Australia's Immigration Revolution

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Andrew Markus, James Jupp and Peter McDonald

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Andrew Markus, James Jupp and Peter McDonald

First published in 2009 Copyright © Andrew Markus, James Jupp and Peter McDonald 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 (the Act) allows a maximum of one chapter or 10 per cent of this book, whichever is the greater, to be photocopied by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational institution (or body that administers it) has given a remuneration notice to Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) under the Act. Allen & Unwin 83 Alexander Street Crows Nest NSW 2065 Australia Phone: (61 2) 8425 0100 Fax: (61 2) 9906 2218 Email: [email protected] Web: www.allenandunwin.com Cataloguing-in-Publication details are available from the National Library of Australia www.librariesaustralia.nla.gov.au ISBN 978 1 74175 708 8 Internal design by Bookhouse, Sydney Index by Jon Jermey Set in 12/15 pt Granjon by Bookhouse, Sydney Printed and bound in Australia by Griffin Press 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents Acknowledgments Tables and figures Introduction: Immigration and the recession

vii ix xi

Part I Defining Australian immigration

1

1

3

Australia’s immigration revolution

Part II The Western context

19

2

Population issues

21

3

Immigration and the nation state

37

Part III Australia

51

4

Immigration policy

53

5

Residential concentration and dispersion

68

6

The politics of immigration, settlement and multiculturalism

88

7

Public opinion and social cohesion

106

8

Conclusion

151

Further reading and references Index

159 166


Acknowledgments Acknowledgments

The plan of the book was developed by Andrew Markus, who wrote the Introduction, first and seventh Chapters and the Conclusion. The demographic and population issues discussed in Chapters 2, 4 and 5 were written by Peter McDonald. James Jupp contributed the discussion of historical and political issues which form Chapters 3 and 6, as well as much of the analysis of multiculturalism in the conclusion. The research project into Australian public opinion funded by the Scanlon Foundation and led by Andrew Markus provided a key component of the seventh Chapter. The on-going support of the foundation and of its project manager, Bruce Smith, and of Professor John Niewenhuysen, Director of the Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements, are acknowledged. The Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements has provided financial support for this publication.

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Tables and figures Tables 2.1 Total fertility rate, EU and selected countries, 2006 2.2 Selected Western countries by the main source countries of their foreign-born populations, 2005 2.3 Inflows to Western countries of foreign population by nationality, 2005 3.1 Electoral support for anti-immigration parties in Europe and Australasia, 1998–2003 3.2 Asylum applications to developed states, 1995–2001 4.1 Australia, overseas-born population from regions of Europe, Australia, 1947, 1961 and 1971 4.2 Australia, overseas-born population, 1971 and 2006 4.3 Permanent residence visas granted and planned by type, Australia, 1999–2000 to 2008–09 5.1 Countries of birth (top 25 countries) of the Australian population and extent of concentration 7.1 Agreement with the proposition that ‘accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger’, 2007 7.2 Political participation (stated), 2007

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a u s t r a l i a’ s i m m i g r at i o n r e v o l u t i o n

7.3 Social cohesion survey, extent of agreement, selected questions, 2007 7.4 Typology of attitudes towards minority groups 7.5 Response to proposition that ‘it is impossible for people who do not share [country’s] customs and traditions to become fully [country’s nationality]’, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, 2003

Figures 4.1 Net overseas migration, Australia, 1947–2007 5.1 Proportion of population aged five years and above that speaks a language other than English in the home, Census collection districts, Fairfield local government area, 2006 5.2 Proportion of population aged five years and above that speaks a language other than English in the home, Census collection districts, Greater Dandenong local government area, 2006 7.1 Pride in Australian nationality, way of life and culture, 1981, 1995 and 2007 7.2 Financial satisfaction, 1981, 1995 and 2007 7.3 Level of trust, agreement with the proposition that ‘most people can be trusted’, 1983–2007 7.4 View of social justice, agreement with the proposition that ‘the gap in incomes is too large’, 1984–2007 7.5 Attitudes to the immigration intake, 1951–72 7.6 Attitudes to the immigration intake, 1974–96 7.7 Attitudes to the immigration intake, 1996–2007 7.8 Correlation of the trend in unemployment and the proportion of those holding the view that ‘the immigration intake is too high’, 1974–2007 7.9 Agreement with the proposition that ‘Australia is a land of economic opportunity’, 2007 7.10 Agreement with government assistance to ethnic minorities for maintenance of customs and traditions, 2007 7.11 Life satisfaction indicators, 2007

Introduction:

Immigration and the recession Immigration and the recession

In May 2008, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship Chris Evans gave a rare personal interview to the Australian’s Editor-at-Large Paul Kelly. Evans used the interview to signal major changes in the country’s immigration policy. The context of the interview was the Rudd government’s first Budget, which provided for an increase in the immigration intake. The total intake for 2008–09 was planned to reach 190 300, an increase of 38 000 and the biggest single-year jump in decades. Within the three streams of the program, the Family component was to increase by 6500, the Humanitarian component by 500 and the Skill component by a massive 31 000, or 30 per cent. Whereas in past years the Family stream had been the largest, Skill now dominated to comprise a record 70 per cent of the intake. At a time of major economic growth, Minister Evans indicated that immigration had delivered some 40 per cent of the increase in labour supply and that recent data showed it was contributing an unprecedented 50 per cent. Immigration was of major importance not only in meeting labour demand but also in helping to contain wage pressures. The significance of the interview, however, lay less in the detail about the 2008–09 program and more in the minister’s expectations for the future. Evans observed that the planned increase was just a start. xi

xii


Australia was not only facing a shortage of skilled workers; there was an emerging shortage of the semi-skilled and unskilled. The nature of work had changed: workers were now mobile across international borders. Unlike the immigrants of an earlier generation, many did not come to Australia as permanent settlers. Evans stated that it was time for ‘a fairly major overhaul of the migration system’. There was need ‘to be more responsive to modern working life and internationalisation’. The current program was ‘based on a model that is out of date’, anchored in the postwar decades, not attuned to the international labour market of the twenty-first century. Australian needed a ‘great national debate over the next few years . . . The system’s creaking at the moment because it is unresponsive to new demands and new realities.’ Evans noted, in a comment which passed without attention, that in the previous year over half a million people had come to Australia outside the permanent program with working rights. In response to Kelly’s observation that ‘these reformist plans will stimulate the race debate’, Evans replied: ‘There’s always, frankly, the race issue. One of the challenges is that source countries are changing. We still get 25 per cent of the program from Britain but we are seeing an increase from India, China, the Philippines and South America off a small base.’ He expressed confidence that: ‘Australians are prepared to accept strong migration provided they think we need the skills and contributions that people bring. The issues are around settlement and how people settle here. When unemployment is very low, I believe you can run a successful large migration program.’ It is said that a week is a long time in politics. The measurement of change in national economies requires a longer calibration of time, but within months the mood had changed: projections of economic growth and labour demand were revised down, then revised down again. Concern over jobs became a major issue as the government announced its first package to stimulate the economy in October 2008. Opponents of large immigration targets raised their concerns on cue. In March 2009, Evans announced that the permanent skill intake for 2008–09 would be cut by 14 per cent, from 133 500 to 115 000. In his announcement, Evans did not refer to the intake of temporary workers, whose growing presence had not entered public consciousness; however, in a later press release dealing with reform of the Business (Long Stay) Visa (subclass 457) program he noted that applications had fallen from

Immigration and the recession xiii

a historical high of 700 per week during 2008 to 430 per week in the first three months of 2009. This again passed without notice. In the media, immigration was still understood to refer only to permanent settlers. The projected ‘great national debate’ about immigration which would explain and win support for policy was off the agenda. The Budget announced in May 2009 further cut the permanent skill intake by 6900 for 2009–10, reducing the total to 108 100 places, an overall drop of almost 20 per cent on previous planning levels; but the Family program was increased by 3800 to 60 300 and the Humanitarian program increased by 250 places to 13 750 people. With the three categories aggregated, the cut in the number of permanent visas was little over 10 per cent. Given that immigration was running at near-record levels in the months leading to the onset of recession, a very large program was being maintained. Data released in May 2009 by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, which employed a wide definition of immigration, indicated that in the year to March 2009 permanent and long-term arrivals outnumbered departures by 337 000, 24 per cent higher than a year earlier. For the three months ending September 2008 the Estimated Resident Population increased by 1.84 per cent from the previous year, up by a staggering 50 per cent from the 1.2 per cent recorded in 2003. The increased flexibility provided by the 457 visa program and other forms of non-permanent migration provided scope for the government to temper reductions to its permanent intake. Avoidance of discussion of the continuing near-record program was assisted by the April 2009 round of frenzied debate and political accusation sparked by the arrival by boat of small numbers of asylum seekers—and by the political stance of the major parties. The Opposition under Malcolm Turnbull was happy to politicise the asylum issue, but kept well clear of immigration. Labour responded in tandem, with attention focused on its tough policies to secure the sea-border. Minister Evans issued three media releases dealing with initiatives announced in the May Budget. The first was headlined ‘New Directions in Detention’. On cue, the Melbourne Age and the Sydney Morning Herald devoted the bulk of their coverage (twelve of fifteen paragraphs) to border protection initiatives and treatment of asylum seekers, with first attention to a $650 million six-year plan to tackle people smuggling. There was only passing attention to immigration targets.

xiv


Australian governments typically respond to economic downturns by cutting immigration, prioritising short-term considerations over long-term need. The 1970s’ recession led to a cut in permanent immigration from 87 000 in 1974 to 13 500 in 1975. In the next downturn immigration was cut from 123 000 in 1981 to 55 000 in 1983. With such an approach, Australian intakes tended to follow rather than keep in step with the economic cycle. Given the long delay between establishing recruitment targets, selecting immigrants and their time of arrival, the peak intake often occurs not at the time of maximum labour demand, but as the economy slips into recession. Conversely, the intake is at its lowest level at the time when the country emerges from recession and employers look to increase their workforce. While the May 2009 cuts to the permanent program were relatively minor, the lack of full and open discussion of the program’s dimensions was in keeping with the record of recent years. This is not the only way. Canada, a major recruiter of immigrants and the country with which Australia is most often compared, has adopted a different approach. First, there was no immediate cut. In March 2009, after four months of economic contraction, with unemployment rising to 8 per cent (compared with 5 per cent in Australia) and projected to reach 11 per cent in 2010, the Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, Jason Kenney, announced that for the present his government did not see a need for reduction. Second, instead of seeking to disguise the full extent of immigration, the minister’s statement included all categories introduced into Canada over the course of 2008, together with the rationale for their admission. Kenney announced that the total intake for 2008 was a record 519 722, including almost 250 000 permanent residents, 143 000 temporary foreign workers and 79 000 foreign students. Kenney erroneously claimed that the intake of permanent residents for 2008 was the largest per capita of any developed country; perhaps his advisers were confused by the way Australian data had been released, because the Australian permanent intake for 2008 calculated on a per capita basis was more than 20 per cent higher than Canada’s. Kenney argued for the value of immigration, which he said was vital to Canada’s future prosperity: he predicted that the time was coming when all labour force growth would be provided by immigration. Canada was distinctive, he stated, because in all likelihood it had ‘the strongest pro-immigration consensus’. Unlike most European countries

Immigration and the recession xv

and the United States, there was no organised group opposed to immigration. Further, there was a long-established tradition of diversity, which made possible an intake which had transformed Canada. Toronto, its largest city, now had nearly half its population born overseas. In his assessment, the challenges ahead related not to the attitudes of nativeborn Canadians, but to integration of immigrants, with special concern for ‘small minorities of extremists’ who rejected the ‘broad consensus of liberal democratic values’. While the concentration of immigrants in ethnic enclaves was an understandable part of the settlement process, action needed to be taken to ensure that they did not become ‘traps preventing people from integrating into the broader Canadian society, limiting their . . . economic opportunities or their social opportunities for engagement beyond the cultures with which they are familiar’. Utilising the new catchword ‘integration’, Kenney stated that ‘the challenge was to ensure that our citizenship program, or multicultural program must increasingly focus on integration, on the successful and rapid integration of newcomers to Canadian society’. As in Canada, there was concern in Australian government over integration and the formation of ethnic enclaves, but there the similarity largely ended. In Canada, the ‘great national debate’ which Evans saw as being needed in Australia had been held. Kenney could openly talk about the magnitude of the intake and reject a hurried cut in immigration during the first stage of the recession. It is the objective of this book to provide understanding of the development of Australian policy and of the magnitude of change in recent years. It explores the politics of immigration in Australia and looks at why governments feel constrained in openly discussing the new model of immigration that has emerged—why a great national debate focused on the ‘new demands and realities’ was still being mooted in 2008 rather than having been carried out years earlier. The first chapter considers recent change with reference to six developments. Some carry a high level of public awareness: the size of the intake, the national origin of immigrants and the uneven impact of immigration across Australia, with areas of high immigrant concentration in the major cities. But some changes are little understood. These include the explosion in the number of long-term residents without full rights of citizenship and the development of the global labour market, making Australian growth contingent to a greater extent

xvi


than in the past on forces beyond national control. The last issue involves the phenomenon of transnationalism, shifting the focus from the host society and its concerns to the changing experience of immigration viewed from the perspective of the immigrant. It is never ideal to attempt an understanding of cross-national processes by limiting study to one country; too many histories of Australian immigration (and many other topics) suffer from an overly narrow, myopic view, all the more so as global pressures play an increasing role in population movement and determination of policy. Chapter 2 looks at Australia’s immigration program in an international context. The world has never experienced population movement on the scale of the first years of the twenty-first century. The number of people living outside their country of birth doubled, to an estimated 191 million between 1980 and 2005. The discussion seeks to explain why immigration to Western countries has accelerated and considers differing interpretations of the economic impact of immigration. Chapter 3 considers the politics of immigration, understood in a historical context. It highlights contradictory trends in the contemporary world, with particular reference to the European Union (EU): the abolition of border controls for EU citizens, consolidated by the Schengen agreements of 1985 and 1990, signals a remarkable experiment, while anti-immigration sentiment swells across Europe. What makes immigration controversial—and hence political—is that it can impact on the character of a society quite rapidly, creating anxiety among those who do not want change. While much public policy is made as though only numbers and skills matter, in the political arena these are often given much less prominence than national issues—the race, religion, languages and ‘culture’ of those who are being admitted. The establishment of the EU has not brought to an end the tensions and hostilities associated with the movement of peoples across cultural and national boundaries. As in the past, so it is today: there are calls for the restriction of immigration, in some countries for the repatriation of recent and not-so-recent arrivals. Anti-immigration parties have emerged across Europe, obtaining over 10 per cent of the vote in seven countries, with a peak of almost 27 per cent in Switzerland. The European experience indicates that the nation state has lost its appeal among elites but still finds support among the masses. The discussion seeks to explain the dynamics of anti-immigration movements and contradictory national policies.

Immigration and the recession xvii

It also considers the magnitude of the asylum problem in Europe and considers why Australia, facing asylum seekers in relatively small numbers, adopted policies of strict deterrence. Between 1995 and 2001, Australia received a total of 69 750 applications for asylum, including fewer than 5000 seaborne asylum seekers. Over the same period European states with smaller populations received a much larger number, including 205 080 in the Netherlands and 160 630 in Belgium. The United Kingdom, with three times Australia’s population, received seven times as many asylum applications. Chapter 4 considers demographic and population issues in Australia. Understanding immigration requires a grasp of complex and detailed statistical data and bureaucratic practice; this complexity facilitates the misrepresentations and misconceptions that feature in public discussion. The chapter provides an introduction to the different measurement criteria employed by Australian governments since 1970, and to the regulations and categories that determine who gains permanent residence and temporary long-stay visas. Competition between the states has become a feature of the present Australian immigration system. As discussed in Chapter 4, New South Wales did not involve itself in this competition in recent years and consequently its share of settler arrivals fell from 43.5 per cent in 2000–01 to 31.2 per cent in 2006–07. Nevertheless, as indicated by language use in the home, Sydney has the largest concentration of immigrants born in non-English speaking countries, and sharp differentiation between areas of cultural diversity and monolingual enclaves. Chapter 5 explores the insight to be gained into the extent and character of ethnic concentration from the 2006 Census. Chapter 6 considers the extent of consensus in Australian politics. For much of the twentieth century, there was agreement on most immigration issues by the major parties, as there was about defence and national security. It was agreed that Australia should be British and white; that the population must be constantly enlarged and that the only way to do this quickly was by immigration; and that the immigrants should be rapidly assimilated. A new consensus forged in the 1970s ended the racially discriminatory ‘White Australia’ policy and developed settlement policy based on the concept of multiculturalism. But consensus on multiculturalism was not to be long lasting. The chapter explores the reasons, with reference to unease over a policy which was seen by some as demeaning the contribution of the national

xviii


founders. By appearing to deny Australia’s British inheritance, it alienated conservative elements in the Liberal Party and other sections of society who resented the perceived challenge to their understanding of Australian cultural traditions. Further, there was not the electoral basis to ensure the maintenance of cross-party support. Multicultural policy appealed to immigrants, but nearly all were concentrated in Labor-controlled electorates. It had no impact on most rural and provincial districts, especially those in conservative parts of Queensland controlled by the National Party (now the Liberal National Party, or LNP). While multiculturalism came under attack from the conservative parties, the party system remained largely impervious to new movements critical of immigration and ethnic diversity, in contrast to Europe where openly racist parties have established small parliamentary bridgeheads. But it also remained largely impervious to most ethnic groups. The discussion of ethnic politics explores the paradox of the creation of a multicultural society with monocultural institutions. Chapter 7 explores the character of Australian public opinion, to the extent that current survey data enables the topic to be analysed. Given its significance for policy and for understanding the distinctive character of societies, there has been surprisingly little systematic consideration of attitudes in Australia, in marked contrast to the country’s long history of innovative policy-making. Drawing on studies of societies which have failed to contain ethnic tensions, and those which have successfully integrated large immigrant populations, key indicators of social cohesion are identified and explored. Attention is particularly directed to survey findings bearing on acceptance of immigrants and indicators of alienation and life satisfaction among those from non-English speaking countries. The final part of the discussion applies two models or typologies for classifying the main attitudinal types in a population, ranging from the intolerant to the actively tolerant. The data available for cross-national comparison indicates that the level of intolerance in Australia is relatively low, but there exists a substantial minority who may be attracted to support politicians campaigning on issues of race, religion and national identity. The concluding chapter considers the likelihood of immigration at high levels in future years, and the successes and failures of Australian policy. In recent years, governments have not given priority to articulating a vision commensurate with the scale of the immigration program. The

Immigration and the recession xix

Howard policy was to minimise public discussion and, despite signals to the contrary from Minister Evans, the Rudd government in its first period of office was continuing the same approach. This approach seems to be unviable in the long term. The discussion directs attention to alternative pathways for managing the increasing ethnic diversity of Australian society and argues for the importance of firm political leadership and policies which are positive, optimistic and effectively based on empirical evidence.


Defining Australian immigration


1

Australia’s immigration revolution Australia’s immigration revolution

What is the justification for entitling this book Australia’s Immigration Revolution? In what sense is it possible to think in terms of a ‘revolution’ in immigration? The concept of revolution is most often used in the context of politics, and refers to the overthrow of a regime by means other than constitutional—generally by force of arms. If the overthrow leads only to a new group seizing power without further substantive change, it may more correctly be termed a coup; it becomes a revolution when it leads to transformative change in the economic and social realm. Such change can also be achieved through constitutional means, however, when a group that has won power through the normal electoral process embarks on policies which result in fundamental transformation. Revolutions occur both at specific points in time and over a long period. There is a moment in time when authority passes from one regime to another. But the implementation of change in the economic and social realm takes many years and typically proceeds through a number of stages, not all of which may be consistent. Thus revolutions may be understood both as involving moments of radical transformation and as the gradual working out of the consequences of those transformations. Another perspective focuses not on the realm of political power but on economic and social processes occurring over decades. Thus we 3

4


conceptualise the industrial and post-industrial revolutions, and a revolution in communications which is taking place in the contemporary world. In this book, revolutionary change is understood in terms of broad social processes, not the actions of specific political parties. It is concerned with change which overturns existing practice and ushers in a new order, a new social reality, readily apparent to those who live in a region and can compare the way things were and the way they are. It is concerned with two dimensions of time: the last half-century and the last decade. It argues that, over the last half-century, there has been a fundamental change in the ethnic character of our immigration intake, with a consequent impact on Australia’s major cities. This change is widely recognised, although in public discussion there is often a lack of awareness of its full extent. The revolutionary change which has taken place over the last ten years is little understood. Public discussion focuses on the number of immigrants reaching Australia. But of greater significance is the increasing arrival of temporary or ‘guest workers’, a radical shift in the balance from permanent to temporary immigration. Second, the context in which the immigration program operates has been transformed. Once Australia and the handful of other nations seeking to recruit immigrants were to a very large extent able to determine the terms of the immigration market; however, in the last decade, and prior to the impact of the global financial crisis, the number of countries seeking to recruit immigrants greatly increased, leading to a mounting competition for skilled workers. In this context, Australia became another competitor in what was becoming a crowded sellers’ market, lessening the extent to which Australia could control its immigration program independently of wider realities. Third, the experience of immigration has been transformed. On the one hand, a significant proportion of immigrants—particularly skilled immigrants—is no longer looking for permanent residence: they see themselves as international citizens, operating in a global labour market. Just as Australia’s capacity to determine the recruitment process has been lessened, so too has its control over those admitted. In addition to greater options of movement from country to country, the immigrants have greater freedom to determine the extent of their involvement in Australian society. No longer do they need to face isolation, cut off from relatives and friends and from their home country; as a consequence of the revolution in communications, they now have a range of options

Australia’s immigration revolution 5

to maintain regular contact, extending to visits utilising low fares better known to locals than to tourists. The option for immigrants to maintain multiple identities has been greatly augmented: geography is no longer the tyrant it once was. As a consequence of the global recession, elements of the revolution in immigration may be on hold, but it is the argument of this book that a large immigration program, in its new form, will continue in the medium and long term. Economic growth in Australia, dependent on capacity to meet labour requirements, will necessitate a continuing large immigration program.

Ethnic composition of the intake Since World War II there have been two revolutions in the composition of the immigration intake. The first occurred in the 1950s, marking a shift from an intake in which over 80 per cent of immigrants came from the United Kingdom to one where immigrants from continental Europe became the majority; the second occurred over the last 30 years, resulting in the largest proportion of immigrants being drawn from Australia’s region, Asia and Oceania. The following statistics indicate the magnitude of the change that has taken place: • In the 1960s, 45.3 per cent of the intake was from United Kingdom and Ireland; in the 1970s, it was 35.8 per cent; in the 1980s, it was 20.9 per cent; and in the 1990s, it was 12.5 per cent. • For the second half of the twentieth century, the top five source countries were all European: the United Kingdom and Ireland at 31.6 per cent, followed by a considerable gap to Italy at 6.9 per cent, New Zealand at 6.6 per cent, Germany at 4.5 per cent, and Greece at 3.9 per cent. Three Asian countries were included in the top ten, but together they contributed only 6.7 per cent of the intake, or less than the immigration intake from Italy alone. • The most recent data, for 2007–08, places New Zealand (18.5 per cent) and the United Kingdom (15.6 per cent) as the top countries, followed by seven countries from the Asian region and one from Africa. With 10.3 per cent of the intake, India is ranked third, followed by China with 8.7 per cent. The seven Asian countries in the top ten now contribute 31.4 per cent of the intake.

6


Another indication is provided by comparing the birthplaces of the Australian population in 1971 and 2006. In 1971, the population born in Europe (including the British Isles) was 2.21 million; in 2006, it was almost the same number—2.25 million. The population change for those born in the regions of Asia is in marked contrast: 154 000 in 1971 compared with 1.49 million in 2006. It is a general rule that most immigrants arrive from the receiving country’s region—for example, Hispanics mainly migrate to United States, North Africans to Europe. Australia, with its prioritisation of immigration from the United Kingdom and then continental Europe, defied this rule for most of its history, utilising assisted passages and rigid immigration controls to achieve its objective. Key moments for the ending of the ‘White Australia’ policy occurred in 1966, 1972 and 1977. A phased unfolding of the consequences of these changes has taken place over the last three decades. In recent years, in the face of global realities which have made racial discrimination untenable and left Australia competing for skills in high demand on the international labour market, there has been little choice but to adjust to the realities of the laws of supply and demand. The statistics on immigration point to a process of ongoing change, in which an ever-increasing proportion of the intake is being drawn from Australia’s neighbours. There is one important point of clarification here, however: just as Europe constitutes diverse peoples, languages and cultures, so Australia’s region is characterised by diversity. Oceania includes the New Zealanders of British stock and the Maori, and the peoples of Polynesia and Micronesia. The designation ‘Asia’ includes, among others, the sub-regions of South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Asia and Western Asia. To think in terms of one Asian entity, to discuss—as some have done—a supposed ‘Asianisation’ of Australia, is to betray an ignorance of the rich complexity of cultures and peoples in regions comprising more than half the world’s population.

The transformation of Australia’s major cities Between 1947 and 1971, there was a rapid change in the proportion of the Australian population born overseas: from 9.8 per cent in 1947 to just over 20 per cent in 1971. Since 1971, the overseas-born proportion of the population has remained relatively constant, at around 20 to 24 per


cent. There may have been a marginal increase over the last ten years, although this is not certain as the number of respondents indicating a place of birth on the Census has also increased over this time. National-level data indicates that those born outside the main English-speaking countries—Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States—continue to increase as a proportion of the overseas-born: up from 60.4 per cent of arrivals in 1996 to 62.1 per cent in 2006. Those who speak a language other than English in their home increased from 15.0 per cent in 1991 to 15.8 per cent in 2006. The national-level data indicates change on a small scale in percentage terms and in relative proportions—although in absolute terms, in the context of rapidly increasing population, the number of Australians from diverse backgrounds has increased substantially. Thus the number of people speaking a language other than English in the home increased over ten years from 2.66 million (1996) to 3.15 million (2006)—that is, by almost half a million. Closer examination of population distribution brings into sharper focus the extent of change taking place in regions of Australia. The nationallevel data needs to be placed in the context of population distribution, with a number of overseas-born groups unevenly distributed across Australia, as discussed in Chapter 5—among the top 25 birthplace groups, the highly concentrated comprise those born in Vietnam, Lebanon, Malta and Fiji, followed by China, Hong Kong and Sri Lanka. Concentration is particularly marked in Sydney and Melbourne, although it does not approach the level reached in some cities of North America. Analysis of the 2006 Census by the socio-linguist Professor Michael Clyne and his colleagues indicates that 31.4 per cent of the population of Sydney speak a language other than English in the home, as do 27.9 per cent of the population of Melbourne. These results are considered to represent an undercount because of the way in which the Census question is framed. The Census further indicates that change is occurring at a faster rate in Sydney than in Melbourne. In Sydney, of those who speak a language other than English, the largest number speak Arabic and Cantonese; in Melbourne, reflecting earlier immigrant waves, Italian and Greek are the most commonly spoken. Between 1996 and 2006, the proportion of Sydney local government areas (LGAs) with a diverse

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ethno-linguistically mixed population increased from 39 per cent to 52 per cent of the total, in Melbourne the increase was from 42 per cent to 45 per cent.

Size of the immigration intake With regard to change over the last ten years, the issue most often discussed is the number of immigrants—understood as permanent arrivals—reaching Australia. Permanent immigration is not, however, at unprecedented levels if it is understood in the context of the size of the existing or host population. If the prime consideration is the impact of arrivals, then in addition to their actual number it is necessary to consider the size of the existing population—or to calculate intake on a per capita basis. This is an important consideration, because the impact of immigration is relative, determined by the size of the host population. For example, a net intake of 200 000 in a country with a population of 300 million will be much less than the impact of 200 000 immigrants in Australia, with its population of 21 million. The calculation of the intake in any given period is not straightforward, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this book. But if the official definitions in use are used, Australia has experienced at least four peaks in its net immigration intake since World War II: in 1949–50 (154 000), 1968–69 (140 000), 1987–88 (173 000) and 2006–07 (184 000). The component of population increase from net overseas migration was 2 per cent in 1949, 1.1 per cent in 1968, 1.1 per cent in 1987 and 0.9 per cent in 2006. Seen in this context—the most appropriate for measurement of the numerical impact of immigration—the intake of recent years indicates a high point in terms of absolute numbers, but in per capita terms it does not reach the level reached of the immediate postwar years.

Long-term population movement It is when the permanent and other forms of population movement are considered together that we come to an understanding of the extent of change in Australian policy. In the Department of Immigration and Citizenship’s annual publication Population Flows (DIAC 2008b, p. 4) it is observed that:


Until 1999–2000 permanent movement . . . represented the major element of net overseas migration . . . Since 1999–2000, the major element of net overseas migration has been long-term movement.

In the years 1983–1992, permanent arrivals averaged 88 per cent of net overseas migration, and long-term arrivals 12 per cent; in the years 2002–07, the balance was 41 per cent permanent and 59 per cent long-term arrivals. The fundamental premise of Australian immigration policy until the 1990s was that those admitted to Australia came as permanent residents, enjoying the same rights and privileges and with the same obligations as the Australia-born. There was a conscious rejection of the ‘guest worker’ programs which developed in postwar Europe. The ideal of permanent immigration and full citizenship was a cardinal principle of the country’s social democratic ethos, which (paradoxically) also underpinned the ‘White Australia’ policy. Australia’s nation-builders rejected the class-divided societies and exploitative labour relations of the countries from which they had emigrated. In the first decades of the new federation, they sought to build a land of what they viewed as (racial) equality, based on the idea of a living wage sufficient to sustain a male worker and his wife and children at a level of frugal comfort, within a fair labour market which balanced the rights of employers and employees. Workers without formal equality were excluded from the mainstream of Australian life. This principle was embodied in legislation enacted in the first years of the Commonwealth: the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 and the Contract Immigrants Act 1905, as well as the various ‘protection’ acts which governed the lives of Aboriginal Australians, passed in the first decades of that century. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Australia began to recruit immigrants in Europe. The first experiment was the Displaced Persons Program, which brought some 170 000 Europeans to Australia in five years. Although the displaced persons came under terms of indenture, bound to the government for two years and facing the threat of deportation if they did not comply with government direction, only a handful were deported. While required to fill the least attractive jobs, the displaced persons were employed on award terms. Almost all displaced persons gained permanent residence, which is in stark contrast to the policies developed in the first years of the twenty-first century.

10


Today, the major category for recruitment of temporary long-stay skilled workers is the Standard Business Sponsorship, the Business (Long Stay) Visa (subclass 457). Additional visa categories provide for specialist workers—for example, doctors (subclass 422) and educators and researchers for employment by tertiary institutions, technical colleges and schools (subclass 418). Supplementary labour for industries requiring short-term casual workers, particularly the hospitality, tourism and rural industries, is provided by the Working Holiday Maker Program and by overseas students. Temporary entrants are required to pay taxes on income earned, but they do not have access to social welfare benefits or Medicare. There are problems with using government statistics to obtain a consistent indication of change over the long term, given changes in definition and the lack of consistent long-run data; however, the following statistics give an indication of change since 1990: • Business (Long Stay) visas (subclass 457) were introduced in 1996 and cover both the primary applicant and his or her family. The number of visas issued in this category has increased from 30 800 in 1997–98, the first full year of operation, to 111 000 in 2007–08. • The number of student visas increased from 29 000 in 1990 to 63 000 in 1997 to a record 278 000 in 2007–08. • Working holiday makers increased from 40 000 in 1994–95 to 135 000 in 2006–07. • The number of New Zealanders moving to Australia (with free entry and the right to work) increased from net 3000 in 1991–92 to net 26 500 in 2006–07. In June 2007, there were 504 000 New Zealand citizens in Australia. Some 78 per cent (or 393 000) of the New Zealand-born are in the workforce. In June 2007, there were also 249 000 students, 104 000 long stay business visa holders and 74 000 working holiday makers resident in Australia. In June 2007, the combined total of residents with visas granted in the Business Long Stay, Study and Working Holiday Maker categories, together with New Zealanders in work, was over 800 000. The number of temporary visas with work entitlements issued in a twelve-month cycle, together with arrivals from New Zealand, exceeds by a margin of almost three to one the number of permanent immigration permits issued over the twelve-month cycle—indicating the magnitude of the immigration revolution, in the context of the broadened definition


of immigration to encompass the full range of population movement, operating at a level without precedent in Australian history. Of the labour force of 11 million, the various categories of residents without permanent settlement but with work rights constitute some 7.5 per cent of the total.

A new type of immigrant Closer examination of one facet of population movement—students coming to Australia to undertake tertiary-level study—illustrates the complex interplay of economic forces shaping the development of policy. These forces are made clearer through comparison with earlier programs for study in Australia under the Colombo Plan. Inaugurated in 1951, the Colombo Plan was a program of economic assistance for developing Asian countries. It provided scholarships, among other forms of assistance, for Asians to study in Australia. The objective was to train young people to assume leadership in the technological, economic, social and political development of their countries. In addition, the program had the benefit of providing Asian elites with knowledge of Australia. Between 1951 and 1980, more than 20 000 Asian students attended Australian institutions under the program. A government review of the first six years of the Colombo Plan, prepared in 1957, noted that ‘a substantial contribution has been made to the growing pool of Asian technical and administrative skills as well as to mutual understanding and respect’. Once the students had completed their studies, they were required to return to their homeland. Even when the prospect of settlement from Asia became possible after 1966, onshore applications were precluded. By contrast, the current study programs are heavily weighted to directly serve Australian economic interests. Education is now Australia’s third largest export earner, after the iron and coal mining industries. Australia is the world’s third largest international educational provider, behind the United States and the United Kingdom. A 2007 report noted that Australia controlled 11 per cent of the international student market and had experienced nearly a threefold increase in student numbers over the previous ten years. Australian immigration policy has facilitated the growth of the educational industry by offering the option of permanent settlement to those successfully completing courses in areas of high labour demand—in

12


2006–07, almost 23 000 former students (close to 10 per cent of those studying in Australia) were granted permanent residence. The potential to link study in Australia with enhanced prospects of permanent settlement confers three benefits on the host country. First, it increases the number of people wanting to study in Australia, producing an economic benefit which underpins the viability of a tertiary sector underfunded by government—the overseas students make up 18 per cent of university enrolments. Students at Australian universities (about half the total number of overseas students in the country) have the opportunity to gain high-quality education, but at considerable cost: they must pay full fees upfront. For an undergraduate degree, this is $10 000–$16 500 per year; for Masters and Doctoral degrees it is $11 000–$18 500 per year. They must also meet their living expenses—typically $360 per week, or close to $15 000 for 40 weeks. Only a small proportion are able to obtain scholarships, mainly at the postgraduate level. Second, these students augment the supplementary or reserve labour force. Whereas previously specific approval was required for students to work in Australia, since April 2008 those granted student visas automatically receive this permission. Students directly benefit sectors of the economy reliant on casual and seasonal labour. From the students’ viewpoint, part-time work enables them to augment funds they bring from overseas, helping to meet their living and educational expenses. Third, the present arrangement satisfies, at minimal cost, Australia’s search for additions to its skilled labour force—through onshore training, undertaken at the expense of those among the overseas students who are attracted by the option of permanent settlement. This process has been described by the Canadian sociologist Alan Simmons, in the context of a similar Canadian program, as one by which the host society ‘designs’ its immigrants. The Australian government publishes and regularly updates a list of skills in demand. The student/applicant-to-be undertakes a course of study in an area of demand to meet the requirement for permanent settlement. The system works to the benefit both of the student and the host society, provided the student can meet the educational costs, develop English language competence and complete the course of study. All comes undone if the student fails one of these requirements, or if there is a change in the labour market during the years of study. If a change in labour demand occurs, there is no longer the prospect of permanent settlement. Australia thus gains an augmented skilled labour pool from which to select its immigrants and flexibility in dealing with


ever-changing labour demand, with the economic and social costs borne by the student/applicant-to-be. Relative to the size of their populations, Australia and Canada recruit the highest proportion of their skilled workforce through immigration—around 11 per cent of their skilled working-age population. An immigration policy heavily weighted to skilled workers (in 2006–07, 70 per cent of those who gained permanent residence were in the Skill category) means that Australia enjoys a ‘net brain gain’ relative to Third World and developing countries, reaping the benefit of country-of-origin investment in education and in human capital. Immigration programs such as Australia’s have been criticised on moral grounds, described by Professor Bob Rowthorn of Cambridge University, for example, as ‘predatory’. Many poor countries have an urgent need for trained professionals, not least in the field of health care. Third World and developing countries not only lose scarce or irreplaceable skills to countries like Australia, Rowthorn comments, they ‘may also lose the brightest and most dynamic of their potential leaders’ (Rowthorn 2008, p. 33). Proponents of this kind of system emphasise the benefit the individual gains by educational and settlement opportunities. Individuals are provided with opportunities to pursue their life goals. Where permanent settlement takes place, it does not necessarily entail a net loss to the country of origin: remittances to relatives are an important source of income into poorer countries and a number of professionals return at a later stage of life, having gained not only qualifications but invaluable work experience. However these processes are viewed, the contrast between the Colombo Plan and current educational practice highlights a key element in the revolution in immigration policy: the development of new pathways for recruitment of skilled labour, with the educational pathway just one among many. The new pathways confer financial benefits on the host society, including flexibility in meeting labour demand and capacity to make adjustments in times of economic downturn. The cost of the adjustment falls on those without social welfare and ongoing residence entitlements.

Transnationalism: The immigrant experience A revolutionary change has also occurred in the experience of immigration. This area of discussion is not about host societies or government policies, but rather a potential transformation in the lives of immigrants.

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In the postwar decades, migration entailed a fundamental dislocation from country, relatives and friends. It still does today, but the nature of the dislocation has changed. In the past, there were limited means of communication—mainly letters—and little scope for return visits given the cost of international travel. Further, in the 1950s and 1960s there was limited access to the media from country of origin, mainly restricted to occasional screenings of films. By contrast, the last two decades have opened a new range of possibilities for the immigrant to maintain contact—through the lessened cost of the telephone and travel, but most significantly with the development of the internet as a vehicle of mass communication. These new developments provide for the immigrant a broadening of options, the enhancement of self-determination and life choice. Today, immigrants living in Australia can maintain regular telephone contact with overseas relatives and friends: $10 pre-paid telephone cards offer over 500 minutes of call time and there are even cheaper forms of internet contact using Skype and other software. It can now be cheaper to place a cross-country call over thousands of kilometres than to make a mobile call across town. Paradoxically, an immigrant has the potential to extend his or her circle of friends in the country of birth after departure, through the sending of emails (enhanced with the option of cheap digital photography) to a distribution list of multiple contacts. Furthermore, immigrants (most of whom are selected for their education and skills, hence with knowledge of the revolution in communication) have ready access to newspapers and radio broadcasts of their country of birth via the internet, as well as to national and international television broadcasts via cable and satellite transmission. There is also ready access to films from the country of birth on DVD, provided by stores which serve immigrant communities. Most of these are new developments of the last decade. This transformation of the immigrant experience through communication technology is now a growing area of research relatively little recognised in public discussion, known to academics as transnationalism. The new reality is that migrants can lead double or multiple lives through complex relationship networks. Transnationalism, in the entry in the Encyclopedia of Globalization, refers to: The activities of immigrants to forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link their societies of origin and settlement as


a single unified field of social action. Innovations in transportation and communications have made possible a density and intensity of links not previously possible between the country of origin and the country of settlement. This, in turn, has allowed for these communities to live simultaneously in two or more worlds, or to create and live in ‘transnational spaces’ to a degree not previously known (Robinson in Robertson & Schotte 2006, p. 1199).

These developments are of significance not only for the individual, but also for the impact on the way the immigrant may choose to interact with the host society. This process of empowerment—a shift in power between the receiving country and the immigrant—may be another factor enhancing the transitory nature and circular patterns of immigration. The immigrant now possesses enhanced resources for self-sufficiency, with a lessened need to adjust to and integrate or assimilate to the norms and customs of the host society. He or she has more power in determining the extent and level of interaction. The immigrant has moved to Australia in body, but with increased potential to remain distant in values and outlook, to sustain and build relationships with people and cultures far away—not only in the imagined world of the mind, which was always the case, but in a real and tangible way, in ‘real time’—all of which is radically different from the experiences of previous generations of immigrants.

Global labour markets The final transformation concerns the power of Australian governments to shape national development by rigid determination of the ethnic and cultural background of those admitted as settlers. Australia is no longer, as it was for so much of its history, a distant outpost of the European world, developing behind the ‘Great White Walls’, to use the term adopted by Charles Price for his study of immigration policy in the nineteenth century (Price 1974). Globalisation has made its impact in many fields of Australian life, not least in the areas of labour market growth and national identity. After more than 150 years of determining its own course through immigration policies, Australia is today more constrained by international realities. In many ways, Australian policies deal with problems common across the developed world and Australia adopts, to a greater or lesser

16


extent, solutions common to many countries. The last decade has witnessed a large measure of convergence, as nations have learned from and emulated the policies of their competitors and allies. The developed world faces common problems, notably an ageing population (at present of lesser impact in Australia than in many European countries, a benefit of the immigration program of the last decades) and, in the long term, an inability to meet the needs of the labour market from internal sources. The increased scale of immigration which Australia experienced prior to the global financial crisis was common to Europe and North America. From 1956 to 1976 external net immigration to the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) averaged 790 000 per year; from 1977 to 1990 it was 1.24 million per year, and from 1990 to 2005 it was 2.73 million per year. A number of traditional countries of emigration became importers of labour—these included Spain, Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom, Greece and Russia. Within the OECD over the last 30 years, the proportion of overseas-born has increased from 4.5 per cent to 8.3 per cent of the population. Immigrants have been accepted from countries previously seen as too far removed in social, cultural and racial terms. The rate at which immigration has grown in many countries is unprecedented. These developments mirror those of Australia over the last decades. In some respects, Australia has led the way, providing a model for countries now seeking to attract immigration—in the system used for selecting immigrants, the control and monitoring of immigration and the rigid policies to limit the flow of asylum seekers. Australia, in turn, has been guided by other countries in competing for skilled labour, in developing its long-stay programs, in reducing impediments facing employers wishing to recruit overseas labour, and in opening avenues for onshore conversion from temporary to permanent status. Moreover, Australia’s concerns about citizenship and challenges to national identity, leading to the adoption of a citizenship test and more stringent requirements for qualification for naturalisation, also follow European developments. The last area of revolutionary change thus relates to Australia’s loss of independence and autonomy in the field of immigration, which has transformed from a global situation in which there were only a handful of nations of immigration—primarily the United States, Canada and Australia—enabling these nations to dictate terms of admission, to


more than 30 nations competing for labour on terms dictated by laws of supply and demand operating at the global level. By 2008, before the global financial crisis, it was becoming clear that Australia was facing increasing competition for skilled labour not only from Europe and North America, but from Asian nations, including China, India, Japan and South Korea. Not only did it face heightened competition in global labour markets, but it also suffered the increasing loss of Australia’s own skilled workers to the rapidly developing Asian economic powers.


The Western context


2

Population issues Population issues

The world has never experienced migration movements on the scale of the first years of the twenty-first century. Millions of people are moving each year, mainly from poor countries to rich countries—especially Western countries. In this chapter, the reasons for this movement are considered and the main movements described.

Why migration to Western countries has accelerated From 1970 to 1995, labour forces in Western countries substantially increased. In Canada and Australia, for example, the labour force grew by about 80 per cent. The percentage increases in selected other Western countries were 64 per cent in New Zealand, 56 per cent in the Netherlands, 45 per cent in the United States, 41 per cent in Spain, 30 per cent in Sweden, 16 per cent in Germany and 14 per cent in the United Kingdom. Growth in this period was due to the full entry to the labour force of the Baby Boom generation, substantial increases in labour force participation for women and, in some countries, immigration. Particularly in Southern Europe, labour force growth was accompanied by high rates of unemployment, but in most Western nations the growth in labour supply was broadly equivalent to growth in the number of employed persons. 21

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Thus, in the last three decades of the twentieth century, Western economies became geared to growth in employment. In rough terms, up to half of the economic growth in Western countries in these years was associated with increases in the size of the labour force. This occurred in a period when economic growth was also boosted substantially by the higher levels of productivity stemming from computerisation. Today, productivity levels in developed countries, in terms of value added per person employed, are six times higher than in Asia and twelve times higher than in Africa. The relative economic well-being of Western nations in the recent past has been a product of both labour force growth and productivity improvement. In the late 1990s, however, the momentum for growth of employment began to slow down in most Western countries as the Baby Boom generation was replaced by the succeeding smaller generations born from 1970 onwards. The entry of women to the labour force also slowed considerably as participation rates for women approached their peak. Today, many countries are facing falls in the absolute numbers in their labour forces and rapidly ageing populations. The labour supply crunch has been driven primarily by falls in the birth rates in Western countries from the early 1970s onwards. The Western countries most severely affected by falls in the birth rate are Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal) and German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria and Switzerland). Advanced East Asian economies (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan) have also been severely affected. In all of these countries, the birth rate has fallen to as low as 1.3 births per woman. When fertility is sustained at this level, the child’s generation is only 63 per cent of the size of the parental generation. When the child’s generation matures to replace the parental generation in the labour force, the size of the labour force plummets. Where advances in productivity are contingent upon technological advances, as is usually the case, there is an argument that young workers are beneficial because, in each generation of new technology, they are the assimilators of the new knowledge. At the same time, Western populations are ageing rapidly and there are concerns about the capacity of the labour force to support the aged population in many countries. More precisely, the concern is that countries that must divert capital to population maintenance rather than to productive investment will have a weaker competitive edge in an increasingly competitive global

Population issues 23

marketplace. To avoid this situation, Western countries have four choices: to increase productivity per worker; to increase labour force participation at older ages; to increase birth rates, taking into account the delayed effect upon labour supply; and to increase immigration. While improvements in productivity per worker are possible, these improvements, generated mainly by technology, are readily transferable between countries and so no country can gain a competitive edge. Furthermore, those countries with labour shortages and aged labour forces will simply have fewer skilled workers to implement the new technologies, and hence be at a competitive disadvantage. There is variable scope across Western countries to increase labour force participation at older ages, but in the end increased immigration is the most immediate and simplest short-term measure to deal with labour and skill shortages. At the same time, there is no shortage of emigrants willing to leave languishing economies for the relatively wealthy economies in Western nations. As a consequence, levels of immigration to Western countries have been rising sharply in recent times. Movement has been especially strong from those countries neighbouring the Western economies. International movement of population is also enhanced by increased levels of education, ease of travel and communication, and globalisation. Globalisation means that people have become more familiar with other parts of the world and the opportunities that are offered. Education means that they are better able to meet job requirements, and improved transport and communication mean that they are better able to access opportunities. For the most skilled workers, the labour market is now an almost open global labour market. All advanced economies want highly skilled workers, and such people have little trouble crossing international boundaries and working in other countries. Language is the only significant barrier to them, but English is now becoming widespread as the international language of the highly skilled. National laws relating to immigration are quickly amended to satisfy the demand for highly skilled workers. In Australia, for example, it is possible for companies with pre-approved arrangements to get a person in this category into the country within 24 hours. The story changes for low-skilled workers. Most countries of the world have legal barriers to the entry of immigrants, and these barriers are used to restrict the flow of low-skilled immigrants. However, many borders are porous, and illegal or undocumented immigration to wealthy countries in Europe and North America has mushroomed in recent

24


decades. Once in the country, illegal immigrants are able to take advantage of less regular labour markets, and employers who are seeking low-cost workers often collude to facilitate the system. On the back of the low wages of illegal immigrants, consumers in these countries in turn benefit from low-cost goods and services. Legal protections often limit the capacity of countries to remove undocumented immigrants rapidly and efficiently. The pre-eminent example of this system is the illegal migration of tens of millions of Mexicans to the United States.

International migration movements in the twenty-first century In 2005, an estimated 191 million people lived outside their country of birth, double those in 1980. Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom are well known historically as countries of out-migration: they are the countries that largely populated the New World. Not previously targets for immigration, they have emerged as major recipients of these new international migrants. In the period 2002–06, Spain experienced average net migration of 626 000 persons per annum and Italy of 443 000 persons per annum. Together, in these years, these two Southern European countries received more migrants than the United States and, per head of population, the migration rate to Spain was four times that of the United States. In Europe, the third largest migrant-receiving country in the 2002–06 period was the United Kingdom, with an annual net migration average of 194 000 persons. The European country with the largest net out-migration among the 27 European Union states was Poland, with an average annual loss of just 18 000 in the period 2002–06. For perspective, this is less than the net annual interstate migration from New South Wales to Queensland in Australia. Thus the migrants to the high-growth countries of Europe primarily come from outside of Europe. In total, the EU-27 countries in 2002–06 received an average net migration of 1.81 million persons per annum from the rest of the world. This compares with 1.06 million going to the United States in the same period (all 2002–06 migration numbers are taken from Vienna Institute of Demography, 2008). The emergence of Europe as a major recipient region for international migration has taken place in a relatively short period but it has not resulted in a lowered rate of migration to the New World countries (the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), the traditional


recipients of large-scale international migration. Indeed, migration to these countries has risen alongside the gains in Europe. Considering global migration and using United Nations’ estimates, in the period 2000–05, the European countries in total received net migration of 1.59 million people per annum. This was almost exactly matched by the numbers going to North America, 1.51 million per annum in the same period. Balancing these movements were net losses for Asia of 1.41 million per annum, 1.37 million for Latin America (including Mexico) and the Caribbean and 0.44 million for Africa. Within Asia, the Arabian peninsula countries of Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates received a net gain of 0.25 million per annum, and Afghanistan received 0.22 million per annum (refugees returning from Iran and Pakistan). Australia and New Zealand had a net gain of 0.14 million per annum. With a net out-migration from 2000 to 2005 of almost 800 000 per annum and remittances to the country of origin of $25 billion in 2007, Mexico stands out as the country of out-migration par excellence. China is the next largest net source of immigrants at 380 000 per annum, a relatively small number given China’s huge population. Also, given the enormous growth in its labour supply, net out-migration from India is remarkably small at 270 000 per annum. While India had some 48 million university graduates in 2004, there are shortfalls in many types of graduate in India relative to domestic demand, especially IT graduates. Other individual countries that were large sources of migrants were Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Iraq and Tajikistan in Asia; Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea in Africa; and Peru, Ecuador and the Caribbean in Latin America and the Caribbean.

International migration: Prospects The maintenance of large immigration programs in Western countries is contingent upon perceptions of the relative balance of the economic benefits of immigration against what are usually perceived to be social and environmental costs. The principal driver of immigration programs, as already described, is the perceived labour shortage in Western countries. The shortage is felt more strongly by employers, and employers are at the forefront of pro-immigration lobbying. As simply stated in a recent report by Jackson

26


and his colleagues, ‘Most business lobbies strongly support more open immigration policies, because capital benefits from an influx of labour’ (Jackson et al. 2008, p. 61). In labour-scarce economies, wages will tend to rise more rapidly, threatening the profitability of capital. If wages rise rapidly, capital is very likely to take flight to another country where wages are not so high. This phenomenon has been evident in manufacturing for the past three decades. It is, of course, inevitable that capital will move to some extent to seek lower production costs; however, if the out-flow turns into a flood, then the domestic economy is severely threatened. A balance is required and the effect of immigration on wages may be an important component of the balance. The relative shortage of workers in Western countries is a longterm phenomenon, and the economic benefits to migrants and to the country of origin from migration remain high. For these reasons, while many Western countries may prefer to be more selective and restrictive about people crossing their borders, high levels of migration are likely to continue. Concern about future labour supply and ageing of the population is particularly strong in those countries of Southern and Western Europe that have very low fertility rates (below 1.5 births per woman, the Group 2 countries listed in Table 2.1). With the exception of Switzerland, which relies heavily on immigration, all of these countries have responded to the United Nations that they are concerned about their low fertility rates and all are implementing policies to increase fertility. There is little sign of success as yet; however, even if these policies are successful, the effect will not begin to flow through to the labour supply for 20–25 years, and will not have its full effect for 40–50 years. On present trends, for the European Union as a whole, from 2005 to 2030, the number of people aged 65 and over will rise by 52 per cent while the age group 15–64 (the working ages) will fall by 7 per cent. This outcome is largely ‘locked in’, as it would take a massive and immediate rise in births to change this situation through natural increase. This is not about to happen, so Europe is faced with adjustment to the relative fall in the numbers at working ages or an increase in the number of immigrants. It is already clear that, despite widespread opposition, immigration has been the main response. While often an unpopular approach, immigration is more palatable than a sharp drop in the welfare entitlements of older people in Europe. Furthermore, the European Green Paper on future demographic challenge includes the statement


Table 2.1 Total fertility rate, EU and selected countries, 2006 Group 1 countries (Total fertility rate above 1.5)

Total fertility rate

Group 2 countries (Total fertility rate below 1.5)

Total fertility rate

United States

2.10

Switzerland

1.44

Iceland

2.08

Austria

1.40

New Zealand

1.98

Greece

1.40

France

1.98

Malta

1.39

Ireland

1.90

Spain

1.38

Norway

1.90

Portugal

1.36

Sweden

1.85

Italy

1.35

Denmark

1.85

Germany

1.33

Finland

1.84

United Kingdom

1.84

Australia

1.81

Belgium

1.74

Netherlands

1.72

Canada (2005)

1.54

Sources: Vienna Institute of Demography (2008) and national statistical offices.

that ‘never in history has there been economic growth without population growth’. While this is a debatable statement, it makes clear the underlying fear about the impact of ageing and low fertility on Europe’s future economic well-being. Again, this suggests a continuation of high levels of migration to Europe. International movements of labour are related to the state of the world economy, and a downturn in movements will occur as the world economy slows. In the longer term, however, based on labour demand only, international movements to the Western countries can be expected to be even larger than they are now. Trends in labour demand in OECD countries relative to the projected domestic supply of labour suggest that the international movement of people between countries will expand in the next half-century. One detailed study of labour force prospects in the EU-27 countries forecasts that these labour market prospects, when combined with income and lifestyle disparities between the countries of Europe and developing countries, will generate 58.5 million new migrants (net) for the European countries between 2002 and 2052 (Bijak et al. 2007). This is the mid-range projection. The same authors project that

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this number of migrants could fall to 23 million if European countries have a weak economic performance in these years, but rise to 109 million if European countries have a strong economic performance. By 2008, the level of migration was running at a level between the mid and high estimates. Interestingly, many European countries have proportions of their population born overseas that are similar to that of the United States, although the United States pre-eminently carries the image of an immigrant country. The study by Bijak and his colleagues (2007) indicates that the biggest net receivers of immigrants in rank order will be Germany, Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Spain. If the mid-range projection were to eventuate, 20 per cent of the European labour force in 2052 would consist of post-2002 immigrants and their descendants. Within Europe, only Spain (109 000 per annum) and Italy (39 000) would receive large net annual gains from other European nations. The other large European nations (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) would be net losers of population to other European nations. Movements to the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand continue to expand. Permanent and temporary inflows to the United States numbered 2 445 000 in 2007, compared with 1 650 000 in 1998. For Canada, the equivalent numbers were 509 000 in 2005 compared with 373 000 in 1998; for Australia, they were 457 000 in 2005 and 266 000 in 1998; and for New Zealand, 54 000 in 2007 and 27 000 in 1998. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, immigration to Australia rose even more sharply after these OECD data sets were published.

The debate on the economic impact of immigrants While these studies emphasise the advantages to the labour supply of immigration, the overall economic benefits of immigration are hotly disputed. A 2008 report of the Select Committee on Economic Affairs of the United Kingdom’s House of Lords (2008) states: Overall, GDP, which the Government has persistently emphasised, is an irrelevant and misleading criterion for assessing the economic impacts of immigration on the UK. The total size of an economy is not an index of prosperity. The focus of analysis should rather be on the effects of immigration on income per head of the resident population. Both theory and the available empirical evidence indicate


that these effects are small, especially in the long run when the economy fully adjusts to the increased supply of labour. In the long run, the main economic effect of immigration is to enlarge the economy, with relatively small costs and benefits for the incomes of the resident population (House of Lords 2008, Abstract).

The House of Lords report argues that there are negative externalities deriving from a larger population, such as increased congestion, excess demand for housing and negative impacts on the environment. These externalities offset what the report argues are the small gains from immigration. At the same time, the House of Lords report favours immigration to the United Kingdom of highly skilled workers. Effectively, therefore, the committee of the House of Lords is arguing that it is the productivity of the immigrants that makes the difference. Favouring of high-skilled immigrants is also evident in the European Union as a whole; in 2007, the EU announced a new Blue Card that fast tracks the entry of highly skilled immigrants. The weakness of this analysis is that it fails to give adequate attention to the need for lower skilled immigrants in wealthy countries: there are certain jobs that the domestic population will not do at the rates of pay and conditions on offer, but immigrants will. The hospital system, for example, would have to adjust to substantial increases in operating costs with impact across the economy without a substantial immigration program. The contribution of low-skilled migration to the provision of services and the production of goods at lower prices has been a defining characteristic of the American economy and a number of other industrialised countries, including Japan in recent years. Another economic argument used to support immigration is its fiscal impact: the increase in government revenue through taxation paid by immigrants. A recent Australian report by Access Economics acknowledges the value of this gain: In terms of the 2006–07 migrant intake in total, the Model estimates that, in the first year, the Commonwealth government budget will benefit by some $536 million. That level of benefit grows steadily over time, to reach $1.34 billion by Year 20, in 2007–08 prices . . . The 2006–07 intake of Temporary Business migrants numbered some 87 000. The net fiscal contribution of that whole group amounts to $1.097 billion in Year 1 (Access Economics 2008, pp. ii, iii).

30


The Australian government’s Intergenerational Report (Common wealth of Australia 2007) also shows a strong positive fiscal contribution from immigration. Unlike the Access Economics report, this analysis also takes into account the costs of immigration to the government. The House of Lords report also considers the fiscal benefits and costs of immigration: Determining whether immigrants make a positive or negative fiscal contribution is highly dependent on what costs and benefits are included in the calculations . . . While the overall fiscal impact of immigration is small, this masks significant variations across different immigrant groups [emphasis added]. Professor Rowthorn concluded that ‘the positive contribution of some immigrants is largely or wholly offset by negative contributions of others’ (House of Lords 2008, p. 41).

Other studies argue that the absolute size of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) does matter and that, where fertility has been low in the past, immigration can also make a meaningful difference to GDP per capita. The Jackson et al. (2008) study predicts that Real Gross Domestic Product will remain almost static over the next 50 years in the G7 countries that restrict immigration, while doubling in the countries that have relatively large migration programs. There is also a chance that the result will be worse than is projected in this modelling: it is entirely possible that capital will take flight from countries with static economies to those with robust growth. The Jackson et al. study is about the strategic implications of demographic change. One of the main conclusions of this report is that the United States will become much more powerful in comparison with Europe because of the relative change in the sizes of their economies—a result of their differing demographic futures. The target countries’ reluctance aside, immigration to Western countries may also falter if there is no perceived economic return to the sending countries or to the emigrants from those countries. As some of these countries become wealthier themselves, domestic demand for their labour grows and wages rise. This is especially the case if these countries have very low birth rates; South Korea is a case in point. There is also the long discussed issue of the ‘brain drain’: the loss from developing countries of those persons who might be most instrumental in future economic development. In countries with large labour surpluses, however, the World Bank argues that the benefits of emigration to sending


countries are manifest, not only in terms of lessening labour market pressures but also through the flow of money sent to relatives by those who have emigrated and the acquisition of skills which return migrants take with them. In 2007, international remittances of cash by migrants living in other countries totalled US$318 billion, more than twice the level of remittances in 2001. The net flow of remittances to all developing countries was over US$240 billion, substantially more than the total of international development aid. In 2003, for example, remittances were twice as large as the level of official aid-related flows to developing countries. Indeed, for developing countries, these private flows of income are almost as large as the total of all foreign direct investment and the flow of remittances is much less volatile. International migration research has shown that the economic gains from migration of workers into OECD countries are significant for both the OECD countries and the origin countries, even for relatively small increases in the workforce, and that relative gains are much higher for households in the origin countries than for OECD households. It is thus evident that the case for continued high levels of immigration in the long term is well made on economic grounds, but there is the prospect that levels may fall through rising levels of opposition to immigration for social reasons in many countries, especially in Europe. The 2008 report by Jackson and his colleagues concluded that, with the exceptions of Australia, Canada and Spain, ‘government policy almost everywhere is swinging back towards greater restriction’; as has been noted, in the context of mounting unemployment, immigration has been cut even in these countries. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2007), prior to the recession the public mood had shifted against immigration in a number of countries for reasons of social purity. If, as Jackson and his colleagues argue, European countries that turn their back on immigration stand to be penalised in both economic and strategic terms, this raises the question of where the limits to social purity may lie. The issue of change in the nature of Western populations through immigration is taken up in the following section.

Immigrant source countries For European, North American and Australasian countries, Table 2.2 provides a listing of the major countries of immigration. The table shows the percentage of the population that is foreign-born and the main source

32


countries of its foreign-born populations. Australia and Switzerland have the highest percentages of their populations born overseas—almost one in four persons in these two countries is born overseas. Canada and New Zealand are the other two countries with high foreign-born population percentages. While the United States carries the image of an immigrant country, the percentage of its population born overseas is little different from most European countries. The source countries of the overseas-born population vary considerably across the West. Two features stand out. First, countries have commonly received immigrants from neighbouring countries. Second, many movements reflect the colonial past of European nations, and often this is related to the fact that the source countries share a language with the destination country. Some source countries—like Turkey, China and Vietnam—do not fit these descriptions: they are main sources of immigrants for many Western countries. Most movements tend to be one way—that is, if Country B is a major source of immigrants to Country A then Country A is not a major source of immigrants to Country B. The main exceptions to this rule are the movements between Ireland and the United Kingdom, and between Australia and New Zealand. The 20 million Mexicans in the United States stand out as by far the largest interchange of population between any two countries. Migration to the United States is dominated by lower skilled immigrants from Mexico and other Latin American countries to its south, as well as from Puerto Rico and the Caribbean countries. This migration is largely uncontrolled, and most of the immigrants are undocumented, with the exception of Puerto Ricans who are US citizens. The results in Table 2.2 encapsulate the history of migration to a country over a long period of time. In contrast, Table 2.3 shows the migration in-flows to the same set of countries in 2005. This is not net migration, but the total in-flow, including temporary longterm movements. Temporary long-term migration does not include tourists and visitors but includes temporary business migration, foreign students and working holiday makers. The inclusion of temporary long-term movements increases the profile of certain countries such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. For Canada and Australia combined, the in-flow in one year is close to one million people. In comparing the source countries of the current in-flows (see Table 2.3) with the historical sources of immigrants (see Table 2.2), the


Table 2.2 S elected Western countries by the main source countries of their foreign-born populations, 2005

Destination country

% of population foreign-born, Main sources of foreign-born population in rank order 2005 (up to ten countries listed)

Australia

23.8

United Kingdom, New Zealand, Italy, China, Vietnam, India, the Philippines, Greece, Germany, South Africa

Switzerland

23.8

Italy, Former Yugoslavia, Germany, Portugal, Turkey, France, Spain, Austria

New Zealand

19.4

United Kingdom, Australia, Samoa, China, South Africa, Fiji, Netherlands, India, Tonga, Korea

Canada

19.1

United Kingdom, China, Italy, India, USA, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Poland, Germany, Portugal

Austria

13.5

Former Yugoslavia, Turkey, Germany, Former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Italy

USA

12.9

Mexico, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, India, China, El Salvador, Vietnam, Germany, Cuba, Canada

Germany

12.9*

Turkey, Italy, Poland, Former Yugoslavia, Greece

Sweden

12.4

Finland, Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Turkey, Chile

Belgium

12.1

France, Morocco, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Germany, Congo, Spain, Former Yugoslavia, Poland

Ireland

11.0

United Kingdom, USA, Nigeria, Germany, France, South Africa, Australia, Romania, China, Spain

Netherlands

10.6

Turkey, Suriname, Morocco, Indonesia, Germany, Former Yugoslavia, Belgium, United Kingdom, Former USSR, Iraq

Greece

10.3**

Albania, Germany, Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Bulgaria, Egypt, Romania, Kazakhstan, USA

United Kingdom

9.7

India, Ireland, Pakistan, Germany, Poland, Bangladesh, South Africa, USA, Kenya, Jamaica

Norway

8.2

Sweden, Denmark, Pakistan, Germany, United Kingdom, Former Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Iran, Poland, Turkey

France

8.1

Algeria, Morocco, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Tunisia, Cambodia

Portugal

6.3

Angola, France, Mozambique, Brazil, Cape Verde, Germany, Venezuela, Guinea-Bissau, Spain, Switzerland

Spain

5.3**

Morocco, Ecuador, Romania, Colombia, Argentina, Peru, China, Bulgaria

Italy

2.5**

Romania, Albania, Morocco, Ukraine, China, the Philippines, Poland, Tunisia, USA, Senegal

* 2003; ** 2001.

Sources: G ermany and Italy: Triandafyllidou & Gropas (2007); Switzerland: <www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/ themen/01/07/blank/key/01/01.html>; all others: OECD (2007).

34


Table 2.3 Inflows to Western countries of foreign population by nationality, 2005 Destination country

Total inflow in 2005

Main source countries in rank order (up to ten countries listed)

1 122 000

Mexico, India, China, Philippines, Cuba, Vietnam, Dominican Republic, Korea, Colombia, Ukraine

Spain

683 000

Romania, Morocco, United Kingdom, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Bulgaria, China

Germany

579 000

Poland, Turkey, Romania, Russia, Hungary, Italy, Serbia and Montenegro, USA, France, Ukraine

Canada

503 000

China, India, Philippines, Pakistan, USA, Colombia, United Kingdom, Korea, Iran, France

United Kingdom

474 000

Not available

Australia

457 000

United Kingdom, New Zealand, China, India, South Africa, Philippines, Malaysia. Sri Lanka, USA, Hong Kong

Italy

319 000

Romania, Albania, Morocco, Poland, Ukraine, China, USA, Brazil, Serbia and Montenegro, Tunisia

France

135 000

Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, Tunisia, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Russia, Haiti, China

Austria

102 000

Germany, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, Poland, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Italy

Switzerland

94 000

Germany, Portugal, France, Italy, Serbia and Montenegro, United Kingdom, USA, Turkey, Austria, Spain

Belgium

77 000

France, Netherlands, Morocco, Poland, Turkey, Germany, Italy, USA, Romania, United Kingdom

Netherlands

63 000

Germany, Poland, United Kingdom, Turkey, China, USA, Morocco, France, Belgium, Italy

New Zealand

54 000

United Kingdom, China, South Africa, India, Samoa, Fiji, USA, Korea, Tonga, Philippines

Sweden

51 000

Denmark, Poland, Iraq, Finland, Norway, Thailand, Germany, China, Somalia, Turkey

Ireland

51 000

United Kingdom, USA

Norway

31 000

Poland, Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Iraq, Russia, Thailand, Somalia, United Kingdom, Philippines

Portugal

28 000

Brazil, Cape Verde, Moldova, Ukraine, Angola, GuineaBissau, United Kingdom, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Russia

USA

Source: OECD (2007).


strongest impression is one of little change. Within each destination country, the main source countries for the 2005 in-flows were largely the same as the main source countries of immigration over the past halfcentury. Neighbouring countries continue to be sources of immigrants. A common language between the destination country and the source country is probably an even more important feature of the 2005 movement compared with the historical movement. The nature of the labour market has changed, demanding higher skill levels of immigrants, and one of those skills is the capacity to speak the language of the destination country. For illegal immigrants, it may also be an advantage to speak the destination country’s language in order to avoid detection more effectively. This comparison shows divergence of the Australian experience from these patterns. This reflects the extent of change discussed at the outset of this book and constitutes Australia’s immigration revolution: in terms of European representation in the top ten source countries, other than the United Kingdom, there has been a marked divergence—in Australia (as in Canada), Asian countries are now much more prominent sources of immigrants than was the case in the past; there is a significant inflow of non-English speaking national groups; Indonesia, Australia’s most populous neighbour, contributes very little to the immigration intake; and there has been relatively little illegal immigration. In social terms, the conclusion from this analysis is that most immigrants enter countries with which they are relatively familiar. Within Europe, immigrant steams come from neighbouring countries or from countries that speak the same language as the destination country. Given that language is an important determinant in the transfer of culture, cultural differences between immigrants and the residents of the host country are smaller than they would otherwise be. Some countries emerge as exporters of migrants to many destination countries. The Philippines is the quintessential example: young people in the Philippines are trained to be migrants. It is rare for ethnic unrest in any destination country to involve immigrants from the Philippines, so the training of migrants appears to be successful. Migration from China provides much the same story: integration in the many destination countries is relatively smooth, although language problems in the first generation can be significant. Destination societies may also adjust to the immigrants when immigrants come from the same country over a long period of time. The United States adjusting to cultures from its

36


south would be the leading example: that one recent US president spoke Spanish was seen to be one of his few redeeming features. Religion of the immigrants may be a more threatening characteristic than any other characteristic. This possibility is taken up elsewhere in the book.

Beware of simple answers This chapter has discussed the unprecedented population movement in the first years of the twentieth century, fuelled by labour demand in the industrialised economies and the disparities of wealth and lifestyles which produce emigration. Countries which were traditional exporters of population have emerged as significant importers. There are a number of distinct streams, including those differentiated by level of skill. Increasing levels of education, the ease of travel and communication, responsive immigration policies, the interlinked economies and the many other facets of globalisation all facilitate the movement of skilled workers. The attractions also operate to entice the displaced and unskilled, while leaving them with major problems to overcome if they are to establish themselves, often with the added burden of overcoming the disadvantage of entry as asylum seekers or as illegal or undocumented workers. The value of migration to the sending and receiving countries is an ever-contested subject, incapable of simple or definitive resolution. This is a function of the complexity of the issues, of the multiple vantage points from which questions related to the value of migration may be framed. Discussion concerned with the receiving country may focus on a spectrum ranging from short- to long-term impact, be concerned with immigrants as workers, consumers, taxpayers or bearers of children, on direct and indirect costs, on immigration considered in the abstract, and with reference to one or more specific group or groups. Whatever the conclusions, the reality is that, for governments focused on the short term, immigration remains the most cost-effective and responsive solution to labour demand. The most likely outcome following recovery from the recession is that immigration will continue at high levels.

3

Immigration and the nation state Immigration and the nation state

The origins of the nation state Australia is one of a small number of states which have built their society principally through immigration by individuals and groups, and by the importation of ideas, values and practices from elsewhere. Its political system, political parties, religions, trade unions, beliefs, values and of course language, have all come from elsewhere over the past two centuries. In the process, they have been amended and redeveloped to suit local conditions. But Australia has been constantly in touch with other English-speaking societies, in relationships which have often been ‘triangular’ (Britain, Australia, North America) rather than simply direct. The Constitution of 1901 is clear evidence of this, with its British parliamentary structures, its American federalism and terminology, and its basis in English common law and legislation. It was created by political leaders who were brought up in British colonial traditions, many of whom were born elsewhere. Continental European influence on Australia’s institutional development has been negligible: the Scottish Enlightenment has had more effect than the French Revolution and the reforming influence of Gladstonian liberalism and Protestant nonconformity more persistent than that of Marxism or Catholicism. This inheritance has been modified over the past 50 years, but remains 37

38


only slightly influenced by its near neighbours in Asia. The JudeoChristian ethic and the Enlightenment notwithstanding, Australians persist in shaping their political and social ideas under the influence of the English-speaking world. Among these formative ideas was the notion put forward by the British political philosopher John Stuart Mill in the 1860s that a stable and democratic political system was best achieved in an ethnically homogenous society based on common secular and religious principles. This concept is still repeated in Australia and elsewhere as an argument for ethnic uniformity. Such uniformity did not actually exist in Mills’ nineteenth-century England, but the idea of a common ‘British’ nationality was already overriding the quite different traditions and languages of Ireland, Scotland and Wales. This British liberalism was the dominant ideology of colonial and post-colonial Australia from the 1850s until at least the 1920s. Public policy during that period was directed towards creating a ‘nation for a continent and a continent for a nation’. This nation would be British, English speaking and white, with such uniformity forming the solid basis for national unity over vast distances, within a democratic framework based on universal suffrage and contested elections. These liberal notions, which saw Aboriginal people pushed to the margins and non-white immigrants excluded, were taken up with great enthusiasm by the newly formed labour movement after 1890, many of whose founders were British immigrants already committed to liberalism and religious nonconformity. While local politics were often fierce and rough, there was a general consensus on what sort of society was wanted, and it changed very little for a century. Consensus was sustained by the imperial power of the United Kingdom, which created a strong sense of patriotism, reinforced by victory in both world wars with Australia as an enthusiastic ally. During this time, in Australia and the United Kingdom political instability was often blamed on ethnic diversity, as Mill had argued. In contrast with the extent of ethnic uniformity in Australia, the United States included a very large Afro-American population descended from slaves and excluded from political influence in many American states. Great effort went into building an American nation state in one of the most multicultural democratic societies on earth, which had added many millions of Europeans and Hispanics through immigration, and smaller numbers from Asia once restrictions were lifted in the second half of the twentieth century. One consequence of American

Immigration and the nation state 39

diversity has been that most academic studies of ethnic relationships have come from the United States, and have strongly influenced countries like Australia—where they are arguably not very relevant. The clash between multinational imperialism in Russia, Austria, Turkey and Germany eventually led to the collapse of all their empires and the creation of smaller and often unstable nation states of Poles, Czechs, Slavs, Arabs and Hungarians. They, in turn, included minorities other than the dominant nation, most controversially large Jewish populations. As other empires dissolved, including the British, more and more nation states were created, most of them also including ethnic minorities. Today there are well over 200 nation states. With very few exceptions, such as Japan and Iceland, all of these have significant ethnic minorities. Until the 1950s, Australia included itself in the exceptional few, ignoring the existence of its Indigenous minority of less than 2 per cent of the population. The creation of uniform nation states out of these new and often varied societies frequently involved the suppression of ethnic differences, minority languages, allegiances and religions. The most extreme example among developed states was in Nazi Germany, where the Nuremburg laws of 1935 defined German nationals as excluding Jews, who had lived in Germany and become assimilated in most respects since the Middle Ages. This example was horrendously extended with mass extermination throughout conquered Europe between 1940 and 1945. While few states deliberately followed it, nationalists revived the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as recently as the Yugoslav civil war of 1995. Turkey and Greece had already ‘cleansed’ their respective states of each other in 1922, with over one million Greeks removed from Asia Minor and half that number of Turks from Thrace and Macedonia. Going well beyond John Stuart Mill (who would probably have been horrified), Europeans defined a stable state as based on one people. All others should either leave or assimilate, or be removed or be killed. In practice, after the enthusiasm of nationalism abated, ethnic minorities remained. Some were sufficiently tolerated as to take part in politics through minority nationalist parties. Such parties became central to the politics of Ireland, Belgium, Canada, South Africa, India and, after a long delay, Scotland and Wales. However, Australia remained distinctive. Through its control over immigration, it simply excluded those likely to form minorities and denied political rights to the only long-standing minority, the Aborigines. National minority parties did

40


not develop in the United States either, where the Afro-Americans were largely disfranchised or had been subsumed within the two-party system. When immigration to America from poorer parts of Europe seemed to threaten Anglo-American hegemony, strict limitations were enforced between 1925 and 1986. These did not apply to Hispanic and Latin Americans, who now form the largest minority in the United States, but who have not formed a distinct political party (US Census Bureau 2007).

Homogenising the nation state Various methods have been devised to turn multi-ethnic societies into nation states. The Australian approach was the easiest because of its great distance from desired sources of immigrants and the absence of land borders. Non-British immigration was kept to a minimum by restrictions and expense, and made impossible for non-Europeans. Other states had more serious problems. The United Kingdom had never officially regarded itself as a nation state on the European model. It was a ‘union’ of four societies, one of which defected with violence to form the Irish Free State. It extended the title of ‘British subject’ to everyone born in its empire, including Australians. This created few problems, as most Commonwealth citizens coming to Britain before 1945 were either of British descent or were students or other transitory professionals. Non-British were controlled by the 1905 Aliens Act, which was passed after agitation against a large influx of Jewish refugees from the Tsarist empire into East London. Other European aliens were allowed in, subject to the issue of a work permit. Until the 1960s, many more people emigrated from the British Isles than entered for settlement. Despite this British liberalism, there were consistent attempts to impose uniformity, the Irish question aside. The Celtic languages of Welsh and Gaelic were discouraged within the school systems. There were no legislative institutions for Scotland and Wales, although Scottish law was distinct. Northern Ireland had its own government, which imposed discrimination on its Catholic minority until the whole system exploded in violence in 1969. In continental Europe, the idea of the nation state was much more strongly imposed after 1918, especially by fascist and conservative parties controlling a growing number of dictatorships in the 1930s. France rigidly sustained the idea of a uniform civil society in which all French citizens enjoyed the same democratic


rights. However, it required a high level of assimilation, including the denial of minority languages such as Breton. Language suppression was, indeed, quite common throughout Europe, and language preservation therefore became important to European migrants who came to Australia after 1945. A particular feature of European nationalism, which eventually caused the outbreak of war in 1939, was irredentism: the claim on fellow countrymen living within a neighbouring state. This was especially an issue for Sudeten and Silesian Germans living in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Hitler claimed they were persecuted by the Slavs, whom the Nazis regarded as inferior people. At the close of World War II, Europe inherited contradictory policies and attitudes. Racism in the Nazi sense was discredited and no democratic government would countenance it. Yet the nation state was still in existence and, due to irredentism and ethnic cleansing, it was often more uniform than in 1939. Few Jews were left in Poland, Germany or Hungary; few Germans were left in Poland, Yugoslavia or Czechos lovakia, which had expelled them. Millions of displaced persons in camps were gradually dispersed by United Nations agencies, with 170 000 of them coming to Australia. A variety of ethnic minorities still lived in Eastern Europe, but they were under communist and Soviet control, which theoretically granted them equality in multinational states like the Soviet Union. That this equality was artificial was not clear until the 1990s when both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia broke into their component parts. Each one was based on a distinct nationality, and in Yugoslavia there was a return to ethnic cleansing and massacres. Movement was tightly controlled within the Soviet bloc, and there was very little immigration to change the ethnic balance.

Multinationalism and mass immigration The last 40 years have seen different and even opposite trends in mass migration across borders. First, the number of borders has greatly increased, as each new nation state has set up controls on who arrives, leaves and remains. These often include visa systems which raise money while controlling movement. Second, lack of economic viability has forced large numbers to move to more prosperous states than their own, often upsetting the ethnic balance or creating hostility from those who identify with the ‘invaded’ state. Third, many of those seeking work or better conditions have chosen to move to the former imperial

42


states, where wealth has increased as colonies were divested. A common language is often an important factor in such movement, as the imperial language was taught in colonial schools. Fourth, the less skilled and secure inhabitants of the former colonial powers have deeply resented the arrival of outsiders, especially those they have been brought up to regard as inferior. Fifth, political instability and violence have forced many in former colonies to flee to safe havens such as refugee camps and to attempt to move on to developed states which have signed the United Nations Refugee Convention of 1951 and the protocol of 1967, extending its application to the entire world. Sixth, rapid changes in the technology of transport and communications have made all these movements much easier—at least to the point when they come up against a well-controlled border. Finally, the demand for unskilled labour, preferably with few rights, continues in developed societies and gives an incentive for industry to pressure government to relax restrictions. While all these factors were creating mass movements from the poor ‘South’ to the rich ‘North’, the nation states of the ‘North’ were cooperating with each other to dismantle many of the controls and restrictions which economic nationalism had created between them. As globalisation advanced, transfers of investment, technology and labour become essential for large corporations. The most important consequence of this trend has been the creation and expansion of the European Union. Designed to end the century of hostility between Germany and France, it has now extended into the former Soviet bloc and is only prevented from covering the whole of Europe by the need to democratise and stabilise the former Yugoslavia. Britain, with considerable reluctance, eventually submerged its identity within Europe, leaving the British Commonwealth as the palest shadow of the British empire. Free movement of capital, industry and information within the European Union also implied free movement of labour and employment at comparable wages and conditions, eventually consolidated by the Schengen agreements of 1985 and 1990. Border controls between states were withdrawn, although Britain and Ireland did not fully comply. One consequence for Australia was that immigration from Europe (other than Yugoslavia) dried up, having already been undermined by changes to restrictive American laws in 1968. British migration to Australia has recently recovered from a low of 10 per cent of the total, but mainly on the basis of temporary 457 visas and the working holiday


scheme. Most of these will not be permanent settlers, as the British had been for two centuries. The abolition of border controls and the introduction of free movement for EU citizens has been a remarkable achievement in the face of racism and the lingering ideal of the nation state, once so firmly entrenched in Europe. While the United Kingdom and Ireland continued for a period to restrict movement, they were among the most liberal towards the entry of new accessions to the EU in 2004. Hundreds of thousands of Poles have arrived in Britain and Ireland, far more than the UK Home Office predicted. The United Kingdom changed its policy in 2007 as a result, to exclude Bulgarians and Romanians. A further problem of the opening to the east has been the movement of many thousands of Roma (gypsies) out of Romania and Slovakia, a trend which could escalate further if the former Yugoslav states are admitted. As with all immigration policy everywhere, there are some people who are not welcome, however liberal the general rules. Another problem was the status of former colonial subjects, whose access to Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands had previously been fairly generous, but who had no counterparts elsewhere in Europe. A final problem—yet to be resolved—is presented by Turkey, a Muslim country with a very large population, a tradition of emigration to Central Europe and an uncertain democratic tradition.

Political reactions The Schengen agreements assumed, falsely, that there was equal protection of the common border. But Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy were receiving large numbers of immigrants from North and East Africa and Albania who were not eligible to settle in the Schengen region, but could move from state to state within it because of the abolition of border control. Most Schengen countries, then, faced an influx not just from their fellow EU members but also from sources which were far from popular. As all members also subscribed to the UN Refugee Convention, this influx was exacerbated by the arrivals from collapsing states in the Balkans and Africa. A noteworthy consequence has been the rise of racist parties in many countries on the basis of opposing immigration from these sources. These have upset the normal political balance in Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland (not a Schengen adherent), and added

44


support to long-established parties in France and Britain. Switzerland, which attracted many refugees but did not offer them citizenship, saw a nationalist party become the largest in national elections. France had a long tradition of extreme nationalism through the National Front and it gained additional support. The small British National Party, which made little progress in national elections, campaigned equally against the newer arrivals from Africa and the long-established settlers and native-born British Muslims from Pakistan and Bangladesh. In Australia, anti-immigration sentiment was channelled by Pauline Hanson and her One Nation Party. Its greatest strength was in Queensland, where at its peak in the 1998 state election it won 22.7 per cent of the vote; in national elections it won 8.4 per cent in 1998 and 4.3 per cent in 2001. The political reaction is summarised in Table 3.1. Table 3.1 E lectoral support for anti-immigration parties in Europe and Australasia, 1998–2003 State

Party/Leader

Vote (%)

Year of election

Switzerland

Swiss Peoples Party

26.6

2003*

Netherlands

Pim Fortuyn

17.0

2002*

France

Front Nationale

16.9

2002 (presidential)

Italy

Liga Nord/AN

15.9

2002*

Norway

Progress Party

14.7

2001*

Denmark

Danish PP(DF)

12.0

2001*

Austria

FPO

10.2

2002*

Belgium

Vlaams Blok

9.9

1999

Australia

One Nation

8.4

1998

New Zealand

NZ First

4.5

1999

Germany

NPD/REP/DVU

3.3

1998

Sweden

National Democrats

1.4

2002

United Kingdom

British National Party

0.2

2001

Election years marked * means party entered government. Sources: D erived by the author from various sources; for further information see World Elections at and links in Wikipedia entries for individual parties and leaders.

The European situation suggests that the nation state has lost its appeal to the controlling elites, but still finds support among sections of the masses. The same might be argued for support and opposition to multiculturalism in Australia. Indeed, this was argued by critics such as Katharine Betts in her 1999 book The Great Divide and by less sophisticated contributors to the Murdoch press and on talkback radio.


There is no possibility of Australia joining or initiating anything comparable to Schengen, for political reasons if no other. However, prior to the onset of the global financial crisis, the temporary labour visa (subclass 457) was greatly extended and a guest worker system to benefit Pacific Islanders was introduced. As has been discussed, these were both major departures from the long tradition that settlement in Australia is permanent (although it was never the intention of many immigrants to stay for the rest of their lives). The United States, too, is following contradictory policies of free trade and capital transfer with Mexico, while at the same time building guarded fences along the Mexican border. All liberalisation systems thus contain devices to keep out those who are not wanted, while making it easier for those who are. This is rarely stated as crudely as was the ‘White Australia’ policy, but often also involves obscuring the true intent. The immigration policies of most developed states, other than Japan, have several objectives in common: to overcome labour shortages due to below-replacement birthrates; to fill gaps in the rural labour force in particular; to maintain many service industries such as health, welfare, tourism and catering which are unattractive to the local workforce because they are poorly paid; to avoid public concern about an influx of poorer and uneducated immigrants who will want to remain; to ensure social harmony by limiting the settlement of elements regarded as unacceptable by public opinion; to provide minimal social support and training necessary to maintain an efficient workforce; and to sustain a flexible workforce which may be dispensed with during economic fluctuations. Balancing these objectives involves a great deal of political skill, especially when combined with obligations to accept refugees and to sustain a regular flow of profitable students, tourists and business migrants. Australia’s distance from the major centres of developed economies and democratic societies, and its proximity to densely populated developing areas of the world, just add further sensitivities.

Economic viability and cultural anxiety Immigration, then, is welcomed for economic reasons but causes anxieties for cultural reasons. It remains a combustible phenomenon which politicians are either afraid to face or tempted to recruit for their own interests. In good economic times, the perceived threat has been seen in terms of changes to neighbourhoods, to comfortable ways of life and to social

46


security, although with the onset of recession the threat to jobs—an almost universal issue a century ago—is being revived. Fear of cheap labour is a concern voiced by some trade unions, in a context in which trade union membership and political influence have declined in most industrialised countries. The political response to immigration varies in all developed societies, being most liberal in the Scandinavian states and Canada. As economic and refugee migration ebbs and flows, so does public policy in the receiving countries. Very few resort to mass deportations, but many restrict entry and the rights of those who have succeeded in getting in anyway. Some, like Australia and Britain, follow uncertain and even illogical policies: they encourage preferred kinds of immigration, which may include unskilled as well as skilled and professional intakes if the labour market requires this. They may even provide settlement services, family reunion and easy naturalisation. But then a backlash in public opinion sets in when large numbers of unacceptable people seem to be arriving. In response, governments erect barriers, tighten entry conditions, extend waiting periods, amend citizenship laws and treat rising public hostility with caution for fear of its escalation. Nation states, then, can act in contradictory ways. They can be quite liberal towards minorities, as Canada, Britain, Australia and Scandinavia have been over the past 30 years. At the same time, their politics may be swayed by anti-immigrant or xenophobic reactions. They may change their laws in the direction of making it harder to arrive and becoming less welcoming to those who will not rapidly assimilate. States like Denmark and the Netherlands may shift towards conservatism, while others like Germany may become less restrictive in their definition of German citizenship. These often unpredictable changes have become especially acute in the context of Islamic revivalism and militancy and the presence of larger Muslim populations in the West. While most developed societies were secular, or at least declining in their Christian adherence, they had become tolerant towards a variety of religions which did not directly touch on their way of life. The prohibitions of the churches on moral and sexual behaviour were increasingly ignored and the pronouncements of religious leaders ceased to influence public debate very much. In this sense, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism was alien, while marginal. It imposed itself from 2001 in an unacceptable and violent way that was quite foreign to settled democracies. In doing so, it challenged the


liberalism of approaches like multiculturalism and did great damage to the prospects of Muslim immigrants being able to gain acceptance and tolerance as others had done in the past. The crucial era for these developments was in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Two factors impacted on public policy—the terrorist attacks on civilians in Western societies and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which led to waves of asylum seekers. These crisis issues ran alongside a continuing exodus from Africa and increased emigration from former communist countries, both continuously important from the 1990s, escalating with the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The main effect of these conjunctures was felt in the EU and the neighbours of the two wars, Pakistan, Syria and Iran. Fleeing Yugoslavs made for Germany in such large numbers that it became the largest recipient of asylum seekers in the Western world, forcing it to change the law which had previously given sanctuary to all refugees—who were mainly fleeing communism when the abandoned law was originally passed. African refugees and economic migrants made for France, Italy, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Britain. All these movements were towards safer and richer countries than those of origin. The other major movement—from Mexico and Latin America into the United States—also affected the international debate on immigration policy but was not replicated elsewhere except within some Latin American cases such as from Bolivia and Paraguay into Argentina. All of these escalating movements predictably sparked political reactions. That they did so in Australia was less understandable. Australia was a minor target for escapees from Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, many of them seeking to join close relatives already in the country. It had previously had a liberalised Special Assistance program, mainly useful to Yugoslavs with Australian sponsors. The Howard government abolished this and kept the number of refugees to such a low level it scarcely met even the modest demands of the UN Convention. In its last three years, it directed the refugee intake to Africa, a move which was seen to cause unacceptable settlement problems and which led to a lowering of the African intake in 2007. The response of European Union states varied and the political reaction was an important factor in policy change. When Germany changed its policy in 1992 (in the context of 438 190 asylum applications lodged during the year), the waves of asylum seekers moved towards Britain and other European countries. Many Africans also came to

48


Britain because of their previous connections with the British empire. The imperial tradition was also important for France, Italy and Portugal. The Scandinavian countries continued their liberal policy towards refugees until numbers became too high for public toleration, leading to political changes in Denmark and Norway, though not in Sweden. Table 3.2 Asylum applications to developed states, 1995–2001 1995 Germany

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

127 940 116 370 104 350

2001

Total

98 640

95 110

78 560

88 290 709 260

United Kingdom

55 000

37 000

41 500

58 490

91 200

98 900

91 600 473 690

Netherlands

29 260

22 170

34 440

45 220

42 730

43 900

32 580 205 080

France

20 420

17 410

21 420

22 380

30 910

38 750

47 290 198 580

Belgium

11 420

12 430

11 790

21 970

35 780

42 690

24 550 160 630

Austria

5920

6990

6720

13 810

20 100

18 280

30 140 101 960

Sweden

9050

5750

9660

12 840

11 230

16 300

23 520

88 350

Italy

1730

680

1860

11 120

33 360

15 560

9620

73 930

Australia

7630

9760

9310

8160

9450

13 070

12 370

69 750

Denmark

5100

5890

5090

9370

12 330

12 200

12 400

62 380

Norway

1460

1780

2270

8370

10 160

10 840

14 780

49 660

Spain

5680

4730

4980

6650

8410

7930

9490

47 870

Ireland

420

1180

3880

4630

7720

11 100

10 320

39 250

Greece

1310

1640

4380

2950

1530

3090

5500

20 400

680

1320

1500

1970

1530

1550

1600

10 150

New Zealand

Source: UNHCR, ‘Asylum applications submitted in 30 industrialised countries, 1992–2001’.

What followed in Australia seems, in retrospect, to be out of all proportion when compared with the European situation. Between 1995 and 2001, Australia received 69 750 applications for asylum. States with smaller populations in Europe over the same period received 205 080 (Netherlands), 160 630 (Belgium), 101 960 (Austria) and 88 350 (Sweden). The United Kingdom, with three times the population, received seven times as many applications (see Table 3.2). Apart from the very modest humanitarian settlement program, which remained unchanged between 1996 and 2004, unlawful asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat were subjected to increasingly draconian treatment, culminating in 2001 in the ‘Pacific Solution’, which included detention on Nauru and Manus Island, both remote Pacific islands from which escape was impossible. Many were detained in these two places for


years, as were those sent to custom-built internment centres in remote mainland locations, including Port Hedland, Woomera and Baxter (South Australia). These were managed by private prison corporations and attracted much critical comment in Australia and overseas. Essentially, the Australian government decided to take as few asylum seekers as possible, to subject them to internment and potential deportation, and then to give them only temporary protection with limited rights of travel and no right to family reunion. The ‘Pacific Solution’ became part of the political debate, with the Coalition government stressing border protection while increasing numbers of critics highlighted deprivation of human rights. Nearly all those interned under the ‘Pacific Solution’ were Muslims from Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran who had arrived by boat. Arrivals by air, who needed visas issued overseas, were not normally interned. As in other democratic situations, the major opposition parties reacted with timidity until eventually Labor won government in 2007. In 2008 it abolished mandatory detention except for those deemed to be a ‘threat’, along with the temporary protection visas for asylum seekers and long-term detention, especially for women and children. These changes enabled those found to be in genuine need of asylum to be provided with permanent residence, access to English language programs, employment and income assistance, and travel rights. It marked the end of an increasingly controversial era in which Australia’s reputation for responsible immigration management was marred by an obsession with asylum seekers arriving unvisaed by boat, who represented only a minority of all asylum seekers—or so it seemed, until a further round of heated political disputation and front-page headlines sparked by a small number of boat arrivals in April 2009 led to renewed focus on people smuggling and alleged queue jumping. Why is Australia so alarmed by small numbers of seaborne asylum seekers, when other countries deal with ten or twenty times as many land arrivals? Essentially, as in many other democracies, opposition to sudden and uncontrolled flows created a political backlash. But there is also something distinctive in the extreme Australian response, a function of its small population and historic sense of being a British and European outpost in a hostile Asian region. As David Marr observed in April 2009: ‘Perhaps we are still gripped by old nightmares of flotillas of boats invading from the north’ (The Age, 18 April 2009). A simple explanatory formula might take into account the following political factors and public perceptions. Its elements comprise:

50


• the challenge to national sovereignty—the sense that the nation was being ‘invaded’ or ‘flooded’ by aliens, by unknown and unpredictable people; • the framing of ‘illegal’ and uncontrolled entry, distinguished from an orderly migration program—the notion of an ‘orderly queue’ and its subversion; • political expediency and the electoral appeal of border protection in times of terrorism; • the demonisation of Muslims as a consequence of terrorism; and • entrenched Australian fears, built on a sense of isolation from similar affluent democratic societies. The issue of the draconian treatment of asylum seekers, including women and children, gradually became part of a broader debate involving national identity, citizenship, religion, defence and a whole range of questions which had little to do directly with the relatively modest problem that had occupied Australian public debate for a decade.

Australia


4

Immigration policy Immigration policy

Humans arrived in Australia some 60 000 years ago. The Indigenous Australians then spread across the land mass even to the far reaches of Tasmania. Remarkably, it took another 60 000 years for the next major immigration of people into Australia to occur, the result of the British government’s decision to establish a penal settlement at Sydney Cove. About 80 000 convicts were transported to New South Wales from 1788–1840, a number almost matched by the 61 000 free immigrants who arrived, mainly in family groups, in the short period from 1836 to 1842. By 1850, the number of free immigrants who had arrived in New South Wales exceeded the number of transported convicts by about 50 per cent. In Tasmania (Van Diemen’s Land), the other place of early settlement, the number of free immigrants arriving prior to 1850 was only about 30 per cent of the number of transported convicts. The convicts were mainly petty criminals from the urban slums and the free immigrants were mainly agricultural labourers fleeing poor conditions. In order to balance the sex ratio, single women were recruited as immigrants and many of these came from Ireland. Australia was transformed by the 1850s’ gold rush. Over one million people arrived in Australia during the decade, and the population trebled between 1850 and 1860. While much of this growth occurred on the goldfields of Victoria, all of the Australian colonies grew. The 53

54


new arrivals came from many countries, including large numbers from China; by 1861, however, only 8 per cent of the population of Victoria originated outside Australia and the British Isles. In the 40 years from 1861 to 1900, around 830 000 immigrants arrived in the Australian colonies from the United Kingdom. About half of these came on assisted passages provided by the various colonial governments, principally Queensland. The peak periods of arrival were 1861–65 (mainly to Victoria) and 1876–90 (mainly to Victoria and Queensland). The latter movement included many labourers intended for work in the burgeoning mining industry. At Federation in 1901, less than 5 per cent of the Australian population had its origins outside Australia and the British Isles. Aside from brief surges in immigration immediately before and after World War I, levels of immigration to Australia were low from 1890 to 1947, and the proportion born in non-English speaking countries continued to fall. Only 2 per cent of the population in 1947 had origins outside of Australia, New Zealand and the British Isles. In 1948, the Leader of the Opposition, Robert Menzies, declared himself—and, by implication, his country—to be ‘British to the bootstraps’. However, World War II was a watershed in Australian population history. Population projections made soon after the war suggested that Australia’s population would rise from 7.7 million in 1950, peak at 8.2 million in 1980 and then fall to 8 million by the year 2000. For the postwar reconstructionists in power at the time, this scenario was unacceptable. A small population meant a small economy, which would leave Australia vulnerable in a precarious political and economic world. The rationale of postwar policy became one of populate or perish. As early as August 1945, Arthur Calwell, the recently appointed and first Minister for Immigration in the Australian Parliament, produced a policy paper on immigration and the highly successful postwar migration scheme was set in train. The refugee camps in Europe provided a ready source of immigrants to Australia, and it was immediately possible to ramp up the levels of entry to record levels: net migration of 149 000 in 1949 and 154 000 in 1950 (see Figure 4.1). From 1949 to 1960, net migration averaged 95 000 per annum. By 1971, the composition of the population had changed, with a new emphasis on immigrants from all regions of Europe (see Table 4.1). While the movement to Australia of people from the British Isles was also very significant in this period, the entry of one million people from

Immigration policy 55

Figure 4.1 Net overseas migration, Australia, 1947–2007 200 000 180 000 160 000 140 000 120 000 100 000 80 000 60 000 40 000 20 000

07

04

20

01

20

98

20

95

19

92

19

89

19

86

19

83

19

80

19

77

19

74

19

71

19

68

19

65

19

62

19

59

19

56

19

53

19

50

19

19

19

47

0

Source: ABS, Australian Historical Population Statistics (continually updated ABS webpage).

other parts of Europe changed the face of Australia irrevocably. The main source countries in rank order were Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Germany and the Netherlands. Two aspects of this migration were notable. First, the new immigrants settled primarily in the large cities—particularly in Sydney and Melbourne. Melbourne gained a Southern European character that it has never lost. Second, the migrants came from a large number of European countries such that no one country was in any way dominant in the movement. This served to begin the change in the character of Australia in a way that was gradual and less threatening to those of British origin. While the source countries of immigrants have Table 4.1 A ustralia, overseas-born population from regions of Europe, 1947, 1961 and 1971 Region of Europe British Isles

1947

1961

1971

543 000

758 000

1 089 000

Northern Europe

32 000

259 000

272 000

Eastern Europe

24 000

228 000

309 000

Southern Europe

53 000

361 000

541 000

Source: Price in Vamplew (1987), pp. 8–9.

56


changed across time, this approach has continued to be a hallmark of Australian immigration to the present day. Migration levels dropped in the early 1960s during an economic downturn. Thereafter, a new pattern of movement emerged in which migration levels are high in good economic times (1964–71, 1980–82, 1985–90 and 1995–2007) and low in the years following recessions (1961–63, 1972–79, 1983–84 and 1992–94). This can be seen in Figure 4.1. The contrast was most notable in the late 1980s when net migration rose to a then-record level in 1988 but rocketed downwards following the recession that began in 1990. Many of the immigrants who arrived in the late 1980s were not able to find jobs for several years as a result of the recession. The effect of this experience was a shift in policy; since then, emphasis has been placed upon the skill level of the potential immigrant, measured by a points system. Points are awarded for qualifications, work experience, age and English proficiency. A further shift in policy allowed large-scale temporary migration as a more flexible way to deal with labour demand shortages. From 1971 to 2006, the number of Australians born in the British Isles and other parts of Europe hardly changed at all while the numbers born in other parts of the world expanded dramatically. While these figures do not include the second and third generations with British or European origin, the Asianisation of migration to Australia after 1971 is very notable. In this period, the number born in Asia expanded by 1.33 million. By 2006, there were 1.49 million persons living in Australia who had been born in Asia, almost 30 per cent more than the number born in the British Isles. The individual countries that stand out in this migration from Asia are, in rank order, China, Vietnam, India, the Philippines and Malaysia. Between 1971 and 2006, the numbers from Asia grew by almost ten times, from Africa by more than four times, from both Latin America and the Pacific by more than seven times and from New Zealand by more than five times. After 1971, immigrants began to come to Australia from almost all of the countries of the world. The diversity of the intake has lessened the number of large immigrant communities, facilitating a gradual and relatively smooth cultural adjustment. In 1971, 20.2 per cent of the population had been born overseas. This had risen to 23.8 per cent by 2006. Between 1945 and 2000, immigrants and their descendants contributed an additional 7 million people to Australia’s population. By comparison, the postwar Baby


Table 4.2 Australia, overseas-born population, 1971 and 2006 Region British Isles Other Europe

1971

2006

1 089 000

1 169 000

1 122 000

1 085 000

West Asia(b)

46 000

208 000

South Asia

45 000

266 000

East Asia

30 000

418 000

Southeast Asia

33 000

594 000

Africa

62 000

267 000

USA and Canada

43 000

100 000

Latin America(c)

13 000

93 000

Pacific

16 000

117 000

New Zealand

80 000

418 000

(a)

TOTAL OVERSEAS Australia-born

2 579 000

4 735 000

10 177 000

15 122 000

(a) Includes Central Asia (20 000 in 2006) (b) Includes Turkey (30 000 in 2006) (c) Includes the Caribbean countries Sources: 1 971: Price in Vamplew (1987); 2006: derived by the author from 2006 Census tables. In 2006, 1.38 million people with country of birth not stated have been distributed evenly across the stated categories.

Boom added about 4.2 million. The postwar reconstruction planners would have been well pleased with this result. Since 1788, about 32 million people have lived in Australia; of these, 22 million—or 69 per cent—were born in Australia and 10 million—or 31 per cent—immigrated to Australia on a permanent or long-term basis.

Who counts as a migrant? The question of who is counted as a migrant to Australia is equivalent to the question of who counts in the official population of Australia. Up until 30 June 1971, the official count of the Australian population referred to any person in Australia at the time the count was made, no matter how temporary their stay in the country was. Thus, up to this date, net migration to Australia (as shown in Figure 4.1) was measured as the excess of arrivals in Australia over departures from Australia in a given period. This approach to measurement became untenable as the numbers moving in and out of Australia for short periods for business or tourism expanded. For example, if the number of tourists was rising by 10 per cent per annum, 10 per cent of tourists would be

58


added to the count of the Australian population, and hence they would be counted as immigrants. After 1 July 1971, the concept of who should be counted as part of the Australian population was changed to those who were in Australia on a permanent or long-term basis, where long-term was defined as at least twelve months. From that date until 30 June 2006, net migration was estimated from the intended lengths of stays in Australia and the intended lengths of absences from Australia as stated on passenger cards. Movements of fewer than twelve-months’ duration were ignored in the calculation of net overseas migration. This approach was fine so long as people did not change their mind after they had moved about how long they would be in or out of Australia. Those who did change their mind were referred to as ‘category jumpers’ so long as the change in mind changed the duration of the move to under or over twelve months. To correct for this, the ABS made estimates of the number of category jumpers. The data in Figure 4.1 from 1972 to 2005 is based on this approach to measurement. The measurement of net overseas migration changed again from 1 July 2006, when it became no longer possible to make reliable estimates of the extent of category jumping. This situation was brought on by the huge increase in movements into and out of the country of long-term temporary residents, especially overseas students and long-term temporary business migrants. Students in Australia undergoing a three-year course would, for example, report themselves correctly as long-term arrivals each time they arrived in Australia but as short-term departures each time they left for a visit to their home country. Under the new and current system of measuring migration, based on passport information, the movements of every individual in and out of Australia are recorded and a person is counted in the population and hence in net overseas migration if he or she spends twelve months out of any sixteen-month period in Australia. The 2007 figure of 184 000, shown in Figure 4.1, is based on this new definition. If the pre-1971 definition used up to 1971 had been used to estimate net overseas migration in 2007, the 2007 estimate would have been 128 000. If the method used from 1971 to 2006 had been employed (assuming zero category jumping), net overseas migration in 2007 would have been 245 000. The disparity between these three numbers indicates how much the level of migration to Australia is a matter of definition.


Grants of permanent residence visas Another way of looking at immigration is to consider the number of visas granted for permanent residence in Australia under different visa categories. It should be noted that some of those granted permanent visas, particularly in the Skill category, take up their right of residence but then depart Australia. On departure, they are provided with a Resident Return visa that enables them to return to Australia over a five-year period. As such, they do not count as an immigrant as defined in the previous section. Grants of permanent residence fall into three broad categories: Skill, Family and Humanitarian. Applications are made by a ‘primary applicant’ but, if this application is successful, the grant of entry also covers the spouse/partner of the primary applicant and his or her dependent children. All numbers cited in this section relate to both primary applicants and their dependants. The trends for the past decade are shown in Table 4.3. Over the decade, the number of visas granted has more than doubled, mainly by increases in the Skill category. The Humanitarian intake has not changed over the decade and is capped at the planning level. About half of the Humanitarian intake consists of refugees in the care of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees who are selected for entry to Australia.

Table 4.3 P ermanent residence visas granted and planned by type, Australia, 1999–2000 to 2008–09 Year

Skill(a)

Family

Humanitarian

Total

1999–2000

38 000

32 000

10 000

80 000

2000–01

47 000

33 000

14 000

94 000

2001–02

55 000

38 000

12 000

105 000

2002–03

67 000

40 000

13 000

120 000

2003–04

72 000

42 000

14 000

128 000

2004–05

78 000

42 000

13 000

133 000

2005–06

98 000

45 000

14 000

157 000

2006–07

98 000

50 000

13 000

161 000

2007–08 (planned)

109 000

50 000

13 000

172 000

2008–09 (planned)

134 000

57 000

13 000

204 000

(a) Includes special eligibility. Sources: 1999–2000 to 2007–08: Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2008a); 2008–09: Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2008b).

60


The Family category consists primarily of spouses or partners of Australian citizens or permanent residents (81 per cent). The category of spouses and partners is uncapped and rises according to the number of Australians who want their overseas resident partner to live with them in Australia. The number has been rising as more young Australians spend time overseas and as more young persons from other countries spend time in Australia under various temporary entry programs. Spouses are initially provided with a provisional two years of residence. Permanent residence is confirmed if the relationship is still intact at the end of this period. Compared with its traditional competitors for international immigrants (Canada, the United States and New Zealand), Australia has a highly restrictive policy on the sponsorship of the parents and non-dependant children of Australians. This policy is designed to prevent the explosion of the family migration stream. However, it has been argued that this may put Australia at a competitive disadvantage in relation to very highly skilled people who wish to bring their parents or children into Australia. At present, parent visas are limited to 1000 per annum where no financial contribution is made, and a majority of the children of the parents must be resident in Australia. Where a substantial payment is made to cover potential health and social security costs, parents with a majority of their children in Australia can be ‘purchased’ into Australia. In 2006–07, 3500 parents entered in this way, about half of whom came from the United Kingdom or China. The Skill category has several sub-categories. The largest sub-category, Skilled Independent, accounts for about 50 per cent of the Skill category. This is the general entry, points-based entry system. The second largest sub-category, accounting for about one quarter of the total, consists of various types of Employer Nominations. These are skilled persons who qualify mainly on the basis that they have a job with an Australian employer for at least three years and are sponsored by their employer. Skilled Australian Sponsored accounts for a further 15 per cent of the total. These are persons who satisfy a points test similar to that of the Skilled Independent but are eligible for additional points because they are sponsored by an Australian resident. The next largest sub-category is the State/Territory Sponsored category where a sub-national government sponsors the applicant. Finally, accounting for about 6 per cent of the total are those who enter under the Business Skills sub-category. These are persons who enter on the basis that they will open a business in


Australia and they have assets of at least $500 000 that can be moved to Australia in a two-year period. Skills for the migration points system are based on a listing, the Migration Occupations in Demand List. This list, published on the website of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, is revised twice a year according to perceived labour market shortages. In 2008, almost all the skills in demand were in the two broad categories: Professionals and Trades. Skill does not necessarily mean high-level academic skill. The list included such occupations as painters, gardeners, cooks and bakers. Since the introduction of the points system for the Skill entry category in the mid-1990s, changes have been made to further guarantee that applicants are genuinely in demand in the Australian labour market. These changes were the greater involvement of state and territory governments in selection and nomination; the greater involvement of employers in selection and nomination; and a widespread ability for many persons in Australia on a temporary basis to apply for permanent residence on shore. In general, those applying through these more ‘guaranteed’ routes are processed faster than those who apply through the Skilled Independent sub-category. Between 2000 and 2005, the percentage of the Skill stream that entered on State-Specific and Regional Migration visas increased from 4 per cent to 28 per cent of the total. States and territories participate in the Australian migration expos run in various cities around the world. Competition for immigrants between the states has become a feature of the present Australian immigration system. The state of New South Wales has largely not participated in this activity. In 2005–06, its share of the State-Specific and Regional Migration visa grants was just 6 per cent. Consequently, New South Wales’ share of Australia’s settler arrivals has fallen sharply. Its share was 43.5 per cent in 2000–01 compared with 31.2 per cent in 2006–07. As all other states have been active participants, the effect of these schemes has been to keep skilled new arrivals out of New South Wales rather than to recruit them to other states and territories. For example, from 2000–01 to 2006–07, the number of settler arrivals to South Australia more than trebled. The numbers going to other states increased over this same period by 10 500 for Victoria, 9000 for Queensland and 8000 for Western Australia while the New South Wales total fell by 3000. At the same time, the New South Wales policy

62


on skilled settler arrivals did not affect other movements to and from New South Wales. In 2006–07, its share of family immigrant arrivals remained at 42 per cent and its share of Australia’s permanent departures also remained at 42 per cent. As the qualification levels of immigrants in the Family stream are lower than those in the skilled migration scheme, and as the qualifications of Australian residents departing tend to be high, the net effect of overseas migration on skills in New South Wales has been strongly negative relative to other states. The number of visas granted under the Employer Nomination sub-category rose from 5400 in 2000–01 to 22 800 in 2006–07. A relatively high minimum salary level applies to nominations in this category, along with at least a three-year qualification and five years’ post-training work experience. Those who have been resident in Australia on a long-term temporary basis (see discussion below) have had time to adjust to Australian society and to the Australian working environment. For this reason, in the past decade the Australian government has progressively opened up the possibility for temporary residents to apply for permanent residence while still residing in Australia. This has applied to long-term temporary business (visa subclass 457) immigrants, temporary immigrants in Australia under labour agreements and a wide range of overseas students studying in Australia. From November 2005, Working Holiday Maker and Occupational Trainee visa holders have been able to apply for a provisional stay visa without leaving Australia. Finally, overseas students who are unable to meet the English test requirements can remain in Australia for eighteen months to build on their English skills and work experience. During this period, if they satisfy the English language requirement, they can apply for permanent residence on shore. Onshore applications accounted for 34 per cent (50 000) of all permanent visa grants in 2006–07.

Long-term temporary visas Until the mid-1990s, Australian policy gave very strong preference to permanent migration. The number of long-term temporary immigrants was relatively small. In order to compete for those with the highest skills in the global labour market, the decision was made in the mid-1990s that a form of temporary skilled migration was required. Under such a scheme, it was argued, recruitment could be streamlined in a market


where speed plays an important role. The application system for permanent migration, in contrast, was slow, cumbersome and unpre dictable. A temporary migration scheme would also enable multinational companies to move their employees into and out of Australia much more effectively. Thus temporary migration would serve as an incentive for companies to have a base in Australia. The outcome was the Business (Long Stay) Visa (subclass 457). The number of grants made in this category rose from zero in the mid-1990s to around 32 000 in 2001–02 and to 111 000 in 2007–08. In this year, 58 000 of the total were primary applicants. The spouses/partners of 457 visa holders are permitted to work in Australia, and research has shown that they are usually highly skilled as well. A 457 visa holder can remain in Australia for up to four years and can apply for another 457 visa at completion. As just described, 457 visa holders can also apply for permanent residence on shore, and 19 000 such grants were made in 2006–07. Most 457 visa applicants must be in the same four occupational skill groupings as applicants for permanent residence (managers, professionals, associate professionals and skilled trades). For these applicants, the employer is required to enter into an agreement to provide various forms of assistance but, most importantly, a minimum salary level is required. For non-ICT workers, this level was $43 440 at 1 August 2008. A small number of grants are made in lower occupational skill categories for labour shortages in defined regional areas. A lower minimum salary level applies in these cases. The average base salary for 457 visa holders in 2007–08 was $73 000. By industry, the highest average salaries were paid to those in mining ($103 000) and the lowest to those in hotels, cafes and restaurants ($44 000). Almost one-quarter of all 457 visa grants are made to citizens of the United Kingdom. Other prominent countries include India, the Philippines, South Africa and China, all prominent in the permanent migration stream as well. These leading sources are followed by a group of advanced countries that do not figure prominently in the permanent migration scheme: the United States, Germany, Canada, Ireland, Japan and France. The temporary migration scheme enables associations with the labour markets of these countries that would not otherwise exist. The economic boom in Western Australia led to the recruitment of a relatively high number of 457 visa holders. Some problems of non-compliance by Australian employers with the terms and conditions of the visas have arisen, which were concentrated

64


at the low salary end—in the regional low-skill segment of the program and in restaurants. These problems were addressed by the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Migration and a number of administrative reforms have been implemented as a result. Overseas students are the largest category of long-term temporary immigrants to Australia. A record number of 278 000 student visas were granted in 2007–08, an increase of 21 per cent over the number granted in the previous year. The students came from 190 countries. About half of these are typical university undergraduate students, but large percentages also are in Vocational Education Training (VET), in English language courses (ELICOS) and in secondary education. As already discussed, overseas students are permitted to work while in Australia, and they represent an important component of the casual labour market. Another important and growing category of temporary immigrants is the Working Holiday Maker. Through bilateral agreements with a range of countries, young people aged between 18 and 30 are able to work in Australia for up to one year, and, if they work for three months in seasonal work in rural areas, they are permitted to stay for two years. In 2006–07, 135 000 visas were granted to working holiday makers. This compares with 77 000 in 2000–01. In order, the main source countries are Korea, the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, Japan, France and Canada.

New Zealanders in Australia Since the early 1980s, citizens of New Zealand have been able to move freely to Australia and to work in Australia. The two countries have a common labour market. New Zealanders are not counted in the government’s formal settler program. At 30 June 2007, an estimated 504 000 New Zealand citizens were living in Australia. The movement to and from New Zealand is volatile, and fluctuates with the relative state of the economies in the two countries. In recent years, Queensland has been the state of first choice for immigrants from New Zealand. New Zealanders, together with 457 visa holders, overseas students and working holiday makers, constitute a temporary population of almost a million, most of whom have work rights in Australia. These more flexible forms of immigration have changed the face of the Australian labour market. In addition, there are about 500 000 Australian full-time students who are in employment. The flexible work status of


these 1.5 million workers (from a total labour force of 11 million) means that Australia is not as vulnerable to unemployment arising from economic downturn as it was in the past. Conversely, in good times, these workers provide a fast way to increase the workforce.

Emigration from Australia For the twenty years leading up to 1995, between 20 000 and 30 000 Australian residents left Australia each year on a permanent basis. Since 1995, however, this number has been rising constantly, reaching 75 000 in 2007. This development indicates the changing global labour market for skills, of which Australia is a part. The increase in immigration in the past decade (see Table 4.3) works in part to offset the growing departure to other countries. In a study of movements of high-technology workers (described as complex problem-solvers), McDonald and Temple (2006) observed that there was a net loss through migration of Australian citizens who were medical scientists, other scientists, engineers, IT specialists and marketing and business specialists. Many more Australian citizens were leaving than were returning. In all five occupational categories, however, the losses were more than compensated for by arrivals from other countries. While Australia gains more than it loses from migration, the losses are not insignificant. The immigration program has served a very important role in keeping Australia ahead of the game in technological skills. Of all emigrants, 80 per cent were in the working age range of 15–64 years, most heavily concentrated in the prime working ages of 25–44 years. About half of those departing permanently had been born in Australia. The remainder were former immigrants, most of whom had been in Australia for more than five years. The countries to which they emigrated in order of significance were New Zealand, the United Kingdom, China (including Hong Kong and Macao), the United States, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. Finally, those leaving Australia permanently were concentrated in professional and management jobs.

The future of immigration and labour demand in Australia Australia’s labour force grew at close to 2 per cent per annum between 1980 and 2000. Typical of the Western economies, this rapid growth was due to full entry to the labour force of the Baby Boom generation,

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increased participation of women and overseas migration. Rapid growth occurred in the twenty-year period to 2000 despite a fall in male labour force participation rates, especially at older ages. As in comparable Western countries, the Baby Boom generation will begin to pass out of the labour force and the scope for further increases in women’s participation is limited. Furthermore, in the past decade, age-specific labour force participation rates have risen sharply at older ages, thus reducing the scope for future rises in participation to accommodate rising labour demand. In 2007–08, the Australian labour force grew at about 1.2 per cent per annum and this rate was falling. Modelling has shown that Australian labour supply growth would be close to zero now and in the future without international migration. At the same time, there are arguments that labour demand in Australia will continue to be very strong following recovery from the global financial crisis. There are six important indications of this likely future labour demand. First, major future investment in new physical infrastructure is required. Physical infrastructure in Australia has deteriorated over the past 30 years and is now a threat to future economic productivity. Inadequate infrastructure also represents a major obstacle to meeting climate-change objectives and the inevitable transformation of energy sources. There is an urgent need for upgrading of water supplies, transport facilities, ports, energy supply, housing and office space, and state-of-the-art communications. This infrastructure bottleneck has already been identified in broad terms, and the Commonwealth government is addressing the priority areas for investment through the creation of Infrastructure Australia. State and territory governments are also moving in the same direction. Capital is being identified for these developments, but labour is an equally important component. Second, the demand for coal, iron ore and other minerals is likely to recover and continue for many years. The mining boom, directly and indirectly, has been a major driver of increased labour demand, and this situation can be expected to continue. Third, the ageing of the population will generate new demands for labour. The most obvious additional demand will be for workers in the health and caring sectors; however, in the more immediate future, the newly retired will demand a wide range of service workers. Fourth, beyond demand generated by the ageing of the population, there is likely to be increased investment in health services delivery.


Polls indicate that there is a broad sense that health service delivery is below the standard expected by the community. Fifth, the Treasury’s Intergenerational Reports and other reports estimate that Australian living standards (GDP per capita) will double in the next 40 years. The beneficiaries will be seeking ways to enjoy this outcome through increased expenditure on goods and services. Increased demand for service workers is an implication. And sixth, radical changes in the way we live our lives in the context of climate change will generate new occupations and industries, many of which are difficult to imagine at present. In particular, the reduction of carbon emissions and the reversal of environmental degradation will create a demand for labour, as well as capital and technology. These trends will mean a higher demand for education and training. Migration is the only way that Australia can meet labour demands effectively in the medium and long term. As a result, Australia’s population will grow rapidly. Population growth in turn has a multiplier effect upon the demand for labour. The additional population must be fed, clothed, housed and generally serviced. Downturns in the business cycle can dampen these upbeat views of Australia’s future labour demand but, if a long-term view is taken, chronic long-term under-supply of labour is a larger threat than a possibility of moderate, short-term over-supply. If net migration averages 180 000 per annum for the next 50 years, GDP per capita will be 10 per cent higher than if net migration were to be nil over this period. This is a substantial difference, well above the cost estimates to Australia of the carbon trading scheme proposed by the Garnaut Report (2008). So not only will migration help meet Australia’s future labour demand and create the prosperity that will be required for environmental and infrastructure reform, but the population absorption costs of immigration will also contribute to infrastructure and environmental costs. Australia will need to seek a balance, and that balance is likely to be around the 2007–08 level of net migration.

5

Residential concentration and dispersion Residential concentration and dispersion

There is a concern that large-scale immigration will lead to ethnic enclaves in Australia’s large cities. Although cities already house very distinct enclaves of the rich and the poor that might be regarded as socially undesirable, public attention tends to focus not on these but rather upon ethnic enclaves. There is a sense among some critics that ethnic enclaves are in some way a danger to ‘Australian values’, or that people living in these enclaves will not integrate with the broader Australian community. It is certainly the case that there are large concentrations of overseasborn in the major cities. A number of indicators may be used to explore ethnic concentration. If the indicator of language usage is employed, in 2006 in the Sydney local government areas of Fairfield and Auburn, 67 per cent and 66 per cent respectively spoke a language other than English in the home; in the Melbourne LGA of Greater Dandenong, 55 per cent spoke a language other than English, while in Brimbank it was 54 per cent. Within these LGAs, there are contiguous localities (Census collection districts, typically comprising between 150 and 250 households) where a very large majority of the population spoke a language other than English: in 34 contiguous localities within Fairfield and twenty

Residential concentration and dispersion 69

Figure 5.1 P roportion of population aged five years and above that speaks a language other than English in the home, Census collection districts, Fairfield local government area, 2006

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006 Census MapStats.

within Greater Dandenong, over 70 per cent of the population spoke a language other than English in the home (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). This chapter presents a detailed examination of the residential locations of immigrant groups, employing place of birth as its indicator. It determines the extent to which groups are concentrated in a small number of locations or widely dispersed across Australia, or across the major cities in which the groups have settled.

Theoretical considerations There are many potential theoretical explanations of residential concentration and dispersion. The degree to which a particular group of immigrants is dispersed across Australia is suggested to be an indicator of the level of integration of that group into Australian society. The more the group is concentrated in particular locations, the less it is integrated. In this regard, heavy concentrations of immigrants of a

70


Figure 5.2 P roportion of population aged five years and above that speaks a language other than English in the home, Census collection districts, Greater Dandenong local government area, 2006

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006 Census MapStats.

particular background in a single locality are viewed negatively by those concerned about the magnitude of immigration and extent of ethnic diversity, which they link with the potential for social unrest and insecurity. The contrary viewpoint is that concentration of newly arrived immigrant groups in particular localities can assist their integration into Australian society because they can draw on familiar support networks as they adjust to life in Australia. It is expected that, as this adjustment progresses, the ethnic concentration will begin to break up. Migrants may also be concentrated in particular locations because of the availability of affordable housing or because the locations are convenient to the industries in which they work. As immigrants obtain secure jobs and higher incomes, they may move from the low-cost rental suburbs of first settlement into home ownership in other areas. The second generation, in the past much better educated than their parents, may move from their parents’ houses into more middle-class areas. Where concentrations remain over the longer term, it may mean that migrants with specific religions have concentrated around the churches, mosques, temples or synagogues of their religion. This can also occur when the group has continued to remain relatively small, such that localised support networks are needed into the longer term.


Locational patterns may also be affected by ‘cultural distance’—that is, the degree of difference in culture between the particular ethnic group and the majority of Australians. Those who are culturally close to the culture of the majority of Australians, such as New Zealanders, may be able to move rapidly into the broader community in a dispersed way. In contrast, the Indigenous Australian population tends to be concentrated in particular localities and is not widely dispersed across the towns and suburbs in which most other Australians live.

Issues of measurement The only reliable sources of data on ethnic concentrations in Australia are the five-yearly population Censuses. Only the Census is able to provide data for a small group living in a small geographic unit. However, measurement of the degree of concentration of a group depends vitally upon the choice of geographic unit at which the measurement is made. A group may be highly concentrated in a few streets of a suburb but not in the suburb as a whole or in the city as a whole. Accurate measurement is enhanced by selecting small geographic units, but the danger is that an overly small geographic area will yield an artificial result, without much meaning in the lives of people. In this analysis, the statistical local area (SLA) is used as the geographic unit of analysis. While the population size of SLAs in Australia varies considerably, most are of such a size that an observed ethnic concentration within the SLA is of a meaningful size. This is especially the case for SLAs in Sydney and Melbourne, by far the most important places for this analysis. The largest SLA in Australia had 133 000 people, but only a small number of SLAs in Sydney had more than 100 000 people. The usual range is from about 10 000 people to about 70 000. However, outside of the cities and especially in the states with smaller populations and the two territories, SLAs are often smaller than 10 000. Ignoring a few very small special SLAs, almost all SLAs have a population of at least 2000. Ethnicity in this analysis is defined by country of birth. For example, all persons born in China are considered to be of ‘Chinese’ ethnicity. This definition is convenient when Census data is being used, but it has limitations. It does not include the second or higher order generations—that is, persons of this ethnicity who were born in Australia. Second, country of birth can be a misleading indicator of ethnicity. For example, some persons of Vietnamese ethnicity may have been born in

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refugee camps in third countries such as Thailand. Persons of Chinese origin may have been born in many other countries of Asia besides China itself. Some countries such as Singapore and Malaysia are multiethnic. Care must also be taken in presuming that immigrants to Australia from a given country come from the majority culture of that country. For example, more than 50 per cent of Iran-born persons in Australia are not Muslims, even though 99 per cent of the Iranian population is Muslim. It is not unusual that immigrants come from minority groups within their country of origin. There are, then, two different measures that need to be considered: the percentage of the total Australian population of the selected ethnicity that lives in the given SLA and the percentage of the total SLA population that is made up of the selected ethnic group. The first measure is important to the group itself. How concentrated or dispersed is its population? It may also be important for the delivery of ethnic-specific services. The second measure is the measure that is important to the broader population. Do particular ethnic groups account for high percentages of the total population in any given locality? A very large immigrant group such as those born in the United Kingdom may be widely dispersed across SLAs and therefore, from its perspective, not be concentrated. On the other hand, because it is a very large group, it may constitute a sizeable percentage of the total population of many SLAs. In contrast, a small group may be highly concentrated in particular SLAs but not make up a large percentage of the total population of any SLA—even those in which it is concentrated. These are the issues of interpretation that need to be considered. Table 5.1 shows the top 25 country of birth categories in rank order as indicated by the Census of 2006. It also shows the number of SLAs in which the group represents 10 per cent of more of the total population of the SLA and a summary assessment of the extent of concentration of the group.

The concentration and dispersion of the overseas-born An understanding of the pattern of settlement of migrants across Australian SLAs provides the broad context for analysis of specific birthplace groups. Based on an examination of the distribution of SLAs by the percentage of the population born overseas, a high percentage born overseas is here defined as being 44 per cent or more while a low percentage is defined as being under 20 per cent.


Table 5.1 C ountries of birth (top 25 countries) of the Australian population and extent of concentration

Country of birth United Kingdom

2006 Census population

Number of SLAs with birthplace group above 10% of total population

Extent of concentration

1 036 245

61

New Zealand

355 765

2

Low+ Low

Italy

218 718

0

Moderate

Vietnam

154 831

8

High

China

142 780

2

Moderate+

Greece

116 431

0

Low+

Germany

108 220

0

Low

Philippines

103 942

0

Low+

India

95 452

0

Low

Netherlands

83 324

0

Low

South Africa

79 425

0

Low

Malaysia

78 858

0

Moderate

Lebanon

71 349

2

High

Hong Kong

67 122

0

Moderate+

Poland

58 110

0

Low

USA

53 694

0

Moderate

Sri Lanka

53 461

0

Moderate+

Croatia

51 909

0

Low

Ireland

50 235

0

Low

Indonesia

47 158

0

Low

Malta

46 998

0

High

Fiji

44 261

0

High

Macedonia (FYROM)

43 527

0

Moderate

Korea, Republic of

38 900

0

Moderate

Singapore

33 485

0

Moderate

Source: Based on Australian Bureau of Statistics data, 2006 Census.

The inner city

At the 2006 Census, in the four largest Australian cities—Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth—around 60 per cent of those living in the central area of the city and the surrounding inner suburbs had been born overseas. In the decade from 1996 to 2006, the percentage born overseas in these central city areas increased strongly. In association with this trend, the amount of high-density housing in the inner city also

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increased sharply in this decade. A breakdown of the countries of birth that rose sharply in number in the inner city suggests that this trend was related to the large increase in long-term temporary migration to Australia in this period, especially of overseas students from Asia, highly skilled workers from countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and working holiday makers from a range of countries. Sydney

In Sydney, 27 of the 63 SLAs, or 43 per cent, had high concentrations of immigrants. The highest concentration was in Auburn, where 64 per cent of the population was born overseas. This was part of the strongest concentration of overseas-born in Sydney along the main western railway lines (Canterbury, Ashfield, Burwood, Strathfield, Auburn, Parramatta and Fairfield). In all of these areas, around 60 per cent of the population was born overseas. These areas are conveniently located to public transport and have low-cost, walk-up apartments that are close to the railway stations. Another increasingly important concentration of immigrants is in the inner southwest (Rockdale, Hurstville, Kogarah and Bankstown). North of the Sydney Harbour– Parramatta River divide, Ryde, Willoughby and North Sydney are also rapidly emerging as concentrations of the more affluent immigrant settlers. Finally, in the inner east SLAs of Randwick, Woollahra and Botany Bay, around 45 per cent of their populations were born overseas, partly a result of proximity to the University of New South Wales. The parts of Sydney that did not have high concentrations of overseas-born were the Northern Beaches suburbs and all of the outer fringe areas of Sydney (Sutherland, Wollondilly, Camden, Penrith, Blue Mountains, Hawkesbury, Gosford and Wyong). It is notable that Cronulla (part of Sutherland) and Camden, both scenes of recent protests directed against immigrants, have low percentages of people born overseas. In Australia, objection to immigration tends to be generated not in the areas of high immigrant concentration but in areas of low immigrant concentration, a pattern also evident in the electoral appeal of One Nation, as discussed in the next chapter. Melbourne

Immigrants are less concentrated in Melbourne than in Sydney. In Melbourne, only 15 of the 78 SLAs—or 19 per cent—have high concentrations of immigrants and, among these, the levels of concentration


are generally lower than in the areas of high concentration in Sydney. Outside of the inner city, only Dandenong (Springvale, Noble Park, Dandenong and Doveton) had 60 per cent of its population born overseas. Hallam, an outer area contiguous with Dandenong and on the same railway line, has 50 per cent born overseas. Only two other SLAs in Melbourne had more than 50 per cent of their populations born overseas: Clayton (52 per cent), and Sunshine in the west of Melbourne (56 per cent). The other Melbourne SLAs with high concentrations of immigrants were Keilor and Maribyrnong in the west; Broadmeadows and Whittlesea South-West (Thomastown, Lalor, Epping) in the north; St Kilda and Caulfield in the inner south; and Waverley East (Vermont) in the east. Unlike Sydney, the areas of concentration tend not to be contiguous in Melbourne. Interestingly, the inner north of Melbourne (Brunswick, Coburg, Northcote, Preston), an area conventionally regarded as having strong immigrant concentrations, did not have 44 per cent or more of its population born overseas at the 2006 Census. Furthermore, the percentages born overseas in these suburbs did not change in the decade from 1996 to 2006. The Australia-born population in these areas may be keeping pace with the overseas-born population because of settlement by second-generation immigrants or because of gentrification. Like Sydney, the areas of low immigrant concentration in Melbourne were overwhelmingly the outer fringe SLAs. Brisbane

SLAs in Brisbane have much smaller populations than those in Sydney and Melbourne; accordingly, there are many more—214—of which fifteen, or 7 per cent, have high concentrations of people born overseas. Outside of the inner SLAs of Brisbane City, Fortitude Valley, Spring Hill, Kangaroo Point and South Brisbane, there are only two areas of high concentration of immigrants in Brisbane: St Lucia (due to the nearby University of Queensland) and a group of suburbs in the south of Brisbane (Macgregor, Sunnybank, Sunnybank Hills, Runcorn, Robertson, Kuraby, Calamvale, Stretton, Mt Ommaney and Darra–Sumner). The highest percentage is Robertson, with 62 per cent born overseas. Other capitals

Only two, or 4 per cent, of Adelaide’s 54 SLAs had high percentages born overseas. These were the inner SLAs of Adelaide City and Enfield Park.

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Eight of Perth’s 36 SLAs, or 22 per cent, had high concentrations of immigrants. The percentage of high concentration SLAs in Perth was therefore second only to Sydney. The areas of high concentration were the inner areas of Perth City, Subiaco, Vincent and Victoria Park, Stirling Central to the immediate north of the city, Canning immediately south of the city, Fremantle Inner, and one outer SLA, Joondalup North. In Hobart, there was only one SLA with a high concentration of immigrants: inner Hobart. There was one in Darwin (Inner Darwin) and three in Canberra (Acton, Braddon and Belconnen Town Centre). However, almost all of Canberra’s 106 SLAs had more than 20 per cent of their population born overseas. Non-metropolitan regions

Concentrations of immigrants are less common outside of the cities and so the focus here is upon those SLAs that do not have low concentrations— that is, they have 20 per cent or more of their populations born overseas. Only eleven of 134 SLAs, or 8 per cent, in New South Wales outside of Sydney had concentrations that were above 20 per cent and, for all of these, the proportion born overseas was under 30 per cent. These eleven SLAs fell into five regions: the industrial city of Wollongong–Shell Harbour; the far north coast area of Tweed–Byron, SLAs surrounding Canberra (Palerang Shire, Queanbeyan, Cooma and Snowy River) and two individual areas, Wingecarribee between Sydney and Canberra and the fruit-growing area of Griffith in the southwest. Much like New South Wales, only seven SLAs in Victoria outside of Melbourne—or 6 per cent—had concentrations of overseas-born above 20 per cent. Most of these were close to Melbourne: the Geelong–Corio region, the Yarra Ranges and the Phillip Island–Bass Coast area. The only more distant SLA with a concentration above 20 per cent was Morwell, which only just qualified with 21 per cent of its population born overseas. The situation in Queensland and Western Australia is very different to that of New South Wales and Victoria in that numerous SLAs outside the capital cities have above 20 per cent of their populations born overseas. In Queensland, all of the Gold Coast SLAs and all but one of the Sunshine Coast SLAs have above 20 per cent. Indeed, four Gold Coast SLAs have high concentrations, including Surfers Paradise with 62 per cent born overseas. Most of the numerous coastal SLAs north of the Sunshine Coast to the far north of Queensland have concentrations


above 20 per cent. In all, about 40 per cent of Queensland’s 260 SLAs outside Brisbane have concentrations above 20 per cent. In the Cairns City SLA, 66 per cent of the population was born overseas. The SLAs in Queensland with low concentrations of overseas-born are inland. In Western Australia, 45 per cent of the SLAs outside of Perth have above 20 per cent of their populations born overseas. These include most of the coastal and mining towns in Western Australia. Port Hedland, with 43 per cent of its population born overseas, has the highest concentration of immigrants in Western Australia outside of Perth. A high percentage (40 per cent) of Northern Territory SLAs outside Darwin also have considerable immigrant populations and two have high concentrations: Jabiru (due to mining and tourism) and Timber Creek (tourism). The situation in South Australia and Tasmania, however, is more like that of New South Wales and Victoria. Only four of the SLAs in South Australia outside Adelaide—or 6 per cent—have above 20 per cent of their populations born overseas: Robe, Whyalla, Roxby Downs and the Unincorporated Far North. In Tasmania, only two SLAs outside Hobart reach 20 per cent: Kingborough Part B and Inner Launceston, both very small SLAs. The relatively high percentages of locations outside of the capitals that have significant numbers of immigrants do not fit the conventional image of country Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory. Indeed, it is the seemingly more cosmopolitan southeastern states that have very low proportions of immigrants outside of the capitals.

The concentration and dispersion of particular birthplace groups In this section, focus is placed both upon the degree of concentration of the main ethnic group in particular SLAs and the percentage that the same group represents of the total population of the SLA. The United Kingdom-born

The United Kingdom-born are widely dispersed across Australia. In 2006, 17 per cent lived in Sydney, 16 per cent in Perth, 15 per cent in Melbourne and 9 per cent in each of Brisbane and Adelaide. In addition, 10 per cent lived in Queensland outside of Brisbane. The percentage

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of all UK-born persons in Australia in any one SLA exceeded 1 per cent in only four instances—all in Perth: Joondalup North (1.1 per cent of all UK-born), Joondalup South (1.4 per cent), Gosnells (1.1 per cent) and Rockingham (1.5 per cent). Outside of Perth, the highest concentration is in Warringah in Sydney (0.98 per cent of all UK-born). In total, however, 17 per cent of all UK-born persons in Australia live in Perth or Mandurah, just south of Perth. Within Perth, they are widely spread in the middle and outer suburbs to the north and the south of the city. The UK-born make up 24 per cent of the total population of Joondalup North in the outer north of Perth. This is the highest percentage that any one birthplace group represents of the total population of any SLA in Australia. The UK-born make up high percentages of the populations of many other SLAs in Perth: Wanneroo (21 per cent); Rockingham (18 per cent); Armadale (16 per cent); and Joondalup South (15 per cent). Despite this heavy presence, in the past decade the percentage of UK-born in all of these SLAs in Perth has fallen. The UK-born exceed 10 per cent of the population in fifteen Perth SLAs and in twelve SLAs in Western Australia outside of Perth. The latter are mainly coastal areas to the south of Perth. The UK-born also make up about 15 per cent of the total population in the Adelaide regions of Playford, Salisbury and Tea Tree Gully. In Adelaide, no fewer than 20 SLAs (37 per cent) have UK-born percentages above 10 per cent. Six SLAs in South Australia outside of Adelaide have more than 10 per cent of their populations being UK-born. One is the industrial city of Whyalla; the others are either coastal areas or hill areas near Adelaide. In Sydney, only one SLA—Manly—has more than 10 per cent of its population born in the United Kingdom. Manly, Warringah and Mosman are the suburbs in which Sydney’s UK-born concentration is found. While not reaching 10 per cent of the population, the UK-born are highly represented in all the coastal regions of New South Wales. Melbourne also has only one SLA with more than 10 per cent UK-born, Mornington Peninsula South. There are two main concentrations of UK-born in Melbourne: the Mornington Peninsula region and the eastern fringe, which is the setting for the TV series so popular in the UK, Neighbours. As in New South Wales, the UK-born are also prominent in coastal areas of Victoria (Barwon and Bass Coast). The UK-born are a sizeable proportion of the population in most Brisbane


SLAs but two regions stand out: the outer west along the upper reaches of the Brisbane River around Pullenvale, where more than 10 per cent are UK-born and, on the opposite side of the city, the coastal region of Redland Shire, centred on Cleveland, with 11 per cent. Outside Brisbane, the UK-born are heavily represented on the Gold Coast where several SLAs have close to 10 per cent. The New Zealand-born

The New Zealand-born, the second largest birthplace group in Australia, are very widely dispersed. They are most concentrated in Queensland, with 19 per cent living in Brisbane and 20 per cent living in Queensland outside Brisbane, particularly on the Gold Coast where 9 per cent of all New Zealanders in Australia lived in 2006. However, no individual Australian SLA accounts for even 1 per cent of the New Zealand-born population. The highest concentration is in Gosnells in the south of Perth, where 0.65 per cent of the New Zealand-born population lives. The New Zealand-born make up 10 per cent of the total population in only two Australian SLAs: Pacific Pines on the Gold Coast and Tanah Merah in the south of Brisbane. Almost all of the 44 Gold Coast SLAs have more than 5 per cent of their populations New Zealand-born. The 5 per cent level is rarely reached in any other part of Australia, the exceptions being Brisbane and the mining areas of Western Australia. The China-born and the Hong Kong-born

The China-born are much more concentrated than the UK-born or the New Zealand-born. In 2006, 53 per cent of all China-born Australians lived in Sydney, a slight fall from 56 per cent in 1996. A further 27 per cent lived in Melbourne in 2006. The largest concentration of China-born in Australia is in the inner southwest of Sydney, around Canterbury, Hurstville, Kogarah and Rockdale. These four SLAs accounted for 15 per cent of all Chinaborn in Australia. The China-born were also heavily concentrated in the inner west of Sydney, with the contiguous areas of Ashfield, Burwood, Strathfield, Concord, Auburn, and Parramatta accounting for 13 per cent of all China-born Australians. A further 10 per cent of all China-born live in the middle-class area of the mid-northwest of Sydney (Ryde, Willoughby, Hornsby, Ku-ring-gai and Baulkham Hills). Persons born in Hong Kong are concentrated in the same areas

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of Sydney, but more especially in the middle-class northwest, where about 18 per cent of all Hong Kong-born Australians live. There is a similar concentration of China-born in the middle-class eastern SLAs in Melbourne, covering suburbs such as Bulleen, Doncaster, Templestowe, Box Hill, Nunawading and Waverley. About 9 per cent of all Chinaborn Australians live in this area of Melbourne. Like Sydney, there is also a strong concentration of the Hong Kong-born in this middle-class part of Melbourne. A similar concentration of both China-born and Hong Kong-born is emerging in the south of Brisbane (Macgregor, Sunnybank, Runcorn, Robertson, Eight Mile Plains, Coopers Plains and Stretton), but this represents only a very small proportion of the total China-born population. Thus, Chinese Australians seem to be attracted to the quintessential suburban middle-class areas of the three largest Australian cities. Because of their large numbers and their degree of concentration, the China-born make up sizeable proportions of the total populations of many areas of Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. The highest representations are mainly in Sydney: Burwood (12 per cent), Hurstville (11 per cent), Kogarah (10 per cent), Ashfield (10 per cent) and Auburn (9 per cent). In the middle-class SLAs, the China-born and Hong Kong-born combined make up 10 per cent of the population of Ryde in Sydney, 8 per cent of Waverley and Glen Waverley in Melbourne, and 13 per cent of the population of Sunnybank in Brisbane. In the other capital cities, the China-born are much less prominent, with the exception of areas close to universities. Few China-born persons live outside the capital cities. The India-born

Another large birthplace group, the India-born, are quite dispersed. Across the capitals, 36 per cent of Indians live in Sydney, 34 per cent in Melbourne, 10 per cent in Perth, 5 per cent in Brisbane and 4 per cent in Adelaide. The one concentration of Indians in Australia is in Parramatta–Holroyd in Sydney, where 7.4 per cent of all Indian Australians live. The India-born are more dispersed in Melbourne than in Sydney. In Sydney, the India-born make up 12 per cent of the population of the SLA of Inner Parramatta and about 5 per cent of the populations of Strathfield and Burwood. In Melbourne, they are 4 per cent of the population of Monash southwest SLA, due to the location of Monash University.


The Vietnam-born

The distribution across the capitals of the Vietnam-born is fairly similar to that of the India-born: 39 per cent live in Sydney, 36 per cent in Melbourne, 8 per cent in Brisbane, and 6 per cent in each of Adelaide and Perth. However, within Sydney and Melbourne, the Vietnam-born are much more concentrated than the India-born. Eighteen per cent of all Vietnam-born Australians live in Fairfield and Liverpool in Sydney, most in Fairfield. In Melbourne, there are two concentrations. Thirteen per cent of all Vietnam-born Australians live in Sunshine–Keilor and Maribyrnong in the inner west of Melbourne and 7 per cent live in Springvale–Dandenong in the outer southeast. The proportion living in Sunshine has been rising sharply. As a large and relatively concentrated group, the Vietnam-born represent sizeable proportions of the total populations of several SLAs in the capital cities: in Sydney, Fairfield East (17 per cent); in Melbourne, Sunshine (13 per cent) and Dandenong Balance, which includes Springvale (13 per cent); in Brisbane, Richlands (16 per cent), Darra–Sumner (15 per cent) and Durack (14 per cent); in Adelaide, Enfield Park (14 per cent). To a large extent, the Vietnam-born are still concentrated near the places where they first lived as refugees in the 1970s and 1980s. The Italy-born

The largest group of immigrants from Italy arrived in Australia in the 1950s and 1960s. Those born in Italy thus represent a rapidly ageing population. They have strong associations with their second-generation children and their distribution across Australia today may reflect where their children live. The Italy-born are relatively dispersed, with 22 per cent living in Sydney, 37 per cent in Melbourne, 10 per cent in Adelaide, 9 per cent in Perth and 3 per cent in Brisbane. In Queensland, the proportion of all Italy-born living outside Brisbane is larger than the percentage living in Brisbane. Four per cent of all Italy-born persons live in Queensland outside of Brisbane and 5 per cent live in New South Wales outside Sydney. The largest concentration of the Italy-born in Australia is in the northern Melbourne suburbs (in an arc from Essendon to Heidelberg), where about 20 per cent of all Italy-born Australians live. It is in this region that the Italy-born represent the highest percentages of the SLAs in which they live: Moonee Valley West (9 per cent), Coburg (8 per

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cent), Moreland North (8 per cent), Whittlesea South-West (8 per cent) and Preston (7 per cent). The Italy-born constitute 7 per cent of the total population of Drummoyne in Sydney. In Adelaide, they represent about 9 per cent of the total population in the two Campbelltown SLAs around Magill. The Lebanon-born

Unlike the groups already discussed, the Lebanon-born are concentrated in one city, Sydney, where 73 per cent of the Lebanon-born live. A further 20 per cent live in Melbourne. Furthermore, within the two cities, the Lebanon-born are concentrated in a small number of areas. Fifty-five per cent of all Lebanon-born Australians live in Rockdale, Canterbury, Bankstown, Auburn, Parramatta, Holroyd, Fairfield and Liverpool, a line of suburbs running from the inner southeast to the mid-west of Sydney. This is the highest level of concentration of any reasonably sized birthplace group in Australia. Within these suburbs, over the past decade, there has been a tendency for the Lebanon-born to move from the inner to the outer suburbs. Despite this high level of concentration, the Lebanon-born represent less than 5 per cent of the total population of these suburbs of Sydney. Compared with the total population in the region in which they live, their levels of concentration are much lower than the UK-born, the China-born, the Vietnam-born or the Italy-born in the areas in which those groups are concentrated. In Melbourne, the Lebanon-born are concentrated in the northern suburbs of Broadmeadows, Coburg and Preston, but represent less than 3 per cent of the population of these suburbs—much lower percentages than the Italy-born in the same suburbs. The Turkey-born

Like the Lebanon-born, the Turkey-born are also concentrated in Sydney and Melbourne, although in their case more in Melbourne (46 per cent) than in Sydney (37 per cent). In each city, they live in much the same localities as the Lebanon-born, but are even more concentrated. Nineteen per cent of all Turkey-born Australians live in Broadmeadows and Craigieburn in the north of Melbourne and 11 per cent live in Auburn and Holroyd in the west of Sydney. The main mosques in Sydney and Melbourne are located close to the concentrations of the Lebanon- and Turkey-born populations. The Turkey-born represent 7 per cent of the


total population of Broadmeadows and 4 per cent of the total population of Auburn. The Greece-born

Australian Greeks live primarily in three cities: Melbourne (47 per cent), Sydney (29 per cent) and Adelaide (9 per cent). Very few Greece-born live outside the capital cities. Within Melbourne, the Greece-born are now widely dispersed. No Melbourne SLA accounts for even 3 per cent of total Greece-born Australians, with the highest concentration in the Manningham West SLA (Doncaster–Templestowe). Combining SLAs, the main Greece-born concentration is in the area around Brunswick, Coburg, Northcote and Preston, where 8 per cent of all Greece-born Australians live. However, in these four suburbs, the Greece-born are only 4 per cent of the total population, and this percentage is falling sharply. In Sydney, the Greece-born are concentrated in the inner southwest around Botany Bay, Marrickville, Rockdale, Kogarah, Hurstville and Canterbury. Half of all Greece-born persons in Sydney live in these SLAs. However, they represent only about 3 per cent of the total population in these suburbs. The Bosnia-, Croatia- and Macedonia-born

For a group of relatively recent immigrants, those from the former Yugoslav republics are relatively widely spread across the country. The Bosnia-born have 26 per cent in Sydney, 34 per cent in Melbourne and between 9 and 10 per cent in each of Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth. The Croatia-born are 30 per cent in Sydney, 30 per cent in Melbourne, 4 per cent in Brisbane, 6 per cent in Adelaide and 9 per cent in Perth. The remaining 21 per cent of Croatians live outside the five major capitals. Likewise, 20 per cent of Macedonia-born persons live outside the major capitals, mainly in New South Wales (Wollongong and Queanbeyan). The Macedonia-born are more likely to live in Melbourne (43 per cent) than in Sydney (29 per cent). These birthplace groups are also relatively widely dispersed within Sydney and Melbourne. There are small concentrations of Bosnians and Croatians in Fairfield–Liverpool in Sydney and in Sunshine–Keilor in Melbourne. A high percentage of Bosnians live in Greater Dandenong in Melbourne. The largest concentrations of Macedonians in Australia are in Whittlesea in Melbourne (14 per cent of all Australian Macedonians) and in Wollongong (10 per cent).

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Other concentrated birthplace groups

Fifty-six per cent of all Fiji-born live in Sydney. About half of the Fijians in Sydney are concentrated in the outer west and southwest in Liverpool, Campbelltown and Blacktown. Sixty-two per cent of the Iraq-born in Australia live in Sydney and two-thirds of these live in Fairfield and Liverpool. This is even more concentrated than the Lebanon-born. The Iraqis constitute about 6 per cent of the population of Fairfield. For an older migration group, the Malta-born remain relatively concentrated. Thirty-three per cent live in Sydney, about half of whom live in Blacktown, Fairfield, Liverpool and Holroyd. Forty-three per cent live in Melbourne, with about three-quarters of these living in the north and northwest of Melbourne. Forty-nine per cent of the Sri Lanka-born live in Melbourne and 29 per cent in Sydney. In Melbourne, half of the Sri Lankans are living in the outer southeast (Dandenong, Berwick, Cranbourne and Hallam) or the east (Waverley, Nunawading, Box Hill, Doncaster and Templestowe). The latter is a more middle-class concentration. In Sydney, there is also a middle-class concentration of Sri Lankans in Ryde, Baulkham Hills, Hornsby and Ku-ring-gai although the main concentration of Sri Lankans in Sydney is in Strathfield, Auburn, Holroyd and Parramatta. Sixty-one per cent of Korea-born persons in Australia live in Sydney. About a third of these live in the inner west (Canterbury, Burwood, Concord, Strathfield, Auburn, Parramatta) and another third live in the middle-class areas of Ryde, Willoughby, Baulkham Hills, Hornsby and Ku-ring-gai. Koreans constitute 7 per cent of the total population of Strathfield. Thirty-one per cent of all Malaysia-born persons live in Melbourne, 23 per cent in Sydney and 21 per cent in Perth. There are strong concentrations of Malaysia-born around the centres of all larger cities. These are mainly students. There are also substantial numbers in the areas populated by middle-class Chinese and Korean immigrants. In Perth, Malaysians live in large numbers in the southeast of the city. The Japan-born and United States-born are concentrated in the Eastern Suburbs of Sydney and the Lower North Shore of that city. The Japan-born are also concentrated on the Gold Coast and in Cairns. The Philippines-born are generally not concentrated, with one exception: 13 per cent of all Philippines-born Australians live in Blacktown


in Sydney. Indonesians likewise are not at all concentrated except for a relatively small concentration around the universities in Sydney. Birthplace groups that are not concentrated

A high degree of dispersion was observed for those born in South Africa, Canada, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland. Overview of ethnic concentration and dispersion

There are areas of the large cities in Australia that have become immigrant areas in the sense that high proportions of their populations are born overseas. Within these areas, there are very large numbers of immigrants but they come from many different countries. In this analysis, no immigrant group other than the UK-born constituted more than 17 per cent of any of the 1422 SLA populations, and it was rare for an immigrant group (other than the UK-born) to make up more than 10 per cent of an SLA population. Of course, these statistics can be a little misleading as an indicator of diversity because they do not include the children born in Australia to immigrants; the sense of identity and belonging of the second generation is an additional area of inquiry, beyond the scope of this analysis. The notable immigrant areas in Sydney are the southwest, the west and the middle-class northwestern suburbs. In Melbourne, the notable areas are the northwest, the north, the far southeast and middle-class areas in the east. In Brisbane, the main immigrant area is in the south. In central city areas, the percentage of overseas-born has increased markedly over the last decade, a process related to the large increase in temporary migration and the provision of high-density housing. Areas with low concentrations of immigrants tend to be located on the fringes of the major cities. Given the considerable mix of persons of different origins in the immigrant localities, there has been remarkably little ethnic tension between groups, although at times the behaviour of gangs of youths has been a problem. Immigrant groups who have come to Australia as refugees have tended to concentrate in Sydney and Melbourne in areas of low-cost housing: Fairfield and Liverpool in Sydney, and Springvale, Dandenong and Sunshine in Melbourne. However, this pattern does not apply to all refugee groups; it is much less the case for the Poles, Croatians, Bosnians and Macedonians. The Lebanese did not settle in these locations, but instead settled in areas of older immigrant settlement: in the southwest

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of Sydney and the north of Melbourne. With the growth of the skilled migration program, many Asian immigrants from China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, India and Sri Lanka have now settled in essentially middle-class areas in the northwest of Sydney and the east of Melbourne. Students from China, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore are concentrated close to the universities, with many resident in the inner city. Immigrants of the one nationality often live close to each other for reasons that are readily understandable—on arrival, many immigrants seek out people who come from a similar background to their own, who share a common culture, language and cuisine. Additional factors shaping concentrations of the newly arrived include the availability of affordable housing and proximity to places of work. There is a conventional view that, as groups become established, they move to areas further out from the centre of the city. Analysis of the 2006 Census establishes that the settlement histories of national groups do not follow a uniform pattern. Among the more numerous groups, those born in Vietnam, Lebanon, China, Hong Kong and Sri Lanka are the more concentrated, while those born in South Africa, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland are the more dispersed. It is also evident that, in some regions of the major cities, the extent of concentration of the overseas-born is increasing. There is no simple process of immigrant succession, such that as one group becomes established most of its members move, to be succeeded by the recently arrived. While there is some evidence of this phenomenon, there seems to be more evidence that groups remain in the same area in which they settled upon arrival. They may move out of rented flats into houses that they own, but usually not far away from where they first settled. As was noted, to a large extent the Vietnam-born are still concentrated near the places where they settled 30 or more years ago. This is a subject requiring more intensive investigation. Also, there is a need to examine the locational choices of the second generation. The concentration of some groups would seem to be linked to ‘cultural distance’—the extent to which members of groups feel different from the mainstream. It may also be influenced by strength of religious adherence and political orientation—the need to be near places of worship and community centres. This chapter highlights the varying choices made by members of different groups. It cannot simply be assumed that immigrants will merge into the general population with the passage of time, or that


their children will do so. Immigrants are changed by their experiences in Australia society, but they also bring change, if not on the national level then certainly in their regions of settlement. They shape the ethnic character of cities, as discussed in other chapters; they challenge Australian values and understandings. This is a complex, multidirectional process into which the geography or spatial dimension of settlement offers one insight.

6

The politics of immigration, settlement and multiculturalism The politics of immigration, settlement and multiculturalism

Australian immigration has always been controlled by public agencies— first the British authorities, then the colonies, then the states and, since 1920, by the Commonwealth. In that sense, it has always been political. However, this control was very lightly administered over white British subjects once the convict system was wound up by the 1850s (later in Western Australia). The main object between 1831 and 1983 was to attract as many British subjects as possible by financial inducements. The first restriction of admissions effectively began in the 1880s and was directed against aliens (non-British) and non-Europeans by race (including British subjects). Most of these policies were introduced without much public controversy, either by legislation or by regulations and administrative practice. Politics in the usual sense of party disagreement and electoral campaigning has been less important to the history of immigration in Australia than these bureaucratic and legalistic changes. There was scarcely an effective party system anywhere in Australia before the 1880s, although there were elected Parliaments with responsible governments. These governments were formed by liberal and conservative factions. Organised labour formed the first modern political party in 88

The politics of immigration, settlement and multiculturalism 89

the 1890s. The party system consolidated into its present tripartite division of business, rural and labour by 1920. Other parties have come and gone but, despite very major changes in the size, location and composition of the population since then, the basic party divisions have remained. These parties did not divide on the major issues involving immigration. For much of the past century, there has been a consensus between the major parties about most immigration issues, as there has been about defence and national security. This is because all three have been related in the public mind. As a very thinly populated society isolated from its origins in the British Isles, Australia has been deeply conscious of its potential vulnerability. One answer to this, on which the parties have agreed, is to rely on a ‘powerful friend’—Britain until 1942 and the United States since then. This has meant taking part as an ally in wars which had no evident relationship to Australia’s location, as well as to those which did, such as World War II. Another answer was to limit immigration to British subjects of European origin. This limitation was never absolute but was enough to produce an essentially white British society by 1939 and one which fought alongside its allies in wars as varied as the Boer War, the battles in France, the Vietnam War, and in Iraq and Afghanistan. Participation in warfare was only limited by the small population and the lack of a major manufacturing industry—both problems which mass immigration after 1945 attempted to resolve. There was, then, partisan consensus on two major issues: first, that Australia should be British and white—endorsed as enthusiastically by the Labor Party as by the older-style liberalism of Sir Henry Parkes and Alfred Deakin’s newer liberalism; and second, that the population must be constantly enlarged and that the only way to do this quickly was by immigration. Labor and the unions were less enthusiastic about immigration during the 1920s, and immigration was suspended entirely during the Great Depression of the 1930s. However, it was the Labor governments of Curtin and Chifley which planned and implemented the massive postwar immigration program after 1945 with the active endorsement of the Liberal and Country parties. The only disagreement was that too many European aliens were being attracted. The external threat had shifted from China and Japan to communism, which the major parties regarded as a menace whose defeat required a close relationship with Britain and the United States. There was disagreement on this issue only within the Labor Party, which contributed to its

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national electoral losses between 1949 and 1969. The only criticism of postwar immigration policy from the Labor leader, Dr Evatt, was that not enough British were being brought out to balance the increasing intake from Catholic Europe. During the Menzies years (1949–66), the parties were united behind the credo that Australia was a British society, united against communism and reliant on a steady stream of immigrants to strengthen its economy and its ability to defend itself. Both Menzies and Labor leaders Evatt and Calwell subscribed to these attitudes. No politician could have been more enthusiastic about the British heritage than Dr Evatt, and none more rigorous about White Australia than Arthur Calwell. A new consensus emerged with a change of political leadership in 1966, cemented under Whitlam and Fraser. White Australia was ‘buried’ (as Al Grassby put it) and multiculturalism was adopted. Both were major reversals of a century of political traditions, but neither formed the basis for disagreement between the parties. This was an even greater departure from the past than the attraction with public funds of tens of thousands of Europeans after 1945. The remarkable feature of the changes between 1966 and 1978 was that, despite the bitterness between the parties over the dismissal of the Whitlam government in 1975, there was no serious argument about these major shifts in immigration policy. This continued to be the case at least until 1988, with the major parties (including the new Australian Democrats) agreeing that White Australia was dead and that multiculturalism was an excellent alternative. This was the new consensus (later dismissed by its critics as ‘political correctness’). The only exhaustive study of the development of multiculturalism—Mark Lopez’s The Origins of Multiculturalism (2000)—describes the new approach as the result of a political operation by a small band of Labor-oriented Melbourne intellectuals and public servants. This was certainly the case in Melbourne, but much less so in Sydney, where the New South Wales state Labor government introduced a major policy statement, Participation, in 1978. This was in the same year that saw the definitive Commonwealth support for multiculturalism, the Galbally Report Migrant Services and Programs. Once again, a bipartisan consensus was established which lasted for more than ten years. Multiculturalism was not accepted by the National Party under Joh Bjelke-Petersen in Queensland. But it was energetically pursued by the Liberal-led coalitions in the Commonwealth and Victoria.


Eventually, once Bjelke-Petersen had retired in 1987, multiculturalism was taken up by all nine Australian governments, regardless of party control. Each government created an office of ethnic or multicultural affairs, usually answerable to the premier or the prime minister; these included the Commonwealth Office of Multicultural Affairs, which lasted from 1987 to 1996. Mass immigration continued with consensual support, and the majority intake was from societies which would have been excluded under the ‘White Australia’ policy. Refugee intake came overwhelmingly from such societies, at least until the major intake caused by the Yugoslav civil wars of the mid 1990s. Settlement policies were designed to take account of the cultural and language features of the new intakes from Asia and the Middle East, a directly opposite approach from the assimilationism of the past. The Good Neighbour Councils, which had been the main advocates of the past policy, were defunded and replaced by Ethnic Communities Councils, with a national umbrella body funded by the Commonwealth from 1979. Commonwealthsupported Migrant Resource Centres were created under migrant management, but with Immigration Department supervision. Most of this was initiated under the Fraser Liberal government and pursued with even more enthusiasm by its Labor successor under Bob Hawke from 1983 to 1991. It was all too good to last, however. The strength of multiculturalism politically was that it appealed to a growing electorate drawn from immigrant minorities. Naturalisation was made increasingly easy until the waiting period was reduced to two years and the qualifications to a clean police and security record and a basic knowledge of English. The weakness of multiculturalism is that this important change in the electorate only affected a limited number of electorates, almost all of which were Labor controlled. It had no impact on most rural and provincial districts, especially those in conservative parts of Queensland controlled by the National Party. By appearing to deny Australia’s British inheritance, it alienated conservative elements in the Liberal Party. By encouraging cultural diversity, it annoyed those who had spent several generations building an Australian culture which, vague though its outlines were, was favoured well beyond conservative partisans. Even before the rise of Islamic militancy brought multiculturalism into question universally, forces were building in Australia which would undermine the apparent bipartisan consensus developed in the 1970s and 1980s. The most important of these were the shift in the internal politics of the Liberal

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Party and the consequent elevation of John Howard to national leadership of the Opposition in 1985. The consensus was quickly broken, revealing that it had never been entrenched in large numbers of the electorate.

What is Australian culture? The idea of a distinctive Australian culture was slow to emerge because of the competing claim that it was a British society. That assumption privileged southern English middle-class culture as the ideal, despite the reality that most Australians were of working-class origin and the majority did not come from southern England, or indeed come from England at all. Children were taught appropriate accents which bore little relation to their normal usage—precisely what happened in schools across England at the time. They were taught English Protestant history in which ‘Bloody Mary’ (Catholic daughter of Henry VIII) burnt Protestants at the stake but Good Queen Bess (Anglican daughter of Henry VIII) never persecuted anyone. Australian Catholics, not surprisingly, preferred to establish their own schools. These also taught English history, dialect and manners to children of predominantly Irish origin, but turned out to march on St Patrick’s Day. What happened in Australia between the 1830s and the 1930s was a mirror image of what was happening in the United Kingdom: the Celtic languages were driven out, regional accents were polished away and the glories of Olde Englande were expounded to the accompaniment of Anglican hymns. It was the age of Rudyard Kipling, poet laureate of the empire. As the numbers of the Australia-born expanded far beyond the numbers of immigrants by Federation in 1901, a counter-culture began to gain popularity. It was given force by the sacrifices of the World War I in which ‘Australia came of age’, albeit by fighting in a British war at the other end of the earth. It was founded by the Bulletin, a rabid supporter of White Australia and of Australian nationalism. It was adopted by the Australian Natives Association, formed in 1871 on the basis of excluding anyone not born in Australia. It was given force by the myth of Gallipoli in which Australians fought alongside New Zealanders in a distinct ANZAC formation. By the 1920s, this counterculture was firmly entrenched among the masses—if not the social elites—and soon afterwards it was also adopted by politicians. This nationalism was endorsed and developed by a wide range of interests: radicals and the RSL, Country Party and Labor, academics and journalists,


Catholics and socialists. It developed alongside the British culture, sometimes in tandem and sometimes in opposition. This uncomfortable hybrid was widely accepted when it came under challenge from the new idea of multiculturalism in the 1970s. One of its leading defenders over the ensuing decades was John Howard, leader of a party which had its roots firmly planted in the British variant so strongly adopted by its founder, Sir Robert Menzies. But the close association between the hybrid nationalism and the Labor Party had weakened with the change of leadership in the late 1960s, especially with the end of party support for White Australia. The Labor Party now had strong electoral roots in the non-British immigrant communities in the major cities. While the Liberals had cultivated Eastern European support with their anti-communist platform, they had failed to overcome the suspicion of the factory proletariat who made up much of the Southern European generation arriving between 1950 and 1970. Neither cohort had been brought up under the influence of Australian nationalism. Much of this was a mystery to them, with its emphasis on the bush where few of them lived and its apparent confusion between British and Australian loyalties, both of which were new to them. The notion that ‘all’ Australians shared a common culture and values was manifestly untrue, nor is it true for any comparable society—especially one with a large immigrant intake. The idea that Australia is a multicultural society, with a dominant culture created over the past two centuries, is much closer to reality.

Assimilation and multiculturalism ‘Assimilation’ was the term used to describe settlement policy in the immediate postwar decades. It is a disputed term. To many, it meant the disappearance of any characteristics which marked individuals apart from each other. On this definition, colour or facial features, which were inherited, made non-Europeans and their children unassimilable. This view was officially maintained as the basis for admission to Australia well into the late 1960s. The term also implied the adoption of majority culture, which was assumed to be uniform and self-evident. This attitude still surfaces in debate today. Most important was the adoption of the English language. An example of assimilation from the early postwar years was the official advice not to behave in any way that would attract attention.

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Assimilation would be complete when nobody noticed the newcomer, typified by a ‘competition’ conducted at Good Neighbour conferences: photos of selected children were displayed and delegates had to choose the ‘Australian’. The term ‘assimilation’ is still used in the sense of becoming culturally Australian, although its use for physical appearance has waned as memories of White Australia have faded away. What is really meant now is ‘acculturation’—the most significant shift being a shift to the use of English. Groups and individuals may retain such varied behaviour as religious adherence or food preferences, so long as they do so within the privacy of their own homes or communities. This was the oftenrepeated expectation of One Nation and other critics of multiculturalism in the 1990s. As a government policy, multiculturalism traces its origins to Canada in the 1970s under the leadership of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Both the name and the policy of catering to a multilingual population were adopted by the Whitlam government, elected in 1972 on a program which included the final abolition of the ‘White Australia’ policy. In contrast to Australia, Canada is manifestly bicultural: about one-quarter of its people, concentrated in Québec, speak French and are of French colonial descent. A bicultural and bilingual policy was inevitable in Canadian democracy, especially as there was manifest discontent and numerous separatist movements among Francophones. Moreover, Canada had also a history of substantial German and Ukrainian settlement in well-defined areas, and a series of treaties with its First Nations. While there was a ‘White Canada’ policy from the 1920s, it was not as rigid as its Australian counterpart and there were substantial Chinese, Japanese and Indian populations in British Columbia. Unlike Australia, in Canada there was a sound basis for the adoption of a multicultural approach which recognised the continuing cultural inheritance of many people, including those still arriving as part of a vigorous immigration program every bit as large as Australia’s. In contrast, Australian ethnic minorities were not based on long-resident settlement groups but on newly arrived immigrants. Exclusion of non-Europeans and preference for the British had made Australia one of the ‘most British’ countries in the world. The only significant minority, Irish Catholics, were well integrated at many levels of society and an important element in the Australian national folklore. In that sense, Australian multiculturalism was a more courageous departure from past traditions.


‘Multiculturalism’ has been defined in different countries in accordance with the local situation. It was reluctantly taken up in the United States, where human rights and ethnic relations have been defined and determined to a large extent in the courts, using the wording of the American Constitution and in response to political agitation. This led to such innovations as bussing, ethnic quotas in public appointments and redrawing electoral boundaries to take account of ethnic distribution. None of these initiatives has been taken up in Australia. Australian multiculturalism puts less emphasis on civil rights and constitutional protections than the American variety. It puts far less emphasis on cultural maintenance than in the Canadian version. It does not endorse distinct cultural development, as in South Africa. All official Australian formulations have stressed the supremacy of existing institutions and values as well as of the English language. Australian policy was not based on distinct enclaves but rather on what Al Grassby originally called ‘the family of the nation’. In other words, everyone would work together towards common purposes in exchange for common treatment. This was, however, a vague idea in its early stages, and there have been repeated attempts to define the essence of multiculturalism as it exists in Australia. Part of the problem with developing Australian multiculturalism was that there was no acceptable model from elsewhere. While Canada has influenced aspects of policy, there has never been any question of bilingualism in Australia. Canadian practice assumes that ethnicity will survive into at least three generations while Australia assumed that it would not, except in terms comparable to Irish or Scottish ethnicity within an English-speaking society. Canada has not linked multiculturalism to immigration, whereas Australia has and still does. No ethnically diverse society other than Canada seems to have been studied in any depth in Australia. The limited understanding of multiculturalism was compounded by the Howard government’s abolition in 1996 of the agencies responsible for research. Multiculturalism has been the responsibility of the Immigration Department for all but nine years since its adoption in the 1970s. Not surprisingly, the policy was seen by the general public, most politicians and public servants as being for immigrants who could not speak English. While policy by 1982 stated that ‘multiculturalism is for all Australians’, this was never effectively implemented or understood. For these reasons, Australian multiculturalism at the national level has had very little to do with culture and a great deal to do with

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immigrant settlement. Language was seen as the core of ethnic diversity. In practice, ‘multicultural’ in Australia has meant ‘multilingual’. The basic question asked in Australia was, therefore, how to ensure that non-British immigrants were integrated into Australian society. The term ‘non-English speaking background’ (NESB) was coined to describe the target group. To many, multiculturalism—with its concomitant emphasis on ‘tolerance’ of difference—was a gentler form of assimilation and incorporation. But it was one of the few policy areas in which Australians of non-British origins had a major input. It produced the remarkable Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), with its excellent international news service and more inclusive offerings than the much more generously funded ABC. Multiculturalism alerted service deliverers and public servants to the variety of their clientele. It could not, however, radically change the access of immigrants to political and social power. It did not challenge the predominance of English-speaking Australia-born politicians, public servants and opinion leaders. It is therefore often hard to understand why there was so much vigorous opposition. In part this was the reaction of Australian conservatives to the long years of Labor government between 1983 and 1996. But it also suggests an underlying hostility to ethnic change which was one of several factors explaining support for One Nation in the 1990s. For many years, Australian multiculturalism was limited in its vision by two concepts. One was that language was the most important indicator of culture, once physical appearance was officially discounted. The other was that quaint, amusing and enjoyable aspects of other cultures— such as dance, music, national dress and, above all, food—could be preserved for the entertainment of the majority population, while other aspects, such as different politics, religion, family structures, gender relations and lifestyles, would wither. The expectation that multiculturalism was a transitory phenomenon was unsound. It overlooked the possibility of a continuing intake of non-British and eventually nonEuropean immigrants who would pose new challenges to existing understandings of what it entailed to be an Australian. Since 1945, there has been a decline in the level of ‘traditional’ (i.e. British) immigrants, followed by the virtual disappearance since the 1970s of the Southern and Eastern Europeans who were the backbone of the first multicultural generation. The new challenges were posed by the increase of an Asian,


Middle Eastern and, most recently, African population consequent on the ending of White Australia. This shift in immigrant source countries since 1980 has raised several questions in public debate: • Can culture still be defined predominantly in terms of language? • Are ‘visible’ immigrants as acceptable to the public as ‘white aliens’? • Are non-Christians fundamentally unassimilable in a Christian society? • Are huge potential numbers from societies like China, India and Indonesia a threat to the ‘traditional ethnic balance’? • Is liberal democracy threatened by large intakes from illiberal autocracies? • Are cultures so different that there can be no compromise between them? Many of these issues were present in the past, but in a greatly modified form. Non-Christians, for example, were largely confined to a thoroughly integrated, prosperous and suburban Jewish population. Despite linger ing anti-Semitism, few believed that they presented a threat to Christian values and the recent adoption of the American term ‘Judeo-Christian’ quashed any remaining doubt. The ‘visible’ Chinese had been present for 150 years, had served millions of meals to Australians throughout the country, and had kept a low profile except in a few metropolitan strongholds. Many postwar Europeans came from dictatorships without affecting Australian politics at all. For the ordinary observer, ‘culture’ was a vague term at best and ‘race’ was losing its force as people in the big cities got used to different faces in the street. Over the last decade, however, the asylum issue, the increasing population of Muslim Aust ralians and international conflict have at times engaged public attention at a level of intensity rarely associated with immigration in the last hundred years.

Politics of multiculturalism What makes immigration controversial, and therefore political, is that it can alter the character of a society quite rapidly and create anxiety among those who do not want change. While much public policy is made as though only numbers and skills are important, in the political

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arena these are often given much less prominence than the race, religion, languages and ‘culture’ of those who are being admitted. Throughout discussion of the ‘White Australia’ policy there were several basic arguments involved which altered in time but were never fully abandoned. One was that the ‘culture’ of non-Europeans (or even of all foreigners) was incompatible with Australian traditions, institutions and practices. This avoided what a fierce advocate of White Australia, Billy Hughes, once admitted was the ‘silly’ argument that physical appearance alone was good cause to exclude immigrants. As racism became discredited, particularly by its association with the Nazis, crude objections based on colour also faded, though they were still given official operational approval as late as the 1960s. Immigration officers, under the 1958 Migration Act, were given the unenviable task of deciding whether applicants for admission were of sufficiently non-European appearance to warrant their exclusion. The basic reasoning behind this was that public opinion would not tolerate numbers of ‘visible’ immigrants and that this would upset social harmony. Previous arguments had been ostensibly more rational, among them the claim that impoverished ‘coolie labour’ would undercut the wages and conditions of unionised Australians. It is an interesting study in public policy debate to see the shifting arguments based on social and labour conditions through to simple-minded beliefs in the inherent inferiority of different human beings. These run alongside each other right up to the temporary political rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation in the 1990s, a century after they became central to the politics of immigration prior to Federation. Even so, what Gwenda Tavan (2005) has called ‘the long, slow death of White Australia’ seemed almost complete by the end of the twentieth century. Yet a new (though also old) argument was brought into the political debate, drawing some of its sustenance from arguments in the political and intellectual life of the United States and Western Europe. This was that there were important cultural differences between races, nationalities and religions, which led to conflict and should not be encouraged within the borders of a nation state through ethnic change via immigration. Arguments from culture were more acceptable than those from race, at least for an increasingly well-educated public. Racism based on physical appearance continued to appeal to young, uneducated males, as underlined by the Cronulla beach riot of 2005 and violence in some British cities. But the central argument of One Nation was not


so crude. It stressed, rather, that non-Europeans could not assimilate because their culture was different and they had no desire to change. It was further argued that, by living together in closed ‘ghettos’, speaking their own languages and worshipping in non-Christian religions, the newcomers were undermining Australian culture. According to One Nation and other critics, immigrants were doing this because official policies of multiculturalism encouraged them to do so. Arguments from culture had much more intellectual and political appeal than crude attacks on those who looked different. At its height, One Nation gained the electoral support of one million voters, with its greatest strength in Queensland. More significant, in the long run, was that One Nation’s opinions were shared by sections of conservative public opinion, and the media and by many Liberal and National politicians, seemingly at times including John Howard, prime minister between 1996 and 2007. Multiculturalism, although endorsed by all nine of the elected Australian governments (Commonwealth, state and territory), became a highly contested concept and policy, more so than at any time since its inception by the Whitlam government in 1972 and its implementation by the Fraser government later in the 1970s. The political attacks on multiculturalism, which began in the early 1980s, were taken up by the Liberal leadership in the late 1980s, and continued until the defeat of the Howard government in 2007. By then, the Commonwealth had dropped the word from the title of the Department of Immigration and had campaigned for a more restrictive approach to citizenship, including a written test in English which required knowledge of a variety of information about Australia. It had operated an increasingly draconian detention system directed almost exclusively against Muslim asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran, though officially applied to all unlawful arrivals. Recently, it was revealed that the Liberal Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Kevin Andrews, had instructed officers to favour Christian refugees and immigrants from the Middle East in preference to Muslims. In fact, there is plenty of evidence from the Censuses that this had been done for many years. All of this was given force by the theory of a ‘clash of civilisations’ which gained currency from the rise in Islamic terrorism and its attacks on the United States, Indonesia and Britain. It was not ameliorated by extreme and often silly attacks by some local Muslims on Western culture or by some Christians on Islam.

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Ethnic politics A multicultural society is likely to have multicultural politics. While the conventional liberal view of politics has been that it is based in social and economic interests and ideologies, in practice political parties in many societies are influenced by ethnicity and religion. Indeed, this has been very common outside the English-speaking democracies. For the past two centuries of representative democracy, ideological divisions between liberalism, conservatism and later socialism have dominated the politics of Australia, New Zealand and Britain. More conservative and more liberal traditional parties have fought it out in Canada and the United States. Yet, even in these two democracies, there have been strong French Canadian parties in the one, and a division between Catholic and Jewish support for the Democrats and Protestant and fundamentalist support for the Republicans in the other. In Australia, Catholics adhered to the Protectionists in the nineteenth century and to Labor in the twentieth century, despite a widespread belief that ‘politics and religions do not mix’. In New Zealand, there have been Maori parties and specific parliamentary representation for well over a century. In Northern Ireland, political parties remain based on Protestant and Catholic rivalry and attempts to import the major British parties have always failed. Two differing trends have recently become apparent in Britain. One is the fading of ideological boundaries between conservatives, liberals and social democrats towards something closer to the US model. The other has been a trend towards ‘identity politics’, with the growth of ethnic-specific parties in Scotland and Wales, which have eventually secured considerable devolution of functions away from London. Nothing similar has happened in Australia. There are no effective ethnic parties, nor is there any devolution on ethnic lines. Attempts to create a degree of self-determination for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders have not been a success. The creation of ethnic-specific parties, trade unions or even pressure groups has been widely deplored in Australia, though there have been a number of attempts. Catholic parties were formed in Victoria and New South Wales at the close of World War I, and Protestant parties were formed in New South Wales and Queensland in subsequent decades. The Democratic Labor Party (DLP)—politically significant between 1958 and 1975—was predominantly Catholic although it claimed to be the legitimate successor of the secular


Australian Labor Party. Attempts to form ethnic or Indigenous parties have withered much more quickly, partly because they do not have the potential for a mass base as do the Catholics and Protestants (at least in theory). A consequence of all this has been a lack of academic or media interest in ethnic politics in the absence of effective ethnic parties, and a strongly entrenched hostility towards their formation. Catholics have taken a major role in the ALP from 1910 but are now just as likely to be found in the conservative parliamentary parties. Electorates with large immigrant populations have been overwhelmingly controlled by Labor for at least 30 years, but they are predominantly represented by Australia-born parliamentarians. Yet most immigrants and all of their locally born descendants are eligible to vote if older than eighteen and naturalised (which the great majority are). There is a large vote of ethnics in Sydney and Melbourne and to a lesser extent in Adelaide, Perth, Brisbane, Wollongong, Canberra and Newcastle. The distinction should be made, however, between a ‘vote of ethnics’ and an ‘ethnic vote’. The latter implies a degree of coherence, consistency and unity; the former is only a statement of fact. Unlike the American, Canadian or Northern Ireland situation, there are few large and uniform concentrations of ethnic minorities in Australia to provide such a firm base for candidates of the same ethnicity. There are 30 federal electorates in which 25 per cent or more of the population use a language other than English in the home. Of these, all but one returned the Labor candidate in 2007, with the Labor primary vote in these seats ranging from 64.3 per cent (Fowler) to 45.3 per cent (Bennelong). There were swings to the party in all but one of the electorates (Melbourne), most notably of 16.2 per cent in Bennelong, where Prime Minister John Howard was defeated. As this shows, there does appear to be an ‘ethnic vote’ for Labor, but it is not uniform. There are very few reliable polling results for specific ethnic groups. The general wisdom among academic political scientists is that characteristics such as age, occupation and education are more important determinants of voting behaviour than religion or ethnicity. This, however, is just an assumption as there is no evidence to sustain or refute it, and it is not normally tested in election surveys. The ‘ethnic constituency’ is made up from a great variety of backgrounds. Elderly Eastern European former refugees from communism are generally accepted to be conservative. They are a declining element. Southern Europeans (Italians, Greeks, Maltese, Macedonians) are

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generally regarded as pro-Labor but are also ageing. The politics of more recent immigrants from Asia and the Middle East have scarcely been analysed at all, a major failing of Australian research. Areas of Vietnamese concentration in Sydney and Melbourne are strongly pro-Labor. The Chinese population is widely scattered and drawn from at least four major sources—Malaysia/Singapore, China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia—raising the possibility that a range of political views exists. As for Muslims, there have simply been no surveys of political allegiances. On the basis of this scanty evidence, ethnic voters appear to be loyal to the ALP and to have formed a strong base for more than one-third of its Commonwealth representatives, including national party leaders such as Arthur Calwell, Gough Whitlam, Simon Crean, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating. This suggests a relationship between a wide range of ethnic communities and the governing party. In 2006, all state governments were Labor controlled, with premiers in recent years from non-British origins, including Steve Bracks and Morris Iemma. But this is not a relationship of equals, rather of patrons and clients. Only 10 per cent of the House of Representatives’ members elected in 2007 were of ‘non-English-speaking birth or recent descent’, compared with 24 per cent of the total population of overseas birth, with another 19 per cent with both parents overseas-born. Most tellingly, there are no Muslims in the Commonwealth Parliament: one, a Bosnian, was defeated in a previous Labor-held seat in 2004 by a Pentecostal Liberal who proclaimed that ‘the Holy Bible is my Leader’. The state Parliaments are slightly more representative of the population, especially in Victoria and South Australia, and there is a substantial second-generation representation in New South Wales. Historically, Australian politics were relatively open to minorities and to social classes who might have been excluded in other societies. Of the 26 prime ministers since Federation in 1901, six have been Catholics. All but one of these represented Labor, while the sixth was a defector from the party. A different five were immigrants from the British Isles, although the last of these left office in 1923. There have been Jewish and Catholic Governors-General and state governors of Arabic, Aboriginal and Sri Lankan origin. State premiers, too, have come from a variety of backgrounds, including Lebanese Catholic, Danish Lutheran and Italian origin in recent years. But these are exceptions compared with the predominance of Australians of British


origin and local birth. The great changes to the population since 1945 have not dramatically influenced the ethnic composition of national and state Parliaments. Full participation in the political institutions is judged to be an indicator of integration, so Australia still has some way to go—most Parliaments are monocultural representatives of a multicultural society. Australia lags well behind comparable systems in the representation of ethnic minorities in its parliamentary system: New Zealand, Canada and the United States all have visibly multicultural Parliaments while the United Kingdom is able to include Muslims and other groups because of the large size of its two Houses of Parliament and the ability to nominate members to the House of Lords. Muslim MPs in Britain have taken a moderating role as community leaders in crisis situations, whereas in Australia the state has had to rely on religious leaders who are often out of touch with modern institutions and ideas. Electing role models is an important part of integrating minorities and canvassing issues of interest to their communities. There are other avenues through which influence can be exerted within the political system, however. An elaborate system of consultations was created under the Hawke and Keating governments, as it also was for discussion with Indigenous groups. A whole series of inquiries into major policy issues drew on a wide range of ethnic nominees. While these were not in any way elected or representative, they frequently had a better understanding of community issues than many who promoted themselves as ‘community leaders’. From the Galbally Report of 1978 through to the Howard government’s agenda of 1999, policy formulation in relevant areas has always had an input from ethnic individuals and organisations.

The future of settlement policy Under the Howard government, there was a move away from the term ‘multiculturalism’ and in the early years of the twenty-first century, official and political sources revived the term ‘integration’. This had already been briefly given official credibility in the transition period between assimilation and multiculturalism in the late 1960s. What it meant then and means now remains unclear. It differed from assimilation in being prepared for ethnically distinct practices and beliefs to continue beyond the first immigrant generation. It differed from multiculturalism

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in assuming that distinct ethnicities would fade in time, although religions and racial appearances might not. This was at least more realistic than crude assimilationism but tended to overlook the reality that immigration was a continuing process, bringing people of new ethnic identities from Asia, the Middle East and Africa, posing new challenges; it also failed to understand the complexity of identity within established communities. Neither multiculturalism nor integration overcomes the political problem that a large section of public opinion and conservative expectations remained assimilationist throughout, as discussed in detail in the next chapter. Insofar as integration has a concise meaning, it suggests that ethnic and religious differences will persist beyond one generation, but that these will be acceptable within the law and culture of the majority. This differs from assimilation in that differences do not disappear. It differs from multiculturalism in that differences are tolerated in acceptable areas such as food, clothing and physical visibility, but that large ‘diverse’ communities do not maintain their social practices, languages, locations and religions or organise politically around them. But, as these are all political terms, they mean different things to different interests. Those calling themselves assimilationists might accept a modest female headscarf, while those identifying as multiculturalists might reject the extremes of gender discrimination in some cultures. Situations vary between states and over time. Sixty years ago, immigrants were reprimanded for using languages other than English in public. Today, public information notices are issued in at least sixteen languages, many using a non-Latin script. Sixty years ago, men with beards were shouted at in the streets. Today, even public servants have beards. Sixty years ago, there were no Catholics leading the conservative parties. Today, there are more Catholic conservative politicians than Labor ones, nationally and in most states. All of these are examples of integration rather than assimilation. In his definitive account of the origins of multiculturalism, Mark Lopez (2000) distinguished four varieties of multiculturalism which were being debated in Melbourne in the early 1970s: cultural pluralism, welfare multiculturalism, ethnic structural pluralism and ethnic rights multiculturalism. Briefly, their distinguishing features were as follows: • Cultural pluralism idealises diversity, favours continuing state support for languages and cultures, and supports a varied immigration program, anti-discrimination laws and equal opportunity practices.


• Welfare multiculturalism stresses immigrant individual disadvantage and its remedies in social welfare and political and trade union participation to pressure states for greater assistance. • Ethnic structural pluralism conceptualises society as divided into ethnic groups with hierarchical advantages and disadvantages, and supports positive discrimination to remedy disadvantage and avoid stratification. • Ethnic rights multiculturalism conceptualises the ethnic population as predominantly working class and disadvantaged by the capitalist division of labour and institutionalised racism, and advocates policies to overcome disadvantage. This is a neat division, but it obscures the fact that people subscribing to all four versions have worked together quite amicably for years, and often do not recognise these distinctions. The same continues to be the case for adopting alternative terminology such as integration, cultural diversity, tolerance or inclusiveness. What binds the supporters of any and all of these together is a desire to be heard, to have access to political influence, to be free of personal and collective prejudice and to secure equality of status with other Australian citizens. This is the despair of intellectuals and ideologues who want to bind society together with definitions. The freedom to work to resolve problems, with a minimum of preconditions, prevents fragmentation and schism. The remarkable feature of multicultural politics since 1975 is that it has created organisations and loyalties which allow the expression of these common claims on society. Essentially, multiculturalism has been a pragmatic and liberal approach which has worked very well, if slowly, in shifting opinion, policy and attitudes. It certainly faces a challenge from Australian conservatives or Islamic fanatics. But it has frequently served as a bridging and compromising influence in ethnic affairs, contributing to social cohesion rather than separatist dissension.

7

Public opinion and social cohesion Public opinion and social cohesion

The attempt to understand Australian public opinion is hindered by a lack of systematic polling. While much is known, there is inadequate data to track shifts in opinion precisely and to fully understand opinion within segments of the population. Funding for research into immigration and multicultural issues declined markedly during the period of the Howard government, beginning with the abolition of the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research. Professor Ian McAllister of the Australian National University recently commented: More than at any time in the past, the design of effective public policy requires the assistance of accurate, informed social surveys. What aspects of social policy concern people most? How do people view the reform of the health services? What level of immigration do most people regard as appropriate for Australian society? These and a host of other questions can only be properly addressed if we know what people feel about these issues and how their views are formed and have changed over time . . . Yet Australia, despite a long history of innovative policy-making, has lagged behind other advanced societies in developing these critical empirical tools (in Wilson et al. 2005, p. 1). 106

Public opinion and social cohesion 107

By way of contrast, within the European Union (EU), annual surveys of public opinion are undertaken for the member states. Public opinion is measured by the Eurobarometer, which plots public opinion at particular points in time, enabling precise tracking of trends for each state. Utilising the data gathered for the annual surveys and specialpurpose surveys, detailed analyses are prepared. One of the subjects which has attracted special attention is the issue of racism and xenophobia, with reports published in 1988, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2007. The EU also funds the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xeno phobia to undertake independent research and analysis for the EU and member states. In addition, individual EU states undertake their own public opinion research. In Great Britain, detailed citizenship surveys took place in 2001, 2003, 2005 and have been conducted since 2007 on an ongoing basis. Each of the first three citizenship surveys was administered to some 15 000 respondents in face-to-face interviews, taking approximately 60 minutes to complete. This survey research is currently under the direction of the Department of Communities and Local Government, which has responsibility for ‘creating safe, tolerant and inclusive communities’. In addition, there is an annual British Social Attitudes survey completed by 3500 respondents. In Canada, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration conducts an ongoing research program to develop a better and ongoing understanding of Canadian attitudes. This includes a quarterly poll of attitudes to immigration. The Ethnic Diversity Survey of 2002 was developed by Statistics Canada in partnership with the Department of Canadian Heritage to provide information on the ethnic and cultural backgrounds of Canadians and included questions on identity, social networks, interaction across cultural groups and civic participation. With an interview length of 35 to 40 minutes, the questionnaire was completed by a sample of 42 500 people. A large targeted sample of this size is required to enable detailed understanding of attitudes and experience within the major ethnic groups and sub-regions of the country. In Australia, relatively minor and infrequent surveys are undertaken by the standards of Europe and Canada. Some research is conducted within the universities, led by the Australian National University. Small-scale, narrowly focused surveys are commissioned on a regular basis for the major newspaper groups, notably News Limited and Fairfax. A private philanthropic trust, the Scanlon Foundation, in 2007

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commissioned the first of a planned two-yearly survey of opinion related to immigration and social cohesion issues. The Scanlon Foundation survey reached 3500 respondents and took fifteen minutes to complete. In the attempt to understand Australian public opinion, one set of problems relates to the lack of systematic survey data. There is a second, general problem facing all researchers in public opinion research: that of interpretation. Some analysis of public opinion may best be characterised as naïve and superficial. At times, surveys seem to be more directed to furthering political agendas than to elucidating public opinion. Data on the most frequently reported component of public opinion, that which is related to support for political parties, provides a case in point. Newspapers regularly report minor shifts in support for political parties—an increase or decrease of 1 per cent—when such variations are meaningless given the margin of error of such polls, which is plus or minus 3 per cent. Further, the recorded failure of a number of polls to gauge the level of electoral support of parties demonstrates the fallibility of polling. The fact that polls preceding elections cannot yield results that are accurate within small margins serves as a caution for interpreting polls findings in the following discussion. Electoral polling may be expected to yield more reliable findings than the responses to a number of questions on immigration and settlement issues here discussed—electoral polling relates to real-life action (casting a vote) undertaken by the respondent, not some abstract concept which may have no immediate relevance in a person’s life. A leading Australian analyst of public opinion polling, Professor Murray Goot, has observed: Opinion polls cannot be seen as simply registering views whose existence is entirely independent of the method by which they are observed; opinion polls . . . construct opinions even as they record them. They put items into people’s heads; take the bewildering range of ideas, formed and unformed, that people have, determine which are the interesting or relevant ones, and then squeeze them to fit some very narrow categories; and having done all that, they report them as clear, simple and separate judgements even when they may be obscure, complex and interconnected (in Markus & Ricklefs 1985, p. 49).

The following analysis is not concerned with a narrow, overly precise reading of poll data; rather, the concern is with the trend of public opinion and with the contextual reading of poll findings. In interpreting polls, the concern is not whether a majority of people (above 50 per


cent) are found to be in support of a specific proposition; rather, it is with the reading of results in the context of the type of question that has been asked. The approach is based on understanding the logic of public opinion, of the types of questions that elicit near-consensus (whether positive or negative) and those that sharply divide opinion. In the following discussion, survey results are interpreted within three categories: (a) strong positive—above 70 per cent—related to the most general of propositions, which receive general endorsement in specific cultures and political systems; (b) polarised or divided—in the range 30–70 per cent—relating to questions on which the major political parties (and hence the electorate or polled opinion) divide and which necessarily evoke a partisan response; and (c) strong negative—below 30 per cent—relating to questions which are seen to be minority issues, such as conferring of benefits on others (minorities) and which, by their nature, will be viewed negatively by the majority of respondents. The issue of interpretation thus relates not to which questions elicit support above or below 50 per cent, but with the level of response within the relevant range determined by the type of the question.

Immigration as threat Immigration is a volatile issue, usually yielding a polarised response in the 40–60 per cent range, but with the potential in Australia to yield very strong (above 70 per cent) negative and positive responses. Governments concerned with long-term national development find it difficult to convince the public that a large immigration program should be maintained in times such as the present, with escalating economic decline and rising unemployment. At these times immigration may come to be seen as of benefit to only a minority (the immigrants themselves and/or their employers), rather than the national interest. As discussed in Chapter 3, there is a long tradition of politicisation of immigration and settlement issues. The key themes raised in such discussion were encapsulated by the English politician Enoch Powell, then a front bench member of the Conservative Party, who in the late 1960s rose to national and international prominence with his call to end immigration (and repatriate recent arrivals) from the New Commonwealth—the West Indies, India and Pakistan. His best known speech, which resonates to the present day in British politics and had its fortieth anniversary recently commemorated, was

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delivered in Birmingham on 20 April 1968. It encapsulates the major themes of anti-immigration opinion. Here is part of the speech: A week or two ago I fell into conversation with a constituent, a middle-aged, quite ordinary working man employed in one of our nationalised industries. After a sentence or two about the weather, he suddenly said: ‘If I had the money to go, I wouldn’t stay in this country.’ I made some deprecatory reply to the effect that even this government wouldn’t last for ever; but he took no notice, and continued: ‘I have three children, all of them been through grammar school and two of them married now, with family. I shan’t be satisfied till I have seen them all settled overseas. In this country in 15 or 20 years’ time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man.’ What he is saying, thousands and hundreds of thousands are saying and thinking—not throughout Great Britain, perhaps, but in the areas that are already undergoing the total transformation to which there is no parallel in a thousand years of English history . . . [The British have] found themselves made strangers in their own country . . . They found their wives unable to obtain hospital beds in childbirth, their children unable to obtain school places, their homes and neighbourhoods changed beyond recognition, their plans and prospects for the future defeated; at work they found that employers hesitated to apply to the immigrant worker the standards of discipline and competence required of the native-born worker; they began to hear, as time went by, more and more voices which told them that they were now the unwanted . . . There are among the Commonwealth immigrants who have come to live here in the last fifteen years or so, many thousands whose wish and purpose is to be integrated and whose every thought and endeavour is bent in that direction. But to imagine that such a thing enters the heads of a great and growing majority of immigrants and their descendants is a ludicrous misconception, and a dangerous one . . . As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the River Tiber foaming with much blood’. That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, is coming upon


us here by our own volition and our own neglect. Indeed, it has all but come. In numerical terms, it will be of American proportions long before the end of the century.

The immediate consequence of this speech was to bring to an end Powell’s prospects of a position in a future Conservative government; he was relegated to the margins of British politics—although, as an indication of the power of the politics of race, he won widespread public support. A poll conducted shortly after his speech indicated 74 per cent of respondents in agreement with Powell’s sentiments, and only a small minority (15 per cent) in opposition. Powell gave voice to the five elements to be found in modern antiimmigration opinion, distinguished from its pre-1945 version by its avoidance of overt claims of racial inferiority and superiority. These five elements relate to: 1. the assertion that the statements being made are reasonable, that they represent common sense, not bigotry or racism; 2. the issue of scale or proportion—the view that far too many immigrants are coming, threatening to swamp the host population; 3. the nature and transformative impact of the immigration stream— these arguments relate to character and essence, the threat to national character and sense of peoplehood; the immigrants are viewed as unassimilable, people who will not integrate into the host culture; 4. the uneven impact of immigration—its impact is not seen by (or hidden from) the majority, but is witnessed daily by those who in another context have been described as on the front line of social transformation; 5. the prediction of the inevitability of social discord—the idea that there can be only one outcome of the present course of events: social dislocation and conflict. When such opinion concerning the inevitable disastrous impact of immigration is voiced, it is given immediacy by examples of racial conflict, with reference to societies which have experienced the fracturing of social cohesion. England, the ‘motherland’ closely observed from Australia, has experienced many episodes of conflict involving immigrants over the last 50 years. Some of the notable examples include the 1958 riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill; the 1981 riots in the Brixton area of

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South London and subsequent disturbances in many cities, including Liverpool’s Toxteth area; riots in 1985 in Birmingham, as well as areas of London and Liverpool; the 1995 riot in Bradford, the first in which South Asian youth (rather than black youth) were centrally involved; and the 2001 riots in the Midlands and Northern areas, including Oldham, Bradford, Burnley and Leeds. These riots caused some deaths, left many hospitalised, including scores of police, and caused property damage counted in the tens of millions of dollars. In 1958, for example, mobs roamed the streets of Notting Hill looking for coloured persons to attack; brawls, disturbances, and Molotov cocktail attacks on homes were a daily feature of life for over a month. Attacks on individuals continued in the following years. In 1981, the Brixton riot left over 300 injured, including more than 200 police, with property damage estimated at £7.5 million and 3074 people arrested. One newspaper account reported ‘around 500 policemen in riot gear . . . fighting pitched battles . . . against mobs attacking them with petrol bombs, bottles, bricks, lumps of concrete—and guns. The mobs set cars and buildings on fire and set up street barricades.’ Lord Scarman wrote in the official report on Brixton that ‘a few hundred young people most, but not all of them, black attacked the police on the streets with stones, bricks, iron bars and petrol bombs . . . [and] brought a temporary collapse of law and order in the centre of an inner suburb of London’. The 1985 riots led to several deaths, including two Asians trapped in a burning building. For the first time, rioters were armed with guns and fired on police; 223 police were injured and one was killed. The immediate precipitating factor in many of the riots was conflict between white youths and youths of immigrant origin, some of the second and third generations. At times, police have come under direct attack for their allegedly discriminatory action against racial minorities and their heavy-handed policing; at other times, they have been caught in the middle of conflict between rival racial groups and left with the task of restoring order in a volatile situation. Urban riots have not been a feature of Australia’s postwar immigration history, with the notable exception of Sydney’s Cronulla beach riot of December 2005. This riot bore some similarity to British disturbances, notably in its genesis in conflict between youths who identified with the culture of the host society and those of recent immigrant origin. Other similarities included the role played by anti-immigration and


white supremacist activists—although they were less prominent at Cronulla than in the British disturbances—and the role of elements of the media in inflaming tensions. Some Sydney talkback radio hosts and newspapers made a significant contribution to fanning the tension that preceded the riot. There were, however, notable differences. At Cronulla, the Australiaborn youth and their allies were by far the majority—with a mob numbered by some estimates at 5000, mostly aged under 25, searching for those of Muslim background. The first day of the riot took place not in areas of heavy immigrant settlement, but in an area distinguished by its high Anglo-Australian concentration—an Anglo-Celtic, Christian heartland. Despite the level of public shock and media attention, the riot was of small scale and of relatively minor impact compared with British riots: the number injured on the first day was counted in the low tens, not the hundreds. The number of police involved was small and they sustained no serious injuries. In the days following the riot in Cronulla, there were retaliatory attacks organised by the youth of the minority culture, but while these retaliatory attacks were serious, they led to few injuries and only minor property damage. Accounts of their extent vary: one describes night attacks by youths in cars armed with baseballs bats, axe handles, pieces of wood and stakes, engaging in hit-and-run raids on cars parked in streets; there are reports of attacks on individuals and one random stabbing. One account suggests that the retaliatory group mustered 70 cars, another claims it was 50. Within days, a 450-strong police task force brought the violence to an end. The potential for a much more serious disturbance was certainly present at Cronulla and in the days following the riot. During the period of the initial rioting, people were knocked unconscious and the alcoholfuelled mob rampaged in the streets chanting for blood—‘Kill the Leb’, ‘Kill the wogs’. The retaliatory attacks were similarly violently motivated. But the full potential for violence was not realised, nor was the mass disturbance sustained over days.

The basis of social cohesion A conceptual framework is required for identification of factors relevant to social cohesion in an ethnically diverse society. A starting point is provided by consideration of contexts in which social cohesion is clearly absent, such as the 2001 British disturbances. There is no simple and

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uniformly agreed explanation for the breakdown of public order; rather, recognition exists of the complex interrelationship of economic, social and political factors. The social factors common to most analyses are readily identified: • the entrenched poverty which characterises some inner-city areas and industrial slums, areas in which manufacturing industry has declined and in which young people face a bleak future; • alienation and absence of sense of community, reflected in low voter turnout in elections, the lack of understanding between groups and the proliferation of negative stereotypes and rumour; • racial segregation—evident, for example, in the employment policies of local authorities and the de facto segregation of schools; • poor police relations, characterised by lack of communication, distrust, heavy-handed and insensitive actions on the part of the police, and suspicion, hostility and a sense of victimisation among the youth within immigrant communities; • failure to accept cultural diversity and to recognise the economic benefits of immigration; • politicisation of animosities, given form in neo-Nazi, skinhead and other anti-social and racist youth movements, and in the contemporary world, anti-Western movements among some immigrant groups of the Muslim faith. These patterns are given tangible form in the reports into British disturbances of recent years. Thus the 2001 inquiry into the Oldham riots drew attention to a number of associated problems stemming from low income, unemployment, poor housing, poor educational attainment and relatively low life expectancy. The British Index of Deprivation indicated that parts of the town registered within the lowest 1 per cent in the nation, with other wards in the lowest 10 per cent. While unemployment in Oldham was at historically low levels (around 4 per cent), there were areas of the town where for some ethnic groups it was close to three times the national average, with a peak of 21 per cent; among those aged sixteen to nineteen, unemployment was twice the national average. Further, much of the available work (about six in ten jobs) was in low-wage industries which were attempting to compete against the low-wage economies of developing countries. There were limited opportunities for retraining, particularly for those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi background, and they were


disproportionately provided with lower quality housing. Of the 11 600 employees of the local council, only 2.6 per cent were of first- or secondgeneration immigrant background. Racially motivated attacks by white and immigrant youth were frequently reported, and parts of the town were regarded as no-go areas for whites. The Oldham inquiry reported that there was ‘deep-rooted segregation which authorities had failed to address for generations’. The major government inquiry following the 2001 British riots reported that people lived ‘parallel’ and ‘polarised’ lives, that those from different backgrounds did not mix. Building on case studies of both dysfunctional and functional societies, researchers have sought to isolate the factors making for communal harmony and heightened social cohesion. In this research, a number of Canadian scholars have been at the forefront. Judith Maxwell of Queen’s and Ottawa universities highlighted the importance of common values, community engagement and lessening of economic disparities: Social cohesion involves building shared values and communities of interpretation, reducing disparities in wealth and income, and generally enabling people to have a sense that they are engaged in a common enterprise, facing shared challenges, and that they are members of the same community (1996, p. 13).

Others have understood social cohesion in terms of ‘an ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity . . . based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity’. This may be contrasted with the alienation expressed by those living in areas of social breakdown. As voiced by an Asian resident of a northern English town in 2001: ‘We have gone from assuming that most of our neighbours were decent and friendly to sleepless nights, footsteps in back alleyways and strange cars on the streets.’ In Great Britain around the time of the 2001 riots, attention was focused not only on levels of disadvantage and advantage—for communities with similar levels of disadvantage responded in different ways to the challenges and crises which they faced; rather, the British experience led to a focus of attention on the community itself. In preference to the term ‘social cohesion’, the concept of ‘community cohesion’ gained prominence. The Community Cohesion Review Team chaired by Ted Cantle explained in its report on the 2001 riots that ‘It is easy to focus on systems, processes and institutions and to forget that community cohesion fundamentally depends on people and their values’

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(2001, p. 18). The Cantle Report emphasised the role of community values and attitudes as the vital ingredient in social cohesion. A cohesive community was seen as one characterised by the commonality of vision and sense of belonging shared across faith and ethnic groups; appreciation and positive valuation of the diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances; the similar life opportunities of those from different backgrounds; and the development of strong and positive relationships between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods. Common to these discussions are five domains for the understanding of social cohesion, developed in the research of Jane Jenson (1998) and Paul Bernard (1999): 1. belonging—shared values, identification with the nation, trust; 2. social justice and equity—a sense of fairness and opportunity; 3. participation—political and cooperative involvement, voluntary work; 4. acceptance (and rejection)—legitimacy, experience of discrimination, attitudes towards minorities, newcomers; and 5. worth—life satisfaction and happiness, future expectations. This leads to the understanding of a socially cohesive community as one in which people identify and feel a sense of belonging and pride in their nation; actively participate in political, economic and civic life; feel that they are included in policies which promote social justice and equality of opportunity; respect minorities and newcomers and value diversity; have trust in other people and confidence in public institutions; are satisfied with life; and are optimistic about the future. In the following discussion of Australian attitudes, these factors are considered at the national and community level.

Social cohesion in Australia To obtain systematic data on social cohesion in Australia, informed by the conceptual framework discussed above, the Scanlon Foundation supported a survey at the national level and in five communities with a high proportion of immigrant settlers. The survey was conducted in July and August 2007, a time of economic prosperity and a historically low level of unemployment. The Westpac–Melbourne Institute of


Consumer Sentiment registered July 2007 as close to the high point in consumer sentiment, some 20 per cent above the long-run average. This survey was the first of its kind in Australia. The findings of the national survey—to the extent that it is possible to benchmark the results against questions posed in earlier Australian and overseas surveys—indicated that, in the ongoing process of fostering social cohesion, Australia was succeeding in establishing and maintaining a high level of positive outcomes within the domains of belonging, social justice and worth. There were also, as will be discussed, indicators of concern in the domains of participation and acceptance, with significant misunderstanding between birthplace groups and experience of discriminatory and hostile behaviour. With regard to questions which can be expected to yield high positive results, the 2007 national survey indicated that the expected high levels were attained within the top of the expected range. Thus a total of 96 per cent responded that they had a sense of belonging to Australia to a ‘great’ or ‘moderate extent’, while only 3 per cent had a ‘slight’ or no feeling of belonging. Ninety-four per cent took pride in the Australian way of life and culture, 58 per cent to a ‘great extent’ and 36 per cent to a ‘moderate extent’; this level was reached in earlier surveys in 1981 and 1995 (with a higher proportion in the ‘great extent’ category). Ninety-four per cent agreed with the statement that ‘in the modern world, maintaining the Australian way of life and culture is important’ (see Figure 7.1). Questions relating to a sense of worth and satisfaction indicated strongly positive attitudes—and a trend of increased positive response when compared with surveys over the last twenty years. When respondents were asked to ‘take all things into consideration’ concerning their lives over the last year, 89 per cent indicated that they were happy (35 per cent indicated that they were very happy and 54 per cent that they were happy). When a more specific question was posed, regarding the level of satisfaction with present financial situation, as to be expected the proportion indicating satisfaction declined, but 75 per cent indicated that they were satisfied with their present financial situation (18 per cent were very satisfied, 57 per cent were satisfied). When compared with two earlier surveys, conducted in 1981 and 1995, this was by far the highest positive result indicated. The combined satisfaction level

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Figure 7.1 P ride in Australian nationality, way of life and culture, 1981, 1995 and 2007 %

Moderate extent

Great extent

100

80

60

40

20

0

1981

1995

2007

Sources: World Values Survey; Markus & Dharmalingham (2008).

Figure 7.2 Financial satisfaction, 1981, 1995 and 2007 %

Very satisfied

Satisfied

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1981

1995

Sources: World Values Survey; Markus & Dharmalingham (2008).

2007


(very satisfied, satisfied) increased from 53.1 per cent in 1995 to 74.8 per cent in 2007 (see Figure 7.2). A key question relating to perception of social justice asked respondents whether they saw Australia as ‘a land of economic opportunity where in the long run hard work brings a better life’. Some 80 per cent of respondents agreed with this view, while a relatively small minority, 16 per cent, disagreed. With regard to issues that typically divide or polarise opinion, one key indicator for community relations is level of trust. A question relating to trust has been posed in identical terms in five surveys, with respondents given the options that most people ‘can be trusted’, that one ‘can’t be too careful’, or that it is not possible to answer. The 2007 survey, for the only time in this series and with a marked change since 2003, indicated majority endorsement of the proposition that most people can be trusted (see Figure 7.3). With regard to specific areas of government programs, which typically yield a polarised response, 52 per cent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that ‘Australia has an excellent government school system’, 36 per cent disagreed or strongly disagreed. Opinion was almost evenly Figure 7.3 L evel of trust, agreement with the proposition that ‘most people can be trusted’, 1983–2007 % 60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1983

1995

2001

2003

Sources: World Values Survey; Australian Survey of Social Attitudes; Markus & Dharmalingham (2008).

2007

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divided (46 per cent to 44 per cent) on whether government financial support to those on low incomes was adequate. Within the high negative range, a question concerning income distribution found that a large majority of respondents agreed (77 per cent) that ‘the gap between those with high incomes and those with low incomes is too large’ (see Figure 7.4). This is within the expected level of response: as discussed, it should not surprise that the majority among those polled, necessarily on average incomes, will consider that the distribution of income in society is not equitable. But of note is the finding that the level of negative response increased markedly between 1997 and 2007, the period of the Howard government. This finding may be seen as one indicator that the government was facing difficulties in the upcoming election. Polls in 1984 and 1987 had found that around 60 per cent considered the gap in incomes to be too large; by 2004, this had increased to 84 per cent, and was at 77 per cent in 2007. Figure 7.4 V iew of social justice, agreement with the proposition that ‘the gap in incomes is too large’, 1984–2007 % 100

80

60

40

20

0

1984

1987

1997

2003

2007

Sources: P usey & Turnbull in Wilson et al. (2005); World Values Survey; Australian Survey of Social Attitudes; Markus & Dharmalingham (2008).

Domains of participation and acceptance In addition to listening to what survey respondents tell us about their attitudes, we need also to consider what is reported with regard to social involvement and interaction. To what extent do people involve themselves


in political life, and to what extent in communal activities through voluntary work? Research indicates that the extent to which individuals show trust and engage in cooperative activities—the level of ‘social capital’—is directly related to the harmonious operation of their communities. Of particular interest is the concept of ‘bridging capital’, as developed by the American political scientist Robert Putnam, which is concerned with the linkages and networks established between members of different groups. Also of importance is the extent of negative interaction—the experience of discrimination—which may hinder contact between members of different ethnic groups and may lead to alienation from the wider society. Australia is one of the few democracies in which voting in federal, state and local government elections is compulsory. Whereas national elections in a number of countries attract the participation of fewer than 60 per cent of electors, in Australia the vote typically exceeds 90 per cent. The 2007 survey found that, of those who were citizens and hence were required to vote, some 93 per cent had voted in an election during the previous three years. Over the same period, 57.3 per cent of the sample had signed a petition, but only a minority were involved in actions requiring individual initiative. Thus, over the past three years: • 25 per cent had written or spoken to a Member of Parliament; • 14.3 per cent had participated in a boycott, while a similar proportion had attended a protest; • 10.5 per cent had attended a political meeting; and • fewer than 5 per cent had participated in a strike. Between 30 and 40 per cent indicated other forms of engagement in community life and in their neighbourhoods. The survey indicated that over 30 per cent of respondents were involved in voluntary work, most of them on a regular basis—over 60 per cent of this number, or almost 20 per cent of the total population, had involvement at least once per week. Some 38 per cent of respondents reported that they visited on a regular basis (at least several times a month) people of a different nationality or ethnicity in their homes. The strongest indicator of acceptance—or rejection—is the experience of discrimination. There is a lack of directly comparable research data on this issue, with the precise wording of questions relating to discrimination varying between surveys. The 2007 survey found that

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slightly more than one in four respondents (25.6 per cent) reported experience of discrimination over the course of their lives on the basis of their national or ethnic background; a much lower proportion (7.7 per cent) reported discrimination on the basis of their religion. Considering their experience over the previous twelve months, almost one in ten respondents (8.6 per cent) reported discrimination on grounds of national or ethnic background or religion. Of greatest concern, 5.8 per cent of respondents reported experience of discrimination on an ongoing basis, at least once per month. If this figure is projected to the Australian population aged 18 and above, it yields over 850 000 people who experience discrimination on an ongoing basis. Of all respondents, some 2 per cent (the equivalent of nearly 300 000 people) reported that they had been physically attacked, and a similar proportion that their property had been damaged; almost one in five (18 per cent) reported experience of verbal abuse, and a slightly smaller proportion (14 per cent) reported encounters in which they were made to feel that they did not belong. A number of surveys in the postwar decades reported the existence in Australia of a status hierarchy, with varying levels of acceptance of immigrant groups. While the proportion of strongly negative views has declined, a preference hierarchy still exists in largely traditional terms. The traditional hierarchy favoured immigration from English-speaking countries and people of European descent—or, in common parlance, white immigrants. The strongest opposition was to immigration from Asia; today, there is still indication of some opposition to Asians, although a new group little considered in the 1950s and 1960s—immigrants from the Middle East or immigrants described as being from Muslim countries—evoked the strongest level of negative response in 2007. The 2007 survey asked respondents whether they considered the balance or mix of immigrants from different countries to be about right. More than one-third (35 per cent) of respondents considered the balance to be wrong. These respondents were asked (in an open-ended question) from which country, if any, there should be more immigrants, and from which there should be fewer. The strongest support was for increased immigration from Europe and the United Kingdom (55 per cent of those who wanted the balance changed, 19 per cent of total respondents); the strongest opposition was to the level of immigration from the Middle East or immigrants described as from Muslim countries (50 per cent,


or 17 per cent of the sample), and from Asia (37 per cent, or 13 per cent of the sample). Within the domain of acceptance, it is possible to consider responses to two types of question in considerable detail—and hence to obtain a detailed understanding of Australian attitudes over the course of a number of surveys. Questions relating to the level of immigration, and to a lesser extent relating to settlement policy and the issue of cultural maintenance by immigrants, have been a staple of newspaper polling for some 50 years. These issues are considered next.

Attitudes to the immigration intake Analysis of polling over more than 50 years yields four propositions or generalisations concerning Australian attitudes to the level of immigration intake. These relate to Australia as a country of immigration, the volatility of attitudes, the key determinants of attitudes and the electoral significance of immigration issues. Proposition 1 holds that, in some countries (including Australia and Canada), public opinion is supportive of immigration in times of economic prosperity; its citizens see their countries as countries of immigration. In most countries, however, this view is held by a minority—the majority do not see immigration conferring significant benefits; rather, they typically view immigration with suspicion and consider that government action to cut the immigration intake is a high priority. Cross-national data is available on attitudes to immigration. Australia has participated in cross-national studies undertaken for the International Social Survey Program; in addition, data is available from polling conducted by some private agencies. The 2003 ISSP survey of national attitudes provides a recent measure of Australian attitudes in a crossnational context. The ISSP survey supports the view that Australian and Canadian citizens are well disposed to immigration, in contrast to those of a number of European nations. For the purposes of this analysis, comparison is made between attitudes in Australia, Canada, Great Britain and Germany (in this case, the former Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany). In response to the question of whether the number of immigrants should be increased, remain the same or be reduced, a minority of Australians (39 per cent) and of Canadians (34 per cent) favoured

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reduction, compared with a majority in Great Britain (76.9 per cent) and Germany (70.3 per cent). In response to the proposition that immigrants are good for a country’s economy, 70.8 per cent of Australians and 60.5 per cent of Canadians were in agreement, compared with 21.9 per cent of Britons and 28.6 per cent of Germans. When presented with the proposition that immigrants improve the country by ‘bringing in new ideas and cultures’, 74.7 per cent of Australians and 67.9 per cent of Canadians were in agreement, compared with 34.2 per cent of Britons and 56.5 per cent of Germans. Proposition 2 states that Australian attitudes towards the immigration intake are among the most volatile of issues polled. This is an issue with the potential to fluctuate across the politicised range—from 30–70 per cent—and on some occasions beyond. When Australian and Canadian opinion over the last 30 years is compared, Australian opinion is found to be more volatile; the peak of those who considered the intake to be too high was 56.4 per cent in Canada in 1982; the peak in Australia was 73 per cent in two polls, one each in 1991 and 1993 (a time at which the level in Canada was 47 per cent). When poll results are tabulated over a period of 55 years, there is division between three types of response: years when opinion is strongly Figure 7.5 Attitudes to the immigration intake, 1951–72 % 80

Too many

Support

70 60 50 40 30 20

72

71

19

70

19

68

19

67

19

66

19

19

64 19

63 19

61 19

58 19

56

55

Source: Morgan polls, in Goot (1999).

19

54

19

53

52

19

19

19

19

51

10


supportive, years when opinion is almost evenly split and fluctuates in the 45–55 per cent range and; years when opinion is strongly negative. These propositions are considered with reference to three periods: 1951–72, 1973–96 and 1996–2007. The standard question used in polling for Australian newspapers asks for respondent views in response to the level of the current immigration intake. While the exact wording of the question has varied across time and between polling organisations, respondents are asked if the intake is ‘too high’, ‘about right’ or ‘too low’. For the purposes of the following analysis, the ‘about right’ and ‘too low’ responses—both indicating support for immigration—are combined. Of the three options, the response favouring an increase in the intake is consistently the least favoured. The postwar immigration program began in 1947, distinguished from previous programs because for the first time the majority of immigrants were recruited from continental Europe, with a significant proportion from regions regarded by Australians as being of low status. This was the period known as the ‘long boom’, punctuated by three periods of short-term economic downturn. As indicated by Figure 7.5, there was uncertainty over the first ten years of the program, growing acceptance from 1958 onwards, with a peak of support above 70 per cent in four polls conducted from 1963 to 1967, followed by decline leading to majority opposition in 1972. As indicated by Figure 7.6, opinion was balanced in the 1970s, with a small minority in support, followed by marked opposition for the next fifteen years, with the exception of one poll in 1989 which indicated an even division in opinion. Opposition peaked in the years 1991–92, when polls registered over 70 per cent in opposition to the level of intake. For the period of the Howard government, 1996–2007, there are two separate sets of poll data, one the relatively consistent question used by polling agencies and a second employed in the Australian Electoral Studies conducted by academics at the Australian National University. The Australian Electoral Studies employed a somewhat awkwardly worded question which asked respondents whether they considered that ‘the number of migrants allowed into Australia has gone much too far, too far, is about right, has not gone far enough’. Both data sets yield similar results, with the findings of the newspaper polling presented in Figure 7.7. The consistent findings of both data sets are that, during 1997–98, support for the level of intake became the majority viewpoint and

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Figure 7.6 Attitudes to the immigration intake, 1974–96 %

Too many

Support

80

70

60

50

40

30

96 19

95 19

92 19

91 19

90 19

89 19

88 19

85 19

84 19

81 19

77 19

75 19

19

74

20

Sources: A NOP, McNair, Morgan and Saulwick polls, in Goot (1999); where there is more than one result in the specified year the results of the polls have been averaged.

Figure 7.7 Attitudes to the immigration intake, 1996–2007 % 80

Too many

Support

70

60

50

40

30

20 1996

1997

2001

2002

2003

2005

2007

Sources: McNair, Morgan, Newspoll, Nielsen and Saulwick polls and Australian Survey of Social Attitudes in Goot (1999), Betts (2002, 2006); Markus & Dharmalingham (2008). Poll results averaged for 1996.


support remained steady in the context of strong economic growth and an increase in the intake. There is one indication of a shift in opinion in the Australian Electoral Study conducted late in 2007, although not in the 2007 social cohesion survey conducted mid-year. Proposition 3 maintains that the key determinant of the attitude to immigration is the state of the economy, particularly the level of unemployment. There is, however, no simple, univariate correlation, such that level of unemployment is the only factor explaining attitude to the level of intake. Two other variables need to be considered. The first is the period over which a large intake has been maintained: after a period of large-scale immigration, attitudes may begin to shift without any change in the economy. This occurred in the late 1960s, and possibly in the second half of 2007, although inadequate survey data is available for 2007. Second, opposition to immigration may increase when one or more politicians who are able to command national media attention campaign for a reduction. The close correlation with trends of unemployment and change in the level of opposition to the immigration intake is charted in Figure 7.8.

Figure 7.8 C orrelation of the trend in unemployment and the proportion of those holding the view that ‘the immigration intake is too high’, 1974–2007 % 80

Too many

Trend in unemployment

70 60 50 40 30 20

19 74 19 75 19 77 19 81 19 84 19 85 19 88 19 89 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 95 19 96 19 97 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 05 20 07

10

Source: A ustralian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends (catalogue no. 4120), 1994, 2001, 2008; survey findings sourced above.

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The impact of politicisation of the immigration issue is also evident in Figure 7.8. The relatively high level of opposition from 1985 to the early 1990s reflects the political campaign against elements of the program, particularly the level of Asian intake, in this period; in the late 1990s, the impact of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party is evident; the counter-position, the impact of a depoliticised immigration program and deflection of public concerns by the Howard government, is reflected in the period 2001–03. It is a feature of Australian opinion that, while there is the possibility of high levels of support for immigration in times of economic prosperity, there is a very strong negative reaction in the context of mounting unemployment. There is also a consistently low level of tolerance for what is seen as unregulated immigration and threats to national sovereignty—a reaction captured in the campaign message of John Howard’s Liberal Party in the 2001 national election: ‘We will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come.’ Public opinion polls consistently reflect harsh views towards asylum seekers arriving by boat on Australia’s shores. A poll in 1993 found 44 per cent of respondents supported the proposition that boat people should be ‘sent straight back where they came from, despite what they say may happen to them’, 46 per cent favoured detention while asylum claims were assessed; and only 7 per cent were in favour of immediate right of asylum. A 2001 poll, held before the events of 9/11, found 50 per cent in favour of turning back all boats; in the same year, after 9/11, the level of support for turning back all boats rose to 56 per cent. The controversial issue of mandatory detention of asylum seekers arriving by boat found 71 per cent of respondents in support in 2001, while only 21.5 per cent favoured allowing such asylum seekers to live in the community while applications were determined. Once arrival of boats became infrequent, the level of concern eased; thus, in 2004, support for turning back of boats declined to 35 per cent. Proposition 4 says that, while the issue of immigration is volatile and can lead to large majorities expressing opposition to the level of intake, immigration is rarely ranked as a major electoral issue—a finding in marked contrast to overseas polling. In Great Britain from 1997– 2007—the period of the Blair government—concern about immigration and race relations increased twelvefold. In the years 2005–07, immigration and race consistently ranked in the top three British electoral issues.


In Australia, the Newspoll organisation regularly conducts a survey of the ranking of electoral issues. In eight surveys conducted from 1993–98, unemployment, health and education consistently ranked at the top of fourteen issues considered. Immigration was ranked last or second last in six of the eight polls; in 1997, in the context of the peak in popularity of Pauline Hanson, immigration rose to rank eleventh of fourteen issues, its highest position. In 2002, immigration ranked eleventh of fifteen issues, in June 2007 seventeenth of eighteen issues. In recent polls conducted by researchers at the Australian National University, immigration and asylum issues have received a similarly low ranking. Thus, in 2005, the top issues were health care, taxes and an ageing population; asylum and refugee issues were ranked fifteenth. A 2008 poll found the economy and the environment were the top issues; immigration was among the lowest ranked, with 6 per cent of respondents considering immigration to be of major importance.

Multiculturalism and cultural diversity It is a complex matter to unravel attitudes on settlement issues. Taking specific poll findings at face value can lead to misrepresentation— for example, the claims made from time to time concerning the level of support for multiculturalism. The following discussion separates responses to four different types of question: the first relates to the value of cultural and ethnic diversity, the second to general views of multiculturalism, the third to what has been termed ‘hard’ multiculturalism (the provision of government funding and other forms of assistance to immigrant groups to facilitate cultural maintenance) and the fourth to views on the desirability of immigrant assimilation. As will be discussed further in the last section of the chapter, settlement issues sharply differentiate the attitudes of immigrants (especially in their first ten years in Australia) and long-time Australians, those born in Australia to Australia-born parents. The long-time Australians are strongly opposed to government funding for cultural maintenance, and surveys indicate the consistency of their attitudes. Funding to immigrant groups is an issue easily politicised, reflected in the cautious approach of governments in recent years. Multiculturalism is difficult to sell in the electorate, although strongly favoured within many immigrant communities.

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Of the aspects of cultural diversity and settlement policy that have been surveyed, one type of question has explored attitudes towards new ideas, different cultures and cultural diversity. Five surveys between 1995 and 2003 tested responses to the general proposition that ‘immigrants make Australia open to new ideas and cultures’ and found consistently strong endorsement. These surveys elicited positive responses in the range 70–80 per cent. In 2007, in response to the proposition that ‘accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger’, 69 per cent were found to be in agreement. These findings are consistent with the proposition discussed above, that Australians accept the idea that they live in a country of immigration. A series of surveys undertaken by Professor Kevin Dunn and Associate Professor Jim Forrest between 2001 and 2008 in various states found agreement above 84 per cent with the general proposition that ‘it is a good thing for society to be made up of different cultures’. These surveys indicate that, when the issue of cultural diversity is raised in the most abstract and general terms, the level of agreement reaches the range 70–85 per cent. But, indicative of the lack of surety and strength of opinion, when the issue was raised in negative terms in 1988, a large majority of respondents (69 per cent) agreed with the proposition that ‘having lots of cultural groups in Australia causes lots of problems’. A second type of question relates to multiculturalism (as distinct from cultural diversity), raised in general terms. This type of question also elicits a high measure of support. When in 1988–89 respondents were presented with the statement that ‘multiculturalism is necessary if people from different cultures are to live in harmony’, 77 per cent were in agreement. In 1997, asked whether ‘multiculturalism has been good or bad for Australia’, 78 per cent agreed that it had been good. In 2005, the same question found 70 per cent in agreement. In the same year, when respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed ‘a policy of multiculturalism in Australia’, 80 per cent were in support. But when there is a suggestion of government action which might encourage separatism, support declines. In 1996, in response to the statement that ‘successive Australian governments have adopted a policy of multiculturalism, [a policy that] involves encouraging migrants to become Australians without having to give up their own culture’, 61 per cent of respondents were in agreement. In 2002, a poll asked


respondents ‘how much should migrants be encouraged to keep their cultural identity’: 52 per cent were in support of substantial cultural maintenance while 48 per cent were equivocal or against. A third type of question which elicits views concerning government support for cultural maintenance finds that the level of support shrinks to a small minority. Three polls in 1995, 2003 and 2007 asked for response to the statement that ‘ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions’; the first two polls found a small minority of 16 per cent in support, while the third poll found 32 per cent in support. As noted at the outset of this chapter, the logic of questions which raise the issue of government funding to minorities will necessarily elicit limited support and the responses to such question need to be interpreted carefully. The negative finding may relate more to the dynamics of majority opinion, which will not support the conferring of funding and other advantages on ‘others’; thus the negative finding relates less to the specific issues raised and more to the nature of such questions. But additional evidence bearing on this issue indicates that Australian opinion continues to favour strongly the idea that immigrants should assimilate to the dominant culture. The fourth type of question concerns the desirability for immigrants to assimilate to Australian norms of behaviour. When in 1988 respondents were asked whether ‘people who come to Australia should change their behaviour to be more like other Australians’, a clear majority of 66 per cent were in agreement. When two polls conducted in 1992 and 1993 posed the general proposition that ‘immigrants to this country should be prepared to adopt the way of life of this country’ there was a very high level of agreement, 87 per cent in the first poll and 86 per cent in the second; 13 per cent and 14 per cent respectively were in disagreement. A poll in 1994 made possible a clearer testing of opinion, providing respondents not with a statement but with options. Respondents were asked which of two statements came closer to their view: ‘Migrants should learn to live and behave like the majority of Australians’ or ‘We should welcome and respect migrants who have different ways of living and behaving’. Sixty-one per cent of respondents favoured the first proposition, that migrants should live like the majority, while 35 per

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cent were in agreement with the view that there should be a welcome and respect extended to those who have different ways. In 2003, the ISSP survey posed two similarly differentiated options: ‘Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial or ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views comes closest to your own?’ This question, although framed in general terms, yielded an even sharper differentiation of opinion, with 81.8 per cent in support of adaptation and 18.2 per cent for maintenance of traditions. The low level of support for maintenance of traditions is particularly notable when Australian opinion is compared with that in other countries. Thus in Canada there was almost double the level of support for maintenance of traditions (at 35 per cent), although in Canada—as in Australia—this was the minority viewpoint. A series of polls conducted in 1993, 1998 and 2006 in a region of Melbourne with high immigrant concentration considered the attitudes of respondents who were born in Australia, with one or both parents born in Australia, and almost exclusively of Anglo-Celtic background. This group was presented with three options for settlement policy. Immigrants should be ‘encouraged to fit into the community as soon as possible’, ‘left to fit in at their own pace’ and ‘assisted by government funds to maintain their own culture during their first years in Australia’. A narrow time period, ‘their first years in Australia’, was specified. Across the three polls, the consistent finding was that almost no respondents (2 per cent, 1 per cent and 3 per cent respectively) supported the govern ment funding option. In contrast, 79 per cent, 80 per cent and 83 per cent supported encouragement to fit into the community as soon as possible. The maximum support in the three polls for the laissez-faire option, ‘left to fit in at their own pace’, was 13 per cent. Three national polls, conducted in 1994, 1996 and 1997, elicited a response to the forthright statement that ‘immigrants to Australia should adopt our way of life even if they have to put their own traditions and culture behind them’. The results were consistent across the three polls, with 59–62 per cent in agreement. There is thus a large measure of consistency in support for the view that immigrants should assimilate to Australian norms of behaviour at the cost of their own customs—depending on the wording of the question, around 60–80 per cent are in agreement, with other poll


findings above 85 per cent. This is a finding of major significance for the future development of multicultural policy in Australia.

Patterns of response A number of senior researchers have considered attitudes towards settlement policy. Professor Ien Ang, one of the authors of the 2002 SBS-sponsored study Living Diversity (Ang et al. 2002), concluded that ‘there is a high degree of ambivalence about cultural diversity in Australia’. A leading Melbourne pollster, Irving Saulwick, has commented on the strong desire for unity in Australia. His findings indicate that ‘the concept of multiculturalism raised in many minds an emphasis on separateness rather than togetherness’ (Saulwick 1997 in National Multicultural Advisory Council 1999, pp. 91, 96). In 1999, Professor Murray Goot drew attention to the contradictory character of public opinion: On the question of assimilation versus multiculturalism, the surveys suggest that the public subscribes to both. It appears to recognise the inevitability, even the advantages, of a society which in many respects is culturally diverse while at the same time wanting migrants in other respects to be ‘one of us’ (1999, p. 31).

More recently, in a 2005 study, Goot concluded that: ‘Depending on how it is presented to survey respondents, statements about multi culturalism can be widely accepted, widely opposed, or can divide opinion down the middle’ (Goot & Watson in Wilson et al. 2005, p. 185). This judgment, with its depiction of variation to all points of the compass, is open to the criticism that it is too sweeping. Rather, there is a largely consistent pattern of response—certain types of question yield predictable types of response. This is further illustrated by the findings of the 2002 Living Diversity study: broad questions—for example, the question about the general benefit to Australia of immigration—yield positive responses at the level of 80 per cent; statements about the enjoyment of eating food from other cultures receive endorsement by 72 per cent; more specific statements—for example, concerning the benefit of cultural diversity—find majority support, but at 59 per cent; a general statement concerning the encouragement to migrants to retain cultural identity splits opinion, with 52 per cent in favour and 48 per cent undecided or against. And, as has been shown, when the prospect of government

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funding is introduced, there is majority opposition. The underlying reality, as noted by Irving Saulwick (1997 in National Multicultural Advisory Council 1999), is the strong desire for unity. Survey findings indicate that unity is understood in terms of a common culture.

Demographic and socio-economic variables The discussion to this point has considered public attitudes at a general level, with attention to responses to different types of questions and to trends over time. Also of importance for understanding of attitudes is the extent of variation across the regions of a country, and the linked issue of variation within populations—across a range of demographic and socio-economic variables, including gender, age, level of education and income. Geographic and population variables are interconnected because socio-economic variables are unevenly distributed across major cities and across the regions of a country—for example, occupation, income and age are three variables with differing spatial distribution. With regard to the impact of population variables on attitudes, there is a large measure of consistency of survey findings in the countries of the developed world. The 2007 Scanlon Foundation survey, for example, found the lowest level of support for the immigration program and lowest level of recognition of the value of cultural diversity among respondents over the age of 54, those with trade-level qualifications and those born in Australia to Australia-born parents. Conversely, the highest level of support was among those with university-level qualifications, those under the age of 35, and those born in non-English speaking countries. Studies of the electoral appeal in the late 1990s of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation movement provide similar findings. Polls indicated that its anti-immigration sentiments and critical stance towards policies seen to favour Aboriginal people were key elements of its appeal. In the view of one commentator, Hanson ‘tapped into a well of resentment over racial and ethnic issues harboured deeply by a small minority of Australians’ (Bean in Goot & Watson 2001, p. 163). The party’s strongest appeal was in Queensland, in fringe urban areas as well as in regional urban centres and their hinterlands; the fringe urban electorates were characterised by a relatively high number of unskilled workers in blue-collar industries, few immigrants and few


Aboriginal people, and with a high proportion of the population buying their homes; they were also areas of substantial population change. The party polled lowest in urban areas with high immigrant populations and in relatively high-income areas. Other electoral studies indicated that the party was most attractive to those in blue-collar employment, in socially and economically marginalised rural areas, among people who identified as Protestant and among trade union members. Similar socio-economic findings are reported from analysis of the Eurobarometer surveys. It is found in Europe that negative attitudes towards minority groups and support for exclusion are found in larger proportion among those with lower educational attainment; those who are self-employed and in manual occupations; those living on social security, including the unemployed, and among primary homemakers; those living in rural areas and country towns; those who attend religious services frequently; and people on the moderate right and far right of the political spectrum. Conversely, positive attitudes towards minorities are more common among those with higher education, of younger age, and with one or more parents or grandparents born overseas or of a different race, religion or culture from the respondent. These response patterns varied only in the context of questions concerning asylum seekers, which elicited a high level of negative views across the demographic spectrum. Thus there was a high level of support for strict limitation on the entry of asylum seekers among those with high educational attainment and among the young. Canadian studies indicate where there is less support for immigration: among women; those from the majority cultures (English and French speakers); those who are older; those with lower education; those who vote conservative; those from trade union households; and those in lower skilled occupations. The nature of variation in Australia is illustrated by considering the level of agreement with the proposition that ‘accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger’. In addition to the key variables of age and educational attainment, the response to this question also indicates that men are more likely to be in agreement than women, and residents of capital cities more likely than those living in regional centres and rural areas. There is also a higher level of support among residents of South Australia and Victoria than those of the other states (see Table 7.1).

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Table 7.1 A greement with the proposition that ‘accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger’, 2007 Gender Male

Female

73.9%

63.3%

South Australia

Victoria

New South Wales

Queensland

Western Australia

77.3%

70.3%

67.3%

65.5%

65.7%

Capital

Rest of state

71.7%

62.4%

18–24

25–34

35–44

45–54

55–64

65–77

76.8%

75.3%

73.2%

66.8%

65.6%

57.0%

State

Region

Age

Level of completed education To Year 12

Trade or diploma

Bachelor degree or higher

62.3%

66.2%

81.3%

Source: M arkus & Dharmalingham (2008).

Birthplace groups There are some significant differences in attitudes among members of different birthplace groups. The 2007 Scanlon Foundation survey provides scope for analysis of the national sample by three birthplace groups: those born in Australia, those born in English-speaking countries (ESB) and those born in non-English speaking countries (NESB).1 1

The term ‘non-English speaking background’ (NESB) is employed in this analysis as it is the most sensible term available, even though it is no longer the preferred terminology in official and academic publications in Australia. There has been an ongoing problem with the specification of aggregated groups, and not only in Australia. In Britain and Canada a form of racial terminology is used. In Britain the classification is ‘white, Asian, black, Chinese, mixed race’, even though confusing to outsiders and to those with a mind for logic and consistency. In Australia, the Chinese would be included in the Asian category, and the meaning of black would not be self-evident. In Canada, the currently preferred term refers to members of ‘visible minorities’, being ‘persons other than the Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race and non-white in colour’. Australians


The analysis by these three birthplace groups indicates a broad level of similarity in response to questions relating to the domains of belonging, worth and social justice, although more of the Australia-born—and for many questions the ESB—record agreement at the strongest level (‘strongly agree’). The Australia-born indicated the strongest sense of belonging, gave the greatest consideration to maintaining the Australian way of life and culture, and expressed the greatest sense of pride; on all three indicators, ESB came next, followed by NESB. The very high level of identification of NESB respondents is, however, a significant finding; thus 93.2 per cent of the NESB group indicated a sense of belonging in Australia to a great or moderate extent, 89.9 per cent took pride in the Australian way of life and culture to a great or moderate extent, and 95.3 per cent strongly agreed or agreed that maintaining the Australian way of life and culture was important. With regard to issues of social justice, when considering the proposition that ‘Australia was a land of economic opportunity’, the strongest agreement was from the ESB (85 per cent), followed by almost equivalent level of response by the Australia-born (79.9 per cent) and NESB (78.1 per cent) (see Figure 7.9). While Australia-born and ESB respondents expressed higher levels of satisfaction with their lives at the strongest level (very happy: 35 per cent of Australia-born, 42.7 per cent of ESB and 26.2 per cent of NESB), the NESB respondents had a stronger sense that their own lives and the lives of their children would improve. This level of optimism for the lives of their children is a particular significant indicator of sense of belonging.

have eschewed racial descriptors over recent decades, an issue of some interest which is outside the scope of this study. In the 1950s, the preferred terminology for non-British Europeans was ‘new Australian’; in the 1970s, the term ‘non-English speaking background’ (NESB) was adopted; more recently, the terms CALD and MESC/non-MESC have come into favour. CALD, referring to those of ‘culturally and linguistically diverse’ background, is not adopted in this study because of the misleading message that it conveys. CALD is used exclusively to apply to non-English speaking peoples, falsely implying that the English-speaking immigrants, who come from many lands, are not culturally diverse (that cultural diversity is somehow an attribute of the non-English speaking) and that English speakers are monolingual. The terms MESC/non-MESC, referring to immigrants from the Main English Speaking Countries/non-Main English Speaking Countries, is simply more confusing (‘non-Main’) than NESB without conferring any substantial terminological advantage.

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Figure 7.9 A greement with the proposition that ‘Australia is a land of economic opportunity’, 2007 %

Strongly agree

Agree

100

80

60

40

20

0

Australia-born

ESB

NESB


There is, however, marked divergence in levels of participation and in response to issues relating to acceptance, including reported experience of discrimination. Questions related to immigration and settlement policy indicate particularly high levels of divergence. The Australia-born have significantly higher levels of participation in communal and political life. Thus the 2007 survey found that 31 per cent of the Australia-born, 22 per cent of the ESB and 17 per cent of the NESB respondents were involved in voluntary work. On other indicators of participation, the level of NESB respondents was half that of the Australia-born. For example, 64 per cent of the Australia-born, 50.2 per cent of the ESB and 31.6 per cent of the NESB had signed a petition over the last three years; 27.2 per cent of the Australia-born, 26.4 per cent of the ESB and 13.5 per cent of the NESB had contacted a Member of Parliament. Only in voting, involvement in political protest and attendance at political meetings did the divergence narrow (see Table 7.2). There was also marked variation in the reported level of discrimination. About two out of ten Australia-born reported having experienced discrimination over the course of their lives as a consequence of their


Table 7.2 Political participation (stated), 2007 Australia-born

ESB

NESB

Voted in an election

93.3%

72.8%

61.7%

Signed a petition

64.0%

50.2%

31.6%

Contacted an MP

27.2%

26.4%

13.5%

Participated in a boycott

15.6%

14.9%

7.4%

Attended a protest

14.5%

11.9%

13.5%

Attended a political meeting

11.1%

10.0%

8.4%

Participated in a strike

5.3%

3.8%

2.7%

Total N

1427

261

297

Source: Markus & Dharmalingham (2008).

national or ethnic background; the proportion for the ESB was three out of ten (31.7 per cent) and for the NESB it was almost five out of ten (46.5 per cent). When asked about their experiences over the last twelve months, 14.1 per cent of NESB respondents reported discrimination on the basis of their national, ethnic or religious background, compared with 7.2 per cent of Australia-born and 8.4 per cent of ESB. Attitudinal divergence is consistently high in response to questions related to immigration and settlement issues. Thus twice as many of the NESB as Australia-born supported an increase in the immigration intake. The largest divergence was in response to the question of government assistance to ethnic minorities for maintenance of customs and traditions. Less than 7 per cent of the Australia-born and ESB were in strong agreement, compared with 20 per cent of the NESB. When those in strong agreement and agreement are combined, 27.8 per cent Australia-born, 27.5 per cent ESB and over 65 per cent NESB agreed (see Figure 7.10). Analysis of the 2007 national poll yields one additional finding of significance: with increased length of residence, there is closer approximation in response to the national average. To provide understanding of change in attitude with length of residence in Australia, overseas-born respondents were divided into three groups (or cohorts): those arriving in the years 1967–81, 1982–96 and 1997–2007. The responses to two questions are considered: those relating to sense of belonging and views on government assistance for maintenance of customs and traditions.

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Figure 7.10 A greement with government assistance to ethnic minorities for maintenance of customs and traditions, 2007 %

Strongly agree

Agree

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Australia-born

ESB

NESB


While almost all respondents (more than 90 per cent) indicate a sense of belonging to Australia to either a ‘moderate extent’ or ‘great extent’, those indicating a sense of belonging to a ‘great extent’ increased significantly with length of residence: 38.7 per cent of those who arrived in the period 1997–2007 have a sense of belonging to a great extent, this was 62.3 per cent for those who arrived 1982–96, and 72.2 per cent for those who arrived 1967–81. On the question of government assistance for maintenance of customs and traditions, 60.9 per cent of 1997–2007 arrivals, 49.6 per cent of 1982–96 arrivals and 28.8 per cent of 1967–81 arrivals were in agreement—compared with 27.1 per cent of the Australia-born. The level of involvement in community life, as indicated by voluntary work, increased over length of residence, from 9.6 per cent to 20.8 per cent to 26.3 per cent. These are important indicators. The survey demonstrates the success of forces working to integrate immigrants into Australian national life and into a shared value system.


Regions of high immigrant concentration As noted in the above conceptual discussion, social cohesion operates not simply in the abstract, the realm of the ‘nation’, but at the community level where people of different backgrounds and cultures make their lives. At the community level, as noted, a number of English towns are noted for their record of social disharmony. The 2007 Scanlon Foundation survey set out to investigate attitudes in four Australian local government areas of high immigrant concentration and relatively high socio-economic disadvantage: Fairfield and Auburn in Sydney, and Dandenong and Hume in Melbourne. A region of high immigration concentration in Brisbane, Stretton–Karawatha and Calamvale, was also studied. The survey sought to establish whether there were indicators of heightened tension and alienation in these regions of Australia’s major cities. The local surveys provide data to analyse the attitudes of four aggregated groups: Australia-born, with both parents born in Australia (termed ‘long-time Australians’); NESB Australians, whose first language is other than English, and two sub-groups among the NSEB. The findings at the national level are used as a benchmark to gauge the extent of variation in the regions of high immigrant concentration. The benchmark indicates that views are more polarised in areas of high immigrant concentration, but comparable levels of life satisfaction are maintained, with minimal indication of alienation. In response to most questions, the long-time Australians show little variation at the national and local levels. Thus, level of happiness over the last year (very happy and happy) is 89.5 per cent at the national level and 89.9 per cent at the local level; with regard to present financial situation (very satisfied and satisfied), the finding is 76.2 per cent at the national and 74.2 per cent at the local level. Among the NESB Australians whose first language is other than English, there is also broad similarity in response at the national and local levels. Thus, at the national level, 84.6 per cent indicated that they were happy compared with 81.8 per cent at the local level. With regard to satisfaction (very satisfied and satisfied) with present financial situation, 65.3 per cent indicated satisfaction at the national level and 63.9 per cent at the local level. A notable finding at the local level was the stronger sense of expected improvement in the lives of children, indicating optimism for the future: 35.6 per cent indicated that they

142


expected their children’s lives would be much improved, compared with 28.6 per cent at the national level. This is consistent with the finding that at the local level there is stronger endorsement (81.1 per cent compared with 77.3 per cent) of the view that Australia is a land of economic opportunity. In response to some questions, however, there is a heightened differentiation of responses at the national and local levels. Among long-time Australians, there is a lower level of trust at the local level (45.8 per cent compared with 55.6 per cent) and heightened reported experience of discrimination (10.3 per cent compared with 7.8 per cent). There is also a lower level of support for government assistance to ethnic minorities to maintain their customs and traditions (20.5 per cent compared with 26.2 per cent) and a marked increased in the number who hold the view that the current immigration intake is too high (51.3 per cent compared with 38.8 per cent)—although a clear majority (59 per cent) endorse the general proposal that ‘accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger’ (see Table 7.3). Table 7.3 Social cohesion survey, extent of agreement, selected questions, 2007 National long-time Australians

Local long-time Australians

Most people can be trusted

55.6%

45.8%

Government assistance to ethnic minorities to maintain their customs and traditions—agree

26.2%

20.5%

Experienced discrimination last year

7.8%

10.3%

Number of immigrants—too high

38.8%

51.3%

1062

307

Question

Total N Source: M arkus & Dharmalingham (2008).

These findings, which point to lower levels of social capital in areas of high immigrant concentration, are supported by the findings for the NESB groups. Among the NESB groups, there is marked divergence in the reporting of discrimination over the last twelve months at the local level (16.4 per cent compared with 10.7 per cent) and a lower level of political participation. NESB Australians are markedly less involved in the political process, and this is heightened at the local level—27.1 per cent at the national level and 15 per cent at the local level had signed


a petition during the last three years; 13.6 per cent and 8.1 per cent had contacted a Member of Parliament, 7.4 per cent and 2.2 per cent had attended a political meeting; and 15.1 per cent and 6.6 per cent had attended a demonstration. Of the two sub-groups surveyed, those of Chinese and Vietnamese background reported the lowest levels of participation. To investigate the level of disaffection, the extent of clustering of responses to six life satisfaction and sense of belonging indicators was considered. It was hypothesised that these indicators would most clearly identify respondents who were disaffected with their lives and alienated from Australian society. The responses of three sub-groups were tabulated: the long-time Australians, those of Chinese and Vietnamese background, and those of Middle Eastern background. The national-level data was again used as a benchmark. The five selected questions concerned levels of happiness, expectations for the future, financial satisfaction, sense of belonging and view of economic opportunity. The sixth response is a composite score for civic non-cooperation. There was little indication of significant variation from the national benchmark for long-time Australians and those of Chinese and Vietnamese background. Among those of Middle Eastern background, there was more of a clustering in responses: four of the five questions and the index of civic non-cooperation indicated negative responses at or beyond 15 per cent of the sampled group, including 15 per cent who indicated unhappiness and expected deterioration in their lives (see Figure 7.11). Four conclusions are drawn from the pattern of response: the proportion of negative responses is very low; sense of belonging yields the lowest level of negative response across the groups analysed; dissatisfaction with personal finances produces the highest level of negative response; and the strongest negative clustering is among the Middle Eastern background sub-group, at the level of around 15 per cent of the sub-group. The findings do not indicate widespread alienation, which would be evidenced by lower levels of life satisfaction, lower levels of national pride and sense of belonging, and withdrawal from community life. Modern societies are characterised by diversity of opinion and disaffection; as richer understanding of Australian public opinion is developed, the

144


Figure 7.11 Life satisfaction indicators, 2007

%

Disagree, economic opportunity

Limited sense of belonging

Civic non-cooperation

Dissatisfied, finances

Life will be worse

Unhappy

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

National

Long-time Australian

Chinese and Vietnamese

Middle Eastern


2007 survey may well be seen as indicating a level of disaffection and threat to social cohesion at historically low levels. The broad indicators point to a society that is succeeding in establishing and maintaining a high level of positive outcomes in the domains of belonging, social justice and worth. They indicate that sense of belonging, pride, identification, and levels of worth or life satisfaction remain at the high level that has characterised Australian society over recent decades. Belief in Australia as a land of opportunity continues. In terms of acceptance of minorities, nearly seven out of ten respondents at the national and local level (68.5 per cent compared with 69.1 per cent) are of the view that immigration from diverse sources makes Australia a stronger country. Over the last decade, majority support for immigration has continued in the context of significant growth of the program. Lastly, what do we know of those who are opposed to immigration and to cultural diversity—an issue of significance for the politics of immigration? What sense do we have of their proportion in the population?


Distribution of attitudes Overseas researchers have developed models to study attitude types within populations. A typology developed by researchers at the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia divides society into four groups with respect to attitudes towards minority groups: the intolerant, ambivalent, passively tolerant and actively tolerant. The key characteristics of each attitudinal type are outlined in Table 7.4. Table 7.4 Typology of attitudes towards minority groups

Attitude group

Disturbed by people from minority groups?

Do minority groups enrich society?

Should assimilation be demanded?

Support for repatriation of immigrants

Support for anti-racist policies

Intolerant

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Ambivalent

No

No

Yes

Not sure

No

Passively tolerant No

Yes

No

No

No

Actively tolerant

Yes

No

No

Yes, strongly

No

Source: Finney & Peach (2004).

The intolerant group displays strong negative attitudes towards minorities. Its members feel disturbed by people from different minority groups and see minorities as bringing no positive benefits to society. They have a strong wish for assimilation. They support repatriation of immigrants to their countries of origin. Those with ambivalent attitudes do not see minority groups making a positive contribution to society and support assimilation. But they do not feel disturbed by the presence of minorities. They do not support extreme restrictive policies on the one hand, nor anti-racism initiatives on the other. They hold both positive and negative attitudes. People who are passively tolerant have positive attitudes towards minorities, but do not support policies which favour them. They are not disturbed by the presence of minorities. They agree that minorities enrich society, so they do not want minorities to abandon their own culture. They do not support anti-racism policies, nor do they support repatriation of immigrants. Actively tolerant people agree that minority groups enrich society and do not call for assimilation. They support anti-racism policies.

146


On the basis of the 1997 EU survey, it is calculated that by far the largest attitudinal groups are the passively tolerant and ambivalent, comprising 64 per cent of the EU population; the actively tolerant are a minority but outnumber the intolerant. It is calculated that the passively tolerant comprise 39 per cent of the EU population (36 per cent in the United Kingdom), the ambivalent 25 per cent (27 per cent in the United Kingdom), the actively tolerant 21 per cent (22 per cent in the United Kingdom), and the intolerant 14 per cent (15 per cent in the United Kingdom). While this model provides a seemingly precise dissection of attitude types, its validity is open to question. The results are contingent on a range of assumptions, including the idea that clearly identifiable and distinguishable, rather than confused and overlapping, attitudes are held. A second model—itself open to the same criticism—is based on respondent self-identification. The annual British Social Attitudes survey has been tracking respondents’ self-description on a three-point scale: ‘not prejudiced at all’; ‘a little racially prejudiced against people from other races’; and ‘very racially prejudiced against people from other races’. Polls between 2000 and 2005 found very few respondents, in the range 1–3 per cent, identifying themselves as ‘very racially prejudiced’. Those identifying themselves as ‘a little racially prejudiced’ ranged from 23–30 per cent. The combined proportion identifying as prejudiced (‘very’ and ‘little’) is in the range 25–33 per cent, close to double the 15 per cent EU rating for the ‘intolerant’ in the United Kingdom. The second typology of attitude groups, developed by the leading British polling agency Ipsos MORI, is better able to deal with the selfdescribed racially prejudiced. It employs three categories: the segregationists, who display a high level of concern about ethnic or racial minorities; those with mixed opinions; and integrationists, characterised by relatively tolerant attitudes towards minorities. Applied to Britain, it yields 21 per cent in the segregationist category, 53 per cent with mixed opinions and 26 per cent integrationists. These models provide insights for understanding the distribution of attitudes in Australia, but cannot be directly applied as surveys adopting the same methodology and questions have not been undertaken. There are, however, indications that the level of racial prejudice within the Australian population is low by international standards.


Professor Kevin Dunn and Associate Professor Jim Forrest (Forrest & Dunn 2007) have explored Australian racism in surveys conducted from 2001–08. Respondents are asked, following a question on ‘racial prejudice’ in Australia, whether they disagree or agree that they are ‘prejudiced against other cultures’. They have interpreted their results as indicating that around 12 per cent self-identify as prejudiced—12.9 per cent in New South Wales (2001), 10.4 per cent in Queensland (2001), 11.9 per cent in Victoria (2006) and 12.4 per cent in South Australia (2007). This finding is around half the level recorded by the British Social Attitudes survey. A second basis for comparison is provided by the 2003 International Social Survey Program. One of its questions presented respondents with a difficultly worded double-negative proposition, worded in the Australian version as: ‘It is impossible for people who do not share Australia’s customs and traditions to become fully Australian.’ The results are provided in Table 7.5. Table 7.5 R esponse to proposition that ‘it is impossible for people who do not share [country’s] customs and traditions to become fully [country’s nationality]’, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, 2003 Australia

Canada

Great Britain

Strongly agree

12.8%

16.0%

15.9%

Agree

29.0%

24.5%

36.3%

Neither

16.4%

12.1%

17.4%

Disagree

31.0%

35.4%

23.3%

8.6%

9.5%

3.4%

Strongly disagree

Source: International Social Survey Program, National Identity module (2003).

As might be expected from the cross-country comparison earlier discussed in this chapter, the distribution of Australian and Canadian attitudes are similar, but the differentiation from the British is surprisingly small. Australia has the lowest proportion who strongly agree that it is impossible for such people to become fully Australian; when the strongly agree and agree categories are combined, 41.8 per cent of Australians and 40.5 per cent of Canadians are in agreement, compared with 52.3 per cent of Britons. In response to general questions probing levels of intolerance and rejection of cultural diversity, some 40–45 per cent of Australian respondents can be found in agreement. Forrest and Dunn (2007) found

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agreement in this range in answer to the propositions that ‘Australia is weakened by ethnic groups sticking to their old ways’ and there are ‘cultural/ethnic groups that do not fit into Australian society’. A more precise approach, which gives attention to distribution of opinion on a five-point scale and which employs questions that markedly polarise opinion, provides for a fuller understanding of a distribution of Australian attitudes. This approach indicates that the proportion of each of the actively tolerant and intolerant is less than 10 per cent. Indication of the proportion of actively tolerant is provided in a number of surveys. In response to the proposition in 2007 that ‘ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to maintain their customs and traditions’, 8.5 per cent were strongly in agreement. In 2003, in response to the proposition discussed above that people need to adopt the country’s customs and traditions to become fully Australian, 8.6 per cent of respondents strongly disagreed. In 1993, 7 per cent of respondents favoured an open admission policy for asylum seekers; in two polls conducted in 2001, 9 per cent and 8 per cent of respondents favoured allowing all boats carrying asylum seekers to enter. With regard to the intolerant, a survey in 1997 and two in 2005 found that those who strongly disagreed with multicultural policy in Australia ranged from 6 per cent to 8 per cent. The 2007 survey found that 8 per cent strongly disagreed with the proposition that ‘accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger’. It also found that 9.8 per cent of respondents were of the view (at a time of historically low levels of unemployment) that there should be no immigration to Australia. Other surveys have found that between 8 and 10 per cent of respondents indicate that they feel strong unease with ethnic groups different from themselves. Thus the core strongly rejecting principles of diverse immigration intake and multiculturalism in the majority of surveys ranged between 8 and 10 per cent. This seem to be the best indicator currently available of the intolerant—those strongly attracted to the politics of race. When those strongly attracted are combined with an ambivalent group, the proportion extends to 40–45 per cent of the population. The cross-national comparison indicates that all societies are characterised by a distribution of attitudes which, employing the EU typology, finds the majority of the population in the ambivalent and passively tolerant categories and a minority in the intolerant and actively tolerant. Levels of intolerance are found in all national


groups, and within all of the sub-groups of the Australian population. EU studies for fifteen countries have found that the proportion of the intolerant ranges from a low of 4 per cent to a high of 27 per cent of the population; the actively tolerant proportion ranges from a low of 7 per cent to a high of 33 per cent. Intolerant attitudes are more widely held by people living in Mediterranean and Eastern European countries and are at their lowest levels in Scandinavian countries. Cross-national data indicates that the level of intolerance in Australia is relatively low, but so is the proportion of actively tolerant. With a finding that up to one in ten Australians hold strongly negative views on issues related to immigration and cultural diversity, with a higher ambivalent group and higher negativity in some regions, there is little reason for complacency; this is an indication of the challenge to be confronted in the maintenance of a socially cohesive society.


8

Conclusion Conclusion

There is a regularity, and hence a predictability, to Australian immigration. The intake of the last 60 years is characterised by peaks and troughs, not a consistency of sustained population movement. In the context of the current global financial crisis, the intake is being reduced, although the cut to the permanent intake in the first phase of the financial crisis was relatively small. If economic difficulties continue, debate is likely to flare, encompassing nationalist as well as economic arguments. Polls will record heightened opposition. Some will blame immigrants for loss of jobs and increased unemployment, ignoring the role of stock market speculation and the failures of the banking system. Signs of such developments were in evidence in the first half of 2009, although the focus on asylum seekers by boat seemingly diverted attention from immigration. Population intake can be expected to remain at high levels. As discussed in this book, a range of factors will underpin future labour demand in the context of slowing domestic labour growth. These include the requirement to address the deterioration of Australia’s physical infrastructure over the past decades, to meet climate-change objectives, including the transformation of energy sources, and the demands placed on the health and caring industries by an ageing population. Immigration provides the only realistic way for Australia to satisfy its 151

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future labour needs. In the long term, under-supply of skilled and less skilled labour is more likely than over-supply. The notion that the age of immigration has passed is mistaken. Australia is one of the few nations to have been built by planned immigration. With no land borders and separated from its neighbours by long distances, Australia has been at the forefront of states which have succeeded in preventing illegal cross-border movement. It stands in contrast to the United States, the illegal or undocumented population of which, by some estimates, numbers 15 million (or 5 per cent of the population). The high level of public support for the harsh measures directed against asylum seekers arriving by boat reflects the historic fear of a nation which has regarded itself as a white outpost in a threatening Asian region, facing the ever-present risk of being swamped by the huge populations to its north. Australia’s immigration record is marked by major successes. Its policies and their implementation, together with those of Canada, have served as a model for emulation by other states. Detailed planning, monitoring of labour demand and tight regulation have been integral to the achievement of objectives. Australian immigration policy has first and foremost served economic goals, at no time more so than over the last decade, with increasing allocation of places to the Skill category and the finetuning of selection policy to make it more responsive to short-term changes in the labour market. The introduction of 457 visas and the onshore application process represent recent refinements of this process. In 2007–08, over 70 per cent of permanent resident visas were granted in the Skill category. In the Family category, only the most immediate relatives gained admission in substantial numbers; more than four out of five were spouses or partners of Australian citizens or permanent residents, admitted on provisional two-year visas, with permanent residence confirmed at the end of that period subject to the relationship continuing. Only 1000 parent visas were granted per annum where no financial contribution was made by the sponsor. The recent development of a guest worker or temporary long-term resident stream, which provides both full-time and casual labour, furthers the objectives of maximising economic growth and minimising cost to the state. Flexibility is added by the option of curtailing renewed residence permits in the context of falling labour demand. Such a program enables the state to minimise unemployment and other welfare expenditure,

Conclusion 153

transferring costs to the temporary workers and the countries to which they return. Problems may arise in implementation, however: European experience shows that it is not as easy to accomplish the departure of the unwanted as policy assumes and requires. The rigid control exercised by the Australian state has been central to the acceptance of immigration by a large majority of the population, as evidenced by public opinion polls over the last decade. In contrast, the limited ability to control cross-border movement in England—a result of the open borders within the EU, which recently resulted in an unanticipated number of arrivals from newly admitted states—has further contributed to the tensions surrounding immigration and race relations. The UK government in recent years has lacked even the capacity to record all arrivals and their length of residence. The diversity of Australia’s intake since the 1950s has also been central to success, a reality which is understood in government but little discussed. Australia diversified its intake from the United Kingdom and Ireland to include continental Europe and more recently Asia. The number of national groups migrating to Australia has prevented the formation of concentrations large enough to rival the established political system and culture. There has been no sustained ethnic mobilisation in opposition to the state, although there have been, and continue to be, tensions—to be expected, given the large immigration intake. This is in contrast to the experience of European and North American states, which face division based on language and other forms of identity. It is in the context of the feared emergence of what have been termed ‘ethnic blocs’ that cross-national linkages forged on the basis of religion have at various points in Australia’s history raised concern, most recently with reference to Muslim immigrants. Despite significant successes, immigration continues to pose challenges for the state, the host population and the immigrant. No country ever meets all of the targets of its population policy, a reality lost on many critics. The recruitment of immigrants numbered in the hundreds of thousands can never be fully effective; indeed, recruitment of a handful of staff by an employer often proves to be accompanied by problems. Labour demand constantly shifts; immigrants may fail to obtain work appropriate to their qualifications; some may have overstated their skills; others fail to overcome language barriers and personal difficulties associated with resettlement.

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A successful immigration program requires governments to act to maximise support within the host population. The Howard government oversaw revolutionary change in immigration, but failed to articulate a vision commensurate with the scale of its initiatives. Further, it ran down the institutions of multiculturalism and refused to meet the anti-immigration forces head on. During the height of Pauline Hanson’s popularity, the prime minister seemingly contemplated an electoral agreement with her One Nation party. The process of reconciliation with Aboriginal peoples ground to a halt following the refusal to issue a public apology to the stolen generations. In a typical response, in the immediate aftermath of the Cronulla riots Prime Minister Howard condemned the violence, but refused to acknowledge the reality of racial bigotry in Australia and its attendant problems. He commented: ‘I do not accept there is underlying racism in this country . . . I have always taken a more optimistic view of the character of the Australian people.’ The Howard policy avoided public discussion of the extent of change in immigration. Success was conditioned on strong economic growth and the harsh policy applied to asylum seekers who reached Australia by boat, creating confidence in the electorate that the government could be trusted to control population issues in the national interest. The Rudd government elected in November 2007 minimised change, in marked contrast to earlier Labor governments. Some of the most criticised features of the asylum policy, such as mandatory detention of children, had been modified or ended in the last Howard years. Following the election, further reforms were instituted, notably speeding up of the processing of asylum applications, moving people assessed as low risk out of detention and scrapping temporary protection visas. In June 2009 legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives to end the daily charge imposed on those placed in detention to cover the cost of their imprisonment, a charge that very few had been able to pay. But the mandatory detention system and off-shore processing remained in place. Rudd Labor thus minimised change and continued the low-profile approach. At the Prime Minister’s much-publicised 2020 Summit, immigration was given no priority. Deputy Prime Minister Julia Gillard took up the newly created Ministry for Social Inclusion. Her Social Inclusion Board, announced in May 2008, had no brief to deal with problems specific to immigrants. When, six months later in December

Conclusion 155

2008, the Australian Multicultural Advisory Council was reconstituted, having been allowed to lapse under the Howard government, the person chosen as its chair was Andrew Demetriou, the chief executive of the Australian Football League, a high-profile public figure without a record of substantial work or achievement in immigrant communities. These developments seemed to point to the low priority accorded to multiculturalism, serving to keep the government at arm’s length from what in past years had been termed the ‘ethnic lobby’. The objective seemed to be to avoid the politicisation of immigration which had characterised the Hawke and Keating years, informed by understanding of the limited electoral appeal of government funding of multicultural initiatives. Yet, in the context of the magnitude of the population changes underway, the minimal-risk policy seems unviable. If net migration remains at a level close to 200 000 per annum, there are urgent settlement issues to be considered—a reality highlighted in July 2008 by Victorian Premier John Brumby, who voiced concern that his state was reaching the limit of its capacity to integrate immigrants. If the past can be taken as a guide, most of the additional population in the next 50 years will reside in much the same places where people live now. This entails substantial growth in the four largest population concentrations: Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane–Southeast Queensland and Perth. There are considerable planning issues for these cities, already facing housing shortfalls and the urgent need for upgrading of water supplies, transport facilities, ports, energy and communications. The scope for informed and independent input into decision-making has been lessened by the cutting back of research capacity over the last ten years. At the outset of this book, the observation of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship Chris Evans that ‘there will always be a race debate’ was noted. He seemingly shrugged off the consequences of racism, failing to address the question of what governments can and will do to minimise its impact. By contrast, the EU, recognising a major problem, invests in research and monitoring of attitudes and supports government initiatives to lessen racism and xenophobia. The year 1997 was proclaimed the European Year Against Racism, 2007 the European Year of Equal Opportunity for All and 2008 the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue.

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In the last four months of 2008 150 racially motivated attacks were reported in two western local government areas of Melbourne, with a number of students hospitalised, some with life-threatening injuries. Immigrants from India and Sri Lanka were reportedly in fear of going out at night. Dr Zhongjun Cao, a Victoria University academic, was killed in January 2008 by youths in the Melbourne suburb of Footscray who were out for an evening’s Asian bashing. In May 2009 the issue of racial violence rose to front-page news in Australia—and in India. In Melbourne one student was bashed and robbed on a train, a second was stabbed as he walked alone at night, four others were attacked at a party with a screwdriver. Some 2000 Indian students marched from the hospital where the latest victim lay in a coma to Flinders Street station, the centre of the city, where their demonstration ended many hours later in a confrontation with police. Demonstrations were also held in Sydney. Protests were conveyed from the Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to their Australian counterparts, while the Indian Head of Mission was instructed to establish contact with student groups in Australia. The Indian press quoted Victorian Opposition leader Ted Baillieu’s statement that assaults on students had been going on for three years without effective government intervention: ‘sadly . . . the problem’s got worse, not better’ (The Age, 29 May, 2 June 2009). In Australia, concerns were voiced not only for the safety of students, but for the future of the multibillion overseas-student market. It was reported by The Age that of the Indian students in Australia, 40 per cent were in Victoria, contributing $4.5 billion to the economy. A central theme of this book has been the difficulty of implementing a successful immigration program. There are no simple solutions, but the minimisation of problems requires explanation and selling of policy, as recognised in May 2008 by Minister Evans in his call for a ‘great national debate’—still to take place—over the ‘new demands and realities of immigration’. There is also need to build on the successes of settlement policy, notably of the Australian form of multiculturalism. Recent experience suggests that massively expensive public relations campaigns around public policy issues are counter-productive. However, lower key approaches and the encouragement of organisations and individuals working to implement multicultural settlement policies were very effective in the 1980s, and even in the more turbulent 1990s.

Conclusion 157

The treatment of Islamic issues and the local Muslim communities is currently crucial. It requires a more responsible attitude by some Muslim clerics and closer consultation between politicians, public servants, journalists, academics and religious leaders along lines commonly developed between 1975 and 1995. Isolating refugees or any ethnic or religious group is undesirable in a stable and harmonious society. This needs to be urged consistently, issues need to be debated but in an atmosphere of tolerance which recognises the reality that ethnic diversity is here to stay. The retreat from multiculturalism at the national level in the decade from the mid-1990s has not been helpful in dealing with the difficult issues which necessarily accompany a large immigration program. The retreat rested too centrally on nationalist rhetoric, naive assimilationist expectations, fears of the unfamiliar and the mobilisation of all of these for immediate electoral gain. It had an inadequate basis in knowledge of ethnic and community relationships, both in Australia and in other comparable societies. It undid much of the official attempts to present diversity as positive rather than problematic. Multiculturalism has by no means been abandoned yet, though it might have been had the 2007 election result been different. A return to a positive and consensual support for the changes of the past 50 years requires firm political leadership, a responsible media, continuing professional research, effective settlement and employment strategies, and institutions to limit prejudice in employment, migrant selection and social mobility. Successive governments—Commonwealth and state—have been much more effective in these areas than in the intractable area of Indigenous equality. But managing a multicultural society still depends on public policies and political arrangements which are positive, optimistic and effectively based on empirical evidence rather than grand theories, rhetoric or nostalgia for a lost past. It is unfortunate that the voices denouncing what they term ‘social engineering’ and ‘political correctness’ are still loud and well placed in the print media and on commercial radio. Talkback radio has played a particularly critical role in Sydney, expressing very conservative views on immigration and ethnic issues as in the United States. Australia has become a multicultural society as a result of public policy developed within a democratic political framework. Each major change in direction was achieved with a high degree of consensus, however radical a departure it was from past practice and beliefs.

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Australia is certainly not the most multicultural society in the world and there is little likelihood of it becoming so in the foreseeable future. However, it does contain significant populations which would not have been accepted in the past. Australian multiculturalism is a means of approaching real issues, not a utopian ideology. It goes beyond the concept of a nation state based on a homogenous nationality to take account of an increasingly globalised world. In that world, people will move between states and expect equal treatment within states in which they were not born. People of one religion will live within societies dominated by other faiths and expect to be left alone to practise their own beliefs. To a large extent, that already happens in Australia. But recent years have seen a revival of narrow concepts of national identity and alarmist concepts of inevitable conflict between different value systems. There are two possible models for managing the increasing ethnic diversity of Australia society. One asserts the rights of the majority over minorities. The other works for compromise and cooperation. In our view, the second model makes a lot more sense in the modern world.

Further reading and references Further reading and references

Chapter 1 Australia’s immigration revolution Clyne, M. Hajek, J. and Kipp, S. (2008), ‘A tale of two multilingual cities in a multicultural continent’, People and Place, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1–8. Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) (2008a), Immigration Update, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra, <www.immi.gov.au/ media/publications/statistics>, accessed 8 April 2009. ——(2008b), Population Flows: Immigration aspects, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra, <www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics/ popflows2007-08/PopFlows_09_whole.pdf>, accessed 8 April 2009. ——(2008c), Settler Arrivals, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra, <www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics>, accessed 8 April 2009. ——(2008d), The People of Australia: Statistics from the 2006 Census, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra, <www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/ research>, accessed 8 April 2009. Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001), Immigration: Federation to century’s end 1901–2000, <www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics>, accessed 8 April 2009. Hugo, Graeme (2004), ‘Temporary migration: A new paradigm of international migration’, Research Note, no. 46, Parliamentary Library, <www.aph.gov.au/ library/pubs/rn/2003-04/04rn46.htm>, accessed 8 April 2009. Price, Charles (1974), The Great White Walls Are Built, Australian National University Press, Canberra. Robertson, Roland and Scholte, Jan Aart (editors-in-chief) (2006), Encyclopedia of Globalization, Routledge, London. Rowthorn, Bob (2008), ‘Cherry picking: A dubious practice’, Canadian Diversity, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 30–5. 159

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Chapter 2 Population issues Access Economics (2008), Migrants Fiscal Impact Model: 2008 update, prepared for the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Access Economics, Canberra. Bijak, J., Kupiszewska, D., Kupiszewski, M., Saczuk, K. and Kicinger, A. (2007), ‘Population and labour force projections for 27 European countries, 2002–2052: Impact of international migration on population ageing’, European Journal of Population, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 1–31. Commission of the European Communities (2005), ‘Confronting demographic change: A new solidarity between the generations’, Green Paper, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels. Commonwealth of Australia (2007), The Intergenerational Report 2007, Department of the Treasury, Canberra. House of Lords, Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2008), The Economic Impact of Immigration. Volume 1: Report, HL Paper 82-I, House of Lords, London. International Labour Office (ILO) (2007), Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 5th edn, ILO, Geneva. Jackson, Richard and Howe, Neil with Rebecca Strauss and Keisuke Nakashima (2008), The Graying of the Great Powers, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC. Jain, Sunil (2005), ‘Graduates in India? 48.7 million’, , accessed 8 April 2009. Lueth, Eric and Ruiz-Arranz, Marta (2006), A Gravity Model of Workers’ Remittances, IMF Working Paper, <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06290.pdf>, accessed 8 April 2009. McDonald, Peter (2006), ‘Low fertility and the state: The efficacy of policy’, Population and Development Review, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 485–510. McDonald, Peter and Kippen, Rebecca (2001), ‘Labor supply prospects in 16 developed countries, 2000–2050’, Population and Development Review, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 1–32. Martin, Philip (2005), Migrants in the Global Labor Market, Global Commission on International Migration, Geneva. OECD (2007), International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2007 edition, OECD, Paris. Pew Global Attitudes Project (2007), ‘World publics welcome global trade—but not immigration’, Pew Research Center, 4 October 2007, , accessed 8 April 2009. Triandafyllidou, Anna and Gropas, Ruby (2007), European Immigration: A sourcebook, Ashgate, Aldershot. United Nations Population Division (2007), World Population Prospects: The 2006 revision, UN Population Division, New York. ——(2008), World Population Policies 2007, UN Population Division, New York, <www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2007/wpp2007.htm>, accessed 8 April 2009. Vienna Institute of Demography (2008), European Demographic Data Sheet 2008, <www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/datasheet/download/sources_notes_datasheet2008.pdf>, accessed 8 April 2009. World Bank (2008a), Migration and Remittances Factbook, <www.worldbank.org/ prospects/migrationandremittances>, accessed 8 April 2009. ——(2008b), Trade research: Migration and remittances, , accessed 8 April 2009.

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Chapter 3 Immigration and the nation state Bauböck, Rainer, Heller, Agnes and Zolberg, Aristide (eds) (1996), The Challenge of Diversity, Avebury, Aldershot. Betts, Katharine (1999), The Great Divide, Duffy & Snellgrove, Sydney. Bouchard, Gerard (2008), The Making of the Nations and Cultures of the New World, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal. Cairns, Alan C., Courtney, John C., MacKinnon, Peter, Michelmann, Hans J. and Smith, David E. (eds) (1999), Citizenship, Diversity and Pluralism, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal. Castles, Stephen and Miller, Mark (1998), The Age of Migration, Guilford Press, New York. Hammar, Tomas (1990), Democracy and the Nation State, Aldershot, Avebury. Hechter, Michael (2000), Containing Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Huntington, Samuel P. (1996), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York. Joppke, Christian (1999), Immigration and the Nation State, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Kymlicka, Will and Norman, Wayne (eds) (2000), Citizenship in Diverse Societies, Oxford University Press, Oxford. McGarry, John and Keating, Michael (eds) (2006), European Integration and the Nationalities Question, Routledge, Abingdon. Uçarer, Emek and Puchala, Donald (eds) (1997), Immigration into Western Societies, Pinter, London. UNHCR, ‘Asylum applications submitted in 30 industrialised countries, 1992–2001’, <www.arena.uio.no/sources/jpa/dublin/unhcr/30countries.pdf>, accessed 8 April 2009. US Census Bureau (2007), American Community Survey, B03002, Hispanic or Latino origin by race, , accessed 8 April 2009. Chapter 4 Immigration policy Australian Bureau of Statistics, Demographic and census publications and data, <www. abs.gov.au>, accessed 29 April 2009. Borrie, Wilfred D. (1994), Immigration into Western Societies: A demographic history 1788–1988, Demography Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra. Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) (2007a), Population Flows: Immigration aspects, 2005–06 edition, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra, <www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics>, accessed 8 April 2009. ——(2007b), Emigration 2006–2007, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Can berra, <www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics>, accessed 8 April 2009. ——(2008a), Population Flows: Immigration aspects, 2006–07 edition, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra, <www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/ statistics>, accessed 8 April 2009. ——(2008b), Fact Sheet 20–Migration Program Planning Levels, Department of Immig ration and Citizenship, Canberra, <www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/20planning. htm>, accessed 8 April 2009.

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Garnaut, Ross (2008), The Garnaut Climate Change Review, Final Report, <www. garnautreview.org.au/index.htm>, accessed 8 April 2009. Joint Standing Committee on Migration (2007), Temporary Visas . . . Permanent Benefits: Ensuring the effectiveness, fairness and integrity of the temporary business visa program, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. Kippen, Rebecca and McDonald, Peter (2000), ‘Australia’s population in 2000: The way we are and the ways we might have been’, People and Place, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 10–17. McDonald, Peter and Temple, Jeromey (2006), Immigration and the Supply of Complex Problem Solvers in Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Canberra, <www.immi.gov.au/media/ publications/research>, accessed 8 April 2009. McDonald, Peter and Withers, Glen (2008), Population and Australia’s Future Labour Force, Policy Paper No. 7, Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, Canberra. Vamplew, Wray (ed.) (1987), Australians: Historical Statistics, Fairfax, Syme & Weldon Associates, Sydney.

Chapter 5 Residential concentration and dispersal Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006 Census MapStats, <www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/ D3310114.nsf/home/Census+data>, accessed 8 April 2009. Chapter 6 The politics of immigration, settlement and multiculturalism Betts, Katharine (1999), The Great Divide, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney. Ethnic Affairs Commission of NSW and Paolo Totaro (chairman) (1978), Report of the Ethnic Affairs Commission of NSW on Participation, NSW Government Printer, Sydney. Jupp, James (2007), From White Australia to Woomera, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne. Jupp, James and Nieuwenhuysen, John (eds) (2007), Social Cohesion in Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne. Levey, Geoffrey B. (ed.) (2008), Political Theory and Australian Multiculturalism, Berghahn Books, New York. Lopez, Mark (2000), The Origins of Multiculturalism, Melbourne University Press, Carlton. Migrant Services and Programs (1978), Review of Post-arrival Programs and Services for Migrants (Galbally Report), Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. Parekh, Bhikhu (2006), Rethinking Multiculturalism, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. Tavan, Gwenda (2005), The Long, Slow Death of White Australia, Scribe, Melbourne. Weiss, Doris (ed.) (2003), Social Exclusion: An approach to the Australian case, Peter Lang, Frankfurt-am-Main. Chapter 7 Public opinion and social cohesion Ang, Ien, Brand, Jeffrey E., Noble, Greg and Wilding, Derek (2002), Living Diversity: Australia’s multicultural future, SBS, Sydney, <www20.sbs.com.au/sbscorporate/ index.php?id=547>, accessed 8 April 2009. Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (n.d.) , accessed 8 April 2009.

Further reading and references 163

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Social Trends (catalogue no. 4120), 1994, 2001, 2008. Bean, C. (2000), ‘Nationwide electoral support for One Nation in the 1998 federal election’, in Leach, Michael, Stokes, Geoff and Ward, Ian (eds), The Rise and Fall of One Nation, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia. Beauvais, Caroline and Jenson, Jane (2002), ‘Social cohesion: Updating the state of the research’, CPRN Discussion Paper, Canadian Policy Research Networks, Ottawa. Berger, Peter L. (ed.) (1998), The Limits of Social Cohesion: Conflict and Mediation in Pluralist Societies. A Report of the Bertelsmann Foundation to the Club of Rome, Westview Press, Oxford. Bernard, Paul (1999), ‘Social cohesion: A critique’, CPRN Discussion Paper, Canadian Policy Research Networks, Inc., Ottawa. Betts, Katharine (1999), The Great Divide, Duffy & Snellgrove, Sydney. ——(2001), ‘Boat people and public opinion in Australia’, People and Place, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 34–48. ——(2002), ‘Immigration and public opinion: Understanding the shift’, People and Place, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 24–37. ——(2006), ‘The ageing of the population and attitudes to immigration’, People and Place, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 26–38. Cantle, Ted (2001), Community Cohesion: A report of the Independent Review Team, chaired by C.T. Cantle, The Home Office, London. ——(2004), The End of Parallel Lives? The report of the Community Cohesion Panel, The Home Office, London. Davis, Rex and Robert Stimson (1998), ‘Disillusionment and disenchantment at the fringe: Explaining the geography of the One Nation Party vote at the Queensland election’, People and Place, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 69–82. Department of Communities and Local Government (2008), Citizenship Survey: April–December 2007, England and Wales, <www.communities.gov.uk/documents/ communities/pdf/737550.pdf>, accessed 8 April 2009. Dunn, Kevin (2003), ‘Racism in Australia: Findings of a survey on racist attitudes and experiences of racism’, paper presented to conferences at the University of Sydney and Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, <www.uws.edu.au/ social_sciences/soss/research/challenging_racism/publications>, accessed 8 April 2009. Environics Research Group (2002), Social Cohesion: Quantitative Research, Final Report, prepared for Canadian Heritage, Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Communication Canada, Ottawa. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (various), Majorities’ Attitudes Toward Minorities in European Member States, various reports. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2007), Report on Racism and Xenophobia in the Member States of the EU, , accessed 8 April 2009. Finney, Nisa and Peach, Esme (2004), Attitudes Towards Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Other Immigrants: A literature review, Commission for Racial Equality, London. Forrest, James and Dunn, Kevin (2007), ‘Constructing racism in Sydney, Australia’s largest EthniCity’, Urban Studies, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 699–721. Fryer, Peter (1984), Staying Power: The history of black people in Britain, Pluto Press, London.

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Index Index

‘457’ visas 10, 63, 152 2020 Summit 154 Aboriginal Australians, see Indigenous Australians acceptance, see participation in politics Access Economics 29 acculturation 94 active tolerance 145, 148 Adelaide Greek migrants in 83 Italian migrants in 81–82 residential concentrations of migrants 75 UK migrants in 78 Afghanistan 25, 47 Africa, migration from 5, 25, 47–48 migration from 56 age factors in labour supply 66 influencing attitudes to immigration 134–36 preference for young workers 22–23 ageing populations 16 Aliens Act 1905 (UK) 40 Andrews, Kevin 99 Ang, Ien 133 anti-immigration movements xvi, 31, 43–44 Arabic, residents speaking at home 7 Asia Australian residents born in 6 falling birth rates in 22 historical intake from 5

migration from 25, 56, 153 opposition to migrants from 122–23 residential concentration of migrants from 86 assimilation 93–97 second generation migrants and 86 support for 131–33 transnationalism and 15 assisted passage migrants 54 asylum seekers and refugees, see also detention policy after World War II 41–42, 54 applications by 47–48 attitudes towards 128, 135, 148 in Europe xvii in regions with high migrant concentrations 142–43 residential concentrations 85 under multicultural policies 91 Auburn, opinion surveys in 141–44 Australia annual inflow to 32 Asian migration to 35 attitudes to immigration in 123–28 attitudes towards 142 citizenship test 16 Constitution of 37 countries of birth of migrants to 73 economic opportunities in 137–38, 142 Estimated Resident Population xiii European migration to 42 165

166


immigration history 28, 53–67 immigration policies 39–40, 88–92, 153–58 labour supply and demand 65–67 length of residence in 139–40 long-term population movements 8–11 measuring migration levels 57–58 Middle Eastern migration to 47 migration from 65 nationalism in 92–93, 118 naturalisation requirements 16 net migration into 25, 55 overseas-born population 6–7, 32, 55–57 population exchange with New Zealand 32 public opinion in xviii reaction to asylum seekers 48–50 residential concentration of migrants 68–87 social cohesion in 116–23 status hierarchy in 122 support for conformity in 131–33 survey of people born in 137–40 universities in 12 voting levels 121 Australian Democrats 90 Australian Electoral Studies poll 125–27 Australian Labor Party Catholic affiliations 101–2 immigration policies 89–90 migrants tend to affiliate with 93 Australian Multicultural Advisory Council 155 Australian National University, opinion surveys 107 Australian Natives Association 92 Austria, asylum seekers applying to 48 Baillieu, Ted 156 Belgium, asylum seekers applying to 48 Betts, Katharine 44 Birmingham (UK) riots 111 birth rates 22, 26–27, see also demographic issues birthplace groups, see ethnic minorities Bjelke-Petersen, Joh 90–91 Blue Card system 29 booms, see economic issues Bosnia, migration to Australia from 83 ‘brain drain’ issues 30 bridging capital 121 Brimbank, residential concentration of migrants in 68 Brisbane Chinese migrants in 79–80 Italian migrants in 81–82 residential concentrations of migrants 75, 85 UK migrants in 78–79 Britain, see United Kingdom

British Index of Deprivation 114 British National Party 44 British Social Attitudes survey 107 Brixton (UK) riots 111 Brumby, John 155 Bulgaria, migration from 43 Bulletin 92 Business (Long Stay) Visas 10, 63, 152 Business Skills sub-category 60–61 Calamvale, opinion surveys in 141–44 Calwell, Arthur 54, 90 Canada attitudes to immigration in 123–24, 135 migration to 13, 28, 32 multiculturalism in 94–95 opinion polls in 107 overseas-born population 32 response to recession xiv–xv Canberra, residential concentration of migrants 76 Cantle, Ted 115–16 Cantonese, residents speaking at home 7 Cao, Zhongjun 156 cash remitted overseas 31 category jumpers 58 Catholics, see also religious issues integration into mainstream 94, 104 political affiliations of 100–102 Census data 71 China Australian migration to 65 integration of migrants from 35 migrants from show low participation levels 143 migration from 5, 25, 54, 79–80, 97 political affiliations of migrants from 102 cities attitudes to migration in 135–36 changes in 6–7 immigrant areas of 85 inner city areas 73–74 regional concentrations of migrants 68–87, 141–44 citizenship tests 16 Clyne, Michael 7 Colombo Plan 11 common values 115 Commonwealth Office of Multicultural Affairs 91 communications technology, transnationalism and 14 communism perceived as threat 89–90 Community Cohesion Review Team 115–16 competition for labour supply 17 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 9 Constitution of Australia 37 consultation with ethnic groups 103 consumer sentiment 116–17 Contract Immigrants Act 1905 9

Index 167

convict transportation 53 country of birth, ethnicity and 71–72 Croatia, migration to Australia from 83 Cronulla beach riot 111–12 cultural issues acculturation 94 concern over ‘dilution’ 45–50 ‘cultural distance’ 71, 86 diversity xv, 147–48 ethnic homogeneity 38 immigration as benefit 124 multiculturalism 129–33, 157 nationalism in Australia 92–93 ‘social purity’ 31, 98–99 support for unity 134 tolerance of diversity 147–48 transnationalism 13–15 cultural pluralism 104 Dandenong 68–70, 75, 141–44 Darwin, residential concentration of migrants 76 Demetriou, Andrew 155 Democratic Labor Party 100–101 demographic issues ageing populations 16 Baby Boom 57 birth rates 22, 26–27 changes in immigration make-up 96–97 impact of war 41, 47 influencing attitudes to immigration 134–36 international population movements xvi, 8–11, 21–36 residential concentration of migrants 68–87 urban changes 6–7 Denmark 48, 149 Department of Immigration (Aust.) 99 depressions, see economic issues detention policy attitudes towards 128 changes in xiii–xiv mandatory detention abolished 49 ‘Pacific Solution’ 48–49 under Howard 99 under Rudd 154 discrimination, see also racism experiences of 121–22, 138–39 in regions with high migrant concentrations 142 displaced persons, see asylum seekers and refugees Displaced Persons Program 9 diversity xv, 147–48 Dunn, Kevin 130, 147 economic issues Australia as land of opportunity 137–38, 142

consumer sentiment 116–17 economic impact of immigrants 28–31, 124 effect on attitudes to immigration 123, 127, 151–52 effect on immigration xii–xiii, xiv, 56 financial satisfaction surveys 117–19 education as export earner 11–13 effect on mobility 23 levels of, and attitudes to migration 135–36 levels of approval of 119–20 ELICOS 64 Employer Nominations 62 empowerment, transnationalism and 15 Encyclopedia of Globalization 14–15 England, see United Kingdom English language becoming universal 23 enforced in Britain 40 knowledge of required for immigration 93–94 societies linked by 37 training in 64 English language training courses 64 English-speaking societies, cohesion between 37 Estimated Resident Population, increased under Rudd xiii Ethnic Communities Councils 91 Ethnic Diversity Survey (Canada) 107 ethnic homogeneity 38, 40–41, see also assimilation; integration policy ethnic minorities attitudes to immigration among 135–40 attitudes towards 145–49 ‘cleansing’ of 39 enclaves in Canada xv experiences of discrimination 122 in Australia 153 political involvement by 100–103 political parties representing 40 prevalence of 39 support for assistance to 139–40 ethnic rights multiculturalism 105 ethnic structural pluralism 105 ethnicity of intake to Australia 4–6, 71–72 Eurobarometer surveys 107, 135 European Green Paper 26–28 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 145 European Union countries anti-immigration movements 31 Australian residents born in 6 expansion of 42 falling birth rates 22, 26–27 historical intake from 5, 55, 89, 153 immigration trends in xvi linguistic issues 35

168


migration into 24–25, 29, 153 nation states in 40–41 opinion surveys in 107, 155 political affiliations of migrants from 101–2 reaction to asylum seekers 47–48 Schengen agreements 43–44 support for migration from 122 European Year Against Racism 155 European Year of Equal Opportunity for All 155 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 155 Evans, Chris xi–xiii, 155 Evatt, Herbert Vere 90 Fairfield opinion surveys in 141–44 residential concentration of migrants in 68–69 Vietnamese migrants in 81 Family category, for permanent residence xi, xiii, 59–60 fertility rates 22, 26–27, see also demographic issues Fiji, migrants to Australia from 84 financial satisfaction surveys 117–19, 141 Finland 149 fiscal impact of immigration 29–30 Forrest, Jim 130, 147 France 41, 44 Fraser Coalition government 90–91 Gallipoli myth 92 Garnaut Report 67 gender differences 22, 135–36 Germany attitudes to immigration in 123–24 labour force growth 21 Nazi Germany 39, 41 Yugoslavian migration to 47–48 Gillard, Julia 154 global trends 15–17, 42, see also international population movements globalisation, effect on mobility 23 gold rush, immigration due to 53–54 Good Neighbour Councils 91 Goot, Murray 108, 133 government assistance, see welfare spending on migrant settlement Grassby, Al 95 Great Britain, see United Kingdom Great Divide, The 44 Greater Dandenong, residential concentration of migrants in 68–70 Greece, migrants to Australia from 7, 83 Gross Domestic Product, impact of immigration on 30 guest workers, see temporary workers gypsies in Europe 43

Hallam, residential concentration of migrants 75 Hanson, Pauline, see One Nation Party happiness surveys 117 Australia-born residents 137 by place of birth 144 of regions with high migrant concentrations 141 Hawke Labor government, multiculturalism policy 91 health services, labour supply required for 66–67 high-technology workers 65 Hispanics, migration to US 6, 40 Hobart, residential concentration of migrants 76 Hong Kong, migrants to Australia from 79–80 Howard Coalition government funding for research 106 immigration policies 125, 128, 154 ‘Pacific Solution’ 48–49 withdraws from multiculturalism 92, 99 Howard, John 154 Hughes, William Morris 98 Humanitarian category, for permanent residence xi, xiii, 59 Hume, opinion surveys in 141–44 identity politics 100 illegal or undocumented immigration 23–24, 128, 152, see also asylum seekers and refugees immigration attitudes towards 109–13, 123–29, 133–34, 148 changes in 125 political issues 88–105 public relations campaigns for 156–57 size of intake 8 Immigration Department (Aust) 95 Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth) 9 income inequality, attitudes to 120 India attacks on students from 156 migrants from 5, 25, 80 Indigenous Australians 53 Howard’s refusal to apologise to 154 no political party representing 100–101 ‘protection’ Acts 9 residential concentrations of 71 rights denied to 39 Infrastructure Australia 66 infrastructure spending, labour supply required for 66 inner city areas 73–74, 85 integration policy 103–4, 131–33, see also assimilation Intergenerational Reports 30 international cash remittances 31

Index 169

international citizens 4–5 international population movements xvi, 21–36 due to World War II 41 global labour markets and 15–17 in 21st century 24–25 source countries for immigration 31–36 International Social Survey Program 147 Internet, transnationalism and 14 intolerance levels xviii, 145, see also racism Iran-born persons, religious affiliations of 72 Iraq, migrants to Australia from 84 Iraq wars, immigration due to 47 Ireland historical intake from 5 movement into and out of restricted 43 population exchange with UK 32 irredentism 41 Islamic immigrants, see also religious issues as British MPs 103 concerns over 46–47 demonisation of 50 hostility towards 122 in Australia 97 placed in detention centres 49 political affiliations of 102 treatment of 157 ISSP survey of national attitudes 123, 132 Italy migrants to Australia from 7, 81–82 migration into 24, 28 Japan, migrants to Australia from 84 Kelly, Paul xi–xiii Kenney, Jason xiv–xv Korea 30, 84 labour movements, nationalism in 38 labour supply and demand benefits in matching 30–31 global labour markets 15–17 impact on immigration policy 42, 151 in Australia 65–67 Western labour shortage 25–26 Latin America, migration from 25, 40, 56 Lebanon, migrants to Australia from 82, 85–86 Liberal Party of Australia 91–93 liberalism 38, 89 life satisfaction, see happiness surveys linguistic issues Australians speaking languages other than English at home 7–8 English language 23, 37, 64, 93–94 ex-colonial immigration and 42 in Britain 40 multilingualism 96, 104 shared languages promote immigration 32, 35

Living Diversity 133 living standard maintenance, labour supply required for 67 long-term arrivals 9, 58 long-term population movement 8–11 long-term temporary visas 62–64 Lopez, Mark 104–5 low-skilled workers 23–24, 29 Macedonia, migration to Australia from 83 Malaysia, migrants to Australia from 84 Malta, migrants to Australia from 84 mandatory detention, see detention policy Manus Island detentions 48–49 Marr, David 49 Maxwell, Judith 115 McAllister, Ian 106 measuring residential concentration 71–72 Melbourne attitudes towards migration in 132 Chinese migrants in 79–80 Greek migrants in 83 Indian migrants in 80 Italian migrants in 81–82 Lebanese migrants in 82 migrants from former Yugoslav republics 83 overseas migration to 55 racially motivated attacks in 156 residential concentrations of migrants 68, 74–75, 85 residents speaking languages other than English at home 7–8 Turkish migrants in 82 UK migrants in 78 Vietnamese migrants in 81 Members of Parliament, ethnic makeup of 102–3 men, attitudes to immigration 135–36 Menzies Coalition government 90 Menzies, Robert 54 Mexico 25, 32, 45 Middle East 122–23, 143 Migrant Occupations in Demand List 61 Migrant Resource Centres 91 Migrant Services and Programs 90 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 98 migration, defining 57–58 Mill, John Stuart 38 minimum salary criteria 63 minority groups, see ethnic minorities multiculturalism attitudes towards 129–33, 148 bipartisan support for xvii–xviii, 90–92 defining 95–96 in Canada 94–95 political issues 97–99 retreat from 157 multinationalism 41–43 Muslims, see Islamic immigrants

170


nation states 37–50 nationalism in Australia 92–93 levels of 118 political parties and 39 naturalisation requirements 16, 91 Nauru detentions 48–49 Nazi Germany 39, 41 negative externalities 29 NESB residents 96, 136–40 Netherlands 21, 48 New South Wales, see also Sydney ethnicity of MPs 102 first European immigrants 53 migrants in non-metropolitan areas 76 not competing for skilled migrants xvii, 61–62 New World, migration into 24–25 New Zealand labour force growth 21 migrants to Australia from 5, 10, 56, 64–65, 79 migration to 25, 28, 65 population exchange with Australia 32 proportion of population born overseas 32 Newspoll opinion surveys 129 non-Christian migrants to Australia 97 non-compliance with visa conditions 63–64 non-English speaking background residents 96, 136–40 non-metropolitan areas 76–77, 135–36 Northern Territory, migrants in non-metropolitan areas 77 Norway 48, 149 Notting Hill (UK) riots 111 Nuremburg laws 39 Occupational Trainee program, permanent residency grants 62 Oceania, migration to Australia from 6, 56 OECD countries 16, 31, see also Australia; Canada; European Union countries; United Kingdom; United States Oldham (UK) riots 114–15 One Nation Party 44, 96 cultural foundations of 98–99 profile of supporters 134–35 support for 128, 154 onshore applications 62 opinion polls, see public opinion optimism, in regions with high migrant concentrations 141–42 Origins of Multiculturalism, The 90 overseas-born population, residential concentration of 72–77 overseas students, see student visas Pacific Islanders 6, 45, 56 ‘Pacific Solution’ 48–49

parental criteria in residency applications 60, 152 Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Migration 64 Parliaments, ethnic makeup of 102–3 Participation 90 participation in politics 120–23, 137–38, 142–43 party system, see political parties passive tolerance 145 permanent arrivals 9, 58 permanent residency grants 59–62 permanent settlement option 11–12 Perth Indian migrants in 80 Italian migrants in 81–82 residential concentrations of migrants 76 UK migrants in 78 petitions, participation in 121, 138 Pew Global Attitudes Project 31 Philippines 35, 84–85 physical infrastructure 66 points system 61 Poland 24, 43 police, racial relations with 114 political issues 88–105 ethnic minorities 100–103 levels of participation 120–23 multiculturalism 97–99 racism as 114 political parties, see also Australian Labor Party; Liberal Party of Australia ethnicity and 100 immigration policies of xvi, xviii, 88–92 nationalism and 39 reported support for 108 supporting racism 43–44 Population Flows 8–9 Powell, Enoch 109–11 prejudice, self-identified 147 Price, Charles 15 Prime Ministers, ethnicity of 102 productivity 22–23, 29 ‘protection’ Acts 9 Protestants, political affiliations of 100–101, see also religious issues public opinion 106–49 attitudes to immigration 123–24 in Australia xviii public relations campaigns 156–57 Queensland, see also Brisbane attitudes towards migration in 134–35 Italian migrants in 81 migrants in non-metropolitan areas 76–77 NZ migrants in 64, 79 One Nation Party in 44, 99 race riots 111–13 racial segregation 114

Index 171

racism, see also intolerance levels cultural foundations of 98–99 distribution of 145–49 experiences of discrimination 121–22 Howard’s failure to recognise 154 political implications of 109–11 political parties supporting 41, 43–44 polls measuring 107 racially motivated attacks 111–13, 156 self-identified prejudice 147 recessions, see economic issues refugees, see asylum seekers and refugees regional changes 7, see also cities; non-metropolitan areas religious issues, see also Catholics; Islamic immigrants attitudes to migration and 135 Christian refugees favoured 99 concentration around places of worship 70–71 influence on Australian culture 92 integration of migrants and 36 non-Christian migrants to Australia 97 political affiliations and 100–101 religious discrimination 122 self-selection of migrants on basis of 72 Resident Return visas 59–62 residential concentrations of migrants 68–87, 141–44 revolution, defined 3–4 Robertson, residential concentration of migrants 75 Roma (gypsies), migration of 43 Romania, migration from 43 Rowthorn, Bob 13 Rudd Labor government Budgets xi–xiii immigration policies xix, 154 rural areas, see non-metropolitan areas Saulwick, Irving 133 SBS 96 Scandinavia, see Denmark; Norway; Sweden Scanlon Foundation opinion surveys 107–8, 134, 136–40, 141–44 social cohesion surveys 116–23 Scarman, Lord 111 Schengen agreements 43–44 second generation migrants 86 Select Committee on Economic Affairs (UK) 28–30 separatism, support for 130–31 settlement policy 103–105, 129 Simmons, Alan 12 Skill category 152 ‘brain gain’ from 13 for permanent residence 59–61 increased under Rudd xi

Skilled Australian Sponsored sub-category 60 Skilled Independent sub-category 60 skills-related immigration, to Australia 56 SLAs 71–72 social capital 121, 142 social cohesion 106–49 Social Inclusion Board 154 social justice 120 ‘social purity’ 31 source countries xii, 31–36, 55 South Australia, see also Adelaide attitudes to immigration in 135–36 migrants in non-metropolitan areas 77 skills-related immigration 61 South Korea 30, 84 Spain future immigration to 28 labour force growth 21 migration into 24 Special Assistance program 47 Special Broadcasting Service 96 specialist workers 10, see also Skill category spouses, applying for permanent residency 60 Sri Lanka, migrants to Australia from 84 St Lucia, residential concentration of migrants 75 Standard Business Sponsorships 10, 63, 152 State-Specific and Regional Migration visas 61 State/Territory Sponsored sub-category 60 statistical local areas 71–72 Stretton–Karawatha, opinion surveys in 141–44 student visas 10–13, 64–65 Sunshine, residential concentration of migrants 75 supplementary labour 10 Sweden asylum seekers applying to 48 labour force growth 21 tolerance levels in 149 Switzerland 32, 44 Sydney Chinese migrants in 79–80 Cronulla beach riot 111–12 Greek migrants in 83 Indian migrants in 80 Italian migrants in 81–82 Lebanese migrants in 82 migrants from former Yugoslav republics 83 residential concentrations of migrants xvii, 68, 74, 85 residents speaking languages other than English at home 7–8 Turkish migrants in 82–83 UK migrants in 78 Vietnamese migrants in 81

172


talkback radio 112, 157 Tasmania 53, 76–77 tax paid by immigrants 29–30 technological change, mobility increased by 42 temporary protection visas 49 temporary workers can apply for permanent residence 62 increasing numbers of xii–xiii, 4, 152–53 long-term temporary visas 62–64 visas for 10–12, 45 The Great Divide 44 The Origins of Multiculturalism 90 threat from immigration 109–13 tolerance xviii, 145, 147–49 Toronto, ethnic diversity xv Torres Strait Islanders, see Indigenous Australians transnationalism 13–15 Trudeau, Pierre 94 trust, levels of 119, 142 Turkey 43, 82–83 Turnbull, Malcolm xiii undocumented immigration, see illegal or undocumented immigration unemployment, effect on support for immigration 127–28 United Kingdom anti-immigration parties 44 assimilation policies 40 asylum seekers applying to 48 attitudes to immigration in 123–24 Australian migrants from 5, 42–43, 54, 63, 77–79, 88 Australian migrants to 65 ‘British’ nationalism 38 citizenship surveys 107 concerns over immigration 128 economic impact of immigration on 28–29 influence on Australian culture 92 joins European Union 42 labour force growth 21 migration into 24 population exchange with Ireland 32 race riots in 111–12 support for migration from 122 United Nations Refugee Convention 42 United States integration policy 35–36, 38–39 labour force growth 21

migrants to Australia from 84 migration into 24, 28, 32, 65, 152 multiculturalism in 95 projected growth of 30 relations with Mexico 45 unity, support for 134 universities, reliance on overseas students 12 urban areas, see cities Victoria, see also Melbourne attitudes to immigration in 135–36 ethnicity of MPs 102 migrants in non-metropolitan areas 76 skills-related immigration 61 UK migrants in 78 Vietnam, migrants to Australia from 81, 102, 143 visa systems 41, 59, 63–64 Vocational Education Training 64 voluntary work, participation in 121, 138 voting levels 121 welfare multiculturalism 105 welfare spending on migrant settlement 131–33, 139–40, 142, 148 Western Australia, see also Perth long-term temporary visa holders in 63 migrants in non-metropolitan areas 76–77 skills-related immigration to 61 Western countries immigration to 21–24 labour shortages 25–26 net inflows into 34 proportion of population born overseas 33 Westpac–Melbourne Institute of Consumer Sentiment 116–17 ‘White Australia Policy’ xvii, 6, 9, 98 ‘White Canada’ policy, multiculturalism policy 94 Whitlam Labor government 90, 94 women 22, 135–36 work entitlement visas, see temporary workers Working Holiday Maker Program 10, 62, 64 working rights for overseas arrivals xii World Bank 30–31 World War II 41, 54, 125 written test for immigrants 99 xenophobia, see racism Yugoslavian region 47, 83

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