Australia's Battlefields in Viet Nam: A Traveller's Guide

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Aust.Battlefields pages 22/8/03 5:04 PM Page i

AUSTRALIA’S BATTLEFIELDS IN VIET NAM

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Gary McKay served in Viet Nam as a platoon commander, and has been back to Viet Nam four times in the past ten years. He has written several books on the war, including In Good Company; Delta Four; Bullets, Beans & Bandages; Sleeping With Your Ears Open; All Guts and No Glory (with Bob Buick); Jungle Tracks (with Graeme Nicholas); and Viet Nam Shots (with Elizabeth Stewart). He is a full-time non-fiction writer and oral historian.

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AUSTRALIA’S BATTLEFIELDS IN VIET NAM A traveller’s guide GARY McKAY

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Disclaimer: The author has received no monetary incentives or rewards from companies or individuals mentioned in this book.

First published in 2003 Copyright © Gary McKay 2003 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 (the Act) allows a maximum of one chapter or 10 per cent of this book, whichever is the greater, to be photocopied by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational institution (or body that administers it) has given a remuneration notice to Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) under the Act. Allen & Unwin 83 Alexander Street Crows Nest NSW 2065 Australia Phone: (61 2) 8425 0100 Fax: (61 2) 9906 2218 Email: [email protected] Web: www.allenandunwin.com National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry: McKay, Gary. Australia’s battlefields in Viet Nam: a traveller’s guide. Bibliography. Includes index. ISBN 1 86508 823 4. 1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961 - 1975 - Battlefields - Guidebooks. I. Title 959.7043 Set in 11.5/13.5pt Adobe Garamond by Midland Typesetters, Victoria Printed by Griffin Press, South Australia 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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For John Iremonger, who got me started. Rest in peace, comrade.

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CONTENTS Map of Viet Nam Preface Glossary

viii ix xiii

Viet Nam’s Wars, 1946–1975 Visiting Viet Nam today General travel tips

1 10 13

Part I: Ho Chi Minh City and Environs 1 Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) 2 Cu Chi and the Ho Bo Woods; Mekong Delta

21 23 31

Part II: 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Baria–Vung Tau (Phuoc Tuy) Province and Environs 48 Vung Tau and Baria 53 Nui Dat and other sites 65 Long Tan 84 Ap My An 98 Binh Ba 103 Long Khanh Province 114 Nui Le 121

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Part 10 11 12

III: Bien Hoa City and Environs The Gang Toi hills Bien Hoa—FSB Andersen FSB Coral and FSB Balmoral

129 132 140 148

Part IV: Central and Northern Viet Nam 13 Central Viet Nam 14 Northern Viet Nam

161 164 172

Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Notes Bibliography Index

A chronology of the war in Viet Nam: 1962–1975 178 Australian war statistics 188 Tour companies in Australia 191 195 201 205

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viii

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PREFACE Viet Nam is a land of smiles; a place where the people’s resilience and understanding nature have enabled them to move on from the grief of the American War. Veterans returning there and meeting their former foes are welcomed and shown a warmth of hospitality that many who have never served in a war would fail to comprehend. I have met dozens of former Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army soldiers and officers and have often heard the saying, ‘Once we were enemies and now we are friends.’ I’ve even had a former officer of D445 Provincial Mobile Force Battalion, who fought often against the Australians, put his hand on my arm and say, ‘We are glad that you are here now as friends . . . shooting us with your cameras and not with your guns.’ This warm and open display of comradeship between brothers-in-arms is experienced by many Australian veterans who return to Viet Nam—and it can be quite a humbling experience. I have been back there three times since I left as a wounded warrior in late 1971. In one case I combined a research trip for my book Delta Four—Australian Riflemen in Viet Nam with a chance to travel there with some of my platoon comrades, and found the entire experience to be PREFACE

ix

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overwhelming and paradoxically comforting. My soldiering in 1971 was as a platoon commander aged 23. My priorities were, as far as possible, to keep my men and myself alive. I was in no position to appreciate the history or the beauty of the country, and the civilians I saw from time to time I always regarded as potentially hostile. After my first trip back to Viet Nam in 1993 I couldn’t wait to return and further explore that wonderful country. My latest visit in 2002 was special as I took my daughter, aged 21, with me, and so came away with yet another dimension to the experience. On each trip I have met more people who fought for their country and their reception of me—a former enemy—has been overwhelming. It is an experience that has been cathartic and eye-opening, and reaffirmed by belief in the human spirit. This book has been written to provide a guide for veterans, their next of kin and tourists in general who want to visit places where the Australian defence forces—principally units of the 1st Australian Task Force—lived and fought against their communist enemy between 1965 and 1972. Throughout the guide I refer to this conflict as ‘the war’ or the American War, although it is commonly known by Australians as the Viet Nam War and by others as the Second Indochina War. And in accordance with Vietnamese practice, I have spelt the name of the country in two words, not one. If I included every major action faced by Australians during the war, the book wouldn’t fit in your suitcase, so I have concentrated on those actions and sites with which the majority of veterans and members of the general public are probably most familiar—although any veteran will tell you that his battle was important, because he was in it! I’ve arranged the contents so that the book can be used in conjunction with a general guidebook for travellers going to Viet Nam. You would benefit greatly from reading the x

PREFACE

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Lonely Planet guide, Vietnam, both before and during your trip, for more general and practical travel information. And for the latest on what is going on there are six-monthly upgrades available from www.lonelyplanet.com/upgrades. Australia’s Battlefields in Viet Nam is structured into four parts. Each covers a specific geographic zone and allows you to follow the path you wish to tread. The usual place of arrival in Viet Nam is Ho Chi Minh City (the former Saigon), and Part One covers that area. Part Two takes you around the region in which most of the battles recounted in this guide took place—the province now renamed BariaVung Tau. Part Three enables you to move back towards Ho Chi Minh City via the major town of Bien Hoa. If you intend to travel more widely you are catered for in Part Four, which covers central and northern Viet Nam. Most chapters in the guide focus on major Australian battles; others cover significant places of remembrance. Within each geographic region the battles are presented in chronological sequence. Suggested day trips and itineraries are included in the introduction to each region for those who are not travelling with a tour company. Please note that permits are required for visits to some sites and these may only be issued in some cases via a tour guide or operator. It is best to use a guide recommended by local tourist companies or hotels, or you may be disappointed. See ‘Tour companies in Australia’, page 191, for more information. The battle chapters are organised to provide a brief background on the area concerned and the military conflict; a battle account describing the fighting’s significant phases and the Australians’ experiences; directions and advice about visiting the area today; and references for the reader who wants to know more, such as further detail on the battle. Information given in the chapters is enriched by PREFACE

xi

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quotes from the personal recollections of Australian veterans who, through their raw emotions and first-hand knowledge, can portray the war in a way that facts alone cannot. If any readers believe that I’ve described or recorded something incorrectly, or if they wish to expand upon what I have written, they are invited to contact me through the publishers. Thanks go to Garry Adams, my tour manager from Battle Tours, for my research trip in 2002; to my publisher Ian Bowring for getting the idea for this book off the ground; and to my editor, Colette Vella, and Emma Singer at Allen & Unwin for guiding the book through its production. Thanks go also to Australian War Memorial historians Ashley Ekins and Libby Stewart for providing valuable data and map support. I must also thank Dale McDaniel of Ellandale Travel in Perth for providing me with very helpful information on tour companies that deal with Viet Nam. Gary McKay January 2003

xii

PREFACE

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GLOSSARY AATTV AK-47 1 ALSG ‘ANZAC’ battalion AO APC ARV ARVN 1 ATF B-52 Bushranger canister Caribou casevac CDT chieu hoi Claymore (mine)

Australian Army Training Team, Viet Nam 7.62mm automatic Kalishnikov assault rifle 1st Australian Logistic Support Group Australian battalion with attached New Zealand subunit area of operations armoured personnel carrier armoured recovery vehicle Army of the Republic of (South) Viet Nam; troops thereof 1st Australian Task Force US long-range strategic bomber RAAF callsign for helicopter gunships armed with mini-guns and rockets large, shotgun-type shell firing hundreds of short steel rods Twin-engined short-haul transport aircraft casualty evacuation (to hospital) clearance diver team enemy soldiers who have surrendered 1.25-pound anti-personnel mine that fires hundreds of steel pellets GLOSSARY

xiii

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CMF CO CP D445 DCM Digger DMZ DRV Dustoff FAC FO FSB GPS grid square HCM HE howitzer Huey KIA LZ M-16 M-60 xiv

Citizen Military Forces, forerunner of the Army Reserve commanding officer, usually of lieutenant colonel rank command post Viet Cong Local Force battalion that operated in Phuoc Tuy Province Distinguished Conduct Medal, for gallant action Army soldier, rank indeterminate Demilitarised Zone Democratic Republic of Viet Nam dedicated helicopter for casevac (casualty evacuation) forward air controller: controls fighters/bombers during an air strike forward observer: directs artillery on to targets fire support base global positioning system a map square measuring 1000 metres by 1000 metres Ho Chi Minh City high explosive high-angle artillery piece capable of sending shells over hills or other high ground slang term for Iroquois helicopter killed in action landing zone 5.56mm American automatic and semi-automatic rifle 7.62mm general purpose machine gun

GLOSSARY

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medevac MIA mini-gun

MM mm NCO NLF NVA NZ OC Possum POW/PW RAAC RAAF RAE RAEME RAF RAN RAR 1 RAR R&C R&R

RCL

medical evacuation, normally by RAAF C-130 Hercules, out of Viet Nam to Australia missing in action A 7.62mm calibre side-mounted, revolving multi-barrelled, electronically-fired machine gun capable of producing 2000 rounds per minute Military Medal, an Imperial award to Other Ranks for bravery millimetre non-commissioned officer National Liberation Front North Vietnamese Army New Zealand officer commanding: a sub-unit commander, usually of major rank radio callsign for a Sioux Army helicopter prisoner of war Royal Australian Armoured Corps Royal Australian Air Force Royal Australian Engineers Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Royal Air Force (UK) Royal Australian Navy Royal Australian Regiment (infantry corps) 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment rest and convalescence leave, a short break from duties taken in Viet Nam rest and recuperation (but usually recreation) leave, taken for five to seven days outside Viet Nam recoilless rifle GLOSSARY

xv

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recce re-entrant RF RNZA RPG

RPG-2 RPG-7 RVN sapper SAS SEATO Scheyville SLR

squadron TAOR Tet The Team

xvi

reconnaissance gully or small valley forming an indentation in a hillside Regional Force (ARVN) Royal New Zealand Artillery rocket-propelled grenade, an anti-tank weapon; also the Russian abbreviation for ‘squad level rocket launcher’ anti-tank weapon with a range of 300 metres anti-tank weapon, larger than RPG-2, with sights—and greater range—700 metres Republic of (South) Viet Nam term for an army field engineer; private rank in the RAE Corps Special Air Service, an elite Australian unit primarily used for reconnaissance South-East Asia Treaty Organisation Officer Training Unit for National Service officers 7.62mm self-loading rifle, the standard issue semi-automatic rifle for the Diggers in Viet Nam company-sized group consisting of three Troops (subunits) tactical area of responsibility, an area assigned to a unit or sub-unit to patrol Vietnamese Lunar New Year holiday period Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (AATTV), an advisory group of Australian soldiers who trained and assisted the Army of the Republic of South Viet Nam

GLOSSARY

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tunnel rat

US USMC VC Vungers Yank

slang term for a solider, usually a sapper/engineer, tasked with searching and clearing Viet Cong tunnels United States US Marine Corps Viet Cong Vung Tau slang term for an American

GLOSSARY

xvii

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VIET NAM’S WARS, 1946–1975 The First Indochina War—the French War, 1946–1954 The roots of Australia’s involvement in Viet Nam lie in an earlier conflict there, in the 1950s. The French had ruled Indochina for almost a century, their occupation characterised by taxes, tyranny, oppression by wealthy landlords, and economic exploitation. Although the French were ousted from Indochina during the Second World War, they returned in 1946 to reassert their rule, especially in the south, and the First Indochina War began. Opposition to the French was led by the Viet Minh, created by Communist Party founding member Ho Chi Minh, who had also declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRV) in 1945. The Vietnamese nationalists were so determined to unite their country as an independent nation that Ho Chi Minh once declared, ‘You can kill 10 of my men for every one I kill of yours, but even at those odds, you will lose and I will win.’ Tragically for Viet Nam, it was prophetically true. VIET NAM’S WARS, 1946–1975

1


The Viet Minh forces of the DRV waged a guerilla war against the French until they finally won independence, culminating in the defeat of the French forces after a 57-day siege at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. The First Indochina War exacted a high toll, with approximately 93 000 French servicemen killed and over three times that number of Viet Minh casualties. Interestingly, the United States underwrote almost 80 per cent of France’s war expenses, spending a total of US$3.5 billion by the time the French were defeated. A little more than two months later, in July 1954, the Geneva Accords were signed by France and Viet Nam in a tough agreement that split Viet Nam along the Ben Hai River near the 17th Parallel, an option that was scarcely acceptable to the hard-core nationalists. Under Ho Chi Minh the DRV, based in Hanoi, remained dedicated to the unification of Viet Nam under communist rule. In the south, the Republic of (South) Viet Nam was established with Ngo Dinh Diem as Prime Minister. During a 300-day amnesty almost 900 000 refugees fled the communist-ruled north for the south. The basis of the Accords was the establishment of a temporary partition pending the outcome of national elections to be held in 1956. Those elections were held, although to some degree they were rigged. (In Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem received one-third more votes than there were registered voters!) In 1955 Diem repudiated the Geneva Accords and refused to participate in elections to decide on reunification.

The Second Indochina War—the American War, 1960–1975 The corrupt and politically unstable regime of Diem was in trouble right from the start, as the people were angry about 2

VIET NAM’S WARS, 1946–1975


treatment of the Cao Dai religious sects and about the apparent bias against Buddhists in favour of Catholics in all areas of life. Also, land reform had gone backwards and nobody was better off than they had been before French rule. The government under Diem became increasingly tyrannical, nepotism was rife and repression was favoured over democratic debate. The intelligentsia rebelled and Buddhist monks began a series of dreadful public self-immolations in a desperate cry to be heard on the international stage, but even after Diem was murdered in a coup, a succession of military regimes continued with corrupt and repressive policies. The communist cadres in the south began calling for the north to overthrow the south. A shift from ‘political struggle’ to ‘armed struggle’ began. In 1960 North Viet Nam introduced universal conscription and less than nine months later created the National Liberation Front. Before long the south found that it was facing not only the Viet Nam Cong Sam (a term later shortened to Viet Cong and standing for ‘Vietnamese communist soldier’) but also the highly trained and motivated soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army. By the beginning of 1965 the south was in desperate trouble trying to contain Viet Cong attacks. The numbers of desertions from the Army of the Republic of (South) Viet Nam (ARVN) were astronomical—about 2000 per month. The military hierarchy was corrupt and not often at the forefront of battle. In ten months of fighting, early in the conflict, only one senior ARVN officer had been wounded in action! The provincial cities of Huê and Da Nang were about to fall to communist attacks and the south called for help in the form of combat troops. The United States stepped in for reasons that have been widely debated for many years. The implausible ‘domino VIET NAM’S WARS, 1946–1975

3


theory’, that communists were intending to expand in certain parts of the world (such as southeast Asia) by progressively taking over adjoining nations, is often cited as the principal reason for intervention. President Lyndon Johnson once contended that the loss of Viet Nam would compel America to fight ‘on the beaches of Waikiki’.1 With this ill-advised foreign policy, America launched into a war that would divide its people and cost it dearly in human lives and many billions of dollars. As an ally in the region under SEATO (the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation), and with Australia’s own backyard also becoming unstable, with communist flashpoints and conflict in Indonesia, British North Borneo and Malaysia, the Menzies Government was looking for reassurance. In an almost obscene trade-off for US military support in the region (if required), Australia ‘asked to be invited’ to provide further support for the South Vietnamese.2 On 29 April 1965 Sir Robert Menzies told the Parliament that Australia was ‘in receipt of a request from the Government of South Viet Nam for further military assistance.’ He went on: ‘We have decided—and this has been in close consultation with the Government of the United States—to provide an infantry battalion for service in South Viet Nam.’3 Australia’s involvement

That infantry battalion was to be the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR). It would be deployed to Viet Nam by sea in June 1965, together with its supporting APC unit, the 4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse, and would serve under the operational control of the American 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate). A lone infantry battalion is 4



unable to support itself in an area of operations on overseas service and thus it was that our ‘first to fight’ would in fact be operating under US guidelines and rules. It was a workable but sometimes strained union and one that in due course would dramatically demonstrate the operational differences between the two armies and the manner in which they went about their lethal business in a counterguerrilla warfare setting. The US Army had masses of troops and large numbers of support elements, from helicopters to artillery, to armoured units and engineers. Australia was small bikkies indeed compared to the American war machine. Before long it became evident that the American approach to jungle fighting was a lot different from the way the Australians wanted to wage war. For the Yanks it seemed to be a case of ‘Big is good, therefore big will win’. But the Australian experience in Malaya and Borneo against communist terrorists and guerrillas had indicated that it was more a matter of using silent foot patrols to track down and destroy the enemy in their jungle hideouts. The Viet Nam conflict remains the Australian nation’s longest ever commitment to war. It began in a small way in August 1962 and continued until December 1972. Australia was part of an Allied Force in Viet Nam that also included personnel from the United States, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea. The Australian contribution to the war totalled some 59 000 servicemen and women. The bulk of the effort came from the Army, which eventually provided a three-battalion Task Force, an artillery regiment, cavalry squadron, Special Air Services squadron, engineer squadrons, Australian Army Training Team, civil affairs unit and logistical support units. The Royal Australian Air Force contributed a helicopter squadron, a short-range VIET NAM’S WARS, 1946–1975

5


tactical transport squadron, medium bombers, and personnel operating as forward air controllers. The Royal Australian Navy had an ongoing commitment from start to finish with transport vessels, warships operating with the American 7th Fleet, a helicopter flight and a clearance diving team. Bruce Davies, an infantryman in 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR)—the first Australian battalion to deploy to Viet Nam, in 1965—recalls what he thought about going to war: No one really knew where South Viet Nam was and we really didn’t understand what it was about. We only knew what we did from some fairly intensive briefings about being called on to support the regime of South Viet Nam against communists from the north [and about] the domino theory; that it was a protectorate of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation . . . and that we had been called upon by our ally the United States to assist. I think we accepted that.4

While Australian forces would be under the ultimate operational command and control of the United States, as has been the case since the Second World War, they retained their national identity, and their command and control over their own troops, regardless of where they were stationed in South Viet Nam. The enemy they faced varied from infiltrated and highly trained and motivated regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops, to the local regular Main Force and part-time Local Force provincial battalions of the Viet Cong, to irregular part-time Viet Cong soldiers. Most NVA units moving into South Viet Nam had local Viet Cong acting as guides to the supply points and prepared rest areas in the jungle. 6



The Tet Offensive

The most significant event of the war was the National Liberation Front’s Tet Offensive in 1968, not only because of its devastating impact on both the Allied and the North Vietnamese forces, but because it had a shocking and disturbing effect on the minds of the American public. The Tet Offensive was designed to capture major towns and cities the length and breadth of South Viet Nam. It failed in that it was a military disaster, but it brought home the fragility of the Allied effort and the fact that this was not, after all, a war where the ‘boys would be home by Christmas’. One communist officer, General Tran Do, admitted after the war: In all honesty, we didn’t achieve our main objective [to reunify Viet Nam before the death of Ho Chi Minh], which was to spur uprisings throughout the south. Still, we inflicted heavy casualties on the Americans and their puppets, and that was a big gain for us. As for making an impact in the United States, it had not been our intention— but it turned out to be a fortunate result.5

Another highly respected communist leader, General Tran Van Tra, said to world-renowned journalist, author and historian Stanley Karnow in 1982: During Tet we did not correctly evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, did not fully realise that the enemy still had considerable capabilities and that our capabilities were limited . . . we suffered large losses in material and manpower, especially in cadres at various echelons, which clearly weakened us.6 VIET NAM’S WARS, 1946–1975

7


Estimates of casualties from the Tet Offensive during the 30 days following 31 January 1968 were approximately 2000 American servicemen; some 4000 ARVN; and an astonishing 50 000 NLF (including Viet Cong and NVA troops).7 The Final Years

The Tet Offensive created awareness in the United States that this war was not going to be a pushover. The US’s military muscle was not having the hoped-for impact. The adversary was tough, doing it tough and fighting tough. Body counts on both sides were climbing and in America the general public no longer wanted their living rooms invaded, on the six o’clock news, with the ghastly images of war. The peace talks that continued sporadically throughout the war had achieved very little apart from the cessation of bombing of Hanoi and mining of Haiphong harbour in the north. By 1970 it was evident that the US was going to get out of the war one way or another. For some it was important not to lose face in Viet Nam, but in reality that had happened already. The bulk of the Australian forces withdrew in December 1971 and the last of the Aussies were gone by December 1972. When the final departure came and the US forces departed in 1973, the next two years saw an escalation in NVA activity and the methodical disintegration of the armies in the south. The latter had simply run out of steam and had lost the will to resist. In 1975 the inevitable took place: in the first few months of that year rapid NVA advances through the countryside saw the ARVN totally destroyed. The Second Indochina War was fully over—at the cost of perhaps two million lives, including almost 60 000 Allied personnel. 8



For a very good overview of the war see Stanley Karnow’s Vietnam—A History (Century, London, 1983), page 155 and pages 523–45 and 639. A chronology of the war and the major battles fought by Australians is given in Appendix 2 of the present book.


9


VISITING VIET NAM TODAY The American War ravaged Viet Nam in a way that only those who lived there will fully understand. In 1965 it was a country of about 40 million people. Almost 10 per cent of the total Vietnamese population were killed or wounded in the 16 years of war (1960–75). Rice production fell through the floor and South Viet Nam needed aid supplies just to exist. A once prosperous country, dubbed the ‘rice bowl of Asia’, became one of the poorest in the region. The war not only divided the nation at the 17th Parallel but split families and communities as well. Thankfully, Viet Nam is now well on the way to recovery. Its population has doubled to 80 million people, it exports rice to other parts of the world and its economy is starting to resemble a ‘new tiger’ in Southeast Asia. Although still a poor country, it’s a land that is on the go and everywhere one looks something is going on and something new is being developed or improved. Foreign relationships have never been better for Viet Nam, and commercial projects undertaken in conjunction with neighbours such as Malaysia, China and Australia are helping Viet Nam to zoom into the 21st century. 10

VISITING VIET NAM TODAY


For veterans, going back to Viet Nam can be an emotional experience. For some it will finally put to rest the feelings they’ve have had or the fears they want to face. In most cases they want to see the country now that it’s at peace. Graham Brown served at Vung Tau with the RAAF and said of his return trip: Flying into Saigon my heart was racing, flying out of Saigon I was in tears; the same emotions I had 35 years ago. I feel now, as I felt then, that I had turned my back on these people and just walked away. This feeling does not sit well with me.1

Bob Hansford was an airframe fitter with 161 Recce Flight at Nui Dat and wanted to put some memories—or, as he called them, ‘ghosts’—to bed. His trip put him in a reflective state of mind: Returning to Nui Dat and other areas where I served, where everyone strived so hard to achieve the best as soldiers/tradesmen, [I found] that almost every trace of our occupation had gone. It just shows how insignificant human beings really are in the greater plan . . . and was it all really worth it in the end? 2

Steve Campling was a rifleman with the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, in 1969 and wanted to see Viet Nam as it is today. He was not disappointed: This trip made me confront my experience in Vietnam. I feel more at peace with myself now that I can see this country striving ahead, quite united and devoid of war. I would recommend that any Viet Nam veteran return. VISITING VIET NAM TODAY

11


It was amazing to experience the lack of animosity toward us. To return to this country so plagued by war for so long and to finally see them at peace would have to quell any veteran’s doubts and fears.3

Veterans going back who find that they want to contribute something to Viet Nam should contact the Australian Vietnam Veterans Reconstruction Group through the Veterans Affairs Department. Finally, a word of caution to returning veterans. Viet Nam is a land of constant change and it seems that only religious buildings and French colonial-era structures have withstood the ravages of progress. Most other buildings have been remodelled, rebuilt, refurbished or, in some cases, demolished. Returning veterans need to be aware that what was there in the way of infrastructure in 1966 or 1969 will probably not be there now. In my own case I wanted to return to a battle site at Nui Le. It was primary jungle in 1971 but today it is part of a rubber plantation. The same goes for two fire support bases, Balmoral and Coral, which are now also covered with rubber trees. But don’t be put off by this situation: the real thrill of visiting the battle sites is simply ‘being there’. The heat and humidity and the smell of the bush haven’t changed. Be prepared for goosebumps and various feelings that could be disquieting in some ways—but beautiful in others.

12

VISITING VIET NAM TODAY


GENERAL TRAVEL TIPS Tour companies and guides It is important that you organise your trip with or through a reputable tour company, whether it be an Australian or a Vietnamese outfit. Be wary of fly-by-night operators who offer cheap prices or who claim to be guides to battle sites. It pays to check their credentials and to ask for references from previous customers (at least three). Check what travel agent they deal with, and whether the agent is a member of the Australian Federation of Travel Agents. Not taking care could result in your spending a lot of money but not actually getting to your specified destinations. And always take out travel insurance. The cost is well worth it for peace of mind. A list of travel companies that organise tours to Viet Nam is included in Appendix 3. Tour arrangements should desirably include not only transport and accommodation but also any entrance fees to museums and sites, plus meals and refreshments. Drinking water is essential on these tours. Find out if the cost of the tour covers bottled water as and when you need it. If not, you will have to obtain your own. GENERAL TRAVEL TIPS

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Package tours ‘in country’ are not likely to be allinclusive and you may find ‘hidden’ fees and charges creeping into the cost during the activity. Most hotels can arrange tours to particular sites but again you should check to see exactly what is included in the fee.

Permits and escorts The land in Viet Nam is owned by the government, and landholders hold leases only. To visit locations regarded as ‘sensitive’, a special permit is needed from the government. Tour companies are required to forward a list of areas to be visited on a given tour to the government organisation Viet Nam Tourism, in Hanoi, which checks with the People’s Committee in each district to make sure that there won’t be a clash of usage of the area and also that it is safe (depending on seasonal restrictions) to enter the site. It then obtains permission from the government in Hanoi, and passes the permit on to the tour operator. The permit must be shown to each site manager. This will be done by your guide, if you have one; it’s another good reason for having a tour guide, who can sort out any problems that might arise. As well, an escort—usually provided by the local police (canh sat)—is compulsory in particularly sensitive locations (e.g. Long Tan, Balmoral and Coral). Your permit will specify whether or not a police escort is required. If your tour guide says that no permit is needed for a site designated as ‘sensitive’ in this book, then you should find another tour guide. Without a permit you can be arrested, detained or shown the door in a most unfortunate fashion. If you are detained, try to stay calm and cool, and seek help by calling your tour operator’s main office. 14

GENERAL TRAVEL TIPS


Maps Present-day maps

I recommend that you carry a good current tourist map of Viet Nam showing the provinces and the major arterial roads. Such a map is best obtained when you arrive. Saigon Tourist, the government-run tourist office in Ho Chi Minh City (49 Le Thanh Ton Street, District 1), sells the Viet Nam Tourist Map. Being cheap, it doesn’t stand up well to continual folding, so it is worth buying a spare. For further information try: www.saigon-tourist.com. It is always a good idea when visiting a new province to get a copy of the provincial map, as it will show a lot more detail than the Viet Nam Tourist Map, including the province’s arterial roads and war sites. War-era maps

If you are interested in poring over old maps and other military memorabilia, you might like to visit a store in Ho Chi Minh City called Bookazine. It is at 28 Kong Dai on Nha Sach in District 1. Veterans know it as the old Tu Do Street. At the back of the store there are piles of old military maps from all over the country, and maps used by US, Filipino, Australian, Hong Kong, Singaporean and Thai military personnel. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, hundreds of these maps were not catalogued, but the staff will hunt something out for you given a couple of days’ notice.

Global positioning system (GPS) If you want to stand exactly where a battle was fought, or have a place of significance you wish to visit, a GPS is an GENERAL TRAVEL TIPS

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extremely useful tool. Hand-held GPSs are readily available at most ship’s chandlers and camping/hiking stores. About a dozen models are on the market but the most popular is the Garmin 12, which has all the features of a dash-mounted maritime GPS and operates on data provided by no less than 12 satellites. It costs about A$385 in 2003 terms. Two other readily available models are the Etrex (A$369) and the Magellan (around A$400). Check to see if a hands-on training session is provided on how to use the GPS before you walk out of the shop: it will make use of the instrument that much easier. Renting a GPS in Viet Nam is not a feasible option.

Renaming of provinces, places and roads Viet Nam is divided into provinces, each of which is made up of a number of districts. Since reunification, provinces and districts in the south have been renamed and rezoned. For example, Phuoc Tuy is now Baria–Vung Tau Province, and Long Khanh Province and Bien Hoa Province have been combined to form Dong Nai Province, with Bien Hoa city as its capital. Names of provincial and district capitals have also changed, so old maps are no use for finding places that may have been frequented during the war. The main roads have all been redesignated and/or renumbered. For example: the old north–south road called Highway 1 is now named National Highway 1; and Route 2, from Baria to Long Khanh Province is now Provincial Route 764. In some places like the Hat Dich area (Suoi Chau Pha valley) there is a highway through what was once jungle and river forest. 16

GENERAL TRAVEL TIPS


Mines and things that go bang Viet Nam still has a problem with war-era mines and unexploded ordnance so don’t go wandering off into the bush without a guide or without knowing that it’s safe. Dozens of local people are killed every year in Viet Nam as a result of mishandling old ordnance or trying to extricate explosive from bombs or shells. The Long Hai hills have been ‘cleared’ in some areas, but no assurances or guarantees are given. Also, war relics might be booby-trapped still, if their location has been long forgotten.

War cemeteries Liet Si is the term for ‘revolutionary martyr’ and these words adorn most war cemeteries, indicating that the deceased were Viet Cong or NVA. You will find it almost impossible to locate cemeteries for South Vietnamese soldiers (ARVN), as the sites have been dismantled or destroyed. Most Australians who died in Viet Nam were initially buried in the Australian section of the British War Cemetery at Terendak in western Malaysia. This practice followed the Australian Government’s longstanding policy of interning war dead in cemeteries overseas. The policy was changed in 1966 when several Training Team men killed in action in Viet Nam were brought home to Australia to be buried.

War souvenirs You will be tempted to buy something to take home but the chance of finding a genuine article is small. Beware of GENERAL TRAVEL TIPS

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the ‘instant’ war souvenir made in a backroom while you wait unknowing. The problem of determining the authenticity of articles is a difficult one. See also ‘War surplus market’, page 29.

Photography Some old military bases are now resident Army, Navy or Air Force installations. Always check before taking a photograph—or be prepared to have the film taken out of your camera (at the very least). There are normally signs warning of such a restriction, but be aware that it also applies at Tan Son Nhut airport where you cannot take shots inside the terminal if you’re facing towards the old airbase buildings.

Driving Driving is best left to the locals: the traffic regulations (which are not always observed) make it a hazardous occupation at the best of times. If you do drive, watch out for motorcycles, a general lack of compliance with double white lines, people going up one-way streets the wrong way, and wandering cattle at the beginning and end of each work day (Monday to Saturday). On long trips take frequent rest stops. Tour companies employ very good bus drivers, but taxis and private car-hire firms should be vetted if possible. Approximately 1000 people are killed every month on the roads, and so hiring a motorcycle or a car without a driver is not recommended and may negate your travel insurance. 18

GENERAL TRAVEL TIPS


Health and hygiene Drink only bottled water—referred to in Viet Nam as mineral water. Be prepared to spend up to 75 000 dong a day for water unless your tour company provides it on the buses (most of the good companies do). You should also carry a small medical kit for scratches and various ailments. Your doctor or pharmacist can advise you on what it should contain—not least a suitable preparation for treatment of diarrhoea.

Elderly or disabled visitors Viet Nam, unfortunately, is not a country for those who have difficulty getting around or are infirm. There are few facilities for people with disabilities and wheelchair access is almost unheard of. An experienced tour company will be able to offer further advice.

Money The US greenback is commonly used in major hotels and tourist locations. But if you’re into bargaining with stallholders over small items, the Vietnamese dong is a more flexible currency to use because greenback trading occurs only in single dollar increments. I recommend carrying about 300 000 dong for small purchases in cafes and at stalls. The Australian dollar is not accepted. At the time of writing A$1 is equivalent to approximately 10 000 dong; US$1 is approximately 15 000 dong. GENERAL TRAVEL TIPS

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When to visit My trips have all been in August/September, but you may find that the heat is too much at that time of the year. The upside in going during the northern winter (say, December or January) is that it is slightly cooler, but some areas may be cut off owing to flooding and delays may be imposed by torrential rains. I once sat on an airstrip for three hours during a heavy downpour as the plane simply couldn’t taxi, let alone take off, and I missed a connection at the other end. While December/January is a popular time to visit, many people like their trip to coincide with Anzac Day (25 April), Viet Nam Veterans Day (18 August) or some battle commemoration date. Check the Lonely Planet guide for more details on the climate and for the time of year that will best suit your needs.

Time and space If you are planning to visit Viet Nam without joining a tour group, build some degree of slack into your itinerary to avoid the disappointment of late departures and missed connections. Don’t expect everything to run according to schedule. Trains out of Hanoi, ferries across to Can Tho in the Delta, buses going anywhere may well break down or run late. Tourists, while very welcome, are not yet priority one.

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GENERAL TRAVEL TIPS


PART I HO CHI MINH CITY AND ENVIRONS Ho Chi Minh City, known in earlier days as Saigon, is the usual starting point for a visit to south Viet Nam. And for many Australian defence personnel, it was where they disembarked on their way to serve the war effort. HCM City is a fascinating place and I recommend staying there for several days so that you can visit its war-related and other sites and also have some time in which to wander around and meet the locals. Specific places of value for those interested in Australia’s war history are covered in Chapter 1. If you like, your stay in HCM City can be broken into sections by a couple of visits to other war-related places: the Cu Chi/Ho Bo Woods area and the Mekong Delta, which are both covered in Chapter 2. The Cu Chi tunnel complex involves a day trip; the Delta requires an overnight trip as it needs two full days.


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CAMBODIA

Phnom Penh

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HO CHI MINH CITY AND ENVIRONS


1 HO CHI MINH CITY (SAIGON) Most visitors to Viet Nam will want to go to Ho Chi Minh City, which southern locals still refer to as Saigon— although they tend to use the name to describe the inner city and not the newer districts that have sprung up since 1975. Today HCM City is a sprawling, industrious, madcap jumble of people and motorcycles going every which way— and loose. It is a metropolis of some five million people and two million of them are on 120cc bikes. It is noisy, energetic, vibrant, colourful and definitely the commercial capital of Viet Nam, so visitors should be aware that it is more expensive than the rest of the country. As Saigon, it was the seat of government of the Republic of Viet Nam (1955–1975) and the military hub of operations during the war. The city was viciously attacked during the Tet Offensive in early 1968, and its capture in 1975 was the ultimate prize for the communists. During the war Saigon was a place most people simply passed through—arriving, departing or going on R&R. Only a very small percentage of our people actually served in Saigon. The site of the original Australian headquarters is HO CHI MINH CITY

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gone (as far as I can discover). The Allied headquarters building has been knocked down. The US Ambassador’s residence and embassy now house the War Remnants Museum.

Tan Son Nhut international airport From 1966 on, within 14 hours of departing Sydney’s Mascot airport a soldier or airman could find himself in Saigon, smack in the middle of the war zone. In that year Australia’s national airline Qantas was chartered to take many of the reinforcement and replacement personnel to South Viet Nam. This provided a flexible and additional means of moving the increasing numbers of support troops to and from the war zone (see also Chapter 3, re transport of troops). The Boeing 707 aircraft usually flew out of Sydney, and were scheduled to arrive at Tan Son Nhut airport around mid-morning and to depart with returning personnel several hours later. At first the Qantas personnel were required to keep their flying to Saigon confidential. The secrecy centred on a fear of demonstrations. As the war progressed and Qantas’s participation in the movement of personnel was more widely known, the air of secrecy vanished and rostered duty to Viet Nam became something closer to routine. But for the volunteer pilots and cabin crew it was an experience that they still remember vividly and recall with great pride. Many were former RAAF or RAF personnel who saw it as a chance to see a war zone again, or simply to do their bit for the war. At the height of American operations Tan Son Nhut was the world’s busiest airport. After arriving there the troops would transfer to an RAAF twin-engine Caribou for a short flight to either the lst Australian Logistic Support 24



Group base (1 ALSG) at Vung Tau (see Chapter 3) or the lst Australian Task Force base (1 ATF) at Nui Dat (see Chapter 4). These short take-off and landing aircraft operated by RAAF 35 Squadron carried a tailplane insignia of a stylised wallaby and were known informally as ‘Wallaby Airlines’. Les Hayward joined Australia’s national airline in 1964 after training as an RAF cadet in Britain. He flew DC-4s or Lockheed Electras before graduating to Boeing 707s. In 1969, as a second officer, he volunteered to fly the Qantas charter flights to Saigon. The aircrew had some interesting times in 1969–70, as Les recalls: The approaches into Tan Son Nhut were rather steeper than normal, to keep the aircraft away from ground fire. On one approach, my first time in, we were told to go around and the American controller very drily said, ‘Qantas, try the other end of the runway, there’s a small war going on at this end’ . . . Ahead we could see the tracer coming up. The reaction on the flight deck was predictable: ‘Shit—let’s get out of here!’ . . . It’s uncomfortable when you know you can’t fire back . . . In those days 707s were big aeroplanes and not all that manoeuverable. We felt very vulnerable . . . The captain was an ex-Bomber Command man from the Second World War and he said, ‘It’s twentyodd years since I’ve seen that.’ However, I don’t think Qantas planes ever got damaged going into Saigon.1

Sometimes just arriving at Tan Son Nhut was harrowing, as a former infantry officer and National Service man, Neil Weekes, remembers: I left Australia on 17 March 1968 and arrived in Viet Nam at 1400 hours at Tan Son Nhut airport. That was at the end HO CHI MINH CITY

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of the 1968 Tet Offensive. I was a member of the 1 RAR advance party. When we arrived at the airport, Saigon was under attack. There was artillery fire going in, fires around the airport. There were several damaged planes that had been hit with rocket or artillery fire, and as we got off the plane we were issued our weapons and live rounds for our magazines. We were then shown across to the protection bays of the aircraft, where we huddled against the walls while waiting for a couple of Caribou to fly us into Nui Dat. My diary records: ‘Guns blasting everywhere—we’re in it.’2

Visiting the airport today

Tan Son Nhut is 7 kilometres northwest of the city centre. The airport is an operational airbase as well, so don’t try to take photographs even from inside the terminal buildings. Armed guards no longer patrol inside but the staff are still very officious. Always carry your passport as you may be required to show it several times—and that’s just to get on an internal flight. The airport has new domestic and international terminals. The old fighter and bomber aircraft revetments and hangars are still visible and above their decaying walls you can see the tailplanes of old C-130 Hercules used by the Americans, C-123 Provider planes, and CH-47 choppers. Almost nothing remains of the US transit base, Camp Alpha, except an outer wall. Most of the US aircraft left behind were either unserviceable or beyond economical repair, or were captured when Saigon was overrun in 1975. Some aircraft were left beind for the South Vietnamese Air Force and were subsequently lost. Australia left behind only the remains of planes destroyed in combat. 26



War Remnants Museum This museum, known previously as the War Crimes Museum, is located on the corner of Duong Vo Van Tan and Duong Le Qui Don, only a block away from the Reunification Palace. The collection is housed in about six different buildings in the grounds of the former US Ambassador’s residence. There is also a large courtyard full of weapons, aircraft, cannons and equipment. There are M-48 and M-41 tanks, Skyraider fighter/bombers, a collection of bombs of various sizes, propellor-driven Strikemasters, an F-5E Tiger fighter ground attack jet, an Iroquois gunship, a collection of 155mm and 105mm howitzers, an 8-inch self-propelled cannon, an M-113 armoured personnel carrier (APC), and a dozer tank. Opening times are 8.00–11.45 am and 1.30–4.30 pm daily. Admission costs 10 000 dong, or around A$1. Despite the evident propaganda and bias, the museum is worth visiting. Allow at least an hour or more for a visit, taking a while to reflect on the horrors of war. Some of the exhibits relating to the alleged effects of Agent Orange contain jars holding deformed foetuses and can give you quite a shock. The museum signs and photograph captions are taken from a famous photographic essay called Requiem.3 Offensive remarks about US and allied soldiers appear in captions under some photographs, especially those concerning the massacre at My Lai, and in other references to war-fighting abilities. The Hostility Truce Room exhibit contains very few captions with English translations, but here is one example: ‘The US expenditure on bombs dropped in the war was 352 billion US dollars according to US economist R.W. Stevens in his book published in 1976. The US expenditure in Viet Nam War amounted to 955 billion US dollars.’ HO CHI MINH CITY

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The ‘Tiger Cages’ exhibit displays the type of prisoner accommodation offered to those captured during the French War and American War. The cells have been refurbished and the section has been significantly upgraded since 1996. Included in the exhibit is a working guillotine, which was used for beheading dissidents in the French colonial era. To the best of my knowledge it was not used for Allied POWs. The impact of the displays is not lost on those who have been lucky enough not to experience war at first hand. My 21-year-old daughter Kelly was visibly upset by some of the exhibits but was able to make this observation: ‘I think anyone naive enough to think that war is the answer to any problem needs to be shown this museum.’4

Revolutionary Museum Located on the corner of Duong Ly Tu Trong and Duong Nam Ky Khoi Nghia, the Revolutionary Museum is housed in a former palace and contains very good archaeological, cultural and revolutionary aspects of Vietnamese life. The museum has two floors: the top floor has two wings covering both the First Indochina War and the Second Indochina War (the museum’s terminology). While English captions are included in the displays upstairs, in the archaeological section downstairs the captions are only in Vietnamese. Use of a guide is strongly recommended. Opening times are 8.00–11.30 am and 2.00–4.30 pm (closed Mondays). The entrance fee is 20 000 dong (A$2).

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Reunification Palace (Presidential Palace) The Presidential Palace of the former South Vietnamese government, now known as the Reunification Palace, is essentially a museum. Its entrance is on Duong Nguyen Du. It contains aspects of presidential life including wellpreserved war rooms under the building. In the extensive gardens are the tanks (or ones of a similar model) that stormed through the gates in 1975 when Saigon fell to the communists. The basement containing the war rooms is well worth a visit. It includes a planning room (with some great maps), a communications node, teletype machines, signals encrypting machines, several message centres, and a very large kitchen that fed up to 500 people who worked in the buildings during the American War. The entrance fee for the Palace is 15 000 dong (A$1.50). Opening times are 8.00–11.00 am and 1.00–4.00 pm daily. A guided tour is a must if you want to learn about the colours of the various rooms and their significance.

War surplus market (Cho Dan Sinh) Among the markets that characterise the Cholon district is the war surplus market (Cho Dan Sinh), which is located at the corner of Yersin Street and Nguyen Cong Tru. It is what my daughter describes as ‘bloke heaven’, being like a super hardware store. At the rear end of the market (furthest from the road) are two sections for war surplus gear. Unfortunately the quality of the sales area has degenerated in the last six to eight years. It used to be well laid out with separate areas for webbing, hats, medals, badges, flags, diaries, letters HO CHI MINH CITY

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and other memorabilia, but now it represents something more akin to a jumble sale. The items on sale are not just from the US Army; there are photos and letters from ARVN forces as well. In 2002 there was a good selection of black and white photographs that looked like shots from the Ho Chi Minh Trail (Truong Son), with Russian officers and also crews of soldiers clad in Russian helmets manning antiaircraft guns. Prices have to be haggled down here as the vendors play on the visiting sucker looking for something to take home. In my opinion the stallholders ask far too much for some of the equipment. And it takes a fair amount of foraging if you want to get what you are after. Potential buyers are better off going in a small group (watching each other’s back and bags) and working their way methodically through the heaps of memorabilia. Remember that the authenticity of anything in this market is subject to question. Some items may well be authentic but others could be very good fakes (like American dog tags and Zippo lighters). I was looking for a Viet Cong flag in 1993 and one was quietly manufactured in a backroom while I was waiting—yet it was guaranteed to be real! Buyer beware!

Further reading Vietnam—A History by Stanley Karnow, Century Publishing, London, 1983; Chapter 14.

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2 CU CHI AND THE HO BO WOODS; MEKONG DELTA The district of Cu Chi lies immediately northwest of Ho Chi Minh City. During the war it supported a vast tunnel system occupied by the Viet Cong. The Cu Chi tunnel complex was big enough to conceal a regiment en route to an area of operations. The area was also one of the few in which troops and wheeled vehicles could move easily in both the wet and the dry seasons, making it highly prized in military operations. And it had firm, red soil that was highly suitable for digging and tunnelling in ground that did not become waterlogged in the monsoon.1 Cu Chi was also important strategically because it bordered an area known as the Iron Triangle, the heartland of the Viet Cong guerillas. The Iron Triangle was an 80 square kilometre area delineated in the north by a 16kilometre line running from the village of Ben Cat (where an Australian-sponsored dairy farm project was run in 1963) to the village of Ben Suc; in the west by the river Song Sai Gon; and in the east by the river Song Thi Tinh. Within the triangle were thick jungle and rubber plantations with numerous villages and hamlets on the periphery. CU CHI AND THE HO BO WOODS

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The Cu Chi tunnels and fortifications were first developed by the Viet Minh to help in the fight against the French during the First Indochina War, when the area was largely unchallenged by the French. At the end of 1947 only 47 kilometres of tunnel existed but with the formation of the Viet Cong many more tunnels and fortifications were added. By the end of 1963 there were an estimated 200 kilometres of arterial tunnels—part of 400 kilometres of arterial tunnels, branches, connecting tunnels and trenches—in a 300 square kilometre area.2 During the 1960s the Viet Cong dominated the whole Cu Chi district and the local people were probably pro-VC. Situated at the end of the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail, the tunnel system provided a vast staging area for North Vietnamese Army troops and supplies coming south. It was estimated that the NVA could concentrate up to 10 000 troops within seven days if they wanted to defend the area. These enemy were likely to be three Main Force regiments, each of which contained three battalions, together with six independent Main Force battalions, the Phu Loi Local Battalion and six local companies. Their weapons included 75mm pack howitzers, a full range of mortars, recoilless rifles and anti-aircraft machine guns that were sometimes employed in a ground defence role.3 The Ho Bo Woods lay on the western edge of the Iron Triangle, north of Cu Chi village and only 40 kilometres northwest of Saigon. The area’s flat terrain and gently rolling hills, used for rice paper production, were a deceptive cover for another, smaller but still very extensive, tunnel network. The Australians, in the form of 1 RAR troops, were to get to know it well.4

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1 RAR The 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, was the first infantry battalion to serve in Viet Nam following the Australian Government’s decision in 1965 to commit combat troops to the Allied forces. The Australian force comprised two companies (Bravo and Delta) of 1 RAR (infantry), an armoured personnel carrier unit from the 4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse (later renamed 1 APC Troop), 105 Field Battery, Royal Australian Artillery, and engineers from the 3rd Field Troop, Royal Australian Engineers. Being too small to operate independently, the Australian force was placed under the command of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate). From May 1965 to May 1966, 1 RAR was based at Bien Hoa (see Chapter 10), about 25 kilometres east of Saigon, and operated in and around the surrounding province. In June 1966, 1 RAR was relieved of duty with the arrival of the 5th Battalion as part of the 1st Australian Task Force.

Operation Crimp, Ho Bo Woods area Operation Crimp, conducted in January 1966, was to be a search and destroy operation to sweep the enemy to the east and pin them against the obstacle of the river Song Sai Gon. The target was the headquarters of the Saigon–Cholon–Gia Special Sector Committee, which was responsible for coordinating all Viet Cong activity around the South Vietnamese capital. It was a large two-brigade operation involving the US 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate), including 1 RAR as one of the infantry battalions and main manoeuvre CU CHI AND THE HO BO WOODS

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elements, and the US 3rd Infantry Brigade. This was 1 RAR’s third foray into the enemy’s heartland. The new commanding officer of 1 RAR, 40-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Alex Preece, was to have a demanding job for the seven days of Operation Crimp. On 8 January airmobile assaults by 173rd Brigade began in the north and west of the Ho Bo Woods, while the 3rd Brigade flew into the south. The plan for the Australians was twofold: they were to adopt a blocking position in a village beside the river on the northern edge of 173rd Brigade’s area of operations; and they were to clear and capture the enemy tunnels. Thankfully the designated landing zone (LZ) (codenamed ‘June’) was changed after it was suspected that the Viet Cong had begun preparations to defend the landing ground. Major John Essex-Clark was the operations officer for 1 RAR and on a visual recce of the LZ in a helicopter the day before he had noticed that there were no leaves on the ground under the trees, indicating they were probably covered by soil—so there was a good chance that bunkers fortified the area. After some procrastination by the American planners, who did not want to change their intricate plans at such late notice, it was agreed to fly into an alternative LZ (‘March’). That decision probably saved many lives and helicopters. Interestingly, even though the orders were delayed until the last possible minute, the Allied radio research unit’s intercept stations picked up a radio transmission warning the Viet Cong that ‘paratroopers’ (173rd Brigade) and the Diggers were in the air. After landing safely on the alternative LZ ‘March’, Major Ian McFarlane, commanding Bravo Company, quickly began set about securing the LZ for the troops following. Almost immediately his company was attacked 34



by sniper fire in the area from well-camouflaged ‘spider holes’. After ‘March’ had been secured and the Australian companies had regrouped on the ground, 1 RAR advanced the 3 kilometres on foot towards ‘June’ to clear the enemy from that position. When the battalion closed in on ‘June’, contact was initiated when cunningly concealed machine guns knocked over six Australians at very close range. Highly camouflaged fortifications with interconnecting tunnels and firing positions were impossible to detect when patrolling. Two medics, Privates Merv Wilson and Chris Clark, were both killed from a well-concealed machine-gun position that pinned down the lead section of Major Ian Fisher’s Delta Company. It soon became evident that the enemy were right in among the Australians and most were firing from concealed bunkers and spider holes throughout the entire area the battalion was occupying. Lieutenant Colonel Preece decided that the enemy and the Special Sector headquarters were right underneath his battalion. He gave quick orders and formed a tight battalion perimeter, hoping the enemy would counterattack. Viet Cong individuals and groups inside this ‘human anthill’ popped up inside the battalion perimeter, from then on. This created all sorts of dramas including the danger of being killed by friendly fire and overshoots. By the end of day one, 1 RAR had suffered three soldiers killed and 15 wounded in action, plus three cases of severe battle shock when a booby trap of considerable size detonated right next to a group of soldiers. Author Bob Breen described the fight through the Ho Bo Woods as ‘a nerve-racking shooting gallery’. He writes in his highly acclaimed book First to Fight: There were snipers and small groups of Viet Cong everywhere—in and behind trees, in bunkers, popping up CU CHI AND THE HO BO WOODS

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from spider holes and tunnel entrances at ground level, and scrambling away after firing quick bursts. The area was seeded with numerous booby traps. Diggers noticed the ominous wires and saw shells and bunches of grenades dangling from trees and clumps of bamboo. One such booby trap mortally wounded 28-year-old Captain Ken Bade, a forward observation officer (FO) with 105 Field Battery. What also complicated the fighting was the presence of sheltering groups of Vietnamese civilians trying desperately to escape this madhouse of warfare.5

Above ground the pathetic crying of local women and children could also be heard, some soldiers suggesting that it was for their menfolk now trapped underground beneath the Australians. The struggle continued throughout the second day. On day three of the operation, and before first light, enemy probes on the battalion perimeter were repelled by grenades, the Diggers avoiding firing their machine guns and disclosing their positions. For the Australians it was a sleepless night. The rest of the operation centred on the Australians charting and systematically clearing the tunnels by sending in sapper teams of ‘tunnel rats’, armed with 9mm Browning pistols and torches, to clear and capture the enemy labyrinth. These tunnel rats were led by 26-year-old Captain Alex MacGregor from 3 Field Troop. Tunnel rat George ‘Snow’ Wilson describes what confronted them: Even at an early stage we realised we had a major complex on our hands. An American engineer [who was working with the troop] and I had just finished handing up a lot of food, clothing, papers and so on—and ‘Bingo!’ we found 36



another, lower level to the tunnel complex. This lower level of tunnels yielded a cache mainly of weapons, ammunition and the like . . . Included in the haul was a Chicom 12.7mm anti-aircraft heavy machine gun, including the tripod and sights . . .6

This was the first systematic attempt by the Allies to clear and then destroy a tunnel system. First they flushed the tunnels with smoke and CS gas (a tear gas) using US air compressors. After this forced out the VC hiding below, a sapper would go down wearing a gas mask. But as George Wilson says, ‘the smoke and CS gas together burn oxygen and made our gas masks useless’.7 The work was very dangerous and, as Wilson explains, sometimes fatal: We then had to start the tedious task of clearing the complex and this was not made any easier by over-zealous grunts tossing smoke canisters and CS gas canisters in each and every hole that they suspected belonged to the system. This practice proved fatal when a good friend, Corporal Bob Bowtell, pushed himself too far into the system and down one hole too many. He ran into a pocket of foul air and suffocated when he couldn’t push himself back out of the hole he had forced himself down. Three other mates, Peter Ash, Alan Christie and Bill Coolburra, had to be medevaced [evacuated by medical aircraft] out of the woods as a result of their desperate efforts to save Bob.8

Bob Bowtell was buried in the Australian section of the British War Cemetery at Terendak in West Malaysia. The Ho Bo Woods tunnel complex was quite amazing. It consisted in many parts of three levels of tunnels, some concrete-reinforced and connected to deeper earthen CU CHI AND THE HO BO WOODS

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chambers full of weapons, documents and war fighting equipment. Wells in some cases went down another 10 metres from an underground chamber already 10 metres underground—and all dug by hand. The documents discovered were especially valuable as they gave the names of members of military units and political cadres in the Saigon area. It was evident that some information contained in the documents had come from South Vietnamese sources. It was a nerve-racking job for the men who were tasked to search and clear the tunnels and the sappers paid a high price for their efforts, as George Wilson recalls: Those long periods spent underground, often in total darkness, where at times the only ‘light’ was the luminous face of your watch, were my most vivid memories of Viet Nam . . . Our troop casualty rate was particularly high on that operation with only 12 men out of 35 remaining until the end . . . of the operation. When our time in the area ran out, we believed that although we had mapped out several kilometres of tunnels, in fact we had barely scratched the surface. It really hurt and went against the grain to seal those tunnel entrances and leave the area. Our whole experience in the tunnels was recorded by the Australian Headquarters in Saigon, for use at the School of Military Engineering back in Australia.9

The Ho Bo Woods complex was so big that it was estimated it would take weeks to search the entire system and several hundred tonnes of explosives to destroy it. By 17 January, three days after the end of Operation Crimp, some 17 kilometres of tunnels had been thoroughly charted. This distance was estimated by the total length of 38



telephone line used by the brave sappers who pushed through the never-ending maze of red dirt tunnels. But it was just a fraction of the overall distance involved. The recovery of some 7500 documents, 90 weapons, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and enough equipment to fill eight 2.5-tonne trucks provided the Allies with what was regarded as ‘the first major intelligence coup of the war’.10 Casualties

In Operation Crimp in the Ho Bo Woods 1 RAR lost eight killed and 29 wounded in action, at the same time accounting for some 27 enemy killed and 30 (probable) wounded in action. The American casualties were higher (22 killed and 106 wounded in action) but there were also many more paratroopers in the field than there were Diggers, and the Americans were up against some heavy opposition. The total enemy casualties were: 128 killed and 190 (probable) wounded in action, over 500 suspects detained and 1000 refugees screened. Remarkably, only one VC soldier was captured (he surrendered). Postscript

The Ho Bo Woods area was restored as a major VC transit and supply centre and, despite several missions made by the US 25th Infantry Division, was never totally destroyed and was still operating when National Liberation Front victory finally came in 1975. Regardless of the number of Allied forays made into this VC heartland, the Cu Chi system remained in use for the entire war. It was never captured or occupied, it was constantly shelled by harassing or interdicting artillery fire, CU CHI AND THE HO BO WOODS

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and it was bombed by Allied aircraft disposing of unused ordnance before returning to Saigon or Bien Hoa. It provided a very valuable staging and support area for the VC—and later the NVA—in the offensive that led to the fall of Saigon after the Allies withdrew in 1972. Visiting the area today

The Ho Bo Woods are today extensively cultivated and not recognisable for what they were during the war. If you want to see what the tunnel system was like you should visit one of the Cu Chi sites open to the public. These are located at the village of Ben Dinh (50 kilometres from Ho Chi Minh City) and Ben Duoc (15 kilometres beyond Ben Dinh). Although the former is more popular, I recommend Ben Duoc because of the facilities available. You should allocate an entire day for this outing. It’s a two and a half hour trip up Highway 22 from Ho Chi Minh City in heavy traffic and then a rough ride along a bitumen road to the tunnel area. I recommend that you take a tour or perhaps organise your own transport, because buses only take you as far as Cu Chi village. If you’re intent on going down into the tunnels, wear old clothes that you don’t mind getting dirty. You will get hot and sweaty as the tunnels are very narrow at times and it’s warm underground. Have cold water with you, a hand towel or sweat rag, and perhaps a change of shirt back in the bus. Old clothes are recommended as the red mud lingers in the fabric through several washings and my wife reckons it will never come out. It’s not a bad idea to wear those T-shirts your partner has always been threatening to throw out at the next clean-up. Shoes, socks, everything will eventually get a smear of the distinctive red dirt on them. Street vendors in Ho Chi Minh City can instantly tell when you’ve been to Cu Chi. 40



Coming to the tunnel site from Ben Duoc village you’ll see wrecked ARVN and American APC hulks adorning the roadside. The area is pockmarked with innumerable craters of all sizes, which now provide good-size duck-breeding ponds and water catchment areas. Strangely, those inside the rubber plantations or in the rice paddyfields have never been filled in. As you start walking into the tunnel complex, the cool and shady tree canopy may bring back memories if you spent a tour of duty searching the forests of Phuoc Tuy and other provinces looking for VC. There are plenty of places in which to sit down and rest and the pathways are clearly marked. The entrance fee is 65 000 dong (roughly A$6.50), unless you’ve paid for the tour in a package deal, and the opening hours are 9.00 am to 4.00 pm. The shop there sells English books (or photocopies of them!) and souvenirs, all for reasonable prices, plus photographic film. As always it’s a case of ‘buyer beware’ when purchasing ‘authentic’ war souvenirs. The site includes various displays, the bulk of which are in underground bunkers, with a few exhibits above ground. A leaf-strewn path follows a long loop and takes you to the entrance of each feature in turn, although one or two may be temporarily closed for maintenance purposes. ‘Classroom’ displays include a collection of rocket pods and bombs and a mock VC in normal fighting gear in a typical hoochie (field shelter) set-up. A large hut has a map display of the Cu Chi system, along with a diorama showing the various tunnel constructions and how the Viet Cong moved and operated inside the system. For the last ten years a black and white post-1975 propaganda movie has been screened that is offensive to most veterans and of poor quality. It is in many places implausible or technically incorrect. CU CHI AND THE HO BO WOODS

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In an early bunker you come across an underground well on display. It is 8–10 metres underground, with the water table 10–15 metres below that. Further along the path a shell has caved in part of a bunker, which gives a good view of how the bunker roofs were constructed with layers of criss-crossing logs and hard-packed soil. The next bunker is an underground medical aid post. Next to it is an operating room for minor surgery that underlines just how tough the VC soldiers had it when it came to medical support in the field. A treatment room is next and soon a sloping crawl tunnel leads to the exit. You now come to the command bunker or, as it’s designated, the ‘Headquarter Meeting’ bunker; this is a must even if you don’t want to go down into any of the other underground rooms. Near the end of your tour of the bunker exhibits there is a bamboo-pipe irrigation system showing how water was reticulated through the camp in order to keep personnel movement to a minimum. It’s a nice touch for the now very hot visitor! After the bunker displays, a non-explosive booby trap lane is almost the last exhibit. Rows of traps are under permanent cover for preservation and guides will show how they worked. They are deadly, ingenious and should not be touched under any circumstances. Shown are a revolvingdoor leg trap, then a pounding trap which swings up and hammers the victim from behind with spikes, then a conical trap where the victim falls in and is trapped against spikes which point down and make extrication extremely difficult and painful. Other fiendish inventions include a pit trap in which a series of crossbow bolts are fired from several directions when the victim hits the bottom of the pit. Finally, the National Defence Sports Shooting Range (crude at best) allows you to fire several types of weapon for 42



about 20 000 dong (A$2) per round. Weapons offered are the SKS, variants of the AK-47 assault rifle, the GPMG M-60 machine gun, Garand rifle and M-14 Carbine, and for those with heavier calibres in mind, a .30 Browning machine gun. Next to the ammunition shop at the shooting range is an Iroquois helicopter on a plinth, and various hulks of vehicles and aircraft are scattered around.

Dien Ben Duoc Three hundred metres down the road from the entrance to the Cu Chi tunnel complex is Dien Ben Duoc, a seriously large and quite magnificent temple and war memorial to the Viet Cong killed in the Cu Chi region and Binh Duong Province. It is only a few years old. Two archways with beautiful carvings and other decoration lead to an expansive courtyard adorned with bonsai shrubs and topiary trees. Magnificent urns are placed around the courtyard and neatly tended grass and pebble paving flanks the inner sanctum. A huge urn for josh sticks greets the visitor. In all it is quite impressive. An enormous pagoda with a seven-storey tower on one side dominates the foreground above the Song Sai Gon river. The 50 000 names of those who paid for Viet Nam’s nationalism are inscribed in gold letters on the inner walls. The adjoining tower is actually an archive on those who fought in the region. Inside the temple a large bell used for calling people to prayer rests on one side, while a huge set of ceremonial drums sit opposite. Massive lotus-shaped pillars support the 20-metre-high roof and the many symbols of the Buddhist religion adorn the inner chamber. On the outer walls of the temple on the southern side a huge tile mosaic depicts scenes from everyday life in CU CHI AND THE HO BO WOODS

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Viet Nam as it was. Around the corner of the temple and overlooking the Song Sai Gon, the next mosaic wall (on the western side) shows the struggle of the Vietnamese people against the French in the First Indochina War. This mosaic shows soldiers running into battle with their AK-47s and tanks, people wearing scarves, French soldiers committing atrocities, people being strung up by French soldiers or police, or being tortured. A firing squad executing a group of peasants is definitely French. The northern wall of the temple, showing the victory of the NLF over the Americans, depicts significant events in the war. The temple of Dien Ben Duoc is certainly worthy of a visit for anyone coming to Cu Chi and to miss it would be a shame. Near the temple is a riverside restaurant, which is recommended for lunch after visiting the tunnel complex. The return trip to Ho Chi Minh City will take at least three hours in the heavy afternoon traffic. As an alternative to the road trip, I suggest returning by boat to Ho Chi Minh City along the Song Sai Gon to avoid traversing the bad access road and repeating the scenery. A large cemetery on the road out of Ben Duoc on the way to Route 22 is typical of the many VC and NVA war cemeteries that abound in Viet Nam. If you wish you can also stop to see—with a guide—how the locals make rice paper (for food) in villages along the road. A large apricot-coloured building on the road out is the Army’s Junior Military Academy (Viet Nam’s Duntroon or West Point).

Mekong Delta The Mekong Delta in the very south of the country was a major hunting ground for US Navy SEAL (Sea Air and 44



Land) commando teams, US Special Forces soldiers and US Marine Corps personnel. The only people that Australia had down in the Delta region were the Australian Army Training Team, Canberra bomber crews on air-strike missions, forward air controllers, and Royal Australian Navy clearance diving teams doing specialist jobs in the many waterways. Besides airborne (especially helicopter) operations, amphibious operations were crucial in the region. The divers’ job was to remove stakes, booby traps and mines that had been inserted by the enemy as obstacles for river patrol craft in order to deny the Allies access to the area. The enemy were also heavily engaged in the destruction of bridges by using floating birdcage mines with timed fuses. On his tour of duty, clearance diver Mick Ey visited the Delta often. He recalls what the Allies were up against: We did underground bunkers, booby traps, and did a lot of river clearances. We demolished river barricades because the Viet Cong . . . where they wanted to keep patrol craft out of the area . . . would get these big long logs and actually cut a thread on them like a screw—hack it out. They’d get the bloody things upright in the water and then with ropes, and I don’t know how they did it, they would screw them into the bottom so you couldn’t pull them out. So then they would have all these huge poles in there and the only way we could get rid of those was with what we called a Mark 8 hose charge . . .11

Being a clearance diver called for a fair amount of raw nerve. Mick Ey explains: We used to work out of a swift patrol craft all the time. We would generally have to go out there with [the CU CHI AND THE HO BO WOODS

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Americans] . . . Whenever they wanted to go up to a river area we would have to jump over the side into the water and crawl around on the banks and clear the river, mainly to see if there were any wires for control of commanddetonated mines.12

Underwater warfare

During the war the RAN clearance diving teams searched 7573 ships and conducted 153 major diving tasks and 88 special operations throughout South Viet Nam. Some 42 000 unpredictable and unexploded items were destroyed and 78 explosive devices were removed from ships. Of the 48 men who served in the RAN clearance diving teams between February 1967 and May 1971, only one was killed in action, with one wounded. Visiting the area today

Take Highway 1 southwest out of Ho Chi Minh City. The country is dead flat but fantastically lush and green. Travelling by road is more reliable than taking the ferry, and in the high monsoon season there is always a chance of a delay or cancellation. A two-day visit is needed to get a proper impression of the area and the various cultures that exist in the Delta. Also it’s a four-hour trip each way by road if everything goes well, so an overnight stay is a good idea. My Tho, about 70 kilometres from Ho Chi Minh City, is situated on the northern branch (Song Tien Giang) of the Mekong River and is a good spot to take lunch on the way south. Further on is Can Tho, which is at the centre of the Mekong Delta system on the southern branch (Song Han Giang) of the Mekong River. A great way to see Can Tho is 46



to hire a cyclo (a three-wheel rickshaw) and tour the sites with a local guide. There are some large military cemeteries on the way down to Can Tho, especially around My Tho.

Further reading The following books provide good insight into the Cu Chi tunnels and/or various operations conducted by Australians in the south: Bullets, Beans and Bandages: Australians at War in Viet Nam by Gary McKay, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1999. First to Fight: Australian Diggers, NZ Kiwis and US Paratroopers in Vietnam, 1965–66 by Bob Breen, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988. To Long Tan: the Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1962–1972 by Ian McNeill, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1984. The Tunnels of Cu Chi by Tom Mangold and John Penycate, Random House, New York, 1985. Vietnam Fragments: An Oral History of Australians at War by Gary McKay, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992.

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PART II BARIA–VUNG TAU (PHUOC TUY) PROVINCE AND ENVIRONS Phuoc Tuy Province—as it existed in the war years—was the prime piece of real estate that the 1st Australian Task Force was responsible for between 1966 and 1972. The province, to the southwest of HCM City, is now known as Baria–Vung Tau Province, with Baria as the capital. The districts that make up this province are now Vung Tau, including Long Son Island (south), with the town of Vung Tau as district capital; Baria (capital and centre), Long Dat (east), with Long Dien as the district capital; Chau Duc (north), with Ngai Giao as the district capital; Xuyen Moc (northeast) with Phuoc Buu as the district capital; and Tan Thanh (west), with Phu My as the district capital. The province is approximately 2500 square kilometres in area, consisting of coastal plains with sand dunes to the south, two isolated jungle-covered mountain groups (Nui Dinh and Nui Thi Vai) to the west and another (the Long Hai 48


hills), to the southeast on the coast. The rest of the province is mainly a deciduous type of tropical rainforest with occasional tracts of primary jungle. Other areas are lightly timbered and, around population centres, rice, cereal and other food is cultivated, along with rubber. Phuoc Tuy Province was an operational backwater compared to the northern provinces near the demilitarised zone (DMZ) on the 17th Parallel border. The number of suspected enemy throughout the province was not as large as in those areas in the north; however, it was an area where Australia could manage its own military affairs to a certain degree and work in accordance with Australian Army doctrine and tactical procedures. BARIA–VUNG TAU PROVINCE AND ENVIRONS

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Every hamlet and village in the province had a small Viet Cong military cell. The part-time local guerrillas from these cells acted as guides, couriers and porters for the Main Force units who were constantly training, rehearsing and preparing for offensive operations against the government forces. Main Force units, one of which was a division consisting of two regiments, were better equipped than the local guerrillas. A full strength local battalion (D445 Battalion) had strong popular support. Militarily, it was respected as a fine unit and was quite successful in action. District companies such as the Binh Ba District Company, and local guerrillas like the Chau Duc Guerrilla Unit, operated on various tasks such as resupply or reconnaissance. Australian clashes with the enemy in Phuoc Tuy Province were more often than not fleeting affairs, sometimes lasting no more than a few shots as the enemy withdrew because of unfavourable circumstances. Sometimes contacts or fire fights lasted up to an hour when the enemy thought he had a chance to inflict casualties, but often it was to force a delay and allow the main body of the force to pack up and get away from danger. Occasionally battles would last for several hours and sometimes several days, but these were few and far between. For the six years the Australian Task Force operated in Phuoc Tuy Province the Viet Cong had no respite. The threat was reduced to a containable level, the population could move about relatively freely and, apart from the fact that a war was in progress, people could make a subsistence living. The Australians were withdrawn completely in 1972 at the behest of their political masters and in conjunction with a phased American withdrawal across all of South Viet Nam. Many Australians felt terrible at leaving because they felt the job had not been finished. During the entire period 50

BARIA–VUNG TAU PROVINCE AND ENVIRONS


of offensive operations the Australians were never defeated on the field of battle and never had a soldier taken prisoner, and they reclaimed the territory for the South Vietnamese Government. Part Two covers the vestiges of the war that you can expect to see today in Baria–Vung Tau Province by drawing on past events to highlight what occurred and what remains today. It includes the most significant sites of Australia’s war in Viet Nam: the bases, the outposts, the local villages, and the sites of important combat and of larger, devastating battles. Veterans are warned that very little remains to see at these sites; it tends to be more a case of just ‘being there’. It is often handy to carry a photograph album because photos are a good way of relating the past to what is there today. They can also help to orientate you and jog your memory. War-era military topographical maps are good for reference to sites, but not for map reading or navigation, as the road system has changed in many places, especially coming out of Vung Tau where there is now a four-lane highway leading up the peninsula. The old Route 2 in Phuoc Tuy, alas, is now Provincial Route 56. The place names of some towns have changed and in some cases whole hamlets have disappeared altogether as progress has overtaken them. I suggest if you are travelling independently that you use Vung Tau as a ‘home base’ for this part of your tour and that you take day trips out to the areas of interest. You can travel to Vung Tau (where there is no commercial airport) from Ho Chi Minh City by road or sea. I recommend going by ferry (see Chapter 3) and returning to HCM City by road via Bien Hoa. Here’s a suggested itinerary: Day 1: Arrive in Vung Tau. Take a half-day tour to see the local sights such as the White Villa, the Peter Badcoe Club, BARIA–VUNG TAU PROVINCE AND ENVIRONS

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1 ALSG base and the Viet Cong Memorial, ‘The Flags’ area and ‘Street of Bars’, and the Grand Hotel (see Chapter 3). Day 2: Take a day trip north up to the Dat Do minefield and the war cemetery, The Horseshoe, the Long Phuoc tunnels, the Long Tan battlefield (see Chapter 5), and the 1 ATF base at Nui Dat. Return to Vung Tau via the town of Hoa Long, well remembered by those who served in the region. Day 3: Visit the Long Hai hills and the Minh Dam Secret Zone and then head west out through Long Dien and Baria to the Hat Dich area (see page 60). Head north to the battle sites of Binh Ba (Chapter 7), Long Khanh (Chapter 8) and Nui Le (Chapter 9). After Nui Le depart north for the city of Bien Hoa, then return to HCM City.

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3 VUNG TAU AND BARIA Vung Tau, known colloquially to veterans as ‘Vungers’, is about 130 kilometres from Ho Chi Minh City. During the war, soldiers were granted local leave to visit the picturesque town, which at the height of the war was a bustling place where over 3000 bar girls plied their trade. Huge numbers of Americans also took in-country leave in Viet Nam and used the town as a rest centre. It was a relatively safe area but a curfew still existed for the general safety of those soldiers, sailors and airmen who might overindulge in the delights of a few days’ liberty. Military Police and Shore Patrols would comb the bars and cafes throughout the evenings and take those who required assistance back to their accommodation. The local merchants quickly picked up on the Australian scene and before long bars with names like Sydney Bar and Kangaroo Bar sprouted to attract the Diggers. The town (population 190 000) is a lot quieter now than it was during the war years and some say it has almost returned to the time when it was a popular French colonial resort. Many young couples travel there on their motorbikes on Sundays for a picnic or a swim. Front Beach (Bai Truoc) is still popular with locals and tourists alike and contains all VUNG TAU AND BARIA

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the tourist hotels, shops and bars. It runs beside what is now Dai Lo Quang Trung, a four-lane road that is busy at most times of the day and early evening. Along the eastern side of Vung Tau runs Dai Lo Thuy Van, or what was known as Back Beach Road. Like Front Beach, the beach itself is still known by its wartime name as well as by its Vietnamese name, Bai Sau.

Getting there Travelling to Vung Tau by road takes a nerve-racking three to four hours. A quicker and easier way is to travel by hydrofoil ferry, which takes about one and a quarter hours. The Russian-built hydrofoils are air-conditioned and not dissimilar to ferries that operate around Hong Kong and earlier on Sydney Harbour. The ferries run to and from Vung Tau several times a day. You should check on the times, especially during the wet season when storms may interrupt services. The ferry terminal in HCM City is on the Song Sai Gon (Saigon River), on Duong Ton Duc Thang. For foreign adults the fare is in the order of 150 000 dong (A$15)— they pay more than the locals do. On board there is seat allocation but once you are underway you can move around to take photos and to stretch your legs. The first part of the journey takes you through the busy port of HCM City. It is usually full of large container ships from all over the planet and coastal freighters of Asian origin. The ferry zooms along at about 65 km/h and offers quite a smooth ride. Before you know it, the Nui Thi Vai mountains (popularly referred to as the Warburtons or ‘Warbies’ by the Diggers in Nui Dat) and the larger Nui Dinh mountains loom into view, telling you that Vung Tau isn’t far off. 54



Vung Tau airbase Vung Tau was the home of the RAAF’s 9 Squadron, with its Iroquois helicopters, and Transport Flight Vietnam (TFV), later to become 35 Squadron, flying the propellor-driven Caribou aircraft. The RAAF based its aircraft in Vung Tau as it was considerably safer than housing them at the Task Force base in Nui Dat and because the airfield facilities at Vung Tau allowed easier maintenance and proper aircrew rest. The TFV was responsible for transporting troops to and from Tan Son Nhut airport in Saigon (see Chapter 1). The pilots gained a considerable reputation for being able to land anywhere and at any time in their Caribou aircraft. They were often employed on missions throughout South Viet Nam where less experienced US Caribou pilots were unable to negotiate the tricky conditions and short strips. The airbase is located on Quoc Lo Sia, a road that runs along the northwestern side of Vung Tau precinct. Very little remains of the old buildings and only a few hangars are still to be seen, the bulk of the facilities having been destroyed in fighting in 1975. The airfield is now mainly used by commercial aviation companies and access is limited to those on aviation business. The Alaska Barge Company (allegedly a front for CIA operations during the war) used to be nearby, at what is now a Socialist Republic of Viet Nam naval dockyard.

White Villa (Bach Dinh) This historical edifice was the summer palace of the South Vietnamese president. Much earlier it was once used as a place of internment (five-star house arrest) for the Vietnamese VUNG TAU AND BARIA

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king, Thanh Thai, before he was deported by the French to the prison island of Reunion. It contains magnificent antique displays from the 17th century and later, including old Chinese ceramics (discovered on the bottom of Vung Tau harbour in 1990) and some interesting weaponry from the 19th and 20th centuries. All displays have both Vietnamese and English captions. From the ramparts of the White Villa in 1820 the Vietnamese fired their first shot in anger against the French. The old French guardroom is still evident at the entrance at the foot of the hill. Large muzzle-loading cannons are scattered around the courtyard and in their day would have been capable of firing over the port of Vung Tau Bay. The villa nestles in some 6 hectares of gardens and natural forest. The entrance fee is about 20 000 dong (A$2). The White Villa is off Dai Lo Quang Trung just north of the main hotel area, and is almost impossible to miss as it sits prominently on the hillside. If you are travelling in a group take a small bus to get up the hill to the villa proper.

Vung Tau Bay—HMAS Sydney Deployment to Viet Nam for many Australian troops was by the converted aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney. This ‘fast troop transport’ became known as the ‘Vung Tau Ferry’, as that port was to be where most infantry and larger units would disembark. The Sydney was escorted to Viet Nam by RAN destroyer escorts and occasionally by submarines for various parts of the journey. The escorts would sometimes be close in to provide protection through the narrower waterways en route to the South China Sea. Indonesia had threatened to close the archipelago straits in the early 1960s 56



to Australian warships that were off to a ‘colonial war’, and the threat was taken seriously by the Australian Government for the duration of our involvement in the conflict. But at no stage during the war did Indonesia ever physically threaten RAN ships. In Vung Tau the soldiers would disembark either by landing craft or by helicopter. If the latter, the ride was often in the medium-lift US Army Chinook helicopters, which most soldiers would never have seen before. Most were airlifted straight into the Task Force base at Nui Dat, which was only a 30–40 minute ride north.

‘The Flags’ Veterans who were in Vung Tau on short rest and convalescence (R&C) leave may want to revisit the spot once known as ‘The Flags’, a recreational area, hostel and popular rendezvous point for soldiers meeting their comrades on leave. ‘The Flags’ (so named because the flags of the Allied nations were flying there) is on the intersection of Duong Ba Cu and Duong Tran Hung Dao, about two blocks back from Front Beach. Today there is an empty square and just a series of shopfronts. The infamous ‘Street of Bars’ in ‘Flag Square’ is no longer. The square is in front of the IngComBank Baria–Vung Tau.

1st Australian Logistic Support Group The 1st Australian Logistic Support Group (1 ALSG) was established in May 1966 with the arrival of the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF); see page 65. Its base was erected VUNG TAU AND BARIA

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in the sand dunes on the eastern side of the Vung Tau peninsula. The ALSG was home for the hundreds of soldiers, doctors, nurses and support troops helping to maintain the fighting elements on operations. When 1 ATF and 1 ALSG were fully established their total Australian strength was about 6500 service men and women.

1st Australian Field Hospital As the Task Force grew in numbers so did the medical facilities. The 1st Australian Field Hospital eventually replaced the field ambulance unit, which had limited surgical capability and capacity when it was established in 1968. The medical staff, especially the doctors, working at the hospital and the field ambulance unit were quite often Citizen Military Force members, who took 6–12 months off from their civilian medical practice to experience war medicine. A doctor who graduated through the Army’s undergraduate program, Ted Heffernan, reflects on his time in Viet Nam: All injuries were tough to treat, I suppose. I guess the ones where you can’t do much and you know they will die are really tough . . . As doctors we were told by some Second World War fellows before we went to Viet Nam, ‘War is long periods of boredom punctuated by periods of intense activity’, and that’s what it was like . . . The primary sorts of treatments were wound debridement under intermittent Pentothal—a dangerous anaesthetic . . . Everyone thought it would be different, but it was very much like road trauma . . . Upsetting to me initially was the number of casualties caused by our own fire. Of the first sixteen blokes killed, nine were by us and seven by the VC.1 58



The R&C Centre—Peter Badcoe Club The tempo of operations during the war meant that there was little rest for the Diggers. An R&C centre was established in 1968 in the confines of the 1 ALSG base, adjoining the field hospital complex. If a soldier was considered able to recover from his wound or injury within 30 days, he was usually cared for at the R&C centre. Named after Major Peter Badcoe VC, who was killed in action, the complex provided recreational and sports facilities, including the Harold Holt Memorial Pool. The Peter Badcoe Club became synonymous with the chance to relax and enjoy the company of one’s mates when given a short break from operations. Most soldiers in the Task Force were granted one or two R&C leave periods during their tour of duty. After six months in Viet Nam a soldier qualified for seven days’ rest and recuperation (R&R) leave, which he could take either back in Australia or in one of several cities in Southeast Asia. Visiting the area today

Very little remains of the 1 ALSG site except part of the old Memorial Pool. The diving board frame is gone; the old concrete block that had the sign on it remains and the frangipani tree is now fully grown. To see the remains of the pool, which is used sometimes as a duck breeding pond, travel along Duong Lo Thuy Van and look for it almost halfway between the clusters of hotels. A sign reading ‘Khu du lich Bien Dong’ indicates the location. To view the 1 ALSG site the best place to go is atop the Viet Cong memorial (Dai Liet Si) on the intersection of Duong Vo Thi Sau and Dai Lo Le Hong Phong. This grand, multi-level VUNG TAU AND BARIA

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monument is dedicated to those killed in the province. The stairs to the memorial start at what was the rear gate of 1 ALSG, and has avenues running off to the cardinal points, with East being towards Back Beach. The 1st Australian Field Hospital location had a construction plant and bitumen site on it in 2002, and you can see it this from atop the memorial.

Baria Baria is the capital of Baria–Vung Tau Province and sits at the confluence of four major arterial roads. During the war years Baria was a busy but small provincial capital (also called Phuoc Le) where Australian units came mainly to get fresh produce, ice (for the beer) and their laundry done. Two buildings that always stood out were the picture theatre and an adjacent water tower. In the 1968 Tet Offensive, Baria was the scene of heavy and sometimes savage fighting between Viet Cong/ARVN and Australian forces. The picture theatre was hit by many rockets, tank shells and artillery rounds which left it badly scarred for many years. It stood as a reminder of just how close the NLF came in 1968 to taking the town and the province. The water tower gained some notoriety during Tet ’68 when a sniper who was holed up in the top of the tower held up the advance of the Allies pushing south toward Vung Tau. The town needed the tower to stay intact, as it was one of the few water sources available to it, so rather than blow it to bits to remove the deadly sniper, the advancing forces simply bypassed the area. For most Australian soldiers, fighting in towns was not their forte and rarely during the Viet Nam war did the 60



Australian Army find itself involved in that sort of work. The men were jungle fighters and skilled in searching thick jungles and tropical rainforests. Fighting in built-up areas is a totally different ball game, requiring specialised training and many more troops than is normally required when fighting in the bush. The opportunity to be ambushed, cut off and defeated in detail is quite high in towns. Keith Berry was an armoured personnel carrier (APC) crew commander and about to complete a tour of duty with A Squadron, 3 Cavalry Regiment, when the unexpected happened. Berry’s vehicles had all been stripped of their normal combat load in preparation for cleaning and refurbishing for replacement crews when, at extremely short notice, his troop was called to counter very heavy attacks in Baria. Berry takes up the story: We had taken all of the sandbags out, all of the ammunition out, everything was stripped out of [the APCs]. All they had was the guns and a belt feeding into them and pretty much nothing else except the radios. So we had all the stuff out of the carriers stowed in our tents. And then the button was pushed, the balloon went up and all of sudden we’re screaming down, picking up an infantry company—who had just arrived in-country, I might add—and raced down to defend Baria. We got into Baria [in the early morning] and got cut off and we had no rations, very little ammunition initially, and we were taking a lot of casualties. The poor infanteers had virtually just got off the ship and they didn’t know what the hell was going on and we had never fought in a town before. So that was a new experience and we were getting rockets fired at us from out of houses. VUNG TAU AND BARIA

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Then [about midday] the word came over the radio that that were three CIA guys living in this house down at the end of this cul-de-sac. No expense was to be spared—we had to go in there and get them, and all their records. The troop leader, Roger Tingley, took us down the road and got to the house and then he got hit. So he was injured and his crew had pulled him inside his carrier and they were baling out in reverse, high speed, but we didn’t know why. So I proceeded down the street and I told my driver to swing the carrier around and drop the ramp. The three guys came running out, got in the carrier with all of their gear and just threw it on the floor. I shut the ramp and said that we would back out. So we’re backing out and I’m brassing up pretty heavily with my two .30 calibre machine guns . . . And I don’t know for what reason, but these three guys climbed up and started sitting on the lip near the top of the turret, on the roof there, and they took a missile. A missile hit this Yank straight on the cruet and blew his head off and all of a sudden I’ve got three casualties! I took a bit of shrapnel in the back, but apart from that everything was fine . . . Luckily I had the cupola lid up, otherwise I would have gone too, no risk about that at all. . . . it was 24 hours of pretty solid operations and then the word came down to Spud Murphy [Berry’s troop sergeant] and he said that we had to get out. We had no ammunition, we had no rations. So this ARVN company came with us and we went around some back streets that they knew and we deployed ourselves near what I think was a prison. Right off toward the west just out of Baria we came across the paddy fields, and came back up that way and got back to Nui Dat.2

One of the tragic consequences of war is that civilians in towns—such as Baria—get caught in the crossfire. A good 62



few Australian soldiers have witnessed at first hand the awful results. Lorrie Johnstone enlisted as a Regular soldier for six years and worked as a signaller until taking discharge in 1959. He re-enlisted in 1960 in the Royal Australian Signals Corps and served two tours of Viet Nam: the first in 1968–69 and the second in 1970–71. He describes going into Baria as Tet was raging throughout the province and outside the town: Well, we were into the hospital and the picture theatre area in Baria the next morning; the morning after they cleared [the Viet Cong] out. And there was still little bits of fighting going on in Baria . . . we actually cleared the theatre to make sure there was nothing in there [even though] it had been cleared by the infantry before. There were buildings down all around; bodies in the buildings, the place stank. There were shops shot to pieces. We then went across to the hospital and we did the rest of our civil aid project in there . . . The hospital was just torn to pieces . . . it was wanton destruction for no reason. The X-ray theatre had been pulled out and just shot to pieces and things like that, and I’ve no idea why they did things like that.3

Visiting the area today

Baria is a bustling, thriving town; the income derived locally from a large gas and petroleum plant is bringing considerable wealth to the region. Paved, tree-lined avenues have replaced the narrow dirt roads and the town even boasts traffic lights. Cement-rendered houses have replaced the shanties that rimmed the town’s edges. The petrochemical plant is visible in the distance and a multistorey supermarket supplements the traditional Baria markets. A four-lane VUNG TAU AND BARIA

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toll road, Route 991, connects Baria to Vung Tau and replaces a one-hour or more journey with a trip that now takes under half an hour. Roadworks are a common sight as many of the roads here (and around the province) are being widened to cope with the enormous increase in vehicular traffic, especially trucks and buses. Consequently, the military buff will not be able to fully grasp how difficult the fighting was in built-up areas. You may find that accommodation in Vung Tau is preferable to that in Baria and more plentiful. Baria can also be reached by Highway 51 from Bien Hoa.

Further reading Bullets, Beans and Bandages by Gary McKay, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1999. Viet Nam Shots by Gary McKay and Elizabeth Stewart, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2002. Jungle Tracks: Australian Armour in Viet Nam by Gary McKay and Graeme Nicholas, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001.

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4 NUI DAT AND OTHER SITES Nui Dat The centre of all operations and the name that many people have heard of from an Australian perspective in the war in South Viet Nam is Nui Dat. Often referred to as ‘The Dat’, it was ‘home’ for many soldiers for a year during their time in Viet Nam. It was rarely attacked and then only by mortars or rockets. It was patrolled by day and night outside ‘the wire’ and had protective field defences, which made it a formidable target from 1966 onwards. The base was once mostly rubber plantation and was encircled by a layer of wire and Claymore mine-studded obstacles. The Dat was abandoned in October 1971 when the 1 ATF withdrew to Vung Tau in preparation for complete withdrawal from South Viet Nam the following March. The 1st Australian Task Force base was sited centrally in Phuoc Tuy Province. It lay around Nui Dat (meaning ‘small hill’) and was on Provincial Route 2, an all-weather arterial road that ran from Baria to the Phuoc Tuy–Long Khanh Province border. Nui Dat was also only 30 kilometres from the 1 ALSG base at Vung Tau. It was an ideal location and NUI DAT AND OTHER SITES

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the only requirement on occupying it was to clear the locals out of the immediate area and to construct a bypass road. This early 1966 operation, named Operation Hardihood, included the relocation of the Long Tan (see Chapter 5) and Long Phuoc (see page 69) villagers, complete with all their chattels and livestock. Positioning the main operational base in the centre of the province, away from the provincial capital of Baria and the main population concentration, suited the operational plans for conducting counter-revolutionary warfare and greatly reduced opportunities for the Viet Cong to gather information. The area was relatively flat and was mostly covered in rubber plantations. A macadamised strip capable of taking the RAAF’s ‘short take-off and landing’ Caribou aircraft was constructed and several large landing zones were cut into the bush and rubber to accommodate helicopters, leaving the runway free most of the time. The airstrip was named Luscombe Field after Lieutenant Brian Luscombe, the first Army pilot killed in the Korean War. At its peak the Nui Dat base was home to over 5000 troops, but the majority of infantry, armour and engineer troops were usually away, deployed on operations. The base itself resembled a small military town complete with its own electricity and water supply and a ring-road system that facilitated easy movement inside the 12-kilometre perimeter. Wire obstacles and belts of anti-personnel mines protected the immediate border of the camp and the bush was cleared out to a range of 500 metres to give early warning of approaching enemy. The first reinforcement battalion to arrive, in April 1966, was the 5th Battalion (5 RAR); it was also the first battalion to contain National Service men from the first draft 66



of conscripts. The soldiers lived in tents, which provided some relief from the hot and humid tropical climate and gave shelter from the monsoonal rains that deluged the base during the wet season. Revetted sandbag walls protected the occupants from shell and mortar splinters if the base was hit, and every soldier had a fighting pit from which he could defend his position. Elevated bunkers around the base perimeter, manned 24 hours a day, contained machine guns, flares and communications gear. The Nui Dat base was situated in a typical lowland area of red loamy soil, which powdered to dust in the dry season and could cause eye and ear infections. But after heavy rain it was simply glutinous, causing the soldiers considerable grief, as shown in this letter from the then Private Doug Bishop to his father: The soil in our area is Red Mud, RED-BLOODY-MUD, it drives me mad. I put on clean greens, 2 minutes later I’m wearing RED greens . . . It’s the only place in the world where you can be bogged down in mud up to your neck and get dust in your eyes.1


Visitors to the old Nui Dat base will need a permit and also a police escort. It’s a restricted area, and people thinking they can just drop in and have a look around are sadly mistaken. Unfortunately, some tour operators also tend to be mistaken, so check with your tour company to make sure that a permit and escort have been arranged. At the western end of the now degenerating Luscombe airstrip is the village of Nui Dat. The area where the Anzac battalions (as 2, 4 and 6 RAR became known) used to live NUI DAT AND OTHER SITES

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is where Viet Nam’s present-day D445 Battalion now resides and trains. The hill of Nui Dat is being mined for very highgrade pumice, which is one of the reasons it is essential to have a police escort in order to gain access to the area. The rubber plantation is now about 15 years old and being worked actively. The Australian Vietnam Veterans Reconstruction Group (AVVRG)—a volunteer group who want to improve the lot of the people in the province—is sponsoring a kindergarten at Nui Dat village. It’s about two-thirds of the way along the old airstrip, heading west, and is near a soccer field. Known as the Phuong Phu Nui Dat Kindergarten, it was opened by the Australian Consul General in Ho Chi Minh City, Dr Steven Hanning, in June 2002. Several Australian companies including BHP Steel, Lysaght Viet Nam and International and Environmental Construction Co Ltd contributed to the building project.

The Horseshoe As part of the pacification of the surrounding countryside, a permanent fire support base was established by the Task Force on an almost circular hill that was fittingly called ‘The Horseshoe’. It was about 8 kilometres southeast of Nui Dat—still within artillery range—and less than 1 kilometre north of the village of Dat Do. It was a prominent feature that allowed observation over a large area of the flat countryside. A rifle company, a section or more of 81mm mortars and a section (three vehicles) of APCs normally occupied the hill and provided a ready reaction force to rapidly assist troops in trouble or establish roadblocks to intercept suspicious traffic. 68



The Horseshoe was a well-defended locality, with Claymore mines, barbed wire and fighting bays dug into the rocky soil. With binoculars it was possible to see almost anything that moved to the east of the village of Dat Do and so The Horseshoe provided an excellent information-gathering site. One of the main reasons it was occupied was that it allowed observation of the ‘barrier’ minefield (see page 79). Visiting the area today

A permit and police escort are required if you want to visit The Horseshoe. To see it, take the road north out of Dat Do for several kilometres (the road to Long Tan). Those who served at The Horseshoe will find it much changed: it has been extensively quarried for road base material and at least a third of the hill has disappeared. On the day I visited in August 2002, access was denied as blasting was in progress. The hill is dotted with a few banana trees, low scrub and some eucalypts. A good place to take a photograph is at the ‘Long Phuoc 7 km’ marker on the road to Long Tan. If you’re into warera maps, the Xuyen Moc SW Vietnam 1:25 000 series provides a good reference.

Long Phuoc Just south of the old Nui Dat base is the village of Long Phuoc, which was destroyed in 1966 as part of the relocation of villagers into secure hamlets. Rod Earle, a former cavalry officer, has this to say about the place: I was involved with 2 RAR on a number of relocation programs. We went out once to move a village [Long Phuoc] NUI DAT AND OTHER SITES

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up along Route 2. It was a beautiful area—places that you would give your arm to live in—and we had to pull these villages down and move the people to that awful place called Ap Gnai Gao. It was bloody terrible. We had to burn these buildings and we ripped down a goat house and there must have been 300 goats there. It started to rain and there was no roof on this thing—just the floor left—and all the goats went back and stood on the floor. We moved all the people and all the goats in the back of our carriers. And the goats ate everything and they pooped everywhere. Unlike the infantry, they ate our books—the infantry used to knock off the books.2


Head east out of Baria on Route 761 and follow the signposts. The village of Long Phuoc was rebuilt on its original site after the war and there is now a small museum and a souvenir shop. Unfortunately the museum presents gross inaccuracies about events and activities in the region. North of Long Phuoc on Route 766 a local entrepreneur has built a ‘tunnel complex’ that replicates what was done during the war. It is not recommended unless you are not going to Cu Chi. According to one tour guide, the story on how the tunnels came into being changes with almost every visit.Their presence should not be taken to support the rumour of tunnels being dug toward Nui Dat—a fallacy that has been put forward for almost a decade.

Long Dien Long Dien, a town about 5 kilometres east of Baria, was the site of some serious fighting during and after the 1968 Tet 70



Offensive. It was a prized piece of real estate as it was the capital of the Long Dien district and sat astride major arterial roads. It is situated at the northern foot of the Long Hai hills, a well-known, heavily mined Viet Cong sanctuary, and most of the area to the west, north and east of the town is flat, open paddyfields. Movement by tanks in the wet season was confined to roads as they would otherwise simply sink in the drowned ricefields. Consequently there was not much room for manoeuvre by the tanks when facing an enemy on foot. Mick Rainey was a Centurion tank corporal with 3 Troop when the enemy began an offensive in and around the town of Long Dien. It became a day-long battle which resulted in Rainey being awarded a Military Medal for bravery. He’d been forced into a situation of having to advance down a narrow defile in the town and was unable to be reinforced as he slowly fought his way against numerous anti-tank teams intent on destroying his vehicle. His tank was hit on many occasions and penetrated four times by RPGs. At one point another tank came up behind his and transferred ammunition into it as there was insufficient room for him to move his own vehicle. Bleeding from the ears, he fought solidly and without fear for a whole day and emerged (almost) unscathed at the other end. It was a close thing, as a hit from a recoilless rifle would have put a fiery end to proceedings. Rainey says: This battle in and around Long Dien went on for about eight or nine hours, it was almost nonstop. It was a long day. I remember, towards the end of it and almost before last light (and that was the only reason we stopped), Badman calling up on the radio and saying to my troop leader, ‘Get NUI DAT AND OTHER SITES

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him out of there.’ So my voice must have been cracking up. Later I heard my own voice on the radio that they taped and I thought, ‘No, that’s not me; it’s got to be somebody else. I wouldn’t talk like that—not much.’ Come last light, I remember, it was like somebody flicked a switch and it was all over. It was all finished. They were starting to do body counts and all that sort of stuff.3


To reach Long Dien head east on Route 761 out of Baria. I recommend stopping near a bus stop just short of the town, near the entertainment and cultural centre, where you can get a view of the Nui Dat and Nui Dat Two hills, The Horseshoe, Dat Do village area, the tip of the Long Hais and the Dinh Co monastery (see opposite).

Dat Do war cemetery Not far from Long Dien and east of the town of Dat Do are a memorial and a war cemetery. The cemetery is worth having a look at as it shows how the Vietnamese people organise and arrange their war graves. Interestingly, there are no Battle of Long Tan veterans to be found (see Chapter 5). Garry Adams, a tour manager who visits Viet Nam regularly, believes they have probably not been buried here— there are not enough grave markers and there are simply no grave markers bearing the date of 18 August 1966. The graves are grouped by villages and not by unit or date; consequently one can come across markers from 1947 through to 1975. There are also some veterans buried here who have died since the war. 72



Dinh Co monastery The Dinh Co monastery sits on a prominent granite outcrop on the western end of the Long Hai hills. It was used as an observation post by both sides during the war and was sometimes not a nice place to visit. Gordon Hurford was a National Service officer who commanded a rifle platoon in the 2nd Battalion (2 RAR) in 1967–68. He explains: Dinh Co was one [place] I might have liked to forget . . . I was with ‘Maps’ [Bill] Carter, OC Bravo Company at the time, and he said, ‘I want you to take your platoon and occupy that feature up there—Dinh Co.’ I asked, ‘Why do you want me to do that?’, and he replied, ‘To see if it is occupied.’ So we sat down, had a look at the map and the hill and decided how we were going to do it. I didn’t expect to have any contact up there because . . . it was only likely to be an observation post or something like that. When we got up on top we ran into a ring main of M-16 jumping mines, which killed one and wounded another fifteen of us. So that was a pretty sad day.4


From Baria take Provincial Route 761 east and turn right on to Provincial Route 766 before you reach Long Dien. The monastery is easily seen from the road as you travel towards the bottom of the Long Hais. It is white in colour. Access is restricted: the ground around the monastery has not been sanctioned for tourism and this site is best viewed through a camera lens. Here it’s worth quoting a grid reference for those travelling with a military map. It is YS 440 575. NUI DAT AND OTHER SITES

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The Long Hai Hills—Minh Dam Secret Zone The Long Hais are a cluster of relatively high hills in the southeastern corner of the province in what is known today as Long Dat district. With its thick vegetation and granite boulder slopes it is a formidable piece of terrain. During the war it was an ideal sanctuary as the approaches were open and flat and any movement towards the hills was easily detected, especially in the dry season. The massive boulders and natural caves and crevices in the hills provided good cover from concealment and from direct and indirect fire. It was an easy area to defend but very difficult to attack. The hidden menace of mines was also a continual problem, especially after the barrier minefield running from the village of Dat Do to the coast was laid (see page 79). The Long Hai hills area was also known as the Minh Dam Secret Zone, after a base established by the Viet Minh and named for the local guerrilla leader Minh and his deputy Dam. From the time of the First Indochina War the Secret Zone had always been a guerrilla stronghold; it was an active nerve centre throughout the American War, operating against ARVN and Australian troops. It was never conquered and remained one of the notorious ‘badlands’. Whenever enemy troops needed a place to rest, refit or recover they would use the Minh Dam Secret Zone as their sanctuary. Peter Lauder was a schoolteacher in Innisfail in central Queensland before being drafted for National Service in February 1966. He was posted to the 8th Battalion (8 RAR) and served as commander of a rifle platoon in Charlie Company when he was 22 years of age. He and his men went ambushing in the Long Hais one week in February 1970. Charlie Company had deployed to protect Fire Support Base Isa (in grid square 4353) on the western flank 74



of the Long Hais and were to ambush likely enemy infiltration routes. Lauder’s platoon was inserted at the rear of the hill and about 200 metres from the planned ambush position. It was an excellent site with good visibility for several hundred metres in almost every direction. It had a long killing ground, with very good fields of fire especially to the west. The ambush position was vacated during daylight hours by moving to the rear behind large rocks and avoiding detection in the sparse cover. Sentries were maintained on the tracks in three directions. The principal method of killing would be Claymore mines fired in banks supported by machine gun and small-arms fire. Nothing happened for two days and doubts on the suitability of the site began to emerge in the platoon commander’s mind. At about 6.40 pm on 15 February a large enemy force of around 100 began moving through the ambush site. The Claymores in the main killing ground were exploded with a roar, cutting a swath through the middle of the enemy column. At least a dozen men were seen to drop in the ear-shattering blast of 15 Claymore mines. According to Peter Lauder: Within seconds the enemy reacted. A machine gun was set up on the Long Hai hills high ground to their own rear, while the ground troops in the ambush killing zone closed very quickly and tightly on the west of the platoon. It was a very professional counter-ambush action. The enemy fired RPG-2 and small-arms fire into the position. Three Diggers suffered slight shrapnel wounds in this first RPG salvo. 9 Platoon then employed mortar and artillery fire in a defensive fire task and walked it in very close to the ambush site.5 NUI DAT AND OTHER SITES

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In the vernacular of the time, ‘shits were trumps’, and Peter Lauder now had to fight with all his might to stop his platoon from being overrun and defeated in detail. Aerial fire support, known as ‘Snoopy’, soon arrived and was employed in putting almost continuous fire on to the enemy manoeuvring around the Australian position. Lauder was now kept busy coordinating the gunship and the supporting artillery. The firefight continued for another 40 minutes. When 8 Platoon, who had been operating around the Dinh Co

Missing in action in the Long Hais Australia had only six men missing in action (MIA) in Viet Nam and the Long Hais claimed one of them. He was Lance Corporal John Gillespie, a medic from 8 Field Ambulance who was on casevac duties on 17 April 1971 with 9 Squadron. Gillespie was aboard an Iroquois helicopter that was ordered to evacuate a severely wounded Regional Forces soldier near the peak of Nui Chau Vien. The helicopter was hit by enemy fire while winching out the soldier, crashed and caught fire. Gillespie perished in the fire and his remains were not found. The tactical situation did not allow for a prolonged search and as a result Lance Corporal John Gillespie remains on record as one of Australia’s six MIA. The official RAAF grid reference for the crash site is YS 476 511, which puts it in a saddle that runs down from the peak of Nui Chau Vien, but the area has never been officially cleared and any movement on foot towards the site would be extremely perilous. It is not advised. 76



monastery (see page 73), arrived on the scene together with a troop of Centurion tanks, the enemy broke contact and withdrew east, as they were now clearly outgunned. The immediately obvious results of this successful ambush were three Australians slightly wounded and 11 enemy bodies left on the track. But later prisoner of war reports confirmed that another 34 members of D445 Battalion had been killed. The ambush triggered a follow-up operation codenamed Hammersley which saw D445 severely mauled. After that, Lauder noted, ‘The Long Hais were no longer a safe sanctuary for the enemy.’ For his leadership in this action Peter Lauder was awarded the Military Cross. Visiting the area today

From Vung Tau take Provincial Route 991 north to Baria and then turn east on Route 761 towards Long Dien. Close to the Long Dien district border the road forks and the best road to take is Provincial Route 766. This heads southeast past the Dinh Co monastery (see page 73), continues past the southern end of the Long Hais and eventually turns back northeast past some now very plush tourist resorts on the Phuoc Hai coast. The Minh Dam caves are signposted and there is a museum, the site of which is entered via a bitumen road that goes up into the lower foothills to a large bus and car park. A small cafe stands at the foot of two walks that visitors can take. The area is popular with locals for picnics and Viet Cong veterans often have reunions in this location. From the Cao Dai monastery on the Long Hais you can take in the magnificent view from Vung Tau in the south and up the coast past the fishing and resort town of Lang Phuoc Hai to the shimmering haze beyond. The Long Hais are a testament to the savage fighting in the war, with NUI DAT AND OTHER SITES

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pockmarked boulders standing silent vigil beside others that were shattered by 500- and 1000-pound bombs from America’s B-52 bombing raids.

Suoi Chau Pha valley—The Hat Dich area One of the areas where Australian troops were often deployed to search for the elusive Viet Cong was the vast, flat western part of Phuoc Tuy Province. Referred to as the Hat Dich (pronounced ‘hut zik’), it was constantly traversed by the VC as they moved men and supplies towards Saigon or from the various rivers that bounded the region. Enemy sampans and smaller boats would drop off supplies that would eventually be portered into the province and further north. It was an area ripe for ambushing and was always heavily patrolled by the Australians. The Suoi Chau Pha valley (suoi means ‘river stream’ and usually denotes a waterway smaller than a river) runs north–south from the very north of the province down to the river Song Dinh at the northern side of the Nui Dinh mountains. Almost every infantryman who patrolled the western side of what was known as Route 2 (now Route 764) will have walked across, waded through or swum across—during the monsoon season—the Suoi Chau Pha. The area was strewn with abandoned jungle hideouts, camps, old bunker systems and tracks. A visit to the valley usually meant that one could almost be guaranteed an enemy contact or sighting. Visiting the area today

The valley is now heavily cultivated, but for veterans at least it is worthwhile traversing the area on the recently built 78



National Route 51 which passes from Phu My on the coast, in Tan Thanh district, to Route 764 just north of Binh Ba. The change in the area since the war is very evident. Where once there was nothing but primary jungle, now it features cashew farms, various field crops, market gardens, cattle, coffee-growing, and almost continuous strip development from the coast to the centre of the province.

The Dat Do barrier minefield The Dat Do minefield is considered to be the greatest single military blunder perpetrated by the Task Force in Phuoc Tuy Province. In 1967 the Task Force commander, Brigadier S.C. Graham, decided to construct an extensive wire and mine obstacle between the village of Dat Do and the coast—a distance of some 10 kilometres. This barrier minefield was designed to prevent Viet Cong movement to the west. It consisted of two parallel belts of barbed wire 2 metres high and 2 metres apart, with about 20 000 antipersonnel M-16 ‘Jumping Jack’ mines sown in between the fences. In theory it should have worked. However, for an obstacle to be effective it has to be covered by observation and fire. Adequate security of the minefield was not maintained either by the Task Force or by the Regional and Popular Forces, who were given some of the responsibility for it. The VC took immediate advantage of the lax security. They would penetrate the barbed-wire defences under cover of darkness and well-trained, courageous soldiers would lift the mines for the VC’s arsenal. Casualties occurred, of course, especially as some of the mines were fitted with antilifting devices, but thousands of mines disappeared from the NUI DAT AND OTHER SITES

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barrier and subsequently caused enormous devastation among Australian and other Allied troops, until our side fully cleared the minefield by 1970. To bring home to you just what happens when a mine is activated, Bruce Scott, who served as a rifleman in the 9th Battalion in 1970, tells what happened to him: We were on patrol with a troop of Centurion tanks and we got fired on by the enemy. The aftermath of this action was that the patrol commander decided to put in a follow-up, so he got my section to put a cordon in the thick secondary growth to protect the armour. There were only six of us in the section, including me. So we split up into three groups of two and started to push our way through in a fan formation for 30 metres. Myself and my mate, Paul, had gone about 30 metres and came across an anthill, so we decided to use it as a bit of cover. Paul went to the left and I went to the right and suddenly I heard what sounded like a steam train coming out of a tunnel. The first thing I thought was that I had run into an ambush. The next thing I thought was that I had been hit. There was a lot of screaming, some of which was mine. What had happened was that we had used the obvious bit of cover, but to us it wasn’t obvious because we had to push our way through this thick scrub to get to it. Maybe at some stage there had been a contact and the VC had used the anthill as cover. We got hit by one of those M-16 mines out of the infamous ‘barrier minefield’ . . . Paul must have stepped on it with his left foot. I was on his right. His body protected me from a lot of the shrapnel. It blew off his leg. It all happened so slowly, almost like a video replay. My pattern of thought was, ‘Where did that steam train come from? You idiot, you’ve walked into an 80



ambush. Shit, I’ve been hit. I’d better get out of here before they finish me off.’ The rest of the section stayed where they were because we were separated by about 30 metres of thick bush. The engineers then came in with mine detectors, after I called out to the OC that it was a mine. After about half an hour we got choppered out. I was in the stretcher above Paul. He said, in my mind, ‘See you later, Scotty’, and I said, in my mind—it was something like an ESP experience—‘See you later, Paul’, and then began making deals with God about what I would do if I lived and got back to Australia. When they got us back to the casualty clearing area I was laying on a bench. It must have been a bad day on the 25th May because they were bringing casualties in from all over the place. I started looking around for Paul but they wouldn’t tell me where he was. Some days later, when I was out of intensive care and had the chance to recover, I found out that Paul had died on the chopper. Then the ESP experience in the helicopter came back to me. I hit a very low depression when it all sunk in at that time. I had been hit seventeen times. The ones that did the damage were to the ribs which ruptured the artery that fed the diaphragm, which filled my chest up with blood and I couldn’t breathe. I found out years later that my lungs had collapsed. I remember that they couldn’t use anaesthetic before they put this suction tube down between my ribs. I remember telling the surgeon that I knew what it felt like to be blown up and stabbed all in the one day.6

On an operation, once it was known that a mine had been triggered, someone had to go in and get the victims NUI DAT AND OTHER SITES

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out. Most often several people would be hit at once, some would be dead, others mortally or severely wounded, and it was a terrifying time for all concerned because no one knew where the next mine might be located. The enemy didn’t fence their mines or booby traps and these could be anywhere at any time. Brett Nolen was a field engineer with the 1st Field Squadron in 1967–68. He tells what it could be like going in after a mine had exploded: One incident I’ll never forget was a 2 RAR lad. I took great care and prodded towards him as fast as I could, marking the ground with my bayonet where I had been. I finally reached him. If there is one thing that would upset a battalion commander this must have been it—this bloke had gone into a bunker system and he had stood on a mine and got blown away. He had travelled through the air with all his webbing and clothes blown apart. When I got around to the bottom of his body (his head and his leg were missing) . . . poking through all the charred bits was a mine, a three-pronged M-16. If that had gone off I think they would have thought it was mortars. The helicopter came in and I got the body on. After the helicopter took off, I turned around and it had totally erased the [bayonet] marks I had made on the ground, and I didn’t have a bloody clue where I had come in.7


There are no traces of the minefield or its fence left, and I assume that no one would want to go looking for them anyway. The site can best be seen from The Horseshoe (see page 68). Its eastern tip is visible from the top of the Long Hais when you’re visiting the Minh Dam Secret Zone (see page 74). 82



Even though the minefield was totally cleared by 1970, occasionally there’s an incident involving a villager. Indeed, when I was there in 1993 a local farmer struck a mine with his plough. It wasn’t in the minefield but probably came from it.

Further reading Bullets, Beans and Bandages by Gary McKay, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1999. Viet Nam Shots by Gary McKay and Elizabeth Stewart, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2002. Jungle Tracks: Australian Armour in Viet Nam by Gary McKay and Graeme Nicholas, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001.

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5 LONG TAN

Five kilometres to the southeast of Nui Dat base, and on the eastern side of the river Soui Da Bang, lies the site of Long Tan, a village abandoned and subsequently destroyed during Operation Hardihood (see Chapter 4). The area is remembered because the Long Tan rubber plantation, 2 kilometres north of the village, saw the Australians’ first major battle of the war.1 The Battle of Long Tan was fought on a stormy afternoon on 18 August 1966. A total of 105 men of Delta Company, Sixth Battalion (6 RAR), and three New Zealanders from 161 Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery, faced an enemy force estimated at three infantry regiments, and sustained heavy casualties against the overwhelming odds of more than ten to one. Despite earlier reports of significant enemy activity in the area around Nui Dat Two (a small local hill) and the Long Tan rubber plantation, the Australian and New Zealand soldiers had been unaware when they set out from the Task Force base that morning that their courage and fighting resilience were about to be tested in such a dramatic way. 84



Battle of Long Tan The soldiers of 6 RAR had been in-country for only a couple of months when, on 17 August at 2.43 am, the Viet Cong attacked the 1 ATF base at Nui Dat for the first time. The enemy mortar and recoilless rifle fire, coming from the east near the Suoi Da Bang, impacted in the area of the artillery, engineers and Task Force headquarters, inflicting moderate casualties with 22 Australians and one New Zealander wounded. Delta Company had been manning the forward defensive lines of the base that night and were looking forward to the following day because a concert with Little Pattie and Col Joye was planned and the men had no extra duties or patrols to perform. But by mid-morning on 18 August they received orders that they were to depart on a three-day TAOR (tactical area of responsibility) patrol and to relieve Bravo Company who were out searching for the enemy position from which the mortars had been fired the night before. The patrol was called Operation Vendetta in response to the mortaring, but more importantly the objective was to find out exactly what was out to the east of the Nui Dat base. The OC Delta Company, Major Harry Smith, had been briefed by the battalion intelligence staff and the commanding officer and they had all agreed that they were probably looking for a group of 30 or more soldiers who would be carrying various pieces of mortar equipment and possibly recoilless rifles. Delta Company set off with a New Zealand forward observer party of three on a direct bearing to rendezvous with Bravo Company, find out what they knew and continue the search. Delta Company, comprising platoons 10, 11 and 12, was slightly under strength with only 105 soldiers instead LONG TAN

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of a full complement of 125. The three platoons were led as follows: 10 Platoon by Second Lieutenant Geoff Kendall, 11 Platoon by Second Lieutenant Gordon Sharp, and 12 Platoon by Second Lieutenant Dave Sabben. The two groups met at the edge of the Long Tan rubber plantation at about 1 pm. Delta Company had been in the area several days before and had found no trace of the enemy and there was nothing to indicate that things were to get very serious in only a matter of hours. The rifle company followed an enemy track that led northwards from a vacated recoilless rifle position. 10 Platoon was leading until the track divided with a branch to the northeast. Major Smith decided to follow the line of the easterly track in a ‘two up’ formation, with 10 Platoon left, 11 Platoon on the right and 12 Platoon centre rear, behind company headquarters. They were now well in under the rubber and because of the distance between trees and good visibility down the lanes of trees—called fire lanes—the company was spread out over a very wide frontage. A contact with a small group of enemy broke out when several Viet Cong soldiers stumbled into the path of 11 Platoon. After 11 Platoon followed up this short sharp exchange they very quickly ran into an enormous burst of small-arms fire, the fusillade of shots shattering the quiet. It was 2 pm. 11 Platoon’s leading section was decimated and the Diggers that remained hugged the ground and fought for their lives. Only half an hour into what became a massive encounter battle, 11 Platoon commander Gordon Sharp became the first National Service officer to be killed in action, leaving Sergeant Bob Buick to take over. 11 Platoon had been moving towards the southeast, following the hastily withdrawing enemy, until they were 86



fired on from the northeast, where the enemy had positioned themselves at the base of Nui Dat Two. The lead section were cut down in a swath of machine-gun fire that erupted with a noise that survivors have described as deafening, horrendous and mind-shattering. In the first couple of minutes the platoon lost four dead and perhaps seven wounded. The surviving Diggers had to fight to save themselves from being overrun and annihilated. When Buick radioed his untenable position, 12 Platoon tried to swing south to provide covering fire so that Buick’s men could withdraw. But the 12 Platoon sections ran into another group of enemy attempting to swing around the flank of the company and a fierce firefight ensued. One of the section commanders, Laurie Drinkwater, describes the enemy assault techniques: When they were doing their assault they would get so far up and then they’d go down, and you would probably think that you’d mowed that lot down, but then the next wave came and blokes were getting up and joining that wave and coming in with them. So although you were killing people out there, everybody that went down wasn’t dead. They were just waiting for the next wave to come through and then they’d join them. Pretty clever.2

Things were going really bad when 10 Platoon, who were tasked with providing some relief to the embattled 11 Platoon, also ran into a large group of enemy that were attempting to encircle the company from the north and east. Delta Company faced a classic ‘double envelopment’ assault, where the front is engaged and both flanks attacked simultaneously to reduce the defender’s ability to concentrate mass and firepower in any one place. The three platoons were LONG TAN

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spread out in a misshapen semi-circle covering a frontage of about 400 metres, fighting grittily to the last bullet, as Buick can attest: We had fought off so many determined enemy assaults that none of us had more than five rounds [left]. The Diggers had been magnificent with their fire discipline. We normally only carried 600 rounds per machine gun and 60 rounds per SLR [self-loading rifle]. The warriors of 11 Platoon were now lying in the mud with hand grenades at the ready, shovel and machete in hand, waiting for the enemy’s final assault.3

Fighting to survive

Buick realised that, with almost no ammunition left and the enemy preparing for further assaults, the options for survival were running out. He had to retire and take his wounded with him. But what he didn’t know was that several severely wounded men were unable to hear what was going on— wouldn’t have heard his call for withdrawal—and would in any case have been cut down as soon as they tried to get up and move. 11 Platoon started a quick dash back towards the north and managed to reach 12 Platoon who were holding ground about 200 metres away. Sabben’s men then pointed the 11 Platoon soldiers in the direction of company headquarters, where they put down on the ground in the western sector in what became a very tight company defensive position. Things were getting seriously desperate: when asking for reinforcements Harry Smith told his battalion headquarters that if help didn’t arrive soon, to not bother coming at all because no one would be left alive. It was almost like ‘Smith’s Last Stand’. 88



Once the company was in a tight circle the two remaining intact platoons (10 and 12) fought the fight of their lives on the eastern perimeter as the enemy desperately tried to overrun them. In the middle of all this mayhem, a tropical thunderstorm unleashed itself over the battlefield, turning day into night and lashing the combatants with driving rain and lightning strikes. The ground turned to red mud, making life difficult for those trying to keep their machinegun-linked ammunition belts clean. The RAAF were asked to bring an ammunition resupply and, despite the fact that it was in the worst possible flying weather and over an active enemy location, the intrepid pilots of 9 Squadron flew a life-saving resupply mission over the Long Tan battlefield, dropping much needed ammunition wrapped in blankets to the desperate soldiers below. Buick recalls the turning point when Delta Company regrouped in a last-ditch stand: The battle had been going for nearly three hours and we were tightly grouped in an 80-metre circle. The enemy in their assault formation numbered about 200 or more and were trying their hardest to wipe us out. Their determination was impressive, of that there was no doubt. Although we were still taking casualties, they were less in number [than earlier] . . . Now it was the enemy who was sustaining very heavy losses.4

For the Australians this was a savage initiation in the business of battle, but they fought heroically. Yet their position seemed hopeless without an imminent arrival of reinforcements.

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APCs to the rescue

Sergeant ‘Blue’ O’Reilly, an APC section commander with 2 Troop, 1 APC Squadron, was sitting at Nui Dat base enjoying the concert when his men were told they needed to drop off Alpha Company out near Long Tan. The troop commander was Lieutenant Adrian Roberts and luckily he knew the area well and knew where he could get across the Suoi Da Bang, which was quickly turning into a torrent. O’Reilly believes that many of the infantry were also unaware of the battle that was raging outside the wire in the Long Tan rubber. After a madcap dash to get crews and vehicles sorted out, O’Reilly led the way out of Nui Dat late in the afternoon, heading east towards Long Tan. He describes the events as they unfolded: . . . I knew where there was a crossing over the Suoi Da Bang. We were called to stop on odd occasions before we got to the river. I was told we had to send some vehicles back to pick up the battalion commander. It was raining, getting very very dark. I got my section across . . . In the rain, with the volume of water going down, it was a reasonable obstacle . . . The banks were sheer—almost like a dug causeway—so you can get in but you can’t get out the other side because you’re down well below the bank. Then you have to recover the vehicle out.5

The battle was raging only a hundred or so metres from where the APCs loaded with infantry were assembling to commence a sweep around the southern and eastern flank of Delta Company’s defensive position. Large groups of enemy had been seen moving from east to west and to the south of the Australian position. What in fact was happening was 90



that an enemy battalion was circling the Australians in an endeavour to either close a circle around Delta Company or attack from the south—or even, as O’Reilly believes, proceeding on its way to attack Nui Dat base. But where the enemy were forming up in readiness for a coup de grâce was right in the path of the APCs. Not surprisingly, the VC battalion decided to withdraw when it found itself in the middle of a mounted infantry assault formation. But there were still considerable numbers of enemy confronting Delta Company to their immediate east and northeast. With Alpha Company still on board, the APCs moved in a more northerly direction to come up on the flank of Delta Company. The APCs being driven by O’Reilly’s section only had machine guns with pintle mounts and no other protection for the crew commander manning the gun. (This anomaly would be rectified as a result of the after-action reports from this battle.) O’Reilly details what happened next as the real assault by the cavalry began: We had a test-fire and two people fell out of the tree in front of my Bravo vehicle and we assaulted through shortly thereafter, in extended line. We knew that Delta Company was somewhere to the west and north. The trees, in line, were guiding us. We advanced line abreast, pretty fast; it was a cavalry gallop and we charged in. We were assaulting through. Artillery was still dropping.6

The men of Delta Company could hear the approaching carriers but could not see them through the lashing rain and the darkness. Morale began to rise in the depleted ranks of the infantry company. Overwhelmed and crushed by this final assault, the enemy decamped and in some cases fled LONG TAN

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the battlefield, and the small-arms fire from the VC dissipated to little more than sporadic fire. Movement to the APCs’ west indicated the presence of Delta Company. Buick recalls standing and cheering when he saw the carriers move into the Delta Company position. The carriers experienced great difficulty in manoeuvring among the Diggers on the ground in the darkness, but eventually a cordon was positioned around Delta Company and battlefield clearance began. Alpha Company disgorged from the APCs and took up a position to the east of Delta Company, and the CO of 6 RAR, Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend, assumed command of the battlefield. The battle had died at about 7 pm. It was won in part by the judicious use of artillery firing in ‘danger close’ support of company commander Major Harry Smith’s men.

The aftermath RAAF and US Army helicopters evacuated the Australian dead and wounded that night, but early the next morning the grisly task of battlefield clearance began. Harry Smith insisted that his company would lead the return to the battle area—there was no discussion. Many of the Diggers had had no overall picture of the battle apart from their immediate front while they were fighting and now felt quite insignificant among the blasted trees and scores of smashed and torn bodies strewn throughout the area. Latex sap was streaming down the trunks where bullets and shrapnel had sliced through the bark and flesh of the rubber trees. The crowns of many trees were missing; their branches and leaves littered the ground everywhere as a result of the highexplosive artillery shells hitting the canopy. Some trees were 92



broken off about a metre above ground, possibly caused by the impact of the Viet Cong’s RPGs. An overpowering stench of death wafted through the still, cool morning air. Amazingly, some men who were listed as missing in action were still in the battlefield area. Barry Meller, the 11 Platoon orderly, was one of the missing 15 and was found leaning against a rubber tree as the Diggers advanced carefully towards him. Bob Buick comments: Barry had been shot in the mouth while talking to me early in the battle, but was hit again in the leg on the withdrawal and was unable to keep up with us as we pulled back. Quite understandably Barry was happy to see us, but as dirty as hell about us leaving him.7

Among this carnage there was one joyous moment for the searching parties of Delta Company: a voice heard calling was Private Jim Richmond, a member of 6 Section. Scattered around the battlefield were several wounded VC who were quickly taken prisoner. The prisoners and captured documents revealed that the Viet Cong 5th Division comprising 275 Viet Cong Main Force battalion and D445, the local provincial mobile battalion, had been involved in the battle. The 274 Main Force battalion was present but not directly involved in the fighting. Delta Company suffered a total of 18 killed and 24 wounded, which represented 35 per cent casualties in Major Smith’s rifle company. The battlefield clearance group buried 245 enemy bodies and many more bodies, and graves, were discovered in the surrounding areas in the weeks to come. Some of the wounded from the battle were evacuated to the American Army’s 36th Medical Evacuation Hospital at Vung Tau. Others, like National Service man Jim LONG TAN

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Richmond, whose wounds required long-term repatriation, were flown back to Australia to spend time in a military hospital before returning to duty and eventual discharge from the Army. In a follow-up to this incredible battle, on 2 September 1966 a parade was assembled near the Task Force headquarters. The South Vietnamese Government intended to award honours and decorations to the Australians for their part in the battle at Long Tan. There were a total of 22 decorations for the infantry company—including a posthumous award to a member of the APC troop who came to Delta Company’s rescue. The day turned farcical when the Commander of the Vietnamese Armed Forces and Chief of State, General Nguyen Van Thieu, was told that, owing to the Australian Government’s policy of non-acceptance of foreign awards, he could not award the decorations to the Australians. The parade was delayed for about an hour while General Thieu’s aides went to Baria to buy dolls in national dress and other gifts. Then, instead of military decorations and awards befitting the actions of warriors, the officers received lacquered wooden cigar cases, sergeants were given similar cigarette cases and the corporals and privates received the dolls. The men who fought in this action have still not received the individual Vietnamese awards that were due to them. On a more positive note, in May 1968 the President of the United States conferred the US Presidential Unit Citation on Delta Company and its attachments. The criteria for the Citation state: ‘The degree of heroism required is the same as that which would warrant award of the Distinguished Service Cross to an individual. Extended periods of combat duty or participation in a large number of operational missions, either ground or air, is not sufficient. Only on rare occasions will a unit larger than a battalion qualify for award of this 94



decoration.’ The only other Australian unit that has been awarded the decoration is 3 RAR, for its participation in the Kapyong Battle during the Korean War. The American Distinguished Service Cross is the second highest award for valour, the highest being the Medal of Honor. The Long Tan Memorial Cross

On 18 August 1969, 6 RAR, while on their second tour of duty, erected a concrete cross at the site where 11 Platoon lost many of their soldiers. They then conducted a memorial service. A cross still stands there today but it’s a replica; the original is now housed in the Dong Nai Museum in Bien Hoa (see page 131). The site has become a ‘hallowed ground’ for returning veterans and is respected by the Vietnamese Government as such. The only other foreign memorial erected is at Dien Bien Phu, for the French soldiers who died during the decisive battle of the First Indochina War (see page 2). No memorials to the Americans have been erected—or been allowed to be built.

Visiting the area today Long Tan is once again a thriving plantation with rubber trees over 8 metres tall. To enter the plantation and the Long Tan Memorial Cross area you will need a police escort and a permit. If you wish to take a floral tribute, florists in Vung Tau can make up suitable pieces given a day’s notice (check the spelling on any ribbons and print your instructions clearly). If travelling from Baria, go up Route 764 towards Binh Ba and turn off on to Route 766; if coming from the west, LONG TAN

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turn off the Dat Do—Long Phuoc road and head northeast to the battle site past The Horseshoe to the rebuilt Long Tan village. Turn north in Dat Do near the signpost reading ‘Long Khanh 59 km’. From Long Tan village turn north into the battle site. You will have to stop at the police post in the village, where the bronze plaque that adorns the cross is kept in safekeeping for placing on the memorial. If your tour group has a small bus it can take you almost right into the area and then you take a 200-metre walk to the cross. Be warned that turning up ‘on spec’ and hoping to get in to Long Tan does not work. A visit to Long Tan is always an emotional experience, especially for veterans or next of kin. Steve Campling served with 6 RAR between September 1969 and May 1970 and the Long Tan cross has a special significance for him: The trip back to Long Tan Memorial was one of the most moving experiences of my life. Being back in the rubber just brought back so many memories. To think how those fellows went through what they did is just totally unbelievable. And probably more moving for me also, because the 18th of August is my birthday and when the cross was dedicated on 18 August 1969 I . . . had my 21st birthday.8

Further reading All Guts & No Glory: The Story of a Long Tan Warrior by Bob Buick with Gary McKay, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000. Bob Buick was the sergeant of 11 Platoon whose platoon commander was killed early in the battle. A gritty down-toearth account of Buick’s tour of duty with 6 RAR, and of the 96



battle. Buick also debunks some myths that developed after the battle and raises interesting points made by other authors. The Battle of Long Tan: The Legend of Anzac Upheld by Lex McAulay, Century Hutchison, Victoria, 1986. To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1950–1966 by Ian McNeill, Allen & Unwin in association with Australian War Memorial, Sydney, 1993. This is the AWM official history. See pp. 305–74 for a full account of the battle and the days immediately following it.

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6 AP MY AN Ap My An was a near-coastal village on the eastern side of Phuoc Tuy Province and several kilometres from the coastal town of Lang Phuoc Hai. It lay astride an arterial road leading around the north of the Long Hai hills and forming a well-known enemy infiltration route. The local people, who mainly fished and grew rice, were often terrorised by the Viet Cong, although a small ARVN force provided some protection.

Battle of Ap My An In the year following the legendary Battle of Long Tan, the 6th Battalion (6 RAR) became embroiled in another major fight with their now familiar nemesis, the local D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion. Not long after first light on 17 February 1967, two companies of D445 moved into Lang Phuoc Hai to attack the South Vietnamese soldiers protecting the town. A fivehour battle ensued and then almost as quickly the Viet Cong withdrew to the northeast. 98



This was a normal ploy: to attack and withdraw before the full weight of Allied air and artillery support could be brought to bear, so the Task Force commander, Brigadier S.C. Graham, reacted by sending three rifle companies of 6 RAR by helicopter to an area 2 kilometres northeast of Ap My An, in order to cut off any enemy withdrawal. There they linked up with a fourth rifle company mounted in APCs who were travelling cross-country to form a large sweeping force in the immediate area. This operation was codenamed Operation Bribie (named after an island just north of 6 RAR’s hometown of Brisbane in Queensland). The enemy attack on Phuoc Hai had been a deliberate tactic to force a reaction by the Australians, and in anticipation an extensive motor vehicle ambush had been set up by D445 Battalion in buildings just west of the town. But, in true Murphy’s Law style, the carriers dashed overland and not along the roads, which were often mined. Soon after arrival, not long after noon, the Australians came under intense small-arms and machine-gun fire, indicating that the enemy were dug in and in some strength. Unaware that they faced a battalion-sized enemy force, the commanding officer of 6 RAR, Lieutenant Colonel Townsend, launched a two-company attack to drive the VC out of their prepared positions. Outnumbered, the attack did not succeed and quickly bogged down when previously undetected machine guns and well-sited snipers began firing. Before long the Australians found themselves well and truly in hot water when they were being counterattacked on three sides and unable to withdraw without the risk of extensive casualties. The APCs were despatched from their holding location near the landing zone and soon 11 carriers were fighting through the bush towards the rear of the companies to AP MY AN

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extract the wounded. By now it was starting to get dark and not a good time to be fighting in jungle, where command and control would become almost impossible. The rifle companies were extracted by last light and Townsend called a massive airstrike and artillery bombardment on to the enemy position as the battalion regrouped. Not surprisingly, when 6 RAR assaulted back into the position the next morning the enemy were gone. The defenders had bought the time they needed for the main body to withdraw and fight another day. Bob Buick of Delta Company was an observer for most of this battle as his company was for the most part in a blocking position, but he recalls the events of a memorable day and the sight of the enemy camp the following morning: The camp layout resembled an ‘X’ in plan view, from memory, and the enemy used weapon pits to protect themselves from ground fire . . . It had become clear that the Viet Cong fought hard and long to allow the heavy weapons elements and their commanders to withdraw . . . Again we were forced to withdraw from the battle area and unable to retrieve our dead and wounded. This group of enemy demonstrated great guts and determination and this time it was us who were at a disadvantage, having to attack them in their prepared positions. That night the battalion requested air support on to the enemy position, using bombs, napalm and rockets to hit the position . . . Watching this awesome show of firepower was one of the best fireworks displays one could watch, as the expanding cone of tracer fire smashed into the jungle . . . The enemy had inflicted a lot of hurt on 6 RAR that day . . . it was not a good day for us.1 100



The battle had been savage and intense and could easily have been Australia’s first defeat in the war had it not been for some plucky section and platoon leaders, courageous fighting by riflemen, and the gutsy attack by the cavalry under heavy fire. This action cost 6 RAR seven lives and a further 26 wounded. The cavalry had a man killed and another trooper wounded and one APC destroyed. The Australians found only eight Viet Cong dead; many more had obviously been removed. Intelligence estimates later indicated that somewhere between 50 and 70 enemy had been killed. As historian Chris Clark later wrote: ‘The action had clearly been no Australian victory. Instead, it was perhaps the closest Australian troops came to defeat in a major battle. Despite showing courage and determination, the Australians had been matched by an enemy equally tenacious and disciplined.’2

Visiting the area today The coastal town of Lang Phuoc Hai has left behind what was once a sleepy little fishing village. It has grown remarkably and now hosts several world-class holiday resorts in its immediate environs. Ap My An is on the fringe of this new semi-urban development and several kilometres out of Lang Phuoc Hai towards the west on Route 766. To reach the battle site, go north of Lang Phuoc Hai on Route 766 and take the turn off to Ap My An (for those with GPS or a military map this is in the vicinity of grid square YS 5358). There is nothing to show the battle site today, as the area is heavily cultivated. This is a place to stop and look at when travelling on a day trip through the Long Hai hills or when out to the east of the province. AP MY AN

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Further reading For a full coverage of the battle see Ian McNeill’s ‘Vietnam 1967: Operation Bribie’ in Wartime (the official magazine of the Australian War Memorial), no. 1, November 1997. This magazine is available in the research centre at the AWM. See also: All Guts & No Glory: The Story of a Long Tan Warrior by Bob Buick with Gary McKay, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000. Vietnam—A Pictorial History of the Sixth Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1966–1967 by Captain Iain McLean Williams, Printcraft Press, Sydney, 1967.

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7 BINH BA One Viet Nam battle stands out for the Australians because it represents all the elements of the all-arms concept of modern warfare. The Battle of Binh Ba was fought over three days—the bulk of the fighting was on day one—and it earned a battle honour for the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) and the undying admiration of the infantry that were supported. What was also remarkable about this battle is that it was fought in the worst type of terrain for armoured vehicles—a village or town. Such actions are now glibly called MOUT: ‘military operations in urban terrain’. It was not an operation for which the battalions or squadrons of the Task Force had trained, yet its execution was successful. Like Long Tan, the Australian infantry were numerically outnumbered for most of the engagement. Binh Ba, 7 kilometres north of Nui Dat on Route 2 (now Provincial Route 764 or National Route 56), was a picturesque plantation village with a properly laid out road system and orderly rows of well-tended houses with concrete walls, tiled roofs, and wooden doors and window shutters. Some 500 metres north of Binh Ba, at Duc Thanh, was the ARVN Regional Force post. BINH BA

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Since establishing their presence in the Phuoc Tuy Province in 1966, the Australians had been threatening the Viet Cong’s lines of communication and base areas. The enemy mounted this operation against Binh Ba most probably to relieve this pressure by drawing the Australian forces—the 6th Battalion—away from the headquarters of 33 NVA Regiment further north. Far from relieving the pressure exerted on them by 6 RAR to the north, 33 NVA Regiment simply drew overwhelming force on themselves in another area—and met with disaster. While Australian casualties were one killed (from Delta Company, 5 RAR) and ten wounded (eight from B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, and two from 5 RAR), the enemy on the other hand lost at the very least 107 killed, six wounded, eight prisoners of war and a further 29 detained.

Battle of Binh Ba The following account draws heavily on a summation from Ironsides magazine.1 The 6th Battalion returned for a second tour of duty in May 1969 and was deployed together with an attached New Zealand rifle company. (The New Zealand commitment was not large enough to be independent.) The combined outfit became known as one of the ‘Anzac’ battalions. Operation Hammer, as it was called, began almost by accident. The Anzac battalion, 6 RAR/NZ, was on its ‘warm up’ operation in a normally ‘quiet’ area of the jungle about 6 kilometres northwest of the Task Force base at Nui Dat. 4 Troop, B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, commanded by Second Lieutenant Chris Sweeney, was under the operational control of 6 RAR/NZ and had asked for a 104



replacement tank. Sweeney had been injured and command was being exercised by his troop sergeant, Robert ‘Jock’ Browning. The replacement tank, in company with an armoured recovery vehicle, was dispatched from Nui Dat early in the morning on 6 June 1969. Both vehicles travelled north on Route 2 to rendezvous with 4 Troop at Fire Support Base Virginia about 8 kilometres northwest of Binh Ba. The route was classified ‘amber’ and although enemy contact was possible, it was thought to be unlikely. But as the two tanks approached Binh Ba village, the unlikely happened: an RPG-7 struck the lead tank, penetrating the turret and seriously wounding the operator, who slumped across the main armament. After returning fire the crew commander, Lance Corporal John Harvey, pressed on past the village and arranged casualty evacuation at the nearby Duc Thanh Regional Force Post. The Regional Force platoons became involved and were heavily engaged from the northern edge of Binh Ba as they approached the village. Pinned by intense RPG and small-arms fire, this force was unable to continue and requested assistance while remaining in a blocking position. 6 June—Phase 1

Following the alert, the Task Force ready reaction force commanded by Major Murray Blake, OC Delta Company, 5th Battalion (5 RAR), was deployed from the base. The reaction force included Blake’s company (badly under strength with only 65 men); a composite troop of Centurion tanks from B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment (commanded by Second Lieutenant Brian Sullivan); an APC troop (3 Troop, B Squadron, 3 Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Captain Ray De Vere); and a direct-support BINH BA

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gun battery (105 Field Battery, Royal Australian Artillery). According to Murray Blake the briefing for Operation Hammer was sketchy. ‘I was to be prepared to move into the village and investigate. It was quite a vague circumstance,’ he says. The enemy strength had been wrongly estimated to be one or possibly two platoons. In fact, the reaction force was about to face a full battalion (1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment, North Vietnamese Army), guided by the local Binh Ba Guerrilla Unit with an estimated strength of 26. Initially, because Binh Ba lay within the 6 RAR/NZ area of operations, command was vested in 6 RAR/NZ, but as the battle unfolded and more troops from 5 RAR became involved the tactical control transferred to 5 RAR. The reaction force moved carefully into the area south of Binh Ba with the three tanks leading, followed by the APCs with D Company mounted. Approximately 600 metres south of Binh Ba, on the northern edge of Duc My hamlet, a burst from an automatic weapon was fired across the roadway in front of the tanks. After returning fire the force was able to move on into the clearing south of Binh Ba village. The initial sweep towards the main part of Binh Ba commenced with all four tanks leading the assault and supported by three APC sections. Blake recalls that the attack hadn’t gone far when the problem of civilians in the battle area arose. Because ‘large numbers of enemy were being reported’ and ‘11 Platoon also reported civilians trying to flee’, the Diggers were told to dismount and herd the civilians out of harm’s way.2 As they slowly advanced through the first part of the village—at a rate designed not to outdistance the dismounted infantry at the rear—a moderate amount of small-arms fire was encountered, together with the occasional rocket. Unfortunately this plan of attack was driven by misinformation. 106



Blake thought that an RF company covered the eastern flank, but in fact they were in a blocking position to the north and there was a large hole in the flank where Blake was trying to drive the enemy from the southwest. Up until this stage he’d assumed that the one (or possibly two) enemy platoons were conducting a fighting withdrawal in the face of the advancing reaction force. But the amount of fire coming from the enemy indicated either that their one or two platoons were extremely well equipped or that the intelligence estimate was somewhat low. The fact that the enemy were prepared to stand and fight against Centurion tanks was a fair indication that it was going to be an interesting day! Shortly after they entered the next part of the village the tempo of activity increased dramatically. The dismounted infantry platoon mopping up at the rear appeared to become engaged in a ‘private war’. At this point the tanks adopted a two-up or ‘pairs’ formation, so that they could be mutually supporting, and the APC sections continued to provide flank and rear support to each ‘pair’ of tanks. The fighting increased in intensity and as Blake describes it, ‘The noise was horrendous. I saw an enemy machine-gun team dressed in greens and webbing towing a wheeled 12.7mm heavy machine gun. This was indicative that the heavy weapons group from a battalion was in the area.’3 During this engagement an observation aircraft reported an enemy group withdrawing to the southwest. Two tanks reacted to this information, leaving their accompanying APCs and infantry behind, and approximately 100 metres further on one of them was struck by an RPG rocket. Tank gunner Trooper Roy Dodd said afterwards: My tank was engaged by several [rockets] . . . One RPG-7 penetrated the turret. It wounded the crew commander BINH BA

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[Corporal Geoff Bennett] badly, and the operator [Trooper Max Dale] and myself were also wounded. We fired back with canister and we continued to fire and moved on out of the village on the western edge. We continued on and over a four-foot bund [paddy] where we stopped to look at the commander’s wounds. I traversed the gun to the south and saw about 30 enemy running just inside the rubber, retreating in a southwesterly direction. I fired five HE [high explosive] rounds, one canister and .30 and .50 calibre machine gun at a range of about 150 metres. I saw many enemy fall when I fired and I believe a lot more were wounded.4

A decision was made to abandon the damaged tank and to evacuate the crew under the covering fire of the second tank. Heavy enemy machine-gun fire and frequent rocket volleys now changed the complexion of the assault, but the remaining two tanks reached an open area beside the school, approximately 350 metres to the west of the Route 2 roadway. The tanks were experiencing severe radio trouble, making operational control between them and the mounted infantry and the APCs difficult. As the assault had lost momentum, it was decided that the remainder of the reaction force would break out of the village to the south and then investigate the sighting report of the enemy company withdrawing to the southwest. As the two tanks, with APCs following, moved out, RPG fire was received from the southeast corner of the open area. One tank was hit by an RPG that struck the engine deck railing and wounded Corporal Barry Bennier in the back of the neck. Second Lieutenant Brian Sullivan then saw a rocket being fired at his tank. He could see a brown object at the centre of the smoke from the RPG primary, and instinctively threw himself forward onto 108



the commander’s cupola machine gun. He was rolling off to the right of the gun, in order to get lower, when the RPG grazed his back and a moment later detonated on a building on the western side of the open area. Sullivan sustained three rocket tailfin cuts to his left shoulder blade, a cut to the back of his head, and minor shrapnel wounds to the right side of his face and his arm. He was also cut in the region of his right kidney by ‘dead’ shrapnel coming back from the RPG explosion against the building. It was his lucky day. It was now obvious to Murray Blake that the combat team was in strife. The tanks were running low on ammunition and the enemy strength was greater than anyone had expected: It was clear that there was an enormous enemy force and we were not in a position to manoeuvre. I estimated at least a couple of companies and probably a battalion was still in the village. There had been some withdrawal to the east but we were still taking a lot of fire. The noise of small-arms rounds striking the APC was enough to tell me they were there in force. My greatest fear was that we were about to be enveloped . . . We were stuck in the middle of the village. The problem we had in breaking out was that I had a dismounted platoon and we had to remount them. But I had people everywhere and it seemed to take from 30 to 60 minutes [to regain control]. For me to get Ray De Vere’s attention I had to reach over his cupola and grab his throat and almost throttle him because he was firing at the enemy almost non-stop. It was now almost impossible to talk on the radios.5

At this stage a US Air Force forward air controller offered rocket assistance to the desperate Australians, but the BINH BA

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support had to be declined because of fire control problems and the fact that everyone thought there were friendly forces to the east, which were in fact some withdrawing enemy. An RAAF light fire team (two Iroquois gunships) now appeared on the scene and sent rockets and mini-gun fire into houses in the southern row to allow the tanks to withdraw into the open area. The tanks and APCs had received small-arms and machine-gun fire from the southern and western sides of the open area throughout the attempted breakout. The APCs had dealt with this fire, while the tanks had concentrated on the RPG fire from the southeastern corner. Orders were given for a second attempt to break out of the village to the south. These orders came at an opportune time as the two surviving tanks were almost out of main gun ammunition. They were able, however, to transfer ammo from the disabled tank. 6 June—Phase 2

When command passed to 5 RAR, tactical headquarters were set up at Duc Thanh and the ARVN Regional Force troops who’d been blocking to the north cleared the church in the northern sector of the village. The CO of 5 RAR, Lieutenant Colonel Colin Kahn, moved the newly arrived Bravo Company (who had driven up the road) into a blocking position to the west and positioned another force in the east. Orders were then issued for Delta Company to do a dismounted infantry sweep from west to east through Binh Ba village, with the support of the APCs and the two remaining fighting tanks. Fortunately, reinforcements in the form of 4 Troop, B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment (from FSB Virginia), led by Sergeant Jock Browning, 110



arrived from Duc Thanh prior to the commencement of the sweep and relieved the remnants of the depleted composite tank troop. Replacement tank crew members had also arrived in the RAAF helicopters ferrying in tank ammunition, and the injured crew members had been evacuated. Heavy contacts began as soon as the sweep commenced. The now four tanks moved in line abreast with dismounted infantry interspersed between them and the APCs to the rear. A systematic drill quickly developed: individual enemy soldiers engaged the advancing force with automatic fire from deep within a house and then jumped into an adjoining bunker or tunnel, which had been prepared by the house owners for self-protection. In response the infantrymen returned fire and called forward a tank to blow a hole in the wall, then they put canister and machine-gun fire into the area. In some cases engagement ranges were down to six metres! The infantry would then assault the house and clear it and its associated bunker or tunnel, using fragmentation grenades and small-arms fire. While this was going on, civilians began to emerge from the houses and to move out of the village towards the advancing force. It soon became obvious that the enemy were taking advantage of this by dressing in civilian clothes taken from the houses to enable them to mingle with the crowd and make good their escape. They were quickly apprehended. The sweep finished at last light and the assault and blocking forces settled in to all-round defence for the night. 7–8 June—Phases 3 and 4

Early the next morning Bravo Company observed a company group moving towards Binh Ba village from the southwest. BINH BA

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These enemy soldiers were engaged by tank and infantry fire and the area was then swept to reveal one enemy dead and a further six wounded. Binh Ba village was slowly cleared throughout the day from west to east with little enemy resistance. Meanwhile, in the village of Duc Trung, about a kilometre north of Binh Ba, enemy forces began attacking an RF platoon. Bravo Company and 4 Troop were ordered to clear and secure the village. The RF troops then completed the village clearance of Duc Trung. By late afternoon, blocks were established for the night northwest of Duc Trung and southwest of Binh Ba. The night was peaceful. Early on 8 June, Operation Hammer concluded with a final sweep of Binh Ba.

Visiting the area today The village of Binh Ba has changed remarkably, as it was almost destroyed in the fighting and has been rebuilt. From Baria travel north up Provincial Route 764 (National Route 56) past Hoa Long and Nui Dat. The road (that was once Route 2) has been widened and more buildings now exist on the eastern side than before. The village is well signposted. The area of the battle is a working rubber plantation and a permit is required to enter. A police escort is not required. It is not possible to see the area of fighting from the main road.

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Further reading Ironsides, Issue Number 2, 1983. Jungle Tracks: Australian Armour in Viet Nam by Gary McKay and Graeme Nicholas, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001.

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8 LONG KHANH PROVINCE Sometimes the operations of the Australian Task Force extended northwards, even on occasion to the province of Long Khanh (now known as Dong Nai). In 1971 the size of the Australian combat force was reduced and in May only two battalions, 3 RAR and 4 RAR/NZ, remained in control of operations in Phuoc Tuy Province. In June that year they were in a combined operation, named Overlord and involving ARVN, American, Australian and Thai units, which was designed to destroy a large enemy force operating north of Phuoc Tuy in Long Khanh Province. Reports had confirmed the existence of a regimental enemy base, comprising 3 Battalion, NVA Regiment, and D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion, in the jungle 5 kilometres east of Route 2 and near the hamlet of Ap Cam My. The operation contained everything that most professional soldiers look for in their careers—combined elements of armour, infantry, artillery and aviation—and was probably the biggest single operation the Task Force took part in during the war. The heaviest fighting took place on 7 June, when the enemy proved to be obstinate and fought hard to maintain their position against superior firepower 114



and the fighter air attacks. One of the enemy bunker systems was a kilometre square and easily outflanked the assaulting Australian companies.

Battle of Long Khanh On 5 June the Americans (2/8 Battalion, 3 Cavalry Brigade) and 4 RAR/NZ Battalion were deployed to form blocking positions to the east and south respectively as part of a U-shaped cordon around the enemy position. 3 RAR was also deployed, with Centurion tanks (C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment) and APCs (A Squadron, 3 Cavalry Regiment) in support, and had the task of forcing the enemy out of their jungle base. When 3 RAR began patrolling it was soon evident that large numbers of enemy were in the area. The Allied blocking forces also began making contact, but the general direction of enemy movement appeared to be northward. The main enemy position—a bunker system—was discovered just before last light on 6 June by 5 Platoon, Bravo Company. The platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Graham Kells (later to win a Military Cross for his handling of the contact), thought it was prudent not to push into a bunker system with darkness almost upon them. As he said later, ‘We didn’t know what was there. Bit of a stupid time to go finding out.’1 The enemy they faced was dug in higher up a spur line, with re-entrants falling away on each side providing them with good fields of fire and restricting the movement of the attackers. There is no such thing as a ‘good’ bunker system to attack, but this one was definitely a bad place to try and winkle the enemy out of. The Australians hit the position LONG KHANH PROVINCE

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with artillery and mortars at first light and then pushed in an assault formation, expecting the enemy to leave with a view to fighting another day. About 90 metres into the position the enemy showed their hand and in heavy fighting the Australians in 5 Platoon suffered severe casualties as they appeared to be outflanked and caught deep in the bunker system. Close fire support from artillery and mortars and suppressive fire from helicopter gunships kept the enemy at bay while an attack was mounted in APCs and tanks on the flank and rear of the position. Two infantrymen from 5 Platoon, Private Robert Payne (Distinguished Conduct Medal), and Private John Charlton (Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry),2 were later recognised for bravery displayed as they extracted their severely wounded comrades from the more exposed positions in the line of fire. The dug-in enemy were now making life very difficult indeed for the 3 RAR infantrymen trying to push the NVA out of their bunker system. Lieutenant Warren Hind, commander of 3 Troop, C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, recalls his involvement in Operation Overlord: The enemy had heavy machine guns. The gunships were called in to basically blast the area between where the tanks were and where the infantry were . . . Sadly, what occurred, a helicopter came out to resupply the infantry with ammunition and was hit by an RPG and crashed. Then the Australian and American gunships were firing in between in that area because as it turned out it was a huge bunker system. We didn’t know that at the time. From memory, that went on for about an hour and one of the things that frustrated me—and I couldn’t do anything thing about it— was that the gunships held us up getting down to the 116



infantry. I think the majority of 3/33 NVA Regiment got away, but they left stay-behind parties and they honestly were suicide parties.3

The RAAF chopper that crashed was trying to bring the resupply in for Bravo Company. It exploded on impact, killing two of the crew and severely wounding two others plus the 3 RAR padmaster who’d been trying to direct it into the landing zone. Fire support from the gunships had to be very close to prevent the enemy overrunning the Australian positions. Usually mini-guns and rocket support were brought no closer to friendly forces than 25 metres but on this occasion the pilots took great risks. Infantryman John Witcombe says, ‘I think they did a great job, as they were dropping rockets and fire within 15 metres.’4 The Centurion tanks carried a full bomb-load of 64 rounds and rarely did a tank go through its full complement of ammunition. However, the fighting this day was very heavy and there was no shortage of targets as Warren Hind explains: Bruce Cameron [a tank troop leader] and the infantry triggered the bottom of that huge camp complex where 3 Battalion, 33 NVA Regiment, were encamped. It was just like something we had at Canungra [the Army’s Jungle Training Centre in Queensland]. They had rope walkways set up . . . it was an incredible camp, an incredible system. We fired our full bomb-load of main armament . . . and cleared an area I estimate [at] nearly half the size of the Melbourne Cricket Ground—just firing canister rounds. We basically just stripped the jungle. That seemed to go on for about three hours.5 LONG KHANH PROVINCE

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The APCs filled a very useful role during this extremely heavy fighting when they were called on to act as armoured ambulances and to resupply the tanks that were fighting furiously to assist the men from 3 RAR. Corporal Peter Turner’s APC section was waiting towards the rear of the assault for the helicopter gunships to finish blasting the enemy. Turner recalls: One of the tank drivers had been brained by a bloody great piece of stuff coming out of the jungle because the tanks had to physically knock their way through the jungle to get in . . . So we had actually gone forward, picked him up and taken him back to the LZ, and we were on the way back when an RPG struck another tank. Then the tanks commenced clearing the jungle with canister and finding bunkers and knocking them out. But the tank on the left-hand flank was stuck. Infantry surrounded it . . . to protect it, but they couldn’t get the casualties out. So we got detailed to go forward . . . I went forward and parked my vehicle right beside the tank and the infantry pulled the crewmen out and laid them on the back on stretchers and we patched them up as best we could. I put them in my vehicle and turned around and took the casualties back. Then they . . . put them on a chopper and flew them out.6

The jungle in the area was very thick and movement by armoured vehicles of any description was tough going. It provided a fair amount of frustration at times when the crews found they were unable to put their combat power to its most effective use because Mother Nature opposed their forward progress. This was a reason why Chris Stephens will never forget this operation: 118



One incident that stands out . . . was that in the night Lieutenant Ian Mathers, the gunners’ forward observer, had been shot. We could not get to him, nobody could get to him, couldn’t get him out . . . and he died in the night, or he was dead the next morning. I was greatly frustrated with that personally, it was something that has always stuck in my mind.7

The artillery also used an enormous amount of ammunition to stave off defeat. The guns had fired 65 rounds of 105mm high explosive (HE) shells the night before, and during the fighting on 7 June they fired 988 rounds of 105mm HE from Fire Support Base Pamela (4 kilometres southwest) and 400 rounds of 105mm HE from Fire Support Base Trish (5 kilometres south). A third fire support base called Cherie (8 kilometres southwest) fired about 200 rounds of 155mm HE in support of Bravo Company. The Australian casualties from the operation were three killed and eight wounded; however, an ambush on 12 June against an APC by 274 Viet Cong Main Force Regiment resulted in another seven men killed and three wounded. The enemy losses were difficult to ascertain, with only five bodies recovered, but substantial evidence from blood trails and human fragments suggested that heavy losses had been sustained. Several thousand Allied soldiers had been deployed in an attempt to smash the stronghold. Although the enemy managed to evade destruction, through the clever use of night movement and good camouflage, they were once again forced to relocate out of their bases, this time heading north and east. That the enemy had been able to move back into the Long Khanh area in large numbers was of some concern, as Denzil Bourne, a cavalry officer, comments: ‘I thought, LONG KHANH PROVINCE

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anybody who is as determined as this mob is and can still infiltrate in large numbers an area that we’d been ostensibly controlling for such a long time, is somebody who has got to be respected.’8

Visiting the area today The area of the battle site is practically inaccessible and in heavy scrub. You need official permission to get into this area and approval from the local People’s District Committee. However, you will have difficulty in getting approval and also in finding a guide willing to scrub-bash with you for half a day to reach the site. The battle was fought over a series of locations and the area is not easy to find. Travel north from the main road at the village of Ap Cam My (YS 460 920) and stop at a knoll alongside the road, roughly at YS 450 957. The general battle site is due east, about 5 kilometres from this spot.

Further reading An Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles by Chris Coulthard-Clark, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001. The Battle of Long Khanh by Michael English, Army Doctrine Centre, Sydney, 1995. The Fighting Fourth: A Pictorial Record of the Second Tour in South Viet Nam by 4 RAR/NZ (Anzac) Battalion 1971–72, by R.L. Sayce and M.D. O’Neill (eds), Printcraft Press, Sydney, 1972.

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9 NUI LE In October 1971, with 3 RAR about to finish its tour and return home, 4 RAR/NZ became the last of our battalions to serve in the war. And Nui Le was the last battle for Australian soldiers in the war, while Delta Company, 4 RAR, won the honour of being the last rifle company to serve in South Viet Nam (it was finally withdrawn from its protective role in March 1972). As it happens, I was the commander of 11 Platoon, Delta Company, and was wounded in the final stages of the battle. Following the fighting in Long Khanh (now Dong Nai) Province in June 1971 (see Chapter 8), the enemy had withdrawn to refit and prepare for what was to become a last push to grab some political mileage out of the Allied withdrawal and to try to give the Australians one last bloody nose before they left. The NVA also wanted the local populace to know that they were still active, and were intent on making it look as if the imperialist aggressors had been driven out of their homeland. For their part, the Australians had spent time searching north of their base looking for signs that the enemy were returning. Nui Le, a small hill just south of the northern provincial NUI LE

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border, and east of Route 2 (now Provincial Route 764) near the large French-owned Courtenay rubber plantation, was at the time in the middle of primary jungle. And if you looked at a battle map of the area in 1971 it would seem as if the area was infected with measles, so many were the red dots signifying previous contacts.

Battle of Nui Le In mid-September 1971, intelligence reports indicated that the enemy—probably NVA—were loitering with intent in the north of Phuoc Tuy Province, in the Nui Le area. Because of this, Operation Ivanhoe was launched on 18 September to determine the exact location of the enemy and to destroy them. Bravo Company, 4 RAR, was deployed by armoured personnel carrier and began operating in an area east of Route 2. Delta Company was already operating further to the east and searching for signs of enemy along a common boundary with 3 RAR. All companies involved were staying in range of the guns at Fire Support Base Debbie at the foot of Courtenay Hill on the Long Khanh–Phuoc Tuy border. During 18–19 September Delta Company had a number of sporadic contacts with platoon-sized groups of enemy, and both the Regional Force (RF) post on Route 2, 10 kilometres south of the border, and the village of Ap Ngai Giao, 5 kilometres further south, were attacked. Then on the morning of 20 September a detachment of APCs from 1 Troop, A Squadron, 3 Cavalry Regiment, were trundling north up Route 2 between the village of Xa Bang and the RF post when they were ambushed by approximately 20 enemy employing RPGs and small-arms automatic fire. The enemy had spent 122



the night waiting for the cavalry to come up the road on a morning clearing patrol. A swift counterattack ensued in which an enemy soldier was killed and an Australian cavalryman was slightly wounded. Almost as soon as Bravo Company had split up and begun searching in platoons, it experienced enemy contacts. All signs indicated that large parties were probably somewhere in the area. 4 Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant Dan McDaniel, came upon a group of enemy inspecting what looked like telephone wire. They killed one NVA soldier and wounded another. Over the next couple of hours several running contacts ensued, until a well-concentrated barrage of enemy mortar fire hit 4 Platoon in the afternoon. Of the 29 men in it, 15 were wounded; luckily none were killed. It should have become evident now to the battalion headquarters that there was no shortage of enemy in the general area: two battalions (2/33 and 3/33 NVA Regiment) and a regimental headquarters were waiting for the Australians to come into their trap. Bravo Company had found the front door to the enemy’s lair but had not fully entered, and Delta Company was quietly knocking on the back door. Delta Company had also split up and started searching in platoons. Almost immediately 11 Platoon found signs, about 2 kilometres southeast of Nui Le hill, indicating that an estimated 200 enemy had passed by—probably within the previous 24 hours. At the same time Second Lieutenant Graham Spinkston (commander, 12 Platoon) found the western end of what was probably the same track and decided to carefully investigate it. He and his men had gone only a small distance when they were engaged with RPG and small-arms fire. Several soldiers (including Spinkston) were hit and one NUI LE

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soldier, Private Jim Duff, was killed when an RPG exploded above his head on a tree. After discovering the enemy track, 11 Platoon could hear the enemy moving to their front, so they decided to hold ground but were soon discovered. For the next two hours the platoon became engaged in large contacts with groups of 60–80 enemy who were intent on overrunning them but were prevented by the judicious placement of hastily deployed Claymore mines. No casualties were inflicted upon the Australians but the NVA paid a terrible price as the Claymores cut down their ranks. Shortly after midday Delta Company re-formed due south of Nui Le at a point where 12 Platoon had come across the edge of a large bunker system. While this redeployment and consolidation were going on, American and Australian air and artillery support began firing into the area of the NVA bunkers. The enormous amount of ordnance made available was delivered as close as possible to the Australians, who were now waiting on word from aerial reconnaissance about what the enemy might be doing. If the NVA began to withdraw north the Australians would quickly attack the bunkers to keep the enemy off balance. Not long after 3 pm the order came for Delta Company to attack. After moving only 50 metres into the bunker system 11 Platoon was hit by an enormous amount of fire and immediately lost two of its section machine guns, with the crews dead or mortally wounded. Desperate fighting raged for about 40 minutes and it became evident that Delta Company could not make headway against the enemy’s well-sited and well-camouflaged gunpits. After winching out the casualties, the company was forced to withdraw from its untenable position to a more secure night defensive position. Unfortunately the company 124



ran into more enemy at its new defensive position and sporadic fighting broke out as the enemy hugged the Australian perimeter on three sides. The artillery forward observer and the gun batteries coordinated some very close fire missions to relieve the Australians. Some time after 9 pm the enemy withdrew and the artillery that had been firing in support almost continuously during the day finally took a rest. The bunker system in Delta Company’s area was extensive: 38 completed bunkers and 17 incomplete bunkers were located. They were laid out in five separate systems in a Y formation, and they were demolished the next day using explosive charges. Delta Company lost five dead and had nine wounded; Bravo Company had 15 wounded on what was a tumultuous day. The enemy casualties from this battle were never fully known, but scores of drag marks and telltale signs of artillery strikes on groups of enemy indicated that the losses would have been heavy. Eighteen enemy bodies were recovered in the original bunker system. Neither the bodies nor the large packs the soldiers had been wearing had been touched or interfered with in any way. In 1993, when I returned for a Delta Company reunion at the battle site, an ex-NVA officer informed me that the artillery fire had killed the commander of 3/33 NVA Battalion.

Battle honours The following battle honours were dealt out in 1972: • Major Jerry Taylor and Gary McKay were awarded the Military Cross

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• Sergeant Daryl Jenkin (11 Platoon) and Corporal Doug Melrose (4 Platoon, Bravo Company) were both mentioned in despatches (MID) • Private Kevin Casson of 11 Platoon was given an MID, but this was upgraded to the Medal of Gallantry (equivalent to the MC) in 1999 in the End of War List after his sterling work in retrieving one of the machine guns under fire • Corporal Mick O’Sullivan, Delta company medic, was awarded the Military Medal for his bravery in extricating wounded and his treatment of the wounded when under fire • American forward air controller, Lieutenant Rodriguez, USMC, who had flown almost all day coordinating air strikes and helped to save Delta Company from being overrun, was awarded the US Navy Cross—much to the delight of the members of Delta Company who met with the brave pilot later in Nui Dat.

The day the air war returned to Phuoc Tuy The amount of ordnance expended to support Bravo and Delta companies was staggering. The aircraft employed were Cobra attack helicopters, Iroquois gunships and F-4 Phantom jet fighters, coordinated by four sets of forward air controllers. In all, the US forces’ air support group expended 967 high explosive (HE) rockets, 120 flechette rockets, 5300 40mm HE rounds, 143 500 7.62mm mini-gun rounds, 28 pods of napalm and four 500-pound bombs. The RAAF flew 16 gunship sorties, nine 126



Dustoff casualty evacuation sorties and five opdems (urgent aerial-delivered resupply sorties), and expended 115 HE rockets, 79 500 7.62mm mini-gun rounds, and 12 500 7.62mm M-60 door-gun rounds. The guns of 104 Battery and A Battery, 12 Field Regiment, expended a total of 2074 HE rounds.1 It was a busy, noisy day. Noted historian David Horner wrote in his history of the Royal Australian Regiment: There is no doubt the quick retaliatory action by the APCs of 1 Troop when ambushed on 20 September and the aggressive action by B and D Companies, with plentiful close air and artillery support during this last battle fought by Australian troops, were responsible for forcing 33 NVA Regiment to abandon their efforts [which had been considerable] to dominate the District, and return to more secure surroundings north of the Phuoc Tuy Province boundary. It had been, though, a near thing.2

Visiting the area today The battle site is now extensively cultivated with rubber and it is possible to drive to the foot of Nui Le in a bus. A permit is required to enter the plantation and can be sought through Viet Nam Tourism. Little if any sign of the battle remains, as the jungle—except on the very top of Nui Le— has been cleared. Travel north along Provincial Route 764. North of Xa Bang and close to the old Long Khanh border (now the NUI LE

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Chau Duc district border) a road leads east toward the Hill 265 feature shown on commercial tourist maps. Nui Le is the hill directly north of Hill 265.

Further reading Delta Four: Australian Riflemen in Viet Nam by Gary McKay, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996. Duty First: A History of the Royal Australian Regiment by David Horner, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990. In Good Company: One Man’s War in Viet Nam by Gary McKay, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987. Last Out: 4 RAR/NZ (Anzac) Battalion’s Second Tour of Vietnam by Jerry Taylor, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001. The Fighting Fourth: A Pictorial Record of the Second Tour in South Vietnam by 4 RAR/NZ (Anzac) Battalion 1971–72, by R.L. Sayce and M.D. O’Neill (eds), Printcraft Press, Sydney, 1972.

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PART III BIEN HOA CITY AND ENVIRONS Four battles in the Bien Hoa area have been recorded as major events for the 1st Australian Task Force. The first was in 1965 in the Gang Toi hills, which involved 1 RAR under the operational control of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate). The second battle centred on Fire Support Base Andersen during Operation Coburg in January–March 1968, during the Tet Offensive. The other two significant battles were fought more or less concurrently and were centred on Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral in May 1968. Many Australians rate the battle of Long Tan (see Chapter 5) as the most important battle of the war, but it was by no means the bloodiest. The battles at Coral and Balmoral raged longer (26 days), accounted for many more enemy and were strategically vital encounters, as they stopped part of a major attack by the NVA and Viet Cong on the South Vietnamese capital. 129


Bien Hoa, some 35 kilometres northeast of Ho Chi Minh City, is an important manufacturing and light industrial centre. Hosting a population of 375 000 people, it is now the commercial centre for the re-formed and re-named Dong Nai Province, which incorporates parts of Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces. The massive American airbase of the war years now seems almost totally deserted and is not even used by commercial or private operators. The military may be using it as a base but, as visitors are not allowed in, I was unable to determine the extent of use, if any. Taking photographs is definitely not permitted. The old hangars 130

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and protective revetments can be glimpsed every now and then as you drive past, but the site seems mostly ramshackle and decaying. The museum in Bien Hoa City, the Dong Nai Museum, is normally opened for visitors by appointment only, so bookings are necessary. It has a large section on local historical, anthropological and cultural matters and another section devoted to the American War, where photographs, memorabilia and the original Long Tan cross are displayed. There is no admission fee. I suggest that you use Bien Hoa City as a base for your visits. Allocate a day for the Gang Toi hills and the Dong Nai Museum, and a day for a trip to FSB Andersen. Your visit to Coral and Balmoral FSBs (allow a full day) can, if you wish, be made on the way to or from Ho Chi Minh City. As an alternative, the visit to FSB Andersen can be made en route to Vung Tau (see Chapter 3) and the southeast coast.


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10 THE GANG TOI HILLS The first setpiece action by the Viet Cong against 1 RAR, and our first major encounter in South Viet Nam, occurred in November 1965 in the course of an operation codenamed Hump. It took place halfway through the battalion’s tour (thus it was that they were ‘over the hump’) and sporadic contacts, ambushes or counter-ambushes had blooded almost every Digger in the battalion. By now 161 Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery, had joined the fray as part of New Zealand’s commitment to the conflict, as well as the newly arrived 105 Field Battery, Royal Australian Artillery.

Battle of Gang Toi Hills Operation Hump formed part of a large-scale search and destroy operation mounted by the US Army. It centred on an area called Hill 82, which was south of the confluence of the rivers Song Be and Song Dong Nai in Bien Hoa Province, and 20 kilometres to the northeast of Bien Hoa airbase. The operation was planned for just five days. What was unknown to the 173rd Airborne Brigade operations and 132



intelligence staff was that the enemy had recently stationed a new headquarters, known as U1, precisely where 1 RAR was to clear some ground. The Viet Cong headquarters was hidden in the leech-infested rainforest of the Gang Toi hills, which was known to be an administrative area for the enemy but was also thought to contain Q762 Regiment and D800 Main Force Battalion. On 5 November 1 RAR was deployed on the southern side of the Song Be to establish a battalion command post (CP) and fire support base (FSB); the US 1/503rd Battalion was deployed into the northern side to establish another FSB. Major John Healy’s Alpha Company was tasked to clear the plateau on the top of the hills by about day 4 of the operation. After establishing the FSB, Alpha Company set off, with Bravo Company on their northern flank and Delta Company on their southern flank. Charlie Company, 1 RAR, stayed behind to protect the CP and FSB. Before long, sightings of tunnels, caches and abandoned camps indicated that the enemy were around. Small contacts were initiated and by the second day several VC soldiers had been killed and two Australians wounded. Just as Healy was about to start searching the area of Hill 82 on 7 November, he received new orders to rendezvous to the east with the rest of the battalion for a return to Bien Hoa on 9 November. This move would take Alpha Company straight up and across the northern edge of the Gang Toi plateau. As Healy’s company began moving off towards the rendezvous point, a contact was made with a lone VC, who was seen trying to creep up on the Australians. The scouts fired and one of the bullets struck a grenade the VC was carrying, killing him instantly. Movement up the slopes of the Gang Toi hills became slower and more careful as fresh THE GANG TOI HILLS

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signs of the enemy, and the discovery of a company position with trenches and dugouts, caused hearts to beat faster and eyes to widen. Trevor Hagan, acting as a sergeant of the under-strength 1 Platoon, Alpha Company, recalls why they were there: We were given the task, as a battalion, to patrol . . . looking for a regimental headquarters . . . Alpha Company had a certain portion to do and we came across a system of tracks. Now, these tracks couldn’t be seen from the air because they’d tied all the trees above them and had the jungle sort of covering the tracks. But the tracks were down to about 6 inches [150 mm] deep—trodden bare earth with people’s feet, elephants, trucks, everything in it—and they could’ve been moving thousands of people through it and no one would’ve seen them when they went at night. Anyhow, we’d found this and . . . we knew we were on to something. And on the 7th [of November] we started to have contacts.1

Hagan’s company, and more importantly his own platoon, were about to run into the highly experienced Viet Cong 271 Main Force Regiment soldiers. Private ‘Tiny’ Parker was acting as Corporal Hagan’s section commander of the lead section. They were given the task of clearing Hill 82, described by Hagan as ‘a very prominent feature that had . . . about three spurs running east–west and one running south off it’. Hagan continues the story: Tiny had just gone over the top, with Ed ‘Wingy’ Townsend as our scout. We just went over the top of the last false crest and five machine guns opened up. And from the noise . . . from where I was, it sounded like an L-shaped ambush. We hit the outside of the centre . . . so every machine gun on 134



the ambush position, which was designed to ambush someone walking down the ridgeline, was turned back on us. And after the initial burst and all the yelling and screaming . . . we all closed up to try and find out what was going on. There was nothing from Wingy or Tiny, not one sound. So we had to move forward to try and find out what happened to them and what we were up against. And of course every time we moved we got one or two of these machine guns open up on any movement on the ridge that we were on.2

Enemy machine guns firing from well-concealed bunkers had cut a swath through the lead section at a range of about 20 metres. All the wounded except one (Parker), who lay directly in front of the bunkers and was probably already dead, managed to crawl back down the hill and avoid being hit again, but Hagan’s platoon was effectively trapped on the side of the feature and pinned down. Parker’s section was now struggling against a dug-in enemy who were not going to give up their base position without one hell of a fight. Hagan was now up behind the lead elements and helping to coordinate the assault of his platoon. As the section moved off, 26-year-old Hagan recalls, ‘Danny [Denzil] Hayes was on my right. He tried to go up and he was shot through the arm and it went through his AR-15 rifle too. And the only bloke that was then left standing in my section was “Chocka” Prior.’ There was no way they could go forward, so Major John Healy decided to put in a left flanking hook by 3 Platoon commanded by Second Lieutenant Clive Williams to try to winkle the enemy out of their concealed positions. Fighting uphill against a determined dug-in enemy is only going to work if the ratio of forces is a minimum of THE GANG TOI HILLS

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three (if not six) to one in the attacker’s favour. At this point it was probably one to one. Alpha Company was not going to win this encounter. Hagan outlines the plan that Healy had given the beleaguered platoon: Major Healy had deployed 3 Platoon, round to the left. What we were going to do was keep 2 Platoon in reserve and 3 Platoon was going to do a left hook up the hill . . . and we were giving him fire support. We moved, we had to move, up to get to the crest to do anything, because we could see nothing. And every time we moved, the enemy tossed Chicom grenades.3

After reaching the top of the ridge, Clive Williams and his men turned right and had advanced about 50 metres along the plateau when 3 Platoon’s left flank was hit with a withering burst of automatic fire. They had run into another sector of the Viet Cong position. Using short sharp bursts of fire and movement, the platoon continued to attack and got to within 15 metres of the enemy machine guns. Down below on the slope of the hill the survivors in 1 Platoon could hear the firefight raging above. Williams’s platoon lost half its men on its attempt to drive the Viet Cong out of the bunkers in their brief but bloody encounter. Another machine-gunner, 21-year-old Private Peter Gillson (married with a four-month-old son), was felled in this assault on the left flank as he struggled through thick undergrowth. As he went down, two of the enemy rushed out from their position to take his machine gun. He shot them both to death at point blank range. Heavy fire now swept the area and Gillson was hit many times in the ensuing fusillade. Several gallant efforts by Sergeant Col Fawcett to recover his body were fruitless, but 136



Fawcett did determine that Gillson was dead. Fawcett would later be awarded the Military Medal for his bravery. Major Healy was faced with making the terrible decision to leave Gillson and Parker’s bodies on Hill 82, as recovery would have only cost more lives. The enemy were now determined to drive home their advantage and attack down the hill, but the Australians had withdrawn into a tight defensive perimeter and the New Zealand artillery forward observer from 161 Battery, Captain Bruce Murphy, called in a box pattern of withering defensive fire from the 105mm howitzers and kept the Viet Cong from attacking the company.4 Ammunition resupply by helicopter was now required to maintain the fighting integrity of the Australian force. Without the intrepid flying of American pilots from the Airborne Brigade’s helicopter company, matters could have been disastrous. The battle lasted a mere two hours but it was ferocious in its content and had bloodied the Australians. It achieved no great tactical or strategic advantage for either side, and in fact several days later the Americans fought an even greater battle north of this site at Landing Zone X-Ray, which has been recounted in a Mel Gibson film, We Were Soldiers. Across on the northern side of the river Song Dong Nai, as the Australian battle raged, the American 1/503 Battalion was embroiled in another heavy contact with a dug-in enemy. The Viet Cong were waiting for the Americans, who had deduced that the VC position was to their direct front. The enemy fortifications were 30 metres inside a thick treeline and overlooked an open area between two spurs. One of the American companies stayed in the open and another began moving up a spur line. An American 173rd paratrooper, James Hutchens, later wrote: THE GANG TOI HILLS

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We had moved no more than 40 yards [37 metres] into the jungle when the whole earth seemed to erupt furiously before our eyes. Staggered Claymore mines exploded all around us. Sheets of interlocking .30 and .50 calibre machine-gun fire rained down on us with deadly accuracy. The noise was deafening, but we could hear the piercing screams of young men whose bodies lay punctured and shattered all around us.5

Attacks and counter-attacks lasted for over four hours, culminating in a VC bayonet charge and savage, brutal handto-hand fighting. Incessant close-quarter artillery fire missions and fighter ground-attack air strikes prevented a rout. One of the companies was nearly overrun but a gallant assault prevented the Americans from being totally enveloped. The Americans stood firm but paid a terrible price. The casualties from this battle were dreadful. The American 1/503rd lost 40 killed and 60 wounded in action. The Viet Cong left 403 men dead on the battlefield; however, later intelligence gleaned from captured documents put the figure at more like 700, many being killed by artillery and air strikes.

Visiting the area today The Australian battle site (Hill 82) is 2 kilometres southeast of the town of Xan Cay Xoai. The grid reference is 160 240. The road to Xan Cay Xoai from Bien Hoa is neither good nor easy to follow, and I suggest that you get local advice. An Australian has erected a memorial at the site and it is well known to the local villagers. A guide is essential, as well-formed tracks do not always exist after the wet season. 138



Seek permission before entering the area from the local People’s District Committee or obtain a permit when organising your itinerary with the tour company.

Further reading First to Fight: Australian Diggers, NZ Kiwis and US Paratroopers in Vietnam, 1965–66 by Bob Breen, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988. To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966 by Ian McNeill, Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, Sydney, 1993.

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11 BIEN HOA—FSB ANDERSEN The city of Bien Hoa lies about 35 kilometres northeast of Ho Chi Minh City and during the war was host to an enormous US airbase and the adjacent logistical centre at Long Binh. The area was always a prime target for ground probes, assaults and rocket and mortar attacks. And the city was on the fast approach routes to the former Saigon and thus an important communication node for rail and other ground transport. With the noticeable build-up of Viet Cong and Main Force units prior to the Tet Offensive of January 1968, the US decided to boost the defences of the Bien Hoa–Long Binh complex. To support this development the entire Australian Task Force (comprising 2, 3 and 7 RAR battalions) was relocated to an area about 15 kilometres east from Bien Hoa and southeast of the infamous Gang Toi hills (see Chapter 10). For the first time the Australians would be operating as a task force outside Phuoc Tuy Province. It was no small deal to get this show under way and some serious planning had to be undertaken to move several thousand men and their vehicles, weapons and equipment to a site some 140



40 kilometres northwest of the base at Nui Dat (see Chapter 4). A fire support base, Andersen, and a maintenance area for the combat services support elements were also established. The village of Trang Bom, on the road designated Highway 1 in 1968 and the location of a Regional Forces (RF) post, was about a kilometre to the south. Another FSB, Harrison, was established to support the infantry operations with artillery and mortars, and a ready reaction force was positioned 10 kilometres northwest of Andersen. The role of the Australians was to deny the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army troops ingress to the area and to prevent them from setting up possible rocket, artillery and mortar sites from which they could attack Bien Hoa and Long Binh. Of the three battalions, 2 RAR/NZ (the Anzac battalion), 7 RAR and a company of 3 RAR were deployed for Operation Coburg which lasted for five weeks from 24 January to 1 March 1968, during which contacts erupted on a daily basis. At this stage 3 RAR had been in South Viet Nam for only 10 weeks.

Battle of the FSB Andersen area Operation Coburg is dissected into four phases by historians for ease of comprehension of events. Phase 1: 24–31 January; Phase 2: 1–8 February; Phase 3: 9–13 February; and Phase 4: 14 February–1 March. During the first phase the enemy launched a series of concerted attacks on Bien Hoa and Long Binh and the operation changed dramatically: instead of attacking, the Australians became a blocking force to disrupt the enemy’s approach marches to its prospective targets. Once this change of operation took BIEN HOA—FSB ANDERSEN

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place the intensity and weight of contacts stepped up remarkably, with some large contacts and clashes recorded, especially with 2 RAR. The village of Trang Bom was overrun by the VC and occupied, then they were in turn driven out a day later by elements of Australian cavalry and Delta Company of 2 RAR, during which action the RF post was re-established. When the second phase started the village of Trang Bom was again overrun and the Australians became involved in heavy street fighting as the cavalry and Delta Company again fought to clear the enemy from the village. A cavalryman, Peter Monaghan, was a liaison officer in the fortified village. He describes one enemy attack: The RF were very good, they were very disciplined and they were firing for the whole time. But in the 90 metres of defences, there was triple concertina wire loaded vertically so that you had three concertina rolls of wire. That started the defences, then it came into a minefield and then another one of those triple concertina rows and then another minefield. Then a fougasse (an incendiary napalm type of device) trench and then another triple concertina, then another minefield and then another fougasse trench, which was right at the base of the wall of the fort. After the first night . . . there were two bodies halfway up that third row of concertina. They had these little ladders that looked like a hunk of bamboo with little steps nailed to them. They would shimmy up them, leap over the wire and shimmy up again. They were NVA soldiers and both of them had little packets of what we reckoned was opium; it was certainly a drug of some sort around their neck. It was the only way they could have done what they did; they must have been as high as kites because there 142



was so much fire going out from the fort itself—there were about 100 soldiers in there. It wasn’t a big place, but there were a lot of people in there . . . and these guys just came over the concertina, through the minefield, through the fougasse and over the next obstacle. It was just incredible and I think the only way you could do that was to be in another world.1

Over this period of the operation the enemy found themselves engaged on many sides by the aggressively patrolling Australians and desperately fought to get out of the area. Some large contacts and firefights developed in and around bunker complexes and on several occasions air strikes were called in to inflict casualties and destroy enemy camps. The fighting was at close quarters and, as any infantryman who has had to do it will tell you, attacking bunkers is not a good idea unless you’re in the company of tanks. Mike Williams, a gunner who was travelling with 7 RAR, describes one bunker contact: We moved into the bunkers where we were all pinned down by heavy fire to our front. There was one main bunker with what sounded like the equivalent of .50 cal [calibre machine gun] firing at us but above our heads. The trees were falling on us as the heavy machine gun was having the same effect as a chainsaw on trees.2

In another heavy contact, the enemy—supported by 122mm rocket fire—attacked Victor Company (NZ) 2 RAR but were repulsed, with Victor Company inflicting moderate casualties. As the operation reached its third week (phase three) the bulk of the Task Force redeployed to Phuoc Tuy, as the BIEN HOA—FSB ANDERSEN

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situation around Baria (see Chapter 3) and Long Dien (see Chapter 4) was becoming intense. The 3 RAR group occupied FSB Anderson and continued to conduct operations searching for VC and NVA. Andersen was a prime enemy target as it sat astride the line of VC communications. The enemy had to either deal with the situation or concede that they had been forced away from the target they so desperately wanted to hit. During the final two weeks of the operation (phase four), there were several major attacks on Andersen. Throughout the night of 17–18 February the enemy attacked in a series of pre-planned infantry human-wave assaults, each preceded by a heavy barrage of mortar and rocket fire. On the southwestern side of the base the enemy breached the perimeter wire, but the attack was driven back by the weight of machine-gun fire from the APCs and American gunners firing their cannons over open sights. Bob McDonnell was working as the radio operator and plotter with Mortar Platoon. His recollection of the attacks is disarming: We were warned . . . [by intelligence info]. The attacks were from local force VC. The first attack was probably about company strength, supported by mortars. The enemy used RPG and heavy machine guns and ground forces. They were well trained, especially their mortars who were right on target.3

The moment of truth for every soldier comes when he finds himself face to face with, or looking over the sights of his weapon at, his adversary. It’s a moment when time seems to pause, almost as if the event is being played in slow motion. Bob McDonnell recalls this moment: 144



The initial fear was when a trip flare went off . . . It seemed to me [that I was] face to face with an enemy who wanted to kill me. I seemed to focus on him. He reminded me of my youth, when we would hold a kangaroo in the spotlight. Of course, the kangaroos didn’t hold RPGs. It is amazing what can go through your mind in seconds. The world stopped still and then all hell broke loose. For most of us this was our baptism of fire. The enemy were probably more battle experienced.4

Two nights later, on 19 February, the enemy attacked again, but the base had been reinforced with Charlie Company, 3 RAR. The attack came from the southeast this time and was preceded by heavy machine-gun fire. The enemy was stopped before reaching the concertina wire, but not before the intrepid enemy sappers hit the assault pioneer lines with rifle grenades and threw satchel charges, causing some casualties. Air support was called in to cover the gaps in the defences. McDonnell recalls: ‘I think most of us were more than a little apprehensive when the Yank choppers were brassing up the No-Go land between us and the Yanks.’5 The third and final attack on Andersen, on 28 February, was again preceded by mortar fire but was broken up by 3 RAR mortar platoon’s accurate defensive fire. The enemy withdrew east and didn’t return. Enemy mortar rounds had wounded three Australians inside the base. Following the attacks the Australians patrolling in the area discovered numerous caches of food, ammunition and equipment which were destroyed. Operation Coburg ended on 1 March when 3 RAR redeployed to Phuoc Tuy Province by road and air. Looking back, the Diggers felt that Andersen should not have been occupied as it was. McDonnell observes: BIEN HOA—FSB ANDERSEN

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The Viet Cong tactics were obviously sound. This was their backyard. I have realised on reflection that there were lots of problems with Andersen. The most glaring mistake was the fact that the base was so close to a village [Trang Bom]. How convenient for the locals to get close to the wire under the guise of begging for lollies and rations! Of course, the Aussies who were new to the country [3 RAR] were only too willing to establish good relations. Some even went through the wire, lured by young maidens. This gave the village VC all the info they required. Maybe if they had hit with a bigger force, I would not be telling this story.6

Over the five-week operation, there were 12 minor patrol clashes up to 31 January which saw 22 enemy killed. In the period after 1 February there were another 29 clashes but with company-sized groups, and some 64 enemy were killed. Australian casualties were nil killed in action and several wounded.

Visiting the area today Nothing remains of fire support bases in most locations around Viet Nam. You might find the odd berm (raised earthern defensive wall) but generally everything movable has gone. Occasionally you will find a rifle cartridge, a piece of shrapnel or a bit of barbed wire. Make sure that you don’t pick up any unexploded ordnance. Today the land where Andersen was located is farmed and official permission from Hanoi and the local People’s District Committee is necessary, as is a police escort. To reach the site from Bien Hoa take the road east to Trang Bom (now called Thong Nhat). Proceed north–northeast 146



out of Trang Bom towards Tri An Reservoir, and a couple of kilometres along the road on the left (to the north) is the Andersen site. Its location is approximately at grid reference YT 215 125; a local guide should be able to help. The map reference is taken from the 1:100 000 1 ATF Special Overprint showing all FSBs.

Further reading An Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles by Chris Coulthard-Clark, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001. Conscripts and Regulars: With the Seventh Battalion in Vietnam by Michael O’Brien, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1995. Duty First: A History of the Royal Australian Regiment by David Horner, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990.

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12 FSB CORAL AND FSB BALMORAL Under pressure from an American public outraged at the horror and losses suffered during the Tet Offensive, the US Government instigated the first in a series of peace talks with the North Vietnamese, which were held in Paris in 1968. At the same time, General Giap (commander of the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu and now commanding general of the communist forces) had ordered a second strike to attempt to take the major strategic prize of Saigon in the south, believing it would be a good bargaining tool at the forthcoming talks. The enemy’s plans for a second push were evident because military intelligence indicators showed massive enemy movements across the countryside. As well, the Paris peace talks demonstrated intense communist intractability on the issue of peace. The Australians were called out of Phuoc Tuy Province by the Allied command and positioned astride the major northwestern approach and enemy infiltration route to the South Vietnamese capital. It was a ploy similar to that used around Bien Hoa during Tet in January–February. Operation Toan Thang (Vietnamese for Complete Victory), which ran from 21 April to 6 June, was launched with 148



1 RAR back for their second tour of duty (having been the first battalion to serve in South Viet Nam) and 3 RAR who had been blooded at FSB Andersen in January and February. The supporting units were mainly artillery and the APCs which would operate in a troop-carrying and cavalry role and also stiffen up the fire base defences at night. The Centurion main battle tanks from C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, were not initially deployed as they had been in-country only a few weeks and were still sorting out their standard operating procedures for jungle warfare. The overall plan was that three areas of operation (AO) would be used, with a fire support base supporting each AO and each other. The FSBs were Coral (mainly supporting 1 RAR), Balmoral (3 RAR) and Coogee. The fighting would take place about 7 kilometres northwest of Tan Uyen (now called Uyen Hung) and northeast of what was Provincial Route 16.

Battle of FSB Coral Upon arrival at the FSB the four rifle companies of 1 RAR quickly dispersed to patrol the surrounding area. The companies were all several kilometres from Coral by nightfall.1 The ground immediately around Coral was dead flat with grey loamy soil and had been cleared of all vegetation apart from scrubby bushes and long grass. Out in the open it was hot, humid and dusty but when it rained it became hot, humid and muddy—to the point that weapon pits literally filled with water in a matter of hours. It was an ugly place. The NVA had noticed all the helicopter activity during the daylight arrival of the four infantry companies and other units and sent reconnaissance teams to check what was going on. The teams saw what they believed was a ripe FSB CORAL AND FSB BALMORAL

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target: Coral at that stage was not yet a defensive position; it was merely occupied. However, during the afternoon the gunners dug in as best they could and were still digging that night. A small bulldozer scraped earth bunds up in front of three of the northernmost cannons—which would prove to be most fortuitous. That first night at Coral, 12–13 May 1968, saw a particularly savage attack on the FSB, starting around 4 am. It was preceded by a series of signals in the form of flares and tracer bullets fired into the air in what was obviously a guide to the incoming NVA. Just before the first attack a member of the mortar platoon, who was on his second tour with 1 RAR, believed he could hear a few hundred enemy chattering only 50 metres from his platoon’s position. Then a series of flares, a mortar barrage and volleys of RPG rockets shattered the night. Suddenly waves of dark figures materialised out of the long grass in front of the mortar position. The enemy quickly overwhelmed the Australians, who fought tenaciously. Some of the mortar platoon were killed in their pits; others fought on in the long grass until they were overwhelmed by the mass of NVA sweeping over the position. None surrendered.2 The three artillery cannons protected by the dirt bunds were able to fire splintex (a large shotgun-type cartridge that fires 7200 steel darts) over their open sights, and at times at almost point blank range, at the enemy. The human waves of rushing NVA were quickly and devastatingly mown down. One cannon—No. 6—was captured for a small period of time as the NVA showered the withdrawing gun crew with grenades and sprayed the area with automatic AK-47 gunfire. It was extremely desperate inside the base. Requests for immediate air support were met: American helicopter gunships and the converted C-47 Dakota or ‘Spooky’, bristling with mini-guns capable of firing several thousand 150



rounds per minute, were soon overhead and starting to turn the tide of battle. They were guided by a fire in the artillery ammunition bay, using it as a reference point to engage the now hapless NVA who had no cover from gunfire. The infantry companies, who were a long way from Coral, could do nothing but listen to the battle. Most had contacts in the early morning with the VC who were withdrawing after the attack against the fire base. The enemy withdrew as it began to get light so that they would be under cover of the jungle before aircraft could hunt them down. Australian casualties from the night were nine killed and 28 wounded. The NVA left behind 52 of their dead, but there were scores of drag marks and body pieces not counted. Dick Crane, who was 1 RAR’s doctor, recalls the sight of the dead next morning as he approached the mortar platoon position: I vividly recall feeling absolutely ill as I saw the first dead Australian soldiers, and I started to realise at that moment what a dreadful thing war really is . . . I remember sitting down and actually vomiting from the horrendous introduction I had experienced to the facts of war.3

Following the first attack the four 1 RAR rifle companies were relocated to Coral for increased protection. The FSB was also reinforced by a troop of APCs from A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Major ‘Blue’ Keldie. The APCs would be responsible for the inner defences of Coral. The 52-ton Centurion tanks of C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, were also deployed, but with Nui Dat base being some 100 kilometres away they didn’t reach the FSB until 23 May. After the first attack the enemy had withdrawn and now FSB CORAL AND FSB BALMORAL

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they were frantically refitting and preparing for another night attack on the base, though their efforts were hampered by Australian foot patrols discovering their camps and rest areas. Sometime around dusk on 15 May the enemy started their 11-kilometre approach march to Coral. In the second attack in the early morning of 16 May the brunt of the battle was borne by Alpha Company, which was defending the eastern perimeter—almost the same position where the first attacks came in on 12–13 May. After savage fighting on the perimeter, part of Alpha Company, especially Second Lieutenant Neil Weekes’s 3 Platoon, was partly overrun and held by the enemy for several hours. The enemy were able to outflank the Australians and actually got in behind the forward pits, a situation that always makes for difficult defence. Earlier, the crews sitting in the APCs of A Squadron could tell that the attack was imminent as flares and tracer came closer to the base. One of the APC troop sergeants, Bill Shakespeare, recalls events inside the wire: The ground assaults were always preceded with a mortar attack, RPGs and thereafter small-arms fire. My APC section was targeted heavily by . . . RPG-7s, which we had never come across before [and which] had a far greater effective range. But you could tell them by the sound of the booster motor—because the RPG-2 goes ‘squirt’ and the RPG-7 goes ‘squirt’ followed by this quite audible ‘roar’ when the booster motor fires to get it closer. Fortunately none of our vehicles were hit at all. Their mortars were very good; I have got to take my hat off to the mortar men in the North Vietnamese Army. Their mortaring was quite good but ours was even better.4 152



The battle raged inside and outside the fire support base position. Neil Weekes eventually led a counterattack with the survivors of his badly mauled 3 Platoon and reclaimed the forward pits. Ammunition ran very low on several occasions and some incredible deeds were performed by several men who took on the extremely hazardous task of getting the ammo forward, sometimes by driving in an open Landrover past columns of attacking enemy and through a hail of small-arms fire and rockets whizzing past. Towards first light the attack in Alpha Company’s sector waned and most of the Diggers thought it was all over for another night. Helicopter gunships were quickly up looking for the retreating columns of NVA. Then at 6.05 am another attack was put in on the Delta Company sector in the north, when the enemy suddenly appeared out of the treeline. The attack, however, soon faded and the enemy withdrew. The helicopter gunships pounced and the NVA took a severe hammering as they tried to extricate themselves from the field of battle. Many inside the FSB wanted to go after the withdrawing enemy in hot pursuit, but the base was far too vulnerable and the chance of walking into an immediate ambush was high. Dawn broke and it was time to secure the perimeter and begin battlefield clearance. The devastation outside the wire was horrific where the splintex rounds had carved up the infantry assaults. Neil Weekes recalls: At the pit joining my platoon and 2 Platoon we found Private King, who was in a completely dazed mental state. As we approached, he jumped from his pit and pointed his self-loading rifle at me and told me to stay away—he was FSB CORAL AND FSB BALMORAL

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going to shoot me or anyone else that came near his pit. I asked him where Lance Corporal [William] Martin was and he pointed to an adjoining shell scrape and we found ‘Ringer’ Martin dead. An RPG had hit him in the chest and upper body and it wasn’t a pretty sight. Private King then told us to stay away and pointed to the front of his pit and said they were his and we were not to touch them. I didn’t understand what he meant until we crawled forward of his pit and right in front of his pit we found an NVA soldier. He had been shot at point-blank range by King through the chest and about two paces behind him was another dead soldier and to the rear was a third, again shot, apparently all by King. The second one had a homemade bangalore torpedo made out of beer cans and filled with plastic explosive.5

When the enemy attacked again on the nights of 22 May and 26 May it was almost on cue at the same time, and the American helicopter gunships and fixed wing DC-3 Dakota aircraft fitted with an array of electronically fired mini-guns would circle the fire support base. They would literally scarify the ground, putting a bullet into it in almost every square metre—if not less—as they poured enormous amounts of ordnance into the positions. Bill Shakespeare’s troop watched in awe as the American military machine swung into gear and kept the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese at bay, inflicting horrendous casualties in the enemy ranks: I had seen ‘Spooky’ and ‘Puff ’ [DC-3 gunships] and those sorts of things earlier around Fire Support Base Andersen [see Chapter 11] . . . but the helicopter gunships were just 154



bloody brilliant. They . . . were purposely exposing themselves to try and draw a bit of fire. When some unfortunate from the opposition would try and engage a helicopter which had shown its lights for a few seconds, there were other helicopters [waiting] in the wings—without lights. And it was really full on stuff.6

Battle of FSB Balmoral Balmoral was established by 3 RAR on 23–24 May after several attacks on Coral showed just how many enemy were operating in the area. Balmoral was placed within gun range and about 6 kilometres to the north of Coral. It was occupied by a company of infantry (Delta Company, 3 RAR); 161 Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery; an APC troop (2 Troop, A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment); and a troop of tanks (2 Troop, C Squadron). It was supported with a lot of artillery and air fire. Grahame O’Hearn, an RAEME mechanic with the Light Aid Detachment, was sent there for a couple of weeks: We [2 Troop, APC] were just dropped up there as basically bait—I mean, ‘You come and get us’—and we just sat up there to stir the possum. I think we had seven batteries from Coral and different American bases that were just firing on sectors of the perimeter. We got a few bites the first night we got in there. The second night they started to hit us, and then they started to hit us fairly well for about a fortnight, every second night. We had the cargo hatch up on a stick. We all had our specific job: I’d whack it as I dived down, hit the floor, close FSB CORAL AND FSB BALMORAL

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the back door; the driver would be in the seat and the crew commander was behind the guns with the hatch down. The idea was to sit out the enemy mortar attack and then throw the hatches open to await the enemy on the wire. The driver and myself would help the crew commander to link belts together to keep the guns going.7

Like the cavalry, the tanks were tasked to patrol outside the Balmoral perimeter during the day. On one occasion, Sergeant Phil Reeves was sent to assist Charlie Company, 3 RAR, who were in deep trouble in a bunker system and badly needed fire support. The whole area in which his squadron was operating was littered with defensive positions, as the enemy had been digging them to shelter in during the day in case of American fighter ground attack or aerial bombing. The bush was heavily vegetated and vines hung from most trees. Visibility was probably about 25 metres at most. Reeves says: We had found out that if we blasted enough canister around, we could go anywhere. It certainly cleared the bamboo: one canister round would open a 6 feet wide [almost 2 metre] path. Two rounds would open up enough for a tank to go through for about 30 metres. The only problem was, of course, that we had our own people . . . in there. But we found that way we could go in and extract bodies and whatever and get them out of there. Charlie were all underground in the bloody bunkers in the scrub. A tank would drive over a thousand of [the enemy] and wouldn’t even know they were there. That’s what happened and why we got into so much shit. The enemy would come out of the bunkers and climb up on top of 156



the tank. I shot six that day: three [of them] had got out and jumped up on the front of the tank and it was up to me to shoot them, otherwise they would have taken over the tank.8

The battle at Balmoral was bloody indeed. There were several major attacks on the FSB. The enemy didn’t appear to learn from its previous encounters and ground out an horrific result—not gaining the FSB position or destroying it, and losing scores of soldiers in the process. In between the enemy’s attacks, our aggressive patrolling around the FSB with mounted companies supported by tanks also cost the other side the initiative and more casualties. The overall battle was won by good defensive procedures, the inclusion of tanks in the FSB defences, and the judicious use of artillery and close air support.

Summation The constant wear and tear on the NVA forces at Coral and Balmoral (and several other battle sites) took their toll and the second offensive ground to a bloody halt. The NVA high command seemed to have complete disregard for the lives of their men, and also an unimaginative strategy for defeating the allies. In Lex McAulay’s words: ‘It was a massive blood-letting.’9 By 6 June the Task Force was back at Nui Dat, its mission achieved. The battles had been costly. There were some 36 contacts, with nine assaults on Coral. The Australian casualties there were a total of 10 killed and 28 wounded. At Balmoral the casualties were less, with one Australian killed and six wounded. Other casualties occurred outside the fire base in FSB CORAL AND FSB BALMORAL

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various engagements, with one killed and seven wounded. Enemy losses at both FSB locations totalled 205 by body count, six prisoners of war, one hoi chanh (surrendered), 90 individual weapons and 33 crew-served weapons. The majority of dead were at Coral. Later intelligence estimates and statements from captured NVA indicated that only 100 men survived from the 800 NVA involved in the attacks on Coral.

Visiting the area today The battle sites are now working rubber plantations and tappers frequent the area. The local people are very sensitive about the sites, owing to the numbers of Viet Cong who were killed in the area, especially at Coral where many enemy were buried in mass graves outside the perimeter wire during the fighting. It is essential to have the correct permits and police escorts may be provided. The local People’s District Committees are receptive to visits but will insist that visitors have the right paperwork. Without it you’ll wear the wrath of the local police, who can at times be most pernickety. This is a direct result of tourist organisations swanning into areas without approval from local police headquarters. I was detained for three hours on a trip in 2002 because Viet Nam Tourism had not processed all the paperwork for the trip to Coral, and the local police took serious umbrage at this oversight. This is a whole-day trip. Take Provincial Route 30 west out of Bien Hoa across the river Song Dong Nai to Provincial Route 13. If you are coming from Ho Chi Minh City take Route 13 northwest out of the city, and turn off to the east at Thu Dau Mot on to Provincial Route 30. The town 158



of Tan Uyen—just south of the Coral battle site—is now called Uyen Hung.

FSB Coral Today there is a large monument to the martyrs of the battles in the area; it is in the position of Coral. The craters formed by the 500-pound and 1000-pound bombs dropped by US Air Force B-52s flying in close air support still litter the area and are an indication of just how close the bombs came to the perimeter position. The turnoff to the Viet Cong monument is on the Uyen Hung (Tan Uyen) to Phu Giao road about 7 kilometres northwest from Uyen Hung (approximate grid reference XT 925 280). The monument to the Viet Cong is at approximate grid reference XT 937 291. If you intend to use a GPS be wary of readings taken under the rubber tree canopy. It is possible to drive into the old FSB site, especially in a smaller bus.

FSB Balmoral The turnoff into Balmoral is just south of the Binh My People’s District Committee office. The all-weather dirt road through the rubber into the site is quite good. The plantation is operational and large trucks are constantly moving latex to the local rubber factory. Apart from several B-52 craters that are evident as you approach from the west, there are no visible signs that Balmoral ever existed. For an accurate position on the centre of the fire base, you will have to use paces and bearings from the road to get to the centre. The grid reference for the mortar position is XT 939 293. The centre of Balmoral is believed to be at XT 936 335. FSB CORAL AND FSB BALMORAL

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Further reading For a full account of the conflict: The Battle of Coral by Lex McAulay, Hutchinson, Australia, 1988. For insight into the fighting at Coral and Balmoral: Duty First: A History of the Royal Australian Regiment by David Horner, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990 (pp. 238–42). Fighting First: Combat Operations in Vietnam 1968–69, The First Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment by Lex McAulay, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991 (pp. 46–101). Jungle Tracks: Australian Armour in Viet Nam by Gary McKay and Graeme Nicholas, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001 (Chapters 7 and 9). See also the 1 RAR and 3 RAR Battalion tour books from the period.

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PART IV CENTRAL AND NORTHERN VIET NAM Almost the entire length of Viet Nam lies between two major rivers—the Mekong in the south and the Song Hong (Red River) in the north. Each ends in a large delta that is densely populated and heavily cultivated. Lying midway between them is a narrow strip which at one point is squeezed to a mere 50 kilometres or so in width by the border with Laos. The coastal plains along this strip, whose soils are poorer than those in the deltas, rise in the west to a jungle-covered range. North of the narrow strip is the region known as Tonkin. It has high, forested mountains along the Chinese and Laotian borders in the north and northwest; Viet Nam’s tallest mountain, Fan Si Pan, 3143 metres, is in this area. From the high country the land runs down to the Song Hong delta, where the people work the rich farmlands, just as they do on the Mekong. Many Australians who fought in Viet Nam saw little of the country outside their immediate area of operation in the southeastern provinces, let alone central Viet Nam up to 161


162

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the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). But other Diggers (mainly AATTV) served in this area and, apart from variations in terrain, encountered what was basically conventional warfare involving the use of armour, artillery and airpower on a very large scale. The difference was such that a South Vietnamese infantry battalion operating in this region could expect to lose as many soldiers in a fortnight (killed or wounded) as an Australian infantry battalion fighting in the south would lose in a 12-month tour of duty. It was also in the central part of the country that some of the most bitter fighting took place during Tet ’68. The places covered in this part include several major tourist attractions, on which a plethora of information is available, as well as tour operators and guides, to assist the traveller.


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13 CENTRAL VIET NAM Central Viet Nam comprises the three provinces of Quang Nam, Thua Thien Hué, and Quang Tri, which abuts the DMZ. The DMZ was the border between the old North and South Viet Nam and was the site of many large-scale battles, each involving tens of thousands of troops from each side. To create diversity in your trip or to save time it is possible to take a train to Hué or fly to Da Nang from Ho Chi Minh City—or from Hanoi. The train trip is interesting (take your own food and water) and the air travel is on a par with any Australian airline, in modern aircraft like the Airbus (often flown by former Ansett pilots). If you’re on a long visit, I suggest taking a rail trip from Hanoi to Hué with several days R&R in Hoi An to soak up the culture, then flying from Da Nang to Ho Chi Minh City. Another suggestion is to go by train or coach from Ho Chi Minh City to Da Nang, have some R&R and then fly to Hanoi.

Hoi An Hoi An is a popular tourist resort and a great place in which to take a break during a long tour. The people are charming 164



and the town is famous for its handmade silks and linens. It saw much fighting during the 1968 Tet Offensive, but escaped damage. It has a great history and is a melting pot of many cultures from previous invaders, traders and settlers. It is situated on National Highway 1, about 30 kilometres south of Da Nang—but allow at least 50–60 minutes if travelling from Hoi An to Da Nang airport in the morning.

My Khe Beach (China Beach) Made famous through an American television series, ‘China Beach’ was in fact an R&C spot for Americans during the war. Part of a long coastal strip comprising variously named beaches, the old R&C location is called My Khe Beach and is a recreational area for both tourists and locals, with many nice hotels and restaurants and some pretty swish resorts. Beware of dangerous undertows if you’re swimming in winter, when the surf can be a trap for the inexperienced. My Khe Beach is about 6 kilometres by road from central Da Nang. It’s a good place to stop at for lunch when travelling in the area.

Da Nang This is where it all started in 1965, when the Americans first landed in strength. The first ashore were US Marines, who thankfully didn’t have to fight their way on to the beaches but were welcomed by ladies in traditional Vietnamese dress, who adorned the men with garlands of flowers. The Marines set up a military HQ just inland from their beachhead. Da Nang’s airport was to become a massive American airbase with an adjacent port facility. CENTRAL VIET NAM

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Visiting the area today Da Nang is a large modern city and the transport hub for rail, road and air travellers in central Viet Nam. It has a large trade in marble products and is the centre of a large ricegrowing region. Most people prefer to stay beachside in Hoi An when visiting the area, in order to get away from the busy traffic and ever present noise of a city at work. Refer to the Lonely Planet guide for the host of attractions in this region. The only remnants of the old US headquarters are concrete building pillars that stand forlornly under pine trees on the beach near an empty lifeguard tower. Be wary of guides offering to take you to ‘the beach’. The more knowledgable guides should take you to Red Beach. The grid reference is AT 946 812. The old airfield is now an international airport and also an operational Socialist Republic of Viet Nam airbase. No photos please! The regional military headquarters in Da Nang, on Highway 1, has a wide array of armoured vehicles, fighter aircraft, helicopters, military vehicles, cannons and equipment as relics of the American War. They are on display on the grass verge in front of the compound wall. Da Nang is served by trains, buses and Vietnam Airlines. It can be reached by car on Highway 1.

Hué The city of Hué, the former imperial capital of Viet Nam, saw some of the most bitter and vicious fighting during the 1968 Tet Offensive. At the time Hué had a population of about 140 000. It was a difficult city to defend but was 166



considered secure before communist forces overran it on 31 January; they were not repulsed until 24 February. After securing the Citadel, the NVA rounded up and then massacred many of the civilian population. The graves of 2800 people were later uncovered but another 3000 civilians were never accounted for. There is no mention of this atrocity in the War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City (see page 27). Over 50 per cent of the ancient city was reduced to rubble in the ensuing air, naval and ground bombardment used in driving the NVA out; some 116 000 people were rendered homeless. The casualties on both sides in this battle were horrific, with communist casualties estimated at 5000 killed and 100 captured, and Allied casualties totalling 600 killed and over 3000 wounded. The 25-day struggle has been called ‘the longest and bloodiest single action’ of the entire war. Three US Marine Corps battalions played a decisive role in the liberation of the city. Captain Myron Harrington, then commanding a 100-man company, remembered afterwards his apprehensions as a truck convoy transported his unit towards the battle from Phu Bai in the south: I could feel a knot developing in my stomach. Not so much from fear—though a helluva lot of fear was there—but because we were new to this type of situation. We were accustomed to jungles and open rice fields, and now we would be fighting in a city, like it was Europe during World War Two. One of the beautiful things about the Marines is that they adapt quickly, but we were going to take a number of casualties learning some basic lessons in this experience.1

The US forces were thrown into this urban street fighting with little or no training and preparation. The CENTRAL VIET NAM

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Citadel was heavily fortified with zigzag-shaped water-filled moats, formidable angled walls and channelled approaches. There were three walls to surmount in order to get at the heart of the Citadel and all approaches were covered by fire from the next wall. It was tough fighting for both sides. It is estimated that the Marines lost a man down for every metre of ground they took.

Visiting the area today The city of Hué is situated on National Highway 1 in Thua Thien Hué Province. It’s a popular tourist destination (in 1993 it was declared a world heritage site) and easily reached by plane from Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City, or on the many buses or mini-buses that accommodate tourists, or by train (the Reunification Express). There’s an abundance of historical and cultural sites (refer to the Lonely Planet guide for details), as well as the Citadel. Many visitors take a dragon boat ride across the Perfume River to the Thien Mu Pagoda and then have their tour bus meet them and take them to the Citadel. The Citadel

Look out any hotel window in Hué and you will see the enormous red flag and yellow star atop the Citadel flag tower. The Citadel was partly destroyed during the First Indochina War, so its present-day scars are not entirely due to the American War. The government is rebuilding the Citadel (slowly) and restoring elements of the old palace. Bullet and shrapnel scars are evident on the walls of some buildings both inside and outside the Citadel. 168



Many of the inner buildings have been destroyed and removed and do not give a true feeling of how the battle was fought, house to house and building to building. Only six buildings remain, but a model of the original on display at the entrance gives an idea of just how cluttered the city was inside the walls. Carry water when walking around the Citadel as it can be excruciatingly hot. It is not uncommon for Hué to be over 30 degrees Celsius on most days in the dry season. The roads leading into Hué have been widened and don’t give a true reflection of the narrow approaches, and lack of firing positions, that the attacking Marines faced. In the park across the road from the Citadel, close air support was employed along the walls. On the bridge across the Perfume River there are still bullets stuck in the ironwork, and many shrapnel and aircraft machine-gun scars.

Further reading Viet Nam—A History by Stanley Karnow, pp. 529–34, describes the battle in general and strategic terms. Battle For Hue: Tet 1968 by Keith Nolan describes the fighting in great detail.

Huong Hoa (Khe Sanh) Immortalised in Cold Chisel’s hard-hitting rock ballad of the same name, Khe Sanh was a massive battle between the Americans and General Giap’s North Vietnamese Army. It has often been described as a victory for air power and when CENTRAL VIET NAM

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one reads a little of the battle statistics it becomes evident that the Americans may well have seen Khe Sanh as their own Dien Bien Phu. In 1966 the US established a base in Khe Sanh for the Special Forces and a Marine Corps battalion. The base straddled Route 9, an old French road connecting the coast with the Laotian markets inland along the Mekong. In early 1968, just before the start of the Tet Offensive, some four enemy infantry divisions—about 40 000 Viet Cong and NVA— converged on the camp. Around 6000 Marines were deployed to fight off the attack and for two and a half months the Americans dug in and clung precariously to the barren knoll that formed the base. It became known as Operation Niagara and at one stage the military planners actually contemplated employing tactical nuclear weapons.2 In the end B-52 bombers dropped almost 75 000 tons of explosive on the hills around Khe Sanh. The base fired thousands of rounds of mortar and artillery ammunition, which was brought in by some of the bravest pilots on the planet. The fighting competes with the battle for Hué in being one of the bloodiest conflicts of the war: at least 10 000 NVA troops and 500 US Marines lost their lives.

Visiting the area today Khe Sanh, now officially known as Huong Hoa, is in Quang Tri Province. This trip is one for the dedicated history buff because, unfortunately, not much remains of the old base today. The area could best be described as a ‘moonscape’. The airstrip is still visible and the area is combed regularly by local villagers digging for scrap metal that remains from the savage fighting that took place here. 170



To reach the town take Highway 9 west from National Highway 1A at Dong Ha—a triangular road intersection is signposted. Buses travel regularly to Huong Hoa (Khe Sanh) from Hué and Dong Ha. Hiring a car and driver is recommended, however, as bus travel is very slow and the timetable is extremely ‘flexible’. The distance from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh is about 65 kilometres. For those with a GPS the following locations can be found: the western end of the base near the museum is at grid reference XD 843 417—the most accessible place today; the centre of the base is approximately at XD 852 418; and the immortal ammo dump, which was hit by a rocket, is at XD 852 417. Look to your west and you can see the dominating Co Roc mountain at XD 741 317. It was used as a safe haven for the NVA’s heavy 130mm and 152mm guns to pound Khe Sanh during the siege.

Further reading Vietnam—A History by Stanley Karnow, pp. 539–42, covers the battle. The End of The Line: The Siege at Khe Sanh by Robert Prisor is also recommended.

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14 NORTHERN VIET NAM Parts of the north were heavily attacked by the Americans during the war. In particular, Hanoi was subjected to incessant bombing by the US Air Force and the major port, Haiphong harbour, was bombed and mined by the US Navy and Air Force. The region was the communists’ power base, operational activities being directed in the main by General Giap from his headquarters in Hanoi. This city, now the capital of Viet Nam, is where the revered head of the struggle for unification, Ho Chi Minh, lived and died and is interred.

Hanoi While Hanoi is the nation’s capital, it is essentially a political bureaucratic capital—the bulk of industry and commerce is alive and well in the larger Ho Chi Minh City, the old Saigon. Apart from its size (3 000 000 plus), Hanoi is to Viet Nam what Canberra is to Australia. It’s a much quieter and more traditional Asian town than HCM City is now, and features an abundance of French colonial architecture, lakes, promenades and broad, tree-lined avenues, 172



all surrounded by market gardens and rice paddies. The commercialism of HCM City has not yet reached Hanoi and hopefully it won’t for some time to come, as it’s a very pleasant place to visit. Getting there

International airlines fly into Hanoi daily, and the train known as the Reunification Express has a twice-daily schedule from the south. It is about a 40-minute bus drive from the airport into town; the train station is almost in the centre of the city. Army museum

As you would expect, the Army Museum in Hanoi presents a biased view of the war, with a heavy propagandist display underlining the fact that winners are grinners and can write their own story. In captions and pamphlets the war is referred to as the War of Reunification, and in other places as either the American War of Destruction, the War of National Salvation or, in another museum, the Imperialist War. The United States’ allies are often referred to as puppets, but Australian veterans are advised that this is the rhetoric of dogma and not intended to be directly offensive or insulting. The forecourt and gardens of the museum contain relics of aircraft, vehicles and weapons. Captions in English and French are provided on most displays. Despite the bias evident in the museum, this is a worthwhile visit. The museum is on the street Pho Dien Bien Phu in central Hanoi. It is open Tuesday to Sunday from 8.00 am to 11.30 am and from 1.30 pm to 4.30 pm. The only NORTHERN VIET NAM

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charges are for the use of a camera and depend on the type of camera (extra for video). Expect to pay around 10 000 dong or A$1. Hoa Lo prison

Hoa Lo prison, known colloquially as the ‘Hanoi Hilton’, has a history that goes back into the early French colonial days, at the turn of the 20th century. The punishments inflicted on its occupants are best described as being the epitome of brutal oppression. Some ‘guests’ of the jail have been Vietnamese dissidents, Viet Minh soldiers and supporters, and then the Americans. The museum’s displays graphically depict the use of leg manacles, chains and other nasty devices. A torture room and its equipment leave little room for the imagination. The guillotine in the courtyard is in working condition but safely bolted. On one of the cell doors, and barely evident, is a crude calendar from the 1960s scratched by an inmate of the time. Captions in English and French are on all of the displays. The museum is on the corner of Pho Hoa Lo and Pho Hai Ba Trung in the French Quarter and is open from 8.00 am to 11.00 am and from 1.00 pm to 4.00 pm. Ho Chi Minh’s mausoleum

Ho Chi Minh’s mausoleum is the most visited site in all of Viet Nam. The tourist and visitor numbers are staggering. On the day I went there probably 2000 people were waiting to get in. For the Vietnamese it’s a pilgrimage and the site is treated with enormous veneration. Foreign visitors do not have to queue; they have a separate waiting area west of the mausoleum. An honour guard of soldiers in full ceremonial 174



dress is mounted at regular intervals and other soldiers supervise the clothing that visitors wear when entering the enormous concrete edifice. The emphasis is on propriety: long trousers or modest dress or skirt; sleeved shirt or blouse. Sleeveless blouses and tops, and sunglasses, are prohibited. The guards also ensure that no cameras or mobile phones are taken in, and no speaking is allowed inside. The Vietnamese people display great respect for their liberator and tourists should match that attitude when visiting the tomb. Next to the mausoleum is a palace assigned to Uncle Ho, which he only used for state occasions, preferring to live in a modest house that is open for inspection. Also on display are his cars, his living, working and sleeping areas, and a bomb shelter. Next door is the famous One Pillar Pagoda, which resembles the lotus flower and is a good place to cool down in after standing in the hot sun. The mausoleum is on Duong Hung Vuong, opposite Ba Dinh Square, in central Hanoi. It is open from Tuesday to Thursday, and at the weekend, from 8.00 am to 11.00 am. Entry is free. The building may be closed from September to early December to allow Ho Chi Minh’s remains to be sent to Moscow for restoration work. There may also be seasonal variations in visiting times, so check with your tourist operator or guide.

Dien Bien Phu The Battle of Dien Bien Phu, which ended on 7 May 1954, marked the Viet Minh victory over the French and is remarkable for one main reason: it is one of the few battles in history that brought a war to an end in such a decisive way. NORTHERN VIET NAM

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The French garrison, placed strategically on the Viet Minh route to the Laotian border, was put under siege when a force of 50 000 Viet Minh surrounded it. The principal weapon used during the siege was the shovel, with hundreds of kilometres of tunnelling undertaken to allow the Viet Minh to get close to their objective. Artillery positioned on the mountains surrounding the fort bombarded it for weeks on end. With the French heavily outnumbered, the fort fell after a series of savage attacks over the first days of May. The French were forced to capitulate, giving up not only Dien Bien Phu but also their attempts to recolonise North Viet Nam. The casualties from this 57-day siege were appalling, with over 8000 Viet Minh killed and 17 000 wounded in action. The French lost 2000 killed in the fighting but it didn’t end there, as some 11 000 men went into captivity and over half of them died while prisoners of war. Dien Bien Phu is one of only two places in Viet Nam where a foreign memorial has been allowed to be erected. (The other is Long Tan; see page 95.) Visiting the area today

Dien Bien Phu is the capital of Dien Bien district in Lai Chau Province and is a very remote outpost. If you go by road, plan on taking four or five days to get there, see the sights and get back to Hanoi, if that’s your plan. The route from Hanoi is via Highways 6 and 42 and can take at least 16 hours each way, but the roads can be impassable in the wet season. It’s a tiring 470-kilometre drive, so plan to stop en route for safety’s sake. There’s a good overnight stop at Son La. I recommend, though, that you fly, which you can do with Vietnam Airlines. The return airfare is about 2 million dong (A$200), and there’s a flight most days of the week. 176



Further reading Vietnam—A History by Stanley Karnow gives one of the best accounts of the battle. Vietnam, Lonely Planet’s guidebook, provides a good summary.

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Appendix 1 A CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN VIET NAM: 1962–1975

1962 6 February

3 August

1963 2 November December

178

American Military Assistance Command formed in Viet Nam. By mid-1962 American advisers increase in number from 700 to 12 000. Thirty advisers forming Australian Army Training Team, Viet Nam (AATTV) arrive in Viet Nam to assist in training Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) elements.

Republic of Viet Nam’s President Diem is assassinated in a military coup. By year’s end Viet Nam has received $500 million in aid; there are now 15 000 American military advisers in the country.

APPENDIX

1


1964 8 June 6 July 14 August 10 November

1965 January 8 March

29 April

May–June

September

AATTV is increased to 80 advisers. First Australian, Warrant Officer Kevin Conway, is killed in action. Six Caribou aircraft are provided by the RAAF Transport Flight. The Australian Government introduces selective conscription of 20-year-old males by ballot under the National Service Act.

AATTV is increased to 100 officers and warrant officers. Two US Marine battalions, the first US combat troops to arrive in Viet Nam, go ashore at Da Nang. Prime Minister Robert Menzies announces the commitment of an infantry battalion to Viet Nam. 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR) and support forces totalling 1100 men are established at Bien Hoa to serve under operational control of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade as its third battalion. Morgan Gallup Poll in Australia indicates: 56 per cent of Australians in favour of Australian involvement in Viet Nam; 28 per cent in favour of withdrawal; 10 per cent undecided. 1 RAR is expanded to a battalion group of 1400 men with the addition of an artillery battery, engineer troop and Army aviation reconnaissance flight. A CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN VIET NAM

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8 November

December

1 RAR has its first major battle in the Gang Toi hills as part of an operation with the US 173rd Airborne Brigade. American forces’ strength reaches 184 300.

1966 8–14 January

1 RAR faces battle in the Ho Bo Woods north of the vast Cu Chi tunnel complex. 23–24 February Battle of Suoi Bong Trang, west of Ben Cat, involving 1 RAR and the 1st US Brigade during Operation Rolling Stone. 8 March Australian Government announces expansion of forces from a battalion group to an independent taskforce of two battalions with combat and logistic support. April Prime Minister Harold Holt visits Viet Nam. April–May 1 RAR departs Viet Nam and is replaced by 5 RAR. May–June 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF), totalling 4500 men including 500 National Service men, is established at Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy Province. 1st Australian Logistic Support Group (1 ALSG) is established at Vung Tau. 24 May Private Errol Wayne Noack becomes the first Australian conscript to die in Viet Nam. June 6 RAR arrives in Viet Nam. 12 June RAAF provides an Iroquois helicopter squadron to support the 1st Australian Task Force. 18 August Battle of Long Tan: D Company, 6 RAR, supported by artillery, beats off attacks by 180

APPENDIX

1


October 19 November

22 December

1967 17 February

March

19 April

May

a combined enemy Main Force regiment and provincial battalion. US President Lyndon B. Johnson visits Australia. Morgan Gallup Poll in Australia indicates: 63 per cent in favour of conscription; 37 per cent in favour of sending conscripts to Viet Nam. Australian Government announces further increases in the military contribution to Viet Nam. American forces’ strength in Viet Nam reaches nearly 400 000.

6 RAR and Viet Cong D445 Provincial Mobile Force Battalion clash in battle at Ap My An. RAN provides a guided missile destroyer to operate with the US 7th Fleet in the South China Sea. 5 RAR completes its first tour of duty and is replaced by 7 RAR. RAAF provides a squadron of Canberra bombers to operate out of Phan Rang, on the coast about 250 kilometres northeast of Saigon. Morgan Gallup Poll in Australia indicates: 62 per cent in favour of the war; 24 per cent in favour of Australian withdrawal; 14 per cent undecided. 2 RAR commences its first tour of duty, replacing 6 RAR. A CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN VIET NAM

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6 August

17 October

October

November 17 December December

7 RAR and Viet Cong 3/274 (Dong Nai) Main Force Regiment clash in battle in Suoi Chau Pha valley. Australian Government announces increase in 1 ATF with the addition of a third battalion and a Centurion tank squadron. RAN provides aircrew and ground staff for a Helicopter Flight attached to the US Army (RAN HFV). 3 RAR arrives in Viet Nam and brings 1 ATF to almost full strength. Prime Minister Holt goes missing in surf near Portsea, Victoria, presumed drowned. American troop strength in Viet Nam approaches 500 000.

1968 10 January John Gorton sworn in as Prime Minister. 24 Jan–1 Mar Battle of Bien Hoa involving all three battalions (2, 3 and 7 RAR), especially 3 RAR around FSB Andersen. 30 January North Vietnamese and Viet Cong commence Tet Offensive against South Vietnamese cities. 12 February Prime Minister Gorton indicates that Australia will not increase its commitment to Viet Nam. 31 March President Johnson orders halt of bombing of North Viet Nam and announces he will not seek re-election in next presidential elections. 182

APPENDIX

1


March–April April–May 13–28 May

7–9 June November 5 November

1969 January

25 January 31 January Feb–Mar

May 6–8 June

1 RAR replaces 7 RAR for its second tour of duty. 4 RAR/NZ replaces its sister ‘Anzac’ battalion, 2 RAR/NZ, for its first tour of duty. l ATF involved in battles defending fire support bases Coral and Balmoral. Centurion tanks involved in first major battle of the war. Prime Minister Gorton visits Viet Nam. 9 RAR commences its first and only tour of duty, replacing 3 RAR. Richard Nixon elected US President. American troop strength in Viet Nam at year’s end is almost 540 000. Australian troop strength is 7171.

Peak of 8300 Australian Service personnel (more than 7000 Army) deployed to Viet Nam. Formal truce negotiations begin in Paris. American forces in Viet Nam reach peak strength of over 542 400. 5 RAR replaces 1 RAR for its second tour of duty. US Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird coins the term ‘Vietnamisation’ to cover preparation for American troop withdrawals. 6 RAR/NZ replaces 4 RAR/NZ for its last tour of duty. 5 RAR routs a battalion of 33 NVA Regiment occupying the village of Binh Ba near the 1 ATF base at Nui Dat. A CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN VIET NAM

183


8 June

August

3 September November December

1970 22 April

April 30 April

May 8 May

18 September

184

President Nixon announces the beginning of the withdrawal of American combat forces. Morgan Gallup Poll: 55 per cent in favour of Australian withdrawal; 40 per cent in favour of continuing the war; 5 per cent undecided. Ho Chi Minh dies in Hanoi aged 79. 8 RAR replaces 9 RAR for its first and only tour of duty. American troop strength reduced by 67 000.

Prime Minister Gorton announces the reduction of Australian forces in Viet Nam: one battalion of the three-battalion Task Force will not be replaced at the end of its tour in November. 7 RAR arrives for its last tour of duty, replacing 5 RAR. President Nixon announces that US and ARVN forces have attacked communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. Large anti-war protests spread across the US. 2 RAR/NZ arrives for its last tour of duty, replacing 6 RAR/NZ. First Moratorium demonstration in Australia: 120 000 march to call for an end to Australian involvement in the war. Second Moratorium demonstration: 100 000 march in Australian cities; over 300 people arrested.

APPENDIX

1


November December 1971 30 March

May 7 June

30 June 18 August

21 September 8 December

1 ATF reduced from three battalions to two by the non-replacement of 8 RAR at the conclusion of its tour of duty. American troop strength down to 334 600. Prime Minister William McMahon announces a gradual withdrawal of 1000 personnel, to take place during next three months. 7 RAR departs South Viet Nam and is not replaced. 1 ATF shrinks to two infantry battalions. 4 RAR/NZ replaces 2 RAR/NZ on its last tour of duty. Battle of Long Khanh takes place involving 1 ATF and US, Thai and ARVN forces; 3 RAR takes brunt of battle forcing the 33 NVA Regiment from its jungle lair. Third and final Moratorium march: 110 000 demonstrate in Australian cities. Australian Government announces that 1 ATF will be withdrawn before Christmas 1971 and the logistic support forces shortly thereafter. Delta Company, 4 RAR, is warned that it will stay as the last rifle company. Battle of Nui Le is the last major engagement by elements of 1 ATF against the NVA. Last major withdrawal of Australian troops from Viet Nam: 1 ATF completes its withdrawal with the departure of the last battalion (4 RAR/NZ). A CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN VIET NAM

185


American troop strength now down to 156 800. 1972 30 March

12 August

5 December

18 December

1973 23 January

26 February

29 March June 1974 January

186

NVA launches offensive across the DMZ. Delta Company, 4 RAR, departs from Vung Tau as the rearguard of the Australian Task Force elements. Last US ground combat troops withdrawn from Viet Nam; over 43 000 airmen and support personnel remain. Following election of Whitlam Labor Government on 2 December, conscription ends and imprisoned draft resisters are released. Almost all Australian troops withdrawn from Viet Nam, leaving a small Australian Embassy guard. Cease-fire agreements formally signed in Paris. Draft ends in the US. Prime Minister Whitlam announces establishment of diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam but maintains diplomatic recognition of RVN, the Republic of (South) Viet Nam. Withdrawal of most remaining US military forces from Viet Nam. Last Australian troops (AATTV) leave. President Thieu announces that war has begun again.

APPENDIX

1


June October 1975 15 March 25 March 21 April

29 April 30 April

North Vietnamese build-up of forces continues in the south. North Vietnamese begin their Winter–Spring offensive. South Viet Nam abandons all its northern provinces to the communists. Hué falls to the Communists. Da Nang captured five days later. Last defensive line outside Saigon captured at Xuan Loc. President Thieu resigns as Saigon is surrounded by 13 NVA divisions. Two days later US President Gerald Ford declares the war ‘finished’. Last American troops evacuate from Saigon by helicopter. NVA troops enter Saigon. The city falls as the final Americans leave, bringing to an end the Second Indochina War.

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN VIET NAM

187


Appendix 2 AUSTRALIAN WAR STATISTICS The nominal roll of Australian Viet Nam veterans encompasses more than 59 000 men and women. This figure includes all those who served in Viet Nam between 1962 and 1973. The following categories served during this period: 42 000 Army personnel, over 4500 RAAF personnel and over 12 000 RAN personnel. The nominal roll also includes a further 1200 people such as Salvation Army and Red Cross workers, merchant seamen, civilian employees of Qantas, entertainers, media people, civilian medical aid teams and others. Conscription

One of the most controversial and divisive issues of the war in Viet Nam for the Australian nation was National Service conscription and the use of conscripts to serve overseas in a ‘foreign war’. The Australian Army tripled in strength during the period of the war to meet defence commitments in Viet Nam, Malaysia and Singapore. Over 804 000 Australian men registered for National Service during the war. From January 1965 to December 1972, 63 740 men 188

APPENDIX

2


were conscripted. Of these, 15 542 served in South Viet Nam where they constituted roughly 50 per cent of each Army unit after 1966. Casualties

Estimates of casualties vary slightly depending upon the source but it is generally accepted that 500 Australian servicemen were killed in action (KIA) in Viet Nam or died as a direct result of war-related injuries. Of these, 478 were Army personnel (200 were National Service men), 14 were RAAF personnel and eight were RAN personnel. The total number includes six Australian servicemen who were declared missing in action (MIA) during the war; they are believed to have been killed in action but have no known graves. In addition, seven civilians were killed. Those declared MIA are: Privates Parker and Gillson, Battle of Gang Toi Hills, 1 RAR, 8 November 1965 Flight Lieutenants Peter Herbert and Robert Carver, 2 Squadron, RAAF, 12 February 1968 Private David Fisher, 3 SAS Squadron, 27 September 1969 Lance Corporal John F. Gillespie, 8 Field Ambulance, 17 April 1971.

Australian Army casualties 1962–1972 Battle casualties Killed in action Killed accidentally Died of wounds Died of injuries/illness Missing presumed dead

ARA 172 15 40 – –

NS 143 10 28 3 1

CMF Total 1 316 – 25 – 68 – 3 – 1

AUSTRALIAN WAR STATISTICS

189


Drowned Total deaths

1 228

Wounded in action Wounded accidentally Injured/ill in action Total wounded Non-battle casualties Killed/died Injured/ill Total deaths and wounded Total casualties

– 185

1140 880 92 87 79 63 1311 1030

49 426 475

15 249 264

2014 1479

– 1

1 414

6 2026 1 180 – 142 7 2348

– 2 2

64 677 741

10 3503

Note: These statistics are in accordance with those used by the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Australian War Memorial on its Roll of Honour. Australian Defence Force Casualties—Revised June 1988, attached to Defence Minute Paper DM 84/12619, SPP 515/88, 23 June 1988, copy provided by CARO. OHC. AWM. This document has been verified by all three Services and is the principal source for statistical information on Viet Nam casualties. Key ARA Australian Regular Army NS National Service CMF Citizen Military Forces (Army Reserve)

190

APPENDIX

2


Appendix 3 TOUR COMPANIES IN AUSTRALIA The Australian Federation of Travel Agents (AFTA) can verify the credentials of any tour company and what it should provide for you in the way of service. Contact AFTA at: Level 3, 309 Pitt Street Sydney NSW 2000 Tel: (02) 9264 3299; Fax: (02) 9264 1085 Website: www.afta.com.au If you want to put a tour group together and shop around for prices, there is a travel trade yearbook, published by Reed Business Information, that incorporates a directory of travel wholesalers. Contact Reed at: Level 1, Tower 2, 475 Victoria Ave Chatswood NSW 2067 Tel: (02) 9422 2999; Fax: (02) 9422 2633 Website: www.travelbiz.com.au The following are some of the better-known companies that run tours to Viet Nam. This list is not complete; there may well be others that are not shown. Owners of the latter should contact the author for listings in future editions. TOUR COMPANIES IN AUSTRALIA

191


Adventure World

73 Walker Street North Sydney NSW 2060 Tel: (02) 8913 0755; Fax: (02) 9956 7707 Website: www.adventureworld.com.au Battle Tours

2/247 Milne Road Modbury North SA 5092 Tel: (08) 8396 1955; Fax (08) 8396 1099 Email: [email protected] Website: www.battletours.com.au Classic Oriental Tours

Travel House Level 3, 35 Grafton Street Woollahra NSW 2025 Tel: (02) 9657 2020; Fax: (02) 9657 2029 Freecall: 1300 302 118 Email: [email protected] Intrepid Travel

12 Spring Street Fitzroy VIC 3065 Freecall: 1300 360 667; Fax: (03) 9419 4426 Email: [email protected] Website: www.intrepidtravel.com.au i-xplore Holidays

i-xplore are a travel wholesaler and do not deal directly with the public but can aid those wanting to organise a tour. 192

APPENDIX

3


Their major product is Viet Nam vacations and you can ask for their program through your local travel agent, particularly Flight Centre and STA Travel. Email: [email protected] Website: www.ixplore.com.au Kumuka Expeditions

Level 4, 46–48 York Street Sydney NSW 2000 Tel: (02) 9279 0491; Fax: (02) 9279 0492 Freecall: 1800 804 277 Email: [email protected] Website: www.kumuka.com.au New Horizons

Ground Floor, 1 William Street Perth WA 6000 Tel: (08) 9268 3777; Fax: (02) 9268 3727 Email: [email protected] Website: www.newhorizons.com.au Peregrine & Gecko’s Adventures

Head office: 258 Lonsdale Street Melbourne VIC 3000 Tel: (03) 9663 8611; Fax: (03) 9663 8618 Freecall: 1300 854 444 Website: www.peregrineadventures.com Peregrine also operates Gecko’s Adventures, which specifically caters for the younger set (same contact details as above). Website: www.geckosadventures.com TOUR COMPANIES IN AUSTRALIA

193


Venture Holidays

Level 9, 234 Sussex Street Sydney NSW 2000 Tel: (02) 9236 5222; Fax: (02) 9221 5394 Email: [email protected] Website: www.ventureholidays.com Venture also has a regional office in Adelaide. Tailor Made Vietnam

17 Montalbo Road Ringwood VIC 3134 Tel: (03) 9879 1030; Fax: (03) 9879 1065 Email: [email protected] Website: www.tailormadevietnam.com.au Travel IndoChina

Level 10, 403 George Street Sydney NSW 2000 Freecall: 1300 365 355; Fax: (02) 9244 2233 Email: [email protected] Websites: www.littleredbook-online.com.au www.travelindochina.com.au www.vietnamholidays.com.au

194

TOUR COMPANIES IN AUSTRALIA


NOTES Viet Nam’s Wars, 1946–1975

1 2

3 4 5 6 7

Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam—A History, p. 250 Information compiled from lecture notes by Ashley Ekins, ‘The Longest War—Australia and the Vietnam War’, written for the AWM Military History staff course Crowley, F.K., Modern Australia in Documents, 1939–70, p. 480 Interview with Bruce Davies, Ocean Grove, VIC, March 1992 Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam—A History, p. 523 ibid, p. 544 These figures were supported by Dr Duong Quynh Hoa when Karnow was researching his epic book, Vietnam—A History.

Visiting Viet Nam Today

1

Interview with Graham Brown, Ho Chi Minh City, August 2002 195


2

Interview with Robert Hansford, Ho Chi Minh City, August 2002 Interview with Stephen Campling, Ho Chi Minh City, August 2002

3

1

Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon)

1 2

Interview with Les Hayward, Sydney, January 1992 Extract from McKay, Gary, Bullets, Beans & Bandages, p. 62 Faas, Hoorst and Page, Tim (eds), Requiem—by the Photographers who Died in Vietnam and Indochina Interview with Kelly McKay, Ho Chi Minh City, August 2002

3 4

2

1 2 3 4 5 6

Cu Chi and the Ho Bo Woods; Mekong Delta

7 8 9 10 11 12

Extract from McNeill, Ian, To Long Tan, pp. 123–4 ibid, pp. 124–5 ibid, p. 125 ibid, map 6.1 p. 123 Breen, Bob, First to Fight, pp. 187–8 Extract from McKay, Gary, Bullets, Beans & Bandages, p. 142 ibid, p. 143 ibid, pp. 142–3 ibid, p. 144 Breen, Bob, First to Fight, Chapter 8 Interview with Mick Ey, Maroochydore, QLD, May 2001 ibid

3

Vung Tau and Baria

1 Extract from an interview with Dr Ted Heffernan, Geelong, VIC, 1991. An edited version of this 196

NOTES


2

3

interview appears in McKay, Gary, Bullets Beans & Bandages, p. 237 Interview with Keith Berry, Brisbane, July 1999. A full account of this action is contained in McKay, Gary and Nicholas, Graeme, Jungle Tracks: Australian Armour in Viet Nam, pp. 167–9 Interview with Lawrence Johnstone, Maroochydore, QLD, May 2001

4

Nui Dat and other sites

1

7

Bishop, Doug, Letter, 18 October 1966, Personal Records, Item E/3/3, AWM 257 McKay, Gary and Nicholas, Graeme, Jungle Tracks, pp. 134–5 Extract from an interview with B.F. ‘Mick’ Rainey, May 1999. A detailed account of this battle is contained in McKay, Gary and Nicholas, Graeme, Jungle Tracks, pp. 169–72 Interview with Gordon Hurford, Alice Springs, Easter 1998 Lauder, Peter, letter to the author, October 2002 Extract from McKay, Gary, Bullets, Beans & Bandages, pp. 199–201 ibid, p. 154

5

Long Tan

1

The first battle of consequence had been in the Gang Toi Hills involving 1 RAR in November 1965 Interview with Laurie Drinkwater, Yarooma, QLD, June 2001 Buick, Bob, with McKay, Gary, All Guts and No Glory, p. 98

2 3

4 5 6

2 3

NOTES

197


4 5 6 7 8

ibid, p. 106 McKay, Gary, and Nicholas, Graeme, Jungle Tracks, p. 158 ibid, p. 160 Buick, Bob with McKay, Gary, All Guts and No Glory, p. 114 Interview with Stephen Campling, Ho Chi Minh City, August 2002

6

Ap My An

1

Buick, Bob with McKay, Gary, All Guts and No Glory, pp. 173–5 Coulthard-Clark, Chris, The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles, p. 286

2

7

Binh Ba

1 2 3 4 5

Ironsides magazine, Journal of the RAAC, no. 2, 1983 Interview with Murray Blake, Brisbane, March 2000 ibid Extract from ‘B Squadron After Action Report’, 31 July 1969 Interview with Murray Blake, Brisbane, March 2000

8

Long Khanh Province

1 2

English, Michael, The Battle of Long Khanh, p. 26 Foreign awards were accepted by the Australian government after 1967 but not allowed to be worn with Australian service medals until the 1990s Interview with Warren Hind, Brisbane, February 1999 English, Michael, The Battle of Long Khanh, p. 42

3 4 198

NOTES


5 6

8

Interview with Warren Hind, Brisbane, February 1999 Interview with Peter Turner, Brisbane, February 1999 Further detail is covered in Chapter 9 of McKay, Gary and Nicholas, Graeme, Jungle Tracks Interview with Chris Stephens, Canberra, November 1993 McKay, Gary and Nicholas, Graeme, Jungle Tracks, p. 277

9

Nui Le

1

Sayce, R.L. and O’Neill, M.D. (eds), The Fighting Fourth Horner, David, Duty First, p. 276

7

2 10

1 2 3 4 5 11

1 2 3 4 5 6

The Gang Toi Hills

Interview with Trevor Hagan, QLD, May 2001 ibid ibid; a Chicom grenade is a fragmentation grenade of Communist Chinese origin For his actions Captain Murphy was decorated with the Military Cross Breen, Bob, First to Fight, p. 114 Bien Hoa—FSB Andersen

Interview with Peter Monaghan, Brisbane, May 1999 O’Brien, Michael, Conscripts and Regulars, p. 116 Extract from letter to the author by Bob McDonnell, October 2002 ibid ibid; McDonnell is referring to the ground between the two allied positions ibid NOTES

199


12

1

2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 13

1 2

200

FSB Coral and FSB Balmoral

The units at Coral were initially BHQ 1 RAR, the Mortar, Signals, Anti-Tank and Pioneer Platoons. With 1 RAR were HQ 12 Fd Regt RAA, 102 Bty RAA and a detachment from 131 Div Loc Bty, and further afield was 161 Bty RNZA. After the first attack and a day later all of the rifle companies were in and the APCs of A Sqn 3 Cav joined the fray. Ten days later the tanks from C Squadron 1 AR joined the FSB as did a battery of US Army 155mm howitzers. At some stage the D & E platoon from 1 ATF HQ was flown in Sayce, R.L. and O’Neill, M.D. (eds) The Fighting Fourth, p. 54 ibid, p. 59 Interview with Bill Shakespeare, Perth, May 1999 McKay, Gary, Vietnam Fragments, p. 200. For his actions at Coral 2LT, Weekes was awarded the Military Cross; his acting platoon sergeant, Bruno Flematti was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his actions on this night and on several notable occasions later in the tour Interview with Bill Shakespeare, Perth, May 1999 McKay, Gary and Nicholas, Graeme, Jungle Tracks, p. 179 Interview with Phil Reeves, Brisbane, June 1999 McAulay, Lex, The Battle of Coral, p. 322 Central Viet Nam

Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam—A History, p. 532 ibid, p. 539

NOTES


BIBLIOGRAPHY Breen, Bob, First to Fight: Australian Diggers, NZ Kiwis and US Paratroopers in Vietnam, 1965–66, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988 Buick, Bob with McKay, Gary, All Guts & No Glory: The Story of a Long Tan Warrior, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000 Coulthard-Clark, Chris, The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001 Crowley, F.K., Modern Australia in Documents, 1939–70, Vol. 2, Wren Publishing, Melbourne, 1973 English, Michael, The Battle of Long Khanh, Army Doctrine Centre, Sydney, 1995 Faas, Hoorst and Page, Tim (eds), Requiem—by the Photographers who Died in Vietnam and Indochina, Jonathan Cape, London, 1997 Horner, David, Duty First: A History of the Royal Australian Regiment, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990 Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam—A History, Century Publishing, London, 1983 Lanning, Michael and Cragg, Dan, Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of Vietnam’s Armed Forces, Ballantine Books, New York, 1992 Mangold, Tom and Penycate, John, The Tunnels of Cu Chi, Random House, New York, 1985 201


Mason, Florence and Storey, Robert, Vietnam, Lonely Planet Publications, Melbourne, 1991 McAulay, Lex, The Battle of Coral: Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral, May 1968, Hutchinson, Australia, 1988 ——The Battle of Long Tan: The Legend of Anzac Upheld, Century Hutchison, Victoria, 1986 ——Fighting First: Combat Operations in Vietnam 1968–69, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1991 McKay, Gary, In Good Company: One Man’s War in Viet Nam, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987 ——Vietnam Fragments: An Oral History of Australians at War, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992 ——Delta Four: Australian Riflemen in Viet Nam, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996 ——Bullets, Beans and Bandages: Australians at War in Viet Nam, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1999 ——Sleeping With Your Ears Open: On Patrol With the Australian SAS, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1999 McKay, Gary and Nicholas, Graeme, Jungle Tracks: Australian Armour in Viet Nam, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001 McKay, Gary and Stewart, Elizabeth, Viet Nam Shots, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2002 McLean Williams, Captain Iain, Vietnam—A Pictorial History of the Sixth Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1966–1967, Printcraft Press, Sydney, 1967 McNeill, Ian, To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1950–1966, Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, Sydney, 1993 Moore, Lieutenant General Harold and Galloway, Joseph L., We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young, Random House, New York, 2002 Nolan, Keith William, Battle For Hue, Tet 1968, Presidio Press, California, 1983 202

BIBLIOGRAPHY


O’Brien, Michael, Conscripts and Regulars: With the Seventh Battalion in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin in association with Seventh Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment Association Incorporated, 1995 Prisor, Robert, The End of the Line: The Siege at Khe Sanh, W.W. Norton, New York, 1982 Sayce, R.L. and O’Neill, M.D. (eds), The Fighting Fourth: A Pictorial Record of the Second Tour in South Vietnam by 4 RAR/NZ (Anzac) Battalion, 1971–72, Printcraft Press, Sydney, 1972 Taylor, Jerry, Last Out: 4 RAR/NZ (Anzac) Battalion’s Second Tour of Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001 Interviews Berry, Keith, Brisbane, QLD, July 1999 Blake, Murray, Brisbane, QLD, March 2000 Bourne, Denzil, Jerrabomberra, ACT, April 1999 Brown, Graham, Ho Chi Minh City, August 2002 Campling, Stephen, Ho Chi Minh City, August 2002 Davies, Bruce, Ocean Grove, VIC, March 1992 Drinkwater, Laurie, Yaroomba, QLD, June 2001 Ey, Michael, Maroochydore, QLD, May 2001 Hagan, Trevor, Yaroomba, QLD, May 2001 Hansford, Bob, Ho Chi Minh City, August 2002 Hayward, Les, Sydney, NSW, October 1991 Hind, Warren, Brisbane, QLD, February 1999 Hurford, Gordon, Alice Springs, NT, Easter 1998 Johnstone, Lawrence, Maroochydore, QLD, May 2001 McKay, Kelly, Ho Chi Minh City, August 2002 Monaghan, Peter, Brisbane, QLD, May 1999 Reeves, Phil, Brisbane, QLD, June 1999 Shakespeare, Bill, Perth, WA, May 1999 Stephens, Chris, Canberra, ACT, November 1993 Turner, Peter, Brisbane, QLD, February 1999 BIBLIOGRAPHY

203


Letters Bishop, Doug, 18 October 1966, Personal Records, Item E/3/3, AWM 257 Lauder, Peter, letter to the author, 9 October 2002 McDonnell, Bob, letter to the author, October 2002 Other sources Ironsides magazine, Journal of the RAAC, no. 2, 1983 Veterans’ Voices: An Oral History of Australians at War, Maroochy Libraries Community Project, recorded by Gary McKay, Sunshine Coast, 2001 Various official reports

204

BIBLIOGRAPHY


INDEX References to maps are in bold Adams, Garry, 72 AK-47, 43–4, 150 Allies, allied forces, 5, 24, 27–8, 33, 37–8, 45, 57, 60, 80, 99, 115, 119, 121, 149, 167, 173 American war, 2–9, 10, 28–9, 74, 131, 166, 168 see also Second Indochina War Anzac, 67, 104 Day, 20 Ap Cam My, 114, 120 Ap Gnai Gao (now Ngai Gao), 70, 122 Ap My An, 49, 98 battle, 98–101, 181 APC, see M-113 Army Museum, Hanoi, 173–4 Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN), 3, 8, 17, 30, 41, 60, 62, 74, 98, 107, 114, 178, 184–5 Popular Forces (PF), 79

Regional Forces (RF), 76, 79, 110, 112, 122, 141–2 Ash, Peter, Spr, 37 Australia, 4–5, 10, 15, 17, 21, 26, 38, 45, 50, 74, 81, 94, 101, 114, 121, 172, 181, 184 Australian Consul General, 68 dollar, 19 government, 33, 57, 94, 179–82, 185 Australian Army, units, bases and installations 1 ATF, 25, 33, 48, 50–1, 55, 57–9, 60, 65, 68, 79, 84–5, 103–5, 114, 129, 140, 143, 158, 180, 182–6 Comd, 79, 99 HQ, 85, 94 1 ALSG, 24–5, 51, 57–60, 65, 180 Armour (RAAC), 103 INDEX

205


Australian Army (cont.) 1 Armd Regt B Sqn, 104 4 Tp, 104–5, 110, 112 C Sqn, 115, 149, 151, 182 2 Tp, 155 3 Tp, 71, 116 1 APC Sqn 2 Tp, 90 3 Cav Regt A Sqn, 61, 115, 151–2 1 Tp, 122, 127 2 Tp, 155 LAD, 155 B Sqn 3 Tp, 105 1 APC Tp, 33 4/19 PWLH, 4, 33 Artillery (RAA) 1 Fd Regt, 105 Fd Bty, 33, 36, 106, 132 12 Fd Regt, 127 A Bty, 127 104 Bty, 127 SME, Casula, 38 1 Fd Sqn, RAE, 82 3 Fd Tp, 33, 36 RA Sigs, 63 161 Recce Flight, 11, 179 1 RAR, 4, 6, 26, 32–5, 129, 131–8 passim, 149, 160, 179–80, 183, 189 A Coy, 133–5, 152–3 1 Pl, 134, 136 2 Pl, 136, 153 3 Pl, 135–6, 152–3 B Coy, 33–4, 133 206

INDEX

C Coy, 133 D Coy, 33, 35, 133, 153 Mor Pl, 150 2 RAR/NZ Anzac, 67, 69, 73, 82, 140–2, 181–5 B Coy, 73 D Coy, 142 V Coy (NZ), 143 3 RAR, 95, 114–19 passim, 121–2, 140–1, 144–5, 149, 160, 182–3, 185 B Coy, 116–19 5 Pl, 115–16 C Coy, 145, 156 D Coy, 155 Mor Pl, 144–5, 159 4 RAR/NZ Anzac, 67, 114–15, 121, 183, 185 B Coy, 122–3, 125–7 4 Pl, 123, 126 D Coy, 121–7 passim 185–6 11 Pl, 121, 123–4, 126–7 12 Pl, 123–4 5 RAR, 33, 66, 105–6, 110, 180–1, 183–4 B Coy, 110–12 D Coy, 104–12 passim 11 Pl, 106 6 RAR/NZ Anzac, 11, 67, 84–95 passim, 96, 98, 100–1, 104, 106, 180–1, 183–4 A Coy, 90–2 B Coy, 85 D Coy, 84–95 passim, 100, 180


Australian Army (cont.) 10 Pl, 85–7, 89 11 Pl, 85–8, 93, 95–6 12 Pl, 85–9 HQ, 88 7 RAR, 140–1, 181–5 8 RAR, 74, 184–5 C Coy, 74 8 Pl, 76 9 Pl, 75 9 RAR, 80, 183–4 SAS, 5 3 Sqn, 189 AATTV, 5, 17, 45, 163, 178–9, 186 RAEME, 155 1 Aust Fd Hospital, 58–60 8 Fd Amb, 58, 76, 189 1 CA Unit, 5 JTC, Canungra, 117 Australian Federation of Travel Agencies (AFTA), 13, 191 Australian Vietnam Veterans Reconstruction Group (AVVRG), 12, 68 Australian War Memorial, 97, 102, 139, 190 B-52, bombs/bombers, 78, 159, 170 Ba Dinh Square, 175 Bach Dinh (White Villa), 49, 55 Back Beach, Vung Tau, 54, 60 Badcoe, VC, Peter, Maj, 59 Bade, Ken, Capt, 36 Badman, Peter, Maj, 71 Bai Sau, 54

Bai Truc, 53 Balmoral, see Fire Support Base Ban Me Thuot, 130 Baria (area), 60 theatre, 60 town, 16, 48, 49, 52–3, 61–6 passim, 70, 72, 77, 94–5, 112, 130, 144 water tower, 60 Baria–Vung Tau Province, 16, 48–51, 49, 60 Ben Cat, 31, 130, 180 Ben Dinh, village, 40 Ben Duoc, 40–1, 44 Ben Hai River, 2 Ben Suc, village, 31 Ben Thanh market, 22 Bennett, Geoff, Cpl, 108 Bennier, Barry, Cpl, 108 Berry, Keith, Cpl, 61 Bien Hoa airbase, 33, 40, 131–3, 140–1, 179, 182 area, 129, 140, 148 city, 16, 22, 51, 64, 95, 130, 131, 138, 146, 158 Province, 1, 49, 131–2 Binh Ba, 103 battle, 103–12 passim, 183 guerilla unit, 50, 106–12 passim village, 49, 52, 79, 103, 105–12 passim Binh Duong Province, 43 Binh My, People’s Committee, 159 INDEX

207


Bishop, Doug, Pte, 67 Blake, Murray, Maj, 105–7 Boeing 707, 24–5 Bourne, Denzil, Lt, 119 Bowtell, Bob, Cpl, KIA, 37 Breen, Bob, 35, 139 British North Borneo, 4–5 British War Cemetery Malaysia, 17, 37 Brown, Graham, 11 Browning (wpns), 36, 43 Browning, Robert ‘Jock’, Sgt, 105, 110 Buick, Bob, Sgt, 86–9, 92–3, 96–7, 100, 102 C-47, Dakota, ‘Spooky’, 151, 154 C-123, Provider, 26 C-130 Hercules, 26 Cameron, Bruce, Lt, 117 Camp Alpha, 26 Campling, Steve, 11, 96 Canberra bombers, 45 Can Tho, 20, 46 Cao Dai, sect, 3 monastery, 77 Caribou, CC–08, 24, 26, 55, 66, 179 Carter, Bill ‘Maps’, Maj, 73 Carver, Robert, Flt Lt, MIA, 189 Casson, MG, MID, Kevin, Pte, 126 casualties, 2, 8, 10, 35, 39, 46, 73, 77, 85, 93, 100, 104, 112, 119, 123, 125, 138, 146, 151, 157–8, 163, 167, 170, 176, 189 208

INDEX

cemeteries, 17, 52, 72 Central Viet Nam, 161–72 passim, 162 Centurion, tank, 71–2, 77, 80, 105–12 passim, 115–17 passim, 149, 151, 156–7, 182–3 CH-47, Chinook, 26, 57, 150 Charlton, VCG, John, Pte, 116 Chau Duc, 48, 128 Chicom, 37, 136 China, 10, 161, 162 China Beach (My Khe Beach), 165 Cho Dan Sinh, 29–30 see also War Surplus market Cholon District, 29 Christie, Alan, Spr, 37 CIA, 55, 62 Citizen Military Force, 58, 189–90 Clark, Chris, Pte, KIA, 35 Co Roc Mountain, 171 Cobra, atk helo, 126 Coolburra, Bill, Spr, 37 Communist(s), 3–4, 5, 7, 148, 167, 184, 186, Party, 172 conscription, conscripts, see National Service Conway, Kevin, WO2, KIA, 179 Coral, see Fire Support Base Coulthard-Clark, Chris, 101, 120, 147 Courtenay, Hill, 122


Crane, Dick, Capt, RMO, 151 Cross of Gallantry, RVN, 116 Cu Chi, area, 22, 31–2, 43–4, 70 tunnels, 21, 31–2, 39–43, 130, 180 village, 32, 40 Da Lat, 130 Da Nang airbase, airport, 165 China Beach, 165 City, 3, 162, 164–6, 187 Red Beach, 165–6, 179 US Headquarters, 165–6 Dai Lo Quang Trung, 54, 76 Dai Lo Thuy, Van, 54 Dale, Max, Tpr, 108 Dat Do minefield, 79, 83 village, 49, 52, 68–9, 72, 74, 79, 96 Warrior graveyard, 52, 72 Davies, Bruce, 6 DC-3, 154 DC-4, 25 De Vere, Ray, Capt, 105, 109 Delta, see Mekong demilitarised zone (DMZ), 49, 163–4, 186 Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRV), 1–2, 186 Diem, see Ngo Dinh Diem Dien Ben Duoc, 22, 43–4 Dien Bien District, 176

Dien Bien Phu area, 162 battle, 2, 148, 170, 175–6 memorial, 95 Dinh Co, monastery, 49, 72–3, 76–7 Distinguished Conduct Medal, 116 Distinguished Service Cross (US), 94 District 1 (HCM City), 15 Dodd, Roy, Tpr, 107–8 Domino Theory, 3–4, 6 Dong Ha, 171 Dong Nai Province, 16, 114, 121, 130 museum, 95, 131 Dong Sai, 130 Drinkwater, Laurie, Cpl, 87 Duc My, 106 Duc Thanh, village, 103 RF post, 103, 105 Duc Trung, 110, 112 Duff, Jim, Pte, KIA, 124 Duong Ba Cu (road), 57 Duong Dai Lo Le Hong Phong, 59 Duong Hung Vuong, 175 Duong Le Qui Don, 27 Duong Lo Thuy Van, 59 Duong Ly Tu Trong, 28 Duong Nam Ky Khoi Hgnia, 28 Duong Nguyen Cong Tra, 29 Duong Nguyen Do, 29 Duong Ton Duc Thang, 54 Duong Tran Hung Dao, 57 Duong Vo Than, 27 Duong Vo Thi Sau, 59 INDEX

209


Earle, Rod, Capt, 69 Embassy Guard, 186 Essex-Clark, John, Maj, 34 exchange rate, 19 Ey, Mick, 45–6 F-4, Phantom, 126 F-5E, Tiger, 27 Fan Si Pan, 161 Fawcett, MM, Col, Sgt, 136–7 Fire Support Base (FSB) Andersen, 129, 131 battle, 141–6 passim Balmoral, 12, 14, 129, 131 battle, 148, 155–60 passim Cherie, 119 Coogee, 149 Coral, 12, 14, 129, 131 battle, 148, 149–55 passim, 157–60, 183 Debbie, 122 Harrison, 141 Isa, 74 Pamela, 119 Trish, 119 Virginia, 105, 110 Fisher, David, Pte, MIA, 189 Fisher, Ian, Maj, 35 Flags, The, Vung Tau, 52, 57 Flag Square, 57 France/French, 2, 12, 32, 44, 53, 56, 95, 122, 170, 172, 174–6 French–Indochina War, 95 French Quarter, Hanoi, 174 see also First Indochina War Front Beach, Vung Tau, 53, 57 210

INDEX

Gang Toi hills, 22, 130, 131, 132–8 passim battle, 129, 132–8 passim, 140, 180, 189 Giap, see Vo Nguyen, General Gillespie, John, LCpl, 76, MIA, 189 Gillson, Peter, Pte, 136, 189 global positioning systems (GPS), 15–16 Graham, S.C., Brig, 79, 99 Grand Hotel, Vung Tau, 52 Hagan, Trevor, Cpl, 134–6 Haiphong harbour, 8, 162, 172 Hanning, Dr, Steven, 68 Hanoi, 2, 8, 14, 20, 162, 164, 168, 172–3, 175–6, 184 Hanoi Hilton (Hoa Lo Prison), 174 Hansford, Bob, Cpl, 11 Harrington, Myron, Capt, USMC, 167 Harvey, John, LCpl, 105 Hat Dich, 16, 49, 52, 78 Hayes, Danny (Denzil), Pte, 135 Hayward, Les, 25 Healy, John, Maj, 133–7 passim Heffernan, Dr Ted, 58 Herbert, Peter, Flt Lt, MIA, 189 Highway 1: 16, 46, 141 6: 176 9: 171 22: 40 42: 176 51: 64


see also National Highway; Route Hill 82: 132–4, 137–8 Hill 265: 128 Hind, Warren, Lt, 116–17 Ho Bo Woods, 21, 22, 31–40 passim, 180 Ho Chi Minh, 1, 172 death, 7, 172, 184 Mausoleum (Hanoi), 162, 174–5 Trail (Truong Son), 30, 32 Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), 15, 21, 22, 23–31 passim, 40, 44, 46, 48, 51–2, 53, 54, 68, 131, 140, 164, 167–8, 172–3 Hoa Lo Prison (‘Hanoi Hilton’), 174 Hoa Long, 52, 112 Hoi An, 162, 164–6 hoi chanh, 158 Holt Harold Memorial Pool, 59 Hong Kong, 15, 54 Horner, Dr David, 127–8 Horseshoe, feature, 49, 52, 68–9, 72, 82, 96 Hostility Truce Room, 27 Hué battle, 166–8 Citadel, 167–9 city, 3, 162, 164, 166, 168–9, 187 massacre, 167 Huong Hoa (formerly Khé Sanh), 162, 169–71 Hurford, Gordon, 2Lt, 73 Hutchens, James, 137

Imperialist War, The, 173 Indochina wars First, 1–2, 28, 32, 44, 74, 95 Second, 2–8 passim, 28, 187 Indonesia, 4, 56 Iron Triangle, 31–2 Iroquois, 27, 43, 76, 110, 126, 180 Jenkin, Daryl, Sgt, MID, 126 Johnson, Lyndon B., US President, 4 Johnstone, Lorrie, Sgt, 63 Joye, Col, 85 Junior Military Academy, 44 Kahn, Colin, LtCol, 110 Kangaroo Bar, 53 Kapyong Battle, 95 Karnow, Stanley, 7, 9, 169 Keldie, ‘Blue’, Maj, 151 Kells, MC, Graham, 2Lt, 115 Kendall, Geoff, 2Lt, 86 Khé Sanh (now Huong Hoa) battle, 169–70 museum, 171 town, 162, 170–1 Khu du lich Bien Dong, 59 King, Pte, 153–4 Kong Dai, 15 Korean War, 66, 95 Lai Chau Province, 176 Laird, Melvin, US Secy Def, 183 Landing Zone (LZ), 117–18 March, 34–5 INDEX

211


June, 34–5 X–Ray, 137 Lang Phuoc Hai, 49, 77, 79, 98, 101 Laos, 161, 162, 170, 176 Lauder, Peter, 2Lt, 74–7 passim Little Pattie, 85 Lockheed Electras, 25 Lonely Planet, guide book, 20, 166, 168, 177 Long Binh, 140–1 Long Dat, 48, 74 Long Dien, 52, 70 battle, 71–2 district, 71, 77 village, 48, 49, 73, 77, 144 Long Hai hills, 17, 48, 49, 52, 71–7 passim, 82, 98, 101 Long Khanh battle site, 52, 115–20 passim, 185 Province, 16, 49, 65, 96, 112, 119, 121–2, 127, 131 Long Phuoc area, 96 tunnels, 52, 70 village, 49, 66, 69–70 Long Son Island, 48 Long Tan area, 14 battlefield, 52, 72, 84–97 passim, 98, 103, 129, 180 Cross, 95–6, 131, 176 village, 66, 69, 84, 96 Luscombe, Brian, Lt, 66 Luscombe Field, 66–7 Lysaght Viet Nam, 68 212

INDEX

M-41, tank, 27 M-48, tank, 27 M-113, APC, 27, 41, 61, 68, 90–1, 99, 107–112 passim, 116, 118, 122, 144, 149, 151–2, 155 McDaniel, Dan, 2Lt, 123 McDonnell, Bob, Pte, 144–5 McFarlane, Ian, Maj, 34 MacGregor, Alex, Capt, 36 McKay, Gary 2Lt, 121 MC, 125 WIA, 121 McLean Williams, Iain, Capt, 102 Malaysia (and western Malaysia), 4–5, 10, 17, 37, 188 Mark 8, hose charge, 45 Martin, William ‘Ringer’, LCpl, KIA, 154 Mathers, Ian, Lt, KIA, 119 Mekong Delta, 20, 21, 22, 31, 44–7, 130 River, 22, 46, 161, 170 Meller, Barry, Pte, WIA, 93 Melrose, Doug, Cpl, MID, 126 memorial(s), 43, 52, 59, 72, 95–6, 159, 176 Mentioned In Despatches, (MID), 126 Menzies, Sir Robert, 4 Military Cross, 77, 115, 125–6 Military Medal, 71, 126, 137 Military Police, 53


Minh Dam Secret Zone, 52, 74, 77, 82 museum, 77 Missing In Action (MIA), 76, 189, Monaghan, Peter, Lt, 142 Moratorium marches, 184–5 Morgan Gallup Poll, 179, 181, 184 Moscow, 175 Murphy, Bruce, Capt, 137 Murphy, ‘Spud’, Sgt, 62 My Khe Beach (formerly China Beach), 165 My Lai, massacre, 27 My Tho, 22, 46–7, 130 National Defence Sports Shooting Range, Cu Chi, 42 National Highway 1: 16, 165–6, 168 1A: 171 51: 79 56: 112 see also Highway; Route National Liberation Front (NLF), 3, 7–8, 39, 44, 60 National Service, 74, 188, 190 Act, 179 men, 25, 66, 86, 93, 180, 189 Navy Cross, (USN), 126 New Zealand Army, units, 104, 132, 143 161 Battery, 84–5, 132, 137, 155 Ngai Giao (formerly Ap Ngai Giao), 48

Ngo Dinh Diem, 2–3, 178 Nguyen Van Thieu, General, 94, 186–7 Nha Sach, 15 Noack, Errol Wayne, Pte, KIA, 180 Nolan, Keith, 169 Nolen, Brett, WO2, 82 North Viet Nam, 3, 6–7, 176–82 passim North Vietnamese Army (NVA), soldiers/units, 3, 8, 17, 32, 116, 121, 123–4, 129, 142–4, 150–60 passim, 167, 169–70, 182, 186 325th Div, U1 HQ, 132 33 NVA Regt, 104, 123, 127, 183, 185 1 Bn, 106 2 Bn, 123 3 Bn, 114, 117, 123, 125 Northern Viet Nam 161, 162, 172–7 passsim Nui Chau Vien, 76 Nui Dat, 11, 25–5, 49, 52, 54–5, 57, 62, 65–70 passim, 72, 84–5, 90–1, 103–5, 112, 126, 140, 151, 157, 180, 183 village, 67–8 Nui Dat Two, 72, 84, 87 Nui Dinh, mountains, 48, 78 Nui Le area, 121 battle, 52, 122–7 passim, 185 feature, 12, 121–4, 127 INDEX

213


Nui Thi Vai, mountains (aka Warburtons), 48, 54 O’Brien, Michael, 147 O’Hearn, Grahame, Cpl, 155–6 O’Neill, M.D., Lt, 120, 128 O’Reilly, Pat ‘Blue’, Sgt, 90–1 O’Sullivan, MM, Mick, Cpl, 126 One Pillar pagoda, 175 Operation Bribie, 99, 102 Coburg, 129, 141, 145 Crimp, 33–4, 38 Hammer, 104–12 passim Hammersley, 77 Hardihood, 66, 84 Hump, 132 Ivanhoe, 122 Niagara, 170 Overlord, 114–20 passim Rolling Stone, 180 Thoan Thang (Complete Victory), 148 Vendetta, 85 Parallel, 17th, 2, 10, 49 Parker, ‘Tiny’, Pte, 134–5, MIA, 137, 189 Paris, peace talks, 148, 183,186 Payne, DCM, Robert, 116 Perfume River, 168–9 permits, 14, 67–9, 95, 112, 120, 127, 139, 146, 158 see also police people’s (district) committees, 14, 120, 139, 146, 158 214

INDEX

Peter Badcoe Club, The (Vung Tau), 51, 59 Phan Rang, 22, 130, 181 Philippines, 5, 15 Pho Dien Bien Phu (street), 173 Pho Hai Bai Trung, 174 Pho Hoa Lo, 174 photography, 18, 26, 51, 131, 166, 174 Phu Bai, 167 Phu Giao, 159 Phu My, 48, 79 Phuoc Buu, 48 Phuoc Hai, coast, 77 Lang (village), 49, 77, 79, 98, 101 Phuoc Le (Baria), 60 Phuoc Tuy, Province, 16, 41, 49–50, 65, 78–9, 98, 104, 114, 122, 126–7, 140, 143, 145, 148, 180 Phuong Phu Nui Dat Kindergarten, 68 police (cahn sat), 14, 67–9, 95–6, 112, 146 Preece, Alex, LtCol, 34–5 Presidential Palace, 22, 28 see also Reunification Palace Presidential Unit Citation, US, 94 Prior, ‘Chocka’, Pte, 135 Provincial Route 2: 65 56: 51 764: 16 see also Routes


‘Puff the Magic Dragon’, aircraft, 154 Qantas, 24–5, 188 Quang Nam Da Nang Province, 162, 164 Quang Tri Province, 162, 164, 170 Quoc Lo Sia, road, 55 RAAF, 5, 11, 24, 55, 66, 76, 89, 92, 110–11, 116–17, 126, 180–1, 188–9 units, TFV, 6, 55, 179 2 Sqn, 6, 181, 189 9 Sqn, 5, 55, 76, 89, 110–11, 116, 180 35 Sqn, 25, 55 Radio Research Unit, 34 RAF, 24–5 Rainey, Mick, Cpl, 71–2 RAN, 5, 56–7, 181–2, 188–9 CDT, 6, 45–6 HFV, 6, 182 HMAS Sydney, 56 Red Beach, Da Nang, 165 Red Cross, 188 Red River, 162 Reeves, Phil, Sgt, 156 Republic of Viet Nam (RVN), 2, 4, 23, 186 Rest and Convalescence (R&C) centre, 57, 59 leave, 57, 59, 165 Rest and Recuperation leave, 23, 59, 164

Reunification Express, train, 168, 173 Reunification Palace 22, 27, 29 see also Presidential Palace Reunion Island, 56 Revolutionary Museum, 22, 28 Richmond, Jim, Pte, WIA, 93–4 road fatalities, 18 Roberts, Adrian, Lt, 90 Rodriguez, Lt, USMC, Navy Cross, 126 Route (provincial) 2: 16, 51, 65, 70, 78, 103, 105, 108, 112, 114, 122 9: 170 13: 158 16: 149 22: 24 30: 158 56 (N): 103,112 761: 70, 72–3, 77 764: 16, 78–9, 95, 103, 112, 122, 127 766: 70, 73, 77, 95, 101 991 toll road: 64, 77 see also Highway; Provincial Route RPG, 71, 75, 93, 105, 107–10, 116, 118, 122–4, 144–5, 150, 152–4 Russia, 30, 54 Sabben, David, 2Lt, 86, 88 Saigon, 2, 11, 21, 23–30 passim, 32–3, 38, 40, 55, 78, 140, 148, 172, 181 INDEX

215


Saigon (cont.) fall of, 187 see also Ho Chi Minh City Saigon Tourist, company, 15 Sayce, R.L., Capt, 120, 128 Scott, Bruce, Pte, WIA, 80–1 SEATO, 4, 6 Second Indochina War, see Indochina wars Second World War, 1, 25, 58, 167 Shakespeare, Bill, Sgt, 152, 154 Sharp, Gordon, 2Lt, KIA, 86 Shore Patrol, 53 Singapore, 15, 188 Skyraider, 27 Smith, Harry, Maj, 85–6, 88, 92–3 Snoopy, fire support aircraft, 76 see also Spooky Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (SRV), 95 Air Force, 166 Army, 68 Navy, 55 Song Be, 132–3 Song Dinh (river), 78 Song Dong Nai, 132, 137, 158 Song Han Giang, 46 Song Hong, 161 Song Sai Gon, 31, 33, 43–4, 54 Song Tien Gang, 46 Song Thi Tinh, 31 Son La, 176 South China Sea, 22, 56, 130, 181 South Korea, 5 216

INDEX

South Vietnamese Air Force, 26 government, 29, 51, 94 souvenirs, 17 Spinkston, Graham, 2Lt, 123 Spooky, aircraft, 151, 154 Stephens, Chris, Lt, 118 Stevens, R.W., 27 Street of Bars, Vung Tau, 52, 57 Strikemaster, 27 Sullivan, Brian, 2Lt, 105, 108 WIA, 109 Suoi Bong Trang, battle, 180 Suoi Chau Pha river, 48, valley, 16, 78, 182 Suoi Da Bang, 84–5, 90 Sweeney, Chris, 2Lt, 104–5 Sydney Bar, 53 tank, see Centurion Tan Son Nhut, airport, 18, 22, 24–6, 55 Tan Thanh, 48, 79 Tan Uyen (now Uyen Hung), 149, 158–9 Tay Ninh, 130 Taylor, MC, Jerry, Maj, 125, 128 Terendak Cemetery, 17, 37 Tet (1968) First Offensive, 7–8, 23, 26, 60, 63, 70, 129, 140, 148, 163, 165–6, 170, 182 Second Offensive, 148–60 passim Thailand, 5 Royal Thai Army, 15, 114, 185


Thanh Thai, King, 56 Thien Mu Pagoda, 168 Thieu, see Nguyen Van Thieu Thong Nhat (Trang Bom), 146 Thu Dau Mot, 158 Thua Tien Hue Province, 162, 164, 168 Tiger Cages, 28 Tingley, Roger, 2Lt, 62 Tonkin, 161 tour companies, 13, 162, 192–4 Townsend, Colin, LtCol, 92, 99–100 Townsend, Ed ‘Wingy’, Pte, 134–5 Tran Do, General, 7 Tran Van Tra, General, 7 Trang Bom (Thong Nhat), 141–2, 146–7 travel agencies and companies, see tour companies Tri An Reservoir, 147 Tu Do Street, 15 tunnels, 31–42, passim see also Cu Chi; Long Phuoc Turner, Peter, Cpl, 118 unexploded ordnance (UXB), 17 United States, 2–4, 6–8, 15, 27, 44, 173, 184 Air Force, 109, 159, 172 ambassador, 24, 27 Army, units, 5, 30, 92, 114, 132, 182, 186 25th Inf Div, 39 1st Inf Bde, 180 3rd Inf Bde, 34

1/503rd Bn, 133, 137–8 3 Cav Bde, 2/8 Bn, 115 173rd Airborne Bde (Separate), 4, 33–4, 129, 132, 137, 179–80 Special Forces, 45, 170 36th Med Evac Hosp, 93 dollar, 19 embassy, 24, 27 government, 148 Navy, 126, 172 7th Fleet, 6, 181 SEAL units, 44 USMC, 45, 126, 165, 167–70, 179 President, 4, 94 USMACV, 149, 178 Uyen Hung (formerly Tan Uyen), 149, 158–9 veterans, 11–12, 15, 51, 57, 77, 95–6, 173, 188 Veterans Affairs Department, 12, 190 Vientiane, 162 Viet Cong, units, 6, 8, 30–1, 34, 50–1, 60, 66, 71, 78–9, 85, 91, 98–9, 104, 129, 131, 137–8, 140, 144–6, 150–60 passim, 170, 180, 182 Saigon–Cholon–Gia Special Sector committee, 33 Special Sector headquarters, 35 5th VC Div, 93 D445 Bn, 50, 68, 77, 93, 98–9, 114–18 274 VC Regt, 93, 119, 182 INDEX

217


Viet Cong, units (cont.) 275 VC Regt, 93 9th VC Div 271 VC Regt, 134 D800 MF Bn, 133 Phu Loi Bn, 32 Q762 Regt, 133 Binh Ba District Coy, 50 Binh Ba Guerrilla Unit, 106 Chau Duc Guerrilla Unit, 50 soldiers, 6, 17, 35, 45, 58, 63, 86 Viet Minh, 1–2, 32, 74, 148, 174–6 Viet Nam Airlines, 166, 176 Viet Nam Cong Sam (Viet Cong), 3, 92–3 see also memorial(s) Viet Nam Tourism, 14, 127, 158 Vietnamisation program, 183 Vinh Loi, 130 Vo Nguyen Giap, General, 148, 169, 172 Vung Tau, area airbase, 11, 25, 49, 55 City, 22, 48, 49, 51–60 passim, 64–5, 93–5, 130, 180, 186 District, 48, 55, 131 Harbour and bay, 49, 56–7 peninsula, 52, 58, 77

218

INDEX

War Crimes Museum, 27 War of Destruction, The American, 173 War of National Salvation, 173 War Remnants Museum, aka War Atrocities Museum, 22, 24, 27–8, 167 War of Reunification, 173 War Surplus market, 18, 29–30 see also (Cho Dan Sinh) Warburtons or ‘Warbies’, 54 see also Nui Thi Vai Weekes, MC, Neil, 2Lt, 25–6, 152–3 White Villa (Bach Dinh), 49, 51, 55–6 Williams, Clive, 2Lt, 135–6 Wilson, George, Spr, 36–8 Wilson, Merv, Pte, KIA, 35 Witcombe, John, LCpl, 117 World War Two, see Second World War Xa Bang, 122, 127 Xan Cay Xoai, 138 Xuan Loc, 187 Xuyen Moc, 48, 69 Yersin St, 29

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