ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regiona...

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued almost 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

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Asean’s Myanmar

Crisis Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community Christopher Roberts

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore

First published in Singapore in 2010 by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: © 2010 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies or respective copyright holder. The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publisher or its supporters. ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Roberts, Christopher B. ASEAN’s Myanmar crisis: challenges to the pursuit of a security community. 1. ASEAN 2. National security—Southeast Asia. 3. ASEAN countries—Strategic aspects. 4. ASEAN countries—Foreign relations—Burma. 5. Burma—Foreign relations—Burma. I. Title. JZ5333.5 A9R64 2010 ISBN 978-981-4279-24-6 (soft cover) ISBN 978-981-4279-36-9 (hard cover) ISBN 978-981-4279-37-6 (E-book PDF) Cover photo (top):

Entrance to the prestigious Defence Services Academy located west of Pyin Oo Lwin (formerly Maymyo) along the Mandalay-Lashio Road (Highway 3). Cover photo (bottom): One of three similar signs situated along the fortified walls of Mandalay Palace. Both cover photos were taken by the author. Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Utopia Press Pte Ltd


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Reproduced from ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community, by Christopher Roberts (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at

CONTENTS List of Tables and Figures

vii

Preface

ix

Acknowledgements

xi

Abbreviations and Glossary

xiii

Introduction

xv

1.

A Contemporary Application of Security Community Frameworks

1

2.

Developing a Defendable Framework: The Processes behind the Emergence of a Security Community

27

3.

The Evolution of Domestic Instability and its Extent in Myanmar

52

4.

ASEAN Security in Myanmar’s Shadow

79

5.

Myanmar’s Membership in ASEAN: Historical and Contemporary Implications

107

6.

Myanmar and Elite-Level Cohesion: A Case of Irreconcilable Dichotomies?

141

7.

Integration Absent Community? Regional Challenges, Collective Responses and Domestic Opportunities

178

8.

ASEAN’s Myanmar Crisis: The Road Ahead and the Prospects for a Security Community

216

v


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vi

Contents

Selected Bibliography

241

Index

254

About the Author

268


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LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 7.1

Security Sector Reform Levels and Objectives Ceasefire and Non-Ceasefire Insurgent Groups in Myanmar Select List of Proposals Contained in the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action

39 65 182

Figures Figure 1.1 Figure 1.2 Figure 1.3 Figure 2.1 Figure 2.2 Figure 2.3 Figure 3.1 Figure 3.2 Figure 3.3 Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure

3.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 7.1 7.2 7.3

Conceptual Framework to a Security Community The Security Dilemma at Low Integration Amended Security Community Structuralization From Identification to Competition and Conflict The Internal Consolidation of the State The Interrelationship of the Economic and Security Environment Chemical Weapons Attack Site at Kawmura The Nyaung Shwe Township “Police Station” Comparative Strength of the Largest Armed Minority Groups Illegal Cross-Border Cattle Station Thailand’s Mae Lah Refugee Camp HIV/AIDS Prevalence Rates in Select Countries Opium Production in Myanmar Myanmar’s Major Import and Export Partners Victims of Cyclone Nargis Rice “Allegedly” Delivered by Aid Agencies The National League for Democracy Office in Hsipaw

5 9 15 33 36 40 60 64 66 68 81 82 83 94 188 190 197

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List of Tables andContents Figures

Figure 7.4 Welcome Message at Mandalay Palace Figure 8.1 Sanctions, Isolation and the Domestic Instability Cycle Figure 8.2 ODA Per Capita in the CLMV Countries and Timor Leste


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PREFACE In October 2003, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) proposed the establishment of a security community for Southeast Asia by 2020. This proposal, if successful, will involve the implementation of a substantial level of integration in the security, economic, and sociocultural spheres of the ASEAN member states. As reflected by the scholarly literature on a security community, the outcome of such integration would be the establishment of a “secure” region where the Southeast Asian states (and the communities they embrace) would reflect the degree of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation witnessed by (perhaps arguably) the nascent security community of the European Union (EU). No country in Southeast Asia challenges the emergence of this security community in the region more than Myanmar, a country that has been plagued by the consequences of instability and poor governance for over half a century. Furthermore, and despite considerable pressure and attention by the international community, Myanmar’s economy continues to slide into ruin, the generals remain in power, and the ethnic minority groups are subjected to human rights abuses. These circumstances have contributed to, and been caused by, the long period of instability that Myanmar has endured, instability that continues to test the comprehensive security environment of Southeast Asia. Examples of these transnational effects include the multifaceted consequences of large-scale narcotics production and, at least until recently, the occurrence of armed conflict along Myanmar’s territorial boundary with Thailand because of armed border incursions. Equally important has been the challenge that Myanmar presents to the operative norms of ASEAN. Twelve years of “constructive engagement” by ASEAN has done little to alleviate the situation, and recent events concerning Myanmar (for example, the potential chairmanship of ASEAN) have seen various ASEAN elites, at a multitude of levels, directly or indirectly, challenge the continued applicability of ASEAN’s non-interference principle. The desire by some states and elites to modify the operative norms of ASEAN has, in turn, contributed to a growing fissure between ix


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Preface

the more democratic ASEAN members and those that are relatively more conservative and authoritarian in nature. Nonetheless, and as this case study will substantiate, ASEAN will need to resolve these divisions in identity should the organization wish to tackle its “Myanmar crisis” successfully and thereby move ahead in its pursuit of a security community.


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am deeply indebted to the Endeavour Australia Cheung Kong Award and the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Australian Defence Force Academy (University of New South Wales) for their generous financial support of my research between 2004 and 2007. Without this support, none of the research for this book would have been possible. My research was also significantly aided by the kind hospitality provided by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) during my seven-month stay there as a visiting associate, and by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) during my sixteen-month stay there as a visiting associate, followed by a twelve-month appointment as a post-doctoral fellow. In this regard, I would like to thank both Ambassador Kesavapany and Ambassador Desker for their kind hospitality and invaluable assistance. I would also like to thank the University of Canberra for providing the time and resources for me to complete the manuscript. Furthermore, during my time in Singapore, the never-ending guidance and support of a number of colleagues particularly stand out. These individuals include, but are not limited to, Premarani Somasundram, Dr Joseph Liow, Dr Ralph Emmers, Dr Mely CaballeroAnthony, S.P. Harish, Manjeet Singh Pardesi, Dr Li Nan, Dr Tan See Seng, Elena Pavlova, Dr Hiro Katsumata, and especially, Sng Seow Lian, Dr Leonard Sebastian, and Dr Deborah Elms. Many others in Southeast Asia, Australia, and beyond have also been of considerable assistance and help over the years (professionally and/or personally) and these include, but again are not limited to, Professor Don McMillen and Associate Professor Peter Wicks (my MA supervisors), together with Dr Bantarto Bandoro, Colonel Jojo Cenabre, Dr Sanong Chinnanon, Major General Supaluck Suvarnajata, Ekapong Rimcharone, Dr Stephen Leong, Nguyen Nam Duong, Noel Choong, Richard Gehrmann, Bob Lowry, Shirley Ramsay, Marilyn Anderson-Smith, Bernadette McDermott, Sandra Mason, Fiona Cotton, Dr Craig Stockings, and especially, Dr Andrew Tan, Professor Peter Dennis, Dr Robert Campbell, and John McFarlane. A very special thanks also go to Professor Desmond xi


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Acknowledgements

Ball for guiding me on a four-week fieldtrip along the Thai-Myanmar border and Jason Burning for providing excellent research assistance during his three-month stay at RSIS. I would also like to thank the many people who have not been named, or whom it is inappropriate to name (that is, those in Myanmar), but who have nevertheless freely provided me with their valuable time and advice throughout my studies. Last, but by no means least, I would like to thank my Ph.D. supervisor, Professor James Cotton, for his continued patience, inspiration, guidance, editorial comment, and invaluable insight in the preparation of my Ph.D. together with this work. Should I eventually become half the scholar that he is, I will be more than satisfied.


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ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY AIPMC AMM APA APEC ARF ASEAN ASEM BCP CLMV DKBA EAS ERAT EU FDI ILO IO KNU NAM NDSC NGO NLD OCHA ODA R2P SLORC SIT SOM SPDC Tatmadaw TCG

ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus ASEAN Ministerial Meeting ASEAN People’s Assembly Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meeting Burmese Communist Party Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam Democratic Karen Buddhist Army East Asia Summit Emergency Rapid Assessment Team European Union Foreign Direct Investment International Labour Organization International Organization Karen National Union Non-Aligned Movement National Defence and Security Council Non-Governmental Organization National League for Democracy UN’s “Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs” Official Development Aid “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine in the United Nations State Law and Order Restoration Council Social Identity Theory Senior Officials Meeting State Peace and Development Committee The Myanmar “army” Tripartite Core Group xiii


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xiv

UN UNGA UNSC USDA UWSA


Abbreviations and Glossary

United Nations United Nations General Assembly United Nations Security Council Union Solidarity and Development Association United Wa State Army

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Introduction

On 7 October 2003, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), at the 9th ASEAN Summit, formally proposed the establishment of a security, economic, and socio-cultural community.1 As will be demonstrated, the proposal to erect these three pillars reflects the academic literature on the concept of a “security community” and the requirement that such a community can only exist when the states of the community no longer envisage war as a foreseeable possibility.2 In order to ensure such behaviour however, it is necessary for Southeast Asia to develop the kind of structures, norms, values, and sense of community that have been witnessed in the European Union (EU). Given the ethnic, religious, and political diversity of the region, achieving this end will be no easy feat. While Southeast Asia, because of this diversity, suffers from destabilizing dynamics in several of its countries, no ASEAN member is as unstable and challenging to ASEAN’s goals as Myanmar.3 Recent events, such as the violent crackdown against protesting monks in 2007, the Myanmar Government’s poor response to the humanitarian crisis that followed Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi in connection with an “alleged” breach of house arrest rules in 2009, have only served to reinforce international concern about the crisis in governance that Myanmar faces. In the context of ASEAN, the challenge of Myanmar has also been highlighted through a sustained and sometimes brutal critique of the inability of the Association to address and overcome the excessive degree of human insecurity throughout the country (and beyond) together with its transnational consequences. While such criticism has come from all quarters including Western governments and scholars, it has been strongest from the press, human rights activists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and a small, but vocal group of parliamentarians within ASEAN itself. The continued inability of ASEAN to resolve the crisis in Myanmar has added fuel to more broad sweeping derision over the failure to either mitigate xv

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significantly, or resolve, a broad range of traditional and non-traditional security challenges. More specifically, concern over ASEAN’s acceptance of Myanmar as a member state and its continued support for the junta in power has also damaged ASEAN’s stature as a diplomatic community on the world stage.4 Zaid Ibrahim, the Malaysian parliamentarian who spearheaded the drive for an Inter-Parliamentary Caucus to pressure both ASEAN and Myanmar over the latter’s domestic instability and human rights violations summarizes a large proportion of the criticism against ASEAN in the following manner: [The] ASEAN governments have for too long remained aloof from … [challenges in the region] … and preferred to take to the sidelines under the pretext of the so-called principle of ‘non-interference’. ASEAN lacks the necessary mechanisms for making the grouping more united and having common policies on such urgent issues … [as Myanmar] … and the elected representatives of the people strongly feel that the time has come for them to play a pro-active role at a regional level.5

Despite these comments, the question of how effective and meaningful ASEAN is in maintaining stability within the security architecture of Southeast Asia remains a deeply contested issue. In truth, scholarly literature has been swamped by a spectrum of opinions ranging from those which enthusiastically and almost unquestionably endorse ASEAN as a near perfect regional model for Southeast Asia at one end,6 to unmasked cynicism and contempt from scholars (usually Western) for what they perceive to be the organization’s failures at the other.7 On the issue of Myanmar itself, an even more polarized divide has emerged among academics who analyse the subject. Because of this, there has been very little by way of critical analysis that can objectively be considered to sit between the two poles of the divide. Exacerbating this fissure is a tendency either to avoid the “controversial” aspects of the debate, or to account for published opinion through the discussion of an incomplete range of issues that will favour the particular pole where one sits. Those that do attempt to provide scholarly analysis — whether objective or otherwise — have become the subject of emotive, sometimes ill-considered and uninformed, attacks against any and all such opinion.8 So heated has the issue become that some scholars actively deter others from researching the topic out of concern that expressing an opinion on the issue “will earn you the wrath of many no matter what you say”.9 Consequently, a review of the many scholarly articles, monographs, and books on the topic — as cited throughout this publication — would reveal that those articles in support of engagement contain little by way of a discussion on the range of


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xvii

human rights abuses that occur in the country on a daily basis. At the other end of the spectrum, the publications that do address human rights abuse in Myanmar (commonly works by NGOs) are — with only a few exceptions10 — highly selective in their analysis and fail to consider viable solutions that take into account the capacity of the state.11 For the purpose of addressing these concerns, the analytical framework of this study is designed to consider the interdependent nature of the material and normative components of a security community.12 At one level, this includes a consideration of how material factors such as narcotics, ethnic conflict, human rights abuse, and general instability can affect bilateral relations, ASEAN, and, therefore, the potential for a security community (the security aspect of the theory). At another level, this analysis seeks to delineate how these long-term comprehensive security challenges, in combination with the normative nature of Myanmar’s so-called rogue government, impact on the normative behaviour and the formation of collective identity in the ASEAN elite (the community aspect of the theory). As will be seen, both the material and normative facets of the analysis are necessary for an assessment of the manner and extent to which Myanmar will challenge the realization of an ASEAN security community (in theory and in practice). Moreover, and in order to equip the reader with at least some insight as to how these challenges might be best overcome, it is also necessary to consider the historical processes that contributed to their emergence. The study, therefore, has a bottom-up approach where the complexity and multidimensional nature of both the framework and ASEAN’s Myanmar crisis, together with a consideration of the many contemporary issues and dilemmas presented by the country, provide a valuable opportunity to contribute to the knowledge in the field. Finally, this analysis aims to give some important insights on the level of cooperation, integration, and mutual understanding necessary should ASEAN truly desire bona fide normative and structural change by 2015.13 In order to achieve the goals of the investigation, the book has been segregated into eight interdependent chapters. The first and second chapters refine the boundaries of analysis by elaborating and developing the concept of a “security community”. More specifically, the first chapter explains and clarifies the conceptual components of a security community in a manner that renders the framework more falsifiable. In building on these considerations, Chapter 2 considers the likely processes that would contribute to the emergence of a security community, including the role of norms, socialization, social identity theory, and the “internal consolidation of the state”. Chapter 3 applies one level of the conceptual framework through an historical review that outlines some of the major factors that have contributed to domestic


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Introduction

instability in Myanmar. Based on these considerations, the next section in the chapter outlines the human rights situation in the country, together with examples of how the government has responded to domestic instability, including the implementation of a ceasefire regime. Chapter 4 considers some of the transnational consequences of instability in Myanmar. The first section reviews the material impact of Myanmar in exacerbating the transnational issues of HIV/AIDS, refugees, illegal migrants, human trafficking, and illicit drugs. The second section considers the manner by which long-term instability, together with its transnational consequences, has been reinforced through a series of key strategic partnerships. China and Thailand have been selected as the two major case studies as they represent examples of bilateral partnerships that potentially challenge ASEAN at both the intramural and extramural levels. Chapter 5 more significantly focuses on the ideational level of analysis (the “community” component of a security community) and provides an historical synopsis of the consequences of Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN. The chapter then considers more contemporary challenges to regional cohesion, including the ASEAN “chairmanship crisis” in 2005. Chapter 6 continues to consider how Myanmar has affected regional cohesion and the development of a “community of states”. The chapter includes an in-depth analysis of the events surrounding the September 2007 protests by Buddhist monks. Chapter 7 seeks to link the different components of the study by considering three interdependent factors. The first section outlines parallel developments in ASEAN, including the motives behind the pursuit of greater integration and institutionalization, starting with the project for a security community and culminating in the implementation of the ASEAN Charter. Having outlined the limitations to political and security integration in ASEAN — because of members such as Myanmar — the next section in the chapter considers how ASEAN rebuilt regional cohesion through a new mode of engagement in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, which focused on mediating the distribution of humanitarian aid. Be that as it may, and given the institutional limitations that ASEAN will continue to endure while members such as Myanmar remain engrossed in domestic instability, the final section reviews Myanmar’s new constitution and assesses the extent to which the document may induce improved governance in the country. By reflecting on the empirical analysis in the previous chapters, the first section of Chapter 8 seeks further insight through a critique of Western approaches to Myanmar. This analysis leads to a series of recommendations concerning how ASEAN and the international community should engage Myanmar in the future. The ability of ASEAN to play a constructive role in resolving the


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situation would provide evidence that the Association is moving towards the construction of a security community. The resolution of the Myanmar crisis, in turn, would remove a major impediment to security community formation in Southeast Asia. Based on these considerations the final section of the chapter concludes with an assessment of the extent to which Myanmar impedes the formation of an ASEAN-wide security community. While articulating the threats caused by a particular issue can be relatively unproblematic, finding reliable evidence on the root causes in a country as closed as Myanmar, and assessing how they might best be overcome are more challenging. In an attempt to prevail over this challenge, the author has conducted three trips to the country and its eastern border with Thailand between May 2004 and July 2005. While in the country, field trips were undertaken to Yangon and Mandalay, and the rural ethnic minority areas of Kyaikto, Taunggyi, Nyaung Shwe, Kalaw, Pyin Oo Lwin (Maymyo), Hsipaw, and Lashio (near the Chinese border). Additionally, the author travelled along the Thai/Myanmar border from Mae Sot and north to Mae Sai beside the Golden Triangle. Between 2004 and 2008, meetings and interviews were conducted with people, ranging from members of government and political officers to foreign embassy staff, scholars, NGOs, IOs, and scholars. During the course of the past five years, the author has also conducted interviews with policy-makers and scholars from all the ASEAN nations. The government in Myanmar represents the greatest challenge to solidarity and elite level cohesion currently faced by ASEAN. The chapters that follow illustrate how the level of domestic instability in Myanmar — along with the various comprehensive security challenges that are a consequence of it — have both direct and indirect consequences for Southeast Asia, ASEAN, and beyond. To date, however, both ASEAN and the international community at large — including the United States and the EU — have ineffectively and inadequately dealt with these consequences. While the policies of the latter need to change, so too do the policies of ASEAN. Unfortunately, however, the research conducted for this study also outlines the limitations of ASEAN in terms of its capacity to implement constructive change in Myanmar. Some of the original ASEAN members sought to reform ASEAN’s modus operandi by deepening the institutionalization of ASEAN through a rulesbased charter that would entrench a commitment to the values of human rights and democracy. More importantly, ASEAN announced the intention to establish legally enforceable mechanisms for the protection of human rights, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building mechanisms. ASEAN’s failure to achieve these goals was reflective of a continued incompatibility between the elite-level identities of each member state, a situation exacerbated


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by the diversity of political systems, ranging from democracies to a military dictatorship in Myanmar. In the Myanmar context, the Association’s strategic calculations have been affected by the power politics of China and other exogenous actors such as India and Russia. ASEAN remains deeply concerned about China’s growing influence in Myanmar and, until recently, such fears helped to build regional cohesion over how to engage with Myanmar. The continued decline of the human rights situation in the country, together with Myanmar’s scant regard for the interests of ASEAN, eventually outweighed the benefits of keeping Myanmar within ASEAN’s sphere of influence. Nevertheless, ASEAN’s recent practice of openly criticizing and pressuring Myanmar has been tenuous, as was again evidenced by the failure of the Charter to endorse such an approach. The more authoritarian ASEAN members remain concerned about providing de facto permission for ASEAN to interfere diplomatically in the internal affairs of the state because of the risk that such a precedent could be used with respect to future human rights issues and instability in their own country. It was only through the tragedy of Cyclone Nargis that ASEAN could rebuild cohesion by depoliticizing engagement. While ASEAN has succeeded in sidestepping international pressure for the time being, neither the ideational nor the material challenges presented by Myanmar (such as threats to regional security) have been resolved. ASEAN will not be able to make significant progress towards the realization of a security community until the “Myanmar Crisis” is resolved. Perversely, Myanmar’s new constitution may represent the only prospect for improved governance in the short to midterm.

Notes 1

2

3

“Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)”, (Internet, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 7 October 2003 [cited 14 October 2003]), available at . This is a simplified definition adopted from Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, in Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 30. After much consideration, the author has chosen to refer to the country as Myanmar (as opposed to its former name of Burma). While the legitimacy of the government is definitely in question, discussions and interactions by the author with the citizens of the country (through three research trips) have indicated that the people themselves have accepted the new name. Furthermore, the government maintains that the name change was necessary to avoid any discrimination against the ethnic minorities.


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5

6

7

8

9

10

xxi

The notion of a diplomatic community was developed by Michael Leifer and refers to a group of states that evidence elements of a “collective-political defence with an extra-mural point of reference”. Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. viii and 83. This term continues to be applied within scholarly literature. For example, “Quality of Partnership: Myanmar, ASEAN and the World Community” (Asian Dialogue Society, 2003), p. 7; Anthony L. Smith, “ASEAN’s Ninth Summit: Solidifying Regional Cohesion, Advancing External Linkages”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 3 (2004): 416. Zaid Ibrahim, “ASEAN: Time to Interfere” (Internet — Commentary, The Irrawaddy [cited 30 September 2005]), available at <www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer. asp?a=4581&print=yes&c=e>. For example, K. Kesavapany, “ASEAN Proves to Be a Regional Blessing”, Straits Times, 18 April 2005; Estrella D. Solidum, The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Regionalism (Singapore: Times Media, Eastern Universities Press, 2003); Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). For example, see David M. Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2006); David M. Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, “Making Process, Not Progress”, International Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 148–84. However, it is the scholarly literature that rests between these two poles from which the greatest degree of insight and knowledge is obtained. Examples of such publications include, Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Jeannie Henderson, “Reassessing ASEAN”, ADELPHI Paper (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999); Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia; Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). For example, see the remarkable correspondence over a report presented to the EU on the issue of Myanmar by Robert H. Taylor (a well-established scholar with many decades of experience on the topic). Located at <www.ibiblio.org/ obl/docs3/Burma_Day-Bob_TaylorCV&letter>. See also Joshua Kurlantzick, “Rangoon Squad: Burma’s Wicked Apologists”, New Republic, 22 October 2007. Email correspondence with an academic, Australian National University, 10 October 2005. For example, see the important work on the subject conducted by the International Crisis Group at .


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12

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Introduction

Such analysis is typically limited to the border areas of Myanmar, treating such volatile areas as being representative of the whole of the country. As will be illustrated, the border areas are a very different world to central Myanmar. Furthermore, not all members of the regime or, indeed, the insurgent groups, should be painted the same colour. Norms are most simply defined as the “standards of appropriate behaviour” to be expected by a society and can exist at both the domestic and international levels. For example, see Markus Hund, “From ‘Neighbourhood Watch Group’ to Community? The Case of ASEAN Institutions and the Pooling of Sovereignty”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 1 (2002): 99–122. The original goal for establishing the ASEAN Community was 2020, but in 2007, the date was brought forward to 2015. ASEAN, “Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015” (Internet, 2007 [cited 18 July 2007]), available at ; “The Politics of Speed: An ASEAN Community by 2015”, The Nation, 28 November 2006.


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1 A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF SECURITY COMMUNITY FRAMEWORKS In order to assess the likely challenges that ASEAN will need to overcome to achieve its stated goals, this chapter develops a security community framework in a manner that is relevant to the international relations of Southeast Asia. This framework provides strong and clearly defined benchmarks for assessing the existence of a security community in a manner that clearly explains the primary obstacles to regional community building and helps develop policy-relevant insights concerning how best to overcome such obstacles. Undertaking this approach is important because, while the concept of a security community is a specialist term within scholarly literature, its “definition and usage must be convincing in its own right”.1 As Laurie Nathan contends, poor usage of the term in some of the recent literature has stripped the concept of any specific meaning.2 Furthermore, if the key proposition of security community literature can be empirically tested, applied, and accepted as a general theory, then there is the possibility of the concept gaining additional relevance as a policy goal (normative project) by “governments, international organisations, social movements and other relevant bodies throughout the world”.3 Therefore, while this chapter focuses on what is necessary for a coherent definition of a security community that is relevant to the ASEAN proposal, the next chapter also explains some of the major processes behind the emergence of a security community. Such an approach has the benefit of providing policy-makers, scholars, and students with some wide-ranging insights on the types of strategies to be implemented in the future to support the ASEAN’s goals. The conceptual foundations of 1

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these two chapters will then be applied and tested in the empirical chapters that follow.

THE ASEAN PROPOSAL AND CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS The emergence of a “security community” as a conceptual framework is largely accredited to the work of Karl Deutsch and his associates back in 1957.4 While some have claimed that this was the first substantive challenge to the realist paradigm,5 the manner in which Deutsch focused on the avoidance of interstate war implied a more eclectic framework with the opportunity to accept some of the contentions of the realist paradigm. Deutsch asserted that a security community could only exist where there are “dependable expectations of peaceful change”.6 According to Deutsch, the existence of such “expectations” will most likely arise whenever two or more states become integrated to an extent that there is an overall sense of community, “which in turn, creates the assurance that they will settle their differences short of war”.7 Therefore, the “community of states” that form a security community abides by norms of peaceful conduct and, in fact, anticipates a stable peace. Deutsch articulated his framework in the following manner: A security-community is a group of people which become “integrated”… By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. … By sense of community we mean a belief on the part of the individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change”. … By peaceful change we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.8

The text of the second Bali Concord is supportive of Deutsch’s definition of a security community. The second Bali Concord recognizes that the three pillars to ASEAN’s own community — namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation — “are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region”.9 With regards to the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) pillar, it targets greater economic integration and cooperation with the end goal of producing a “single market


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and production base”. This pillar is potentially the most feasible given that the ASEAN states, particularly the original members, have traditionally shared “… an almost religious belief in the effects of rapid economic growth in diffusing the sources of social and political discontent within their societies”.10 Meanwhile, many of the goals in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) are more pragmatic than might be otherwise inferred from the name. These goals include an intensification of cooperation in public health (for example, the prevention of SARS) and a desire to raise the “standard of living of disadvantaged groups and the rural population”. In line with constructivist literature, the ASCC also seeks to foster a “regional identity”.11 The goals of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) pillar were similarly influenced by scholarly literature,12 and the ASC states that the “members shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives”. The primary intention of the ASC is to push “ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane”.13 The establishment of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community was initially scheduled for 2020, but this date was later moved forward to 2015.14 Within scholarly literature, there are two types of a security community: an amalgamated security community and a pluralistic security community.15 Both categories maintain the notion of dependable expectations of peaceful change, but an amalgamated security community is said to exist where a group of states formally unify and establish formal organizations, associations, or political institutions — as in the case of the United States of America.16 By contrast, a pluralistic security community exists where states preserve their sovereignty.17 According to Kacowicz, the distinction between amalgamation and pluralism is crucial because, in “logical terms, we can envision a situation of amalgamation without integration (that is, without a sense of community), as in a nation-state torn apart by civil war”.18 However, is it possible to have an “amalgamated security community” in the absence of integration? A nation state torn apart by civil war is no longer a nation state, and neither does it have an overarching sense of “security” or “community”. If amalgamation is a synonym for supranational institutionalization, and such institutionalization can be considered a result of the integration of political and economic processes (defined further below), then the distinction is superfluous and, therefore, unnecessary to make. While the preservation of sovereignty remains important to states, fifty years on from Deutsch’s work, the processes of globalization and integration of the international economy have penetrated the sovereignty of all states to


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one degree or another. As a potential response to the “insecurity” posed by these modern processes, some states — such as the European Union — have already started to pool their sovereignty through institutionalization and multilateral arrangements to buffer against such uncertainties. Furthermore, if the analysis of amalgamated security communities is to be limited simply to examples such as the United States or Australia (the latter was initially a collection of semi-sovereign colonies), then this provides little enlightenment in terms of theoretical prediction, or the ability to connect the theory to challenges worthy of empirical observation.19 Therefore, the evolutionary process of security communities is better characterized as a shift from pluralism (at one level of integration) towards amalgamation (at an even higher level of integration). In other words, and as will be elaborated further below, this study does not consider the two labels as separate events, but rather, as different characterizations along the continuums of integration in the economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres.20 Given the aforementioned considerations, this study dismisses Adler and Barnett’s definition, that a “pluralistic” security community is “… a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change”, as too restricted.21 Instead, the study proposes that a “security community” is more comprehensively defined as a transnational community of two or more states whose sovereignty is increasingly amalgamated and whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. The structure of this definition deliberately avoids Adler’s use of the word “region” as it risks invoking confusion with several theories such as Buzan’s “regional security complex” framework,22 or Thompson’s “regional subsystem’s theory”.23 A security community does not require the existence of a geographical region, but rather, it can exist between just two or more states, such as the security community of Australia and New Zealand;24 Singapore and Brunei; or the United States and Canada.25 In other words, and while a security community might most logically occur between states that share contiguous borders, a security community exists wherever the “relations” between two or more states can be described as a stable peace — where the possibility of war is unforeseeable. In order to satisfy the requirements for this state of affairs, it is necessary that dependable expectations of peaceful change exist throughout the territorial boundaries and communities of the collection of states characterized to be a security community. In considering the design of the ASEAN proposal, Figure 1.1 illustrates the conceptual components necessary to an understanding of what it would mean for ASEAN to evolve successfully to become a security community. These are “security”, “dependable expectations of peaceful change”, “community”, and


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FIGURE 1.1 Conceptual Framework to a Security Community Definitional Framework (a) “Security”

Comprehensive Security An indigenous definition of security in SEA Traditional Security

(b) “Dependable Expectations of Peaceful Change”

• Intra and interregional military threats • Economic security and stability • Terrorism and armed conflict

(c) “Community”

(d) “Integration”

Non-Traditional Security • • • • • • • •

Illicit Drugs Environment People Trafficking Illegal Immigration Health and Disease Fishing Arms Trading Other Organized Crime (1) Collective identity formation

The three characteristics of a “Community”

(2) Multifaceted, direct and indirect, interaction (3) The existence of reciprocity whereby there is a degree of long-term interest.

Source: Compiled by the author.

“integration”. The notion of security provides the foundation on which the remaining three concepts are built. Integration, in its traditional sense, is the key component to the formation of dependable expectations of peaceful change. While the notion of a community should be viewed as interdependent with the process of integration, as a term, it moves beyond integration’s traditional boundaries through the consideration of the relationship between “nation” and “state”. This framework also recognizes the existence of transnational communities and how they might affect the emergence of a collective identity among the states that are thought to be composite members of a security community. The sections below provide a more detailed explanation of these intricate concepts.


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(a) Security Traditionally, the concept of security applied exclusively to the absence of a military threat to a sovereign state. Adler and Barnett follow the contemporary trend of broadening security to include “economic, environmental, and social welfare concerns” (examples of these concerns are illustrated by the category of “non-traditional security” in Figure 1.1).26 In contrast, Raimo Vayrynen criticizes this approach and applies a narrow, realist definition. Vayrynen has a point in arguing that a broad definition of security encompassing nontraditional security matters could destabilize the Deutschian framework and its application. That is, should a broad definition of security applies, there would be difficulty in the classification of a community of states in the event of a vis major (for example, a plague or economic crisis). Such neo-liberal or constructivist approaches would result in a security community that is existent one week, non-existent the next, and back again the week after. In light of this problem, Vayrynen defines security in the following terms: [As a] low past, present and future probability of using serious coercive force between or within nations. Coercion can be both military and economic in nature as both of them can inflict major damage and pain on the targeted people. Peace is broken, and the security community unrealised in the region, if people are subjected to physical destruction and suffering. In other words, peace and security mean, ultimately, freedom from coercion and its threats.27

This is not to say that broader, non-traditional security approaches should be dismissed. On the contrary, and in contrast to other security community frameworks, it is suggested that the aforementioned definition of traditional security should be utilized as a threshold test. However, once the application of this threshold test is satisfied, the broader definition of “comprehensive security” encompassing non-traditional considerations, in addition to traditional security factors, should be applied (for example, illicit drugs, people trafficking, and disease — see Figure 1.1). The Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) formulated the following as an indigenous definition of comprehensive security in the Asia Pacific (to which ASEAN has since adhered):28 “[c]omprehensive security is the pursuit of sustainable security in all fields (personal, political, economic, social, cultural, military and environmental) in both the domestic and external spheres, essentially through cooperative means”.29 Personal security is taken to mean freedom from oppression, exploitation, poverty, and adequate medical attention; social security exists with the absence of drug trading,


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people smuggling, and general transnational crime; and cultural security is the community’s ability to refract external dilution of customs and practices. In this study, reference to domestic security is taken to mean the sum of all the factors that stem from the categories of both “personal” and “social” security.30 The relevance and importance of domestic security was highlighted by the political and security challenges that arose in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis and may well be further entrenched in the region’s mindset as the consequences of the 2008 global credit crunch continue to unfold. As has been well documented, the 1997 economic crisis contributed to the collapse of Indonesia’s “New Order” regime. It also led to political turmoil in other ASEAN states — such as Malaysia and Thailand — as well as a broad range of other challenges, such as increased transnational crime and heighted hostility among some of the ASEAN members. Laurie Nathan outlines the broader relevance of domestic security and instability in the following manner: Domestic instability in the form of large-scale violence precludes the emergence or existence of a security community in a number of ways. It generates tension and suspicion between states, preventing the forging of trust and common identity. It can also lead to cross-border violence [and in the very least] … other states cannot exclude the possibility of spill-over violence in the future and cannot be certain about the reliability of unstable regimes. In the national context, instability seriously undermines the security of citizens and the state. The inhabitants of a country wracked by violence cannot plausibly be said to live in a security community. A security community should therefore be defined to include dependable expectations of peaceful domestic change. Based on this definition, structural instability, and authoritarian rule could be viewed as further obstacles to the formation of these communities.31

In the context of Nathan’s comments, it is also important to consider a broader understanding of security that includes a focus on “… the primacy of economic growth and its interconnectedness with social stability, societal order, and regional peace and stability”. As Katzenstein and Sil note, this is in line with a “regionwide consensus” and the empirical evidence proffered by the region since the end of the Cold War.32 Aside from responding to a publicly declared desire by ASEAN to provide domestic security for its people, this framework also includes non-traditional security elements to test the ability of ASEAN to cooperate and implement meaningful measures and mechanisms for the purpose of their resolution. As will be seen, the ability to cooperate on issues of comprehensive security that affect one or more states of


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a community reflects the existence of a sense of reciprocity and “we-feeling” that is necessary to the definition of a security community. In agreement with Deutsch, who says that security communities are ultimately built from within, this framework, therefore, also limits the threshold test for the existence of a security community to intramural security threats.33 However, extramural security challenges also present a point of relevance in as far as they test the degree of identity convergence (that is, collective identity).34 Thus, Ganesan has noted that the actions and policies of external powers and institutions can have a unifying role where “… it is interesting … that much of ASEAN’s ideological convergence derived from external forces and structures”.35 For example, common perceptions of a “communist threat” had a unifying effect in that they eventually contributed to the formation of the ASEAN-5.36 Had this intermural threat been absent, the history of the region could have been very different. Likewise, and as Vayrynen contends, military alliances and/or other security coalitions which are formed to address perceived security externalities, “reflect in the first place, the differences between or commonality of its member’s values and identities”.37 In other words, considerations of exogenous challenges assist with an assessment of the degree to which foreign policy “interests” have converged, and such convergence reflects how integrated the identities of actors are at the elite level. This approach also provides a conceptual linkage between empirical assessments of “security” and “community” that, in turn, facilitates a far deeper and richer level of insight into the driving forces behind integration (or disassociation) among states.38 From the inception of the security community framework there was an implicit acceptance of the continued role of “elements” of the realist paradigm.39 For example, and in relation to Deutsch, his focus on state relations and the complete absence of war or any possibility thereof implies the realist emphasis on the pursuit of traditional security (high politics). An example of one factor incorporated by Deutsch, but traditionally applied by realist scholars, was the role of power — a central tenet of the realist paradigm.40 In Deutsch’s original 1957 investigation he suggested that it was “larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically, and educationally advanced political units [that] were found to form the cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative processes developed”.41 Likewise, the concept of power can also be considered relevant in the context of an analysis of the degree to which ASEAN matters in its ability to shape the behaviour of both intra and extraregional actors.42 For the purpose of this study, the power of a system of states, a state, a regime, or a transnational community (such as a terrorist organization) is defined


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by the total combination of military and economic capacity, as each of these can be equally destructive when used for personal gain. 43 In line with the constructivist (and security community) contention, power can also be both tangible (material) and intangible in nature (behavioural and ideational).44 The concept of a “balance of power” can be distinguished between (a) the balance of power as a system, and (b) the balance of power as a policy. As a policy, the focus is on deliberate attempts of a state (or states) to prevent the hegemony of another state or a combination of states. As a system, the focus is on the types of interactions that tend to limit or curb hegemony, resulting in peaceful equilibrium.45 As opposed to the work of Emmers,46 this study applies the balance of power theory in the systemic sense (rather than as a policy). The degree to which power balancing takes place on an intramural basis is in turn taken as prima facie evidence of the type of threat perceptions and lack of trust that are barriers to the existence of a security community. As will be seen by the ensuing discussions of “community”: the greater the contradiction in strategic perspective, the greater the divergence in the perceived interests of elites and also in foreign policy (the community component), and the lower the level of political integration — all major indicators of the existence of a security community. FIGURE 1.2 The Security Dilemma at Low Integration State A

State B Sense of Insecurity

Increase in State A’s Military and/or Economic Capacity

Reciprocal decrease in State B’s Sense of Security

Sense of Security



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As illustrated in Figure 1.2, in circumstances where states seek a balance of power at the intramural level, a power and security dilemma arises where increases to one state’s economic and military capacity (whether inadvertent or intentional) leave other states comparatively less secure. While this argument is based on the notion of systemic anarchy,47 the argument is also based on the notion that states tend to compete, rather than cooperate, in the pursuit of security.48 In the case of Southeast Asia, various concepts employed by the realists relating to the “pursuit of power”, the ability to exercise and exert power and influence, and the related concept of a “balance of power”, remain applicable at both the regional and subregional levels because there is a low level of integration. Back in 1995 Sheldon Simon suggested that “[r]ealism [or self help] will continue as an important analytical framework for understanding Southeast Asian security because individual states still have unresolved conflicts with each other and because no consensus exists whether external threats to regional order exist or who they may be”.49 As will be demonstrated by the conclusion of this study, Simon’s analysis remains equally applicable in today’s context. Despite the rhetoric of ASEAN that “implicitly rejects balance of power politics”,50 actual power balancing can be observed or seen to be pursued in Southeast Asia.51 Nonetheless, and in loosely following the contentions of Emmers, this study acknowledges that both anarchy and the security dilemma can be mitigated through cooperative security arrangements designed to address transnational security problems.52 While Amitav Acharya has suggested that security community frameworks are more about the prevention of war than the development of security cooperation between states,53 the European Union (EU) — as the only multilateral security community in the world — has sought security cooperation, as well as formal organizations, associations, and political institutions in its pursuit of both military and economic security.54 The greater interdependence that has stemmed from integration, particularly in the economic sphere, has also dramatically increased both the material and ideational costs of future armed conflict.55 Actual examples of cooperative security arrangements evidencing integration in Southeast Asia include the existence of multistate naval operations to combat piracy in the Malacca Strait, as well as regional cooperation to inhibit the production and movement of illicit drugs.

(b) Dependable Expectations of Peaceful Change Adler and Barnett break this key concept into its two companion elements: “dependable expectations” and “peaceful change”. 56 They contend that


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“dependable expectations” are best considered by reference to the various theories of social interaction, including the existence of a collective identity (discussed further below). Indeed, the existence of a collective identity and feelings of mutual trust are necessary preconditions for the existence of dependable expectations of peaceful change. This belief, as opposed to the realist explanation for the absence of war, is very much a part of the constructivist paradigm and of the contentions of Deutsch, Adler and Barnett, and Acharya. While accepting a continued role for their contentions on this point, the earlier discussion concerning the concept of security and the associated role of power illustrates the need for a pragmatic middle ground that also recognizes the role of some factors central to the realist analysis. The second of the companion elements to the concept is “peaceful change”. Peaceful change can best be defined as “neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes”.57 In order to satisfy this criterion, it is assumed that states do not prepare for, or even consider, security actions that would or could be interpreted by others as representing a threat to another state or community’s hard-security. Thus, if a security community were to exist in the absence of “well-developed strategic ties or formal alliance”, then there would, at least, be “tacit and/or formal normative prohibitions against states settling their disputes through military means”.58 The degree to which either strategic ties and formal alliances, or normative prohibitions against conflict exist, is directly proportional to the degree of integration that subsists among and throughout the states of a community. The existence of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), preventative diplomacy, and dispute resolution procedures, further complements and assists in the finding of peaceful change.59

(c) Community Deutsch envisioned that the development of a stable peace was inseparable from the existence of a transnational community.60 However, and for the purpose of the framework, a community can exist both within the territorial borders of a state or across them. There are three key components to the existence of a community.61 The first of these is the existence of a collective identity (see Figure 1.1). Consistent with the general umbrella of constructivism, a central element of a collective identity is the belief that an “identity” can be socially constructed (for example, by way of a statedriven nation building process).62 Identity is defined as a sense of belonging


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to some type of citizenship or population and this sense of “belonging” may exist at the local, domestic, state, regional, and/or global levels.63 Additionally, collective identities are reinforced by common meanings and values, which, in turn, lead to a transnational understanding. While a transnational understanding provides people with a common language to talk about social reality and a common acceptance of certain norms, it is only with the inclusion of common meanings that the substance of a community — such as common actions, feelings, and celebrations — will be formed.64 As shown in Figure 1.1, the second factor in the construction of a community is the requirement that the interaction occurring within a community is direct and numerous in its types of setting. Labelling this the transactionalist approach, Deutsch utilized a wide range of indicators in the measurement of integration. These include “international trade, mail flows, student exchanges and travel”.65 A modern version of this approach would include the internet, as well as email, Yahoo Messenger, Skype, ICQ, Facebook, blogs, and various other electronic discussion forums and chat communities.66 Given these considerations, references to a particular “community” might apply only to particular segments of a populace within a state, or may transcend the territorial boundaries of the state. For example, and as Amitav Acharya has argued, a community might exist at the elite level in ASEAN, but fail to embrace the general ASEAN populaces as a whole.67 In recent times, scholars have built upon the process of transactionalism through the notions of socialization and social learning. The processes of socialization and social learning nurture the behaviour of individuals and communities to encourage conformity to social expectations as represented by the collective identity of the community or state,68 that is, they learn the way of life and culture within their community.69 At the level of the political elite, state actors internalize norms of appropriate behaviour, and this, in part, governs how states interact with one another.70 The third and final requirement for the existence of a community is that there exists a practice of reciprocity, which not only indicates a “sense of long-term interest” — that is, knowledge of, and among, the groups within the community71 — but also involves a sense of obligation towards, and a responsibility for, the members of the community. 72 These factors combine to provide a long-term convergence in foreign and national interests. As Deutsch notes, an outcome of the existence of a community is the existence of “mutually successful predictions of behaviour”.73


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(d) Integration Integration is defined as “the making up of a whole by adding together … the separate parts”,74 or, in other words, “to turn previously separate units into components of a coherent system”.75 Such integration can take place at the economic, political-security, and socio-cultural levels.76 Deutsch argues that one of the central tasks of integration is the “maintenance of peace”77 and it is the centrality of “peace” within the concept of integration that provides a direct link to the notion of a security community.78 Thus, an example of the centrality of “integration” to the existence of a security community can be found in Deutsch’s references to dependable expectations of peaceful change. As outlined earlier, by peaceful change Deutsch meant the “resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures, without resort to large-scale force”.79 For social problems to be resolved by “institutionalised procedures” a certain convergence of identity must first evolve in relation to the practice of how states address transnational security issues, and this includes explicit and/or implicit restrictions on how, when, and where a state can use coercive military and/or economic measures. Therefore, and in this context, integration is concerned with “how and why states voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours so as to lose several factual attributes of sovereignty”.80 A loss in several of the attributes of sovereignty — and the interdependence that ensues — acts to reduce the number of policy options that can be viewed as aggressive by increasing, inter alia, the material and ideational costs of conflict and war (which, in a circular fashion, links back to the core definition of a security community). As Zhiqun Zhu summarizes from the works of Deutsch, “no security community, no integration”.81 The process of integration ultimately causes, and/or is a consequence of, a number of empirical events.82 Such events include the gradual movement towards increased cooperation (a primary linkage to “security”); a gradual transfer of authority towards supranational institutions such as ASEAN83 (also linked to security and a sense of elite-level community); a gradual homogenization of values (strongly linked to the conceptual notions of “community”); and finally, the coming into being of a transnational civil society (or, perhaps, eventually, a global civil society), and with it, the construction of new forms of political community — including the eventual development of the communal components of a security community, the beginnings of which can be seen in the case of the EU.84 By incorporating the community component of the framework we can also understand that the states of a grouping are integrated (and, therefore, a security community) when “there is a prevalence of mutually compatible self-images of the states


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participating in the process, up to the point of developing a common identity and mutual expectations of shared economic and security gains”.85 The concept of integration also provides a conceptual link to the empirical aspects of “security” — together with the level of economic capacity that adequate security entails — because the “process” of pursuing security creates the “outcome” of integration for both state economies and their security apparatuses at the interstate and/or regional level. As a process, integration also provides a bridge between “security” and “community”.86 For example, a security community cannot form without integration between the mindsets of state actors leading to a largely “common” viewpoint vis-àvis transnational security and economic issues.87 The concept of integration is further linked to the concept of “community” because a community should be viewed as a continuation of a process of integration that moves beyond integration’s traditional boundaries through the consideration of the relationship between “nation” and “state”. Therefore, integration applies at both the material and ideational levels in an analytic sense and these two levels are virtually inseparable from each other. In the context of Deutsch’s requirement for sufficient integration, the “habits” of peaceful change should be entrenched to an extent that would preclude the declaration of a security community among states that might form an overnight “alliance”, only to renege the next day. Therefore, and despite Adler and Barnett’s claim that integration exists at virtually any moment a group of states ceases to fear or prepare for war,88 there should be a degree of consistency and evolution towards a situation of anticipated and actual peace among the nations analysed. This is reflected by Deutsch’s requirement that there needs to be dependable expectations of peaceful change.89 Given these considerations, the term “integration” is better used to denote a process while the term “integrated” symbolizes the end result. With this path of reasoning, it follows that the degree of integration that exists determines how a group of states should be characterized. For example, at a very low level of integration, a collection of states might best be characterized as a “conflict formation”, while at a far higher level of integration, a collection of states might be characterized as an embryonic, ascendant, or mature security community. In the context of high integration, Adler and Barnett define five different types of a security community.90 In order to remove some of the ambiguities that were inherent in their framework, Figure 1.3 illustrates a new and simplified conceptualization of the subcategories of a security community — embryonic, ascendant and mature. Here, a nascent security community is considered the equivalent of Rikard Bengtsson’s concept of


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an “integrative peace”. According to Bengtsson, an integrative peace (herein termed an embryonic security community) denotes a more positive peace than “conditional peace”, but unlike an ascendant or mature security community, it has not yet eliminated the security dilemma.91 During the nascent phase of a security community’s evolution, there exists adequate empirical evidence to illustrate a future and sustainable course towards “dependable expectations of peaceful change”. Such evidence is found in the existence of security community triggering mechanisms such as mutual threat perceptions, joint trade benefits, and the duplication of other institutional structures such as those of the EU.92 These factors will not normally occur unless there is a convergence of the foreign policies and national interests that exist inside the grouping. Thus, “the peace rests primarily … on the identification of mutual interests, dependence, joint problem solving and norm governed behaviour”.93 In other words, an embryonic security community would, at the very least, require a developed sense of collective identity at the elite level.

FIGURE 1.3 Amended Security Community Structuralization Indicators A 1. Multilateralism 2. Unfortified borders 3. Changes in military planning 4. Common definition of threat 5. Language and discourse of community

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Indicators B All indicators contained within “Indicators A ” Cooperative and collective security High level of military integration Policy coordination against internal threats Free movement of population Internationalization of authority A multiperspectival polity

Mature Security Community

Ascendant Security Community

Nascent Security Community

A security complex or some form of a non-integrated collection of sovereign states.

Increasing hierarchy of “Dependable Expectations” of “Peaceful Change” in parallel with ascending levels of integration



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Within the ascendant phase, one can begin to witness a heightened sense of security among states (“Indicators A” in Figure 1.3), involving “increasingly dense networks” with “new institutions and organisations that reflect either tighter military coordination and cooperation and/or decreased fear that the other represents a threat”.94 The level of interaction between members of the security community will also have “been extended and intensified” from the level witnessed in a nascent security community to one where the “states and their societies are [now] increasingly embedded in a dense network of relations collectively portrayed as ‘friendly’”.95 These processes would generate higher levels of political and security integration (such as joint exercises, training, and general cooperation among the militaries) and the beginnings of cognitive transition towards intersubjective processes and collective identities, further reinforcing “dependable expectations of peaceful change”. A higher level of integration would further distinguish between an ascendant security community and a mature community. A mature security community exists where key economic and political aspects of state sovereignty have been amalgamated at the supranational level of the grouping, and a collective identity has not only been solidified among the political elite but has also started to emerge at the grassroots level — that is, the emergence of a significant “We” as will be discussed in the next chapter. The threshold test applied to the characterization of a mature security community is the same as Adler and Barnett’s notion of a tightly coupled security community, where “there is a ‘mutual aid society’ providing for collective and cooperative efforts to help each other and offer joint solutions to common problems”.96 Additionally, it requires the existence of substantial cooperative and collective security, a high level of integration among the militaries, joint policy coordination against internal threats, unrestricted movement of societies among states, the internalization of authority, and a multiperspectival policy where political authority (rule) is shared at the national, transnational, and supranational levels (“Indicators B” in Figure 1.3). Thus, while a mature security community would only exist at a relatively complete level of integration, it remains an important phenomenon to hypothesize as the benefits — such as heightened peace, security, stability, development, and wealth — have the potential to become an important “end goal” within foreign policies. As Lebow contends, a shortcoming of modern social sciences, in contrast to ancient philosophy, is that it is overwhelmingly focused on “means” rather than “ends”.97 This framework seeks to redress this shortcoming.


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Conclusions A security community is a near “ideal” state of affairs and, therefore, an “end goal” that may be sought within the foreign policies of states. It exists when an exceptionally high level of positive transactions and interactions take place at a relatively complete level of integration. As such, even the EU is at best an ascendant security community.98 The irreconcilable differences in the foreign policies of EU members (on Iraq, for example) show that it is yet to act with a common foreign policy outlook and the common threat perceptions inherent in such an outlook.99 As will be demonstrated in later chapters, ASEAN is even further away from reaching the conditions necessary for it to be characterized as a security community. Certainly, various actors in the region have used the “ASEAN Way” and the idea of a unique set of “Asian values” as an excuse for why such a framework, and its associated linkages to democratic values and human rights, should not apply.100 Nevertheless, the notions of peace and dependable expectations of peaceful change know no culture or “ASEAN Way”. Either dependable expectations of peaceful change exist or they do not. Certainly, norms and values such as the “ASEAN Way” may provide some insight as to the long-term viability of peace, but they are a means to an end rather than an end in itself. It would be hard for anyone to deny that a sense of reciprocity, shared values, and trust should not be considered relevant in the context of assessing the likelihood of peace. These markers are universally relevant. A look behind the rhetoric of those who dismiss the relevance of a security community in Southeast Asia because of some unique cultural milieu, is more accurately suggestive of an admission that Southeast Asia has simply not yet integrated enough for the emergence of a security community to become feasible. Given these considerations and debates, the next chapter outlines the major processes that are likely to contribute to a deepening of regional integration and, eventually, the emergence of a security community.

Notes 1

2 3

4

Laurie Nathan, “Domestic Instability and Security Communities”, European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 2 (2006): 278. Ibid., pp. 278 and 293. Donald K. Emmerson, “Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analysing ASEAN”, Japanese Journal of Political Science 6, no. 2 (2005): 169. Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience (New York:


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Greenwood Press, 1957). While Deutsch developed the initial framework and its composite notions, the actual founder of the term was Richard van Wagnen in the early 1950s. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., “Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective”, in Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 3. Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 201. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p. 5. Adler and Barnett, “Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective”, p. 3. Under the definition provided by Deutsch, a security community may exist between communities within states or across states — a security community is, in fact, non-territorial. However, for the purpose of this study and in light of its modern application, the study will limit the focus and application of security community frameworks to interstate relations. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p. 5. “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)” (cited). Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 49. In Michael Leifer’s opinion, the original motivation for regional cooperation “was not intended to serve the interest of common security through the projection of common power but through the mitigation and management of conflict and attendant economic development”. Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 6. The author’s own survey of 100 elites from all the ASEAN states (including scholars and political officers) indicated that 64.44 per cent of the “sample” believed that economic liberalization would “benefit” their country and 77.78 per cent of the respondents believed that their own national economy was either compatible with the economic structures of all the ASEAN states, or at least the ASEAN states that were already structurally defined as a “market economy”. Interestingly, back in 1995 Singapore’s Deputy Speaker, Eugene Yap, argued that it was futile to try to forge a common identity for ASEAN, “Futile to Forge ASEAN Identity — Singapore”, Straits Times, 20 September 1995. For a scholarly example on the subject of identity, see Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). One example of such influence in the Bali Concord II includes the exploration of “innovative ways to increase its security and establish modalities …, which include, inter alia, the following elements: norm-setting approaches to conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building”. As Jones and Smith assert, the Bali Concord II redescribes the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in language that could be found in “many undergraduate course outlines in international relations”. Jones and Smith, “Making Process, Not Progress”, International Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 158. “Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)” (cited).


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A Contemporary Application of Security Community Frameworks 14

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ASEAN, “Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015” (cited). Adler and Barnett, “Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective”, pp. 6–7; Arie Kacowicz, “Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?”, Alternative: Social Transformation and Humane Governance 24 (1999): 542. Kacowicz, “Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?”, p. 542. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p. 6. Kacowicz, “Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?”, p. 541. The problematic nature of this bifurcated approach is indicated by the disappearance of the term “amalgamated security community” from scholarly literature except in as far as reviews of the literature are concerned. As Laurie Nathan states, amalgamated security communities “… are now largely ignored in the literature and unlikely to occur in practice …”. Nathan, “Domestic Instability and Security Communities”, p. 289. For a succinct outline of how political, economic, and socio-cultural integration may affect international relations in the context of Southeast Asia, see Christopher B. Roberts, “The ASEAN Security Community Project: The Prospects for Comprehensive Integration in Southeast Asia”, The Indonesian Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2006): 270–93. Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, p. 30. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 19; Barry Buzan, “The Southeast Asian Security Complex”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 10, no. 1 (1988): 1–16. Mohammed Ayoob, “From Regional System to Regional Order”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999): 249; William R. Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and Propositional Inventory”, International Studies Quarterly 17 (1973): 101. Nevertheless, where the members of a security community are not contiguous, then it is suggested that the security community will be forged in the midst of a core of power such as the security community that exists between Australia and the United States (with the United States representing the dominant “integrator”). Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p. 20. Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 114–15. Adler and Barnett, “Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective”, p. 4. Raimo Vayrynen, “Stable Peace through Security Communities”, in Stable Peace among Nations, edited by Arie Kacowicz et al. (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 112.


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See for example, “ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action” (Internet, ASEAN Secretariat, 2004 [cited 6 December 2004]), available at . “Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security”, CSCAP Newsletter, no. 6 (1997): 1. In this study, domestic security deliberately excludes cultural security as it is contended that, aside from raising an entirely separate debate (beyond the scope of this investigation), globalist forces are making it an increasingly difficult, if not impossible, “ideal” to sustain. Nathan, “Domestic Instability and Security Communities”, p. 293. Katzenstein and Sil further suggest that whilst originally spearheaded by Japan and the ASEAN-6 (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei), an acceptance of the interconnectivity of security has “spread, most importantly, to China and Vietnam …”. Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, “Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism”, in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, edited by J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 2. Vayrynen adds that “internal peace must be also one of … [a security community’s] defining characteristics especially if internal instability threatens to have negative security externalities”. Raimo Vayrynen, “Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building”, Occasional Paper No. 18 (The Joan B. Krock Institute for International Peace Studies, 11 June 2000 [cited 10 September 2001]), available at . The Asian Dialogue Society also supports a similar view with the suggestion that peace is dependent on human security and “peace can be sustained and made sustainable only if there is freedom from fear and freedom from want”. “Quality of Partnership: Myanmar, ASEAN and the World Community”, (Asian Dialogue Society, 2003), p. 6. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, pp. 156–57. Furthermore, and because the end goal of a security community has been to bar the possibility of regional conflict, much of the security community literature has neglected economic and security issues pertaining to the domestic and international tiers of analysis. As Kacowicz states, “[t]he literature on pluralistic security communities does not address extensively the possibility of conflict and clashes between or among regions or communities. It focuses upon peaceful change and peace at the intraregional level, though it ignores the interregional, international, and global levels”. Kacowicz, “Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?”, p. 543. N. Ganesan, “ASEAN: A Community Stalled?”, in The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition, edited by Jim Rolfe (Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p. 129. Ganesan later adds that “powerful perception of threat” externally “have made ASEAN cohere better”, ibid., p. 132.


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The term ASEAN-5 denotes the original members of ASEAN: Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand. As Emmers states, “The motivation for ASEAN was based not only on regional reconciliation. The Association should also be viewed as a response to an advancing communist threat in Indochina and a related fear of internal communist insurgencies.” Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 13. Vayrynen, “Stable Peace through Security Communities”, p. 119. See also Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security”, in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 60–63. For example, and in the case of ASEAN and the South China Sea, how the ASEAN states unite or divide over a potential China threat (real or imagined), would test their level of solidarity, reciprocity and loyalty. The use of the word “loyalty” has not been applied in security community frameworks to date. It is contended, however, that loyalty stems directly from a sense of community; that we are the same (this we-feeling), and we are obligated to one another. This is not to suggest, however, that he wholeheartedly embraced all the contentions offered by the realist school of thought. For example, the realists contend that the problem of uncertainty can never be overcome to the extent necessary to eliminate mistrust and the fear of war. However, the security community examples of the United States and Canada, Western Europe, and the Nordic states, have without a doubt rebutted such an argument. As Sean Shore states, “It is simply unimaginable to most observers … that the two North American countries could fight a war over any issues that are likely to arise. As 5,000 miles (and 125 years) of undefended border attest, neither side regards the other as even a potential military threat, despite the fact that interstate anarchy supposedly makes war an ever-present possibility”. Sean M. Shore, “No Fences Make Good Neighbours: The Development of the Canadian-US Security Communities, 1871–1940”, in Security Communities, edited by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 333. P.A. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations (London: 1980), p. 117. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p. 38. Sarah Eaton and Richard Stubbs, “Is ASEAN Powerful? Neo-Realist Versus Constructivist Approaches to Power in Southeast Asia”, The Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2006): 137. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations, p. 117. Alex J. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 25. However, and as Waltz articulates, state actors, when seeking power, are in fact seeking


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to maximize security rather than the other way around. As cited in Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p. 42. One example of the role of intangible power is aptly illustrated by the case of the Vietnam War. The United States has overwhelming superiority in terms of tangible military power “and used virtually all military means short of nuclear war to bring about a North Vietnamese withdrawal”. Yet, and in spite of its tangible power, the Vietnamese were able to tip the scales of overall power in their favour by drawing on a massive volume of intangible power. In the Vietnamese case, their intangible power was both “direct” and “indirect”. The positive intangible power consisted, inter alia, of being able to seize and utilize massive amounts of national will or nationalism. The indirect intangible power was provided by the United States through the “deteriorating support for the war in the United States and among Washington’s allies’ and the Vietnamese were able to achieve politically what they could not achieve militarily: governmental self-determination and the expulsion of American force”. Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations, 5th ed. (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1985), p. 246. Ernst B. Haas, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda”, World Politics 5, no. 4 (1953): 442–77. Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p. 41. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, eds., The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 494. Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 291. Sheldon W. Simon, “International Relations Theory and Southeast Asia”, Pacific Review 8, no. 1 (1995): 7. Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, p. 6. Interviews with K.S. Nathan, ISEAS, Singapore, 26 May 2004 and 6 December 2001 in the context of Singapore and its forward defence plan along with the country’s bilateral relations; interview with Dato Mohamed Jawhar Bin Hassan, ISIS Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 13 December 2001. It is important to note that Emmers’ reference was in fact to cooperative security associations. Cooperative security associations exist where states cooperate with, and take into account, the security needs of the other states in the grouping (association). However, and for the purpose of the analogy made here, this component of a cooperative security association is compatible with the convergence of interests and long-term cooperation necessary to the existence of a security community. Amitav Acharya, “Re: Research Trip to Singapore — An Investigation of Security Community Framework in Southeast Asia” (Email, 2001 [cited 21 September 2001]). In this correspondence Amitav Acharya states that he is not sure whether


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the “… security approach will hold for piracy. It’s [sic] more about avoiding war than developing specific forms of security cooperation …” Meanwhile, the Bali Concord II also outlines greater political and security cooperation as a major goal in establishing a security community by 2020. Furthermore, a tangible example of actual security cooperation would include the MALSINDO joint policing of piracy in the Malacca Strait. “Launch of Trilateral Coordinated Patrols — MALSINDO Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol (Internet, Singapore MINDEF, 2004 [cited 21 August 2007]); available at . For example, see Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins, “The Study of Interdependence and Conflict: Recent Advances, Open Questions, and Directions for Future Research”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 6 (2001): 834–35. In relation to the combined effects of economic interdependence and economic freedom, see Erik Gartzke, “Economic Freedom and Peace”, in Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report, edited by James Gwartney and Robert Lawson (Canada: Fraser Institute, 2005), pp. 29–30. On the connection between interdependence and the security dilemma, see Barry R.J. Jones, Globalisation and Interdependence in the International Political Economy (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995). Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, p. 34. Ibid. Ibid., p. 35. For a discussion and definition of the role of these three organizing concepts, see Marie-Francis Desjardins, “Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures”, ADELPHI, no. 307 (1996): 10. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p. 5. Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, p. 31. A state-driven nation building process is the policy of a government that is directed towards a unification of the communities that exist within its territorial boundaries. An example is Singapore’s adoption of English as a neutral and practical language of communication between its ethnic groupings. Carl H. Lande, “Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia”, Studies in Comparative International Development 33, no. 4 (1999): 106; Yong Leng Lee, “Race, Language, and National Cohesion in Southeast Asia”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 11, no. 1 (1980): 128. Rasma Karklins, “The Concept of Collective Identity”, paper presented at the Directorate of Communication and Research, Strasbourg, 17–18 April 2001, p. 1. Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”, in Interpretative Social Science, edited by Paul Rabinow and William Sullivan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 51. See also Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?, pp. 31–39.


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Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 32. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p. 32. Amitav Acharya, “Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia”, in Security Communities, edited by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 207–14. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 17. Joel Charon, The Meaning of Sociology: A Reader (Englewood, CA: Prentice Hall, 1987), pp. 63–69. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?, pp. 24–26; Rikard Bengtsson, “The Cognitive Dimension of Stable Peace”, in Stable Peace among Nations, edited by Arie M. Kacowicz et al. (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), pp. 99–100. Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, p. 31. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p. 32. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p. 36. William Little, H.W. Fowler, and Jessie Coulson, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, edited by C.T. Onions, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 1088. Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 2nd ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc, 1981), p. 198. Christopher B. Roberts, “East Asian Regionalism: A Backgrounder on an Eclectic Alternative for Analysis”, in Do Institutions Matter Regional Institutions and Regionalism in East Asia, edited by See Seng Tan (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2008), pp. 20–24. Deutsch also suggested three further purposes to integration and these included “attaining greater multipurpose capabilities”, “accomplishing some specific task”, and “gaining a new self image and role identity”. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, p. 198. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?, p. 10; Kacowicz, “Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?”, p. 12. As a concept, integration laid the foundation for the study of interdependence in the 1970s. Griffiths and O’Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, p. 155. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p. 5. Kacowicz, “Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?”, pp. 12–13.


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Zhiqun Zhu, “Prospect for Integration in Pacific-Asia”, Asian Profile 28, no. 6 (2000): 510. We can also recall that the first component in Deutsch’s definition of a security community is that “it is a group of people which become integrated”. This is alternatively referred to as the “integrative process”. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, p. 198. This is not to advocate that such a “transfer” has happened, only that ASEAN is an example of such a “supranational institution”. Griffiths and O’Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, p. 155. Kacowicz, “Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?”, p. 12. Evans and Newnham, eds., The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, p. 253. That is to say, a security community requires a convergence of interests and identity (at least, at the elite level) and this links to the later discussion and definition of community formation and collective identity formation. Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, p. 35. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, p. 5. In the original work by Adler and Barnett, the authors attempted to define a security community through five separate tiers of integration: nascent, ascendant, mature, loosely coupled, and tightly coupled security communities. Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, pp. 50–57. However, it is argued that Adler and Barnett’s description is more likely to misguide rather than enlighten the reader on the admittedly subjective characterization of the structure behind a security community. For the purpose of alleviating some of the ambiguity in the framework, the tiers of integration in a security community have, therefore, been reduced to three levels: nascent, ascendant, and mature. Bengtsson, “The Cognitive Dimension of Stable Peace”, p. 94. Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, pp. 52–53. See also Roberts, “The ASEAN Security Community Project: The Prospects for Comprehensive Integration in Southeast Asia”, pp. 271–79. Bengtsson, “The Cognitive Dimension of Stable Peace”, p. 94. Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, p. 53. Ibid. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, p. 35. Richard Ned Lebow, “Reason, Emotion and Cooperation”, International Politics 42 (2005): 304. As Ole Weaver contends, and as was recently evidenced by the divisions within its member states of the 2003 intervention in Iraq, “the state model still dominates


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and national identities differ; as a result, the West European security community is not yet full-fledged”. Cited in Vayrynen, “Stable Peace through Security Communities”. Raising the benchmark for the existence of a security community provides added meaning to the framework and it is contended that it remains a reachable objective. This is an objective that the EU may be able to reach in the next two to three decades, with the right conditions and a continued process of integration at all levels of the framework. One of the most recent attempts to justify a unique set of Asian Values that continues to place “human rights” as collateral damage in the pursuit of economic development has come from Kishore Mahbubani. See Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008). Kishore Mahbubani is currently Director of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Government and has served the ruling government (People’s Action Party) of Singapore in various capacities, including in his final post as Singapore’s Ambassador to the United Nations, for more than thirty years.


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2 DEVELOPING A DEFENDABLE FRAMEWORK The Processes behind the Emergence of a Security Community Chapter 1 outlined the major conceptual aspects necessary to the classification of a security community. In building on these considerations, the present chapter develops an understanding of the key processes behind the emergence of a security community. The chapter also seeks to discern how various domestic, material, and ideational factors interrelate with one another and potentially contribute to integration and the formation of a stable peace. Understanding the processes and pathways behind security community formation not only equips the analyst with an ability to foresee many of the obstacles to security community formation, but can also aid the development of an understanding, in later chapters, of the most efficient and effective approach to resolving any possible obstacles to realizing the goal of a security community. The likelihood of ASEAN successfully responding to these obstacles is a separate issue and one that will be addressed in the final chapter of this study (see Chapter 8).

NORMS AND THE COLLECTIVE IDENTITY OF THE STATE — THE CAUSATION BEHIND COOPERATION AND PEACE? For the purpose of this investigation, the conceptual framework follows the second wave literature on norms with a primary focus on the ability of norms to affect “state behaviour via domestic political processes”.1 This branch of the 27


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literature seeks to ascertain the domestic salience of transnational norms via an examination of “changes in domestic discourses, national institutions, and state policies”.2 The question of who instigates these “changes” is examined through (and partially answered by) various social theories on structure and agency. Agents are the actors in politics who have the power to exercise and display choice, reflexivity, learning, and transformative capacity.3 While the central actor has traditionally been seen as the state (see below), recent literature has broadened the concept to include non-state actors such as international organizations, non-governmental organizations, transnational social movements, private economic actors, and epistemic communities (including civil society).4 Structure, by contrast, is the structured environment under which the agents act. The structure of a society, of a state, of a collectivity of states (for example, ASEAN), or of an international order is determined by the examined entity’s ascertainable (or diverging) norms and identity (the ideational determinants of structure), together with its material capacities and institutions.5 In the structurationist approach within sociological theory,6 both agents and structures are said to be mutually constitutive, in other words, there is a continuous cycle of actors influencing structure, and structure socializing actors.7 For the purpose of this framework, and as a further reflection on the question of socialization, the collective identity of a state’s political elite transposes to become the identity of the state. In this sense, the “state” is viewed as a social actor and is socialized in “social rules and conventions that constitute its identity and the reasons for the interests that motivate actors”.8 In addition to the theoretical and methodological arguments outlined by scholars such as Wendt, this generalization is also important due to practical considerations and constraints. For example, it can be highly problematic to attempt to distinguish between political elites in power and the role of the state in the construction of foreign policy and political preferences, and the sets of interstate relations that evolve because of these policies — there is some overlap between these entities. In this context, the state is considered to exist as a real entity (rather than a social abstraction),9 with the “capacity to do” and/or exist “as an agent of something”.10 While Bellamy is correct in arguing that a nation-state’s identity is constituted by a range of domestic, economic, social-geographic, cultural, and historical factors,11 it is argued that the collective identity of a state most strongly emerges from, and is influenced through, the collective memories of history.12 This contention is made because all of Bellamy’s factors can be understood, in one degree or another, through the lens of history; as Katzenstein argues “[h]istory is a process of change that leaves an imprint on


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a state and its society’s identity”.13 The argument regarding the important role of history links back to the discussion of transactionalism and socialization in the first chapter. Direct and numerous interactions among different sociocultural communities within a state over an extended timeframe “socialise” the different identities in a manner where elements of the “part” evolve into the collective identity of the group. In other words, socialization becomes part of the “process of learning to conform one’s behaviour to social expectations”.14 This is not to suggest that the emergence of a “collective identity” fully replaces any or all of the individual socio-cultural identities (co-cultures); on the contrary, the idea is that these individual identities may eventually become socially compatible with one another to an extent that there might emerge an identifiable collective identity.15 This process of socialization will (and does) lead to the formation of socio-cultural norms, a subcategory of norms depicting the standards of behaviour that, in the present context, prescribe the rights and obligations that the society of a given state expects its leaders to uphold – both domestically and internationally.16 While the “norms of the social group are the structures that determine behaviour and constitute agent identity”,17 the agent has the capacity to seek “self-consciously” to construct new norms that might potentially enhance the incentives for specific forms of behaviour and also even affect the very structure of society itself.18 These changes have been conceptualized within the literature under the notion of social change which, in turn, is understood as occurring where “the interaction between agents and structures creates new possibilities for collective action by changing norms and institutions, as well as the evolution of existing and emergent actors (and their interactions) who are both enabled and constrained in the pursuit of their goals”.19 In this context the process of the transfer of norms, whether consciously or unconsciously, occurs mainly at the agent level.20 Thus, and in summary, the collective identity of a state (as represented by its elite) arises from the sum total of historical interaction — including ideas, learning, and socialization21 — at both the domestic and international levels. Drawing on nine years of intensive fieldwork in all the ASEAN countries, it is argued here that, inter alia, the major ideational attributes relevant to assessing a state’s identity within Southeast Asia appear to include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) political ideology, (b) religion (especially where aspects of (a) or (b) contain a militant “missionary” ideology), (c) culture, (d) nationalism and patriotism (particularly if they breed a culture of superiority), (e) an inferiority complex (related to or a possible consequence of (d)), (f ) the degree of xenophobia evidenced by a given society, and (g) a vast range of norms — such as norms of cooperative (or competitive) behaviour


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and of peaceful coexistence. Other ideational factors that influence the collective identity of a state include such things as language systems, historical differences, and/or animosities, and various other variables — as articulated later in the discussion on morphological compatibilities. An understanding of these ideational attributes assists in the formation of a distinction between situations when states will trust outsiders or, alternatively, perceive them as a threat. Different states will not agree to be bonded by agreements in the absence of trust.22 The development of trust among states and/or communities entails, inter alia, a compatibility of values that does not conflict with the political and ideational survival of the other state and/or community with which interaction takes place. In the absence of any such political and/or ideational friction, frequent interactions will contribute to at least some degree “of identification with the other because without such association actors would be self-contained and devoid of any … basis” for common action.23 The existence of trust is central to the constituent elements of a community (for example, in the form of reciprocity and altruism), as well as the formation of dependable expectations of peaceful change. In fact, Adler and Barnett place “trust” alongside and equal with “collective identity formation” and contend that “trust and identity are reciprocal and reinforcing”.24 In addition to these considerations, Waltz adds that ideational/ideological values represent a “system of meaning that entails the distinction between self and other in the definition of threat”.25 This is because, particularly in the case of a robust nation state, the totality of ideational values represents the core existence of self — the identity of the state. Therefore, ideational survival can be considered equal with political survival as an underlying basis for the formation of a state’s national interests – whether declared or otherwise.26 Furthermore, and according to this perspective, a partial definition of threat would be based on the ideational attributes of other states that are perceived to exist as opposed to the political (and ideational) survival of the state examined. In the absence of trust (at a low level of integration), military expenditure is greater (because of uncertainty) and there is a lower occurrence of cooperation and cooperative arrangements. The greater sense of predictability (together with reduced perceptions of risk) to stem from the existence of trust and a transnational collective identity, also reduces the perceived costs of cooperation and integration at the political, security, and economic levels. Additionally, the development of trust and a compatibility of identity (in the absence of a collective identity) among states help to remove any ideational obstacles to a rational decision making process.27 In order to understand better the basis for distinguishing between those actors who are perceived


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as a “threat” and those actors a state can “trust”, it is necessary to consider recent developments in social psychology concerning Social Identity Theory (SIT).

Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Interstate Relations While the relationship of identity (as a component of collective identity formation) to security community frameworks has already been discussed, recent developments in the theory of identity have contributed to a better understanding of how states will relate to one another. To this end, SIT – with its origins in social psychology — has been applied by various international relations theorists to test whether international conflicts are inevitable,28 and to understand the causal properties behind two or more states seeking to cooperate. Social identity theory is social constructivism’s theory of the agent and is primarily concerned with actors (agency) rather than norms (structure).29 In the context of the theory, and because it is possible to conceive of identity as understanding oneself relative to others, it follows that a state or community’s social identity is also dependent on its relationship with others.30 Within the large body of literature on SIT it is clear that the concept of “social identity” or “social group” plays an important role in all sets of relations — whether that of the individual, the group, or the state. Similar to the notion of a collective identity, the “social group” is defined as “one that is psychologically significant for the members, to which they relate themselves subjectively for social comparison and the acquisition of norms and values”.31 In this context, SIT argues that individuals and communities that fit within the umbrella of a collective identity (social identity) will attach a strong sense of importance to their membership of that social group. These groups utilize their acquired norms and values for the purpose of comparing and evaluating their sense of “self ” with other social groups comprising contrasting collective identities.32 In other words, communities of all types (including security communities) tend to draw boundaries around themselves in order to “differentiate between themselves and outsiders”. Thus, the theory argues that once actors identify themselves as part of the same group they will then interact, trade, and bargain with one another in terms of absolute gain. However, when dealing with actors who are identified, consciously or unconsciously, as being outside the “grouping”, then how they interact, trade, and bargain will be conducted on the basis of relative gain (as opposed to absolute gain). According to Hemmer and Katzenstein, these “findings have been consistent across studies even with the flimsiest and most arbitrarily defined groups”.33


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Identity is a relative phenomenon. The notion of a relative differentiation between groups with differing levels of identity divergence was suggested in the work of Flockhart where it was argued that: What actually happens is that identities are constructed through complex constellations of ‘we-groups’ in a system of social groups consisting of the ‘Self ’/‘We’, placed in a hierarchical system between the ‘Other’ and what I call the ‘Significant We’. The ‘Other’ defines what the ‘Self ’/‘We’ is not and what it seeks to distance itself from, whereas the ‘Significant We’ is as important (perhaps even more so) for the construction of identities, as is the other’.34

For example, in the context of democratic norms transfer within Europe, the European Union (EU) could be conceptualized as the “Significant We”. In this example, the “other” would be represented by the contrasting communities perceived as pursuing core values at variance with those of the EU.35 The importance of the Significant We has been evidenced by a myriad of social psychology studies illustrating a fundamental desire to associate and assimilate with compatible groups (for example, those that evidence a compatible collective identity) based on several factors: existential distress, uncertainty reduction, and desires for inclusion, belonging, and self-esteem.36 Of these factors, self-esteem has received the most attention. This is not to suggest that it is because individuals and/or communities seek self-esteem that they associate with a group, but rather, the continued association with a social group is determined by the extent to which they gain or lose “collective self esteem” because of the social group’s achievements and failures.37 These findings are relevant to ASEAN because if its membership does not provide adequate self-esteem, then the members will either leave the group or be less influenced by its leadership and normative values.38 SIT can also be applied to examine how states will relate to one another within the region and on a multilateral basis with actors exogenous to the region. For example, when a group of people in one Asian state (State A) deals with another group of people from a different Asian state (State B), then where there continue to exist sufficient differences in the constituent elements of identity (for example, language, culture, religion, etc.) the relations may be best characterized as that of relative gain (competitive), and these identities will be seen to be mutually exclusive of each other. However, if the analysis is enlarged to three or more actors operating under some multilateral mechanism (for example, the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF]), and one of the state actors is an external state (State C, for example, the


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United States), then relative to the external state (the “other”), the identities of states A and B will converge in the eyes of all parties involved. In these circumstances, states A and B do not perceive each other as “others”, but as members of the same “Significant We”, within a wider common identity.39 Thus, the “outsider” will be competing against two states (A and B) that are bargaining as one (in terms of absolute gain). This has the practical benefit of increasing their collective bargaining power. This outcome may provide an additional “theoretical” thread in the explanation of ASEAN’s formation and the various occasions when ASEAN states have responded collectively to exogenous threats and issues.40 Furthermore, and as far as ASEAN’s security community project is concerned, the success of the proposal will be achieved “through the inscription of boundaries, which serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’, a ‘self ’ from an ‘other’, a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’”.41 At the individual state unit of analysis, because of the propensity for state actors to identify with the collective identity of their own nation and to imbue their “national identities with positive value”, when “such positivity is challenged, leading to … consequential, … relative comparisons with … salient external nations …” a state then becomes more likely to promote competition leading to “the rivalry of two or more groups for limited material or symbolic purposes”.42 According to Gries, the occurrence of competition is a necessary precondition for the initiation of conflict. Furthermore, the development of “We” identification and “Other” hostility is “progressive and contingent rather than necessary and inevitable”.43 Thus, and as Figure 2.1 illustrates, conflict represents the last stage in a four-stage process. In this figure, the transition from stages 1 to 2 is taken as automatic, but the transition between stages 2 and 3, and between stages 3 and 4, is considered progressive and contingent. It is at the juncture of these later stages that social comparison takes place, and — where the identity and national interests of

FIGURE 2.1 From Identification to Competition and Conflict In-Group Identification

Inter-Group Competition

In-Group Positivity

Automatic

Progressive/ Contingent

Inter-Group Conflict

Progressive/ Contingent



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a state are challenged — competition will only arise when such comparisons are salient, consequential, and zero-sum.44 Furthermore, in order for conflict to take place the “agents” cannot be viewing one another as either a “We” or “Significant We”: the challenge for ASEAN, therefore, becomes how it can develop a regionwide collective identity that delivers enough trust and esteem to create a collective identity or, alternatively, a “Significant We”. Notwithstanding the exceptions listed above, in summary, and in returning to the rational actor argument (as discussed earlier), it can be argued that a state actor will generally make decisions based on costs and benefits in a way that is normally perceived as being rational. However, this analysis of costs and benefits and its relationship to the pursuit of national interests are informed by both material and normative concerns. For example, how a state may perceive another state’s military structure and any subsequent increase in military capability can be partially informed by how closely they both understand and identify with that other state’s elite. Where there are strong ideational differences that impact on normative behaviour, the military capacity in one state may be deemed a threat and, therefore, a reason to increase one’s own military capability (for example, power balancing) whereas the same military capacity in another neighbour — but one with a lower level of ideational differences — may be seen as non-threatening. The same considerations apply to other areas and tiers of this analysis. For example, while ideational factors may very well influence decisions to cooperate in the security, economic, and political realms, the pursuit of power, balances of power, and the associated security dilemma remain relevant to this security community framework at the lower levels of integration. At the higher levels of integration, the security dilemma is reduced and, eventually, mitigated. The processes contributing to how a state will act at any given moment and how it will evolve in the future are thus both material and ideational in nature (for example, collective identity) and their sum total provides the basis for assessing the structure of a state and whether its structure (morphology) is compatible (for the purpose of integration) with the morphologies of other states.

EMPIRICAL CONNECTIONS: THE INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE In addition to interactions, transactions, and thereby, socialization, the level of structural compatibility among states can also be enhanced through political, economic, and socio-cultural integration (see Chapter 1). Such processes can be state-driven (agency) through various initiatives and policies


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by governments. For example, the teaching of a common language can reduce transaction costs by enhancing the compatibility of the workforce and the promotion of trade and exchange at the elite level. A common language also has ideational effects by increasing, for example, the amount of communication that takes place among different ethnic and religious communities both within and across state borders. While an unlimited number of other pathways towards a compatibility of morphologies potentially exist, they can broadly be analysed at three levels: the international system, intragroup relations (such as cooperation and integration), and the domestic security architecture of the individual member states. By considering the processes that act to stabilize and simultaneously build the capacity of a state at the domestic level, this section seeks to highlight not just the major pathways, but also the preconditions for identity convergence during the evolution towards a security community. There are potentially unlimited possibilities when it comes to the processes that might contribute towards, or allow for, the development of a security community and to attempt to outline even a representative sample of them is beyond the scope of the present investigation. Instead, the study here outlines what the author considers to be the most important group of processes: those that contribute to the “internal consolidation” of the state. Internal state consolidation is necessary because it directly affects national interests, and according to the classic formulation by Joseph Frankel, national interests, most significantly explain the foreign policies of each state in the community.45 Such national interests are best understood through a formulation based on goals, the most important of which are “… state survival, wealth maximisation, and the preservation and promotion of values”.46 These goals link back to the discussion of traditional and nontraditional security issues in the previous chapter. In other words, while goals such as “state survival” necessitate the pursuit of security vis-à-vis external actors, these goals also imply a bottom-up approach where there is the need to maintain an adequate level of domestic stability (through tools such as wealth maximization) in order to ensure state survival.47 Should the contentions above be accepted, it then becomes possible to decipher the fundamental national interests of a state based on the sum total of its domestic and exogenous problems. For example, if a state is only newly formed and its people are divided by ethnicity, religion, language (or any combination of these), then it is likely that a significant percentage of a state’s resources will be devoted to the process of nation building (discussed and defined below).48 Furthermore, if a state is dominated by an authoritarian regime, then its national interests may be further confined to the pursuit of


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nation building for the express purpose of “regime survival” — as in the case of Myanmar.49 The greater the number of domestic challenges that exist and shape the national interests of a state, the more this deflects from a focus on national interests understood in terms of regional and/or international goals. Thus, when Soeharto and his New Order regime came to an end following the collapse of the Indonesian economy (for example, a loss of national resilience), it was widely perceived throughout the region that Indonesia had lost its reputation and capacity to act as a leader and “first among equals” within ASEAN. Therefore, internal consolidation is defined as the capacity to avoid intrastate and interstate comprehensive security challenges. Figure 2.2 outlines the three procedural phases of the concept, namely, economic management, nation building, and security sector reform.50

FIGURE 2.2 The Internal Consolidation of the State

Both processes exist to one degree or another

Normative Driven (Communal Influence on State Policy)

Procedural Phases

Nation Building

Security Sector Reform

Normative Creating (State Driven)

Economic Management and Capacity

Social Cohesion and Collective Identity Formation within the State

Internal Consolidation (The Emergence of a Nation State)

Outward Orientation of National Policy

Regional Cooperation Comprehensive Integration

Where there is identification and morphological compatibility



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The Internal Consolidation of the State: Economic Management In the example of Southeast Asia, the internal consolidation of some states in the region — along with the development of political legitimacy — has been largely facilitated by a “focus on economic development since about the mid 1960s”.51 Economic development helps to equip the state with increased resources to be able to assist in both security sector reform and nation building (for example, Singapore, Brunei and, to a more limited extent, Malaysia). In terms of security sector reform, it can help a state to direct sufficient resources to the education and professionalization of the military, police, and other related organs of government. Adequate wages and professional training can further limit the level of corruption in a state and assist in the maintenance of a separation of powers. Of equal importance is the increased ability not only to resolve domestic security problems, but also to resolve the root causes behind them. The resolution of these issues links to the concept of nation building below and the ability of the state to provide services such as an independent, non-secular education. However, and in an increasingly globalized world, the greatest challenge for states is the ability to advance and implement economic development policies whilst simultaneously building social structures and protective mechanisms that can cope with, and benefit from, regional and global markets and economies.

The Internal Consolidation of the State: Nation Building The process of nation building is important in at least two ways. From a state’s perspective, it has the goal of creating domestic security (sometimes referred to as “state building”). In the context of scholarly literature, its purpose is to increase the number of common elements in social communication to build social cohesion thereby contributing to the potential emergence of a collective identity in the future.52 Identity is similarly central to the concept of a nation; a “nation” simply defined, is a “body of people who feel they are a nation”.53 Deutsch takes this approach a step further by specifying that the existence of a nation requires a community organized around a particular system of social communication.54 Over time, the identity of a state is influenced by how the elites and society of a state have been socialized over the long term by the national building policies of the government. Any pluralist and unifying policies that are implemented to this end act to reinforce the collective identity of the state, leading, eventually, to the formation of a “nation state”.


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A nation state exists where the inhabitants of the state consider themselves members of one nation as constituted by the state.55 As shown in Figure 2.2, internal consolidation — in addition to being aided by regional economic, political, and security cooperation — also has a reciprocal effect by facilitating more resources to allow for an outward orientation of a state’s national policy, resulting in heightened regional participation, cooperation, and integration. Nonetheless, while other ASEAN states can aid the construction of a nation state in Southeast Asia, ultimately, internal consolidation is significantly dependent on how the people and leaders of a given state undertake, implement, and respond to the process.56 Given that in some ASEAN states, the internal challenges to security are greater than the external threats (for example, Myanmar, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines), it is important for many of the ASEAN states to achieve further internal consolidation.57 As outlined in Figure 2.2, the nation building process can occur via two methods. It can be state driven (norm-creating), where elite-led state policies drive the salience of norms at the communal level, or alternatively, it can be communally driven (norm-driven), where communal groups influence and/or coerce the nation building polices of the state. While the nation building process can be advanced through any combination of these push/pull factors, a successful nation building process is usually highly dependent on a pluralist (multicultural), state-driven process. A pluralist nation building process refers to those nation building policies of a state that propel a convergence of the national identities in a state. An example of one method to address any incompatibilities in the national identity of the state is an education system that recognizes and promotes understanding and accommodation among the ethnic and religious communities within the nation’s boundaries. This goal might also be achieved through guarantees of religious and cultural freedom, and would normally involve a complete absence of the type of opportunistic scapegoating of individual ethnic communities previously witnessed in parts of Southeast Asia.58

The Internal Consolidation of the State: Security Sector Reform Security sector reform, in its most simplified construction, is the aim of the state to secure “armed, uniformed forces that are functionally differentiated, professional forces under objective and subjective civilian control, at the lowest functional level of resource use”.59 Here, the emphasis on the lowest functional level of resource is aimed at freeing governmental resources in the direction of the other two procedural phases (nation building and economic


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management). Nicole Ball rightly broadens the branches of security sector reform to include civil authorities as well as civil and political society.60 This is because civil authorities have the important responsibility of policy development, while civil and political societies have an important role in terms of developing policy and monitoring the activities of security forces, as well as those of civil authorities. These different actors and bodies fall under the general umbrella of the “democratic security family”. “Legal process reform” (as a sub-framework to security sector reform) relates both to traditional security actors and to civil authorities. Legal process reform considers the various institutions of government that regulate, control, and maintain the rule of law. Adequate legal sector reform results in a government that is more efficient and less corrupt. This in turn results in greater investor confidence and greater levels of satisfaction (performance legitimacy) within the society of a given state. Table 2.1 illustrates the various objectives of security sector reform at three separate political/sociological levels. This table, and the tiers of analysis within it, also reflect a kind of co-dependent relationship that exists between the economic security realms at both the domestic and regional levels of analysis. As the ASEAN elites have realized, it is difficult for economic development (at the state or regional level) to take place in the absence of domestic and regional security.61 Figure 2.3 illustrates that when instability develops (whether caused by domestic, economic, non-traditional security, or military threats) international investors lose confidence and will shift their foreign direct investment (FDI) away from the state (or region) in crisis towards environments more “popularly” considered stable — such as China. TABLE 2.1 Security Sector Reform Levels and Objectives Political Level

Objective of the Security Sector

Institutional Level (armed forces, police, paramilitary)

Professionalization of forces

Economic Level

Minimal resource use by the security sector (links to the goal and pursuit of economic development)

Societal Level

Provision of physical security for the population

Source: Adapted from “Brief 15: Security Sector Reform”, BICC 2000, p. 7


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FIGURE 2.3 The Interrelationship of the Economic and Security Environment (domestic and regional level) Regional Instability

Loss of FDI

Economic Downturn


The requirements of security sector reform, economic management, and a pluralist form of nation building, along with such labels as the “democratic security family”, have so far implied that the existence of democracy is an important factor behind the emergence of dependable expectations of peaceful change. This study, therefore, accepts the contentions that stem from the Kantian notion of “democratic peace”.62 However, this is not to contend that there is a strict division between the two poles of a spectrum where democracy sits at one end as a stabilizing factor, and authoritarianism sits at the other end of the spectrum as an erratic and destabilizing force. On the contrary, recent reports from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) argue that both full democracies and full autocracies are the most stable states, while states undertaking a transition from autocracy to democracy are the ones most likely to suffer from political instability.63 In the case of Deutsch, he seems to dismiss an absolute requirement for democracy by arguing that a commonality of “main values” is sufficient for a possible security community to exist. He adds that where differences in economic and political values and norms do exist, this does not necessarily prohibit the existence of a security community so long as its members avoid the development of a “militant missionary attitude”.64 However,


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both Kacowicz and Vayrynen argue that in non-democratic zones where interstate wars have been absent for a substantial period, then the security architecture is best characterized as one of “negative peace” — that is, where security cooperation is minimal, the security dilemma is high, and the balance of power paradigm is strongly prevalent. A potential caveat to this assessment is provided by Benson and Kugler who contend that the most important political distinction to be made between governments is the degree of government rather than form of government. In other words, efficient governments, rather than just democratic ones, are able to avoid violence at the domestic level.65 Nevertheless, and as Barry Buzan contends in the context of Southeast Asia, while fully-fledged democracy may not be necessary for internal order, it is certainly a huge asset.66 In building on the considerations above, it could be stated that the development of political and institutional capacity represents the most important factor as far as domestic stability is concerned. Nevertheless, the existence of a degree of democracy, and/or efficiency in government, propels, or is a consequence of, the formation of such institutions and structures. The types of structures and institutions that are typically existent in democracies (or efficient governments) impose normative and legal-procedural constraints on the decision making process in foreign and domestic policy. The evolution and development of such institutions, structures, and ideational values results in a strategic environment that is more predictable in nature. Thus, in a stable democracy, unexpected regime change (for example, by way of a coup d’état), and the changes to domestic and foreign policy that go with it (with subsequent effects on regional relations) are reduced. Democracy and the ability to remove peacefully a political party from power (for example, by way of election or through a parliamentary vote of no confidence) also has a moderating effect on the type of leader in power (for example, less radical and generally more pragmatic). As earlier discussed, this is important because it is difficult for a group of states to evolve towards a security community in the absence of domestic stability within the member states, and the stronger and more amicable relations among them that ensue. As the Kantians assert, political and economic liberalism increases the probability of such an outcome.67 One final qualification should be made at this juncture. The conceptual framework takes a pragmatic rather than “missionary” attitude in relation to the “value” and “role” of democracy. It is, therefore, contended that democracy, and the related issue of security sector reform, are simply additional tools which help acquire domestic stability at one level, and peaceful relations, cooperation, and integration at the other. The study recognizes that where


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there is insufficient internal consolidation, then rapid democratization can, in fact, be a destabilizing factor.68 For the case of Southeast Asia, this study, rather than presuming the necessity of democracy, leaves the question open to the empirical analysis in later chapters. More broadly, the processes of economic and security sector reform (for example, a set of compatible workplace relations laws) can enhance the structural compatibility of a community of states. The process of nation building also provides a positive contribution to structural compatibility at both the material and ideational levels. In terms of the ideational contribution (within the context of structural compatibility), positive, pluralist education policies (associated with nation building) also contribute to the forging of common bonds and “we-ness” across states (as opposed to policies that enhance hatred, discrimination, and racism).69

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN SUMMARY Like Southeast Asia, this security community framework is “multilayered, multidimensional, and multipronged”.70 The various components of this chapter, together with the first chapter, have attempted to outline some of the conceptual elements of the definition of a security community, as well as the empirical factors that contribute to its emergence. What has been seen is that “dependable expectations of peaceful change” represent the final and ultimate test of a security community’s existence and, therefore, the ultimate goal for establishing a security community. Likewise, and in reflecting the interdependence entailed by the notion of dependable expectations of peaceful change, the processes behind integration are central to all the defining characteristics of a security community. It is only through the formation of a mature security community that the states of that community can be said to be close to complete integration. While dependable expectations of peaceful change can exist where there is sufficient integration at the political, economic, and socio-cultural levels, this does not automatically translate into an amassed or cumulative status of being integrated. For example, it is foreseeable that certain transnational elements could have integrated themselves within an ascendant security community to a point where there exist dependable expectations of peaceful change, but there remain some components that are not yet integrated and, therefore, the overall characterization would fall short of being adequately integrated for the purpose of a mature security community characterization. Thus, the status of being integrated to the extent of a mature security community is an absolute


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test, whereas dependable expectations of peaceful change can exist at a lower threshold and is relative to a pragmatic assessment of the empirical elements contributing to the comprehensive security architecture of the grouping — that is, no remaining or potential conflict initiators. In summary, where there exist dependable expectations of peaceful change then, ipso facto, there exists (at least) a nascent security community. However, it is only when the states of the community are adequately integrated (based on the constituent elements listed in Chapter 1) that they can properly be characterized as being members of a mature security community. The processes that contribute to integration begin at all levels — that is, the domestic, state, transnational, and international levels. While there appears to be no specific law regarding the order of these processes, an analysis of the socio-cultural history of the states examined may indicate whether integration will be a natural outcome of evolution (communally driven) or whether such integration must be engineered (state driven). Once the dominant processes for integration have been determined, it is then possible to hypothesize the order by which the processes behind integration may emerge and/or become dominant at a given point in time — for example, economic, political, and/or socio-cultural. As indicated by the analysis, an increase of integration in one area can translate to a reciprocal increase in one or more alternative areas. Nevertheless, and before high levels of integration can materialize at the transnational level, it is necessary for states to consolidate internally. Once internally consolidated, the leadership of a state will have enhanced its capacity to focus on its foreign relations and will be less distracted by domestic concerns. The three processes behind internal consolidation — nation building, successful economic management (including capacity building), and security sector reform — are also interdependent and mutually reinforcing. It is interesting to note that empirical investigations of the EU, the world’s most pre-eminent multilateral security community, have uncovered only a limited sense of collective identity at the communal level of analysis. There is, however, a relatively stronger sense of collective identity at the diplomatic elite level, and this has been a consequence of, inter alia, a multitude of social transactions over several decades which were facilitated, in part, by the processes of Track One and Track Two dialogue. Recent international events (such as the invasion of Iraq) have shown some splits in the fabric of this identity, but for the time being, the EU does succeed in maintaining dependable expectations of peaceful change. For this reason, it is argued that a nascent security community can exist where common identities (for all intents and purposes) are confined to the elite level. The one major caveat to this statement pertains to any divergence of identity at


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the communal level that is so significant that it becomes impossible for the elites to avoid (consciously or subconsciously) the effect of such ideational divisions. Such circumstances may be a consequence of violent histories and other ideational factors, including those that stem from differences in religion, culture, and ethnicity. As will be evidenced in later chapters, the substantial additions to the theory of a security community offered by this study do not, however, entail an assessment that ASEAN is, or will be, a security community as a predetermined proposition. Thus, this framework is also different from some earlier works on the subject in its attempt to develop a conceptual toolkit designed to measure critically the impediments to security community formation. The approach undertaken by the remaining chapters is also designed to seek further insights on the root causes behind instability, and the potential for conflict in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, and concerning the community components of the framework, the study is limited to the types of ideational attributes, processes, and policies that form the collective identity of the state (when it is a nation state) or the communities within the state. To this end, the analysis in the remaining chapters will be founded on the basis of concrete historical settings71 and seeks to examine how instability in Myanmar challenges the comprehensive security environment of Southeast Asia and, therefore, dependable expectations of peaceful change. More importantly, however, this will set the scene for a deeper understanding (by the book’s conclusion) of how domestic, transnational, and international challenges in Myanmar expose and exacerbate certain normative flaws and divisions within the organization. As will be seen, the development of an ASEAN wide collective identity at the elite level, together with ASEAN’s aspiration to become a security community more generally, is thoroughly put to the test by the case of Myanmar.72

Notes 1

2

3

A.P. Cortell and J.W. Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of Norms: A Research Agenda”, International Studies Review 2, no. 1 (2000): 161. Kate O’Neill, Jorg Balsiger, and Stacy D. VanDeveer, “Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate”, Annual Review of Political Science 7 (2004): 162. As O’Neill estates, “In structuration theory, agency denotes the ability to choose among different courses of action, to learn from previous experience, and to effect change. Social agency sometimes depends solely on the capability of actors to make a difference in the production of definite outcomes, regardless of whether or not they intend (are aware) that these outcomes occur. Since ‘to make a difference’ is to


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4 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

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transform some aspect of the process or event, agency in structuration theory is equated with transformative capacity” [Emphasis by author]. Ibid. Ibid. Trine Flockhart, “‘Complex Socialisation’: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization”, European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1 (2006): 90. The terms “structurationist” was originally coined by Giddens; see Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies (London: Hutchinson, 1976). For a concise overview see also Michael Barnett, “Social Constructivism”, in The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 254–55. Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences (Harveston: Brighton, 1979), p. 359. See also Alex J. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators? (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 20; O’Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, “Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate”, p. 151; Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, International Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 335–70. Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 23. While agreeing with Flockhart’s analysis that the state exists as a real entity (Flockhart, “‘Complex Socialisation’: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization”, p. 92), the framework here diverges in that it partially accepts Wendt’s contention that a state contains a social identity (or more accurately, reflects to a degree, the collective identity of the state’s political elite), albeit with certain caveats such as the structural restrictions placed on the state and its political elite. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 193–245. Colin Wight, “State Agency: Social Action without Human Activity”, Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004): 275–76. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?, p. 38. See also Andrew Hurrell, “Norms and Ethics in International Relations”, in Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: Sage, 2005), pp. 141–42. Richard Ned Lebow, “Reason, Emotion and Cooperation”, International Politics 42 (2005): 294. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, p. 23. Sutherland provides two examples of the role of contrasting historical contexts on the member states of the EU, by comparing Britain’s “fateful resignation” with Spain’s “exuberant happiness” joining the organization. Claire Sutherland, “Another Nation Building Bloc? Integrating National Ideology into the EU and ASEAN”, Asia Europe Journal 3 (2005): 144. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 170.


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16

17

18

19

20

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22


Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, in Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 43–44. As Bellamy adds, but in relation to the interstate level of analysis, “We are not talking about transcending national [or ethnic or sociocultural] loyalties or replacing particularlism with cosmopolitanism, an idea that is implied in much of the security community literature. Instead, what we are talking about here is the production of common identities in which ‘the category of the collective is part of the self-conception of individuals’”. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?, p. 38. Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 24–25. As Acharya contends, they are specific to a group and (as with the formation of identity) are “likely to reflect the historical and cultural milieu of the actors”. In relation to the contentions of the present study, a fair criticism could be directed towards the fact that in regions such as Southeast Asia (in particular) the expectations and desires at the communal level are not necessarily reflected by the policies of the elite (for example, in the absence of democracy). At one level of analysis, such an assertion would be correct, but the emphasis here is on the processes that shape the ideational attributes of people and it is contended that this applies to all members of a state’s society, including the elites. For example, if the state is a nation state that has one national language, then it is likely that the elite will also speak the same language. If it is a Buddhist state, then it is likely that the leaders will also be Buddhist. If there is an historical mistrust of another country that is taught (or preached) for the earliest stages of childhood, then it is also likely that the elite will be socialized to a point where they will reflect such a perception to one degree or another (for example, Thailand and Myanmar). Flockhart, “‘Complex Socialisation’: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization”, p. 96. As Michael Barnett argues, “… no structure is so determining that it eliminates the capacity for critical reflection and the possibility that agents might knowingly attempt to transform the structure”. Barnett, “Social Constructivism”, p. 255. O’Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, “Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate”, p. 152. Flockhart, “‘Complex Socialisation’: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization”, p. 96. O’Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer, “Actors, Norms, and Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-Structure Debate”, p. 160. Charles W. Jr. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics (Colombia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), p. 248.


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Processes behind the Emergence of a Security Community 23

24

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Raimo Vayrynen, “Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building”, Occasional Paper No. 18 (The Joan B. Krock Institute for International Peace Studies, 11 June 2000 [cited 10 September 2001]), available at . Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, p. 37. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism”, International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 586. This has been reapplied from the contention of Alagappa that political survival is the “most basic goal of Asian states”. Muthiah Alagappa, ed., “Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conception and Issues”, in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 79. He characterizes ideational survival as one of four subservient goals to political survival. However, this characterization has limited application when applied to a theory that proposes to be of general application. For this reason, the study places both ideational and political survival as equal goals forming the national interests of a state. The actual norms and premises that constitute political and ideational survival will depend on an empirical analysis of a given state. Further factors that build and develop trust as well as an interstate collective identity are considered in the following two tiers of the framework. Meanwhile, the case studies examined in later chapters will consider more specifically the types of structural and ideational attributes of the states in Southeast Asia that have the potential to impede such a collective identity and the cooperation and integration that go with it. See the contrasting views of Gries and Mercer: Peter Hays Gries, “Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China Threat’ Inevitable?”, European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (2005): 256–57; Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity”, International Organization 49, no. 2 (1995): 233. Flockhart, “‘Complex Socialisation’: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization”, pp. 90–92. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?, p. 43. John Turner, Rediscovering the Social Group (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1987), p. 1. Similarly, but at the individual unit of analysis, Henri Tajfel has defined social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group … together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership”. Cited in Gries, “Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China Threat’ Inevitable?”, p. 240. Flockhart, “‘Complex Socialisation’: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization”, p. 94.


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48 33

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39 40

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Hemmer and Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism”, p. 586. Flockhart, “‘Complex Socialisation’: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization”, p. 94. Ibid. Gries, “Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China Threat’ Inevitable?”, p. 241. Jennifer Crocker and Riia Luhtanen, “Collective Self-Esteem and Ingroup Bias”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58, no. 1 (1990): 62–63. These findings reflect, to a certain extent, the arguments of Wendt who suggested that a state’s desire “for predictability in [its] relationships with the world” drives state actors to “seek recognition as an actor by others …” Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (1994): 385. Flockhart, “‘Complex Socialisation’: A Framework for the Study of State Socialization”, p. 95. Ibid. There have been a number of occasions when ASEAN has been able to apply a unified position in response to challenges that have arisen from states exogenous to the grouping. One example pertains to the censure by ASEAN of China following its occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995. Dana R. Dillon, “Contemporary Security Challenges in Southeast Asia”, Dow Jones Interactive Database (Parameters, 1997 [cited 28 April 2002]); available at . Another example relates to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and how this “galvanized ASEAN political cooperation and sustained its role as a diplomatic community”. How San Khoo, “ASEAN as a ‘Neighborhood Watch Group’” (Electronic Database — Expanded Academic ASAP) (Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 2, 2000 [cited 17 May 2005]), available at <www.infotrac.galegroup. com>. David Campbell, cited in Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?, p. 43. Gries, “Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China Threat’ Inevitable?”, p. 239. Ibid. Ibid., p. 240. Gries provides a detailed list of exceptions that could act to prevent the emergence of competition leading to hostility. Because these exceptions, such as social mobility and social creativity are subjective, ambiguous, and apply awkwardly to the current security community framework, this study rejects them in favour of a return to some additional ideational considerations within the constructivist literature to build further on the discussion of norms and identity in the context of social identity theory, namely, trust, and knowledge. Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1.


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Processes behind the Emergence of a Security Community 46 47

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P.A. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations (London, 1980), p. 49. The concept of internal consolidation, as developed in this study, has some common ground with the philosophy behind “national resilience” and “regional resilience” and the perceived interdependence between the two ideas. Thus, while national resilience was perceived by Soeharto to build regional resilience, the reverse was also considered true as far as the benefits of regional resilience were concerned. As Michael Leifer stated, “[b]y cultivating intra-mural accord and so reducing threats among themselves, the ASEAN states would be able to devotes themselves through the instrumentality of economic development to the common cause of political stability”. Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 2. While a number of states continue to pursue “nation-building policies” actively and the term is at times referred to in their policy statements, the concept was originally a staple concept of the development oriented political science in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, see David Ernest Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation: A Developmental Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). National interests can be interpreted narrowly as the national interests of the elite rather than society as a whole, or, alternatively, they can be broader and more egalitarian in nature with the pursuit of what benefits the entire society of the state. This may, at times, follow a trend where states that are more democratic tend to form opinions about their national interests based on what is good for the state’s society as a whole, whereas the national interests of authoritarian regimes can tend to be narrower, and may be limited, or, at least, prioritized toward regime survival. Alagappa has since referred to a similar process called “state consolidation” and this is based on the building of nations, constructing viable political systems and strengthening state capacity. Muthiah Alagappa, ed., “Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite Changes”, in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 20. Ibid., p. 21. Karin von Hippel, “Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building”, The Washington Quarterly (2000): 96. Rasma Karklins, “The Concept of Collective Identity”, paper presented at the Directorate of Communication and Research, Strasbourg, 17–18 April 2001, p. 5. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience (New York: Greenwood Press, 1957), pp. 36–37. See also Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967). Kacowicz adds, “[it] is a geographically bounded legal entity under a single and recognized government, the population of which psychologically considers itself


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to be related, through historical, linguistic, racial, or other links”. Arie Kacowicz, “Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Overlapping?”, Alternative: Social Transformation and Humane Governance 24 (1999): 532. See also Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 209. Alagappa, ed., “Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite Changes”, p. 20. Alagappa, ed., “Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conception and Issues”, p. 80. Tim Huxley argued that “weak statehood”, along with historical ethnic and geographical factors, are the key variables in the facilitation of ASEAN’s core security problems. Huxley, Insecurity in the ASEAN Region (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), p. 83. Both Myanmar and Indonesia provide good examples of negative, state-driven nation building processes. In the case of Indonesia, since independence in 1949, there have been more anti-Chinese riots than in any other country within Southeast Asia. Yong Leng Lee, “Race, Language, and National Cohesion in Southeast Asia”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 11, no. 1 (1980): 128. This is because towards the end of the 1950s, the anti-communist military largely blamed the local Chinese for communist insurgencies. The Chinese communities were utilized as a scapegoat to divert dissatisfaction away from both the Sukarno and Soeharto regimes. Sukarno excluded all alien Chinese from retail and rural trade, and the military repatriated many Chinese nationals. Resented for their wealth and for their alleged involvement in communist insurgencies, massive numbers of Chinese were massacred. Carl H. Lande, “Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia”, Studies in Comparative International Development 33, no. 4 (1999): 101. In the case of Myanmar, its attempts at nation building were, and continue to be, highly exclusionary in nature, with tactics ranging from alien expulsion (that is, of Indians and Pakistanis) to the oppression and slaughter of those who would not submit themselves to the dominant regime-defined Burmese culture and religion. Michael Brzoska, “The Concept of Security Sector Reform”, in Security Sector Reform, edited by Connie Wall (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2000), p. 6. Nicole Ball, “Towards a Conceptual Framework for Security Sector Reform” (Report, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2001 [cited 11 April 2001]), available at . “ASEAN Tackles Terrorism and Trade” (Internet, BBC News, 2002 [cited 30 July 2002]), available at . For example, see John W. Patty and Roberto A. Weber, “Agreeing to Fight: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace”, Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5, no. 3 (2006): 305–20. The PITF studies are located at . See, for example, Jack A. Goldstone et al., “A Global Forecasting Model of Political


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Instability”, in Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Washington, D.C.: Political Instability Task Force, 2005), pp. 28–29. Vayrynen similarly contends that many semi-democratic states (for example, Colombia, India, Sri Lanka, and Northern Ireland) have suffered more from large-scale internal violence than have some authoritarian states. Vayrynen, “Stable Peace through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building” (cited). Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, pp. 123–25. Michelle Benson and Jacek Kugler, “Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal Violence”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 2 (1998): 198–99. Interestingly, he adds, none of the Western arguments for the decline of war (democracy, interdependence, institutions etc.) exists in East Asia. Barry Buzan, “Security Architecture in Asia: The Interplay of Regional and Global Level”, The Pacific Review 16, no. 2 (2003): 143–73. John R. O’Neal and Bruce M. Russett, “The Classic Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985”, International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 267–68. Goldstone et al., “A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability”, pp. 28–32. Other areas of concern could include radical religious schools that explicitly or implicitly promote religious and/or racial hatred of people from competing religions. Surin Pitsuwan cited in Paul Evans, “Possibilities for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Track 2 and Track 1” (Internet — Paper, Pacific Symposium, 2001 [cited 24 June 2002]), available at . Katzenstein argues that most people in the field agree that the national identity of a state cannot be deductively stipulated, but must be empirically investigated based on “concrete historical settings”. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, p. 24. Flaws of which Rizal Sukma was seemingly aware, and this has likely influenced his proposal for an ASEAN security community in the first place. Rizal Sukma, “The Future of ASEAN: Towards a Security Community” (Seminar Paper, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, 2003 [cited 24 August 2003]), available at <www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/ Mission/asean/paper_rizalsukma.PDF>.


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3 THE EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC INSTABILITY AND ITS EXTENT IN MYANMAR This chapter seeks to lay the groundwork for a deeper understanding of the factors contributing to instability in Myanmar and thereby ASEAN’s security community project. Interdependent with this is an analysis of the “domestic” consequences of instability and the prospects for change. The analysis is further designed to provide some understanding of the linkages between history, instability, ethnic conflict, and human rights abuse within the country. The necessity of this approach also arises from, and is complemented by, the conceptual framework in the previous chapter, which discussed the need for each member of a potential security community to consolidate internally. The successful internal consolidation of Myanmar, in addition to freeing the resources of the state for the purpose of regional integration, would assist in removing any destabilizing transnational factors that have the potential to compromise the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the deliberation by this chapter of the internal dynamics of the state, together with the perceptions and actions of its leadership, provides an important understanding of the “interests” of the state “without which, no theory of international relations can be adequate”.1 Finally, the analysis of Myanmar’s internal security environment provides an important background to an assessment (in the final chapter) of the extent to which Myanmar presents an obstacle (both materially and normatively) to ASEAN’s security community project. 52


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The Evolution of Domestic Instability and Its Extent in Myanmar

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BURMESE HISTORY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES — AN OVERVIEW Broadly speaking, Myanmar underwent three historical phases in its embryonic unification as a nation state. In the first phase, parts of Myanmar were inhabited by small settlements as far back as 11,000 years ago. These palaeolithic and pro-neolithic groups settled, in the very least, along the Irrawaddy Valley and the eastern part of the present-day Shan State. In the second phase, and between the first century BC and the ninth century AD, the Pyu, speakers of the Tibeto-Burman languages and followers of Sarvastivada Buddhism, established city-kingdoms at Halingyi, Mongamo, Sri Ksetra, and Binnaka. By the eighth century, Pye, the former capital of the Pyu, had fallen to the Mons, and in the ninth century, the Pyu disappeared from historical records as a discrete people. The third and final phase in the establishment and semi-unification of Myanmar was the rise of the Bamar (Burmese) civilization. Initially, they established themselves in the northern dry zone with a small settlement in the present-day city of Pagan, but eventually they institutionalized Theravada Buddhism as the principal religion throughout much of the country.2 By 1057, and under the leadership of King Anawrahta, the Burmese had unified (temporarily) the hub of modern-day Myanmar, with a single kingdom centred at Pagan. However, the lack of power, influence, and control, in the highland areas meant that the different ethnic groups (including the Bamar majority) remained relatively distinct from one another in areas pertaining to “language, culture, patterns of production, and political traditions”.3 An early dynamic contributing to the eventual divisions and tensions that now exist between the Bamar and the ethnic minorities stemmed from the differentiations in wealth generated by the geographical locations of the various ethnic groups. In the case of the Bamar, their long-term control of the lush and fertile soil in the lowlands allowed for the cultivation of irrigated, wet rice plantations. This contributed to the emergence of the comparatively larger, wealthier, and more hegemonic Bamar. In contrast, the ethnic minorities were predominately confined to the highland areas where dry rice plantations were necessary. This resulted in comparatively poorer and smaller villages and kingdoms.4 These early ethnic-based divisions — combined with a turbulent and cyclic period of invasion, disintegration, and reunification within Myanmar — contributed to the vulnerability of Myanmar (and its sovereignty) to colonization by the British Empire. In hindsight, we see that the British quickly developed a sophisticated understanding of the ethnic dynamics


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of the time and manipulated them to their advantage.5 Between 1824 and 1826, Britain conquered the Tanintharyi (Tanasserim) and Rakhine (Arakan) provinces. After two further wars (1852 and 1885) the Konbaung dynasty collapsed and Myanmar, by and large, succumbed to the authority of the British.6 To achieve this objective, and to maintain control later, the British implemented their historical stratagem of divide and rule. Here, the British favoured and recruited the Karen, Kachin, and Chin ethnic groups into the colonial army and administration.7 In circumstances where the Bamar had proudly identified themselves as the unifiers of modern-day Myanmar, the approach by the British fostered “minority demands as well as majority resentments”.8 Mistrust and division among the various ethnic groups of Myanmar was further exacerbated in World War II, when the alignment by the Bamar with the Japanese contributed to the committal of many atrocities against, and bloody clashes with, the remaining ethnic groups in Myanmar.9 By the time Myanmar had gained independence in 1948, these ethnic rivalries contributed to the fragmentation of the British installed political system and hampered the stability of the newly independent government. During the early years of independence, various initiatives were implemented in an attempt to placate some of the ethnic minority groups. In February 1947, one month after an accord for independence with the British, the Panglong Agreement was signed.10 This “declaration of intent” facilitated the granting of autonomy to the Shan, Kachin, and Chin provinces. However, the declaration fell well short of covering the 142 ethnic and linguistic groups that comprise one third of the country’s populace.11 Shortly thereafter, General Aung San, then leader and Prime Minister of Myanmar, along with the majority of his cabinet, were assassinated under the direction of U Saw.12 As a leader, General Aung San had successfully worked to accommodate the needs of the ethnic minorities, and the loss of his statesmanlike presence dealt a severe blow to the unification of Myanmar. Despite this setback, the government managed to pass its first constitution unanimously on 24 September 1947.13 While the constitution emphasized the need to accommodate and placate ethnic differences (in line with the approach of General Aung San),14 a major flaw was the fact that it lacked any ethnic representation vis-à-vis the Mon, Chin, or Rakhine peoples.15 In the absence of Aung San’s strong and charismatic leadership, the constitution proved inadequate to placate the diverse array of ethnic and political groups throughout the country. Consequently, the level of domestic stability in Myanmar rapidly declined. First, the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) boycotted the 1947 democratic elections and went underground. Then, in March 1948, and within three months of independence, several thousand


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soldiers from the newly formed army (Tatmadaw) had defected to the BCP. These events, inter alia, culminated to a point where the government lost control over the greater part of the country and Yangon itself was soon in threat of falling from government control.16 It is in light of this background, and following a further ten years of instability, that U Nu ceded authority to General Ne Win (then army chief of staff ) and his “caretaker” military government in 1958. Democratic elections were held for the last time in 1960 and U Nu’s party was returned to office. The win, however, was not without costs. Despite the “relative” economic success during the two-year reign by the military, support for U Nu came partly in response to the already repressive means of the military and this reaction was a complete surprise to its leaders (an experience to be repeated in 1990). Furthermore, U Nu’s promotion of himself as an “ideal Buddhist ruler”, together with Buddhism as a state religion, increased the ideological divide between the Bamar and the ethnic minority groups, some of which practised alternative religions.17 In 1962, General Ne Win launched a military coup, placed U Nu under house arrest, and soon suspended the 1947 Constitution. Claiming legitimacy under the guise of a need to unify and stabilize Myanmar, Ne Win established the “Revolutionary Council” under which he ruled for a further twenty-six years. Through this Council, the “Burmese Way to Socialism” was proclaimed and the economy nationalized, all independent newspapers, and foreign owned enterprises were banned, and he attempted to isolate the country from external influence through various ventures, including membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).18 In the immediate years that followed, Ne Win undertook an assimilationist approach to nation building where Bamar became the only permitted medium of instruction in the new (compulsory) primary education system.19 While government sponsored human rights abuses had occurred prior to this time (such as forced relocations in Bago), this marked the beginning of a new era where the independence of the judiciary, the rule of law, the rights of the individual, and the equality of all were no longer viewed as necessary components to state polity. In 1987, following several years of deterioration in the economy, the government demonetized the majority of its bank notes. This pushed the economy to the brink of bankruptcy and many people lost their savings.20 For several months widespread resentment mounted until it reached boiling point with the Red Bridge incident in March 1988. On this occasion, the authorities killed dozens of peaceful student protestors and this sparked additional protests throughout the nation that eventually led to Ne Win’s resignation.21 In spite of this, many segments of society believed the regime remained little more than a “fox in sheep’s clothing” and the level of public


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protest did not decline. On the auspicious date of 8.8.88, tens of thousands of people, representing a broad spectrum of Myanmar’s ethnic diversity, launched demonstrations throughout the country to demand, if not a democratic system of governance, then, at least, a change of government. The protests were not always as peaceful as has been claimed. For example, in one instance military intelligence officers and suspected informers were lynched. There was also widespread looting and some individuals attacked the Tatmadaw with improvised weapons such as jinglees — darts made from sharpened umbrella or bicycle spokes. These events further heightened a deep-seated fear of potential repercussions should the junta lose power in the future.22 The junta also suspected that the BCP and/or Western backed groups were coordinating the protests. Subsequently, the junta responded with unrestrained violence and thousands were killed and imprisoned in the process. The actions of the government demonstrated that it lacked the intellectual and institutional capacity to engage political opposition through any other means besides coercion and brutality.23 On 18 September 1988, in response to an increasingly marginalized leadership and the mounting chaos and lawlessness that ensued, a group of officers calling themselves the “State Law and Order Restoration Council” — with the ominous acronym of SLORC — reinstated government control in central Myanmar and announced plans for multiparty elections.24 It was at this point that Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of “independence founder” General Aung San, entered the stage and formed the National League for Democracy (NLD). Despite her arrest and disqualification from the elections, the NLD won 392 (or 80 per cent) of the 485 parliamentary seats.25 The SLORC, stunned by the result, refused to recognize the vote and thereby demurred in handing over power to the government-elect. Under the new name of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), they remain in power to this day.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF HISTORY — HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE AND CONFLICT It is in light of Myanmar’s history that the country is considered to have the worst human rights record in Asia, and potentially, one of the worst in the world. As discussed in the conceptual chapters, the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia, including peace in general, can be affected by a broad range of non-traditional security items. In the context of Myanmar, a report entitled “Quality of Partnership: Myanmar, ASEAN and the World”26 argues that such comprehensive security issues include environmental degradation,


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human trafficking, the spread of narcotics and diseases, forced child labour and prostitution, a proliferation of small arms, the challenges caused and/or associated with widespread displacement and illegal migration and, “perhaps most importantly in the long-term, uneven progress in improving educational systems and other forms of human resource development”.27 While some of these issues (such as poor education) can be attributed to a failure in state capacity, several also link more directly to ethnic conflict and the continuation of the insurgency movement.28 The protracted nature of these conflicts — now the world’s longest ongoing civil war — has also been intensified by the inability of the Tatmadaw to engage all the ethnic minority groups in constructive dialogue.

Child Soldiers One human rights issue to have been addressed directly by the United Nations and, specifically, by Kofi Annan29 is the forcible recruitment of children into the Burmese Army.30 Despite a minimum age requirement of eighteen, as many as 20 per cent (70,000) of the national army’s 350,000 soldiers are reportedly underaged.31 While information on the age of child-soldiers ranges from as young as seven, to eleven years, the upper end of this spectrum is more probable.32 It is claimed that these children are recruited, in part, because they are obedient and well suited to guerrilla warfare as they can reach places other soldiers cannot due to their agility and size. Additionally, many children — especially orphans and street children — were forced into the Tatmadaw by local authorities to fulfil strict government quotas that do not distinguish or enforce the government’s age requirement of eighteen.33 Former child soldiers have reported that individual recruiters frequently receive bags of rice and the equivalent of around eleven U.S. dollars (11,000 Kyat) per recruit.34 The kidnapping of children often takes place at “railway, bus and ferry stations” and is perpetrated through threats of detention, intimidation, and violence.35 In some instances, there have been reports of summary executions where a child has attempted to “desert” or run away.36 Following recruitment, and a brutal period of training, these children are then forced to fight against armed ethnic opposition groups and, in many instances, to carry out further human rights abuses, including the burning of villages, the rounding up of villagers for forced labour, and extrajudicial executions.37 A silver lining is the fact that the extent of the demand for child soldiers may have fallen by the turn of the century as the success of the ceasefire regime (discussed later) meant that it was no longer necessary to continue expanding the number of soldiers in the Tatmadaw, and there no longer exists a shortage of labour


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to warrant such recruitment in the military.38 Today, the problem of child soldiers continues to exist, but is more logically limited to insurgent army groups that do suffer from a shortage of available personnel.

Forced Labour and the Use of Porters for the Military The use of children is not limited to compulsory recruitment into the military. Where a family’s father is either away or killed, then at least one of his children, in certain rural areas, must take his place, where necessary, to fulfil government-imposed labour quotas.39 More generally, forced labour is an issue that also applies to all capable age groups and sexes in Myanmar. This is because the SPDC supports — or at least tolerates — the use of forced labour for purposes ranging from major infrastructure projects through to porters for the military.40 By the turn of the new millennium, it was estimated that the government had forced more than 800,000 of its citizens to work as labourers for little or no pay in a desperate bid to bolster its sinking economy.41 The infrastructural projects on which the country’s people have been forced to work have involved such things as the construction of military barracks, dams, roads, and railroads.42 More specifically, countless thousands of men and children have also been coerced to work as porters from villages and even prisons.43 These porters have been used to support attacks against ethnic rebel groups, during which they face the harshest of conditions that include hauling heavy loads of rice and munitions whilst on starvation diets.44 These people are also used as human minesweepers and human shields in battles against ethnic rebels.45 While one individual, connected to the SPDC, admitted in an interview that the practice continues, he argued, by way of justification, that the government did attempt to stop it for about a year, but the military found it “simply too difficult to function without porters”. He adds that while the military does try to pay its porters, the practice continues to involve “some form of coercion”.46

The Displacement of Persons The SPDC has also been criticized for an array of policies that have contributed directly to the displacement of persons. Between 1996 and 2004, more than 2,740 villages were estimated to have been “destroyed, relocated or abandoned”. Furthermore, between 2002 and 2004, more than 160,000 persons were thought to have been displaced,47 with 526,000 in the eastern part of the country alone.48 In 2006, the Thai-Burma Consortium, an aid agency caring for refugees along the border, indicated that the situation


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had declined further with an estimated 82,000 displaced from their homes that year alone.49 Some of these displacements were carried out in order to satisfy contractual obligations with Thai and Chinese logging companies by clearing the border areas of insurgents so that their loggers could operate safely. To this end, villages have been burnt, and in some instances, their people — in the process of being forced to relocate — have been tortured, raped, and/or executed.50 In circumstances where the Tatmadaw have accused various villagers of having supported armed opposition groups, then the entire village has been evicted.51 Once evicted, landmines have reportedly been laid around some of these villages to prevent reoccupation. The scale of the displacement of ethnic minorities, together with their systematic suppression, has been argued by some to be “an attempt to assimilate and destroy the culture of the ethnic minorities”. In more recent times, people in the cities have also been forcibly relocated so the government’s developmental projects can be carried out.52 These displacements have contributed to a crisis in Thailand of nearly 150,000 refugees and over one million illegal migrants (see Chapter 4).

Mass Rape The widespread rape of ethnic minority women throughout the border areas has also been a major problem. In 2002 a report by the Shan Human Rights Foundation and the Shan Women’s Action Network documented the rape of 625 women and children by the Tatmadaw in the Shan State, while a 2004 report detailed the rape of an additional 125 women in the Karen State.53 Such abuse, however, is not limited to the ethnic minority areas. The report, “System of Impunity”, by the Women’s League of Burma, provides a detailed account of how soldiers have subjected the country to a pattern of sexual violence throughout the nation.54 According to the Shan Women’s Action network, 61 per cent of the cases they documented were gang rapes and 83 per cent of the total rape cases involved high-ranking military officers.55 A 2005 rape of a soldier’s young daughter shows that few are immune from such violence and is further evidence of the inability and/or reluctance of the government to implement security sector reform and professionalize the military.56

The Use of Chemical Weapons It has been alleged that the junta has also resorted to the use of chemical weapons on five separate occasions between 1984 and 2005 in order to


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FIGURE 3.1 Chemical Weapons Attack Site at Kawmura

Source: Photograph taken by the author, 6 June 2005.

obtain a strategic advantage in armed warfare. The use of these weapons, if the allegations are correct, appears to have been directed primarily against the Karen and Kachin insurgent groups. Figure 3.1 shows the Myanmar/Thai border site of Kawmura (north of Mae Sot) where the Tatmadaw reportedly used chemical weapons during the final stages of their capture of the Karen stronghold in February 1995. The most recent incident in the reported use of chemical warfare pertains to a number of mustard gas shells that were fired into another Karenni Army base at Nya My (near Mae Hong Son) on the 15 February 2005.57

Extrajudicial Killings and Political Prisoners Equally disconcerting are accusations that the junta is guilty of committing extrajudicial killings on a frequent basis. Between June 2003 and August 2004, eighty-two such murders were reported in the Shan state alone.58 Some


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recent evidence concerning rape and murder has come from Thai intelligence intercepts that include video footage of villages being burnt and the residents being murdered in front of the camera.59 However, many dissidents who are not killed are imprisoned. Despite various releases of political prisoners over the years, the government continues to hold an estimated 1,100 political prisoners including journalists, teachers, lawyers, student leaders, monks, writers, and poets, as well as NLD and other opposition leaders.60 These prisoners are subjected to torture on a routine basis and the pro-democracy activists who have not been arrested are frequently harassed. 61 Not all harassment, however, is related to politics. One dissident reported how shortly before the author’s arrival in the country, a sixteen-year-old girl was detained and tortured for more than forty-eight hours because she had played music in the street without a permit.62

The Domestic Environment for Political Moderates and the Opposition As the education system within the country is rapidly collapsing,63 the prospects for the regime being replaced by a new, improved, and more educated leadership have become much starker. Those who had pushed for reform, or at least been open to reform, have been variously removed from positions of influence, retired, or ousted from power. One of the most notable examples occurred with the removal of the country’s former prime minister, Khin Nyunt, on 17 October 2004. Khin Nyunt was considered by some — arguably and relatively speaking — to be one of the more moderate leaders and the one most open to reform, as well as negotiation and compromise with the ethnic minority groups.64 He had established many links throughout the region and was especially well connected in China. He was also in charge of the comparatively more educated and sophisticated (but overtly corrupt) military intelligence (MI) division of the Tatmadaw. Despite his power and position as prime minister, his removal was executed efficiently and without recorded protest. President Than Shwe provided only a few hours’ notice for the operation to regional Tatmadaw commanders, whereby they were first put on high alert and then, within a few hours, ordered to arrest all mid to high-ranking officers in the MI.65 Equally disturbing is that any opportunity to return to office the elected representatives of the NLD is fast coming to an end. Many have passed away and in the case of the Central Executive Committee of the NLD, the remaining seven to eight members are now in their seventies and eighties.66 Besides, the NLD is now only a “shell of its former past” due to the oppressive


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actions of the junta.67 Throughout the country hundreds of members of the NLD have been variously arrested, placed under house arrest, or have disappeared in mysterious circumstances in the course of the past decade.68 In contrast, the presence of civil society in Myanmar is surprisingly strong and has been growing rapidly in recent years. A report by Save the Children was able to list sixty-four non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 455 community-based organizations (CBOs) on which many segments of Myanmar depend.69 These NGOs and CBOs present a valuable opportunity for the international community and ASEAN to provide aid and engage at the societal level. However, as promising as these developments are, there remains little to no prospect that political change will occur as a result of a sustained and coordinated campaign by civil society in Myanmar. Expression of thought is now tightly controlled in the universities and educational institutions that continue to operate, and any elements “disloyal” to the regime (at least publicly) have long since been removed from a position of influence (in universities or otherwise).

Domestic Instability and the Unity of the Tatmadaw For the foreseeable future, it is only in relation to the stability of the regime that there is a very limited prospect of significant domestically driven change. In May 2005 for example, three coordinated bombings took place throughout Yangon. While speculation as to who were behind the attacks varied from disgruntled rogue elements of insurgent groups to individuals formally in Myanmar’s military intelligence, a less known possibility is that the source of the bombings may have come from a faction within the Tatmadaw itself. The information passed to the author is that, in part, a faction was disgruntled about missing out on a contract for trade, and the three bombs, including one targeting a Thai Trade delegation, were sent as a warning to the central government.70 Three months after the bombings, reports of a possible coup emerged (22 August 2005). While they turned out to be a hoax reportedly orchestrated by the junta in an attempt to pre-empt and/or prevent an actual coup, the event seems to add weight to the hypothesis that all is not well within the junta. General Than Shwe had actually been flown to a Singapore hospital on 26 August. Interestingly, before seeking medical assistance, the leader was reported to have approached his astrologer for guidance (as Bamar custom dictates) and it was here that the idea of feigning a coup was hatched in order to address Than Shwe’s concerns over the instability in the regime.71


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Rumours of divisions between the junta’s top ranks occurred throughout much of 2008.72 In this context, it was reported that the promotion of Shwe Mann to Chief of Joint Staff suggests that General Maung Aye may be retired should Than Shwe either die or retire.73 Some Burmese have indicated a perception that he may provide relatively better and more moderate leadership should he come to power.74 Whatever the case, any potential disunity within the regime provides little hope for future stability and reform in the near future. As many or all of the actual or potential reformists (relatively speaking) close to the pinnacle of leadership (such as Khin Nyunt) have been removed, a change of leadership may only result in one conservative and inwardly focused dictator, intent on little more than maintaining his power, being replaced by another manifesting the same traits. Given the curtailment of political freedom and the extreme nature of the human rights abuses outlined by this section, it becomes highly problematic to reconcile such negative “impressions” with the positive “images” one acquires while travelling in the rural areas of the country which are accessible to tourists.75 In the course of such exploration, including a substantial portion of the Shan ethnic minority area controlled by the government, the author noted with some surprise that many of the people were relatively well nourished and there were few visible signs of abject poverty — relative to other ASEAN countries such as Cambodia.76 Furthermore, much of the populace lived relatively free from substantial interference, and, in some respects, enjoyed more freedom than their urban counterparts in Yangon and Mandalay. An example of such freedom was found in the public display of pictures of General Aung San in shops at Nyaung Shwe. There was also a greater openness in discussing the “political” in the rural areas and townships — such as Kalaw and Kyaikto.77 Throughout the countryside local police stations, such as the Nyaung Shwe police station (see Figure 3.2), were small and unfortified despite their location in ethnic minority areas, and this indicated both the existence of, and potential for, peaceful coexistence between the various ethnic groups of Myanmar.78 As mentioned, the competing images between that of a peaceful Myanmar and that of a violent and repressive country are difficult to reconcile. However, obtaining an analytical reconciliation for this competing imagery is far from impossible. In view of the history of Myanmar, it is not too surprising that many of the worst human rights violations outlined by this section have occurred, whether directly or indirectly, in ethnic minority areas that are either subject to continued ethnic conflict, or lacking central government authority. The extent of ethnic violence in Myanmar has been described as representing a “slow genocide”79 and even the SPDC itself has acknowledged


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FIGURE 3.2 The Nyaung Shwe Township “Police Station”

Source: Photograph taken by the author, June 2005.

the loss of over a million lives.80 Therefore, in areas where ethnic conflict remains, it would seem natural to suggest that any resolution of such conflict would enhance the human security of the people resident within such areas. However, even where ceasefire arrangements have been formed with the SPDC, there has been no corresponding increase (in most cases) in the level of human security (other than the decline of the overall body count), so even the most atrocious of human rights abuses have continued.81 Furthermore, in terms of the level of poverty, the borderland areas subsist as an entirely separate world to central Myanmar. Thus, the GDP per capita in the Kokang, Wa, and Shan areas are under US$100, rendering these marginalized areas the poorest in Asia and among the poorest in the world.82 In view of these phenomena, the discussion below reviews the ceasefire process in an attempt to understand the mindset of the SPDC and why the implementation of its ceasefire regime has not resulted in any substantial increase to human security in the borderlands of Myanmar. In this respect, the analysis returns to the dilemma of enhancing state capacity (internal consolidation) by seeking an understanding of “where” and “how” these abuses occur.


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The Ceasefire Movement and its Consequences In 1989, and little more than a year after the bloody protests for democracy, the SPDC sought to reconsolidate its power by mending its relations with the “leaders” of several insurgent groups.83 The process commenced with the signing of formal ceasefire arrangements with the Communist Party of Burma and its splinter factions — the Kokang and Wa.84 As illustrated in Table 3.1, these early ceasefires provided the government and its armed forces with the opportunity to focus on the remaining (smaller) insurgency groups, including an alliance of ethnic groups under the umbrella name of the National Democratic Front (NDF). By 1991, several of the weaker

TABLE 3.1 Ceasefire and Non-Ceasefire Insurgent Groups in Myanmar • Main Ceasefire Groups

• Main Non-Ceasefire Groups

– – – – –

– Arakan Liberation Party – Arakan Rohingya National Organization – Chin National Front – Hongsawatoi Restoration Party – Karen National Union (KNU) – Karenni National Progressive Party – Lahu Democratic Front – Mergui-Tavoy United Front – National Socialist Council of Nagaland – National United Party of Arakan – Rohingya Solidarity Organization – Wa National Organization – Shan State Army — South

– – – – – – – – – – – – –

Communist Party of Burma New Democratic Party (Kachin) Kachin Independence Organization Kayan National Guard Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front Kayan New Land Party New Mon State Party Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang) United Wa State Army (UWSA) Shan State Army — North National Democratic Alliance Party Kachin Democratic Army Pao National Organization Palaung State Liberation Army Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organization Shan State National Army Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Army Democratic Karen Buddhist Army

Sources: Adapted from Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre and Martin T. Smith, “State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma” (2007), pp. 67–69.


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members of the NDF had given up their struggle against the SPDC, and by 1995 the Kachin Independence Organization, the New Mon State Army, and the Karenni National Progressive Party had followed suit. By 2004, the total number of ceasefire groups had accumulated to about fourteen. However, for nearly every ceasefire agreed on, smaller splinter factions formed to continue their fight against the government.85 What the different groups acquired in return for the ceasefires largely depended on both the timing of the ceasefire and their respective sizes (leverage). At one end of the spectrum, some of the earlier ceasefire groups maintained their arms whilst receiving extensive local autonomy along with material support and business opportunities for the development of their region.86 At the other end of the spectrum, many of the smaller groups were compelled to surrender their arms, and while they received some political and economic support, they were granted little to no autonomy. For these groups, what took place was more akin to a surrender rather than a ceasefire.87 Nevertheless, as of October 2008, it was estimated that the country contained more than 35,000 soldiers in non-state armed groups.88 As Figure 3.3 depicts, the largest of the remaining insurgent groups to continue their armed struggle against the government are the Karen National Union (KNU), the Shan State Army, and the Karenni Army. Of interest, and as depicted below, is

FIGURE 3.3 Comparative Strength of the Largest Armed Minority Groups

25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0

Personnel

UWSA (ceasefire)

KNU (non-ceasefire)

SSA (non-ceasefire)

Karenni Army (non-ceasefire)

21,000

7,000

5,000

1,000

Source: Jane’s Sentinel Intelligence Database (2005). Located at <www.janes.com>.89


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the relative weakness of these remaining insurgent groups when compared with the United Wa State Army (UWSA) — a current ceasefire group. Interestingly, the UWSA has more than doubled in strength since its ceasefire with the SPDC, and the factors behind this force expansion are considered further below. One of the problems with the ceasefire regime, as implemented by the SPDC, is that the government provided many of the early ceasefire groups — such as the UWSA and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army — with a level of autonomy far beyond what was necessary for good governance within local municipalities. The power accorded to many of the early ceasefire groups is again reflective of the desperate nature of the SPDC (at the time) to survive mounting instability and growing international isolation. Consequently, the UWSA now operates in alliance with the SPDC and maintains a military force of 21,000 (the largest armed force outside the central government).90 The USWA also has the dubious honour of being the world’s principal armed narcotics producer and is heavily involved in the production of both methamphetamines and heroin (see Chapter 4).91 The UWSA has also actively cooperated with the Tatmadaw in attacking other insurgent groups in return for a substantive degree of regional autonomy and the freedom to continue to manufacture and export narcotics.92 The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) is a breakaway group from the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) — the military wing of the Karen National Union (KNU). The DKBA signed a ceasefire with the SPDC in 1994 and maintains a fighting force of between two and three thousand fighters. These soldiers have been trained, financed, and armed by the Myanmar Government for the purpose of using them in military operations against the KNU. The DKBA also maintains friendly relations with the UWSA and a secondary source of its funding has been illegal cross-border cattle trading (see Figure 3.4) and narcotics trafficking into Thailand.93 From the perspective of the SPDC, the key dilemma in 1989 was how to maintain the unity of the country whilst retaining power and, to this end, it was the implementation of the ceasefire regime that was considered the best available option. Furthermore, the ceasefire movement, together with the SPDC’s agreement to undertake democratic elections in 1990, reflected the relative strength, at the time, of the democracy movement as led by the NLD, and its ability to form an alternative government that could effectively administer the country.94 Today, aside from the culpability that rests with the SPDC for any explicit or implied permission to commit various atrocities, the comparative peace enjoyed by ethnic minority groups firmly under the administrative control of the central government (the SPDC) means that


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FIGURE 3.4 Illegal Cross-Border Cattle Station


imposition of the same conditions (control by the central government) in the remaining ethnic minority areas is the “choice of the lesser evil” for the people of Myanmar. Therefore, the key dilemma for the government is how to increase the level of comprehensive security existent in both the “autonomous zones” and the remaining insurgent areas. To this end, the government believes it has incorporated a mechanism in the various ceasefire arrangements for the extension of central government control throughout the country, but this cannot be carried out until a constitution is agreed on.95 Nonetheless, and regardless of whether effective measures to combat human rights abuse will require a breach of ceasefire agreements (and the autonomy granted by them), the ability and desire of the government to implement them will only arise from an increase in the capacity of the SPDC’s political institutions and security sector apparatus (internal consolidation) over the mid to long term. While later chapters will continue to analyse the prospects for internal consolidation, the third section in Chapter 7 specifically analyses Myanmar’s new constitution as ratified in the wake of Cyclone Nargis.


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Conclusions The human rights violations outlined in this chapter represent, in all likelihood, little more than a small sample of the true totality of abuse that afflicts the citizens of Myanmar.96 The heinous nature of these human rights abuses notwithstanding, the investigative goals of this book have rendered it necessary to seek an objective understanding of why, how, and where such abuses occur. More than anything else, a history of ethnic tension and insurgency continues to contribute to the domestic instability in Myanmar today. Such instability destroyed a fledgling democracy and resulted in the implementation of measures by the government that were both desperate and inappropriate in nature. The long-term leadership by the military destroyed the comparative economic advantage that Myanmar enjoyed at the time of independence and severely dented the development of a professional civil service within the country. Furthermore, the lack of education throughout the leadership has contributed to a xenophobic worldview infested with paranoia that has drastically hampered both the ability of the regime to respond to domestic crises, and its ability to engage with ASEAN (and the international community). The inability to engage foreign actors on the international stage has, in turn, further isolated the members of the regime and its civilian branches of government by reducing the opportunity for foreign training, education, and cultural and professional exchanges. The history of Myanmar also has normative and/or institutional consequences for ASEAN’s security community project. As one ICG report states, “arms have been the primary means used not just in the pursuit of power, but also to settle differences over state policy and direction”.97 The ease with which the different ethnic groups (including the Bamar) have historically resorted to violence is akin to Adler and Barnett’s definition of a “war community”.98 If a security community is defined, in part, by the identities of its respective members, then the existence of a member state with a cultural tendency to resolve differences through violence and/or coercive means, is a serious obstacle to the successful accomplishment of ASEAN’s goals. Consequently, and as will be further elaborated in later chapters, the government, along with its military, continues to undertake both domestic and international polices that exacerbate instability and isolate the country internationally. For the purpose of ASEAN’s goal to become a security community, it is important to uncover the type of policies that ASEAN will need to implement so that it can execute a constructive role (whether unilaterally or in cooperation with the international community) in assisting Myanmar to


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consolidate internally. Given the internal dynamics of Myanmar, a necessary precondition to the implementation of democracy in the future (should ASEAN or the international community so desire) will be an adequate level of progress towards the internal consolidation of the country. Such internal consolidation will need to be done in a manner that simultaneously builds stability, good governance, and the capacity of its political institutions. To attempt this process in reverse, with the implementation of democracy first, is to risk pushing the country towards outright anarchy where the transnational consequences to ensue would be far greater than what ASEAN is currently afflicted with. Therefore, in order to reinforce the concerns raised by this concluding analysis, and with the internal dynamics of Myanmar in mind, the next chapter will commence by considering the material impact that domestic instability has had on the comprehensive security architecture of ASEAN itself. Contrastingly, later chapters will examine the impact of Myanmar on the degree of solidarity and the formation of an elite-level collective identity in ASEAN. As stated previously, these two tiers of analysis are necessary for a final determination of not only the degree to which Myanmar inhibits ASEAN’s security community project, but also how ASEAN and the international community can best contribute to a resolution of the Myanmar crisis.

Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6

Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 14. In 1849, Pago was established as the Myanmar capital city. D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (Hong Kong: MacMillan Press, 1981), pp. 151–81. “Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics” (Bangkok/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), p. 2; Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 7. Carl H. Lande, “Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia”, Studies in Comparative International Development 33, no. 4 (1999): 79. See, for example, the reflections of the biographer and loyal servant to the British empire, George Scott, in Andrew Marshall, The Trouser People: A Story of Burma in the Shadow of the Empire (London: Penguin Books, 2002). Robert H. Taylor, “Pathways to the Present”, in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 4. During the time when the British imperial forces had initially set up


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7

8

9 10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

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headquarters at the Royal Mandalay Palace, biographer George Scott enquired “how far does the British empire exercise its authority?” to which the British commander replied “as far as the front gate”. “Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics”, p. 2. Martin Smith, on the other hand, contends that divisions based on apparent British favouritism are a myth. Smith, “Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches”, in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 64. Nicholas Tarling, Nations and States in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 29. “Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics”, p. 2. “Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns” (Bangkok: Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma, 2004), p. 8. The New ASEANs: Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia and Laos (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1997), p. 110. As the International Crisis Group points out, there are no reliable statistics in relation to this issue and so any approximation must be treated with caution. “Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics”, p. 1. For an informative account of this aspect of Myanmar’s history see, Kin Oung, Who Killed Aung San? (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1993). Hall, A History of South-East Asia, p. 882. The Karen National Union (KNU), however, boycotted the vote and this move may have contributed to the fact that the Karen state, eventually created in 1952, only embraced around 25 per cent of the Kayin people of the time. Smith, “Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches”, p. 66. Camilla Buzzi, “Burma — Twelve Years after 1988” (Internet, Democratic Voice of Burma, 2002 [cited 11 December 2004]), available at . Smith, “Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches”, p. 66. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, p. 884; Smith, “Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches”, p. 66. As Taylor adds, “by the end of the first year of independence, the KNU had also gone into revolt, taking many of the ethnic minority troops which had previously been part of the colonial armed forces underground with it”. Taylor, “Pathways to the Present”, p. 15. This was achieved via an amendment to the national constitution in 1961. Lande, “Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Accommodation, and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia”, p. 92. “Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns”, p. 9; “Timeline: Burma” (Internet, BBC News, 2004 [cited 22 November 2004]), available at . “The ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ was a Blend of Buddhism, Nationalism


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19

20

21 22 23 24 25

26

27 28

29

30

31


and Marxism”. Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience, p. 62. Myanmar withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1979 in protest over Cuba’s chairmanship of it. “Burma Prime Minister Arrives in Jakarta”, Reuters, 29 June 1987. The nationalization of the majority of private schools took place between 1963 and 1964. Neil Englehart, “Is Regime Change Enough for Burma”, Asian Survey 45, no. 4 (2005): 622–44. Perhaps a better alternative to nation or state building is cultural pluralism and diversity. Rasma Karklins, “The Concept of Collective Identity”, paper presented at the Directorate of Communication and Research, Strasbourg, 17–18 April 2001, p. 3. Tin Maung Maung Than, “Myanmar: Military in Charge”, in Government and Politics in Southeast Asia, edited by John Funston (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p. 206. However, as Mya Than argues, the “1987 demonetization of currency notes was just the spark. Other factors include the deterioration of the economy since the 1962 military takeover; the transformation to a market-oriented system from the socialist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; economic reform in China; the success of the ASEAN economies in the region and the People’s Power victory in the Philippines”. Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience, p. 70. July 23, 1988. “Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns”, p. 9. Englehart, “Is Regime Change Enough for Burma”, p. 633. Taylor, “Pathways to the Present”, p. 21. Englehart, “Is Regime Change Enough for Burma”, p. 634. According to Robert Taylor, the actual percentage of the vote was 62 per cent. Taylor, “Pathways to the Present”, p. 22. “Quality of Partnership: Myanmar, ASEAN and the World Community” (Asian Dialogue Society, 2003), p. 6. Ibid. The previous section outlined some of the historical factors that contributed to, and exacerbated, these ethic divisions. Alan Boyd, “Losing Battle to Rescue Child Soldiers” (Internet, Asia Times, 2004 [cited 23 April 2004]), available at ; “Myanmar Rejects UN Claims on Child Soldiers in Army”, Channel News Asia, 21 January 2004. This contravenes the Convention on the Rights of the Child, one of the most widely ratified treaties in the world. Interestingly, the only two countries never to have ratified it are Somalia and the United States. “Convention on the Rights of the Child” (Internet, United Nations Convention, UNICEF, 2004 [cited 11 December 2004]), available at . “Burma: Demobilize Child Soldiers” (Internet, Human Rights Watch, 2004 [cited 8 December 2004]), available at . Other sources claim the total number to be closer to 50,000 (as opposed to the Human Rights Watch estimate of 70,000) and that


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33

34

35 36 37 38

39 40

41 42

43

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this number is the total for both government and opposition armies. Marianne Bray, “Child Soldiers in Myanmar’s Front Line” (Internet — News, CNN, 2001 [cited 15 December 2004]), available at . It is estimated that there are currently more than 100,000 child soldiers as young as eight within greater Asia. Boyd, “Losing Battle to Rescue Child Soldiers” (cited). “Army of Children” (Internet, Sunday Times, 2002 [cited 19 October 2002]), available at ; Bray, “Child Soldiers in Myanmar’s Front Line” (cited); “Human Rights Watch World Report 2007” (Internet, Human Rights Watch, 2003 [cited 12 January 2008]), available at . Further, such authorities may be fined should they fail to meet the government quota. Bray, “Child Soldiers in Myanmar’s Front Line” (cited); Christina Fink, Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2001), p. 145. “Burma: Demobilize Child Soldiers” (cited); “Child Soldiers Global Report” (Internet, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2004 [cited 15 December 2004]), available at . “Human Rights Watch World Report 2007” (cited). “Child Soldiers Global Report” (cited). “Burma: Demobilize Child Soldiers” (cited). According to one government spokesperson, the government was better able to restrain the regional military divisions from recruiting child soldiers because there was no longer a need to continue expanding the number of personnel in the military. While many might (understandably) question the authenticity of such comments, the fact that the size of the Tatmadaw has remained relatively stable for the better part of the past decade does lend some credence to its validity. Interview by the author with government spokesperson, Yangon, May 2005. “Child Soldiers Global Report” (cited). “Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy toward Burma for the Period September 28, 2004–March 27, 2005” (Internet — Government Report, U.S. Department of State — Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2005 [cited 5 April 2005]); available at . “Burma Slammed over Forced Labour”, BBC News, 17 June 1999. “Amnesty International’s Concerns at the 89th International Labour Conference” (Internet — Report, Amnesty International, 5–21 June 2000 [cited 18 October 2005]), available at . “Porter Shortage Affects Junta Troops Search for Mon Splinter Group”, BBC News, 26 November 2001; “Thai Army Hands Back 17 Porters to Burmese”, Reuters, 24 December 2004.


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“Burmese Forces Resume Porter Round-Up”, Reuters, 13 June 1995. A sanitized term for forcing people to walk ahead of soldiers in minefields without metal detectors or any other method of safety and protection. Bray, “Child Soldiers in Myanmar’s Front Line” (cited); “Thai Army Hands Back 17 Porters to Burmese”. Child soldiers, inter alia, are also ordered to subject others to similar human rights abuses they or their friends and colleagues have encountered. In one account by a child soldier, they were forced to line up forty Karenni villagers and make them walk through a minefield. Those that survived were then lined up and shot dead. Ellen Nakashima, “Burma’s Child Soldiers Tell of Army Atrocities”, Washington Post, 10 February 2003. Interview by the author with government spokesperson, Yangon, May 2005. Vaclav Havel and Bishop Desmond M. Tutu, “Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma” (DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, 2005), p. 16. “Burma: Displacement Continues Unabated in One of the World’s Worst IDP Situations” (Global IDP Project, 2005), p. 1. “UN Denounces Human Rights Violations in Myanmar”, Dow Jones International News, 24 December 2006. Denis Gray, “War in Burma Gets Even More Brutal: Refugees and Rebels Tell of Growing Violence and Repression by the Military”, Sanfrancisco Chronicle, 15 May 1990. “Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns”, p. 76. Havel and Tutu, “Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma”, pp. 17–18. “Rape of Shan Women a Grave Concern”, The Nation, 12 August 2002; Charm Tong, “The War on Burma’s Women”, Boston Globe, 28 June 2005. “System of Impunity: Nationwide Patterns of Sexual Violence by the Military Regime’s Army and Authorities in Burma”, The Women’s League of Burma (WLB), 2004. “Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns”, p. 85. Tong, “The War on Burma’s Women”. Field trip by the author with Professor Desmond Ball, 3–24 June 2005. See also Desmond Ball, “Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands”, Working Paper No. 9 (Australia: Australian Mekong Resource Centre, 2003). During this time (between January and February 1995), two battles took place in Manerplaw and Kawmura involving some 15,000–20,000 troops. Because of these battles, the Burmese Army acquired these strongholds. “Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns”, p. 77. “Burma — Military Mass Murders Alleged” (Electronic Database — Factiva, Periscope Daily Defense News Corporation, 2005 [cited 22 November 2005]), available at <www.factiva.com>; “Burmese Army Accused of Killings” (Internet, BBC News, 2005 [cited 22 November 2005]), available at .


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The Evolution of Domestic Instability and Its Extent in Myanmar 60

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Larry Fine, “UN Panel Presses Myanmar on Rights Abuse, Rape”, Reuters, 19 November 2005. Edith M. Lederer, “Myanmar Is Holding More Than 1,100 Political Prisoners, U.N. Human Rights Investigator Says”, Associated Press Newswires, 29 September 2005. Interview by the author, Yangon, June 2005. As a national average (worse in the ethnic minority areas), only one in two children will finish primary school and only about 35 per cent enrol in high school. Data supplied by UNDP website, located at . Furthermore, and in the Wa state for example, illiteracy is estimated to be as high as 90 per cent. Smith, “Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches”, p. 59. For example, in a meeting with two members from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, it was stated that all of their contacts were with people formally connected to Khin Nyunt and his military intelligence. Since the removal of the military intelligence, the only connection they have now is with the Myanmarese ambassador in Tokyo. Christopher B. Roberts, “The Argument for Engagement: A Clash with the Predominant ‘State’ Morality”, paper presented at the IDSS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 19 October 2005. Field trip by the author with Professor Desmond Ball, Thai/Myanmar border, June 2005. Roger Mitton, “How Things Look on the Inside — The Democracy Party Is Not Fully United” (Internet, Asiaweek, 1999 [cited 15 October 2005]), available at <www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/99/0716/nat5.html>; “The ‘National Convention’” (Internet, The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Members of Parliament Union, 2004 [cited 19 January 2006]), available at . “Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?” (Yangon/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004), p. 21. For an in-depth review of the status of individual members of the NLD in recent years who have suffered this fate, see: Myanmar: Justice on Trial (Report, Amnesty International, 2003 [cited 13 November 2005]), available at . Email correspondence with Andrew Kirkwood, Save the Children (Programme Director), 22 September 2005. Jean A. Blake, “Helping Hands in Myanmar” (Report, Yale, 2005 [cited 22 November 2005]), available at <www.yale.edu/ seas/helpinghands.doc>. Field trip by the author with Professor Desmond Ball to the Thai/Myanmar border, June 2005. “Myanmar: Staged Unrest Risks Creating the Real Thing” (Electronic Intelligence Database, Stratfor, 2005 [cited 22 October 2005]), available at <www.stratfor. com>.


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76 72

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Min Lwin, “Rise of Factions Roils Relations within Burmese Junta”, The Irrawaddy, 10 July 2008; Myanmar: Staged Unrest Risks Creating the Real Thing (cited). “Executive Summary, Myanmar”, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 17 July 2008. Correspondence with a Burmese, September 2008. Interestingly, the bulk of the country is generally accessible to tourists except for a comparatively narrow breadth of territory along Myanmar’s border with its neighbours. Field trip by the author to the Philippines, November 2005; field trip by the author to Cambodia, July 2005. While this is indeed a logical outcome of the inability of a security force in any large country to maintain vigilance throughout its rural areas, it is important to have a better appreciation of the environment to which people are subjected in the various parts of the country, namely, urban Myanmar, the long-term ceasefire areas of rural Myanmar, and the non-ceasefire or newly formed ceasefire areas of rural Myanmar. This comment is made by way of a comparison to the heavily fortified government facilities that can be found in Yangon. Such fortifications include high fences, razor wire and armed guards/officers (typically with machine guns). It is also important to note that this township is located near Inle Lake and is, therefore, a popular tourist destination that would inevitably have some impact on how the local residents are treated. Anton La Guardia, “Burma’s ‘Slow Genocide’ is Revealed through the Eyes of Its Child Victims: British Research tells of Murder, Rape, Starvation, and the Systematic Destruction of Villages as Military Junta Forces More Than a Million Ethnic Minority People to Live in the Jungle”, The Daily Telegraph, 2005. Comments by General Saw Maung, the former head of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (the precursor to the current SPDC). Martin T. Smith, “Ethnic Groups in Burma: Development, Democracy and Human Rights” (Internet — Report, Anti-Slavery International, 1994 [cited 22 November 2005]), available at . Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Myanmar in 2004: Why Military Rule Continues”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 2005, edited by Kin Wah Chin and Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 248; “Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas” (Yangon/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004), p. 12; “Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar: Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar” (United Nations, 2003), p. 17. Smith, “Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches”, p. 73. Laos, in comparison, is ranked the most underdeveloped country by the United Nations, but its GDP per capita in 2004 was estimated to


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be US$402. “Laos Factsheet” (Internet — News, DFAT, 2005 [cited 2 February 2006]), available at <www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/laos.pdf>. As opposed to the people of the ethnic minority groups. This is because many of the new relationships remain exploitative in nature, with the new ethnic minority councils also subjecting their people to forced labour and other abuses. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Myanmar in 2004: Why Military Rule Continues”, p. 258; “Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics”, p. 7. Desmond Ball, “Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands”, Working Paper No. 9 (Australia: Australian Mekong Resource Centre, 2003), p. 8. This is reflected in the comparatively lengthy list of political/military groups that are not yet subject to any ceasefire arrangement as shown in Table 3.1. Interestingly, as Kyaw Yin Hlaing states, for all the government’s “outward display of military might”, it was never able to establish a viable and functioning civil administration in the Wa areas. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Myanmar in 2004: Why Military Rule Continues”, p. 248. “Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics”, p. 8. “Myanmar: Non-State Armed Groups”, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment — Southeast Asia, 6 October 2008. These figures are based on reports published by Jane’s in 2006. Since this time, Jane’s has ceased to report on the military strength of some of the non-ceasefire groups such as the KNU. This has grown from a force of 12,000 to 15,000 back in 1989. “United Wa State Army (UWSA)” (Intelligence Database, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2005 [cited 29 September 2005]), available at <www.janes.com>. Anthony Davis, “Ethnic Breakdown” (Internet, Asia Week, 2000 [cited 2 March 2003]), available at . Interview by the author with Professor Desmond Ball, Australian National University, September 2004. “Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)” (Intelligence Database, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2005 [cited 29 September 2005]), available at <www.janes.com>. According to Jane’s, the “DKBA are entirely dependent on the Yangon military for salaries, uniforms, logistics support (food, ammunition, fuel) and artillery support if attacked by the KNU”. Unfortunately, the success of the ceasefire regime has since provided the government with the opportunity (and resources) to all but crush the NLD and its ability to form an effective government. This issue is discussed further in the next section of the book. Interview by the author with Maung Aung Myoe, Yangon, May 2005. Having said this, and for the purposes of methodology and a related need to dismiss possible concerns over interviewee bias, we have to add that it is difficult to verify exactly how good or bad the situation is in the borderlands until the government of Myanmar allows independent and thorough investigation


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throughout its border areas. This was a dilemma recognized in a recent report by the United Nations, “Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar: Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar”. The report further states that “[i]t was no coincidence that thousands of prodemocracy activists fled to the border to take up arms against the government or that many exile groups have put their main hope for change on another popular uprising. “Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?”, p. 13. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, in Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 34.


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4 ASEAN SECURITY IN MYANMAR’S SHADOW In spite of Myanmar’s “in principle” support for a security community, the method of rule by the country’s military regime (and the domestic instability that is a consequence of it) presents a direct challenge to the ability of Southeast Asia countries to integrate into an ASEAN style security community. This is because the achievement of the proclaimed “security community”, along with the level of integration necessary for it, is beholden to the nature of interstate relations within the organization.1 These interstate relations are challenged, both directly and indirectly, at two levels by the situation in Myanmar. At one level, both traditional and non-traditional security threats challenge the region’s security architecture and the potential formation of a security community. At another level, Myanmar challenges elite-level cohesion (collective identity formation) and the operative norms of ASEAN (such as non-interference). This chapter, in dealing with the first level of analysis, focuses on two interdependent issues. The first issue for consideration is how Myanmar challenges the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia. The second issue investigated by the chapter is the manner in which various states — through their bilateral relationships with Myanmar — has enhanced and/or detracted from the security architecture of the region. In a complement to this approach, Chapters 5 to 7 focus primarily on the second level of analysis — the challenge of Myanmar to elite-level cohesion.

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SPILLOVER EFFECTS: COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR ASEAN Several issues of human security and transnational crime afflict ASEAN because of domestic instability, corruption, and poor state capacity in Myanmar. These non-traditional security issues have all been exacerbated by the long-term instability of Myanmar and they include the trafficking of narcotics, money laundering, the spread of HIV/AIDS, environmental degradation, the rise and flow of refugees, and the associated problem of human trafficking. Additionally, the particular issues of narcotics production, human trafficking, and money laundering are reflective of transnational criminal communities that can operate across state boundaries. In the context of Myanmar, and in addition to the aforementioned factors, globalization has exacerbated the opportunity for, and the impact of, these transnational criminal activities. The comparative rise in the level and extent of transnational crime has occurred because of a revolution in information technology and communications, the marginalization of state borders (thus allowing for the entry and exit of people, goods, capital, and information), and the accompanying economic and political changes that have occurred throughout the region.2 While some of these criminal communities, such as the DKBA and the UWSA, were initially formed based on political ideologies, such ideologies have long since been replaced by a self-interested quest for wealth through illegal endeavours. Nowadays, Myanmar’s criminal communities know no boundaries — not legal, cultural, religious, or moral.3 As will be seen below, the impact of these criminal activities has been pervasive and multifaceted. While the examination here discusses several transnational security issues, the section finishes with an examination of narcotics trafficking. Illicit narcotics have been chosen as a major case study because it most aptly exemplifies the spillover effects of non-traditional security at the regional level.

Human Trafficking The issue of human trafficking has transnational costs and effects that, if anything, appear to be growing in significance throughout Southeast Asia. Within the ASEAN nations, both the points of origin and points of destination present a challenge to the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia. As a point of origin, Southeast Asians are trafficked from Myanmar (as well as Vietnam and Cambodia) to destination countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand. In the case of Thailand,


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its 100 billion baht per year industry (US$2.45 billion) means that it is now the largest destination country in ASEAN.4 According to the United Nations, between half a million and four million people are trafficked each year globally and this figure has grown to in excess of 200,000 in the Asia Pacific.5 Welfare groups have said that the number of people being trafficked into Thailand is now rising by as much as 20 per cent per year, and of this, at least 10,000 a year are impoverished Myanmarese women and children who, in many instances, are forced into prostitution and/or slave labour conditions.6

Refugees and Illegal Migrants Figure 4.1 shows a very small segment of Thailand’s Mae Lah refugee camp which houses 50,000 (mainly Karen) refugees.7 The decades-long refugee crisis is a consequence of extreme poverty throughout the borderlands, plus the many factors that were discussed in Chapter 2 — such as the harshness of forced village relocations, crop destruction, forced labour, and the continuation of ethnic conflict. In June 2003, the number of official Myanmarese refugees in Thailand reached 143,474,8 with estimates of additional illegal migrants in Thailand ranging between 600,000 and 1.2 million.9 Aside from the economic costs of the crisis, the continuation FIGURE 4.1 Thailand’s Mae Lah Refugee Camp



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of this transnational movement of people has fuelled the problem of human trafficking and its associated costs — including a rise in the prevalence of HIV/AIDS rates. Some of the illegal migrants have also carried other infectious diseases including, for example, an outbreak of anthrax in July–September 2002. Meanwhile, over 50,000 ethnic minority women from Myanmar are estimated to work in Thailand currently as prostitutes.10 Furthermore, the problems of human trafficking and refugees are also interdependent with, and emanate from, the discussion of human rights abuse and instability in the previous chapter.

HIV/AIDS The spread of HIV/AIDS is a growing concern that is linked to both intravenous drug use and the sex industries of Southeast Asia — particularly Thailand and the countries in the Indochina belt. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), an estimated 24 per cent of all intravenous drug users in Myanmar are infected with HIV/AIDS.11 Infection rates are highest in the ethnic minority areas and, more specifically, in the mining areas where such drugs are more readily available.12 An alarming link to recent increases in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates throughout Southeast Asia is the fact that as many as 50 per cent of intravenous drug users in the region share their injecting equipment.13 Figure 4.2 lists the Southeast

FIGURE 4.2 HIV/AIDS Prevalence Rates in Select Countries 3.00%

2.60%

2.50% 2.00% 1.20%

1.50%

0.80%

1.00%

0.40% 0.10%

0.50% 0.00% HIV/AIDS Prevalance Rate

Cambodia

Myanmar

Thailand

Vietnam

Laos

2.60%

1.20%

0.80%

0.40%

0.10%

Source: Compiled by the author from statistical information supplied by the UNDP (2005), located at .


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Asian countries with the worst HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. As can be seen, Myanmar is second only to Cambodia. While a significant proportion of the rate in Cambodia and Thailand can be attributed to their respective sex industries, the transnational effects of Myanmar’s narcotics industry have undoubtedly exacerbated the figures.14

Narcotics Production: Linkages and Transnational Consequences Myanmar — infamous for its historical role in the Golden Triangle’s opium trade — has had a mixed record in recent years. While Myanmar is currently the second largest global producer of opium, Figure 4.3 shows the relative success of recent eradication programmes in reducing the level of opium production — a consequence of cooperation between the Myanmar Government, the United Nations, and other international agencies. Between 1997 and 2005, there was a consistent decline in opium production. However, in 2007 the estimated level of production increased by 46 per cent with a total of 460 metric tons covering a total of 27,700 hectares. In 2008, opium production again started to decline by 10.9 per cent, amounting to a total of 410 metric tons, but the area of production was estimated to cover

FIGURE 4.3 Opium Production in Myanmar Metric Tons

1,800 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,100 800 600 400 200 0

Y1997 Metric Tons 1,676

Y2001 1,097

Y2003 810

Y2004 370

Y2005 312

Y2006 315

Y2007 460

Y2008 410

Source: Compiled by the author from UNODC statistics, located at .


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28,500 hectares, indicating that there was a drop in production due to a poor season rather than from government efforts at eradication. Eighty-nine per cent of production comes from the Shan State.15 While some credit can be attributed to the proactive “elements” of the SPDC who actively cooperated in the fight against opium production,16 the reduction is also explained, in part, by a shift in manufacturing by the country’s criminal organizations to the production of Amphetamine Type Stimulants (ATS) or methamphetamines.17 According to Professor Desmond Ball, the production methods for these methamphetamines, alternatively known as Ya-Ba (the Thai word for “Crazy drug”), have become alarmingly sophisticated. Organizations such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) have now constructed mobile narcotic convoys where one truck will house the drug laboratory and others will individually and/or collectively accommodate the generator, storage, and supply facilities. These mobile units (together with the relative ease of production) have rendered detection and anti-trafficking measures much more difficult and have contributed to a massive rise of production in recent years.18 While highly problematic to trace, various bodies, including the United States intelligence organizations, estimate that by 2004 total production had reached as high as eight hundred million tablets — more than double the production in 2003.19 An equally worrying trend to emerge in Myanmar since 2002 has been the further diversification of ATS production to include the more expensive varieties such as Ecstasy and Ice — crystallized methamphetamine, alternatively known as Shabu.20 Despite recent successes in reducing the production of opium, the combined production of opium and ATS means that Myanmar continues to rank as the world’s number one “narco-state”.21 As mentioned, the SPDC has had a mixed record in combating the scourge of drug production within its territory. Despite intensive interviews and research by the author, the question of whether the recent reduction in opium production is best explained by the actions of the SPDC, or is a consequence of other factors (such as a combination of drought, reduction in demand, and diversification into other narcotics production) remains a matter for debate. What can be said is that, on balance, the evidence does seem to suggest that at least some elements of the SPDC and the Tatmadaw have directly benefited from opium and methamphetamines production.22 For example, since the implementation of the government’s ceasefire regime, some of the leading drug traffickers in Myanmar have in fact enjoyed good relations with certain SPDC generals — including ousted Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. Various Tatmadaw battalions (No. 227 and No. 330) have


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even conducted joint military exercises with the UWSA and Khin Nyunt presided over the opening ceremony on this occasion.23 The historical relationship and assistance provided to the former rebel leader and drug-lord Chang Chifu (Khun Sa) since his 1996 surrender is also well documented.24 Meanwhile, at the ground level, there have been reported cases of farmers being forcibly coerced by the Tatmadaw to cultivate opium.25 However, and given the internal dynamics outlined in Chapter 2, the involvement by the lower ranks of the Tatmadaw in illicit narcotics and any associated corruption is an unfortunate and inevitable consequence of poor wages and the incapability of the government to implement security sector reform. At the elite level, and despite reports that certain generals and top military brass and their families have been recalled from their regional postings in Myanmar due to corrupt dealings and placed in administrative positions within Way Pyi Daw,26 the SPDC as a whole also continues, at least indirectly, to benefit from the narcotics industry by way of its support for the UWSA and the DKBA. As discussed in the previous chapter, both the DKBA and the UWSA have become the de facto security force of the SPDC along the Thai/Myanmar border. Also, to avoid the complete collapse of its economy, the SPDC has opened the doors to widespread “money laundering”27 by formulating a no questions asked policy and inviting Wa businesspeople — many UWSA commanders — to invest in the Myanmar mainstream economy. The Wa have since set up businesses in Yangon, Mandalay, Kengtung, Tachilek, and Lashio.28 Meanwhile, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) — understood to have commercial relations with the UWSA in the production of ATS — depends almost entirely on the support of the Myanmar Government for their salaries, uniforms, food, ammunition, fuel, and artillery support.29 Additionally, and as revealed during an interview in Yangon, one Bamar (connected to the junta) conceded that the SPDC does possibly benefit “indirectly” through the tax revenue generated from the narcotics industry.30 The challenges presented by the complicity of the government in the narcotics industry are transnational in nature. Due to a lack of capacity and systemic corruption, increasingly large quantities of illicit narcotics have been entering Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. UWSA tablets have also been seized in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. In Vietnam, corrupt practices by its border guards along the country’s south-western border with Cambodia have generated significant problems in relation to the trafficking of both narcotics and people. It is here — and in nearby Ho Chi Minh City — that the value of heroin has increased threefold. Furthermore, various reports allege that shipments of guns and narcotics can be safely ferried


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across the border for less than US$50. Meanwhile, weapons are openly sold on the Cambodian side of the border for as little as US$100.31 Cambodia is a major transit country and point of origin for human trafficking, and due to the level of corruption on the issue, the United States Department of State has downgraded it to a Tier 3 category — the worst possible category for human trafficking.32 In reality, corruption is one of the biggest challenges for the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) countries as Transparency International has ranked Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar among the twenty most corrupt countries in the world, while Vietnam, with a country ranking of 123 (1 being the best) was also deemed highly corrupt.33 Consequently, the region’s security forces continue to be bribed by transnational criminal networks, including the Chinese Triads, who have cooperated with the Japanese Yakuza and Vietnamese gangs in the trafficking of narcotics in the region.34 Meanwhile, recent arrests of foreign smugglers, namely from Europe and Western Africa, have also evidenced the involvement of more distant criminal organizations.35 While a very high volume of people trafficking is still conducted in Thailand by local and transnational criminal networks, Thailand no longer produces significant quantities of opium or methamphetamine for export. Nonetheless, Thailand remains an important state for analysis as it is now one of the principal destination countries in the region for illegal narcotics. By 2003, conservative estimates suggested that there were at least 250,000 drug addicts in Thailand and that 80 per cent of methamphetamines consumed in Thailand is from Myanmar.36 Consequently, in 1998 the Thai Government declared the influx of narcotic substances to be the nation’s principal security threat.37 The Thai Government’s threat perceptions directly resulted in the establishment of two task forces — the Task Force 399 and the 3rd Army’s Pha Muang Task Force — to combat the issue.38 As Ralf Emmers states, the social ills generated by illicit drugs are well documented and include increased levels of violent crime, the wastage of human potential, weakened family structures, the reduced health of consumers, and the spread of HIV/AIDS due to intravenous drug use.39 In Vietnam, for example, drug addiction has already contributed to a significant increase in crime rates, with, for example, local authorities in Ho Chi Minh City recording a 50 per cent increase in murder rates for the first half of 2005. Furthermore, the same authorities recorded a 40 per cent increase in attacks against police officers between November 2004 and June 2005. Meanwhile, Jane’s Intelligence alleges that, in March 2005, hundreds of youth fought a series of bloody battles with two units of the local police force. Such events were unimaginable just a decade ago.40


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The transnational security challenges raised in this section detract from the overall level of comprehensive security experienced by the ASEAN states and Thailand in particular. Besides, some of these transnational security issues — such as refugees, illegal migrants, human trafficking, and HIV/ AIDS — are causally linked to the discussion of human rights abuse and the need for internal consolidation in Chapter 2 (as conceptualized and defined in Chapter 1). However, other issues, such as the complicity of the SPDC in the narcotics industry, have additional consequences for ASEAN’s security community project as far as the defining criteria of a sense of community are concerned. For example, the involvement of the government (directly or indirectly) in the narcotics industry evidences a complete disregard for the interests and security of Thailand (and the ASEAN states more generally). Meanwhile, as discussed in the theoretical chapters of this study, actions that reflect a degree of “we-feeling”, reciprocity, and long-term mutual interest are necessary to substantiate the existence of a collective identity. Therefore, the leadership’s involvement with narcotics production within the country, and its indifference to the transnational consequences of this, renders it difficult to consider the actions of Myanmar as reflecting an appropriate sense of an ASEAN wide community — now, or in the foreseeable future. Indicative of the interdependence between the security and community components of the framework, the focus by the SPDC on short-term gains without regard to the interests of the community (ASEAN) — as evidenced by any potential involvement in the narcotics industry — also detracts from a potential finding of dependable expectations of peaceful change. The junta’s disregard for the interests of the community is problematic because dependable expectations of peaceful change necessitate a level of integration where states (and their leadership) demonstrate a capacity to sacrifice the short-term gains of the country (within reason) for the longterm interests of the grouping (the security community). Therefore, the current actions by Myanmar’s leadership are more akin to a narrow and amoral pursuit of the regime’s interests (for example, pursuit of power) as typified by the realist paradigm at a “low” level of integration. Consequently, and in the absence of some kind of elite-level ideological membership in an ASEAN community, Myanmar cannot be “depended” on to restrain from the use of coercion and/or force during a conflict of interests. As will be seen, the absence of dependable expectations of peaceful change and any shared sense of a collective identity are further typified by, and exacerbated through, its bilateral relations with other states — both in Southeast Asia and beyond.


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MYANMAR’S FRIENDS: THE CONSEQUENCES FOR ASEAN AND THE CHALLENGES TO REFORM In consequence of several factors, including economic and diplomatic isolaztion, strategic location, and a defiant determination to maintain power within the country, the SPDC has, on many an occasion, made international headlines over its bilateral relations in the Asia Pacific. Of the countries with which it has the closest relations — be they diplomatic, military, economic, or otherwise — several stand out and these include Singapore, India, Russia, Japan, North Korea, Thailand, and China. This section largely limits its analysis to the last two, as relations with both China and Thailand are representative of a material pursuit of national interests at both the interregional and intraregional levels. By reflecting on the study’s conceptual framework, this section will illustrate how such behaviour also challenges ASEAN’s security community project. As will be seen, these relationships dampen the prospects for political reform in Myanmar itself and further impedes ASEAN’s project. Despite this, a few preliminary comments in relation to Myanmar’s alternative strategic relationships are justified because of the degree to which they inform elite-level behaviour on the one hand, and exacerbate the divisions in the foreign policy (and thereby collective identity) of the ASEAN member states on the other (discussed further in Chapter 5). Singapore had been one of the biggest sources of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Myanmar in the past decade and while this is not problematic in itself, certain military dealings are at least compromising. Numerous reports suggest that Singapore has not only supplied some of Myanmar’s weapons in the past, but was the first to do so in the wake of the killings that were a consequence of the government’s response to the protests of 1988.41 Jane’s Intelligence also lists Singapore as a possible supplier of landmines to the country42 and added weight to this concern was provided by a former Singaporean intelligence officer who alleged that Singapore did, at least until the beginning of the new millennium, manufacture landmines and that they were for the explicit purpose of export.43 Meanwhile, the majority of Myanmar’s more standard munitions — such as ammunition — now come from North Korea due to their low cost of production. Also, more recently, in April 2007, Myanmar formally restabilized diplomatic relations with North Korea44 and it had previously been accused of pursuing a nuclear relationship with that country, an accusation that it strongly denies as a “false and disconcerting alarm”.45 What seems relatively certain, however, is that in 2002 Myanmar entered an agreement with Russia for it to supply


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Myanmar with a 10-megawatt nuclear reactor46 and while the agreement was temporarily suspended due to a dispute over payment,47 a new agreement regarding the nuclear reactor, together with Russia’s commitment to establish a “nuclear physics and biotechnology” research centre in Myanmar, was signed on 15 May 2007.48 India, on the other hand, has become concerned with the strategic implications of Myanmar’s relationship with China, and subsequently sought, as a counterbalance, to engage and assist the country (economically, militarily, and politically) through its “Look East” policy. Therefore, India has snubbed the United States arms embargo against Myanmar, and, in an exploitative manner similar to Thailand and China, has rewarded the regime financially with the purchase of access to Myanmar’s natural gas reserves.49

Thai Relations with Myanmar Given Myanmar’s proximity as a neighbour to Thailand, the two countries have had a long history of interaction. However, these relations have not always been cordial or, indeed, peaceful. The people in Thailand continue to hold historical memories of a “Burmese” attack on its kingdom in the seventeenth century.50 Centuries later, and in the midst of the Cold War, Thailand also had to contend with an ideologically opposed and Chinesefunded Burmese Communist Party (BCP) inside Myanmar’s border. In reaction to these threats, together with an attempt to contain the spread of communism, the Thai Government implemented a buffer zone policy by supporting, directly and indirectly, the insurgent armies in Myanmar along the border.51 While this buffer zone was a source of considerable tension, the prevalence of the military within each country’s leadership did assist in the emergence of some close and “mutually beneficial” relations at the individual level.52 During the 1980s, as the threat of communism to the Thai Government became more remote, Thailand started to downplay the role of the buffer zone. However, perceptions over the possible threat of Myanmar soon remerged following the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and the buffer zone policy was subsequently reinforced. The combination of economic and military aid from China, together with the formation of a ceasefire arrangement with one of the most powerful insurgent groups (the UWSA), resulted in massive increases to the power and size of the Tatmadaw during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Because of this, the remaining insurgency movements (the stalwarts of the buffer zone) became threatened and, subsequently, were either forced to join in the government’s


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ceasefire regime or rendered ineffectual through a series of successful military campaigns by the Tatmadaw. On several occasions both the Tatmadaw and various insurgent groups have encroached upon Thailand’s territory for the purpose of launching an assault from the rear (in the case of the former) or to find a safe haven (in the case of the latter). The strategic advantage and/or necessity of these border incursions have been exacerbated by the mountainous and inaccessible nature of the terrain along Myanmar’s border with Thailand. Consequently, Thailand’s armed forces have intervened, resulting in a number of armed skirmishes between the Thai military, the Tatmadaw, and various insurgent groups.53 As recently as July 2006, the Tatmadaw fired at a Thai military helicopter,54 and the Thai army, for its part, has as recently as May 2002, fired shells at the Tatmadaw when elements of it (together with the UWSA) crossed into Thailand’s territory while in battle against the Shan State Army.55 A few months prior to that, in March 2002, the government-backed UWSA fired on Thai soldiers who were securing the area for a special visit by Queen Sirikit of Thailand.56 Mortar fire was subsequently exchanged by both sides and Thai villagers had to be evacuated as stray rounds threatened their safety.57 In spite of the deleterious impact on local and subregional trade, the border was immediately closed for five months.58 Within thirty-six hours of the border’s reopening, security had to be tightened as six bombs were found in the Myanmar border town of Myawaddy alongside Thailand’s Tak province.59 Meanwhile, territorial disputes have also remained an issue of concern. For example, in March 2003 the SPDC demanded that Thailand withdraw thirty-two troops that were stationed on a strategic mountain in Doi Lang — both governments claim this area as their own territory.60 The deleterious effects of long-term ethnic conflict in Myanmar have extended far beyond the traditional security realm of territorial disputes and border incursions. In 1999, between five and a dozen men from the “Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors” group seized control of Myanmar’s embassy in Bangkok for twenty-six hours and held approximately forty people hostage.61 The SPDC was subsequently outraged when the Thai Government complied with the dissidents’ request for helicopters and safe passage in exchange for the release of hostages.62 Then, in January 2000, Thai security forces stormed a hospital in the Ratchaburi Province where patients, visitors, and staff had been held hostage by another insurgent group called “God’s Army”. Investigations by the Thai Government later found a connection between this insurgent group and those responsible for the embassy incident a year prior. This connection, inter alia, resulted in new and less accommodating policies by the Thai Government vis-à-vis the insurgency movements.63


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Relations between the two countries have also been hampered by competing nationalism and seemingly irreconcilable differences between their national identities. For example, in 2002 relations took another turn for the worse when various Myanmarese newspapers criticized the Thai monarchy, a faux pas that is difficult to forgive within Thai society and culture. Thailand immediately demanded an apology for this and blacklisted two SPDC journalists.64 The SPDC responded to the demand by denouncing Thailand for “harbouring insurgents” and, to this end, organized a rally of 20,000 antiThai supporters near Thailand’s border.65 In the context of several of these considerations, Anthony Davis (Jane’s Intelligence) argues that “there is [a] real ongoing potential for the Thai and Burmese military to kill each other, to clash, to kill not just in ones or twos but at a company or battalion level”.66 Whether or not this eventuates, the fact of the matter is that there has been conflict in recent years. As the appropriate level of integration necessary to the existence of “dependable expectations of peaceful change” requires a “degree of consistency and evolution towards a situation of actual and anticipated peace between nations”, both Myanmar and Thailand mutually exclude each other from any “joint” membership in a potential security community. Despite the continued risk of conflict between Thailand and Myanmar, during the course of recent history, the impact of these transnational comprehensive security issues on their relations has not been as negative as one might expect. Firstly, there was an initial (albeit limited) improvement to their bilateral relations as a consequence of an SPDC initiative to grant “logging concessions” selectively to key political and military figures including General Chavalit — then commander-in-chief of the Thai Armed Forces and later deputy prime minister.67 These deals resulted in a massive increase in logging along the Thai-Myanmar border through to 1993, and this — in conjunction with the earlier mentioned hostage taking by “God’s Army” — marked a turning point in Thai/Myanmar relations that moved towards the demise of Thai support for Myanmar’s ethnic minority groups and their opposition to the SPDC.68 Having said this, we must add that the most significant improvement to relations between the two countries occurred with the election of Thaksin Shinawatra as Thailand’s Prime Minister in January 2001. Thaksin’s administration was quick to criticize publicly the previous Chuan Government with the claim that its tough policies had put the Thai/ Myanmar relationship in danger. One of these criticisms pertained to the Chuan Government’s policy of suspending all high-ranking state visits to Myanmar. Nonetheless, despite Thaksin’s initial goodwill gesture of sending the Thai premier to Yangon, it took at least a year for relations between


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the two countries to thaw.69 It was at this time that the SPDC announced three preconditions to the establishment of affable relations. The conditions raised by the SPDC, to which Thaksin agreed, consisted of (1) the removal of the Thai army chief, General Surayud Chulanont, (2) the removal of the commander of the 3rd army, and (3) an end to all “provocative operations” along the border by Task Force 399.70 Later, in September 2003, Thaksin also directed his government “to consider banning foreign dissidents who seek to use Thailand as a base for opposition struggles against neighbouring governments”.71 Then, in early 2005, the Thaksin government, on the grounds of “national security”, ordered at least 3,000 Burmese refugees to leave Bangkok and to move into one of three border camps currently in operation. No mobile phones or electronic devices are allowed in these camps, rendering it difficult for political activists to operate.72 Amidst allegations of corruption due to his rapid rise from police officer to multibillionaire,73 Thaksin further sought to improve bilateral relations by increasing Thailand’s economic links with (and exploitation of ) Myanmar. Thaksin’s ThaiCom-2 and ThaiCom-3 Satellites now provide Myanmar with telecommunications services including satellite TV, telephone, and internet.74 Furthermore, by 2007 Thailand accounted for 44 per cent of Myanmar’s export revenue mainly due to a contract for Myanmar to export natural gas to Thailand. In pursuit of his security agenda he also ended the previous administration’s “back to the barracks” policy so that in 2002 there were more than fifty (two to three-star) generals who visited Myanmar for the purpose of conducting (possibly corrupt) business dealings.75 Thailand’s newfound restraint against anything that might provoke hostility in its relations with the SPDC has also extended to what has been claimed to be an ally of the junta, the United Wa State Army. As the UWSA now controls much of the 850 km frontier with Thailand, some analysts have argued that this has already had the effect of increased drug trafficking across the border.76 The cordial nature of this new relationship between Thailand and Myanmar has had a number of repercussions, positive and negative, for both the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia and ASEAN’s Security Community project. Firstly, starting with the positive, the increased economic interdependence between the two countries and the removal of other contentious factors has meant that the prospect for armed conflict has been reduced in the present circumstances. This, at least, is a positive development when compared with the frequent occurrence of armed conflict along the border as recently as five years ago. However, the situation remains unstable given the continued threat of leadership change in both countries, together with an absence of political institutions to moderate leadership behaviour,


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and, therefore, the two countries represent major obstacles to the existence of dependable expectations of peaceful change. Furthermore, as stated earlier, the lack of consistency in relations between the two countries, and the shortterm nature of any evolution towards a “situation of actual and anticipated peace” excludes Myanmar from being able to satisfy the framework’s threshold test for the existence of a security community.

The China Factor: The Strategic Implications of Myanmar’s Relationship with China The SPDC needed to strengthen the Tatmadaw in order to respond to the continued threat of the insurgency movements, which, in turn, provided the Tatmadaw with added leverage to negotiate and/or coerce the implementation of its ceasefire regime later. To this end, the SPDC desperately needed an ally that would readily provide it with unconditional military aid, munitions, and armaments. While China had the potential to meet the government’s needs in this context, the long history of animosity between the two countries presented an obstacle to the formation of friendly relations. An opportunity to end this historical enmity emerged with implementation of a ceasefire arrangement with the formerly Chinese-backed BCP. Following an initial set of diplomatic talks designed to normalize relations between Myanmar and China, the SPDC soon found that China was a more than willing sponsor and ally of the regime.77 China’s eagerness to support its comparatively weak and impoverished neighbour can be partially attributed to the strategic opportunity for it to enhance its access (militarily and economically) to both the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait.78 A further point of strategic importance for China is the existence of relatively vast energy resources within Myanmar, which, for example, currently has proven reserves of 115 million barrels of oil, along with 314.4 billion cubic metres of natural gas. In addition, there remain large offshore areas that have yet to be explored.79 Because of China’s own energy shortage, the plentiful supply of natural resources in Myanmar render it highly important for China to maintain its strategic influence. On the normalization of relations between the two countries, China almost immediately rewarded the Tatmadaw with an initial supply of military equipment estimated to be in the order of between US$1.2 billion and US$1.5 billion for the period between 1990 and 1994.80 This assistance has since been boosted to US$2 billion, with acquisition emphasis being on “helicopters, assault rifles, patrol boats and armoured vehicles”.81 For the purpose of enhancing its strategic access to the Indian Ocean and the Malacca


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Strait, some scholars contend that China also refurbished four of Myanmar’s naval bases, installed new coastal radar systems,82 and constructed a large electronic surveillance establishment on Coco Island.83 Other Chinese facilities have also been installed and these, inter alia, are located on Ramree Island south of Sittwe in the Rakhine state, Zadetkyi Kyun (St. Mathews Island) off the Tanintharyi coast, and Hainggyi in the Ayeyarwady River estuary near Pathein.84 In addition, through a combination of aid and trade benefits received, the SPDC managed to almost double the size of its armed forces to just under half a million personnel.85 China has also supported Myanmar by supplying aid and soft loans to the country. In 2003, for example, China provided Myanmar with US$200 million in loans and agreed to write off an unspecified number of the country’s debts to China.86 With the level of aid provided by China to Myanmar, the bilateral relations between the two countries may — more than any other factor — explain the continued survival of the regime. As illustrated in Figure 4.4, international political and economic isolation have also enhanced the significance of China as a trade partner for Myanmar. 87 While China currently ranks third in terms of Myanmar’s exports, at 28.5 per cent it is now first in relation to imports. This is largely due to the ability of China to supply comparatively cheaper consumer goods. The economic (and cultural) influence of China is most significant in the upper quadrants of the country

FIGURE 4.4 Myanmar’s Major Import and Export Partners Myanmar’s Main Import Partners

Other 32%

Myanmar’s Main Export Partners Other 34%

China 34%

China 7%

Thailand 19%

Singapore 15%

India 15%

Thailand 44%

Source: Compiled by the author from the statistics of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs (September 2008), located at .


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from Mandalay city through to the north and east of the country, along the border with China. In 2003, bilateral trade between Myanmar and China exceeded US$1 billion and a set of agreements for economic cooperation was approved in March 2004.88 The dominance of China in Myanmar’s foreign relations was further exemplified by Than Shwe’s actions following Khin Nyunt’s dismissal as prime minister. In the aftermath of the dismissal Than Shwe almost immediately undertook a diplomatic visit to China (as opposed to ASEAN) to justify the actions of the SPDC.89 Nevertheless, Myanmar is aware that it needs to balance its strategic relations with China against other relationships such as those with India and Russia.90 However, in practice, the capacity of the SPDC to maintain an appropriate strategic balance between its major partners is highly limited. At the behavioural (normative) level, China is further important to Myanmar because of China’s strict adherence to the principle of noninterference. As will be illustrated in later chapters, China has remained relatively consistent in its position that the sovereignty of Myanmar should not be compromised through international pressure and this has impeded ASEAN’s ability to compel change in the country.91 At the international level, China’s position also serves its own national interests by the avoidance of any potential criticism (at least within ASEAN) over its own human rights abuses and potential instability in the future. The importance to China of ensuring that “non-interference” remains adhered to throughout Southeast Asia as was seen at the 26 July 2005 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Laos. Following the announcement that Myanmar had decided to relinquish the ASEAN Chair, China’s foreign minister Li Zhaoxing broke protocol and left the meeting, thereby boycotting the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) assembly he was to attend immediately afterwards. He then flew to Yangon where discussions were hurriedly organized with President Than Shwe and Prime Minister Soe Win. The official excuse provided by the foreign minister for his early departure was that Myanmar was “the only country in ASEAN that I’ve never seen”.92 Myanmar’s relationship within China presents a number of challenges to change and reform in Myanmar. For example, the natural resources within Myanmar (including adequate food security) have enabled the military regime to survive for decades with only limited dependence on the outside world. Therefore, the aid, trade, and armaments provided by China satisfy a significant proportion of the regime’s relatively modest requirements. Furthermore, through a select club of key economic partners, Myanmar now maintains the highest level of foreign exchange reserves on record.93 In other words, the material benefits Thailand and China provide, together


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with the latter’s diplomatic support, have directly increased the probability of the SPDC remaining in power for the near future. In addition, the material benefits that Myanmar gains from China are greater than the sum total of those from ASEAN. The greater significance of China, relative to ASEAN, has significantly impeded ASEAN’s influence in Myanmar. In the context of political change, while Myanmar’s relations with some ASEAN states continue to bear considerable importance (for example, trade with Thailand), what little collective leverage they have had has been inconsistently applied vis-à-vis Myanmar. In contrast, China’s unswerving adherence to the principle of non-interference has contributed towards an ideological endearment of Myanmar to China. Given the form of governance in China, this alone presents a major challenge to positive change (socialization) in the future. Another problem in the implementation of political change within Myanmar is the high level of strategic importance that China places on Myanmar. Because of this — together with the significance China places on the non-interference principle — it is highly unlikely that ASEAN could, in the future, rely on China to cooperate in any multilateral strategy to apply substantive pressure on Myanmar towards reform and improved governance.

Conclusions The first section in this chapter considered a non-exhaustive list of the transnational security challenges that have afflicted some of the ASEAN states. Largely these challenges arose from an inadequate level of internal state consolidation and this situation has, in turn, been exacerbated by longterm domestic instability. While the direct impact of these non-traditional security threats to “dependable expectation of peaceful change” is marginal, their existence indirectly affects ASEAN’s security community project in at least two respects. In the first instance — and in line with the conceptual framework to the study — the transnational consequences of instability raised by the chapter will continue to divert the state resources of Thailand (among others) away from the pursuit of regional integration. In the second instance, the continued existence of these transnational security issues also evidence the low level of “security integration” between the ASEAN states where its member states have been unable to cooperate and formulate the measures necessary to resolve the non-traditional security challenges raised by the investigation. Meanwhile, the domestic environment and leadership in Myanmar continue to threaten the traditional (hard) security of Thailand — the threshold test to a security community. While there is currently a


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low probability of armed conflict between the two states, the risk of armed conflict is not unforeseeable. A low, but foreseeable, risk of conflict between two countries does not satisfy the relatively stringent requirements for the existence of a security community. Therefore, Myanmar and Thailand, in cooperation with ASEAN, will need to resolve this risk before ASEAN can succeed in its goal for an ASEAN-wide security community by 2015. The low level of integration amongst the ASEAN states was further illustrated by recent developments in Myanmar’s relations with Thailand and China. For example, the Thaksin administration’s amoral and self-interested pursuit of trade with Myanmar compromises the potential of Thailand to join ASEAN in a common position, should the organization wish to take a tougher stance vis-à-vis Myanmar. As later analysis will demonstrate, there have already been a few instances to indicate that the Thaksin administration had shifted to a more conservative position in its normative stance within ASEAN. The 2006 military coup in Thailand, followed by continued leadership transitions, renders it difficult to predict future Thai policy and its relations with Myanmar. In the context of Myanmar’s relations with China, their mutual identification with each other has been at the expense of Myanmar’s capacity to identify with ASEAN collectively. The transference of a sense of community towards China and away from ASEAN is sufficient in degree to question the loyalty of Myanmar, and whether it can be depended on to support ASEAN in the event of a serious conflict of interests (with or without the potential for violence) between China and any of the ASEAN states. Regardless of how improbable this hypothetical scenario may be, the actual existence of circumstances where a state might be anticipated to side with an exogenous actor in circumstances of coercion and/or armed conflict, and in a manner that would fundamentally conflict with the interests of the grouping (community of states), is the antithesis of a security community. Many of these concluding points pertain to the material impact of Myanmar on the ASEAN security community project. However, Myanmar also challenges the operation and normative structure of ASEAN more generally. How Myanmar has also challenged the operative norms, solidarity, and elite-level collective identity of ASEAN more generally is the focus of the next chapter.

Notes 1

James Cotton, “Regional Order and the Over-determination of Regional Institutions in the Asia-Pacific”, paper presented at the UTS-Guadalajara Workshop, Guadalajara, January 2004, p. 2.


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John McFarlane describes transnational criminal communities as “… organised crime groups that have a home base in one state, but operate in one or more host states where there are favourable market opportunities”. John McFarlane, “Transnational Crime and Illegal Immigration in the Asia-Pacific Region: Background, Prospects and Countermeasures” (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1999), p. 1. John McFarlane and Karen McLennon, “Transnational Crime: The New Security Paradigm” (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1996), p. 2. “Asia Takes Aim at Growing Child Sex Trafficking” (Internet, Express India — Reuters, 2004 [cited 18 December 2004]), available at . Binh Minh Ho, “Six Asian Nations Act to Stop Human Trafficking”, Reuters, 31 March 2005. “Children on the Edge: Protecting Children from Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking in East Asia and the Pacific” (UNICEF, 2002), p. 36. Field trip by the author with Professor Desmond Ball to the Thai/Myanmar border, June 2005. It is located just east of Thailand’s border with Myanmar (behind the mountain) and is approximately 100 kilometres north of Mae Sot, but south of Mae Hong Son. According to Professor Ball, the refugees are treated reasonably well and the author can confirm that Thailand’s refugees are provided with basic facilities such as power and television, as well as things such as basic schooling. Desmond Ball, “Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands”, Working Paper No. 9 (Australia: Australian Mekong Resource Centre, 2003), p. 12. Others seem to have come up with less concise, but understated estimates of around 120,000. See, for example, Martin T. Smith, “Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches”, in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 58. Interview by the author with Ekapong Rimcharone, Office of the National Security Council, Thailand, June 2004. Within scholarly literature, this figure has varied, depending on the source of information. For a representative sample of the estimate see, Desmond Ball, “Security Developments in the ThailandBurma Borderlands”, p. 9. Ibid., p. 12. At a global level, 10 per cent of all HIV infections are a consequence of unsafe injection of drugs. “Drugs and HIV/AIDS in Southeast Asia — Reducing HIV Vulnerability from Drug Abuse” (Internet, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2005 [cited 28 September 2005]), available at . “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control” (United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law


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Enforcement Affairs, 2005). “In 2001, 50 per cent of injecting users in Thailand were infected with HIV … 76 per cent in Malaysia, and 65 per cent in Vietnam”, “Drugs and HIV/AIDS in Southeast Asia — Reducing HIV Vulnerability from Drug Abuse” (cited). Vaclav Havel and Bishop Desmond M. Tutu, “Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma” (DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, 2005), p. 29. Chris Beyrer, “Drug Use and HIV/AIDS in Burma” (Electronic Database — Expanded Academic ASAP, The Lancet, 1999 [cited 7 December 2004]), available at . “Opium Poppy Cultivation in South East Asia”, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, December 2008, p. 45. See also “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control”. The author has made this distinction because in the context of Myanmar it is dangerous to perceive the government and its military branches as acting solely as one unified body. While unity is an often self-declared and cherished principle within the Tatmadaw, the previous chapter outlined a small sample of factors that showed the junta to be anything but unified. Furthermore, while the conservative elements within the government may have consolidated their positions in power for the moment, this does not mean that there are no longer any pro-reformists in the government. Vaclav Havel and Bishop Desmond M. Tutu, “Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma”, p. 27. Interview by the author with Professor Desmond Ball, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, November 2004. Field trip by the author with Professor Desmond Ball to the Thai/Myanmar border, May 2005. See also, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control”. Other factors that contribute to the popularity in producing and promoting methamphetamines include the fact that “there is no dependence on growing seasons, no large workforce is required, necessary chemicals are easily obtained, it is easy to locate laboratories near consumer markets, and there is a high profit return on their investments”. “Methamphetamine: The Current Threat in East Asia and the Pacific Rim”, (United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, 2003). “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug and Chemical Control”. In 2001, the level was around 600 million tablets per annum. Interview by the author with Rodney Tasker, FEER, Bangkok, 18 December 2001. Ecstasy laboratories have also been uncovered in Indonesia and Malaysia. Hanna Ingber, “‘Club Drug’ Trend Worries Thai Officials” (Internet, The Irrawaddy, 2005 [cited 30 September 2005]), available at <www.irrawaddy.org>; Grant Peck, “Asian Amphetamine Producers Are Diversifying, Say Experts” (Internet, The Irrawaddy, 2005 [cited 30 September 2005]), available at <www.irrawaddy. org>.


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Desmond Ball, “Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands”, p. 8. Certainly, distinguished and well-informed academics such as Desmond Ball and Alan Dupont are convinced of the involvement of the SPDC in the narcotics industry. For example, see Alan Dupont, “Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia”, Asian Survey 39, no. 3 (1999): 439. Desmond Ball, “Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands”, p. 13. See also Desmond Ball, “Burma and Drugs: The Regime’s Complicity in the Global Drug Trade” (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1999). For an historical account of the evolution of the opium trade in Myanmar and the Golden Triangle, including the relationship between Chang Chifu and the government of Myanmar, see Bertil Lintner, “The Golden Triangle Opium Trade” (Internet, Asia Pacific Media Services, 2000 [cited 18 April 2005]), available at <www.asiapacficms.com/papers/>. On Chang Chifu’s surrender and its effect on narcotics production, see Sudha Ramachandran, “War or No War, Drug Trade Flourishes” (Internet, Asia Times, 2004 [cited 20 December 2004]), available at . Vaclav Havel and Bishop Desmond M. Tutu, “Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma”, p. 27. Interview by the author with Andrew Selth, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, March 2004. Indeed, money laundering is on the rise globally, see “Money Laundering on the Rise, Poll Finds” (Internet, Toronto Star, 2004 [cited 28 September 2004]), available at . For a detailed and relatively up to date discussion on the meaning, application, and impact of money laundering in Southeast Asia, see Peter Lilley, “The Asian Money Laundering Explosion”, in Fighting Corruption in Asia: Causes, Effects and Remedies, edited by John Kidd and Frank-Jurgen Richter (Singapore: World Scientific, 2003). “United Wa State Army (UWSA)” (Intelligence Database, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2005 [cited 29 September 2005]), available at <www.janes. com>. For an overview of money laundering events in Myanmar, see “Money Laundering in Burma” (Internet, The Irrawaddy, 2004 [cited 28 August 2005]), available at <www.irrawaddy.org>. “Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)” (Intelligence Database, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2005 [cited 29 September 2005]), available at <www. janes.com>. Interview by the author, Yangon, May 2005. “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Vietnam”, Jane’s Intelligence Database, 2007. “Burma, Cambodia, North Korea Cited for Human Trafficking Abuses”, Hindustan Times, 2005.


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The report by Transparency International is located at . Ralf Emmers, Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitisation (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2004), p. 11. “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Vietnam”. “Methamphetamine: The Current Threat in East Asia and the Pacific Rim”. Desmond Ball, “Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands”, p. 6; Desmond Ball, “Burma and Drugs: The Regime’s Complicity in the Global Drug Trade”, p. 2. Desmond Ball, “Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands”, p. 3. Emmers, Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitisation, p. 12. Furthermore, officials believe that the police spend about 60 per cent of their time dealing with the drug crime in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Vietnam”. William Ashton, “Burma Receives Advances from Its Silent Suitors in Singapore” (Intelligence Database, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1998 [cited 22 October 2005]), available at <www.janes.com>; Andrew Selth, Burma’s Secret Military Partners, vol. 136 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2000), pp. 27–29. Other weapons, armaments, and military equipment that have been supplied by Singapore include one BAeS Dynamics Bloodhound Mk II SAM system; three Scorpion radars; arms manufacturing plant and equipment; mortars and ammunition; 84-mm recoilless gun ammunition; automatic rifles; small arms ammunition; computers and electronic equipment; radars and communications equipment, and raw materials for arms manufacture. “Procurement — Myanmar” (Intelligence Database, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment — Southeast Asia, 2005 [cited 17 January 2006]), available at <www.janes.com>. He based his contention on that fact that he has seen Singapore Government posters advertising the manufacture and sale of military munitions, and “landmines” were one of the pictures featured in the poster. He added that the Singapore military does not receive any training in the use of landmines and, therefore, it can be implied that the purpose of their manufacture is solely for export. Discussions with the author, Singapore, September 2005. Furthermore, Singapore, like Myanmar and Vietnam, is not a signatory to the international agreement against landmines. “Myanmar Now the Region’s Black Spot for Hidden Peril” (Internet, South China Morning Post, 2002 [cited 19 January 2006]), available at . “Burma-North Korea Ties Need Scrutiny: Renewal of Relations between These Two Pariah States Raises Fear of a Shift in Regional Balance of Power” (Internet, The Nation, 2007 [cited 11 July 2007]), available at .


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“Myanmar Rejects Ties with North Korea” (Electronic Intelligence Database, Stratfor, 2004 [cited 19 January 2005]), available at <www.stratfor.biz>. For the first time in twenty-five years, a Burmese foreign minister visited Pyongyang on 27 October 2008. “Burma’s Foreign Minister Makes First Visit to North Korea in 25 Years” (News, The Irrawaddy, 2008 [cited 27 October 2008]), available at <www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=14510>. To be located in its central lowlands at a cost of between US$25–35 million. Bertil Lintner, “China Gets Nuclear Reactor: Deal Vexes China’s Efforts to Expand Its Influence by Courting Myanmar”, 3 January 2002. “Armed Forces, Myanmar” (Intelligence Database, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment — Southeast Asia, 2005 [cited 22 October 2005]), available at <www.janes.com>. “Russia and Myanmar Sign Intergovernmental Agreement on Nuclear Research Center in Myanmar” (Internet, SKRIN, 2007 [cited 11 July 2007]), available at <www.skrin.com>; “Moscow Website Provides More Details of Plans to Build Nuclear Reactor in Burma”, BBC News, 18 May 2007; “Russia to Build Atomic Plant for Burmese Junta: Going Nuclear”, The Guardian, 17 May 2007. Bruce Loudon, “India to Snub US on Burma Arms Embargo”, The Australian, 23 January 2007. N. Ganesan, “Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN”, Pacific Strategic Papers (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1999), p. 17. Maung Aung Myoe, Neither Friend nor Foe: Myanmar’s Relations with Thailand since 1988 — A View from Yangon (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 37. Ganesan, “Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN”, p. 19. Larry Jagan, “Burma Drums up Border Tension” (Internet, BBC News, 2002 [cited 3 July 2002]), available at . The Tatmadaw “supposedly” mistook the helicopter as being from the Shan State Army. Sattha Subin Kheunkaew Cheewin, “Army to Protest at ‘Hostile Act’ after Chopper Comes under Fire”, Bangkok Post, 11 July 2006; “Foreign Minister Protests Burma over Border Shooting” (Internet, The Nation, 2006 [cited 3 January 2007]), available at <www.nationamultimedia.com/2006/07/13/ headlines/headlines_30008633.php>; “Myanmar Military Admits Soldier Shoots Thai Copter Unintentionally”, Organization of Asia-Pacific News Agencies, 2006. Aung Hla Tun, “Myanmar Says Thailand Dishonest on Border Fighting”, Reuters, 17 June 2002. “Border Tension on the Burner Again” (Internet, The Nation, 2002 [cited 5 December 2004]), available at .


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For the Thais, “Queen Sirikit’s inability to travel freely in her own kingdom was an affront to national dignity”. Robert Horn, “Border Disorder” (Internet, Time Asia, 2002 [cited 5 December 2004]), available at . “Thai-Burmese Border Reopens” (Internet, BBC News, 2002 [cited 19 October 2002]), available at ; “Thailand, Myanmar Reopen Border Checkpoints”, Asian Political News, 21 October 2002. The Thai/Myanmar border had also been closed the previous year because of Thailand being accused of firing artillery shells into Myanmar in support of Shan rebels (the SSA). “Thai-Burmese Relations ‘Improve’ after Visit” (Internet, BBC News, 2001 [cited 8 November 2004]), available at ; “Thailand, Myanmar Officials to Meet over Border Conflict”, Agence France Presse, 19 March 2001. “Thai-Myanmar Border Shocked after 6 Bombs Found after Reopening”, Xinhua News Agency, 17 October 2002. A year later (May 2003) a number of bombs exploded in Myanmar border town of Tachilek a few hundred metres from the Thai city of Mae Sai. “Thaksin: Border Explosions Not to Affect Thai/Myanmar Relations” (Electronic Database — Expanded Academic ASAP, Xinhua News Agency, 2003 [cited 8 November 2004]), available at . “Burma Demands Troops Leave Doi Lang” (Internet, The Nation, 2003 [cited 9 November 2004]), available at . Busaba Sivasomboon, “Myanmar Embassy in Thailand Stormed” (Internet, Washington Post, 1999 [cited 18 October 2003]), available at <www.washington. com/wp-srv/aponline/19991001/aponline095635_000.htm>; “Thailand Security Forces Storm Hospital, Kill 10 Myanmar Rebels”, Grand Rapids Press, 25 January 2000. Charlotte Bevan, “Bangkok Siege ‘Stank of Conspiracy’” (Internet, BBC News, 1999 [cited 8 March 2006]), available at . This fringe group is led by twelve-year-old boys who claim to have mystical powers that make them invincible. “Thailand Security Forces Storm Hospital, Kill 10 Myanmar Rebels”. “‘New Low’ for Thai-Burma Relations” (Internet, BBC News, 2002 [cited 1 July 2002]), available at ; “Thailand Blacklists Myanmar Journalists” (Internet, Straits Times Interactive, 2002 [cited 2 July 2002]), available at . “Tens of Thousands Rally in Burma” (Internet, Radio Australia News, 2002 [cited 5 December 2004]), available at .


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Interview by the author with Anthony Davis, Jane’s Intelligence, Bangkok, 15 February 2006. For example, Professor Desmond Ball describes the deputy prime minister as a man who “boasts of his good relations with the junta in Rangoon. He had earned the nickname ‘logger’ Chavalit in the late 1980s, when as Chief of the Army he had arranged a deal with the Burmese whereby Tatmadaw troops could enter Thailand to attack the border strongholds of the ethnic insurgents from the rear, and in return Thai logging companies were given access to forests in Kayin [Karen] State, which they then stripped bare with heavy machinery”. Desmond Ball, “Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands”, p. 7. “A Conflict of Interests — the Uncertain Future of Burma’s Forests” (London: Global Witness, 2003), p. 12. “Border Tension on the Burner Again” (cited). Tom Fawthrop, “Thai-Myanmar Ties: Drug Lords Cash In” (Internet, Asia Times, 2003 [cited 5 December 2004]), available at ; Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Thailand Accused of Dancing to Myanmar’s Tune” (Internet, Asia Times, 2004 [cited 5 December 2004]), available at . “Thailand Reconsiders Security Policy” (Electronic Intelligence Database, Stratfor, 2004 [cited 8 November 2004]), available at . “Burma Refugees Miss Thai Deadline” (Internet, BBC News, 2005 [cited 2 April 2005]), available at ; Simon Montlake, “Burma Refugees Face Thai Deadline” (Internet, BBC News, 2005 [cited 4 April 2005]), available at ; “Thailand Uproots Burmese Refugees” (Internet, Sydney Morning Herald, 2005 [cited 24 March 2005]), available at . Discussions with Professor Desmond Ball during the field trip to the Thai/ Myanmar border in June 2005. Desmond Ball, “Security Developments in the Thailand-Burma Borderlands”, p. 7. Discussions with Professor Desmond Ball during the field trip to the Thai/ Myanmar border in June 2005. Fawthrop, “Thai-Myanmar Ties: Drug Lords Cash In” (cited). “Myanmar: The Future of the Armed Forces”, International Crisis Group, 2002. Vijai Nair, “Why India is Wary about China”, vol. 1, issue 9 (Internet, The Jamestown Foundation, 2001 [cited 20 August 2002]), available at . According to newspaper sources, China believes that there may be as much as 3.2 billion barrels of oil and 2.46 trillion cubic metres of gas. “Myanmar: India and China Compete to Support Economy” (Intelligence Database, AsiaInt Reference Library, 2004 [cited 5 January 2005]), available at <www.asiaint.com>.


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“China’s External Affairs: Relations with Myanmar” (Intelligence Database, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 2005 [cited 22 October 2005]), available at <www. janes.com>. Additional armaments included fighter aircraft, artillery, anti-aircraft guns and missiles. Derek Da Cunha, “Southeast Asian Perceptions of China’s Future Security Role in Its ‘Backyard’”, in In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, edited by Richard H. Yang and Jonathan D. Pollack (RAND, 1998), pp. 117–18. In relation to claims of a further $2 billion in assistance, see Nair, “Why India is Wary about China” (cited). From 2001 to 2003, there were a further four shipments of weapons reported. N. Ganesan, “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 50. Jonathan S. Landay, “What Nuclear Tests Mean for China and the Rest of Asia”, Christian Science Monitor, 15 May 1998. “China-Burma-India Intelligence” (Internet, Voice of America, 2002 [cited 3 September 2002]), available at ; Sudha Ramachandran, “Myanmar Plays off India and China” (Internet, Asia Times, 2005 [cited 25 August 2005]), available at <www.asiatimes. com>. There have also been claims that the Chinese funded road and bridge projects to provide a military corridor through to the coast so that Myanmar can be used as a “launching pad” for any relevant military operation or assault. “Myanmar: The Future of the Armed Forces”. N. Ganesan, “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, p. 50. Derek Da Cunha, “Renewed Military Buildups Post-Asian Crisis: The Effect on Two Key Southeast Asian Bilateral Military Balances” (Internet, Journal Article, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001 [cited 20 October 2002]), available at <www.iseas.edu.sg/ipsi32001.pdf>. Ian Holiday, “Rethinking the United States’ Myanmar Policy”, Asian Survey 45, no. 4 (2005): 615–16. From 1996 to 1999 Singapore was the biggest exporter to Myanmar (at around 30 per cent of total imports), but thereafter China took its place. This analysis is based on data supplied by the Strategic Asia Database, located at . See also N. Ganesan, “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, p. 36. “China’s External Affairs: Relations with Myanmar” (cited). Soe Win, the new prime minister, also visited China a week later, but did so only after a visit to India, reflecting both the comparative inconsequentiality of Southeast Asia for the leadership, and the need to diversify the country’s dependence on “major” powers within the greater Asia-Pacific region. “Myanmar: India and China Compete to Support Economy” (cited); “Myanmar: Soe Win Heads to China” (Electronic Intelligence Database, AsiaInt Reference Library, 2004 [cited 8 November 2004]), available at .


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For example, Myanmar has sought to increase its economic and military relations with India. Myanmar has also attempted to diversify the destinations from which it receives military equipment to include Russia. In 1999, it received a squadron of Russian Mi-17 helicopters, and in 2003, it obtained at concessionary rates a squadron of Mig-29s. In 1999, it further turned down a Chinese offer for US$200 million in military credits. “External Affairs, Myanmar” (Electronic Intelligence Database, Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment — Southeast Asia, 2005 [cited 29 May 2005]), available at <www.janes.com>. In May 2005, Myanmar and India had commenced a feasibility study on building a deep-sea port in the southern Tanintharyi division, “India to Study Possibility of Building Deep-Sea Port in Myanmar” (Internet, People’s Daily OnLine, 2005 [cited 29 March 2005]), available at . N. Ganesan, “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, p. 36. “Chinese Cuts Short ASEAN Visit, to Travel to Myanmar”, Associated Press Newswires, 28 July 2005; “Chinese FM Visits Myanmar” (Internet, China View, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]), available at . Barry Desker and Christopher Roberts, “Myanmar: Prospects and Challenges of Engagement”, in Security through Cooperation: CSCAP Regional Security Outlook (CRSO), edited by Brian L. Job and Erin Williams (Singapore: CSCAP, 2008), p. 34.


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5 MYANMAR’S MEMBERSHIP IN ASEAN: Historical and Contemporary Implications Previous chapters in this analysis considered the historical implications and contemporary challenges of domestic instability in Myanmar. This has included an analysis of such issues as human rights and environmental exploitation, various transnational security challenges, and the strategic impact of Myanmar’s relations with Thailand and China. In particular, the analysis identified that while the likelihood of wide-scale armed conflict between Myanmar and Thailand is currently little more than a remote possibility, it is not unforeseeable. This possibility in itself excludes the existence of a security community. Further, the analysis has also suggested certain difficulties as far as the community aspect of the theory is concerned. In this context, this chapter explores how the failure of the SPDC to respond to a policy of constructive engagement has affected both ASEAN’s international stature and, more specifically, its cohesion. As later analysis will demonstrate, the Myanmar issue has forced some elites within ASEAN to question the primacy of the ASEAN Way, including its principle of non-interference. In turn, this has exacerbated the divide between those who want reform in the Association and those who wish to retain the status quo. Given the fundamental nature of the principle of non-interference to the operation of ASEAN, continued normative divisions will also inhibit the emergence of an elite-level collective identity. An understanding of these consequences is vital to the concluding analysis in the final chapter. 107


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THE ASEAN WAY AND NON-INTERFERENCE — A NORMATIVE SYNOPSIS Regional scholars such as Kusuma Snitwongse have interpreted the language of the Bangkok Declaration that established ASEAN — including the members’ “stability and security from external interference” — as an elite move to deepen the salience of a number of normative rules that provide the basis of what has become known as the ASEAN Way. The core components of the ASEAN Way are (i) consensus-based decision making; (ii) a respect for national sovereignty; and (iii) non-interference in the domestic affairs of others.1 Such an interpretation, at least as far as the rhetoric of ASEAN is concerned, is also supported by the Bangkok Declaration’s reference to the principles of the United Nations Charter which, among other things, includes the principle of non-interference2 — a well established principle of the modern Westphalian state system.3 However, the behaviour of the member states tended to reflect this normative ideal only when faced by external common threats. Historically, the limited examples of such cohesion were further restricted because of the bipolar cleavages of the Cold War. Regardless of the limitations of the Bangkok Declaration, the formation of the Association was at least important for establishing a culture of consultation — whether that be at a karaoke bar or at a golf course.4 While some analysts have somewhat cynically interpreted the ASEAN Way to mean little more than simply “leave us alone”,5 the reality is somewhat more complex. Thus, the ASEAN Way does not mean that the ASEAN states are apathetic towards one another, or that they are never involved in the internal affairs of another member, but points rather to (i) the avoidance of public criticism; and (ii) the provision of support “if an elite is threatened by internal rebellion”.6 Consequently, the idea of helping neighbouring governments and “acting as a mutual support group … is very much the essence of ASEAN”7 and, as Alan Collins adds, such normative rules have the practical effect that security is considered to be very much synonymous with domestic stability.8 In line with these principles, any cooperation between member states was to be, at all times, mutually beneficial and of mutual interest, with an absolute assertion of sovereignty as well as an unqualified right of veto. This socio-cultural aspect of ASEAN’s normative behaviour is understood as the process of consensually based decision making. In order to adhere to this, the ASEAN states have also “traditionally” had an aversion to any form of integration between national governments — also viewed as a contravention of non-interference — as this would have demanded the transfer of at least some degree of national sovereignty to the supranational


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Historical and Contemporary Implications of Myanmar’s ASEAN Membership 109

level. As can be seen in various diplomatic arrangements such as ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality), SEANWFZ (Southest Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone) and the ASEAN Concord, these foreign policy outlooks have resulted in a traditional avoidance of cooperative security and legally binding rules and treaties, together with a strong predilection for decentralized decision making, informality, and bilateral negotiation. Within the confines of non-interference and consensus, several more diplomatic practices have guided ASEAN relations. For example, the requirement of consensus implies a process of gradualism, the outcome of which has been progress at a rate no faster than the lowest common denominator, where only the minimum collective agenda is pursued.9 Additionally, the procedural norms of informality and confidentiality (or alternatively quiet diplomacy and silent peer pressure) has meant that consensus was to be obtained informally and “outcomes” were understood as the only legitimate information to be communicated to the public. Differences of opinion in proceedings that took place prior to the organization’s attainment of consensus were to be kept confidential. 10 Furthermore, because of membership expansion, Weatherbee suggests that there is now an even lower common denominator as encapsulated by Myanmar and the limitations over what the SPDC would agree to.11 Consequently, the principles of consensus and non-interference have had the advantage of cloaking certain faults in the normative behaviours of the organization. As Kwa Chong Guan states in an interview, the Southeast Asian states have largely agreed to sweep controversial issues under the carpet.12 Thus, the ASEAN Way has enabled the Association to continue to be perceived as having at least the “aura” of an organization that was more successful than may otherwise have been the reality. Given these considerations, the principle of non-interference has increasingly become the subject of criticism from academics and politicians13 and may be further viewed as a major limitation to the scope, level, and potential for regional cooperation. In particular, Jones and Smith contend that the principle of non-interference has made the ASEAN Way characteristically contradictory. 14 The organization’s position on these “non-negotiable” principles conveniently overlooks definitive lapses in the organization’s (or its members’) adherence to the same self-declared principles. Examples of such contraventions include Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, and in the politically motivated delay in admitting Cambodia because of domestic issues.15 Another contradiction is evidenced by ASEAN’s inconsistency in upholding the principle of neutrality (as expressed in ZOPFAN) when ASEAN aligned itself against Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina.16 By aligning itself in support of China and the United States, the member states


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of ASEAN demonstrated that they would only remain neutral when it was convenient, and within their “interests” to do so. Besides, as Jones and Smith correctly assert, the Association’s repeated practice of contradicting, neglecting, or ignoring its so-called “inalienable principles” whenever convenient, has resulted in an organization that is best characterized by an ASEAN style of self-deception that was most memorably defined by George Orwell as “the capacity of holding two contradictory views in one’s mind simultaneously and accepting both of them”.17 Finally, it is also important to highlight the fact that despite claims of a “collective view-point” being encapsulated by the ASEAN Way, the security arrangements of Southeast Asia have never represented, or emerged from, collective approaches to security. Instead, the dominant form of security throughout Southeast Asia’s history has always been based on bilateral arrangements and approaches.18 The ASEAN Way had been proclaimed a major tool utilized in support of security and economic development.19 It was argued that various issues of instability in the regional and domestic security environments of the Southeast Asian states necessitated this distinctly regional approach to decision making, human rights, and democracy as encapsulated by the principles of national and regional resilience. Conveniently, and perhaps even necessarily, the ASEAN unity in diversity approach — which stems from the norm of consensualism — allowed for, and indeed justified, the existence of a variety of regimes ranging from soft-authoritarian to military dictatorships. 20 The Philippines and its catchcry chant of “people power” was viewed as an exception — even an abrogation — to the normative values of the region.21 In truth, however, it was economic growth and “performance legitimacy” that was the means (rather than the end) upon which state and transnational security was to be grounded. The expansion of ASEAN’s membership, moreover, further impeded the pace of integration and marginalized the ability of the ASEAN states to garner consensus on important security and economic issues. Furthermore — in a manner similar to the events that precipitated the formation of ASEAN — the motivations that informed the decisions to join ASEAN were not derived from any deep-seated sense of “community”, but, were rather, based on pragmatic assessments over the material benefits such membership could potentially deliver. While each of the CLMV countries (that is, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) have generated various complications regarding the potential for interest harmonization and foreign policy coordination, the most significant challenge to such cooperation has been the military dictatorship in Myanmar.


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MYANMAR IN ASEAN — THE HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP The eventual inclusion of Myanmar as a member in ASEAN had been in the Association’s sights from the beginning. At the time of ASEAN’s formation, both Myanmar and Cambodia were informally approached to test their interest in membership, but both declined due to the international Cold War climate of the time and their membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).22 Less known is the fact that in 1987, in seeking to end decades of diplomatic isolation, Myanmar itself tested the possibility of membership in ASEAN. However, Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry (which Myanmar approached) was only lukewarm in its response suggesting that the Association might only be prepared to go as far as providing “observer status”.23 Following a limited change in leadership because of the 1988 protests, the issue of Myanmar was temporarily put aside. Nonetheless, given the regime’s refusal to accept the election result, along with several more years of instability with transnational consequences, first Thailand, and then ASEAN, started to reconsider their relations (and policies) with Myanmar. While Thailand had practised a policy of “constructive engagement” with Myanmar since 1988, it was not until 1991 that it officially declared and articulated this policy.24 According to Leszek Buszynski, the development and conceptualization of constructive engagement by Thailand had two purposes. As a political device, “it was a means of ensuring Thailand’s security as well as economic interests”. However, as a diplomatic device “it was designed to deflect international attention from Thailand’s cooperative policy in relation to SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council)”, with the justification that there would be a subsequent improvement to the behaviour of the regime.25 In 1994, with Myanmar’s membership in mind, ASEAN adopted Thailand’s policy. In the same year, Thailand’s new foreign minister, Prasong Soonsiri, invited the foreign minister of Myanmar, U Ohn Gyaw, to attend the ASEAN summit meeting in Bangkok as an “observer”. A year later, the SPDC responded by publicly revealing an intention to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). As a goodwill gesture, the junta released Aung San Suu Kyi from six years of house arrest shortly before an ASEAN meeting in Brunei. At the rhetorical level, at the very least, this gesture was seen by some elites as supporting the virtues of ASEAN’s constructive engagement policy. By 1996, Myanmar had become an official observer in ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).26 Despite protests by both the European Union (EU) and the United States, the country was admitted as a full member in July 1997.27


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ASEAN had several reasons for wanting Myanmar to become a member of the Association28 and some of these — including the country’s “geographic proximity, cultural similarities and comparable security situation” — dated back to when ASEAN first approached Myanmar over the possibility of membership.29 Besides, with the fall of the communist bloc, new opportunities and challenges emerged. On the one hand, the previous “ideological divide” between ASEAN and the Indochina states, plus Myanmar, had been removed resulting in a Thai proposal to change the Indochinese “battlefields into marketplaces”.30 On the other hand, the perception of a “China threat” emerged and this was compounded by China’s growing strategic and military liaison with Myanmar (as discussed in Chapter 4). In reaction, some of the member states hoped that the admission of Myanmar into ASEAN would lessen the country’s dependence on China and thereby weaken China’s influence on it.31 Twelve years on, it appears the policy has had little success (if any) as Myanmar’s economic, political, and military dependence on China has, overall, increased since Myanmar became a member in 1997.32 A further rationale, at least in certain quarters of ASEAN’s elite, was the desire to pursue the formation of a unified economic (and perhaps political)33 block under the auspices of an “ASEAN-10”. The looming economic blocs of Europe (the EU) and the Americas (North American Free Trade Agreement — NAFTA) further motivated this response as there was the fear that Southeast Asia could, in the future, be marginalized by ruinous trade restrictions in their most important export markets.34 Enlargement was also considered to work well with ASEAN’s ambitions for economic integration as symbolized through AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) and its desire to increase investment incentives. One of the early indications of an intension to establish a regional community, as well as its justification of an “ASEAN-10”, was echoed by the then president of the Philippines, Fidel Ramos, who stated that “progress towards a Southeast Asian community would add considerable weight to ASEAN — in its influence in the world and in dealing with big powers”.35 The decision to admit Myanmar (along with Cambodia) did not proceed without opposition. In the case of Cambodia, some ASEAN members were concerned about political instability, while in the case of Myanmar, there were concerns about how its human rights record would reflect on the Association. Aside from Thailand, the issue of admitting Myanmar as a member of ASEAN attracted intense debate within the Philippines and its government actively raised these concerns in ASEAN.36 In contrast, Malaysia (under the leadership of Dr Mahathir) was one of Myanmar’s strongest supporters and insisted that it be admitted as a member of ASEAN.37 While past publications have


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included Singapore — in addition to Malaysia and Indonesia — as another supporter for admitting Myanmar as a member,38 more recent statements either contradict this “view” or represent a Singaporean attempt to rewrite history.39 By 2005, the position of the Singapore Government was that it was one of the states “against” expansion on the basis that Lee Kuan Yew considered its integration with ASEAN to be economically “premature”.40 Meanwhile, when the West lobbied for Myanmar’s exclusion, they further motivated a rebellious decision to proceed with membership expansion by exacerbating both nationalist and anti-colonialist sentiments. Given these conditions, the ASEAN leaders did not want to be seen to bow to Western pressure. Furthermore, some members defended the choice by arguing that this was a continuation of constructive engagement, and it was inclusion, rather than exclusion, that would most likely modify Myanmar’s conduct through the imposition of ASEAN norms and practices. In this regard, it was hoped that the ASEAN Way and its policy of “constructive engagement” might succeed in modifying the behaviour of the SPDC and nudge it towards political reform.41 As has been seen, and will be discussed further, this was a hope that has not come to fruition.42 The timing of Myanmar’s admission as a member in ASEAN was unfortunate as the country joined at the beginning of the regional economic crisis. As a former Singaporean ambassador to Myanmar said in an interview, Myanmar’s leadership always seemed to learn the wrong lessons from major events in Southeast Asia and this was particularly the case in relation to the economic crisis.43 At the regional level, the disunity and rivalry that ensued within the Association during and in the wake of the economic crisis detracted further from ASEAN’s credibility and any sense of a collective identity at the elite level. The admission of Myanmar, along with Laos and Cambodia, also increased the divide between the impoverished and wealthy member states. Finally, at the international level, Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN severely damaged the Association’s international stature. Thus, the West responded to the development with open contempt and a number of the European governments declared their intention to treat the whole of ASEAN according to its lowest common denominator — Myanmar.44 Given Western protests in the lead-up to Myanmar’s admission into ASEAN, the eventual position adopted by Europe was not unexpected. Nevertheless, there were (and continue to be) serious economic, political, and security factors explaining why ASEAN could not entirely ignore the policy positions of both the EU and the United States. In part, this is because of the Association’s political and economic ties to the West — connections that have been strengthened through the creation of the ARF


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and the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). In the case of the ARF, its continued viability is important to ASEAN due to it being the principal multilateral security forum in the Asia Pacific.45 This, in turn, provides ASEAN with a sounding board where it can seek to influence the foreign policies of a number of the world’s major powers including United States, the EU, Russia, China, and Japan.46 In contrast, ASEM is primarily important as a potential gateway to the vast import and export markets in Europe.47 Approximately 2.3 billion people or 37 per cent of the world’s population live in the ASEM countries and the group accounts for US$14.8 trillion or 46 per cent of global GDP.48 While trade issues initially dominated the ASEM agenda, the Seoul Summit expanded cooperation to deal with the regional concept of comprehensive security in response to such problems as environmental degradation, human rights, transnational migration and crime, the trafficking of persons, and international terrorism.49 As earlier chapters have illustrated, all these issues (with the possible exception of terrorism) are relevant in the context of Myanmar. As will be seen, the importance of ASEAN’s international stature in these two organizations has exacerbated the vulnerability of the organization to pressure from the EU and the United States vis-à-vis Myanmar. Equally important, the presence of a military dictatorship within ASEAN, not to mention the existence of a number of other semi-authoritarian states in the group, represent major obstacles to interest harmonization and policy coordination in both ASEM and the ARF. Given ASEAN’s growing interdependence with the West, and following an ineffective decade of constructive engagement with Myanmar, plus the onset of the 1997 economic crisis and the haze from Indonesia, Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim called on ASEAN to consider “constructive interventions and constructive involvement” before emerging problems in the region “erupt into full blown crises”.50 The Thai Government also came to a similar conclusion in assessing how best to respond to the challenge of Myanmar. Surin Pitsuwan, Thailand’s then foreign minister and now secretary general of ASEAN, concluded that domestic issues with regional consequences could no longer be ignored and the Association’s historical adherence to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs should, therefore, be modified. Thus, with Myanmar specifically in mind, Pitsuwan argued that the ASEAN countries should be prepared to “intervene” in a country’s domestic affairs “in the form of peer pressure or friendly advice, when a matter of domestic concern poses a threat to regional stability”.51 Pitsuwan’s proposal became known as “constructive intervention”. This proposal proved to be highly controversial and was almost immediately rejected by the majority of the


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ASEAN members (Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia taking the lead)52 and informally replaced by the idea of “enhanced interaction”.53 Despite ASEAN’s rhetorical approval (together with Western support) for this proposal, the Association was initially ill-equipped to make the normative leap due to a majority concern that enhanced interaction would be disruptive to good relations in the region, and thus, for a while, the ASEAN member states retreated from it so that the boundaries of “enhanced interaction” were rarely tested through to the middle of the present decade.54 This led some regional analysts to criticize the Association further by claiming that “enhanced interaction” was just another example of the broad range of meaningless rhetoric.55 However, and as some of the original members began to climb out of the depths of the regional economic crisis, the political and normative gaps between the members became more apparent. Given this, along with the positions of the West, some viewed it to be increasingly necessary to exert pressure on some of the newer members in order to strengthen ASEAN’s international stature and to ensure that their own national interests be served. It, therefore, became necessary to test and even push some of the organization’s operational boundaries — at least in the case of Myanmar. The continued influence of exogenous actors, along with the manner in which this movement occurred, is one of the focal points in the section below.

THE CHALLENGE OF MYANMAR TO ASEAN’S STATURE AND ELITE-LEVEL COHESION By the turn of the present decade, instances of interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs started to occur with increased frequency. In December 2001, for example, sixteen congressional representatives from the Philippines crossed party lines to sign a “manifesto of support” for the National League of Democracy.56 Then in 2002, at the ARF ministerial meeting in Brunei — and after welcoming what the ministers “termed” improvements in Myanmar’s “national reconciliation process, unity and economic progress” — the “ministers expressed the hope that the government of Myanmar would take steps in further consolidating such progress”.57 While the statement did not criticize the SPDC directly, it did imply that ASEAN was aware of the multifaceted consequences should Myanmar fail to start to take concrete steps towards democracy.58 Nevertheless, it was not until mid-2003, with the Joint Communiqué of the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Phnom Penh), that the degree to which Myanmar challenged the function and operative norms of ASEAN was fully apparent.


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A month earlier, the Black Friday incident occurred where Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters were violently attacked by what would appear to have been agents of the government.59 Aung San Suu Kyi was subsequently returned to house arrest “out of concern for her safety” and has remained there ever since. Reflective of the unsatisfactory nature of the SPDC’s explanation to ASEAN for these events, the joint ASEAN Ministers’ statement explicitly referred to the incident and “… urged Myanmar to resume its efforts of national reconciliation and dialogue among all parties concerned …” so as to lead to a “peaceful transition to democracy”. Added sting was imparted with the assertion that ASEAN “looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions placed on Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD members”.60 Notwithstanding the difficulty of obtaining consensus over the communiqué,61 the statement was significant in as far as it refers specifically to political issues in the country and undermines the position of a leadership threatened by internal opposition.62 Furthermore, the declaration signalled to the junta (and the ASEAN states more broadly) that there were limits to how far a state could hide behind the non-interference principle if the issue had direct and deleterious consequences for the remaining member states of the organization. The communiqué was followed by some unilateral initiatives from Indonesia and Thailand. In the case of Indonesia, it sent its former foreign minister, Ali Alitas, to Yangon in an attempt to secure Suu Kyi’s release, but was unsuccessful.63 Jakarta then proposed invoking the ASEAN Troika mechanism to break the political and reform deadlock in Myanmar. The idea, which was supported by the Philippines and Malaysia, involved sending a three-state delegation to Yangon to discuss a political solution to Aung San Suu Kyi’s return to house arrest and the continued breakdown of dialogue among the political interest groups within the country. However, Myanmar avoided the Troika by opting “for bilateral crisis diplomacy” with select neighbours such as China, Japan, and Thailand. For the SPDC, the advantage of this approach was that the leadership would have the opportunity to gain concessions and understanding from those of its neighbours more inclined to adopt a face-saving formula. A month later, Thailand utilized the opportunity of the Asia-Europe Meeting to present its own diplomatic initiative which became known as the “Bangkok process”. This five-step “roadmap” provided a process for reconciliation and democratic reform in Myanmar. While the SPDC did eventually agree to participate in the process, it seems such consent was provided with the prior knowledge that Khin Nyunt would announce a seven-step road map for democracy. For the purposes of the SPDC, this successfully detracted from, and thereby undermined, any substantial progress concerning the hitherto agreed Bangkok Process.64


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Given Dr Mahathir’s traditional position on ASEAN’s norms, his announcement that ASEAN should, as a last resort, consider expelling Myanmar if it continued to detain Aung San Suu Kyi and failed to implement political reform, came as a surprise to many analysts in the region.65 According to Kavi Chongkittavorn, however, Malaysia had a number of state-centric motives for threatening to interfere directly (and in so doing, actually interfering) in the domestic policies of Myanmar. Two of these reasons were to do with the failure of the junta to support the policies of Malaysia itself: the SPDC had upset Malaysia by backing the U.S.-led war in Iraq, and Malaysia also took offence to the fact that Myanmar did not support its drive to establish an ASEAN+3 Secretariat.66 However, indicative of how “intolerable” Myanmar’s situation had become to ASEAN’s international stature, inter alia, Mahathir’s statement also served as a further warning (in addition to the ASEAN’s earlier communiqué) that the SPDC would now have to defend its record on its own — it should no longer rely on ASEAN to perform this role.67 In response to the diplomatic manoeuvring of Khin Nyunt and his announcement of a road map for democratic transition on 30 August, ASEAN significantly weakened its stance over Myanmar at the 9th ASEAN Summit (the Bali Summit, October 2003) by providing the leadership with unconditional “understanding and support”.68 It seems that compromises over the statement were made, in part, to allow other member states to achieve what they deemed to be the “greater priority” of negotiating an agreement over Indonesia’s Bali Concord II and the “ASEAN Security Community” project. In this regard, Indonesia was worried the Myanmar issue would detract from what it considered a key development that would “take the organisation’s regional cooperation one step higher”.69 Similarly, at the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in June 2004 (Jakarta), the Foreign Ministers Communiqué maintained a conciliatory approach towards Myanmar despite reiterating the continued application and relevance of the 36th AMM Joint Communiqué.70 Thus, Megawatti Sukarnoputri, the Indonesian president at the time, declared “… we gladly note that a member of the ASEAN family, Myanmar, has added its voice to the cause of promoting democracy”. 71 Furthermore, and just in case the Association’s solidarity was in question, the ministers contradicted the earlier communiqué by repledging their commitment to the “cardinal principle of non-interference within the spirit of the ASEAN family”.72 Interestingly, at the July 2004 ARF Meeting (which immediately followed the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting [AMM]), the United States — in a possible response to ASEAN’s return to a conciliatory approach — pressured ASEAN


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over the Myanmar issue. In contrast to the official agenda for the meeting, for two days Colin Powell, then the United States secretary of state, demanded that the junta release Aung San Suu Kyi.73 On the same occasion, the EU, for its part, raised the stakes by threatening to boycott the October ASEM summit unless the SPDC was ejected from it or made political concessions before it was allowed to participate.74 The conservative elements within ASEAN held firm and ASEAN responded by rejecting these demands, with Thailand’s foreign minister asserting that “[t]here should be no demands; there should be a good understanding”.75 ASEAN argued that Myanmar’s inclusion was a matter of principle and its domestic politics should be kept separate from ASEM membership. ASEAN further threatened to veto the accession of the new EU members should Myanmar’s participation be rejected by the European Union. The EU eventually compromised on its demands and agreed to Myanmar’s participation so long as someone lower than the “head of state/government level” attended it.76 The ASEM Meeting continued as planned.77 Western pressure, together with genuine concern over the human rights situation by some of the more democratic states, did contribute towards what one Philippine official described as an “intense debate” by ASEAN over the issue of a draft statement and whether or not to renew calls for the “release of Aung San Suu Kyi” at the eleventh meeting of the ARF in July 2004.78 Eventually, consensus emerged in favour of a more moderate statement where “… the Ministers underlined the need for the involvement of all strata of Myanmar society in the ongoing national convention. The Ministers urged Myanmar to take every action that will add substance to the expression of its democratic aspiration”.79 While Aung San Suu Kyi was not mentioned in the final document, references to “Myanmar[’s] society”, the “national convention”, and “democratic aspiration” (in particular) continue to be indicative of an Association prepared to “interfere” more significantly in the internal affairs of a state. Despite ASEAN’s growing impatience and somewhat more assertive nature, Myanmar demonstrated very little by way of a Deutschian sense of “we-feeling” and/or “reciprocity”; subsequently, the country refused to receive a further visit by the Indonesian president’s special envoy (Ali Alitas) on the Myanmar issue.80 Indonesian confidence (and indeed ASEAN confidence) in Myanmar would undoubtedly have been further dampened with the discovery of a listening device at Indonesia’s embassy in Yangon.81 As far as the Association’s traditional support for the SPDC was concerned, Singaporea’s foreign minister reflected that “subsequent developments in Myanmar undermined our position. … Unless the Myanmar authorities


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handle the situation carefully, ASEAN’s credibility and cohesion would be jeopardised”.82 Certainly, ASEAN’s return to a reiteration of the noninterference principle at the 37th AMM was criticized by some as having sent the wrong message to the junta.83 With the ouster and arrest of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt a few months later, time added weight to the criticism. From an ASEAN perspective, his removal stunned the Association as it was executed without any warning or consultation. Consequently, several leaders took exception to this course of events in Myanmar whereby, for example, the foreign minister of Malaysia, Syed Hamid Albar, argued that the image of ASEAN had been further dented by these events, and added, “I think it has hurt us because of the suddenness of the thing. All of us were caught by surprise that there is a change of leadership and the news that he has been arrested because of corruption and put under house arrest”.84 In view of the deteriorating circumstances inside Myanmar, the EU reinvigorated its push to confront Myanmar directly through, in this instance, a critical statement on its human rights record at the ASEM Summit in October 2004.85 Again, ASEAN resisted the pressure, and in the end, the Association agreed to a short statement calling on the junta to lift its restrictions on political parties with no reference to Aung San Suu Kyi.86 Perhaps reflective of Europe’s frustration over its earlier mentioned compromise to allow Myanmar to participate at the summit, together with the weakness of the statement to which the ASEAN leaders were prepared to agree, the EU strengthened its sanctions regime against Myanmar only days after the summit’s conclusion.87 In an attempt to reconcile the growing divide between ASEAN and the West, Indonesia’s foreign minister, Hassan Wirayuda, flew to Myanmar shortly before the Vientiane Summit in order to be updated on the future policies of the junta and to voice Indonesian concern over Khin Nyunt’s removal.88 However, President Than Shwe was not prepared to meet with him and he was forced to meet with the country’s new prime minister, Lieutenant General Soe Win, instead.89 Despite the unwillingness of the SPDC to provide ASEAN with anything by way of a concession or conciliatory statement, ASEAN maintained its support for the SPDC at the November Vientiane Summit and a discussion of the Myanmar issue was curtailed; the final Summit statement contained no reference to Myanmar.90 Soe Win did hold private discussions with certain “select” colleagues, but this informal briefing apparently provided little in terms of potential concessions or encouraging insights.91 Despite having escaped formal censure by the Association, Myanmar chose the occasion to announce that that they would continue to detain Aung San Suu Kyi for another year.92 As a possible response, a number of leaders from the


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older ASEAN states (including Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines) individually issued some gentle statements of concern.93 With ASEAN’s inability to negotiate change in Myanmar in mind, the United States called for Myanmar to step down from its scheduled chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006, and declared that “the United States has made clear that the situation in Burma has complicated our dealings with ASEAN”. The Malaysian Government, in a return to a more conservative position, challenged this statement and suggested that the United States should not issue threats to ASEAN in relation to Myanmar’s human rights record. Malaysia’s foreign minister argued that “… you can’t simply intimidate or threaten a whole regional organisation that has served its people well and has created peace and stability in Asia”.94 Five months later, in May 2005, and undeterred by previous objections to its interference, the United States again reiterated its concern that Myanmar’s leadership would threaten ASEAN-U.S. relations.95 For the first time since the ARF was launched, the United States’ Secretary of State (in this instance Condoleezza Rice) was absent from the meeting. In her place was the Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, and in view of the previous warnings by the U.S., this was interpreted in some quarters as a response to frustration in relation to the continued plan by ASEAN to permit Myanmar to hold the chair.96 Further pressure was added when the United States subsequently suggested a possible withdrawal of developmental assistance throughout the region should Myanmar chair the Association.97 Given these circumstances, the future of the organization’s relations with major Western powers was further imperilled by the time of the 2005 ASEM Summit. Furthermore, Myanmar had done little, if anything, to assist its ASEAN partners to reach a satisfactory compromise with either Europe or the United States. For a number of the ASEAN nations, Myanmar’s continued defiance, together with the subsequent consequences regarding relations with the United States (including economic assistance), was a pill too large to swallow. Consequently, consensus between the ASEAN delegates shifted back towards a relatively hardline position (akin to the 36th AMM Communiqué) with the demand (in combination with their European counterparts) that Myanmar undertake “democratic dialogue” with all parties and re-engage with UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail.98 Despite one scholar’s claim that the more strongly worded statements by ASEAN reflect a voluntary response to “norms of human rights and democracy” throughout Southeast Asia,99 it was more likely a consequence of international pressure, together with the economic and transnational security consequences of instability in Myanmar, that caused ASEAN to reinterpret its


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non-interference principle. The role of the West in these developments was all the more evident because the political diversity of the grouping — together with the continued prevalence of human rights violations in some countries such as Laos and Vietnam — translates to a hesitance over any modification or abandonment of rules of behaviour that have been historically perceived to support and/or maintain their respective elites in power.100 Furthermore, the international pressure that was applied against the Association was only effective due to a continued dependence by some ASEAN states on trade and security relations with the West. In this sense, ASEAN cannot entirely escape the need to attempt to maintain its international stature as a diplomatic community.101 In response to the United States concerns over Myanmar’s potential chairmanship, Ernst Bower, a former U.S.-ASEAN Business Council president and business consultant, summarized the significance of the situation with the statement that “we are facing an unwelcome scenario in 2006 whereby ASEAN’s global profile could be severely damaged by Myanmar’s chairing of the grouping. Such damage would come at a time when it can be least afforded — when markets are bouncing back, foreign direct investment is returning to the region and intra-regional trade is growing nicely.”102 In view of these circumstances, the next section focuses on the normative impact of the leadership crisis that emerged between 2004 and 2005. Interestingly, as will be seen, while the influence of the West continued to play a major role in the behaviour of ASEAN, elites from the legislative branches of several ASEAN governments also played an active role in the push for change in both ASEAN and Myanmar.

MYANMAR’S CHAIRMANSHIP CRISIS AND THE EVOLUTION OF ENHANCED INTERACTION There is a Japanese proverb about a house being so unprepared that, “when the robber came, the residents first had to make the rope they needed to catch him with”.103 This certainly rings true when one examines ASEAN and its last minute debate on the chairmanship crisis. Based on alphabetical rotation, Myanmar was due to take the helm in 1996, including the hosting of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMCs), and the ASEAN Regional Forum.104 The extent of the forthcoming diplomatic crisis seemed to catch many unawares, and in the process, a series of conflicting signals and statements emerged. Indicative of the continued desire to maintain good relations with ASEAN’s Western dialogue partners, a former Thai diplomat previously based in Myanmar


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argued that “if Myanmar has not changed by then [2006], it could prove very embarrassing for ASEAN, because its partners in the West would not attend the meeting”.105 From his perspective, the greatest risk of all was that “it could even result in the break-up of ASEAN”.106 By June 2004, in the context of these concerns, together with the human rights situation within Myanmar, calls to disqualify the country from the ASEAN chairmanship had escalated to the level of government throughout the older and more globalized member states of ASEAN.107 Contrary to Jurgen Haacke’s analysis,108 the chairmanship issue, when considered in conjunction with the events of the past decade, has become the biggest challenge to elite-level solidarity and collective identity formation since the Asian economic crisis in 1997. In retrospect, the critical stance taken by Dr Mahathir over Myanmar in 2004 (as discussed in the previous section) may have opened a pandora’s box in Malaysia. On 8 June 2004, Malaysian parliamentarians from both sides of the House and from both Houses of Parliament united to create the Malaysian Parliamentary Pro-Democracy Myanmar Caucus, which was the first crossparty caucus in the country.109 This caucus was formed due to Myanmar’s impending leadership of ASEAN and the realization that the “region was about to encounter a major diplomatic crisis which would potentially have grave implications for the region’s political and economic future”.110 Consequently, the caucus was designed to push Myanmar towards greater democracy, and to start this process, it made a number of demands. First, it requested the immediate release of all political detainees;111 and second, it called on “the Myanmar government to respect ASEAN and international opinion and return to the mainstream of responsible international norms and behaviour”.112 In a display of how far it was prepared to interfere in the domestic affairs of Myanmar, it then invited an exiled opposition party, the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, for talks.113 Meanwhile, a public announcement from the Prime Minister’s Department stated that Prime Minister Badawi had in “no uncertain terms” warned Khin Nyunt “that something must come out of this” road map for democracy. Within two days, the group successfully called for other parliamentarians throughout ASEAN to join them.114 The ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC) was subsequently formed in November 2004 and initially comprised parliamentarians from Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and Cambodia. Despite the release of some political prisoners (and other prisoners) in correlation with one of the demands (whether coincidental or not), the caucus issued a collective statement calling for the abdication of Myanmar’s chairmanship of ASEAN and the suspension of its membership


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from ASEAN.115 The group believed this position was necessary due to Myanmar’s continued lack of progress over democratic reform and political openness.116 The preparedness by some elites to interfere (albeit below the leadership level) has not, however, been region wide. In the same month, Thaksin Shinawatra (Thailand’s Prime Minister) threatened to walk out of the November 2004 Vientiane Summit should the meeting refer to ethnic violence in southern Thailand. He justified his threat on the basis that this would amount to interference in Thailand’s internal affairs.117 The timing of this intervention eventually handicapped ASEAN’s ability to censure Myanmar at the summit. Viewed in this light, ASEAN may have been partially motivated by a desire to placate the Europeans and the United States by allowing a hard line position so long as it was held at a level below that of the leadership.118 Thus, this strategy maintained “solidarity” at the leadership level and delayed entrenching what some members viewed to be a dangerous precedent for intervention by certain ASEAN member states. In March 2005, in the wake of a resolution unanimously approved by the Philippine Senate calling for ASEAN to bar Myanmar from the chairmanship,119 leading members of the Caucus (in a meeting with Prime Minister Badawi) proposed a parliamentary motion that would have Malaysia “formally” demand from Myanmar the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and a speed up of democratic reform.120 In the event that these demands were not met, Nazri Abdul Azizi stated that the “members of parliament will make a [further] motion urging ASEAN to suspend Myanmar from taking the chair of ASEAN next year and until changes are carried out”.121 The AIPMC proposed similar and additional motions for debate in the legislatures of Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand. However, indicative of continued limitations concerning normative change at the leadership level, the parliamentary debate was blocked by Prime Minister Badawi a few days before its scheduled commencement.122 One of the drafters of the motion, government lawmaker and parliamentarian Zaid Ibrahim argued that the delay was a “step backward” and suggested “that there must have been pressure from the [Myanmar] regime”.123 More likely, or in addition, the postponement and later cancellation was a consequence of “unofficial signals” by the SPDC that it would voluntarily abdicate its seat as the Chair of ASEAN. In view of these factors, the pressure by Malaysia — when combined with Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the international community — may have borne fruit and produced temporary relief to the crisis. A week after the statement by the Malaysian Government lawmakers and amidst allegations of a further chemical weapons attack against minority insurgents,124 Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong also took a


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diplomatic trip to Yangon where he stated that “in an interdependent world, developments in one ASEAN country could impact on ASEAN as a whole”.125 A few days later, Singapore’s minister of foreign affairs reiterated this opinion with the more direct statement of “what happens in Myanmar affects ASEAN as a whole”.126 Prime Minister Lee stated that the ASEAN ministers would discuss the chairmanship issue “behind closed doors” during its Cebu (Philippines) retreat in April.127 Cambodia also supported Lee’s call128 and there was a notable shift in the position of Indonesia whereby it suggested that it would be better for Myanmar to resolve its domestic preoccupations prior to assuming the chairmanship.129 Nevertheless, at the retreat, the ASEAN foreign ministers soon became deadlocked over the issue after Myanmar’s foreign minister, Nyan Win, criticized the United States and the EU for their pressure over the chairmanship and added, “that is their attitude, not ours. We can decide ourselves because we are an independent country”.130 Unsurprisingly, it appears that consensus over the issue remained unobtainable as some members, including Laos and Cambodia (the latter had returned to a more conservative position), wanted to maintain a strict adherence to the principle of non-interference, and stated the concern that to take away the chairmanship would “set a very bad precedent for ASEAN”.131 Meanwhile, the first “official” visit by Soe Win, Myanmar’s new prime minister, to his ASEAN counterparts occurred in April 2005. However, the visit was confined to the relatively less democratic belt of Indochina — Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia.132 The selection of “who to meet with” was reflective of Myanmar’s angst over the divisions among the ASEAN member states vis-à-vis Myanmar and their respective level of adherence to the principle of non-interference. Interestingly Laos, often viewed as one of the strongest supporters of Myanmar, was also one of the first foreign nations to send dignitaries to visit Myanmar after Khin Nyunt’s dismissal as prime minister in October 2004.133 As discussed in Chapter 4, during this period, Thailand’s foreign policy position, under Thaksin’s leadership, had also shifted significantly towards the narrow pursuit of economic gain, without regard to political reform in Myanmar. Thus, on 27 March the Thai foreign minister announced that Thailand would not support a further motion to be tabled by Malaysian MPs that called for Myanmar to release Aung San Suu Kyi and to speed up political reforms, or risk losing the chairmanship.134 Nevertheless, by late April and at the sidelines of the Asian-African Summit, the first signs of a more conciliatory attitude by the SPDC started to become evident. At the summit and during a second round of talks with Indonesia’s foreign minister, Myanmar’s foreign minister expressed awareness by the SPDC of the “collective interests of the regional grouping and said that


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Myanmar does not want to be an obstacle in ASEAN”.135 Despite growing reservations by Thailand over the direction that the ASEAN group was taking, the Thai Government was assigned the task of applying diplomatic pressure on Myanmar to find a “face-saving” solution that would include the SPDC’s relinquishment of the ASEAN chairmanship. Thailand’s foreign minister, Kantathi Supamongkhon, subsequently announced that they had “impressed upon Myanmar the concerns of the international community”.136 The combination of bilateral and collective diplomacy soon resulted in further progress when the SPDC informed Singapore that they would “take into account the interests of ASEAN as a whole” and make an announcement over their decision at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in July 2006.137 Confirmation of a possible face-saving solution also came from M.C. Abad at the ASEAN Secretariat, who stated that the “issue of [the] future ASEAN Chairmanship is high on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers [Meeting and] … it is a matter that [the] ASEAN members take seriously.”138 Nonetheless, despite the junta’s successful exploitation of ideational divisions in ASEAN concerning how best to respond to Myanmar, the SPDC eventually decided in favour of ASEAN’s international interests, and at the AMM (July 2005), announced that it would forgo the leadership position. The face-saving reason provided by the Lao foreign minister, Somsavat Lengsavat, was that Myanmar needed “to focus on the national reconciliation process”.139 The SPDC’s relinquishment of the Chair came in the face of a host of benefits that the country could have expected through the chairmanship. These included additional funding for infrastructure, business opportunities, and investment.140 As Ruukun Katanyuu suggests, the SPDC could also have utilized the position to acquire greater political legitimacy and to influence the agenda in both ASEAN’s regional and extraregional meetings and summits — such as the ARF and the Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC).141 While Myanmar’s abdication of the chair was a diplomatic victory for ASEAN in some contexts, the question of Myanmar’s leadership in ASEAN after 2006 was never resolved. As the then Secretary General of ASEAN, Ong Keng Yong, stated, “it was decided that Myanmar could come back anytime they like to resume the chair but that has created for us, as the Secretariat, an uncertainty”.142 Furthermore, Myanmar’s abdication of the ASEAN leadership meets only one of the demands by the AIPMC.143 From their perspective, the country’s resignation of the chair “should not be seen as an excuse to ignore the urgent need for political reforms in Myanmar. Domestic instability in Myanmar will continue to afflict ASEAN long after this debate on Chairmanship is over.”144


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Conclusions As was reflected by a number of examples in this chapter, including the refusal by Myanmar to receive Ali Alitas, the importance Myanmar places on its membership in ASEAN is somewhat less than what the other ASEAN states probably hope for. This situation is at least partially explained by the substantial benefits (normative and material) that China provides to the SPDC. The detached nature of Myanmar’s relations with ASEAN in recent times has further reduced the ability of ASEAN to implement change and influence the domestic environment of Myanmar, which has only rarely bowed to the collective interests of ASEAN (the proposed community of states) and has only done so under pressure. The narrow and self-interested pursuit by the SPDC of its own national interests, with little regard for ASEAN, reflects a set of behaviour that is most adequately explained by the realist paradigm at low integration. At this level of integration, Myanmar does not identify with ASEAN or the fundamental elements of a security community. As this chapter has also shown, at the regional level, through to 2005, there has been a growing divide between the policies of ASEAN and two of its dialogue partners — the United States and the EU — over the appropriate approach to take vis-à-vis Myanmar. As will be demonstrated by the conclusion of this book, neither side of the divide has produced a satisfactory result as far as improvements in Myanmar are concerned. Despite ASEAN’s attempt to bridge the divide by a greater preparedness to criticize and coerce publicly the member state of Myanmar towards making political concessions and implementing political reform, the success of this new approach has thus far been limited to the temporary delay of the Myanmar’s ASEAN chairmanship. However, the process of responding to international pressure on Myanmar has not been without its costs. The more conservative states within the Association undoubtedly remain concerned that any departure from the principle of non-interference could result in de facto permission to comment on issues of instability and human rights in their own countries. Concern over the potential for such normative change informs the complicated behaviour of ASEAN in its relations with Myanmar and the West. ASEAN only acted decisively over the chairmanship issue when it became absolutely clear in 2005 that the consequences of inaction would outweigh any potential division over the application of non-interference — at least in the short to mid-term. The partial victory achieved by ASEAN in pressuring Myanmar to abdicate its chairmanship has been a double-edged sword in other respects. The ability to maintain a common foreign policy position is an important


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component to any sense of “we-feeling” and “reciprocity” as required by the community component of a security community. The political rift that emerged significantly tested the capacity of the Association to synthesize foreign policy among its various members over when to interfere in the internal affairs of their fellow member states. In part, this rift can be attributed to disparities between the national identities of the ASEAN states. To this end, a larger study might indicate that competing nationalism, alternative ideologies and religions, language differences, and the different types of political institutions have driven the diverging identities within the region. 145 The existence of these differences, unless resolved, will continue to detract from the ability of ASEAN to garner a regionwide elite-level collective identity by 2015. However, the practice of “enhanced interaction” has not been a static phenomenon. As the next chapter will demonstrate, ASEAN subsequently struggled to find an approach to Myanmar that alleviated international pressure whilst simultaneously maintaining regional cohesion when further challenges emerged between 2005 and 2007.

Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

“The ASEAN Experience: Insights for Regional Political Cooperation” (Geneva, Switzerland: South Centre, 2007), p. 11; Kusuma Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements through Political Cooperation”, The Pacific Review 11, no. 2 (1998): 183. In addition to what has already been discussed, this included that the states of Southeast Asia were “… determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation”. “The ASEAN Declaration” (Internet, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1967 [cited 9 April 2007]), available at . Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 57. Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, “ASEAN 10: The Political and Cultural Dimensions of Southeast Asian Unity”, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 27, no. 1 (1999): 80. Rowan Callick, “ASEAN Trapped in a Burmese Daze”, Australian Financial Review, 2005. Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 141. John Funston, “ASEAN: Out of Its Depth?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 20, no. 1 (1998): 27. Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p. 141.


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128 9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

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Shigekatsu Kondo, East Asian Strategic Review (Tokyo: National Institute for Defence Studies, 2000), p. 30. Simon Tay, “The Future of ASEAN: An Assessment of Democracy, Economies and Institutions in Southeast Asia” (Internet, 2001 [cited 18 June 2002]), available at . Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), p. 93. As Kwa Chong Guan states in an interview, “You know the famous metaphor that we have in ASEAN, that we do not resolve any conflicts, we merely sweep them under the carpet and that in time we may have a very lumpy carpet, but at least we still got a carpet to stand on.” Interview with Kwa Chong Guan, RSIS, Singapore, 5 December 2001. See also Markus Hund, “From ‘Neighbourhood Watch Group’ to Community? The Case of ASEAN Institutions and the Pooling of Sovereignty”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 1 (2002): 119. It is important to note, however, that the criticism of the principle of noninterference has been more limited in the ranks of politicians — or political elites — within Southeast Asia. The only proponents of change to the principle from within the region have come from the seemingly more democratic nations of the Philippines and Thailand. David M. Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, “The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror, and the Delusions of Regionalism”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 (2001): 275. Anthony L. Smith, Strategic Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role in ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), p. 275; Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, p. 92. James Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), p. 32. Jones and Smith, “The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror, and the Delusions of Regionalism”, p. 275. Yukiko Nishikawa, “The ‘ASEAN Way’ and Asian Regional Security”, Politics and Policy 35, no. 1 (2007): 44. Constance See, “ASEAN is Floundering” (Internet, Center for Defence Information, 2000 [cited 9 September 2001]), available at ; David M. Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, “The Strange Death of the ASEAN Way” (Internet, Australian Financial Review, 2002 [cited 8 July 2002]), available at . As James Cotton suggests, “[d]espite claims that the entry of new members required them to accept the ‘regional code of conduct’, it is difficult not to conclude that the most significant outcome of the enlargement episode was the realization of the proposition that ‘ASEAN’s expansion may enhance regime security in new members’”. Cotton, Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific: Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide, p. 33.


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Tay, “The Future of ASEAN: An Assessment of Democracy, Economies and Institutions in Southeast Asia” (cited). Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 17. Myanmar withdrew from its membership of the NAM in 1979 in protest over Cuba’s chairmanship of it. “Burma Prime Minister Arrives in Jakarta” (Internet, Reuters, 1987 [cited 18 August 2005]), available at <www.factiva.com>. “Burma Prime Minister Arrives in Jakarta” (cited). An unofficial policy of “constructive engagement” was commenced at a bilateral level by the Thai Government as far back as 1988. However, it was not until August 1991 that Arsa Sarasin, Thailand’s foreign minister at the time, formally coined the policy “constructive engagement”. Leszek Buszynski, “Thailand and Myanmar: The Perils of Constructive Engagement”, Pacific Review 11, no. 2 (1998): 290–91. David Capie and Paul Evans add that in practice, constructive engagement meant that Thailand and ASEAN “not only declined to enforce sanctions against Myanmar but actually encouraged the development of economic, political, and military links to the SLORC regime”. Capie and Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, 2nd ed. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), p. 125. N. Ganesan, “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 45; Maung Aung Myoe, Neither Friend nor Foe: Myanmar’s Relations with Thailand since 1988 — A View from Yangon (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 5; “Quality of Partnership: Myanmar, ASEAN and the World Community” (Asian Dialogue Society, 2003); Aung Zaw et al., “Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses” (Ottawa, Canada: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001), pp. 41–42. “Myanmar Dissidents Urge ASEAN to Investigate Thai Border Conflict”, Agence France Presse, 15 February 2001. At the individual state level, the motives for wanting to admit Myanmar into ASEAN were as broad and diverse as the region itself. In the case of Indonesia, it held an historical appreciation of Myanmar’s membership in the NAM and its replication of Indonesia’s dual function (dwifungsi) and territorial system for the military (this legitimated a role for the military in domestic politics). Malaysia and Indonesia were also concerned about influencing the country’s treatment of its minority Muslims. Malaysia was further interested in the “politically defining moment” of following the original plan of admitting the remaining candidate countries at the same time. By contrast, according to Ganesan, Singapore was primarily concerned with developing a policy of engagement that would lead to “economic reform” and a more favourable climate for foreign investment. Ganesan, “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, p. 45.


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Aung Zaw et al., “Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses”, p. 38. Towards the end of the Cold War, Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonavan espoused this idea. How San Khoo, “ASEAN on Myanmar: Creative Damage Control” (Internet, Asia Times, 2004 [cited 12 May 2004]), available at Derek Da Cunha, “Renewed Military Buildups Post-Asian Crisis: The Effect on Two Key Southeast Asian Bilateral Military Balances” (Internet, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001 [cited 20 October 2002]), available at <www. iseas.edu.sg/ipsi32001.pdf.>, p. 4. Lily Zubaidah Rahim, “Fragmented Community and Unconstructive Engagements: ASEAN and Burma’s SPDC Regime”, Critical Asian Studies 40, no. 1 (2008): 73. A view shared by Sukhumbhand Paribatra, but to which he adds that because of Myanmar’s geographical proximity to China, it was in the interests of both China and the SPDC that their relations should grow and this is regardless of whether or not Myanmar was to become a member of ASEAN. “A Regional Perspective on Burma: An Interview with M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra”, The Irrawaddy, July 2004. See also Bill Tarrant, “ASEAN Shrugs off Pressure, Says Will Admit Burma” (Internet, Reuters, 1997 [cited 11 April 2004]), available at <www.factiva.com>. As Chapter 7 will discuss, the rapid proliferation of economic and security challenges with transnational consequences contributed to a change in policy by some ASEAN members who now seek greater political and economic integration. Aung Zaw et al., “Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses”, p. 39. Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements through Political Cooperation”, p. 191. James Cotton, “Regional Order and the Over-determination of Regional Institutions in the Asia-Pacific”, paper presented at the UTS-Guadalajara Workshop, Guadalajara, January 2004, p. 3. “Myanmar May Give Up ASEAN Chair to Uphold Common Interests: Singapore’s Yeo” (Internet, Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]), available at <www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/154494/1/. html>. Aung Zaw et al., “Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses”, p. 43. Interview by the author with General Almonte, former chief advisor to President Fidel Ramos, Manila, 16 November 2005. “Myanmar May Give Up ASEAN Chair to Uphold Common Interests: Singapore’s Yeo” (cited). Terence Chong, “Myanmar Question: ASEAN Dilemma”, Straits Times, 16 April 2005.


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Mya Than and Tin Maung Maung Than, “ASEAN Enlargement and Myanmar”, in ASEAN Enlargement: Impacts and Implications, edited by Mya Than and Carolyn L. Gates (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), p. 252. Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 5 September 2005. “ASEAN: Is Myanmar the First Crack in Solidarity?” (Electronic Intelligence Database, Stratfor, 2004 [cited 8 December 2004]), available at <www.stratfor. biz>. In recent years however, APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) seems to have expanded its economic role to include an increasingly open discussion of security issues. To date, however, the broadening of the security agenda in APEC has not resulted in any tangible impact on the security architecture of the region. ASEAN maintains a strong diplomatic position within the forum because it holds the chair and the forum operates under the organization’s norms and principles. ASEM was initiated by Singapore and Thailand hosted the first summit. It was launched in 1996 and now has thirty-nine members including all the ASEAN and EU states, along with Japan, South Korea, and China. “The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): Overview” (Internet, Europa, 2005 [cited 12 October 2005]), available at . The ASEM countries also account for a combined value of trade in goods amounting to US$2,718 billion or 43 per cent of world trade. “ASEM: Opportunities and Challenges for Asia-Europe Cooperation” (Electronic Intelligence Database, AsiaInt.com, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]), available at ; “EU Falls Short on Myanmar” (Electronic Intelligence Database, Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]), available at ; Anuraj Manibhandu, “Burma Comes out with Win at ASEAN”, Bangkok Post, 12 October 2004. The ASEM process has resulted in enhanced cooperation between NGOs in both Asia and Europe. One such organization, the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), was established in 1997 and seeks to contribute to improved socio-cultural understanding by way of cultural, intellectual and people-to-people exchanges. “ASEM: Opportunities and Challenges for Asia-Europe Cooperation” (Electronic Intelligence Database, AsiaInt.com, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]), available at ; “EU Falls Short on Myanmar” (Electronic Intelligence Database, Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]), available at . Capie and Evans, The Asia Pacific Security Lexicon, p. 92. Herman Kraft, “The Principle of Non-Intervention: Evolution and Challenges for the Asia-Pacific Region”, in Non-Intervention and State Sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific, edited by David Dickens and Guy Wilson-Roberts (Wellington: Center for Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 23.


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Ganesan, “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, p. 46. Shigekatsu Kondo, East Asian Strategic Review, p. 36. Additionally, in an interview with Dr Kanala Khantaprab (advisor to deputy prime minister, advisor to defence minister, advisor to deputy house speaker), she also advocated the concept of enhanced interaction and stated “both sides must be able to exchange views … and be able to talk frankly”. Interview by the author with Dr Kanala Khantaprab, Government of Thailand, Bangkok, 26 December 2001. Indicative of the sensitivity of the subject, the idea or policy of “enhanced interaction” does not appear in any of ASEAN’s formal documents. Only two unofficial documents within the ASEAN domain (website) refer to it. One was a speech by former Indonesia’s foreign minister, Ali Alitas, in January 2004 and another at a UN-ASEAN Conference in February 2004. Interestingly, ASEAN’s “Myanmar” crisis had already started by the time these two documents were published on the ASEAN website. Source: Web-based “domain” search for the term “enhanced interaction” by the author as of October 2005. Jurgen Haacke, “‘Enhanced Interaction’ with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (2005): 190. See also Herman Kraft, “The Principle of Non-Intervention and ASEAN: Evolution and Emerging Challenges” (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2000); Robin Ramcharan, “ASEAN and Non-Interference: A Principle Maintained?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (2000): 60–88. As Anthony L. Smith argued, “this compromised wording barely covers the fact that there remains division over how far this interaction should go”. Smith, “Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN: The End of Leadership?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 2 (1999): 250. See also David M. Jones, “Regional Illusion and Its Aftermath”, Policy 19, no. 3 (2003): 37–44. “Solons Cross Party Lines”, ABS-CBN, 11 December 2001. Jim Gomez, “ASEAN Regional Forum Urges Myanmar to Continue Reforms, Democratisation”, Associated Press, 31 July 2002. ASEAN, “Chairman’s Statement: The Ninth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum” (Internet, Bandar Seri Begawan, 31 July, 2002 [cited 2 November 2005]), available at <www.aseansec.org/12661.htm>. At the same meeting, the EU foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, also criticized the SPDC government and (despite the release of hundreds of political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi) argued that there was still a need for faster political reform. “ASEAN Pressures Burma to Make Democratic Reforms” (Internet, ABC News, 2002 [cited 23 September 2002]), available at <www.abc.com.au>. Simon Montlake, “Burma’s ‘Black Friday’” (Internet, BBC News, 2004 [cited 22 November 2004]), available at . ASEAN also reaffirmed its “continued support for the efforts of the UNSG Special Representative Tan Sri Razali Ismail”. ASEAN, Joint Communiqué of the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Internet, Phnom Penh, 16–17


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June 2003 [cited 18 October 2005]), available at <www.aseansec.org/14833. htm>. Mark Baker, “Turmoil in Burma Splits ASEAN”, The Age, 17 June 2003. Soon after this, and in reflecting on the significance of the event, the foreign minister of Thailand asserted that “… ASEAN’s willingness to talk about the matter showed it had reached another stage of maturity”. Bhanravee Tansubhapol, “Rangoon Tackled over Suu Kyi”, Bangkok Post, 17 June 2003. Such statements are contrary to historical interpretations of the ASEAN Way that require each ASEAN member to avoid any statements or actions that implicitly or explicitly detract from the stability of the leadership in power. Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, p. 141. For further details concerning the ASEAN Way, see the first section of the chapter. Isagani De Castro, “Burma Crisis Casts Pall over Integration”, Inter Press Service, 6 October 2003. The SPDC did uphold its commitment to attend one meeting organized via the “Bangkok Process”, but other than to announce the reconvening of the national convention, it made no concessions at this time. Jurgen Haacke, “‘Enhanced Interaction’ with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (2005): 194. Statement on 28 July 2003. “Should ASEAN Kick out Burma” (Internet, The Irrawaddy, 2003 [cited 9 November 2004]), available at . Kavi Chongkittavorn, “ASEAN Must Reflect before Axing Burma”, The Nation, 22 July 2003. Ibid. Indeed, a former Malaysian diplomat and UN special envoy to Myanmar stated that the circumstances behind Mahathir’s statement illustrated the intolerability of it all. “ASEAN is very embarrassed by one member and has the right to demand standards of behaviour in terms of governance”, he added. “UN Envoy Backs Malaysian Pm’s Warning on Myanmar”, Agence France Presse, 22 July 2003. Malaysia, proud of the initial achievements by its former ambassador and now special envoy for the United Nations, Razali Ismail, would also have been muffled by the later rebuttals he received from Yangon. Yangon further insulted Malaysia by not allowing him back in the country for more than a year from June 2004. During the July 2005 ASEAN Meeting in Vientiane, Razali was also refused an audience with Myanmar’s foreign minister, Nyan Win. Yeni, “Image Conscious Burma” (Internet, The Irrawaddy, 2005 [cited 30 September 2005]), available at <www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=4853& print=yes&c=e>. The statement also said that “the Leaders welcomed the recent positive developments in Myanmar and the Government’s pleaded to bring about a transition to democracy through dialogue and reconciliation”. ASEAN, “Press


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Statement: By the Chairperson of the 9th ASEAN Summit and the 7th ASEAN + 3 Summit” (Internet, Bali, Indonesia, 7 October 2003 [cited 12 August 2005]), available at <www.aseansec.org/15260.htm>. As Umar Hadi from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Indonesia stated, “ASEAN needs to make sure that this very issue [of Myanmar and Suu Kyi] … will not steal the attention, both of ASEAN member countries themselves and the international community, about the important issues that will be addressed in the summit”. De Castro, “Burma Crisis Casts Pall over Integration”. ASEAN, “Joint Communiqué of the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting” (Internet, Jakarta, 29–30 June 2004 [cited 18 August 2005]), available at <www. aseansec.org/16193.htm>. “Indonesia Signals Soft Line on Myanmar as ASEAN Ministers Start Meeting” (Internet, Bernama, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]), available at . They added, “Asia is fortunate because democracy is neither being imposed nor just a mindless imitation of Western systems”. “ASEAN Goes Soft on Myanmar” (Internet, DAWN, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]), available at <www. dawn.com/2004/07/01/int14.htm>. “ARF Meeting Ends with No Progress on Myanmar Issue” (Internet, Jakarta Post, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]), available at <www.thejakartapost.com>. Kim Chew Lee, “ASEAN and EU Thrash out Myanmar Problem”, Straits Times, 3 July 2004. Jane Macartney, “North Korea, Myanmar in Limelight at Asia-Pacific Talks” (Internet, ABC News, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]), available at . The issue was further complicated by the fact that, until this point in time, the summit had been attended by the EU’s original fifteen members and the ASEAN-5 members, together with Vietnam (in addition to China, Japan, and South Korea). When the EU wanted to expand this to include its ten new member states, ASEAN, in turn, insisted on including its three newest members: Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. “ASEM: Opportunities and Challenges for Asia-Europe Cooperation” (Electronic Intelligence Database, AsiaInt.com, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]), available at ; “EU Falls Short on Myanmar” (Electronic Intelligence Database, Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]), available at . “10 ASEAN Nations Reject EU Effort on Myanmar” (Internet, International Herald Tribune, 2004 [cited 20 April 2004]), available at . “ASEM 5 Summit in Hanoi” (Internet, Europa, 2004 [cited 12 October 2005]), available at . As Anuraj Manibhandu notes, “Undeservedly, Burma is probably the biggest winner. Without lifting a finger — while other Asians and Europeans fretted over its record and eligibility — it has been inducted into another respectable club, seven years after joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations”.


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Anuraj Manibhandu, “Burma Comes out with Win at ASEAN”, Bangkok Post, 12 October 2004. “ARF Meeting Ends with No Progress on Myanmar Issue” (Internet, Jakarta Post, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]), available at <www.thejakartapost.com>. Ibid. (cited), ASEAN, “Chairman’s Statement: The Eleventh Meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum” (Internet, Jakarta, 2 July 2004 [cited 15 October 2005]), available at <www.aseansec.org/16246.htm>; “ASEAN Goes Soft on Myanmar” (Internet, DAWN, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]), available at <www. dawn.com/2004/07/01/int14.htm>. James Cotton, “The ASEAN Dynamic — The Road to a 2020 Security Community Passes through Yangon” (Internet, ASEAN Focus Group, 2004 [cited 16 October 2004]), available at <www.aseanfocus.com/asiananalysis/article. cfm?articleID=769>. Ibid. (cited). Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Malaysia Pressures Myanmar for Change”, International Herald Tribune, 23 March 2005. “Quality of Partnership: Myanmar, ASEAN and the World Community”. “ASEAN’s Image Hurt by Shakeup in Myanmar, Malaysia Says”, Kyodo News, 21 October 2004. EU wanted the statement to include a demand for Aung San Suu Kyi’s immediate release, an end to all action against the National League for Democracy, and the renewal of the national convention in order to progress further with political reform in the country. “ASEM 5 Summit in Hanoi” (Internet, Europa, 2004 [cited 12 October 2005]), available at ; Anuraj Manibhandu, “Burma Comes out with Win at ASEAN”, Bangkok Post, 12 October 2004. “EU Falls Short on Myanmar” (Electronic Intelligence Database, Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]), available at ; Anuraj Manibhandu, “Burma Comes out with Win at ASEAN”, Bangkok Post, 12 October 2004. These included an expansion of its visa restriction against the leadership (above the rank of Brigadier General) and those who are connected or benefit from it; a ban on investment by member states with the junta, and the freezing of the overseas assets of the SPDC leadership. “EU Falls Short on Myanmar” (Electronic Intelligence Database, Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]), available at ; Marwaan MacanMarkar, “Asia-Europe Summit Ignores Top Burmese Dissident”, Inter Press Service, 13 October 2005. “Indonesia Voices Concerns to Yangon” (Electronic Intelligence Database, AsiaInt.com, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]), available at ; “Indonesian Foreign Minister Visits Myanmar after Regime Shakeup”, Agence France Presse, 12 November 2004.


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“Indonesia Voices Concerns to Yangon” (Electronic Intelligence Database, AsiaInt.com, 2004 [cited 23 November 2004]), available at . “ASEAN, Chairman’s Statement of the 10th ASEAN Summit” (Internet, Jakarta, 29 November 2004 [cited 19 August 2005]), available at <www.aseansec. org/16632.htm>. See also Haacke, “‘Enhanced Interaction’ with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?”, p. 195; Noporn Wong-Anan, “ASEAN Quiet on Myanmar Democracy Issue — Communiqué”, 27 July 2004. Haacke, “‘Enhanced Interaction’ with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?”, p. 195. Ibid. Zaraidah Ibrahim, “Myanmar Hogs Spotlight for the Wrong Reason” (Internet, Straits Times, 2004 [cited 1 December 2004]), available at . It is difficult to imagine how anyone in Myanmar, other than the elites in power, could believe that ASEAN “has served its people well” or has “created peace and stability”. “Do Not Threaten ASEAN, Malaysia Tells US”, Bernama, 6 December 2004; “Malaysia Urges US to Stop Threatening ASEAN”, Xinhua News Agency, 6 December 2004. The United States Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick stated: “I did express our concern about how it would hinder our dealings with ASEAN if Burma were the chair, but I recognise that’s a decision for the ASEAN countries to make. … Burma’s role puts severe limitations on what the US can do, so I can’t go beyond that at this point, we’ll see what ASEAN decides to do.” “ASEAN-US Ties at Risk If Myanmar Becomes Chair, Says Top US Official”, Agence France Presse, 4 May 2005. “Myanmar, Accountability to Top ASEAN Meeting in Laos: Diplomats”, Channel News Asia, 22 July 2005. “Rice May Skip ASEAN Talks amid Myanmar Concerns” (Internet, Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]), available at <www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/154050/1/.html>. Salim Osman, “Myanmar May Not Chair ASEAN”, Straits Times, 24 April 2005. Yeni, “Image Conscious Burma” (Internet, The Irrawaddy, 2005 [cited 30 September 2005]), available at <www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=4853&print=yes &c=e>. In December 2004, and through unofficial channels of communication, Myanmar was warned that any pledge towards democracy would only be considered credible when followed by the actual release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. Haacke, “‘Enhanced Interaction’ with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?”, p. 196. Hiro Katsumata, “Why ASEAN Criticised Myanmar” (Internet, Asia Times, 2003 [cited 10 October 2005]), available at <www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/ EF25Ae02.html>.


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The absence of human rights and democratic reform in some states links back to the author’s theory on the “internal consolidation of the state” in Chapter 6. As stated there, until a majority of the ASEAN states achieve internal consolidation (with sufficient levels of domestic stability, economic development, and security sector reform), any preparedness to modify the principle of non-interference will be dominated by a “concern about what will happen if they were on the receiving end of such intervention?” Interview by the author with Aileen Baviera, Department of Asian Studies (Dean), University of the Philippines, Manila, 17 November 2005. How San Khoo, “ASEAN on Myanmar: Creative Damage Control” (Internet, Asia Times, 2004 [cited 12 May 2004]), available at . “Myanmar, Accountability to Top ASEAN Meeting in Laos: Diplomats”. Yukio Okamoto, “Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance”, The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2002): 66. While the written rules of ASEAN dictate that the members are to elect the chairman, such rules have never been invoked. Instead, a convention has emerged where the chairmanship follows alphabetical rotation. Senior officials suggested, however, that had Myanmar not stepped aside, then as a last resort, these “official” rules could have been applied as a formal base to block Myanmar’s chairmanship of ASEAN. Cumming-Bruce, “Malaysia Pressures Myanmar for Change”. Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Malaysian MPs Criticise Burmese Junta” (Internet, Mizzima News, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]), available at <www.mizzimma.com/ archives/news-in-2004/news-in-jun/09-jun04-17.htm>. Ibid. (cited). “A Regional Perspective on Burma: An Interview with M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra”. Haacke, “‘Enhanced Interaction’ with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?”, pp. 198–200. “Myanmar — Suspend from ASEAN If No Progress in 12 Months” (Internet, Democratic Action Party, 2004 [cited 9 July 2004]), available at . These comments were made by Zaid Ibrahim, the Chair of the Malaysian Caucus. Ibrahim further justified the creation of the caucus by stating: “We do not anticipate that ASEAN’s bilateral and multilateral ties will be jeopardized by accommodating these international waves of change. Within the region, we feel that ASEAN parliamentarians should initiate the birth of dialogue and understanding on regional issues of common concern to them, such as the problem of migrant workers, environmental pollution caused by uncontrolled open fires, territorial disputes, human rights abuses, the spread of narcotics and diseases such as HIV, to name a few.” Ibrahim, “ASEAN: Time to Interfere” (cited).


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“Malaysian MPs Launch Myanmar Democracy Push”, Reuters, 8 June 2004. Ibid. “Malaysian Caucus Expresses Desire to Work with Burmese Opposition” (Internet, Democratic Voice of Burma, 2004 [cited 22 June 2004]), available at . “Myanmar — Suspend from ASEAN If No Progress in 12 Months” (cited). “ASEAN: Is Myanmar the First Crack in Solidarity?” (Electronic Intelligence Database, Stratfor, 2004 [cited 8 December 2004]), available at <www.stratfor. biz>. Ibid. (cited). This is also evidence of the nascent or even embryonic nature of the so-called democracies within Southeast Asia. This is in stark contrast to the more democratic and transparent nature of the previous administration in Thailand and shows just how rapidly the form of governance and foreign policy outlooks of individual ASEAN states can change. Lee Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement”, Asian Security 4, no. 3 (2008): 271–93. “Malaysian Prime Minister Defends Blocking of Anti-Myanmar Motion in Parliament” (Internet, Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 8 August 2005]), available at . “Malaysia to Press for Myanmar to Be Denied ASEAN Chair: Report” (Internet, Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 29 March 2005]), available at . Cumming-Bruce, “Malaysia Pressures Myanmar for Change”. “Malaysian Prime Minister Defends Blocking of Anti-Myanmar Motion in Parliament” (cited). “Malaysian Parliament Delays ASEAN Chairmanship Debate”, Dow Jones International News, 27 April 2005. William Hollingworth, “Myanmar Denies Using Chemical Weapons on Karen Soldiers”, Kyodo News, 22 April 2005; Jessica Le Masurier, “Myanmar ‘Used Chemicals’ on Rebels” (Internet, CNN, 2005 [cited 25 April 2005]), available at ; “Myanmar, Accused of Using Chemical Weapons, Maintains Right to ASEAN Chair” (Electronic Database — Factiva, Today, 2005 [cited 5 May 2005]), available at <www.factiva.com>. “Singapore PM in Talks with Myanmar Leaders” (Internet, Bernama, 2005 [cited 4 April 2005]), available at . “MFA Says What Happens in Myanmar Affects Whole of ASEAN” (Internet, Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 29 March 2005]), available at .


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“ASEAN to Discuss Myanmar’s Political Situation Next Month” (Internet, Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 29 March 2005]), available at . Tansubhapol, “Rangoon Tackled over Suu Kyi”. Haacke, “‘Enhanced Interaction’ with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?”, p. 196. “Impasse over Myanmar at ASEAN’s Minister’s Retreat in Philippines” (Internet, Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 24 April 2005]), available at ; Connie Levett, “Burma Sits Tight on Chairmanship in Face of Criticism” (Internet, Sydney Morning Herald, 2005 [cited 24 April 2005]), available at . “Myanmar May Give Up ASEAN Chair to Uphold Common Interests: Singapore’s Yeo” (Internet, Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]), available at <www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/154494/1/. html>. See also Haacke, “‘Enhanced Interaction’ with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?”, p. 196. “Myanmar PM to Visit Three Southeast Asian Countries” (Internet, China View, 2005 [cited 5 April 2005]), available at . Given that Cambodia’s main opposition leader is living in exile in Thailand, and taking into account the evidence garnered during a research trip to Cambodia in July 2005, the author is of the opinion that the country is currently democratic in name, but not in substance. Ibid. (cited). The newly installed Thai diplomat added that “Thailand will not get involved in Malaysia’s campaign. We have to be very careful”. “Thailand Will Not Join Campaign to Suspend Myanmar from Chairing ASEAN Foreign Minister” (Internet, Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 29 March 2005]), available at . Osman, “Myanmar May Not Chair ASEAN”, “Philippines May Yet Assume 2006 Chairmanship of ASEAN” (Electronic Database — Factiva, Asia Pulse, 2005 [cited 5 May 2005]), available at <www.factiva.com>. “Philippines May Yet Assume 2006 Chairmanship of ASEAN” (cited). “Myanmar May Give Up ASEAN Chair to Uphold Common Interests: Singapore’s Yeo” (cited). “Myanmar, Accountability to Top ASEAN Meeting in Laos: Diplomats” (Internet, Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]), available at <www. channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/159251/1/.html>. “Burma Will Not Take ASEAN Chair” (Internet, BBC News, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]), available at ; “Myanmar Gives Up ASEAN Chairmanship” (Internet, Channel News Asia, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]), available at <www. channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/159895/1/.html>. Kylie Morris, “ASEAN’s Face Saving Solution” (Internet, BBC News, 2005 [cited 12 August 2005]), available at . Ruukan Katanyuu, “Beyond Non-Interference in ASEAN: The Association’s Role in Myanmar’s National Reconciliation and Democratization”, Asian Survey 46, no. 6 (2006): 842. “ASEAN Leadership Uncertain after Myanmar Skips Turn” (Internet, Reuters, 2005 [cited 13 October 2005]), available at <www.factiva.com>; Morris, “ASEAN’s Face Saving Solution” (cited). On 26 September 2005, legislators from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines requested that ASEAN set a deadline for Myanmar for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners by September 2006, or be suspended from the organization. To date, ASEAN has not done so. “Lawmakers Want ASEAN to Suspend Myanmar” (Internet, Straits Times, 2005 [cited 28 September 2005]), available at <www.factiva. com>; “Myanmar Should Be Suspended from ASEAN” (Internet, Hindustan Times, 2005 [cited 27 September 2005]), available at <www.hindustantimes. com/news/181_1501342,00050004.htm>. Statement by Teresa Kok, Secretary of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus (AIPMC) and Member of Parliament, Malaysia. See Teresa Kok, “On the Occasion of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), Laos, 26–29 July 2005” (Press Statement, ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Democracy in Myanmar, 2005 [cited 15 October 2005]), available at <www.aseanmp. org/media/ps_260705.html>. This study provided an example of how competing sets of nationalism can negatively affect relations between two countries. See Chapter 4 and the section entitled “Thai Relations with Myanmar”.


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6 MYANMAR AND ELITE-LEVEL COHESION: A Case of Irreconcilable Dichotomies? With the passing of time, the AIPMC’s (ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus’s) analysis that Myanmar would continue to affect ASEAN both regionally and internationally has proved accurate.1 While the chairmanship issue forced the evolution of ASEAN towards more open engagement with (and criticism of ) the internal affairs of Myanmar, such developments did not result in any marked improvement in the political conditions within the country and, moreover, ASEAN’s tougher stance did not succeed in shielding the Association from international pressure. As will be demonstrated, ASEAN’s experiment in “enhanced interaction” further isolated ASEAN’s relations with Myanmar and weakened any ascertainable “collective identity” by raising tensions between the progressive and conservative members of the ASEAN elite. As had been feared by some regional policy-makers, Myanmar increasingly turned towards other nations — such as China, India, Russia, and North Korea — for diplomatic, military, and economic support. In the process of strengthening its bilateral relationships with extraregional actors, the SPDC seemed to have paid even less regard to the interests of ASEAN. 2 The manner by which ASEAN attempted to respond to this conundrum and the continued consequences for the Association’s modus operandi form the subject of analysis below. The section that follows examines the regional and international implications of September 2007 when thousands of Buddhist monks led protests against 141


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the junta in the streets of Yangon (Rangoon) — herein referred to as the “Saffron Revolution”.

THE FRAGMENTATION OF CONSENSUS: RESPONDING THROUGH CRITICAL DISENGAGEMENT? In the wake of the announcement that Myanmar would be abdicating its chairmanship of ASEAN, both the United States and the European Union (EU) almost immediately indicated that they expected more from both Myanmar and ASEAN, and the AIPMC renewed its call for either the suspension or expulsion of Myanmar from ASEAN.3 During the first ASEAN meeting with the United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (September 2005). Rice singled out Myanmar’s foreign minister and criticized the continuation of political repression in the country, arguing that Myanmar was “out of step with the world”.4 Then, at a November 2005 APEC leaders’ summit, Rice again attacked Myanmar “as one of the worst regimes in the world” and then set her sights on ASEAN for failing to speak adequately out about and address human rights abuses in the country.5 Two days later, in a meeting with ASEAN, United States President Bush also urged greater pressure on the regime and had earlier that week criticized Myanmar as “an outpost of tyranny”. However, what was more significant for ASEAN was the threat that a proposed ASEAN-U.S. Summit might not take place due to the situation in Myanmar and the junta’s continued membership in ASEAN.6 The seven ASEAN members at the meeting (Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos are not members of APEC) were quick to point out that because APEC is a “trade forum” it was not appropriate to bring up issues about a non-APEC member such as Myanmar.7 Given the institutional and diplomatic strains that ASEAN had been confronted with in its search for a resolution to the chairmanship issue, the ASEAN leaders likely felt that continued pressure by the United States and the EU for them to do more was unreasonable, and was affecting the cohesion of ASEAN. Consequently, when the Netherlands refused to issue a visa the Myanmar’s economic minister, the ASEAN economic ministers boycotted the ASEM meeting and sent senior officials in their place.8 In a possible attempt to set certain boundaries concerning how far ASEAN was prepared to pressure its wayward member, both Malaysia and Singapore released statements that reiterated their support, relatively speaking, for the traditional ASEAN Way of handling regional and domestic issues of concern. In the case of Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated:


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Myanmar is a member of ASEAN. It’s got certain internal problems … and we’ve discussed this with them. It’s caused difficulties with our relations with our dialogue partners — the Europeans and the Americans — but within ASEAN, we have to manage these issues in a way which will be helpful, effective and constructive in the long term. Where we can cooperate, we move forward first. I think that is the way we have handled problems in ASEAN and it has worked for us. In the case of Myanmar, we have made our views known to Myanmar from the point of view of people who wish Myanmar well — that we hope they will be able to overcome their problems.9

In line with the “ASEAN Way” traditionally defined, the ASEAN Secretariat started to indicate that the issue of Myanmar would not be on the agenda of the ASEAN leaders’ summit scheduled for December 2005. This position was held relatively consistently in the two months preceding the summit, with Marty Natalegawa, the leader of Indonesia’s delegation at the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), also confirming that Myanmar would not be on the agenda, just a few weeks before the summit.10 However, continued developments, combined with international pressure, rendered futile any attempt to ignore the Myanmar issue. For example, in November the SPDC suddenly announced that it was moving its capital to Naypyitaw in what was rumoured to be a reaction to its fear of invasion.11 Myanmar’s leadership did not even provide the courtesy of informing the ASEAN leadership in advance about the more, a development that also symbolized the SPDC’s growing isolation from its own population, ASEAN, and the international community more broadly.12 Furthermore, the SPDC formally announced the extension of Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention on 3 December — little more than a week before the 11th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur.13 During preparations for the summit, one of the ASEAN foreign ministers told the foreign minister of Myanmar that the timing of the announcement was a “slap in the face of ASEAN”14 and the Thai prime minister later complained that Myanmar never informed its ASEAN neighbours about developments in the country.15 Given Myanmar’s lack of regard for the collective interests of ASEAN, the Association’s foreign ministers urged the SPDC to be more “open and frank”, and reports soon emerged concerning the level of “bitterness” and “dissatisfaction” that had been manifested when Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines “repeatedly grilled” Myanmar’s foreign minister over recent actions by his government.16 Three days before the leaders’ summit, ASEAN foreign ministers released a statement urging Myanmar to carry out democratic reforms quickly and free Aung San Suu Kyi. Myanmar,


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for its part, refused to provide any indication of when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would be freed.17 After the meeting, Malaysia’s foreign minister told reporters that “… [w]e respect the position of Myanmar as a member of ASEAN but at the same time I don’t think any single country in ASEAN does not feel impatient, or does not feel uncomfortable, because it does create problems and difficulties for us”. He then added, “We hope they will take the necessary steps without us wanting to interfere in their internal affairs. But this has created some embarrassment, some difficulties, some problems for ASEAN countries.”18 Despite occasional references to the “ASEAN Way”, the tone of discussions and statements surrounding the foreign ministers’ meeting further demonstrated the impracticality of non-interference vis-à-vis a member as wayward as Myanmar. Thus, the next day ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong announced that he anticipated Myanmar’s prime minister would be required to “… update [the] leaders on the development[s] in his country and there will be an exchange of views on this”.19 Myanmar did provide a briefing on domestic developments, but this was followed by a strong debate “bordering on a squabble” where, according to Ong Keng Yong, “Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines have said that we have to do more because we just can’t simply follow what we did in the past and leave things like that. They feel we should be more proactive in telling the world outside what is going on”.20 The ASEAN chairman’s statement released after the summit praised Indonesia for its handling of Aceh and how Yudhoyono had invited ASEAN-EU monitors to help implement a peace settlement, declaring it a “model for cooperation”. The communiqué then turned to the issue of Myanmar where it “noted the increased interest of the international community on developments in Myanmar” and “called for the release of those placed under detention” while also encouraging “Myanmar to expedite the [Roadmap to Democracy] process”.21 The wording of ASEAN’s praise for the efforts of Indonesia in seeking domestic reconciliation appears to have been structured in a way that would send a message to the SPDC that ASEAN expected it to be similarly open to foreign assistance in resolving domestic instability and the challenges to good governance. While the chairman’s statement, together with individual statements by ASEAN’s political elite, supports the contention that Myanmar has forced an evolution of the “ASEAN Way”, the strongest implications for ASEAN’s modus operandi, its engagement with Myanmar, and intramural relations more generally, occurred behind the scenes of the leaders’ summit. Prior to Myanmar’s abdication as Chair of ASEAN, the United States had raised the issue of Myanmar under “other matters” at the UN Security Council on


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24 June 2005. 22 Then, in September 2005, Vaclav Havel and Bishop Desmond Tutu released a report contending that Myanmar fitted the criteria for intervention by the United Nation’s Security Council (UNSC).23 Further, the AIPMC soon joined the call for greater involvement by the Security Council over the crisis of governance in Myanmar.24 On this occasion, the lack of solidarity and the diversity of strategic alignments within ASEAN were also evident when the Philippine Government said it would support a possible United States resolution if it came to a vote in the Security Council.25 When Myanmar asked ASEAN to oppose the security resolution, Singapore’s foreign minister, George Yeo, responded that ‘ASEAN has lost the credibility and ability to defend Myanmar’.26 Nevertheless, given certain reservations by the Indochina countries (that is, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam) concerning the direction ASEAN was taking, the Association offered a further olive branch to Myanmar. After the foreign ministers’ meeting, Malaysia’s prime minister, Abdullah Badawi, stated that “so far we have stood by Myanmar on some of the regional meetings where there were objections to Myanmar’s participation. How can we speak for Myanmar if we are not certain of what’s happening in the country?”27 It was in this context that that ASEAN agreed to send Malaysia’s foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar, to Myanmar on a fact finding mission “to gauge the progress of democratic reforms promised by the junta”.28 Despite the initiative, the UNSC held its first ever briefing on Myanmar on 16 December with the United States spearheading a drive for the UNSC to pass a resolution on the issue.29 According to Kavi Chongkittavorn, the ASEAN leaders had mooted at least two other ideas before agreement was reached to send Syed. One suggestion was to send all the ASEAN foreign ministers, but this would have been a logistical nightmare and also impractical for the purpose of seeking information on the status of the country (for example, dialogue with opposition delegates, including Aung San Suu Kyi). A second idea was to establish an ASEAN Troika similar to that discussed in the preceding chapter. This idea proved to be too controversial as previous proposals to form a Troika for Myanmar had been rejected by the SPDC in 2000, and by Vietnam, as the ASEAN Chair, in 2001.30 Syed’s visit was tentatively scheduled for 4 January 2006. However, his appointment was repeatedly delayed as the SPDC claimed that the move to Naypyitaw had rendered it too busy to host the visit.31 Adding to ASEAN’s frustration was the fact that Myanmar did find the time to meet with Chinese President Hu Jintao.32 By late January, even the relatively authoritarian government of Cambodia started to voice impatience over the delay, with its foreign minister publicly urging the SPDC to desist


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from further delays and adding that Syed’s mission must “not be a tourist visit and should yield results” for the purpose of domestic reform.33 In the midst of all these delays, the United Nations’ special envoy to Myanmar, Razali Ismail, resigned from his post, citing frustrations over what was now clear to him — that “they do not want me back” — given that he had not been allowed to enter the country for twenty-two months.34 While Razali’s resignation was a setback for ASEAN in general, it was more significantly a disappointment for Malaysia as it had held high hopes for a positive outcome from Razali’s diplomacy, given his distinguished career in the Malaysian foreign ministry and his former position as president of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Somewhat more positive was a visit to Myanmar by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on 1 March.35 Myanmar and Indonesia have traditionally enjoyed a degree of camaraderie as Myanmar had modelled its military forces after the Indonesian structures of dwi fungsi and territoriality that had evolved during the time of former President Soeharto’s New Order regime.36 The level of kinship enjoyed between the two countries because of these historic linkages meant that President Yudhoyono was able to meet with the normally reclusive Senior General Than Shwe where others had failed in such a request.37 In view of Indonesia’s difficult transition to democracy, together with a history of ethnic conflict and animosity, President Yudhoyono suggested to Than Shwe that the two countries could learn from each other, and he further offered to help Myanmar work towards democracy. According to President Yudhoyono’s spokesperson, Dino Patti Djalal, the SPDC generals provided an extensive brief on the regime’s “roadmap to democracy” and pledged their continued commitment to the plan.38 Nonetheless, Yudhoyono told Than Shwe that ASEAN needed “constant communication” about its democracy efforts and urged the junta to provide access to regional monitors, including Malaysia’s foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar.39 Most importantly, President Yudhoyono achieved agreement on a joint commission to discuss and assist with the seven-point road map to democracy.40 Despite an initial schedule of April 2006, the first meeting of the Joint Commission was delayed twice before finally occurring in February 2007.41 The meeting yielded little in the way of tangible results and seemed to focus more significantly on increasing cooperation in the “fields of trade and investment, defence and security, energy, education and training, agriculture, forestry, transportation and tourism.”42 However, one important exception involved an Indonesian proposal for members of the SPDC, army, navy, and air force to attend courses at the Indonesian Military Staff and Command School, while junior diplomats were also invited to attend courses at


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Indonesia’s Training and Education Facility within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.43 Such an initiative, if implemented, could have the potential to provide an additional opportunity to socialize more positive norms and values in Myanmar’s elite. The potential impact and feasibility of such socialization will be discussed further in Chapter 8. Meanwhile, negotiations continued in an attempt to get the SPDC to allow Malaysia’s foreign minister to undertake his fact finding mission. After Myanmar finally agreed to Syed’s visit in March, the Malaysian foreign minister cut short his visit as he was not permitted to meet with Senior General Than Shwe and neither was he permitted to meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. While Syed initially reported that he was reasonably satisfied that Myanmar was moving “towards democracy”, his true level of frustration soon spilled into the public arena when he later stated that the SPDC believed the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi were irrelevant to their democratic transition. He also explained how “there is a feeling that Myanmar is dragging us [ASEAN] down in terms of our credibility and image” and that they “must be believable”. “If [they] have a good story to tell, [they] must not be fearful of the things [they] have done. They must convince people and not only ASEAN that their plan is on track”.44 The level of concern the issue held in ASEAN was also reiterated by the secretary general who stated that Myanmar “has now reached a point of international attention and it has an impact on our ASEAN credibility, our ASEAN image as a whole”.45 In seeking a way out of its diplomatic mess, ASEAN then sought to pass greater responsibility to China and India by asking them to undertake a more active role in pressing Myanmar towards reform. In some respects, this was a reasonable approach, given the level of influence India and China held over the Myanmar Government. However, the secretary general, in calling for the two countries to take a lead in leveraging Myanmar towards reform, neglected to raise the issue of the high degree of influence held by Thailand. As previously stated, Thailand accounted for 44 per cent of Myanmar’s export revenue in 2007 (compared with 7 per cent for China and 14.4 per cent for India).46 Most of these exports are connected with a natural gas deal, and a large percentage goes to the SPDC to fund projects such as the relocation of Myanmar’s capital, a nuclear reactor, and a continued process of military modernization; the Myanmar people receive very little benefit from this trade.47 Nonetheless, the secretary general’s advocacy that these more powerful countries should undertake a more significant role did not relieve ASEAN from continued international pressure, and was, furthermore, unlikely to yield results as both India and China benefit too much from their relations with Myanmar, and are not particularly vulnerable to international pressure.48 By


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this time, it seems some of the ASEAN members felt that they had pushed the boundaries of “enhanced interaction” to the limit of what the more conservative ASEAN members would be prepared to agree with. Moreover, ASEAN had personally discovered the limits of its intramural diplomacy with respect to Myanmar. As ASEAN’s secretary general stated: ASEAN, you know, loves to look after everybody’s ego and interests … so there is a very limited space for us to manoeuvre … the reason why Myanmar has done what it has done is because of its own national interests, but also maybe they feel ASEAN is not in a position to dictate terms for them.49

In response to ASEAN’s inability to reach a consensus on how to resolve the Myanmar issue, Singapore’s foreign minister, George Yeo, suggested that “we [ASEAN] will have to distance ourselves a bit if it is not possible for them to engage us in a way which we find necessary to defend them internationally”.50 Still, some of the relatively democratic ASEAN members continued to lobby for a “new formula to deal with the Myanmar deadlock” and indicated their hope that this could be achieved at an informal foreign ministers’ retreat in Bali (May 2006). However, while the foreign ministers claimed to have addressed the issue in a “frank” manner,51 they were unable to reach a consensus. Soon after the meeting, Syed Hamid stated that “if Myanmar does not want to make a move, there is nothing we can do”.52 Nevertheless, Singapore’s foreign minister, George Yeo, reported that other ASEAN members were yet to be convinced of the idea that they “should take a step back” and continued to feel that it would be more constructive to further “engage Myanmar and help it move forward”. Given this dilemma, he suggested that it might be more feasible for individual members to seek to “nudge Myanmar towards reforms”.53 Despite apparent fissures in the cohesion of ASEAN, the ministers did agree to another collective statement that reiterated their position on the “importance of Myanmar staying on the roadmap toward democracy” and they called for “the release of Aung San Suu Kyi”. The Myanmar Government responded by stating that “[t]hey don’t like pressure. They like suggestions”.54 Meanwhile, further evidence surfaced concerning the emerging rift between Myanmar and its ASEAN counterparts when the defence minister from Myanmar did not attend ASEAN’s inaugural Defence Ministers Meeting (May 2006), leaving Myanmar as the only member state not to participate.55 Then, at a two-day Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Kuala Lumpur, Myanmar’s foreign minister, Nyan Win, refused


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to explain to his ASEAN colleagues the reasoning behind a further extension of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention, stating “this is not an international issue … this is only a domestic issue”.56 Furthermore, in contrast to the lack of cooperation with ASEAN’s nominated envoy, the SPDC soon welcomed a visit by the United Nations’ new special envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, who not only managed a sitting with Senior General Than Shwe in Naypyitaw, but also met with Aung San Suu Kyi.57 The level of cooperation and priority accorded to the United Nations led Syed Hamid to lament that Myanmar had not invited any ASEAN leader or foreign minister to visit its new capital, but had instead accorded “the honour” to a UN official. 58 Nevertheless, the United Nations soon discovered its own limitations in regard to Myanmar when, as mentioned earlier, the junta announced that it would extend Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention for another year, little more than a week after Ibrahim Gambari’s visit. Shortly before the July 2006 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), Syed Hamid responded to the emerging state of affairs in ASEAN’s relations with Myanmar through a damming attack in a Wall Street Journal article entitled “It is Not Possible to Defend Myanmar”. Early in the paper, he states: ASEAN has reached the stage where it is not possible to defend Myanmar if it does not cooperate with us or help itself by delivering tangible progress on economic and political reforms. An ASEAN “hands-off ” approach could potentially open the door to greater pressure and criticism of Myanmar. Individual ASEAN members may cooperate actively with other international players to exert more pressure on Myanmar. Myanmar has only itself to blame — its indifferent attitude to ASEAN has driven us to this point … Unfortunately Myanmar appears to be deliberate in its disregard of our goodwill and concern.59

In a separate statement, Syed again referred to the visit by Ibrahim Gambari, arguing how it indicated that “Myanmar does not want us to stand with them” thereby implying that ASEAN should step away from the issue.60 At the AMM in July, it seems a final consensus and agreement was reached, albeit short lived, concerning the Singapore and Malaysian approaches to Myanmar. Given ASEAN’s inability to generate positive change in Myanmar, together with the diversity of political systems and values among the ASEAN members, the only collective decision feasible under a consensusbased decision making system was what Lee Jones describes as “critical disengagement”. Jones defines critical disengagement as “criticism of Burma’s internal affairs in violation of non-interference, coupled with resignation as to ASEAN’s inability to influence Burma and a desire to transfer responsibility


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to the UN to ‘decouple’ the SPDC’s behaviour from ASEAN’s standing”.61 Evidence of this interpretation could be seen in the joint communiqué where ASEAN “recognised that Myanmar needs both time and political space to deal with its many and complex changes” whilst simultaneously calling for the release of political detainees, dialogue with the opposition, and expressing concern about the pace of reconciliation and democratic reform.62 Some ASEAN members had hoped for a stronger statement but, as Syed Hamid acknowledges, it also had to reflect a “compromised position in order to be acceptable to all”.63 Further evidence indicating a shift towards critical disengagement occurred when Malaysia, as ASEAN chairman, joined the Philippines in its support for the UN Security Council to debate the issue officially. Thailand also appealed to the United Nations to play a greater role in helping to resolve the situation in Myanmar.64 Despite statements by various ASEAN members that it would not allow Myanmar to become isolated,65 when Myanmar was placed on the UNSC security agenda “ASEAN refused to defend Burma internationally, leaving it to Cuba as Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to protest against the development”.66 According to Lee Jones, the final obstacle to critical disengagement was dispersed when Prime Minister Thaksin (Thailand) was removed through a coup d’état on 19 September 2006. Thailand subsequently joined Singapore and the Philippines in breaking from a NAM campaign against “country specific-resolutions” in the United Nations to merely abstain with their vote. Meanwhile, Indonesia purported to maintain a commitment to a combination of bilateral and ASEAN diplomacy, and Malaysia as the previous Chair of NAM abided by the block’s position.67 However, the continuation of an ideational divide among the ASEAN members was further emphasized by both Brunei and the Indochina block (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) when they voted against the resolution.68 Despite opposition from NAM, the UN General Assembly resolution passed.69 Then, in December 2006, the United States submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council. Indonesia responded by stating that ASEAN would be unlikely to defend Myanmar should the Security Council pass the resolution.70 However, at this level of international debate, even Indonesia struggled to decide on which course of action it should take as it joined Malaysia in arguing that Myanmar is “not a threat to regional peace and security”.71 Unsurprisingly, the UNSC failed to adopt the Draft Resolution due to a double veto by China and Russia. As for Indonesia, it opted to abstain from the vote.72 Nevertheless, regional unease about the issue climbing so high on the international community’s agenda resulted in


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ASEAN adopting a last minute addition to the chairman’s statement at the 12th ASEAN Summit.73 This development indicated a further policy shift in ASEAN’s response to exogenous developments as, under the heading of Myanmar, the communiqués amendment stated that ASEAN “… agreed on the need to preserve ASEAN’s credibility as an effective regional organisation by demonstrating a capacity to manage important issues within the region”.74 Syed Hamid subsequently stated that “ASEAN, rather than the Security Council was in a better position to handle the Myanmar issue”.75 To the extent that “critical disengagement” may have existed as an undeclared policy, it was to be inconsistently applied from then through to the time of the next section’s discussion of the “Saffron Revolution”. During the lead-up to the Cebu leaders’ summit, Myanmar continued its political game with ASEAN and the international community. Just ten days before the summit the junta released 3,000 prisoners, but the releases did not include political detainees. Moreover, while the Philippines had invited Than Shwe to attend the Cebu Summit, he declined the invitation, sending Prime Minister Soe Win instead in his place. Than Shwe stated that the drafting of Myanmar’s new constitution had left him too busy to attend.76 Than Shwe may also have been a little unsure of the reception he would get in Cebu, despite one Philippine diplomatic arguing that “ASEAN does not work through arm twisting and political pressures as the Western countries want”,77 it was reported that President Gloria Arroyo pushed very hard for a strongly worded statement to come out of the summit.78 However, the final statement, including the earlier-mentioned reference to the need for ASEAN to take responsibility for developments in the region, was bland and did not enter any new territory as far as “deliverables” were concerned. The Myanmar section reiterated the need for Myanmar “… to make greater progress towards national reconciliation”, called for “greater dialogue” and the release of “those placed under detention”.79 The elite-level divide over Myanmar continued throughout the remainder of the year. For example, the Philippine Government declared that Myanmar would not be on the agenda during a series of preparatory meetings for the November 2007 “ASEAN Summit” in Singapore,80 and Singapore’s prime minister declared that ASEAN should not be “held hostage” by the international community over the Myanmar issue should they wish to enhance ties with ASEAN. Lee Hsien Loong also continued to push his government’s position that “ASEAN had decided to leave Myanmar alone to sort out its own internal problems”.81 However, a week earlier, Malaysia’s foreign minister had called for ASEAN to “put its act together” over the issue, adding that “if we start looking at our own national interest rather than the way ASEAN


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looks at things, then ASEAN is going to face problems”.82 Meanwhile, in response to former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s remarks that the case of Myanmar fitted the “responsibility to protect” doctrine,83 the ASEAN Secretariat returned to espousing the virtues of the ASEAN Way with its secretary general maintaining that the policy “… has helped because we provided peace and stability over the past 40 years of ASEAN’s existence”.84 Despite such statements from the Secretariat, the ASEAN foreign ministers’ statement in July 2007 was at the time reported to represent one of the strongest set of remarks against the SPDC.85

THE “SAFFRON REVOLUTION” AND THE EVOLUTION OF MUTUAL DISENGAGEMENT Meanwhile, continued criticism amidst weakening political and economic engagement also had negative consequences with respect to the utility of ASEAN for Myanmar. Thus, a number of events occurred between 2005 and 2006 that demonstrated the growing detachment of Myanmar from ASEAN and the international community in general. As previously discussed, the SPDC shifted its capital to Naypyidaw in November 2005. On 8 January 2006, UN Special Envoy to Myanmar Razali Ismail quit his post having been refused entry for two years; and in April 2007 the SPDC restored diplomatic relations with North Korea. The reported level of human rights abuses also increased during this period and the Tatmadaw launched largescale anti-insurgent offences in the Karen and Karenni states, displacing tens of thousands more villagers.86 Given the deteriorating circumstances in the country, the United States extended its sanctions regime for up to another three years. Meanwhile, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) departed from its usual neutral stance by accusing the Myanmar Government of abusing its people’s rights. The junta responded by suspending five key field officers of the Red Cross. Meanwhile, the SPDC extended Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest for six months on 3 December 2005, and a further twelve months on 27 May 2006. Given these developments, together with the events discussed in the previous section, by late 2006 the relationship between Myanmar and its remaining ASEAN counterparts had deteriorated to a point most accurately defined as “mutual disengagement”. Throughout 2007, Myanmar’s isolation from ASEAN and the world continued to deepen and, in parallel, the level of discontent of the people of Myanmar grew. Nonetheless, in the early half of 2007 the junta displayed an uncharacteristic tolerance of dissent as it worked towards the conclusion of a new constitution to implement what it claimed would be “disciplined


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democracy”.87 However, as the size and frequency of anti-government protests rapidly increased — including an incident of 500 protestors on the 27 May anniversary of the 1990 elections — the government’s tolerance for dissent soon returned to its normal dictatorial level. The “Anniversary protestors” were met by “thugs” from the government’s Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) and a further protest by the 88 Generation Students earlier that month also led to arrests by members of the same organization.88 Then, and without warning, in August 2007, the junta increased the subsidized price of petrol (gasoline) from US$1.18 to US$1.96 per gallon.89 Individuals from both the media and academia have debated whether this price hike was a “deliberate, albeit miscalculated, attempt to address Myanmar’s growing budget deficit” or whether it was in reality ‘“bait” to spur what the government calls “troublemakers” who could then be detained, before the national referendum on the constitution is held’.90 Regardless of the true motivation, the decision proved to be a gross mistake in the context of Myanmar’s regional relations and the international community’s acceptance of the drafting of its new constitution. On 19 August, members of the 88 Generation Students organized a series of relatively small protests in Yangon, but later that month the situation escalated to further protests led by Buddhist monks in Pegu, Moulmein, Monywa, Sittwe, Mandalay, and Pakokku.91 However, the critical turning point in the crisis occurred in the latter town of Pakokku, located approximately 130 kilometres southwest of Mandalay, where on 5 September, security forces and members of a pro-government militia responded by firing live shots over the heads of the highly revered monks and several monks were captured, tied, and badly beaten. While unconfirmed, rumours circulated that one of the monks died. The usually peaceful monks responded by taking hostage a number of military officials, and, according to one UN report, some vehicles were “reportedly” burned in retaliation to violence by the SPDC’s security forces.92 On 9 September, the newly formed All Burma Monks Alliance publically demanded that the government apologize to the Sangha (Buddhist Monastic Order), ease the living conditions of the Myanmar people, release all political prisoners, and undertake meaningful dialogue for national reconciliation. The government did not respond to these demands.93 In the absence of a response, young members of the Sangha returned to the streets from 17 September in rapidly growing numbers to demonstrate against the government. As Andrew Selth states, the “increasingly political nature of the protest movement was underlined on 22 September when, unaccountably, a group of demonstrating Buddhist monks and others were


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permitted to meet opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi outside the house in Rangoon where she has been incarcerated for 12 of the past 20 years”.94 On 24 September, the minister for religious affairs responded to these developments by appealing to the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee. His appeal blamed the unrest amongst monks on foreign radio stations, Communist Party remnants, and “agitation by NLD extremists”, and led to the issuance of Directive 93 “… instructing the monkhood to avoid political and secular activities” that, by implication, were in violation of the rules of the Sangha and, therefore, subject to legitimate action by the government’s security forces.95 Despite a number of monasteries being raided by both the police and army, where further beatings and possible killings took place,96 the next day an estimated 10,000 monks marched to the Thein Gyi Zei, Yangon’s largest department store and market complex. Estimates of a total of between 25,000 and 100,000 people took to the streets of Yangon that day.97 The potential for confrontation escalated further as the political nature of the protests deepened. For example, in one particular march down Sule Pagoda Road, approximately 700 monks and thirty nuns were joined by 500 NLD supporters, including two party flag bearers and a party banner.98 The government and state controlled press were very quick to label the protestors “neo-colonialists” and “bogus monks”99 who had been funded with cash and kind by anti-government groups outside the country, including “the intelligence organisation of a big power”.100 Ironically, the government’s propaganda machine was somewhat encouraged when certain opposition groups outside Myanmar took credit for having supported the Saffron Revolution.101 That night the government imposed a curfew and when the security forces had sufficiently amassed in Yangon by 26 September, they “opened fire on a large demonstration”. Meanwhile, the government continued to launch raids against monasteries, and within days, the streets were empty.102 Nonetheless, hunkered down in Naypyidaw, and paranoid as ever, the SPDC’s violent response to the protests resulted in over 4,000 arrests and at least thirty-one deaths, including that of a Japanese journalist.103 The government’s crackdown generated international outrage and further diplomatic pressure by key Western states, including the United States and the EU, for ASEAN to take action.104 The United States Senate, for example, passed a resolution calling on ASEAN to expel, or at least suspend, Myanmar from membership in ASEAN.105 Even Barry Desker, the dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and an ambassador for the Singapore Government, called for Myanmar’s expulsion from ASEAN.106 Furthermore, monks,107 exiled opposition groups,108 and the United Nations


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Commissioner for Human Rights raised the possibility of applying the United Nations’ “Responsibility to Protect Doctrine” in order to force the SPDC, by whatever means necessary, to comply with internationals human rights norms.109 Meanwhile, civil society organizations from the region, such as the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA), together with the AIPMC, also called on ASEAN to play a more active role in supporting the pro-democracy actors in Myanmar, and to combine its diplomatic resources with China and India in order to pressure the regime towards reform.110 When the resident coordinator of the United Nations, Charles Petrie, commented that the government’s crackdown reflected an “urgent need to address the deteriorating humanitarian situation” he was subsequently expelled from Myanmar.111 The timing of the crisis could not have been worse for ASEAN as it occurred just two months before the November leaders’ summit when the Association was to present its first ever charter to the region and to the world. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the charter was intended to advance the pursuit of a security community by institutionalizing (and integrating) ASEAN politically, economically, and socially — and include the entrenchment of democracy and the protection of human rights. The events surrounding the “Saffron Revolution” greatly undermined the legitimacy of both ASEAN and its new charter as it was difficult to imagine how the charter could carry any weight if a dictatorship such as Myanmar was more than happy to endorse it. Moreover, the fact that these events happened, and that ASEAN’s adoption of the charter would not change the situation, also underlined the hollow nature of the charter’s references to democracy and the protection of human rights. While ASEAN’s “initial silence was deafening” (having not responded to the protests for five weeks),112 following the junta’s crackdown, the Association was forced to respond at the sidelines of a UNGA Plenary session on 27 September — a day after the violence started. Significantly, the wording of the statement was even stronger than the July Foreign Ministers’ statement discussed in the previous section. On behalf of the ASEAN foreign ministers, Singapore’s foreign minister stated that “they were appalled to receive reports of automatic weapons being used … [and that] they [had] expressed their revulsion to Myanmar’s foreign minister, Nyan Win, over reports that the demonstrations in Myanmar are being suppressed by violent force and that there has been a number of fatalities”. Furthermore, the foreign ministers had “… demanded that the Myanmar government immediately desist from the use of violence against demonstrators”.113 While George Yeo made the statement in his capacity of the ASEAN Chair, the wording of the document had been circulated to the ASEAN foreign ministers and they had consented


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to the statement’s release. As Jurgen Haacke contends, in practical terms the document represented a “joint statement” as other foreign ministers had contributed amendments and it was delivered in the presence of all the foreign ministers except that of Myanmar.114 Moreover, aside from breaching the three primary principles of the ASEAN Way (sovereignty, non-interference, and consensus),115 the statement was important for providing a common position at the forthcoming meeting in the UNGA where a consensus resolution was reached that also “strongly deplored the violent suppression of the peaceful demonstrations”.116 Meanwhile, Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had earlier that day released a statement emphasizing the broader implications of the situation in Myanmar for the region as a whole, and further suggested that the United Nations was “the best hope for a peaceful resolution of the situation”.117 Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong had also contacted the leaders of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines, and, aside from gaining consensus on the aforementioned chairman’s statement, he obtained agreement on the importance of the proposed United Nation’s mission to Myanmar which was to be undertaken by its special envoy Ibrahim Gambari.118 With China’s assistance, Gambari was able to visit Myanmar on 2 October where he met with the SPDC’s key leaders — including Senior General Than Shwe — as well as Aung San Suu Kyi. In a rare display of “unanimity”, a UNSC executive statement followed on 11 October that urged the SPDC to exercise restraint and reaffirmed its support for the good offices of Ibrahim Gambari.119 Meanwhile, most Western states strengthened their sanctions regime against Myanmar, but, as Robert Taylor contends, the measures were little more than symbolic in nature.120 However, an important exception occurred when Air Bagan was forced to cancel all its flights to Singapore after Singapore banks refused to deal with it.121 Given Singapore’s historically close relationship Myanmar, such a decision represents an important development in regional relations.122 Singapore was, moreover, highly active in its international diplomacy with major powers including the United States, Japan, India, and China. While in New York for the UNGA meeting, Foreign Minister Yeo met with Christopher Hill, the United States assistant secretary of state, during which Haacke contends he conveyed a message similar to a previous press statement suggesting that the United States is “the best shot we have and the key now is to build up the authority and the moral prestige of Ambassador Gambari”.123 Between September and November, Yeo also undertook trips to China, India, and Japan with a view to discuss how “how regional countries could support both a genuine process of peaceful reconciliation in Myanmar generally


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and Gambari’s good offices role in particular”.124 The AIPMC also held “quiet” discussions with Chinese officials,125 and China, for its part, hosted a meeting for the United States deputy assistant secretary of state, Eric Johns, and three Myanmar ministers that reportedly discussed the issue of political transition and the potential release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Nonetheless, the Chinese Government continued to emphasize an approach that would achieve “stability, development and national reconcilement” but did not appear willing to jeopardize its economic and strategic interests in Myanmar.126 While in New York, the SPDC was unable to do anything about the earlier statement by the ASEAN Chair; however, back at the ASEAN setting in Singapore, “the Burmese junta took its revenge”.127 In October, Singapore’s ambassador to the United States informed the Security Council that it had invited Ibrahim Gambari to brief the leaders at the November East Asia Summit (EAS). His briefing described this as “an important opportunity [for Gambari] to personally update and engage” the leaders from all sixteen EAS countries including China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia, together with all ten of the ASEAN members.128 On 19 November, after Gambari had already departed on a flight for Singapore, the ASEAN leaders held an informal dinner to discuss the forthcoming agenda. Somewhat embarrassingly, a microphone was left on and significant segments of the “heated” dialogue that ensued were clearly audible to the media in a room nearby.129 Despite having previously agreed to Gambari’s briefing, Myanmar objected to it at the dinner.130 Myanmar’s confidence to take this stance was likely to have been strengthened by China’s objection, or at least ambivalence, over the proposed Gambari briefing.131 Furthermore, while Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines all suggested that this was no longer a matter that could be considered a domestic affair, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia sided with Myanmar, arguing that “one of our members is objecting”.132 The Singaporean initiative also faltered on the ground that Singapore had not consulted with all the ASEAN members prior to declaring publically its invitation to Gambari to brief the EAS.133 Aside from Myanmar’s prime minster walking out from the meeting, having allegedly threatened to scuttle the entire ASEAN Charter,134 the final outcome of the lengthy debate boiled down to just one point concerning what was then a unanimous consensus: from this moment on “Myanmar was on its own” in its dealings with the United Nations and the international community.135 After the meeting, Prime Minister Lee, flanked by all the ASEAN leaders except that of Myanmar, announced that while Gambari’s group briefing was cancelled, individual leaders and foreign ministers would be welcome to meet with him privately.


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During his time in Singapore, Gambari was able to meet with senior officials from all the ASEAN countries except those from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.136 The challenge for ASEAN and its charter did not end with Myanmar; Gloria Arroyo departed from the November summit stating that unless the situation in Myanmar improves, her Senate might boycott the ratification of the charter. This risk was also identified as a possibility with the relatively democratic parliaments in Indonesia and Thailand.137 From the outset, Singapore took the lead in attempting to generate a collective response from the region, including greater Asia. On the one hand, Singapore was proactive because it realized that the “SPDC has cost ASEAN too much credibility”.138 On the other hand, Singapore’s leadership on the matter was also a reaction to a strategic assessment that, in the words of Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, Myanmar constitutes a potential “time bomb”.139 While Singapore’s foreign minister also raised such a threat perception, he argued further that the disintegration of Myanmar would also have deleterious consequences for the region, including the anger of Myanmar’s diaspora — with two million globally and tens of thousands in Singapore.140 Contrary to the relatively open image Singapore has portrayed to the world (in recent years), such threat perceptions were also likely to be connected with the highly discreet actions of Singaporean intelligence in monitoring, questioning, and denying visas and/or permanent residence to Burmese expatriates who peacefully demonstrated in front of the Myanmar embassy and other locations.141 Meanwhile, Indonesia remained eager to display its democratic credentials and to also reclaim and/or maintain its leadership role in ASEAN. Consequently, soon after the Saffron Revolution, President Yudyhono appointed General Agus Widjoyo and Ali Alatas as his special envoys to Myanmar, but thus far, Indonesia’s attempts to implement change have not yielded any progress. His continued reasoning was that since ASEAN and the West have failed, Indonesia remained in the best position to help Myanmar move forward, given its historical ties and that it had the “least material motive” for offering its assistance. Like Singapore, Indonesia has also been quietly engaging India and China on the issue at the sidelines of UN meetings.142 As a further initiative, Thailand and Indonesia have separately suggested that a process akin to the Six Party Talks could be utilized to help Myanmar and that this might include ASEAN, China, Japan, India, and the United States or even the EU.143 As it has not yet been possible to implement the idea, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam accepted invitations to join the Group of Friends on Myanmar. The UN secretary general convenes


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this multilateral forum and its extraregional members include China, Japan, India, Australia, the United States, Russia, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the EU. The group has thus far met on three occasions, with the third meeting in September 2008, as the first to be held at ministerial level. However, beyond the usual calls for improved governance this forum has also been unable to forge any tangible headway towards resolving the crisis of governance in Myanmar.144 As will be discussed in the next chapter, the SPDC’s announcement that it would be proceeding with the final stages of its road map for democracy caught many unawares.145 The response from ASEAN, together with regional analysts and the media, ranged from cautious support to outright scepticism; the decision to continue with the referendum immediately after a devastating cyclone did not help to placate those at the more critical end of the spectrum. Nonetheless, given the sum total of regional relations vis-à-vis the Myanmar issue, Myanmar and ASEAN had effectively disengaged from each other. To the extent that some ASEAN members may have sought a modus vivendi akin to “mutual disengagement”, the fluctuating positions of both the United States and the EU were likely to have encouraged (and rewarded) the idea that ASEAN could escape international pressure through a combination of regular criticism of Myanmar and simultaneously disengaging from meaningful attempts to encourage positive change in Myanmar. As early as 2006, both the United States and the EU had started to undertake a more conciliatory approach regarding ASEAN’s position on Myanmar. For example, during a January 2006 visit to Malaysia by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, he announced that Condoleezza Rice would be attending the July ARF meeting.146 As discussed in the previous chapter, her absence from the 2005 ARF meeting was widely interpreted as a protest against Myanmar’s participation in the ARF, and ASEAN’s failure to force Myanmar to implement reform and improve its human rights record. Later that year, Condoleezza Rice personally commended ASEAN for making an “important evolution” in the level of pressure it had applied against Myanmar.147 She made the comment shortly after the aforementioned foreign ministers’ statement in July 2006. Rice also associated herself with the September 2007 ASEAN Chair’s statement, with the implication that that “ASEAN had finally joined the side of Myanmar’s long-term critics”.148 Meanwhile, the EU indicated in April 2006 that it shared ASEAN’s frustration over the deadlock in Myanmar and its foreign policy chief stated that “we think that together we have to see how we can get Myanmar to evolve in the direction that it is supposed to evolve in”.149 Later, in the leadup to a September 2007 ASEM meeting in Finland, the EU also confirmed


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that it would not allow its talks with ASEAN to be derailed by the Myanmar issue.150 However, the relatively conciliatory tone by the EU and the United States was inconsistently maintained. For example, negotiations regarding the first ASEAN-U.S. Summit soon stalled over the issue of including Myanmar at the meeting.151 Soon after the EU had indicated that it needed to cooperate with ASEAN on Myanmar, the EU Trade Chief suggested that Myanmar’s poor human rights record could hinder a trade pact between the two regional organizations. Nevertheless, he suggested that they “needed to work through these problems that enable us to negotiate for the benefit of many, rather than to be held hostage by one country”.152 Despite such a reassurance, and through to the beginning of 2009, the two blocks had been unable to conclude a free trade agreement and the issue of Myanmar remains a major obstacle to further progress in the future. The United States, however, did not allow the Myanmar issue to completely impede a trade arrangement with ASEAN. While the pact was concluded in August 2006, it was scaled down to a “trade and investment facilitation arrangement”, which is less formal than an “agreement” and does not require Senate approval, because the United States was unable to exclude Myanmar from the process.153 The United States further maintained that the nature of the arrangement would not result in any increase to trade between the United States and Myanmar.154 Some ASEAN countries, through their bilateral relations with Myanmar, were also inconsistent in the “human rights” and “good governance” rhetoric of ASEAN, with the Philippines, for example, appearing to place greater emphasis on economic gains, rather than attempting in any way to help implement genuine political reform.155 Despite several strongly worded statements by the Philippine Government against the junta throughout the period covered in this chapter, Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto G. Romulo visited Naypyitaw in August 2006, but his discussions with Senior General Than Shwe reportedly focused on strengthening bilateral cooperation with “trade and investments, tourism, agriculture, forestry, education and human resource developments”. The foreign secretary did touch on the issue of “democracy”, but only did so for the purpose of assuring Than Shwe that the Philippine Government fully supported its road map for democracy, and added a subtle remark that his government would like to help Myanmar move forward in the national reconciliation process.156 Romulo had previously indicated that the primary purpose of his trip was to reiterate regional concerns about the government’s slow progress towards democracy.157 Meanwhile, Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen in a meeting with the AIPMC, publicly acknowledged that Myanmar affects the region adversely,


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and committed to work with his ASEAN counterparts to resolve the crisis.158 However, there is nothing in either the primary or the secondary literature on this to indicate that Hun Sen did anything other than to engage in a friendly meeting with Than Shwe and First Secretary Thein Sein. As with Indonesia’s workshop earlier in the year, the Cambodian meeting focused on bilateral ties, including tourism and air transport.159 When the Cambodian foreign minister was asked if Cambodia had pressured the SPDC to release Aung San Suu Kyi, he responded that “it was not Cambodia’s position, and neither other ASEAN member states, to interfere in another’s internal affairs”.160 Both Laos and Vietnam have similarly focused on economic gains in their relations with Myanmar and the CLMV countries have also made significant progress in developing subregional institutions for cooperation, including the CLMV Cooperation Frameworks, the Mekong River Committee, the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), the East West Economic Corridor (EWEC), and the Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS).161 Furthermore, Vietnam entered into a new defence agreement with Myanmar on 13 August 2008 that will “further consolidate defence co-operation”.162 From Robert Taylor’s perspective, the fact that the new prime minister of Myanmar’s first “get to know you” visits were to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia symbolized the regime’s discomfort with its more proAmerican ASEAN critics.163

Conclusions Neither mutual disengagement nor critical disengagement represented the best possible foreign policy options for ASEAN. They were, however, the only feasible foreign policy options under a system of consensus-based decision making. Given ASEAN’s modus operandi together with the authoritarian blend of membership — that is, with Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia — it was in fact remarkable that ASEAN could find sufficient cohesion to formulate statements that included the words “revulsion” and “appalled” in their criticism of the SPDC — albeit through the Singapore Chair at the time. The development of mutual disengagement was all the more notable in that the region sought to pass responsibility to extramural actors such as China, India, and the United Nations. Because of the ideal of “regional resilience”, a goal that has existed since ASEAN’s inception, these developments revealed a level of intramural frustration rarely witnessed in the Association’s history. The apex of this frustration was reached when Myanmar asked ASEAN to defend it from UN action and Singapore’s foreign minister responded that ASEAN had lost both the “credibility and ability” to do so.


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Nevertheless, in as far as ASEAN mustered a degree of cohesion in its rhetoric concerning Myanmar, such capacity was largely driven by international pressure. Throughout the chapter it has been shown how various ASEAN leaders and the Association’s secretary general sought to justify their criticism of Myanmar on the basis of how much the SPDC had affected ASEAN’s international stature; the plight of Myanmar’s people rarely appeared as the principal factor in such justifications. Moreover, ASEAN’s position remained in a state of flux throughout the period and appeared to vary, not only because of varying levels of international pressure, but also because of a tug of war between the more authoritarian and democratic members of ASEAN. While democracy may not be a prerequisite for a security community, the empirical evidence suggests that the political institutions within each of the ASEAN members have considerably affected the way each member constructs its foreign policy. In view of the fact that Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam all continue to suffer from serious human rights challenges, their leaderships then undoubtedly remain concerned about how “enhanced interaction” might be applied to their own domestic affairs in the future. Meanwhile, the period was significant for the fact that China, for the first time, exerted pressure on Myanmar during the “Saffron Revolution” through a combination of quiet diplomacy with the SPDC leaders, the organization of meetings for Myanmar and the United States, and public statements, including a UNSC executive statement. Importantly, China played a pivotal role in getting the SPDC to accept a visit by the United Nations’ special envoy to the country. Nevertheless, China likely shares similar concerns as those of ASEAN’s Indochina members. Consequently, a more detailed analysis would reveal that China was largely motivated by international publicity concerning its own relationship with Myanmar. Moreover it would have been concerned about events surrounding developments in Tibet and calls to boycott its Olympic Games as a consequence of these developments as well as its strategic relationship with Myanmar.164 However, China’s statements were carefully worded and while they may have helped contain the situation in Myanmar, they did not go so far as to risk China’s strategic relationship with the country. In reality, China has continued to strengthen its relationship with Myanmar and is now in the midst of building a deep seaport in Kyaukpyu, and is improving other transportation links that will provide it with greater trade access to South Asia and enable it bypass the Strait of Malacca. The period covered by this chapter was also notable for role that was played by some of ASEAN’s original members. At various junctures, both the Malaysian and Singaporean foreign ministers took the lead in criticizing Myanmar, seeking a regional consensus on how to respond to Myanmar, and


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in their international diplomacy with foreign powers. The fact that Singapore’s banks refused to deal with Air Bagan may have also marked a turning point in Singapore’s “behind the scenes” relations with the junta. While Singapore’s diplomacy was particularly successful in convincing both the United States and the EU that the Association had done everything possible to pressure Myanmar, in terms of deliverables, neither Singapore, nor ASEAN collectively, managed to improve the crisis of governance in the country. ASEAN’s success in satisfying some of the expectations of the international community was also a mixed blessing in other respects. When the Myanmar issue reached the UNSC’s agenda, some of the ASEAN members appeared to be highly concerned that ASEAN would lose control over when exogenous actors could interfere in the region. Thus, Syed Hamid Albar declared that ASEAN, rather than the Security Council, was in a better position to handle the Myanmar issue. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s comments that Myanmar fitted the United Nations’ “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine would have undoubtedly heightened such alarm. These developments, in addition to creating a democratic/authoritarian divide, further explain the continued shifts between ASEAN’s engagement and disengagement from Myanmar. As this chapter reveals, despite ASEAN’s efforts, Myanmar’s leadership has increasingly been exhibiting erratic and unpredictable behaviour. The junta shifted its capital to Naypyidaw; it failed to predict the civil dissent that arose out of its sudden announcement to increase the price of fuel significantly; and human rights abuses continued unabated. The evolution of mutual disengagement also witnessed a period where Myanmar paid even less respect to the interests of ASEAN. Myanmar did not attend ASEAN’s inaugural Defence Ministers Meeting, its leaders accorded greater courtesy and cooperation to the United Nations than to ASEAN, and the SPDC maintained a practice of making embarrassing announcements at highly sensitive moments for ASEAN — such as announcing the continuation of Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention just days prior to the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur. As also shown in the previous chapter, these events indicate that the SPDC does not identify with ASEAN or its ideal of a regional community, and, consequently, the regime continues to conduct its relations with ASEAN based on relative gain. Myanmar’s disregard for the interests of ASEAN was most aptly demonstrated by the manner in which it responded to the “Saffron Revolution”. ASEAN lacked the institutional capacity to provide any response beyond “criticism” as Singapore’s failed attempt to get Gambari to address the East Asia Summit aptly demonstrated. Thus, by the end of 2007, there were few calls within ASEAN for any collective response beyond the confines


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of mutual disengagement. However, in recent decades, ASEAN has faced many other challenges, and, as the security community proposal indicates, the Association has attempted to modify both its norms and institutional structure. Just how ASEAN has attempted to evolve institutionally in response to the challenge of Myanmar and other issues with transnational implications, forms the initial subject of analysis in the next chapter.

Notes 1

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As stated towards the end of the previous chapter, from the perspective of the AIPMC, the country’s resignation of the chair “should not be seen as an excuse to ignore the urgent need for political reforms in Myanmar. Domestic instability in Myanmar will continue to afflict ASEAN long after this debate on Chairmanship is over”. Teresa Kok, “On the Occasion of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), Laos, 26–29 July 2005” (Press statement, ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus on Democracy in Myanmar, 2005 [cited 15 October 2005]), available at <www.aseanmp.org/media/ps_260705.html>. Such fears were raised by many policy-makers and scholars throughout Southeast Asia in the course of the past eight years. “ASEAN MPs Call for Myanmar Junta Ejection”, Reuters, 23 September 2005; “EU Unimpressed by Burma’s ASEAN Move”, The Nation, 15 September 2005. “Rice Chastens Myanmar Minister at ASEAN Talks”, Today, 14 September 2005. “Myanmar Casts Long Shadow over Bush Summit with ASEAN”, Agency France Presse, 17 November 2005. “Bush Pressures ASEAN over Myanmar, Offers Bird Flu Help”, Agence France Press, 18 November 2005. “Myanmar Casts Long Shadow over Bush Summit with ASEAN”. “ASEAN to Boycott Asia-Europe Meeting over Burma Visa Denial”, BBC News, 15 September 2005. “Expelling Myanmar from ASEAN Will Not Solve Problem: Singapore’s Lee”, Agence France Presse, 29 September 2005. While Malaysia acknowledged that it was disappointed with the results of ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar and its foreign minister renewed his call for Myanmar to free Aung San Suu Kyi and to increase its cooperation with ASEAN, Malaysia indicated that the noninterference principle should be upheld at the forthcoming ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur. En-Lai Yeoh, “ASEAN’s Chosen Path with Myanmar Has Produced Disappointing Results, Malaysia Says”, Associated Press, 29 September 2005. Adianto P. Simamora, “Myanmar Not on the Agenda of ASEAN Summit Meeting: Official”, Jakarta Post, 6 December 2005. Reference. Singapore’s foreign minister, George Yeo, described the decision as “sudden” and “bizarre”. “ASEAN Chides China, India for Inaction over Myanmar”, Agence France Presse, 30 March 2006.


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Ruukan Katanyuu, “Beyond Non-Interference in ASEAN: The Association’s Role in Myanmar’s National Reconciliation and Democratization”, Asian Survey 46, no. 6 (2006): 840. Nick Cumming-Bruce, “Myanmar Gets Stern Warning from ASEAN, Foreign Ministers Demand Progress on Democratic Reforms”, International Herald Tribune, 10 December 2006. Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin had in fact met with Myanmar’s Prime Minister, Soe Win, in Bangkok three days before the announcement but the “Myanmarese guest did not divulge a word”. Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Myanmar Ruffles ASEAN Feathers”, The Statesman, 20 December 2005. The AIPMC had however learned of Myanmar’s intention to extend Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention as early as in 2005. Win Aung, the former foreign minister, had informed ASEAN that Suu Kyi would be released in April. Chongkittavorn, “Myanmar Ruffles ASEAN Feathers”. ASEAN’s Secretary General, Ong Keng Yong, confirmed the discussion, adding “yes, yes that’s correct but I can’t tell you which minister”. Eileen Ng, “Myanmar told that Suu Kyi’s Detention a Slap to ASEAN, Says Official”, Associated Press, 11 December 2005. “Thai PM: Burma Never Informs ASEAN Neighbours of Political Developments”, BBC News, 14 December 2005. Having gained access to a record of the discussion among the foreign ministers, Chongkittavorn also added that “Laos and Vietnam were more sympathetic … while Thailand did not say much”. Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Record of ASEAN Discussion Reveals ‘Bitterness’ with Burma”, The Nation, 25 December 2005. “ASEAN Ministers Demand Myanmar Carry out Democratic Reforms”, Dow Jones International News, 9 December 2005. Jalil Hamid, “ASEAN Feels Embarrassment over Myanmar — Malaysia”, Reuters, 9 December 2005. Ng, “Myanmar told that Suu Kyi’s Detention a Slap to ASEAN, Says Official”. Vivian Ho, “Myanmar Asks ASEAN to Oppose U.N. Security Council Resolution”, Kyodo News, 12 December 2005. Furthermore, the peace settlement was described as “a model for cooperation between ASEAN member countries in conflict resolution as provided for by the ASEAN Security Community, as well as a model for cooperation between regions”. “Chairman’s Statement of the 11th ASEAN Summit: ‘One Vision, One Identity, One Community” (Internet, ASEAN, 2005 [cited 8 November 2008]), available at . See also Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement”, p. 282. Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Burma: U.N. Threatens New Sanctions over Use of Child Soldiers”, Inter Press Service, 28 July 2005. Vaclav Havel and Bishop Desmond M. Tutu, “Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma” (DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, 2005).


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Edith M. Lederer, “U.S. Raises Myanmar’s Detentions in Security Council but Russia and China Block Discussion”, Associated Press, 25 June 2005. Lee Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement”, Asian Security 4, no. 3 (2008): 282. Foreign Affairs Assistant Secretary Susan Castrence also said “the President has informed President [George] Bush that if there will be a vote, the Philippines is prepared to vote for the inclusion of Myanmar in UNSC agenda”. “RP Backs Call for Suu Kyi Release”, Manila Standard, 3 December 2005. When it was the Philippines’ turn to speak at the Foreign Ministers Meeting, Foreign Minister Gatmaitan Romulo reportedly “had a lot of explaining to do” due to his country’s support of the UNSC briefing just days after the ASEAN Summit. Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Be More Open, ASEAN Tells Burma”, The Nation, 26 December 2005. Chongkittavorn, “Record of ASEAN Discussion Reveals ‘Bitterness’ with Burma”. Ho, “Myanmar Asks ASEAN to Oppose U.N. Security Council Resolution”. “Malaysian PM: ASEAN to Continue ‘Constructive’ Engagement with Myanmar”, BBC News, 11 December 2005. “Myanmar’s NLD Wants ASEAN Envoy to See Suu Kyi ‘without Fail’”, Kyodo News, 20 December 2005. “Burma’s Democracy League Believes ASEAN ‘Serious’ About Country’s Situation”, BBC News, 18 December 2005. Chongkittavorn, “Myanmar Ruffles ASEAN Feathers”. The structure of the ASEAN Troika was formalized at the third ASEAN Informal Summit held in Manila on 28 November 1999. Varunee Torsricharoen, “ASEAN Visit Delayed as Myanmar Busy Moving Capital”, Kyodo News, 22 January 2006. “ASEAN Frustrated by Myanmar Refusal of Malaysia Visit”, Dow Jones Newswires, 16 February 2006. “Cambodia Calls for Myanmar to Stop Delaying ASEAN Democracy Mission by Malaysian Envoy”, Associated Press, 24 January 2006. “UN’s Burma Envoy Quits”, SBS World News, 9 January 2006. “Indonesian President Meets Myanmar Leader”, Kyodo News, 1 March 2006. Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement”, p. 274. As Indonesia’s foreign minister stated, “the president’s visit is important in the eyes of many parties because it is the first direct access Myanmar has granted [in recent years] to an official at the highest level”. “Indonesian Leader Starts Burma Visit; Reforms on Agenda”, BBC News, 1 March 2006. According to Dino Patti Djalal, “The president said that Indonesia has a past which is similar to what is happening now in Myanmar, not only on the issue of democracy, but also the problem of ethnic conflict”. “Indonesia’s President Offers Myanmar Help on Democracy, Ethnic Conflict”, Agence France Presse, 3 March 2006.


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“Indonesian President Seeks Myanmar Access for Regional Monitors”, Dow Jones International News, 3 March 2006. “Indonesia Democracy Lesson for Myanmar Minister”, Reuters, 17 March 2006; “Indonesia Urges Myanmar to Allow Malaysian FM Visit”, Agence France Presse, 17 March 2006. “Myanmar Constitution to Be Completed in 2007 — Indonesia”, Reuters, 15 February 2007. Abdul Khalik, “Myanmar Hopes to Complete Constitution This Year: FM”, Jakarta Post, 16 February 2007. “RI Invites Myanmar’s Military Officers to Attend Military Staff & Command School Courses”, LKBN Antara, 15 February 2007. “Malaysian FM Says Myanmar Holding ASEAN Hostage”, Dow Jones Newswires, 18 April 2006. “Myanmar Situation Affecting ASEAN Credibility: ASEAN Chief ”, Agence France Presse, 18 April 2006. CIA World Factbook located at <www.cia.gov>. According to Kingston, the deal for a nuclear reactor will cost the government US$250 million while the construction of the new capital has been estimated to be as high as US$40 billion. He adds that while the government only spends 11 per cent of its budget on both health and education, more than 40 per cent is spent on the military each year. Jeff Kingston, “Burma’s Despair”, Critical Asian Studies 40, no. 1 (2008): 4–7. The lack of vulnerability to international pressure enjoyed by both China and India is partly a consequence of their size and relative power, but also due to an associated dependency of the United States and the EU on continued trade with them. Until the major powers of the world are willing to endure economic costs for the sake of maintaining their “publically declared values”, the status quo vis-a-vis China, in particular, is likely to be maintained. “ASEAN Chides China, India for Inaction over Myanmar”. “Transcript of Remarks by Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo in Parliament on 2 March 2006” (Internet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006 [cited 3 January 2009]), available at . According to Thailand’s foreign minister, “I think this past day, especially last night, has shown that we in ASEAN can talk openly. We were able to be frank and Myanmar listened. It’s a very healthy situation.” Achmad Sukarsono, “Myanmar Tells ASEAN It Doesn’t Like Pressure”, Reuters, 2006. According to Singapore’s foreign minister, “We had a good discussion last night, a very frank and heartfelt discussion … We did not take any decision at this meeting.” Varunee Torsricharoen, “ASEAN Entertains Call to ‘Take a Step Back’ on Myanmar”, Kyodo News, 20 April 2006. “ASEAN Fails to Find Myanmar Strategy”, Agence France Presse, 20 April 2006; Anthony Deutsch, “ASEAN Ministers Fail to Agree on New Way to Force Reform in Myanmar”, Associated Press, 20 April 2006.


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Torsricharoen, “ASEAN Entertains Call to ‘Take a Step Back’ on Myanmar”. Sukarsono, “Myanmar Tells ASEAN It Doesn’t Like Pressure”. “Myanmar Absent from First ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting”, Agence France Presse, 5 May 2006. Nyan Win also refused to discuss the issue privately with his Thai and Malaysian counterparts, saying “the program is tight, we’ve got no time to meet bilaterally”. Sean Yoong, “Myanmar Holds Firm on Suu Kyi Detention”, Washington Post, 29 May 2006. “Myanmar Dissident Healthy, U.N. Agent Says after Meeting”, New York Times, 21 May 2006. “ASEAN Set to Wash Its Hands off Burma”, The Australian, 22 June 2006. Hamid Albar Syed, “It Is Not Possible to Defend Myanmar”, Wall Street Journal, 24 July 2006. Wayne Arnold, “Malaysia, in Reversal, Condemns Myanmar”, International Herald Tribune, 22 July 2006. Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement”, p. 283. “Joint Communiqué of the 39th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM)” (Internet, ASEAN, 2006 [cited 21 November 2008]), available at <www.aseansec. org/18562.htm>. John Burton and Amy Kazmin, “ASEAN Denies It Backed Away from Tackling Burma”, Financial Times, 27 July 2006; Vijay Joshi, “ASEAN Sends ‘Strong Signal’ to Myanmar to Speed up Democratic Reforms, Says Malaysia”, Associated Press, 26 July 2006. Kavi Chongkittavorn, “ASEAN Changes Tack to Call for UN Debate on Burma”, The Nation, 4 July 2006. “ASEAN Will Not Isolate Myanmar, Says Syed Hamid”, Organization of Asia-Pacific News Agencies, 26 July 2006; “Thailand Still Wants ASEAN, UN to Resolve Myanmar Controversy”, Bernama Daily Malaysian News, 24 July 2006. Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement”, p. 283. Ibid. “Summary Record of 52nd Meeting: A/C.3/61/Sr.52”, A/C.3/61/SR.52 (New York: Third Committee, United Nations, 2007). There were 79 votes in favour, 28 against, and 63 abstentions. Indonesia’s foreign minister, Hassan Wirajuda, stated that “our view on Myanmar is that it should be more forthcoming in its interaction with its own ASEAN family, otherwise there is nothing much we can do when the United Nations through its Security Council decides to make its own moves on the question of Myanmar. … As we are not well informed with what they are doing, we are not well-equipped to help defend Myanmar”. “ASEAN Is Losing Patience with Myanmar”, Reuters, 23 August 2006.


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Abdul Khalik, “ASEAN Urges Myanmar to Avoid UN Resolution by Democratizing”, Jakarta Post, 12 January 2007; R. Ravichandran, “Myanmar Does Not Pose Security Threat, Says Abdullah”, Bernama Daily Malaysian News, 13 January 2007. Chairperson’s Statement of the 12th ASEAN Summit: H.E. The President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. “One Caring and Sharing Community” Cebu, Philippines, 13 January 2007 (Internet, ASEAN, 2007 [cited 2 December 2008]), available at <www.aseansec.org/19281.htm>. Indonesia had already indicated that it would likely abstain from the vote, a few days prior to the vote in the UNSC. Abdul Khalik, “RI Likely to Abstain on Myanmar”, Jakarta Post, 13 January 2007. “ASEAN Says It Must Take Lead on Myanmar”, Agence France Presse, 14 January 2007. Emphasis by the author. “ASEAN in a Better Position to Handle Myanmar Issue” (Internet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wisma Putra, 2007 [cited 28 July 2008]), available at . “Myanmar Leader to Skip ASEAN Summit in Philippines”, Reuters, 2 December 2006. The seventy-three year old general had also skipped the previous year’s summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The same diplomat added, “… ASEAN has already made policy statements on Myanmar for so long and whatever message we want to convey to the military leaders have already been made”. “ASEAN Rejects GMA Calls for Reforms in Myanmar”, Manila Standard, 15 January 2007. Chairperson’s Statement of the 12th ASEAN Summit: H.E. The President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. “One Caring and Sharing Community” Cebu, Philippines, 13 January 2007 (Internet, ASEAN, 2007 [cited 29 September 2008]). “Philippines Says Myanmar’s Suu Kyi Not on ASEAN Agenda”, Reuters, 23 May 2007. “ASEAN Should Not Be Held Hostage over Myanmar Issue: PM Lee”, Channel News Asia, 2 June 2007. He also stated that while “Myanmar is not a security issue … the issue of Myanmar is our [ASEAN’s] concern. Each time they arrest [pro-democracy movement members], ASEAN would be in question”. “Malaysian Foreign Minister Urges Collective ASEAN Stance on Burma”, Bernama Daily News, 21 May 2007. See also “Myanmar Still on ASEAN’s Mind, Says Syed Hamid”, Bernama Daily Malaysian News, 30 June 2007. Annan highlighted the fact that as part of the United Nations, many of the ASEAN nations had voted to adopt the doctrine. “It means the government concerned has the responsibility to protect its citizens against gross and systematic violations of human rights and crime against humanity. If it fails to do so or the government itself is responsible, the rest of the international community has


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the responsibility to step in”. “Annan Speaks His Mind on ASEAN, Myanmar”, Bernama Daily Malaysian News, 13 July 2007. Mohd Azizaziz Noor, “Better Not to Interfere; ASEAN Served Well by Its Non-Intervention in Myanmar’s Affairs”, Today, 19 July 2007. For examples of how the Foreign Ministers Meeting was reported in the media, see “ASEAN Ministers Call for Democracy in Burma”, Washington Post, 30 July 2007; “ASEAN Ministers Press Myanmar to Free Suu Kyi”, The Wall Street Journal, 31 July 2007; “ASEAN Voices Frustration over Myanmar”, Agence France Presse, 30 July 2007; Alastair McIndoe, “ASEAN Slams Myanmar for Lack of Democracy”, Straits Times, 30 July 2007; Emma-Kate Symons, “ASEAN Drags Its Heels on Burma”, The Australian, 1 August 2007. See Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for summaries of the human rights situation during this period. The processes behind, and the nature of, the new constitution will be discussed in the next chapter. In the context of how the regime displayed a greater tolerance for political expression early in 2007, Robert Taylor outlines that “… the regime was relatively tolerant of various minor demonstrations and campaigns directed at rising food prices and political issues such as the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other activists”. For example, “[a] group who went regularly from January to pray for their release was watched closely, at least once doused with water, occasionally harassed, but otherwise tolerated. In late February, a group of about twelve individuals calling themselves the Myanmar Development Committee marched from one of the main markets to the Sule Pagoda. Though they were arrested, most were released within 24 hours, including three journalists who were covering the incident. Four days later, there was a similar demonstration with the same result.” Robert H. Taylor, “Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 2008, edited by Daljit Singh and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), p. 254. Some scholars list the protests as commencing on 17 August while others suggest they commenced on 15 August. See Andrew Selth, “Burma’s Saffron Revolution and the Limits of International Influence”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 3 (2008): 282; Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung and Maung Aung Myoe, “Myanmar in 2007: A Turning Point in The “Roadmap”?”, Asian Survey XLVIII, no. 1 (2008): 17. However, it appears that the more likely date for the commencement of the protests was in fact 19 August as the government only announced the price hikes on 15 August and the date of 19 August was confirmed by the UN Special Rapporteur. See Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar”, Advanced Edited Edition (Human Rights Council A/HRC/6/17, 2007). For further reports suggesting 19 August, see “Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008), p. 2; Taylor, “Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate”, p. 256.


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The price of petrol had been as low as 14 cents just two years earlier. Christopher Roberts, “Plight of Myanmar’s People: Challenges for the International Community” (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 4 October 2007). Taylor, “Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate”, pp. 255–59; Thawnghmung and Myoe, “Myanmar in 2007: A Turning Point in the ‘Roadmap’?,” p. 15. “Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown”, p. 2; Thawnghmung and Myoe, “Myanmar in 2007: A Turning Point in the ‘Roadmap’?”, p. 15. According to Robert Taylor, the individual protests involved no more than thirty or forty people and “little more happened other than to mount additional demonstrations in other areas when the authorities failed to take any action”. Taylor, “Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate”, p. 256. Pinheiro, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar”, Advanced Edited Edition, p. 7. See also Pushpa Thambipillai et al., “The ASEAN-10”, in Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2008–2009, edited by Deepak Nair and Poh Onn Lee (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), p. 42. “Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown”, p. 2; Roberts, “Plight of Myanmar’s People: Challenges for the International Community”. Selth, “Burma’s Saffron Revolution and the Limits of International Influence”, p. 283. Taylor, “Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate”, p. 258. The minister for religious affairs added that the origin of these events could be located in the “perpetration of internal and external destructionists, who are jealous of national development and stability, to harm all the Government’s endeavours”. Pinheiro, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar”, Advanced Edited Edition, pp. 8–9. Taylor, “Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate”, p. 258. As Andrew Selth states, the precise details of what took place during the 2007 protests has been “clouded by some inaccurate and misleading reports …” Selth, “Burma’s Saffron Revolution and the Limits of International Influence”, p. 282. Taylor, “Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate”, p. 258. U Myo Myint, “Foreigners Want to See Unrest, the Myanmar People Dislike”, The New Light of Myanmar, 3 October 2007; Taylor, “Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate”, p. 256. Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan also stated in a meeting with the United Nation’s Ibrahim Gambari, that “Anti-government groups outside the country under the


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guise of advocating democracy, human rights and labour rights are also providing cash and kind assistance to anti-government groups inside the country; rendering help for launching underground activities inside the country; providing trainings for subversive acts and carrying out foreign relation works for the anti-government groups inside the country so as to enable them to survive.” Later, he adds, ‘Those who staged these protests are the ones who were sentenced to jail for creating disturbances in 1988 … it is found that today’s protests and violences [sic] are created and manipulated by them”. “UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Mr Gambari Pays Courtesy Call on Head of State Senior General Than Shwe and Acting Prime Minister Secretary-1 Lt-Gen Thein Sein”, New Light of Myanmar, 6 October 2007. Blaine Harden, “Capitalizing on Burma’s Autumn of Dissent: Opposition in Exile Urging More Protests, Even Armed Conflict”, Washington Post, 4 December 2007. See also “Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown”, p. 4. Selth, “Burma’s Saffron Revolution and the Limits of International Influence”, p. 283. “Hurdles to the Singapore Summit”, Jakarta Post, 25 October 2007; Thawnghmung and Myoe, “Myanmar in 2007: A Turning Point in the ‘Roadmap’?”. See also Pinheiro, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar”, Advanced Edited Edition. Roberts, “Plight of Myanmar’s People: Challenges for the International Community”. Lily Zubaidah Rahim, “Fragmented Community and Unconstructive Engagements: ASEAN and Burma’s SPDC Regime”, Critical Asian Studies 40, no. 1 (2008): 68. Barry Desker, “Suspend Myanmar from ASEAN”, Straits Times, 4 October 2007. For example, a group of exiled Buddhist monks sent a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon that called for Security Council action under the “responsibility to protect” doctrine. Oliver Ward, “Burmese Police Fire into Crowds”, Toronto Star, 28 September 2007. For example, a senior official from a party representing the members of government elected in 1990 and now in exile argued that the “responsibility to protect” doctrine provided grounds for UNSC action and called for the Canadian Government, which had played a pivotal role in the doctrine’s formation, to “help … organise an inter-governmental lobby”. “Myanmar Military Raids Monastery; Shots, Tear Gas and Baton Charges Quell Huge Protests”, Montreal Gazette, 27 September 2007. “Calls for Burma to Free Political Detainees”, Scoop, 3 October 2007. “Open Letter to the Heads of Government of ASEAN, China and India” (Internet, ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, 2007 [cited 17 January 2009]), available at . See also Alan Collins, “A People-Oriented ASEAN: A Door


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Ajar or Closed for Civil Society Organisations”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (2008): 321. Charles Petrie’s position in Myanmar had also been compromised when a confidential report to the United Nations criticizing the junta’s “uncompromising attitude” was leaked to the press. Htet Aung, “Official’s Expulsion Challenges UN’s Role — Thai Based Burmese Paper”, BBC News, 5 November 2007. Donald K. Emmerson, “ASEAN’s ‘Black Swans’”, Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008): 72. “Statement by ASEAN Chair: Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo, New York” (Internet, ASEAN, 2007 [cited 8 May 2008]), available at <www.aseansec.org/20974.htm>. Jurgen Haacke, “ASEAN and the Situation in Myanmar/Burma”, in Myanmar/ Burma: Challenges and Perspectives, edited by Guo Xiaolin (Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden: Institute for Security and Development Study, 2008), p. 140. As Donald Emmerson states: “The final noteworthy aspect of Yeo’s statement is what it said about the ‘ASEAN Way’ — the foundation commitment of the association to the sovereignty of its member states, to non-interference in their internal affairs, and to consensus among them as a necessary basis for making regional decisions. Yeo’s comments could be understood as violating all three of these principles. In his capacity as the ASEAN Chair, Yeo had criticized the domestic behaviour of a member regime. He had done so on behalf of ‘the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’, despite the obvious objection of at least one of them, Nyan Win, and the likely antipathy of others from their region’s more authoritarian regimes such as Laos and Vietnam … Depending on how these terms were understood, sovereignty had been breached, interference had occurred, and consensus had been ignored.” Emmerson, “ASEAN’s ‘Black Swans’”, p. 74. Selth, “Burma’s Saffron Revolution and the Limits of International Influence”, p. 285. See also Thawnghmung and Myoe, “Myanmar in 2007: A Turning Point in the ‘Roadmap’?”, p. 19. “Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman’s Comments on the Situation in Myanmar, September 27 2007” (Internet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [cited 15 August 2008]), available at . Haacke, “ASEAN and the Situation in Myanmar/Burma”, p. 139. Selth, “Burma’s Saffron Revolution and the Limits of International Influence”, p. 285. Taylor, “Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate”, p. 260. Thawnghmung and Myoe, “Myanmar in 2007: A Turning Point in the ‘Roadmap’?”, p. 18. For a concise summary of financial relations between the two countries, see Rahim, “Fragmented Community and Unconstructive Engagements: ASEAN


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and Burma’s SPDC Regime”, pp. 84–86. For information concerning certain military relations between Singapore and Myanmar, see Jane’s Intelligence Database. Haacke, “ASEAN and the Situation in Myanmar/Burma”, p. 144. Ibid., p. 147. Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement”, p. 286. Thawnghmung and Myoe, “Myanmar in 2007: A Turning Point in the ‘Roadmap’?”, p. 19. Similarly, Andrew Selth contends that “China’s carefully worded expressions of concern about the 2007 unrest, for example, were not prompted by any attachment to democratic reform in Burma, but by the need to preserve its national interests there and maintain its diplomatic influence, both in the UN and further afield.” Selth, “Burma’s Saffron Revolution and the Limits of International Influence”, p. 287. Emmerson, “ASEAN’s ‘Black Swans’”, p. 74. United Nations, “Security Council Told of ‘Positive’ Outcomes of Visit to Myanmar by Special Adviser, with Continuing Concerns over Human Rights Situation”, US Fed News, 13 November 2007. Vijay Joshi, “ASEAN Cancels UN Myanmar Briefing, but Urges Move to Democracy”, Dow Jones International News, 20 November 2007; Mergawati Zulfakar, “Testing ASEAN’s Patience”, The Star, 21 November 2007. Varunee Torsricharoen, “Singapore Miscalculates Balance of Power over Myanmar Issue”, Kyodo News, 21 November 2007. There are a number of views concerning the role China played and there remains no public information available to help with discerning which of the views are more accurate. Haacke, for example, argues that China’s main failure was that it did not directly pressure Myanmar on accepting the Gambari briefing. Haacke, “ASEAN and the Situation in Myanmar/Burma”, p. 150. A Singapore news report stated that China voiced concerns about the briefing but such concerns were alleviated when the Singapore Government reassured China that it would be an “informal briefing”. Velloor Ravi and Suk-Wai Cheong, “Discord at the ‘Family Dinner’”, Straits Times, 21 November 2007. However, Jones contends that Myanmar’s opportunity to reject the briefing was generated by a Chinese threat to boycott the briefing if it continued. Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement”, p. 286. In the context of the latter contention, Emmerson adds that “China, for one, would not have welcomed ASEAN criticism of repression in Burma, knowing that its own behaviour could be next — a prescient concern in view of Beijing’s extirpation of mass protest in Tibet in March 2008, about which ASEAN had nothing to say.” Emmerson, “ASEAN’s ‘Black Swans’”, pp. 75–76. Some ASEAN officials also shared this view, with one Malaysian diplomat stating “what if Malaysia has problems in the future, are we getting the UN to interfere too?” Zulfakar, “Testing ASEAN’s Patience”.


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Ravi and Cheong, “Discord at the ‘Family Dinner’”. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand were also concerned about whether it was prudent to bring the issue of Myanmar into one of the few ASEAN forums, the EAS, that had thus far been free of the Myanmar “albatross”. Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement”, p. 286. Even Malaysia’s foreign minister, Syed Hamid, blamed the outcome on Singapore’s approach by stating “the host country invited Gambari — it was not something that was done by ASEAN”. Benni Avni, “Asian Nations Deal Blow to U.N. Efforts on Burma”, New York Sun, 20 November 2007. Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement”, p. 286. The “ASEAN Chairman statement on Myanmar” declared that “[t]he ASEAN Leaders agreed that ASEAN would respect Myanmar’s wishes and make way for Myanmar to deal directly with the UN and the international community on its own. ASEAN stands ready to play a role whenever Myanmar wants it to do so.” Moreover, the “Leaders reiterated that the Myanmar Government should continue to work with the UN in order to (a) open up a meaningful dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD); (b) make full use of the good offices of the UN Secretary-General and Professor Gambari in this process; (c) lift restrictions on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and release all political detainees; (d) work towards a peaceful transition to democracy; and (e) address the economic difficulties faced by the people of Myanmar”. “ASEAN Chairman Statement on Myanmar” (Internet, ASEAN, 2007 [cited 13 December 2007]), available at . Torsricharoen, “Singapore Miscalculates Balance of Power over Myanmar Issue”. Zulfakar, “Testing ASEAN’s Patience”. Kingston, “Burma’s Despair”, p. 39. Cited in Haacke, “ASEAN and the Situation in Myanmar/Burma”, p. 146. At one point in an interview, George Yeo stated, “There is a lot of anger in Myanmar and among the Myanmar people in Singapore — there are tens of thousands of them here. I met some of them two days ago at the Burmese temple here. There is great frustration. They readily admitted that the recent crackdown was much less than what had happened in 1988, which was a brutal crackdown. However, that was the period before the Internet and hand phone cameras, and today whatever happens will be quickly spread worldwide. And the Myanmar diaspora is over 2 million, not only in neighbouring countries, but also in Europe, Australia and America. So there is no way the current situation can go on like this for a long time”. “Transcript of Reply by Minister George Yeo to Questions in Parliament on 22 October 2007” (Internet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 2007 [cited 3 July 2008]), available at .


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Discussions with a Burmese expatriate, Singapore, August 2008. The expatriate has since had her application for permanent residence declined, despite satisfying the requirements of its preapproved conditions (that is, obtaining employment after graduation). According to the interlocutor, several Burmese colleagues had been “interviewed” about political affiliations and memberships, together with questions on whether they, or anyone they knew, had participated in protests against the Myanmar Government. See also “Myanmar Activists Face Visa Problems in Singapore”, Agence France Presse, 8 August 2008; Siti Rahil, “Singapore Police Arrest 2 for Protesting Ejection of Myanmar Workers”, Kyodo News, 12 January 2009. In early 2009, the Singapore Government announced it would be further increasing the powers of the police for the purpose of preventing such protest ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that it will be hosting. “Singapore to Tighten Rules on Public Protests Ahead of APEC Summit”, Kyodo News, 17 January 2009. Jones, “ASEAN’s Albatross: ASEAN’s Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement”, p. 286. “Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown”, p. 12; Haacke, “ASEAN and the Situation in Myanmar/Burma”, p. 153. The ministerial meeting held in September 2008 called on Myanmar to work more closely with the United Nations’ good offices, to initiate more inclusive dialogue with the opposition, and to release political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi. Chietigj Bajpaee; “United Nations Meeting Applies Pressure on Myanmar for Political Reforms”, Global Insight, 30 September 2008; “SecretaryGeneral Convenes High-Level Meeting of ‘Group of Friends’ on Myanmar”, M2 Presswire, 27 September 2008. See also Kingston, “Burma’s Despair”, p. 34. Haacke, “ASEAN and the Situation in Myanmar/Burma”, p. 154. Vivian Ho, “Malaysia Says ASEAN Will Prod Myanmar on Reform in ‘Acceptable’ Ways”, Kyodo News, 16 January 2006. Vivian Ho, “ASEAN Has Made ‘Important Evolution’ on Myanmar”, Kyodo News, 28 July 2006. Haacke, “ASEAN and the Situation in Myanmar/Burma”, p. 141. “EU Shares ASEAN Frustration over Myanmar: Foreign Policy Chief ”, Agence France Presse, 21 April 2006. Finland’s ambassador to Indonesia, Markku Niinioja, said, “Myanmar has been accepted by ASEAN and has joined the ASEM since the 2004 meeting in Hanoi. We are very concerned about what has happened in Myanmar but we appreciate ASEAN’s efforts so far.” Ronan Mac Aongusa, first secretary at the office of the EU Delegation of the European Commission (EC) to Indonesia, added, “[t]he ten years of ASEM cooperation will also be one of the meeting’s cross cutting themes. The summit will aim to submit proposals for further development of the ASEM cooperation and to adopt a Helsinki declaration on the future of ASEM.” He also rejected suggestions that human rights issues in Myanmar would negatively affect the discussion of such issues. Abdul Khalik,


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“EU Says Talks with ASEAN Won’t Be Derailed by Myanmar”, Jakarta Post, 8 August 2006. “ASEAN, U.S. Mull 1st Summit in November, but Differ over Myanmar”, Kyodo News, 3 February 2006. Eileen Ng, “EU Trade Chief Says Myanmar’s Poor Human Rights Record Could Hinder Trade Pact with ASEAN”, Associated Press Newswires, 15 May 2006. Eileen Ng, “ASEAN-US Trade Pact Scaled Down to Overcome Myanmar Sensitivities, Officials Say”, Associated Press Newswires, 19 August 2006. “US Says Myanmar Sanctions Unaffected by ASEAN Trade Pact”, AFX Asia, 24 August 2006. In terms of public rhetoric, Cambodia was similarly inconsistent. “Philippines Invites Myanmar to Attend ASEAN Summit in Cebu”, Xinhua News Agency, 14 August 2006. “Manila Minister to Air ASEAN Concerns in Myanmar”, Reuters, 7 August 2006. “Cambodia to Join ASEAN in Resolving Myanmar Issue”, Vietnam News Agency Bulletin, 30 August 2006. “Myanmar, Cambodia Working for Closer Ties”, People’s Daily, 24 May 2007. “Myanmar Expects New Constitution This Year, Cambodian Minister Says”, Asian Political News, 28 May 2007. “Myanmar, Cambodia Working for Closer Ties”. For example, in August 2007, Vietnam’s prime minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, undertook a two-day visit to Myanmar’s capital that saw the signing of an agreement “between Myanmar’s Energy Planning Department and PetroVietnam”. The two countries expressed their satisfaction over plans by Vietnam Airlines to commence direct flights between Yangon and Hanoi, while the SPDC also pledged to provide Vietnam with favourable investment conditions for the Vietnamese telecommunications company, Viettel. Elizabeth Mills, “Vietnamese PM Visits Myanmar as Part of ASEAN Tour”, Global Insight, 16 August 2007. Jon Grevatt, “Vietnam Seeks Closer Defence Cooperation with Myanmar and Malaysia”, Jane’s Defence Industry, 15 August 2008. Taylor, “Myanmar in 2007: Growing Pressure for Change but the Regime Remains Obdurate”, p. 263. For example, Edward McMillan-Scott, vice-president of the European Parliament, suggested threatening a boycott of the Beijing Olympics in an attempt to push China, a key military and economic partner of Myanmar, into applying real pressure for political change. More specifically, he stated, “China is the puppetmaster of Burma. The Olympics is the only real lever we have to make China act. The civilised world must seriously consider shunning China by using the Beijing Olympics to send the clear message that such abuses of human rights are not acceptable”. “Where the World Stands on Burma” (Internet, BBC News, 2007 [cited 30 September 2007]), available at .


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7 INTEGRATION ABSENT COMMUNITY? Regional Challenges, Collective Responses and Domestic Opportunities As mentioned in the previous chapter, the onset of the “Saffron Revolution” occurred just two months before ASEAN’s new charter was to be presented to the region and the world. The Myanmar Government’s violent crackdown on monks and protesters seriously impeded what had been intended as a celebration of ASEAN’s evolution, including the downing of a new era of intramural relations and institutionalization for the organization. Then, in May 2008, Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar and the SPDC’s poor response to the tragedy once again fell under the spotlight of international attention. Despite the continuation of both structural and ideational weaknesses within ASEAN that have previously been highlighted, these developments temporarily regalvanized ASEAN cohesion, contributing to the development of a new formula for functional cooperation in response to the Myanmar crisis. Rather than continue to push the boundaries of what the more authoritarian members of ASEAN were prepared to agree on, ASEAN focused on mediating between Myanmar and the international community in the delivery of aid, a role that simultaneously satisfied international expectations whilst delivering tangible benefits to the people affected by the cyclone. Meanwhile, the SPDC announced that it had completed drafting a new constitution to implement “disciplined democracy” and that it would be holding a referendum to determine whether it should be adopted in 178


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May 2008 — just days after Cyclone Nargis had struck with devastating effect. The new constitution has been largely condemned by the media, regional scholars, and foreign governments. Moreover, since the completion of ASEAN’s humanitarian role in August 2008, the country has largely fallen from regional and international attention. Given these developments, this analysis questions the extent to which ASEAN’s institutions can be reformed before its Myanmar crisis is resolved. As previous chapters have demonstrated, the Myanmar crisis has not only challenged the comprehensive security of ASEAN, but has also significantly impeded any regionwide sense of collective identity. Therefore, the first section of the chapter reviews ASEAN’s efforts to implement greater political and security cooperation and integration in the absence of a significant degree of “community”. The second section reviews the positive developments surrounding ASEAN’s response to Cyclone Nargis. While ASEAN’s efforts have not resolved the crisis of governance inside Myanmar, the analysis is conducted in order to assess whether such developments concerning the Association’s approach to Myanmar may have positive implications in the future. In other words, and as will be highlighted in the final chapter, ASEAN may not be able to succeed in its goal of becoming a security community for the foreseeable future, but it remains important to assess whether it can make headway in removing some of the obstacles to regional security and collective identity formation. It is here that the question of internal consolidation reemerges. In this context, the final section reviews developments concerning Myanmar’s new constitution. While the new constitution has been criticized for failing to implement democracy (or a more efficient form of government), it is important at least to assess the bone fides of the document as the official English version was not printed until September 2008, and few analysts have thoroughly assessed its final provisions. Myanmar may not be the only challenge to security community formation in Southeast Asia, but it is certainly the biggest challenge. The prospects for reform in Myanmar, and any meaningful role that ASEAN may have in delivering such reform, are essential issues in assessing the future viability and efficacy of ASEAN.

PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS IN ASEAN: BUILDING THE CAPACITY TO RESPOND THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION The challenge of Myanmar — combined with other crises such as the 2004 Tsunami, SARS, the haze, the 1998 economic crisis, and the subsequent collapse of Soeharto’s New Order regime (Indonesia) — triggered a realization


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by some of the region’s political elite that ASEAN needed further institutionalization in order to accelerate political, economic, and socio-cultural integration. Simultaneously, the Myanmar issue had also forced an acceptance within the more liberal quarters of ASEAN that, as Aung San Suu Kyi states, “… the days have passed when we can say that the troubles of one country can be isolated and that the internal affairs of one country are no concern of its neighbours”.1 The irrevocable nature of this new state of affairs was demonstrated in earlier chapters which showed how the Myanmar crisis forced increasingly frequent violations of the non-interference principle, thereby rendering the “ASEAN Way” essentially outmoded. In the context of these considerations, Umar Hadi, the director of public diplomacy in Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reflects on the founding document of ASEAN (Bangkok Declaration) “as a solution to a given problem in a given time …”, but argues that today “we need to reflect on whether this solution, is still valid, or is still workable for another set of problems”.2 From the Indonesian perspective, the modus operandi of ASEAN required fundamental change that would allow for “a new political and security blueprint” in order to equip ASEAN with an enhanced ability to respond to the challenges of the “new world”.3 According to this line of thought, the achievement of economic development, and the domestic stability that ensues, are mutually interdependent with political and security cooperation. As Umar Hadi adds: [T]he point is that we look at the cooperation side [and] … economic cooperation is much more developed compared to other fields, especially in the fields of political and security [cooperation], and when we reflect … in Indonesia what happened in 1998 with reformasi, yes we did have an economic crisis, but we did not develop our political life quite enough, so we didn’t put our energy into political development as much as we put our energy into economic performance, so when [such] performance fails then you get chaos. So we put that [lesson] into ASEAN: when you have very progressive cooperation … in the economic sector, but you don’t balance it with enough cooperation in the political and security field, then one day you end up with a dysfunctional institution … Politically speaking we have a liberal democracy in the Philippines, and then on the other hand we have a military junta [in Myanmar], so in essence we … need to balance the two; cooperation in economics and the cooperation in political and security matters.4

The Indonesian Foreign Ministry subsequently sought advice from Rizal Sukma, a scholar from Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)


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in Jakarta, regarding the direction Indonesia should take during its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2003. In building on a Singaporean proposal for an economic community the previous year,5 Rizal Sukma suggested that the Indonesian Government should “reclaim its strategic centrality” by proposing the establishment of a security community. Informed by the writings of scholars such as Amitav Acharya and Michael Leifer, Sukma drafted a concept paper which he presented to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry on 20 March 2003.6 The Foreign Ministry then drafted what has been termed Indonesia’s “Non-Paper on ASEAN Security Community” and circulated it along with various modified versions at several ASEAN meetings. These meetings included a Senior Officials Meeting (13–14 June 2003); the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Retreat in Phnom Penh (16 June 2003); a special SOM Meeting in Bogor, Indonesia (4–6 August 2003); and another SOM meeting in Surabaya, Indonesia (26–28 August 2003).7 During the course of these meetings, the Philippine Government wanted to include, by way of a complement, a socio-cultural pillar within the proposal. 8 Consequently, the negotiations that took place during these meetings culminated in an agreement at the 9th ASEAN Summit (Bali) in October 2003 to forge an ASEAN-wide security community through economic, security, and socio-cultural integration. The extent to which ASEAN could successfully implement concrete measures to address realistically the aspirations expressed by the second Bali Concord was to be tested in the immediate months that followed Indonesia’s negotiations on how best to implement the “ASEAN Security Community”, embracing the pillars of political, economic, and socio-cultural integration. As indicated in Table 7.1, Indonesia’s aspiration over the new direction it envisioned for ASEAN was most holistically stated in its February 2004 “Draft Plan of Action for a Security Community”. The plan of action contained seventy-five concrete steps to support its achievement, along with concrete dates for implementation and the most significant of these are listed in Table 7.1.9 Despite a recommendation by Rizal Sukma that Indonesia narrow its proposal to the relatively more feasible commitments eventually adopted in the final “Vientiane Plan of Action” (for example, greater cooperation on transnational security issues), the Indonesian Foreign Ministry insisted on a regional peacekeeping force and a regional commission for human rights together with a related commitment to democratic governance and values.10 Faced with strong opposition from Myanmar and several of its ASEAN counterparts, it backed down and a compromise emerged where the proposals for a human rights commission and a peacekeeping force were removed. Furthermore, the language concerning some of the remaining


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TABLE 7.1 Select List of Proposals Contained in the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action (draft as of 13/02/2004) Category

Activities

Time Line

Political Development

1. Developing a just, democratic, and harmonious environment in ASEAN: • Strengthening the systems of people’s participation through regular and free elections; • Strengthening the rule of law and judiciary systems; • Development of good governance; • Anti-corruption campaign: strengthening legal infrastructure, capacity building, and concrete cooperation in asset recovery.

By 2017

2. Promotion of human rights of ASEAN Peoples: • Developing an ASEAN Charter of Rights and Obligations of the Peoples; • Establishment of an ASEAN Regional Commission on human rights; • Protection of vulnerable groups, including the eradication of trafficking in persons, especially women and children.

By 2006

3. Resolution of outstanding land, sea, and air space boundary issues through delimitation and demarcation: • Identification of all boundary problems; • Resolution of bilateral/trilateral boundary delimitation and demarcation; • Development of borders regime to facilitate people’s movement, border trade, and border security.

By 2010

Conflict Prevention


1. Strengthening Preventive Measures: • Developing an ASEAN early warning system based on existing mechanisms (to prevent occurrence/escalation of conflicts).

Continuously Continuously

By 2006 By 2006 By 2006

By 2005 By 2010 From 2004

By 2008

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Category

Activities 2. Enhancing cooperation on non-traditional security issues: • Enhancing the role of the AMM on Transnational Crimes (AMMTC) as the main implementing body dealing with transnational crimes, including terrorism; • Ensuring border security with regard to traditional border crossing; • Strengthening ASEAN’s capacity to prevent and control the spread of communicable diseases; • Establishing a regional framework to combat smuggling, illegal logging, and illegal trade of natural resources; • Establishing a regional framework to combat trafficking in persons, particularly women and children; • A drug-free ASEAN.

Conflict Resolution

1. Developing a Regional Peacekeeping Arrangement: • Establishing an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force (standby arrangement) and its deployment mechanism.

183

Time Line

From 2005 By 2005

By 2006

By 2006

By 2015

By 2012

Source: Compiled by the author from the original draft.

initiatives and goals was watered down and a commitment to specific dates for implementation was also removed.11 The ideals contained within Indonesia’s Draft Plan of Action represented such a radical departure from the traditional ASEAN Way that the many non-democratic members of ASEAN simply could not tolerate them. The Plan of Action, in its final format, was delivered at the ASEAN Leader’s Summit in Vientiane in November 2004. Within the Vientiane Action Programme, the proposal for a security community was divided into five key components and these were expressed as (a) political development, (b) the shaping and sharing of norms, (c) conflict prevention, (d) conflict resolution, and (e) post-conflict peace building. Interestingly, the security community pillar in the Vientiane Plan of Action did manage to maintain various references to values such as “human


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rights”and stated further that the “… ASEAN Member Countries [should] live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment”.12 Nonetheless, the nature and content in the Vientiane Plan of Action can be best understood as a statement of intent rather than a structured (and/or legally binding) agreement with concrete commitments for implementation. Thus, the final structure remained inside the boundaries of the ASEAN Way.13 Despite the watering down of the document, statements of intent set expectations for results and so negotiations for agreement over the implementation of mechanisms for conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building have been ongoing. According to the deputy director general of the “ASEAN Department” in Laos’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, implementation concerning the latter two components of the Vientiane Plan of Action — conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building — remains difficult due to “different political systems, cultures, religions, and the level of comfort or trust”.14 Besides, more than 30 per cent of agreements within ASEAN have never been ratified and so the original ASEAN members (that is, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines) have also pursued institutional reform that would improve this poor record of implementation.15 In the context of these goals, many political elite interviewed saw an opportunity for progress through negotiations for an ASEAN Charter that is intended to provide the Association with a legal identity and a more institutionalized and binding framework for operation.16 In reality, however, the issue areas for which institutional reform would be feasible was always going to limited due to the nature and diversity of the ASEAN member states. Nonetheless, and as will be highlighted below, the early thrust of negotiations for the ASEAN Charter was refreshingly bold and progressive. The most significant development during negotiations for the ASEAN Charter occurred when a detailed set of recommendations was released in December 2006 by the ASEAN-commissioned “Eminent Persons Group” (EPG). Despite the involvement of representatives from all the ASEAN countries in drafting the report’s recommendations, the report acknowledged the need to calibrate ASEAN’s principle of “non-intervention” and called for the institutionalization of “dispute settlement mechanisms”, including compliance monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Interdependent with the suggested “recalibration of non-interference” was the recommendation that democratic values, good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (among other things) be constituted as a fundamental component of ASEAN’s “principles and objectives”. The EPG report also urged that ASEAN be vested with the power to suspend the


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“rights and privileges of membership” in order to redress serious breaches of ASEAN agreements, objectives, and major principles (for example, human rights violations).17 The report, however, did not go so far as to recommend a set of rules that would permit the termination of membership. In relation to ASEAN’s traditional mode of decision making, the EPG report suggested that “consensus should be preserved as the guiding principle”, but argued that consensus “should aid, but not impede, ASEAN’s cohesion and effectiveness”. More significantly, the report recommended the creation of “rules of procedure” that would provide the ASEAN Summit (renamed the ASEAN Council) with the power to vote where consensus could not be achieved. At the very least, the report recommended that there should be a flexible application of the “ASEAN minus X” or the “2 plus X formula” should other ASEAN members be unable or unwilling to enter an agreement.18 In such circumstances, any member states not privy to the agreement could presumably join at some later time. The EPG report was followed by an announcement at the July 2007 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting that the ministers had agreed to establish a “Human Rights Body”.19 In revamping one of the original proposals from Indonesia’s Draft Plan of Action for a Security Community, the ASEAN foreign ministers announced that they had overcome various objections by Myanmar — together with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam — regarding the proposal and whether it should be included as a component of the Charter.20 However, indicative of trouble on the horizon, Singapore’s foreign minister, George Yeo, informed the press that the ASEAN leaders hoped to finalize the “specifics” for the Human Rights Body in time for the November 2007 Summit in Singapore.21 As will be seen, the Association’s failure to modify its decision-making process (as recommended by the EPG Report) significantly impeded how much the charter would reform ASEAN. Aside from some exceptions in the economic realm, all ASEAN decisions take place on the basis of consensus. This provides each and every member of ASEAN with an implicit veto. Given such unilateral powers, no member is more challenging to the effectiveness of the Association than Myanmar. Perceptions over the country’s precarious state of affairs have been reinforced by recent developments, including the behaviour of the SPDC in the wake of the “Saffron Revolution” that was discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, the continuation of “consensus based decision making” ensured the failure of any form of institutional amendment that would conflict with the “national interests” of the “SPDC”.22 The current leadership in Myanmar — the lowest common denominator for ASEAN — was bound to interpret a number of the EPG recommendations as a direct threat to regime survival;


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therefore, the most progressive of these recommendations were doomed to the same fate as some equally enterprising provisions from the February 2004 Draft Plan of Action — either deletion or dilution. Prior to the charter, there did not exist any “legal constraints” to prohibit a core group of “progressive” (or perhaps “democratic”) countries from agreeing to a charter that adopted most, if not all, the EPG recommendations. As stated in a previous publication, “now that all the ASEAN members have ratified the charter [into domestic law], ASEAN’s ability to sanction Myanmar or other members by suspending membership, for example, has been seriously compromised”.23 Similarly, the implementation of further reform, together with the deepening of ASEAN’s level of institutionalization, has also been rendered more difficult through the charter’s ratification by all the ASEAN members. While it may be possible to mount an historical argument that the “consensus style of decision making has served ASEAN well”,24 the basis of this argument assumes that all the ASEAN members will continue to cooperate and reach consensus on enough issues to ensure ASEAN’s overall viability and future institutional development. In other words, the success of “consensus” requires, a priori, a convergence of interests on a given issue by all the ASEAN states. In the political and security realm, the combined effects of consensus, and a significant divergence of interests (primarily due to a democratic/ authoritarian divide)25 ensured the delivery of a charter that did not significantly modify (or improve upon) the traditional interpretation or application of the ASEAN Way. Similar to previous instruments and communiqués by ASEAN, the preamble to the ASEAN Charter reiterated a respect for the fundamental importance of principles such as sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, consensus, and non-interference.26 The challenge of moving beyond ASEAN’s traditional norms was also seen in the context of the proposed “Human Rights Body”. The final charter delivered just two clauses and five lines on the issue. After stating that the body would conform to the purposes and principles of the charter (including non-interference and consensus), the second clause adds that the “ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting”.27 The reality was that a consensus could not be reached over the “terms of reference” in time for the ASEAN summit, and, moreover, it appears that the exclusion of the human rights body was necessary to get Myanmar’s endorsement of the charter.28 The fact that Myanmar, one of the most infamous dictatorships in the world, was willing to endorse documents such as the Vientiane Plan of Action and the ASEAN Charter, provides the strongest evidence of the limited


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extent to which ASEAN has managed to modify and thereby strengthen institutionalized rules of procedure concerning its modus operandi. Aside from some initiatives and agreements with regard to the economic pillar, the ASEAN Charter primarily maintained the status quo by retaining consensusbased decision making and the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Moreover, the charter did not provide any binding commitments in the realm of political and security cooperation, and it also failed to garner any meaningful agreement over the protection of human rights. While Myanmar is undoubtedly the lowest common denominator in ASEAN, the palpable gap between aspirations and outcomes is also symbolic of a growing divide between the democratic and authoritarian regimes of Southeast Asia more generally. Until the ASEAN members’ political structures and ideologies converge to become more compatible, significant interest harmonisation and policy coordination will also be difficult to achieve. These factors, combined with a general lack of trust, explain not just the difficulty of political and security integration, but also the difficulty of implementing more specific multilateral security arrangements and mechanisms for preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building. In the meantime, and despite some of the challenges that were raised, cooperation and integration based on the economic pillar (that is, the “ASEAN Economic Community”) is likely to remain the most feasible. Over time, an associated rise in the level of interdependence and interaction between the elites and peoples of Southeast Asia, may produce positive spillover effects, facilitating continued increases in the level of trust and any ascertainable sense of “community”. Nonetheless, decades, rather than several years, will be necessary in order for the ASEAN states to develop the capacity and intention to consolidate truly as a single and integrated “ASEAN Community”. In the meantime, it will be necessary for ASEAN to develop a strategy to deal with its Myanmar crisis so that the country can reform its political institutions and internally consolidate. The possible emergence of such a strategy is the subject of analysis in the next section.

THE NARGIS SOLUTION: RE-ESTABLISHING CONSENSUS THROUGH HUMANITARIAN AID In the months that followed, ASEAN appeared to push the Myanmar issue to the sidelines of regional and international attention as far as mutual disengagement would allow. However, ASEAN was forced to change its rationale on the evening of 2 May 2008 when Cyclone Nargis struck with


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devastating effect. The cyclonic winds that hit the Ayeyarwady delta exceeded 190 kilometres and the subsequent 3.5 meter high tidal surge wiped out entire villages.29 Estimates of the eventual death toll ranged from 130,000 to 200,000, and the International Crisis Group further estimated that as many as 800,000 people might have been displaced by the cyclone. 30 The enormity of the destruction was demonstrated by images such as that in Figure 7.1 that graphically illustrates some of the children who perished during the storm. The image also corresponds with early CNN broadcasts that showed the junta dumping bodies in rivers, evidencing a general lack of capacity by the non-military sector.31 Furthermore, the ease with which many of the Ayeyarwady delta’s homes and local structures could be blown down by the storm meant that many people had been seriously injured or killed as they were sandblasted by the winds whilst clinging to trees and other structures in an attempt to survive the cyclone. The only institution inside Myanmar with the capacity to respond to a natural disaster of this magnitude was the military. Amazingly, the military was not immediately called in to rescue any of the survivors of the cyclone or to assist with the country’s recovery efforts.32 While the government did declare a “national emergency” in the five worst hit areas and subsequently

FIGURE 7.1 Victims of Cyclone Nargis

Source: Photograph supplied by a Burmese dissident, August 2008.


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activated its “Natural Disaster Preparedness Central Committee”, which was chaired by the country’s prime minister, it took several days before any aid arrived. Even then, much of the government’s efforts were “undermined by lack of communication, petty corruption and sheer incompetence”.33 Despite continued chaos, including the risk of widespread famine and disease,34 Senior General Than Shwe declared the situation was “returning to normal” just five days after the cyclone had struck. Then, and while “bloated bodies were [still] lying in the ditches and tens of thousands of victims were … waiting for assistance”, Than Shwe declared that “relief efforts had ended and the reconstruction phase had begun”.35 Hunkered down in Naypyidaw, the SPDC leadership was seemingly incapable of grasping the extent of the crisis. On 5 May, the government also declared that the national referendum on its new constitution to implement “disciplined democracy” would continue as planned on 10 May, and that the scheduled vote would only be delayed by two weeks in the areas that had been hit the hardest by the cyclone. The junta further argued that the “referendum is only a few days away and the people are eagerly looking forward to voting”.36 The SPDC initially refused the delivery of international aid for the victims of the cyclone. Despite this, numerous reports outlined the highly proactive nature of the Sangha, NGOs, and civil society groups inside Myanmar in their attempts to help in the recovery process. However, these groups, together with individuals indigenous to Myanmar, including doctors, were blocked in their efforts to help victims of the cyclone. Some monasteries were also prohibited from receiving aid and the government established roadblocks to further restrict relief workers from reaching the worst hit areas. As of 14 May, it was reported that the SPDC had implemented a fine of $3,000, or five years’ imprisonment, for any foreign nationals caught in the delta. Moreover, despite the victims having lost everything, when limited government supplies did eventually arrive, the government expected payment from them for non-food items such as emergency shelter tarpaulins. Numerous reports also suggested that local branches of government participated in the confiscation of aid, or, in some cases, replaced the aid with inferior products, including rotten rice.37 According to one informant, government employees placed UN labels on the bags containing the rotten and maggot-infested rice and informed the recipients that this was how little the world thought of you.38 The diversion of valuable resources in preparation for the referendum, the obstruction of local efforts by NGOs and civil society, and the initial refusal of international aid by the SPDC, generated a level of international outrage that had been witnessed several months earlier during the “Saffron Revolution”. The pinnacle of such outrage was encapsulated by French


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FIGURE 7.2 Rice “Allegedly” Delivered by Aid Agencies

Source: Photograph supplied by a Burmese dissident, August 2008.

Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner when he sought to invoke the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine agreed to by more than 150 countries at the UN World Summit in 2005. Had the principle been invoked then, at the very least, air drops of aid would have been delivered to the country, with or without the consent of the SPDC.39 France’s call was all the more notable given the support it received from other influential nations including the United States, Canada, Australia, and Germany. Moreover, and seemingly in support of the potential application of R2P, E.U. Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana also urged the United Nations to utilize “all means necessary” to ensure the delivery of aid to those most in need.40 However, the insurmountable challenge of securing UNSC authorization for such action, together with the logistical nightmare of facilitating the forced but effective delivery of aid, meant that it was never going to be a viable option. Nonetheless, various media outlets hopped on the “intervention” wagon with The Australian claiming “It’s time for an aid intervention”, the Time Magazine suggesting that it’s time to consider “the more serious option” of “invading Burma” and the AsiaTimes Online concluding that while an invasion was “once a paranoid delusion” it was now a “strong pre-emptive possibility”.41


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The SPDC’s fear of invasion may, in fact, be a “paranoid delusion”, but such perceptions have very real consequences for how the leadership behaves and these perceptions, therefore, shape the strategic realities inside the country. A systemic failure by major Western powers to understand the worldview of the SPDC leadership has seriously imperilled the ability of the West to devise tangible solutions to the Myanmar crisis. Thus, when naval vessels from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States arrived offshore with the offer of aid and support, the presence of foreign forces, including marines, helicopters, and amphibious landing craft off Myanmar’s coastline, only heightened the military junta’s sense of xenophobia, fear of interference, and obstructionism in the delivery of aid.42 Despite the United States assurances that it had no intention to invade — backed by an invitation to representatives of the Tatmadaw to attend flights delivering aid — “it would not have escaped Naypyidaw’s attention” that on the day that the U.S. pleaded for access to the Delta the President awarded Aung San Suu Kyi its highest civilian honour — the U.S. Congressional Gold Medal.43 Singapore even received reports that the Tatmadaw had not been called in to help the victims of the cyclone because they had instead been ordered into “defensive positions”.44 While the West called on Thailand, India, and China to pressure the junta unilaterally into allowing foreign aid and emergency relief personnel into the country,45 for weeks the SPDC continued to deny visa applications from foreign aid workers, and foreign aid agencies repeatedly warned that their aid was not getting to the victims most in need.46 Aside from invasion, the junta also viewed the cyclone more as a “security threat” rather than a “natural disaster” because granting permission for a massive relief effort would result in a large influx of foreign aid workers and media personnel. Therefore, the SPDC was primarily concerned about its grip on power and the avoidance of “alien cultural influences” that might translate into “social instability”.47 In the end, the only institution that was able to manage these concerns and thereby play a pivotal role in helping the victims of Nargis was ASEAN, which released its first press statement on 5 May, and in order to assess the extent of the catastrophe, it dispatched its Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT) to Myanmar between 9 and 18 May.48 The deployment of ERAT was provided for by previous agreements, including the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response that had been ratified by Myanmar and developed in the wake of the 2004 Asian tsunami.49 Meanwhile, on 8 May ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan sought to raise resources for the disaster relief effort by initiating the ASEAN Cooperation Fund for Disaster Assistance.50 In addition, on 12 May Pitsuwan organized a meeting between the ASEAN Secretariat, the World Bank, and


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the United Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for the purpose of assessing potential support for a “coalition of mercy” — a phrase that was later changed to “Humanitarian Coalition for the Victims of Cyclone Nargis”51 — together with medium and long-term measures that such a coalition would need to adopt. ERAT reported to an emergency meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers on 19 May where it had the difficult task of balancing praise — in order to overcome the SPDC’s obstructionism — whilst giving a realistic picture of the challenge of assessment and the potential problems that lay ahead. Thus, the report claimed that the SPDC “tried its level best to meet the demands of an adequate and organised response”, but later states that its assessment “would have been more reflective of the realities on the ground had the team been permitted to conduct assessments in disaster-affected areas that ASEAN-ERAT selected”.52 Given this problem, the continued recalcitrance of the junta, and the fact that ASEAN’s international stature had again been challenged, heated discussions with Myanmar’s foreign minister Nyan Win ensued. According to an official source from a Singapore embassy, the Indonesian foreign minister “leaned across the table and asked the foreign minister of Myanmar what he thought ASEAN membership meant to Myanmar and what — at that time and in those circumstances — Myanmar’s membership meant to ASEAN — in terms of ASEAN’s internal coherence — international profile — and its membership’s shared vision for the future”.53 In the end, ASEAN managed to force the SPDC to take a more cooperative position through a carrot and stick approach. The nature of the question by Indonesia’s foreign minister revealed a level of frustration that questioned the utility of Myanmar remaining a member of ASEAN. Having explicitly outlined the potential stakes for Myanmar, Jurgen Haacke contends that the ASEAN ministers then explained to Nyan Win “… that the crisis offered Naypyidaw a final opportunity to allow the Association a role in facilitating the military’s relations with the international community”.54 ASEAN’s narrow focus on humanitarian aid effectively depoliticized the Association’s engagement with Myanmar, and, aside from some potential long-term implications, this approach undoubtedly saved lives in the process. Thus, ASEAN subsequently obtained consent to establish the “ASEAN Humanitarian Taskforce for the Victims of Cyclone Nargis” (which would provide an ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism for the effective distribution of aid) and consent to coordinate with the United Nations in holding an ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference in Yangon on 25 May 2008. In order to maintain Myanmar’s cooperation, George Yeo highlighted that the delivery of international aid “through ASEAN… should not be


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politicised”, but simultaneously warned that ‘Myanmar should allow more international relief workers.55 Surin Pitsuwan then visited Prime Minister Thein Sein in Yangon between 20 and 21 May in order to map out the steps that would be necessary to implement the 19 May agreements in a manner that would maintain the “full endorsement and support of the government of Myanmar”. Surin’s efforts were soon reinforced by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon when he visited with Senior General Than Shwe on 22 May. During his visit, Ban stressed the urgent need for officials to accept international assistance and to grant the necessary visas.56 Ban received a pledge that Myanmar would provide visas to all foreign aid workers, regardless of their nationality, and that the SPDC would not hamper relief efforts. However, Than Shwe’s promises were riddled with conditions.57 The International Pledging Conference took place as planned with fifty-one countries and twenty-four international organizations attending, but the issue of “access” continued to overshadow the event. As Thailand’s foreign minister Noppadon Pattama complained, “they have opened up more, at least granting permission for foreign media and some international aid workers to see devastated areas, but it is not unhindered access”,58 Given the continued challenge of access, international donors remained hesitant and the conference raised just US$50 million, bringing the total to US$119–US$81 million short of the previously declared United Nations target of US$200 million. As Singapore’s foreign minister remarked, “the problem is not one of generosity, the problem is one of establishing greater trust between Myanmar and the world community”.59 Despite the continued challenge of cooperating with the SPDC, Surin Pitsuwan persisted, and by the closure of the conference he had developed the initial “taskforce” into the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) consisting of three delegates each from Myanmar, ASEAN, and the United Nations. The TCG was established to coordinate, facilitate, and monitor the distribution of aid and its chair was Myanmar’s deputy foreign minister Kyaw Thu. The TCG then carried out a comprehensive joint assessment of recovery needs led by the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment team (PONJA) consisting of experts from ASEAN, the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. 250 members of PONJA were dispatched on 9 June. As part of the TCG, more than 250 aid workers and professionals were selected from the ASEAN countries but at a meeting immediately prior to their arrival in Myanmar, Kyaw Thu reminded the PONJA experts that their assessments should not contain any political content.60 Nonetheless, through the TCG structure, combined with ASEAN’s mediatory role, the issuance of visas became largely


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routine and by 18 August, 1,035 visas had been issued, and in the third week of August the last of the United Nations’ flights from Bangkok’s Don Muang airport took place.61 Understandably, the United Nations was quick to praise ASEAN’s efforts during the crisis, with Ibrahim Gambari stating that the “TCG provided an effective model for cooperation and collaboration between the international community and Myanmar”.62 ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan was similarly satisfied with the role that he and ASEAN had played during the crisis, arguing that ASEAN had been “baptised by Cyclone Nargis” and that it was ASEAN that had been able “to open up the humanitarian space”. He added, “I think that’s the success of ASEAN. I think that’s the resiliency of ASEAN. I think that’s the new ASEAN ready to take on the responsibility placed on it, expected of it”.63 Meanwhile, PONJA completed its assessment and released a report on 21 July to the ASEAN foreign ministers. The report summarized ASEAN’s role in the following manner: This is the first time that ASEAN has played such a leading role in responding to a natural disaster affecting one of its Member States. ASEAN facilitated and coordinated international assistance to the survivors of the cyclone as well as the conduct of this assessment. At their special meeting on 19 May … Secretary-General of ASEAN Dr Surin Pitsuwan said, “By linking hands with the UN, the international NGOs, and the rest of the world, ASEAN has shown how international humanitarian cooperation can work to help bring relief and assistance to the victims of Cyclone Nargis. At the same time, ASEAN is putting into action its pledge to build a caring and sharing community.64

Beyond international aid, the usual circumstances surrounding the politics of Myanmar applied. For example, just one day after the International Pledging Conference the SPDC announced that it would be extending Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention for another year.65 Moreover, the general human rights situation has continued to decline and by the close of 2008, the government had “sentenced over 200 political and labour activists, internet bloggers, journalists, and Buddhist monks and nuns” to lengthy jail terms.66 Particularly disconcerting for the long-term prospects of the country was a report by a Burmese dissident who previously worked for Khin Nyunt that students can no longer study English at university unless both their parents join the government’s Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA).67 Despite these developments, the junta announced that it had ratified ASEAN’s new Charter — complete with its references to human rights and democracy — at the July 2008 Foreign Ministers Meeting.68


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In some respects, Myanmar’s ratification of the charter was an embarrassment for ASEAN and so it was not surprising that the Association released a further joint communiqué expressing their “deep disappointment” over Myanmar’s continued failure to engage with all groups in the country and the continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political detainees.69 Meanwhile, ASEAN’s success in re-establishing its utility for the SPDC resulted in a corresponding decline in the junta’s perception of the utility of the United Nations and its special rapporteur Ibrahim Gambari. The heightened pressure that Myanmar had received from the United Nations also played a significant role in Myanmar’s re-engagement with ASEAN.70 Furthermore, Donald Emmerson argues how Surin, “[a]s an intermediary between angry donors and stubborn generals in Myanmar, he tried to save lives. But in doing so, he also helped save the junta’s face, and to that extent his actions may have marginally prolonged its lease on life”.71 Earlier he states that as ASEAN had effectively depoliticized intervention, this is in turn “likely to undercut the ability of [the] … regional organisation (ASEAN) to induce reform”.72 Perhaps in reflecting on some of these issues, Singapore’s foreign minister, George Yeo, publicly declared that he could only give ASEAN a “C grade” for its handling of Myanmar.73 Nevertheless, ASEAN’s humanitarian efforts and the mediatory role the Association played was undoubtedly a success. As the ICG argues, “internal factors along with international pressure and particularly regional pressure and diplomacy had their effect, and developments since then show that it is possible to work with the military regime on humanitarian issues”.74 In this regard, the TCG may well have provided a model for further functional cooperation not just with the delivery of aid, but also in the socialization of more positive norms of behaviour. For example, and as will be outlined in the next and final chapter, ASEAN could build on the TCG model to organize exchange programmes where mid-ranking officers from the Tatmadaw and the civil services would have the opportunity to attend professionalization courses that would also “implicitly” involve human rights training. Given the current human rights situation in the country, capacity building and the professionalization of Myanmar’s security sectors would represent an important step towards Myanmar’s internal consolidation. In an ideal world, such training would not be problematic, as similar approaches have been undertaken with other ASEAN members — for example, Australia’s training and education programmes with officers from Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.75 However, such programmes require the support and consent of the government in power. Given the current climate in Myanmar, together with international animosity towards the SPDC, the


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feasibility of such approaches will be questionable until there is a change in leadership or, at least, the SPDC worldview. In the context of these considerations, the next section investigates the prospects for change, however limited they may be, because of Myanmar’s new Constitution.

MYANMAR’S NEW CONSTITUTION: A BLESSING OR A CURSE FOR ASEAN? Myanmar had joined ASEAN in 1997 with the promise that it would get its “house in order” and thereby avoid international embarrassment for the Association. As stated, the February 2008 announcement that it would finally be holding a referendum in May 2008 on its new constitution to implement “disciplined democracy”, followed by multiparty elections in 2010, caught ASEAN by surprise. The development had been an unrealized promise for many years and was met by cautious support from ASEAN.76 While rallying support for the new constitution from the international community was always going to be problematic for the junta, the SPDC effectively forfeited any international support when it refused to delay the referendum after Cyclone Nargis and, in the process, diverted valuable resources away from the recovery efforts in the Ayeyarwady delta. Very few observers accepted the process as constituting a free and fair election as the junta made it illegal to campaign for a “no” vote.77 International observers were not allowed to oversee the proceedings, and there were major irregularities in the vote. As noted in the previous section, the junta held the first round of votes in the areas unaffected by the cyclone on 10 May, and in the areas affected by the cyclone, the vote was held just two weeks later on 24 May. The junta claimed that 98.12 per cent of eligible voters cast their votes in the referendum, and that an astounding 92.48 per cent supported the draft constitution.78 As Donald Emmerson outlines, “the junta did not even bother to come up with two different numbers for the ‘yes’ majority in each round”, claiming that it achieved the same percentage in both rounds.79 Nevertheless, the new constitution may arguably represent the choice of the lesser evil in the absence of any viable alternative. In order to assess such a proposition it is necessary to consider the historical background to the constitution briefly. The new Constitution is an outcome of the 1988 protests discussed in Chapter 3. Given the continuation of widespread ethnic violence and an economy in ruins, the SPDC sought to maintain its grip on power through the implementation of two related strategies. The first was its attempt to implement a ceasefire regime and the second was the reconvening of the


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national convention to draft a constitution in order to establish what the rhetoric of the SPDC claims would be a democracy. This was the promise it had made to its people, ASEAN, and the world. Up to the time of the “Saffron Revolution” in September 2007, the second strategy had been technically in “process” (if not “progress”) since 1993.80 Most analysts and many Burmese consulted by the author believed that the national convention represented little more than a stalling tactic to avoid handing power to the NLD;81 however, the completion of the process at the very least symbolizes that the SPDC sought something more. The National Convention stalled in 1996 when the NLD boycotted the convention with the accusation that the junta had been “manipulating the political process”.82 Finally, in November 2003, there appeared to be some hope for progress when former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt announced plans to reconvene the convention in May 2004. To this end, he articulated a sevenpoint “roadmap” to implement “democracy”. The completion of the national convention was to be the first of these steps.83 The road map provided that

FIGURE 7.3 The National League for Democracy Office in Hsipaw

Source: Photograph taken by the author, May 2005.


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once the national convention had drafted the constitution, then a national referendum (as the second step) would be held to determine whether it should be adopted. The government then proposed to hold “free and fair elections” throughout a tiered system of national and regional legislative assemblies (Pyithu Hluttaw) where “a modern, developed and democratic nation” would be formed. Shortly after the announcement of the road map, twenty-nine NLD members were released from prison and a further five leading members released from house arrest.84 Despite all the fanfare that surrounded the road map within both Myanmar and ASEAN, the limitations to how far the junta intended to reform its political institutions soon became apparent. For example, shortly before the national convention reconvened in 2004, the SPDC closed all the NLD’s regional offices, including the Hsipaw office (see Figure 7.3). Because of this, together with the continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD once again boycotted the process.85 From the perspective of the editor of The Irrawaddy, “without the NLD, the convention [lacked] … any form of credibility”.86 A further concern regarding the national convention was the process the SPDC utilized in determining the clauses for each chapter in the constitution. Officially, each of the chapters in the constitution was to be adopted by a “majority”. However, there was no official vote in deciding if the junta had achieved a “majority” and, moreover, manipulating the majority in the direction favoured by the SPDC was not difficult as 900 of the 1,000 delegates had been handpicked and vetted by the SPDC. During the 2004 session that was held between May and July, various ceasefire groups and “other invited guests” did table substantial, but poorly presented proposals on the distribution of legislative powers between Naypyidaw and the regions, but these were overruled by the SPDC. According to Vicky Bowman, the ceasefire groups only attended in the end because “they were likely to face further pressure if they … [did] not show up”.87 Meanwhile, in 2004 General Bo Mya, from the Karen National Union (KNU), entered into talks with Senior General Than Shwe about the possibility of a formal ceasefire agreement. Despite the formation of an “in principle” agreement, the signing of a formal ceasefire arrangement was never realized and consequently the KNU, together with the Shan National League for Democracy, did not attend the national convention.88 The absence of the KNU represented a further blow to the process as it maintained a guerrilla force of around 7,000 thousand soldiers at the time and there has been a resurgence of clashes with the government since January 2005.89 However, the most significant event to challenge the authenticity of the process occurred in October 2004 with the ouster of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. As the initiator


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of the road map for democracy, and the primary driver behind the ceasefire regime, he was what some regional analysts considered to be one of the best hopes for reform in Myanmar.90 The National Convention reconvened briefly in 2005, but no significant progress was made. The culmination of these events provided the European Union (EU) and the United States with more than enough fuel to broadcast their scepticism of the SPDC’s road map for democracy, with Condoleezza Rice describing the process as a “mockery”.91 Despite very little domestic or international support, Lieutenant General Thein Sein, SPDC Secretary One, and the National Convention Convening Commission Chair, announced on 3 September 2006 that the National Convention, last adjourned on 31 January 2006 following three sessions, would be reconvened in October 2006, with the goal of concluding the draft constitution.92 In the end, the final drafting stage lasted nearly a year with the detailed principles of the constitution being agreed to on 3 September 2007. While the announcement of the final constitution did not alleviate discontent at the grass roots level, as evidenced by the events surrounding the “Saffron Revolution”, Timo Kivimaki contends that it may represent “a much more democratic alternative to the current practice of administration”.93 As flawed as the document may be, it is important at least to consider the possibility that the new constitution might deliver positive political reform. According to an official English version of the constitution obtained directly from Myanmar, its ratification would result, in practice (although this is not stated given sensitivities surrounding the ethnic minority groups), in a federal system of government. In some respects, the constitution confirms and legitimizes the military structure that existed when SLORC reaffirmed its control of the country in 1988. For example, Section 6(f ) from Chapter 1 (entitled “Basic Principles of the Union”) includes as a “consistent objective” the enabling of “… the Defence Services to be able to participate in the National political leadership role of the State”.94 The power of the military also extends to the ministries of defence, security, home, and border affairs where the commander-in-chief appoints their respective ministers.95 Aside from such limitations, the Constitution vests considerable power with the “President” and accords him with the authority to appoint the commander-in-chief of the Defence Services, subject to the approval of the NDSC.96 The constitution also provides a role for elected civilian political parties through a new bicameral national legislative assembly (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw), together with fourteen “state” and “regional” single-chamber legislatures (Hluttaws). One chamber of the national legislative assembly will be appointed on the “basis of township as well as population, and the


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other on an equal number of representatives elected from Regions and States”.97 These legislatures have the power to appoint the president through a majority of votes. Importantly, the president is empowered to appoint a cabinet together with state and regional governments. However, the commander-in-chief will have the power to appoint 25 per cent of the members in both the lower People’s Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw) and the upper Nationalities Assembly (Amyotha Hluttaw), together with a third of the delegates in the fourteen regional and state assemblies.98 Despite the stacking of the legislatures in favour of the military, the fact that the civilian delegates will maintain a majority in each of the legislatures means that they could overrule the military on certain matters should more than 68 per cent of the civilian delegates support a motion in both the national legislatures.99 Nonetheless, the constitution restricts such power in the event of a “state of emergency” where an eleven-member National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), with at least six members being from the armed forces, can dissolve both the government and the legislatures.100 However, a state of emergency is to be called by the president rather than the commander-in-chief.101 In such an event, Section 413(b) provides that the commander-in-chief can take over executive, legislative, and judicial powers, but the president must first “declare a military administrative order” and further caveats apply. The constitution states that “to the extent possible” there shall be a separation of powers between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.102 While the constitution further provides for the establishment of one ‘Supreme Court of the Union”, together with “High Courts of the Regions, High Courts of the States and Courts of the different levels including Courts of the Self Administered Areas”, it excludes the military from judicial authority by stating that the “… Defence Services has the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces” and in the event of an “emergency”, the court’s power to issue writs will be suspended.103 However, the constitution does vest the president with significant power to select the chief justice of Myanmar, and also the judges of the Supreme Court, subject to approval by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, and does not provide for any restrictions by the military beyond their previously prescribed representation in parliament.104 In so far as the future interpretation of the constitution is concerned, Section 320 provides for the formation of a “Constitutional Tribunal of the Union”. Again, the president is granted considerable authority in its establishment, having the power to choose three representatives, with a further six to be chosen by the speakers of the two assemblies.105


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Furthermore, there are some safeguards provided by the constitution in connection with the judiciary where, for example, “no citizen shall be placed in custody for more than twenty-four hours without the permission of the court”. The constitution further states that “every citizen shall enjoy the right of equality, the right of liberty and the right of justice, as prescribed in this Constitution”. In terms of religion and civil liberties, the constitution declares that “every citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess and practice [sic] religion”, but such rights are subject to “public order, morality or health and to other provisions of this Constitution”.106 Chapter 8 provides for the “fundamental rights and duties of the citizens”, including that the “Union shall guarantee any person to enjoy equal rights before the law and shall equally provide legal protection”.107 Section 348 prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, birth, religion, official position, status, culture, sex and wealth”. Interestingly, Section 354 provides the right (a) “to express and publish freely their convictions and opinions”, (b) “to assemble peacefully without arms and holding procession”, and (c) “to form associations and organisations”, but these “freedoms” are subject to, inter alia, the prevailing laws of the Union and the “prevalence of law and order”. A number of provisions are particularly relevant to the conditions currently extant in the ethnic minority areas. Section 358 “prohibits the enslaving and trafficking in persons”; Section 359 “prohibits forced labour except hard labour as punishment for crime”; and section 356 protects both the citizen’s property and personal effects. Many other “protections” and “caveats” are provided within the chapter. Such provisions, if adhered to, represent a clear improvement on the current judicial and extrajudicial conditions that prevail in Myanmar. Despite the challenges to the road map to democracy that have been outlined, a brief analysis of the most significant provisions contained within the official English language version of the constitution reveals that its implementation would present “a more democratic alternative to the current administration”. Of course, the content of the constitution cannot be viewed in isolation as the evolution of democracy and improved governance are subject to other variables, including the right of its people to nominate for a seat in parliament and to run an election campaign without interference. The successful implementation of democracy in the future will also be determined by the political alignment of the parties elected; it may well be the case that pro-junta parties are initially elected thereby maintaining the status quo for the duration of the election term (five years). It is also likely that corrupt practices, including vote rigging, will prevail for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, should greater political pluralism emerge in a way that


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does not threaten the stability of the country or the “perceived” security of individual members of the SPDC, then adherence to the provisions of the constitution would help curtail practices that are counter-productive to good governance. Furthermore, the structure of the constitution may also provide enough space for future legislative acts that can also improve the quality of governance in Myanmar. Whether or not the constitution will deliver “national reconciliation”, and, in the process, open up opportunities to advance internal consolidation, remains a difficult question to answer. Certainly, security sector reform (including the professionalization of the military) remains one of the most problematic issues to address, given the extent of human rights abuse in the country. The challenge of security sector reform has also been compounded by the problem of corruption that is systemic and reaches up from the lower echelons of the military through to the leadership itself. For example, in 2008 Transparency International’s Corruption Index ranked Myanmar the second most corrupt country in the world.108 At the ground level, low ranking officers and rank-and-file soldiers are paid less than a dollar a week to work for either the Tatmadaw or the government’s proxy forces — such as the former insurgent armies of the DKBA and the UWSA.109 In these circumstances, the challenges of transnational crime — such as the issue of narcotics analysed in Chapter 4 — represent difficult flames to put out. For many, such corrupt practices, including rent seeking, are necessary for the survival of the individual, the family, or both. The problem has been further compounded by infrequent wage increases that are too insufficient to compensate for inflation rates as high as 53.7 per cent (2002).110 Thus, and especially at the ground level, the dilemma becomes how to implement security sector reform and improve the governance in Myanmar without first improving the economic capacity of the state. While Section 35 of the constitution declares that Myanmar’s economic system will be based on a “market economy model”, the SPDC has only rhetorically striven to achieve this goal for the greater part of the last two decades. Strengthening the country’s economic capacity may represent a pillar from which the remaining process of internal consolidation can build (for example, nation building and security sector reform), but strengthening such capacity will be unlikely in the absence of greater international engagement and economic integration. The structure of the constitution, together with the extent of political reform it has the potential to implement, has been challenged by the history of the country that was outlined in Chapter 3. While this history does not justify the human rights abuses that are committed in the country, it is


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difficult to deny the role of history in shaping the worldview and psychology of the junta. For example, after a brief period of failed democracy following independence the leaders reacted to the country’s history of colonization and instability by immersing state polity in socialist ideology. To this end, the regime and its people were largely isolated — socially, economically, and politically — from ASEAN and the rest of the world.111 As indicated previously, these factors have contributed to a “siege mentality” and a related paranoia of both “neo-colonialism” and “western conspiracies” that have aggravated and exacerbated heightened animosity against foreign interference, whether perceived or real.112 Such is the extent of this animosity that, in some respects, the behaviour of the SPDC cannot be located within the psychological and normative boundaries of rationality that one might expect from Myanmar’s ASEAN counterparts. Related to this trend, or perhaps exacerbated by it, is the fact that the country’s leaders are some of the least educated in the world.113 These factors, combined with a history of insurgency and colonial occupation, have contributed to the creation of a seemingly irrational leadership. The current leader of the SPDC, Senior-General Than Shwe, is highly superstitious and various government decisions during the period of his leadership, as well as during the reign of leaders before him, have been based on the advice

FIGURE 7.4 Welcome Message at Mandalay Palace

Source: Photograph taken by the author, May 2005.


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of astrologers and soothsayers.114 Closely related to such superstition is a worldview swamped in conspiracy theories and paranoia. Not only did an unfounded fear of invasion contribute to the junta’s decision to move its capital to the centre of the country,115 but other examples of paranoia were also evident during discussions with government officials. In a meeting with one of Myanmar’s ambassadors it was explained that most Burmese “hate” Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and that the current secretary general of ASEAN, and former foreign minister of Thailand, Dr Surin Pitsuwan, “… is a puppet of the CIA and he was recruited by them when doing his university studies in the United States”.116 However, and as suggested by the message in Figure 7.4, the most significant factor of all (but often the least understood) is that at least some of the ruling elite from the SPDC remain caught between a genuine belief that they are the sole guardians to national unity (including independence from foreign powers)117 and a wholehearted fear of the repercussions to themselves (and their families) should they lose power.118 Within Myanmar itself, the SPDC’s fear of retribution has constantly affected government policy, including the manner in which it implemented its road map to democracy. The role such fears have played can be seen in the provisions of the constitution. For example, Section 20(b) declares that the “Defence Services has the right to independently administer and adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces” and the adjudication of military justice section 343(b) provides that the “decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services is final and conclusive”. Moreover, Section 43 declares that no penal (criminal) shall be implemented with retrospective effect. In other words, the SPDC would appear to be keenly interested in ensuring that future laws cannot be enacted that could lead to criminal charges for atrocities committed in the past. In this regard, Section 204(b) provides that the NDSC also has the power to recommend the granting of amnesty to the president. Given the powers that the SPDC have been willing to divest in the president, Section 64 prohibits the “President and the Vice Presidents … from taking part in party politics during the term of their office”. The implementation of these safeguards has been influenced by the 8.8.88 protests where some military personnel were lynched. Because of these fears, the constitution dictates that both the president and vice-presidents must “be a citizen of Myanmar who was born of both parents who were born in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Union and being Myanmar Nationals”. This provision represents a major impediment to “reconciliation” as it was specifically designed to preclude Aung San Suu Kyi from being elected and thereby permanently restricting her parliamentary influence in the future.


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Nevertheless, should the junta have no genuine intention to transfer a degree of authority to an elected civilian in the future, then it would be difficult to understand why it thought it strategically prudent to go to such length to protect itself from future prosecution. Aside from the combination of challenges and opportunities that have been raised in connection with the constitution, one of the important aspects of the document concerns its provisions for future constitutional amendment. Section 435 provides that a proposal to amend the constitution shall be submitted in the form of a bill to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, if twenty present of the total number of the assembly’s representatives support its submission.119 It is here that the constitution becomes complicated. In the context of amendments to the sections considered “sensitive for the military” — such as military representation in the legislative assemblies — then the amendment will need to be approved by more than 75 per cent of the representatives of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Once approved by the Assembly then the amendment will also have to be subjected to a nationwide referendum with the approval of more than half of the citizens eligible to vote. All other provisions in the charter that are not exempted by Section 436(a) can be amended by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw only; but this would again be subject to an approval of more than 75 per cent of the elected representatives.120 In practical terms, the process for amendments renders it necessary to receive at least some military support, in addition to approval by all the civilian delegates. Assuming that some of civilian parties and/or representatives are loyal to the military, then the passing of such an amendment would almost be impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, with the passing of time, a continued devolution of power to civilian delegates and parties may evolve through the building of mutual trust, continued stability, and the entrenchment of new “precedents” in the country’s constitutional law. In such circumstances, and assuming the gradual socialization of certain democratic practices provided by the constitution, then the military members of parliament may eventually become more independent in their voting actions, rendering the possibility of constitutional amendment more feasible. Such an outcome would be no different to the events that occurred in Indonesia.121 The constitution is far from ideal, but, at the same time, it represents a step towards democracy that is greater than has often been portrayed by either the media or scholarly literature. In this regard, the constitution has the potential to be a blessing for ASEAN in the mid to long-term and, more importantly, represents the only immediate prospect for ASEAN to overcome its biggest challenges to regional cohesion, cooperation, and integration.


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Conclusions This chapter has reviewed a combination of regional challenges, collective responses, and domestic opportunities for reform. All three components to the analysis are interdependent on one another. As the events surrounding ASEAN’s Charter have demonstrated, the Association will not be able to make significant headway in terms of political cooperation, integration, and institutionalization until the political institutions of the region converge to a point of greater compatibility. Despite past debates concerning a unique set of “Asian values” offering an alternative path to regional cohesion and cooperation, the analysis in this chapter has revealed that democracy has played a pivotal role in motivating a desire to commit to legally binding rules and institutionalization. Furthermore, and as Donald Emmerson contends, “[l]eaders of polities that allow for criticism of their own rulers are, other things being equal, less likely to feel threatened by criticism of other regimes”.122 In this regard, the continued practice of “enhanced interaction”, or indeed critical disengagement, will depend on the continued prevalence of relatively more liberal values in those states that exercise the greatest influence within ASEAN — such as Indonesia and Singapore. While the political institutions of some of the ASEAN members are currently in a state of transition, not all the ASEAN members shifted in a positive direction towards either efficient governance or domestic stability. Thailand endured a military coup in 2006, and, by the close of 2008, a further two prime ministers had been forced to resign. Meanwhile, having performed terribly in Malaysia’s polls, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi has resigned. Moreover, and in the midst of the opposition leader’s declaration that “he will bring down the UMNO government”, Malaysia has returned to arresting political dissidents under its outdated Internal Security Act (ISA). Nevertheless, and despite an abundance of challenges beyond Myanmar, the SPDC continues to represent the “lowest common denominator” in ASEAN. Even if Myanmar’s domestic situation improves in the near future, it will be decades, rather than years, before the country achieves significant internal consolidation. Until such time, ASEAN will remain hamstrung by Myanmar and a related ideational divide between its authoritarian and democratic members. For the foreseeable future, ASEAN will primarily be limited to less controversial roles in its engagement with Myanmar. ASEAN’s handling of Cyclone Nargis provided a potential model for such engagement in the future. Should ASEAN succeed in continuing to maintain a similar role in the distribution of further aid, then it may be able to utilize this approach


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to alleviate poverty and also to help restore the country’s ailing health and education sectors. In the event that ASEAN expands this role to include further exchange and training programmes with mid-ranking officers of the Tatmadaw and the country’s civil servants, then ASEAN may also play a vital role in socializing positive norms of behaviour, that could lead to better governance and an increased protection of human right in Myanmar. Such initiatives should be interpreted as a way to complement, and reinforce, the more positive provisions of Myanmar’s constitution. Nevertheless, achieving this end will be no easy feat as recent arrests and restrictions concerning access to English training in the country aptly illustrate. Having provided an in-depth analysis of Myanmar’s domestic environment, together with a critique of ASEAN’s engagement of the SPDC, the next and final chapter provides further consideration to how to respond to the Myanmar crisis, together with the degree to which Myanmar challenges the prospects for an ASEAN security community.

Notes 1

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Cited in Erik Martinez Kuhonta, “Walking a Tightrope: Democracy Versus Sovereignty in ASEAN’s Illiberal Peace”, The Pacific Review 19, no. 3 (2006): 337. Interview with Umar Hadi, director of public diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 26 May 2006. Sukma, “Towards an ASEAN Security Community”. This was the original paper circulated to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. An almost exact replica was published on the internet several months later, see Rizal Sukma, “The Future of ASEAN: Towards a Security Community” (Seminar Paper, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, 2003 [cited 24 August 2003]), available at <www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/Mission/asean/ paper_rizalsukma.PDF>. Interview with Umar Hadi, director of public diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 26 May 2006. At the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh (2002), ASEAN agreed to consider Goh Chok Tong’s proposal for an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) with the intention of accelerating “economic integration” in line with ASEAN Vision 2020. “Press Statement by the Chairman of the 8th ASEAN Summit, the 6th ASEAN + 3 Summit and the ASEAN-China Summit” (Internet, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 4 November 2002 [cited 2 October 2004]), available at . Sukma, “Towards an ASEAN Security Community”. As Sukma states in an interview, the proposal “owes a lot to the concept as developed by Deutsch and


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Amitav [Acharya], and after presenting it to the Foreign Minister here I presented a modified version in New York. Have been working on this even though it has been watered down, massaged, but the intellectual rules had to be found, and I looked at Leifer who talked about a political community in the 80s”. Interview with Rizal Sukma, CSIS, Jakarta, 21 April 2006. Interview with Rizal Sukma, CSIS, Jakarta, 21 April 2006. For confirmation of the dates of these meetings and, in some instances, elements of the content, see “Track 1 — Governmental Meetings” (Internet, Dialogue and Research Monitor, 2003 [cited 9 August 2007]), available at . Interview with Pratap Parameswaren of the ASEAN Secretariat, 25 April 2006. Interview with Dr Chookiat, Director, Institute of Security and International Studies, Bangkok, 16 February 2006. Department of Foreign Affairs, “ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action” (Draft) (Jakarta, 13 February 2004). Interview with Rizal Sukma, CSIS, Jakarta, 21 April 2006. It is important to note that Indonesia’s Draft Plan of Action did not represent the first attempt to establish a Human Rights Commission in ASEAN. As early as 1993, ASEAN foreign ministers had agreed to consider the feasibility of establishing a human rights mechanism leading to the establishment of an ASEAN Working Group for a Human Rights Mechanism whose responsibility was to draft an agreement to set up an ASEAN Human Rights Commission. However, the ASEAN ministers later rejected the proposal in July 2000. “ASEAN Welcomes Call for Talks on Regional Human-Rights Commission”, Agence France-Presse, 15 July 1996; “Could an ASEAN Human Rights Body Become a Reality?”, Business Day, 11 July 2000; Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “ASEAN Rejects Ngo Proposal for Permanent Human Rights Body”, Kyodo News, 24 July 2000. Christopher B. Roberts, “The ‘ASEAN Charter’: A Crossroads for the Region?” (Commentary, IDSS, 2005 [cited 19 September 2005]), available at . Roberts, “ASEAN Charter: The Model Decision”, Straits Times, 9 September 2005. “ASEAN, Vientiane Action Programme” (Internet, 2004 [cited 10 December 2004]), available at . The ASEAN Way has been traditionally interpreted through three related principles: (i) consensus based decision making; (ii) respect for national sovereignty; and (iii) non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. Kusuma Snitwongse, “Thirty Years of ASEAN: Achievements through Political Cooperation”, The Pacific Review 11, no. 2 (1998): 183. “The ASEAN Experience: Insights for Regional Political Cooperation” (Geneva, Switzerland: South Centre, 2007), p. 11. See also Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 141; John Funston, “ASEAN: Out of Its Depth?”, Comtemporary Southeast Asia 20, no. 1 (1998): 27.


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Interview with a senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vientiane, Laos, 13 July 2007. According to The Economist, a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington) found that “only about 30 per cent of ASEAN’s agreements are ever implemented”. “South-East Asia’s Jamboree: Fifth from the Right Is the Party-Pooper” (Internet, The Economist, 2007 [cited 9 December 2007]), available at <www.economist.com>. Roberts, “The ‘ASEAN Charter’: A Crossroads for the Region?” (cited); Roberts, “ASEAN Charter: The Model Decision”. “Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter” (Jakarta: ASEAN, 2006). Ibid. Dario Agnote, “ASEAN Foreign Ministers Agree to Create Human Rights Body”, Kyodo News, 30 July 2007. This particular attempt to establish a human rights body (but not commission) had been initiated in December 2005 by Malaysia in the context of the Bali Concord II. “Malaysia Mulls ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism — Syed Hamid”, Bernama Daily Malaysian News, 7 December 2005. Then, in August 2006, Fidel Ramos, and EPG members from the Philippines, joined the call and argued that the Human Rights Body be embedded in the charter. Fidel Ramos Volt Contreras, “Need for Human Rights Body Pushed in ASEAN Charter”, Philippines Daily Enquirer, 11 August 2006. “ASEAN Overcomes Resistance, Will Set up Regional Human Rights Commission”, Associated Press Newswires, 30 July 2007; “ASEAN to Set up Human Rights Body in November — Kyodo Obtained Draft Charter”, BBC News, 22 October 2007. Jim Gomez, “ASEAN Agrees to Human Rights Commission” (Internet, The Irrawaddy, 2007 [cited 30 July 2007]), available at <www.irrawaddy.org>. Barry Desker and Christopher Roberts, “Myanmar: Prospects and Challenges of Engagement”, in Security through Cooperation: CSCAP Regional Security Outlook (CRSO), edited by Brian L. Job and Erin Williams (Singapore: CSCAP, 2008), p. 33. Desker and Roberts, “Myanmar: Prospects and Challenges of Engagement”, p. 33. “Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter”, p. 6. Donald K. Emmerson, “Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analysing ASEAN”, Japanese Journal of Political Science 6, no. 2 (2005): 177. ASEAN, “Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations” (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2007), pp. 2 and 4. Ibid., p. 14. Jim Gomez, “ASEAN Adopts Landmark Charter with Reduced Human Rights Body to Appease Myanmar”, The Canadian Press, 20 November 2007; “Myanmar Supports ASEAN Charter after Human Rights Body Neutered”, The Statesman, 20 November 2007.


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Andrew Selth, “Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar’s Fears of Invasion”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 3 (2008): 386. “Burma/Myanmar after Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008), p. 3; Nga Pham, “Burmese Still Struggling after Cyclone”, BBC News, 5 August 2008. Other estimates indicated that 2.4 million people lost their homes or were otherwise seriously affected. Donald K. Emmerson, ed., “Critical Terms: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia”, in Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 40. “Burma/Myanmar after Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations”, p. 7. Selth, “Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar’s Fears of Invasion”, p. 387. “Burma/Myanmar after Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations”, pp. 2–3. A second large-scale wave of deaths among survivors in the delta was thought to be a high possibility by the United Nations and relief agencies due to “a lack of clean drinking water, water-borne diseases and malnutrition”. Jurgen Haacke, “ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 3 (2008): 370. While these risks were largely averted, such an outcome was impossible to predict at the time and was largely due to the actions of ASEAN and the United Nations, as will be discussed later in the chapter. “After Myanmar’s Cyclone”, Jane’s Intelligence, 2008. Selth, “Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar’s Fears of Invasion”, p. 388. “Myanmar’s Junta Says Referendum Voters Accepted New Constitution”, Kyodo News, 30 May 2008. “Burma/Myanmar after Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations”, p. 3; Simon Jenkins, “As Burma Dies, World’s Invaders Sit on Their Hands”, The Mail and Guardian, 16 May 2008; “Myanmar Briefing: Human Rights Concerns a Month after Cyclone Nargis”, Amnesty International, 5 June 2008. Discussions with Burmese interlocutor, May 2008. Ian Holiday, “Burma: Beyond Burma Versus the World”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 June 2008, p. 48. While British officials said they would welcome a discussion of the R2P doctrine, their opinion, from the outset, was that it was unlikely to be a feasible option. Mike Blanchfield, “Force Burmese Aid: Canada, Calls on UN to Insist Rulers Allow Outside Relief ”, National Post, 2008; David Brunnstrom and Ingrid Melander, “Europeans Call for Forced Intervention”, Reuters, 14 May 2008; Jonathan Pearlman, “Rudd Says Donors Must Bash in Doors”, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 May 2008. Cited in Selth, “Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar’s Fears of Invasion”, pp. 393–94. Desker and Roberts, “Myanmar: Prospects and Challenges of Engagement”, p. 33. See also “Singapore Minister Says Myanmar Junta Spooked by Foreign Warships”, Kyodo News, 27 May 2008.


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Furthermore, on 5 May, Laura Bush released statements that were highly critical of the junta and only a day before the onset of the cyclone, President Bush had renewed United States sanctions against Myanmar. Selth, “Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar’s Fears of Invasion”, pp. 392–93. “Transcript of Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo’s Interview with Dow Jones on 16 July” (Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008 [cited 21 January 2009]), available at . “ASEAN Takes Charge in Myanmar Relief Effort”, AsiaInt, 30 May 2008. “French Naval Aid Ship Le Mistral Due Off Burma as Junta Refuses Help”, Sunday Business Post, 18 May 2008. It is also important to note that most Western governments initially offered aid on the condition that it is delivered outside government structures. “Burma/Myanmar after Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations”, p. 6. Selth, “Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar’s Fears of Invasion”. “ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team Mission Report, 9–18 May 2008”, (Jakarta: ASEAN, 2008). On 9 May, the SPDC also permitted the arrival of a UN Disaster Assessment Team, but this consisted of only four experts with two being from the Philippines and Singapore. However, this may account for why the ERAT report was able to claim that it had been active in Myanmar from as early as 9 May. Peter Lloyd, “Burma Death Toll Rising, Disaster Aid Permitted Burma Death Toll Rising”, Australian Broadcasting Commission, 8 May 2008. See also “Joint Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade: Inquiry into Australia’s Relationship with ASEAN” (Canberra: Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Act for Peace, 2008). “ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response” (Internet, ASEAN, 2005 [cited 12 January 2008]), available at . The challenge of organizing backing for such a relief effort is aptly outlined by Emmerson who details how the Fund’s guidelines included two provisos that betrayed the tightrope on which the SG had to balance. On the one hand, to alleviate Myanmar’s fears of political interference, donors were warned not to place any conditions on the use of their contributions. On the other hand, to assuage donors worried that the regime would misuse their gifts, donations were described as “solely intended” to “alleviate the suffering of the cyclone’s victims”. Emmerson, “Critical Terms: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia”, p. 43. This change was recommended by ERAT in order to “better portray the objective of the coalition”. “ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team Mission Report, 9–18 May 2008”. Correspondence with official source from an embassy in Singapore, 21 January 2009. See also “Transcript of Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo’s Interview with Dow Jones on 16 July” (cited). Emphasis by the author. Haacke, “ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative”, p. 371.


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“Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting Chairman’s Statement, Singapore, 19 May 2008” (Internet, ASEAN [cited 26 August 2008]), available at <www. aseansec.org/21557.htm>. Frank Frost, “ASEAN’s Regional Cooperation and Multilateral Relations: Recent Developments and Australia’s Interests” (Canberra: Department of Parliamentary Services, 2008), p. 19. “ASEAN Provides Aid Bridge into Myanmar”, AsiaInt, 23 May 2008; Hla Hla Htay, “Myanmar Denies Delays to Cyclone Aid, as Relief Effort Lags”, Agence France Presse, 3 June 2008. “Junta Still Delaying Aid Work”, The Nation, 27 May 2008. “ASEAN Provides Aid Bridge into Myanmar”. Emmerson, “Critical Terms: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia”, p. 43. “After Myanmar’s Cyclone”; “Burma/Myanmar after Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations”, p. 9. “6th Press Release of the Tripartite Core Group — UN Special Advisor Gambari Says Myanmar Coordination Body Is a Model” (Internet, ASEAN, 2008 [cited 28 August 2008]), available at <www.aseansec.org/21880.htm>. “New ASEAN Emerging from Response to Myanmar Cyclone: Surin”, Agence France Presse, 18 June 2008. “Joint ASEAN-UN Press Release, Comprehensive Assessment of Cyclone Nargis Impact Provides Clearer Picture of Relief and Recovery Needs, 21 July 2008” (Internet, ASEAN [cited 2 February 2009]), available at <www.aseansec. org/21765.htm>. “World Condemns Suu Kyi Detention”, SBS World News, 28 May 2008. “Burma: Lawyer’s Testimony Highlights Distorted Justice”, Human Rights Watch, 16 December 2008. Discussions with a Burmese dissident, December 2008. “Burma Signs Landmark ASEAN Charter at Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Singapore”, BBC News, 1 August 2008. “Statement by ASEAN Chair, Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo, Singapore, 20 July 2008” (Internet, Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs [cited 27 November 2008]), available at . Haacke, “ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative”, pp. 365–66. Emmerson, “Critical Terms: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia”, p. 49. Ibid., p. 47. Leslie Koh, “George Yeo Gives ASEAN … C Grade for Its Handling of Myanmar Issues”, Straits Times, 18 July 2008. “Burma/Myanmar after Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations”, p. i. For example, each year students from various ASEAN countries graduate with a Masters Degree from the Australian Defence Force Academy. Their time in


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Australia socializes a completely new world of thinking about approaches to government and the military. As Jurgen Haacke outlines, ASEAN’s Secretary General reflected that it was “… a development in the right direction” as it was a “clear, definite beginning”. Singapore stated that it was a “positive development” and “expressed the hope that it would be inclusive”, while Syed Hamid Albar returned to a much more conciliatory tone when he argued that Malaysia wanted “the pressure on Myanmar by the international community to be taken off or reduced or minimised so that Myanmar can concentrate on development and play its role in ASEAN”. Haacke, “ASEAN and the Situation in Myanmar/Burma”, in Myanmar/Burma: Challenges and Perspectives, edited by Guo Xiaolin (Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden: Institute for Security and Development Study, 2008), p. 154. Frost, “ASEAN’s Regional Cooperation and Multilateral Relations: Recent Developments and Australia’s Interests”, p. 18. “Myanmar’s Junta Says Referendum Voters Accepted New Constitution”. Emmerson, “Critical Terms: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia”, p. 40. “Burma to Relaunch Democracy Talks” (Internet, BBC News, 2004 [cited 24 November 2004]), available at . See for example, “Political Situation of Myanmar and Its Role in the Region” (Internet — Government Report, Myanmar Information Committee, 2004 [cited 17 September 2004]), available at . Kate McGeown, “Hopes Fade for Burma’s Democracy” (Internet, BBC News, 2004 [cited 22 November 2004]). Ibid. (cited). K. Kesavapany et al., Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2006–2007 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 36–37. Chairman Tin Oo also remains in detention. Peter Lloyd, “Doubts as to Aung San Suu Kyi’s Release for Burma Convention” (Internet, ABC News, 2004 [cited 18 August 2004]), available at ; Kate McGeown, “Hopes Fade for Burma’s Democracy” (Internet, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Pages, 2004 [cited 9 August 2004]), available at . Vicky Bowman, “The Political Situation in Myanmar”, in Myanmar: The State, Community and the Environment, edited by Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2007), pp. 3–4. Larry Jagan, “Truce with Rebels Would Give Yangon Junta a Boost” (Internet, Asia Times, 2004 [cited 20 December 2004]), available at ; Kate McGeown, “Hopes Fade for Burma’s Democracy” (Internet, BBC News, 2004 [cited 22 November 2004]). However, the ouster of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, with whom the KNU had


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been negotiating, has raised fears that that the Burmese Junta may depart from its recently conciliatory approach. Simon Montlake, “Burma’s Disoriented Rebels” (Internet, BBC News, 2004 [cited 12 November 2004]), available at . Anthony Davis, “Myanmar — Ethnic Breakdown” (Internet, Asia Week, 2000 [cited 2 March 2003]), available at . Since this time, for example, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the KNU has recommenced and the possibility of a ceasefire with the KNU has been called into question. “Border Clashes: Burmese Troops Attack KNU Camps” (Internet, The Nation, 2005 [cited 22 January 2005]), available at <www. nationmultimedia.com>; “Myanmar: KNU Ceasefire Collapses” (Intelligence Database, AsiaInt, 2005 [cited 19 January 2005]), available at <www.asiaint. com>; “Myanmar: KNU Says Peace Process in Danger” (Internet, AsiaInt, 2005 [cited 19 January 2005]), available at <www.asiaint.com>. Stephen McCarthy, “Burma and ASEAN: Estranged Bedfellows”, Asian Survey 48, no. 6 (2008): 932. “Myanmar Constitutional National Convention to Resume in October”, Xinhua News Agency, 2 September 2006. Timo Kivimaki, “Authoritarian Bargaining in Burma/Myanmar”, Asia Europe Journal 6 (2008): 87. “Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar” (Printing and Publishing Enterprise, Ministry of Information, 2008), p. 3. Section 17(b). Section 342. Section 12(b). Sections 109, 141, 161, and 167. However, the constitution contains various exceptions to this formula. For example, in the event that there arises a need to “re-delineate the territorial boundary of the Union” and if either of the legislative assemblies vote against such a change then 75 per cent of the total number of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw representatives would be required to cast assenting votes. See Section 52(d). Section 201. See also Section 40. Section 411. Section 11(a). Emphasis by the author. Sections 18(a) and 20(b). On the suspension of the courts’ power to issue writs, see Section 296(b). Section 299. Sections 321–23. Section 34. Section 347. The index covered 180 countries in 2008. See .


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Until recently, a standard private’s salary was less than fifty cents a month, but the government funded an increase to military salaries through money printing, which has in turn contributed to massive inflation rates. “My Gun Was as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma” (Human Rights Watch, 2002), pp. 64 and 79–90. For an overview of the salary and conditions of life in the ethnic minority armies (whether subject to a ceasefire arrangement or not), see pp. 110–59. While the inflation rate was 52.8 per cent in 2003, it subsequently dropped to its lowest level in fifteen years in 2004 — 17.8 per cent. Data provided by CIA World Factbook at . A visit to the country would reveal that a large percentage of men continue to wear the traditional Bamar dress (Longyi) when other societies in Asia have long since swapped customary dresses, formerly in everyday use, for modern shorts and jeans. Field trips by the author, June 2004, and May to July 2005. Donald M. Seekins, “Burma and U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime”, Asian Survey 45, no. 3 (2005): 448. Louise Williams, “Burma Falls Back into Grip of One of the World’s Least Educated Military Cliques”, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 2004. Wai Moe, “Than Shwe Finds Burma’s Fate in the Stars”, The Irrawaddy, 26 November 2007. There are also reports that Than Shwe was advised by an astrologer to feign a coup attempt on 22 August 2005 in order to prevent an actual coup. “Myanmar: Staged Unrest Risks Creating the Real Thing” (cited). Larry Jagan, “Burma: Fearing Invasion, Junta Plans a New Capital in the Hills”, Inter Press Service, 20 July 2005; “Myanmar’s Junta Pondering Leaving Yangon for Somewhere ‘Safer’: Analysts”, Agence France Presse, 4 July 2005. Dinner discussions, Kuala Lumpur, May 2005. The belief of the Myanmar Government that they (the SPDC and the Tatmadaw) are charged with an immutable responsibility to uphold Myanmar’s unity and sovereignty is a genuine belief and should not be dismissed as simply propaganda; any irrationality in this and their worldview can be partially explained by the earlier mentioned xenophobia and paranoia generated by, in some instances, ignorance, a lack of education, and very little contact with the outside world. Seekins, “Burma and U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime”, p. 448. Englehart, “Is Regime Change Enough for Burma”, p. 633. Section 435. Section 436(a). This is an important consideration because, as mentioned earlier, the Tatmadaw was initially influenced by the Indonesian model of government and military structures. Donald K. Emmerson, “ASEAN’s ‘Black Swans’”, Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008): 78.


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8 ASEAN’S MYANMAR CRISIS: The Road Ahead and the Prospects for a Security Community This study has sought to analyse the feasibility of ASEAN’s security community project in a manner that will constructively delineate how to overcome the most significant obstacles to security community formation in Southeast Asia. The crisis in Myanmar has now escalated to a point where both ASEAN’s cohesion and its stature as a diplomatic community have been seriously challenged. For Myanmar to become a part of a collective Southeast Asian security community, ASEAN will need to be able to assist it in what the study has referred to as a process of internal consolidation. In turn, Myanmar will need to cooperate with ASEAN and the international community by accepting this assistance and abiding by the principles of its new constitution in a manner that protects the welfare and human rights of its people. The achievement of this state of affairs will of necessity require the SPDC to allow greater political pluralism, including an active role for the National League for Democracy (NLD). Full reconciliation is unlikely to be achieved until the SPDC also allows for Aung San Suu Kyi’s participation in domestic politics.1 The willingness of the SPDC to entrust ASEAN with an active role to help facilitate and aid political reform in Myanmar would evidence a common “we-feeling” and sense of reciprocity that is necessary to a security community. While the completion of the national convention may have in part been a response to regional and international pressure, ASEAN has not yet been able to formulate policies that have tangibly addressed the causes of instability and human rights abuse in Myanmar. To date, the only concrete 216


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achievements concerning the consequences of domestic instability have been outside the ASEAN framework and concern a reduction in opium production (the United Nations in cooperation with the SPDC) and a temporary stay in cross-border armed skirmishes (the initiative of Thailand). In practice, part of the reason for ASEAN’s failure lies in the fact that constructive engagement, as traditionally articulated by ASEAN, had translated into silently condoning the policies and practices of the ASEAN governments — no matter how good or bad, humane or inhumane, they are. In principle, if pressure was applied, it was done at the sidelines of ASEAN meetings through the practice of quiet diplomacy where there would not be a loss of face. Until recently, the “ASEAN Way” rarely resulted in any substantial pressure towards reform and/or good governance. Therefore, the operative norms of ASEAN can be said to have enabled the Myanmar crisis to fester relatively unhindered. In recent years, influential members of ASEAN have recognized the limitations of “constructive engagement” and subsequently sought to apply greater pressure on the regime. However, the only significant initiative to have emerged beyond “critical declarations” concerns the valuable role ASEAN played in facilitating the delivery of aid in the wake of Cyclone Nargis. Nonetheless, the jury is still out on whether ASEAN can continue to undertake such a role and, moreover, develop its approach in a way that aids political reform. Besides, other foreign policy approaches to Myanmar have been equally unsuccessful for the purpose of implementing stability, prosperity, and reform in Myanmar. Therefore, and before considering the road ahead for both ASEAN and Myanmar, and the extent to which Myanmar challenges ASEAN’s Security Community project, it is beneficial to understand the efficacy of Western policies that support isolation and sanction.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STABILITY AND REFORM IN MYANMAR: INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS Questions over whether to sanction or engage, to provide aid or to isolate, represent the core of a debate that has placed ASEAN at odds with a number of its Western dialogue partners — including the United States and the European Union (EU). While ASEAN has largely chosen to engage with the SPDC since it first started to interact with the country in the 1990s, both the United States and the EU have alternatively attempted to condemn, isolate, and/or sanction the regime. The sanctions implemented by these two groups have been both targeted and broad sweeping in nature.


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Targeted sanctions have been implemented by both the United States and the EU, including a visa ban and assets freeze for members of the regime and its supporters, along with a tightening of its arms embargo. In contrast, and despite the persistent survival of the regime in the face of sanction and isolation, the United States has expanded its sanctions regime to include broad-sweeping sanctions that involve a ban on imports from Myanmar, along with a prohibition against the export of financial services to the country (including all new investments by U.S. firms and nationals).2 By 2004, these broad sweeping sanctions were estimated to have resulted in the loss of at least 100,000 jobs within the textile industry.3 Furthermore, the EU removed its preferential tariffs system with Myanmar and while this is not a sanction, it has undoubtedly affected the country’s economy and employment situation within the textile industry.4 International organizations and NGOs have also had a role to play in the isolation of Myanmar. Due to the existence of forced labour in the country, the United Nation’s International Labour Organization (ILO), for the first time in its history, adopted a resolution to compel the government of Myanmar to comply with its obligations under the Forced Labour Convention of 1930. The move authorized the ILO director general to request that ILO member-countries, international organizations and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) review and potentially cut their relations with Myanmar.5 International policies of isolation and sanction have been further encouraged by the lobbying of various exiled political and civil society groups, together with human rights organizations (such as Amnesty International). These groups have carried out widespread campaigns (particularly in the United States) to stop all tourism to, investment in, and foreign trade with Myanmar.6 This has motivated the United States to isolate Myanmar further economically, aided by advocating the suspension of “in country assistance” from the various Bretton Woods institutions — the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.7 The lack of bilateral and multilateral funding has, in turn, limited the presence of international nongovernmental organizations.8 While Myanmar’s foreign exchange reserves may now be at a record high, in the absence of economic engagement with the types of industries and trade that benefit its people, it is difficult to imagine how the country will be able to move forward. The isolation of Myanmar will particularly affect the ethnic minority areas that are already impoverished which, in turn, will add to the risk of fuelling social unrest with the potential to result in the kind of downward spiral depicted by Figure 8.1.9 Under such circumstances, the capacity of the state to internally consolidate is further marginalized.


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FIGURE 8.1 Sanctions, Isolation and the Domestic Instability Cycle Sanctions, restrictions on aid, and isolation

Escalating levels in repression, suffering, and violence

The SPDC

Escalated economic stagnation or downturn

Deepening social unrest and domestic instability


Myanmar’s health and education sectors are on the brink of collapse. Some of the reasons for these problems can be found in the exceptionally low levels of Official Development Aid (ODA) received by Myanmar, which other countries, with higher levels of ODA, utilize to fund their education and health services. Figure 8.2 shows a comparison of Myanmar with East FIGURE 8.2 ODA Per Capita in the CLMV Countries and Timor Leste ODA in US$ Per Capita

Cambodia: $38.20 Laos: $49.90

Vietnam: $23.00 Timor Leste: $189.40

Myanmar: $2.90

Source: Compiled by the author from UNDP statistics as per the Human Development Report 2007/2008, located at .


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Timor, as well as the remaining CLMV countries — Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam — in terms of the levels of ODA per capita for 2008. While Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos range between US$23 and US$50, East Timor is currently receiving a substantial US$189.40 on a per capita basis. Meanwhile, Myanmar received only $US2.90 in the same year. If broad sweeping sanctions are detrimental to the future economic capacity (and thereby state capacity) of Myanmar, then such a lack of ODA is crippling. The dangerous consequences of isolation and sanction have been further exacerbated through a lack of understanding by some Western actors over the “security goals” of the SPDC leadership. Given its history of colonization and civil war, the generals’ security goals have taken, and will continue to take, precedence over their economic goals. In view of this history and the country’s strategic and economic relationships with China and Thailand (among others), sanctions intended to target the economy of Myanmar were doomed to fail from the beginning because no matter what degree of hardship these sanctions might inflict on the people, the government believes it cannot accede to what “it” considers to be modern-day interventions by “imperialist states”. The belief of the military that they are charged with an immutable responsibility to uphold Myanmar’s unity and sovereignty is a genuine belief and should not be dismissed as simple propaganda.10 Any irrationality in their worldview can be partially explained by the xenophobia and paranoia generated by, in some instances: ignorance, comparatively little contact with the outside world (isolation), and the previously mentioned lack of education. Furthermore, the historical background illustrated how the government, from the early years of independence and while immersed in socialist party doctrine, largely followed isolationist policies. In contrast to the often-cited South African case, it survived — albeit at subsistence levels — without the need for significant trade and investment from the West. The government has continued to survive because there remain adequate natural resources and strategic allies to maintain the continued functionality of its primary security force — the Tatmadaw.11 International isolation has only pushed the SPDC closer to countries such as China and North Korea. Given the authoritarian nature of these regimes, increased political interaction will not socialize positive norms. Nor will it result in pressure towards reform and good governance. Finally, had the implementation of targeted sanctions and isolation been universal, there might have been some prospect of forcing the regime to at least cede some authority to an elected civilian government. Aside from the economic hardship and even bloodshed that such a large-scale sanctions regime might have delivered, the problem is that a unified global approach to Myanmar


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was not possible, and will not be possible in the future so long as Myanmar remains strategically important to China, and to a lesser degree, India, or even the current government of Thailand.12 Therefore, any push for change that was solely dependent on a sanctions regime was also doomed to fail from the very beginning. As far back as 1990, David Steinberg, a specialist in Burmese affairs, wrote than “an indefinite policy of isolation might not work”.13 Nearly two decades later, there is much to suggest that he was right. Part of the problem seems to rest with the fact that the United States and other Western states appear to have forgotten historical policies and beliefs where economic liberalism and interdependence were seen as the key to long-term reform. In a more recent work, Steinberg suggested that meaningful reform and “[c]hange can take a long time. Political liberalisation and openness as a consequence of embracing a market economy bridged more than a generation or more in the cases of South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan. The connection has yet to be made in Vietnam and China”.14 With the advent of sanctions and isolation, this connection, in Myanmar, may take even longer; especially given recent shifts back towards a policy of political isolation and “economic autarky”.15 Perhaps it is in view of some of these factors, along with a desperate need for continued capacity building, that Japan continues to supply aid at the “grassroots level” to NGOs in Myanmar.16 Indeed, Britain has also shown an about-face on the issue. This was seen with the United Kingdom’s “Department for International Development” (DFID) announcing in 2003 a commitment of US$15.7 million to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS.17 The United Kingdom was also the largest donor in the wake of Cyclone Nargis. In justifying its new approach, the Department stated: In the international aid world more generally there is the contemporary need for much more realism about what’s achievable and politically feasible in a particular country context; to develop local solutions rather than relying on best practice models from elsewhere; and to be more realistic about timescales for fundamental reform.18

Despite the equally poor record of “constructive engagement”, the reasoning behind those who cite evidence of corruption and human rights abuse as an ethical excuse for not engaging with or providing aid to the regime and its people must be called into question.19 This is because the evidence presented throughout the analysis suggests that the country’s domestic instability will not be mitigated until the nation building process is complete, ethnic conflict has been resolved, and the level of state capacity has been improved — politically


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and economically.20 In other words, while the need for the SPDC to practise good governance is beyond question, given the level of domestic instability, inadequate state capacity, and the regime’s historical animosity to outside interference, there are limits as to how much ASEAN and the international community can expect in terms of reform over the short to mid-term. More importantly, the people of Myanmar are suffering and they need urgent access to better health, education, and — particularly in the ethnic minority areas — more basic aid, such as food, clothing, and shelter. In summary, the historical problem with the ASEAN and Western approaches to Myanmar is that they have each sat irreconcilably at two opposing ends of a spectrum between engagement and isolation. With only a few limited exceptions, there has not been an attempt to launch a sustained programme that critically engages the government of Myanmar whilst aiding and supporting its people. Nevertheless, should ASEAN continue to take a proactive role in its preparedness to engage and pressure the SPDC simultaneously towards reform, then it may be possible for the United States and the EU to moderate their approaches in a way that might attain some common ground with ASEAN in the future. While it may not be feasible to bridge the policy divide completely (given the authoritarian nature of some member states), any shift towards a greater uniformity of approach within the international community would advance the potential effectiveness of the recommendations in this section — recommendations that need to take into account the structural, political, and economic limitations of Myanmar.

The Road Ahead Although the morality of seeking to provide the “people of Myanmar” with adequate human security and a viable economic future is greater than a “principled refusal” to engage with the regime, the analysis indicated that ASEAN’s “constructive engagement” approach has also been ineffective. Therefore, the core issue is how ASEAN (and the international community) can open better pathways for the regime to follow for the purpose of nation building, economic development, and internal consolidation. Based on the relative failure of both isolation and engagement, this investigation contends that the new constitution offers ASEAN and the international community an opportunity to coordinate better a stick and carrot approach normatively situated between the two ends of the policy spectrum (engagement and isolation). The carrot offered to Myanmar should be utilized in a way that increases Myanmar’s economic and diplomatic engagement (and dependence)


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with both ASEAN and the international community. Such an approach should simultaneously be developed in a fashion that increases ASEAN and the international community’s leverage to ensure gently that the SPDC (and any future elected government) adhere to the provisions of the constitution in a manner that delivers greater political pluralism, human rights protection, and increased personal security for the people of Myanmar. Based on these suppositions, the policy recommendations below are designed (a) to contribute towards an eventual resolution of domestic instability in Myanmar, and (b), if implemented, to lay the foundations for greater political and economic cooperation and integration throughout Southeast Asia in the future. The implementation of the internal consolidation of Myanmar, and with other regimes struggling with domestic instability, would remove one of the greatest hurdles to the eventual formation of an ASEAN-wide security community. For the purpose of formulating the “road ahead”, the section presumes that ASEAN will be able to muster the requisite motivation and capacity to overcome successfully any structural and normative inadequacies (as discussed later) that might hinder or obstruct the successful pursuit of its goals. In the context of Myanmar’s historical experience, and despite various developments concerning Myanmar’s new constitution, the strategic policies to be formulated by ASEAN (in cooperation with the international community) need to focus on long-term institution building and the capacity of the state. This is necessary because the ethnic diversity and continued existence of armed insurgent groups in Myanmar mean that, in the current environment, any opportunity and attempt to install a democratic government “rapidly” would risk the disintegration of the country into a nation-wide civil war. In some respects, ASEAN’s new focus on humanitarian engagement in the wake of Cyclone Nargis was a shift in the necessary direction. Therefore, the ability to play a constructive role in returning stability to Myanmar will be dependent on the implementation of a multipronged strategy by ASEAN. At one level, ASEAN needs to utilize whatever stature it has as a diplomatic community to lobby and convince the international community (including states, international organizations and NGOs) that a more nuanced approach between engagement and isolation is necessary in the case of Myanmar. However, ASEAN should not call for an end to all sanctions by actors exogenous to the region. The earlier mentioned sanctions that target the regime, its assets, and the importation of arms, should remain in place. However, ASEAN should lobby governments to install clear benchmarks for when they can be removed in lieu of good behaviour. Such a stick and carrot approach has been utilized by Japan in the past. Thus, when


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the SPDC does not satisfy the conditions of an aid package, rather than withdraw the money altogether, the aid should be provided to alternative NGOs and/or ethnic minority groups. Given the mindset of the SPDC, this approach would generate greater incentive for good governance and the appropriate distribution of such aid, whilst simultaneously providing ASEAN with greater power to coerce the junta diplomatically — as and when necessary. Meanwhile, ASEAN should lobby for the removal of more broad sweeping sanctions, such as those of the United States that have impacted on Myanmar’s textile industry and the livelihoods of many citizens at the grass roots level.21 At the ground level, ASEAN needs to develop a mechanism similar to the TCG (Tripartite Core Group) for the purpose of lobbying the international community to commit to the development and implementation of a largescale aid package that will target the countrywide crisis in education and health care over the mid to long term. Health is an immediate problem with immediate transnational effects whereas the collapse of the education system will affect the country for generations to come. Access to education throughout the country will not only be critical to future economic growth, but to the continued development of civil society and to a new and improved generation of potential leaders in Myanmar. This aid package should also be directed towards the impoverished border areas that house most of the marginalized ethnic minority groups. The task would need to be accomplished in conjunction with the completion of the ceasefire arrangements with the remaining ceasefire groups in armed conflict with the government. In order to achieve the SPDC’s acquiescence to such an initiative, the international community may need to demonstrate more patience and a greater tolerance of Myanmar’s new constitution and its plans for elections in 2010. Where the SPDC takes positive action, the international community should be more forthcoming in its praise; in this respect the “moderates” within the SPDC should be supported as far as possible.22 Such praise, in combination with a mechanism modelled on ASEAN’s TCG for the delivery of future aid, would also build trust by alleviating some of the junta’s fears. Correspondingly, this would reinforce its openness to foreign assistance in the future. The development of future programmes for the delivery of aid should initially be devised in a manner that is relatively depoliticized, but at the same time, build the institutions for good governance. Aid that seeks to enhance the capacity of the education sector in Myanmar, with the long-term goal of producing a better generation of leaders in the future, represents one such example. Nevertheless, the delivery of aid should not only focus on


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education and health, but should also be designed to restrict human rights abuses in the future. Attention should, therefore, be directed towards nation building processes and how the ethnic minorities can be better integrated into the broader society and economy. One example would be a large-scale programme to construct an accessible road network through the borderlands. This would open up opportunities for increased trade and tourism. ASEAN would demonstrate that it is moving in the direction of a security community by garnering the collective consensus necessary to coordinate and implement many of these efforts — even if the level of finance necessary to carry them out is beyond the capacity of the ASEAN states alone. In relation to the previous policy suggestion, the presence of tourists as a consequence of providing increased accessibility for transport in the minority areas would also boost the local economies and serve as a further restraint against human rights abuse. States and other groups should no longer discourage countrywide tourism. Aung San Suu Kyi should be lobbied in this regard. Moreover, many ethnic minority groups (including the ceasefire groups) have yet to gain access to cross-border trade.23 Therefore, Thailand (with ASEAN’s encouragement) should immediately work with Myanmar to form a border regime that would further open the border areas for trade by these minority peoples. These measures are relatively simple and inexpensive, but represent effective options to provide financial benefits to at least some ethnic minority groups that live close to Myanmar’s border with Thailand. It is contended that on their implementation they would further increase the channels of communication between the ethnic minority groups and the outside world. Additionally, as mentioned, the provision of greater channels of communication would serve as a restraint against the junta and/or other ethnic minority groups (such as the DKBA and the UWSA) committing some of the more extreme human rights abuses that have occurred in these areas. Student exchanges and education programmes, similar to the ASEAN Scholarship Programme in Singapore, where possible and feasible, should also be offered (or increased) by the Southeast Asian countries — Thailand and Malaysia may have the capacity to assist in this regard. Over the mid-term, education and the positive socialization of mid-ranking military officers and civil servants will be critical to changing how the military government, or any future political party, operates within Myanmar. To achieve this end, ASEAN should engage with Track Two organizations, academic institutions, and think tanks to develop specific professionalization courses with an implicit human rights function. Such programmes have already been undertaken with success by both Australia and Singapore. Australia had conducted a human rights programme in Myanmar and Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School


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of International Studies also provides training to officers from Myanmar and the region.24 Furthermore, Indonesia has expressed a willingness to provide courses for members of the SPDC and the military at its Indonesian Military Staff and Command School as noted in Chapter 6. Indonesia has also invited junior diplomats to attend courses at Indonesia’s Training and Education Facility within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.25 ASEAN and the international community should support these initiatives. In the presentation of ASEAN’s case for engagement to the international community, multinational corporations (MNCs) should be engaged by the Association and educated on the positive implications of reinvestment for Myanmar’s society. This will not be an easy task, as success in this realm will also involve negotiating a change of policy in the ILO, the EU, and the United States, among others. This course of action could be complemented by the ASEAN states themselves developing new and more targeted investments strategies. For the purpose of engagement, individuals from key independent sectors at the Myanmar end should also be trained and supported.26 The impact of long-term economic liberalization has been seen throughout Southeast Asia and the cases of Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. What the international community should understand is that to restrict such liberalization is to cut off one of the few natural (bottom-up) pathways towards the socialization of positive norms and values leading to positive reform in the long term. At the organizational level, ASEAN will need to remove the ambiguity in its relations with Myanmar. It must negotiate clear goals for reform with the SPDC and develop firm policies on how it should respond in the event that these goals are not met. In some instances, a failure to meet a particular goal may again be based in state capacity and the government in Myanmar may, therefore, need more time, together with targeted international aid in order to accomplish the collective target. In the event that the SPDC fails to reach an agreed goal due to a lack of cooperation or through a deliberate attempt to avoid reform and the transfer of power to a civilian government, then ASEAN will need to consider an appropriate response that will either resolve the issue or remove Myanmar as a future impediment to regional integration. ASEAN, in planning for such a response, should make use of the fact that Thailand is now the largest source of foreign income for Myanmar.27 Thailand, therefore, has the power to play a pivotal role in supporting and enforcing ASEAN’s efforts; however, recent political instability has detracted from this possibility. Should Thailand be required to pressure Myanmar in the future, then the international community may need to help facilitate such a role by providing aid, and/or an alternative supply of natural gas to


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Thailand.28 While the ability to take such strong measures has been impeded by ASEAN’s new charter, such normative and structural changes within the Association remain necessary to support the evolution towards ASEAN’s goal of a security community.

THE CHALLENGE OF MYANMAR TO THE ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY Can ASEAN successfully become a security community? The insights provided by the case study of Myanmar may only partially answer the question. While the analysis has raised several material and normative issues, alternative case studies on the remaining ASEAN states, together with a consideration of more specific issues (for example, alternative religions and cultures, regional and exogenous hegemonies, and structural incompatibilities in the regional economies) may further inform a final conclusion on the question. Nevertheless, many of the issues raised by the Myanmar case study reflect more generally the types of challenges that ASEAN can expect to face in the process of establishing a security community. To this end, the preceding chapters covered a broad, interdependent, and complex set of issues. These issues ranged from several non-traditional and traditional security obstacles through to a myriad of factors that work against the formation of an ASEAN-wide elite-level collective identity. Furthermore, while several of these issues had an obvious connection with ASEAN’s security community project, other issues (such as Myanmar’s history) were designed to contextualize a deeper understanding of how some of these challenges to a security community emerged. This final assessment draws on the connections that lie between these factors and considers the extent to which Myanmar challenges — materially and normatively — the emergence of a possible security community — in any meaningful sense of the term.29 The analysis has challenged the existence of a possible community between the elites of Myanmar and its remaining ASEAN counterparts. As stated in the theoretical framework of Chapter 1, there are a number of characteristics necessary to the establishment of a common sense of community and these include the existence of a collective identity, together with a sense of “reciprocity whereby there is a degree of long-term interest”. As unfortunate as the history of Myanmar is, the first goal of the leadership in the country has been to pursue and maintain power, regardless of the subsequent loss to its people and the region. This struggle to preserve power has existed not just between different political parties and ethnic groups, but also within the SPDC itself. Hence, where limited opportunities for greater stability, reform,


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and prosperity have arisen, such prospects have been crushed the moment they threaten the small club of elites at the pinnacle of power. A recent example pertained to Khin Nyunt and his growing popularity with foreign powers such as China, and what was arguably a degree of success concerning the ceasefire agreements, and his “roadmap for democracy”; he was subsequently ousted by Senior-General Than Shwe in 2004. In circumstances where the maintenance of power has become more important than stability and reform, it will then remain highly probable that the leadership will continue to act against the interests of ASEAN. In this regard, the government of Myanmar cannot be said to participate in the formation of a potential ASEAN community at the elite level. The propensity of the SPDC to act in a manner that is contrary to the interests of ASEAN has been seen in a number of instances. One example was illustrated by Myanmar’s relations with China. In this context, not only is the extent of Myanmar’s military and economic alignment towards China a concern, but ideologically it now identifies more closely with China than with ASEAN. In the event of a conflict of interests between ASEAN and China, China is likely to hold more influence and leverage over Myanmar. A further example of Myanmar’s disregard for the interests of ASEAN was the complicity of the SPDC in allowing for, contributing to, and benefiting from, the trade of illicit narcotics. Such complicity also detracts from any embryonic measure of “we-feeling” and reciprocity that could be considered extant among the elites of Southeast Asia. The potential existence of a collective identity between Myanmar and its ASEAN colleagues was also negated by Myanmar’s chairmanship of ASEAN. Myanmar’s leadership only begrudgingly relinquished its chairmanship following the imposition of a considerable degree of exogenous pressure (for example, the potential boycott of ASEAN by the United States and the EU) and a sustained period of pressure by the ASEAN elites. For twelve months, the issue of Myanmar’s chairmanship had put the international image of ASEAN in the spotlight and threatened its relations with two of its biggest dialogue partners — the United States and the EU. Despite the importance ASEAN has publicly placed on being seen by the international community to be both active and effective in dealing with the Myanmar crisis, at various junctures Myanmar refused to receive the Indonesian delegates and the UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail. On other occasions, the country’s top leader, Senior General Than Shwe, refused to meet with his ASEAN colleagues and they were also not able to meet with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The junta’s obstructionism against the efforts of ASEAN to help broker a solution in the country was aptly


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demonstrated when ASEAN tried to send Malaysia’s foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar, on a fact-finding mission to the country. After initially granting permission for the visit, the SPDC repeatedly delayed Syed’s mission, claiming they were too busy, despite the fact that they found the time to meet with China’s president, Hu Jintao. When Syed was finally permitted to enter the country, he was also not able to meet with either Than Shwe or Aung San Suu Kyi. The SPDC’s violent response to the “Saffron Revolution” and its poor handling of the humanitarian crisis generated by Cyclone Nargis further embarrassed ASEAN. These circumstances, together with the often inconsiderate timing of the SPDC’s public announcements (such as the continuation of Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention), detract from the existence of any “we-feeling”, reciprocity, and mutuality that would be reflected by a collective identity — nascent or otherwise. The threshold test necessary to a finding that there exists, or in the foreseeable future will exist, the degree of regional integration necessary to the characterization of a nascent security community, is also challenged by the existence of both actual and potential traditional security threats. Bilateral relations between Myanmar and Thailand have been strained for centuries and armed skirmishes over ethnic conflict and territorial disputes have been occurring right through to recent years. All armed conflict has the potential to escalate and the intermittent conflicts along the Thai-Myanmar border should not be considered an exception to this rule. Still, as pointed out previously, the former Thaksin administration (in a possible realization of this risk) had been determined to forge better relations with its neighbour. Should the level of economic interdependence between the two countries grow under the new Thai administration, and Thailand continues to abstain from supporting Myanmar’s insurgencies (the moral implications notwithstanding), the risk of conflict between the two countries is also likely to continue to decline. However, and as stated in Chapter 4, a low risk of armed conflict does not equate to it being “unforeseeable”. In order to satisfy this threshold test over the long term there will need to be a complete end to the insurgency movement and ethnic conflict, together with the development of stable and mature political institutions and processes within Myanmar. Several non-traditional security issues raised by the case study will need to be resolved by ASEAN in the course of the next six years. At the domestic level of analysis, the case study raised various human rights issues, including forced labour, forced porterage, child soldiers, the large-scale rape of ethnic minority women and children, the displacement of persons, and the burning of villages, extrajudicial killings, and allegations of the use of chemical weapons. While the quantitative extent of these abuses, together with the direct complicity


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of the leadership in some issues, is problematic to verify with any certainty, given the expansive and detailed nature of the reports (including a vast array of eye-witness accounts) the actual orchestration of most of these abuses (with the possible exception of the use of chemical weapons) by the Tatmadaw and its allies is beyond question. In addition, this analysis also raised, several other non-traditional security threats of a transnational nature because of Myanmar’s domestic instability. These included the spread of HIV/AIDS, the social and economic impact of refugees, illegal migrants, people trafficking, prostitution, and transnational crime (including narcotics). In this regard, Singapore has stated that Myanmar represents a potential “time bomb”, and, for example, has interpreted recent protests by the Burmese diaspora as a potential threat to its own security and the security of other Asian nations. Most importantly, the continuation of these non-traditional security concerns will detract from Myanmar’s capacity to contribute to and participate in the strengthening of regional cooperation and political/security integration as entailed by ASEAN’s proposal for a security community. Perhaps it is in the realization of these transnational consequences — together with Myanmar’s impact on the Association’s international stature as a diplomatic community — that ASEAN, with an occasional step backwards, started to take a tougher stance over Myanmar. At various times the group’s leaders publicly commented on the internal affairs of the country, made various “generalised” demands on what the leadership had to do, and, eventually, exerted pressure on Myanmar’s leadership to relinquish its scheduled chairmanship of ASEAN. Thus, in light of the mounting regional consequences to arise out of the combined effects of transnational insecurity and international pressure, ASEAN was left with little choice, but to depart from a strict adherence to its historical principle of non-interference and move towards a policy akin to enhanced interaction. However, this policy was difficult to sustain given the continued ideational divide between the authoritarian and relatively democratic members of ASEAN. The evolution of critical disengagement, followed by mutual disengagement, generated tangible tensions within the Association as some of the members were undoubtedly wondering when the same policy would be applied with respect to their own internal affairs. Cyclone Nargis and the depoliticization of engagement through the TCG mechanism has at least temporarily relieved these tensions. Nevertheless, and at the institutional level of analysis, the ability of ASEAN to continue to implement the type of reform that would be indicative of a higher level of integration (rather than a realist agenda limited to the pursuit of material interests at low integration) was always in question. The outcome of the charter confirmed such limitations.


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While the charter represents a step forward for the Association and will deliver tangible benefits in respect to economic integration and cooperation as well as the delivery of a legal identity, the charter fell far short of expectations in the political and security sphere. The charter contained no legally enforceable provisions for the resolution of political disputes, it entrenched consensusbased decision making as an official component of ASEAN’s modus operandi, and the members have not yet been able to agree to the terms of reference for a human rights body. One of the most significant problems for ASEAN is that its relations have rarely been motivated by some form of mutual identification leading to interaction on the basis of absolute gain. On the contrary, relations are primarily conducted on the basis of relative gain, and consequently, as Martin Ott adds, much of the impetus for regional engagement among the ASEAN states has grown out of the perceived and burgeoning economic opportunities of doing so; this is especially the case with respect to Myanmar.30 So long as the primary motivation of some of the ASEAN members remains the pursuit of material gain — as opposed to any ideational value and norms that might be interpreted as reflecting a shared sense of community or collective identity31 — then evolution towards satisfying the constituent elements of a security community (as defined in Chapter 1) will remain highly problematic. In an international environment where the foreign policies of states are primarily driven by the pursuit of self-interest (with little regard for the consequences of such actions) the collective group of states will fundamentally operate under an environment of mutual suspicion.32 These conditions further challenge the prospect of garnering a collective policy position on the implementation of binding mechanisms to address the diverse range of comprehensive security challenges in Southeast Asia at the ground level. Furthermore, the few normative shifts that have taken place have not been evenly applied throughout the grouping. Indicative of the altered state of democracy in Thailand and the former Thaksin’s administration’s sensitivity over the prospect of “interference’” regarding instability in its southern provinces, the ruling elite intervened to prevent any participation by its legislative branch in further motions by the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus. Other states, such as Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia have been equally conservative. Thus, while the consolidation of democratic regimes in some ASEAN members allowed for greater political openness and freedom within these states, this advent has also enlarged a normative schism with the more authoritarian ASEAN members — particularly with respect to their perceived national interests and foreign policies. Until the political


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institutions of the region evolve to reflect a common identity and foreign policy, the ability of ASEAN to garner consensus over the implementation of normative change at the leadership level will be more difficult. The formation of new channels to exert pressure on individual members of ASEAN when they act contrary to the interests of the region, such as through the AIPMC, may satisfy the goals of the more progressive states for the time being. However, the political negotiations that were witnessed in the lead-up to the charter demonstrated that some ASEAN states want to accelerate the pace of economic and/or political integration and institutionalization in ASEAN. Indeed, one Philippine delegate in ASEAN has already questioned whether ASEAN should be replaced altogether with a new organization “institutionally” modelled after the EU.33 Furthermore, the continuation of different patterns of normative behaviour at the regional level does not reflect well on the potential for future solidarity and a collective identity. Indeed, it remains possible to argue that the transient ability of ASEAN to garner a collective common position is primarily limited to mutual exogenous threats (such as the ideological threat of communism at ASEAN’s foundation) and exogenous pressure (such as that exerted by the United States and the EU). While these factors may initiate a degree of integration and evolution towards a security community in the first instance, their continued existence as the organization’s primary motivator indicates a negligible level of regional integration. As suggested by the Lao Foreign Ministry in the previous chapter, until a greater level of similarity, and thereby compatibility, between the region’s political systems and socio-cultural identities evolves, it will be highly difficult for ASEAN members to achieve concrete progress in the realm of political integration, with the level of institutionalization necessary for its facilitation. Even in the economic realm, the challenge of integration has been significant. The continued operation of the principle of non-interference has been given as an explanation why several of the economic initiatives have either been dismissed as “too complicated” or have required a “level of coordination and cohesion that ASEAN had deliberately avoided in the past”.34 In the case of the ASEAN Surveillance Mechanism,35 for example, the disclosure of information is strictly voluntary and concerns have been raised that honest exchanges of information under the peer review process may be interpreted as a contravention of the ASEAN Way.36 Likewise, the ASEAN Action Plan on Social Safety Nets also failed to take off as it was designed to address “domestic social welfare concerns” in each of the member states and this too would have risked compromising the principle of noninterference.37 Thus, where ASEAN has achieved a consensus to advance


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economic integration and cooperation, such outcomes have only been feasible to the extent that they have not challenged regime security.38 As Ralf Emmers argues, Southeast Asia remains challenged by “feelings of mistrust, bilateral disputes and contradictory strategic perspectives”.39 A necessary prerequisite to overcoming this ongoing problem would be for ASEAN states to complete the process of internal consolidation as has been advocated by this book with respect to Myanmar. Until ASEAN achieves success in this realm, including heightened stability and capacity through security sector reform, then ASEAN members will be unlikely to overcome the challenges to cohesion and cooperation that were outlined by Emmers. The deleterious spillover effects of political and socio-cultural diversity in Southeast Asia were recently exemplified by the author’s survey of 100 elites from all the ASEAN states where on the question of trust, 59.8 per cent did not believe they could trust all the countries in Southeast Asia to be good neighbours.40 This level of mistrust has also been influenced by various bilateral quarrels, such as territorial disputes and with other tensions grounded in history, ethnicity, and/or religion. Some further examples include the Southern Thailand insurgency,41 the gunboat diplomacy between Malaysia and Indonesia over an oilfield dispute in the Sulawesi Sea,42 and the 2008 military stand-off over the Preah Vihear temple along the border of Cambodia and Thailand. The region’s history of animosity may have also affected the survey’s response rates concerning threat perceptions. While 22 per cent of the entire sample of elite respondents felt that armed conflict between the ASEAN states was possible within the next twenty years, over 42 per cent of Thai respondents and 47 per cent of the Singaporean respondents viewed armed conflict as a possibility.43 Such enmity and distrust among certain ASEAN states also explains the nature of armed expenditure in the region. While a proportion of the military expenditure may be motivated by continued domestic instability and local insurgencies, it is difficult to attribute all of it to such domestic intentions, at least some of the ASEAN governments continue to engage in competitive arms acquisitions aimed at maintaining a balance of power vis-à-vis neighbouring states.44 Finally, until the gap on “how to govern” between the various ASEAN nations is resolved, ASEAN will not be able to implement the policies necessary to establish an “integrated” security community. Already, this institutional gap has contributed to the divide among the ASEAN states during the negotiation for a plan of action to implement the goal of a security community. As outlined in Chapter 7, Indonesia’s proposal to establish several mechanisms to enhance the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia, with specific dates for implementation, proved to be too controversial and/or ambitious for the


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grouping in its current form. Several of these goals and mechanisms, such as a peacekeeping force and human rights commission, were in fact relevant to the challenges raised by this case study. These mechanisms and goals were not included in the final draft of the plan of action and while the idea of a human rights mechanism was reinstated in the charter, the ASEAN leaders have not yet been able to agree on its final structure.

Conclusions ASEAN’s relationship with Myanmar is neither secure nor reflective of the type of relations characterized by a “community” of states. Myanmar challenges all the constituent elements of the definition of a security community. The people of Myanmar have very little interaction with ASEAN or the outside world, and only a very small band of the country’s elite travel and interact with the ASEAN countries on a regular basis. Thus, the current state of affairs inside the country has significantly impeded the prospect of socializing positive norms and values in the ruling elite. Meanwhile, Myanmar is more closely aligned with foreign powers such as China, than it is with ASEAN. ASEAN’s former policy of “constructive engagement” did not help to avert this outcome. The Myanmar case study also demonstrated an ideational divide among other ASEAN members and it is difficult to envision how an elite-level collective identity will arise among the ASEAN states in the near future. Myanmar also challenges the comprehensive security of Southeast Asia. At the non-traditional level, a range of issues including illegal immigrants, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and the trafficking of illicit narcotics — particularly methamphetamines — has affected ASEAN. At the traditional security level, the continued prospect of limited military clashes between Myanmar and Thailand cannot be ruled out entirely. Given the prospects for leadership change in both of these countries, together with the unpredictable manner by which regime transition may occur, there is a remote possibility that relations could significantly deteriorate, with the consequent risk of conflict on a much larger scale. Such an event would be completely unforeseeable among the EU member states, but its possibility in Southeast Asia, as remote as it is, prohibits a finding that there exist dependable expectations of peaceful change. Not only are many of the policy suggestions provided earlier in the chapter controversial in nature, but the goal of a security community itself has also proven to be controversial within ASEAN. Admittedly, the capacity of ASEAN to implement many or all of the policy suggestions outlined by the chapter may be called into question. However, these recommendations


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were formulated on the basis of what is necessary to overcome the current humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, including the root causes of instability — a major impediment to ASEAN’s security community project. Moreover, the level of interaction and socialization generated by ASEAN’s implementation of these recommendations would also contribute to greater trust and cooperation in the future. At the empirical level, the construction of the type of community that would establish “dependable expectations of peaceful change” is not an easy criterion to fulfil. Therefore, despite various claims that the security architecture of Southeast Asia already fits “the concept of a ‘nascent’ security community”,45 ASEAN can more accurately be defined as a limited economic and security regime.46 To this end, the issues raised by the analysis have been critically examined with the presumption that ASEAN’s goal of a security community corresponds with a genuine aspiration to implement meaningful change in Southeast Asia. While the Association’s ambitious targets have thus far floundered, their realization would mean the progression of a predominately developing region towards an integrated and stable region. The goal of a security community is not an all or nothing proposition. While ASEAN will not become a security community by 2015, any shift towards higher integration will provide tangible economic, political, and security benefits for the region.

Notes 1

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Unfortunately, Aung San Suu Kyi will not be able to be elected as either president or vice-president until the constitution is amended. The United States has also taken other measures such as legislating its opposition to loans and other assistance from international financial institutions, exerting pressure on regional countries to censure the military, and informally raising the matter in the UN Security Council. The United States itself estimated that there would be an initial loss of 40,000 jobs and that this would escalate to a loss of around 100,000 over the long term. Others, such as David Steinberg, have estimated higher job losses of around 180,000. Donald M. Seekins, “Burma and U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime”, Asian Survey 45, no. 3 (2005): 442. On the controversial nature of these findings (including the suggestion that they ignore such things as competition from China that would have destroyed the industry in any case), see “Some Talking Points Regarding Economics, and the ‘Independent Report’ for the EU” (Internet — Preliminary Draft, Burma Economic Watch, 2005 [cited 19 April 2005]), available at <www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Burma_Day-BEW.htm>. Interview by the author with Ambassador Vicky Bowman, British High Commission, Yangon, May 2005. The ambassador did not make this suggestion,


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but supplied the author with various materials including government correspondence, from which the author extrapolated the opinion stated in the text. The review of the available literature in general also supports the stated opinion. “ILO Decides Sanctions on Myanmar over Forced Labour” (Electronic Database — Factiva, Kyodo News, 2000 [cited 22 November 2005]), available at <www. factiva.com>; “Amnesty International’s Concerns at the 89th International Labour Conference” (Internet — Report, Amnesty International, 5–21 June 2000 [cited 18 October 2005]), available at . “Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?” (Yangon/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004), p. 15. A large number of the multinational companies that were present in the 1990s have since left the country due to the exertion of foreign political pressure. N. Ganesan, “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 34. Martin T. Smith, “Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches”, in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 70. “Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?”, p. 15. Ibid. Also see Christopher Roberts, “Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: A Clash of Contending Moralities?” (Working Paper, IDSS, 18 March 2006 [cited 18 March 2006]), available at , pp. 17–25. Seekins, “Burma and U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime”, p. 448. This includes self-sufficiency in food security; particularly in the central Bamar areas on which the government depends for its survival. “Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?”, p. 17. Even if it were possible to garner global support for the implementation of a uniform sanctions regime the opportunity for it to succeed has already been lost given the age of the remaining members in the NLD’s Executive Committee, and the success with which the SPDC has managed to crush any form of organized political opposition in central Myanmar. David I. Steinberg, The Future of Burma: Crisis and Choice in Myanmar (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990), p. 91. David I. Steinberg, “Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise”, in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 86–116. Seekins, “Burma and U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime”, p. 448. History may prove that the pinnacle of this return to isolation and


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self-reliance was reached during the 2004–05 period with the removal of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt from power and the abdication of the 2006 ASEAN Chairmanship. The recent retreat of the government to its new capital in Pyinmana, while leaving the foreign embassies behind in Yangon, is but one example of a normative return to political isolation. Kate McGeown, “Burma’s Confusing Capital Move” (Internet, BBC News, 2006 [cited 22 March 2006]), available at . Formal ODA was, however, halted by late June 2003, following the Black Friday attacks against Aung San Suu Kyi. Seekins, “Burma and U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime”, p. 439. Nevertheless, continuing aid to NGOs so that the people may continue to benefit is a better middle ground to take. Meanwhile, and regrettably, the “United Nations Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria” announced in August 2005 that it would be withdrawing its programme from Myanmar. It claimed that the main reason for its withdrawal was that the workers were unable to carry out their duties because of government interference. “Aids Organisation to Leave Burma” (Internet, BBC News, 2005 [cited 22 August 2005]), available at . Other organizations remain, however, and have managed to work with the government even if it has been difficult to do so at various times. In an interview, two senior UN officials (one from the UNODC and another from the UN Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Sub-region) stated that the withdrawal of the fund had nothing to do with interference by the government of Myanmar. It was simply because of “internal discordance”. Interview by the author with UN officials, February 2006. Smith, “Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches”, p. 74. In fact, the reasoning of policy-makers has not always been so ethical nor has it always taken the “moral high ground”. For example, one can note a loophole in U.S. sanctions where the investments of Unocal remain unaffected. Unocal is “a politically well-connected American oil company” that operates the Yadana Pipeline Project. As Donald Seekins states, this project provides “little to no employment to locals, gives the junta huge annual revenues (as much as $400 million), and has caused great hard-ship, forced labour, and forced relocation for ethnic minorities in the Thai-Burma border area”. Seekins, “Burma and U.S. Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime”, pp. 451–52. In addition, and for an in-depth political/social science extrapolation, see Neil Englehart, “Is Regime Change Enough for Burma”, Asian Survey 45, no. 4 (2005): 622–44. For an economic perspective, see Jeffrey D. Sachs, ed., “Making the Investments Needed to End Poverty”, in The End of Poverty (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), pp. 244–65. See also, Jeffrey D. Sachs. “Why Some Countries Fail to Thrive”, in The End of Poverty (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), pp. 51–73.


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For a more detailed explanation of the appropriate benchmarks to set and the reasons for continuing some targeted sanctions, see Christopher Roberts, “Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: A Clash of Contending Moralities?” (Working Paper, IDSS, 18 March 2006 [cited 18 March 2006]), available at , pp. 24–25. For example, the government’s efforts in reducing opium production were barely acknowledged by the West. Khin Nyunt’s announcement of this road map for democracy was also shunned and the 2003 release of Aung San Suu Kyi did not result in any positive re-engagement with the West. As Khin Nyunt’s initiatives failed to gain any major concessions from the West, the harsh position of the United States and the EU may have in fact undermined Khin Nyunt’s power together with his reform process. Smith, “Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches”, p. 75. Barry Desker and Christopher Roberts, “Myanmar: Prospects and Challenges of Engagement”, in Security through Cooperation: CSCAP Regional Security Outlook (CRSO), edited by Brian L. Job and Erin Williams (Singapore: CSCAP, 2008), p. 35. See also David Kinley and Trevor Wilson, “Engaging a Pariah: Human Rights Training in Burma/Myanmar”, Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2007): 367–402. “RI Invites Myanmar’s Military Officers to Attend Military Staff & Command School Courses”. “Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?”, p. 30. “Burma (Myanmar) Fact Sheet” (Internet, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008 [cited 1 September 2008]), available at <www.dfat.gov.au>. Additionally, Singapore and Malaysia both have extensive investments in the tourism and hotel industry. N. Ganesan, “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World”, p. 47. As noted previously, very little of the money Thailand supplies to Myanmar trickles down to the people on the ground. Perversely, as most of the money from its gas deal is used to fund the government and its military, the temporary withdrawal of such funds has the capacity to pressure the regime without any significant impact on the people. Even the threat of such a response could be useful leverage if and when necessary. By “meaningful”, the author means the development of a security community that would produce tangible benefits to the governments and people of Southeast Asia. This might include many of the defining characteristics to the theoretical definition of a security community (for example, dependable expectations of peaceful change and a broad sense of security). Martin Ott, “From Isolation to Relevance”, in Burma: Prospects for Democratisation (Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 1998), p. 79. Cited in Aung Zaw et al., “Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on


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Multilateral and Bilateral Responses” (Ottawa, Canada: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2001). As opposed to any regionwide principles for, and value of, democracy and human rights. Such an environment has been witnessed during the author’s interviews with a diverse range of policy-makers and academics in Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. During the course of this time, key interviewees in Cambodia spoke of the “selfish actions” of Thailand; Malaysians have commented on the militant nature of Singapore “and its” paranoid Israeli defence force siege mentality; and the Philippines questions the integrity behind Malaysia’s claim to Sabah. Christopher B. Roberts, “ASEAN Charter: The Model Decision”, Straits Times, 9 September 2005. Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 164. The ASEAN Surveillance Process has been described as a collective early warning and monitoring system (based on the G7 Model) that seeks to facilitate greater transparency as well as the supervision of macroeconomic policies and financial regulations. “Recent Developments in ASEAN Economic Integration” (Internet, ASEAN, 1999 [cited 8 August 2002]), available at . See also “Terms of Understanding on the Establishment of the ASEAN Surveillance Process” (Internet, ASEAN, [cited 22 March 2007]), available at . Mely Anthony and Denis Hew, “ASEAN and ASEAN+3 in Postcrisis Asia”, NIRA Review, vol. 7, no. 4 (Autumn 2000) (cited); Mari Pangestu, “Southeast Asian Regional and International Economic Cooperation”, in International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, edited by Donald E. Weatherbee et al. (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), p. 195. Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, p. 164. Furthermore, the desire for and subsequent success of certain economic initiatives, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) has been driven by what Amitav Acharya coined “performance legitimacy”. Amitav Acharya, “Transnational Production and Security: Southeast Asia’s ‘Growth Triangles’”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 17, no. 12 (1995): 260. In other words, the economic wealth generated by a “degree” of economic integration actually secures political regimes such as those in Singapore and Malaysia by delivering to the people sufficient material benefits to avert any significant challenge to regime authority. Even so, regional analysts have also questions the efficacy of AFTA and the level of economic integration such initiatives have achieved. For example, Hadi Soesastro contends that “only a very small percentage of intra-ASEAN trade … utilises the lower AFTA preferential rates”. Hadi Soesastro, “Accelerating ASEAN Economic Integration: Moving Beyond AFTA”, in CSIS Working Paper Series (Jakarta: CSIS, 2005), p. 2.


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Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 6. Christopher B. Roberts, “Affinity and Trust in Southeast Asia: A Regional Survey”, in People’s ASEAN and Government’s ASEAN, edited by Hiro Katsumata and See Seng Tan (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2007), pp. 87–88. Continued violence in southern Thailand resulted in a blame game between Thailand and Malaysia where Thailand claimed that they had proof of insurgent training camps in Malaysia. Vaudine England, “Malays Reject Accusations They Aid Thai Separatists” (Internet, International Herald Tribune, 2005 [cited 1 July 2007]), available at ; “Thai ‘Proof ’ of Malaysia Camps” (Internet, BBC News, 2004 [cited 22 December 2004]), available at . In March 2005 tensions rose over the Ambalat offshore oil block in the Sulawesi/ Celebes sea. The gunboat diplomacy that ensued included the deployment of several naval vessels and four F16 fighter jets by Indonesia. Bill Guerin, “Sulawesi Sea Row Dredges up Defenses” (Internet, Asia Times, 2005 [cited 4 October 2006]), available at <www.atimes.com>; Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, “Energy Security and Southeast Asia: The Impact on Maritime Boundary and Territorial Disputes”, Harvard Asia Quarterly 9, no. 4 (2005): 36–39. Roberts, “Affinity and Trust in Southeast Asia: A Regional Survey”, p. 88. According to Robert Hartfiel and Brian Job, “[t]here are indeed competitive arms acquisition processes underway among Southeast Asian states, for sustaining technological dominance (on Singapore’s part) and/or numerical equivalence.” Robert Hartfiel and Brian L. Job, “Raising the Risks of War: Defence Spending Trends and Competitive Arms Processes in Southeast Asia”, The Pacific Review 20, no. 1 (2007): 15. See also Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region”, International Security 18, no. 3 (1994): 78–112; Andrew Tan, “Force Modernisation Trends in Southeast Asia” (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2004). Amitav Acharya, “Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia”, in Security Communities, edited by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 219; Yuen Foong Khong, “ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex”, in Regional Orders: Building Security in the New World, edited by David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 339; Raimo Vayrynen, “Stable Peace through Security Communities”, in Stable Peace among Nations, edited by Arie Kacowicz, Yaacov Bar-Simon-Tov, Ole Elgstrom, and Alexander Jerneck (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p. 176. This definition is similar to Tim Huxley’s definition of a “limited security regime”. Huxley, Insecurity in the ASEAN Region (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), p. 81.


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Index

ASEAN Community, 187 three pillars, 3 ASEAN Concord, 109 ASEAN Cooperation Fund for Disaster Assistance, 191 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), 2 ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT), 192 Mission Report, 211 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 112, 239 ASEAN Humanitarian Taskforce for the Victims of Cyclone Nargis, 192 ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC), 122, 140, 155 discussion with Chinese officials, 157 effect of Myanmar, 141 ASEAN leaders’ summit (2005), 143 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), 149, 181 36th Joint Communiqué, 115 37th, 117 ASEAN People’s Assembly, 155 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 32 ASEAN Scholarship Programme, 225 ASEAN Secretariat, 152

88 Generation Students, 153 A Abdullah Badawi, 123, 145, 206 Aceh ASEAN-EU monitors, 144 Acharya, Amitav, 10, 11, 181 views on community at elite level, 12 Adler, Emanuel, 11 agent identity, 29 Air Bagan Singapore’s refusal to deal with, 163 Ali Alatas, 116, 126, 158 All Burma Monks Alliance, 153 Amnesty International, 170, 218 Amphetamine Type Stimulants, 84 Annan, Kofi, 152, 163 Anwar Ibrahim call for constructive interventions, 114 armed conflict, 10 Arroyo, Gloria, 151, 158 ASEAN+3 Secretariat, 117 ASEAN-5, 8 ASEAN-10, 112 ASEAN Action Plan on Social Safety Nets, 232 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, 191, 211 ASEAN Charter, 157, 184 Myanmar’s ratification, 194 254


12/8/09 5:41:55 PM

Index

ASEAN Secretary General, 125 ASEAN security, effect of Myanmar, 79–106 ASEAN Security Community (ASC), 3 impact of Myanmar-Thai relations, 92 Plan of Action list of proposals, 182–83 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), 3 ASEAN Summit rules of procedure, 185 ASEAN Summit (9th) see also Bali Summit ASEAN Summit (11th), Kuala Lumpur, 143 ASEAN Summit (12th), 151 ASEAN Surveillance Mechanism, 232 ASEAN Surveillance Process, 239 ASEAN Troika, 145 mechanism suggested by Indonesia, 116 ASEAN Way, 17, 152, 217, 232 traditional interpretation, 208 constructive engagement, 113 core components, 108 criticism, 108 non-interference, 107 toll for supporting security and economic development, 110 traditionally defined, 143 ASEAN-wide community, 87 security community, 97 Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), 114 impact on NGOs, 131 initiation by Singapore and Thailand, 131 meeting, Finland (2007), 159 Myanmar’s observer status (1996), 111 Seoul Summit, 114 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 193, 218


255

Asian values, 17, 26 Asian-African Summit, 124 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) collective identity, 141, 231, 234 collective policy, 231 consensus style of decision making, 186 constructive engagement, 222 constructive role, 69 criticisms against, rhetoric, 115 Defence Ministers Meeting, 148, 163 diplomatic practices, 109 divide between impoverished and wealthy members, 113 elite-level cohesion, 79 elite-level collective identity, 127, 227 Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT), 191, 192, 211 engagement with Track Two organizations, 225 experiment in enhanced interaction, 141 focus on humanitarian engagement, 223 formation of elite-level collective identity, 70 ideational divisions, 125 limits of intramural diplomacy, 148 Myanmar’s chairmanship, 142 decisive action, 126 face-saving solution, 125 Myanmar’s membership, 107–40 chairmanship crisis, 121–26 challenge elite-level cohesion, 115–21 historical implications, 111–15 protests from EU and U.S., 111 non-interference, 79 criticism, 128

12/8/09 5:41:56 PM

256

normative structure challenge posed by Myanmar, 97 policy of constructive engagement, 234 principle of non-interference, 230, 232 role, expansion of, 207 Secretary General reflection on Myanmar decision to have multiparty elections, 213 security challenges, 80–88 HIV/AIDS, 82–83 human trafficking, 80–81 illegal migrants, 81–82 narcotics, 83–87 refugees, 81–82 security community Myanmar challenge, 227–34 significant problem lack of mutual identification on basis of absolute gain, 231 stature as a diplomatic community, 216 Tripartite Core Group, 224 unified position in certain challenges, 48 whether organization should be replaced, 232 Aung San Suu Kyi, 116, 154, 157, 180, 225, 228 calls for release, 148 extension of house arrest, 143, 152 participation in domestic politics, 216 Australia, 4, 225 authoritarian regime national interests of, 35 authority internalization of, 16 autonomous zones Myanmar, 68


Index

Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), 161 B balance of power, 9, 10 Bali Concord, 2, 117, 181 Bali Summit, 117 Ball, Desmond (Professor), 84 Ball, Nicole, 39 Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono, 158 Ban Ki-Moon, 193 Bangkok Declaration, 108 Bangkok process, 116 Bengtsson, Rikard, 14 Bo Mya (General), 198 Bower, Ernst, 121 Bowman, Vicky, 198 Bretton Woods institutions, 218 Brunei, 4 ARF ministerial meeting (2002), 115 Burmese Communist Party, 89 Bush, Laura, 211 Buzan, Barry, 41 C Cambodia ASEAN’s concern over political stability, 112 border with Thailand, military stand-off, 233 HIV/AIDS rate, 82 human trafficking, 86 withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from, 89 Canada, 4 cattle trading, illegal cross-border, 67 ceasefire groups, 66 Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 180, 209 Chang Chifu (Khun Sa), 85 Chavalit (General), 91 chemical weapons, 59–60, 229

12/8/09 5:41:56 PM

Index

child soldiers, 57–58, 73, 229 China conflict of interest with ASEAN states, 97 facilities installed in Myanmar, 94 funding of road and bridge projects, 105 lack of vulnerability to international pressure, 167 largest exporter to Myanmar, 105 pressure on Myanmar, 162 refurbishment of Myanmar’s naval bases, 94 relations with Myanmar, 93–96 role in Myanmar issue, 174 strategic influence in Myanmar, 93 Chongkittavorn, Kavi, 145 Chulanont, Surayud (General), 92 civil authorities, security sector reform, 39 civil liberties, constitution, 201 civil society, 28 security sector reform, 39 CLMV Cooperation Frameworks, 161 Coco Island, electronic surveillance established, 94 collective identity, 11, 15, 27–34, 29 attributes of, 29 state actors, 33 collective memories of history, 28 Collins, Alan, 108 common identities, importance of, 43 common language, 35 Communist Party of Burma, 64 community, 11–12 definition, 5 community of states, 2 community-based organizations, Myanmar, 62 conditional peace, 15 confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), 11 conflict formation, 14


257

conflicts as a stage in a four-stage process, 33 consensus-based decision making, 231 constitution national convention to draft, 197 constitutional amendment, 205 Constitutional Tribunal of the Union, 200 constructive engagement, 221 awareness of limitations, 217 constructivist approaches security, 6 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 72 Cotton, James, 128 Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), 6 Courts of Self Administered Areas, 200 credit crunch, global, 7 criminal communities, 80 critical disengagement, 230 Cuba as Chair of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 150 Cyclone Nargis, 178, 179, 206, 223, 229 D Davis, Anthony, 91 decision making process, legalprocedural constraints, 41 Declaration of ASEAN Accord II (Bali Concord II), 18 defence services adjudication of military justice, 204 democracy roadmap, 197, 201 Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), 66, 67, 80 democratic peace, 40 democratization rapid, 42 democratic security family, 39

12/8/09 5:41:56 PM

258

dependable expectations of peaceful change, 10–11, 14, 30, 40, 91, 234, 235 Desker, Barry calls for Myanmar’s expulsion from ASEAN, 154 Deutsch, Karl, 2, 8, 11 integration, 13 measurement of integration, 12 requirements for sufficient integration, 14 Dino Patti Djalal, Yudhoyono’s spokesperson, 146 disciplined democracy, 178 displacement of persons, Myanmar, 58–59 dispute resolution procedures, 11 dispute settlement mechanisms, 184 domestic instability, impact on security architecture of ASEAN, 69, 70 domestic security, 7 Draft Plan of Action for a Security Community, 181 E East Asia Summit (EAS), 157 East West Economic Corridor (EWEC), 161 economic capacity, 14 economic environment relationship with security environment, 40 economic integration benefits of, 231 economic issues, 14 economic liberalism, 41, 221 economic management, internal consolidation of state, 37 Ecstasy, 83 education system, 38 elections 1990, 68 international observers, 196


Index

Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT), 191 Eminent Persons Group (EPG), 184, 185 Emmers, Ralf, 86, 233 Emmerson, Donald, 173, 195, 196, 206 equilibrium, peaceful, 9 ethnic communities, scapegoating of, 38 ethnic tension, history, 68 European Community, 4 ascendant security community, 17 European Union, 10, 13, 32, 160 approach for Myanmar, 217 at odds with ASEAN over Myanmar, 217 institutional structures, 15 restrictions on Myanmar, 135 sanctions against Myanmar, 119 extrajudicial killings, 60–61 F Finland, 176 food security, 95 forced labour, Myanmar, 58 Forced Labour Convention, 218 foreign direct investment effect of instability on, 39 Singapore to Myanmar, 88 foreign exchange reserves, 95 G global credit crunch, 7 God’s Army, 90 government, degree of, 40 Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), 161 Group of Friends on Myanmar, 158 H Haacke, Jurgen, 156 Hassan Wirayuda, visit to Myanmar, 119 Havel, Vaclav, 145

12/8/09 5:41:56 PM

Index

hegemony, curbing of, 9 Hill, Christopher, 156 visit to Malaysia, 159 HIV/AIDS, 82–83, 230, 234 funding for combat of, 221 unsafe injections, from, 98 Hluttaws, 199 Ho Chi Minh City narcotics trade, 85 Hu Jintao, 129, 145 human rights, 229 abuse, 56–70 restriction of future abuses, 225 violation, contribution to domestic instability, 68 human rights commission, 234 Human Rights Watch, 170 human trafficking, 80–81, 230 constitution, 201 human security, for people of Myanmar, 222 humanitarian aid establishing consensus through, 187–93 Hun Sen, 160 Huxley, Tim, 240 concept of weak statehood, 50 I Ibrahim Gambari, 156, 157, 158, 194 United Nations special envoy, 149 Ice, 84 ICG report, use of arms, 69 ideational survival, 47 identity definition, 11 relative phenomenon, 32 identity convergence, preconditions, 35 illegal migrants, 81–82 India lack of vulnerability to international pressure, 167 Look East policy, 89


259

Indonesia collapse of New Order regime, 7 constitutional amendment, 205 Draft Plan of Action, 183, 185 New Order regime, 146 Non-Paper on ASEAN Security Community, 181 stance towards Myanmar, 134 support for Myanmar, 113 Indonesian Military Staff and Command School, 226 inflation rates, 202, 215 institution building long term, 223 institutionalization building capacity to respond, 179–87 supranational, 3 insurgent groups Myanmar, in, 65 use of chemical weapons against, 60 intangible power, role of, 22 integration, 5 definition of, 13–16 low level, 97 process of, 13 regional, deepening of, 17 integrative peace, 14, 15 interest harmonization, 187 internal consolidation, 35 concept of, 48 definition, 36 insufficient, 42 Internal Security Act (Malaysia), 206 internalization of authority, 16 International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), 152 international conflicts, test for, 31 International Crisis Group, 188 International Monetary Fund, 218 International Organization for Migration, 193

12/8/09 5:41:57 PM

260

International Pledging Conference, 193, 194 interstate relations evolution of, 28 J Jane’s Intelligence, 86, 88, 91 Japan carrot and stick approach, 223 Johns, Eric, 157 Jones, Lee, 149, 150 K Kachin Independence Organization, 65, 80 Kachin, insurgent groups, 60 Karen, 68 insurgent groups, 60 refugees in Thailand, 81 Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), 67 Karen National Union (KNU), 66, 67, 198 recommencement of fighting with Tatmadaw, 214 Karenni National Progressive Party, 65 Kawmura, 60 Khin Nyunt, 197 arrest, ASEAN caught by surprise, 119 dismissal, 102 reform process, undermining by EU and U.S., 238 removal, 61 roadmap for democracy, 228 killings extrajudicial, see extrajudicial killings Kokang splinter faction of Communist Party of Burma, 64 Kouchner, Bernard, 190 Kusuma Snitwongse, 108 Kwa Chong Guan, 109, 128 Kyaw Hsan (Brigadier General), 171


Index

L landmines, 59 Laos, 184 Foreign Ministry, suggestion, 232 language, common, 35 Laos, HIV/AIDS rate, 82 legal process reform, 39 Lee Hsien Loong, 142, 151, 156 visit to Yangon, 124 Lee Kuan Yew, 158 legal protection constitution, 201 Leifer, Michael, 181 Li Zhaoxing, 95 liberalism political and economic, 41 logging companies clearing of border areas, 59 logging concessions, 91 Longyi traditional Bamar dress, 215 M Mahathir Mohamad, 117 support of Myanmar, 112 Malacca Strait piracy, 10 policing of, 23 Malaysia insult by Myanmar, 133 Internal Security Act, 206 political turmoil, 17 upset by Myanmar’s backing of U.S.-led war in Iraq, 117 Malaysian Parliamentary ProDemocracy Myanmar Caucus, 122 MALSINDO, 23 market economy model, 202 mass rape Myanmar, 59 Maung Aye (General), 63 McFarlane, John, 98

12/8/09 5:41:57 PM

Index

McMillan-Scott, Edward, 177 Megawati Sukarnoputri, 117 Mekong River Committee, 161 militant missionary attitude, 40 military expenditure motivated by domestic instability, 233 military intelligence division, corruption, 61 military representation legislative assemblies, 205 minority groups comparative strengths, 66 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 156 multilateral strategy, 96 mutual aid society, 16 mutual disengagement, 159, 161, 230 Myanmar anti-government protests, 153 ASEAN chairmanship crisis, 121, 125 balance of strategic relations, 94 bicameral national legistative assembly, 199 Buddhist monks, protests, 141, 142 ceasefire agreements with insurgent groups, 65–68 challenges to reform, 88–96 chemical weapons use, 59, 60 child soldiers, 57 consequences for ASEAN, 88–96 consequences of isolation, 220 constitution, safeguards provided, 201 Directive, 85, 154 displacement of persons, 58–59 domestic instability, 52–79, 219 ceasefire movement, 64–68 chemical weapons use, 59–60 child soldiers, 57–58 displacement of persons, 58–59 extrajudicial killings, 60–61


261

forced labour, 58 history, 53–56 human rights abuse and conflict, 56–70 political prisoners, 60 rape of women, 59 unity of Tatmadaw, 62–64 education levels, national average, 75 education system, collapsing, 61 elites, possibility of relations with ASEAN counterparts, 227 EU restrictions on, 135 extrajudicial killings, 60–61 fear of invasion, 143 forced labour, 58 foreign exchange reserves, 95 full ASEAN membership (1997), 111 future directions, 217–27 government and military branches, not one unified body, 99 history, 53–56 HIV/AIDS rate, 82 human rights abuse, 56–70 impact on elite-level cohesion, 141–77 evolution of mutual disengagement, 152–61 fragmentation of consensus, 142–52 import and export partners, 95 improved relations with India, 106 insurgent groups, 65 ceasefire and non-ceasefire regimes, 65–68 internal consolidation, 223 international approaches, 217 international pressure, 126 junta, reaction to history of colonization, 203 lack of funding, 218 lack of organized political opposition, 236

12/8/09 5:41:57 PM

262

membership in ASEAN, 107–40 non-interference, 108–11 military intelligence, 62 move of capital to Naypyitaw, 143 multiparty elections (2010), 196 nation-building processes, negative and state-driven, 50 new constitution, 196–206 Official Development Aid (ODA), 219 oil reserves, 93 opium production, 83 political moderates, 61–62 political opposition, 61–62 political prisoners, 60–61 potential impact of chairmanship of ASEAN, 121 regime survival, 36 regime transition, 234 relations with China, 93–96, 228 relations with Thailand, 89–93, 107, 229 competing nationalism, 91 Singapore investment in, 88 supply of landmines to, 88 unity of Tatmadaw, 62–64 Myanmar-Thai relations, impact on ASEAN, 92 N narcotics, 83–87, 202 Golden Triangle, 83 trade in, 228 Natalegawa, Marty Indonesia’s delegation at SOM, 143 Nathan, Laurie, 1, 7 nation definition, 37 nation building resources for, 35 nation state formation, 37 nation-building policies, 49


Index

national building, internal consolidation of state, 37 National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, 122 National Convention, 199 drafting of new constitution, 197 National Development Front (NDF), 65 national interests deciphering, 35 definition, 49 National League for Democracy (NLD), 61, 216 age of remaining members, 236 boycott process of national referendum, 198 members under house arrest, 198 nationalism, competing, 91 Nationalities Assembly, 200 Natural Disaster Preparedness Central Committee, 189 natural gas reserves, sale to Thailand and China, 89 naval operations, piracy, 10 Naypyitaw, 152 Nazri Abdul Aziz, 123 New Mon State Army, 65 New Zealand, 13 Niinioja, Markku, 176 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 111 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, 148 non-democratic zones, negative peace, 41 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Myanmar, 62 role in isolation of Myanmar, 218 non-interference, impracticality of, 144 non-negotiable principles, 109 non-traditional security issues, 229 normative shifts, 231

12/8/09 5:41:57 PM

263

Index

norms collective identity of state, 27–34 transnational, 28 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 112 North Korea, relations with Myanmar, 88 Nyan Win, 148 Myanmar Foreign Minister, 155 O Ong Keng Yong, 125, 144 opium trade, 83 historical account, 100 production in Myanmar, 83 Ott, Martin, 231 P peace conditional, 15 integrative, 15 peaceful change dependable expectations, 10–11, 14, 30, 40, 91, 234, 235 peacekeeping force, 234 personal security, 7 definition, 6 People’s Assembly, 200 Philippines, people power, 110 piracy, 10 Pitsuwan, Surin, see Surin Pitsuwan policy coordination, 187 political change minimal collective leverage by ASEAN, 96 political freedom, curtailment, 63 political ideology, 29 Political Instability Task Force (PITF), 40, 50 political liberalization, 221 political prisoners, 60–61 Post-Nargis Joint Assessment team (PONJA), 193


power intangible, 22 nature of, 9 poverty, borderland areas, 64 Powell, Colin demand for release of Aung San Suu Kyi, 118 prisoners, political, see political prisoners prostitution, 81 Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, 199 Q Queen Sirikit, 90 R Ramos, Fidel, 112 rational actor argument, 34 Razali Ismail, 133, 146, 228 resignation as UN Special Envoy, 152 UN Special Envoy, 120 realists agenda, 230 paradigm elements, 8 reciprocity, practice of, 12 Red Cross, see International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) refugees, 81–82 regional security complex, 4 regional subsystem theory, 4 relative differentiation, 32 Rice, Condoleezza, 120, 159 criticism of Myanmar, 142 view of SPDC’s roadmap to democracy, 199 Rizal Sukma, 180, 181, 208 Romulo, Alberto G., 160 Russia, 88, 89 S S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 225–26

12/8/09 5:41:58 PM

264

Saffron Revolution, 142, 152–61, 178, 185, 229 China’s quiet diplomacy with Myanmar, 162 commencement date, 170 events surrounding, 199 Sangha (Buddhist Monastic Order), 153 Save the Children, report, 61, 62 security broader understanding of, 7 comprehensive, 6 cooperative and collective, 16 definition, 6–10 neo-liberal approach, 6 security challenges extramural, 8 process, 27–51 security community application of frameworks, 1–26 ascendant nascent, 16 ascendant phase, 16 benchmark for existence of, 26 characteristics, 42–44 conceptual framework, 5 definition of, 1, 2, 4, 8, 13 dependable expectation of peaceful change, 42 economic management, 43 emergence, 2 evolutionary process, 4 embryonic phase, 15 expectations of peaceful change, 10–11 impediments to formation of, 44 integration, 13–16 levels, 43 meaningful, 239 nation building, 43 pluralistic, 4 processes, 1 processes behind internal consolidation, 43


Index

prospects, 216–35 security sector reform, 43 structuralization, 15 types, 14 security dilemma low integration, 9 security environment relationship with economic environment, 40 security integration low level, 96 security sector reform internal consolidation of state, 38–42 levels and objectives, 39 security threats intramural, 8 self-esteem, collective, 32 Shabu, 84 Shan, 63 Shan Human Rights Foundation, 59 Shan National League for Democracy, 198 Shan State, mass rape in, 59 Shan State Army, 66, 90 battle with Thai military, 90 Shan Women’s Action Network, 59 Shinawatra, Thaksin, see Thaksin Shinawatra Shwe Mann, promotion of, 62 siege mentality, 203 Simon, Sheldon, 10 Singapore, 4 biggest exporter to Myanmar, 105 collective response from region, 158 investments in Myanmar, 88 supply of arms to Myanmar, 101 support for Myanmar, 113 Sirikit (Queen), 90 slave labour, 81 social actor the state as, 28 social group definition, 31

12/8/09 5:41:58 PM

Index

Social Identity Theory (SIT), 31 interstate relations, 31–34 social learning, 12 social problems resolution by institutionalized procedures, 13 social psychology, 31 social sciences, modern, 16 social security, 7 socialization, 12, 28 complex, 45 socio-cultural diversity, 233 socio-cultural identities, 29 Soe Win (Lieutenant General) meeting with Hassan Wirayuda, 119 visit to ASEAN countries, 124 visit to China, 106 Solana, Javier, 190 Somsavat Lengsavat, 125 South China Sea, 21 Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ), 109 Southeast Asian states, competitive arms acquisition process, 240 sovereignty, attributes of, 13 state, the collective identity, 27–34 internal consolidation, 34–42 economic management, 37 flowchart, 36 nation building, 37–38 security sector reform, 38–42 as social actor, 28 state consolidation, 49 State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 111 State Peace and Development Committee (SPDC) acknowledgment of loss of lives, 64 attendance of meeting organized via Bangkok Process, 133 benefit from narcotics industry, 85


265

carrot and stick approach, 192 China’s sponsorship, 93 clear goals for reform within, 226 conciliatory attitude, 124 doubling size of armed forces, 94 failure to respond to constructive engagement, 107 fear of invasion, 191 fear of retribution, 204 initial refusal to accept international aid, 189 leaders, highly superstitious, 203, 204 requirement for political pluralism, 216 road map for democracy, 159 State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, 154 states, community of, 42 Steinberg, David, 221 structuration theory, 44 structurationist approach, 28 Sulawesi Sea, 233 supranational institutionalization, 3 Supreme Court of the Union, 200 Surayud Chulanont (General), 92 Surin Pitsuwan, 114, 194 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 146 Syed Hamid Albar, 119, 145, 146, 151, 229 frustration with Myanmar, 147 systemic anarchy, 10 T transformative capacity, 28 Tatmadaw, 62 benefit from opium production, 84 offensives against Karen and Karenni states, 152 recommencement of fighting with KNU, 214 skirmishes with Thai military, 90 Taylor, Robert, 156, 161, 170

12/8/09 5:41:58 PM

266

TCG mechanism, 230 ThaiCom satellites, 92 Thai-Burma Consortium, 58 Thailand buffer zone policy, 89 constructive engagement with Myanmar, 111 encroachment by insurgent groups from Myanmar, 90 HIV/AIDS rate, 82 illegal migrants in, 59 insurgency in southern regions, 233 Mae Lah refugee camp, 81 military coup (2006), 97, 206 money supplied to Myanmar, little benefit to people on the ground, 238 narcotics trading in, 67 political turmoil, 7 Queen Sirikit, 90 reduction in narcotics production, 86 relations with Myanmar, 89–93, 229 source of foreign income for Myanmar, 226 task force to combat narcotics trade, 86 violence in southern region, 240 Thaksin administration, 229, 231 Thaksin Shinawatra, 91 allegations of corruption, 92 Than Shwe (General), 62, 146, 149, 160, 189 arrest of military intelligence division, 61 diplomatic mission to China, 95 highly superstitious, 203 inability to attend Cebu Summit, 151 medical treatment in Singapore, 62 meeting with Ibrahim Gambari, 156 ousting of Khin Nyunt, 228


Index

Thein Gyi Zei, 154 Thein Sein (Lieutenant General), 161, 199 threat, definition of, 30 tourism, opportunities, 225 trade, opportunities, 225 transactionalism, 12 transactionalist approach, 12 transnational communities, 5 McFarlane’s definition, 98 transnational community, 11 transnational norms, 28 transnational security, 14 problems, 10 transnational security challenges, 87 Transparency International, Corruption Index, 202 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), Myanmar’s intention to accede, 111 Tripartite Core Group, 193 trust absence of, 30 development of, 30 factors that build, 47 Tutu, Desmond (Bishop), 145 U Umar Hadi, 134, 180 Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), 153, 194 United Kingdom, Department for International Development (DFID), 221 United Nations Myanmar’s dealings with, 157 Responsibility to Protect doctrine, 163 United Nations Charter, 108 UN Commission for Human Rights, 155 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 218

12/8/09 5:41:58 PM

267

Index

United National General Assembly (UNGA), 146 UN General Assembly, Plenary session (September 2008), 155 UN Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 237 UN International Labour Organization (ILO), 218 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 192 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 82 UN Security Council (UNSC) calls for intervention by, 145 draft resolution by the U.S., 150 United States, 4 arms embargo to Myanmar, 89 at odds with ASEAN over Myanmar, 217 call for Myanmar to step down from scheduled ASEAN chairmanship, 120 issue of Myanmar raised at UN Security Council, 144, 145 legislating to censure military governments, 235 pressure on ASEAN re Myanmar’s chairmanship, 142 restrictions on trade with Myanmar, 218 United Wa State Army (UWSA), 65 mobile narcotics convoy, 84 narcotics producer, 67 UWSA, control of frontier, 92 V Vayrynen, Raimo, 6 Vientiane Plan of Action, 181, 183, 184, 186, 187 Vietnam, HIV/AIDS rate, 82


Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors, 90 Vihear, Preah, 233 village relocations, 81 vote rigging, 201 W Wa, splinter faction of Communist Party of Burma, 65 wage increases, recommendation for military and government, 202 war community, 69 Weaver, Ole, 25 Women’s League of Burma, 59 World Bank, 193, 218 X xenophobia, SPDC leadership, 220 Y Yadana Pipeline Project, 237 Yangon bombings, 62 fortified government facilities, 76 Yap, Eugene, 18 Yeo, George, 148 diplomatic trips to resolve Myanmar issue, 156 Singapore Minister for Foreign Affairs, 145 statement in capacity as ASEAN chair, 155 transcript of answer in Parliament, 175 Z Zaid Ibrahim, 123, 138 Zoellick, Robert, 120 Zhu, Zhiqun, 13 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), 169

12/8/09 5:41:58 PM

About The Author

Christopher Roberts is a Lecturer in International Relations and Asian Studies at the Faculty of Business and Government, University of Canberra. He is also a Visiting Fellow at the University of New South Wales (ADFA campus). He was previously a post-doctoral fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations (RSIS) in Singapore and has held visiting appointments at both RSIS and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). Supervised by Professor James Cotton at UNSW at ADFA, he completed a Ph.D. on ASEAN’s pursuit of a security community in 2007. Thanks to a number of research grants — including the Australian Government’s Endeavour Australia Cheung Kong Award — together with his work for organizations such as the ASEAN Secretariat and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the author has conducted more than thirty field trips to all ten of the ASEAN countries. The author has published several book chapters, journal articles and commentaries on issues ranging from international relations theory to ASEAN and regional security issues, in areas such as the South China Sea and Myanmar. Aside from Myanmar, his current research interests include the Indochina countries and the challenges of transnational crime. From an international relations perspective, he has also been investigating the role of values and norms in the emergence of greater cooperation, institutionalization and peace among the ASEAN nations.

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12/8/09 5:43:20 PM

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