Averroes' Tahafut Al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) Volumes I and II

"E. J. W. GIBB MEMORIAL" NEW SERIES XIX

AVERROES' TAHAFUT AL-TAHAFUT (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)

T R A N S L A T E D FROM T H E ARABIC W I T H I N T R O D U C T I O N AND N O T E S BY

S I M O N VAN DEN BERGH

VOLUMES I A N D II

PUBLISHED AND D I S T R I B U T E D BY THE T R U S T E E S OF THE "E. J. W. GIBB MEMORIAL"

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by mimeograph or any other means without permission in writing from the publishers. © EJW Gibb Memorial Trust 1954 Reprinted 1969 Reprinted as one volume 1978 and 1987 ISBN o 906094 04 6 Produced in association with Book Production Consultants, Cambridge, England

Reprinted at the University Press, Cambridge

THIS VOLUME IS ONE OF A SERIES PUBLISHED BY THE TRUSTEES OF T H E " E . J. W. G I B B M E M O R I A L " The funds of this Memorial are derived from the Interest accruing from a Sum of money given by the late MRS GIBB of Glasgow, to perpetuate the Memory of her beloved Son

ELIAS JOHN W I L K I N S O N GIBB and to promote those researches into the History, Literature, Philosophy and Religion of the Turks, Persians and Arabs, to which, from his Youth upwards, until his premature and deeply lamented Death in his forty-fifth year, on December 5, 1901, his life was devoted.

" These are our works, these works our souls display; Behold our works when we have passed away."

CLERK OF T H E

TRUST

P. R. Bligh, F.C.A. c/o Spicer and Oppenheim Leda House, Station Road Cambridge, England

A catalogue of other publications by the Truat will be sent upon request.

VOLUME I

PREFACE I wish to express my warmest thanks to the Trustees of the Gibb Memorial Fund for making the publication of this work possible, and especially to Professor Sir Hamilton Gibb, who asked me to undertake the work and who has not only read the proofs but has continually given me his interest and encouragement. I am also deeply indebted to Dr. R. Walzer, who has read the proofs, carefully checked the references in my notes, and composed the indexes and the Greek-Arabic and Arabic-Greek vocabularies. I have also to thank Dr. S. M. Stern for his help in completing the subject-index. Finally, I wish to pay a tribute to one who is no longer amongst us, Father Maurice Bouyges, without whose admirable text the work could never have been undertaken.

The marginal numbers in Vol. I refer to the text of Father Bouyges's edition of the Tahafut al Tahafut in his Bibliolheca Arabica Scholasticorum, vol. iii,

Beyrouth, 1930. The asterisks indicate different readings from those to be found in Bouyges's text: cf. the Appendix, Vol. I, pp. 364 ff.

CONTENTS (VOLUME i)

INTRODUCTION

pa#

*

TRANSLATION THE FIRST DISCUSSION

I

Concerning the Eternity of the World

THE THE THE THE

FIRST PROOF SECOND PROOF THIRD PROOF FOURTH PROOF

I 37 57 58

THE SECOND DISCUSSION The Refutation of their Theory of the Incorruptibility of the World and of Tint Motion

69 and

THE THIRD DISCUSSION

87

The demonstration of their confusion in saying that God is the agent and ttu maker of the world and that the world in His product and act, and the demonstration that these expressions are in their system only metaphors without any real sense

THE FOURTH DISCUSSION

i56

Showing that they are unable to prove the existence of a creator of the world

THE FIFTH DISCUSSION

i7o

To show their incapacity to prove God's unity and the impossibility of two necessary existents both without a cause

THE SIXTH DISCUSSION

186

To refute their denial of attributes

THE SEVENTH DISCUSSION

221

To refute their claim that nothing can share with the First its genus, andbe differentiated from it through a specific difference, and that with respect to its intellect the division into genus and specific difference cannot be applied to it

THE EIGHTH DISCUSSION

235

To refute their theory that the existence of the First is simple, namely that it is pure existence and that its existence stands in relation to no quiddity and to no essence, but stands to necessary existence as do other beings to tfieir quiddity

THE NINTH DISCUSSION To refute their proof that the First is incorporeal

241

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CONTENTS

THE TENTH DISCUSSION 250 To prove their incapacity to demonstrate that the world has a creator and a COUStt and that in fact they are forced h admit atheism THE ELEVENTH DISCUSSION To show the incapacity of those philosophers who believe that th* First know othtr things besides its own self and that it knows the genera and thi Sficies in a Wwtrsai way, to prove that this is so

255

THE TWELFTH DISCUSSION About the impotence of the philosophers to prove that God knows Himself

a6

rW«.)>i&ti

9

THE THIRTEENTH DISCUSSION To refute those who affirm that God is ignorant of the individual things which are divided in time into present, past, and future

275

THE FOURTEENTH DISCUSSION To refute their proof that heaven is an animal moving in a circle in obedience to God

285

THE FIFTEENTH DISCUSSION To refute the theory of the philosophers about the aim which moves heaven

293

THE SIXTEENTH DISCUSSION To refute the philosophical theory that the souls of the heavens observe all the particular events of this world

300

ABOUT THE NATURAL SCIENCES

311

THE

FIRST DISCUSSION

316

The denial of a logical necessity between cause and effect THE

SECOND DISCUSSION

333

The impotence of the philosophers to show by demonstrative proof that the soul is a spiritual substance THE

THIRD DISCUSSION

356

Refutation of the philosophers* proof for the immortality of the soul T H E F O U R T H DISCUSSION

359

Concerning the philosophers' denial of bodily resurrection A P P E N D I X : Changes proposed in the Arabic Text

365

I N D E X of Proper Names

374 (VOLUME

11)

NOTES Index of Proper Names mentioned in the Introduction and in the Notes Index of Subjects mentioned in the Notes Some contradictions in Aristotle's System Arabic-Greek Index to the Notes " 2 Greek-Arabic Index to the Notes

1 207 211 215 1 6 218

INTRODUCTION P it may be said that Santa Maria sopra Minerva is a symbol of our European culture, it should not be forgotten that the mosque also was built on the Greek temple. But whereas in Christian Western theology there was a gradual and indirect infiltration of Greek, and especially Aristotelian ideas, so that it may be said that finally Thomas Aquinas baptized Aristotle, the impact on Islam was sudden, violent, and short. The great conquests by the Arabs took place in the seventh century when the Arabs first came into contact with the Hellenistic world. At that time Hellenistic culture was still alive; Alexandria in Egypt, certain towns in Syria—Edcssa for instance—were centres of Hellenistic learning, and in the cloisters of Syria and Mesopotamia not only Theology was studied but Science and Philosophy also were cultivated. In Philosophy Aristotle was still 'the master of those who know', and especially his logical works as interpreted by the Neoplatonic commentators were studied intensively. But also many Neoplatonic and Ncopythagorean writings were still known, and also, very probably, some of the old Stoic concepts and problems were still alive and discussed. T h e great period of translation of Greek into Arabic, mostly through the intermediary of Christian Syrians, was between the years 750 and 850, but already before that time there was an impact of Greek ideas on Muhammadan theology. The first speculative theologians in Islam arc called Mu'tazilites (from about A.D. 723), an exact translation of the Greek word axirj/iariKot (the general name for speculative theologians is Mutakallimun, 5(OA»CTIKOI, dialecticians, a name often given in later Greek philosophy to the Stoics). Although they form rather a heterogeneous group of thinkers whose theories are syncretistic, that is taken from different Greek sources with a preponderance of Stoic ideas, they have certain points in common, principally their theory, taken from the Stoics, of the rationality of religion (which is for them identical with Islam), of a lumen naturale which burns in the heart of every man, and the optimistic view of a rational God who has created the best of all possible worlds for the greatest good of man who occupies the central place in the universe. They touch upon certain difficult problems that were perceived by the Greeks. The paradoxes of Zeno concerning movement and the infinite divisibility of space and time hold

I

x INTRODUCTION their attention, and the subtle problem of the status of the nonexistent, a problem long neglected in modern philosophy, but revived by the school of Brentano, especially by Meinong, which caused an endless controversy amongst the Stoics, is also much debated by them. A later generation of theologians, the Ash'arites, named after Al Ash'ari, born A.D. 873, are forced by the weight of evidence to admit a certain irrationality in theological concepts, and their philosophical speculations, largely based on Stoicism, are strongly mixed with Sceptical theories. They hold the middle way between the traditionalists who want to forbid all reasoning on religious matters and those who affirm that reason unaided by revelation is capable of attaining religious truths. Since Ghazali founds his attack against the philosophers on Ash'arite principles, we may consider for a moment some of their theories. The difference between the Ash'arite and Mu'tazilite conceptions of God cannot be better expressed than by the following passage which is found twice in Ghazali (in his Golden Means of Dogmatics and his Vivification of Theology) and to which by tradition is ascribed the breach between Al Ash'ari and the Mu'tazilites. 'Let us imagine a child and a grown-up in Heaven who both died in the True Faith, but the grown-up has a higher place than the child. And the child will ask God, "Why did you give that man a higher place?" And God will answer, "He has done many good works." Then the child will say, "Why did you let me die so soon so that I was prevented from doing good?" God will answer, "I knew that you would grow up a sinner, therefore it was better that you should die a child." Then a cry goes up from the damned in the depths of Hell, "Why, O Lord, did you not let us die before we became sinners?" ' Ghazali adds to this: 'the imponderable decisions of God cannot be weighed by the scales of reason and Mu'tazilism'. According to the Ash'arites, therefore, right and wrong are human concepts and cannot be applied to God. 'Cui mali nihil est nee esse potest quid huic opus est dilectu bonorum et malorum?' is the argument of the Sceptic Carneades expressed by Cicero (De natura deorum, iii. 15. 38). It is a dangerous theory for the theologians, because it severs the moral relationship between God and man and therefore it cannot be and is not consistently applied by the Ash'arites and Ghazali. T h e Ash'arites have taken over from the Stoics their epistemology, their sensationalism, their nominalism, their materialism. Some

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details of this epistemology are given by Ghazali in his autobiography: the clearness of representations is the criterion for their truth; the soul at birth is a blank on which the sensations are imprinted; at the seventh year of a man's life he acquires the rational knowledge of right and wrong. Stoic influence on Islamic theology is overwhelming. Of Stoic origin, for instance, are the division of the acts of man into five classes; the importance placed on the motive of an act when judging its moral character; the theory of the two categories of substance and accident (the two other categories, condition and relation, are not considered by the Muslim theologians to pertain to reality, since they are subjective); above all, the fatalism and determinism in Islam which is often regarded as a feature of the Oriental soul. In the Koran, however, there is no definite theory about free will. Muhammad was not a philosopher. The definition of will in man given by the Ash'arites, as the instrument of unalterable fate and the unalterable law of God, is Stoic both in idea and expression. (I have discussed several other theories in my notes.) Sometimes, however, the theologians prefer to the Stoic view the view of their adversaries. For instance, concerning the discussion between Ncoplatonism and Stoicism whether there is a moral obligation resting on God and man relative to animals, Islam answers with the Neoplatonists in the affirmative (Spinoza, that Stoic Cartesian, will give, in his Ethica, the negative Stoic answer). The culmination of the philosophy of Islam was in the tenth and eleventh centuries. This was the age also of the great theologians. It was with Greek ideas, taken in part from Stoics and Sceptics, that the theologians tried to refute the ideas of the philosophers. T h e philosophers themselves were followers of Aristotle as seen through the eyes of his Neoplatonic commentators. This Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle, although it gives a mystical character to his philosophy which is alien to it, has a certain justification in the fact that there arc in his philosophy many elements of the theory of his master Plato, which lend themselves to a Neoplatonic conception. Plotinus regarded himself as nothing but the commentator of Plato and Aristotle, and in his school the identity of view of these two great masters was affirmed. In the struggle in Islam between Philosophy and Theology, Philosophy was defeated, and the final blow to the philosophers was given in Ghazali's attack on Philosophy which in substance is incorporated in Averroes' book and which he tries to refute.

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Ghazali, who was born in the middle of the eleventh century, is one of the most remarkable and at the same time most enigmatic figures in Islam. Like St. Augustine, with whom he is often compared, he has told us in his autobiography how he had to pass through a period of despair and scepticism until God, not through demonstration but by the light of His grace, had given him peace and certitude. This divine light, says Ghazali, is the basis of most of our knowledge and, he adds, profoundly, one cannot find proofs for the premisses of knowledge; the premisses are there and one looks for the reasons, but they cannot be found. Certitude is reached, he says, not through scholastic reasoning, not through philosophy, but through mystical illumination and the mystical way of life. Still Ghazali is not only a mystic, he is a great dogmatist and moralist. He is regarded as Islam's greatest theologian and, through some of his books, as a defender of Orthodoxy. It is generally believed that the Tahafut, the book in which he criticizes Philosophy, was written in the period of his doubts. The book, however, is a Defence of Faith, and though it is more negative than positive,"for it aims to destroy and not to construct, it is based on the theories of his immediate predecessors, many of whose arguments he reproduces. Besides, he promises in this book to give in another book the correct dogmatic answers. The treatise to which he seems to refer does not contain anything but the old theological articles of faith and the Ash'arite arguments and solutions. But we should not look for consistency in Ghazali; necessarily his mysticism comes into conflict with his dogmatism and he himself has been strongly influenced by the philosophers, especially by Avicenna, and in many works he comes very near to the Neoplatonic theories which he criticizes. O n the whole it would seem to me that Ghazali in his attack on the philosophers has taken from the vast arsenal of Ash'arite dialectical arguments those appropriate to the special point under discussion, regardless of whether they are destructive also of some of the views he holds. Averroes was the last great philosopher in Islam in the twelfth century, and is the most scholarly and scrupulous commentator of Aristotle. H e is far better known in Europe than in the Orient, where few of his works arc still in existence and where he had no influence, he being the last great philosopher of his culture. Renan, who wrote a big book about him, Averroh et I'Averro'isme, had never seen a line of Arabic by him. Lately some of his works have been edited in Arabic, for instance his Tahafut al Tahafut, in a most

INTRODUCTION

xiii

exemplary manner. Averroes' influence on European thought during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance has been immense. The name of Ghazali's book in which he attacks the philosophers is Tahqfut al Falasifa, which has been translated by the medieval Latin translator as Destmctio Philosophorum. The name of Averroes' book is Tahafut al Tahqfut, which is rendered as Destructio Destructions (or destructionum). This rendering is surely not exact. The word 'Tahafut' has been translated by modern scholars in different ways, and the title of Ghazali's book has been given as the breakdown, the disintegration, or the incoherence, of the philosophers. The exact title of Averroes' book would be The Incoherence of the Incoherence. In the Revue des Deux Mondes there was an article published in 1895 by Ferdinand Brunetiere, 'La Banqueroute de la Science', in which he tried to show that the solutions by science, and especially by biology, of fundamental problems, solutions which were in opposition to the dogmas taught by the Church, were primitive and unreasonable. Science had promised us to eliminate mystery, but, Brunetiere said, not only had it not removed it but we saw clearly that it would never do so. Science had been able neither to solve, nor even to pose, the questions that mattered: those that touched the origin of man, the laws of his conduct, his future destiny. What Brunetiere tried to do, to defend Faith by showing up the audacity of Science in its attempt to solve ultimate problems, is exactly the same as Ghazali tried to do in relation to the pretensions of the philosophers of his time who, having based themselves on reason alone, tried to solve all the problems concerning God and the world. Therefore a suitable title for his book might perhaps be 'The Bankruptcy of Philosophy'. In the introduction to his book Ghazali says that a group of people hearing the famous names Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and knowing what they had attained in such sciences as Geometry, Logic, and Physics, have left the religion of their fathers in which they were brought up to follow the philosophers. T h e theories of the philosophers arc many, but Ghazali will attack only one, the greatest, Aristotle; Aristotle, of whom it is said that he refuted all his predecessors, even Plato, excusing himself by saying 'amicus Plato, arnica Veritas, sed magis arnica Veritas'. I may add that this well-known saying, which is a variant of a passage in Plato's Phaedo and in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, is found in this form first in Arabic. One of the first European authors who has it in this form

xiv

INTRODUCTION

is Cervantes {Don Quijote, ii, c. 52). I quote this saying—Ghazali adds—to show that there is no surety and evidence in Philosophy. According to Ghazali, the philosophers claim for their metaphysical proofs the same evidence as is found in Mathematics and Logic. But all Philosophy is based on supposition and opinion. If Metaphysics had the same evidence as Mathematics all philosophers would agree just as well in Philosophy as in Mathematics. According to him the translators of Aristotle have often misunderstood or changed the meaning and the different texts have caused different controversies. Ghazali considers Farabi and Avicenna to be the best commentators on Aristotle in Islam, and it is their theories that he will attack. Before entering into the heart of the matter I will say a few words about Ghazali's remark that Metaphysics, although it claims to follow the same method as Mathematics, does not attain the same degree of evidence. Neither Aristotle nor his commentators ever asked the question whether there is any difference between the methods of Mathematics and Metaphysics (it is a significant fact that most examples of proof in the Posterior Analytics are taken from Mathematics) and why the conclusions reached by Metaphysics seem so much less convincing than those reached by Mathematics. It would seem that Metaphysics, being the basis of all knowledge and having as its subject the ultimate principles of things, should possess, according to Aristotle, the highest evidence and that God, as being the highest principle, should stand at the beginning of the system, as in Spinoza. In fact, Aristotle could not have sought God if he had not found Him. For Aristotle all necessary reasoning is deductive and exclusively based on syllogism. Reasoning—he says—and I think this is a profound and true remark—cannot go on indefinitely. You cannot go on asking for reasons infinitely, nor can you reason about a subject which is not known to you. Reason must come to a stop. There must be first principles which are immediately evident. And indeed Aristotle acknowledges their existence. When we ask, however, what these first principles are, he does not give us any answer but only points out the Laws of Thought as such. But from the Laws of Thought nothing can be deduced, as Aristotle acknowledges himself. As a matter of fact Aristotle is quite unaware of the assumption on which his system is based. He is what philosophers are wont to call nowadays a naive realist. He believes that the world which we perceive and think about with all it contains has a reality indepen-

INTRODUCTION

XV

dent of our perceptions or our thoughts. But this view seems so natural to him that he is not aware that it could be doubted or that any reason might be asked for it. Now I, for my part, believe that the objectivity of a common world in which we all live and die is the necessary assumption of all reasoning and thought. I believe indeed, with Aristotle, that there are primary assumptions which cannot be deduced from other principles. All reasoning assumes the existence of an objective truth which is sought and therefore is assumed to have an independent reality of its own. Every thinking person is conscious of his own identity and the identity of his fellow beings from whom he accepts language and thoughts and to whom he can communicate his own ideas and emotions. Besides, all conceptual thought implies universality, i.e. belief in law and in objective necessity. I can only infer from Socrates being a man that he is mortal when I have assumed that the same thing (in this case man in so far as he is man) in the same conditions will always necessarily behave in the same way. In his book Ghazali attacks the philosophers on twenty points. Except for the last two points which are only slightly touched by Averroes, Averroes follows point for point the arguments Ghazali uses and tries to refute them. Ghazali's book is badly constructed, it is unsystematic and repetitive. If Ghazali had proceeded systematically he would have attacked first the philosophical basis of the system of the philosophers—namely their proof for the existence of God, since from God, the Highest Principle, everything else is deduced. But the first problem Ghazali mentions is the philosphers' proof for the eternity of the world. This is the problem which Ghazali considers to be the most important and to which he allots the greatest space, almost a quarter of his book. He starts by saying rather arbitrarily that the philosophers have four arguments, but, in discussing them, he mixes them up and the whole discussion is complicated by the fact that he gives the philosophical arguments and theological counterarguments in such an involved way that the trend is sometimes hard to follow. He says, for instance, page 3, that to the first arguments of the philosophers there are two objections. The first objection he gives on this page, but the second, after long controversy between the philosophers and theologians, on page 32. I will not follow here Ghazali and Averroes point for point in their discussions but will give rather the substance of their principal arguments (for a detailed discussion I refer to my notes). The theory of the eternity of the world is an Aristotelian one.

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Aristotle was, as he says himself, the first thinker who affirmed that the world in which we live, the universe as an orderly whole, a cosmos, is eternal. All the philosophers before him believed that the world had come into being either from some primitive matter or after a number of other worlds. At the same time Aristotle believes in the finitude of1 causes. For him it is impossible that movement should have started or can continue by itself. There must be a principle from which all movement derives. Movement, however, by itself is eternal. It seems to me that this whole conception is untenable. If the world is eternal there will be an infinite series of causes and an infinite series of movers; there will be an infinite series, for instance, of fathers and sons, of birds and eggs (the example of the bird and egg is first mentioned in'Censorinus, De die natali, where he discusses the Peripatetic theory of the eternity of the world), and we will never reach a first mover or cause, a first father or a first bird. Aristotle, in fact, defends the two opposite theses of Kant's first antinomy. He holds at the same time that time and movement are infinite and that every causal series must be finite. The contradiction in Aristotle is still further accentuated in the Muhammadan philosophers by the fact that they see in God, not only as Aristotle did, the First Mover of the movement of the universe, but that they regard Him, under the influence of the Plotinian theory of emanation, as the Creator of the universe from whom the world emanates eternally. However, can the relation between two existing entities qua existents be regarded as a causal one? Can there be a causal relation between an eternally unchangeable God and an eternally revolving and changing world, and is it sense to speak of a creation of that which exists eternally? Besides, if the relation between the eternal God and the eternal movement of the world could be regarded as a causal relation, no prior movement could be considered the cause of a posterior movement, and sequences such as the eternal sequence of fathers and sons would not form a causal series. God would not be a first cause but the Only Cause of everything. It is the contradiction in the idea of an eternal creation which forms the chief argument of Ghazali in this book. In a later chapter, for instance, when he refutes Avicenna's proof for God based on the Aristotelian concepts 'necessary by itself, i.e. logical necessity, and 'necessary through another', i.e. ontological necessity, in which there is the usual Aristotelian confusion of the logical with the ontological, Ghazali's long argument can be reduced to the assertion that once the possibility of

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an infinite series of causes is admitted, there is no sense in positing a first cause. The first argument is as follows. If the world had been created, there must have been something determining its existence at the moment it was created, for otherwise it would have remained in the state of pure possibility it was in before. But if there was something determining its existence, this determinant must have been determined by another determinant and so on ad infinitum, or we must accept an eternal God in whom eternally new determinations may arise. But there cannot be any new determinations in an eternal God. The argument in this form is found in Avicenna, but its elements are Aristotelian. In Cicero's Academics we have a fragment of one of Aristotle's earlier and more popular writings, the lost dialogue De philosophia, in which he says that it is impossible that the world could ever have been generated. For how could there have been a new decision, that is a new decision in the mind of God, for such a magnificent work? St. Augustine knows this argument from Cicero and he too denies that God could have a novum consilium. St. Augustine is well aware of the difficulty, and he says in his De civitate dei that God has always existed, that after a certain time, without having changed His will, He created man, whom He had not wanted to create before, this is indeed a fact too profound for us. It also belongs to Aristotle's philosophy that in all change there is a potentiality and all potentiality needs an actualizer which exists already. In the form this argument has in Avicenna it is, however, taken from a book by a late Greek Christian commentator of Aristotle, John Philoponus, De aeternitate mundi, which was directed against a book by the great Neoplatonist Proclus who had given eighteen arguments to prove the eternity of the world. Plato himself believed in the temporal creation of the world not by God Himself but by a demiurge. But later followers of Plato differed from him on this point. Amongst the postAristotelian schools only the Stoics assumed a periodical generation and destruction of the world. Theophrastus had already tried to refute some of the Stoic arguments for this view, and it may well be that John Philoponus made use of some Stoic sources for his defence of the temporality of the world. The book by Proclus is lost, but John Philoponus, who as a Christian believes in the creation of the world, gives, before refuting them, the arguments given by Proclus. The book by Philoponus was translated into Arabic and many of its arguments are reproduced in

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the Muhammadan controversies about the problem (arguments for the temporal creation of the world were also given by Philoponus in a work against Aristotle's theory of the eternity of the world, arguments which are known to us through their quotation and refutation by Simplicius in his commentary on Physics viii; one of these arguments by Philoponus was well known to the Arabs and is also reproduced by Ghazali, see note 3. 3). T h e argument I have mentioned is the third as given by Proclus. Philoponus' book is extremely important for all medieval philosophy, but it has never been translated into a modern language and has never been properly studied. On the whole the importance of the commentators of Aristotle for Arabic and medieval philosophy in general has not yet been sufficiently acknowledged. To this argument Ghazali gives the following answer, which has become the classic reply for this difficulty and which has been taken from Philoponus. One must distinguish, says Philoponus, between God's eternally willing something and the eternity of the object of His Will, or, as St. Thomas will say later, 'Deus voluit ab aeterno mundus esset sed non ut ab aeterno esset'. God willed, for instance, that Socrates should be born before Plato and He willed this from eternity, so that when it was time for Plato to be born it happened. It is not difficult for Averroes to refute this argument. In willing and doing something there is more than just the decision that you will do it. You can take the decision to get up tomorrow, but the actual willing to get up can be done only at the moment you do it, and there can be no delay between the cause and the effect. There must be added to the decision to get up the impulse of the will to get up. So in God there would have to be a new impulse, and it is just this newness that has to be denied. But, says Averroes, the whole basis of this argument is wrong for it assumes in God a will like a human will. Desire and will can be understood only in a being that has a need; for the Perfect Being there can be no need, there can be no choice, for when He acts He will necessarily do the best. Will in God must have another meaning than human will. Averroes therefore does not explicitly deny that God has a will, but will should not be taken in its human sense. He has much the same conception as Plotinus, who denies that God has the power to do one of two contraries (for God will necessarily always choose the best, which implies that God necessarily will always do the best, but this in fact annuls the ideas of choice and will), and who regards the world as produced by natural necessity. Aristotle also held that for the

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Perfect Being no voluntary action is possible, and he regards God as in an eternal blissful state of self-contemplation. This would be a consequence of His Perfection which, for Averroes at least, involves His Omniscience. For the Perfect the drama of life is ended: nothing can be done any more, no decision can be taken any more, for decisions belong to the condition of man to whom both knowledge and ignorance are given and who can have an hypothetical knowledge of the future, knowing that on his decisions the future may depend and to whom a sure knowledge of the future is denied. But an Omniscient Being can neither act nor decide; for Him the future is irremediable like the past and cannot be changed any more by His decisions or actions. Paradoxically the Omnipotent is impotent. This notion of God as a Self-contemplating Being, however, constitutes one of the many profound contradictions in Aristotle's system. And this profound contradiction is also found in all the works of Aristotle's commentators. One of Aristotle's proofs for the existence of God—and according to a recent pronouncement of the Pope, the most stringent —is the one based on movement. There cannot be an infinite series of movers; there must be a Prime Agent, a Prime Mover, God, the originator of all change and action in the universe. According to the conception of God as a Self-Contemplating Being, however, the love for God is the motive for the circular motion of Heaven. God is not the ultimate Agent, God is the ultimate Aim of desire which inspires the Heavens to action. It is Heaven which moves itself and circles round out of love for God. And in this case it is God who is passive; the impelling force, the efficient cause, the spring of all action lies in the world, lies in the souls of the stars. Let us now return to Ghazali. We have seen that his first argument is not very convincing, but he now gives us another argument which the Muhammadan theologians have taken from J o h n Philoponus and which has more strength. It runs: if you assume the world to have no beginning in time, at any moment which we can imagine an infinite series must have been ended. T o give an example, every one of us is the effect of an infinite series of causes; indeed, man is the finite junction of an infinite past and an infinite future, the effect of an infinite series of causes, the cause of an infinite series of effects. But an infinite series cannot be traversed. If you stand near the bed of a river waiting for the water to arrive from an infinitely distant source you will never see it arriving, for an infinite distance cannot be passed. This is the argument given by K a n t in the thesis of his

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first antimony. The curious fact is that the wording in Kant is almost identical with that of J o h n Philoponus. The answers Averroes gives are certainly not convincing. He repeats the Aristotelian dictum that what has no beginning has no end and that therefore there is never an end of time, and one can never say that at any moment an infinite time is ended: an infinite time is never ended. But this is begging the question and is surely not true, for there are certainly finite times. He denies that an infinite time involves an infinite causal series and the negation of a First Cause. The series involved is but a temporal sequence, causal by accident, since it is God who is its essential cause. Averroes also bases his answer on the Aristotelian theory that in time there is only a succession. A simultaneous infinite whole is denied by Aristotle and therefore, according to Aristotle, the world must be limited in space; but in' time, according to him, there is never a whole, since the past is no longer existent and the future not yet. But the philosophers have a convincing argument for the eternity of the world. Suppose the world had a beginning, then before the world existed there was empty time; but in an empty time, in pure emptiness, there cannot be a motive for a beginning and there could be nothing that could decide God to start His creation. This is Kant's antithesis of his first antinomy. It is very old and is given by Aristotle, but it is already found in the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides. Ghazali's answer is that God's will is completely undetermined. His will does not depend on distinctions in outside things, but He creates the distinctions Himself. The idea of God's creative will is of Stoic origin. According to the Neoplatonic conception God's knowledge is creative. We know because things are; things are because God knows them. This idea of the creative knowledge of God has a very great diffusion in philosophy (just as our bodies live by the eternal spark, of life transmitted to us by our ancestors, so we rekindle in our minds the thoughts of those who are no more); it is found, for instance, in St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza, and Kant—who calls it intellektuelle Anschauung, intellectual intuition, and it is also used by the Muhammadan philosophers when it suits them. Against Ghazali's conception, however, Averroes has the following argument: If God creates the world arbitrarily, if His Will establishes the distinctions without being determined by any reason, neither wisdom nor goodness can be attributed to Him. We have here a difficulty the Greeks had seen already. Either God is beyond

INTRODUCTION xxi the laws of thought and of morals and then He is neither good nor wise, or He Himself stands under their dominion and then He is not omnipotent. Another argument for the eternity of the world is based on the eternity of time: God cannot have a priority to time, as the theologians affirm, because priority implies time and time implies movement. For the philosophers God's priority to the world consists solely in His being its simultaneous cause. Both parties, however, seem to hold that God's existence does not imply time, since He exists in timeless eternity. But in this case, what neither of the parties has seen, no causal relation between God and the world can exist at all, since all causation implies a simultaneous time. We come now to the most important argument which shows the basic difference between the philosophical and theological systems. For Aristotle the world cannot have come to be because there is no absolute becoming. Everything that becomes comes from something. And, as a matter of fact, we all believe this. We all believe more or less unconsciously (we are not fully aware of our basic principles: a basement is always obscure) in the dictum rien ne se cre'e, rien ne se perd. We believe that everything that comes to be is but a development, an evolution, without being too clear about the meaning of these words (evolution means literally 'unrolling', and Cicero says that the procession of events out of time is like the uncoiling of a rope— quasi rudentis explicatio), and we believe that the plant lies in the seed, the future in the present. For example: when a child is born we believe it to have certain dispositions; it may have a disposition to become a musician, and when all the conditions arc favourable it will become a musician. Now, according to Aristotle, becoming is nothing but the actualization of a potentiality, that is the becoming actual of a disposition. However, there is a dilliculty here. It belongs to one of the little ironies of the history of philosophy that Aristotle's philosophy is based on a concept, i.e. potentiality, that has been excluded by a law that he was the first to express consciously. For Aristotle is the first to have stated as the supreme law of thought (or is it a law of reality?) that there is no intermediary between being and non-being. But the potential, i.e. the objective possible, is such an intermediary; it is namely something which is, still is not yet. Already the Elcatics had declared that there is no becoming, either a thing is or it is not. If it is, it need not become. If it is not—out of nothing nothing becomes. Besides, there is another difficulty which the Megarians have shown.

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You say that your child has a disposition to become a musician, that he can become a musician, but if he dies as a child, or when conditions are unfavourable, he cannot become a musician. He can only become one when all the conditions for his being a musician are fulfilled. But in that case it is not possibly that he will be a musician, necessarily he will be one. There is in fact no possibility of his being a musician before he actually is one. There is therefore no potentiality in nature and no becoming of things out of potencies. Things are or are not. This Megarian denial of potentiality has been taken over by the Ash'aritcs, and Ghazali in this*book is on the whole, although not consistently, in agreement with them. I myself regard this problem as one of the cruces of philosophy. The Ash'arites and Ghazali believed, as the Megarians did, that things do not become and that the future does not lie in the present; every event that occurs is new and unconnected with its predecessor. The theologians believed that the world is not an independent universe, a self-subsistent system, that develops by itself, has its own laws, and can be understood by itself. They transferred the mystery of becoming to the mystery of God, who is the cause of all change in the world, and who at every moment creates the world anew. Things are or are not. God creates them and annihilates them, but they do not become out of each other, there is no passage between being and non-being. Nor is there movement, since a thing that moves is neither here nor there, since it moves—what we call movement is being at rest at different space-atoms at different time-atoms. It is the denial of potentiality, possibility in return natura, that Ghazali uses to refute the Aristotelian idea of an eternal matter in which the potentialities are found of everything that can or will happen. For, according to Aristotle, matter must be eternal and cannot have become, since it is, itself, the condition for all becoming. It may be mentioned here that the modern static theory of movement is akin to the Megarian-Ash'arite doctrine of the denial of movement and becoming. Bertrand Russell, for instance, although he does not accept the Megarian atomic conception, but holds with Aristotle that movement and rest take place in time, not in the instant, defines movement as being at different places at different times. At the same time, although he rejects the Megarian conception of 'jumps', he affirms that the moving body always passes from one position to another by gradual transition. But 'passing' implies, just as much as 'jumping', something more than mere being, namely, the

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movement which both theories deny and the identity of the moving body. On the idea of possibility another argument for the eternity of the world is based. It is affirmed that if the world had been created an infinite number of possibilities of its creation, that is, an eternal duration of its possibility, would have preceded it. But nothing possible can be eternal, since everything possible must be realized. T h e idea that everything possible has to be realized is found in Aristotle himself, who says that if there could be an eternal possible that were not realized, it would be impossible, not possible, since the impossible is that which will never be realized. Aristotle does not see that this definition is contrary to the basic idea of his own philosophy—the reality of a possibility which may or may not become real—and that by declaring that the possible will have to happen he reduces it to a necessity, and by admitting that everything that happens had to happen he denies that the possibility of its not happening could precede it, i.e. he accepts, in fact, the Megarian conception of possibility which he himself had tried to refute. Averroes, who agrees with his master on this point, is not aware either of the implication of the definition. O n the other hand, the Ash'arites, notwithstanding their denial of potentiality, maintain that for God everything is possible, a theory which implies objective possibility (the same inconsistency was committed by the Stoics). Both philosophers and theologians, indeed, hold about this difficult problem contradictory theories, and it is therefore not astonishing that Ghazali's and Averroes' discussion about it is full of confusion (for the details I refer to my notes). I n the second chapter Ghazali treats the problem of the incorruptibility of the world. As Ghazali says himself, the problem of the incorruptibility of the world is essentially the same as that of its being uncreated and the same arguments can be brought forward. Still, there is less opposition amongst the theologians about its incorruptibility than about its being uncreated. Some of the Mu'tazilites argued, just as Thomas Aquinas was to do later, that we can only know through the Divine Law that this world of ours will end and there is no rational proof for its annihilation. Just as a series of numbers needs a first term but no final term, the beginning of the world does not imply its end. However, the orthodox view is that the annihilation of the world, including Heaven and Hell, is in God's power, although this will not happen. Still, in the corruptibility of

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the world there is a new difficulty for the theologians. If God destroys the world He causes 'nothingness', that is, His act is related to 'nothing'. But can an act be related to 'nothing' ? The questio' as it is posed seems to rest on a confusion between action and effec but its deeper sense would be to establish the nature of God's action and the process by which His creative and annihilating power exercises itself. As there cannot be any analogy with the physical process through which our human will performs its function, the mystery of His creative and annihilating action cannot be solved and the naive answers the theologians give satisfy neither Averroes nor Ghazali himself. Averroes argues that there is no essential difference between production and destruction and, in agreement with Aristotle, he affirms that there are three principles for them: form, matter, and privation. When a thing becomes, its form arises and its privation disappears; when it is destroyed its privation arises and its form disappears, but the substratum of this process, matter, remains eternally. I have criticized this theory in my notes and will only mention here that for Aristotle and Averroes this process of production and destruction is d e n i a l , circular, and reversible. Things, however, do not revolve in an eternal cycle, nor is there an eternal return as the Stoics and Nietzsche held. Inexorably the past is gone. Every 'now' is new. Every flower in the field has never been, the up-torn trees are not rooted again. 'Thou'll come no more, Never, never, never, never, never!' Besides, Averroes, holding as he does that the world is eternally produced out of nothing, is inconsistent in regarding with Aristotle production and destruction as correlatives. In the third chapter Ghazali maintains that the terms acting and agent are falsely applied to God by the philosophers. Acting, according to him, can be said only of a person having will and choice. When you say that fire burns, there is here a causal relation, if you like, but this implies nothing but a sequence in time, just as Hume will affirm later. So when the philosophers say that God's acting is like the fire's burning or the sun's heating, since God acts by natural necessity, they deny, according to Ghazali, His action altogether. Real causation can only be affirmed of a willing conscious being. The interesting point in this discussion is that, according to the Ash'arites and Ghazali, there is no causation in this world at all, there is only one extra-mundane cause which is God. Even our acts which depend on our will and choice are not, according to the Ash'arites, truly performed by ourselves. We are only the instru-

INTRODUCTION xxv ments, and the real agent is God. But if this is true, how can we say that action and causation depend on will and choice? How can we come to the idea of any causal action in God depending on His Will if we deny generally that there is a causal relation between will and action? The same contradiction is found in modern philosophy in Mach. Mach holds that to speak of causation or action in material things—so to say that fire burns—is a kind of fetishism or animism, i.e. that we project our will and our actions into physical lifeless things. However, at the same time he, as a follower of Hume, says that causation, even in acts caused by will, is nothing but a temporal sequence of events. H e denies causation even in voluntary actions. Therefore it would follow that the relation of willing and acting is not different from the relation of fire and burning and that there cannot be any question of fetishism or animism. According to such a theory there is no action at all in the universe but only a sequence of events. Then, after a second argument by which Ghazali sets out to show that an eternal production and creation are contradictions in terms, since production and creation imply the generation of something after its non-existence, he directs a third argument against the Neoplatonic theory, held by the philosophers, of the emanation of the world from God's absolute Oneness. Plotinus' conception of God is prompted by the problem of plurality and relation. All duality implies a relation, and every relation establishes a new unity which is not the simple addition of its terms (since every whole is more than its parts) and violates therelore the supreme law of thought that a thing is what it is and nothing else. Just as the line is more than its points, the stone more than its elements, the organism transcending its members, man, notwithstanding the plurality of his faculties, an identical personality, so the world is an organized well-ordered system surpassing the multitude of the unities it encloses. According to Plotinus the Force binding the plurality into unity and the plurality of unities into the allcontaining unit of the Universe is the Archetype of unity, the ultimate, primordial. Monad, God, unattainable in His supreme Simplicity even for thought. For all thought is relational, knitting together in the undefinable unity of a judgement a subject and a predicate. But in God's absolute and highest Unity there is no plurality that can be joined, since all joining needs a superior joining unit. Thus God must be the One and the Lone, having no attribute, no genus, no species, no universal that He can share with any

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creatures of the world. Even existence can be only referred to Him when it expresses not an attribute, but His very Essence. But then there is no bridge leading from the stable stillness of His Unity to the changing and varied multiplicity of the world; all relation between Him and the world is severed. If the One is the truly rational, God's rationality can be obtained only by regarding His relation to the world as irrational, and all statements about Him will be inconsistent with the initial thesis. And if God is unattainable for thought, the very affirmation of this will be self-contradictory. Now, the philosophers in Islam hold with Plotinus that although absolutely positive statements are not admissible about God, the positive statements made by them can be all reduced to negative affirmations (with the sole exception, according to Averroes, of His possessing intellect) and to certain relative statements, for neither negations nor external relations add anything to His essence. In this and several following chapters Ghazali attacks the philosophers from two sides: by showing up the inanity of the Plotinian conception of God as pure unity, and by exposing their inconsistency in attributing to Him definite qualities and regarding Him as the source of the world of variety and plurality. The infinite variety and plurality of the world does not derive directly from God according to the philosophers in Islam, who combine Aristotle's astronomical view of animate planets circling round in their spheres with the Neoplatonic theory of emanation, and introduce into the Aristotelian framework Proclus' conception of a triadic process, but through a series of immaterial mediators. From God's single act—for they with Aristotle regard God as the First Agent—only a single effect follows, but this single effect, the supramundane Intellect, develops in itself a threefoldness through which it can exercise a threefold action. Ghazali objects in a long discussion that if God's eternal action is unique and constant, only one single effect in which no plurality can be admitted will follow (a similar objection can be directed against Aristotle, who cannot explain how the plurality and variety of transitory movements can follow from one single constant movement). The plurality of the world according to Ghazali cannot be explained through a series of mediators. Averroes, who sometimes does not seem very sure of the validity of mediate emanation, is rather evasive in his answer on this point. In a series of rather intricate discussions which I have tried to elucidate in my notes, Ghazali endeavours to show that the proofs of

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the philosophers for God's uniqueness, for their denial of His attributes, for their claims that nothing can share with Him His genus and species, that He is pure existence which stands in no relation to an essence, and that He is incorporeal, are all vain. The leading idea of the philosophers that all plurality needs a prior joining principle, Ghazali rejects, while Averroes defends it. Why—so Ghazali asks, for instance—since the essence in temporal things is not the cause of their existence, should this not be the case in the Eternal? Or why should body, although it is composite according to the philosophers, not be the First Cause, especially as they assume an eternal body, since it is not impossible to suppose a compound without a composing principle? From the incorporcality of God, the First Principle, Avicenna had tried to infer, through the disjunction that everything is either matter or intellect, that He is intellect (since the philosophers in Islam hold with Aristotle and in opposition to Plotinus that God possesses self-consciousness). Ghazali does not admit this disjunction and, besides, argues with Plotinus that self-consciousness implies a subject and an object, and therefore would impede the philosophers' thesis of God's absolute unity. The Muliammadan philosophers, following Aristotle's Neoplatonic commentators, affirm that God's self-knowledge implies His knowledge of all universals (a line of thought followed, for instance, by Thomas Aquinas and some moderns like Brentano). In man this knowledge forms a plurality, in God it is unified. Avicenna subscribes to the Koranic words that no particle in Heaven or Earth escapes God's knowledge, but he holds, as Porphyry had done before, that God can know the particular things only in a universal way, whatever this means. Ghazali takes it to mean that God, according to Avicenna, must be ignorant of individuals, a most heretical theory. For Averroes God's knowledge is neither universal nor particular, but transcending both, in a way unintelligible to the human mind. One thing, however, God cannot know according to Avicenna (and he agrees here with Plato's Parmenides) and that is the passing of time, for in the Eternal no relation is possible to the fleeting 'now'. There are two aspects of time: the sequence of anteriority and posteriority which remains fixed for ever, and the eternal flow of the future through the present into the past. It will be eternally true that I was healthy before I sickened and God can know its eternal truth. But in God's timeless eternity there can be no 'now' simultaneous with the trembling present in which we humans live and change and die,

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there is no 'now' in God's eternity in which He can know that I am sickening now. In God's eternal stillness the fleeting facts and truths of human experience can find no rest. Ghazali objects, erroneously, I think, that a change in the object of thought need not imply a change in the subject of consciousness. In another chapter Ghazali refutes the philosophers' proof that Heaven is animated. He does not deny its possibility, but declares that the arguments given are insufficient. He discusses also the view that the heavens move out of love for God and out of desire to assimilate themselves to Him( and he asks the pertinent question—already posed by Theophrastus in his Metaphysics, but which scandalizes Averroes by its prosaicness—why it is meritorious for them to circle round eternally and whether eternal rest would not be more appropriate for them in their desire to assimilate themselves to God's eternal stability. In the last chapter of this part Ghazali examines the philosophers' symbolical interpretation of the Koranic entities 'The Pen' and 'The Tablet' and their theories about dreams and prophecy. It is interesting to note that, although he refutes them here, he largely adopts them in his own Vivification of Theology. In the last part of his book Ghazali treats the natural sciences. He enumerates them and declares that there is no objection to them according to religion except on four points. The first is that there exists a logical nexus between cause and effect; the second, the selfsubsistent spirituality of the soul; the third, the immortality of this subsistent soul; the fourth, the denial of bodily resurrection. T h e first, that there exists between cause and effect a logical necessity, has to be contested according to Ghazali, because by denying it the possibility of miracles can be maintained. T h e philosophers do not deny absolutely the possibility of miracles. Muhammad himself did not claim to perform any miracles and Hugo Grotius tried to prove the superiority of Christianity over Islam by saying 'Mahumetis se missum ait non cum miraculis sed cum armis'. In later times, however, Muhammad's followers ascribed to him the most fantastic miracles, for instance the cleavage of the moon and his ascension to Heaven. These extravagant miracles are not accepted by the philosophers. Their theory of the possibility of miracles is based on the Stoic-Neoplatonic theory of 'Sympathia', which is that all parts of the world are in intimate contact and related. In a little treatise of Plutarch it is shown how bodily phenomena are influenced by

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suggestion, by emotion and emotional states, and it is claimed by him, and later also by Plotinus, that the emotions one experiences cannot only influence one's own body but also other bodies, and that one's soul can exercise an influence on other bodies without the intermediary of any bodily action. The phenomena of telepathy, for instance the fascination which a snake has on other animals, they explained in this way. Amulets and talismans can receive through psychological influences certain powers which can be realized later. This explanation of occult phenomena, which is found in Avicenna's Psychology, a book translated in the Middle Ages, has been widely accepted (for instance, by Ghazali himself in his Vivification of Theology), and is found in Thomas Aquinas and most of the writers about the occult in the Renaissance, for instance Heinricus Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus, and Cardanus. It may be mentioned here that Avicenna gives as an example of the power of suggestion that a man will go calmly over a plank when it is on the ground, whereas he will hesitate if the plank be across an abyss. This famous example is found in Pascal's Pensees, and the well-known modern healer, Coue, takes it as his chief proof for the power of suggestion. Pascal has taken it from Montaigne, Montaigne has borrowed it from his contemporary the great doctor Pietro Bairo, who himself has a lengthy quotation from the Psychology of Avicenna. Robert Burton in his Anatomy of Melancholy also mentions it. In the Middle Ages this example is found in Thomas Aquinas. Now the philosophers limit the possibility of miracles only to those that can be explained by the power of the mind over physical objects; for instance, they would regard it as possible that a prophet might cause rain to fall or an earthquake to take place, but they refuse to accept the more extravagant miracles I have mentioned as authentic. The theologians, however, base their theory of miracles on a denial of natural law. The Megarian-Ash'arite denial of potentiality already implies the denial of natural law. According to this conception there is neither necessity nor possibility in rerum natura, they are or they are not, there is no nexus between the phenomena. But the Greek Sceptics also deny the rational relation between cause and effect, and it is this Greek Sceptical theory which the Ash'arites have copied, as we can see by their examples. The theory that there is no necessary relation between cause and effect is found, for instance, in Galen. Fire burns but there is, according to the Greek Sceptics, no necessary relation between fire and burning. Through seeing this

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happen many times we assume that it will happen also in the future, but there is no necessity, no absolute certainty. This Sceptical theory is quasi-identical with the theory of Hume and is based on the same assumptions, that all knowledge is given through sense-impression; and since the idea of causation cannot be derived from sense experience it is denied altogether. According to the theory of the theologians, God who creates and re-creates the universe continually follows a certain habit in His creation. But He can do anything H e desires, everything is possible for Him except the logically impossible; therefore all logically possible miracles are allowed. One might say that, for the theologians, all nature is miraculous and all miracles are natural. Averroes asks a good question: What is really meant by habit, is it a habit in man or in nature? I do not know how Hume would answer this question. For if causation is a habit in man, what makes it possible that such a habit can be formed? What is the objective counterpart of these habits? There is another question which has been asked by the Greek opponents of this theory, but which is not mentioned by Averroes: How many times must such a sequence be observed before such a habit can be formed? There is yet another question that might be asked: Since we cannot act before such a habit is formed—for action implies causation—what are we doing until then? What, even, is the meaning o f ' I act' and 'I do'? If there is nothing in the world but a sequence of events, the very word 'activity' will have no sense, and it would seem that we would be doomed to an eternal passivity. Averroes' answer to this denial of natural law is that univcrsals themselves imply already the idea of necessity and law. I think this answer is correct. When we speak, for instance, of wood or stone, we express by those words an hypothetical necessity, that is, we mean a certain object, which in suchand-such circumstances will necessarily behave in a certain way— that the behaviour of wood, for example, is based on its nature, that is, on the potentialities it has. I may remark here that it seems to me probable that Nicholas of Autrecourt, 'the medieval Hume', was influenced by Ghazali's Ash'arite theories. He denies in the same way as Ghazali the logical connexion between cause and effect: 'ex eo quod aliqua res est cognita esse, non potest evidenter cvidentia reducta in primum principium vel in certitudinem primi principii inferri, quod alia res sit' (cf. Lappe, 'Nicolaus von Autrecourt', Beitr. z- Gesch. d. Phil. d. M. B.vi, H.2, p . u ) ; he gives the same example of ignis and stupa, he

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seems to hold also the Ash'arite thesis of God as the sole cause of all action (cf. op. cit., p. 24), and he quotes in one place Ghazali's Metaphysics (cf. N. of Autrecourt, 'Exigit ordo executionis', in Mediaeval Studies, vol. i, ed. by J . Reginald O'Donnell, Toronto, 1931, p. 208). Now Nicholas's works were burnt during his lifetime in Paris in 1347, whereas the Latin translation of the Tahafut al Tahafut by Calo Calonymus was terminated in Aries in 1328. T h e second point Ghazali wants to refute are the proofs for the substantiality and the spirituality of the soul as given by the philosophers. He himself does not affirm that the soul is material, and as a matter of fact he holds, in other books, the contrary opinion, but the Ash'arites largely adopted the Stoic materialism. The ten arguments of the philosophers for the spirituality of the soul derive all from arguments given by the Greeks. It would seem to me that Ghazali's arguments for the soul's materiality may be based on the Stoic answers (which have not come down to us) against the proofs of Aristotle and the later Platonists for the immateriality of the soul. There is in the whole discussion a certain confusion, partly based on the ambiguity of the word 'soul'. The term 'soul' both in Greek and Arabic can also mean 'life'. Plants and animals have a 'soul'. However, it is not affirmed by Aristotle that life in plants and animals is a spiritual principle. 'Soul' is also used for the rational part, the thinking part, of our consciousness. It is only this thinking part, according to Aristotle, that is not related to or bound up with matter; sensation ;md imagination are localized in the body, and it is only part of our lliinking soul that seems to possess eternity or to be immortal. Now, most of the ten arguments derive from Aristotle and mean only to prove that the thinking part of our soul is incorporeal. Still the Muhammadan philosophers affirm with Plato and Plotinus that the whole soul is spiritual and incorruptible, and that the soul is a substance independent of the body, although at the same time they adopt Aristotle's physiological explanations of all the non-rational functions of the soul and accept Aristotle's definition of the 'soul' as 1 lie first entelechy of an organic body. O n the other hand, the Muhammadan philosophers do not admit the Platonic theory of the prr-cxistence of the soul. Aristotle's conception of a material and transitory element in the soul and an immaterial and immortal clement destroys all possibility of considering human personality as .1 unity. Although he reproaches Plato with regarding the human mini as a plurality, the same reproach can be applied to himself.

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Neither the Greek nor the Muhammadan philosophers have ever been able to uphold a theory that does justice to the individuality of the human personality. T h a t it is my undefinable ego that perceives, represents, wills, and thinks, the mysterious fact of the uniqueness of my personality, has never been apprehended by them. It is true that there is in Aristotle's psychology a faint conception of a functional theory of our conscious life, but he is unable to harmonize this with his psycho-physiological notions. I have discussed in my notes the ten arguments and will mention here only two because of their importance. Ghazali gives one of these arguments in the following form: How can man's identity be attributed to body with all its accidents? For bodies are continually in dissolution and nutrition replaces what is dissolved, so that when we see a child, after separation from its mother's womb, fall ill a few times, become thin and then fat again, and grow up, we may safely say that after forty years no particle remains of what there was when its mother was delivered of it. Indeed, the child began its existence out of parts of the sperm alone, but nothing of the particles of the sperm remains in it; no, all this is dissolved and has changed into something else and then this body has become anolher. Still wc say that the identical man remains and his notions remain with him from the beginning of his youth although all bodily parts have changed, and this shows that the soul has an existence outside the body and that the body is its organ. Now the first part of this argument, that all things are in a state of flux and that of the bodily life of man no part remains identical, is textually found in Montaigne's Apology of Raymond de Sebond. Montaigne has taken it from Plutarch, and the Arabic philosophers may have borrowed it from the same source from which Plutarch has taken it. The argument of the philosophers that matter is evanescent, but the soul a stable identity, which is also given by the Christian philosopher Nemesius in his De natura hominis (a book translated into Arabic), who ascribes it to Ammonius Saccas and Numenius, is basically Platonic and Neoplatonic, and strangely enough, although he refutes it here, it is adduced by Ghazali himself in his Vivtfication of Theology. Socrates says in the Platonic dialogue Cratylus: 'Can we truly say that there is knowledge, Cratylus, if all things are continually changing and nothing remains? For knowledge cannot continue unless it remains and keeps its identity. But if knowledge changes its very essence, it will lose at once its identity and there will be no knowledge.' Plotinus (Enn. iv. 7. 3) argues that

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matter, in its continual changing, cannot explain the identity of the soul. And he says in a beautiful passage (Enn. iv. 7. 10) the idea of which Avicenna has copied: 'One should contemplate the nature of everything in its purity, since what is added is ever an obstacle to its knowledge. Contemplate therefore the soul in its abstraction or rather let him who makes this abstraction contemplate himself in this state and he will know that he is immortal when he will see in himself the purity of the intellect, for he will see his intellect contemplate nothing sensible, nothing mortal, but apprehending the eternal through the eternal.' This passage bears some relation to Descartes's dictum cogito ergo sum, but whereas Plotinus affirms the self-consciousness of a stable identity, Descartes states only that every thought has a subject, an ego. Neither the one, nor the other shows that this subject is my ego in the sense of my undefinable unique personality, my awareness who I a m : that I am, for instance, John and not Peter, my consciousness of the continuity of my identity from birth to death, my knowledge that at the same time I am master and slave of an identical body, whatever the changes may be in that body, and that as long as I live I am a unique and an identical whole of body and soul. Plautus' Sosia, who was not a philosopher, expresses himself (Amphitruo, line 447) in almost the same way as Descartes—'sed quom cogito, equidem certo idem sum qui fui semper'—but the introduction of the words semper and idem renders the statement fallacious; from mere consciousness the lasting identity of my personality cannot be inferred. Ghazali answers this point by saying that animals and plants also, notwithstanding that their matter is continually changing, preserve their identity, although nobody believes that this identity is based on a spiritual principle. Averroes regards this objection as justified. The second argument is based on the theory of universals. Since thought apprehends universals which are not in a particular place and have no individuality, they cannot be material, since everything material is individual and is in space. Against this theory of universals (ihuzali develops, under Stoic influence, his nominalistic theory which is probably the theory held by the Ash'arites in general. This theory is quasi-identical with Berkeley's nominalistic conception and springs liom the same assumption that thinking is nothing but the having of images. By a strange coincidence both Ghazali and Berkeley give

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the example of a h a n d : when we have an idea of a hand as a universal, what really happens is that we have a representation of a particular hand, since there are no universals. But this particular hand is capable of representing for us any possible hand, just as much a big Hack hand as a small white one. The fallacy of the theory lies, of course, in the word 'representing', which as a matter of fact assumes what it tended to deny, namely, that we can think of a hand in general which has neither a particular shape, nor a particular colour, nor is localized in space. T h e next point Ghazali tries to refute is the argument of the philosophers for the immortality of the soul. According to the philosophers, the fact that it is a substance independent of a body and is immaterial shows that a corruption of the body cannot affect it. This, as a matter of fact, is a truism, since the meaning of substantiality and immateriality for the philosophers implies already the idea of eternity. On the other hand, if the soul is the form of the body, as is also affirmed by them, it can only exist with its matter and the mortality of its body would imply its own mortality, as Ghazali rightly points out. T h e Arabic philosophers through their combination of Platonism and Aristotelianism hold, indeed, at the same time three theories inconsistent with each other, about the relation of body and soul: that the soul is the form of the body, that the soul is a substance, subsistent by itself and immortal, and that the soul after death takes a pneumatic body (a theory already found in Porphyry). Besides, their denial of the Platonic idea of pre-existence of the soul vitiates their statement that the soul is a substance, subsistent by itself, that is, eternal, ungenerated, and incorruptible. Although Averroes in his whole book tries to come as near to the Aristotelian conception of the soul as possible, in this chapter he seems to adopt the eschatology of the late Greek authors. He allows to the souls of the dead a pneumatic body and believes that they exist somewhere in .the sphere of the moon. He also accepts the theory of the Djinn, the equivalent of the Greek Daimones. What he rejects, and what the philosophers generally reject, is the resurrection of the flesh. , In his last chapter Averroes summarizes his views about religion. There are three possible views. A Sceptical view that religion is opium for the people, held by certain Greek rationalists; the view that religion expresses Absolute T r u t h ; and the intermediate view, held by Averroes, that the religious conceptions are the symbols of a higher philosophical truth, symbols which have to be taken for reality

INTRODUCTION xxxv itself by the non-philosophers. For the unphilosophical, however, they are binding, since the sanctity of the State depends on them. When we have read the long discussions between the philosophers and theologians we may come to the conclusion that it is sometimes more the formula than the essence of things which divides them. Both philosophers and theologians affirm that God creates or has created the world. For the philosophers, since the world is eternal, this creation is eternal. Is there, however, any sense in calling created what has been eternally? For the theologians God is the creator of everything including time, but does not the term 'creation' assume already the concept of time? Both the philosophers and theologians apply to God the theory that His will and knowledge differ from human will and knowledge in that they are creative principles and essentially beyond understanding; both admit that (he Divine cannot be measured by the standards of man. But this, in fact, implies an avowal of our complete ignorance in face of the Mystery of God. Still, for both parties God is the supreme Artifex who in His wisdom has chosen the best of all possible worlds; for although the philosophers affirm also that God acts only by natural necessity, their system, like that of their predecessors, the Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics, is essentially teleological. As to the problem of possibility, both parties commit the same inconsistencies and hold doinctimes that the world could, sometimes that it could not, have been different from what it is. Finally, both parties believe in God's ultimate Unity. And if one studies the other works of Ghazali the resemblance between him and the philosophers becomes still greater. For instance, he too believes in the spirituality of the soul, notwithstanding the arguments he gives against it in this book; he too sometimes regards religious concepts as the symbols of a higher philosophical or mystical truth, although he admits here only a literal interpretation. He too Kometimes teaches the fundamental theory of the philosophers which lie tries to refute so insistently in our book, the theory that from the one supreme Agent as the ultimate source through intermediaries nil things derive; and he himself expresses this idea (in his Alchemy qf Happiness and slightly differently in his Vivification of Theology) by I lie charming simile of an ant which seeing black tracings on a sheet of paper thinks that their cause is the pen, while it is the hand that moves the pen by the power of the will which derives from the heart, Itself inspired by the spiritual agent, the cause of causes. T h e

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resemblances between Ghazali and Averrbes, men belonging to the same culture, indeed, the greatest men in this culture, seem sometimes greater than their differences. Emotionally the difference goes deep. Averroes is a philosopher, and a proud believer in the possibility of reason to achieve a knowledge of 'was das Innere der Welt zusammenhalt'. He was n o t . always too sure, he knew too much, and there is much wavering and hesitation in his ideas. Still, his faith in reason remains unshaken.* Although he does not subscribe to the lofty words of his master that" man because of the power of his intellect is a mortal God, he * reproaches the theologians for having made God an immortal man., God, for him, is a dehumanized principle. But if God has to respond * to the needs of man's heart, can He be exempt from humanity? Ghazali is a mu'min, that is a believer, he is a muslim, that is he accepts: his heart submits to a truth his reason cannot establish, for his heart has reasons his reason does not know. His theology is the philosophy of the heart in which there is expressed man's fear and loneliness and his feeling of dependence on an understanding and loving Being to whom he can cry out from the depths of his despair, and whose mercy is infinite. It is not so much after abstract truth that Ghazali strives; his search is for God, for the Pity behind the clouds.

IN T H E NAME O F T H E M E R C I F U L AND COMPASSIONATE 3 G O D : AND A F T E R PRAISE T O GOD AND B E N E D I C T I O N U P O N ALL H I S MESSENGERS AND P R O P H E T S : T H E aim of this book is to show the different degrees of assent 1 and conviction attained by the assertions in The Incoherence of the Philosophers, and to prove that the greater part has not reached the degree of evidence and of truth.

THE FIRST DISCUSSION Concerning the Eternity of the World Ghazali, speaking of the philosophers' proofs for the eternity of the 4 world, 2 says: Let us restrict ourselves in this chapter to those proofs that make an impression on the mind. This chapter contains four* proofs. THE FIRST PROOF The philosophers say: It is impossible that the temporal should proceed 5 from the absolutely Eternal. For it is clear—if we assume the Eternal existing without, for instance, the world proceeding from Him, then, at a certain moment, the world beginning to proceed from Him—that it did not proceed before, because there was no determining principle for its existence, but its existence was pure possibility*. When the world begins in time, a new determinant either does or does not arise. If it does not, the world will stay in the same state of pure possibility as before; if a new determinant does arise, the same question can be asked about this new determinant, why it determines now, and not before, and either we shall have an infinite regress or we shall arrive at a principle determining eternally.3 I say: This argument is in the highest degree dialectical and does 5 not reach the pitch of demonstrative proof.4 For its premisses are common notions, and common notions approach the equivocal, whereas demonstrative premisses are concerned with things proper to the same genus. 5 For the term 'possible' is used in an equivocal way of the possible that happens more often than not, of the possible that happens less often than not, and of the possible with equal chances of happening, and these three types of the possible do not seem to have the same need for a new determining principle. 6 For the possible that happens 5 more often than not is frequently believed to have its determining

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principle in itself, not outside, as is the case with the possible which has equal chances of happening and not happening. 1 Further, the possible resides sometimes in the agent, i.e. the possibility of acting, and sometimes in the patient, i.e. the possibility of receiving, and it does not seem that the necessity for a determining principle is the same in both cases. For it is well known that the possible in the patient needs a new determinant from the outside; this can be perceived by the senses in artificial things and in many natural things too, although in regard to natural things there is a doubt, for in most natural things the principle of their change forms part of them. 2 Therefore it is believed of many natural things that they move themselves, and it is by no means self-evident that everything that is moved has a mover and that there is nothing that moves itself.3 But all this needs to be examined, and the old philosophers have therefore done so. As concerns the possible in the agent, however, in many cases it is believed that it can be actualized without an external principle, for the transition in the agent from inactivity to activity is often regarded as not being a change which requires a principle; e.g.. the transition in the geometer from non-geometrizing to geometrizing, or in the teacher from non-teaching to teaching. Further, those changes which are regarded as needing a principle of change can sometimes be changes in substance, sometimes in quality, or in quantity, or in place. 4 In addition, 'eternal' is predicated by many of the eternal-by-itself and the eternal-through-another. 5 According to some, it is permissible to admit certain changes in the Eternal, for instance a new volition in the Eternal, according to the Karramites, 6 and the possibility of generation and corruption which the ancients attribute to primary matter, although it is eternal. 7 Equally, new concepts are admitted in the possible intellect although, according to most authors, it is eternal. 8 But there are also changes which are inadmissible, especially according to certain ancients, though not according to others. Then there is the agent who acts of his will and the agent which acts by nature, and the manner of actualization of the possible act is not the same for both agents, i.e. so far as the need for a new determinant is concerned. 0 Further, is this division into two agents complete, or does demonstration lead to an agent which resembles neither the natural agent nor the voluntary agent of human experience? All these are multifarious and difficult questions which need, each of them, a special examination, both in themselves and in regard to

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the opinions the ancients held about them. To treat what is in reality a plurality of questions as one problem is one of the wellknown seven sophisms, 1 and a mistake in one of these principles becomes a great error by the end of the examination of reality. 2 Ghazali says: 5 There are two objections to this. The first objection is to say: why* do you deny the theory of those who say that the world has been created by an eternal will which has decreed its existence in the time in which it exists; that its non-existence lasts until the moment it ceases and that its existence begins from the moment it begins; that its existence was not willed before and therefore did not happen, and that at the exact moment it began it was willed by an eternal will and therefore began? 3 What is the objection to this theory and what is absurd in it? I say: This argument is sophistical: although it is not allowable for him to admit the possibility of the actual effect being delayed after the actual cause, and in a voluntary agent, after the decision to act, he regards it as possible that the effect should be delayed after the will of the agent. It is possible that the effect should be delayed after the will of the agent, but its being delayed after the actual cause is impossible, and equally impossible is its being delayed after a voluntary agent's decision to act. The difficulty is thus unchanged, for he must of necessity draw one of these two conclusions: either that the act of the agent does not imply in him a change which itself would need an external principle of change, or that there are changes which arise by themselves, without the necessity of an agent in whom they occur and who causes them, and that therefore there are changes possible in the Eternal without an agent who causes them. And his adversaries insist on these two very points: (1) that the act of the agent necessarily implies a change 4 and that each change has •1 principle which causes it; (2) that the Eternal cannot change in any way. But all this is difficult to prove. 5 T h e Ash'arites are forced to assume either a first agent or a first act of this agent, for they cannot admit that the disposition of the agent, relative to the effect, when he acts is the same as his disposition, when he does not act. 6 This implies therefore a new disposition or a new relation, and this necessarily either in the agent, or in the clfect, or in both. 7 But in this case, if we posit as a principle that for each new disposition there is an agent, this new disposition in the first agent will either need another agent, and then this first agent

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was not the first and was not on his own account sufficient for the act but needed another, or the agent of the disposition which is the condition of the agent's act will be identical with the agent of the act. Then this act which we regarded as being the first act arising out of him will not be the first, but his act producing the disposition which is the condition of the effect will be anterior to the act producing the effect.1 This, you see, is a necessary consequence, unless one allows that new dispositions may arise in the agents without a cause. But this is absurd, unless one believes that there are things which happen at haphazard and by themselves, 2 a theory of the old philosophers who denied the agent, 3 the falsehood of which is self-evident. In Ghazali's objection there is a confusion. For our expressions 'eternal will' and 'temporal will' are equivocal, indeed contrary. For the empirical will is a faculty which possesses the possibility of doing equally one of two contraries and then of receiving equally one of the two contraries willed. 4 For the will is the desire of the agent towards action. s When the agent acts, the desire ceases and the thing willed happens, and this desire and this act are equally related to both the contraries. But when one says: 'There is a Wilier who wills eternally one of two contraries in Himself, the definition of the will is abandoned, for we have transferred its nature from the possible to the necessary. If it is objected that in an eternal will the will does not cease through the presence of the object willed, for as an eternal will has no beginning there is no moment in it which is specially determined for the realization of the object willed, we answer: this is not obvious, unless we say that demonstrative proof leads to the existence of an agent endowed with a power which is neither voluntary nor natural, which, however, the Divine Law calls 'will', in the same way as demonstrative proof leads to middle terms between things which seemed at first sight to be contrary, without being really so, as when we speak of an existence which is neither inside nor outside the world. 6 Ghazali answers, on behalf of the philosophers: The philosophers say: This is clearly impossible, for everything that happens is necessitated and has its cause, and as it is impossible that there should be an effect without a necessitating principle and a cause, so it is impossible that there should exist a cause of which the effect is delayed, when all the conditions of its necessitating, its causes and elements are completely fulfilled. On the contrary, the existence of the effect, when the cause is realized with all its conditions, is necessary, and its delay is just as impossible as an effect without cause. Before the existence of the world

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there existed a Wilier, a will, and its relation to the thing willed. No 10 new wilier arose, nor a new will, nor a new relation to the will—for all this is change; how then could a new object of will arise, and what prevented its arising before? The condition of the new production did not distinguish itself from the condition of the non-production in any way, in any mode, in any relation—on the contrary, everything remained as it was before. At one moment the object of will did not exist, everything remained as it was before, and then the object of will existed. Is not this a perfectly absurd theory?

I say: This is perfectly clear, except for one who denies one of the premisses we have laid down previously. But Ghazali passes from this proof to an example based upon convention, 1 and through this he confuses this defence of the philosophers. Ghazali says: This kind of impossibility is found not only in the necessary and essential cause and effect but also in the accidental* and conventional. If a man pronounces the formula of divorce against his wife without the divorce becoming irrevocable immediately, one does not imagine that it will become so later.2 For he made the formula through convention and usage a cause of the judgement, and we do not believe that the effect can be delayed, except when the divorce depends on an ulterior event, e.g. on the arrival of tomorrow or on someone's entering the house, for then the divorce does not take place at once, but only when tomorrow arrives or someone enters the house; in this case the man made the formula a cause only in conjunction with an ulterior event. But as this event, the coming of tomorrow and someone's entering the house, is not yet actual, the effect is delayed until this future event is realized. The effect only takes place when a new event, i.e. entering the house or the arrival of tomorrow, has actually happened. Even if a man wanted to delay the effect after the formula, without making it dependent on an ulterior event, this would be regarded as impossible, although it is he himself who lays down the convention and fixes its modalities. If thus in conventional matters such a delay is incomprehensible and inadmissible, how can we admit it in essential, rational, and necessary causal relations? In respect of our conduct and our voluntary actions, there is a delay in actual volition only when there is some obstacle. When there is actual volition and actual power and the obstacles are eliminated, a delay in the object willed is inadmissible.3 A delay in the object willed is imaginable only in decision, for decision is not sufficient for the existence of the act; 4 the decision to write does not produce the writing, if it is not, as a new fact, accompanied by an act of volition, i.e. an impulse in the man which presents itself at the moment of the act. If there is thus an analogy between the eternal Will and our will to act, a delay of the object willed is inadmissible, unless

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through an obstacle, and an antecedent existence of the volition is equally inadmissible, for I cannot will to get up tomorrow except by way of decision. If, however, the eternal Will is analogous to our decision, it does not 12 suffice to produce the thing decided upon, but the act of creation must be accompanied by a new act of volition, and this brings us again to the idea of a change. But then we have the same difficulty all over again. Why does this impulse or volition or will or whatever you choose to call it happen just now and not before? There remain, then, only these alternatives: either something happening without a cause, or an infinite regress. This is the upshot of the discussion: There is a cause the conditions of which are all completely fulfilled, but notwithstanding this the effect is delayed 5 and is not realized during a period to the beginning of which imagination cannot attain and for which thousands of years would mean no diminution; then suddenly, without the addition of any new fact, and without the realization of any new condition, this effect comes into existence and is produced. And this is absurd. I say: This example of divorce based on convention seems to strengthen the argument of the philosophers, but in reality it weakens it. For it enables the Ash'arites to say: In the same way as the actual divorce is delayed after the formula of divorce till the moment when the condition of someone's entering the house, or any other, is fulIO filled, so the realization of the world can be delayed after God's act of creation until the condition is fulfilled on which this realization depends, i.e. the moment when God willed it. But conventional things do not behave like rational. The Literalists, comparing these conventional things to rational, say: This divorce is not binding and does not become effective through the realization of the condition which is posterior to the pronouncement of the divorce by the divorcer, since it would be a divorce which became effective without connexion with the act of the divorcer. 1 But in this matter there is IS no relation between the concept drawn from the nature of things and that which is artificial and conventional. Then Ghazali says, on behalf of the Ash'arites: The answer is: Do you recognize the impossibility of connecting the eternal Will with the temporal production of anything, through the necessity of intuitive thought or through a logical deduction, or—to use your own logical terminology—do you recognize the clash between these two concepts through a middle term or without a middle term? 2 If you S claim a middle term—and this is the deductive method—you will have to produce it, and if you assert that you know this through the necessity of thought, why do your adversaries not share this intuition with you?J For

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the party which believes in the creation of the world in time through an eternal Will includes so m a n y persons that no country can contain them and no n u m b e r enumerate them, and they certainly do not contradict the logically minded out of obstinacy, while knowing better in their hearts. A proof according to the rules of logic must be produced to show this impossibility, as in all your* arguments u p till now there is only a presumption of impossibility and a comparison with our decision and our will; and this is false, for the eternal Will does not resemble temporal volitions, and a p u r e presumption of impossibility will not suffice without proof. 10

I say: T h i s a r g u m e n t is o n e of those w h i c h h a v e only a v e r y feeble persuasive p o w e r . I t a m o u n t s to saying t h a t o n e w h o claims t h e impossibility of d e l a y in a n effect, w h e n its c a u s e w i t h all its c o n d i tions is r e a l i z e d , m u s t assert t h a t h e k n o w s this e i t h e r b y a syllogism o r from first p r i n c i p l e s ; if t h r o u g h a syllogism, h e m u s t p r o d u c e i t — b u t t h e r e is n o n e ; if from first p r i n c i p l e s , it m u s t b e k n o w n to all, a d v e r s a r i e s a n d o t h e r s alike. But this a r g u m e n t is m i s t a k e n , for it is n o t a c o n d i t i o n of objective t r u t h t h a t it s h o u l d b e k n o w n to all. T h a t a n y t h i n g s h o u l d b e h e l d b y all does n o t i m p l y a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n its b e i n g a c o m m o n n o t i o n , j u s t as t h e existence of a c o m m o n n o t i o n 14 does n o t i m p l y objective t r u t h . 1 G h a z a l i answers o n b e h a l f of t h e A s h ' a r i t e s : If it is said, ' W e know by the necessity of thought that, when all its conditions are fulfilled, a cause without effect is inadmissible and that to a d m i t it is an affront to the necessity of thought,' we answer: what is the 5 difference between you and your adversaries, w h e n they say to you, ' W e know by the necessity of thought the impossibility of a theory which affirms that one single being knows all the univcrsals, without this knowledge forming a plurality in its essence or adding anything to it, and without this plurality of things known implying a plurality in the knowledge'? 2 For this is your theory of God, which according to us and our science is quite absurd. You, however, say there is no analogy between eternal and temporal knowledge. Some of you acknowledge the impossibility involved, a n d say that God knows only Himself and that H e is the knower, the knowledge and the known, and that the three are one. O n e might object: 10 T h e unity of the knowledge, the knower, and the known is clearly an impossibility, for to suppose the Creator of the world ignorant of His own work is necessarily absurd, and the Eternal—who is far too high to be reached by your* words a n d the words of any heretics—could, if H e knows only Himself, never know His work. I say: T h i s a m o u n t s to saying t h a t t h e t h e o l o g i a n s d o n o t g r a t u i t o u s l y

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and without proof deny the admitted impossibility of a delay between the effect and its cause, but base themselves on an argument which leads them to believe in the temporal creation of the world, and that they therefore act in the same way as the philosophers, who only deny the well-known necessary plurality of knowledge and known, so far as it concerns their unity in God, because of a demonstration which, according to them, leads them to their theory about Him. And that this is still more true of those philosophers who deny it to be necessary that God should know His own work, affirming that H e knows only Himself. This assertion belongs to the class of assertions whose contrary is equally false.1 For there exists no proof which refutes anything that is evidently true, and universally acknowledged. Anything that can be refuted by a demonstrative proof is only supposed to be true, not really true. z Therefore, if it is absolutely and evidently true that knowledge and known form a plurality, both in the visible and in the invisible world, we can be sure that the philosophers cannot have a proof of this unity in God; but if the theory of the plurality of knowledge and known is only a supposition, then it is possible for the philosophers to have a proof. Equally, if it is absolutely true that the effect of a cause cannot be delayed after the causation and the Ash'arites claim that they can advance a proof to deny it, then we can be absolutely sure that they cannot have such a proof. If there is a controversy about questions like this, the final criterion rests with the sound understanding 3 which does not base itself on prejudice and passion, when it probes according to the signs and rules by which truth and mere opinion are logically distinguished. Likewise, if two people dispute about a sentence and one says that it is poetry, the other that it is prose, the final judgement rests with the 'sound understanding' which can distinguish poetry from prose, and with the science of prosody. And as, in the case of metre, the denial of him who denies it does not interfere with its perception by him who perceives it, so the denial of a truth by a contradictor does not trouble the conviction of the men to whom it is evident. This whole argument is extremely inept and weak, and Ghazali ought not to have filled* his book with such talk if he intended to convince the learned, And drawing consequences which are irrelevant and beside the point, Ghazali goes on to say: But the consequences of this argument cannot be overcome. And we say to them: How will you refute your adversaries, when they say the

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eternity of the world is impossible, for it implies an infinite number and an infinity of unities for the spherical revolutions, although they can be divided by six, by four, and by two.1 For the sphere of the sun revolves in one year, the sphere of Saturn in thirty years, and so Saturn's revolution is a thirtieth and Jupiter's revolution—for Jupiter revolves in twelve years— a twelfth of the sun's revolution. But the number of revolutions of Saturn has the same infinity as the revolutions of the sun, although they are in a proportion of one to thirty and even the infinity of the sphere of the fixed stars which turns round once in thirty-six thousand years is the same as the daily revolution which the sun performs in twenty-four hours. If now your adversary says that this is plainly impossible, in what does your argument differ from his? And suppose it is asked: Are the numbers of these revolutions even or uneven or both even and uneven or neither even nor uneven? If you answer, both even and uneven, or neither even nor uneven, you say what is evidently absurd. If, however, you say 'even' or 'uneven', even and uneven become uneven and even by the addition of one unit and how could infinity be one unit short? You must, therefore, draw the conclusion that they are neither even nor uneven. I say: This too is a sophistical argument. It amounts to saying: In the same way as you are unable to refute our argument for the creation of the world in time, that if it were eternal, its revolutions would be neither even nor uneven, so we cannot refute your theory that the effect of an agent whose conditions to act are always fulfilled cannot be delayed. This argument aims only at creating and establishing a doubt, which is one of the sophist's objectives. But you, reader of this book, you have already heard the arguments of the philosophers to establish the eternity of the world and the refutation of the Ash'arites. Now hear the proofs of the Ash'arites for their refutation and hear the arguments of the philosophers to refute those proofs in the wording of Ghazaliif I say. This is in brief that, if you imagine two circular movements in one and the same finite time and imagine then a limited part of these movements in one and the same finite time, the proportion between I he parts of these two circular movements and between their wholes will be the same. For instance, if the circular movement of Saturn in (he period which we call a year is a thirtieth of the circular movement of the sun in this period, and you imagine the whole of the circular movements of the sun in proportion to the whole of the t [Here, in the Arabic text, the last passage of Ghazali, which previously was given only in an abbreviated form, is repeated in full.]

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circular movements of Saturn in one and the same period*, necessarily the proportion between their wholes* and between their parts will be the same.' If, however, there is no proportion between two movements in their totality, because they are both potential, i.e. they have neither beginning nor end but there exists a proportion between the parts, because they are both actual, then the proportion between the wholes is not necessarily the same as the proportion between the 19 parts—although many think so, basing their proof on this prejudice —for there is no proportion between two magnitudes or quantities which are both taken to be infinite. 2 When, therefore, the ancients believed that, for instance, the totality of the movements of the sun and of Saturn had neither beginning nor end, there could be no proportion between them, for this would have implied the finitude 5 of both these totalities, just as this is implied for the parts of both. This is self-evident. Our adversaries believe that, when a proportion of more and less exists between parts, this proportion holds good also for the totalities, but this is only binding when the totalities are finite.3 For where there is no end there is neither 'more' nor 'less'. 10 The admission in such a case of the proportion of more and less brings with it another absurd consequence, namely that one infinite could be greater than another. This is only absurd when one supposes two things actually infinite, for then a proportion does exist between them. 4 When, however, one imagines things potentially infinite, there exists no proportion at all. This is the right answer to this question, not what Ghazali says in the name of the philosophers. And through this are solved all the difficulties which beset our 20 adversaries on this question, of which the greatest is that which they habitually formulate in this way: If the movements in the past are infinite, then no movement in the actual present can take place, unless an infinite number of preceding movements is terminated. 5 This is true, and acknowledged by the philosophers, once granted 5 that the anterior movement is the condition for the posterior movement's taking place, i.e. once granted that the existence of one single movement implies an infinite number of causes. But no philosopher allows the existence of an infinite number of causes, as accepted by the materialists, for this would imply the existence of an effect without cause and a motion without mover. 6 But when the existence of an 10 eternal prime mover had been proved, whose act cannot be posterior to his being, it followed that there could as little be a beginning for

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his act as for his being; otherwise his act would be possible, not necessary, and he would not be a first principle. 1 T h e acts of an agent who has no beginning have a beginning as little as his existence, and therefore it follows necessarily that no preceding act of his is the condition for the existence of a later, for neither of them is an agent by itself and their sequence is accidental. An accidental infinite, not an essential infinite, is admitted by the philosophers; nay, this type of infinite is in fact a necessary consequence of the existence of an eternal first principle. 2 And this is not only true for successive or continuous movements and the like, but even where the earlier is regarded as the cause of the later, for instance the man who engenders a man like himself.3 For it is necessary that the series of temporal productions of one individual man by another sho uld lead upwards to an eternal agent, for whom there is no beginning either of his existence or of his production of man out of man. The production of one man by another ad infinitum is accidental, whereas the relation of before and after in it is essential. The agent who has no beginning cither for his existence or for those acts of his which he performs without an instrument, has no first instrument* cither to perform those acts of his without beginning which by their nature need an instrument. 4 But since the theologians mistook the accidental for the essential, they denied this eternal agent; the solution of their problem was difficult and they believed this proof to be stringent. But this theory of the philosophers is clear, and their first master Aristotle has explained that, if motion were produced by motion, or element by element, motion and element could not exist.5 For this type of infinite the philosophers admit neither a beginning nor an end, and therefore one can never say of anything in this series that it has ended or has begun, not even in the past, for everything that has an end must have begun and what does not begin does not end. This can also be understood from the fact that beginning and end are correlatives. Therefore one who affirms that there is no end of the celestial revolutions in the future cannot logically ascribe a beginning to them, for what has a beginning has an end and what has no end has no beginning, and the same relation exists between first and last; i.e. what has a first term has also a last term, and what has no first term has no last term, and there is in reality neither end nor beginning lor any part of a series that has no last term, and what has no beginning for any of its parts has no end for any of them either. When, therefore, the theologians ask the philosophers if the move-

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ments which precede the present one are ended, their answer is negative, for their assumption that they have no beginning implies 10 their endlessness. T h e opinion of the theologians that the philosophers admit their end is erroneous, for they do not admit an end for what has no beginning. 1 It will be clear to you that neither the arguments of the theologians for the temporal creation of the world of which Ghazali speaks, nor the arguments of the philosophers which he includes and describes in his book, suffice to reach absolute evidence or afford stringent proof*. And this is what we have tried to show in 23 this book. The best answer one can give to him who asks where in the past is the starting-point of His acts, is: The starting-point of His acts is at the starting-point of His existence; for neither of them has a beginning. And here is the passage of Ghazali in which he sets forth the defence of the philosophers against the argument built on the difference in speed of the celestial spheres, and his refutation of their argument. 5 Ghazali says: If one says, 'The error in your argument consists in your considering those circular movements as an aggregate of units, but those movements have no real existence, for the past is no more and the future not yet; "aggregate" means units existing in the present, but in this case there is no existence.' Then he says to refute this: We answer: Number can be divided into even and uneven; there is no third possibility, whether for the numbered permanent reality, or for the numbered passing event. Therefore whatever number we imagine, we must believe it to be even or uneven, whether we regard it as existent or IO non-existent; and if the thing numbered vanishes from existence, our judgement of its being even or uneven does not vanish or change.2 I say: This is the end of his argument. But this argument—that the numbered thing must be judged as even or uneven, whether it exists or not—is only valid so far as it concerns external things or things in the soul that have a beginning and an end. For of the number which exists only potentially, i.e. which has neither beginning nor end, it cannot truly be said that it is even or uneven, or that it 24 begins or ends; it happens neither in the past nor in the future, for what exists potentially falls under the law of non-existence. 3 This is what the philosophers meant when they said that the circular movements of the past and the future are non-existent. 4 The upshot of this

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question is: Everything that is called a limited aggregate with a beginning and an end is so called either because it has a beginning 5 and end in the world exterior to the soul, or because it is inside, not outside, the soul. Every totality, actual and limited in the past, whether inside or outside the soul, is necessarily either even or uneven. But an unlimited aggregate existing outside the soul cannot be other than limited so far as it is represented in the soul, for the soul cannot represent unlimited existence. Therefore also this unlimited aggregate, as being limited in the soul, can be called even or I 0 uneven; in so far, however, as it exists outside the soul, it can be called neither even nor uneven. Equally, past aggregates which are considered to exist potentially outside the soul, i.e. which have no beginning, cannot be called even or uneven unless they are looked upon as actual, i.e. as having beginning and end. No motion possesses totality or forms an aggregate, i.e. is provided with a beginning or an end, except in so far as it is in the soul, as is the case with time. 1 And it follows from the nature of circular movement that it is neither even nor uneven except as represented in the soul. The cause of this mis- 25 take is that it was believed that, when something possesses a certain quality in the soul, it must possess this quality also outside the soul, and, since anything that has happened in the past can only be represented in the soul as finite, it was thought that everything that has happened in the past must also be finite outside the soul. And as the circular movements of the future are regarded by the imagination* 5 as infinite, for it represents them as a sequence of part after part, 2 Plato 3 and the Ash'arites believed that they might be infinite, but this is simply a judgement based on imagination, not on proof. Therefore those* who believe—as many theologians have done—that, if the world is supposed to have begun, it must have an end, are truer I0 to their principles 4 and show more consistency. Ghazali says after this: And we say moreover to the philosophers: According to your principles it is not absurd that there should be actual units, qualitatively differentiated, which are infinite in number; I am thinking of human souls, separated through death from their bodies. These are therefore realities that can neither be called even nor uneven. How will you refute the man who affirms that this is necessarily absurd in the same way as you claim the connexion between an eternal will and a temporal creation to be necessarily absurd? This theory about souls is that which Avicenna 26 accepted, and it is perhaps Aristotle's.

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I say: This argument is extremely weak. It says, in brief, 'You philosophers need not refute our assertion that what is a logical necessity for you is not necessary, as you consider things possible which your adversaries consider impossible by the necessity of thought. That is to say, just as you consider things possible which your adversaries consider impossible, so you consider things necessary which your adversaries do not consider so. And you cannot bring a criterion forjudging the two claims.' It has already been shown in the science of logic that this is a weak rhetorical or sophistical kind of argument. 1 The answer is that what we* claim to be necessarily true is objectively true, whereas whatj>OK claim as necessarily absurd is not as you claim it to be. For this there is no other criterion than immediate intuitive apprehension, 2 just as, when one man claims that a line is rhythmical and another denies it, the criterion is the intuition of the sound understanding. As for the thesis of a numerical plurality of immaterial souls, this is not a theory acknowledged by the philosophers, 3 for they regard matter as the cause of numerical plurality 4 and form as the cause of congruity in numerical plurality. And that there should be a numerical plurality without matter, having one unique form, is impossible. For in its description one individual can only be distinguished from another accidentally, as there is often another individual who participates in this description, 5 but only through their matter do individuals differ in reality. And also this: the impossibility of an actual infinite is an acknowledged axiom in philosophical theory, equally valid for material and immaterial things. We do not know of any one who makes a distinction here between the spatial and the non-spatial, with the single exception of Avicenna. 6 I do not know of any other philosopher who affirms this, it does not correspond with any of their principles and it makes no sense, for the philosophers deny the existence of an actual infinite equally for material and for immaterial things, as it would imply that one infinite could be greater than another. Perhaps Avicenna wanted only to satisfy the masses, telling them what they were accustomed to hear about the soul. But this theory is far from satisfactory. For if there were an actual infinite and it were divided in two, the part would equal the whole; e.g. if there were a line or a number actually infinite in both directions and it were divided in two, both the parts and the whole would be actually infinite; and this is absurd. 7 All this is simply the consequence of the admission of an actual and not potential infinite.

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Ghazali says: If it is said, 'The truth lies with Plato's theory of one eternal soul which is only divided in bodies and returns after its separation from them to its 5 original unity', 1 we answer: This theory is still worse, more objectionable and more apt to be regarded as contrary to the necessity of thought. For we say that the soul of Zaid is either identical with the soul of Amr or different from it; but their identity would mean something absurd, for everyone is conscious of his own identity and knows that he is not another, and, were they identical, their knowledge, which is an essential quality of their souls and enters into all the relations into which their souls enter, would be identical too.2 If you say their soul is unique and only divided through its association with bodies, we answer that the division of a unity 10 which has no measurable volume* is absurd by the necessity of thought. And how could the one become two, and indeed a thousand, and then return to its unity? This can be understood of things which have volume and quantity, like the water of the sea which is distributed into brooks and rivers and flows then back again into the sea, but how can that which has no quantity be divided?3 We seek to show by all this that the philosophers cannot shake the conviction of their adversaries that the eternal Will is connected with temporal creation, except by claiming its absurdity by the necessity of thought, and that therefore they are in no way different from the theologians who make the same claim against the philosophical doc- »9 trines opposed to theirs. And out of this there is no issue. I say: Zaid and Amr are numerically different, but identical in form. If, lor example, the soul of Zaid were numerically different from the soul of Amr in the way Zaid is numerically different from Amr, the soul of Zaid and the soul of Amr would be numerically two, but one 39 in their form, and the soul would possess another soul. 4 The necessary conclusion is therefore that the soul of Zaid and the soul of Amr are identical in their form. An identical form inheres in a numerical, i.e. a divisible, multiplicity, only through the multiplicity of matter. If then the soul does not die when the body dies, or if it possesses an immortal element, it must, when it has left the bodies, form a numerical unity. 5 But this is not the place to go deeper into this 5 subject. His argument against Plato is sophistical. It says in short that the soul of Zaid is either identical with the soul of Amr or different from it; but that the soul of Zaid is not identical with the soul of Amr and that therefore it is different from it. But 'different' is an equivocal M term, and 'identity' too is predicated of a number of things which arc also called 'different'. 6 The souls of Zaid and Amr are one in one

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sense and many in another; we might say, one in relation to their form, many in relation to their substratum. His remark that division can only be imagined of the quantitative is partially false; it is true of essential division, but not of accidental division, i.e. of those things which can be divided, because they exist in the essentially divisible. 1 30 The essentially divisible is, for example, body; accidental division is, for instance, the division of whiteness, when the bodies in which it is present are divided, and in this way the forms and the soul are accidentally divisible, i.e. through the division of the substrate. The soul is closely similar to light: light is divided by the division of • illuminated bodies, and is unified when the bodies are annihilated, 5 and this same relation holds between soul and bodies. 2 To advance such sophistical arguments is dishonest, for it may be supposed that he is not a man to have overlooked the points mentioned. What he said, he said only to flatter the masses of his times, but how far removed is such an attitude from the character of those who seek to set forth the truth! 3 But perhaps the man may be forgiven on account of the time and place in which he lived; and indeed he only proceeded in his books in a tentative way. 4 10 And as these arguments carry no evidence whatsoever, Ghazali says: We want to show by all this that the philosophers cannot shake the conviction of their adversaries that the eternal Will is connected with temporal creation, by claiming its absurdity by the necessity of thought, and that therefore they do not distinguish themselves from the theologians, who make the same claim against the philosophical doctrines opposed to theirs. And out of this there is no issue. I say: When someone denies a truth of which it is absolutely certain that it is such-and-such, there exists no argument by which we can come to an understanding with him; for every argument is based on known 31 premisses about which both adversaries agree. 5 When each point advanced is denied by the adversary, discussion with him becomes impossible, but such people stand outside the pale of humanity and have to be educated. But for him who denies an evident truth, 5 because of a difficulty which presents itself to him there is a remedy, i.e. the solution of this difficulty. He who does not understand evident truth, because he is lacking in intelligence, cannot be taught anything, nor can he be educated. 6 It is like trying to make the blind imagine colours or know their existence.

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Ghazali says: The philosophers may object: This argument (that the present has 10 been preceded by an infinite past) can be turned against you, for God before the creation of the world was able to create it, say, one year or two years* before He did, and there is no limit to His power; but He seemed to have patience and did not create. Then He created. Now, the duration of His inactivity is either finite or infinite. If you say finite, the existence of the Creator becomes finite; if you say infinite, a duration in which there is an infinite number of possibilities receives its termination.1 We answer: Duration and time are, according to us, created, but we shall explain the real answer to this question when we reply to the second proof of the philosophers.2

I say: Most people who accept a temporal creation of the world believe time to have been created with it. Therefore his assertion that the duration of His inactivity was either limited or unlimited is untrue. For what has no beginning does not finish or end. And the opponent does not admit that the inactivity has any duration at all. What one has to ask them about the consequences of their theory is: Is it possible, when the creation of time is admitted, that the term of its beginning may lie beyond the real time in which we live? 3 If they answer that it is not possible, they posit a limited extension beyond which the Creator cannot pass, and this is, in their view, shocking and absurd. If, however, they concede that its possible beginning may lie beyond the moment of its created term, it may further be asked if there may not lie another term beyond this second. If they answer in the affirmative—and they cannot do otherwise—it will be said: Then we shall have here a possible creation of an infinite number of durations, and you will be forced to admit—according to your argument about the spherical revolutions—that their termination is a condition for the real age which exists since them. If you say what is infinite does not finish, the arguments you use about the spherical revolutions against your opponents your opponents will use against you* on the subject of the possibility of created durations. If it is objected that the difference between those two cases is that these infinite possibilities belong to extensions which do not become actual, whereas the spherical revolutions do become actual, the answer is that the possibilities of things belong to their necessary accidents and that it does not make any difference, according to the philosophers, if they precede these things or are simultaneous with them, for of necessity they are the dispositions* of things. 4 If, then, it is impossible

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that before the existence of the present spherical revolution there 5 should have been infinite spherical revolutions, the existence of infinite possible revolutions is equally impossible. If one wants to avoid these consequences, one can say that the age of the world is a definite quantity and cannot be longer or shorter than it is, in conformity with the philosophical doctrine about the size of the world. 1 Therefore these arguments are not stringent, and the safest way for him who accepts the temporal creation of the world is to regard time io as of a definite extension and not to admit a possibility which precedes the possible; 2 and to regard also the spatial extension of the world as finite. Only, spatial extension forms a simultaneous whole; not so time. Ghazali expounds a certain kind of argument attributed to the philosophers on this subject against the theologians when they 34 denied* that the impossibility of delay* in the Creator's act after His existence is known by primitive intuition: 3 How will you defend yourselves, theologians, against the philosophers, when they drop this argument, based on the necessity of thought, and prove the eternity of the world* in this way, saying that times are equivalent so far as the possibility that the Divine Will should attach itself to them is concerned, for what differentiates a given time from an earlier or a later time? And it is not absurd to believe that the earlier or the later might be chosen when on the contrary you theologians say about white, black, movement, and rest that the white is realized through the eternal Will although its substrate accepts equally black and white. Why, then, does the eternal Will attach itself to the white rather than to the black, and what differentiates one of the two possibles from the other for connexion with the eternal Will ? But we philosophers know by the necessity of thought that one thing does not distinguish itself from a similar except by a differentiating principle, for if not, it would be possible that the world should come into existence, having the possibility both of existing and of not existing, and that the side of existence, although it has the same possibility as the side of non-existence, should be differentiated without a differentiating principle. If you answer that the Will of God is the differentiating principle, then one has to inquire what differentiates the Will, i.e. the reason why it has been differentiated in such or such way. And if you answer: One does not inquire after the motives of the Eternal,4 well, let the world then be eternal, and let us not inquire after its Creator and its cause, since one does not inquire after the motives of the Eternal! If it is regarded as possible that the Eternal should differentiate one of the two possibles by chance, it will be an extreme absurdity to say that the world is differentiated in differentiated forms which might just as well be other-

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wise, and one might then say that this has happened by chance in the same way as you say that the Divine Will has differentiated one time rather than another or one form rather than another by chance. If you say that such a question is irrelevant, because it refers to anything God can will or decide, we answer that this question is quite relevant, for it concerns any time and is pertinent for our opponents to any decision God takes. We answer: The world exists, in the way it exists, in its time, with its qualities, and in its space, by the Divine Will and will is a quality which has the faculty of differentiating one thing from another,1 and if it had not this faculty, power in itself would suffice.2 But, since power is equally related to two contraries3 and a differentiating principle is needed to differentiate one thing from a similar, it is said that the Eternal possesses besides His power a quality which can differentiate between two similars.4 And to ask why will differentiates one of two similars is like asking why knowledge must comprehend the knowable, and the answer is that 'knowledge' is the term for a quality which has just this nature. And in the same way, 'will' is the term for a quality the nature or rather the essence of which is to differentiate one thing from another. The philosophers may object: The assumption of a quality the nature of which is to differentiate one thing from a similar one is something incomprehensible, nay even contradictory, for 'similar' means not to be differentiated, and 'differentiated' means not similar. And it must not be believed that two blacks in two substrates are similar in every way, since the one is in one place and the other in another, and this causes a distinction; nor are two blacks at two times in one substrate absolutely similar, since they are separated in time, and how could they therefore be similar in every way? When we say of two blacks that they are similar, we mean that they are similar in blackness, in their special relation to it—not absolutely. Certainly, if the substrate and the time were one without any distinction, one could not speak any more of two blacks or of any duality at all. This proves that the term 'Divine Will' is derived from our will, and one docs not imagine that through our will two similar things can be differentiated.5 On the contrary, if someone who is thirsty has before him two cups of water, similar in everything in respect to his aim, it will not be possible for him to take either of them. No, he can only take the one he thinks more beautiful or lighter or nearer to his right hand, if he is right-handed, or act from some such reason, hidden or known. Without this the differentiation of the one from the other cannot be imagined. I say: T h e summary of what Ghazali relates in this section of the proofs of the philosophers for the impossibility of a temporal proceeding 5 from an eternal agent is that in God there cannot be a will. T h e philosophers could only arrive at this argument after granting to their opponents that all opposites—opposites in time, 6 like anterior

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and posterior, as well as those in quality, like white and black—are equivalent in relation to the eternal Will. And also non-existence and existence are, according to the theologians, equivalent in relation to the Divine Will. And having granted their opponents this premiss, although they did not acknowledge its truth, they said to them: It is of the nature of will that it cannot give preponderance to one thing rather than to a similar one, except through a differentiating principle 1 and a cause which only exist in one of these two similar things; if not, one of the two would happen by chance—and the philosophers argued for the sake of discussion, as if they had conceded that, if the Eternal had a will, a temporal could proceed from an eternal. As the theologians were unable to give a satisfactory answer, they took refuge in the theory that the eternal Will is a quality the nature of which is to differentiate between two similar things, without there being for God a differentiating principle which inclines Him to one of two similar acts; that the eternal Will is thus a quality like warmth which gives heat or like knowledge which comprehends the knowable. 2 But their opponents, the philosophers, answered: It is impossible that this should happen, for two similar things are equivalent for the wilier, and his action can only attach itself to the one rather than to the other through their being dissimilar, i.e. through one's having a quality the other has not. When, however, they are similar in every way and when for God there is no dilferentiating principle at all, His will will attach itself to both of them indifferently and, when this is the case—His will being the cause of His act—the act will not attach itself to the one rather than to the other, it will attach itself either to the two contrary actions simultaneously or to neither of them at all, and both cases are absurd. The philosophers, therefore, began their argument, as if they had it granted to them that all things were equivalent in relation to the First Agent, and they forced them to admit that there must be for God a differentiating principle which precedes Him, which is absurd. When the theologians answered that will is a quality the nature of which is to differentiate the similar from the similar, in so far as it is similar, the philosophers objected that this is not understood or meant by the idea of will. They therefore appear to reject the principle which they granted them in the beginning. 3 This is in short the content of this section. It waves the argument from the original question to the problem of the will; to shift one's ground, 4 however, is an act of sophistry.

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Ghazali answers in defence of the theological doctrine of the Divine Will: There are two objections: First, as to your affirmation that you cannot imagine this, do you know it by the necessity of thought or through deduction? You can claim neither the one nor the other. Your comparison with our will is a bad analogy, which resembles that employed on the question of God's knowledge. Now God's knowledge is different from ours in several ways which we acknowledge. Therefore it is not absurd to admit a difference in the will. Your affirmation is like saying that an essence existing neither outside nor inside the world, neither continuous with the world nor separated from it, cannot be understood, because we cannot understand this according to our human measure; the right answer is that it is the fault of your imagination, for rational proof has led the learned to accept its truth. How, then, will you refute those who say that rational proof has led to establishing in God a quality the nature of which is to differentiate between two similar things? And, if the word 'will' does not apply, call it by another name, for let us not quibble about words! We only use the term 'will' by permission of the Divine Law.1 It may be objected that by its conventional meaning 'will' designates that which has desire, and God has no desire, but we are concerned here with a question not of words but of fact. Besides, we do not even with respect to our human will concede that this cannot be imagined. Suppose two similar dates in front of a man who has a strong desire* for them, but who is unable to take them both. Surely he will take one of them through a quality in him the nature of which is to differentiate between two similar things. All the distinguishing qualities you have mentioned, like beauty or nearness or facility in taking, we can assume to be absent, but still the possibility of the taking remains. You can choose between two answers: cither you merely say that an equivalence in respect to his desire cannot be imagined—but this is a silly answer, for to assume it is indeed possible— or you say that if an equivalence is assumed, the man will remain for ever hungry and perplexed, looking at the dates without taking one of them, and without a power to choose or to will, distinct from his desire.2 And this again is one of those absurdities which are recognized by the necessity of thought. Everyone, therefore, who studies, in the human and the divine, the real working of the act of choice, must necessarily admit a quality the nature of which is to differentiate between two similar things.

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I say: This objection can be summarized in two parts: In the first Ghazali concedes that the human will is such that it is unable to 5 (lilfcrentiate one thing from a similar one, in so far as it is similar, but that a rational proof forces us to accept the existence of such a quality in the First Agent. T o believe that such a quality cannot exist

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would be like believing that there cannot exist a being who is neither inside nor outside the world. According to this reasoning, will, which is attributed to the First Agent and to man, is predicated in an equivocal way, like knowledge and other qualities which exist in the to Eternal in a different way from that in which they exist in the temporal, and it is only through the prescription of the Divine Law that we speak of the Divine Will. It is clear that this objection cannot have anything more than a dialectical value. For a proof that could demonstrate the existence of such a quality, i.e. a principle determining the existence of one thing rather than that of a similar, would have to assume things willed that are similar; things willed are, however, not similar, but on the contrary opposite, for all opposites can be reduced to the opposition of being and not being, which is the extreme form of opposition; and opposition is the contrary of similarity. 1 The assumption of the theologians that the things to which the will attaches itself are similar is a false one, and we shall 39 speak of it later. If they say: we affirm only that they are similar in relation to the First Wilier, who in His holiness is too exalted to possess desires, and it is through desires that two similar things are actually differentiated, 2 we answer: as to the desires whose realization contributes to the perfection of the essence of the wilier, 3 as 5 happens with our desires, through which our will attaches itself to the things willed—those desires are impossible in God, for the will which acts in this way is a longing for perfection when there is an imperfection in the essence of the wilier; but as to the desires which belong to the essence of the things willed, 4 nothing* new comes to the wilier from their realization. It comes exclusively to the thing willed, io for instance, when a thing passes into existence from non-existence, for it cannot be doubted that existence is better for it than nonexistence. It is in this second way that the Primal Will is related to the existing things, for it chooses for them eternally the better of two opposites, and this essentially and primally. This is the first part of the objection contained in this argument. In the second part he no longer concedes that this quality cannot exist in the human will, but tries to prove that there is also in us, in the face of similar things, a will which distinguishes one from the other; of this he gives examples. For instance, it is assumed that in 40 front of a man there are two dates, similar in every way, and it is supposed that he cannot take them both at the same time. It is supposed that no special attraction need be imagined for him in either

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of them, and that nevertheless he will of necessity distinguish one of them by taking it. But this is an error. For, when one supposes such a thing, and a wilier whom necessity prompts to eat or to take the date, then it is by no means a matter of distinguishing between two 5 similar things when, in this condition, he takes one of the two dates. It is nothing but the admission of an equivalence of two similar things; for whichever of the two dates he may take, his aim will be attained and his desire satisfied. His will attaches itself therefore merely to the distinction between the fact of taking one of them and the fact of leaving them altogether; it attaches itself by no means to the act of taking one definite date and distinguishing this act from the act of leaving the other (that is to say, when it is assumed that the desires for the two are equal); he does not prefer the act of taking the one to the act of taking the other, but he prefers the act of taking one of the two, whichever it may be, and he gives a preference to the act of 10 taking over the act of leaving. 1 This is self-evident. For distinguishing* one from the other means giving a preference* to the one over the other, and one cannot give a preponderance to one of two similar 41 things in so far as it is similar to the other—although in their existence as individuals they are not similar since each of two individuals is different from the other by reason of a quality exclusive to it. 2 If, therefore, we assume that the will attaches itself to that special character of one of them, then it can be imagined that the will attaches to t h e o n e rather than the other because of the element of difference existing in both. But then the will does not attach itself to two similar objects, in 5 so far as they are similar. This is, in short, the meaning of Ghazali's first objection. Then he gives his second objection against those who deny the existence of a quality, distinguishing two similar objects from one another. Ghazali says: The second objection is that we say: You in your system also are unable to do without a principle differentiating between two equals, for the world exists in virtue of a cause which has produced it in its peculiar shape out of >° a number of possible distinct shapes which are equivalent; why, then, has this cause differentiated some of them? If to distinguish two similar things is impossible, it is irrelevant whether this concerns the act of God, natural causality, or the logical necessity of ideas.3 Perhaps you will say: the universal order of the world could not be different from what it is; if the world were smaller or bigger than it actually is, this order would not be perfect, and the same may be asserted of the number of spheres and of stars. And perhaps you will say: The big differs from the small and the

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many from the few, in so far as they are the object of the will, and therefore they are not similar but different; but human power is too feeble to perceive the modes of Divine Wisdom in its determination of the measures and qualities of things; only in some of them can His wisdom be perceived, as in the obliquity of the ecliptic in relation to the equator, and in the wise contrivance of the apogee and the eccentric sphere.1 In most cases, however, the secret is not revealed, but the differences are known, and it is not impossible that a thing should be distinguished from another, because the order of the world depends on it; but certainly the times are absolutely indifferent in relation to the world's possibility and its order, and it cannot be claimed that, if the world were created one moment later or earlier, this order could not be imagined; and this indifference is known by the necessity of thought.—But then we answer: Although we can employ the same reasoning against your argument in the matter of different times, for it might be said that God created the world at the time most propitious for its creation, we shall not limit ourselves to this refutation, but shall assume, according to your own principle, a differentiation in two points about which there can be no disagreement: (i) the difference in the direction of spherical movement; (2) the definite place of the poles in relation to the ecliptic in spherical movement.2 The proof of the statement relating to the poles is that heaven is a globe, moving on two poles, as on two immovable points, whereas the globe of heaven is homogeneous and simple, especially the highest sphere, the ninth,3 which possesses no stars at all, and these two spheres4 move on two poles, the north and the south. We now say: of all the opposite points, which are infinite, according to you philosophers, there is no pair one could not imagine as poles. Why then have the two points of the north and south pole been fixed upon as poles and as immovable; and why does the ecliptic not pass through these two poles, so that the poles would become the opposite points of the ecliptic?s And if wisdom is shown in the size and shape of heaven, what then distinguishes the place of the poles from others, so that they are fixed upon to serve as poles, to the exclusion of all the other parts and points? And yet all the points are similar, and all parts of the globe are equivalent. And to this there is no answer. One might say: Perhaps the spot in which the point of the poles is, is distinguished from other points by a special quality, in relation to its being the place of the poles and to its being at rest, for it does not seem to change its place or space or position or whatever one wishes to call it; and all the other spots of the sphere by turning change their position in relation to the earth and the other spheres and only the poles are at rest; perhaps this spot was more apt to be at rest than the others. We answer: If you say so, you explain the fact through a natural differentiation of the parts of the first sphere; the sphere, then, ceases to be homogeneous, and this is in contradiction with your principle, for one of the proofs by which

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you prove the necessity of the globular shape of heaven, is that its nature is simple, homogeneous, and without differentiation, and the simplest shape is the globe; for the quadrangle and the hexagon and other figures demand a salience and a differentiation of the angles,1 and this happens only when its simple nature is added to. But although this supposition of yours is in contradiction with your own theory, it does not break the strength of your opponents' argument; the question about this special quality still holds good, namely, can those other parts accept this quality or not? If the answer is in the affirmative, why then is this quality limited to a few only of those homogeneous parts? If the answer is negative, we reply: the other parts, in so far as they constitute bodies, receiving the form of bodies, are homogeneous of necessity, and there is no justification for attributing this special quality to this spot exclusively on account of its being a part of a body and a part of heaven, for the other parts of heaven participate in this qualification. Therefore its differentiation must rest on a decision by God, or on a quality whose nature consists in differentiating between two similars. Therefore, just as among philosophers the theory is upheld that all times are equivalent in regard to the creation of the world, their opponents are justified in claiming that the parts of heaven are equivalent for the reception of the quality through which stability in position becomes more appropriate than a change of position. And out of this there is no issue. I say: This means in brief that the philosophers must acknowledge that there is a quality in the Creator of the world which differentiates between two similars, for it seems that the world might have had another shape and another quantity than it actually has, for it might have been bigger or smaller. Those different possibilities are, therefore, equivalent in regard to the determination of the existence of the world. On the other hand, if the philosophers say that the world can have only one special shape, the special quantity of its bodies and the special number of them it actually has, and that this equivalence of possibilities can only be imagined in relation to the times of temporal creation—since for God no moment is more suitable than another for its creation—they may be told that it is possible to answer this by saying that the creation of the world happened at its most propitious moment. But we, the theologians say, want to show the philosophers two equivalent things of which they cannot affirm that there exists any difference between them; the first is the particular direction of the spherical movement and the second the particular position of the poles, relative to the spheres; for any pair whatever of opposite points, united by a line which passes through the centre of

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the sphere, might constitute the poles. But the differentiation of these 44 two points, exclusive of all other points which might just as well be the poles of this identical sphere cannot happen except by a quality differentiating between two similar objects. If the philosophers assert that it is not true that any other place on the sphere might be the seat for these poles, they will be told: such an assertion implies that the S parts of the spheres are not homogeneous and yet you have often said that the sphere is of a simple nature and therefore has a simple form, viz. the spherical. And again, if the philosophers affirm that there are spots on the sphere which are not homogeneous, it will be asked how these spots came to be of a heterogeneous nature; is it because they are a body or because they are a celestial body? But the absence of homogeneity cannot be explained in this way. Therefore—Ghazali says—just as among philosophers the theory is upheld that all times are equivalent in regard to the creation of the world, io the theologians are justified in claiming that the parts of heaven are equivalent in regard to their serving as poles, and that the poles do not seem differentiated from the other points through a special position or through their being in an immovable place, exclusive of all other places. This then in short is the objection; it is, however, a rhetorical one, for many things which by demonstration can be found to be necessary seem at first sight merely possible.1 The philosophers' answer is that they assert that they have proved that the world is composed of five 45 bodies: a body neither heavy nor light, i.e. the revolving spherical body of heaven 2 and four other bodies, two of which are earth, absolutely heavy, which is the centre of the revolving spherical body, and fire, absolutely light, which is seated in the extremity of the revolving sphere; nearest to earth is water, which is heavy relatively j to air, light relatively to earth; next to water comes air, which is light relatively to water, heavy relatively to fire. The reason why earth is absolutely heavy is that it is farthest away from the circular movement, and therefore it is the fixed centre of the revolving body; the reason why fire is absolutely light is that it is nearest to the revolving sphere; the intermediate bodies are both heavy and light, io because they are in the middle between the two extremes, i.e. the farthest point and the nearest. 3 If there were not a revolving body, surely there would be neither heavy nor light by nature, and neither high nor low by nature, 4 and this whether absolutely or relatively; and the bodies would not differ by nature in the way in

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which, for instance, earth moves by nature to its specific place and fire moves by nature to another place, and equally so the intermediary bodies. And the world is only finite, because of the spherical body, and this because of the essential and natural finiteness of the spherical body, as one single plane circumscribes it.1 Rectilinear bodies are not essentially finite,2 as they allow of an increase and decrease; they are only finite because they are in the middle of a body that admits neither increase nor decrease, and is therefore essentially finite. And, therefore, the body circumscribing the world cannot but be spherical, as otherwise the bodies would either have to end in other bodies, and we should have an infinite regress, or they would end in empty space, and the impossibility of both suppositions has been demonstrated.3 He who understands this knows that every possible world imaginable can only consist of these bodies, and that bodies have to be either circular—and then they are neither heavy nor light—or rectilinear—and then they are either heavy or light, i.e. either fire or earth or the intermediate bodies; that these bodies have to be either revolving, or surrounded by a revolving periphery, for each body either moves from, towards, or round the centre; that by the movements of the heavenly bodies to the right and to the left4 all bodies are constituted and all that is produced from opposites is generated; and that through these movements the individuals of these four bodies never cease being in a continual production and corruption.5 Indeed, if a single one of these movements ihould cease, the order and proportion of this universe would disappear, for it is clear that this order must necessarily depend on the actual number of these movements—for if this were smaller or greater, either the order would be disturbed, or there would be another order—and that the number of these movements is as it is, either through its necessity for the existence of this sublunary world, or because it is the best.6 Do not ask here for a proof for all this, but if you are interested in ni.ience, look for its proof, where you can find it. Here, however, listen to theories which are more convincing than those of the theologians and which, even if they do not bring you complete proof, will give your mind an inclination to lead you to proof through icientific speculation. You should imagine that each heavenly iphere is a living being, in so far as it possesses a body of a definite measure and shape and moves itself in definite directions, not at random. Anything of this nature is necessarily a living being; i.e.

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when we see a body of a definite quality and quantity move itself in space, in a definite direction, not at random, through its own power, not through an exterior cause, and move in opposite directions at the same time, we are absolutely sure that it is a living being, and we said only 'not through an exterior cause' because iron moves towards a magnet when the magnet is brought to it from the outside—and besides, iron moves to a magnet from any direction whatever. 1 The heavenly bodies, therefore, possess places which are poles by nature, and these bodies cannot have their poles in other places, just as earthly animals have particular organs in particular parts of their bodies for particular actions, and cannot have them in other places, e.g. the organs of locomotion, which are located in definite parts. The poles represent the organs of locomotion in animals of spherical form, and the only difference in this respect between spherical and non-spherical animals is that in the latter these organs differ in both shape and power, whereas in the former they only differ in power. 2 For this reason it has been thought on first sight that they do not differ at all, and that the poles could be in any two points on the sphere. And just as it would be ridiculous to say that a certain movement in a certain species of earthly animal could be in any part whatever of its body, or in that part where it is in another species, because this movement has been localized in each species in the place where it conforms most to its nature, or in the only place where this animal can perform the movement, so it stands with the differentiation in the heavenly bodies for the place of their poles. For the heavenly bodies are not one species and numerically many, but they form a plurality in species, like the plurality of different individuals of animals where there is only one individual in the species.3 Exactly the same answer can be given to the question why the heavens move in different directions: that, because they are animals, they must move in definite directions, like right and left, before and behind, which are directions determined by the movements of animals, and the only difference between the movements of earthly animals and those of heavenly bodies is that in the different animals these movements are different in shape and in power, whereas in the heavenly animals they only differ in power. And it is for this reason that Aristotle thinks that heaven possesses the directions of right and left, before and behind, high and low.4 The diversity of the heavenly bodies in the direction of their movements rests on their diversity of species, and the fact that this difference in the directions

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of their movements forms the specific differentia of their species is 50 something proper to them. Imagine the first heaven as one identical animal whose nature obliges it—either by necessity or because it is for the best—to move with all its parts in one movement from east to west. The other spheres are obliged by their nature to have the opposite movement. The direction which the body of the universe is 5 compelled to follow through its nature is the best one, because its body is the best of bodies and the best among the moving bodies must also have the best direction. All this is explained here in this tentative way, but is proved apodictically in its proper place. This is also the manifest sense of the Divine Words, 'There is no changing the words of God', 1 and 'There is no altering the creation of God'. 2 If you want to be an educated man, proceeding by proof, you should 10 look for the proof of this in its proper place. Now if you have understood all this, it will not be difficult for you to see the faults in Ghazali's arguments here about the equivalence of the two opposite movements in relation to each heavenly body and to the sublunary world. O n first thoughts it might be imagined that the movement from east to west might also belong to other spheres besides the first, and that the first sphere might equally well move from west to east. You might as well say* that the crab could be imagined as having the same direction of movement as man. But, 51 as a matter of fact, such a thought will not occur to you about men and crabs, because of their difference in shape, whereas it might occur to you about the heavenly spheres, since they agree in shape. 3 I le who contemplates a product of art does not perceive its wisdom II he does not perceive the wisdom of the intention embodied in it, 5 and the effect intended. 4 And if he does not understand its wisdom, lie may well imagine that this object might have any form, any quantity, any configuration of its parts, and any composition whatever. This is the case with the theologians in regard to the body of I lie heavens, but all such opinions are superficial. He who has such beliefs about products of art understands neither the work nor the 10 artist, and this holds also in respect of the works of God's creation. Understand this principle, and do not judge the works of God's creation hastily and superficially—so that you may not become one of those about whom the Koran says: 'Say, shall we inform you of those who lose most by their works, those who erred in their endeavour after the life of this world and who think they are doing good deeds?' 5 May God make us perspicacious and lift from us the veils of

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52 ignorance; indeed He is the bounteous, the generous! To contemplate the various actions of the heavenly bodies is like contemplating the kingdom of heaven, which Abraham contemplated, according to the words of the Koran: 'Thus did we show Abraham the kingdom of heaven and of the earth, that he should be of those who are sure.' 1 5 And let us now relate Ghazali's argument about the movements. Ghazali says: The second point in this argument concerns the special direction of the movement of the spheres which move partially from east to west, partially in the opposite direction, whereas the equivalence of the directions in relation to their cause is exactly the same as the equivalence of the times. If it is said: If the universe revolved in only one direction, there would never be a difference in the configuration of the stars, and such relations of the stars as their being in trine, in sextile, and in conjunction2 would never arise, but the universe would remain in one unique position without any change; the difference of these relations, however, is the principle of all production in the world—we answer: Our argument does not concern the difference in direction of movement; no, we concede that the highest sphere moves from east to west and the spheres beneath it in the opposite direction, but everything that happens in this way would happen equally if the reverse took place, i.e. if the highest sphere moved from west to east and the lower spheres in the opposite direction. For all the same differences in configuration would arise just as well. Granted that these movements are circular and in opposite directions, both directions are equivalent; why then is the one distinguished from the other, which is similar to it? 1 If it is said: as the two directions are opposed and contrary, how can they be similar?—we answer: this is like saying 'since before and after are opposed in the existing world, how could it be claimed that they are equivalent?' Still, it is asserted by you philosophers that the equivalence of times, so far as the possibility of their realization and any purpose one might imagine in their realization is concerned, is an evident fact. Now, we regard it as equally evident that spaces, positions, situations, and directions are equivalent so far as concerns their receiving movement and any purpose that might be connected with it. If therefore the philosophers are allowed to claim that notwithstanding this equivalence they are different, their opponents are fully justified in claiming the same in regard to the times.* 53

I say: From what I have said previously, the speciousness of this argument and the way in which it has to be answered will not be obscure to you. All this is the work of one who does not understand the exalted natures of the heavenly bodies and their acts of wisdom for the sake of which they have been created, and who compares God's knowledge with the knowledge of ignorant man.

THE FIRST DISCUSSION

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If it is said: as the two directions are opposed and contrary, how can they be similar?—we answer: this is like saying 'since before and after in the existing world are opposed, how could it be claimed that they are equivalent?' Still, it is asserted by you philosophers that the equivalence of times so far as the possibility of their realization, and any purpose one might imagine in their realization is concerned, is an evident fact. Now, we regard it as equally evident that spaces, positions, situations, and directions are equivalent so far as concerns their receiving the movement and any purpose that might be connected with it. I say: The falsehood of this is self-evident. Even if one should admit that the possibilities of man's existence and non-existence are equivalent in the matter out of which he has been created, and that this is a proof for the existence of a determining principle which prefers his existence to his non-existence, still it cannot be imagined that the possibilities of seeing and not seeing are equivalent in the eye. 1 Thus no one can claim that the opposite directions are equivalent, although he may claim that the substratum for both is indifferent, and that therefore out of both directions similar actions result. 2 And the same holds good for before and after: they are not equivalent, in so far as this event is earlier and that event later; they can only be claimed to be equivalent so far as their possibility of existence is concerned. 3 But the whole assumption is wrong: for essential opposites also need essentially opposite substrata and a unique substratum giving rise to opposite acts at one and the same time is an impossibility. 4 The philosophers do not believe that the possibilities of a thing's existence and of its non-existence are equivalent at one and the same time; no, the time of the possibility of its existence is different from the time of the possibility of its non-existence, 5 time for them is the condition for the production of what is produced, and for the corruption of what perishes. 6 If the time for the possibility of the existence of a thing and the time for the possibility of its non-existence were the same, that is to say in its proximate matter, its existence would be vitiated, because of the possibility of its nonexistence, and the possibility of its existence and of its non-existence would be dependent only on the agent, not on the substratum. 7 Thus he who tries to prove the existence of an agent in this way gives only persuasive, dialectical arguments, not apodictic proof. It is believed that Farabi and Avicenna followed this line to establish

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that every act must have an agent, but it is not a proof of the ancient philosophers, and both of them merely took it over from the theologians of our religion. 1 In relation, however, to the temporal creation of the world—for him who believes in it—before and after cannot even be imagined, 2 for before and after in time can only be imagined in relation to the present moment, 3 and as, according to the theologians, there was before the creation of the world no time, how could there be imagined something preceding the moment when the world was created? A definite moment cannot be assigned for the creation of the world, for either time did not exist before it, or there was an infinite time, and in neither case could a definite time be fixed to which the Divine could attach itself.4 Therefore it would be more suitable to call this book 'Incoherence' without qualification rather than 'The Incoherence of the Philosophers', for the only profit it gives the reader is to make him incoherent. Ghazali says: If, therefore, the philosophers are allowed to claim that, notwithstanding this equivalence, they are different, their opponents are fully justified in claiming the same in regard to times. I say: He wants to say: If the philosophers are justified in claiming a difference in the direction of movement, the theologians have the right to assert a difference in times, notwithstanding their belief in their equivalence. This is only a verbal argument, and does not refer to the facts themselves, even if one admits an analogy between the opposite directions and the different times,* but this is often objected to, because there is no analogy between this difference in times and directions. 5 Our adversary, however, is forced to admit that there is an analogy between them, because they are both claimed to be different, and both to be equivalent! These, therefore, are one and all only dialectical arguments. Ghazali says: The second objection6 against the basis of their argument is that the philosophers are told: 'You regard the creation of a temporal being by an eternal as impossible, but you have to acknowledge it too, for there are new events happening in the world and they have causes. It is absurd to think that these events lead to other events ad infinitum, and no intelligent person can believe such a thing. If such a thing were possible, you need not acknowledge a creator and establish a necessary being on whom possible existences depend. If, however, there is a limit for those events in which their sequence ends, this limit will be the eternal and then

THE FIRST DISCUSSION 33 indubitably you too acknowledge the principle that a temporal can proceed from an eternal being.'1 I say: If the philosophers had introduced the eternal being into reality from the side of the temporal by this kind of argument, i.e. if they 10 had admitted that the temporal, in so far as temporal, proceeds from an eternal being, there would be no possibility of their avoiding the difficulty in this problem. But you must understand that the philosophers permit the existence of a temporal which comes out of a temporal being ad infinitum in an accidental way, when this is repeated in a limited and finite matter—when, for instance, the corruption of one* of two things becomes the necessary condition for the existence 57 of the other. For instance, according to the philosophers it is necessary that man should be produced from man on condition that the anterior man perishes so as to become the matter for the production of a third. 2 For instance, we must imagine two men of whom the first produces the second from the matter of a man who perishes; when the second becomes a man himself, the first perishes, then the 5 second man produces a third man out of the matter of the first, and then the second perishes and the third produces out of his matter a fourth, and so we can imagine in two matters an activity continuing ad infinitum, without any impossibility arising. And this happens as long as the agent lasts, for if this agent has neither beginning nor end for his existence, the activity has neither beginning nor end for its existence, as it has been explained before.3 And in the same way you 10 may imagine this happening in them in the past: When a man exists, there must before him have been a man who produced him and a man who perished, and before this second man a man who produced him and a man who perished, for everything that is produced in this way is, when it depends on an eternal agent, of a circular nature in which no actual totality can be reached. 4 If, on the other hand, a man were produced from another man out of infinite matters, or there were an infinite addition of them, there would be an impossi- 58 bility, for then there could arise an infinite matter and there could be an infinite whole. For if a finite whole existed to which things were added ad infinitum without any corruption taking place in it, an infinite whole could come into existence, as Aristotle proved in liis Physics* For this reason the ancients introduce an eternal abso- 5 lutely unchanging being, having in mind not temporal beings, proceeding from him in so far as they are temporal, but beings

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proceeding from him as being eternal generically, 1 and they hold that this infinite series is the necessary consequence of an eternal agent, for the temporal needs for its own existence only a temporal cause. 2 Now there are two reasons why the ancients introduce the existence of an eternal numerically unique being which does not suffer any change. The first is that they discovered that this revolving being is eternal, for they discovered that the present individual is produced through the corruption of its predecessor and that the corruption of this previous individual implies the production of the one that follows it, and that it is necessary that this everlasting change should proceed from an eternal mover and an eternal moved body, which does not change in its substance, 3 but which changes only in place so far as concerns its parts,* and approaches certain of the transitory things and recedes from certain of them, and this is the cause of the corruption of one half of them and the production of the other half.5 And this heavenly body is the being that changes in place only, not in any of the other kinds of change, 6 and is through its temporal activities the cause of all things temporal; and because of the continuity of its activities which have neither beginning nor end, it proceeds from a cause which has neither beginning nor end. T h e second reason why they introduce an eternal being absolutely without body and matter is that they found that all the kinds of movement depend on spatial movement, 7 and that spatial movement depends on a being moved essentially by a prime mover, absolutely unmoved, both essentially and accidentally, 8 for otherwise there would exist at the same time an infinite number of moved movers, and this is impossible.' And it is necessary that this first mover should be eternal, or else it would not be the first. Every movement, therefore, depends on this mover and its setting in motion essentially, not accidentally. And this mover exists simultaneously with each thing moved, at the time of its motion, for a mover existing before the thing moved*—such as a man producing a man—sets only in motion accidentally, not essentially; but the mover who is the condition of man's existence from the beginning of his production till its end, or rather from the beginning of his existence till its end, is the prime mover. And likewise his existence is the condition for the existence of all beings and the preservation 10 of heaven and earth and all that is between them." All this is not proved here apodictically, but only in the way we follow here and which is in any case more plausible for an impartial reader than the arguments of our opponents.

THE FIRST DISCUSSION 35 If this is clear to you, you certainly are in no need of the subterfuge s by which Ghazali in his argument against the philosophers tries to conciliate them with their adversaries in this matter; indeed these artifices will not do, for if you have not understood how the philosophers introduce an eternal being into reality, you have not understood how they settle the difficulty of the rise of the temporal out of the eternal; they do that, as we said, either through the medium of a being eternal in its essence but generable and corruptible in its 10 particular movements, not, however, in its universal circular movement, 1 or through the medium of what is generically eternal 2 —i.e. has neither beginning nor end—in its acts. Ghazali answers in the name of the philosophers:

The philosophers may say, 'we do not consider it impossible that any temporal being, whatever it may be, should proceed from an eternal being, but we regard it as impossible that the first temporal should proceed from the eternal, as the mode of its procession does not differ from that which precedes it, either in a greater inclination* towards existence or through the presence of some particular time, or through an instrument, condition, nature, accident, or any cause whatever which 61 might produce a new mode. If this therefore is not the first temporal, it will be possible that it should proceed from the eternal, when another thing proceeds from it, because of the disposition of the receiving substratum, or because the time was propitious or for any other reason.'3 Having given this reply on the part of the philosophers, Ghazali answers it: This question about the actualization of the disposition, whether of the 5 time and of any new condition which arises in it, still holds good, and we must either come to an infinite regress or arrive at an eternal being out of which a first temporal being proceeds. I say: This question is the same question all over again as he asked the philosophers first,4 and this is the same kind of conclusion as he made them draw then, namely that a temporal proceeds from an eternal, and having given as their answer something which does not correspond with the question, i.e. that it is possible that a temporal being should proceed from the Eternal without there being a first temporal being, he turns the same question against them again. The correct io answer to this question was given above: the temporal proceeds from the First Eternal, not in so far as it is temporal but in so far as it is eternal, i.e. through being eternal generically, though temporal in

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its parts. For according to the philosophers an eternal being out of which a temporal being proceeds essentially1 is not the First Eternal, but its acts, according to them, depend on the First Eternal; i.e. the actualization of the condition for activity of the eternal, which is not the First Eternal, depends on the First Eternal in the same way as the temporal products depend on the First Eternal and this is a dependence based on the universal, not on individuals. 2 After this Ghazali introduces an answer of the philosophers, in one of the forms in which this theory can be represented, which amounts to this: A temporal being proceeding from an eternal can only be represented by means of a circular movement which resembles the eternal by not having beginning or end and which resembles the temporal in so far as each part of it is transient, so that this movement through the generation of its parts is the principle of temporal things, and through the eternity of its totality the activity of the eternal. Then Ghazali argues against this view, according to which in the opinion of the philosophers the temporal proceeds from the First Eternal, and says to them: Is this circular movement temporal or eternal? If it is eternal, how does it become the principle for temporal things? And if it is temporal, it will need another temporal being and we shall have an infinite regress. And when you say that it partially resembles the eternal, partially the temporal, for it resembles the eternal in so far as it is permanent and the temporal in so far as it arises anew, we answer: Is it the principle of temporal things, because of its permanence, or because of its arising anew? In the former case, how can a temporal proceed from something because of its permanence? And in the latter case, what arises anew will need a cause for its arising anew, and we have an infinite regress.3 I say: This argument is sophistical. The temporal does not proceed from it in so far as it is eternal, but in so far as it is temporal; it does not need, however, for its arising anew a cause arising anew, for its arising anew is not a new fact, but is an eternal act, i.e. an act without beginning or end. Therefore its agent must be an eternal agent, for an eternal act has an eternal agent, and a temporal act a temporal agent. Only through the eternal element in it can it be understood that movement has neither beginning nor end, and this is meant by its permanence, for movement itself is not permanent, but changing. And since Ghazali knew this, he said: In order to elude this consequence the philosophers have a kind of artifice which we will expose briefly.

THE FIRST DISCUSSION

Ghazali says:

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THE SECOND PROOF OF THE PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING THIS PROBLEM1 They assert that he who affirms that the world is posterior to God and God prior to the world cannot mean anything but that He is prior not temporally but essentially,2 like the natural priority of one to two, although they can exist together in temporal existence, or like the priority 5 of cause to effect, for instance the priority of the movement of a man to the movement of his shadow which follows him, or the movement of the hand to the movement of the ring, or the movement of the hand in the water to the movement of the water, for all these things are simultaneous, but the one is cause, the other effect, for it is said that the shadow moves through the movement of the man and the water through the hand in the water, and the reverse is not said although they are simultaneous.1 If this is what you mean by saying that God is prior to the world, then it follows that they must both either be temporal or eternal, for it is absurd that the I 0 one should be temporal and the other eternal.4 If it is meant that God is prior to the world and to time, not essentially, but temporally, then there was, before the existence of the world and of time, a time in which the world was non-existent, since non-existence preceded the world and God preceded it during a long duration which had a final term but no initial one, and then there was before time an infinite time, which is selfcontradictory. Therefore the assertion that time had a beginning is absurd. And if time—which is the expression of the measure of movement —is eternal, movement must be eternal. And the necessity of the eternity of movement implies the necessity of the eternity of the thing in motion, through the duration of which time endures. I say: The mode of their reasoning which he reproduces docs not constitute a proof. It amounts to saying that the Creator, if He is prior to the world, must either be prior not in time, but in causation, like the priority of a man to his shadow, or prior in time, like a builder to a wall. 5 If He is prior in the same way as the man is prior to his sliadow, 65 and if the Creator is eternal, then the world too is eternal. But if He is prior in time, then He must precede the world by a lime which has no beginning, and time will be eternal, for if there is a time before the actual, its starting-point cannot be imagined. And if time is 5 eternal, movement too is eternal, for time cannot be understood without motion. And if motion is eternal, the thing in motion will be eternal, and its mover will necessarily be eternal too. lint this proof is unsound, for it is not of the nature of the Creator to be in time, whereas it belongs to the nature of the world to be so; and lor ibis

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10 very reason it is not true that He is either simultaneous with it or prior to it in time or in causation.' Ghazali says: The objection to this is: Time is generated and created, and before it there was no time at all. The meaning of our words that God is prior to the world and to time is: He existed without the world and without time, then He existed and with Him there was the world and there was time. And the meaning of our words that He existed without the world is: the ex66 istence of the essence of the Creator and the non-existence of the essence of the world, and nothing else. And the meaning of our words that He existed and with Him there was the world is: the existence of the two essences, and nothing else. And the meaning of priority: the uniqueness of His existence, and nothing else. And the world is like a singular person; if we should say, for instance: God existed without Jesus, then He existed with Jesus—these words contain nothing but, first, the existence of an essence and the non-existence of an essence, then, the existence of two essences, and there is no need to assume here a third essence, namely time, although 5 imagination cannot desist from assuming it. But we should not heed the errors of the imagination.2 I say: These words are erroneous and mistaken, for we have already proved that there are two kinds of existence: one in the nature of which* there is motion and which cannot be separated from time; the other in the nature of which there is no motion and which is eternal and cannot be described in terms of time. The first is known by the senses and by reason; the existence of the second—in the nature io of which there is neither motion nor change—is known by proof to everyone who acknowledges that each motion needs a mover and each effect a cause, and that the causes which move each other do not regress infinitely, but end in a first cause which is absolutely unmoved. And it has also been established that the entity in the nature of which there is no movement is the cause of the entity in the nature of which there is movement. And it has been proved also 67 that the entity in the nature of which there is motion cannot be separated from time, and that the entity in the nature of which there is no movement is entirely free from time. Therefore the priority of 5 the one entity over the other is based neither on a priority in time, nor on the priority of that kind of cause and effect, which belongs to the nature of things in motion, like the priority of a man to his shadow. For this reason anyone who compares the priority of the unmoved being to the thing in motion to the priority existing be-

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tween two things in motion is in error; since it is only true of each one in pairs of moving things that, when it is brought in relation 10 to the other, it is either simultaneous with it or prior or posterior in time to it. It is the later philosophers of Islam who made this mistake, since they enjoyed but slight comprehension of the doctrine of the ancients. So the priority of this one being to the other is the priority of the unchanging timeless existence to the changing existence which is in time, and this is an altogether different type of priority. 68 I t is therefore not true of these existences that they are simultaneous, or that the one precedes the other, and Ghazali's observation that the priority of the Creator to the world is not a temporal priority is true. But the posteriority of the world to the Creator, since He does 5 not precede the world in time, can only be understood as the posteriority of effect to cause, 1 for posteriority and priority are opposites which are necessarily in one genus, as has been shown in the sciences. 2 Since therefore this priority is not in time, the posteriority also cannot be in time, and we have the same difficulty all over again: how can the effect be delayed after the cause when the conditions of acting are fulfilled?3 T h e philosophers, however, since they do not recognize 10 a beginning in the totality of this existence in motion, are not touched by this difficulty, and it is possible for them to indicate in what way the temporal beings proceed from the eternal. One of their proofs* that existence in motion has no beginning, and that in its totality it does not start, is that, when it is assumed to start, it is assumed to exist before its existence, for to start is a movement, and movement is of necessity in the thing in motion,* equally whether the movement is regarded as taking place in time or at an instant. 5 Another proof is that everything that becomes has the potentiality of becoming before it actually becomes, although the theologians deny this (a 69 discussion with them on this point will follow); now potentiality is a necessary attribute of being in motion, and it follows necessarily that, if it were assumed to become, it would exist before its existence. 6 What we have here are only dialectical arguments; they have, however, a much greater plausibility than what the theologians ad- 5 vance. As for Ghazali's words: If we should say, for instance, that God existed without Jesus, and then He existed with Jesus, these words contain nothing but, first, the existence of an essence and the non-existence of an essence, then, the existence of two essences, and there is no need to assume here a third essence, namely time.

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I say: This is true, provided that Jesus' posteriority is not regarded as an essential temporal posteriority, but, if there is a posteriority, it is an accidental posteriority, for time precedes this posterior entity*, i.e. it is a necessity of Jesus' existence that time should precede Him and io that His existence should have begun, but the world is not subject to such a necessity, except in so far as it is a part of a moving existence beyond which time extends in two directions, 1 as happens to Jesus* and other transitory individuals. 2 Nothing of this is proved here; here it is simply explained that the objection is not valid. In addition, what he says afterwards of the proofs of the philosophers is untrue. 70 Answering in the name of the philosophers, Ghazali says: One might say that our expression 'God existed without the world' means a third thing, besides the existence of one being and the nonexistence of another, because, if we should suppose that in the future God should exist without the world, there would be in the future the existence of one being and the non-existence of aViother, still it would not be right 5 to say 'God existed without the world', but we should say 'God will exist without the world', for only of the past do we say 'God existed without the world'; and between the words 'existed' and 'will exist' there is a difference, for they cannot replace each other. And if we try to find out where the difference between the two sentences lies, it certainly does not lie in the words 'existence of one being' and 'non-existence of another being', but in a third entity, for if we say of the non-existence of the world in the future 'God was without the world', it will be objected: this is wrong, for 'was' refers only to the past. This shows therefore that the word 'was' comprises a third entity, namely the past, and the past by itself is time, and through another existent it is movement, for movement passes only through the passing of time. And so it follows necessarily that, before itself exists, and there is time between each pair of instants, because instant is not continuous with instant, nor point continuous with point. 6 This has been proved in the sciences. Therefore before the instant in which the movement occurs there must necessarily be a time, because, when we represent two instants in reality, there must necessarily be time between them. And what is said in this objection that 'higher' resembles 'before' is not true, nor does the instant resemble the point, nor the quantity which possesses position the quantity which docs not possess position. 7 He who allows the existence of an instant which is not a present, or of a present which is not preceded by a past, denies time 78 and the instant, for he assumes an instant as having the description which we have mentioned, 8 and then assumes a time which has no

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beginning—which is a self-contradictory assumption. It is, therefore, wrong to ascribe to an act of imagination the fact that there is a prior event for every occurrence, for he who denies priority denies the event in time. The contrary is the case with the man who denies the real character of the high*, for he denies the absolutely high and, when he denies the absolutely high, he denies also the absolutely low,1 and when these two are denied, also the heavy and the light are denied 2 and the act of the imagination that a body with straight dimensions must end in another body is not false; no, this is a necessary truth, for the body with straight dimensions has the possibility of increasing, and what has this possibility is not limited by nature. 3 Therefore the body with straight surfaces must end in the circumscribing circular body, since this is the perfect body which is liable neither to increase nor to decrease. Therefore when the mind seeks to imagine that the circular body must end in another body, it imagines the impossible. These are all matters of which the theologians and those who do not start their inquiry in the proper scientific order are unaware. Further, the relation between time and motion is not the same as that between spatial limit and spatial magnitude, for the spatial limit is an attribute of spatial magnitude, in so far as it inheres in it, in the way that the accident inheres in its substratum and is individualized by the individuality of its substratum and is indicated by pointing at its substratum and by its being in the place in which its substratum is.4 But this is not the case with the necessary relation between time and motion. For the dependence of time on motion is much like the dependence of number on the thing numbered :5 just as number does not become individualized through the individuation of the thing numbered, nor pluralizcd through its plurality, so it stands with the relation between time and movement. 6 Time, therefore, is unique for all movement and for each thing moving, and exists everywhere, so that if we should suppose people confined from youth in a cave in the earth, still we should be sure that they would perceive time, even if they did not perceive any of the movements which are perceived in the world. 7 Aristotle therefore thought that the existence of movements in time is much like the existence of the things numbered in number, 8 for number is not pluralizcd through the plurality of the things numbered, nor is it localized through the individuation of the places numbered. He thought, therefore, that its specific quality was to mesaure the movements and to measure the existence of moving

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things, in so far as they are moving, as number counts the individual moving things, and therefore Aristotle says in his definition of time 80 that it is the number of movement according to the relations of anterior and posterior. 1 Therefore, just as the supposition that a thing numbered occurs does not imply that number comes into existence, but it is a necessary condition for the occurrence of a thing numbered that number should exist before it, so the occurrence of movement implies that there was time before it. If time occurred 3 with the occurrence of any individual movement whatever, time would only be perceived with that individual movement. 2 This will make you understand how different the nature of time is from the nature of spatial magnitude. Ghazali answers on behalf of the philosophers: It may be said: This comparison3 is lame, for there is neither above nor below in the world; for the world is spherical, and in the sphere there is neither above nor below; if the one direction is called above, because it to is overhead, and the other below, because it is under foot, this name is always determined* in relation to you, and the direction which is below in relation to you is above in relation to another, if you imagine him standing on the other side of the terrestrial globe with the sole of his foot opposite the sole of your foot. Yes, these parts of heaven which you reckon above during the day are identical with what is below during the night, and what is below the earth comes again above the earth through the daily revolution. But it cannot be imagined that the beginning of the world becomes its end. If we imagined a stick with one thick and one thin end and we agreed to call the part nearest the thin end 'above' and the other 'below', there would not arise from this an essential differentiation in the parts of the world; it would simply be that different names would have been applied to the shape of the stick, so that if we substituted the one name for the other, there would be an exchange of names, but the world itself would remain unchanged. So 'above' and 'below' are a mere 81 relation to you without any differentiation in the parts and places of the world. The non-existence, however, preceding the world and the initial term of its existence are essential realities, a substitution or a change of which cannot be imagined. Nor can it be imagined that the non-existence which is supposed to occur at the disappearance of the world and which follows the world can become the non-existence preceding it. The initial and final terms of the world's existence are permanent essential terms, in which no change can be imagined through the change of the subjective relation to them, in contrast with 'above' and 'below'. Therefore we 5 philosophers, indeed, are justified in saying that in the world there is neither 'above' nor 'below', but you theologians have not the right to assert that the existence of the world has neither a 'before' nor an 'after'.

THE FIRST DISCUSSION 47 And when the existence of 'before' and 'after' is proved, time cannot mean anything but what is apprehended through the anterior and the posterior.1 I say: This answer given in the name of the philosophers is extremely unsound. It amounts to saying that 'above' and 'below' are relative to us and that therefore imagination can treat them as an infinite sequence, but that the sequence of 'before' and 'after' does not rest on imagination—for there is here no subjective relation—but is a purely rational concept. This means that the order of above and below in a thing may be reversed in imagination, but that the privation before an event and the privation after an event, its before and its after, are not interchangeable for imagination. But by giving this answer the problem is not solved, 2 for the philosophers think that there exists a natural above 3 to which light things move and a natural below to which heavy things move, or else the heavy and the light would be relative and exist by convention, and they hold* that in imagination the limit of a body, having by nature its place above, may end either in occupied or in empty space. 4 And this argument is invalid as a justification of the philosophers for two reasons. First, that the philosophers assume an absolute above and an absolute below, but no absolute beginning and no absolute end; secondly that their opponents may object that it is not the fact of their being relative that causes the imagination to regard the sequence of low and high as an infinite series, but that this happens to the imagination because it observes that every spatial magnitude is continuous with another spatial magnitude, just as any event is preceded by another event. Therefore Ghazali transfers the question from the words 'above' and 'below' to 'inside' and 'outside' 5 and he says in his answer to the philosophers: There is no real difference in the words 'above' and 'below', and therefore there is no sense in defining them, but we will apply ourselves rather to the words 'inside' and 'outside'. We say: The world has an inside and an outside; and we ask: Is there outside the world an occupied or empty space? The philosophers will answer: There is outside the world neither occupied nor empty space, and if you mean by 'outside' its extreme surface, then there is an outside, but if you mean anything else, there is no outside.6 Therefore if they ask us theologians if there is anything before the existence of the world, we say: If you mean by it the beginning, i.e. its initial term, then there is a before, just as there is an outside to the world according to your explanation that that is its ultimate limit and its final plane, but if you mean anything else, then there is not, in analogy with your answer.

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If you say: A beginning of existence, without anything preceding it, cannot be understood, we say: A limit of a body existing without anything outside it cannot be understood.1 If you say: Its exterior is its furthest plane and nothing else, we say: Its before is the beginning of its existence, nothing else. The conclusion is that we say: We affirm that God has an existence without the world's existing, and this assumption again does not force us to accept anything else. That to assume more rests on the act of imagination is proved by the fact that imagination acts in the same way in regard to time as in regard to place, for although our opponents believe in the eternity of the world, their imagination is willing to suppose it created; whereas we, who believe in its creation, are often allowed by our imagination to regard it as eternal. So much as far as body is concerned; but to revert to time, our opponents do not regard a time without a beginning as possible, and yet in opposition to this belief their imagination can represent it as a possible assumption, although time cannot be represented by the imagination in the way that body is represented, for neither the champion nor the opponent of the finitude of body can imagine a body not surrounded by empty or occupied space; the imagination simply refuses to accept it. Therefore one should say: a clear thinker pays no attention to the imagination when he cannot deny the finitude of body by proof, nor docs he give attention to the imagination when he cannot deny the beginning of an existence without anything preceding it, which the imagination cannot grasp. For the imagination, as it is only accustomed to a body limited by another body or by air, represents emptiness in this way, although emptiness, being imperceptible,2 cannot be occupied by anything. Likewise the imagination, being only accustomed to an event occurring after another event, fears to suppose an event not preceded by another event which is terminated. And this is the reason of the error.3

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Through this transference, by his comparing the time-limit with the spatial limit in his argument against the philosophers, this argument becomes invalid and we have already shown the error through which it is specious and the sophistical character of the argument, and we need not repeat ourselves. 5 Ghazali says: The philosophers have a second way of forcing their opponents to admit the eternity of time. They say: You do not doubt that God was able to create the world one year, a hundred years, a thousand years, and so ad infinitum, before He created it and that those possibilities are different in magnitude and number. Therefore it is necessary to admit before the existence of the world a measurable extension, one part of which can be longer than another part, and therefore it is necessary that something should have existed before the existence of the world. If you say the word

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'years' cannot be applied before the creation and revolution of heaven, let us drop the word 'years' and let us give another t u r n to our argument and say: If we suppose that from the beginning of the world till now the sphere of the world has performed, for instance, a thousand revolutions, was God able to create a second world before it, which, for example, would have performed eleven hundred revolutions up to now? If you deny it, it would m e a n that the Eternal had passed from impotence to power or the world from impossibility to possibility, but if you accept it, and you cannot but accept it, it m a y be asked if God was able to create a third world which would have performed twelve h u n d r e d revolutions up to now and yovi will have to admit this. W e philosophers say: T h e n , could the world which we called by the order of our supposition the third, although as a m a t t e r of fact it is the first, h a v e been created at the same time as the world we called the second, so that the former would have performed twelve h u n d r e d revolutions and the latter eleven h u n d r e d revolutions, it being understood that both, in revolving, complete t h e same distance at the same speed? If you were to admit this, you would be admitting something absurd, for it would be absurd that in that case the n u m b e r of t h e two revolutions, having the same speed and finishing at the same moment, should be different. But, if you answer that it is impossible that the third world which has u p to now performed twelve h u n d r e d revolutions could have been created at the same time as the second world which has up to now performed eleven hundred revolutions, and that on the contrary it must have been created the same n u m b e r of years earlier t h a n the second, as the second has been created before the first—we call it first, as it comes first in order, when in imagination we proceed from our time to it—then there exists a quantity of possibility double that of another possibility, and there is doubtless another possibility which doubles the whole of the others. These measurable quantitative possibilities, of which some are longer t h a n others by a definite measure, have no other reality t h a n time, and those measurable quantities are not an attribute of the essence of God, who is too exalted to possess measure,' nor an attribute of the non-existence of the world, for non-existence is nothing and therefore cannot be measured with different measures. Still, quantity is an attribute which demands a substratum, and this is nothing other than movement, and quantity is nothing but the time which measures movement. Therefore also for you theologians there existed before the world a 84 substratum of differentiated quantity, namely time, and according to you time existed before the world. 2 I say: T h e s u m m a r y of this a r g u m e n t is t h a t , w h e n w e i m a g i n e a m o v e m e n t , w e find w i t h it a n extension w h i c h m e a s u r e s it, as if it w e r e its 5 m e a s u r e m e n t , while r e c i p r o c a l l y t h e m o v e m e n t m e a s u r e s t h e e x t e n sion, 3 a n d w e find t h a t w c c a n a s s u m e in this m e a s u r e a n d this

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extension a movement longer than the first supposed movement, and we affirm through the corresponding and congruous units of this extension that the one movement is longer than the other. 1 If therefore for you theologians the world has a certain extension from its beginning till now—let us suppose, for instance, a thousand years— and since God according to you is able to create before this world another world, we may suppose that the extension He can give it will be longer than the extension of the first world by a certain definite quantity, and that He can likewise create a third world before this second and that the existence of each of them must be preceded by an extension through which its existence can be measured. 2 If this is true, and there is an infinite regress of this possibility of anterior worlds, there is an extension which precedes all these worlds. And this extension which measures all of them cannot be absolute nonexistence, for non-existence cannot measure; it has, therefore, to be a quantity, for what measures a quantity has to be quantity itself, and the measuring quantity is that which we call time. And it is clear that this must precede in existence anything we imagine to occur, just as the measure must precede the measured in existence. If this extension which is time were to occur at the occurrence of the first movement, then it would have to be preceded by an extension which could measure it, in which it could occur, and which could be like its measurement. And in the same way any world which could be imagined would have to be preceded by an extension which measures it. Therefore this extension has no beginning, for if it had a beginning it would have to have an extension which measured it, for each event which begins has an extension which measures it and which we call time. This is the most suitable exposition of this argument, and this is the method by which Avicenna proves infinite time, 3 but there is a difficulty in understanding it, because of the problem that each possible has one extension and each extension is connected with its own possible and this forms a point of discussion ;4 or one must concede that the possibilities prior to the world are of the same nature as the possible inside the world, i.e. as it is of the nature of this possible inside the world that time inheres in it, so also with the possible which is prior to the world. This is clear concerning the possible inside the world, and therefore the existence of time may be imagined from it. 5 Ghazali says:

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The objection is that all this is the work of imagination, and the most convenient way of refuting it is to compare time with place; therefore we say: Was it not in God's power to create the highest sphere in its heaven a cubit higher than He has created it? If the answer is negative, this is to deny God's power, and if the answer is affirmative, we ask: And by two cubits and by three cubits and so on ad infinitum? Now we affirm that this amounts to admitting behind the world a spatial extension which has measure and quantity, as a thing which is bigger by two or three 5 cubits than another occupies a space bigger by two or three cubits, and by reason of this there is behind the world a quantity which demands a substratum and this is a body or empty space. Therefore, there is behind the world empty or occupied space. And how can you answer this? And likewise we may ask, whether God was not able to create the sphere of the world smaller than He has created it by a cubit or two cubits? And is there no difference between those two magnitudes in regard to the occupied space taken away from them and the space they still occupy, for the occupied space withdrawn is bigger when two cubits are taken away than when one cubit is taken away? And therefore empty space has measure. But emptiness is nothing; how can it have measure? And our answer is: 10 'It belongs to the illusion of imagination to suppose possibilities in time before the existence of the world', just as your answer is: 'It belongs to the illusion of imagination to suppose possibilities in space behind the existence of the world.' There is no difference between those two points of view.' I say: This consequence is true against the theory which regards an infinite increase in the size of the world as possible, for it follows from this theory that a finite thing proceeds from God which is preceded by infinite quantitative possibilities. And if this is allowed for possibility in space, it must also be allowed in regard to the possibility in 88 time, and we should have a time limited in both directions*, although it would be preceded by infinite temporal possibilities. The answer is, however, that to imagine the world to be bigger or smaller does not conform to truth but is impossible. But the impossibility of this does not imply that to imagine the possibility of a world before this world is to imagine an impossibility, except in case the nature of the possible were already realized and there existed before the existence of the 5 world only two natures, the nature of the necessary and the nature of the impossible. 2 But it is evident that the judgement of reason concerning the being of these three natures is eternal, like its judgement concerning the necessary and the impossible. This objection, however, does not touch the philosophers, because they hold that the world could not be smaller or bigger than it is,

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io If it were possible that a spatial magnitude could infinitely increase, then the existence of a spatial magnitude without end would be possible and a spatial magnitude, actually infinite, would exist, and this is impossible and Aristotle has already shown the impossibility 89 of this.' But against the man who believes in this possibility, because the contrary would imply a denial of God's power, this argument is valid, for this spatial possibility is just as much a purely rational concept 2 as the possibility of temporal anteriority according to the philosophers. Therefore, he who believes in the temporal creation of the world and affirms that all body is in space, is bound to admit that 5 before the creation of the world there was space, cither occupied by body, in which the production of the world could occur, or empty, for it is necessary that space should precede what is produced. 3 The man who denies empty space and affirms the finitencssof body—like* certain later Ash'arites who, however, separated themselves from the principles of the theologians; but I have not read it in their books and it was told to me by some who studied their doctrines 4 —cannot admit the temporal production of the world. If the fact of this exten'° sion which measures movement and which stands in relation to it as its measurement were indeed the work of an illusion—like the representation of a world bigger or smaller than it really is—time would not exist, for time is nothing but what the mind perceives of this extension which measures movement. And if it is self-evident that time exists, then the act of the mind must necessarily be a veracious one, embodying reason, not one embodying illusion. Ghazali says: It has been objected:5 we declare that what is not possible is what 90 cannot be done and increase or decrease in the size of the world is impossible, and therefore could not be brought about.6 I say: This is the answer to the objection of the Ash'arites that to admit that God could not have made the world bigger or smaller is to charge Him with impotence, but they have thereby compromised themselves, for impotence is not inability to do the impossible, but inability to do what can be done. 7 5 Ghazali, opposing this, says: This excuse is invalid for three reasons: The first is that it is an affront to reason, for when reason regards it as possible that the world might be bigger or smaller than it is by a cubit, this is not the same as regarding it as possible to identify black with white and existence with non-existence;

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impossibility lies in affirming the negative and the positive at the same time, and all impossibilities amount to this. This is indeed a silly and faulty assertion.1

I say:

,0

This statement is, as he says, an affront to reason, but only to the reason of him who judges superficially; it is not an affront to true reason, for a statement about its being possible or not 2 requires a proof. And therefore he is right when he declares that this is not impossible in the way in which the assumption that black might be white is impossible, for the impossibility of the latter is self-evident. The statement, however, that the world could not be smaller or larger than it is is not self-evident. And although all impossibilities can be reduced to self-evident impossibilities, this reduction can take place in two ways. The first is that the impossibility is self-evident; the 91 second is that there follows sooner or later from its supposition an impossibility of the same character as that of self-evident impossibilities.•' For instance, if it is assumed that the world might be larger or smaller than it is, it follows that outside it there would be occupied or empty space. And from the supposition that there is outside it occupied or empty space, some of the greatest impossibilities follow: 5 from empty space the existence of mere extension existing by itself; from occupied space a body moving either upward or downward or in a circle which therefore must be part of another world. Now it has been proved in the science of physics that the existence of another world at the same time as this is an impossibility4 and the most unlikely consequence would be that the world should have empty space: for any world must needs have four elements and a spherical body revolving round them. He who wants to ascertain this should look up 10 the places where its exposition is demanded—this, of course, after having fulfilled the preliminary conditions necessary for the student to understand strict proof.5 Then Ghazali mentions the second reason: If the world is in the state it is, without the possibility of being larger or smaller than it is, then its existence, as it is, is necessary, not possible. But the necessary needs no cause. So say, then, as the materialists do that you deny the creator and that you deny the cause of causes! But this is not your doctrine.6 I say: T o this the answer which Avicenna gives in accordance witli his 92

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doctrine is quite appropriate. 1 According to him necessity of existence is of two kinds: the necessary, existent by itself, and the necessary, existent through another. But my answer on this question is still more to the point: things necessary in this sense need not have an agent 5 or a maker; take, for example, a saw which is used to saw wood—it is a tool having a certain determined quantity, quality, and matter, that is, it is not possible for it to be of another material than iron and it could not have any other shape than that of a saw or any other measure than the measure of a saw. Still nobody would say that the saw has a necessity of being.- See, therefore, how crude this mistake is! If one were to take away the necessity from the quantities, qualities, and 10 matters of things produced by art, in the way the Ash'aritcs imagine this to happen concerning the created in relation to the creator, the wisdom which lies in the creator and the created would have been withdrawn, any agent could be an artificer and any cause in existence a creator. But all this is a denial of reason and wisdom. 3 Ghazali says: The third reason is that this faulty argument authorizes its opponent 4 to oppose it by a similar one, and we may say: The existence of the world was not possible before its existence, for indeed possibility—according to your theory—is coextensive with existence, neither more nor less.5 If you say: 'Hut then the eternal has passed from impotence to power', we answer: 93 'No, for the existence was not possible and therefore could not be brought about and the impossibility of a thing's happening that could not happen docs not indicate impotence.' If you say: 'How can a thing which is impossible become possible?' We answer: 'But why should it be impossible that a thing should be impossible at one moment and possible at another?' 6 If you say: 'The times are similar,' the answer is: 'But so are the measures, and why should one measure be possible and another, bigger or smaller by the width of a nail, impossible?7 And if the latter assumption is not impossible, the former is not impossible either.' And this is the way to oppose them. But the true answer is that their supposition of possibilities8 makes no sense whatever. We concede only that God is eternal and powerful, and that His action never fails, even if He should wish it. And there is nothing in this power that demands the assumption of a temporal extension, unless imagination, confusing God's power with other things*, connects it with time*.5 I say: The summary of this is that the Ash'arites say to the philosophers: this question whether the world could be larger or smaller is impos-

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sible according to us; it has sense only for the man who believes in a priority of possibility in relation to the actualization of a thing, i.e. the realization of the possible. We, the Ash'arites, however, say: 'Possibility occurs together with the actuality as it is, without adding or subtracting anything.' Now my answer is that he who denies the possibility of the possible before its existence denies the necessary, for the possible is the contrary of the impossible without there existing a middle term, and, if a thing is not possible before its" existence, then it is necessarily impossible.' Now to posit the impossible as existing is an impossible falsehood, but to posit the possible as existing is a possible, not an impossible, falsehood.2 Their assertion that possibility and actuality exist together is a falsehood, for possibility and actuality are contradictory, and do not exist together in one and the same moment. The necessary consequence for them is that possibility exists neither at the same time as the actuality nor before it. 3 The true consequence for the Ash'arites in this discussion is not that the eternal passes from impotence to power, for he who cannot do an impossible act is not called impotent, but that a thing can pass from the nature of the impossible to the nature of existence, and this is like the changing of the necessary into the possible. To posit a thing, however, as impossible at one time and possible at another docs not cut it off from the nature of the possible, for this is the general character of the possible; the existence of anything possible, for instance, is impossible at the moment when its contrary exists in its substratum. 4 If the opponent concedes that a thing impossible at one time is possible at another, then he has conceded that this thing is of the nature of the absolutely possible5 and that it has not the nature of the impossible. If it is assumed that the world was impossible for an infinite time before its production, the consequence is that, when it was produced, it changed over from impossibility to possibility.6 This question is not the problem with which we arc concerned here, but as we have said before, the transference from one problem to another is an act of sophistry. And as to his words:

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But the true answer is that their supposition of possibilities makes no sense whatever. We concede only that God is eternal and powerful and that His action never fails, even if He should wish it. And there is nothing in 5 this power that demands the assumption of a temporal extension, unless imagination confusing God's power with other things* connects with it time*.

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I say:

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Even if there were nothing in this supposition—as he says—that implies the eternity of time, there is something in it that demands that the possibility of the occurrence of the world and equally of time should be eternal. And this is that God never ceases to have power for action, and that it is impossible that anything should prevent His act from being eternally connected with His existence; and perhaps the opposite of this statement indicates the impossibility better still, namely, that He should have no power at one time but power at another, and that He could be called powerful only at definite limited times, although He is art eternal and perpetual being. And then we have the old question again whether the world may be either eternal or temporal, or whether the world cannot be eternal, or whether the world cannot be temporal, or whether the world may be temporal but certainly cannot be eternal, and whether, if the world is temporal, it can be a first act or not. And if reason has no power to pronounce for one of these opposite propositions, let us go back to tradition, but do not then regard this question as a rational one! We say that the First Cause cannot omit the best act and perform an inferior, because this would be an imperfection; but can there be a greater imperfection than to assume the act of the Eternal as finite and limited, like the act of a temporal product, although a limited act can only be imagined of a limited agent, not of the eternal agent whose existence and action are unlimited? All this, as you sec, cannot be unknown to the man who has even the slightest understanding of the rational. And how can it be thought that the present act proceeding from the Eternal cannot be preceded by another act, and again by another, and so in our thinking infinitely, like the infinite continuation of His existence? For it is a necessary consequence that the act of Him whose existence time cannot measure nor comprehend in either direction cannot be comprehended in time nor measured by a limited duration. For there is no being whose act is delayed after its existence, except when there is an impediment which prevents its existence from attaining its perfection,' or, in voluntary beings, when there is an obstruction in the execution of their choice. He, therefore, who assumes that from the Eternal there proceeds only a temporal act presumes that His act is constrained in a certain way and in this way therefore does not depend on His choice.

THE FIRST DISCUSSION

THE T H I R D PROOF FOR THE OF T H E W O R L D Ghazali says:

57 ETERNITY 5

They insist on saying: The existence of the world is possible before its existence, as it is absurd that it should be impossible and then become possible;1 this possibility has no beginning, it is eternally unchangeable and the existence of the world remains eternally possible, for at no time whatever can the existence of the world be described as impossible; and if the possibility never ceases, the possible, in conformity with the possibility, never ceases either; and the meaning of the sentence, that the existence of the world is possible, is that the existence of the world is not impossible; and since its existence is eternally possible, it is never impossible, for if it were ever impossible, it would not be true that the existence of the world is eternally possible; and if it were not true that the existence of the world 10 is eternally possible, it would not be true that its possibility never ceases; and if it were not true that its possibility never ceases, it would be true that its possibility had begun; and if it were true that its possibility had begun, its existence before this beginning would not be possible and that would lead to the assumption of a time when the world was not possible and God had no power over it.

I say: He who concedes that the world before its existence was of a never-ceasing possibility must admit that the world is eternal, for the assumption that what is eternally possible2 is eternally existent 98 implies no absurdity. 3 What can possibly exist eternally must necessarily exist eternally, for what can receive eternity cannot become corruptible, except if it were possible that the corruptible could become eternal. 4 Therefore Aristotle has said that the possibility in the eternal beings is necessary.5 Ghazali says: The objection is that it is said that the temporal becoming of the world never ceased to be possible, and certainly there is no time at which its becoming could not be imagined. But although it could be at any time, it did not become at any time whatever, for reality does not conform to possibility, but differs from it.6 You yourself hold, for instance, in the matter of place, that the world could be bigger than it is, or that the creation of an infinite series of bodies above the world is possible, and that there is no limit to the possibilities of increase in the size of the world, but io still the actual existence of absolutely infinite occupied space and of any infinite and limitless being is impossible. What is said to be possible is an actual body of a limited surface, but the exact size of this body, whether it is larger or smaller, is not specified. In the same way, what is possible is

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the coming into existence of the world in time, but the exact time of its coming into existence whether earlier or later, is not specified. The principle of its having come into being is specified and this is the possible, nothing else.1 I say: T h e man who assumes that before the existence of the world there was one unique, never-ceasing possibility must concede that the world is eternal. The man who affirms, like Ghazali in his answer, that before the world there was an infinite number of possibilities of worlds, has certainly to admit that before this world there was another world and before this second world a third, and so on ad infinitum, as is the case with human beings, and especially when it is assumed that the perishing of the earlier is the necessary condition for the existence of the later. 2 For instance, if God had the power to create another world before this, and before this second world yet another, the scries must continue infinitely, or else wc should arrive at a world before which no other world could have been created (however, the theologians do not affirm this nor use it as a proof for the temporal production of the world). 3 Although the assumption that before this world there might be an infinite number of others docs not seem an impossible one, it appears after closer examination to be absurd, for it would follow from it that the universe had the nature of an individual person in this transitory world, so that its procession from the First Principle would be like the procession of the individual person from Him—that is to say, through an eternal moving body and an eternal motion. Rut then this world would be part of another world, like the transient beings in this world, and then necessarily cither wc end finally in a world individually eternal or we have an infinite scries. And if wc have to bring this series to a standstill, it is more appropriate to arrest it at this world, by regarding it as eternally unique. THE FOURTH

PROOF

Ghazali says: The fourth proof is that they say everything that becomes is preceded by the matter which is in it, for what becomes cannot be free from matter.4 5 For this reason matter never becomes; what becomes is only the form, the accidents and the qualities which add themselves to matter.5 The proof is that the existence of each thing that becomes must, before its becoming, either be possible, impossible, or necessary: it cannot be impossible, for the essentially impossible will never exist; it cannot be necessary, for the

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essentially necessary will never be in a state of non-existence, and therefore it is the essentially possible.' Therefore, the thing which becomes has before its becoming the possibility of becoming, but the possibility of becoming is an attribute which needs a relation and has no subsistence in itself.2 It needs, therefore, a substratum with which it can be connected, and there is no substratum except matter, and it becomes connected with it in the way in which we say this matter receives warmth and coldness, or black and white, or movement and rest, i.e. it is possible that these qualities and these changes occur in it and therefore possibility is an attribute of matter. Matter does not possess other matter, 3 and cannot become; for, if it did, the possibility of its existence would precede its existence, and possibility would subsist by itself without being related to anything else, whereas it is a relative attribute which cannot be understood as subsisting by itself. And it cannot be said that the meaning of possibility amounts to what can be done and what the Eternal had the power to do, because we know only that a thing can be done, because it is possible, and we say 'this can be done because it is possible and cannot be done because it is not possible';4 and if 'this is possible' meant 'this can be done', to say 'this can be done because it is possible' would mean 'this is possible because it is possible', and this is a circular definition; and this shows that 'this is possible' is a first judgement in the mind, evident in itself, which makes the second judgement 'that it can be done' intelligible. It cannot be said, either, that to be possible refers to the knowledge of the Eternal, for knowledge depends on a thing known, whereas possibility is undoubtedly an object of knowledge, not knowledge;5 further, it is a relative attribute, and needs something to which it can be related, and this can only be matter, and everything that becomes is preceded by matter. I say: The summary of this is that everything that becomes is possible before it becomes, and that possibility needs something for its subsistence, namely, the substratum which receives that which is possible. For it must not be believed that the possibility of the recipient is the same as the possibility of the agent. It is a different thing to say about 101 Zaid, the agent, that he can do something and to say about the patient that it can have something done to it. Thus the possibility of the patient 6 is a necessary condition for the possibility of the agent, for the agent which cannot act is not possible but impossible. Since it is impossible that the possibility prior to the thing's becoming should be absolutely without* substratum, or that the agent should be its substratum or the thing possible—for the thing possible loses its possibility, when it becomes actual—there only remains as a vehicle for 5 possibility the recipient of the possible, i.e. matter. Matter, in so far as

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it is matter, does not become; for if it did it would need other matter and we should have an infinite regress. Matter only becomes in so far as it is combined with form. Everything that comes into being comes into being from something else, and this must either give rise to an infinite regress and lead directly to infinite matter which is impossible, 102 even if we assume an eternal mover, for there is no actual infinite; or the forms must be interchangeable in the ingenerable and incorruptible substratum, eternally and in rotation. 1 There must, therefore, be an eternal movement which produces this interchange in the eternally transitory things. And therefore it is clear that the generation of the one in each pair of generated beings is the corruption of the other; 5 otherwise a thing could come into being from nothing, for the meaning of 'becoming' is the alteration of a thing and its change, from what it has potentially, into actuality. It is not possible that the privation itself should change into the existent, and it is not the privation of which it is said that it has become. There exists, therefore, a substratum for the contrary forms, and it is in this substratum • o that the forms interchange. Ghazali says: The objection is that the possibility of which they speak is a judgement of the intellect, and anything whose existence the intellect supposes, provided no obstacle presents itself to the supposition, we call possible and, if there is such an obstacle, we call it impossible and, if we suppose that it cannot be supposed not to be, we call it necessary.2 These are rational judgements which need no real existent which they might qualify. There are three proofs of this. The first is: If possibility needed an existent to which it could be related, and of which it could be said that it is its possibility, impossibility also would need an existent of which it might be said 103 that it is its impossibility; but impossibility has no real existence, and there is no matter in which it occurs and to which it could be related. I say: That possibility demands an existing matter is clear, for all true intellectual concepts need a thing outside the soul, for truth, as it 5 has been defined, is the agreement of what is in the soul with what is outside the soul.3 And when we say that something is possible, we cannot but understand that it needs something in which this possibility can be. 4 As regards his proof that the possible is not dependent on an existent, because the impossible is not dependent on an existent, this is sophistical. Indeed the impossible demands a substratum io just as much as the possible does, and this is clear from the fact that the impossible is the opposite of the possible and opposite contraries

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undoubtedly require a substratum. For impossibility is the negation of possibility, and, if possibility needs a substratum, impossibility which is the negation of this possibility requires a substratum too, e.g. we say that the existence of empty space is impossible, because the existence of independent dimensions outside or inside natural bodies is impossible, or that the presence of opposites at the same 104 time in the same substratum is impossible, or that the equivalence of one to two is impossible, i.e. in reality. All this is self-evident, and it is not necessary to consider the errors here committed. Ghazali says: The second proof is that the intellect decides that black and white are possible before they exist.' If this possibility were related to the body in I < which they inhere, so that it might be said that the meaning is that this body can be black and white, then white would not be possible by itself and possibility would be related only to the body. But we affirm, as concerns the judgement about black in itself, as to whether it is possible, necessary, or impossible, that we, without doubt, will say that it is possible. And this shows that the intellect in order to decide whether something is possible need not admit an existing thing to which the possibility can be related. I say: This is a sophism. For the possible is predicated of the recipient and of the inherent quality. In so far as it is predicated of the substratum, its opposite is the impossible, and in so far as it is predicated of the inherent, its opposite is the necessary. 2 Thus the possible which is described as being the opposite of the impossible is not that which abandons its possibility so far as it is actualized, when it becomes actual, because this latter loses its possibility in the actualizing process.3 This latter possible is only described by possibility in so far as it is in potency, and the vehicle of this potency is the substratum which changes from existence in potency into existence in actuality. 4 This is evident from the definition of the possible that it is the nonexistence which is in readiness to exist or not to exist.5 This possible non-existent is possible neither in so far as it is non-existent nor in so far as it is actually existent. 6 It is only possible in so far as it is in potency, and for this reason the Mu'tazilites affirm that the nonexistent is a kind of entity. 7 For non-existence is the opposite of existence, and each of the two is succeeded by the other, and when the non-existence of a thing disappears it is followed by its existence, and when its existence disappears it is succeeded by its non-existence. As non-existence by itself cannot change into existence, and existence

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by itself cannot change into non-existence, there must be a third entity which is the recipient for both of them, and that is what is described by 'possibility' and 'becoming' and 'change from the quality of non-existence to the quality of existence'. For non-existence itself is not described by 'becoming' or 'change'; nor is the thing that has become actual described in thjs way, for what becomes loses the quality of becoming, change, and possibility when it has become actual. Therefore there must necessarily be something that can be described by 'becoming' and 'change' and 'transition from nonexistence to existence', as happens in the passage of opposites into opposites; that is to say, there must be a substratum for them in 106 which they can interchange—with this one difference, however, that this substratum exists in the interchange of all the accidents in actuality, whereas in the substance it exists in potency. 1 And we cannot think of regarding what is described by 'possibility' and 'change' as identical with the actual, i.e. which belongs to the becoming in so far as it is actual, for the former again vanishes and 5 the latter must necessarily be a part of the product. 2 Therefore there must necessarily be a substratum which is the recipient for the possibility and which is the vehicle of the change and the becoming, and it is this of which it is said that it becomes, and alters, and changes from non-existence into existence. Nor can we think of making this substratum of the nature of the actualized, for if this were the case the existent would not become, for what becomes >o comes into being from the non-existcnt not from the existent. 3 Both philosophers and Mu'tazilites agree about the existence of this entity; only the philosophers are of the opinion that it cannot be exempt from a form actually existent, i.e. that it cannot be free from existence, like the transition, for example, from sperma to blood and the transition from blood to the members of the embryo. 4 The reason is that if it were exempt from existence it would have an existence of its own, and if it had an existence of its own, becoming could not 107 come from it.5 This entity is called by the philosophers lhyle\ and it is the cause of generation and corruption. And according to the philosophers an existent which is free from hyle is neither gcncrablc nor corruptible. 0 Ghazali says: The third proof is that the souls of men, according to the philosophers, are substances which subsist by themselves7 without being in a body or in matter or impressed on matter; 8 they had a beginning in time, according

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to the theory of Avicenna and the acknowledged philosophers, they had possibility before their beginning, but they have neither essence nor matter 1 and their possibility is a relative attribute, 2 dependent neither on 5 God's power nor on the Agent;3 but on what then is it dependent? The difficulties are therefore turned against them themselves.

I say: I do not know any philosopher who said that the soul has a beginning in the true sense of the word and is thereafter everlasting except ? —as Ghazali relates—Avicenna. 4 All other philosophers agree that in their temporal existence they are related to and connected with the bodily possibilities, which receive this connexion like the possibilities which subsist in mirrors for their connexion with the rays of the I 0 sun. 5 According to the philosophers this possibility is not of the nature of the generable and corruptible forms, but of a kind to which, according to them, demonstrative proof leads, and the vehicle of this possibility is of another nature than the nature of the liyle. He alone can grasp their theories in these matters who has read their books and fulfilled the conditions there laid down by them, and has besides a sound understanding and a learned master. 6 That Ghazali should 108 touch on such questions in this way is not worthy of such a man, but there are only these alternatives: either he knew these matters in their true nature, and sets them out here wrongly, which is wicked; or he did not understand their real nature and touched on problems he had not grasped, which is the act of an ignoramus. However, he 5 stands too high in our eyes for either of these qualifications. But even the best horse will stumble 7 and it was a stumble of Ghazali's that he brought out this book. But perhaps he was forced to do so by the conditions of his time and his situation. Ghazali says, speaking on behalf of the philosophers: It may be said: To reduce possibility to a judgement of the intellect is absurd, for the meaning of 'judgement of the intellect' is nothing but the knowledge of possibility, and possibility is an object of knowledge, not knowledge itself; knowledge, on the contrary, comprises possibility and "> follows it and depends on it as it is, and if knowledge vanished the object of knowledge would not, but the disappearance of the object of knowledge would imply the disappearance of knowledge. For knowledge and the object-known are two things, the former dependent on the latter, and if we supposed rational beings to turn away from possibility and neglect it, we should say: 'It is not possibility that is annulled, for the possibilities subsist by themselves, but it is simply that minds neglect them or that minds and rational beings have disappeared; but possibility remains,

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without any doubt. •Wd the three proofs are not valid, for impossibility requires an existent to which it can be related, and impossibility means identifying two opposites, and if the substratum were white it could not become black as long as the white existed, a n d therefore we need a substratum, qualified by the quality during the inherence of which its opposite is spoken of as impossible in this substratum, a n d therefore impossibility is a relative attribute subsistent in a substratum and related to it. A n d where the necessary is concerned it is evident t h a t it is related to 5 necessary existence. As concerns t h e second proof, that black is in itself possible, this is a mistake, for if it is taken, abstracted from the substratum in which it inheres, it is impossible, not possible; it only becomes possible w h e n it can become a form in a b o d y ; the body is then in readiness for the interchange, a n d the interchange is possible for t h e b o d y ; but in itself black has no individuality, so as to be characterizable by possibility. As concerns the third proof about the soul, it is eternal for one school of philosophers, and is only possible in the attaching of itself to bodies, and io therefore against those philosophers the a r g u m e n t does not apply. 2 But for those who admit that the soul comes into existence—and one school of philosophers has believed that it is impressed on matter and follows its t e m p e r a m e n t , as is indicated by Galen in certain passages—it comes into existence in matter and its possibility is related to its matter. 3 And according to the theory of those who admit that it comes into existence, although it is not impressed on matter—which means that it is possible for the rational soul to direct m a t t e r — t h e possibility prior to the becoming is relative to matter, 4 and although the soul is not impressed on matter, it is attached to it, for it is its directing principle a n d uses it as an instrument, and in this way its possibility is relative to matter. 5

I say: W h a t h e says in this section is t r u e , as will b e clear to y o u from o u r e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e n a t u r e of t h e possible. T h e n G h a z a l i , o b j e c t i n g to t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s , s a y s : And the answer is: T o reduce possibility, necessity, and impossibility to rational concepts is correct, and as for the assertion that the concepts of reason form its knowledge, and knowledge implies a thing known, let them be answered: it cannot be said that receptivity of colour a n d ani110 mality and the other concepts, which arc fixed in the mind according to the philosophers—and this is w h a t constitutes the sciences—have no objects; 6 still these objects have no real existence in the external world, a n d the philosophers are certainly right in saying that uriivcrsals exist only in the mind, not in the external world, and that in the external world there are only particular individuals, which arc apprehended by the senses, not by reason; and yet these individuals arc the reason why the mind abstracts from them a concept separated from its rational m a t t e r ; therefore

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receptivity of colour is a concept, separate in the mind from blackness and whiteness, although in reality a colour which is neither black nor white 5 nor of another colour cannot be imagined,1 and receptivity of colour is fixed in the mind without any specification—now, in the same way, it can be said that possibility is a form which exists in minds, not in the exterior world, and if this is not impossible for other concepts,2 there is no impossibility in what we have said.3 I say: This argument is sophistical because possibility is a universal which has individuals outside the mind like all the other universals, and knowledge is not knowledge of the universal concept, but it is a knowledge of individuals in a universal way which the mind attains in the case of the individuals, when it abstracts from them one common nature which is distributed among the different matters. 4 The nature, therefore, of the universal is not identical with the nature of the things of which it is a universal. Ghazali is here in error, for he assumes that the nature of possibility is the nature of the universal, without there being individuals on which this universal, i.e. the universal concept of possibility, depends. The universal, however, is not the object of knowledge; on the contrary through it the things become known, although it exists potentially in the nature of the things known; 5 otherwise its apprehension of the individuals, in so far as they are universals, would be false. This apprehension would indeed be false if the nature of the object known were essentially individual, not accidentally individual, whereas the opposite is the case: it is accidentally individual, essentially universal. 6 Therefore if the mind did not apprehend the individuals in so far as they are universal, it would be in error and make false judgements about them. But if it abstracts those natures which subsist in the individual things from their matter, and makes them universal, then it is possible that it judges them rightly; otherwise it would confuse those natures, of which the possible is one. The theory of the philosophers that universals exist only in the mind, not in the external world, only means that the universals exist actually only in the mind, and not in the external world, not that they do not exist at all in the external world, for the meaning is that they exist potentially, not actually in the external world; indeed, if they did not exist at all in the outside world they would be false. Since universals exist outside the mind in potency and possibilities exist outside the soul in potency, the nature of universals in regard

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to this resembles that of possibilities. And for this reason Ghazali tried to deceive people by a sophism*, for he compared possibility to the universals because of their both being potentially in reality, and then he assumed that the philosophers assert that universals do not exist at all outside the soul; from which he deduced that possibility does not exist outside the soul. What an ugly and crude sophism! 112

Ghazali says:

As regards their assertion that, if it were assumed that rational beings had vanished or had neglected possibility, possibility itself would not have disappeared, we answer: 'If it were assumed that they had vanished, would not the universal concepts, i.e. the genera and species, have disappeared too?' and if they agree to this, this can only mean that universals are only concepts in the mind; but this is exactly what we say about possibility, and there is no difference between the two cases; if they, however, affirm that they are permanent in the knowledge of God,' the same may be said about possibility, and the argument is valid, and our 5 aim of showing the contradiction in this theory has been attained. I say: This argument shows his foolishness and proneness to contradiction. The most plausible form in which it might be expressed would be to base it* on two premisses: the first, that the evident proposition that possibility is partially individual, namely, outside the soul, partially universal, namely, the universal concept of the individual IO possibles, is not true; and the second, that it was said that the nature of the individual possibles outside the soul is identical with the nature of the universal of possibility in the mind; and in this case the possible would have neither a universal nor an individual nature, or else the nature of the individual would have to be identical with that of the universal. All this is presumptuous, and how should it be else, for in a way the universal has an existence outside the soul. Ghazali says: And as regards their subterfuge where the impossible is concerned, that it is related to the matter qualified by its opposite, as it cannot take the place of its opposite,2 this cannot be the case with every impossible, for that God should have a rival is impossible, but there is no matter to which 113 this impossibility could be related. If they say the impossibility of God's having a rival, means that the solitude of God in His essence and His uniqueness are necessary and that this solitude is proper to Him, we answer: This is not necessary, for the world exists with Him, and He is therefore not solitary. And if they say that His solitude so far as a rival is

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concerned is necessary, and that the opposite of the necessary is the impossible, and that the impossible is related to Him, we answer: In this case the solitude of God in regard to the world is different from His solitude in regard to His equal and in this case His solitude in regard to His rival is necessary, and in regard to the created world not necessary.' 5 I say: All this is vain talk, for it cannot be doubted that the judgements of the mind have value only in regard to the nature of things outside , the soul. If there were outside the soul nothing possible or impossible, the judgement of the mind that things are possible or impossible would be of as much value as no judgement at all, and there would be no difference between reason and illusion. And that there should be a rival to God is just as impossible in reality as God's existence is 10 necessary in reality. But there is no sense in wasting more words on this question. Ghazali says: The subterfuge concerning the becoming of the souls is worthless too, for they have individual essences and a possibility prior to their becoming,2 and at that time there is nothing with which they could be brought into relation.3 Their argument contends that it is possible for matter that the souls direct it is a remote relation4 and, if this satisfies you, you might as well say that the possibility of the souls' becoming* lies in the power of Him who can on His own authority produce them,5 for the souls are then 114 related to the Agent—although they are not impressed on Him—in the same way as to the body, on which they are not impressed either. And since the imprint is made neither on the one substrate nor on the other*, there is no difference between the relation to the agent and that to the patient. I say: H e wants to force those who assume* the possibility of the soul's becoming without there being an imprint in matter to concede that 5 the possibility in the recipient is like the possibility in the agent, because the act proceeds from the agent and therefore these two possibilities are similar. But this is a shocking supposition, for, according to it, the soul would come to the body as if it directed it from the outside, as the artisan directs his product, and the soul would not be a form in the body^JMst as the artisan is not a form in his product. The answer is that it!s*not impossible that there should be amongst 10 the entelechies which conduct themselves like forms6 something that is separate from its substratum as the steersman is from his ship 7 and the artisan from his tool, and if the body is like the instrument of the

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soul, the soul is a separate form, and then the possibility which is in the instrument is not like the possibility which is in the agent; no, the instrument is in both conditions, the possibility which is in the patient and the possibility which is in the agent, and therefore the instruments are the mover and the moved, and in so far as they are the mover, there is in them the possibility which is in the agent, and in so far as they are moved, the possibility which is in the recipient. 1 115 But the supposition that the soul is a separate entity does not force them into the admission that the possibility which is in the recipient is identical 2 with the possibility which is in the agent. Besides, the possibility which according to the philosophers is in the agent is not only a rational judgement, but refers to something outside the soul. 3 5 Therefore his argument does not gain by assimilating one of these two possibilities to the other. And since Ghazali knew that all these arguments have no other effect than to bring doubts and perplexity to those who cannot solve them—which is an act of wicked sophists, he says: And if it is said you have taken good care in all your objections to oppose io the difficulties by other difficulties, but nothing of what you yourself have adduced is free from difficulty, we answer: the objections do show the falsity of an argument, no doubt, and certain aspects* of the problem are solved in stating the opposite view and its foundation.4 We have not committed ourselves to anything more than to upsetting their theories, and to showing the faults in the consequence of their proofs so as to demonstrate their incoherence. Wc do not seek to attack from any definite point of view, and we shall not transgress the aim of this book, nor give full proofs for the temporal production of the world, for our intention is 116 merely to refute their alleged knowledge of its eternity. But after finishing this book we shall, if it pleases God, devote a work to establishing the doctrine of truth, and we call it 'The Golden Mean in Dogmatic Beliefs'*,5 in which we shall be engaged in building up, as in this book we have been in destroying.

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I say: To oppose difficulty with difficulty does not bring about destruction, but only perplexity and doubts in him who acts in this way, for why should he think one of the two conflicting theories reasonable and the opposite one vain? Most of the arguments with which this man Ghazali opposes the philosophers are doubts which arise when certain parts of the doctrine of the philosophers come into conflict with others, and when those differences are compared with each other; but this is an imperfect refutation. A perfect refutation would be one that succeeded in showing the futility of their system according to

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the facts themselves, not such a one as, for instance, his assumption. 10 that it is permissible for the opponents of the philosophers to claim that possibility is a mental concept in the same way as the philosophers claim this for the universal. For if the truth of this comparison between the two were conceded, it would not follow that it was untrue that possibility was a concept dependent on reality, but only either that the universal existed in the mind only was not true, or that possibility existed in the mind only was not true. Indeed, it would have been necessary for him to begin by establishing the truth, 117 , before starting to perplex and confuse his readers, for they might die before they could get hold of that book, or he might have died himself before writing it. But this book has not yet come into my hands' and perhaps he never composed it, and he only says that he docs not base this present book on any doctrine, in order that it should not be thought that he based it on that of the Ash'arites. It appears from 5 the books ascribed to him that in metaphysics he recurs to the philosophers. And of all his books this is most clearly shown and most truly proved in his book called The Niche for Lights.1

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The Refutation oftheir Theory of the Incorruptibility ofthe World and of>Time and Motion Ghazali says: v Know that this is part of tlie first question, for according to the philosophers the existence of the world, having no beginning, does not end 5 either; it is eternal, without a final term. Its disappearance and its corruption cannot be imagined; it never began to exist in the condition in which it exists3 and it will never cease to exist in the condition in which it exists. Their four arguments which we have mentioned in our discussion of its eternity in the past refer also to its eternity in the future, and the objection is the same without any difference. They say that the world is caused, and that its cause is without beginning or end, and that this applies both to the effect and to the cause, and that, if the cause does not change, the effect cannot change either; upon this they build their proof of the impossibility of its beginning, and the same applies to its ending. This is their first proof. io

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The second proof is that an eventual annihilation of the world must occur after its existence, but 'after' implies an affirmation of time. The third proof is that the possibility of its existence does not end, and that therefore its possible existence may conform to the possibility.1 But this argument has no force, for we regard it as impossible that the world should not have begun, but we do not regard it as impossible that it should last eternally, if God should make it last eternally, for it is not necessary that what begins has also an end, although it is necessary for an act to have a beginning and an initial term. Only Abu Hudhail al-Allaf thought that the world must needs have an end, and he said that, as in the past infinite circular movements are impossible, so they are in the future;' but this is wrong, for the whole of the future never enters into existence either simultaneously or successively, whereas the whole of the past is there simultaneously but not successively.' And since it is clear that we do not regard the incorruptibility of the world as impossible from a rational point of view—we regard indeed its incorruptibility and corruptibility as equally possible—we know only through the Divine Law4 which of the two possibilities will be realized. Therefore let us not try to solve this problem by mere reason! I say: His assertion that the argument of the philosophers for the eternity of the world in the past applies also to its eternity in the future is true, and equally the second argument applies to both cases. But his assertion that the third argument is not equally valid for the future and for the past, that indeed we regard the becoming of the world in the past as impossible, but that with the exception of Abu Hudhail al-Allaf, who thought that the eternity of the world was impossible in cither direction, we do not regard its eternity in the future as absolutely impossible, is not true. For when it was conceded to the philosophers that the possibility of the world had no beginning and that with this possibility a condition of extension, which could measure this possibility, was connected in the same way as this condition of extension is connected with the possible existent, when it is actualized, and it was also evident that this extension had no initial term, the philosophers were convinced that time had no initial term, for this extension is nothing but time, and to call it timeless eternity 5 is senseless. And since time is connected with possibility and possibility with existence in motion, existence in motion has no first term either. And the assertion of the theologians that everything which existed in the past had a first term is futile, for the First exists in the past eternally, as it exists eternally in the future. 6 And their distinction here between the first term and its act 7 requires a proof,

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for the existence of the temporal which occurs in the past is different from the existence of the eternal which occurs in the past. For the temporal which has occurred in the past is finite in both directions, i.e. it has a beginning and an end, but the eternal which has occurred ' ° in the past has neither beginning nor end. 1 And therefore, since the philosophers have not admitted that the circular movement has a beginning, they cannot be forced to admit that it has an end, for they do not regard its existence in the past as transitory, and, if some philosopher does regard it as such, he contradicts himself and therefore the statement is true that everything that has a beginning has an end. 2 T h a t anything could have a beginning and no end is not true, unless the possible could be changed into the eternal, for everything that has a beginning is possible. And that anything could be liable to corruption and at the same time could be capable of eternity 121 is something incomprehensible 3 and stands in need of examination. The ancient philosophers indeed examined this problem, and Abu Hudhail agrees with the philosophers in saying that whatever can be generated is corruptible, and he kept strictly to the consequence which follows from the acceptance of the principle of becoming. As to those who make a distinction between the past and the future, because what is in the past is there in its totality, whereas the future never enters into existence in its totality (for the future enters reality 5 only successively), this is deceptive, for what is in reality past is that which has entered time and that which has entered time has time beyond it in both directions and possesses totality. But that which has never entered the past in the way the temporal enters the past can only be said in an equivocal way to be in the past; it is infinitely extended, with the past rather than in the past, 4 and possesses no totality in itself, although its parts are totalities. And this, if it has 10 no initial term beginning in the past, is in fact time itself. For each temporal beginning is a present, and each present is preceded by a past, and both that which exists commensurable with time, and time commensurable with it, must necessarily be infinite. Only the parts of time which are limited by time in both directions can enter the past, in the same way as only the instant which is evcrchanging and only 122 the instantaneous motion of a thing in movement in the spatial magnitude in which it moves can really enter the existence of the moved. 5 And just as we do not say that the past of what never ceased to exist in the past ever entered existence at an instant—for this would mean that its existence had a beginning and that time limited it in both

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5 directions—so it stands with that which is simultaneous with time, not in time. For of the circular movements only those that time limits enter into represented existence, 1 but those that are simultaneous with time do not afterwards enter past existence, just as the eternally existent does not enter past existence, since no time limits it. And when one imagines an eternal entity whose acts are not delayed after 10 its existence—as indeed must be the case with any entity whose existence is perfect 2 —then, if it is eternal and does not enter past time, it follows necessarily that its acts also cannot enter past time, for if they did they would be finite and this eternal existent would be eternally inactive and what is eternally inactive is necessarily impossible. And it is most appropriate for an entity, whose existence does 123 not enter time and which is not limited by time, that its acts should not enter existence either, because there is no difference between the entity and its acts. If the movements of the celestial bodies and what follows from them are acts of an eternal entity, the existence of which does not enter the past, then its acts do not enter past time either. 5 For it is not permissible to say of anything that is eternal that it has entered past time, nor that it has ended, for that which has an end has a beginning. For indeed, our statement that it is eternal means the denial of its entering past time and of its having had a beginning. He who, assuming that it entered past time, assumes that it must have a beginning begs the question. 3 It is, therefore, untrue that what is coexistent with eternal existence, has entered existence, io unless the eternal existence has entered existence by entering past time. Therefore our statement 'everything past must have entered existence' must be understood in two ways: first, that which has entered past existence must have entered existence, and this is a true statement; secondly, that which is past and is inseparably connected with eternal existence cannot be truly said to have entered existence, for our expression 'entered existence' is incompatible with our expression 'connected with eternal existence'. And there is here 124 no difference between act and existence. For he who concedes the existence of an entity which has an eternal past must concede that there exist acts, too, which have no beginning in the past. And it by no means follows from the existence of His acts that they must have entered existence, just as it by no means follows from the past permanency of His essence that He has ever entered existence. And all this is perfectly clear, as you sec. 5 Through this First Existent acts can exist which never began and

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will never cease, and if this were impossible for the act, it would be impossible, too, for existence, for every act is connected with its existent in existence. The theologians, however, regarded it as impossible that God's act should be eternal, although they regarded His existence as eternal, and that is the gravest error. To apply the expression 'production' for the world's creation as the Divine Law does is more appropriate than to use it of temporal production, as the Ash'aritcs did, 1 for the act, in so far as it is an act, is a product, and 10 eternity is only represented in this act because this production and the act produced have neither beginning nor.end. And I say that it was therefore difficult for Muslims to call God eternal and the world eternal, because they understood by 'eternal' that which has no cause. 2 Still I have seen some of the theologians tending rather to our opinion. 3 Ghazali says: Their fourth proof is similar to the third, for they say that if the world were annihilated the possibility of its existence would remain, as the possible cannot become impossible. This possibility is a relative attribute and according to them everything that becomes needs matter which precedes it and everything that vanishes needs matter from which it can 125 vanish, but the matter and the elements do not vanish, only the forms and accidents vanish which were in them. I say: If it is assumed that the forms succeed each other in one substratum in a circular way and that the agent of this succession is an eternal one, nothing impossible follows from this assumption. But if this 5 succession is assumed to take place in an infinite number of matters or through an infinite number of specifically different forms, it is impossible, and equally the assumption is impossible that such a succession could occur without an eternal agent or through a temporal agent. For if there were an infinite number of matters, an actual infinite would exist, and this is impossible. It is still more absurd to suppose that this succession could occur through temporal agents, and therefore from this point of view it is only true that a man must 10 become from another man, on condition that the successive series happens in one and the same matter and the perishing of the earlier men can become the matter of the later. Besides, the existence of the earlier men is also in some respect the efficient cause and the instrument for the later —all this, however, in an accidental way, for those men are nothing but the instrument for the Agent, who does not

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cease to produce a man by means of a man and through the matter of a man. The student who does not distinguish all these points will not be able to free himself from insoluble doubts. Perhaps God will place you and us among those who have reached the utmost truth concerning what may and must be taught about God's infinite acts. What I have said about all these things is not proved here, but must be examined by the application of the conditions which the ancients have explained and the rules which they have established for scientific research. Besides, he who would like to be one of those who possess the truth should in any question he examines consult those who hold divergent opinions. 1 Ghazali says: The answer to all this has been given above. I only single out this question because they have two proofs for it. The first proof is that given by Galen, who says: If the sun, for instance, were liable to annihilation, decay would appear in it over a long period. But observation for thousands of years shows no change in its size, and the fact that it lias shown no loss of power through such a long time shows that it docs not suffer corruption.2 There are two objections to this: The first is that the mode of this proof—that if the sun suffers corruption, it must suffer loss of power, and as the consequence is impossible, the antecedent must be impossible too—is what the philosophers call a conjunctive hypothetical proposition,3 and this inference is not conclusive, because its antecedent is not true, unless it is connected with another condition. In other words the falsehood of the consequence of the proposition 'if the sun suffers corruption, it must become weaker' does not imply the falsehood of the antecedent, unless either (i) the antecedent is bound up with the additional condition that, if it suffers corruption through decay, it must do so during a long period, or (a) it is seriously proved that there is no corruption except through decay, for only then docs the falsehood of the consequence imply the falsehood of the antecedent. Now, we do not concede that a thing can only become corrupt through decay; decay is only one form of corruption, for it is not impossible that what is in a state of perfection should suddenly suffer corruption. I say: He says in his objection here to this argument that there is no necessary relation between antecedent and consequent, because that which sulfers corruption need not become weaker, since it can suffer corruption before it has become weaker. The conclusion, however, is quite sound, when it is assumed that the corruption takes place in a natural way, not by violence, and it is assumed besides that the celestial body is an animal, for all animals suffer

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corruption only in a natural way—they necessarily decay before their corruption. However, our opponents do not accept these premisses, 10 so far as they concern heaven, without proof. And therefore Galen's statement is only of dialectical value. The safest way to use this argument is to say that, if heaven should suffer corruption, it would either disintegrate into the elements of which it is composed or, losing the form it possesses, receive another, as happens with the four elements when they change into one another. If, however, heaven passed away into the elements, those elements would have to be part of another world, for it could not have come into being from the elements contained in this world, since these elements are infi- 128 nitely small, compared with its size, something like a point in relation to a circle. 1 Should heaven, however, lose its form and receive another there would exist a sixth element opposed to all the others, being neither heaven, nor earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire.2 And all this is impossible. And his statement that heaven does not decay 5 is only a common opinion, lacking the force of the immediately evident axioms; and it is explained in the Posterior Analytics of what kind these premisses are. 3 Ghazali says: The second objection is that, if it were conceded to Galen that there is no corruption except through decay, how can it be known that decay does not affect the sun? His reliance on observation is impossible, for observations determine the size only by approximation, and if the sun, whose size is said to be approximately a hundred and seventy times that 10 of the earth, 4 decreased, for instance, by the size of mountains the difference would not be perceptible to the senses. Indeed, it is perhaps already in decay, and has decreased up to the present by the size of mountains or more; but perception cannot ascertain this, for its knowledge in the science of optics works only by supposition and approximation. The same takes place with sapphire and gold, which, according to them, are composed out of elements and which are liable to corruption. Still, if you left a sapphire for a hundred years, its decrease would be imperceptible, and perhaps the decrease in the sun during the period in which it has been observed stands in proportion to its size as the decrease of the sapphire to its size in a hundred years. This is imperceptible, and this fact shows that his proof is utterly futile. We have abstained from bringing many proofs of the same kind as the wise disdain. We have given only this one to serve as an example of what 129 we have omitted, and we have restricted ourselves to the four proofs which demand that their solution should be attempted in the way indicated above.

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I say: If the sun had decayed and the parts of it which had disintegrated during the period of its observation were imperceptible because of the size of its body, still the effect of its decay on bodies in the sublunary 5 world would be perceptible in a definite degree, for everything that decays does so only through the corruption and disintegration of its parts, and those parts which disconnect themselves from the decaying mass must necessarily remain in the world in their totality or change* into other parts, and in cither case an appreciable change must occur in the world, either in the number or in the character of its parts. And if the size of the bodies could change, their actions and affections would change too, and if their actions and affections, and especially 10 those of the heavenly bodies, could change, changes would arise in the sublunary world. To imagine, therefore, a dissipation of the heavenly bodies is to admit a disarrangement in the divine order which, according to the philosopher, prevails in this world. This proof is not absolutely strict. 130 Ghazali says: The philosophers have a second proof of the impossibility of the annihilation of the world. They say: The substance of the world could not be annihilated, because no cause could be imagined for this and the passage from existence to non-existence cannot take place without a cause. This cause must be cither the Will of the Eternal, and this is impossible, for if He willed the annihilation of the world after not having willed it, He would have changed; or it must be assumed that God and His Will S are in all conditions absolutely the same, although the object of His Will changes from non-existence to existence and then again from existence to non-existence. And the impossibility of which we have spoken in the matter of a temporal existence through an eternal will, holds also for the problem of annihilation. Hut we shall add* here a still greater difficulty, namely, that the object willed is without doubt an act of the wilier, for the act of him who acts after not having acted—even if he does not alter in his own nature—must necessarily exist after having not existed: if he remained io absolutely in the state he was in before, his act would not be there. But when the world is annihilated, there is no object for God's act, and if He does not perform anything (for annihilation is nothing), how could there be an action? Suppose the annihilation of the world needed a new act in God which did not exist before, what could such an act be? Could it 1)0 the existence of the world? Hut this is impossible, since what happens is on the contrary the termination of its existence. Could this act then be the annihilation of the world? But annihilation is nothing at all, and it could therefore not be an act. I'or even in its slightest intensity an act

THE SECOND DISCUSSION 77 must be existent, but the annihilation of the world is nothing existent at all; how could it then be said that he who caused it was an agent, or he who effected it its cause?1 The philosophers say that to escape this difficulty the theologians are divided into four sects and that each sect falls into an absurdity. I say: ~ He says here that the philosophers compel the theologians who admit the annihilation of the world to draw the consequence that from the Eternal, who produced the world, there proceeds a new act, i.e. the act of annihilation, just as they compelled them to draw this consequence in regard to His temporal production. About this problem everything has been said already in our discussion of temporal production, for the same difficulties as befall the problem of production apply to annihilation, and there is no sense in repeating ourselves. But the special difficulty he mentions here is that from the assumption of the world's temporal production it follows that the act of the agent attaches itself to non-existence, 2 so that in fact the agent performs a non-existing act and this seemed to all the parties too shocking to be accepted, 3 and therefore they took refuge in theories he mentions later, liut this consequence follows necessarily from any theory which affirms that the act of the agent is connected with absolute creation—that is, the production of something that did not exist before in potency and was not a possibility which its agent converted from potency into actuality, a theory which affirms in fact that the agent created it out of nothing. But for the philosophers the act of the agent is nothing but the actualizing of what is in potency, and this act is, according to them, attached to an existent in two ways, either* in production, by converting the thing from its potential existence into actuality so that its non-existence is terminated, or* in destruction, by converting the thing from its actual existence into potential existence, so that it passes into a relative non-existence. But he who docs not conceive the act of the agent in this way has to draw the consequence that the agent's act is attached to non-existence in both ways, in production as in destruction; only as this seems clearer in the case of destruction, the theologians could not defend themselves against their opponents. For it is clear that for the man who holds the theory of absolute annihilation the agent must perform something non-existent, for when the agent converts the thing from existence into absolute non-existence, he directs his first intention to something non-existent, by contrast with what

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o from the one agent there can arise but one object (and according to all the First was an absolutely simple unity), it became difficult for them to explain how plurality could arise from it. This difficulty

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compelled them finally to regard the First as different from the mover of the daily circular movement; they declared that from the First, who is a simple existent, the mover of the highest sphere proceeds, and from this mover, since he is of a composite nature, as 180 he is both conscious of himself and conscious of the First, a duality, the highest sphere, and the mover of the second sphere, the sphere under the highest can arise. This, however, is a mistake, 1 according to philosophical teaching, for thinker and thought are one identical thing in human intellect and this is still more true in the case of the abstract intellects. 2 This does not affect Aristotle's theory, for the individual agent in the empirical world, from which there can 5 only proceed one single act, can only in an equivocal way be compared to the first agent. 3 For the first agent in the divine world is an absolute agent, while the agent in the empirical world is a relative agent, and from the absolute agent only an absolute act which has no special individual object can proceed. And thereby Aristotle proves that the agent of the human intelligibles is an intellect free from matter, since this agent thinks all things, 4 and in the 10 same way he proves that the passive intellect is ingenerable and incorruptible, 5 because this intellect also thinks all things. According to the system of Aristotle the answer on this point is that everything whose existence is only effected through a conjunction of parts, like the conjunction of matter and form, or the conjunction of the elements of the world, receives its existence as a consequence of this conjunction. T h e bestower of this conjunction is, therefore, the 181 bestower of existence. And since everything conjoined is only conjoined through a unity in it, and this unity through which it is conjoined must depend on a unity, subsistent by itself, and be related to it, there must exist a single unity, subsistent by itself, and this unity must of necessity provide unity through its own essence.6 This unity is distributed in the different classes of existing things, according 5 to their natures, and from this unity, allotted to the individual things, their existence arises; and all those unities lead upwards to the First Monad, as warmth which exists in all the individual warm things proceeds from primal warmth, which is fire, and leads upwards to it. 7 By means of this theory Aristotle connects sensible existence with intelligible, saying that the world is one and proceeds from one, io and that this Monad is partly the cause of unity, partly the cause of plurality. And since Aristotle was the first to find this solution, and because of its difficulty, many of the later philosophers did not

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u n d e r s t a n d it, as we h a v e s h o w n . I t is e v i d e n t , therefore, t h a t t h e r e is a u n i q u e e n t i t y from w h i c h a single p o w e r e m a n a t e s t h r o u g h w h i c h all beings exist. A n d since t h e y a r e m a n y , it is necessarily from t h e M o n a d , in so far as it is o n e , t h a t p l u r a l i t y arises or p r o c e e d s o r w h a t e v e r t e r m is to b e u s e d . 1 T h i s is t h e sense of Aristotle's t h e o r y , a 182 sense v e r y different from t h a t in w h i c h those thinkers believe w h o affirm t h a t from t h e o n e o n l y o n e c a n p r o c e e d . See therefore h o w serious this e r r o r p r o v e d a m o n g t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s ! Y o u should, t h e r e fore, sec for youself in t h e b o o k s of t h e a n c i e n t s w h e t h e r these philosop h i c a l theories a r e p r o v e d , n o t in t h e works of A v i c e n n a a n d o t h e r s w h o c h a n g e d t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e in its t r e a t m e n t of m e t a - 5 physics so m u c h t h a t it b e c a m e m e r e guessing. G h a z a l i says, o n b e h a l f of t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s : I t m a y be said: If the philosophical theory is properly understood, the difficulties disappear. Existents can he divided into what exists in a substratum, like accidents and forms, and what does not exist in a substratum. T h e latter can be divided again into what serves as a substratum for other things, e.g. bodies, and w h a t does not exist in a substratum, e.g. substances which subsist by themselves. These latter again are divided into those which exert an inllucncc on bodies and which we call souls, and those 10 which exert an influence not on bodies but on souls, and which we call abstract intellects. Existents which inhere in a substratum, like accidents, are temporal and have temporal causes which terminate in a principle, in one way temporal, in another way everlasting, namely, circular movement. But we are not discussing this here. H e r e we are discussing only those principles which exist by themselves and do not inhere in a substratum, which are of three kinds: (1) bodies, which are the lowest type, (2) abstract intellects, which are not attached to bodies, either by way of action or by being impressed upon them, which are the highest type, and (3) souls, which are the intermediate agencies, attached to the bodies in a certain way, namely, through their influence and their action upon them, and which stand midway in dignity; they undergo an influence from the intellects and exert an influence upon the bodies. Now the n u m b e r of bodies is ten. There are nine heavens, and the tenth body is the matter which (ills the concavity of the sphere of the moon. 2 183 T h e nine heavens arc a n i m a t e d ; they possess bodies and souls, and they have an order in existence which we shall mention here. From the existence of the First Principle there emanates the first intellect—an existent which subsists by itself, immaterial, not impressed on body, conscious of its principle a n d which we philosophers call First Intellect, 3 but which (for we do not quibble about words) m a y be called angel, or intellect, or w h a t you will. F r o m its existence there derive three things, an intellect, the soul, 5 a n d the body of the farthest sphere, i.e. the ninth heaven. 4 T h e n from the

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T second intellect there derive a third intellect a n d the soul a n d the b o d y of the sphere of the fixed stars, then from the third intellect there derive a fourth intellect a n d the soul a n d the body of the sphere of Saturn, then from the fourth intellect there derive a fifth intellect a n d the soul a n d the body of the sphere of J u p i t e r , a n d so on till one arrives at the intellect from which there derive the intellect, the soul a n d the body of the sphere of the m o o n , a n d this last intellect is that which is called the active intellect. T h e n there follows t h a t which fills the sphere of the moon, namely, the m a t t e r which receives generation a n d corruption from the active intellect a n d from the natures of the spheres. T h e n through the action of the movements of the spheres a n d the stars the matters are mixed in different mixtures from which the minerals, vegetables, a n d animals arise. I t is not necessary that from each intellect another intellect should derive endlessly, for these intellects are of a different kind, a n d w h a t is valid for the one is not valid for the other. 1 I t follows from this that the intellects after the First Principle are ten in n u m b e r a n d that there are nine spheres, a n d the sum of these noble principles after the First Principle is therefore nineteen; a n d that under each of the primary intellects there are three things, another intellect a n d a soul a n d body of a sphere. T h e r e fore there must be in each intellect a triple character, and in the first effect a plurality can only be imagined in this w a y : ( i ) it is conscious of its principle, (2) it is conscious of itself, (3) it is in itself possible, since the necessity of its existence derives from another. These are three conditions, a n d the most noble of these three effects must be related to the most noble of these conditions. 2 Therefore the intellect proceeds from the first effect 1 in so far as the first effect is conscious of its principle; the soul of the sphere proceeds from the first effect, in so far as the first effect is conscious of itself; a n d the body of the sphere proceeds from the first effect, in so far as by itself the first effect belongs to possible existence. W e must still explain why this triple character is found in the first effect, although its principle is only one. W e say that from the First Principle only one thing proceeds, namely, the essence of this intellect through which it is conscious of itself. T h e effect, however, must by itself become conscious of its principle, a n d this kind of consciousness cannot derive from its cause. Also the effect by itself belongs to possible existence, a n d cannot receive this possibility from the First Principle, b u t possesses it in its own essence. W e do indeed regard it as possible that one effect should proceed from the one, although this effect possesses by itself and not through its principle certain necessary qualities, either relative or nonrelative. 4 I n this way a plurality arises, a n d so it becomes the principle of the existence of plurality. T h u s the composite can meet the simple, as their meeting must needs take place a n d cannot take place in any other m a n n e r , a n d this is the right a n d reasonable explanation, a n d it is in this way that this philosophical theory must be understood. 5

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I say: All these are inventions fabricated against the philosophers by Avicenna, Farabi, and others. But the true theory of the ancient philosophers is that there are principles which are the celestial bodies, and that the principles of the celestial bodies, which are immaterial existents, are the movers of those celestial bodies, and that the celestial bodies move towards them in obedience to them and out of love for them, to comply with their order to move and to understand them, and that they are only created with a view to movement. For when it was found that the principles which move the celestial bodies are immaterial and incorporeal, there was no way left to them in which they might move the bodies other than by ordering them to move. And from this the philosophers concluded that the celestial bodies are rational animals, conscious of themselves and of their principles, which move them by command.' And since it was established—in the De Anima—that there is no difference between knowledge and the object of knowledge, except for the latter's being in matter, 2 of necessity the substance of immaterial beings—if there are such —had to be knowledge or intellect or whatever you wish to call it. And the philosophers knew that these principles must be immaterial, because they confer on the celestial bodies everlasting movement in which there is no fatigue or weariness, 3 and that anything which bestows such an everlasting movement must be immaterial, and cannot be a material power. And indeed the celestial body acquires its permanence only through these immaterial principles. And the philosophers understood that the existence of these immaterial principles must be connected with a first principle amongst them; if not, there could be no order in the world. You can find these theories in the books of the philosophers and, if you want to make sure of the truth in these matters, you will have to consult them. It also becomes clear from the fact that all the spheres have the daily circular movement, although besides this movement they have, as the philosophers had ascertained, their own special movements, that He who commands this movement must be the First Principle, i.e. God, and that He commands the other principles to order the other movements to the other spheres. Through this heaven and earth are ruled as a state is ruled by the commands of the supreme monarch, which, however, are transmitted to all classes of the population by the men he has appointed for this purpose in the different affairs of the state. As it says in the Koran: 'And He inspired every Heaven with its bidding.' 4

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This heavenly injunction and this obedience are the prototypes of the injunction and obedience imposed on man because he is a rational animal. 1 What Avicenna says of the derivation of these principles from each other is a theory not known amongst the ancients, who merely state that these principles hold certain positions 2 in relation to the First Principle, and that their existence is only made real through this relation to the First Principle. As is said in the Koran: 'There is none amongst us but has his appointed place.' 3 It is the connexion 4 which exists between them which brings it about that some are the effect of others and that they all depend on the First Principle. By 'agent' and 'object', 'creator' and 'creature', in so far as it concerns this existence nothing more can be understood than just this idea of connexion. But what we said of this connexion of every existent with the One is something different from what is meant by 'agent' and 'object', 'maker' and 'product' in this sublunary world. If you imagine a ruler who has many men under his command who again have others under their command, and if you imagine that those commanded receive their existence only through receiving this command and through their obedience to this command, and those who arc under those commanded can only exist through those commanded, of necessity the first ruler will be the one who bestows on all cxistcnts the characteristic through which they become existent, and that which exists through its being commanded will only exist because of the first ruler. And the philosophers understood that this is what is meant by the divine laws when they speak of creation, of calling into existence out of nothing, and of command. This is the best way to teach people to understand the philosophical doctrine without the ignominy attaching to it, which seems to attach when you listen to the analysis Ghazali gives of it here. The philosophers assert that all this is proved in their books, and the man who, having fulfilled the conditions they impose, 5 is able to study their works will find the truth of what they say -or perhaps its opposite—and will not understand Aristotle's theory or Plato's in any oilier sense than that here indicated. And ihcir philosophy is the highest point human intelligence can reach. It may be thai, when a man discovers these explanations of philosophical theory, he will find that they happen not only to be true but to be generally acknowledged, anil teachings which arc generally acceptable arc pleasing and delightful to all. 6 One of the premisses from which this explanation is deduced is thai when one observes this sublunary world, one finds that what is

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called 'living' and 'knowing' moves on its own account in welldefined movements towards well-defined ends and well-defined acts from which new well-defined acts arise. For this reason the theologians say that any act can only proceed from a living, knowing being. When one has found this first premiss, that what moves in welldefined movements from which arise well-defined and ordered actions is living and knowing, and one joins to this a second premiss which can be verified by the senses, that the heavens move on their own account in well-defined movements from which there follow in the existents under them well-defined acts, order, and rank through which these existents under them receive their subsistence, one deduces from this, no doubt, a third principle, namely, that the heavenly bodies are living beings endowed with perception.' That from their movements there follow well-defined acts from which this sublunary world, its animals, vegetables, and minerals receive their subsistence and conservation, 2 is evident from observation, for, were it not that the sun in its ecliptic 3 approaches the sublunary world and recedes from it, there would not be the four seasons, and without the four seasons there would be no plants and no animals, and the orderly origination of elements out of each other necessary for the conservation of their existence would not take place. For instance, when the sun recedes towards the south the air in the north becomes cold and rains occur and the production of the watery element increases, whereas in the south the production of the airy element becomes greater; whereas in summer, when the sun approaches our zenith, the opposite takes place. 4 Those actions which the sun exercises everlastingly through its varying distance from the different existents which always occupy one and the same place are also found in the moon and all the stars which have oblique spheres, and they produce the lour seasons through their circular movements, and the most important of all these movements, in its necessity for the existence and conservation of the creation, is the highest circular movement which produces day and night. The Venerable Book refers in several verses to the providential care for man which arises out of God's subjection of all the heavens to His bidding, as, for instance, in the Koranic verse 'And the sun and the moon and the stars are subjected to His bidding', 5 and when man observes these acts and this guidance which proceed necessarily and permanently from the movements of the stars, and sees how these stars move in fixed movements, and that they have well-defined shapes and move in well-defined diiec-

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tions towards well-defined actions in opposite motions, he understands that these well-defined acts can only arise from beings perceptive, living, capable of choice and of willing. And he becomes still more convinced of this when he sees that many beings in this world which have small, despicable, miserable, and insignificant bodies are not wholly devoid of life, notwithstanding the smallness of their size, the feebleness of their powers, the shortness of their lives, the insignificance of their bodies; and that divine munificence has bestowed on them life and perception, through which they direct themselves and conserve their existence. And he knows with absolute certainty that the heavenly bodies are better fitted to possess life and perception than the bodies of this sublunary world, because of the size of their bodies, the magnificence of their existence, and the multitude of their lights, 1 as it says in the Divine Words: 'Surely the creation of the heavens and the earth is greater than the creation of man, but most men know it not.' 2 But especially when he notices how they direct the living beings of this sublunary world, docs he understand with absolute certainty that they are alive, for the living can only be guided by a being leading a more perfect life.3 And when man observes these noble, living, rational bodies, capable of choice, which surround us, and recognizes a third principle, namely, that they do not need for their own existence the providence with which they guide the sublunary world, 4 he becomes aware that they are commanded to perform these movements and to control the animals, vegetables, and minerals of this sublunary world, and that He who commands them is not one of them and that He is necessarily incorporeal (for, if not, He would be one of them) and that all these heavenly bodies control the existents which are under them, but serve Him, who for His existence is in no need of them. And were it not for this Commander, they would not give their care everlastingly and continuously to this sublunary world which they guide willingly, without any advantage to themselves, especially in this act. They move* thus by way of command and obligation the heavens which repair to them, only in order to conserve this sublunary world and to uphold its existence. And the Commander is God (glory be to Him), and all this is the meaning of the Divine Words 'We come willingly'. 5 And another proof of all this is that, if a man sees a great many people, distinguished and meritorious, applying themselves to definite acts without a moment's interruption, although these acts are

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not necessary for their own existence and they do not need them, it is absolutely evident to him that these acts have been prescribed and ordered to them and that they have a leader who has obliged them in his everlasting service to act continually for the good of others. 1 This leader is the highest among them in power and rank and they are, as it were, his submissive slaves. And this is the meaning to which the Venerable Book refers in the words: 'Thus did we show Abraham the kingdom of heaven and the earth that he should be of those who are safe.' 2 And when man observes still another thing, namely, that all the seven planets in their own special movements arc subservient to their universal daily motion and that their own bodies as parts of the whole are submissive to the universal body, as if they were all one in fulfilling this service, he knows again with absolute certainty that each planet has its own commanding principle, supervising it as a deputy of the first Commander. Just as, in the organization of armies, where each body of troops has one commander, called a centurion, each centurion is subordinate to the one Commander-in-chief of the army, so also in regard to the movements of the heavenly bodies which the ancients observed. They number somewhat more than forty, of which seven or eight5—for the ancients disagreed about this —dominate the others and themselves depend on the first Commander, praise be to Him! Man acquires this knowledge in this way, whether or not he knows how the principle of the creation of these heavenly bodies acts, or what the connexion is between the existence of these commanders and the first Commander. In any case he docs not doubt that, if these heavenly bodies existed by themselves, that is, if they were eternal and had no cause, they might refuse to serve their own commanders or might not obey them, and the commanders might refuse to obey the first Commander. But, since it is not possible for them to behave in this way, the relation between them and the first Commander is determined by absolute obedience, and this means nothing more than that they possess this obedience in the essence of their being, not accidentally, as is the case in the relation between master and servant. 4 Servitude, therefore, is not something additional to their essence, but these essences subsist through servitude and this is the meaning of the Divine Words: 'There is none in the heavens or the earth but comes to the Merciful as a servant.' 5 And their possession is the kingdom of the heavens and the earth which God showed to Abraham, as it is expressed in the Devine Words: 'Thus did we show Abraham the kingdom of heaven and

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earth that he should be of those who are safe.'1 Therefore you will understand that the creation of these bodies and the principle of their becoming cannot be like the coming to be of the bodies of this sublunary world, and that the human intellect is too weak to understand how this act works, although it knows that this act exists. He who tries to compare heavenly with earthly existence, and believes that the Agent of the divine world acts in the way in which an agent in this sublunary world works, is utterly thoughtless, profoundly mistaken, and in complete error. '« This is the extreme limit we can reach in our understanding of the theories of the ancients about the heavenly bodies, of their proof for the existence of a Creator for these bodies who is immaterial, and of their statements concerning the immaterial existents under Him, one of which is the soul. But to believe in His existence as if He were the cause through which these bodies had been produced in time, in the way we see the production of the bodies of this sublunary world, as the theologians desired—this, indeed, is very difficult, and the 194 premisses they use for its proof do not lead them where they desire. We shall show this later, when we discuss the different proofs for the existence of God. And since this has been firmly established, we shall now go back to relate and refute in detail what Ghazali tells of the philosophers, and to show the degree of truth reached by his assertions, for this is 5 the primary intention of this book. Ghazali says, refuting the philosophers: What you affirm are only suppositions and in fact you do nothing but add obscurities to obscurities. If a man were to say that he had seen such things in a dream, it would be a proof of his bad constitution, or if one should advance such arguments in juridical controversies, in which everything under discussion is conjectural, one would say these were stupidities which could not command any assent.

I say: •o

This is very much the way the ignorant treat the learned and the vulgar the eminent, and in this way, too, the common people behave towards the products of craftsmanship. For, when the artisans show the common people the products of their craftsmanship which possess many qualities from which they draw wonderful actions, the masses scoff* at them and regard them as insane, whereas in reality they 195 themselves are insane and ignorant in comparison with the wise.2 With such utterances as these the learned and the thoughtful need

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not occupy themselves. What Ghazali ought to have done, since he relates these theories, is to show the motives which led to them, so that the reader might compare them with the arguments through which he wants to refute them. Ghazali says: The ways of refuting such theories are countless, but we shall bring here a certain number. The first is that we say: You claim that one of the meanings of plurality in the first effect is that it is possible in its existence, but we ask whether its being possible in its existence is identical with its being or something different? If you say 'identical', then no plurality proceeds from it, but if you say that it is different, why then do you not assert that there is a plurality in the First Principle, for it not only has existence, but is necessary in its existence, and existence and necessary existence are not identical. Therefore, because of this plurality in the First Principle, let us allow that different entities proceed from it. If it is said: 'Necessity of existence cannot mean anything but existence', we answer: 'Possibility of existence cannot mean anything but existence.' If, however, you say: 'Its existence can be known without its possibility being known, and therefore they are different,' we answer: 'In the same way the existence of the necessary existent can be known without its necessity being known, unless another proof is added,' let them therefore be different! Generally speaking, existence is a universal which can be divided into necessary and possible, and if the one specific difference is an addition to the universal, the other specific difference is also an addition, for both cases are the same.' If you say, 'It possesses the possibility of its existence through itself and its existence through another, how then can what it possesses through itself and what it possesses through another be identical?' we answer: 'How then can the necessity of its being be identical with its being, so that the necessity of its existence can be denied and its existence affirmed? And to God, the One, the Absolute Truth, negation and affirmation cannot be applied equivocally, for one cannot say of Him that He is and is not, or that His existence is at the same time necessary or not necessary; but it can be said of Him that He exists, but that His existence is not necessary, as it can be said of Him that He exists, but that His existence is not possible. And it is through this that His Unity can be recognized. But this unity in the First cannot be upheld*, if what you say is true, that possibility of existence is something different from the possible existent*.'2

I say: Ghazali affirms that, when we say of a thing that it is possible in its existence, this must either mean that it is identical with its existence or different from it, i.e. something additional to its existence. If it is identical, there is no plurality, and the statement of the

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philosophers that there is a plurality in the possible existent has no sense. If, however, it is not identical, the philosophers will have to make the same admission about the necessary existent, i.e. that there is a plurality in it, but this is in contradiction to their own principle. This reasoning, however, is not valid, for Ghazali has overlooked a third case, namely, that necessity of being might be not something added to existence outside the soul but a condition' in the necessary existent which adds nothing to its essence; it might be said to refer to the denial of its being the effect of something else, a denial of that which is affirmed of all other entities, 2 just as, when we say of something that it is one, nothing additional to its essence existing outside the soul is meant—as is, on the contrary, the case when we speak of a white existent—but only a negative condition, namely, indivisibility. 3 In the same way, when we speak of the necessary existent, we mean by the necessity of His existence a negative condition which is the consequence of His existence, namely, that His existence is necessary through Himself, not through something else. And also when we speak of the existent which is possible through itself, it is not something additional to its essence outside the soul—as is the case with the real possible 4 —that should be understood, but merely that its essence determines that its existence can become necessary only through a cause; what is meant, therefore, is an essence which will not be by itself necessary in its existence when its cause is removed and therefore is not a necessary existent, i.e. it is denied the quality of necessary existence. 5 It is as if Ghazali said that the necessary existent is partially necessary through itself, partially through a cause, and that which is necessary through a cause is not necessary through itself.6 Nobody doubts that these specific differences are neither substantial differences which divide the essence nor additions to the essence, but that they are only negative or relative relations, just as, when we say that a thing exists, the word 'exists' does not indicate an entity added to its essence outside the soul, which is the case when we say of a thing that it is white. 7 It is here that Avicenna erred, for he believed that unity is an addition to the essence and also that existence, when wc say that a thing exists, is an addition to the thing. 8 This question will be treated later. And the first to develop this theory of the existent, possible by itself and necessary through another, was Avicenna; 9 for him possibility was a quality in a thing, different from the thing in which the possibility is, and from this it seems to follow that what is under the First is composed of two things,

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one to which possibility is attributed, the other to which necessity is attributed; but this is a mistaken theory. 1 But he who has understood 5 our explanation will not be concerned about the difficulty which Ghazali adduces against Avicenna. The only question he will have to ask, when he has understood the meaning of 'possibility of existence' for the first effect, is whether this possibility brings about a compound character in the first effect or not, for if the quality is relative, it does not bring about a compound character. For not all the different dispositions which can be imagined in a thing need determine additional qualities in its essence outside the soul; indeed, 10 this is the case with the disposition of privations and relations, and for this reason certain philosophers do not count the category of relation among things which exist outside the soul, i.e. the ten categories. 2 Ghazali, however, implies in his argument that any additional meaning must apply to an additional entity actually outside the soul; but this is a mistake, and a sophistical argument. 3 This follows from his words: Generally speaking, existence is a universal which can be divided into necessary and possible, and if the one specific difference is an addition to the universal, the other specific difference also is an addition, for both cases are the same. But the division of existence into possible and necessary is not like 199 the division of animal into rational and irrational, or into walking, swimming, and flying animals, for those things are additional to the genus and provide additional species—animality is their common concept and they are specific differences added to it. But the possible into which Avicenna divides existence is not an entity actually outside the soul, and his theory is wrong, as we said before. For the 5 existence which for its existence is in need of a cause can, as an entity by itself, only be understood as non-existence—that is to say, anything that exists through another thing must be non-existent by itself, unless its nature is the nature of the true possible. 4 Therefore the division of existence into necessary and possible existence is not a valid one, if one does not mean by 'possible' the true possible; but we will treat of this later. The summary of what we said here is that 10 the existent can be divided either into essential differences or into relative conditions or into accidents additional to its essence; out of the division into essential differences there must necessarily result a plurality of acts which arise out of the existent, but out of the division into relational and accidental dispositions no such plurality of

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different acts results. And if it should be claimed that out of relational qualities a plurality of acts results, well then, a plurality will proceed from the First Principle of necessity without need of the intervention of an effect as the principle of plurality; on the other hand, if it should be claimed that out of relational qualities no plurality of acts results, well then, out of the relational qualities of the first effect also there will result no plurality of acts, and this latter assumption is the better.' Ghazali says: How then can what it possesses through itself, and what it possesses through another, be identical? But how can this same man who affirms that possibility exists only in the mind, say such a thing? Why then does he not apply this doctrine here, for it is not impossible for the one essence to be positive and negative in its relations without there resulting a plurality in this essence—which, however, Ghazali denies. But if you have understood this, you will be able to solve the problem Ghazali poses in this section. If it is said: 'It follows from this that there is no composition, either in existence, necessary by itself, or in existence, necessary through another,' we answer: As to what is necessary through another, the mind perceives in it a composition through cause and effect; if it is a body*, there must be in it both a unity actually, and a plurality potentially; 2 if it is, however, incorporeal, the mind does not perceive a plurality either in act or in potency*. 3 For this reason the philosophers call this kind of existent simple, but they regard the cause as more simple than the effect and they hold that the First is the most simple 4 of them all, because it cannot be understood as having any cause or effect at all. But composition can be understood of the principles which come after the First; therefore, according to the philosophers, the second principle is more simple than the third, and it is in this way that their theory must be understood. The meaning of'cause' and 'effect' in these existents is that a potential plurality (as it were) exists in them which shows itself in the effect, i.e. there proceeds out of it a plurality of effects which it never contains actually in any definite moment. 5 If the hearer has understood their theory in this way and accepted it, he will see that they are not affected by the objections of Ghazali. But one should not understand this theory in the way Ghazali does, namely, that out of the second principle, because it knows its own essence and knows its principle, and there-

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fore possesses two forms or a dual existence, there proceed two differ- »o ent things, for this^is a false theory. For this would mean that this second principle is composed of more than one form and that there- t fore this form' is one in its substratum, many by its definition, as is the case with the soul.* But the theologians keep tenaciously to this false explanation in their statements about the derivation of these principles from each other, as if they wanted to understand the divine through an analogy with perceptible acts; indeed, when metaphysics contains such theories, it becomes more conjectural than jurisprudence. You will have seen from this that the conclusion Ghazali wants the philosophers to draw concerning the plurality in the necessary existent, because of the plurality which he considers must exist in the possible existent, has no validity. For, if possibility were under- 202 stood as real possibility, it would indeed imply here a plurality, but since this is impossible, according to what we have said and shall show later, nothing similar follows concerning the necessary existent. But if possibility is understood as being a concept of the mind, it follows that neither the necessary existent nor the possible existent must be regarded as composite for this reason; the only reason why composition must be admitted here is because of the relation of cause 5 and effect. Ghazali says: The second objection is that we say: 'Is the knowledge the first effect has of its principle identical with its own existence and with the knowledge it has of itself?' If so, there is only a plurality in the expression used to describe the essence, not in the essence itself; if not, this plurality will exist also in the First, for He knows Himself and He knows others. I say: What is true is that the knowledge the first effect has of its principle is identical with its own essence and that the first effect belongs to the domain of relation and is therefore of a lesser rank than the First who 10 belongs to the domain of what exists by itself. It is true, according to the philosophers, that the First thinks only His own essence— not something relative, namely, that He is a principle—but His essence, according to the philosophers, contains all intellects, nay, all existents, in a nobler and more perfect way than they all possess in reality, as we shall explain later. 3 Therefore this theory does not imply the abominable consequences he ascribes to it. 4 Ghazali says: 203 It may be said by the philosophers that His knowing Himself is identical

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with His essence, and that he who does not know that he is a principle for others does not know his own essence, for knowledge conforms to the thing known and refers therefore to His essence.

I say: This statement is wrong, for His being a principle is something relative and cannot be identical with His essence. If He could think that He is a principle, He would be conscious of the things the prin5 ciple of which He is, in the way these things really exist, and in this case the higher would be perfected through the lower, for the thing known is the perfection of the knower according to the philosophers, as is set forth in the sciences about the human intellect. 1 Ghazali says: But we answer: In this case the knowledge the effect has of itself is identical with its essence, for it thinks with its substance and knows itself, and intellect and knower and thing known are all one. Therefore, if its knowing itself is identical with its essence, well then, let it think itself as the effect of a cause, for this it really is. But the intellect conforms to the 10 thing known; therefore all this refers solely to its essence and so there is no plurality. If, indeed, there is a plurality, it must exist in the First. Therefore, let differentiation proceed from the First. I say: What he says here of the philosophers, about the exclusive existence of a plurality in the principles under the First Principle, is wrong and does not follow from their principles. There is, according to them, no plurality in these intellects, and they do not distinguish themselves 204 by simplicity* and plurality, but only by being cause and effect. And the dilfercnce between the knowledge of the First Principle, as knowing itself, and the knowledge of the other principles, as knowing themselves, is that the First Principle thinks itself as existing by itself, not as being related to a cause, whereas the other intellects think themselves as related to their cause and in this way plurality is intro5 duced into them. They need not all have the same degree of simplicity, since they are not of the same rank in relation to the First Principle and none of them is simple in the sense in which the First Principle is simple, because the First Principle is regarded as an existence by itself whereas they arc in related existence. And as to Ghazali's words: Therefore, if its knowing itself is identical with its essence, well then, let it think itself as the effect of a cause, for this it really is. But the intellect conforms to the thing known, and therefore all this refers solely to its

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essence and so there is no plurality. If, indeed, there is a plurality, it must 10 exist in the First Principle. I say: It does not follow from the fact that intellect and the thing known are identical in the separate intellects that they are all similar in simplicity, for in this, according to the philosophers, some are superior to others in a greater or lesser degree; absolute simplicity is only found in the First Intellect, and the reason is that the essence of the First Intellect is subsistent by itself, and the other intellects, when they think themselves, are conscious that they subsist by it; if intellect and the intelligible were in each of them of the same degree of unity as in the First Principle, either the essence existing by reason of itself and the essence existing by reason of another would be congruous, 205 or intellect would not conform to the nature of the intelligible thing; 1 which is impossible, according to the philosophers. All these arguments and their answers, as set forth by Ghazali, are dialectical and the only man who can—notwithstanding the deficiency of the human understanding concerning these questions—give a demonstrative argument about them is the man who knows (to begin with) what the intellect is, and the only man who knows what the intellect is is 5 the man who knows what the soul is, and the only man who knows what the soul is is the man who knows what a living being is. 2 There is no sense in discussing these matters in a superficial way and according to the common notions, which do not contain specific knowledge and are not properly related to the problem. To discuss these questions, before knowing what the intellect is, is nothing more than babbling. The Ash'arites, therefore, when they relate the philoso- 10 phical doctrines, make them extremely hateful and something very different from even the first speculation of man about what exists. Ghazali says: Let us therefore drop the claim of its absolute unity, if this unity is annulled through plurality of this kind. I say: Ghazali means that, when the philosophers assume that the First thinks its own essence and knows through this that it is the cause of others, they must conclude that it is not absolutely one. For it has 206 not yet been proved that God must be absolutely one. This is the theory ofsome Peripatetics who interpreted it as the theory ofAristotle himself.3 Ghazali says: If it is said that the First knows only its own essence, and the knowledge

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of its own essence is identical with its essence, for intelligence, thinker, and intelligible are all one and it does not know anything but itself—this can 5 be refuted in two ways. First, because of its worthlessness this theory was abandoned by Avicenna and other philosophers of repute, who affirm that the First knows itself as the principle of what emanates from it and knows all other existents in their species by a universal thought, and not individually. For they repudiate the theory that there emanates out of the First Principle, which does not know what emanates from it, only one intellect; that its effect is an intellect from which there emanates an intellect and the soul and the body of a sphere, and that this intellect knows itself and its three effects, whereas its cause and principle knows 10 only itself. For according to this theory the effect is superior to the cause, since from the cause only one thing emanates, whereas from the effect three things emanate; moreover, the First Principle knows only itself, but the effect knows its principle and effects besides itself. Who can be satisfied with the idea that such words can apply to the status of God, for indeed they make Him lower than any of His creatures, who know themselves and know Him, and he who knows Him and knows himself is of a nobler rank than He is, since He knows none but Himself. Their profound thoughts about God's glory end therefore in a denial of everything that is understood by His greatness, and assimilate the state of God to that of a dead body which has no notion of what happens in the world, with the sole exception that God possesses self-knowledge.' So does God deal with those who turn aside from His way and deviate from the path of His guidance, denying His words: 'I did not make them witnesses of the creation of the heavens and the earth nor of the creation of themselves,'1 who think wicked thoughts about God,3 who believe that the powers of man suffice to reach the essence of the divine, who, deceived in their minds, believe that the human understanding is competent to free itself from the authority of the prophets and from obedience to them. For no doubt they 207 arc now forced to acknowledge that the quintessence of their thought is reduced to absurdities which would make one wonder if they were told in a dream. I say: One who wants to enter deeply into these speculations must know that much of what is firmly established in the speculative sciences 5 seems at first sight, and compared to the opinions the common man holds about them, like the visions of a dreamer, as Ghazali truly says; many of these truths are deduced from a different kind of premisses from that which satisfies the masses; indeed there is no other way for anyone to become convinced of their truth than that of comprehending them by logical proof and evidence. If, for example, the common • o man, and even he who has reached a somewhat higher degree of

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culture, is told that the sun, which appears to the eye as being the size of a foot, is about a hundred and seventy times bigger than the earth, he will say that it is absurd, and will regard him who believes it as a dreamer; and it is difficult for us to convince him through propositions which he can easily understand and acknowledge in a short time. The only way, indeed, to attain such knowledge is through deductive proof—that is, for the man who is amenable to proof. If it is the case even with geometrical questions and mathematical problems in general, that, when a solution is explained to the common man, it will appear to him fallacious and open to criticism at first sight and to have the character of a dream, how much more this will be the case in the metaphysical sciences, since for this kind of knowledge there are no plausible premisses which satisfy the superficial understanding, by which I mean the understanding of the masses. One might say that the final knowledge the understanding can reach will seem to the common man at first sight something absurd. And this happens not only in the theoretical sciences but in the practical sciences as well. Therefore, the assumption that one of the sciences should vanish and then come into existence again, at first sight would seem to be impossible. 1 For this reason many have thought that those sciences are of supernatural origin and some attribute them to the Jinn, others to the prophets, so that Ibn Hazm goes so far as to aflirm that the strongest proof of the existence of prophecy is the existence of these sciences.2 Therefore, if a lover of truth finds a theory reprehensible and does not find plausible premisses which remove its reprehensible character, he must not at once believe that the theory is false, but must inquire how he who puts it forward has arrived at it, must employ much time in learning this, and follow the systematic order corresponding to the nature of the topic. And if this is necessary in other sciences than metaphysics, how much more will this hold for metaphysics, since that science is so remote from the sciences built on common sense. Thus it should be learned that in metaphysics rhetorical reasoning cannot be applied, as it may be applied in other questions; for dialectics is useful and permissible in the other sciences but forbidden in this. For this reason most students of this science seek refuge in the theory that metaphysics is wholly concerned with the qualification of the substance 3 which the human mind cannot qualify, for if it could do so, the eternal and the transitory would be on the same level. If this is so, may God judge him who discusses these

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questions with common opinions and who argues about God without scientific knowledge. So it is often thought that the philosophers are extremely inefficient in this science, and for this reason Ghazali says that metaphysics is only conjectural. 10 But in any case* we shall try to show some plausible premisses and true propositions—and we try this only because Ghazali gave such a false representation of this noble science and denied people the 210 possibility of attaining happiness through excellent acts, and God is the inquirer and the reckoner'—in order to set out the motives which moved the philosophers to believe these theories about the First Principle and other existents, the limit which the human understanding can reach in this matter, and the doubts which beset these problems; 5 and we shall show all this also in respect to the Muslim theologians and indicate how far their wisdom attained. We hope through this to help the lover of knowledge to find the truth, and to urge him to study the sciences of both parties, hoping also that God may assist him in all this! We say: 10 The philosophers tried to acquire knowledge about reality through speculation alone, without relying on the words of anyone who should induce them to acquiesce in them without proof; on the con211 trary, sometimes through speculation they came into contradiction with the facts as shown by the senses.2 They discovered that the sublunary world can be divided into two classes, the living and the inanimate, any instance of which only comes into being through something, called form, which is the entity by which it comes into being after having been non-existent; through something, called 5 matter, out of which it comes into being; through something, called the agent, from which it comes into being; and through something, called the end, for the sake of which it comes into being; and so they established that there are four causes. And they found that the form by which a thing comes into being, i.e. the form of the thing generated, is identical with the proximate agent, from which it comes into io being, cither in species, like the generation of man out of man, or in genus, like the generation of the mule from a horse and a donkey. 3 And since, according to them, the causes do not form an infinite series, they introduced a primary, permanent efficient cause. Some of them believed that the heavenly bodies are this efficient cause, 4 some that it is an abstract principle, connected with the heavenly bodies, some that it is the First Principle, some again that it is a prin-

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ciple inferior to it, 1 and these philosophers thought it sufficient to regard the heavens and the principles of the heavenly bodies* as the cause for the coming into being of the elements, 2 since according to them they too need an efficient cause. As to the generation of living beings from each other in the sublunary world, the philosophers had, because of this faculty of life, to introduce another principle, which was the bestower of soul and of form, and of the wisdom which is manifested in this world. This is what Galen calls the formative faculty 3 and some regard it as an abstract principle, 4 some as an intellect, some as a soul, 5 some as the body of the heavens, and some as the First. Galen called this potency the demiurge 6 and was in doubt whether it is God or another principle. This faculty acts in the generative animals and in plants, and is needed still more in those plants and animals which have an equivocal generation. 7 This was the point they reached in the examination of the sublunary world. When they had agreed that the heavens were the principles of the perceptible bodies, they investigated the heavens also and agreed that the heavenly bodies are the principles of the changeable perceptible bodies and of the species in the sublunary world, either by themselves or in combination with an abstract principle. And from their investigation of the heavenly bodies it appeared to them that these do not come into being in the way that the transitory things of the sublunary world come into being, for what comes into being, in so far as it comes into being, is seen to be a part of this perceptible world and its coming into being is only effected in so far as it is a part of it, for what has come into being has come into being out of something, through the act of something, by means of something, in time and in space. And they discovered that the celestial bodies are, as remote efficient causes, a condition for the coming into being of perceptible things. If, however, the celestial bodies themselves had come into being in this way, they would, as a condition of their becoming, have required prior to them other bodies which would have needed to be parts of another world, and there would be in this other world bodies like these, and if these bodies had also come into being, they would have required other celestial bodies before, and so ad infinitum} And since this was established in this way and many others, they were convinced that the heavenly bodies neither come into being nor are destroyed in the way that sublunary things come into being and are destroyed, for 'coming into being' has no other definition or description' or explanation or meaning than that which we have laid down

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here. Then they found that the celestial bodies have also moving principles by means of which and by the agency of which they are moved. And when they investigated their principles, they found that the moving principles were neither bodies nor potencies in bodies. They are not bodies because they are the first principles of the bodies encircling the world; they are not potencies in bodies, i.e. their bodies are not a condition for their existence (as is the case in this sublunary world with the composite principles in animals), because any potency in a body is, according to the philosophers, finite, since it can be divided through the division of the body 1 and every body which can be divided is generable and corruptible, i.e. composed of matter and form, and the existence of its matter* is a condition for the existence of its form. 2 And again, if the principles of heavenly bodies were like the principles of earthly bodies, the former would be like the latter and would need other bodies prior to them. 3 Thus they were convinced of the existence of incorporeal principles which are not potencies in a body. Moreover, they had already found, concerning the human intellect, that form has two modes of existence, a sensible existence in matter, as in the stone theie is the form of the inorganic which exists in the matter outside the soul, and an intelligible existence, namely, perception and intellect, which is separate from matter and exists in the soul. 4 From this they concluded that these absolutely abstract existences arc pure intellects, for if what* is separated from another is already intellect, how much better suited to be intellect will something be .that is absolutely separate. 5 And so, of necessity, they deduced that the objects of thought of those intellects are the forms of the cxistents and of the order which exists in the world, as is the case with the human intellect, for the human intellect is nothing other than the perception of the forms of the cxistents, in so far as they are without matter. They concluded, therefore, that existents have two modes of existence, a sensible existence and an intelligible existence, and that the relation between sensible and intelligible existence is like the relation between the products of art and the arts of the craftsman, 6 and they believed therefore that the heavenly bodies are conscious of these principles and that they can only guide what exists in the sublunary world because they arc animated. And when they compared the separate intellects with the human intellect, they found that these intellects are superior to the human intellect, although they have it in common with the human intellect that their

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intelligibles are the forms of existents, and that the form of each of these intellects is nothing but the forms and the order of the existents it perceives, in the way that the human intellect is nothing but the forms and the order of the existents it perceives. The difference between these two kinds of intellect is that the forms of the existents are a cause of the human intellect, since it receives its perfection through them, in the way that the existent is brought into being through its form, whereas the intelligibles of these intellects are the cause of the forms of the existents." For the order and arrangement in the existents of this sublunary world are only a consequence and result of the order which exists in these separate intellects; and the order which exists in the intellect which is in us is only a consequence of the order and arrangement which it perceives in the existents, and therefore it is very imperfect, for most of this order and arrangement it does not perceive. If this is true, there are different degrees in the forms of the sensible existents; the lowest is their existence in matters, then their existence in the human intellect is superior to their existence in matters, and their existence in the separate intellects is still superior to their existence in the human intellect. Then again they have in the separate intellects different degrees of superiority of existence, according to the different degrees of superiority in these intellects in themselves. And again when they investigated the body of the heavens they found that in reality it is one unique body similar to one single animal, and that it has one general movement—which is like the general movement of the animal which moves the whole body of the animal —namely, the daily movement, and they found that the other heavenly bodies and their individual movements were similar to the particular members of a single animal and its particular movements. 2 And they believed, because of this connexion between these bodies, their referring to one body and to one end, and their collaboration in one act—namely, the world in its totality—that they depended on one principle, as happens to different arts which aim at one product and which depend on one primary art. For this reason they believed that these abstract principles depend on a unique abstract principle which is the cause of all of them, that the forms and the order and arrangement in this principle are the noblest existence which the forms, the order, and the arrangement in all reality can possess, that this order and arrangement are the cause of all the orders and arrangements in this sublunary world, and that the intellects reach their different

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degrees of superiority in this, according to their lesser or greater distance from this principle. The First amongst all these principles thinks only its own essence and, by thinking its essence, thinks at the same time all existents in the noblest mode of existence and in the noblest order and arrangement. The substance of everything under the First Principle depends on the way in which it thinks the forms, order, and arrangement which exist in the First Intellect; and their greater or lesser superiority consists only in this. They conclude therefore that the inferior cannot think the superior in the way the superior thinks its own essence, nor does the superior think the inferior in the way the inferior thinks its own essence; this means that no one of any pair of existents can be of the same rank as its fellow, since if this were possible they would have become one and would not form a numerical plurality. 1 Because of this they say that the First thinks only its own essence, and that the next principle can think only the First, but cannot think what is under itself, because this is its effect and if it should think its effect, the effect would become a cause. The philosophers believe that the consciousness which the First has of its own essence is the cause of all existents, and that which each of the intellects inferior to it thinks is in part the cause of those existents the creation of which pertains especially to it, in part the cause of its own essence, i.e. the human intellect in its universality. 2 It is in this way that the doctrine of the philosophers concerning these things and concerning the motives which lead them to these beliefs about the world must be understood. On examination they will not be less convincing than the motives of the theologians of our religion, first the Mu'tazilites and secondly the Ash'aritcs, which lead them to their view of the First Principle. They believed, namely, that there exists an essence—neither corporeal, nor in a body—which is living, knowing, willing, provided with power, speaking, hearing, and seeing, 3 while the Ash'arites, but not the Mu'tazilites, held besides that this essence is the agent of everything without intermediary 4 and knows them with an infinite knowledge, since the existents themselves are infinite.5 The Ash'arites denied the existence of causes, and professed that this living, knowing, willing, hearing, seeing, powerful, speaking essence exists in continuous existence connected with everything and in everything. But this assumption may be thought to imply consequences open to criticism, for an essence with qualities as mentioned above must necessarily be of the genus of the soul, for the soul is an essence, incorporeal, living, knowing, pro-

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vided with power, willing, hearing, seeing, speaking, and therefore these theologians assumed the principle of reality to be a universal soul, separated from matter in a way they did not understand. 1 We shall now mention the difficulties which result from this assumption. The most obvious one concerning their theory of the qualities is that there must exist a composite, eternal essence and therefore an eternal compound, which contradicts the Ash'arite theory that every compound is temporal, because it is an accident and every accident is according to them a temporal product. 2 They assumed besides that all existents are possible acts, and they did not believe that there is in them an order, a proportion, and a wisdom which the nature of these existents requires; 3 no, they held that all things could be different from what they are and this applies necessarily also to the intellect ;4 still, they believed that in the products of art, to which they compared the products of nature, there exist order and proportion, and this was called wisdom, and they called the Creator wise.5 The argument by which they tried to show that there is in the universe something like this principle was that they compared natural acts to acts of will and said that every act, in so far as it is an act, proceeds from an agent endowed with will, power, choice, life, and knowledge, and that the nature of an act, in so far as it is an act, demands this; and they tried to prove the truth of this by arguing that what is not living is inorganic and dead, and, since from the dead there cannot proceed any act, there does not proceed any act from what is not alive. Thus they denied the acts which proceed from natural things and moreover they refused to admit that the living beings which we see in the empirical world have acts; they said that these acts seem connected with the living in the empirical world, but their agent is only the living God in the divine world. But the logical conclusion for them would be that there is in the empirical world no life at all, for life is inferred from things in the empirical world, because of their acts; 6 and, further, it would be interesting to know how they arrived at this judgement about the divine world. 7 The manner in which they established this creator was by assuming that every temporal product must have a cause, but that this cannot go on infinitely, and that therefore of necessity the series must end in an eternal cause; and this is true enough, only it does not follow from this that this eternal principle cannot be body. They need therefore the additional proposition that a body cannot be eternal, but this proposition causes them many difficulties. For it

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is not sufficient for them to prove that this world is produced, since it might still be argued that its cause is an eternal body which has none of the accidents, no circular movements, nor anything else, through which—although they themselves admitted an eternal com2 5 posite being'—they proved that the heavens must be produced. Now, having assumed that the lAavenly body has been produced, they supposed that this production had taken place in quite a different way from what is understood by production in the empirical world. 3 In the empirical world, namely, things are produced from something, in time and space, and with a definite quality, not in their totality, 4 and in the empirical world there is no production of a body from that which is not a body. Nor did they suppose its agent to act like an i 0 agent in the empirical world, for the empirical agent changes one quality in the existent into another; it does not change absolute nonexistence into existence—no, it brings the existent into a form and an intelligible quality through which this existent becomes another existent instead of this, different from it in substance, definition, name, and act, as it is expressed in the Divine Words: 'We have created man from [an extract of] clay, then we made him a clot in a sure depository, then we created the clot congealed blood, and we created the congealed blood a morsel, &c.' 5 It is for this reason that 222 the ancient philosophers believed that the absolute existent neither comes into existence nor can be destroyed. Now, if one concedes to the theologians that the heavens were created in time, they are unable to prove that they are the first of created things, as is the evident meaning of what is said in the Venerable Book in more than one verse, for instance, in the Divine Words, 'Do not those who misbelieve see that the heavens and the earth were both solid, &c.?' 6 and in the words, 'and His throne was 5 upon the water', 7 and in the words, 'then H e made for heaven and it was but smoke, &c.' 8 And as concerns this agent, according to the theologians, it creates the matter and the form of that which becomes, if they believe that it has a matter, or it creates the thing in its totality, if they believe it to be simple in the way they believe the atom to be simple; 9 and if this is so, this kind of agent changes cither IO non-existence into existence, namely, when there is generation, that is when the atom, which according to them is the element of the bodies, comes into being; or existence into non-existence, namely, when there is destruction, that is, when the atom is destroyed. But it is clear that an opposite cannot be changed into its opposite, and that

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non-existence itself cannot become existence nor warmth itself cold. It is the privation which becomes existent, it is the warm thing which becomes cold and the cold thing which becomes warm, and for this reason the Mu'tazilites say that privation is an entity although they deprive this entity of the attribute of existence before the becoming of the world.' And their arguments by which they believe it can be proved that a thing does not come into being from another thing are incorrect. The most plausible of them is their affirmation that, if a thing came into being from another thing, this would imply an infinite regress. The answer is that this is only impossible for production in a straight line, which, indeed, needs an infinite existence in act; but, as to circular production, it is not impossible that, for instance, fire should come from air and air from fire ad infinitum, while the substratum is eternal. They support their theory of the temporal production of the universe by saying that that which cannot be devoid of things produced must itself be produced, and the universe, being the substratum of the things that are produced, must therefore be produced. T h e greatest mistake in this argument, when its premiss is conceded, is that it is a false generalization, for that which cannot be devoid of things produced in the empirical world is a thing produced out of something else, not out of nothing, whereas they assume that the universe is produced out of nothing. Further, this substratum which the philosophers call primary matter cannot be devoid of corporeality according to the philosophers, and, according to the philosophers, absolute corporeality is not produced. 2 Besides, the premiss which affirms that what cannot be devoid of things produced is produced, is only true when the things produced of which it cannot be devoid are individual things, but if the things produced are one gcncrically, they have no initial term; and from whence then should it follow that their substratum must be produced? 3 And since among the theologians the Ash'arites understood this, they added to this proposition another, namely, that it is not possible that infinite generated things (i.e. without initial and final term) should exist, a proposition which the philosophers regard as necessary. 4 Such difficulties follow from the assumption of the theologians, and they are much more numerous than those which can be held against the philosophers. And again their assumption that the identical agent which is the First Principle is an agent for everything in the world without an intermediary contradicts the evidence of the senses that things act

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upon other things. Their most convincing argument on this point is that, if the agent were an effect, this would lead to an infinite regress. 1 But this would only follow if the agent were agent only in so far as it is effect, and if what is moved were the mover, in so far as it is moved, but this is not the case; on the contrary the agent is only agent in so far as it is an actual existent, for the non-existent does not produce any effect.2 What follows from this is not that there are no acting effects,3 as the theologians thought, but that the acting effects end 4 in an agent which itself is not an effect at all. Further, the impossibility which is the consequence of their deduction is still greater than the impossibility which follows from the premisses from which they draw this conclusion. For if the principle of the existents is an essence, endowed with life, knowledge, power, and will, and if these qualities are additional to its essence and this essence is incorporeal, then the only difference between the soul and this existent is that the soul is in a body and this existent is a soul which is not in a body. But that which has such a quality is necessarily composed of an essence and attributes, and each compound requires of necessity a cause for its being a compound, since a thing can neither be compounded by itself nor produced by itself, for producing, which is an act of the producer, is nothing but the putting together of the product. And, in general, just as for each effect there must be an agent, so for each compound there must be an agent which puts it together, for the putting together is a condition of the existence of the compound. 5 And nothing can be a cause of the condition of its own existence, because this would imply that a thing should be its own cause. Therefore the Mu'tazilites assumed that these attributes in the First Principle refer to its essence and are nothing additional to it, in the way in which this happens with many essential qualities in many existents, like a thing's being existent and one and eternal and so on. 6 This comes nearer to the truth than the theory of the Ash'arites, 7 and the philosophers' theory of the First Principle approaches that of the Mu'tazilites. We have now mentioned the motives which led these two parties to their theories about the First Principle, and the conclusions which their adversaries can draw from them and hold against them. As concerns the objections against the philosophers, Ghazali has related them in full; we have answered some of them already, and we will answer some of them* later. The difficulties which beset the theologians we have shown in this discussion in detail.

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We shall now return to distinguish the degree of conviction and plausibility reached by the different statements which Ghazali makes in this book, as we proposed to do, and we were only compelled to mention the plausible propositions which led the philosophers to their theories about the principles of the universe because they answer the objections which their adversaries, the theologians, adduce against them; on the other hand, we mentioned the difficulties which beset the theologians because it is only right that their arguments on this problem should be known and their views represented, since they are free to use them as they wish. It is right, as Aristotle says, that a man should adduce the arguments of his adversaries as he brings forward his own; that is, he should exert himself to find the arguments of his opponents in the same way as he exerts himself to find the arguments of his own school of thought, and he should accept the same kind of arguments from them as he accepts when he has found the arguments himself.1 We say: T h e objection that the First Principle, if it can think only its own essence, must be ignorant of everything it has created would be only a valid inference if the way it thinks its essence were to exclude all existents absolutely. But the philosophers mean only that the manner in which it thinks its own essence includes the existents in their noblest mode of existence, and that it is the intellect which is the cause of the existents; and that it is not an intellect because it thinks the existents, in so far as they are the cause of its thinking, as is the case with our intellect. The meaning of their words, that it does not think the existents which arc under it, is that it does not think them in the way we think them, but that it thinks them in a way no other thinking existent can think them, for if another existent could think them in the way it thinks them, it would participate in the knowledge of God, and God is far too exalted for this. 2 This is a quality which is peculiar to God, and for this reason certain theologians concluded that God, besides the seven qualities which they attribute to Him, has yet another which is peculiar to Him. 3 Therefore His knowledge can be described neither as universal nor as individual, for both the universal and the individual are effects of existents, and the knowledge of both universal and individual is transitory. 4 We shall explain this still better when we discuss the question whether God knows individuals or does not know them, as the philosophers mostly assert when they pose this problem, and we shall explain that the whole problem is absurd in relation to God. 5 This problem as a whole is

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based on two necessary points. First, if God thought existents in such a way that they should be the cause of His knowledge, His intellect would necessarily be transitory and the superior would be brought into being through the inferior. Secondly, if His essence did not contain the intelligibles of all things and their order, there would exist a supreme intellect which would not perceive the forms of existents in their order and proportion.' And since these two cases are absurd, it follows that when this principle thinks its own essence,* these existents exist in it in a nobler mode than that in which they exist by themselves. And that one and the same existent can have different degrees of existence can be shown from what occurs with colour*. 2 For we find that colour has different degrees of existence, some higher than others; the lowest degree is its existence in matter, a higher degree is its existence in sight, for it exists in such a way that the colour becomes conscious of itself,3 whereas existence in matter is an inorganic existence without consciousness; further, it has been proved in the science of psychology that colour has also an existence in the imaginative faculty,4 and this is a superior existence to its existence in the faculty of sight; it has equally been shown that it has an existence in the remembering faculty superior to that in the imaginative faculty,5 and, finally, it has in the intellect an existence superior to all these existences. Now, in the same way, we are convinced that it has in the essence of the First Knowledge an existence superior to all its other existences, and that this is the highest degree of existence possible. As for what Ghazali mentions concerning the philosophical theory of the order in the emanation of these separate principles and of the number of entities which emanate out of each of them, there is no proof that this really takes place and that this happens exactly in this way; and the form in which Ghazali relates it is therefore not to be found in the works of the ancient philosophers. But these philosophers all agree on the theory that the principles, both separate and nonseparate, all emanate from the First Principle, and that through the emanation of this unique power the world in its totality becomes a unity, and that through this power all its parts are connected, so that the universe aims at one act, as happens with the one body of an animal; which, however, has different potencies, members, and acts; and indeed the world is according to the learned one and the same existent* only because of this one power which emanates from the First Principle. 6 And they agree about all this, because according to them

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the heavens are like a single animal and the daily movement which is common to all the heavens is like the animal's general movement in space, and the particular movements which the different parts of heaven have are like the particular movements of the members of the animal. And the philosophers had already proved that there is one power in the animal through which it becomes one and through which all the potencies which it possesses tend towards one act, that is, towards the preservation of the animal, 1 and all these potencies are connected with the potency which emanates from the First Principle; and if this were not the case, its parts would disconnect themselves and it would not persist for the twinkling of an eye. If, however, it is necessary that for a single animal there should be a single spiritual potency, 2 permeating all its parts, through which the plurality of potencies and bodies in it becomes unified, so that it can be said of its bodies and potencies that they are one, and if, further, the relations of individual beings to the universe in its totality are like the relation of the parts of an animal to the animal itself,3 it needs must be the case that all the potencies in the particular parts of this unique animal and in the psychological and intellectual motive powers of these parts should be such that there is in them one single spiritual force which connects all the spiritual and bodily potencies and which permeates the universe in one and the same penetration. 4 If this were not the case, no order and no proportion would exist. And in this way it is true that God is the creator, supporter, and preserver of everything, and to this the Divine Words apply: 'Verily, God supports the heavens and the earth lest they should decline.' 5 And it in no way follows from the fact that this one potency permeates many things that there should be a plurality in it, as those thought who said that from the First Principle there can in the first place emanate only one from which plurality can then emanate; for this statement can only be regarded as valid if the immaterial agent is compared to the material agent. Therefore the term 'agent' can only be applied equivocally to both the immaterial agent and the material. And this will explain to you the possibility of the procession of plurality from the Monad.

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Again, the existence of all other separate principles consists only 231 in the forms in which they conceive the First Principle, and it is not impossible that this should be one identical thing, notwithstanding the difference of the forms in which they conceive it, in the same way as it is not impossible that a plurality should be conceived through one and the same form. 6 And we find, indeed, that all the

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heavenly bodies in their daily movement, and the sphere of the fixed stars, conceive one identical form 1 and that they all, moving in this daily movement, are moved by one and the same mover, who is the mover of the sphere of the fixed stars; and we find, too, that they have also different particular movements. Therefore it needs must be that their movements proceed partly from different movers, partly— namely through the connexion of their movements with the first sphere—from one unique mover. 2 And just as the removal of an organ or a potency vital to the whole animal would invalidate all the organs and potencies of this animal, so the same applies to heaven with respect to its parts and its moving potencies, and in general with respect to the principles of the world and their parts in relation to the First Principle and in their mutual relations. According to the philosophers the world is closely similar to a single state: a state is upheld through one ruler and many deputies subordinate to him; all the deputies in the state are connected with the first ruler, because the authority of each of them is based on him alone, with respect to the ends and the order of the acts which lead to these ends for the sake of which these deputies exist; and so is the relation of the First Ruler in the world to His deputies. And it is evident to the philosophers that he who bestows on the immaterial existents their end is identical with him who bestows on them 3 their existence, for according to them form and end arc identical in this kind of existent 4 and he who bestows on these existents both form and end is their agent. And therefore it is clear that the First Principle is the principle of all these principles, and that He is an agent, a form, and an end. 5 And as to His relation to the sensible existcnts, He is—since H e bestows on them the unity which causes their plurality and the unification of their plurality—the cause of all of them, being their agent, form, and end, and all the existents seek their end by their movement towards Him, and this movement by which they seek their end is the movement for the sake of which they are created, and in so far as this concerns all existents, this movement exists by nature, and in so far as this concerns man, it is voluntary. 6 And therefore man is of all beings the one charged with duty and obligation. And this is the meaning of the Divine Words: 'Verily, we offered the trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they refused to bear it and shrank from it; but man bore it: verily he is ever unjust and ignorant.' 7 And the philosophers only assert that, although all these ruling

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•39 principles proceed from the First Principle, it is only some of them that do so directly, whereas others, ascending gradually from the lower world to the higher, proceed mediately. For they discovered that cer- 5 tain parts of heaven exist for the sake of the movements of other parts, and they related them in each instance to a first principle, till they finally arrived at the absolutely First Principle; and so it was evident to them that there was one unique* order and one unique act in which they all participate. But to ascertain the order, which he who contemplates reality and aspires to the knowledge of the First Principle perceives, is difficult, and what human understanding can grasp of it is only its general principle. 1 What led the philosophers to believe in 10 a gradation of these principles, in conformity with the spatial order of their spheres, is that they saw that the highest sphere seems in its action superior to what is under it, and that all the other spheres follow its movement. 2 And therefore they believed that what was said about their order was based on their spatial order. But one might perhaps object that the order in the spheres is perhaps only based on their activity, not on their spatial order; for since it seemed that the activities and movements of the planets exist because of the movement of the sun, perhaps their movers in setting them in motion follow the 234 sun, and the movement of the sun derives perhaps directly from the First. 3 For this reason there are in this question no indubitable assertions, but only assertions more or less plausible and likely to be true. And since this is established, let us now return to our subject. Ghazali says: The second answer is: people say of the First Principle that it knows 5 only itself, because they want to avoid the implication of plurality in it, for the statement that it knows another would imply a duality: its knowing itself and its knowing another. However, the same applies to the first effect: it must necessarily know only itself. If it knew another and not itself alone, there would have to be a different cause for its knowing another than that for its knowing itself, but there is no other cause than that for its knowing itself, namely the First Principle. So it can only know itself, and the plurality which arose in this way disappears. If it is said that it follows from its existence and from its knowing itself 10 that it must know its principle, we answer: Does this necessity arise from a cause or without a cause? If the former is the case, there is no other cause than the one first cause from which only one effect can proceed, and indeed has proceeded, namely this first effect itself; how, therefore, could this second effect proceed from it? In the latter case, then, let the existence of the First Principle imply a plurality of existents without a cause, and let the plurality follow from them! But if such a thing cannot be imagined,

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because the necessary existent can be only one, and anything added to it must be a possible, and the possible needs a cause, then the following conclusion must be drawn concerning the effect: if it is an existent necessary by itself, then what the philosophers say is untrue, that there is only one necessary existent; if it is a possible,1 then it needs a cause; but it has no cause,2 and therefore it cannot know the existence of its cause. 235 There is no special necessity for the first effect to have a possible existence ; this is necessary for any effect. However, that the effect should know its cause is not necessary for its existence, just as the knowledge of its effect is not necessary for the existence of the cause; still, it seems more plausible that the cause should know its effect than that the effect should know its cause.1 Therefore the plurality which would arise from its knowing its principle is impossible; there is no principle for this knowledge and it S is not a necessary consequence of an effect that it should know its principle; and out of this there is no issue.

I say: This is a proof of one who affirms that the First Principle must, besides knowing itself, know its effect; for, if not, its knowing itself would be imperfect. 4 T h e meaning of Ghazali's objection is that the knowledge the 10 efFect has of its principle must either be based on a cause or be without a cause. In the former case, there must be a cause in the First Principle, but there is none; in the latter case, a plurality must follow from the First Principle, even if it does not know it; if, however, a plurality follows from it, it cannot be a necessary existent, for there can be only one necessary existent, and that from which there proceeds more than one is only a possible existent; but the possible existent needs a cause, and therefore their assertion that the First Principle is a necessary existent is false, even if it does not know* its effect. He says also that if it is not a necessity of its existence that the effect should have knowledge of its cause, it even seems more fitting that it is not a necessity of its existence that the cause should know its effect. 236 My answer to this is that all this is sophistical. If we assume that the cause is an intellect and knows its effect, it does not follow that this is an addition to the essence of the cause; on the contrary, it belongs to the essence itself, since the emergence of the effect is the consequence of its essence.5 And it is not true that if the effect proceeds from the First Principle not because of a cause, but because of the essence of this principle, a plurality proceeds from it, for according 5 to the thesis of the philosophers the emergence of the effect depends on the essence of the First Principle: if its essence is one, one proceeds

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from it; if many, many proceed from it. What he assumes in this discussion, namely, that every effect is a possible existent, is only true for the composite effect, for there cannot be a compound that is eternal, and everything that is of a possible existence is generated, according to the philosophers, as Aristotle has shown in different passages of his works; 1 and we shall prove this more fully later in our discussion of the necessary being. What Avicenna calls the possible existent has only its name in common with what is in reality the possible existent; it is, therefore, by no means clear that it needs an agent in the way it is clear that the possible existent needs an agent. 2 Ghazali says: The third objection is: Is the self-knowledge of the first effect identical with its essence or not? If the former*, this is impossible, for knower and known cannot be identical; if the latter, let the same apply to the First Principle, so that plurality will follow* from the First Principle. And if the self-knowledge of the effect is not identical* with the essence of the effect, there will not only be a triplicity in the effect, as they affirm, but a quadruplicity, to wit: its essence, its knowledge of itself, its knowledge of its principle, and its being a possible existent by itself, and to this it should perhaps be added that it is an existent necessary through another—and then it would be fivefold. From this you can see and measure the depth of their ignorance. I say: In this discussion of the intellects there are two points: first the question about what these intellects know or do not know (this question was fully treated by the ancients); secondly, the question of what proceeds from these intellects. What Ghazali mentions here as the theory of the philosophers is in fact the individual opinion of Avicenna on this latter problem. Ghazali exerts himself especially to refute him and his followers, in order to create the impression that he has refuted them all; and this is acting like one who is, as he puts it, in the depths of ignorance. But this theory is not found in the works of any of the ancients; and there is no proof of it except the supposition that from the one there can proceed only one. But this proposition does not apply in the same way to the agents which are forms in matter as to the agents which are forms separate from matter, and according to the philosophers an intellect which is an effect must necessarily know its principle, and there arc here not two entities, i.e. the intellect and something additional to its essence, for, if so, it would be a compound, and the intellect, which is simple, cannot be composite. And the difference in the separate forms between cause and

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effect is that the First Cause exists by itself and the second cause exists through its relation with the First Cause, for the fact of its being an 5 effect lies in its substance and is not an additional entity, in contrast with material effects; e.g. colour is an entity which exists by itself in a body, but it is the cause of sight, in so far as it is related, and sight has no existence except in this relation; 1 and in the same way* substances which are separate from matter are substances which are of the nature of relation. For this reason the cause and the effect are unified in the forms separated from matter, 2 and in the same way* sensible forms are of the nature of relation, as has been proved in the :o book on psychology. 3 Ghazali says: The fourth objection is that it can be said: Triplicity is not sufficient in the first effect, for the body of heaven which, according to the philosophers, proceeds from one entity out of the essence of its principle is composite, and this in three ways. The first way is that it is composed of form and matter, as is body generally, according to the philosophers, and both must have a principle, since matter differs from form and they are, according to the philosophers, interdependent causes, so that the one cannot come into being by means of the other without the intervention of another cause.4 239 I say: What he says here is that according to the philosophers the body of the heavens is composed of matter, form, and soul, and that therefore there must be in the second intellect, 5 from which the body of the heavens proceeds, four entities, namely, one from which the form proceeds, one from which the hyle proceeds—as both are interdependent, for matter is in one way a cause of form and form in one way a 5 cause of matter 6 —one from which the soul proceeds, and one from which the mover of the second sphere proceeds. 7 But the view that the body of the heavens is composed of form and matter like other bodies is falsely ascribed by Aviccnna to the Peripatetics. On the contrary, according to them the body of the heavens is a simple body; if it were composite, it would, according to them, suffer corruption, and therefore they say that it neither comes into being nor IO perishes, and does not possess the potency for contraries. 8 If it were as Avicenna says, it would be composite like a living being,' and if this were true, quadruplicity would be a necessary consequence for the man who asserted that from the one only one can proceed. And we have already stated that the way these forms are causes for each

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other, for the heavenly bodies, and for the sublunary world, and the way the First Cause is a cause for all of them, is quite different from all this. Ghazali says: The second way is that the highest sphere has a definite measure of size* and its determination by this special measure taken from among all other measures is an addition to the existence of its essence, since its essence might be smaller or bigger than it is; therefore, it must have a determinant for this measure, added to the simple entity which causes its 240 existence. The same necessity does not exist for the existence of the intellect, which is pure existence and not specified by any measure taken from among other measures, and therefore may be said to need only a simple cause. I say: T h e meaning of this statement is that when the philosophers say that the body of the sphere proceeds as a third entity, which by itself is not simple (for it is a body possessing quantity), there are here in reality two entities, the one which provides the substantial corporeality, the other the definite quantity; therefore there must be in the intellect from which the body of the sphere proceeds more than one entity, and therefore the second cause is not triple but quadruple. But this is a false assumption, for the philosophers do not believe that body in its entirety' proceeds from the separate principles; if anything proceeds from them, according to the philosophers, it is only the substantial form, and according to them the measures of the bodily parts follow from the forms; this, however, refers only to the forms in matter, but the heavenly bodies, since they are simple, are not susceptible of measure. 2 Therefore, to assume that form and matter proceed from an abstract principle is by no means in conformity with philosophical principles, and is quite absurd. In reality, the agent in transitory things, 3 according to the philosophers, produces neither the form nor the matter; it only makes a compound out of matter and form. If the agent produced the form in matter, it would produce the form in something, not from something. 4 This is not philosophical theory, and there is no sense in refuting it, as if it were. Ghazali says, on behalf of the philosophers: It might be said: If the sphere were bigger than it is, this greater size would be superfluous for the order of the universe; if smaller, it would not suffice for the intended order. I say: He means by this statement that the philosophers do not believe

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that, for example, the body of the sphere could be bigger or smaller than it is, for in either case the order intended in the universe would not be realized, and the sphere would not set the world in motion 10 according to its natural power, but either too strongly or too weakly, both of which would involve the corruption of the world. A greater size of the world would not be a superfluity, as Ghazali says; no, out of both, bigness and smallness, the corruption of the world would result. 1 Ghazali says, to refute the philosophers: We answer: Does the determination of the manner of this order suffice in itself for the existence of what possesses this order, or does it need a cause to effect it? If you believe it suffices, then you regard it as superfluous to assume causes at all, and you may well judge that from the order of these existents the existents themselves result without any additional cause; if, however, you believe it does not suffice, but a cause is necessary, this new cause will not suffice either for the specification of these measures, 242 but will itself need a cause for its specifying*.2 I say: The summary of this is that he makes the objection against them that in the body there are many things which cannot proceed from one agent, unless they admit that many acts can proceed out of one agent, or unless they believe that many accidents of the body result 5 from the form of the body and that the form of the body results from the agent. For, according to such an opinion, the accidents resulting from the body which comes into being through the agent do not proceed from the agent directly but through the mediation of the form.3 This is a conception permissible to the doctrines of the philosophers, but not to those of the theologians. However, I believe that the Mu'tazilitcs think as the philosophers do that there are things io which do not directly proceed from the agent. 4 We have already explained how the Monad is the cause of the order, and of the existence of all things which support this order, and there is no sense in repeating ourselves. Ghazali says: The third way is that in the highest heavens there are marked out two points, the poles, which are immovable and do not leave their position, whereas the parts of the equator change their position. Now either all the 243 parts of the highest sphere are similar (and then there will not be a special determination of two points amongst all the points to be poles), or the parts of the sphere are different and some have a special character which others have not. What, then, is the principle of these differences? For the

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body of the heavens proceeds from only one and the same simple entity and the simple can cause only that which is simple of shape, namely the sphere, and that which is homogeneous, that is, has no special distinguishable character. And out of this there is no issue. I say: 'Simple' has two meanings: first, simplicity can be attributed to that which is not composed of many parts, although it is composed of form and matter, and in this way the four elements are called simple; 1 secondly, it can be attributed to that which is not composed of form and matter capable of changing its form,2 namely to the heavenly bodies; further, simplicity can be attributed to the agglomerate which has the same definition for its whole and its part, even when it is composed of the four elements. 3 The simple character which is attributed to the heavenly bodies can very well possess parts which are differentiated by nature, as are the right and left sides of the sphere and the poles; for the globe, in so far as it is a globe, must have definite poles and a definite centre through which globes differ individually, and it does not follow from the fact that the globe has definite sides that it is not simple, for it is simple in so far as it is not composed of form and matter in which there is potency, and it is non-homogeneous in so far as the part which receives the place of the poles* cannot be any part of the globe, but is a part determined by nature in each globe individually. If this were not so, globes could not have centres by nature through which they were differentiated; thus they are heterogeneous—in this special meaning of the word 'heterogeneous'—but this does not imply that they are composed of bodies different by nature, nor that their agent is composed of many potencies, for every globe is one. Nor do the philosophers regard it as true that every point of whatever globe can be a centre and that only the agent specifies the points, for this is only true in artificial things, not in natural globes. 4 And from the assumption that every point of the globe can be a centre, and that it is the agent which specifies the points, it does not follow that the agent is a manifold unless one assumes that there is in the empirical world nothing that can proceed from a single agent; for in the empirical world things are composed of the ten categories and therefore anything whatever in the world would need ten agents. But all this, to which the view in question leads, which is very much like babbling in metaphysics, is stupid and senseless talk. The artificial product in the empirical world is produced, indeed, by only one agent, even if it possesses the ten

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categories. How untrue is this proposition that the one can produce 245 only one, if it is understood in the way Avicenna and Farabi understand it, and Ghazali himself in his Niche for Lights, where he accepts their theory of the First Principle. 1 Ghazali says: One might say: 'Perhaps there are in the principle different kinds of plurality which do not result from its being a principle,2 only three or four are manifest to us, and the rest we do not perceive, but our incapacity for observation3 does not shake our belief that the principle of plurality is 5 plurality and that from the one no manifold can proceed.' I say: If the philosophers made such a statement, they would have to believe that there is in the first effect an infinite plurality, and one would necessarily have to ask them whence plurality comes in the first effect. And since they say that from the one no manifold proceeds, they would have to concede that the manifold cannot proceed 10 from the One, but their statement* that from the one only one proceeds contradicts their statement* that what proceeds from the First Monad possesses plurality, for from the One one must proceed. Of course they can say that each term in the plurality of the first effect is a first term, but then there must be a plurality of first terms. It is most astonishing how this could remain hidden from Farabi and Avicenna, for they were the first who made these silly statements, and many followed them and attributed these theories to the philo246 sophers. For when Farabi, Avicenna, and their school say that the plurality in the second principle arises through its self-knowledge and its knowing another, it follows for them that its essence has two natures or two forms, and it would be interesting to know which form proceeds from the First Principle and which does not. And there 5 is a similar difficulty in their statement that the second principle is possible by itself, but necessary by another, for its possible nature must necessarily be different from its necessary nature, which it acquires from the necessary being. But the possible nature cannot become necessary, unless the nature of the possible can become necessary. Therefore tl)ere is in necessary natures no possibility at 10 all, be it a possibility necessary by itself or a possibility necessary by another. 4 All these are senseless statements and assertions, weaker than those of the theologians, extraneous to philosophy, and not congruous with its principles, and none of these affirmations reaches the level of rhetorical persuasion to say nothing of dialectic persuasion.

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And therefore what Ghazali says in different passages of his books is true, that the metaphysics of Farabi and Avicenna are conjectural. Ghazali says: We answer: If you regard this as possible, say then that all existing things in their multiplicity (and indeed their number reaches thousands) derive from the first effect and one need not limit this to the body of the extreme sphere1 and its soul, but all souls, heavenly and human, and all 247 earthly and heavenly bodies can proceed from it, with the many diversities, belonging to them, which nobody has ever seen. But then the first effect will suffice. I say: This conclusion is true, especially when they imagine that the first act proceeding from the First Principle is the unity through which the first effect becomes a unique existent, notwithstanding the plurality 5 in it. And indeed, if they allow an undetermined plurality in the first effect, it must be less or more than the number of existents, or equal to it; if less, they must introduce a third principle unless there is a thing without cause, if equal or more, the plurality assumed* in it will be superfluous. 2 Ghazali says: And then it follows that the First Cause by itself will suffice too. For if one 10 regards it as possible that a plurality should arise inevitably, although without a cause, and although there is no necessity for it in the existence of the first effect, this will be permissible also with reference to the First Cause, and the existence of all things will be without a cause, although it is said that they follow inevitably and their number is not known. And if their existence without a cause can be imagined with reference to the First Cause, it can also be imagined with reference to the second cause; indeed, there is no sense in speaking of a reference to the first or to the second cause, since there is no distinction between them in time and place3 and neither the first nor the second cause can be characterized by its rela- 248 tion to things which do not differ from them in time and place and can exist without a cause.* I say: He says that if a plurality in the first effect is permissible without a cause, because out of the First Cause there does not follow a plurality, one may also suppose a plurality within the First Cause, and there is no need to assume a second cause and a first effect. And if the existence of something without cause within the First Cause is impossible, 5 then it is also impossible within the second cause; indeed, our expression 'second cause' has no sense, since in fact they are one and the

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same thing, and the one is not different from the other either in time or in space, and if it is permissible that something should exist without a cause, neither the First Cause nor the second can be specially 10 distinguished by this; it suffices that it refers to one of them and therefore it is not necessary to refer it to the second cause. Ghazali says by way of an answer in the name of the philosophers: It might be said: 'The entities have become so many that they exceed thousands, but it seems absurd that a plurality of that extent exists in the first effect and for this reason we have multiplied the intermediates.' Then he says in refutation of this: We answer, however: To say 'it seems absurd' is pure conjecture, and such a judgement should not be applied to intelligibles. But if one says 249 that it is impossible, we ask: 'Why is it impossible, what will refute it, and where is the criterion?' For, once we exceed the one and believe that one, two, or three entities can arise in the first effect without a cause, what makes it impossible that there should be four, five, indeed, a thousand and many thousands*, and who could fix the limit? No, if unity is once exceeded, nothing can be rejected. This proof again is decisive. I say: If, however, Aviccnna and these other philosophers had answered that the first effect possesses plurality, and that necessarily any plurality becomes one through a unity which requires that plurality should depend on unity, and that this unity through which plurality becomes one is a simple entity which proceeds from an individual simple Monad, then they would have saved themselves from these objections of Ghazali, and disengaged themselves from these false 10 theories. 1 But since Ghazali secured his point by ascribing a false assumption to the philosophers, and did not find anyone to give him a correct answer, he made merry and multiplied the impossibilities which can be deduced from their theory, for anyone who lets his horse canter in an empty space can make merry. 2 But if he had known that he did not thereby refute the philosophers, he would not have been so delighted about it. The fundamental mistake of Avicenna and Farabi was that they made the statement that from the one 250 only one can proceed, and then assumed a plurality in the one which proceeds. Therefore they were forced to regard this plurality as uncaused. And their assumption that this plurality was a definite plurality 3 which demanded the introduction of a third and fourth principle was a supposition not enforced by any proof. And generally, this assumption is not a legitimate assumption for a first and second prin5

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ciple, for they might be asked, 'Why has only the second principle and not the first this special character of possessing a plurality?' All this is foolish and senseless talk. The fact is that Avicenna and Farabi did not know how the Monad was a cause in the system of Aristotle and the Peripatetics. Aristotle, in the twelfth book of his Metaphysics, expresses pride in his solution, 1 and says that none of his predecessors could say anything about this problem. 2 In the sense in which we have expounded the Aristotelian doctrine, this statement that out of the one only one can proceed is true, and the statement that out of the one a plurality proceeds is equally true. Ghazali says: Further, we affirm that the statement that out of the one only one can proceed is false in respect of the second effect, for out of it there emanates the sphere of the fixed stars, in which there are a thousand and twenty-odd stars*,3 different in magnitude, 4 shape, position, colour,s and influence, be it of ill omen or auspicious, some in the shape of a ram, a bull, or a lion, others in the shape of a man; 6 they influence one and the same place of the sublunary world differently in conferment of cold and warmth, fortune and misfortune,7 and their own measures are variable.8 On account of their differences it cannot be said that they are all of one kind; for if this could be said, it might also be said that all the bodies of the world were of one and the same kind of corporeal nature, and that one cause sufficed for them all. But just as the differences in qualities, substances, and natures of the bodies of the sublunary world show that they themselves are different, in the same way the stars, no doubt, are shown to differ, and each of them will need a cause for its form, a cause for its matter, a cause for the special function in its nature, to bring warmth or cold or happiness or calamity, a cause for its being in the definite place it occupies, then again a cause for its special tendency to group itself with others in the shapes of different animals. And if this plurality can be imagined to be known in the second intellect, it can also be imagined in the first intellect; and then this first intellect will suffice.

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I say: He had already exhausted this difficulty which is of a type he uses abundantly in this book, and if the answer we have given in defence 10 of the philosophers is valid, none of these impossibilities need follow. But if by this expression one understands that, from the simple numerically one, only one simple one—not something numerically one in one way, but plural in another—can proceed, and that its unity is the cause of the existence of plurality, then one can never escape from these doubts. And again, things only become many, according to the philosophers, through substantial differences, and

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differences through accidents—be they quantitative, qualitative, or in whichsoever of the nine categories of the accident—do not cause, according to them, differentiations in the substance, 1 and the heavenly bodies, as we said, are not composed of matter and form 252 and are not specifically different, since they have, according to the philosophers, no common genus (for, if so, they would be composite, not simple). 2 But we have treated of this already, and there is no sense in repeating ourselves. Ghazali says: The fifth objection is to say: If we concede these inept assumptions 5 and these erroneous judgements, how is it then that they are not ashamed to say that from the fact that the first effect is of a possible existence, there results the existence of the highest sphere, and that from its knowledge of itself there follows the existence of the soul of the sphere and from its knowledge of the First Principle there follows the existence of an intellect? What is the difference between this and the statement that the existence of an unknown man is necessary*, and that he is of a possible existence and knows himself and his Creator and then that from the fact that he is of a possible existence there follows the existence of a sphere? But it will be objected: What is the relation between his having a possible existence and the existence of a sphere following from him? And the same holds for the fact that from his knowing himself and his 10 Creator there follow two other entities. But it would be ridiculous to say such a thing about a man or any other existent whatever, for the possibility of existence is a concept which does not change through the changing of the possible object, be it a man or an angel or a sphere. 3 1 do not know how any madman could content himself with any of these assertions, let alone the learned who split hairs in their discussions about intelligibles. I say: These are all theories of Avicenna and his followers, which are not true and are not built on the foundations of the philosophers; still they are not so inept as this man says they are, nor does he represent 253 them in a true light. For the man whom he supposed to be of a possible existence through himself and necessary through another, knowing himself and his agent, is only a true representation of the second cause, when it is assumed in addition that through his essence and through his knowledge he is the agent of the existents, in the way this is assumed by Avicenna and his school of the second principle, 5 and in the way all philosophers must admit it of the First Principle, God, glory be to Him. If this is admitted, it follows that from this man two things proceed: one in so far as he knows himself, the other,

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in so far as he knows his Creator, for he is supposed to act only because of his knowledge, and it is not absurd, if he is supposed to act because of his essence, to say that what proceeds from him, in so far as he has a possible existence, is different from what proceeds from him in so far as he has a necessary existence, since both these attributes exist in his nature. This theory, therefore, is not so ignominious as this man tries to represent it to be through this comparison, in order to cast odium on the theories of the philosophers and to make them despicable in the eyes of students. 1 There is no difference between Ghazali's comparison and a person who said: If you assume a being living through life, willing through will, knowing through knowledge, hearing, seeing, and speaking through audition, sight, and speech, and the whole world proceeds from him, 2 it is possible* that from man, living, knowing, hearing, seeing, speaking, the whole world proceeds, for if these attributes by themselves determine the existence of the world, it cannot make any difference in the effect through whichever being possessing these attributes they produce it.3 If this man Ghazali sought to speak the truth in this and erred, he might be forgiven; if, however, he understood how to deceive in these things and tried that, and if there were no necessity for him to do so, there is no excuse for him. And if he only wanted to show that he possessed no proof by which he could provide an answer to the question whence plurality proceeds, as might be inferred from what he says below, he speaks the truth, for Ghazali had not reached the degree of knowledge necessary for comprehending this problem, as will be seen from what he says later; and the reason is that he studied only the books of Avicenna, and through this the deficiency in his knowledge arose. Ghazali says:

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But if one should say to us: 'Certainly, you have refuted their theory, but what do you say yourself? Do you affirm that from one thing two different things can in any way proceed? In that case you offend reason. Or will you say that in the First Principle there is plurality? In that case you abandon the doctrine of God's unity. Or will you say that there is no plurality in the world? In that case you contradict the evidence of the senses. Or will you say that plurality occurs through intermediates? In that case you are forced to acknowledge the theory of your opponents.' We answer: 'We have not made a deep inquiry in this book; our aim— 255 which we have attained—was only to disturb the claims of our opponents.' To this we may add that the claim that the thesis that two proceed from one is an affront to reason, and the claim that the attribution of eternal

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attributes to the First Principle contradicts the doctrine of God's unity— both these claims, we say, are vain and possess no proof. The impossibility that two should proceed from one is not known in the way the impossibility of one single person's being in two places is known; in short, it is known 5 neither by intuitive necessity nor by deduction. What is the objection against saying: 'The First Principle is provided with knowledge, power, will; He acts as He wants, He judges as He wants, He creates the dissimilar and the similar as He wants and in the way He wants ?' The impossibility of this is known neither by immediate necessity nor by deduction. But the prophets have brought us this truth, justifying it through their miracles, and we must accept it.1 To inquire, however, how God's act proceeds from Him through His Will is vain and an illusory pursuit. Those who have sought to represent and understand this have arrived as a result of >o their inquiry at a first effect from which as a possible existent there proceeds a sphere, and from which, so far as it knows itself, there proceeds the soul of the sphere. But this is nonsense and is by no means an appropriate explanation. Let us therefore accept the principles of these things from the prophets, and let us believe in this, since the intellect does not regard it as impossible. And let us abandon the inquiry about quality, quantity, and quiddity,* for the human powers do not suffice for this. And therefore the master of the Divine Law has said: Think about God's creation, but do not think about God's essence.3 I say: His statement is true, that we have to refer to the Law of God everything which the human mind is unable to grasp. For the knowledge which results from revelation comes only as a perfection of the sciences of the intellect; that is, any knowledge which the weakness of the human mind is unable to grasp is bestowed upon man by God through revelation. This inability to comprehend things the know256 ledge of which is, however, necessary in the life and existence of man, is cither absolute—i.e. it is not in the nature of the intellect, in so far as it is intellect, to comprehend such a thing—or it is not in the nature of a certain class of men, and this kind of weakness is either a fundamental character of his disposition or something accidental through a lack of education. Revelation is >a mercy bestowed on all 5 these classes of men. 4 And as to Ghazali's words: Our aim—which we have attained—was only to disturb our opponents; this aim is not a proper one for him and is censurable in a learned man, for the intention of the learned, in so far as they are learned, must be to seek the truth, not to sow doubts and perplex minds. And as to his words:

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the impossibility that two should proceed from one is not known in the way the impossibility a single person's being in two places is known; 10 although these two propositions are not of the same degree of assent, still the proposition that from the simple unit there proceeds only one single unit keeps its evidence inside the empirical world. Propositions which are evident differ in their degree of evidence, as has been shown in the Posterior Analytics* and the reason for this is that when evident propositions are supported by imagination they receive a stronger degree of assent, and unsupported by imagination their assent is weakened; but only the masses rely on imagination, and he who is well trained in intellectual thought and renounces imagination 257 accepts both propositions with the same degree of assent. The strongest degree of evidence pertains to this proposition when a man makes an induction from transitory existents and sees that they only change their names and definitions through their acts and 5 that, if any existent whatever could arise from any act and any agent whatever, the essences and definitions would become mixed and knowledge would be annihilated. 2 The soul, for instance, distinguishes itself from the inorganic only through its special acts which proceed from it, and inorganic things are only distinguished from one another through the acts that are proper to them; and the same applies to souls.3 And if many acts were to proceed from a single potency, in the way that many acts proceed from composite poten- 10 cies, there would be no difference between the simple and the composite essence and they would be indistinguishable for us. And again, if many acts could proceed from one single essence, an act without an agent would be possible, for an existent comes to be through an existent, not through a non-existent, and therefore the non-existent cannot come to be by itself; and if it is true that the mover of the privation and the transposer of its potency into act transposes it only through the actuality it possesses itself, of necessity the actuality it possesses must be of the same kind as the act it transposes.4 If any effect whatever could proceed from any agent what- 258 ever, it would not be impossible that the effects should be actualized by themselves without an agent. And if many kinds of potency could be actualized through one and the same agent, this agent would itself have to possess these kinds or related kinds, for if it possessed only one of these kinds, all the other kinds would have to be actualized by 5 themselves without a cause. I t is not permissible to say: T h e only condition for the agent is that it exists as acting with an absolute

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action, not with a specified kind of action; for, in that case, any existent whatever would be able to perform any act whatever and what exists would be mixed; 1 besides, the absolute, that is the universal, existent stands nearer to non-existence than the real individual existent. 2 So those who denied the theory of universals denied the belief in a universal existent and in a universal becoming*, 3 whereas the champions of this theory regarded them as something midway between being and non-being; but if this were the case, it would follow that the universals could be a cause of existents. The proposition that from the one only one act can proceed is more evident for the empirical than for the divine world. For knowledge multiplies through the multiplying of the objects of thought in the world, since the intellect knows these objects in the way that they exist in the world, and they arc the cause of its knowledge. 4 It is not possible for many objects of thought to be known through one act of thought, nor can one act of thought produce many effects in the empirical world, e.g. the knowledge of the artisan which produces, for example, a cupboard is different from the knowledge which produces a chair. But eternal wisdom and the eternal agent differ in this matter from temporal knowledge and the temporal agent. If I were asked 'What is your own point of view in this question? You have denied Avicenna's theory of the cause of plurality, but what do you say yourself? For it has been pointed out that the different schools of philosophy have three different answers to this question; that the plurality comes only through matter; that the plurality comes only through instruments; that the plurality comes through mediators. 5 And it is said of the Peripatetics that they accept the theory which makes mediation the cause of plurality'—I cannot give in this book an answer to this question supported by a demonstrative proof. Wc find, however, neither in Aristotle nor in any of the known Peripatetics this theory which is ascribed to them, with the exception °f Porphyry, the Tyrian, the author of the Introduction to Logic, and he is not among the most subtle of philosophers. 6 My opinion is that according to the principles of the Peripatetics the cause of plurality is a combination of three factors, the intermediates, the dispositions, and the instruments; and we have already explained how all these depend on the Monad and refer to it, for each of them exists through an absolute unity which is the cause of plurality, For it seems that the cause of the plurality of the separate intellects is the difference in their natures, by which they receive the knowledge they gain of the

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First Principle and which acquire from the First Principle a unity which by itself is one single act, but which becomes many through the plurality of the recipients, just as there are many deputies under the power of a king and many arts under one art. This we shall 10 examine in another place, and if some part of it becomes clear it will suffice; otherwise we must take refuge in revelation. In so far as the differences depend on differences between the four causes, the question is clear. For the differentiation of the spheres arises from the differences of their movers, of their forms, of their matter, supposing they have matter, 1 and of their acts which serve a special end in the world, even if the philosophers did not believe that these spheres 261 exist for the sake of these acts. 2 As to the differences which arise primarily in the sublunary world in the elements, as for instance the differences between fire and earth, and in short the opposites, they are based on the differentiation of matter and on their varying distances from their movers, 3 which are the heavenly bodies. As to the difference between the two supreme movements, 4 one of which is the 5 agent of generation and the other the agent of corruption, they depend on the differentiation of the heavenly bodies and their motions, as is proved in the book On Generation and Corruption. For the difference which arises from the heavenly bodies resembles the difference which arises from the difference in the instruments. T o sum u p : the factors for the origination of plurality from the one Agent 10 are three, according to Aristotle, and he refers to the O n e in the sense mentioned above, namely, that the One is the cause of the plurality. In the sublunary world the differences arise from the four causes, that is to say, the difference of the agents, the matter, the instruments, and the intermediaries which transmit the acts of the First Agent without its direct interference, and those intermediaries are very similar to the instruments. And an example of the differentiation 262 which arises through the difference of the recipients, and out of the fact that certain differentiated things cause others, is colour. For the colour which arises in the air differs from the colour in the body, and the colour in the faculty of sight, i.e. in the eye, from the colour in the air, and the colour in the common internal sense from the colour in the eye, and the colour in the imagination from the colour in the 5 common internal sense, and the colour in the memorative and retentive faculty from the colour in the imagination; and all this has been explained in the book of psychology. 5

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THE FOURTH DISCUSSION Showing that they are unable to prove the. existence of a creator of the world

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Ghazali says: We say: Mankind is divided into two categories; one, the men of truth who have acknowledged that the world has become and know by necessity that what has become does not become by itself but needs a creator, and the reasonableness of their view lies in their affirmation of a creator; the other, the materialists, believe the world, in the state in which it exists,' to be eternal and do not attribute a creator to it, and their doctrine is intelligible, although their proof shows its inanity. But as to the philosophers, they believe the world to be eternal and still attribute a creator to it. This theory is self-contradictory and needs no refutation.2 I say: The theory of the philosophers is, because of the factual evidence, 3 more intelligible than both the other theories together. There are two kinds of agent: (1) the agent to which the object which proceeds from it is only attached during the process of its becoming; once this process is finished, the object is not any more in need of it—for instance, the coming into existence of a house through the builder; (2) the agent from which nothing proceeds but an act which has no other existence than its dependence on it. 4 The distinctive mark of this act is that it is convertible with the existence of its object, i.e. when the act does not exist the object does not exist, and when the act exists the object exists—they are inseparable. This kind of agent is superior to the former and is more truly an agent, for this agent brings its object to being and conserves it, whereas the other agent only brings its objects to being, but requires another agent for its further conservation. The mover is such a superior agent in relation to the moved and to the things whose existence consists only in their movement. The philosophers, believing that movement is the act of a mover and that the existence of the world is only perfected through motion, say that the agent of motion is the agent of the world, and if the agent refrained for only one moment from its action, the world would be annihilated. 5 They use the following syllogism: The world is an act, or a thing whose existence is consequent upon this act. Each act by its existence implies the existence of an agent. Therefore the world has an agent existing by reason of its existence. The man who regards it as necessary that the act which proceeds from the

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agent of the world should have begun in time says: The world is temporal through an eternal agent. But the man for whom the act of the Eternal is eternal says: T h e world has come into being 1 from an 265 eternal agent having an eternal act, i.e. an act without beginning or end; which does, however, not mean that the world is eternal by itself, as people who call the world eternal imagine it to be. Ghazali says, on behalf of the philosophers: The philosophers might answer: When we affirm that the world has a creator, we do not understand thereby a voluntary agent who acts after not having acted, as we observe in the various kinds of agents, like tailors, 5 weavers, and builders, but we mean the cause of the world, and we call it the First Principle, understanding by this that there is no cause for its existence, b u t t h a t i t i s a cause of the existence of other things; and if we call this principle the Creator, it is in this sense. It is easy to establish by a strict proof an existent for the existence of which there is no cause. For we say that the world and its existents either have a cause or have not. If it has a cause, this cause itself either has or has not a cause, and the same can be said about the latter cause, and either we go on ad infinitum in this way, and this is absurd, or we arrive at a last term, and this end is the First 10 Cause, which has no cause for its existence and which we call First Principle. And if the world existed by itself without cause, then it would be clear what the First Principle is, for we only mean by it an existent without a cause and which is necessarily eternal. However, it is not possible that the First Principle should be the heavens, for there are many of these and the proof of unity contradicts this, and its impossibility is shown on examination of the attribute of the principle.2 Nor can it be said that one single heaven, or one single body, the sun or any other body, can be the First Principle; for all these are bodies, and body is composed of matter and form, and the First Principle cannot be composite, as is clear on a second examination. Our intention is to show that an existent which has no cause is eternal by necessity and by universal consent, and only about its qualities is there a divergence of opinion. And this is what we mean by a first principle. I say: 266 This argument carries a certain conviction, but still it.is not true. For the term 'cause' is attributed equivocally to the four causes— agent, form, matter, and end. Therefore if this were the answer of the philosophers, it would be defective. For if they were asked which cause they mean by their statement that the world has a first cause, and if they answered, 'That agent whose act is uncreated and ever- 5 lasting, and whose object is identical with its act', their answer would be true according to their doctrine; for against this conception, in the way we expounded it, there is no objection. But if they answered

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'The formal cause', the objection would be raised* whether they supposed the form of the world to subsist by itself in the world, and if they answered, 'We mean a form separate from matter', their statement would be in harmony with their theory; but if they answered, 'We mean a form in matter', this would imply that the First Principle was not something incorporeal; and this does not accord with philosophical doctrine. Further, if they said, 'It is a cause which acts for an end', this again would agree with the philosophical doctrine. As you see, this statement is capable of many interpretations, and how can it be represented there as an answer of the philosophers ? And as to Ghazali's words: We call it the First Principle, understanding by this that there is no cause for its existence, but that it is a cause for the existence of other things.

this again is a defective statement, for this might be said also of the first sphere, or of heaven in its entirety, or generally of any kind of existents which could be supposed to exist without a cause; and between this and the materialistic theory 1 there is no difference. 267 And as to Ghazali's words: It is easy to establish by a strict proof an existent for the existence of which there is no cause. this again is a defective statement, for the causes must be specified, and it must be shown that each kind has an initial term without cause—that is, that the agents lead upwards to a first agent, the 5 formal causes to a first form, the material causes to a first matter, and the final causes to a first end. 2 And then it must still be shown that these four ultimate causes lead to a first cause. This is not clear from the statement as he expresses it here. And in the same way the statement in which he brings a proof for 10 the existence of a first cause is defective, i.e. his statement: For we s;.y that the world and its existents either have a cause or have not. . . . For the term 'cause' is used in an equivocal way. And similarly the infinite regress of causes is according to philosophical doctrine in one way impossible, in another way necessary; impossible when this 268 regress is essential and in a straight line and the prior cause is a condition of the existence of the posterior, not impossible when this regress is accidental and circular, when the prior is not a condition for the posterior and when there exists an essential first cause—for instance, the origin of rain from a cloud, the origin of a cloud from

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vapour, the origin of vapour from rain. And this is according to the philosophers an eternal circular process, which of necessity, however, presupposes a first cause. 1 And similarly the coming into existence of 5 one man from another is an eternal process, for in such cases the existence of the prior is not a condition for the existence of the posterior; indeed, the destruction of some of them is often a necessary condition. This kind of cause leads upwards to an eternal first cause which acts in each individual member of the series of causes at the moment of the becoming of its final effect; for instance, when Socrates 10 engenders Plato, the ultimate mover, according to the philosophers, is the highest sphere, or the soul, or the intellect, 2 or all together, or God the Creator. And therefore Aristotle says that a man and the sun together engender a man, 3 and it is clear that the sun leads upwards to its mover and its mover to the First Principle. Therefore the past man is not a condition for the existence of the future man. 269 Similarly, when an artisan produces successively a series of products of craftsmanship with different instruments, and produces these instruments through instruments and the latter again through other instruments, 4 the becoming of these instruments one from another is something accidental, and none of these instruments is a condition for the existence of the product of craftsmanship except the first5 instrument which is in immediate contact with the work produced. 6 Now the father is necessary for the coming into existence of the son 5 in the same way as the instrument which comes into immediate contact with the product of craftsmanship is necessary for its coming into existence. And the instrument with which this instrument is produced will be necessary for the production of this instrument, but will not be necessary for the production of the product of craftsmanship unless accidentally. Therefore sometimes, when the posterior instrument is produced from the matter of the anterior, the destruction of the anterior is a condition for the existence of the posterior, for instance, when a man comes into being from a man who has perished, through 10 the latter becoming first a plant, then sperm or menstrual blood. 7 And we have already discussed this problem. Those, however, who regard an infinite series of essential causes as possible are materialists, and he who concedes this does not understand the efficient cause. And about the efficient cause there is no divergence of opinion among philosophers. And as to Ghazali's words: And if the world existed by itself without cause, then it would be clear what the First Principle is.

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he means that the materialists as well as others acknowledge a first 270 cause which has no cause, and their difference of opinion concerns only this principle, for the materialists say that it is the highest sphere and the others that it is a principle beyond the sphere and that the sphere is an effect; but these others are divided into two parties, those who say that the sphere is an act that has a beginning and those who say that it is an eternal act. And having declared that the acknowledgement of a first cause is common to the materialists as well as to others, Ghazali says: 5

However, it is not possible that the First Principle should be the heavens, for there are many of these and the proof of unity contradicts this; meaning that from the order of the universe it is evident that its directing principle is one, just as it appears from the order in an army that its leader is one, namely, the commander of the army. And all this is true. And as to Ghazali's words:

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Nor can it be said that one single heaven or one single body, the sun or any other body, can be the First Principle; for all these are bodies, and body is composed of matter and form, and the first body cannot be composite.

I say: T h e statement that each body is composed of matter and form does not accord with the theory of the philosophers (with the exception of Avicenna) about the heavenly body, unless one uses 'matter' here equivocally. 1 For according to the philosophers everything composed of matter and form has a beginning, like the coming into existence of a house and a cupboard; and the heavens, according to them, have not come into existence in this sense, and so they called them eternal, because their existence is coeternal with the First 271 Principle. For since according to them the cause of corruption is matter, that which is incorruptible could not possess matter, but must be a simple entity. If generation and corruption were not found in sublunary bodies, we should not draw the conclusion that they were composed of matter and form, for the fundamental principle is that body is a single essence not less in its existence than in 5 perception, 2 and if there were no corruption of sublunary bodies, we should judge that they were simple and that matter was body. But the fact that the body of the heavens does not suffer corruption shows that its matter is actual corporeality. And the soul which exists in this

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body does not exist in it because this body requires, as the bodies of animals do, the soul for its continuance, nor because it is necessary for the existence of this body to be animated, but only because the superior must of necessity exist in the condition of the superior and 10 the animate is superior to the inanimate. 1 According to the philosophers there is no change* in the heavenly bodies, for they do not possess a potency in their substance. They therefore need not have matter in the way the generable bodies need this, but they are either, as Themistius affirms, forms, 2 or possess matter in an equivocal sense of the word. And I say that either the matters of the heavenly bodies are identical with their souls, or these matters are essentially alive, not alive through a life bestowed on them. 3 Ghazali says: 272 "" To this there are two answers. The first is that it can be said: Since it follows from the tenets of your school that the bodies of the world are eternal, it must follow too that they have no cause, and your statement that on a second examination such a conclusion must be rejected will itself be rejected when we discuss God's unity and afterwards the denial of attributes to God. I say: 5 Ghazali means that since they cannot prove the unity of the First Principle, and since they cannot prove either that the One cannot be body—for since they cannot deny the attributes, the First Principle must, according to them, be an essence endowed with attributes, and such an essence must be a body or a potency in a body 4 —it follows that the First Principle which has no cause is the celestial bodies. And this conclusion is valid against those who might argue in the way 10 he says the philosophers argue. T h e philosophers, however, do not argue thus, and do not say that they are unable to prove the unity and incorporeality of the First Principle. But this question will be discussed later. Ghazali says: 273 The second answer, and it is the answer proper to this question, is to say: it is established as a possibility that these existents can have a cause, but perhaps for this cause there is another cause, and so on ad infinitum. And you have no right to assert* that to admit an infinite series of causes is impossible, for we ask you, 'Do you know this by immediate necessary intuition or through a middle term?' Any claim to intuition is excluded, and any method of deductive proof is forbidden to you, since you admit celestial revolutions without an initial terra; and if you permit a coming into 5 existence for what is without end,5 it is not impossible that the series should

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consist of causal relations and have as a final term an effect which has no further effect, although in the other direction the series does not end in a cause which has no anterior cause,' just as the past has a final term, namely the everchanging present, but no first term. If you protest that the past occurrences do not exist together at one moment or at certain moments, and that what does not exist cannot be described as finite or infinite, you are forced to admit this simultaneous existence for human souls 10 in abstraction from their bodies; for they do not perish, according to you, and the number of souls in abstraction from their bodies is infinite, since the series of becoming from sperma to man and from man to sperma is infinite, and every man dies, but his soul remains and is numerically different from the soul of any man who dies before, simultaneously, or afterwards, although all these souls are one in species. Therefore at any moment there is an infinite number of souls in existence. If you object that souls are not joined to each other, and that they have no order, either by nature or by position, and that you regard only those infinite existents as impossible which have order in space, like bodies which have a spatial order of higher and lower, or have a natural order like cause and effect, and that this is not the case with souls; we answer: 'This theory about position does not follow any more than its contrary; 2 you cannot regard one of the two cases as impossible without involving the other, for where is your proof for the distinction? And you cannot 274 deny that this infinite number of souls must have an order, as some are prior to others and the past days and nights are infinite. If we suppose the birth of only one soul every day and night, the sum of souls, born in sequence one after the other, amounts at the present moment to infinity. The utmost you can say about the cause is that its priority to the effect exists by nature, in the way that its superiority to the effect is a matter of 5 essence and not of space. But if you do not regard an infinite sequence as impossible for real temporal priority, it cannot be impossible for natural essential priority either. But what can the philosophers mean when they deny the possibility of an infinite spatial superposition of bodies, but affirm the possibility of an infinite temporal sequence? Is this theory not really an inept theory without any foundation? I say: As to Ghazali's words: I0

But perhaps for this cause there is another cause and so on ad infinitum . .. and any method of deductive proof is forbidden to you, since you admit celestial revolutions without an initial term: T o this difficulty an answer was given above, when we said that the philosophers do not allow an infinite causal series, because this would lead to an effect without a cause, but assert that there is such a series accidentally from an eternal cause—not, however, in a

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straight line, nor simultaneously, nor in infinite matters, but only as a circular process. What he says here about Avicenna, that he regarded an infinite number of souls as possible and that infinity is only impossible in what has a position, is not true 1 and no philosopher has said it; indeed, its impossibility is apparent from their general proof which 275 we mentioned, and no conclusion can be drawn against them from this assumption of an actual infinity of souls. Indeed, those who believed that the souls are of a certain number through the number of bodies and that they are individually immortal profess to avoid this assumption through the doctrine of the transmigration of souls.2 And as to Ghazali's words: But what can the philosophers mean when they deny the possibility of S an infinite spatial superposition of bodies, but affirm the possibility of an infinite temporal sequence? I say: T h e difference between these two cases is very clear to the philosophers, for from the assumption of infinite bodies existing simultaneously there follows an infinite totality and an actual infinite, and this is impossible. But time has no position, and from the existence of 10 an infinite temporal series of bodies no actual infinite follows. Ghazali says on behalf of the philosophers: The philosophers might say: The strict proof of the impossibility of an infinite causal series is as follows: each single cause of a series is either possible in itself or necessary; if it is necessary, it needs no cause, and if it is possible, then the whole series needs a cause additional to its essence, a cause standing outside the series.3 I say: 276 T h e first man to bring into philosophy the proof which Ghazali gives here as a philosophical one, was Avicenna, who regarded this proof as superior to those given by the ancients, since he claimed it to be based on the essence of the existent, whereas the older proofs are based on accidents consequent on the First Principle. 4 This proof Avicenna took from the theologians, who regarded the dichotomy of existence into possible and necessary as self-evident, and assumed 5 that the possible needs an agent and that the world in its totality, as being possible, needs an agent of a necessary existence. This was a theory of the Mu'tazilites before the Ash'arites, 5 and it is excellent, and the only flaw in it is their assumption that the world in its totality

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10 is possible, for this is not self-evident. Avicenna wanted to give a general sense to this statement, and he gave to the 'possible' the meaning of'what has a cause', 1 as Ghazali relates. 2 And even if this designation can be conceded, it does not effect the division which he had in view. For a primary division of existence into what has a cause and what has no cause is by no means self-evident. Further, what has a cause can be divided into what is possible and what is necessary. 3 If we understand by 'possible' the truly possible4 we 277 arrive at the necessary-possible s and not at the necessary which has no cause; and if we understand by 'possible' that which has a cause and is also necessary, there only follows from this that what has a cause has a cause and we may assume that this cause has a cause and so ad infinitum.'' We do not therefore arrive at an existent without cause—for this is the meaning of the expression 'entity of a necessary 5 existence'—unless by the possible which Avicenna assumes as the opposite of what has no cause we understand the truly possible, for in these possibles there cannot exist an infinite series of causes.7 But if by 'possible' is meant those necessary things which have a cause, it has not yet been proved that their infinite number is impossible, in the way it is evident of the truly possible existents, and it is not yet proved that there is a necessary existent which needs a cause, so that from this assumption one can arrive at a necessary entity existing 10 without a cause. Indeed, one has to prove that what applies to the total causal series of possible entities applies also to the total causal series of necessary existents. 8 Ghazali says: The terms 'possible' and 'necessary' are obscure, unless one understands by 'necessary' that which has no cause for its existence and by 'possible' that which has a cause for its existence;' then, by applying the terms as defined to the statement, we say: Each member of a causal series is possible in this sense of 'possible', namely, that it has a cause additional to its essence, but the series as a whole is not possible in this sense of 'possible'.10 And if anything else is meant by 'possible', it is obscure. If it is objected that this makes the necessary existent consist of possible existents and this is impossible, we answer: By defining 'necessary' and 'possible' as we have done, you have all that is needed and we do not concede that it is impossible. To say that it is impossible would be like saying that it is impossible that what is eternal should be made up of what is temporal, for time according to you philosophers is eternal, but the individual circular 278 movements are temporal and have initial terms, though collectively they have no initial term; therefore, that which has no initial term consists

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of entities having initial terms, and it is true of the single units that they have a beginning, but not true of themcollectively. In the same way it can be said of each term of the causal series that it has a cause, but not of the series as a whole. And so not everything that is true of single units is true of their collectivity, for it is true of each single unit that it is one and a portion and a part, but not true of their collectivity; and any place on the earth which we choose is illuminated by the sun by day and is dark 5 by night, and according to the philosophers each unit has begun, but not the whole. Through this it is proved that the man who admits temporal entities without a beginning, namely, the forms of the four elements,' cannot at the same time deny an infinity of causes, and we conclude from this that because of this difficulty there is no way in which they can prove the First Principle, and their dichotomy is purely arbitrary. 2 I say: The assumption of infinite possible causes implies the assumption of a possible without an agent, but the assumption of infinite necessary entities having causes implies only that what was assumed to have a cause has none, and this argument is true with the restriction that the impossibility of infinite entities which are of a possible nature does not involve the impossibility of infinite necessary entities. 3 If one wanted to give a demonstrative form to the argument used by Avicenna one should say: Possible existents must of necessity have causes which precede them, and if these causes again are possible it follows that they have causes and that there is an infinite regress; and if there is an infinite regress there is no cause, and the possible will exist without a cause, and this is impossible. Therefore the scries must end in a necessary cause, and in this case this necessary cause must be necessary through a cause or without a cause, and if through a cause, this cause must have a cause and so on infinitely; and if we have an infinite regress here, it follows that what was assumed to have a cause has no cause, and this is impossible. Therefore the series must end in a cause necessary without a cause, i.e. necessary by itself, and this necessarily is the necessary existent. And when these distinctions are indicated, the proof becomes valid. 4 But if this argument is given in the form in which Avicenna gives it, it is invalid for many reasons, one of which is that the term 'possible' used in it is an equivocal one and that in this argument the primary dichotomy of all existents into what is possible and what is not possible, i.e. this division comprising the existent qua existent, is not true. And as to Ghazali's words in his refutation of the philosophers: We say: Each member of a causal series is possible in this sense of

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'possible', namely, that it has a cause additional to its essence, but the whole series is not possible in this sense of 'possible'.

I say:

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Ghazali means that when the philosophers concede that they understand by 'possible existent' that which has a cause and by 'necessary existent' that which has no cause, it can be said to them: 'According to your own principles the existence of an infinite causal series is not impossible, and the series in its totality will be a necessary existent,' for according to their own principles the philosophers admit that different judgements apply to the part and to the whole collectively. This statement is erroneous for many reasons, one of which is that the philosophers, as was mentioned before, do not allow an infinite scries of essential causes, whether causes and effects of a possible' or of a necessary nature, as we have shown. T h e objection which can be directed against Avicenna is that when you divide existence into possible and necessary and identify the possible existent with that which has a cause and the necessary existent with that which has none, you can no longer prove the impossibility of the existence of an infinite causal series, for from its infinite character it follows that it is to be classed with existcnts which have no cause and it must therefore be of the nature of the necessary existent, especially as, according to him and his* school, eternity can consist of an infinite series of causes each of which is temporal. 2 The fault in Avicenna's argument arises only from his division of the existent into that which has a cause and that which has none. If he had made his division in the way we have done, none of these objections could be directed against him. And Ghazali's statement that the ancients, since they admit an infinite number of circular movements, make the eternal consist of an infinite number of entities, is false. For the term 'eternal', when it is attributed both to this infinite series and to the one eternal being, is used equivocally. 3 And as to the words of Ghazali: If it is objected that this makes the necessary existent consist of possible cxistents, and this is impossible, we answer: Iiy defining 'necessary' and 'possible' as we have done you have all that is needed, and we do not concede that it is impossible. I say: Ghazali means that the philosophers understand by 'ncccssi: that which has no cause and by 'possible' that which has a cause, and that he, Ghazali, does not regard it as impossible that what has

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no cause should consist of an infinite number of causes, because, if he conceded that this was impossible, he would be denying the possibility of an infinity of causes, whereas he only wants to show that the philosophers' deduction of a necessary being is a petitio principii.1 Then Ghazali says: To say that it is impossible would be like saying that it is impossible that what is eternal should be made up of what is temporal, for time, according to you philosophers, is eternal, but the individual circular movements are temporal and have initial terms; therefore that which has no initial term consists of entities having initial terms, and it is true of the single units that they have a beginning, but not true of them collectively. In the same way it can be said of each term of the causal series that it has a cause, but not of the series as a whole. And so not everything that is true of single units is true of their collectivity, for it is true of each single unit that it is one and a portion and a part, but not true of their collectivity. I say: Ghazali means that it is not impossible that what has no cause should consist of infinite effects in the way the eternal, according to the philosophers, consists of temporal entities, which are infinite in number. For time, according to the philosophers, is eternal, and consists of limited temporal parts, and likewise the movement of heaven is eternal according to the philosophers, and the circular movements of which it consists are infinite. And the answer is that the existence of an eternal consisting of temporal parts, in so far as they are infinite in number, is not a philosophical principle; on the contrary they deny it most strongly, and only the materialists affirm it. For the sum must consist either of a finite number of transitory members or of an infinite number. If the former is the case, it is generally admitted that the members must also be gencrically transitory. 2 For the latter case there are two theories. The materialists believe that the totality is of a possible nature and that the collectivity must be eternal and without a cause. 3 The philosophers admit this infinity and believe that such genera, because they consist of possible transitory constituents, must necessarily have an external cause, lasting and eternal, from which they acquire their eternity. 4 It is not true either, as Ghazali seems to imply, that the philosophers believe that the impossibility of an infinite series of causes depends on the impossibility that the eternal should consist of an infinity of constituents. 5 They affirm that the eternity of these generically different movements must lead to one single movement, and that the reason

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283 why there exist genera* which are transitory in their individuals, but eternal as a whole, is that there is an existent, eternal partly and totally, and this is the body of the heavens. The infinite movements are generically infinite only because of the one single continuous eternal movement of the body of the heavens. And only for the mind 5 does the movement of heaven seem composed of many circular movements. 1 And the movement of the body of the heavens acquires its eternity—even if its particular movements are transitory—through a mover which must always move and through a body which also must always be moved and cannot stop in its motion, as happens with things which are moved in the sublunary world. io About genera there are three theories, that of those who say that all genera are transitory, because the individuals in them are finite, and that of those who say that there are genera which are eternal and have no first or last term, because they appear by their nature to have infinite individuals; the latter are divided into two groups: those, namely the philosophers, who say that such genera can only be truly said to be everlasting, because of one and the same necessary cause, without which they would perish on innumerable occasions in infinite time; and those, namely the materialists, who believe that the existence of the individuals of these genera is sufficient to make them eternal. It is important to take note of these three 284 theories, for the whole controversy about the eternity or non-eternity of the world, and whether the world has an agent or not, is based on these fundamental propositions. The theologians and those who believe in a temporal creation of the world are at one extreme, the materialists at the other, while the philosophers hold an intermediate position. 5 If all this is once established, you will see that the proposition that the man who allows the existence of an infinite series of causes cannot admit a first cause is false, and that on the contrary the opposite is evident, namely, that the man who does not acknowledge infinite causes cannot prove the existence of an eternal first cause, since it is the existence of infinite effects which demands the necessity of an eternal cause from which the infinite causes acquire their existence; io for if not, the genera, all of whose individuals are temporal, would be necessarily finite.2 And in this and no other way can the eternal become the cause of temporal existents, and the existence of infinite temporal existents renders the existence of a single eternal first principle necessary, and there is no God but He.

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G h a z a l i , a n s w e r i n g this o b j e c t i o n in t h e n a m e of t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s , says: T h e philosophers might say: T h e circular movements a n d the forms of the elements do not exist at the present m o m e n t ; there actually exists only one single form of them, and w h a t does not exist can be called neither finite nor infinite, unless one supposes t h e m to exist in the imagination, 2 8 5 and things which are only suppositions in the mind cannot be regarded as impossible, even if certain of these suppositions are supposed to be causes of other suppositions;' for m a n assumes this only in his imagination, a n d the discussion refers only to things in reality, not to things in the mind. 2 T h e only dilliculty concerns the souls of the dead and, indeed, some philosophers 3 have arrived at the theory that there is only one eternal soul before it is united with bodies, and that after its separation from the bodies it becomes one again, so that it has no numerical q u a n t i t y and can cer- 5 tainly not be called infinite. O t h e r philosophers have thought that the soul follows from the constitution of the body, that d e a t h is nothing b u t the annihilation of the soul, and that the soul cannot subsist by itself without the body. In that case souls have no existence except in respect of the living, and the living are beings limited in n u m b e r , and their finitude is not denied, and those that have ceased to exist cannot be qualified at all, either by finitude or by infinity, except when they are supposed to exist in imagination. T h e n G h a z a l i says: W e answer: This difficulty a b o u t the souls has come to us from 10 Avicenna and F a r a b i and the most acknowledged philosophers, since they concluded that the soul was a substance subsistent by itself; and this is also the view taken by Aristotle and by the commentators on the ancient philosophers. And to those philosophers who turn aside from this doctrine 4 we say: C a n you imagine that at each m o m e n t something comes into being which will last for ever? A negative answer is impossible, and if they a d m i t this possibility, we say: If you imagine that every day some new thing comes into being and continues to exist, then u p to the present m o m e n t there will have been an infinite collection of existents a n d , even if the circular movement itself comes to an end, the lasting and endless existence of w h a t has come into being d u r i n g its revolution is not impossible. In this way this difficulty is firmly established, and it is quite irrelevant whether this survival concerns the soul of a m a n or a J i n n i , the soul of a devil or a n angel, or of any being whatever. And this is a necessary consequence of every philosophical theory which admits an infinity of circular movements. I say: T h e a n s w e r w h i c h h e gives in t h e n a m e of t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s , t h a t 286 t h e p a s t r e v o l u t i o n s a n d t h e p a s t forms of t h e e l e m e n t s w h i c h h a v e c o m e from e a c h o t h e r 5 a r e n o n - e x i s t e n t , a n d t h a t t h e n o n - e x i s t e n t

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c a n b e called n e i t h e r finite n o r infinite, is n o t a t r u e o n e . A n d as t o S t h e difficulty h e raises a g a i n s t t h e m as to t h e i r t h e o r y a b o u t souls, n o such t h e o r y is h e l d b y a n y p h i l o s o p h e r s , a n d t h e t r a n s f e r e n c e of o n e p r o b l e m t o a n o t h e r is a sophistical artifice.

J»7

THE F I F T H

DISCUSSION

To show their incapacity to prove God's unity and the impossibility of two necessary existents both without a cause G h a z a l i says: 5

T h e philosophers have two proofs of this. T h e first is to say, 'If there were two necessary existents, the species of necessary existence would be attributed to them both. 1 But what is said to be a necessary existent must either be so through itself, and cannot be imagined to be so through another, or it must be so through a cause, and the essence of the necessary existent will be an effect; and its cause then determines its necessity of existence.' 'Hut', say the philosophers, 'we understand by "necessary existent" only a n entity whose existence has no connexion with a cause.' 2 A n d the philosophers affirm that the species ' m a n ' is asserted of Zaid and 10 of A m r and that Zaid is not a m a n through himself—for in that case A m r would not be a m a n — b u t through a cause which makes both him and A m r a m a n ; and the plurality of men arises from the plurality of matter in which h u m a n i t y inheres, and its inherence in matter is an effect which does not lie in the essence of humanity. 3 T h e same is the case with necessary existence in respect to the necessary existent: if it is through itself 288 a necessary existent, it must possess this qualification exclusively, and if it exists because of a cause, it is an effect and cannot be a necessary existent. A n d from this it is clear that the necessary existent must needs be one. T o this G h a z a l i objects a n d s a y s : 5

W e say: Y o u r statement that the species of necessary existence must belong to the necessary existent either through the necessary existent itself or through a cause is a self-contradictory disjunction, for we have already shown that the expression 'necessary existence' is obscure, unless we m e a n by it the denial of a cause, and so let us rather use* the term which is really m e a n t by it and say: T o admit two existents without a cause, and without the one's being a cause of the other, is not impossible. And your statement that what has no cause has none, either because of its own essence or through some cause, is a faulty disjunction, for one

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does not ask for the cause of a thing which is said to have no cause and to need no cause for its existence. And what sense is there in the statement that what has no cause has no cause either because of its own essence or through a cause? For to say 'no cause' is an absolute negation, and an 10 absolute non-entity has no cause, and cannot be said to exist either by its own essence or not by its own essence. But if you mean by 'necessary existence' a positive qualification of the necessary existent, besides its being an existent without a cause for its existence, it is quite obscure what this meaning is. But the genuine meaning of this word is the negation of a cause for its existence, and this is an absolute negation about which it cannot be said that it is due to its essence or to a cause, such that the intended proof might be based on the supposition of this disjunction. To regard this as a proof is senseless and has no foundation whatever. On the contrary, we say that the meaning of its necessity is that it has no cause for its k existence and no cause for its coming into existence, without there being any cause whatever for this; its being without a cause is, again, not caused by its essence; no, the fact that there is no cause for its existence and no cause for its being, has itself no cause whatsoever. This disjunction cannot be applied even to positive qualities, not to speak of that which is really equivalent to a negation. For suppose one were to say: 'Black is a colour because of its essence or through a cause, and if it is a colour because of its essence, then red cannot be a colour, and then the species of colouredness 289 can exist only because of the essence of black; if, however, black is a colour because of a cause which has made it a colour, then black can be thought of as being without a colour, i.e. as not having been made a colour by a cause, for a determination added to an essence through a cause* can be represented in the imagination as absent, even if it exists in reality.'1 'But', it will be objected, 'this disjunction is false in itself, for one cannot say of black that it is a colour because of its essence, meaning by this that it cannot be through anything but its essence, and in the same way one cannot say that this existent is necessary because of its essence, i.e. 5 that it has no cause because of its own essence, meaning by this that it cannot exist through anything but its essence.' I say: This method of proving the unity of God is peculiar to Avicenna, and is not found in any of the ancient philosophers; its premisses are common-sense premisses, and the terms are used in a more or less equivocal way. For this reason many objections can be urged against 10 it. Still, when those terms and the aim they intend arc properly analysed, this statement comes near to being a proof. T h a t this primary disjunction is faulty, as Ghazali asserts, is not true. He says that the meaning of 'necessary existent' is 'that which has no cause', and that the statement 'that what has no cause, has

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no cause, either because of its own essence or through another cause', and similarly the statement 'that the necessary existent is a necessary existent, either because of its own essence or through another cause' arc meaningless statements. But this is by no means the case. For the meaning of this disjunction is only whether the necessary existent is such, because of a nature which characterizes it, in so far as it is 290 numerically one,' or because of a nature which it has in common with others—for instance, when we say that Amr is a man because he is Amr, or because of a nature he has in common with Khalid. If he is a man because he is Amr, then humanity does not exist in anyone else, and if he is a man because of a general nature, then he is 5 composed of two natures, a general one and a special one and the compound is an effect; but the necessary existent has no cause, and therefore the necessary existent is unique. And when Aviccnna's statement is given in this form it is true. And Ghazali's words: and an absolute non-entity has no cause and it cannot be said to exist either by its own essence or not by its own essence form a statement which is not true either. For there are two kinds of negation, (lie negation of a particular quality, proper to something in (and this kind of negation must be understood in respect of the words 'by its own essence' used in this statement), and the negation of a quality, not particular to something (and this kind of negation must be understood here in respect of the term 'cause'). 2 Ghazali affirms that this disjunction is not even true of positive qualities and therefore certainly not of negative and lie objects to this disjunction by giving as an example black and colourcdncss. And he means that when wc say of black that it is a colour, either because of its essence 2«i or through a cause, neither alternative can be true, and both are lalse. For il black were a cause, because of its essence, red could not be a colour, just as if Amr were a man because of his essence, Khalid could not be a man; on the other hand, if black were a colour through a cause, colour would have to be an addition to its essence, and an essence which receives an addition can be represented without this s addition, and therefore this assumption would imply that black could be represented without colourcdncss, and this is absurd. But this argument of Ghazali is erroneous and sophistical, because of the equivocation in the terms 'essence' and 'cause'. For if by 'by its essence' is understood the opposite of 'by accident', our statement

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that black is a colour because of its essence is true, and at the same time it is not impossible that other things, red for instance, should be colours. And if by 'cause', in the expression that black is a colour through a cause, is understood something additional to its essence, i.e. that it is a colour through a cause external to black, it does not follow that black can be represented without colouredness. For the genus is an addition to the specific quality and the species, and the species or the specific quality cannot be represented without the genus, and only an accidental additional quality—not the essential additional quality—can be represented without the genus. And therefore our statement that black is a colour either because of its essence or through a cause is a disjunction of which, indeed, one of the alternatives must be true, i.e. black must be a colour either by black itself or through an entity additional to black. And this is what Avicenna meant by his assertion that the necessary existent must be a necessary existent, either through its own special character or through an addition which is not peculiar to it; if through the former, there cannot be two existents which are both necessary existents; if through the latter, both existents must be composed of a universal and of a peculiar entity, and the compound is not a necessary existent through itself. And if this is true, the words of Ghazali: 'What prevents us from representing two existents which should both be of a necessary existence?' are absurd. And if it is objected, 'You have said that this statement comes near being a proof, but it seems to be a proper proof, we answer: We said this only because this proof seems to imply that the difference between those two assumed necessary existents must lie either in their particularity, and then they participate in their specific quality, or in their species, and then they participate in their generic quality, and both these differences are found only in compounds, and the insufficiency of this proof lies in this, that it has been demonstrated that there are existents which are differentiated, although they are simple and differ neither in species nor individually, namely, the separate intellects. 1 However, it appears from their nature that there must be in their existence a priority and posteriority of rank, for no other differentiation can be imagined in them. Avicenna's proof about the necessary existent must be therefore completed in this way: If there were two necessary existents, the difference between them must consist either in a numerical difference, or in a specific difference, or in rank. 2 In the first case they would agree in species; in the second case

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5 in genus, and in both cases the necessary existent would have to be composite. In the third case, however, the necessary existent will have to be one, and will be the cause of all the separate existents. And this is the truth, and the necessary existent is therefore one. For there is only this tripartite disjunction, two members of which are false, and therefore the third case, which necessitates the absolute io uniqueness of the necessary existent, is the true one. 1 Ghazali says:

The second proof of the philosophers2 is that they say: If we assumed two necessary existents, they would have to be similar in every way or different. If they were similar in every way, they could not be thought to be a plurality or a duality, since two blacks can have only a duality, when they are in two places, or in one place at different times, for black and movement can only exist in one place and be two at the same time, because they differ essentially. When the two essences, like the two blacks, do not differ and at the same time are simultaneous and in one place, they cannot be thought to be a plurality; if one could speak of two simultaneous 294 blacks as being in the same place, any individual could be said to be two, although not the slightest difference could be perceived between the two. Since they cannot be absolutely similar, they must* be different, but they cannot differ in time or in place, and they can therefore only differ in essence. But two things which differ in something must either participate 5 in something or not participate in anything. The latter is impossible, for it would mean that they would participate neither in existence,3 nor in the necessity of existence, nor in being subsistent in themselves and not inhering in a substratum. But if they agree in something and differ in something, that in which they agree must be different from that through which they differ; there will therefore be composition in them, and it will be possible to analyse them in thought. But there is no composition in the necessary existent, and just as it cannot be divided quantitatively, so it cannot be analysed by thought either, for its essence is not composed of elements which intellectual analysis could enumerate.4 The words io 'animal' and 'rational', for instance, mean that which constitutes the essence of man, namely, animal and rational, and what is meant by the word 'animal' when one speaks of a man is different from what is meant by 'rational', and therefore man is composed of parts which are ordered in the definition by words which indicate these parts, and the term 'man' is applied to the whole of them*. 5 This composition, however, cannot be imagined in the necessary existent, while duality cannot be imagined except in this way. The answer is that we concede that duality can only be imagined where there is a differentiation, and that in two things, similar in every way, no difference can be imagined. But your statement that this kind of

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composition is impossible in the First Principle is a mere presumption, and where is your proof of it? Let us now treat this problem in detail. It belongs to their well-known theories that the First Principle can as little be analysed intellectually as divided quantitatively, and on this fundamental truth, according to the philosophers, the uniqueness of God must be based. I say: 295 Ghazali does not know the mistake which is in this second proof, and he begins to discuss with the philosophers the question to which they give a negative answer, namely, if one may introduce a plurality into the definition of the necessary existent. He wants* to consider this problem in detail, since the Ash'arites allow a plurality in God, regarding Him as an essence with attributes. 1 T h e mistake in this second proof is that two different things can be essentially different 5 and have nothing in common but their name, in the case where they have no common genus, either proximate or remote, for instance, the term 'body', attributed by the philosophers to both the body of the heavens and the transitory body, and the term 'intellect' attributed to the intellect of man and the separate intellects, and the term 'existent' attributed to transitory things and to eternal. Such • terms must be regarded as equivocal rather than as univocal, and therefore it does not follow that things which are differentiated must be composite. 2 And since Ghazali, in his answer to this proof of the philosophers, limits himself in the way he has indicated, he begins first by stating their theory of God's unity and then tries to refute the philosophers. Ghazali, expounding the philosophical theory, says: 296 For the philosophers assert that God's unity can only be perfected by establishing the singleness of God's essence in every way, and by the denial of any possible plurality in Him. Now plurality can belong to things in five ways.3 First, to what can undergo division actually or in imagination, and therefore the single body is not absolutely one—it is one through the continuity which exists in it, which can suffer a decrease and can be quanti- 5 tatively divided in imagination. This is impossible in the First Principle. Secondly: a thing may be divided by thought, not quantitatively, into two different concepts, as for instance the division of body into matter and form, for although neither matter nor form can subsist separately, they are two different things in definition and in reality, and it is by their composition that a unity results, namely body. This also must be denied of God, for God cannot be a form or a matter* in a body, or be the compound of both. There are two reasons why God cannot be their compound, 10

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first because this c o m p o u n d can be divided into quantitative parts, actually or in imagination, secondly, because this c o m p o u n d can be divided conceptually into form and matter, and God cannot be matter, because m a t t e r needs a form, and the necessary existent is self-sufficient in every respect and its existence cannot be conjoined with the condition of something else besides it, a n d God c a n n o t b e form, because form needs matter. T h i r d l y : the plurality through attributes implied in knowledge, power, and will; 1 if these attributes had a necessary existence, the essence a n d these attributes would participate in necessary existence and the necessary existent must be a plurality, and its uniqueness would be denied. F o u r t h l y : the rational plurality whicli results from the composition of genus and species. For black is black a n d colour, and blackness is not colouredness for the intellect, b u t colouredness is a genus, and blackness a specific difference, and therefore black is composed of genus and species; and animality is for the m i n d something different from h u m a n i t y , for m a n is a rational animal, animal is a genus a n d rational a specific difler297 ence, and m a n is composed of genus and species, and this is a kind of plurality, and the philosophers affirmed t h a t this kind also must be denied of the First Principle. Fifthly: the plurality which results from the duality of a quiddity and the existence of this q u i d d i t y ; for m a n before his existence has a quiddity, and existence occurs to it and enters into relation with it, and in this 5 way the triangle has a quiddity, namely, it is a figure surrounded by three sides, and existence is not a component of this quiddity, and therefore the intellect can perceive the quiddity of m a n a n d the quiddity of a triangle without knowing whether they exist in the external world or not. 2 If existence were a component of the quiddity to which it is added, the fixation of this quiddity in the mind before its existence could not be imagined. Existence stands in a relation to quiddity, whether in a necessary inseparable relation, for instance, heaven, or in a n accidental relation occurring after a thing's non-existence, like the quiddity of m a n in respect of Zaid or A m r and the quiddity of accidents and forms which occur. 3 And the philo10 sopliers affirm that this kind of plurality also must be denied of the First Principle. T h e y say that the First Principle has no quiddity to which existence is joined, but existence is necessary to it, as is quiddity to the other entities.' 1 Therefore necessary existence is at once a quiddity, a universal reality and a real nature, in the same way as a m a n , a tree, and heaven are quiddities. 5 For if the necessary existent needed a quiddity for its existence, it would be consequent on this essence and would not constitute it, and the consequent is something secondary and an effect, so that the necessary existent would be an effect, and that would be in opposition to its being necessary. I say: T h e s e a t e t h e theories of t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s w h i c h Gluizuli

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tions on the subject of their denial of plurality in the Monad. Then he begins to show how they contradict themselves on this question. We must now first examine these statements which he ascribes to them, and explain the degree of consent they reach; we shall then investigate* the contradictions of the philosophers which he mentions, and his methods of opposing them on this problem. The first kind of division which, according to Ghazali, the philosophers deny of the First Principle, is the quantitative division, either in supposition or in reality. Everyone who believes that the First Principle is not a body, whether he believes that a body is composed of atoms or not, agrees about this. T h e proof of this is that the First Principle is not a body, and its discussion will follow. The second kind is the qualitative division, like the division of body into matter and form, and this according to the doctrine of those, namely, the philosophers, who believe that body is composed of matter and form and this is not the place to discuss the truth of either of these theories. This division also is denied of the First Principle by everyone who believes that the First Principle is not body. As to the denial of the corporeality of the First Principle in so far as it is essentially a necessary existent, the discussion of this will follow later, when we give a complete account of the whole argument used in this matter. For as to Ghazali's words that the necessary existent does not need another, i.e. it does not consist of anything else, but that body consists of form and matter and neither of them are necessary existents, for form cannot dispense with matter and matter cannot dispense with form—there is here a problem; for according to the philosophers the body of the heavens is not composed of matter and form, but is simple, and it has sometimes been thought that it is a necessary existent by its own essence; but this problem will be treated later, and I do not know of any philosopher who has believed that the body of the heavens is composed of matter and form, with the sole exception of Avicenna. We have already spoken on this question in another place, 1 and shall discuss it still later on. The third kind is the denial of the plurality of attributes in the necessary existent, for if these attributes were of a necessary existence, the necessary existent would be more than one, since the essence also is a necessary existent. And if the attributes were caused by the essence, they could not be necessary existents, and attributes of the necessary existent would not be necessary existents, otherwise the term 'necessary existent' would comprise the necessary existent and B 2076

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that which is not a necessary existent, and this is impossible and absurd. And this is a proof which comes very near to being an absolute truth, when it is conceded that the 'necessary existent' must indicate an immaterial existent, and in such existents, which subsist by themselves without being bodies, there cannot be imagined essential attributes of which their essence is constituted, not to speak of attributes which are additional to their essence, that is, the so-called accidents, f° r when accidents are imagined to be removed, the essence remains, which is not the case with the essential attributes. And therefore it is right to attribute essential attributes to their subject, since they constitute its identity, 1 but it is not right to attribute non-essential attributes to it, except through derivative words, 2 for we do not say of a man that he is knowledge, but we only say that he is an animal and that he is knowing; 3 however, the existence of such attributes in what is incorporeal is impossible, since the nature of these attributes is extraneous to their subject, and for this reason they are called accidents and are distinct from what is attributed essentially to the subject, be it a subject in the soul or in the external world. If it is objected that the philosophers believe that there are such attributes in the soul, since they believe that the soul can perceive, will, and move, although at the same time they hold that the soul is incorporeal, we answer that they do not mean that these attributes are additional to the essence, but that they are essential attributes, and it is of the nature of essential attributes not to multiply the substratum which actually supports them; they are a plurality only in the sense that the thing defined becomes a plurality through the parts of the definitions, that is, they are only a subjective plurality in the mind according to the philosophers, not an actual plurality outside the soul. For instance, the definition of man is 'rational animal', but reason and life are not actually distinguishable from each other outside the soul in the way colour and shape are. And therefore he who concedes that matter is not a condition for the existence of the soul must concede that in the separate existences there is a real oneness existing outside the soul, although this oneness becomes a plurality through definition. 4 This is the doctrine of the Christians concerning the three hypostases in the divine Nature. They do not believe that they are attributes additional to the essence, but according to them they are only a plurality in the definition—they are a potential, not an actual, plurality. Therefore they say that the three are one, i.e. one in act and three in potency. 5 We shall enumerate later the repre-

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hensible consequences and absurdities which arise from the doctrine that the First Principle possesses attributes additional to His essence. The fourth kind of plurality is that which occurs to a thing because 10 of its genus and specific difference; this plurality comes very near to that which belongs to a thing because of its matter and form, for there are only definitions for that which is composed of matter and form, and not for simple, non-compound things, and nobody need disagree about denying a plurality through definition to the First Principle. The fifth kind of plurality is the plurality of essence and existence. 302 Existence in the nature of things is a logical concept which affirms the conformity of a thing outside the soul with what is inside the soul.1 Its meaning is synonymous with the true, and it is this that is meant by the copula in categorical propositions. 2 T h e term 'existence' is used in two senses; the first synonymous with the true, when we ask, 5 for instance, if something exists or not, or whether a certain thing has such and such a quality or not. 3 The second sense stands in relation to the existing things as their genus, in the way the existent is divided into the ten categories, and into substance and accident. 4 When by existent is understood the true, there is no plurality outside the soul :5 when by existent is understood what is understood by entity and , 0 thing, 6 the term 'existent' is attributed essentially to God and analogically to all other things in the way warmth is attributed to fire and to all warm things. 7 This is the theory of the philosophers. But Ghazali based his discussion on the doctrine of Avicenna, and this is a false doctrine, for Avicenna believed that existence is something additional to the essence outside the soul and is like an accident of the essence. And if existence were a condition for the being of the essence and a condition for the essence of the necessary existent, the necessary existent would be composed of the conditioning and the 303 conditioned and it would be of a possible existence. Avicenna affirms also that what exists as an addition to its essence has a cause. Now, existence for Avicenna is an accident which supervenes on the essence,8 and to this Ghazali refers when he says: For man before his existence has a quiddity and existence occurs to it 5 and enters into relation with it, and in this way the triangle has a quiddity, namely, it is a figure surrounded by three sides, and existence is not a component of this quiddity, and therefore the intellect can perceive the quiddity of man and the quiddity of a triangle without knowing whether they exist in the exterior world or not.

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This shows that the term 'existence' which he uses here is not the term which signifies the most universal genus of all entities, nor the term which indicates that a thing exists outside the soul. For the term 'existence' is used in two meanings, the former signifies the true and the latter the opposite of non-existence, and in this latter sense it is that which is divided into the ten categories and is like their genus. This essential sense which refers to the things which exist in the real world outside the soul is prior to the sense it has in the existents of second intention, 1 and it is this sense which is predicated of the ten categories analogically, and it is in this sense that we say of the substance that it exists by itself and of the accident that it exists through its existing in the existent which subsists by itself. As to the existent which has the meaning of the 'true', all the categories participate in it in the same way, 2 and the existent which has the meaning of the 'true' is something in the mind, namely that a thing is outside the soul in conformity with what it is inside the soul, 3 and the knowledge of this is prior to the knowledge of its quiddity; that is, knowledge of the quiddity of a thing cannot be asked for, unless it is known that it exists.4 And as to those quiddities which precede in our minds the knowledge of their existence, they are not really quiddities, but only nominal definitions, and only when it is known that their meaning exists outside the soul does it become known that they are quiddities and definitions. And in this sense it is said in the book of the Categories that the intelligible universals of things become existent through their particulars, and that the particulars become intelligible through their universals. 5 And it is said in the De Anima that the faculty by which it is perceived that a thing is a definite particular and exists is another faculty than the faculty by which the quiddity of the definite particular is perceived, 6 and it is in this way that it is said that particulars exist in the external world and universals in the mind. 7 And there is no difference in the meaning of the 'true', whether it concerns material existents or separate existents. The theory that existence is an addition to the quiddity and that the existent in its essence does not subsist by it 8 —and this is the theory of Avicenna—is a most erroneous theory, for this would imply that the term 'existence' signified an accident outside the soul common to the ten categories. And then it can be asked about this accident when it is said to exist, if'exist' is taken here in the meaning of the 'true' or whether it is meant that an accident exists in this accident, and so on ad infinitum, which is absurd, as we have shown

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1

e l s e w h e r e . I believe t h a t it is this m e a n i n g of 'existence' w h i c h G h a z a l i tried to d e n y of t h e First P r i n c i p l e , a n d i n d e e d in this sense it m u s t b e d e n i e d of all existents a n d a fortiori of t h e First P r i n c i p l e , since it is a false t h e o r y . 5 H a v i n g m e n t i o n e d this sense of u n i t y in t h e s t a t e m e n t s of t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s , G h a z a l i n o w p r o c e e d s to d e s c r i b e t h e ways in w h i c h t h e y c o n t r a d i c t themselves in his o p i n i o n , a n d h e s a y s : N o w notwithstanding all this, the philosophers affirm of God that He is the First and a principle, an existent, a substance, a m o n a d , that H e is eternal, everlasting, knowledge and knower and known, a n agent and a creator, that He is endowed with will and power and life, that H e is the lover and the beloved, the enjoyer and the enjoyed, that H e is generous, and the absolute good, and they believe that all this is meant by the term 'one', and does not imply any plurality. And this indeed is something very wonderful. Now we must first state their theory clearly in order to understand it well, and then we shall occupy ourselves with its refutation, for it is an absurd undertaking to refute a theory before it is well understood. Now the central point for the understanding of their doctrine is that they say that the essence of the Principle is one, and the plurality of terms arises only through bringing something in relation to it or through bringing it in relation to something, or through denying something of it; for the negation of something does not cause a plurality in that of which it is denied, nor does the establishment of a relation produce, a plurality. ; Then-lore they do not deny the plurality of the negations and the relations, and it is thus their task to refer all the qualities mentioned to negation and relation. T h e y say that when God is said to be the First this means a relation to all the existents after Him. W h e n He is said to be a principle, it signifies that the existence of everything else depends on H i m and is caused by H i m ; it means therefore a relation to an effect. And when He is said to exist, it means that He is apprehended, 3 and when H e is said to be a substance it means that He is the being ol which it is denied that it inheres in a substratum and this is a negation. 4 When He is said to be eternal, it means that His non-existence in the past is denied; and when He is said to be everlasting, it means that His non-existence in the future is denied, and the terms 'eternal' and 'everlasting' arc reduced to an existence not preceded n o r followed by a non-existence. W h e n H e is said to be a necessary existent, it means that there is no cause for His existence and that H e is the cause of everything else, and this is a combination of negation and relation : the denial of a cause for His existence is a negation, and making H i m the cause of cvciy thing else is a relation. W h e n H e is said to be intellect, this means that H e is free from matter and everything f m f i o m matter is intellect, i.e. thinks its own substance, is self-conscious, and knows everything else, a n d the essence of God is such:

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He is free from matter and therefore—for these two expressions have the same meaning—He is an intellect.' When He is said to be knowing, it means that His essence which is intellect has an object of thought, namely His essence, for He is self-conscious and knows His own self, and His essence is the known and the knower for all that is one, since He is the known in so far as He is a quiddity, abstract from matter, not hidden from His essence which is intellect in the sense that it is a quiddity abstract from matter, from which nothing is hidden; and because He thinks His own self, He is knowing, and because He is His own object of thought, He is an object known, and since He thinks through* His own essence, not through something additional to His own essence, He is intellect, and it is not impossible that the knower and the thing known should be one, for the knower, when he knows that he knows, knows it because he is a knower,2 so that knower and known are in a way the same; although our intellect is in this respect different from the intellect of the First Principle, for the intellect of the First Principle is eternally in act, whereas our intellect is sometimes in potency, sometimes in act.3 And when He is said to be a creator, an agent and an originator and to have the other attributes of action, it means that His existence is eminent, from which the existence of the universe emanates in a necessary emanation, and that the existence of everything derives from Him and is consequent on His existence in the way that light is consequent on the sun and heat consequent on fire. But the relation of the world to God resembles the relation of light to the sun only in this, that both are effects, and not in any other way, for the sun is not aware of the emanation of light from it, nor fire of the emanation of heat from it; for this is mere nature. 4 But the First is conscious of Himself and is aware that His essence is the principle of everything else, and the emanation of everything which emanates from Him is known to Him, and He is not inattentive to anything that proceeds from Him. Nor can He be compared to one of us who puts himself between a sick man and the sun, for then it is the case that because of him, but not through his choice (although he does it consciously and not unwillingly cither), the sick man is protected against the sun's heat, and it is his body which causes the shadow, but it is his soul, not his body, which knows that the shadow is falling and is pleased about it. But this does not apply to the First: in Him the agent is at the same time the knower and the one that is pleased; that is, He is not unwilling, and He is conscious that His perfection consists in the emanation proceeding from Him. s Yes, even if it were possible to assume that the man's body causing the shadow were identical with the knower of the shadow, who is pleased with it, even then he would not be similar to the First. For the First is both knower and agent, and His knowledge is the principle of His act; and His consciousness of Himself as the principle of the universe is the cause of the emanation of the universe and the existing order; and the existing order is the consequence of the order thought of, in the sense that it occurs through Him and that

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H e is the agent of the universe without there being an addition to His knowledge of the universe, since His knowledge of the universe is the cause of the emanation of the universe from H i m , and His knowledge of the universe does not a d d anything to His self-consciousness, for H e could not be self-conscious if H e did not know that H e is the principle of the universe, the object of His knowledge is in first intention His own essence, a n d the universe is the object of His knowledge in second intention,' and this is the meaning of His being an agent. A n d when it is said that He has power, nothing is m e a n t but that He is an agent in the way we have stated, namely, t h a t His existence is the existence from which the powers e m a n a t e through the emanation of which the a r r a n g e m e n t of the world is ordered in the most perfect way possible in accomplishment and beauty. 2 And when it is said that H e is willing, nothing is m e a n t but that H e is not inattentive to w h a t emanates from H i m and that H e is not opposed to it; no, H e knows t h a t in the e m a n a t i o n of the universe His own perfection is attained, a n d it is permissible to say in this sense that H e is satisfied, and it is pennissible to say of the satisfied that H e is willing; and His will is nothing but His very power and His power is nothing but His very knowledge and His knowledge nothing b u t His very essence, so that everything is reduced to His very essence. For His knowledge of things is not derived from tilings, for otherwise H e would acquire His quality and perfection through another, and this is impossible in the necessary existent. But our knowledge is twofold: partly knowledge of a thing which results from its form like our knowledge of the form of heaven and earth, partly knowledge of our own invention, when we represent in ourselves the form of a thing we do not see and then p r o d u c e it; in this case the existence of the form is derived from the knowledge and not the knowledge from the existence. 3 Now the knowledge the First has is of the second category, for the representation of the order in Himself is the cause of the emanation of the order from Him. 4 Indeed, if the mere presence of the form of a picture or of writing in our souls were sufficient for the occurrence of this form, then our knowledge would be identical with our power and our will ; s but through our deficiency our representation does not suffice to produce the form, but we need besides a new act of will which results from our appetitive faculty, so that through these two the power which moves our muscles and our nerves in our organs can enter into motion, and through the movement of our muscles a n d nerves our h a n d or any other m e m b e r can move, a n d through its movement the p e n or any other external instrument can come into motion and through the movement of the pen the matter, e.g. the ink, can move, and so the form is realized which we represented in our souls. Therefore the very existence of this form in our souls is not a power a n d a n act of will; no, in us power lies in the principle which moves our muscles and this form moves the mover which is the principle of the power. 6 But this is not the case with the necessary existent, for H e is n o t composed of bodies from which the powers in His extremities

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originate, and so His power, His will, His knowledge, and His essence a r e all one. W h e n it is said that H e is living,' nothing is meant but t h a t H e is conscious of the knowledge through which the existent which is called His act emanates from H i m . For the living is the doer, the perceiver, and the meaning of the term is His essence in relation to His acts in the way we have described, not at all like our life, which can be only perfected through two different faculties from which perception and action result. But His life again is His very essence. And when it is said that He is generous, w h a t is meant is that the universe emanates from H i m , but not for an end which refers to Himself, 2 for generosity is perfected by two conditions: first that the receiver of the benefit has profit of w h a t is given to him, for* the giving of something to one who is not in need of it is not called generosity; secondly, that the benefactor is not himself in need of generosity, so that he himself becomes a benefactor through a need he experiences himself, and anyone who is generous out of a desire for praise and approbation or to avoid blame seeks a reward and is not generous. 3 But true generosity belongs to God alone, for He does not seek to avoid blame, nor does He desire a perfection acquired through praise, and the term 'generosity' indicates His existence in relation to His act and with the denial of a n end, and this does not imply a plurality in His essence. W h e n H e is said to be the absolute good, it means that His existence is free from any imperfection and from any possibility of non-existence, for badness has no essence, but refers to the non-existence of an essence or to the absence of the goodness of the essence. 4 For existence itself, in so far as it is existence, is good, and therefore this term refers* to the negation of the possibility of non-existence and of badness. Sometimes 'good' means that which is the cause of the order in things, and the First is the principle of the order of everything and therefore H e is g o o d ; ' and in this case the term signifies existence in a certain kind of relation. W h e n He is said to be a necessary existent, this existence is m e a n t with the denial of a cause for His existence and the impossibility of a cause for His non-existence, in the beginning and at the end. W h e n it is said that H e is the lover and the beloved, 6 the enjoyer and the enjoyed, 7 it means that He is every beauty and splendour and perfection, and that He is beloved and desired by the possessor of this perfection and the only meaning of 'enjoyment' is the perception of appropriate perfection. If it could be imagined of a single m a n that he knew his own perfection in comprehending all intelligibles, if he could comprehend them, that he knew the beauty of his own form, the perfection of his power, the strength of his limbs, in short if he perceived in himself the presence of all perfection of which he was capable, he would love his perfection and enjoy it, and his enjoyment would only be incomplete through the possibility of its loss and its diminution, for the joy which refers to the

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transitory, or to what is feared to be transitory, is not perfect. But the First possesses the most perfect splendour and the most complete beauty, since all perfection is possible to Him and present in Him, and He perceives this beauty, secure against the possibility of its diminution and loss, and the perfection He possesses is superior to all perfection, and His love and His enjoyment of this perfection are superior to all love and to all enjoyment, and His enjoyment cannot be compared in any way to our enjoyment and is too glorious to be called enjoyment, joy, and delight, for we have no expressions for such concepts, and using these terms metaphorically for Him, we must be conscious of the great difference, just as when we apply to Him metaphorically our terms, 'willing', choosing', 'acting', we are convinced of the great distance between His will, power, and knowledge, from our will, power, and knowledge, and it is not impossible that this term 'enjoyment' should be regarded as improper and that another term should be used.2 What we want to express is that His state is more glorious than the conditions of the angels, and more desirable, and the condition of the angels is more glorious than our condition; and if there were no other joy than in bodily desire and sex, the condition of the ass and the pig would be superior to the state of the angels, but the angels, who are separate from matter, have no other joy than the joy arising from the knowledge of their share in perfection and beauty, the cessation of which is not to be feared. But the joy of the First is superior to the joy of the angels, and the existence of the angels which are intellects separate from matter is possible in its essence and necessary of existence through another, and the possibility of non-existence is a kind of badness and imperfection, and nothing is absolutely free from badness except the First, and He is the absolute good and He possesses the utmost splendour and beauty; further, He is the beloved, whether anyone else loves Him or not, as He is the knower and the known, whether anyone else knows Him or not. And all these concepts refer to His essence and to His perception and to His knowledge of His essence, and the knowledge of His essence is His very essence, for He is pure intellect, and all this leads back to one single notion. This is the way to set forth their doctrine, and these things can be divided into that which may be believed (but we shall show that according to their own principles they must regard it as untrue) and into that which may not be believed (and we shall show its falsehood). We shall now return to the five classes of plurality and to their claim to deny them, and shall show their inability to establish their proof, and shall treat each question separately. I say: The greater part of what he mentions in his description of the philosophical theories about God as being one, notwithstanding the plurality of attributes ascribed to Him, he has stated accurately, and

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we shall not argue with him about it, with the exception of his statement that to Him the designation of'intellect' is a negation; 1 for this is not true—on the contrary it is the most special appellation for His essence according to the Peripatetics, in contrast to Plato's opinion that the intellect is not the First Principle and that intellect cannot be attributed to the First Principle. 2 Nor is his statement that in the separate intellects there is potency, non-existence, and badness a philosophical theory. But we shall now return to his refutations in these five questions.

THE SIXTH DISCUSSION To refute their denial of attributes Ghazali says: The philosophers agree—exactly as do the Mu'tazilites—that it is impossible to ascribe to the First Principle knowledge, power, and will, and they aflirm that we have received these terms through the Divine Law, and that they may be used as verbal expressions, but that they refer to one essence as we have explained previously, and that it is not permissible to accept an attribute additional to its essence in the way we may consider, as regards ourselves, our knowledge, power, and will, as attributes of ourselves, additional to our essence. And they affirm that this causes a plurality, because if these attributes are supposed to occur to us in the course of our development, we know that they are additional to our essence, because they constitute new facts*; on the other hand, if they are supposed to be simultaneous with our existence without any time-lag, their simultaneity does not prevent them from being an addition to our essence.3 For when one thing is added to another and it is known that they are not identical, it is thought, even if they are simultaneous, that they are two. Therefore the fact that these qualities would be simultaneous with the essence of the First does not prevent them from being extraneous to its essence, and this causes a plurality in the necessary existent, and this is impossible; and therefore they all agree in the denial of the attributes.

I say: The difficulty for the man who denies a plurality of attributes consists in this: that different attributes are reduced to one essence, so that for instance knowledge, will, and power would mean one and the same thing and signify one single essence, and that also knowledge and knower, power and possessing power, will and wilier

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would have one and the same meaning. The difficulty for the man, however, who affirms that there exist both an essence and attributes additional to the essence, consists in this: that the essence becomes a condition for the existence of the attributes and the attributes a condition for the perfection of the essence, and that their combination would be a necessary existent, that is, one single existent in which there is neither cause nor effect. And this latter difficulty can- 10 not be really solved when it is assumed that there exists an essentially necessary existent, for this implies that it must be one in every way and can in no way be composed of the condition and the conditioned and of cause and effect, for such a composition would have to be either necessary or possible; (1) if necessary, it would be necessary through another, not through itself, since it is difficult to assume an eternal compound as existing through itself, i.e. as not having a cause for its composition, and this is especially difficult for the man who believes that every accident is temporal, 1 since the fact of being a 313 compound would be an eternal accident; (2) if possible, a cause would be needed to join together the effect and the cause. Now, according to philosophical principles it is quite impossible that there should be a compound existing by itself, having eternal attributes, since the composition would be a condition of its existence; and its parts could not be agents for the composition, for the composition 5 would have to be a condition for their existence. Therefore, when the parts of any natural compound are disjoined, their original name can be only applied to them equivocally, e.g. the term 'hand', used of the hand which is a part of the living man and the hand which has been cut off; and every compound is for Aristotle transitory and a fortiori cannot be without a cause. 2 But as to the system of Avicenna, with its division of the necessary 10 existent from the possible existent, it does not lead to the denial of an eternal compound; for when we assume that the possible ends in a necessary cause and that the necessary cause must either have a cause or not, and in the former case must end in a necessary existent which has no cause, this reasoning leads through the impossibility of an infinite regress to a necessary existence which has no efficient cause— not, however, to an existent which has no cause at all, for this existent might have a formal or a material cause, unless it is assumed that 314 everything which has matter and form, or in short every compound, must have an external cause; but this needs a proof which the demonstration based on the principle of the necessary existent does not

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contain, even if we do not consider the mistake in it we have already mentioned. And for exactly the same reason the proof of the Ash'arites that every temporal occurrence needs a cause does not lead to an eternal First Principle which is not composite, but only to a First Principle which is not temporal. As to the fact that knower and knowledge are one, it is not impossible, but necessary, that such pairs of things lead up to the unity of their concepts; e.g. if the knower knows through knowledge, that through which he becomes a knower is more apt to be a knower, for the quality which any thing acquires from another is in itself more apt to possess the concept which is acquired, e.g. if the living bodies in our sublunary world are not alive by themselves, but through a life which inheres in them, then necessarily this life through which the non-living acquires life is alive by itself, or there would be an infinite regress; and the same is the case with knowledge and the other attributes. 1 Now, it cannot be denied that one essence can have many attributes related, negative, or imaginary, in different ways without this implying a plurality in the essence, e.g. that a thing is an existent and one and possible or* necessary, 2 for when the one identical entity is viewed in so far as something else proceeds from it, it is called capable and acting, and in so far as it is viewed as differentiating between two opposite acts, it is called willing, and in so far as it is viewed as perceiving its object, knowing, and in so far as it* is viewed as perceiving and as a cause of motion, it is called living, since the living is the perceiving and the self-moving.3 What is impossible is only a single simple existence with a plurality of attributes, existing by themselves, and especially if these attributes should be essential and exist in act, and as to these attributes existing in potency, it is not impossible, according to the philosophers, that something should be one in act and a plurality in potency, and this is the case according to them, with the parts of the definition in their relation to the thing defined. 4 And as to Ghazali's words: And they affirm that this causes a plurality . . . that they arc two. he means by them that the fact that these attributes arc simultaneous with the essence does not prevent them from being necessarily a plurality by themselves, just as, if their existence were posterior to the essence, or if some of them were posterior to others, mind would not conceive them as being one.

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After stating the view of the philosophers, Ghazali says: 316 But it must be said to the philosophers: How do you know the impossibility of plurality of this kind? for you are in opposition to all the Muslims, the Mu'tazilites excepted, and what is your proof of it? If someone says: 'Plurality is impossible, since the fact that the essence is regarded as one is equivalent to the impossibility of its having a plurality of attributes' this is just the point under discussion, and the impossibility is not self-evident, and a proof is needed. They have indeed two proofs. The 5 first is that they say that, when subject and attribute are not identical, either both, subject and attribute, can exist independently of the other, or each will need the other, or only one of them will depend on the other. In the first case they will both be necessary existents, and this implies an absolute duality and is impossible. In the second case neither of them will 10 be a necessary existent, because the meaning of a necessary existent is that it exists by itself and does not depend in any way on anything else, and when a thing requires something else, that other is its cause, since, if this other were annulled, its existence would be impossible and it would therefore exist not by itself but through another. In the third case the one which was dependent would be an effect and the necessary existent would be the other, on which it would be dependent, and that which was an effect would need a cause, and therefore this would necessarily involve connecting the essence of the necessary existent with a cause.1 I say: When their opponents concede to the philosophers that there is an existent necessary by itself and that the meaning of the necessary existent is that it has no cause at all, neither in its essence through which it subsists, or through something external, they cannot escape the conclusion which the philosophers forced upon them: that if the attributes existed through the essence, the essence would be an existent necessary through itself, and the attributes would be necessary 317 through something different from themselves, and the essence of the necessary existent would exist by itself, but the attributes would be necessary through something different from themselves, and essence and attributes together would form a compound. 2 But the Ash'arites do not concede to the philosophers that the existence of a necessary existent, subsisting by itself, implies that it has no cause whatsoever, for their argument leads only to the denial of an efficient cause additional to the essence.3 5 Ghazali says: The objection against this is to say: The case to be accepted is the last, but we have shown in the fifth discussion that you have no proof for your denial of the first case, that of absolute duality; what is affirmed by you

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in the fifth discussion can only be justified by basing it upon your denial of plurality in this and the following discussions: how can you therefore base this discussion upon what* is itself the upshot of this discussion ?' But the correct solution is to say: 'The essence does not need the attributes for its subsistence, whereas the attributes need a subject, as is the case with us ourselves.' There remains their statement that what is in need of something else is not a necessary existent. One may ask them: Why do you make such a statement, if you understand by 'necessary existent' only that which has no efficient cause, and why is it impossible to say that, just as there is no agent for the essence of the necessary existent, which is eternal, there is no agent for its attributes, which are equally eternal? If, however, you understand by 'necessary existent' that which has no receptive cause, we answer that that is not implied in this conception of the necessary existent, which, according to this conception is all the same eternal and has no agent; and what is wrong with this conception? If it is answered that the absolute necessary existent is that which has no efficient cause and no receptive cause,2 for if a receptive cause for it were conceded, it would be conceded that it was an effect—we say: To call the receptive essence a receptive cause3 is one of your technical terms, and there is no proof of the real existence of a necessary existent corresponding to your terminology; all that is proved is that there must be a final term to the series of causes and effects, and no more, and this series can end in a unit with eternal attributes which have no more an agent than the essence itself, and are supposed to be in the essence itself. But let us put aside this term 'necessary existent', which is full of possible confusion. The proof indeed only demonstrates the end of the series and nothing more, and your further claims are pure presumption. If it is said: In the same way as the series of efficient causes must have an end, the series of receptive causes must have an end, since if every existent needed a substratum to inhere in it and this substratum again needed a substratum, this would imply an infinite scries, just as this would be the case if every existent needed a cause and this cause again another cause—we answer: You are perfectly right and for this very reason we say that the series has an end and that the attribute exists in its essence and that this essence docs not exist in something else, just as our knowledge exists in our essence and our essence is its substratum, but does not exist itself in a substratum. The series of efficient causes comes to an end for the attribute at the same time as for the essence, since the attribute has an agent no more than the essence has, still the essence provided with this attribute does not cease to exist, although neither itself nor its attribute has a cause. As to the receptive causes, its series can only end in the essence, for how could the negation of a cause imply the negation of a substratum? 4 The proof does not demonstrate anything but the termination of the series, and every method by which this termination can be explained is sufficient

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to establish the proof which demands the existence of the necessary existent. But if by 'necessary existent' is understood something besides the existent which has no efficient cause and which brings the causal series to an end, we do not by any means concede that this is necessary. And whenever the mind regards it as possible to acknowledge an eternal existent which has no cause for its existence, it regards it as possible to acknowledge an eternal subject for which there is no cause, either for its essence or for its attribute. As to Ghazali's words: We have shown in the fifth discussion that you have no proof for your denial of the first case, that of absolute duality; what is affirmed by you in the fifth discussion can only be justified by basing it upon your denial of 319 plurality. I say: Ghazali means the philosophers' denial that subject and attribute are both subsistent by themselves, for from this it follows that they are independent of each other and that both are independent gods, which is a dualistic theory, since there is no connexion through which attribute and subject could become a unity. And since the philoso- 5 phers used as an argument for the denial of this kind of plurality the fact that it has dualism as its consequence, 1 and a demonstration ought to proceed in the opposite sense, namely, that dualism would have to be denied, because of the impossibility of plurality, he says that their proof is circular and that they proved the principle by the conclusion. Their objection, however, was not based upon the facts themselves, but on the theory of their opponents who deny dualism. And you 10 have learned in another place that there are two kinds of refutation, one based on the objective facts, the other based on the statement of the opponent, and although the former is the true kind of refutation, the second type may also be used. 2 As to Ghazali's words: But the correct solution is to say: 'The essence does not need the attributes for its subsistence, whereas the attributes need a subject, as is the 320 case with us ourselves.' There remains their statement that what is in need of another is not a necessary existent. I say: Ghazali means that, when this tripartite division which they use to deny plurality is submitted to them, the facts lead them to establish that (1) the, necessary existent cannot be a compound of attribute

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5 and subject; (2) the essence cannot be a plurality of attributes, for they cannot accept these things according to their principles. Then he starts to show that the impossibility which they strive to deduce from this division is not strict. As to Ghazali's words: One may ask them: Why do you make such a statement, if you understand by 'necessary existent' only that which has no efficient cause, and why is it impossible to say that, just as there is no agent for the essence of 10 the necessary existent, which is eternal, there is no agent for its attributes, which are equally eternal? I say: All this is an objection to Avicenna's method of denying the attributes by establishing the necessary existent which exists by itself, but in this question the most convincing method of showing the necessity of unity and forcing it as a consequence upon the Ash'arites is the method of the Mu'tazilites. For the latter understand by 'possible 321 existence' the truly possible, 1 and they believe that everything below the First Principle is such. Their opponents, the Ash'arites, accept this, and believe also that every possible has an agent, and that the series comes to an end through what is not possible in itself. The Mu'tazilites concede this to them, but they believe that from this concession it follows that the First, which is the final term of the 5 series of possibility, is not a possible, and that this implies its absolute simplicity. The Ash'arites, however, say that the denial of true possibility does not imply simplicity, but only eternity and the absence of an efficient cause, and therefore there is among the Ash'arites no proof of the simplicity of the First through the proof based on the necessary existent. 2 10 And Ghazali says: If it is answered that the absolute necessary existent is that which has no efficient cause and no receptive cause, for if a receptive cause for it were conceded, it would be conceded that it was an effect. I say: Ghazali means that, if the philosophers say that the proof has led to a necessary existent which has no efficient cause, it has, according to them, no receptive cause either, and that according to the philosophers the assumption of essence and attributes implies the assumption of a receptive cause. 322 Then Ghazali, answering this, says: ,

THE SIXTH DISCUSSION 193 We say: To call the receptive essence a receptive cause is one of your technical terms, and there is no proof for the real existence of a necessary existent corresponding to your terminology; all that is proved is that there must be a final term to the series of causes and effects.

I say: Ghazali means that the Ash'arites do not concede that this essence in which the attributes inhere is a receptive cause, 1 so as to be forced to admit an efficient cause for it. He says that the proof of the philosophers does not lead to an existent which has no receptive cause, let alone proving the existence of what has no essence and no attributes. It only proves that it has no efficient cause. This objection is a necessary consequence of their own proof. Even if the Ash'arites had accepted the philosophical theory that what has no efficient cause has no receptive cause, their own statement would not have been overthrown, for the essence which they assume only receives attributes which do not belong to the First, since they assume that the attributes are additional to the essence of the First, and they do not admit essential attributes in the way the Christians do. 2 And as to Ghazali's words: 323 If it is said: In the same way as the series of efficient causes must have an end, the series of receptive causes must have an end, since if every existent needed a substratum to inhere in it and this substratum again needed a substratum, this would imply an infinite series, just as this would be the case if every existent needed a cause and this cause again another cause— we answer: You are perfectly right and for this very reason we say that the series has an end and that the attribute exists in its essence and that this essence does not exist in something else, just as our knowledge exists in our essence and our essence is its substratum, but does not exist itself in a substratum. I say: This statement has no connexion with this discussion either with respect to the philosophical theories he mentions or with respect to the answers he gives, and it is a kind of sophism, for there exists no relation between the question, whether the receptive causes must or must not have an end, and the problem which is under discussion, namely whether it is a condition of the First Agent that it should have a receptive cause. 3 For the inquiry about the finiteness of receptive causes differs from the inquiry about the finiteness of efficient causes, since he who admits the existence of receptive causes admits necessarily that their series must end in a primary receptive cause which is

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324 necessarily external to the First Agent, just as he admits the existence of a First Agent external to the receptive matter. For if the First Agent possessed matter, this matter would not exist numerically and individually either in the first recipient or in the inferior recipients of other things;' no, if the First Agent possessed matter, this matter would have 5 to be a matter peculiar to it, and in short it would belong to it; that is, either it would be its primary matter or we should arrive at a first recipient, and this recipient would not be of the genus which is the condition for the existence of all the other existents proceeding from the First Agent. 2 But if matter were the condition for the existence of the First Agent, it would be a condition for the existence of all agents io in their actions, and matter would not only be a condition for the existence of the agent's act—since every agent acts only on a recipient •—but it would be a condition for the existence of the agent itself, and therefore every agent would be a body. 3 All this the Ash'arites neither admit nor deny. But when the philosophers tell them that an essence to which such an attribute is ascribed must be a body, they answer: 'Such an attribute is ascribed by you to the soul and yet, according to you, the soul is not a body.' 4 This is the limit to which dialectical arguments in this question can 325 be carried. But the demonstrations are in the works of the ancients which they wrote about this science, and especially in the books of Aristotle, not in the statements of Avicenna about this problem and of other thinkers belonging to Islam, if anything is to be found in them on this question. For their metaphysical theories are pure 5 presumptions, since they proceed from common, not particular, notions, i.e. notions which are extraneous to the nature of the inquiry. And as to Ghazali's words: The series of efficient causes comes to an end for the attribute at the same time as for the essence, since the attribute has an agent no more than the essence has, still the essence provided with this attribute does not cease to exist, although neither itself nor its attribute has a cause. I say: This is a statement which is not accepted by their opponents, the philosophers; on the contrary, they affirm that it is a condition of the First Agent that it should not receive an attribute, because reception io indicates matter and it is therefore not possible to assume as the final term of the causal series an agent of any description whatsoever, but only an agent which has absolutely no agent, and to which no attribute—from which it would follow that it had an agent—can be

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ascribed. For the assumption of the existence of an attribute of the First Agent existing in a receptive cause which would be a condition 326 for its existence is thought by the philosophers to be impossible. Indeed, anything for the existence of which there is a condition can only be connected with this condition through an external cause, for a thing cannot itself be the cause of its connexion with the condition of its existence, just as it cannot be the cause of its own existence. For the conditioned, if it were not connected with its condition, would have to exist by itself, and it needs an efficient cause to connect the 5 condition with it, since a thing cannot be the cause of the existence of the condition of its own existence; but all these are common notions. And in general one cannot imagine that it is possible to arrive by this method, as applied to this problem, at something near evidence, because of the equivocation in the term 'existent necessary by itself, and in the term 'possible by itself, necessary through another', and the other preliminary notions which are added to them. 10 Ghazali says: The second proof of the philosophers is that they say that the knowledge and the power in us do not enter the quiddity of our essence, but are accidental, and when these attributes are asserted of the First, they too do not enter the quiddity of its essence, but are accidental in their relation to it, even if they are lasting; for frequently an accident does not separate itself from its quiddity and is a necessary attribute of it, but still it does not therefore become a constituent of its essence. And if it is an accident, it is consequent on the essence and the essence is its cause, and it becomes an effect, and how can it then be a necessary existent?1 Then Ghazali says, refuting this: 327 This proof is identical with the first, notwithstanding the change of expression. For we say: If you mean by its being consequent on the essence, and by the essence's being its cause, that the essence is its efficient cause, and that it is the effect of the essence, this is not true, for this is not valid of our knowledge in relation to our essence, since our essence is not an efficient cause of our knowledge. If you mean that the essence is a substratum and 5 that the attribute does not subsist by itself without being in a substratum, this is conceded, and why should it be impossible? For if you call this 'consequent' or 'accident' or 'effect' or whatever name you want to give it, its meaning does not change, since its meaning is nothing but 'existing in the essence in the way attributes exist in their subjects'. And it is by no means impossible that it should exist in the essence, and be all the same eternal and without an agent. All the proofs of the philosophers amount to nothing but the production of a shock by the use of a depreciating expression: 'possible', 'permissible', 'consequent', 'connected', 'effect'—but all

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this may be ignored. For it must be answered: If by this you mean that it has an agent, it is not true, and if only it is meant that it has no agent, but that it has a substratum in which it exists, then let this meaning be indicated by any expression you want, and still it will not become impossible.

I say: This is using many words for one idea. But in this question the difference between the opponents consists in one point, namely: 'Can a thing which has a receptive cause be without an agent or not?' 328 Now it belongs to the principles of the theologians that the connexion of condition and conditioned appertains to the domain of the permissible 1 and that whatever is permissible needs for its realization and actualization an agent which actualizes it and connects the , condition with the conditioned, and that* the connexion is a condition for the existence of the conditioned and that it is possible 5 neither that a thing should be the cause of the condition of its existence, nor that the condition should be the efficient cause of the existence of the conditioned, for our essence is not the efficient cause of the existence of the knowledge which exists in it, but our essence is a condition for the existence of the knowledge existing in it. And because of all these principles it is absolutely necessary that there should exist an efficient cause which brings about the connexion of condition and conditioned, and this is the case with every conjunction of a condition and a conditioned. But all these principles are annulled 2 by the philosophical theory that heaven is eternal, although it possesses essence and attributes, for the philosophers do not give it io an agent of the kind which exists in the empirical world, as would be the consequence of these principles; they only assume that there is a proof which leads to an eternal connexion through an eternal connecting principle, and this is another kind of connexion, differing from that which exists in transitory things. 3 But all these are problems which need a serious examination. And the assumption of the philosophers 4 that these attributes do not constitute the essence is not true, for every essence is perfected by attributes through which it becomes more complete and illustrious, and, indeed, it is constituted by these attributes, since through knowledge, power, and will we become superior to those existents which do not possess knowledge, and the essence in which these attributes exist is common to us and to 329 inorganic things. How therefore could such attributes be accidents consequent on our essence? All these are statements of people who have not studied well the psychological and accidental attributes.

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Ghazali says: And often they shock by the use of a depreciating expression in another way, and they say: This leads to ascribing to the First a need for these attributes, so that it would not be self-sufficient absolutely, since the absolutely self-sufficient is not in need of anything else.1 Then Ghazali says, refuting this: 5 This is an extremely weak verbal* argument, for the attributes of perfection do not differ from the essence of the perfect being in such a way that he should be in need of anything else. And if he is eternally perfect through knowledge, power, and life, how could he be in need of anything, or how could his being attached to perfection be described as his being in need? It would be like saying that the perfect needs no perfection and that he who is in need of the attributes of perfection for his essence is imperfect; the answer is that perfection cannot mean anything but the existence of perfection in his essence, and likewise being self-sufficient does not mean 10 anything but the existence of attributes that exclude every need in his essence. How therefore can the attributes of perfection through which divinity is perfected be denied through such purely verbal arguments? I say: There are two kinds of perfection: perfection through a thing's own self and perfection through attributes which give their subject its perfection, and these attributes must be in themselves perfect, for if they were perfect through perfect attributes, we should have to ask whether these attributes were perfect through themselves or through 330 attributes, and we should have therefore to arrive at that which is perfect by itself as a final term. Now the perfect through another will necessarily need, according to the above principles if they are accepted, a bestower of the attributes of perfection; otherwise it would be imperfect. But that which is perfect by itself is like that which is existent by itself, and how true it is that the existent by itself is perfect by itself!2 If therefore there exists an existent by itself, it 5 must be perfect by itself and self-sufficient by itself; otherwise it would be composed of an imperfect essence and attributes perfecting this essence. If this is true, the attribute and its subject are one and the same, and the acts which arc ascribed to this subject as proceeding necessarily from different attributes exist only in a relative way. Ghazali says, answering the philosophers: 10 And if it is said by the philosophers: When you admit an essence and an attribute and the inherence of an attribute in the essence, you admit a composition, and every compound needs a principle which composes it, and just because a body is composed, God cannot be a body—we answer:

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Saying that every compound needs a composing principle is like saying that every existent needs a cause for its existence, and it may be answered: The First is eternal and exists without a cause and without a principle for its existence, and so it may be said that it is a subject, eternal, without a cause for its essence, for its attribute and for the existence of its attribute in its essence; indeed all this is eternal without a cause. But the First cannot be a body, because body is a temporal thing which cannot be free from what is temporal 1 : however, he who does not allow that body has a beginning must be forced to admit that the first cause can be a body, and we shall try later to force this consequence on the philosophers. I say: Composition is not like existence, because composition is like being set in motion*, namely, a passive quality, additional to the essence of things which receive the composition, 2 but existence is a quality which is the essence itself, and whoever says otherwise is mistaken indeed. Further, the compound cannot be divided into that which is compound by itself and that which is compound through another, so that one would finally come to an eternal compound in the way one arrives, where existents are concerned, at an eternal existent, and we have treated this problem in another place. 3 And again: If it is true, as we have said, that composition is something additional to existence, then one may say, if there exists a compound by itself, then there must exist also something moved by itself, and if there exists something moved by itself, then also a privation will come into existence by itself, for the existence of a privation is the actualization of a potency, 4 and the same applies to motion and the thing moved. But this is not the case with existence, for existence is not an attribute additional to the essence, and every existent which does not exist sometimes in potency and sometimes in act is an existent by itself, whereas the existence of a thing as moved occurs only when there is a moving power, and every moved thing therefore needs a mover. 5 The distinctive point in this problem is that the two parts* in any compound must be either (i) mutually a condition for each other's existence, as is, according to the Peripatetics, the case with those which are composed of matters and forms, 6 or (2) neither of them a condition for the existence of the other, or (3) exclusively one the condition for the other. In the first case the compound cannot be eternal, because the compound itself is a condition for the existence of the parts and the parts cannot be the cause of the compound, nor the compound its own cause, for otherwise a thing might be its own cause, and this kind of

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compound, therefore, is transitory and needs an agent for its actualization. 1 I n the second case—and for these compounds it is not in the nature of either of their parts that it implies the other—there is no composition possible without a composing factor, external to the parts, since the composition is not of their own nature so that their essence might exist through their nature or be a consequence of their nature; and if their nature determined the composition and they were both in themselves eternal, their composition would be eternal, but would need a cause which would give it unity, since no eternal thing can possess unity accidentally. I n the third case, and this is the case of the non-essential attribute and its subject, if the subject were eternal and were such as never to be without this attribute, the compound would be eternal. But if this were so, and if an eternal compound were admitted, the Ash'arite proof that all accidents are temporal would not be true, since if there were an eternal compound there would be eternal accidents, one of which would be the composition, whereas the principle on which the Ash'arites base their proof of the temporality of accidents is the fact that the parts of which a body, according to them, is composed must exist first separately; if, therefore, they allowed an eternal compound, it would be possible that there should be a composition not preceded by a separation, and a movement, not preceded by a rest, and if this were permissible, it would be possible that a body possessing eternal accidents should exist, and it would no longer be true for them that what cannot exist without the temporal is temporal. And further, it has already been said that every compound is only one because of a oneness existing in it, and this oneness exists only in it through something which is one through itself. And if this is so, then the one, in so far as it is one, precedes every compound, and the act of this one agent—if this agent is eternal—through which it gives all single existents which exist through it their oneness, is everlasting and without a beginning, not intermittent; for the agent whose act is attached to its object at the time of its actualization is temporal and its object is necessarily temporal, but the attachment of the First Agent to its object is everlasting and its power is everlastingly mixed with its object. And it is in this way that one must understand the relation of the First, God, praise be to Him, to all existents. But since it is not possible to prove these things here, let us turn away from them, since our sole aim was to show that this book of Ghazali does not contain

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any proofs, but mostly sophisms and at best dialectical arguments. But proofs are very rare, and they stand in relation to other arguments as unalloyed gold to the other minerals and the pure pearl to the other jewels. 1 And now let us revert to our subject. 10 Ghazali says: All their proofs where this problem is concerned are imaginary. Further, they are not able to reduce all the qualities which they admit to the essence itself, for they assert, that it is knowing, and so they are forced to admit that this is something additional to its mere existence, and then one can ask them: 'Do you concede that the First knows something besides its essence?1 Some of them concede this, whereas others affirm that it only knows its own self. The former position is that taken by Avicenna, for he affirms that the First knows all things in a universal timeless way, 335 but that it does not know individuals, because to comprehend their continual becoming would imply a change in the essence of the knower.2 But, we ask, is the knowledge which the First has of all the infinite number of species and genera identical with its self-knowledge or not? If you answer in the negative, you have affirmed a plurality and have contradicted your own principle; if you answer in the affirmative, you are like a man claiming that man's knowledge of other things is identical with his self-knowledge and with his own essence, and such a statement is mere stupidity. 5 And it may be argued: 'The definition of an identical thing is that its negation and affirmation cannot be imagined at the same time, and the knowledge of an identical thing, when it is an identical thing, cannot at the same time be imagined as existing and not existing. And since it is not impossible to imagine a man's self-knowledge without imagining his knowledge of something else, it may be said that his knowledge of something else is different from his self-knowledge, since, if they were the same, the affirmation or negation of the one would imply the affirmation or negation of the other. For it is impossible that Zaid should be at one and the same time both existing and not existing, but the existence of self-knowledge simultaneously with the non-existence of the knowledge of something else is not impossible, nor is this impossible with the self-knowledge of the First IO and its knowledge of something else, for the existence of the one can be imagined without the other and they are therefore two things, whereas the existence ofvits essence without the existence of its essence cannot be imagined, and if the knowledge of all things formed a unity, it would be impossible to imagine this duality. Therefore* all those philosophers who acknowledge that the First knows something besides its own essence have undoubtedly at the same time acknowledged a plurality. I say: The summary of this objection to the proposition that the First knows both itself and something else is that knowing one's self is

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different from knowing something else. But Ghazali falls here into confusion. For this can be understood in two ways: first, that Zaid's knowledge of his own individuality is identical with his knowledge of other things, and this is not true; secondly, that man's knowledge of other things, namely of existents, is identical with the knowledge of his own essence, and this is true. 1 And the proof is that his essence is nothing but his knowledge of the existents. 2 For if man like all other beings knows only the quiddity which characterizes him, and if his quiddity is the knowledge of things, then man's self-knowledge is necessarily the knowledge of all other things, for if they were different his essence would be different from his knowledge of things. This is clear in the case of the artisan, for his essence, through which he is called an artisan, is nothing but his knowledge of the products of art. 3 And as to Ghazali's words, that if his self-knowledge were identical with his knowledge of other things, then the negation of the one would be the negation of the other and the affirmation of the one the affirmation of the other, he means that if the self-consciousness of man were identical with his knowledge of other things, he could not know his own self without knowing the other things; that is, if he were ignorant of other things, he would not know his own self, and this proposition is in part true, in part false. For the quiddity of man is knowledge, and knowledge is the thing known in one respect and is something different in another. And if he is ignorant of a certain object of knowledge, he is ignorant of a part of his essence, and if he is ignorant of all knowables, he is ignorant of his essence; and to deny man this knowledge is absolutely the same as to deny man's selfconsciousness, for if the thing known is denied to the knower in so far as the thing known and knowledge are one, man's self-consciousness itself is denied. But in so far as the thing known is not knowledge, it is not man, and to deny man this knowledge does not imply the denial of man's self-consciousness. And the same applies to individual men. For Zaid's knowledge of Amr is not Zaid himself, and therefore Zaid can know his own self, while being ignorant of Amr. Ghazali says: If it is said: 'The First does not know other things in first intention. No, it knows its own essence as the principle of the universe, and from this its knowledge of the universe follows in second intention,4 since it cannot know its essence except as a principle, for this is the true sense of its essence, and it cannot know its essence as a principle for other things, without the other things entering into its knowledge by way of implication and consequence;

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it is not impossible that from its essence consequences should follow, and this does not imply a plurality in its essence, and only a plurality in its 5 essence is impossible'—there are different ways of answering this. First your assertion that it knows its essence to be a principle is a presumption; it suffices that it knows the existence of its essence, and the knowledge that it is a principle is an addition to its knowledge of its essence, since being a principle is a relation to the essence and it is possible that it should know its essence and not this relation, and if this being-a-principle were not a relation, its essence would be manifold and it would have existence and be 10 a principle, and this forms a duality. And just as a man can know his essence without knowing that he is an effect, for his being an effect is a relation to his cause, so the fact that the First is a cause is a relation between itself and its object. This consequence is implied in the mere statement of the philosophers that it knows that it is a principle, since this comprises the knowledge of its essence and of its being a principle, and this is a relation, and the relation is not the essence, and the knowledge of the relation is not the knowledge of the essence and we have already given the proof of this, namely that we can imagine knowledge of the essence, without the knowledge of its being a principle, but knowledge of the essence without the knowledge of the essence cannot be imagined, since the essence is an identical unity. I say: The proposition which the philosophers defend against Ghazali in this question is based on philosophical principles which must be 338 discussed first. For if the principles they have assumed and the deductions to which, "according to them, their demonstration leads, are conceded, none of the consequences which Ghazali holds against them follows. T h e philosophers hold, namely, that the incorporeal existent is in its essence nothing but knowledge, for they believe that 5 the forms1 have no knowledge for the sole reason that they are in matter; but if a thing does not exist in matter, it is known to be knowing, and this is known because they found that when forms which are in matter are abstracted in the soul from matter they become knowledge and intellect, for intellect is nothing but the forms abstracted from matter, 2 and if this is true for things which by the principle of their nature are not abstracted, then it is still more appropriate for things which by the principle of their nature are abstracted to be knowledge and intellect. And since what is intelliio gible in things is their innermost reality, and since intellect is nothing but the perception of the intelligibles, our own intellect is the intelligible by itself, in so far as it is an intelligible, and so there is no difference between the intellect and the intelligible, except in so far

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as the intelligibles are intelligibles of things in the nature of which there is no intellect and which only become intellect because the intellect abstracts their forms from their matters, and through this our intellect is not the intelligible in every respect. But if there is a thing which does not exist in matter, then to conceive it by intellect is identical with its intelligible in every respect, and this is the case with the intellectual conception of the intelligibles. And no doubt* the intellect is nothing but the perception of the order and arrangement of existing things, but it is necessary for the separate intellect that it should not depend on the existing things in its intellectual conception of the existing things and of their order, and that its intelligible should not be posterior to them, for every other intellect is such that it follows the order which exists in the existents and perfects itself through it, and necessarily falls short in its intellectual conception of the things, and our intellect, therefore, cannot adequately fulfil the demands of the natures of existing things in respect of their order and arrangement. But if the natures of existing things follow the law of the intellect and our intellect is inadequate to perceive the natures of existent things, there must necessarily exist a knowledge of the arrangement and order which is the cause of the arrangement, order and wisdom which exist in every single being, and it is necessary that this intellect should be the harmony which is the cause of the harmony which exists in the existents, and that it should be impossible to ascribe to its perception knowledge of universals, let alone knowledge of individuals, 1 because universals are intelligibles which are consequent on and posterior to existents, 2 whereas on the contrary the existents are consequent on this intellect. And this intellect necessarily conceives existents by conceiving the harmony and order which exist in the existents through its essence, not by conceiving anything outside its essence, for in that case it would be the effect, not the cause, of the existent it conceives, and it would be inadequate. And if you have understood this philosophical theory, you will have understood that the knowledge of things through a universal knowledge is inadequate, for it knows them in potency, 3 and that the separate intellect only conceives its own essence, and that by conceiving its own essence it conceives all existents, since its intellect is nothing but the harmony and order which exist in all beings, and this order and harmony is received by the active powers which possess order and harmony and exist in all beings and are called natures by the philosophers. 4 For it seems that in every being there

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are acts which follow the arrangement and order of the intellect, and this cannot happen by accident, nor can it happen through an intellect which resembles our intellect; no, this can only occur through an intellect more exalted than all beings, and this intellect is neither a universal nor an individual. And if you have understood this philosophical theory, all the difficulties which Ghazali raises here against the philosophers are solved; but if you assume that yonder intellect resembles our own, the difficulties mentioned follow. For the intellect which is in us is numerable and possesses plurality, but this is not the case with yonder intellect, for it is free from the plurality which belongs to our intelligibles and one cannot imagine a difference in it between the perceiver _ and the perceived, whereas to the intellect which is in us the perception of a thing is different from the perception that it is a principle of a thing, and likewise its perception of another is different in a certain way from the perception of itself. Still, our intellect has a resemblance to yonder intellect, and it is yonder intellect which gives our intellect this resemblance, for the intelligibles which are in yonder intellect are free from the imperfections which are in our intellect: for instance, our intellect only becomes the intelligible in so far as it is an intelligible, because there exists an intellect which is the intelligible in every respect. The reason for this is that everything which possesses an imperfect attribute possesses this attribute necessarily through a being which possesses it in a perfect way. For instance, that which possesses an insufficient warmth possesses this through a thing which possesses a perfect warmth, and likewise that which possesses an insufficient life or an imperfect intellect possesses this through a thing which possesses a perfect life or a perfect intellect. 1 And in the same way a thing which possesses a perfect rational act receives this act from a perfect intellect, and if the acts of all beings, although they do not possess intellects, are perfect rational acts, then there exists an intellect through which the acts of all beings become rational acts. It is weak thinkers who, not having understood this, ask whether the First Principle thinks its own essence or if it thinks something outside its essence. But to assume that it thinks something outside its essence would imply that it is perfected by another thing, and to assume that it does not think something outside its essence would imply that it is ignorant of existents. One can only wonder at these people who remove from the attributes which are common to the Creator and the created, all the imperfections which they possess in

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the created, and who still make our intellect like His intellect, whereas nothing is more truly free from all imperfection than His intellect. This suffices for the present chapter, but now let us relate the other arguments of Ghazali in this chapter and call attention to the mis- 10 takes in them. Ghazali says: The second way to answer this assertion is to say that their expression that everything is known to it in second intention is without sense, for as soon as its knowledge comprehends a thing different from itself, in the way it comprehends its own essence, this First Principle will have two different objects of knowledge and it will know them both, for the plurality and the difference of the object known imply a plurality in the knowledge, since each of the two objects known receives in the imagination the discrimination which distinguishes it from the other. And therefore the knowledge of the one cannot be identical with the knowledge of the other, for in that case it would be impossible to suppose the existence of the one without the other, and indeed there could not be an other at all, since they would both form an identical whole, and using for it the expression 'second intention' does not make any difference. Further, I should be pleased to know how he who says that not even the weight of an atom, either in heaven or earth, escapes God's knowledge,1 intends to deny the plurality, unless by saying that God knows the universe in a universal way. However, the universals which form the objects of His knowledge would be infinite,2 and still His knowledge which is attached to them would remain one in every respect, notwithstanding their plurality and their differentiation. I say: 343 The summary of this is found in two questions. The first is, 'How can its knowledge of its own self be identical with its knowledge of another?' The answer to this has already been given, namely that there is something analogous in the human mind which has led us to believe in the necessity of its being in the First Intellect. T h e second question is whether its knowledge is multiplied through 5 the plurality of its objects known and whether it comprehends all finite and infinite knowablcs in a way which makes it possible that its knowledge should comprehend the infinite. The answer to this question is that it is not impossible that there should exist in the First Knowledge, notwithstanding its unity, a distinction between the objects known, and it is not impossible, according to the philosophers, that it should know a thing, different from itself, and its own essence, through a knowledge which differs in such a way that there should

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10 exist a plurality of knowledge. The only thing which is absolutely impossible according to them is that the First Intellect should be perfected through the intelligible and caused by it, and if the First Intellect thought things different from itself in the way we do, it would be an effect of the existent known, not its cause, and it has been definitely proved that it is the cause of the existent. The plurality which the philosophers deny does not consist in its knowing through its own essence, but in its knowing through a knowledge 1 which is additional to its essence; the denial, however, of this plurality in God does not imply the denial of a plurality of things known, except through dialectics, and Ghazali's transference of the problem 344 of the plurality which is in the knowledge, according to the philosophers, to the problem of plurality which is in the things known themselves, is an act of sophistry, because it supposes that the philosophers deny the plurality which is in the knowledge through the things known, in the way they deny the plurality which arises through the duality of substratum and inherent. 5 But the truth in this question is that there is not a plurality of things knownin the Eternal Knowledge like their numerical plurality in human knowledge. For the numerical plurality of things known in human knowledge arises from two sources: first the representations, and this resembles spatial plurality; 1 secondly the plurality of what is known in our intellect, namely the plurality which occurs in the first genus—which we may call being 2 —through its division into all the species which are subsumed under it, for our intellect is one 3 with IO respect to the universal genus which comprises all species existing in the world, whereas it becomes manifold through the plurality of the species. And it is clear that when we withhold the idea of the universal from the Eternal Knowledge, this plurality is in fact abandoned and there only remains in the Divine a plurality the perception of which is denied to our intellect, for otherwise our knowledge would be identical with this eternal knowledge, and this is impossible. And therefore what the philosophers say is true, that for the human understanding there is a limit, where it comes to a stand, and beyond which it cannot trespass, and this is our inability to understand the nature 345 of this knowledge. And again, our intellect is knowledge of the existents in potency, not knowledge in act, and knowledge in potency is less perfect than knowledge in act; and the more our knowledge is universal, the more it comes under the heading of potential knowledge and the more its knowledge becomes imperfect. 4 But it is not

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true of the Eternal Knowledge that it is imperfect in any way, and in it there is no knowledge in potency, for knowledge in potency is 5 knowledge in matter. Therefore the philosophers believe that the First Knowledge requires that there should be a knowledge in act and that there should be in the divine world no universal at all and no plurality which arises out of potency, like the plurality of the species which results from the genus. And for this reason alone we are unable to perceive the actually infinite, that the things known to us are separated from each other, and if there exists a knowledge in which the things known are unified, then with respect to it the finite 10 and the infinite are equivalent. The philosophers assert that there are definite proofs for all these statements, and if we understand by 'plurality in knowledge' only this plurality and this plurality is denied of the Divine, then the knowledge of God is a unity in act, but the nature of this unity and the representation of its reality are impossible for the human understanding, for if man could perceive the unity, his intellect would be identical with the intellect of the Creator, and this is impossible. And since knowledge of the individual is for us knowledge in act, we know that God's knowledge is more like knowledge of the individual than knowledge of the universal, although it is neither the one nor the other. And he who has understood this understands the Divine Words: 'Nor shall there escape from it the weight of an atom, either 346 in the heavens or in the earth', and other similar verses which refer to this idea. Ghazali says: Avicenna, however, has put himself in opposition to all the other philosophers who, in order not to commit themselves to the consequence of plurality, took the view that the First only knows itself; how, then, can he share with them the denial of plurality? Still he distinguished himself from them by admitting its knowledge of other things, since he was 5 ashamed to say that God is absolutely ignorant of this world and the next and knows only His own self—whereas all others know Him, and know also their own selves and other things, and are therefore superior to Him in knowledge—and he abandoned that blasphemous philosophical theory, refusing to accept it. Still he was not ashamed of persisting in the denial of this plurality in every respect, and he affirmed that God's knowledge of Himself and of other things, yes, of the totality of things, is identical with His essence without this implying any contradiction, and this is the very contradiction which the other philosophers were ashamed to accept, because of its obviousness. And thus no party among the

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10 philosophers could rid itself of a blasphemous doctrine, and it is in this manner that God acts towards the man who strays from His path and who believes that he has the power through his speculation and imagination to fathom the innermost nature of the Divine.

I say:

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The answer to all this is clear from what we have said already, namely that the philosophers only deny that the First Principle knows other things than its own self in so far as these other things are of an inferior existence, so that the effect should not become a cause, nor the superior existence the inferior; for knowledge is identical with the thing known. They do not, however, deny it, in so far as it knows these other things by a knowledge, superior in being to the knowledge by which we know other things; on the contrary, it is necessary that it should know them in this way, because it is in this way that the other things proceed from the First Agent. As to the inquiry about the possibility of a plurality of things known in the Eternal Knowledge, that is a second question, and we have mentioned it, and it is not because of this that the philosophers sought refuge in the theory that the First knows only its own self, as Ghazali wrongly supposes; no, only because in short—as we have declared already—its knowledge should not be like our knowledge which differs from it in the extreme. And Avicenna wanted only to combine these two statements, that it knows only its own essence and that it knows other things by a knowledge superior to man's knowledge of them, since this knowledge constitutes its essence, and this is clear from Avicenna's words that it knows its own self and other things besides itself, and indeed all things which constitute its essence, although Avicenna does not explain this, as we have done. And, therefore, these words of his are not a real contradiction, nor are the other philosophers ashamed of them; no, this is a statement about which, explicitly or implicitly, they all agree. And if you have grasped this well, you will have understood Ghazali's bad faith in his attack on the philosophers, although he agrees with them in the greater part of their opinions. Ghazali says, on behalf of the philosophers: It may be said that if it is asserted that the First knows its own self as a principle by way of relation, the knowledge of two correlatives is one and the same, for the man who knows the son knows him through one single knowledge in which the knowledge of the father, of fatherhood, and sonhood are comprised, so that the objects of knowledge are manifold, but the knowledge is one.1 And in the same way the First knows its essence as a principle for the other things besides itself and so the knowledge is one,

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although what is known is manifold. Further, if the First thinks this relation in reference to one single effect and its own relation towards it, and this does not imply a plurality, then a plurality is not implied by an addi- 348 tion of things which generically do not imply a plurality.1 And likewise he who knows a thing and knows his knowing this thing, knows this thing through this knowledge, and therefore all knowledge is self-knowledge connected with the knowledge of the thing known,2 and the known is manifold, but knowledge forms a unity. 3 An indication of this is also that you theologians believe that the things known to God are infinite, but His knowledge is one, and you do not attribute to God an infinite number of cognitions; if, indeed, the manifoldness of the known implied a plurality in the knowledge itself, well, let there then be an infinite number of cog- 5 nitions in the essence of God. But this is absurd. Then Ghazali says, answering the philosophers: We say: Whenever knowledge is one in every respect, it cannot be imagined that it should be attached to two things known; on the contrary, this determines a certain plurality, according to the assumption and tenet of the philosophers themselves about the meaning of 'plurality', so that they even make the excessive claim that if the First had a quiddity to which existence were attributed, this would imply a plurality. And they do not think that to a single unity possessing reality existence also can be 10 attributed; no, they assert that the existence is brought in relation to the reality and differs from it and determines a plurality, and on this assumption it is not possible that knowledge should attach itself to two objects of knowledge without this implying a greater and more important kind of plurality than that which is intended in the assumption of an existence, brought in relation to a quiddity. And as to the knowledge of a son and similarly of other relative concepts, there is in it a plurality, since there must necessarily be knowledge of the son himself and the father himself, and this is a dual knowledge, and there must be a third knowledge, and this is the relation; indeed, this third knowledge is implied in the dual knowledge 15 which precedes it, as they are its necessary condition, for as long as the terms of relation are not known previously, the relation itself cannot be known, and there is thus a plurality of knowledge of which one part is conditioned through another. Likewise when the First knows itself as related to the other genera and species by being their principle, it needs the knowledge of its own essence and of the single genera and it must further know that there exists between itself and those genera and species the relation of being a principle, for otherwise the existence of this relation could not be supposed to be known to it. And as to their statement that he who knows something knows that he is knowing through this knowledge itself, so that the thing known can be manifold, but the knowledge remains one, this is not true; on the contrary, he knows that he knows through another knowledge, and this ends in a knowledge to

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which he does not pay attention and of which he is no longer conscious, and we do not say that there is an infinite regress, but there is a final term of knowledge attached to the thing known, and he is unconscious of the existence of the knowledge, but not of the existence of the known, like a man who knows the colour black and whose soul at the moment of his knowing it is plunged in the object of his knowledge, the colour black, and who is unconscious of his knowing this colour black and whose attention is not centred on it, for if it were, he would need another knowledge till his attention came to a stand.' And as to the affirmation of the philosophers that this can be turned against the theologians concerning the things known by God, for they are infinite, whereas God's knowledge according to the theologians is one, we answer, 'We have not plunged ourselves into this book to set right, but to destroy and to refute, and for this reason we have called this book "The Incoherence of the Philosophers", not "The Establishment of the Truth", and this argument against us is not conclusive.' And if the philosophers say: 'We do not draw this conclusion against you theologians in so far as you hold the doctrine of a definite sect, but in so far as this problem is applied to the totality of mankind, and the difficulty for all human understanding is the same, and you have no right to claim it against us in particular, for it can be turned against you also, and there is no way out of it for any party'—we answer: 'No, but our aim is to make you desist from your claim to possess knowledge of the essential realities through strict proofs, and to make you doubt. And when your impotence becomes evident, we say that there are men who hold that the divine realities cannot be attained through rational inquiry, for it is not in human power to apprehend them and it was for this reason that Muhammed, the Lord of the Law, said "Ponder over God's creation, but do not ponder over God's essence".2 Why then do you oppose this group of men who believe in the truth of the prophet through the proof of his miracles,3 who confine the judgement of the intellect to a beliefin God, the Sender of the Prophets, who guard themselves against any rational speculation about the attributes, who follow the Lord of the Law in his revelations about God's attributes, who accept his authority for the use of the terms "the knowing", "the wilier", "the powerful", "the living", who refuse to acknowledge those meanings which are forbidden and who recognize our impotence to reach the Divine Intellect? You only refute these men in so far as they are ignorant of the methods of demonstration and of the arrangement of premisses according to the figures of the syllogisms, and you claim that you know these things by rational methods; but now your impotence, the breakdown of your methods, the shamelessness of your claim to knowledge, have come to light, and this is the intention of our criticism. And where is the man who would dare to claim that theological proofs have the strictness of geometrical proofs?'4

I say:

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All this prolix talk has only a rhetorical and dialectical value. And the arguments which he gives in favour of the philosophers about the 350 doctrine of the unity of God's knowledge are two, the conclusion of which is that in our concepts there are conditions which do not through their plurality bring plurality into the concepts themselves, just as there appear in the existents conditions which do not bring plurality into their essences, for instance that a thing should be one and exist and be necessary or possible. And all this, if it is true, is a 3 proof of a unique knowledge comprising a multitude, indeed an infinite number, of sciences. The first argument which he uses in this section refers to those mental processes which occur to the concept in the soul and which resemble the conditions in the existents with respect to the relations and negations 1 which exist in them; for it appears from the nature of the relation which occurs in the concepts that it is a condition through which no plurality arises in the concepts, 2 and it is now argued that 10 the relation which presents itself in the related things belongs to this class of conditions. Ghazali objects to this that the relation and the terms of the relation form a plurality of knowledge, and that for instance our knowledge of fatherhood is different from our knowledge of the father and the son. Now the truth is that the relation is an attribute additional to the terms of the relation outside the soul in the existents, but as to the relation which exists in the concepts, it is 351 better suited to be a condition than an attribute additional to the terms of the relation; 3 however, all this is a comparison of man's knowledge with the Eternal Knowledge, and this is the very cause of the mistake. Everyone who concerns himself with doubt about the Eternal Knowledge and tries to solve it by what occurs in human knowledge does indeed transfer the knowledge from the empirical to the Divine concerning two existents which differ in an extreme degree, not existents 5 which participate in their species or genus, but which are totally unlike. The second proof is that we know a thing through a single knowledge and that we know that wc know by a knowledge which is a condition in the first knowledge, not an attribute additional to it, and the proof of this is that otherwise there would arise an infinite series.4 Now Ghazali's answer, that this knowledge is a second knowledge and that there is no infinite series here, is devoid of sense, for it is self-evident that this implies such a series, and it does not follow from the fact that when a man knows a thing but is not con- >o scious that he knows the fact that he knows, that in the case when he

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knows that he knows, this second knowledge is an additional know: ledge to the first; no, the second knowledge is one of the conditions of the first knowledge and its infinite regress is therefore not impossible; if, however, it were a knowledge existing by itself and additional to the first knowledge, an infinite series could not occur.' As to the conclusion which the philosophers force upon the theo352 logians, that all the theologians recognize that God's knowledge is '" infinite and that at the same time it is one, this is an argumentum ad hominem, not an objective argument based on the facts themselves. And from this there is no escape for the theologians, unless they assume that the knowledge of the Creator differs in this respect from the knowledge of the creature, and indeed there is no one more 5 ignorant than the man who believes that the knowledge of God differs only quantitatively from the knowledge of the creature, that is that He only possesses more knowledge. All these are dialectical arguments, but one may be convinced of the fact that God's knowledge is one and that it is not an effect of the things known; no, it is their cause, 2 and a thing that has numerous causes is indeed manifold itself, whereas a thing that has numerous effects need not be manifold in the way that the effects form a plurality. And there is no io doubt that the plurality which exists in the knowledge of the creature must be denied of God's knowledge, just as any change through the change of the objects known must be denied of Him, and the theologians assume this by one of their fundamental principles. J But the arguments which have been given here are all dialectical arguments. And as to his statement that his aim here is not to reach knowledge of the truth but only to refute the theories of the philosophers and to reveal the inanity of their claims, this is not worthy of him—but rather of very bad men. And how could it be otherwise? For the greater 353 part of the subtlety this man acquired—and he surpassed ordinary people through the subtlety he put in the books he composed—he only acquired from the books of the philosophers and from their teaching. And even supposing they erred in something, he ought not to have denied their merit in speculative thought and in those ideas through which they trained our understanding. Nay more, if they 5 had only invented logic, he and anyone else who understands the importance of this science ought to thank them for it, and he himself was conscious of the value of logic and urged its study and wrote treatises about it, 4 and he says that there is no other way to learn the truth than through this science, and he had even such an exaggerated

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view of logic that he extracted it from the book of God, the holy Koran. 1 And is it allowed to one who is indebted to their books and to their teaching to such an extent that he excelled his contemporaries and that his fame in Islam became immense, is it really allowed to such a man to speak in this way of them, and to censure them so openly, so absolutely, and condemn their sciences? And suppose they erred in certain theological questions, we can only argue against their mistakes by the rules they have taught us in the logical sciences, and we are convinced that they will not blame us when we show them a mistake which might be found in their opinions. And indeed their aim was only the acquisition of truth, and if their only merit consisted in this, it would suffice for their praise, although nobody has said anything about theological problems that can be absolutely relied upon and nobody is guaranteed against mistakes but those whom God protects in a divine, superhuman way, namely the prophets, and I do not know what led this man to this attack against such statements; may God protect me against failings in word and in deed and forgive me if I fail! And what he says of the belief held by those who follow the Divine Law in these things is in agreement with what is said by the renowned philosophers, for when it is said that God's knowledge and attributes cannot be described by, or compared to, the attributes of the creature, so that it cannot even be asserted that they are essence or an addition to the essence, this expresses the thought of genuine philosophers and other true thinkers, and God is the Saviour, the Leader. Ghazali says:

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It may be said, 'This difficulty applies only to Avicenna in so far as he says that the First knows other things, but the acknowledged philosophers are in agreement that it does not know anything besides itself, and this difficulty is therefore set aside.' But we answer, 'What a terrible blasphemy is this doctrine! Verily, had it not had this extreme weakness, later philosophers would not have scorned it, but we shall draw attention to its reprehensible character, for this theory rates God's effects higher than Himself, since angel and man and every rational being knows himself and his principle and knows also of 15 other beings, but the First knows only its own self and is therefore inferior to individual men, not to speak of the angels; indeed, the animals besides their awareness of themselves know other things, and without doubt knowledge is something noble and the lack of it is an imperfection. And what becomes of their statement that God, because He is the most perfect splendour and the utmost beauty, is the lover and the beloved ? But what beauty

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can there be in mere existence which has no quiddity, no essence, which 355 observes neither what occurs in the world nor what is a consequence or proceeds from its own essence? And what deficiency in God's whole world could be greater? And an intelligent man may well marvel at a group of men who according to their statement speculate deeply about the intelligibles, but whose inquiry culminates in a Lord of Lords and Cause of causes who does not possess any knowledge about anything that happens in the world. What difference is there then between Him and the dead, except that He has self-consciousness? And what perfection is there in His self-knowledge, if He is ignorant of everything else? And the blasphemy 5 of this doctrine releases us from the use of many words and explanations. Further, there may be said to them: 'Although you plunge yourselves in these shameful doctrines, you cannot free yourselves from plurality, for we ask: "Is the knowledge He has of His essence identical with His essence or not?" If you say, "No", you introduce plurality, and if you say they are identical, what then is the difference between you and a man who said that a man's knowledge of his essence was identical with his essence, which is pure foolishness? For the existence of this man's essence can be conceived, while he gives no attention to his essence,1 whereas when afterwards his attention returns, he becomes aware of his essence. Therefore his awareness of his essence differs from his essence.' io If it is argued: 'Certainly a man can be without knowledge of his essence, but when this knowledge occurs to him, he becomes a different being', we answer: 'Non-identity cannot be understood through an accident and conjunction, for the identical thing cannot through an accident become another thing2 and that other thing, conjoined with this, does not become identical with it, but keeps its individual otherness.5 And the fact that God is eternally self-conscious does not prove that His knowledge of His essence is identical with His essence, for His essence can be imagined separately and the occurrence of His awareness afterwards, and if they were identical this could not be imagined.'4 '5 And if it be said: 'His essence is intellect and knowledge, and He has not an essence in which afterwards knowledge exists', we answer: 'The foolishness of this is evident, for knowledge is an attribute and an accident which demands a subject, and to say, "He is in His essence intellect and knowledge" is like saying, "He is power and will, and power and will exist by themselves", and this again is like saying of black and white, quantity, fourness and threeness and all other accidents that they exist by 356 themselves. And in exactly the same way as it is impossible that the attributes of bodies should exist by themselves without a body which itself is different from the attributes, it is known to be impossible that attributes like the knowledge, life, power, and will of living beings should exist by themselves, for they exist only in an essence. For life exists in an essence which receives life through it, and the same is the case with the other attributes. And therefore they do not simply content themselves

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with denying to the First all qualities (and not merely its real essence and quiddity); no, they deny to it also its very existence by itself and reduce it 5 to the entities of accidents and attributes which have no existence by themselves; and besides we shall show later in a special chapter their incapacity to prove that it is conscious either of itself or of other things.' I say: The problem concerning the knowledge of the Creator of Himself and of other things is one of those questions which it is forbidden to discuss in a dialectical way, let alone put them down in a book, for the understanding of the masses does not suffice to understand such subtleties, and when one embarks on such problems with them the meaning of divinity becomes void for them and therefore it is forbidden to them to occupy themselves with this knowledge, since it suffices for their blessedness to understand what is within their grasp. T h e Holy Law, the first intention of which is the instruction of the masses,2 does not confine itself to the explanation of these things in the Creator by making them understood through their existence in human beings, for instance by the Divine Words: 'Why dost thou worship what can neither hear nor sec nor avail thee aught?', 3 but enforces the real understanding of these entities in the Creator by comparing them even to the human limbs, for instance in the Divine Words: 'Or have they not seen that we have created for them of what our hands have made for them, cattle and they are owners thereof?' 4 and the Divine Words, 'I have created with my two hands'. 5 This problem indeed is reserved for the men versed in profound knowledge to whom God has permitted the sight of the true realities, and therefore it must not be mentioned in any books except those that are composed according to a strictly rational pattern, that is, such books as must be read in a rational order and after the acquisition of other sciences the study of which according to a demonstrative method is too difficult for most men, even for those v.. o possess by nature a sound understanding, although such men are very scarce. But to discuss these questions with the masses is like bringing poisons to the bodies of many animals, for which they are real poisons. Poisons, however, are relative, and what is poison for one animal is nourishment for another. T h e same applies to ideas in relation to men; that is, there are ideas which are poison for one type of men, but which are nourishment for another type. And the man who regards all ideas as fit for all types of men is like one who gives all things as nourishment for all people; the man, however, who

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forbids free inquiry to the mature is like one who regards all nourish858 ment as poison for everyone. But this is not correct, for there are things which are poison for one type of man and nourishment for another type.' And the man who brings poison to him for whom it is really poison merits punishment, although it may be nourishment for another, and similarly the man who forbids poison to a man for whom it is really nourishment so that this man may die without it, he too must be punished. And it is in this way that the 5 question must be understood. But when the wicked and ignorant transgress and bring poison to the man for whom it is really poison, as if it were nourishment, then there is need of a physician 2 who through his science will exert himself to heal that man, and for this reason we have allowed ourselves to discuss this problem in such a book as this, and in any other case we should not regard this as permissible to us; on the contrary, it would be one of the greatest crimes, or a deed of the greatest wickedness on earth, and the punishment of the wicked is a fact well known in the Holy Law. And since it is io impossible to avoid the discussion of this problem, let us treat it in such a way as is possible in this place for those who do not possess the preparation and mental training needed before entering upon speculation about it. So we say that the philosophers, when they observed all perceptible things, found that they fell into two classes, the one a class perceptible by the senses, namely the individual bodies existing by themselves and the individual accidents in these bodies, and the other a class perceptible by the mind, namely, the quiddities and natures of these substances and accidents. And they found that in 359 these bodies there are quiddities which exist essentially in them, and I understand by the 'quiddities' of bodies attributes existing in them, through which these bodies become existent in act and specified by the act which proceeds from them; 3 and according to the philosophers these quiddities differ from the accidental attributes, because they found that the accidents were additions to the individual sub5 stance which exists by itself and that these accidents were in need of the substances for their existence*, whereas the substances do not need the accidents for their own existence. And they found also that those attributes which were not accidents were not additional to the essence, but that they were the genuine essence of the individual which exists by itself, so that if one imagined these attributes annulled, io the essence itself would be annulled. Now, they discovered these

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qualities in individual bodies through the acts which characterize each of them; for instance they perceived the attributes through which plants by their particular action become plants' and the attributes through which animals by their particular actions become animals, 2 and in the same way they found in the minerals forms of this kind which are proper to them, through the particular actions of minerals. 3 Then, when they had investigated these attributes, they learned that they were in a substratum of this essence and this substratum became differentiated for them, because of the changing of the individual existents from one species into another species and from one genus into another genus through the change and alteration of these attributes; 4 for instance the change of the 360 nature of fire into air by the cessation of the attribute from which the actuality of fire, through which fire is called fire, proceeds, and its change into the attribute from which the actuality peculiar to air, through which air is called air, proceeds. They also proved the existence of this substratum through the capacity of the individual essence to receive an actuality from another, just as they proved by the actuality the existence of form, for it could not be imagined 5 that action and passivity proceed from one and the same nature. 5 They believed therefore that all active and passive bodies are composed of two natures, one active and the other passive, and they called the active nature form, quiddity, and substance, and the passive part subject, ultimate basis of existence 6 and matter. And from this it became clear to them that the perceptible bodies are not simple bodies as they appear to be to the senses, nor compounded of 10 simple bodies, since they are compounded of action and passivity; and they found that what the senses perceive are these individual bodies, which are compounded of these two things which they called form and matter and that what the mind perceives of these bodies are these forms which only become concepts and intellect when the intellect abstracts them from the things existing by themselves, i.e. what the philosophers call substratum and matter. 7 And they found that the accidents also are divided in the intellect in a way similar to those two natures, 8 although their substratum in which they exist in reality is the bodies compounded of these two natures. And when they had distinguished the inteUigibles from the sensibles and it had 361 become clear to them that in sensible things there are two natures, potency and act, they inquired which of these two natures was prior to the other and found that the act was prior to the potency, because

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the agent was prior to its object, 1 and they investigated also causes and effects, which led them to a primary cause which by its act is the first cause of all causes, and it followed that this cause is pure act and that in it there is no potency at all, since if there were potency in it, it would be in part an effect, in part a cause, and could not be a primary cause. And since in everything composed of attribute and subject there is potency and act, it was a necessary implication for them that the First could not be composed of attribute and subject, and since everything free from matter was according to them intellect, it was necessary for them that the First should be intellect. This in summary is the method of the philosophers, and if you are one of those whose mind is sufficiently trained to receive the sciences, and you are steadfast and have leisure, it is your duty* to look into the books and the sciences of the philosophers, so that you may discover in their works certain truths (or perhaps the reverse); but if you lack one of these three qualities, it is your duty* to keep yourself to the words of the Divine Law, and you should not look for these new conceptions in Islam; for if you do so, you will be neither a rationalist nor a traditionalist. 2 Such was the philosophers' reason for their belief that the essence which they found to be the principle of the world was simple and that it was knowledge and intellect. And finding that the order which reigns in the world and its parts proceeds from a knowledge prior to it, they judged that this intellect and this knowledge was the principle of the world, which gave the world existence and made it intelligible. This is a theory very remote from the primitive ideas of mankind and from common notions, so that it is not permitted to divulge it to the masses or even to many people; indeed, the man who has proved its evidence is forbidden to reveal it to the man who has no power to discover its truth, for he would be like his murderer. And as to the term 'substance' which the philosophers give to that which is separate from matter, the First has the highest claim on the term 'substance', the terms 'existent', 'knowing', 'living', 3 and all the terms for the qualities it bestows on the existents and especially those attributes which belong to perfection, for the philosophers found that the proper definition of substance was what existed by itself and the First was the cause of everything that existed by itself. To all the other reproofs which he levels against this doctrine no attention need be paid, except in front of the masses and the ordinary man, to whom, however, this discussion is forbidden.

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And as to Ghazali's words: What beauty can there be in mere existence which has no quiddity, no essence, which observes neither what occurs in the world nor what is a consequence or proceeds from its own essence? . . . —this whole statement is worthless, for if the philosophers assume a quiddity free from a substratum it is also void of attributes, and it cannot be a substratum for attributes except by being itself in a substratum and being composed of the nature of potency and the nature of act. T h e First possesses a quiddity that exists absolutely, and all other existents receive their quiddity only from it, and this First Principle is the existent which knows existents absolutely, because existents become existent and intelligible only through the knowledge this principle has of itself; for since this First Principle is the cause of the existence and intelligibility of existents, of their existence through its quiddity and of their intelligibility through its knowledge, it is the cause of the existence and intelligibility of their quiddities. The philosophers only denied that its knowledge of existents could take place in the same way as human knowledge which is their effect, whereas for God's knowledge the reverse is the case. For they had established this superhuman knowledge by proof. According to the Ash'arites, however, God possesses neither quiddity nor essence at all but* the existence of an entity neither possessing nor being a quiddity cannot be understood, 1 although some Ash'arites believed that God has a special quiddity by which He differs from all other existents, 1 and according to the Sufis it is this quiddity which is meant by the highest name of God. 3 And as to Ghazali's words: Further, there may be said to them: 'Although you plunge yourself in these shameful doctrines, you cannot free yourselves from plurality, for we ask: "Is the knowledge He has of His essence identical with His essence or not?" If you say, "No", you introduce plurality, and if you say, "they are identical", what then is the difference between you and a man who said that a man's knowledge of his essence was identical with his essence?'

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I say: This is an extremely weak statement, and a man who speaks like this deserves best to be put to shame and dishonoured. For the conse- 10 quence he draws amounts to saying that the perfect one, who is free from the attributes of becoming and change and imperfection, might have the attribute of a being possessing imperfection and change. For a man indeed it is necessary, in so far as he is composed of a

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substratum and knowledge, which exists in this substratum, that his knowledge should differ from his essence in such a way as has been described before, since the substratum is the cause of change in the knowledge and the essence. And since man is man and the most noble of all sentient beings only through the intellect which is conjoined to his essence, but not by being essentially intellect, it is neces365 sary that that which is intellect by its essence should be the most noble of all existents and that it should be free from the imperfections which exist in the human intellect. 1 And as to Ghazali's words: And if it be said: His essence is intellect and knowledge and He has not an essence in which afterwards knowledge exists, we answer: 'The foolishness of this is evident, for knowledge is an attribute and an accident which demands a subject, and to say "He is in His essence intellect and 5 knowledge" is like saying "He is power and will, and power and will exist by themselves", and this again is like saying of black and white, fourness and threeness, and all other accidents that they exist by themselves.' I say: T h e error and confusion in his statement is very evident, for it has been proved that there is among attributes one that has a greater claim to the term 'substantiality' than the substance existing by itself, and io this is the attribute through which the substance existing by itself becomes existing by itself. For it has been proved that the substratum for this attribute is something neither existing by itself nor existing in actuality; no, its existing by itself and its actual existence derive from this attribute, and this attribute in its existence is like that which receives the accidents, although certain of these attributes, as is evident from their nature, need a substratum in the changeable things, since it is the fundamental law of the accidents, that they exist in something else, whereas the fundamental law of the quiddities is that they exist by themselves, except when, in the sublunary world, these quiddities need a substratum through being in transitory 366 things. But this attribute is at the greatest distance from the nature of an accident, and to compare this transcendent knowledge to sublunary accidents is extremely foolish, indeed more foolish than to consider the soul an accident like threeness and fourness. And this suffices to show the incoherence and the foolishness of this whole argument, and let us rather call this book simply 'The In5 coherence', not 'The Incoherence of the Philosophers'. And what is further from the nature of an accident than the nature of knowledge,

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and especially the knowledge of the First? And since it is at the greatest distance from the nature of an accident, it is at the greatest distance from having a necessity for a substratum.

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To refute their claim that nothing can share with the First its genus, and be differentiated from it through a specific difference, and that with respect to its intellect the division into genus and specific difference cannot be applied to it1 Ghazali says: Indeed, they are all of this opinion, and they deduce from this that, since nothing can share its genus, it cannot be differentiated through 5 a specific difference and cannot have a definition, since a definition is constructed out of genus and specific difference and what has no composition cannot have a definition, for a definition is a kind of composition.2 And they affirm that, since the First is said to resemble the first effect in being an existent and a substance and a cause for other things, and to differ from it in other respects, this certainly does not imply sharing in its genus; no, it is nothing but a sharing in a common necessary attribute. The difference between genus and necessary attribute consists in their content, not in universality, according to logical theory, for the genus, namely, the essential universal, is the answer to the question what the thing is, and is subsumed under the quiddity of the thing defined, and io constitutes its essence: a man's being alive is subsumed under the quiddity of man, i.e. his animality, and is his genus, but his being born and created are his necessary attributes, and, although they are universals which can never be separated from him, are not subsumed under his quiddity, according to logical theory, about which there can be no misgiving.3 And the philosophers affirm that existence is never subsumed under the quiddity of things, but stands in a relation to the quiddity, either necessarily and inseparably, like its relation to heaven, or subsequently, after their nonexistence, like its relation to temporary things, and that the sharing of 368 existence does not imply a sharing in genus.4 And as to its sharing in 'being a cause to other things' with all the other causes, this is a necessary relation which likewise cannot be subsumed under the quiddity,5 for neither the fact of being a principle nor existence constitutes the essence, but they are necessary attributes of the essence, consequent upon the constitution of the essence out of the parts of its quiddity, and this community is only the sharing of a necessary common attribute consecutive to the essence, not a

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community of genus. Things therefore are only defined by their constitu5 ents, and if they are defined by the necessary attributes this is only a description1 to differentiate them, not to define their essential forms; for the triangle is not defined by the fact that its angles are equal to two right angles, although this is a necessary and common attribute of all triangles, but it is defined as a figure bounded by three sides. And the same applies to its being a substance, and the meaning of its being a substance is that it is an existent which does not exist in a substratum.2 And the existent is not a genus, since, as it is related to a negation, namely not being in a substratum, it cannot become a constituent genus; indeed, even if it could be brought into a relation to something positive and it could be said 10 that it existed in a substratum, it could not become a genus in the accident.3 And the reason is that the man who knows substance by its definition, which is rather its description, namely that it is an existent which does not exist in a substratum, does not know whether it exists, and a fortiori does not know whether it exists in a substratum or not; no, the meaning of the description of substance is that it is the existent which does not exist in a substratum, i.e. that it is a certain reality which, when it does exist, does not exist in a substratum, but we do not mean that it actually exists at the time of the definition,4 and its community is not the community of the genus, for only the constituents of the quiddity 15 form the community of the genus which needs also a specific difference.5 But the First has no other quiddity, except necessary existence, and necessary existence is its real nature and its own quiddity*, exclusively confined to it, and since necessary existence is exclusively confined to the First, it cannot be shared by others, it cannot have a specific difference, and it cannot have a definition.6 ls ay: Here ends what Ghazali says of the philosophical views about this question, and it is partly true, partly false. As to his statement that no other thing can share with the First its genus and be distinguished from it through a specific difference, if he means by this the genus and the difference that are predicated univocally, it is true, for any5 thing of this description is composed of a common form and a specific form, and such things possess a definition. But if by 'genus' is meant what is predicated analogically, I mean per prius et posterius,7 then it can have a genus, e.g. existent, or thing, or identity, or essence, and it can have a kind of definition, and this kind of definition is used in 10 the sciences—for instance, when it is said of the soul that it is the entelechy of the natural organic body, 8 and when it is said of the substance that it is the existent which does not exist in a substratum —but these definitions do not suffice for knowledge of the thing, and they are only given to indicate through it the different individuals

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which fall under such definitions and to represent their peculiarities. But as to his statement that according to the philosophers the term 'existence' only indicates a necessary attribute of the essences of things, this is not true, and we have already explained this in another place and none of the philosophers has said this but Avicenna. Having denied that existence is a genus, predicted either univocally or equivocally, Avicenna affirmed that it was a term which signified a common necessary attribute of things. But the difficulty he found in regarding existence as an essence can be held up against him when it is regarded as a necessary attribute, for if it were a necessary attribute, this necessary attribute could not be given as an answer to the question what a thing is.1 And further, if'existence' really signifies a necessary attribute in things, does it signify this necessary attribute univocally, or equivocally, or in some other mode of attribution? And if it has a univocal meaning, how can there be an accident univocally predicated of things essentially different (I believe that Avicenna regarded this as possible)? 2 It is, however, impossible, because from different things the congruous and identical can only derive, when these different things agree in one nature, since necessarily a single necessary attribute must come from one nature, just as a single act* can proceed only from one nature. And since this is impossible, the term 'existence' indicates essences which have analogical meanings, essences some of which are more perfect than others; and therefore there exists in the things which have such an existence a principle which is the cause of that which exists in all the other things of this genus, just as our term 'warm' is a term which is predicated per prius et posterius of fire and all other warm things, and that of which it is asserted first, i.e. fire, is the cause of the existence of warmth in all other things, and the same is the case with substance, intellect, and principle and such terms (most metaphysical terms are of this kind), and such terms can indicate both substances and accidents. And what he says of the description of substance is devoid of sense, but existence is the genus of substance and is included in its definition in the way the genera of the sublunary things are included in their definitions, and Farabi proved this in his book about demonstration, and this is the commonest view amongst philosophers. 3 Avicenna erred in this only because, since he thought that the 'existent' means the 'true' in the Arabic language, and that what indicates the true indicates an accident 4 —the true, however, really indicates* one

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of the second predicates, i.e. a predicable 1 —he believed that when the translator used the word 'existent' it meant only the 'true'. This, however, is not so, for the translators meant only to indicate what is also meant by 'entity' and 'thing'. Farabi explains this in his Book of the Letters1 and he shows that one of the reasons for the occurrence of this mistake is that the term 'existent' in Arabic is a derivative in form and that a derivative signifies an accident, and in fact an accident is linguistically a derivative. 3 But since the translators did not find in Arabic a term which signified that concept which the ancient philosophers subdivided into substance and accident, potency and act, a term namely which should be a primitive symbol, 4 some translators signified that concept by the term 'existent', not to be understood as having a derivative meaning and signifying therefore an accident, but as having the same meaning as 'essence'. It is thus a technical term, not an idiomatic word. Some translators, because of the difficulty attached to it, decided to use for the concept, which the Greek language tried to express by deriving it from the pronoun which joins the predicate and the subject, the term which expresses this, because they thought that this word comes nearer to expressing this meaning, and they used instead of the term 'existent' the term 'haeceitas', but the fact that its grammatical form is not found in Arabic hindered its use, and the other party therefore preferred the term 'existent'. 5 And the term 'existent' which signifies the true does not signify the quiddity, and therefore one may often know the quiddity without knowing the existence, 6 and this meaning of 'existent' of necessity does not signify the quiddity in the compound substance, but is in the simple substance identical with the quiddity; 7 and this meaning is not what the translators intended by 'existence', for they meant the quiddity itself, and when we say of the existent that it is in part substance, in part accident, the sense meant by the translators must be understood, and this is the sense which is predicated analogically of different essences of things. When we say, however, that substance exists, it must be understood in the sense of the true. And therefore* if we have understood the well-known discussion of the ancient philosophers, whether the existent is one or more than one, which is found in the first book of Aristotle's Physics where he conducts a discussion with the ancient philosophers Parmenides and Melissus,8 we need only understand by 'existent' that which signifies the essence. And if the 'existent' meant an accident in a substratum, then the statement that the existent was one would be self-contradic-

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tory. 1 And all this is clear for the man who is well grounded in the books of the philosophers. And having stated the views of the philosophers, Ghazali begins to 10 refute them, and says: This is the sense of the doctrine of the philosophers. And the discussion with them consists of two parts: a question and a refutation. The question is: This is the simple narration of your doctrine, but how do you know the impossibility of this with respect to God, so as to build on it the refutation of dualism, since you say that a second God would have to participate in something and differ from the first in something, and that which partly possesses something in common with another, partly is different from it, is compound, whereas that He should be compound is absurd? I say: I have already said that this is only valid for something which possesses a common feature through a genus which is predicated univocally, not analogically. For if, by the assumption of a second God, a God were assumed of the same rank of divinity as the first, then the name of God would be predicated univocally, and He would be a genus, and the two Gods would have to be separated by a specific distinction and both would be compounded of a genus and a specific distinction, and the philosophers do not allow a genus to an eternal being; 2 but if the term 'existence' is predicated per prius et posterius, the prior will be the cause of the posterior. Ghazali says, refuting the philosophers: But we say: How do you know the impossibility of this kind of composition? For there is no proof except your denial of the attributes, which has been mentioned, namely that the compound of genus and species is an aggregate of parts; thus if it is possible for one or for a collection of the parts to exist without the others, this single one will be the necessary existent and the others will not be necessary; and if it is possible neither for the parts to exist without the totality, nor for the totality to exist without the parts, then the whole is an effect needing something else as its cause. We have already discussed this in the case of the attributes, and have shown that their plurality is not impossible, since an end of the causal series is admitted and all that is proved is that there is an end of the causal series. For those enormous difficulties which the philosophers have invented concerning the inherence of attributes in the necessary existent there is no proof whatever. If the necessary existent is what the philosophers describe it to be, namely to possess no plurality and not to need anything else for its existence, then there is no proof of the existence of this necessary existent; the only thing proved is that there is an end of the causal series, and we have exhausted this subject in our discussion of

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attributes. And for this kind of plurality it is still more obvious, for the division of a thing into genus and specific difference is not like the division of the subject into essence and attribute, since, indeed, the attribute is not the essence and the essence is not the attribute, but the species is not in every way different from the genus, for whenever we mention the species, 5 we mention the genus with an addition, and when we speak of a man we only mention animal with the addition of reason.1 And to ask whether humanity can be free from animality is like asking whether humanity can be without itself, when something is added to it. And indeed genus and species are more distant from plurality than attribute and subject.2 And why should it be impossible that the causal series should end in two causes, one the cause of the heavens and the other the cause of the elements, or one the cause of the intellects and the other the cause of all bodies, and that there should be between those two causes a conceptual difference and 10 separation as between redness and warmth when they exist in one and the same place? For they differ in content without our being obliged to assume in the redness a compound of genus and specific difference through which this difference is established; indeed, if it possesses a plurality, this kind of plurality does not impair the singleness of its essence, and why should this be impossible with respect to the causes? Through this there is shown the weakness of their refutation of the existence of two Gods.

I say: Composition out of genus and specific difference is exactly the same as the composition of a thing in potency and a thing in act, for the nature which is indicated by the genus does not actually exist at any time without the presence of the nature which is called specific 376 difference and form.3 And everything which is composed of these two natures is, according to the philosophers, transitory, and possesses an agent, for the specific difference is one of the conditions for the existence of the genus in so far as the genus is in potency and docs not exist without the specific difference. And the conjunction of either with its partner is in a certain way a condition for the existence of the other. And as a thing cannot itself be a cause of the condition of 5 its existence, it necessarily possesses a cause which provides it with existence by conjoining the condition and the conditioned. Also, according to the philosophers the recipient is in reality something which possesses only potency, and if it is actually, then only accidentally; and what is received is actuality, and if it is potency, then only accidentally; for the recipient and the thing it receives are only distinguished by the fact that one of them is potentially something else, whereas actually it is the thing received 4 and whatever is poten•o dally another thing must necessarily receive this other thing and lose

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1

the thing it actually is. Therefore, if there should exist a recipient in actuality and a thing received in actuality, both would exist by themselves, but the recipient is necessarily body, for only body, or what is in a body, possesses receptivity primarily, and receptivity cannot be attributed to accidents and forms, 2 nor to the plane, the line, and the point, 3 nor in general to what cannot be divided. As regards an incorporeal agent, this has been already proved, 4 and as to an incorporeal recipient, or a recipient not embedded in matter, such a recipient is impossible, although there is a problem for the philosophers about the potential intellect. 5 And indeed, if the compound has a subject and an attribute* which is not additional to its essence,6 it is transitory and necessarily a body, and if it has a subject and an attribute additional to its essence, without its having any potency in its substance even in respect of this attribute, as is the case according to the ancients with the body of the heavens, 7 it possesses quantity of necessity and is a body. For, if from such an essence, supporting the attribute, bodilincss were taken away, it would no longer be a perceptible recipient, and equally the sensory perception of its attribute would be annulled and its attribute and subject would both become intellect, and they would be reduced to one single simple entity, for from the nature of the intellect and the intelligible it is evident that they are both one and the same thing, since plurality exists in them accidentally, namely through the substratum. 8 And in short, when the philosophers assume an essence and attributes additional to the essence, this amounts to their assuming an eternal body with accidents inherent in it, and they do not doubt that* if they took away the quantity which is corporeity, the perceptible element in it would be annulled, and neither substratum nor inherent would exist any more; but if, on the other hand, they regarded the substratum and the inherent as abstracted from matter and body, the substratum and inherent would of necessity be both intellect and intelligible; but this is the Unique, the Uncompounded, God, the Truth. As to his statement that the whole mistake of the philosophers consists in their calling the First the 'necessary existent', and that if instead they called it 'the causeless", the conclusion which they draw about the First, concerning the necessary attributes of the necessary existent, would not follow—this statement is not true. For since they assume an existent which has no cause, it follows necessarily that it is in itself a necessary existent, just as, when a necessary existent existing by itself is assumed, it follows necessarily that it has no cause,

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and if it has no cause it is more appropriate that it should not be divided into two things, cause and effect. The assumption of the theologians that the First is composed of an attribute and a subject implies that it has an efficient cause, 1 and that therefore it is neither a first cause nor a necessary existent, and this is in contradiction to their assumption that it is one of those existents of which the attribute 10 and the subject are reduced to one single simple entity; but there is no sense in repeating this and expatiating on it. And as to his statement that it is not impossible of God, the First, that He should be composed of a substratum and an attribute additional to the substratum, and that therefore a fortiori it is not impossible that He should be composed of a substratum and an attribute which is identical with its substratum, we have already explained the way in which this is not impossible, namely when both are abstract from matter. 379 And as to his statement that their refutation of dualism does not prevent the possibility of the existence of two Gods, one of whom would be, for instance, the cause of heaven and the other the cause of the earth, or one the cause of the intelligible and the other the cause of the sensible in the bodies, and that their differentiation and distinction need not determine a contradiction, as there is no contra5 diction in redness and warmth which exist in one place—this statement is not true. For if the production and creation of the existent is assumed to be the effect of one nature and of one essence, not of two different natures, it would necessarily follow that if a second thing of this nature were assumed, similar in nature and intellect to the first, they would share in one attribute and differ in another. And their difference would come about either through the kind of io differentiation which exists between individuals or through the kind of differentiation which exists between species. In the latter case the term 'God' would be predicated of them equivocally, and this is in contradiction with their assumption, for the species which participate in the genus are either contraries or stand between contraries, and this is wholly impossible. 2 And if they were individually differentiated, they would both be in matter, and this is in opposition to what is agreed about them. But if it is assumed that one of these natures is superior to the other and that this nature is predicated of them per prius et posterius, then the first nature will be superior to the second and the second will be necessarily its effect, so that for instance the 380 creator of heaven will be the creator of the cause which creates the

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elements; and this is the theory of the philosophers. And both theories lead to the acceptance of a first cause; that of those who believe that the First acts through the mediation of many causes, and that of those who believe that the First is directly the cause of all other things without mediation. But according to the philosophers this latter 5 theory cannot be true. For it is evident that the worlds exist through cause and effect, and it is inquiry concerning these causes which leads us to a first cause for everything. And if some of these different principles were wholly independent of others—that is, if some were not the cause of others—then the world could not be a single wellconnected whole, and to the impossibility of this the Divine Words refer, 'Were there in both heaven and earth Gods beside God, both surely would have been corrupted'. 1 Ghazali says: It may be said: This is impossible so far as the difference which exists between these two essences is either a condition for their necessary existence (and in that case it will exist in both the necessary existents, and then they will not differ anyhow), or neither the one nor the other specific difference is a condition (and since the necessary existence is able to exist without the things that are not a condition for it, the necessary existence will be perfected by something else).2 But we reply: This is exactly the same answer as you gave concerning the attributes and we have already discussed it,3 and the source of confusion throughout this problem is the expression 'necessary existent'; let us therefore get rid of this term; and indeed, we do not accept that demonstration proves a necessary existent, if anything else is meant by it but an eternal existent which has no cause, and if this is meant by it, let us abandon the term 'necessary existent' and let it be proved that an existent which 381 has no cause and no agents cannot have a plurality and a distinctive mark, but indeed there is no proof of it. There remains therefore your question whether this specific difference is a condition of the causeless character of this causeless existent, and this is nonsense. For we have shown that there is no cause for its being without a cause, so as to make it possible to ask for its condition. It would be like asking whether blackness is a condition for the colour's becoming a colour, and if it is a condition, why redness is then a colour. And the answer is: as to the essential nature of colour, i.e. in so far as the essence of colouredness is asserted in the intellect, neither of them 5 is a condition,4 and as to its existence, each of them is a condition for its existence, but not individually, since* a genus cannot exist in reality without a specific difference.5 And likewise the man who accepts two causes as starting-points of the series must say that they are differentiated through a specific difference, and both differences are a condition for their existence, no doubt, though not through their individuality.

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I say: The summary of what he says here of the proof of the philosophers 10 is that they say that the specific difference through which the duality in the necessary existent occurs is either a condition or not a condition for necessary existence. If the specific difference through which they are distinguished is a condition for both the necessary existents, they will no longer be separated in their necessary existence and the necessary existent will be of necessity one and the same, just as, if black were to be a condition for the necessity of colour and white a condition for colouredness, they could not differ in colouredness. If, 382 on the other hand, the specific difference does not enter into the essence of necessary existence, then both these necessary existents will have necessary existence only by accident, and their duality will not be based on their both being necessary existents. This, however, is not true, for the species are a condition for the existence of the genus, and both colours are a condition for the existence of the genus, 5 though not individually (for in this case they could not exist together in the existence of the colour). 1 Ghazali opposes this statement with two arguments. The first is that this can only happen in so far as 'necessary existent' means a special nature; according to the theologians, however, this is not the case, for they understand by 'necessary existent' only something negative, namely something which has no cause, and since negative things are not caused, how can, for the denial of the causeless, an io argument like the following be used: 'That which distinguishes one causeless entity from another causeless entity is either a condition of its being causeless or not; if it is a condition, there cannot be any plurality or differentiation; and if it is not a condition, it cannot occasion a plurality in the causeless, which therefore will be one.' However, the erroneous part in Ghazali's reasoning is that he regards the causeless as a mere negation, and, as a negation has no cause, he asks how it could possess a condition which is the cause of its exis383 tence. But this is a fallacy, for particular negations, which are like infinite terms and which are used for distinguishing between existents, 2 have causes and conditions which determine this negation in them, just as they have causes and conditions which determine their positive qualities; and in this sense there is no difference between positive and negative attributes, and the necessity of the necessary 5 existent is a necessary attribute of the causeless and there is no difference between saying 'the necessary existent' or 'the causeless'.

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And the nonsense comes from those who talk like Ghazali, not from his opponents. And the summary of Ghazali's second objection is that to say, as the philosophers do, that the specific difference through which the necessary existent is distinguished is either a condition or not, that in the former case the one necessary existent cannot be distinguished from the other in so far as they are necessarily existent and that therefore the necessary existent is one, and that in the latter case the necessary existent has no specific difference through which it can be divided: that to speak like this is like saying that if there exist more colours than one of the genus colour, the difference through which one colour is distinguished from another is either a condition for the existence of colour or not; that in the former case the one cannot be distinguished from the other in so far as they are colour, and colour is therefore one single nature; that in the latter case, if neither of them is a condition for the existence of colouredness, one colour has no specific difference through which it can be distinguished from another, and this is not true. 1 Ghazali says, answering this problem on behalf of the philosophers: It may be said perhaps: This is possible in the case of colour, for it has an existence related to the quiddity and additional to the quiddity, but it is not possible for the necessary existent, for it possesses only necessary existence, and there is therefore no quiddity to which its existence might be related, and just as the specific differences of black and red are not conditions for colouredness being colouredness, but only a condition for the actual realization of colour through a cause,2 in the same way the specific difference cannot be a condition for necessary existence, for necessary existence is in relation to the First what colouredness is in relation to the colour, and not like the existence brought in relation to colouredness.3 But we reply, we do not accept this; on the contrary, the necessary existent has a real essence to which existence is attributed, as we shall show in the next discussion, and their statement that the First is an existence without quiddity is incomprehensible. The trend of their argument is, in short, that they base their denial of dualism on the denial that the First is composed of the generic and the specific, then they base the denial of this on their denial that there is a quiddity behind the existence. Therefore as soon as we have refuted this last proposition, which is their fundamental principle, their whole structure (which is a very shaky fabrication, just like a spider's web) tumbles down. I say: Ghazali builds the answer he gives here in the name of the philo-

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sophers on their statement that existence is an accident in the existent, i.e. the quiddity, and he objects against them that the existence in everything is something different from the essence, and he affirms that their whole argument is built only on this. 1 But the distinction which the philosophers make here does not save them from the implication held against them about colouredness and its specific differences, in whatever way they may turn the question. Indeed, nobody doubts that the specific differences of the genus are the cause of the genus, whether it is assumed that the existence of the genus is different from its essence, or that the essence and existence of the genus are identical; for if the specific differences were differences in 385 the existence, and the existence of the colour were different from the quiddity of the colour, it would follow that the specific differences by which the colour is divided are not differences in the quiddity of the colour, but differences in one of its accidents, 2 and this is an absurd assumption. 3 Therefore the truth is to say, 'When we divide colour 5 by its specific differences, the existence of the colour in so far as it is colour is only actual, cither because it is white, or because it is black or any other colour. Thus wc do not divide an accident of the colour, but we divide only the essence of the colour. 4 Through this solution the statement that existence is an accident in the existent is seen to be false, and the argument and his answer are unsound. As to Ghazali's words: They base their denial of dualism on the denial that the First is composed of the generic and the specific, then they base the denial of this on io the denial that there is a quiddity behind the existence. Therefore as soon as we have refuted this last proposition, which is their fundamental principle, their whole structure tumbles down. I say: This argument is not sound, for their structure, the denial of individual duality attributed to simple things univocally, is self-evident, for if we assume a duality and two simple things possessing a common trait, the simple becomes a compound. 5 And the summary of the philosophical proof for this is that the nature called 'necessary existent', i.e. the cause which has no cause and which is a cause for other things, must be either numerically one or many; if many, it must be many through its form, one through the genus predicated univocally 386 of it, or one through a relation, or one through the term only. 6 If it is like Zaid and Amr individually differentiated and specifically one, then it necessarily possesses hyle, and this is impossible. If it is differen-

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tiated through its form, but one through the genus predicated univocally of it, then it is necessarily composite. If it is one in its genus, predicated by analogy to one thing, there is no objection, and one 5 part of it will be the cause of another and the series will end in a first cause, and this is what happens with the forms abstracted from matter, according to the philosophers. If it is only common through the term, then there is no objection to its being more than one, and this is the case with the four primary causes, i.e. the first agent, the ultimate form, the ultimate end, the ultimate matter. 1 Therefore, no strict proof is attained through this method, and one does not arrive at the io First Principle as Avicenna thought, nor to its being necessarily one. Ghazali says: The second way is the drawing of the consequence, and we say: If existence, substantiality and being a principle are not a genus, because they do not give an answer to the question 'What is it?', then according to you the First is pure intellect just like the other intellects which are the principles of existence, called angels,2 according to the philosophers, and which are the effects of the First, are intellects separate from matter. And this abstract reality comprises the First and the first effect. This 387 First, further, is according to the philosophers simple, and there is no compound in its essence except through its necessary attributes, and both the First Cause and the first effect participate in being intellect without matter. This, however, is a generic reality. Nor is intellectuality, separate from matter, a necessary attribute, for it is indeed a quiddity, and this quiddity is common to the First and all the other intellects. Therefore, if they do not differ in anything else, you have necessarily conceived a duality without a further difference; and if they do differ, what then is this distinc- 5 tion apart from their intellectuality, which they have in common?* F'or what they have in common is participation in this abstract reality. For indeed the First is conscious of its own self and of others, according to those who believe that it is in its essence intellect separate from matter; and also the first effect, which is the first intellect which God has created without a mediator, participates in this characteristic. This proves that the intellects which are effects are different species, that they only participate in intellectuality and are besides this distinguished by specific differences, and that likewise the First participates with all the other intellects in this intellectuality. The philosophers, therefore, are either in plain contradiction to their own fundamental thesis, or* have to affirm that intellectuality 10 does not constitute God's essence. And both positions are absurd according to them. I say: If you have understood what we have said before this, that there

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are things which have a term in common not univocally or equivocally, but by the universality of terms analogically related to one thing, and that the characteristic of these things is that they lead upwards to a first term in this genus which is the first cause of everything to which this word refers, like warmth, which is predicated of fire and all other warm things, and like the term 'existent' which is predicated of the substance and all other accidents, and like the term 'movement' predicated of motion in space* and all the other movements, you will not have to occupy yourself with the mistakes in this reasoning. For the term 'intellect' is predicated analogically of the separate intellects according to the philosophers, and there is among them a first intellect which is the cause of all the other intellects, and the same thing is true of substance. And the proof that they have not one nature in common is that some of them are the causes of others and the cause of a thing is prior to the effect, and the nature of cause and effect cannot be one in genus except in the individual causes, and this kind of community is contradictory to genuine generic community, for things which participate in genus have no first principle which is the cause of all the others—they are all of the same rank, and there is no simple principle in them—whereas the things which participate in something predicated of them analogically must have a simple first principle. And in this First no duality can be imagined, for if a second were assumed, it must be of the same level of existence and of the same nature as the First, and they would have one nature in common in which they would participate by generic participation and would have to be distinguished through specific differences, additional to the genus, and both would be composed of genus and specific difference, and everything which is of this description is temporal; and lastly that which is of the extreme perfection of existence must be unique, for if it were not unique, it could not be of the extreme perfection of existence, for that which is in the extreme degree cannot participate with anything else, for in the same way as one single line cannot have two extreme points at the same end, things extended in existence and differentiated through increase and decrease have not two extremes at the same side. And since Aviccnna was not aware of this nature, which stands midway between the nature of that which is univocally predicated and those natures which participate only through the equivocation of the term or in a distant, accidental way, this objection was valid against him.

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To refute their theory that the existence of the First is simple, namely that it is pure existence and that its existence stands in relation to no quiddity and to no essence, but stands to necessary existence as do other beings to their quiddity Ghazali says: There are two ways of attacking this theory. The first is to demand j a proof and to ask how you know this, through the necessity of the intellect, or through speculation and not by immediate necessity; and in any case you must tell us your method of reasoning. If it is said that, if the First had a quiddity, its existence would be related to it, and would be consequent' on this quiddity and would be its necessary attribute, and the consequent is an effect and therefore necessary existence would be an effect, and this is a contradiction, we answer: This is to revert 10 to the source of the confusion in the application of the term 'necessary existence', for we call this entity 'reality' or 'quiddity' and this reality exists, i.e. it is not non-existent and is not denied, but its existence is brought into a relation with it, and if you like to call this 'consequent' and 'necessary attribute', we shall not quibble about words, if you have once acknowledged that it has no agent for its existence and that this existence has not ceased to be eternal and to have no efficient cause; if, however, you understand by 'consequent' and 'effect' that it has an efficient cause, this is not true. But if you mean something else, this is 391 conceded, for it is not impossible,2 since the demonstration proves only the end of a causal scries and its ending in an existent reality; a positive quiddity, therefore, is possible, and there is no need to deny the quiddity. If it is said: Then the quiddity becomes a cause for the existence which is consequent on it, and the existence becomes an effect and an object of the act, we answer: The quiddity in temporal things is not a cause of their existence, and why should it therefore be the case in the eternal, if you mean by 'cause' the agent? But if you mean something else by it, 5 namely that without which it could not be, let that be accepted, for there is nothing impossible in it; the impossibility lies only in the infinite causal series, and if this series only comes to a final term, then the impossibility is cancelled; impossibility can be understood only on this point, therefore you must give a proof of its impossibility.3 All the proofs of the philosophers are nothing but presumptions that the term has a sense from which certain consequences follow, and nothing but the supposition that demonstration has in fact proved a necessary existent with the meaning the philosophers ascribed to it. We have, however, shown previously that this is not true. In short, this proof of the philosophers

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10 comes down to the proof of the denial of attributes and of the division into genus and specific difference; only this proof is still more ambiguous and weak, for this plurality is purely verbal, for the intellect does allow the acceptance of one single existent quiddity. The philosophers, however, say that every existent quiddity is a plurality, for it contains quiddity and existence, and this is an extreme confusion; for the meaning of a single existent is perfectly understandable—nothing exists which has no essence, and the existence of an essence does not annul its singleness. I say: Ghazali does not relate Avicenna's doctrine literally as he did in his book The Aims of the Philosophers.1 For since Avicenna believed that the existence of a thing indicated an attribute additional to its essence, he could no longer admit that its essence was the agent of its existence out of the possibles, for then the thing would be the cause of its own existence and it would not have an agent. It follows from this, according to Avicenna, that everything which has an existence additional to its essence has an efficient cause, and since according to Avicenna the First has no agent, it follows necessarily that its existence is identical with its essence.2 And therefore Ghazali's objec392 tion that Avicenna assimilates existence to a necessary attribute of the essence is not true, because the essence of a thing is the cause of its necessary attribute and it is not possible that a thing should be the cause of its own existence, because the existence of a thing is prior to its quiddity. 3 To identify the quiddity and the existence of a thing is not to do away with its quiddity, as Ghazali asserts, but is only the affirmation of the unity of quiddity and existence. If we 5 regard existence as an accidental attribute of the existent, and it is the agent which gives possible things their existence, necessarily that which has no agent either cannot have an existence (and this is absurd), or its existence must be identical with its essence. But the whole of this discussion is built on the mistake that the existence of a thing is one of its attributes. For the existence 10 which in our knowledge is prior to the quiddity of a thing is that which signifies the true. 4 Therefore the question whether a thing exists, either (1) refers to that which has a cause that determines its existence, and in that case its potential meaning is to ask whether this thing has a cause or not, according to Aristotle at the beginning of the second chapter of the Posterior Analytics? or (2) it refers to that which has no cause, and then its meaning is to ask whether a thing possesses a necessary attribute which determines its

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existence. And when by 'existent' is meant what is understood by 'thing' and 'entity', 2 it follows the rule of the genus which is predicated analogically, 3 and whatever it is in this sense is attributed in the same way to that which has a cause and to that which has none, and it does not signify anything but the concept of the existent, and by this is meant 'the true', and if it means something additional to the essence, it is only in a subjective sense which does not exist outside the soul except potentially, as is also the case with the universal. 4 And this is the way in which the ancient philosophers considered the First Principle, and they regarded it as a simple existent. As to the later philosophers in Islam, they stated that, in their speculation about the nature of the existent qua existent, they were led to accept a simple existent of this description. The best method to follow, in my opinion, and the nearest to strict proof, is to say that the actualization of existents which have in their substance a possible existence necessarily occurs only through an actualizer which is in act, i.e. acting, and moves them and draws them out of potency into act. And if this actualizer itself is also of the nature of the possible, i.e. possible in its substance, there will have to be another actualizer for it, necessary in its substance and not possible, so that this sublunary world may be conserved, and the nature of the possible causes may remain everlastingly, proceeding without end. And if these causes exist without end, as appears from their nature, and each of them is possible, necessarily their cause, i.e. that which determines their permanence, must be something necessary in its substance, and if there were a moment in which nothing was moved at all, there would be no possibility of an origination of movement. 5 The nexus between temporal existence and eternal can only take place without a change affecting the First through that movement which is partly eternal, partly temporal. 6 And the thing moved by this movement is what Avicenna calls 'the existence necessary through another', and this 'necessary through another' must be a body everlastingly moved, and in this way it is possible that the essentially temporal and corruptible should exist in dependence on the eternal, and this through approach to something and through recession from it, as you observe it happen to transitory existents in relation to the heavenly bodies. 7 And since this moved body is necessary in its substance, possible in its local movement, it is necessary that the process should terminate in an absolutely necessary existent in which there is no potency at all, either in its substance, or locally

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or in any of the other forms of movement; and that which is of this description is necessarily simple, because if it were a compound, it would be possible, not necessary, and it would require a necessary existent. And this method of proving it is in my opinion sufficient, and it is true. However, what Avicenna adds to this proof by saying that the possible existent must terminate either in an existent necessary through another or in an existent necessary through itself, and in the former case that the necessary through another should be a consequence of the existent necessary through itself, for he affirms that the existent necessary through another is in itself a possible existent and what is possible needs something necessary—this addition, is to my mind superfluous and erroneous, for in the necessary, in whatever way you suppose it, there is no possibility whatsoever and there exists nothing of a single nature of which it can be said that it is in one way possible and in another way necessary in its existence. 1 For the philosophers have proved that there is no possible whatsoever in the necessary; for the possible is the opposite of the necessary, and the only thing that can happen is that a thing should be in one way necessary, in another way possible, as they believed for instance to be the case with the heavenly body or what is above the body of the heavens, namely that it was necessary through its substance and possible in its movement and in space. What led Avicenna to this division was that he believed that the body of the heavens was essentially necessary through another, possible by itself, and we have shown in another place that this is not true. And the proof which Avicenna uses in dealing with the necessary existent, when this distinction and this indication arc not made, is of the type of common dialectical notions; when, however, the distinction is made, it is of the type of demonstrative proof. You must know further that the becoming of which the Holy Law speaks is of the kind of empirical becoming in this world, and this occurs in the forms of the existcnts which the Ash'arites call mental qualities 2 and the philosophers call forms, and this becoming occurs only through another thing and in time, and the Holy Words: 'Have not those who have disbelieved considered that the heavens and the earth were coherent, and we have rent them . . .'•> and the Divine Words 'then he straightened himself up to the sky which was smoke . . .', 4 refer to this. But as to the relation which exists between the nature of the possible existent and the necessary existent, about

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this the Holy Law is silent, because it is too much above the understanding of the common man and knowledge of it is not necessary for his blessedness. When the Ash'arites affirm that the nature of the 10 possible' is created and has come into existence in time out of nothing (a notion which all the philosophers oppose, whether they believe in the temporal beginning of the world or not), they do not say this, if you consider the question rightly, on the authority of the law of Islam, and there is no proof for it. What appears from the Holy Law is the ' commandment to abstain from investigating that about which the Holy Law is silent, and therefore it is said in the Traditions: 'The people did not cease thinking till they said: God has created this, but who has created God? And the Prophet said: When one of you finds this, this is an act of pure faith', and in another version: 397 'When one of you finds this, let him read the verse of the K o r a n : Say, He, God is one. And know that for the masses to turn to such a question comes from the whisperings of Satan and therefore the prophet said: This is an act of pure faith.' 2 Ghazali says: The second way is to say that an existence without quiddity or essence cannot be conceived, and just as mere non-existence, without a relation 5 to an existent the non-existence of which can be supposed,3 cannot be conceived, in the same way existence can be only conceived in relation to a definite essence, especially when it is defined as a single essence; for how could it be defined as single, conceptually differentiated from others, if it had not a real essence? For to deny the quiddity is to deny the real essence, and when you deny the real essence of the existent, the existent can no longer be understood. It is as if the philosophers affirmed at the same time existence and a non-existent, which is contradictory.4 This is shown by the fact that, if it were conceivable, it would be also possible in the effects that there should be an existence without an essence, participating with the First in not having a real essence and a quiddity, differing from it in having a cause, whereas the First is causeless. And why 10 should such an effect not be imagined ? And is there any other reason for this than that it is inconceivable in itself? But what is inconceivable in itself does not become conceivable by the denial of its cause, nor does what is conceivable become inconceivable because it is supposed to have a cause. Such an extreme negation is the most obscure of their theories, although they believe indeed that they have proved what they say. Their doctrine ends in absolute negation, and indeed the denial of the quiddity is the denial of the real essence, and through the denial of this reality nothing remains but the word 'existence', which has no object at all when it is not related to a quiddity.5

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And if it is said: 'Its real essence is that it is the necessary, and the necessary is its quiddity', we answer: 'The only sense of "necessary" is "causeless", and this is a negation which does not constitute a real essence; and the denial of a cause for the real essence presupposes the real essence, and therefore let the essence be conceivable, so that it can be described as being causeless; but the essence cannot be represented as non-existent, since "necessity" has no other meaning than "being causeless".1 Besides, if the necessity were added to the existence, this would form a plurality; and 5 if it is not added, how then could it be the quiddity? For the existence is not the quiddity, and thus what is not added to the existence cannot be the quiddity either.'

I say: This whole paragraph is sophistry. For the philosophers do not assume that the First has an existence without a quiddity and a quiddity without an existence. They believe only that the existence in the compound is an additional attribute to its essence and it only acquires this attribute through the agent, and they believe that in that which io is simple and causeless this attribute is not additional to the quiddity and that it has no quiddity differentiated from its existence; but they do not say that it has absolutely no quiddity, as he assumes in his objection against them. 1 Having assumed that they deny the quiddity—which is false— Ghazali begins now to charge them with reprehensible theories and says: If this were conceivable it would also be possible in the effects that there should be an existence without an essence, participating with the First in not having a real essence. I say: But the philosophers do not assume an existent absolutely without a quiddity: they only assume that it has not a quiddity like the quiddities of the other existents; and this is one of the sophistical fallacies, for the term 'quiddity' is ambiguous, and this assumption, and everything built upon it, is a sophistical argument, for the non-existent cannot be described either by denying or by affirming something of 5 it. And Ghazali, by fallacies of the kind perpetrated in this book, is not exempt from wickedness or from ignorance, and he seems nearer to wickedness than to ignorance—or should we say that there is a necessity which obliged him to do this? And as to his remark, that the meaning of 'necessary existent' is 'causeless', this is not true, but our expression that it is a necessary

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existent has a positive meaning, consequent on a nature which has absolutely no cause, no exterior agent, and no agent which is part of it. And as to Ghazali's words:

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If the necessity were added to the existence, this would form a plurality; and if it is not added, how then could it be the quiddity? For existence is not the quiddity, and thus what is not added to the existence cannot be the quiddity either. I say: According to the philosophers necessity is not an attribute added to the essence, and it is predicated of the essence in the same way as we say of it that it is inevitable and eternal. 1 And likewise if we under- 400 stand by 'existence' a mental attribute, it is not an addition to the essence, b u t if we understand it as being an accident, in the way Avicenna regards it in the composite existent, then it becomes difficult to explain how the uncompounded can be the quiddity itself, although one might say perhaps: ' I n the way the knowledge in the uncompounded becomes the knower himself.' If, however, one re- 5 gards the existent as the true, all these doubts lose their meaning, and likewise, if one understands 'existent' as having the same sense as 'entity', and according to this it is true that the existence in the uncompounded is the quiddity itself.

THE NINTH DISCUSSION To refute their proof that the First is incorporeal

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Ghazali says: There is a proof only for him who believes that body is only temporal, because it cannot be exempt from what is temporal and everything that 5 is temporal needs a creator.2 But you, when you admit an eternal body which has no beginning for its existence, although it is not exempt from temporal occurrences, why do you regard it as impossible that the First should be a body, either the sun, or the extreme heaven, or something else? If the answer is made 'Because body must be composite and divisible into parts quantitatively, and into matter and form conceptually, and into qualities which characterize it necessarily so that it can be differentiated from other bodies (for otherwise all bodies in being body would be similar) 10

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and the necessary existent is one and cannot be divided in any of these ways' we answer: 'We have already refuted you in this, and have shown that you have no proof for it except that a collection is an effect, since some of its parts require others, and we have argued against it and have shown that when it is not impossible to suppose an existent without a creator, it is not impossible to suppose a compound without a composing principle and to suppose many existents without a creator, since you have based your denial of plurality and duality on the denial of composition and your denial of composition on the denial of a quiddity distinct from existence, and with respect to the last principle we have asked for its foundation and we have shown that it is a mere presumption.' 402 And if it is said: 'If a body has no soul, it cannot be an agent, and when it has a soul, well, then its soul is its cause, and then body cannot be the First', we answer: 'Our soul is not the cause of the existence of our body, nor is the soul of the sphere in itself a cause of its body, according to you, but they are two, having a distinct cause; and if they can be eternal, it is 5 possible that they have no cause.' And if the question is asked, 'How can the conjunction of soul and body come about?', we answer, 'One might as well ask how the existence of the First comes about; the answer is that such a question may be asked about what is temporal, but about what is eternally existent one cannot ask how it has come about, and therefore* since body and its soul are both eternally existent, it is not impossible that their compound should be a creator.' I say: When a man has no other proof that the First is not body than io that he believes that all bodies are temporal, how weak is his proof, and how far distant from the nature of what has to be proved!—since it has been shown previously that the proofs on which the theologians build their statement that all bodies are temporal are conflicting; and what is more appropriate than to regard an eternal composite as possible, as I said in this book when speaking of the Ash'arites, i.e. in saying that according to them an eternal body is possible, since in the accidents there is some eternal clement, according to their own theory, for instance, the characteristic of forming a compound; and therefore their proof that all bodies are temporal is not valid, because they base it exclusively on the temporal becoming of the accidents. 1 The ancient philosophers do not allow for the existence of a body eternal through itself, but only of one eternal through another, and 403 therefore according to them there must be an existent eternal through itself through which the eternal body becomes eternal. But if we expound their theories here, they have only a dialectical value, and you should therefore instead ask for their proofs in their proper place.

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And as to Ghazali's refutation of this, and his words: We answer: 'We have already refuted you in this, and we have shown that you have no proof for this except that a collection is an effect, since some of its parts require others, 5 I say: H e means that he has discussed this already previously, and he says that the philosophers cannot prove that the existent necessary through itself is not a body, since the meaning of 'existent necessary through itself is 'that which has no efficient cause', and why should they regard an eternal body which has no efficient cause as impossible—and especially when it should be supposed to be a simple body, indivisible quantitatively or qualitatively, and in short an eternal composite' without a composing principle? This is a sound 10 argument from which they cannot escape except through dialectical arguments. 2 But all the arguments which Ghazali gives in this book either against or on behalf of the philosophers or against Avicenna arc dialectical through the equivocation of the terms used, and therefore it is not necessary to expatiate on this. And as to his answer on behalf of the Ash'arites that what is eternal through itself does not need a cause for its eternity, and that when the theologians assume something eternal through itself and assume its essence as the cause of its attributes, 3 this essence does not become eternal because of something else, I say: 404 It is a necessary consequence to be held up against Ghazali that the Eternal will be composed of a cause and an effect, and that the attributes will be eternal through their cause, i.e. the essence. And since the effect is not a condition for its own existence, the Eternal is the cause. And let us say that the essence which exists by itself is God and that the attributes are effects; then it can be argued against the theologians that they assume one thing eternal by itself and a plurality of things eternal through another, and that the combination of all 5 these is God. But this is exactly their objection against those who say that God is eternal through Himself and the world eternal through another, namely God. Besides, they say that the Eternal is one, and all this is extremely contradictory. And as to Ghazali's statement that to assume a compound without the factor which composes it, is not different from assuming an existent without a creator, and that the assumption cither of a single

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10 existent of this description or of a plurality is not an impossible supposition for the mind, all this is erroneous. For composition does not demand a composing factor which again itself is composed, but there must be a series leading up to a composing factor composing by itself, just as, when the cause is an effect, there must finally be a cause which is not an effect. Nor is it possible, by means of an argument which leads to an existent without a creator, to prove the oneness of this existent. 1 And as to his assertion that the denial of the quiddity implies the denial of the composition, and that this implies the assertion of composition in the First, 2 this is not true. And indeed the philosophers 405 do not deny the quiddity of the First, but only deny that it has the kind of quiddity which is in the effects, and all this is a dialectical and doubtful argument. And already previously in this book we have given convincing arguments, according to the principles of the philosophers, to prove that the First is incorporeal, namely that the possible 5 leads to a necessary existent and that the possible does not proceed from the necessary except through the mediation of an existent which is partly necessary, partly possible, and that this is the body of the heavens and its circular motion; and the most satisfactory way of expressing this according to the principles of the philosophers is to say that all bodies are finite in power, and that they only acquire their power of infinite movement through an incorporeal being. 3 io Ghazali answering the objection which infers that according to the philosophers the agent is nothing but the sphere, composed of soul and body, says: If it is answered: 'This cannot be so, because body in so far as it is body does not create anything else and the soul which is attached to the body does not act except through the mediation of the body, but the body is not a means for the soul in the latter's creating bodies or in causing the existence of souls and of things which are not related to bodies', we answer: 'And why is it not possible that there should be amongst the souls a soul which has the characteristic of being so disposed that both bodies and incorporeals are produced through it? The impossibility of this is not a thing known necessarily, nor is there a proof for it, except that we do not 406 experience this in the bodies we observe; but the absence of experience does not demonstrate its impossibility, and indeed the philosophers often ascribe things to the First Existent which are not generally ascribed to existents, and are not experienced in any other existent, and the absence of its being observed in other things is not a proof of its impossibility in reference to the First Existent, and the same holds concerning the body and its soul.'

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I say: As to his assertion that bodies do not create bodies, if by 'creating' is understood producing, the reverse is true, for a body in the empiri- 5 cal world can only come into being through a body, 1 and an animated body only through an animated body, 2 but the absolute body does not come into being at all, for, if it did, it would come into being from non-existence, not after non-existence. 3 Individual bodies only come into being out of individual bodies and through individual bodies, 4 and this through the body's being transferred from one name to another and from one definition to another, so that for instance the 10 body of water changes into the body of fire, because out of the body of water is transformed the attribute through the transformation of which the name and definition of water is transferred to the name and definition of fire, and this happens necessarily through a body which is the agent, participating with the becoming body specifically or gencrically in either a univocal or an analogical way; 5 and whether the individual special corporeality in the water is transformed into the individual special corporeality of the fire is a problem to be studied. 6 And as to Ghazali's words: But the body is not a means for the soul in the latter's creating bodies or 407 in causing the existence of souls, I say: This is an argument which he builds on an opinion some of the philosophers hold, that the bestower of forms on inanimate bodies and of souls is a separate substance, either intellect or a separate soul, and that it is not possible that either an animated body or an inanimate body should supply this. And if this opinion is held and at 5 the same time it is assumed that heaven is an animated body, it is no longer possible for heaven to supply any of the transitory forms, either the soul or any other of these forms. For the soul which is in the body only acts through the mediation of the body, and that which acts through the mediation of the body can produce neither form nor soul, since it is not of the nature of the body to produce a substantial form, either a soul or any other substantial form. And this theory resembles that of Plato about forms separate from matter, and is the "> theory of Avicenna and others among the Muslim philosophers; their proof is that the body produces in the body only warmth or cold or moisture or dryness, 7 and only these are acts of the heavenly

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bodies according to them. But that which produces the substantial forms, and especially those which are animated, is a separate substance which they call the giver of forms.1 But there are philosophers 1 466 who believe the contrary and affirm that what produces the forms in the bodies is bodies possessing forms similar to them either specifically or generically, those similar specifically being the living bodies which produce the living bodies of the empirical world, like the animals which are generated from other animals, whereas those forms produced by forms generically similar, and which are not '•> produced from a male or a female, receive their lives according to 5 the philosophers from the heavenly bodies, since these are alive. And these philosophers have non-empirical proofs which, however, need not be mentioned here. 3 And therefore Ghazali argues against them in this way: And why is it not possible that there should be among the souls a soul which has the characteristic of being so disposed that both bodies and incorporeals are produced through it? I say: 10 He means: 'Why should it not be possible that there should be among the souls in bodies souls which have the characteristic of generating other animate and inanimate forms?' And how strange it is that Ghazali assumes that the production of body out of body does not happen in the empirical world, whereas nothing else is ever observed. 409 But you must understand that when the statements of the philosophers are abstracted from the demonstrative sciences they certainly become dialectical, whether they are generally acknowledged, or, if not, denied and regarded as strange. The reason is that demonstrative statements are only distinguished from statements which are not demonstrative, by being considered in the genus of science which is 5 under investigation. 4 Those statements which can be subsumed under the definition of this genus of science, or which comprise in their definition this genus of science, are demonstrative, and those statements which do not seem to fulfil these conditions are not demonstrative. Demonstration is only possible when the nature of this genus of science under investigation is defined, and the sense in which its essential predicates exist is distinguished from the sense in which they do not, and when this is retained in mind by keeping to that sense in 10 every statement adopted in this science, and by having the identical meaning always present in the mind. Arid when the soul is convinced

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that the statement is essential to this genus or a necessary consequence of its essence, the statement is true; but when this relation does not enter into the mind, or when it is only weakly established, the statement is only an opinion, and is not evident. And therefore the difference between proof and convincing opinion is more delicate than the appearance of a hair and more completely hidden than the exact limit between darkness and light, especially in theological* questions which are laid before the common people, because of the confusion between what is essential and what is accidental. Therefore 410 we see that Ghazali, by relating the theories of the philosophers in this and others of his books and by showing them to people who have not studied their works with the necessary preparation the philosophers demand, changes the nature of the truth which exists in their theories or drives most people away from all their views. And by so doing he does more harm than good to the cause of truth. And God 5 knows that I should not have related a single one of their views, or regarded this as permissible, but for the harm which results from Ghazali's doings to the cause of wisdom; and I understand by 'wisdom' speculation about things according to the rules of the nature of proof. Ghazali says, on behalf of the philosophers: If it is said that the highest sphere, or the sun, or whatever body you 10 may imagine, possesses a special size which may be increased or decreased, and this possible size needs for its differentiation a differentiating principle and can therefore not be the First,' we answer: By what argument will you refute the man who says that this body must have the size it possesses* for the sake of the order of the universe, and this order could not exist if this body were smaller or larger—since you philosophers yourselves affirm that the first effect2 determines the size of the highest sphere because all sizes are equivalent in relation to the essence of the first effect, but certain sizes are determined for the sake of the order which depends on them and therefore the actual size is necessary and no other is possible; and all this holds just as well when no effect is assumed.3 Indeed, if the philosophers had established in the first effect, which is according to the philosophers the cause of the highest sphere, a specifying principle, as for instance the will, a further question might be put, since it might be asked why this principle willed this actual size rather than another, in the way the philosophers argued against the Muslims about their theory of the relation between the temporal world and the Eternal Will,4 an argument which we turned against them with respect to the problems of the determination of the direction of the heavenly movement and of the determina- 411 tion of the points of the poles. And if it is clear that they are forced to admit

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that a thing is differentiated from a similar one and that this happens through a cause, it is unessential whether this differentiation be regarded as possible without a cause or through a cause, for it is indifferent whether one puts the question about the thing itself and asks why it has such-andsuch a size, or whether one puts the question about the cause, and asks why it gave this thing this special size; and if the question about the cause may be answered by saying that this special measure is not like any other, 5 because the order depends on it exclusively, the same answer may be made about the thing itself, and it will not need a cause. And there is no escape from this. For if the actual size which has been determined and has Tbeen realized were equivalent to the size which has not been realized, one might ask how one thing comes to be differentiated from a similar one, especially according to the principle of the philosophers who do not admit a differentiating will. If, however, there is no similar size, no possibility exists, and one must answer: 'This has been so from all eternity, and in the same way therefore as, according to the philosophers, the eternal cause exists.'1 And let the man who studies this question seek help from what we said about their asking about the eternal will, a question which we turned against them with respect to the points of the poles and •o the direction of the movement of the sphere. It is therefore clear that the man who does not believe in the temporal creation of the bodies cannot establish a proof that the First is incorporeal. I say: This indeed is a very strange argument of Ghazali's. For he argues that they cannot prove another creator than the heavenly body, since they would have to give an answer by a principle in which they do not believe. For only the theologians accept this principle, since they say that heaven receives the determinate size it has, to the exclusion of other sizes it might have, from a differentiating cause, and that the differentiating principle must be eternal. He either attempted 412 to deceive in this matter or was himself deceived. For the differentiation which the philosophers infer is different from that which the Ash'arites intend, for the Ash'arites understand by 'differentiation' the distinguishing of one thing either from a similar one or from an opposite one without this being determined by any wisdom in the thing itself which makes it necessary to differentiate one of the two 5 opposite things. The philosophers, on the other hand, understand here by the differentiating principle only that which is determined by the wisdom in the product itself, namely the final cause, for according to them there is no quantity or quality in any being that has not a n end based on wisdom, an end which must either be a necessity in the nature of the act of this being or exist in it, based on the principle of

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1

superiority. For if, so the philosophers believe, there were in created things a quantity or quality not determined by wisdom, they would have attributed to the First Maker and Creator an attitude in relation to His work which may be only attributed to the artisans among His creatures, with the intention of blaming them. 2 For when one has observed a work with respect to its quantity and quality, and asked why the maker of this work chose this quantity or this quality to the exclusion of all other possible quantities and qualities, there is no worse mistake than to answer 'Not because of the intrinsic wisdom and thoughtfulness in the product itself, but because he willed it,' since according to this view all quantities and qualities are similar with respect to the end of this product, which in fact the maker produced for its own sake, namely for the sake of the act for whose purpose it exists. For indeed every product is produced in view of something in it which would not proceed from it, if this product had no definite quantity, quality and nature*, although in some products an equivalent is possible. If any product whatever could determine any act whatever, there would exist no wisdom at all in any product, and there would be no art at all, and the quantities and qualities of the products would depend on the whim of the artisan and every man would be an artisan. 3 O r should we rather say that wisdom exists only in the product of the creature, not in the act of the Creator? But God forbid that we should believe such a thing of the First Creator; on the contrary, we believe that everything in the world is wisdom, although in many things our understanding of it is very imperfect and although we understand the wisdom of the Creator only through the wisdom of nature. And if the world is one single product of extreme wisdom, there is one wise principle whose existence the heavens and the earth and everything* in them need. 4 Indeed, nobody can regard the product of such wonderful wisdom as caused by itself, and the theologians in their wish to elevate the Creator have denied Him wisdom and withheld from H i m the noblest of His qualities.

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THE TENTH DISCUSSION To prove their incapacity to demonstrate that the world has a creator and a cause, and that in fact they are forced to admit atheism Ghazali says:

Their statement that body needs a creator and a cause can be understood S from the theory of those1 who argue that all bodies are temporal, because they cannot exist without what is temporal. But what keeps you philosophers from the doctrine of the materialists, namely that the world is eternal in the condition in which it actually is, and that it has no cause and no creator, that there is only a cause for temporal events and that no body comes into existence and no body is annihilated, and that only forms and accidents come into existence, for the bodies are the heavens (which are eternal) and the four elements, which are the stuff of the sublunary world, and their bodies and matters are eternal too, and there is only a change of forms in them through mixtures and alterations ;2 and that the souls of men and animals and plants come into existence, that all the causes of •o these temporal events terminate in the circular movement, and that the circular movement is eternal and its source the eternal soul of the sphere. Therefore there is no cause for the world and no creator for its bodies, but since the world, as it is, is eternal, there is no cause for it, i.e. no cause for its bodies. For indeed, what sense is there in the doctrine of the philosophers that these bodies exist through a cause, although they are eternal ? 415

I say: The philosophers assert that the man who says that all bodies have been produced (and by 'produced' must be understood creation ex nihilo) gives a meaning to the term 'produced' which is never found in the empirical world, and his statement surely stands in need of a proof. As to his attacks on the philosophers in this passage, so that he even forces on them the implication of atheism, we have already 5 answered them previously and there is no sense in repeating ourselves, but, in short, the philosophers hold that body, be it temporal or eternal, cannot be independent in existence through itself; and this principle is, according to the philosophers, binding for the eternal body in the same way as for the temporal, although imagination does not help to explain how this is the case with the eternal body in the way it is with the temporal body. 3 Aristotle therefore, in the second book of De caelo el mundo,* when he wanted to explain the fact IO that the earth was circular by nature*, first assumed it to have come

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into being in time so that the intellect might imagine its cause, and then transferred its existence to eternity. Having forced on the philosophers these reprehensible deductions, Ghazali now gives an answer in defence of them and objects then to their answer. Ghazali says: And if the philosophers say: 'Everything that has no cause is of a necessary existence, and we philosophers have already mentioned the qualities of the necessary existent through which it is proved that body cannot be 416 the necessary existent,' we answer: We have shown the mistake in your claim about the attributes of the necessary existent, and that your proof does not demonstrate anything but the termination of a causal series, and this termination also exists for the materialists at the beginning of things,1 for they say that there is no cause for the bodies, and the forms and accidents are causes for each other and terminate in the circular movement part of which is the cause of another part in the same way as it takes place according to the doctrine of the philosophers, and this causal series2 ends 5 in this circular movement. And the man who observes what we have related will understand the inability of those who believe in the eternity of bodies to claim at the same time that they have a cause, and the consequence of their theory is atheism and apostasy, which one party has clearly admitted, those namely who rely solely on the determinations of the intellect. I say: All this has been already answered, and its degree of truth has been stated, and there is no reason to repeat ourselves. And as to the 10 materialists, they rely only on the senses, and when according to them the movements had terminated in the heavenly body and through this the causal series was ended, they thought that where sensation had come to a limit, the intellect also had come to a limit; but this is not true. But the philosophers considered the causes till they ended in the heavenly body, then they considered the intelligible causes and arrived at an existent which cannot be perceived and which is the principle of perceptible being, and this is the meaning of the words: 'Thus did we show Abraham the Kingdom of Heaven and of the earth. . . .' 3 The Ash'arites, however, rejected sensible 417 causes; that is, they denied that certain sensible things are the causes of other sensible things, and they made the cause of sensible being a nonsensible being by a way of becoming which is neither experienced nor perceived, and they denied causes and effects; and this is a kind of view which is inconsistent with the nature of man in so far as he is man. 4

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Ghazali says, objecting to the argument of the philosophers:

If it is said that the proof that body is not a necessary existent is that, if it were a necessary existent, it would have neither an external nor an internal cause, but if it has a cause for its being composed, it will be possible in respect of its essence, and every possible needs a necessary existent, we answer: The terms 'necessary existent' and 'possible existent' are 10 devoid of sense, and your whole confusion lies in these terms; but let us revert to their plain sense, which is the denial and the affirmation of a cause, for then your words amount to nothing else but saying that bodies either have a cause or not, and the materialists affirm the latter," and why should you deny it? And when this is understood by 'possibility' and 'necessity', we say body is necessary and not possible, and your statement that body cannot be necessary is pure presumption without any foundation.

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I say: We have already said that if by 'necessary existent' is understood the causeless and by 'possible existent' is understood that which has a cause, the division of being into these two sections is not acknowledged, and opponents might say that this division is not true, but that, indeed, all existents are causeless. But when by 'necessary existent' is understood absolute necessary being and by 'possible' the genuinely possible, then we must arrive at a being which has no cause, for we can say that every being is either possible or necessary; if possible, it has a cause, and if this cause is of the nature of the possible, we have a series which ends in a necessary cause. Then, concerning this necessary cause it may be asked again whether some necessary beings might have a cause and other necessary beings none, and if a cause is ascribed to the nature of the necessary being which can have a cause, there will follow a series which ends in a necessary being which has no cause. Avicenna wanted by this division only to conform to the opinion of the philosophers concerning existents, for all philosophers agree that the body of the heavens is necessary through something else; whether, however, this thing necessary through another is possible by itself is a problem which has to be studied. 2 And this argument is therefore faulty when this method is followed, and this method is of necessity faulty, because being is not primarily divided into the genuinely possible and the necessary, for this is a division which is only known through the nature of existing things. 3 Then Ghazali answers the philosophers' statement that body cannot be a necessary existent by itself, because it has parts which are its cause.

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If it is said: 'It cannot be denied that body has parts, and that the whole is only constituted through the parts, and that the parts in a thing are prior to the whole,' we answer: 'Let it be so; certainly, the whole is constituted by the parts and their aggregation, but there is no cause for the parts nor for their aggregation, which on the contrary are eternally 5 in the condition in which they are without an efficient cause.' And the philosophers cannot refute this, except by the argument of theirs which we have mentioned, which is based on the denial of plurality in the First; we have shown its futility, and apart from it there is no other method. It is therefore clear that for the man who does not believe in the temporal creation of bodies there is no foundation for believing in a creator at all. I say: This argument is, without doubt, binding for the man who follows the method of a necessary existent to prove the existence of an incorporeal being, but this is not the method followed by the ancient philosophers, and the first, so far as we know, who used it was Avi- 10 cenna. H e said that it was superior to the proof of the ancients, because the ancients arriv-.d only at an immaterial being, the principle of the universe, through derivative things, namely motion and time; whereas this proof, according to Avicenna, arrives at the assertion of such a principle as the ancients established, through the investigation of the nature of the existent in so far as it is an existent. If indeed it did arrive at such an affirmation, what Avicenna says would be true; however, it does not. 1 For the most that could be affirmed of the existent necessarily existing by itself would be that it is not composed of matter and form, and generally speaking that it 420 has no definition. But if it is supposed to exist as composed of eternal parts which are continuous by nature, as is the case with the world and its parts, it may indeed be said of the world with its parts that it is a necessary existent, 2 it being of course understood that there is a necessary existent. And we have already said that the method Avicenna followed to establish an existent of this description is not 5 demonstrative and does not by nature lead to it, except in the way we have stated. The utmost consequence of this argument—and this constitutes its weakness—is the theory of those, namely the Peripatetics, who assume that there exists a simple body not composed of matter and form. For the man who assumes an eternal compound of actual parts must necessarily acknowledge that it is essentially one, and every oneness in a compound is one through an essential unity, IO namely a simple, and through this unity the world becomes one, and therefore Alexander of Aphrodisias says that there must exist a

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spiritual force which is diffused in all the parts of the universe in the same way as there is a force in all the parts of a single animal which binds them together, and the difference between the two forces is that the binding force in the world is eternal, because the conjoining principle is eternal, whereas the conjunction between the parts of the sublunary animal is individually transitory—although, through the eternal conjunction, not specifically transitory1—since it cannot be individually imperishable like the world.2 And through this theory the Creator will be deprived ofthat very kind of perfection which nothing else can equal, as Aristotle says in his book De animalibus.3 And we see nowadays that many of Avicenna's followers because of this aporia ascribe this opinion to him, and they say that he does not believe that there exists a separate existence, and they assert that this can be seen from what he says about the necessary existent in many passages, and that this is the view which he has laid down in his Oriental Philosophy, and they say that he only called this book Oriental Philosophy* because it is the doctrine of the Orientals; for they believed that according to the Orientals divinity is located in the heavenly bodies, as Avicenna himself had come to believe. However, notwithstanding this they accept* Aristotle's argument to prove the First Principle through movement. And as for ourselves, we have discussed this argument at other times and have shown in what sense it can be regarded as evident, and we have solved all the doubts concerning it; we have also discussed Alexander's argument on this question, namely the one he uses in his book called On the principles.5 For Alexander imagined that he was turning from Aristotle's argument to another; his argument, however, is taken from the principles which Aristotle proved, and both arguments are sound, though the more usual* is Aristotle's. And when the argument for a necessary existent is verified, it is true according to me in the way I shall describe it, although it is used too generally and its different senses must be distinguished. It must, namely, be preceded by knowledge of the different kinds of possible existents in substance and the different kinds of necessary existents in substance. And then this argument takes this form: The possible existent in bodily substance must be preceded by the necessary existent in bodily substance, and the necessary existent in bodily substance must be preceded by the absolute necessary existent which does not possess any potency whatsoever, either in its substance or in any other of the different kinds of movements, and such an entity is

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not a body. For instance, it appears from the nature of the body of the heavens that it is a necessary existent in its bodily substance, 1 for 10 otherwise there would have to be a body prior to it, and it appears also from its nature that it is a possible existent in its local movement; it is therefore necessary that its mover should be a necessary existent in its substance, and that there should be in it no potency whatsoever, either as regards movement or in any other respect, and that neither 423 movement nor rest could be ascribed to it nor any other kind of change, and such an entity is absolutely without body and without any potency in a body. But the eternal parts of the world are only necessary existents in their substance, either universally like the four elements, or individually like the heavenly bodies. 2

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To show the incapacity of those philosophers who believe that the First knows other things beside its own self and that it knows the genera and the species in a universal way, to prove that this is so Ghazali says: Since for the Muslims existence is confined to the temporal and the eternal, and there is for them nothing eternal except God and His attri- 5 butes, and everything besides Him is temporally created by Him through His will, according to them the existent of necessity exists previously in His knowledge, for the object willed must be known by the wilier. They deduced from this that the universe is known to Him, for the universe was willed by Him and produced by Him, and nothing comes into existence but what is produced through His will, and nothing is everlasting but His essence alone. And when once it was established that God wills and knows what He wills, He must be necessarily living,3 and every living being is conscious of its own self,4 and He is the most capable of knowing Himself. Therefore the whole universe is known to God, and they understood this through this argument, since they had found that He willed everything that happens in the world. 10 I say: He says this only as an introduction and preparation for the comparison between his theory and that of the philosophers about eternal

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knowledge, because his theory seems at first sight more satisfactory 425 than that of the philosophers. But when the theory of the theologians is tested, and shown up to him for whom such an exposure is necessary, it becomes clear that they only made God an eternal man, 1 for they compared the world with the products of art wrought by the will and knowledge and power of man. And when it was objected against them that He must then have a body, they answered that He is eternal and that all bodies are temporal. They were therefore 5 forced to admit an immaterial man who produces all existents. But this theory is nothing but a metaphor and a poetical expression; and metaphorical expressions are certainly very convincing, till they are explored, but then their deficiency becomes evident. For indeed there is no nature more distant from that of the transitory than that of the eternal. And if this is true, it cannot be that there should exist one single species which is differentiated by eternity and non-eternity 2 as 10 one single genus is differentiated through the various differences into which it is divided. For the distance between the eternal and the temporal is far greater than that between the different species which participate in temporality. And if the distance between eternity and non-eternity is greater than that between the various species, how then is it possible to apply a judgement about the empirical world to the invisible: for those two are opposite extremes? And when you have understood the sense of the attributes which exist in the visible world and those which exist in the invisible world, it will be clear to you that through the ambiguity of the terms they are so equivocal that they do not permit a transference from the visible to the invisible. 426 Life, for instance, added to the intellect of man only applies to the potentiality of motion in space through will and sense-perception, 3 but senses are impossible for the Creator and still more impossible for Him is motion in space. But the theologians ascribe to the Creator the faculty of sense-perception* without sense-organs, and deny His move5 ment absolutely. Therefore either they do not ascribe life to the Creator in the sense it has in the animal and which is a condition for the existence of knowledge in man, or they identify it with perception in the way the philosophers say that perception and knowledge in the First are identical with life. Further, the meaning of'will' 4 in man and in animal is a desire which rouses movement and which 10 happens in animal and man to perfect a deficiency in their essence, and it is impossible that there should be in the Creator a desire because of an imperfection in His essence, which could be a cause of

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movement and action either in Himself or in something different from Himself. And how could an eternal will be imagined which should be the cause of an act occurring without an increase of the desire at the time of the act, 1 or how could a will and a desire be imagined which would be before, during, and after the act in the same state without any change occurring to them? And again, desire (in so far as it is the cause of movement) and movement are only 427 found in body, and desire is only found in the animate body. Therefore according to the philosophers the meaning of 'will' in God is nothing but that every act proceeds from Him through knowledge, and knowledge in so far as it is knowledge is the knowledge of opposites, either of which can proceed from Him. And the Knower is called excellent by the fact that there always proceeds from Him the better of the opposites to the exclusion of the worse. Therefore 5 the philosophers say that three attributes are most appropriate to the Creator, namely that He has knowledge, excellence, and power. And they say that His power is not inferior to His will, as is the case with man. All this is the theory of the philosophers on this problem and in the way we have stated it here with its proofs, it is a persuasive not 10 a demonstrative statement. It is for you to inquire about these questions in the places where they are treated in the books of demonstration, if you are one of the people of perfect eudaemonia, and if you are one of those who learn the arts the function of which is proof. For the demonstrative arts are very much like the practical; for just as a man who is not a craftsman cannot perform the function of craftsmanship, in the same way it is not possible for him who has not learned the arts of demonstration to perform the function of demonstration which is demonstration itself: indeed this is still more necessary for this art than for any other—and this is not generally acknowledged in the case of this practice only because it is a mere act 2 —and there- 428 fore such a demonstration can proceed only from one who has learned the art. The kinds of statement, however, are many, some demonstrative, others not, and since non-demonstrative statements can be adduced without knowledge of the art, it was thought that this might be also the case with demonstrative statements; but this is a great error. And therefore in the spheres of the demonstrative arts, no other 5 statement is possible but a technical statement which only the student of this art can bring, just as is the case with the art of geometry. Nothing therefore of what we have said in this book is a technical

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demonstrative proof; they are all non-technical statements, some of them having greater persuasion than others, and it is in this spirit that what we have written here must be understood. So this book of Ghazali might be best given the name of the 'Incoherence of both parties together'. All this in my opinion is in excess of the Holy Law, and an inquiry into something not ordered by a religious law because human power does not suffice for it. For not all knowledge about which the Holy Law is silent needs to be explored and explained to the masses as being, according to speculative thought, part of the dogmas of religion; for from this the greatest confusion arises. One must not speak about those things concerning which the Holy Law is silent; the masses must learn that human understanding is not sufficient to treat these problems, and must not go beyond what the teaching of the Holy Law explains in its texts, since this is teaching in which all can participate and which suffices for the attainment of their happiness. And just as the physician investigates the measure of health which agrees most with the healthy for the preservation of their health, and with the sick for the curing of their illness, so the Lord of the Holy Law instructs the masses only in so far as is needed for their acquisition of happiness. And the same thing holds in respect of the facts of human behaviour, only the investigation of these facts in so far as the Holy Law is silent about them is more legitimate, especially when they are of the same genus as those about which the Law pronounces judgement. For this reason the lawyers disagree about this kind of facts; some of them, the Zahirites, deny the use of analogy, whereas others, the analogists, admit it, 1 and this is absolutely the same thing as happens in the sphere of knowledge, only perhaps the Zahirites are happier in the purely intellectual sphere than in the practical. And anyone amongst the two opposing parties who inquires after these questions must either belong to the followers of proof, i.e. the rationalists, or not; in the former case he will speak about them and base his statements on demonstration, he will know that this way of discussion is limited to the followers of proof, and he will know the places in which the Holy Law gives to the people who possess this kind of knowledge a hint about the conclusions to which demonstration leads; in the latter case he will be either a believer or an unbeliever : if he is a believer he will know that to discuss those questions is forbidden by the Holy Law, and if he is an unbeliever, it is not

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difficult for the followers of proof to refute him with the stringent proofs they possess. T h e rationahst must act in this way in every 5 religion, but especially in our Divine Revelation, which although it is silent on certain intellectual problems nevertheless hints at the conclusions about them to which demonstration leads, without, however, mentioning these problems in its instruction of the masses. Since this is established, we shall revert now to our subject, which is forced upon us by necessity—for otherwise, by God, the Knower, the Witness, the Revealer, we should not think it permissible to discuss such questions in this way. And Ghazali, having described the I 0 arguments through which the theologians prove the attribute of knowledge and other attributes, and shown that they are very evident because they are generally admitted and extremely easy to accept, begins to compare these arguments with those of the philosophers about these attributes, and this is an act of rhetoric. 1 Ghazali says, addressing the philosophers: 431 And you, philosophers, when you affirm that the world is eternal and not produced by God's will, how do you know that He knows something beside His essence, for you require a proof of this? Then Ghazali says: And the summary of what Avicenna says to prove this in the course of his argument can be reduced to two heads: First, that the First does not exist in matter, and everything which does not exist in matter is pure intellect and all the intelligibles are revealed to it, for the obstacle to 5 perceiving all things is attachment to matter and being occupied with matter, and the human soul is occupied by directing matter, i.e. its body, and when this occupation is terminated and it is not any longer defiled by the bodily passions and the despicable conditions which affect it through the things of nature, all the realities of the intelligibles are revealed to it2 and therefore is it asserted that all the angels know all the intelligibles without exception, for they too are pure immaterial intellects. And having related their theory, Ghazali argues against them: But we say: If by your assertion that the First does not exist in matter, you mean that it is not a body, nor impressed on a body, but exists by itself not comprised by space nor locally specified by a direction, this is admitted by us. There remains then your answer to the question what its attribute is, namely that it is pure intellect—and what do you understand by 'intellect' ? If you mean by it that which thinks all the other things, this is just what we are trying to find out and the point under discussion, and how, therefore, can you take it as the premiss of a syllogism which must prove it? And if you mean by it something else, namely that it thinks

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its own self—and some of your fellow-philosophers may concede this to you, but this amounts again to your saying that what thinks its own self thinks other things also—the answer to be made is 'Why do you claim this? For this is not known by necessity, and only Avicenna of all the philosophers affirmed it; and how can you claim this as necessary knowledge, or, if you know it by deduction, what is your proof?' And if the assertion is made: 'Because what prevents the perception of things is matter," and the First is not matter', we answer: We concede that matter is an impediment, but we do not admit that it is the only impediment; and let them arrange their syllogism in the figure of the hypothetical syllogism and say: 'If this First is in matter it cannot think things, but it is not in matter, therefore it thinks things'.1 And this is the assumption as a minor premiss of the opposite of the antecedent, but such an assumption does not lead to a conclusion in all cases, for it is like saying: 'If this is a man, it is an animal, but it is not a man, therefore it is not an animal'. 2 But this is not a necessary conclusion, for although not a man, it might be a horse, and therefore an animal. The assumption as a minor premiss of the opposite of the antecedent is valid only conditionally, as we have shown in our logic—namely, when the consequent is universally convertible with the antecedent, as when the logicians say: 'If the sun has risen, it is day, but the sun has not risen, therefore it is not day', for the only cause of its being day is the fact that the sun has risen—an example in which antecedent and consequent are convertible with each other—and the explanation of these theories and terms can be understood from our book 'The Touchstone of Knowledge'*, which we have written as an appendix to this book.3 If, however, they say 'We claim that antecedent and consequent are here convertible, and that the one and only obstacle to thinking is being in matter', we answer: 'This is a pure presumption; where is your proof?'

I say: The first mistake he makes here is that, in relating the theory and the proof, he regards the premisses lie mentions as first principles, whereas for the philosophers they are conclusions from many premisses. For the philosophers had seen that every sensible existent is 433 composed of matter and form, and that the form is the entity through which the existent becomes existent 4 and that it is the form which is designated by the name and the definition, 5 and that the specific act proceeds from the form in every existent, and it is this act which shows the existence of the forms in the existent. 6 For they had found that in substances there are active potencies, particular to every single existent, and passive potencies, either particular or common, 7 5 and that a thing cannot be passive by reason of the same thing as it is active; for activity is the opposite of passivity, and opposites do

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not admit each other, and it is only their substratum which admits them successively, e.g. hotness does not accept coldness, it is simply the hot body that accepts coldness by divesting itself of hotness and accepting coldness, and vice versa. Now when the philosophers found that this was the case with activity and passivity, they understood that all existents of this description were composed of two substances, 10 a substance which is the act and a substance which is the potency, and they realized that the substance in act is the perfection of the substance in potency and that the substance in act stands in relation to the substance in potency as if it were the end of its actualization, for there is no actual difference between them.' Then, when they looked through all the different forms of existents, they found that all these substances must necessarily lead up to a substance in act which is absolutely devoid of matter, and this substance must necessarily be active and cannot have any passivity and cannot be subject to exhaustion, weariness, and decay; for such things occur to the substance in act only because it is the perfection of the substance in potency, not because it is pure act. For since the substance in potency only goes forth into act through a substance in act, the series of 434 substances which are at the same time both active and passive must terminate in a substance which is pure act, and the series must terminate in that substance. And the proof of the existence of this substance, in so far as it is a mover and agent, through essential particular premisses, can be found in the eighth book of Aristotle's Physics. Having established the existence of this substance by special and 5 general arguments according to what is known in their books, the philosophers now investigated the nature of the forms in matter which produce motion, and they found some of them nearer to actuality and farther from potency because they are less than others involved in passivity, which is the special sign of the matter which exists in them. And they realized that that which among these forms is most destitute of matter is the soul, and especially the intellect, so 10 that they started to doubt whether the intellect belongs to the forms which are in matter or not. 2 But when they investigated the perceiving forms amongst the forms of the soul and found that they were free from matter, they understood that the cause of perception consists in freedom from matter, 3 and since they discovered that the intellect is without passivity they understood that the reason why one form is inorganic and another perceptive consists in the fact that

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when it is the perfection of a potency it is inorganic or not percipient,' 435 and when it is pure perfection with which no potency is mixed it is intellect. 2 All this they proved in a demonstrative order and by natural deductions which cannot be reproduced here in this demonstrative sequence, for this would involve collecting in one place what by its nature is treated in many different books, and anyone who has the slightest experience of the science of logic will acknowledge that 5 this is an impossibility. Through arguments of this kind they came to realize that what has no passivity whatever is intellect and not body, for what is passive is body which exists in matter according to them. An objection against the philosophers in these questions ought to be made only against the first principles they use in the proof of these conclusions, not against those conclusions themselves, as it is made by io Ghazali. Through this they came to understand that there exists here an existent which is pure intellect, and when they saw further that the order which reigns in nature and in the act of nature follows an intellectual plan very much like the plan of the craftsman, they realized that there must exist an intellect which causes these natural potencies to act in an intellectual way, and through these two points they received the conviction that this existent which is pure intellect is that which bestows on the existents the order and arrangement in their acts. And they understood from all this that its thinking its own 436 self is identical with its thinking all existents, and that this existent is not such that its thinking its own self is something different from the thought by which it thinks other things, as is the case with the human intellect. And about this intellect the disjunction assumed as a premiss, that every intellect either thinks its own self or thinks something else or thinks both together, is not valid. For when this disjunction is admitted, what is said is: 'If it thinks other things, it is self-evident that it must think its own self; however, if it thinks its own self, it is not at all necessary that it should think other things.' 5 And we have discussed this previously. And all the things which he says about the hypothetical syllogism which he formed in the figure he explained are not true. For the hypothetical syllogism is only valid when the minor and the legitimacy of the inference 3 are proved through one or more categorical syllogisms. For correct hypothetical inference in this question is: 'If io what does not think is in matter, then what is not in matter thinks.' But, of course, first the truth of this conjunction and disjunction must

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be proved. And these are the premisses of which we said that they are according to the philosophers conclusions, whereas Ghazali pretends they are first principles for them, or nearly so. And when it is explained as we have done, it is a syllogism of a legitimate figure and of true premisses. As to its legitimate form, the minor is the opposite of the consequent and the conclusion is the opposite of the antecedent, not as Ghazali believed, the minor the opposite of the antecedent and the conclusion the opposite of the consequent. 2 But since they are not first principles, nor generally acknowledged, nor evident at first sight, they are regarded, no doubt, by those who have 437 never heard anything of these things as very much open to objection. But indeed Ghazali confused the sciences in a most terrible way, and he uprooted science from its foundation and its method. Ghazali says: The second argument is that the philosophers say: 'Although we assert neither that the First wills temporal production nor that it produces the 5 world in time by secondary* intention, we nevertheless affirm that the First has made the world and that indeed the world has its existence through the First only, the First never losing its character as an agent and never ceasing to act; our theory only distinguishes itself from others in this point, in no way however with respect to the principle of the act. And since the agent must have knowledge in conformity with its act, the universe, according to us, exists through its act.' But there are two ways to answer this, of which the first is: 'There are two kinds of action: voluntary, like the action of animal and man; and involuntary, like the action of the sun in producing light, of fire in pro- 10 ducing heat, of water in producing cold. Now knowledge of the act is only necessary in voluntary acts, as in the human products of art, not in the acts of nature. But according to you philosophers, God has made the world consequent on His essence by nature and by necessity, not through will and choice; indeed, the universe is consequent on His essence, as light is on the sun, and just as the sun has no power to check its light, nor fire to repress its producing heat, so the First cannot check its acts. Now this kind of occurrence, although it may be called an act, does not imply knowledge at all.' And if it is answered that there is a difference between the two things, in that the procession of the universe from God's essence occurs through His knowledge of the universe and His representing the / universal order in the course of the emamation of the universe, and He has no other cause than His knowledge of the universe, and His knowledge of the universe is identical with His essence, and if He had not this knowledge of the universe, the universe would not exist through 438 Him, which is not the case with light in relation to the sun, we answer: 'In this you are in contradiction to your fellow-philosophers, for they say

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that His essence is the essence from which the existence of the universe in its order follows naturally and necessarily, and it is not because He knows this.' And what is wrong with this conception, once you agree with them in denying His will? And since the sun's knowledge of its light is no condition for its light, but its light is necessarily consequent on the sun, so 5 let us accept this also in the case of the First; and nothing prevents this.' I say: In this section Ghazali begins by saying something reprehensible about the philosophers, namely that the Creator possesses a will neither with respect to the things produced nor with respect to the universe as a whole, because His act proceeds from His essence necessarily like the procession of light from the sun. Then he says of them that they say that through His acting He must have knowledge. The io philosophers, however, do not deny the will of God, nor do they admit that He has a human will, for the human will implies a deficiency in the wilier and a being affected by the object willed, and when the object is attained, the deficiency is completed and the passivity, which is called will, ceases. The philosophers only attribute a will to God in the sense that the acts which proceed from Him proceed through knowledge, and everything which proceeds through knowledge and wisdom proceeds through the will of the agent, not, however, necessarily and naturally, since the nature of knowledge does not imply (as he falsely affirms of the philosophers) the proceeding of the act. For if the nature of knowledge did imply this, then, when we say that God knows the opposites, it would be necessary that the opposites should proceed from Him together, and this is absurd. The fact that only one of the opposites proceeds from Him shows that there is another attribute present beside knowledge, namely will, and it is in this way that the affirmation of will in the First must be understood according to the philosophers. 2 For God, according to the philosophers, necessarily knows and wills through 439 His knowledge. As to Ghazali's assertion that the act can be subdivided into two, into a natural act and a voluntary act, this is false. God's act according to the philosophers is in a certain way not natural, nor is it absolutely voluntary; it is voluntary without having the deficiency which is attached to the human will. Therefore the term 'will' is attributed to the Divine Will and the human in an equivocal way, just as the term 'knowledge 'is attributed equivocally 5 to eternal knowledge and to temporal. For the will in animals and man is a passivity which occurs to them through the object of desire

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and is caused by it. This is the meaning of 'will' in the case of the human will, but the Creator is too exalted to possess an attribute which should be an effect. Therefore by 'will' in God only the procession of the act joined to knowledge can be understood. And 'knowledge', as we said, refers to the two opposites, and in the knowledge of God there is knowledge of the opposites in a certain way, and His performing only the one shows that there exists in Him another attribute which is called 'will'. Ghazali says: The second way of answering is to concede that the procession of a thing from the agent implies knowledge of the thing which proceeds. Now, according to them, the act of God is one, namely the effect which is pure intellect, and God can only know this effect. The first effect again will only know what proceeds from it. For the universe does not proceed from God immediately, but through mediators and derivation and a series of consequences. For that which proceeds from what proceeds from Him need not be known to Him, and from Him Himself only one thing proceeds. And how should He know everything that proceeds mediately from Him? For this is not even necessary in voluntary acts, and how could it be necessary in natural acts? For the movement of a stone from the top of a mountain can occur through a voluntary propulsion which implies knowledge of the principle of motion, but does not imply knowledge of all the consequences which may occur through its knocking and breaking something.1 And to this again the philosophers have no answer. I answer: The answer to this is that the Agent whose knowledge is of the highest perfection knows everything which proceeds from Him and which proceeds from that which proceeds from Him, and so from the first term to the last. And if the knowledge of the First is of the highest perfection, the First must know everything that proceeds from it either mediately or immediately, and its knowledge need not be of the same kind as our knowledge, for our knowledge is imperfect and posterior to the thing known. Then Ghazali says, answering the objection he brought forward against the philosophers: If, however, the philosophers should say: 'If we declared that the First only knows its own self, this would be a very reprehensible doctrine, for all other beings know themselves and know the First, and would therefore be superior to it; and how can the effect be superior to the cause? I say: This is an insufficient answer, for it opposes a rational argument with a moral one.

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Then Ghazali answers this and says: We should answer: 'This reprehensible doctrine is a necessary consequence for those who follow* the philosophers in denying the Divine Will and the production of the world, and one must either adhere to it as the other philosophers do, or abandon the philosophers and acknowledge that the world is produced through will.'

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I say: Ghazali means that if they belong to those who affirm that God knows His work, only to avoid the reprehensible doctrine that He docs not know anything but His own self, they are forced to acknowledge this reprehensible doctrine just as well, since they affirmed another reprehensible doctrine, namely the eternity of the world and the denial of the Will. 1 However, the philosophers do not deny the Will, and only deny that part of it which implies a deficiency. Then Ghazali says:

How will you refute those philosophers who say that this knowledge 10 does not add to God's dignity, since other beings need knowledge only in order to acquire perfection (for in their essence there is a deficiency) and man receives dignity through the intelligibles either that he may see his advantage in the coming events of this world and the next, or that his obscure and insufficient essence may be perfected, and likewise all the other creatures, but that the essence of God does not stand in need of perfection: nay, if a knowledge could be imagined through which He would be perfected, His essence, in so far as it is His essence, would be imperfect? This is just the same kind of remark as your assertions, Aviccnna, concerning His hearing and seeing and His knowing the particular beings which fall under the concept of time, for you agree with all the other philosophers in saying that God is too exalted for that, and that the changes which fall under the concept of time and which are divided into past and future events are not known to the First, since this would imply a change 442 in its essence and a being influenced, and the denial of this does not imply an imperfection, but rather a perfection, and there is only an imperfection in the senses and the need for them.2 If there were not this human imperfection, man would not be in need of the senses to guard himself against any change which might affect him. And in the same way you affirm that the knowledge of particular events is an imperfection. And if it is true that we can know all particular events and perceive all sensible things, whereas the First cannot know anything of the particulars nor perceive anything of sensible things without this implying any imperfection in the First, it may 5 also be permitted to ascribe to others knowledge of the intelligible universal but to deny it of the First without this implying any imperfection in the First. There is no way out of this.

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I say: This is the proof of those who say that the First knows only itself, and we have already spoken of the theory of those who combine the doctrine that the First knows only itself with the theory that it knows all existents; and for this reason some of the best known philosophers affirm that God the Creator is Himself all existents and that He grants them in His benevolence, and there is no sense in repeating ourselves. The premisses used in this section are common dialectical propositions, since they all belong to those which compare the Divine to the empirical, although no common genus unites these two spheres and they do not possess any common factor at all. In general his discussion in this section, when he argues with Avicenna, who adduces the argument of those philosophers who believe that God in knowing Himself must know other things, since He must necessarily know what proceeds from Himself, and all the other assertions of Avicenna to prove this, which he relates, and which he uses himself again to refute Avicenna, are all taken from human conditions which he tries to refer to the Creator; and this is false, since the terms of these two types of knowledge are predicated equivocally. Avicenna's assertion that any intelligent being from whom an act proceeds knows this act is a true proposition; not, however, in the sense in which the word 'knowledge' is used of the human intellect, when it understands a thing, for the human intellect is perfected by what it perceives and knows, and is affected by it, and the cause of action in man is the representation he forms in his intellect. 1 And Ghazali argues against this kind of proposition by saying that when a man acts and there follows from his act another act and from the second act a third and from the third a fourth, it is not necessary that the conscious agent should know all the consequences which follow from his first act; and Ghazali says to his opponent this is a fact which concerns voluntary acts, but how is it when one assumes an agent whose acts are not voluntary? And he only says this because he means that the affirmation of God's knowledge implies the affirmation of God's will. 1 And therefore Ghazali says: To this again the philosophers have no answer*. I say: Ghazali means that it does not follow that the First according to Avicenna thinks anything but the act which proceeds from it

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primarily, and this act is the second cause and the first effect. Neither is there an answer to the other difficulty which he states that if the First thinks only itself and nothing else, man would be more noble than it. And the reason why Ghazali's words carry a certain con444 viction is that if one imagines two men, one of whom thinks only his own self, whereas the other thinks his own self and other things besides, the latter intellect is regarded as superior to the former. However, as the term 'intellect' is applied to the human intellect and to this Divine Intellect in a purely equivocal way, since the latter is an agent and not a patient and the former a patient and not an agent, this analogy does not hold any longer. 5 Having given as Avicenna's argument the maxim which Avicenna applies to every intelligent being,' that the more knowledge an intellect possesses the nobler it is, and having affirmed that, according to him (Ghazali), it is just the philosophers' denial of God's will and of temporal creation which forces them to deny to God a knowledge of anything but Himself, since the conscious agent knows his effect only in so far as it differs from himself by being an object of his will, he says that this reprehensible assertion, i.e. the assertion that the effect io which is man must be nobler than the cause which is the Creator, is a consequence for the philosophers only, since as the philosophers deny the coming into being of the world, they deny the Divine Will, as he affirms, and as they deny the Divine Will, they deny that God knows what proceeds from Him. 2 But all this, namely the denial of God's will, has been shown previously not to be true; for they deny only His temporal will. And having repeated Avicenna's arguments, which he regarded as being applicable both to the knowledge of the temporal and the knowledge of the eternal, 3 he begins to argue against him, showing the distinction which the philosophers 445 established on this point between these two sciences, and indeed this consequence is incumbent on Avicenna. And Ghazali says: How will you refute those philosophers who say that this knowledge docs not add to God's dignity, for only other beings need knowledge. . .? I say; The summary of this is that, if all these perceptions exist only 5 because of man's imperfection, then God is too exalted for them; and therefore Ghazali says to Avicenna: 'Just as you acknowledge with your fellow-philosophers that God's not perceiving individual things is not a consequence of an imperfection in Him, for you have proved

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that the perception of individuals rests on an imperfection in the perceiver, in the same way the perception of other things than Himself need not derive from an imperfection in Him, since the perception of these other things depends on the imperfection of the perceiver.' T h e answer to all this is that God's knowledge cannot be divided into the opposites of true and false in which human knowledge is divided; for instance, it may be said of a man that either he knows or he does not know other things, because these two propositions are contradictory, and when the one is true the other is false; but in the case of God both propositions, that He knows what He knows and that He does not know it*, are true, for He does not know it through a knowledge which determines an imperfection, namely human knowledge, but knows it through a knowledge which does not carry with it any imperfection, and this is a knowledge the quality of which nobody but God Himself can understand. And concerning both universals and individuals it is true of Him that He knows them and does not know them. This is the conclusion to which the principles of the ancient philosophers led; but those who make a distinction, and say that God knows universals but does not know particulars have not fully grasped their theory, and this is not a consequence of their principles. For all human sciences are passivities and impressions from the existents, and the cxistents operate on them. But the knowledge of the Creator operates on existents, and the existents receive the activities of His knowledge. Once this is established, the whole quarrel between Ghazali and the philosophers comes to an end in regard to this chapter as well as the next two. We shall, however*, give an account of these chapters and mention in them both what is particular to them and those arguments which have been already discussed above.

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THE TWELFTH DISCUSSION About the impotence of the philosophers to prove that God knows 447 Himself Ghazali says: We say that when the Muslims understood that the world was created through the will of God, they proved His knowledge from His will, then

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His life from His will and His knowledge together,1 then from His life, according to the principle that every living being knows itself,2 they proved that He too must know His own essence, since He is alive. And this is a rational procedure of extreme force. For you philosophers, however, since you deny the divine will and the world's coming into existence, and since you affirm that what proceeds from Him proceeds in a necessary and natural sequence, why should it be impossible that His essence should be of such a nature that only the first effect proceeded from it, and that then the second effect followed the first till the whole order of existents was completed, but, notwithstanding this, the First would not know itself, just as neither fire from which heat proceeds, nor the sun from which light proceeds, know themselves or anything else? For only that which knows itself knows what proceeds from itself, and therefore knows other things besides itself. And we have already shown that, according to the theory of the philosophers the First does not know other things, and we have forced those who do not agree with them on this point to acknowledge this consequence which follows from their assumption. And if it does not know others, it is not absurd to suppose that it does not know its own self. If they say: 'Everyone who does not know himself is dead, and how could the First be dead?'—we answer: 'This is indeed a conclusion which follows from your theory, since there is no difference between you and those who say that every one who does not act through will, power and choice, who neither hears nor sees, is dead, and he who does not know other things is dead. And if it is possible that the First is destitute of all these attributes, what need has it of knowing itself?' And if they return to the doctrine that everything which is free from matter is intellect by itself and therefore thinks itself, we have shown that this is an arbitrary judgement without any proof. And if they say: 'The proof is that what is existent is divided into what is alive and what is dead, and what is alive is prior and superior to what is dead, and the First is prior and superior: therefore let it be alive; and every living being knows itself, since it is impossible that the living should be amongst its effects and should not itself be alive',' we answer: 'All this is pure presumption, for we affirm that it is not impossible that that which knows itself should follow from that which does not, either through many intermediaries or without mediation. And if the reason for its impossibility is that in that case the effect would be superior to the cause, well, it is not impossible that the effect should be superior to the cause, for the superiority of the cause to the effect is not a fundamental principle. Further, how can you refute the view that its superiority might consist not in its knowledge but in the fact that the existence of the universe* is a consequence of its essence? For the proof is that, whereas the First neither sees nor hears, there are many other beings who know other things than themselves and who do see and hear.'

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And if it were said, 'Existents are divided into the seeing and the blind, the knowing and the ignorant', we answer: 'Well, let the seeing then be superior and let the First see and have knowledge of things!'1 But the philosophers deny this, and say that its excellence does not consist in seeing and knowing things, but in not being in need of sight and knowledge and being the essence from which there proceeds the universe in which the knowing and the seeing beings exist. And in the same way it may be said that this essence does not possess excellence because it has knowledge itself, but because it is the principle of essences which possess knowledge, and this is an excellence which is peculiar to it. The philosophers are therefore forced to deny also that the First knows itself, for nothing proves such a knowledge but will, and nothing proves will except the temporal beginning of the world, and if this principle is destroyed, all these things are destroyed which are accepted through the speculation of the mind alone. For they do not possess a proof for any thing they affirm or deny concerning the attributes of the First, but they make only such guesses and conjectures as lawyers would despise in their suppositions. However, no wonder that the intellect should be perplexed about the divine attributes; one should wonder only at the wonderful 449 self-complacency of the philosophers, at their satisfaction with their proofs and their belief that they know those things through evident proofs, notwithstanding the mistakes and the errors in them. I say: T h e most wonderful thing is the claim of the theologians that the temporal becoming of the world implies that it has been willed by a will, for we find that temporal things occur through nature, through will, and by chance. 2 Those that occur through will are the products J of art, and those that occur through nature are natural things, and if temporal things occurred only through will, will would have to be included in the definition of the temporal, whereas it is well known that the definition of temporal becoming is 'existence succeeding non-existence'. If indeed the world had come into being temporally, it would be more appropriate that it should have come into being, in so far as it was a natural existent, from principles appropriate to natural things, rather than from principles appropriate to artificial 10 things, i.e. the will. Since, however, it is established that the world exists through a First Agent which preferred its existence to its nonexistence, it is necessary that this agent should be a wilier, and if this First Agent does not cease to prefer the world's existence to its nonexistence, and the wilier—as Ghazali says—must have knowledge, the philosophers are in complete agreement with the theologians about this fundamental point. The whole theological argument,

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however, which he gives has only persuasive power, because it compares natural things to artificial. As to what he says of the philosophers, that they believe that what proceeds from the Creator proceeds in a natural way, this is a wrong imputation. What they really believe is that existents proceed from Him in a way superior to nature and to the human will, for both these ways are subject to an imperfection, but they are not the only possible ways, since it has been proved that the act of God can proceed from Him neither in a natural way nor in a voluntary, in the sense in which this is understood in the sublunary world. For will in an animal is the principle of movement, and if the Creator is devoid of movement, He is devoid of the principle of movement in the way a voluntary agent in the empirical world moves. 1 What proceeds from God proceeds in a nobler way than the voluntary, a way which nobody can understand but God Himself. And the proof that He wills is that He knows the opposites, and if He were an agent in absolutely the same way as He is a knower, He would carry out the two contrary acts together, and this is impossible; and therefore it is1 necessary that He should perform one of the two contraries through choice. 2 The error of the theologians with regard to this question is that they say that every act is either natural or voluntary, but do not understand the meaning of either of these words. For nature, according to the philosophers, has different meanings, the primary being the ascending of fire and the descending of earth, 3 and an existent only has this movement when something has prevented it from being* in its natural place, and there was therefore something that constrained it; but the Creator is too high for this kind of nature. The philosophers also apply the term 'nature' to every potency from which an intellectual act proceeds, in the same way as the acts which proceed from the arts, 4 and some of the philosophers ascribe intellect to this nature, and some say that this nature does not possess intellect but acts only by nature. 5 And they say that this nature proceeds from an intellect, because they compare it to artificial things which move themselves and from which orderly well-arranged acts proceed. 6 And therefore their master Aristotle asserts that it is manifest that the nature of intellect rules the universe. 7 And how far is this belief from what Ghazali ascribes to them! Who, however, assumes as a universal maxim that he who knows himself must know other things which proceed from him, must conclude that he who does not know other things cannot know himself.

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And having refuted Avicenna's theory that God knows other things, by the arguments of the philosophers on this point which he adduces against him, 1 he concludes against him that the First does not know itself; and this conclusion is valid. 2 "o And as to what he relates of the argument of the philosophers on this point, namely that they say that he who does not know himself is dead and the First cannot be dead, this is a persuasive argument composed of common propositions, for he who is not alive is not dead unless it is in his nature to receive life3—or one must mean by 'dead' what is meant by 'inanimate' and 'inorganic', and then this is a true dichotomy, for every existent is cither alive or inorganic, provided we understand by 'life' a term which is equivocally used of the eternal and the corruptible. And as to Ghazali's words: 452 And if they return to the doctrine that everything which is free from matter is intellect by itself and therefore thinks itself, we have shown that this is an arbitrary judgement without any proof. I say: We have already shown the manner in which this proof of the philosophers must be taken, in so far as this proof preserves its power by being given in this book—I mean its power is diminished, as is necessary when a thing is removed from its natural context. And as to 5 what he says of their arguing on this point against the philosophers that the existent is either alive or dead, and that which is alive is more noble than that which is dead, and that the principle is nobler than that which is alive and that it is therefore necessarily alive, if by 'dead' is understood the inanimate, these propositions arc common and true. His assertion, however, that life can proceed from the lifeless and 10 knowledge from what docs not possess knowledge, and that the dignity of the First consists only in its being the principle of the universe, is false. For if life could proceed from the lifeless, then the existent might proceed from the non-existent, and then anything whatever might proceed from anything whatever, and there would be no congruity between causes and effects, either in the genus predicated analogically or in the species.4 As to his assertion that, when the philosophers say that what is 453 nobler than life must be alive, it is like saying that that which is nobler than what has hearing and seeing must have hearing and seeing: the philosophers do not say so, for they deny that the First Principle can hear and see. And Ghazali's argument that, since,

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according to the philosophers, that which is superior to what hears 5 and seesjieed not hear and see, then also what is superior to the living and the knowing need not itself be alive and possessed of knowledge and that, just as according to the philosophers that which possesses sight can proceed from what has no sight, so it is possible that knowledge should proceed from what has no knowledge: this is a very sophistical and false argument. For according to the philosophers that which has no hearing or seeing is not absolutely superior to that which has hearing and seeing, but only because it has a perception superior to seeing and hearing, 10 namely knowledge. 1 But, since there is nothing superior to knowledge, it is not possible that that which does not possess knowledge should be superior to that which does, be it a principle or not. For since some of the principles possess knowledge, others not, it is not permissible that those which do not know should be superior to those that do, just as little as this is possible in regard to effects which do and do not possess knowledge. And the nobility of being a principle cannot surpass the nobility of knowledge, unless the nobility of a principle that does not possess knowledge could surpass the nobility 454 of a principle that does. And the excellence of being a principle cannot surpass the excellence of knowledge. And therefore it is necessary that the principle which has the utmost nobility should possess the utmost excellence, which is knowledge. T h e philosophers only avoid ascribing to the First hearing and seeing, because this would imply its possessing a soul. The Holy Law ascribes hearing and seeing to 5 God to remind us that God is not deprived of any kind of knowledge and understanding, and the masses cannot be made to grasp this meaning except by the use of the terms 'hearing' and 'seeing', and for this reason this exegesis is limited to the learned, and therefore cannot be taken as one of the dogmas of the Holy Law common to the masses. And the same is the case with many questions the solutions of which the Holy Law leaves to science, io Everything this chapter contains is the confusion and the incoherence of Ghazali himself. But, we appeal to God on account of the mistakes the learned have made, and that He may pardon them because of their wish to glorify His name in all such questions, and we pray God that He may not place us among those who are excluded from the next world through their faults in this, or from the highest through their desire for the lowest, and that H e may bestow on us final blessedness!

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To refute those who affirm that God is ignorant of the individual things which are divided in time into present, past, and future Ghazali says: About this theory they all agree; for as to those who believe that God only knows Himself, this is implied in their belief; and as to those who believe that He knows things besides Himself (and this is the theory which 5 Avicenna has chosen) they believe that God knows other things in a universal knowledge which does not fall under the concept of time and which is not differentiated through past, future, and present although, nevertheless, Avicenna affirms that not the weight of a grain escapes God's knowledge either on earth or in the heavens, since He knows individual things in a universal way.1 Now we must first understand this theory, and then occupy ourselves with refuting it. We shall explain this through an example, namely that the sun, for example, suffers an eclipse,2 after not having been eclipsed, and afterwards recovers its light. There are therefore in an eclipse three ' ° moments: the moment when there was not yet an eclipse but the eclipse was expected in the future, the time when the eclipse was actually there, its being, and thirdly, the moment the eclipse had ceased but had been. Now we have in regard to these three conditions* a threefold knowledge: we know first 456 that there is not yet an eclipse, but that there will be one, secondly that it is now there, and thirdly, that it has been present but is no longer present. This threefold knowledge is numerically distinguishable and differentiated and its sequence implies a change in the knowing essence, for if this knowing essence thought after the cessation of the eclipse that the eclipse was present as before, this would be ignorance, not knowledge, and if it thought during its presence that it was absent, this again would be ignorance, and the one knowledge cannot take the place of the other. The philosophers affirm now that the condition of God is not differenti- 5 ated by means of these three moments, for this would imply a change, and that He whose condition does not change cannot be imagined to know these things, for knowledge follows the object of knowledge, and when the object of knowledge changes, the knowledge changes, and when the knowledge changes, without doubt the knower changes too; but change in GocT is impossible. However, notwithstanding this, the philosophers affirm that God knows the eclipse and all its attributes and accidents, but through a knowledge which is attributed to Him in an eternal attribution and is unchangeable: God knows for instance that the sun exists and that the moon exists, and that they have emanated from God Himself through the medium of angels whom the philosophers in their technical terminology 10

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call 'separate intellects', a n d God knows t h a t the sun and moon move in circles and that between their orbits there is an intersection at two points, the ascending and the descending node, 1 a n d that at certain times the sun and moon are together in these nodes and that then the sun is eclipsed— i.e. the body of the moon comes between the sun and the eyes of the observer, and the sun is concealed from his eyes, a n d that when the sun has passed a certain distance beyond this node, say a year, it is eclipsed again, and that this eclipse is either total or for a third or for a half, a n d that it 'will last an hour or two hours, and God knows equally all other time determinations a n d all other accidents of the eclipse; and nothing of this escapes God's knowledge. However, God's knowledge before, during, and after the eclipse is all of one kind without any differentiation and without any implication of a change in His essence. And such is His knowledge of all temporal occurrences which take place through causes which ~have other causes terminating finally in the circular movement of the heavens, and the cause of this movement is the soul of the heavens, and the cause of the soul's movement is its desire to assimilate itself to God and to the angels near H i m . 2 And the whole universe is known to H i m , t h a t is, it is manifested to H i m in one single congruous manifestation which is not influenced by time. Still, at the time of the eclipse it cannot be said that H e knows that the eclipse is taking place now, nor does H e know when it has passed that it has passed now, for H e cannot be imagined to know anything which for its definition needs a relation to time, since this implies a change. This is their solution in so far as it concerns a division in time. 1 And as concerns their theory about what is divided in matter and space, like individual m e n and animals, they say that God does not know the accidents of Zaid, Amr, a n d Khalid and that H e knows only m a n in general, through a universal knowledge, and that H e knows the accidents a n d properties of m a n in general, namely that he must have a body composed of limbs, some to grasp with, some to walk with, some to perceive with, some of which form a pair while some a r e single, and t h a t the bodily faculties must be dispersed in all parts of the body. And the same applies to all the qualities which are inside a n d outside m a n ' s body and all its accidents, attributes, and consequences, so that there is nothing that is h i d d e n from God in His knowledge of the universal. But the individual Zaid can only be distinguished from A m r through the senses, not through the intellect, and this distinction is based on pointing to a special direction, whereas the intellect can only understand direction and space absolutely as universals. And when we say 'this' and ' t h a t ' * , this is a case of pointing to a special relation of a sensible thing to the observer as being near to him or far from him, or in a definite place, and this is impossible where God is concerned. 4 This then is the principle in which they believe, a n d through it they u p r o o t the Divine Laws absolutely, for this principle implies t h a t G o d

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cannot know whether Zaid obeys or disobeys H i m , since God cannot know a n y new occurrences that h a p p e n to Zaid, as H e does not know the individual Z a i d ; for the individual and his acts come into existence after nonexistence, and as God does not know the individual, H e cannot know his conditions a n d his acts—indeed, H e cannot know that Zaid becomes a heretic or a true believer, for H e can know only the unbelief and the belief of m a n in general, not as it is specified in individuals. Yes, God cannot know M u h a m m e d ' s proclaiming himself a prophet at the time he did, nor can God know this of any definite p r o p h e t ; H e can only know that some people proclaim themselves prophets and that they have such-and-such qualities, but any individual prophet H e cannot know, for he can only be known by sense-perception. Nor can He know the acts which proceed from the prophets, since they are divided as acts of a definite m a n through the division of time, and their perception with their diversity implies a change in the observer. This is w h a t we wanted to do first, namely to expound their view, then to render it intelligible, thirdly to show the perversities implied in it. W e shall now pass on to relate the artfulness* of their theory and the point where it fails. Their artfulness lies in the fact that they say: ' T h e r e are here three different moments, and a sequence of different things in one single subject no d o u b t implies a change in it. For if at the m o m e n t of the eclipse God thought that what was happening* was like what had been before, H e would be ignorant; if, on the other hand, He knew t h a t it was h a p p e n i n g and knew previously that it was not happening, b u t would h a p p e n , His knowledge and His condition would have become different, and this would imply a change, for " c h a n g e " means only a difference in the knowledge and a difference in the knowledge implies a difference in the knower, for he who did not know a thing and then knows it, has changed; previously he had no knowledge that it was happening, and then his knowledge was realized: therefore he changed.' And they have elaborated this by saying that there are three kinds of conditions; 1 first a condition which is a mere relation*, as when we say right and left, for this does not refer to an essential attribute, but is a mere relation; for if you change a thing from your right to your left, your relation to it changes, but the condition of your essence does not change, for the relation changes with respect to the essence, but the essence does not change. T h e second kind of condition is of the same type, i.e. w h e n you have the capacity to move bodies in front of you, and those bodies or p a r t of them disappear, your innate power and your capacity does not change, for your capacity is first the capacity to move body in general and secondly to move a definite body in so far as it is a body; and the relation of the capacity to the definite body is not an essential attribute, b u t a mere relation, and the disappearance of the body determines the cessation of the relation, but not a change in the condition of the one who possesses this capacity. T h e third* kind of condition, however, is a

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change in the essence, for when one who had no knowledge acquires knowledge and one who had no power becomes powerful there is indeed a change.1 And the change in the object known causes a change in the knowledge, 459 for the relation to the definite object known enters into the essence of the knowledge itself, since the essence of the definite knowledge is attached to the definite object known as it exists in reality, and when the knowledge attaches itself to it in another relation, it becomes necessarily another knowledge and this succession implies a differentiation in the essence* of the knowledge. And it cannot be said that God has one single knowledge which, having been knowledge of the future event, could become knowledge of the present event, and having been knowledge of the present event, could become knowledge of the past event, for although the know5 ledge would be one and the same and have similar conditions, there would be a change of relation to Him and the change of relation would enter into the essence of the knowledge; and this change would imply a change in the essence of the knowledge, and from this there would result a change (which is impossible) in God. The objection to this is twofold. First one can say: How will you refute one who says that God has one single knowledge of the eclipse, for instance, at a definite time, and that this knowledge before the occurrence of the eclipse is the knowledge that 10 the eclipse will occur, and during the eclipse is identical with the knowledge that it is occurring, and after the eclipse identical with the knowledge that it has ceased, and that these differences refer to relations which imply neither a change in the essence of the knowledge nor a change in the essence of the knower, and that this is exactly like a mere relation?2 For one single person can be at your right and then turn in front of you and go to your left, and there is a succession of relations with respect to you; but that which is changing is the person who takes up different positions, and God's knowledge must be understood in this way, for indeed we admit that God comprehends things in one single knowledge in everlasting eternity, and that His condition does not change; with their intention, 15 the denial of His change, we do agree, but their assertion that it is necessary to regard the knowledge of an actual becoming and its cessation as a change, we refuse to accept. For how do you know this? Indeed, suppose God had created in us a knowledge that Zaid will arrive tomorrow at daybreak, and had made this knowledge permanent without creating for us another knowledge or the forgetfulness of this knowledge; then, by the mere previous knowledge, we should know at daybreak that at present Zaid is arriving and afterwards that he had arrived, and this one permanent knowledge would suffice to comprehend these three moments.3 20 There still remains their assertion that the relation to a definite object known enters into the essence of the knowledge of this object, and that whenever the relation becomes different the thing which has this essential

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relation becomes different, and that whenever this differentiation and this sequence arise, there is a change.1 We say: If this is true, then rather follow the path of your fellow-philosophers when they say that God knows only Himself and that knowing Himself is identical with His essence, for if He knew man and animal and the inorganic in general (and these are undoubtedly different things), His relation to them would undoubtedly be different too; and one single 460 knowledge cannot be a knowledge of different things, since the object related is differentiated, and the relation is differentiated, and the relation to the object known is essential to the knowledge, and this implies a multiplicity and a differentiation—not a mere multiplicity with a similarity, for similar things are things which can be substituted for each other, but the knowledge of an animal cannot be substituted for the knowledge of the inorganic, nor the knowledge of white for the knowledge of black, for they are two different things.2 Besides, these species and genera and universal accidents are infinite3 and they are different, and 5 how can different sciences fall under one science? Again, this knowledge is the essence of the knower without any addition, and I should like to know how an intelligent man can regard the unity of the knowledge of one and the same thing, when this knowledge is divided through its relations with the past, the future, and the present, as impossible, and uphold the unity of the knowledge which is attached to all genera and all different species!4 For the diversity and the distance between the genera and the remote species is far greater than the difference which occurs in the conditions of one thing which is divided through the division of time; and if the former does not imply a plurality and differentiation, why then 10 does the latter? And as soon as it is proved that the diversity of times is less important than the diversity of genera and species, and that the latter does not imply a plurality and a diversity, the former also will not imply this. And if this does not imply a diversity, then it will be possible that the whole universe should be comprehended in one everlasting knowledge in everlasting time, and that this should not imply a change in the essence of the knower. I say: This sophistry is based on the assimilation of Divine Knowledge to human and the comparison of the one knowledge with the other, for man perceives the individual through his senses, and universal existcnts through his intellect, and the cause of his perception is the thing perceived itself, and there is no doubt that the perception changes through the change in the things perceived and that their plurality implies its plurality. As to his answer that it is possible that there should exist a know- 461 ledge the relation of which to the objects known is that kind of

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relation which does not enter into the essence of the thing related, like the relation of right and left, to that which has a right and a left— this is an answer which cannot be understood from the nature of human knowledge. 1 And his second objection, that those philosophers who affirm that God knows universals must, by admitting in His knowledge a plurality of species, conclude that a plurality of individuals and a plurality of conditions of one and the same individual is permissible for His knowledge, is a sophistical objection. For the knowledge of individuals is sensation or imagination, and the knowledge of universals is intellect, 2 and the new occurrence of individuals or conditions of individuals causes two things, a change and a plurality in the perception; whereas knowledge of species and genera does not imply a change, since the knowledge of them is invariable and they are unified in the knowledge which comprehends them, and universality and individuality only agree in their forming a plurality. And his statement that those philosophers who assume one simple knowledge, which comprehends genera and species without there existing in it a plurality and diversity which the differentiation and diversity of the species and genera would imply, will have also to admit one simple knowledge which will comprehend different individuals and different conditions of one and the same individual, is like saying that if there is an intellect which comprehends species and genera, and this intellect is one, there must be one simple genus which comprehends different individuals; and this is a sophism, since the term 'knowledge' is predicated equivocally of divine and human knowledge of the universal and the individual. 3 But his remark that the plurality of species and genera causes a plurality in the knowledge is true, and the most competent philosophers therefore do not call God's knowledge of existents either universal or individual, for knowledge which implies the concepts of universal and individual is a passive intellect and an effect,4 whereas the First Intellect is pure act and a cause, and His knowledge cannot be compared to human knowledge; for in so far as God does not think other things as being other than Himself His essence is not passive knowledge, and in so far as He thinks them as being identical with His essence, His essence is active knowledge. 5 And the summary of their doctrine is that, since they ascertained by proofs that God thinks only Himself, His essence must of necessity be intellect. And as intellect, in so far as it is intellect, can only be

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attached to what exists, not to what does not exist, and it had been proved that there is no existent but those existents which we think, it was necessary that His intellect should be attached to them, since it was not possible that it should be attached to non-existence and there is no other kind of existent to which it might be attached. 1 And since it was necessary that it should be attached to the existents, it had to be attached either in the way our knowledge is attached to it, or in a superior way, and since the former is impossible, this knowledge must be attached in a superior way and according to a more perfect existencc of existents than the existence of the existents to which our intellect is attached. For true knowledge is conformity with the existent, 2 and if His knowledge is superior to ours and His knowledge is attached to the existent in a way superior to our attachment to the existent, then there must be two kinds of existence, a superior and an inferior, and the superior existence must be the cause of the inferior. And this is the meaning of the ancient philosophers, when they say that God is the totality of the existents which He bestows on us in His bounty and of which He is the agent. And therefore the chiefs of the Sufis say: there is no reality besides Him. 3 But all this is the knowledge of those who arc steadfast in their knowledge, and this must not be written down and it must not be made an obligation of faith, and therefore it is not taught by the Divine Law. And one who mentions this truth where it should not be mentioned sins, and one who withholds it from those to whom it should be told sins too. And that one single thing can have different degrees of existence can be learned from the different degrees of existence of the soul.4 Ghazali says:

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The second refutation is: 'What prevents you, according to your doctrine, from affirming God's knowledge of individuals, even if this implies His changing, for why do you not believe that this kind of change is not impossible in God, just as Jahm, one of the Mu'tazilites, says that His knowledge of temporals is temporal5 and the later Karramites say that God is the substratum of the temporals?6 The true believers refute these theories only by arguing that what changes cannot be without change, and what cannot be without change and without temporal occurrences is itself 5 temporal and not eternal.7 For you, however, according to your doctrine the world is eternal but not without change, and if you acknowledge an eternal which changes, nothing prevents you from accepting this theory.' If you replied: We only regard this as impossible, because the temporal knowledge in His essence must either derive from Himself or from something else; that it should derive from Himself is impossible, for we have

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shown that from the eternal no temporal can proceed and that God cannot become active after having been at rest, for this would imply a change, and we have established this in treating the question of the temporal 10 becoming of the world; and if it were to arise in His essence from something else, how could something else influence and change Him so that His conditions changed as if under the power and necessity of something different from Him?—we answer: Neither of these alternatives is impossible, according to your doctrine. As to your assertion that it is impossible that from the eternal a temporal being should proceed, we refuted this sufficiently when we treated this problem. According to you it is impossible that from the eternal there should proceed a temporal being which is the first of a series of temporal beings and it is only impossible that there should be a first temporal being." However, these 15 temporal beings have no infinite number of temporal causes, but by means of the circular movement they terminate in something eternal which is the soul and life of the sphere; and the soul of the sphere is eternal and the circular movement arises temporally from it and each part of this movement begins and ends, and that which follows it is surely a new occurrence.2 Therefore, according to you the temporal beings arise from the eternal.3 However, since the conditions of the eternal are uniform, the emanation of temporal occurrences from Him will be 'eternally uniform, just as the conditions of the movement are uniform, -since they proceed from an eternal being whose conditions are uniform; and all the philosophical sects acknowledge that from an eternal being a temporal being can proceed, when this happens in a proportionate way and eternally. Therefore let the different types of His knowledge proceed from Him in this way.4 46S And as to the other alternative, that His knowledge should proceed from another, we answer: Why is that impossible according to you? There are here only three difficulties. The first is the changing, but we have already shown that this is a consequence of your theory. The second difficulty, that one thing should be the cause of a change in another, is not impossible according to you; for let the occurrence of the 5 thing be the cause of the occurrence of its being known, just as you say that the appearance, of a coloureds figure in front of the pupil of the eye is the cause of the impression of the image of this figure on the vitreous humour of the pupil through the medium of the transparent air between the pupil and the figure seen ;6 and if therefore an inanimate object can be the cause of the impression of the form on the pupil—and this is the meaning of sight—why should it be impossible that the occurrence of temporal beings should cause the First to acquire its knowledge of them* ? And just as the potency ofseeing is disposed to perceive, and the appearance of the coloured figure, when the obstacles are removed, is the cause of the actualization of the perception, so let according to you the essence of the 10 First Principle be disposed to receive knowledge and emerge from potency

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into act through the existence of this temporal being. And if this implies a change in the eternal, a changing eternal is not impossible according to you. And if you protest that this is impossible in the necessary existent, you have no other proof for establishing the necessary existent than the necessity of a termination to the series of causes and effects, as has been shown previously, and we have proved that to end this series with an eternal being which can change is not impossible. The third difficulty in the problem is that if the Eternal could change through another, this would be like subjection and the control of another '5 over Him. But one may say: Why is this impossible according to you? For it only means that the Eternal is the cause of the occurrence of the temporal beings through intermediaries, and that afterwards the occurrence of these temporal beings becomes the cause of the knowledge which the Eternal has of them. It is therefore as if He were Himself the cause of this knowledge reaching Him, although it reaches Him through intermediaries. And if you say that this is like subjection, let it be so, for this conforms to your doctrine, since you say that what proceeds from God proceeds in the way of necessity and nature, and that He has no power not to do it, and this too resembles a kind of bondage, and indicates that He is as it were under necessity as to that which proceeds from Him. And if it is said that this is no constraint, since His entelechy consists in the fact that He makes everything proceed from Himself, and that this is no subjection, then we answer that His entelechy consists in knowing everything, and if it is true to say that the knowledge which we receive in conjunction with everything that happens is a perfection for us,1 not an imperfection or subjection, let the same be the case with respect to God. I say: 466 The summary of this first objection against the philosophers, which is a refutation of their theories, not of the fact itself, is that 'according to your principles, philosophers, there exists an eternal being in which temporal beings inhere, namely the sphere; how can you therefore deny that the First Eternal is a subject in which temporal beings inhere?' The Ash'arites deny this only because of their theory that any subject in which temporal beings inhere is itself a temporal 5 being. And this objection is dialectical, 2 for there are temporal beings which do not inhere in the eternal, namely the temporal beings which change the substance in which they inhere; and there are temporal beings which inhere in the eternal, namely the temporal beings which do not change the substance of their substratum, like the local movement of the moving body and transparency and illumination; 3 and further there is an eternal in which no movements

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and no changes inhere at all, namely the incorporeal eternal; and 10 there is an eternal in which only some movements inhere, namely the eternal which is a body like the heavenly bodies, and when this distinction, which the philosophers require, is made, this objection becomes futile, for the discussion is only concerned with the incorporeal eternal. Having made this objection against the philosophers, he gives the ' ' answer of the philosophers about this question, and the summary is , that they are only prevented from admitting temporal knowledge in . the First, because temporal knowledge must arise through itself or through another; and in the former case there would proceed from the eternal a temporal being, and according to the principles of the philosophers no temporal being can proceed from the eternal. Then 467 he argues against this assertion that from the eternal no temporal being can proceed, by showing that they assume that the sphere is eternal and that they assume that temporal beings proceed from it. But their justification of this is that the temporal cannot proceed from an absolutely eternal being, but only from an eternal being which is eternal in its substance, but temporal in its movements, 5 namely the celestial body; and therefore the celestial body is according to them like an intermediary between the absolutely eternal and the absolutely temporal, for it is in one way eternal, in another way temporal, and this intermediary is the celestial circular movement according to the philosophers, and this movement is according to them eternal in its species, temporal in its parts. And so far as it is eternal, it proceeds from an eternal, and in so far as its parts are temporal, there proceed from them infinite temporal beings. And the only reason that prevented the philosophers from accepting an existence of temporal beings in the First was that the First is incor10 poreal and temporal beings only exist in body, for only in body, according to them, there is receptivity, and that which is free from matter has no receptivity. And Ghazali's objection to the second part of the argument of the philosophers, namely that the First Cause cannot be an effect, is that it is possible that God's knowledge should be like the knowledge of man, that is that the things known should be the cause of His knowledge and their occurrence the cause of the fact that He knows them, 468 just as the objects of sight are the cause of visual perception and the intelligible the cause of intellectual apprehension; so that in this way God's producing and creating existents would be the cause of His

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apprehending them, and it would not be His knowledge that would be the cause of His creating them. But it is impossible, according to the philosophers, that God's knowledge should be analogous to ours, for our knowledge is the effect of the existents, whereas God's knowledge is their cause, and it is not true that eternal knowledge is of the same form as temporal. 5 He who believes this makes God an eternal man 1 and man a mortal God, 2 and in short, it has previously been shown that God's knowledge stands in opposition to man's, for it is His knowledge which produces the existents, and it is not the existents which produce His knowledge.

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To refute their proof that heaven is an animal moving in a circle in obedience to God Ghazali says: The philosophers say also that heaven is an animal and possesses a soul which has the same relation to the body of heaven as our souls to our bodies, and just as our bodies move by will to their ends through the 5 moving power of the soul, heaven acts. And the aim of the heavens in their essential movement is to serve the Lord of the world in a way we shall relate. Their doctrine in this question is something that cannot be refuted, and we shall not declare that it is impossible; for God has the power of creating life in any body, and neither the size of a body nor its circular shape is a hindrance to its being animated, for the condition of the existence of life is not limited to a particular shape, since animals, notwithstanding 10 their different shapes, all participate in the reception of life.3 But we claim their incapacity to reach this knowledge by rational proof, even if it is true, and only the prophets through divine revelation or inspiration could 470 apprehend such a knowledge, but rational argument does not prove it; indeed, we do not even assert that it is impossible that such a thing should be known by proof, if there is a proof and this proof is valid, but we must say that what they have given as a proof has only the value of a conjecture, but lacks all strictness. Their device* is that they say that heaven is moved, and this is a premiss given by perception.4 And every body moved has a mover, which

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5 is a premiss established by reason, since if body were moved merely by being body, every body would be in motion.1 Every mover receives its impulse either from the moved itself, like the nature in the stone which falls and the will in the movement of the animal conjoined with its power to move, or from an external mover which moves through constraint, as when a stone is flung upwards. Everything that is moved by something existing in itself is either unconscious of its movement (and we call this nature), like the falling of the stone, or conscious (and we call this 10 voluntary or animated). This disjunction, that a movement is either constrained or natural or voluntary, comprises all the cases completely, so that if a movement does not fall under two of these divisions it must be of the third type. Now the movement of heaven cannot be constrained, because the mover of a movement by constraint is either (i) another body which is moved by constraint or by will, and in this case we must finally no doubt arrive at a will as mover, and when in the heavenly bodies a body moved through will is established, then our aim is reached, for what use is it to assume movements through constraint when finally we must admit a will?2 or (2) God is the mover of its movement by constraint without inter•5 mediary, and this is impossible; for if it moves through Him in so far as it is a body ahd in so far as He is its creator, then necessarily every body ought to he. moved.3 This movement, therefore, must be distinguished by a quality which marks this body off from all other bodies; and this quality will be its proximate mover, either by will or by nature. And it cannot be said that God moves it through His will, because His will has the same relation to all bodies, and why should this body be specially disposed so that God should move it rather than another? One cannot suppose this; for it is impossible, as has been shown in the question about the temporal beginning of the world. When it is therefore established that this body needs as 20 a principle of movement a special qualification, the first division, that of the movement through constraint, is ruled out. So there remains the possibility that this movement occurs by nature. But this is not possible, for nature by itself is not the cause of motion, because the meaning of'motion' is the withdrawal from one place to another place; and a body does not move from the place in which it is when that place is its proper place. For this reason a bladder full of air on the surface of the water does not move, but when it is immersed it moves towards the surface of the water, and then it has found its proper place and has come to rest and its nature is stabilized; when, however, it is transferred to a place which is not its proper one, it withdraws to its proper place, just 471 as it withdraws from mid-water to the border of the air.* Now it cannot be imagined that the circular movement is natural, since it returns to every position and place which it would be supposed to abandon, and it is not by nature that a body seeks the place which it abandons, and therefore the bladder of air does not seek the interior of the water, nor the stone when

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it has come to rest on the earth the air. Thus only the third division remains, that of movement by will.1 I say: What he lays down in this section, that every thing moved either is moved by itself or through a body from outside and that it is this which is called constraint, is self-evident. But that for every thing which is moved by itself there is no mover but the moved 2 is not a self-evident proposition; it is only a common notion, and the philosophers indeed try to prove that every thing moved by itself has an interior mover different from it, through the use of other premisses which are self-evident, and of premisses which are the conclusions of other proofs, and this is something which may be ascertained in their books. And likewise it is not self-evident that every thing moved by an exterior mover must finally terminate in a thing moved by itself: what is posed here as a set of self-evident premisses is, as a matter of fact, a mixture of the two kinds of assertions; that is to say they are partly conclusions and partly self-evident. Indeed, that whatis moved by itself and not by an external body is moved either by its substance and nature or by an interior principle, and that it cannot be moved by something which cannot be seen or touched and which is connected with it from the outside (or in other words by an incorporeal entity) is self-evident.3 You can claim* to have a proof for this, namely by saying that if this were not so*, upward movement would not be proper to fire rather than to earth; but it is, indeed, evident in itself.4 And as to that which* does not move by its own substance and nature, this is evident in the things which are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest, since that which is by nature cannot perform both of two opposites; 5 for those things, however, which are perceived to move continually, a proof is necessary. 6 Again, as to his assertion that what is moved by itself is moved through a principle in itself, either a principle called 'nature' or a principle called 'soul' and 'choice', this is true, when previously it has been proved that nothing exists which is moved by itself. As concerns his affirmation that the principle called nature does not move by itself in space, except when it is not its proper place (for then it moves to its proper place and stays there), this is true. And his further remark that what moves in a circle has neither an improper nor a proper place, so that it could move from the one to the other either totally or partially, this is nearly self-evident and easy to uphold, and he has in this section mentioned something of its

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473 explanation and proof; and therefore, when we understand 'nature' in the sense he has established here, circular movement cannot move by nature. And as to his further remark that, when it does not move by nature, it moves through soul or through a potency which resembles the soul, it appears that the term 'soul' is predicated only equivocally 5 of the soul in the celestial bodies, 1 and the learned for the most part apply the term 'nature' to every potency which performs a rational act, namely an act which conforms to the order and arrangement which exist in rational things; 2 but they exclude heaven from this kind of potency, because according to them it is heaven which provides this directing power for all existents. 3 However, the argument of the ancients he relates here has only io dialectical value, partly because much in it which is in reality a conclusion of a proof is assumed to be self-evident and partly because things are opposed in it which are not really in opposition. It is also dialectical because its premisses are probable and common notions. This was Avicenna's method of proving that the heavenly body was an animated body, but for this the ancients have a more efficient and clearer proof. Ghazali says: The objection is that we can assume* besides your theory three hypo474 theses which cannot be proved to be untrue. The first is that we assume the movement of heaven to take place through constraint by another body which desires its movement and makes it turn eternally, and that this body which sets it in motion is neither a sphere nor a circumference nor a heaven; their assertion is therefore false that the movement of heaven is voluntary and that heaven is animated, and what we have said is possible, and it cannot be denied except by a presumption of impossibility. 5

I say: This is false, for the philosophers have proved that outside heaven there is no other body, and it cannot be inside heaven; besides, were this body to set it in motion, it would necessarily have to be moved itself, and we should have an infinite regress. 4 Ghazali says:

The second hypothesis is to say: 'The movement occurs by constraint and its principle is the will of God, and indeed we say that the downward movement of a body also occurs by constraint, through God's creating this movement in this body; and the same can be said of all the other io movements of those bodies which are not living.'

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There still remains the fact that the philosophers regard this as impossible, because they ask why the will should have distinguished just this body, whereas all other bodies participate in bodiliness. But we have already explained that it is of the nature of the eternal Will to differentiate one thing from a similar one, and that the philosophers are forced to admit such a quality for the determination of the direction of the circular movement and for the determination of the place of the poles and their points, and we shall not repeat this; but our argument is, in short, that when they deny that a body can be differentiated for the attachment of the will to it without a distinctive attribute, this can be turned against them in regard to this distinctive attribute, for we ask them: 'Why is the body of heaven distinguished by this attribute, which sets it apart from all other bodies, although all other bodies are also bodies; and how can anything occur to it which does not occur to other bodies ?' If this is caused by another 475 attribute, we must repeat the same question about this other attribute, and in this way we should get an infinite series, and they would be forced in the end to acknowledge an arbitrary judgement of the will and the fact that in the principles there is something that distinguishes one thing from a similar one. I say: That a stone moves downwards through a quality which has been created in it, and fire upwards, and that these qualities are opposed 5 —this is a self-evident fact, and to contradict it is pure folly. But it is still more foolish to say that the eternal Will causes the movement in these things everlastingly—without any act He deliberately chose 1 — and that this movement is not implanted in the nature of the thing, and that this is called constraint; for if this were true, things would have no nature, no real essence, no definition at all. For it is selfevident that the natures and definitions of things only differ through 10 the difference of their acts, just as it is self-evident that every movement forced on a body comes from a body outside it. And this argument has no sense whatever. And as to his affirmation 'that to assume that the act which proceeds from an existent requires a special attribute makes it necessary to ask about this attribute also why it characterizes this existent rather than any other of its kind', this is like saying that one ought to ask a man who asserted that earth and fire, which participate in bodiliness, were distinguished only by an attribute added to their bodiliness, why the attribute of fire characterizes fire and the attri- 476 bute of earth, earth, and not rather the reverse. These, indeed, are the words of a man who does not assume for the attributes themselves

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a particular subject, but on the contrary believes that any attribute can be in any subject. 1 He who speaks like this denies also the definition and the differentiation of subjects, and their characterization 5 through special attributes, which is the first cause of the specification of existents through particular attributes, and this assumption belongs to the principles of the Ash'arites who tried thereby to annul both religious and rational wisdom and, in short, reason itself.2 Ghazali says: The third hypothesis is to admit that heaven is differentiated by an attribute and that this attribute is the principle of the movement, in the way they believe this of the downward movement, although in this case it is not known, as it is known in the case of the stone.3 10 And their assertion that a thing cannot by its nature abandon the place sought by its nature rests on a confusion.* For according to them there is here no numerical difference; on the contrary, the body is one and the circular movement is one, and neither the body nor the movement has an actual part; they are only divided by imagination, and this movement is not there to seek its place or to abandon it—indeed, it may well be that God creates a body in the essence of which there is something which determines a circular movement. The movement itself will then be determined by this attribute, not, however, the aiming at the place, for that would imply that arrival at the place would be the aim of the movement. And 15 if your assertion that every movement takes place in seeking a place or abandoning it is a necessary principle, it is as if you made the seeking of the place the goal of nature, not the movement itself which will in this case only be a means.5 But we say it is not absurd that the movement, not the seeking of a place, should be the goal itself; and why should that be 477 impossible? And it is clear that, simply because they regard their hypothesis as the most plausible, we are not obliged to deny any other hypothesis absolutely; for to assert absolutely that heaven is a living being is pure presumption, for which there is no support. I say: T h e assertion of the philosophers that this movement is not a natural potency resembling the natural movement in earth and fire 5 is true. And this is clear from their saying that this potency desires the place suitable to the body which possesses existence through this potency, and that the heavenly body, since all space is suitable to it, is not moved through such a potency, and the learned do not call this potency heavy or light. 6 Whether this potency depends on perception or not, and if so which kind of perception, is shown by other arguments. 7 10 And the summary of this is to say: The inanity of the first hypo-

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thesis, namely that the mover of heaven might be another body which is not heaven, is self-evident or nearly so. For this body cannot set the heavenly body in a circular movement without being moved by itself, as if one were to say that a man or an angel turned the heavens from east to west.1 And if this were true, this animated body would have to be either outside the world or inside it; and it is impossible that it should be outside the world, since outside the world there is neither place nor emptiness, as has been shown in many passages, and it would also be necessary that when this body set it in motion it should rest upon a body supporting it*, and this latter body again upon another, and so ad infinitum.2 But that it should be inside the world is also impossible, for then it ought to be perceived by the senses, since any body inside the world can be perceived, 3 and this body, besides needing a body which would make it turn, would also need a body to carry it* or perhaps the body conveying it and the body setting it in motion might be identical, and the conveying body would need a body to convey it, and the number of animated bodies which set things in motion would have to be equal to the number of heavenly bodies. And one would also have to ask about these bodies whether they were composed of the four elements, in which case they would be transitory, 4 or whether they might be simple; and, if they were simple, what their nature was. All this is impossible, especially for one who has ascertained the natures of the simple bodies and learned their number and the species of bodies composed of them, and there is no sense in occupying ourselves with this matter here, for it has been proved in another place that this movement does not take place by constraint, since it is the principle of all movements, and through its intermediary, not only movements, but life5 is distributed to all beings. As to the second hypothesis, that God moves the heavens without having created a potency in them through which they move, this also is a very reprehensible doctrine, far from man's understanding. It would mean that God touches 6 * and moves everything which is in this sublunary world, and that the causes and effects which are perceived are all without meaning, and that man might be man through another quality than the quality God has created in him and that the same would be true for all other things. But such a denial would amount to a denial of the intelligibles, for the intellect perceives things only through their causes. This theory resembles the theory of those ancient philosophers, the Stoics,7 who say that God exists in

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everything; and we shall engage in a discussion with them 1 when we treat the question of the denial of causes and effects. The third objection which assumes a natural movement is to suppose that the movement of heaven is caused by a natural potency in it and through an essential attribute, not through a soul. It says that the argument of the philosophers in denying this is false, in so far as they build their proof on the following argument. The philosophers, that is, say that if the movement of heaven occurred by nature, the place sought by its natural movement would be identical with the place which it abandoned, because every part of heaven moves to places from which it has moved, since its movement is circular. The place, however, from which natural local movement retires is different from the place it aims at, for the place from which it moves is an accidental place, 2 while the place to which it moves is its natural place, in which it will come to rest. But, says Ghazali, this is a false assumption of the philosophers, for although they assume that the parts of heaven have many movements through many movers, this cannot be correct according to their own principles, for they affirm that the circular movement is unique, and that the body moved by it is unique, and therefore heaven is not in search of a place through its circular movement, and it is thus possible that in heaven there should be something through which it aims at the movement itself. But the justification of the philosophers is that they only say this to such people as believe that the stars change their place through a natural movement, similar to the change of place found in things moved by nature. And the true assumption of the philosophers is that through the circular movement the thing moved is not in search of a place, but only seeks the circular movement itself, and that things which behave in this way have of necessity as their mover a soul and not nature. Movement, that is to say, has existence only in the intellect, since outside the soul there exists only the thing moved and in it there is only a particular movement without any lasting existence. 3 But what is moved towards movement in so far as it is movement must of necessity desire this movement, and what desires movement must of necessity represent it. 4 And this is one of the arguments through which it is evident that the heavenly bodies are provided with intellect and desire; and this is clear also from various other arguments, one of which is that we find that circular bodies move with two contrary movements at the same time, towards the east and towards the west; and this cannot

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happen through nature, for that which moves through nature moves in one movement alone. 1 And we have already spoken of what caused the philosophers to believe that heaven possesses intellect, and their plainest proof is that, having understood that the mover of heaven is free from matter, they concluded that it can only move through being an object of thought and representation, and therefore the thing moved must be capable of thought and representation. And this is clear also from the fact that the movement of the heavens is a condition of the existence and preservation of the existents in the sublunary world, which cannot take place by accident. But these things can only be explained here in an informative and persuasive fashion.

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To refute the theory of the philosophers about the aim which moves heaven1 Ghazali says: The philosophers have also affirmed that heaven is an animal which obeys God by movement and by drawing near Him; for every voluntary 5 movement arises for the sake of an end, since one cannot imagine that an act and a movement can proceed from an animal which does not prefer the act to its omission—indeed, if the act and its omission were to be equipollent, no act could be imagined. Further, approach to God does not mean seeking His grace and guarding oneself from His wrath, since God is too exalted for wrath and grace; similar words can only be applied to Him metaphorically, and they are used in a metaphorical way when one speaks of His will to punish or to reward.3 Approach cannot mean the seeking of an approach to Him in space, for this is impossible; the only meaning it can have is of an approach in qualities, for God's existence is the most perfect and every other exist- 10 ence is imperfect in relation to His, and in this imperfection there are degrees and distinctions. The angels are nearest to Him in quality, not in place; and this is the meaning of the term 'the angels in His proximity' —namely, the intellectual substances which neither change nor alter nor 483 pass away, and which know things as they really are.4 And the nearer man comes to the angels in qualities the nearer he comes to God, and the end of man's nature lies in assimilation to the angels. And when it is established that this is the meaning of 'approach to

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God', and that it refers to seeking approach to Him in qualities, then* this consists for man in knowledge of the realities of the existents and in his remaining eternally in the most perfect condition possible to him; for indeed permanence in the utmost perfection is God. As to the angels in His proximity, any perfection that is possible for them is actual with them in their existence, since there is no potency in them which could emerge into act,' and therefore they are in the utmost perfection in regard to everything but God. And by 'heavenly angels' is meant the souls which move the heavens, and in them there is potency, and their perfections are divided into what is actual, like their circular shape and their appearance, which exists always, and what is potential, namely their appearance in a definite position and place; for any definite position is possible to them, but they are not actually in all positions, for to be in all of them at once is impossible.2 And since they cannot be at all times in all particular positions at once, they try to exhaust all these particular positions by being in them specifically,1 so that they do not cease to aim at one position and one place after another; and this potentiality is never ending, nor do these movements ever end. But their one aim is to assimilate themselves to the First Principle, in the acquisition of the utmost perfection within the bounds of possibility with respect to Him, and this is the meaning of the obedience of the heavenly angels to God. And their assimilation is acquired in two ways. First, in completing every position specifically possible, and this is aimed at by first intention; secondly, by the order proceeding from their movement through the diversity of their configuration in trine and quartile, in conjunction and opposition, and through the diversity in the ascendant in relation to the earth, so that the good which is in the sublunary world can emanate from it, and all that happens arise from it. And every soul is intellective and longs for the perfection of its essence. I say: Everything he says here about the philosophers is a philosophical doctrine, or its consequence, or can be regarded as a philosophical doctrine, with one exception, when he says that heaven seeks by its movement the particular positions which are infinite; however, what is infinite cannot be sought, since it cannot be attained. 4 Nobody has held this doctrine but Avicenna, and Ghazali's objection to it, which we will mention later, is sufficient, and according to the philosophers it is the movement itself in so far as it is movement which is aimed at by heaven. s For the perfection of an animal, in so far as it is an animal, is movement; in this sublunary world rest occurs to the transitory animal only by accident, that is through the necessity of matter, for lassitude and fatigue touch the animal only because it is in matter. 6 The whole life and perfection of those animals which are

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not affected by tiredness and languor must of necessity lie in their movement; and their assimilation to their Creator consists in this, that by their movement they impart life to what exists in this sublunary world. This movement, however, does not occur according to the philosophers in first intention for the sake of this sublunary world; that is, the heavenly body is not in first intention created for the sake of this sublunary world. For indeed this movement is the special act for the sake of which heaven is created, and if this movement occurred in first intention for the sake of the sublunary world, the body of the heavens would be created only for the sake of this sublunary world, and it is impossible, according to the philosophers, that the superior should be created for the sake of the inferior; on the contrary, out of the superior there follows the existence of the inferior, just as the perfection of the ruler in relation to his subject does not lie in his being a ruler, but his being a ruler is only the consequence of his perfection. In the same way the providence which prevails in this world is like the care of the ruler for his subjects, who have no salvation and no existence except in him, and especially in the ruler who for his most perfect and noble existence does not need to be a ruler, let alone that he should need his subjects' existence. 1 Ghazali says: The objection to this is that in the premisses of this argument there are controversial points. We shall not, however, pay any attention to them, but shall revert at once to the final intention the philosophers had in view and refute it from two standpoints. The first is to say: 'To seek perfection through being in all possible places may be foolishness rather than obedience; is it not in some degree like a man, who has no occupation and who has adequate means to satisfy his wishes and needs, and who gets up and walks round in a country or in a house, and declares that by doing so he approaches God and that he perfects himself by arriving at all possible places, and says that it is possible for him to be in these places, but not possible for him to unite all the places numerically, and that therefore he fulfils this task specifically and that in this there is perfection and an approach to God? Indeed, it is his foolishness which makes him do such a stupid thing, and it may be said that to change positions and pass from place to place is not a perfection which has any value or which may be an object of desire.2 And there is no difference between what they say and this. I say: It might be thought that the silliness of such an argument either

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comes from a very ignorant or from a very wicked man. Ghazali, 486 however, has neither of these dispositions. But sometimes unwise words come by way of exception from a man who is not ignorant, and wicked talk from a man who is not wicked, and it shows the imperfection of people that such conceits can be addressed to them. But if we concede to Avicenna that the sphere aims through its movement at a change of positions, that this change of positions is 5 what conserves the beings of this sublunary world after giving them their existence, and that this action is everlasting, can there then exist an obedience more complete than this? For instance, if a man exerted himself in guarding a city against the enemy, going round the city day and night, should we not regard this as a most important act of approach to God? But if we assumed that he moved round the town 10 for the end which Ghazali attributes to Avicenna, namely that he only sought to perfect himself through trying to be in an infinite number of places, he would be declared mad. 1 And this is the meaning of the Divine Words: 'Verily thou canst not cleave the earth, and thou shalt not reach the mountains in height.' 2 And his assertion that, since heaven cannot complete the individual numerical positions or join them, it has to complete them specifically, is a faulty, incomprehensible expression, unless he means that its movement has to last in its totality since it cannot be lasting in its parts. For there are movements which are lasting neither in their 487 parts nor in their totality, namely the movements of the transitory; and there are movements which are lasting in their totality, transitory in their parts, but notwithstanding this such a movement is said to be one in ways which are distinguished in many passages of the books of the philosophers. 3 And his assertion that, since heaven cannot complete them numerically, it completes them specifically, is 5 erroneous, since the movement of heaven is numerically one, and one can only apply such an expression to the transitory movements in the sublunary world; for these movements, since they cannot be numerically one, are specifically one and lasting through the movement which is numerically one. 4 Ghazali says: The second is to say: What you assert of the aim can be realized through the movement from west to east. Why, then, is the first movement from >° east to west, and why are not all the movements of the universe in the same direction? And if there is an intention in their diversity, why are they not different in an opposite way, so that the movement from the east

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should become the movement from the west, and the reverse? Everything you have mentioned of the occurrence of events like trine and sextile and others through the diversity of movements would happen just the same through the reverse. Also, what you have mentioned of the completion of the positions and places would happen just the same if the movement were in the opposite direction. Why then, since the reverse movement is possible for them, do they not move sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another, to complete all their possibilities, if it is in the completion of all their possibilities that their perfection lies? It is therefore shown that '5 all these things are phantasms without any substance; for the secrets of the heavenly kingdom cannot be attained through such phantasms. God alone can manifest them to His prophets and saints through revelation, not through proof, and therefore the later philosophers are unable to give the reason for the direction of the movement of the heavenly bodies and why they have chosen it.

I say: This objection is sophistical, for the transference from one question to another is an act of sophistry. Why does there follow, from their inability to assign the reason of the diversity in the directions of the movements of heaven, their inability to give the reason for the movement of heaven or to say that there is no reason at all for this movement? But this whole argument is extremely weak and feeble. However, how happy the theologians are about this problem! They believe that they have refuted the philosophers over it, since they are ignorant of the different arguments by which the philosophers have arrived at their reasons and of the many reasons that are required and must be assigned to every existent, since the causes differ through the variety in the natures of the existents. For simple existents have no other cause for what proceeds from them than their own natures and their forms,' but in composite things there arc found, beside their forms, efficient causes which produce their composition and the conjunction of their parts. The earth, for instance, has no other cause for its downward movement than its attribute of earthiness, and fire has no other cause for its upward movement than its own nature and its form, and through this nature it is said to be the opposite of earth. Likewise, for up and down there are no reasons why the one direction should be higher and the other lower, but this is determined by their nature. And since the differentiation of directions is determined through the directions themselves, and the differentiation of the movements through the differentiation of the directions, no other reason can be assigned for the variation in the movements than the

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variation in the directions of the things moved, and the variation in their natures depends on the variation of their natures; i.e. some are nobler than others. For instance, when a man sees that animals in walking place one leg in front of their body before the other and not the reverse, and asks why the animal does this, there is no sufficient answer except to say that an animal in its movement must have one leg to put forward and one to support itself on, and therefore an animal must have two sides, right and left, and the right is the one which is always* put forward first because of its special potency and the left the one which always, or mostly*, follows, because of its special potency; and it cannot be the reverse, so that the left side became the right, since the natures of the animal determine this, either through a determination in a majority of cases, or through a constant determination. 1 The same is the case with the heavenly bodies since, if a person asks why heaven moves in a particular direction, the answer is that it is because it has a right and a left, and especially because it is evident from its nature that it is a living being, only it has the peculiarity that the right side in a part of it is the left side in another part, 2 and that although it has only this one organ of locomotion 3 it moves in opposite directions like a left foot which can also do the work of a right. 4 And just as the answer to the question whether the animal would not be more perfect if its right were its left, and why the right has been differentiated to be the right, and the left to be the left, is that the only reason for this is that the nature of the side called right has been determined by its essence to be the right and not the left, and that the left side has been determined by its essence to be the left and not the right, and the noblest has been attributed to the noblest; in the same way, when it is asked why the right side has been differentiated for the movement of the highest sphere to be the right and the left side to be the left (for the reverse was also possible as the case of the planets shows), the only answer is that the noblest direction has been attributed to the noblest body, as upward movement has been attributed to fire, downward movement to earth. As to the fact that the other heavens move in two contrary movements 5 besides the diurnal, this happens because of the necessity of this opposition of movements for the sublunary world, namely the movement of generation and corruption, 6 and it is not of the nature of the human intellect that it should apprehend

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more in such discussions and in this place than what we have mentioned. Having made this objection against the philosophers and asserted that they have no answer to it, he mentions an answer which some of the philosophers give. Ghazali says: Some philosophers say that since the perfection occurs through move- 491 ment, from whatever side it may be, and the order of events on earth requires a diversity of movements and a determination of directions, the motive concerning them of the principle of movement lies in the approach to God1 and the motive of the direction of movement in the diffusion of good over the sublunary world. But we answer: 'This is false for two reasons. The first is: if one may imagine such a thing, let us declare that the nature of heaven demands rest, and must avoid movement and change, 5 for this is in truth assimilation to God; for God is too exalted to change, and movement is a change, although God chose movement for the diffusion of His grace. For through it He is useful to others and it does not weigh on Him nor tire Him—so what is the objection to such a supposition? 'The second is that events are based on the diversity of the relations which result from the diversity in the directions of the movements. Now let the first movement be a movement from the west, and let the others move from the east, then the same diversity will arise as is needed for the diversity of the relations. Why then has one direction been specially 10 chosen, since these varieties require only the principle of variety and in this sense one direction by itself is not superior to its contrary?' I say: This theologian wants to indicate the cause of this from the point of view of the final cause, not of the efficient, and none of the philosophers doubts that there is here a final cause in second intention, which is necessary for the existence of everything in the sublunary world. And although this cause has not yet been ascertained in detail, nobody doubts that every movement, every progression or regression 492 of the stars, has an influence on sublunary existence, so that, if these movements differed, the sublunary world would become disorganized. But many of these causes are either still completely unknown or become known after a long time and a long experience, 2 as it is said that Aristotle asserted in his book On Astrological Theorems.* 5 As to the general questions, it is easier to discover them, and the astrologers have indeed come to know many of them and in our own time many of these things have been apprehended which ancient nations, like the Chaldaeans* and others, had already discovered.

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And for this reason one cannot doubt that there is a wisdom in the existents, since it has become clear through induction that every10 thing which appears in heaven is there through provident wisdom and through a final cause. And if there are final causes in animals, it is still more appropriate that there should be final causes in the heavenly bodies. 1 For in the case of man and animal about ten thousand signs of providence 2 have become known in a period of a thousand years, and it seems not impossible that in the infinite course of years much of the purpose of the heavenly bodies will come to light. 3 And we find that about these things the ancients give some mysterious indications which the initiated, that is the most highly reputed of the philosophers, know how to interpret. 4 493 As to the two reasons in Ghazali's argument, the first, that assimilation to God would determine heaven to be at rest, since God is too exalted for movement, but that God has chosen movement because through it His grace can be diffused over transitory things—this is a faulty argument, since God is neither at rest nor moving, 5 and the motion of body is nobler for it than rest, and when an existent 5 assimilates itself to God it assimilates itself to Him by being in the noblest of its states, which is movement. As to Ghazali's second point, it has been answered previously.

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To refute their theory that the souls of the heavens observe all the particular events of this world, and that the meaning of 'the indelible tablet'6 is the souls of the heavens, and that the inscrip5 tion of the particular events of the world on the tablet resembles the delineation of the facts remembered on the faculty of memory contained in the brain of man,1 and that this is not a broad hard body* on which things are written as things are written on a slate by children; since the quantity of this writing demands a large surface of material on which it is written, and if this writing is infinite, the material on which it is written must be infinite too, and one cannot imagine an infinite body, nor infinite lines on a

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body, nor can an unlimited number of things be determined by a finite number of lines Ghazali says: And they assert that the heavenly angels are the souls of the heavens, 10 and that the cherubim which are in the proximity of God are the separate intellects, which are substances subsisting by themselves which do not fill space and do not employ bodies, and that from them the individual forms emanate in the heavenly souls, and that those separate intellects are superior to the heavenly angels, because the former bestow and the latter acquire, and bestowing is superior to acquiring, and therefore the highest is symbolized by the pen1 and it is said that God knows through the pen, because He is like the engraver who bestows as does the pen and the recipient is compared to the tablet.2 And this is their doctrine. And the discussion of this question differs from the preceding one in so far 495 as that what we mentioned previously is not impossible, because its conclusion was that heaven is an animal moving for a purpose, and this is possible; but this doctrine amounts to the assertion that the created can know the infinite particulars, which is often regarded as impossible, and in any case, has to be proved, since by itself it is a mere presumption. I say: What he mentions here is, to my knowledge, not said by any 5 philosophers except Avicenna, namely that the heavenly bodies have representations, not to speak of the fact that these representations should be infinite, and Alexander of Aphrodisias explains in his book called The Principles of the Universe that these bodies have no representations, because representations exist only in animals because of their conservation, and these bodies do not fear corruption, and with respect to them representations would be valueless (and likewise sensations). 3 If they had representations they would also have sensa- 10 tions, since sensations are the condition for representations and every being which has representations necessarily has sensations, although the reverse is not true. 4 Therefore to interpret the indelible tablet in the way Ghazali says that they do is not correct, and the only possible interpretation of the separate intellects which move the different spheres by means of subordination is that they are the angels in the proximity of God, 5 if one wants to harmonize the conclusions of reason with the statements of the Holy Law. Ghazali says: 496 And they prove this by saying that the circular movement is voluntary and that the will follows the thing willed,6 and that a universal thing

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willed can only be intended by a universal will, and that from the universal will nothing proceeds.' For—so they say—every actual existent is determined and individual, and the relation of the universal will to the individual units is one and the same, and no individual thing proceeds from it. Therefore an individual will is needed for a definite movement. For every particular movement from every definite point to another definite point the sphere has a will, and this sphere no doubt has a representation of this particular movement through a bodily potency, since individuals only perceive through bodily potencies and every will must of necessity represent the thing willed, i.e. must know it, be it an individual or a universal. And if the sphere has a representation and a comprehension of the particular movements, it must of necessity also comprehend what follows from them through the diversity of their relations to the earth, because some of the individuals of the sphere are rising, some setting, some in the middle of the sky for some people and under the earth for others.* And likewise it must know the consequences of the diversity of those relations which always arise anew through the movement, like trine and sextile, opposition and conjunction, to other such heavenly occurrences; and all earthly occurrences depend on heavenly occurrences either directly, or through one intermediary, or through many; and in short every event has a cause, occurring in a concatenation which terminates in the eternal heavenly movement, some parts of which are the causes of others. Thus the causes and effects ascend in their concatenation to the particular heavenly movements, and the sphere representing the movements represents their consequences and the consequences of their consecjuences, so as to reach the end of the series.2 And therefore the sphere observes everything that occurs and everything that will occur, and its occurrence is necessary through its cause, and whenever the cause is realized, the effect is realized. We only do not know the future events because all their causes are not known to us; for if we knew all the causes, we should know all the effects, for when we know, for instance, that, fire will come into contact with cotton at a certain moment, we know that the cotton will burn, and when we know that a man will eat, we know that his appetite will be satisfied, and when we know that a man will walk over a certain spot lightly covered where a treasure is buried, and his feet will accidentally touch the treasure and he will perceive it,5 we know that he will be rich because of this treasure. Only as a matter of fact we do not know these causes. Sometimes we know part of the causes, and then we guess what may happen, and when we know the more important or the greater part of them, we have a sound opinion about the occurrence of these events; but if we knew all the causes, then we should know all the effects.'' However, the heavenly occurrences are many and, besides, they are mixed up with earthly events and it is not in human power to observe the causality of all these. But the souls of the heavens perceive it through

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their perception of the First Cause and through the observation of their consequences and the consequences of their consequences, to the end of their concatenation.1 And therefore they say that the man who dreams sees in his dream what 5 will happen in the future through being in contact with the indelible tablet and observing it.z And when he observes a thing it remains often in his memory as it really was, but sometimes his imagination hastens to symbolize it, for it is of the nature of this faculty to represent things through things which, in some way or another, are related to them, or to ••.• transfer things to their opposites; and the thing that was perceived is then effaced in his memory, but the image belonging to his imagination remains there. Then it is necessary to interpret what his imagination symbolizes, e.g. a man by means of a tree, a woman by means of a shoe, a servant by means of some household vessels, and a man who observes the paying of the legal alms and the poor-tax by means of linseed oil, 10 for the linseed in the lamp is the cause of the illumination; it is on this principle that the interpretation of dreams is based.3 And they assert that contact with these souls takes place in a state of languor*, since then there is no obstacle; for when we are awake we are occupied with what the senses and our passions convey to us, and occupation with those sensual things keeps us away from this contact, but when in sleep some of these occupations are obliterated, the disposition for this contact appears. And they assert that the prophet Muhammed perceived the hidden universe in this way; however, the spiritual faculty of a prophet has such power that it cannot be overwhelmed by the external senses, and therefore he sees in a waking condition what other people perceive in their sleep.4 But his imagination also pictures to him what he sees, and although sometimes the thing he sees remains in his memory exactly as it was, sometimes only its representation remains, and such an inspiration is just as much in need of interpretation as such dreams are. And if all events were not eternally inscribed on the indelible tablet, the prophets would not know the hidden world either awake or asleep; but the pen has indelibly fixed what shall be till the day of resurrection, and the meaning of this we have explained. And this we wanted to impart to make their doctrine understood.

I say: We have already said that we do not know of anyone who holds this theory but Aviccnna. And the proof which Ghazali relates rests on very weak premisses, although it is persuasive and dialectical. For 498 it is assumed that every particular effect proceeds from an animate being through the particular representation of this effect and of the particular movements through which this effect is realized. To this major premiss a minor premiss is joined, that heaven is an animate

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5 being from which particular acts proceed. From these premisses it is concluded that the particular effects, and the particular acts which proceed from heaven, occur through a particular representation which is called imagination; and that this is not only apparent from the different sciences, but also from many animals which perform particular acts, like the bees and the spider. 1 But the objection to these premisses is that no particular act proio ceeds from beings endowed with intellect, except when this act* is represented through a universal representation, and then endless individual things proceed from it—for instance the form of a cupboard proceeds from a carpenter only through a universal representation which does not distinguish one particular cupboard from another. 2 And the same thing happens when the works of animals proceed by nature 3 from them. 4 And these representations are an intermediary between the universal and the particular perceptions; that is, they are an intermediary between the definition of a thing s and its particular representation. 6 But if the heavenly bodies have representations, then they must have representations that are of the nature of the universal, not of the nature of the particular representation which is acquired through the senses. And it is not possible that our acts should proceed from particular representations, and thcre499 fore the philosophers believe that the represented forms from which the definite acts of animals proceed are like an intermediary between the intelligibles and the individual forms represented, e.g. the form by reason of which non-carnivorous birds flee from birds of prey, and the form by reason of which bees build their cells.7 The only 5 artisan who needs an individual sensible image is the one who does not possess this universal representation, which is necessary for the origination of the individual things. 8 It is this universal image which is the motive power for the universal will which does not aim at a particular individual; and it is the individual will which aims at a particular individual of one and the same species—this, however, does not happen in the heavenly bodies. And that a universal will should exist for a universal thing in so io far as it is universal is impossible, since the universal does not exist outside the soul and has no transitory existence. And his primary division of will into a universal and an individual will is, indeed, not correct; otherwise one must say that the heavenly bodies move towards the definite limits of things without the definite limit being

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accompanied by the representation of an individual existent, in contrast to what happens with us. And his assertion that no individual is realized through the universal will is false, if by 'universal will' is understood that which does not distinguish one individual from another, but represents it universally, as is the case with a king who arranges his armies for battle. 1 If, however, there is understood by 'will' its being attached to a universal entity itself, then it must be said that such an attachment is not a will at all, and there does not exist such a will except in the way we have explained. 2 And if it followed from the nature of the heavenly bodies that they think sublunary things by way of imagination, they must do this through universal imaginations which are the results of definition, not through particular imaginations which are the results of senseimpressions. And it seems quite clear that they cannot think sublunary things through individual representations especially when it is said that what proceeds from them proceeds from them by second intention. However, the doctrine of the philosophers is that the heavenly bodies think themselves and think the sublunary world, and whether they think the sublunary world as something different from themselves is a problem that must be examined in places specially reserved for this problem; and in general, if the heavens know, the term 'knowledge' is attributed to our knowledge and theirs in an equivocal way. As to the theory he gives here about the cause of revelation and dreams, this is the theory of Avicenna alone, and the opinions of the ancient philosophers differ from his. For the existence of a knowledge of individuals actually infinite, in so far as it is an individual knowledge, is impossible, and I understand by individual knowledge that kind of apprehension which is called representation. But there is no reason to introduce here the question of dreams and revelation, for this leads to much controversy, and such an act is an act of sophistry, not of dialectics. My statement, however, that the imaginations of the heavenly bodies arc imaginations intermediary between individual and universal representations is a dialectical argument; for what results from the princi pic of the philosophers is that the heavenly bodies have no imagination whatever, for these imaginations, as we have said already, whether they are universal or particular, aim only at conservation and protection; and they arc also a condition for our intellectual representation, which therefore is transitory, but the intellectual representation of the heavenly bodies, since it is not

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t r a n s i t o r y , c a n n o t b e a c c o m p a n i e d b y i m a g i n a t i o n , for o t h e r w i s e it w o u l d d e p e n d in o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r o n i m a g i n a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e t h e i r a p p r e h e n s i o n is n e i t h e r u n i v e r s a l n o r i n d i v i d u a l , b u t these t w o k i n d s of k n o w l e d g e , u n i v e r s a l a n d i n d i v i d u a l , a r e h e r e unified, a n d b e c a u s e 10 of this t h e y c a n o n l y b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y t h e i r m a t t e r s . A n d in this w a y k n o w l e d g e of t h e occult a n d of d r e a m s a n d t h e like c a n b e a c q u i r e d , a n d this will be e x p l a i n e d perfectly in its p r o p e r p l a c e . G h a z a l i says: A n d the answer is for us to ask: H o w will you refute those who say that the prophet knows the occult through God, who shows it to h i m by way of revelation*, and the same is the case with the m a n who has visions in his sleep, which he only sees because God or an angel inspires t h e m in h i m ? W e do not need any of the things you have related, and you have not the slightest proof for introducing the Holy Law by mentioning the T a b l e t and the Pen; for true believers do not in the least understand by 'the T a b l e t ' and ' t h e Pen' w h a t you have mentioned, and the way to e m b r a c e 502 the religious dogmas is not to refuse to admit them in the way they must be understood. 1 And, although the possibility of what you have said is granted, so long as you cannot indicate why you deny the correctness of the sense in which these religious terms are understood, the reality of what you say cannot be known or verified. Indeed, the only way to arrive at knowledge of such things is through the Holy Law, not by reason. T h e rational proof of what you have said is primarily based on many premisses, the refutation of which need not detain us, but wc shall limit ourselves to 5 the discussion of three propositions. T h e first proposition is that you say that the movement of heaven is voluntary, and we have already settled this problem and shown the futility of your claim. If, however, to oblige you we grant you this voluntary movement, the second proposition is your saying that heaven needs a particular representation for each particular movement, and this we do not concede. For according to you there are no parts in the sphere, which is one single thing and is only divided in imagination; nor are there particular movements, for there is only one continuous movement, and in order to comIO plete all the places possible for it, it is sufficient for the sphere to desire this one movement, as you have indicated yourselves, and it will only need universal representation and a universal will. Let us give an example of the universal and the particular will to make the intention of the philosophers clear. W h e n , for instance, a m a n has a universal aim to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, from this universal will no movement follows, 2 for the movement occurs as a particular movement, in a particular direction, and of a particular extent, and the m a n does not cease, in directing himself to Mecca, to form new representations of the • 5 place one alter another, where he will go and the direction he will take,

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and every particular representation will be followed by a particular will „ to move from the place which he has reached by his movement. And this is what they understood by a particular movement which follows a particular will; and this is granted, for the directions, when he takes the road to Mecca, are many, and the distance is undetermined, and he must determine place after place and direction after direction, passing from one particular will to another. But the heavenly movement has only one direction, for it is a sphere and moves on its axis in its own space, going neither beyond its own space nor beyond the movement willed. There is therefore only one direction and , ; one impulse and one aim*, like the downward movement of the stone, which tends towards the earth in the shortest way, and the shortest way is the straight line, and the straight line is determined,' and therefore 503 this movement needs no new cause besides the universal nature which tends to the centre of the earth while it changes its distance from the earth, and arrives at and departs from one definite place after another. In the same way the universal will sufliccs for this movement, and nothing else is required, and the assumption of this proposition is a mere presumption.

I say: As to Ghazali's words: 5 And the answer is for us to ask: How will you refute those who say. . . . We do not need any of the things you have related. this answer is based on tradition, not on reason, and there is no sense in introducing it in this book. The philosophers examine everything there is in the Holy Law, and, if it is found to agree with reason, wc arrive at a more perfect knowledge; if, however, reason does not perceive its truth, it becomes known that human reason cannot attain it, and that only the Holy Law perceives it. 2 Ghazali's 10 argument against the philosophers about the interpretation of the Tablet and the Pen does not belong to the problem under discussion, and there is therefore no sense in introducing it here. And this interpretation of knowledge of the occult, according toAvicenna, has 110 sense. The rational objection he adduces against Avicenna over this problem is well founded. For there are for heaven no particular motions of particular distances that would require imagination. The animate being which moves through particular motions in particular 504 spaces* imagines, no doubt, these spaces towards which* it moves, and these movements, when it cannot visually perceive these distances; the circular, however, as Ghazali says, moves qua circular in one single movement, although from this one movement there follow many different particular motions in the existcnts below it. These

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5 spheres, however, are not concerned with those particular movements, but their only intention is to conserve the species of which these particulars are the particulars, not to conserve the existence of any of these particulars in so far as they are particulars, for, if so, heaven would surely possess imagination. The question that still needs to be examined is whether the temporal particulars which proceed from the heavenly movement are intended for their own sake or only for the preservation of the species.1 to This question cannot be treated here, but it certainly seems that there exists a providence as concerns individuals, as appears from true dreams and the like, e.g. the prognostication of the future; however, in reality this is a providence concerning the species.2 Ghazali says:

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The third proposition—and this indeed is a very bold presumption— is that they say that, when heaven represents particular movements, it also represents their results and consequences. This is pure nonsense, like saying that, when a man moves himself and knows his movement, he must also know the consequences of his movement vertically and horizontally (that is, the bodies which are above and under him and at his side), and when he moves in the sun he must know the places upon which his shadow falls and does not fall, and what happens through the coolness of his shadow because of the interruption of the rays of the sun there, and what happens through the compression of the particles of earth under his foot, and what happens through the separation of these particles, and what happens to the humours inside him by their changing through his movement into warmth, and which parts of him are changed into sweat, and so on, till he knows all the occurrences inside and outside his body of which the movement is the cause or the condition or the disposition or the aptitude. And this is nonsense which no intelligent man can believe, and by which none but the ignorant can be beguiled. And this is what this presumption amounts to. Besides, we may ask: 'Are these different particulars which are known to the soul of the sphere the events which are occurring at the present moment or are future events also brought in relation to it?' If you limit its knowledge to present events you deny its perception of the occult and the apprehension of future events through it, by the prophets in the state of wakefulness, by others in their sleep; and then the point of this proof disappears. For it is indeed presumption to say that he who knows a thing knows its consequences and results, so that if we knew all causes we should also know all future events. For, indeed, the causes of all events are to be found at present in the heavenly movement, but it determines the effect either through one intermediary or through many. And if this knowledge covers the future also, it will not have an end, and how can the

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distinction between particulars in the infinite future be known, and how can m a n y different particular objects of knowledge, of a n infinite n u m b e r and without an end to their units, be collected in a created soul, at one i j and the same m o m e n t without a n y sequence? 1 H e whose intellect does not perceive the impossibility of this m a y well despair of his intellect. And if they reverse this against us with respect to God's knowledge, God's knowledge is not attached to its object in its correspondence with the things known, in the way this a t t a c h m e n t exists in the case of things known by created beings, but as soon as the soul of the sphere moves round like the soul of m a n , 2 it belongs to the same kind as the soul of m a n , and also it participates with the soul of m a n in the perception of individuals through an intermediary. 3 And although no absolute knowledge can be had about this, it is most probable that the soul of the sphere is of the same kind as the h u m a n soul; a n d if this is not most probable, it is possible, 20 and the possibility destroys the claim to absolute knowledge they put forward. And if it is said, ' I t is also proper to the h u m a n soul in its essence to perceive all things, but its preoccupation with the consequences of passion, anger, greed, resentment, envy, hunger, pain, and in short the accidents of the body and w h a t the sensations convey to the body, is so great that, when the h u m a n soul is occupied with one of these things, it neglects everything else; but the souls of the spheres are free from these attributes, and nothing occupies them, and neither care nor pain nor perception overwhelms them, a n d therefore they know everything'—we answer: ' H o w 5 0 6 do you know that nothing occupies t h e m ? Does not their service of the First and their longing for H i m submerge them and keep them from the representation of particular things? And what makes it impossible to suppose other impediments than anger and passion? For these are sensual hindrances, and how do you know that these hindrances are limited in the way we experience them? For there are occupations for the learned through the excellence of their interests and the desire for leadership which children are unable to imagine, and which they cannot believe to b e occupations and hindrances. 4 And how do you know that analogous things arc impossible for the souls of the spheres?' 5 This is what we wanted to mention about those sciences to which they give the n a m e of metaphysical. I say: As to his r e g a r d i n g it as impossible t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d exist a n i m m a t e r i a l intellect which thinks things with their consequences, c o m p r i s i n g t h e m all, n e i t h e r t h e impossibility n o r t h e necessity of its existence is a self-evident fact, b u t t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s affirm t h a t t h e y 10 h a v e a p r o o f of its existence. As t o t h e existence of infinite r e p r e s e n t a tions, this c a n n o t b e i m a g i n e d in a n y i n d i v i d u a l , b u t the p h i l o s o p h e r s affirm t h a t t h e y h a v e a p r o o f of t h e existence of t h e infinite in t h e

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eternal knowledge and an answer to the question how man can attain knowledge of particular events in the future through the eternal knowledge, namely that of these things the soul thinks only the universal which is in the intellect, not the particular* which is particularized in the soul*. For individuals are known* to the soul because it is potentially all existents, and what is in potency emerges into act either through the sensible things or through the nature of the intel507 lect, which is prior to sensible things in reality (I mean the intellect : through which sensible things become stable intelligibles, not, however, in such a way that in this knowledge there are representations of an infinite number of individuals). 1 In short, the philosophers assert that these two kinds of knowledge, the universal and the particular, are unified in the knowledge which is separated from matter; and when this knowledge emanates in the sublunary world 5 it divides itself into universal and particular, although this knowledge itself is neither the one nor the other. 2 But the proof of this or its contrary cannot be given here. And the discussion here about these questions is like the assumption of geometrical propositions which are not well enough known to meet with immediate assent and which are not convincing at first sight. And Ghazali mixes one part with another, i.e. he starts objecting to one part of the theory through another, and this is the worst method of discussion, because in this 10 way assent neither by proof nor by persuasion can be obtained. 3 Likewise the problems about the differences between the souls of the heavenly bodies and the soul of man are all very obscure, and when such things are discussed in a place not proper to them the -discussion becomes either irrelevant or dialectical and superficial; that is to say, the conclusions are drawn from possible premisses, like their assertion that the irascible and the concupiscible soul hinder the human soul in the perception of what is proper to it.* It appears 508 from the nature of these and similar sayings that they are possible and are in need of proofs, and that they open the way to many conflicting possibilities. And this closes what we decided to mention of the different assertions which this book contains about theological problems; this is the most important part of our book. We shall now speak on physical problems.

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Ghazali says: The so-called natural sciences are many, and we shall enumerate their 5 parts, in order to make it known that the Holy Law does not ask one to contest and refute them, except in certain points we shall mention.1 They are divided into principal classes and subdivisions.2 The principal classes are eight. In the first class are treated the divisibility, movement, and change which affect body in so far as it is body, and the relations and consequences of movement* like time, space, and void,3 and all this is contained in Aristotle's Physics. The second treats of the disposition of the parts of the elements of the world, namely heaven and the four elements which are within the sphere of the moon, and their natures and the cause of the disposition of each of them in a definite place; and this is contained in Aristotle's De coelo. The third treats of the conditions of generation and corruption, of equivocal generation and of sexual generation, of growth and decay, of transmutations, and how the species are conserved, whereas the individuals perish through the two heavenly movements (westwards and eastwards), and this is contained in De generatione et corruptions The fourth treats of the conditions which are found in the four elements through their mixture, by which there occur meteorological phenomena like clouds and rain and thunder, lightning, the halo round the moon, the rainbow, thunderbolts, winds, and earthquakes. The fifth treats of mineralogy, the sixth of botany. The seventh treats of zoology, which is contained in the book Historia animalium. The eighth treats of the soul of animals and the perceptive faculties, and says that the soul of man does 510 not die through the death of his body but that it is a spiritual substance for which annihilation is impossible. The subdivisions are seven: The first is medicine, whose end is the knowledge of the principles of the human body and its conditions of health and illness, their causes and symptoms, so that illness may be expelled and health preserved.* The second, judicial astrology, which conjectures from the aspects and configuration of the stars the conditions which will be found in the world and in the State and the consequences of dates of births and of years. The third is physiognomy, which infers character from the external appearance. 5 1'hc fourth is dream-interpretation, which infers what the soul has witnessed of the world of the occult from dream images, for the imaginative faculty imagines this symbolically. The fifth is the telesmatical art, that is the combination of celestial virtues with some earthly so as to constitute a power which can perform marvellous acts in the earthly world.' The sixth is the art of incantation, which is the mixing of the virtues of earthly substances to produce marvellous things from them.' The seventh is alchemy, whose aim is to change the properties

312 TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT of minerals so that finally gold and silver are produced by a kind of magic.' And there is no need to be opposed to any of these sciences by reason of the Divine Law; we dissent from the philosophers in all these sciences in regard to four points only. I say: As to his enumeration of the eight kinds of physical science, this is exact according to the doctrine of Aristotle. But his enumeration of the subdivisions is not correct. Medicine is not one of the natural sciences, but is a practical science which takes its principles from S physical science; for physical science is theoretical and medicine is practical, and when we study a problem common to theoretical science and practical we can regard it from two points of view; for instance, in our study of health and illness the student of physics observes health and nature as kinds of natural existents, whereas the 10 physician studies them with the intention of preserving the one, health, and keeping down the other, illness. Neither does judicial 511 astrology belong to physical science; it is only a prognostication of future events, and is of the same type as augury and vaticination. Physiognomy is also of the same kind, except that its object is occult things in the present, not in the future. 2 The interpretation of dreams 5 too is a prognosticating science, and this type belongs neither to the theoretical nor to the practical sciences, although it is reputed to have a practical value. The telesmatical art is vain, for if we assume the positions of the spheres to exert a power on artificial products, this power will remain inside the product and not pass on to things io outside it. As to conjuring, this is the type of thing that produces wonder, but it is certainly not a theoretical science. Whether alchemy really exists is very dubious; if it exists, its artificial product cannot be identical with the product of nature; art can at most become similar to nature but cannot attain nature itself in reality. 3 As to the question whether it can produce anything which resembles the natural product generically, we do not possess sufficient data to assert categorically its impossibility or possibility, but only prolonged experiments over a lengthy period can procure the necessary evidence. We shall treat the four points Ghazali mentions one after the other. Ghazali says: 512

The first point is their assertion that this connexion observed between causes and effects is of logical necessity, and that the existence of the cause without the effect or the effect without the cause is not within the realm of the contingent and possible. The second point is their assertion that

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human souls are substances existing by themselves, not imprinted on the body, and that the meaning of death is the end of their attachment to the body and the end of their direction of the body; and that otherwise the soul would exist at any time by itself. They affirm that this is known by demonstrative proof. The third point is their assertion that these souls cannot cease to exist, but that when they exist they are eternal and their annihilation cannot be conceived.2 The fourth point is their assertion that these souls cannot return to their bodies.3 As to the first point, it is necessary to contest it, for on its negation depends the possibility of affirming the existence of miracles which interrupt the usual course of nature, 4 like the changing of the rod into a serpent5 or the resurrection of the dead or the cleavage of the moon,6 and those who consider the ordinary course of nature a logical necessity regard all this as impossible. They interpret the resurrection of the dead in the Koran by saying that the cessation of the death of ignorance is to be understood by it, and the rod which conceived the arch-deceiver, the serpent, by saying that it means the clear divine proof in the hands of Moses to refute the false doctrines of the heretics; and as to the cleavage of the moon they often deny that it took place and assert that it does not rest on a sound tradition; and the philosophers accept miracles that interrupt the usual course of nature only in three cases.7 First: in respect to the imaginative faculty they say that when this faculty becomes predominant and strong, and the senses and perceptions do not submerge it, it observes the IndelibleTablet, and theforms of particular events which will happen in the future become imprinted on it; and that this happens to the prophets in a waking condition and to other people in sleep, and that this is a peculiar quality of the imaginative faculty in prophecy.8 Secondly: in respect of a property of the rational speculative faculty i.e. intellectual acuteness,' that is rapidity in passing from one known thing to another; for often when a problem which has been proved is mentioned to a keen-sighted man he is at once aware of its proof, and when the proof is mentioned to him he understands what is proved by himself, and in general when the middle term occurs to him he is at once aware of the conclusion, and when the two terms* of the conclusion are present in his mind the middle term which connects the two terms of the conclusion occurs to him. And in this matter people are different; there are those who understand by themselves, those who understand when the slightest hint is given to them, and those who, being instructed, understand only after much trouble; and while on the one hand it may be assumed that incapacity to understand can reach such a degree that a man does not understand anything at all and has, although instructed, no disposition whatever to grasp the intelligibles, it may on the other hand be assumed that his capacity and proficiency may be so great as to arrive at a comprehension of all the intelligibles or the majority of them in the shortest and quickest time. And this difference exists quantitatively over

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all or certain problems, a n d qualitatively so t h a t there is an excellence in quickness and easiness, a n d t h e understanding of a holy a n d p u r e soul m a y reach through its acuteness all intelligibles in the shortest time possible; and this is the soul of a prophet, who possesses a miraculous speculative faculty and so far as the intelligibles are concerned is not in need of a teacher*; but it is as if he learned by himself, and he it is who is described by the words ' t h e oil of which would well-nigh give light though no fire were in contact with it, light upon light'.' T h i r d l y : in respect to a practical psychological faculty which can reach such a pitch as to influence a n d subject the things of n a t u r e : for instance, w h e n our soul imagines something_the limbs and the potencies in these limbs obey it and move in the required direction which we imagine, so t h a t w h e n a m a n imagines something sweet of taste the corners of his m o u t h begin to water, and the potency which brings forth the saliva from the places where it is springs into action, and w h e n coitus is imagined the copulative potency springs into action, a n d the penis extends; 2 indeed, when a m a n walks on a plank between two walls over an empty space, his imagination is stirred by the possibility of falling and his body is impressed by this imagination and in fact he falls, but when this plank is on the earth, he walks over it without falling. 3 This happens because the body a n d the bodily faculties a r e created to be subservient and subordinate to t h e soul, and there is a difference here according to the purity and the power of the souls. And it is not impossible that the power of the soul should reach such a degree that also the natural power of t h i o l s outside a m a n ' s body obeys it*, since the soul of m a n is not impressed on his body although there is created in m a n ' s n a t u r e a certain impulse and desire to govern his body. 4 And if it is possible that the limbs* of his body should obey him, it is not impossible that other things besides his body should obey him and that his soul should control the blasts of the wind or the d o w n p o u r of rain, or the striking of a thunderbolt or the trembling of the earth, which causes a land to be swallowed u p * with its inhabitants. 5 T h e same is the case with his influence in p r o d u c i n g cold or w a r m t h or a movement in the air; this w a r m t h or cold comes a b o u t through his soul, 6 all these things occur without any a p p a r e n t physical cause, and such a thing will be a miracle brought a b o u t b y a prophet. But this only h a p p e n s in matters disposed* to receive it, a n d cannot attain such a scale that wood could be changed into an animal or that the moon, which cannot undergo cleavage, could be cloven. This is their theory of miracles, a n d we do not deny anything they have mentioned, and that such things h a p p e n to p r o p h e t s ; we are only opposed to their limiting themselves to this, and to their denial of the possibility t h a t a stick might change into a serpent, and of the resurrection of the dead and other things. W e must occupy ourselves with this question in order to be able to assert the existence of miracles and for still another reason, namely to give effective support to the doctrine on which the Muslims base their belief that God can do anything. And let us now fulfil our intention.

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I say: .,-. The ancient philosophers did not discuss the problem of miracles, since according to them such things must not be examined and ques- 10 tioned; for they are the principles of the religions, and the man who inquires into them and doubts them merits punishment, like the man who examines the other general religious principles, such as whether God exists or blessedness or the virtues. For the existence of all these cannot be doubted, and the mode of their existence is something divine which human apprehension cannot attain. The reason for this is that these are the principles of the acts through which man becomes virtuous, and that one can only attain knowledge after the attainment of virtue. 1 One must not investigate the principles which cause virtue before the attainment of virtue, and since the theoretical sciences can 515 only be perfected through assumptions and axioms which the learner* accepts in the first place, this must be still more the case with the practical sciences. As to what Ghazali relates of the causes of this as they are according to the philosophers, I do not know anyone who asserts this but Aviccnna. And if such facts are verified and it is possible that a body could be changed qualitatively* through something which is neither a body nor a bodily potency, 2 then the reasons he mentions for this 5 are possible; but not everything which in its nature is possible3 can be done by man, for what is possible to man is well known. Most things which are possible in themselves are impossible for man, and what is true of the prophet, that he can interrupt the ordinary course of nature, is impossible for man, but possible in itself; and because of this one need not assume that things logically impossible are possible for the prophets, and if you observe those miracles whose , 0 existence is confirmed, you will find that they arc of this kind. 4 The clearest of miracles is the Venerable Book of Allah, 5 the existence of which is not an interruption of the course of nature assumed by tradition, like the changing of a rod into a serpent, but its miraculous nature is established by way of perception and consideration for every man who has been or who will be till the day of resurrection. And so this miracle* is far superior to all others. 516 Let this suffice for the man who is not satisfied with passing this problem over in silence, and may he understand that the argument on which the learned base their belief in the prophets is another, to which Ghazali himself has drawn attention in another place, 6 namely the act which proceeds from that quality through which the

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5 prophet is called prophet, that is the act of making known the mysterious and establishing religious laws which are in accordance with the truth and which bring about acts that will determine the happiness of the totality of mankind. I do not know anyone but Avicenna who has held the theory about dreams Ghazali mentions. The ancient philosophers assert about revelation and dreams only that they proceed from God through the intermediation of a spiritual > incorporeal being which is according to them the bestower of the M human intellect, and which is called by the best authors* the active intellect and in the Holy Law angel. We shall now return to Ghazali's four points.

THE FIRST

DISCUSSION

517 Ghazali says: According to us the connexion between what is usually believed to be a cause and what is believed to be an effect is not a necessary connexion; each of two things has its own individuality and is not the other,' and neither the affirmation nor the negation, neither the existence nor the non-existence of the one is implied in the affirmation, negation, existence, and non-existence of the other—e.g. the satisfaction of thirst does not 5 imply drinking, nor satiety eating, nor burning contact with fire, nor light sunrise, nor decapitation death, nor recovery the drinking of medicine, nor evacuation the taking of a purgative, and so on for all the empirical connexions existing in medicine, astronomy, the sciences, and the crafts.2 For the connexion in these things is based on a prior power of God to create them in a successive order, though not because this connexion is necessary in itself and cannot be disjoined*—on the contrary, it is in God's power to create satiety without eating, and death without decapitation, lo and to let life persist notwithstanding the decapitation, and so on with respect to all connexions. The philosophers, however, deny this possibility and claim that that is impossible. To investigate all these innumerable connexions would take us too long, and so we shall choose one single example, namely the burning of cotton through contact with fire; for we regard it as possible that the contact might occur without the burning 618 taking place, and also that the cotton might be changed into ashes without any contact with fire, although the philosophers deny this possibility. The discussion of this matter has three points. The first is that our opponent claims that the agent of the burning is the fire exclusively;3 this is a natural, not a voluntary agent, and cannot abstain from what is in its nature when it is brought into contact with a recep5 tive substratum. This we deny, saying: The agent of the burning is God,

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through His creating the black in the cotton and the disconnexion of its parts, and it is God who m a d e the cotton burn and m a d e it ashes either through the intermediation of angels or without intermediation. For fire is a dead body which has no action, and what is the proof that it is the agent? I n d e e d , the philosophers have no other proof t h a n the observation of the occurrence of the burning, when there is contact with fire, but observation proves only a simultaneity,' not a causation, and, in reality, there is no other cause but God. 2 For there is unanimity of opinion a b o u t the fact that the union of the spirit with the perceptive and moving faculties in the sperm of animals does not originate in the natures contained in I 0 w a r m t h , cold, moistness, and dryness, and that t h e father is neither the agent of the embryo through introducing the sperm into the uterus, nor the agent of its life, its sight and hearing, and all its other faculties. And although it is well known that the same faculties exist in the father, still nobody thinks that these faculties exist through h i m ; no, their existence is produced by the First either directly or through the intermediation of the angels who are in charge of these events. 3 Of this fact the philosophers who believe in a creator are quite convinced, but it is precisely with t h e m that we are in dispute. I t has been shown that coexistence does not indicate causation. W e shall make this still more clear through an example. Suppose that a m a n 15 blind from birth, whose eyes are veiled by a m e m b r a n e and who has never heard people talk of the difference between night and day, has the m e m b r a n e removed from his eyes by d a y a n d sees visible things, he will surely think then that the actual perception in his eyes of the forms of visible things is caused by the opening of his eyelids, and that as long as his sight is sound and in function, the hindrance removed and the object in 519 front of him visible, he will, without doubt, be able to see, and he will never think that he will not see, till, at the m o m e n t when the sun sets and the air darkens, he will understand that it was the light of the sun which impressed the visible forms on his sight. 4 And for what other reason do our opponents believe that in the principles of existence 5 there are causes and influences from which the events which coincide with them proceed, t h a n that they are constant, do not disappear, and are not moving bodies which vanish from sight? For if they disappeared or vanished we should observe 5 the disjunction and understand then that behind our perceptions there exists a cause. And out of this there is n o issue, according to the very conclusions of the philosophers themselves. T h e true philosophers'' were therefore unanimously of the opinion that these accidents and events which occur when there is a contact of bodies, or in general a change in their positions, proceed from the bestower of forms who is an angel or a plurality of angels, so that they even said t h a t the impression of the visible forms on the eye occurs through the bestower of forms, and that the rising of the sun, the soundness of the pupil, and the existence of the visible object are only the preparations and dispositions

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which enable the substratum to receive the forms; and this theory they io applied to all events. And this refutes the claim of those who profess that fire is the agent of burning, bread the agent of satiety, medicine the agent of health, and so on.

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I say: To deny the existence of efficient causes which are observed in sensible things is sophistry, and he who defends this doctrine either denies with his tongue what is present in his mind or is carried away by a sophistical doubt which occurs to him concerning this question. For he who denies this can no longer acknowledge that every act must have an agent. The question whether these causes by themselves are sufficient to perform the acts which proceed from them, or need an external cause for the perfection of their act, whether separate or not, is not self-evident and requires much investigation and research. And if the theologians had doubts about the efficient causes which are perceived to cause each other, because there are also effects whose cause is not perceived, this is illogical. Those things whose causes are not perceived are still unknown and must be investigated, precisely because their causes are not perceived; and since everything whose causes are not perceived is still unknown by nature and must be investigated, it follows necessarily that what is not unknown has causes which are perceived. 1 The man who reasons like the theologians does not distinguish between what is self-evident and what is unknown, 2 and everything Ghazali says in this passage is sophistical. And further, what do the theologians say about the essential causes, the understanding of which alone can make a thing understood? For it is self-evident that things have essences and attributes which determine the special functions of each thing.and through which the essences and names of things are differentiated. If a thing had not its specific nature, it would not have a special name nor a definition, and all things would be one—indeed, not even one; 3 for it might be asked whether this one has one special act or one special passivity or not, and if it had a special act, then there would indeed exist special acts proceeding from special natures, but if it had no single special act, then the one would not be one. 4 But if the nature of oneness is denied, the nature of being is denied, and the consequence of the denial of being is nothingness. 5 Further, are the acts which proceed from all things absolutely necessary for those in whose nature it lies to perform them, or are

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they only performed in most cases or in half the cases? This is a 5 question which must be investigated, since one single action-andpassivity between two existent things occurs only through one relation out of an infinite number, and it happens often that one relation hinders* another. Therefore it is not absolutely certain that fire acts when it is brought near a sensitive body, 2 for surely it is not improbable that there should be something which stands in such a relation to the sensitive thing as to hinder the action of the fire, as is asserted 10 of talc and other things. But one need not therefore deny fire its burning power so long as fire keeps its name and definition. Further, it is self-evident that all events have four causes, agent, form, matter, and end, and that they are necessary for the existence of the effects—especially those causes which form a part of the effect, namely that which is called by the philosophers matter, by the theologians condition and substratum, 3 and that which is called by the philosophers form, by the theologians psychological quality. 4 The theologians acknowledge that there exist conditions which are necessary to the conditioned, as when they say that life is a condition of knowledge; and they equally recognize that things have realities 522 and definitions, and that these are necessary for the existence of the existent, and therefore they here judge the visible and the invisible according to one and the same scheme. 5 And they adopt the same attitude towards the consequences of a thing's essence, namely what they call 'sign', 6 as for instance when they say that the harmony* 5 in the world indicates that its agent possesses mind and that the existence of a world having a design indicates that its agent knows this world. 7 Now intelligence is nothing but the perception* of things with their causes, and in this it distinguishes itself from all the other faculties of apprehension, and he who denies causes must deny the intellect. Logic implies the existence of causes and effects, and knowledge of these effects can only be rendered perfect 10 through knowledge of their causes. Denial of cause implies the denial of knowledge, and denial of knowledge implies that nothing in this world can be really known, and that what is supposed to be known is nothing but opinion, that neither proof nor definition exist, and that the essential attributes which compose definitions are void. The man who denies the necessity of any item of knowledge must admit that even this, his own affirmation, is not necessary knowledge. 8 As to those who admit that there exists, besides necessary know-

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523 ledge, knowledge which is not necessary, about which the soul forms a judgement on slight evidence and imagines it to be necessary, whereas it is not necessary, the philosophers do not deny this. And if they call such a fact 'habit' this may be granted, but otherwise I do not know what they understand by the term 'habit'—whether they mean that it is the habit of the agent, the habit of the existing things, or our habit to form a judgement about such things? 1 It is, however, impossible that God should have a habit, for a habit is a 5 custom which the agent acquires and from which a frequent repetition ofhis act follows, whereas God says in the Holy Book: 'Thou shalt not find any alteration in the course of God, and they shall not find any change in the course of God.' 2 If they mean a habit in existing things, habit can only exist in the animated; 3 if it exists in something else, it is really a nature, and it is not possible that a thing io should have a nature which determined it either necessarily or in most cases.4 If they mean our habit of forming judgements about things, such a habit is nothing but an act of the soul which is determined by its nature and through which the intellect becomes intellect. The philosophers do not deny such a habit; but 'habit' is an ambiguous term, and if it is analysed it means only a hypothetical act; as when we say 'So-and-so has the habit of acting in such-and-such a way', meaning that he will act in that way most of the time. If this were true, everything would be the case only by supposition, and there 524 would be no wisdom in the world from which it might be inferred that its agent was wise. And, as we said, we need not doubt that some of these existents cause each other and act through each other, and that in themselves they do not suffice for their act, but that they are in need of an external agent whose act is a condition of their act, and not only of 5 their act but even of their existence. However, about the essence of this agent or of these agents the philosophers differ in one way, although in another they agree. They all agree in this, that the First Agent is immaterial and that its act is the condition of the existence and acts of existents, and that the act of their agent reaches these existents through the intermediation of an effect* of this agent, which is different from these existents and which, according to some io of them, is exclusively the heavenly sphere, whereas others assume besides this sphere another immaterial existent which they call the bestower of forms. But this is not the place to investigate these theories, and the

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highest part of their inquiry is this; and if you are one of those who desire these truths, then follow the right road which leads to them. The reason why the philosophers differed about the origin of the essential forms and especially of the forms of the soul is that they could not relate them to the warm, cold, moist, and dry, which are the causes 525 of all natural things which come into being and pass away, 1 whereas the materialists related everything which does not seem to have an apparent cause to the warm, cold, moist, and dry, affirming that these things originated through certain mixtures of those elements, just as 5 colours and other accidents come into existence. 2 And the philosophers tried to refute them. Ghazali says: Our second point is concerned with those who acknowledge that these events proceed from their principles, but say that the disposition to receive the forms arises from their observed and apparent causes. However, according to them also the events proceed from- these principles not by deliberation and will, but by necessity and nature, as light does from the sun, and the substrata differ for their reception only through the differentia- >° tions in their disposition. For instance, a polished body receives the rays of the sun, rcllects them and illuminates another spot with them, whereas an opaque body docs not receive thein; the air does not hinder the penetration of the sun's light, but a stone does; certain things become soft througli the sun, others hard; 1 certain things, like the garments which the fuller bleaches, become white through the sun, others like the fuller's face become black: 4 the principle is, however, one and the same, although the effects differ through the differences of disposition in the substratum. Thus there is no hindrance or incapacity in the emanation of what emanates 15 from the principles of existence; the insufficiency lies only in the receiving substrata. If this is true, and we assume a fire that has the quality it has, and two similar pieces of cotton in the same contact with it, how can it be imagined that only one and not the other will be burned, as there is here no voluntary act? And from this point of view they deny that Abraham could fall into the fire and not be burned notwithstanding the fact that the fire remained fire, and they affirm that this could only be possible through abstracting the warmth from the fire (through which it 526 would, however, cease to be fire) or through changing the essence of Abraham and making him a stone or something on which fire has no influence, and neither the one nor the other is possible. I say: Those philosophers who say that these perceptible cxistents do not act on each other, and that their agent is exclusively an external principle, cannot affirm that their apparent action on each other is 5

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totally illusory, but would say that this action is limited to preparing the disposition to accept the forms from the external principle. However, I do not know any philosopher who affirms this absolutely; they assert this only of the essential forms, not of the forms of accidents. They all agree that warmth causes warmth, and that all the four 10 qualities act likewise, but in such a way that through it the elemental fire1 and the warmth which proceeds from the heavenly bodies are conserved. The theory which Ghazali ascribes to the philosophers, that the separate principles act by nature, not by choice, is not held by any important philosophers; 2 on the contrary, the philosophers affirm that that which possesses knowledge must act by choice. However, according to the philosophers, in view of the excellence which exists in the world, there can proceed out of two contraries only the better, and their choice is not made to perfect their essences—since 527 there is no imperfection in their essence—but in order that through it those existents which have an imperfection in their nature may be perfected. As to the objection which Ghazali ascribes to the philosophers over the miracle of Abraham, such things are only asserted by heretical Muslims. The learned among the philosophers do not permit dis5 cussion or disputation about the principles of religion, and he who does such a thing needs, according to them, a severe lesson. For whereas every science has its principles, and every student of this science must concede its principles and may not interfere with them by denying them, this is still more obligatory in the practical science of religion, for to walk on the path of the religious virtues is necessary for man's existence, according to them, not in so far as he is a man, but in so far as he has knowledge; and therefore it is necessary IO for every man to concede the principles of religion and invest with authority the man who lays them down. T h e denial and discussion of these principles denies human existence, and therefore heretics must be killed. Of religious principles it must be said that they are divine things which surpass human understanding, but must be acknowledged although their causes are unknown. Therefore we do not find that any of the ancient philosophers discusses miracles, although they were known and had appeared all over the world, for they are the principles on which religion is based 528 and religion is the principle of the virtues; nor did they discuss any of the things which are said to happen after death. For if a man grows up according to the religious virtues he becomes absolutely

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virtuous, and if time and felicity are granted to him, so that he becomes one of the deeply learned thinkers and it happens that he can explain one of the principles of religion, it is enjoined upon him that he should not divulge this explanation and should say 'all these are ; the terms of religion and the wise', conforming himself to the Divine Words, 'but those who are deeply versed in knowledge say: 5 we believe in it, it is all from our Lord'. 1 Ghazali says: There are two answers to this theory. The first is to say: 'We do not accept the assertion that the principles do not act in a voluntary way and that God does not act through His will, and we have already refuted their claim in treating of the question of the temporal creation of the world. If it is established that the Agent creates the burning through His will when the piece of cotton is brought in contact with the fire, He can equally well omit to create it when the contact takes place.

I say: Ghazali, to confuse his opponent, here regards as established what 10 his opponent refuses to admit, and says that his opponent has no proof for his refusal. He says that the First Agent causes the burning without an intermediary He might have created in order that the burning might take place* through the fire. But such a claim abolishes any perception of the existence of causes and effects. No philosopher 529 doubts that, for instance, the fire is the cause of the burning which occurs in the cotton through the fire—not, however, absolutely, but by an external principle which is the condition of the existence of fire, not to speak of its burning. The philosophers differ only about the quiddity of this principle—whether it is a separate principle, or an intermediary between the event and the separate principle 5 besides the fire. Ghazali says, on behalf of the philosophers: But it may be said that such a conception involves reprehensible impossibilities. For if you deny the necessary dependence of effects or their causes and relate them to the will of their Creator, and do not allow even in the will a particular definite pattern, but regard it as possible that it may vary and change in type, then it may happen to any of us that there should be in his presence beasts of prey and flaming fires and immovable mountains and enemies equipped with arms, without his seeing them, 10 because God had not created in him the faculty of seeing them. And a man who had left a book at home might find it on his return changed into a youth, handsome, intelligent, and efficient, or into an animal; or if he left a youth at home, he might find him turned into a dog; or he might

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leave ashes and find t h e m changed into musk; or a stone changed into gold, and gold changed into stone. And if he were asked a b o u t any of these things, he would answer: ' I do not know w h a t there is at present in m y house; I only know t h a t I left a book in m y house, but perhaps by now it is a horse which has soiled the library with its urine and excrement, a n d I left in m y house a piece of bread which has perhaps changed into a n apple-tree.' For God is able to d o all these things, and it does not belong to the necessity of a horse that it should be created from a sperm, nor is it of the necessity of a tree that it should be created from a seed; no, there is no necessity that it should be created out of anything at all. And perhaps G o d creates things which never existed before; indeed, w h e n one sees a m a n one never saw before and is asked whether this m a n has been generated, one should answer hesitantly: ' I t m a y be that he was one of the fruits in the m a r k e t which has been changed into a m a n , a n d that this is t h a t m a n . ' For God can do any possible thing, and this is possible, and one cannot avoid being perplexed by it; and to this kind of fancy one may yield ad infinitum, but these examples will do. 1 But the answer is to say: If it were true that the existence of the possible implied that there could not be created in m a n any knowledge of the non-occurrence of a possible, all these consequences would follow necessarily. But we are not at a loss over any of the examples which you have brought forward. For God has created in us the knowledge that H e will not do all these possible things, and we only profess that these things are not necessary, but that they arc possible and m a y or may not h a p p e n , and protracted habit time after time fixes their occurrence in our minds according to the past habit in a fixed impression. Yes, it is possible t h a t a prophet should know in such ways as the philosophers have explained that a certain m a n will not come tomorrow from a journey, and although his coming is possible the prophet knows t h a t this possibility will not be realized. 2 And often you may observe even ordinary m e n of w h o m you know that they are not aware of anything occult, and can know the intelligible only through instruction, and still it cannot be denied that nevertheless their soul and conjecturing power 5 can acquire sufficient strength to apprehend w h a t the prophets a p p r e h e n d in so far as they know the possibility of an event, but know that it will not h a p p e n . And if God interrupts the habitual course by causing this unusual event to h a p p e n this knowledge of the habitual is at the time of the interruption removed from their hearts a n d H e no longer creates it. T h e r e is, therefore, no objection to a d m i t t i n g that a thing m a y be possible for God, but that H e had the previous knowledge that although H e might have done so H e would not carry it out during a certain time, and that H e has created in us the knowledge that H e would not d o it during that time. 4 I say: W h e n t h e t h e o l o g i a n s a d m i t t h a t t h e o p p o s i t e of e v e r y t h i n g exist-

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ing is equally possible, and that it is such in regard to the Agent, and that only one of these opposites can be differentiated through the will of the Agent, there is no fixed standard for His will either constantly or for most cases, according to which things must happen. For this reason the theologians are open to all the scandalous implications with which they are charged. For true knowledge* is the knowledge of a thing as it is in reality. 1 And if in reality there only existed, in regard both to the substratum and to the Agent, 2 the possibility of the two opposites, 3 there would no longer, even for the twinkling of an eye, be any permanent knowledge of anything, since we suppose such an agent to rule existents like a tyrannical prince who has the highest power*, for whom nobody in his dominion can deputize*, of whom no standard or custom is known to which reference might be made. 4 Indeed, the acts of such a prince will undoubtedly be unknown by nature, and if an act of his comes into existence the continuance of its existence at any moment will be unknown by nature. Ghazali's defence against these difficulties that God created in us the knowledge that these possibilities would be realized only at special times, such as at the time of the miracle, is not a true one. For the knowledge created 5 in us is always in conformity with the nature of the real thing, since the definition of truth is that a thing is believed to be such as it is in reality. 6 If therefore there is knowledge of these possibles, there must be in the real possibles a condition to which our knowledge refers, either through these possibles themselves or through the agent, or for both reasons—a condition which the theologians call habit. 7 And since the existence of this condition which is called habit is impossible in the First Agent, this condition can only be found in the existents, and this, as we said, is what the philosophers call nature. 8 The same congruity exists between God's knowledge and the existents, although God's knowledge of existents is their cause, and these existents are the consequence of God's knowledge, and therefore reality conforms to God's knowledge.' If, for instance, knowledge of Zaid's coming reaches the prophet through a communication of God, the reason why the actual happening is congruous with the knowledge is nothing but the fact that the nature of the actually existent 10 is a consequence of the eternal knowledge, for knowledge qua knowledge can only refer to something which has an actualized nature." The knowledge of the Creator is the reason why this nature

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becomes actual in the existent which is attached to it.1 Our ignorance of these possibles is brought about through our ignorance of the nature which determines the being or non-being of a thing. 2 If the opposites in existents were in a condition of equilibrium, both in themselves 3 and through their efficient causes, it would follow that they neither existed nor did not exist, or that they existed and did not exist at the same time, and one of the opposites must therefore have a preponderance in existence. And it is the knowledge of the existence of this nature which causes the actualization of one of the opposites. And the knowledge attached to this nature is either a knowledge prior to it, and this is the knowledge of which this nature is the effect, namely eternal knowledge, or the knowledge which is consequent on this nature, namely non-eternal knowledge. The attainment of the occult is nothing but the vision of this nature, and our acquisition of this knowledge not preceded by any proof is what is called in ordinary human beings a dream, and in prophets inspiration. The eternal will and eternal knowledge are the causes of this nature in existents. And this is the meaning of the Divine Words: 'Say that none in the heavens or on the earth know the occult but God alone.' 4 This nature is sometimes necessary and sometimes what happens in most cases.5 Dreams and inspiration are only, as we said, the announcement of this nature in possible things, and the sciences which claim the prognostication of future events possess only rare traces of the influences of this nature or constitution or whatever you wish to call it, namely that which is actualized in itself and to which the knowledge attaches itself. Ghazali says:

The second answer—and in it is to be found deliverance from these reprehensible consequences6—is to agree that in fire there is created a nature which burns two similar pieces of cotton which are brought into contact with it and does not differentiate between them, when they are alike in every respect.7 But still we regard it as possible that a prophet should be thrown into the fire and not burn, either through a change in the quality of the fire or through a change in the quality of the IJ prophet, and that either through God or through the angels there should arise a quality in the fire which limited its heat to its own body, so that it did not go beyond it, but remained confined to it, keeping, however, to the form and reality of the fire, without its heat and influence extending beyond it; or that there should arise in the body of the person an attribute, which did not stop* the body from being flesh and bone, 534 but still defended* it against the action of the fire. For we can see a man

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r u b himself with talc and sit down in a lighted oven and not suffer from it; and if one had not seen it, one would deny it, and the denial of o u r opponents that it lies in God's power to confer on the fire or to the body an attribute which prevents it from being burnt is like the denial of one who has not seen the talc and its effect.' For strange and marvellous things are in the power of God, m a n y of which we have not seen, and why should we deny their possibility and regard t h e m as impossible? A n d also the bringing back to life of the dead a n d the changing of a 5 stick into a serpent are possible in the following w a y : matter can receive any form, and therefore earth and the other elements can be changed into a plant, 2 and a plant, when an animal eats it, can be changed into blood, 3 then blood can be changed into sperm, 4 and then sperm can be thrown into the w o m b and take the character of an animal. 5 This, in the habitual course of nature, takes place over a long space of time, but why does our opponent declare it impossible that matter should pass through these different phases in a shorter period than is usual, and when once a shorter period is allowed there is no limit to its being shorter and shorter, so that these potencies can always become quicker in their action and eventually arrive at the stage of being a miracle of a prophet. 6 And if it is asked: 'Does this arise through the soul of the prophet or 10 through another principle at the instigation of the prophet?'—we answer: 'Does what you •acknowledge may h a p p e n through the power of the prophet's soul, like the d o w n p o u r of rain or the falling of a thunderbolt or earthquakes—does that occur through him or through another principle? W h a t we say about the facts which we have mentioned is like what you say about those facts which you regard as possible. And the best method according to both you and us is to relate these things to God, either immediately or through the intermediation of the angels. But at the time these occurrences become real, the attention of the prophet turns to such facts, and the order of the good determines its a p p e a r a n c e to ensure the duration of the order of religion, and this gives a preponderance 15 to the side of existence. T h e fact in itself is possible, and the principle in God is His m a g n a n i m i t y ; but such a fact only emanates from Him when necessity gives a preponderance to its existence a n d the good determines it, and the good only determines it when a prophet needs it to establish his prophetic oflice for the promulgation of the good.' 7 And all this is in accordance with the theory of the philosophers and follows from it for them, since they allow to the prophet a particular characteristic which distinguishes him from common people. T h e r e is no intellectual criterion for the extent of its possibility, but there is no need to declare it false when it rests on a good tradition and the religious law states it to be true. Now, in general, it is only the sperm which accepts the form of animals—and it receives its animal potencies only from the angels, who according to the philosophers, arc the principles of existents — a n d only a m a n can be created from the sperm of a m a n , and only a

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horse from the sperm of a horse, in so far as the actualization of the sperm through the horse determines the preponderance of the analogous form of a horse over all other forms, and it accepts only the form to which in this way the preponderance is given, and therefore barley never grows from wheat or an apple from a pear. 1 Further, we see that certain kinds of animal are only produced by spontaneous generation from earth and never are generated by procreation—e.g. worms, and some which are produced both spontaneously and by procreation like the mouse, the serpent, and the scorpion, for their generation can come also from earth. 2 Their disposition to accept forms varies through causes unknown to us, and it is not in h u m a n power to ascertain them, since those forms do not, according to the philosophers, e m a n a t e from the angels by their good pleasure or h a p h a z a r d , 1 but in every substratum only in such a way that a form arises for whose acceptance it is specially determined through its own disposition. These dispositions differ, and their principles are, according to the philosophers, the aspects of the stars and the different relative positions of the heavenly bodies in their movements. And through this the possibility is open that there m a y be in the principles of these dispositions wonderful and marvellous things, so that those who understand talismans through their knowledge of the particular qualities of minerals and of the stars succeed in combining the heavenly potencies with those mineral peculiarities, and make shapes of these earthly substances, and seek a special virtue for them and produce marvellous things in the world through them. And often they drive serpents and scorpions from a country, and sometimes bugs, and they do other things which are known to belong to the science of talismans. And since there is no fixed criterion for the principles of these dispositions, and we cannot ascertain their essence or limit them, how can we know that it is impossible that in certain bodies dispositions occur to change their phases at a quicker rhythm, so that such a body would be disposed to accept a form for the acceptance of which it was not prepared before, which is claimed to be a miracle? T h e r e is no denying this, except through a lack of understanding and an unfamiliarity with higher things and oblivion of the secrets of God in the created world and in n a t u r e . And he who has examined the m a n y wonders of the sciences does not consider in any way impossible for God's power w h a t is told of the wonders of the prophets. 4 O u r opponents m a y say: ' W e agree with you that everything possible is in the power of God, and you theologians agree with us t h a t the impossible cannot be done and that there are things whose impossibility is known and things which are known to be possible, and that there are also things about which the understanding is undecided and which it does not hold to be cither impossible or possible. Now what according to you is the limit of the impossible? If the impossible includes nothing but the simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same thing, then say that of

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two things the one is not the other, and t h a t the existence of the one does not d e m a n d the existence of the other. And say then t h a t God can create will without knowledge of t h e thing willed, a n d knowledge without life,1 and that H e can move the h a n d of a dead m a n a n d make him sit a n d write volumes with his h a n d a n d engage himself in sciences while he has his eye open and his looks are fixed on his work, although he does not see and there is no life in him and he has no power, and it is God alone who creates all these ordered actions with the moving of the dead man's h a n d , a n d the m o v e m e n t comes from God. But by regarding this as possible the difference between voluntary action and a reflex action like shivering* is destroyed, and a judicious act will no longer indicate that the agent possesses knowledge o r p o w e r . 2 It will then be necessary that God should be able to change genera and transform the substance into an accident and knowledge into power and black into white and a voice into an odour, just as H e is able to change the inorganic into an animal and a stone into gold, and it will then follow that God can also bring a b o u t other unlimited impossibilities.' T h e answer to this is to say that the impossible cannot be done by God, and the impossible consists in the simultaneous affirmation and negation of a thing, or the affirmation of the more particular with the negation of the more general, or the affirmation of two things with the negation of one of them, and what does not refer to this is not impossible and w h a t is not impossible can be done. T h e identification of black and white is impossible, because by the affirmation of the form of black in the substratum the negation of the form of white and of the existence of white is implied; and since the negation of white is implied by the affirmation of black, the simultaneous affirmation and negation of white is impossible. 3 A n d the existence of a person in two places at once is only impossible* because we imply by his being in the house that he cannot be in another place, and it cannot be understood from the denial that he is in another place that he can be simultaneously both in another place and in the house. And in the same way by will is implied t h e seeking of something that can be known, a n d if we assume a seeking without knowledge there cannot be a will a n d we would then deny what we had implied. And it is impossible that in the inorganic knowledge should be created, because we understand by inorganic that which does not perceive, and if in the organic perception was created it would become impossible to call it inorganic in the sense in which this word is understood. As to the transformation of one genus into another, some theologians affirm that it is in the power of God, 5 but we say that for one thing to become another is irrational; for, if for instance, the black could be transformed into power, the black would either remain or not, and if it does not exist any more, it is not changed but simply does not exist any more and something else exists; a n d if it remains existent together with power, it is not changed, but something else is brought in relation to it, and if the

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15 black remains and power does not exist, then it does not change, but remains as it was before. And when we say that blood changes into sperm, we mean by it that this identical matter is divested of one form and invested with another; and it amounts to this, that one form becomes nonexistent and another form comes into existence while the matter remains, and that two forms succeed one another in it. And when we say that water becomes air through being heated, we mean by it that the matter which had received the form of the water is deprived of this form and takes so another, and the matter is common to them but the attribute changes. And it is the same when we say that the stick is changed into a serpent or earth into an animal. But there is no matter common to the accident and the substance, nor to black and to power, nor to the other categories, and it is impossible for this reason that they should be changed into each other. As to God's moving the hand of a dead man, and raising this man up in the form of a living one who sits and writes, so that through the movement of his hand a well-ordered script is written, this in itself is not impossible as long as we refer events to the will of a voluntary being, and it is only to be denied because the habitual course of nature is in opposition 537 to it. AndyourafFirmation, philosophers, that, if this is so, the judiciousness of an act no longer indicates that the agent possesses knowledge is false, for the agent in this case is God; He determines the act and He performs it. And as to your assertion that if this is so there is no longer any difference between shivering and voluntary motion, we answer that we know this' difference only because we experience in ourselves the difference between these two conditions, and we find thereby that the differentiating factor is power,1 and know that of the two classes of the possible the one happens 5 at one time, the other at another; that is to say, we produce movement with the power to produce it at one time, and a movement without this power at another. Now, when we observe other movements than ours and see many well-ordered movements, we attain knowledge of the power behind them,2 and God creates in us all these different kinds of knowledge through the habitual course of events, through which one of the two classes of possibility becomes known, though the impossibility of the second class is not proved thereby. I say: When Ghazali saw that the theory that things have no particular 10 qualities and forms from which particularacts follow, for every thing is very objectionable, and contrary to common sense, he conceded this in this last section and replaced it by the denial of two points: first that a thing can have these qualities but that they need not act on a thing in the way they usually act on it, e.g. fire can have its warmth but need not burn something that is brought near to it,

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even if it is usually burnt when fire is brought near to it; secondly that the particular forms have not a particular matter in every object. The first point can be accepted by the philosophers, for because of external causes the procession of acts from agents may not be necessary, 1 and it is not impossible that for instance fire may sometimes be brought near cotton without burning it, when something is placed with the cotton that makes it non-inflammable, as Ghazali says in his instance of talc and a living being. As to the point that matter is one of the conditions for material things, this cannot be denied by the theologians, 2 for, as Ghazali says, there is no difference between our simultaneous negation and affirmation of a thing and our simultaneous denial of part of it and affirmation of the whole. And since things consist of two qualities, a general and a particular—and this is what the philosophers mean by the term 'definition', a definition being composed according to them of a genus and a specific difference—it is indifferent for the denial of an existent which of its two qualities is denied. For instance, since man consists of two qualities, one being a general quality, viz. animality, and the second a particular, viz. rationality, man remains man just as little when we take away his animality as when we take away his rationality, for animality is a condition of rationality and when the condition is removed the conditioned is removed equally.

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On this question the theologians and the philosophers agree, except that the philosophers believe that for particular things the general qualities are just as much a condition as the particular, and this the theologians do not believe; for the philosophers, for instance, warmth 539 and moisture are a condition of life in the transient, 3 because they are more general than life, just as life is a condition of rationality. 4 But the theologians do not believe this, and so you hear them say: 'For us dryness* and moisture are not a condition of life.' For the philosophers shape, too, is one of the particular conditions of life in 5 an organic being; if not, one of two following cases might arise: either the special shape of the animal might exist without exercising any function, or this special shape might not exist at all. 5 For instance, for the philosophers the hand is the organ of the intellect, and by means of it man performs his rational acts, like writing and the carrying on of the other arts; now if intelligence were possible in the inorganic, it would be possible that intellect might exist without 10 performing its function, and it would be as if warmth could exist without warming the things that are normally warmed by it. 6 Also,

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according to the philosophers, every existent has a definite quantity and a definite quality, and also the time when it comes into existence and during which it persists are determined, although in all these determinations there is, according to the philosophers, a certain latitude. 1 Theologians and philosophers agree that the matter of existents which participate in one and the same matter sometimes accepts one of two forms and sometimes its opposite, as happens, according to them, with the forms of the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth. Only in regard to the things which have no common matter or which have different matters do they disagree whether some of them can accept the forms of others—for instance, whether something which is not known by experience to accept a certain form except through many intermediaries can also accept this ultimate form without intermediaries. For instance, the plant comes into existence through composition out of the elements; it becomes blood and sperm through being eaten by an animal and from sperm and blood comes the animal, as is said in the Divine Words: 'We created man from an extract of clay, then We made him a clot in a sure depository' 2 and so on till His words 'and blessed be God, the best of creators'. T h e theologians affirm that the soul of man can inhere in earth without the intermediaries known by experience, 3 whereas the philosophers deny this and say that, if this were possible, wisdom would consist in the creation of man without such intermediaries, and a creator who created in such a way would be the best and most powerful of creators; both parties claim that what they say is selfevident, and neither has any proof for its theory. And you, reader, consult your heart; it is your duty to believe what it announces, and this is what God—who may make us and you into men of truth and evidence—has ordained for you. But some of the Muslims have even affirmed that there can be attributed to God the power to combine the two opposites, and their dubious proof is that the judgement of our intellect that this is impossible is something which has been impressed on the intellect, whereas if there had been impressed on it the judgement that this is possible, it would not deny this possibility, but admit it.4 For such people it follows as a consequence that neither intellect nor existents have a well-defined nature, and that the truth which exists in the intellect does not correspond to the existence of existing things. The theologians themselves are ashamed of such a theory, but if they held

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it, it would be more consistent with their point of view than the contradictions in which their opponents involve them on this point. For their opponents try to find out where the difference lies between what as a matter of fact the theologians affirm on this point and what they deny, and it is very difficult for them to make this out—indeed they do not find anything but vague words. We find, therefore, that those most expert in the art of theological discussion take refuge in denying the necessary connexion between condition and conditioned, between a thing and its definition, between a thing and its cause and between a thing and its sign. All this is full of sophistry and is without 542 sense, and the theologian who did this was Abu-1-Ma'ali. 1 T h e general argument which solves these difficulties is that existents are divided into opposites and correlates, and if the latter could be separated, the former might be united, but opposites are not united and correlates therefore cannot be separated. And this is the wisdom 5 of God and God's course in created things, and you will never find in God's course any alteration. 2 And it is through the perception of this wisdom that the intellect of man becomes intellect, and the existence of such wisdom in the eternal intellect is the cause of its existence in reality. The intellect therefore is not a possible entity which might have been created with other qualities, as Ibn Hazm imagined. 3

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Their impotence to show by demonstrative proof that the human soul is a spiritual substance which exists by itself and does not fill space, is neither body nor impressed on a body, is neither continuous with the body nor separated from the body,4 5 just as neither God nor the angels according to them is outside or inside the world Ghazali says: The discussion of this question demands the exposition of their theory about the animal and human faculties.5 The animal faculties are divided according to them into motive and apprehensive, and the apprehensive are of two classes, the external and the internal. The external are the five senses, and these faculties are entities impressed on the bodies.6 The internal 10 are three in number.7 The first is the representative faculty in the foremost part of the brain behind the faculty of sight;8 in it the forms of the things seen remain after the closing of the eye, and in this faculty there

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is impressed a n d collected* what the five senses bring to it, a n d it is there5 4 4 fore called the common sense. If it did not exist, a m a n who saw white honey and perceives its sweetness by taste could not, when he saw it a second time, apprehend its sweetness as long as he had not tasted it as he did the first time, but in the common sense there is something which judges that this white is the sweetness, a n d there is in it, no doubt, a judging element for which both these things, colour and sweetness, are brought together and which determines then that when the one is present the other must be there too. 1 5 T h e second is the estimative faculty, 2 which is that which apprehends the intentions 3 whereas the first apprehends the forms; 4 and the meaning of 'forms' is 'that which cannot be without matter, i.e. body', whereas the meaning of'intentions' is ' t h a t which does not require a body for its existence, although it can h a p p e n that it occurs in a body'—like enmity and concord. T h e sheep perceives the colour, shape, and appearance of the wolf, which are only found in body, but it perceives also that the wolf is its enemy, and the l a m b perceives the shape and colour of its mother and then perceives its love and tenderness, and for this reason it flees from the •o wolf while it walks behind the mother. Discord a n d concord need not be in bodies like colour and shape, but it sometimes happens that they occur in bodies. This faculty differs from the first*, and is located in the posterior ventricle of the brain. 5 T h e third faculty is called in animals the imaginative and in m a n the cogitative, 6 and its n a t u r e is to combine the sensible forms and to compose the intentions with the forms : 7 it is located in the middle ventricle between 15 the place where the forms are kept and that where the intentions are retained. 8 Because of this m a n can imagine a horse that flies a n d a being with the head of a m a n and the body of a horse, and other combinations, although he has never seen such things. It is more appropriate, as will be shown, to join this faculty with the motive faculties than with the a p p r e hensive.' T h e places where these faculties are located are known only through medicine, for if a lesion occurs to one of these ventricles the faculties become defective. 10 Further, the philosophers affirm that the faculty on which the forms of sensible things a r e impressed through the five senses retains these forms so that they do not disappear after their reception, for one thing does not retain another through the faculty by which it receives it, for water receives without retaining, while wax receives through its wetness and retains through its dryness, by contrast with w a t e r . " T h r o u g h this consideration that which retains is different from that which receives, and 545 this is called the retentive faculty. And in the same wray intentions are impressed on the estimative faculty, and a faculty retains them, which is called the memorative.' 2 T h r o u g h this consideration, these internal perceptions, when the imaginative faculty is joined to them, become five in n u m b e r , like the external faculties.

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The motive faculties' form two classes, in so far as they are only stimulating motion or executing motion and acting; the stimulating motive faculty is the impulsive and appetitive faculty; this is the faculty 3 which stimulates the acting motive power to move when, in the representative faculty which we have mentioned,2 there is inscribed the form of something to be sought or avoided. The stimulating faculty has two branches, one called concupiscent which excites to a movement, through which there is an approach to the things represented as necessary or useful in a search for pleasure, and the irascible which excites to a movement through which the thing represented as injurious or mischievous is removed as one seeks to master it. Through this faculty the complete 10 determination to act is effected, which is called will.3 The motive faculty which itself executes movement is a faculty which is diffused in the nerves and muscles and has the function of contracting the muscles and drawing the tendons and ligaments which are in contact with the limbs in the direction where this faculty resides, or of relaxing and extending them so that the ligaments and tendons move in the opposite direction.* These are the animal faculties of the soul as described in a summary way, without the details. And as regards the soul which thinks things and is called the rational or discursive soul by the philosophers (and by 'discursive'5 is meant 15 'rational', because discourse is the most typical external operation of reason and therefore the intellective soul takes its name from it), it has two faculties, a knowing and an acting, and both are called intellect, though equivocally.6 And the acting faculty is one which is a principle moving man's body towards the well-ordered human arts, whose order derives from the deliberation proper to man. The knowing faculty, which is called the speculative, is one which has the function of perceiving the real natures of the intelligibles in abstraction from matter, place, and position; and these are the universal concepts which the theologians call sometimes conditions and sometimes modes,7 and which the philosophers call abstract universals. The soul has therefore two faculties on two sides: the speculative faculty on the side of the angels, since through it it receives from the angels knowledge of realities (and this faculty must always be receptive for the 546 things coming from above); and the practical faculty on the inferior side, which is the side of the body which it directs and whose morals it improves. This faculty must rule over all the other bodily faculties, and all the others must be trained by it and subjected to it. It must not itself be affected or influenced by them, but they must be influenced by it, in such a way that there will not through the bodily attributes occur in the soul subservient dispositions, called vices, but that this faculty may remain predominant 5 and arouse in the soul dispositions called virtues.8 This is a summary of the human vital faculties, which they distinguished and about which they spoke at great length, and we have omitted the

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vegetative faculties, since there is no need to mention them as they are not connected with our subject. Nothing of what we have mentioned need be denied on religious grounds, for all these things are observable facts whose habitual course has been provided by God. We only want now to refute their claim that the soul being an essence subsistent by itself1 can be io known by demonstrative rational proofs, and we do not seek to refute those who say that it is impossible that this knowledge should derive from God's power or who believe that the religious law is opposed to this; for perhaps it will be clear at the dividing on the Day ofJudgement that the Holy Law regards it as true. However, we reject their claim that this can be known by mere reason and that the religious law is not necessary for its knowledge, and we shall ask them to produce their proofs and indeed they have many. I say: All this is nothing but an account of the theory of the philosophers about these faculties and his conception of them; only he followed Avicenna, who distinguished himself from the rest of the philosophers by assuming in the animal another faculty than the imaginative, 2 which he calls the estimative faculty and which replaces the cogita547 tive faculty in man, and he says that the ancients applied the term 'imaginative faculty' to the estimative, and when they do this then the imaginative faculty in the animal is a substitute for the cogitative faculty in man and will be located in the middle ventricle of the brain. 3 And when the term 'imaginative' is applied to the faculty which apprehends* shape, 4 this is said to reside in the foremost part of the brain. There is no contradiction in the fact that the retentive 5 and memorative faculties should both be in the posterior part of the brain, for retaining and memory are two in function, but one in their substratum. And what appears from the theory of the ancients is that the imaginative faculty in the animal is that which determines that the wolf should be an enemy of the sheep and that the sheep should be a friend of the lamb, for the imaginative faculty is a perceptive one 5 and it necessarily possesses judgement, and there io is no need to introduce another faculty. What Avicenna says would only be possible if the imaginative faculty were not perceptive; and there is no sense in adding another faculty to the imaginative in the animal, especially in an animal which possesses many arts by nature, for its representations are not derived from the senses6 and seem to be perceptions intermediary between the intellectual and the sensible* forms, and the question of these forms* is concisely treated in De sensu et sensato,7 and we shall leave this subject here and return to Ghazali's objections against the philosophers.

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G h a z a l i says: T h e first proof is t h a t they say that intellectual cognitions inhere in h u m a n souls, and are limited and have units which cannot be divided, and therefore their substratum must also be indivisible and every body is divisible, and this proves that the substratum of the cognitions is something incorporeal*. 1 O n e can p u t this into a logical form according to the figures of logic, but the easiest way is to say that if the substratum of knowledge is a divisible body, then the knowledge which inheres in it must be divisible t o o ; but the inherent knowledge is not divisible, and therefore the substratum is not a b o d y : and this is a mixed hypothetical syllogism in which the consequent is denied, from which there follows the denial of the antecedent in all cases; and there is no doubt about the validity of this figure of the syllogism, nor again about its premisses, for the major is that everything inherent in something divisible is necessarily divisible, the divisibility of its substratum being assumed, and this is a major a b o u t which one cannot have any doubt. T h e minor is that knowledge as a unity inheres in m a n and is not divided, for its infinite division is impossible, and if it is limited, then it comprises no doubt units which cannot be divided; and in short, when we know a thing, we cannot assume that a p a r t can cease and a p a r t remain, because it has no parts. T h e objection rests on two points. It m a y be said: ' H o w will you refute those who say that the substratum of knowledge is an a t o m in space which cannot be divided, as is known from the theory of the theologians?' 2 And then there remains nothing to be said against it but to question its possibility, and to ask how all that is known can exist in one atom, whereas all the atoms which surround this one are deprived of it although they are near to it. But to question its possibility has no value, as one can also turn it against the doctrine of the philosophers, by asking how the soul can be one single thing which is not in space or outside the body, either continuous with it or separated from it. However, we should not stress this first point, for the discussion of the problem of the a t o m is lengthy, 3 and the philosophers have geometrical proofs against it whose discussion is intricate, and one of their m a n y arguments is to ask: 'Does one of the sides of an a t o m between two atoms touch the identical spot the other side touches or n o t ? ' T h e former is impossible, because its consequence would be t h a t the two sides coincided, whereas a thing t h a t is in contact with another is in contact, and the latter implies the affirmation of a plurality and divisibility, 4 and the solution of this difficulty is long and we need not go deeper into it and will now turn to the other point. Your affirmation that everything which inheres in a body must be divisible is contradicted by w h a t you say of the estimative faculty of t h e sheep where the hostility of the wolf is concerned, for in the j u d g e m e n t of one single thing no division can be imagined, since hostility has no part, so that one p a r t of it might be perceived a n d another neglected. Still, accord-

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ing to you this perception takes place in a bodily faculty, and the souls of animals are impressed on their bodies and do not survive death, and all the philosophers agree about this. And if it is possible for you to regard as divisible that which is perceived by the five senses, by the common sense and by the faculty which retains the forms, this is not possible for you in the case of those intentions which are not supposed to be in matter. And if it be said: 'Absolute hostility, abstracted from matter, is not perceived by the sheep, but only the hostility of the definite individual wolf connected with its bodily individuality and shape, and only the rational faculty perceives universal realities abstracted from matter'—we answer that the sheep perceives, indeed, the colour and shape of the wolf and then its hostility, and if the colour is impressed on the faculty of sight and the same happens to the shape, and it is divided through the division of the substratum of sight, I ask, 'through what does the sheep perceive the hostility? If through a body, hostility is divided, and I should like to know what this perception is when it is divided, whether it is a perception of a part of the hostility—and how can it have a part?—or whether every part is a perception of the hostility and the hostility is known many times as its perception is fixed in every part of the substratum.' 1 And thus this problem is a difficulty for their proof and must be solved. And if it is said: 'This is an argument against the intelligibles, but the intelligibles cannot be denied,2 and as long as you cannot call in question the premisses that knowledge cannot be divided and that what cannot be divided cannot be in a divisible body, you can have no doubt about the consequence'—the answer is: 'We have only written this book to show the incoherence and contradictions in the doctrine of the philosophers, and such a contradiction arises over this question, since through it either your theory about the rational soul is refuted or your theory about the estimative faculty.' Further we say that this contradiction shows that they are not conscious of the point, which confounds* their syllogism, and it may well be that the origin of their confusion lies in their statement that knowledge is impressed on a body in the way colour is impressed on a coloured thing, the colour being divided with the division of the coloured thing, so that knowledge must be divided by the division of its substratum.3 The mistake lies in the term 'impression', since it may well be that the relation of knowledge to its substratum is not like that of colour to the coloured object so that it could be regarded as being spread over it, diffused over its sides and divisible with it; knowledge might well be related to its substratum in another way which would not allow its divisibility although its substratum was divisible; yes, its relation to it might be like that of perception of the hostility to the body,4 and the relations of the attributes to their substrata do not all follow the same pattern and they are not all known to us with all their details so that we could rely on our knowledge, and to judge such a question without a perfect comprehension of all the

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details of the relation is an unreliable judgement. In short, we do not deny that what the philosophers say gives reasonable and predominant reasons for belief, but we deny that it is known by an evidence which excludes error and doubt. And it is in this way that a doubt about it may be raised- l° I say: When the premisses which the philosophers use are taken in an indefinite way the consequence Ghazali draws is valid. For our assertion that every attribute inhering in a body which is divisible is divisible through the divisibility of the body can be understood in two ways. First it may be meant that the definition of every part of this attribute which inheres in the particular body is identical with the definition of the whole: for instance the white inhering in the white body, for every part of whiteness which inheres in the individual body has one and the same definition as the whole of whiteness in this body.' Secondly, it may be meant that the attribute is attached to the body without a specific shape, 2 and this attribute again is divided through the division of the body not in such a way that the intension of the definition of the whole is identical with the intension of the definition of every part—for instance, the faculty of sight which exists in one who sees—but in such a way that it is subject to a difference in intensity according to the greater and lesser receptivity of the substratum, and therefore the power of sight is stronger in the healthy and the young than in the sick and the old. 3 What is common to those two classes* is that they are composed of individuals, i.e. that they are divided by quantity and not by quiddity, i.e. that either the uniqueness of the definition and the quiddity remains or that they are annulled. 4 Those which can be divided quantitatively into any particular part are one by definition and quiddity* and those which cannot be divided* into any individual part whatever 5 only differ from the first class in a degree of intensity, for the action of the part which has vanished is not identical with that of the part which remains, since the action of the part which has vanished in weak sight does not act in the same way as the weak sight. 6 Those two classes have it in common that colour also cannot be divided by the division of its substratum into any particular part whatever and keep its definition absolutcly intact, but the division terminates in a particular part in which the colour, when it is distributed to it, disappears. 7 The only thing which keeps its distribution always intact is the nature of the continuous in so far as it is continuous, i.e. the form of continuity. 8 When this premiss is assumed in this way, namely by holding that

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everything which is divisible in either of these two classes has a body as its substratum, it is self-evident, and the converse, that everything which is in a body is divisible according to one of these two classes, is evident too; and when this is verified, then the converse of its opposite is true also, namely that what is not divisible according to one of these two classes cannot be in a body. If to these premisses there is added further what is evident in the case of the universal intelligibles, namely that they are not divisible in either of the two ways, since they are not individual forms, it is clear that there follows from this that neither is the substratum of these intelligibles a body, nor is the faculty which has the power to produce them a faculty in a body; and it follows that their substratum is a spiritual faculty which perceives itself and other things. But Ghazali took first the one of these two classes and denied that the universal intelligibles belong to it, and then made his objection by means of the second class, which exists in the faculty of sight and in the imaginative faculty, and in doing this he committed a sophism; but the science of the soul is too profound and too elevated to be apprehended by dialectics. 1 Besides, Ghazali has not adduced the argument in the manner in which Avicenna brought it out, 2 for Avicenna built his argument only on the following: If the intelligibles inhered in a body, they would have to be either in an indivisible part of it, or in a divisible part. Then he refuted the possibility of their being in an indivisible part of the body, and after this refutation he denied that, if the intellect inhered in a body, it could inhere in an indivisible part of it. Then he denied that it could inhere in a divisible part of it and so he denied that it could inhere in body at all. And when Ghazali denied one of these two divisions he said it was not impossible that there might be another form of relation between the intellect and the body than this, but it is quite clear that if the intellect is related to the body there can exist only two kinds of relation, either to a divisible or to an indivisible substratum. This proof can be completed 3 by saying that the intellect is not attached to any animal faculty in the way the form is attached to its substratum, for the denial of its being attached to the body implies necessarily the denial of its being attached to any animal faculty which is attached to the body. For, if the intellect were attached to any of the animal faculties, it would as Aristotle says be unable to act except through this faculty, but then this faculty would not

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perceive the intellect. This is the argument on which Aristotle himself bases his proof that the intellect is separate. 1 We shall now mention the second objection which Ghazali raises 1^ t against the second proof of the philosophers, but we must first observe that their proofs, when they arc taken out of their context in those sciences to which they belong, can have at the most the value of dialectical arguments. The only aim of this book of ours is therefore to s,, ascertain the value of the arguments in it which are ascribed to the two parties, and to show to which of the two disputants the terms 'incoherence' and 'contradiction' would be applied with greater justification. Ghazali says:

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The second proof is that the philosophers say: 'If the knowledge of one single intellectual notion, i.e. a notion abstracted from matter, were impressed on matter as accidents are impressed on bodily substances, their division would necessarily follow the division of the body, as has been shown before. And if it is not impressed on matter nor spread out over it, and the term 'impression' is rejected, let us then use 5 another term and say, 'Is there a relation between knowledge and the knower?' It is absurd to deny the relation, for if there did not exist a relation, why would it be better to know something than not to know it* ? And if there is a relation, this relation can take place in three ways; either there will be a relation to every part of the substratum, or to some parts to the exclusion of others, or to no part whatever. It is false to say that the notion has no relation to any individual part of the substratum; for if there is no relation : 0 to the units, there can be no relation to the aggregate, since a collection of disconnected units is not an aggregate, but itself disconnected. It is false to say that there might be a relation to some part, for the part that was not related would have nothing to do with this notion and therefore would not come into the present discussion. And it is false to say that every part of the substratum might be related to it, for if it were related in all its parts to this notion in its totality, then each single part of the substratum would possess not a part of the notion but the notion in its totality, and this notion would therefore be repeated infinitely in act; on the other hand, if every part were related to this notion in a special way, different from the relation of another part, then this notion would be divided in its content; 15 and we have shown that the content of a notion, one and the same in every respect, is indivisible; if the relation, however, of each part were related to another part of the notion, then this notion would clearly be divided, and this is impossible.2 And from this it is clear that the things perceived which are in the five senses are only images of the particular divided forms, and that the meaning of perception is the arrival of the

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image of the thing perceived in the soul of the perceiver, so that every part of the image of the thing perceived is related to a part of the bodily organ. 555 And the objection against this is what has been said before. For by replacing the term 'impression' by 'relation' the difficulty is not removed which arises over the question what of the hostility of the wolf is impressed on the estimative faculty of the sheep, as we have mentioned; for the perception is no doubt related to it, and with this relation there must occur what you have said, and hostility is not a measurable thing possessing a measurable quantity, so that its image could be impressed on a measurable body and its parts related to the parts of that body, and the fact that the shape of the wolf is measurable does not remove the difficulty, for the 5 sheep perceives something else as well as the shape, namely the adversity, opposition, and hostility, and this hostility, added to the shape through the hostility, has no magnitude, and still the sheep perceives it through a body having magnitude; and that is necessarily a difficulty in this proof as well as in the first. And if someone says: 'Do you not refute these proofs by asserting that knowledge inheres in a spatial indivisible body, namely the atom?' we lo answer: 'No, for* the discussion of the atom is connected with geometrical questions the solution and discussion of which is long and arduous. Further, such a theory would not remove the difficulty, for the power and the will ought then also to be in this atom. For man acts, and this acting cannot be imagined without power and will, which would also be in this atom; and the power to write resides in the hand and the fingers, but knowledge of it does not reside in the hand, for it does not cease when the hand is cut off; nor is the will in the hand, for often a man wants to write, when his hand has withered and he is not able to do so, not because his will has gone, but because his power has.' 1

I say: This discussion is not an independent one, but only a complement to the first, for in the first discussion it was merely assumed that knowledge is not divided by the division of its substratum, and here an attempt is made to prove this by making use of a division into three categories. And he repeats the same objection, which presented 556 itself to him because he did not carry out the division of matter in the two senses in which it can be taken. For when the philosophers denied that the intellect could be divided through the division of its substratum in the way in which accidents are divided through the division of their substratum, and there exists another way of division in body which must be applied to the bodily functions of perception, 5 they had a doubt about these faculties. The proof is only completed by denying that the intellect can be divided in either of these ways,

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and by showing that everything which exists in a body is necessarily I divisible in one of them. For of those things in the body which are divided in this second way, i.e. which are not by definition divisible through the division of their substratum 1 it was sometimes doubted whether they are separable from their substratum or not. 2 For we see it happen that most parts of the substratum decay and still this kind of existence, 10 i.e. the individual perception, does not decay; and it was thought that it might happen that, just as the form does not disappear through the disappearance of one or more parts of its substratum, in the same way the form might not disappear when the whole was destroyed, and that the decay of the act of the form through its substratum was similar to the decay of the act of the artisan through the deterioration of his tools. And therefore Aristotle says that if an old man had the eye of a young man, he would see as well as the young one, meaning that it is thought that the decrepitude which occurs to the sight of the old man does not happen because of the decay of the faculty but because of the decay of the organs. 3 And he tries to prove this by the inactivity of the organ or the greater part of it in sleep, fainting, drunkenness, and the illnesses through which the perceptions 557 of the senses decay, whereas it is quite certain that the faculties are not destroyed in these conditions. 4 And this is still more evident in those animals which live when they are cut in two; and most plants have this peculiarity, although they do not possess the faculty of perception. 5 But the discussion of the soul is very obscure, and therefore God 5 has only given knowledge of it to those who are deeply learned; and therefore God, answering the question of the masses about this problem, says that this kind of question is not their concern, saying: 'They will ask thec of the spirit. Say: " T h e spirit comes at the bidding of my Lord, and ye are given but a little knowledge thereof." ' 6 And the comparison of death with sleep in this question is an evident proof that the soul survives, since the activity of the soul ceases in sleep through the inactivity of its organ, but the existence of the soul "> does not cease, and therefore it is necessary that its condition in death should be like its condition in sleep, for the parts follow the same rule. 7 And this is a proof which all can understand and which is suitable to be believed by the masses, and will show the learned the way in which the survival of the soul is ascertained. And this is evident from the Divine Words: 'God takes to Himself souls at the time of their death; and those who do not die in their sleep.' 8

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Ghazali says:

The third proof is that they say that, if knowledge resided in a part of the body, the knower would be this part to the exclusion of all the other parts of man, but it is said of man that it is he who knows, and knowledge is an attribute of man in his totality without reference to any specified 5 place.1 But this is nonsense, for he is spoken of as seeing and hearing and tasting, and the animals also are described in this way; but this does not mean that the perception of the senses is not in the body, it is only a metaphorical expression like the expression that someone is in Baghdad, although he is in a part of the whole of Baghdad, not in the whole of Baghdad, the reference however being made to the whole.

I say: When it is conceded that the intellect is not related to one of man's organs—and this has already been proved, since it is not self-evident •o —it follows that its substratum is not a body, and that our assertion that man knows is not analogous to our assertion that he sees.2 For since it is self-evident that he sees through a particular organ, it is clear that when we refer sight to man absolutely, the expression is allowed according to the custom of the Arabs and other people. 3 And since there is no particular organ for the intellect, it is clear that, when we say of him that he knows, this docs not mean that a part of him knows. However, how he knows is not clear by itself, for it does 559 not appear that there is an organ or a special place in an organ which possesses this special faculty, as is the case with the imaginative faculty and the cogitative and memorative faculties, the localization of which in parts of the brain is known. Ghazali says: The fourth proof is that, if knowledge inhered for instance in a part of the heart or the brain, then necessarily ignorance, its opposite, might 5 reside in another part of the heart or the brain, and it would then be possible that a man should both know and not know one and the same thing at the same time. And since this is impossible, it is proved that the place of ignorance and the place of knowledge are identical, and that this place is one single place in which it is impossible to bring opposites together. But if this place were divisible, it would not be impossible that ignorance should reside in one part of it and knowledge in another, for a thing's being in one place is not contradicted by its opposite's being in another, just as there may be piebaldness in one and the same horse, and black and white in a single eye, but in two spots. This, however, does not follow for the senses, as there is no opposite to their perception; but someIO times they perceive and sometimes not, and there exists between them the sole opposition of being and not-being, and we can surely say that some-

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one perceives through some parts, for instance the eye and the ear, and not through the other parts of his body; and there is no contradiction in this. And you cannot evade this difficulty by saying that knowing is the opposite of not-knowing, and that judgement is something common to the whole body; for it is impossible that the judgement should be in any other place but in the place of its cause, and the knower is the place in which the knowledge resides; and if the term is applied to the whole, this is a metaphor, as when we say that a man is in Baghdad, although he is in a part of it, and when we say that a man sees although we know with certainty that the judgement of his sight' does not reside in his foot and hand but is peculiar to his eye. The judgements are opposed to each other in the same way as their causes, and the judgements are limited to the place where the causes reside. And one cannot evade the difficulty by saying that the place disposed to receive the knowledge and the ignorance of man is one single place in which they can oppose each other, for according to you theologians every body which possesses life can receive knowledge and ignorance, and no other condition but life is imposed, and all the parts of the body are according to you equivalent so far as the reception of knowledge is concerned.2 The objection to this is that it can be turned against you philosophers in the matter of desire, longing, and will; these things exist in animals as well as in men, and are things impressed on the body, but it is impossible that one should flee from the object one longs for and that repugnance and craving in regard to one and the same thing should exist in him together, the desire being in one place and the repugnance in another. Still, that does not prove that they do not inhere in bodies, for these potencies, although they are many and distributed over different organs, have one thing that joins them together, namely the soul,3 which is common both to animal and to man; and since this cohesive entity forms a unity, the mutually contradictory relations enter into relation with it in turns. This does not prove that the soul is not impressed upon the body, as is quite clear in the case of animals. I say: The only logical consequence of what he says here in the name of the philosophers is that knowledge does not inhere in the body in the way colour and in general all accidents d o ; it does not, however, follow that it does not inhere in body at all. For the impossibility that the place of knowledge should receive the knowledge and want of knowledge of a thing necessarily demonstrates its identity, since oppositcs cannot inhere in one and the same place, and this kind of impossibility is common to all attributes, whether perceptive or nonperceptive. But what is peculiar to the receptivity of knowledge is that it can perceive opposites together; and this can only happen

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through an indivisible apprehension in an indivisible substratum, for he who judges is of necessity one, and therefore it is said that knowledge of opposites is one and the same.' And this kind of receptivity is of necessity proper to the soul alone. What is indeed proved by the philosophers is that this is the condition of the common sense when it exercises its judgement over the five senses, and this common sense is according to the philosophers something bodily. 2 And therefore there is in this argument no proof that the intellect does not inhere in a body, for we have already said that there are two kinds of inherence, the inherence of non-perceptive attributes and that of perceptive. And the objection Ghazali makes here is true, namely that the appetitive soul does not tend to opposites at the same time although it resides in the body. I do not know of any philosopher who has used this argument 3 to establish the survival of the soul, unless he paid no attention to the philosophical doctrine* that it is the characteristic of every perceptive faculty that in its perception two opposites cannot be joined, 4 just as it is the peculiarity of contraries outside the soul that they cannot be together in one and the same substratum; and this is what the perceptive potencies have in common with the non-perceptive. It is proper to the perceptive faculties to judge coexisting contraries, one of them being known through knowledge of the other, 5 and it is proper to non-psychical potencies to be divided through the division of the body so that contraries can be in one body at the same time, though not in the same part. And since the soul is a substratum that cannot be divided in this way, contraries cannot be in it together, i.e. in two parts of the substratum. Such arguments are all arguments of people who have not grasped the views of the philosophers about this problem. How little does a man understand, who gives it as a proof of the soul's survival that it does not judge two opposites at the same time, for from this it follows on ' y t n a t the substratum of the soul is one, and not divided in the way the substratum of the accidents is divided; and it does not follow from the proof that the substratum is not divided in the way the substratum of the accidents is divided that the substratum is not divided at all. Ghazali says: The fifth proof is: If the intellect perceived the intelligibles through a bodily organ, it would not know its own self.6 But the consequent is impossible ; therefore it knows its own self and the antecedent is impossible. We

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answer: It is conceded that from the exclusion of the contrary of the consequent the contrary of the antecedent follows,1 but only when the consequence of the antecedent has been previously established, and we say we do not concede the necessity of the consequence; and what is your proof? And if it is said that the proof is that, because sight is in the body, sight does not attach itself to sight, and the seeing is not seen nor the hearing 10 heard, and so on with respect to the other senses; and if the intellect, too, could only perceive through body it could not perceive itself, but the intellect thinks itself just as it thinks other things, and it thinks that it thinks itself and that it thinks other things—we answer: What you assert is wrong on two points. The first is that according to us sight could be attached to itself, just as one and the same knowledge can be knowledge of other things and of itself, only in the usual course of events this does not happen; but according to us the interruption of the usual course of events is possible. The second, and this is the stronger argument, is for us to say that we concede this for the senses; but why, if this is impossible for some senses, is it impossible for others, and why is it impossible that there should be a difference in the behaviour of the senses with respect to perception although they are all in the body?—just as sight differs from touch through 563 the fact that touch, like taste, can only come to perceive by being in contact with the object touched, whereas separation from the object is a condition of sight, so that when the eyelids cover the eye it does not see the colour of the eyelid,2 not being at a distance from it.3 But this difference does not necessitate that they should differ in their need to be in a body, and it is not impossible that there should be among the senses something called intellect that differs from the others in that it perceives itself.

I say: The first objection, that the usual course of events might be inter- 5 rupted so that sight might see itself, is an argument of the utmost sophistry and imposture, and we have discussed it already. As to the second objection, that it is not impossible that a bodily perception should perceive itself, this has a certain plausibility, but when the motive is known which led the philosophers to their assertion, then the impossibility of this supposition becomes clear, for perception is something which exists between the agent and the patient, and it consists of the perceiver and the perceived. It is impossible that a 10 sense should be in one and the same respect its own agent and patient, and the duality of agent and patient in sense arises, as concerns its act, from the side of the form and, as concerns its passivity, from the side of the matter. 4 But no composite can think itself, because if this were so, its essence would be different from that by which it thinks, for it would think only with a part of its essence; and

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since intellect and intelligible are identical, 1 if the composite thought its essence, the composite would become a simple, and the whole the part, and all this is impossible. When this is established here in this 564 way, it is only a dialectical proof; but in the proper demonstrative order, i.e. preceded by the conclusions which ought to precede it, it can become a necessary one. Ghazali says: The sixth proof is that they say that, if the intellect perceived through a . bodily organ like sight, it would be just as incapable of perceiving its own 3 organ as the other senses; but it perceives the brain and the heart and what is claimed to be its organ, so that it is proved that it has no organ or substratum, for otherwise it would not perceive the brain and the heart*. 2 We have the same kind of objection against this as against the preceding proof We say it is not inconceivable that sight should perceive its subject, for that it does not perceive it is only what happens in the usual course of events. Or* shall we rather say it is not impossible that the senses should differ individually in this respect, although it is common to them all to be impressed on bodies, as has been said before? And why do you say that what exists in a body cannot perceive the body, and how do you io know its impossibility in all cases, since to make an infinite generalization from a finite number of individual cases has no logical validity? In logic it is stated, as an example of an inference made from one particular cause or many particular causes to all causes, that when we say, after learning it by induction through observing all the animals, 'all animals move the lower jaw in masticating', the crocodile has been neglected, since it moves the upper. 3 The philosophers have only made the induction from the five senses, and found this known common feature in them and then judged that all the senses must be like this. But perhaps the intellect 15 is another type of sense which stands in regard to the other senses as the crocodile stands to the other animals, and in this case there would be some senses which could perceive their substratum although they were corporeal and divisible, and other senses which could not do this; just as the senses can be divided into those which perceive the thing perceived without contact, like sight, and those which cannot perceive without contact, like taste and touch. Although, therefore, what the philosophers affirm creates a certain presumption, it does not afford reliable evidence. 565 But it may be said by the philosophers :4 We do not merely point to the enumeration of the senses but lay stress on a proof, and say that if the heart or the brain were the soul of man, he could never be unaware of them, and never for a moment not think of them, just as he is never unconscious of himself; for nobody's self is ever unaware of itself, but it is always affirming itself in its soul, but as long as man has not heard any one speaking about the heart and the brain or has not observed them through

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the dissection of another man, he does not perceive them and does not 5 believe in their existence. But if the intellect inhered in the body, it would necessarily either think or not think of this body continually; neither the one nor the other is the case, but it sometimes thinks of its body* and sometimes does not*. This can be proved by the fact that the perception which inheres in the substratum perceives that substratum either because of a relation between itself and the substratum—and one cannot imagine another relation between them than that of inherence—and then the perception must perceive its substratum continually, or this relation will not suffice; and in this case the perception can never perceive its substratum, since there can never occur another relation between them; just as because of the fact that it thinks itself, it thinks itself always and is not sometimes aware, sometimes unaware of itself. 10 But we answer: As long as a man is conscious of himself and aware of his soul, he is also aware of his body; indeed, the name, form, and shape of the heart are not well defined for him, but he regards his soul and self as a body to such an extent that he regards even his clothes and his house as belonging to his self,1 but the soul or the self which the philosophers mention has no relation to the house or the clothes. This primary attribution of the soul to the body is necessary for man, and his unconsciousness of the form and name of his soul is like his unconsciousness of the seat of smell, which is two excrescences in the foremost part of the brain resembling the nipples of the breast; 2 still, everyone knows that he perceives smell with his body, but he does not represent the shape of the seat of this per- 15 ception, nor does he define this seat, although he perceives that it is nearer to his head than to his heels, and, in relation to the whole of his head, nearer to the inside of his nose than to the inside of his ear. Man knows his soul in the same way, and he knows that the essence through which the soul exists is nearer to his heart and breast than to his foot, and he supposes that his soul will persist when he loses his foot, but he does not regard it as possible that his soul should persist when his heart is taken away. But what the philosophers say about his being sometimes aware of his body*, sometimes not*, is not true. I say: As to his objection against the assertion that a body or a bodily faculty cannot know itself, because the senses are perceptive faculties in bodies and do not know themselves, this assertion indeed is based on induction, and induction does not provide absolute evidence. 3 As to Ghazali's comparison of this to the induction which establishes 566 that all animals move their lower jaw, this comparison is only valid in part. For the induction that all animals move their lower j a w is an imperfect one, because not all animals have been enumerated; whereas the man who assumes that no sense perceives itself has

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5 certainly made a complete induction, for there are no other senses than the five.1 But the judgement based on the observation of the senses that no perceptive faculty is in a body resembles the induction by which it is judged that all animals move their lower j a w ; for, just as io in the latter case not all the animals, in the former not all the perceptive faculties are enumerated. 2 As to his saying in the name of the philosophers that if the intellect were in the body, it would, when it perceives, perceive the body in which it is, this is a silly and inane assertion which is not made by the philosophers. It would only follow if everyone who perceived a thing had to perceive it together with its definition; but that is not so, for we perceive the soul and many other things without perceiving their definition. If, indeed, we perceived the definition of the soul together with its existence, we should of necessity know through its definition* that it was in the body or that it was incorporeal; for, if 567 it were in the body, the body would be necessarily included in its definition, and if it were not in the body, the body would not be included in the definition. And this is what one must believe about this problem. As for Ghazali's objection, that a man knows of his soul that it is 5 in his body although he cannot specify in which part—this indeed is true, for the ancients had different opinions about its seat, but our knowledge that the soul is in the body does not mean that we know that it receives its existence through being in the body; this is not self-evident, and is a question about which the philosophers ancient as well as modern differ, for if the body serves as an instrument for the soul, the soul does not receive its existence through the body; but if the body is like a substratum for its accident, then the soul can only exist through the body. Ghazali says: >o

The seventh proof. The philosophers say that the faculties which perceive through the bodily organs become tired through the long-continued performance of the act of perception, since the continuation of their action destroys the mixture of their elements and tires them, and in the same way excessive stimulation of the perceptive faculties makes them weak and often even corrupts them, so that afterwards they are not able to perceive something lighter and more delicate; so for instance a loud voice and a strong light hinder or corrupt the perception of a low voice and delicate objects of sight afterwards; and in fact the man who tastes something extremely sweet does not afterwards taste something less sweet. But the 568 intellectual faculty behaves in the opposite way; a long observation of

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intelligibles does not tire it, and the perception of important necessary truths gives it strength for the perception of easy observations and does not weaken it, and if sometimes tiredness may befall it, this happens because it makes use of and gets assistance from the imaginative faculty, so that the organ of the imaginative faculty becomes weary and no longer serves the intellect.' Our objection to this follows the same line as before, and we say that it may well be that the bodily senses differ in this; and what is true for 5 some of them need not be true for others—yes, it may be that the bodies themselves may differ and that some of them may grow weak through a certain type of movement, whereas others may grow strong through a certain type of movement, not weak, and that when this type of movement has made an impression on them, it causes a renewal of strength in them so that they do not perceive any new impression made on them. And all this is possible, since a judgement valid for some is not valid for all. I say: This is an old proof of the philosophers, and it amounts to this: that when the intellect perceives a strong intelligible and afterwards 10 turns to the perception of a slighter, it perceives it more easily, and this shows that it does not perceive through the body, since we find that the bodily perceptive faculties are impressed by strong sensations in a way which lessens their power of perception, so that after strong sensations they cannot perceive things of slight intensity. The reason is that through every form which inheres in a body the body receives an impression, because this form is necessarily mixed* with it; for otherwise this form would not be a form in a body. Now since the philosophers found that the receptacle of the intelligibles was not impressed by the intelligibles, they decided that this receptacle was not a body. And against this there is no objection. For every substratum which is impressed congruously or incongruously by the inherence of the form in it, be it little or much, is necessarily corporeal, and the reverse is also true, namely that everything corporeal is impressed 569 by the form which is realized in it, and the magnitude of the impression depends on the magnitude of the mixing of the form and the body. And the cause of this is that every becoming is the consequence of a change, and if a form could inhere in a body without a change it might happen that there could be a form whose realization did not impress its substratum. 5 Ghazali says: The eighth proof is that the philosophers say: 'All the faculties of parts

352 TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT of the body become weaker, when they have reached the end of their growth at forty years and later; so sight and hearing and the other faculties become weaker, but the intellectual faculty becomes strong in most cases only after this age.' And the loss of insight in the intelligibles, through ill— io ness in the body and through dotage in old age, does not argue against this, for as long as it is proved that at certain times the intellect is strong notwithstanding the weakness of the body, it is clear that it exists by itself, and its decline at the time of the declining of the body does not imply that it exists through the body, for from a negative consequent alternating with a positive consequent there is no inference.2 For we say that, if the intellectual faculty exists through the body, then the weakness of the body will weaken it at all times, but the consequent is false and therefore the antecedent is false; but, when we say the consequent is true, sometimes it does not follow that the antecedent is true. Further, the cause of this is that the soul has an activity through itself, when nothing hinders it and 15 it is not preoccupied with something. For the soul has two kinds of action, one in relation to the body, namely to govern and rule it, and one in relation to its principles and essence, and this is to perceive the intelligibles, and these two kinds of action hinder each other and are opposed to each other, and when it is occupied with the one action, it turns away from the other and it cannot combine both. And its occupations through the body are sense-perception and imagination and the passions, anger, fear, grief, and pain, but when it sets out to think the intelligible it neglects all these other things. Yes, sense-perception by itself sometimes hinders the apprehension and contemplation of the intellect without the occurrence of any damage to the organ of the intellect or to the intellect itself, and the reason 570 for this is that the soul is prevented from one action through being occupied with another, and therefore during pain, disease, and fear—for this also is a disease of the brain3—intellectual speculation leaves off. And why should it be impossible that through this difference in these two kinds of action in the soul they should hinder each other, since even two acts of the same kind may impede each other, for fear is stunned by pain and desire by anger and the observation of one intelligible by that of another? And a sign that the illness which enters the body does not occur in the 5 substratum of the sciences is that, when the sick man recovers, he does not need to learn the sciences anew, but the disposition of his soul becomes the same as it was before, and those sciences come back to him exactly as they were without any new learning. The objection is that we say that there may be innumerable causes for the increase and the decrease of the faculties, for some of the faculties increase in power at the beginning of life, some in middle life, some at the end, and the same is the case with the intellect and only a topical proof can be claimed. And it is not impossible that smell and sight should differ 10 in this, that smell becomes stronger after forty years and sight weaker, although they both inhere in the body, just as those faculties differ in

ABOUT THE NATURAL SCIENCES 353 animals; for in some animals smell is stronger, in others hearing and sight because of the difference in their temperaments, and it is not possible to ascertain these facts absolutely. Nor is it impossible that the temperament of the organs also should differ with individual persons and conditions. One of the reasons why the decay of sight is earlier than the decay of the intellect is that sight is earlier, for a man sees when he is first created, whereas his intellect is not mature before fifteen years or more,1 according to the different opinions we find people to have about this problem; and it is even said that greyness comes earlier to the hair on the head than to 15 that on the beard, because the hair on the head grows earlier. If one goes deeper into these causes and does not simply refer them to the usual course of nature, one cannot base any sure knowledge thereon, because the possibilities for certain faculties to become stronger and others weaker are unlimited, and nothing evident results from this. I say: When it is assumed that the substratum of the perceptive faculties is the natural heat, and that natural heat suffers diminution after forty years, then intellect must behave in the same way in this respect; that is, if its substratum is natural heat, 2 then it is necessary that the intellect should become old as the natural heat becomes old. If, however, it is thought that the substrata for the intellect and the senses are different, then it is not necessary that both should be 571 similar in their lifetimes. Ghazali says: The ninth proof is that the philosophers say: How can man be attributed to body with its accidents, for those bodies are continually in dissolution, and nutrition replaces what is dissolved, so that when we see a child after its separation from its mother's womb fall ill a few times and become thin and then fat again and grow up, we may safely say that after forty 5 years no particle remains of what was there when his mother was delivered of it. Indeed, the child began its existence out of the parts of the sperm alone, but nothing of the particles of the sperm remains in it; no, all this is dissolved and has changed into something else, and then this body has become another.3 Still we say that the identical man remains and his notions remain with him from the beginning of his youth, although all the bodily parts have changed. And this shows that the soul has an existence outside the body and that the body is its organ.4 The objection is that this is contradicted by what happens to animals 10 and plants, for when the condition of their being small is compared to the condition of their being big, their identity is asserted equally with the identity of man; still, it does not prove that they have an incorporeal existence.5 And what is said about knowledge is refuted by the retention of

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imaginative forms, for they remain in the boy from youth to old age, although the particles of his brain change. I say: None of the ancient philosophers used this proof for the survival of the soul; they only used it to show that in individuals there is $72 an essence which remains from birth to death and that things are not in an eternal flux, as was believed by many ancients who denied 1 necessary knowledge, so that Plato was forced to introduce the forms. There is no sense in occupying ourselves with this, and the objection of Ghazali against this proof is valid. 9 Ghazali says: The tenth proof is that they say that the intellectual faculty perceives the general intellectual universals which the theologians call modes, so that man in general is apprehended (whereas the senses perceive the individuality of a definite man), and this universal differs from the man who is perceived by the senses, for what is perceived by the senses is in a particular place, and his colour, size, and position are particular, but the intelligible absolute man is abstracted from all these things; however, in him there is everything to which the term 'man' is applied, although he has not the colour, size, position, or place, of the man perceived by the senses, and even a man who may exist in the future is subsumed under io him; indeed, if man disappeared there would remain this reality of man in the intellect, in abstraction from all these particular things. And in this way, from everything perceived by the senses as an individual, there results for the intellect a reality, universal and abstracted from matters and from positions, so that its attributes can be divided into what is essential (as, for example, corporeity for plants and animals, and animality for man) and into what is accidental (like whiteness and length for man), and this reality is judged as being essential or accidental for the genus of man and plant and of every thing not apprehended as an individual perceived by the senses, and so it is shown that the universal, in abstraction from sensible attachments, is intelligible and invariable in the mind of man. This intelligible universal cannot be pointed at,' nor has it a position or size, and in its abstraction from position and matter it is either related to its object (which is impossible, for its object has position and place and size) or to its subject (which is the rational soul), and therefore the soul cannot have a position or be pointed at or have a size, for if it had all these things what inheres in it would also possess them.2 And the objection is that the idea of a universal which you philosophers assume as existing in the intellect is not accepted by us.3 According to us nothing inheres in the intellect but what inheres in the senses, only it inheres in the senses as an aggregate which they cannot separate, whereas the intellect is able to do so. Further, when it is separated, the

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single part separated from its attachments is just as much an individual in the intellect as the aggregate with its attachments, only this invariable part 1 in the mind is related to the thing thought of2 and to similar things by one single relation, and in this way it is said to be a universal. For there is in the intellect the form3 of the individual thing thought of which is first perceived by the senses, and the relation of this form to all the individuals of this genus which the senses perceive is one and the same. If, after seeing one man, someone sees another, no new form occurs to him, as happens when he sees a horse after seeing a man, for then two different forms occur in him. A similar thing happens to the senses themselves, for when a man sees water, one form occurs in his imagination, and if he sees blood afterwards, another form occurs, but if he sees another water, no other form occurs, but the form of the water which is impressed on his imagination is an image for all individual stretches of water, and for this reason it is often thought to be a universal. And in the same way, when for instance he sees a hand, there occurs in his imagination and in his intellect the natural position of its parts, namely the surface of the hand and the division of the fingers in it and the ending of the fingers in the nails, and besides this there occur to him the smallness or bigness of the hand and its colour, and if he sees another hand which resembles the first in everything, no other new form occurs to him; no, this second observation, when a new thing occurs, does not produce an impression on his imagination, just as, when he sees the water after having previously seen it in one and the same vessel and in the same quantity, no new impression is produced. And he may see another hand, different in colour and size, and then there occurs to him another colour and another size, but there does not happen to him a new form of hand, for the small black hand has in common with the big white hand the position of its parts, differing from it in colour, and of that in which the second hand agrees with the first no new form is produced, since both forms are identical, but the form of the things in which they differ is renewed. And this is the meaning of the universal both in sensation and in intellect, for when the intellect apprehends the form of the body of an animal, then it does not acquire a new form of corporeity from a plant, just as in imagination the form of two stretches of water perceived at two different times need not be renewed; and the same happens with all things that have something in common. But this does not permit one to assert the existence of a universal which has no position whatever, although the intellect can judge that there exists something that cannot be pointed at and has no spatial position; for instance, it can assert the existence of the creator of the universe, with the understanding, however, that such a creator cannot be imagined to exist in matter, and in this kind of reality the abstraction from matter is in the intelligible itself and is not caused by the intellect and by thinking.4 But as to the forms acquired from material things, this happens in the way we have mentioned.

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I say: T h e meaning of the philosophical theory he relates is that the intellect apprehends, in relation to the individuals which have a common species, a single entity, in which they participate and which is the quiddity of this species without this entity's being divided into the things in which the individuals qua individuals are divided, like space and position and the matters through which they receive their plurality. This entity must be ingenerable and incorruptible 1 and is not destroyed by the disappearance of one of the individuals in which it exists, and the sciences therefore are eternal and not corruptible except by accident, that is to say by their connexion with Zaid and Amr; that is, only through this connexion are they corruptible, and not in themselves, since if they were transitory in themselves this connexion would exist in their essence and they could not constitute an identity. 2 And the philosophers say that, if this is established for the intellect and the intellect is in the soul, it is necessary that the soul should not be.divisible in the way in which individuals are divisible, and that the soul in Amr and in Zaid should be one single entity. 3 And this proof is strong in the case of the intellect, because in the intellect there is no individuality whatever; the soul, however, although it is free from the matters* through which the individuals receive their plurality, is said by the most famous philosophers not to abandon the nature of the individual, although it is an apprehending entity. 4 This is a point which has to be considered. As for Ghazali's objection, it amounts to saying that the intellect is something individual and that universality is an accident of it, and therefore Ghazali compares the way in which the intellect observes a common feature in individuals to the way in which the senses perceive the same thing many times, since for Ghazali the intelligible is a unity, but not something universal, and for him the animality of Zaid is numerically identical with the animality which he observes in Khalid. 5 And this is false, and if it were true, there would be no difference between sense-perception and the apprehension of the intellect.

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And after this Ghazali says that the philosophers have two proofs to demonstrate that the soul after once existing cannot perish. 6 T h e first is that if the soul perished this could only be imagined in one of these three ways: either (i) it perishes simultaneously with the body,

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or (2) through an opposite which is found in it, or (3) through the power of God, the powerful. It is false that it can perish through the corruption of the body, for it is separated from the body. It is false that it can have an opposite, for a separate substance has no opposite. 1 And it is false, as has been shown before, that the power of God can attach itself to non-being. 2 Now, Ghazali objecting to the philosophers answers: 'We theologians do not admit that the soul is external to the body; besides, it is the special theory of Avicenna that the souls are numerically differentiated through the differentiation of the bodies, for that there should be one single soul in every respect and in all people brings about many impossibilities, for instance that when Zaid knows something Amr should know it too, and when Amr does not know something Zaid should not know it either; and many other impossibilities follow from this assumption.' 3 And Ghazali adduces against Avicenna the argument that when it is assumed that the souls are numerically differentiated through the differentiation of the bodies, then they are attached to the bodies and must necessarily perish with their decay. The philosophers, however, can answer that it is by no means necessary that, when there exists between two things a relation of attachment and love, for instance the relation between the lover and the beloved and the relation between iron and the magnet, the destruction of the one should cause the destruction of the other. But Avicenna's opponents may ask his partisans through what the individuation and numerical plurality of souls takes place, when they are separated from their matters, for the numerical plurality of individuals arises only through matter. He who claims the survival and the numerical plurality of souls should say that they are in a subtle matter, namely the animal warmth which emanates from the heavenly bodies, and this is a warmth which is not fire and in which there is not a principle of fire; in this warmth there are the souls which create the sublunary bodies and those which inhere in these bodies. 4 And none of the philosophers is opposed to the theory that in the elements there is heavenly warmth and that this is the substratum for the potencies which produce animals and plants, but some of the philosophers call this potency a natural heavenly potency, whereas Galen calls it the forming power and sometimes the demiurge, saying that it seems that there exists a wise maker of the living being who has created it and that this is apparent from anatomy, but

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where this maker is and what His substance is is too lofty a problem for human understanding. 1 From this Plato proves that the soul is separated from the body, for the soul creates and forms the body, and if the body were the condition for the existence of the soul, the soul would not have created it or formed it. 2 This creative soul is most apparent in the animals which do not procreate, but it is also evident in the animals which do. And just as we know that the soul is something added to the natural warmth, since it is not of the nature of warmth qua warmth to produce well-ordered intelligible acts, so we know that the warmth which is in the seeds does not suffice to create and to form. And the philosophers do not disagree about the fact that there are in the elements souls creating each species of animals, plants, and minerals that exists, and that each of them needs a directing principle and preserving powers for it to come into existence and remain. And these souls are either like intermediaries between the souls of the heavenly bodies and the souls in the sensible bodies of the sublunary world, and then no doubt they have absolute dominion over these latter souls and these bodies, and from here arises the belief in the Jinn, 3 or these souls themselves are attached to the bodies which they create according to a resemblance which exists between them, and when the bodies decay they return to their spiritual matter and to the subtle imperceptible bodies. And there are none of the old philosophers who do not acknowledge these souls, and they only disagree as to whether they are identical with the souls in our bodies or of another kind. And as to those who accept a bestower of forms,4 they regard these powers as a separate intellect; but this theory is not found in any of the old philosophers, but only in some philosophers of Islam, because it belongs to their principles that the separate principles do not change their matters by transformation in respect of substance and primarily, for the cause of change is the opposite of the thing changed. 5 This question is one of the most difficult in philosophy, and the best explanation that can be given of this problem is that the material intellect thinks an infinite number of things in one single intelligible, and that it judges these things in a universal judgement, and that that which forms its essence is absolutely immaterial. 6 Therefore Aristotle praises Anaxagoras 7 for having made intellect, namely an immaterial form, the prime mover, and for this reason it does not suffer any action from anything, for the cause of passivity is matter and in this respect the passive potencies are in the same position as

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the active, for it is the passive potencies possessing matters which accept definite things.

The Fourth Discussion Having finished this question Ghazali begins to say that the philosophers deny bodily resurrection. 1 This is a problem which is not found in any of the older philosophers, although resurrection has been mentioned in different religions for at least a thousand years and the philosophers whose theories have come to us are of a more recent date. The first to mention bodily resurrection were the prophets of Israel after Moses, as is evident from the Psalms and many books attributed to the Israelites. 2 Bodily resurrection is also affirmed in the New Testament and attributed by tradition to Jesus. It is a theory of the Sabaeans, whose religion is according to Ibn Hazm the oldest. 3 But the philosophers in particular, as is only natural, regard this doctrine as most important and believe in it most, and the reason is that it is conducive to an order amongst men on which man's being, as man, depends and through which he can attain the greatest happiness proper to him, 4 for it is a necessity for the existence of the moral and speculative virtues 5 and of the practical sciences in men. They hold namely that man cannot live in this world without the practical sciences, nor in this and the next world without the speculative virtues, and that neither of these categories is perfected or completed without the practical virtues, 6 and that the practical virtues can only become strong through the knowledge and adoration of God by the services prescribed by the laws of the different religions, like offerings and prayers and supplications and other such utterances by which praise is rendered to God, the angels, and the prophets. In short, the philosophers believe that religious laws are necessary political arts, the principles of which are taken from natural reason and inspiration, 7 especially in what is common to all religions, although religions differ here more or less. The philosophers further hold that one must not object cither through a positive or through a negative statement to any of the general religious principles, for instance whether it is obligatory to serve God or not, and still more whether God does or does not exist, and they affirm this also concerning the other religious principles, for instance bliss in the beyond

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and its possibility; for all religions agree in the acceptance of another existence after death, although they differ in the description of this existence, just as they agree about the knowledge, attributes, and acts of God, although they differ more or less in their utterances about the essence and the acts of the Principle. All religions agree also about the acts conducive to bliss in the next world, although they differ about the determination of these acts. In short, the religions are, according to the philosophers, obligatory,' since they lead towards wisdom in a way universal to all human beings, for philosophy only leads a certain number of intelligent people to the knowledge of happiness, and they therefore have to learn wisdom, whereas religions seek the instruction of the masses generally. Notwithstanding this, we do not find any religion which is not attentive to the special needs of the learned, although it is primarily concerned with the things in which the masses participate. And since the existence of the learned class is only perfected and its full happiness attained by participation with the class of the masses,2 the general doctrine is also obligatory for the existence and life of this special class, both at the time of their youth and growth (and nobody doubts this), and when they pass on to attain the excellence which is their distinguishing characteristic. Fdr it belongs to the necessary excellence of a man of learning that he should not despise the doctrines in which he has been brought up, and that he should explain them in the fairest way, and that he should understand that the aim of these doctrines lies in their universal character, not in their particularity, and that, if he expresses a doubt concerning the religious principles in which he has been brought up, or explains them in a way contradictory to the prophets and turns away from their path, he merits more than anyone else that the term unbeliever should be applied to him, and he is liable to the penalty for unbelief in the religion in which he has been brought up. Further, he is under obligation to choose the best religion of his period, even when they are all equally true for him, and he must believe that the best will be abrogated by the introduction of a still better. Therefore the learned who were instructing the people in Alexandria became Muhammedans when Islam reached them, and the learned in the Roman Empire became Christians when the religion of Jesus was introduced there. And nobody doubts that among the Israelites there were many learned men, and this is apparent from the books which are found amongst the Israelites and

ABOUT THE NATURAL SCIENCES

361

which are attributed to Solomon. And never has wisdom ceased among the inspired, i.e. the prophets, and therefore it is the truest of all sayings that every prophet is a sage, 1 but not every sage a prophet; the learned, however, are those of whom it is said that they are the heirs of the prophets. 2 584 And since in the principles of the demonstrative sciences there are postulates and axioms which are assumed, this must still more be the case for the religions which take their origin in inspiration and reason. Every religion exists through inspiration and is blended with reason. And he who holds that it is possible that there should exist a natural religion based on reason alone must admit that this religion 5 must be less perfect than those which spring from reason and inspiration. And all philosophers agree that the principles of action must be taken on authority, for there is no demonstration for the necessity of action except through the existence of virtues which are realized through moral actions and through practice. And it is clear from this that all the learned hold about religions the opinion that the principles of the actions and regulations prescribed in every religion are received from the prophets and law- 10 givers, who regard those necessary principles as praiseworthy which most incite the masses to the performance of virtuous acts; and so nobody doubts that those who are brought up on those principles are of a more perfect virtue than those who are brought up on others, for instance that the prayers in our religion hold men back from ignominy and wickedness, as God's word certifies, and that the prayer ordained in our religion fulfils this purpose more truly than the prayers ordained in others, and this by the conditions imposed on 585 it of number, time, recitation, purity, and desistance from acts and words harmful to it. And the same may be said of the doctrine of the beyond in our religion, which is more conducive to virtuous actions than what is said in others. Thus to represent the beyond in material images is more appropriate than purely spiritual representation, as 5 is said in the Divine Words: 'The likeness of the Paradise which those who fear God are promised, beneath it rivers flow.'3 And the Prophet has said: ' I n it there is what no eye has seen, no ear has heard, nor ever entered the mind of man.' 4 And Ibn Abbas said: 'There is no relation in the other world to this world but the names.' 5 And he meant by this that the beyond is another creation of a higher order than this world, and another phase superior to our earthly. He need 10 not deny this who believes that we see one single thing developing

362

I

586

5

10

587

5

10

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

itself from one phase to another, for instance the transformation of the inorganic into beings conscious of their own essences, i.e. the intellectual forms. Those who are in doubt about this and object to it and try to explain it are those who seek to destroy the religious prescriptions and to undo the virtues. They are, as everyone knows, the heretics and those who believe that the end of man consists only in sensual enjoyment. When such people have really the power to destroy religious belief both theologians and philosophers will no doubt kill them, but when they have no actual power the best arguments that can be brought against them are those that are contained in the Holy Book. What Ghazali says against them is right, and in refuting them it must be admitted that the soul is immortal, as is proved by rational and religious proofs, and it must be assumed that what arises from the dead is simulacra 1 of these earthly bodies, not these bodies themselves, for that which has perished does not return individually and a thing can only return as an image of that which has perished, not as a being identical with what has perished, as Ghazali declares. Therefore the doctrine of resurrection of those theologians who believe that the soul is an accident and that the bodies which arise are identical with those that perished cannot be true. For what perished and became anew can only be specifically, not numerically, one, and this argument is especially valid against those theologians who hold that an accident does not last two moments. Ghazali accused the philosophers of heresy on three points. One concerns this question, and we have already shown what opinion the philosophers hold about this, and that according to them it is a speculative problem. T h e second point is the theory attributed to the philosophers that God does not know individuals, but here again we have shown that they do not say this. The third point is their theory of the eternity of the world, but again we have shown that what they understand by this term has not the meaning for which they are accused of heresy by the theologians. Ghazali asserts in this book that no Muslim believes in a purely spiritual resurrection, and in another book he says that the Sufis hold it. 2 According to this latter assertion those who believe in a spiritual but not in a perceptible resurrection are not declared heretics by universal consent, 3 and this permits belief in a spiritual resurrection. But again in another book he repeats his accusation of heresy as if it rested on universal consent. 4 And all this, as you see, is confusing. And no doubt this man erred in

ABOUT THE NATURAL SCIENCES

363

religious questions as he erred in rational problems. God is the succourer for the finding of what is true, and He invests with the truth whomever H e chooses. I have decided to break off my inquiry about these things here, 588 and I ask pardon for their discussion, and if it were not an obligation to seek the truth for those who are entitled to it—and those are, as Galen says, one in a thousand'—and to prevent from discussion those who have no claim to it, I would not have treated all this. And God knows every single letter, and perhaps God will accept my excuse and forgive my stumbling in His bounty, generosity, munificence and excellence—there is no God but H e !

APPENDIX Page

Bouyges's text

Af>> readings ilOjl

4- 3 4.6 "• 5 13-9 14. 12 16.8 18. 12 18. 13 21.9 22. 13, 14 25- 5

(>•""

25- 9

6-

26. 10 28. 10 31. n 32- 14 33-4

JJuo

JJuu

33- 12 33- 13 34- 2

37- ' 3

39-8

/it

40. 10 40. 11 5°- 15

C=^y

366

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT Page

Bouyges's text

52-7

Oltrfjl

0UVI

55- ' 5

aujVi

iiJUriuJI X^jVt

56. 14

JuUJI

59- "3

4^" JJ

My readings

JU-ljJI lijXZ*

Jj

60. 14

66.9 68. 12

69-9 69. 12 71. 10

72. 6 75- '3 78.4 80. 10

**> (ij^l

Jjjill

•iJL^l'

Jjix7

82.3 88. 1 89-7 93- 7 (95- 6)

l^fl^-inj

93- 7 (95- 6)

*• W*"'

cL^U

tUjj!

ojl^o!

C^U-I

Col>J-l

"4-3

ijs*^^'

U1*-^-^'

114. 4

\j»i>J j l

!>"-^j

j t a

--- •

101. 4 i n . 14 112. 7 113. 14

115. 11 116. 2

Jb'LuJI J^ly"

APPENDIX Page

Bouyges's text

129.7

OU3

130.8

•*ijt

131. 14 ' 3 ' - 15 '33-2

367 Afy readings

(Jt^-**^' •

^

a a

LI

LJU.

UjJjt-i

U

'34-5

*JucLJ

l»jj«j

•35-8

k^jljj-l J»w

-

169. 11

1

171- 9

*£>* ! > >

*&>* j y j

176. 2

ijJkiJI (jLi

SjJkiJlj JjL*

178.2

l4J

*J

191-2

±1^>

^~"

•94- ' 3

•>«•>*

|jjt>

•>.«•.>•*

?>

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

368 Page

My readings

Bouyges's text

196.7 196.8 200. 13

U15CI jJA

200. 15

Ofc»> ftJI J U O I

I omit these words which I regard as a gloss.

,y. blwl J J

I omit these words which seem superfluous.

209. 10 '

214. 6

'

-

•

'

"

•

:b_,l~JI

212. 1

o**JI

<J_fc^l

fl^l ^ J J

214. 15

l*i

L

225. 16

jV-J

228. 1

Aj'b

jU" Ui"'*.' a*-9 •ob ^

228. 4

iT^1

j>Ul

229. 8

'•^J-1'

'•>W«

>T

233- 7

Jul

=35- '5 237. 2

o^X-

237. 2

rA>

rj^»

237. 2

•.K^ l/"eJ

Ijli A^c ^^J

238.7

dUJJ

dUJi"

2389

dUJJ

itUJJ"

242. 1

s-^OJi

(Ut-^a^cXJ 1

243. 16

u*^1

u^1

245. 10

^^a

(•^J*

245. 10

^

(•^J*

APPENDIX Page

Bouyges's text

369 Af)> readings

247-9

i'jjl_jJI

A£-$j>y*j\

249-3

Vlju^l

sSih uiJi

250. 14 252.7 253- 15 258. 10 266.8 271. 12

|_ -^

fcj

Ulr*

iJjt-

V^J

jl fj djij

Lul jU3 j ^ U

61 djfj jl£) J^i.1

273-3

c^y

^ y

280. 12

pT-Ufc

|**X-C

283. 1

LUI

LUI

288. 6

LxuJj

289. 3

iluJ

294-3

Jb %

Jb ^ i

4f)^?uj

Lc^ocJ

294. 12 295-3 296.9

^ Jjte* J X-sL. "i/j

AU

rb S J L VJ

298. 1

jsi!

JS-J

3°6- "5

AjlJJ

Aj'ljj

308. 11

J-u

308. 18

ju ^ " i l l I J * J>»>J»>

311. 6

COj*?

3'5- 1

U-ljj

Ujjl

3I5-4

^UJI

.^1

3'7-9

L^u

*4*

328. 3

6^>

Olj

329-

6

ts^J

0.}J\?cJ

^

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

370 Page

33>-4 33'- «7

Bouyges's text

My readings

4.y«dl AJI_)a.l j l

il^JI

*Jj»-

j6

335- '2 339- i

oVj

ob

359- 5

l*j iJUJI

14-ly J

tiil^yiJ

•iJL^ii

368. 16

*LAUJ *^^**

ASJbL) .

370. 10

js-il

J-iJI

371. 11

J*

361. 12 361. 14 364. 2

6^

373-3 377-2 377- ' 3 381.6

jl

387-5 387. 10 388.2

^JjJI

402. 7 409. 16 410. 12 4'3- 2-3

Xjlfc

••

Transpose the words J L L f j after i'jjjbe-, 'L*&

4'3- '3 415. 10 421. 10 422. 1

0-J

APPENDIX Page

Bouyges's text

Afji readings

426.4 4 3 2 . 12

371

oL^

lul &»>

JyuJI iJjlju

(JLJI JU-_

437-5

Lob

Ulf

441.2

ill*

jliU

JU* v)j>. V ffl IJ^i

A^6 l _ i l ^ V U u l IJL^j

443- 11 445. 14 {bis) 446. 11

UI

^•OUI

483-3

ttUij

illJi

489-9

ilOil

Ul

nljCol

JjllJil

489. 9-10 496.9

j

f j ' " '

* y #Ji c * i '

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

37* Page

Bouyges's text

497- 12 498. 10

(_5i«JI d U i

J*iJI tU|j

J J ^ I

502. 2 0

JjoVl

r~«.,„•

Vj**

*J iJ>».

W^

504.2 506. 15

Jjj*_

J J V •

50i- ' 3

504. 1

M y readings

O^

1

u-

Wl 1

J ^ tr^1

506. 16

te>J

U^

506. 16

ijjyijl

iijyw

AJI^XJ

W*~i

JL>-

ljb>

5°9 ( 0 . 1 - 4 5"3- 1

(^

f*~

5i3- ' 7

A-.Jbcl'

l^J^u

513- 18

.UJ

tU^tl

5'3-8

513- 2 0 514-2 5'5- 1 5'5-5 516. 1 516. 10

UA*wPbJ -XJCUV-* t ' j J b

(J-JI «0UtX*«l ^ * J

LJUMTBXJ oJj£+*r*

^la-#

^Jl 4 j U e ^ - * l Jr-J^J

O I ^ J C A J I oJA

o^#c«*JI oJA

OJJ-I

JJJ-I

5*7-9

OJJUI

J>u

521-7

Ajuli'

ii'U

522.5 522. 7

(jtj'l *T\ji\

JjUl'l iJljjl

524.8

i\)**~>

J>*«-»

528. 12

OjQ

o^J

53'-2

c^JI

53'-5

J»*l JiJI

o

2

^

1

J^IOJI

APPENDIX Page

373 Afy readings

Bouyges's text

531-5

o"bo

tj'kxi

533- '7

*^V»«i

A»-j£ej

533- '7

JJLi

*iXJ

535- 25

XJUyJI

JLU^I

539-4

**s«JI

i-j~)l

543- '2

iw-M-i

»*~*LJ

544. I I

AJliJI

JjVl

,jfl»J

J***J

547- "3

iLi-J^I

Aui**4*A>tJI

547- '4

ej^oJI

547-4

548-4

r>&i

V . y i *1»M

55°- 1

irr^

55'-3

u s ^ 1 a^1*

55'-5

o*->

55J-6

«JAJ . . . j»~£j Vi

554-7

U U AJ »>•£. OjJ

oV

555- 10

,^»u V . ^

J>*JI U>« U*s^

OS^

1

ui-i*

li* 1

J4I... ^

V ^jij

AJ l»JU ^ X . OJS'

•W*

56".5

AJJ!

(•4^

564.6

AT^I

I^TJJI

564-8

il

jl

565-6

Ji*i

AjjlU

565-6

J2« V

Alio ^

565- '9

(»"«*" 0* J ^

I*—*)' J 2 "

565- 19

Ait J i i V

Aliu V

566. 16

Uj

568. 15

L«-J a* iilUc-.

574- 11

U ^ l

1*-*- Cr* AJ i U U ~ JI^JI

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES ibn 'Abbas, 585, 8. Abraham, 52, 2. 52, 3. 191, 11. 193, 3. 416, 16. 527, 2. Alexander of Aphrodisias, 420, 12. 421, 13.

495. 7-

al-Ghazali, passim. ibn Hazm, 208, 10. 542, 9. 580, 8. Hippocrates, 140, 13. abu'l Hudhail, 119, 14. 121, 2.

Anaxagoras, 177, 12. 579, 11. Aristotle, 2 1 , 12. 49, 14. 79, g, 14. 88, 12. Israelites, 580, 5. 583, 11, 12. 171, 12, 14. 172, 2. 176, 3. 180, 3, 8. 181, 8. 187, 9. 206, 2. 236, 10. 250, 7. Jesus, 69, 12. 580, 7. 583, 10. 259, 11, 14. 261, 10. 268, 12. 313, 8. al-Juwaini (abu'l Ma'ali), 542, 12. 373. 5- 392, 12. 4 ' 5 , 9 - 4 8 1 , 3, 10, 14, 15. 422, 1. 451, 4. 510, 2. 553, 7, 9. 556, 14. Karramites, 6, 9. 135, 11. 136, 7. 579. " • Ash'arites, 8, 8. 12, 8. 13, 2. 14, 2. 15, 10. Materialists, cf. Dahriyya. 17, 9-10. 25, 6. 89, 8. 90, 2. 92, 10. 93, 8. Melissus, 373, 5. 94. 7- >>7. 6- 124. 9- "33. ' 5 - ' 3 6 . 9Moses, 69, 12. 580, 15. "37-I39- ' 5 8 , 9- 169, 15. 172, 14. 205, Mutakallimun, 21, 10. 22, 7, 10, 12. 25, 10. 2 1 8 , 1 2 - 1 5 . 219,10. 223,16. 2 2 5 , 1 1 . 10. 35, 6. 37, 3- 5 ' , 9- 54, ' 5 - 69, 1. 72,4276, 8. 295, 4. 314, 4. 317, 3. 320, 13. 78,12. 99, 6.132, 4. 1 8 8 , 1 . 1 9 3 , 1 4 . 210, 321, 1, 6. 322, 5, 9. 324, 12. 333, 5. 364, 5. 218, 11. 223, 16. 225, 16. 226, 6. 227, •~3- 396, 3. '• 402. ' 3 - 4 ° 3 , ' 4 - 4 i a , 2. 5. 242, 8. 246, 10. 276, 4. 284, 3. 295, 3. 416, 16. 466, 4. 476, 6. 295, 3- 328, 1. 351, 15. 352, i . 352, 11. Avicenna, 27, 7, 11. 54, 13. 86, 10. g2, I. 378, 7. 411, 16. 425, 1. 426, 4. 430, 10. 1 0 7 , 8 . 1 4 1 , 1. 163, 8 . 1 6 6 , 9 , " • I ^ 7 , 1 3 449. ' 3 - 521. 16. 530, 18. 531, 1. 538, 5, 168, 6. 179, 9. 182, 5. 184, 6. 186, 5. ' 3 . ' 5 - 539,3- 54°, ' 2 - 54 10.542, 2.586, ' 9 7 . ' 5 - o- 552, 12Pythagoras, 177, 12. 579, 11. 576, 8. Chaldaeans, 492, 8. Christians, 301, 5. 322, 13. Dahriyya, 20, 7. 266, 17. 269, 12, 16. 270, 1, 4. 282, 6, 9. 283, 17. 284, 4. 416, 10. 525, 2. al-Farabi (abu Nasr), 54, 13. 179, 9. 184, 6. 245, 1, 14. 371, 9, 15. Galen, 127, n . 155, 4. 212, 16. 577, 15. 588,3.

Sabaeans, 580, 8. ibn Sina, cf. Avicenna, Socrates, 268, 10. 'Sophists', 542, i, 11. Stoics, 479, 8. Sufis, 364, 4. 463, 11. 587, 7. Themistius, 271, 14. ?ahirites, 12,13. 429> I 0 Zanadiqa (heretical Muslims), 537, 3, n . 585» »4*

v0tv*H5,n>r)

CONTENTS (VOLUME II)

NOTES Index of Proper Names mentioned in the Introduction «»d in the Notes Index of Subjects mentioned in the Notes Some contradictions in Aristotle's System Arabic-Greek Index to the Notes Greek-Arabic Index to the Notes

i 207 211 215 216 218

NOTES liovoi $i.\oaoijaai "E\Xi]ves hvvavrat Only Greeks philosophize, EPICURUS (CLEM. ALEX. Strom, i. 1 5 ; DIOO. LAERT. X. 1 1 7 )

One must know that everything the Moslems, Mu'tazilites as well as Ash'arites, have professed concerning these subjects, has been borrowed from the Greeks and Syrians who applied themselves to the criticism of the philosophers. (MAIMONIDES, Guide of the Perplexed, i. 71) p . 1. I . According to Aristotelian logic, demonstrative proof which affords necessary, absolute truth must be distinguished from dialectical and rhetorical proofs which only yield probability. T h e term . s j JU^J is a translation of the Stoic term avyKardBeois, assent, and synonymous with . x j b c j , b u t whereas for the Stoics assent m a y be given to the single representation, for the Aristotelian logicians in Islam assent refers always to a proposition. T h e Arabs divide Logic into two parts, the one treating of concepts, J J ,~"i t n e other of judgements in so far as they refer to the exterior world, ^ J^aj' (cf, e.g. Avicenna, Salvation, ed. H . 1331, p . 3). p. 1.2. T h e general term for eternity is . J ? (Greek di'Sio'rTjs), b u t Aristotle distinguishes the eternal a parte ante, the ungenerated, dyivr/rov, J j I, from the eternal a parte post, the indestructible, a8aprov, t£Ju I. T h e r e is also the term altliv, J O ('timeless eternity'), in scholastic philosophy aevum, used by Plato (77m. 39 d) and Aristotle (De caelo A g. 279*22), which becomes especially important in Neoplatonism. p. 1.3. T h e basic ideas of this proof, which presumes an eternal agent, are to be found in Aristotle, who regards himself as the first thinker to affirm that the world is ungenerated (De caelo A 10. 2 7 g b i 2 ) : that the world cannot have had an origin, because there could be no new decision in the mind of God for its beginning (cf. the passage of Aristotle—probably from the De philosophia fr. 22 Rose—quoted by Cicero, Acad. pr. ii. 38 'neque enim o r t u m esse u n q u a m m u n d u m , quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tarn praeclari operis inceptio'); that in all change there is potentiality (e.g. Ph.ys.r2) \ t h a t the potential needs an actualizer which already exists actually (Met, & 8. i049 b 24). T h e a r g u m e n t itself follows closely Proclus' third argument in J o h n Philoponus' De aeternitate mundi, R a b e , p . 42, which I here give in summ a r y : T h e demiurge will be either always in act or sometimes in potency. If he is always in act, then his work (S-q^n-ovpyov^vov) also will be always in a c t ; if he is sometimes in potency, there must be an actualizer of this potency. Therefore either we shall have an infinite regress, always seeking a new cause for the actualization of this potency, or we shall have to admit a

2

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

cause always in act. I n the a r g u m e n t given by Ghazali we find the term Tta-^i ('determining principle', or more literally ' w h a t causes to incline'; the Greek word is TO imxtevov—see for this word below, note 19.1.), which is used by the Muslim theologians in their proof (inspired by Aristotle) for the existence of G o d : the possible existence of the world needs for its actual existence a *^-,->, a determining principle which cannot have itself a cause, as an infinite series of causes is impossible. T h e argument given by Ghazali is found in substance, for example, in Avicenna's Salvation, p p . 415-17. Shahrastani, a younger contemporary of Ghazali, gives in his book Religious and Philosophical Sects (ed. Cureton, p . 338) a short and somewhat imperfect enumeration of eight of Proclus' eighteen arguments (that mentioned above is the second). Shahrastani says that all these arguments have a logical flaw, t h a t they were used by Avicenna, b u t t h a t h e himself has composed a special book to refute them logically ( i j k u * jj^Lr* L ^ ' p . 1.4. As an Aristotelian, Averroes ought to have accepted this argum e n t , and as a matter of fact he ultimately does so. In his objection, which corresponds to that of Philoponus, he seems moved by a certain esprit de contradiction against his Moslem fellow-philosophers. Averroes argues like Philoponus t h a t both the 'potential' and the 'actual' are homonymous terms. Philoponus (op. cit., p . 46) distinguishes a potency which is a natural aptitude, <j>vai.K-q im.T-qhei6rr)s eiV n, and a potency in habitu, KO.8' e£iv. According to Philoponus, a m a n having a natural aptitude to become a teacher needs a n external cause to become a teacher; being once a teacher in habitu, i.e. having sufficient knowledge, he no longer needs an external cause. But the question of the internality or externality of the cause is not relevant to Proclus' argument. p. 1. 5. Common notions; common, 2uU = *jj^.-':.,, i.e. KOIVOV = ev&o^ov ~ TO. hoKovvra -naoiv 17 TOLS irAeloTois, the domain of probability (Top. A 1. ioo b 22). T h a t proofs a r e concerned with things proper to the same genus: Anal. Post. A 7. p . 1.6. T h e different meanings of the possible, Aristotle, Met. A 12; eVJ TO TTO\V, i$jS*i I; eV cXarrov, ^ 3 ^ I; « r ' iaov, (£j L J I Lc . p . 2. 1. For the eVJ TO noXv does not happen by c h a n c e ; cf. Met. A 30. I025»i5 and De caelo A 12. 283*32. p . 2. 2. T h e natural has its principle of movement in itself, the artificial is moved from the outside; Phys. B 1. i g 2 b i 3 . p . 2. 3 . T h e soul has its principle of movement in itself; De an. B 1. 4i2bi6. p . 2. 4. T h e four types of c h a n g e : e.g. Phys. E 1. 225*3. p . 2. 5. i.e. the eternal unmoved mover and the eternally m o v e d ; cf. Met. A 6.

'!

NOTES

3

p . 2. 6. A sect n a m e d after M u h a m m e d ibn K a r r a m of Khorasan (ninth century). T h e y say t h a t God is a substratum for new accidents, a n d t h a t nothing comes into existence in the world without being preceded by new accidents in God, e.g. new volitions (cf. e.g. Baghdadi, The Differences between the Sects, p . 202). p . 2. 7. M a t t e r is the principle of all generation a n d corruption, e.g. Met. H 5. I 0 4 4 b 2 7 ; m a t t e r is eternal, e.g. Met. B 4. 999 b 5. p . 2. 8. This is the vovs TraBrfTiKos, called in Arabic (in accordance with Alexander of Aphrodisias, De an. 82. 20 sqq. Bruns) also ( j ^ j - ^ J I ( J i J I, vovs iXucos, mentioned in Aristotle, De an. T 5, where he distinguishes an active a n d a passive intellect, the intellect which 'does' and the intellect which 'becomes everything'. Greek and A r a b commentators elaborated Aristotle's scanty and rather obscure remarks about the intellect and m a d e a n u m b e r of new distinctions. This potential intellect is regarded by Averroes (and by T h o m a s Aquinas) as eternal, in opposition to Aristotle, De an. r 5. 430*23: TOUTO (i.e. TO TTOIOVV) fiovov dddvarov Kal di'Siov (see also below, note 14. 4 ) . p . 2. 9. T h e non-rational faculties only produce the effect proper to them, whereas the rational are able to produce contrary effects, e.g. Met. & 5. I048"8. p . 3. 1. This is the fallacy TO dnAws 7} ^ quid ad dictum simpliciter.

anXws, fallacia a dicto secundum

p . 3. 2. Cf. Aristotle, De caelo A 5. 2 7 I b 8 : ctirep xal ro puxpov irapa^fjvai rijs d\T]8eias d^tarapevots yiverai iroppco pvpioTrXdaiov, a small deviation from the truth at the beginning multiplies itself later ten thousandfold. p . 3. 3. This is the Ash'arite theory, which is in conformity with that of Philoponus in his sixteenth argument. O n e must distinguish, says Philoponus (op. cit., p p . 567-8), between God's eternally willing something and God's willing it to be eternal, between God's eternal will and the eternity of the object of His will. It was not in the nature of Socrates to be created before Sophroniscus; but before Sophroniscus became, God had willed that Socrates should be, not absolutely, not always, but when it should be possible. Therefore God willed what H e h a d ordained to be before it became, a n d H e willed it to be at the time when its becoming should be possible. This agrees with the teaching of St. Augustine, who, using Cicero's expression novum consilium, denies expressly that there could be in God a novum consilium {De civ. dei, K a l b . , xii. 15). However, St. Augustine is well aware of the difficulty of his theory and he says (loc. c i t . ) : 'valde quippe altum est et semper fuisse et hominem, quem n u n q u a m fecerat, ex aliquo tempore p r i m u m facere voluisse nee consilium voluntatemque mutasse' (that God has always existed and that after a certain time H e created m a n w h o m H e h a d not wanted to create before, without having changed His mind and will—this, indeed, is very deep for us).

4

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T p . 3. 4. i.e. a change in the agent.

p . 3. 5. I t is not clear why he regards this as difficult to prove, since the proof follows immediately. Probably he means t h a t the whole problem of God's relation to the world is a difficult one. p . 3. 6. T h e word J U . which I translate here by 'disposition' is a most ambiguous one. I take it here to be the translation of the Aristotelian term Siadims ('disposition') which is opposed to t f « , A5VU ('habitude'), the former denoting a temporary, the latter a more lasting condition. But Averroes, I think, uses this word here, too, in reference to its theological meaning. T h e systems of the Muslim theologians (called in Arabic Mutakallimun, a translation of the Greek SiaAeioriKoi) are largely dependent on Stoicism, and their term J U. is a translation of the Stoic term 77-01? e^ov. This term does not signify a thing, a material reality, but a fact or event, either a state, e.g. the fact that a body is in space, or a result of a cause, e.g. the fact t h a t I will, which is the result of the will in me, a living being. These states and events are regarded by the Stoics and those Muslim theologians who accept this theory as something either intermediate between reality and unreality or as not real; they are meanings (in a more or less objective sense), XCKTO., <jU_*; thoughts (in a m o r e or less objective sense), vo-jnara, f|>>.l (both these Arabic words are very ambiguous: JL*^ , for example, can also mean 'idea' in the Platonic sense). T h e theologians accepted also from the Stoics the term ri, t J;, the 'something' which is defined as i^s- j^*i Ol \y?± ^ J1" > everything of which something can be said, and which includes the real and the unreal. T h e term J U. applied by the theologians to the attributes of God gives them a certain unreality so as not to impair God's unity. Amongst t h e Muslim theologians there are never-ending discussions about the J U . (Sextus Empiricus, Ado. log. viii. 262, speaks of the axrpnrros pax7! among the Stoics about the existence of the XCKTO.) . A b o u t the use of the term J U. for .the universal by the Ash'arites see below (for the Stoic theory see v. Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ii. 48-49, 118-22, 131—3, and E. Brehier, La Theorie des incorporels dans Vancien Stoicisms, deuxieme id., Paris, 1928; for the Muslim theory Shahrastani, The Utmost Proficiency in Theology, ed. Guillaume, p p . 131 sqq.). It m a y perhaps be noted that the Stoics introduced into philosophy the concepts of meaning and of event or fact. T h e Stoics distinguish the sentence, i.e. the words, from the judgement and from the fact m e a n t ; e.g. 'it is raining' is at the same time a sentence, a judgement, and the objective fact, m e a n t or expressed b y these words. T h e Stoics, too, saw that the realm of meaning, i.e. of the things meant, which includes the past, the future, the universal, the possible, the impossible, the imaginary, the false and illusory, is infinitely vaster t h a n the universe of actual reality. T h e Muslim theologians use the Stoic theory of meaning to define the words of God as mean-

NOTES

5

ings without the concomitance of physical speech (cf. op. cit., especially p . 289), a n d the theory of the 'something' to explain God's knowledge of the non-existent possible world before its actual existence (see op. cit., p p . 150 sqq.). T h e paradox of the reality of non-being, that there are things which do not exist, was foreshadowed by Plato, Soph. 240 B. I t is a characteristic of the undefinable act of meaning that its object need not exist. Indeed, all our planning concerns the not yet existing future just as our memories refer to the no more existing past. This is an ultimate fact which cannot be explained, i.e. reduced to another fact, nor represented, nor described by any material image. p . 3. 7. T h a t this new disposition may be in the effect and not in the agent—in the creature, not in the creator—seems rather astonishing, b u t refers to the theological theory that the acts of God do not affect God's essence, but are only related to the object (for this theory see Al-Ash'ari, The Dogmas of the Muslim Theologians, ed. Ritter, p . 176). This conforms to Plotinus' theory (Enneads vi. 9. 3) that to speak of God's causation is not to attribute something to H i m but to us, a n d to Christian dogma, e.g. St. Augustine, De trinitate v. 16: concerning the unchangeable substance of God we must admit that something m a y be so predicated relatively in respect to the creature that although it begins to be so predicated in time, yet nothing shall be understood to have happened to the substance of God itself, but only to the creature in respect of which it is predicated; De civ. dei xxii. 2. 2 'cum deus m u t a r e dicitur voluntatem, homines potius q u a m ipse mutantur'. p . 4. 1. i.e. the act of creation depends on a new disposition, and this new disposition will be either caused by another God or by God Himself. If by God Himself, there will be an act of God prior to the creation which we regarded as God's first act. T h e problem is set out by Aristotle, Phys. 9 1. 251 b 3 0 : if the moving h a d existed without moving, a cause would have been necessary for the change, one would then have had a change anterior to the first. p . 4. 2. At h a p h a z a r d and by themselves U c U l j ,yi^t ('differentiating principle'), which can mean as used by Ghazali (like » j - i praeponderans, determining principle or principle giving preponderance) (1) a principle which, determining or choosing without any motive one of two similar objects, establishes

i8

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

a distinction between them through this choice, (2) a principle which determines or chooses, without the motive being known, the existence of one of two opposites which seem equally purposeful, (3) the dissimilarity which is the motive for the choice. T h e conception of a 'differentiating principle' is of Stoic origin. T h r o u g h God as the logos the world gradually develops through division (Diog. Laert. vii. 136); all things are set in opposition through the logos, e.g. t h e mortal and the immortal, t h e material and the immaterial (Plutarch, De solert. an. ii. 9 ) ; Lactantius says {Stoic. Vet. Fr. i. 42. 23) that Zeno called the logos naturae dispositor; Ps.-Arist. (De mundo 5. 397*17) has t h e word xpl&w (the natures of the different kinds of animals are s e p a r a t e d ) ; and Philo uses the expression (Quis rer. div. her. 26. 130) Xoyos TOfitw, the specifying logos. Ghazali probably borrowed his theory of a differentiating principle from his master Juwaini (for whose theory see Averroes, Theology and Philosophy, ed. Miiller, p . 40). Aristotle, although h e is convinced t h a t n a t u r e always does the best possible, rj revets ail 7roiet TCOV ivBe^op-^vcuv TO PCXTLOTOV (De caelo B 5. 288 a 2) (which seems to imply that even for nature—or for God—not everything is possible, a problem m u c h discussed in theology, since it denies one of its postulates, God's omnipotence), and that nothing in the eternal world can h a p p e n by chance and at random, 287 b 24, says (287 b 3r) that to ask a reason for everything would seem to show a n excessive simplicity (cin)6a.a) and zeal (trpoBviila). T h e Aristotelian and Stoic principle that God does always TO PeXnorov, *JL*>V I, is generally admitted by the Muslim theologians (cf. also Leibniz's principium melioris). p . 18. 4. W e should not inquire after the motives of the Eternal, according to the K o r a n , xii. 2 3 : God is not to be questioned concerning what H e does. p . 19. 1. According to Plutarch (De stoic, rep. xxiii, Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 973) there were certain philosophers, tznoi TO> (f>i.Ao (Chrysippus denied the existence of such a faculty, which would imply the existence of the causeless, W/CUTIOV). This is the theory which, as we will see, Ghazali adopted for the h u m a n will. However, in t h e definition he gives here (and he seems to speak here of the will in general and not only of the Divine W i l l ; but the whole passage is ambiguous) he regards the will in every act of will as a n imK\lvov or a -ro/jew, since he assumes in the agent for every voluntary act an equal possibility of acting or not acting. This is the Pelagian conception of the liberum arbitrium. p . 19. 2. This would b e rather a n a r g u m e n t for t h e opposite of Ghazali's

NOTES

ig

thesis, for will is a faculty, a power, which needs for its actualization a cause, a motive. p. 19. 3. iraaa Bvvafus a/ia TTJS avrMf>aac(iis eoriv, every potency is at one and the same time a potency of the opposite (Met. & 8. I050b8). p. 19.4. According to the Muslim theologians God has power to act and to will. p. 19. 5. For the Divine Will also could only choose between things exhibiting a dissimilarity. p. 19. 6. It is, however, the similarity, not the opposition of the timepoints, which constitutes the philosophical objection; see pages 22, 25, and 32, and note 32. 4. p. 20. 1. Differentiating principle, i.e. a dissimilarity; the term 'differentiating principle' has a different sense for Averroes from that which it has for Ghazali. p. 20. 2. It would not contain the possibility of contrary effects; warmth —says Aristotle (Met. 0 2. I046b5)—is capable only of heating, but the medical art can produce both disease and health. p. 20. 3. i.e. they reject the idea of a Divine Will, at least in the theological sense. p. 20. 4. (Jjjj, fUTa^opa; for transference as a form of sophistry, see De soph, elench. 18. I76b20. p. 21. 1. i.e. in the Koran will is attributed to God. p. 21.2. The original of this example is in Aristotle, De caelo B 13. 295b32, where, discussing Plato's theory that the earth is sustained in heaven through the equivalence (o/ioio'-nj?) of the surrounding heaven (Phaedo 108 e), he speaks of the constraint of equivalence in a man who, at an equal distance from food and drink and equally starving and thirsting, must remain where he is. More or less the same example, duo cibi aequaliter appetibiles, is found in Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol. 1. ii. 13. 6, and in Dante, Par. iv. 1-6, who adds, however, the much less paradoxical example of a lamb standing egualmente temendo between two hungry and fierce wolves. The paradox becomes known later as that of Buridan's ass (although in Buridan, who often gives asses as examples, this particular ass is not found), and the example of an ass dying with hunger between two similar bundles of straw at an equal distance is mentioned and discussed by such different authors as Montaigne, Essais, ii. 14; Spinoza, Scholion at the end oiEth. ii; Bayle in his Dictionnaire; and Schopenhauer, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Etkik, 2nd ed., p. 58. p. 22. 1. According to Aristotle there are four classes of opposition: contradiction, privation, contrariety, relation; the first opposition is that of being and not-being , irptiyrrj evavrlaiais e^t? Kai areprjais TeActa (absolute privation, i.e. non-being) (Met. 1 4. I055a33).

20

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

p. 22. 2. i.e. it is only through our desires that we regard two similar things as different. p. 22. 3. For the definition of will as desire of a good, ij jiovXrjois ope&s ayaBov, see Top. Z 8. I46 b 5. p. 22. 4. 'The desires which belong to the essence of the things willed'. This contradictory sentence, which implies that the thing willed is the wilier, refers to Aristotle's theory of God as the mover of the world through being desired and loved (/ayef (is epwpcvov), and is but a consequence of the profound contradiction in Aristotle's system in that God is both the supreme Agent and the supreme End. Not only does Aristotle ascribe the motion of the heavens to their love—TAmor che muove i] sole e 1'altre stelle'—but he attributes even to matter a desire for the divine, the good, and the desirable (Phys. A 9. I92"i 6). That to be is better than not to be,fieXnovTO etvaj. TOV fir) thai (De gen. et con. B 10. 336b28) is Aristotelian optimism. p. 23. 1. Averroes misses the point here completely. Certainly the donkey will take one or the other of the two bundles rather than die, but the question is what determines its taking the one rather than the other. Obviously it will take the one that comes first to hand; only, when there is a complete equivalence of all conditions, this is ' ipossible, and Spinoza says bluntly that the donkey will have to die. As a matter of fact, in such cases a complete equivalence of psychological and physical conditions is never reached; no living body even is strictly symmetrical, and if per impossibile such an equivalence could be momentarily reached, the world is changing, not static, and the donkey will move and not die. p. 23. 2. What Averroes wants to express here, I believe, is not the prindpium identitatis indiscemibilium, but simply the fact that two individual things, even when completely similar, are not identical. Averroes, I think, confuses similarity with identity. By 'the quality exclusive to it' he means, probably, its spatial or temporal localization. p. 23. 3. The impossible—like the necessary—is for Aristotle of two kinds, the logically impossible, the impossible through the necessity of thought, and the empirically impossible, not based on the necessity of thought (see Aristotle, Met. A 12. ioig b 2i). Since a logical impossibility is here in question, the impossibility is valid for all cases: divine, natural, and logical. p. 24. 1. The sun, by moving on the ecliptic, approaches to and recedes from the different points of the earth, and is in this way the cause of change, of coming to be and passing away in the sublunary world (De gen. et corr. B i o ) . The theory of the eccentric sphere, KVKXOS eitKcvrpos, and the apogee, anoyciov, belongs to Ptolemaic astronomy, see e.g. Aim. iii. 3 (according to Simplicius, In Arist. libr. de carlo, Heiberg, p. 507, the Pythagoreans were perhaps the first to introduce an eccentric sphere for the sun). The apogee is the point farthest from the earth on the orbit of a planet which has its

NOTES

21

centre outside the earth. All change in the sublunary world is conditioned by the positions and movements of the heavenly spheres, rats avca <j>opais {Meteor. A 2. 339*21). p. 24. 2. The problem why the heaven revolves in the one direction rather than the other is posed by Aristotle at De caelo B 5, and the problem why the planets have a movement different from that of the sphere of the fixed stars at De caelo B 3. According to Aristotle only two points on the sphere of heaven have a distinguishing mark (8uxf>opd) and they are the two poles through their immobility. p. 24. 3. In Arabian astronomy the ninth sphere serves to communicate the diurnal motion to all the other spheres. The fineness of the simple body increases with its distance from the centre: see De caelo B 4. 287b20 and Meteor. A 3. 340b6. p. 24.4. These two spheres, i.e. (a) the ninth sphere; (4) all the other spheres together. p. 24. 5. Ghazali means, evidently, that the ecliptic might have passed through the points which are in the actual world occupied by the poles; the actual poles would then have had to occupy other points; he cannot mean that the ecliptic might go through the poles, since the order of the world depends on the relation between the ecliptic and the poles. Ghazali's objection is not quite analogous to that ofthe philosophers, who argue against a creation which implies a pre-existence in time by saying that since all time-points are similar no definite time-point could cause a new volition in God. Ghazali's objection, that God could not choose individual points from among the homogeneous points of the world-globe to serve as poles, does not imply that God first created the globe and then chose the poles from amongst its homogeneous points; the implication is that any other two points which God might have chosen, while creating the world, would have been equally purposeful, so that the choice of the actual poles cannot depend on a choice made by God based on His conception of the best possible world. There is no answer to this objection, which is valid against a complete explanation of the world by final causes; one might as well ask why God created me and not someone similar in my stead (one cannot ask— says Plotinus, Em. iii. 3. 3, why plants have no sensations and are not animals, or animals are not men; this would be like asking why men are not gods); all explanation in terms of final causes presupposes a number of primitive facts and laws which cannot themselves be explained by final causes. Theophrastus in his Metaphysics (see especially ad fin.) had already remarked that certain things do not seem to exist for the sake of an end, and that we must limit teleological explanation. The consequence of Ghazali's theory that God's will is not determined by any motive at all, however, would seem to be that there is no wisdom whatever in the world and that

22

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

nothing has a purpose. But Stoics and Aristotelians, Muslim theologians and philosophers alike, believe in the principle of TO /JE'ATIO-TOV, J J L ^ N I, 'que tout est pour le mieux dans le meilleur des mondes possibles'. p . 25. 1. A salience and a differentiation of the angles l^j'jUjj U l j j r_)j=~ ovhtv yap airqpmqpAvov e^ct ovSe Trpoexov> vboirtp TO €v8vypap>pov (De caelo B 8. 290 b 6). p. 26. I. Possible, evSexoptvov, i.e. accidental, OV/XJSC^KO'S. T h e accidental, according to Aristotle, is w h a t m a y or may not happen, and is not based on any inner necessity: avp^firjKos 5e e<mv . . . o eVScxeTai vndpxeiv ortpovv ivl KOX TO) atlrip ml p.rj ihrdpxeiv (Top. A 5. I02 b 4). Averroes means that the position of the poles seems accidental, but is nevertheless based on necessity. I n w h a t follows Averroes reproduces the Aristotelian doctrine as found in the De caelo. p. 26. 2. TO 5r) KVKACV tr<jjp.a tf>cpop€vov d&vvarov «x e u / fidpos rj Kov^o-rqra (De caelo A 3. 26g b 3o). p. 26. 3. T h e properties of the four elements in the matter of weight and lightness are treated by Aristotle, De caelo A 4 ; fire is absolutely light, because it rises higher than anything else; earth is absolutely heavy, because it sinks below everything else. p . 2 6 . 4 . High, (JJ«i, OLVIU, i.e. away from the c e n t r e ; low, Karw, i.e. towards the centre (De caelo A 2. 2 6 8 b 2 i ) .

AiLJ,

p. 27. 1. T h e sphere has only one surface, e'mfWeia (De caelo B 4. 286 b 3o), and is therefore the primary body, just as the circle is the primary figure; the spherical shape of heaven is proved by Aristotle at De caelo B 4. p. 27. 2. Rectilinear bodies (TO. eiBvypapp.a) are not essentially since an addition to a straight line is always possible (286 b 2o).

finite,

p. 27. 3. T h e impossibility of there being any bodily mass or any empty space beyond heaven is demonstrated by Aristotle, De caelo A g. p. 27. 4. Since the heaven is alive (0' oipavos ip,<jivxos), it is clear—says Aristotle (De caelo B 2. 285*30)—that it must possess a right and a left; see also note 28. 4. p . 27. 5. T h a t all generation is effected through the movements of the heavenly bodies is shown by Aristotle, De caelo B 3. 2 8 6 b i - g . For the theory t h a t this continual production and corruption is based o n the movements of the heavenly bodies, see De gen. el corr. B 1 o ; cf. also note 2 4 . 1 . p. 27. 6. Cf. Philo, De provid. ii. 74 (Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 332.3): 'Numerus autem planetarum prodest universo'. ' M u n d u m esse opus providentiae' is especially emphasized by the Stoics. According to Aristotle dm Su'o ahlcu, TO 6' ot lv(Ka KOX TO ef avayx-qs (e.g. Phys. B 7. I 9 8 b I 7 ) . See note 3 1 . 1. p. 28. 1. T h a t each heavenly sphere has its own eternal principle of movement is stated in Aristotle, Met. A 8. I073 a 33; that the heavens a r e

NOTES

23

composed of simple bodies moving through their own nature and not by force, having their definite natural movement, a circular one, which has no contrary as rectilinear movement has, since it turns, i.e. it moves at the same time in two directions, is stated in Aristotle, De caelo A 2. T h e sentence about the magnet is not found in Aristotle, nor, as far as I know, in a n y Greek c o m m e n t a t o r ; it touches a very delicate point in the Aristotelian philosophy, for according to Aristotle the spheres move through an external principle, God, their final principle; they move in fact like iron which is attracted by the magnet (with the exception, as Averroes mentions, t h a t the magnet can attract from any direction). O n e could say that the heaven either moves in virtue of its own nature (Kara, -rqv eavrov <j>vmv) or through an external principle which attracts i t ; Aristotelianism, however, wishes to have it both ways. p. 28. 2. ThispassageisacommentaryonAristotle,/)e(ra«/oB2.285 a i2sqq. Aristotle has (285" 15) the sentence that certain living beings differ only in power or faculty, whereas other living beings differ also in shape (TO. /lev yap rfj 8vvdp.€t Sia^e/jet p.6vov, TO. 8e /cat Tof? oy^-qfiaat . . .). T h a t the world needs for its spherical movement neither hands, legs, nor feet is laid down in Timaeus 34. p. 28. 3. Aristotle proves {Met. A 8. io74 a 3i) that there can be but one heaven, since only through matter can there be plurality (man is one in species but numerically m a n y because of his matter, e.g. Socrates, Callias). But the heavenly bodies are in a sense immaterial (Met. H 4. I044 b 7) a n d yet they form a plurality and have a plurality of immaterial moving principles (the heavenly bodies and their movers are not always well distinguished). This plurality is explained by the Neoplatonic commentators as being not a plurality of individuals which would need matter, but as a plurality of universals. Every divine being, although it is unique (vdvra ftova&tKa TO. ovpdna £epa, S i m p l i c , Comment, de caelo 276. 32), forms a species in itself and is a universal (KOIJTOV) . These beings are called angels by the theologians, both Muslim and Christian, and T h o m a s Aquinas affirms that there are as m a n y species of angels as there are individual angels. p. 28. 4. According to Aristotle heaven possesses TO aVcu ml KO.TU>, TO Sector /cat apicrrepov, TO €p.TTpoadcv /cat 6-TTurdev (cf. De caelo B 2 and B 5). T h e diurnal revolution from East to West moves in the better direction («Vi TO TipLuiyrtpov) and is a forward movement. Aristotle regards the south pole as the more divine and the superior. If you imagine yourself standing with your feet to the north pole and your head to the south pole, you will see heaven turn in front of you in its diurnal movement from your left to your right (see De caelo B 2 ad fin., and B 5 ad fin.). p. 29. 1. K o r a n x. 65. p. 29. 2. K o r a n xxx. 29.

24

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

p. 29. 3. According to Aristotle the organ derives from its function (not the reverse), and he censures Anaxagoras for saying that man is the most intelligent being, because he has hands; whereas, according to Aristotle, he has hands because he is the most intelligent being. Nature, like an intelligent man, provides everything with the instrument it can use (Depart, an. A 10. 687*7 sqq.). On the movement of the crab (xapKiVos) see Aristotle, De an. incess. 14 712W3. p. 29. 4. According to Aristotle nature (or God) acts like the craftsman (see e.g. Phys. B 8 ad fin. and 9 ad fin.). That in every work of art, one must inquire for its intention (TC'AO?, AJU.) is a doctrine found, for example, in Aristotle, Phys. B 9, where as an example we find the saw, o irplwy, . UUJI (20o"io), as also below in the text, p. 54. See also note 31. 1. p. 29. 5. Koran xviii. 103-4. p. 30. 1. Koran vi. 75. p. 30. 2. Heavenly bodies are in trine or sextile or conjunction, when, as viewed from the earth, they are respectively distant from each other a third of the zodiac (i.e. 1200) or a sixth or in close proximity. p. 30. 3. Aristotle has an answer to this: the highest sphere has the greatest dignity and must therefore have the superior movement (rt/iuajrepov), which is the diurnal movement from East to West, whereas the other spheres move from West to East (see note 28. 4). p. 31. 1. The whole of this passage is rather confused, but it is a consequence of Aristotle's dualistic conception of nature, i.e. of a necessary and a teleological element in nature. Aristotle introduced the conception of immanent teleology; nature itself strives towards an end (but in different places—see De caelo A 4, De gen. et corr. B 10, Eth. Nic. K 11, Polit. H 4— Aristotle identifies nature and God, which of course destroys the opposition of immanence and transcendence; the Muslim commentators often put the emphasis on God rather than on nature). But just as a craftsman cannot make a saw without iron, so nature is bound by the necessities of its material; in order to create, nature needs materials with specific qualities and inherent necessities. This conception would imply that certain materials having their own laws are presupposed by nature, and so are not nature itself; nowhere, however, does Aristotle indicate what these materials are, and indeed this whole conception is in opposition to his fundamental thesis that matter in itself, i.e. without having as yet received any form—and form and end are fundamentally identical for Aristotle—is absolutely undetermined. It may be added that the basic relation of matter and form is extremely obscure; both primary matter and form are ungenerated, nonspatial, non-individual, but yet it is said that the form enters into matter and that out of the combination of these ungenerated, non-individual entities the transitory individual comes into being. Besides, man as a univer-

NOTES

25

sal form is e t e r n a l ; as an individual m a n h e is transitory. For Aristotle, only individuals exist; w h a t then can it m e a n to say that the universal form is ungenerated ? T h e Neoplatonic commentators explained this b y saying t h a t universals exist in the mind of God (a theory found already in the Middle Platonist Albinus), and the Muslim Aristotelians followed this tradition. I t is God who is the source from which everything emanates, it is H e who provides matter with its forms, (either directly, or indirectly as in Plotinus a n d Avicenna through the vovs, iyic, 6 xopr/yos T">v Ao'yoiv Enn. V . 9. 3 , jjva-ll 1—»L}> m e datorformarum) and this is Averroes's conception also. Nevertheless we frequently find in Averroes the more naturalistic conception of matter as having its own qualities, its own potencies and necessities; and such a passage we have here. I t m a y be—he says—that the existence of m a n cannot be explained by the potencies of his substratum alone, and that we must look for a final cause; but other actualities can be wholly explained by the potencies which are found in their substrata, and h e gives as an example the seeing of the eye—probably referring to Aristotle, Meteor. A 12. 390*10, where it is said that the eye is an eye in full actuality when it sees. See also notes 3 1 . 7 and 62. 6. p . 3 1 . 2. T h e word I translate by 'substratum' is ( J J U J I , which is a translation of TO ndaxov, rd irdBos. Like m a n y Aristotelian terms this word is ambiguous; it is often synonymous with imoKtliicvov, substratum, a n d as this is the sense it has a few lines farther on I take it so h e r e ; but vaBrj, epya, and Trpafeis- are sometimes synonymous and one might perhaps translate 'the effect of both is equivalent', which would seem m o r e logical. p . 3 1 . 3. For example, a period of 5,000 years ago is not equivalent or similar to that of 6,000 years a g o ; these two times are equivalent only in so far as there is nothing in them which would determine God to choose the one rather than the other as the m o m e n t of creation. p . 3 1 . 4 . Since a desirable result cannot be accomplished through any and every material, but needs materials that have the required nature. See note 3 1 . 1. p. 3 1 . 5 . However, possibility implies always two opposites. Averroes means the time of its production is different from the time of its corruption. For the underlying problem see below note 52. 6. p . 3 1 . 6 . T i m e , says Aristotle (Phys. A 14. 222 b 3o), is the condition for every change and for everything that moves: (fravepov o n naoa perajSoAr) Kal a7roi> TO Kivov/xevov ev xpdvai. p. 3 1 . 7. T h e proximate matter of things which have the principle of becoming in themselves—a grain, for example—develops by itself when there is no exterior obstacle; whereas out of wood a carpenter can m a k e either a chair or a t a b l e ; see Met. 0 7. 1049*13.

26

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

p . 32. I. This is not very clear. T h e source of the proof for God, based on contingency, i.e. t h a t the possible must be actualized by a necessary existent, is certainly in Aristotle; it is only the term 'determining principle', 7E» r$opa aAAou yevcais.

NOTES

27

p. 3 3 . 3 . S e e p . 11. p . 33. 4. O f a circular nature (in Greek, avaKa^Trreiv). This is clearer in the case in which water comes into existence out of air, a n d the process is reversible, than it is in the example of a m a n coming into existence from a m a n . However, the meaning is t h a t there is no ascending series, either infinite or finite, to a first cause. A n d here is the difficulty of the whole conception, for if m a n can come into existence out of m a n eternally, in a n eternal causal series, where is the need to posit a first cause at all ? A n d if it is claimed that God is the condicio sine qua non of the existence a n d indeed of the possibility of this process, the relation between two eternally constant terms is not a causal one, since causation presupposes change. P- 33- 5- phys- r 5. 204 b 22. p . 34. 1. This is a Neoplatonic rather than an Aristotelian conception; it is not the individual m a n , b u t m a n generically that proceeds from God, i.e. m a n generically emanates from the idea of m a n in God. Nothing, however, is more obscure than t h e Neoplatonic conception of emanation, which is not a flowing from a source, not a causal relation in t i m e : the idea of m a n in God, and m a n generically, are simultaneous eternally; a n d even this, perhaps, is not true, since t h e idea in God exists in timeless eternity (see text below). p. 34. 2. This means probably that if there were no eternal agent there could not be an infinite series. p . 34. 3. IXTJ KCLT' ovolav, Aristotle, Mel. A 7. io72 b 7. p . 34. 4. As concerns its p a r t s : T h e sphere of heaven, in its uniform and circular movement, always follows the same course and therefore does not change as a whole; it is simply that its parts change their place. However, the term c.y-, 'part' (like the original Greek term ^e'por—and /leptKos—in late Greek use) is ambiguous and can mean also 'particular', and on the ambiguity of this term the plausibility of the argument depends in p a r t : the movement of the heavenly sphere, since it does not change as a whole or generically is the cause of the eternal and generical, but in so far as it changes in its parts or particulars it is the cause of the particular and temporal (cf. note 35. 1). (The word AS~, 'whole', is also ambiguous, and can m e a n 'universal'.) p . 34. 5. T h r o u g h the inclination of the ecliptic the sun is the cause of all generation and corruption; see Aristotle, De gen. el con. B 10. p . 34. 6. T h e four kinds of c h a n g e : in substance, quality, quantity, locality. See note 2. 4. p. 34. 7. $o/>d yap 17 npwrq TU>V /j,CTaf!o\u>v, Aristotle, Met. A 7. I072 b 8. T h e whole passage is a comment, with a slight Neoplatonic bias, on Aristotle, Met. A 7. i o 7 2 b 4 - i o .

28

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

p. 34. 8. Essentially and accidentally. As Averroes explains in the following passage, moving essentially means moving by a mover existing simultaneously with the thing moved, moving accidentally means moving by a mover preceding the thing moved; this distinction is not found in Aristotle and as a matter of fact annuls the proof, for it cannot be seen why an infinite series of accidentally moving movers should not suffice. p. 34* 9* Phys- ® 5* 2 5°" a i 7 '• aSwaTOV yap tts atretpov Uvat TO KWOVV KCU Kwovpxvov inr* aAAou avro' ru>v yap anetpcov O$K (OTIV ov&ev yrpanov.

p. 34. 10. Preservation Jai», ouyrqpla. For God as preserver, ounr/jp, of the world, see Ps.-Arist. De mundo 6. 397b2o. p. 34. n . 'Heaven and earth and all that is between them' is a Koranic expression, Sur. xx. 5. p. 35. 1. See note 34. 4 ; ^y*., itcpims, means 'particular' or 'of the parts'; AS', OAIKO'S, 'universal' or 'of the whole'. p. 35. 2. i.e. God. This is not very well expressed; no alternative should have been put forward. It is the movement of heaven, in which eternity and temporality are combined, which forms the link [ovv&eauos, J l ^ i j I) between the eternal and the temporal. p. 35. 3. Surely this strange theory, which seems both to deny and to imply a creation of the world in time, was not propounded by any philosopher. Ghazali seems to advance it only for the pleasure of refuting it. p. 35.4. i.e. how can new things arise in the world ? p. 36. 1. i.e. qua temporal. p. 36. 2. i.e. Socrates as an individual depends on the transience in the movement of heaven; Socrates as a universal, as a human being, depends on the eternity of the First Mover (or-—Averroes' position here shifts—on what is eternal in the movement of heaven). This conception is not Aristotelian. p. 36. 3. Ghazali's argument is perfectly sound. The unchanging infinite eternal and the transient finite individual are incommensurable. No change can depend on the unchangeable, and to posit as a link an entity participating in both natures does not solve the difficulty but doubles it, for the relation of the primary terms to the intermediate term remains as obscure as the relation between the primary terms. The idea of the link, of mediation, goes back to Plato's conception, in 77m. 35, of the World-Soul which possesses the opposite qualities of the TOUTOV and the Barepov, of uniformity and change; it became in later Greek philosophy one of the chief devices to safeguard God's transcendence. And all transition is gradual: natura non facit solium (Arist. Hist. an. 0 1. 588b4), OjUu A-J -Ull ,JLV j (£y U, 'you do not find any discontinuity in God's creation', as the Arabs have it. Cf. also Leibniz's principium continui.

NOTES

29

p . 37. I. T h e following argument, the substance of which is found in Avicenna (e.g. Salvation,p.4ig), is based on Aristotle, Phys. & 1. 251 b i o (cf. Met. A 6. i o 7 i b 8 ) : H o w could there b e any 'before' (nporepov) or 'after' (varepov) if there were no time, or how could time itself exist if there were no motion ? Proclus in his fifth argument gives a variation not based on the term 'before' but on the term 'once' (77-oTe). H e says in brief: W h e n once there was no time, there was time, for 'once' implies time (TO yap TTOTC XpoviKov); and since time is the measure of the movement of heaven, heaven is coeternal with time. T h e same argument is found in Ps.-Philo, De incorr. rrmndi 53, p . 89, 8 Cohn-Reiter (notwithstanding Cumont's arguments I still regard this work as spurious, as does, for instance, von A r n i m ) . See also Sextus Empiricus, Adv. phys. ii. 189. p . 37. 2. Definitions of 'prior' (and 'posterior') are given by Aristotle, e.g. Cat. 12 and Met. A 11. 'Essential' and 'natural priority' are Aristotelian t e r m s : irporepov /car* ovoiav (Phys. © 6. 260^19) a n d irporepov ^uo-et (9. 265*22). T h e example of one and two is given in Cat. 12 and found also in Avicenna, Ioc. cit. p. 37. 3. Aristotle gives it as an example of the simultaneity of cause and effect, where cause and effect are not reversible, that the intervention of the earth causes the eclipse of the moon (Anal. Post. B 16). This presupposes, of course, that light does not travel. p . 37. 4. Since the effect always follows the cause. p . 37. 5. T h e builder, however, is also prior to the wall in the order of causation. p . 38. 1. J u s t as Averroes' objection to the first argument was inspired by J o h n Philoponus, so in this objection he is influenced by Philoponus' objection to Proclus' fifth argument. Philoponus says t h a t when, for example, it is said that God was before men knew God, 'was' cannot express time (Jjv is not a xpovtKov Trpoo-p^a), since God is not in time, but in the alwv, timeless eternity. Averroes also denies priority to God in the sense of causation. This is a necessary consequence of the denial of the simultaneity of God and of the w o r l d : since causation is in time, a time-relation is the necessary condition of any causal relation (neither Plato nor Aristotle, who also regard God as existing in timeless eternity, has seen this consequence). Philoponus does not treat of that problem in this argument, but Plotinus regards God as a causa sui generis (whatever this means) and declares, Enn. vi. 8. 8, that in one way God is a n cipxy, in another way n o t ; a n d this is also Averroes's theory here. But up to now the whole argument against the theologians has been built upon the idea t h a t God is a cause and the world His effect, and Averroes's way of hunting with the hounds and running with the hare lands him, as we shall see, in the most flagrant contradiction.

30

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

p . 38. 2. Ghazali's originality lies in the example. In such sentences, says Philoponus (op. cit., p . 116, 1. 10), 'existed' or 'was' (VJv) expresses a mere existence, ^iAf) \mapt;is (cf. Plato, Tim. 38 a ) . Philoponus also regards the <j>avTaaia, which can represent the timeless only in time, as the cause of the error. p . 39. 1. Here is the flagrant contradiction I mentioned, for here the relation between God and the world is, notwithstanding the denial immediately preceding, regarded as a causal relation in which the cause does not precede the effect, but is eternally simultaneous with it. p . 39. 2. See Cat. 11. 14*15: Sijhov oe ori KOA TTCOI rairrov 7] ciSet yj yivti ITC(J>VKC yiveotiai T<X evamla. p . 39. 3. T h e difficulty exists only when the effect is axiomatically regarded as following the cause immediately in t i m e ; if the effect can be delayed, it must be in t i m e ; and if it is in time, the cause must be in time. p. 39. 4. T h i s proof is found in Aristotle, Phys. 8 1. 251*17-20. p . 39. 5. T h a t noth'ng can be in movement or at rest at an instant (TO vCv, O J I) is proved by Aristotle, Phys. Z 3 . 234"24- b 9. According to Plato, Partn. 156 d, e, the transition from rest to movement takes place instantaneously (TO i£al<j>vT)s) and for the Megarians movement takes place at an instant, discontinuously by j u m p s (see Arist. Phys. Z 1. 232*&-io; ib. 9. 24o b 30-24i"6; a n d Sext. E m p . Adv. phys. ii. 85). T h e discontinuous conception of movement is found also in Stoicism (e^ei TO TTOXIM KO.1 nd\iv Simpl. In Arist. Cat., see Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 161. 21). I n Islam the idea of a j u m p ( i j i k l l ) in movement is connected with the n a m e of an-Nazzam, b u t as a m a t t e r of fact the conception of the discontinuity of reality, combined with the Megarian and Stoic denial of potentiality, is one of the basic ideas of Muslim theology. p. 39. 6. T h a t change (becoming or motion) is the actualization of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially (17 TOU Svvdfiei OVTOS cvrtXeX«a, fj Toioihov, Kinjoir « m v ) , is proved by Aristotle, Phys. 7 1 1. 200 b 25~ 201 "29. p . 40. I. navra ra cV xpwf A 12. 221*28.

oVra TrfpiixeaQai \mo xpovov, Aristotle, Phys.

p . 40. 2. I take this sentence to m e a n : God is not prior to Jesus in time, provided that you do not regard God as creating the world (and Jesus) in time and as preceding it. Jesus is only a posterior entity in so far as H e is a n effect—what Averroes calls here an accidental posteriority—of a n infinite series of causes and effects. T h e duration of the world as a whole is not preceded by anything, since time is infinite; it is only particular parts of this duration that are preceded and followed by time.

NOTES

3»

p . 40. 3. This question is discussed by Philoponus, p . 116, 1. 12, who answers it in the same way as Averroes does: I t is permissible to say of the Timeless, H e was when there was no time, and H e will be when there will be no time, fy ore OVK TJC XP°V°S Ka*L ^ffTat °T* °VK carat. Philoponus adds t h a t we must not m i n d the weakness of o u r expressions, b u t give our attention to their meaning. p . 4 1 . 1. ' G o d was indulgent a n d compassionate.' O n e might translate equally: 'God is indulgent'. T h e so-called perfect in Arabic can indicate a state either in the past or in the present. T h e example, however, given by Philoponus, who himself quotes Plato, Tim. 29 e, is: aya8os fy, aya6u> Si ov8el$ nept ovScvos ovhtTrort eyyiyverai $>86vos, God was good and the good can never have the slightest envy of anything (therefore God created the world). p . 4 1 . 2 . In the following interesting, but slightly confused, passage Ghazali is no longer dependent o n Philoponus. H e begins by saying that future and past are relative to us (he ought to have said to the 'now' in which we are at present). T h e subjectivity of time, as I have remarked already (see note 13.1.), is often asserted in Hellenistic philosophy. I n de Ei apud Delphos, Plutarch, in a passage quoted by Eusebius Praepar. Evang. xi. 11.529a in which he expounds a Heraclitean view of nature which comes very near to the conceptions of the Muslim theologians, says: 'the terms of time, ' 'afterwards", "before", "will b e " , " h a s been", are already by themselves a confession (e£ofjLoX6yi]m?) of the unreality of time'. Proclus in a passage of his commentary on Plato Tim. (Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 166. 4) says that the Stoics and m a n y Peripatetics assert that time is /car' inlmiav ifiiX-qv, a mere product of thought. (Stobaeus, Eclog. Phys. 252, mentions by n a m e the Peripatetics Antiphanes and Critolaus, as saying that time is a iwj/ia f) plrpov, ov'x v-noaraais, a concept or measure, not an existent.) Ghazali, however, does not develop this idea, but goes on arguing quite rightly that, if an extreme limit in time-extension is illusory, an extreme limit in spatial extension is illusory also. But, whereas we moderns regard such a limit as logically impossible, i.e. contradictory, Ghazali regards it as well founded and its denial an illusion of the imagination; for although denying the eternity of movement he seems to accept the Aristotelian conception of time and space as dependent on motion and body. p. 4 1 . 3 . This argument would have been more convincing if Ghazali could have shown that the past m a y also become the future. p . 4 1 . 4. All this, i.e. the belief in the infinity of time. p . 42. 1. T h i s definition agrees with the conception of Sia<mj^.a, 'extension' or 'interval', as quoted by Simplicius (Comm. in Arist. phys. 22) : TO StdcrrTjfjLa TO fxera^ij raiv toxd-Twv rov Trepiexovros TOV TOTTOV. however, a conception of space which Aristotle himself rejects (Phys.

Juo, 571. This is, A 4.

33

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

2 I I b 7 ) , but which seems to have been adopted later by the Stoics, according to Simplicius (loc. cit.) a n d Themistius (Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 165. n ) . p . 4 2 . 2. Sidanjiia, JUJ , 'extension', can m e a n also 'dimension', for which Aristotle has also the term Siaoratu?; as space has three dimensions—p-ffKos, wAaror, fidBos (Phys. A 1. 209/4)—high a n d ' o w a r e o n t y o n e ° f t n e three relations into which extension can be divided. p . 42. 3. By counting; the relation of the soul to time is treated by Aristotle, Phys. A 14. 223*16-29. p . 4 2 . 4 . T h e necessary is eternal and u n m o v a b l e ; nothing compulsory or against its nature attaches to it (Arist. Met. A 5 ad fin.). p . 4 3 . I. <S yap 77 KivrjoLs vndpyei, TOVTOV f} aKtvqala rjpepta, Aristotle, Phys. r 2. 202*4. p . 4 3 . 2. Absolute becoming cannot b e a movement, for, if it were, the non-existent in its becoming would have to move: Aristotle, Phys. E 1. 225*25. Absolute becoming would imply that the non-existent existed already, ibid. 28. p . 4 3 . 3. T h e Arabic text has only one word, »JLc, orepriois; both the Arabic word and the Greek can mean, according to the context, either absolute non-existence, TO p.r) 5v, or privation; here, of course, relative non-existence, privation, is m e a n t ; becoming develops from contrary t o contrary, the privation of health, for example, is sickness, of w a r m t h , coldness, the sick m a n becomes healthy, the w a r m thing cold, b u t coldness a n d health, being forms, do not become or perish; they are eternal (see e.g. Phys. B 5. 205*6 a n d Met. B 4. 9 9 9 b s ) . p . 4 3 . 4. A vacuum, emptiness, which according to Aristotle does not exist, would have the potentiality of extension, because a body could occupy i t : Kevov S* eival (paatv cV (5 prj ivvTrdp^ei oa>p.a, Svvarov 8* tort yeveoQai, De caelo A*g. 279*13 (this is a definition accepted later by the Stoics, see Sext. E m p . Hyp. Pyrrh. iii. 124). I n using the expression 'for instance' Averroes thinks probably of a matter, uAi;, without extension which might be erroneously assumed to exist. p . 4 3 . 5. T h e paralogism Ghazali commits, according to Averroes, is t h a t irapa. TT)V eWcitjiiv TOV Xoyov, i.e. based on a n insufficiency in the definition (De soph, elench. 5. 167*22). p . 4 3 . 6. Since time does not abide, says Aristotle, it cannot have position (8c<ns), and one should rather say of it that it has order (rd£is), through its relations of prior and posterior (Cat. 6. 5*27-30). p. 44. I. ro vvv reXevrrj /cat dpx*) XP°VOVt • • • T°^ f**v wprjKOVros reAeurr/, °-Pxh ^ T°v peXXovros, Phys. A 13. 222*33—b6. p. 44. 2. Since it is impossible that time could exist or be conceived without the present, a n d since the.present is a kind of middle combining

NOTES

33

beginning a n d end (apxffv KO.1 TcXcvrrfv e-^ov dp.a) . . ., time must b e eternal and stretch away from it in two directions, Phys. 0 i. 2 5 i b i o , - 2 6 . p. 44. 3. rj an.yp.rf irepas ypafj.fj.ijs e.g. Top. Z 4 . 141 b20—21. p. 44. 4. r) artypr) apx?] ypafJ.fJ.rjs e.g. Top. A 18. 108^30. p. 44. 5. ' T h a t its becoming is a vanishing'—this is one of the paradoxes of continuity. T h e past 'now' must have vanished before the present 'now', b u t it could not have vanished when it was itself the 'now', because then it would not have been, nor could it have vanished in another 'now' t h a n itself (see Arist. Phys. A 9. 218*15-18). p. 44. 6. I t is clear, says Aristotle, that the 'now' is not a part of time a n y more than points are part of a line, Phys. A 11. 220" 18. p. 44. 7. Spatial quantity has position (6cms); n u m b e r a n d time have order, rd^is, Cat. 6. 5M5 (see note 4 3 . 6). p. 44. 8. i.e. of being a present and preceded by a past, for this is its definition. p. 45. 1. So far as the infinite void is infinite, says Aristotle, it could not have a high (dW>) or low (Kara)), a n d so far as it is emptiness, no high nor low could be distinguished in it, any more than any distinctions can be m a d e in the nothing; and emptiness is nothing positive, but a mere areprjais, Phys. A 8. 215*8. p. 45. 2. For how can there be any natural movement in the undifferentiated infinite v a c u u m ? loc. cit. "6. p. 45. 3. See note 27. 2. p. 45. 4. O n the whole Aristotle regards the accident as a universal (only in Cat. 2 does he d r a w an explicit distinction between the universal and the individual accident), in agreement with our common language, for when we say, 'This table is yellow', 'yellow' is a universal, and when we speak of'this yellow' we mean this shade of yellow, a universal and not a n individual yellow. T h e commentators, however, often regard the yellow of the table and the yellow of the chair as individually different, and as individualized, and localized through their substratum, and this is w h a t Averroes means here. H e makes the true observation that the point is localized in the individual line and can be pointed at, it is a this, a TO'SC n, it is here or t h e r e ; but the 'now' is everywhere, for it is everywhere now, or, as Aristotle expresses it, Phys. A 12. 2 2 0 b 5 : 'everywhere the identical time is simultaneous'. p. 45. 5. T i m e is not movement, says Aristotle, but that by which movement can be numerically expressed, OVK apa KIVIJCTI? 6 xpo"os cM' fj apSpov e?x« 17 KivTnms, Phys. A 11. 2 i g b 2 . p. 4 5 . 6. T h e relation between movement, the 'now', time, and n u m b e r in Aristotle's physics seems very obscure, o xpovos 4arl TO apt.8fiovfj,evoi> /cat OVJC

34

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

4> dpifl/ioO/iev, time is the thing numbered and not the numbers by which we count (2igb7) and it is the 'now' which counts according to Phys. 220*22. Plotinus in his attack on Aristotle's definition of time, Enn. iii. 7. 8, says that there is no explanation given whether the time is the measure or the thing measured. Still, what Averroes says expresses at least one of the things Aristotle intended. The number 'ten' can be attributed to ten horses or any other group of ten, says Aristotle, 220*23; and a hundred men and a hundred horses have the same number, but the horses numbered are different from the men numbered, 220 b io. p. 45. 7. Aristotle does not speak of a cave in connexion w>th time (he has the simile of the cave, inspired by Plato, in De pfdiosophia fr. 12 Rose—Cic. Denat. deor. 2. 37. 95), but he says, Phys. A 11. 219*4, that even in the dark, and even if we had no perceptions through the body, we should know time through a movement in the soul. p. 45. 8. That movements exist in time is clear, but how the things numbered can exist in number cannot be understood; it is rather number which exists in the things numbered. This shows the fallaciousness of the analogy. p. 46. I. o xp°v°s apidfios c'trn Kivrjottos Kara TO Tiportpov KOX vorepov, e.g. Phys. A 11. 2ig b i-2. p. 46. 2. For it would be the individual accident of that individual movement. p. 46. 3. i.e. the comparison of the temporal with the spatial limit. p. 47. 1. The answer Ghazali here gives in the name of the philosophers is not one that can have been given by a philosopher of the school of Aristotle, for whom 'above' and 'below' not only have a real physical significance, but who distinguishes explicitly between an objective sense, by nature, $voti, and a relative sense of the terms up, down, right, and left according to the position we take up (Kara rqv Qiaw OTTWS av crrpa(f>wp.€v, Phys. A 1. 2o8 b i6). As a matter of fact the argument is based on a passage in Tim. 62 d-63 a, in which Plato says, to put it briefly, that, since the universe is in the form of a sphere and its circumference is everywhere at the same distance from the centre, the earth, which cannot be called anything else but centre, it would be irrational td call any part above or below. A man walking round the earth in a circle would often stand at the antipodes (aiTmovs) of his former position and would then call the same direction above which formerly he had called below. This passage is summarized by Aristotle, De caelo A 1. 308*18, in one sentence: some say that there is no above and below in the world, because all directions are equivalent and anyone walking round from anywhere will come to stand at his antipode. Aristotle then refutes this theory by saying that 'above' has a real physical sense and means 'nearest to the extreme, TO taxarov, the circumference', and

NOTES

35

'below', 'nearest to the centre, the earth'. Ghazali seems on the whole to agree with the a r g u m e n t given in the n a m e of the philosophers. H e does not seem to be aware that it is in contradiction with two of the principles enunciated by himself: that time is relative to us (see p . 41), for time is regarded here as objective a n d irreversible; and t h a t spatial extension is apprehended as divided through the relation of high a n d low (see p . 42). p . 47. 2. For the answer is irrelevant, since the problem is: W h y is there a final term to the objective spatial dimension ? p . 47. 3. <j>oaa. p . 47. 4. See p . 27. p . 47. 5. Ghazali will not really object that 'above' a n d 'below' form an infinite series because of experience based on imagination, since according to him 'above' and 'below' have no definite sense; he will now use the terms 'outside' a n d 'inside', which for Averroes, however, have the same meaning as 'above' a n d 'below'. p . 47. 6. Aristotle does not distinguish space from place, i.e. the space actually occupied by a body. T h e consequence of this is his negation of the void. T h e space of the world is contained as in a vessel by its extreme surface. A body is in a place when it is surrounded by another body outside i t ; b u t if not, not (Arist. Phys. A 5. 212*31). p . 4 8 . 1. T o be consistent Ghazali ought to have said 'cannot b e imagined'. p . 48. 2. Imperceptible, ^ ^ J tc., avalo9r)Tov. Those w h o believe in the void, says Aristotle, believe it to be a n extension not occupied by a n y perceptible body (Phys. A 6. 2 I 3 ' 2 7 ) ; a n d he says, Phys. r^. ad init., t h a t it is impossible t h a t there should exist a n infinite void separated from the perceptible. p . 48 . 3 . Amongst the five reasons which Aristotle, Phys. r 4. 2 0 3 b i 5 , gives for the belief in something infinite, he reckons the imagination as the most important. T h r o u g h imagination t h a t which is outside heaven, rd «?£afikv 8fi rffv Kivqcm elvai €VTeX^xctav

T

°v KIVTJTOV Jj KIVTJTOV Phys. S I. 251*9), it presupposes the

existence of a mobile. And since movement is measured by time, time also must be eternal. p. 50. 3. This argument is found, for example, in Avicenna's Salvation, p. 189 and p. 421. p. 50. 4. i.e. every potentiality will realize its actuality and every actuality is the consequence of its own potentiality; e.g. if God had created the world a thousand years ago, this would have been the actualization ofthe potentiality of creating the world a thousand years ago, and the world could not have been created eleven hundred years ago, because this was never realized and therefore was not possible. Averroes refers here to one of the problems most discussed in Islam, whether there can be possibles that are never realized. According to Aristotle, Met. & 4 ad init., you cannot say that a certain thing may possibly be but will never be, for this would destroy the definition of the impossible, since 'impossible' means what will never be (it is this conception of the possible which is meant by Aristotle when he declares that there cannot be an infinite possible time, since a possible cannot be infinitely unrealized; see note 17. 1 and below). Averroes himself often accepts this definition, but it is contrary to the basic idea of Aristotelian philosophy, the reality of a potentiality which may or may not happen; and by declaring that the possible must happen he reduces it to necessity. This conception of the possible—which is also maintained by Simplicius, In Phys. 1225. 32 Swarw dSvvarov oi>x e-rrercu—forms the basis of the argument given by the Megarian Diodorus Cronus, see my Ep. d. Met. d. Av., p. 209. p. 50. 5. i.e. since every possible movement in the world is in time, it may well be that any 'possible' is connected with time (the question, however, is: Are there any 'possibles' outside the world?). p. 51. 1. There is certainly no difference. p. 51. 2. The reasoning is: it is impossible to imagine the world smaller or bigger than it actually is (this is a petitio principii, for it needs to be proved that actually it is not infinite), but before the world existed and its possibility was actualized, the world might possibly have any size, since it was then not yet necessary that the world should have its actual size. This implies that the future is not yet determined, but that when a thing has once occurred it must necessarily be what it is. This conception is found in Aristotle, De

NOTES

37

interpr. 9. 19*23: that a thing is in the time in which it is, is indeed necessary (TO p.kv oSv etvat. TO OV orav jj. . . avaytaj), but it is not necessary that a naval battle will take place tomorrow, it is only necessary that either it will take place or not. In reference to the future there are therefore three natures: the possible, the impossible, and the necessary. p. 52. 1. See note 27. 3. p. 52. 2. i.e. it is based on reason, not on mere imagination. p. 52. 3. That the generation of the world would imply a avaraais, some formation out of which the change could take place, is laid down by Aristotle, Decaelo A 10. 280*23, and he proves, ibid. J"2. 30ib3O-3O2*9, the impossibility of a generation ex nihilo, since it demands an empty space to hold previously non-existent bodies. Compare the Stoic argument (Ps.Philo, De incorrupt, mundi 102, Stoic. Vet. FT. ii. 188. 24) that there has to be empty space in which the world can dissolve itself at its conflagration. p. 52. 4. This sentence expresses of course a certain contempt for the theologians. Maimonides in his Guide of the Perplexed, i, ch. 73, where he gives a summary of the system of the Muslim theologians, says only of the older Mutakallimun that they believed in the theory of the Void. Empty space is refuted by Ibn Hazm, op. cit. v. 70, 71 and i. 25 sqq. p. 52. 5. By the Ash'antes. Ghazali here gives in Ash'arite terminology a theory of the Ash'arites which he criticizes, although he accepts it ultimately. He pretends, however, that it is given by the philosophers, and indeed it may have been given by a philosopher for the reason stated in note 50. 4 (cf. also next note), but there is here some confusion in Ghazali's mind. p. 52. 6. i.e. the world, having the size it has, could not have been created otherwise, for the possible is what will be some day realized; a difference in size was never realized, and it was therefore not possible and could not have been realized, i.e. it is impossible that reality should have been different from what it actually is (cf. Spinoza, Eth. i, prop, xxxiii: 'res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productae sunt'). The theory of the Ash'arites comes to the same as Aristotle's doctrine that the possible must always be realized, but neither Aristotle nor Averroes is aware of the implication of this doctrine, i.e. that it destroys their own theory of objective possibility—the possibility of opposite acts. The Ash'arites in their doctrine of the possible are dependent on the Megarian and Stoic conception of the possible, just as in their whole conception of fate and will they depend on the Stoics. The Ash'arite doctrine that there is no possible before the real, actual fact, that the possible is coexistent and coextensive with the actual, is the Megarian theory 'that a thing can act only when it is acting, and when it is not acting cannot act', criticized by Aristotle at Met.

38

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

0 3. i046b2g. The word j j J i i . , which I translate by 'can be done', corresponds in its original meaning to the Stoical term ei/iap/ieW, that which is decreed; but since for the Ash'arites what is decreed is the real, and the real is the possible, and the possible is what can be done, the term takes the meaning which it has here, that of anything that can be done by a will, be it the eternal Will or the will of a transitory being (the same development had taken place in Stoic doctrine, where the eliiappAnq became identified with the tirtScKTiKov TOO yevtoBcu, i.e. fate is what is capable of becoming, see Plutarch, De stoic, rep. 46 and note 53. 1). We find in Shahrastani, Religious and Philosophical Sects, p. 69, 1, the following definition _ys ,_ - ^5CJI ijiU-l i j j d l o ^ " Jv>U-lj AJJU-I 'ijjjih jjJJUJI which I would translate: 'acts in our power (,_^^5C«JI corresponds to the Stoic term TO £' •q/iiv) are those which have been decreed to be done, and therefore can be done, by the power of a transitory being, and can be realized by it'. This is the Stoic conception of the will of the creature as an instrument through which the predestined will of God can be realized. It seems to me embodied in such definitions as in Alexander ofAphrodisias, Defato 13, Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 285. 33 ray Sta rutv £u>uiv inro TT}S elfzapfi^vr^s yivofj.4yq.s eirl rots £GJOIS eivai: w h a t is

in the power of animals is what is realized by fate through them as its instrument; or in its Latin form in Chalcidius, Commentary on the Timaeus, Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 272. 4: 'quae in nostra potestate posita, omnia certe ex initio disposita atque decreta'. The Ash'arite denial of potentiality, i.e. the denial of the possible in rerum natura, taken from the Megarians, is founded on the law of thought, later formulated and violated by Aristotle—see note 12. 3—that a thing either is or is not, tertium non datur, whereas the potential, as what may be, is not yet, still seems to have some reality. From this law of thought, too, the Megarians and the Ash'arites, as before them the Eleatics, had deduced that there can be no becoming (since what becomes neither is nor is not) nor transition in time, nor movement in space, for what passes in time is not in time, since it passes, and what moves would be nowhere, since it moves. Therefore the Megarians and the Muslim theologians conclude that what we call movement is the being (or illogically Kivrmara, timeless jumps— illogically, for there is no identity in the atoms) of a material atom (d/iepc'y) at the next time-atom in the next space-atom (that this is the theory of the Megarians can be seen from Arist., Phys. Z 10. 240 b 3l, and Sext. Emp. Adv. phys. ii. 85). This implies the atomic structure of nature (see Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 32; for the atomic view in Islam see, e.g., the extensive discussion in Ibn Hazm, op. cit. v. 92). This atomic structure of nature is not admitted by the Stoics, who believe in the infinite divisibility of matter, time, and space (the Mu'tazilite an-Nazzam, who is the Islamic thinker most influenced by Stoicism, also accepts this infinite divisibility); but from them the Muslim theologians take the idea of a passive material universe and the one active

NOTES

.•',

39

principle, God. In Islam, however, the immanent Stoic God, the agent of a unified universe, becomes the transcendent Allah, who discontinuously creates and re-creates His atomic world. The problem of the existence of potentiality, i.e. objective possibility— capacities, faculties, tendencies, dispositions, powers, all the entities that imply the term 'can' (and every individual is a centre ofsuch possibilities)— in which we all seem to believe when we are not philosophizing, was much discussed in later Greek and Roman philosophy (see e.g. Ps.-Plutarch De fato, Cicero De fato, and especially Alexander of Aphrodisias Defato, an important book which has never been properly translated) and even became a subject of polite banter (see Cicero, Adfamiliares ix. 4, Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 93). The problem is very difficult, and I do not see how the EleaticMegarian argument can be refuted. Aristotle argues against the Megarians (Met. 0 3) that potentiality must necessarily precede actuality; before a man builds, he says—and it seems almost a truism, for it seems evident that it is through the knowledge which he has acquired and which lies dormant in his soul that the builder will practise his art—he must possess the art ofbuilding, i.e. he must be a potential builder; before a man actually sees or walks he must have the capacity to see or walk. However, there is here a difficulty—which the Megarian Diodorus Cronus saw in his Kvpievwv Ao'yor, his 'master-proof (for the problem compare Cicero, Defato 7.13 where the question is discussed whether a signet-ring, gemma, which never will be broken can be regarded as breakable): it is not possible for a man to see, i.e. he cannot see, before all the conditions of his seeing are fulfilled, e.g. when it is light and his eyes are uncovered; it is impossible that he should walk if he does not will to walk. But if all the conditions of his seeing and walking are fulfilled, so that he can see and walk, he will see and walk actually and his seeing and walking will be necessary, not possible. Indeed, we seem to hold the contrary propositions that we act because we have the power to act (because we can act), and that we act because we have to act. The difficulty is felt by Aristotle, where he says (Met. @ 7.1049*8) that a house is potentially a house when there are no obstacles and when nothing has to be added or subtracted or altered. But in such a case the potential house is already the actual house, and there is no process, no becoming. The idea of potentiality (and potentiality in Aristotle does not only mean 'capacity', 'power', i.e. 'can do', but also 'can be', 'can exist', 'can undergo') seems to express our belief in the fundamental identity of things, our belief that ex nihilo nihil, que rien ne se cre'e,rienne seperd, that all change, all becoming is but a transformation of what existed previously under another form, is but a coming-to-be out of something, a development, an evolution (i.e. an unrolling; cf. Cicero, De div. i. 56. 127: the series of events in time is like the uncoiling of a rope, quasi rudentis explicatio), that tomorrow is

40

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

contained in today, that ciascuna cosa, qualella e, diventa (Dante, Parad. xx. 78). But the idea of potentiality leaves two things unexplained: (1) the status of potentiality, this mysterious state of dormancy between being and nonbeing ; (2) the very process of actualization, of development, of evolution, for in the actualizing process either something is added to- the potentiality and then we have a becoming out of nothing, or nothing is added and then there is no change. Aristotle tries to have it both ways. In the example of the house given above the potential house is already the actual house, there is no process, no becoming; in the example of wine turning sour (cf. note 61. 6), the actual sourness is the actualization of a potential sourness, but how this actualization takes place cannot be understood, as Aristotle himself admits, and the actual sourness, since it was not there before, arises out of nothing. p. 52. 7. They have compromised themselves by accusing their opponents of charging God with impotence, since they themselves hold that it is impossible that the world should be bigger or smaller than it actually is. p. 53. 1. The implication of this argument is that for God only the contradictory is impossible. Ghazali here makes the important distinction between logical impossibility or necessity and factual or hypothetical impossibility or necessity, TO avayicatov &TT\CL>S and TO avayKalov e£ vnodeo-cws, found confusedly in Aristotle, Depart, an. A 1. 63gb24 (cf. Met. A 5. ioi5 b g and Met. A 7. I072 b i2; see also note 23. 3). This distinction is known in modern philosophy through Leibniz's distinction oi veritis de fait and ve'rites de raison (Monad. 33, Nouv. Essais, i. 1. 26). A virite de raison is that A is not not-A; a verity defait, that fire burns. The distinction is, however, complicated by the fact that we believe that there are reasons why fire burns, as Leibniz acknowledges, Monad. 31-32, that in the apparent changing events there are underlying identities, and the aim of science is to find, in the veritis defait, virile1 s de raison. The problem of possibility in relation to God was much discussed both in Eastern and Western scholasticism. Some, like Ibn Hazm, hold that God can do the impossible, whereas the Ash'arites exclude the logically impossible or what they hold to be the logically impossible (see Ibn Hazm's criticism of them, op. cit. iv. 214, 1. 1). Both Ghazali and the Ash'arites hold the contradictory propositions that nothing is possible but what exists, and that for God everything is possible but the logically impossible. Plutarch, De stoic, repugn, c. 46, Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 64. 39, reproaches the Stoics with the same contradiction. In modern philosophy Descartes believed in God's omnipotence; Leibniz excluded the logically impossible. p. 53. 2. i.e. the possibility that the world might be larger or smaller than it actually is. p. 53. 3. Averroes does not express himself well, but what is implied is sound. He should have said: All logical inference is necessary; no inference

NOTES

41

a b o u t fact, however, is based solely on logical necessity, b u t needs as a n initial premiss a fact, self-evident (cogito, e.g.) but not logically necessary; if, however, by fabe reasoning you assume a fact, contradictions will follow from this assumption whose exposition is called by Aristotle «K (or Sia) TOU a&vmrov SEIKVTWI (or diroSeffcu), e.g. Anal. Pr. A 17. 37 a 9, a reductio ad absurdum. p. 53. 4. ware OVTC VVV CICTI nXziovs ovpavot OVT' iyevovro OVT' ei'Se^crat •yeveadai irXelovs' aAA* el? KOX povos Kal reAeto? otiros ovpavos eoriv, De caelo A 9. 279"9. p. 53. 5. i.e. after the study of logic. p. 5 3 . 6. F r o m the thesis that it is impossible that something which has not happened (or will not happen) might have happened, Ghazali concludes rightly that everything that happens is necessary (of course this implies a belief in natural l a w ; if you deny natural law with the Ash'arites, things are neither necessary nor possible, they simply are). This necessity is admitted by Averroes. Ghazali, using the double sense of 'necessity' in Aristotle, proceeds to conclude, from the fact that everything happens by necessity, that it will have no cause. Aristotle, as we saw, distinguishes logical necessity a n d factual necessity—a fact is necessary when it has happened through a cause; primary logical necessity is not conditioned, but is necessary by itself and eternal, i.e. it is eternally true or valid. Aristotle, who constantly confuses the individual and the universal, facts and propositions, regards God's existence as such an eternal truth and therefore unconditioned a n d necessary by itself (see especially the passage at Met. A 5. i o i 5 b 9 indicated above in note 53. 1). p. 54. 1. This doctrine is not proper to Avicenna, but, as we have shown, is fundamentally Aristotelian. It is the correct answer, according to Aristotle, that God's existence is necessary through His own essence, whereas the existence of transitory beings needs an extraneous cause. p. 54. 2. This example (see note 29. 4) is highly confused. H e has to show that transitory existents which are necessary have a cause; w h a t he shows is that there are necessities which cannot be attributed to existents because they express a relation between universals. T h e necessity h e mentions here concerns the conditions for a saw being a saw, but does not refer to the existence of any particular saw. p. 54. 3. T h e r e is no necessary Ash'arite atomic universe, nor does straint; o n the contrary, H e is t h e have the word (j-j-iU, namus). T h e

connexion between the atoms of the God stand under any law or any conlaw, the Aoyos, t h e N6/j.os (the Arabs latter idea is Heraclitean a n d Stoic.

p. 54. 4. i.e. according to G h a z a l i : the opponent of the philosopher, i.e. the Ash'arite.

42

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

p. 54. 5. The argument is not similar, but identical. The thesis is: the world is only possible during its existence. Convert this statement and you have: the world is impossible before its existence. This is the objection which Aristotle makes against the Megarians, Met. 9 2. 1047" 10: en el dSvvarov ro eaTeprjfievov Svvdfiews, ro fj.7] yev6[ievov ahvvarov ecrrai yeveoQcu; again, if t h a t

which has no possibility is impossible, that which is not happening cannot possibly happen, i.e. if the possible is what happens, that which does not happen ('that which has no possibility') is impossible; therefore, Aristotle concludes, before the possible thing happened it was impossible. Aristotle's argument rests on a quatemio terminorum: he takes 'possible' in its Megarian sense of 'happening' and 'impossible' in the usual sense of 'what cannot happen'. If he had given to the word 'impossible' the sense the Megarians intended, his argument would only have amounted to this: 'If that which is not, is not, that which is not happening is not happening.' Ghazali turns here completely round; he now makes the philosophers, using Aristotle's argument, attack the Ash'arite thesis, which he pretended they held, and he defends the Ash'arite thesis which he previously attacked himself. p. 54. 6. If you take 'impossible' to mean, as it does for the Ash'arites, 'non-existent' and 'possible' 'existent', this is certainly quite obvious. p. 54. 7. Ghazali now reverts to his former argument based on the analogy of time and space; this sentence has no connexion with what immediately precedes. p. 54. 8. i.e. the suppositions of different possibilities in time for the creation of the world as given in Avicenna's argument, pp. 48-49. p. 54. 9. i.e. because all things are in time, imagination represents God as in time. p. 55. 1. i.e. the possible implies the impossible, but the impossible is what necessarily cannot happen and therefore implies necessity. p. 55. 2. This-refers to Aristotle, Met. A 12. ioi9 b 23 and De caelo A 12. 281 b 27: to assume that what is impossible may exist, e.g. the fact that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side, is an impossible falsehood, because, according to Aristotle, its contrary is not only false, but also false of necessity; to assume that the possible may exist is a possible falsehood, because the contrary is not necessarily false; that a man should be seated is possible, says Aristotle, since it is not necessarily false that he is seated. P- 55- 3- This is quite true. The Megarians and the Ash'arites should not have said that the possible is coextensive with the actual; they should have said that 'possible' has no meaning at all. p. 55. 4. If it is impossible before its existence, it cannot be true, as he has just said, that a thing should be possible before its existence.

NOTES

43

p. 55. 5. Nothing absolutely incorruptible—says Aristotle, Met. & I050bi6—is absolutely potential: ov&ev apa TWV a^Bdprcav turAu); Swa/tet eurlv dnXats. p. 55. 6. See notes 50. 4, 17. 1, and below. p. 56. 1. This is one of the fundamental ideas of the Aristotelian philosophy and also one of its fundamental contradictions: in action (cVpytta) J j j , lies the perfection (<WeAex«a) J L£L,I, of every being, and indeed these two terms are often used synonymously; on the other hand, the idea of action presupposes the idea of perfection, of an end; action is not an end in itself (this is denied by Arist. Met. 0 6. I048 b i8, at least for certain actions), but tends towards an end. We have here the old difficulty of change and becoming, concealed through the ambiguous use of the term cvipyeia. cvtpyeia is the act, the actualizing, it is also the end of the process of actualizing, the being in actuality, the reality attained, and in fact it is synonymous with reality. Without realizing it Aristotle identifies becoming and being, the act, ivepyeia, towards the end becomes the end, cVrcAexfia, and inversely the end, cWtAe'^fia, becomes the act, tVpyeta. There is a similar confusion in Aristotle's theory of movement which he defines Phys. & 5. 257b8 as an incomplete action, cvrtXexela Bapra elorj, natural and perishable forms. See note 3 1 . 1. p. 59. I. e.g. Met. & 8. I 0 5 0 b i 6 : ovOcv dpa TWV cuftOdprwv drrXcus SiW^iei i Sv d-n-Aws, nothing which is essentially incorruptible is essentially in potency (i.e. can be or not be). p. 59. 2. This is not absolutely t r u e ; it is in contradiction to what Ghazali has just said, namely that matter itself is the essentially potential. I t is, however, true that in Aristotelian philosophy potentiality is at the same time t h e substrate, the potentiality in the substrate, a n d the potentiality of t h e agent. See the text below and note 62. 6.

NOTES1

45

p . 59. 3. See note n . 5. p . 59. 4. i.e. that a m a n can do something is a consequence of his possessing the power to do it. p . 59. 5. i.e. a n objective reality, not something subjective. p . 59. 6. i.e. matter. p . 60. 1. For the circularity of this process see page 33 a n d note 3 3 . 4. p . 60. 2. Aristotle admits both a n objective necessity a n d a n objective possibility. T h e Stoics, who regard the world as a closed unique system in which everything that happens is the necessary consequence of an eternally determined concatenation of causes a n d effects, deny objective possibility (not quite consistently, as we have seen) and define possibility and chance in terms of our h u m a n ignorance of the laws of nature, alrCa aSiyAos- avBpumivtp Xoyi.op.ui (Alex. Aphr. Defato c. 8, p . 174. 2, Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 281. 35). I t would seem that only the Eleatics and Megarians, who absolutely deny all becoming, could deny both objective necessity and objective possibility. However, the Stoics divide 'things' (see note 3. 6) into the corporeal and the incorporeal, relations belonging to the incorporeal. Necessity and possibility, being both relations and incorporeal, would have to be regarded by them as subjective. T h e Stoics seem to have committed the same inconsistency as many moderns who a p p e a r to believe in the objective necessity of cause and in the necessary character of objective laws of nature, but regard both possibility and necessity as expressing not the characteristics of things, but the conditions of our knowledge of them. T h a t Ghazali m a y have taken his argument from some late Stoic source is indicated by the expression 'provided no obstacle presents itself. Sextus Empiricus tells us in fact {Adv. log. i. 253) that the later Stoics regarded the apprehensive presentation rljv KaraXriTTTiKTjv tpavraalav as a criterion of truth, provided that it has no obstacle, TO p.i)hkv tyovaav €varr]p.a. T h e term KaraXrjTrTos, * *^JL* , the apprehended, comprehended {comprehendibile in Cicero's translation, see Stoic. Vet. Fr. i. 18. 18), is frequently used in Muslim theology (see e.g. Massignon, op. cit., p . 56), and is often regarded by the theologians as synonymous with 'possible' -iC»j. For the intermediate position of the apprehensive presentation see Cicero, loc. cit.: 'sed inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem . . . collocabat (scilicet: Zeno), eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis numerabat, sed soli credendum esse diccbat'. Chrysippus' definition of the possible (Alex. Aphr. Defato c. 10, Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii, p . 279. 15) as that which is not prevented from happening by anything, although it may not happen (ouvarov ei^ai ytvtoBai TOUTO O im' ov&evos KOJAV€TOU yevloQai, Kav p.7] yevrjTai.) implies of course objective possibility (see also note 241. 1). p. 60. 3. This, the most obvious definition of truth, is based on Aristotle, De interpr. 9. I9 a 33 opolcus ol Xoyoi aXrjdeis iuorrtp TO rrpayp-ara. T h e definition

46

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

becomes somewhat problematic when one asks what in the mind conforms to reality; but when rightly interpreted it is undoubtedly true, since it expresses in the form of an image the tautology that a true judgement is a judgement which expresses a truth ('truth' which is assumed in all thought is indefinable and irreducible like all primary concepts). Aristotle has also in this form the definition Met. J1 6. 1011 b 26: TO yxv yap Xeyeiv TO OV fir) etmt. r\ TO ftTj ov elvai ipevSos, TO Se ov elvai /cat TO fiij ov p.-rj eipai a\-q8cs. Aristotle

holds three views on truth: (i) the conformity of thought with reality; (2) a connexion between concepts (0-1741^0/07 vorjjiaTiov) inside the judgement, De an. r 8. 432M1; (3) reality itself, Met. 0 10. 105i b i. p. 60. 4. It is an Aristotelian assumption that every logical concept has its counterpart in reality; thus the absence of a quality (privation, oreoi/oxr) takes for Aristotle a positive meaning, and even of absolute privation, the non-existent, he says (Met. r 2. ioo3 b io) that it is something, namely the non-existent (see note 61. 7). The 'something' (TI, see note 3. 6) plays an important role in Stoicism, which distinguishes between meaning and existence: 'nothing' means something, but the 'something' it means does not exist. Averroes in his answer might have said that the impossible, like the non-existent, expresses a negation; neither the impossible nor the nonexistent exists, and therefore they need no substratum, but the non-existence of the impossible does not imply the non-existence of the possible, and the problem Ghazali has touched upon does not concern the impossible only, the negation of the possible, but negation generally; however, he follows a more Aristotelian train of thought, and regards the privation of the possible as a reality. p. 61. 1. Ghazali seems to hold that every concept has to be either necessary, impossible, or possible; modality, however, refers only to judgements. Ghazali's argument would have seemed more plausible, if he had given as an example that four can be divided by two, which is a purely rational judgement and does not refer to any definite time. Ghazali's argument may be an interpretation of the Stoic theory as, for example, expounded by Cicero (loc. cit.): 'visis non omnibus adiungebat [scilicet: Zeno] fidem, sed iis solum quae propriam quondam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur'. The apprehending presentation carries with itself its own evidence. p. 61. 2. By the 'possible' as predicated of the recipient he means the at present existing and actualized matter which is changing, losing one attribute and taking the contrary; e.g. wine turning into vinegar. The opposite of this possible is the impossible, for the matter of the wine can never become non-existent. The opposite of the sweetness of the wine is the acidity of the vinegar, and this acidity is necessary because the wine, turning into vinegar, will necessarily become acid.

NOTES

47

p. 61. 3. The sweetness (i.e. the potentiality to become acidity) loses its potentiality when the wine has become acid, i.e. the sweetness is not there anymore (OVK cvrmdpx^h see Phys. A 8. io.i b i6). p. 61. 4. It is the wine which is potentially vinegar, and which changes from potential vinegar into actual vinegar; in other words, becoming is not the change of a quality into another quality, of the sweetness into acidity; the substance, the substratum (the wine; the term 'substratum' is ambiguous, and I shall explain the difficulty below) becomes another substance through a change of quality. Something persists, says Aristotle, Met. A 2 ad init., but the opposite does not persist; there is, therefore, a third entity besides the opposites, namely matter, cf. Phys. A 7. 19.0M7. p. 61. 5. So far as I know, this definition is not found in Aristotle in exactly this form, but it expresses his conception perfectly. Cf. such passages as Met. N2. 1089/28: TO Kara SiW^uy (viz. /AT) ov) cV rovrov rj yeveals ccrrtv, out of the possible (which is said not to be) generation follows, and Met. @ 8. 1050^11 : TO apa Svvarov €tpat CPSC'XCTCU Kal eu-ai /cat p/tj eii/ai, that, then, which can possibly be can either be or not be. p. 61. 6. The possible non-existent lies in the cneprjms of what may become; in our example, the sweetness is the ore'ptjais (i.e. it is the nonacidity) of the acidity. In this areprims, in this sweetness (the non-acidity), the acidity lies potentially hidden; this potency is a kind of intermediate between pure nothingness and full reality. It seems an astonishing and unbelievable paradox, Aristotle himself says (Phys. A 8. igi b i6), that anything can become in this way out of the non-existent. p. 61. 7. Indeed, the Mu'tazilite doctrine of the non-existent as a reality is based on Aristotle's doctrine of ore'pijo-i? as something positive (see also note 3. 6). There is an interesting parallel in early medieval Western philosophy: Fredegisus of Tours (an Englishman who was a pupil of Alcuin and who died in 819) says in his Epislola de nihilo et tenebris (ed. Migne, Pair. L. cv. 751): 'Omnis significatio est quod est. "Nihil" autem aliquid significat. Igitur "nihil" eius significatio est quid est, id est rei existentis.' p. 62. 1. The actualized matter, wine qua wine, is in actuality; in the wine, however, there is an underlying substratum, matter, vfo), which is in potency. The last section of this passage is redundant and only repeats what I have tried to explain in notes 61. 2 to 61. 6. p. 62. 2. The acidity of the vinegar is the outcome of the process of becoming; i.e. it belongs to the becoming in so far as it is actual, it exists in the product, whereas the non-acidity, the sweetness changing into it, has disappeared. p. 62. 3. i.e. matter cannot be already actual, for becoming implies something that is not actual.

48

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p. 62. 4. i.e. both Mu'tazilites and philosophers regard non-existence as something positive. The philosophers, however, believe that non-existence, which they call matter, never exists in reality without being connected with a form. The transition from blood to sperma and from sperma to the members of the embryo refers to Aristotle's theory, De gen. an. A 19. 726b5, that sperma is concocted blood coming from all parts jnopia, cL^sl, of the animal and possessing potentially all the parts of the new animal. p. 62. 5. i.e. it would be an independent reality, fully existent and actual in itself. p. 62. 6. The whole of this passage is a faithful, although somewhat redundant, summary of Aristotle's theory of becoming, discussed in Phys. A 6-10. This theory is contradictory, for it is said that becoming is the transition of a arep-qcns into a positive quality (e.g. non-acidity into acidity) and that in the (jrep-qms its opposite potentially lies, but it is also said, as I have explained in note 61. 4, that the sweetness, the arcprjais of acidity does not become acidity; it leaves the wine and is replaced by its opposite, the acidity, and therefore it is the substratum, the substance, the wine, which becomes acid, i.e. the potentiality lies in the wine, not in the sweetness. But even this latter thesis can only be maintained through an ambiguity in the term 'substratum' or 'substance'. For although the wine may be called a substance or substratum, according to Aristotle's definition (Cat. 5) that the substance is the individual, the real substratum of the whole process is not the wine but matter. For the wine is nothing but the combination of matter and form; when wine turns into vinegar some forms leave the substratum, matter, to be replaced by other forms; there is here no becoming, only a change of forms; the real substratum, unqualified matter, remains, and remains eternally. For matter is eternal, although according to Aristotle it is pure potentiality, and nothing potential, according to him, can be eternal, and in this eternal matter eternal forms alternatively appear and vanish eternally, for forms too are eternal. Eternal forms and eternal matter, indeed, are the basic principles of the whole system, and through the combination of these principles the transient world is said to arise. But how can such heterogeneous elements as matter and form combine; how can the transient individual arise out of the combination of these two eternal elements? Whence do these eternal forms come, and whither do they go ? Concerning this last problem there are two attempts at solution: (1) the transcendent Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic solution that they lie eternally in the mind of a transcendent God; (2) the immanent Stoic solution that the individual forms (Adyoi) lie in germ (avepp.aTi.Kws) hidden in the immanent divine logos which unfolds itself in the world fatally and inexorably. The theory of a germinal development, i$yS, was known in Islam and is ascribed to an-Nazzam (cf. note 31. 1 and compare my Epitome der Metaphysik des Averroes, pp. 190-1).

NOTES

49

p. 62. 7. Although this is in verbal agreement with Avicenna it is scarcely true in fact, for according to the Muslim philosophers, who combine the Plotinian concept of the soul as a substance with the Aristotelian concept of the soul as a form, the human soul never subsists by itself; during life it is in need of the human body, and after death it is, in one way or another, part of the universal soul; see notes 15. 1 and 14. 4. p. 62. 8. *~1S^J , 'impressed', is a translation of the Stoic term rvTrovfievov or €vocj>pa.yi.£6p,evov used of the presentation, (jxwTaaia, as stamped on the material soul (see e.g. Sext. Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. ii. 70; Adv. log. i. 228). The expressions TVTTOS and o$payi£6ixevoi are used earlier by Aristotle, De memoria 1. 450 a 3i-32; see also note 67. 1. That the soul is not impressed on the body is often maintained by Avicenna, e.g. Book of Theorems and Notices, ed. Forget, p. 219.

p. 63. 1. According to Aristotle the soul has its seat in warmth (9ep\iov) or in spirit (nvevp-a); see De gen. an. B 3. 736b2g, cf. note 64. 4. p. 63. 2. i.e. becoming implies a relation to a pre-existent matter and to an agent, but the individual souls do not become out of anything, nor are they created (ex nihilo) by God. The mystery of the human personality, the uniqueness of my Ego, cannot be explained by science, which tries to rationalize events by seeking to find the underlying identities in the apparent changes. However much I may resemble my parents, however much the same universals may describe my physical and moral constitution, it is I, my unique Ego, individuum ineffabile, who becomes, lives, thinks, suffers, enjoys, and dies. Neither the traducianism of the rationalists, nor the creationism of the faithful, can explain the primary fact of my individual, personal existence. p. 63. 3. i.e. God. p. 63. 4. See note 14. 6. p. 63. 5. Light, according to Plotinus (Enn. iv. 5. 7), is incorporeal; the image in the mirror is the act of the object reflected, and when the object disappears, the image vanishes; in the same way the individual soul reflects the light of the world-soul (cf. Leibniz's conception of the monad as 'un miroir vivant, representatif de 1'Univers selon son point de vue', (Euvres, Erdmann, p. 714). According to Aristotle, Meteor, r 2. 372*33, there are in mirrors different possibilities of reflection, in some of which only shape is reflected, in others colour also. p. 63. 6. 'Sound understanding', 6p6os Ao'yo?, see note 8. 3. Islam has no faith in the self-taught man (aulodidactus): A . 1. ., (jlk..£j| AJ JL»_ "^ j - . , 'Satan is the master of him who has no master', says an Arabic proverb. p. 63. 7. This is an Arabic proverb. Maidani has it in this form: JJo Js ->ljJ-l 61 (Freytag, Meid. Prov. i, p. 11).

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p. 64. 1. The distinction between knowing and the object known provides the conclusive argument against all subjectivism. If perception and thought had no object beyond themselves, we should dwell in timeless monads without windows or communication—timeless, for time would be subjective too. All knowledge is relational, related to an object of knowledge ; if percipere and cognoscere were identical with their objects, there could be neither illusion nor falsehood, but everything would merely be. The Platonic Socrates in the Theaetetus realized this when he drew the consequence from Protagoras' doctrine (167 a ) : ovre yap ra /x^ on-a hvvarov So£daax OUTC aAAa nap a av irajyyrj^ ravra Se act aXrjQij, for no one can think anything but what he thinks, nor perceive anything but what he perceives, and this is always true. For all our thinking the existence of a unique, common, objective world is an unavoidable primary assumption. Cf. note 65. 3. p. 64. 2. i.e. the Platonists and Neoplatonists. p. 64. 3. Galen says, e.g. Quodanim. mor. corp. temp. seq. c. 3.775 K., that if the soul is mortal (which seems problematic to Galen), all the forms and parts of the soul will have potentialities which foliow (8UUK«, * ^ ) the temperament (x-pacrir, —I y,) of its matter. p. 64. 4. 'The possibility prior to the becoming is relative to matter': this refers probably to Aristotle's theory that the seat of the soul is in warmth and spirit, by which he wishes to explain how the soul can be transferred through procreation from one being to another. The problem, however, is how and whence the new individual soul arises. This problem was not seen by Aristotle, for whom soul is a form, a universal, whereas Callias and Socrates are individuals only through their bodies; see notes 14. 4 and 67-3p. 64. 5. According to Aristotle the soul is eWeAej^eia i) -npoirq ow/iaToy •ftvaiKov opyaviKov, the first entelechy of a natural, organic body ('organic', i.e. used as an instrument), De an. B i. 4i2 b 5; the body is merely there to serve as an instrument for the soul, De pari. an. A 1. 641*29. p. 64. 6. That they have objects seems in contradiction to Ghazali's theory, which appears to assert that concepts simply are. If they have objects, what, according to Ghazali, are these objects, and in what, according to Ghazali, does science consist ? p. 65. 1. Blackness and whiteness, black and white, however, are just as much universals as receptivity of colour. p. 65. 2. i.e. if it is not impossible for other concepts to exist only in minds, not in the external world. p. 65. 3. We have entered here upon the perennial problem of universals. Ghazali is justified in saying that one cannot assert the objectivity of

NOTES

51

necessity and possibility and deny the objectivity of universals. If we believe with the Aristotelians in the 'natures' of things, we have to admit the objectivity of universals, although we may be at a loss to explain the mode of their being and how these universals and 'natures' are related to the individuals. Ghazali's own nominalistic view is untenable; it is based on the common illusion of representing the spiritual, of regarding as representable what cannot be represented, and on the consequent representation, materialization, and localization of thought as imprints in the soul, as individual spiritual atoms in the mind. Material things, however, are subsistent by themselves—they merely are; but every perception, every thought, expresses a relation, and points beyond itself. We perceive things, we think about things, and every object of thought can become the object of thought for innumerable thinkers: the basic, unrepresentable fact of thought, inexplicable and indefinable—since it is assumed in all definition and explanation—, is that we can mean something objective, and that our meaning can be communicated to others and understood by them. p. 65. 4. That knowledge is not knowledge of the universal concept is a view contrary to that of Aristotle, who says that knowledge is always of the universal, e.g. Met. B 6 ad fin. xatfoAou ij eVicmj/x?) •na.vrtov. This is the great and insoluble difficulty of his system, that for it all reality is individual, all knowledge universal. The second assertion, that the individuals are known in a universal way, yvwpil,om-ai. TW KUBOXOV \6ya>, agrees with Aristode, Met. Z io. io36a8. p. 65. 5. i.e. although potentially things are universals, namely when they are known. This is, of course, a petitio principii, for the question is: How can, and why should, the mind think as a universal, what in reality is an individual ? p. 65. 6. The conception of the real as accidentally individual, essentially universal, is not found in Aristotle; it is not very clear what it means, and it seems rather a Platonizing conception of Aristotle. (It is true, of course, that according to Aristotle the individual consists of a universal form plus matter, but this rather adds to the difficulty, for how, out of these two heterogeneous and non-individual elements, can the individual arise?) p. 66. 1. According to the Neoplatonic conception of the Muslim Aristotelians, universals, i.e. the ideas, exist permanently in the Mind of God. p. 66. 2. e.g. blackness is impossible for a thing which eternally possesses the opposite of blackness, i.e. whiteness. p. 67. i. This sophistical argument seems to imply that words can mean only existents; now the impossible does not exist, and therefore the term 'impossible' cannot be applied to anything. The whole argument is a

5a

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

reductio adabsurdum of a materialistic and nominalistic conception of thought, of the conception that every thought is an individual imprint (rvTruims) in the soul. This Stoic conception was definitely refuted by anticipation in Plato Theaet. 191 c sqq.. (Plato already uses the terms anorvnovaSaj., receive an impression, a n d SO.KTVXIU>V arj/ieta, seals ofsignet-rings)^ T h e M u ' t a z i -

lites (and Aristotelians) affirm that, since 'non-existence' means something, the non-existent exists (in a way); Ghazali asserts that, since the nonexistent does not exist, 'non-existence' does not mean anything. The difficulty was seen by Plato, who makes Socrates ask at Theaet. 18g a: 'Will not he who thinks of the non-existent (/*i) ov) think of nothing (oi)SeV) ? And does he who thinks of nothing think at all ?' p. 67. 2. This seems in contradiction to Ghazali's own theory that there is no objective possibility. p. 6y. 3. See note 63. 2. For Aristotle the soul of the child is transmitted by the parents (both Aristotle and the Stoics are traducianists), or rather there is one soul, a universal in all human beings. The real crux of Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Neo-platonism is the relation of the universal to the individual. p. 67. 4. A remote or secondary relation, since the soul in its essence or existence, at least according to the Neoplatonic commentators, is not dependent on the body, but is essentially a part of the World-Soul and comes from the outside into the body. It is not impressed on the body, but merely directs the body. p. 67. 5. i.e. God, who can produce them ex nihilo by His will. Ghazali means that you might just as well say that the soul is potentially in God as that it is potentially in matter, since the soul is not extracted by God out of matter. The statue is not more potentially in the marble than in the sculptor, since the sculptor brings the form of the statue out of himself into the matter of the marble. And the relation of the soul to the body is still more 'remote' for the commentators than the relation of form to matter. For, says Plotinus (Enn. iv. 3. 20), the soul, which is not in the body as in a place, cv rovta, or in a container, cV dyyeiw, is not its form either, for the form which is involved in matter is not self-subsistent; if it is said that the soul is not engendered but self-subsistent, how can the self-subsistent soul be in the body? p. 67. 6. See the Aristotelian definition of the soul quoted in note 64. 3. p. 67. 7. The metaphor of the soul as a steersman or pilot is found in Plato, Phaedr. 247 c, where the rational part of the soul is called ipvxys KvfScpvr)TT)s (cf. Arist. De an. B 1. 4i3°g). At Tim. 41 e the demiurge is said to have placed the souls cu? is oxW> a s m a s n 'Pp. 68. 1. This refers to the Aristotelian doctrine of the triad which exists where there is motion, Phys. & 5. 256 b i3: the mover, the instrument of

NOTES

53

motion, TO

-£- — fj^*~* jiA> aKaToA^77ros. p. 71. 4. Compare Aristotle, Phys. A 12. 22i b 3: the eternal, rd aej oira, is not in time. p. 71. 5. This, I believe, does not signify anything but the tautology that only the present or the present movement exists or takes place at present. p. 72. I. i.e. finite existence, since the infinite cannot be represented. p. 72. 2. When the existence of a thing is perfect, i.e. when all the conditions of its existence are fulfilled, its action cannot be delayed. p. 72. 3* petitioprincipi^^jAhtJl Llfc c\}lya_», aTrreaQai rfjs ^-njo-ecos ef apxvsp. 73. 1. Averroes wants to suggest that the philosophical view of an eternal creation is not in contradiction to the Koranic view and that the verb 'to produce', 'to cause to happen', which occurs in the Koran, Sura lxv. 1, does not necessarily imply a time-factor, and that therefore the Ash'arites gave a wrong interpretation of the true conception of the Koran. (The verb 'to produce', A».l in Arabic is a causative form of the verb 'to become' which corresponds to the Greek yvyvtoBat.) p. 73. 2. Here he wants to suggest that the philosophical view is in fact the common view of Muslims, and that when they say that the world is not eternal, they really mean that the world has a cause, so that the difference is only verbal, lai, not factual, t£y*->. p. 73. 3. He is possibly alluding here to the Maturidites who—in opposition to the rival school of the Ash'arites—see, for example, Muhammad alMurtada, Commentary on Ghazali's Vivification of Theology, ii, p. 8—regard God's attributes of action, AxiJI oU*», and His creative production, / j »5-J, as coeternal with the attributes of His nature. Ibn Hazm, op. cit. iv, p. 212, speaks of even the Ash'arites as holding the heretical view

56

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

that the world is eternal. For, according to him, the Ash'arites affirm that God says eternally ' sJT' 'let it be' to all things, whether they have been created or will be created, and this, according to Ibn Hazm, implies the eternity of the world. The theological distinctions are in any case very subtle. p. 74. 1. This is an Aristotelian principle {Top. A 3) which Aristotle himself puts into practice. p. 74. 2. This argument, as far as I know, is not found in those works of Galen which have come down to us, although there is a reference to our problem in De plac. Hippocr. et Plat., Mueller, p. 783 (K. v, p. 760), where Galen says: It is not astonishing that more questions have not been settled in philosophy, since in philosophy one cannot base one's judgement on evident experience (ireipa); and so some declare that the world has not come into being, others that it has. Most probably the argument was found in the fourth book of the lost work De demonstratione, Tlepl drroSeifeiu?, OU^JI ( j , a work of which, among other parts, the first half of Book IV was known to the Arabs. In this book Galen discussed those arguments which, since they are based on an imperfect experience, can only reach a certain degree of probability. Averroes in his commentary on De caelo (see I. Mueller, Vber Galens Werk vom wissenscliaftlichen Beweis, Abh. philos.philolog. Kl. d. K. Bayr. Ak. d. W., Bd. xx) refers to Galen's arguments in De demonstratione about the eternity of the world and says: 'Galenus aestimat quod nullus potest scire mundum esse aeternum nisi per has propositiones quarum origo est a sensu et testimonio; dicit in suo libro quem composuit de eis quae credit, quod nihil certum habebat de mundo utrum esset novus aut antiquus, et manifestum est quod ipse non utitur in antiquitate mundi nisi talibus propositionibus ex verbis suis et in libro suo quem appellavit Demonstrationem.' Philoponus, De aet. mundi xviii, p. 599. 23 gives a long quotation out of Galen's De demonstratione in which Galen comes to the conclusion that 'ungenerated' implies 'indissoluble', but not the reverse, for what is indissoluble may be indissoluble not essentially but extrinsically, 'since it may have been provided with immortality', and Galen himself quotes Tim. 41 b, where the demiurge says to the gods he has created: 'since you are created, you are not altogether immortal and indissoluble, but you shall not be dissolved nor experience the fate of death'. Galen's argument is directed against the Stoic syllogism to prove the corruptibility of the world (see Diog. Laert. Vitae vii. 141 and Ps.-Philo De aetern. mundi 124 (p. n o . u Reiter); the argument is found also in Philoponus, De aet. mundi, p. 502): 'That whose parts are corruptible is corruptible as a whole. Now the parts of the world are corruptible, and therefore the world is corruptible. Moreover, everything is corruptible, if it is capable of decay [tmb'eKTiKov rfjs eVi TO xelpov /i£Ta/3oA^?).' The premiss of the Stoic argument seems to be assumed by Ghazali. The Ash'arites accepted this Stoic argument,

NOTES

57

a n d say (see e.g. the Arabic text of our book, 4 6 6 . 5 ) : i i o l j J - 1 avv^iMfievov dfioj^xa, in opposition to the hypothetical disjunctive syllogism J ^ i i U .Xyi c r W ' &eJetiy/LtcVov aficu/za (for these terms and the ambiguity of the term Sie^evyp-evov allw/ia see Galen, Intr. dial, 3, Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 7 1 . 15). p. 75. 1. T h a t the transitory things of our sublunary world are of no significance in relation to the size of the universe is stated by Aristotle, Met. r 5. 1010*28: 6 yap irepl 7}p.as rod alaSrjTov TOTTOS iv (f>dop& xal yevecret StareAet p.6vos wv> aAA* OVTOS ovdev ws ehreXv \xopiov rod TTO-VTOS ecmp. Cf. Meteor. A 3. 339 b 13-340" 18. p. 75. 2. This all agrees with Aristotle, De caelo A 3. 2 7 0 a i 3 - 3 5 ; A 9. 278 b 2I. p. 75. 3. I n the Posterior Analytics Aristotle says [A 3) that everything cannot be proved, but there are immediately evident principles, d p x a ' a/xecroi. These principles are of two classes, those common to all the sciences, a n d those proper to specific sciences, e.g. n u m b e r a n d magnitude, Anal. Post. A-] ad fin. p. 75. 4. 'Abu Zaid al-Balkhi', op. cit. ii. 18, tells us that the generality of astronomers affirm that the sun is i 6 6 5 \ times the size of the earth. Actually the surface of the sun exceeds that of the earth 11 ,goo times, while its volume is 1,306,000 times greater t h a n that of the earth. p. 77. 1. T h e difficulty mentioned in this section did not exist for t h e Greek philosophers, who admit neither a creation ex nihilo nor a destruction in nihil. Nobody is so naive (tvrjd-qs)—says Ps.-Philo, op. cit. 5 (p. 74. 3. Reiter) as to ask whether the world can b e absolutely annihilated, since absolute annihilation, 17 CK TOO OVTOS avalpeois, is a non-entity, dvunapKrov; the question is, rather, whether its order can be corrupted and dissolved; however, says Ps.-Philo 83 (p. 98. 16 Reiter) if there were, as the Stoics believe, a conflagration, iKirvpaims, of the world, in w h a t would God's

58

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activity, God's life, then consist, and would not His inactivity be in fecf His death, since life is activity? p. 77. 2. For temporal production implies annihilation. p. 77. 3. For the performance of nothingness is doing nothing. The problem is a consequence of the failure to distinguish between the act and the end or intention of the act. It is another example of the identification of the process of the act and its end, mentioned in note 56. t, which language itself does not always distinguish sharply: 'annihilation' can mean the act of annihilating or the result of this act. Non-existence, even my own nonexistence, can be my intention, but my act of annihilating is something positive. p. 78. 1. i.e. the theologians deny potential existence, they deny that there is a tertium quid between existence and non-existence, that there is a passage from the one to the other, i.e. becoming; they transfer the mystery of change to the agency of God, or rather, through the miraculous idea of creation they eliminate the idea of becoming: God said 'let it be' and the thing was, immediately, without any process. p. 78. 2. i.e. either there is no agent or cause at all, or God's act must attach itself to the non-existent. p. 78. 3. Contrary opposites (evavria) that have middle terms can, according to Aristotle, only pass into each other through the middle terms; e.g. before arriving from white at black one has to pass grey (Met. 1. 7 and Cat. 10). The difficulty, however, of the problem of becoming lies precisely in the fact that there is no middle term between being and not-being; a thing either is or is not. p. 78. 4. The simile is taken from Plato, Rep. vii. 514 sqq.: beings living in a cave and brought into light will, owing to the weakness of their eyes, believe that the shadows they formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to them. p. 78. 5. In this defence of the doctrine rien ne se cre'e, rien ne se perd there still is, besides the general problem of becoming, this difficulty: it may be said that I existed potentially before my actual existence, in so far as my existence was possible, but once gone I am gone for ever and have no potential existence any more, since 'potential' refers always to the future. Uptorn trees are not rooted again. p. 78. 6. This is not quite correct; according to Aristotle neither matter nor form, both of which are eternal, is subsistent by itself. The only thing subsistent by itself is the combination of both, the individual, and this is transitory. p. 79. 1. Since the theologians regard the act of God not as a process but as a static fact in which the intention, the result, and the act all coincide,

NOTES

59

they do not make the result of the annihilating act, namely the annihilation of the world, i.e. nothingness, directly dependent on Him, for this would mean that God intended and did nothing. Thefollowing rather naive theories, which seem indeed to have been inspired by the criticism of the philosophers, have therefore the tendency to interpolate between God and the annihilation of the world a tertium quid, a quasi-positive entity which causes the annihilation. By doing this they of course introduce a process between this tertium quid and the annihilation. p. 79. 2. This theory is ascribed by Baghdadi, op. cit., pp. 168 and 183, to Jubbai and his son Abu Hashim. Abu Hashim is regarded as the most important Mu'tazilite of his generation. According to this theory God cannot destroy an atom without involving the destruction of Heaven and Earth. p. 79. 3. i.e. if extinction existed in a substratum, it could not be the opposite of existence, i.e. non-existence, since a non-existent existent is absurd. p. 79. 4. According to Bagdhadi, op. cit., p. 319, most of the Karramites, however, regarded it as impossible for God to destroy the bodies in the Universe. p. 80. 1. Condition, J U . : for the theological sense see note 3. 6. p. 80. 2. This is rather a strange conception. The Karramites assert that the act of God is an external relation and does not change the essence of the substratum, i.e. His essence, but inheres in the substratum. (A favourite example for both the philosophers and the theologians of an external relation is that of right and left; there is no difference in the objects themselves, whether I am at their right or their left, Aristotle argues, De caelo Bs. 285*1.) This is a contradiction, for if it inheres in the substrate, it is not merely an external relation. The obvious objection is that an act is not an external relation, since it assumes in the agent a change, a newness, like the change from whiteness to blackness. Averroes, however, moved perhaps by an esprit de contradiction against the Ash'arites, takes just the opposite view, denying that an act does inhere and admitting that it is a purely external relation. p. 80. 3. He evidently means temporal reality in the world, for there is a temporal reality in God, or in relation to God, produced by Him. p. 80. 4. Since the temporal reality in God, or in relation to God, does not affect His essence. p. 80. 5. This amounts to saying that an act is not an external relation, since it assumes in the agent a change, a newness. p. 80. 6. ,^-aj IJLJ (1)1 jU- bsj J_jj*.jjl ^ J J I l i l , If the existent exists one instant, it is permissible that it should exist two instants, says Ibn

6o

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

H a z m , o p . cit. iv. 85, who also admits the logical possibility of a n eternity a parte post. p . 8 1 . 1. W e do not perceive identity, which is a rational concept. T h e r e is no place for identity (nor for similarity) in a nominalistic a n d sensationalistic system. O u r j u d g e m e n t t h a t we have a n identical individual assumes (1) that there is a n exterior world, (2) that every change is based o n causation. Ghazali, who accepts t h e Ash'arite principle t h a t there is no natural causation, b u t t h a t God is the only agent, has no right to assert the identity of individuals, since everything is continually changing a n d every change depends on a new creative act of God (besides, since h a i r grows, it is not unconditionally true that the hair on a m a n ' s head today is identical with the hair there was yesterday). I n addition, we must distinguish between 'This white is the same as t h a t white', which asserts an identity of universals, and 'This is the identical hair', which asserts the identity of an individual. I b n H a z m , criticizing the Ash'arites (v. 107), says there is no m o r e extraordinary foolishness, t_j»=. A J I £ I 1 _ ^ ")1, t h a n to say t h a t the whiteness of snow, the blackness of tar, the greenness of grass are different n o w from w h a t they were before. p. 8 1 . 2. C o m p a r e Aristotle's argument, Met. K2. 1060*34: If there are perishable principles for perishable things, we need other perishable principles for them, and so shall have an infinite regress. T h e difficulty in a n infinite regress exists for all relations. All duality implies infinity, since between any two terms there is a middle term, as the Eleatics saw. This h a d become a well-known a r g u m e n t with t h e Greek Sceptics a n d Neoplatonists and the Muslim theologians a n d Mystics for proving the subjectivity a n d unreality of relations. T h e question whether the creating act was different from, or identical with, the thing created was discussed in Islam. T h e opponents of their duality based themselves on the infinite regress this duality would involve (see I b n H a z m , o p . cit. v. 40). T h e Mu'tazilite M u ' a m m a r was-widely known in Islam for his acceptance of the infinity of relations (Jl_^»-I). H e regarded them, however, in the Stoic fashion as ( j U J I , rd Ae/o-a, something intermediate between being a n d not-being (see note 3 . 6 ) . p . 8 1 . 3 . Flux, 0~^"> T° Pe'"> °f- Aristotle, De caelo r I. 2g8 b 2Q, navra yiyveoBai Kai peiv . . . oirep €oi/cafft fiovXeadau Xeyetv aXXol r e iroXXoi /cat "HpaxXeiros 6 'Etfriaios. I t is a curious fact that the two schools, the H e r a cliteans and the Megarians, w h o start from opposite premisses, the former that there is no being but only becoming, the latter that there is only being but no becoming, arrive at the same conclusion: t h a t nothing is permanent. Both theories m a y be spoken of as theories of flux. p . 8 1 . 4 . T h i s is the theory of the famous Ash'arite theologian Baqillani (end of the tenth century). I b n H a z m , op. cit. iv. 222, gives a quotation

NOTES

•••.:-.':

61

from Baqillani's Book about the Doctrines of the Qarmates, where Baqillani says: 'Accidents cannot endure, and their annihilation is necessary in the second instant after their becoming, without an annihilating cause. T h e accidents annihilate t h e substances, since they annul the spatial relations and conditions without which the substances cannot exist.' I b n H a z m adds that this implies the heretical doctrine that God is not the cause of their annihilation. p. 82. 1. 'does not inhere in a substratum': i.e. the individual substance, e.g. this stone, according to the definition at the beginning of Cat, 5: ovala he e<mv . . . 7) [i-qTe Kad' imoK€tfi4vov nvos Aeyerat /-ITJT' ev ujrotfetfxevai TiPi ecrTlv. p. 82. 2. This is not quite correct; the individual substance is transient; w h a t h e means is that it does not become absolutely non-existent, since its matter and form are eternal. p. 82. 3. This argument is based on Aristotle's argument against the Megarians, Phys. Z 10. 2 4 0 b i 7 - 3 o : a thing which is changing must b e partially this and partially that, b u t in the indivisible instant there cannot be a c h a n g e : it must be wholly this or that, wholly existent or wholly non-existent. p. 82. 4. i.e. t h a t the accidents should be m a d e a condition for the persistence of t h e substance. p. 8 3 . I. eycb &€ 7]fu, €i ev fy 6 avdpwrros ouSerroTG av TJXyeev ovhe yap av fjv, vip' OTOU dAyrjcraep li» eiiv, I say: if m a n consisted of a unique substance, he would not suffer, for what would be for this simple existent the cause of his suffering? This sentence is a quotation from the second chapter of Ps.-Hippocrates TJepl ^u'crior dvBpciTrov. I n this little treatise, which starts b y discussing t h e view that the h u m a n body consists of one unique substance, there is expounded the theory of the four bodily h u m o u r s : the sanguine, the choleric, the phlegmatic, and the melancholic. Aristotle (Hist. an. J 1 3 . 5 i 2 b i 2 ) gives a quotation from the second part of this work, which, however, he ascribes to Polybus. Galen, who regarded the book, or at least the first part of it, as genuine, wrote on it a still extant commentary which was in part translated and abbreviated by H u n a i n ibn Ishaq (see G. Bergstrasser, H. ibn Ishaq und die Syr. und Arab. Galen-Ubersetz., No. 102). T h e Arabic translation of De natura hominis, with Galen's commentary, is still extant in three copies, cf. H . Diels, Handschriften der antiken Arzte, i, p . 101 and Aya Sofya 3632. This same quotation is found in Nemesius, De natura hominis, Migne, xl. 629. p. 83. 2. See note 14. 6. p. 8 3 . 3. Ghazali's theory might be explained by saying that God wills t h e annihilation, and then the annihilation occurs. O f course the problem is: W h a t is the relation between the object of His will and His will, in w h a t does His act consist? But this relation is not more obscure for His annihilative than for His creative act, for when God wills 'let it be' and 'it is', why

6a

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

is it, why is its being the act of God ? A n d since by God's power is m e a n t the fact that H e can do it, w h a t does H e do, besides willing it ? p . 84. 1. T h e same idea is very well expressed by 'Abu Zaid al-Balkhi', o p . cit. ii. 135: 'If it is said that we cannot understand production out of nothing, for, for example, a ring must be m a d e out of silver, it must be answered that the shape of the ring is something new which did not exist a n d its maker created it out of nothing. If the coming into existence of a new accident is possible, w h y not the coming into existence of a body out of nothing? T h e whole question is, do new things a p p e a r ? well, we see t h e m appear.' p . 8 5 . 1. T h e so-called answer of the philosophers is in fact a consequence of the Megarian theory, and Ghazali ought to agree with it. T h e Megarians are true to the principle that something either is or is not, tertium non datur; there is no becoming, since becoming is illogical, a n d there is no disappearing, which is just as irrational. A t one time-atom there was black, at another time-atom there is w h i t e ; nothing else can be affirmed. Reality is positive, but in becoming and disappearing a non-positive reality seems implied. p. 8 5 . 2. This answer comes dangerously near the Mu'tazilite proposition that the non-existent exists. I t is true that the existence of white implies the non-existence of black; b u t the truth that the existence of white implies the non-existence of black does not imply the existence or reality of the non-existent black. W h a t we consider as real is the event, the passage, the passing from black into white, the becoming of white, the disappearing of black, but this very passage is denied by the Megarians a n d Ash'arites. Becoming and disappearance imply time, whereas the laws of identity a n d contradiction do n o t imply time. F o r the laws of thought, as for t h e p r i n ciples of mathematics, there is no such process as c h a n g e ; they are valid tunelessly. p . 8 5 . 3 . F o r "even G o d cannot do the impossible; for another instance see, for example, m y Ep. d. Met. d. Av., p . 106. Aristotle himself at Eth. Nic. Z 2. l i 3 g b i o quotes Agathon's lines: For even G o d lacks this one thing alone, T o make a deed that has been done, undone. p . 86. 1. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. A 8. 191 b i 3 about ardp-qms: nothing comes absolutely from not-being, ov&ev airXws (K p.ri on-o?, but only from w h a t is not-being per accidens, eV firj OVTOS Kara ovufiefiTjKos. p . 86. 2. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. E 6. 229 b 25 : arrXms tvayriov xivrjms xivyoei, dcuVeiTai Se /cat ijpe/xt'a, areprjats yap. Movements are contrary, w h e n the one passes from this opposite to that, and the other from that to this. p . 8 6 . 3 . i.e. not the opposition of two positives.

NOTES

63

p. 86. 4. For the contradiction in Aristotle's theory of becoming a n d arcprjms see note 62. 6. T h e Aristotelians would answer t h a t the movable potentially possesses movement a n d has therefore a positive oreprjms (of course when one speaks of a positive orepnms t h e opposition of Ifiy a n d cn-epTjOK, of possession and non-possession, is annulled). p . 86. 5. T h e vitreous h u m o u r of the eye / ^ J J I {-* AjjJisJI hjSaji\, TO vaAoetSes iypov TOV o(j>BaXp.ov. According to the Aristotelian theory of perception the sense-organ receives the form of t h e object perceived without its matter. According to De sensu 2. 438*12 sqq. sight has its seat in t h e pupil, (copi), which consists of water (cf. Hist. an. A 9. 491 b 2 1 : TO vypov TOV Stf)9aXfj.ov w /SAeVet, 17 Koprj). p . 86. 6. See note 58. 2. p . 87. 1. T h e r e m a y be here a n allusion to the title of one of Ghazali's books, The Distinction between Faith and Heresy. p . 87. 2. Here, indeed, we have the fundamental difficulty of the Neoplatonic philosophy of emanation and of the theology of the Muslim philosophers. If we admit with the Eleatics that 'becoming' cannot m e a n anything but 'coming from', and t h a t ultimate Reality is nothing but the absolute, simple monad, how then, from this highest principle, this absolutely simple monad, can the infinite variation of this world of multiple things derive, how can the O n e provide the plurality it does not possess itself (as Plotinus himself asks, Enn v. 3. 15: a /X17 E^M TTUIS wapdoxev;) ? Plurality, if it exists, must consist of units, says Zeno the Eleatic (Diels,Fr. d. Vors.s i, p . 252. 23 sqq.), and since there cannot be a plurality of units, there is only the O n e (cf. Arist. Met. B 4. 1001 "27). T h e Sceptics reaffirm this Eleatic doctrine, a n d Aenesidemus says (Sext. E m p . Adv. Phys. i. 220): 01/re yap TO €v yeveoBai Svo hvvarov ctrrt ovre TO. Svo rpirov a-noTtXci, two cannot arise out of the one, nor can the two produce a third (Democritus too had said that one cannot come into existence from two nor two from one, a dictum which Aristotle approves, restricting it, however, to actual existence, see Met. Z 13. 1039*9). T h e Muslim Aristotelians accept the principle that from the one only one can proceed, but use it illogically to explain the emanation of the m a n y from the one according to the Neoplatonic principle of a gradual pluralization, laid down, for example, in Porphyry, Sententiae x i : a> dow/iam vnoordrreLS vrrofiaivovoaA. p.tv p.€pi^ovrat Kai 7TXf]6wovTat . . . imcpfialvovoai 8^ ivi^ovTou. (cf. Plotinus, Enn. v. 3. 16). Ghazali's criticism in the following chapter consists in showing the inconsistency of the philosophers in their surreptitiously introducing a plurality both into the O n e itself and into its emanation. p . 88. 1. T h e conception of will as a passivity seems rather strange: one would imagine t h a t it is the activity /car' ifoxqv. However, according to Aristotle, the will is ultimately based on pleasure and pain (De an. B 2. 413^23) and will is the sign (o-rip.tiov') of pains and pleasures (Arist. Rhet.

64

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

B 4. 1381*7). Sextus Empiricus says (Adv. phys. i. 146): 'Sensation is a kind of alteration. . . . If God, then, has a sensation, He is altered, if He is altered, He is capable of alteration and change . . . and if so, He is also perishable.' p. 88. 2. i.e. will brings to perfection the qualities of the wilier. p. 89. 1. i.e. man is an agent and therefore a cause; the sun is a cause; therefore we may metaphorically (but not properly) call the sun an agent, the tertium comparationis between man and sun being that they are both causes. p. 89. 2. In the proper sense. p. 89. 3. There is some confusion in this paragraph. Ghazali reproaches the philosophers who, according to him, admit only a natural causal relation between God and the objects of His acts, with calling God an agent; only a voluntary agent is an agent according to him. At the same time he reproaches them with calling all natural causes agents. The consequence would seem to be that the philosophers do not distinguish between agent and cause. To ascribe an act to a non-living being would seem to Ghazali, to use a modern expression, a kind of animism or fetishism. Nonliving beings do not act, according to him; between fire and burning there is only a constant time-sequence. This is also the theory of modern empiricists. However, for the modern empiricist, as well as for the Ash'arite Ghazali, all causal relations (inclusive of voluntary acts) in the empirical world are reducible to a time-sequence. According to Hume, between my will and the movement of my arm there is no other relation' than an empirically perceptible sequence in time, and the same is said by the Ash'arites, who, as I shall show later, are dependent on Greek empiricism. (The Ash'arites acknowledge one voluntary essential agent, God, who, however, is not of this world.) But why then speak of animism or fetishism, as the empiricist E. Mach does—e.g. Die Mechanik, p. 455—, or why this distinction between agent and cause which Ghazali establishes? Averroes is aware of the contradiction in Ghazali, and in the following passages he puts forward some forceful criticisms. p. 89. 4. i.e. a voluntary act, like any potential act, is not inseparably conjoined with its agent, but heat cannot be separated from fire. This would imply, in contradiction to Aristotle's theory, a superiority of the potential to the actual; and besides, according to Aristotle, God's act is inseparable from Him—God is eternally in activity. p. 90. 1. 'Separated' seems to be used equivocally; as used here of God it seems to have the meaning of transcendent. p. 90. 2. Cf. below, notes 90. 4 and 90. 5. p. go. 3. For God's bounty as the motive of creation cf. Plato, Tim. 29 d, e and Plotinus, Enn. v. 4. I.

NOTES

65

p . 90. 4. This astonishing quotation—which as far as I know has never been discussed—is not found in a n y of the genuine or spurious works of Aristotle that have come to us. It seems a quotation from a Muslim religious writer rather t h a n from a Greek philosopher. However, by creation ex nihilo is not meant here the orthodox conception of a temporal creation ex nihilo, but an eternal creation. An eternal creation, as I have tried to show, is a contradictory conception, and of course t o regard such a creation as ex nihilo emphasizes the contradiction, since logically this can only m e a n that the creation was preceded by nothingness, although this is explicitly denied. This contradiction does not seem to have been felt by Averroes, but I do not think Aristotle can have expressed this contradiction so manifestly. O n the other h a n d , it does not seem improbable to m e t h a t this quotation is in some way connected with Aristotle's dialogue De philosophia, the theology of which seems to have been, according to the Epicurean in Cicero's De nat, deor.i. 13.33 (fr-26 Rose), somewhat confused. In the dialogues Aristotle expresses himself in a more popular way and takes on the exposition of his own ideas (cf. Cicero, Ad Alt. xiii. 19. 4). T h e passages ofDe philosophia quoted by Cicero (frr. 12, 22) show that Aristotle regarded the world as an eternal, divine work (opus); we find in De philosophia the proof for the existence of God, based on the degrees of being (fr. 16, from Simplicius, De caelo i. 9, p . 288.28 Heiberg; this proof is developed by Cleanthes—see Sext. E m p . Adv. phys. i. 88-93—and is one of the proofs of T h o m a s Aquinas); the stars are regarded in this dialogue as having voluntary movements (fr. 24 from Cicero, De nat. dear. ii. 16. 44) and, according to a passage in Ps.-Philo, De aetern. mundi (fr. 18), Aristotle accused in it those who did not recognize the eternity of the world as guilty of a terrible atheism, 8«nj dBeorqs, since they compared t h e transitory works of m a n , x*v<jis airri] Kad* iavrrjV €a ovra, TO. S* WS 6 Xoyos a/za, the moving cause precedes, but the formal cause is simultaneous. T h e father, for example, precedes the son as his efficient cause. Averroes means that God as an efficient cause acts eternally, although this eternal action is not implied in the idea of an efficient cause. p . 103. 3. e.g. according to Simplicius, Aristotle a n d Plato agree about the problem of creation: Aristotle only denies the coming into existence of the world in time from not-being into being (Comm. in libr. De Caelo, p . 103. 4 - 6 ) . Simplicius says—In Phys. libr. 1363. 8-12—that his master Ammonius wrote a special book with m a n y arguments, TTIVTCU, to show that according to Aristotle God is also the efficient cause (iroirjTtKov aXnov) of the Universe. This book was known to the Arabs, and is mentioned in the Fihrist, p . 253, u n d e r the title J l y J I j HLIU.jl ,_^' ivos).

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p. 108.4. i' e - the active Intellect; the connexion with the preceding sentence is not very clear; it would almost seem that Averroes identifies God here with the active Intellect; this is, as a matter of fact, Alexander of Aphrodisias' conception [De an. 80. 16-92. 11; Mantissa 106. ig-113. 24), which is not accepted by Averroes. p. 108. 5. This is not exact; see note 2.8. The passive Intellect is the same as the potential or material Intellect. p. 108.6. Compare Plotinus, Enn. vi. 5. I : TO ex KOX rairov aptfyuS rravraxov ajua oXov eivai KOIVT] p.iv TLS tvvoid (fyqoiv . . ., that the identical one

is wholly everywhere is a common human notion; instinctively we declare that the God who lives in us all is one and identical. p. 108. 7. The idea (which became one of the principles of Neoplatonism —see e.g. Proclus, Inst. Theol., prop. 7) that the cause possesses in the fullest measure that which it communicates to others, is, with this example taken from warmth, found in Aristotle's Metaphysics (a 1. 993b24—ascribed in the ancient world to Pasicles) : eVaoToi* 5e pAXiara avro TWV aAAcox KO.6' O /cat rots aXXois imapxei ro ovvcovvpov, otov ro -nop depfJ.6ra.Tov.

p. 109. 1. This sentence shows up the pelitio principii in the whole argument : 'since they are many'; but the problem is precisely, How can there be a many—how can the many proceed from the one ? p. 109. 2. i.e. the matter of the sublunary world. p. 109. 3. The term 'First Intellect' is confusing. The 'First Intellect' corresponds to the vovs of the Neoplatonic system, according to which the absolute First, the Monad, does not think. But according to the Arabic philosophers God, the First, is Himself intellect—a theory found as early as Simplicius. Comm. in Enchir. Epict. c. 38, who asserts that the highest principle, the apxq apxwv, the God of Gods, possesses the highest yvuioi-s. p. 109. 4. i.e. the sphere surrounding the world assumed by Ptolemy to explain the precession of the equinoxes (see my Ep. d. Met. d. Av., note 112. 6).

p. n o . 1. i.e. these intellects are of a gradually diminishing unification and dignity. According to Proclus, Inst. Theol., prop. 95, the more unified a power, the more capable it is of infinitude, naaa 8vmp.is, iviKunepa ovoa, rfjs nA'rjdvvoiJievrjs dn€t.poT€pa.

p. 110. 2. For the degree of nobility compare Proclus, Inst. Theol., prop. 129: All divine bodies are divine through the influence of a divine soul, all divine souls through a divine intellect, and all divine intellects through participation in a divine monad. p. n o . 3. Or from a superior intellect, for this process repeats itself eight times, since there are nine spheres. •••'

NOTES

75

p. 110.4. This sentence invalidates the whole theory; there is an admission here that there is something in the effect which is not found in the cause, that although the Monad is the ultimate Source of everything, the effect cannot be wholly deduced from the cause. The same contradiction is found in Proclus, who, notwithstanding his theory of gradual emanation, admits aiBimoarara, self-subsistent entities (Inst. Theol., prop. 40). Further, Aristotle's monism of a First Mover or a First Cause is contradicted by his pluralism, by his acceptance (Met. A 8. 1073a33) of a number of unmoved movers for the planets. p. 110. 5. This section contains a succinct exposition of the ingenious theory of emanation, as it is found amongst the Arabic philosophers (e.g. in Avicenna, Recovery of the Soul, Met. ix. 6 and Salvation, pp. 448 sqq., and especially p. 455; Farabi, The Ideal State, p. 19; and also in Averroes in his Ep. d. Met. d. Av.—see my translation, p. 131 —who seems there to accept the general principles of the theory he denies here). This theory combines Aristotle's astronomical theory with the Neoplatonic theory of emanation, and introduces into the Aristotelian framework Proclus' conception of the triadic process of emanation, pivtiv, lrpoUvtu, imarpefeiv (Inst. Theol., prop- 35)Although this theory is by no means consonant with the general naturalistic trend of Aristotle's system, there are two aspects of his philosophy in which it may be defended or from which it can be deduced. (1) In the closing chapters of his theology (Met. A) God is much more than a mere Prime Mover: the world hangs on God (IJ/?TT)Tv ov ironyriov. A thing is not good because God has ordained it, but God has ordained it because it is good. T h e relativist Carneades, for whom morals exist only in relation to society and who maintained t h a t the terms 'right' a n d 'wrong' can therefore not be applied to God—see Cicero, De nat. deor. iii. 15. 38—had objected that if God had virtue by nature, H e would stand under the power of the moral law—cf. Sext. E m p . Adv.phys. i. 176. T h e Mu'tazilites fully grant the inference, and admit that just as in the logical domain God's power is restricted, since even H e cannot perform what is logically contradictory, H e is also bound by the moral law, and it is of necessity that H e has ordained w h a t H e has ordained and forbidden w h a t H e has forbidden; indeed, H e stands under the double bondage of reason: that of pure reason and that of practical. T h e orthodox Muslim, however, denies that there is any necessity for God in the moral domain. It was possible, %JU-, for God to impose other laws t h a n those H e has actually decreed.

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p . 112. 2. Positions, i.e. they keep a certain order, rdgis, in Latin ordo (cf. Cicero, De nat. dear. ii. 16. 43). p . 112. 3 . K o r a n xxxvii. 164. p . 112. 4 . Connexion, L L i j I , i.e. their order a n d union, ovorams, Ps.-Aristotle De mundo 5. 3 9 6 b 2 3 : •q TWV SXWV ovoraois.

cf.

p . 112. 5 . i.e. the systematic study of their works, beginning with logic, cf. Aristotle, Met. r 3. I005 b 2. p . 112. 6. O n e m a y freely accept, says Aristotle, Top. A 10. I 0 4 a n , t h a t on which the wise agree, when it does not stand in opposition to the opinion of t h e m a n y . This is contrary to Epicurus' aristocratic view, see Seneca, Ep. 29. 10: ' n u n q u a m volui populo placere, n a m q u a e ego scio, non probat p o p u l u s ; quae probat populus, ego nescio'. p . 113. 1. Cf. e.g. Cicero, De nat. dear. ii. 16. 4 3 : 'scnsum a u t e m astrorum a t q u e intellegentiam m a x u m e declarat ordo eorum et constantia; nihi lest enim quod ratione et n u m e r o moveri possit sine consilio, in q u o nihil est temerarium, nihil varium, nihil fortuitum . . . . ' p . 113. 2. Conservation, j i i » . , ouirqpta, cf. Ps.-Aristotle, De mundo 6. 400*4. p . 1 1 3 . 3 . I* w a s Aristotle who first asserted—De gen. et con. B 10. 336*31—that it was t h e sun's movement o n the ecliptic, 17 (fiopa Kara TOT Xo(ov KVKXOV, which influenced all earthly change, all earthly becoming a n d decay. All t h a t follows agrees with the traditional views of the Stoic theodicy, cf. e.g. Cicero, De nat. deor. ii. 19 a n d ii. 40. p . 113. 4 . Cf. Aristotle, Meteor. B 4 . 361*7. p . 113. 5. K o r a n xiv. 3 7 ; xvi. 12. p . 114. 1. T h e better being cannot fail to possess in the highest degree the best qualities) i.e. life and reason. T h e basic idea of this argument is Stoic, cf. Cicero, De not. deor. ii. 14. 3 8 : H o w can the world, which embraces all things, fail to possess that which is the best ? But there is nothing better than intelligence a n d reason: t h e world therefore cannot be without them. p . 114. 2. K o r a n xl. 59. p . 114. 3. Cf. e.g. Cicero, De nat. deor. ii. 3 1 . 7 9 : if mankind possesses intellect, faith, virtue, whence can these have flowed down to the earth, if not from the gods ? p . 114. 4. For the gods—according to Plotinus (Enn. v. 8. 3 ) — a r e not concerned with h u m a n affairs, they contemplate only the Divine a n d the Intelligible: Kal iaaot. irdvra, teal yiyvdiOKOvai ov ra avBpwTrcia, dAAd TO iavrwvy r d #cta Kal offa vovs opa. p . 114. 5. K o r a n xli. 10.

NOTES

79

p. 115. 1. Cf. e.g. Cicero, De not. deor. ii. 5. 13: when a man goes into a house or a gymnasium or to the market place, and sees the method, the order, the discipline in all things that happen there, he cannot possibly suppose that all this comes about without a cause, but he understands that there is someone who commands and whose orders are obeyed. p. 115. 2. Koran vi. 75. p. 115. 3. According to Averroes' Ep. d. Met. (see my translation, p. 113) there are forty-five of these movers, if each of the seven planets has its own mover for its daily revolution. 'Seven or eight' seems rather strange; one would have expected 'eight or nine', i.e. one for the daily movement of the heaven of the fixed stars, seven for the daily movement of the planets, and a problematic one to explain the precession of the equinoxes (/xcTanrcuOTj). Compare for all this my Ep. d. Met. d. Av.t pp. 112-13 and notes. p. 115. 4. Cf. Plotinus, Enn. v. 5. 3 : 0 St eject paoiXevs OVK aXKorplwy apxcov, dAA* e\oJV TTJV St/caioTarqv /cat (f>voei. apxrjv /cat rqv OLXTJ8TJ jSaatAciai*, arc rrjs dXySeias fHaaiXevs /cat tuv Kara (j>vatv Kvpios TOV aurou ddpoov ycenj-

fiaros . . . . In yonder world the king does not govern like a man governs aliens, He exercises the most just and the most natural government, the true kingdom, for He is the King of Truth and has by nature power over all those He has engendered Himself. p. 115. 5. Koran xix. 94. p. 116. 1. Koran vi. 75. p. 116. 2. Probably Averroes thinks here of ru>v Bavparaiv ravropjira, 'those marvellous things which move themselves', mentioned by Aristotle, Met. A 2. 983" 14, at which people wonder who have not yet ascertained their causes. p. 117. 1. The proof, of course, that it is necessary. p. 117. 2. For then in the First also the necessity of existence would create a duality. Ghazali's argument is excellent and unassailable, and exposes clearly the surreptitious introduction of duality. The basic idea was put forward by Aenesidemus (Sext. Emp. Adv. phys. i. 219 sqq.) in his denial of causation: a cause can only act by either remaining by itself or joining with something else. In the first case, it cannot effect anything but its own nature, in the latter case the two together cannot produce a third; therefore nothing can come into being which did not exist previously. p. 118. 1. A condition, ij U., mis (xov> something subjective, i.e. not something outside the soul, an external relation (for Averroes often regards all relations as subjective, as is frequent in post-Aristotelian philosophy, or even as negations). p. 118. 2. i.e. the necessary is that which has no cause (or rather which needs no cause) for its existence; all other entities have (or need) causes for their existence. We shall discuss later this definition of the 'necessary'.

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p . 118. 3. Averroes here raises incidentally the important problem of those notions, like 'one' a n d 'being', which are predicated of everything and are called by the schoolmen notiones transcendentales (the aporia of 'one' and 'being' is discussed by Aristotle, Met. B 3. 9 g 8 b i 4 : they are not genera, because they have no species), and which Averroes seems here to regard as subjective (unity he regards, in fact, as negative, cf. Aristotle's definition of [lovas—Met. A 6. I0l6 b 24—25—as TO Kara TO TTOOOV f[ rroaov dhiaiptrov rrdvrrj /cat aderov). T h e whole discussion is irrelevant to Ghazali's argument and does not invalidate his dichotomy: if necessity a n d possibility do not a d d anything to existence, then neither the necessary existent nor the possible existent contains a plurality, and the emanation of a plurality out of the M o n a d remains unexplained. p. 118. 4. T h e real possible, matter, is transitory; the first effect is eternal, i.e. necessary, although it is possible. T h e same contradiction exists for Aristotle: the material world is eternal, i.e. necessary, although m a t t e r is potential a n d nothing potential is eternal. T h e contradiction rests finally on the confusion between logical a n d ontological necessity. Cf. notes 53. 6 a n d 163. 4. p . 118. 5. W e are here involved in a circle: Averroes seems here to regard b o t h 'necessary' a n d 'possible' as mere negations, 'necessary' being the negation of 'possible' and 'possible' the negation of 'necessary'. p . 118. 6. H e seems to m e a n that if, through the necessity in it, there were a duality in the necessary existent, the necessary existent would be necessary by itself a n d at the same time its necessity would be caused by the necessity in i t ; but then the necessary existent would not be necessary by itself. p . 118. 7. Cf. K a n t , Krit. d. rein. Vernunft, A 598, B 626: 'Sein ist kein reales Pradikat d. i. ein BegrirT von irgend etwas, was zu d e m Begriffe eines Dinges hinzukommen konne.' p . 118. 8. W h e n we say a thing exists, or a thing is one, 'exists' a n d 'one' are predicates arid therefore, according to Avicenna, accidents (for the discussion of this theory see m y Ep. d. Met. d. Av., p p . 8 a n d 17 a n d notes). p . 118. 9. This is not correct; the theory is originally Aristotelian, e.g. rwv p,kv Srj ertpov atriov rov dvayKala eivat, rtov Sc ovdev, aAAa Sta ravra ercpd eariv ig aviyK-qs, some things have an extraneous cause of their necessity, others not, but are themselves the cause of necessity in other things (Met. A 5. i o i 5 b i o ; for the discussion of this theory see m y Ep. d. Met. d. Av., p . 150). p . 119. 1. For Aristotle this composition exists in the generated only: every individual is the synthesis of two things, matter and form, and it is its matter to which possibility is attributed, e.g. De gen. et corr. B 9. 335"32: (is* pt-tv ovv v\-q rots yewqrots tariv atriov TO Svvarov eiVat Kat p.7] eivai. Cf., however, n o t e 141. 2.

NOTES

81

p. 119. 2. This is rather a curious way of putting it, since 'relation' is one of the ten categories. As we have seen, the Stoics, the Sceptics, and also the Muslim theologians regarded relations as subjective. p. 119. 3. This does not seem to me to follow from the sentence he quotes. p. 119. 4. This seems in absolute opposition to the view held by Aristotle, and by Averroes himself, that all becoming is but the transition of a preexistent potentiality to actuality. p. 120. 1. This is the very point Ghazali makes. p. 120. 2. I think he means that every body has actually a unity, i.e. it is one, but is a synthesis of matter and form, and, since matter represents the potential, is a plurality potentially. p. 120. 3. For, since it is pure form, it lacks matter—i.e. potency, the principle of plurality. p. 120. 4. But a thing is either simple or composite—tertium non datur. p. 120. 5. The theory seems something of a petitio principii. Ghazali asks: 'How, from the absolutely simple One, can a plurality proceed?' Averroes answers: 'The One is absolutely simple, but contains potentially a plurality, i.e. a plurality proceeds from it.' p. 121. 1. This form, i.e. this second principle. p. 121. 2. In the soul of an individual man there are, according to the Arabian Aristotelians, different intellects, e.g. the material and the active intellect, i.e. different forms having different definitions. The second principle would therefore be a composite intellect like the intellect of man. p. 121. 3. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In Met. lib. xii. 11: 'nee tamen sequitur quod omnia alia a se ei sunt ignota; nam intelligendo se intelligit omnia alia'. p. 121. 4. Of course this is no answer to Ghazali's objection. >— p. 122. 1. The thing known is the perfection of the knower: 8ui«ifi« wco? c a r t Ta vorjra 6 vovs, aAA* eWeAe^ct'a oi)8eV, Trplv av vofj ( A r i s t . De an. T4. 4 2 9 b 3 0 J

however, God's Intellect is eternally in act, eternally in perfection). Avicenna affirms {Salvation, p. 404) that God, knowing Himself and knowing that He is the principle of everything, knows everything that emanates- from Him, but knows individual things only in a universal way. But Avicenna denies (op. cit., p. 403) that God knows things through the things themselves, for in this case His essence would depend on these things (i.e. if through my free will I perform an act and God knows this act, God's knowledge will depend on my action). The difference between Avicenna and Averroes here consists, therefore, only in the fact that Averroes denies that it is through God's knowledge that He is their principle, that He knows all things. For Averroes the essence of God consists in all things knowable in the noblest

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form of knowledge (according to the Aristotelian theory that the Intellect in act is identical with the things known). p. 122. 2. But compare p. 120 and note 130. 4, and below: 'they need not all have the same degree of simplicity', and p. 123. p. 123. 1. i.e. the intellect would not know the things as they are. p. 123. 2. Cf. Aristotle, Anal. Post. A i. 71"!: naaa SiSaonaMa xa.1 nana [idOijais Siavo7]TiKy oc irpoihTapxova-ns ylverai yvuivews. p. 123. 3. Possibly he is here referring to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who admits that the natural and necessary consequences of God's causation are known to Him (Quaest. nat. ii. 21), i.e. that there is in God a npoma, a providence for the sublunary world. At De fato xxx (see also the passage in Freudenthal, Die dutch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders, p. 112) Alexander denies the Stoic theory that the gods know future events; for future events are not yet determined, contain a potential element, and are infinite, and are therefore unknowable before they come into actuality. It is unreasonable to attribute even to the gods knowledge of the unknowable; even for them the impossible keeps its character. Avicenna's theory, which I shall discuss later in more detail, seems an elaboration of Alexander's. p. 124. 1. A similar objection is made by Aristotle (De an. A 5. 4io b 4 sqq., cf. Met.B^. iooob3) to Empedocles, whose theory, according to Aristotle, would imply that God is the most unintelligent, cufipovirrraTos, of beings, since He alone cannot know what every mortal being knows. p. 124. 2. Koran xviii. 49. p. 124. 3. 'who think wicked thoughts about God': words used at Koran xlviii. 6. p. 125. 1. Averroes is here referring probably to Met. A 8. io74 b 9, where Aristotle says that the arts and sciences in fact do perish, and that in the first utterances of science there is something like a divine inspiration, Bums elprjoBai, according to the faulty Arabic rendering followed by Averroes (Met., p. 1687 Bouyges): LJ*')1\ JjiJI dlli j l J^^J. Human affairs turn in a circle, (f>aal yap KVK\OV elvai ra avOpumiva Trpdypara, Phys. A 14. 223b24, p. 125. 2. Ibn Hazm, op. cit. i. 72. The superhuman origin of the sciences and arts is current in Greek mythology. It is embodied, for example, in the myth of Prometheus (the 'Fore-Thinker'), Hephaestus, and Athena as told by Plato, Pit. 274 c. Ibn Hazm says, loc. cit., line 1: 'We know clearly that man could never have acquired sciences and arts guided solely by his own natural powers and without being taught.' He enumerates different sciences (e.g. medicine and astronomy) and arts, which man could never have acquired without divine assistance. One of the examples he gives is language 'which man could never have fixed by convention without using another language or by starting from another language' (according to Aristotle,

NOTES

83

De interpr. c. 2. 16*19, language, although not the psychological basis of language, is fixed by convention, Seaa, or /card owfyictpi; Epicurus asserts that language exists by nature, (pvaei, cf. Diog. Laert. x. 75). p. 125. 3. The substance, jAyjJI, here synonymous with the essence o l H I , i.e. the substance or the essence /car e£oxrjv'. God. p. 126. 1. God as the reckoner: Koran iv. 7 and xxxiii. 39. p. 126.2. According to Aristotle, however (De an. r 3. 427 b n and 428" 11), perception, aioOrjms, is always true; only through judgement and imagination are we liable to error. But Zeno affirmed (Cic. Acad. post. i. 14. 41) that one should not have faith in all sense-impressions (visis, ^avraalais), but only in those that are trustworthy, i.e. tjxunaaLai. KaraX-rjimKai; against which Epicurus said (Cic. De nat. dear. i. 25. 70) that if one single senseimpression were false, none would be true. p. 126. 3. In normal cases, like the generation of man from man, the father (the proximate agent, TO iyyvrarov atriov, i^jJiJI Aclill) and the son are identical in species (man), but in abnormal cases, like the generation of the mule from a horse and a donkey, they participate only in the genus next above them (cf. Arist. Met. Z 8. I033b33). p. 126. 4. He refers here possibly to Strato (see note 251. 1) or the naturalistic theory ascribed to Avicenna, in his Oriental Philosophy; see below, note 254. 4. p. 127. 1. I think he means, by 'abstract principle, connected with the heavenly bodies', one or possibly more immaterial movers of heavenly bodies. A principle inferior to God would be, for example, the World-Soul or the First Intellect. p. 127. 2. 'elements': the text has ik~~JI flj»Vl, T£ff€8opd.S

S^KTIKOV.

p. 128. 3. Cf. Aristotle, De caelo A 10. 280*24. p. 128. 4. Perception is the reception in the soul of the form of the external thing perceived without the matter, Aristotle, De an. B 12. 424": 7; intellect is a form which knows or apprehends intelligible forms, Aristotle, De an. r 8. 43ib20~432"3 (for this theory compare my Ep. d. Met. d. Av., note 47. 6). p. 128. 5. Cf. Aristotle, Met. A 7. I072 b l8: ij Si roijcrij ij Ka6' avrrjv TOU Ka9* avro dplarov, /cat r] /xdAiora TOU fiaXurra..

p. 128. 6. i.e. the relation of intellectual to sensible existence is like the relation of craftsmanship to its material (otov 17 rixw) Tpos rqv VXTJV, De an. r 5. 430*12); the image (CISOJAOV) of the craftsmanship, says Plotinus (Enn. v. 9. 5), penetrates into the matter, but the craftsmanship itself remains in its identity outside the matter. p. 129. 1. This is the important Plotinian theory of creative knowledge. If the First Intellect, says Plotinus (Enn. v. 9. 5), has to be the creative power of the Universe, it cannot think it, in creating it, as existing in that which does not yet exist. The intelligibles must therefore exist prior to the world, and cannot be an image of the sensible things; on the contrary they are their archetypes . . . . This theory was accepted by both Christian and Muhammadan theologians. We know the things because they are; they are because God knows them. St. Augustine says (De trin. xv. 22): 'with respect to all His creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, He does not know them, because they are, but they are because He knows them' ('non quia sunt, ideo novit, sed ideo sunt, quia novit'). And John Scotus Eriugena, De div. nat. Migne, exxii. 596 B, says: ' . . . divina siquidems cientiao mnium, quae sunt, causa est. Non enim ideo Deus scit ea, quae sunt, quia subsistunt, sed ideo

i

,

NOTES

85

subsistunt, quia Deus ea scit.' Compare St. Thomas Aquinas, Summ. Theol. i, qu. 14, art. 10. We shall see that this theory is accepted also by Ghazali (cf. too his analogous doctrine that God differentiates things through His choice, not that He chooses them because they are differentiated). p. 129. 2. For this compare Ptolemaeus, Hypotheses (ex Arab, interpret, est L. Nix, Leipzig, 1907), p. 119, and note 115. I of my Ep. d. Met. d. Av. p. 130. 1. For it is a basic principle of Neoplatonism that emanation implies a progressive degradation (itjC-rrjXov), e.g. Enn. iii. 8. 4 : 6p.oyeve$ yap del Set TO yewcofievov etvai- aadevearepov p.ev rut e£tTT]\ov KaraflaZvov yiyveadai.

p. 130. 2. In this rather obscure sentence there is of course a contradiction : if the First is the cause of everything, the inferior Intellects cannot create anything. Averroes means evidently that the First is only the first or supreme cause of everything and that the inferior Intellects are subordinate causes. By 'saying6 each intellect is the cause of its own essence, i.e. the human intellect', I think Averroes means that all these separate {x^piaros, cf. De an. r 5. 430*17) Intellects are (or are the cause of) the Active Intellect (o rroi-qriKos vovs) which exists in each human being from birth to death, whenever he thinks. p. 130. 3. These are God's seven attributes, about which madan theologians agree, although they disagree about their p. 130.4. i.e. God is the unique efficient cause. p. 130. 5. The Ash'arites, like the Stoics, ascribe to God individual things. Against this the Peripatetics hold (see

the Muhamnature. knowledge of Alexander of

Aphrodisias' argument in Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Frgm. Alexanders, p . 113

and my Ep. d. Met. d. Av., p. 145) that the knowledge of individuals, since there is in infinite time an infinite number of them, would imply an infinite actual knowledge, and an actual infinite is impossible even for God. p. 131. 1. i.e. they could not explain the relation. p. 131. 2. Averroes refers here to the Stoic argument of the Ash'arites, that everything in the world is transitory and that which is transitory in its parts is transitory as a whole. p. 131. 3. i.e. there is no objective necessity in them, since the things of this world have no 'natures', characters, dispositions, capacities. p. 131. 4. This may mean either that there are no virilis de raison (the Ash'arites, however—but not orthodox theologians like Ibn Hazm— admitted that the contradictory is not possible even for God) or that the intellect cannot find any necessity in the world. p. 131. 5. This is a true and profound remark: if there is no necessity in things, there can be no wisdom, no reason, in their maker. For wisdom implies necessity, since reason is the making of inferences, the finding of

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objective necessities. It may be added that to ascribe wisdom to God is to deny His omniscience, as was seen by Garneades, who said (Sext. Emp. Adv. phys. i. 167-8) that God cannot possess reason ((fipovrjais) and cannot deliberate (fSovXcveoBai), since one who reasons has not yet found. It is the prerogative of man to reason and to act, because he partly knows, partly does not know. All action implies a supposition and the knowledge of a necessary relation: I can act voluntarily when I know that, if I do this, that will happen. All reasoning implies an ignorance and the possible knowledge of a necessity: I reason when I want to find that, if, when I do this, that will happen. p. 131. 6. This is very true; cf. note 89.3. p. 131. 7. i.e. we infer voluntary action in the Divine only by analogy with voluntary action in ourselves. p. 132. 1. Namely God who possesses attributes. p. 132. 2. i.e. they proved thai: the heavens are produced by admitting in them accidents, i.e. transitoriness, and by the argument that that which is transitory in its part is transitory as a whole. p. 132. 3. i.e. they supposed that this creation had taken place ex nihilo. p. 132. 4. i.e. ex nihilo. p. 132. 5. Koran xxiii. 12-14. p. 132. 6. Koran xxi. 31. p. 132. 7. Koran xi. 9. p. 132. 8. Koran xli. 10. p. 132. 9. According to the Aristotelians the individuality of a thing is based on its being composed of matter and form; but every atom is an individual by itself, in its simplicity. p. 133. 1. It is the non-cold (the warm, for omnis determinatio est negatio) which takes the place of the cold, when a thing becomes warm. Every negative is just as much an object of the mind as the positive, and possesses therefore a certain reality, according to Aristotle. The non-existent world was, according to the Mu'tazilites, an object of God's thought before the creation of the world. God creates the world by conferring on this object of His thought the attribute of existence (for existence is an attribute for the Mu'tazilites and for Avicenna, though not for the Ash'arites and Averroes). p. 133. 2. Cf. my Ep. d. Met. d. Av., note 63. 2, for the inherence of corporeality in primary matter. p. 133. 3. e.g. an individual man has individual transitory qualities, and therefore the individual man is transitory; but man as a universal is a rational being, this rationality which is one generically is eternal and has no first term; therefore, why should man in general be produced ?

NOTES

87

p . 133. 4. 'necessary', i.e. it is a necessary, evident proposition for the philosophers t h a t infinitum actu non datur. But the philosophers a n d Ash'arites did not agree a b o u t the infinitum actu. p . 134. 1. i.e. the father is the cause of the son, but the father is himself a son, i.e. t h e effect of another father; if therefore the power t h e father h a d t o generate a son h a d to come to him from a father who h a d generated him, we should have a n infinite regress. T h e r e must therefore be a power (an all-pervading power, Swa^u? Sid TTJS UAIJ? Tre^om^Kuia, as the Stoics have it) which moves the matter in itself motionless {vXi) KO.8' ai-r^v SLKCVTJTOS) of the Universe, a n d this power will be God. This Stoic a r g u m e n t (see Sext. E m p . Adv. phys. i. 75-77) is a logical correction and consequence of Aristotle's doctrine of the prime mover. According to Aristotle there is an infinite sequence of fathers a n d sons, of causes a n d effects. But all change derives ultimately from a prime mover, itself unmoved, not itself a n effect. This prime mover, however, is not at the beginning of the causal series father-son-father, since this series is infinite, but, moving eternally, is so eternal with this series; the prime mover is therefore, in fact, t h e unique mover, the unique cause, a n d source of all change. p . 134. 2. This is in agreement with Aristotle's theory of movement, e.g. Phys. 0 4. 255*16: we must always distinguish the mover from the moved, just as we see this when a living agent moves a lifeless t h i n g ; and Phys. 0 5. 2 5 7 b 9 : m e mover is already an actual existent, TO Se KIMOVV TJSTJ evepyeiif eariv; but I do not see how this refutes the Ash'arite argument. p . 134. 3. i.e. that there is no causation in the world. p . 134. 4. ' e n d ' : this is just the p o i n t ; the series father-son-father is infinite, a n d does not end in an agent which itself is not a n effect, i.e. the prime mover, b u t the prime mover acts eternally a n d is coeternal with the series, which would not exist at all without this prime mover. p . 134. 5. This is both Aristotelian a n d Neoplatonic. For Aristotle everything immaterial is indivisible, Met. A 9. 1075*7: dSiaiperov vw TO \ir\ eypv vX-qv. I n God the thinker and the thought are identical, and the divine t h o u g h t is eternally indivisible. F o r Neoplatonism compare, for example, Proclus, Jnstit. theol. v, prop. 4 7 : vav TO avdvirooraTov dfiepes eariKai dir\ovvt 'all that is self-subsistent is without parts a n d simple', and its proof; a n d especially Plotinus, Enn. v. 4. 1 : TO TC p.rj dnXovv rwv 4v avrw OTTAIOI/ Bcop.evov tv' $ t'f iKiivmv, ' t h a t which is not simple needs simple entities for its composition'. This doctrine has profoundly influenced monotheistic theology, Christian (see next note), M u h a m m a d a n , a n d Jewish. I n M u h a m m a d a n theology the w o r d JL»._yj, 'God's one-ness', i.e. ' t h e uniqueness of God', takes also the meaning of God's simplicity. This problem will be discussed later in extenso.

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p. 134.6. i.e. they are termini transcendentales. For this theory of the M u ' t a zilites see, for example, Shahrastani, o p . cit. ed. Cureton, i. 30, and Baghdadi, The Different Sects, p . 93. T h a t there is no composition in God is also affirmed by the Alexandrian Fathers, e.g. St. Athanasius (Migne, xxvi. 1044 B) : 01) yip crvv8eTO$ 6 8e6s o TO. TTOVTO ek TO elvoj. owreOttKws . . .' amXr/ yap ioriv ovaia eV J5 OVK evi Troiorqs, God who has compounded everything is not Himself compounded . . . for a substance in which there is no attribute is simple. p . 134. 7. T h e Ash'arites assert that God's attributes are distinct from His essence. p . 135. 1. Cf. e.g. Aristotle, Met. B 1. g95 b 2 and Top. A 2. 101*35. p . 135. 2. 'God's essence exceeds even the understanding of the blessed in their mystical union with God' ('excedit ipsam copulationem intellectus beatorum, qui essentiam Dei vident per copulationem'), says T h o m a s Aquinas following Dionysius Areopagita, De divin. nom. v. 1. p . 135. 3. Averroes refers here to the theory originally held by the Mu'tazilite A b u Hashim (cf. e.g. F a k h r ad-Din al-Razi, Compendium of the Opinions of the Ancients, Cairo, H . 1323, p . 111), t h a t God possesses a positive quality which characterizes H i m , i.e. His being God, His divinity (i_fc VI), other theologians denied this (see Razi, loc. cit.) and applied to God the method of negation, J b y 5 (literally ' r e m o v a l ' ; the word is an exact translation of the term 6nj>aipeois), i.e. they asserted that God h a d to be described by negation, a n d that there are negative qualities in H i m , a n d that the positive qualities H e possesses H e does not possess in the way other beings possess them. Negative theology is a characteristic of Neoplatonism (see Enn. v. 3. 13, where the First is said to be ineffable, app-qTov) and, indeed, of all mysticism, since in its ultimate consequence the elimination or synthesis of opposites in the Absolute—as in the self-contradictory assertion of Dionysius Areopagita that nothing positive or negative can be asserted of that which is itself the cause of everything positive and negative, 17 navraiv Qeais, 17 TTavruiv aaipeo~LS, TO vrrep iraaav KOL deotv teal atfratpeaiv—it is the total surrender of reason before the mystery of God. Negative theology is emphasized especially by the later Neoplatonists; e.g. for Damascius, De principiis (Kopp, p p . 5 sqq.), the First is neither a cause nor a non-cause, neither a principle nor not a principle, neither at the beginning of the Universe nor transcending it (eWKeim 77-aj^-ajv). Dionysius Areopagita, in his Mystical Theology, iv and v, enumerates more t h a n fifty negations about God. p . 1 3 5 . 4 . This is rather unusual, for according to the Arabic philosophers (Averroes included) the Platonic ideas, i.e. the universals, exist eternally in the mind of God (this synthesis of Plato and Aristotle is found already in Middle-Platonism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, a n d Philo J u d a e u s ) . But b y 'universals' Averroes here evidently means the universals that have a

NOTES

89

transitory existence in the minds of m e n and are abstracted from individual things in the way described by Aristotle, Anal. Post. B ig. Averroes here employs both the method of theology per negationem and that of theology per analogiam or per eminentiam (iTrepoyr)). God has a thought superior to our thought, b u t none of the attributes of our thought is valid for God's thought. T h e obvious objection is to ask how God's thought can be regarded as thought at all. According to Dionysius Areopagita, there is a threefold way to the knowledge of G o d : by absolute negation, by absolute superiority, a n d by regarding H i m as the absolute cause (cV TTJ TTCLVTUIV acu.pdaei KO.1 imepoxfj KCU iv TJJ irdvTwv airta (De div. notn. viii. 3). p. 135. 5. Cf., however, the argument of Alexander of Aphrodisias against God's knowledge of individuals (note 130. 5), an argument which Averroes copies in his Epitome (see m y translation, p . 145). p. 136. 1. T h e implication of this petitio principii would seem to be that the order of the Universe proves definitely the existence of a creative intellect. p. 136. 2. T h a t existence or being has different degrees is a basic idea of Aristotelian t h o u g h t : TO Se 6V XeyeTai pkv noXXaxoos says Aristotle, e.g. at the beginning of T 2 of his Metaphysics; and at Met. F 2. ioo3 b 6 he says: some things are spoken of as being, because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance (ird0ij ovalas), others because they lead towards substance . . . and therefore we say that even non-being is non-being. p . 136. 3. A strange conception, but a consequence of a theory of perception without a n ' e g o ' ; cf. Aristotle, De an. F 2. 4 2 5 b 2 2 : STI Se Kai TO opwv etrnv cos /cexpto/xaTicrrai • TO yap aiadrjTTjptov SCKTLKOV rod alcjdijrov avev rfjs vXrjs ZKO-OTOV, i.e. that which sees is, in the act of seeing, in a way coloured, for it receives without its matter the identical form which exists in the coloured object perceived. p. 136. 4. Imagination, which according to Aristotle differs from senseperception and is included in thought, is the faculty in virtue of which we say that an image presents itself to us, 17 tpavraoia. KO.8' T}V X4yop.ev tpduraafxa Tt r)p,tv ylyveodal (De an. F 3. 4 2 8 a l ) . p . 136. 5. M e m o r y is imagination consciously referring to a n earlier perception of which the image is a copy, Aristotle, De mem. 1. 44g>24 sqq. p . 136. 6. T h a t the universe is a unified body, r)vcupivov n ouip.a, kept together through its one cohesive power, eft?, is a Stoic doctrine, cf, Sext.

Emp. Adv. phys. i. 77-78. p . 137. 1. T h a t the first tendency of the animal is towards its own preservation (ry TrpwTrj oppi) cm TO TTjpetv eafTo Diog. Laert. vii. 85, cf. v. Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Fr. iii. 43 sqq.) is a Stoic doctrine which is found, for example, in

go

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

St. Augustine {De civ. dei xi. 28), Thomas Aquinas {Contr. gent. iii. 65), Hobbes {English Works, Molesworth, iv. 83), and Spinoza ('una quaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo perseverare conatur', Eth. iii, prop. 6). According to the Stoic doctrine as exposed by Cicero {Defin.iii. 20) there is no conflict between self-love and the equally natural love of humanity: the theatre of the world is open to all, although every spectator has a right to his own seat. And Seneca says {Ep. 48. q): 'alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere', you cannot but live for others, if you want to live for yourself. p. 137. 2. i.e. mevfia, spiritus, the Stoic life-spirit. p. 137.3. The analogy between the world, the macrocosm (the term 'macrocosm' is not found in classical Greek; Aristotle—see below—has lieyas Koopos; it occurs for the first time in its Latin form in Higden, 14th century, but it may well be older, cf. O.E.D. s.v.), and the living being (especially man), the microcosm, was maintained by various Greek philosophers, e.g. Democritus (fr. 34 Diels), Plato, Aristotle {Phys. 8 2. 252 b 24: el 8* iv t,opp.al Trpos TCL VOTJT& (known to the Arabs under the title J y i * * J I j (JJuJI ( j , cf. A. Mueller, Die griechischen Philosophen in der arab. Vberlieferung, p . 25). p . 155. 1. Cf. note 142. 8. p . 155. 2. i.e. so far as these acts aim at the conservation of the sublunary world; for the less noble cannot be w h a t the more noble aims at (see e.g. Porphyry, Sententiae 30). p . 155. 3. i.e. their efficient causes, i.e. the third principle, ij Tpirrj apxq, (besides matter and form) of which Aristotle says (De gen. et con. B 9. 335 b 7) that none of his predecessors h a d been able to establish it, although they h a d some slight inkling of it. p . 155. 4. hvo Kivrjoeis (De gen. et corr. B 10. 336"34), the two motions of the sun along the ecliptic by which it approaches and recedes from a n y given point on the earth. p . 155. 5. See the parallel passage (p. 136 and notes). T h e question of the common internal sense, sensus communis, aiaffycrij KOIVTJ (see e.g. De an. r 1. 425 a 27) I shall treat later. p . 156. 1. T h e world, in the state it exists in, i.e. our world, the world as a cosmos, a n ordered whole. p. 156. 2. See note 33. 1; cf. also I b n H a z m , op. cit. i. 2 4 : becoming implies a prior non-existence, o f ^ ^ i «-) L. _yt ( i i j ^ c j l ^r-> • I t m a y b e added here t h a t Zacharias of Mytilene, a contemporary of Philoponus, who in the same way as Philoponus tried to refute Proclus' arguments for the eternity of the world, attempted, in his dialogue Ammonius seu de mundi opificio, to rebut Ammonius Hermiae's arguments for this eternity, also asserts that an eternal creation is a contradiction in terms (op. cit., ed. Migne, lxxxv. 1093). p . 156. 3. Because of the factual evidence

NOTES

IOI a

p . 156. 4 . Aristotle distinguishes, Met. 0 8. iO5O 30, the actuality which is in the product, e.g. the house which is being built, from the actuality which is in the exercise of the action itself, e.g. the act of seeing which is in the seeing subject. p . 156. 5. Cf. p p . 9 8 - 9 9 and notes 98. 3 a n d gg. 2. p . 157. 1. T h e Arabic word I translate by 'has come into being' is ii>} U.. I have translated the same term one line above b y ' t e m p o r a l ' ; t h e speciousness of the argument lies in the ambiguity of this term. p . 157. 2. Aristotle lays down as a condition for the First Principle t h a t it must be itself unmoved, that it must be a n unmoved mover, Phys. 8 5. 257a3'-257b'3p . 158. 1. By 'materialistic theory' is meant not only the mechanistic a n d atomistic conception of nature held by Democritus and Epicurus (for the arguments against Democritus cf. Arist. De gen. an. E 8), but also such a system as that of Strato, who denies the need for an immaterial divine principle for the explanation of the universe (cf. Cic. Acad. Pr. ii. 38. 121 'Strato . . . negat opere deorum se uti ad fabricandum universum'). p. 158. 2. Aristotle tries to prove [Met. a 2), for all four types of cause, that they cannot form an infinite series. p. I5g. 1. See p . 33 and note 33. 2. For the two ways of coming from another thing, the one in which the process is irreversible, the other in which it is reversible, cf. Aristotle, Met. a 2. gg4 a 22 sqq. (see also Arist. De gen. et corr. S i r . 338"5 about rectilinear, tls cvdv, and circular, KVKACO, generation). T h e difficulty of the whole problem lies in this, that w h e n the cause is regarded as prior in time to the effect and time is eternal, the causal series also has to be eternal. p. 159. 2. T h e soul, i.e. the soul as totality, the Platonic or Neoplatonic World-Soul; the intellect, i.e. the vovs as a s u p r a m u n d a n e entity. p . 159. 3. e.g. Aristotle, Met. A 5. 1071 = 13 : dvdpw-irov aii-iov . . . d iranjp, KOLI . . . d ^fAtos, avdpwiros avdpumov yewa Kal -rjXios, Phys. B 2. 194k13. p . 1 5 9 . 4 . This sentence seems to be tautological. p . 159. 5. First, i.e. nearest to the product of art, but, in fact, last in t h e series of instruments. p. 159. 6. This is completely a r b i t r a r y ; all the instruments are conditions for the existence of the product (cf. also note 11. 3). p . 159. 7. i.e. from the matter of the dead m a n a plant comes into being, which through nutrition becomes sperm or menstrual blood (cf. m y Ep. d. Met. d. Av., p . 73 and the note 73. 1). p . 160. 1. See note 142. 8.

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p. 160. 2. Body in itself is what is extended in any direction (Arist. Phys. r 5. 204^20: ouifia [iev yap earn TO TT6.VTTJ €)(OV BtacrraaLv) and is perceptible in place (Arist. Phys. r 5. 205b31 : irav aw^a alaB-qTov eV TOVO>. p. 161. 1. Cf. the dictum of Zeno of Citium (Sext. Emp. Adv. phys. i. 104): the rational is better than the non-rational and the animate better than the inanimate, but nothing is better than the cosmos, therefore the cosmos is rational and animate. p. 161. 2. This refers, I think, to the passage in Themistius, Paraphrasis in libr. A Metaphys., ed. Landauer, 5. 22: 'in omnibus vero, quae mutantur, id quod mutationem subit necessario corpus est quoddam; idcirco substantiae perpetuae [i.e. the heavenly movers which are identified with their bodies] quae generationem et corruptionem non subeunt, cum loco mutentur et ipsae, fieri non potest quin corpora sint.' p. 161. 3. i.e. they are life in themselves; this seems to me, however, an impossible conception, for life or soul is defined by Aristotle in relation to a body which is moved by it; soul is the faculty of self-movement in a body, De an. B I. 412W6: i) 4,xyX7l ^oyos truifiaTx>s ijtvctKov rotovSl GXOVTOS Q-px*}v Kivfjotws Kal ordaeois ev cavrut.

p. 161. 4. For that which can be attributed to a substance is its accidents, and the accidental—cf. e.g. Aristotle, Met. K8. 1065*1—is what occurs, but neither necessarily nor for the most part; and what can or cannot occur possesses matter (cf. e.g. Met. & 7. IO32»2O). p. 161. 5. A first cause, according to Ghazali, implies a coming into existence, but a circular process is infinite a parte post. p. 162. 1. i.e. the first cause. p. 162. 2. That an infinite series of entities not having position is possible does not follow any more than that an infinite series of entities having a position should be impossible. p. 163. 1. See, however, note 14. 6. p. 163. 2. Cf. note 14. 6. p. 163. 3. Leibniz, who, of the great philosophers since Descartes, is the one most strongly dependent on scholastic philosophy (in Spinoza the influence of Stoicism is overwhelming) has this argument in the following form in his Monadology (Erdmann, p. 708): The connexion of all contingent things leads us to conclude that outside this connexion there is a necessary Being who is their source and origin. p. 163. 4. Avicenna, for the reason given by Averroes, places this argument at the beginning of the metaphysical part of his Recovery (i. 6-7). He is perfecdy justified in ascribing this argument to the philosophers, for it is implied in Aristotle's whole system, and all the elements in it are

NOTES

103

found in Aristotle himself: the dichotomy of reality into the eternal and divine and the possible is asserted by Aristotle, De gen. an. B 1. 73i b 24; that everything absolutely necessary is eternal, Eth. Nic. Z 3. U39 b 24 (absolutely, amXws, as distinguished from the hypothetically, e'f imo94atais, necessary: see e.g. Phys. B 9. ig9 b 34); that 'eternal' and 'necessary' are convertible, De gen. et con. B 11. 338s 1; that the eternal is essentially prior to the perishable, Met. 0 8. I050 b 7; that the actual is essentially prior to the potential, Met. 0 8. 1050*4; that certain things owe their necessity to something other than themselves, others not, but are the cause of the necessity in others, Met. A 5. ioi5 b g; that nothing which exists necessarily can be potential, Met. 0 8. I050 b i8; that in its primary and absolute sense the necessary is the simple, Met. A 5. ioi5 b i 1; finally, the necessity of an eternal unmoved substance is proved Met. A 6, and it is affirmed at Met. A 7. I072 b io that the first mover possesses its existence of necessity, t'f dvayK-qs dpa iorlv ov. The argument is based on the confusion, deeply rooted in Aristotle's system, of the ontological with the logical—here of ontological necessity with logical necessity, of necessity in reality with necessary truth. That the angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles is a necessary universal truth; it is not valid at one time, invalid at another time (see Arist. Met. 0 10. I052a4), but its validity is eternal or rather timeless (this immutability of truth concerns not only the relations of universals but also all past events; for also the past is at rest, forever beyond the sway of time—it is eternally true that once there lived in Athens a man called Socrates; it is the trembling, ever-changing 'now' that alters today's truth into tomorrow's falsehood). This being-valid of truth is confused by Aristotle with ontological being, i.e. the existence of individuals in reality; and he says at Met. & 10. I05i b i that being in the strictest sense is truth, TO 8e Kvpuurara ov aXrjBes (about the threefold conception of truth in Aristotle see my Ep. d. Met. d.Av.,nole.&i.$). So it comes about that the intrinsic necessity attributed to timeless universal truth is transferred to the eternal existence of an individual prime mover, i.e. God. This identification of God and Truth is found in both Christian and Muslim theology; 'te invoco, deus Veritas, in quo et a quo et per quem vera sunt quae vera sunt omnia', says St. Augustine, Soliloq. i. 1. 3 and 'The Truth (,jJ-l)' is an epithet applied to God by the Muslim theologians with the meaning of 'the necessarily-existing by His own essence' (see Lane, Ar.-Engl. Diet.). p. 163. 5. The theory of the theologians that the possibles in God need for their actualization in time a necessary eternally existent, i.e. God, is nothing but the Jewish-Christian-Muslim conception of creation expressed in Aristotelian terminology. p. 164. 1. e.g. in his Recovery, Met. i. 6: JulJb J43-JI ,_.~l,ll j | (J«JU» XL& vra>v, e.g. in the series father—sonfather every individual is mortal, but the series is infinite and man as a genus is eternal; it is through reproduction and the eternity of their genus that animals participate in the eternal and the divine, cf. Aristotle, De an. B 414*29 and Plato, Symp. 206 e and 207 a. Cf. also St. Augustine, De civ. dei vi. 4: 'alii namque, sicut de ipso mundo crediderunt, semper fuisse homines opinantur. unde ait et Apuleius, cum hoc animantium genus describant: singillatim mortales, cuncti tamen universo genere perpetui'.

p. 167. 5. i.e. the philosophers do not object to an infinite series of nonessential causes, but this series must depend on an eternal essential cause outside it. p. 168. 1. This subjective conception would seem to imply that all finitude and particularity depend solely on our minds, and is in contradiction to p. 33—and also to the following sentence in the text—where the particularity in the heavenly movements serves to explain the particularity and transiency of sublunary affairs. The contradiction is based on the difficulty of, on the one side, guarding the eternal from all contamination with the transitory, and on the other, deriving the transient from the eternal. p. 168. 2. This sentence is of course tautological: he who does not concede the infinity of a series of causes must admit that this series is finite.

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p . 169. i . i.e. even if some of these imaginary things are regarded M causes of other imaginary things. ' p. 169. 2. Cf. p . 12. p. 169. 3. Cf. p . 14. p. 169. 4. i.e. of the one eternal soul subsisting by itself. p . 169. 5. For the origination of the elements from each other see Aristotle, De gen. et corr, B 4. p. 170. 1. i.e. they would b e individually different, but would have the species of necessary existence in common. T h e argument given here by Ghazali is taken from Avicenna's Salvation, p . 374, where the author summarizes the argument he gives in The Recovery (Met. i. 7) by which he tries to prove that the necessary existent can be neither a genus nor a species, but must be the simple M o n a d . ( T h a t the absolute One, TO m i r c o t iv, cannot be predicated of anything, and therefore cannot be a genus, is proved by Plotinus, Enn. vi. 2. 9.) This argument, although its elements are to be found in Aristotle (see note 163. 4), does not occur in his works in this form. It rests on the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neoplatonic confusion between the logical concept of species and specific difference, a n d the ontological concept of cause (the word etSos in Aristotle's philosophy means both the logical concept of species and the ontological concept of 'form', which is for Aristotle a kind of cause; Plato also gives his 'ideas' a dynamic sense—e.g. Phaedo roo d ) : every plurality has a specific difference which must be caused b y a n entity, which, if it contained a plurality, would again need a cause. (There is a similar confusion in Aristotle's philosophy between the logical concept of genus and the ontological concept of m a t t e r ; cf., for example, Met. A 28. I024 b g.) p. 170. 2. Avicenna, Recovery, loc. cit., says: j i j ^ J I J_jJI AlJU ^ ^ J J _ J » J J I jk5"U' ^jjil VI j 'the nature of the necessary existent is simply the establishing of its existence through its essence'; cf. Spinoza, Eth. i, prop, iii: 'ad n a t u r a m substantiae pertinet existere—ipsius essentia involvit necessario existentiam'. I should agree with Ghazali that the only meaning one can give to this—as to Spinoza's related expression causa sui—is that it has no cause whatever. Plotinus also affirms that the existence of the First is identical with His essence: OVK aAAo fxev avro, aAAo Se 17 oucria ainov, Enn. vi. 8. 12. p. 170. 3. Cf. Aristotle, Met. A 8. I074"33: plurality is the consequence of matter, 00a apiBjiia 7roAAua8at. It m a y be, however, that Averroes means that by regarding existence solely as the true, another aspect of existence is neglected. p. 1 7 9 . 6 . Entity, o l j , and thing, t ^ i , are translations of the Stoic term rl, the highest genus of all being, including the existent a n d the nonexistent. p. 179. 7. Cf. note 174. 3. p . 179. 8. Aristotle does not clearly distinguish between 'being' ('that which is', TO ov) as a substantive and 'being' ('to be', TO e!vat) as a verb. If one takes 'being' as a verb, it is plausible to regard existence as an accident, for in the sentence ' a thing is', 'is' as an attribute is a n accident; taken, however, as a substantive, being, TO OV, is the equivalent of ij ouox'a, i.e. substance. Avicenna takes the former, Averroes the latter view. For Averroes

NOTES

III

existence is the existent thing itself or the genus of existing things (though, regarded as a genus, it can be predicated and is a n accident). See also m y Ep. d. Met. d. Av. p p . i v - v . p . 180. I. T h e existents of first intention ( J j VI Aa^JI, •npuyrq Bems, prima intentio, in scholastic terminology), i.e. first intention of t h e mind, are the individual things in the external world of which the ten categories or predicaments a r e the highest g e n e r a ; the existents of second intention ( j l i l l A»._jJI, Sevrepa Bems) are the concepts in the m i n d of which the five predicables, genus, species, differentia, property, a n d accident, are the highest genera. As early as Aristotle (Cat. 5. 2*14) we find the term Sevrepm oiaiaj. for the genera and species, which, however, are regarded in his philosophy as having some objective existence, although not a n independent, separate (xwpurros) one. p . 180. 2. Since the things in the m i n d are in conformity with the things outside the mind. p . 180. 3 . T h e r e is some confusion h e r e ; the 'true' means a n existent in the mind, but this existent in the mind seems to be aware of an existent outside the mind a n d able to compare itself with it. T h e confusion is based on the common error of not distinguishing between thought, the thinking as a n act, the meaning in an active sense, and thought—the object of thought, the thing meant. T h e former m a y be said (by a spatial metaphor) to be in the rnind; to the latter there belongs everything thinkable, existing or non-existing, possible or impossible, false or t r u e ; it is neither in your m i n d nor in mine, for exactly the same thing m a y be meant by you a n d by m e . p . 1 8 0 . 4 . i.e. you cannot know what a thing is before you know that it is; cf. Aristotle Anal. Post. B J. 92^4: ava/yicrj yap TOV eiSdVa TO TI eartv avBpumos 7) aAAo OTIOVVJ elBevai /cat oVt eartv. p . 180. 5. This sentence is not found in the Categories. Averroes seems to take it as a n interpretation of the beginning of Cat. cap. 5, where it is said t h a t the individual cannot be predicated and that it is the universal which predicates the individual. p . 180. 6. Cf. Aristotle, De an. B 5. 4 1 7 b 2 2 : TWV KO.8' exaarov evepyaav aZodrjais, 17 Se emo-nj/x-q TWV KadoXav.

ij KOT'

p . 180. 7. Aristotle does not say explicitly that the universal exists only in the mind (the forms existing in the individuals express a universality; cf. note 180. 1), although according to him knowledge refers always to the essential, the universal (cf. e.g. Met. Z 6. I 0 3 i b 2 0 : TO imaraaBan Iraorox TOUTO eort TO Tt fy tlvot eTTiaTaoBcu); Averroes here follows an interpretation which is found as early as Alexander of Aphrodisias, De an. (Bruns), p . 9 0 . 5 : voovp.eva 8e xwP^ ^XT]S KOIVO. TC /cat KadoXov yiverat, Kal Tore eort vouff, orav

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T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

vorjrat, el 8e p.7] voolro, ouSe eorw ere, wore xojptcrdevra rov voovvros avra vov <j>9elperai.. O f course this conception destroys t h e definition of t r u t h as conformity between things inside the mind and things outside it. p . 180. 8. 'by i t ' : i.e. b y its existence; existence is not a n accident, b u t the essence itself, according to Averroes. p . 181. 1. Cf. m y Ep. d. Met. d. Av. p p . 8 - 9 . Aristotle himself h a d seen this difficulty, and denied (cf. note 179. 4) t h a t existence or being was a genus; however, his own conception t h a t even the non-existent, since it is a n o n existent, possesses being in a certain way, implies the same infinite regress, for if the non-existent is, then the non-existence of the non-existent is, and so on. p. 181. 2. T h e theory here expounded, that the plurality of negations a n d relations attributed to God does not destroy His unity, is found in Avicenna, Salvation, p p . 408 sqq., and Recovery, Met. viii. 7-8. T h e basic principle, t h a t all determination of G o d is either negative or relative, is found in Plotinus: negative, e.g. Enn. vi. 8. 11 (cf. v. 3. 14): hi d^aipeW iravra ra. irepl rovrov Xeyopeva, relative, Enn. vi. 9. 3 : eVet /cat TO alriov Aeyew ov KOTyyopetv e'trrt ovpfle^rjKOs re avrqi, dAA' rjptv, ore e^ppev ri •nap? avrov eKelvov ovros ev avrai. p . 181. 3. 'apprehended', f_>JL»-i, KaraXrprros. W e are able, says Plotinus (Enn. v. 3. 14), t o apprehend H i m without being able to n a m e H i m , exelv Se ov KuXvopeBa, K$.V p.r] Xeyuipev. This seems more closely in agreement with Averroes t h a n with Avicenna, who seems to regard existence as a positive determination in God, whereas all the other attributes determine this existence either relatively or negatively; cf. Salvation, p . 4 1 0 : ( J j ^ l iiyaJI

M ij^-jiU the first attribute of the l _ J u J I M i_j^>JI I J a l ^ " 4 J 'islp\ necessary being is that it is ( j l ) a n d exists; the other attributes determine this existence either relatively or negatively. Compare also Plotinus, Enn. vi. 7. 38, where it is said that 'is', earl, cannot be predicated of God, but points to His essence, TO Se eariv ov)( uis /car' aXXov dAAo, dAA' <Us or\p.aivov o eari. p. 181. 4. This is part of the Aristotelian definition of substance (the individual), Cat. 5. 2 a i I: ovolaSeecmv . . . TJ p-qre KO.8' viroKeipevovrevosAeyerai p.r\r tv inroKeipeva) rivl eariv. I t is negative, since individuum est inejfabile; it is experienced, but beyond description. p. 182. 1. T o this negative definition shall see on p . 186. I t is, however, in p . 4 1 0 : Aic L^Lw* i_j^jJI I J * j l Vl 1 $ J U 5 \ * J < o U I ik!Uc-i jUa*> when

of intellect Averroes objects, as we agreement with Avicenna, op. cit. XfjJ-b. (j*J i«J • • • J ^ J s » l ^ b H e is called intellect, this only

NOTES

U3

means that His existence cannot be mixed with matter and its accompaniments. p . 182. 2. H e r e there is a reference to the problem of self-consciousness as set forth b y Aristotle (De an. T 2. 4 2 5 b i 2 - 2 5 ; E 4. 4 3 o a 2 - 9 ) : if perception (or thought) needed another perception (or thought) to become conscious of itself, we should have a n infinite regress. T h e difficulty h a d been seen already b y Plato, Charmides 168 d, e. T h e problem is mentioned by Avicenna in his Salvation, p p . 399-400, in t h e chapter in which h e sets out to prove t h a t the necessary existent is in itself the thought, the thinker, and the object of thought. p. 182. 3. According to Aristotle (De an. E 4. 430*5) there is a n intermission in the process of our thinking. p. 182.4. For Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom, vii. 7. 42, the mark which distinguishes God's action from the action of fire is will: God is not involuntarily good {aKwv dyados) as the fire is involuntarily productive of w a r m t h ; in H i m the imparting of good things is voluntary, (KOVOWS. p. 182. 5. This whole passage seems to refer to Plotinus, Enn. vi. 8. 12-13. T h e presence (irapovola) of the good is not accidental in God, according to Plotinus, Enn. vi. 8. 13. His essence is not external to His will. T h e good in H i m implies a will which does not destroy His unity. I n addition God's act cannot be differentiated from His essence, el p.ev ovv earl TIS evepyeia ev avria, teal ev rfj evepyeia axnov 6r)a6p.e8a, ov6" av Sta TOVTO etr\ av erepov avTov (Enn. vi. 8. 12). E a c h of us, through his body, is far distant from the Essence; through his soul h e participates in t h e Essence, b u t h e is not fundamentally essence (xvpluis oioia) and therefore not master of his essence (Enn. vi. 8. 12). p . 183. 1. 'in second intention', Kara TrapaKoXovBrjaiv, as a necessary consequence (the term is Stoic), for the Universe in itself is not an end, but a consequence. For the theory based o n Plato t h a t the visible world has not been created by intention, Xoyiop.w, b u t b y necessity, dvdyK-n, see, for example, Plotinus, Enn. iii. 2. 2. p. 183. 2. Cf. Plotinus, Enn. vi. 4. 3 : God remains in Himself, and from H i m all powers emanate to everything, Swdfieis Se an' airov levai em •na.vra.. p. 183. 3. This seems to be based on the Aristotelian distinction between the theoretical and the practical Intellect (e.g. De an. Eg. 432 b 26) and the commentators' division of the Aristotelian philosophy into the theoretical a n d the practical. p. 183. 4. Cf. the passage in Clemens Alexandrinus, Protr. c. iv, 63, Stahlin, i. 48. 18, where he says that God creates merely through His will; the effect follows His mere willing immediately, 0iA [SovXeodai Srj/iiovpyei KM T$ p.6vov edeArjaai avrov eircrai, TO yeyevijadai.

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p . 183. 5. I t seemed to me, says Plotinus (Enn. v. 8. 7), t h a t if we ourselves were the archetypes, the essence, and the forms all together, and if the form which produces the sublunary things were our essence, we should create without exertion, eSd/cct oe fiot, art /cat, cl yfiets apxirvna. /cat ovala /cat fiSrj ct/ta, /cat TO elSos ro troiovv evravOa fy "qfjuov ouax'a, cKpar^ffev av dVcv TT6VU>V 17 ijueTepa S-qfuovpyta. p . 183. 6. Cf. Aristotle, De mot. an. 7. 701 " 3 5 : ij eaxwrq atria rov KivciaBai ope£ts, avrq Be ytWrat -q St* atadrjoews fj Std (fxivraaias /cat vo-qaews. p . 184. 1. Life belongs also to God, says Aristotle (Met. A 7. io72 b 26 /cat £0117 oe ye indpxct); we say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, perfectly good, so that life a n d timeless eternity, continuous and unending, belong to G o d ; <j>ap.ev 8-q T6V deov etvat t,wov atotov dpiarov, ware £ayr} /cat alwv avvexqs /cat dtSto? imdpxei Ttp &€$. According to Plotinus, Enn. vi. 5. 12, a n inexhaustible a n d infinite life-stream proceeds from God, whose n a t u r e is as it were boiling over with life, (ftvmv . . . ev airrij otov v/repjeoup . 184. 2. 'not for a n end which refers to Himself'; this is, as Avicenna says (Salvation, p . 411), a negative attribute. Gf. Plotinus, for example, Enn. vi. g. 6 : dAA* ttmv imepdyaQov /cat avro ov\ eaurtS, TOIS 5* aAAots dyadov, t i n avrov SiWrat p.eraXap.^dvuv, H e is the* hypergood': H e is the good not for Himself, but for the others who can participate in H i m . T h e doctrine of God's generosity (aj>Bovia) goes back to the Timaeiu-passage 29 d : H e was good, a n d the good can never grudge anything to anything. A n d being generous, H e desired that all things should be as like Himself as they could be. p . 184. 3. Avicenna gives, for example, in his Theorems and Notices, Forget, p . 159, this definition of generosity: ^ J J J V , U iolil J j J - l . Generosity is giving in the right way, not for the sake of reward. I n his Recovery, Met. vi. 5, he has a long passage about generosity. p . 184. 4. For badness as a uripqais or d-novola (or eAAet^tr) dyadov see Plotinus, Enn. i. 8. 3. T h e basic idea that the cause of badness lies in matter as non-being is to be found already in Plato, Tim. 46 c, 46 e, 48 a. p . 184. 5. For the highest good as the order (raft?) of the universe cf. Aristotle, Met. A 10. 1075"! 1. p. 184. 6. 'the lover and the beloved'; cf. Plotinus, Enn. vi. 8.15 (ad init.): /cat epaoyitov /cat epa>s 6 avros /cat avrov epeos. p. 184. 7. T h e doctrine of God's joy as based on His thought goes back to the passage of Aristode, Met. A 7. i o 7 2 b i 4 sqq. p . 185. 1. A n d ifGod is always in this h a p p y condition in which we sometimes are, says Aristotle (Met. A 7. io72 b 24), this is wonderful, and if in a still happier condition, this is still more wonderful.

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p . 185. 2. T h a t all t h e expressions used t o describe G o d are only m e t a phorically used (OVK SpBws), since even for thought H e is not a duality (ouS' cis els emvoiav Silo), is stated b y Plotinus, Enn. vi. 8. 13. p. 186. 1. Cf. note 182. 1. p . 186. 2. i.e. Plato in the interpretation of Plotinus. God is anterior to thought, says Plotinus, Enn. vi. g. 6 : irpo ydp Kivj\aeuis Kal irpo vor^ueuis. p . 186. 3. T h e philosophers, however, do not say w h a t this essence is, i.e. w h o or w h a t the owner is of these attributes. p. 187. 1. As, for instance, the Ash'arites believe. p. 187. 2. T h e example of the h a n d is to be found in Aristotle, e.g. De gen. an. A 19. 726 b 22 : 7) xe'cP Q-vev *pvxLKy5 Svvdpeuis OVK eari %elp dXXd povov 6p.uiwp.ov, without the faculty of the soul a h a n d is only a h a n d equivocally; another example is the finger, SAKTVXOS (cf. especially Met. Z 10. I035 b 25) or the eye, 6<j>6a\p6s (Degen. an.Bi. 735" 8) a n d generally 6 vexpos avBpumos 6p.covvp.uis, a corpse is a m a n equivocally (Meteor. A 12. 3 8 g b 3 i ) . p. 188. 1. This principle that the cause contains the effect in a superior w a y is found already, with the example of fire, in Aristotle's Metaphysics, i.e. in Book a, which was ascribed by m a n y a m o n g the ancients to Pasicles: eKaarov he paXiara. avro ruiv ahXuiv, Ka&* o Kal rots OLXXOLS vrrapyei ro > t ^ , to -npo-qyp.(vov, commodum; the morally indifferent act, V J U . , r-L-» to aoidijtopov, medium', the unbecoming act, tjS^*, to airoirporjyficvov, incommodum; and the sinful act, * \j*., to ap.apn]jia, peccatum. It m a y be added that the long controversy in Islam whether there is or is not a middle term between belief and unbelief is inspired by Stoic thought. T h e Stoics originally believed that virtue can neither be increased nor decreased, ofrt imnlveaSai aire avUoBai., that there is no intermediate term between virtue and sin, ^rjBev p.tuov et^at dperijs Kal Ka/a'a? (Diog. Laert. vii. 227), a n d t h a t all sins are equal, iaa iari ra auaprqp.aTa; for whether a m a n is

u8

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a h u n d r e d stadia from his aim or only one stadium, h e is equally not there (cf. Sext. E m p . Adv. log. i. 422 a n d Diog. Laert. viii. 120); a n d those theologians w h o asserted t h a t belief is based only on , S J - V J > assent (i.e. t h e Stoic cwyKarddeaK; for faith as a Beoaeficias ovyKaTaSems see, for example, Clem. Alex. Strom, ii. 2. 8), held that faith can be neither increased nor diminished . T h e term -y U. takes, then, also the meaning of the logically permissible, i.e. the non-contradictory, the logically possible, and in this way, since for them everything is possible but the logically impossible, it becomes synonymous for the theologians with / , £ _ • , the possible. p . 196. 2. For according to the theologians only God, the simple, unique immaterial efficient cause, who connects the condition and the conditioned in a transitory conjunction, is eternal. p . 196. 3. i.e. the theologians regard God, t h e efficient cause, as acting in time through a prior knowledge a n d will, as we imagine empirical, rational beings to act, but the philosophers assume a n eternal unique connexion between an eternal unifying principle and an eternal world. p. 196. 4, 'the assumption of the philosophers': the text has 'their assumption', but I presume from the context that the philosophers are meant here. H e r e Averroes, in opposition to Avicenna, seems to regard these attributes in God as something positive. But according to Averroes's conception here— which, however, is quite in agreement with Aristotle, for whom, too, the essence is the end of the process of becoming, e.g. Met. A 4. i o i 5 a i o : 17 ovma . . . earl TO TCXOS TT}S yeviottus—an essence is not a subject of attributes, b u t is constituted by the attributes, and through this the Aristotelian opposition of essence and attributes is destroyed. p . 197. 1. Both philosophers and theologians describe God as the selfsufficient, ii]I, 6 airapK-qs, cf., for example, Aristotle, Met. A?4. i o g i b i 8 . T h e term ^ji I is a n epithet given to God in several places in the K o r a n . I believe its meaning there is 'the rich one', the one, as M u h a m m a d says, 'to w h o m belongs all that is in the heavens and on earth', b u t the word is later interpreted under the influence, I think, of Greek philosophy, as meaning 'self-sufficient'. p . 197. 2. This seems in contradiction to the assertion on p . 196 t h a t every essence is perfected by attributes. p . 198. 1. i.e. according to the Asha'rite (Stoic) doctrine that what cannot be free from the temporal is itself temporal. p . 198. 2. For this compare Aristotle, Phjs. r 1. 2oo b 26: the mover is the active, TO jro^Ti/cdV, a n d the moved the passive,TOnaffrinKov, a n d the moved is moved through the action of the mover,TOKIVTJTOV KIVTJTOV imo TOV KIVT]TI.KOV. p . 1 9 8 . 3 . F o r this compare Aristotle, PAj'-5--^2- 2 2 5 b 3 3 , where it is proved t h a t there is no absolute generation, no generation of the substance, i.e of

> NOTES

Iig

t h e compound qua compound, n o generation of generation, since absolute generation would imply an infinite regress a n d one could never arrive at a first compound. O n the other h a n d , the series of possibles or moved movers ends in an eternal necessary existent or unmoved mover. p . 198. 4. i.e. a cold thing, for example, cannot become warm—cold being potentially w a r m and the privation of warm—without a n agent which actualizes the warmth, 'for from the potentially existing the actually existing is always produced by an actually e x i s t i n g . . . ; there is always a first mover and the mover exists already actually' (cf. Arist. Met. & 8. I04g b 24). p . 198. 5. dvav TO KtvovfjLevov dvaytcr) VTTO TIVOS KivetoOai (Arist. Phys. H 1 a d init.). p . 198. 6. i.e. the concrete substance (r/ cnlvoAos oiaia) matter and form, cf., for example, Met. Z 11. 1037*30.

composed of

p . 199. 1. Cf. Aristotle, Met. N 2. i o 8 8 b i 4 sqq., where Aristotle asserts that what consists of elements must have matter, i.e. potentiality, and that the potential can either be actualized or not. p . 200. 1. I t m a y be remarked here that the Arabic word for 'substance' or 'essence' is J&J*-, a word which by origin means 'jewel'. Averroes remarks in his Ep. d. Met. (see m y translation, p . 11) t h a t this n a m e was given to substance because it is the most valuable of the categories. p. 200. 2. This problem will be discussed more fully later. T h e whole problem of God's knowledge is clearly stated as early as Plato's Parmenides, 134: only God can know the universal, and nothing can be known to God but the perfect truth of ideas; there is an unbridgeable chasm between God and m e n ; it is impossible for the divine and eternal to know the things of m e n , rd dvBpumeia npayp-ara, and equally for our fleeting h u m a n knowledge to reach the divine truth. Plotinus repeats this idea at Enn. v. 8. 3 : the gods eternally possess their wisdom in an impassible, immutable, and pure intellect (eV a77-a#ef rut vai /cat oTaaip.w Kal Kadapui); they know everything, however, not the things of men, TO dvOpwirma, but the things divine. But to this Plotinus adds, Enn. v. 8. 4, the idea which so strongly influenced Leibniz: in the intelligible world everything comprises everything in itself and beholds everything in everything else, everything is everywhere, everything is everything, each thing is anything, and the splendour is infinite (cf. Leibniz: 'chaque monade est u n miroir vivant, representatif de l'Univers suivant son point de vue'). T h e idea of a difference in value between God's knowledge and man's is found also in Aristotle. Thinking in its purest form, i.e. God's thought, is concerned with the highest good, i.e. with itself (cf. Met. A 7. I 0 7 2 b l 8 : 77 Be vor/ats T) Kad' avrrjv rov Kad' avro dplorov, Kal 17 /idXiara rov /xdAiara). T h e r e is a parallelism between thinker and thought. However, it is one of the disturbing consequences of Aristotle's theory (or

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r a t h e r of one side of his theory) that, in fact, material, individual things cannot be the object of thought at all, since thought is only concerned with the universal, i.e. the unalterable, the eternal. p. 201. I. It seems true enough, indeed, t h a t Zaid's knowledge of his own individuality is not identical with his knowledge of other things, but then it cannot be true that man's knowledge of other things is identical with the knowledge of his own essence, i.e. his individuality. This dilemma exists for all theories (Hume's as well as Aristotle's) which do not distinguish between the subject of thought, the Ego, a n d its object. p. 201. 2. According to Aristotle's theory that thought and the object of thought are identical (ravrov vovs KCLI VOJJTOV), Aristotle even says (De an. r 6. 4 3 I b l 6 ) : oXuts oe 6 vovs eariv 6 KCLT' evepyeiav ra rrpdypara votov, the intellect when it thinks is the things. But the things exist also when the intellect does not think them, and the intellect does not add anything to the things by its thinking, since, when it thinks, it is identical with the things. T h o u g h t therefore is nothing. (Aristotle himself says, De an. Fq.. 42g a 22, that the intellect is nothing at all actually, before it thinks, o vovs . . . oi)8cV iarai evepyeiq rwv ovruiv irplv voeiv.) T h e difficulty of conceiving the intellect without making it falsify reality by adding something to it through thinking caused Aristotle to adopt a theory which annuls thought itself (the same view was held by Plotinus even more emphatically, Erm. v. 3. 5 : contemplation must be identical with the contemplated, the intellect with the intelligible; without this identity one cannot possess the truth, since instead of possessing realities, one would only have an impression, TVTTOS, of t h e m which would be different from the realities and therefore not the truth). However, Aristotle also regards the intellect as an existent in which the concepts exist: the vovs is a SCKTIKOV TOU eiSovs- In some passages, too, Aristotle tries to express the character of thought as an act, and he conceives it then as a touching (Biyyaveiv) or a participation ((JCTOATJI/II?) : the thinker touches the object of thought, cf. Met. 0 10. I05i b 24 and especially Met. A 7. i o 7 2 b 20, where this contact is mentioned in connexion with the identification of thought and its object: avrov Se voet o vovs Kara perdXTjtptv rov VOTJTOV • VOTJTOS yap ytyverai Btyyavojv Kal vowv, WOTC ravTov vovs Kal VOTJTOV. These conceptions are complicated still more by the introduction of his obscure theory of an active and a passive intellect. p . 201. 3. Cf. Aristotle, Met. Z 7. I032 b 22: artificial production starts from the knowledge in the soul of the artisan. T h a t which produces and from which the movement starts in artificial production is the form in the soul, TO 87) TTOIOVV Kal o8ev apxcrai i) Ktvqais . . . eav pev and rtxvrjs, TO ctdos COTL TO ev rfj tpvxfj. p . 201. 4. In second intention, i.e. by way of implication and consequence (TrapaKoXovBrjais), i.e. not through deliberation (AoytoyiiS), but through logical

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necessity (dray/cij), just as, according to Plotinus, Enn. iii. 2. 2, the sensible world emanates from the intelligible. p. 202. i. i.e. the forms in matter, which are called by Alexander of Aphrodisias ivvXa eiSrj. p . 202. 2. Cf. Aristotle, De an. T 4. 430 a 2: eVi p.h> ydp TU>V dvev vX-rjs TO avro eort TO VOOVV Kal TO voovpzvov. p . 203. i . For Avicenna God cannot know individuals (at least not as individuals), b u t His knowledge is limited to unalterable, eternal universals. (Porphyry, Sentent. xxiii, expressed the difference between the universal intellect and the particular in this w a y : in the universal intellect the particular existents also exist universally, whereas in the particular intellect both the universal and the individual exist individually.) Averroes goes beyond this: God knows through a knowledge which is neither the knowledge of universals nor the knowledge of individuals, and is superior to the knowledge of m e n a n d incomprehensible to them. This, of course, makes the term 'knowledge' as applied to G o d not only incomprehensible b u t meaningless. p . 203. 2. Although Aristotle regards the individual existent alone as the truly real, from which through abstraction the universals are acquired, he asserts all the same t h a t the universal, as form and essence of things, by its nature and absolutely, is prior to the individual (cf. e.g. Anal. Post. A 2. I b 7 33)- Averroes here follows Alexander of Aphrodisias, for w h o m the universal is also by its n a t u r e posterior to the individual, since t h e existence of universals depends on the existence of the individuals; cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Cat. Comm., Kalbfleisch, c. 5, p . 82, 1. 22 : d pivroi AAegavSpos evrav8a KCU 777 l\oV€iK€t . . . KOIVOV yap ovros, T]oiv, aydyKtj Kal arofiop etvac • cv yap rots KOIVOLS TO. aVo/xa TreptextTai. p . 203. 3. 'in potency'. This is a consequence of the conception that the universal is posterior b y n a t u r e to t h e individual, a n d would imply something very different from what Aristotle maintained, namely that knowledge of the individual is superior to knowledge of the universal. However, even Aristotle regards the genus, the more universal, in the definition as representing the matter, i.e. the potential, whereas the differentia specifica represents the form: cf. Aristotle, Met. H 6. i045"34. p . 203. 4. 'the active powers which . . . are called n a t u r e s ' ; cf. Aristotle, De gen. an. B 4. 7 4 ° b 3 5 : V noiovaa 8iW/xis . . . 17 iftvois r] e/caorou, ivimdpxovoa. Kal ev avraaia, does not occur a p a r t from sensation, foeo alo0rjoews, and is similar to sensation, a n d in sensation the common properties, like movement a n d size, are preserved. T h a t is w h y Averroes can say that the plurality of representations resembles plurality in space. p. 206. 2. 'which we m a y call b e i n g ' : Aristotle himself, as we have seen already—see note 179. 4—denies explicitly that being, ro 6V, is a genus, but the older Stoics seem to regard being, since it has itself no genus, as the highest genus (cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 61); a n d in a n y case the Stoics include everything in one highest genus: em vdvrcuv ev yeVos Xa/ifldvovmv (Plotinus, Enn. vi. 1. 35). p . 206. 3. i.e. being. p . 206. 4. Cf. note 203. 3. p. 208. 1. According to Aristotle, Met. A 15. I02i a 23, the relation fatherson is one of those which by their very essence are related to something else, rut onep iarlv dAAou Xeytadai avro 6 loriv. Cf. also the (tautological) Stoic definition of relation, Sext. E m p . Adv. log. ii. 162 : Trpoi n Se ion ra Kara rfjv tits -npds erepov ayiaiv voovp.tva /cat ou/ceVt aTroAeAupeVai? \ap.pavopLeva, the relative is w h a t is conceived in relation to another thing, neither of them being apprehended separately. p. 209. 1. Since they all fall under the most universal genus o f ' b e i n g ' or of 'something' (rl, C Ji) • p. 209. 2. Cf. the passage in Aristotle, Met. A 7. io72 b 20 quoted in note 201. 2 : airov Se voet 6 vovs Kara pLCTaXrjipiv rod vonqrov, 'the intellect thinks itself through partaking of the thing known'. 'Self-knowledge' is here ambiguous ; it means both self-consciousness, the fact that in all cogitare an 'ego' is implied (cf. note 2 0 1 . 2) a n d all the knowledge a n individual 'self has acquired. It is on this very ambiguity that the theory is built that God in knowing Himself knows all other things. p. 209. 3. T h e logic of facts forces the Aristotelians to establish distinctions which—since in their system there is no subject, no 'ego', and they identify the things known with the knowledge of things—they are not entitled to make—i.e. the distinctions between (1) self-knowledge, (2) the knowledge the individual 'self possesses, (3) the things known. By 'unity of knowledge' is here meant the unity of experience and knowledge in each of

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us through the unity and identity of his 'self'. Unity of knowledge, imarl\\vr\s hi6rr]S, is affirmed by Aristotle in another sense, when he declares (Met. r 2. ioo3 b 2i) that the study of all species of being qua being belongs to a science which is generically one, whereas the study of the several species of being belongs to the specific parts of this science. But it is not true that knowledge, although the knower is a unity, need not possess plurality, when the things known form a plurality, for knowledge is dependent on the things known and has to conform to their nature. What is true, and seems to me a primary truth, although it is denied both by the idealist and by the relativist, is that the object of knowledge is not affected by the fact of being known. A cat may look at a king, and the king is not affected by the cat's awareness of him. All knowledge implies being, implies facts that can be known and that are independent of this knowledge. Being is prior to knowledge (and even the possibility of being which enables us to act through knowledge is prior to knowledge). If the object of knowledge were affected by its being known, nobody could twice perceive an identical thing, nor could the same object be perceived by many or the same thought be common to many; and however inexplicable it may be, we are aware of living in one unique common universe and of communicating our thoughts, and even the relativist and the idealist are forced to admit that at least their theories would be true, i.e. correspond to the facts, even if no one ever held them. God, therefore, is not affected by our loving Him or our knowing Him, but as to His knowledge, either God's knowledge is dependent on our decisions and acts in so far as it follows them; or God knows them from eternity, and then the human drama is but a puppet-show; or the eternal sequence of becoming and passing away is eternally beyond His ken. p. 210. 1. i.e. if a man perceives a thing, he is either completely plunged in the contemplation of that thing and is unaware that he is the perceiver, or if he perceives that he perceives there is a limit to the series, i.e. there is not an infinite series of his perceiving that he perceives that he perceives . . . . p. 210. 2. i.e. God, the Unknowable, the Ineffable, can be understood only by His works and His providence. This tendentious tradition is quite alien to primitive Islam and is inspired by the study of Greek and Christian philosophy. Cf. St. Theophilus, Ad Autolyc. (Migne, vi. 1032A): Just as the soul of man cannot be seen, but can be understood through the movement of his body, God cannot be seen by the eyes of man, but must be understood by His Providence and His works; and St. Gregory of Nyssa, De an. et resurrect. (Migne, xlvi. 28C): Just as, through observing the universe, the macrocosm, and the omnipotent wisdom (17 miwo8iW/K>r oo<j>Ca) which pervades it, we arrive at an intellect which is above sense-perception, tmkp aioBrjmv, so in contemplating man, the microcosm, we can infer from the visible appearances the hidden and imperceptible intellect; and Maximus

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT 124 Confessor, Ambigua (Migne, xci. 1285-7): Just as our human intellect, which is one and invisible in itself, yet manifests itself in words and deeds and expresses its thought in letters and figures, so the Divine Essence which is far above the reach of our intellect manifests itself in the created universe. Compare with this Wisdom of Solomon xiii. 5 : 'For from the greatness of the beauty even of created things in like proportion does man form the image of their first maker', and Romans i. 20: 'For the invisible things of Him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His everlasting power and divinity', in both of which Stoic influence is unmistakable. p. 210. 3. This is the orthodox conception. That miracles by themselves are not an absolute proof of the mission of the prophet is not only affirmed by the Mu'tazilites, but even by the Ash'arite Baqillani, who held that miracles might also be performed by a sorcerer or a saint (for the whole problem cf. Ibn Hazm, op. cit. v. 2-12). Already Celsus (Orig. Contra Cels. i. 68) had asked: 'Since sorcerers can perform the same feats as Jesus, must we admit that they too are "sons of God"?' p. 210. 4. Compare with this the passage in St. Gregory of Nyssa, De vita St. Greg. Thaumat. (Migne, xlvi. 901), where he speaks of the internal discord, (/iijivXios iro'Acfioy, of the Greek philosophers over the Divine, and praises the stable word of faith, which in its simplicity is proclaimed to all equally and does not find its strength in some logical jugglery and artificial constructions of logic, XoyiKrj TLVI TTtpiepyLq. Kal rexvi-Kats TrXoKats, since,

indeed, the transcendent nature, ij vTrepKei/ievrj (j>vms, is inaccessible, dvempaTos, to human reason. p. 211. 1. This seems to imply that even negations have a certain objective existence. p. 211. 2. This is rather badly expressed, for if there are concepts, there is already a plurality. The meaning is: 'The terms of the relation constitute with the relation a unity, or the terms of the relation are nothing additional to the relation.' p. 211. 3. This seems to mean that the father and the son have an existence in reality independent of their relation to each other, but that in our thoughts fatherhood implies sonhood and the thought fatherhood-sonhood constitutes a unity. However, we can think of the father without thinking of the son. p. 211. 4. 'the first knowledge': i.e. my knowing a thing includes my consciousness of my knowing this thing. This seems to me a sound theory: in all perception and knowledge the consciousness of an 'ego' is included. p. 212. 1. Averroes seems to mean that the series 'the knowledge that I know that I know' can be infinitely extended, and its infinity is implied in

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125

the idea of knowledge. This infinity, however, according to Averroes, is only a potential infinity (which is admissible), not an actual infinity (which is impossible). p. 212. 2. i.e. God's knowledge does not depend on the reality of the things known; God does not know things because they exist, but God's knowledge is a creative knowledge, and the things exist because God knows them. Of course, if esse = percipi, even our human knowledge does not depend on the reality of things; and for Kant the mere possibility of knowledge implies a creative element—which, however, implies that my thought that thought is creative is itself creative. p. 212. 3. i.e. by their doctrine of God's unalterable unity, JL»._JJ . p. 212. 4. Ghazali had written three treatises on Logic: The Touchstone of Science in Logic, ,jjUr,l | -J j J j J | . L*_,, The Touchstone of Speculation in Logic, ( j i u J I j J&^\ ii^t, and The Just Balance, ~ 2 x ~ J | ^ I k ^ S J I . p. 213. 1. This refers to Ghazali's curious work, mentioned in the preceding note, The Just Balance, in which he extracts the principles of Logic from verses of the Koran, and where (p. 20, ed. Kabbani, Cairo, 1900) he bases his belief that the principles of Logic can be deduced from the Koran on the verses at the beginning of Sura lv, the Merciful, where it is said that God taught man demonstration (or articulate speech), j L J I , and 'set the balance that in the balance ye should not transgress'. p. 214. 1. i.e. when he is plunged in the contemplation of something else. For Ghazali, therefore, the inference cogito ergo sum would not be valid, since according to him thought or consciousness does not imply the self-consciousness of an 'ego'. p. 214. 2. Since the addition of a non-essential accident does not change the individuality of a thing. p. 214. 3. i.e. two individual entities keep their individuality even when they are conjoined. The conception of God's attributes as here expressed is in agreement with al-Ash'ari, cf. Shahrastani, Relig. and Philos. Sects, pp. 66-67. p. 214. 4. This criticism is not altogether illegitimate. For Aristotle God is pure form, pure being, or pure thought, i.e. a universal existing independently and so individually; i.e. God is an individual universal or a universal individual. p. 215. 1. Since only substances (in which attributes inhere) exist by themselves. St. Augustine, De trinit. vii. 5, just because he asserts that no attributes can inhere in God, declares that in deo substantia abusive dicitur. Only transient compound things are truly called substances. But since it is impious to say that goodness inheres in God instead of saying that God's essence is goodness, God can be in truth only called essence, not substance

126

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('nefas est autem dicere ut subsistat et subsit Deus bonitate sua, atque ilia bonitas non substantia sit vel potius essentia, neque ipse Deus sit bonitas sua, sed in illo sit tamquam in subiecto: unde manifestum est Deum abusive substantiam vocari'). p. 215. 2. That the religious texts of the past (i.e. Homer and Hesiod) address themselves to the masses in a language intelligible to them, the deeper sense of which, vnovoux, can be understood by the philosopher only is one of the more general theses of the Greek age of enlightenment. Antisthenes, the father of Cynicism, had declared that Homer had only in part spoken the truth; in another part, however, Kara Sofav, he had spoken in agreement with vulgar opinion, and therefore his words needed philosophical interpretation (cf. Dio Chrysost. Oral. liii). It was the Stoics who more than any others practised the principle of aXhyyopla, allegorical exposition. p. 215. 3. Koran xix. 43. p. 215. 4. Koran xxxvi. 71. p. 215. 5. Koran xxxviii. 75. p. 216. 1. Cf. Themistius, Oraliones, xxvi. 319 b : It was a special characteristic of Aristotle to believe that the same teachings were not suited for the masses and the philosophers, just as the same drugs (dppa.Ka) or provisions are not suited both for the perfectly healthy and for those of a precarious health, but for the former the really wholesome and for the latter that which agrees with their actual bodily state. He therefore .called some exoteric (dvpalovs) and made them generally accessible (averovs ZnorfaaTo), and shut some within (etaco aneKXaae) and communicated them only to a few in security. We find an analogous conception in Averroes's great Jewish contemporary, Maimonides, who says (Guide of the Perplexed, i. 33) that the Scriptures, since they had to be understood by children, women, and the masses, could not be written in philosophical language; this would have been like rearing an infant on wheaten bread, meat, and wine, which would certainly kill it. Compare Spinoza, Tract, theol. polit. xii: 'primis ludaeis religio tamquam lex scripta tradita est, nimirum quia turn temporis veluti infantes habebantur'. See also 1 Cor. iii. 1-2: 'And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual (nvevpartKots) but as unto carnal (oapKtvois) even as unto babes in Christ. I have fed you with milk and not with meat (Ppwpa, i.e. solid food), for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye able.' This metaphor is found already in Philo, De agricult. ( C o h n ) , 9 , p . 96, 2 6 : cVet Sevqnlots pevtoTLyaXaTpo^T], TeAetot? Sera eKirvpwv ndppara, KO.1 tpvxrjs ya\a.KTw8eis pev av ttcv rpotpai Kara TT}V TTCU&IKTJI' -qXiKiav ra TTJS eyfcvicAiav povatKijs irpoTTatSevpara.

p. 216. 2. For Themistius also the physician is a favourite metaphor for the philosopher, see, for example,. Oration, v. 63 b, xxiv. 302 b, and the

NOTES

127

m e t a p h o r is ascribed to Antisthenes (Diog. Laert. vi. 1. 4 and 6). In later Greek philosophy, a n d in R o m a n , the image of philosophy as a medicina mentis is a commonplace, e.g. Cicero, Tusc. iii. 6 : 'est animi medicina {4>apfiaKov) philosophia', and it is found in Plutarch, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius a m o n g others. p . 216. 3. Cf. Aristotle, Met. H 3 . I 0 4 3 b i : TO yap Tt fy etvai TW eihei Kai T?j evepyeia virdpxei, a n d Met. A 8. 1074*35 : TO Se Tt fy elvai. . . eireAexeta. p. 217. i. i.e. nutrition a n d generation; cf. Aristotle, De gen. an. B 4. 74° b 34p . 217. 2. i.e. perception; cf. Aristotle, De an. B 2. 4 i 3 b i p . 217. 3. For each substance (even the inorganic) is a kind of actuality a n d nature, cVreAe'xeta KOX (j>vais ns eVacm; (ovala): Aristotle, Met. H 3 . 1044*9. p . 217. 4. Cf. e.g. Aristotle, Met. H I. 1042*32: eV Trdaais yap avriKCLfievais pterapoAaZs eort Tt TO VTroKecpiCvov.

rats

p . 217. 5. Cf. Aristotle, Met. 0 8. I 0 5 0 b 2 : TO effior evepyaa cartv, a n d Aristotle, De gen. et con. A 4. 320*2 : eort Se VXTJ . . . TO VTroK€ip.evov yevtaeais Kai 0opas SeKTLKov. p . 217. 6. 'ultimate basis of existence': t h e Arabic is j^aXt, a translation of the Greek oroixttov, element (i.e. fire, air, water, e a r t h ) , but the term oroixeiov is also used of matter, e.g. Aristotle, Met. N2. Io88 b 27 : ra. oroi^eta v\rj rfjs ovatas the elements are the matter of substance. p. 217. 7. Cf. e.g. Aristotle, De an. r 4. 430*7: avev yap $\-qs Swa/xtj o voCf Tiuv TOIOVTUIV (T<SV exovmiv vhijv), for the intellect is the power to become t h e things possessing m a t t e r without their matter. p. 217. 8. Averroes is here referring to Aristotle's theory (Met. H 6. 1045*30) that in the definition which consists of the genus and the differentia specifica the genus represents the matter, the differentia specifica the form: eori &€ T^? vXrjs 17 fiev VOTJTTJ T] 8' CUV^TTJ, /cat del TOV Xoyov TO fj.£v CXrj TO 5C eW/>yeia eony, olov 6 KVKXOS orxrjfta iiriTreb'ov, i.e. plane figure is the generic element of 'circle'. p . 218. I. Cf. Aristotle, Met. & 8. I 0 4 9 b 5 : avepov oVt Trporepov ivcpyaa Swd/ietis iariv, i.e. the active element, the form, is prior to the purely passive element, matter. p . 218. 2. H e r e Averroes, in opposition to the general trend of his book, drops the pretence that the inner sense (vnovoia) of revealed religion m a y express the highest truths of reason. H e r e he follows the unalloyed rationalism of classical philosophy, and professes, as Plato did, that the t r u t h can only be attained by the systematic and strenuous thought of the philosophical few. p . 218. 3. According to Aristotle, Met. A 7.

128

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

p . 219. 1. i.e. according to the Ash'arites the attributes inhere in a n immaterial substratum which has no characteristic of its own, and one might therefore ask: ' W h o or w h a t then is the possessor of these attributes ?' But I think the question cannot be answered: individuum est ineffabile, description a n d definition express only the universal. A n d if God, like m a n , is conscious, the individuality of His consciousness is as difficult to describe a n d define as the individuality of the h u m a n ego. However, al-Ash'ari gives a kind of Neoplatonic solution of this problem, i.e. he affirms that in God the opposites are destroyed, for he asserts according to Shahrastani, op. cit., p . 67, that one m a y neither say t h a t God's attributes are identical with God, nor different from H i m , nor that they are not God, nor not different from

Him: >jj. W j y> VVj . > Vj y. ^

J l i V.

p . 219. 2. Cf. note 135. 3. Perhaps h e is here referring to the Ash'arites I b n Furak and Baqillani, who, according to I b n H a z m , op. cit. iv. 214, v. 32, affirmed t h a t God has but one name, although H e has m a n y appellations (oL»*J")—which implies the magical theory t h a t names exist by n a t u r e a n d express the essential nature of the object named, or to Abu Ishaq al Isfaraini, who held, according to Shahrastani, op. cit., p . 72, 3 that the most proper description of God is t h a t His being compels us to differentiate H i m from all other beings, (instead of oj~«J) «_)-~»J" 1—-*>> OjS~ j& <W>j j j o i . I p. 219. 3. T h e hidden highest name, 'the most great n a m e ' , of God, since it expresses His real essence, would confer unlimited power on the m a n to w h o m it was revealed. For 'the most great n a m e of God' cf. Frazer, The Golden Bough, vol. iii, p . 390. p. 220. 1. Cf. Origen, De princip. i. 1 . 6 : 'Deus . . . evds, et mens ac fons ex q u o initium totius intellectualis n a t u r a e vel mentis est'. p . 221. 1. Cf. Plotinus, Enn. v. 4. 1: It is necessary that above everything there must be something simple, different from everything else, independent in no communion (ov iieii.iyfj.cvov) with w h a t depends on it. p . 221. 2. T h e First is without any conjunction and composition: avy.fiaoeojs egco irdo-qs Kal avv6eaeu>s, Plotinus, Enn. v. 4. 1. Plotinus asserts (Enn. vi. 2.17) that even if, in one way, we m a y call the First the Good (TO ayaSov), the Good is not a genus, for it cannot be predicated of anything else, since otherwise this would be equally the Good. According to Aristotle the First has no contrary, ov yap eoriv evavrlov r£> irpunw ovdev (Met. A 10. I075 b 22). p . 221. 3. Cf. note 195. 1. p . 221. 4. T h a t neither ' t h e one' nor 'being' can b e a genus is asserted by Aristotle (Met. B 3. 9g8 b 22 : ov)( olov re Se TO>V OVTOIV ev elvai yevos ovre TO ev oihe TO OX) since otherwise unity and being would have to be predicated of the differentiae of this genus also.

NOTES

..

129

p . 2 2 1 . 5. O n e m a y call the First, according to Plotinus, Em. vi. 8. 8, principle, apxq', from another point of view, however, so far as this would imply a constituent of its essence, the First is not a principle. p . 222. 1. Description n^\, moypa(j>rj; viroyparj is a technical term of Stoicism; description does not indicate the essence of a thing as the definition does, b u t omits its proprium (cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Cat. Comm., K a l b fleisch, 29. 21 : 6 p.ev vTToypa<jnKOS Xoyog TT)V tStdr^ra rijs odaias a 5} KvpLutTard re /cat irpMV (Arist. Met. Z 7. 1032*20); body cannot come into being from the incorporeal (Arist. De oaelo J 1 6. 305*16). p . 245. 2. Generation takes place only within the same species: m a n begets m a n (Arist. Met. Z 7. 1032*24); Aristotle a n d his school a d m i t also a generatio aequivoca, but only for certain primitive organisms. p . 245. 3. T h e r e is no absolute becoming, for everything must come into being out of something a n d this something must itself be ungenerated, dyevr/rov, cf. Aristotle, Met. B 4. 999 b 5. p . 245. 4. T h e doctrine that the principle of the individual is the individual, dpxrj yap TO KO.8* cKao-rov TOIV Ka9* CKOOTOV (Arist. Met. A 5. 1071*20): Peleus is the principle of Achilles. p . 245. 5. I n a univocal way, when the father is regarded as the cause of the son, because both belong to the same species; in an analogical way, w h e n the cause a n d effect are not really in the same genus. Aristotle says t h a t different things, i.e. things not in the same genus, have identical causes a n d elements only by analogy {Met. A 5. 1071*24: dAAa Si aAAaiv ulna, KO.1 orotic la . . ., trXyv rat dvd\oyov). p . 245. 6. T h a t fire a n d water have a special corporeality is not a n Aristotelian theory. T h e r e is here a reference to a problem not found in Aristotle. Although for Aristotle m a t t e r is the absolutely indefinite, he often seems unconsciously to regard it as spatial—which is only natural, for how, if it were not spatially extended, could anything enter into i t ? — a n d he never asks the question how matter becomes spatially extended. Plotinus, whose theory of matter is inspired both b y Plato's Timaeus a n d by Aristotle, regards magnitude, pAycBos [Erin. ii. 4. 8), as a form which enters into m a t t e r , b u t which itself is incorporeal, dawp.arov. F o r Avicenna t h e first form which enters into m a t t e r a n d is common to all matter is t h a t of corporeality,

140

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

through which matter receives the three dimensions and continuity and divisibility (cf. my Ep. d. Met. d. Av., p. 64). According to Plato (Tim. 53 c sqq.) fire has the shape of a pyramid (tetrahedron), air that of an octahedron, water that of an icosahedron, earth that of a cube; and he explains the transmutability of water, air, and fire by the fact that their surfaces are composed of right-angled scalene triangles; but to an Aristotelian like Averroes such a theory, refuted by his master (see e.g. De caelo r 8. 3o6b3 sqq.), could not be acceptable, and it is not easy to see what he means here by 'special corporeality' (cf. also my Ep. d. Met. d. Av., pp. 65-66). p. 245. 7. Warmth, deploy, cold, tjnixpov, moist, iypov, dry, (-qpov are the basic qualities of the elements; cf. Aristotle, De gen. etcorr.Bs. 329b24. That the production of the elements from each other is caused by the movement of the heavenly bodies is a doctrine found in Aristotle, Meteor. A 2. 339*21. p. 246. 1. For this theory ofAvicenna cf., for example, his Salvation, p. 461, 11. 1 sqq., and my Ep. d. Met. d. Av., p. 44. p. 246. 2. He refers here, for example, to Themistius, Paraphr. in Arist. Met. A, Landauer, g. 3-10. 5 ; cf. my Ep. d. Met. d. Av., loc. cit. p. 246. 3. The principal argument would seem to be that in matter there are realized resemblances, o'/ioioVip-cr, with the forms of the separate principles. Equivocal generation, therefore, is not in conflict with the thesis that omne vivum ex vivo (cf. the passages indicated in the two preceding notes). For the Neoplatonic conception of equivocal generation cf., for example, Plotinus, Enn. iv. 3. 8 at the end, and Porphyry, De Antro Nymph. r8 where he speaks of the flovyevtts ipv\al ds ylvimv loCoi : i W s TO tl&os Kal TO TC'AO? dprfiai TO OUTO). p. 260. 7. W h y the active potencies are only particular and not common, whereas t h e passive potencies can be either particular or common, I d o not k n o w ; nor is it clear which potencies are active and which passive—all we know is that they are opposites; there is some confusion in this passage, since the opposition of active a n d passive potencies is reduced to that of actuality (or activity) a n d potentiality, or form and matter. p . 26 1. 1. Cf. Aristotle, Met. H 6. 1045^17. "0 cV^cm^ uAij /cat y p.optf>Tj Tauro Kal ev, TO p.ev hvvap.ti, TO Se ivcpytla.: the proximate matter a n d the form are one a n d the same, the one potentially and the other actually. p. 261. 2. According to Aristotle it is only the active intellect which is separate from matter {xwpioT6s Kal anaOrjs Kal a/uyijy, De an. V5. 4 3 0 a i 8 ) .

NOTES

147

p. 261. 3. Cf. Aristotle, De an. B 12, ad init.: 17 /**" WLOBTJOCS ion TO SeicnKOV r&v alaOryrwv elSuiv dvev T?y? VXTJS. p. 262. i. This refers to the passage in De an. J" 7. 431*4-7, where it is said that perception is not a passivity and cannot be compared to the other movements in which there is something imperfect, since activity in the absolute sense is the activity of that which has reached perfection (TOU TfTehto/ievov). Aristotle, does not, however, offer any further explanation. The theory of perception expounded in this passage is difficult to understand. Perception, according to Aristotle, is an activity of the soul, but when we ask what this activity is, the only answer is that the percept (aloBijTov) makes (770161) an actual percipient (aicrtffyTi/cdV) of a potential. This would imply that perception is a passivity rather than an activity; but this Aristotle denies. The crux of the problem lies in the term aloB-qrov, 'the percept or perceived' (not here to be translated by 'the perceptible'), for the percept (whether we take it to mean the perceived object or the perceived matterless form—in the latter case the perception of any material object would be impossible) is here regarded as the cause of perception; but it has also to be its effect, i.e. the perception itself. We find in Aristotle the two tendencies which run through the history of philosophy: (1) to regard the thing perceived in perception both as a cause and as an effect of perception; (2) to reduce the act of perception to a state (a state of the organ, according to Aristotle; the existence of sensations in a consciousness, according to the moderns). p. 262. 2. Cf. Aristotle, Met. A 7. io72 b i4-io73"i3: God as pure intellect and pure actuality. p. 262. 3. Inference, Arabic » j j j , Greek eVi^o/ra (the concept and the term- are Stoic). Theophrastus (cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias in Anal. Pr. Wallies, 388. 17) had asserted that the minor in the mixed syllogism must itself be accepted through induction, or through another hypothesis, or from self-evidence (evdpyeia.), or through a syllogism. Compare with Averroes's passage Sext. Emp. Adv. log. ii. 329, where the latter discusses Epicurus' proof for the existence of the void: If motion exists, the void exists; but motion does exist, therefore the void exists. The premisses of this syllogism—says Sextus—are not generally accepted; the Peripatetics deny the major, and Diodorus Cronus the minor and the conclusion. p. 263. 1. The conjunction is that of matter and of absence of thought; the disjunction, &id£ev£is, is that reality is either material (or attached to matter) or thought—the proposition 'If it does not think, it is in matter' is equivalent to this disjunction (cf. note 260. 2). p. 263. 2. i.e. the argument in the form of the mixed hypothetical syllogism should not be as Ghazali gives it, but should run: 'If the First does not think, it is in matter; but the First is not in matter, therefore it thinks'.

148

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

p . 264. I. Cf. e.g. Plotinus, Enn. Hi. 2. 2 : ycyove Se ov Aoyio/toJ rov Sclv yevcadai, aAAd (pvacws Sevrcpas avdyKr): i.e. the world has not come into being because of God's reasoning t h a t H e had to create it, but because of the necessity that there should b e a secondary nature. p . 264. 2. This argument is nothing but a petitio principii. I t is true that will implies the possibility of choice between opposites, i.e. that I know t h a t I can do a thing or refrain from doing it (or, as Aristotle has it, e.g. De an. J 1 10. 433*29: irpaKTOv S* core TO 4v8e)(6pLevov /cat aAAcus" €\€iv)y b u t in a world in which there was no will there would be no choice of opposites. p . 265. 1. C o m p a r e the Epicurean argument (e.g. Lucretius, De rerum natura, ii. 1095) that the gods are unable to rule all the events in the infinite world {regere immensi summam). Ghazali here means by 'knowledge' knowledge of the purpose and of the means to its a t t a i n m e n t ; and indeed will seems to imply such a preliminary knowledge (although there is here a difficulty; e.g. I can only will to lift my arm, when I know that I can lift i t ; but how can I know that through m y will I can lift m y arm, when I have never willed it?). T h e r e may, however, be foreknowledge, even for h u m a n beings, of some of the consequences following the attainment of the purpose, although these consequences are indifferent to the wilier. p . 266. I. i.e. when one denies the divine will and temporal creation, one has to regard God as a natural cause acting by necessity a n d through mediation, and such a cause cannot know the mediate effects which constitute the world. p . 266. 2. Cf. Carneades' argument inSext. E m p . Adv. phys. i. 139-42, and Cicero, De nat. deor. iii. 13. 32, that the senses imply transiency and d e a t h : omne igitur animal confitendum est esse mortale. p. 267. 1. 'representation', i.e. (pavraaia; cf. Aristotle, De an. r 10. 433 b 28 sq.: SpeKTocov Sc OVK CLPCV (pavraoias- tpavraala Se irdaa TJ AoytcrriK^ rj alodrjTtKq. As m a n is concerned, Averrocs here means the <j>avrama Aoyiori/«j. p . 267. 2. i.e. God's knowledge, for Ghazali, means God's purpose, God's intention; a n d intention implies will. p . 268. 1. 'to every intelligent being', i.e. both in the temporal world and in the eternal. p . 268. 2. As a matter of fact, Ghazali's assertion that God can only know the purpose of His own action, and that H e cannot know the consequences of these actions through mediate causes, would ascribe to H i m ignorance of all h u m a n actions; and the only way to avoid this consequence would be t h e Ash'arite doctrine of regarding God as the real cause of all h u m a n actions also. I t is noteworthy that Geulinx in his Metaphysica vera et ad mentem peripateiicam propounds a theory which has a certain resemblance to Ghazali's: according to Geulinx nothing acts which does not know what it is

.

NOTES

149

d o i n g ; since m a n does not know how he moves his hand, he cannot do it himself, but God, when a m a n wills to move his hand, takes this opportunity (occasio) to set his h a n d in motion. All h u m a n actions, both for the Ash'arites and for the occasionalists, are performed by God, the difference between the two schools being apparently that whereas for the occasionalists the will of man, e.g. to move his hand, is dependent on himself, for the Ash'arites even this volition is caused b y God. p . 268. 3. i.e. the more knowledge a n intellect possesses, the nobler it is. p. 270. 1. See note 255. 2. p . 270. 2. See note 255. 3. p . 270. 3. This is the well-known argument of Zeno (Sext. E m p . Adv. phys. i. 104) : TO ep-ipv^ov rov p.r) epi/wxov Kpeirrov itmv. p . 271. I. Ghazali follows the same line of reasoning as Alexinus, the Megarian (Sext. E m p . Adv. phys. i. 108) in his opposition to Zeno's argument. Alexinus observed: ' O n e might in this way argue t h a t the Universe was not only animate, but also poetical, grammatical, and possessed of the other arts, since the possession of all these is better t h a n their absence.' p. 271. 2. This trichotomy is a difficult point in the Aristotelian philosophy. O n e of the distinctions between natural and voluntary acts is that in inanimate natural things there is a necessity (ivayx-rj) of becoming which does not exist for activities based on will (npoalpcois), where there is a choice between two contraries (cf. Arist. Met. & 5. 1048*1). O n the other hand, there is also in nature the accidental, for—says Aristotle, De interpr. 9. i g ' g — in w h a t is non-eternal a n d transient there is always the possibility of being and non-being (on oAa>? eariv iv TOIS fir) det evepyovoi TO Svvarov tlvai KO! pyfj. For the failure of the Aristotelian philosophy to distinguish between nature and art see m y Ep. d. Met. d. Av., p p . 204-5. p . 272. I. This is rather a strange theory for a philosopher who regards God as the Prime Mover. W h a t Averroes seems to m e a n here is that God, being incorporeal, cannot set things in motion through the movement of his body as m a n does. T h e Sceptics and Stoics held t h a t the incorporeal was incapable of any action (cf. Sext. E m p . Adv. phys. i. 1 5 1 : oihkv Swdfievov cvepyetv TO aaatfiarov). p . 272. 2. Cf. note 264. 2. W e m a y add here that this conception is opposed to Aristotle's explicit statement (Phys. B 8. igg b 26) that in n a t u r e , although it acts according to an end, there is no deliberation (fiovAevms), i.e. no conscious choice (-Trpoalpeois). It is the characteristic of nature (see note 271. 2) that in it there is no choice between two contraries. p . 272. 3. Cf. Aristotle, Met. A 4. I 0 i 5 a i 4 : r) -nptim) vv TCLVTOliara, e.g. Met. A 2. 983M4; De gen. an. B 1. 734 b io. p. 272. 7. Cf. Aristotle, Met. A 3. g84 b i5: vovv. .. cwtwu, KaBdvtp iv rots £tuois Kal iv rfj vo€i rov atriov rov Koo-fiov Kal rtjs rd£ca>s ncurrjs: 'that there is intellect in nature, just as in animals, and that it is the cause of all order and arrangement'. p. 273. 1. Cf. p. 266. 1

p. 273. 2. But Averroes does not accept the universal maxim: no universal maxim applies to God's uniqueness. This of course implies that nothing can be attributed to God, since every attribute is a universal. p. 273. 3. i.e. being dead, like being blind, is a privation, a orcprjcns, of that which would naturally be in the possession of the subject: cf. Aristotle, Met. A 22. I023b24. p. 273. 4. i.e. the Aristotelian principle that every individual is generated from what is synonymous with it {eKaarq eV avvwvvpov yiyverai oiaia), e.g. that man begets man, would thereby be violated. p. 274. 1. This is the same answer as the Stoics gave to refute Alexinus' argument against Zeno (see note 271. 1): Zeno had chosen—they said—the absolutely superior, TO Ka6dna$ Kpdrrov, namely reason (Sext. Emp. Adv. phys. i. 109). p. 275. 1. Avicenna says in his Salvation (p. 404, 1. 4; cf. the parallel passage in his Recovery, Met. viii. 6): 'To ascribe to God a plurality of thoughts is just as much attributing to Him a deficiency as to ascribe to Him a plurality of acts: God knows everything, only in a universal way; still no single thing, not even the weight of an atom, is hidden from Him (according to the Koran xxxiv. 3 ; x. 62). This is something very wonderful, the understanding of which needs great intellectual subtlety.' p. 275. 2. The example of the eclipse is taken from Avicenna (Recovery, Met. viii. 6, and Salvation, p. 405). p. 276. 1. A node is one of two points at which the orbit of a planet intersects the ecliptic; the ascending node is that encountered by the heavenly body in its northward passage, the descending that encountered in its southward passage.

NOTES

151

p. 276. 2. 'in its desire to assimilate itself to God'; for Aristotle the heavens move through love for God, and here the Platonic re'Ao?, 'assimilation', ofioiaims ru> 8eu> xara TO Swarov, is added to this conception. For the question whether this assimilation can be realized through movement, whereas God is the eternally stable, see below. p. 276. 3. The whole of this interesting passage is based on Avicenna, Recovery, Met. viii. 6 and the parallel passage Salvation, pp. 404 sqq. Avicenna's position about God's knowledge or ignorance of the individual is far from clear, and indeed his thesis that God can know every individual thing in a universal way, being contradictory, cannot be understood. (On the fundamental problem of the relation between the individual and the universal, as an empiricist Aristotle asserts the priority of the individual to the universal, as a Platonist the priority of the universal to the individual, and this contradiction is still more evident in the Neoplatonic commentators; cf. my Ep. d. Mel. d. Av., notes 81.5 and 126. 2). But the conclusion Ghazali, following Avicenna, mentions here does not really concern God's knowledge or ignorance of the individual—His knowledge, indeed, is here assumed— but is the logical outcome of any theory which ascribes to God a timeless eternity, for no actual relation can exist between the timeless and the transitory. If we admit in God omniscience, and foreknowledge of all future events, He will know the sequence of things in an eternal 'now', for He will know time as a sequence of events which are earlier and later (just as we know in the present an eternal and stable sequence of past events). But there is another aspect of time, the passing of the future through the present into the past, i.e. the living indefinable experience of the everfleeting, the ever-new 'now'. God, not being in a fleeting present, can never have experience of it. He may know that such-and-such actions are subsequent to my birth, but He cannot know now that I am acting or have acted in such-and-such a way, for in God's stable timeless 'now', in God's stillness, there can be no experience of the indefinable fleeting 'now' in which we live and act and die. This was clearly seen by Avicenna. He says (cf. e.g. Salvation, p. 406. 14 sqq.): 'If you know eclipses in as far as you exist' (I take this to mean: in as far as you exist without any reference to time) 'or in as far as you exist eternally, and if you have knowledge not of the eclipse in general, but of any eclipse whatever, then the existence or non-existence of any definite eclipse will not produce a change in you or your knowledge, for what you know is that one definite eclipse is later than another; and this knowledge of yours will be true during, before, and after any eclipse. But when you introduce the concept of time, and know at one definite moment that the eclipse is not actual and at another that it is, then your knowledge is not unalterable. The First, however, who is not in time or subject to its rule, can never refer to anything in this or that definite time, since this would imply that He Himself was in it and would imply in Him a new judgement

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and a new knowledge' (Aristotle had already distinguished, Met. 0 10, between two types of truth, eternal and transitory, cf. my Ep. d. Met. d. Av., pp. 220-1). p. 276. 4. Possibly this is Avicenna's conception, but his theory (which I shall not try to analyse here) in the chapter mentioned in the preceding note is both confused and contradictory. In any case Avicenna ascribes to God only conceptual knowledge, since for Him there is neither a hie nor a nunc, and denies sense-perception to Him; he repeats (e.g. Salvation, 405. 9) Aristotle's assertion that an individual of any species can only be known by being a 'this', a r6Se TI, A J I J U U I , by being pointed at, i.e. through direct perceptual experience, X~^J-\ i'JutULjl (cf. e.g. Cat. 5.3 b io, where Aristotle says that every individual substance seems to signify a 'this'). However, this view cannot be upheld. It is true that in perception everything perceived stands in relation to a 'here' (a most mysterious relation, since 'here' is the place where my body is, and 'my body' assumes a relation between something non-spatial, i.e. my spiritual self, and a spatial entity). But in thought an individual can be completely determined in space and time without direct reference to any 'here' or 'now', although it may be conceded that without any perception of spatial relations we should not have any conception of space. It may be remarked that hie and nunc are not in every sense analogous. The 'now', the present moment, is involved in the concept of time, whereas the 'here' does not enter into the definition of space, but needs space for its own definition (the place in which my body is), and is individually subjective, whereas any interaction between individuals assumes the simultaneity of a 'now'. Another point is that if God is deprived of perception of the individual He cannot have knowledge of the universal either. It is one of the fundamental cruces of philosophy that perception and conception seem to imply each other; there is no individual percept that has no qualities (Aristotle knew that there is no 'that' which is not a 'what'), and there is no universal which does not stand either directly or indirectly in some relation to something perceived. p. 277. 1. Conditions, JI_^>J, vu>s e^on-o: see note 3. 6. p. 278. 1. I have not found this tripartite division in Avicenna who, however, in his Recovery, Met. iii. 10, has a long discussion about relations (the difficult concept of relation was much discussed in later Greek philosophy, see e.g. the long discussion in Simplicius, Comm. in Cat., Kalbfleisch, 155. 30 sqq.; the Peripatetic Boethus dedicated a whole book to the discussion of this problem, according to Simplicius, op. cit. 163. 6). Avicenna there refutes, for example, the view held by the Greek sceptics, the Muslim theologians and some moderns (Bradley, for example—Appearance and Reality2, pp. 31 sq.—some of whose negative theories may be found in Sextus Empiricus) that relation, since it implies an infinite regress, can have no

NOTES

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reality, and I do not know to which Arabic author Ghazali is here referring. The tripartite division which he mentions here is illogical and confused, for there is only room here for two classes of relations, essential (or internal) and non-essential (or external), and the example of Ghazali's second kind of condition implies an essential relation: when a man stops moving, although his capacity to move has not changed, there is an actual change in him from action to rest. This tripartite division seems to refer to the equally confused distinction between irpos ri 7ruis excv> 7Tl^JS *Xov> a n ( ^ irpos TL in Stoicism (cf. Simplicius, op. cit. p. 165, 32 and v. Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 132. 21). The first condition would be .the npos n irws exov> i-e- a n accidental relation (see loc. cit., 1. 26, where 'to the right', 8ef 10V, is given as an example); the second would be the rrws exov> which is a non-essential characteristic of a thing (as an example of such a non-essential characteristic Plotinus, Enn. vi. 1. 30, gives acting—TO irmeiv irws fxov)'> t n e third would be, when a thing in its distinct existence of its own—i.e. when it is a TTOWV—implies a relation to something else, and is therefore essentially relative, like any state, knowledge, and perception (v. Arnim, op. cit. ii. 132. 45 orav fj.ev Kara Statpopdv TI 8iaKeLfj.evov rrpos erepov vev&r], irpos ri p.6vov TOVTO earaty lbs T) t£is Kal 77 eVioTTj^ KCU r/ ataO^ats). p. 278. 2. 'like a mere relation', i.e. like a mere external relation. p. 278. 3. This of course is false; Ghazali has evidently not seen the point. If God had created in us an everlasting knowledge that Zaid will come tomorrow, this knowledge, if true today, would be false tomorrow and ever afterwards. On the other hand, if God had created in us an everlasting knowledge that Zaid has come, or will come, the former would be false up to the moment he has actually come, but true ever afterwards, whereas the latter would be true till he has actually come and false ever afterwards.p. 279. 1. This sentence is rather confused, but I am well aware of the difficulty of the problem of relations in general and of the problem of knowledge in particular. The words 'whenever the relation becomes different' mean 'whenever the knowledge becomes different' (because of the change in the object of knowledge in reality); again, by 'the thing which has this essential relation' knowledge is understood; according to this view knowledge both is a relation and has an essential relation to the thing known. I think knowledge (knowing) can only be conceived as a unique and indefinable relation implying two terms, the knower and the objective thing known; if it is represented—as it so often is—as a separate entity having some independent existence in a mind, two new relations will be needed, one to a mind and the other to the objective thing. I think it is correct to say that when an object known or perceived changes, the percipient who notices this change changes too through the change in his knowing and perceiving. The last part of Ghazali's sentence—i.e. that

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whenever this differentiation and this sequence arise there is a change—is a tautology. p. 279. a. One might answer: 'There might be in God one single cognitive relation to the whole world, just as in one human act of perception or thought a whole consisting of a plurality may be apprehended; my perception of a complex, e.g. the face of a friend, does not consist in my perception of all its parts individually—every complex forms a new unity in which the individual constituents are merged.' Indeed, if the act of perception were identical with the object perceived, not only would the perception of a magnitude be itself a magnitude, but it would consist like the magnitude itself of an infinite number of points (cf. Arist. De an. A 3. 407*6 sqq., where he rejects the view that thought, vaqais, is a magnitude, pAytBos). p. 279. 3. That universals are infinite is not accepted by the Aristotelians, and would not fit easily into their conception of a spatially limited universe. They argue, however, against the Stoic theory of a divine providence for all individuals, saying that, since time is infinite, this would imply in God knowledge of the infinite (cf. my Ep. d. Met. Av., p. 145). Cf. note 205. 2. p. 279. 4. Ghazali misses the point: time is a condition of change; a timeless knowledge is allowed in God, not a temporal changing knowledge. p. 280. 1. Since human knowledge enters into the essence of the knower. p. 280. 2. Cf. Aristotle, e.g. De an. B 5. 4i7 b 22: iwv KOO' tKaorov rj Kwr' ivipynco> aiodrjois, 1} 8* eirwrnj/xi? rdv KO.96\OV.

p. 280. 3. He seems to mean: if the human mind possessed a highest genus, e.g. 'being', or 'something' (which are the highest genera according to the Stoics) by which it could comprehend (the word is used equivocally and can mean both 'grasp' and 'include') all the genera and species, it would also comprehend all the individuals; but one should not compare the divine understanding with the human mind, since for the divine intellect the opposition between universal and individual is obliterated. p. 280. 4. 'a passive intellect and an effect': i.e. our human intellect; it is regarded here as passive and an effect, because in its knowledge it is dependent on reality, our knowledge being posterior to reality; whereas God's knowledge, being the cause of reality, either precedes it (as a cause, but not in time) or, being identical with the things, coexists with them without any priority or posteriority (cf. Enn. v. 9. 5: oi yap toTW ovrt irpo avrov aire fier* avrov, viz. T<X ovra).

p. 280. 5. This theory of God's active or creative knowledge goes back to Plotinus (cf. especially Enn. v. 9. 5), whoquotes Parmenides' important statement that thought and being are identical, TO yap avro vottv eoriv re Kai tlvai. (Parmenides, Fr. 3 Diels). According to Plotinus the vols is pure act and is eternal; by its absolute being it thinks and creates (i$urrnaa>) things,

NOTES

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which cannot exist as something outside itself, iripioSi. Thinking its own self, in its own self it thinks the things, which therefore are identical with it: eoTix apa ra Svra. This theory, the so-called theory of intellectual intuition, is found also in Christian philosophy and theology. Cf. e.g. St. Augustine (Confess, xiii. 38. 53): 'nos itaque ista quae fecisti videmus, quia sunt; tu autem quia vides ea, sunt'. Kant expresses this in his De mund. sens, atque intell. form, et princip. ii. 10: 'intuitus nempe mentis nostrae semper est passivus . . . divinus autem intuitus, qui obiectorum est principium, non principiatum, cum sit independens, est Archctypus et propterea perfecte intellectualis'. p. 281. 1. Of course one might ask how, if intellect can be only attached to the existent, the non-existent can form an object of thought, or how the intellect can plan the non-existing future, remember the non-existing past, be subject to illusion and doubt. We have, however, seen that for Averroes even the objectively non-existing has some existence, existing subjectively, i.e. in the mind, as a representation. We have here an example of the fatal reification of thought, regarding the act of thought as the existence in the mind of some mental atoms, which has so deeply warped philosophical speculation. p . 2 8 1 . 2. Veritas adaequatio intellectus et ret.

p. 281. 3. Compare the scholastic principle Esse est Deus, which is Eckehart's fundamental principle. Both Sufism, i.e. Muslim mysticism, and Western medieval mysticism are based on Neoplatonic conceptions (in Sufism there are also Hermetic and Gnostic elements). The resemblance between those two schools, which are geographically so far apart, is often so great that many affirmations of German medieval mystics like Eckehart, Tauler, or Suso might be taken for translations from some Arabian or Persian mystic. p. 281.4. Namely, in plants, animals, men, and heaven. p. 281. 5. The Mu'tazilites seem to have been aware of the difficulty that to attribute to God a knowledge of the changing affairs of the world implies a change in Him. According to Shahrastani (Religious and Philosophical Sects, p. 60), Jahm said, 'God cannot know a thing before creating it, for either (1) God's knowledge is unchangeable, and if He knew that it would be before He created it, He would be in error (the text has 'ignorance', A $ J O , when it was or had been and He still thought that it would be; or (2) His knowledge would be changeable, but only the created can change.' (Ibn Hazm, op. cit. ii. 130, says that the Mu'tazilites asked: 'When does God know that Zaid has died? For if God knows it eternally, this implies Zaid's eternal death.' Ibn Hazm's answer on this problem runs on the same lines as Ghazali's.) At the same time, according to Shahrastani, Jahm affirmed that God had new knowledge, not, however, in a substratum ( A c j V i-e.

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not in God Himself). It is to this latter assertion that Ghazali is evidently referring, but it seems to contradict the other assertion that God's knowledge cannot change. Probably Jahm regarded God's knowledge as a separate entity emanating from Him (there is here probably some vague relation to the Philonic Logos-theory), and used 'knowledge of God' in an ambiguous way, meaning at one time an attribute of God, at another an effect of God. p. 281. 6. See note 2. 6. p. 281. 7. Gf. 74. 2; and since nothing that changes can be eternal, that which is eternal (i.e. God) cannot be subject to change. p. 282. 1. i.e. it is impossible that time should have a beginning, although the series of causes is limited. We have already shown the fallacy of this view. p. 282. 2. i.e. every movement of the spheres is temporal, since all movement implies time and there is a continual beginning and ending of these movements, just as time changes eternally and a new 'now' continually occurs. p. 282. 3. i.e. according to their system time arises from the timeless; time is the effect of a timeless cause. p. 282. 4. i.e., if the temporal can proceed from the timeless, should not temporal knowledge, i.e. knowledge of the temporal, proceed from the timeless knower ? However, the idea of an emanation of knowledge from the knower seems- to make very little sense. p. 282. 5. 'coloured', for according to Aristotle it is only colour or that which possesses colour that is seen (De an. r 2. 425 b i8: oparai Sk xpayia f/ TO *xov)m

p. 282. 6. For this conception of vision cf. e.g. De sensu 2. 438 *I2 sqq. p. 283. 1. For knowledge as the supreme end of man see, for example, Aristotle, Met. A 2; Eth. Jftc. K 7. p. 283. 2. Since the terms used are equivocal. p. 283. 3. i.e. since illumination or light is, according to Aristotle (De an. B 7. 419*9), the actuality of the transparent, the substance of the transparent is not changed through the illumination. p. 285. 1. See note 256. 1. p. 285. 2. 'man a mortal god', homo quasi dots mortalis: this refers to the beautiful words ascribed to Aristotle in Cicero, Definibus ii. 13. 40 (fr. 61 Rose): man whose destiny is thought and action is like a mortal god: 'sic hominem ad duas res—ut ait Aristoteles—, ad intellegendum et agendum, esse natum quasi mortalem deum'. p. 285. 3. St. Thomas Aquinas, who regards it as probable that the stars are moved by angels, asserts, Sum. c. gent. ii. 70, that from the religious point

NOTES

157

of view it is indifferent whether it b e declared that heaven is animated o r n o t : 'hoc a u t e m q u o d dictum est d e animatione coeli n o n diximus quasi asserendo secundum fidei doctrinam, a d q u a m nihil pertinet sive sic sive aliter dicitur'. However, a m o n g t h e 219 opinions ascribed t o t h e Latin Averroist Siger of B r a b a n t a n d condemned b y the C h u r c h in 1277, we find this proposition (prop. 92 in Denifle, Chart. Univ. P. i, p . 5 4 8 ) : 'quod corpora celestia moventur a principio intrinseco, quod est a n i m a ; et quod moventur p e r a n i m a m et p e r virtutem appetitivam, sicut animal. Sicut enim animal appetens movetur, ita et coelum.' (St. T h o m a s Aquinas believed that the movement of the stars depended on a n external animated principle.) p . 285. 4. ' b y perception': alveTai, as Aristotle says, De caelo B 8. 2 8 9 b i ; for another example of an argument based on the evidence of the senses, 81a T&V (paivojiivcov, cf. De caelo B 14. 2 9 7 b i . Although in the following Ghazali seems to b e referring t o Avicenna's Salvation, p p . 422 sqq. (and t h e parallel passages in the ninth book of the metaphysical p a r t of his Recovery), his argument differs considerably from t h e discussion b y Avicenna; but i n a n y case its principle is derived from Aristotle's De philosophia. Aristotle, i n the passage of this lost dialogue quoted b y Cicero, De nat. deor. ii. 16. 44 (fr. 24 Rose), bases his argument o n the disjunction that all movement either takes place b y nature or is constrained or is voluntary {out natura aut vi aut voluntate). H e rules out the possibility that the stars might b e moved b y nature, since all movement b y nature is either downward or upward, a n d the stars have a circular movement; their movement cannot take place b y constraint, for w h a t could possess a greater force t h a n the stars? I t is therefore voluntary. p . 286. 1. T h e meaning is: if the fact of being a body implied its movement, every body would be in motion; there must therefore b e a cause of motion, i.e. everything moved is necessarily moved b y something (Arist. Phys. H 1, a d init., 24l a 34-' a7rav TO Kivov^ievov VTTO TLVOS dvdyKT] /avetofiat). p . 286. 2. I t is interesting to note that this sentence is a free translation (with, however, a slight, b u t important difference) of one i n Aristotle, Phys.

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the existence of an eternal soul which moves the body of heaven by a first movement, i.e. a movement on which all the other movements of the world depend. As a matter of fact there is no reason why Aristotle should have made his first mover transcendent, and why the mover of heaven should not be immanent in the world and be the soul of heaven. Of course, if this argument is offered to prove the soul of heaven, it can no longer be offered to prove the existence of God; and if the existence of God is still accepted, He can no longer be the source of all movement and action, for the soul, even the human soul, does not set in motion through a mover (although for a motive), but by itself, i.e. its will and desire. That the soul cannot be moved is acknowledged by Aristotle himself, De an. A 4. 4o8b3o. p. 286. 3. i.e. the universal relation of the world to God cannot explain motion: if the fact of being created and a body itself implied movement, every body would be in motion. p. 286. 4. This example is found in Avicenna, Recovery, Met. ix. 4. p. 287. 1. According to Aristotle (De caelo A 2), however, the movement of the stars is a natural one, i.e. natural to things which possess an element more sublime than the four sublunary ones. Avicenna also, in his Salvation, p. 424, regards the heavenly movement as caused by an inclination ( J _ . , oppfi or potrr)) which may be called natural; however, he adds 'This natural inclination is inspired by a soul and renewed by its representation.' (For the problem caused by the contradiction in the Aristotelian texts, cf. my Ep. d. Met. d. Av., note 108. 2; Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroes deny that the celestial bodies can have jmnaaia, i.e. any representations.) p. 287. 2. This refers to Ghazali's words: 'every mover receives its impulse from the moved itself; but this is only a verbal quibble, for Ghazali means the same as Averroes. p. 287. 3. In fact this is a tautology; what he wants to say is that it is self-evident that things have intrinsic natures by which they are moved. p. 287. 4. i.e. if things had not an intrinsic nature, and everything depended solely on the will of God, as the Ash'arites hold, earth might move upward just as easily as fire. p. 287. 5. Things which are sometimes at rest, sometimes in motion, can receive by constraint a movement opposed to their natural one, and can therefore execute two opposite movements, cf. Aristotle, De caelo A 2. 269*7: a simple body can receive the motion of another body by constraint (ftiq), granted that a single body has only one natural movement. p. 287. 6. Aristotle argued (De caelo A 4) that there can be no movement contrary to the circular motion of the stars; heaven cannot be constrained to move by another movement than its own; cf. op. cit. A 3. 270*9. Since, according to Averroes—see below in the text—the motion of the stars is not natural, a proof of the cause of their movement must be given.

NOTES

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p. a88. 1. That the soul of the heavenly bodies is only equivocally (oiuumjuiis) called a soul is stated by Alexander of Aphrodisias, On the Principles of the Universe, ed. cit., p. 255. p. 288. 2. 'Nature' is a most ambiguous word, both in common language and in Aristotle. For the meaning intended here of 'a rational principle' see e.g. Aristotle, De gen. an. A 23. 731*24: eiXoyws 1$ <j>vms Sijiuovpyct 'nature works rationally'. p. 288. 3. In fact heaven is excluded from physics only so far as its spiritual elements, the separate intelligibles, are in question, since, according to Aristotle (Met. E 1. I025b26), physics theorizes about substances which are capable of motion and have forms, but about these forms only so far as they are inseparable from matter (cf. also the beginning of De caelo). p. 288. 4. That there cannot be a body outside heaven is argued by Aristotle, De caelo A 9. 278b25 sqq. p. 289. 1. 'without any act he deliberately chose', since according to Ghazali's theory God's will is not '.elective (i.e. it does not choose between distinct cases), but creative (i.e. it creates the distinctions themselves). p. 290. 1. Although we moderns can explain the fact that fire moves upward and stones downward by attributing it to a general characteristic of matter, Averroes is right in asserting that the differentiation of individuals having their special characteristics cannot be deduced from a general principle: there is no answer to the question why this stone is not that stone or that flower. Still, both Averroes and Ghazali, when asked why things are as they are, would answer that everything depends upon the will of God; both would assert that God's eternal will was not comparable with our human will and that God's action was wholly creative. (It is curious to see that, in the matter of God's knowledge, Averroes reproaches Ghazali for not observing that it is wholly creative, whereas in the matter of God's volition he reproaches him for regarding it as wholly creative.) Both would assert also that this was the best of all possible worlds, not only implying by this a deliberation and choice in God, but fixing a limit for His illimitable power. p. 290. 2. The Ash'arite view will be discussed below at length. p. 290. 3. This is Aristotle's own thesis, De caelo A 2. 26g b 5-i4, where he proves that circular motion is natural to the body which has this motion, and 269bi4~i 7, where he proves that there is a fifth element (i.e. the ether), superior to the sublunary elements, to which the circular movement is natural. If by 'natural movement of the ether' is meant that it moves by itself (Aristotle derives the word alB-qp from del Bctv, 'to run always'), there is no need to accept movers for the spheres. p. 290. 4. This is based by Aristotle on the principle that a thing can have only one contrary, cv ivl tvavrlov (cf. De caelo A 2. 269"io), and he

i6o

T A H A F U T AL T A H A F U T

holds the strange theory (strange, for circular motion implies a movement in opposite directions) that circular motion has no opposite and t h a t the ether is free from all opposition. Still, according to Aristotle himself the heaven of the fixed stars turns from right to left, that of the planets from left to right. p . 290. 5. According to the principle that God moves as does the beloved, it would seem t h a t movement qua movement was t h e supreme a i m ; b u t Plutarch, De defect, orac. xxx, emphasizes the variety and changes (\ierafloXai) implied in movement, a n d says that, to j u d g e from the motion of the heavens, the Divine really enjoys variety a n d is glad to survey movement. p. 2go. 6. T h e heavy, according to Aristode, is t h a t whose n a t u r e it is to move towards the centre, the light that whose n a t u r e it is to move away from the centre; according to De caelo A 3. 26g1>30, the body whose movement is circular can have neither weight n o r lightness, for neither naturally nor unnaturally can it move either towards or away from the centre. p . 290. 7. i.e. whether the heavenly bodies have consciousness a n d which kind of consciousness. p . 291. I. According to Aristotle an external force moving heaven would involve a n effort, whereas the movement of heaven is airovos, effortless; he says that we should not believe the traditional m y t h about Atlas (cf. De caelo B 1. 284*11-22). p . 291. 2. Aristotle in his criticism of Thales' view that the earth rests on water {De caelo B 13. 294=28) says t h a t t h e n one would have to ask the same question over again: for w h a t supports the water? p . 291. 3. Cf. Aristotle, De caelo A 9. 27g a 8: JAij yap fjv avrm TO (f>voiKav otofia Ka.i aiVSijToV: the matter (of the whole universe) is natural perceptible body. p . 291. 4. T h a t the elements are transitory, yevrjTa., is argued by Aristotle, De caelo r 6. p. 291. 5. All generation a n d decay on earth are caused through the motion of t h e sun along the ecliptic; cf. Aristotle, Meteor. A 9. p. 2 9 1 . 6. For Aristotle (cf. e.g. Phys. F 2. 202 a 8) all motion is based on t o u c h ; even in thought the thing thought of is touched by the thinker (cf. Met. 0 10. i o 5 i b 2 4 and A 7. io72 b 2o). p . 291. 7. I t is interesting to note that Averrocs sees that there is a resemblance between the Stoic theory and the Ash'arite. W e have tried to show above that there is, in fact, a relation between these two views. p. 292. 1. i.e. the Ash'arites, not the Stoics. p. 292. 2. 'accidental', since it was there only by constraint.

NOTES

161

p . 292. 3. i.e. movement qua movement, without a n y reference to a special place or time, is a universal; and if the heavenly bodies desire this movement, they are moved by a concept, something in the soul. Averroes's argument, however, is not only a petitio principii, i.e. not only is it used to prove that the heavenly bodies are animated, but it is also contradictory, for it first denies the objective existence of movement absolutely, a n d then admits that a movement exists in the individual moving thing, although not permanently (this is in opposition to Arist. Phys. A 4. 228 a 20, where it is asserted t h a t the movement which is absolutely one [and particular] is t h a t which is continuous, without any restriction as to t i m e ; cf. also Avicenna, Salvation, 180. 11). Averroes's assertion is a reminiscence of the animistic view that all movement is based on love or desire, which we discussed above in our note on love. I t m a y be added t h a t this view survives in modern philosophy in one form or another. Schopenhauer, for example, regards movement as the objectivation of will, and at vol. i, p . 1 i g of his Die Welt ah Wille und Vorstellung he quotes with approval the passage of St. Augustine, De civ. Dei xi. 2 8 : 'si essemus lapides . . . non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis appetitus, n a m velut amores corporum m o m e n t a sunt ponderum, sive deorsum gravitate, sive sursum levitate n i t a n t u r : ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore.' p . 2g2. 4. This would seem to imply t h a t the souls of t h e heavenly bodies possess imagination ((pavraata), and indeed Avicenna asserts this. Averroes, however, denies it—see m y Ep. d. Met. d. Av., note 109. 6—and we must regard the representation he mentions here as a kind of intellectual act. Alexander of Aphrodisias also denied (pa.vra.ma to t h e intellectual movers: see below, 3 0 1 . 3. p . 293. 1. Aristotle did not see this difficulty in ascribing natural motion to heaven (see note 290. 4). p . 293. 2. I n the following passage Ghazali refers to the chapter in Avicenna's Salvation (pp. 429 sqq.) about the aim of the movement of h e a v e n ; cf. also ib., p . 490. p . 293. 3 . T h e basic idea of this deeply religious assertion, that God should be loved for His own sake, not out of hope for reward or fear of punishment, is found already in Aristotle, Eth. End. H 3 a d init., where h e lays down as a condition of love a certain equality, IOOTTJS, between t h e lover a n d the beloved, and where h e says t h a t it would be ridiculous to expect God in His majesty to repay the love with which H e is loved (cf. Spinoza, Eth. v, prop, xix: 'qui d e u m a m a t , conari non potest, u t deus ipsum contra a m e t ' ) . Plotinus, Enn. ii. 2. 2, says that the stars, wherever they are, rejoice in surrounding God, a n d this not b y reason, but b y a natural necessity (eKacrrov yap ofi eWt Tr^pieiX-q^os TOV Qeov dyaAAerat oti Xoyt.ap.ai aAAa (pvuiKaZs avayKats).

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p. 293. 4. T h e angels in His proximity', i.e. the Hebrew Cherubim, are mentioned in the K o r a n iv. 170. W e have here a n example of the identification mentioned above, note 233. 2, of Judaec—Christian-Muslim concepts with the entities of Aristotelian-Neoplatonic philosophy. Avicenna, Salvation, p . 490, does not use the term 'Cherubim' (he uses the term, however, in other writings, for instance, in his Refutation of the Astrologists), b u t says that the spiritual abstract angels, 'i ij**) I i o U-j_,J I iSC^LJ I, of the highest degree are called intellects, whereas the angels of the second degree, the active angels, i.e. the movers of the stars, are called souls. I n Qazwini's Cosmography (ed.Wustenfeld, p p . 55 sqq.) there is given a long list of angels w h o are inhabitants of heaven, olj*->JI ijfc>l«, a n d at p . 59 the C h e r u b i m are mentioned, who, according to Kazwini, are continuously, day and night, wholly absorbed in adoration of God. H e mentions also the movers of the stars, of whom (he says) there are seven, b u t according to him the exact n u m b e r of angels is known only to God. Muslim angelology was influenced by Neoplatonism (cf. Plotinus Enn. iii. 5. 6), which regarded the stars as gods of a secondary order, subsidiary and related to the intelligible gods and dependent on them, deovs Sevrepovs /ACT' eKetvovs KCLI KO.T' eKewovs TOU? voijTovsy €^7)pTrifj.4vovs €K€LVO>V. St. T h o m a s Aquinas, too, distinguishes between angels who move stars and those who do n o t ; the former he calls intelligentiae, e.g. Contra gent. iii. 23. Like the Muslim philosophers he regards the differentiation of individual angels as a differentiation of species. p. 294. I. 'there is no potency in t h e m ' ; since they are eternally absorbed in the contemplation and adoration of God, there is no change, no possibility of change in them, 'their assimilation to God is m a d e perfect in stability', o L i J l j Aj •* $. ,*." Ji (Avicenna, op. cit., p . 431. 15). p. 294. 2. W h e n the body of the heavens is actually in one position in the heavenly sphere, it is potentially in another, says Avicenna—op. cit., p. 432. 10—in agreement with Aristotle who says, Met. A 7. I072 b 5, t h a t so far as heaven is moved there is a possibility for it of being otherwise, if not in substance, at least in place. p. 294. 3. 'specifically', specifically and successively, i _ » i U d l j

c.y]\i,

says Avicenna, op. cit., p . 432. 1 3 ; the term 'specifically' according to Averroes—see below in the text—is unintelligible. p. 294. 4. It is unfortunately not true that the unattainable cannot be desired. p. 294. 5. This might be thought to be more closely in agreement with the words of Aristotle, Met. A 8. 1073"23: r/ /lev yap aprf K a ' T° TP&TOV T&V ovraiv aKiv-qrov KOI Kad' avro Kal Kara avp.f$e[l7]K6s, KIVOVV Se Tqv irpto-rrjv atSiov xal p.lav KivTjmv: the principle and the first of all beings is immovable b o t h essentially and accidentally, setting in motion the eternal and single

NOTES

163

movement. A n d indeed Plotinus, Enn. iv. 4. 8, says t h a t it is not the proper function of the stars to contemplate the places they pass, for this is not essential to them, since they possess a uniform life, Cwfy rf/v airrf/v e^cnra, and their movement is vital rather t h a n local, cos JUIJ TOTTIKOV aX\a £am/coi/ TO KivT)p.a €ivac.

p . 294. 6. Cf. Aristotle, Met. 0 8 . 1 0 5 0 b 2 4 , where he says t h a t the heavenly bodies suffer no fatigue, since there is not for them, as there is for transitory things, that possibility of the opposite which makes continuity of movement laborious, the substance of the latter being matter and potentiality, not actuality; cf. also De caelo B 1. 284 a 4p. 295. I. Cf. Plotinus, Enn. vi. 9. 6 : ap^i) §e OVK eVSce? rGiv fier' avro, r/ &' airavraiv apxr/ avtvSees a-navrutv: a principle is in no need of what is under it, a n d the principle of everything is in no need of anything. Cf. also Plotinus, Enn. iv. 4- 6 : cUA* ouSc nepl rwv avBpumlvajv avrois hrlvoiax /cat firjxaval e£ wv Stoi/cTjo-oucn r d ij/zeVepa: the heavenly bodies do not think about h u m a n affairs, nor have they the means to administer them. p . 295. 2. T h e conception of this circular movement of the stars as based on a desire to assimilate themselves to God, the unmovable, the object of this love, is a n extremely strange one, and Theophrastus, whose Metaphysics, was known to the Arabs, felt its difficulty. It is difficult to see, he says (Met. 5 a 25), how, having a physical desire, the stars do not pursue rest instead of movement, especially when this view is combined with the Platonic theory of imitation (^u^rjais). p. 296. 1. T h e comparison is of course w r o n g : guarding a city against the enemy m a y be called a n approach to God, because the intention of the act is praiseworthy; b u t then the approach to God is a consequence of the good intention of the a c t ; approach to God, i.e. assimilation to God, is not its primary intention. p. 296. 2. K o r a n xvii. 39. p . 296. 3. e.g. Phys. E 4. 228*20; see note 292. 3. p . 296. 4. Specifically one, i.e. so far as they are movements. This, however, is by no means w h a t Aristotle understands by 'a movement specifically one'. H e says (Phys. E 4. 228=3) that when Socrates undergoes a n alteration (aWolwms) specifically ( ™ «"§«) identical, repeated at different times, these alterations (i.e. movements) will be specifically one, b u t numerically different, although similar. p . 297. 1. C o m p a r e Plotinus, who asks (Enn. iii. 3. 3) 'Has one to attribute the character of every being to its creator, if there is one, or to the creature itself, or should one not ask for a reason at all ?' H e answers that to ask for a reason why plants are created without perception, or why animals do not behave like men, would be like asking w h y m e n are not gods.

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164

p. 298. i. AJ1 this is in agreement with Aristotle's view that the side from where movement in animals starts is the right; cf. e.g. De inc. an. 6. 7o6b25~ p. 298. 2. This rather strange conception is based on Aristode's view that right and left are only to be found in moving living beings, for only living beings have in themselves a principle of motion (cf. De caelo B 2. 285*27), and that motion starts from the right and tends towards the right. This implies that both the sphere of the fixed stars and the spheres of the planets move towards the right, although they move in opposite directions, and according to Aristotle the northern hemisphere is the lower in relation to the diurnal movement but the upper in relation to the motion of the planets (cf. De caelo B 2. 285 b i5). Aristotle and Averroes have it both ways; they regard right and left as relative to an observer and as absolutely attributable to the universe (cf. Arist. Phys. r 5. 205b33). According to the latter view Averroes holds that only the heaven of the fixed stars tends to the right, and this because the right side is the nobler; according to the former view he holds that all the heavens tend to the right. p. 298. 3. Since it can only revolve on its axis. p. 298.4. Literally: like an ambidextrous foot. According to Aristotle (Hist. an. B 1. 497 b 3i) only man among the animals is ambidextrous. p. 298. 5. Contrary, namely in their direction—in their approach to the earth and recession from it, p. 298. 6. Cf. e.g. Aristotle, De caelo B 3. 286 b i sqq.; generation implies more than one revolution of heaven; if there were only one revolution the relations between the four elements would remain stable, but the four elements imply generation by their nature, since none of them is eternal. p. 299. 1. 'Why does the heaven revolve ?', Plotinus asks at the beginning of Enn. ii. 2. 1, and the answer is that it is because it imitates the Intellect, OTl VOVV

fJ.l[lCLTai.

p. 299. 2. This kind of argument, which is very frequent, is used, for example, by Favorinus against the astrologers in Aulus Gellius' Noct. Alt. xiv. I: The shortness of human life prevents the perception and interpretation of such relations between events as are assumed by the astrologers. p. 2gg. 3. Literally On the particular influences of the spheres. But that TO aaTpoXoyiKa 8ewprJii.aTa is meant can be seen from the fact that in his commentary (comm. 68) on De caelo B 10. 291" 29, where Aristotle himself seems to refer to this work (other references are found in Meteor. A 3. 339b7 a n d A 8. 345 b i), Averroes says: 'Aristoteles autem fecit librum de hoc qui dicitur de regiminibus coelestibus' (regimina corresponds exactly to the Arabic o l j - ; J o , which I have translated by 'influences'). About the astrological meaning of the word Seuprnpa Cicero informs us at Defato i. 6. 11

NOTES

165

where he translates the word BewptffiaTo. by percepta, a n d where he gives as a n example of such a. perception the fact that if so and so is born at the rise of the dog-star, h e will not be drowned at sea. T h e correct English translation for Betiprjpa in its astrological meaning would seem to be 'judgement'. 'As it is said' seems to imply that Averroes himself h a d not seen the book. p . 2 9 9 . 4 . 'Chaldaeans' in Greco-Roman literature is often synonymous with 'astrologers'; cf. e.g. Cicero, De divin. i. 1.2.

almost

p . 300.1 . Cf. Aristotle, Depart, an. A 1. 6 4 1 b 12. p . 300. 2. For a great n u m b e r of signs of providence (the ratio naturae intellegentis) indicative of terrestrial things, compare, for example, Cicero, De nat. deor. ii. 47. 120 sqq. p . 300. 3. 'thousand years'; this n u m b e r makes it plausible that Averroes borrowed the assertion from some Greek author, and indeed Theophrastus, as quoted by Ps.-Philo, De aetemitate mundi (145), says that science w a s invented barely a thousand years ago, p.6Xts vpo XIAKUV tvtavrwv. Compare Lactantius, De ira c. 13.10 (Stoic Vet. Fr. ii. 337.2): ' ( S t o i c i ) a i u n t e n i m m u l t a esse in gignentibus et in numero animalium q u o r u m adhuc lateat utilitas, sed earn processu temporum inveniri, sicut iam plura prioribus saeculis incognita necessitas et usus invenerit.' p . 300. 4. Cf. AristoUe, Met. A 8. 1074=38; compare also Cicero, De Divin. a d init. 'Mysterious indication', \_«,, corresponds to Greek p.vv, 'divine, inspired t r u t h ' : cf. e.g. Corp. herm. i. 16. p . 300. 5. This is, of course, a sophism: if rest is taken as the opposite of movement, G o d is not at rest, since H e is not spatially determined; b u t if rest is taken as the opposite of change it will apply also to God (representing the universe in spatial images, m a n in general, and Aristotle in particular, have a tendency to regard all change as m o t i o n : a moving in and out). p . 3 0 0 . 6 . ' t h e indelible tablet' ,kjA*eJI 7-jii\. T h e indelible tablet is mentioned in the Koran, lxxxv. 2 1 : 'it is a glorious K o r a n written on the indelible tablet'. I t is regarded by the M u h a m m a d a n s as the depository of all the events decreed by God. T h e allegorical interpretation of the philosophers takes the indelible tablet as the symbol of the Universal Soul. Jurjani in his Definitions, ed. Fluegel, p . 204, distinguishes four tablets: (1) the first Intellect; (2) the Universal Soul which is identical with the indelible tablet; (3) the particular souls of the heavens in which everything which has shape or form or magnitude in this world is inscribed; (4) matter. p . 300. 7. T h e r e is a passage in Plutarch, De defect, oral. 40 (p. 432 c), in which h e gives the Posidonian view of prophecy and compares the prophetic faculty, TO puuniKov, with a tablet, not written on, irrational a n d indeterminate in itself, ypapnaTtiov aypatpov KOX dXoyov KOI aopurrov e'£ aurou, b u t

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capable through the reception of representations a n d forebodings of grasping the future without reasoning, dauAAoyiWuis. A n d he says (op. cit. 39) that the prophetic faculty should not surprise us, for the soul possesses also its counterpart, memory, which preserves w h a t has been the present, b u t no longer i s : in a mysterious way the soul lays hold both on the not yet existing a n d on the no longer existing. Compare also Cicero, De divin. i. 56. 128: it is not astonishing that soothsayers can predict things that are nowhere, for everything 'is', although not (really) in time {sunt enim omnia, sed tempore absunt). p. 300. 8. Cf. Farabi, The Gems of Wisdom (Dieterici), p . 77. F a r a b i asserts that neither the tablet nor the pen—see next note—is a concrete thing. p . 3 0 1 . 1. ' T h e Pen' is the n a m e of Sura lxviii of the K o r a n . I n M u h a m m a d a n tradition it is affirmed that the first thing God created was the pen with which H e wrote down all future events. p . 301. 2. T h e images in this sentence are rather mixed; the pen, or r a t h e r the burin, is regarded as the instrument of the divine engraver, but is also personified as His knowledge. In any case for the allegorical interpretation the pen is regarded as the active element, i.e. the First Intellect, the tablet as the receptacle or the effect of its action, the Universal Soul. p . 3 0 1 . 3. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, The Principles of the Universe, ed. cit., p . 255, where it is stated that the heavenly bodies do not need those faculties which serve only for preservation. F o r Avicenna's theory that the heavenly bodies have representations or imagination cf. m y Ep. d. Met. d. Av., p p . 117-18. p . 301. 4. According to Aristotle (De an. T 3. 428M0) all animals have sensations, but not all animals have imagination; for instance, the ant, the bee, and the grub do not possess it. p. 301. 5. i.e. they possess only the intellectual part of the soul. p . 3 0 1 . 6. T h e will follows the end and not the end the will, says Avicenna, Salvation, 4 4 6 . 2 ; cf. Aristotle, Rhet. T 16. 1417 a i 8 :07 npoatpecns -noia rip reAci. T h e opposite was held by Spinoza, for whom the good, or rather the good for me, is w h a t is desired by me (Eth. iii, prop. 39, schol.). p. 302. 1. This is proved by Avicenna, e.g. Salvation, p p . 426 sqq. (cf. the parallel passage, Recovery, ix. 4 ) : the Universal Will, A-bOl i o l j ^ l , cannot cause a movement from one definite point to another. p . 302. 2. Avicenna (Salvation, p . 463) says that the celestial bodies influence the terrestrial through the qualities which are proper to them and which flow out from them into this world; and they also influence the souls of this world; through this we know that the nature which leads (^yc/iovei) these terrestrial bodies, like their perfection a n d their form (read i j j ^ a J I ) ,

NOTES

167

receives its existence from the soul which is dispersed over heaven, or through its collaboration. p. 302. 3. The accidental finding of a treasure, when one is digging for another reason, is a standard example among the Peripatetics of an event occurring by accident, dm} TU'^T;? and unpredictable; cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. r 5. 1112*27 and Alexander of Aphrodisias, Defato, 172. 25. 'What can be the connexion between the universe and the finding of a treasure?' asks Cicero, De divin. ii. 14. 33. p. 302. 4. All this is Stoic determinism; compare, for example, Cicero, Dedivin. i. 56. 127: if there were a man who saw the connexion of all causes, he would never fail in any prediction, for he who knows the causes of future events will necessarily know all future events; but since this is only possible for a god, man cannot predict the future except by certain signs. p. 303. 1. Avicenna affirms in his Recovery, Met. x. 1, that the souls of the heavenly bodies know the particular individual in a way which is not purely intellectual. p. 303. 2. Muslim dream-interpretation depends largely on Greek principles, especially on those of the Stoics (Chrysippus, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater, and Posidonius all wrote books on divination and dreams, cf. Cicero, De divin. i. 3. 6). The basic idea of prophetic inspiration is found in the famous passage of Aristotle's De philosophia (fr. 10 Rose) quoted by Sext. Emp., Adv. phys. i. 20: The conception of gods arose among men from two principles, from what befalls the soul and from the aspect of the heavens; it arose from what befalls the soul because of inspirations in sleep and prophecies. For (he says) when the soul retires in sleep to itself it takes on its proper nature, and prophesies and predicts the future. It is also in this state when, at the point of death, it is severed from its body. Posidonius— cf. Cicero, De divin. i. 30. 63—took over this view from Aristotle. One of the three reasons given by Posidonius for the divine inspiration of dreams is the kinship of the human soul with the divine (Cic. op. cit. 64), or, as Cratippus (ap. Cic. i. 32. 70) says: 'Outside the human soul there is a divine soul from which the human takes its origin.' Compare also the passage quoted by Cicero (op. cit. 61) from Plato's Republic ix. 571 sq., where the latter says that when, in sleep, the irrational parts of the soul are pacified and the rational part shines forth, a man's dreams will be peaceful and reliable (turn ei visa quietis occurrent tranquilla atque veracia). Avicenna's relation to astrology is much the same as Plotinus', or rather it depends on it. Both Plotinus and Avicenna accept the Stoic idea of a natural sympathy through which all parts of the Universe stand in relation to each other, and changes in one part can give indications of changes in others. But they both reject the extravagant claims of the astrologers (cf. Plotinus, Enn. iii. 1. 5 sqq.; Avicenna, e.g., in a short treatise on the question) with arguments

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TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

derived ultimately from Carneades; and both inconsistently try to safeguard free-will, notwithstanding the dependence of everything on one supreme principle and the emanation of everything from it. p. 303. 3. Aristotle, in Dedivin. personal. 2, denies that dreams are divinely inspired (SeonefinTa), since animals also dream, and otherwise only the wisest would be able to foresee the future, whereas common men and even the demented and melancholic are capable of doing so. He holds that dreams depend on an unconscious and irrational perception of signs which the imagination symbolizes. Therefore, says he (op. cit. 2. 464b5), the best interpreter (re^viiccoTOTor) of dreams is one who can perceive the similarities. p. 303. 4. Cf. Plutarch, De gen. Socr. 24, who says that the chosen few are sometimes, but rarely, in direct contact with the Divine, whereas the common man receives only the signs which form the subject-matter of soothsaying (TO detov o'A/yoi? evrvy^dvei oV airov KOX wavlcvs, Toff 5e noX\ots 0-rjfj.eta St'Sojotv). p. 304. 1. Cf. note 301. 4. p. 304. 2. Cf. Aristotle, Met. Z 8. The carpenter gives the form of the cupboard, which is always a universal, to the matter, i.e. all art proceeds from universal rules; but such a theory can never explain the individual differences in works of art, and the fact that in his work of art the artist expresses his individuality. p. 304. 3. 'by nature', i.e. by instinct. p. 304. 4. According to Aristotle, however, animals have no notion of the universal, but only representation of the particular (TWV KO,B' tKacrra favramav) and memory, cf. Eth. Nic. H 5. 1147b5p. 304. 5. 'the definition of a thing', i.e. the concept of it. p. 304. 6. This distinction between a universal representation and the concept (form) is not found in Aristotle. p. 304. 7. The problem of the instinct of animals seems to have interested the Stoics especially. 'How is it,' asks Seneca (Epist. 121. 19), 'that the hen does not flee from the peacock or the goose, but from the hawk, which is much smaller and which it does not even know ?' ('quid est, quare pavonem, quare anserem gallina non fugiat, at tanto minorem et ne notum quidem sibi accipitrem ?'), and he asks from where the bees get their ingenuity in building their cells, and the unity of their collaboration (22): 'non vides, quanta subtilitas apibus ad fingenda domicilia, quanta dividui laboris obeundi undique concordia.' And the answer is that their art is innate, not acquired: 'nascitur arsista, non discitur' (cf. n. 334. 3). Origen, Deprincip. iii. 108 (Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 288. 2), says that some animals have by instinct an imagination which leads them to some specified action, the bees, for example, to the building of cells.

NOTES

169

p . 304. 8. i.e. t h e artisan who does not genuinely possess his art, b u t p r o ceeds empirically. p. 305. 1. H e means that the king who arranges his armies for a b a t d e is not occupied with the individual men, but only with the armies as a whole. Averroes seems here to confound 'whole' a n d 'universal'. p . 305. 2. Aristotle says {Elk. Nic. r 5. 1112*21) t h a t there can b e n o deliberation a b o u t t h a t which is eternal (since it is eternally fixed, and therefore no will can alter it). p . 306. 1. Irenaeus (Contra haer. i. 9. 4) h a d protested against the Gnostics t h a t they transferred expressions and terms from their natural sense to a n unnatural (Acfct? KO.1 6v6p,ara fieratfrepovcriv eV rod Kara (f>vatv els TO irapa p . 306. 2. Both the terms 'universal aim' a n d 'universal will' which h e identifies here have very little sense. If he means, however, that when a m a n has decided to go immediately to Mecca, no movement occurs, this is not correct: all his subsequent movements depend on this decision and a r e simply the means to attain his end. p. 307. 1. i.e. the straight line is perfectly determined, and to follow it one needs no other determination. p . 307. 2. T h i s is in fact Anselm's (and Augustine's) doctrine offidesquaerens intelledum. I t would be negligent, in a person capable of understanding, not to proceed from the means to the end, from belief to understanding. p. 308. 1. T h e former would be the Stoic view, the latter the Peripatetic. p. 308. 2. Averroes seems rather undecided about this question, but perhaps he means the same as Cicero, De nal. deor. ii. 65. 164: 'licet contrahere universitatem generis h u m a n i eamque gradatim ad pauciores postremo deducere ad singulos', i.e. if the gods care universally for m a n , one m a y deduce from this that providence extends to every individual m a n . p. 309. 1. 'in a created soul', since, for God, knowledge of the infinite is not impossible. For Augustine also (De civ. dei. xii. 19) God can comprehend the infinite, a n d His knowledge transcends n u m b e r as infinity transcends n u m b e r : 'infinitas itaque numeri, quamvis infinitorum n u m e r o r u m nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei, cuius intelligentiae non est numerus'. O n the other hand, Alexander of Aphrodisias (Defato xxx. 201. 9) asserts that, since theinfinite cannot be measured, the infinite future events cannot be known to the gods. For the gods w h a t is impossible remains impossible, and they do not seek to overcome it, since this would make any assertion meaningless. For this reason it is impossible for the gods to know definitely of a thing contingent by nature that it will be or will not (op. cit. 200. 23)

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(Alexander's thesis against Stoic determinism is that there are things contingent by nature and that chance exists). It is rather astonishing that Ghazali, for whom as an Ash'arite there is no objective necessity at all, and for whom there is no certainty in any foreknowledge, since any future event depends solely on God's pleasure, does not attack (as Alexander does) the basic Stoic thesis of the necessary concatenation of all events. p. 309. 2. i.e. in a body. P- 3°9- 3- i-e- through a body. p. 3og. 4. There is here, perhaps, some reference to the difficult problem in Platonic ethics and Greek ethics generally of the dual nature of man, divine through his spiritual, intellectual being, profane through his earthbound life. If man's aim lies solely in the perfection of his intellect, in a purification from all earthly desire, in a flight of the alone to the Alone (^vyij fiovov Trpos i^ovov), his relation to his fellow men would seem irrelevant. But it would be presumptuous in earth-bound man, says Protarchus (cf. Plato, PhilebiL* 62 b), to seek only the eternal and divine; to find his way home man should consider also the less pure and less perfect particular knowledge. It is, according to Greek ethics, in and through society that man, being by nature a gregarious animal, will develop his moral character. And since kings ought to be philosophers, some philosophers ought to be leaders of men. Compare Cicero, De fin. iii. 20. 68: the wise man should desire to engage in politics and government, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and perfect his fellows; cf. Spinoza, Eth. iv. 73 (Spinoza certainly knew the Definibus; compare, e.g., Defin. iv. 1. 14 with Eth. v. 20 demonstr., and Defin. iv. 7. 16 with Eth. iv. 20 demonstr.). p. 310. 1. i.e. the soul is all the individuals potentially, because on the one hand in perception it can become all the individuals actually, and on the other it receives from the intellect a knowledge of the permanent (stable, oraTucos) intelligibles which comprehend potentially all the individuals. p. 310. 2. According to Plotinus the soul stands in an intermediary position between the Intellect and the sublunary world; it is a unityplurality, nhfjOos €v, and otherwise could not produce a plurality so far distant from unity (cf. Enn. vi. 2. 5). p. 310. 3. I think Averroes is here referring to the passage p. 309,1. 10, where Ghazali admits the possibility that the soul of heaven may know all particular events, but where he limits this knowledge to the present and therefore partially accepts, partially rejects the philosophical theory, and where by this arbitrary limitation he refutes the philosophical theory of prophecy. Of course Ghazali admits foreknowledge in God of the infinity of all particular events. St. Augustine (De civ. Dei v. 9) says that this foreknowledge, according to Cicero, De divin., implies fate (concessa scientia

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futurorum ita esse consequens fatum ut negari omnino turn possit), a n d that therefore Cicero rejects it. So did the Peripatetics, as we have seen, and for the same reason. T h e implication seems to m e evident, but St. Augustine is not of this opinion. p . 310. 4 . T h e irascible soul, Bviws, the concupiscent soul, smBvpla, i.e. the two irrational parts of the soul according to Plato (cf. Rep. iv. 436 a ) ; to contemplate the soul in her primordial purity, she should b e viewed in her immortal yearning for the divine which is akin to her, a n d as cleansed from the incrustation due to her earth-bound state (cf. op. cit. x. 611-12). p . 3 1 1 . 1. F o r a n historical view of t h e division of the sciences from the Alexandrian commentators on Aristotle, especially Ammonius Hermiae, who is the originator of this type of philosophical literature, to the end of the scholastic period, see L. Baur, 'Gundissalinus, de divisione philosophiae', Beitr. z- Gesch. d. Philos. d. Mitielalt. iv. 2 - 3 , p p . 325 sqq. Both Farabi a n d Avicenna wrote treatises on the division of the sciences, Farabi's treatise being called On the Enumeration of the Sciences and Avicenna's On the Divisions of the Intellectual Sciences. Avicenna's division is based on A m m o n i u s ' scheme of Biaipfms (division) into practical and theoretical sciences; imSiaipeats (secondary division), e.g. the tripartite division of the theoretical sciences into physics, mathematics, a n d theology; and vnoSt-alpems, subdivision, e.g. the subdivision of the physical sciences. T h e division of physics into eight parts, each based on a special treatise of Aristotle, is a c o m m o n feature of t h e Muslim commentators. T h e sequence of these parts and the enumeration of the books ofAristotle is taken from Philoponus, in Phys. comm. (Vitelli i. 1.20); Philoponus, however, subdivides the part that treats of animals into a class that treats of them as wholes and a class that treats of their parts. p . 3 1 1 . 2. Classes, J j ^ l , i.e. literally 'roots', radices; subdivisions, c - j y , i.e. ramifications, rami. p . 3 1 1 . 3. N o t only is time, according to Aristotle, a consequence of movement (di8e KaX TTporryeZoBax roSe rovSe xai

mpimapxetv ro'Se ripSe): Galen, De meth. med. ii. 7 (K. x. 126 F ; Deichgraber, op. cit. 123. 24). p. 316. 3. The example of burning is given by Sext. Emp. Adv. phys. i. 241 sqq. The argument given there is that if fire were the cause of burning, it would either burn by itself or need the co-operation of the burning matter; in the former case, it would burn always and in all circumstances, in the latter it would not burn exclusively through its own nature. p. 317. 1. 'simultaneity': Hume would have regarded this rather as a sequence. p. 317. 2. According to Stoicism also God is the only active principle and matter is passive or, as Ghazali would say, dead. The Stoic God is immanent in the world; He does not act voluntarily, but Himself is Law, Fate, and Necessity. In a way Aristotelianism also, as we have seen, implies God as the Unique Agent; for He is the one principle of movement, the constant mover of Heaven, on whom all earthly change depends, and in the next sentence in the text Ghazali quite righdy draws this conclusion. p. 317. 3. Aristotle's own theory of procreation is confused and obscure; life and soul are not body, but cannot exist without body, which either is

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warmth, not fire (6epp.iv oi rrvp), or pneuma, and something more divine t h a n the so-called elements (aaipjL deioTepov TOIV KaXovpAvojv oroc^etajv) and related to the m a t t e r of stars (dvdXoyov ra> TOIV dorpojv oroi^etw); cf. De gen. an. B 3 . 736 b 29 sqq. For t h e theories of Avicenna a n d Averroes compare my Ep. d. Met. d. Av., p p . 40 and 44 a n d notes. p . 317. 4. This is rather a strange argument in a refutation of the causal nexus between phenomena, since it admits and implies such a nexus. T h e arguments seems somehow related to the equally b a d argument of Chrysippus quoted in Cicero's Defato 1 8 . 4 1 - 1 9 . 4 5 , by which Chrysippus wanted to safeguard free-will without abandoning the idea of a universal causal concatenation, a n d where he distinguishes between causae perfectae et principalis a n d causae adiuvantes et proximae. W e cannot, h e says, give o u r consent (assensio, o-vyKarddeo-is) to a thing seen without the form of the visible object making an impression on our soul, but this impression is only a causa adiuvans of the consent, which depends on our own nature. Compare also Cicero, Top. 15.58, for the Stoic distinction of two types ofcauses, the efficient, ' u n u m quod vi sua id quod sub ea subjectum est certo efficit' (amov Si' o), 'alterum quod n a t u r a m efficiendi non habet sed sine q u o non potest efBci' {aXnov ov OVK dvev or aZriov irpoKarapKTiKov). I n Ghazali's example the light of the sun is a cause of the former type, the opening of the eyelids of the latter. For a further classification of causes by the Stoics see, for example, Clement of Alexandria, Strom, viii. 9. 25 (Stoic Vet. Fr. ii, p p . 119-21). p . 317. 5. i.e. the celestial bodies. p . 317. 6. W h o m does h e mean ? I n a well-known passage in Book X I I of his great commentary o n Aristotle's Metaphysics (Bouyges, p . 1498, quoted already by R e n a n , Averroes et I'Averroisme3, p . 1 og) Averroes distinguishes the different opinions held by philosophers on the relation between God and the world; according to him, besides the Muslim theologians only the Christian philosophers like J o h n Philoponus professed that all the potentialities of the created reside in God. However, according to Neoplatonism and the Neoplatonic commentators all forms derive ultimately from God, and so all the M u h a m m a d a n Aristotelians m a y be m e a n t here. But it is strange t h a t Ghazali should give them the designation of 'true philosophers'. p . 318. 1. This is perfectly t r u e ; if the only function of the h u m a n m i n d were the registration of isolated sense-impressions, as the empiricists or sensationalists or positivists have it, or if esse were percipi, there could be no investigation, no search for explanation or causes, since nothing could b e known but the experienced and the given. All search, all research, all questioning, all wonder implies belief in causation. All knowledge, as b o t h Plato and Aristotle knew, arises from questioning and w o n d e r : Sid yap TO davp.dZ,€tv oi dvdpwnot Kal vvv Kal TO irparrov rfptjavro etv (Arist. Met. A 2. g 8 2 b i 2 ; cf. Plato, Theaet. 155 d), and transcends the actually perceived.

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p. 318. 2. 'evident', I think, would be better than 'self-evident'; the evident is that whose cause is known, the unknown that of which the cause is not yet perceived. We believe that we know a thing—says Aristode, Anal, post. A 2. 71 b 9—when we believe that we know its cause. (See above, note 236. 5.) p. 318.3. This is Aristotle's argument against the Heraclitean flux (Pfrys. A 2. i85 b ig): all things would be one, right and wrong, man and horse, would be identical; indeed one would not even speak any more about the identity of all things but about their nothingness: oi mpi rot kv eivat. ra ovra . . . dAAa 7repl TOV p.Tjb'ev. p. 318. 4. This also seems to me to be true. All conceptual thought implies the idea of identity, and all identity in the real implies a conformity to law, a sameness of action under the same conditions, i.e. that in such-andsuch conditions a certain entity will necessarily act in such-and-such a way; the concept of fire, for example, implies a fore-knowledge of hypothetical necessities: if fire acted in different ways under the same conditions, the concept of fire would not convey any meaning. p. 318. 5. Since 'one' and 'being' are convertible (cf. e.g. Arist. Met. I 2- i°53 b2 5)p. 319. 1. In this sentence his belief in absolute causal necessity would seem to be shaken, and indeed Averroes holds with Aristotle that there are accidental events: i.e. when something does not happen always or in the majority of cases, eVi TO TTO\V (cf. e.g. Met. E 2. i026b32). From the following, however, it appears the he means here only that under different conditions things may act differently. p. 319. 2. i.e. the body of someone capable of sensation. p. 319. 3. Condition (or presupposition, inoBcms: the word {modems with this sense is found in Theophrast. Hist. Plant. 4. 13.4, where it is said that the root is the presupposition of the tree) is a logical concept; a substratum {vTroKiijitvov) is a real entity, but, as we have seen, ancient philosophy does not distinguish clearly between the logical and the real. As we have seen, too, the theologians do not accept the Platonic-Aristotelian-Stoic concept of matter; they do, however, accept the idea of the inherence of accidents in a substratum (and they accept the Platonic and Aristotelian idea of a scala naturae—see below); and in their logic, which is based on Stoic logic and which uses hypothetical propositions for preference, relations of inherence can be included, as in the example given in the text: life is the condition or presupposition of knowledge, i.e. if there is no life there is no knowledge, and there can be knowledge only in the living (from Kant's treatment of the hypothetical judgement, Kr. d. r. V., tr. An. 9. 3, it has often been erroneously assumed that the hypothetical judgement expresses a causal relation, the categorical a relation of inherence).

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p. 319. 4. Forms, being universals, are not admitted by the theologians; for them there are no universal entities in rerum natura, and universals are psychological entities, things of the mind (owioi). p. 319. 5. i.e. they acknowledge that not only is God, who is invisible, a cause, but there are also visible causes. p. 319. 6. 'sign' (AJi, cnjficfoi') is one of the more important concepts of Stoic logic (cf. Sext. Emp. Hyp. Pyrrh. ii. 96 sqq.; Adv. log. ii. 140 sqq., 149 sqq.). Stoic logic, in opposition to the Platonic and Aristotelian, does not try to establish relations between concepts, but contents itself with finding an external connexion between certain observed facts, e.g. the fact that a woman has milk is a sign or indication that she has conceived. The empirical physicians do not try to explain the connexion, i.e. to find a more universal law from which it may be deduced, nor do they regard this connexion as necessary, but only as probable; and the question how often such a connexion has to be observed to give a reasonable probability was much discussed (the fact that the probability is greater the greater the number of observations can, however, only be explained by the fact that a real causal connexion becomes more probable). The fact that science tries to explain such connexions and does not regard them as a mere expression of empirically stated coincidence, but holds them to be invariable and necessary, shows that we assume them to be based on a causal relation. p. 319. 7. This is a Stoic proof (cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. phys. i. 78 sqq.); instead of 'harmony' one might translate 'sympathy', i.e. the Stoic avy.irddcLa which holds all things together and through which, when a finger is cut, the whole body shares in its condition. p. 319. 8. This is a well-known dictum; cf. note 16. 5. Sextus Empiricus says (Adv. phys. i. 204 and Hyp. Pyrrh. ii. 19; 23) that the man who denies cause does so either without a cause or with a cause—but in the former case his assertion is worthless. p. 320. 1. This is a telling question, and I do not know how, for example, Hume would answer it. If causation is really a habit in man, what makes it possible that such a habit can be formed, or what is the objective counterpart of these habits? Is it simply our good luck that nature repeats the same connexions over and over again? The most important question, however, that which the Greek dogmatists asked the empiricists, viz. how many times such a connexion must be observed, before it can be relied upon (cf. e.g. Galen, On Medical Experience, Walzer, viii. 8), or before such a habit can be formed, is one he does not ask. Besides, how can we act at all, before such a habit is formed ? For we shall not be able to act, not knowing the consequences of our actions, or rather not knowing that we can act at all. Have we to pass through a period of inertia where we observe and wait till in one way or another the habit arises? (see also note 324.4). Proverbial wisdom,

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however, has it that once bitten is twice shy, t h a t a b u r n t childe dreadeth the fire, t h a t he that stumbleth twice at one stone is worthy to break his shin. p. 320. 2. K o r a n xxxv. 41-42. p. 320. 3. H a b i t (£60$), says Aristotle (Rhet. A 10. I36g b 6) is w h a t one does through having done it often. p. 320. 4 . For nature, according to Aristotle {Rhet. A 11. 1370*7) is concerned with the invariable, as habit with the frequent, 17 /±kv ifavois TOU act, TO oe Wos TOU TToAAaKtf. However, Aristotle often says that things that h a p p e n by nature h a p p e n invariably or in a majority of cases (e.g. Phys. B 8. i g 8 b 3 5 ) ; a n d Averroes repeats this below in the text. p . 3 2 1 . 1. Gf. note 317. 3. p . 3 2 1 . 2. H e is here referring of course to the Stoics, not the Epicureans. According to Aristotle colours come into existence from the fundamental colours, black and white, through mixture (gifts'); cf. De sensu 3. 4 3 9 b i 8 440 b 25. About the Stoic theory of colours nothing is known except a few words ascribed to Zeno (Stoic Vet. Fr. i. 26. 1-3), according to which colours are the first configurations (axrip-anajioi) of matter, or colour is the surfacestain (e-nixpuiois) of matter. p . 3 2 1 . 3 . T h e sun hardens m u d and melts wax, says Sext. E m p . Adv. log. ii. 194; Adv. phys. i. 2 4 7 ; for this whole passage compare Sext. E m p . Adv. phys. i. 246-9. p . 3 2 1 . 4 . This example is also found in Sextus Empiricus, loc. c i t . : o jjXtos . . . XevKatvei [lev r a eodrfftaraj /ieAatVet Se TTJV 'fj^txripav cVt^aWtap: the sun whitens clothes, but blackens our complexion. p. 322. 1. T h e elemental fire, i.e. the fire which has its natural place directly under the heavenly spheres and which surrounds the air (cf. Aristotle, De caelo B 4. 287*33; Meteor. A 4. 3 4 i b i 4 ) . For Averroes's theory compare m y Ep. d. Met. d. Av., p . 182. p . 322. 2. Compare, however, w h a t Averroes says himself, p . 288. p. 323. 1. K o r a n iii. 5. I t is hardly necessary, I think, to d r a w attention to the ambiguity of Averroes's religious views. p . 324. 1. W i t h the whole of this section compare Sext. E m p . Adv. phys. i. 202-4, where it is said t h a t if there were no causes anything might come from anything at any time and place; a horse might come from a m a n , a plant from a horse, snow might congeal in Egypt, there might be a drought in Pontus, things happening in summer might occur in winter a n d vice versa; a n d again, Hyp. Pyrrh. iii. 18, where we have again as a n example the horse which might come from mice, or, as another example, elephants that might come from ants. p . 324. 2. I t is to be remembered, however, that for the Ash'arites the possible is the realized.

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p. 324. 3. The conjecturing power, i.e. ^J^., ayxtvoia, which we met in Avicenna, see note 313. 9. p. 324. 4. This is of course an absurd theory, and condemns man to absolute passivity. Such an absolute passivity, however, is the consequence of any sensationalistic theory which reduces causation to a mere sequence of events, since for such a theory the words 'I do', 'I act', 'I think' are completely devoid of sense. Ghazali admits activity in God, but does not define the word; he would hardly be able to hold (as Averroes sees) that God's action is nothing but a habit in Him, i.e. an habitual sequence of events. p. 325. 1. The formula in itself leaves the question open; if knowledge is simply the recording of external data, there is no objection to Ghazali's theory; it belongs, however, to man to foresee, to intend, and to act, which implies law and a knowledge of law; and this is what Averroes wishes to express, as can be seen from what follows. p. 325. 2. i.e. if the agent, God, could do anything, and anything could be done to the creature, i.e. the substratum. (However, the omnipotence of the creator already implies the possibility of omniformity in the creature.) p. 325. 3. i.e. if anything may happen in the future. p. 325. 4. I do not think that Averroes's position is very acceptable from a theological point of view, for it does not leave any liberty to God whatever, since God must conform to the law. One might perhaps say that God has chosen the law Himself; however, once this law is chosen He can no longer infringe it. p. 325. 5. 'created', i.e. revealed or inspired. p. 325. 6. This seems to mean that even revealed or inspired knowledge must be in agreement with what is possible according to the laws of nature. p. 325. 7. I think this means that if we know that an event is possible— and we may know this either through revelation or through reason or through both—there must be in reality potentialities which make this event possible. p. 325. 8. This contradicts what he said on p. 320 (see note 320. 4). p. 325. 9. i.e. knowledge, even divine creative knowledge, implies always a thing known with which it is in agreement. p. 325. 10. 'the nature of the actually existent', i.e. the fact that Zaid is coming. p. 325. 11. This seems to mean that knowledge can only refer to facts, an assertion which is surely false. p. 326. 1. i.e. through God's knowledge, Zaid's coming (for example) is attached to Zaid. This would seem to imply that God's knowledge is the only cause of everything that happens. See, however, the next sentence in the text and the next note. The whole passage is of course very confused; the

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term 'nature' is used in a very vague and indefinite sense and the concept of creative knowledge involves in fact a conlradictio in adiecto. The general sense of the passage, however, seems to be that God cannot infringe natural law. p. 326. 2. i.e. through our ignorance of the causal laws which determine (for example) Zaid's coming. p. 326. 3. It would seem from the next sentence in the text that opposites are always in equilibrium in themselves, since the cause of their actualization, i.e. the preponderance given to the one over the other, seems to lie in 'the knowledge of the existence of this nature', i.e. God's knowledge that this opposite will be realized. p. 326. 4. Koran xxvii. 66. p. 326. 5. Cf. note 320. 4. p. 326. 6. The consequences mentioned, pp. 323-4. p. 326. 7. In this section Ghazali abandons the Ash'arite theory of the denial of causation, and reverts to the rationalistic supernaturalism of the Muslim philosophers (i.e. their attempt to justify supernatural facts by rational arguments, by theories, for example, of influences emanating from the soul or of a universal natural sympathy) which ultimately derives from Stoicism. The philosophers limit supernatural possibilities arbitrarily to certain categories; but the Ash'arites, who do not show any logical consistency, assert that, once philosophical principles are admitted, there is no limit to God's omnipotence but the logically impossible and absurd. The whole problem was much discussed in Scholastic philosophy. Leibniz's position on this question is almost identical with the Ash'arite view. p. 327. 1. Compare Leibniz, Theod. 1, 'Discours de la conformity de la foi avec la raison', 3: 'II se peut qu'il y ait des miracles que Dieu fait par le ministere des anges, oil les lois de la nature ne sont point violees, non plus que lorsque les hommes aident la nature par l'art, l'artifice des anges ne different du notre que par le degre de perfection.' It is interesting to see that Newton's discovery of the law of gravitation was used for the explanation of such possibilities; cf. Leibniz, op. cit., 19: '. . . le celebre M. Locke a declare^ en repondant a M. l'eveque Stillingfleet, qu'apres avoir vu le livre de M. Newton, il retracte ce qu'il avait dit lui-meme, suivant l'opinion des modernes, dans son Essai sur l'entendement, savoir qu'un corps ne peut operer immediatement sur un autre qu'en le touchant par sa superficie et en le poussant par son mouvement: et il reconnait que Dieu peut mettre des proprietes dans la matiere qui la fassent operer dans l'eloignement.' p. 327. 2. For plants as composed of earth, cf. Aristotle, De an. r 13. 435b*p. 327. 3. Blood is the final form of food, eVxanj Tpo^fj TO af/ia, cf. e.g. Aristotle, De gen. an. A 19. 726b3-

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p. 327. 4. For the theory of sperm as coming from blood see Aristotle, De gen. an. A 17-20. p. 327. 5. In the sperm there is the form of the animal; cf. Aristotle, De gen. an.Bi. 733b32 sqq. p. 327. 6. The theologians and Ghazali admit a scala naturae, a necessary order and succession, TO t<j>e£fjs, in all things; cf. Aristotle, Hist. an. H 1. 588b4 sqq. and also De an. B 4i4 b 28: sensation, for example, is a condition of intellect, nutrition of sensation, &c. Compare Thomas Aquinas, Contr. gent, iii, c. 99, where he declares that God can produce an effect without its proximate causes. p. 327. 7. Cf. Leibniz, op. cit. 2: 'il est done vrai que ce n'est pas sans raison que Dieu les (i.e. les lois generates) a donnees, car il ne choisit rien par caprice, et comme au sort, ou par une indifference toute pure; mais les raisons geneYales de bien et de l'ordre, qui l'y ont porte\ peuvent etre vaincues, dans quelques cas, par des raisons plus grandes d'un ordre superieur.' p. 328. 1. According to Aristotle's principle of synonymity, everything comes into existence from the synonymous, e.g. warmth from warmth; cf. Met. Z 9. p. 328. 2. For the spontaneous generation of worms, the so-called 'earthguts', yrjs evTcpa, see Aristotle, De gen. an. r 11. 762b27, and Hist. an. Z 16. 570*15; see also Hist. an. E 19. 550*1 for the spontaneous generation of grubs, crKioXrjKes; for the spontaneous generation of mice compare the curious passage in Aristotle, Hist. an. Z 37. 58ob30, and Pliny, x. 85, who says that according to Aristotle the generation of mice takes place lambendo, non coitu. Scorpions according to Aristotle (fr. 367 Rose) are generated from rotten bergamot-mint, eV TWV miwij.f3piu>v OO.TT4VTU>V ; as to serpents, they are oviparous (see Arist. Hist. an. Z 1. 558 b i ) , and Aristotle nowhere says that they might be generated spontaneously. p. 328. 3. 'non pas par caprice, et comme au sort, ou par une jndifKrence toute pure*. p. 328.4. Although Aristotle himself does not seem to admit the possibility of the generation of men from earth (see Arist. De gen. an. r 11. 762b28), there was an old Greek tradition that such a generation had taken place (cf., for example, Plato, Pit. 269 b and Herodotus viii. 55). p. 329. 1. In these two examples, although they are logically impossible, something more than the simultaneous affirmation and negation of one isolated entity is involved: in the definition of will, for example, a relation to knowledge is implied. All definition states a necessary relation between two concepts, and to deny the logical implication is logically impossible since it destroys the definition.

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p. 329. q. There is some confusion here. There is no logical impossibility in the supposition that God creates purposeful actions in a dead man (or in a living animal that acts by instinct). But the Ash'arites hold that God is the sole agent, and that the actions of living men are created by Him, and then the question arises what difference there can be between voluntary and involuntary action in man (for the distinction between voluntary and involuntary action see Galen, De motu muse. ii. 5). The same objection was made against the Stoics: if no atom can move without God's will, if everything depends on fate, there is no longer any sense in man's deliberation and will (cf. Plut. De comm. not. 34; Alexander Aphrod. Defato i. 33; Nemesius, De nat. horn. 39). Another unavoidable consequence is that vice occurs not only of necessity or according to fate, but also in accordance with the Reason of God and with what is best (cf. Plut. De Stoic, rep. 34). p. 329. 3. Aristotle expresses the principle of contradiction in the same way: opposites cannot inhere in the same substratum simultaneously (Met. r 3. ioo5b26). p. 329. 4. Leibniz (op. cit. 19) does not seem to regard this as impossible; he thinks the dogma of the real and substantial participation may be explained perhaps by the fact that one body can have an immediate influence on others; divine omnipotence might perhaps cause one body to be present in others, there being no great difference between immediate influence and presence. p. 329. 5. I do not know to whom Ghazali is referring; perhaps it is to Ibn Hazm, according to whom God can do also what is logically impossible (cf. op. cit. ii. 181); but as a matter of fact it is the theory which the Ash'arites and Ghazali himself hold, since according to them God at every moment re-creates afresh the whole world, in which there is no stable element nor any connexion. For Aristotle, however, whose theory Ghazali (cf. Phys. A 6-10) is going to reproduce, change implies a substratum, a matter which changes and is the underlying stable element to which the changes occur. p. 330. 1. He should, of course, say 'the illusion of power', for if God acts in us we do not act ourselves, although we may in 'voluntary action' labour under the illusion that we do. 'Power' seems here to be a translation of TO i(j>y rjtiw and Ghazali, following al-Ash'ari, who also distinguishes between voluntary action and a reflex action like shivering (see Shahrastani, Relig. and Philos. Sects, i. 68), here gives the answer of the Stoics to their critics (see, for example, Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. vii. 2): although everything is determined by fate, everything acts according to its nature; if, for example, you throw down a stone the impulse is given by you, but the stone rolls according to its own nature, and man acts according to his nature when he acts deliberately and by will. The ultimate dilemma, and that not only for the Stoics and the Ash'arites, is this: I am only responsible for those acts which I have

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freely chosen, and my choice depends on my character (or nature). But there are only two factors which determine my character: the internal initial characteristics transmitted to me by my parents, and the external conditions in which I find myself; and I have freely chosen neither of these factors. The whole problem belongs to that of objective possibility, which I have discussed before: My will implies the possibility of doing or not doing, but only when all the conditions are fulfilled can the possible happen; then, however, it is necessary. p. 330. 2. I think he means that we attain the knowledge that these movements are performed by a living being like ourself, possessing will. I do not think he means God here. p. 331. I. This is badly expressed; what he means is that certain acts which are expected need not necessarily occur. p. 331. 2. Since the theologians admit definitions, and in the definition, according to Aristotle, the genus takes the place of matter, the specific difference the place of form (cf. e.g. Arist. Met. A 6. IOI6"28). p. 331. 3. i.e. in sublunary living beings. p. 331. 4. The theologians admit, as we have seen (p. 319), that life is a condition of rationality; i.e. they accept the definition of man as a rational animal, but do not regard warmth and moisture, which are the active qualities of the elements (cf. De gen. et con. B 2. 32gb24), as a condition of life, because these qualities do not enter into the definition of life. For the Aristotelians, however, there is a steady progress, an uninterrupted scala naturae, from the simple elements through the homogeneous parts (6/j,oioiiepj)) and the organic towards man, in whom earthly nature finds its highest perfection and its supreme end: the lower is a condition of the higher, which is its end (cf. Arist. De part. an. B 1. 646*12). It is warmth (or pneuma) which generates life according to Aristotle (De gen. an. B 3. 736b2g sqq.). P' 33' • 5- Every organ is adapted to its function, whose means it is; shape and function are intimately related (cf. Arist. De an. A 3. 407 b i3). p. 331. 6. For the hand as an organ of the intellect see Aristotle, De part, an. A 10. 687"7 sqq. p. 332. 1. i.e. every species has its peculiar qualities, Mia, which do not define the species although they characterize it (cf. Arist. Top. A 4. ioi b io). p. 332. 2. Koran xxiii. 12-14. p. 332. 3. We have seen that some Greek authors also believed this. p. 332. 4. Such a theory is in fact akin to those theories (see e.g. J. S. Mill, Syst. ofLogic, ii. 7. 5) which derive the laws of thought from experience. Averroes here refers to Ibn Hazm, who (op. cit. ii. 181) distinguishes four

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classes of the impossible, declares that the third class, that of the logically impossible, e.g. that a m a n should at the same time sit and stand, is possible for God in another world, although we know necessarily by the actual organization of our mind (JJUJI A ^ J ) that it is not possible in this. T h e Ash'arites do not assert that the logically impossible is possible for God (see I b n H a z m ' s polemics against them, op. cit. v. 214). p. 333. 1. It is rather strange that Shahrastani in his Religious and Philosophical Sects, p p . 70-71, reproaches Abu Ma'ali (i.e. Juwaini, surnamed the I m a m of the two Holy Towns, an Ash'arite and the teacher of Ghazali) for acknowledging a causal nexus in nature and coming near to the philosophical point of view. P- 333- 2 - Koran xxxiii. 62 ; xxxv. 4 1 ; xlviii. 23. P- 333- 3- Cf. note 332. 4, and see also I b n H a z m (op. cit. ii. 182), where he says that what is logically impossible for our understanding is so only because God has m a d e it impossible; if God had wished, it would no longer be impossible, and a thing both could be and could not be at the same time, or a body could be at the same time in two places or two bodies in the same place. p. 333. 4. i.e. since the soul has no spatial magnitude it cannot be localized anywhere. P- 333- 5- I " t n e following, Ghazali summarizes Avicenna's doctrine found, for example, in his Salvation, p p . 259 sqq., from which, however, h e deviates in certain points of terminology, as I shall indicate. p . 333. 6. It seems contradictory to say that although the soul is not impressed on a body its faculties are so impressed; the same difficulty exists for Aristotle also, but the question will be discussed at length below. It m a y be added that both in Greek a n d in Arabic the term for sensation, aiV&jcris, i l U . , can also mean 'sense-organ'. P- 333- 7- T h e term 'internal sense' is not found in Aristotle. But Aetius tells us (Plac. iv. 8. 7 ; Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 39) that the Stoics called Aristotle's 'common sense' eWd? ajjyq, internal touch (touch, in accordance with their general materialistic view), a term translated by Cicero as tactus interior (Acad. post. 7. 2 0 ) ; and Alexander of Aphrodisias opposes the objects of (frnvraala (for the relation of <j>avraala to common sense see note 334. 1) as internal percepts, aloBryra eVrd?, to the objects of the senses, alaO-qra CKTOS (De anima, Bruns, 68. 31). T h e expression, 'internal perception', 1} alaBrjTtK-ri ij cv&ov Svvaius, is used in Neoplatonism (cf. e.g. Plotin. Enn. iv. 8. 8), a n d Augustine under Neoplatonic influence speaks of an internal sense which is conscious of its own perception and in which everything the external senses provide is collected (e.g. De lib. arb. ii. 4 and ii. 23). •

NOTES

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p. 333.8. The location of sensation in the brain is based on the discovery of the nerves and the anatomical study of the brain by the Greek physicians Erasistratus and Herophilus. p. 334. 1. Aristotle in his theory of the common sense, 77 KOIVTJ a"oBr)ois, made a first and interesting attempt to explain the unity of the perceiver and the thing perceived, i.e. to explain (1) the fact that the same man (the same ego) can perceive sensations ofdifferent senses or compare the different sensations of one and the same sense (he did not observe the fact that he is conscious of his own identity, although he attributes to the common sense the faculty of perceiving that we perceive); (2) the fact that, for example, when we perceive yellow honey, we are aware that it is sweet, although we only see it (cf. De an.T 1. 425* 22). On the second point Aristotle confuses the unity of the qualities in the external thing (although he does not doubt the objectivity of these qualities) with our conviction that the identical thing which is seen may be touched and eventually tasted (one must distinguish of course between the unity of the external object and our knowledge, or our imagining, that it is a unity of such-and-such qualities) and with some faculty in our soul of unifying the subjective sensations; if, as a matter of fact, the external world were simply a construction out of sensations, there ought to be such a unifying faculty (the primitive and irreductible fact that the self-same thing which is seen can be touched belies the possibility of such a construction, for a visual sensation, even if visually extended, can never be touched, since by definition it is not in the objective space in which we move: heterogeneous sensations cannot be combined). As to <j>avraoCa (representation, imagination), it is primarily, according to Aristotle, a function which transcends the actual sensation (cf. De an. r 3. 428*9). Since, however, there is also in the sensus communis an awareness of a non-actual sensation (as in the example of honey given above), he cannot delimit <j>avrama from common sense; and indeed he ascribes to (j>avraaia some of the functions he attributes to the sensus communis, e.g. awareness that the white object actually perceived has such-and-such non-perceived qualities (cf. De an.T %. 428*28) and also (428b22) awareness of the common sensibles (which, for instance at De an. r 1. 425*17, he attributes to the common sense). The commentators saw the difficulty, and,forexample,Ps.-JohnPhiloponus tries—Comm. in de an. libr., Hayduck, 507.16—to establish a distinction between common sense and avraaia: common sense is the receptacle of the sensible forms through the medium of the particular sense, ataS-qms ptpiieq, whereas (fxuracrla receives them both through the common sense. The confusion in the Aristotelian theory is increased still further in Muslim philosophy through certain Stoic developments, as I shall show, and also through terminological difficulties, the terms used here for the first three internal senses being different translations (whose sense is not absolutely fixed) of the Greek word <j>avTaaia; the word, for example, which I translate by 'representative

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faculty' (2LJUL| 'ijiiI) is used byAvicenna (who calls it also ( i j j y z j I Sji)I) foi w h a t Ghazali calls the 'conservative faculty', whereas Avicenna designates the sensus communis by the Greek word (in Arabic transcription, L u l i z j ) . For the expression 'judging element' compare note 334. 6. p. 334. 2. T h e estimative faculty (;U»A_JJI 'iy}\): the term is one of t h e different translations of the term avTaaia, b u t has acquired a special sense— in the Latin translations it is called vis aestimativa. P - 3 3 4 - 3 - T h e intentions, J U J I (in the Latin translation intentiones). T h e word j U J I , as we have seen—note 3. 6—is a translation of the Greek TO AEKTO, and instead of 'intentions' I might have translated it 'meanings' or 'significations'. T h e term shows t h a t here we have Stoic influence, a n d indeed the Stoics define XZKTOV through avraola: XZKTOV Se irnapxew ojjl TO Kara XoyLK-fjv (f>avraaiav u^tora/xevov, an intention is what subsists in conformity with a rational presentation (Sext. E m p . Adv. log. ii. 70). Now the Stoics distinguish six classes of avramai (Diog. Laert. vii. 5 1 ; Stoic. Vet. Ff. ii. 24. 15): t h e sensational (aur&rruccu), the non-sensational (OVK a.lo8r)TtKai), the rational (Xoymal), the non-rational (aAoyoi), the artful (rexy-Kal), a n d the artless (a-re-^voi), i.e. natural, unmethodical; the non-sensational apprehend through insight (Smiwa) the incorporeals a n d the other conceptual notions; the rational exist only in m a n a n d are thoughts (vo->jcr«j), whereas the non-rational, which animals possess, have no n a m e (oi) reTvyfiKamv oVopaTor). I t seems to m e from this that the later Stoics m a y have recognized a non-rational, but at the same time non-sensational, ^avraala on which the instinct of animals depends, and that the Arabs m a y have applied to this favraola, to which t h e Greeks h a d not given a distinctive n a m e , the term 'estimative faculty'. I n a n y case, t h a t there is Stoic influence here m a y b e seen from Seneca's epistle 121, where he asserts that animals also have a constitutionis suae sensus (constitutionis suae sensus is the translation of crvvctSr/ms, the Stoic counterpart of Aristotle's sensus communis in so far as sensus communis means the consciousness of one's own activity), and to this sensus he ascribes all the instinctive actions of animals a n d , for example, t h e fact t h a t the hen flees from the hawk, but not from the peacock or the goose (I have not met in classical literature the example of wolf, sheep, and lamb which seems to b e a common example a m o n g the Arabs and which, e.g., is found in Farabi's Gems of Wisdom and in Ghazali's Vilification of Theology, vol. iii, p . 7). Cf. note 304. 7. p. 334. 4. T h e forms, i.e. the individual sensible forms which exist in t h e sensus communis. p. 334. 5. According to Avicenna this faculty is located at the end of the middle ventricle of the brain (Salvation, p . 266).

NOTES

189

p. 334. 6. Aristotle distinguishes between (jiavraala alaBriructf (or povXcvTUOJ) and favraola Aoyioruoj (De an. r 10. 433b20.), sensational and intellectual or deliberative (f>avraata (a term which in a way is a contradictio in adiecto, since (j>avraoia is by definition alaSrjnicrj, an image); but he does not indicate how the animals can perform their actions by mere tj>avraala (and desire), without any rational element (on the other hand, he regards sensation already as having a kind of rational element akin to judgement, De an. r 7. 431*8, and in De memoria 1. 450" 15 he regards all ^avraaia as having a conceptual element), and John Philoponus simply says (op. cit. 515. 9): 'You must know that what in us is the intellect is in an animal the <j>avromV; from which it would appear that the imaginative faculty can perform what the estimative faculty is supposed to do, and the estimative faculty is therefore superfluous, as Averroes asserts later (p. 336). P- 334- 7- Here, too, there is some Stoic influence. The Stoics (but not Aristotle) have the term tfiavraola ovvBeTucrj, 'combining tfratnaoLa' (cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. log. ii. 276), and Ps.-John Philoponus (op. cit. 509. 16) distinguishes two kinds of tj>avTaoia, one that accepts the forms and one that combines at will representations of phantastic beings. p. 334. 8. Avicenna says, loc. cit., that this faculty is located in the middle ventricle of the brain near the vermiform process (-^ .Lu.jVl i_ij_j»x)l <j i'jjjJI Xs. c. LijJI). P- 334- 9- See note 335. 2. p. 334. 10. Galen, De plac. Hippocr. el Plat. vii. 3 (K. v. 605), says that anatomical research on the brain has shown that a lesion in the last ventricle affects the sensibility and motive power of the animal more than a lesion of the middle ventricle, and a lesion in the middle ventricle more than one in the first. Aristotle himself regarded the heart as the central organ of sensation (see e.g. De iuvent. 2. 469*11). p. 334. 11. This is a very questionable logic, especially in view of the fact that representation itself implies memory; but the comparison with water is found also in Avicenna, loc. cit. It is inspired by a passage in Aristotle's De memoria 1. 450 b i - 3 , where he says that people in violent emotion do not remember well; it is as if a seal were stamped on running water. And Plotinus says, Enn. iv. 7. 6, that if one should imagine sense-impressions to be impressed on a liquid like water, they would run away and there would be no memory. p. 334. 12. Avicenna calls the memorative faculty the retentive-memorative: ojS'lJJI ikiU-l ojil\. In this distinction of two memories, one for sensible affections, one for thoughts, there seems to be some Neoplatonic influence, for Plotinus in his subtle and profound discussion of memory (Enn. iv. 3. 25-33) distinguishes between them and attributes the former to

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT 190 the lower soul, the latter to the higher (Enn. iv. 3. 15-22). He has, however, a much more idealistic view of memory, which, according to him, belongs exclusively to the soul, and at Enn. iv. 3. 26 he refutes the Stoic view which compares memory with the imprint of a signet-ring on wax (a view which, however, Chrysippus did not share, cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. log. i. 229). P- 335- '• What Ghazali relates here of the motive faculties is almost (see note 335. 4) a textual quotation from a passage in Avicenna, Salvation, p. 259. It is, although simplified, materially in agreement with Aristotle, cf. e.g. De an. r 10. 433 b i3 sqq. Aristotle has simply the term <j>avTama: the appetitive animal cannot be without (f>amama (433b28). p. 335. 2. There is here some terminological confusion. Ghazali here copies Avicenna, who understands by 'representative faculty' the fourth internal sense, whereas Ghazali meant by it the first. According to what Ghazali says (p. 334) about the relation between the third internal sense and the motive faculty, one would have expected him to have mentioned this third faculty here. But I admit that the meaning of all these terms is very evasive. p. 335. 3. This is the only sentence Ghazali adds to this passage. p. 335. 4. Cf. Aristotle, De an. r 1 o. 433 b 25: all animals move by pushing and pulling, wms ml cAfis; there must therefore be in them a fixed point from which the movement starts (cf. also Arist. Phys. H 2. 243 b i5). p. 335. 5. 'discursive' from 'discourse' (i.e. speech). By this I translate fflLU, derived from .ikj like Aoyumicos fromAo'yos, both the Greek and the Arabic word meaning both 'speech' and 'reason'. p. 335. 6. This is also stated by Avicenna, loc. cit. p. 335. 7. 'Conditions' and 'modes' are here synonymous; by these terms the theologians expressed the unreality of universals, which existed only for the mind (cf. note 3. 6). p. 335. 8. This is a very simplified summary of Avicenna's chapter 'On the faculty of the speculative soul and its degrees', op. cit., p. 269. The idea that the soul receives its vices by inclining to the body and being subjected by it, and its virtue by contemplation of intellectual realities, is derived from Neoplatonism; cf. e.g. Plotinus, Enn. i. 6. 5-6. p. 336. 1. The soul is not really subsistent by itself for Aristotle (it is so for Plotinus), since it is the form of the body; but although it is incorporeal it performs its functions (except the highest, the intellectual) through organs in which it is located, and only the active part of the intellect is separable from the body (how this is possible, when the soul is regarded as a unity, is another question). The arguments that will be given try to prove the

NOTES

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intellect's independence of any bodily organ (the terms 'intellect', vovs, and 'soul', xy, are often confused). p. 336. 2. I think Averroes here means by 'imaginative faculty' imagination in the more general sense of (fxivraola, common to men and animals. P- 336. 3- This sentence is rather confusing. Avicenna evidently does not think that the estimative faculty in the animal replaces the cogitative in man, nor could Avicenna mean (if indeed he said that the ancients called the estimative faculty the imaginative) that the estimative faculty and the imaginative are identical, as Averroes seems to imply, but only that the ancients did not distinguish clearly between them. p. 336. 4. i.e. to the sensus communis; shape (onpj/xa), being a kind of magnitude, is one of the common sensibles and is apprehended through motion by the sensus communis (Arist. De an. r i. 425" 16) which, according to the Muslim philosophers, is located in the front part of the brain. p. 336. 5. i.e. the imaginative faculty is not mere imagination, but perceives what happens in the external world. p. 336. 6. i.e. they are not derived from sensible experience; this seems to contradict the Aristotelian principle 'nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu'. P- 336. 7. Nothing is found in the De sensu about this question, but Averroes is probably referring to De memoria 1. 450*15, where Aristotle says that animals possess <j>avraaia, because it is primarily a perception and not one of the conceptual faculties, although it is accidentally such a faculty (it seems to be, like memory, something intermediate between perception and thought; cf. ibid. 449b26). p. 337. 1. This is the thesis of Avicenna [Salvation, p. 285) in the chapter on the immateriality of the substratum of the intelligibles. See below in the text. p. 337. 2. Some theologians held that thought was located in an atom in the heart. The Stoics also had placed the TiycpoviKov in the heart (or in the brain; according to Plutarch, De comm. not. 45, the Stoics regarded it as a nopos onyiuaios, a passage not bigger than a point, in the heart). P- 337- 3- The question of the indivisibility or divisibility of time, space, and matter was discussed copiously by the Muslim theologians. How well the Greek arguments for either point of view were known can be seen from the long discussion of this question by Ibn Hazm, and his refutation of Ash'arite atomism, op. cit., vol. v. 92-108 (the arguments for indivisibility are mainly based on Aristotle). Curiously enough the older theologians were also interested in this question. p. 337. 4. i.e. of a plurality in the atom, since this atom would have two sides and would therefore be divisible. This is the argument found in

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Aristotle, Phys. Z I (ad init.): indivisibles could not touch, because they woald not have parts and therefore their wholes would coincide. It is also given by Avicenna, p. 286, in the chapter mentioned in note 337. I. p. 338. 1. Throughout this problem perception and tjiavraoia are regarded as images on an extended substratum, and, of course, Ghazali is right in regarding it as impossible, as the philosophers hold in the case of other universals, that an abstract entity like hostility should be impressed on a surface. p. 338. 2. But this is not an argument against the intelligibles, for the philosophers do not hold that intelligibles can be impressed on matter, although inconsistently they hold this to be possible for hostility. On the contrary it is an argument against the materialism which Ghazali has set out to defend. p. 338. 3. This argument against the philosophers is correct, if by 'knowledge' is meant sensible knowledge, i.e. perception and <j>avraola. p. 338.4. This is a curious remark, since Ghazali has just argued that there can be no relation between hostility and a body. It can only mean here: "like the relation of hostility to the body according to the philosophers, a conception I have shown to be false'. p. 339. 1. i.e. the colour white, for example, is evenly extended over the whole body, and when you take a part of the body you take also a part of the white, and the white of the part is the same white as the white of the body. p. 339. 2. Here there is another conception of sensation; i.e. it is conceived not as an impression, but as a faculty, a capacity for action (and reception), and therefore shapeless ('without a specific shape', says Averroes, but this seems to me a contradidio in adiecto); but how can the shapeless be extended over the extended ? There is here a reference to the theory found in Aristotle, De an. A 5. 411*26. Cf. note 343. 2. p. 339. 3. i.e. sight, which is an attribute of the eye, is, like whiteness, found in every part of its substratum, i.e. the eye, but some eyes or some parts of the eye have a greater receptivity for sight than others, and in old age this receptivity of some parts of the eye becomes less and therefore the old see less well than the young (Aristotle says, De an. A 4.4o8b2i,ifanoldman could acquire the eye of a young man, he would see as well as a young man). p. 339.4. i.e. sight and (the same shade of) white have in all individuals the same definition, but they are quantitatively divided, i.e. spatially and through being in different individuals. p. 339. 5. He probably means by 'that they cannot be divided into any particular part whatever' that, for example, some eyes lose in part their receptivity for sight.

NOTES

rg3

p . 339. 6. i.e. the p a r t which has vanished acts (or acted) with a greater intensity. P- 339' 7- Even colours cannot be divided absolutely, for they terminate in a point at which they cannot b e seen any more (namely at a certain distance). This refers to Aristotle, De sensu 7. 449 a 22 sqq. P- 339- 8. This refers to De sensu 6. 445 b 28, where Aristotle says that only the continuous per se (xaB' airo) falls into a finite n u m b e r of equal parts. p . 340. 1. H e means that Ghazali treated estimation as if it were a n impression, whereas it is a faculty; Averroes, however, has not shown i n any way how Ghazali's argument could be refuted by regarding estimation as a faculty. p . 340. 2. I n the chapter quoted in note 337. 1. p . 340. 3 . T h i s completion is given b y Avicenna in t h e chapter indicated in note 346. 6. p . 3 4 1 . 1. Curiously enough this is nowhere explicidy stated by Aristotle. T h e a r g u m e n t is found in Avicenna (see below). It may be inferred from the passage a t the beginning of De an.T\, where Aristotle agrees with Anaxagoras that the mind must be unmixed, aiuyrjs, and asserts that it cannot be mixed with the body or have an organ, a n d cannot have a form of its own, since the appearance of such a form would obstruct everything else. This connects with the passage (De an. B 5. 417*2) where he asks w h y the sense-organs cannot have a perception of themselves. p . 3 4 1 . 2. This is the argument given by Avicenna (Salvation, p . 290). I t is based on the argument found in Aristotle, De an. A 3. 407^2 sqq., where Aristotle attacks Plato's conception, found in the Timaeus, of the soul as implying magnitude. Aristotle says in substance that, t h e meaning Plato gives to 'soul' being undoubtedly 'intellect', the unity of the intellect is not the unity of a magnitude. If it were a magnitude, with which of its parts would it think ? And if it thought with some only of its parts, the others would be superfluous; besides, if the term 'parts' means points, there would be an infinity of them and infinity cannot be traversed, and if all the parts collectively were in contact with the thing thought, w h a t could be meant by this contact? p. 342. 1. Cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. Z 1. 1 ' 3 9 b 4 : y OPCKTIKOS VOVS 17 wpoalpems ^ opc£ts StavorjTiKYi, Kal rj roiavr-r] ap^r) cLvBpwTros: will is either desiring reason or reasoning desire, and such a principle is m a n (in his totality). p . 343. 1. T h i s in a way contradicts w h a t he said on p . 339, where h e regarded this second class as that of things by definition divisible through the divisibility of the substratum, although with different degrees of intensity. p. 343. 2. T h e problem of the faculties is discussed in De an. A 5. 411* 26 sqq., where Aristotle asks w h a t it is t h a t holds the soul together if it can be

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divided b y nature through the different operations of its organs. Should we not rather say that each of the operations of the soul belongs to the soul in its entirety? Is not the soul a unity? However, although in this passage h e seems to regard the soul as a unity, he regards only the intellect as selfsubsistent a n d imperishable, for, says he, if there were anything that could destroy it, it would be decrepitude (De an. A 4. 4 o 8 b i 8 - 2 o ) . p . 343. 3 . After the passage where Aristode asserts t h a t only decrepitude could destroy the intellect, he says that the same thing seems to apply to the sense-organs; and then the sentence quoted by Averroes follows: « yap AajSot o 7rpeaflvT7]s op.p.a TotovSi, jSAeVot aV aiomep «at o veos (loc. cit., b 2 l ) . p. 343. 4. Aristotle says, loc. cit., b 22 : 'Decrepitude is not due to some affection of the soul, b u t to t h a t in which it resides, just as in drunkenness a n d illnesses.' However, for Aristode sleep and fainting, Xmo^mxla, are not due to any affection of any sense-organ, but to the inactivity of the central sense, the sensus communis (cf. De somn. 2. 455 a 26 sqq.). p . 343. 5. I t is found that plants a n d certain insects live when they a r e cut in two, a n d it seems that the same soul resides specifically, although not numerically, in the two parts (Arist. De an. A 4. 409=9; cf. B 2. 4 i 3 b i 6 ) . p . 343. 6. K o r a n xvii. 87. p . 343. 7. T h e parts, i.e. the organ and the soul: the organ becomes inactive, a n d the soul remains both in sleep a n d in death (but can it be active after d e a t h ? ) . But this is not the conception of Aristotle, for w h o m both waking a n d its opposite, sleep, are common to body and soul (cf. De somn. 1. 1) and due, as we have seen, to the inactivity of the central sense; the term 'common sense', however, is ambiguous and m a y m e a n either the central organ (in animals that have blood this is the heart) or its counterp a r t in the soul; both meanings are intended here. For Aristotle (cf. De gen. an. E 1. 778 b 3o) sleep is a borderland (1j.e86pt.0v; j j j | is the Arabic term, well known in Muslim mysticism) between life and death, between existence and non-existence. Sleep is the first state of the animal, because through it it passes from non-existence to existence (the Homeric metaphor of Sleep as the brother of Death was well known in Islam, see, for example, Ghazali, Vivification of Theology, iv. 291). p. 343. 8. K o r a n xxxix. 43. p . 344. 1. C o m p a r e note 342. 1; for Aristotle, however, m a n in his totality consists of his body and soul, for Ghazali's materialism, in his body exclusively. p . 344. 2. If the soul is a unity, as Averroes has just asserted, there is certainly such a n analogy, as Aristotle also holds (see next note). p . 344. 3. Both Aristotle a n d Averroes hold a t the same time three different theories about sensation: (1) that sensation is a n impression on a

NOTES

195

sense-organ; (2) t h a t it is a faculty of a soul in which all faculties are u n i t e d ; (3) that it is a faculty of that (for Aristotle, at least, inseparable) synthesis of body and soul which constitutes m a n . Here Averroes seems to hold t h a t one ought really to say t h a t the eye sees, a n d t h a t 'a m a n sees' is only a n idiomatic expression. Aristotle, however (De an. A 4. 408 b i 3 ) , says: JSEATIOK yap tocos firj Xeyetv TT\V tpv%T)v eAeeix rj [xavddvew 7) hiavozlo&ai, dXXa. TOP avdpuyrrov Ttj i/ivxfj. ' I t would perhaps be better not to say that the soul has pity or learns or thinks, b u t that the m a n does so through his soul.' p . 345. 1. ' J u d g e m e n t of his sight.' For Aristotle there is in sensation already a cognitive element (De an. B 10. 424=5 ; cf. 432*16). p. 345. 2. Such absurdities are a consequence of all materialization of mental p h e n o m e n a ; compare with this section Plutarch, De comm. not. 4 5 . This theory is directed against the materialism, Stoic in origin, of those theologians for w h o m all reality consists only in body, a n d for w h o m the soul is nothing b u t the material vital spirit (uvcCfia, spiritus, »- J J ) which is dispersed through the whole body (cf. "e.g. Alex. Aphr. De an. libr. mant. 115. 6, B r u n s ; Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 218. 25) although its principle is in the heart (or the brain). T h e origin of the a r g u m e n t is unknown to me, and seems to have been so to Averroes, too, but it is based on problems discussed by t h e Stoics; Chrysippus objected to the impression-theory on the ground that, if the mind thought at the same time of a triangle a n d a quadrangle, the same b o d y would b e a t the same time triangular a n d q u a d r a n g u l a r (cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. log. i. 229). I t m a y have been offered either by someone w h o believed the seat of the soul to be a n indivisible body, a n atom, or b y one who believed the soul to be a n indivisible immaterial substratum (if t h e latter, one should not be shocked by the idea that it is said to be in a p l a c e ; Aristotle himself calls the intellect a TOTTOS el&wv, De an. P 4 . 429*27, a place tor universals, and our modern philosophers say t h a t things a r e in a consciousness). I t asserts that, since we cannot assert two opposite ideas at the same time and cannot, for example, possess at the same time ignorance (regarded as something positive) and knowledge, there must be room in the soul for only one of two opposite notions, a n d therefore it must b e indivisible. T h e last sentence of the passage means t h a t the theologians might retort t h a t in one indivisible place ignorance a n d knowledge could b e opposed, since in one place they might form a unity—i.e. the notion t h a t ignorance is not knowledge; b u t their adversary can then object ad hominem t h a t the Stoic conception, that the principle of the soul is in the heart or in the brain a n d that at the same time it is a unique vital force extended over the whole body, is contradictory. This objection seems legitimate, but if such a vital force is acknowledged it destroys the assailant's thesis also. (It is curious to see t h a t Plotinus argues t h e other way round. H e says, Enn. iv. 7. 8, t h a t if t h e soul were the entelechy of the body a n d therefore dispersed through the whole

196

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body, a h u m a n being could have only one sentiment a n d never b e in discord with itself. I n a little treatise, 'On happiness and on the ten arguments for the substantiality of the soul'—published in Seven Treatises by Avicenna, H a i d e r a b a d , H . 1353, a n d where Avicenna follows largely Plotinus—Avicenna says, p . 8, t h a t if the intelligible form were in a body, it would b e impossible to perceive at the same time two opposites. p . 345. 3. C o m p a r e Chrysippus' definition: 17 tjivxq Trvevyia ion ovfujnnov TtfiXv owexks nam ra awjian hifjicov (Stoic. Vet. Fr. ii. 238. 33). Plants a n d animals are joined through one single Ifis, junction (Sext. E m p . Adv. log. i. 102; Adv. pkys. i. 8 1 : three cohesive forces are distinguished, efis- for the inorganic, fifcns for the plants, faxy for the animals). p . 346. I. Aristotle, e.g. Anal. Pr. A i. 24*21 : rwv ivavrtwv etvai rrjv avTfjv i-mvms, i/ivxri- N o t only is the identity and unity of our Self a mystery, b u t the unity a n d identity of any reality, be ityarganic or inorganic, is a problem, the whole being more t h a n the parts. p . 354. 1. i.e. it is not a ro'Se TI. p . 354. 2. Cf. Aristotle, Anal. Post. A 4. 73 b 26: /caSdAou Se Xtym o aV Kara iravros re imdpxci *at KO.8' avro KOX fj avro. (jtavepov apa ort 00a KadoXov e£ dvayK-qs imdpxei rots rrpdynaow. I call universal that which is valid of everything, per se, and so far as it is this t h i n g ; it is therefore clear t h a t everything that is universal pertains to things necessarily. T h e intellect is receptive of the form and potentially like the form (Aristotle, De an. T \ . 429*15). P' 354' 3' T h e theory of the theologians which will be expounded here is essentially the same as the sensationalism of the Stoics (cf. e.g. Sext. E m p . Adv. log. ii. 5 8 - 6 0 ; Adv. phys. i. 393-5). T h e essence of all nominalistic a n d sensationalistic theories (ancient or modern—plus fa change, plus c'est la mime chose) is that thought is reified a n d regarded as a joining or severing of

NOTES

201

mental impressions, that in fact thought and representation are identified; and since there are no representations of universal things—you can represent a particular hand, but not a universal hand—the existence of universals is denied (the theories are mostly so confused—one cannot be a consistent nominalist—that they both do and do not deny the universal). Berkeley's theory in his introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge, Intr. §§ 10-12, is practically identical with Ghazali's conception. 'I can consider', he says, 'the hand . . . separated from the rest of the body, but whatever hand . . . I imagine must have some particular shape I believe we shall acknowledge, that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.' But how can a particular idea represent—whatever the word means— all particular ideas of the same sort and become general in this singular fashion, and what do 'the same sort' and 'general' mean on a theory which only acknowledges particular ideas ? Ghazali, too, both affirms and denies universals at the same time; he asserts that one shape of hand can represent, or, as he expresses it, can be related to, both a big white hand and a small black hand; he too may be asked how this can come about. p. 355. 1. i.e. the individual impression which is retained in the soul. p. 355. 2. 'the thing thought of, this is how I here translate J_jSx_ (which can also mean 'intelligible'), since I take it that Ghazali here means something outside the mind. P' 355- 3- The Aristotelian term 'form' probably means here both sensible form and external shape (it is susceptible of both meanings in Aristotle himself). P' 355- 4- i-e> t n e o n ty immaterial being is God. p. 356. 1. Cf. e.g. Aristode, Met. Z 8. I033b5 : oiSe TO e?So? ylyverai ovS' terra" airrov yevtois. Concepts are timeless, every real thing may be inconstant, but the concept 'inconstancy' is constant. p. 356. 2. i.e. the absolutely individual cannot be shared, cannot be communicated: individuum est ineffabile, this is the basic argument against all nominalism. p. 356. 3. As I have said before, this theory of identity rests on the confusion of the identity of the thing thought with the identity of the thinker. Zaid and Amr may have an identical thought just as they may perceive an identical thing, for we all live in one common universe; but this does not imply that Zaid and Amr, the thinkers, are identical. p. 356. 4. This would seem to mean that in the soul also there is a principium individuation^ through which the soul of Amr, even if it is separated from his body, is distinguished from the soul of Zaid. However, such a view could not be ascribed to the most famous philosopher of them all, Aristotle. (Cf., however, note 14. 4.)

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TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

p. 356. 5. i.e. for Ghazali the animality in Zaid is numerically identical with the animality in Khalid. It is as if one said that Zaid carried the numerically identical book that Khalid carried at the same time, but two cannot be one and the same book cannot be in two places at the same time. Ghazali, as Averroes rightly observes, confuses the identity of the individual with that of the universal. p. 356. 6. Averroes omits to mention the second proof, which is (Ghazali, Incoherence, Bouyges, 339. 10) that no immaterial substance can perish (*Ji«JI JuU J ^ u ^ J J « _ . j ^>J j&y*. JS"), but of course this second proof is a part of the first. Avicenna, op. cit. 302, has two propositions: (1) that the soul does not die with the death of the body; (2) that the soul is absolutely incorruptible. P- 357- '• This is the principal Platonic argument (Phaedo 102 a-107 b): a concept can never change into its opposite, and since life belongs to the concept of the soul, it can never be changed into its opposite, death (Plotinus, who wrote a special treatise on Immortality, Enn. iv. 7, gives this argument at iv. 7. 11). The argument rests on a confusion between the universal and the individual (it belongs to the paradoxes of the history of philosophy that Plato, for whom all individual things are transitory, regards the human personality, individuality par excellence, as eternal), and it certainly cannot prove the immortality of the individual soul; but if it is true that the living can only proceed from the living, life itself would seem to have no origin—and indeed the origin of life and of consciousness remain insuperable cruces for any theory of evolution. p. 357. 2. This has been shown in Chapter II. p. 357. 3. Avicenna accepts, as does Plato, the immortality of the soul, but denies with Aristotle its pre-existence (which invalidates, of course, all his Platonic arguments for the eternity of the soul). There can be no preexistence of the soul, says Avicenna, Salvation, pp. 300 sqq.; for either all souls would form a unity before their union with the body, which brings about many impossibilities, as Averroes says, or they would be individually differentiated; but they can only be individually differentiated by matter, i.e. their bodies. But how, then, can they be individually differentiated after death ? This is a question to which Avicenna has no satisfactory answer. p. 357. 4. Here and throughout this passage Averroes leaves his Aristotle and accepts the notions of the Stoics and the Neoplatonists. The passage is rather confused, and Averroes does not seem to distinguish clearly between the souls of the Saip.ov€s (intermediaries, like the Xoyoi arrepfMiriKoi, between God and man) and the disembodied souls of men. According to Plotinus the souls of the Sal/ioves have bodies of air or of fire, atupxvra de'ptva fj irvpaia (cf. Enn. iii. 5. 6). According to Sext. Emp. Adv. phys. i. 71-73, the Stoics held that souls consist of fine particles not less like fire than like

NOTES

203

•nvzv\La.. Compare also for the Sal/ioves, e.g. Sext. Emp. Adv. phys. i. 87, and especially Plutarch, De orac. defectu (cf. G. Soury, La Demonologie de Plutarque, Paris, 1942). p. 358. 1. See note 127. 6. p. 358. 2. 'the soul creates and forms the body', i.e. it makes its matter a living organism. This sentence is not Platonic, but Plotinian. Plato and Plotinus seem to have been often confused by the Arabs. The sentence refers to Enn. iv. 7- n • T) ndOos enaKTov rfj V\T) Acyopre? TTJV £oirjv, •nap1 orov TOVTO TO nddos eA-qXv&ev ets TTJV JA7p, avro eneivo dvayKaaOrjaovrat ofioXoyetv addvarov

tlvai: if it is said that life is a condition imposed on matter, one is forced to admit that the principle which has given this condition to matter must be immortal. p. 358. 3. The functions attributed by late Greek philosophers to the Baijj.oves are ascribed by Muslim authors to the Jinn. p. 358. 4. The bestower of forms is identified by Avicenna with Aristotle's active intellect. p. 358. 5. Averroes seems to assume here that the idea of a bestower of forms implies a temporal creation, a change both in the giver and in the receiver; but the only change permitted in the celestial world according to Aristotle is a change of place. However, for the theory of emanation the giving is timeless and changeless. What is in the giver is simultaneous in the receiver, and emanation is a timeless immutable transaction. This is a selfcontradictory theory, but Averroes also accepted it. p. 358. 6. It is not clear from this isolated sentence what is meant here by 'material intellect'; if the counterpart of the active intellect is meant (which is its usual meaning), Averroes here identifies the active intellect with God, as does Alexander of Aphrodisias. But he may understand here by 'material intellect' simply an intellect in contact with this world, whereas the absolutely immaterial intellect, God, is free from all earthly contact. However, Allah knows best! p. 358. 7. Cf. Aristotle, Met. A 3. g84 b i5. Averroes here identifies Anaxagoras' vovs with the Aristotelian prime mover. p. 359. 1. In the last chapter of his Incoherence Ghazali attacks the arguments of the philosophers, who in their eschatological theories, taken from late Greek philosophy, deny the resurrection of the flesh and interpret the materialistic conceptions expressed in the Koran symbolically in accordance with their system. According to Ghazali a literal interpretation is possible (cf. Incoherence, 355. 4), and the philosophers through their denial of the express words of the Koran place themselves outside the community of Islam. Averroes in his last chapter touches on this problem only slightly, but he aims at defending the philosophers against the accusation of heresy.

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His approach to religion is pragmatic and utilitarian. He asserts that religion has no other aim than philosophy in its search for the summum bonum and the development of those moral qualities upon which the order of society depends and which the masses never could attain without the guidance of divinely inspired men. His attitude stands midway between the materialistic and utilitarian view of religion which sees in it an astute human invention, aiming at enforcing moral conduct on the masses through the fear of an invisible and omnipresent supervisor (immcmros, see Sext. Emp. Adv. phys. i. 54), and the supernatural conception of religion as the revelation of the supreme divine truth. With the latter it considers religion as inspired and expressing the one fundamental truth of the existence of a supreme spiritual deity; with the former it takes the purely pragmatic view of regarding religious dogmas, which are amenable to a rational interpretation and in which an element of pious fraud seems to be involved, as a means of establishing the order and the preservation of society, which forms the condition of all human activity. It had not been difficult for an acute dogmatist like Ibn Hazm to confute this line of thought (cf. op. cit. i. 94), which is based—as I have shown—on Stoic ideas, was already followed by Farabi, and was later adopted by Spinoza in his Tractatus theologico-politicus. p. 359. 2. Indications of a belief in bodily resurrection are few and late in the Old Testament; they are found in Daniel and especially 2 Maccabees, and there is a suggestion of resurrection in Psalm lxxxviii. u . How well the Arabs were informed about Judaism and Christianity may be seen from the lengthy exposition and criticism of both religions in Ibn Hazm, op. cit. i. 116-ii. 75. P- 359- 3- C f - I b n H a z m , op. cit. i. 35. 5 : j ^ J U J I J A ^ J ( ^ i l l o ^ J U J J I ^C t _ J U J I j yt>jj| A » J ^i. ( j l o ^ l j-Jj'l, the religion of the Sabaeans was the oldest and the most widely accepted. About the Sabaeans there was some confusion in Islam. They are mentioned in the Koran (ii. 59, v. 73, xxii. 17), but there a sect in Mesopotamia seems to be meant, also called Mandaeans. T h e sect whose dogmas are described under this name by the M u h a m m a d a n authors (e.g. Shahrastani in his Ret. and Philos. Sects and Ibn H a z m ) was a Gnostic sect in the city of H a r r a n , an ancient city of Hellenistic culture; a strong Neoplatonic influence can be discerned in its tenets and it may have contributed to the spread of Neoplatonic ideas in Islam. p. 359. 4. i.e. his euSaijUovia. p . 359. 5. For the distinction between ethical and dianoetic virtues compare Aristotle, Eth. Nic. A 13. 1103*3. p . 359. 6. ' T h e practical virtues', i.e. the moral virtues. p. 359. 7. Cf. e.g. Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning, i. 5. 1: ' T h e knowledge of m a n is as the waters, some descending from above, and some

tioTES

205

springing from b e n e a t h ; the one informed by the light of nature, the other inspired by divine inspiration.' p. 360. 1. Cf. Spinoza, Tract, theol.-polit. xiv. 14: 'fidem non per se, sed t a n t u m ratione oboedientiae salutiferam esse'. p. 360. 2. This is a Stoic doctrine; cf. Seneca, Epist. 5. 4 : 'hoc p r i m u m philosophia promittit: sensum communem, humanitatem et congregationem.' Cf. also Sext. E m p . Adv. phys. i. 1 3 1 : TJ SIKCLIOOVVT) Kara Tiva Koivuivlav avdpamatv irpos aXXtfXovs «at avBpumutv irpos 6eovs v€v6rjrai: justice is a certain brotherhood between men and men, and between m e n and the gods. p. 3 6 1 . 1. Spinoza, op. cit. ii. 1, is opposed to this view: the prophets were not m e n of special intellectual gifts, but had a strong moral sense and a strong 'imaginatio' (<j>avraola); prophecy has never m a d e prophets learned m e n (op. cit. ii. 3). p . 3 6 1 . 2 . This well-known saying m a y possibly come from a Jewish source. p. 3 6 1 . 3. K o r a n xiii. 35. p. 3 6 1 . 4. T h e r e are, however, m a n y traditions giving a realistic description of M u h a m m a d ' s vision of heaven during his ascension (7-! _«_). Cf. Asin y Palacios, La escatologia musulmana en la Divina Comedia, 2nd ed., Apendice I, p . 425. p . 3 6 1 . 5 . i.e. the words we apply to the other world are meant in a sense absolutely different from the ordinary; cf. e.g. Spinoza, Eth. i, prop, xvii schol.: 'intellectus et voluntas, qui Dei essentiam constituerent, a nostro intellectu et voluntate toto coelo differre deberent, nee in ulla re, praeterq u a m in nomine, convenire possent; non aliter scilicet, q u a m inter se conveniunt canis, signum coeleste, et canis, animal latrans.' Even Spinoza does not seem to have seen that this absolutely deprives these words, as applied to the Divine, of any sense. M a n y traditions were attributed to I b n Abbas, a paternal cousin of M u h a m m a d ; this one seems to have been inspired by an anti-literalist. T o the same I b n Abbas is attributed a tradition of a realistic character about M u h a m m a d ' s ascension. Cf. Asin, op. cit., P- 432p . 362. 1. Simulacrum: eiSwXov—see for this word a n d the theory Porphyry, Sentent. 32. For the theory of the pneumatic or astral body compare also Plotinus (Em. iii. 5. 6). Proclus (Inst. 205) a n d Iamblichus (Myst. 5. 12) call this body oxVPap. 362. 2. H e refers here to Ghazali's Balance of Action, Cairo, H . 1328, where, p . 5, Ghazali distinguishes four classes of people as to their opinions a b o u t the life hereafter. T h e third class to which the Sufis belong declare t h a t in d e a t h the soul is for ever severed from the body. p. 362. 3. Universal consent, c.Ua.1, in Islam confers the sanction of

206

TAHAFUT AL TAHAFUT

legitimacy on a dogma. The idea seems inspired by the Stoic notion of universal consent, 'omnium consensus naturae vox est' (Cic. Tusc. i. 15. 35); 'apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri' (Seneca, Epist. 117. 6). p. 362.4. In his 'Ignominies of the Allegorists' (p. 11 of the text in Goldziher's Gazali's Streitschrift gegen die Batinijja) Ghazali repeats his attacks on the denial of a bodily resurrection. p. 363. 1. I have not found the exact sentence in Galen. Galen says, however, DefacuU. natur. subst. iii. 10 : those who want to know anything better than do the masses must far surpass all others by nature and by early training; such people, however, can be only very few in number, etev 8' w oXiyoi vavrairamv ovroi. It was in the Stoic tradition that the wise man was rare, as rare as the phoenix which is born once in five hundred years (cf. Seneca, Epist. 42. 1).

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES MENTIONED IN THE I N T R O D U C T I O N AND NOTES ibn 'Abbas, 205. *Abd al-Rahman al-Sufi, 96. Aenesidemus, 63, 79. Aetius, 186, 198. Agathon, 62. Agrippa, H . C , xxix, 175. Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 138. Albertus Magnus, 130, 175. Albinus, 25. Alexander of Aphrodisias, 3, 38, 39, 45, 74, 82, 90, i n , 115, 121, 122, 143, 144, 147, 158, 161, 167, 169, 172, 184, 186, 195. — (from Arabic translations), 85, 89, 122, H3» *59, »66. Aleximus, 149, 150. Ammonius Saccas, xxxii. Ammonius, son of Hermias, 70, 75, 76, 100, 171. Anaxagoras, 24, 72, 193. Anselm, 169. Antipater, 167. Antiphanes, 3 1 . Antisthenes, 126, 127. Apocrypha: Wisdom of Solomon, 124. Aquinas, St. Thomas, ix, xviii, xx, xxiii, xxvii, xxix, 3, 19, 23, 54. 65, 85, 90, 9 1 , n o , 156, 157, 162, 174, 175, 183. Aristotle, Anal. Pr., 4 1 , 145, 172, 196. — Anal. Post., 2, 6, 29, 57, 82, 89, 99, i n , 121, 130, 136, 140, 173, 178, 200. — De anima, 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 15, 46, 50, 52, 63, 66, 68, 76, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 89, 93, 99, 100, 102, 104, 105, n o , i n , 113, 115, 120, 122, 127, 145, 146, 147, 148, *54i l5$> 1581 166, *82, 183, 185, 187, i8g, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 200. — Categories, 29, 30, 32, 33, 48, 58, 6 1 , 109, i n , 112, 129, 152. — De. an. incessu, 24, 164. — De an. motu, 114. — De an. gen., 48, 49, 101, 102, 105, 115, 121, 127, 159, 177, 182, 183, 185. — Decaelo, i, 2, 3, 6,8,17, 18,19,21, 22,23, 24, 26, 32, 34, 37, 4o» 4=» 43. 44. 57. 59, 6 0 , 7 6 , 8 4 , 9 2 , 9 4 , 137* «39» *4°» ' ^ J *57» ' 5 8 , 159, 160, 163, 164, 180. — De div. per somn., 168. — De gen. et corr., 1 o, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 72, 78, 80, 84, 94, 100, 101, 103, 106, 137, 140, 142, 143, 185.

— — — —

De interpr., 37, 45, 82, 131, 134, 149. De iuv., 189. De memoria, 49, 89, 189, 191. Depart, an., 24, 40, 50, 143 f., 150, 165, 185. — De philosophia, xvii, 1, 34, 65 (new fragment), 98, 157, 167. — De sensu, 63, 84, 95, 156, 180, 193, 196. — De somnoy 194. — Eth. Eud., 161. — Eth. Nic., 4, 62, 103, 156, 167, 168, 169, 171, 193, 204. — Hist. An., 28, 6 1 , 63, 164, 183, 197. — Metaphysics: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, n , 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 2g, 32, 36.37 *"•> 39, 4 0 . 4 i . 42,43» 44, 46, 47, 5 1 * 57, 58, 60, 63, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75,76,78,79> 80,82,84,87,88,89,90, 92, 93, 94, 9 6 , 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 108, 109, n o , i n , 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137. 139, 142, 144, H 6 , H 7 , 149, 150. 152, 156, 159, 160, 162, 163, 165, 168, 171, 177, 178, 183, 184, 185, 201, 203. — Meteor., 21, 25, 49, 57, 69, 78, 83, 115, 137, 140, 160, 164, 180. — Physics, 2, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36» 38, 43> 44, 47, 48, 52, 53, 55, 61, 62, 66, 87, 90, 91, 92, 95, 101, 102, 103, 104, 117, 118, 119, 132, 134, 135, 137, 149, 157, 160, 161, 163, 164, 171, 178, 180, 184, 190, 192. — Politics, 24. — Rhet., 63, 145, 166, 180. — Soph. EL, 1 9 , 3 2 , 6 6 . — Topics, 2, 7, 20, 22, 33, 56, 78, 88, 116, 185, 197. — Fragm. 367 R., 183. — De mundo, 18, 65, 67, 76, 78. — On the particular influences of the spheres, 164. — Problemata, 98. — Theology, 76, 200. al-Ash'ari, x, 5, 125, 184. Ash'arites, xii, xxii, xxiii, xxix, 3,17, 37,40, 41, 42, 44, 53, 55, 56, 59, 60, 62, 64, 70, 85, 86, 87, 88, 97, 115, 116, 118, 128, i37> *38, I43> x 48, i59» 160, 173, 180, 182, 184, 186, 191. Athanasius, St., 88.

208

INDEX

OF PROPER

Atomists, 44. Augustine, St., xii, xvii, xx, 3, 5, n , 16, 68, 84, go, 9 1 , 98, 100, 103, 105, 116, 125, 155, 161, i6g, 170, 175) 186. Averroes, 18, 53, 56, 57, 164, 177, and passim. Avicenna, xii, xiv, xxvii, 13, 25, 26, 48 f., 49. 66, 69, 83, 86, 92, 95. 97. " 8 , 121, 137, 138 f-, 172. -— Division of tlie intellectual sciences, 171. — On Happiness, 196, 197. — On Love, 91. — Oriental Philosophy, 83, 144. — Recovery (Shifa), 13, 67, 71, 75, 102, 103, 106, 112, 114, 143, 144, 150, 151, ! 52» 157. ! 5 8 , 167, 175, 200. — Refutation of the Astrologists, 162, 167. — Salvation {Najdt), 1, 2, 13, 17, 29, 36, 67, 75, 8 i , 106, 107, 108, 112, 113, 114, 129, 130, 134. !37> i4°> ! 4 4 . 145, ^50, 151, 152, 157, 158, 161, 162 ff., 166, 173, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 198, 202. — Theorems and Notices, 49, 100, 114, 144, 173, 174* >75.

NAMES

Clement of Alexandria, 1, 16, 65, 113, 118, 177. Corpus Hermeticum, 165. Coud, Emile, xxix, 174. Cratippus, 167. Critolaus, 31. Damascius, 88. Dante, 19, 20, 40, 92, 135. Democritus, 63, 90, 101. Descartes, xxxiii, 40, 102, 175, 200. Dio Chrysostomus, 126. Diodorus Cronus, 36, 3g, 147. Diogenes of Babylon, 167. Diogenes Laertius, 1, 18, 56, 67, 83, 89, 117 f., 122, 127, 138, 144, 188. [Dionysius Areopagita], 88, 89, 91. Eckehart, 155. Eleatics, xxi, 45, 60, 63. Empedocles, 44, 72, 9 1 . Epictetus, 72, 77, 127. Epicurus, 1, 78, 83, 101. Erasistratus, 187. Eryximachus, 9 1 . Eusebius, 16, 31, 100, 172.

Fakhr ad-Din ar-Razt, 88. al-Farabi, xiv, 7, 12, 71, 75, 76, 131, 136, 171; 26, 166, 173, 188. Favorinus, 164. Ficino, M . , 92, 175. Fienus, T h . , 174, 175. Fludd, R., 90. • Franck, 70. Frazer, 128. Fredegisus of Tours, 47. ibn Furak, 128. Galen, xxix, 16, 50, 56, 57, 61, 66, 83, 145* *76, 179, 184, 189, 197, 198, 206. — De demonstr., 56. Gellius, Aulus, 66, 164, 184. Campanella, 9 1 . Geulinx, 148. al-Ghazali, xxviii, xxix, xxxii, xxv, and/wtfGardano, xxix, go. sim. Carneades, x, 77, 86, 140, 148, 168. — Aims of the Philosophers, 146. Gelsus, g7, 124. — Alchemy of Happiness, xxxv. Censorinus, xvi, ig8. — Balance of Action, 205. Cervantes, xiv. — Distinction between Faith and Heresy, 63. Chalcidius, 38. — Foundation of Dogmatics, x, 53. Chrysippus, 11, 18, 45, 77, 167, 177, 190, — Golden means in Dogmatics, x, 53. i95> 196. — Ignominies of the Allegorists, 206. Cicero, xvii, xxi, 1, 3, 13, 16, 39, 65, 76, 83, 101, 127, 142, 172, 177, 186, 205. — Just Balance, 125. — Mchefor Lights, 53, 95. — De div., 39, 98, 165, 166, 167, 170. — Preserver from Error, 176. — Defato, 39, 164 f., 172, 177. — Touchstone of Knowledge, 146. — Defin., 12, 16, 90, 156, 170. — Touchstone of Science in Logic, 125. — De nat. deor., 8, 34, 65, 77, 78, 79, 83, — Touchstone of Speculation in Logic, 125. 140, 141, 148, 157, 165. 1 — Vivijication of Theology,x, 53,91,188,194. Cleanthes, 65, 197.

Bacon, Francis, 204. al-Baghdadi, 3, 15, 16, 54, 59, 77, 88. Bairo, Pietro, 174. al-BaqiIla.nl, 60 f„, 124, 128. al-Battani, 96. Bayle, Dictionnaire, 19. Berkeley, xxxiii, 201. Bernard of Glairvaux, St., 9 1 . Boethius, 134. Boethus, 152. Bradley, 152. Brentano, x, xxvii. Brunetiere, F., xiii. Burton, R., xxix, 92, 174, 175.

INDEX OF PRC3 P E R N A M E S Gibbon, 98. Gnosticism, 12, 155. Goethe, 90. Gregory of Nyssa, St., 123, 124. Grotius, 97. al-Hallaj, 7. abu Hashim, 59, 88. ibn Hazm, 7, 8, 13, 37, 38, 40, 54, 55 f., 60 f, 82, 85, 100, 124, 128, 155, 184, 185, 186, 191, 204. Heracliteans, 60. Heraclitus, 44. Herodotus, 183, 197. Herophilus, 187. Hesiod, 126. Higden, 90. Hipparchus, 96. Hippocrates, 6 1 . Hippolytus, 172. Hisham b. *Amr al-Fuwati, 13, 173. Hobbes, 90. Holstenius, 100. Homer, 96, 126, 133, 194. abu'l Hudhail al-*Allaf, 54. H u m e , xxx, 64, 120, 173, 176, 179. Hunain ibn Ishaq, 6 1 . abu Ishaq al-Isfara'ini, 128. Irenaeus, 169. J a b i r ibn Hayyan, 172. J a h m , 155 f. James, W., 197. Jesus, 30, 97. J o h n Damascene, St., 109C J o h n Philoponus, xvii, 1, 3, 7, 8, 26, 29, 3 0 , 3 1 , 56, I 7 i . 177, i87» 189. J o h n Scotus Eriugena, 84. al-Jubbai, 59. al-Jurjani, 165. al-Juwaini, 18, 186. K a n t , xvi, xix, xx, 8,10, 11, 1 7 , 8 0 , 9 6 , 125, 129, 137, 138, 155, 178. Karramites, 3, 59. ibn Khaldun, 172, 174, 175. al-Kindl, 90. Lactantius, 18, 98, 165. Leibniz, 13, 18, 28, 40, 49, 119, 182, 183, 184. Leo Hebraeus, 92. Lucretius, 16, 148. Mach, E, xxv, 64. al-Maidani, 49, 95.

209

Maimonides, 1, 37, 126. Marcianus, 77. Mandacans, 204. Marcus Aurelius, 14, 72, 127. Maslama ibn Ahmad al-Majriti, 172. Maximus Confessor, 123 f. Megarians, xxi, xxii, xxix, 17, 37, 38, 39, 42, 45, 60, 6 1 , 62, 68. Meinong, x. Middle Platonism, 48, 88. Mill, J . S-, 185. Montaigne, xxix, xxxii, 19, 174, 199. M u ' a m m a r , 60, 94. Mucius Scaevola, 98. M u h a m m a d al-Murtada, 55. Muslim, 138. al-Mutahhar al-Maqdis!, cf. abu Zaid alBalk'hi. Mu'tazilites (oxwpariKol) , ix, x, xxii, xxiii, 7, 47, 48, 54, 59, 62, 77, 86, 88, 94, u 6 , 155, 173. Mysticism, German, 12. ibn an-Nadim, 70. an-Nazzam, 30, 38, 48, 54, 173. Nemesius of Emesa, xxxii, 6 1 , 184, 197. Neoplatonism.xi, 1,12, 51, 54. Gf. Plotinus, Proclus, &c. Neopythagoreanism, 88. New Testament, 124, 126. Nicholas of Autrecourt, xxx. Nietzsche, F., xxiv, Numenius, xxxii. Old Testament, 201. Origen, 8, 12, 14, 97,. 98, n 6 , 124, 128, 168. Panaetius, 98. Paracelsus, xxix, 90, 175. Parmenides, xx. 17, 132, 154. Pascal, xxix, 174. Pasicles, 115. Pelagius, 18. Philo (of Alexandria), 18, 22, 72, 76, 88, 126, 135, 156. — De aetern. m., 29, 37, 56, 57, 65, 165. Philoponus, cf. J o h n Ph. Plato, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 19, 30, 50, 52, 58, 68, 72, 82, 9 1 , 105, 106, 119, 142, 145, 167, 170, 171, 177, 183, 199. — Tim., 1, 11, 14, 23, 28, 30, 31, 34, 52, 5 6 , 6 4 , 72, 114, 139, 140, 193. Plautus, xxxiii. Pliny, 183. Plotinus, xi, xvi, xviii, xxv, xxvi, xxix, xxxi, xxxii, 5 f., 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 25, 29,

210

I N D E X OF PR O P E R NAMES

34. 49. 52. 63» 64, 65, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79. 84> 85, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 95, 106, 108, 109, 110, 112, H 3 , H 4 , 115, 119, 120, 121, 122, 128, I2g, I39, I4O, 14I, 145, M 8 . *53> '54i 161, , 6 2 » 163, 164, 167, 170, 172, 173, 175, 186, 189, 190, 195, 196, 197, 199, 202, 203, 205. Plutarch, xxviii, xxxii, 18, 31, 38, 40, 72, 98, 127, 160, 165, 168, 174, 184, 199, 202. [Plutarch], 39. Pomponatius, 175. Porphyry, xxxiv, 63, 76, 100,121, 140, 205. Posidonius, 165, 167. Procius, xvii, xxvi, 1 f.,2 9, 31, 74, 75, 87, 91, 106,205. Ptolemy, 20, 74, 85, 96. Poly bus, 6 1 . Pythagoras, 17a. Pythagoreans, 20. C£. Ncopythagoreans. al-Qazwinl, 162. Q u r ' a n , 18, 23, 2 4 , 5 3 , 5 4 , 5 5 , 6 6 , 72, 76, 78, 79, 82, 83, 86, 90, 92, 97, 98, 118, i 2 i , 125, 126, 138, 143, 150, 162, 163, 165, 166, 173, 174, 175, 180, 182, 185, 186, 194, 204, 205. Rcnan, E-, xii. Russell, B-, xxii. Sabaeans, 204. Sceptics, ix f., xxix, 60, 63, 81, 149. Schopenhauer, 19, 161. Seneca, 13, 16, 7a, 77, 127, 168, 175, 188, '99* 205, 206. Sextus Empiricus, 4, 16, 29, 30, 32, 38, 45, 49» 53. 63, 65, 67, 68, 71, 72, 77, 79, 86, 87, 89, 99, 102, 118, 122, 138, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152 f., 167, 176, 179, 180, 188, 189, 190, 195, 196, 197, 200, 202, 205. ash-Shabxastani, 2, 4, 7, 38, 88, 94, 125, 128, 155, 173, 184, 186, 204.

Siger of Brabant, 157. Simplicius, xviii, 7, 20, 23*30*31,37)65,70, 74, 84, i 2 i , 129, 152, 163. Spinoza, xi, xiv, xx, 19, 20, 37, 90, 92, 10a, 106, 126, 16 r, 166, 170, 204, 205. Stobaeus, 3 1 . Stoic terms, ix f., xvii, xxiii, xxiv, 1, 4, 17 f., 45. 48. 52, 56 f., 57 (•> 81, 85, 87, 89, 92, 117, 122, 126, 137, 138, 149, 150, 154, 160, 176, 180, 182, 188, 189, 191, 200, 202. Stoicorum Vetentm Fragmenta, 4, n , 18, 22, 30. 3*. 32* 37, 38, 39* 4 ° . 45, 57* 65, 76, 89*90, 153, 165, 168, 177, 180, 186, 188, *95. ! 9 6 , 198. Strato, 83, I O I , 142. Sufism, 12, 60, 155. Suidas (Suda), 76. Suso, 155. Tauler, 12, 155. Taurus, 66. Telesio, 9 1 . Tertullian, 97. Thales, 160. Themistius, 32, 76, 94, 102, 126, 140. Theophilus, St., 123. Theophrastus, xvii, xxviii, 2 1 , 147, 163, 165, 178. ibn Tufail, 12, 73. ibn U t h m a n al-Khayyat, 7. Varro, 98. abu Y a ' q u b , 73. Zacharias of Mitylene, 100. ZaJiirites, 145. 'abu Zaid al-Balkhi', 8, 54, 57, 6a. Gf, Mu(ahhar al Maqdisi. Zeno of Gitium, 102, 180. Zeno the Eleatic, i, 63, 149. Zopyrus, 172.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS MENTIONED IN THE NOTES accident as a universal, 33. accidental, 22. actions, classification of, 117. actual, 2. actuality, 67, 137. actualizer, 1. agent, eternal, 1. alchemy, 172. analogy, 145. angels, 23, 135, 162. annihilation of the world, 54, 59. aporetic, 53. apprehension, immediate intuitive, 11; cf. intuition. art, 149, 168, 192. artisan, 120, 169. ascension of Muhammad, 205. ass, Buridan's, 19. assimilation to God, 151, 163. astrology, 164^, 167. astronomy, 82. atomism, 38, 184, 191; cf. matter; time. attributes, U5f., 135 f., 138 f. autodidactus, 49. badness, 114. becoming, 10, 48, 58, 62 f. being, 80, 89, 110 f., 122, 129, 137; nonbeing, 5, 47; cf. existence. blood, 182. body, 102; celestial b., 77, 161, 166 (cf. stars); pneumatic or astral b., 205; rectilinear, 22; terrestrial, 166. brain, 187, 188 f. causation, 60, 64, 67; denial of c , 79, 178, 179, 181, 182. cause, 74, 79, 106, 177 (stoic); efficient c , 70; final c , 2 1 ; material c , 104, 105; receptive c , 116; timeless c , 156; see also first cause, change, 3, 10, 27, 58, 62, 71, 184. circularity, 27. colour, 107, 134, 135, 137, 156, 180, I93

*

command, divine, 77.

common man, 168. — notions, 2, 6. — sense, 187 f., 194; cf. internal sense, compenetration, n o . conjecturing power, 173 f., 181. consent, universal (ijmd')% 205 f. convention, 6. copula, 131. corruptibility of the world, 56 f. creation, eternal, 9, 55, 75, 76, 100; ex nihilo, 65; temporal, 148. creationism and traducianism, 49, 52. dator formarvm, 25, 83, 203. deliberation, 169. demiurge, 1. demonstration, 1, 116, 130. description, 84, 129. desire, 5, 145. determinism, 167. differentiating principle, 17. dimension, 32. disposition, 4. divination, 167. divisible, 15. dreams, 167, 168. dualism, 24. eclipse, 150. ecliptic, 21. effect, 5, 68, 115. ego, I2f., 117, 120, 175, 200; cf. selfconsciousness. elements, 22, 83. emanation, 63, 73, 75, 85, 92, 94, 100, 115, 203. Empirical physicians, 176, 179. Empiricism, 16. essence and existence, 136 fT.; cf. existence. estimation (aestimatio), 188, 193. Eternity, 1; of the world, 56, 67; timeless, i, 54. ethics, 170. event, 4. evidence, 16.

212

INDEX

existence, 112; potential e., 58; possible and actual e., 10; non-e., 10, 46, 47, 48, 52; cf. being, essence, existent, necessary, 106. extension, 31.

65> 7*» 81, 93> 94» 9*>> ll9> I 2 I » r32> 139—-soul as, 49, 120, 172. — specific difference in place, 185. — substances having, 159. — sweetness in wine, 132. faith, 124. — transient, 133. fallacy, 3. — unity based on, 15. falsehood, 4a. — universal, as universals, 25, 51, 121, avraata (cf. imagination, representa179formative faculty, 83. tion), 122, 161, 188 f. fate, 38. generation (cf. procreation), 139; sponfear, 198. taneous g., 140, 183. fire, 180. generosity, 114. first agent, 135. God, acts of, 5. — cause, 9, 95. — attributes of, 4, 108, 109. — effect, 95. — cause of human actions, 198. — principle, 93, 139. — efficient cause, 70. flux, 60, 199. Form; acceptance of, 189. — essence and existence coincide, 134. — eternal agent, 1. — as active element, 127. — eternal man, 144, — as thoughts, 68. — bestower of (active intellect), 200, — generosity, bounty, 64, 114. —-joy, happy condition, 114. 203; cf. dator formarum. — knowledge, 119, 121, 151, 152, 153, •— change in, 48. 155, 159, 170, 181; active or creative — different definitions of, 8 r, 90. knowledge, 154; self-knowledge, 7; — distinctions in, 14. his knowledge of the infinite, 169; his — entry into matter, 23. knowledge of-individuals, 81, 85, 89. — eternity, immortality of, 44, 61, — life of, 114. 91, 144. — mercy of, 98. •— God providing, 35, 69. — new decisions in the mind of G., 1, 3. — God the, 91. — new volitions in G., 3. — humanity, 99. — no composition in G., 88. — imperishable, 32. •—individuality, individual, 51, 86, — omnipotence of, 181. — omniscience of, 86, 151. 133, 188. — only active principle (Stoicism), 176. — in blood, 182. " — providence of, 82. — in colouredness, 89. — power and majesty of, 77. — in sperm, 183. — power to do one of the contraries, 5. — intellect receptive of, 200. — prime mover, 20, 91. — intelligible, 196. — self sufficient, 118. — mind and, 193. — simplicity of, 87. — non-becoming of, 44. — supreme end, 20, 91. — non-self-subsistence of, 52— synectic cause, 65. — One through, 12, 14. — uniqueness of, 87, 108, 150. — of object, 62. — unity of, 4, 108, 109 f., 112, 113. — of percept, 196. — will of, 113, 141, 148, 159; eternal -— perception of, 84. will of, 3, 6. — perfection of, 166. — words of, 4. — proximate, 146. — pure, 81, 125. — relation of matter and, 24, 48, 52, habit, 179, 180.

I»DEX hand, 115, 185. heart, 191. heaven, 23. heresy, 203. hypothetical propositions, syllogism.

178;

cf.

ideas, Plato's theory of, 88, 99. identity, 12, 14, 60, 178, 199 f., 201. immortality, 12, 202. impossible, 36, 40. indestructible, 1. imagination, 35, 83, 89, 161, 166, 174!". (influence on body), 187, 191. impressed, 49. inclination, 158. individuality, 49. induction, 197. inference, 147. infinite, actual, potential, 8; number, 7; time 8, 10; God's knowledge of, 109 infinite series, 26 (cf. regress), 13, 14. instant, 30. instinct of animals, 168. intellect, 13, 72, 84, 120; active, 3, 15, 74, 81, 83, 115, 146, 203; first, 74, 166; immaterial, 198, 200; material, 3, 74, 81, 203; passive, 3, 13, 74, 154; potential, 3, 15, 74; practical, 113; separate, 135; theoretical, 113. intention, first, i n ; second, m , 113, 120 f.; intentions, 188. internal sense, internal perception, 186. interpretation, allegorical, 165, 166. intuition, intellectual, 155; cf. apprehension. Jinn, 203. judgement, 83. jump, 30, 38. Kings philosophers, 170. knowledge, 153; creative, 84; relational, 50; traditional, 16; selfk., 122 f.; unity of, 123; God's knowledge, see- God. Kumun, 48. law, 41. liberum arbitrium, 18. life and death, 68 f. light, 15, 49.

213

Logic: Aristotelean, 1,2; Stoic, 178,179. logical and ontological, 103, 104. love, 20, 91 f., 151, 161. lumen naturale, ix, 7. macrocosm, 90. magic, 172, 175, man a mortal God, 156. materialists, 105, 142. matter, 3, 95, 106, n6f., 119, 139, 178, 191; proximate, 25, 146. meaning, 4. measure, 35. mediation, 71, 97. medicine, 82, 171. memory, 89, 166, 189 f. microcosm, 90. miracles, 97, 124, 173, 175. motion, 160; circular, 158 f.; essential and accidental, 26; self-m., 145. motive faculties, 190. movement, 157, 161; principle of, 2; two definitions of, 42. Mover, eternal, 79, 93; prime, 26, 149; unmoved, 2, 75. mystical, intuitive apprehension, n . nature, 83, 142, 149 f., 159, 180, 182; atomic structure of n., 38. necessity, 138; objective, 45; logical and factual, 40, 103. negative theology, 88. nominalism, 15, 51. nothingness, 58, 59. notiones transcendentales, 80. optimism, Aristotelean, 20. organ, 185. paradox of continuity, 33. paronomasia, 109, 131. particular, 168. Pen, 166. perception, 83, 84, 89, 147, 154. physiognomy, 172. plants, 182. plurality, 23, 71, 106. pluralization, 63. pneuma, 90. possibility, 16, 95; objective, 37, 38, 39, 45, 185; subjective, 10; coextensive with reality, 38, 44.

214

INDEX

possible, 2, 10, 36, 40, 180. potency, active, 146; passive, 146; as a dormancy, 39. potentiality, 1, 2, 10 f, principium continui, 28. principium identitatis indiscernibUium, 13. principium individuation^, 117, 201. principium melioris, 16. principle of contradiction, 7, 184; of movement, 2; of synonymity, 183; determining p., 2,17; first principles, 6. priority and posteriority, 29. privation, 32, 48, 63, 150. process and result, 68. procreation, 83, 105, 143; cf. generation. progress, 165. prophets, 124, 165, 167, 174, 176, 205. providence, 22, 82, 123, 154, 165; cf. God. purpose, 5.

190; universal, world, s. of heaven, 83, 84, 165, 166, 170; pre-existence of, 12, 202.

space, 35, 171, 190. sperm, 183. sphere, 20, 21, g2. .spirit, 195. stars, 22, 78, 96, 157, 158 ff.; cf. body, celestial, state, world as, 72, 76. Stoic philosophy, and Ghazali, 129. —- — and ijma', 205 f. —- — classification of actions, 1 \ 7. —. — divine command, 77. middle terms between belief and unbelief, 117. pneuma, 90. self-preservation, 89. synectic cause, 65. — — ri (entity, thing), 116. universal divine Law, 76. — — universe a unified body, 89. quality, 69. world as a state, 76. quiddity, 109, 130. cf. cause. substance, 112. ratio recta (6p06s Aoyo?), 7, 49. substratum, 25. reality, n o ; dichotomy of r., 103; sun, 20, 57. trichotomy of r., 66, 104. supernaturalism, 182. recipient, 46. syllogism, dialectical, 116; disjunctive, regress, infinite, 60, 87. 57, 146; hypothetical, 57, 145 ff. relation, 60, 81, 115, 122, 124, 152 f. sympathy, 167, 175. religion, 98, 180, 203 f. representation, 148, 166, 168; cf. tablet, indelible, 165. avT(xala. teleological argument, 140 f. resurrection of the body, 173, 203, 204, telesmatic art, 172. 206. theology, negative, 88, 89; per anarhetorician, 145. logiam, per emineniiam, 89. right and left, 23. time, 8, 11, 28, 31 (subjective), 34 (definition), 35 (and movement), 63 (time atom), 151, 154, 156, 171, 191. scala naturae, 183, 185. treasure, 167. sciences, 97, 171; division of, 171. self-consciousness, 12 f., 73, 113, 120, truth, 15, 45, 103, n o . ungenerated, 1. 122, 144, 200; cf. ego. universal, 4, 50, 52, 109, 12r, 154, 168, sensation, 122, 187, 194 f. sensationalism, 181. 179, 190, 200, 202. shape, 191. sign, 179virtue, 175, 204. simultaneity of cause and effect, 29. vision, 156. sleep, 194. whole and part, 27. something, 4, 46. will, 5, 6, 18, 20, 63, 145, 148, 166, 169; sophistry, 15. God's will, see God. soul, 12 ff., 50, 102, 159, 171, 172, 186, I World, ungenerated, 1.

INDEX

215

SOME CONTRADICTIONS IN ARISTOTLE'S SYSTEM System teleological and denial of God's will, 6. Common notions as probable and as a criterion of truth, 6. The potential infinite can never be actualized, whereas the potential is what can be or has to be actualized, 8. The potential as what can be actualized and as what has to be actualized, 36, 37-40. Theory of a first cause and the acceptance of an infinite series of causes, 9. Time as what has no beginning nor end, whereas there are finite times, 10. The dubious nature of time-, 8, 11. Soul as possessing and not possessing individuality, 12. God as the supreme Agent and the supreme End, 20. Matter as the principle of plurality, and the plurality of the immaterial heavens, 23. Forms and matter as ungenerated, whereas only the individual exists, 25The transitory individual as composed of two non-existing eternal elements, form and matter, 25. Matter as the possible and eternal, whereas everything eternal is necessary, 26. God's existence as timeless and as simultaneous with the world, 29. The denial of an intermediary between being and non-being, and the theory of the potential, 38. The potential as identical with the actual, 6, 40. Monistic and pluralistic views, 75, 93. Matter regarded as something corporeal, 93, 117, 139. Identification of action (evepyeta) and end (eiTtAe'xcia), 43. Privation as a negation and a positive

existent, 47. The contradiction in Aristotle's theory of becoming, 48. All reality is individual, all knowledge universal, 65. Relation of individual and universal, 99Confusion of logical and ontological necessity, 103. Dubious nature of the universal, M I , 121.

The difficulty in the assertion that the non-existent is, 112. Identification of knowledge and things known, 122. God as an individual universal or a universal individual, 125. The ambiguous relation of matter to form, 132. The difficulty of the distinction between art and nature, 142. Difficulties in Aristotle's theory of perception, 147. Difficulty in the trichotomy of things becoming, 149. Different conceptions of the cause of movement of the stars, 158. Right and left as relative to the observer and as absolutely attributable to the universe, 164. Confusion in the theory of the common sense, 187. Contradiction in the conception of avraoia, 187. Difficulties in regarding the soul as a unity, 193. Ambiguity of the term 'common sense', 194, 196. Three different conceptions of sensation, 194. That all thought is accompanied with <j>avrama is in contradiction to the concept of pure self-consciousness, 200.

ARABIC/GREEK INDEX TO THE NOTES abadl a8apTov, i . a'dd popia, 4 8 . 'adorn orep-qats, 3 2 . ahdatha c a u s a t i v e o f ylyveaOat, 5 4 . akkdm vo-qpaTa, 4al-ajrdm al-baslta TO. 6.TTX8. owpara, 8 3 . *ald-l-akthari errl TO TTOAU, 2 . 'amm Koivov, 2 . al-dn TO vvv, 1 0 . *ald-l-aqalli eVi TO eAdTTOv, 2 . *a?/ hayuldnl vovs VXIKOS, 3.