Aristotle's Physics

API~TOTEAOT~ T~IKH AKPOA~I~

ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS A REVISED TEXT WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY

BY

w. D. ROSS PROVOST OF ORIEL COLLEGE

OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 193 6

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AlItEN HOUSE, E.C. 4 London Edinburgh Glasgow New York Toronto Melbourne Capetown Bombay Calculla Madras Shanghai

HUMPHREY MILFORD PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

PREFACE THE Physics has always been recognized to be one of the most important of Aristotle's works, and it is therefore rather surprising that, until the appearance of Wicks teed and Corn ford's ed ition, no edition with an introduction and commentary had been produced in modern times. The need of such an edition was brought home to me when I was engaged in preparing for publication the translation by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye; and the task of an editor had been facilitated by the Berlin Academy's editions of the paraphrase by Themistius and of the commentaries of Philoponus and Simplicius. I had some hopes that new light might be thrown on the text by a collation of the hitherto neglected Vienna MS. Gr. 100; but these have hardly been realized, since that MS. does not preserve many good read ings that were not already known to exist in other M55. More light has in fact been derived from a study of the three Greek commentators. lowe much to the careful and scholarly work of Messrs. Hardie and Gaye; and at an earlier stage I learned much in the pleasant hours spe nt I in reading the PhYSICS as a member of the Oxford Aristotelian Society, under the guidance of such consummate Aristotelians as Professors Bywater, Smith, and Joachim. I have vari ed the plan adopted in my edition of the Meta· phys,cs, by printing the analysis continuously instead of prefixing it to the several chapters; I hope that this will make it easier for readers to follow th e course of the magnificently continuous argument which runs, in particular, through books v, vi, and viii. It would have been possible, and might have been profitable, to make the Introduction much longer, by attempting to discuss more fully the philosophical merits of Aristotle's argument and of the resultant doctrines; but I thought that the interests of readers would on the whole be better served by keeping the work within the limits of a single volume. I have tried to supply, in text and commentary, the foundation on which such a discussion by others may be based.

VI

PREFACE

wish to acknowledge with gratitude the provIsion by the Jowett Copyright Fund of a subsidy which has assisted the publication of the book, and to thank the officers and staff of the Clarendon Press for the care they have bestowed on its production . I would also thank Mr. D. J. Allan, Fellow of Balliol College, for his kindness in looking up some doubtful readings of the Paris MSS. 1859 and 1861.

W. D.R.

CONTENTS BOOKS REFERRED TO

viii

INTRODUCTION: 1. II.

III.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PHYSI CS

ARISTOTLE' S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. THE TEXT OF THE PHYSICS

I

19 102

PHYS ICS: TEXT

"9

SIGLA

120

SECOND VERSION OF

vii

1- 3

ANALYSI S . COMMENTARY

INDEXES: INDEX VERBORUM

733

I NDEX TO THE INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY

748

BOOKS AND AR TI CLES ON T H E PHYSi CS AND OTHER BOOKS REFERRED TO (This list is meant only to facilitate reference, and does not aim at completeness.) A.C.P. = Arthiv fur Geschickte dey PhilosofJltie. J.P. ~ Jolt",al oj Philology. R./lII.M. = Revue de Alttapltysique ct de Morale. R.P. = Revue Ph£losojJhique. Aldus Manut ius : Arist. v ita foX Laerlio . .. Aris!. de pltys. audiltl . Ven. 1497· Arnim, H. von: Die EntstelZ1mg d. Gotltslehre d. Arts!. Wien, 1931. Baumker, C: Vum eilltiiche Arist. Z eugnisse iJber Anarimalldros' AI1EIPON, i"Jaltro.J. CI. Pltilol . [31 ([885 ),827- 32. Bekker, I: Arisl. Opera . Berol., 1831 . Bergson, H.: Quid Arist. de loco senserit. Paris, 1889. Bonitz, H.: Arisl. Sludiefl. i. ii- :ii, iv. Wien, 1862,1863, 1866. Bonitz, H : Inder Arist. BeroL, 1870. Brandis, C. A.! Comment. E/eatieae. Al:ona, 1813. Burnet, J.: Early Creek Philosophy, ed. 3. Lond . 1920. Bywater, I.: A ristotelia ii, v, in J. P . xiv (1885), 41 and xxxi (1913), 10 7. Camoti~s, J. B. : Anst. de pltys. auscultalione,&c. Ven.I5SI . Carteron, H.: La Notion de Force dans Ie Systeme ti' Arist. Paris, 1924. Carleron, H.: An·st. Pltys. Paris, 1926, 1931. Comford, F. M.: Til e Laws of !vlotion in Ancient Thought. Camb., 1931. Cornford, F. M.: Arist. Pltys., 25011 9-19 and 266:" 12 - 24, in Class. Quart., xxvi (1932), 52- 4. Dickerman, S. 0.: Some Stock Illustrations of Am'mal Intel/igmee Greek Psychology, in Trans . oj American Plt~'lol. Assocn. xlii (191 I), 12 3-3 0 • Diels, H. : Doxog rajJhi Gratei. Berol., 1879. D ieJs, H.: Zur Te:rtgesclticJtle ti. Arisl. Pltys. Berlin, 1882. Diels, H. : Fragmenle d. Vm'sokratiker, ed . 3. Berlin, 1912. Edel, A.: Aristotle's Theory oftlte Infinite. New York, 1934. Emminger, A. : Die 'llorsokratiscltm PltilosojJlten n(Uk d. Bericltlen d . Arist. Wtirzburg, 1878 . Erasmus, D.: Arist. .. . Opera. Basil., 1531.

i,.,

BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON THE PHYSICS

IX

Frohlings, A.: Die Begnl1e Dynamis 11. Energie d. Ansi. 'II. d. tnodeYllm pl,ysiJ.:alisdrm Hegriffi d. Kraft 11. Energie. Koblenz, 1929. Gagnebin, S. : Un ApeyfU de la Physique d' Arist. Lausanne, 1934. Gohlke, P.: Die Entstdumgsgesclticlzte d. natu1"-dlisst1Zscnajliid,nt Scltnflen d. Arlst., in Hn7nu Iix (1924), 274-306. Goldbeck, E.: Die gto8e1llriscne Lekre d. Arist, 11. inre Auj16mng. Berlin, 1911.

Goltschlich, E.: Zlir Phys. d. Arist., in Jahrb. f. Ct. Philol. CV (1872), 618- 20 and cvii (1873), 109-10. Guthrie, W. K. C.: Tlte Droe/oplllmt of Arisl.'s Tlu%O, in Class. Qllart. xxvii (1933), 162-7 1, xxviii (1934), 90-8. Haas, A . E : Die Gnmdlagm d. anliken Dynamik, in Arch. d. Cud,. d. Na turwislencltajlen 11. d. Teclmik i (1908), 19- 47. Hamelin, 0.: La Na t ure eI Ie MouvmzeJtt d'apres Adst., in R.P. Ixxxvii ( 19 19),353-68 . H amelin, 0.: Arist. Phys. ii - Traduction el Commentaire, cd. 2. Paris,

'93 " j. H. and Greenhill, G. : Prof TUrlle1' and Arist., in Nature, Hardcastle, xcii (19 13- 14), 584- 5. Hardcastle. j. I-f.: Aristotle's Physics, in h'ature xci ii (1~,jl4), 428. Hardie, R. P. and Caye, R. K.: Translation of Pltysicr. Oxford, 1930. Hayduck, M.: Belftcr/mngen zur Phys. d. Arist. Greifswald, 1871. Hayduck, M.: Ooservatiolles Critical! in aii'lllot locos Arisl. Greifswald, I8n Heath, D. D.: 011 some Misconceptions oj Arist.'s doctrine on Causall01' and TO (J~TOJA(J"O~, in J.P. vii (I877 ), 97- 115. Heidel, W. A.: Qualitative Change in Pre-Socratic Philosophy, in A.C.P. xix (1906), 55 3-79. Hoffmann, E . : De Arist. Pltys. sept:mi libri origine at auctor/tate. Berol., 1905. Hoffmann, E.: De Arist. Pltys. libn: sejJtimi forma, I, II. Friedenau, 1908- in referring forward to Phys. vi (An. Post. 95b lI), and in referring back to Phys. vi (Phys. 263' lI, De Caelo 272" 30, 299' 10, De Sensu 445' 19, Met. I049b 36), and to Phys. viii (De Caelo 275' 22, De Gen. et Carr. 318& 3). He also uses th e phrase 'Ta. '1t'£pl. xpovou KQt KUI~U(W'> in referring back to Plrys. vi (De Cado 303" 23)' Further, he uses the phrase Ta 7TCpl. TO.'; rlpXas in referring back to Phys. iii (De Caelo 274& 21). He also uses the words TO. 1Tfpl CPVCTfWfj; in referring back to the De Caelo (Met. 9ag" 24). Bonitz quotes Met. 1073" 32, and (with hesitation) Met. I042b 8, lo62 b 31, 1086& 23, as also referring to the De Caelo and the De Ge1l. el Carr. by the litle TO VlJULI, oX7]CTtS', 8lVl]eTtS', but expounds them in the order w;;nr; (So 26- 8), 0X'7Ut.. (& 28-b 23), ,~" (b 23- 9), Oiv~'m (b 29- 244" 17), which obscures th e point clearly brought out in a that lAb, and '''''' are logically prior to 0XYJCTtS and UII1JCTLS. (2) In a 243b 12-15 ;/(7J'lfO~, 7t'TV(Tt'ii, and the ('(Kpt'TlKal Ktvt1Ut:l~ are rightly described as forms of """. In f3 243 b 25-7 they are absurdly described as 1A~",. (But this should perhaps be emended by excising f'A~t:t~ and understanding KlV7}U£t~ with at Aonra{.) (3) f3 245 b 26-7 puts less accurately what is better stated in b 0. 245 9- 11. (4) f3 246. 22-b 21 is rather a jejune restatement of what is stated more fully, and in a thoroughly Aristotelian way, in

a 246& r_b 4.

(5) (6)

I

f3 247" 28- b 21 is similarly related to a 247 b 1-7. f3 has several un·Aristotelian phrases :-

iv -r?J CJ.v-rV /CQT7JYop{?- n]~ ovu{Q~ ~ TOU y£vov~ 242b 4· il1T'£p -rij'i cpopO.~ for 1iEpl n]'i cpopO.'i in 243& 10 creates some suspicion. This use of inrlp is found thrice in the Categories, five times in th e Topics, and five times in the NicomacJzean Ethics, and nowhere else in Aristotle's genuine works. But it is common in the Magna Moralia and in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrutn. It is a late use; where it occurs in genuine works of Aristotle it is probably due to corruption, and where it exists in a work of unknown date it is an argument for lateness. -ro Tij~ ruOtWUEW~ 245& 20, 246a 29, b 26, 248b 27, 'TO Tij~ -,]Bovij~ 2478.25,27 . 'TO n1~ i1iur"lfLTf~ ib. 30. This seems to be found, in

genuine works of Aristotle, only in De Resp. 472b 9, and it is a late and feeble idiom.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PHYSICS 15 b ly Tn TIj~ brt~p.." .. V1T'aPXll 247 29 and yivrrraL v~q,wv 7T'po-rl or t:r8o~ or apx~ ij> ;, .\0)'0>, the principle which forms the object of definition. (I) and (2), or (I) and (3), together make up an ouaIn or T60£ n. The Eleatics denied the existence of coming into being, because they held that it must be either from that which is or from that which is not, and could not be from either; not from that which is, because then there would be no change, and not from that which is not, because out of nothing nothing can corne. Aristotl e gets over this . difficulty by pointing ou t the distinction between g eneration out of something per se and generation out of something in virtue of th e concomitance of that with something else. If a doctor becomes, by neglecting his art, no doctor, it is qua doctor that he undergoes the change; but if he turns grey it is not qua doctor but qua blackhaired, i.e. in virtue of a concomitant of his doctorhood, that he does so. So too, if an OY comes into being ~K J-L7] OYTO'i) it is not be ,...~ OP'TO'i as such (which would contradict th e principle ex nih£!o nihil fit); it comes into being €K J-L~ OV'TO'i) i.e. from a U'T Ep7]Ut'i, non-a, but €K J-L,q OJl'TO'i in virtue of the concomitance of the (n'£p1JuL'i with a lJ7roKf.t,...f.YOV, X. Again, if an OY comes into being U OV'TO'i, it is not €t OY'TO'i as such (in which case there would be no change), but U OVTO'i, i.e. from a lJ7t'OKf.tP.f.JlOJl, x, in virtue of the concomitance of the lJ1T'OKf.tj!f.VOY with a u'Tlp'r]O'w, non·a. Thus we save the existence of generation, without denying the principle 'everything either is or is not " which to an Eleatic seemed to make change impossible. 1 The Platonists also recognize a triad, the one, the great, and the small. But though they speak of the great and the s mall, they treat the great and small as a single principle, not distinguishing within the terminus a quo of change the persistent and the non-p ersistent element, supposite and opposite. Thus when the question is asked what it is that aims at the divine principle of form, we answer that it is the supposite or matter that does so, but they can only say that it is the opposite that does so-though th is can no more desire its own opposite, which will destroy it, than form can desire itself. 2 If we ask whether matter comes into being, or passes away, we must answer that qua that in which the crrlPY}Ul'i is present, it passes away when the U7'£p'r]u~'i passes away (for / that in which 1

Ch.B.

2

J9Ib3S-1 923.25.

INTRODUCTION the UTEp7pLIO is present) then no longer exists), but that in virtue of its function it is eternal. For if matter ever was coming into being, th ere must have been something that underlay this process, and this itself would be matter, so that th ere would have been matter before matter came into being; and if matter perishes, it must pass into something, and this would still be matter, so that matter would survive its own perishing,1 Thus the whole substance of book i, if we eliminate incidental digressions, is the establishment of matter, form, and privation as the factors involved in all change. Aristotle's chief claim is that he has for the first time exhibited clearly the distinction between matter and privation, and th e necessity of both to any account of change j and this claim is a well·founded one.

Nature as Internal Source of Change. He begins his account of nature, in book ii, by assuming the existence of two kinds of thing which ordinary language dis· tinguishes as f existing by nature' and f existing as a result of other causes' ; and the context shows that this latter phrase may be paraphrased by 'existing by art, or by other rational activity'. To the former class belong animals and th eir parts, plants (and presumably their parts), and the simple bodies fire, air, water, and earth ; to the other, such things as beds and clothes. N ow the former have this characteristic, that they have in themselves a power of ini tiating change and of bringing it to an end; animals and the simple bodies can initiate change of place j animals and plants can initiate change of size and of quality. Beds and clothes initiate no change. In a sense the two classes overlap; for beds and clothes are, after all, made up out of th e simple bodies, and as such can initiate change of place; they will of themselves fall if unsupported, though no external force acts on them. But they do this not qua beds or clothes but qua composed of simple bodies. The distinction th erefore holds good, and it reveals th e fac t that when a is said to be a natural object and b is not, what is meant is that a as such has, and b as such has not, an internal power of originat· ing movement. This then is what nature is; things that have this f have a nature', and these of course are substances, since nature can exist only in a substratum; both these and 1

19Za25-b4-

ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 25 their essential attributes I are by nature' or 'are according to nature '.1

Aristotle adds that, while the nature or essence of a natural object is by some thinkers identified with the material of which it is made, it is more properly identified with the shape, or with the form which would be stated in the definition of the thing. A thing is most truly itself when it exists actually, not potentially, and its nature should therefore be identified not with the material out of which it can develop, but with the form it exhibits when it has developed. Form then is nature; but a certain definite absence of form is itself a kind of form and constitutes the nature of things at an earlier stage of development. 2

Further light is thrown on Aristotle's view of "',;"" by the discussion in book viii. In book ii cfJ.VCTLIO is spoken of as an apxTl KtV~UEW~ EV airr4J, and we are apt to form the impression that Aristotle thinks of it as a power, resident in natural objects, of absolutely initiating movement. The apparent presence of such a power both in Iireless and more particularly in living things is cited in book viii among the grounds that seem to indicate the possibility of the origination of movement out of comlJlete immobility.s But as regards lifeless objects, Aristotle implies that their passage from a state of rest to one of movement is in fact not initiated from within but due to the action of an external agent. What is characteristic of them is that when a particular movement takes place, viz. the removal of an obstacle to their free movement, they respond to this by a movement of their own-upward in the case of fire and air, downward in that of water and earth-which is the actualization of a permanent potentiality of their nature. What is characteristic of living things is that when certain elements of their environment (notably air and food) set up changes in them which are not of the nature of locomotion, they respond by local movements of their limbs, which again are the realization of permanent potentialities of their nature. 4 Thus neither the four elements nor living things are absolute originators of movement from a state of complete immobility. Yet the distinction between natural movements, which are the realization of typical potentialities, 1

192b8- 193a 9. 4

' 193b 18-20.

• 252b 12-28.

For the details of the discussion in bk. viii cf. pp. 86- 8.

INTRODUCTION and compulsory movements, which are forced on things from without, contrary to their typical potentialities, remains [or Aristotle complete. Al'islotle's Dynam£cs,t

The distinction between natural and compulsory movement lies at the basis of Aristotle's whole dynam ics. His theory of natural movement is a theory about the facts which a re now summed up under the heading of gravitation. With regard to these facts there were three main theories in antiquity. There was the theory that bodies may be divided into light bodies, which tend towards the circumference of the universe, and heavy bodies, which tend towards its centre. This is Aristotle's view, but he adds 2 that while it is the nature of fire to move as far as it can towards the circumference, and of earth to move as far as it can towards the centre, to air we can ascribe only a tendency towards the region just inside the circumferential region, and to water only a tendency towards the region just outside the central region. Thus air is only in a qualified sense light, water only in a qu alified sense heavy.' He adds that earth has weight (i.e. a centripetal tendency) wherever it is, water such a. tendency everywhere except in the region of earth, air everywhere except in the regions of water and earth, all three having we ight in their own region 4; and he adds as proof of this that an innated skin weighs more than an empty one. 1i This last allusion illustrates forcibly two great defects of Aristotle's theory. In the lirst place, the supposed experi· mental fact is not correct. If the experiment had been conducted exactly enough, he would have found that an empty skin and a skin inflated with air weigh, in air, exactly the same. In the second place, the theory is not true to the experimental facts he thought he had at his command; for if the inflated skin really weighed more than the empty one, that would suggest not that air has an upward tendency but that it has a downward one and that air is prevented from moving to the centre of the 1 This section owes much to A. E. Haas's article in Archiv fur d. Gesdt. d. Nalurwisst1lsclraflen u. d. Technik, i (1908), 19-47. 2 Anticipated by Anaxagoras, D. L. ii. 8. , De Caelo 3IJllZ2-9 t ib. 3U b 5-9. ti ib. 9.

ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 27 universe merely by the greater weight of earth and of water. The supposed fact should have suggested therefore a comparative theory of weight, not the theory that different elements have contrary properties of heaviness and lightness. This experiment played an important part in the development of later theories. Ptolemy repeated the experiment, obtained the opposite result, that the inflated skin is lighter than the empty one, and drew the conclusion that air has no heaviness in its own region I; and from the fact that divers do not suffer from the pressure of the water above them he inferred that water also has no heaviness in its own region. 2 Finally Simplicius again made the experiment of the skins, got the correct result, that the inflated skin weighs the same in air as the empty skin, and explained this on the ground that since the natural /xJ7rl] of each element is to its own region, it has no fxm~ when it is already there. 3 Though, in Aristotle's cosmology, the centre of the earth coincides with the centre of the universe, he was careful to say that it was to the latter as such and not to the former that heavy bodies go'; and he added that if the earth were to leave the centre of the universe and be placed where the moon is, particles of earth would still tend to the centre of the universe.o Both Plutarch and the Epi.cureans' rejected as absurd the notion that a point in space, irrespective of what occupies it, could be the natural terminus ad quem of gravitation. Plutarch argues that it is absurd to suppose that a heavy mass plunging through the earth would rest when it reaches the centre,? or if it overshot that mark would return to it.' The Epicureans also rejected the notion that there are absolutely light bodies, and assigned to all bodies alike a tendency downwards, holding that the upward movement of light bodies was an unnatural movement imparted to them by heavier bodies which squeezed them upwards. 9 The theory of Plato was intermediate between that of Aristotle and that of the Atomists. Like the Atomists he rejects the notion that any of the elements is absolutely light." Like Simp. de Caelo 710. 24. 2 ib. 17. sib. 29. De Caelo 296b 16. I 310b 2- 5. I Lucr. i. ib. 1052-60, 1074-6. '1 De Caelo273 a It. I Mor. 9 2 4 ab. , Simp. de Caeio 267. 30, Epic. fro 276. 10 Simp. de Caelo 269. 6. I

4

INTRODUCTION Aristotle, he thinks they have their characteristic regions to which they tend. Essentially, however, he makes this not a tendency towards different spatial regions, but a tendency of like towards like, of small parts of any of the elements to aggregate themselves with the main masses of what resembles them respectively; it is in fact a selective gravitation of like to like. I Thus the distinction between heavy and light becomes a relative one. All bodies are heavy, because all tend to unite with the main mass of what resembles them.' Some are lighter than others simply because they offer less opposition to a force that moves them towards what is unlike them. s Plato's prin~ ciple of universal selective gravitation, it will be seen, was more on the lines on which advance was to take place than Aristotle's division of the elements into two classes, distinguished by the spatial position of the regions they tend to. When we turn to consider the velOCtty of natural movement, we find that Aristotle considers this to be in the main determined by two factors, (I) the amount of p07r~, i.e. of weight or lightness, possessed by the moving object,4 which in turn, as between bodies of the same kind, is said to vary directly with their size/ and {2} the density of the medium.' To these must be added a third factor, (3) the shape of the moving thing,' the notion being of course that a pointed object penetrates a given medium faster than a less pointed object of the same kind. If we ignore this as not lending itself readily to formulation, his formula would be CMxT or V ..--~~C-:;M,----,,-_ .' D Density of medium Density of medium From this he draws the conclusion that in a void, if there could be such a thing, since density of medium would = 0, all bodies would move with infinite velocity, or in other words would take no time to move.' But since he (rightly) thinks it impossible that any distance should be traversed in no time, he draws the wrong conclusion that a void must be impossible since motion through it would occupy no time. His error of course lies in Tim. 52 e-53 a. t ib. 63 e. Jib. 63 d. Phys. 215& 28. lib. 216& 15, De Caelo i. 6, 2nb 4, 30Sb 18. , PllYS. 2I5a 26. 7 ib. 216;1. 19. De Coeto iv. 6. I D = distance, M = mass, T=time, V = velocity, C = a constant . • Phys. 215b 12-Z16a 1I.

1 4

ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 29 not seeing that the essence of motion is the traversal of a given distance in a given time, and in supposing that it is essentially the penetration of a medium to a certain distance, so that the resistance of the medium, instead of being something that merely reduces the velocity of the moving body, is something by which the POm] of the body has to be divided, to get its velocity. In fact, having observed accurately that motion through a denser medium is slower than through a rarer one, he makes the natural enough mistake of supposing that velocity and density ceteris paribus vary inversely i failing to notice that the relation which connected them might be more complex than that of inverse proportion. A better mathematician might, even in the absence of evidence, have noticed the possibility of this. Major J. H. Hardcastle, writing in Nature,) has pointed out that Aristotle's view that bodies fall with a speed proportional to their weight is approximately true of the terminal velocity of projectiles, i.e. the velocity at which retardation due to a medium such as air or water almost exactly balances the acceleration due to gravity, resulting in an almost constant speed offall. Aristotle may have been relying on rough observation of this fact. But it is clear that he has not analysed out the factors that combine to produce this result. Though in the main he works with the idea of velocity and says little of acceleration, he assumed that the free fall of a heavy body is subject to acceleration, and that the free rise of a light body is so too.' Strato later sought to establish the former fact by two observations-that when water is poured from ajug the lower part of the waler breaks into drops while the upper does not, and that a body falling from a shorter distance makes no great impact on the ground, while one falling from a greater distance does. lI We do not know how Aristotle satisfied him~ self of the truth of the principle. I t seems probable that he simply assumed that the attraction of the terminus ad quem increased as the moving body approached it. Simplicius quotes a current explanation, that the nearer a portion of any element gets to its proper region, the more it acquires its own proper form, which is the tendency to move towards that region: This , xcii (1913- 14). 584- 5, xciii (1914). 428. 2 Phys. 230b 24, De Caelo 277 11 27. 4 ib. 5, Simp. De Caelo 266. 32.

!

Simp. PAys. 916. 12- 28.

INTRODUCTION is in accordance with Aristotle's principle that for a thing to move towards its place is to move towards its form. 1 According to Aristotle compulsory movement is an entirely different phenomenon from natural movement. He no doubt realized that the nature of the medium affected the former as well as the latter, but in his actual treatment of compulsory movement he ignores the medium. In the case of compulsory movement the mass of tbe moving body is thought of not as increasing but as diminishing its velocity, so that his formula is

MxD CFxT CF, Fx T = C, or D= ---xr-' or V= M' But this principle according to him is valid only when the ratio of force to mass moved remains constant or when the force increases relatively to the mass. (I) M can be halved and D doubled, F and T remaining the same. (2) M and T can be halved, F and D remaining the same. Since (3) D and T can be both halved or both doubled, F and M remaining the same, . . ' . (4) F and M can be halved, D and T remaining the same.' Since (5) M cannot be doubled and D halved, F and T remaining the same . . '. (6) Fand Dcannot be halved, Mand Tremainingthe same. (7) If F' moves M' distance D in time T, and FJI moves Mil distance D in time T, F' + F" move M' + Mil distance D in time T.' The enunciation of (5) and (6) is based by Aristotle on empirical grounds, e.g. on the fact that where a company of men can haul a ship a certain distance in a certain time, a single man may not be able to move it at all. He does not realize that this is due to friction, and speaks as if the mere weightiness of the object to be moved demanded a certain minimum force to move it at all. He does not contemplate a force acting on a mass and giving it a definite velocity of movement, which it then retains until some other force or some resistance brings its motion to an end or alters it. His general principle is that the continuance of imparted motion implies continued contact 1 3

De Caeio 3 lOa 33. Pltys. 249 b 30- 250a 9.

, F = force. 4

ib. 2503.9-28.

ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 3' between mover and moved; and when this seems not to be the case, as in the movement of a projectile, he falls back on some special explanation, such as that the air continues to impart movement to the moving body,l In the present passage, as the example of the ship-haulers t shows, he contemplates a force remaining in contact with th e moving body. He sees correctly enough that the speed of the movement varies with the duration of th e application of the force, but fails to see that in the absence of a resisting mediu m and of friction the application of a force however small for a time however short would move a mass however grea t with a certain velocity. In another place,' as we have seen, Aristotle shows himself aware of the importance, in the theory of motion, of the nature of the medium, and indeed exaggerates its importance, making velocity inversely proportional to th e density of the medium. He can hardly be supposed to have overlooked in the present passage 4 the existence of the resistance of the medium, and we must assu me that he presupposes an identical medium to be present throughout. When he came to notice that though A moves B distance C in time D, A need not move

2

B (or

~2

move B) distance

f2

in

time D, Aristotle, if he had reasoned more profoundly, would have seen that this upset his original principle that if A moves

B distance C in time D, A moves!!. precisely distance 2

2

C in

time D. ' He would have seen that his principle that velocity varies with force and inversely to mass moved, while tru e in itself (if we substitute acceleration for velocity), could not be the complete theory of th e velocity of movement, and would have been led to suspect that the apparent breach of his prin· ciple was due to the interference of friction. He erred by underestimating the complexity of the problem. As Duhem well remarks/, 'Cette Dynarnique, en effet. semble s'adapter si heureusement aux observations courantes qu'elle ne pouvait manquer de s'imposer, tout d'abord, a I'acceptation des premiers qui aien t specule sur les forces et les mouvements. (Au Piree, Aristote observe un groupe de haleurs; Ie corps 1

ib. 266 b 27-267R 20.

S

Phys. iv. 8.

4

!Ii

ib. vii. 5.

B

ib. 250& 18.

SJ1stbnedze Monde, i. 194- 5.

\ 32 INTRODUCTION penche en avant, ils pesent ie de grande importance y est joue par des resistances dont les phenomenes vraiment simples doivent ~tre entierement exempts; en un mot, que pour formuler les principes de la science du mouvement, on doit, par abstraction, considerer un mobile qui, sous 1'action d'une force unique, se meut dans Ie vide. Or, de sa Dynamique, Aristote va justement conclure qu'un tel mouvement est inconcevable: I-laving no conception of the F irst Law of Motion, Aristotle finds it necessary to offer some explanation of the fact that a body goes on moving after the body which moved it has ceased to be in contact with it. In vne passage I he says that this must be due either to u.vTLr.£pluracTL~ or to the fact that the impelled air pushes the body with a movement faster than its natural movement. The first explanation is that mooted by Plato in the Tima. ....s,' that the air which is dispelled by the moving body gathers in behind it and pushes it on. The second explanation, since it is distinguished from this, must be that there was from the start air between the propellant and the proj ectile, and that this pushes on the projectile so long as 1

Pltys. 2IS a

14- 17.

I

79 a-So c.

ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 33 the motion imparted to it by the propellant is more vigorous than the natural motion of the projectile. 1 Further, since Aristotle thinks of impressed movement not as a tendency to move for ever with a uniform velocity but as the property of moving a certain distance in a certain time and then coming to a stop, he naturally thinks of the movement as gradually losing velocity till it merges into immobility. Compulsory motion tends to decelerate, while natural motion tends to accelerate.' Apart from the defects of Aristotle's dynamics named above, perhaps his most serious error is his division of natural movement into two kinds, the rectilinear movement of the terrestrial elements and the rotatory movement of the celestial spheres. In regarding circular motion as being equally simple with rectilinear, he falls into a natural confusion between identity of direction and constant change of direction. This bifurcation, and the wider bifurcation of movement into natural and compulsory, are the main reasons why he failed to reach a correct and unified dynamical theory. Yet there is in Aristotle a hint at a true theory of rotation. In book vii !I he says there are four ways in which one body may be set in motion by another-pulling, pushing, carrying, and twirling or rotation. The accounts given of pulling and pushing imply that they act in a straight line to or from the motive agent 4; and rotation is said' to be compounded out of pulling and pushing, the motive agent pulling one part of the moving object and pushing another part. Here circular motion is in fact described as the resultant of two simple rectilinear movements. If Aristotle had extended this analysis to include the' natural circular motion of the celestial spheres, he would have been on the track wh ich ultimately led to Newton's explanation of the movement of the planets. But in fact he always treats the rotation of the heavenly spheres as equally simple with rectiJinear motion.' J

The Four Causes. Chance,

Necessity,

We may now resume the thread of the argument in book ii. Aristotle next turns 1 to discuss what it is that is the precise

cr. PAys.

266b 27 -26711"20, De Caelo 30Ib22-9. Pltys. 230b 24, De Caelo 277 b 6. 4 ib. 18-b6. e Phys. 261 b 28-31, De Caeio 26S b 17-19. I

t

ton

D

!I I!

.

24311. 17 .

ib. 244ft 2.

..

1\ . 2 .

INTRODUCTION 34 object of study to the student of nature. In particular, how does he differ from the mathematician? Physical bodies contain solids, planes, lines, points, which are the very things studied by the mathematician. But the mathematician studies them in abstraction from the fact that they are the limits of physical bodies. Though these things have no existence apart from physical bodies, we can study them in abstraction from the whole fact of change, and since they have a nature of their own, and consequential properties of their own, which are entirely independent of change, no error arises from their being studied in abstraction. It is a mistake, however, to suppose, as Aristotle accuses the Platonists of doing, that physical objects can be studied in abstraction from the fact of change. The difference between a mathematical and a physical object may be seen by comparing curvature with snubness. Curvature exists in physical bodies and (Aristotle would say) nowhere else; but it can be studied-the properties of various curves can be studied-in abstraction from the fact of change. Snubness, on the other hand, is a particular curvature in a particular sort of body. A certain kind of body, and therefore susceptibility to certain kinds of change, is involved in the very definition of snubness, and cannot properly be abstracted from when we study snubness. And in this respect flesh, bone, man, in short all the objects of the physicist's study, are like the snub. Each of them is a ,..oot: lv "'4Jo~-,t a particular form embodied in a par· ticular kind . of body which that form requires for its embodiment; they, and their attributes, are AOYOL €vvAm, enmattered forms.1 Not only physics, but even the more physical branches of mathematics- optics, harmonics, astronomy-study objects which no doubt have a mathematical character, but study them in respect of their physical attributes. Since the objects of physics are essentially complexes of matter and form, it follows that physics must take account both of their matter and of their form. But Aristotle implies that it is only f up to a certain point' that it studies each of these. 3 It is not made very clear in his account how this point is fixed. But we may perhaps say that in studying any particular complex of form a with matter b, physics must know what kind I

3

Met. I030bI8, I036bZ3. Pkys. 194a. 23, b 9.

ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

35

of matter that form needs for its embodiment, and what form

that matter is fitted to embody, as a doctor (though he is not a natural philosopher or physicist but an artist, whose task, how· ever, is in this respect akin to that of the physicist) I must know both the nature or definition of health so far as that can be stated without reference to any kind of matter, and also th e kind of matter in which that nature can be embodied, viz. f bile and phlegm '. On the other hand, qua studying a in b, the physicist is not bound to know what further ends a conduces to, nor what more primitive matter b is composed of. It is enough that he should know a and b in their relation of form to matter, of end to means, of actuality to potentiality. It is easy to see the agreement between this account of the nature of physics and that given in the Metaphysics,' where (ltwpl]nKTJ bnunJJLl] is divided into physics, dealing with XIJJPlCTTfJ. aX).' OVK tlK{VfJTa, things that have separate, substantial existence, but involve movement in their being, and therefore matter, which is the potentiality of movement; mathematics, dealing with uKlIIT}Ta JLf:V 011 XWptCTTo' Sf: iCTW~ aXA' W~ Ell vAn, things that are devoid of movement but have no separate existence, but only exist as embodied ill matter j and theology, which deals with XWptUTo. Kal uKLvT}Ta, pure forms that exist separately and exempt from change (viz. God and the beings that move the heavenly spheres). A typical example of physics as thus conceived is Aristotle's psychology, which is really psycho· physics, in which both body and soul, and the relation between them, are held constantly in view. In intention at least, all Aristotle's physical treatises adhere to this programme. The form or end is always in the forerront j the method of treatment, particularly in the biological works, is predominantly teleologi. cal. But constant regard is also had to the material structure by which and by which alone the ends of nature can be realized. Aristotle next points out that, since the object of physics is to understand natural change or process, in other words to know why it takes place, the physicist must inquire what are the various kinds of ainoll. aiTtOV must not here be understood as meaning I cause'; for the several aiTta are not causes in the sense of furnishing complete explanations of natural processes. It is on ly the union of them all that furnishes a complete

INTRODUCTION explanation, and severally they are merely necessary conditions of natural process. The chapter in which they are expounded' is repeated, but for its beginning and its end, in Met. a. 2, and it is impossible to say with certainty wh ethe r it was in its context in the Phys£cs or as part of his philosophical lexicon ·that Aristotle lirst formulated his doctrine. But it is to the Physics and not to book t:. that he refers in the M etaphysics' as the place in which the doctrine has been already expounded, and the exposition arises naturally enough out of its context in the Physics. In i. 5- 8 Aristotle has pointed out that everything that comes to be is a union of form and matter, that these are at least among the necessary conditions of its coming to be. The same two elements have been in ii. I described as being the two meanings of the word l nature', and in ii . 2 he has described physics as necessarily studying both. These reappear in ii. 3 as the constituent elements S in everything that comes to be by nature, and he adds to th em the external conditions of natural process-the efficient and the final cause. Though these are here distinguished from one another and from the formal cause, and are distinguished from the latter as external from internal conditions of change, Aristotle tells us later that all three t often coincide '.4 This is clear enough as regards the formal and the final cause. In the case of the building of a house, one and the same thing, 'capacity to shelter living bodies and goods " 1\ is at the same time the internal factor which distinguishes the house from the bricks and mortar which are its proximate matter, and an external condition of the house's coming to be, the final cause which draws the builder on to his act of building. And so, too, in the case of natural as opposed to artistic process, the form which characterizes the product is also that at which nature was unconsciously aiming when it produced the product. The identity of the efficient with the formal cause is less obvious. The concrete things cited as examples of the efficient cause- ' the person who advised a course of action, the father who begot a child, the maker and in general the cause of change J 6 - sound. very different from the abstractions cited as instances of the formal J

ii.3.

4

198a 24.

s 983a 33, 98 Sa J 2, 988H. 22, 993 a I I. , Mel. I043a 16.

3

195 a 19.

, I94b 30-2.

ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 37 cause, e.g. the ratio of 2 to I as formal cause of the harmony of a note with its octave.' Yet the general principle holds good ;af' f.K TOU 81Jva.p.f.t 0117"010 ylyllETQt 'TO f.llfPYE{9- ~y lnrO il/fPYEr€!- 010'1"05.2 That which potentially has a certain form comes to have it actually only through the actual presence of that (orm in the motive agent. But the form is present as efficient cause in different manners according as the process is natural and unconscious, or artistic and intelligent. In natural process the form is literally present in the efficient cause. That which produces the form of heat in other things does so by possessing the form of heat itself; that which produces the form of man in another being produces it by possessing the form of man itself. The form is that which is really efficient in the concrete efficient cause. In the case of artistic production the form is not present in the efficient cause as qualifying this; that which produces a house is not itself a house. But the form is present in the builder as being known by him and as filling his mind. Pn'ma facie we might say that the efficient cause of a house is a man, but if we look more closely we see that it is a builder, and if we look marc closely still we see that it is the building art, in other words the form of house as known, that is the efficient cause.' Thus one thing, the form, functions both as a component in that which is produced, as its final cause, and as the really efficient element in its efficient cause. We do not know how Aristotle arrived at the doctrine of the four causes; where we find the doctrine in him, we find it not argued for but presented as self·evident. He may have reached it by direct reflection on instances of natural process and ot artistic production. But if so, the reflection was aided by the work of his predecessors; just as the doctrine of the categories was apparently the result of a direct attempt at classifying the contents of the universe, but was undoubtedly aided by Plato's recognition now of substance and again of quality or relation as main forms of being. The material cause, as Aristotle himself points out,' is writ large in the whole history of early Greek philosophy. The efficient cause was implicitly recognized by Empedocles and Anaxagoras when they introduced love and strife, or reason, as moving principles. The formal cause was 1 ib. 27-9. , 195 b 21 - 5·

2

Met. l049b24,cf.Plty s. 20Z&II.

~

Met. A. 7.

INTRODUCTION recognized most clearly in the Theory of Ideas. The final cause, Aristotle says,l was not recognized in its true nature by any of his predecessors. He says elsewhere' that Plato used only the material and the formal cause. He strangely and grudgingly ignores the many passages in Plato which emphasize the efficient cause-the self-movi ng saul of the Phaedrus ' and the Laws/ the demiurgus of th e Sopftistes Ii and the T~'maeus/, the niTta nj~ p1~(wr; of the Plti/ebus'" i and the many references to a final cause-the ultimate good or ov XaptV of the Pltt'lebus, 8 the object of the creator's purpose in the Tt"maeus 9 and th e Laws,llI In the Phtlebus 11 the material cause, the formal, the efficient (TO a.7r£LPOV, 7T'EpaS, 7] ai.Tta 'T~ .. p..t~(w .. ) are all to be found. In the T1'maeus the v7ro8oX~ and th e 7T'upa8dyp..uuL answer to the material and the formal cause, the 0TJfLLOvpyor; and the object of his bene· ficent purpose to the efficient and the final. But Aristotle did not find anywhere in Plato the statement that in all change all four causes are needed. I n his account of the aina 12 Aristotle interpolates a discussion of chance-not that he thinks chance is a vera causa, but because it is often so regarded. IS He reaches his theory of chance by a series of approximations. To begin with, we may note that in chs. 4 and 5 ruX1J and TO aVT6p.aTOY are used almost indiscriminately, with only occasional suggestions that there is a difference between them, and that it is only in ch. 6 that they are carefully distinguished_ When they are distinguished, it becomes clear that TO aVT6p.n.TolI has a specific usage in which it stands for something different from rVXYJ, and a generic usage in which it includes both ruX1J and TO QiJT6PQTOY in the specific sense. We may perhaps use chance' as equivalent to TO aVTOPQTOY in its generic sense, and f luck' to stand for rVX1J; we have no very natural English equivalent for TO aVT6pQTOY in its specific sense, but may perhaps call this I random '. After pointing out in eh. 4 the variety of views held by earlier thinkers about chance, Aristotle proceeds in eh . 5 to give his own account of its nature. He first points out that I some f

ib. 988b 6- 16. 265 b- d. 9 2od, S3 e. 12 ii. 3, 7- 9. 1

o

2

ib. 988a 9. '28cff. t 29 d ff. IS 19S b 3I - 3.

S

245 c, d.

4 891-9. 23 d, 26 e-27 b. 903 c. II 27 b.

7

10

ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 39 things happen always in the same way, others for the most part '0 I.e. there are observable sequences which can be for· mulated quite rigidly in the form' a is followed by b', and others which can only he formulated in the form I a is usually followed by b', Aristotle is not contending that there is any lack of necessity in the causation of b in the latter case. ]t may well be that there is an absolute rule' a when accompanied by x is always followed by b '. He is simply pointing to the fact that there are nameable conditions (or sets of conditions) a which are usually but not always followed by a certain result b. There are, then, also cases in which such conditions are followed by results other than their normal results. As a first approximation, he identifies chance sequences with such cases. I But this is only an approximation to the truth. He proceeds to a further division of even ts into those that happen (lIfKa T OV and those th at do not. It is impossible to make sense of his doctrine of chance if we ta ke EY£Ka 'TOU to have here its natural meaning of 'for a purpose '. Things th at happen (II(Ko. TOU are ' those that might be done as a result of thought and those that might happen as a result of nature ',2 i.e. those that produce end-like results. Now, events being divided (A) into (1) 'TU 0.(1 waavT(lJ~ yty.,6fl£Ya, (2) Tn W~ Ed 'To. "OAV, (3) 'To. 1iapa TaiiTa, and (B) into (I) Ta ;Y(l(a TOll (those having end-like results) and (2) TU p..q €1I(Ka TOU, it is obviously possible that some events in class A (3) are also in class B (I). Such events are chance events. Further, if we consider class A (3), where a is followed by an unusual result c, we can see that a does not as such cause c (for if it did, it would always cause it). It must be followed by C KaT" , because the contrary of a I(tV1]CTt5 is always either another x{vY]Ut .. or an ~PEP.{Q, while the contrary of a ~9opa is a yiv«",. It follows that only case (I), the passage from a positive state to the contrary positive state (or an intermediate), is x{v"'1U't'i. It will be noticed that there is an overlapping here between 1£11(17(5 and K{v71U(S. For the passage from not-white to white, which would usually be called aAAotW(rtS, i.e. a form of x{v7JUtS, is included under 1£1'(0"(5, though only as Y£VEut.. TtS. In fact one and the same change may be considered from two points of view. It may be considered as the passage of a subject from blackness to whiteness, and then it will be called a K{Y7/Ut(~"'7J : ooo-w...

J PST

In 196b 34 he seems right in preferring KOP.J;.0JLEIIOV of In '97& '7 S's

to the readings of the other MSS.

~WyWII K(L~ 8mCTofLEIIQIi

(q,oryWII

T,

Kai O{Q.CTtl.JLEl'Of>

(ha.crO,.,.,Ellor; Kat

.p.vyWV FI, Owr0I"VO< .p,Vywv J) seems to be right. In 221& 7 AST Damascius seem to be right in omitting 8(, This provides a principal clause for the sentence.

In 216b 17-20 PST omit the probably corrupt sentence which all the MSS., V, and Averroes have. (G and H preface the sentence with a.\.\.ws-, which seems to imply that the writers of these MSS. (or the writer of their archetype) found this sen· tence only as a variant in some MSS.)

But the Arabic transla-

tion used by Averroes belongs to the ninth century, and £ has the character of a ninth-century MS. (absence of accents, and

defective division of words); Diels infers th at the archetype of our MSS. is to be placed between 600 and 800 A.D. It would be safer to say, between 530 (the approximate date of Philoponus and Simplicius) and 850. Diels next cites a number of agreements between E and 5

which confirm the superiority already assigned to £ by Laas, Bonitz, and Prantl. I. may supplement Diels's argument by mentioning the following passages in books v- viii in which E

alone or almost alone agrees with S in what is evidently the right reading:230b 7 yap am. £' PS 233b 23- 5 TO 1'" ••. TO Ii. £S: TO. I"V . .. TO. Ii, HI) K. 235b I I " . . . &".o).""."V £S: omitted by haplography in Ki\.' 239b 9 TWV om itted wrongly by KA. 240b '9 Ii' £S: yap KA by anticipation of b20. 2,p'61'~KO< £S: I'Fy,Oo< Ki\. 241& 17 ~ omitted wrongly by KAP. 266"'33 illl"~ S( AB ES: £V ~ 8' 11 A:B A. Again, £ P seem to be right in the following places :235 b 24 ~ Ii.: ~ yo." Ki\. yap repeated from O~ yo.". 238b 35 ,«pov £FP: (K«.,poV HI) KS. 239" 5 &v am. Ki\S. I

For the sense in which I usc the symbol

A

see p.

120.

THE TEXT OF THE PHYSICS ET are right in :228& 22 p1.a.v: pia. AS.

r05

228b 21

J.vwp.a).la.: w,wjJJJA{o.s AS. 233' 20 ;, ~vo. is probably a later addition by KA. 233" 7 .;,. om. E' AT Aspasius, found in KAS. EA are right in 258- 27; TO B1 r . . . "yap is a gloss found in KA "yp. S but absent in EA. Diels adds, however, a large number of passages in which E has additions, omissions, or changes that are condemned either by internal evidence or by the adverse testimony of the com· mentators. To this 1 may add that there are not a few places in which E agrees with one or more of the commentators in error :ES

249" 23

ofLwvVf'wv.

255" 35 omission of the first TO. 259" 28 the second TO is wrongly omitted in ES' but found in KAPSp. 262" 2 Kat uAlo.,1j 'Tel croYKExvp.lva ~AAOV' lJcrTfPOV o' lK T06rWV ylyvETaL YVwp,JJ.a

/Cal at apxal atQtpOVCTt railra. aU) b( TWV KaTel KaO' £KaCJTa afL 7rpotEVat· TO yap OhOV KaTel T~V arU01]UtV yvwptp.wnpov. TO a£ KaOOhOV OhOV rt fun' 25 7TOAAa yap 7TfplAap.{3aVft WS JJ.EPl1 TO KaOOAov. 7TI7TOVO€ aE

r a. O"ToLX£ta

80AOV t7T~

TaVTO TOVTO TP07iOV nvn Ka~ Tn dVOJJ.aTa 7rPOS' TOV hOYOV' 184b aAov yap n Kal aatOp(UTWS UlJp.a(vft. orOV 0 K~KAO), (, aE opurJJ.3S' atiToll a taLp€~ fls Ta KaO' gKQ(J'ra.

Kat Ta '7TaLO(Q TO

JJ.Ev 7rPWTOV 7rpOuayopf~ft 7TaVTaS' TOVs- &.vapaS' 7TaT/paS' Kat

2

jJ.ljTlpas rcts yvvaLKaS', VI.TTfPOV Ot owp((U TOVTWV EKaTfpov. ' AvaylO7 o· ,iTO, p.(av ftvat T~V apX~v ~ 7TAf(OVS', Kal fl 15 p.(av, i,To, CtK(V1]TOV, c:)S' ~YJ(J" napJJ.fV(01]S Kat MEh'(J'(TOS'. ~ Kt·

184a Titulum om. I 13 yIl6)P;'CT(J)~UI

EFIPS:

A am. yll(J){I;'W~UI ]

J:

TO A E: ~ 1rfpl a.PX~1I A F IS 1rp(MOIl 3wplCTaCT8al FJ

Eustratius; 3lOpluClu8a& P 16 ~ am. I 17 Tn om. Jl 18 YJ.l6>PlJ.l6Yrfpa E 19 "OUTOII ,.011 TP07f'OIl F ufl¢unlpr.Jv J1 ~iv am. A 20 -rii om. IJ T.~ ¢uuu E'AV: am. E l 21 ,.0 am. E 22 1'"wpt~a yivfTat I: yJlWPtpn F 24 ;101 AP: fIS' ES 26 wS' AP: CJ(T1rfp E b II «at om. P a.aloplCTT'(J)S' E IFJVP: a.3u;pIfJTOJl E'I I2 TO] aE TO I 13 ~ill om. FJ 1rPOUQ· YO/JfUU ••• livapoS' FJT: lnrO>"op.l3nllfl 1raV,.M 'T OllS' l!lI~paS' IV: 7f'UV'TM Tour (iv3pa, VnoAafifMllu (hoc verbum erasum) rrpouoyopfVU E 14 aE om. F J 5 cY] btl Torstrik 16 &" ES: wurr,p AP ~u.

EFPS : au," IJ I

'rl:IK1U AKPOAl:E!U A

01 CPVULICot, 01 #ltV &Epa CP&'UKOVTfS ElvaL 01 01 vowp T~V 7TPWTtJV apX1Jv' £i OE 7TAE[OVS, ~ 7Tf7TfpaUJ.lEVaS ~ a1tf{~ povs, Ka, fl 7rE7TfpaCTILEvas 1iAdous Of J-tws, ~ ova ~ rpEtS ~ TIT. 20 Tapas ~ cl'\.\OV Ttva. a.pdJp.ov, Kal fl c17rdpovs, ~ ovrwS' W(T7TfP VOVjlEV7'jVJ WCT7UP

A ' o flV, CTX'YJJLan I t:. ... ( ' ' ' ' ' ) • •, ul1fA.oKP LTos, TO"YEVOS uf IJLa't'Epovuas,'1 n u u aLacpEpOVUaS ~ /Cal fvavr{as. OJ.Lo(ws aE (71TOVUL 01 aura

(lJTOVVTt:s'

7roaa'

i,

Ka, Ta.

ciiv

yap TO.

ovra EO'"Tl7fpwTwv, (?JTOVUL raiJia

1iOTEPOV ~v ~ 7TO'\'\&, Kal El 7TO'\'\d., 1iE7TEpaU}J.Eva ~ U7ffLpa, TO tTTOLXE'LOV (1JTOVUL 7Tonpov ~v ~ 7f0'\'\&.

WtTTf

25 T~V apx~v Kat

~~

'5

El ~v Kat ClIdVl1TOV TO ~v fTK07iELV 011 'iTEP' CPVCTfWS E