolemy's losses of 1,500 f o o t a n d 700 horse. W h e n he got h o m e , A n t i o c h u s sued for peace a n d was granted a truce for o n e year. Polybius, 5: 79-86. *Recently confirmed: Peter Connolly, Greece a n d R o m e at W a r , Greenhill, 1998, p. 75.

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L A R I S S U S R (209) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League T h e y o u n g P h i l o p o e m e n , w h o h a d distinguished himself so well at Sellasia (222), was later a p p o i n t e d to lead the A c h a e a n cavalry which b e c a m e engaged in a battle against the Aetolians a n d Eleans. T h e e n c o u n t e r t o o k place on the river Larissus, which f o r m e d the b o r d e r between A c h a e a a n d Elis. P l u t a r c h described it as a great battle, a l t h o u g h almost n o t h i n g is k n o w n a b o u t it. It is, however, recorded that w h e n the general in c o m m a n d of the Elean cavalry charged against P h i l o p o e m e n personally, the latter coolly deflected the blow a n d killed his adversary. A f t e r seeing their leader fall, the Eleans lost heart a n d p r o m p t l y fled. Plutarch, 49(7)

Philopoemen,

7(6-7);

Pausanias,

8:

L A B U S M (209) - A n a b a s i s of A n t i o c h u s A n t i o c h u s III e a r n e d his title of 'the G r e a t ' as a result of his a n a b a s i s of the eastern provinces. He started out f r o m M e d i a a n d , a f t e r crossing the Salt Desert, reached the P a r t h i a n capital of Hecatompylus. His next objective was an a d v a n c e into H y r c a n i a , which involved crossing the pass over M o u n t L a b u s [Elburz]. T h e ascent to the pass covered nearly 35 miles, mostly r o u g h going t h r o u g h a deep a n d rock-strewn gorge. T h e sides of the gorge were lined a l o n g the t o p by h o r d e s of b a r b a r i a n s . A n t i o c h u s , f o r e w a r n e d , had detached g r o u p s of archers, slingers a n d javelin throwers u n d e r his general Diogenes. These he sent outside the defile to o u t f l a n k the g r o u p s of b a r b a r i a n s a n d dislodge them f r o m the higher g r o u n d , repeating the process as he a d v a n c e d . On the eighth day A n t i o c h u s reached the t o p of the pass, where a whole mass of b a r b a r i a n s h a d congregated to o p p o s e him. T h e y f o u g h t fiercely against the p h a l a n x a n d might have succeeded h a d they not been o u t f l a n k e d . But the light-armed t r o o p s h a d m a d e a wide d e t o u r at night a n d occupied the heights in the rear of the enemy. This created panic a n d the b a r b a r i a n s took to flight. A n t i o c h u s then descended into H y r c a n i a , where he b r o u g h t the P a r t h i a n king Arsaces to battle a n d forced him to sue f o r terms. Polybius, 10: 29-31(4) A R I U S R (208) - A n a b a s i s of A n t i o c h u s A f t e r dealing with the P a r t h i a n s (above), Antio c h u s proceeded to Bactria against E u t h y d e m u s , a G r e e k w h o had seized c o n t r o l of the region. A n t i o c h u s heard t h a t 10,000 of the u s u r p e r ' s 123


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cavalry were g u a r d i n g the ford over the river Arius [Heri-Rud\. He e n c a m p e d a d a y ' s m a r c h a w a y a n d a d v a n c e d with his cavalry, light t r o o p s a n d 10,000 peltasts by night as he h a d heard that the enemy cavalry withdrew at dusk to their quarters. H e h a d got most of his forces across the river before the Bactrian cavalry arrived on the scene. W i t h 2,000 of his best cavalry the king faced the enemy while the rest of his forces drew themselves u p in order. H e repulsed the first enemy d e t a c h m e n t but the second a n d third o n s l a u g h t s got the better of him. At this point P a n a e t o l u s , in charge of the m a i n forces, a d v a n c e d a n d turned the Bactrians into h e a d l o n g flight, killing m a n y of them in the p u r suit. As a result, E u t h y d e m u s withdrew f r o m the area. In the battle, A n t i o c h u s received a blow in the m o u t h a n d lost several teeth. Polybius, 10: 49 L A M I A (208) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League T h e A c h a e a n s were being a t t a c k e d on all sides. T h e Aetolians h a d crossed the intervening straits a n d were ravaging their land, while M a c h a n i d a s , the tyrant of S p a r t a , was harassing t h e m across their m u t u a l b o r d e r . In a d d i t i o n , K i n g A t t a l u s I of P e r g a m u m , w h o s u p p o r t e d the Aetolians, was believed to be on the p o i n t of crossing to E u r o p e . T h e A c h a e a n s appealed to Philip V of M a c e d o n for help, a n d it suited him to descend into Greece in his o w n interests. T h e Aetolians, led by Pyrrhias, m a r c h e d out a n d met him near L a m i a . In addition to their o w n forces, the Aetolians h a d some of A t t a l u s ' t r o o p s as well as a t h o u s a n d m e n sent f r o m a R o m a n fleet. Philip f o u g h t two battles against Pyrrhias, winning b o t h of t h e m a n d forcing the Aetolians to shut themselves u p in L a m i a . A truce was subsequently a r r a n g e d following the intervention of a c o m b i n e d d e p u t a t i o n to Philip f r o m Ptolemy, A t h e n s , R h o d e s a n d Chios. In t r u t h , the real aim of these parties was to try to keep Philip out of G r e e k affairs. Livy, 27: 30(1-2) M A N T I N E A (207) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League M a c h a n i d a s , the t y r a n t of S p a r t a , continually molested the A c h a e a n s . He was eventually b r o u g h t to b o o k by P h i l o p o e m e n at M a n t i n e a , where the A c h a e a n general h a d collected his forces. W h e n P h i l o p o e m e n heard that the enemy was a d v a n c i n g u p the road f r o m Tegea 10 miles to the south, he divided his forces into three p a r t s a n d m a r c h e d t h e m out of the city. R u n n i n g across the middle of the plain was a d e e p ditch a l o n g which 124

P h i l o p o e m e n stationed his p h a l a n x in several divisions. T h e A c h a e a n cavalry were placed on the right wing. On the left were all the o t h e r forces, the light-armed troops, the heavy-armed cavalry, a n d all the mercenaries, with P h i l o p o e m e n himself in c h a r g e of the m e r c e n a r y cavalry. W h e n M a c h a nidas a p p r o a c h e d , he lined u p his mercenaries facing the enemy a n d placed c a t a p u l t s at intervals in f r o n t . P h i l o p o e m e n , realizing that M a c h a n i d a s intended to shoot at his p h a l a n x a n d t h r o w it into disorder, wasted n o time in o p e n i n g the a t t a c k with his cavalry o n the left. T h e y were o p p o s e d by the e n e m y ' s o p p o s i t e n u m b e r s . T h e light-armed t r o o p s went in to s u p p o r t their respective cavalries, a n d ultimately all the mercenaries of both sides on t h a t wing b e c a m e engaged. A f t e r a confused struggle the t y r a n t ' s mercenaries, w h o were superior in n u m b e r , got the u p p e r h a n d a n d routed the o p p o s i t i o n , which tied back to the city. It was at this point that M a c h a n i d a s m a d e his great mistake. Instead of o u t f l a n k i n g the enemy line, he pursued the routed forces with childish glee. Phil o p o e m e n remained calm. H e allowed the t y r a n t ' s men to pass t h r o u g h in their pursuit a n d then wheeled the first section of his p h a l a n x into the g a p left by the enemy, o u t f l a n k i n g their wing a n d cutting off the r e t u r n of M a c h a n i d a s a n d his men. T h e S p a r t a n p h a l a n x now acted on its o w n initiative in starting a charge which c a m e to grief in the ditch. U n d e r the impression that this would present little obstacle, the S p a r t a n s tried to clamber t h r o u g h it a n d presented an excellent target for P h i l o p o e m e n ' s p h a l a n x , which p r o m p t l y c o u n t e r charged with levelled spears. M o s t of the enemy w h o tried to cross died in the a t t e m p t . W h e n the t y r a n t r e t u r n e d f r o m the chase, he f o u n d himself cut off by the ditch with the only bridge in the h a n d s of the enemy. H e f o u n d a possible crossing place a n d urged his horse over, but P h i l o p o e m e n was waiting f o r him on the o t h e r side a n d killed him. Polybius,

11: 11-18; Pausanias,

8:

50(2)

S C O T I T A S (201) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League T h e successor to M a c h a n i d a s as t y r a n t of S p a r t a was the equally undesirable N a b i s . P h i l o p o e m e n , the general of the A c h a e a n s , devolved a plan for a m a s s i n g an A c h a e a n force to o p p o s e N a b i s w i t h o u t the knowledge of the t y r a n t ' s secret police a n d spies. He sent letters to all the m o r e distant t o w n s telling t h e m to collect all the m e n of military age a n d to proceed to the next t o w n ( n a m e d in the letter), where they were to h a n d in a similar letter. P h i l o p o e m e n h a d calculated the time taken for

THE GREEK

each of the h u m a n chains to reach the final destin a t i o n , Tegea, so that he could a r r a n g e f o r them to arrive at the same time. In this way the men of A c h a e a converged on Tegea w i t h o u t k n o w i n g their ultimate destination or p u r p o s e . H a v i n g collected his a r m y , P h i l o p o e m e n sent his picked t r o o p s to m a k e a raid on Laconia in o r d e r to d r a w out the t y r a n t ' s men. T h e A c h a e a n s h a d been instructed that when they were a t t a c k e d , they were to retire to Scotitas. In the m e a n t i m e P h i l o p o e m e n himself, with the main b o d y of the t r o o p s , m a d e a night m a r c h to Scotitas to set u p an a m b u s h . T h e subsequent events went entirely according to plan. Scotitas was a district between Tegea a n d S p a r t a which, a c c o r d i n g to Pausanias, was a forest of oaks. A possible site has been noted by m o d e r n scholars. Polybius, 16: 36-37; Pausanias, 3: 10(6)

C H I O S ISL (201, autumn) In 202 the R h o d i a n s declared war on Philip of M a c e d o n . A year later, Philip's aggressive actions in the Aegean upset A t t a l u s I of P e r g a m u m , w h o began to w o n d e r if he would be the next target a n d decided to ally himself with R h o d e s . Action was not long delayed. Philip was besieging the town of C h i o s when A t t a l u s a n d the R h o d i a n s sailed up to b l o c k a d e him. Philip had 53 decked warships a n d a large fleet of galleys a n d o t h e r ships. T h e allies had 65 decked ships a n d 3 triremes but fewer o t h e r craft. As Philip's siege h a d met with n o success, he decided to m a k e a quick run for the o p e n sea a n d to trust to the unexpectedness of his m o v e to effect an escape. As he sailed out of the h a r b o u r , A t t a l u s c a m e u p a n d a t t a c k e d Philip's right wing. Philip ordered that wing to face the enemy a n d fight. T h e R h o d i a n s were f u r t h e r away. T h e y arrived in time to attack the last of the M a c e d o n i a n ships in the rear. T h e e n c o u n t e r then resolved itself into two separate battles: a fight close to the shore between A t t a l u s a n d the M a c e d o n i a n right, a n d a r u n n i n g fight between the R h o d i a n s a n d the o t h e r enemy ships which were still proceeding t o w a r d the m a i n l a n d . A t t a l u s was gaining the u p p e r h a n d over his M a c e d o n i a n adversaries until he chased an enemy ship t o w a r d the shore a n d was cut off by the enemy f r o m the o p e n sea. He h a d n o alternative but to beach his ships a n d effect an escape by land. O u t at sea, superior R h o d i a n speed a n d s e a m a n s h i p prevailed. T h e R h o d i a n s were adept at avoiding b o a r d i n g c o n t a c t with the M a c e d o nians, w h o were valiant fighters on deck. Instead, the R h o d i a n s c o n c e n t r a t e d on shearing oars a n d d a m a g i n g ships. T h e M a c e d o n i a n s soon r a n into

WORLD

difficulties a n d eventually a b a n d o n e d the scene altogether. T h e final o u t c o m e is best depicted by the h u m a n losses, the allies losing a b o u t 130 men between them as against 3,000 soldiers a n d 6,000 sailors on the M a c e d o n i a n side. In spite of this d i s p r o p o r t i o n Philip claimed the victory, but his action next day gave the lie to it when the allies again sailed against him a n d he declined the challenge. Polybius, 16: 2-7 P A N I U M (200 or 198) - F i f t h Syrian W a r A r o u n d the turn of the c e n t u r y A n t i o c h u s the G r e a t invaded Coele-Syria for the second time. A f t e r an initial setback at the h a n d s of a f o r m e r Aetolian general called Scopas, w h o h a d transferred his services to Egypt, A n t i o c h u s met him again in a battle which is variously dated 200 or 198. T h e e n c o u n t e r t o o k place near P a n i u m [Baniyas], where o n e of the sources of the J o r d a n springs f r o m a cavern in the foothills of M o u n t H e r m o n . Here A n t i o c h u s destroyed the greater p a r t of Scopas' a r m y . W e are indebted to Polybius for n a m i n g the site a n d telling us t h a t the armies were lined u p on level g r o u n d with Scopas' right wing resting on the hills. Polybius' passage is otherwise virtually confined to a diatribe against the errors a n d inconsistencies of the historian Z e n o . He m a k e s no a t t e m p t here to give an a c c o u n t of the battle, which remains obscure. Polybius, 16: 18-19; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 3, 3 (131-132); Stephanus of Byzantium, ndcviov, s.v. nocvia A T H A C U S (200) - Second M a c e d o n i a n W a r Following the battle off C h i o s (201) A t t a l u s of P e r g a m u m a n d his R h o d i a n allies s o u g h t help f r o m R o m e against Philip of M a c e d o n . T h e senate, which h a d its own reasons for distrusting a n d fearing Philip, sent him an u l t i m a t u m . This was rejected. T h e following year the R o m a n s landed a force in Illyria u n d e r Sulpicius G a l b a , w h o p r o ceeded e a s t w a r d s into M a c e d o n i a . Philip m a r c h e d westward to meet him. Neither side knew the w h e r e a b o u t s of the other, a n d so both sent out reconnaissance cavalry which eventually met a n d engaged in an indecisive skirmish. Philip himself then moved f o r w a r d with 20,000 f o o t a n d 2,000 horse a n d fortified a hill near A t h a c u s ( u n k n o w n ) a b o u t a mile f r o m the R o m a n c a m p . On the third day Sulpicius led out his a r m y . T h e king sent a d e t a c h m e n t of Illyrians a n d C r e t a n s with cavalry s u p p o r t to h a r a s s the R o m a n s , w h o retaliated by o p p o s i n g them with a force of similar size. T h e 125


WORLDS

R o m a n attack was s t u b b o r n a n d the enemy auxiliaries, lightly a r m e d a n d a c c u s t o m e d only to hita n d - r u n tactics, were taken a b a c k by the static h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting a n d fled. O n the next day the two armies met in full force. T h e king h a d previously posted some peltasts in a m b u s h between the c a m p s , but they emerged t o o soon a n d the R o m a n s were the victors. T h e following day the R o m a n s again lined up a n d positioned some e l e p h a n t s in f r o n t of their lines. T h e enemy declined the challenge. Livy, 31: 34(5)-36(6) O T T O L O B U M (200) - Second M a c e d o n i a n War A f t e r the e n c o u n t e r at A t h a c u s (above), Sulpicius moved his c a m p to O t t o l o b u m 8 miles f r o m the enemy to m a k e it safer to forage. O n e day when Philip saw the R o m a n s widely dispersed while foraging, he t o o k his cavalry a n d C r e t a n auxiliaries a n d cut off their return to c a m p . He then sent a part of his force against the foragers, a m o n g w h o m they created m u c h slaughter. Sulpicius, the R o m a n consul, sent out his cavalry a n d then led out the legions. T h e cavalry fared badly, particularly against the enemy t r o o p s blocking the way, but when the M a c e d o n i a n s p u r s u e d the cavalry, they got carried a w a y by their zeal a n d r a n into the R o m a n c o h o r t s . In their disorganized state, the M a c e d o n i a n s suffered considerable slaughter a n d they, in their t u r n , b r o k e off a n d fled. T h e king himself nearly s u c c u m b e d , being t h r o w n f r o m his horse a n d n a r r o w l y escaping being t r o d d e n u n d e r f o o t . T h e e n c o u n t e r cost the M a c e d o n i a n s a b o u t 300 cavalry killed or c a p t u r e d . W e k n o w n o t h i n g of the R o m a n losses. Livy, 31: 36(5)-37 A O U S R (198) - Second M a c e d o n i a n W a r In 198 the R o m a n s again crossed the Adriatic to Epirus, with a fresh force u n d e r Titus Quinctius F l a m i n i n u s . H e d e b a t e d whether he should invade M a c e d o n i a by the long circuitous r o u t e to the n o r t h . T h e alternative was a direct but h a z a r d o u s route e a s t w a r d t h r o u g h the enemy positions on the river A o u s [Vijose], He decided to take it. W h e n he reached enemy-held territory near the river, he vacillated f o r over a m o n t h until Philip submitted p r o p o s a l s f o r peace. T h e consul's d e m a n d s in r e t u r n were t o o stringent for Philip, w h o b r o k e off negotiations. W a r it was to be. T h e river A o u s flows t h r o u g h a n a r r o w valley between two m o u n t a i n s , both of which were fortified by the M a c e d o n i a n s . O n e was occupied by light-armed 126

troops; the king's c a m p was pitched on the other. C a t a p u l t s a n d o t h e r engines of war were positioned on m a n y of the crags. While F l a m i n i n u s was p o n d e r i n g over the difficulties, a shepherd was b r o u g h t to him w h o offered to lead him r o u n d the e n e m y ' s dispositions by a track to a point which overlooked the enemy. T o avert the e n e m y ' s suspicions, F l a m i n i n u s kept up his usual harassing a t t a c k s f o r a couple of d a y s a n d then sent out a force of 4,000 picked i n f a n t r y with 300 cavalry. They were to proceed up the valley as far as the horses could go, where the cavalry would stay p u t . T h e i n f a n t r y were to a d v a n c e with the guide by night, the m o o n at that time being full. O n the third day they reached their objective a n d sent up the agreed s m o k e signal. T h e consul immediately divided his force into three c o l u m n s a n d sent o n e up each side of the valley while he led the third u p the middle. T h e fighting was becoming f r a u g h t with d a n g e r a n d difficulty f o r the R o m a n s when a shout a n d s o u n d s of battle were heard f r o m the direction of the enemy's rear. This b r o u g h t hostilities to a n early end as the king's m e n scattered a n d fled, if they could, h e m m e d in as they were in f r o n t a n d behind. U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r the R o m a n s , pursuit was impossible in that terrain. T h e fleeing king, when he realized this, stopped a f t e r a few miles to collect stragglers. Surprisingly, the enemy host reassembled with a loss of not m o r e t h a n 2,000 men. Livy, 32: 5(8)-6(4) F l a m i n i n u s , 3(4)-5(

and 10-12; 1)

Plutarch,

CYNOSCEPHALAE MS (197) - Second Macedonian War In a new year of c a m p a i g n i n g Philip descended once m o r e into Thessaly while F l a m i n i n u s , collecting r e i n f o r c e m e n t s en route (notably 6.000 Aetolians), m a r c h e d u p to the b o r d e r . T h e king a n d the general were s o o n to meet f o r the decisive e n c o u n t e r . With well-matched forces of a r o u n d 25,000 on each side, the two armies a p p r o a c h e d the range of hills k n o w n as C y n o s c e p h a l a e [Chalkodonion] f r o m different directions. As a result, they e n c a m p e d with hills between t h e m so t h a t neither k n e w the position of the other. O n the following m o r n i n g the whole area was s h r o u d e d in dense mist which reduced the visibility to a low level. Philip, impatient f o r action, immediately sent out a task force to seize the s u m m i t s of the hills. F l a m i n i n u s , a little m o r e leisurely, also sent out a reconnaissance s q u a d , which met the M a c e d o n i a n s in the pass. In the s u b s e q u e n t skirmish the R o m a n s c a m e off worst a n d sent a

THE GREEK

message f o r help. W h e n r e i n f o r c e m e n t s arrived, the tables were turned a n d the enemy retreated to the s u m m i t a n d asked their side f o r help. Philip sent a large r e i n f o r c e m e n t of cavalry a n d mercenaries which again turned the tables by driving the R o m a n s f r o m the ridge. At this point, b o t h armies m a r c h e d out in full force. F l a m i n i n u s drew up his a r m y at the foot of the hills a n d ordered the right half to stay put, with the elephants in f r o n t , while he himself led the left half against the enemy. Philip, on the o t h e r side of the pass, led his peltasts a n d p a r t of his p h a l a n x u p the slope. His first m o v e at the t o p of the pass was to occupy the s u m m i t s on his left, which h a d been vacated by the R o m a n s . On his right, however, his mercenaries r e a p p e a r e d in flight, hotly pursued by the R o m a n heavy-armed t r o o p s u n d e r F l a m i n i n u s . Philip ordered the p a r t of his p h a l a n x which h a d reached the pass to d o u b l e in d e p t h , level their spears, a n d charge. T h e R o m a n s h a d no c h a n c e of s t a n d i n g up to this weight of heavy a r m o u r c h a r g i n g d o w n on them f r o m above. They were being driven back a n d slaughtered. F l a m i n i n u s decided t h a t his only hope was a diversion by his right wing, of which he t o o k c o m m a n d . W i t h his elephants in f r o n t , he led the legions against the forces on the enemy left, w h o had only just completed the climb a n d were still in m a r c h i n g order. T h e y were unoccupied a n d idly w a t c h i n g the battle. T h e a p p r o a c h of the elep h a n t s a n d the legions threw t h e m into c o n f u s i o n so that they were utterly routed a n d hotly p u r s u e d . H o w e v e r , one R o m a n t r i b u n e on the right displayed a spark of initiative f a r b e y o n d the call of mere pursuit. H a v i n g seen the enemy defeated in this part of the battle, he t o o k a small force of twenty maniples a n d wheeled t h e m r o u n d to attack the victorious M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x in the rear. A p h a l a n x with spears a r o u n d 20 feet long is a c u m b e r s o m e i n s t r u m e n t , incapable of any a b r u p t c h a n g e in direction. In consequence, the t r i b u n e ' s action created havoc. T h e M a c e d o n i a n s , a t t a c k e d f r o m f r o n t a n d rear, raised their spears in token of surrender o r d r o p p e d t h e m a n d fled. T h e R o m a n s lost a b o u t 700 killed in the battle, in c o n t r a s t to the enemy losses of a r o u n d 13,000 killed or c a p t u r e d . T h e result of the battle was a request by Philip f o r an armistice, a n d a peace was granted in 196 which effectively limited him to Macedonia. Polybius, 18: 19-26; Livy, 33: 6-10; F l a m i n i n u s , 7-8

Plutarch,

N E M E A R (197) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League In the year in which the battle of C y n o s c e p h a l a e

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h a d b r o u g h t hostilities against Philip to an end in n o r t h e r n Greece, there was one f u r t h e r a r m e d conflict with him f u r t h e r south, near C o r i n t h . T o Philip this city was a s t r o n g h o l d against the G r e e k cities a n d he h a d reinforced it to a total of 6,000 soldiers. W i t h this force A n d r o s t h e n e s , the king's general, a t t a c k e d the A c h a e a n s a n d ravaged the surrounding territory. As N i c o s t r a t u s , the A c h a e a n leader, was at Sicyon with only 2,000 men, he was forced to stay put until he could o b t a i n allies f r o m the n e i g h b o u r i n g states a n d a r r a n g e a secret place of assembly. This b r o u g h t his strength up to m o r e t h a n 5,000 men. A n d r o s thenes, in ignorance of this, h a d e n c a m p e d on the river N e m e a , a stream b o r d e r i n g the territories of C o r i n t h a n d Sicyon. H e sent out half his a r m y with orders to lay waste all the s u r r o u n d i n g c o u n t r y side. N i c o s t r a t u s seized the o p p o r t u n i t y a n d sent out a d e t a c h m e n t to block the pass leading to C o r i n t h i a n territory, while with the bulk of his force he a d v a n c e d u p o n the enemy c a m p in two c o l u m n s f r o m different directions. A n d r o s t h e n e s , t a k e n completely by surprise, m a r c h e d out with his depleted force a n d f o r m e d up by the river while recalling the foragers. T h e M a c e d o n i a n s put u p a stout fight but the rest of the force, assembled in haste, did not stand up to the enemy but fled in disorder. T h e disciplined M a c e d o n i a n s m a n a g e d to retire in a m o r e orderly fashion until they also eventually t o o k to flight. A f t e r the battle there was a great slaughter of the m o r e distant foragers a n d of those w h o were still r e t u r n i n g to c a m p . T h e enemy losses a m o u n t e d in toto to 1,500 killed a n d 300 prisoners. Livy, 33: 14-15 A L A B A N D A (197) In Asia, the R h o d i a n s w a n t e d to repossess the m a i n l a n d district of Peraea in C a r i a which they h a d previously held. They sent out a mixed force of A c h a e a n infantry a n d auxiliaries, a m o u n t i n g to 2,600 men, which was reinforced by a f u r t h e r 1,100 A c h a e a n s . T h e y set u p c a m p at A l a b a n d a [Araphisar]. T h e king's prefect, D i n o c r a t e s , recalled all the garrisons f r o m t o w n s in the region a n d collected a force similar in size to the enemy's. He m a r c h e d to A l a b a n d a a n d e n c a m p e d close to them but on the opposite side of the river. W h e n the t w o sides lined u p f o r battle, the A c h a e a n s crossed the river, followed by the auxiliaries, a n d c o n f r o n t e d the e n e m y ' s left wing which consisted of 400 Agrianes. A f t e r a lengthy struggle the A c h a e a n s m a n a g e d to dislodge their o p p o n e n t s by weight of n u m b e r s . U p to that point the 500 M a c e d o n i a n s 127


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on the enemy right flank h a d not yielded an inch, but when their left gave way, the p h a l a n x was u n a b l e to t u r n to meet the t h r u s t on their flank. T h e y began to fall back, then threw a w a y their a r m s a n d fled. T h e R h o d i a n a n d A c h a e a n victory was a wasted e f f o r t . If the victors h a d proceeded immediately to Stratonicea [Eskihisar], they would have gained it w i t h o u t a fight. Instead, they wasted time taking s u n d r y f o r t s a n d small towns, giving D i n o c r a t e s the o p p o r t u n i t y to t a k e refuge there a n d to reinforce the garrison with his surviving t r o o p s . W h e n the R h o d i a n s a n d A c h a e a n s did get a r o u n d to investing the city, the siege was unsuccessful. Livy, 33: 18

R o m a n s sent a fleet a n d garrison to defend the place but P h i l o p o e m e n , the general of the A c h a e a n s a n d a r c h - e n e m y of Nabis, became impatient at waiting f o r them a n d launched the ships of the A c h a e a n s . At that time there was a f a m o u s old q u a d r i r e m e which h a d been c a p t u r e d 80 years before a n d was in a state of extreme disrepair. N o t h i n g d a u n t e d , P h i l o p o e m e n ordered it to be launched as his flag-ship. In this hulk a n d in total ignorance of m a r i t i m e m a t t e r s , he led his fleet against the S p a r t a n flotilla f r o m G y t h e u m . At the first b u m p with a n o t h e r vessel the old ship disintegrated a n d the whole crew were taken prisoner. P h i l o p o e m e n himself escaped in a light skiff. T h e rest of the fleet m a d e off speedily as soon as their 'flag-ship' went d o w n .

S P A R T A (195) - W a r against N a b i s A r g o s left the A c h a e a n league a n d looked to Philip f o r help which he was not in a position to provide. Philip asked Nabis, u s u r p e r a n d tyrant of S p a r t a , to u n d e r t a k e the protection of A r g o s on his behalf. N a b i s provided it by instituting a reign of terror. This p r o m p t e d F l a m i n i n u s to convene a conference of G r e e k delegates, at which war against the t y r a n t w a s agreed. By this, the G r e e k s m e a n t w a r against A r g o s since A r g o s was the cause of it all. F l a m i n i n u s retorted t h a t he did not see the sense in going to w a r against the city which had appealed for help. He insisted on striking at the core of the p r o b l e m , S p a r t a . W h e n the R o m a n s were m a r k i n g out their c a m p in the vicinity of t h a t city, they were a t t a c k e d by the t y r a n t ' s auxiliary troops. This totally unexpected assault p r o v o k e d some panic, but w h e n the legions c a m e up, the enemy was forced to retire to the city. O n the following d a y F l a m i n i n u s was m a r c h i n g a l o n g the river E u r o t a s when N a b i s a n d his mercenaries suddenly burst out of the city t h r o u g h several gates a n d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n r e a r g u a r d of light i n f a n t r y a n d cavalry. T h e tyrant h a d kept his men lined u p in readiness within the walls against just such a n o p p o r t u n i t y . H o w e v e r , A p p i u s C l a u d i u s in c h a r g e of the r e a r g u a r d h a d also p r e p a r e d his m e n f o r this sort of eventuality. He b r o u g h t them r o u n d smartly a n d s m o t e the enemy until they b r o k e a n d fled. Later in the same year F l a m i n i n u s besieged N a b i s in S p a r t a a n d forced him fo surrender, a l t h o u g h N a b i s was left in possession of the city. Livy, 34: 28

Livy, 35: 26; Plutarch,

G Y T H E U M (192) - W a r against N a b i s Belligerent as ever, N a b i s besieged G y t h e u m . a t o w n a n d h a r b o u r in the s o u t h of Laconia. T h e 128

Philopoemen,

14(1-3)

P L E I A E (192) - W a r against N a b i s As a result of his lucky victory in the naval fiasco off G y t h e u m (above), N a b i s considered that there was no f u r t h e r d a n g e r f r o m the sea to his siege of that town. He decided to strengthen his land lines by w i t h d r a w i n g a third of his force f r o m the siege a n d stationing it near Pleiae, where it would t h r e a t e n the o b v i o u s a p p r o a c h r o u t e of a hostile army. T h e e n c a m p m e n t consisted largely of huts m a d e of reeds a n d t h a t c h e d with leaves. Philop o e m e n determined to m a k e a surprise attack on this c a m p with a new w e a p o n - fire. He amassed a fleet of small c r a f t into which he e m b a r k e d a force of lightly a r m e d soldiers. L a n d i n g t h e m near Pleiae, he m o v e d by night to the sleeping c a m p into which f i r e b r a n d s were t h r o w n . Everything was destroyed a n d nearly everybody with it. W h e t h e r P h i l o p o e m e n h a d heard of the similar a t t a c k in Africa by Scipio A f r i c a n u s only 11 years previously is a m a t t e r f o r surmise. Livy, 35: 27(1-9); Plutarch, P h i l o p o e m e n . 14(4)

CAMP OF PYRRHUS (192) - War against Nabis F r o m Pleiae, P h i l o p o e m e n proceeded n o r t h w a r d s a n d threatened S p a r t a in o r d e r to lure N a b i s , the tyrant of that city, away f r o m the siege of G y t h e u m . It so h a p p e n e d that G y t h e u m had already fallen to N a b i s , w h o m a r c h e d a f t e r Philopoemen a n d e n c a m p e d at a n unidentified place called the C a m p of P y r r h u s n o r t h of S p a r t a . N a b i s was certain t h a t his enemy would c o m e that way, a n d events p r o v e d him right. T h e r o a d was n a r r o w , a n d P h i l o p o e m e n ' s c o l u m n was a b o u t 5 miles long with the cavalry a n d auxiliaries at the rear, where he expected an a t t a c k . He was c a u g h t

THE GREEK

off balance when he f o u n d the enemy a h e a d c o n f r o n t i n g his van. His c o l u m n was back t o f r o n t f o r the occasion. His astuteness in coping with such situations h a s been well recorded, a n d in the present instance he m a n a g e d to bring the C r e t a n auxiliaries a n d cavalry f r o m the rear to the fore. He seized a n d fortified a cliff overlooking a stream f r o m which both sides would have to get water. He also concealed a force of caetrciti (shield bearers) in a secluded valley nearby. T h e following day the battle b r o k e out on the b a n k s of the stream between the cavalry a n d C r e t a n auxiliaries of b o t h sides. T h e t w o sides were evenly balanced, but a f t e r a while the A c h a e a n s were ' f o r c e d ' to withd r a w t o w a r d the a m b u s h , as instructed. T h e enemy, chasing them t h r o u g h the defile, were suddenly c o n f r o n t e d by the caetrciti, fresh a n d full of vigour, a n d they fled w i t h o u t hesitation to their c a m p . M a n y never reached it. This was not the end of the slaughter. P h i l o p o e m e n noticed that the fugitives scattered into the w o o d s in all directions and he realized that sooner o r later they would head back to S p a r t a . In so doing, they fell into the a m b u s h e s which he h a d set u p in the hills a r o u n d the city. Livy, 35: 27(11 )-29(7); 14(5-7)

Plutarch,

Philopoemen,

T H E R M O P Y L A E P (191) - War against Antiochus T h e Aetolians considered t h a t they h a d h a d a raw deal in the settlement that followed the Second M a c e d o n i a n W a r . T h e y aired their grudge by inviting A n t i o c h u s III to liberate Greece. In 192, the king landed in Thessaly with a force of a r o u n d 10,000 men, but he received no help or w a r m t h f r o m the Greeks. W h e n the R o m a n s sent an expedition of 20,000 i n f a n t r y with horse a n d elep h a n t s , which m a r c h e d across Greece to Thessaly, A n t i o c h u s fell back on the pass of T h e r m o p y l a e . H e pitched his c a m p inside the pass, which he blocked with a stone wall, ditch a n d r a m p a r t . T h e n he sent 2,000 of the Aetolians to hold the heights o v e r l o o k i n g the pass in o r d e r to prevent an o u t f l a n k i n g m o v e m e n t such as that which defeated Leonidas in 480. W h e n the R o m a n consul Acilius G l a b r i o arrived, he also e n c a m p e d in the pass facing A n t i o c h u s . N o t i c i n g the Aetolians on the heights, he sent M a r c u s C a t o a n d Lucius Valerius against t h e m with 2,000 men each. T h e n he drew up his t r o o p s . T h e king h a d placed his p h a l a n x in f r o n t of his r a m p a r t with a b o d y of javelin throwers, archers a n d slingers on the lower slopes to his left. Initially, the p h a l a n x easily withstood

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the R o m a n s , w h o were at the s a m e time assailed with missiles f r o m their right flank. Eventually the p h a l a n x was forced to w i t h d r a w a n d to fall back behind the r a m p a r t . T h e m a n n e d barrier so f o r m e d might have p r o v e d i m p e n e t r a b l e if C a t o h a d not dislodged the A e t o l i a n s o n the hill. But, having d o n e so, he then descended o n t o the pass. T h e enemy did not wait to ascertain the size of his force but d r o p p e d their a r m s a n d fled. Pursuit was difficult owing to the terrain, the fortifications, a n d the presence of elephants, but the king lost virtually the whole of his a r m y . T h e R o m a n s suffered only a b o u t 200 casualties. A f t e r the battle A n t i o c h u s withdrew entirely f r o m Greece a n d returned to Asia. It m a y be noted that A p p i a n , c o n t r a r y to Livy, places the sea on A n t i o c h u s ' left a n d q u o t e s his dispositions as if he were facing e a s t w a r d s in the battle. In fact, the R o m a n s entered the pass f r o m the west a n d the king escaped e a s t w a r d s to S c a r p h e a a n d thence to Chalcis. Livy, 36: 15-19; Appian, Syrian W a r s , 17-20; Plutarch, C a t o M a j o r , 13-14 C O R Y C U S P R (191) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s T h e battle of T h e r m o p y l a e (above) ended the w a r against A n t i o c h u s in Greece, but the R o m a n s planned to extend it to Asia. They sent a fleet to the Aegean, where it was reinforced by E u m e n e s a n d a little later by the R h o d i a n s . Polyxenidas, the king's a d m i r a l , was a n x i o u s to engage the R o m a n s before the R h o d i a n s could join them. T h e R o m a n s a n d E u m e n e s had a c o m b i n e d strength of 105 decked ships a n d 50 open c r a f t , with which they h e a d e d f o r C a p e C o r y c u s [Koraka], Polyxenidas, w h o h a d been waiting f o r t h e m n e a r b y with 100 ships ( A p p i a n says 200) sailed out against them a n d deployed in a straight line with his right flank l a n d w a r d a n d his left in the o p e n sea. In f r o n t of the R o m a n fleet were two C a r t h a g i n i a n ships which were fighting on the R o m a n side. They were engaged by three enemy ships. O n e of the C a r thaginian vessels was a t t a c k e d by t w o of the enemy a n d was easily c a p t u r e d ; the o t h e r fled back to the fleet. This upset G a i u s Livius, the R o m a n c o m m a n d e r , w h o sailed his flag-ship between the two enemy victors a n d grappled a n d b o a r d e d b o t h of them, c a p t u r i n g the pair. By then hostilities h a d b r o k e n out all a l o n g the line. T h e action of Livius h a d t h r o w n the e n e m y ' s left wing into some confusion, a n d n o w E u m e n e s a t t a c k e d their right wing. It was Polyxenidas on the right wing w h o began the flight. Realizing t h a t the R o m a n s were superior in the arts of grappling a n d h a n d - t o - h a n d 129


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fighting, he set sail a n d hurried away. T h e o t h e r wing soon followed suit. T h e R o m a n s a t t e m p t e d to p u r s u e t h e m but their heavier, slower ships m a d e it a profitless exercise. Nevertheless, the R o m a n s had sunk 10 ships a n d c a p t u r e d 13 with their crews f o r the loss of only the one C a r t h a g i nian vessel. Livy, 36: 44-45(4); Appian, Syrian Wars, 22 P A N O R M U S (190) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s T h e R o m a n c o m m a n d e r , Livius, was a w a y with his fleet at the Hellespont when the R h o d i a n s sent him 36 ships u n d e r the c o m m a n d of P a u s i s t r a t u s to the naval base at P a n o r m u s n e a r Ephesus. A n t i o c h u s ' c o m m a n d e r , Polyxenidas, himself a R h o d i a n w h o h a d been exiled f o r criminal activities, devised a scheme f o r getting his own back on his hated rival, Pausistratus. H e offered to h a n d over the king's fleet in exchange f o r his f r e e d o m to return to R h o d e s . In convincing P a u s i s t r a t u s of his good faith, Polyxenidas led the o t h e r to relax his vigilance. T h e n , by night, he landed some m a r i n e s w h o were to create a d i s t u r b a n c e on land behind the h a r b o u r of P a n o r m u s , while he himself sailed in a n d fell u p o n the unsuspecting P a u s i s t r a t u s at d a w n . A t first P a u s i s t r a t u s decided to fight it out on land but the a p p r o a c h of the m a r i n e s forced him to c h a n g e his mind. A f t e r a rapid re-embark a t i o n he ordered his m e n t o a t t e m p t to force a passage t h r o u g h the h a r b o u r entrance. Only seven ships escaped. T h e y were vessels which were equipped with fire a p p a r a t u s consisting of u r n s suspended on projecting poles a n d c o n t a i n i n g blazing material which could be p o u r e d o n t o an invader. P a u s i s t r a t u s ' o w n ship was a t t a c k e d by three enemy ships a n d sank, taking him with it. Livy, 37: 10-11; Appian, Syrian W a r s , 24 P H O E N I C U S (190) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s T h e R o m a n s h e a r d that an enemy fleet was being p r e p a r e d in Cilicia. G a i u s Livius was sent to intercept it a n d prevent it f r o m j o i n i n g up with Polyxenidas, A n t i o c h u s ' c o m m a n d e r , at Ephesus. H e set sail f o r P a t a r a with two q u i n q u e r e m e s a n d seven R h o d i a n q u a d r i r e m e s but was prevented by b a d w e a t h e r f r o m p u t t i n g in to the h a r b o u r . H e proceeded to the m o r e sheltered h a r b o u r of P h o e n i c u s [Finiki] a couple of miles f u r t h e r on. T h e cliffs o v e r l o o k i n g the h a r b o u r were soon c r o w d e d with the t o w n s p e o p l e a n d with the king's garrison. Livius sent out s o m e light-armed t r o o p s to harass the m o b . W h e n yet m o r e people p o u r e d out of the t o w n , he became apprehensive a n d sent his m a r i n e s a n d seamen into the fight. T h e y 130

suffered considerable casualties but eventually drove the t h r o n g back into the city, a f t e r which they a b a n d o n e d the expedition. Livy, 37: 16 P E R G A M U M (190) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s Seleucus, the son of A n t i o c h u s III, was ravaging the territory a r o u n d P e r g a m u m [Bergama] a n d was virtually imprisoning E u m e n e s ' garrison within the city. E u m e n e s sailed to his naval base at Elaea, where he received 1,000 veteran A c h a e a n infantry a n d 100 horse which h a d been sent to him by the A c h a e a n s u n d e r the c o m m a n d of D i o p h a n e s . They were c o n d u c t e d into P e r g a m u m by night a n d proceeded to observe the e n e m y ' s m o v e m e n t s . D i o p h a n e s noted t h a t the enemy, having met n o o p p o s i t i o n , h a d become cont e m p t u o u s a n d ill disciplined. He tried to p e r s u a d e the garrison c o m m a n d e r to join him in a sally but the idea was rejected as folly. U n d e t e r r e d , D i o p h a n e s m a r c h e d his men out a n d stationed them quietly in f r o n t of the walls, facing a n enemy of at least f o u r times his strength. A f t e r a period of inactivity in which the enemy became careless a n d disorderly a n d started eating their lunch, Diop h a n e s suddenly ordered a charge. T h e panic his m e n caused was out of all p r o p o r t i o n to their n u m b e r s . T h e i n f a n t r y slaughtered the scattered elements while m a n y of the enemy were u n a b l e to m o u n t o r even catch their horses in time. On the following d a y the enemy arrived but with m o r e c a u t i o n . D i o p h a n e s m a r c h e d his men out a n d the t w o sides faced each o t h e r all day uneventfully until, at sunset, the enemy packed up a n d started to leave the field. D i o p h a n e s waited motionlessly until they were just out of sight, when he charged their rear a n d d r o v e them back to their c a m p . As a result of these exploits, Seleucus was forced to a b a n d o n his c a m p a n d to give u p his activities against P e r g a m u m . Livy, 37: 20-21(3);

Appian,

Syrian W a r s , 26

S I D E (190, s u m m e r ) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s A R h o d i a n fleet u n d e r E u d a m u s was sent to intercept an enemy fleet which was reported to be on its way f r o m Syria. In the bay of P a m p h y l i a the R h o d i a n s put in at the m o u t h of the E u r y m e d o n [Koprii fayi] where they heard that the enemy was close at h a n d off Side. O n the next day both fleets m o v e d out of h a r b o u r ready f o r battle. T h e R h o dian fleet consisted of 32 q u a d r i r e m e s a n d 4 triremes. T h e king's fleet, which was u n d e r the c o m m a n d of H a n n i b a l , was rather bigger with 37 large ships, including 3 hepteremes a n d 4 hexer-

THE GREEK

ernes, as well as 10 triremes. As the fleets closed, the king's fleet was already in line abreast with H a n n i b a l in c o m m a n d on the left, which stretched out to the o p e n sea. T h e R h o d i a n s came out in line astern a n d needed time to redeploy a n d extend their right wing out to sea. As a result, E u d a m u s on the right wing engaged H a n n i b a l initially with only five ships. T o offset this, m a t t e r s were going well on the Rhodians" left where o n e of the king's hepteremes was sunk by a m u c h smaller R h o d i a n vessel. It was not long before the enemy ships all along that wing were t u r n i n g to flight. M e a n w h i l e , E u d a m u s out in the o p e n sea was being h a r d pressed by H a n n i b a l , w h o enjoyed m u c h greater n u m b e r s . E u d a m u s might well have been surr o u n d e d h a d he not raised a signal t o rally assistance, bringing vessels to the flag which h a d already w o n their individual fights. It was n o w H a n n i b a l ' s t u r n to feel the pinch a n d his wing began to w i t h d r a w . In the end, fewer t h a n 20 of the enemy's ships escaped u n s c a t h e d . Livy, 37: 23-24 M Y O N N E S U S P R (190) - W a r against Antiochus T h e R o m a n fleet set out f r o m its base in S a m o s in search of provisions. It h a d been heard that the people of Teos h a d m a d e a generous offer of supplies to the enemy fleet, a n d so the R o m a n s p u t in at Teos a n d started p l u n d e r i n g the land. W h e n Polyxenidas heard that the R o m a n s were at Teos, not f a r f r o m his base at Ephesus, he sailed with the king's fleet to the area a n d a n c h o r e d in a secluded h a r b o u r on a small island called Macris o p p o s i t e the p r o m o n t o r y of M y o n n e s u s [C. Doganbey]. This p r o m o n t o r y projects f r o m the m a i n l a n d south of Teos. While the R o m a n s were a n c h o r e d near Teos, a peasant reported t h a t he had seen a fleet m o o r e d off the island of M a c r i s f o r a couple of days. C o n s t e r n a t i o n in the R o m a n c a m p led to a rapid e m b a r k a t i o n , d e p a r t u r e a n d d e p l o y m e n t into line ready for any emergency. T h e R h o d i a n s b r o u g h t up the rear. T h e king's fleet was soon sighted, deploying into line abreast with its left wing so extended as to be c a p a b l e of encircling the R o m a n s . E u d a m u s , c o m m a n d e r of the R h o d i a n s , dealt with that situation by speedily m o v i n g f r o m the rear to the extreme right wing, thus equalizing the lines. H e then m a d e straight for the flag-ship of Polyxenidas on the enemy left, a f t e r which b o t h fleets became engaged a l o n g the whole line. T h e R o m a n s u n d e r Aemilius Regillus h a d 80 ships, 22 being R h o d i a n ; the enemy h a d 89 vessels, 5 of which were exceptionally large. However, the

WORLD

R o m a n inferiority in size a n d n u m b e r s was m o r e t h a n offset by their fire-carrying ships with blazing c a u l d r o n s suspended o u t b o a r d at the e n d s of long poles. N o t h i n g inspired so m u c h terror in the enemy, w h o would not venture n e a r them. In the action, the R o m a n s b r o k e t h r o u g h the enemy centre a n d then wheeled right to attack the rear of the king's left wing, which was already engaged with the R h o d i a n s . T h e enemy right wing remained intact until the men saw Polyxenidas fleeing on the left, when they also t o o k to flight. T h e enemy lost 42 ships c a p t u r e d or sunk ( A p p i a n says 29). In c o n t r a s t , it is said t h a t only two R o m a n ships were destroyed. As a result of this e n g a g e m e n t A n t i o c h u s effectively lost c o n t r o l of the sea a n d b e c a m e u n a b l e to defend his f a r - f l u n g territories. Livy, 37: 28-30;

Appian,

Syrian W a r s , 2 7

M A G N E S I A - A D - S I P Y L U M (190, December) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s H a v i n g r o b b e d A n t i o c h u s of any c o n t r o l at sea, the R o m a n s were bent on c o m p l e t i n g the destruction with a victory on land. A l t h o u g h the king h a d a large force of 60,000 foot a n d 12,000 horse, he was apprehensive. He withdrew across the river Phrygius [Kum £ay] a n d established a strongly fortified e n c a m p m e n t near M a g n e s i a - a d Sipylum [Manisa], T h e c o n s u l a r a r m y , with a total strength of a b o u t 30,000, a d v a n c e d across the river a n d e n c a m p e d a b o u t 2 to 3 miles a w a y f r o m the enemy. A f t e r several days of inaction in which the king refused to accept any challenge, the consul m o v e d his c a m p nearer to the enemy a n d lined up for battle with his left wing against the river. T h e king accepted the challenge for fear of s h a m e . T h e action started on the R o m a n right wing which was o p p o s e d by a mixed mass of light cavalry, preceded by scythed c h a r i o t s a n d camels. E u m e n e s II, on the R o m a n right, took the initiative by sending his slingers a n d archers against the chariots, creating panic in the horses a n d d i s r u p t i n g the enemy wing. A charge by his cavalry followed a n d extended the disorder, which spread to include the whole of the flank. T h e R o m a n legions seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to m a k e a direct f r o n t a l a t t a c k on the enemy p h a l a n x , which was in the centre of their line with elephants posted between the sections. In the m e a n t i m e , A n t i o c h u s , w h o was in c o m m a n d of a large b o d y of elite cavalry on the right wing, h a d n o t e d that the enemy h a d t h o u g h t it unnecessary to post a n y cavalry on their left, which was covered by the river. H e executed the m a n o e u v r e on which he h a d staked his chances by c h a r g i n g the 131


WORLDS

i n f a n t r y a n d o u t f l a n k i n g them a l o n g the riverside a n d then driving them back to their c a m p . In this extended pursuit he threw a w a y any c h a n c e of victory by failing to s u p p o r t his p h a l a n x in its h o u r of need. It was driven back behind the r a m p a r t . A t t a l u s , w h o was with his b r o t h e r E u m e n e s on the R o m a n right, saw the situation on the o p p o s i t e flank a l o n g the river. Being at that time unengaged, he charged across the field to the assistance of the c a m p g u a r d a n d forced A n t i o c h u s back. T h e king, seeing that his whole a r m y was giving way, fled. His reputed losses were 50,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 3,000 cavalry against a loss on the R o m a n side of 350 men. A f t e r this total disaster A n t i o c h u s sent envoys to sue for peace. Livy, 37: 37(6)-44(2); 36

Appian,

Syrian W a r s ,

30-

C U B A L L U M (189) - G a l a t i a n Expedition A l t h o u g h the R o m a n s a n d their allies h a d conq u e r e d A n t i o c h u s the G r e a t b o t h on land a n d sea, they k n e w that there would be n o peace in Asia until the G a l a t i a n s h a d been s u b d u e d . These were a part of the Gallic h o r d e which h a d invaded M a c e d o n i a with Brennus, some of w h o m h a d proceeded into T h r a c e a n d then, a little later, h a d crossed the Hellespont into Asia. G n a e u s M a n l i u s Volso t o o k over the R o m a n a r m y (or at least p a r t of it) a f t e r the battle of M a g n e s i a a n d headed for the G a l a t i a n s t r o n g h o l d s on M o u n t s O l y m p u s [Alis Dagi] a n d M a g a b a [Elmadagi], regrettably extorting m o n e y f r o m m o s t of the peaceful c o m munities on his route. M a n l i u s m a d e his first c o n t a c t with the enemy when he was e n c a m p e d near the G a l a t i a n s t r o n g h o l d of C u b a l l u m . His a d v a n c e g u a r d s were suddenly a t t a c k e d by enemy h o r s e m e n , w h o threw them into c o n f u s i o n a n d caused some casualties. T h e u p r o a r b r o u g h t out the R o m a n cavalry in a h u r r y a n d the G a u l s were driven off with considerable losses. Livy, 38: 18(5-6) O L Y M P U S M ( 1 8 9 ) - G a l a t i a n Expedition M a n l i u s Volso proceeded against the T o l o s t o b o g i i w h o h a d fortified their position on the heights of M o u n t O l y m p u s [Alis Dagi] in the n o r t h of G a l a t i a near the Bithynian b o r d e r . H e divided his force into three c o l u m n s which started to climb u p the only negotiable track. T h e G a u l s decided to block their progress by sending a r o u n d 4,000 men to occupy a hill which overlooked the r o a d . M a n l i u s h a d p r e p a r e d f o r this sort of m a n o e u v r e by e q u i p p i n g his men with a large n u m b e r of missiles of various sorts. Accordingly, the C r e t a n archers. 132

slingers a n d javelin throwers were sent f o r w a r d to discharge a b a r r a g e at the enemy horde. T h e enemy retaliated with their only missiles - stones. M o r e o v e r , they were inadequately protected a n d were fighting n a k e d as was their w o n t . T h e y m a d e a disorderly retreat back to their c a m p , where they massed outside their r a m p a r t . There, the story was repeated, the R o m a n missiles driving the enemy back behind the r a m p a r t s . W h e n the R o m a n s burst into the c a m p , the G a u l s t o o k off a n d fled in all directions. Livy, 38: 20-23; Appian, Syrian W a r s , 42; Florus 1: 27(5-6) A N C Y R A (189) - G a l a t i a n Expedition W h e n the consul returned f r o m M o u n t O l y m p u s (above) to his base at A n c y r a [Ankara], some s p o k e s m e n f r o m the Gallic tribe of Tectosages asked for a conference. They were given a d a t e a n d place for a meeting but they failed to a p p e a r . O n the second occasion n e g o t i a t i o n s could not be completed owing to the regrettable absence of the chieftain. A third a p p o i n t m e n t was m a d e a n d they did a p p e a r - as an a r m e d b o d y of 1,000 horse c h a r g i n g d o w n at full gallop. M a n l i u s a n d the R o m a n s , with an escort of only 500 horse, were forced to disperse a n d might well not have escaped at all but f o r a n o u t p o s t of 600 cavalry which h a d been stationed near the c a m p to protect some foragers. T h e arrival on the scene of the o u t p o s t a n d the foragers turned the scales. These fresh r e i n f o r c e m e n t s routed a n d pursued the G a u l s , taking no prisoners. Few escaped. Livy, 38: 25; Polybius, 21: 39 M A G A B A M (189) - G a l a t i a n Expedition M a n l i u s Volso's assault on the h e a d q u a r t e r s of the Tectosagi on M o u n t M a g a b a [Elmadagi], 10 miles south of A n k a r a , was virtually a repeat p e r f o r m a n c e of the attack on M o u n t O l y m p u s , described above. T h e only significant difference was the state of mind of the enemy, w h o r e m e m b e r e d the f a t e of their neighbours. T h e n u m b e r of the enemy has been estimated at m o r e t h a n 60,000, of w h o m 8,000 are said to have been killed. A f t e r their defeat the G a u l s sent envoys to ask f o r peace. Livy, 38: 26-27; Appian, Syrian W a r s , 42; Florus 1: 27(5-6)

CYPSELA (188) O n his j o u r n e y h o m e f r o m G a l a t i a the consul M a n l i u s Volso ran into trouble near Cypsela [Ipsala] in T h r a c e . He was m a r c h i n g d o w n a long, n a r r o w , w o o d e d track when he was a t t a c k e d by a

THE GREEK

c o n g l o m e r a t e of a b o u t 10.000 T h r a c i a n tribesmen. They waited until a f t e r his van h a d passed. T h e n , before the r e a r g u a r d h a d c o m e into view, they attacked a n d looted the baggage w a g g o n s in the middle of the c o l u m n . W h e n the t r o o p s f r o m the van a n d rear rushed to the centre, a disorderly fight ensued a n d persisted until the T h r a c i a n s withdrew at dusk. Both sides suffered heavy losses. Livy, 38: 40(5)-41(3)

TEMPYRA (188) After Cypsela (above), M a n l i u s suffered a f u r t h e r attack f r o m local tribes, in a pass near T e m p y r a in the s o u t h of T h r a c e . T h e situation was very different to Cypsela in that this pass was b a r r e n and totally devoid of hiding places. T h e T h r a u s i blatantly blocked the r o a d with their n u m b e r s , enforcing an o p e n battle. However, they failed to stand up to a R o m a n c h a r g e in close f o r m a t i o n and were t r a p p e d a n d slaughtered in the defile of their o w n choice. Livy, 38: 41(5-7)

EVANDER'S HILL (182) - Wars of the A c h a e a n League T h e last exploit of P h i l o p o e m e n , the general of the A c h a e a n s , t o o k place a f t e r a tyrannical Messenian called D i n o c r a t e s t o o k Messene out of the A c h a e a n confederacy. P h i l o p o e m e n heard reports that the tyrant was h e a d i n g for a village called Colonis (or C o r o n e ) with intent to take it. A l t h o u g h he himself was ailing at the time, he raised a b o d y of horse f r o m the y o u n g men of Megalopolis a n d set out to forestall the Messenian. A c c o r d i n g to Plutarch, he met D i n o c r a t e s at a place called E v a n d e r ' s Hill, possibly the M o u n t Eva near Messene referred to by P a u s a n i a s . Here he put D i n o c r a t e s to flight. T h e enemy rallied when they were joined by a b o d y of a b o u t 500 m e n whose j o b it was to g u a r d t h a t area of the c o u n tryside. P h i l o p o e m e n retreated with his men, bringing up the rear a n d t u r n i n g to w a r d off any assailant. H e got separated f r o m his men a n d , on being t h r o w n by his horse on r o u g h g r o u n d , he suffered a head injury a n d was taken prisoner. Embassies for his release were answered by his death when he was m a d e to drink hemlock. In revenge, Messene was c a p t u r e d by the A t h e n i a n confederacy in the same year. Livy m a k e s n o m e n t i o n of E v a n d e r ' s Hill or of anything suggestive of it. In his a c c o u n t , Philopoemen was riding t h r o u g h a d a n g e r o u s valley on his way to C o r o n e when he was taken by surprise by Dinocrates.

Plutarch, P h i l o p o e m e n , 18(3-8); 5); Pausanias, 4: 31(4)

Livy, 39:

WORLD

49(1-

C A L L I N I C U S (171) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r T h e R o m a n s drifted into a n o t h e r w a r against M a c e d o n . F o r the third time they sent a force across the Adriatic, this time against K i n g Perseus w h o had assumed the t h r o n e on the d e a t h of Philip V. T h e king h a d descended into Thessaly a n d h a d a p e r m a n e n t e n c a m p m e n t at the foot of M o u n t Othrys, f r o m which his m e n f o r a g e d t h r o u g h o u t the s u r r o u n d i n g lowlands. His forces a m o u n t e d to nearly 40,000 infantry a n d 4,000 cavalry. T h e R o m a n s u n d e r the consul P. Licinius C r a s s u s m a r c h e d f r o m E p i r u s to Thessaly a n d e n c a m p e d a b o u t 3 miles f r o m Larissa [.Larisa] a b o v e the river Peneus [Pinios], Their total force was a r o u n d 30,000 men. T h e initiative was taken by the M a c e d o n i a n s , w h o suddenly a p p e a r e d in the o f f i n g with a large c o l u m n of men while the R o m a n s were c o n f e r r i n g a b o u t their plans. T h e result was a skirmish in which neither side gained any a d v a n t a g e . F o r several days t h e r e a f t e r the M a c e d o n i a n s a p p e a r e d at the same time of day. E a c h time, the R o m a n s declined the challenge until o n e d a y Perseus arrived unexpectedly at d a w n a n d d r e w u p a battle line near a hill called Callinicus, less t h a n half a mile f r o m the R o m a n r a m p a r t . In c o n s t e r n a t i o n , the R o m a n s a r r a y e d their troops. T h e d e p l o y m e n t s of the t w o forces were b r o a d l y similar. Both sides placed their elite cavalry s q u a d r o n s in the centre while on the wings cavalry were interspersed with light-armed t r o o p s . At the outset a vigorous charge by the enemy left wing threw the R o m a n right into c o n f u s i o n . T h e n the M a c e d o n i a n centre forced the R o m a n s back a n d routed them. Livy a t t e m p t s to put a g o o d R o m a n face on the events a f t e r that but the outc o m e was clearly a disaster. T h e R o m a n s were only saved f r o m almost total destruction w h e n the M a c e d o n i a n s got scattered in pursuit a n d Perseus was advised not to follow u p his victory any f u r ther. T h e R o m a n s lost nearly 3,000 killed or captured in c o n t r a s t to a b o u t 60 enemy casualties. A f t e r the battle Perseus m a d e peace overtures but these were flatly rejected. Livy, 42: 57-60(1); Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 9(2) P H A L A N N A (171) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r T h e R o m a n s , having reaped a n d gathered all the harvests a r o u n d C r a n n o n to the s o u t h of Larissa, moved to the fields of P h a l a n n a [Falanna] n o r t h of the city. Perseus, learning t h a t the enemy were 133


WORLDS

scattered a n d vulnerable, fell on t h e m w i t h o u t w a r n i n g with a small d e t a c h m e n t . A f t e r seizing a b o u t 1,000 w a g g o n s a n d 600 m e n , he a t t a c k e d a g u a r d d e t a c h m e n t consisting of a b o u t 800 R o m a n s u n d e r a tribune, Lucius P o m p e i u s . This officer withdrew his m e n to a hill where they were besieged with missiles a n d were completely surr o u n d e d but refused to surrender. T h e consul, on being told a b o u t this, proceeded to the assistance of the beleaguered m e n with his cavalry a n d light t r o o p s , followed by the legions. T h e enemy were r o u t e d , but when they tried to escape they r a n into their own p h a l a n x in a confined space a n d blocked its p a t h . T h e p h a l a n x h a d been s u m m o n e d earlier by Perseus but it arrived t o o late. It has been said that 8,000 of the enemy were killed a n d nearly 3,000 taken prisoner against m o r e t h a n 4,000 dead on the R o m a n side. A l t h o u g h these figures seem to be inflated, the o u t c o m e dismayed Perseus to the extent that he d e c a m p e d a n d withdrew into Macedonia. Livy, 42: 65-66 U S C A N A (170) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r G e n t i u s , the oppressive king of the Illyrians, was suspected of p r o - M a c e d o n i a n sympathies (which subsequently b l o o m e d into a f r a n k alliance with King Perseus of M a c e d o n ) . T h e legate, A p p i u s C l a u d i u s C e n t o , was sent against G e n t i u s with 4.000 infantry, a force which he d o u b l e d by raising r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m the allies. U s c a n a , an Illyrian town of a r o u n d 10,000 i n h a b i t a n t s , sent secret messages to A p p i u s to the effect that they w a n t e d to betray the city to him. He fell f o r the bait a n d n a m e d a day. W h e n his t r o o p s arrived within missile range of the a p p a r e n t l y deserted city, the i n h a b i t a n t s sallied out en masse. T h e R o m a n s , in unsuspecting disorder, failed to stand up to the charge a n d were slaughtered in flight. Barely 2,000 escaped back to the c a m p . Livy, 43: 10 S C O D R A (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r G e n t i u s , the Illyrian king, w h o was n o w actively allied with Perseus, h a d w i t h d r a w n to his wellfortified t o w n of Scodra [Shkoder], T h e R o m a n p r a e t o r , L. Anicius Gallus, m a r c h e d up to the walls of the t o w n with his a r m y in battle f o r m a tion. If the i n h a b i t a n t s a n d militia had a t t e m p t e d to defend the place f r o m the r a m p a r t s , they would a l m o s t certainly have succeeded in driving the R o m a n s a w a y . Instead, they sallied f r o m the gate a n d were p r o m p t l y r o u t e d . T h e R o m a n s occupied the t o w n where an abject a n d grovelling G e n t i u s 134

was invited to dine with the p r a e t o r , a f t e r which he was placed u n d e r g u a r d a n d then sent to R o m e . Livy, 44: 31 E L P E U S R (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r In 169, at the end of the c a m p a i g n i n g season, Perseus fortified a s t r o n g position on the far b a n k of the d r i e d - u p river Elpeus, the course of which r u n s f r o m M o u n t O l y m p u s past D i u m to the sea. In the following year the consul Aemilius P a u l u s a d v a n c e d a n d t o o k u p a position on the opposite b a n k , facing the M a c e d o n i a n s . In his o p i n i o n the e n e m y ' s fortified b a n k presented an insuperable obstacle. T h e total width of the river bed between the b a n k s was a b o u t a mile, a n d the b o t t o m was r o u g h a n d uneven. F o r two d a y s e n g a g e m e n t s took place in the middle of this space between light-armed t r o o p s of the t w o sides. Heavy casualties occurred on b o t h sides, particularly a m o n g the R o m a n s . H o w e v e r , these were no o r d i n a r y battles f o r s u p r e m a c y . T h e y were engineered by the consul to divert the prying eyes of Perseus a w a y f r o m o t h e r h a p p e n i n g s (see P y t h i u m , below). Livy, 44: 35(9-24) P Y T H I U M (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r W h e n the consul Aemilius P a u l u s was e n c a m p e d opposite Perseus on the Elpeus (above), a f r o n t a l assault across the river bed was out of the question. S o m e h o w Paulus had to circumvent the e n e m y ' s position. H e learnt t h a t all the m o u n t a i n passes were g u a r d e d with the sole exception of the Petra Pass, p r o b a b l y because the terrain was so inhospitable. He instigated a feint by dispatching Scipio Nasica with 8.000 men a n d 120 horse to H e r a c l e u m on the coast. A f t e r d a r k the force m o v e d off in the o p p o s i t e direction, skirting the south-west aspect of M o u n t O l y m p u s a n d halting below P y t h i u m , the s a n c t u a r y of A p o l l o on the west side of the m o u n t a i n . Perseus, seeing Aemilius still in position o p p o s i t e him, was u n a w a r e of N a s i c a ' s expedition until a deserter f r o m that force told him the facts. Perseus immediately sent o u t 2,000 M a c e d o n i a n s with 10,000 mercenaries u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Milo to seize the passes. W h e n this force e n c o u n t e r e d Nasica, there was a s h a r p conflict in which the enemy were put to a disgraceful flight. Nasica then led his men uneventfully t h r o u g h the Petra Pass a n d r o u n d the n o r t h of O l y m p u s to the plain near D i u m in the Maced o n i a n rear. This forced Perseus to w i t h d r a w a n d he retired to the region of P y d n a n o r t h of D i u m . T h e a c c o u n t s of this expedition by Polybius,

THE GREEK

Scipio Nasica a n d Livy are all lost. Plutarch has preserved their essence. Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 15-16(3)

Happily,

P Y D N A (168, s u m m e r ) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r Aemilius P a u l u s m a r c h e d f r o m the river Elpeus to the plain near P y d n a where he joined Scipio Nasica a n d e n c a m p e d opposite Perseus. T h e battle began on the following day in the a f t e r n o o n , a time chosen by Aemilius so that his m e n would not have to face the sun. It has been said that it was started by a trivial incident when a horse b r o k e loose a n d was chased by some R o m a n s t o w a r d the enemy position. T h e resulting skirmish escalated until the whole of the enemy force c a m e out. It has also been suggested t h a t Aemilius himself released the horse to trigger the action. T h e battle itself lasted less than one h o u r . T h e salient f e a t u r e was the action in the centre of the field a r o u n d the M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x . T h e R o m a n legions were unable to hold their g r o u n d a n d were forced back relentlessly until the consul noticed that, owing to some unevenness of the g r o u n d , there were gaps in the enemy phalanx. He immediately divided his men into small g r o u p s a n d sent them into the gaps to attack the enemy in their flanks. T h e M a c e d o nians were u n a b l e to t u r n w i t h o u t getting their long pikes entangled with each other. W h e n these were discarded, they h a d only short swords with which to fight, which were no m a t c h for the R o m a n arms. In consequence, the p h a l a n x was gradually b r o k e n into segments which were attacked on all sides until the M a c e d o n i a n s fled. Perseus, with the cavalry, had already preceded them in flight. A b o u t 25,000 of the M a c e d o n i a n s were killed, rather m o r e t h a n half of the total force. It is said that only 80-100 R o m a n s perished. The king later surrendered, bringing the war to an end. Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 16(4)-22; 42

Livy,

44:40-

O R T H O S I A (167) In Asia the i n h a b i t a n t s of C a u n u s [near Daly an], a town in the R h o d i a n province of Peraea in south Caria, revolted f r o m R h o d e s . At the same time Mylasa a n d A l a b a n d a h a d joined forces in seizing towns in the R h o d i a n province of E u r o m u s . T h e R h o d i a n s realized that if they lost all their possessions in the m a i n l a n d in this way, they would be left with n o t h i n g but their infertile island, which could not s u p p o r t their people. Accordingly, they sent out a r m e d forces which compelled the C a u n i a n s to submit a n d b r o u g h t the i n h a b i t a n t s of

WORLD

M y l a s a a n d A l a b a n d a to battle. These peoples were defeated in an e n g a g e m e n t near O r t h o s i a on the left b a n k of the river M e a n d e r [Menderes], Livy, 45: 25(11-13) B E T H - H O R O N (166) - M a c c a b e a n Revolt T h e M a c c a b e a n revolt h a d its origins in an a t t e m p t by A n t i o c h u s IV E p i p h a n e s of Syria to force Hellenism u p o n the Jews. A priest n a m e d M a t t a t h i a s rebelled a n d fled into the m o u n t a i n s with his family. He died soon a f t e r w a r d s , leaving one of his sons, J u d a s M a c c a b e u s , as his successor. J u d a s collected a b a n d of insurgents a n d , in a preliminary skirmish at an u n k n o w n place, the S a m a r i t a n general was killed. W h e n S o r o n , the general in Coele-Syria, heard a b o u t the n u m b e r s t h a t were j o i n i n g J u d a s , he m a r c h e d against him with a large a r m y a n d met him at B e t h - H o r o n [Beit Ur], At sight of the enemy n u m b e r s J u d a s ' men were reluctant to fight, but a f t e r m u c h e x h o r t a t i o n they engaged. W h e n S o r o n himself was killed, the Syrians fled. A b o u t 800 of t h e m were killed in the pursuit. 1. Maccabees, 3, 13-24; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 7, 1 (287-292) E M M A U S (166) - M a c c a b e a n Revolt Before he went on a visit to Persia, A n t i o c h u s IV a p p o i n t e d a m a n called Lysias as his d e p u t y a n d g o v e r n o r of the k i n g d o m a n d ordered him to c o n q u e r J u d a e a a n d destroy the Jews. Lysias sent G o r g i a s against J u d a e a with a force of 40,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 7,000 horse, which c a m p e d near E m m a u s [Amwas]. F r o m this force G o r g i a s detached 5,000 foot a n d 1,000 horse to m a k e a surprise a t t a c k by night on J u d a s , w h o was c a m p e d not f a r away. J u d a s h e a r d a b o u t this a n d turned the tables by surreptitiously leaving his c a m p a n d m a r c h i n g all night to E m m a u s to attack the enemy c a m p . H e had only 3,000 men with h i m but the element of surprise was sufficient to win him the battle a n d cause the enemy to flee. A b o u t 3,000 of them were slain in c a m p a n d d u r i n g the pursuit. 1. Maccabees, 4, 1-15; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 7, 3-4 (298-311) B E T H - Z U R (165) - M a c c a b e a n Revolt In the year a f t e r the defeat of his forces at E m m a u s (above), Lysias collected a larger a r m y of 60,000 foot a n d 5,000 horse with which he e n c a m p e d at the village of B e t h - Z u r [Beit Sur]. J u d a s went against him with only 10,000 m e n but they slew a b o u t 5,000 of the Syrian van, a f t e r which Lysias 135


WORLDS

withdrew to A n t i o c h to collect an even greater force. 1. Maccabees, 4, 28-34; Joseplms, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 7, 5 (313-315)

J u d a s pursued them, the local i n h a b i t a n t s joined in the chase a n d helped to slaughter the fugitives until not o n e of the 9,000 remained alive. 1. Maccabees, 7, 39-46; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 10, 5 (408-411)

B A T H - Z A C H A R I A S (162) - Maccabean Revolt W h e n A n t i o c h u s IV died in 163, his boy son A n t i o c h u s V E u p a t o r raised a mighty a r m y of 100,000 men with 20,000 horse a n d 32 elephants u n d e r Lysias a n d besieged Beth-Zur. W h e n J u d a s e n c a m p e d 9 miles a w a y at B a t h - Z a c h a r i a s [Beit Skaria], A n t i o c h u s directed his a r m y against him. J u d a s killed several h u n d r e d of the enemy, but the o d d s against him were t o o great a n d he decided to w i t h d r a w a f t e r his b r o t h e r , Eleazar, h a d been crushed by an elephant. 1. M a c c a b e e s , 6, 28-47; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 9, 4 (367-375) C A P H A R S A L A M A (161) - M a c c a b e a n Revolt D e m e t r i u s 1 of Syria h a d been held as a hostage in R o m e a n d h a d seen his k i n g d o m pass in his absence to A n t i o c h u s IV a n d V. H e escaped in 162 a n d assumed the kingship a f t e r slaying the y o u n g A n t i o c h u s V a n d his regent Lysias. P u r s u i n g the policy of his predecessors against the Jews, D e m e t r i u s sent a prince called N i c a n o r to treat with J u d a s openly but in reality to seize him. J u d a s , however, noted an o m i n o u s signal a n d , alerted to the plot, he fled. N i c a n o r then went against J u d a s with his a r m y a n d a battle was f o u g h t near the village of C a p h a r s a l a m a . T h e a u t h o r of Maccabees, a reliable historian, relates that 5,000 of N i c a n o r ' s men were killed, a f t e r which the rest fled to Jerusalem. T h e later source, J o s e p h u s , assigns t h e 5,000 casualties to J u d a s ' b a n d a n d declares N i c a n o r the winner a n d J u d a s the fugitive to Jerusalem, but there are inconsistencies which suggest c o r r u p t i o n of the source. Jerusalem, f o r example, was in the h a n d s of the Syrians - a m o s t unlikely refuge f o r J u d a s . 1. Maccabees, 7, 31-32; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 10, 4 (402-405) A D A S A (161) - M a c c a b e a n Revolt A f t e r C a p h a r s a l a m a (above), N i c a n o r was reinforced with a n o t h e r Syrian a r m y a n d e n c a m p e d at B e t h - H o r o n . J u d a s pitched his c a m p 4 miles a w a y at A d a s a [Adaseh] with n o m o r e t h a n 3,000 men ( J o s e p h u s says 1,000). U n d e t e r r e d by the gross disparity of the forces, J u d a s engaged the enemy a n d slew m a n y of them including N i c a n o r himself. A f t e r t h a t , the Syrians gave u p a n d fled. W h e n 136

B E R E A (160)i - M a c c a b e a n Revolt W h e n D e m e t r i u s I learnt of the defeat a n d d e a t h of N i c a n o r at A d a s a , he sent Bacchides with 20,000 foot a n d 2,000 horse against J u d a s . T h e two sides met a n d faced each o t h e r at Berea [Bireh], W h e n the Jews saw the Syrian a r m y , most of t h e m lost heart a n d deserted J u d a s , leaving him with only 800 stalwarts w h o stood by their leader with a grim d e t e r m i n a t i o n to sell themselves dearly. J u d a s h a d noticed that the strength of the enemy force lay in its right wing where Bacchides h a d positioned himself. W i t h o u t hesitation he a n d his small b a n d launched a desperate attack on that wing, b r e a k i n g its r a n k s a n d p u t t i n g them to flight. In the pursuit that followed, the enemy left wing seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to attack the Jews in the rear a n d s u r r o u n d them. M a n y were killed on both sides, including J u d a s himself. His position as leader of the revolt was a s s u m e d by his b r o t h e r Jonathan. 1. Maccabees, 9, 1-18; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 11, 1-2 (420-431)

S P A R T A (148) - Achaean War T h e A c h a e a n s picked a quarrel with the Laced a e m o n i a n s a n d assembled an expedition against S p a r t a u n d e r their general D a m o c r i t u s . It was at this time t h a t the p r o p r a e t o r Metellus arrived with an a r m y in M a c e d o n i a . H e requested a commission to look into A c h a e a n affairs. T h e c o m m i s s i o n f o r b a d e the A c h a e a n s to use a r m s against S p a r t a a n d told t h e m to await the arrival of the peace commissioners. By the time D a m o c r i t u s received these o r d e r s he h a d already m a r c h e d on S p a r t a . T h e S p a r t a n s sallied o u t to d e f e n d their city but were soon o v e r c o m e with the loss of a b o u t 1,000 of their n u m b e r . Instead of c a p t u r i n g the city, as he could have d o n e , D a m o c r i t u s contented himself with looting the countryside. W h e n he returned h o m e , he was fined by the A c h a e a n s for betraying their interests a n d was exiled. Pausanias, 7: 13(1-2)

AZOTUS OR A S H D O D (147) - Maccabean Revolt A f t e r the d e a t h of J u d a s M a c c a b e u s at Berea (160), t w o of his b r o t h e r s called J o n a t h a n a n d Simon carried on his w o r k t h r o u g h guerilla

THE GREEK

w a r f a r e against Bacchides, with w h o m they eventually c a m e to terms. In 150, A l e x a n d e r Balas, a p r e t e n d e d son of A n t i o c h u s IV, killed D e m e t r i u s 1 of Syria in battle at an u n k n o w n site a n d seized his k i n g d o m . This inevitably b r o u g h t him into conflict with the rightful heir, D e m e t r i u s ' son a n d n a m e s a k e . T h e situation p r o v e d a d v a n t a g e o u s to J o n a t h a n when both sides w o o e d him with h o n ours, each o u t b i d d i n g the other. It gave him an excellent o p p o r t u n i t y to extend his d o m i n i o n . In 147 he raised 10,000 m e n a n d was joined by Simon with w h o m he m a r c h e d to J o p p a [Jaffa], T h e citizens refused to o p e n the gates because a garrison h a d been installed by the g o v e r n o r of CoeleSyria, A p o l l o n i u s D a u s , w h o was hostile to J o n a t h a n a n d h a d challenged him to battle. W h e n J o n a t h a n started to besiege the city, the citizens changed their m i n d s a n d let him in. A p o l l o n i u s then collected 8,000 f o o t a n d 3,000 horse a n d , a p p e a r i n g b e f o r e J o p p a , he proceeded to w i t h d r a w to A z o t u s in the h o p e of luring J o n a t h a n into the plain. A p o l l o n i u s was c o n f i d e n t of victory by virtue of his cavalry on such suitable terrain. J o n a t h a n m a r c h e d out a n d followed the o t h e r to the plain near A z o t u s , where he was a t t a c k e d in the rear by 1,000 c a v a l r y m e n w h o m A p o l l o n i u s h a d left in a m b u s h . J o n a t h a n ' s m e n suffered the d a r t s all day on their shields w i t h o u t m a k i n g any a t t e m p t to retaliate. A t the end of the day when the e n e m y ' s horses were tired and the d a r t s h a d been used up, Simon a n d his force a t t a c k e d the cavalry while J o n a t h a n faced the i n f a n t r y in f r o n t . T h e cavalry turned a n d fled, a n d when the i n f a n t r y saw this they retreated to A z o t u s . J o n a t h a n then set fire to the t o w n , inflicting a total of nearly 8,000 casualties by sword a n d fire. This exploit gave him the valuable s e a b o a r d t o w n of J o p p a , which was to be succeeded in d u e course by f u r t h e r gains a n d expansion. 1. Maccabees, 10, 74-85; Josephus, Antiquities, 13; 4, 3-4 (86-100)

Jewish

A L P H E U S R (146) - Achaean War In 146 the general of the A c h a e a n s was a m a n called C r i t o l a u s w h o was not only a n t i - S p a r t a n but even m o r e violently a n t i - R o m a n . H e insulted the R o m a n a m b a s s a d o r s a n d b r o u g h t their vengeance u p o n him in the f o r m of an a r m y , which defeated him a n d his forces alongside the river A l p h e u s [Alfios] in Elis. A R o m a n a r m y was sent d o w n by Metellus f r o m M a c e d o n i a , but it m a y be d o u b t e d w h e t h e r Metellus himself was in c o m m a n d , as F l o r u s states, in view of his descent later in the year against C r i t o l a u s in central Greece

WORLD

(Scarphea, below). F l o r u s also states, incorrectly, that the battle on the A l p h e u s ended the war at a single stroke. Florus, 1: 32(2-3)

SCARPHEA (146) - Achaean War Critolaus, the A c h a e a n general, m a d e an expedition against Heraclea in Malis which refused to join the A c h a e a n league. This b r o u g h t the R o m a n consul Metellus d o w n on him f r o m M a c e d o n i a . C r i t o l a u s was so petrified that he headed for refuge in S c a r p h e a [near Molos] in Locris but he a n d his m e n were c a u g h t in flight by the forces of Metellus. A large n u m b e r of t h e m were killed a n d 1,000 were taken prisoner. C r i t o l a u s was never seen again. Pausanias, 7; 15(2-3); Livy, e p i t o m e 52

CHAERONEA (146) - Achaean War A force of 1,000 A r c a d i a n s w h o were connected with C r i t o l a u s ' expedition (above) a n d w h o were m a r c h i n g to join him, h a d a d v a n c e d as f a r as Elatea. A f t e r learning of the disaster at S c a r p h e a , the E l a t e a n s ordered the A r c a d i a n s to leave their city. T h e y were on their way back to the Pelop o n n e s e w h e n Metellus met t h e m at C h a e r o n e a a n d m a s s a c r e d them. Pausanias, 7; 15(3)

I S T H M U S (146) - Achaean War Following the d e a t h of Critolaus, D i a e u s was once again a p p o i n t e d general of the A c h a e a n s . H e assembled everyone of military age, the whole gathering a m o u n t i n g to 14,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 600 horse. Of these, 4,000 men were detached a n d sent t o garrison M e g a r a to block a R o m a n advance, but as s o o n as the R o m a n s drew near, they fled straight back to the A c h a e a n c a m p at C o r i n t h . T h e consul Lucius M u m m i u s arrived on the scene a n d , a f t e r dismissing Metellus, assembled his army. This a m o u n t e d to 23,000 f o o t a n d 3,500 horse with a few extras. A f t e r a cheeky sally by night, the A c h a e a n s c a m e out in force to fight in the neck of the I s t h m u s , but the cavalry fled at once w i t h o u t waiting for a charge. T h e i n f a n t r y stood their g r o u n d until they were o u t f l a n k e d a n d put to flight, o p e n i n g the way for M u m m i u s , w h o sacked a n d b u r n t a virtually deserted city. It h a s been said t h a t 20,000 were killed in the battle, but this figure exceeds the total A c h a e a n n u m b e r s , m a n y or most of w h o m seem to have fled. T h e destruction of C o r i n t h m a r k s the end of G r e e k liberty. T h e R o m a n senate dissolved the 137


WORLDS

A c h a e a n league a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d its constituent states into the new province of M a c e d o n . Pausanias, 7: 16( 1-2); Florus, 1: 32(5); Livy, e p i t o m e 52

OENOPARAS R (145) In 150, A l e x a n d e r Balas, a pretender to the Seleucid k i n g d o m , killed the king D e m e t r i u s I in battle at an u n k n o w n place a n d seized the kingd o m . This b r o u g h t the rightful successor, the f u t u r e D e m e t r i u s II of Syria, f r o m Crete with an a r m y in search of vengeance. Ptolemy VI Philom e t o r , also, waited in the wings f o r a c h a n c e to get his h a n d s on the Seleucid k i n g d o m . As Balas was his son-in-law, Ptolemy travelled to Syria with an a r m y to assist him, only to discover a real or imaginary plot by Balas to kill him. H e p r o m p t l y

138

removed his d a u g h t e r f r o m Balas' care a n d h a n ded her to Demetrius, with w h o m he m a d e a pact. H e then p e r s u a d e d the people of A n t i o c h to accept D e m e t r i u s as their king. Balas, w h o was in Cilicia, returned to Syria with an a r m y a n d c o n f r o n t e d the forces of Ptolemy a n d D e m e t r i u s on the b a n k s of the river O e n o p a r a s [Afrin] near A n t i o c h . T h e site has been n a m e d by S t r a b o . Balas was defeated a n d fled to A r a b i a where an A r a b i a n prince cut off his head a n d sent it to Ptolemy. H o w e v e r , the recipient himself only survived the battle by a few days. H e died f r o m injuries received when his horse threw him in the battle. D e m e t r i u s alone survived a n d retained his rightful k i n g d o m . 1. Maccabees, 11, 15-18; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 13; 4, 8 (116-119); Strabo, 16; 2, 8; Livy, epitome 52

PART THREE

THE ROMAN WORLD

THE ROMAN

WORLD

Chronological Table of Battles of The Roman World VICTORS 2

VANQUISHED 2 Romans Latini Aurunci L. Aemilius Mamercus Volsci Etruscans

Algidus M Algidus M Algidus M Fidenae Nomentum Algidus M Fidenae Algidus M

Latins A. Postumius Albus Regillensis P. Servilius Priscus Volsci L. Aemilius Mamercus (I) M. Fabius Vibulanus (2) Cn. Manlius Cincinnatus Veientes C. Horatius Pulvillus = 3 C. Horatius Pulvillus = Sp. Servilius Structus P. Valerius Publicola T. Quinctius Capitolinus Barbatus (1) Q. Fabius Vibulanus (2) T. Quinctius Capitolinus Barbatus L. Quinctius Cincinnatus T. Romilius Rocus Vaticanus L. Valerius Potitus Mam. Aemilius Mamercus Q. Servilius Priscus Fidenas A. Postumius Tubertus Mam. Aemilius Mamercus Aequi and Labici

Algidus M Gurasium Allia R

Q. Servilius Priscus Romans Gauls (Brennus)

BC

PLACE'

502 496 495 482 482 480

Pometia Regillus L Aricia Antium Longula Veii

477 477 477 476 475 468 465

Cremera R Temple of Hope Colline Gate Janiculum Veii Antium Algidus M

458 455 449 437 435 431 426 418 418 391 390

1

WAR OR EPISODE

Gallic Invasion

Clan Fabii Etruscans = 3 Etruscans = Etruscans Veientes and Sabini Antiates Aequi

Aequi Aequi Volsci and Aequi Fidenates and Veientes Fidenates and Veientes Volsci and Aequi Veientes and Fidenates (1) L. Sergius Fidenas (2) M. Papirius Mugilar Aequi and Labici Volsci (1) Q. Servilius Fidenas (2) Q. Sulpicius Gallus (3) P. Cornelius Maluginensis

Abbreviations:

C - Cape; Isl(s) - Island(s); L - Lake; M(s) - Mountain(s); P - Pass; Pr - Promontory; R - River. : Praenomina: A. - Aulus; Ap. - Appius; C. - Gaius; Cn. - Gnaeus; D. - Decimus; L. - Lucius; M. - Marcus; Mam. - Mamercus; M \ - Manius; P. - Publius; Q. - Quintus; Ser. - Servius; Sex. - Sextus; Sp. - Spurius; T. - Titus; Ti. - Tiberius. 3 Equal symbols ( = ) after victor and vanquished denote an indecisive outcome. * Battles so marked (between 219 and 146 BC) are described under The Greek World. 141


WORLDS

BC

PLACE

WAR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

390 390 389 389 389 386 382

Rome Veascium Lanuvium Campus Martius Bola Satricum Velitrae

Gallic Invasion Gallic Invasion

? M . Furius Camillus Gauls Volsci Volsci Aequi Volsci, Latini a n d Hernici Veliterni

381 380 377

Satricum Allia R Satricum

362 362 361

Signia Signia Anio R

360 358 357 346 343 343 343 343 340

Colline G a t e Pedum Privernum Satricum Capua Gaurus M Saticula Suessula Veseris

Gallic Invasion Gallic Invasion

340 339 338 338 338 331 325 321

Trifanum F e n e c t a n e Plains Pedum Astura R Manduria Pandosia Imbrinium Caudine Forks

G r e a t Latin W a r G r e a t Latin W a r G r e a t Latin W a r G r e a t Latin W a r Tarentine Wars Tarentine Wars Second Samnite W a r Second Samnite W a r

G a u l s (Brennus) M . Furius Camillus M . Furius Camillus M . F u r i u s Camillus M . Furius Camillus M . Furius Camillus (1) Sp. Papirius Crassus (2) L. Papirius Mugillanus M. Furius Camillus T. Quinctius C i n c i n n a t u s (1) P. Valerius Potitus Publicola (2) L. Aemilius M a m e r c u s Hernici A p . C l a u d i u s Inregillensis (1) T. Quinctius P o e n u s Capitolinus Crispinus (2) T . M a n l i u s Imperiosus Torquatus Q. Servilius A h a l a C. Sulpicius Peticus C. M a r c i u s R u t u l u s M . Valerius M a x i m u s C o r v u s Samnites M . Valerius M a x i m u s C o r v u s A. Cornelius Cossus M . Valerius M a x i m u s C o r v u s (1) T. M a n l i u s Imperiosus Torquatus (2) P. Decius M u s T. M a n l i u s Imperiosus T o r q u a t u s Q. Publilius Philo L. F u r i u s Camillus C. M a e n i u s Lucanians Lucanians Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus Samnites ( G a i u s Pontius)

316 315

Saticula Saticula

Second Samnite W a r Second Samnite W a r

315

Lautulae

Second Samnite W a r

315

Tarracina


314

Caudium


311 310 310 310 310

Sutrium Sutrium Perusia Vadimonis L Talium

Second Second Second Second Second

142

Gallic Invasion

First Samnite W a r First Samnite W a r First Samnite W a r G r e a t Latin W a r

Samnite Samnite Samnite Samnite Samnite

War War War War War

L. Aemilius M a m e r c u s Privernas (1) Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus (2) Q. Aulius C e r r e t a n u s Samnites (1) Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus (2) C. F a b i u s A m b u s t u s (1) C. Sulpicius L o n g u s (2) M . Poetelius Libo Q. Aemilius Barbula Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus Romans ? L. Papirius C u r s o r

Volsci and Praenestini Praenestini Latini and Volsci G e n u c i u s Aveninensis Hernici Gauls

Gauls Gauls Privernates Antiates and Volsci Campanians Samnites Samnites Samnites Samnites and Latini

N u m i s i u s (Latini) Latini Pedani Aricini et al. A r c h i d a m u s III of Sparta Alexander of Epirus Samnites (1) T.Veturius Calvinus (2) S p . P o s t u m i u s Caudinus Samnites Samnites Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus Samnites Samnites Etruscans Etruscans Etruscans Etruscans Samnites

THE ROMAN WORLD BC

PLACE

WAR OR EPISODE

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

308 308 307 305 305 305

Perusia Mevania Allifae Tifernum Bovianum Tifernum

Second Second Second Second Second Second

Etruscans Umbrians Samnites Samnites = Samnites Statius Gellius (Samnites)

302 298 298 297 297 296 295

Thuriae Bovianum Volaterrae Tifernum Beneventum Volturnus R Camerinum

Tarentine Wars Third Samnite War Third Samnite War Third Samnite War Third Samnite War Third Samnite War Third Samnite War

Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus L. Postumius Megellus = Ti. Minucius Augurinus (1) L. Postumius Megellus (2) Ti. Minucius Augurinus Romans Cn. Fulvius Maximus Centumalus L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus P. Decius Mus L. Volumnius Flamma Violens Samnites and Gauls

295

Sentinum

Third Samnite War

295 295

Tifernus M Caiatia

Third Samnite War Third Samnite War

294 293 293 284 283 282 282 280

Luceria Aquilonia Herculaneum Arretium Vadimonis L Populonia Tarentum, off Heraclea

279

Pyrrhus ? =

C. Fabricius Luscinus ? =

276

A(u)sculum Satrianum Straits of Messina

Carthaginians

Pyrrhus

275

Beneventum

M \ Curius Dentatus

Pyrrhus

274c. 265 c. 264 264 262

Cyamosorus R Longanus R Messana Messana Heraclea Minoa

Third Samnite War Third Samnite War Third Samnite War Gallic Invasion Gallic Invasion Gallic Invasion Tarentine War Tarentine (Pyrrhic) War Tarentine (Pyrrhic) War Tarentine (Pyrrhic) War Tarentine (Pyrrhic) War Mamertine War Mamertine War First Punic War First Punic War First Punic War

Hiero II Hiero II Ap. Claudius Caudex Ap. Claudius Caudex Hanno

262 260 260 260 260 258 257 256

Agrigentum Lipara Cape of Italy, off Mylae, off Thermae Himerienses Camarina Tyndaris, off Ecnomus Pr, off

Mamertines Mamertines Hiero 11 Carthaginians (1) L. Postumius Albinus (2) Q. Mamilius Hanno Cn. Cornelius Scipio Asina Hannibal Carthaginians Roman Allies

First Punic War First Punic War First Punic War

256

Adys

First Punic War

First First First First First

Samnite Samnite Samnite Samnite Samnite Samnite

Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic

War War War War War

War War War War War War

Cleonymus the Spartan Samnites Etruscans Samnites Apulians Staius Minatius (Samnites) L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (1) Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus Samnites and (2) P. Decius Mus Gellius Egnatius (Gauls) L. Volumnius Flamma Violens Samnites (1) Ap. Claudius Caecus Samnites (2) L. Volumnius Flamma Violens M. Atilius Regulus Samnites L. Papirius Cursor Samnites Sp. Carvilius Maximus = Samnites = Senones M \ Curius Dentatus Boii and Etruscans P. Cornelius Dolabella Romans Boii and Etruscans Tarentini L. Valerius Pyrrhus P. Valerius Laevinus

Romans Boodes (Carthaginians) Romans C. Duilius Hamilcar Carthaginians C. Atilius Regulus = (1) M. Atilius Regulus (2) L. Manlius M. Atilius Regulus

A. Atilius Calatinus Hamilcar = Hamilcar Hasdrubal (son of Hanno) 143

BATTLES

OF THE

GREEK

AND

ROMAN

WORLDS

BC

PLACE

WAR OR EPISODE

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

255 255

Bagradas R Hermaeum C, off

First Punic War First Punic War

M. Atilius Regulus Carthaginians

250 249 245 241 225 225

Panormus D r e p a n u m , off Aegimurus Isl, off Aegetes Isls, off Clusium Telamon

First Punic War First Punic War First Punic W a r First Punic W a r Gallic Invasion Gallic Invasion

222 222 219 218 218 218 218 218 217 217 217

Clastidium Mediolanum Pharos Isl* Rhodanus R Ticinus R Lilybaeum, off Trebia R Cissis Iberus R Trasimenus L Callicula M

Gallic Invasion Gallic Invasion Second Illyrian War Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r

Xanthippus (Carthaginians) (1) M. Aemilius Paulus (2) Ser. Fulvius L. Caecilius Metellus Adherbal Romans C. Lutatius Catulus Gauls (1) C. Atilius Regularis (2) L. Aemilius Papus M. Claudius Marcellus Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus L. Aemilius Paulus Hannibal Hannibal Romans Hannibal Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus Hannibal Hannibal

216 216 216 215 215 215 215

Gerunium Cannae Nola Grumentum Nola Carales Ibera

Second Second Second Second Second Second Second

215

lliturgi (Tarracon.)

Second Punic War

215

Intibili

Second Punic W a r

(1) Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus (2) P. Cornelius Scipio

214 214 213 213 213 212

Beneventum Nola lliturgi (Baetica) Munda Aurinx Capua


Ti. Sempronius Gracchus M. Claudius Marcellus Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus Capuans

212

Capua

Second Punic W a r

Hannibal =

212 211 211

Herdonea Himera R Upper Baetis R

Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r

211

Ilorci

Second Punic War

Hannibal M. Claudius Marcellus Masinissa, Indibilis and Carthaginians Hasdrubal Barca, Mago and Hasdrubal (son of Gisgo)

144

Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic

Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic

War War War War War War War


Hannibal Hannibal M. Claudius Marcellus Ti. Sempronius Longus M. Claudius Marcellus T. Manlius T o r q u a t u s (1) Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus (2) P. Cornelius Scipio (1) Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus (2) P. Cornelius Scipio

Hasdrubal (son of H a n n o ) P. Claudius Pulcher Carthaginians Hanno Romans Gauls Gauls Gauls Demetrius of Pharos Gauls P. Cornelius Scipio Carthaginians Ti. Sempronius Longus Hanno Hasdrubal Barca C. Flaminius Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator M. Minucius R u f u s C. Terentius Varro Hannibal Hanno Hannibal Hasdrubal the Bald Hasdrubal Barca Hasdrubal Barca, Mago and Hamilcar (son of Bomilcar) Hasdrubal Barca, M a g o and Hamilcar (son of Bomilcar) Hanno Hannibal Carthaginians Carthaginians Carthaginians (1) Ap. Claudius Pulcher (2) Q. Fulvius Flaccus (1) Ap. Claudius Pulcher = (2) Q. Fulvius Flaccus Cn. Fulvius Flaccus H a n n o and Epicydes P. Cornelius Scipio Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus

THE ROMAN

WORLD

BC

PLACE


VICTORS

VANQUISHED

211

Capua

Second Punic W a r

211 211 210 210 210 209 209 208 208

Colline G a t e Anio R Sapriportis, off Herdonea Numistro New Carthage Canusium Petelia Venusia

Second Second Second Second Second Second Second Second Second

Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic

War War War War War War War War War

(1) Ap. C l a u d i u s Pulcher (2) Q. Fulvius Flaccus Q. Fulvius Flaccus Q. Fulvius Flaccus = D e m o c r a t e s and Nico Perco Hannibal M . Claudius Marcellus = P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s Hannibal Carthaginians Hannibal

208 208 208 207 207 207 207

Locri Epizephyrii C l u p e a , off Baecula Carmone Grumentum Venusia Metaurus R

Second Second Second Second Second Second Second

Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic


206 206 206 204 204 203

Ilipa Astapa Carteia, off Salaeca Croton Utica


Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic


H a n n i b a l and M a g o M . Valerius Laevinus P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s C. C l a u d i u s N e r o C. C l a u d i u s N e r o (1) M . Livius Salinator (2) C. C l a u d i u s N e r o P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s L. M a r c i u s Septimus C. Laelius P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s Hannibal P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s

Campanians Hannibal Hannibal Hannibal = D. Quinctius C n . Fulvius C e n t u m a l u s Hannibal = Mago M . C l a u d i u s Marcellus Romans (1) M . C l a u d i u s Marcellus (2) T. Quinctius Crispinus L. Cincius Alimentus Carthaginians H a s d r u b a l Barca H a s d r u b a i (son of Gisgo) Hannibal Hannibal H a s d r u b a l Barca

203

G r e a t Plains

Second Punic W a r

P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s

203 203 202 201 200

A m p s a g a R (Cirta) Second Punic W a r Utica, off Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Zama Mutilum Gallic Uprising Gallic Uprising Cremona

C. P. P. C. L.

200

Athacus*

P. Sulpicius G a l b a M a x i m u s

H a s d r u b a l (son of Gisgo) Astapenses Adherbal H a n n o (son of Hamilcar) P. S e m p r o n i u s T u d i t a n u s H a s d r u b a l (son of Gisgo) and Syphax H a s d r u b a l (son of Gisgo) and Syphax Syphax Carthaginians = Hannibal G a u l s (Boii) G a u l s (Insubres) and Hamilcar Philip V ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

P. Sulpicius G a l b a M a x i m u s

Philip V ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

T. Quinctius F l a m i n i n u s


T. Quinctius F l a m i n i n u s


C. Cornelius Cethegus M . C l a u d i u s Marcellus

Gauls G a u l s (Insubres and Comenses) Nabis (Spartans) Budares and Baesadines (Spaniards) Celtiberi Spaniards G a u l s (Boii and Insubres)

Laelius and Masinissa Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s = Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s Ampius Furius Purpurio

197 196

Second M a c e d o n i a n w arr Ottolobum* Second M a c e d o n i a n W w o arf Second M a c e d o n i a n A o u s R* W r w a ar C y n o s c e p h a l a e Ms* Second M a c e d o n i a n W r w a ar Gallic Uprising Mincius R Comum Gallic Uprising

195 195

Sparta* Turda

W a r against N a b i s Spanish W a r s

T. Quinctius F l a m i n i n u s Q. Minucius T h e r m u s

195 195 194

lliturgi ( T a r r a c o n . ) Emporiae Mediolanum

Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Gallic Uprising

M . Helvius M. Porcius C a t o L. Valerius Flaccus

W o

200 198 197

145

BATTLES

OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

BC

PLACE

193 193 193 192 191

Mutina Ilipa Toletum Pisae T h e r m o p y l a e P*

WORLDS

W AR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS

190 189 189 189 189 188 188 186 186 185

L. Cornelius M e r u l a P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica M . Fulvius Nobilior Q. Minucius T h e r m u s M ' . Acilius G l a b r i o and M . Porcius C a t o C o r y c u s Pr* W a r against A n t i o c h u s C. Livius Salinator and Eumenes II Panormus* W a r against A n t i o c h u s Polyxenidas Phoenicus* W a r against A n t i o c h u s C. Livius Salinator W a r against A n t i o c h u s E u d a m u s ( R h o d i a n s ) Side, off* M y o n n e s u s Pr, off* W a r against A n t i o c h u s L. Aemilius Regillus and Eudamus W a r against A n t i o c h u s C n . D o m i t i u s A h e n o b a r b u s and Magnesia-adE u m e n e s II Sipylum* Spanish W a r s Lusitani Lyco G a l a t i a n Expedition C n . Manlius Volso Cuballum* G a l a t i a n Expedition C n . M a n l i u s Volso Olympus M* G a l a t i a n Expedition C n . M a n l i u s Volso Ancyra* G a l a t i a n Expedition C n . M a n l i u s Volso Magaba M* C n . M a n l i u s Volso Cypsela* C n . M a n l i u s Volso Tempyra* Hasta Spanish W a r s C. Atinius L. M a n l i u s Acidinus Fulvianus Calagurris Spanish W a r s Toletum Spanish W a r s Spaniards

185

Tagus R

Spanish W a r s

181 181 180 179 179 179 178 177 176 173 171

Aebura Contrebia M a n l i a n Pass Complega Alee Chaunus M Timavus R Scultenna R C a m p i Macri Carystus Callinicus*

171

Phalanna*

170

Uscana*

168

Scodra*

168

Elpeus R*

168

Pythium*

168

Pydna*

Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Istrian W a r Ligurian W a r s Ligurian W a r s Ligurian W a r s Third M a c e d o n i a n War Third Macedonian War Third Macedonian War Third Macedonian War Third Macedonian War Third Macedonian War Third Macedonian War

191 190 190 190 190 190

146

Gallic Uprising Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Ligurian W a r s W a r against A n t i o c h u s

(1) C. C a l p u r n i u s Piso (2) L. Quinctius Crispinus Q. Fulvius Flaccus Q. Fulvius Flaccus Q. Fulvius Flaccus Ti. S e m p r o n i u s G r a c c h u s Ti. S e m p r o n i u s G r a c c h u s Ti. S e m p r o n i u s G r a c c h u s A. M a n l i u s Volso C. C l a u d i u s Pulcher Q. Petilius Spurinus M . Popilius L a e n a s Perseus ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

VANQUISHED G a u l s (Boii) Lusitani Vaccaei, Vettones el al. Ligures A n t i o c h u s III Polyxenidas Pausistratus ( R h o d i a n s ) Phoenicus Hannibal Polyxenidas A n t i o c h u s III L. Aemilius Paulus Galatians Galatians Galatians Galatians Thracians Thracians Lusitani Celtiberi (1) C. C a l p u r n i u s Piso (2) L. Quinctius Crispinus Spaniards Celtiberi Celtiberi Celtiberi Celtiberi Celtiberi Celtiberi Istri Ligures Ligures Ligures P. Licinius Crassus

L. P o m p e i u s

Perseus ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

G e n t i u s (Illyrians)

Ap. C l a u d i u s C e n t o

L. Anicius Gallus

G e n t i u s (Illyrians)

L. Aemilius P a u l u s

Perseus ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum L. Aemilius P a u l u s

Milo ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Perseus ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

BC

PLACE

WAR OR EPISODE

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

153 151 151 149 147 147 146 146

Numantia Cauca Intercatia Nepheris Carthage, off Tribola Alpheus R* Scarphea*

Spanish Wars Spanish Wars Spanish Wars Third Punic War Third Punic War Viriathus' Uprising Achaean War Achaean War

Q. Fulvius Nobilior Vaccaei Vaccaean (single combat) M' (or M). Manilius Carthaginians M (or C). Vetilius Critolaus (Achaeans) Critolaus (Macedonians)

146

Chaeronea*

Achaean War

146 141 140

Isthmus* Termantia Erisana

Achaean War Spanish Wars Viriathus' Uprising

Celtiberi L. Licinius Lucullus P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Hasdrubal P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Viriathus Romans Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus L. M u m m i u s Q. Pompeius = Viriathus

130

Leucae

Aristonicus' Uprising

Aristonicus

130 121

Stratonicea Vindalium

M. Perperna Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus

121

Isara R

113 109 109 106 105

Noreia Suthul Muthul R Cirta Arausio

Aristonicus' Uprising Conquest of Gallia Narb. Conquest of Gallia Narb. Invasion by N o r t h m e n Jugurthine War Jugurthine W a r Jugurthine War Invasion by N o r t h m e n

103 102 101

Scirthaea Aquae Sextiae Vercellae

Second Servile War Invasion by N o r t h m e n Invasion by N o r t h m e n

90 90 90 90

Aesernia Aesernia Grumentum Acerrae

Social Social Social Social

90 90 90 90 90 89 89 89 89 89 88

Tolenus R: I Tolenus R: II Teanum Sidicinum Falernus M Firmum Asculum Picenum Fucinus L Nola Canusium Teanus R Esquiline Forum

Social W a r Social War Social War Social War Social War Social War Social War Social War Social War Social War First Civil War

88

Amnias R

First Mithridatic W a r

88

Protopachium

First Mithridatic War

War War War War

Q. Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus Cimbri Jugurtha Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus C. Marius Cimbri and Teutones L. Licinius Lucullus C. Marius (1) C. Marius (2) Q. Lutatius Catulus Vettius Scaton (Italians) L. Cornelius Sulla Felix Marcus Lamponius (Italians) L. Julius Caesar Vettius Scaton (Marsi) C. Marius Marius Egnatius (Samnites) Italians Cn. Pompeius Strabo Cn. Pompeius Strabo Marsi L. Cornelius Sulla Felix Samnites Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (1) L. Cornelius Sulla Felix (2) Q. Pompeius (1) Neoptolemus (2) Archelaus Neoptolemus

Arcadians Diaeus (Achaeans) Termestini = Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus P. Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus Aristonicus Allobroges Bituitus (Arverni and Allobroges) Cn. Papirius C a r b o A. Postumius Albinus Jugurtha Jugurtha and Bocchus (1) Cn. Manlius (2) Q. Servilius Caepio Salvius (Tryphon) Teutones and Ambrones Cimbri L. Julius Caesar Italians P. Licinius Crassus C. Papius Mutilus (Italians) P. Rutilius Lupus Vettius Scaton (Marsi) L. Julius Caesar Cn. Pompeius Strabo Lafrenius (Italians) Vidacilius (Picentes) L. Porcius C a t o L. Cluentius (Italians) C. Cosconius Poppaedius Silo (Marsi) (1) C. Marius (2) P. Sulpicius R u f u s Nicomedes IV (Bithynia) M'. Aquilius 147


WORLDS

PLACE

WAR OR EPISODE

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

86 86 85 83

Chaeronea Orchomenus T e n e d o s Isl Canusium Capua

First First First First First

Mithridatic W a r Mithridatic W a r Mithridatic W a r Civil W a r Civil W a r

L. L. L. L. L.

82 82 82 82 82 82 82

Aesis R Sacriportus Clanis R Saturnia Clusium Spoletium Faventia

First First First First First First First

Civil Civil Civil Civil Civil Civil Civil

Cn. Pompeius Magnus L. Cornelius Sulla Felix L. Cornelius Sulla Felix L. Cornelius Sulla Felix L. Cornelius Sulla Felix Cn. Pompeius M a g n u s Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius

82

Placentia

First Civil W a r

M. Lucullus

82

Clusium

First Civil W a r

Cn. Pompeius Magnus

82

Colline G a t e

First Civil W a r

L. Cornelius Sulla Felix

80 79 78 77 76 75 75

Baetis R Ana R Segovia Milvian Bridge Lauro Italica Valentia

Sertorian Sertorian Sertorian Lepidus' Sertorian Sertorian Sertorian

Q. Sertorius L. Hirtuleius L. Hirtuleius Q. L u t a t i u s C a t u l u s Q. Sertorius Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Cn. Pompeius M a g n u s

75 75

Sucro R Turia R

Sertorian W a r Sertorian W a r

Archelaus Archelaus Neoptolemus C. N o r b a n u s (1) C. N o r b a n u s (2) L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus Carinas C. M a r i u s Cn. Papirius C a r b o Marians C n . Papirius C a r b o Carinas (1) C n . Papirius C a r b o (2) C. N o r b a n u s C n . Papirius C a r b o ' s Forces C n . Papirius C a r b o ' s Forces (1) Papirius C a r b o ' s Generals (2) Telesinus (Samnites) L. Fufidius M . D o m i t i u s Calvinus L. Manlius M . Aemilius Lepidus Cn. Pompeius M a g n u s L. Hirtuleius (1) C. H e r e n n i u s (2) M . P e r p e r n a Veiento Cn. Pompeius Magnus Q. Sertorius

75

Saguntum

Sertorian W a r

74 74 74 74 73 73

Calagurris Chalcedon Rhyndacus R Aesepus R L e m n o s Isl Vesuvius M

Sertorian W a r T h i r d Mithridatic Third Mithridatic Third Mithridatic Third Mithridatic Third Servile W a r

72 72 71

Cabira Garganus M Camalatrum

Third M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Third Servile W a r Third Servile W a r

L. Licinius Lucullus' Forces L. Gellius Publicola M. Licinius Crassus Dives

71 71 71 69 69

Cantenna M Petelia Silarus R Cydonia Tigranocerta

Third Third Third Third Third

M . Licinius Crassus Dives Spartacus M . Licinius Crassus Dives Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus L. Licinius Lucullus

OO

BC

148


War War War Revolt War War War

War War War War

Servile W a r Servile W a r Servile W a r Mithridatic W a r Mithridatic War

Cornelius Sulla Felix Cornelius Sulla Felix Licinius Lucullus Cornelius Sulla Felix Cornelius Sulla Felix

Q. Sertorius (1) C n . Pompeius M a g n u s (2) Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (1) Cn. P o m p e i u s M a g n u s (2) Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Q. Sertorius M i t h r i d a t e s VI (Pontus) L. Licinius Lucullus L. Licinius Lucullus L. Licinius Lucullus Spartacus

(1) Q. Sertorius (2) M . P e r p e r n a Veiento Cn. Pompeius Magnus M . Aurelius C o t t a Mithridates VI (Pontus) M i t h r i d a t e s VI (Pontus) M . M a r i u s et al. (1) C. C l a u d i u s G l a b e r (2) P. V a r e n u s M i t h r i d a t e s VI (Pontus) Crixus (Spartacus) C a s t u s and C a n n i c u s (Spartacus) Spartacus Crassus' Lieutenants Spartacus Lasthenes (Cretans) Tigranes the G r e a t (Armenia)

THE ROMAN

WORLD

BC

PLACE


VICTORS

VANQUISHED

68

Arsanias R

Third Mithridatic War

L. Licinius Lucullus

68 67 67 66 66 65 62 61

Comana Pontica Zela Coracesium Nicopolis Cyrus R Abas R Pistoria Solonium

Third Mithridatic War Third Mithridatic War War against Pirates Third Mithridatic War Third Mithridatic War Third Mithridatic War Catiline Conspiracy Gallic Uprising

61 58 58 58 57 57 57 57

Admagetobriga Arar R Bibracte Plain of Alsace Axona R Sabis R Octodurus Jerusalem

Germanic Incursion Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Jewish Revolt

C. Valerius Triarius Mithridates VI (Pontus) Cn. Pompeius Magnus Cn. Pompeius Magnus Cn. Pompeius Magnus Cn. Pompeius Magnus M. Petreius (1) L. Marius (2) Ser. Sulpicius Galba Ariovistus (Suebi) C. Julius Caesar C. Julius Caesar C. Julius Caesar C. Julius Caesar C.Julius Caesar Ser. Sulpicius Galba A. Gabinius

Tigranes the Great (Armenia) Mithridates VI (Pontus) C. Valerius Triarius Pirates Mithridates VI (Pontus) Oroeses (Albania) Oroeses (Albania) L. Sergius Catilina Gauls (Allobroges)

56 56 55

Morbihan Gulf Sotium Tabor M

Gallic War Gallic War Jewish Revolt

D. Junius Brutus P. Licinius Crassus A. Gabinius

53 52 52 52 52 51 51 51 49 49 49

Carrhae Noviodunum Gergovia Lutetia Parisiorum Alesia Uxellodunum Antigonea Amanus M Massilia Sicoris R Ilerda

Parthian War Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Parthian War Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War

M. Licinius Crassus Dives C. Julius Caesar Vercingetorix (Gauls) T. Labienus C. Julius Caesar C. Caninius Rebilus C. Cassius Longinus M. Tullius Cicero D. Junius Brutus L. Afranius C. Julius Caesar

49 49 48 48 48 47 47 47 47 47 47 46 46 46

Utica Bagradas R Salonae Dyrrhachium Pharsalus Salonae Tauris Isl Alexandria Nilus R Nicopolis Zela Hadrumentum Ruspina Thapsus

Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War Alexandrian War Alexandrian War Revolt of Pharnaces Revolt of Pharnaces Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War

C. Scribonius Curio Saburra (Numidians) A. Gabinius Cn. Pompeius Magnus C. Julius Caesar Dalmatians P. Vatinius Euphranor C. Julius Caesar Pharnaces C. Julius Caesar Numidians T. Labienus C. Julius Caesar

Gauls Tigurini (Helvetii) Helvetii Ariovistus Belgae Nervii (Belgae) Seduni and Veragri Alexander (son of Aristobulus) Gauls (Veneti) Sotiates Alexander (son of Aristobulus) Surenas (Parthians) Vercingetorix (Gauls) C. Julius Caesar Camulogenus (Gauls) Vercingetorix (Gauls) Drappes and Lucterius Osaces (Parthians) Amanienses L. Domitius Ahenobarbus C. Fabius (1) L. Afranius (2) M. Petreius P. Attius Varus C. Scribonius Curio M. Octavius C. Julius Caesar Cn. Pompeius Magnus M. Octavius M. Octavius Alexandrians Ptolemy XIII Cn. Domitius Calvinus Pharnaces C. Julius Caesar C. Julius Caesar Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio

149


WORLDS

BC

PLACE


VICTORS

VANQUISHED

46

H i p p o Regius

Second Civil W a r

P. Sittius

46 45

Carteia, off Munda

Second Civil W a r Second Civil W a r

C. Didius C. Julius C a e s a r

43

F o r u m G a l l o r u m : I W a r of M u t i n a

43

W a r of M u t i n a

A. Hirtius

43

Forum G a l l o r u m : II Mutina

Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio P. Attius Varus Cn. Pompeius M a g n u s (son) (1) C. Vibius P a n s a Caetronianus (2) D. C a r f u l e n u s M. Antonius

W a r of M u t i n a

42 42

Laodicea M y n d u s , off

C a m p a i g n of Cassius C a m p a i g n of Cassius

(1) C. O c t a v i a n u s (2) A. Hirtius C. Cassius Longinus C. Cassius Longinus

42 42 42

Rhodes, off Scyllaeum Pr, off Philippi: I

C a m p a i g n of Cassius W a r against Pompeius Second T r i u m v i r a t e

42 39 39 38 38

Philippi: II Cilician G a t e s Amanus M Gindarus C u m a e , off

Second T r i u m v i r a t e Parthian War Parthian War Parthian War W a r against Pompeius

C. Cassius Longinus Sex. P o m p e i u s M a g n u s Pius (1) M. A n t o n i u s (2) M . Junius Brutus M. A n t o n i u s P. Ventidius Bassus P. Ventidius Bassus P. Ventidius Bassus Menecrates

36 36 36

Mylae, off T a u r o m e n i u m , off N a u l o c h u s , off

W a r against Pompeius W a r against Pompeius W a r against Pompeius

M . Vipsanius Agrippa Sex. P o m p e i u s M a g n u s Pius M . Vipsanius A g r i p p a

36 31

Phraaspa Actium Pr, off

Parthian War W a r against C l e o p a t r a

M. Antonius = C. O c t a v i a n u s

150

M. Antonius

M. Antonius P. Cornelius Dolabella Alexander and M n a s e a s (Rhodians) Rhodians Q. Salvidienus R u f u s (1) C. Cassius Longinus (2) C. O c t a v i a n u s M. J u n i u s Brutus Parthians P h r a n a p a t e s (Parthians) P a c o r u s (Parthians) M e n o d o r u s and Calvinius Sabinus D e m o c h a r e s (or Papias) C. O c t a v i a n u s Sex. Pompeius M a g n u s Pius Phraates IV (Parthia) = M . A n t o n i u s and C l e o p a t r a VII

THE ROMAN

WORLD

Battles of The Roman World INTRODUCTION F r o m the days of the m o n a r c h y R o m e aspired to be the controlling influence over the whole of Italy. Her e x p a n s i o n resulted in part f r o m peaceful processes of a m a l g a m a t i o n a n d alliance but notably f r o m wars. T h e history of the Republic in the fifth a n d f o u r t h centuries reads like a seemingly u n e n d i n g succession of revolts a n d reprisals, sieges a n d sorties, truces a n d trickeries. M a n y of the early engagements are k n o w n only f r o m passing mentions. T h o s e t h a t have passed into recorded ' h i s t o r y ' have d o n e so with a varying a d m i x t u r e of legendary embellishment or fictitious material or b o t h . H o w m u c h is legend, fiction or fact is a question which has been - a n d still is - a matter of dispute. T h e p r o b l e m has been discussed at m o r e length in the section, Reliability of D a t a (p. 32). R o m e was not involved in any conflicts outside Italy f o r m o r e t h a n two centuries a f t e r the f o u n d a t i o n of the Republic, a l t h o u g h latterly the T a r entines invited a general a n d his a r m y f r o m Greece to fight their w a r with R o m e f o r them. By the end of this time R o m e controlled the whole of peninsular Italy. T h e scenario changed with the advent of the Punic W a r s , which t o o k R o m e overseas with a vengeance.

P O M E T I A (502)' Pometia (or Suessa Pometia), a Latin colony, threw off its allegiance to R o m e a n d joined the A u r u n c a n s . T h e R o m a n s p r o m p t l y invaded A u r uncan territory a n d smashed the natives in a blood bath. T h e following year they turned their whole a t t e n t i o n to P o m e t i a , which they a t t e m p t e d to reduce by assault a n d battery. In rage a n d desperation the o c c u p a n t s p o u r e d out of the t o w n carrying firebrands, with which they set fire to the 1

B r a c k e t e d f i g u r e s in t h e s u b t i t l e s a r e d a t e s , all o f w h i c h a r e B C .

:

T h e w o r d ' a b o v e ' in b r a c k e t s r e f e r s t h r o u g h o u t t o t h e i m m e d i a t e l y

preceding entry.

siege-engines a n d created havoc. T h e y inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, nearly killing one of the two consuls, a n d they forced the R o m a n s to w i t h d r a w a n d lick their w o u n d s . P o m e t i a was situated close to the P o m p t i n a e P a l u d e s [Pontine Marshes], to which it gave its n a m e , but the exact location is u n d e f i n e d . Livy, 2: 16(8-9)

REGILLUS L (496) T h e prospect of war with the Latins h a d been l o o m i n g for some time a n d h a d reached inevitable p r o p o r t i o n s . Aulus P o s t u m i u s , w h o h a d been g r a n t e d dictatorial powers as the sole c o m m a n d e r in-chief, proceeded with a p o w e r f u l a r m y of a r o u n d 24,000 men to L a k e Regillus, a b o u t 15 miles south-east of R o m e . T h e r e he met the Latin forces, which were said to be a b o u t 40,000 s t r o n g with 3,000 horse. It was said that the hated T a r quins were with the Latins, including the old T a r q u i n i u s S u p e r b u s in person a n d in his 90s. T h e T a r q u i n presence f u r t h e r inflamed the passions of the R o m a n s , whose initial o n s l a u g h t caused the Latins to give g r o u n d . A c o m p a n y of R o m a n exiles was sent to reinforce the Latin f r o n t a n d they m a n a g e d to push the R o m a n s back. At this point P o s t u m i u s ordered his personal g u a r d of picked cavalry to cut d o w n every R o m a n soldier w h o was trying to save his skin. This had the desired effect. A t t a c k e d f r o m f r o n t a n d rear the fleeing R o m a n s turned a n d faced the enemy, w h e r e u p o n the d i c t a t o r ' s cavalry, fresh a n d vigorous, d i s m o u n t e d a n d joined the fight on f o o t . T o urge his men to m a x i m u m effort, the dictator a d o p t e d the novel s t r a t a g e m of seizing a s t a n d a r d a n d hurling it into the midst of the enemy r a n k s f o r his m e n to recover. N o ploy was m o r e calculated to spur a R o m a n soldier to frenzy. T h e Latins b r o k e a n d fled, p u r s u e d a n d cut d o w n by their o p p o n e n t s . A c c o r d i n g to Dionysius only 10,000 Latins returned to their homes; there a r e n o figures for the R o m a n losses. L a k e Regillus exists n o longer. Its most likely site is t h o u g h t to have been the m o d e r n Pantano 151


WORLDS

Secco, a volcanic depression which was drained in the seventeenth century. Livy, 2:19-20; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 6: 4-12; Florus 1: 5( 1-4)

ARICIA (495) T h e A u r u n c a n s were the aggressors in a battle with the R o m a n s u n d e r their consul Publius Servilius. T h e armies met near Aricia [Ariccia], a b o u t 15 miles south-east of R o m e . Both sides e n c a m p e d on n e a r b y hills b e f o r e a d v a n c i n g to the plain, where the R o m a n s routed their adversaries. Livy, 2: 26(4-6); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 6: 32(3)-33

challenged them to fight, but the challenge was declined by the consul. T h e situation was saved by the o t h e r consul, C a e s o F a b i u s , w h o sent r e i n f o r c e m e n t s to the besieged Lucius. These m a n a g e d to enter the c a m p unperceived by the enemy. W h e n the enemy next a t t a c k e d the c a m p , the R o m a n s pulled d o w n the r a m p a r t s a n d fell u p o n them. T h e Volscians, fighting uphill, were hurled back with m a n y losses a n d t o o k to flight. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 8: 85(4)-86

VEII (480)

T h e Volscians decided to m a k e war u p o n R o m e . L e a r n i n g of their intentions, the R o m a n s sent the consul Lucius Aemilius at the head of an a r m y against A n t i u m [Anzio], where he e n c a m p e d on a hill o p p o s i t e the enemy. W h e n the t w o sides descended to level g r o u n d to fight, the battle was fiercely contested with no a d v a n t a g e either way. Both sides stood firm until eventually the Volscians deceived their o p p o n e n t s by starting to give g r o u n d a n d retreat. T h e R o m a n s , a s s u m i n g t h a t they were winning, followed in an undisciplined f a s h i o n , some of them s t o p p i n g to strip the corpses a n d to plunder. W h e n the Volscians saw this, they retired uphill as f a r as their c a m p a n d then faced a b o u t a n d stood firm. At this p o i n t their c o m r a d e s w h o h a d been left behind in the c a m p rushed out a n d joined in the fight. T h e roles were n o w reversed. T h e R o m a n s , fighting at a d i s a d v a n t a g e , fled; the Volscians p u r s u e d , causing a heavy slaughter.

T h e Veientes were bent on war with R o m e , which at this time was full of internal dissensions. T h e soldiers were disobeying orders, a n d in a recent c a m p a i g n they h a d actually walked off the battlefield to m a k e sure t h a t their c o m m a n d e r did not get the credit f o r a victory! W i t h considerable misgivings the two consuls, M a r c u s F a b i u s a n d G n a e u s M a n l i u s , m a r c h e d against the Veientes a n d their E t r u s c a n allies b u t hesitated to give battle. T h e y were m o r e a f r a i d of the actions of their o w n t r o o p s than of the enemy. D a y a f t e r d a y the Veientes t a u n t e d the R o m a n s with cowardice until, as their consuls h o p e d , their soldiers b e c a m e so incensed that they d e m a n d e d to be led out to fight. Each m a n t o o k an o a t h to win or die. In the battle the fighting was ferocious a n d its course seesawed with m a n y c h a n g e s of tide a n d f o r t u n e . It lasted f r o m n o o n until sunset, b o t h sides sustaining heavy losses. T h e consul M a n l i u s was slain, as also was a f o r m e r consul. Q u i n t u s F a b i u s . But the ultimate victory went to the R o m a n s , whose foe a b a n d o n e d their c a m p a n d withdrew d u r i n g the night.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 83(3)-85(3)

Livy, 2: 44(7)-47(9); Dionysius of R o m a n Antiquities, 9; 5-13(2)

ANTIUM (482)

R o m a n Antiquities, 8:

Halicarnassus,

LONGULA (482)

CREMERA R (477)

O n the night a f t e r their reverse at A n t i u m (above) 2 the R o m a n consul Lucius Aemilius led his men a w a y in silence, unnoticed by the enemy. T h e following a f t e r n o o n he e n c a m p e d on t o p of a hill near L o n g u l a , a b o u t 10 miles f r o m A n t i u m . W h e n the Volscians heard of this m o v e a n d were told that the enemy were few in n u m b e r a n d h a d m a n y w o u n d e d , they a b a n d o n e d their celebrations a n d m a r c h e d out, e n c a m p i n g o p p o s i t e the R o m a n s . T h e y tried to pull d o w n the palisades but were eventually repulsed by the R o m a n cavalry, w h o sallied out against them on foot, followed by the veteran triarii. In the following d a y s the Volscians, w h o greatly o u t n u m b e r e d the R o m a n s , repeatedly

T h e Veientes, the most p o w e r f u l c o m m u n i t y in E t r u r i a , were a c o n s t a n t t h o r n in the R o m a n side, distracting her by c o n t i n u a l acts of p r o v o c a t i o n a n d preventing her f r o m giving her a t t e n t i o n elsewhere. In view of this situation o n e of the R o m a n clans, the Fabii, offered to m u s t e r a small a r m y f r o m the midst of their family a n d to police the b o r d e r with Veii. They built a fort on the b a n k s of the C r e m e r a [Fosse della Valchetta], a stream which flows into the Tiber a b o u t 5 miles n o r t h of R o m e . In m a n y raids a n d skirmishes they were successful, but the Veii eventually set a t r a p for t h e m , luring t h e m out into an a m b u s h a n d then s u r r o u n d i n g them. T h e F a b i a n s gathered in a

152

THE ROMAN

wedge f o r m a t i o n a n d m a n a g e d to break out of the circle a n d gain some high g r o u n d but to no avail. T h e enemy sent a force r o u n d behind the hill a n d took them in the rear. T h e r e was only one F a b i a n survivor - a mere boy. Every m a n a m o n g the b a n d was killed, said to be 306 in n u m b e r . Livy, 2: 49(8-50); Dionysius of Haliearnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 9: 19-21

TEMPLE OF HOPE (477) A f t e r annihilating the Fabii at the River C r e m e r a (above), the E t r u s c a n s p u s h e d s o u t h w a r d a n d occupied the J a n i c u l a n hill on the d o o r s t e p of R o m e . T h e consul G a i u s H o r a t i u s was immediately recalled f r o m o p e r a t i o n s against the Volscians, a n d a battle was f o u g h t a b o u t 1 mile f r o m the city, near the T e m p l e of H o p e . Livy describes the result as indecisive. Dionysius, on the o t h e r h a n d , refers to the enemy being o v e r c o m e a n d t h r o w n back. Livy, 2: 51(2); Dionysius of Haliearnassus, Roman Antiquities, 9: 24(4)

COLLINE GATE (477) A l m o s t immediately a f t e r the battle near the T e m p l e of H o p e a f u r t h e r e n c o u n t e r , even closer to the city, t o o k place against the E t r u s c a n s at the P o r t a Collina. A c c o r d i n g to Livy the R o m a n t r o o p s w o n only a slight a d v a n t a g e . Nevertheless, it b o o s t e d their m o r a l e a n d staved off the i m m e d i a t e threat. Livy, 2:51(2); Dionysius of Haliearnassus, Roman Antiquities, 9: 24(4)

JANICULUM (476) T h e E t r u s c a n s ' m o d e s t reverses at the T e m p l e of H o p e a n d the Colline G a t e in the previous year did n o t h i n g to stop their m a r a u d i n g . O n e night they crossed the Tiber a n d a t t a c k e d the c a m p of the consul Servilius. T h e y were repelled with heavy losses a n d struggled back to the Janiculan hill, but Servilius followed t h e m a n d set u p c a m p at the base of it. T h e next d a y he rashly a t t e m p t e d to s t o r m the enemy position on t o p of the hill, an e n c o u n t e r which would have been a complete disaster f o r R o m e but f o r the timely arrival of his colleague Verginius. C a u g h t between two fires, the enemy was badly m a n g l e d , a result which ended the current series of hostilities in the vicinity of R o m e itself. Livy, 2: 51(6-9)

VEII (475) W a r b r o k e out again with the Veientes, with w h o m

WORLD

the Sabines h a d joined forces. T h e consul Valerius was sent to Veii, 12 miles n o r t h of R o m e , with an a r m y reinforced with allied contingents. He m a d e an i m m e d i a t e assault u p o n the Sabines w h o had a s s u m e d a position just outside the t o w n walls. T h e a t t a c k t o o k the enemy by complete surprise. Valerius gained possession of the gate a n d his m e n p o u r e d into the t o w n a n d m a s s a c r e d the inhabitants. T h u s b o t h Veientes a n d Sabini, R o m e ' s t w o most p o w e r f u l foes, were defeated at one fell swoop. Livy, 2:

53(1-3)

ANTIUM (468) In o p e r a t i o n s against the Volscians there was a bitter struggle a b o u t 4 miles f r o m A n t i u m [Anzio], T h e R o m a n s were o u t n u m b e r e d a n d would have fallen back if the consul, Titus Quinctius, h a d not put fresh heart into his m e n by telling them - falsely - that their o t h e r wing was winning. H a v i n g gained the a d v a n t a g e , he did not d a r e to p u s h f o r w a r d t o o h a r d but w i t h d r e w to his c a m p . All was quiet f o r a d a y or two until the enemy, w h o h a d been reinforced, suddenly launched a night a t t a c k o n the R o m a n c a m p . Livy reports t h a t the consul, with presence of m i n d , t o o k a b o d y of men a c c o m p a n i e d by t r u m p e t e r s on h o r s e b a c k outside the defences a n d instructed t h e m to m o v e a b o u t a n d m a k e a lot of noise. This deceived the enemy until d a w n when the R o m a n s , being rested a n d fresh, f o r m e d battle lines against the sleepless enemy. It was a bitter struggle, but the enemy eventually withdrew to higher g r o u n d where the battle c o n t i n u e d to rage. A f t e r sustaining heavy losses the R o m a n s eventually gained the s u m m i t a n d the e n e m y ' s c a m p . T h e Volscians fled a n d were pursued to A n t i u m , which surrendered a few d a y s later. Dionysius of Haliearnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 9: 57-58; Livy, 2: 64(5)-65

ALGIDUS M (465) T h e A e q u i a n s were causing t r o u b l e a n d so the consul Q u i n t u s F a b i u s m a r c h e d against them a n d defeated them. A truce was g r a n t e d but the enemy p r o m p t l y b r o k e it by m a k i n g a raid into L a t i u m . A c a m p a i g n against t h e m was begun a n d dragged on into its third year, by which time Q u i n t u s F a b i u s was again one of the consuls. H e gave t h e m a stern w a r n i n g in the h o p e that his n a m e as their previous victor would bring t h e m to heel. W h e n the A e q u i a n s paid n o heed - a p a r t f r o m m a n h a n d l i n g the R o m a n envoys - b o t h consuls led their armies to Algidus [Compatri] against them. A fierce battle 153


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ensued in which n o q u a r t e r was given on either side. T h e A e q u i a n s were forced to retreat, still refusing to a d m i t defeat. Instead, they m a d e a s u d d e n violent incursion across the b o r d e r , which caused considerable a l a r m in R o m e where it was magnified out of all p r o p o r t i o n . T h e consul Titus Quinctius t o o k the m a t t e r in h a n d , calmly pointing out that the enemy h a d already been defeated. He m a r c h e d to the f r o n t i e r but f o u n d no enemy on R o m a n soil. In the m e a n t i m e , F a b i u s , k n o w i n g the r o u t e the enemy would take, h a d fallen u p o n them. They were so impeded by the p l u n d e r t h a t they had amassed d u r i n g their raid that they were scarcely able to move. Few of t h e m escaped alive. Livy, 3: 2(6)-3(8)

ALGIDUS M (458)

Dionysius gives a rather different a n d m o r e e l a b o r a t e a c c o u n t of an action which seems, however, to be the same o n e by virtue of the similarity of c a u s a t i o n a n d circumstance. In his version, the e n c o u n t e r t o o k place a b o u t 4 miles f r o m A n t i u m [Anzio] as the A e q u i a n s were r e t u r n i n g h o m e . They were e n c a m p e d on t o p of a steep hill. Romilius, the R o m a n consul in charge, asked a seasoned veteran called Siccius, w h o h a d volunteered f o r service with a b a n d of 800 older men, to climb straight up the hill a n d a t t a c k the enemy c a m p - an act of certain death. Siccius, w h o was something of a braggart, was g o a d e d into acceptance but h a d different ideas. He led his m e n to the t o p by a circuitous sheltered track, c a p t u r e d the enemy c a m p , a n d then proceeded to descend a n d attack the m a i n b o d y of the enemy in the rear. A c c o r d i n g to this version the R o m a n success was entirely a t t r i b u t a b l e to Siccius a n d his little b a n d of seasoned veterans.

Once again the A e q u i a n s menaced R o m e . T h e y b r o k e a truce, which h a d been m a d e only the previous year, a n d fortified a position on M o u n t Algidus [M. Compatri] a b o u t 14 miles south-east of the city. T h e consul Minucius was sent out to a t t a c k t h e m but he was t o o c a u t i o u s or timid to leave the fortifications of his c a m p . T h e A e q u i a n s p r o m p t l y walled him in with e a r t h w o r k s , which caused a state of p a n i c in R o m e . T r a d i t i o n m a i n t a i n s that the R o m a n s s u m m o n e d their hero Lucius Quinctius C i n c i n n a t u s f r o m his f a r m a n d a p p o i n t e d him dictator to deal with the emergency. H e levied an a r m y a n d ordered each m a n to collect a n d bring a dozen stakes. O n Algidus, he deployed his m e n in a circle a r o u n d the A e q u i a n c a m p a n d got each m a n to dig a trench a n d fix his stake, thereby p u t t i n g the besieger u n d e r siege with a c o n t i n u o u s trench a n d palisade. As soon as Minucius realized that help was at h a n d , he a t t a c k e d the enemy f r o m the inside of their circle. This left the dictator free to complete the circumvallation before assaulting the e n e m y ' s o u t e r defences. A t t a c k e d f r o m b o t h sides the A e q u i a n s s u r r e n d e r e d a n d were m a d e to pass u n d e r the yoke. Livy, 3: 26-28

Six years a f t e r their defeat of 455 (above), the A e q u i a n s joined forces with the Volscians on M o u n t Algidus [M. Compatri]. T h e consul Valerius, w h o was sent out to deal with them, trod cautiously. He set up c a m p a b o u t a mile f r o m the enemy a n d doggedly refused to respond to their challenges to fight. T h e enemy accepted this as weakness a n d started pillaging the c o u n t r y s i d e in a disorderly way, giving Valerius the o p p o r t u n i t y he h a d been waiting for to a t t a c k . T h e enemy garrison sallied out to meet him but were still in a disorderly state when the a t t a c k struck h o m e . A f t e r a brisk struggle the consul ordered his cavalry to charge. S o m e of them b r o k e clean t h r o u g h the enemy lines while others skirted r o u n d a n d cut off their retreat. Few escaped. Livy, 3: 60-61 (10); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 11: 47

ALGIDUS M (455)

FIDENAE (437)

A l a r m i n g news reached R o m e to the effect that T u s c u l u m , 12 miles south-east of the city, h a d been a t t a c k e d by the A e q u i a n s . T h e T u s c u l a n s had recently rendered good services to R o m e , a n d so it was a m a t t e r of h o n o u r to give them assistance. Both consuls were sent out a n d they m a d e contact with the enemy at their usual base on M o u n t Algidus. In the s u b s e q u e n t battle the A e q u i a n s were badly t r o u n c e d a n d lost 7,000 men, according to Livy.

In 437 Fidenae, a town 5 miles n o r t h of R o m e , severed its allegiance to R o m e a n d joined u p with the E t r u s c a n s in Veii [Isola Farnese], 10 miles to the north-west. T o a d d to this disloyalty the F i d e n a t e s m u r d e r e d f o u r R o m a n envoys. T h e R o m a n s m a r c h e d out against the Veientes a n d w o n a costly victory south of the river A n i o [Aniene] on R o m a n territory, but it was e n o u g h to force the enemy to w i t h d r a w back across the river. T h e y t o o k up position b e f o r e the walls of Fidenae.

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Livy, 3: 31(3-4); Dionysius of R o m a n Antiquities, 10: 43-47

Halicarnassus,

ALGIDUS M (449)

THE ROMAN

T o cope with the emergency the R o m a n s a p p o i n ted a dictator, M a m e r c u s Aemilius, w h o c a m p e d a few miles south of the enemy a n d then m a r c h e d out to give battle. T h e t w o armies faced each o t h e r in the space between their c a m p s . T h e action was begun by the dictator, w h o ordered the cavalry to charge, followed by the infantry. In the ensuing melee the King of Veii, w h o stood out as a c h a m p i o n fighter, was killed. This so disheartened the E t r u s c a n s that they fled a n d were cut d o w n by the R o m a n s in pursuit. Livy, 4: 17(6)-19

NOMENTUM (435) R o m e was plagued with a serious epidemic which b r o u g h t her a l m o s t to a standstill. T o m a k e m a t ters worse the men of F i d e n a e chose this m o m e n t to venture into R o m a n territory. T h e aggressors' allies, the Veientes, sent them reinforcements, a n d their c o m b i n e d armies a d v a n c e d almost to the Colline G a t e . T o meet the emergency the senate a p p o i n t e d a dictator, Q u i n t u s Servilius, w h o p r o m p t l y ordered a m u s t e r of every m a n w h o was in a fit state to bear arms. This caused the enemy t o have second t h o u g h t s a n d they started to withd r a w , but Servilius p u r s u e d them a n d inflicted a defeat on them near N o m e n t u m [Montana], 12 miles north-east of R o m e . T h e enemy f o u n d refuge in Fidenae, where Servilius proceeded to undermine the walls with saps a n d c a p t u r e the town. Livy, 4: 21(6)-22(2)

ALGIDUS M (431) T h e Volscians a n d A e q u i a n s were again intent on war a n d on a larger scale t h a n before. T h e y raised two large armies a n d t o o k u p separate positions on M o u n t Algidus [M. Compatri] a b o u t 14 miles south-east of R o m e . T h e two R o m a n consuls in t h a t year did not see eye to eye on a n y t h i n g a n d were continually bickering. In consequence, the senate a p p o i n t e d a dictator, A u l u s P o s t u m i u s T u b e r t u s , to raise an a r m y a n d to take s u p r e m e charge. R o m e ' s allies were also told to levy t r o o p s . O n Algidus, the R o m a n s a n d their allies followed the e n e m y ' s precedent by setting up two e n c a m p ments. Hostilities started with almost c o n t i n u o u s skirmishing as the d i c t a t o r e n c o u r a g e d his men to flex their muscles. It also proved to the enemy t h a t they were unlikely to win in a straight fight. Instead, they resorted to a night attack on the consul's c a m p , as a result of which o n e of their own c a m p s was largely deserted. T h e dictator, whose c a m p was unassailed, sent t r o o p s to storm it a n d c a p t u r e d it a l m o s t w i t h o u t a fight. T h e

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d i c t a t o r himself then t o o k a n o t h e r b o d y of men a r o u n d the outside of the field a n d a t t a c k e d the e n e m y ' s rear. T h e enemy were s u r r o u n d e d , but u n d e r the leadership of o n e heroic stalwart they rallied a n d m a d e a brave s t a n d . They were eventually forced to surrender a n d every m a n was sold into slavery. Livy, 4: 26-29(4)

FIDENAE (426) T h e Veientes were dissatisfied with some m i n o r defeat which they inflicted on the R o m a n s . T h e y w a n t e d m o r e action a n d s o u g h t help f r o m the neighbouring communities. The Fidenates alone f a v o u r e d renewed hostilities a n d joined t h e m ; or rather the Veientes joined F i d e n a e , the t o w n which they had decided to use as their j o i n t base. M a m e r c u s Aemilius, the dictator for this emergency, m a r c h e d out f r o m R o m e a n d e n c a m p e d a mile a n d a half south of F i d e n a e , where he was protected by hills on his right a n d the Tiber on his left. H e then sent out a d e t a c h m e n t to occupy a ridge in the e n e m y ' s rear, behind which his men would be screened. Next m o r n i n g the Veientes t o o k the field a n d M a m e r c u s ordered his i n f a n t r y out to o p p o s e them at the d o u b l e . A f t e r a trem e n d o u s clash the Veientes h a d begun to yield when suddenly a vast h o r d e of creatures p o u r e d out of F i d e n a e waving f i r e b r a n d s . T h e R o m a n s were temporarily nonplussed by this novel f o r m of w a r f a r e but the dictator rallied them, telling his men either to seize the torches or to use their swords against the otherwise u n a r m e d m u l t i t u d e . At this point, the d e t a c h m e n t on the ridge was s u m m o n e d by the d i c t a t o r a n d suddenly a p p e a r e d in the e n e m y ' s rear. T h e Veientes were s u r r o u n d e d a n d fled, mostly to the Tiber where m a n y were cut d o w n o r d r o w n e d . T h e F i d e n a t e s m a n a g e d to escape t h r o u g h their c a m p a n d into the t o w n , but the p u r s u i n g R o m a n s forced their way in t o o . A f t e r f u r t h e r fighting the o c c u p a n t s s u r r e n d e r e d . Livy, 4: 31(6)-33

ALGIDUS M (418) At the beginning of the year a delegation f r o m T u s c u l u m reported to R o m e that a new enemy, the t o w n of Labici, h a d conspired with an A e q u i a n force to raid their territory a n d was at t h a t time e n c a m p e d on M o u n t Algidus. W a r was declared on Labici, a n d an a r m y was sent out u n d e r the leadership of two of the military tribunes, Lucius Sergius a n d M a r c u s Papirius. T h e trouble was that the tribunes could not agree on a n y t h i n g a n d were forced to c o m e to an a r r a n g e m e n t whereby they 155


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assumed c o m m a n d in t u r n on alternate days. A divided c o m m a n d h a d caused defeats in the past a n d it did so again. W h e n the enemy withdrew to their r a m p a r t s , feigning fear, the R o m a n s incautiously followed them u p a n d were c a u g h t off g u a r d by a n A e q u i a n a t t a c k , which forced them in h e a d l o n g (light d o w n a gully. T h e r e m n a n t s of the a r m y on the field m a d e for T u s c u l u m . Livy, 4: 45(5)-46(7)

ALGIDUS M (418) T h e senate r e s p o n d e d to the debacle on Algidus (above) by a p p o i n t i n g a d i c t a t o r . Q u i n t u s Servilius Priscus, w h o led a reserve a r m y to Algidus a n d ordered the forces w h o h a d fled to T u s c u l u m to join him. This time it was the enemy w h o were o v e r - c o n f i d e n t . O n e R o m a n cavalry c h a r g e followed by a massed i n f a n t r y attack disorganized them so completely that they fled to their c a m p , which was assaulted by the R o m a n s a n d c a p t u r e d with ease. T h e survivors t o o k refuge in Labici, which the d i c t a t o r proceeded to c a p t u r e a n d sack. Livy, 4: 46(8)-47(6)

GURASIUM (391) D i o d o r u s reports a b l o o d y battle at G u r a s i u m against the Volscians, m a n y of w h o m were killed. T h e place is u n k n o w n a n d Livy does not m e n t i o n the incident. Diodorus, 14: 109(7) A L L I A R (390, July 18) - Gallic Invasion At this p o i n t in the early history of R o m e a new foe a p p e a r e d . T h e r e was a m a s s m i g r a t i o n of Gallic tribes across the Alps a n d d o w n t h r o u g h Italy as f a r as R o m e itself. T h e R o m a n s a p p e a r e d to be u n a w a r e of the m a g n i t u d e of this invasion or of its speed of a d v a n c e . T h e y did not even a p p o i n t a dictator. Their a r m y of 40,000 f o o t , u n d e r a tribune o r two, m a r c h e d out a n d h a d covered a b a r e 11 miles b e f o r e it e n c o u n t e r e d the G a u l s at the c o n f l u e n c e of the Allia a n d Tiber rivers. T h e g r o u n d a r o u n d was s w a r m i n g with the Gallic h o r d e , reported to be a b o u t 70,000 in n u m b e r . T h e tribunes extended their lines as f a r a n d as thinly as they d a r e d , a n d some reserves were posted on high g r o u n d to o n e side. T h e Gallic chieftain, Brennus, a t t a c k e d the reserves first to prevent them f r o m descending on his flank when he t u r n e d his a t t e n t i o n to the m a i n R o m a n body. But this b o d y did not wait. T h e reserves, driven f r o m the hills, descended en masse to their colleagues in the plain, w h o were t h r o w n into c o n f u s i o n . T h e y fled in blind panic a n d were cut d o w n as they fled. M e n 156

on the wing nearest the river tried to get across a n d a b o u t half of them reached Veii. T h o s e on the opposite wing m a d e for R o m e where survivors shut themselves u p in the Citadel. T h e battle a n d the d a y have gone d o w n as the blackest in early R o m a n history. T h e d a t e 390 is the c o n v e n t i o n a l V a r r o n i a n d a t e f o r the battle of the Allia a n d the subsequent sack of R o m e (below). T h e c h r o n o l o g y of Polybius places these events in 387/6, which m a n y a u t h o rities regard as nearer the t r u t h . Livy, 5: 37(6)-38; Diodorus, 14: 114-115(2); Plutarch, Camillus. 18(4)-19(1) R O M E (390) - Gallic Invasion A f t e r their victory at the river Allia (above), the G a u l s swept on to R o m e , which was u n d e f e n d e d a p a r t f r o m the fortress on the Capitol to which every m a n capable of fighting h a d repaired. T h e G a u l s entered the open city w i t h o u t o p p o s i t i o n a n d proceeded to sack it. T h e Livian version of events proceeds as follows. M a t t e r s were looking u p in Veii by virtue of its reinforcement by soldiers w h o h a d fled there f r o m the Allia a n d f r o m R o m e , in a d d i t i o n to volunteers f r o m s u r r o u n d i n g c o m munities. All they lacked was a c o m m a n d e r . T h e o b v i o u s choice was the veteran soldier, Camillus, w h o h a d once been d i c t a t o r a n d w h o was living in v o l u n t a r y exile in A r d e a , 24 miles south of R o m e . He was ready to act if the senate agreed. A messenger was therefore sent to the senate in the Citadel, which a p p r o v e d the request a n d a p p o i n ted Camillus as dictator f o r the second time. Camillus h a d already, on his own initiative, rallied the A r d e a n s a n d destroyed a n e i g h b o u r i n g Gallic c a m p while its o c c u p a n t s slept in the middle of the night. He n o w s u m m o n e d the force f r o m Veii to join him a n d m a r c h e d on R o m e , arriving just when the senate was bargaining with Brennus a n d h a d agreed to give him 1,0001b. of gold in exchange f o r his d e p a r t u r e . Camillus put a stop to that. T h e city, full of rubble, was n o place f o r a m a j o r e n c o u n t e r but the G a u l s were taken by surprise a n d were scattered. A second e n c o u n t e r was then f o u g h t later 8 miles to the east on the r o a d to Gabii. T h e enemy a r m y was annihilated. It was a decisive t r i u m p h for the R o m a n s which, in c o n j u n c t i o n with the subsequent rebuilding of the City which Camillus organized, earned for him the title of Second F o u n d e r of R o m e . Such is the tale - doubtless largely legend p e r p e t u a t e d in tradition a n d told by Livy. A very different version is given by D i o d o r u s in which Camillus does not f e a t u r e in the City. T h e G a u l s

THE ROMAN

are b o u g h t off with gold a n d take themselves away. H o w e v e r , the gold is recovered a f t e r a defeat of the G a u l s by Camillus shortly a f t e r w a r d s (Veascium, 390). T h e t r u t h of the m a t t e r p r o b a b l y rests with Polybius in his assertion that the G a u l s negotiated a treaty with the R o m a n s a n d returned h o m e safely. Livy himself says as m u c h in a later passage. Polybius points out that the G a u l s h a d good reason to secure a quick settlement a n d a hasty d e p a r t u r e because their o w n c o u n t r y h a d just been invaded. Livy, 5: 49(4-5) and 10: 16(6); Plutarch, Camillus, 22-29; Diodorus, 14: 116; Polybius, 2:18(1-3) V E A S C I U M (390) - Gallic Invasion In the a c c o u n t of D i o d o r u s , the G a u l s , on their way f r o m R o m e a f t e r sacking it, laid siege to the city of Veascium, a place n o w u n k n o w n . T h e dict a t o r Camillus a t t a c k e d them, killed most of them a n d regained possession of the gold which h a d been paid to the G a u l s as the price f o r their d e p a r t u r e f r o m R o m e . This is p r o b a b l y a legendary embellishment, which is at variance with the equally suspect Livian version (above). T h e e n g a g e m e n t , if it occurred, suggests that Veascium might have been the place a few miles east of the City on the r o a d to G a b i i where Livy places a final e n c o u n t e r between Camillus a n d the G a u l s . Diodorus, 14: 117(5)

LANUVIUM (389) T h e Volscians a n d E t r u s c a n s did not give R o m e long to recover f r o m the sack of the City. T h e y saw their c h a n c e of eliminating her completely in her enfeebled state. T o c o m b a t the threat, the veteran Camillus was again a p p o i n t e d dictator, this f o r the third time. He mustered every available ablebodied m a n a n d y o u t h a n d set out to a t t a c k the Volscian c a m p near L a n u v i u m [Lanuvio], south of M o u n t A l b a n [Colli Albani]. T h e news t h a t Camillus was in c o m m a n d in person caused such a panic a m o n g the Volscians that they b l o c k a d e d themselves behind an i m p e n e t r a b l e b a r r i c a d e of logs. Camillus ordered his men to fire the barricade. They b u r n t a way t h r o u g h it. entered the enemy c a m p a n d routed the o c c u p a n t s . T h e y then p u r s u e d the fugitives a n d laid waste their territory until the Volscians at last s u r r e n d e r e d - a f t e r 70 years of repeated w a r f a r e . D i o d o r u s a n d Plutarch give a different a c c o u n t of the defeat of the Volscians in a very different setting ( C a m p u s M a r t i u s , below). It seems virtually certain, however, that all three historians are

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referring to the same battle because they all refer to the a p p o i n t m e n t of Camillus as d i c t a t o r f o r the third time, the use of incendiary tactics, a n d the total s u b j u g a t i o n of the Volsci. Livy, 6: 2

CAMPUS MARTIUS (389) This e n g a g e m e n t is clearly the same decisive battle against the Volscians as the o n e at L a n u v i u m (above) described by Livy, a l t h o u g h in a very different guise a n d setting. A c c o r d i n g to D i o d o r u s a n d Plutarch the Volscians descended on R o m e , in c o n t r a s t to the R o m a n s m a r c h i n g against them. Vastly superior in n u m b e r s , they were o p p o s e d by a R o m a n force e n c a m p e d on the C a m p u s M a r t i u s ( D i o d o r u s ) or M o u n t M a r c i u s (Plutarch). A plea was sent to the City f o r help a n d Camillus, a p p o i n t e d dictator for the third time, enrolled every available m a n . W i t h this relief force he m a r c h e d out at night a n d t o o k up a position in the e n e m y ' s rear. He then set fire to the e n e m y ' s c a m p , driving the Volscians out into the a r m s of the original force, which cut t h e m d o w n almost to a man. Diodorus,

14: 117(1-3);

Plutarch,

Camillus, 34

BOLA (389) A f t e r defeating the Volscians, Camillus proceeded against the Aequi a n d e n c o u n t e r e d their a r m y near Bola. n o r t h - e a s t of M o u n t Algidus [M. Compatri]. H e t o o k them by surprise a n d slew m o s t of t h e m , a c c o r d i n g to D i o d o r u s , c a p t u r i n g b o t h the enemy c a m p a n d the t o w n in the process. F r o m Bola he m a r c h e d against the E t r u s c a n s at S u t r i u m [Sutri], where the enemy were so m u c h off g u a r d a n d disorganized t h a t they surrendered virtually without a fight. Livy, 6: 2(14);

Diodorus.

14:

117(4)

SATRICUM (386) N e w s reached R o m e that the people of A n t i u m were u n d e r a r m s a n d were assembling Volscian forces at Satricum [Conca], c o m b i n e d with large n u m b e r s of Latini a n d Hernici. Camillus, accompanied by Publius Valerius, set out with an a r m y to c o n f r o n t them. O n seeing the huge scale of the o p p o s i t i o n , c o m p o s e d of b o t h old a n d new enemies, the R o m a n s were dispirited a n d required m u c h e x h o r t a t i o n f r o m Camillus w h o eventually a n d in spite of his a d v a n c e d age - charged the enemy in person. His men cheered a n d rushed f o r w a r d as a whole, forcing back the Antiates, w h o were filled with panic at the mere sight of Camillus in the f o r e f r o n t . In their flight they were badly 157


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h a m p e r e d by their very n u m b e r s , m a n y of t h e m being cut d o w n . T h e Latini a n d Hernici deserted a n d went home; the a b a n d o n e d Antiates shut themselves u p in Satricum. T h e next d a y the R o m a n s t o o k the t o w n with the help of scaling ladders, a n d the Volscians surrendered. Livy, 6: 7-8

VELITRAE (382) A new enemy c r o p p e d up. T h e citizens of the colony of Velitrae [Velletri], on the south slope of the A l b a n hills, revolted against R o m e in 383. This disloyalty went u n p u n i s h e d f o r so long t h a t others were beginning to follow suit. In the following year the senate decided to act a n d the c o n s u l a r tribunes, Spurius a n d Lucius Papirius. led out the a r m y . A successful battle was f o u g h t near Velitrae against the colonists, w h o h a d been reinforced with a c o m p a r a b l e n u m b e r of s u p p o r t i n g t r o o p s f r o m Praeneste [Palestrina], T h e enemy fled in retreat to the t o w n , but the tribunes refrained f r o m a t t a c k ing it in view of its status as a colony. Livy, 6: 22(1-3)

h a d the usual beneficial effect. A f t e r a fierce struggle the enemy were finally r o u t e d . Livy, 6: 22(4)-24; Plutarch, Camillus, 37

ALLIA R (380) T h e citizens of Praeneste [Palestrina] were getting restless again. W h e n they heard that the R o m a n s h a d not recruited a new a r m y a n d were bickering a m o n g themselves, they saw t h a t this was their golden o p p o r t u n i t y . T h e y m a r c h e d right u p to the Colline G a t e , which a r o u s e d so m u c h panic in R o m e t h a t Titus Quinctius C i n c i n n a t u s was a p p o i n t e d dictator. O n hearing this, the Praenestini retreated to the river Allia where they set up c a m p , c o n g r a t u l a t i n g themselves on the choice of a site which would be certain to inhibit the R o m a n s by a r o u s i n g g l o o m y memories of their disaster of 10 years b e f o r e (Allia, 390). In the event the R o m a n s launched a cavalry c h a r g e to disrupt the enemy r a n k s a n d followed this u p with an attack on f o o t . T h e enemy could w i t h s t a n d neither. T h e y turned a n d fled back to their town, shut themselves u p in it a n d surrendered. Livy, 6: 28-9

SATRICUM (381) T h e b e h a v i o u r of the Praenestines in allying themselves with the rebellious colony of Velitrae (above) enraged the R o m a n s , w h o declared w a r on them. Praeneste [Palestrina] p r o m p t l y joined forces with the Volscians a n d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n colony of Satricum [Conca], taking it by storm a n d m a l t r e a t i n g their prisoners. This stung the R o m a n s into electing Camillus as c o n s u l a r tribune for the sixth time a n d p u t t i n g him in c h a r g e of the whole c o n d u c t of the war. He set out f o r S a t r i c u m with f o u r legions totalling 16,000 m e n . T h e enemy, c o n f i d e n t in their numerical superiority, were impatient and a d v a n c e d almost up to the R o m a n r a m p a r t . This enraged the R o m a n s so m u c h that the second trib u n e , a brash y o u n g m a n called Lucius Furius, disregarded the p r u d e n c e of Camillus a n d w o r k e d the m e n up to fever pitch. In the ensuing conflict the enemy at first gave way, retiring uphill t o w a r d their c a m p where they h a d left some s t r o n g c o h o r t s . W h e n the R o m a n s b r o k e r a n k s to p u r s u e the 'fugitives' they suddenly f o u n d themselves exposed to attack f r o m the higher g r o u n d . They turned a n d fled back to their c a m p . Camillus could c o n t a i n himself no longer. T h o u g h infirm a n d far a d v a n c e d in years, he was hoisted into his saddle, threw in the reserves, a n d imbued feelings of s h a m e in his fugitives, w h o turned again to face the foe. T h e sight of Camillus in the f r o n t rank 158

SATRICUM (377) T h e Latins a n d the Volscians joined forces a n d c a m p e d near Satricum [Conca], A R o m a n a r m y was sent out against them u n d e r two of the military tribunes, Publius Valerius a n d Lucius Aemilius. They a t t a c k e d the enemy at once a n d were gaining the u p p e r h a n d when violent winds a n d a r a i n s t o r m b r o u g h t the action to a standstill. T h e fighting was resumed next day, on which the enemy stood firm until a cavalry charge threw t h e m into disorder. W h e n the infantry followed this up, the enemy lines b r o k e altogether a n d their t r o o p s scattered a n d fled into Satricum, being cut d o w n by the cavalry as they went. T h a t night the fugitives fled on f r o m Satricum to A n t i u m [Anzio], m o v i n g so speedily that the R o m a n s were u n a b l e even to h a r a s s them. Livy, 6: 32(4) S I G N I A (362) T h e r e h a d been defection a m o n g the Hernici f o r a few years, but as the R o m a n s h a d been battling with internal p r o b l e m s , n o t h i n g h a d been d o n e a b o u t it. Eventually they declared w a r a n d assigned the c o n d u c t of it to Lucius Genucius, w h o was the first of their recently i n t r o d u c e d plebeian consuls to have such full responsibility. This m a t t e r of m a k i n g plebeians a n d patricians alike eligible f o r such posts h a d caused a lot of misgiv-

THE ROMAN

ing. C o n s e q u e n t l y , it was with m u c h b a t i n g of R o m a n b r e a t h that Lucius led out his a r m y against the Hernici near the R o m a n colony of Signia [Segni] - a n d straight into an a m b u s h . Lucius was killed; his a r m y fled. W h e n the news reached Rome, there was less dismay at the disaster t h a n anger a m o n g the patricians over the o m i n o u s effects of a p p o i n t i n g plebeian c o m m a n d e r s . Livy, 7: 6(7-9)

SIGNIA (362) As a result of the debacle at Signia (above), A p p i u s Claudius, w h o h a d o p p o s e d plebeian consuls, was n o m i n a t e d d i c t a t o r a n d levied m o r e t r o o p s . Before they could reach the Hernici a legate in the R o m a n c a m p near Signia, G a i u s Sulpicius by n a m e , h a d started to t u r n the tables. W h e n the Hernici a p p r o a c h e d the s t o c k a d e with over-confidence, he led a sortie which forced them back in disorder. At this point the dictator arrived a n d the two armies joined forces. T h e enemy likewise mobilized every available m a n . T h e t w o armies met in the middle of the two-mile long plain which separated their respective c a m p s . At first the fighting was evenly balanced with n o a d v a n t a g e either way. Repeated charges by the R o m a n cavalry failed to disrupt the enemy lines. Filled with bitter f r u s t r a t i o n , they d i s m o u n t e d a n d charged the enemy on f o o t . So f u r i o u s was their onslaught t h a t they would have crashed right t h r o u g h the lines if they had not c o m e u p against the e n e m y ' s special picked c o h o r t s . T h e resulting clash was b o t h b l o o d y a n d evenly m a t c h e d until the R o m a n s , with a s u p r e m e effort, forced the enemy to give some g r o u n d . This concession was soon turned into a rout as the enemy t o o k to their heels a n d fled back to their c a m p . It was by then t o o late in the d a y for an attack on the c a m p , which the Hernici a b a n d o n e d d u r i n g the night. As their c o l u m n of fugitives passed the walls of Signia, the i n h a b i t a n t s c a m e out a n d 'helped' them on their way. T h e casualties in the battle were heavy on both sides, the R o m a n s losing a q u a r t e r of their men. Livy, 7: 7-8 A N I O R (361) - Gallic Invasion Nearly 30 years a f t e r the R o m a n disaster at the river Allia at the h a n d s of the Gauls, a n o t h e r Gallic incursion t o o k place. Livy confidently asserts that the intruders e n c a m p e d at the third milestone along the Via Salaria on the f a r side of the bridge over the river A n i o [Aniene], Poenus, the dictator, met the challenge by m a r c h i n g forth with an immense a r m y a n d c a m p i n g o p p o s i t e the G a u l s

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at the o t h e r end of the bridge, on the near b a n k of the river. A f t e r a n u m b e r of futile skirmishes for possession of the bridge, a G a u l of gigantic p r o p o r t i o n s a d v a n c e d o n t o it a n d bellowed to the bravest R o m a n to c o m e out a n d fight him in single c o m b a t . T h e challenge was met with a p r o l o n g e d silence until Titus M a n l i u s , with the d i c t a t o r ' s permission, stepped f o r w a r d a n d c o n f r o n t e d the G a u l . W i t h his shield M a n l i u s k n o c k e d u p his o p p o n e n t ' s shield a n d then, raising his sword, slipped in close to the G a u l a n d struck him in the belly with fatal result. He removed a t o r q u e f r o m a r o u n d the dead G a u l ' s neck, t h e n c e f o r t h e a r n i n g f o r himself the n i c k n a m e "Torquatus". T h e G a u l s were so stunned by the defeat of their c h a m p i o n that they t o o k themselves off to T i b u r [Tivoli] a n d allied themselves with the Tiburtines. Livy, 7: 9(6)-ll(l)

C O L L I N E G A T E (360) - Gallic Invasion T i b u r [Tivoli] was behind a lot of d a m a g i n g raids in the region, in which considerable s u p p o r t was provided by the G a u l s . T o the R o m a n s , the Gallic presence necessitated a d i c t a t o r as c o m m a n d e r - i n chief, a n d Q u i n t u s Servilius A h a l a was a p p o i n t e d to the position. He ordered the consul to lead his a r m y against T i b u r a n d to pen the T i b u r t i n e s up in their o w n d o m a i n , while he himself mustered every m a n of military age to deal with the G a u l s . A long a n d b l o o d y battle was f o u g h t within sight of the Colline G a t e with the result that the G a u l s were eventually forced to retreat a n d then to flee. T h e y headed f o r T i b u r where the consul r o u n d e d t h e m u p a n d forced t h e m inside. Livy, 7: 11(3-7) P E D U M (358) - Gallic Invasion T h e G a u l s r e t u r n e d to m e n a c e the R o m a n s again, setting u p c a m p near P e d u m . G a i u s Sulpicius was m a d e dictator to cope with the emergency. W i t h a t h o u g h t f o r the G a u l s ' difficulties a n d steady deterioration t h r o u g h lack of supplies, he decided to p r o l o n g the war a n d instituted severe punishment for a n y o n e w h o a t t a c k e d the enemy without his permission. This enraged his men, w h o became o u t s p o k e n a n d rebellious. A d e p u t a t i o n app r o a c h e d the d i c t a t o r to voice the general grievance, a n d he agreed to meet their wishes. T h e o r d e r was given f o r an e n g a g e m e n t on the following day. In the m e a n t i m e he gave orders f o r the pack-saddles to be taken off the mules, a f t e r which he a r m e d the muleteers a n d told this b o d y of a l m o s t 1,000 men to go u p into the w o o d s in the m o u n t a i n s a b o v e the c a m p by night. T h e y were to 159


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hide themselves until they received a given signal. N e x t m o r n i n g he deployed his t r o o p s a l o n g the slower slopes at the edge of the plain so that the enemy w o u l d be forced to face the m o u n t a i n s behind him. W h e n the G a u l s realized that the R o m a n s h a d lined u p f o r battle, they rushed into the f r a y like m a d creatures. At first they c o n c e n t r a t e d their a t t a c k against the R o m a n right until they were repulsed by a cavalry charge. Sulpicius n o w turned his a t t e n t i o n to his left wing where an assault was brewing, a n d at the same time he gave the signal to the muleteers. W h e n the G a u l s heard the battle-cry c o m i n g f r o m the heights a n d saw the 'cavalry' descending the hillside, they m a d e for their c a m p in h e a d l o n g flight, only to be c o n f r o n t e d by the master of Horse, M a r c u s Valerius. T h e y t u r n e d a n d fled to the m o u n t a i n s into the a r m s of the muleteers. Livy, 7: 12(8-9) and 14(6)-15(8)

PRIVERNUM (357) T h e recorded e n g a g e m e n t s d u r i n g 357 have received n o m o r e t h a n a passing m e n t i o n with the exception of one, which did not resound to the credit of the R o m a n s . T h e consul G a i u s M a r c i u s led a p l u n d e r i n g a r m y w i t h o u t p r o v o c a t i o n into the territory of P r i v e r n u m [Priverno], where peace h a d reigned f o r m a n y years. He let his m e n have their fill of loot. W h e n the i n h a b i t a n t s c a m p e d behind strong e n t r e n c h m e n t s in f r o n t of their walls, the R o m a n s d r o v e them back into their town with a single charge a n d were intent on taking it a n d pillaging it. T h e sight of the scaling ladders led the citizens to surrender. Livy, 7: 16(3-6)

SATRICUM (346) N e w s reached R o m e t h a t Volscian envoys f r o m A n t i u m [Anzio] were trying to stir up the Latin peoples. T h e consul M a r c u s Valerius C o r v u s was t h e r e f o r e ordered to attack the Volscians. H e m a r c h e d against Satricum [Conca] where he was c o n f r o n t e d by the A n t i a t e s a n d o t h e r Volscians, w h o were defeated a n d fled t o the shelter of the city. W h e n the R o m a n s b r o u g h t u p scaling ladders, the i n h a b i t a n t s gave themselves u p to the n u m b e r of a b o u t 4,000 soldiers. Livy, 7: 27(5-8)

CAPUA (343) T h e Samnites m a d e an u n p r o v o k e d a t t a c k u p o n the Sidicini, w h o were weak a n d helpless a n d w h o looked to the C a m p a n i a n s f o r assistance. T h e Samnites then shifted their aim a n d targeted the 160

C a m p a n i a n s with their whole military might. First, they occupied M o u n t T i f a t a a b o u t 3 miles n o r t h of C a p u a . T h e n they descended to the plain between T i f a t a a n d C a p u a a n d f o u g h t the C a m p a n i a n s , w h o lost a n d were driven back within their walls a f t e r losing the best of their fighting force. T h e C a m p a n i a n s sent envoys to the R o m a n s to beg for military assistance, an act which led to the First S a m n i t e W a r (below). Livy, 7: 29(4-7) G A U R U S M (343) - First S a m n i t e W a r R o m e a n d S a m n i u m h a d been at peace. T r o u b l e b r o k e out because the Samnites molested the C a m p a n i a n s ( C a p u a , above), w h o appealed to the R o m a n s for help. T h e senate refused to t a k e up a r m s against the Samnites with w h o m it was already b o u n d by treaty, but it sent envoys to intercede. T h e Samnites, however, were so u n c o m p r o m i s i n g that the senate declared w a r . T h e consul Valerius led out an a r m y against the Samnites a n d c a m p e d near M o u n t G a u r u s , west of N e a p o l i s [Naples]. T h e two a n t a g o n i s t s were so well m a t c h e d in n u m b e r s a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n that the battle raged for a considerable time in which neither side yielded. Eventually Valerius ordered an all-out o n s l a u g h t with a cavalry attack on each wing, while the i n f a n t r y m a d e a final desperate push. Even this failed to shift the enemy at first but they finally showed signs of giving g r o u n d , which was soon turned into a r o u t . M a n y of them were slaughtered b e f o r e nightfall put an end to f u r t h e r pursuit. Livy, 7: 32(2) and 33 S A T I C U L A (343) - First Samnite W a r While Valerius was fighting the Samnites at M o u n t G a u r u s in C a m p a n i a , the o t h e r consul Cornelius was e n c a m p e d with the second a r m y near Saticula in S a m n i u m . W h e n he decided to m o v e against the enemy, his r o u t e t o o k him t h r o u g h densely w o o d e d c o u n t r y in which there was a deep ravine. H e rashly entered the ravine, oblivious to the presence of s u r r o u n d i n g Samnites. I m p e n d i n g disaster was prevented by the initiative of a military tribune, Publius Decius, w h o pointed to a hill which rose a b o v e the w o o d a n d overlooked the enemy c a m p . H e asked to be allowed to take a b o u t 3,000 men in an a t t e m p t to occupy the hill. U n n o t i c e d by the enemy, he climbed to its base t h r o u g h the w o o d l a n d a n d achieved his objective, a t t r a c t i n g the a t t e n t i o n of the enemy a n d allowing the consul to w i t h d r a w u n m o l e s t e d . Decius a n d his m e n stayed o n the hill until it was nearly d a r k a n d then stole quietly d o w n a n d m a d e

THE ROMAN

their escape, picking their way t h r o u g h the sleeping enemy. O n the following m o r n i n g they returned to their o w n c a m p , where Decius immediately p r o p o s e d to the consul t h a t it would be an excellent time to m o u n t an immediate attack on the unsuspecting enemy. T h e consul agreed a n d the a r m y m a r c h e d out. A f t e r taking a safer r o u t e t h a n their previous one they c a u g h t the Samnites off g u a r d , scattered f a r a n d wide a n d often u n a r m e d . T h e enemy fled to their c a m p in terror a n d were b u t c h e r e d when the c a m p was taken. A l t h o u g h this can hardly be described as a p r o p e r battle, the e n g a g e m e n t is of note on a c c o u n t of the m a g n i t u d e of the S a m n i t e losses. Livy puts the figure at 30,000 killed. Livy, 7: 34-36 S U E S S U L A (343) - First S a m n i t e W a r A f t e r their defeat at the h a n d s of the consul Valerius at M o u n t G a u r u s (343) the Samnites mustered f o r a n o t h e r assault and e n c a m p e d near Suessula. A p p e a l s for help were sent by the Suessulani to Valerius, w h o m a r c h e d immediately to the rescue, travelling light. H e chose a site f o r his c a m p which was near the enemy, a n d a l t h o u g h it was small it was a d e q u a t e for his needs. W h e n the Samnites f o r m e d u p f o r battle, n o b o d y c a m e out to challenge t h e m a n d so they a d v a n c e d to the R o m a n c a m p . T h e y were a m a z e d by its small size a n d decided t h a t it presented n o threat to themselves. Clearly the R o m a n s h a d n o t h i n g m u c h in the way of stores a n d provisions a n d would s o o n be starving a n y w a y . T h e Samnites therefore decided that they would a t t e n d to their o w n needs, a n d they scattered a r o u n d the countryside in search of forage. W h e n Valerius saw t h a t the enemy h a d dispersed in this way he led out his m e n a n d captured their c a m p at the first assault. T h e cavalry were then sent out to r o u n d u p a n d slaughter the foragers. T h e n u m b e r slain is not reported but the c a p t u r e of 170 military s t a n d a r d s gives an indication of a sizeable massacre. Livy, 7: 37(4-17) V E S E R I S R (340) - G r e a t L a t i n W a r In 341, a f t e r the First Samnite W a r , the R o m a n s renewed their previous treaty with the Samnites. This upset their m o r e recent allies in C a m p a n i a on whose behalf the war h a d been declared. T h e C a m p a n i a n s then s o u g h t allies a m o n g some of the Latin cities. T h e y in turn h a d their o w n grievances against R o m e , which were f a n n e d into a quarrel a n d eventually an u l t i m a t u m . T h e Roman response was to send out an a r m y u n d e r two

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consuls, w h o c a m p e d near C a p u a . They h a d been joined en route by an a r m y of Samnites, w h o were faithful to the treaty of the previous year. T h e e n g a g e m e n t t o o k place at the f o o t of Vesuvius near a river - p r o b a b l y just a s t r e a m - called the Veseris.* T h e two sides were equally m a t c h e d , but a f t e r a while the first line of the R o m a n left wing started to fall back. Decius M u s , the consul c o m m a n d i n g that wing, ' d e v o t e d ' himself by invoking the gods in a spiritual ritual, a f t e r which he m o u n t e d his horse a n d charged straight into the midst of the enemy h o r d e . Eventually he succumbed to a rain of missiles but not b e f o r e his example h a d inspired his men a n d b r o u g h t confusion to the enemy right wing. T h u s far the veterans had not seen a n y action on either side; b o t h c o m m a n d e r s h a d kept t h e m in reserve. W h e n the consul Titus M a n l i u s ordered the r e a r m o s t line f o r w a r d , the enemy assumed t h a t they were the pick a n d they sent f o r w a r d their own veterans. T h e enemy f o u g h t h a r d , but w h e n they began to show signs of e x h a u s t i o n M a n l i u s gave the signal to his veterans to engage. This fresh a r m y of seasoned a n d rested m e n b r o k e u p the e n e m y ' s f o r m a t i o n , inflicting heavy slaughter. Scarcely a q u a r t e r of t h e m were left alive. A c c o r d i n g to Livy, s o m e historians held that the Samnites did not in fact join the f r a y until they were certain of the o u t c o m e . Livy, 8: 8(19)-10; *W. Smith (ed.), A D i c t i o n a r y of G r e e k a n d R o m a n G e o g r a p h y , 1873\ s.v. Veseris T R I F A N U M (340) - G r e a t Latin W a r N u m i s i u s , the Latin c o m m a n d e r , raised a n o t h e r a r m y f r o m a m o n g the Latin a n d Volscian peoples, w h o were not told the t r u t h a b o u t the disaster at Veseris (above). T h e consul T i t u s M a n l i u s T o r q u a t u s , victor of Veseris, m e t this a r m y near T r i f a n u m in s o u t h e r n L a t i u m . T h e t w o sides plunged straight into a battle which ended with a R o m a n victory. T h e enemy losses were so great that the Latins gave themselves up, followed by the C a m p a n i a n s . This w o u l d have ended the war but f o r the fact that the Latins were m a d e to give u p their territory as p u n i s h m e n t f o r their disloyalty. T h e resentment so engendered ensured t h a t hostilities did not in fact cease. Livy, 8: 11(11-13)

FENECTANE PLAINS (339) - Great Latin War T h e Latins t o o k u p a r m s again in resentment for the loss of their land after their defeat at T r i f a n u m 161


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(above). T h e y were defeated by Q u i n t u s Publilius Philo on the F e n e c t a n e Plains, a place which is now unknown. Livy, 8: 12(5) P E D U M (338) - G r e a t Latin W a r While Publilius Philo was defeating the Latins on the F e n e c t a n e Plains (above), his colleague Tiberius Aemilius M a m e r c i n u s led his a r m y against P e d u m . W h e n he heard that Publilius h a d been decreed a t r i u m p h , he a b a n d o n e d his as yet unfinished c a m p a i g n a n d returned to R o m e to d e m a n d a t r i u m p h f o r himself! T h e senate was o u t r a g e d . P e d u m h a d to wait until the following year, when Lucius F u r i u s Camillus successfully f o u g h t a very p o w e r f u l a r m y f r o m T i b u r which was allied with the Pedani. D u r i n g the battle, which t o o k place in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d of P e d u m , the o c c u p a n t s of the t o w n suddenly sallied out. W i t h p a r t of his a r m y Camillus d r o v e them back inside a n d scaled the walls to c a p t u r e the t o w n , all in the s a m e day. T h e c a p t u r e of this t o w n m a r k e d the beginning of the end of the Latin W a r . T h e consuls, with their m o r a l e at peak level, toured r o u n d the Latin cities c a p t u r i n g each in t u r n until they had s u b d u e d the whole of L a t i u m a n d established their s u p r e m a c y . Livy, 8: 13(6-8) A S T U R A R (338) - G r e a t Latin W a r S o m e of the forces which were m a r c h i n g to the assistance of the Pedani before the battle of P e d u m (above) never reached their destination. Camillus' c o n s u l a r colleague. G a i u s M a e n i u s , intercepted a n d routed forces f r o m Aricia, L a n u v i u m a n d Velitrae near the A s t u r a river, as they were j o i n i n g up with Volscians f r o m A n t i u m . Livy, 8: 13(4-5) M A N D U R I A (338) - T a r e n t i n e W a r s In s o u t h e r n m o s t Italy, the p r o s p e r o u s people of T a r e n t u m started engaging a d v e n t u r e r s f r o m m a i n l a n d Greece to help them protect their interests. T h e first of these 'outsiders' was a S p a r t a n king, A r c h i d a m u s III, w h o perished in a battle against the L u c a n i a n s at M a n d u r i a . T h e details are u n k n o w n . Plutarch, Agis, 3(2) P A N D O S I A (331) - T a r e n t i n e W a r s Seven years a f t e r the d e a t h of A r c h i d a m u s at M a n d u r i a (above), the T a r e n t i n e s engaged his brother-in-law, K i n g A l e x a n d e r of Epirus, in a similar role. In a series of e n g a g e m e n t s he routed 162

n e i g h b o u r i n g armies a n d t o o k several towns. His last e n g a g e m e n t t o o k place near the B r u t t i a n city of P a n d o s i a , where he took u p a position on a triad of hills on each of which he built a c a m p . T h e two subsidiary c a m p s were overwhelmed by a surprise a t t a c k by L u c a n i a n s . A l e x a n d e r , however, m a n aged to b r e a k out of his c a m p , a c c o m p a n i e d by his e n t o u r a g e of L u c a n i a n exiles, but it so h a p p e n e d that they h a d previously m a d e an offer to the enemy to bargain him in exchange for their safe r e t u r n h o m e . H e was killed with a javelin by one of them. Livy, 8: 24 I M B R I N I U M (325) - Second Samnite W a r Peace with the Samnites b r o k e d o w n when, in 327 in an e n d e a v o u r to extend their influence westw a r d , they put a garrison into the G r e e k t o w n of N e a p o l i s [Naples], C a p u a protested a n d the R o m a n s besieged Neapolis. A dictator Lucius Papirius C u r s o r was a p p o i n t e d to m a n a g e the w a r against S a m n i u m . He h a d to p a y a visit to R o m e connected with the auspices a n d a d j u r e d his master of Horse, Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus, not to engage the enemy while he, the dictator, was a w a y . However, Q u i n t u s F a b i u s learnt f r o m scouts that everything seemed very quiet on the Samnite f r o n t , a n d so he marshalled his t r o o p s a n d m a r c h e d on I m b r i n i u m (now u n k n o w n ) , where he e n c o u n t e r e d the Samnites a n d became engaged in a pitched battle. This was an o u t s t a n d i n g success f o r the R o m a n s . A f t e r several charges the cavalry cut their way t h r o u g h , followed by the infantry. A c c o r d i n g to some estimates they slaughtered as m a n y as 20,000 men. Livy, 8: 30(1-7)

C A U D I N E F O R K S (321) - Second Samnite War T h e disastrous c o n f r o n t a t i o n between R o m a n s a n d Samnites at the C a u d i n e F o r k s c a n n o t strictly be termed a battle because no sword was raised. It was a classic a m b u s h , which b r o u g h t unparalleled s h a m e a n d disgrace to the R o m a n s . T h e F o r k s were situated in S a m n i u m between C a p u a a n d Beneventum but the exact site c a n n o t be identified with certainty. T h e Samnite chief, G a i u s P o n t i u s , c a m p e d with his a r m y near C a u d i u m [Montesarchio] a f t e r spreading r u m o u r s a b o u t that the Samnites were in A p u l i a besieging Luceria in strength. These r u m o u r s were reinforced by 'shepherds', w h o were likewise agents of deception. T h e R o m a n s , w h o were e n c a m p e d near Calatia in C a m p a n i a , were

THE ROMAN

keen to go to the assistance of their s t a u n c h Lucerian allies. In view of the r u m o u r s of the Samnite w h e r e a b o u t s , the consuls Titus Veturius Calvinus a n d Spurius P o s t u m i u s decided to take the shorter but m o r e h a z a r d o u s route t h r o u g h the C a u d i n e F o r k s in S a m n i u m . This f e a t u r e consisted of a large grassy bowl s u r r o u n d e d by m o u n t a i n s on all sides. Access to the bowl was by a deep defile t h r o u g h the rocky hills to the west a n d a similar one to the east. T h e R o m a n s gained the central plain by travelling the western gorge, but when they a p p r o a c h e d the eastern exit they f o u n d it blocked by felled trees a n d boulders. A n a t t e m p t to retrace their steps was foiled by a similar blockage of the western a p p r o a c h . T h e enemy occupied the heads of the passes a n d the ridges all a r o u n d . T h e R o m a n s c a m p e d in the plain for the night, but the next day, as all a t t e m p t s to break out were fruitless, they h a d n o alternative but to capitulate. T h e Samnite chief dictated a treaty by g u a r a n t e e , reinforced by hostages, a n d ordered the whole a r m y f r o m the consuls d o w n w a r d s to be sent u n d e r the yoke - the s u p r e m e disgrace a n d h u m i l i a t i o n in the eyes of the R o m a n s . Livy, 9: 2-6(2) S A T I C U L A (316) - Second Samnite W a r T h e R o m a n s wriggled out of the C a u d i n e Peace a n d the g u a r a n t e e s extracted f r o m them a f t e r their humiliation at the C a u d i n e F o r k s (above). Instead, they used the interlude to m a k e a big increase in their a r m e d forces to enable them to resume the Samnite W a r . T h e y then besieged a n d took Luceria [Lucera], c a p t u r e d Satricum [Cone a] t h r o u g h treachery, a n d a t t e m p t e d an assault on Saticula even t h o u g h the Samnites were e n c a m p e d nearby with a large a r m y . W h e n the i n h a b i t a n t s of Saticula m a d e a s u d d e n violent sortie, the R o m a n s f o u n d themselves fighting on two f r o n t s . T h e dict a t o r Lucius Aemilius c o n c e n t r a t e d his e f f o r t s on driving the p o p u l a t i o n back into their t o w n before t u r n i n g to face the Samnites. Victory was slow in c o m i n g but the Samnites were eventually forced back into their c a m p , f r o m which they stole a w a y u n d e r cover of darkness, leaving the R o m a n s to proceed with the siege. In retaliation, the Samnites laid siege to a R o m a n town. Livy, 9: 21; Diodorus, 19: 72(4) S A T I C U L A (315) - Second Samnite W a r T h e siege of Saticula, c o m m e n c e d in 316, continued into the following year w h e n reinforcements arrived f r o m R o m e u n d e r the new dictator, Q u i n t u s F a b i u s . T h e Samnites h a d returned with

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r e i n f o r c e m e n t s a n d were c a m p e d in the same place as in the previous year. T h e y kept riding up to the r a m p a r t s on nuisance raids until the m a s t e r of Horse, Q u i n t u s Aulius, m u s t e r e d all his cavalry a n d charged at t h e m full tilt. It is said that the m a s t e r of H o r s e himself r o d e at the Samnite general with levelled spear a n d killed him outright, w h e r e u p o n the general's b r o t h e r dragged the R o m a n f r o m his saddle a n d wreaked his revenge. T h e forces on b o t h sides then d i s m o u n t e d a n d f o u g h t a r o u n d the bodies. T h e R o m a n s c a m e off best a n d the Samnites a b a n d o n e d Saticula once more. Livy, 9: 22 L A U T U L A E (315) - Second S a m n i t e W a r T h e a c c o u n t s of this e n g a g e m e n t are conflicting. It seems certain that a R o m a n a r m y u n d e r the d i c t a t o r s h i p of Q u i n t u s F a b i u s e n c o u n t e r e d the Samnites in the defile of L a u t u l a e [Powo di Portella] near the coastal t o w n of T a r r a c i n a [Terracina], Livy describes the o u t c o m e of the e n c o u n t e r as indecisive w h e n it was terminated by nightfall, but he a d m i t s that some sources called it a defeat. D i o d o r u s , referring to the place as Laustolae, certainly talks of panic which spread t h r o u g h the whole a r m y a n d led to flight. Aulius alone, he says, stood his g r o u n d a n d gained a hero's d e a t h . (According to Livy, Q u i n t u s Aulius, the master of Horse, h a d been killed earlier in the year at Saticula.) Livy, 9: 23(1-5);

Diodorus,

19:

72(6-7)

T A R R A C I N A (315) - Second S a m n i t e W a r A f t e r his failure in the defile of L a u t u l a e (above) near T a r r a c i n a the dictator, Q u i n t u s Fabius, rested his men for a few d a y s in their c a m p a n d e n d e a v o u r e d to b o o s t their m o r a l e . M e a n w h i l e a relief a r m y was sent out f r o m R o m e u n d e r G a i u s F a b i u s , the m a s t e r of Horse, w h o was to replace the dead Q u i n t u s Aulius. W h e n G a i u s F a b i u s was in the offing, but keeping deliberately out of sight, the dictator drew u p his men a n d engaged the Samnites while G a i u s F a b i u s , on receipt of an agreed signal, a t t a c k e d the enemy in the rear. A f t e r a bitter struggle the R o m a n s w o n a great victory a n d put the enemy to flight. It seems that this e n c o u n t e r recorded by Livy is p e r h a p s the same battle as the o n e placed near T a r r a c i n a by D i o d o r u s w h o , however, assigns it to the following year. D i o d o r u s ' i n f o r m a t i o n is scanty but he records that m o r e t h a n 10,000 Samnites were killed in the pursuit. Livy, 9: 23(6-17); Diodorus, 19: 76(1-2) 163


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C A U D I U M (314) - Second S a m n i t e W a r D i s t u r b a n c e s in C a m p a n i a caused the Samnites to c o n c e n t r a t e their forces in C a u d i u m [ M o n tesarchio], where they would be in a position to a t t a c k C a p u a if a n o p p o r t u n i t y occurred. T h e R o m a n consuls led a p o w e r f u l a r m y to the area and b o t h sides c a m p e d o p p o s i t e each o t h e r in the plain below the C a u d i n e F o r k s . W h e n they f o r m e d u p f o r action, the consul Sulpicius t o o k c h a r g e of the right wing which was very extended; the Samnites extended their left wing to m a t c h . T h e o t h e r consul, Poetelius, t o o k c o m m a n d of the R o m a n left, which was stationed in close f o r m a tion a n d was reinforced with auxiliary c o h o r t s b r o u g h t f o r w a r d f r o m the rear. W i t h these forces Poetelius forced the enemy i n f a n t r y back, whereu p o n the S a m n i t e cavalry on the extreme right wheeled in to the a t t a c k . A s they did so, the R o m a n cavalry charged t h e m at full tilt, t h r o w i n g everything into c o n f u s i o n a n d forcing the enemy to flee f r o m this part of the field. O n the o t h e r flank, the f o r t u n e s were reversed a n d the Samnites b r o k e t h r o u g h the R o m a n lines. T h e R o m a n s , however, regained their c o n f i d e n c e when they saw that their t r o o p s in the rest of the field were victorious. T h e y regained the lost g r o u n d a n d the Samnites gave u p a n d fled. Livy, 9: 27 S U T R I U M (311) - Second Samnite W a r At this point in the S a m n i t e W a r the E t r u s c a n s mobilized a n d intervened by a t t a c k i n g S u t r i u m [Sutri], which was allied with R o m e . T h e consul Aemilius led an a r m y to raise the siege. T h e E t r u s c a n a r m y , which was numerically superior, took the field ready f o r battle a n d the consul drew u p his line not f a r a w a y . T h e r e was no action until a f t e r m i d d a y w h e n the Etruscans, impatient to settle m a t t e r s , raised a s h o u t a n d charged. T h e issue h u n g in the balance f o r a long while until the R o m a n second line was ordered to the f r o n t to relieve the exhausted first line. T h e E t r u s c a n s , w h o h a d no fresh reserves, fell where they f o u g h t . T h e r e was n o rout or flight. T h e survivors were only saved by the a d v e n t of d u s k , when the retreat was sounded. Livy, 9: 32 S U T R I U M (310) - Second Samnite W a r As the E t r u s c a n s h a d resumed the siege of S u t r i u m [Sutri], the consul Q u i n t u s F a b i u s led an a r m y to relieve it. At the foot of the m o u n t a i n s (the peak of M o u n t Ciminius is only 10 miles f r o m Sutrium), he was c o n f r o n t e d by the E t r u s c a n s d r a w n up f o r 164

battle in huge n u m b e r s . T o gain some a d v a n t a g e against their numerical superiority he led his m e n up the lower slopes of the hills. T h e enemy rushed into battle b r a n d i s h i n g their swords to be met by javelins a n d rocks, which threw t h e m into disorder. T h e y were u n a b l e t o get to close q u a r t e r s until the R o m a n s did it f o r them by c h a r g i n g downhill a n d r o u t i n g them. T h e fugitives were barred f r o m their c a m p by the R o m a n cavalry a n d fled instead into the Ciminian Forest. M a n y t h o u s a n d s of t h e m were killed. Livy, 9: 35 P E R U S I A (310) - Second Samnite W a r A f t e r his rout of the E t r u s c a n s near S u t r i u m (above), the consul F a b i u s decided to p u r s u e them a n d to extend the sphere of activity n o r t h w a r d s into central E t r u r i a . He successfully eluded the E t r u s c a n g u a r d s a n d t o o k his a r m y by the most direct r o u t e t h r o u g h the dense, d r e a d e d a n d d a n gerous Ciminian forest to the plain on the far side. In the m e a n t i m e the E t r u s c a n s h a d assembled a large a r m y , a n d they c a m p e d in the plain not far f r o m the R o m a n r a m p a r t s . But their enemy showed no sign of fighting. Eager for a battle, m a n y of the E t r u s c a n s m o v e d u p to the R o m a n r a m p a r t s a n d decided to stay there until the enemy c a m e o u t . T h e n in the small h o u r s of the night the R o m a n s were w o k e n a n d d r a w n u p within their defences. Shortly b e f o r e d a w n they burst out of the c a m p a n d a t t a c k e d . M a n y of the E t r u s c a n s were killed while still asleep or only half-awake; the rest had no time to a r m themselves. T h e y were pursued as they fled to the w o o d s or their c a m p , but the c a m p itself was taken later. It is stated that a b o u t 60,000 were killed o r c a p t u r e d . In consequence, envoys f r o m Perusia a n d o t h e r cities sought a treaty with the R o m a n s . T h e y were g r a n t e d a truce for 30 years. Livy holds that this battle was f o u g h t on the south side of the C i m i n i a n forest near S u t r i u m [Sutri] but he notes that o t h e r historians place it on the n o r t h side near Perusia [Perugia], D i o d o r u s is o n e of them. His c o n t e n t i o n is s u p p o r t e d by the m o v e m e n t s of F a b i u s , w h o had c o m e f r o m S u t r i u m a f t e r the battle there earlier in the year a n d w h o aimed to carry hostilities n o r t h w a r d s . Livy, 9: 36(9)-37; Diodorus, 20: 35(1-3) V A D I M O N I S L (310) - Second Samnite W a r In c o n t i n u a t i o n of the E t r u s c a n take-over of w h a t h a d started as a Samnite war, a fierce battle was f o u g h t near L a k e V a d i m o (the English f o r m of the Latin n a m e ) [Lago di Bassano] in which neither

THE ROMAN

R o m a n s n o r E t r u s c a n s yielded an inch. As the f r o n t line fell, the next line t o o k its place until the cavalry d i s m o u n t e d a n d a d v a n c e d to the fore. Eventually the E t r u s c a n s began to break, a f t e r which their flight gathered m o m e n t u m . Their c a m p was sacked. Livy goes so f a r as to say t h a t on that d a y the power of the E t r u s c a n s was b r o k e n f o r the first time. Livy, 9: 39(4-11) T A L I U M (310) - Second S a m n i t e W a r D i o d o r u s reports a battle at a place called T a l i u m . in which the R o m a n consuls defeated the Samnites. T a l i u m is n o w u n k n o w n . O n the following day, a second battle t o o k place in which m a n y of the Samnites were either killed or t a k e n prisoner. O n e or o t h e r of these e n c o u n t e r s m a y have been the overwhelming victory of the dictator Papirius C u r s o r in S a m n i t e territory which Livy recounts w i t h o u t a n y reference to place. Livy does not, however, m e n t i o n t w o battles. Diodorus, 20: 26(3-4); Livy, 9: 40(1-14) P E R U S I A (308) - Second Samnite W a r T h e E t r u s c a n s ' military might was severally atten u a t e d a f t e r their defeat near Lake V a d i m o (310). T h e r e m n a n t s were engaged by the consul F a b i u s near Perusia [Perugia], a city which h a d b r o k e n the recent 30-year truce granted a f t e r the earlier battle there (Perusia, 310). H e w o n a clear victory a n d would have proceeded to t a k e the t o w n if the i n h a b i t a n t s h a d not surrendered it. Livy, 9: 40(18-21); Diodorus, 20: 35(4) M E V A N I A (308) - Second Samnite W a r As the Etruscans settled in peace, the U m b r i a n s arose in revolt. T h e consul F a b i u s m o v e d against them at M e v a n i a [Bevagna] where they were gathered, a n d they launched f o r t h into an unusual sort of battle. T h e enemy did not wait for a seco n d but started rushing wildly over the R o m a n s ' e a r t h w o r k s while the consul was still entrenching his c a m p . W h e n the consul h a d assembled his forces a n d let them off the leash, they seemed to be a t t a c k i n g men w h o were u n a r m e d . T h e R o m a n s wrenched the s t a n d a r d s f r o m the bearers' h a n d s a n d dragged the bearers bodily to the consul, t h e r e a f t e r returning to the melee for a f u r t h e r grab. T h e m e t h o d s were those of dragging, p u s h i n g and shoving, using shields rather than swords. In consequence, m a n y m o r e of the enemy were c a p t u r e d t h a n killed; the rest surrendered. Livy, 9:

41(8-20)

WORLD

A L L I F A E (307) - Second S a m n i t e W a r In recognition of the successes of Q u i n t u s F a b i u s , the senate extended his c o m m a n d into the following year, in which he proceeded to defeat the Samnite a r m y n e a r Allifae [Alife] in n o uncertain way. T h e enemy were routed a n d driven back to their c a m p , which was s u r r o u n d e d by the R o m a n s b e f o r e d a r k n e s s fell. Early next m o r n i n g the Samnites surrendered a n d all were sent u n d e r the yoke. Livy, 9:

42(6-7)

TIFERNUM (305) ) B O V I A N U M (305) > - S e c o n d S a m n i t e W a r

TIFERNUM (305) J T h e Samnites c o n t i n u e d their warlike activities, carrying out raids in C a m p a n i a . Accordingly the two consuls were sent o u t . b o t h to S a m n i u m but to different areas. Lucius P o s t u m i u s m a d e f o r Tifern u m , a t o w n n o w u n k n o w n in the region of M o u n t T i f e r n u s [Miietto], T h e r e he engaged the enemy w h o , a c c o r d i n g to some of Livy's sources, were definitely defeated. Others, however, m a i n t a i n e d that the fighting was indecisive a n d that Postumius, feigning fright, led his t r o o p s by night into the m o u n t a i n s where he built a secure c a m p . T h e enemy followed him a n d c a m p e d n e a r b y . Leaving a garrison in the c a m p , P o s t u m i u s crept out with his legions a n d went to join his colleague Tiberius M i n u c i u s w h o was c o n f r o n t i n g a n o t h e r S a m n i t e a r m y near B o v i a n u m [Bojano], Minucius at B o v i a n u m h a d been engaging the enemy in a long a n d indecisive battle w h e n Post u m i u s arrived a n d threw his fresh legions into the a t t a c k . T h e enemy were by then t o o exhausted to escape a n d they a r e said to have been completely annihilated. T h e R o m a n s c a p t u r e d 21 s t a n d a r d s . A f t e r their c o m b i n e d success against the Samnites at B o v i a n u m the consuls P o s t u m i u s a n d M i n u c i u s m a r c h e d to the c a m p which P o s t u m i u s h a d left garrisoned in the region of M o u n t Tifernus. T h e Samnites in that area h a d c a m p e d 2 miles away. Both consuls a t t a c k e d them a n d put t h e m to flight, c a p t u r i n g 26 s t a n d a r d s as well as the Samnite c o m m a n d e r , Statius Gellius. Peace with S a m n i u m was restored the following year. Livy, 9: 44(5-13); c f . Diodorus, 20: 90(3-4) T H U R I A E (302) - T a r e n t i n e W a r s An extension of the Samnite W a r into Apulia caused uneasiness a m o n g the T a r e n t i n e s , w h o once again invited assistance f r o m outside as at M a n d u r i a (338) a n d P a n d o s i a (331). A G r e e k fleet u n d e r C l e o n y m u s the S p a r t a n landed a n d 165


WORLDS

c a p t u r e d the city of T h u r i a e ( u n k n o w n ) in the territory of the Sallentini in C a l a b r i a . A R o m a n a r m y was sent against the G r e e k s , routed them a n d d r o v e them back to their ships, but some said that C l e o n y m u s h a d already d e p a r t e d w i t h o u t setting eyes on any R o m a n s . Livy, 10: 2(1-3) B O V I A N U M (298) - T h i r d S a m n i t e W a r T h e T h i r d Samnite W a r arose f r o m a c o m p l a i n t to the consuls by the L u c a n i a n s against the Samnites, w h o m they accused of having invaded their territory. T h e R o m a n s agreed to a treaty with Lucania a n d issued an o r d e r to the Samnites to w i t h d r a w f r o m L u c a n i a n territory. T h e Samnites were inflexible a n d so the senate called f o r war. T h e consul G n a e u s Fulvius m a r c h e d out against the Samnites a n d f o u g h t a ' f a m o u s ' battle near B o v i a n u m [Bojano] in S a m n i u m , but n o details seem to be available. Livy, 10: 12(1-3) and (9) V O L A T E R R A E (298) - T h i r d Samnite W a r While the third w a r with the Samnites was getting u n d e r way, the E t r u s c a n s also were p r e p a r i n g f o r a r e s u m p t i o n of hostilities in c o n t r a v e n t i o n of the existing truce. T h e consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio m a r c h e d out against t h e m a n d was c o n f r o n t e d by his enemy near V o l a t e r r a e [Volterra]. T h e fight was a long a n d h a r d one, with heavy losses on both sides a n d n o clear result either way by nightfall. In the m o r n i n g when the R o m a n s m a r c h e d out there was no enemy to fight. T h e E t r u s c a n s h a d slunk a w a y in the night, thereby conceding the victory. Livy, 10: 12(1-6) T I F E R N U M (297) - T h i r d Samnite W a r T h e consuls f o r the year were Q u i n t u s F a b i u s M a x i m u s (for the f o u r t h time) a n d Publius Decius M u s (for the third time). They led their armies into S a m n i u m by different routes. F a b i u s ' scouts were quick to spot that the Samnites were d r a w n u p in a r e m o t e valley near T i f e r n u m with the object of a m b u s h i n g a n d a t t a c k i n g the R o m a n s f r o m higher g r o u n d . F a b i u s brazenly led his men in s q u a r e f o r m a t i o n right u p to the e n e m y ' s place of concealment. As their ruse was obviously no secret, the Samnites descended to level g r o u n d to fight a regular e n g a g e m e n t . This proved to be evenly m a t c h e d . N o w h e r e did the enemy give g r o u n d a n d so F a b i u s ordered the cavalry to charge. T h e Samnites resisted even this a n d stayed firm. As a p r e c a u t i o n , F a b i u s h a d also a d o p t e d a s t r a t a g e m . 166

He h a d w i t h d r a w n the veterans of the first legion f r o m the battle a n d h a d asked t h e m to take a circuitous r o u t e to the hills just behind the enemy a n d to climb up f r o m the far side. At the sight of this party descending in their rear, the Samnites assumed or were led to believe that the second consul h a d arrived with a fresh a r m y , while they themselves were in an exhausted state. T h e t h o u g h t created panic a n d they fled f a r a n d wide. T w e n t y - t h r e e s t a n d a r d s were c a p t u r e d a n d 3,400 of the enemy were killed. Livy, 10: 14

BENEVENTUM (MALEVENTUM) (297) Third Samnite W a r While Q u i n t u s F a b i u s was engaging the Samnites near T i f e r n u m , his colleague Publius Decius was c a m p i n g near M a l e v e n t u m (called Beneventum [Benevento] a f t e r 268) to prevent the A p u l i a n s f r o m j o i n i n g up with the Samnites. He drew them into battle a n d defeated them in an e n g a g e m e n t which was m o r e flight t h a n fight. Only 2,000 A p u l i a n s were killed. T h e r e a f t e r the two consuls joined forces a n d spent f o u r m o n t h s ravaging the land a n d destroying everything. Livy, 10: 15(1-2) V O L T U R N U S R (296) - T h i r d Samnite W a r At a time when the entire R o m a n w a r m a c h i n e was mainly directed against the Etruscans, the S a m nites seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to invade C a m p a n i a a n d despoil the land. A t that time the consul V o l u m n i u s was returning to S a m n i u m a n d he changed his course to intercept the enemy w h o , he learnt, were e n c a m p e d on the river V o l t u r n u s [Volturno], He e n c a m p e d just f a r e n o u g h f r o m t h e m to prevent t h e m learning of his presence. T h e next m o r n i n g he heard f r o m spies t h a t the enemy were leaving to r e t u r n to S a m n i u m a n d that they h a d so m u c h b o o t y that they were in complete disorder, each m a n fending for himself. W h a t a heaven-sent o p p o r t u n i t y ! T h e consul charged the e n e m y ' s c o l u m n a n d o v e r p o w e r e d the m e n with little difficulty as most of them carried spoils in preference to a r m s . T h e c a m p was then assaulted with a predictable result. T o a d d to the Samnites' turmoil, their prisoners b r o k e loose. M o r e o v e r , the prisoners seized the S a m n i t e general a n d led him, still m o u n t e d , to the R o m a n consul. A total of 6,000 Samnites were slain a n d 2,500 were taken prisoner. T h e R o m a n losses, p r o b a b l y m i n u t e , are not recorded; on the o t h e r h a n d , they did recover 7,400 prisoners a n d a vast a m o u n t of stolen loot. Livy, 10: 20

THE ROMAN

C A M E R I N U M (295) - Third Samnite W a r T h e a r m e d forces of the Etruscans, Samnites, U m b r i a n s a n d G a u l s were c o m b i n i n g into a massive force with the intention of finally s u b d u i n g R o m e . As a f o r e t a s t e of things to come, a c o m bined force of Samnites a n d G a u l s arrived in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d of C a m e r i n u m [Camerino] in U m b r i a (erroneously referred to as Clusium by Livy). Scipio, the c o m m a n d e r of the R o m a n c a m p , was conscious of his numerical inferiority a n d led his men u p a hill between his c a m p a n d the town. T h r o u g h i n a d e q u a t e reconnaissance he was u n a ware that the enemy h a d already a p p r o a c h e d it f r o m the o t h e r side. T h e legion was a t t a c k e d a n d s u r r o u n d e d , incurring heavy losses or, as some authorities say, total destruction. Livy, 10: 26(7-11); Polybius, 2:19(5) S E N T I N U M (295) - T h i r d S a m n i t e W a r A few d a y s a f t e r C a m e r i n u m (above), the consuls, Q u i n t u s F a b i u s (for the fifth time) a n d Publius Decius ( f o u r t h time), led out all their forces a n d e n c o u n t e r e d the enemy near Sentinum in U m b r i a . T h e enemy decided t o split their forces. T h e Samnites a n d G a u l s were to engage the R o m a n s while the U m b r i a n s a n d E t r u s c a n s a t t a c k e d the R o m a n c a m p . These plans were foiled by deserters w h o disclosed t h e m to Fabius. H e then sent messages to the c o m m a n d e r s of t w o o t h e r R o m a n armies which h a d been stationed not far f r o m R o m e , asking them to m o v e to Clusium a n d devastate E t r u s c a n lands. This forced the Etruscans to w i t h d r a w f r o m Sentinum. F a b i u s a n d Decius n o w tried to t e m p t the enemy into action. F o r t w o days the enemy declined the challenge, but on the third d a y b o t h sides lined u p a n d engaged. T h e t w o sides were well m a t c h e d but progress on the t w o wings was very dissimilar. F a b i u s , on the R o m a n right, knew f r o m long experience t h a t b o t h Samnites a n d G a u l s tended to flag if the struggle dragged on. Faced with the Samnites, he deliberately p r o l o n g e d the battle. W h e n he was certain of their fatigue, he urged his m e n on, threw in all his reserves a n d ordered the cavalry to charge the enemy flank. This was t o o m u c h for t h e m a n d they fled back to c a m p . M a t ters were very different on the R o m a n left where Decius, y o u n g e r a n d m o r e strong-headed t h a n F a b i u s , p o u r e d in all his resources f r o m the start. He called on the cavalry to a t t a c k , b u t at the seco n d c h a r g e they were carried on t o o far into the midst of the enemy infantry. H e r e they were met by a c o u n t e r c h a r g e of chariots a n d w a g g o n s driven by a r m e d G a u l s , which terrified the R o m a n

WORLD

m o u n t s . T h e cavalry were o v e r t h r o w n a n d the legionaries were t r a m p l e d u n d e r f o o t a n d r u n over by vehicles. W h e n Decius saw the havoc, he ' d e v o t e d ' himself as his f a t h e r h a d d o n e at Veseris (340) a n d galloped into the Gallic lines, t h r o w i n g himself on their w e a p o n s . This h a d the desired effect. T h e R o m a n s a b a n d o n e d their flight a n d returned to the fight. At this point, reserves t a k e n by F a b i u s f r o m his r e a r m o s t line arrived in supp o r t . In the face of this renewed pressure, the tightly p a c k e d G a u l s f o r m e d themselves into a defensive testudo ('tortoise' shell of o v e r l a p p i n g shields). F a b i u s then detached the 500-strong C a m p a n i a n cavalry s q u a d r o n a n d ordered them to circle r o u n d a n d attack the G a u l s in the rear. T h e cavalry were followed by the third legion, with instructions to m a k e the most of the disarray a n d panic caused by the C a m p a n i a n s . F a b i u s then rode to the Samnite c a m p , to which the terrified h o r d e was being driven, a n d a f t e r a short struggle the c a m p was taken. E n e m y losses were 25,000 killed including the Samnite c o m m a n d e r , Gellius Egnatius; 8,000 were taken prisoner. T h e a r m y of Publius Decius lost 7,000 men; F a b i u s lost 1,700. Livy, 10: 26(14)-29; Polybius, 2: 19(6) T I F E R N U S M (295) - T h i r d S a m n i t e W a r While the great battle of S e n t i n u m was in progress, the proconsul Lucius V o l u m n i u s was c a m p a i g n i n g in S a m n i u m where he forced a S a m n i t e a r m y up M o u n t T i f e r n u s [Miletto] a n d then routed it a n d put it to flight. Livy, 10: 30(7) C A I A T I A (295) - T h i r d Samnite W a r Despite the R o m a n victories at Sentinum a n d M o u n t T i f e r n u s earlier in the year, there was still n o peace in S a m n i u m or Etruria. S o m e of the Samnite legions were pursued by A p p i u s Claudius, others by Lucius V o l u m n i u s . T h e Samnites then c a m e together a n d took u p a position near Caiatia [Caiazzo], where A p p i u s a n d V o l u m n i u s also joined forces. In the ensuing battle the S a m n i t e losses were 16,300 killed a n d 2,700 c a p t u r e d ; the R o m a n s lost 2,700. Livy, 10: 31(5-7) L U C E R I A (294) - T h i r d Samnite W a r In the w o r d s of Livy, there are still m o r e Samnite wars to be recounted. W h e n the Samnites were a t t a c k i n g Luceria [Lucera] in Apulia, the consul M a r c u s Atilius led his legions to the rescue. T h e Samnites f o u g h t so fiercely a n d so well that the R o m a n losses were m u c h the greater. T h e 167


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R o m a n s , u n a c c u s t o m e d to reverses, became dispirited. A l t h o u g h the Samnites were the clear victors in the preliminary e n c o u n t e r , they t o o were lacking in m a r t i a l zeal a n d w a n t e d to retire without a f u r t h e r fight. Their difficulty lay in the fact t h a t the only r o a d led p a s t the R o m a n c a m p . T h e R o m a n s , however, were in a state of virtual m u t i n y . T h e consul tried h a r d with minimal success to put some life into his men. Eventually, when the Samnites started to a p p r o a c h d o w n the r o a d , the R o m a n s reluctantly straggled out of their c a m p . S o m e sort of e n c o u n t e r was inevitable because each side t h o u g h t that the other was determined to fight, a l t h o u g h n o t h i n g was f u r t h e r f r o m the t r u t h . B o t h sides f o r m e d u p in line, but n o b o d y m o v e d . Atilius then sent in a few squad r o n s of cavalry but f o r the most p a r t they were u n h o r s e d . T h e rest t r a m p l e d on the R o m a n soldiers w h o h a d gone to their help. This was e n o u g h to start a r o u t which sent the entire R o m a n a r m y h e a d i n g f o r its c a m p . T h e consul took decisive action. He placed a cavalry g u a r d on the gate a n d issued an o r d e r that a n y b o d y , R o m a n o r Samnite, w h o m a d e f o r the r a m p a r t should be treated as an enemy. T h e cavalry levelled their spears at their o w n side a n d d r o v e the i n f a n t r y back. Eventually the a r m y turned to face the enemy, w h o h a d still refrained f r o m pressing a n y a t t a c k . T h e e x h o r t a tions of the consul were ultimately rewarded with success. His men developed some martial zest a n d d r o v e the Samnites back to their pile of baggage in the r o a d , where they f o r m e d a circle a r o u n d it. This was rapidly dispelled by an onslaught of the R o m a n i n f a n t r y f r o m the f r o n t while the cavalry a t t a c k e d the rear. T h e n u m b e r of Samnites t a k e n prisoner reached 7,800, a n d they were sent u n d e r the yoke; nearly 5,000 h a d been killed. However, the R o m a n s t o o h a d suffered badly, with an overall loss of 7,800 m e n in the t w o d a y s of conflicts. Livy,

10:

35-36(15)

A Q U I L O N I A (293) - T h i r d Samnite W a r T h e Samnites were well p r e p a r e d f o r a s h o w d o w n . T h e y h a d held a levy of all those of military age a n d h a d told the whole a r m y , n u m b e r i n g in excess of 36,000, to report at A q u i l o n i a [Lacedonia], T h e consuls left R o m e separately a n d led their armies into S a m n i u m , where Papirius arrived outside Aquilonia; Carvilius c a m p e d outside C o m i n i u m [San Donato Val di Comino] a b o u t 20 miles away. T h e y a r r a n g e d that when Papirius a t t a c k e d , Carvilius would d o likewise at C o m i n i u m to 168

prevent the Samnites there f r o m sending relief to A q u i l o n i a . Before taking the field Papirius ordered a legate, Spurius N a u t i u s , to take the mules with three c o h o r t s of allied t r o o p s by a hidden r o u t e to a hill in full view a n d to await a given signal. T h e e n c o u n t e r then c o m m e n c e d a n d was in the R o m a n s ' f a v o u r f r o m the start. T h e Samnites were h a r d pressed a n d cut d o w n right, left a n d centre. In the middle of the c a r n a g e a dense cloud of dust was seen c o m i n g over a hill, a p p a r e n t l y raised by a great a r m y . It was stirred up by N a u t i u s a n d his cavalry of muleteers, w h o were trailing branches a l o n g the g r o u n d . A s h o u t was raised that C o m i n i u m h a d fallen a n d t h a t here was the o t h e r a r m y c o m i n g to their s u p p o r t . As the coup de grace, Papirius gave a p r e a r r a n g e d signal to the cavalry to charge against the enemy with full force. This routed them, a n d they were p u r s u e d in every direction as they fled. T h e t o w n was c a p t u r e d shortly a f t e r w a r d s . T h e Samnite losses on t h a t day were 20,340 killed a n d 3,870 t a k e n prisoner, with the c a p t u r e of 97 s t a n d a r d s . T h e R o m a n casualties are not recorded. Livy, 10: 38-42

H E R C U L A N E U M (293) - T h i r d Samnite W a r As a result of the battle of A q u i l o n i a (above), there was n o r e m a i n i n g Samnite a r m y which was capable of a pitched battle. A t t a c k s on Samnite cities were the only f o r m of w a r f a r e left to the R o m a n s . But at H e r c u l a n e u m in S a m n i u m (a place n o w u n k n o w n ) the consul Carvilius h a d to fight a regular battle. T h e result was ' u n c e r t a i n ' a n d his losses were greater then the enemy's. However, he recouped by shutting the enemy inside their t o w n , which he s t o r m e d a n d t o o k . Livy, 10: 45(8-11)

A R R E T I U M (284) - Gallic Invasion T h e G a u l s h a d been checked at S e n t i n u m (295) but not crushed. Ten years later they reinvaded E t r u r i a a n d besieged A r r e t i u m [Arezzo], A R o m a n relief force a t t a c k e d the enemy b e f o r e the walls, but it was defeated a n d the p r a e t o r was killed. M a n i u s C u r i u s D e n t a t u s was a p p o i n t e d in his place. H e sent a delegation to negotiate the r e t u r n of prisoners, but the G a u l s treacherously massacred the envoys. In reprisal, C u r i u s D e n t a tus led a R o m a n force against the Senones, the Gallic tribe responsible, a n d defeated them in a pitched battle at an unspecified place in their o w n territory. He d r o v e them f r o m their h o m e l a n d . Polybius, 2: 19(7-11)

THE ROMAN

V A D I M O N I S L (283) - Gallic Invasion W h e n the Boii saw the expulsion of the Senones f r o m their h o m e l a n d a f t e r the battle at A r r e t i u m (above), they feared a similar fate for themselves. T h e y mobilized their forces, called on the Etruscans f o r help a n d m a r c h e d in the direction of R o m e . T h e i r progress was arrested some 50 miles short of the City by P. Cornelius Dolabella, w h o f o u g h t a n d defeated them near L a k e V a d i m o [Lago di Bassano]. T h e E t r u s c a n s were largely wiped out a n d only a few of the Boii escaped. Polybius, 2: 20(1-3) P O P U L O N I A (282) - Gallic Invasion In spite of their disaster at L a k e V a d i m o (above), the Boii a n d the E t r u s c a n s again joined forces in the next year a n d challenged the R o m a n s . Again they suffered a total defeat. A m o d e r n historian cites P o p u l o n i a , a t o w n on the E t r u s c a n coast, as the site of the battle but the evidence f o r this is unclear. A f t e r the battle, the Boii sued f o r peace. T h e y remained on peaceful terms with R o m e f o r nearly half a century. Polybius, 2: 20(4-5)

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yet arrived, he m a r c h e d out a n d pitched c a m p near the river Siris [Sinni] not f a r f r o m Heraclea [Policoro] in Lucania only to find that the R o m a n s were close by on the o t h e r side of the river. Laevinus was a n x i o u s to forestall the arrival of reinforcem e n t s f o r P y r r h u s , a n d he m a n a g e d to cross the river despite the g u a r d which P y r r h u s h a d stationed. P y r r h u s o p p o s e d him with a c h a r g e by his 3,000 m o u n t e d t r o o p s . W h e n these forces started to give g r o u n d , he o r d e r e d his i n f a n t r y to charge. T h e R o m a n s in their turn gave g r o u n d a n d so the battle seesawed m a n y times. Eventually the R o m a n s were driven back by P y r r h u s ' e l e p h a n t s which created panic in the R o m a n horses. As the enemy faltered, P y r r h u s launched a charge with his Thessalian cavalry, which routed them. A c c o r d i n g to one source q u o t e d by Plutarch, the R o m a n s lost nearly 15,000 m e n a n d P y r r h u s 13,000, but a n o t h e r of his sources q u o t e d m o r e m o d e s t figures of 7.000 a n d 4,000 respectively. P y r r h u s ' victory was sufficiently impressive to win over o t h e r G r e e k cities as well as the L u c a n i a n s a n d Samnites to his side. Plutarch, P y r r h u s , 16(3)-17; Zonaras, 8: 3; Orosius, 4; 1(8-15); Livy, e p i t o m e 13

TARENTUM (282) - Tarentine War T h e R o m a n s sent an a d m i r a l , Lucius Valerius, with a small fleet on some e r r a n d to the G u l f of T a r e n t u m [Tar an to]. O n the supposition that the T a r e n t i n e s were friendly, he a n c h o r e d off their city. His move, however, caused bitter resentment. T h e T a r e n t i n e s h a d been associating clandestinely with various enemies of R o m e , a n d their guilt feelings a r o u s e d the suspicion that Valerius was sailing against them. T h e y set sail a n d a t t a c k e d him in his innocence a n d sank his flag-ship a n d m a n y others. T h e R o m a n s responded by sending envoys but the T a r e n t i n e s merely m o c k e d t h e m , which g o a d e d the R o m a n s into a declaration of war. Dio Cassius, 9: (5-6); Zonaras, 1(1); Livy, e p i t o m e 12

8, 2; Orosius,

4:

H E R A C L E A (280) - T a r e n t i n e (Pyrrhic) W a r With a war i m p e n d i n g between R o m e a n d T a r e n t u m , the T a r e n t i n e s as usual resorted to military leadership f r o m a b r o a d . T h e y invited P y r r h u s of Epirus to c o m e a n d m a n a g e their affairs. P y r r h u s ' voyage to Italy was beset by squalls a n d he eventually t o o k to the water a n d struggled a s h o r e like a d a m p squib. With w h a t remained of his force he proceeded to T a r e n t u m , where he heard that the consul Valerius Laevinus was advancing against him with a large army. A l t h o u g h his allies h a d not

ASCULUM SATRIANUM (279, spring) T a r e n t i n e (Pyrrhic) W a r P y r r h u s ' second e n c o u n t e r with the R o m a n s occurred in Apulia, which he h a d invaded. H e a t t a c k e d the R o m a n s , u n d e r G a i u s Fabricius, at the city of A s c u l u m [Ascoli Satriano] but the terrain was u n f a v o u r a b l e f o r b o t h cavalry a n d elep h a n t s . T h e fighting was fierce a n d there were heavy losses before nightfall ended the hostilities. T h e next d a y P y r r h u s forced a fight on even terrain, which he occupied at first light. He launched a charge with his heavy i n f a n t r y in close f o r m a tion, forcing the R o m a n s to o p p o s e him with their swords against his pikes. A f t e r a long struggle the battle was t u r n i n g in P y r r h u s ' f a v o u r when the coup de grace was administered by his elephants. Even the R o m a n s could not stand u p to their weight a n d unstoppability. Six t h o u s a n d of the R o m a n s were killed; P y r r h u s , however, lost rather m o r e t h a n half of that n u m b e r . Such is the account given by Plutarch, but other sources differ in m a n y respects. Dionysius speaks of only o n e battle but he d o e s tell us that the two armies were r e a s o n a b l y m a t c h e d with Pyrrhus fielding 70,000 f o o t against a s o m e w h a t larger R o m a n force. P y r r h u s , on the o t h e r h a n d , was slightly superior in cavalry a n d h a d 19 elephants. Dionysius also lists the various nationals 169


WORLDS

comprising each army and details their battle order. However, he fails to follow up this information with a clear and orderly account of the battle as a whole or with any meaningful casualty figures. He maintains that Pyrrhus' elephants were stopped by R o m a n waggons equipped with jibs carrying firebearing grapnels, but Pyrrhus' light-armed troops disabled the waggons. Fighting was eventually brought to an end by sunset in an action which was thoroughly indecisive, a conclusion with which Livy agrees. Other sources, however, contend that the outcome was a defeat for Pyrrhus (Dio) or even a disaster (Orosius). The casualty figures given by Orosius were 5,000 for the R o m a n s as against a massive 20,000 on Pyrrhus' side - a result which could hardly rate even as a 'Pyrrhic' victory! Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 21(5-10); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 20: 1-3; Zonaras, 8: 5; Orosius, 4: 1 (19-23); Livy, epitome 13 STRAITS OF MESSINA (276) - Tarentine (Pyrrhic) W a r After the battle of Asculum (above), Pyrrhus received a delegation inviting him to visit Sicily. He accepted, but his high hopes did not materialize and he returned to Italy under a cloud. While he was crossing the straits with 110 decked ships and m a n y auxiliary vessels, the Carthaginians attacked him. At that time the R o m a n s had no more than a few ships, and the Carthaginians provided the fleet against Pyrrhus under a treaty. They sank 70 of his ships and disabled m a n y others. Appian, Samnite History, 12(2); Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 24(1) B E N E V E N T U M (275) - Tarentine (Pyrrhic) War Pyrrhus entered into a third and final r o u n d against the R o m a n s . One of their armies was encamped in Samnite territory under M a n i u s Curius Dentatus; the other was in Lucania. Pyrrhus sent a part of his army into Lucania to engage that consul and prevent him f r o m joining forces with his colleague. He himself took the main body against Curius, who was camped in the Arusine Plain near Beneventum [Benevento], Pyrrhus was eager to get to grips with his o p p o n e n t before the latter could receive reinforcements. Accordingly, he took his best troops and elephants on a r o u n d a b o u t night march to the enemy's camp. This took longer than he predicted and his descent f r o m high g r o u n d was revealed to the enemy by the advent of dawn. Curius led out his troops. 170

routed Pyrrhus' advance guard and drove his main body o n t o the plain. On open ground Curius drove back one of the opposing wings but in a n o t h e r part of the f r o n t his men were overwhelmed by Pyrrhus' elephants. He then s u m m o n e d up all the auxiliaries who had been left to guard the c a m p and threw them into the fray. They charged in, throwing their javelins at the elephants and forcing them to turn a b o u t and trample on their own troops. Casualty figures are lacking, Orosius alone putting Pyrrhus' dead at an incredible 33,000 out of a force of 80,000. But the victory indubitably belonged to the R o m a n s . Dionysius of Halicarnassus points out that Pyrrhus was the greatest general of the day with a seasoned a r m y that was three times larger than his adversary's. He attributes Pyrrhus' defeat in this battle to the fatigue occasioned by the heavy a r m o u r of the hoplites on a long, hilly, cross-country march. Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 24(4)-25; Orosius, 4: 2(3-6); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 20: 10-11; Livy, epitome 14 C Y A M O S O R U S R (c.274) - M a m e r t i n e W a r In a b o u t 288 a band of discharged C a m p a n i a n mercenaries who had been imported into Sicily in the service of Agathocles seized Messana [Messina] and imposed a rule of tyranny and terror on the s u r r o u n d i n g countryside. They assumed the n a m e of Mamertines. They harassed the neighbouring Carthaginians and Syracusans until, after a few years of such aggravation, a young Syracusan c o m m a n d e r called Hiero (the f u t u r e Hiero II of Syracuse) decided to kill two birds with one stone. He had come to the conclusion that his mercenaries were potentially m u t i n o u s trouble-makers. He therefore led them out against the Mamertines of Messana and, having pitched c a m p against the enemy near Centuripa [Centuripe], he drew up his men near the river C y a m o s o r u s [upper Simeto]. The mercenaries were then ordered to advance and were left to their fate. The Syracusan infantry and cavalry under the personal c o m m a n d of Hiero were withheld and withdrew to Syracuse while the mercenaries were being butchered. Polybius, 1: 9(1-6) _ L O N G A N U S R (c.265) - M a m e r t i n e W a r T h e battle of C y a m o s o r u s (above) was aimed at ridding Hiero of his unreliable mercenaries rather more than the Mamertines, w h o had been allowed to win an easy victory. T h a t they continued to be aggressive is no matter for surprise. Hiero therefore led out his troops and engaged the Marner-

THE ROMAN

tines near the river L o n g a n u s [Longano] in the plain of Mylae [Milazzo], not far f r o m M e s s a n a . He crushed them completely a n d c a p t u r e d their leaders. This seems likely to be the battle which D i o d o r u s described as taking place on the river L o i t a n u s ( u n k n o w n ) . In the a c c o u n t of D i o d o r u s , Hiero succeeded by an o u t f l a n k i n g m o v e m e n t , sending a picked b o d y of m e n r o u n d to the f a r side of a hill occupied by the enemy. A f t e r their defeat some of the M a m e r t i n e s s o u g h t protection f r o m C a r t h a g e while others t u r n e d to R o m e , e m p h a sizing that they, the M a m e r t i n e s , were originally C a m p a n i a n s a n d therefore neighbours. T h e stage was being set f o r t h a t great P u n i c - R o m a n struggle, the First Punic W a r . Polybius, 1: 9(7-9); Diodorus, 22: 13(2-4) M E S S A N A (264) - First Punic W a r T h e year 264 m a r k s the onset of the First Punic W a r , a struggle f o r control of Sicily between R o m e a n d C a r t h a g e . T h e trigger was a dist u r b a n c e in the city of M e s s a n a [Messina], where a b a n d of discharged C a m p a n i a n mercenaries, k n o w n as M a m e r t i n e s , h a d t a k e n c o n t r o l a n d had entrenched themselves. W h e n they were defeated by Hiero II of Syracuse at the river L o n g a n u s (above), some of the M a m e r t i n e s appealed to C a r t h a g e f o r help; others looked to R o m e . While the R o m a n s deliberated, a Punic c o m m a n d e r , H a n n o , t o o k up residence in the citadel. But when the M a m e r t i n e s heard that the R o m a n s h a d eventually decided to send an expedition, they contrived to get H a n n o to leave a n d then h a n d e d their city over to the R o m a n s . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s crucified H a n n o a n d laid siege to Messana. W h e n the C a r t h a g i n i a n s started to besiege M e s s a n a , Hiero of Syracuse decided to join forces with them in an a t t e m p t to rid Sicily of the M a m e r t i n e s once a n d for all. H e m a r c h e d his forces out of Syracuse a n d a d v a n c e d on M e s s a n a , setting up c a m p on the opposite side of the city to the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . Meanwhile, the R o m a n consul, A p p i u s Claudius, set sail a n d negotiated the d a n gerous crossing over the Phoenician-controlled straits by night. He m a d e his way into the besieged city. This was, in fact, the first occasion on which the R o m a n s t r a n s p o r t e d an a r m y by sea. As A p p i u s was n o w s u r r o u n d e d on all sides by warring factions, a fight seemed inevitable. H e decided to tackle the Syracusans first, led out his men a n d drew them u p in battle order. H i e r o followed suit. In the ensuing s t r e n u o u s battle A p p i u s got the better of his o p p o n e n t a n d d r o v e the whole a r m y

WORLD

back to its c a m p . T h a t night Hiero disengaged a n d withdrew to Syracuse. Polybius, 1: 11(9-15); Zonaras, 8: 9 M E S S A N A (264) - First P u n i c W a r A f t e r the success of his drive against the Syracusans (above), A p p i u s decided to tackle his o t h e r o p p o n e n t , the C a r t h a g i n i a n s , w i t h o u t delay. H e led his t r o o p s out to battle at first light, a n d in the ensuing e n g a g e m e n t he killed m a n y of them. T h e rest were forced to retreat in disorder to n e i g h b o u r i n g towns. Polybius, 1: 12(1-4); Zonaras, 8: 9

HERACLEA MINOA (262) - First Punic War T h e First Punic W a r c o m m e n c e d in earnest at Heraclea M i n o a , which was a little u n d e r 20 miles u p the coast to the north-west of A g r i g e n t u m [Agrigento], T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s had c o n c e n t r a t e d all their t r o o p s a n d supplies in their base at Agrig e n t u m u n d e r the leadership of H a n n i b a l (one of m a n y of that name). T h e R o m a n consuls, Lucius P o s t u m i u s a n d Q u i n t u s Mamilius, seized the initiative a n d c o n c e n t r a t e d their entire force against A g r i g e n t u m , c a m p i n g a b o u t a mile f r o m the city a n d c o n f i n i n g the enemy within the city walls. Their next m o v e was to divide their forces a n d to set up a second c a m p on the o t h e r side of the city, which faced Heraclea. T h e g r o u n d between the c a m p s was trenched, fortified a n d patrolled, a n d a f t e r five m o n t h s the besieged were starving. In response to repeated pleas f o r help, the C a r t h a g i n i a n s at h o m e sent a p o w e r f u l force to Sicily to join their o t h e r general, H a n n o , whose base was at Heraclea. H a n n o (not the same H a n n o as at M e s s a n a in 264) then seized the initiative a n d was the clear winner in a cavalry e n g a g e m e n t . He sent out his N u m i d i a n cavalry as an a d v a n c e g u a r d , with o r d e r s to lure out the R o m a n horse a n d then to fall back on their o w n lines. T h e R o m a n cavalry p u r s u e d them only to find themselves s u r r o u n d e d as the N u m i d i a n s wheeled r o u n d a n d c h a r g e d , killing m a n y of them. Polybius,

1:

19(1-4)

A G R I G E N T U M (262) - First Punic W a r A f t e r his success at Heraclea (above), H a n n o moved his c a m p a n d occupied a hill only a little over a mile a w a y f r o m the R o m a n c a m p . But he failed to follow u p his a d v a n t a g e a n d did n o t h i n g for two m o n t h s until pressed by the d e s p e r a t e H a n n i b a l in the besieged a n d starved city of A g r i g e n t u m (formerly A c r a g a s ) [Agrigento], This 171


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forced H a n n o to risk a battle. T h e action, which t o o k place between the camps, was long d r a w n out, but the R o m a n s eventually d r o v e the C a r t h a g i n i a n mercenaries back o n t o their o w n s u p p o r t i n g units a n d elephants, creating c o n f u s i o n which turned into a general rout. T h e greater p a r t of their force w a s slaughtered on the field. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , in the period of exhaustion a f t e r battle the R o m a n s were off their g u a r d . H a n n i b a l seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to extricate his force f r o m the besieged city a n d w i t h d r a w unobserved. T h e statement of Z o n a r a s that H a n n i b a l ' s men were recognized a n d killed seems i m p r o b a b l e in view of their n u m b e r , estimated by Polybius to be in excess of 50,000. Polybius,

/.• 19(5-11);

Zonaras,

8: 10

L I P A R A (260) - First Punic W a r T h e consul G n a e u s Cornelius Scipio was placed in c o m m a n d of a fleet destined f o r Sicily as soon as it h a d been fitted out. Scipio himself sailed a h e a d to M e s s a n a with the 17 ships which were ready. H e was told that the C a r t h a g i n i a n - h e l d t o w n of L i p a r a [Lipari] on the n e a r b y island of that n a m e would be betrayed to him, but this was a ruse. A f t e r the unsuspecting Scipio h a d a n c h o r e d off the t o w n , H a n n i b a l , the C a r t h a g i n i a n general in P a n o r m u s [Palermo], despatched a C a r t h a g i n i a n senator called Boodes with 20 ships to L i p a r a by night, t r a p p i n g Scipio in the h a r b o u r . T h e subsequent fate of the R o m a n s is in dispute. Polybius records that the crews fled inland a n d t h a t Scipio surrendered himself a n d was t a k e n to H a n n i b a l with the c a p t u r e d ships. A c c o r d i n g to Z o n a r a s , Scipio a n d the R o m a n tribunes were invited a b o a r d the flag-ship to discuss terms but were then taken captive a n d sent to C a r t h a g e . Polybius, 1: 21(4-8); Zonaras, 8; 10; Livy, e p i t o m e 17

CAPE OF ITALY (260) - First Punic War A few days a f t e r Scipio's debacle at L i p a r a the m a i n R o m a n fleet was sailing d o w n the west coast of Italy to Sicily. W h e n H a n n i b a l heard a b o u t this, he h e a d e d t o w a r d s t h e m with his 50 ships in o r d e r to spy out their strength a n d dispositions. As he was r o u n d i n g a p r o m o n t o r y which Polybius refers to only as an unspecified Italian cape, he suddenly c a m e u p o n the enemy. In the ensuing e n g a g e m e n t , H a n n i b a l lost m o s t of his ships but m a n a g e d against all h o p e to m a k e his escape with the remainder. Polybius, 172

1

21(9-11)

M Y L A E (260, s u m m e r ) - First Punic W a r W h e n G a i u s Duilius, the c o m m a n d e r of the R o m a n a r m y in Sicily, heard a b o u t the naval disaster at L i p a r a (260), he h a n d e d over his c o m m a n d a n d joined the fleet. H e a r i n g that the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were in the vicinity of Mylae [Milazzo], Duilius sailed out with his total force of 120 ships. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s immediately put out to meet him with their 130 ships ( D i o d o r u s says 200) a n d , displaying complete confidence, they h e a d e d straight f o r the enemy. T h e R o m a n s , however, h a d been a w a r e t h a t their ships were inferior to the C a r t h a g i n i a n vessels in speed a n d m a n o e u v r a b i l i t y . T o c o m p e n s a t e f o r this they h a d e q u i p p e d their ships with 'ravens'. This device, which is described in detail by Polybius, consisted basically of a g a n g w a y 36 feet in length which was hinged to the p r o w of the ship a n d was carried n o r m a l l y in a vertical position. W h e n an enemy ship was within range of the 'raven', it was lowered o n t o the enemy deck a n d held the ship fast. As a result of these tactics the C a r t h a g i n i a n s did not meet with the expected success but with grappling gangways a n d b o a r d i n g R o m a n s in h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting. They eventually t u r n e d a n d fled, losing 50 ships. This battle has been called the first victory of the R o m a n navy, but in fact the lesser k n o w n victory off the cape of Italy (above) preceded it. Polybius, 1; 22-23; Zonaras, 1; Livy, e p i t o m e 17

8. 11; Diodorus,

23:

THERMAE HIMERIENSES (260) - First Punic W a r It came to the a t t e n t i o n of the C a r t h a g i n i a n s t h a t there was bickering between the R o m a n s a n d their allies, w h o h a d e n c a m p e d a p a r t . T h e allies were near T h e r m a e Himerienses [Termini Imerese] on the n o r t h coast of Sicily. H a m i l c a r , w h o h a d replaced H a n n i b a l as C a r t h a g i n i a n c o m m a n d e r , launched a surprise attack on the allies while they were striking c a m p a n d killed some 4,000 of them. ( D i o d o r u s p u t s the casualties at 6,000 R o m a n s w i t h o u t specifying t h a t they were allies.) Polybius, 1: 24(3-4); Diodorus, 23: 9(4) C A M A R I N A (258) - First Punic W a r W h e n the R o m a n s set out to attack C a m a r i n a , the consul Atilius rashly led his m e n into a ravine where they were a m b u s h e d by the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . T h e y would have been utterly destroyed but for the c o u r a g e a n d action of a military tribune, M a r c u s C a l p u r n i u s , w h o spotted t h a t o n e of the s u r r o u n d i n g hills h a d been left unoccupied by the

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enemy by virtue of its steepness. C a l p u r n i u s asked for 300 men, with w h o m he seized the m o u n d , thereby diverting all enemy a t t e n t i o n u p o n himself a n d his b a n d . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s m a d e a united assault u p o n t h e m d u r i n g the course of which the R o m a n a r m y slipped out of the ravine. In the fierce battle on the hill all 300 R o m a n s fell. Calp u r n i u s , severely w o u n d e d , was left f o r dead a m o n g the corpses but he alone survived. W h e n f o u n d alive by the enemy, his life was spared. Zonaras, 8: 12; Livy, e p i t o m e 17; Orosius, 4: 8(1-3) T Y N D A R I S (257) - First Punic W a r T h e two versions of this e n c o u n t e r differ m a r k edly. A c c o r d i n g to Polybius, the R o m a n consul G a i u s Atilius R e g u l u s was a n c h o r e d off T y n d a r i s when he saw the C a r t h a g i n i a n fleet sailing past him, p r e s u m a b l y u n a w a r e of his presence in the lea of a p r o m o n t o r y . He sailed out immediately with an a d v a n c e g u a r d of 10 of his fastest ships, o r d e r i n g the rest to follow. W h e n the C a r t h a g i nians saw the a d v a n c e s q u a d r o n way out in f r o n t , they turned a n d s u r r o u n d e d it a n d sank nine of the vessels. T h e consul's ship alone escaped by virtue of its speed. T h e subsequent arrival of the rest of the R o m a n fleet reversed the picture. T h e R o m a n s took up f o r m a t i o n a n d sank eight enemy ships while c a p t u r i n g a n o t h e r 10. Z o n a r a s , on the o t h e r h a n d , says that it was the C a r t h a g i n i a n s w h o were lying in wait below the height of T y n d a r i s . W h e n the R o m a n s saw t h e m , they sent half their fleet r o u n d the p r o m o n t o r y to lure the C a r t h a g i n i a n s f o r t h . O n the arrival of the o t h e r half of the R o m a n fleet, the C a r t h a g i n i a n commander H a m i l c a r was routed a n d lost most of his ships. It will be noted that whichever version of the events is correct, the R o m a n s were the victors. Polybius, 1: 25(1-4); Zonaras, 8: 12 E C N O M U S P R (256) - First Punic W a r T h e R o m a n s , pleased with their Sicilian successes, m a d e plans to extend their o p e r a t i o n s to the C a r t h a g i n i a n m o t h e r l a n d by sailing to Africa. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , on the o t h e r h a n d , were a w a r e of the vulnerability of their h o m e l a n d a n d decided to have a trial of strength at sea. T h e R o m a n fleet, which is said to have consisted of 330 warships, sailed f r o m Italy via M e s s a n a to E c n o m u s [Poggio di Sant' Angelo] on the s o u t h Sicilian coast, which was to be their s p r i n g b o a r d for the crossing to Africa. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , with a fleet of similar size sailed r o u n d f r o m western Sicily a n d a n c h o r e d at Heraclea M i n o a a b o u t 40 miles west of

E c n o m u s . T h e subsequent battle when the two fleets met has been fully described by Polybius. The R o m a n s adopted a triangular formation which was led at the apex by the ships of the two consuls, Regulus a n d M a n l i u s , while t w o o t h e r s q u a d r o n s provided a s t r o n g base to the wedge. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s u n d e r H a m i l c a r o p p o s e d this with a single line of ships a b r e a s t , reaching to the shore on their left a n d with an extended right wing u n d e r H a n n o which could o u t f l a n k the enemy. T h e action began when the R o m a n s a t t a c k e d the C a r t h a g i n i a n centre, which h a d o r d e r s to retire, luring the R o m a n s in pursuit. In this way the leading R o m a n s q u a d r o n s became separated f r o m the slower ones at the back, which were towing a n d protecting the t r a n s p o r t vessels. At this point H a m i l c a r ordered the C a r t h a g i n i a n centre to t u r n 173


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a n d engage its pursuers. A t the same time H a n n o ' s right wing o u t f l a n k e d the R o m a n s a n d a t t a c k e d their veteran s q u a d r o n in the rear, while the left wing engaged the s q u a d r o n towing the t r a n s p o r t vessels. T h e r e were thus three separate actions in progress a n d each was a well-matched contest in strength. T h e greater speed of the C a r t h a g i n i a n ships enabled t h e m to d r a w rings r o u n d the enemy, but a n y ship which c a m e within striking distance of a R o m a n vessel f o u n d itself grappled by a ' r a v e n ' (see Mylae, 260) a n d b o a r d e d . Ultimately, H a m i l c a r ' s s q u a d r o n was routed by the leading R o m a n s q u a d r o n s , leaving Regulus free to sail to the rescue of the veterans a n d t r a n s p o r t s at the rear. Here the C a r t h a g i n i a n s n o w f o u n d themselves being a t t a c k e d f r o m the f r o n t a n d rear, a n d they withdrew. M a n l i u s . likewise freed f r o m his e n g a g e m e n t , went to the assistance of the R o m a n s w h o were penned in close to the shore by the C a r t h a g i n i a n left. F e a r of the R o m a n 'ravens' h a d prevented the besiegers f r o m closing in a n d destroying their q u a r r y . M a n l i u s , n o w joined by Regulus, s u r r o u n d e d the enemy a n d c a p t u r e d 50 of them. In the action as a whole 24 R o m a n ships were sunk; the C a r t h a g i n i a n s lost m o r e t h a n 30 ships sunk a n d 64 c a p t u r e d complete with crews. A f t e r taking on victuals a n d effecting repairs the R o m a n fleet set out again f o r Africa. Polybius, 1: 25(7)-28 A D Y S (256) - First P u n i c W a r W h e n the R o m a n s landed in Africa, they c a p t u r e d C l u p e a [Kelibia] a n d set a b o u t p l u n d e r i n g the countryside. O n o n e of these expeditions the consul Regulus reached the t o w n of A d y s a n d set a b o u t besieging it. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s led out their t r o o p s f r o m C a r t h a g e u n d e r the c o m m a n d of H a s d r u b a l (son of H a n n o ) together with Hamilcar, w h o h a d been urgently recalled f r o m Sicily. T h e y occupied some high g r o u n d which overlooked the R o m a n s but they ignored the difficult n a t u r e of the terrain, which was totally unsuitable for their greatest asset, the cavalry a n d elephants. This decided the R o m a n s to strike first, at d a w n a n d f r o m b o t h sides of the hill. T h e y were met by a vigorous c h a r g e by the C a r t h a g i n i a n mercenaries, w h o forced the first legion to t u r n a b o u t a n d run. But the mercenaries went t o o f a r a n d f o u n d themselves s u r r o u n d e d by the R o m a n division a t t a c k i n g the hill f r o m the o t h e r side. This victory left the R o m a n s free to m a r a u d a n d sack the towns, in the process of which they seized Tunes. On the back of his success, Regulus o p e n e d negotiations with the C a r t h a g i n i a n s , but his 174

conditions were so h a r s h that they were rejected outright. Polybius, 1: 30(4-14) B A G R A D A S R (255, spring) - First Punic W a r Dispirited but defiant, the C a r t h a g i n i a n s trained a new a r m y with recruited r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m Greece. These included a veteran L a c e d a e m o n i a n officer n a m e d X a n t h i p p u s , w h o rapidly assumed c o m m a n d a n d trained the a r m y in the best S p a r t a n traditions. M o r a l e soared. He p e r s u a d e d the C a r thaginians to o v e r c o m e their fears a n d to descend f r o m the heights into the plains of the B a g r a d a s [Medjerda] valley where the enemy was e n c a m p e d a n d where, he assured his men, they would be invincible. Polybius q u o t e s their roll as 12,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry a n d 100 elephants. W h e n the R o m a n s pitched c a m p nearby, the C a r t h a g i nians accepted the challenge a n d gave X a n t h i p p u s full p o w e r s of c o m m a n d . He ordered the elephants to the f r o n t of the whole a r m y a n d divided the cavalry between the wings. T h e R o m a n s o p p o s e d the elephants with their light-armed t r o o p s in the f r o n t , covering a deep f o r m a t i o n of legionaries behind them. Their cavalry, also, were on the wings. W h e n X a n t h i p p u s gave the order, the elep h a n t s charged a n d t r a m p l e d the f r o n t maniples u n d e r f o o t . At the same time the C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry, w h o were numerically m u c h superior, routed their o p p o s i t e n u m b e r s on b o t h flanks a n d proceeded to attack the R o m a n rear, which b e c a m e completely s u r r o u n d e d . A few m e n w h o m a n a g e d to retreat were subsequently c a p t u r e d ; they included the c o m m a n d e r Regulus. Only a b o u t 2,000 R o m a n s survived, mainly f r o m the left wing which h a d n o t been c o n f r o n t e d by the elephants. T h e y had m a n a g e d to rush their o p p o s i n g C a r t h a g i n i a n mercenaries a n d drive them back to their c a m p . T h e sole C a r t h a g i n i a n losses were a b o u t 800 of these mercenaries. Polybius, 1: 32-34; Zonaras, 8: 13; Appian, Punic W a r s , 3; Livy, epitome 18 H E R M A E U M C (255, s u m m e r ) - First Punic War Following the R o m a n disaster in the Bagradas valley (above), the citizens at h o m e immediately fitted out a new fleet with a view to rescuing the r e m n a n t s of their a r m y in Africa. They are said to have launched 350 ships, which they sent out u n d e r M a r c u s Aemilius a n d Servius Fulvius. N e a r C a p e H e r m a e u m [Cape Bon] this fleet e n c o u n t e r e d the patrolling C a r t h a g i n i a n fleet, on which it inflicted a severe defeat, c a p t u r i n g 114 ships

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( D i o d o r u s says 24) with their crews. It is said by Z o n a r a s t h a t at the height of the battle the R o m a n s in Aspis (also k n o w n as C l u p e a ) [Kelibia], w h o were the object of the rescue mission, sailed out a n d a t t a c k e d the C a r t h a g i n i a n s in the rear. A f t e r the battle, they joined the R o m a n fleet on its return j o u r n e y to Italy. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , they ran into an appalling s t o r m off C a m a r i n a in Sicily a n d less t h a n a q u a r t e r of their ships survived. Polvbius, 1: 36(5-12); Zonaras, 8: 14; Diodorus, 23: 18(1) P A N O R M U S (250, June) - First Punic W a r In 254 the R o m a n s assaulted P a n o r m u s [Palermo] by land a n d sea a n d carried it. T h e ensuing f o u r years were a period of stalemate. T h e defeat of Regulus ( B a g r a d a s , 255) h a d instilled into the R o m a n s an abject terror of the e n e m y ' s elephants. E n c o u r a g e d , H a s d r u b a l decided to recover P a n o r m u s a n d he m a r c h e d out of Lilybaeum [Marsala] a n d c a m p e d on the b o r d e r . T h e consul Lucius Caecilius Metellus m a d e no response, h o p i n g to lure the enemy closer. A t t r i b u t i n g the R o m a n ' s inertia to fear, H a s d r u b a l pressed o n a n d eventually, in the absence of any R o m a n move, he crossed the river in f r o n t of the t o w n with his whole force including the elephants. Metellus then began to harass the beasts, o r d e r i n g his lighta r m e d t r o o p s to fire missiles at t h e m f r o m outside the wall a n d then to retreat to a p r e p a r e d trench as the e l e p h a n t s charged. W h e n the e l e p h a n t s began to attack the trench, they b e c a m e targets f o r the archers on the walls. Before long the a n i m a l s s t a m p e d e d a n d turned on their o w n troops. At this point Metellus led out his force a n d charged the enemy flank, p u t t i n g the whole a r m y to h e a d l o n g flight. T e n e l e p h a n t s were c a p t u r e d a n d the rest, totalling 120, were r o u n d e d u p a n d later were t r a n s p o r t e d to R o m e . T h e victory restored the m o r a l e of the R o m a n t r o o p s . Polybius, 1: 40; Zonaras, 8: 14; Diodorus, 23: 21 D R E P A N U M (249) - First Punic W a r By the year 249 the R o m a n s were in control of the whole of Sicily with the exception of Lilybaeum [Marsala] a n d D r e p a n u m [Trapani] on the west coast. A f t e r investing Lilybaeum w i t h o u t success, they decided to launch an a t t a c k with their whole fleet on the C a r t h a g i n i a n base at D r e p a n u m while m a i n t a i n i n g the siege of Lilybaeum. U n d e r the c o m m a n d of Publius C l a u d i u s Pulcher they put to sea at m i d n i g h t unobserved by the enemy in Lilybaeum. W h e n A d h e r b a l , the C a r t h a g i n i a n commander at Drepanum, saw the fleet

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a p p r o a c h i n g , he hastily mustered his crews a n d ordered t h e m to get u n d e r way a n d follow his ship. He led t h e m out of the h a r b o u r , clinging to the shore on the o p p o s i t e side of the h a r b o u r to the o n e by which the R o m a n s were entering. Pulcher saw w h a t was h a p p e n i n g t o o late; he was leading his fleet f r o m behind! By the time he realized the t r u t h , some of his ships were in the h a r b o u r while others were in the e n t r a n c e o r a p p r o a c h i n g it. He gave orders for the whole fleet to put o u t to sea with d e v a s t a t i n g results. In the process of turning, ships fouled each other, o a r s were b r o k e n a n d c o n f u s i o n reigned. Eventually, as the ships cleared the h a r b o u r , they were b r o u g h t into line abreast close to the shore. This position proved to be their u n d o i n g . T h e enemy ships, which were a n y w a y the faster, could m a n o e u v r e in the o p e n sea as they pleased; the R o m a n s could hardly move. W h e n the R o m a n c o m m a n d e r saw the carnage, he fled with some 30 o t h e r ships which could escape. T h e remaining 93 vessels were all c a p t u r e d with their crews, a p a r t f r o m the sailors w h o beached their ships a n d fled. Polybius, 1: 49-51; e p i t o m e 19

Diodorus,

24: 1(5);

Livy,

A E G I M U R U S I S L (245) - First Punic W a r T h e chronicle of F l o r u s r e p o r t s a naval battle near A e g i m u r u s [Al Djamur], a small island off the Bay of C a r t h a g e . A C a r t h a g i n i a n fleet sailing against Italy was engaged a n d defeated by a R o m a n fleet. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the R o m a n ships laden with b o o t y were subsequently wrecked by a s t o r m . This action a p p e a r s to be otherwise u n m e n t i o n e d in the extant literature. Florus, 1: 18(30-32) A E G A T E S I S L S (241, s u m m e r ) - First Punic War T h e R o m a n s h a d c o m e to realize that they were m a k i n g n o progress on land, largely as a result of H a m i l c a r Barca's o u t s t a n d i n g leadership of the C a r t h a g i n i a n s since he h a d assumed the c o m m a n d in 247. T h e y could only win the w a r by a victory at sea. In spite of their m a j o r defeat at D r e p a n u m (249) a n d the loss of several fleets wrecked by storms, they decided to m a k e o n e m o r e a t t e m p t . A fleet of 200 q u i n q u e r e m e s was built t h r o u g h private enterprise a n d m o n e y . T h e ships were built to a design copied f r o m a C a r t h a g i n i a n ship which had been so fast a n d m a n o e u v r a b l e that it h a d been able to run the b l o c k a d e at Lilybaeum on m a n y occasions. This new fleet sailed for Sicily u n d e r the c o m m a n d of G a i u s L u t a t i u s a n d took 175


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the enemy by surprise. T h e Punic fleet h a d sailed h o m e to C a r t h a g e with n o suspicion of i m p e n d i n g trouble. As soon as the C a r t h a g i n i a n s heard the news, they fitted out their ships a n d loaded them with provisions for their forces w h o were engaged with the R o m a n s at Eryx [Erice]. Their c o m m a n der H a n n o planned to sail direct to Eryx to offload the stores a n d to take on some m e r c e n a r y m a r i n e s as well as H a s d r u b a l Barca himself, a n d then to engage the R o m a n s . L u t a t i u s anticipated his t h o u g h t s a n d sailed to the island of Aegusa [Favignana], the largest of the Aegates islands [Egadi] off north-west Sicily, f r o m which he could b a r the passage to Eryx of the enemy fleet, which was expected the next day. T h a t d a y turned out to be r o u g h with an u n f a v o u r a b l e wind, but L u t a t i u s in his agony of m i n d could not a f f o r d to let the enemy lighten their load a n d take on t r o o p s at Eryx. W h e n they were sighted, he m a d e his decision, put to sea a n d faced the enemy in line abreast. T h e respective c o n d i t i o n s of the t w o fleets were now the antithesis of those which h a d pertained at D r e p a n u m (249). T h e R o m a n s were geared for fighting; the enemy ships were loaded with supplies a n d their m e n were raw recruits enlisted in emergency. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s h a d rashly assumed t h a t the R o m a n navy would not b o t h e r t h e m again. In the event they were worsted all a l o n g the line f r o m the very start. Fifty of their ships were sunk a n d 70 c a p t u r e d with crews. A c c o r d i n g to Polybius the R o m a n s t o o k nearly 10,000 prisoners in the battle. Polybius does not give the R o m a n losses, but D i o d o r u s q u o t e s 30 ships sunk a n d 50 badly d a m a g e d . T h e i m m e d i a t e effect of this battle was that the C a r t h a g i n i a n s could no longer supply their t r o o p s in the field, a n d so they gave H a m i l c a r Barca, their c o m m a n der in Sicily, the a u t h o r i t y to act at his discretion. Left with n o way of saving his troops, he p r u d e n t l y asked f o r negotiations, which b r o u g h t this long a n d weary war to an end.

Po valley a n d a d v a n c e d on E t r u r i a . H e l p for the R o m a n s was f o r t h c o m i n g on all sides in central a n d s o u t h e r n Italy. T h e forces in position for defence of the b o u n d a r i e s alone a m o u n t e d , so it is said, to 130,000 infantry, with several times that n u m b e r fit f o r service. W h e n the invading G a u l s reached Clusium [Chiusi], they heard t h a t a R o m a n a r m y was c o m i n g up behind them. T h e y turned t o face it a n d the t w o armies h a d a l m o s t m a d e contact by sunset, when they c a m p e d for the night. A f t e r lighting their c a m p fires the G a u l s withdrew by night in the direction of Faesulae [Fiesoli] to set u p an a m b u s h , leaving their cavalry at the c a m p . A t d a y b r e a k the R o m a n s spotted the cavalry a n d a d v a n c e d against them, while the cavalry, following instructions, withdrew t o w a r d F a e s u l a e with the R o m a n s in pursuit. At the site of the a m b u s h the G a u l s s p r a n g u p a n d charged. In the ensuing fight the R o m a n s were o u t n u m b e r e d a n d lost 6,000 men. T h e rest fled to a hill which the G a u l s tried to seize but w i t h o u t success, a n d so they put a cavalry g u a r d on it, determined to have a n o t h e r try next day. M e a n w h i l e the consul Lucius Aemilius P a p u s , in charge of a second R o m a n a r m y near the Adriatic, h a d heard of the invasion of E t r u r i a a n d h a d hurried south, reaching the battlefield at the crucial m o m e n t . He c a m p e d near the enemy a n d lit c a m p fires. W h e n the G a u l s saw the flames, they realized the t r u t h of the situation a n d decided to pull out before d a w n a n d m a k e f o r home.

24: 11; Livy, e p i t o m e

This e n c o u n t e r h a s sometimes been referred to as the battle of Faesulae [Fiesoli], n o r t h of Florence. If this was the site, the ensuing battle at T e l a m o n 90 miles south of F a e s u l a e would be inexplicable if the G a u l s were heading h o m e w a r d as reported. It has been said that the G a u l s withdrew f r o m Clusium in the direction of Faesulae a n d set u p an a m b u s h in the space of o n e night. It seems p r o b a b l e to the present writer that the a m b u s h was m u c h closer to Clusium t h a n Faesulae. Polybius, 2: 25-26

C L U S I U M (225) - Gallic Invasion T h r o u g h o u t the First Punic W a r the G a u l s refrained f r o m e m b a r r a s s i n g the R o m a n s with a second f r o n t . T h e y h a d been completely crushed a bare 20 years b e f o r e h a n d , a n d it was not until some years a f t e r the Punic W a r that Gallic unrest recurred. T h e t w o largest tribes, the Insubres a n d the Boii, joined forces a n d enlisted s u p p o r t f r o m o t h e r tribes, raising a total of 50,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 20,000 cavalry. In 225 this force descended into the

T E L A M O N (225) - Gallic Invasion A f t e r the battle of Clusium (above), the G a u l s m a r c h e d to the E t r u r i a n coast a n d started n o r t h wards, pursued by P a u l u s a n d his legions. At the same time the consul G a i u s Atilius Regularis, r e t u r n i n g f r o m Sardinia with his forces, h a d landed at Pisa a n d was m a r c h i n g south to R o m e . W h e n the G a u l s were in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d of T e l a m o n [Talamone], Atilius learnt f r o m some c a p t u r e d foragers of the proximity of the Gallic a r m y a n d of the presence of Aemilius P a p u s with

Polybius, 19 '

176

1: 59-61; Diodorus,

THE ROMAN

his a r m y in their rear. Atilius immediately led his cavalry to occupy a hill which was on the line of the G a u l s ' advance. W h e n the G a u l s realized t h a t they were sandwiched between t w o armies, they deployed their forces back to back. On his arrival, the first action of P a p u s was to send his cavalry to s u p p o r t his colleague in the fight f o r the hill, to which the initial fighting was c o n f i n e d . T h e consul Atilius was killed in this action but his cavalry f o u g h t on a n d eventually w o n the coveted high g r o u n d . Meanwhile, the infantry of the three armies h a d begun to close. In the terrifying t u m u l t that followed, the R o m a n javelin t h r o w e r s had the first pick a n d executed m u c h d a m a g e , particularly a m o n g the w a r r i o r s of the G a s a t a e w h o preferred to fight n a k e d . T h e y cracked. Next, the R o m a n i n f a n t r y a d v a n c e d , but they were held by the o t h e r tribes w h o , a l t h o u g h savagely m a u l e d , stood their g r o u n d with great courage. T h e end was b r o u g h t a b o u t by the R o m a n cavalry in a f u r i o u s charge f r o m the hill which h a d been c a p t u r e d earlier. T h e Gallic cavalry fled a n d the foot soldiers were cut to pieces. T h e Gallic losses have been given as 40.000 killed a n d at least 10,000 c a p t u r e d , including o n e of their kings. A n o t h e r king t o o k his own life. T h e R o m a n victory t e r m i n a t e d the largest a n d last of the Gallic invasions, but the a f t e r m a t h lingered on for a few m o r e years. Polybius, 2: 27-31(2) C L A S T I D I U M (222) - Gallic Invasion N o t c o n t e n t with their utter defeat of the G a u l s , the R o m a n s were determined to clear the Insubres out of the P o valley completely. In 223 the consul G a i u s F l a m i n i u s crossed the P a d u s [Po] a n d defeated the Insubres at an u n k n o w n river. T h e following year the G a u l s sued f o r peace but the new consuls, M a r c u s C l a u d i u s Marcellus a n d G n a e u s Cornelius, were u n c o m p r o m i s i n g . They besieged the t o w n of Acerrae; the G a u l s r e s p o n d e d by laying siege to Clastidium [Casteggio], C l a u d i u s then set off with his cavalry to rescue the besieged, which caused the G a u l s to raise the siege a n d to m a r c h out to meet him. Their force included some 10.000 G a s a t a e , w h o h a d joined their c o m p a t r i o t s either f o r m o n e y or, according to Plutarch, to f o m e n t unrest. T h e R o m a n s were greatly outn u m b e r e d a n d , to c o m p e n s a t e f o r this, Marcellus extended his wings. W h e n , as a result, the G a u l s f o u n d themselves being encircled by the R o m a n cavalry, they gave way a n d were either cut d o w n or put to flight. N e v e r before in R o m a n history did so few cavalrymen inflict such a defeat u p o n so m a n y foot a n d horse c o m b i n e d .

WORLD

A n a c c o u n t of a single h a n d - t o - h a n d c o m b a t between Marcellus himself a n d the king of the G a u l s is included in P l u t a r c h ' s a c c o u n t . Marcellus despatched the G a u l with his spear, e a r n i n g f o r himself the right to dedicate the spolia opima to Jupiter Feretrius. H e was only the third person in R o m a n history to win the h o n o u r , the first traditionally being R o m u l u s . Polybius, 2: 34(1-9); Plutarch, Marcellus, 6(2)7(4); Livy, e p i t o m e 20 M E D I O L A N U M (222) - Gallic Invasion F r o m Clastidium (above) the G a u l s withdrew to M e d i o l a n u m [Milan], p u r s u e d by G n a e u s C o r n e lius w h o h a d meanwhile c a p t u r e d Acerrae. W h e n Cornelius decided to head back to Acerrae. the G a u l s in M e d i o l a n u m m a d e a sortie a n d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n r e a r g u a r d , r o u t i n g a p a r t of it. T h e R o m a n v a n g u a r d was then ordered back to m a k e a c o u n t e r a t t a c k , as a result of which the G a u l s b r o k e up a n d fled to the m o u n t a i n s . Cornelius went on to c a p t u r e M e d i o l a n u m . after which the Insubres s u b m i t t e d a n d were g r a n t e d peace. Polybius, 2: 34(10)-35(1) P H A R O S I S L (219) - Second Illyrian W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 121. R H O D A N U S R (218) - Second Punic W a r While the R o m a n s were involved with the Gallic invasion of 225-222, the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were empire-building in Spain, a c c u m u l a t i n g resources a n d reaping considerable Iberian military m a n p o w e r in the process. A n o t h e r war with R o m e was clearly in mind. In 221 H a n n i b a l , the 25-year-old son of H a m i l c a r Barca, assumed the Punic c o m m a n d a n d t u r n e d the probability of war into a certainty. T h e spark which ignited the Second Punic W a r was an affair at S a g u n t u m , the only city south of the E b r o which was not held by the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . H a n n i b a l threatened to attack the city, to which the R o m a n s h a d promised protection. T h e R o m a n s protested but C a r t h a g e upheld the actions of H a n n i b a l , w h o proceeded to c a p t u r e the place all the same a f t e r eight m o n t h s of siege. T h e Punic g o v e r n m e n t ' s refusal to surrender H a n n i b a l at the request of the R o m a n s led to a p r o m p t declaration of war in 218. T h e C a r t h a g i nians h a d not been able to rebuild their navy, a n d so it a p p e a r e d to the R o m a n s that the war would be an ' a w a y ' m a t c h in Spain a n d Africa. H a n n i b a l h a d o t h e r ideas. He planned to circumvent the enemy at sea a n d to invade their h o m e by land. In the spring of 218 H a n n i b a l crossed the river 177


WORLDS

Iberus [Ebro] a n d started his m a r c h to n o r t h e r n Italy. W i t h a force reputed to consist of 50,000 foot with 9,000 horse a n d 37 e l e p h a n t s he reached the R h o d a n u s [Rhone], where he e n c o u n t e r e d his first m a j o r o p p o s i t i o n . T h e natives on the right b a n k were a m e n a b l e a n d helped to build a fleet of canoes; but on the opposite b a n k a large force of b a r b a r i a n s assembled menacingly. T o deal with this threat H a n n i b a l sent a d e t a c h m e n t u p s t r e a m u n d e r the c o m m a n d of H a n n o , son of Bomilcar. A f t e r a b o u t 25 miles they reached a convenient place for crossing the river on rafts. H a v i n g d o n e so, they proceeded d o w n s t r e a m a n d lit a s m o k e fire as a signal to H a n n i b a l that they were across a n d close at h a n d . H a n n i b a l immediately ordered his men to start ferrying themselves over, whereu p o n H a n n o a n d his men a p p e a r e d , set fire to the Gallic c a m p a n d t o o k the h o r d e completely by surprise. This gave H a n n i b a l the o p p o r t u n i t y t o f o r m u p those w h o h a d landed a n d engage the enemy on the o t h e r flank. They p r o m p t l y turned a n d fled. In the m e a n t i m e Publius C o r n e l i u s Scipio (father of A f r i c a n u s M a j o r ) a n d his b r o t h e r G n a e u s h a d set sail f r o m Pisa with an a r m y b o u n d for Spain. Five d a y s later Publius d r o p p e d a n c h o r at the eastern end of the R h o n e delta a n d was a m a z e d to learn that H a n n i b a l had already reached the river. Publius sent out a reconnaissance party of 300 h o r s e m e n , w h o met a n d clashed with 500 N u m i d i a n s f r o m H a n n i b a l ' s c a m p on a similar e r r a n d . In a fierce skirmish, with heavy losses on both sides, the N u m i d i a n s were defeated a n d fled. But when Scipio followed u p s t r e a m with his whole a r m y , he f o u n d that H a n n i b a l had already m a r c h e d off a n d eluded him. Polybius, 3: 42-45; Livy, 21: 26(3-5) and 27-29 T I C I N U S R (218) - Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l crossed the Alps in a f o r t n i g h t a n d descended into the Po valley with a force reduced to half the size. H e lost n o time in a u g m e n t i n g it with recruits f r o m the disaffected G a u l s . In the m e a n t i m e , Publius Cornelius Scipio, w h o had coincidentally arrived at the R h o n e crossing three days a f t e r H a n n i b a l h a d left, set sail h o m e w a r d s with a small d e t a c h m e n t to Pisae [P/.va], T a k i n g c o m m a n d of the legions stationed in the area, he m a r c h e d n o r t h w a r d s to the Po valley, crossed the river a n d a d v a n c e d westward to the river Ticinus, which flowed s o u t h w a r d s f r o m Lake V e r b a n u s [Maggiore] into the Po. H e crossed this river a n d t o o k u p station on the west b a n k 5 miles f r o m V i c t u m u l a e [Vigerano]. T h e R o m a n a n d C a r t h a 178

ginian armies were n o w almost in c o n t a c t , a n d the next m o r n i n g b o t h generals led out their cavalry a n d engaged. Scipio also t o o k his javelin throwers, w h o m he placed in the van. O n the o t h e r side, H a n n i b a l put his heavy cavalry in f r o n t a n d kept his N u m i d i a n cavalry out on the wings. W h e n the action began, the initial C a r t h a ginian charge was so fast a n d f u r i o u s that the R o m a n javelin throwers h a d n o time to t h r o w their missiles a n d were compelled to retreat t h r o u g h the r a n k s to the rear. T h e R o m a n cavalry m a n a g e d to hold the enemy charge, inflicting heavy losses, until the N u m i d i a n s o u t flanked them a n d fell u p o n them f r o m the rear. T h e javelin throwers, n o w in the rear, were the first to s u c c u m b , being t r a m p l e d u n d e r f o o t . T h e R o m a n cavalry were then a t t a c k e d f r o m the rear as well as the f r o n t a n d they b r o k e a n d fled. Scipio himself was severely w o u n d e d in the battle a n d owed his life to the intervention of his y o u n g son. This was only the first of a series of c r u s h i n g defeats sustained by the R o m a n s at the h a n d s of Hannibal. Polybius,

3: 65; Livy, 21:

45-46

L I L Y B A E U M (218) - Second Punic W a r In the Sicilian arena, C a r t h a g e sent 20 q u i n q u e r emes with 1,000 soldiers to raid the coast. Seventeen of them reached the L i p a r a islands off n o r t h east Sicily but three were swept off course into the Siculum F r e t u m [Straits of Messina]. Hiero II, the tyrant of Syracuse a n d a f a i t h f u l ally of R o m e , h a p p e n e d to be in M e s s a n a [Messina] a n d saw the ships. H e sent out 12 warships which c a p t u r e d the three e r r a n t C a r t h a g i n i a n vessels a n d b r o u g h t them into h a r b o u r . It was learnt f r o m the c a p t u r e d crews that a n o t h e r s q u a d r o n of 35 q u i n q u e r e m e s was on its way, with Lilybaeum [Marsala] as the p r i m a r y objective. Hiero i n f o r m e d the R o m a n s w h o issued a general alert. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s intended to land just before d a w n , but they were spotted in the m o o n l i g h t a n d soon realized that they h a d been observed. They lay offshore, prep a r i n g for a battle. W h e n the R o m a n s sailed out against them, it b e c a m e o b v i o u s that the C a r t h a ginian ships carried few soldiers. W h e r e a s the R o m a n s strained to grapple a n d b o a r d , their o p p o n e n t s did their best to elude close contact. This did not prevent the R o m a n s f r o m s u r r o u n d ing seven of the enemy vessels, w h e r e u p o n the rest fled. T h e R o m a n s suffered d a m a g e to only o n e ship. Livy, 21:

49-50

THE ROMAN

T R E B I A R (218, D e c e m b e r ) - Second Punic W a r A f t e r his defeat at the Ticinus (218) Scipio c a m p e d at Placentia [Piacenza], T w o days later H a n n i b a l arrived a n d c a m p e d close by. F o r the R o m a n s the situation was m a d e the m o r e a l a r m i n g by a treac h e r o u s n o c t u r n a l a t t a c k by the G a u l s serving in their a r m y , w h o then defected to the C a r t h a g i nians. Scipio saw the d a n g e r of a m a s s swing of all the Gallic tribes to the enemy cause, a n d so he m a r c h e d to the river Trebia [Trebbia] where the tribes were loyal allies. H e was harassed by H a n nibal's N u m i d i a n cavalry but m a n a g e d to cross the river with most of his force a n d c a m p e d on the right (east) b a n k . H a n n i b a l followed a n d pitched his c a m p a few miles a w a y on the left b a n k . At this point the consul Titus S e m p r o n i u s L o n g u s , w h o had been recalled f r o m Sicily, arrived with his legions a f t e r a m a r c h of 40 days. As Scipio h a d been severely w o u n d e d at the Ticinus, the e n t h u siastic a n d a m b i t i o u s L o n g u s assumed the c o m m a n d . He was itching for a battle, which H a n n i b a l duly provided. At d a y b r e a k H a n n i b a l ordered his N u m i d i a n s to cross the river a n d to try to entice the R o m a n s into action before they were fully prepared. L o n g u s r e s p o n d e d by sending out his cavalry, followed by 6,000 javelin-throwers a n d then the rest of the a r m y consisting of 16,000 R o m a n infantry a n d 20,000 allies. In pursuit of the N u m i d i a n s , they w a d e d across the Trebia, which was swollen with the winter rains a n d icy cold. In consequence, they started the battle in a frozen, wet a n d h u n g r y state, as H a n n i b a l h a d intended. He then led out his o w n fresh a n d well-fed t r o o p s and drew up the infantry in a line 20,000 strong with the 10.000 horse divided between the two wings. T h e elephants he placed in f r o n t of the i n f a n t r y ' s wings. C o n f r o n t i n g this a r m y were 16,000 R o m a n infantry a n d 20,000 allies with the 4,000 horse divided between the two wings. T h e action was started by the light-armed t r o o p s . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s gained the u p p e r h a n d in this, the R o m a n s having already discharged most of their missiles against the N u m i d i a n cavalry. W h e n these skirmishers h a d retired a n d the heavy i n f a n t r y h a d engaged, the C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry immediately a t t a c k e d on b o t h wings. T h e R o m a n cavalry, w h o were numerically inferior, fell back and exposed the i n f a n t r y ' s flanks to a t t a c k . At this point the R o m a n s were suddenly a n d unexpectedly charged f r o m the rear. H a n n i b a l h a d previously set up a t r a p a n d had sent his b r o t h e r M a g o with 1,000 horse a n d an equal n u m b e r of foot to conceal themselves in a w a t e r c o u r s e with high b a n k s obscured by bramble. These forces n o w emerged

WORLD

a n d created c o n f u s i o n in the R o m a n ranks. T h e wings, which were pressed f r o m the f r o n t by the e l e p h a n t s a n d on their flanks by the light-armed t r o o p s , were forced back. T h e R o m a n centre, which h a d u p till then resisted the enemy, n o w f o u n d itself p u s h e d f o r w a r d by its own forces in the rear a n d completely s u r r o u n d e d . This b o d y of 10,000 m e n a d o p t e d their only m e a n s of escape by hacking a way t h r o u g h the C a r t h a g i n i a n line, a f t e r which they withdrew to Placentia. Polybius, 3: 71-74; Livy, 21: 54-56 C I S S I S (218) - Second P u n i c W a r W h e n Publius Scipio interrupted his j o u r n e y to Spain at the R h o n e delta ( R h o d a n u s , 218) a n d returned to Italy to intercept H a n n i b a l , he told his b r o t h e r G n a e u s , w h o was with him, to take the forces on to Spain. There, G n a e u s developed a r e p u t a t i o n for clement b e h a v i o u r a m o n g the tribes, which gained him m a n y allies a n d reinforcements. T h e c o m m a n d e r responsible for the defence of C a r t h a g i n i a n interests in Spain n o r t h of the E b r o was H a n n o (a c o m m o n Punic name). Deciding that he must act before the entire region passed u n d e r R o m a n control, he c o n f r o n t e d Scipio n e a r Cissis [probably Guissona] a n d p r e p a r e d f o r battle. Scipio accepted the challenge willingly, k n o w i n g that there was a second C a r t h a g i n i a n a r m y to be reckoned with a n d preferring to fight the t w o armies separately. In the fight against H a n n o , 6,000 of the enemy were killed a n d a further 2.000 were taken prisoner including the c o m m a n d e r himself. T h e enemy c a m p proved to be a rich source of booty. Livy, 21: 60(5-9); Polybius, 3: 76(5-6) 1 B E R U S R (217, s u m m e r ) - Second Punic W a r At the beginning of s u m m e r the C a r t h a g i n i a n a d m i r a l H a m i l c a r put out of New C a r t h a g e with a fleet of 40 decked ships a n d sailed n o r t h w a r d s along the coast to the m o u t h of the Iberus [Ebro], H a s d r u b a l , the c o m m a n d e r in Spain, kept pace with him, m a r c h i n g his a r m y a l o n g the shore. G n a e u s Scipio, hearing of this, m a n n e d 35 ships a n d a p p e a r e d off the Iberus. W h e n he learnt that the enemy fleet was a n c h o r e d off the m o u t h of the river, he sailed in against it a n d c a u g h t the enemy totally u n p r e p a r e d . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s scarcely put up any resistance but fell back on the shore, beaching their ships a n d leaping out to the p r o tection a f f o r d e d by the a r m e d forces d r a w n up on the beach. T h e R o m a n s sailed in boldly a n d towed a w a y every ship which could be floated - 25 of them. As a result of this m o d e s t action the R o m a n s 179


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established their naval s u p r e m a c y a l o n g the coast for the time being. Polybius, 3: 95-96(6); Livy, 22: 19-20(1-3) T R A S I M E N U S L (217, J u n e 2 1 ) - Second Punic War While m a t t e r s were going well f o r the R o m a n s in Spain, they suffered n o t h i n g but a series of m a j o r reverses nearer h o m e . In the spring, H a n n i b a l started m a r c h i n g s o u t h again, t h r o u g h Etruria. Characteristically, he chose to go t h r o u g h the marshes, a r o u t e which involved f o u r days a n d three nights of m a r c h i n g a n d privation a n d which would be totally unexpected by the enemy. T h e R o m a n consul G a i u s F l a m i n i u s h a d pitched c a m p at A r r e t i u m [Arezzo], close to H a n n i b a l ' s r o u t e a f t e r he h a d emerged f r o m the marshes. H e was a vain a n d o v e r c o n f i d e n t m a n , a n d H a n n i b a l h a d heard as m u c h . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n decided to play on the o t h e r ' s weakness by ignoring F l a m i n i u s a n d a d v a n c i n g straight past him, ravaging the countryside as he went. This was t o o m u c h for the R o m a n , w h o was lured into following his enemy into a trap. T h e r o a d , little m o r e t h a n a n a r r o w p a t h , ran a r o u n d the n o r t h shore of Lake Trasim e n u s [Trasimene], T h e a p p r o a c h to the western end of the lake was a n a r r o w defile, a f t e r which the g r o u n d levelled out into a small hill-locked valley. At the eastern end of this there was a m o u n t a i n o u s barrier with sheer slopes, where H a n n i b a l positioned himself with his veterans. H e concealed his light-armed t r o o p s in the hills n o r t h of the lake; the cavalry he placed out of sight close to the western defile so that they could block it when the enemy was in the trap. F l a m i n i u s c a m p e d nearby f o r the night a n d led his m e n on a misty d a w n t h r o u g h the defile into the valley. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s fell on t h e m out of the mist on all sides. A c a r n a g e resulted in which F l a m i n i u s was killed, while those in the rear were t r a p p e d between hills a n d lake. M a n y d r o w n e d a t t e m p t i n g to swim to safety in full a r m o u r . Altogether a b o u t 15,000 perished a n d similar n u m b e r s were taken captive. A r o u n d 6,000 escaped t e m p o r a r i l y into the mist but were r o u n d e d u p later. Livy, however, says that a r o u n d 10,000 men m a n a g e d to find their way back to R o m e . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n losses a m o u n t e d to a b o u t 1,500. Polybius, 3: 83-84; Livy, 22: 4-7(1-5)

CALLICULA (ERIBIANUS) M (217) Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l ' s victory at T r a s i m e n e (above) o p e n e d the r o a d to R o m e , but f o r various reasons he decided to turn aside. H e pillaged his way t h r o u g h 180

all the territories on the Adriatic side of the A p e n n i n e s d o w n into Apulia, ravaging the land as he went. While this was going on, the R o m a n s h a d a p p o i n t e d Q u i n t u s F a b i u s M a x i m u s as dictator. Their military forces at that time consisted of f o u r hastily conscripted legions together with their second a r m y , which h a d been g u a r d i n g the Adriatic a p p r o a c h e s at the time of Trasimene. T h e dictator assumed c o m m a n d of the lot a n d c a m p e d near the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . H a n n i b a l immediately led out his a r m y a n d c o n f r o n t e d the R o m a n s but he failed to elicit any response. T h e r e a f t e r , F a b i u s employed the dogging a n d delaying tactics f o r which he b e c a m e noted a n d which e a r n e d him the appellation of C u n c t a t o r . W h e r e v e r H a n n i b a l went, F a b i u s s h a d o w e d him, constantly harassing but keeping his distance. In this way they passed t h r o u g h S a m n i u m . H a n n i b a l then descended t h r o u g h a pass near the m o u n t called Callicula (Livy) o r E r i b i a n u s (Polybius) into the F a l e r n i a n Plain a r o u n d C a p u a , the richest a n d m o s t fertile area in the whole of Italy. He h o p e d that the sight of him p l u n d e r i n g a n d devastating this beautiful region would entice his enemy to give battle. If F a b i u s refrained, it would at least s h o w to all a r o u n d t h a t he, H a n n i b a l , was the indisputable m a s t e r w h o could d o as he chose with impunity. This would e n c o u r a g e them to a b a n d o n their allegiance to R o m e a n d join him. F a b i u s , as usual, stuck to his plan a n d moved along the ridges, resisting any t e m p t a t i o n to descend a n d fight. It occurred to F a b i u s that in d u e course H a n nibal would w a n t to leave the plain by the same route that he h a d come. T h e r e are but few routes out of the plain a n d F a b i u s h a d already blocked t w o of t h e m with garrisons. Accordingly he sent 4,000 men u p the pass by M o u n t Callicula a n d he himself c a m p e d on a hill o v e r l o o k i n g it. It began to look as t h o u g h the master of traps h a d himself been t r a p p e d . H a n n i b a l , realising his position, developed a most ingenious plan. H e got his men to collect as m a n y dry faggots as they could a n d to r o u n d up 2,000 of the strongest oxen f r o m the stock which they h a d c a p t u r e d . As soon as it was d a r k the oxen were driven up to the pass a n d the faggots were tied to their h o r n s . T h e f a g g o t s were then set on fire a n d the beasts were driven h a r d u p to the t o p of the hills. T h e R o m a n garrison in the pass, thinking that the enemy was escaping over the t o p , moved u p to meet him. T h e a p p a r i t i o n s t h a t they e n c o u n t e r e d puzzled a n d terrified them into keeping their distance f r o m the f l a m i n g monsters. Meanwhile, H a n n i b a l led his a r m y t h r o u g h the pass u n o p p o s e d , while F a b i u s

THE ROMAN

remained within his c a m p , also puzzled a n d fearing a t r a p . T h e arrival of d a w n f o u n d the R o m a n garrison still on t o p of the hill a n d in the c o m p a n y of the C a r t h a g i n i a n s w h o h a d driven the beasts. T h e r e h a d been virtually n o action d u r i n g the c o n f u s i o n of the night, but n o w the t w o parties closed. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s were heavily o u t n u m b e r e d a n d would have been wiped out but f o r the arrival of a Spanish d e t a c h m e n t which h a d been sent back by H a n n i b a l . In the ensuing e n g a g e m e n t the R o m a n s c a m e off worst, losing 'a n u m b e r ' of m e n according to Livy; Polybius p u t s their losses at a b o u t a thousand. Polybius, 3: 92-94(6); Livy, 22: 15-18(4) G E R U N I U M (216) - Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l had by now amassed an i m m e n s e q u a n t i t y of p l u n d e r a n d provisions, a n d he settled on G e r a n i u m as an ideal place f o r storage a n d f o r his winter q u a r t e r s . He seized it a n d fortified his e n c a m p m e n t in f r o n t of the town. T h e R o m a n s c a m p e d nearby. T h e c a u t i o u s tactics of F a b i u s were scorned as cowardly by his d e p u t y M a r c u s M i n u c i u s w h o , after a successful skirmish, b e c a m e even m o r e intolerably overconfident. Fabius, a w a r e of this, offered him a choice between c o m m a n d of the a r m y on alternate days or total c o m m a n d of half the army. M i n u c i u s accepted the division, a n d the two halves c a m p e d a mile or t w o a p a r t . H a n n i b a l , also, was a w a r e of the schism a n d of M i n u c i u s ' impulsiveness, a n d so he set a trap. Between his c a m p a n d that of M i n u c i u s was a small hill surr o u n d e d by r o u g h g r o u n d a n d hollows. H a n n i b a l sent out a contingent of 500 cavalry a n d 5,000 i n f a n t r y by night with orders to conceal themselves in this terrain. T h e n at d a y b r e a k he sent a small p a r t y of light-armed t r o o p s to occupy the hill. W h e n M i n u c i u s saw this, he sent out his lighta r m e d t r o o p s followed by the cavalry. H a n n i b a l sent reinforcements, a n d so M i n u c i u s engaged with his heavy infantry. H a n n i b a l then a p p e a r e d with his cavalry a n d the rest of his a r m y . A t this p o i n t the signal was given to the t r o o p s lying in a m b u s h , w h o charged out f r o m all directions. T h e result might have been a complete disaster if F a b i u s had not been watching the action a n d h a d not hastily b r o u g h t his a r m y u p to the rescue. This put heart into the R o m a n s w h o rallied a n d m a n aged to w i t h d r a w to safety. As it was, they lost m a n y of the light i n f a n t r y a n d even m o r e of the legionaries. T h e effects of his impetuosity a n d of his salvation by F a b i u s were salutary lessons to

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Minucius, w h o was t h e r e a f t e r c o n t e n t to play second fiddle to his n o w revered superior. Polybius, 3; 104-105; Livy, 22; 28-29; Plutarch, F a b i u s M a x i m u s , 11-12 C A N N A E (216, A u g u s t 2) - Second Punic W a r In the spring of 216 H a n n i b a l left G e r a n i u m a n d m a r c h e d to C a n n a e in Apulia, where he c a p t u r e d the citadel a n d with it the R o m a n supplies stored in it. T h e citadel c o m m a n d e d the whole surr o u n d i n g countryside so that any a p p r o a c h by the R o m a n s w o u l d inevitably lead to a battle. T h e generals appealed to R o m e f o r instructions, a n d the senate decided to put eight legions (40,000 men excluding allies) into the field. This was an unprecedented step, t w o legions being the usual c o m p l e m e n t or at most f o u r legions. This huge force of a r o u n d 80.000 men plus cavalry set out for C a n n a e u n d e r two consuls, the c a u t i o u s L. Aemilius P a u l u s a n d the hasty G a i u s Terentius V a r r o , w h o pitched c a m p by the river A u f i d u s a few miles f r o m the C a r t h a g i n i a n c a m p . H a n n i b a l , with a force n u m b e r i n g a b o u t half t h a t of the R o m a n s , h a d t a k e n u p a position on the right (south) b a n k of the river with the prevailing wind f r o m the m o u n t a i n s behind him. This fact is not m e n t i o n e d by Polybius, but Livy m a k e s a great p o i n t of it. T h e wind d r o v e over the s a n d y plain,

B A T T L E O F C A N N A E (216BC)

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w h i p p i n g u p dust which would c h o k e a n d blind his o p p o n e n t s . In a c c o r d a n c e with c u s t o m , the consuls assumed c o m m a n d in t u r n on alternate days. O n a d a y when V a r r o was in c o m m a n d - a n d against all the advice of P a u l u s - he led out his legions a n d drew them up facing the enemy with the legionaries in close f o r m a t i o n in the centre a n d cavalry on both wings. H a n n i b a l had d r a w n u p his line in a crescent with the centre f o r e m o s t . Here, in the middle, he had placed his weakest a n d m o s t unreliable t r o o p s , the Celts a n d S p a n i a r d s . T h e y were strengthened on either side by A f r i c a n i n f a n t r y with cavalry b e y o n d on the wings. In the e n g a g e m e n t the R o m a n centre forced the Celts a n d S p a n i a r d s b a c k , as H a n n i b a l is said to have intended. W h e n , u n d e r f u r t h e r pressure, they c o n t i n u e d to give g r o u n d , the C a r t h a g i n i a n line ceased to be a convex arc a n d became concave. T h e R o m a n i n f a n t r y had n o w p e n e t r a t e d deeply into the enemy centre where they f o u n d themselves f l a n k e d by the A f r i c a n t r o o p s at either end of the enemy line. These divisions turned i n w a r d s a n d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n flanks. M e a n w h i l e the C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry was getting the better of the Roman horse. On the C a r t h a g i n i a n left, H a s d r u b a l with his cavalry had virtually destroyed the o p p o s i n g wing a n d , being unengaged, he led his s q u a d r o n s r o u n d behind the R o m a n position to assist the N u m i d i a n cavalry on the right. W h e n they had routed the enemy horse, H a s d r u b a l turned a n d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n i n f a n t r y in the rear. T h e legions were n o w completely s u r r o u n d e d a n d were almost annihilated. Estimates of their total casualties range f r o m 50,000 to 70,000. T h e consul V a r r o m a n a g e d to escape, but the gallant Paulus was killed. O n the C a r t h a g i n i a n side the losses were a b o u t 6,000 all told. Livy tells a d u b i o u s story a b o u t some N u m i dians w h o p r e t e n d e d to be deserters to the R o m a n cause but h a d secreted swords u n d e r their tunics. A p p i a n a n d Z o n a r a s have a very similar tale a b o u t some Celtiberians. These a c c o u n t s read r a t h e r like fabricated excuses f o r the R o m a n disaster, blaming it on dirty w o r k . F r o m the sketchy a c c o u n t of Z o n a r a s it is difficult to recognize the battle as that of C a n n a e . As a m a t t e r of perspective, it m a y be n o t e d that Livy's lower estimate for the R o m a n casualties would still represent the worst losses suffered by any single western a r m y on a single day up to the present time. Polybius, 3: 110-117; Livy, 22: 43(10)-49; Plutarch, F a b i u s M a x i m u s , 15-16; Appian, H a n n i b a l i c W a r , 19-26; Zonaras, 9: I 182

N O L A (216) - Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l ' s overwhelming victory at C a n n a e (above) o p e n e d the way for an immediate m a r c h straight on R o m e , but he did not take it. His force was not a large one, a n d R o m e still held the allegiance of the centre and n o r t h of Italy. T h e disaster of C a n n a e b r o u g h t out the best in the R o m a n t e m p e r a m e n t . Peace was never m e n t i o n e d . T h e senate proclaimed a levy a n d raised f o u r legions, enlisting even boys. In addition, they a r m e d 8,000 volunteers f r o m a m o n g the slaves. T h e r e were also in excess of 10,000 fugitives w h o h a d m a n a g e d to escape a f t e r C a n n a e . Instead of a t t a c k i n g R o m e , H a n n i b a l r o a m e d a b o u t mainly in C a m p a n i a , receiving t o w n s which were h a n d e d over to him or a t t a c k i n g t h e m with or w i t h o u t success. W h e n he presented himself at the gates of N o l a , a b o u t 9 miles north-east of Vesuvius, M a r c u s C l a u d i u s Marcellus was holding the place with his army. T h e senators of N o l a reported to Marcellus that the citizens were secretly plotting with the enemy to seize c o n t r o l of the t o w n w h e n the R o m a n s m o v e d out to battle. They would seize the R o m a n baggage, shut the gates a n d m a n the walls. Acting on this tip, Marcellus divided his a r m y into three sections a n d positioned them at the three gates which faced the C a r t h a g i n i a n c a m p . T h e baggage was supervised a n d n o citizen was allowed to a p p r o a c h the walls o r gates. F o r several days H a n n i b a l h a d lined his men up in battle o r d e r w i t h o u t o b t a i n i n g any response. He then assembled all the gear needed f o r an assault a n d h a d started to a d v a n c e w h e n the middle gate was flung open. T h e pick of the R o m a n i n f a n t r y charged f o r t h followed by the cavalry. T h e C a r thaginian centre was reeling u n d e r the shock when the allied horse a n d light i n f a n t r y charged out of the o t h e r gates a n d a t t a c k e d the e n e m y ' s wings. They were driven back to their c a m p a n d subsequently withdrew f r o m N o l a . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s are reputed to have lost 2,800 m e n (Plutarch says 5,000) against a R o m a n loss of 500. But even Livy, whose a c c o u n t s are frequently coloured with patriotic embellishments, hesitates to a d o p t these figures a n d clearly does not regard the result as m o r e t h a n a m i n o r victory. It was, he says, a h a r d e n o u g h task at t h a t time to avoid defeat by Hannibal. Livy, 23: 16; Plutarch,

Marcellus, 11

G R U M E N T U M (215) - Second Punic W a r In an action near G r u m e n t u m in L u c a n i a , Tiberius S e m p r o n i u s L o n g u s defeated the C a r t h a g i n i a n s u n d e r H a n n o . Over 2.000 of the enemy were killed

THE ROMAN

with a R o m a n loss of 280, a n d 41 s t a n d a r d s were c a p t u r e d . H a n n o withdrew into B r u t t i u m . Livy, 23: 37(10-11) N O L A (215) - Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l decided to m a k e a n o t h e r a t t e m p t at N o l a , following his defeat there by Marcellus in the preceding year ( N o l a , 216). H e was joined there by H a n n o , w h o arrived f r o m B r u t t i u m with r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m C a r t h a g e . Between them they s u r r o u n d e d the town. T h e p r o c o n s u l Marcellus m a r c h e d his m e n out, a n d a battle t o o k place on flat g r o u n d between the t o w n a n d the C a r t h a g i nian c a m p a b o u t a mile away. Plutarch records t h a t Marcellus h a d a r m e d his i n f a n t r y with long spears f o r use at long range, whereas the enemy h a d only short w e a p o n s f o r close fighting. As a result, the C a r t h a g i n i a n s turned a n d fled. N o a m o u n t of praise or a b u s e f r o m H a n n i b a l could prevent his m e n f r o m breaking. H e lost 5,000 m e n killed against 1,000 R o m a n casualties. A few d a y s later nearly 300 Spanish a n d N u m i d i a n cavalrymen deserted to the R o m a n s . This a c c o u n t by Livy, repeated by Plutarch, is at variance with the statement of Polybius that H a n n i b a l remained u n b e a t e n b e f o r e the battle of Z a m a (202). If Polybius' assertion is accepted, it is necessary also to accept t h a t Livy (and P l u t a r c h ) have exaggerated the R o m a n victory, p r e s u m a b l y to offset the R o m a n disaster at C a n n a e (216). Livy, 23: 44-46(6); Plutarch. Marcellus, 12(2-3); Polybius, 15: 16(5) C A R A L E S (215) - Second Punic W a r In Sardinia, the R o m a n presence was small a n d its control of the island was tottering. A certain local m a g n a t e , H a m p s i c o r a , was stirring u p revolt a n d b e c k o n i n g to C a r t h a g e . H a s d r u b a l the Bald was sent there with a force of a b o u t 12,000 f o o t a n d 1,500 horse, but the fleet was d a m a g e d a n d they were delayed by b a d weather. O n the o t h e r side, the R o m a n s sent 5,000 f o o t a n d 400 horse u n d e r Titus M a n l i u s T o r q u a t u s , w h o n o w controlled a total force of 22,000 f o o t a n d 1,200 horse. H e m a r c h e d u p c o u n t r y a n d e n c a m p e d near the position occupied by H a m p s i c o r a . Shortly afterw a r d s H a s d r u b a l arrived, causing M a n l i u s to w i t h d r a w to Carales [Cagliari], H a s d r u b a l joined forces with H a m p s i c o r a a n d together they a d v a n c e d t o w a r d Carales b u t were met a n d engaged by Manlius. T h e action lasted f o r f o u r h o u r s d u r i n g which n u m e r o u s Sardinians were either killed of fled. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s put up a stiffer resistance but eventually they t o o turned

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a n d started to flee, only to find that their retreat was cut off by the R o m a n wing which had routed the Sardinians. W h a t followed was butchery. T h e enemy lost a total of 12,000 men killed a n d 3,700 c a p t u r e d . A m o n g the prisoners were H a s d r u b a l himself a n d two o t h e r c o m m a n d e r s , H a n n o a n d M a g o . H a m p s i c o r a , learning that his son was d e a d , killed himself. Livy, 23: 40-41(4) I B E R A (215) - Second Punic W a r In 216 o r 215 H a s d r u b a l Barca, the C a r t h a g i n i a n c o m m a n d e r in Spain, received orders to follow in the footsteps of his b r o t h e r H a n n i b a l a n d m a r c h to Italy. W h e n the Scipio brothers, G n a e u s a n d Publius, heard of this, they joined forces in an a t t e m p t to a b o r t the threat to R o m e . They crossed the river Iberus [Ebro] a n d p r e p a r e d to a t t a c k the t o w n of Ibera just south of the river. H a s d r u b a l c o u n t e r e d by assaulting a R o m a n - h e l d t o w n , p r o b a b l y D e r t o s a [Tortosa] on the n o r t h b a n k of the river, to which the R o m a n s repaired. W h e n the two armies lined up f o r battle, the Spanish contingents in H a s d r u b a l ' s centre gave way almost immediately a n d were completely routed by a vigorous charge. His wings fared better a n d p a r tially encircled the R o m a n s , forcing them t o w a r d the centre where they f o u n d themselves fighting in a massed b o d y a n d in both directions. However, with the r o u t of the enemy centre the R o m a n s h a d become superior in n u m b e r s , a n d they forced the e n e m y ' s wings to give way with heavy losses. Few C a r t h a g i n i a n s survived. T h e enemy cavalry h a d already fled the field w h e n they saw their centre give way. T h e R o m a n victory forced H a s d r u b a l to p o s t p o n e his m a r c h to Italy, which eventually took place nine years later. A n a d d i t i o n a l R o m a n gain was a resulting swing to R o m e on the part of m a n y of the Iberian tribes. Livy, 23: 28(7)-29 I L I T U R G I (215) - Second Punic W a r lliturgi [near Cabanes], a Spanish t o w n in the east which h a d joined the R o m a n s , was besieged by H a s d r u b a l . M a g o a n d H a m i l c a r (son of Bomilcar). Starvation was l o o m i n g when Publius a n d G n a e u s Scipio forced their way in between the three armies, bringing supplies. T h e Scipios then m a d e a sortie against the m a i n enemy position u n d e r H a s d r u b a l , w h o was p r o m p t l y joined by the o t h e r t w o armies. T h e R o m a n s were grossly o u t n u m b e r e d with only 16,000 men against the c o m b i n e d enemy force of 60,000. Nevertheless, in spite of the m i s m a t c h , the R o m a n s w o n an 183


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u n d o u b t e d victory which cost the enemy m o r e casualties t h a n the total R o m a n strength. All three enemy c a m p s were c a p t u r e d . Livy 23: 49((5-11) I N T I B I L I (215) - Second Punic W a r A f t e r their defeat at Iliturgi (above) the C a r t h a ginians m a r c h e d n o r t h w a r d s to a t t a c k Intibili [near Benicarlo]. Here the story was m u c h the same as at Iliturgi. T h e R o m a n s engaged them a n d killed m o r e t h a n 13,000 of t h e m as well as c a p t u r i n g 2,000 men a n d several elephants. These successes encouraged m o s t of the local tribes to go over to the R o m a n s . Livy, 23: 49(12-14) B E N E V E N T U M (214) - Second Punic W a r In Italy, the C a r t h a g i n i a n general H a n n o a n d the R o m a n Tiberius S e m p r o n i u s G r a c c h u s converged with their armies on Beneventum [Benevento]. W h e n G r a c c h u s learnt that H a n n o was e n c a m p e d a b o u t three miles away, he took u p a position a mile a w a y f r o m him. A f t e r the two sides h a d lined u p a n d engaged, there resulted one of the most e x t r a o r d i n a r y battles in the war. T h e t r o o p s of G r a c c h u s consisted largely of slaves w h o , following the disastrous R o m a n losses at C a n n a e (216), h a d volunteered to enlist in exchange f o r their f r e e d o m . N o w , two years later, they were w o n dering if that d a y w o u l d ever c o m e . G r a c c h u s sensed their resentment a n d told them that freed o m would be g r a n t e d immediately to any m a n in the c o m i n g battle w h o b r o u g h t him a C a r t h a g i nian head. This nearly lost G r a c c h u s the battle. T h e slaves were so busy d e c a p i t a t i n g corpses a n d r u n n i n g a r o u n d with heads that they were incapable of fighting the living. W h e n G r a c c h u s was alerted to this, he told his men to forget the heads a n d proclaimed that no m a n could h o p e for freed o m unless the enemy was utterly defeated. This turned the scales. T h e o n s l a u g h t was so f u r i o u s that the C a r t h a g i n i a n f r o n t was driven in a n d r o u t e d . T h e enemy were pursued to their c a m p where the slaughter c o n t i n u e d u n a b a t e d . Less t h a n 2,000 escaped alive out of H a n n o ' s total force of 18,000: the R o m a n s lost a r o u n d 2,000. G r a c c h u s kept his promise a n d liberated every o n e of the slave-volunteers. Livy, 24: 14-16 N O L A (214) - Second Punic W a r T h e s e n a t o r s of N o l a were loyal to R o m e ; the c o m m o n s were hostile a n d h a d previously tried to h a n d the t o w n over to H a n n i b a l . W h e n H a n n i b a l 184

arrived again in the vicinity, the c o m m o n s sent envoys p r o m i s i n g that the t o w n w o u l d be surrendered to him. T h e senators called in Marcellus, w h o arrived h o t f o o t a n d sent 6,000 infantry a n d 300 horse into the t o w n f o r i m m e d i a t e protection. Marcellus then s u m m o n e d the t r o o p s stationed at Suessula a b o u t seven miles away to try to force an engagement. H e also ordered a d e t a c h m e n t of cavalry to leave the t o w n t h r o u g h the far gate at night a n d to m a k e a wide d e t o u r to the e n e m y ' s rear. This part of the plan failed as the d e t a c h m e n t got lost a n d failed to sight the enemy. In spite of its absence the R o m a n s h a d the u p p e r h a n d a n d killed a r o u n d 2,000 of the enemy for a loss of 400. But Marcellus did not w a n t to press the pursuit w i t h o u t the cavalry. T h e following d a y he again lined u p for battle but H a n n i b a l did not accept the challenge. Livy, 24: 13(8-11)

and 17

I L I T U R G I (213) - Second Punic W a r In Spain, the R o m a n garrison in Iliturgi [near Andujar] in Baetica was besieged by the C a r t h a ginians a n d nearing surrender on a c c o u n t of starvation. Relief arrived in the f o r m of G n a e u s Scipio with one legion, which forced its way into the t o w n a f t e r inflicting heavy losses. T h e following d a y Scipio m a d e a sortie. Over 12,000 of the enemy were killed in total. Livy, 24: 41(8-10) M U N D A (213) - Second Punic W a r A f t e r failing to take Iliturgi (above), the C a r t h a ginians decided to try their luck at M u n d a , a t o w n in the extreme south, the precise site of which has not been defined. G n a e u s Scipio followed a n d engaged t h e m in an action which lasted several h o u r s . T h e R o m a n s withdrew when Scipio was w o u n d e d , but only a f t e r 12,000 of the enemy h a d allegedly been killed, as well as 39 elephants. Livy, 24: 42(1-4) A U R I N X (213) - Second Punic W a r T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s proceeded f r o m their defeat at M u n d a (above) to A u r i n x , again followed by G n a e u s Scipio. M a g o , one of the C a r t h a g i n i a n generals, h a d been sent out to raise fresh t r o o p s a n d bring the C a r t h a g i n i a n strength u p to scratch. This was of little avail. T h e R o m a n s w o n their third victory in succession, in which they are said to have slain a f u r t h e r 8,000 of the enemy. Livy, 24: 42(5-8)

THE ROMAN

C A P U A (212) - Second Punic W a r T h e consuls, A p p i u s C l a u d i u s a n d Q u i n t u s Fulvius, were bent on c a p t u r i n g the enemy-held city of C a p u a , 15 miles n o r t h of N e a p o l i s [Naples], W h e n they arrived in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d , they started devastating the c r o p s f o r miles a r o u n d . T h e C a p u a n s , s u p p o r t e d by C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry, m a d e a sortie a n d overwhelmed the R o m a n s before the consuls h a d time to recall their t r o o p s a n d line them up. T h e y lost m o r e t h a n 1,500 men t h r o u g h their lack of caution. Livy, 25: 18(1) C A P U A (212) - Second Punic W a r A few days a f t e r the incident above, H a n n i b a l moved to C a p u a to protect it a n d offered battle in w h a t proved to be an abortive action. T h e R o m a n infantry were f a r i n g badly at the h a n d s of the enemy cavalry until their own m o u n t e d t r o o p s were ordered into the f r a y . D u r i n g this cavalry battle an unidentified b o d y of men was seen a p p r o a c h i n g in the distance. Both c o m m a n d e r s f a v o u r e d discretion a n d disengaged, r e t u r n i n g to their respective c a m p s . Livy, 25: 19(1-5) H E R D O N E A (212) - Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l was looking f o r easy victories when the news reached him t h a t the forces u n d e r the p r a e t o r G n a e u s Fulvius were in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d of H e r d o n e a [Ordona] in A p u l i a a n d that they a n d their c o m m a n d e r h a d become very lax a n d undisciplined. H a n n i b a l proceeded there a n d concealed a force of 3,000 m e n by night, placing them in nearby f a r m s a n d w o o d l a n d s . M a g o with 2,000 horse was instructed to cover all possible escape roads. T h e next m o r n i n g H a n n i b a l d r e w u p his infantry in battle order, a challenge which was impetuously accepted by Fulvius a n d his men. T h e y failed to stand up to the first onslaught a n d were s u r r o u n d e d a n d hacked to pieces. N o t m o r e than 2,000 escaped out of the force of 18,000. As for Fulvius, he galloped off the field in the early stages of the e n c o u n t e r . Livy, 25: 20(5)-21 H I M E R A (211) - Second Punic W a r In 212 Marcellus c a p t u r e d Syracuse, thus bringing virtually the whole of the island of Sicily u n d e r R o m a n control. But there was still a sizeable active pocket of o p p o s i t i o n at A g r i g e n t u m [Agrigento] u n d e r the C a r t h a g i n i a n generals H a n n o a n d Epicydes a n d an A f r i c a n half-caste called M u t t i n e s , w h o h a d been trained a n d sent out by

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H a n n i b a l . M u t t i n e s , w h o was the driving force of the p a r t y , p e r s u a d e d his colleagues to leave the protection of the city a n d to take u p a position on the river H i m e r a [Sfl/so], Marcellus replied by c a m p i n g a few miles away. F o r two d a y s M u t t i n e s and his N u m i d i a n cavalry inflicted severe d a m a g e on the R o m a n o u t p o s t s . O n the third d a y M u t t i n e s was called away to deal with a m u t i n y of the N u m i d i a n s at h e a d q u a r t e r s , a n d he a d j u r e d the o t h e r t w o c o m m a n d e r s not to engage the enemy in his absence. T h e y , however, were beginning to find him insufferable a n d , m o r e o v e r , they w a n t e d the credit for any success. Accordingly, they crossed the river a n d offered battle. At that p o i n t a few of their N u m i d i a n cavalry rode u p to Marcellus a n d told him of their grievances a n d their s y m p a t h y with their m u t i n o u s colleagues. T h e y w o u l d , they said, stay out of any fight. In the absence of this the most feared b r a n c h of the enemy forces - the battle was short a n d the R o m a n victory was overwhelming. It is said that m a n y t h o u s a n d s were killed or c a p t u r e d . Livy, 25: 40(5)-41(7)

UPPER BAETIS R (211) - Second Punic War T h e Scipio brothers, G n a e u s a n d Publius, h a d gained control of Spain n o r t h of the Iberus [Ebro], thereby fulfilling their principal aim of preventing H a s d r u b a l f r o m d e p a r t i n g f o r Italy. In 212 they a d v a n c e d s o u t h of the river a n d , at the end of the year, went into winter q u a r t e r s , Publius at Castillo a n d G n a e u s at O r s o (also k n o w n as U r s o [Osuna]). T h e r e were still three C a r t h a g i n i a n armies o p p o s ing them, but d u r i n g the winter the R o m a n s were strengthened by the a d d i t i o n of 20,000 Celtiberian mercenaries. With these r e i n f o r c e m e n t s they decided to start a m a j o r offensive in the spring. T h e y also decided - unwisely with hindsight - to split their forces, Publius taking t w o thirds of the total f o r action against M a g o a n d H a s d r u b a l (son of Gisgo). G n a e u s with the rest against H a s d r u b a l Barca. Publius is believed to have h e a d e d for the u p p e r reaches of the Baetis [Guadalquivir], where he fell foul of the y o u n g Masinissa a n d his N u m i d i a n cavalry. This awe-inspiring o p p o n e n t h u n g o n t o him like a leech, harassing him d a y a n d night a n d preventing him f r o m leaving his c a m p to o b t a i n supplies. M o r e o v e r , Publius knew t h a t Indibilis, the prince of the Ilergetes, was on his way to join the C a r t h a g i n i a n s with 7,500 of his people. Yielding to necessity, he determined to try to stop this reinforcement. Leaving his c a m p at night, he met the enemy a n d was engaged in a r u n n i n g battle with Indibilis when the N u m i d i a n cavalry 185


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suddenly a p p e a r e d on b o t h his Hanks. As if this was not e n o u g h , the C a r t h a g i n i a n generals also put in an a p p e a r a n c e in his rear. Publius was killed in the fighting, a f t e r which the R o m a n s broke. T h e y were slaughtered in the process of trying to escape, only a few being saved by the onset of darkness. Livy, 25: 34 I L O R C I (211) - Second Punic W a r T h e b a c k g r o u n d to this battle has been outlined in the preceding entry. Publius a n d G n a e u s Scipio had decided to go their s e p a r a t e ways a n d G n a e u s was t a k i n g o n e third of their total strength for action against H a s d r u b a l . W h e n the C a r t h a g i n i a n was in sight, the Celtiberians serving with G n a e u s , said to be 20,000 in n u m b e r , suddenly deserted him a n d d e p a r t e d . Livy says that H a s d r u b a l h a d bribed them to abstain. W h a t e v e r the motive, the effect left Scipio t o o weak to m a t c h the enemy. H e determined to m o v e a w a y , but they followed closely on his heels. T h e o u t l o o k f o r G n a e u s reached its lowest e b b when H a s d r u b a l Barca was joined by M a g o a n d H a s d r u b a l , son of Gisgo, a f t e r their defeat of Publius (above). T h e only course o p e n to G n a e u s was to get a w a y as f a r a n d as fast as he could. He withdrew d u r i n g the following night a n d got well a w a y undetected, but the N u m i d i a n s c a u g h t u p with him b e f o r e the end of the day. They harassed him so h a r d that he was forced to stand a n d defend himself. T o w a r d nightfall he withdrew to a nearby hill. This proved to be so bare a n d stony that the R o m a n s were forced to pile their pack-saddles as a m a k e s h i f t r a m p a r t . It sufficed only to cause a t e m p o r a r y delay a n d was quite i n a d e q u a t e to hold off three armies a n d to prevent the inevitable. S o m e of the R o m a n s escaped into the w o o d s but G n a e u s Scipio was a m o n g those killed. Livy gives no indication of the site of this battle; it is to Pliny that we are indebted for the n a m e of Ilorci [Lorca] in the hinterland behind New Carthage. Livy, 25: 32(3)-33 History, 3: 9

and 35-36;

Pliny,

Natural

C A P U A (211) - Second Punic W a r In Italy, the whole of the R o m a n w a r e f f o r t was devoted to the siege of C a p u a . This caused H a n nibal to a b a n d o n , with reluctance, the c a p t u r e of the citadel at T a r e n t u m [Taranto] in f a v o u r of a n a t t e m p t to save C a p u a . H a v i n g established himself in a valley out of sight of t h a t city, he m a n a g e d to get messages into the city so as to c o - o r d i n a t e his attack f r o m outside with a m a s s sortie of the 186

C a m p a n i a n s , s u p p o r t e d by the C a r t h a g i n i a n garrison. T o deal with this situation, the consul A p p i u s C l a u d i u s o p p o s e d the t o w n while his colleague Q u i n t u s Fulvius c o n f r o n t e d H a n n i b a l . In the action, C l a u d i u s h a d little difficulty in keeping the C a m p a n i a n s at bay a n d eventually forcing them back into the town. In Fulvius' sector, on the o t h e r h a n d , a Spanish c o h o r t b r o k e t h r o u g h the R o m a n lines a n d penetrated with three elephants right up to the r a m p a r t s . Realizing the gravity of the situation, Fulvius rallied his m e n a n d directed them to wheel i n w a r d s a n d a t t a c k the S p a n i a r d s on b o t h flanks. T h e y were cut to pieces a n d the e l e p h a n t s were killed. W h e n H a n n i b a l saw that his Spanish c o h o r t was being m a u l e d , he b r o k e off the assault a n d withdrew. A c c o r d i n g to Livy, the early a c c o u n t s varied greatly in their assessment of this battle. S o m e regarded it as a m a j o r e n c o u n t e r with heavy casualties; o t h e r s as noise a n d c o n f u s i o n r a t h e r t h a n d e a t h a n d destruction. C a p u a fell to the R o m a n s shortly a f t e r w a r d s . Livy, 26: 5-6

COLLINE GATE (211) - Second Punic War After withdrawing from Capua, Hannibal made tracks f o r R o m e . It was F a b i u s M a x i m u s C u n c t a t o r w h o s o o t h e d the f r a y e d nerves of his c o u n trymen by pointing out that H a n n i b a l ' s m o v e was an o b v i o u s feint to d r a w the R o m a n armies a w a y f r o m C a p u a . In the event, Q u i n t u s Fulvius r e t u r n e d to R o m e with a force of 15,000 f r o m C a p u a , leaving the rest in situ. H e e n c a m p e d o u t side the City between the Colline a n d Esquiline G a t e s . H a n n i b a l , f o r his part, established himself on the river A n i o [Aniene] 3 miles a w a y . He then rode u p to the Colline G a t e with 2,000 h o r s e m e n t o inspect the City's defences. This piece of e f f r o n t e r y so infuriated Fulvius t h a t he sent his cavalry against H a n n i b a l . T h e e n g a g e m e n t was successful a n d the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were driven off. Livy, 26: 10 A N I O R (211) - Second Punic W a r A military non-event occurred the day a f t e r the skirmish at the Colline G a t e (above) when H a n nibal crossed the A n i o a n d lined up for battle. Fulvius accepted the challenge. As the t w o armies c o n f r o n t e d each o t h e r in readiness for a fight for R o m e itself, a torrential d o w n p o u r washed a w a y any t h o u g h t s of battle a n d b o t h sides returned to c a m p . W h e n the same thing h a p p e n e d again on the following day, H a n n i b a l accepted the o m e n a n d moved away. Livy, 26: 11(1-4)

THE ROMAN

S A P R I P O R T I S (210) - Second Punic W a r In 212 the city of T a r e n t u m [Taranto] was betrayed into H a n n i b a l ' s h a n d s but he failed to c a p t u r e the citadel, to which the R o m a n garrison withdrew. T h e y were still holding out two years later a l t h o u g h starvation was nigh. Supplies were on their way f r o m Sicily, escorted a l o n g the Italian coast by a fleet of 20 ships u n d e r D e c i m u s Quinctius. This s q u a d r o n fell in with a proC a r t h a g i n i a n fleet of T a r e n t i n e ships off Sapriportis, a b o u t 15 miles f r o m T a r e n t u m but n o w u n k n o w n . T h e T a r e n t i n e vessels were similar in n u m b e r to the R o m a n s ' a n d were u n d e r the c o m m a n d of D e m o c r a t e s . T h e fleets met head on, beak to b e a k , resulting in m u c h grappling, b o a r d i n g a n d h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting. T h e outc o m e centred a r o u n d the first t w o ships to engage. In o n e was Quinctius fighting valiantly; the o p p o s i n g vessel was c o m m a n d e d by a T a r entine n a m e d Nico, w h o ran Quinctius t h r o u g h with his spear. W h e n the R o m a n flag-ship was c a p t u r e d , the rest of the fleet t o o k fright a n d fled. M o s t of the supply vessels, which were outside the battle zone, m a n a g e d to escape to sea but their c o n t e n t s never reached the beleaguered garrison in the citadel at T a r e n t u m . Livy, 26: 39 H E R D O N E A (210) - Second Punic W a r T h e proconsul G n a e u s Fulvius was c a m p e d near H e r d o n e a [Ordona] a n d was h o p i n g to wrest the t o w n f r o m the C a r t h a g i n i a n s while H a n n i b a l was out of the way in B r u t t i u m . H a n n i b a l heard of these plans a n d was also a w a r e that Fulvius was characteristically negligent. W i t h a lightning forced m a r c h he m a d e a totally unexpected a p p e a r a n c e before H e r d o n e a in battle order. Fulvius hurriedly assembled his forces a n d accepted the challenge. W h e n the i n f a n t r y battle was in full swing, H a n n i b a l sent his cavalry r o u n d the flanks, some with orders to a t t a c k the R o m a n c a m p a n d the rest to take the R o m a n s themselves in the rear. T h e R o m a n s , w h o u p to that point had s t o o d their g r o u n d , n o w gave way a n d tried to flee, but m a n y were killed, including Fulvius a n d 13 military tribunes. T h e R o m a n losses have been variously put at between 7,000 a n d 13,000. Before the battle H a n n i b a l , having inflicted an ignominious defeat on the p r a e t o r G n a e u s Fulvius at H e r d o n e a two years earlier, j o k e d cont e m p t u o u s l y a b o u t his i m p e n d i n g defeat of the p r a e t o r ' s n a m e s a k e at the same place. T h e q u i p was only a c c u r a t e up to a point. T h e p r a e t o r was

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G n a e u s Fulvius Flaccus w h e r e a s the proconsul was G n a e u s Fulvius C e n t u m a l u s . Livy, 27: 1; Appian, H a n n i b a l i c W a r , 48 N U M I S T R O (210) - Second Punic W a r In L u c a n i a , H a n n i b a l was e n c a m p e d o n a hill near N u m i s t r o when Marcellus arrived a n d took u p a position on level g r o u n d not f a r a w a y . In spite of his d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s position, it was Marcellus w h o issued the challenge by a d o p t i n g battle positions, which H a n n i b a l accepted. In the engagem e n t , b o t h sides were evenly m a t c h e d a n d on b o t h sides fresh forces were periodically sent f o r w a r d to relieve the exhausted f r o n t lines. T h e battle raged in this way f r o m d a w n to d u s k , when the o p p o s i n g armies were forced to s e p a r a t e with the issue still undecided. On the following m o r n i n g the R o m a n s again f o r m e d up, but there was n o enemy to fight. H a n n i b a l h a d crept silently away d u r i n g the night. Although pursued by Marcellus, Hannibal studiously avoided a n y m a j o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n while his p u r s u e r cautiously avoided a n y trap. Livy, 27: 2; Plutarch, Marcellus, 24(4-6) N E W C A R T H A G E (209) - Second Punic W a r In Spain, the y o u n g Publius Cornelius Scipio (later A f r i c a n u s ) h a d assumed the c o m m a n d of the R o m a n forces following the d e a t h of his f a t h e r at the U p p e r Baetis (211) a n d of his uncle at Ilorci (211). H e f o u n d himself o p p o s i n g three s e p a r a t e armies. He decided to give t h e m all the brush a n d to attack their key base at N e w C a r t h a g e [Cartagena], f r o m which they were all at least 10 days' m a r c h away. H e t o o k u p a position a q u a r t e r of a mile a w a y f r o m the city a n d drew up his men in f r o n t of his c a m p . T h e hostilities began with an open battle when the garrison c o m m a n d e r M a g o opened the city gate a n d launched a charge by 2,000 a r m e d citizens ( A p p i a n says 10,000) against the R o m a n s . T h e fighting was s t u b b o r n , but the o d d s were heavily in f a v o u r of the R o m a n s . Scipio h a d deliberately positioned his forces at a distance f r o m the city so that the enemy h a d to cover the intervening g r o u n d , while the R o m a n reserves were close at h a n d . T h e enemy were forced back by sheer weight of n u m b e r s . T h e y b r o k e a n d fled back to the gate where m a n y were t r a m p l e d to d e a t h in the crush. Scipio proceeded t o assault a n d c a p t u r e the city f r o m the land a n d sea. Polybius, 10: 12; Livy, 26: 44(1-4) C A N U S I U M (209) - Second Punic W a r Q u i n t u s F a b i u s M a x i m u s was intent on retaking f r o m H a n n i b a l his one last r e m a i n i n g s t r o n g h o l d 187


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in Italy: T a r e n t u m [Taranto], H e asked Marcellus to d o g a n d divert the C a r t h a g i n i a n with all his might. W h e n Marcellus met up with H a n n i b a l near C a n u s i u m [Canosa], the C a r t h a g i n i a n moved a w a y a n d did his best to avoid a battle. But the R o m a n stuck close to his heels a n d eventually c a u g h t a n d harassed him while H a n n i b a l was fortifying his c a m p . A general e n g a g e m e n t was inevitable a n d c o n t i n u e d until d u s k with no decision. Both sides again t o o k the field next m o r n i n g . T h e struggle was resumed a n d was evenly balanced until the R o m a n right wing started to weaken. Marcellus b r o u g h t a n o t h e r legion up to the f r o n t t o replace the exhausted men, but the execution of this m a n o e u v r e went awry. W i t h one legion m o v i n g f o r w a r d a n d a n o t h e r retiring, m u d d l e a n d c o n f u s i o n set in a n d turned into a general r o u t . T h e R o m a n s lost 2,700 men. Livy, 27: 12(7-17); Plutarch, Marcellus, 25(2-4) P E T E L I A (208) - Second Punic W a r T h e consuls h o p e d that it might be possible to m a k e an assault on the C a r t h a g i n i a n - h e l d t o w n of Locri Epizephyrii [Locri] near the extreme s o u t h in the 'toe' of Italy. T h e y ordered a d e t a c h m e n t to be sent to Locri f r o m the R o m a n garrison at T a r e n t u m . H a n n i b a l ' s spies i n f o r m e d him of these moves, a n d he sent 3,000 cavalry a n d 2,000 foot to conceal themselves u n d e r the hill of Petelia [Strongoli] a l o n g the R o m a n s ' route. T h e R o m a n s walked straight into the a m b u s h . T w o t h o u s a n d or m o r e were killed a n d almost as m a n y taken prisoner. Livy, 27: 26(5-6); Plutarch, Marcellus, 29(1) V E N U S I A (208) - Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l was e n c a m p e d near Venusia [Venosa] in the direction of Bantia a b o u t 12 miles away. Marcellus m o v e d u p a n d stationed himself nearby. Between the t w o c a m p s was a w o o d e d hill, to which H a n n i b a l sent a d e t a c h m e n t of N u m i d i a n cavalry with o r d e r s to conceal themselves. T h e R o m a n s , also, considered t h a t it was a key feature which deserved investigation. Marcellus decided to reconnoitre the hill himself a n d he rode o u t with his c o n s u l a r colleague, Q u i n c t i u s Crispinus, a n d 220 h o r s e m e n , 40 of w h o m were f r o m Fregellae while the rest were Etruscans. Their a p p r o a c h was spotted by the N u m i d i a n l o o k o u t . W h e n the R o m a n p a r t y drew close, the m e n in a m b u s h s p r a n g up, hurled their spears a n d charged. T h e E t r u s c a n s fled straight away, but the men f r o m Fregellae stayed to fight until b o t h consuls were struck. Marcellus was run t h r o u g h with a lance 188

a n d killed; Crispinus was w o u n d e d but m a n a g e d to get away with the survivors f r o m Fregellae. H e died of his w o u n d s at the end of the year (not within a few days, as Plutarch relates). Livy, 27: 26(7)-27; Plutarch, Marcellus, 29

LOCRI EPIZEPHYRII (208) - Second Punic War In the a m b u s h at Petelia (208), H a n n i b a l h a d t h w a r t e d the R o m a n a t t e m p t to assault Locri by land. But the place was still being besieged f r o m the sea by Lucius Cincius, w h o h a d sailed a fleet over f r o m Sicily with men a n d m u c h e q u i p m e n t . H a n n i b a l n o w m a r c h e d to relieve the siege, preceded by his N u m i d i a n cavalry. As soon as M a g o , the garrison c o m m a n d e r , heard that the N u m i dians were arriving, he m a r c h e d out against the R o m a n besiegers a n d c a u g h t them u n a w a r e s . T h e e n c o u n t e r was nevertheless indecisive until the N u m i d i a n s actually a p p e a r e d , at which point the R o m a n s b r o k e a n d fled to their ships. Livy, 27: 28(13-17) C L U P E A (208, s u m m e r ) - Second Punic W a r D u r i n g the s u m m e r , Valerius crossed f r o m Sicily to A f r i c a with a fleet of 100 ships. He landed near Clupea [Kelibia] and was devastating the s u r r o u n d i n g territory w h e n he heard t h a t a C a r t h a g i n i a n fleet of 83 ships was a p p r o a c h i n g . A f t e r a hurried r e - e m b a r k a t i o n Valerius engaged the enemy fleet in a successful action. Eighteen enemy vessels were c a p t u r e d a n d were t a k e n to Lilybaeum [Marsala] as prizes. Livy, 27: 29(7-8) B A E C U L A (208) - Second Punic W a r In Spain, H a s d r u b a l , son of H a m i l c a r a n d b r o t h e r of H a n n i b a l , was a w a r e that the S p a n i a r d s were going over to the R o m a n s in considerable n u m b e r s a n d he was determined to fight a battle before the i m b a l a n c e b e c a m e t o o great. Scipio, t o o , w a n t e d to fight - before the three C a r t h a g i n i a n armies could a m a l g a m a t e . He m a r c h e d to Baecula [Bctilen], where the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were e n c a m p e d . H a s d r u b a l was c a m p e d on a high plateau with a river behind, which protected his rear. T h e plateau was b o u n d e d in f r o n t by a flat ridge at a lower level so that the whole f o r m a t i o n was stepped, while the f r o n t edge of the ridge was steep a n d rock-strewn. This highly a d v a n t a g e o u s position gave Scipio cause f o r deliberation. W h e n he a t t a c k e d , he sent f o r w a r d some light-armed t r o o p s to climb the ridge a n d m a k e a direct f r o n t a l assault on the e n e m y ' s light t r o o p s w h o were covering the ridge.

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T h e going was exceedingly tough, but they carried out the o r d e r so successfully that H a s d r u b a l , seeing the heavy losses a m o n g his o w n men, started to lead out his t r o o p s o n t o the plateau. Scipio responded by sending m o r e light t r o o p s to reinforce the centre while he divided his m a i n b o d y into t w o parts. W i t h one half he w o r k e d his way r o u n d the ridge to the left a n d a t t a c k e d the enemy in the flank. T h e o t h e r half, u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Laelius, did the same thing on the o p p o s i t e flank. These m a n o e u v r e s t o o k H a s d r u b a l by surprise in his confidence in his unassailable position, a n d they gave him no time to deploy. T h e R o m a n s charged f r o m b o t h sides before the enemy h a d f o r m e d up, a n d forced t h e m to turn a n d flee. It is said that the C a r t h a g i n i a n losses totalled 8,000 dead a n d 12,000 c a p t u r e d , but these are d u b i o u s figures which would have a m o u n t e d to a r o u n d 80 per cent of the total force. A f t e r the battle, Hasd r u b a l collected the fugitives together a n d headed for the Pyrenees in the first stage of his m a r c h to join his b r o t h e r in Italy. Polybius, 10: 38(6)-39; Livy, 27: 18 C A R M O N E (207) - Second Punic W a r T h e action at C a r m o n e [Carmona] consisted of two e n g a g e m e n t s , b o t h of which have been reported only by A p p i a n . He recounts that a f t e r the d e p a r t u r e of H a s d r u b a l Barca f o r Italy, Hasd r u b a l (son of Gisgo) assembled all the r e m a i n i n g C a r t h a g i n i a n forces in Spain at C a r m o n e . These included large n u m b e r s of S p a n i a r d s u n d e r M a g o and the N u m i d i a n s u n d e r Masinissa. T h e cavalry of M a g o a n d Masinissa bivouacked in the o p e n in f r o n t of H a s d r u b a l ' s fortified c a m p . W h e n Scipio arrived on the scene, he sent Laelius to a t t a c k M a g o while he himself t o o k on Masinissa a n d the N u m i d i a n cavalry. T h e N u m i d i a n s severely e m b a r r a s s e d him with their usual h i t - a n d - r u n tactics, in which they discharged their d a r t s then speedily withdrew to f o r m up for a n o t h e r charge. Scipio c o u n t e r e d this by o r d e r i n g his cavalry to level their spears a n d a d v a n c e steadily regardless of the enemy tactics. This r o b b e d the enemy of any c h a n c e of t u r n i n g r o u n d within their striking range, a n d they withdrew. A f t e r these preliminaries, Scipio e n c a m p e d in a strong position a little over a mile f r o m the enemy. His total strength was barely a third of the e n e m y ' s n u m b e r s , which are said to have been 70,000 f o o t alone, a superiority which caused Scipio to hesitate. W h e n his supplies began to run short, he decided to fight. He ordered his m e n to eat a n d then led them in a rapid a d v a n c e against the

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enemy, w h o were only a little over a mile a w a y a n d were c a u g h t u n p r e p a r e d a n d fasting. T h e R o m a n cavalry got the better of the N u m i d i a n s by using similar relentless tactics to those employed in the p r e l i m i n a r y e n g a g e m e n t . T h e infantry, however, were heavily o u t n u m b e r e d a n d were h a r d pressed all day. Eventually, Scipio seized a shield a n d dashed into the space between the armies, s h o u t i n g out to his men to rescue him. This b r o u g h t a b o u t such a f u r i o u s charge that the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were utterly u n a b l e to resist. Their collapse was followed by a terrible slaughter in which 15,000 of them are said to have been slain. T h e R o m a n casualties n u m b e r e d 800. It is n o w t h o u g h t that A p p i a n ' s battles at C a r m o n e m a y have been the actions at Ilipa (206) in a different guise. Appian, Spanish W a r s , 25-27 G R U M E N T U M (207) - Second Punic W a r H a s d r u b a l , son of H a m i l c a r , was bringing a fresh a r m y f r o m Spain to Italy to join his b r o t h e r H a n n i b a l . He had already crossed the Alps in his b r o t h e r ' s f o o t s t e p s a n d was besieging Placentia [Piacenza]. T h e two consuls f o r the year left R o m e in o p p o s i t e directions, Livius m a r c h i n g n o r t h w a r d s to intercept H a s d r u b a l while N e r o ' s task was to o p p o s e H a n n i b a l in the s o u t h . H a n n i b a l collected all the forces he could m u s t e r a n d p r o ceeded to G r u m e n t u m in L u c a n i a , where he set up c a m p almost against the walls of the town. N e r o followed him cautiously a n d t o o k up a position a b o u t o n e a n d a half miles a w a y . His entire aim was to pin his adversary d o w n . H a n n i b a l , on the o t h e r h a n d , was so intent on getting a w a y that he lined u p repeatedly in battle f o r m a t i o n in the h o p e of inflicting a quick rebuff. This p r o m p t e d N e r o to set a t r a p f o r the master of traps. O n the R o m a n right were some b a r e hills which provided n o cover a n d aroused n o suspicion. N e r o ordered a d e t a c h m e n t to cross them a f t e r d a r k a n d to take up a position on the far side. Next m o r n i n g he led out his a r m y , to which the C a r t h a g i n i a n s responded. They started p o u r i n g out of their c a m p gates in such a r a n d o m fashion t h a t they were flung into disorder by a R o m a n cavalry charge. At this point H a n n i b a l emerged with his main force, which started to join in the undisciplined fighting a n d could not be b r o u g h t into p r o p e r o r d e r b e f o r e the concealed R o m a n d e t a c h m e n t charged d o w n u p o n them f r o m the flank. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s turned a n d fled back to their c a m p , losing m o r e than 8,000 killed in spite of the proximity of the c a m p . T h e R o m a n losses were a b o u t 500. 189


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As in a previous instance ( N o l a , 215), this a c c o u n t is at variance with Polybius w h o asserts unreservedly t h a t H a n n i b a l remained u n d e f e a t e d until 202. Disorderly a n d undisciplined t r o o p s u n d e r H a n n i b a l defy the imagination. Livy h a s p r o b a b l y amplified a m i n o r R o m a n success. Livy, 27: 41-42(8); Polybius, 15: 16(5) V E N U S I A (207) - Second Punic W a r A f t e r the e n g a g e m e n t at G r u m e n t u m (above), H a n n i b a l refused to accept a f u r t h e r challenge but slipped a w a y d u r i n g the night a n d m a d e f o r Apulia. N e r o c a u g h t up with him near Venusia [Venosa], where there was a r u n n i n g battle in which the C a r t h a g i n i a n s lost a f u r t h e r 2,000 men. H a n n i b a l again m o v e d on - by night over the m o u n t a i n s - with N e r o always in pursuit. Livy, 27: 42(14-17) M E T A U R U S R (207, J u n e 23) - Second P u n i c War T h e decisive R o m a n victory at the M e t a u r u s c a m e a b o u t t h r o u g h the e x t r a o r d i n a r y initiative of o n e m a n , the consul C l a u d i u s N e r o . H a s d r u b a l h a d crossed the Alps in the spring of 207 a n d had w o r k e d his way d o w n to Sena Gallica [Senigallia] in U m b r i a , near which he h a d c a m p e d . T h e consul Livius had been sent n o r t h to o p p o s e him a n d was e n c a m p e d 500 yards a w a y . H a s d r u b a l sent a letter to his b r o t h e r H a n n i b a l a b o u t a meeting in U m b r i a , but the bearers were c a p t u r e d a n d t a k e n to N e r o , w h o h a d been assigned the task of pinning H a n n i b a l d o w n in the s o u t h . N e r o f o r w a r d e d the letter to the senate a n d i n f o r m e d them at the same time of his intentions. He then detached his best 6,000 i n f a n t r y m e n a n d 1,000 horse f r o m his force a n d left the rest with his s e c o n d - i n - c o m m a n d at C a n u s i u m [Ccmosa] to c o n t i n u e the w a t c h on

H a n n i b a l as if n o t h i n g h a d c h a n g e d . N e r o d e p a r ted at night a n d is reputed to have m a d e a forced m a r c h of a b o u t 250 miles in six d a y s to join his colleague Livius in Sena. W h e n he arrived at Livius' c a m p u n d e r cover of darkness, the t w o consuls shared the c a m p a n d t o o k every m e a s u r e to ensure t h a t H a s d r u b a l was u n a w a r e of the proceedings. T h e next m o r n i n g N e r o refused to entertain any idea of a rest f o r himself a n d his men, insisting t h a t they must strike at once. H a s d r u b a l , however, h a d got wind of the t r u t h by noticing, f o r example, that the t r u m p e t h a d s o u n d e d twice in the consul's c a m p . H e recalled his men back to c a m p . A f t e r d a r k he silently withdrew n o r t h w a r d s to the M e t a u r u s [Metauro] in the h o p e of p u t t i n g the river between himself a n d the R o m a n s . But he missed the track a n d reached the b a n k s of the river at a point where there was n o c h a n c e of crossing it. Here the R o m a n s c a u g h t up with him a n d Hasd r u b a l was forced to d r a w up his men a n d fight. T h e battle c o m m e n c e d with a bloody fight between Livius on the R o m a n left a n d H a s d r u b a l w h o was o p p o s i n g him with his veteran S p a n i a r d s . T h e r e was great slaughter on b o t h sides but no a d v a n t a g e to either. T h e a n t a g o n i s t s were well m a t c h e d a n d the result h u n g in the balance. M e a n w h i l e N e r o , on the R o m a n right, was u n a b l e to a d v a n c e owing to the hilly n a t u r e of the terrain in f r o n t of him, which separated him f r o m H a s d r u b a l ' s G a u l s . W o n d e r i n g why he h a d c o m e so far to no p u r p o s e , N e r o displayed a n o t h e r s t r o k e of genius which saved the day. Wheeling several c o h o r t s f r o m his force, he led them speedily r o u n d behind the R o m a n lines to the o p p o s i t e side of the field where they charged the S p a n i a r d s in the llank a n d rear. T h e m o v e m e n t was as successful as it was unexpected. T h e enemy were cut to pieces where they stood. T h e G a u l s , w h o were on the C a r t h a ginian left a n d h a d t a k e n n o p a r t in the strife u p to this point, were n o w s u r r o u n d e d a n d butchered in their t u r n . Even the elephants, which H a s d r u b a l had placed in f r o n t of his line, were of no help to him. T h e y did n o m o r e t h a n cause c o n f u s i o n on b o t h sides. W h e n H a s d r u b a l saw that the d a y was irreparably lost, he galloped straight into the midst of a R o m a n c o h o r t a n d died fighting valiantly. Polybius estimates that the C a r t h a g i n i a n s lost no less t h a n 10,000 killed in the battle as against 2.000 R o m a n casualties. Livy's figure of 57,000 C a r t h a g i n i a n dead is unacceptable, being almost certainly larger t h a n H a s d r u b a l ' s entire force. N e r o started back f o r C a n u s i u m on the night a f t e r the battle, arriving o n the sixth d a y a c c o r d i n g to the reports. He t o o k with him the head of

190

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H a s d r u b a l a n d o r d e r e d this to be t h r o w n into H a n n i b a l ' s c a m p , the first i n t i m a t i o n H a n n i b a l received of his b r o t h e r ' s defeat a n d death. T h e s u p r e m e initiative of the consul C l a u d i u s N e r o h a d saved Italy a n d R o m e . T h e victory, of which he was the ultimate architect, was the truly decisive event in the whole c a m p a i g n against H a n n i b a l . It defeated the C a r t h a g i n i a n aspirations once a n d f o r all a n d shattered them irreparably in readiness f o r the final d e n o u e m e n t at Z a m a . Livy, 27: 43-49; Polybius, 11: 1-3 (fragment); Zonaras, 9: 9

ILIPA (OR S I L P I A ) (206) - Second Punic War In Spain, H a s d r u b a l (son of Gisgo) a n d M a g o (son of H a m i l c a r ) collected together a force estimated at 50,000-70,000 f o o t a n d 4,000 horse a n d established themselves near Ilipa [Aleala del Rio] in open c o u n t r y at the f o o t of the hills. W h e n Scipio (later A f r i c a n u s ) heard a b o u t the size of this force, he raised 3,000 extra Spanish auxiliaries w h o b r o u g h t his total n u m b e r s up to 45,000. While they were fortifying their c a m p on a low hill opposite the enemy, M a g o a n d Masinissa seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to attack with their cavalry in force. Scipio h a d foreseen this probability a n d h a d stationed his cavalry out of sight behind a hill. T h e

WORLD

unexpectedness of their charge disconcerted the enemy, w h o b r o k e up a n d retired a f t e r a brisk struggle. F o r several d a y s a f t e r this preliminary e n g a g e m e n t H a s d r u b a l led out his forces each m o r n i n g a n d lined t h e m u p in battle o r d e r . E a c h time, Scipio followed suit a f t e r an interval but, as the day w o r e on, n o t h i n g f u r t h e r h a p p e n e d . Scipio, however, noticed that H a s d r u b a l always emerged at a leisurely h o u r a n d that he invariably placed his best t r o o p s , the Libyans, in the centre, while he himself had o p p o s e d them with his R o m a n t r o o p s a n d put the S p a n i a r d s on the wings. O n the day on which he intended to give battle he changed everything r o u n d . He ordered his t r o o p s to b r e a k f a s t early, a n d then he sent the cavalry a n d light t r o o p s a h e a d to h a r a s s the enemy c a m p . H e led out the m a i n forces at sunrise a n d lined them u p with the S p a n i a r d s in the centre a n d the R o m a n s on the wings. H a s d r u b a l was c a u g h t u n p r e p a r e d . H e had to send out his o w n cavalry a n d light t r o o p s to c o u n t e r the e n e m y ' s a n d then h u r r y to line u p his h u n g r y men in their usual f o r m a t i o n . F o r some h o u r s the e n g a g e m e n t was restricted to intermittent skirmishing on the p a r t of the cavalry a n d light t r o o p s . Eventually Scipio allowed the skirmishers to w i t h d r a w a n d , having placed t h e m in the rear of the wings, the whole

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force a d v a n c e d to within a b o u t half a mile of the enemy. At this p o i n t the wings were ordered to execute certain m a n o e u v r e s , the objects of which were to extend them so as to cover the enemy wings a n d to a d v a n c e t h e m out in f r o n t to within striking distance of the enemy. T h e S p a n i a r d s , in the centre, were withheld a n d were told to m o v e f o r w a r d only slowly. T h e cavalry were on the extreme wings. As Scipio h a d intended, the battle devolved entirely r o u n d the two wings, where the enemy were a t t a c k e d by the R o m a n infantry f r o m the f r o n t a n d by the cavalry on the flank. M o r e over, the R o m a n veterans were o p p o s e d by raw recruits. O n the C a r t h a g i n i a n side, on the o t h e r h a n d , the veteran A f r i c a n s in the centre h a d been inactivated by Scipio's tactics. T h e y d a r e d not t u r n to assist their wings because they would have presented their flanks to the S p a n i a r d s . H u n g r y a n d o u t m a n o e u v r e d , the C a r t h a g i n i a n wings began to retreat, then finally b r o k e a n d fled back to their c a m p . H a s d r u b a l ' s elephants, as so often, did as m u c h d a m a g e to friend as foe a n d did not influence the result either way. At the end of the struggle, the R o m a n s looked set to c a p t u r e the e n e m y ' s c a m p but a torrential d o w n p o u r intervened. Scipio's masterly strategy achieved o n e f u r t h e r object. He could not completely trust his S p a n i a r d s , particularly a f t e r the Celtiberian desertion of his f a t h e r , Publius, a n d uncle, G n a e u s , which led to their respective defeats a n d death at the U p p e r Baetis a n d at Ilorci in 211. Placing the S p a n i a r d s in the centre of his line discouraged a repeat of any such infidelity. Polybius", 11: 20-24; Livy, 28: 12(13)-15 A S T A P A (206) - Second Punic W a r A f t e r the c r u s h i n g defeat of the C a r t h a g i n i a n s at Ilipa (above), the R o m a n s were set on s u b d u i n g any Spanish tribes w h o had not capitulated. M a r c i u s Septimus, one of Scipio's officers, h a d already received the peaceful surrender of two wealthy settlements, but at A s t a p a [Estepa] the c o m m u n i t y h a d a seething hatred f o r the R o m a n s which far outweighed their allegiance to C a r t h a g e . T h e y decided to d o or die a n d piled up all their possessions in the f o r u m . O n t o p of this pyre they forced their w o m e n a n d children to sit, p r e p a r e d to fire it if m a t t e r s went against them. W h e n the gates were flung o p e n , they rushed out with a roar. T h e R o m a n s h a d not expected such a sortie a n d sent for two or three t r o o p s of cavalry a n d some light infantry. In the w o r d s of o n e historian, there was 'a battle of sorts'. T h e onslaught of the i n h a b i t a n t s 192

was so frenzied t h a t the leading R o m a n horse were driven back, inducing panic in the light infantry behind. But they rallied a n d f o r m e d into line. W h e n the t o w n s p e o p l e persisted in hurling themselves o n t o the R o m a n swords in blind fury, the R o m a n s extended their line a n d with their superiority in n u m b e r s encircled the townspeople. Every m a n of t h e m was killed, just as he had wished. In the t o w n , the pyre of possessions a n d people was ignited. T h e final act in this m a c a b r e scene was played by those w h o h a d been d e p u t e d to light the fire, w h o then hurled themselves into the flames. Livy, 28: 22 C A R T E I A (206) - Second Punic W a r T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n A d h e r b a l was sailing f r o m G a d e s [Cadiz] to C a r t h a g e with eight triremes a n d a q u i n q u e r e m e , the latter c o n t a i n i n g some conspirators w h o h a d plotted to h a n d G a d e s to the R o m a n s . T h e y were just entering the Straits when G a i u s Laelius sailed out of Carteia in a quinq u e r e m e a c c o m p a n i e d by seven triremes. Livy gives a graphic but u n i n f o r m a t i v e description of the effect of the strong tides, which tossed the ships a r o u n d out of c o n t r o l a n d turned the action into a chaotic m a t t e r of chance. In view of these h a z a r d s , it is surprising that the R o m a n q u i n q u e r e m e m a n a g e d to sink t w o of the enemy triremes a n d to disable a third, while A d h e r b a l succeeded in escaping with his remaining five vessels. Livy, 28: 30(3-12)

SALAECA (TOWER OF AGATHOCLES) (204) - Second Punic W a r Publius Cornelius Scipio landed in Africa at C a p e Apollinis [Cape Farina] a n d moved d o w n the coast to n e a r b y Utica where he c a m p e d a b o u t a mile f r o m the town. His presence caused extreme consternation in C a r t h a g e . H a n n o , son of H a m i l c a r , had been sent out to raise r e i n f o r c e m e n t s a n d was in Salaeca a b o u t 15 miles f r o m the R o m a n c a m p with 4,000 men. Scipio w a n t e d to put a b r a k e on his activities. He asked Masinissa, w h o h a d by then changed sides a n d joined the R o m a n s , to ride up to the t o w n with a d e t a c h m e n t of cavalry a n d to d r a w the enemy out, gradually retiring as the pressure on him increased. Scipio then followed with the bulk of the cavalry, which he concealed behind some hills. Masinissa did as instructed a n d m a n a g e d to lure the entire enemy cavalry out of the t o w n . T h e y forced him to w i t h d r a w , but he achieved this in a g r a d u a l orderly way until he h a d lured them to the scene of the a m b u s h . Scipio a n d the cavalry then a p p e a r e d a n d s u r r o u n d e d the

THE ROMAN

enemy, while Masinissa turned r o u n d a n d joined the fray. A b o u t a t h o u s a n d of the enemy were killed, including H a n n o . T h e rest m a n a g e d to escape, but 2,000 m o r e were killed or c a p t u r e d in the pursuit. A p p i a n , whose a c c o u n t differs in several respects f r o m Livy's, says t h a t the a m b u s h occurred near a tower built by Agathocles a b o u t 3 or 4 miles f r o m Utica. M o d e r n scholars hold that this site is identifiable a n d t h a t the g e o g r a p h y c o n f o r m s precisely with w h a t is k n o w n a b o u t the battle. Livy, 29: 34; Appian, Punic W a r s , 14 C R O T O N (204) - Second Punic W a r In Italy, the consul S e m p r o n i u s c a m e u p o n H a n n i b a l on the m a r c h in the region of C r o t o n [Crotone] in Bruttii. A r u n n i n g fight ensued, in which the R o m a n s lost 1,200 men. T h e following night S e m p r o n i u s joined forces with the p r o c o n s u l Licinius, a f t e r which he challenged H a n n i b a l to fight again. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s were routed a n d suffered over 4,000 casualties. This Livian a c c o u n t of the second e n g a g e m e n t is suspect, like some earlier a c c o u n t s of H a n n i b a l i c defeats ( N o l a , 215; G r u m e n t u m , 207), in view of the statement by Polybius that H a n n i b a l remained u n d e f e a t e d until the battle of Z a m a (202). Livy, 29: 36(4-9) U T I C A (203) - Second Punic W a r Scipio h a d p r o b l e m s . H e h a d c a m p e d for the winter on a p r o m o n t o r y , later k n o w n as the C a s t r a C o r n e l i a n a , close to Utica. T h e p r o b l e m s arose because H a s d r u b a l a n d his ally Syphax, the chief of the N u m i d i a n Masaesylii, h a d both set u p c a m p not far away where they could hem him in with forces superior in n u m b e r to his o w n . F u r t h e r m o r e , the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were keeping a fleet in readiness to cut off his supplies by sea. Scipio's solution to the p r o b l e m was a well-researched incendiary attack on both enemy c a m p s simultaneously. This was not strictly a battle since it was entirely one-sided. T h e enemy h a d no time to pick up a r m s ; they either perished or fled, mostly the former. Polybius, 14: 4-5; Livy, 30: 3(8)-6; W a r s , 21-23

Appian,

Punic

GREAT PLAINS (203) - Second Punic War H a s d r u b a l escaped f r o m the blazing i n f e r n o of his c a m p (above) with a b o u t 2,000 infantry a n d 500 cavalry. He set a b o u t raising fresh t r o o p s . Syphax, an ally of C a r t h a g e , also escaped after the incendiary attack a n d was on his way h o m e to his

WORLD

capital, C i r t a [Constantine], when he e n c o u n t e r e d 4,000 Celtiberian mercenaries on their way to join the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . Within a m o n t h of the b u r n i n g of the camps, Syphax a n d the Celtiberians h a d joined the forces raised by H a s d r u b a l a n d h a d c o n g r e g a t e d on the G r e a t Plains, a r o u n d Souk el Kremis, on the u p p e r reaches of the B a g r a d a s [Medjerda] river. T h e i r c o m b i n e d strength is q u o ted by Polybius a n d Livy at a r o u n d 30,000 men. Here, 75 miles west of Utica, they were quietly organizing themselves at leisure when Scipio a p p e a r e d . As soon as he h a d heard of the enemy c o n g r e g a t i o n , he h a d detailed some of his men to c o n t i n u e the siege of Utica while he set out with the rest ( p e r h a p s 15,000), arriving at G r e a t Plains five d a y s later. He e n c a m p e d on a hill a b o u t 4 miles f r o m the enemy a n d descended on the next d a y into the Plains, where he drew u p his forces within a mile of the enemy a n d engaged in some skirmishing. But it was not until t w o m o r e d a y s of skirmishing h a d elapsed that both sides went into battle. Scipio a d v a n c e d with his infantry in the centre in the usual R o m a n order. T h e cavalry were on the wings: Italians on the right wing a n d Masinissa with the N u m i d i a n s on the left. T h e e n e m y ' s centre was held by the r e d o u b t a b l e Celtiberians; the cavalry were again on b o t h wings. In the first c h a r g e b o t h C a r t h a g i n i a n wings were routed by the R o m a n cavalry. T h e Celtiberians, on the o t h e r h a n d , stood fast, but their flanks had been exposed by the flight of the cavalry. Scipio's f r o n t line (hastati) c o n t i n u e d to engage t h e m while the second line (principes) a n d third line (triarii) t u r n e d , half to the right, half to the left, a n d m a r c h e d out to o u t f l a n k the enemy on b o t h sides. T h e Celtiberians were soon s u r r o u n d e d a n d cut to pieces, but their resistance gave H a s d r u b a l a n d Syphax time to escape. Polybius, 14: 7(9)-8; Livy, 30: 8

A M P S A G A R (CIRTA) (203, winter) - Second Punic W a r W h e n Syphax fled f r o m the battlefield at G r e a t Plains (above) he m a d e for his capital of Cirta [Constantine], where he assembled a n d a r m e d all the able-bodied men. In the m e a n t i m e Masinissa o b t a i n e d f r o m Scipio a third of the R o m a n force, u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Laelius, to supplement his own N u m i d i a n cavalry. T o g e t h e r they set out in pursuit of Syphax w h o m they e n c o u n t e r e d somewhere n e a r Cirta. T h e resulting battle is sometimes referred to by that n a m e . A p p i a n , however, records that Syphax gave battle n e a r a certain river a n d this would almost certainly be the A m p s a g a 193

BA TTLES

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[Rummel], on which C i r t a stood. T h e e n g a g e m e n t began with a cavalry skirmish, which gradually escalated until the entire cavalry strengths on b o t h sides were in o p e r a t i o n . T h e large numerical superiority of S y p h a x ' s horse was telling in his f a v o u r until the R o m a n light i n f a n t r y intervened a n d checked the enemy. At this point the legionaries a d v a n c e d , w h e r e u p o n S y p h a x ' s M a s a e s y lians decided to stay on the field n o longer. While trying to e n c o u r a g e his m e n , Syphax was t h r o w n f r o m his horse, taken prisoner a n d put in chains. T h e casualties suffered by his side are put at less t h a n 5.000 by Livy but at 10,000 by A p p i a n . Masinissa a n d Laelius between them lost only a few h u n d r e d men. Livy, 30: 11-12(5);

Appian, Punic W a r s , 26

U T I C A (203) - Second Punic W a r W i t h C a r t h a g e itself n o w the prime objective, Scipio occupied T u n e s which h a d been a b a n d o n e d by its garrison. It a f f o r d e d a good view of the capital which was only a b o u t 15 miles away. F r o m T u n e s the R o m a n s spotted the enemy fleet sailing out of C a r t h a g e in the direction of Utica. Scipio immediately hastened there with his men to organize his ships which h a d been left in n o sort of o r d e r a n d with n o t h o u g h t of an i m p e n d i n g a t t a c k . His subsequent actions were, as so o f t e n , u n o r t h o d o x . He ordered all the warships to be b r o u g h t close inshore. T h e n , on their seaward side he lined up the t r a n s p o r t s f o u r deep. These he lashed together (with gaps between the g r o u p s of four), securing p l a n k s on t o p to provide a passageway d o w n the line. A l t h o u g h the C a r t h a g i n i a n s h a d naval superiority, they were dilatory in pressing their a t t a c k , deferring it until the m o r n i n g a f t e r their arrival. As Livy says, w h a t followed bore no resemblance to a sea-fight. T h e R o m a n t r a n s p o r t s were taller t h a n the e n e m y ' s ships, giving the R o m a n s the a d v a n t a g e of height in firing missiles at their adversaries. A f t e r a period of Punic unsuccess. the enemy started t o grapple the t r a n s p o r t s in an a t t e m p t to tow t h e m away, forcing the R o m a n s to cut the b o n d s between their ships. A b o u t 60 of the t r a n s p o r t s were towed a w a y in this f a s h i o n , a feat which the C a r t h a g i n i a n s regarded as a source of m u c h rejoicing in view of their recent string of disasters. Livy, 30: 10 Z A M A (202) - Second P u n i c W a r T h e defeat a n d c a p t u r e of C a r t h a g e ' s ally. Syphax, at the A m p s a g a river (203) a n d Scipio's occupation of T u n e s caused the C a r t h a g i n i a n s to seek 194

BATTLE O F Z A M A (202BC)

A d a p t e d f r o m a d i a g r a m in B . H . L i d d e l l H a r t , Scipio

Africanus,

1926

peace terms, while at the same time they ordered H a n n i b a l to return at once f r o m Italy. Their envoys were still in R o m e asking f o r peace when their brethren at h o m e violated the armistice. Scipio sent urgent messages to Masinissa in N u m i d i a to collect as large a force as he could a n d to meet up with him. He then set off w e s t w a r d s up the Bagradas [Medjerda] valley a n d eventually e n c a m p e d at N a r a g a r a [Sidi Youssef], 50 miles west of Z a m a , where the reunion with Masinissa a n d his N u m i d i a n forces took place. In the m e a n t i m e , H a n n i b a l h a d landed near H a d r u m e n t u m [Soi/sse] a n d h a d proceeded a f t e r an interval to Z a m a , a b o u t 80 miles south-west of C a r t h a g e . H e sent to Scipio requesting a conference. Scipio p r o m p t l y m o v e d a few miles to the east a n d e n c a m p e d on a hill with a plentiful supply of water nearby. He invited H a n n i b a l to meet him there. H a n n i b a l m o v e d w e s t w a r d s out of Z a m a a n d e n c a m p e d on a hill o p p o s i t e Scipio. His hill was short of water, a f a c t o r which played a p a r t in the battle to come. At the c o n f e r e n c e the negotiations came to nothing; the only possible o u t c o m e was a battle - on the following day. Both armies were d r a w n up f o r battle in three

THE ROMAN

lines. H a n n i b a l ' s first line consisted of 12,000 mercenaries, a n d his second line, at a distance behind, comprised the C a r t h a g i n i a n s a n d Libyans. C o n s i d e r a b l y f u r t h e r in the rear were the veterans w h o m H a n n i b a l kept as a reserve force. T h e cavalry were divided between the wings. In f r o n t of the whole force were the light-armed t r o o p s a n d some 80 or m o r e elephants, the largest n u m b e r H a n n i b a l h a d ever fielded. T h e g r a n d total would be a r o u n d 40,000. Facing them, the R o m a n s were d r a w n up in their usual three lines but with an u n u s u a l f o r m a t i o n . T h e maniples of the f r o n t line (hastati) were d r a w n u p with the usual intervals between them. T h e u n u s u a l f e a t u r e w a s the d e p l o y m e n t of the second line (principes), the maniples of which were aligned immediately behind those of the first line, while the d e p l o y m e n t of the third line (triarii) was a repetition of the o t h e r two. This f o r m a t i o n aligned the intervals between maniples as c o r r i d o r s to allow e l e p h a n t s to pass t h r o u g h the lines while inflicting minimal d a m a g e . Initially, light-armed t r o o p s were stationed in the f r o n t of these gaps. T h e cavalry were on b o t h wings. A f t e r some preliminary skirmishing on the p a r t of the cavalry, H a n n i b a l ordered a c h a r g e of the e l e p h a n t s to terrify the enemy. Scipio adroitly turned the tables by o r d e r i n g all the t r u m p e t e r s a n d buglers to blow, a n d the resulting c a c o p h o n y created panic in the beasts. S o m e turned r o u n d a n d collided with their o w n cavalry; o t h e r s charged the R o m a n light t r o o p s a m o n g w h o m they did inflict heavy d a m a g e . T h e surviving beasts escaped by way of the c o r r i d o r s between the R o m a n maniples a n d s t a m p e d e d off the field. It was at this m o m e n t of c o n f u s i o n that Laelius on the left wing a n d Masinissa on the right launched charges against the e n e m y ' s cavalry, driving b o t h wings off the field a n d p u r s u i n g them. Both flanks of the C a r t h a g i n i a n infantry were therefore exposed. M e a n w h i l e the t w o o p p o s i n g bodies of infantry were a d v a n c i n g steadily t o w a r d s each o t h e r until the R o m a n s charged a n d engaged the enemy in h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting. T h e C a r t h a g i nian mercenaries gained the u p p e r h a n d initially, but the R o m a n s remained steadfast a n d forced them to give g r o u n d . M o r e o v e r , the e n e m y ' s seco n d line failed to give any s u p p o r t to the mercenaries in their h o u r of need. W h e n the mercenaries did fall b a c k , they were repelled by the C a r t h a g i n i a n s behind t h e m , against w h o m they then turned in anger. A l t h o u g h these C a r t h a g i nians h a d to c o n t e n d first with their own mercenaries a n d then with the R o m a n s , they put up a

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spirited fight a n d even m a n a g e d to cause some c o n f u s i o n in the R o m a n ranks. But most of them were cut d o w n by o n e side or the other. By this time the space between the armies was a slippery, b l o o d - s o a k e d , corpse-ridden mess, which m a d e any a d v a n c e difficult. In the final phase of the battle the R o m a n s faced H a n n i b a l himself in charge of his f o r m i d a b l e reserve b o d y of veterans w h o were still some distance in the rear. U p to this point they h a d h a d n o part to play a n d were fresh a n d full of energy. T o deal with this new situation Scipio calmly redeployed his force, extending his f r o n t by placing the principes a n d triarii on the wings, the hastati remaining in the centre. T h e o p p o s i n g forces then closed f o r the final r o u n d . T h e a n t a g o n i s t s were evenly m a t c h e d a n d the issue h u n g in the balance in b r e a t h t a k i n g suspense. At the crucial m o m e n t Laelius a n d Masinissa returned f r o m the cavalry pursuit a n d launched themselves into the C a r t h a g i n i a n rear. This tipped the scales heavily a n d b r o u g h t the contest to a rapid end. T h e R o m a n losses a m o u n t e d to a total of 2,000 m e n , but m o r e t h a n 20,000 C a r t h a g i n i a n s are said to have been killed a n d a l m o s t as m a n y were taken prisoner. These figures for the dead a n d c a p t u r e d together a c c o u n t for virtually the whole C a r t h a g i n i a n force with n o leeway for any escapees, a l t h o u g h H a n n i b a l was one. Z a m a b r o u g h t the Second Punic W a r to an end. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s h a d little o p t i o n but to capitulate, a n d Scipio forced the point by p a r a d i n g his legions, his navy a n d himself in the environs of the city. Polybius, 15: 9-14; Livy, 30: 32-35; Appian, Punic W a r s , 40-47 M U T I L U M (201) - Gallic Uprising T h r o u g h o u t the Second Punic W a r the G a u l s had caused little t r o u b l e t o the R o m a n s , w h o had contained them without m u c h difficulty. A f t e r the war, however, the Gallic tribes began to reassert themselves. Hostilities c o m m e n c e d with a m i n o r incident - not a full-blown battle but a prelude to worse to come. W h e n the consul Publius Aelius arrived in G a u l , he learnt that the Boii h a d raided the territories of some of R o m e ' s allies. He enrolled t w o scratch legions, a d d i n g f o u r c o h o r t s f r o m his own forces, a n d ordered G a i u s Arnpius to invade the territory of the Boii. A m p i u s started p l u n d e r i n g their land a n d f o u n d , near a place called M u t i l u m (now u n k n o w n ) , some crops ready f o r harvesting, but he failed to detail sufficient a r m e d pickets to protect the reapers. T h e G a u l s m a d e an unexpected attack a n d s u r r o u n d e d the 195


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harvesters, w h e r e u p o n the pickets fled. As m a n y as 7,000 scattered reapers were slain, including A m p i u s himself. Livy 31: 2(5-9) C R E M O N A (200) - Gallic Uprising In a m a j o r uprising, the Insubres f r o m a r o u n d M e d i o l a n u m [Milan] joined up with the C e n o m a n i f r o m Brixia [Brescia], B e r g o m u m [Bergamo] a n d V e r o n a , a n d the Boii f r o m C i s p a d a n a together with various o t h e r tribes w h o m they h a d incited. T h e r e were 40,000 of them u n d e r a r m s a n d u n d e r the leadership of the C a r t h a g i n i a n H a m i l c a r , w h o had stayed behind f r o m the a r m y of either H a s d r u b a l or M a g o . They began by sacking a n d b u r n i n g Placentia [Piacenza] and were intending next to a t t a c k the R o m a n colony of C r e m o n a . T h e p r a e t o r Lucius F u r i u s a d v a n c e d against t h e m a n d e n c a m p e d , a n d the next day both sides c a m e out p r e p a r e d for battle. F u r i u s stationed a s q u a d r o n of allied t r o o p s in the f r o n t line, s u p p o r t e d by two R o m a n legions. T h e G a u l s m a d e a mass attack on the f r o n t s q u a d r o n but were repelled a n d decided instead to use their superior n u m b e r s to o u t f l a n k a n d encircle the R o m a n s . T o c o u n t e r this move, F u r i u s extended his line by bringing f o r w a r d the two legions, o n e to each wing. He also threw in the m o u n t e d t r o o p s , directing the legionary cavalry to o n e wing a n d the allied horse to the other. In their d e t e r m i n a t i o n to encircle the R o m a n s , the G a u l s h a d w e a k e n e d their centre. F u r i u s observed this a n d ordered his infantry to charge. T h e G a u l s , pushed back a l o n g their whole f r o n t by the i n f a n t r y a n d cavalry, gave way a n d fled to their c a m p with the R o m a n s in pursuit. It is said that only 6.000 escaped, 35,000 being killed o r c a p t u r e d . T h e dead included Hamilcar. T h e R o m a n casualties a m o u n t e d to a r o u n d 2,000. Livy 31: 10 and 21 A T H A C U S (200) - Second M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 125. O T T O L O B U M (200) - Second M a c e d o n i a n War Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 126. A O U S R (198) - Second M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 126.

CYNOSCEPHALAE MS (197) - Second Macedonian War Described u n d e r The Greek 198

World, p. 126.

M I N C I U S R (197) - Gallic Uprising T h r e e years a f t e r their massive defeat at C r e m o n a (above), the Boii crossed the P a d u s [Po] a n d c o m b i n e d again with the Insubres a n d the C e n o m a n i . At that time a report that one of the consuls was devastating the lands of the Boii split the entente. T h e Insubres refused to desert their possessions to help their allies a n d so the Boii d e p a r t e d alone to defend their territory, leaving the Insubres a n d the C e n o m a n i e n c a m p e d on the b a n k s of the river Mincius [Mincio]. T h e consul G a i u s Cornelius arrived a n d established his position 2 miles d o w n s t r e a m on the same river. W h e n he discovered f r o m the local C e n o m a n i villagers that their men h a d joined the revolt w i t h o u t any official backing, he tried to p e r s u a d e the w a r r i o r s to detach themselves f r o m the Insubres a n d either to go h o m e or to join the R o m a n s . They refused to d e p a r t but did give assurances that they would at least remain inactive. T h e Insubres s o m e h o w c a m e to suspect t h a t their allies were backsliding a n d so they stationed the C e n o m a n i in reserve, refusing to trust them on either wing. In the e n c o u n t e r , the Insubres failed to stand up to the first R o m a n assault. S o m e sources have even reported that the C e n o m a n i a t t a c k e d their f o r m e r allies in the rear. T h e I n s u b r i a n casualties are given as 35,000 killed a n d 5,200 c a p t u r e d , including Hamilcar. As these figures are virtually the same as those reported f o r the battle of C r e m o n a (above) in which H a m i l c a r was said to be killed, they are clearly suspect. Nevertheless, as a result of the R o m a n victory m a n y Gallic t o w n s which had joined the revolt subsequently surrendered to the Romans. Livy, 32: 30 C O M U M (196) - Gallic U p r i s i n g In the year following the slaughter of the Insubres on the Mincius (above) the consul C l a u d i u s M a r cellus was devastating the territory of the Boii, w h o refrained f r o m being d r a w n into a pitched battle. Marcellus decided to cross the Po a n d a d v a n c e instead against the Insubres in the region of C o m u m [Como]. T h e y joined battle with him immediately a n d with such vigour that his f r o n t line was forced back. Marcellus r e s p o n d e d to this threat by sending all the Latin cavalry against the enemy. A couple of charges f r o m this q u a r t e r blunted the Gallic zeal a n d put heart into the R o m a n line. A f t e r o n e vigorous c h a r g e by the i n f a n t r y the enemy gave up the fight a n d lied in disorder. T h e enemy losses were heavy 40.000 a c c o r d i n g to Valerius A n t i a s ( a l t h o u g h as Livy

THE ROMAN

observes, this historian was usually p r o n e to exaggeration). T h e enemy c a m p was p l u n d e r e d a n d C o m u m was c a p t u r e d . This was followed by the defection to the consul of 28 walled towns. Livy, 33: 36(9-15) S P A R T A (195) - W a r against N a b i s Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 128. T U R D A (195) - Spanish W a r s D u r i n g the Second Punic W a r the Spanish tribes f o u g h t for o n e side or the o t h e r (or b o t h in turn). Soon a f t e r the cessation of hostilities they began to fight f o r themselves - against the R o m a n s . In 197 the R o m a n s divided the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the c o n q u e r e d p a r t into two p r a e t o r i a n provinces, Hispania Citerior (Hither Spain) in the east a n d H i s p a n i a Ulterior ( F u r t h e r Spain) in the south. In the same year there was an insurrection in Hither Spain in which a R o m a n a r m y was routed at an u n k n o w n place a n d the p r a e t o r T u d i t a n u s died of his w o u n d s . A f t e r this, the" S p a n i a r d s a p p e a r e d to simmer d o w n until, t w o years later, the p r a e t o r Minucius routed two Spanish c o m m a n d e r s in a pitched battle near T u r d a ( p r o b a b l y T u r b a ) , inflicting 12,000 casualties a n d c a p t u r i n g o n e of the c o m m a n d e r s . It is unsaid but m a y be p r e s u m e d that the S p a n i a r d s started the fight. Livy, 33: 44(4-5) I L I T U R G I (195) - Spanish W a r s M a r c u s Helvius was retiring f r o m F u r t h e r Spain with 6,000 men at the end of his t o u r of duty. A large force of Celtiberians, estimated at a r o u n d 20,000 in n u m b e r , fell u p o n him in the vicinity of Iliturgi [near Cabanes], A b o u t 12,000 of the Celtiberians were said to be killed. T h e t o w n was seized a n d all the a d u l t s were put to d e a t h . Livy, 34: 10(1-2) E M P O R I A E (195) - Spanish W a r s T h e senate decided that the escalation of the war in Spain necessitated a c o m m a n d e r of c o n s u l a r rank instead of a p r a e t o r . T h e province of Hither Spain was assigned to M a r c u s Porcius C a t o , w h o landed at E m p o r i a e [Ampurias] just s o u t h of the Pyrenees a n d e n c a m p e d nearby. While he was there, representatives of the Ilergetes, w h o were allies of R o m e , c a m e to c o m p l a i n that they were being continually a t t a c k e d by hostile tribesmen a n d they asked for help. C a t o was in a d i l e m m a . He was unwilling to refuse aid to his allies but t h o u g h t it equally unwise to weaken his m o d e s t force. He solved the p r o b l e m by o r d e r i n g the

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e m b a r k a t i o n of a third of his force in full view of the delegates. W h e n the latter h a d d e p a r t e d to report the 'facts', which were also certain to reach the enemy ears, he ordered the d i s e m b a r k a t i o n of the troops. A f t e r a period of intensive training, he t o o k his men out one night a n d led t h e m past the enemy position. At d a y b r e a k he drew his men up in battle o r d e r a n d sent three c o h o r t s up to the r a m p a r t s . W h e n the enemy saw them, C a t o recalled t h e m as if in flight. T h e ploy succeeded in enticing the enemy out of their defences, whereu p o n C a t o ordered the cavalry to attack t h e m on b o t h flanks while they were still in disorder. Even with this a d v a n t a g e , the fighting was indecisive. T h e cavalry on the right were driven back, causing some panic, a n d so the consul sent t w o c o h o r t s to o u t f l a n k the enemy on that wing a n d a t t a c k them in the rear. This redressed the balance. W h e n his m e n became exhausted, the consul put in fresh reserves w h o m a d e a vigorous charge in wedge f o r m a t i o n . This forced the enemy back a n d then put them to flight back to their c a m p . W h e n C a t o saw this, he ordered the second legion to a d v a n c e at full speed a n d a t t a c k the c a m p . T h e fighting was still robust a n d the c a m p was vigorously d e f e n d e d until the consul noticed that the left gate was only thinly m a n n e d . He directed the principes a n d hastati to the weak point, where they burst inside the c a m p . A f t e r that, it b e c a m e a massacre as the R o m a n s cut d o w n the enemy w h o jostled a n d s c r u m m e d at the a p p r o a c h e s to the gates. T h e enemy losses were 'heavy'. In c o n sequence of the battle the S p a n i a r d s in that area surrendered, as did m a n y o t h e r towns a l o n g the consul's r o u t e until the whole c o u n t r y n o r t h of the E b r o h a d been s u b d u e d . Livy, 34: 11-16(2); Appian, Spanish W a r s , 40 M E D I O L A N U M (194) - Gallic Uprising In G a u l , the Insubres a n d the C e n o m a n i had been s u b d u e d by the battles on the Mincius (197) a n d at C o m u m (196) a n d h a d been granted peace. T h e Boii, in C i s p a d a n a , were still insurgent a n d disruptive. They crossed the Po a n d incited the Insubres to take up a r m s again. Valerius Flaccus f o u g h t a n d w o n a pitched battle with them near M e d i o l a n u m [Milan], A b o u t 10.000 of the enemy were killed. Livy, 34: 46(1) M U T I N A (193) - Gallic U p r i s i n g In spite of f r e q u e n t expeditions against them, the Boii remained u n s u b d u e d . T h e consul Lucius Cornelius m a r c h e d against t h e m , p l u n d e r e d their 197


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territory a n d offered battle, but they persistently refused to engage in the open. A f t e r he h a d finished w r e a k i n g havoc, the consul withdrew t o w a r d M u t i n a [Modena]. T h e Boii followed silently, intent on an a m b u s h . T h e y stole past the R o m a n c a m p at night a n d occupied a defile on the e n e m y ' s route a h e a d , but their m o v e m e n t s had not passed unnoticed. In the m o r n i n g the consul detailed a t r o o p of horse to reconnoitre, a n d a battle subsequently took place in the o p e n with b o t h armies in p r o p e r a r r a y . Initially, the R o m a n f r o n t line failed to hold the Gallic a t t a c k , a n d an urgent message was sent to the consul f o r help to prevent a humiliating defeat. T h e second legion was sent f o r w a r d a n d this infusion of fresh t r o o p s restored the equilibrium, a f t e r which the original f r o n t liners were b r o u g h t back. It so h a p p e n e d that it was a scorching hot d a y a n d the G a u l s began to suffer. W h e n the consul noticed this, he sent in the auxiliary horse at full gallop with the legionary cavalry in s u p p o r t . This equestrian h u r r i c a n e threw the G a u l s into disorder, a n d their a t t e m p t s to r e f o r m were defeated when the cavalry got in a m o n g t h e m . A final concerted p u s h by the i n f a n t r y settled the issue a n d put the enemy to flight, pursued by the cavalry. F o u r t e e n t h o u s a n d of the Boii were slain a n d 1,092 were taken captive, but this was at a cost to the R o m a n s a n d their allies of m o r e t h a n 5,000 men, including two military tribunes, f o u r allied c o m m a n d e r s a n d 23 centurions. Livy, 35: 4-5 1 L I P A (193) - Spanish W a r s W h e n M a r c u s C a t o returned h o m e a f t e r the battle near E m p o r i a e (195). m a n y of the local c o m m u nities began to rebel again. T h e r e were a n u m b e r of u n r e c o r d e d battles which achieved n o t h i n g a n d b r o u g h t n o credit to the R o m a n s . Prestige was restored by the u n s u n g successes of P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, the son of G n a e u s w h o h a d been killed at Ilorci [Lorca] in 211. S o o n a f t e r these events Nasica, as p r a e t o r in F u r t h e r Spain, a t t a c k e d a c o l u m n of the Lusitani near Ilipa [Alcala del Rio}. T h e y h a d been m a r c h i n g h o m e all night f r o m F u r t h e r Spain with a vast haul of plundered b o o t y . T h e R o m a n s were greatly o u t n u m b e r e d , but they h a d the a d v a n t a g e in every o t h e r respect. T h e enemy were tired, straggling in c o l u m n a n d e m b a r r a s s e d by their beasts of b u r den. In spite of these h a n d i c a p s , the Lusitani held the R o m a n s in a well-matched c o n f r o n t a t i o n until, a f t e r five hours, Scipio e x h o r t e d his men to m a k e a final effort. T h e enemy gave way a n d fled, losing 198

12,000 of their n u m b e r slain in the pursuit against a R o m a n loss of 73. Livy, 35: 1(5-12) T O L E T U M (193) - Spanish W a r s M a t t e r s were proceeding well for the R o m a n s in b o t h Spanish provinces. M a r c u s Fulvius h a d won two battles (unspecified) a n d had c a p t u r e d f o u r towns, when he c a m e to T o l e t u m [Toledo], H e was besieging the city when a large force of Vaccaei, Vettones a n d Celtiberi c a m e to assist the Toletani. Fulvius engaged them in a pitched battle a n d routed them before reducing the city. A battle which a p p e a r s to be this one has been recorded again by Livy u n d e r the following year. T h e small variations in the two a c c o u n t s have been a m a l g a m a t e d here. Livy, 35: 7(8) and 22(6-8) P I S A E (192) - Ligurian W a r s N o t infrequently the R o m a n battles with the Ligures took place at sites u n n a m e d o r now u n k n o w n in their u n c h a r t e d territory. This is one of the exceptions - it t o o k place outside Liguria near Pisa where Q u i n t u s Minucius engaged the Ligures in a pitched battle. Nine t h o u s a n d of the enemy were killed a n d the rest were driven into their c a m p . T h e R o m a n s failed to take the c a m p before nightfall a n d the Ligures a b a n d o n e d it silently d u r i n g the night. M i n u c i u s p u r s u e d t h e m into their territory a n d laid waste their towns. Livy, 35: 21(7-9)

T H E R M O P Y L A E P (191) - War against Antiochus Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 129. C O R Y C U S P R (191) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 129. P A N O R M U S (190) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 130. P H O E N I C U S (190) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 130. S I D E (190) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 130.

MYONNESUS PR (190) - War against Antiochus Described u n d e r The Greek

World, p. 131.

THE ROMAN

MAGNESIA-AD-SIPYLUM (190)-War against A n t i o c h u s Described u n d e r The Greek

World, p. 131.

L Y C O (190) - Spanish W a r s In F u r t h e r Spain, the R o m a n s suffered a severe setback when an a r m y u n d e r Lucius Aemilius was defeated by the Lusitani at a place called Lyco (now u n k n o w n ) in the c o u n t r y of the Bastetani, the south-eastern region a r o u n d a n d behind N e w C a r t h a g e [Cartagena], Six t h o u s a n d R o m a n s were slain. T h e rest were forced back behind their r a m p a r t s , which they held with difficulty, a n d they were subsequently led back like sheep to safe country. Livy, 37: 46(7-8) C U B A L L U M (189) - G a l a t i a n Expedition Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 132. O L Y M P U S M ( 1 8 9 ) - G a l a t i a n Expedition Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 132. A N C Y R A (189) - G a l a t i a n Expedition Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 132. M A G A B A M (189) - G a l a t i a n Expedition Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 132.

CYPSELA (188) Described u n d e r The Greek

World, p. 132.

TEMPYRA (188) Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 133. H A S T A ( 1 8 6 ) - Spanish W a r s In the extreme south of Spain, G a i u s Atinius w o n a victory but lost his life. In a pitched battle with the L u s i t a n i a n s near H a s t a [near Jerez de la Frontera], a b o u t 6,000 of the enemy were killed a n d the rest were put to flight. Atinius then captured the town with little difficulty but, in the process, he was hit by a missile a n d died a few d a y s later. Livy, 39: 21(1-3) C A L A G U R R I S (186) - Spanish W a r s In Hither Spain, Lucius M a n l i u s Acidinus engaged the Celtiberians in an action which was so indecisive that b o t h sides withdrew. T h e Celtiberians m o v e d c a m p d u r i n g the night but returned with r e i n f o r c e m e n t s a few d a y s later a n d challenged the R o m a n s to battle near Calagurris [Calahorra], Livy r e m a r k s on the p a r a d o x t h a t greater military

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strength can lead to greater weakness, as exemplified in this battle. T h e a u g m e n t e d Celtiberian force was defeated with the loss of a b o u t 12,000 men killed a n d 2,000 c a p t u r e d . Livy, 39: 21(6-10) T O L E T U M (185) - Spanish W a r s In early spring the p r a e t o r s , G a i u s C a l p u r n i u s a n d Lucius Quinctius, led their men out of their winter q u a r t e r s a n d joined forces. T h e y m a r c h e d into C a r p e t a n i a a n d headed for the enemy c a m p not f a r f r o m T o l e t u m [Toledo], F o r a g i n g parties f r o m the two sides c a m e into c o n t a c t with each o t h e r a n d a fight b r o k e out. R e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m b o t h c a m p s kept j o i n i n g in until the entire armies were involved. T h e R o m a n s showed up particularly badly, especially in view of the fact that they h a d two armies in the field. Both were routed with a loss of a b o u t 5,000 men a n d were driven back to their c a m p s , which they proceeded to a b a n d o n silently d u r i n g the night. T h e enemy looted the c a m p s a n d then moved away to the Tagus. Livy, 39:

30(1-6)

T A G U S R (185) - Spanish W a r s A f t e r their bitter defeat near T o l e t u m (above) in the spring of this year, the p r a e t o r s recruited Spanish auxiliaries f r o m the allied t o w n s as h a r d as they could. W h e n they h a d got their forces up to strength a n d h a d repaired the shattered m o r a l e of their m e n , they m a r c h e d d o w n to the T a g u s [Tajo] a n d saw the enemy e n c a m p e d on a hill across the river. T h e r e were t w o f o r d s across the river. C a l p u r n i u s a n d his a r m y crossed by o n e of them a n d Quinctius by the other, in full sight of the enemy w h o failed to seize such a good o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a t t a c k . By the time the S p a n i a r d s h a d rushed at t h e m across the intervening plain, the R o m a n s had f o r m e d up, p u t t i n g all their strength in their centre. T h e S p a n i a r d s a t t a c k e d in wedge (cuneus) f o r m a t i o n a n d were causing some distress to the R o m a n centre, at which point C a l p u r n i u s t o o k the legionary cavalry r o u n d the struggling lines a n d charged the enemy wedge in the flank. Quinctius, with the allied cavalry, executed the same m a n oeuvre on the o t h e r wing a n d a t t a c k e d the o p p o site flank. T h e legions, e m b o l d e n e d by these actions, swept f o r w a r d in an irresistible c h a r g e which overwhelmed the enemy a n d sent them fleeing to their c a m p . They were pursued by the cavalry, w h o forced their way inside the r a m p a r t a n d were followed by the legions. Only a b o u t 4,000 of the S p a n i a r d s escaped out of the original 199


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force of 35,000. T h e R o m a n s a n d their allies lost a b o u t 750 m e n all told. Livy, 39 30(6)-31 A E B U R A (181, spring) - Spanish W a r s A f t e r a lull, w a r b r o k e out again in Hither Spain. T h e p r a e t o r Q u i n t u s Fulvius Flaccus heard that the Celtiberians were mobilizing a n d he recruited as m a n y Spanish auxiliaries as he could. But he could not m a t c h the 35,000 men that the enemy had u n d e r arms. Nevertheless, he m a r c h e d into C a r p e t a n i a a n d e n c a m p e d not f a r f r o m A e b u r a [probably Cuerva). A few days later the Celtiberians arrived a n d set up c a m p a b o u t two miles a w a y at the base of a hill. T h e p r a e t o r sent his b r o t h e r with two t r o o p s of cavalry to ride up to the enemy r a m p a r t s to r e c o n n o i t r e a n d to w i t h d r a w immediately if the enemy emerged. This was repeated on several consecutive days. Eventually the Celtiberians c a m e out of their c a m p a n d lined themselves up m i d w a y between the two positions, a n d there they stayed for f o u r d a y s while Flaccus m a d e no m o v e m e n t . Bored by the inactivity, the enemy gave up a n d returned to c a m p . W h e n Flaccus j u d g e d that they no longer expected any R o m a n initiative, he ordered Lucius Acilius to take a s q u a d r o n of cavalry a n d 6,000 auxiliaries by night to the far side of the hill in the enemy rear a n d to charge d o w n when he heard a signal. Flaccus then sent G a i u s Scribonius a n d his allied t r o o p s up to the e n e m y ' s r a m p a r t , which b r o u g h t out their whole a r m y . As soon as they were in the open, Scribonius retreated as ordered, bringing the enemy in pursuit. As the enemy a p p r o a c h e d the R o m a n r a m p a r t s , Flaccus sallied out with his a r m y in three divisions, raising a shout which b r o u g h t Acilius c h a r g i n g d o w n on the enemy c a m p . This was c a p t u r e d with ease a n d it was then set on fire. T h e incendiary strategy m a y have been misguided. Its effect on the Celtiberians was o n e of initial panic which was followed by greater stubb o r n n e s s at the realization that they h a d no haven of retreat. T h e i r centre was h a r d pressed, but they were on the point of forcing back the auxiliaries on the R o m a n left when the garrison in A e b u r a c a m e out to help. In a d d i t i o n , Acilius was rapidly a p p r o a c h i n g f r o m the rear. T h e Celtiberians became s u r r o u n d e d a n d were cut d o w n on the spot. T h o s e that escaped were pursued. Their casualties a m o u n t e d to 23,000 killed a n d 4,700 c a p t u r e d . N o r did the R o m a n s escape lightly. Over 200 legionaries were killed a n d m o r e than 3,000 Latin allies a n d auxiliaries perished. Livy; 40: 30-32

200

C O N T R E B I A (181) - Spanish W a r s F r o m A e b u r a (above), Flaccus m a r c h e d to besiege C o n t r e b i a [near Albarracin]. T h e i n h a b i t a n t s of this town called on the Celtiberians f o r help, but the relief was long delayed by the effects of torrential rains with the result that the t o w n surrendered. T h e Celtiberians knew n o t h i n g of the surrender. W h e n they reached the town a n d saw no c a m p , they assumed that the enemy had withd r a w n . As they a p p r o a c h e d the walls in peaceful disorder, the R o m a n s sallied out a n d scattered them in flight. A b o u t 12,000 were killed a n d 5,000 t a k e n captive. Early in the following year m u c h of Celtiberia surrendered. Livy, 40: 33

MANLIAN PASS (180) - Spanish Wars While he was waiting for his relief to arrive f r o m R o m e , Fulvius Flaccus t o o k his a r m y to the r e m o t e r p a r t s of Celtiberia, which had not surrendered. He ravaged the countryside, which p r o v o k e d the natives into m u s t e r i n g their forces on the quiet. At this point, Flaccus received a message telling him of the d a y of his successor's arrival, which caused him to turn r o u n d a n d begin his return to base immediately. His r o u t e took him t h r o u g h the M a n l i a n pass, as the natives h a d foreseen a n d which they had blocked. W h e n the R o m a n s entered the pass, the enemy a p p e a r e d on b o t h sides a n d fell u p o n them. Flaccus coolly drew u p his men in c o l u m n a n d faced the charge. W h e n the Celtiberians f o u n d that they were u n a b l e to m a k e any h e a d w a y against the legions, they f o r m e d up a n d a t t a c k e d in wedge f o r m a t i o n . T h e R o m a n line was on the p o i n t of b r e a k i n g when Flaccus ordered the legionary cavalry to close their lines a n d to give the horses their heads w i t h o u t reins in a violent charge against the wedge. T h e cavalry did as ordered, not once but twice - out a n d back inflicting heavy slaughter a n d b r e a k i n g u p the wedge. It was n o w the turn of the allied cavalry, w h o w i t h o u t waiting for a n o r d e r charged into the disorganized t h r o n g . T h e Celtiberians turned in h e a d l o n g flight a n d were cut d o w n as they went, leaving 17,000 dead in the pass a n d 3,700 captives. T h e R o m a n s , also, h a d their losses: 472 were killed a n d over 4.000 of the Latins a n d auxiliaries were slain. T h e saltus M a n l i a n u s is t h o u g h t to have been on the Parameras de Molina in the I d u b e d a m o u n t a i n range in Celtiberia.* Livy, 40: 39-40; *W. Smith (ed.), Dictionary of G r e e k a n d R o m a n G e o g r a p h y , s.v. I d u b e d a , 1873

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C O M P L E G A (179) - Spanish W a r s Tiberius S e m p r o n i u s G r a c c h u s t o o k over f r o m Flaccus a n d carried on trying to s u b j u g a t e the f u r t h e r p a r t s of Celtiberia. W h e n he was e n c a m p e d near C o m p l e g a (site u n k n o w n ) , the i n h a b i t a n t s of t h a t town, a b o u t 20,000 in n u m b e r , c a m e to him bearing olive b r a n c h e s a n d professing peace. As soon as they h a d been received, they a t t a c k e d his c a m p . G r a c c h u s immediately a b a n d o n e d the c a m p a n d simulated flight, but he turned a b r u p t l y and fell u p o n the h o r d e while they were busy plundering. M o s t of t h e m were killed. Appian, Spanish W a r s , 43 A L C E (179) - Spanish W a r s C o n t i n u i n g his c a m p a i g n to s u b d u e the r e m o t e r p a r t s of Celtiberia, G r a c c h u s came to Alee ['/Alcazar de San Juan], where the enemy were e n c a m p e d , a n d began harassing their o u t p o s t s . Every day he increased the scale of his skirmishes until they b r o u g h t the enemy out in full force. W h e n this h a d been achieved, he reduced the pressure a n d ordered his skirmishers to turn tail a n d flee back to their c a m p as if they had been overcome. T h e enemy followed in disorderly p u r suit. T h e skirmishers h a d just reached the c a m p a n d were entering t h r o u g h o n e gate when G r a c c h u s sallied out with his whole force t h r o u g h all the o t h e r gates. T h e surprise a t t a c k completely routed the enemy w h o were driven back to their c a m p , which was subsequently t a k e n . N i n e t h o u sand of t h e m were killed. G r a c c h u s then began p l u n d e r i n g a n d devastating a wide area, as a result of which 103 towns surrendered within a very short space of time. Livy, 40: 48 C H A U N U S M (179) - Spanish W a r s Livy retails o t h e r sources, which he does not n a m e , but which relate that G r a c c h u s f o u g h t a d a y - l o n g pitched battle with the Celtiberians on the C h a u nus m o u n t a i n in the n o r t h of the c o u n t r y . T h e losses were heavy on b o t h sides in w h a t a p p e a r s to have been a n indecisive action. T w o days later hostilities were resumed in a bigger battle in which the R o m a n s were the victors. It is said that the enemy lost 22,000 m e n a n d that this action put an end to war with the Celtiberians. It is certainly on record that G r a c c h u s received their surrender. N o m o u n t a i n is k n o w n by the n a m e of C h a u nus. It is p r o b a b l e that Livy's sources were referring to M o u n t C a u n u s near Bilbilis [Calatayud] in the I d u b e d a chain in Celtiberia. Livy, 40: 50

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T I M A V U S R (178) - Istrian War W h e n t r o u b l e b r o k e out with the Istrians (Histrians), the consul A u l u s M a n l i u s set out f r o m Aquileia a n d pitched c a m p at the source of the river T i m a v u s [Timavo] a b o u t 5 miles f r o m the sea. A t the same time warships a n d t r a n s p o r t s were sent to the n e a r b y h a r b o u r . T o protect the traffic between h a r b o u r a n d c a m p the R o m a n s established a string of o u t p o s t s . T h e Istrians a t t a c k e d some of these posts in the m o r n i n g mist, which caused the a t t a c k e r s to seem like a veritable a r m y in the eyes of the terrified g u a r d s . T h e g u a r d s fled to the c a m p , where their a l a r m caused even m o r e panic a n d a general flight to the sea. T h e only h u m a n beings left in c a m p were a military tribune with three c o m p a n i e s which had been a b a n d o n e d in the turmoil. T h e Istrians burst into the c a m p a n d a fierce struggle ensued in which all the R o m a n s were killed. In the officers' q u a r t e r s the Istrians f o u n d everything ready for a b a n q u e t , a n d so the chief reclined a n d dined; his m e n followed suit. By the time the consul a n d his men had been recalled f r o m the b o a t s a n d h a d returned to the a p p a r e n t l y deserted c a m p , the Istrians were all inebriated a n d presented no p r o b l e m . A few escaped but a b o u t 8,000 of them were slain. N o prisoners were taken, but the d r u n k e n chief m a n aged to escape when two of his m e n hoisted him o n t o a horse. A p a r t f r o m the three R o m a n c o m panies which were annihilated in the c a m p , 237 of the others fell, mostly d u r i n g the flight. Istria was subsequently pacified d u r i n g the following year. Livy, 41: 2-4 S C U L T E N N A R (177) - Ligurian W a r s T h e Istrian W a r ended with the c a p t u r e of its principal t o w n s by the new consul G a i u s Claudius. But as o n e w a r ended, the Ligurian W a r s recommenced. It was suggested to G a i u s C l a u d i u s t h a t he might consider leading his a r m y against the Ligurians to assist his b r o t h e r , Tiberius, w h o was proconsul at Pisa with only o n e legion. T h e Ligurians h a d c o m e d o w n to the plains a n d h a d e n c a m p e d near the river Scultenna [Panaro], In the battle 15,000 of them were killed a n d over 700 taken captive. T h e rest fled to the m o u n t a i n s a n d kept out of sight. Livy, 41: 12(7-10)

CAMPI MACRI (176) - Ligurian Wars T h e Ligurians did not lie low for long but rebelled again in the year after their defeat by G a i u s C l a u d i u s at the Scultenna river (above). This time they decided to avoid the plains a n d they occupied 201


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two m o u n t a i n s called L e t u m a n d Ballista, which were near the C a m p i Macri a n d which they surr o u n d e d with a wall. Claudius, n o w proconsul, was asked to meet the consul Q u i n t u s Petilius at C a m p i Macri near M u t i n a [Modena[, where the o t h e r consul G a i u s Valerius also joined them. T h e r e they divided their forces into two armies a n d a p p r o a c h e d the enemy f r o m different directions. It was Petilius w h o h a d all the action. W i t h his c a m p facing the two m o u n t a i n s , which were joined by a ridge, he m a r c h e d his men up the hills in two c o l u m n s , o n e on each side. T h e c o l u m n which he himself led m a d e g o o d progress, but the o t h e r o n e was forced back by the enemy. W h e n Petilius rode over to the waverers, he did indeed restore o r d e r but he was struck by a javelin a n d killed in the process. T h e c o l u m n m a n a g e d to conceal the d e a t h of its leader f r o m the enemy a n d proceeded to dislodge t h e m a n d seize the m o u n t a i n . T h e Ligurians lost a b o u t 5,000 men killed; the R o m a n losses were 52. Livy, 41: 17(9)-18(13) C A R Y S T U S (173) - Ligurian W a r s A m u l t i t u d e of Ligurians assembled near a t o w n called C a r y s t u s , n o r t h of Genoa in the territory of Statellae. T h e consul M a r c u s Popilius m a r c h e d against them but they remained behind their r a m p a r t s . Popilius m a d e p r e p a r a t i o n s to assault the t o w n which, as he h a d h o p e d , b r o u g h t the enemy out into the o p e n where they f o r m e d u p in f r o n t of their gates. T h e battle raged indecisively f o r m o r e than three h o u r s until the consul ordered the cavalry to divide into three s q u a d r o n s a n d to c h a r g e simultaneously at different points with as m u c h u p r o a r as possible. W h e n m a n y of the horsemen h a d forced their way t h r o u g h the Ligurian centre a n d had reached the rear lines, the enemy panicked a n d fled. It is said that 10,000 were killed a n d 700 were c a p t u r e d ; but the R o m a n s lost as m a n y as 3,000 soldiers, mostly in the initial stalemate. W h e n the Ligurians c o u n t e d their losses, they s u r r e n d e r e d unconditionally. C a r y s t u s is now u n k n o w n . Livy, 42: 7(3-10) C A L L I N I C U S ( 1 7 1 ) - Third M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 133. P H A L A N N A ( 1 7 1 ) - T h i r d Macedonian War Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 133. U S C A N A (170) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 134. 202

S C O D R A (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 134. E L P E U S R (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 134. P Y T H I U M (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 134. P Y D N A (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 135. N U M A N T I A (153) - Spanish W a r s T h e consul Fulvius N o b i l i o r m a r c h e d against the Celtiberi with an a r m y of 30,000 men a n d pushed on as f a r as N u m a n t i a [Cerro de Gar ray], a city of considerable n a t u r a l strength. Here he was joined by 300 horse a n d 10 elephants which h a d been sent to him by Masinissa, R o m e ' s ally in N u m i d i a . W h e n N o b i l i o r moved against the city, he placed the elephants in the rear where they could not be seen by the enemy. As the armies c a m e to close quarters, the right a n d left halves of the R o m a n a r m y parted to reveal the beasts. T h e Celtiberians, w h o h a d never seen a n elephant before, were terrified a n d fled back to their city. N o b i l i o r proceeded up to the walls, where o n e of the elephants was hit by falling m a s o n r y a n d ran a m o k in rage. T h e o t h e r beasts followed suit a n d the whole herd turned a n d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n s , p u t t i n g the a r m y to flight. T h e N u m a n t i n e s sallied f o r t h a n d p u r sued the R o m a n s , killing 4,000 men a n d three e l e p h a n t s f o r a loss of a b o u t 2,000 of their own number. This was the first e n g a g e m e n t in the N u m a n t i n e W a r , in which a few t h o u s a n d people defeated assaults by f o u r later R o m a n armies until the city was besieged a n d destroyed in 133, bringing the Spanish W a r s to a n end. Appian, Spanish W a r s , 46 C A U C A (151) - Spanish W a r s A new consul Licinius Lucullus - a n aggressive b r u t e - t o o k up his c o m m a n d in Spain with a fresh a r m y . W i t h o u t the a u t h o r i t y of the senate a n d with n o incitement he invaded the territory of the Celtiberian Vaccaei, a people w h o h a d never o f f e n d e d the R o m a n s . He pitched his c a m p near the city of C a u c a [Coca] a n d gave some t r u m p e d - u p excuse f o r war. T h e r e was a pitched battle in which the light-armed Caucaei were getting the better of it until they h a d expended all their darts. Being u n a c c u s t o m e d to w i t h s t a n d i n g an orderly charge, they fled back to their city where a b o u t 3,000 were

THE ROMAN

slain while they struggled to get t h r o u g h the gates. The next day the citizens asked for peace terms and complied with all of Lucullus' requests, but this did not prevent him f r o m gaining access to the city by trickery a n d slaying all the adult males. Appian, Spanish W a r s , 51 I N T E R C A T I A (151) - Spanish W a r s At Intercatia, the consul Lucullus tried to m a k e a treaty with the i n h a b i t a n t s but was r e p r o a c h e d with his recent perfidy at C a u c a (above). Angrily Lucullus drew u p a line of siege a n d a t t e m p t e d to p r o v o k e a battle. T h e citizens as a whole did not respond, but o n e of their n u m b e r , a large a n d distinguished m a n in splendid a r m o u r , r o d e into the space between the armies a n d challenged the R o m a n s to single c o m b a t . W h e n he jeeringly repeated the challenge, it was taken up by Lucullus' d e p u t y - the y o u n g Scipio A e m i l i a n u s - w h o t r i u m p h e d in spite of his small stature. T h e siege was pressed a n d the wall was b r o k e n , but when the R o m a n s rushed in, they themselves were in such p o o r condition t h a t they were o v e r p o w e r e d . As both sides were suffering f r o m m a l n u t r i t i o n , Scipio m a d e a treaty with the i n h a b i t a n t s a n d promised that it would not be violated, a pledge which the i n h a b i t a n t s accepted in view of his r e p u t a t i o n for h o n o u r . Appian,

Spanish W a r s , 53; Livy, epitome 48

N E P H E R I S (149) - T h i r d Punic W a r T h e sole R o m a n object in waging a n o t h e r Punic W a r was the complete destruction of C a r t h a g e . C o n t r a r y to expectations, it t o o k three years to achieve. In the early d a y s the consul M a n i u s Manilius u n d e r t o o k an expedition against Hasd r u b a l , the C a r t h a g i n i a n leader, whose c a m p was at Nepheris, south of C a r t h a g e , in wild a n d rugged territory. Scipio Aemilianus, w h o was then only a military tribune serving in the force, d i s a p p r o v e d of the project because of the difficult terrain. Less than half a mile f r o m their destination they had to descend into a river bed a n d climb out on the o t h e r side. Scipio again r e m o n s t r a t e d on the g r o u n d s that they would cut themselves off f r o m any base for a retreat. H e was accused of cowardice. M a n ilius pressed on a n d met H a s d r u b a l on the other side, where there was m u c h slaughter of b o t h armies. H a s d r u b a l retired to his stronghold to wait for a better chance, leaving the R o m a n s to withd r a w to the river. This was H a s d r u b a l ' s c h a n c e a n d he t o o k it, p u t t i n g the R o m a n s to flight a n d killing a great n u m b e r of them. At this point Scipio collected a few h u n d r e d h o r s e m e n , divided them

WORLD

into two t r o o p s a n d instructed them to take t u r n s in c h a r g i n g the enemy, t h r o w i n g their javelins a n d w i t h d r a w i n g in a c o n t i n u o u s r o u n d of h i t - a n d - r u n h a r a s s m e n t . His action drew the enemy against him a n d allowed the o t h e r R o m a n s to cross the stream, a n o p e r a t i o n which Scipio a n d his m e n then achieved only with great difficulty. T h a t was not all. F o u r R o m a n c o h o r t s h a d got separated f r o m the m a i n b o d y a n d , being u n a b l e to cross the stream, h a d taken refuge on a hill where they were besieged by the enemy. Scipio again collected some cavalry a n d set out to rescue t h e m or perish. T h e details of this o p e r a t i o n are unclear but the result was entirely successful. It was all of t w o years later that Nepheris was actually c a p t u r e d , t o w n and camp. Appian,

Punic W a r s , 102-103;

Livy, e p i t o m e 49

C A R T H A G E (147) - T h i r d Punic W a r T h e siege of C a r t h a g e , which led to its c a p t u r e a n d utter destruction, was c o n d u c t e d by Scipio Aemilianus w h o had by then been p r o m o t e d to consul. H e aimed to prevent a n y o n e getting into or out of the place by land or sea. His naval b l o c k a d e was not p r o o f against the occasional r u n n e r a n d so he planned to block the h a r b o u r entrance. T h e harb o u r was f o r m e d by a long spit of land which projected f r o m the shore below the city a n d then extended parallel with the shore, acting as a b r e a k w a t e r . T h e e n t r a n c e lay between the end of the spit a n d the shore. Scipio proceeded to close this e n t r a n c e by building a massive stone mole f r o m the shore to the spit of land. T h e C a r t h a g i nians met this threat by digging a new exit f r o m the h a r b o u r straight out to sea, an o p e r a t i o n which they m a n a g e d to conceal until the last minute. It was t h e r e f o r e with p r o f o u n d a s t o n i s h m e n t that the R o m a n s suddenly noticed a C a r t h a g i n i a n fleet of 50 triremes a n d o t h e r c r a f t sailing out into the sea. If at that p o i n t the C a r t h a g i n i a n s h a d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n fleet, which had not been properly maintained, they might well have c a p t u r e d o r destroyed the whole fleet. But they c o n t e n t e d themselves with ' s h o w i n g their flag' a n d then retiring. T h e battle c a m e three days later when the C a r t h a g i nians set out to fight a n d were met by the R o m a n s with their ships by then in g o o d order. T h e nimble C a r t h a g i n i a n small b o a t s inflicted considerable d a m a g e to their adversaries by b r e a k i n g off their oars a n d r u d d e r s a n d stoving holes in their sterns. Nevertheless, by evening the o u t c o m e was still undecided a n d the C a r t h a g i n i a n s t h o u g h t it prudent to w i t h d r a w a n d r e c o m m e n c e on the m o r r o w . As the small b o a t s led the way a n d jostled to get 203


WORLDS

into the h a r b o u r t h r o u g h the new entrance, they b e c a m e entangled a n d blocked the m o u t h . T h e larger ships were then forced to berth at the q u a y below the city wall on the sea f r o n t . T h e R o m a n s a t t a c k e d them with ease but f o u n d it less easy to extricate themselves, a n d they suffered m u c h d a m a g e while they were turning r o u n d . S o m e friends of the R o m a n s w h o were helping out provided the answer. They a t t a c h e d long ropes to the a n c h o r s of their five ships a n d d r o p p e d the a n c h o r s out at sea, using the ropes to haul themselves back stern first a f t e r each a t t a c k . T h e rest of the fleet then followed the same routine. A f t e r m a n y such h i t - a n d - r u n a t t a c k s the C a r t h a g i n i a n fleet h a d been sorely reduced in n u m b e r s a n d ceased to be a threat. Appian, Punic W a r s , 120-123 T R I B O L A (147) - Viriathus' Uprising A b o u t 10,000 Lusitanians w h o h a d escaped the perfidious massacres of Lucullus a n d his successor G a l b a , for instance at C a u c a (151), assembled together. M a r c u s Vetilius m a r c h e d against them with a force of a r o u n d 10.000 men a n d bottled t h e m up in a place f r o m which there was n o escape. T h e Lusitani asked for a truce, but a shepherd called Viriathus, a b o r n leader, rose up in their midst as a c h a m p i o n a n d reminded them of R o m a n perfidy a n d b r o k e n pledges. W i t h 1,000 men a n d some swift horses he m a n a g e d to harass the R o m a n s a n d hold them at bay while the rest of the L u s i t a n i a n s escaped, with instructions to meet up at Tribola. Pursued by Vetilius, Viriathus himself then proceeded t o w a r d s the t o w n , near which he laid an a m b u s h in a dense thicket. As the R o m a n s passed the place, they were suddenly a t t a c k e d by Viriathus f r o m the f r o n t a n d the concealed men in the flanks. A b o u t 4,000 of the 10,000 R o m a n s were slain; Vetilius himself was c a p t u r e d a n d then killed. T h e a c c o u n t of O r o s i u s is basic a n d at variance with A p p i a n in regard to the casualties a n d the fate of Vetilius. Appian, Spanish W a r s , 61-63; Orosius, 5: 4(2)

Livy, e p i t o m e 52;

A L P H E U S R (146) - Achaean War Described u n d e r The Greek

World, p. 137.

SCARPHEA (146) - Achaean War Described u n d e r The Greek

World, p. 137.

CHAERONEA (146) - Achaean War Described u n d e r The Greek 204

World, p. 137.

I S T H M U S (146) - Achaean War Described u n d e r The Greek

World, p. 137.

T E R M A N T I A (141) - Spanish W a r s Nearly a d e c a d e a f t e r the defeat of the consul Fulvius N o b i l i o r at N u m a n t i a (153), the ' N u m a n t i n e W a r ' e r u p t e d in earnest. W h e n Q u i n t u s P o m p e i u s e n c a m p e d against the city with an a r m y of 30,000 men, he suffered a series of almost daily setbacks t h r o u g h skirmishes a n d guerilla w a r f a r e until he decided to m o v e a w a y a n d try his luck against a n easier target, T e r m a n t i a . Here, too, he suffered n o less t h a n three indignities in o n e d a y . T h e following m o r n i n g he got his c h a n c e when the Termestini c a m e out p r e p a r e d for a regular battle. It lasted all d a y a n d was eventually stopped by nightfall, when neither side h a d gained the u p p e r h a n d . A f t e r that P o m p e i u s moved a w a y against a smaller N u m a n t i n e - h e l d town! Appian,

Spanish W a r s , 77

E R I S A N A (140) - Viriathus' Uprising In the process of chasing the r e d o u b t a b l e guerilla leader Viriathus r o u n d his native Lusitania, F a b i u s M a x i m u s Servilianus invested the t o w n of Erisana. Viriathus got into the t o w n furtively at night, a n d at d a y b r e a k he fell u p o n the m e n w h o were digging the trenches a n d sent them flying. Servilianus d r e w u p the rest of the a r m y in battle f o r m a t i o n . In the ensuing battle Viriathus was victorious, p u r s u i n g the fleeing R o m a n s a n d driving them up against some cliffs where they were h e m m e d in. R e g a r d i n g this as an apt o p p o r t u n i t y for ending the war, he c a m e to terms with the R o m a n s a n d was declared to be a friend. T h e peace, however, did not last. T h e treaty, like so m a n y of its predecessors, was b r o k e n by the R o m a n s . Later in the year Viriathus was assassinated by his m o s t trusted friends, w h o m he h a d sent as emissaries of peace to the R o m a n c o m m a n d e r . T h e latter h a d bribed t h e m to c o m m i t the fell deed. Appian,

Spanish W a r s , 69

L E U C A E (130) - Aristonicus' Uprising W h e n A t t a l u s III of P e r g a m u m died in 133, his k i n g d o m passed at his bequest to R o m e . A m a n called Aristonicus, w h o was p r o b a b l y an illegitim a t e relation, intended to u s u r p the k i n g d o m a n d led a f o r m i d a b l e p o p u l a r uprising, chiefly a m o n g the slaves a n d depressed classes. T h e R o m a n s sent an a r m y against him u n d e r the consul Publius Licinius Crassus, w h o received m u c h assistance

THE ROMAN

f r o m the rulers of B i t h y n i a , P o n t u s , C a p p a d o c i a a n d elsewhere. A b a t t l e w a s f o u g h t in the region of L e u c a e [near Foca], a t o w n which h a d been c a u s e d to revolt by A r i s t o n i c u s . In spite of the large size of the R o m a n a n d allied a r m y , C r a s s u s w a s d e f e a t e d a n d his a r m y w a s r o u t e d . H e himself w a s s u r r o u n d e d by t h e e n e m y a n d w a s killed. Strabo, 14: 1, 38; Orosius, 5: 10(1-3); Livy, e p i t o m e 59 S T R A T O N I C E A (130) - A r i s t o n i c u s ' U p r i s i n g A t t h e t i m e of C r a s s u s ' d e f e a t a n d d e a t h at the h a n d s of A r i s t o n i c u s n e a r L e u c a e ( a b o v e ) , his relief h a d a l r e a d y been a p p o i n t e d . T h e successor, M a r c u s P e r p e r n a , set o u t i m m e d i a t e l y f o r Asia a n d e n g a g e d A r i s t o n i c u s , w h o m he d e f e a t e d . A c c o r d i n g t o O r o s i u s , P e r p e r n a t o o k his a d v e r sary by s u r p r i s e while he w a s resting a f t e r his recent victory, suggesting t h a t the c o n f r o n t a t i o n t o o k place n o t f a r f r o m L e u c a e . A r i s t o n i c u s w a s f o r c e d to flee a n d t o o k r e f u g e in S t r a t o n i c e a in the n o r t h of L y d i a . E u t r o p i u s , h o w e v e r , says t h a t the b a t t l e t o o k place n e a r S t r a t o n i c e a , t o w h i c h Arist o n i c u s h a d fled. P e r p e r n a s u b s e q u e n t l y r e d u c e d the city a n d f o r c e d his e n e m y to s u r r e n d e r . Eutropius, 4: 20; Orosius, 5: 10(4-5) V I N D A L I U M ( 1 2 1 ) - C o n q u e s t of N a r b o n e s e Gaul T h e M a s s i l i o t e s w e r e the m o s t t r u s t y f r i e n d s of R o m e . W h e n they c o m p l a i n e d to R o m e a b o u t the b e h a v i o u r of the Saluvii, m i l i t a r y a c t i o n h a d to be t a k e n . C o m p l a i n t s were also received f r o m the A e d u i , likewise R o m a n allies, t o the effect t h a t the A l l o b r o g e s , w h o c e n t r e d a r o u n d V i e n n a [Vienna] o n the R h o n e , h a d d e v a s t a t e d their l a n d . In a d d i t i o n , the A l l o b r o g e s h a d given r e f u g e a n d all possible a s s i s t a n c e to the S a l l u v i a n chief w h e n he fled. A s a result of these i n c i t e m e n t s a n a r m y , w h i c h i n c l u d e d s o m e e l e p h a n t s , w a s sent o u t a g a i n s t the A l l o b r o g e s u n d e r the p r o c o n s u l G n a e u s D o m i t i u s . H e m e t the e n e m y in f r o n t of V i n d a l i u m [Sorgues], w h e r e they p a n i c k e d at sight of the e l e p h a n t s a n d t u r n e d to flight in their myriads. Strabo,

4: 1, 11; Livy, e p i t o m e 61

I S A R A R (121) - C o n q u e s t of N a r b o n e s e G a u l A f t e r their d e f e a t at V i n d a l i u m ( a b o v e ) , t h e Allob r o g e s received help f r o m the A r v e r n i [Auvergnats]. Between t h e m they p u t u p a f o r c e of 180,000 m e n u n d e r Bituitus, the k i n g of the A r v e r n i , a n d were o p p o s e d by the c o n s u l Q u i n t u s F a b i u s M a x i m u s w i t h a f o r c e of less t h a n 30,000. O r o s i u s

WORLD

relates the s c o r n f u l r e m a r k a t t r i b u t e d t o Bituitus t h a t t h e r e w e r e insufficient R o m a n s even to feed the d o g s in his o w n c a m p . In spite of his c o n t e m p t , he s u f f e r e d a m a s s i v e d e f e a t at the place w h e r e the river I s a r a [Isere] Hows i n t o the R h o d a n u s [Rhone], A s B i t u i t u s h a d realized t h a t o n e b r i d g e a c r o s s the R h o n e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r the c r o s s i n g of his h u g e force, he built a s e c o n d o n e f r o m small b o a t s c h a i n e d t o g e t h e r . D u r i n g the flight, the c h a i n s b r o k e u n d e r the p r e s s u r e i m p o s e d o n t h e m , d r o w n i n g a m u l t i t u d e of t h e fugitives. E s t i m a t e s of the e n e m y c a s u a l t i e s r a n g e f r o m 120,000 to 200,000! Orosius, 5: 14(1-4); e p i t o m e 61; Florus,

Strabo, 1: 37

4: 1, 11;

Livy,

N O R E I A (113) - I n v a s i o n of the N o r t h m e n F r o m G e r m a n y there occurred a mass migration of C i m b r i a n d T e u t o n e s w h o w e r e d r i v e n o u t of their l a n d s by the e n c r o a c h m e n t of the sea a n d were in search of new p a s t u r e s . T h e y r o a m e d i n t o Illyricum a n d N o r i c u m , giving the R o m a n s c a u s e to f e a r a n i n c u r s i o n i n t o Italy. T h e c o n s u l P a p i r i u s C a r b o m o v e d t o block their p r o g r e s s a n d seized the n e a r e s t A l p i n e pass. A l t h o u g h they m a d e n o hostile m o v e , he still m a r c h e d a g a i n s t t h e m o n the g r o u n d s t h a t they h a d i n v a d e d a s t a t e friendly t o R o m e . T h e N o r t h m e n sent a m b a s s a d o r s s t a t i n g t h a t they were i g n o r a n t of this f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n ship a n d giving a n u n d e r t a k i n g t h a t they w o u l d desist f r o m a n y m o l e s t a t i o n . C a r b o nevertheless p r e s s e d o n a g a i n s t t h e m . A b a t t l e t o o k place at N o r e i a [Neumarkt], a c c o r d i n g t o S t r a b o , w h e r e the R o m a n s were heavily d e f e a t e d a n d r o u t e d . T h e a c t i o n w a s e v e n t u a l l y t e r m i n a t e d by a t h u n d e r s t o r m a n d d a r k n e s s b u t n o t b e f o r e C a r b o h a d lost the g r e a t e r p a r t of his a r m y . Appian, Gallic W a r s , fragment 13; Livy, e p i t o m e 63; Strabo, 5: 1.8

S U T H U L (109) - Jugurthine War A f t e r the d e s t r u c t i o n of C a r t h a g e in 146. N u m i d i a w a s f i r m l y in the h a n d s of M a s i n i s s a ' s eldest son, M i c i p s a , w h o f o l l o w e d his f a t h e r ' s t r a d i t i o n of f r i e n d s h i p with R o m e . T h e region w a s at p e a c e until the d e a t h in 118 of M i c i p s a , w h o h a d left his k i n g d o m j o i n t l y to his t w o s o n s , H i e m p s a l a n d A d h e r b a l , a n d a n e p h e w , J u g u r t h a , w h o m he h a d a d o p t e d . T h e a b l e J u g u r t h a w a s t e d n o t i m e in a r r a n g i n g the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of H i e m p s a l , f o l l o w e d by a n a t t a c k o n A d h e r b a l , w h o w a s d r i v e n o u t of the c o u n t r y a n d went t o R o m e t o air his grievance. M a t t e r s m i g h t h a v e been settled a m i c a b l y b u t f o r the s u b s e q u e n t a c t i o n s of J u g u r t h a , w h i c h left the 205


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R o m a n s with little alternative but to go to war. Their c a m p a i g n s against him were initially m a r k e d by a c o n s p i c u o u s lack of success. In 111 C a l p u r nius Bestia m a d e no military h e a d w a y a n d resorted to a b o r t i v e negotiations. T h e following year, his successor, Spurius Postumius Albinus, achieved n o t h i n g a n d r e t u r n e d to R o m e for the elections, leaving his b r o t h e r Aulus in charge. In J a n u a r y of 109 this officer s u m m o n e d his men f r o m their winter q u a r t e r s a n d m a r c h e d them in appalling w e a t h e r against J u g u r t h a ' s treasurehold at Suthul. T h e place was virtually impregnable, not only because of its n a t u r a l strength but also by virtue of the b a d weather which h a d converted the s u r r o u n d i n g terrain into a lake. A siege was out of the question but this did not deter A u l u s f r o m m a k i n g the usual p r e p a r a t i o n s . J u g u r t h a , arriving in the vicinity, feigned fear a n d withdrew into w o o d e d c o u n t r y , luring A u l u s with the prospect of a treaty into raising the siege a n d following him. At dead of night J u g u r t h a surr o u n d e d the R o m a n c a m p , in which he was assisted by a n u m b e r of bribed traitors. One, a chief c e n t u r i o n , allowed the enemy to b r e a k into the c a m p t h r o u g h the section of r a m p a r t which he h a d been detailed to d e f e n d . T h e N u m i d i a n s burst in; the R o m a n s fled out to a n e a r b y hill. T h e next day J u g u r t h a pointed out to A u l u s that he h a d his men completely s u r r o u n d e d . He spared their lives on c o n d i t i o n that they passed u n d e r the yoke in token of surrender, as in d a y s of yore, a n d that they d e p a r t e d f r o m N u m i d i a within 10 days. Sallust p u t s the d a t e of this battle at the very beginning of 109 but there is evidence t h a t it m a y have taken place a m o n t h or t w o earlier, at the end of 110, which is now m o r e generally accepted. Sallust, J u g u r t h i n e W a r , 37-38

M U T H U L R (109) - Jugurthine War W h e n Metellus assumed c o m m a n d in N u m i d i a , his first task was to restore discipline a n d m o r a l e a m o n g the t r o o p s . T h e n he initiated a c a m p a i g n of attack against J u g u r t h a ' s towns. J u g u r t h a noted his line of m a r c h t o w a r d s the river M u t h u l [?Melegue] a n d got a h e a d of him. A b o u t 20 miles f r o m the river a n d parallel with it there r a n a range of b a r r e n hills f r o m the middle of which projected a long spur p o p u l a t e d with trees a n d thickets. T h e plain below was waterless as f a r as the river. O n this spur J u g u r t h a positioned his men a n d elep h a n t s in an extended line. Metellus was u n a w a r e of the a m b u s h until he h a d descended the hill, when he saw the enemy. Fearing the effects of thirst d u r i n g p r o l o n g e d skirmishing in the plain. 206

he sent his lieutenant Rutilius R u f u s a h e a d to the river with light t r o o p s a n d cavalry to seize a position for a c a m p . Meanwhile, J u g u r t h a sent a force to block the track d o w n the hill by which Metellus had descended a n d to prevent any retreat by that route. T h e n he signalled the N u m i d i a n cavalry to a t t a c k . Their m e t h o d of fighting was one of fast a n d f u r i o u s h a r a s s m e n t , t h r o w i n g missiles at long range then wheeling away a n d returning again. T h e R o m a n s were powerless a n d unable to hit back. W h e n they charged, the enemy retreated individually in different directions so that any pursuit was also an individual a f f a i r which b r o k e the R o m a n ranks. T h e result was an utterly c o n f u s e d a n d r a n d o m conflict, which p r o ceeded in this way until late in the day. By this time the N u m i d i a n attack was w e a k e n i n g a n d Metellus m a n a g e d to reform his ranks. As his men knew that they h a d no way of escape, they obeyed his o r d e r to s t o r m the hill a n d they dislodged the enemy w h o turned to flight. In the m e a n t i m e J u g u r t h a ' s N u m i d i a n ally, Bomilcar, led some cavalry a n d the elephants d o w n to the plain a n d followed Rutilius to his w o o d e d c a m p site by the river. W h e n the two sides closed, they both charged. F o r t u n a t e l y f o r the R o m a n s , the elephants b e c a m e entangled in the trees a n d presented easy targets f o r individual destruction. As soon as the N u m i d i a n s saw that they h a d lost the beasts on which they relied f o r protection, they turned a n d fled. F o r t y of the elephants were killed a n d f o u r were c a p t u r e d . Sallust, J u g u r t h i n e W a r , 48-53

CIRTA (106) - Jugurthine War A f t e r c a p t u r i n g a n u m b e r of J u g u r t h a ' s valuable towns, the proconsul M a r i u s , w h o had assumed c o m m a n d in 107, ventured to the western extremity of J u g u r t h a ' s k i n g d o m . Here the river M u l u c c a [Moulouya] f o r m e d the b o u n d a r y with the M o o r i s h realm of King Bocchus, J u g u r t h a ' s brother-in-law. T h e aim of M a r i u s was to t a k e J u g u r t h a ' s treasure-fort situated near the river. By a stroke of luck, he succeeded in d o i n g this, thereby depriving the king of the m e a n s to pay his mercenaries. J u g u r t h a , having lost his bases a n d m u c h m o n e y , p e r s u a d e d Bocchus to c o m e to his assistance with an a r m y , as a pitched battle n o w seemed to be inevitable. M a r i u s , having completed his mission, decided to winter in the coastal towns to the east, a j o u r n e y of at least 600 miles as the c r o w flies. D u r i n g his progress J u g u r t h a a n d Bocchus set on him twice. Sallust says that the first attack occurred just as M a r i u s was setting out. But

THE ROMAN

later he says that the second battle occurred on the f o u r t h day a f t e r the first one, by which time M a r i u s h a d covered most of his j o u r n e y . T h e first e n g a g e m e n t , in which M a r i u s eventually routed the enemy a n d killed m o r e of them t h a n in any previous battle, is described by Sallust in some detail but the site of the battle remains obscure. T h e second attack was launched against M a r i u s as he was a p p r o a c h i n g Cirta [Constantine]. W a r y of the enemy's habits, he h a d a d o p t e d the p r e c a u t i o n of m a r c h i n g in s q u a r e f o r m a t i o n , ready to receive an a t t a c k f r o m any direction. At this j u n c t u r e he saw n o reason to c h a n g e his d e p l o y m e n t . T h e enemy were k n o w n to be in the offing but there was no indication of their position. In the event, J u g u r t h a h a d divided his forces into f o u r sections in the certainty t h a t one of them would catch M a r i u s in the rear. At the outset of the engagem e n t , the q u a e s t o r Sulla t o o k some s q u a d r o n s of cavalry a n d charged against the M o o r i s h horse. M e a n w h i l e J u g u r t h a himself a t t a c k e d the R o m a n f r o n t lines with his best cavalry while Bocchus a n d his son with their i n f a n t r y a t t a c k e d the rear lines. T h e R o m a n s were faring badly until Sulla returned a f t e r r o u t i n g the M o o r i s h cavalry a n d charged Bocchus a n d his i n f a n t r y in the flank. Bocchus fled immediately. J u g u r t h a exhorted his men a n d tried to grasp the victory t h a t was a l m o s t in his h a n d s , but he was s u r r o u n d e d by cavalry a n d h a d to force his way out a n d escape alone, leaving his c o m r a d e s dead on the field. T h e J u g u r t h i n e W a r was over. Bocchus was subsequently p e r s u a d e d by Sulla to set a t r a p to catch the king, w h o was sent to R o m e a n d executed in d u e course. It is well-nigh impossible to reconcile O r o s i u s ' graphic description of the battle 'near C i r t a ' with t h a t of Sallust. It seems m o r e likely that he has r e c o u n t e d the first of the two battles, to which he has a p p e n d e d a brief m e n t i o n of a second a n d final battle, the actual battle of Cirta. Sallust. J u g u r t h i n e W a r , 101; Orosius. 5; 15(1019) A R A U S I O (105, O c t o b e r 6) - Invasion by the Northmen T h e invasion by the N o r t h m e n , which had already led to the battle of N o r e i a (113), c o n t i n u e d to cause a l a r m in R o m e where it was feared that the invaders would cross the Alps a n d invade n o r t h e r n Italy. Nevertheless, a f t e r their overwhelming victory over the consul C a r b o at N o r e i a , the C i m b r i a n d T e u t o n e s refrained f r o m pressing s o u t h w a r d s but m o v e d a r o u n d the Alps into G a u l . Within a few years they h a d routed three m o r e R o m a n

WORLD

armies at u n k n o w n sites outside Italy. T h e n , an a r m y u n d e r G n a e u s M a n l i u s a n d Servilius C a e p i o met them on the R h o n e at A r a u s i o [Orange], where the R o m a n s suffered a c a t a s t r o p h i c defeat. This was largely a t t r i b u t a b l e to b a d relationships between the t w o generals. T h e p r o c o n s u l C a e p i o was jealous of the consul a n d refused to c o - o p e r a t e in a j o i n t c a m p or a j o i n t plan. A n x i o u s t o secure all the glory for himself, C a e p i o positioned himself between M a n l i u s a n d the e n e m y , allowing the enemy to take on the two armies o n e at a time. Both their c a m p s were c a p t u r e d a n d , a c c o r d i n g to Antias, 80,000 R o m a n soldiers were killed. O r o sius goes so far as to say that only 10 m e n were left alive to carry the bad news, but it m a y be noted that this historian has c o n f o u n d e d this battle with the r o u t a n d subsequent execution of M a r c u s Aurelius S c a u r u s at a r o u n d the same time. Livy, epitome 67; Orosius. 5: 16( 1-4); Dio Cassius, 27; fragment 91(1-4); Eutropius, 5: 1 S C I R T H A E A (103) - Second Servile W a r In b o t h Sicily a n d Italy there occurred at this time a n u m b e r of insurrections on the p a r t of slaves. In Sicily o n e of these uprisings escalated into a m a j o r rebellion u n d e r the leadership of a m a n called Salvius. Having assembled as m a n y as 30,000 picked fighters, he proclaimed himself king a n d assumed the n a m e of T r y p h o n . His aim was to occupy Triocala [?Caltabellota], an almost i m p r e g n a b l e ridge of rock on which he intended to build a royal palace. He strengthened the place f u r t h e r with a wall a n d a m o a t . Against the dissident slaves the R o m a n senate assigned Lucius Licinius Lucullus with an a r m y of 16.000 men. T r y p h o n not u n n a t u r a l l y w a n t e d to meet them at Triocala, but o n e of his generals, A t h e n i o n , advised against letting themselves in f o r a siege a n d a d v o c a t e d a fight in the open. T h e advice was accepted a n d they e n c a m p e d n e a r Scirthaea [Castello Gristia] with a force of at least 40,000. T h e R o m a n c a m p was a b o u t a mile a n d a half away. W h e n the two armies closed. A t h e n i o n achieved miracles with the 200 horse at his c o m m a n d until he himself was w o u n d e d a n d h a d to d r o p o u t . A f t e r this, the slaves lost heart a n d were r o u t e d , T r y p h o n fleeing with them. At least 20,000 were killed; the rest fled to Triocala. N i n e d a y s later the p r a e t o r arrived to besiege the place but, after inflicting a few casualties, he was driven off. H e was later called to a c c o u n t in R o m e a n d was punished. His i m m e d i a t e successor did a n d fared n o better. Diodorus, 36; 7-8 207


WORLDS

AQUAE SEXTIAE (102) - Invasion by the Northmen A f t e r the battle at A r a u s i o (105), the N o r t h m e n again failed to follow u p their victory with an invasion of Italy. Instead, they moved westward to G a s c o n y a n d Spain before returning once again to threaten the R o m a n s . W i t h o u t even waiting for M a r i u s to set foot on h o m e soil on his return f r o m N u m i d i a , the senate re-elected him consul for the second year (and subsequently f o r f o u r m o r e terms) to deal with the threat in the n o r t h . M a r i u s p r o m p t l y set a b o u t assembling a n d training his a r m y . As soon as he heard that the N o r t h m e n were a p p r o a c h i n g , he crossed the Alps a n d set u p c a m p near the Rhone. T h e N o r t h m e n h a d divided themselves into two parts. T h e Cimbri were planning to m o v e inland t h r o u g h N o r i c u m a n d to force a way south t h r o u g h the m o u n t a i n s . M a r i u s ' colleague, L u t a t i u s C a t u l u s , would proceed there to head them off. T h e T e u t o n e s a n d A m b r o n e s set out to t a k e the coastal r o u t e t h r o u g h Liguria, passing close to M a r i u s ' c a m p . T o the disgust of M a r i u s ' m e n , the consul let the N o r t h m e n pass by w i t h o u t m a k i n g a move. Their n u m b e r is said to have been so great that a steady stream passed by for six days. As soon as they h a d gone, he d e c a m p e d a n d s h a d o w e d them on a parallel r o a d , always setting up c a m p with the fullest p r e c a u t i o n s a n d with difficult g r o u n d between them, until they c a m e to A q u a e Sextiae [Aix-en-Provence] where he intended to give battle. Here, he occupied some high g r o u n d f o r his c a m p while the enemy were d o w n by a river. Hostilities began immediately with an unscheduled skirmish when the Ligurians, allies of the R o m a n s , rushed d o w n a n d a t t a c k e d some A m b r o n e s w h o were crossing the river. T h e R o m a n s charged d o w n to help their allies a n d between them they routed the enemy, crossed the river a n d pursued the fugitives back to their c a m p . T h r o u g h o u t the following d a y the enemy showed signs of p r e p a r i n g f o r a regular battle. M a r i u s , on his p a r t , sent C l a u d i u s Marcellus with 3,000 i n f a n t r y r o u n d to some w o o d e d glens on the far side of the enemy position. His instructions to them were to lie low until they heard the fighting. At d a w n on the m o r r o w M a r i u s lined up his t r o o p s in f r o n t of his c a m p . W h e n the natives saw this, they were t o o impatient to wait or consider the situation but charged uphill against the R o m a n s . With the terrain in their f a v o u r the R o m a n s h a d gradually forced them back to the level g r o u n d w h e n Marcellus t o o k his cue a n d a p p e a r e d at the double, c h a r g i n g their rear. T h e whole h o r d e went into c o n f u s i o n , b r o k e a n d fled. 208

In the pursuit m o r e t h a n 100,000 of them were said to have been killed or c a p t u r e d , including their king T e u t o b o d u s w h o was taken prisoner. Livy inflates the figures f u r t h e r to 200,000 killed a n d 90,000 captives. Orosius, at variance with Plutarch a n d Florus, p u t s the whole battle in the valley a n d says that T e u t o b o d u s was killed. Plutarch is the only source m e n t i o n i n g an a m b u s h , which seems to have been a m a j o r f a c t o r in the R o m a n victory. Plutarch, M a r i u s , 18-21(2); Livy, e p i t o m e 68; Velleius, 2; 12(4); Florus, 1: 38(6-10); Orosius, 5; 16(9-12); Eutropius, 5; 1 V E R C E L L A E ( 1 0 1 ) - Invasion by the N o r t h m e n While M a r i u s was waiting in G a u l to o p p o s e the o n c o m i n g T e u t o n e s a n d A m b r o n e s at A q u a e Sextiae (above), the C i m b r i had hived off inland t o w a r d N o r i c u m with the aim of forcing an entry into Italy t h r o u g h the Alpine passes. T o M a r i u s ' c o n s u l a r colleague, Q u i n t u s L u t a t i u s C a t u l u s , was assigned the task of blocking their progress. W h e n it c a m e to the point, he decided that he was not s t r o n g e n o u g h to hold the passes a n d he descended into the Italian plain a n d fortified a place on the far b a n k of a river. T h e arrival of the C i m b r i a n d their p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r crossing the river unsettled the R o m a n s w h o started to flee, forcing C a t u l u s to m a k e a f u r t h e r withdrawal. M a r i u s at that time was in R o m e where he h a d been recalled for discussions. He set out n o r t h to join C a t u l u s a n d sent f o r his o w n a r m y to join him f r o m G a u l . They crossed the P a d u s [Po] a n d c o n f r o n t e d the C i m b r i . w h o at first were hesitant to fight. It a p p e a r e d that they were waiting for their friends the T e u t o n e s to join them. M a r i u s disillusioned them on that score a n d b r o u g h t f o r t h the T e u t o n kings in chains as p r o o f of the events at A q u a e Sextiae. T h e king of the C i m b r i then challenged M a r i u s to m a k e an ' a p p o i n t m e n t ' f o r a battle, which was a r r a n g e d for the third d a y t h e r e a f t e r on the C a m p i Raudii near Vercellae. O n the a p p o i n t e d day the two armies drew up for battle with the c o m b i n e d R o m a n force of nearly 55,000 facing the west. M a r i u s divided his men between the two wings with C a t u l u s ' force in the centre. T h e C i m b r i m o v e d first, their i n f a n t r y a d v a n c i n g slowly in a s q u a r e while their cavalry, 15,000 strong, m o v e d to their right a w a y f r o m the square. T h e aim of the horsemen was to d r a w the R o m a n s a f t e r them so that the s q u a r e was on their flank. In fact, it a p p e a r s that such a cloud of dust was raised by the horses that M a r i u s , when he a d v a n c e d , m a d e n o c o n t a c t with the enemy at all. T h e enemy i n f a n t r y b o r e d o w n on C a t u l u s in the centre, w h o carried the whole b r u n t .

THE ROMAN

T h a n k s to M a r i u s ' foresight, the C i m b r i were fighting with the sun in their eyes a n d the dust blown into their faces. W i t h the R o m a n s well trained a n d in good fettle, the end result was the destruction of a large p a r t of the enemy force. N o r did those w h o lied back to their c a m p escape they were killed by the w o m e n , w h o then killed themselves. T h e r e is a fairly general agreement a m o n g the sources t h a t 60,000 C i m b r i were taken prisoner while d o u b l e that n u m b e r were slain. F l o r u s puts the casualties at a m u c h lower 65,000 killed against a mere 300 on the R o m a n side. Their losses, at any rate, ensured that the N o r t h m e n ceased to pose a threat. Plutarch, M a r i u s , 24-27(3); Livy, e p i t o m e 68; Florus, 1; 38(11-18); Orosius, 5: 16(14-21); Velleius, 2: 12(5); Eutropius, 5; 2

AESERNIA (90) - Social War At the beginning of the first c e n t u r y there was increasing unrest a m o n g the Italians, w h o w a n t e d equal rights with the R o m a n citizens. T h e anger grew until, in 90, it developed into a f r a n k revolt and then an o u t - a n d - o u t war. T h e r e is a r e m a r k a b l e paucity of extant i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t this Social, M a r s i c or Italic W a r , as it is variously called. Over a brief two-year period the battles were m a n y ; the details are a l m o s t non-existent. This a n d the following entries d o little m o r e t h a n list those which t o o k place at or near some identifiable site. Vettius Scaton, a Samnite c o m m a n d e r , defeated the consul Lucius Julius C a e s a r (sometimes called Sextus Julius) a n d killed 2,000 of his men. A p p i a n says t h a t Scaton then m a r c h e d against Aesernia [Isernia], A c c o r d i n g to Livy the siege of Aesernia was c o m m e n c e d at the outset of the war a n d p r o b a b l y in the year 91. It fell into the h a n d s of the Samnites in 90 but the o r d e r of events is unclear. C a e s a r m a y have been trying to relieve it w h e n the battle took place - at Aesernia, according to Orosius. Appian, Civil W a r s 1; 41; Livy, epitome 72 and 73; Orosius, 5: 18(14)

WORLD

GRUMENTUM (90) - Social War M a r c u s L a m p o n i u s , o n e of the Italian leaders, engaged Publius Licinius C r a s s u s a n d killed a b o u t 800 of his m e n . He d r o v e the rest into the town of G r u m e n t u m , which suggests that the e n c o u n t e r t o o k place in the vicinity. Appian, Civil W a r s 1; 41

A C E R R A E (90) - Social War G a i u s P a p i u s Mutilus, the S a m n i t e c o m m a n d e r of the s o u t h e r n rebels, c a p t u r e d m a n y t o w n s in C a m p a n i a a n d p u t such fear into the others that they s u b m i t t e d . O n d e m a n d , they provided him with 10,000 infantry a n d 1,000 horse, with which he laid siege to Acerrae [Acerra], n o w a s u b u r b of Naples. Lucius Julius C a e s a r went against him with 10,000 f o o t a n d some A f r i c a n cavalry a n d he e n c a m p e d near the town. P a p i u s a t t a c k e d him a n d breached the palisade of the c a m p but C a e s a r burst out t h r o u g h the gates with his cavalry, slaying 6,000 of the enemy. He then withdrew. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 42 T O L E N U S R: I (90, J u n e 11) - Social W a r T h e consul Rutilius a n d his legate G a i u s M a r i u s built two bridges over the river T o l e n u s [Turano] ( A p p i a n says it was the Liris [Garigliano], which is f u r t h e r south). T h e bridges were sufficiently far a p a r t to be out of sight of each other. Vettius Scaton, a M a r s i c c o m m a n d e r , set u p his c a m p on the opposite side of the river to the R o m a n e n c a m p m e n t a n d close to the bridge of M a r i u s . A f t e r d a r k he placed some men in a m b u s h in some gullies o p p o s i t e the bridge built by Rutilius. W h e n Rutilius crossed the bridge, S c a t o n ' s men rose up in his rear a n d killed a b o u t 8,000 of his force. O t h e r s were driven back into the river. Rutilius himself was w o u n d e d a n d died soon afterwards. Appian, Civil W a r s , /. 43; Orosius, 5; Livy, epitome 73

18(11-12);

T O L E N U S R: II (90) - Social War

AESERNIA (90) - Social War It is reported that while Aesernia was still held by the R o m a n s , an a t t e m p t to relieve it was m a d e by Cornelius Sulla w h o went to its aid with 24 cohorts. A c c o r d i n g to Orosius, Sulla lifted the siege a f t e r a t r e m e n d o u s battle with great slaughter of the enemy. If this is correct, the relief must have been short-lived before the Samnites c a p t u r e d the place in the same year. Orosius, 5: 18(16)

W h e n the consul Rutilius was defeated by Scaton on the T o l e n u s (above), M a r i u s lower d o w n the river saw corpses floating d o w n s t r e a m a n d guessed the t r u t h . H e crossed the river a n d c a p t u r e d S c a t o n ' s c a m p , killing a b o u t 8,000 of the Marsi, according to Orosius, a l t h o u g h the c a m p was said to be only lightly held. T h e enemy was forced to w i t h d r a w f o r lack of provisions. Appian, Civil W a r s , / 43; Orosius. 5: 18(13); Livy, e p i t o m e 73 209


WORLDS

TEANUM SIDICINUM (90) - Social War Lucius Julius C a e s a r was m a r c h i n g t h r o u g h a rocky gorge with 30,000 foot a n d 5,000 horse w h e n he was a t t a c k e d by the Samnites u n d e r M a r i u s Egnatius. H e was utterly defeated a n d lost m o s t of his force. H e himself was ill a n d was carried out on a litter, reaching T e a n u m [Teano] only with difficulty. O r o s i u s a n d Livy m e n t i o n the defeat but provide no f u r t h e r details. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1 45; Orosius, 5; 18(11)

consul Lucius Porcius C a t o while he was fighting the Marsi. Orosius goes f u r t h e r in saying that the battle in question was f o u g h t at the Fucine lake a n d that C a t o ' s d e a t h was no mere military m a t t e r . C a t o , w h o h a d h a d m u c h help f r o m the M a r i a n forces, is said to have boasted that M a r i u s himself h a d never achieved greater deeds. It is alleged that C a t o was surreptitiously killed in the battle by M a r i u s ' son, a charge which r e m a i n s u n c o n f i r m e d . Orosius, 5; 18(24)

FALERNUS M (90) - Social War

NOLA (89) - Social War

In the n o r t h e r n sector G n a e u s P o m p e i u s was defeated near M o u n t F a l e r n u s (unidentified) by the c o m b i n e d forces of Vidacilius, L a f r e n i u s a n d Vettius. H e was pursued a n d fled to the city of F i r m u m where he was besieged by L a f r e n i u s . Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 47

Lucius Cornelius Sulla was e n c a m p e d near the P o m p a e a n hills w h e n Lucius Cluentius pitched his c a m p close by. Sulla a t t a c k e d him impetuously with only a p a r t of his force because m a n y of his o w n m e n were out foraging. He got the worst of it. A f t e r assembling all his men, he tried again a n d defeated Cluentius, forcing him to m o v e his c a m p f u r t h e r away. Cluentius received reinforcements a n d moved in again for a n o t h e r contest. It c o m menced with a challenge f r o m a G a u l of gigantic p r o p o r t i o n s to any R o m a n w h o would engage him in single c o m b a t . A little m a n accepted the challenge a n d killed the G a u l , w h e r e u p o n all the o t h e r G a u l s fled. As a result of the g a p in Cluentius' lines, the rest of his men failed to stand their g r o u n d a n d fled to N o l a . They were pursued by the R o m a n s w h o killed a b o u t 3,000 of t h e m in the pursuit, b u t the m a i n slaughter occurred outside the gates of N o l a . T h e i n h a b i t a n t s would only o p e n o n e gate f o r fear of letting the enemy in as well. A r o u n d 20,000 of the fugitives were killed outside the walls, including Cluentius. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 50; Orosius, 5: 18(23)

F I R M U M (90) - Social War While P o m p e i u s was being besieged by L a f r e n i u s in F i r m u m [Fermo] after the battle near M o u n t F a l e r n u s (above), he learnt t h a t a n o t h e r enemy force was a p p r o a c h i n g . He decided to m a k e a d a s h f o r it a n d sent a lieutenant r o u n d to a t t a c k L a f r e n i u s in the rear while he himself m a d e a f r o n t a l sally. T h e fighting was bitter until Sulpicius set fire to the e n e m y ' s c a m p . L a f r e n i u s h a d already been killed, a n d the leaderless a r m y fled f o r refuge to A s c u l u m which P o m p e i u s proceeded to invest. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 47

ASCULUM PICENUM (89) - Social War W h e n P o m p e i u s extricated himself f r o m the siege of F i r m u m (above), he in his turn set a b o u t besieging A s c u l u m [Ascoli Piceno]. He was a t t a c k e d by the M a r s i in a fierce battle in the plain in which 18,000 of them were slain. Vidacilius, the leader of the Picentes, whose h o m e t o w n this was, also hastened to its relief with eight c o h o r t s , having first sent w o r d to the i n h a b i t a n t s o r d e r i n g them t o m a k e a sally as soon as he arrived. A l t h o u g h they were t o o frightened to obey his instructions, he still m a n a g e d to force his way in t h r o u g h the R o m a n forces. Realizing that he could not save the city, he built a large pyre, h a d a g o o d meal a n d then t o o k poison, a f t e r which the pyre was ignited as he had requested. T h e city fell to Pompeius. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1; 47-48; Livy, e p i t o m e 76

Orosius, 5;

18(18);

F U C I N U S L (89) - Social War Several sources baldly record the d e a t h of the 210

CANUSIUM (89) - Social War T h e p r a e t o r G a i u s C o s c o n i u s laid siege to C a n u sium [Canosa], A S a m n i t e a r m y c a m e to its relief a n d there was a bitter struggle. A f t e r m u c h slaughter on b o t h sides C o s c o n i u s was defeated a n d withdrew to C a n n a e . Appian, Civil W a r s , 7. 52

T E A N U S R (89) - Social War T w o of the Italian leaders, P o p p a e d i u s Silo a n d Obsidius, were killed in a m a j o r battle against the Apulians, which O r o s i u s places at the river T e a n u s . T h e R o m a n c o m m a n d e r is variously given as Sulpicius (Servius Sulpicius G a l b a ) , Caecilius Metellus (Pius) or Aemilius M a m e r c u s ( M a m e r c u s Aemilius Lepidus). T h e T e a n u s river a p p e a r s to be u n k n o w n t o d a y but it might be expected to be in the vicinity of T e a n u m A p u l u m

THE ROMAN

[San Paolo di Civitate], possibly a t r i b u t a r y of the F r e n t o [Fortore], Orosius, 5: 18(25); Appian, Civil W a r s , 1. 53; Livy, epitome 76

ESQUILINE FORUM (88) - First Civil War T h e enmity between G a i u s M a r i u s a n d Lucius Cornelius Sulla, which inter alia led to the First Civil W a r , h a d its origins in the J u g u r t h i n e W a r . M a r i u s w o n the battles; the diplomacy of Sulla reaped the ultimate goal a n d , in the eyes of M a r i u s , the credit. Subsequently, Sulla h a d been a p p o i n t e d to c o m m a n d the c a m p a i g n against M i t h r i d a t e s when, by a political fiddle, it was given instead to M a r i u s . Sulla resolved to settle the issue by force of arms. With the exception of one q u a e s t o r , Sulla's superior officers deserted him because they would not subscribe to civil war. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the r a n k a n d file of his a r m y , prepared for the M i t h r i d a t i c W a r , was solidly behind him. M o r e over, he was joined by his c o n s u l a r colleague, Q u i n t u s Pompeius. T o g e t h e r with six legions, they m a r c h e d on R o m e where Sulla t o o k possession of the Esquiline G a t e while P o m p e i u s occupied the Colline G a t e . With two of the legions, Sulla entered the city. He met M a r i u s a n d his associate, Publius Sulpicius, with some hastily assembled t r o o p s near the Esquiline F o r u m a n d here a battle took place not a mere street riot but a p r o p e r battle with all the p a r a p h e r n a l i a of war. W h e n Sulla's t r o o p s started to waver, he g r a b b e d a s t a n d a r d a n d stood out in f r o n t e x h o r t i n g his m e n while at the same time he called up fresh t r o o p s to go r o u n d a n d take M a r i u s in the rear. It was the M a r i a n s ' t u r n to waver. M a r i u s called to the citizens in the houses, p r o claiming f r e e d o m to slaves w h o joined them, b u t answer was there none. In despair the M a r i a n s fled, M a r i u s himself ultimately m a k i n g his way to Africa. Sulla punished looters on the spot a n d began to restore order. In the following year he sailed with his a r m y to Greece. It was not until his return in 85 that the Civil W a r was resumed in earnest. Appian,

Civil W a r s , / : 57-58;

Florus, 2;

9(6-8)

A M N I A S R (88) - First M i t h r i d a t i c W a r M i t h r i d a t e s VI E u p a t o r of P o n t u s w a n t e d m o r e space. In the past he h a d gained c o n t r o l of C a p padocia but h a d been ordered by the R o m a n s to give it back a n d keep his h a n d s off it. W h e n R o m e became involved in the Social W a r , M i t h r i d a t e s saw his c h a n c e a n d expelled N i c o m e d e s f r o m Bithynia a n d A r i o b a r z a n e s f r o m C a p p a d o c i a . C o n t r a r y to his expectations, the R o m a n s sent

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M a n i u s Aquilius to reinstate the t w o kings with the assistance of the R o m a n t r o o p s in Asia. M i t h r i d a t e s r e m o n s t r a t e d b u t , a f t e r the failure of talks, war was inevitable a n d M i t h r i d a t e s was the first to act. H e sent a large force to seize C a p p a docia, a f t e r which he collected f u r t h e r forces f r o m all over Asia M i n o r until he h a d an a r m y of 250,000 foot a n d 40,000 horse with N e o p t o l e m u s a n d A r c h e l a u s as his generals. O n the R o m a n side, the G o v e r n o r of Asia h a d at his disposal a total force of 120,000 men, which he divided into three equal divisions. T h e first e n c o u n t e r t o o k place w h e n N i c o m e d e s of Bithynia with his whole a r m y of 50,000 foot a n d 6,000 horse met N e o p t o l e m u s a n d Archelaus, the generals of M i t h r i d a t e s , with a m u c h smaller force of light infantry, cavalry a n d some scythed chariots. They met in a plain alongside the river A m n i a s [Geuk Irma] in P a p h l a g o n i a , where N e o p t o l e m u s sent a small force to seize a hill in the plain. W h e n it was driven off, b o t h sides sent in m o r e men a n d the action escalated. N i c o m e d e s put the enemy to flight but Archelaus then a t t a c k e d the Bithynian pursuers, giving the fugitives time to rally a n d advance. At the same time the scythebearing chariots were sent in against the Bithynians with devastating effect. A f t e r that, the Bithynians were routed by the c o m b i n e d assaults of A r c h e l a u s on their f r o n t a n d N e o p t o l e m u s in their rear. N i c o m e d e s fled a n d m a n y prisoners were taken, w h o m M i t h r i d a t e s treated with great h u m a n i t y . T h e battle caused considerable a l a r m a m o n g the R o m a n generals, w h o were disturbed that such a small force had defeated o n e so m u c h larger. Appian,

M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 18

P R O T O P A C H I U M (88) - First M i t h r i d a t i c War A f t e r the battle by the river A m n i a s (above), N e o p t o l e m u s met u p with the legate M a n i u s Aquilius at a stronghold called P r o t o p a c h i u m . T h e R o m a n force consisted of 40,000 f o o t a n d 4,000 horse, but in an action a b o u t which n o t h i n g m o r e is k n o w n N e o p t o l e m u s killed 10,000 of them. T h e prisoners were again treated h u m a n e l y a n d released by M i t h r i d a t e s . Aquilius escaped to P e r g a m u m . T h e M i t h r i d a t i c forces were n o w virtually u n o p p o s e d a n d m a d e a clean sweep t h r o u g h Asia M i n o r , where M i t h r i d a t e s himself ordered the massacre of all R o m a n s a n d Italians in w h a t has been called the 'Asian Vespers'. T h e war was n o w to be war with a vengeance. Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 19 211


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C H A E R O N E A (86) - First M i t h r i d a t i c W a r N o t c o n t e n t with the c o n t r o l of Asia M i n o r , M i t h r i d a t e s p r e p a r e d f o r an invasion of E u r o p e . His h e n c h m a n Aristion f o m e n t e d a revolution in A t h e n s a n d w o n the city over, while his general Archelaus occupied the Piraeus a n d then proceeded to gain c o n t r o l of the whole of the south a n d most of central Greece. In 87, Sulla landed in the s o u t h of Greece with five legions. It t o o k him until the following year to break into A t h e n s a n d seize Piraeus. M e a n w h i l e , the Pontic a r m y was a d v a n c i n g s o u t h w a r d s f r o m T h r a c e , a n d Archelaus m o v e d n o r t h w a r d s to join up with it. He assumed overall c o m m a n d of the c o m b i n e d forces, which are said to have n u m b e r e d 120,000 men. Sulla, also, m o v e d n o r t h w a r d s into Boeotia a n d the two sides met near C h a e r o n e a . Plutarch gives the size of Sulla's force as a mere 15,000 infantry but this a p p e a r s to be a considerable u n d e r statement in view of the fact that he landed in Greece with a r o u n d 30,000 a n d h a d received some r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m M a c e d o n i a . A p p i a n ' s statement that Sulla was o u t n u m b e r e d a b o u t three to o n e m a y be nearer the t r u t h . T h e r e are t w o a c c o u n t s of the battle, neither of them very clear. T h e action took place in a n a r r o w plain s u r r o u n d e d by craggy hills a n d m o u n t a i n s where a large force would have little a d v a n t a g e . T h e Pontic a r m y h a d a heavily fortified e n c a m p ment at the base of a n d between two m o u n t a i n s . They lined up their forces on the plain a n d Sulla deployed his men o p p o s i t e them. H e placed cavalry on b o t h wings, with himself in charge on the right, a n d positioned a force in reserve on higher g r o u n d in the rear. As Sulla gave the o r d e r to a d v a n c e , the enemy unleashed his scythe-bearing chariots. T h e distance between the t w o armies was not sufficient to allow these to get u p an effective speed, a n d they were easily side-stepped or t u r n e d . A r c h e l a u s then extended his right wing in an enveloping m o v e m e n t . Sulla's reserve flying force charged to the assistance of his left but f o u n d itself being s u r r o u n d e d a n d h e m m e d in against the cliffs. Sulla, w h o h a d not yet engaged on the right wing, went across immediately to the assistance of the distressed left where he t u r n e d the tables. A r c h e l a u s then a b a n d o n e d his assault against the enemy left a n d turned his a t t e n t i o n to the opposite wing, which Sulla had left t e m p o r a r i l y leaderless. Sulla, seeing the o t h e r ' s move, rode across a n d charged A r c h e l a u s while he was in the middle of executing his m a n o e u v r e . This created c o n f u s i o n a n d b r o k e the e n e m y ' s lines. W h e n the wings collapsed, the enemy centre started to give up t o o 212

a n d the whole a r m y rushed to their fortifications, losing m a n y m o r e m e n in the flight t h a n the fight. It is reported in b o t h a c c o u n t s that only 10,000 of the enemy m u l t i t u d e survived whereas the R o m a n s , it seems, lost only 12 m e n ( A p p i a n says 13). Plutarch, Sulla, 15-19; Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 41-45 O R C H O M E N U S (86) - First M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Sulla moved n o r t h w a r d f r o m C h a e r o n e a (above) into Thessaly but, as he did so, a large enemy fleet put into Chalcis in E u b o e a with 80,000 of M i t h r i d a t e s ' best t r o o p s on b o a r d . This a r m y crossed the E u r i p u s a n d invaded Boeotia, e n c a m p i n g near O r c h o m e n u s on a plain which extended f r o m the city to the m a r s h e s of the river Melas. T h e site seemed to Archelaus, the general, to be ideal f o r cavalry, in which he excelled. Sulla t u r n e d a b o u t a n d m a r c h e d to O r c h o m e n u s where he e n c a m p e d close to the enemy. His first action was to get his men digging trenches d o w n both sides of the plain in an a t t e m p t to deny the enemy access to the h a r d e r g r o u n d suitable f o r cavalry. This t h o u g h t did not appeal to the enemy w h o charged out a n d routed not only Sulla's diggers but also the t r o o p s w h o were protecting them. At this point Sulla d i s m o u n t e d a n d dashed t h r o u g h the fugitives to the f r o n t , exhorting them to rally a n d to turn a n d face the enemy, a f t e r which he led an assault which sent the enemy fleeing back to their fortifications. O n the following day, Sulla resumed his digging a n d the enemy r e a p p e a r e d but w i t h o u t any zest for fighting. T h e y were routed easily, with the loss of 15,000 men, a n d their c a m p was c a p t u r e d as well. This action, c o m b i n e d with the previous o n e at C h a e r o n e a , b r o u g h t to an end the hostilities of M i t h r i d a t e s in E u r o p e . Plutarch, Sulla, 20-21; Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 49 T E N E D O S I S L (85) - First M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Following the defeat of his forces in E u r o p e , M i t h r i d a t e s retired to P e r g a m u m a n d then escaped f r o m there to Pitane on the coast of Aeolis. A n u n s c r u p u l o u s R o m a n legate, Flavius F i m b r i a , w h o had m u r d e r e d the consul Flaccus a n d had assumed c o m m a n d of his a r m y , besieged Pitane by land but h a d n o ships with which to prevent an escape by sea. He appealed to Lucullus to bring his fleet but the a d m i r a l refused to d o so a n d c o n t i n u e d his c a m p a i g n against the king's ships. A f t e r defeating some of them off the p r o m o n t o r y of Lectum in the T r o a d , he f o u n d

THE ROMAN

N e o p t o l e m u s waiting f o r him with a large a r m a ment off the island of T e n e d o s [Bozcaada]. N e o p t o l e m u s c a m e out well in f r o n t of his fleet with the intention of r a m m i n g Lucullus but, as Lucullus' flag-ship was a heavy well-reinforced vessel, the enemy steersman refused to obey his instructions a n d minimized the collision. Lucullus proceeded to put the enemy fleet to flight a n d to give N e o p t o l e m u s a good run in the chase. Plutarch, Lucullus, 3(8-10) C A N U S I U M (83) - First Civil W a r Sulla's r e t u r n f r o m Asia a f t e r the end of the First M i t h r i d a t i c W a r signalled the r e s u m p t i o n of the First Civil W a r in earnest, a f t e r a preliminary c o n f r o n t a t i o n five years earlier in R o m e itself (Esquiline F o r u m , 88). In the interim M a r i u s h a d died, but his d e a t h did n o t h i n g to relieve the tensions between the o p p o s i n g factions. A c c o r d i n g to A p p i a n , Sulla's first e n c o u n t e r with the opposition, which could have occurred on his r o u t e n o r t h w a r d s f r o m B r u n d i s i u m [Brindisi], is said to have taken place at C a n u s i u m [Canosa di Puglia] where he a n d Caecilius Metellus Pius met the consul G a i u s N o r b a n u s . They are reputed to have killed 6,000 of his m e n f o r a loss of 70 of their own. N o r b a n u s retreated to C a p u a . Velleius, F l o r u s a n d E u t r o p i u s , however, say that Sulla first met N o r b a n u s near C a p u a (below), suggesting that A p p i a n m a y have been in e r r o r in regard to the site. Appian,

Civil W a r s , 1: 84

C A P U A (83) - First Civil W a r Sulla met N o r b a n u s a n d the o t h e r consul, L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, near C a p u a [5. Maria Capua Vetere], either by the river V o l t u r n u s (Florus) or on M o u n t T i f a t a (Velleius). N o r b a n u s was p r o m p t l y r o u t e d , whereas Scipio's a r m y longed only f o r peace a n d the whole lot were enticed to desert en masse to Sulla. N o r b a n u s lost 7.000 men killed a n d 6,000 c a p t u r e d ; Sulla's losses a m o u n t e d to 124 men. It m a y be n o t e d t h a t these casualty figures are c o m p a r a b l e with those reported by A p p i a n f o r C a n u s i u m (above), which was p r o b a b l y the same battle at an erroneously reported site. Velleius, 2: 25(2);

Florus, 2: 9(20);

Eutropius,

5: 7

A E S I S R (82, spring) - First Civil W a r W h e n fighting was resumed in the spring, the consul Papirius C a r b o sent a large cavalry force under his lieutenant C a r i n a s against a Sullan force on the b a n k s of the Aesis [Esino], which f o r m s the

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b o r d e r between U m b r i a a n d Picenum. T h e c o m m a n d e r of the Sullan force was the y o u n g G n a e u s P o m p e i u s (not Metellus, as A p p i a n states). Heavy fighting t o o k place a n d c o n t i n u e d f o r several h o u r s until C a r i n a s was r o u t e d . In the pursuit, P o m p e y d r o v e the enemy o n t o difficult g r o u n d f r o m which they could not escape a n d were forced to surrender. Plutarch, P o m p e y , 7(3); Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 87 S A C R I P O R T U S (82) - First Civil W a r T h e y o u n g M a r i u s , son of the great general, was o n e of the consuls in 82. He was e n c a m p e d near Setia [Sezze] in L a t i u m w h e n Sulla c a p t u r e d the town. M a r i u s withdrew to S a c r i p o r t u s where he was b r o u g h t to battle. W h e n his left wing gave way, five c o h o r t s of f o o t a n d some cavalry deserted to Sulla. M a r i u s a n d the rest of his a r m y fled to Praeneste [Palestrina] pursued by Sulla. T h e Praenestines allowed the first fugitives to enter but they shut the gates as soon as Sulla a p p e a r e d . As a result, there was a n o t h e r great slaughter outside the walls as Sulla's men despatched the u n f o r t u nates w h o could not gain admission. M a r i u s himself was hauled u p into the city by m e a n s of a rope. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 87; Florus, 2; Velleius, 2; 26(1); Livy, e p i t o m e 87

9(23);

C L A N I S R (82) - First Civil W a r As w a r f a r e was being waged vigorously in E t r u r i a , Sulla set out there to deal with it. H e began with a cavalry battle on the b a n k s of the river Clanis (Glanis) [Chianci] against s o m e Celtiberian horsemen w h o h a d been sent over f r o m Spain by the p r a e t o r s to reinforce the consuls. A f t e r Sulla h a d killed a b o u t 50 of them, 270 m o r e deserted to him. T h e rest were killed by the consul C a r b o , p r o b a b l y out of fear of f u r t h e r desertions. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 89 S A T U R N I A (82) - First Civil W a r Shortly a f t e r the tussle at the river Clanis (above), Sulla overcame a n o t h e r enemy d e t a c h m e n t near S a t u r n i a in Etruria. T h e details are u n k n o w n . Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 89 C L U S I U M (82) - First Civil W a r A m a j o r battle was f o u g h t near Clusium [Chiusi] in E t r u r i a between Sulla a n d C a r b o . It went on all day w i t h o u t showing a n y clear a d v a n t a g e either way, according to A p p i a n . Livy talks of a victory here by Sulla, a l o n g with several o t h e r victories, but this m a y refer to the second recorded 213


WORLDS

e n c o u n t e r at C l u s i u m in the same year, which is entered below (Clusium, 82). Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 89; Livy, e p i t o m e 88 S P O L E T I U M (82) - First Civil W a r In the plain of Spoletium [Spoleto], Sullan forces u n d e r P o m p e y a n d C r a s s u s killed a b o u t 3,000 of C a r b o ' s men a n d besieged his lieutenant C a r i n a s , w h o was in c o m m a n d . C a r b o sent some reinforcem e n t s but Sulla heard a b o u t this a n d set an a m b u s h . He killed a b o u t 2,000 of them. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 90 F A V E N T I A (82) - First Civil W a r C a r b o a n d N o r b a n u s planned to m a k e an attack at dusk on the c a m p of Metellus in F a v e n t i a [Faenza] in Gallia C i s p a d a n a . T h e y set out at the a p p o i n t e d time but the d a r k n e s s was t o o m u c h for them. T h e area was covered with vineyards, in which they got completely entangled. They lost 10,000 m e n in the escapade, a f t e r which a f u r t h e r 6,000 deserted. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1; 91; Velleius, 2: 28(1); Livy, e p i t o m e 88 P L A C E N T I A (82) - First Civil W a r M a r c u s Lucullus, Sulla's lieutenant, defeated a b o d y of C a r b o ' s forces near Placentia [Piacenza] in Gallia C i s p a d a n a . This so discouraged C a r b o that he fled to Africa in spite of his position as consul a n d the large forces which he still had at his disposal. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1; 92 C L U S I U M (82) - First Civil W a r W h e n the consul C a r b o fled to Africa, there was still an a r m y of 30,000 of his m e n at Clusium [Chiusi] in Etruria. P o m p e y engaged this force a n d killed 20,000 of t h e m . Appian, Civil W a r s . 1: 92; Livy, e p i t o m e 88 C O L L I N E G A T E (82, N o v e m b e r 1) - First Civil War As a result of their losses in E t r u r i a the remaining M a r i a n forces joined u p with a S a m n i t e a r m y of 40,000 u n d e r their chieftain Telesinus. T h e combined forces m a d e an effort to relieve Praeneste [.Palestrina] a n d to rescue the y o u n g M a r i u s , but they failed in the a t t e m p t . T h e y then turned their footsteps in the direction of R o m e a n d e n c a m p e d outside the walls. Sulla hurried a f t e r t h e m a n d took up position by the Colline G a t e where he gave battle. In the fierce fighting that followed, C r a s s u s on Sulla's right wing crushed his o p p o 214

nents but the Sullan left was r o u t e d . T h e close a n d bitter contest persisted until the early h o u r s of the m o r n i n g , by which time the Samnite generals h a d been killed a n d their c a m p h a d been taken. T h e generals of C a r b o ' s faction fled a f t e r their a r m y h a d been destroyed. It was estimated that in all a b o u t 50,000 men were slain. In the a f t e r m a t h of Sulla's n a r r o w victory his enemies were rooted out one by one a n d eliminated, leaving him with the a b s o l u t e p o w e r of a dictator. Plutarch, Sulla, 29-30(1); Appian, Civil W a r s , 1; 93; Velleius, 2; 27(1-3); Orosius, 5: 20(9); Eutropius, 5: 8; Livy, epitome 88

BAETIS R (80) - Sertorian War Q u i n t u s Sertorius was a military a d v e n t u r e r w h o s u p p o r t e d the p o p u l a r faction of M a r i u s d u r i n g the Civil W a r . W h e n Sulla returned f r o m Asia a n d the p o p u l a r p a r t y lost its popularity, Sertorius sailed a w a y to Spain where he trained a native a r m y a n d became m u c h respected locally. Sulla sent an a r m y against him, a n d Sertorius then sailed to M a u r e t a n i a . While he was there - a n d a f t e r m a n y a d v e n t u r e s a n d several battles - the Lusit a n i a n s in Iberia invited him to become their leader in their need for protection against R o m e . Their confidence was not misplaced. A m o n g o t h e r feats he o p p o s e d the g o v e r n o r of F u r t h e r Spain, Lucius Fufidius, on the b a n k s of the river Baetis [Guadalquivir] near C o r d u b a [Cordoba] a n d routed him, killing 2,000 of his men. Plutarch, Sertorius, 12(3) A N A R (79) - Sertorian W a r M a r c u s D o m i t i u s , the g o v e r n o r of Hither Spain, was one of the first generals to o p p o s e Sertorius. D o m i t i u s f o u g h t Lucius Hirtuleius, the Sertorian s e c o n d - i n - c o m m a n d , at the river A n a [Guadiana] a n d was defeated. Florus, 2; 10(6-7); Plutarch, Sertorius, 12(3); Eutropius, 6: 1; Orosius, 5; 23(3); Livy, e p i t o m e 90

S E G O V I A (78) - Sertorian War Sertorius' lieutenant, Hirtuleius, followed up his defeat of D o m i t i u s (above) by o b t a i n i n g a victory at Segovia over a n o t h e r of the enemy c o m m a n ders. T h e defeated general is said to have been called either T h o r i u s or T h o r a n i u s but in all probability he was Lucius M a n l i u s , w h o was g o v e r n o r of T r a n s a l p i n e G a u l in 78 a n d w h o crossed into Spain to help in the fight against Sertorius. Florus, 2; 10(6-7); Plutarch, Sertorius, 12(4); Orosius, 5; 23(4); Livy, e p i t o m e 90

THE ROMAN

WORLD

M I L V I A N B R I D G E (77) - Lepidus' Revolt

VALENTIA (75) - Sertorian War

N o sooner had Sulla died, in 78, t h a n the factions began to quarrel with each other. T h e consul M a r c u s Aemilius Lepidus, a f o r m e r s u p p o r t e r of the M a r i a n faction, w a n t e d to repeal s o m e of Sulla's decrees. His actions incited revolt a n d threatened to destabilize the constitution, as a result of which he was declared an enemy of the state. H e repaired to E t r u r i a , where he recruited forces a n d then m a r c h e d on R o m e . T h e o t h e r consul, Q. L u t a t i u s C a t u l u s , was waiting for him a n d , with the help of P o m p e y , h a d already seized the Milvian Bridge a n d the J a n i c u l u m . L e p i d u s was repulsed at the first o n s l a u g h t a n d fled. He sailed soon a f t e r w a r d s t o Sardinia where he died. A p p i a n places the battle near the C a m p u s M a r t i u s a n d ascribes n o p a r t to P o m p e y . Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 107; Florus, 2; 11

G a i u s H e r e n n i u s a n d M a r c u s P e r p e r n a were two R o m a n exiles w h o h a d joined Sertorius a n d h a d been given c o m m a n d s by him. P o m p e y engaged them near Valentia [Valencia] a n d defeated them, killing H e r e n n i u s a n d inflicting m o r e t h a n 10,000 casualties. Plutarch, P o m p e y , 18(3)

L A U R O (76) - Sertorian War T h e guerilla tactics of Sertorius a n d his largely local a r m y met with so m u c h success that he eventually held m o s t of R o m a n Spain. V a r i o u s generals were sent against him, n o t a b l y Metellus Pius, w h o achieved little on his own, a n d in 76 the great P o m p e y . P o m p e y ' s first e n c o u n t e r with Sertorius t u r n e d out to be an utter humiliation. Sertorius was besieging the t o w n of L a u r o , a n d P o m p e y m a r c h e d to relieve it with the whole of his a r m y . A hill n e a r b y a p p e a r e d to be an i m p o r t a n t position, a n d b o t h armies raced to get there first. Sertorius succeeded a n d occupied it. P o m p e y ' s chagrin at his failure to prevent the o t h e r f r o m gaining the hill was completely offset by the realization that he h a d t r a p p e d the enemy - between the city a n d himself. But P o m p e y h a d not kept an eye on his rear a n d was u n a w a r e that it was he w h o was t r a p p e d until 6,000 of the enemy a p p e a r e d behind him f r o m Sertorius' c a m p , where they h a d been left as an a m b u s h . As P o m p e y did not d a r e to attack a n d was a s h a m e d to r u n away, he h a d to sit a n d watch the siege while Sertorius w o n a victory w i t h o u t a battle. Plutarch, Sertorius, 18(3-6), Orosius, 5; 23(6-7)

artel P o m p e y ,

18(3);

ITALICA (BAETICA) (75) - Sertorian War It is reported that Hirtuleius, Sertorius' lieutenant, battled against Metellus a n d was heavily defeated. O r o s i u s places the battle at the city of Italica [Santiponce] a n d says t h a t Hirtuleius lost 20,000 men. He fled into Lusitania. Orosius, 5; 23( 10); Livy, e p i t o m e 91

S U C R O R (75) - Sertorian War Immediately a f t e r the battle near Valentia (above) P o m p e y hurried to challenge Sertorius himself a n d engaged him by the river Sucro [Jucar], P o m p e y is said to have been a n x i o u s to get the credit f o r a victory b e f o r e Metellus arrived to join him. This jealousy suited Sertorius, w h o was c o n t e n t to fight o n e a r m y at a time. In the e n c o u n t e r , on each side o n e wing was winning a n d o n e losing until Sertorius, having routed the enemy wing o p p o s i t e him, went to the assistance of his left wing which was being forced back by P o m p e y . He rallied his t r o o p s a n d launched a successful c o u n t e r a t t a c k . P o m p e y f o u n d himself in a very difficult position a n d only m a n a g e d to escape by a b a n d o n i n g his horse. Both armies lined up again on the following d a y but, as Metellus was by then a p p r o a c h i n g , Sertorius withdrew a n d his a r m y scattered. This is P l u t a r c h ' s account of events. A p p i a n c o n t e n d s that Metellus was present f r o m the start a n d that the battle was really a f o u r s o m e in which Perp e r n a , w h o h a d joined Sertorius f r o m Italy in 77, was also leading a wing. A c c o r d i n g to this source, Metellus was defeating P e r p e r n a while Sertorius defeated P o m p e y so that the overall result was inconclusive. H o w e v e r , this a c c o u n t is so similar to A p p i a n ' s ensuing description of the battle at Segontia (see S a g u n t u m , 75, below) as to suggest an e r r o r of duplication. A p p i a n ' s a c c o u n t of Sucro is suspect. Plutarch, P o m p e y , 19(1-4), Appian, Civil W a r s , 1; 110

and Sertorius, 19;

T U R I A R (75) - Sertorian War A brief c o m m e n t by P l u t a r c h refers to a battle near the river T u r i a in which P o m p e y a n d Metellus defeated Sertorius. A p p a r e n t l y Sertorius m a n a g e d to extricate himself f a v o u r a b l y , but no o t h e r details are given. W h e n was this battle f o u g h t in relation to the o t h e r Sertorian encounters? Plutarch asserts t h a t P o m p e y hurried f r o m Valentia to engage Sertorius in person at the river Sucro b e f o r e Metellus arrived. On these g r o u n d s the action near the T u r i a m u s t have taken place a f t e r Sucro when 215


WORLDS

P o m p e y a n d Metellus h a d joined forces. Plutarch implies this w h e n he praises Sertorius' qualities on the Sucro a n d again near the Turia. T h e fierce struggles on the Sucro a n d the T u r i a (in that order) are also m e n t i o n e d by Cicero. Finally, the o p p o s i n g armies would have to cross the river T u r i a to get f r o m the Sucro to S a g u n t u m (below) a direct progression n o r t h w a r d s . Plutarch, Sertorius, 19(1); Cicero, p r o Balbo, 2(5)

SAGUNTUM (75) - Sertorian War Plutarch briefly describes a battle in the plains of S a g u n t u m [Sagunto] between Sertorius a n d the forces of P o m p e y a n d Metellus. Sertorius was winning the d a y until Metellus was w o u n d e d a n d was carried off the field. This so enraged his men that they r e d o u b l e d their e f f o r t s a n d forced Sertorius to a b a n d o n the field. A p p i a n cites a battle at a b o u t the same time - a f t e r the battle at the Sucro (75) a n d b e f o r e winter - in which Sertorius defeated P o m p e y a n d killed a b o u t 6,000 of his men. At the same time Metellus worsted P e r p e r n a , slaying a b o u t 5,000 of his force. A p p i a n places this battle near Segontia [Siguenza], also k n o w n as Saguntia. C o n f u s i o n with S a g u n t u m would be an easy m a t t e r . It seems p r o b a b l e that these are two admittedly differing a c c o u n t s of one a n d the same action. T h e site of S a g u n t u m m a k e s g o o d geographical sense f o r a sequel to the battles on the Sucro a n d T u r i a . M o r e o v e r , Plutarch specifies the site as the plains of S a g u n t u m , which was situated on the fertile coastal strip. It is unlikely t h a t there was an action at this time near Segontia, a distance of 150 miles f r o m S a g u n t u m as the c r o w flies. T h e place n a m e given by A p p i a n m a y have been c o r r u p t e d . Plutarch, Sertorius, 21(1-3); Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 110

C A L A G U R R I S (74) - Sertorian War T h e last recorded c o m b a t of the Sertorian W a r occurred a f t e r P o m p e y laid siege to Pallantia [Palencia], Sertorius c a m e on the scene a n d raised the siege, w h e r e u p o n P o m p e y retired to join Metellus at Calagurris [Calahorra], Sertorius a t t a c k e d their e n c a m p m e n t a n d killed 3,000 of their c o m b i n e d forces. By this time P o m p e y a n d Metellus were t a k i n g m o r e a n d m o r e towns a n d Sertorius was losing his hold. T h e w a r was b r o u g h t to an end by the assassination of Sertorius in 72 by the j e a l o u s P e r p e r n a , w h o was himself defeated a n d slain by P o m p e y soon a f t e r w a r d s . Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 112; Livy, e p i t o m e 93 216

C H A L C E D O N (74) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r T h e First M i t h r i d a t i c W a r was followed by a period of good relationship between the Pontic king a n d R o m e but this was short-lived. T h e Second W a r was almost a non-event, an internal a f f a i r which did not involve R o m e , but a Third W a r loomed rapidly out of the m u r k of m u t u a l suspicion. W h e n N i c o m e d e s IV of Bithynia died, he bequeathed his realm to R o m e . T h e R o m a n s accepted it; M i t h r i d a t e s did not! T o him, a R o m a n province d o w n the road was an u n p a l a t a b l e threat, a n d so he invaded it. T h e unmilitary consul, Aurelius C o t t a , w h o had been sent out with some ships to g u a r d the area, fled to C h a l c e d o n [Kaclikoy] at the e n t r a n c e to the B o s p h o r u s , where he was besieged. W h e n M i t h r i d a t e s a d v a n c e d against the city, C o t t a was a f r a i d to go out a n d meet him. O n e of his officers, N u d u s by n a m e , did take a d e t a c h m e n t a n d occupy a position in the plain but was driven back to the gates, which the g u a r d s were a f r a i d to open. N u d u s a n d a few others were hauled over the wall by ropes; the rest perished. M i t h r i d a t e s then assailed the h a r b o u r , b u r n t f o u r of C o t t a ' s ships a n d towed the o t h e r 60 away. In the action C o t t a lost a b o u t 3,000 men against an enemy loss of only 20. Plutarch, Lucullus, 8(1-2); Appian, W a r s , 71; Livy, e p i t o m e 93

Mithridatic

R H Y N D A C U S R (74) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r M i t h r i d a t e s proceeded to besiege Cyzicus by land a n d sea. In the m e a n t i m e , the consul Lucullus had landed in Asia with an a r m y to which he a t t a c h e d all the R o m a n forces in the area, giving him a total of 30,000 infantry. H e pitched c a m p near M i t h r i dates at Cyzicus. W h e n Lucullus heard that the enemy a m o u n t e d t o 120,000 foot ( A p p i a n says 300,000) a n d 16,000 horse, he was struck by the logistical p r o b l e m s of feeding such a h o r d e . T h e o b v i o u s way to defeat t h e m was to starve them. T o this end he e n c a m p e d on a suitable hill f r o m which he could o b t a i n supplies while denying them to the enemy. Mithridates, ignoring all advice, pursued the siege with every m e a n s at his disposal until f a m i n e started to take its toll. At that point he sent a w a y to Bithynia all his cavalry, beasts of b u r d e n , a n d disabled foot soldiers, w h o were of no use in the siege. Lucullus p u r s u e d t h e m a n d o v e r t o o k them at the river R h y n d a c u s [Kocasu], where he defeated t h e m overwhelmingly. In a d d i t i o n to those that were slain, he c a p t u r e d 6,000 horses a n d 15,000 men. Plutarch, Lucullus, 11(1-3); W a r s , 75

Appian,

Mithridatic

THE ROMAN

A E S E P U S R (74) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r T h e starvation caused by Lucullus' b l o c k a d e forced M i t h r i d a t e s to a b a n d o n the siege of Cyzicus. H e fled to the sea, leaving his generals to evacuate the a r m y to L a m p s a c u s [Lapseki], Lucullus fell u p o n t h e m a n d killed 20,000 of them at o n e of the two m a i n rivers in the area, which were greatly swollen a n d difficult to cross. A vastly greater n u m b e r were t a k e n captive. A p p i a n n a m e s the river Aesepus [Gonen] nearer Cyzicus; P l u t a r c h q u o t e s the G r a n i c u s [Kocabas], f u r t h e r west. As it would be necessary to cross b o t h rivers between Cyzicus a n d L a m p s a c u s , the difference is of academic significance. Appian, 11(6)

M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 76; Plutarch,

Lucullus,

L E M N O S I S L (73, spring) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c War Lucullus raised a fleet a n d sailed to the T r o a d , where he heard that enemy ships h a d been seen sailing f r o m the h a r b o u r of the A c h a e a n s near Ilium t o w a r d L e m n o s . H e proceeded to the h a r b o u r , where he c a u g h t the last 13 ships of the enemy fleet of 50 vessels a n d c a p t u r e d them b e f o r e proceeding to chase the rest of the fleet. H e met up with them off a small deserted island near Lemnos, where they had either beached their ships o r d r o p p e d a n c h o r close to the shore. A t t e m p t s to d r a w them o u t to sea failed; they preferred to defend themselves on land. Lucullus o v e r c a m e them by sending some of his ships r o u n d the island to d i s e m b a r k a n d take the enemy in the rear. A f t e r suffering m u c h slaughter, they t o o k to flight. Their leaders were c a p t u r e d , including M a r c u s M a r i u s , w h o h a d been sent to assist M i t h r i d a t e s by his ally Sertorius in Spain. Appian,

12

M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 77; Plutarch,

Lucullus,

V E S U V I U S M (73) - T h i r d Servile W a r In 73 a slave of T h r a c i a n origin called S p a r t a c u s escaped f r o m the gladiatorial school at C a p u a with a h a n d f u l of colleagues a n d proclaimed a revolt. His call to a r m s soon raised a force of a r o u n d 10,000 fighters, at first men of T h r a c i a n a n d Celtic extraction, but this figure rapidly increased to at least seven times t h a t n u m b e r . R e p o r t s of his activities are b o t h few a n d sketchy. His first base was on M o u n t Vesuvius, where the p r a e t o r s C l a u d i u s G l a b e r a n d Publius V a r e n u s with 3.000 men s u r r o u n d e d him a n d a t t e m p t e d to besiege him. S p a r t a c u s a n d his men rushed d o w n f r o m the heights a n d c a p t u r e d the R o m a n c a m p

WORLD

a f t e r p u t t i n g their enemy to flight. S o m e say that the t o p of the m o u n t a i n was covered with vines f r o m which the rebels m a d e ladders. With the help of these, they descended some precipitous slopes a n d a p p e a r e d in the e n e m y ' s rear. Orosius, 5; 24(1); Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 116; Florus, 2; 8(3-5); Plutarch, Crassus, 9(1); Livy, e p i t o m e 95 C A B I R A (72, spring) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Lucullus, the general o p p o s i n g M i t h r i d a t e s , spent the year 73 in chasing his q u a r r y , wasting his land a n d winning over his cities. His soldiers criticized him f o r not p u r s u i n g the war but allowing his enemy to recoup. Lucullus replied that that was precisely what he w a n t e d - a s t r o n g enemy w h o would fight rather t h a n bolt into the wilderness. In the spring of the following year Lucullus crossed the m o u n t a i n s a n d m a r c h e d against C a b i r a ( N e o c a e s a r e a ) [Niksar], where M i t h r i d a t e s had entrenched himself with 40,000 foot a n d 4,000 horse. T h e P o n t i c king crossed the river Lycus to meet the R o m a n s in the plain, a n d a cavalry battle ensued in which the R o m a n s were put to flight. Lucullus decided to avoid the plains in f u t u r e as they were f a v o u r a b l e to his adversary with his numerically superior cavalry wing. H e retired into the hills a n d e n c a m p e d at a well-provided spot which was directly a b o v e the enemy c a m p . While he w a s there, he sent out some men to get supplies of grain. M i t h r i d a t e s , hearing of this, sent a large d e t a c h m e n t of his best cavalry to intercept the convoy, which it met as the c o n v o y was c o m i n g t h r o u g h a defile. T h e enemy cavalry were t o o impatient to hold off until the R o m a n s emerged into o p e n c o u n t r y . They a t t a c k e d immediately in a confined space, which rendered their horses quite useless. T h e R o m a n s lined u p in f o r m a t i o n a n d w o n a c o m p l e t e victory in which few of the enemy escaped to tell the tale. This a n d one or t w o similar incidents, n a r r a t e d by Plutarch, put such fear into M i t h r i d a t e s that he decided to d e c a m p a n d m o v e a w a y , leaving Lucullus free to c a p t u r e C a b i r a . Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r , 79-81; Plutarch, Lucullus, 15 and 17(1-2) G A R G A N U S M (72) - T h i r d Servile W a r By the end of 72 S p a r t a c u s , the leader of the slave revolt, h a d defeated f o u r R o m a n armies, a n d yet the w h e r e a b o u t s a n d details of these contests remain obscure. A t one n a m e d site, a R o m a n a r m y u n d e r the consul Gellius Publicola defeated S p a r t a c u s ' lieutenant, Crixus, a n d a force of 30,000 near M o u n t G a r g a n u s [Gargano] in Apulia. 217


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Crixus himself was killed together with two thirds of his men (Plutarch says the lot). But this gain was offset by a heavy defeat of the o t h e r consul by S p a r t a c u s himself at a place u n k n o w n . Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 117; Plularcli, Crassus, 9(7); Orosius, 5; 24(4) C A M A L A T R U M (71) - T h i r d Servile W a r T h e p r o p r a e t o r M . Licinius Crassus, w h o h a d been placed in c h a r g e of the war, e n c o u n t e r e d C a s t u s a n d C a n n i c u s , the leaders of the G a u l s in S p a r t a c u s ' a r m y , near a place called C a m a l a t r u m ( u n k n o w n ) . C r a s s u s sent 12 c o h o r t s r o u n d a m o u n t a i n with instructions to fall on the enemy in their rear as soon as the action began. T h e enemy were completely r o u t e d a n d fled. Frontinus, 2: 4, 7 C A N T E N N A M (71) - T h i r d Servile W a r W h e n S p a r t a c u s was e n c a m p e d near M o u n t C a n t e n n a (unidentified), Licinius C r a s s u s fortified t w o c a m p s in close proximity to the enemy. O n e night, he led all his forces out quietly, leaving his c a m p looking as if it was occupied. He divided his cavalry into two d e t a c h m e n t s a n d directed o n e half to engage S p a r t a c u s a n d to pin him d o w n . T h e o t h e r half was to m a k e a feint a t t a c k on the G e r m a n s a n d G a u l s a n d then to w i t h d r a w with the object of luring t h e m out into an a m b u s h . T h e exercise proceeded according to plan. T h e cavalry fell back to the base of the m o u n t a i n a n d then withdrew to the flanks, disclosing C r a s s u s with the infantry arrayed in battle order. Thirty-five t h o u s a n d of the enemy were slain, including their leaders C a s t u s a n d C a n n i cus. (The battle against these leaders which is described by P l u t a r c h seems to be a different one, p r o b a b l y earlier. T h e casualties were fewer a n d there is n o m e n t i o n of the d e a t h s of C a s t u s a n d Cannicus.) Frontinus, 2; 5, 34; Orosius, 5: 24(6); Crassus, 11(2-3); Livy, e p i t o m e 97

Plutarch,

P E T E L I A (71) - T h i r d Servile W a r S p a r t a c u s retired to the ' m o u n t a i n s of Petelia', the city itself being perched on t o p of a lofty hill. H e was followed there closely by t w o of C r a s s u s ' officers until S p a r t a c u s turned a n d a t t a c k e d his pursuers. T h e y were completely routed. As a result of this victory S p a r t a c u s ' slaves b e c a m e overc o n f i d e n t a n d refused to listen to reason. T h e y forced their officers to lead t h e m back t h r o u g h Lucania against the m a i n R o m a n force. Plutarch, Crassus, 11(4-5) 218

S I L A R U S R (71) - T h i r d Servile W a r C r a s s u s h a d asked that P o m p e y should be sent to assist him in the destruction of S p a r t a c u s . He now bitterly regretted his action a n d was determined to effect the kill himself before the arrival of Pompey, w h o would gain the credit. O r o s i u s alone of the extant sources provides a specific indication of what m a y have been the site of the final showd o w n . He states that S p a r t a c u s was laying out a c a m p at the head of the river Silarus [Sele], which is in Lucania near the C a m p a n i a n b o r d e r . It is unclear w h e t h e r the final battle actually occurred at this site. S o m e say that it m a y have taken place in Apulia. But it has been noted a b o v e that f r o m Petelia the slaves forced their officers to lead them back t h r o u g h Lucania against the R o m a n s , which suggests that the Silarus would be equally feasible. Wherever the e n c o u n t e r , C r a s s u s was completely victorious, killing 60,000 of the enemy a n d capturing a n o t h e r 6,000 f o r the loss of 1,000 R o m a n s . S p a r t a c u s himself was killed, his death m a r k i n g the end of the war, but his b o d y was never f o u n d . Orosius, 5; 24(5-8); Livy, e p i t o m e 97; Appian, Civil W a r s , 1; 120 C Y D O N I A (69) - Third M i t h r i d a t i c W a r D u r i n g the M i t h r i d a t i c W a r , the C r e t a n s supported M i t h r i d a t e s , to w h o m they gave considerable assistance against the R o m a n s . W h e n R o m e declared war on t h e m , they sent an embassy to treat f o r peace but were unwilling to accept the terms dictated to them. Q. Caecilius Metellus was sent against them a n d he defeated the C r e t a n leader Lasthenes at C y d o n i a [Kluinia], Lasthenes fled, a n d Metellus proceeded to s u b j u g a t e the whole island. Appian, Sicily, fragment 6 T I G R A N O C E R T A (69, O c t o b e r 6) - T h i r d Mithridatic War A f t e r his defeat at C a b i r a (72), M i t h r i d a t e s t o o k refuge with his k i n s m a n Tigranes in A r m e n i a . Lucullus d e m a n d e d that he be surrendered. W h e n this was refused, Lucullus m a r c h e d with two legions against Tigranes at T i g r a n o c e r t a [?Silvan], N o b o d y d a r e d to tell the king t h a t Lucullus was a p p r o a c h i n g because the first m a n to d o so was beheaded f o r his pains. W h e n Tigranes did learn the truth, he sent M i t h r o b a r z a n e s against Lucullus with 2.000 h o r s e m e n , while he himself went out a n d collected an a r m y which is said to have c o m prised between 150,000 a n d 250,000 f o o t a n d 50.000 horse. In the m e a n t i m e Lucullus had readily defeated M i t h r o b a r z a n e s at the first

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e n c o u n t e r a n d was n o w p r e p a r i n g to face Tigranes himself. M i t h r i d a t e s advised Tigranes not to c o m e to close q u a r t e r s with the R o m a n s but to s u r r o u n d Lucullus a n d to cut him off f r o m all supplies. But Tigranes scorned such ideas a n d a d v a n c e d to meet his enemy. Behind the king there was a hill of which Lucullus took good note. H e stationed his cavalry in f r o n t of the enemy with instructions to h a r a s s them a n d by w i t h d r a w i n g slowly to d r a w t h e m gradually f o r w a r d in pursuit. M e a n w h i l e , Lucullus led his infantry in a d e t o u r r o u n d to the hill, which he occupied unobserved by the enemy. As soon as he saw that they were widely scattered in pursuit of the R o m a n cavalry, Lucullus charged d o w n the hill o n t o the e n e m y ' s baggage train directly below. This caused c h a o s as the baggage personnel fled into the midst of the assembled h o r d e of soldiery, setting everybody in collision with each other. At the same time, the R o m a n cavalry, having lured their p u r s u e r s a f t e r t h e m , turned a n d hacked t h e m to pieces. Tigranes a n d M i t h r i d a t e s fled, a n d the city of T i g r a n o c e r t a fell to the R o m a n s . It is said that m o r e t h a n 100,000 of the enemy i n f a n t r y were slain a n d a l m o s t all of the cavalry. In c o n t r a s t , 100 R o m a n s were w o u n d e d while only five are reported as killed. Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 84-85; Plutarch, Lucullus, 25-28(6)

casualty figures are not recorded, but it is on record that M i t h r i d a t e s was a m o n g the first to m a k e a s h a m e f u l flight. Plutarch, Lucullus, 31(3-8)

A R S A N I A S R (68) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Following his defeat a n d the c a p t u r e of his royal city of T i g r a n o c e r t a (above), Tigranes retired to his capital city of A r t a x a t a [Artashat], A l m o s t a year later Lucullus set out against him. Tigranes led out his forces to meet the enemy a n d t o o k up a position on the b a n k s of the river A r s a n i a s [Murat], which Lucullus would have to cross on his m a r c h to A r t a x a t a . U n d e t e r r e d , the R o m a n crossed the river with his t r o o p s deployed on a b r o a d f r o n t to prevent any o u t f l a n k i n g m o v e m e n t . H e was c o n f r o n t e d at the outset by m o u n t e d archers a n d lancers w h o covered the m a i n b o d y of the enemy t r o o p s . A l t h o u g h Tigranes t h o u g h t highly of them, a brush with the R o m a n cavalry was all that was needed to send them flying in all directions. W h e n Tigranes t o o k their place at the head of his cavalry, m a t t e r s took on a different h u e f o r Lucullus w h o was t a k e n a b a c k by their n u m bers a n d s p l e n d o u r . He recalled his o w n cavalry f r o m the pursuit of the light t r o o p s a n d c o n f r o n t e d the enemy immediately in f r o n t of him, but they fled before he could even get close to them. T h a t ended the battle, leaving the R o m a n s engaged in a pursuit which lasted t h r o u g h o u t the night. T h e

Z E L A (67) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Early in the year M i t h r i d a t e s e n c a m p e d o p p o s i t e the legate Triarius near G a z i u r a in P o n t u s a n d tried to p r o v o k e him into a battle before Lucullus arrived on the scene. W h e n the R o m a n refused to accept the challenge, M i t h r i d a t e s s o u g h t to lure him o u t by sending a force to a t t a c k the t o w n of D a d a s a , which the R o m a n s used as a store. This had the desired effect. As Triarius was reluctantly a d v a n c i n g t o w a r d the place, M i t h r i d a t e s ' a r m y fell u p o n him a n d s u r r o u n d e d his force, killing most of his men. It is said t h a t over 7,000 R o m a n s fell, including 150 c e n t u r i o n s a n d 24 tribunes. T h e battle t o o k place near a high hill a few miles f r o m Zela [Zile], T h e site of the battle is q u o t e d in The Alexandrian War in c o n n e x i o n with the later a n d b e t t e r - k n o w n battle of Zela in 47. Dio Cassius, 36: 12; Plutarch, Lucullus, 35(1); Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 89; (Caesar), The A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , 72

C O M A N A (68, winter) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r A certain legate, M a r c u s F a b i u s , w h o c o m m a n d e d a force of u n t r u s t w o r t h y mercenaries, f o u n d himself besieged by M i t h r i d a t e s in C a b i r a [Niksar], A legate of Lucullus, Valerius Triarius, was passing that way to join Lucullus a n d heard of these events. H e collected as m a n y m e n as he could a n d m a r c h e d against M i t h r i d a t e s , w h o assumed that Triarius was a d v a n c i n g at the head of a full a r m y . T h e king withdrew w i t h o u t ever setting eyes on his o p p o n e n t . Triarius followed him as far as C o m a n a Pontica [ T o k a t ] where he f o u n d M i t h r i dates e n c a m p e d on the f a r side of a river. T h e king w a n t e d to engage immediately while the R o m a n s were fatigued, a n d so he crossed the river a f t e r instructing a p a r t of his force to cross by a n o t h e r bridge f u r t h e r along. T h e second bridge collapsed u n d e r the weight of the soldiery, r o b b i n g Mithridates of his o u t f l a n k i n g m a n o e u v r e . He himself put u p a stout fight for a considerable while but eventually he was forced to retreat a f t e r suffering a severe defeat. H e retired into winter q u a r t e r s . Dio Cassius, 36: 10

C O R A C E S I U M (67) - W a r against Pirates D u r i n g the M i t h r i d a t i c W a r piracy on the high seas began to flourish, e n c o u r a g e d by M i t h r i d a t e s himself. T h e r e was a rapid increase in the n u m b e r s 219


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of pirates a n d ships a n d in their m a r a u d i n g expeditions until eventually they controlled the whole of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . This state of affairs b r o u g h t severe s h o r t a g e s a n d starvation to R o m e . T o deal with the menace, P o m p e y was given a b s o l u t e c o m m a n d of the naval 'province' with a large n u m b e r of ships a n d men which he divided into 13 sections, each with its o w n area of o p e r a t i o n . His m e t h o d s were so successful that he ridded the seas of piracy within three m o n t h s . T h e pirates withdrew to their principal bases in Cilicia a n d awaited P o m p e y ' s a t t a c k . A c c o r d i n g to Plutarch, there was a battle off C o r a c e s i u m [Alanya] in which the pirates were defeated. T h e y were then besieged in their s t r o n g h o l d s a n d eventually surrendered, m o r e than 20,000 of them in n u m b e r . A p p i a n , however, says that there was not even a battle; the pirates merely capitulated in the hope of lenient t r e a t m e n t . P o m p e y did not put them to death. He decided sagely to disperse t h e m inland, using them to colonize u n d e r - m a n n e d areas. Plutarch, P o m p e y , 28; Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 96 N I C O P O L I S (66) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r A f t e r P o m p e y ' s final defeat of the pirates off C o r a c e s i u m (above) , he was a p p o i n t e d c o m m a n der of the M i t h r i d a t i c W a r with absolute p o w e r s a n d c o n t r o l over all R o m a n forces outside Italy. In fact, his predecessor Lucullus h a d d o n e all the w o r k . Little was left a p a r t f r o m a final defeat of M i t h r i d a t e s , w h o was on the r u n with a m u c h reduced a r m y of 30,000 men. P o m p e y immediately moved n o r t h w a r d s f r o m Cilicia a n d c a u g h t up with M i t h r i d a t e s ' n e a r the E u p h r a t e s ' . A m a j o r battle took place, the site of which would be u n k n o w n if P o m p e y h a d not subsequently f o u n ded the city of Nicopolis [Divrigi] near the site as a m e m o r i a l . T h e r e are three versions of the battle. Plutarch m a i n t a i n s that P o m p e y ' s fear of letting his enemy escape d u r i n g d a r k n e s s p r o m p t e d him to m a k e a night attack on their c a m p . T h e enemy were c a u g h t off g u a r d a n d fled in panic at the tricks played by the m o o n l i g h t s h a d o w s . M o r e t h a n 10,000 of t h e m were cut d o w n , but M i t h r i dates m a n a g e d to escape. Dio Cassius, also, describes a night a t t a c k , but in his account P o m pey eluded M i t h r i d a t e s in the d a y t i m e a n d created an a m b u s h in a defile a h e a d of the enemy. W h e n M i t h r i d a t e s ' a r m y m a r c h e d in c o l u m n t h r o u g h the defile at night, the R o m a n s created an ear-splitting din. hurled rocks a n d javelins d o w n o n t o them a n d then c h a r g e d , killing m a n y . A p p i a n ' s battle was a d a y t i m e affair. It would be difficult to imagine t h a t 220

this was the same battle were it not that A p p i a n is o n e of the two sources to m e n t i o n Nicopolis. Whichever a c c o u n t is nearest the truth, all are agreed that M i t h r i d a t e s suffered a crushing defeat, f r o m which he m a n a g e d to m a k e a characteristic getaway. He headed f o r Colchis. Plutarch, P o m p e y , 32(3-7); Dio Cassius, 36: 4849; Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 99-100, and Syrian W a r s , 57 C Y R U S R (66) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Leaving A r m e n i a , P o m p e y went in pursuit of M i t h r i d a t e s t o w a r d s Colchis. This t o o k him t h r o u g h the territories of the A l b a n i a n s a n d the Iberians in the region of the C a u c a s u s . T h e A l b a n i a n s g r a n t e d him a free passage b u t . while he was in their territory, he was o v e r t a k e n by winter. T h e A l b a n i a n s then mustered 40,000 men a n d crossed the C y r u s [Ki'ir] river (also variously called the C y r n u s or C y r t u s ) against him. P o m p e y allowed them to cross a n d then attacked t h e m , r o u t i n g t h e m a n d killing m a n y . A p p i a n states that P o m p e y drove the b a r b a r i a n s into a w o o d a n d set fire to it, causing them to emerge a n d surrender. Their king Oroeses begged f o r mercy a n d P o m p e y m a d e peace with him. T h e n he m a r c h e d against the Iberians, w h o were a n x i o u s to keep in f a v o u r with Mithridates. P o m p e y r o u t e d these people also, at some u n k n o w n place. A f t e r this, he p r o ceeded to Colchis where, to j u d g e by A p p i a n ' s description, he indulged in w h a t seems like a sightseeing spree. Plutarch, P o m p e y , 34; Appian, 103; Dio Cassius, 36: 54(5)

Mithridatic Wars,

A B A S R (65) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r A t Colchis. P o m p e y heard that the A l b a n i a n s were up in a r m s again. Retracing his steps, he crossed the river C y r u s [Ku'r] a n d then, a f t e r a long m a r c h , the river C a m b y s e s [Iori], Proceeding f u r t h e r , he h a d reached the river A b a s [Alazani] a n d had crossed it, w i t h o u t any interference, when he heard that Oroeses was c o m i n g u p against him. P o m p e y was a n x i o u s to conceal the size of his a r m y f r o m the enemy for fear that it might give him second t h o u g h t s a n d cause him to w i t h d r a w . Accordingly, he positioned his cavalry in f r o n t a n d instructed the i n f a n t r y to kneel motionlessly behind t h e m u n d e r their shields. Oroeses was deceived a n d sent his cavalry into battle c o n t e m p t u o u s l y . W h e n P o m p e y ' s cavalry turned in simulated flight, the i n f a n t r y rose u p a n d allowed their cavalry to pass t h r o u g h their r a n k s but s u r r o u n d e d the enemy w h o were p u r s u i n g them. T h e R o m a n cavalry then

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wheeled r o u n d a n d a t t a c k e d the enemy flanks with d e v a s t a t i n g result. A f t e r w a r d s P o m p e y g r a n t e d a renewal of peace to the A l b a n i a n s . P l u t a r c h ' s a c c o u n t is sketchy a n d gives n o n e of the tactical details of D i o ' s readable version; n o r does he give any result save that P o m p e y killed the enemy leader, a b r o t h e r of Oroeses a n d not the king himself. Dio Cassius, 37: 3(6)-4; Plutarch, P o m p e y , 35 P I S T O R I A (62) - Catiline C o n s p i r a c y Lucius Sergius Catilina s o u g h t election to the consulship in 63 a n d 62 a n d was t h w a r t e d on b o t h occasions by Cicero. His f r u s t r a t e d a m b i t i o n s caused him to initiate a conspiracy aimed at causing riots, incendiarism a n d o t h e r d i s t u r b a n c e s in R o m e while he m a r c h e d on the City with an a r m y f r o m E t r u r i a . T h e plot was discovered a n d Catiline's fellow-conspirators were arrested a n d executed. His a r m y , which had been built u p to two full legions, dwindled t h r o u g h desertions to a few t h o u s a n d men, only a b o u t a q u a r t e r of w h o m were properly a r m e d . W i t h this b a n d he headed n o r t h w a r d s intending to slip t h r o u g h into G a u l . T h e senate sent the consul G a i u s A n t o n i u s a f t e r him, a n d Catiline f o u n d himself t r a p p e d near Pistoria [Pistoia] between A n t o n i u s a n d the a r m y of Metellus Celer. Metellus, w h o h a d been in Picenum with three legions, h a d m o v e d to block Catiline's advance. Catiline decided that his only course was to risk a battle. H e elected to fight A n t o n i u s , even t h o u g h the latter's a r m y was the larger of the two, p r o b a b l y because A n t o n i u s h a d played a part in the conspiracy a n d might hold his punches. This general, however, was either ill or p r e t e n d i n g to be so, a n d his a r m y was entrusted to M a r c u s Petreius. T h e battle took place on a plain at the foot of the m o u n t a i n s . Here Catiline posted eight c o h o r t s consisting of all his picked men in the f r o n t line. T h e rest he placed in reserve. Petreius likewise placed his c o h o r t s of veterans in his f r o n t line. W h e n the signal was given, the two sides closed so rapidly that spears were discarded a n d o p p o n e n t s resorted to h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting. In spite of their great inferiority in n u m b e r s , Catiline's m e n resisted with the u t m o s t bravery a n d vigour, yielding not an inch. Petreius then led his picked b o d y g u a r d against the enemy centre, which was t h r o w n into c o n f u s i o n , a n d he followed this up with a t t a c k s on b o t h flanks. W h e n Catiline saw that resistance was at an end, he plunged h e a d l o n g into the enemy mass, fighting to the bitter end. Only then could it be seen that practically every m a n in the c o n s p i r a t o r ' s force lay dead at his post

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- 3,000 of them. T h e g o v e r n m e n t forces did not get off lightly either. All their best fighters were either killed or badly m a i m e d . Sallust, W a r with Catiline, 57-61; Cassius Dio, 37: 39-40; Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 7 S O L O N I U M (61) - Gallic Uprising A n uprising a m o n g the Allobroges, w h o inhabited the n o r t h - e a s t e r n corner of the R o m a n Province, was responsible f o r the d e v a s t a t i o n of m u c h of Gallia N a r b o n e n s i s . T h e legates Lucius M a r i u s a n d Servius G a l b a crossed the R h o n e a n d a t t a c k e d a place called Solonium or Solo (now u n k n o w n ) , where they defeated the enemy a n d set fire to p a r t s of the town. T h e y were prevented f r o m c a p t u r i n g it by the arrival of C a t u g n a t u s , the chief of the Allobroges. T h e j o b was completed by P o m p t i n u s , the g o v e r n o r , w h o then proceeded to s u b j u g a t e the o t h e r districts. Dio Cassius, 37: 48; Livy, e p i t o m e 103

A D M A G E T O B R I G A (61) - Germanic Incursion A r o u n d the year 71, Ariovistus, king of the G e r m a n i c Suebi, was invited by the Gallic Sequani to help them in their feud against the Aedui. T h e G e r m a n i c 'visitors' developed such a liking for G a u l that m o r e a n d m o r e of them arrived. N o t content with defeating the Aedui, they started occupying the land of their 'hosts', the Sequani. T h e G a u l s united in an a t t e m p t to t h r o w the G e r m a n s out but they were defeated at A d m a g e tobriga, a f t e r which they appealed to Julius C a e s a r f o r help. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 1: 31(12)

ARAR R (58) - Gallic War T h e Helvetii, w h o n u m b e r e d a r o u n d 300,000 in all, were c r a m p e d for space in their small m o u n t a i n locked c o u n t r y a n d decided to migrate en masse. T h e plan h a d been instigated by their leader Orgetorix, but he died b e f o r e it could be put into practice. U n d a u n t e d , the Helvetii resolved to proceed all the same. They b u r n t their h o m e s a n d moved w e s t w a r d s t h r o u g h the territories of the Sequani a n d the Aedui, h e a d i n g f o r the R o m a n Province. C a e s a r decided that they would not be the most desirable neighbours. He did not forget that o n e of their tribes, the Tigurini, h a d humiliated a R o m a n a r m y 50 years previously by sending it u n d e r the yoke. H e immediately collected five legions a n d crossed the Alps into G a u l , where he came u p o n the b a r b a r i a n s as they were crossing the river A r a r [Saone]. T h r e e q u a r t e r s of 221


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them had already crossed, but Caesar took three legions and attacked the rest, destroying most of them. It was gratifying to Caesar that the g r o u p which he had slaughtered comprised the Tigurini, the tribe which had so humiliated R o m e in the past. Caesar, Gallic War, 1: 12; Plutarch, Caesar, 18(12); Dio Cassius, 38: 32(4)

B I B R A C T E (58) - Gallic War After the battle on the A r a r (above) Caesar crossed the river and doggedly followed the Helvetii for a b o u t a fortnight, resisting any contest with them. As the R o m a n s were running short of provisions, Caesar decided to turn off toward Bibracte [Mont Beuvray], the largest town of the Aedui, and to stock up there. The Helvetii heard of this and turned to follow him. Caesar withdrew to a nearby hill and stationed his f o u r veteran legions in three lines halfway up the hill. The two raw legions of recent recruits he placed on top of the hill with the auxiliaries. When the enemy arrived they formed themselves into a compact body and started to march up the hill. They were met by a shower of pila f r o m the legionaries, who then charged down with d r a w n swords. The enemy were falling back to a hill a b o u t a mile away, when 15,000 tribesmen f r o m the rear of the enemy's column marched up and attacked the R o m a n right flank. This put heart into those who were withdrawing and they turned and resumed the attack. The battle was a long and hard one, fought on two f r o n t s f r o m midday till evening. The fighting was particularly fierce a r o u n d the waggons, which the enemy had converted into a laager. Here the battle continued well into the night. Caesar records that not a single man of the opposing force was seen in llight. Eventually, however, they were forced to yield, and a b o u t 130,000 of them marched off through the night. Subsequently, short of supplies, they sent envoys to Caesar offering surrender and were told to return to their own country and to resettle themselves there. Caesar's motive behind this h u m a n e decision was the fear that if that country was left u n p o p u l a t e d , the G e r m a n i c tribes might cross the Rhine and a p p r o p r i a t e it. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 1: 23-26; Plutarch, Caesar, 18(2-4); Dio Cassius, 38: 33 PLAIN OF ALSACE (58) - Gallic W a r Ariovistus, the leader of the Suebi f r o m north of the Rhine, was a cruel and arrogant tyrant. Having invaded G a u l and conquered the neighbouring tribes at A d m a g e t o b r i g a (61), he appropriated 222

their land and generally enslaved them. M o r e G e r m a n s poured across the Rhine every day, ravaging the Gallic territories, until it seemed that there would be no end to the influx. The Aedui appealed to Caesar, whose remonstrations with Ariovistus elicited only an insolent rebuttal. The situation was also of concern to Caesar himself because of the m o u n t i n g threat to the R o m a n Province. Accordingly, Caesar advanced at top speed against Ariovistus. On hearing that the latter was hurrying to occupy the valuable city of Vesontio [Besanfon], Caesar pushed ahead by forced marches and occupied the place. F r o m there he marched for six days until he was within 23 miles of his quarry. In a large plain - the plain of Alsace - there was a m o u n d where the two leaders held a conference. Caesar repeated his previous d e m a n d s and received the usual arrogant replies. On the following day Ariovistus moved closer to the R o m a n s and camped at the foot of the m o u n t a i n s in a position which would allow him to cut off the R o m a n s ' supplies. But day after day he refused Caesar's challenge to fight. Caesar ascertained the reason for this f r o m prisoners: Ariovistus had been told by his diviners that he was not destined to win before the new m o o n . The next day Caesar forced the issue on his adversary by drawing up his five legions in three columns and advancing right up to the enemy camp, compelling them to come out and line up. The engagement was started by Caesar who, noticing that the enemy left looked the weaker wing, led his right wing against it. The enemy responded immediately with such a rapid dash that the R o m a n s discarded their spears in f a v o u r of swords. The enemy adopted their usual phalanx formation, which helped them to ward off the attack until the R o m a n s threw themselves o n t o the shields, wrenched them out of the enemy h a n d s and stabbed the unprotected owners. These tactics c o n f o u n d e d the enemy and put his left wing to flight. On the opposite flank, the enemy right was pressing hard on the R o m a n s by sheer weight of numbers. Publius Crassus, in charge of the cavalry, noticed this and sent the third line forward to relieve the harassed wing. This caused the p e n d u l u m to swing the other way, and before long the whole enemy horde was in flight and heading for the Rhine a few miles away. Ariovistus himself managed to find a boat and escape across the river, but most of his forces were hunted down and slain by the R o m a n cavalry. Plutarch quotes a figure of 80.000 dead. The battle took place in the plain of Alsace at the foot of the Vosges and, according to Caesar,

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a b o u t five miles f r o m the Rhine, but the exact site is not k n o w n . T h e vicinity of Cernay is t h o u g h t to be likely if C a e s a r ' s 'five miles' is assumed to be a corruption. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 1: 51-53

AXONA R (57) - Gallic War In the winter of 58/57 r u m o u r s reached Caesar, w h o was in Italy, that the tribes of the Belgae were conspiring against the R o m a n s a n d were mobilizing their forces. C a e s a r raised two new legions a n d set off immediately for the Belgic frontier. W h e n he learnt that the various tribes h a d already joined forces a n d were a d v a n c i n g , he crossed the A x o n a [Aisne], 8 miles f r o m Bibrax [Bievres], and e n c a m p e d with the river protecting his rear. H e did not have long to wait f o r the enemy, w h o e n c a m p e d barely 2 miles a w a y . Both sides m a r c h e d out of their c a m p s a n d deployed for action, but between t h e m there was a m a r s h . E a c h side waited in the h o p e that the o t h e r would be p r e p a r e d to a d v a n c e over u n f a v o u r a b l e terrain, but neither side moved a n d a pitched battle never materialized. Instead, some of the Belgae m a r c h e d straight t o the river a n d began to cross it at a f o r d . W h e n C a e s a r h e a r d a b o u t this, he crossed the river by a bridge which was g u a r d e d by his men, t a k i n g all his cavalry a n d the light-armed t r o o p s . With this force he a t t a c k e d the Belgae as they a t t e m p t e d the crossing a n d killed m a n y of them. O t h e r s w h o a t t e m p t e d to cross over on the corpses of their m a t e s suffered a similar fate. T h e Belgae then decided to return to their h o m e s a n d to await f u t u r e developments. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 2: 5-10

SAB1S R (57)-Gallic War A f t e r expelling a n u m b e r of Belgic tribes a n d receiving the surrender of several others as a result of the e n c o u n t e r at the A x o n a (above), C a e s a r m a r c h e d against the Nervii, the most warlike of the Belgae. T h e y had been joined by t w o neighb o u r i n g tribes, the A t r e b a t e s a n d the V i r o m a n d u i , a n d the whole h o r d e h a d massed together on the n o r t h side of the river Sabis [Sambre], awaiting C a e s a r ' s arrival. T h e R o m a n s chose for their c a m p a hill on the south side of the river, which sloped gently d o w n to the river b a n k . Across the river there was a n o t h e r hill with a densely w o o d e d s u m m i t . Here the main b o d y of the enemy lay concealed, while some cavalry on the low g r o u n d acted as a decoy. While the six R o m a n legions were engaged in fetching materials a n d building their c a m p , the enemy suddenly d e b o u c h e d f r o m

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the w o o d o p p o s i t e a n d raced d o w n the hill, crossed the river a n d started climbing the R o m a n s ' hill with a surprising speed a n d agility. T h e R o m a n s were c a u g h t completely off g u a r d . T h e r e was n o time to d o n full a r m o u r or to find o n e ' s o w n legion. T h e men just fell in u n d e r the nearest s t a n d a r d . T h e ensuing battle was n o set piece. C o o r d i n a t e d c o m m a n d was impossible as the legions faced in different directions a n d f o u g h t separate fights as a n d where the threat presented itself. T h e only bright spot f o r the R o m a n s was on their left, where Titus L a b i e n u s a n d the f a m o u s T e n t h legion forced back their o p p o n e n t s a n d d r o v e t h e m d o w n to the river. A f t e r slaughtering t h e m , the R o m a n s charged up the e n e m y ' s hill a n d c a p t u r e d their c a m p . W h e n they looked back a n d saw that Caesar a n d the rest were in dire straits, the T e n t h legion rushed back again over the river to their assistance. This completely changed the whole face of the battle. R o m a n s w h o h a d given u p h o p e were reinvigorated. while the cavalry which had fled returned to the fight. W h a t promised to be a cata s t r o p h i c disaster turned into a r e s o u n d i n g victory. C a e s a r himself writes that the Nervii were a l m o s t annihilated a n d their n a m e was virtually blotted o u t . T h e enemy reported that of their survivors only 500 were fit to bear a r m s out of a force of 60,000. C a e s a r told them to keep their territories a n d ordered their n e i g h b o u r s to leave t h e m in peace. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 2: 16-28; 20(4-5)

Plutarch,

Caesar,

OCTODURUS (57) - Gallic War C a e s a r w a n t e d to o p e n a safe t r a d i n g route t h r o u g h the Alps. T o this end he sent Servius G a l b a with o n e legion a n d some cavalry up into the region of Haute Savoie. A f t e r a few m i n o r e n c o u n t e r s he m a d e peace with the tribes a n d decided to winter in the village of O c t o d u r u s [near Martigny]. S o m e days later the R o m a n s w o k e up o n e m o r n i n g to find t h a t the s u r r o u n d i n g heights were densely occupied by an i m m e n s e s w a r m i n g h o r d e of the Seduni a n d Veragri, w h o had also blocked all the roads. T h e R o m a n force was small e n o u g h at the best of times but, in a d d i t i o n , t w o c o h o r t s were absent on a search f o r supplies. F r o m their c o m m a n d i n g position the enemy charged d o w n the slopes a n d hurled missiles at the e n c a m p m e n t . T h e R o m a n s r e s p o n d e d well at first but they lacked any reserves to back them u p a n d take over, in c o n t r a s t to the a t t a c k e r s with their a l m o s t unlimited m a n p o w e r . A f t e r m o r e t h a n six h o u r s of fighting the R o m a n s were in a desperate 223


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state, exhausted and almost out of a m m u n i t i o n . The enemy had broken through the palisade and were filling u p the ditches. G a l b a , p r o m p t e d by his chief centurion, decided that their only feasible course was a sudden sortie. After a period of passive resistance to give themselves a rest, they suddenly charged out of the c a m p and surrounded the enemy. Of the 30,000 or more tribesmen who had been active in the attack, over a third were killed. The rest fled in panic. The next day, G a l b a led his men back to safe territory without further incident. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 3: 1-6 J E R U S A L E M (57) - Jewish Revolt On the death of Salome Alexandra, the widow of King Alexander (of Judaea), the succession was fought for by her two sons, Aristobulus II and H y r c a n u s II. At this point the R o m a n s arrived on the scene, and P o m p e y the G r e a t attempted to mediate. He ended up by making a prisoner of Aristobulus and sending him to Rome; H y r c a n u s was m a d e High Priest. P o m p e y then captured Jerusalem. In 57, Alexander, the son of Aristobulus, m a d e his bid for the throne. He assembled a force of 10,000 infantry and 1,500 horsemen, which b r o u g h t the R o m a n s against him. Aulus Gabinius, the c o m m a n d e r in Syria, sent his cavalry c o m m a n d e r . M a r c u s A n t o n i u s (better k n o w n as M a r k Antony), in advance while he himself followed with his legion. Alexander fell back on Jerusalem, where the adversaries met in a pitched battle near the city. Three thousand of Alexander's men were killed and a similar n u m b e r were taken prisoner. Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 14: 5, 2 (82-85) Jewish Wars, 1: 8, 2-3 (160-165)

and

MORBIHAN GULF (56) - Gallic W a r Caesar was satisfied that he had pacified G a u l for the time being. Leaving his t r o o p s in their winter quarters, he was in Illyria when war b r o k e out again, this time on the Atlantic seaboard. Publius Crassus, who was encamped in those regions, had sent tribunes to the neighbouring tribes to seek provisions. T h e Veneti, a powerful maritime tribe in the Brittany area, detained the tribunes sent to them and persuaded their neighbours to do likewise. When Caesar was informed, he instructed his officers to build warships on the river Liger [Loire] pending his return. Bad behaviour must be punished as an example to others. The strongholds of the Veneti were difficult to attack. They were built on headlands in the tidal 224

estuaries and could only be a p p r o a c h e d by land at low tide and by sea at high tide and in fair weather. When the R o m a n s did succeed in m a k ing life difficult, the occupants merely decamped to other strongholds. Because of these natural features, the boats of the Veneti were of unusual design. They were exceedingly strong, m a d e of oak, with flatfish b o t t o m s for negotiating shallow waters and with high sides as a protection against high seas. Against them, the R o m a n vessels had but two advantages - speed and oars. When the R o m a n fleet assembled off the Liger estuary under the c o m m a n d of Decimus Brutus and headed for the enemy, 220 enemy ships sailed out against him. But Brutus was c o n f r o n t e d not only by an enemy fleet; there were tactical problems to face as well. R a m m i n g would do no serious d a m a g e to the oaken enemy, and the disparity in height of the ships favoured the enemy's missiles. T h e R o m a n s , however, had given some thought to these matters and had equipped themselves with long poles, each fitted with a h o o k at the end. Armed with these, they contrived to ensnare the halyards of the enemy ships and bring down their sails. As these ships were dependent on sail and could not be rowed, they found themselves immobilized and were ripe for b o a r d i n g by the crews of two or three R o m a n ships attacking simultaneously. A f t e r losing a n u m b e r of vessels in this way the Veneti turned to escape, but a providential calm brought a complete victory to the R o m a n s . T h e enemy lay like sitting ducks ready to be plucked. Very few of them m a d e it back to land after a battle which had lasted all day. The survivors surrendered and received harsh treatment f r o m Caesar. It is generally accepted that the battle probably took place in the Gulf of Morbihan, on which the Veneti had established their capital, Dariorigum [Vannes], The Liger [Loire] estuary with its similar geographical features has been suggested as a possible alternative. This was not in the territory of the Veneti, but the N a m n e t e s who occupied the territory between Morbihan and the Liger were probably in league with them. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 3: 7-16

S O T I U M (56) - Gallic War Before the battle off Morbihan (above), Publius Crassus was sent by Caesar to Aquitania with 12 cohorts and a strong cavalry force to prevent any reinforcements reaching the Veneti f r o m that quarter. W h e n he arrived in the territory of the Sotiates, these people assembled a force and

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a t t a c k e d his c o l u m n on the m a r c h with their cavalry. W h e n this was repulsed, their f o o t soldiers w h o were concealed in a valley s p r a n g up a n d fell on the R o m a n s while they were in a disordered state. A f t e r a fierce struggle the Sotiates were routed a n d fled to their t o w n of Sotium [SYm], which C r a s s u s proceeded to besiege until the i n h a b i t a n t s capitulated. A m o d e r n a u t h o r i t y * states that the battle t o o k place near the source of the river Ciron, a t r i b u t a r y of the G a r o n n e . N o evidence is q u o t e d , but the Ciron does arise not f a r f r o m Sos. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 3: 20-21; Dio Cassius, 39; 46(1-2); Orosius, 6: 8(19-20) and translation by * R.J. Deferrari, Catholic University of America Press, Washington DC, note 25 (p. 246) T A B O R M (55) - Jewish Revolt Alexander, son of Aristobulus, having been defeated in his first revolt against the R o m a n s (Jerusalem, 57), struck again. This time he collected an a r m y of 30,000 Jews with which he e n c o u n t e r e d his f o r m e r a n t a g o n i s t G a b i n i u s . A battle t o o k place at M o u n t T a b o r , in which A l e x a n d e r was again defeated a n d lost 10,000 of his men. Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 14; 6, 3 (101-102) and Jewish W a r s , 1; 8, 7 (177) C A R R H A E (53, J u n e 9) - P a r t h i a n W a r M . Licinius C r a s s u s Dives was an a m b i t i o u s m a n w h o , in spite of his a d v a n c i n g years, was loath to play second fiddle to P o m p e y a n d C a e s a r in achievement a n d r e p u t a t i o n . H e o b t a i n e d the province of Syria a n d set himself to beat the Parthians. It was his private war, uninstigated by the senate. H e crossed the E u p h r a t e s with seven legions, 4,000 cavalry a n d some light-armed t r o o p s , a n d with little knowledge of the c o u n t r y or of the P a r t h i a n a r m y a n d its m e t h o d s . He s t u b b o r n l y refused to take advice f r o m his quaestor Cassius to m a i n t a i n the protection a f f o r d e d by the river. Lured on by a treacherous, wily A r a b chieftain, he allowed himself to be led into the plains, which deteriorated into a waterless sandy desert devoid of any sign of life. In this way he m a r c h e d on until his scouts reported the a p p r o a c h of a considerable P a r t h i a n force. Crassus hastily f o r m e d his men into an open square, with the cavalry distributed equally on the f o u r sides, a n d m a r c h e d to meet the enemy. They did not a p p e a r to be nearly as n u m e r o u s as the scouts h a d implied, but this was because Surenas, the

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greatest of the P a r t h i a n generals, h a d hidden the bulk of his force behind the f r o n t lines a n d had told them to cover themselves with skins to prevent any tell-tale glitter f r o m the a r m o u r . W h e n they a d v a n c e d , they created a terrifying noise of d r u m - b e a t s , a f t e r which the hidden t r o o p s d r o p ped their c a m o u f l a g e a n d revealed themselves as a magnificent glittering host c o m p o s e d entirely of cavalry. A f t e r that it was a m a t t e r of s u p e r b a n d deadly archery f r o m horseback against foot soldiers w h o were inadequately a r m o u r e d against the slender, s h a r p a n d very fast a r r o w s of the enemy. A charge by the R o m a n light-armed t r o o p s achieved n o t h i n g but suicide. W i t h n o b o d y to stop them, the P a r t h i a n cavalry s u r r o u n d e d the s q u a r e a n d p o u r e d a c o n t i n u a l s h o w e r of a r r o w s into a target in which they could not fail to find a m a r k . T h e R o m a n s e n d u r e d it in the h o p e that the enemy w o u l d run short of a r r o w s , but they lost h o p e when they realized that there was a camel train loaded with fresh supplies. C r a s s u s asked his son Publius to try to effect a breakt h r o u g h . T h e enemy w h o m Publius a t t a c k e d turned a n d a p p e a r e d to flee, luring him a w a y f r o m the m a i n force, only to turn a n d to s u r r o u n d him. T h e P a r t h i a n s then stationed a b o d y of a r m o u r e d cavalry with long spears in f r o n t of the R o m a n s a n d subjected them to the same treatment with long-range archery as the s q u a r e h a d received. T h e y were literally shot t h r o u g h . In a last gesture Publius charged the h e a v y - a r m e d P a r t h i a n cavalry with his Gallic horse, but they h a d no c h a n c e - they carried only short light spears which were n o m a t c h f o r the long pikes of the enemy. T h e force was annihilated a p a r t f r o m 500 w h o were c a p t u r e d a n d w h o killed themselves with their swords. Publius C r a s s u s was u n a b l e to despatch himself on a c c o u n t of a w o u n d e d a r m . He asked his shield bearer to d o the j o b for him. T h e P a r t h i a n s carried his head on a spike back to the main b o d y , v a u n t i n g it a n d t a u n t i n g his father, whose spirit was finally b r o k e n . T h e fighting, such as it was, carried on until dusk when the P a r t h i a n s retired f o r the night. C r a s s u s a n d the few a m b u l a n t survivors set out a n d were picked up by the garrison f r o m C a r r h a e [Harran], Following f u r t h e r treachery a n d deception, Crassus was killed. T h e 4,000 w o u n d e d w h o had been left behind mostly died f r o m their w o u n d s o r f r o m exhaustion or by suicide, according to Dio. Plutarch says t h a t the P a r t h i a n s returned a n d slaughtered them all a n d picked off any stragglers or isolated g r o u p s that they could find. Plutarch, Crassus, 23ff.; Dio Cassius, 40: 20(3)ff.

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NOVIODUNUM BITURIGUM (52)-Gallic War In the later stages of the Gallic war a y o u n g Avernian called Vercingetorix emerged as a Gallic c h a m p i o n a n d w o r t h y adversary f o r Caesar. Their first spar took place when C a e s a r was besieging N o v i o d u n u m in the territory of the Bituriges [?Neuvy-sur-Barangeon], T h e garrison had sent envoys asking f o r peace, but at this point the cavalry v a n g u a r d of Vercingetorix was seen a p p r o a c h i n g in the distance. T h e t o w n s m e n changed their m i n d s a b o u t peace a n d m a n n e d their wall. C a e s a r sent his Gallic cavalry to engage the a d v a n c i n g horse, but as his men were faring rather badly he sent out his 400 G e r m a n horsemen to reinforce them. Their charge caused heavy losses a n d sent the enemy flying back to their a r m y , causing the d e f e n d a n t s of the t o w n to c h a n g e their m i n d s again. A l t h o u g h this was n o m o r e than a cavalry skirmish, it was sufficient to stop the a d v a n c e of Vercingetorix. As a result of this a n d o t h e r reverses he decided that he would have to c h a n g e his plan of c a m p a i g n . Caesar, Gallic W a r , 7: 12-13

surreptitiously f r o m the m a i n c a m p t o the small one via the connecting trench. F r o m there they were sent to climb the hill on which the town s t o o d , a distance of a b o u t o n e mile u p to the r a m p a r t s . T h e lower part of the hill was undefended; the u p p e r half was covered with the enem y ' s camps, which were protected by a high stone wall coursing a r o u n d the hillside. T h e R o m a n s climbed over the wall a n d c a p t u r e d three of the c a m p s , a gesture sufficient f o r C a e s a r ' s p u r p o s e a n d e n o u g h to prevent a n y suggestion of a cowardly retreat. U n h a p p i l y , the legions - a p a r t f r o m the T e n t h - got carried a w a y a n d c o n t i n u e d the ascent up to the r a m p a r t s . W h e n the G a u l s hurried to the scene f r o m the o t h e r side of the town, there was fierce h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting in which the R o m a n s , w h o were already exhausted, were also greatly o u t n u m b e r e d . T h e y were driven d o w n a n d p u r s u e d , but the pursuit was checked by the T e n t h legion which was lined up at the b o t t o m against such an eventuality. Nevertheless, the over-zealous legions lost nearly 700 men including 46 centurions. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 7:

41-51

GERGOVIA (52) - Gallic War

LUTETIA PARISIORUM (52) - Gallic War

C a e s a r successfully besieged A v a r i c u m [Bourges] a n o t h e r setback for Vercingetorix. He then divided his a r m y into two parts. F o u r legions u n d e r the c o m m a n d of L a b i e n u s were to m o v e n o r t h w a r d s while C a e s a r a n d the o t h e r six legions proceeded to G e r g o v i a [G ergo vie]. Situated on the s u m m i t of a steep high m o u n t , this town was difficult to a t t a c k . O p p o s i t e the t o w n a n o t h e r steep hill, which rose u p f r o m the base of the m o u n t , was garrisoned by the enemy. At dead of night C a e s a r dislodged this garrison a n d built a small c a m p on the s u m m i t . He connected this by a trench with his m a i n c a m p f u r t h e r back. While he was at G e r g o v i a it was heard that R o m e ' s most loyal allies, the Aedui, were stirred into revolt a n d there was fear that this would spread into a m a j o r uprising. C a e s a r was a n x i o u s to disengage himself f r o m G e r g o v i a w i t h o u t losing face in o r d e r to deal with the situation elsewhere. Within the e n e m y ' s lines there was a w o o d e d ridge which gave access to the f a r side of the town. T h e enemy were a n x i o u s a b o u t its security a n d h a d been fortifying it. C a e s a r sent some men in t h a t direction with instructions to m a k e themselves c o n s p i c u o u s a n d to m o v e a r o u n d the whole area with an air of p u r p o s e f u l intent. This b r o u g h t all the G a u l s to the t h r e a t e n e d area to c o m p l e t e the fortifications. In the m e a n t i m e , C a e s a r h a d moved his legions

C a e s a r divided his a r m y a n d put Labienus in charge of f o u r legions with instructions to proceed against the Senones a n d Parisii. L a b i e n u s set out for Lutetia [Paris], a town which was built on an island in the middle of the S e q u a n a [Seine]. W h e n he was close to it, the n e i g h b o u r i n g tribes assembled against him in large n u m b e r s u n d e r the leadership of C a m u l o g e n u s a n d contrived to stop him a d v a n c i n g . He retraced his steps for a b o u t 30 miles u p s t r e a m to M e t l o d u n u m [Melun], where he crossed the river to the right b a n k a n d again a d v a n c e d d o w n s t r e a m to c a m p near Lutetia. T h e tribes e n c a m p e d on the left b a n k opposite him. Meanwhile, news of a Gallic uprising to the south forced L a b i e n u s to c h a n g e his plans. His overriding aim was to get a w a y safely back to his base at A g e d i n c u m [Sens]. H e ordered his main b o d y of three legions to m o v e silently d o w n s t r e a m at night a n d to cross the river, while five c o h o r t s were to m o v e u p s t r e a m a n d m a k e as m u c h c o m m o t i o n a b o u t it as they could. T h e remaining five c o h o r t s were to g u a r d the c a m p . T h e G a u l s were c o n f u s e d by the news c o m i n g in f r o m all sides. They, too, divided their force into three divisions, but Labienus a n d the legions were already across the river before they e n c o u n t e r e d C a m u l o g e n u s with the larger part of the enemy. At the signal to attack the Seventh legion on the R o m a n right put their

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o p p o n e n t s to flight. O n the left, the T w e l f t h legion was having a m u c h t o u g h e r fight against C a m u logenus himself, in which the G a u l s showed no sign of breaking. T h e issue was in the balance until the Seventh legion, having cleared the field in f r o n t of it, turned a n d t o o k the G a u l s on the o t h e r wing in the rear. Even then, n o G a u l considered flight. The legions s u r r o u n d e d a n d killed the lot including C a m u l o g e n u s . A f t e r that, the o t h e r enemy d e t a c h m e n t s were easy prey, a n d L a b i e n u s returned in safety to A g e d i n c u m . Caesar, Gallic W a r , 7: 57-62

ALESIA (52) - Gallic War Alesia [AUse Ste Reine] was the site of C a e s a r ' s most f a m o u s siege. As such, it does not c o m e within the scope of this w o r k , but an o p e n battle qualifies f o r inclusion. Vercingetorix had m a d e a fatal mistake in w i t h d r a w i n g within the walls of this city. C a e s a r laid siege to the place but f o u n d himself besieged in his turn by the arrival of a combined Gallic relief force, allegedly of 250,000 men a n d 8,000 cavalry. They e n c a m p e d on a hill outside the R o m a n lines a n d a b o u t a mile away. T h e following day they occupied the whole of the plain with their cavalry interspersed with archers and light-armed t r o o p s . C a e s a r ordered his cavalry to engage them, a n d the battle went on f r o m m i d d a y until sunset with n o clear a d v a n t a g e either way until C a e s a r ' s G e r m a n horse m a d e a mass charge at one point. This threw the G a u l s back a n d they b r o k e a n d fled. T h e rest of C a e s a r ' s cavalry then t o o k up the pursuit as f a r as the enemy c a m p , allowing the enemy n o chance to resume the offensive. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 7: 79-80

U X E L L O D U N U M (51) - Gallic War Within a year of the siege of Alesia all organized resistance h a d c o m e to an end t h r o u g h o u t the whole of G a u l . Isolated tribal insurrections still occurred a n d were dealt with, only to be superseded in m a n y areas by localized b a n d s of guerillas. O n e of these b a n d s , which was led by t w o brigands called D r a p p e s a n d Lucterius, was operating close to the R o m a n Province a n d w a s causing some anxiety. D r a p p e s , a Senonian, h a d been raiding R o m a n c o n v o y s with a b u n c h of desperadoes a n d slaves while Lucterius, a C a d u r can, h a d previously tried to invade the Province. They joined forces a n d started to inarch t o w a r d the Province with a b o u t 2,000 m e n . W h e n they heard t h a t Caninius, o n e of C a e s a r ' s generals, was after them, they occupied U x e l l o d u n u m , a t o w n

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situated on t o p of precipitous rocks. C a n i n i u s c a m p e d n e a r b y a n d started to m a k e entrenchments. T h e t o w n s p e o p l e feared starvation a n d so D r a p p e s a n d Lucterius went out a n d collected a large q u a n t i t y of grain. While Lucterius was trying to smuggle the load into the t o w n in the d a r k , the noise alerted the R o m a n s . C a n i n i u s led out some c o h o r t s against the c o n v o y a n d gave n o q u a r t e r . Lucterius got a w a y with only a h a n d f u l of his men a n d was unable to rejoin his colleague. C a n i n i u s then learnt that D r a p p e s was e n c a m p e d a b o u t 12 miles away. He led out his cavalry, his G e r m a n i n f a n t r y a n d one legion. W h e n he a p p r o a c h e d , he f o u n d that D r a p p e s was e n c a m p e d by a river a n d t h a t the cavalry a n d G e r m a n f o o t were already a t t a c k i n g it. C a n i n i u s seized all the s u r r o u n d i n g high g r o u n d with his legionaries, w h o charged d o w n on the enemy f r o m all sides. All the G a u l s were killed or c a p t u r e d , D r a p p e s being a m o n g the prisoners. Hirtius:

In Caesar, Gallic W a r . 8:

32-36

A N T I G O N E A (51) - Parthian War Following the destruction of C r a s s u s a n d his a r m y at C a r r h a e (53), the P a r t h i a n s were able to win back the whole of the c o u n t r y east of the E u p h r a t e s , but they did not a d v a n c e b e y o n d the river. It was not until two years later t h a t they invaded Syria in force u n d e r the leadership of Osaces, w h o was acting as regent for the infant P a c o r u s . They reached A n t i o c h [Antakya] but were repulsed by G a i u s Cassius. He h a d been C r a s s u s ' q u a e s t o r a n d so was in c o m m a n d of the diminished R o m a n forces in Syria p e n d i n g the arrival of C r a s s u s ' successor, Bibulus. F r o m A n t i o c h the P a r t h i a n s turned their a t t e n t i o n to A n t i g o n e a . T h e y m a d e little progress there t o o a n d decided to m o v e on to some easier prey, but Cassius heard a b o u t their intended r o u t e a n d set an a m b u s h . H e met them with a few men a n d lured them into p u r s u i n g him - straight into the a r m s of his whole force. Osaces was killed, a f t e r which P a c o r u s a b a n d o n e d any f u r t h e r intentions against Syria. Dio Cassius, 40:

28-29

AMANUS M (51) In the s u m m e r of 51, Cicero, the f a m o u s o r a t o r , t o o k u p an a p p o i n t m e n t as g o v e r n o r of Cilicia a n d proconsul f o r one year. S o o n a f t e r Cassius h a d repulsed the P a r t h i a n s f r o m A n t i o c h a n d a m b u s h e d them near A n t i g o n e a (above), Cicero m o u n t e d an offensive against the hostile people of M o u n t A m a n u s . This f o r m e d the b o u n d a r y 227


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between Cilicia a n d Syria. T a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of defiles a n d o t h e r c o n t o u r s , he took the enemy by surprise a n d killed o r c a p t u r e d m a n y of them. He then c a p t u r e d a n d b u r n t their strongholds. A f t e r being hailed as imperator at Issus, he proceeded to besiege the fortified t o w n of Pindenissus. W h e n he returned h o m e at the end of his term, he h o p e d to be a w a r d e d a t r i u m p h ; instead, he f o u n d himself embroiled in the nastiness of the Civil W a r . Cicero, Letters to his Friends, 2: 10 M A S S I L I A (49) - Second Civil W a r While C a e s a r was fighting the Gallic W a r , a power struggle was t a k i n g place in R o m e in which P o m p e y in essence gained complete c o n t r o l of the state. In J a n u a r y 49, C a e s a r , having s u b d u e d the G a u l s , crossed the R u b i c o n with his a r m y a n d invaded n o r t h e r n Italy in defiance of an o r d e r that he should relinquish his c o m m a n d . T h e civil w a r between himself a n d P o m p e y h a d begun. Caesar 'escorted' P o m p e y f r o m R o m e to Brundisium [Brindisi] where P o m p e y e m b a r k e d for Illyria. C a e s a r , u n a b l e to p u r s u e him for lack of ships, turned a n d headed for Spain where P o m p e y ' s lieutenants were active. En route he stopped at Massilia [Marseilles] where the Massiliotes refused him entry. C a e s a r r e s p o n d e d by bringing up three legions a n d m a k i n g p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a siege. He also ordered the c o n s t r u c t i o n of 12 ships a n d put D e c i m u s Brutus in charge. While C a e s a r was in Spain, a naval battle t o o k place off Massilia. D o m i t i u s , in charge of the P o m p e i a n forces in Massilia, h a d 17 ships, m a n y of them decked. He m a n n e d t h e m with a large n u m b e r of archers a n d proceeded confidently against the 12 ships of Brutus, which were heavier a n d slower t h a n his o w n . M o r e o v e r , Brutus' crews were hardly trained. But C a e s a r h a d m a n n e d his ships with veteran fighters and they were equipped with g r a p p l i n g irons. T h e Massiliotes with their superior n u m b e r s kept m a k i n g a t t e m p t s to s u r r o u n d the enemy. T h e y were also a d e p t at nimbly evading close c o n t a c t . In spite of this, Brutus' crews m a n aged to use their g r a p p l i n g e q u i p m e n t to g o o d effect. W h e n e v e r an o p p o r t u n i t y presented itself, an enemy ship f o u n d itself held fast, a n d on occasions one ship would grapple two of the enemy, o n e on each side. In this way the Massiliotes lost nine ships sunk or c a p t u r e d a n d the rest were driven into h a r b o u r . Brutus' losses are not recorded. Caesar, Civil W a r , 1: 56-58; 21(3) 228

Dio Cassius,

41:

S I C O R I S R (49) - Second Civil W a r C a e s a r c o n t i n u e d his a d v a n c e f r o m Massilia to Spain, having sent G a i u s F a b i u s a h e a d with three legions to seize the passes over the Pyrenees. These were in the h a n d s of P o m p e y ' s lieutenant A f r a nius, w h o was dislodged. A f r a n i u s linked up with Petreius, w h o was in c o m m a n d of a second P o m peian a r m y in Spain. This gave them a c o m b i n e d force of five legions a n d a b o u t 5,000 cavalry with which they e n c a m p e d near Ilerda [Lerida] on the west b a n k of the river Sicoris [Segre], Altogether C a e s a r ' s force comprised six legions a n d 6,000 cavalry, half of them Gallic. F a b i u s h a d built two bridges a b o u t 4 miles a p a r t across the Sicoris. With a s h o r t a g e of f o o d , he had taken to crossing the river to the west b a n k a n d foraging. On o n e of these expeditions, two of Fabius" legions sent to g u a r d the foragers h a d crossed the bridge, when a s u d d e n squall carried the bridge a w a y , cutting the legions off f r o m the cavalry w h o were on the point of crossing. T h e flotsam carried d o w n the river told the enemy w h a t had h a p p e n e d . A f r a n i u s immediately led f o u r legions a n d all his cavalry against the distressed legions of Fabius. These h a d taken u p a position on some higher g r o u n d a n d were m a n a g i n g to hold out when, according to C a e s a r ' s a c c o u n t , two m o r e legions c a m e to their assistance. T h e y h a d been sent over the second bridge by a far-sighted Fabius, a n d their arrival put an end to the fighting. Dio a n d A p p i a n b o t h put a less f a v o u r a b l e interpretation on the events, holding that m a n y of F a b i u s ' men were killed. They m a k e n o m e n t i o n of a relieving force. Caesar, Civil W a r , 1:40; Dio Cassius, 41: 20(1-2); Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 42 I L E R D A (49, A u g u s t 2) - Second Civil W a r T w o d a y s after the battle at the Sicoris (above), C a e s a r arrived with 900 cavalry a n d m a r c h e d with his whole force t o w a r d s Ilerda [Lerida], He c a m p e d a b o u t half a mile f r o m A f r a n i u s a n d fortified his c a m p with a trench on three sides. A f r a n i u s a n d Petreius, w h o were e n c a m p e d on a hill close to the town, m a r c h e d d o w n to the foot of the hill in the h o p e of p r o v o k i n g a battle but C a e s a r ignored them. Between the t o w n a n d the enemy c a m p there was a hillock in the middle of a small level plateau, which a p p e a r e d to C a e s a r to be an ideal objective. He led out three legions a n d then sent one line at the d o u b l e to occupy the hillock. A f r a n i u s saw w h a t he was up to a n d sent some c o h o r t s , w h o m a n a g e d to get there first by a shorter route. T h e P o m p e i a n legions then charged d o w n f r o m their c a m p a n d created c o n f u s i o n a m o n g C a e s a r ' s

THE ROMAN

WORLD

v a n g u a r d a n d right wing. C a e s a r led the N i n t h legion to their s u p p o r t a n d turned the tables, forcing the enemy to w i t h d r a w right back to the walls of the town. However, the men of the N i n t h legion got carried a w a y by their success a n d pressed the pursuit t o o far. They f o u n d themselves on a flat ridge which h a d steep sides a n d which led to the final climb up to the town. T h e enemy were a b o v e them, showering missiles d o w n on t h e m a n d receiving fresh r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m their c a m p t h r o u g h the t o w n , while the steep sides of the ridge m a d e it extremely difficult f o r C a e s a r to get any help to his m e n . W h e n they tried to w i t h d r a w , the enemy pressed d o w n on them with renewed vigo u r . A f t e r five h o u r s of fighting the N i n t h legion h a d used up all its missiles. As a last resort they drew their s w o r d s a n d charged uphill against the enemy, killing some a n d forcing others back a n d some even into the town. At last this gave them a c h a n c e to w i t h d r a w . Seventy of C a e s a r ' s force were killed in the initial c h a r g e a n d 600 were w o u n d e d . A f r a n i u s lost 200 men a n d five centurions killed.

armies there was a small valley with steep sides which were difficult to scale. Both sides were waiting to see w h o would be the first to a t t e m p t a crossing when the cavalry of V a r u s a c c o m p a n i e d by some light-armed t r o o p s suddenly a p p e a r e d in the valley on C u r i o ' s right a n d trotted d o w n the centre of it. C u r i o sent in his cavalry, w h o routed their o p p o n e n t s at o n e c h a r g e a n d sent t h e m flying back to their base, leaving the light-armed t r o o p s to be slaughtered to a m a n . C u r i o himself then followed in the steps of his cavalry, leading his legions d o w n into the valley. T h a t was e n o u g h f o r V a r u s ' t r o o p s , w h o turned a b o u t a n d bolted back into their c a m p , blocking the e n t r a n c e with their n u m b e r s a n d being crushed in the s t a m p e d e . A b o u t 600 of t h e m died a n d 1,000 were w o u n d e d . C u r i o did lose o n e m a n , an o r d i n a r y soldier w h o got c a u g h t up with the retreating enemy a n d sought out V a r u s in a suicidal dash. V a r u s m a n aged to w a r d off the blow but his assailant was inevitably killed.

T h e war in Spain became a w a r of attrition. Petreius a n d A f r a n i u s , finding it d a n g e r o u s to forage, decided to m o v e south to Celtiberia. Caesar pursued t h e m , continually harassing t h e m , preventing them f r o m f o r a g i n g a n d depriving them of water. Eventually, the P o m p e i a n s sued f o r peace, which was granted on the o n e c o n d i t i o n that their armies should be d i s b a n d e d . Caesar, Civil W a r , 1: 43-46

B A G R A D A S R (49, A u g u s t 24) - Second Civil War C u r i o h e a r d that a large force of K i n g J u b a ' s was a p p r o a c h i n g Utica u n d e r the c o m m a n d of his general S a b u r r a . T h e king h a d been detained by a b o r d e r dispute a n d would be following shortly. T h e y o u n g a n d enthusiastic R o m a n , spurred on by his previous success at Utica (above), decided t h a t he would give battle before J u b a arrived with the rest of the N u m i d i a n forces. S a b u r r a was e n c a m p e d by the river B a g r a d a s [Medjerda] some distance away, a n d C u r i o sent o u t all his cavalry a f t e r d a r k . Arriving a r o u n d d a w n , they c a u g h t the unsuspecting N u m i d i a n s sleepy-eyed a n d slew a great n u m b e r of them. T h e cavalry returned t o w a r d their c a m p a n d met C u r i o , w h o h a d left in the early h o u r s a n d h a d already m a r c h e d 6 miles. Spurred on by the g o o d news, he m a r c h e d as fast as he could, o r d e r i n g the weary cavalry to follow a l t h o u g h they were u n a b l e to keep u p with him. O n the o t h e r side, S a b u r r a suspected that the cavalry a t t a c k h a d been a mere preliminary a n d that the whole force would follow. He had his m e n lined u p a n d ready f o r the enemy, with instructions to w i t h d r a w gradually as if in fear. C u r i o took the bait, b r o u g h t his men d o w n into the plain a n d pursued the enemy for a r o u n d 16 miles. At this p o i n t S a b u r r a gave the signal a n d turned to face the enemy with his cavalry in the f r o n t line. C u r i o ' s principal weakness was his s h o r t a g e of cavalry. He h a d only 200 with him; the o t h e r s h a d s t o p p e d to

U T I C A (49) - Second Civil W a r G a i u s C u r i o , o n e of C a e s a r ' s generals, landed near C l u p e a [Kelibia] in Africa a n d m a r c h e d with his t w o legions a n d 500 cavalry to Utica, where he e n c a m p e d near the town. T h e enemy c a m p of Attius V a r u s was right up against the t o w n walls a n d was sandwiched between the walls on o n e side a n d a massive edifice on the other. As the only a p p r o a c h was a n a r r o w passageway, the e n c a m p ment was highly secure. While C u r i o was fortifying his c a m p , his scouts reported that a large a r m y h a d been sent by King J u b a of M a u r e t a n i a to reinforce V a r u s a n d that it was a p p r o a c h i n g . C u r i o sent out his cavalry to delay the enemy while he himself organized the legions; but they were not needed. T h e king's forces were not expecting an e n c o u n t e r a n d were in such disorder that C u r i o ' s cavalry routed their horse a n d killed m a n y of their infantry. O n the following day, b e f o r e J u b a ' s a r m y reached Utica, C u r i o a n d V a r u s led out their men a n d c o n f r o n t e d each other. Between the two

Caesar, Civil W a r , 2: 26 and

33-35

229

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK

AND ROMAN

WORLDS

rest the horses some way back. T h e enemy, by c o n t r a s t , h a d received a reinforcement of 2,000 Spanish a n d Gallic cavalry which h a d been sent in a d v a n c e by J u b a . As a result, the R o m a n s were easily s u r r o u n d e d , while f u r t h e r instalments f r o m J u b a were a d d i n g to the N u m i d i a n n u m b e r s all the time. In d e s p e r a t i o n , C u r i o ordered his men to seize a nearby hill, but S a b u r r a anticipated them a n d got there first. Every i n f a n t r y m a n was killed. C u r i o himself dismissed the suggestion t h a t he might try to escape. H e preferred to die with his m e n . T h e exhausted cavalry w h o h a d ridden all the previous night a n d arrived t o o late for the battle were just a b o u t the only survivors. Caesar, Civil W a r , 2:38-42; Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 45 S A L O N A E (48) - Second Civil W a r W h e n P o m p e y was forced out of Italy, he crossed the Adriatic a n d eventually retired to Dyrr h a c h i u m where he built u p a base f o r a f u t u r e invasion of Italy. C a e s a r followed him there a f t e r the end of hostilities in Spain. While they were there, M a r c u s Octavius, o n e of P o m p e y ' s a d m i r als, sailed to S a l o n a e [Split] a n d tried to stir up the D a l m a t i a n s against s u p p o r t i n g C a e s a r . T h e R o m a n c o m m u n i t y at Salonae were u n c o m p r o mising a n d so Octavius laid siege to the place with a ring of five c a m p s a r o u n d it. W h e n the inhabitants b e c a m e desperate f o r lack of corn, they m a d e a s u d d e n sortie a n d s t o r m e d the nearest c a m p so successfully that they proceeded to a t t a c k the remaining f o u r , one a f t e r the other. They d r o v e the besiegers out of all the c a m p s , killing m a n y of them, a n d forced Octavius to flee to his ships with the rest. He sailed to D y r r h a c h i u m to j o i n Pompey. Caesar, Civil W a r , 3: 9

DYRRHACHIUM: LESNIKIA R (48) Second Civil W a r W h e n C a e s a r heard that P o m p e y was at A s p a r agiurn, he moved there a n d c a m p e d nearby. T h e next m o r n i n g he offered battle. P o m p e y was a n x i o u s to avoid this in spite of his overwhelming numerical superiority as his t r o o p s were inferior in training to C a e s a r ' s veterans. W h e n the offer was refused, C a e s a r decided to m a k e f o r D y r r h a c h i u m [Durres], P o m p e y ' s base. By h e a d i n g off in a different direction a n d m a k i n g a d e t o u r , Caesar outwitted his foe a n d got there first as P o m p e y a p p e a r e d in the distance. P o m p e y , excluded f r o m the t o w n , built a strong c a m p s o u t h of the t o w n on a hill called Petra close to the Bay of D y r r h a c h i u m , 230

Based on a diagram in J.F.C. Fuller. Julius Caesar

where he established a well-stocked base. Caesar c a m p e d f u r t h e r inland a n d started b l o c k a d i n g P o m p e y by constructing a line of forts with e n t r e n c h m e n t s between them, stretching f r o m sea to sea over a distance of a b o u t 12 miles. P o m p e y retaliated by m a k i n g a similar but s h o r t e r line of fortifications inside C a e s a r ' s line. Military activities in the early stages were confined to harassment a n d a t t e m p t s to c o n f i n e the o t h e r a n d deny access to supplies a n d provisions. C a e s a r m e n t i o n s that in o n e d a y alone there were six e n g a g e m e n t s which a c c o u n t e d for enemy losses of a b o u t 2,000 casualties. W h e n P o m p e y decided to a t t e m p t a b r e a k - o u t , a bigger battle did ensue. In the middle of the night he led 60 c o h o r t s to the s o u t h e r n end of the encircling fortifications where they joined the sea. At the same time he e m b a r k e d a large force of archers a n d light-armed t r o o p s , w h o m he sent to the same shoreline a c c o m p a n i e d by his warships. At this point C a e s a r ' s line was a d o u b l e wall consisting of t w o parallel lines of

THE ROMAN

r a m p a r t s a n d trenches a few h u n d r e d yards a p a r t . T h e y extended f r o m the sea f o r a b o u t 2 miles inland at which p o i n t there was a c a m p , occupied at the time by Lentulus Marcellinus. These fortifications h a d been built by C a e s a r in the early stages of the c a m p a i g n but h a d not been quite completed. T h e cross wall connecting the two r a m p a r t s by the sea had never been built, a n d P o m p e y h a d heard a b o u t this deficiency f r o m deserters. A t the time of P o m p e y ' s a t t a c k , two c o h o r t s of C a e s a r ' s N i n t h legion were c a m p i n g by the sea. T h e a t t a c k e r s started hurling missiles f r o m outside the o u t e r r a m p a r t while others a t t a c k e d the inner r a m p a r t f r o m the o t h e r side. T h e defenders, between the walls, h a d only stones with which to retaliate. They were already suffering badly when the enemy noticed that there was n o cross wall a n d m a n a g e d to get into the space between the r a m p a r t s f r o m the shore. T a k e n on the flank as well as in the f r o n t a n d rear, the defenders turned to flight. S o m e c o h o r t s which were sent to the rescue f r o m Marcellinus' c a m p failed to achieve a n y t h i n g except to increase the c o n f u s i o n a n d to get in the way. Finally, A n t o n y arrived with 12 c o h o r t s a n d d r o v e the enemy back. T h e final disgrace was avoided when a legionary s t a n d a r d bearer just m a n a g e d to h a n d on his eagle, the s u p r e m e emblem, before he expired. A f t e r his victory P o m p e y built a new c a m p , situated on the shore to the south of the circumvallation, outside the blockade.

WORLD

left c o l u m n saw that the right was in rout, it t o o turned a n d fled. Caesar himself a t t e m p t e d to halt the h e a d l o n g flight but n o o n e paid any attention to him. In the t w o e n g a g e m e n t s taken together C a e s a r lost 960 m e n a n d 32 military tribunes a n d centurions; the P o m p e i a n losses are u n k n o w n . These e n c o u n t e r s are n o w k n o w n as the Battle of the Lesnikia. C a e s a r , however, d o e s not n a m e the river a n d neither A p p i a n n o r Dio Cassius m e n t i o n a river at all. Caesar, Civil W a r , 3:62-64; Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 61; Dio Cassius, 41; 50(3-4) P H A R S A L U S (48, A u g u s t 9) - Second Civil War C a e s a r ' s reverses at D y r r h a c h i u m led him to pull out a n d give himself time to b o o s t the m o r a l e of his troops. H e met a n d joined forces with G n a e u s D o m i t i u s at Aeginium a n d they proceeded into Thessaly. C a e s a r was looking f o r a suitable base with a m p l e crops for f o d d e r a n d he decided to halt near P h a r s a l u s [Farsala] a n d wait f o r P o m p e y there. P o m p e y h a d m e a n w h i l e joined forces with Q. Caecilius Scipio. He arrived a few d a y s later

This battle consisted in fact of two distinct e n g a g e m e n t s a n d w h a t has been described was only the first. T h e second p h a s e t o o k place in the same area a n d centred r o u n d an old c a m p of C a e s a r ' s situated in the plain between his d o u b l e fortification a n d the s o u t h e r n end of P o m p e y ' s line of w o r k s to the n o r t h . A river, the Lesnikia [Gesnike], ran on the n o r t h side of this c a m p t h r o u g h the plain to the sea. C a e s a r heard that P o m p e y was m o v i n g t r o o p s into this c a m p a n d he sent 33 c o h o r t s in two c o l u m n s to a t t a c k it. T h e left colu m n got into the c a m p a n d forced the o c c u p a n t s back; but the right c o l u m n e n c o u n t e r e d a r a m p a r t which they t h o u g h t was the c a m p wall. In fact, it ran f r o m the c a m p to the river. U n a b l e to find a gate, they b r o k e t h r o u g h the r a m p a r t near the river a n d got into the plain on the o t h e r side. P o m p e y then led five legions a n d some cavalry to the relief of the c a m p . W h e n C a e s a r ' s right c o l u m n tried to retire they c a m e up once m o r e against the r a m p a r t which led to the river. U n a b l e to get t h r o u g h en masse, m a n y of them j u m p e d f r o m the t o p of the r a m p a r t into the trench a n d were trampled d o w n by those t h a t followed. W h e n the 231


WORLDS

a n d e n c a m p e d at the foot of a m o u n t a i n . In spite of his large numerical superiority P o m p e y was at first loath to c o m m i t himself to a pitched battle, but he was eventually p e r s u a d e d to settle the issue. He led his men out in battle a r r a y a n d C a e s a r followed suit. P o m p e y ' s right wing was protected by the river Enipeus a n d so he put all his cavalry a n d light-armed t r o o p s on the o p p o s i t e wing. His force totalled at least 40,000 infantry a n d 7,000 cavalry. Against t h e m , C a e s a r lined his t r o o p s up in the usual three rows but, on noting the e n e m y ' s dispositions, he withdrew o n e c o h o r t f r o m each legion f r o m the third line a n d stationed t h e m as a f o u r t h line o p p o s i t e the enemy cavalry. His total force a m o u n t e d to 22,000 men a n d a mere 1,000 horse. T h e e n g a g e m e n t began on C a e s a r ' s side with an infantry charge which was met a n d m a t c h e d by their o p p o n e n t s . At the same time P o m p e y ' s cavalry, s u p p o r t e d by the archers, charged f o r w a r d with the intention of a t t a c k i n g C a e s a r ' s right wing in the flank a n d rear. They m a d e short w o r k of his cavalry but were b r o u g h t up sharply by his f o u r t h line, which h a d been f o r m e d specifically f o r the p u r p o s e . This corps ran f o r w a r d with their javelins aimed at the faces of the enemy, w h o failed to withstand the unnerving experience. They turned a n d fled to the hills, leaving their s u p p o r t i n g archers a n d slingers exposed a n d u n p r o t e c t e d against the butchery which followed. M e a n w h i l e , C a e s a r ' s f o u r t h line c o n t i n u e d its c h a r g e r o u n d P o m p e y ' s left wing a n d a t t a c k e d it in the rear. A t this point C a e s a r threw into the fray his third line, which h a d so far seen n o action. T h e P o m p e i a n force could not stand up to this new assault by fresh soldiers. They turned a n d fled as a whole a n d were p u r s u e d to their c a m p , which was s t o r m e d , a f t e r which they occupied a hill. C a e s a r ' s m e n started to besiege the hill but the P o m p e i a n s retreated over the hills behind. T h e y were finally r o u n d e d up a n d forced to surrender. C a e s a r spared them all. P o m p e y himself left the field a f t e r the defeat of his cavalry. H e stayed in his tent until the c a m p was a t t a c k e d a n d then rode off to Larissa. It is t h o u g h t that a b o u t 15,000 of his men were killed in the battle, while m o r e t h a n 24,000 were taken prisoner. T h e losses on C a e s a r ' s side were said to n u m b e r n o m o r e t h a n 200. Caesar, Civil W a r , 8 5 - 9 9 ; Dio Cassius, 41: 52(3)-61( 1); Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 70-82; Plutarch, C a e s a r , 42-45 and P o m p e y , 68(3)-72

Cornificius was having a h a r d time holding his o w n . C a e s a r sent A u l u s G a b i n i u s with some new levies to join him but G a b i n i u s , too, h a d a h a r d time as the weather was b a d a n d the c o u n t r y was bare. A f t e r f r e q u e n t defeats in his a t t e m p t s to storm places, he withdrew to Salonae [Split] on the Adriatic coast, where the R o m a n citizens were loyal. O n e source states that he was a t t a c k e d on the m a r c h a n d lost 2,000 m e n including 38 cent u r i o n s a n d f o u r tribunes. Dio, however, m a k e s n o m e n t i o n of this. He reports t h a t Octavius h a d been besieging Salonae f o r a long time without success until, o n e night, G a b i n i u s a n d the i n h a b i t a n t s a t t a c k e d the c a m p of the besiegers a n d c a p t u r e d both the c a m p a n d the h a r b o u r . Octavius escaped, gathered a n o t h e r force a n d returned to t a k e the t o w n , by which time G a b i n i u s h a d died there of some disease. D i o places these events in the year 48 - before Pharsalus. (Caesar), 11

232

42:

T A U R I S I S L (47) - Second Civil W a r At a b o u t the time of the a b o v e events at Salonae, the p r o p r a e t o r Cornificius in Illyria was sending urgent appeals to Vatinius in Brundisium [Brindisi] to c o m e a n d help. Vatinius h a d only a few battle ships a n d so he fitted beaks to a n u m b e r of his smaller c r a f t a n d e m b a r k e d m a n y veterans, of w h o m there were large n u m b e r s at Brundisium as a result of the war. At that time M a r c u s Octavius was a t t a c k i n g E p i d a u r u s . H e was forced to a b a n d o n the siege a n d w i t h d r e w to m o o r i n g s by the island of T a u r i s [Torcola], There, Vatinius o p p o s e d him a n d b o t h sides deployed for battle. Vatinius with his q u i n q u e r e m e sailed straight for the q u a d r i r e m e of Octavius a n d the two ships became entangled. T h e other ships on both sides rallied to the s u p p o r t of their flag-ships so that they became packed in a c o n c e n t r a t e d mass. This suited Vatinius, whose smaller vessels were less a p p r o p r i a t e f o r naval w a r f a r e but whose seamen were better m o t i v a t e d for b o a r d i n g a n d h a n d - t o h a n d fighting. T h e enemy flag-ship sank a n d Octavius b o a r d e d a small craft, which p r o m p t l y went d o w n u n d e r the weight of escaping seamen. He m a n a g e d to escape in spite of w o u n d s but 11 of his decked ships were c a p t u r e d . Vatinius' fleet remained intact. (Caesar),

S A L O N A E (47) - Second Civil W a r P o m p e i a n p o c k e t s of resistance to C a e s a r were g r o w i n g in Illyria, a n d the p r o p r a e t o r Q u i n t u s

A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , 43; Dio Cassius,

Alexandrian War,

44-47

ALEXANDRIA (47) - Alexandrian War A f t e r his crushing defeat at P h a r s a l u s (48). P o m p e y fled to Egypt, where he was m u r d e r e d .

THE ROMAN

C a e s a r , w h o h a d followed him there, got embroiled in local politics a n d the regal succession, a n d gained the enmity of the king a n d of the A l e x a n d r i a n s , w h o besieged him. F r o m the military point of view most of the action was in the f o r m of street fighting a n d similar u r b a n episodes. But the A l e x a n d r i a n s decided that if they built up their fleet, they might effectively complete the b l o c k a d e against Caesar. They built small b o a t s a n d called in every old ship f o r restoration, c o m pleting 5 q u i n q u e r e m e s , 22 q u a d r i r e m e s a n d a n u m b e r of undecked vessels. T h e y m a n n e d t h e m with t r o o p s a n d p r e p a r e d f o r battle. C a e s a r h a d 34 ships f r o m R h o d e s , P o n t u s , Lycia a n d Asia, u n d e r the c o m m a n d of E u p h r a n o r , w h o sailed r o u n d P h a r o s a n d drew u p opposite the enemy. He placed 17 ships in the f r o n t line with the r e m a i n d e r in reserve. T h e A l e x a n d r i a n s h a d 22 in their f r o n t line a n d , in a d d i t i o n , a large n u m b e r of dinghies e q u i p p e d with fire-darts. W h e n the e n g a g e m e n t started, the R h o d i a n s displayed their skill in that they never presented themselves b r o a d s i d e on; n o r did they allow their o a r s to be sheared off. T h e o u t c o m e of the battle was hardly d r a m a t i c but it was a definite victory f o r C a e s a r ' s men. A quinq u e r e m e a n d a bireme were c a p t u r e d a n d three o t h e r enemy ships were s u n k , while the rest fled to the protection of the townspeople. C a e s a r ' s fleet suffered n o losses. (Caesar), A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , 12-16

NILUS R (47) - Alexandrian War At the start of the A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , C a e s a r h a d asked his friend M i t h r i d a t e s of P e r g a m u m , a reputed son of the great M i t h r i d a t e s , to bring r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m Syria a n d Cilicia. M i t h r i d a t e s m a r c h e d with a large force to Pelusium on the eastern side of the Nile delta a n d c a p t u r e d the place. T h e king, P t o l e m y X I I I , sent a large force against him, but those of his t r o o p s w h o were first across the river were t o o eager to attack a n d claim the credit f o r the victory. They lost it a n d m a n y were killed. T h e king himself then sailed d o w n the Nile to check M i t h r i d a t e s , while C a e s a r set out by sea at the same time to meet u p with him. T h e king e n c a m p e d in a strong position on some high g r o u n d which a d j o i n e d the Nile on one side a n d was protected by a m a r s h on a n o t h e r side. T o reach it Caesar h a d to cross a n a r r o w t r i b u t a r y of the Nile which h a d high b a n k s . T h e king sent out all his cavalry a n d some light t r o o p s to stop him, b u t C a e s a r ' s G e r m a n cavalry scouted a r o u n d a n d f o u n d some places where the b a n k s were lower, while his t r o o p s felled tall trees a n d bridged the

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river. W h e n they h a d effected a crossing, they engaged a n d killed nearly all of the enemy cavalry. T h e king h a d built a fort in a n e a r b y village a n d h a d connected it to his c a m p with walls. T h e next day, Caesar c a p t u r e d this fort a n d proceeded with his whole force u p to the c a m p ' s fortifications. T h e r e was a space between the c a m p a n d the Nile which offered a possible o p e n i n g f o r an attack on the fortifications. Here the R o m a n s m a d e no h e a d w a y . They were targets for missiles b o t h f r o m the fortifications a n d f r o m b o a t s full of archers a n d slingers on the river. At this point C a e s a r noticed that the highest - a n d most naturally secure - p a r t of the c a m p was the m o s t lightly defended. He sent some c o h o r t s r o u n d there, a n d they h a d little difficulty in dealing with the few guards. This caused a panic a n d rout which spread rapidly t h r o u g h o u t the c a m p , allowing the R o m a n s to c a p t u r e it with ease. T h e king escaped a n d e m b a r k e d on a ship, but the c r o w d s trying to scramble a b o a r d capsized it a n d the king was d r o w n e d . As a result of the R o m a n victory, the A l e x a n d r i a n s s u b m i t t e d to C a e s a r , w h o gained c o n t r o l not only of the town but also of Egypt. (Caesar), A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , 26-32 N I C O P O L I S (47) - Revolt of P h a r n a c e s P h a r n a c e s , son of the great M i t h r i d a t e s , t o o k a d v a n t a g e of R o m a n involvement in the Civil W a r to seize A r m e n i a M i n o r a n d C a p p a d o c i a . D o m itius Calvinus, to w h o m C a e s a r h a d assigned the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Asia, took o n e of his legions a n d t w o native legions with which he m a r c h e d to the vicinity of Nicopolis [Divrigi], where P h a r n a c e s h a d installed himself. P h a r n a c e s d u g two parallel trenches leading out f r o m the t o w n a n d drew up his battle line between them. His cavalry, which greatly o u t n u m b e r e d the enemy's, was divided between the flanks outside the confines of the trenches. D o m i t i u s deployed his force opposite the enemy a n d b o t h sides launched a fierce charge simultaneously. D o m i t i u s ' Thirty-sixth legion on the right wing charged the enemy cavalry so successfully that they forced them back to the t o w n walls. A f t e r that, the legion crossed the ditch a n d a t t a c k e d the enemy i n f a n t r y in the rear. O n the o t h e r wing, however, D o m i t i u s ' Pontic legion a t t e m p t e d to cross the trench in o r d e r to a t t a c k their opposite n u m b e r s on the flank, but they were overcome w h e n they were negotiating the ditch. In the centre, D o m i t i u s ' native forces failed to m a k e any stand, with the result that P h a r n a c e s ' right a n d centre were b o t h free to join in against the T h i r t y sixth. This legion, s u r r o u n d e d by the whole enemy 233


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a r m y , f o r m e d itself into a circle a n d withdrew to the foothills of the m o u n t a i n s where the enemy was unwilling to p u r s u e the a t t a c k . T h e R o m a n s escaped with a loss of n o m o r e t h a n 250 killed. T h e native legions, on the o t h e r h a n d , were almost annihilated. W i t h this victory behind him, P h a r naces occupied P o n t u s with a devastating display of cruelty a n d despotism. (Caesar), A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , 34 and 38-40 Z E L A (47, A u g u s t 2) -- Revolt of P h a r n a c e s A f t e r gaining Egypt, C a e s a r proceeded via a r o u n d a b o u t r o u t e to P o n t u s against the rebellious Pharnaces. He h a d f o u r legions a n d the r e m a i n s of a fifth legion of veterans. P h a r n a c e s asked for terms a n d gave m a n y pledges but clearly h a d no intention of abiding by them. A b o u t 3 miles f r o m Zela [Zile] there was a high hill, which was almost connected to the t o w n by a ridge. Here P h a r n a c e s installed himself - in the place where his f a t h e r h a d c a m p e d before winning a victory against the R o m a n s two decades previously (Zela, 67). At d a w n the next day C a e s a r surprised him by capturing s o m e n e i g h b o u r i n g heights which were only a b o u t a mile f r o m P h a r n a c e s ' c a m p across an intervening valley. C a e s a r was a m a z e d when P h a r n a c e s drew u p his forces in f r o n t of his c a m p a n d proceeded to descend into the valley a n d then a d v a n c e speedily t o w a r d s him over the rising, rough a n d uneven, intervening g r o u n d . C a e s a r assumed that his enemy was merely flexing his muscles in a display of strength, a n d so he carried on with his fortifications. W h e n it b e c a m e a p p a r ent t h a t P h a r n a c e s was intending to fight, C a e s a r h a d to m o v e quickly to assemble his men a n d get t h e m into some sort of order. A charge by some scythed c h a r i o t s caused additional c o n f u s i o n but they were readily driven off with missiles. T h e t w o armies then c a m e to grips. In hard fighting the veteran Sixth legion on C a e s a r ' s right forced its o p p o n e n t s back d o w n the slope. Elsewhere along the line, victory c a m e m o r e slowly but the o u t c o m e was similar. Once the enemy h a d been dislodged, the downhill flight was as rapid as h a d been their spectacular initial uphill charge. Their c a m p was c a p t u r e d a n d P h a r n a c e s fled, but the whole of his a r m y was either c a p t u r e d o r killed. W h e n he was celebrating his t r i u m p h in R o m e , C a e s a r referred to the battle with his n o w f a m o u s u t t e r a n c e 'Veni, vidi, vici'. It was all in a d a y ' s work! (Caesar), A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , 72-76 H A D R U M E N T U M (46) - Second Civil W a r T h e Civil W a r did not c o m e to an end with the 234

death of P o m p e y . Large n u m b e r s of his s u p p o r t e r s were in c o n t r o l in Africa with very considerable forces, which were f u r t h e r a u g m e n t e d by t r o o p s f r o m the N u m i d i a n king, J u b a . C a e s a r proceeded against them a n d e m b a r k e d an a r m y of six legions a n d 2,000 cavalry. H e landed near H a d r u m e n t u m A p p i a n m a i n t a i n s that he intended to attack the t o w n but that he himself was a t t a c k e d a n d badly beaten by L a b i e n u s a n d Petreius. Against this, it is r e p o r t e d in the African War that C a e s a r ' s ships became separated d u r i n g the crossing a n d t h a t he landed near H a d r u m e n t u m with only 3,000 infantry a n d 150 cavalry. H e knew that he was not in a position to attack such a strong town a n d was starting to m o v e a w a y when the t o w n s p e o p l e sallied out, reinforced by 2,000 of J u b a ' s cavalry w h o h a d just arrived. T h e y a t t a c k e d the rear of C a e s a r ' s c o l u m n a n d were driven off by his cavalry but returned a n d repeatedly harassed him for some distance. He e n c a m p e d that night at Ruspina. (Caesar), 2: 95

A f r i c a n W a r , 3-6; Appian,

Civil W a r s ,

R U S P I N A (46) - Second Civil W a r While Caesar was at R u s p i n a [Monastir], the rest of his ships arrived. W h e n the whole force h a d e n c a m p e d , C a e s a r went off on a f o r a g i n g expedition with a force of 30 c o h o r t s , 400 cavalry a n d 150 archers. T h e y h a d gone but 3 miles when a m u c h larger enemy force of cavalry a n d light t r o o p s u n d e r Labienus arrived a n d deployed. T h e enemy tactics were novel to Caesar. T h e N u m i d i a n light t r o o p s would rush f o r w a r d between their horsemen a n d t h r o w their javelins. W h e n the R o m a n s c h a r g e d , the cavalry w o u l d retire. But any pursuit by the R o m a n s w o u l d expose their flanks to the light troops, w h o held their g r o u n d until the cavalry returned f o r a n o t h e r r o u n d . In the m e a n time the enemy n u m b e r s were such that their cavalry h a d n o difficulty in s u r r o u n d i n g C a e s a r ' s force. C a e s a r c o u n t e r e d this by extending his line as f a r as possible a n d getting the alternate c o h o r t s to turn a b o u t a n d face in the o p p o s i t e direction an extended back-to-back d e p l o y m e n t . Showers of missiles t h r o w n in b o t h directions kept the enemy at a distance while the C a e s a r i a n line gradually fell back t o w a r d its defences. At this point a force of 1,600 N u m i d i a n cavalry arrived to reinforce the enemy, a n d so the battle started up again. C a e s a r ' s t r o o p s were utterly exhausted but f o r t u n a t e l y the d a y was nearly at an end. W i t h a last d e s p e r a t e e f f o r t they forced the enemy back off the plain a n d

THE ROMAN

behind a hill, which the R o m a n s then possessed. A f t e r this the enemy withdrew. (Caesar), A f r i c a n W a r , 12-18 T H A P S U S (46, April) - Second Civil W a r C a e s a r spent some time in the vicinity of R u s p i n a , where he received a second c o n v o y of t r o o p s f r o m Sicily. T h e enemy was not far a w a y a n d so there was a seemingly endless succession of f o r a y s a n d skirmishes. It seemed evident that Q u i n t u s Caecilius Scipio, the P o m p e i a n c o m m a n d e r , h a d no intention of risking a full battle in spite of his numerical superiority. He h a d eight legions of his own, 20,000 horse, 30 elephants a n d n u m e r o u s light t r o o p s . Additionally, his ally J u b a had 30.000 foot, as well as 20.000 horse a n d 60 elep h a n t s . Caesar h a d 10 legions. It was C a e s a r w h o forced the issue by m o v i n g 16 miles a f t e r d a r k a n d c a m p i n g near the Pompeian-held coastal t o w n of T h a p s u s [Ras Dimas], Inland f r o m the t o w n there was a lake a b o u t 7 miles long. T h e arc of land between the lake on o n e side a n d the coast a n d t o w n on the o t h e r side was a b o u t o n e a n d a half miles wide. C a e s a r positioned his c a m p near the town, in the middle of the arc, a n d set a b o u t investing the town. W h e n Scipio arrived, he f o u n d that he h a d been d e b a r r e d f r o m entering the s o u t h e r n end of the arc by Caesar, w h o h a d erected a fort there a n d installed a garrison. Scipio was forced to m a r c h right r o u n d the far side of the lake, a n d he c a m p e d in the n o r t h e r n e n t r a n c e to the arc. C a e s a r withdrew his t r o o p s f r o m the siege a n d proceeded to deploy his forces in battle array. Scipio drew u p his line with his elephants on both wings, a n d C a e s a r o p p o s e d t h e m with cavalry, archers a n d slingers. T h e archers a n d slingers on the right wing sent such a volley of missiles at the elephants t h a t the terrified beasts turned a n d charged t h r o u g h their gates to the protection a f f o r d e d by the r a m p a r t s . A f t e r this overture, the infantry e n g a g e m e n t was started by C a e s a r ' s t r o o p s , w h o were so eager f o r battle that they refused to be held back a n d acted entirely w i t h o u t orders. A t r u m p e t e r was persuaded to s o u n d the call to charge, w h e r e u p o n the legions unleashed themselves. T h e Moorish cavalry on the enemy left failed to withstand the charge a n d followed the example of the elephants so t h a t C a e s a r ' s legions readily seized the r a m part. A f t e r this the opposition c r u m b l e d c o m pletely along the whole line, a n d Scipio's a r m y took to Hight with C a e s a r ' s men in hot pursuit. T h e P o m p e i a n s fled back to their c a m p only to find it deserted. They went on to J u b a ' s c a m p , but

WORLD

that was already in C a e s a r ' s h a n d s . Finally, they retreated to a hill and m a d e gestures of surrender. Even this did not halt the angry victors, whose blood was so high that, in spite of C a e s a r ' s protestations, they massacred them to a m a n . Five t h o u s a n d (Plutarch says 50.000) were killed f o r a loss of 50 on C a e s a r ' s side. A p a r t f r o m some m o p p i n g up, organized resistance to C a e s a r in Africa was at an end. Plutarch m a k e s the interesting c o m m e n t that according to some sources C a e s a r was not on the battlefield at T h a p s u s because of a recurrence of his illness (epilepsy). If that is true, it m i g h t explain the i m p e t u o u s n e s s a n d impatience of his troops. A p p i a n provides a n o t h e r variation when he says that J u b a had to remove his forces a n d return h o m e before the battle to defend his capital Cirta against an a t t a c k . (Caesar), A f r i c a n W a r , 79-86; Dio Cassius, 43: 7 9(1); Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 96-97; Plutarch, Caesar, 53

HIPPO REGIUS (46) - Second Civil War Scipio fled f r o m T h a p s u s (above) with a n u m b e r of s e n a t o r s a n d o t h e r officers. T h e y were on their way to Spain in a convoy of 12 ships when they were driven by bad weather into H i p p o Regius [Bone], It so h a p p e n e d that the fleet of Publius Sittius was in p o r t at the time. This m e r c e n a r y captain h a d previously routed J u b a ' s a r m y somewhere in M a u r e t a n i a a n d killed its general S a b u r r a , the victor at the B a g r a d a s River (49). He h a d also a m b u s h e d a n d c a p t u r e d A f r a n i u s d u r i n g his a t t e m p t e d escape to Spain. O n this occasion, Sittius' ships s u r r o u n d e d a n d sank the whole of Scipio's fleet. Scipio a n d the o t h e r officers were all d r o w n e d . A p p i a n says that Scipio stabbed himself a n d then j u m p e d into the sea. A n o t h e r variation is given by Dio, w h o holds that Scipio was cast a s h o r e in M a u r e t a n i a a n d c o m m i t t e d suicide out of fear of Sittius. (Caesar), A f r i c a n W a r , 96; Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 100; Dio Cassius, 43: 9(5) C A R T E I A (46) - Second Civil W a r P o m p e i a n s u p p o r t e r s were crossing f r o m Africa to Spain a n d were rallying to P o m p e y ' s son a n d n a m e s a k e , w h o retired to Baetica to consolidate. C a e s a r ' s lieutenant Didius sailed against t h e m a n d defeated P o m p e y ' s legate V a r u s in a naval battle off Carteia [near San Rogue], V a r u s would have lost his whole fleet if he h a d not got a s h o r e a n d e m b e d d e d a r o w of a n c h o r s in the m o u t h of the h a r b o u r . These wrecked the f o r e m o s t of the 235


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p u r s u i n g ships before the rest of the fleet was alerted to the d a n g e r . Dio Cassius, 43: 31(3) M U N D A (45. M a r c h 17) - Second Civil W a r C a e s a r travelled to Spain to p u t an end to the last bastion of P o m p e i a n resistance, which flourished u n d e r the b a n n e r of G n a e u s Pompeius, the eldest son of P o m p e y the G r e a t . W h e n C a e s a r arrived in Spain, he began a t t a c k i n g the Pompeian-held t o w n s a n d fortifications, but he was u n a b l e t o d r a w the enemy out to battle until he reached M u n d a , where P o m p e i u s had e n c a m p e d u n d e r the t o w n ' s fortifications in a strong position. T h e town was on high g r o u n d , which sloped d o w n to a plain across which there flowed a stream. C a e s a r c a m p e d o p p o s i t e the enemy in the plain convinced, it is said, that P o m p e i u s would descend to his level where the flat terrain would be ideal f o r the P o m p e i a n cavalry. He was proved w r o n g . T h e enemy a r m y showed no sign of moving. In consequence, C a e s a r was faced with a literally uphill task which, m o s t uncharacteristically, he accepted. T h e enemy i n f a n t r y were deployed u n d e r 13 s t a n d a r d s , with cavalry a n d 6,000 light-armed t r o o p s divided between the wings. C a e s a r h a d eight legions a n d 8,000 cavalry. It was a long, h a r d struggle which, according to o n e source, lasted all day. T h e issue remained in d o u b t with no a d v a n tage either way until the T e n t h legion in its cust o m a r y place on the right wing m a n a g e d to p u s h the o p p o s i n g forces back. T o avoid being a t t a c k e d on their flank, the enemy directed a legion to m o v e across f r o m their right wing. C a e s a r ' s cavalry then seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to p u s h h a r d on this n o w w e a k e n e d wing which gave way, causing the rest of the line to c r u m b l e a n d flee into the town. A m a j o r a d d i t i o n a l reason for the P o m p e i a n defeat is given by D i o Cassius. H e r e c o u n t s t h a t Bogud, king of M a u r e t a n i a a n d an ally of C a e s a r ' s , was not directly involved in the conflict a n d decided on his own initiative to attack the enemy c a m p . Labienus left the enemy line to go against him a n d was t h o u g h t to be fleeing, to the detriment of P o m peian morale. A b o u t 30.000 of the enemy were killed; C a e s a r ' s losses were 1,000. A m a c a b r e note was s o u n d e d w h e n the victors h a d to erect a palisade against escapers f r o m the town. T h e only materials they could find were corpses a n d heads, which they impaled on lances. G n a e u s P o m p e i u s did escape but he was subsequently f o u n d a n d killed. M u n d a was in Baetica, but the q u o t e d distances a n d l a n d m a r k s d o not a d d u p a n d the site is 236

uncertain. It is now t h o u g h t to have been near U r s o [Osuna], (Caesar), Spanish W a r , 28-31; Dio Cassius, 43: 35(4)-38; Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 104-105; Plutarch, C a e s a r , 56(1-3)

FORUM GALLORUM: I (43, April 14) - War of M u t i n a T h e issue which triggered this a n d the next action was the c o m m a n d of Cisalpine G a u l , which was held by Decimus Brutus until M a r k A n t o n y enacted a law assigning it to himself a n d a u t h o r izing him to t r a n s f e r C a e s a r ' s legions to his new province. He p r o m p t l y effected the take-over before the end of the current term a n d p e n n e d Brutus up in M u t i n a [Modena], which he besieged. T h e r e are two g o o d a c c o u n t s of the ensuing events. O n e is A p p i a n ' s ; the o t h e r is contained in a letter to Cicero f r o m Sulpicius G a l b a , w h o was with the consul Vibius P a n s a a n d w h o w r o t e within a few days of the actions. W h e n Brutus started to suffer f r o m h u n g e r . Octavian a n d the consul Hirtius m a r c h e d t o w a r d M u t i n a but waited at a little distance f o r Pansa, w h o was c o m i n g to join them. They sent C a r f u l e n u s ( A p p i a n calls him Carsuleius) with G a l b a a n d the M a r t i a n legion a n d two p r a e t o r i a n c o h o r t s to reinforce P a n s a . At this point A n t o n y sent out his cavalry a n d some light t r o o p s against P a n s a , while holding his two legions back in reserve. T h e o p p o s i n g forces met in some m a r s h y c o u n t r y near F o r u m G a l l o r u m [Caste/franco] where, a c c o r d i n g to A p p i a n a n d Dio Cassius, P a n s a was a m bushed. P a n s a ' s M a r t i a n s on the right wing a d v a n c e d on their o w n initiative a n d were forging a h e a d when A n t o n y suddenly charged out of F o r u m G a l l o r u m with his legions. At first the M a r t i a n s repulsed o n e of A n t o n y ' s legions, but they were then o u t f l a n k e d by the cavalry a n d b e c a m e s u r r o u n d e d . G a l b a s u m m o n e d help f r o m t w o legions of recruits, which were still c o m i n g up, a n d m a n a g e d to retreat t o w a r d their c a m p . Meanwhile, A n t o n y ' s p r a e t o r i a n s c o n f r o n t e d O c t a v i a n ' s in the r o a d , while P a n s a ' s left wing in the m a r s h y g r o u n d alongside the r o a d was o u t flanked by m o r e of A n t o n y ' s cavalry a n d was forced to retreat. G a l b a a d m i t s to heavy losses in the p r a e t o r i a n c o h o r t s a n d M a r t i a n legion. A c c o r d i n g to A p p i a n , O c t a v i a n ' s p r a e t o r i a n s perished to the last m a n , but P a n s a ' s t r o o p s held out until the consul himself was w o u n d e d a n d carried off the field to B o n o n i a [Bologna], Cicero, Letters to his Friends, 10: 30; Appian, Civil W a r s , 3: 67-69; Dio Cassius, 46: 37(5-6)

THE ROMAN

FORUM GALLORUM: II (43) - War of Mutina A f t e r the battle near F o r u m G a l l o r u m (above), A n t o n y tried to c a p t u r e the enemy c a m p but was repulsed. W h e n Hirtius, w h o was near M u t i n a , heard t h a t a battle h a d taken place, he hurried there with 20 veteran c o h o r t s a n d a t t a c k e d the weary a n d disordered A n t o n i a n s as they were w i t h d r a w i n g to their own c a m p . A c c o r d i n g to G a l b a , Hirtius routed a n d annihilated A n t o n y ' s m e n on the same g r o u n d as the previous battle. Cicero, Letters to his Friends, 10:30: Appian, Civil W a r s , 3: 70; Dio Cassius, 46: 37(7)-38(2)

M U T I N A (43) - War of Mutina T h e o u t c o m e of the e n c o u n t e r s at F o r u m G a l l o r u m dissuaded A n t o n y f r o m a f u r t h e r general e n g a g e m e n t . He preferred to bide his time until Brutus, besieged in M u t i n a [Modena], surrendered. O n the o t h e r side, Octavian a n d Hirtius w a n t e d to settle the issue by lifting the siege. T h e y m a d e a pass with their cavalry at the least defended part of the city, while their infantry p r e p a r e d themselves f o r battle. A n t o n y parried the cavalry a t t a c k with his cavalry alone but then h a d second t h o u g h t s a n d sallied out with t w o legions, as the enemy h a d h o p e d . H e sent f o r o t h e r legions f r o m various c a m p s , but they failed to arrive in time to prevent his defeat at the h a n d s of Octavian. Hirtius even b r o k e into A n t o n y ' s c a m p , but he was killed in the process. Against the advice of his friends, A n t o n y a b a n d o n e d the siege a n d h e a d e d f o r the Alps. Appian, Civil Wars, 3: 71-72; Dio Cassius, 38(5-7); Plutarch, A n t o n y , 17(1)

46:

L A O D I C E A (42) - C a m p a i g n of Cassius T h e c o m m a n d in Syria h a d been assigned to P. Cornelius Dolabella, but he blotted his c o p y b o o k when he killed one of the tyrannicides, C. T r e b o nius, w h o h a d previously held the c o m m a n d . C. Cassius L o n g i n u s immediately seized control of Syria a n d was given a u t h o r i t y by the senate to m a k e war on Dolabella. Cassius had the Syrian forces at his disposal. M o r e o v e r , the R o m a n t r o o p s w h o h a d been left in Egypt by C a e s a r a n d were on their way to Syria were easily p e r s u a d e d to desert to his side. With these r e i n f o r c e m e n t s Cassius joined battle with Dolabella, defeated him a n d then besieged him in the port of Laodicea [Al Ladhiqtyah]. Dolabella still had p o w e r on the sea, partly by virtue of ships which h a d been sent to him by C l e o p a t r a . This situation was dealt with by L. M u r c i u s Staius, w h o sailed into the h a r b o u r

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a n d defeated any ships that o p p o s e d him. Devoid of h o p e a n d fearing betrayal, Dolabella killed himself. Dio Cassius, 47: 30(1-5) M Y N D U S (42) - C a m p a i g n of Cassius Brutus a n d Cassius h a d gained c o n t r o l of all the eastern provinces but there were t h o r n s in their flesh - the R h o d i a n s a n d Lycians. These peoples were friendly to Octavian a n d A n t o n y a n d constituted a potential threat in the rear of the c o n s p i r a t o r s . It was decided that Brutus would deal with the Lycians, Cassius with R h o d e s . T h e R h o d i a n s u n d e r the c o m m a n d of their leaders, A l e x a n d e r a n d M n a s e a s , struck first. T h e y sailed their best 33 ships against Cassius at M y n d u s [Gumusliik], h o p i n g to take him by surprise. T h e R o m a n n u m b e r s are not k n o w n , but the R h o d i a n s were heavily o u t n u m b e r e d a n d were s u r r o u n d e d . T h e R o m a n ships were the heavier a n d were therefore superior at close q u a r t e r s when it came to r a m m i n g , while the swiftness of the R h o d i a n s was of little benefit to them. T h r e e of their ships were c a p t u r e d with their crews a n d two were sunk. T h e rest fled back to R h o d e s in a d a m a g e d condition. M a n y of the R o m a n s ' ships also were d a m a g e d but they suffered n o actual losses. Appian, Civil W a r s , 4: 71 R H O D E S (42) - C a m p a i g n of Cassius W h e n Cassius h a d repaired the d a m a g e inflicted to his ships off M y n d u s (above), he sailed against R h o d e s with 80 ships a n d t r a n s p o r t e d some foot soldiers across f r o m the m a i n l a n d . T h e R h o d i a n s sailed out to fight but were forced to give u p with the loss of two ships a f t e r being completely encircled. T h e city was not p r e p a r e d for a siege a n d was soon forced to capitulate. Appian, Civil W a r s . 4: 72 S C Y L L A E U M P R (42) - W a r against P o m p e i u s A f t e r the battle of M u n d a (45) which ended the Second Civil W a r , Sextus P o m p e i u s , the y o u n g e r son of P o m p e y , b e c a m e the rallying point for P o m p e i a n s f r o m all parts. Following the m u r d e r of C a e s a r in 44. Sextus was given c o m m a n d of the sea, which provided him with ships as well as men. He sailed to Sicily a n d o b t a i n e d the s u r r e n d e r of the island, which p r o m p t e d O c t a v i a n , C a e s a r ' s a d o p t e d son a n d heir, to send Salvidienus with a fleet to destroy him. Sextus sailed out against Salvidienus with a large fleet a n d they met off the Scyllaeum p r o m o n t o r y [Scilia] at the e n t r a n c e to the Straits of Messina. Sextus' ships were lighter 237


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a n d swifter t h a n those of his adversary a n d his crews were m u c h better trained a n d m o r e c a p a b l e of negotiating the heavy seas of the straits. Salvidienus was the first to w i t h d r a w . A p p i a n is s o m e w h a t a m b i v a l e n t in his assessment of the o u t c o m e . He says that b o t h sides suffered a b o u t equally but then refers to w h a t was left of Salvidienus' d a m a g e d fleet. Appian, Civil W a r s , 4: 85 P H I L I P P I : I (42, O c t o b e r 3) - W a r s of the Second T r i u m v i r a t e M a r c u s Brutus went t h r o u g h the Balkans collecting an a r m y in Greece, Illyria a n d M a c e d o n i a . Cassius meanwhile was d o i n g the same thing in Asia M i n o r . T h e two c o n s p i r a t o r s met u p together a n d set up c a m p near Philippi [Kr in ides] in M a c e d o n i a , where they fortified an i m p r e g n a b l e position on t w o hills a little over 2 miles f r o m Philippi a n d a b o u t a mile a p a r t . Cassius set up c a m p on o n e of the hills, Brutus on the other, a n d they built a fortification joining the c a m p s across the intervening space. T h e r e were m a r s h e s on o n e side of the hills a n d gorges on the other. T o c o m plete the defences, Cassius fortified the n a r r o w g a p between his c a m p a n d the m a r s h . W h e n M a r k A n t o n y a n d O c t a v i a n arrived they e n c a m p e d in the plain a b o u t a mile f r o m the enemy. Each side h a d 19 legions but those of Brutus a n d Cassius were u n d e r strength. On the o t h e r h a n d , they h a d 20,000 cavalry as against A n t o n y ' s 13,000. Brutus a n d Cassius had all they w a n t e d in the way of supplies a n d they were keen to spin out the c o n f r o n t a t i o n to their a d v a n t a g e . A n t o n y , by c o n t r a s t , feared delay a n d planned accordingly. Every day he led out his forces, a p p a r e n t l y entire, while a part of his force w o r k e d surreptitiously by d a y a n d night to m a k e a causeway over the m a r s h a n d to erect some forts to protect it. W h e n this h a d been c o m p l e t e d , he a t t a c k e d the e n e m y ' s fortifications between their c a m p a n d the m a r s h , demolished their palisade a n d forced a way in t h r o u g h the gate. Relying on the n a t u r a l strength of the place, Cassius h a d detailed only a few m e n to g u a r d the c a m p , which was taken with little difficulty. In the m e a n t i m e the rest of A n t o n y ' s forces, w h o had lined up as usual, were surprised to find that Cassius was p r e p a r e d to risk an o p e n battle. In a long, h a r d struggle the forces of A n t ony proved victorious. A t the same time, in w h a t was virtually a s e p a r a t e e n c o u n t e r , the forces of Brutus charged d o w n of their o w n initiative against O c t a v i a n ' s t r o o p s , put t h e m to flight a n d c a p t u r e d the c a m p which he a n d A n t o n y shared. 238

T h e defeated Cassius, however, deprived of his c a m p a n d u n a w a r e - according to most sources that Brutus h a d t r i u m p h e d , persuaded his shield bearer to kill him. It is t h o u g h t that a b o u t 8,000 of Cassius' men were killed; Octavian is believed to have lost a b o u t d o u b l e that n u m b e r . But since each side had w o n o n e r o u n d a n d lost a n o t h e r the score was broadly even. Appian, Civil W a r s , 4: 107-112; Plutarch, A n t o n y , 22(1-3) and Brutus, 40(10)-43; Dio Cassius, 47: 42-46 P H I L I P P I : II (42, O c t o b e r 23) - W a r s of the Second T r i u m v i r a t e A f t e r the first battle A n t o n y a n d O c t a v i a n remained e n c a m p e d opposite Brutus. N e w s that a large fleet which was bringing t h e m supplies had been destroyed in the Adriatic gave them considerable anxiety. H u n g e r was beginning to be felt a n d they w a n t e d a quick military settlement. Brutus, on the o t h e r h a n d , was well stocked a n d h a d complete c o n t r o l of the seas. He was content to watch the enemy starve to d e a t h . His troops, however, were becoming restive, a n d eventually he gave in a n d lined them up f o r battle. A p p i a n ' s a n d D i o ' s versions give the impression of a very o r d i n a r y battle, devoid of strategy, in which the t w o armies simply engaged with d r a w n swords in h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting. T h e forces of Brutus were slowly pushed back a n d gave way to flight. Plut a r c h ' s a c c o u n t is m o r e clarifying. Brutus, in his o w n sector on the right wing, o v e r c a m e the enemy left a n d d r o v e it back with the help of the cavalry. His left wing, however, h a d been extended to prevent it f r o m being o u t f l a n k e d by the e n e m y ' s superior n u m b e r s . This left a weak centre which was u n a b l e to hold its g r o u n d but b r o k e a n d fled, leaving the victorious right wing o p e n to encirclement. Brutus himself fled a n d later killed himself. N o n e of the a c c o u n t s gives a n y casualty figures. Plutarch, Brutus, 49; Appian, Civil W a r s , 4: 129; Dio Cassius, 47: 48(4-5)

128-

CILICIAN GATES (39) - Parthian War A f t e r Philippi (above), A n t o n y proceeded eastw a r d s with the intention of waging a war against the P a r t h i a n s . H e sent Publius Ventidius a h e a d to pave the way. O n the way Ventidius e n c o u n t e r e d Q u i n t u s Labienus, w h o h a d fought with Brutus a n d Cassius on the losing side a n d had not d a r e d to return h o m e for fear of the consequences. L a b i e n u s had not yet received some P a r t h i a n t r o o p s that he was expecting, a n d he was so

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terrified of Ventidius t h a t he ran a w a y t h r o u g h Syria with Ventidius on his heels. Ventidius overtook him near the Cilician G a t e s [Giilek Bogazi], It was here that the expected P a r t h i a n t r o o p s c a u g h t up with Labienus. but at the same time Ventidius received a r e i n f o r c e m e n t of heavy-armed infantry. Ventidius remained judiciously e n c a m p e d on the heights f o r fear of the P a r t h i a n cavalry. They, on the o t h e r h a n d , were utterly fearless a n d self-confident. T h e y did not even wait to join L a b i e n u s but a p p r o a c h e d the heights a n d charged straight u p them. T h e R o m a n s on t o p h a d little difficulty in hurling t h e m back d o w n the hill, killing m a n y of them. Even m o r e were killed by their own people when those fleeing downhill charged into o t h e r s w h o were still ascending. T h e survivors fled into Cilicia. Labienus himself offered n o opposition but a t t e m p t e d to escape a f t e r d a r k . His plan b e c a m e k n o w n to Ventidius, w h o set a m b u s h e s a n d either killed his men or w o n t h e m over to his o w n side, but Labienus m a n a g e d to get away. He was later f o u n d a n d killed. Plutarch, A n t o n y , 33(4); Dio Cassius, 48: 39-40

A M A N U S M (39) - Parthian War A f t e r recovering Cilicia, Ventidius proceeded to M o u n t A m a n u s [Nur Daglari], having first sent P o m p a e d i u s Silo a h e a d with the cavalry. P o m paedius tried to occupy the exceedingly n a r r o w A m a n i c G a t e s but he was defeated by P h r a n a pates, w h o was in c h a r g e of the P a r t h i a n garrison at the pass. P o m p a e d i u s would have lost his life if Ventidius h a d not h a p p e n e d to arrive at that time a n d fallen unexpectedly u p o n the enemy. W i t h his superior n u m b e r s he killed m a n y of them, including P h r a n a p a t e s . Dio Cassius, 48: 41(1-4); Plutarch, A n t o n y , 33(4); Strabo, 16: 2, 8

GINDARUS (38) - Parthian War Publius Ventidius heard that P a c o r u s , the son of O r o d e s of Parthia, was p r e p a r i n g to invade Syria. This worried him because his t r o o p s were still in winter q u a r t e r s a n d n o t h i n g was in place f o r a reception. He resorted to s u b t e r f u g e by getting a friendly 'confidence' to the ears of P a c o r u s to the effect t h a t his men would d o better to cross the E u p h r a t e s at their c u s t o m a r y place rather t h a n f u r t h e r d o w n where the river r a n t h r o u g h a plain. P a c o r u s was deceived by w h a t he assumed was deliberate m i s i n f o r m a t i o n a n d he crossed the river lower d o w n , as Ventidius h a d intended. This r o u t e was the longer of the two, which gave the R o m a n s m o r e time to prepare. They allowed the P a r t h i a n s

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to cross the river without o p p o s i t i o n a n d were c o n s p i c u o u s by their absence on the far side. C o n s e q u e n t l y , when the P a r t h i a n s reached the R o m a n c a m p at G i n d a r u s , they a t t a c k e d it immediately, expecting to take it with ease. A sudden sally took them by surprise, a n d as the c a m p was on high g r o u n d they were easily defeated by the heavy-armed R o m a n soldiers charging d o w n on them. W h e n P a c o r u s was killed, the P a r t h i a n s gave u p the struggle a n d were either killed or fled. T h e battle c a m e to be regarded as settlement in full f o r the disaster at C a r r h a e (53) a n d the d e a t h of Crassus, which had been such a bitter humiliation to the R o m a n s . Plutarch, A n t o n y , 34(1); Dio Cassius, 49: 1920(3); Strabo, 16: 2, 8 C U M A E (38) - W a r against P o m p e i u s Octavian engaged in a c a m p a i g n to rid himself of his o p p o n e n t Sextus P o m p e i u s , the younger son of P o m p e y , w h o had gone f r o m strength to strength. Sextus h a d been deserted by his admiral M e n o d o r u s , w h o h a d defected to Octavian. In his place, Sextus gave the naval c o m m a n d to Menecrates, the bitterest enemy of M e n o d o r u s , a n d ordered him to sail u p the Italian coast a n d intercept the enemy fleet. W h e n O c t a v i a n ' s fleet u n d e r Calvisius S a b i n u s a n d M e n o d o r u s c a u g h t sight of M e n e crates at d u s k , they retired into the Bay of C u m a e f o r the night. T h e next m o r n i n g they deployed their ships in a crescent f o r m a t i o n as close to the shore as possible. M e n e c r a t e s could not lure t h e m out to sea a n d so he a d o p t e d the alternative lactic of driving t h e m o n t o the rocks. As they were prevented by the hostile terrain f r o m moving, M e n e c r a t e s was able to d r a w off a n d renew his attack with fresh ships as he pleased. W h e n M e n o d o r u s was still afloat, he c a u g h t sight of his arch-enemy Menecrates. They charged at each other, grappled a n d f o u g h t in w h a t a m o u n t e d to a single c o m b a t at sea, oblivious to all a r o u n d . M e n e c r a t e s was w o u n d e d in the thigh, a n d when his ship was c a p t u r e d he threw himself o v e r b o a r d a n d was d r o w n e d . This was the only bright spot in the gloom on O c t a v i a n ' s side. Appian, Civil W a r s , 5: 81-83; Dio Cassius, 48: 46(5) M Y L A E (36) - W a r against P o m p e i u s O c t a v i a n was sailing with his fleet to the L i p a r a [Lipari] islands off north-east Sicily when he noticed considerable P o m p e i a n naval forces off the Sicilian shore. R e c k o n i n g that Sextus P o m peius was there in person, Octavian sailed a w a y 239


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with the intention of a t t a c k i n g T a u r o m e n i u m [Taormina], leaving A g r i p p a in c o m m a n d . This brilliant a d m i r a l took half of his ships a n d sailed f o r t h against the P o m p e i a n c o m m a n d e r D e m o chares (some say Papias) a n d his 40 ships off Mylae [Milazzo]. Meanwhile, according to o n e source, Sextus h a d sent a f u r t h e r 45 ships to the area a n d was himself following with a n o t h e r 70. A g r i p p a immediately s u m m o n e d the rest of his fleet to join him at t o p speed. Both of the ancient sources proceed to a dissertation of the relative merits of the o p p o s i n g ships a n d the quality of their s e a m a n s h i p . W h a t e v e r these m a y have been, the o u t c o m e was such that the P o m p e i a n s are said to have lost 30 of their ships a n d sunk only 5 of the enemy's. W h e n the remaining P o m p e i a n ships withdrew in good order, A g r i p p a c o n t i n u e d to h a r a s s them until they t o o k refuge a m o n g the shoals, where his larger ships would be unable to navigate. H e was intent on b l o c k a d i n g the enemy but he reluctantly accepted advice to retire. Appian, Civil W a r s , 5: 105-108; Dio Cassius, 49: 2-4(1)

T A U R O M E N I U M (36) - War against Pompeius Octavian sailed to T a u r o m e n i u m with three legions, 1,000 light t r o o p s a n d 2,000 allies. H e was laying out his c a m p when, to his a m a z e m e n t , Sextus P o m p e i u s arrived with a large fleet f r o m M e s s a n a having guessed the intentions of the other. T h e next d a y Octavian left his i n f a n t r y in the charge of Cornificius a n d sailed out to sea to forestall any a t t e m p t by the enemy to b l o c k a d e him. Sextus put to sea against him a n d a battle ensued which went on until nightfall. O c t a v i a n ' s fleet was utterly b r o k e n a n d dispersed. S o m e ships were c a p t u r e d ; others were set on fire; yet others tied to the Italian coast. Octavian spent the night in a small b o a t a n d eventually reached the shore with one a t t e n d a n t . Appian, 5(1-4)

Civil W a r s , 5: 110-111;

Dio Cassius,

49:

N A U L O C H U S (36) - W a r against P o m p e i u s In the Sicilian war between Octavian a n d Sextus Pompeius, the latter b e c a m e a f r a i d of O c t a v i a n ' s t r o o p s , of which there were 21 legions with 20,000 cavalry. Sextus had m o r e confidence in his naval forces a n d decided to stake everything on a m a j o r battle at sea. O n e source says t h a t he challenged Octavian to a naval duel a n d that a d a t e was fixed for an e n g a g e m e n t off N a u l o c h u s . O n each side 300 ships lined up, fully a r m e d with towers, 240

missiles a n d the best of machines. T h e device which in practice proved to be the most successful was a novel g r a b which h a d been devised by A g r i p p a , O c t a v i a n ' s brilliant admiral. This consisted of a long pole, b o u n d with iron to prevent it f r o m being cut or b r o k e n a n d on the end of which there was a claw. L o n g ropes were a t t a c h e d to the pole, which was propelled by a c a t a p u l t at long range. W h e n one of these devices g r a b b e d a target, the victim was hauled in by the ropes as the a t t a c k i n g ship backed water. As the prey also backed water, the result was a t u g - o f - w a r in which the heavier ships of O c t a v i a n were likely to win. A f t e r that it was a m a t t e r of b o a r d i n g a n d fighting on deck. W h e n A g r i p p a h a d o v e r p o w e r e d a n u m b e r of the enemy ships, 17 of them escaped t o w a r d the straits. T h e rest were cut off, a n d some which were driven a g r o u n d were either pulled off or set on fire. A c c o r d i n g to one source, D e m o chares killed himself to avoid c a p t u r e , while Sextus' o t h e r c a p t a i n , A p o l l o p h a n e s , deserted to Octavian. T h e P o m p e i a n ships which were still resisting surrendered. In the battle, Sextus lost 28 ships at sea; the rest were c a p t u r e d , b u r n t or beached a p a r t f r o m the 17 escapees. Only three of O c t a v i a n ' s ships were sunk. Sextus hurried a w a y leaving behind m o s t of his forces, w h o surrendered to Octavian, a n d bringing the Sicilian c a m p a i g n to a n end. Appian, Civil W a r s , 5: 118-121; 8(5)-U(l)

Dio Cassius,

49:

PHRAASPA (36) - Parthian War T h e successful c a m p a i g n of Publius Ventidius in Parthia (Cilician G a t e s , 39, et seq.) might have aroused some feelings of jealousy in M a r k A n t o n y . In consequence, Ventidius diplomatically postp o n e d f u r t h e r activities as a p r e c a u t i o n . A n t o n y eventually set out f o r P a r t h i a himself two years later, a f t e r P h r a a t e s had killed his o w n f a t h e r a n d seized the k i n g d o m . He received reinforcements f r o m A r t a v a s d e s of A r m e n i a , which b r o u g h t his forces up to 60,000 R o m a n s with 10,000 cavalry and 30,000 other nationals. Winter was a p p r o a c h i n g but A n t o n y was impatient. A n t o n y m a r c h e d on f r o m A r m e n i a t h r o u g h A t r o p a t e n e in such a h u r r y t h a t he refused to wait for his 300 w a g g o n s of siege-engines, which were to follow behind in the care of a large force u n d e r O p p i u s Statianus. W h e n P h r a a t e s heard a b o u t this, he sent a strong force of cavalry which s u r r o u n d e d Statianus, killing 10,000 of his men a n d destroying the siege e q u i p m e n t . M e a n w h i l e A n t o n y was besieging P h r a a s p a [ T a k h t i Suleiman], the royal

THE ROMAN

WORLD

city of M e d i a , a n d was bitterly regretting his folly over the engines. W h e n the P a r t h i a n a r m y arrived, A n t o n y tried to d r a w t h e m off to a pitched battle by m a k i n g an expedition with 10 legions a n d all his cavalry. T h e P a r t h i a n s started to encircle his c a m p a n d so A n t o n y pretended to be in retreat. H e m a r c h e d his men in perfect f o r m a t i o n past the b a r b a r i a n lines but h a d given instructions for a charge as soon as the legions were within a t t a c k i n g range. T h e b a r b a r i a n s repelled the initial cavalry charge, but their horses were terrified a n d bolted when the legions followed u p the a t t a c k , creating as m u c h noise as they could. T h e R o m a n cavalry pursued them f o r m a n y miles but, at the end of the day, the enemy losses were estimated to have been a mere 80 killed a n d 30 taken prisoner. O n their way back to P h r a a s p a , the R o m a n s were again a t t a c k e d a n d m a n a g e d to reach their c a m p only with great difficulty. T h e siege of P h r a a s p a h a d to be a b a n d o n e d . Plutarch, 26(2)

A n t o n y , 38-39;

Dio Cassius, 49:

25-

A C T I U M P R (31, S e p t e m b e r 2) - W a r against Cleopatra By 33, war between A n t o n y a n d O c t a v i a n h a d become inevitable. T h e balance in the p o p u l a r i t y of the two r u n n e r s in R o m e had been shifting in O c t a v i a n ' s f a v o u r . T h e scales were given a f u r t h e r p u s h when A n t o n y , while still married to Octavian's sister, agreed to become C l e o p a t r a ' s consort. T h e implications f o r R o m e were grave. T h e last straw c a m e when O c t a v i a n unscrupulously got hold of A n t o n y ' s will a n d read the c o n t e n t s to the senate. R o m e was o u t r a g e d , a n d war was declared against C l e o p a t r a . Octavian, as consul, was directed to p r o m o t e it. At the end of 32, A n t o n y moved d o w n t h r o u g h Greece a n d sent his fleet a h e a d to m o o r in the strait leading into the A m b r a c i a n G u l f [Arta]. H e h a d assembled a r o u n d 500 ships, m a n y of them very large ones (deceres or deciremes). Meanwhile, Octavian gathered his forces off B r u n d i s i u m [Brindisi] before crossing the sea to Epirus, where he d i s e m b a r k e d his a r m y on the n o r t h e r n side of the strait. He is said to have had 250 ships but m o d e r n estimates d o u b l e this figure. W h e n A n t ony arrived with his a r m y , he e n c a m p e d at the base of the A c t i u m [La Punta] peninsula, the s o u t h e r n side of the strait. F o r m a n y m o n t h s the two sides just watched each other. In the m e a n t i m e A g r i p p a , O c t a v i a n ' s a d m i r a l , h a d been p u t t i n g his fleet t h r o u g h its paces. A n attack u p o n the enemy fleet was a b a n d o n e d but he did succeed in cutting

their supply routes. Faced with shortages a n d desertions, A n t o n y eventually decided to give battle a n d lined up his m u c h reduced fleet in o p e n sea outside the straits with C l e o p a t r a a n d her 60 Egyptian ships as a r e a r g u a r d . Octavian conf r o n t e d them. But A n t o n y ' s fleet remained stationary a n d showed n o sign of engaging. A n t o n y h a d given orders that the sails were to be stowed on b o a r d - a most unusual event in naval battles which suggests that he m a y have c o n t e m p l a t e d a b r e a k - o u t if the wind was f a v o u r a b l e . Similar implications can be d r a w n f r o m the fact that he h a d taken all his treasure on b o a r d . M o r e o v e r , both Plutarch a n d Dio put heavy e m p h a s i s on disease, d e a t h a n d desertion in the A n t o n i a n c a m p . These f a c t o r s h a d reduced A n t o n y ' s m a n power to the extent that he h a d s u p e r f l u o u s ships, which he b u r n e d before the battle. T h o s e that were in service were u n d e r - m a n n e d , badly crewed a n d ripe f o r f u r t h e r desertions. W h e n this fleet showed n o sign of m o v e m e n t , O c t a v i a n eventually sailed against it in a crescent f o r m a t i o n with the aim of o u t f l a n k i n g the enemy, w h o reluctantly got u n d e r 241


WORLDS

way. A c c o r d i n g to P l u t a r c h , O c t a v i a n on the right wing backed water to lure the enemy left on a n d then turned to the attack in an o u t f l a n k i n g m o v e m e n t . A p a r t f r o m these snippets of inform a t i o n the two principal a c c o u n t s of the battle are deficient a n d give n o clear impression of events. D i o ' s is essentially a stereotyped discourse on the naval tactics of the time which could apply equally to m a n y o t h e r naval encounters. T h e u n u s u a l f e a t u r e of this battle was provided by the s u d d e n d e p a r t u r e of C l e o p a t r a , w h o hoisted her flag a n d proceeded to sail f r o m her place in the rear of A n t o n y ' s lines right t h r o u g h the battle zone, heading for Egypt. A n t o n y p r o m p t l y transshipped to a smaller vessel a n d followed as fast as he could, a b a n d o n i n g his own fleet in a m a n o e u v r e not calculated to bolster confidence in his crews. This fiasco ensured t h a t the loss of life was small in p r o p o r t i o n to the n u m b e r s involved a n d that the n u m b e r of c a p t u r e d ships a n d desertions was

242

c o m p a r a b l y great. It is said t h a t not m o r e t h a n 5,000 lives were lost but that 300 ships were captured. T h e survivors surrendered to Octavian a n d the a r m y followed suit soon a f t e r w a r d s . In the past century there have been a n u m b e r of reconstructions of these events with various interpretations. It has even been m o o t e d p r o v o catively that C l e o p a t r a m a y never have sailed away at the critical m o m e n t , n o r that her besotted lover a b a n d o n e d his fleet t o follow. These stories could have been the p r o p a g a n d i s t f a b r i c a t i o n s of O c t a v i a n to denigrate his adversary.* Such speculations a n d interpretations are outside the scope of this w o r k . A c t i u m , whatever did or did not h a p p e n , was the t u r n i n g point which led to Octavian's mastery of R o m e . Plutarch, A n t o n y , 61-68(3); Dio Cassius, 50: 1235; *M. Rostovtzeff, A History of the Ancient W o r l d , Oxford, 1928, vol. 2, p. 157

BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEXES


WORLDS

Select Bibliography GENERAL Bury, 4th Cary. 3rd

J.B. a n d Meiggs, edn. ( M a c m i l l a n , M . a n d Scullard, edn. ( M a c m i l l a n ,

R., A History of Greece, 1975) H . H . , A History of Rome, 1974)

SPECIFIC TOPICS A l t o n , E.H., ' T h e R o m a n A r m y , ' in Sandys, J.E. (ed.), Companion to Latin Studies, 3rd edn. ( C a m b r i d g e , 1921) Bickerman, E.J., Chronology of the Ancient World, revised edn. ( T h a m e s & H u d s o n , 1980) C o n n o l l y , P., Greece and Rome at War, revised edn. (Greenhill, 1998) C o n n o l l y , P., The Roman Army (Macdonald E d u c a t i o n a l , 1975) C o o k , A.B., 'Ships', in Whibley, L. (ed.), Companion to Greek Studies, 4th edn. ( C a m b r i d g e , 1931) Cottrell, L., Enemy of Rome (Evans, 1960) Fuller, J . F . C . , The Generalship of Alexander the Great (Eyre S p o t t i s w o o d e , 1958; W o r d s w o r t h , 1998) Fuller, J . F . C . , Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier & Tyrant (Eyre S p o t t i s w o o d e , 1965; W o r d s w o r t h , 1998)

244

G r a n t , M., Greek and Roman Historians: Information and Misinformation (Routledge, 1995) G r e e n , P.. Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C. (University of California Press, 1991) H a c k e t t , J. (ed.), Warfare in the Ancient World (Sidgwick & J a c k s o n , 1989) Lazenby, J.F., The Defence of Greece 490-479 (Aris & Phillips, 1993) Lazenby, J.F., The Spartan Army (Aris & Phillips, 1985) Lazenby. J.F., Hannibal's War (Aris & Phillips, 1978) Liddell H a r t , B.H., Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon (William Blackwood, 1926; reprinted Greenhill, 1992) O m a n , C., ' W a r ' , in Whibley, L. (ed.), Companion to Greek Studies, 4th edn. ( C a m b r i d g e , 1931) Scullard, H . H . , Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician ( T h a m e s & H u d s o n . 1970) S e k u n d a , N.V., The Ancient Greeks (Osprey, 1986) T a r n , W . W . , ' T h e R o m a n N a v y ' , in Sandys, J.E. (ed.), Companion to Latin Studies, 3rd edn. ( C a m b r i d g e , 1921) W a r r y , J., Warfare in the Classical World (Salam a n d e r , 1980)

Index of Persons Praenomina:

A.: A u l u s ; A p . : A p p i u s ; C . : G a i u s ; C n . : G n a e u s ; D.: D e c i m u s ; L.: L u c i u s ; M a m . : M a m e r c u s ; M ' . : M a n i u s ; M . : M a r c u s ; P.: P u b l i u s ; Q.: Q u i n t u s ; Ser.: Servius; Sex.: S e x t u s ; Sp.: S p u r i u s ; T.: T i t u s ; Ti.: T i b e r i u s

T h e R o m a n s in this i n d e x a r e e n t e r e d u n d e r t h e i r nomen ( f a m i l y n a m e ) , n o t cognomen, in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h logical p r a c t i c e . C r o s s - r e f e r e n c e s f r o m cognomen t o nomen (e.g. Scipio: see C o r n e l i u s ) a r e given f o r t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s w h o a r e e i t h e r g e n e r a l l y o r s e e m t o b e t h e m o s t likely o n e s t o b e k n o w n b y t h e i r cognomen. Achaemenes, Persian general: 59 Acilius. L.: 200 Acilius Glabrio. M \ : 129 Acrotatus, son of king Areus of Sparta: 116-17 Aelius Paetus. P.: 195 Aemilius Barbula. Q.: 164 Aemilius Lepidus. M.: 215 Aemilius Mamercinus, Ti.: 162 Aemilius Mamercus, L. (1), consul 484: 152 Aemilius Mamercus, L. (2), mil. tribune 377: 158 Aemilius Mamercus. Mam.: 155 Aemilius Mamercus Privernas, L.: 163 Aemilius Papus, L.: 176-7 Aemilius Paul(l)us, L (1). consul 216: 121, 181-2 Aemilius Paul(l)us, L (2), victor of Pydna: 134-5, 199 Aemilius Paul(l)us, M.: 174 Aemilius Regillus, L.: 131 Afranius, L.: 228-9, 235 Agatharchus, son of Agathocles: 112-13 Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse: 112-14, 170 Agathostratus, Rhodian admiral: 117 Agesandridas, Spartan commander: 76 Agesilaus, king of Sparta: 83-6 Agis II. king of Sparta: 70-1 Agis III, king of Sparta: 103 Agrippa: see Vipsanius Agron, king of Illyria: 118 Ahenobarbus: see Domitius Alcamenes. Spartan admiral: 75 Alcetas (1), general of Eumenes: 108 Alcetas (2). king of Epirus: 111 Alcibiades, Athenian general and politician: 71, 75, 77-81 Alcidas, Spartan admiral: 65 Alcisthenes, Spartan general: 85 Alexander, son of Alcetas (2) of Epirus: 111

Alexander, son of Aristobulus II of Judaea: 224-5 Alexander I of Epirus: 162

Alexander III ('the Great') of Macedon: 99-106 Alexander of Pherae: 93-4 Alexander Balas: 137-8 Allobrogicus: see Fabius Maximus Amompharetus, Spartan commander: 57 Ampius, C: 195-6 Anaxibius, Spartan general: 88 Androsthenes, general of Philip V: 127 Anicius Gallus, L.: 134 Antigonus I (Monophthalmos), a 'successor' of Alexander: 108-11. 113-14 Antigonus Doson. king of Macedonia: 120-1 Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia: 116-18 Antiochus, Alcibiades' steersman: 79 Antiochus I (Soter): 114, 117 Antiochus III ("the Great'): 121-5. 129-32 Antiochus IV (Epiphanes): 135, 137 Antiochus V (Eupator): 136 Antiochus Hierax: 117, 119 Antipater. a 'successor' of Alexander: 103, 106-8 Antiphilus. Greek commander: 106 Antonius. M (Mark Antony): 224, 231, 236-8. 240-2 Antonius Hibrida, C.: 221 Apollonius Daus, governor of CoeleSyria: 137 Aquilius. M'.: 211 Aratus, general of the Achaean League: 118-21

Archelaus, general of Mithridates: 211-12 Archidamus, king of Sparta: 115 Archidamus III. king of Sparta: 91-2, 96, 162 Areus, king of Sparta: 116-17 Ariaeus, Persian lieutenant of Cyrus: 82 Ariobarzanes. Persian satrap: 104 Ariobarzanes I of Cappadocia: 211 Ariovistus, king of the Suebi: 221-2

Aristagoras, tyrant of Miletus: 50 Aristeus, Corinthian general: 63 Aristides. Athenian politician: 56 Aristippus, tyrant of Argos: 118 Aristobulus II of Judaea: 224 Aristodemus (1). Messenian leader: 48 Aristodemus (2) 'the Effeminate' of Cumae: 50 Aristodemus (3). dictator of Megalopolis: 117 Aristomenes, Messenian leader: 48-9 Aristonicus: 204-5 Arsaces, Parthian king: 123 Artabazus, Persian commander: 57 Artaphernes, Persian general: 52 Artaxerxes. king of Persia: 82 Astyochus, Spartan commander: 76 Atilius Calatinus, A.: 172 Atilius Regularis, C.: 176-7 Atilius Regulus. C.: 173-4 Atilius Regulus, M (I), consul 294: 167-8 Atilius Regulus. M (2). consul 256: 173-4 Atinius, C.: 199 Attalus (1), general of Alexander: 108 Attalus (2). brother of Eumenes: 131-2 Attalus I of Pergamum: 119. 122, 124-5 Attalus III of Pergamum: 204 Attius Varus. P.: 229. 235 Aulius Cerretanus. Q.: 163 Aurelius Cotta, M.: 216 Bacchides. general of Antiochus: 136-7 Bardylis, king of Illyria: 94 Bituitus. king of the Arverni: 205 Bocchus, king of the Moors: 206-7 Boges (Butes), Persian commander: 58 Brasidas, Spartan commander: 68-70 Brennus (1), Gallic chieftain (4th century): 156 Brennus (2), Gallic chieftain (3rd century): 115-16. 132 Brutus: see Junius Caecilius Metellus, L.: 175 245

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK

AND ROMAN

Caecilius Metellus Celer, Q.: 221 Caecilius Metellus Creticus, Q.: 218 Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Q.: 136-7 Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Q.: 206 Caecilius Metellus Pius. Q.: 210. 213-16 Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio, Q.: 231. 235 Caepio: see Servilius Caesar: see Julius Callias, Athenian commander: 63 Callicratidas, Spartan admiral: 79-80 Callimachus, Athenian polemarch: 53 Calpurnius, M.: 172-3 Calpurnius Piso. C.: 199 Calvinus: see Domitius, Veturius Calvisius Sabinus, C.: 239 Camillus: see Furius Camulogenus, a leader of the Aulerci: 226-7 Caninius Rebilus, C.: 227 Cannicus, Gallic lieutenant of Spartacus: 218 Carbo: see Papirius Carfulenus, D.: 236 Carinas, lieutenant of Carbo: 213-14 Carvilius Maximus. Sp.: 168 Cassander. a •successor' of Alexander: 108, 111. 114 Cassius Longinus. C.: 225, 227, 237-8 Castus. Gallic lieutenant of Spartacus: 218 Catilina: see Sergius Cato: see Porcius Catugnatus, chief of the Allobroges: 221 Catulus: see Lutatius Cerethrius, Gallic leader: 116 Chabrias, Athenian general: 90-1. 95 Chares, Athenian general: 95-6, 99 Charminus, Athenian commander: 76 Chremonides. Athenian politician: 117 Cicero: see Tullius Cimon, Athenian commander: 58-9. 61 Cincinnatus: see Quinctius. Manlius Cincius Alimentus. L.: 188 Claudius Caecus, Ap.: 167 Claudius Caudex, Ap.: 171 Claudius Cento, Ap.: 134 Claudius Glaber, C.: 217 Claudius Inregillensis, Ap.: 159 Claudius Marcellus. M (1), father of (2), consul 222: 177, 182-5, 187-8 Claudius Marcellus, M (2), son of (I). consul 196: 196 Claudius Marcellus, M (3): 208 Claudius Nero, Ap.: 128 Claudius Nero. C.: 189-91 Claudius Nero. Ti.: 201 Claudius Pulcher, Ap.: 186 Claudius Pulcher, C.: 201-2 Claudius Pulcher, P.: 175 Clearchus, Spartan general under Cyrus: 82 Cleippides, Athenian commander: 65 Cleitus (1), Illyrian chieftain: 100 Cleitus (2), Macedonian admiral: 107-9 246

WORLDS Cleombrotus. king of Sparta: 90-1 Cleomenes I. king of Sparta: 52 Cleomenes III, king of Sparta: 119-21 Cleon. Athenian politician: 68. 70 Cleonymus. Spartan pretender: 116. 165-6, Cleopatra VII: 241-2 Cluentius, L.: 210 Cnemus. Spartan commander: 64 Conon, Athenian general: 79, 81, 86 Cornelius Cethegus, C.: 196 Cornelius Cossus. A.: 160 Cornelius Dolabella. P (1). consul 283: 169 Cornelius Dolabella, P (2), consul suffete 44: 237 Cornelius Merula, L.: 197 Cornelius Scipio. P. father of Africanus: 177-9, 183-6. 192 Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, P.: 203 Cornelius Scipio Africanus. P.: 178, 187-9, 191-5 Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, L.: 213 Cornelius Scipio Asina, Cn.: 172 Cornelius Scipio Barbatus, L.: 166-7 Cornelius Scipio Calvus, Cn, uncle of Africanus: 177-9. 183-6, 192 Cornelius Scipio Nasica, P.: 198 Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum, P.: 134-5 Cornelius Sulla Felix, L.: 207, 209-14 Cornificius. Q, propraetor in Illyria: 232 Cosconius, C.: 210 Cotta: see Aurelius Crassus: see Licinius, Papirius Craterus, Macedonian general: 104-5, 107-8 Critolaus, General of the Achaeans: 137 Crixus, lieutenant of Spartacus: 217-18 Curio: see Scribonius Curius Dentatus, M.: 168. 170 Cursor: see Papirius Cyrus, elder son of Darius II of Persia: 82 Damocritus. Achaean general: 136 Darius I, king of Persia: 52-4 Darius III, king of Persia: 101-4 Datis, Persian general: 52 Decius Mus. P (1). father of (2): 160-1 Decius Mus. P (2). son of (1): 166-7 Deinias, general of Cassander: 111 Deinocrates, leader of Syracusan exiles: 112, 114 Demetrius I of Macedon. 'Poliorcetes': 110-11, 113-15 Demetrius II of Macedon: 118 Demetrius of Pharos: 121-2 Demetrius I of Syria: 136-8 Demetrius II of Syria: 138 Demosthenes (1), Athenian general: 65-9, 73-5 Demosthenes (2), Athenian orator: 98-9 Diaeus. general of the Achaeans: 137 Didius, C, legate of Caesar: 235

Dinocrates (1). prefect of Macedonian king: 127-8 Dinocrates (2). Messenian despot: 133 Diogenes, general of Antiochus III: 123 Diomedon. Athenian commander: 75-6 Dion, 'liberator' of Sicily: 94-5 Dionysius, Ionian commander: 52 Dionysius I. ruler of Sicily: 81, 83, 86-9, 91-2 Dionysius II. tyrant of Syracuse: 94, 97 Diophanes. Athenian commander: 130 Diphilus, Athenian commander: 73 Dolabella: see Cornelius Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cn.: 205 Domitius Ahenobarbus, L.: 228 Domitius Calvinus, Cn.: 231, 233 Domitius Calvinus, M.: 214 Dorieus. Rhodian commander: 77 Drappes, leader of the Senones: 227 Ducetius, Sicel leader: 60-1 Duilius, C.: 172 Epaminondas. Theban general: 90-1. 93-4. 117 Ephialtes, Malian informer: 54 Epicydes, Carthaginian general: 185 Epitadas, Spartan commander: 68 Eucleidas. brother of Cleomenes III: 120-1 Eudamus, Rhodian admiral: 130-1 Eumenes I of Pergamum: 117 Eumenes II of Pergamum: 129-32 Eumenes of Cardia, Macedonian general: 108-10 Euphranor. Rhodian admiral: 233 Eurybiades, Spartan commander: 55-6 Eurylochus, Spartan commander: 66 Eurymedon, Athenian commander: 65. 68, 73-4 Euthydemus, Greek 'king of Bactria':

123—4 Evagoras, king of Salamis (Cyprus): 89 Evetion, Athenian admiral: 107 Fabius, C.: 228 Fabius Ambustus, C.: 163 Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus. Q.: 205 Fabius Maximus Rullianus. Q.: 162-7 Fabius Maximus Servilianus, Q.: 204 Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator, Q.: 180-1, 186-7 Fabius Vibulanus. M.: 152 Fabius Vibulanus. Q.: 153-4 Fabricius Luscinus, C.: 169 Flaccus: see Fulvius. Valerius Flamininus: see Quinctius Flaminius, C.: 177. 180 Flavius Fimbria, C.: 212 Fufidius. L.: 214 Fulvius. Ser.: 174 Fulvius Centumalus Maximus, Cn.: 187 Fulvius Flaccus, Cn.: 185 Fulvius Flaccus, Q (1), consul 212: 186 Fulvius Flaccus. Q (2), consul 179: 200-1 Fulvius Maximus Centumalus. Cn.: 166

INDEX Fulvius Nobilior, M.: 198 Fulvius Nobilior, Q.: 202 Furius Camillus, L.: 162 Furius Camillus, M, dictator 5 times: 156-8 Furius Medullinus, L.: 158 Furius Purpurio, L.: 196 Gabinius, A.: 224-5, 232 Gaius Pontius, Samnite leader: 162 Galba: see Sulpicius Gellius Egnatius, Samnite commander: 167 Gellius Publicola, L.: 217 Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse: 56 Gentius, Illyrian king: 134 Genucius Aveninensis, L.: 158-9 Glaucias, chief of the Taulantians: 100 Glos, Persian admiral: 89 Gorgias, Syrian general: 135 Gorgoleon, Spartan polemarch: 90 Gracchus: see Sempronius Gylippus, Spartan general: 72-5 Hamilcar Barca, father of Hannibal: 175-6 Hampsicora, Sardinian leader: 183 Hannibal, son of Hamilcar Barca: 130-1, 177-91, 193-5 Harpagus, Persian general: 53 Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo: 185-6, 189, 191-3 Hasdrubal Barca, son of Hamilcar: 179, 183, 185-6, 188-91 Hegesileos, Athenian commander: 93 Heloris, Syracusan commander of Croton: 88 Helvius, M.: 197 Herennius, C.: 215 Herippidas, Spartan commander: 84 Hermocrates, Syracusan: 78 Hicetas (1), tyrant of Leontini: 97-8 Hicetas (2), tyrant of Syracuse: 115 Hiero II of Syracuse: 170-1, 178 Hieron of Syracuse: 58 Hippo, tyrant of Messana: 98 Hippocrates, Athenian general: 69 Hippocrates, Spartan commander: 78 Hippocrates of Gela: 52 Hipponicus, Athenian commander: 65 Hirtius, A.: 236-7 Hirtuleius, L, lieutenant of Sertorius: 214-15 Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus: 52 Horatius Pulvillus, C.: 153 Hyrcanus II of Judaea: 224 Inaros, Libyan: 59 Indibilis, prince of the Ilergetes (Spain): 185 Iphicrates, Athenian general: 86-8, 95 Ismenias, Theban leader: 85 Jason of Pherae: 90 Juba II. king of Numidia: 229-30. 234-5 Jugurtha. Numidian: 205-7

Julius Caesar, C.: 221-4, 226-37 Julius Caesar, L.: 209-10 Junius Brutus, M.: 237-8 Junius Brutus Albinus, D.: 224, 228, 236-7 Labienus. Q.: 238-9 Labienus, T.: 223, 226-7, 234, 236 Laches, Athenian commander: 66 Laelius, C.: 188-9, 192-5 Laevinus: see Valerius Lafrenius, T, Italic leader: 210 Lamachus, Athenian commander: 71-2 Lamponius, M. Italic leader: 209 Lasthenes, Cretan leader: 218 Leon (1), Athenian commander: 75-6 Leon (2), Spartan commander: 76 Leonidas, king of Sparta: 54 Leonnatus, Macedonian nobleman: 106-7 Leosthenes, Athenian condottiere: 106 Leotrophides, Athenian commander: 78 Leotychides, Greek commander: 58 Lepidus: see Aemilius Leptines (1), brother of Dionysius I: 83, 89 Leptines (2), lieutenant of Agathocles: 103 Licinius Crassus, P (1), consul 171: 133 Licinius Crassus, P (2), lieutenant in Social War: 209 Licinius Crassus, P (3), son of the triumvir (below): 222, 224-5 Licinius Crassus Dives, M, triumvir: 214, 218, 225 Licinius Crassus Dives, P.: 193 Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus, P.: 204-5 Licinius Lucullus, L (1), consul 151: 202-3 Licinius Lucullus, L (2), praetor 104: 207 Licinius Lucullus, L (3), consul 74: 212-3, 216-9 Livius Salinator, C.: 129-30 Livius Salinator, M.: 189-90 Longus: see Sempronius, Sulpicius Lucterius, leader of the Cadurci: 227 Lucullus: see Licinius Lucullus, M.: 214 Lutatius Catulus, C.: 175-6 Lutatius Catulus, Q (1), consul 102: 208 Lutatius Catulus. Q (2), consul 78: 215 Lyciscus, general of Cassander: 111 Lycomedes, Mantinean commander: 91 Lycophron (1), Corinthian commander: 69 Lycophron (2), tyrant of Pherae: 96 Lydiades, tyrant of Megalopolis: 118, 120 Lysander, Spartan general: 79, 81, 84 Lysias, regent of Syria: 135-6 Lysimachus, a 'successor' of Alexander: 114-15 Maccabeus, Jonathan, Jewish patriot: 136-7

OF

PERSONS

Maccabeus, Judas, Jewish patriot: 135-6 Maccabeus, Simon, Jewish patriot: 136-7 Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta: 124 Maenius, C.: 162 Mago, brother of Hannibal: 179, 181, 183-6, 191 Mamercus, tyrant of Catana: 98 Mamertines, the: 170-1 Manilius, M'.: 203 Manlius, Cn.: 207 Manlius, L (1), consul 256: 173—4 Manlius, L (2), proconsul 78: 214 Manlius Acidinus Fulvianus, L.: 199 Manlius Cincinnatus, Cn.: 152 Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus, T.: 159, 161 Manlius Torquatus, T: 183 Manlius Volso, A.: 201 Manlius Volso, Cn.: 132-3 Marcellus: see Claudius Marcius Rutulus, C.: 160 Marcius Septimus, L.: 192 Mardonius, Persian general: 57 Marius, C.: 206, 208-9. 211, 213 Marius, C (son): 213—4 Marius, L, legate: 221 Marius Egnatius, Samnite leader: 210 Masinissa, king of Numidia: 185, 189, 191-5, 202 Masistius, Persian cavalry commander: 57 Mausolus, satrap of Caria: 95 Megabyzus, Persian commander: 61 Megistonous. Arcadian from Orchomenus: 120 Melissus. Samian leader: 62 Memnon, Rhodian, military commander: 101 Menecrates, commander of Sextus Pompeius: 239 Menedaius, Peloponnesian commander: 66 Menelaus, general of Ptolemy: 113-4 Menodorus. admiral of Octavian: 239 Metellus: see Caecilius Micion, ?Macedonian: 107 Milo of Croton, leader of Crotoniates: 50 Miltiades, Athenian general: 52-3 Mindarus, Spartan admiral: 76-7 Minucius, L.: 154 Minucius Augurinus, Ti.: 165 Minucius Rufus, M.: 181 Minucius Thermus, Q.: 197-8 Mithridates VI of Pontus: 211-12, 216-20 Mithridates of Pergamum: 233 Mithrobarzanes, Armenian general of Tigranes: 218 Molon, governor of Media: 121 Mummius, L.: 137 Muttines, African half-caste: 185 Myronides, Athenian commander: 60 Nabis, tyrant of Sparta: 124, 128 247

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK

AND ROMAN

Nautius, Sp.: 168 Neoptolemus (1), general of Eumenes: 108 Neoptolemus (2), general of Mithridates: 211, 213 Nero: see Claudius Nicanor (1), of Stageira, general of Cassander: 108-9 Nicanor (2), Seleucid general: 136 Nicias, Athenian politician and general: 65, 68-71. 73-5 Nicolochus, Spartan admiral: 90 Nicomedes, Spartan commander: 60 Nicomedes IV of Bithynia: 211, 216 Nicostratus (1), Athenian admiral: 65. 70 Nicostratus (2). Achaean leader: 127 Nobilior: see Fulvius Norbanus, C.: 213-14 Numisius. Latin commander: 161 Octavianus, C, future Emperor Augustus: 236-42 Octavius, M, admiral of Pompey: 230, 232 Olympiodorus, Athenian general: 1 14 Onesilus, Cypriot leader: 51 Onomarchus of Elatea. Phocian general: 96 Orgetorix. leader of the Helvetii: 221 Oroeses, king of the Albanians: 220 Osaces, Parthian regent: 227 Pacorus, son of king Orodes of Parthia: 227, 239 Pagondas, Boeotian general: 69 Panaetolus, general of Antiochus III: 124 Pansa: see Vibius Papirius Carbo, Cn (1), consul 113: 205, 207 Papirius Carbo, Cn (2), consul 82: 213—4 Papirius Crassus, Sp.: 158 Papirius Cursor, L (1), dictator 325 & 310: 162, 165 Papirius Cursor, L (2), son of above: 168 Papirius Mugilanus, L.: 158 Papius Mutilus, C.: 209 Parmenio. general of Alexander: 101, 104 Patroclus, Egyptian commander: 117 Paul(l)us: see Aemilius Pausanias (1). king of Sparta: 57 Pausanias (2), grandson of above: 84 Pausistratus, Rhodian commander: 130 Pelopidas, Theban general: 90-1, 93 Perdiccas, general of Alexander: 101, 108

Perdiccas II, king of Macedonia: 63 Pericles (1), Athenian politician: 61-2 Pericles (2). son of (I): 80 Perilaus, general of Antigonus: 110 Perperna, M.: 205 Perperna Veiento, M.: 215-16 Perseus, king of Macedonia: 133-5 Petilius Spurinus, Q.: 202 248

WORLDS Petreius, M.: 221, 228-9, 234 Phalaecus, Phocian general: 96 Pharnabazus. Persian commander: 75-8, 83—4, 86 Pharnaces, king of Bosphorus: 233-4 Phayllus. Phocian general: 96 Pheidippides (Philippides), Marathon runner: 52 Philip II, king of Macedon: 94. 96-9 Philip V, king of Macedon: 124-8 Philocles, Athenian general: 81 Philomelus. Phocian general: 95-6 Philopoemen. general of Achaean Confederacy: 120, 123-5, 128-9, 133 Phintias, tyrant of Acragas: 115 Phocion, Athenian statesman and general: 97, 107 Phormio, Athenian admiral: 64 Phraates IV, king of Parthia: 240 Pisander. Spartan admiral: 86 Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens: 49 Plutarch, tyrant of Eretria: 97 Poetilius Libo, M.: 164 Pollis, Spartan admiral: 90 Polyanthes, Corinthian commander: 73 Polycleitus, admiral of Ptolemy I:

110-11 Polyperchon, general of Alexander: 108 Polytropus, Spartan general: 91 Polyxenidas, Rhodian commander of Antiochus: 129-31 Pompedius Silo, Q, Italic leader: 210 Pompeius, L, military tribune 171: 134 Pompeius, Q (1), consul 141: 204 Pompeius, Q (2), consul 88: 211 Pompeius Magnus, Cn (1), Pompey 'the Great': 213-6, 220-1, 224, 230-2 Pompeius Magnus, Cn (2), son of (1): 236 Pompeius Magnus Pius, Sex, younger son of Pompey: 237, 239 40 Pompeius Strabo, father of Pompey: 210 Popilius Laenas, M.: 202 Porcius Cato. L.: 210 P o r c i u s C a t o . M.: 129, 197-8 Porus, Indian king: 105-6 Postumius Albinus, A.: 206 Postumius Albus Regillensis, A.: 151 Postumius Caudinus, Sp.: 163 Postumius Megellus, L.: 165 Postumius Tubertus, A.: 155 Praxitas, Spartan commander at Sicyon: 86 Prusias I Cholus, king of Bithynia: 122 Ptolemy, son of Pyrrhus: 116 Ptolemy I Soter, general of Alexander: 101, 111, 113-15 Ptolemy II Philadelphus: 117 Ptolemy IV Philopator: 122-3 Ptolemy VI Philometor: 138 Ptolemy XIII: 233 Ptolomaeus, general of Antigonus: 111 Publicola: see Valerius Publilius Philo, Q.: 162 Pulcher: see Claudius Pyrrhias. Aetolian general: 124

Pyrrhus, king of Epirus: 115-17, 169-70 Pythagoras, philosopher: 50 Quinctius, D.: 187 Quinctius Capitolinus Barbatus, T.: 153-4 Quinctius Cincinnatus, L.: 154 Quinctius Cincinnatus, T.: 158 Quinctius Crispinus. L.: 199 Quinctius Crispinus, T.: 188 Quinctius Flamininus. T.: 126-8 Quinctius Poenus Capitolinus Crispinus, T.: 159 Regillus: see Aemilius Regulus: see Atilius Romilius Rocus Vaticanus, T.: 154 Rufus: see Minucius, Salvidienus, Sulpicius Rullianus: see Fabius Maximus Rutilius Lupus, P.: 209 Rutilius Rufus, P.: 206 Saburra, Numidian general: 229-30, 235 Salinator: see Livius Salvidienus Rufus, Q.: 237-8 Scipio: see Caecilius, Cornelius Scopas, Aetolian general: 125 Scribonius, C.: 200 Scribonius Curio, C.: 229-30 Seleucus I Nicator, a 'successor' of Alexander: 111. 114-15, 122 Seleucus II Callinicus: 117 Seleucus III Ceraunus: 121 Seleucus IV Philopator: 130 Sempronius Gracchus. Ti (1), consul 215 & 213: 184 Sempronius Gracchus. Ti (2), consul 177: 201 Sempronius Longus, Ti.: 179, 182 Sempronius Tuditanus. C.: 197 Sempronius Tuditanus, P.: 193 Sergius Catilina, L.: 221 Sertorius, Q.: 214-17 Servilius Ahala. Q.: 159 Servilius Caepio. Q.: 207 Servilius Priscus. P.: 152 Servilius Priscus, Q.: 156 Servilius Priscus Fidenas, Q.: 155 Servilius Structus, Sp.: 153 Siccius Dentatus, L.: 154 Sittius. P. mercenary captain: 235 Sophocles, Athenian general: 67 Sophron, Egyptian admiral: 117 Soron, Syrian general: 135 Spartacus, leader of gladiators' rebellion: 217-18 Statius Gellius. Samnite leader: 165 Strombichides, Athenian commander: 76 Sulla: see Cornelius Sulpicius Galba, Ser.: 221, 223-4, 236- 7 Sulpicius Galba Maximus, P.: 125-6 Sulpicius Longus, C.: 164 Sulpicius Peticus, C.: 159-60 Sulpicius Rufus. P.: 211

INDEX Surenas, Parthian general: 225 Syphax, king of Masaesulii (Numidians): 193^1 Syrmus, king of the Triballians: 100 Tarquinius Superbus, L. the last king of Rome: 151 Telesinus, Samnite chieftain: 214 Teleutias, Spartan commander: 88-9 Telys, tyrant of Sybaris: 50 Terentius Varro, C.: 181-2 Teuta, Queen of Illyria: 118-19 Theagenes, Theban commander: 99 Themistocles, Athenian politician: 54-6 Theodotus, admiral of Antigonus:

110-11 Theopompus (1), king of Sparta: 48 Theopompus (2), Spartan polemarch: 90 Theramenes. Athenian admiral: 77-9 Therimachus. Spartan governor: 88 Theron, tyrant of Acragas: 56, 58 Thirty Tyrants of Athens: 81-2 Thrasybulus, Athenian admiral: 76-7, 81-2, 84, 88 Thrasydeus, tyrant of Acragas: 58-9 Thrasyllus, Athenian admiral: 76-8, 80 Thrasymelidas, Spartan admiral: 68

Thymochares, Athenian admiral: 76 Tigranes, commander of the Medes: 58 Tigranes II 'the Great" of Armenia: 218-19 Timarchus, Athenian commander: 78 Timoleon, liberator of Sicily: 97-8, 112 Timotheus, Athenian general: 90, 95 Tissaphernes, Persian satrap of Sardes: 75, 77, 83-4 Tolmides, Athenian general: 60-1 Triarius: see Valerius Tryphon (Salvius), self-proclaimed king in Sicily: 207 Tullius Cicero, M. the famous orator: 227 Tyrtaeus, Spartan elegiac poet: 49 Valerius, L.: 169 Valerius Flaccus, L.: 129, 197 Valerius Laevinus, C.: 202 Valerius Laevinus, M.: 188 Valerius Laevinus, P.: 169 Valerius Maximus Corvus, M.: 160-1 Valerius Potitus, L.: 154 Valerius Potitus Publicola, P.: 157-8 Valerius Publicola, M.: 160 Valerius Publicola, P.: 153

OF

PERSONS

Valerius Triarius, C.: 219 Varenus, P.: 217 Varro: see Terentius Varus: see Attius Vatinius. P.: 232 Ventidius Bassus. P.: 238-41 Vercingetorix. 'king' of the Arverni: 226-7 Verginius Tricostus Rutilus, A.: 153 Vetilius, C.: 204 Vettius Scaton, Italic leader: 209-10 Veturius Calvinus, T.: 163 Vibius Pansa Caetronianus, C.: 236 Vidacilius, C, Italic leader: 210 Vipsanius Agrippa, M.: 240-1 Viriathus, Lusitanian leader: 204 Volso: see Manlius Volumnius Flamma Violens, L.: 166-7 Xanthippus, Spartan mercenary commander: 174 Xenoclides, Corinthian leader: 62 Xenodocus, leader of Acragantines: 113 Xenophon (1), Athenian general: 63 Xenophon (2). Athenian mercenary leader and writer: 82 Xerxes I, king of Persia: 54. 56, 59

249

Index of Places C : C a p e ; Isl(s): I s l a n d ( s ) ; L: lake; M ( s ) : m o u n t a i n ( s ) ; P: P a s s ; Pr: P r o m o n t o r y ; R : R i v e r T h e b r a c k e t e d f i g u r e s a r e t h e d a t e s of b a t t l e s . All t h e d a t e s a r e B.C. T h e n a m e s in italics b e f o r e t h e d a t e s a r e t h e m o d e r n n a m e s ('[;>/]' if t h e m o d e r n a n d a n c i e n t n a m e s a r e t h e s a m e ) of t h e sites o r of n e a r b y places. T h e n a m e s of t h e p r e s e n t p r o v i n c e s , d e p a r t m e n t s o r d i s t r i c t s a r e a l s o given in italics. P a g e r e f e r e n c e s f o r m a p s a r e given in bold t y p e . Abacaene or Abacaenum [nr Tripi] (392), NE Sicily: 14. 86 Abae [nr Exarchos] (352). Phocis, S Greece: 17. is! 96 Abas [Alazani] R (65), Georgia/Azerbaijan: 21. 220 Abolus R (338), probably Alabus R [Cantaro], E Sicily: 14. 98 Abydus [Nara] (411) (322), Troad, NW Anatolia: 19. 20, 77, 107 Acerrae [Acerra] (90), Campania [id\, S Italy: 13. 209 Acharnae [Acharna] (403), Attica, S Greece: 18, 81 Acragas, later Agrigenlum [Agrigento, formerly Girgenti] (472) (406) (307) (262), S Sicily: 14, 58, 80, 113, 171 Actium Pr [La Punta] (31), Acarnania, W Greece: 17. 241 Adasa [Adaseh] (161), Judaea, Palestine: 22, 136 Admagetobriga or Magetobriga [IMoigte de Broie, nr Pontailler-sur-Saone] (61), E France: 10. 221 Adranum: see H a d r a n u m Adrumentum: see Hadrumentum Adys (256), Tunisia (site unknown): 174 Aebura [probably Cuerva] (181), Hispania Tarraconensis [Toledo], C Spain: 9, 200 Aegates Isls [Egadi] (241), off NW Sicily: 14. 175 Aegimurus Isl [Al Djamur] (245), off Bay of Carthage. Tunisia: 15, 175 Aegina Isl [Egina or Aiyina] (459), Saronic Gulf, S Greece: 18. 60 Aegitium [nr Varnakovis] (426), Aetolia, 5 Greece: 17. 65 Aegospotami R (405). unidentified stream in the Thracian Chersonese, European Turkey: 81 Aesepus R [Gonen] (74). Phrygia Minor, NW Anatolia: 19. 20. 217 Aesernia [Isernia] (90). Samnium [Molise], S Italy: 13. 209 Aesis R [Esino] (82), Umbria/Picenum [Marches], N Italy: 11. 213 Aetna: see Inessa Agrigentum: see Acragas Alabanda [Araphisar nr Cine] (197). Caria, SW Anatolia: 20. 127 Alalia [Aleria] (c.540), Corsica: 11. 49 Alee ['!Alcazar de San Juan] (179). Hispania Tarraconensis [Ciudad Real], C Spain: 9, 201 Alesia [Alise-Ste-Reine] (52), Gallia Celtica [Cote-d'Or], France: 10. 227 Alexandria [id] (47), Egypt: 15. 232 Alexandria-Eschate [Leninabad, formerly Khojent] (328), Tadzhikistan: 21, 105 Algidus M [Compatri] (465) (458) (455) (449) (431) (418), Latium [id], S Italy: 13, 153. 154. 155. 156 Allia R ['.'Fo.tto delta Bettina] (390) (380), Latium [id], S Italy: 13. 156, 158 250

Allifae [Alife] (307), Samnium [Campania], S Italy: 13. 165 Alpheus R [Alfios] (146). Elis/Arcadia, 5 Greece: 18. 137 Altis: see Olympia (364) Alyzia [nr Mitikas] (375), Acarnania. W Greece: 17. 90 Amanus M [Nur Daglari] (51) (39). Cilicia/Syria, SE Anatolia: 20. 227. 239 Amnias R [Gokirmak] (88). Paphlagonia, N Anatolia: 20. 211 Amorgos Isl [id], (322), Cyclades, Aegean: 19, 107 Amphipolis [Amfipolis] (422), Macedonia. N Greece: 16. 17. 19. 70 Ampsaga R [Rummel] (203), Numidia, Algeria: 15. 193 Ana R [Guadiana] (79), C & SW Spain: 9. 214 Ancyra [Ankara] (236) (189), Galatia, C Anatolia: 20. 117. 132 Andros Isl [id] (246). Cyclades, Aegean: 19. 117 Anio R [Aniene] (361) (211), Latium [id], S Italy: 11. 13. 159, 186 Antigonea (51). nr Antioch [Antakya], Syria (site unidentified): 227 Antium [Anzio] (482) (468), Latium [id], S Italy: 12. 13. 152, 153 Aous R [ Vijose] (198), Epirus, Albania: 16. 17, 126 Aphrodisias [nr Ovacik] (315), Cilicia, S Anatolia: 20. 110 Apollonia [nr Fier] (312). Illyria, Albania: 16. I l l Apollonia (220), Babylonia, Iraq (site unidentified): 121 Aquae Sextiae [Aix-en-Provence] (102), Gallia Narbonensis [Bouches-du-Rhone], S France: 10, 208 Aquilonia [Lacedonia] (293), Samnium [Campania], S Italy: 13.

168 Arar R [Saone] (58), E France: 10. 221 Arausio [Orange] (105). Gallia Narbonensis [Vaucluse], S France: 10. 207 Arginusae Isls (406), off Mysia, Aegean: 19, 80 Argos [id] (272). Argolis, S Greece: 18. 116 Aricia [Ariccia] (506) (495), Latium [id], S Italy: 13. 50, 152 Arisba or Arisbe [nr Beybas] (218). Troas, NW Anatolia: 19. 122 Arius R [Heri-Rud] (208), Afghanistan: 21. 123 Arretium [Arezzo] (284), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy: I I . 168 Arsanias R [Mural or Eastern Euphrates] (68), Armenia, now E Turkey: 21, 219 Artemisium (480), site of Temple of Artemis on north coast of Euboea I [Evvoia]: 17. 55 Asculum Picenum [Ascoli Piceno] (89). Picenum [Marches], N Italy: 11, 210 A(u)sculum Satrianum [Ascoli Satriano] (279), Apulia [/V/|, SE Italy: 12, 169 Aspis: see Clupea Astapa or Ostippo [Estepa] (206), Hispania Baetica [Seville]. S Spain: 9. 192 Astura R [id] (338), Latium [id], S Italy: 13. 162

INDEX Athacus (200), probably in the Lyneus district of Macedonia (place unknown): 125 Aurinx or Oringis (213), Hispania Baetica, 5 Spain (site uncertain): 184 Axona R [Aisne] (57), Gallia Belgica, N France: 10, 223 Azotus or Ashdod [Ashdod, formerly Esdud\ (147), Judaea, Israel: 22. 136 Baecula [Bailen] (208). Hispania Baetica [Jaen], S Spain: 9. 188 Baetis R [Guadalquivir] (211) (80). S Spain: 9. 185, 214 Bagradas R [Medjerda] (255) (49), Tunisia: 15. 174, 229 Bath-Zacharias [Beit Skaria] (162). Judaea, Palestine: 22. 136 Beneventum [Benevento] (297) (275) (214), Samnium [Campania], S Italy (Maleventum before 268): 13, 166. 170, 184 Berea or Berretho or Bethzetho [Bireli] (160), Judaea. Palestine: 22. 136 Beth-Horon or Bethoron [Beit Ur] (166). Judaea, Palestine: 22. 135 Beth-Zur or Bcthsura [Beit Sur] (165). Judaea, Palestine: 22, 135 Bibracte [Mont Beuvray] (58). Gallia Celtica [Sadne-et-Loire]. C France: 10, 222 Boar's Barrow (c.684), Messenia, S Greece (site unknown): 49 Bola (389). Latium [id], S Italy (site uncertain): 157 Bolissus [ Volissos] (412). Chios, off Lydia, Aegean: 19. 75 Bosphorus [id] (318), Turkey: 19. 20. 108, 109 Bovianum [Bojano] (305) (298). Samnium [Molise], S Italy: 12. 13. 165, 166 Byzantium [Istanbul] (408), European Turkey: 16. 20. 78 Cabala (379), Sicily (place unknown): 89 Cabira or Neocaesarea [Niksar] (72), Pontus, N Anatolia: 20. 217 Caiatia [Caiazzo] (295), Samnium [Campania], S Italy: 13, 167 Caicus R [Bakir f a n ] (230). Mysia, W Anatolia: 19. 20. 119 Calagurris Nassica [Calahorra] (186) (74), Hispania Tarraconensis [Logrofio], N Spain: 9, 199, 216 Callicula (or Eribianus) M (217), ridge on C a m p a n i a / S a m n i u m border, 5 Italy: 180 Callinicus (171), a hill near Larissa [Larisa], Thessaly, C Greece: 17. 133 C a m a l a t r u m (71), S Italy (place unknown): 218 C a m a r i n a [id] (258), S Sicily: 14. 172 C a m e r i n u m [Camerino] (295). Umbria [Marches], N Italy: 11. 167 C a m p of Pyrrhus (192), Laconia, S Greece (north of Sparta; unidentified site): 128 Campi Macri (176), Cisalpine G a u l [Emilia], N Italy: 11. 201 Campi Raudii: see Vercellae (101) C a m p u s Martius (389). Rome, Italy: 157 C a n n a e [Canne] (216). Apulia, SE Italy: 12. 181 C a n t e n n a M (71), C a m p a n i a or Lucania, S Italy (unidentified): 218 C a n u s i u m [Canosa di Puglia] (209) (89) (83). Apulia [id], SE Italy: 12. 187, 210, 213 C a p e of Italy (260), possibly T a u r i a n u m Pr [C. Vaticano], Bruttii [Calabria], SW Italy: 172 C a p h a r s a l a m a [Selemiyeh] (161). Judaea. Palestine: 22, 136 C a p h y a e [Kliotussa or Chotousa] (220), Arcadia, S Greece: 18. 121

C a p r i m a (314), Caria, SW Anatolia (place unknown): 111 C a p u a [Santa Maria Capua Vetere] (343) (212) (211) (83), C a m p a n i a [id], S Italy: 12. 13. 160, 185, 186, 213 Carales [Cagliari] (215), Sardinia: 12, 183 Cardamyle [Kardamila] (412), Chios 1. off Ionia, Aegean: 19. 75

OF

PLACES

C a r m o n e or C a r m o [Carmona] (207), Hispania Baetica [Seville], SW Spain: 9. 189 Carrhae or C h a r a n [Harran] (53), N Mesopotamia, Turkey: 20, 21,225 Carteia [ElRocadillo nr San Roque] (206) (46). Hispania Baetica [Cadiz], SW Spain: 9. 192, 235 Carthage (147). Tunisia: 15. 203 C a r t h a g o Nova: see New C a r t h a g e Carystus (173), Liguria, N Italy (place unknown): 202 C a t a n a [Catania] (397), E Sicily: 14, 83 Cauca [Coca] (151), Hispania Tarraconensis [Segovia], N Spain: 9, 202 Caudine Forks (321), S a m n i u m [Campania], S Italy (precise site uncertain): 162 C a u d i u m [Montesarchio] (314), Samnium [Campania], S Italy: 13. 164 C a u e (395), NW Anatolia (unidentified): 84 Cecryphalea Isl [Angistrion] (459), Saronic Gulf, S Greece: 18. 60 Cephisus R [Kifissos] (352). Boeotia, S Greece: 17, 18, 96 Cerata Ms (The Horns) (409), twin peaks on border between Megaris and Attica, S Greece: 18, 77 Chaeronea [id] (352) (338) (146) (86), Boeotia, S Greece: 17, 18. 96, 98. 137, 212 Chalcedon or Calchedon [Kadikoy] (408) (74), Bithynia, NW Anatolia: 19, 20. 78, 216 Chalcis (429), Aetolia, S Greece: 18, 64 Chares R (235). Argolis, S Greece (unidentified): 118 C h a u n u s M (179), probably C a u n u s M, near Bilbilis [Calatayud], Zaragoza, Spain: 201 Chios Isl [id] (411) (357) (201). off Ionia. Aegean: 19. 76, 95, 125 Cilician Gates [Giilek Bogazi] (39), pass in T a u r u s Mountains, Cilicia, S Anatolia: 20, 238 Cimolia: see Megara (458) Cirta or C o n s t a n t i n a [Constantine] (106), N u m i d i a , N Algeria: 15. 206: (203) see Ampsaga R Cissis or Cissa [probably Guissona] (218). Hispania Tarraconensis [Lerida], NE Spain: 9, 179 Citium [Larnaca] (381), Cyprus: 20. 89 Clanis or Glanis R [Chiana] (82), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy: 11, 213 Clastidium [Casteggio] (222), Gallia C i s p a d a n a [Lombardy], N Italy: 11, 177 Cleonae [Kleonai] (235), Argolis, S Greece: 18. 118 Clupea or Aspis [Kelibia] (208), Tunisia: 15. 188 Clusium [Chiusi] (225) (82), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy: 11. 176, 213, 214 Cnidus (394), at tip of Cnidian Chersonese [Resadiye Peninsula], Doris, SW Anatolia: 19. 20. 86 Colline G a t e (477) (360) (211) (82). Rome, Italy: 153, 159, 186. 214 Coloe or Gygaeus L [Marmara Gold] (c.229), nr Sardes, Lydia, W Anatolia: 19. 119 C o m a n a Pontica [nr Tokat] (68), Pontus, N Anatolia: 20. 219 Complega (179). Hispania Tarraconensis (Celtiberia), C Spain (unidentified): 201 C o m u m [Como] (196), Gallia T r a n s p a d a n a , [Lombardy], N Italy: 11, 196 Contrebia [nr Albarracin] (181). Hispania Tarraconensis [Teruel], E Spain: 9. 200 Coprates R [Dez] (317), Susiana, Iran: 21. 109 Coracesium [Alanya] (67), Cilicia, S Anatolia: 20. 219 Corcyra Isl [Corfu] (427), off Epirus, Ionian Sea: 17, 65 Corinth [id] (369), 5 Greece: 18, 91: Long Walls (392), parallel walls connecting Corinth with the port of Lechaeum: 86 251

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK

AND ROMAN

WORLDS

Coronea [id] (447) (394) (352) (347). Boeotia, S Greece. 17. 18. 61, 86. 96. 97 Corupedium (Plain of Cyrus) (281). nr Manisa, Lydia, W Anatolia (site unidentified): 115 Corycus or Corycium Pr [C. Koraka] (191). Lydia, W Anatolia: 19, 129 Cos Isl [id] (c.246), Sporades, off Caria, Aegean: 19. 117 Crannon [Krannon nr Larisa] (322), Thessaly, N Greece: 17. 107 Cremaste [nr Kirazli] (388). Hellespontine Phrygia, NW Anatolia: 19. 88 Cremera R [Fosso della Valchetta] (477), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy (identity uncertain): 152 Cremona [id] (200), Gallia Transpadana [Lombardy], N Italy: 11. 196 Cretopolis (319). Pisidia. S Anatolia (exact site unknown): 20.

Emmaus [Amwas] (166). Judaea. Palestine: 22. 135 Emporiae [Atnpurias] (195), Hispania Tarraconensis [Gerona], NE Spain: 9. 197 Ephesus [nr Selfuk] (c.498) (409) (c.246). Lydia. W Anatolia: 19. 20. 51, 77, 117 Eretria [id] (411), Euboea I [Evvoia], off E Greece: 17. 18. 76 Eribianus M: see Callicula M Erineus [id] (413). Achaea, 5 Greece: 18. 73 Erisana (140). Lusitania, W Spain/Portugal (unidentified): 204 Eryx [Erice] (406), NW Sicily: 14. 80 Esquiline Forum (88). Rome. Italy: 211 Eurymedon R [Koprii f a r / ] (c.468), Pamphylia/Pisidia. 5 Anatolia: 20. 59 Eurymenae (312). Epirus. W Greece (unidentified): 111 Evander's Hill (182). Messenia. S Greece (place unknown): 133

108

Crimisus R [Fredolo] (339), NW Sicily: 14. 98 Crocian Plain (352). Thessaly, E Greece (site of Mikrothivai Airport): 17, 96 Cromnus (365), Arcadia. S Greece (place unidentified): 92 Cronium [nr Palermo] (379), N Sicily (site unidentified): 89 Croton [Crotone] (204). Bruttii [Calabria], SW Italy: 12. 193 Cuballum (189), Galatia, C Anatolia (place unknown): 132 Cumae or Cyme (524) (474), Campania, S Italy. 12, 13. 50, 58; off (38): 239 Cunaxa (401), Babylonia, Iraq: 21. 82 Cyamosorus R [upper Simeto] (c.274), NE Sicily: 14. 170 Cydonia [Canea or Khania] (69), NW Crete: 19.' 218 Cynoscephalae Ms [Chalkoddnion] (364) (197), Thessaly, N Greece: 17. 93. 126 Cynossema Pr [nr KiUtbahir] (411), Thracian Chersonese [Gallipoli], European Turkey: 16. 76 Cypsela [Ipsala] (188), Thrace, European Turkey: 16. 132 Cyrus R [Kiir] (66), Azerbaijan/Georgia: 21. 220 Cythera Isl [Kithira] (424). off southern tip of Laconia, Mediterranean: 18. 19, 69 Cyzicus (410), on Arctonnesus [Kapidagi] peninsula in Propontis, NW Anatolia: 16. 19. 77 Damurias R (338). E Sicily (unidentified): 98 Danube R: see Ister Dascylium [nr Ergili] (396) (395). Phrygia Minor, NW Anatolia: 19. 83, 84 Delium [Dilesst] (424), Boeotia, 5 Greece: 17, 18. 69 Delphi [id] (356) (279), Phocis, 5 Greece 17. 18. 95. 116 Derae (c.685). Messenia. S Greece (place unknown): 48 Dipaea (c.471), Arcadia, S Greece (site disputed): 59 Drepanum [Trapani] (368) (249). NW Sicily: 14. 92, 175 Dyme [Kato Akliaia] (225), Achaea, S Greece: 18. 120 Dyrrhachium. formerly Epidamnus [Durres. formerly Durazzo] (48). Illyria. Albania: 16: Lesnikia [Gesnike] R (48). flows into the Bay of Dyrrhachium: 230 Ebro R: see Iberus Ecnomus Pr [Poggio di Sant 'Angelo] (311) (256), near Licata, S Sicily: 14. 112, 173 Edessa [Vodena] (286), Macedonia. N Greece: 16. 115 Eion (476). Port of Amphipolis, Macedonia, N Greece: 16, 17, 19, 58 Elatea [Elatia] (305), Phocis [Ftluotis], S Greece: 17. 114 Elleporus R [ICallipari] (389). Bruttii. S Italy (a small stream): 88 Elpeus R (168). Thessaly. N Greece (rises on M Olympus; unidentified): 134 Embata or Embaton (356), on the coast near Erythrea. Lydia. W Anatolia (site unknown): 95 252

Falernus M (90), probably Picenum. N Italy (unidentified): 210 Faventia [Faenza] (82). Gallia Cispadana [Emilia], N Italy: 11. 214 Fenectane Plains (339), ?Latium. S Italy (site unknown): 161 Fidenae [Castel Giubileo] (437) (426). Latium [(>/], 5 Italy: 12. 13. 154. 155 Firmum [Fermo] (90). Picenum [Marches], N Italy: 11, 210 Forum Gallorum [Caste/franco] (43), Gallia Cispadana [Emilia], N Italy: 11, 236, 237 Fucinus L [now Piana del Fucino] (89), Marsian territory [Abruzzi & Molise], S Italy: 13. 210 Gabene or Gabiene (316), an eparchy of Elymais (map p.21). Iran (battle site unknown): 110 Galeria or Galaria [probably Gagliano Castelferrato] (312), C Sicily: 14. 112 Garganus M [Gargano] (72), Apulia [id], SE Italy: 12, 217 Gaugamela (331), Assyria, Iraq: 21. 103 Gaurium [Gavrion] (407). Andros I, Cyclades, Aegean: 19. 79 G a u r u s M [Spaccata] (343). Campania [id], S Italy: 13. 160 Gaza [id] (312), Israel: 15. 22, 111 Gergovia [Gergovie] (52). Gallia Celtica [Puy-de-Ddme], S France: 10. 226 Geranium or Gereonium [nr Casacalenda] (216), Samnium [Molise], S Italy: 13, 181 Gindarus (38). N E of Antioch. Syria: 20. 239 Glanis R: see Clanis R Granicus R [Kocabas] (334). Phrygia Minor, NW Anatolia: 19. 2 0 , 101

Great Foss (f.682), Messenia, S Greece (location unknown): 49 Great Plains [nr Souk el Kremis] (203). Numidia. Tunisia: 15. 193 G r u m e n t u m [Grumento Nova] (215) (207) (90), Lucania [Basilicata], S Italy: 12. 182. 189. 209 Gurasium (391). probably Latium. S Italy (place unknown): 156 Gytheum [Gythion or Yithiori] (192), Laconia. S Greece: 18. 128 H a d r a n u m [Adrano] (344). E Sicily: 14. 97 Hadrumentum. Adrumentum or Adrymes [Soi/ise or Susa] (46). Tunisia: 15, 234 Haliartus [Aliartos] (395), Boeotia, S Greece: 17. 84 Halieis [Portoclielion] (459), Argolis, S Greece: 18. 59 Harpasus R [Akyay] (c.229). Caria. SW Anatolia: 19. 119 Hasta [nr Jerez de la Frontera] (186). Hispania Baetica [Seville], S Spain: 9. 199 Hellespont [Dardanelles] (321) (c.229), Turkey: 16. 108. 119 Helorus R [Tellaro] (c.492), SE Sicily: 14. 52 Heraclea [Policoro] (280). Lucania [Basilicata], S Italy: 12. 169

INDEX Heraclea Lyncestis [nr Bilola, formerly Monastir] (358), Macedonia. 16, 94 Heraclea M i n o a [nr Montallegro] (262). SW Sicily. 14. 171 Herculaneum (293), S a m n i u m . 5 Italy (place unknown): 168 Herdonea or Herdoniae [Ordona] (212) (210). Apulia [id], SE Italy: 12. 185. 187 H e r m a e u m or Mercurii Pr [C. Bon] (255), Tunisia'. 15. 174 Hermeum (353). the Temple of Hermes at C o r o n e a . Boeotia, 5 Greece: 96 Himera (480) (409), N Sicily (exact site uncertain): 14. 56, 78 Himera R [Sa/so] (446) (211), S Sicily: 14. 61, 185 Hippo Regius [Bone] (46). Numidia, Algeria: 15. 235 H o r n s (Megaris): see Cerata Ms Hyampolis [nr Exarchos] (347), Phocis, S Greece: 17. 18, 97 Hyblaeus R (280), SE Sicily (unidentified): 115 Hydaspes R [Jheium] (326). Pakistan: 21, 105 Hysiae [nr Achladokampos] (c.669). Argolis. S Greece: 18. 49 Ibera [nr St Carles de la Rdpita] (215). Hispania Tarraconensis [Tarragona], E Spain: 9. 183 Iberus or Hiberus R [Ebro] (217), NE Spain: 9. 179 Idomene (426). name given to two peaks in Amphilochia (Epirus). W Greece: 17. 66 Ilerda [Lerida] (49). Hispania Tarraconensis [Lerida], NE Spain: 9. 228 Ilipa or Silpia [Alcala del Rio] (206) (193), Hispania Baetica [Seville], S Spain: 9. 191. 198 lliturgi [nr Cahanes] (215) (195). Hispanis Tarraconensis [Caste/Ion], E Spain: 9, 183. 197 lliturgi [nr Andujar] (213). Hispania Baetica [Cordoba], S Spain:

9. fs4 Ilorci [Lorca] (211). Hispania Tarraconensis [Murcia], SE Spain: 9. 186 Imbrinium (325), Samnium, S Italy (place unknown): 162 Inessa or Aetna [nr Paterno] (426). E Sicily: 14, 66 Intercatia (151). Hispania Tarraconensis [Zamora], N Spain: 9, 203 lntibili [nr Benicarlo] (215). Hispania Tarraconensis [Caslellon], E Spain: 9. 184 Ipsus (301), central Phrygia, W Anatolia (site uncertain): 20, 114 Isara R [/.kt

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