Annual Editions: Comparative Politics 07 08

Cornpar~tive

Politics Twenty-fifth Edition

EDITOR Christian S/iJe California State University. Long Beach

Christian S"e was born in Denmark. studied at the University of British Columbia and the University of Michigan, and received his doctoral degree in political science at the Free University in Berlin. He is professor in political science at California State University in Long Beach, where he teaches coUrses in comparative pOlitics. His research deals primarily with political developments in contemporary Germany. He visits that country annually to conduct research on parties and elections, as part of an effort to follow continuities and shifts in its politics. His publications include a book be co-edited with Mary N. Hampton, Between Bonn and Berlin: German Politics Adrift? that examines the last years of Helmut Kohl's center-right government and its replacement by a center-left coalition headed by Gerhard SchrOder and Joschka Fischer. The milestone election of 1998 is the subject of another 'bOOK that he coedited with David Conradt and Gerald R. Kleinfeld, Power Shift in Germany. The same team co-edited a recent volume on the 2002 German Bundestag election and its aftermath, Precarious Wctory. Three other publications include a biographical essay on Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Germany's foreign minister from 1974 to 1992, in Political Leaders o!Contempomry Western Europe, a chapter on the Free Democratic Party in Germany's New Politics, and another chapter on the Danish-Gennan relationship in The Germans and Their Neighbors. Dr. SIJ;' is also co-editor of the latter two books.", He has been editor of Annual Editions: Compamtive Politics since the beginning of ,this series in 1983.

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Europe In Transition: West, Center, and East

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Copyright Cataloging in Publication Data Main"entry under title: Annual Editions: Comparative Politics. 2007/2008, 1. Comparative Politics-Periodicals. I. 809, Christian, comp.lI. Title: Comparative Politics. ISBN-13: 97!Hl-Q7-351628-8 MHID-10: 0-07-351628-7 658'.05 ISSN 0741-7233

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Editors!Advisory Board Members of the Advisory Board are instrumental in the final selection of articles for each edition of ANNUAL EDITIONS. Their review of articles for content, level, currentness, and appropriateness provides critical direction to the editor and staff. We think that you will find their careful consideration well reflected in this volume.

EDITOR Christian S0e California State University, Long Beach

ADVISORY BOARD Louis J. Cantori University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Jane Curry Palmer Santa Clara University

E. Gene Frankland Ball State University

Ronald Inglehart University of Michigan

Anthony M. Messina University of Notre Dame

Timothy J. White

Helen E. Purkitt U.S. Naval Academy

Mark E. Rush

Xavier University

Joel D. Wolfe

Washington and Lee University

Michael J. Sodaro George Washington University

JUdithe A. Thompson University of Rio Grande

University of Cincinnati

Eleanor E. Zeft Drake University

Charles E. Ziegler University of Louisville

Primo Vannicelli University of Massachusetts, Boston

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Preface In publishing ANNUAL EDITIONS we recognize the enormous role played by the magazines, newspapers, and journals of the public press in providing current, first-rate educational information in a broad spectrum of interest areas. Many of these articles are appropriate for students, researchers, and professionals seeking accurate, current material to help bridge the gap between principles and theories and the real world. These articles, however, become more useful for study when those of lasting value are carefully collected, organized, indexed, and reproduced in a low-cost format, which provides easy and permanent access when the material is needed. That is the role played by ANNUAL EDITIONS.

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his collection of articles, culled from many sources, has the aim of promoting a comparative perspective on politics. It pays special attention to the varied patterns of democratic politics in today's world, but it also reports on major alternative forms of governance, ranging from what amounts to contemporary oligarchy or autocracy to modern party dictatorship. Together the readings will provide a better understanding of the conditions that encourage or inhibit the emergence, survival and enhancement of the democratic expression in politics. They leave us with no reason to assume that representative democracy can be installed at will, whenever and wherever we choose. Like no other form of government, democracy requires an active and informed citizenry. There is reason to be concerned over the withdrawal of people from politics in a number of established democracies. Unit 1 begins with an inventory of the main forms of rule in today's world. About one-half of humanity now lives under rulers who can be elected and removed by use of the ballot. Yet many of the democracies are flawed, often beginning with the electoral process on which they rest. The other articles in this unit examine politics in some prominent contemporary representative democraciesBritain, France, Germany and Japan. In terms of gross domestic product (GOP), these countries constitute, along with the United States, the top five market economies in the world. If China were included, it would presumably occupy the third rank, between Japan and Germany, in view of the sheer volume and value of output in that populous country. Each of our four advanced industrial societies has its own tradition of politics and governance within a particular institutional framework that has been historically developed. Nevertheless, as the readings of Unit 2 show, there are comparable patterns of political challenge and response in their politics and those of many other representative democracies. The issue of women's advancement toward a greater share of the top elective and appointive jobs lends itself very well to a comparative study-cross-nationally and/or historically. Unit 3 deals with the impact of two major forces of change that continue to have an impact on the political scene of Europe. One of them is the irregular, sometimes halting, but nevertheless impressive growth of the European Union (EU). It began with six member states

in 1957, grew incrementally to fifteen, and then in 2004 added ten new countries. With the addition of Bulgaria and Romania at the beginning of 2007, the total membership has now reached 27 countries, with a population of about 480 million. A second and closely related major change involves the political and economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia, after the collapse of the Communist regimes in that region between 1989 and 1991. Here the marked turn toward authoritarian pOlitics in Russia could have important consequences. Unit 4 adds a discussion of the impact of globalization along with articles on pOlitics in the developing countries and regions. Here there will probably be no surprises in the list of countries covered. It includes Mexico and Latin America as a whole, Nigeria, India, China, and the Muslim world with special attention to Iran. South Africa has been covered in the past and will probably return in a future edition. The articles will give the careful reader a better understanding of the diversity of social and political conditions in these countries. Unit 5 considers three major trends in contemporary politics from a comparative perspective. First, the past twenty-five years have seen a remarkable spread of democratic forms of government in the world. This recent "wave of democratization;' sometimes described as the 'third" of its kind in modern history, seems likely to have a lasting effect on the political process in some countries that previously knew only authoritarian governments. Yet some recent reversals remind us that there is no simple or guaranteed way to construct a stable democracy anywhere-least of all in countries that are marked by deep ethnic, economic, religious and other divisions. Second, beginning in the early 1980s or sometimes even earlier, a major shift took place in economic policy toward greater reliance on private enterprise and markets. There was a corresponding reduction in state ownership and regulation in much of the world, including Communistruled China. Here too there have been later reactions against the inequalities, dislocations, and uncertainties associated with the unfettered market economy. There not been a return to the status quo ante, however, and it would probably be a mistake to enlist in such a lost cause. Third, many parts of the world h,ave seen a surge of what has been called "identity politics:' This trend has brought group identities more strongly into play when

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differences are being defined, played out, and resolved in the political arena. Amy Chua and Benjamin Barber warn in different ways about the potential costs of such a politics. This is an important time to study comparative politics. The past few years have seen a major restructuring of politics in many countries along with generational shifts in leadership. Even in a time of political transformation, however, there will usually be significant patterns of continuity as well. This is the twenty-fifth edition of Annual Editions: Comparative Politics. It has been a busy and crowded quarter of a century in politics, but I believe the series has managed to identify major developments fairly early and has at the same time avoided getting lost in some dead end streets. Here is a special word of thanks to my many students at California State University, Long Beach. They are wonderfully inquisitive and help keep me posted on matters that this anthology must address. Several of my past students have helped me gather materials for this edition. As always, I am particularly grateful to Susan B. Mason, who received her master's degree in political science from this university some fifteen years ago. She has continued since then, from a distance of some three thousand miles, to volunteer her services as a superb research assistant. Once again, I also wish to thank other former or recent students at California State University, Long Beach. It is impossible to name them all, but the following have been particularly helpful: Linda Wohlman, Erika Reinhardt, Erik Ibsen, Jon Nakagawa, Mike Petri, and Ali Taghavi. Like

so many others, these individuals first encountered the anthology in comparative politics courses. It is a great joy to have worked with them, for they have shown an enthusiasm for the project that remains contagious. To meet the annual deadlines, I have been able to rely on the quick and ready assistance of my two sons, Nils and Erik. Louise Soe has academic obligations of her own, but she always finds time to enjoy with me the world we share beyond the paper jungle. Thanks also to Rowena Moore and Margaret Dennis for their assistance in critical moments. And as always, I am indebted to my colleagues and to Nancy St. Martin and Amelia Marquez for having made the work day at Cal State Long Beach so pleasant. I am very grateful also to members of the advisory board and McGraw-Hili/Contemporary Learning Series as well as to the many readers who have made useful comments on past selections and suggested new ones. I ask you all to help improve future editions by keeping me informed of your reactions and suggestions for change. Please complete and return the article rating form in the back of the book.

Christian S0e Editor

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Contents iv xiv xviii

Preface Topic Guide Internet References

UNIT 1 Pluralist Democracies: Country Studies Unit Overview

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Part A. The United Kingdom

1. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy, Laza Kekic, The Economist, 2007 In a new "index of democracy," the world's 167 countries (excluding its micro· states) are scored across five broad categories: electoral process, functioning of government, political participation and political culture. Countries are split into four regime types determined by their democratic credentials: 28 "full" democracies, 54 "flawed" democracies, 30 "hybrid" regimes, and 55 "authoritarian" regimes. The top ranks go to Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries as well as the Netherlands. North Korea is ranked last.

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2. A Revised British Constitution: Tony Blair's Lasting Legacy?, Donley T. Studlar, McGraw-HilVContemporary Leaming Series, 2007 Tony Blair's "New" Labour came to power In 1997 promising to modernize British government. The subsequent institutional reforms can be seen as Tony Blair's lasting legacy. Here an American political scientist examines Mr. Blair's record until the end of 2006. He covers such topics as the reform of the House of Lords, the regional and local devolution of power, the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights Into British law, a relatively timid British Freedom of Information Act, and electoral reforms.

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3. Who Killed the British Prime Minister? The Economist, September 14, 2006 This article reviews Tony Blair's record as party reformer and government modernizer. It pOints to Iraq as an obvious reason for his massive loss of public trust, but finds a deeper explanation in Blair's governing style-his enthusiastic ~'oversell" of his political initiatives, his tendency to micro~manage and his perceived inclination toward expediency.

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4. Electoral Politics in the United Kingdom, Donley T. Studlar, McGraw-Hili/Contemporary Learning Series, 2007 The author singles out and explains some important aspects of Britain's electoral politics. He discusses the sharp drop in voter turnout in the two most recent general elections as well as the considerable distortions in the present system that give considerable advantages to Labour and enormous disadvantages to the "third" party of Liberal Democrats. It is clear that the rules of the game are anything but neutral in their political impact. All of this takes place without partisan design, such as the strategy of gerrymandering.

The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

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Part B.

France

5. The End of French Europe?, Steven Philip Kramer, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006 The author connects the French vote against the European constitution in 2005 to two factors-a general crisis in French society and the flaws in the French conception of Europe. The postwar French model (political, economic and social) no longer functions well. There is a pervasive mood of decline in France and a widespread public distrust of the political class. Economic growth is low, the social welfare model is under siege, and the system of ethnic integration has been challenged in the recent riots. Meanwhile France has come to use Its leading role In the EU In an Increasingly self-serving and defensive manner.

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6. France's Murky Mix of School and Scandal, Katrin Bennhold, The Nation, May 15, 2006 France has a smaller and more exclusive elite than is found In other democracies. It is concentrated in PariS, where Its training grounds are the grandes ecoles, above all the Ecole Natlonale d'Admlnistration (ENA) and the Polytechnique ( or "X"). The graduates form closed networks that close off outsiders and blur the lines between the business sector and the public arena. In a country where the state has a big presence in the economy, these exclusive networks result in a lack of transparency and result in preferential treatment. Part C.

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Germany

7. Angela Merkel's Not-So-Grand Coalition, The Economist, October 6, 2006 The "grand" coalition of Germany's two major parties-the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats-Is not as popular as It was at the outset. It turns out, as many had predicted, that the left-right differences in such a coalition generate tensions, that interest groups block some reforrns, and that the two governing parties become worried as they lose supporters. There is no easy alternative in sight.

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8. Waiting for a Wunder, Ludwig Siegele, The Economist, February 11, 2006 Far from being '1he sick man of Europe:' Germany Is in better shape than some of its larger neighbors. Yet the fabled "German model" has lost much of its attraction during the last two decades. This article looks at how Germany's institutions have become increasingly paralyzed and provides an explanation that resembles those heard in Britain before Margaret Thatcher's radical reforms.

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Part D.

Japan

9. Japanese Spirit, Western Things, The Economist, July 10, 2003 150 years after Commodore Perry's order to open the country to trade, Japan lays claim to be one of the world's great economic success stories. This survey examines the origins of that success and emphasizes that Japan has shown that modernization does not require a wholesale embrace of Western culture.

The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

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10. Departing Japanese Leader Shook Up Politics as Usual, Norimitsu Onishi, The New York Times, September 19, 2006 After more than five years in office, prime. minister Koizumi stepped down at the end of September 2006. He enjoyed a high popularity rating until the end, although his reforms were often controversial. He took a leading role in reducing the central government and Its bureaucracy, devolving more authority to the local officials. His pro·market policies of deregulation and privatization stimulated the dormant economy.

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UNIT 2 Pluralist Democracies: Factors in the Political Process 64

Unit Overview

Part A.

Patterns of Democratic Change. Some Comparative Perspectives

11. Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis?, The Economist, July 17, 1999 Advanced democracies differ considerably from each other, but In recent years they have shared a common pattern of public disillusionment with Institutions and politicians. The first in a series of three briefs dealing with this development examines the general decline in public trust and voter turnout in well-established democracies.

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12. Political Parties: Empty Vessels?, The Economist, July 24 1999 This brief from The Economist series examines the partial weakening of political parties in modern democracies.

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13. Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures, The Economist, August 21, 1999 This brief reports on the growth of special-interest lobbying in modern democracies.

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Part B.

Women in Politics

14. Women in National Parliaments, Inter·Parliamentary Union, November 30, 2006 This table has been compiled by the Inter·Parliamentary Union on the basis of information regularly provided by national parliaments. It classifies 181 countries in descending order by the percentage of women elected to the lower or single legislative chamber. The most striking change in recent years has been the move by Rwanda to the top of the list. This is a the result of elections held in 2003, in the aftermath of the genocide that often left women-now nearly two-thirds of the popUlation-to take charge of rebuilding the country. Otherwise the "usual suspects" among the older and smaller democracies occupy the high end of the list-the five Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands as well as Costa Rica. Germany keeps placing well, and a growing number of other countries have attained what is sometimes called the "critical mass" of 30 percent. After the 2004 elections, the United States continues to lag behind.

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15. The True Clash of Civilizations, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, Foreign Policy, MarchIApril 2003 There is a cultural divide between the West and the Muslim world, but it derives from a fundamental difference about gender equality and not, as Samuel Huntington would have it, over the value of democracy.

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The concepts in bold italics are developed in the arUcte. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

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Part C.

The Institutional Framework

16. What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require?, Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, As seen in Political Science Quarterly, vol. 120, no. 2, 2005 Here Robert Dahl summarizes some of his most important findings about the core institutions of a representative democracy.

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17. What Democracy Is ... and Is Not, Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, Journal of Democracy, Summer 1991 The two authors of this important article point out that modern representative democracies vary in their institutions, practices, and values, depending on their socioeconomic, historical and cultural settings. The carefully developed argument includes two concluding sections headed, "How Democracies Differ" and "What Democracy Is Not."

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18. Judicial Review: The Gavel and the Robe, The Economist, August 7, 1999 Democracies have handed increasing amounts of power to unelected judges. This article examines the growth and many different forms of judicial review.

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19. Referendums: The People's Voice, The Economist, August 14, 1999 Direct democracy takes many forms. This article examines the different kinds of referenda, looks at the experience so far, and reviews the arguments about letting voters decide policy questions directly.

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Part D.

American Politics in Comparative Perspective

20. The Great Divide, Timothy Garton Ash, Prospect, March 2003 Influenced by their own weakness and the trauma of contemporary wars, Europeans have come to pursue International peace, negotiation, and cooperation at almost any price, whereas Americans have retained a greater willingness to use force. Kagan sums up the contrast in a memorable overstatement, "On major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus." Ash explains why he finds Kagan's analysis to be only half right.

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21. Living With a Superpower, The Economist, January 2, 2003 A study in world values by Ronald Inglehart and associates shows a fairly persistent pattern of basic similarities and differences within countries. On an axis that plots "quality of life," Americans and West Europeans show high commitments to "self~expression" values. They differ on "secular~ rational" and nonreligious values. Here Europeans (except the Irish) turn out to be markedly more secular-rational and less patriotic and religious than Americans.

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22. The Case for a Multi-Party U.S. Parliament? American Politics in Comparative Perspective, Christopher S. Allen, Original Work, 2006 The author supports the inclusion of American political institutions in the study of comparative pOlitics. He presents a brief on behalf of a multi-party parliamentary system for the United States. As he points out, it can be read as a mental experiment In institutional transplantation. It underscores the basic insight that institutions are not neutral but have consequences for the political process itself.

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The concepts In bold italics are developed in the articlEi. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

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UNIT 3 Europe in Transition: West, Center, and East 124

Unit Overview Part A.

The European Union

23. A Too Perfect Union? Why Europe Said "No", Andrew Moravcsik, Current History, November 2005 The defeat of the EU Constitution in French and Dutch referendums had little to do with the substance of the document and does not mean that the European Union is now in decline or disarray, according to this American observer. The EU continues to be a successful multilevel system of governance, but it should not aspire to imitate or replace the nation states with their symbolic and democratic legitimacy.

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24. Bored by 'Results', Europe Regains Its Taste for Grand Plans, George Parker, Financial Times, October 27, 2006 Europe is having a breather after the traumas of 2005, when the EU's consti-

tutional draft was rejected in French and Dutch referendums and a major EU budget revision failed to be enacted. As the fiftieth anniversary of the EU's founding in the Treaty of Rome approaches, however, this observer finds signs that the EU is gearing to lurch forward on several major issues.

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25. A Venture at a Standstill, The Economist, May 27, 2006 The British weekly sees no emerging consensus among EU members on how to proceed. This article differentiates between the "Institutionalists," who

favor a new framework, and the "incrementalists," who prefer an organic development of what has already become a variegated organization. It concludes that some institutional adjustments are needed and possible while a grand makeover, as sought by the draft EU constitution, is neither necessary nor likely.

Part B.

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Central and Eastern Europe

26. Shadows at Europe's Heart, The Economist, October 12, 2006 This article looks at the former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. While their economies have flourished, there is great risk of political failure in these newcomers to the EU, with populist politicians taking advantage of the rampant discontents.

Part C.

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Russia

27. Russia's Ersatz Democracy, Lilia Shevtsova, CUrrent History, October 2006 The author of this unusual interpretation of Russian politics sees the country's governing elite as experimenting with a political model that attempts to bring together "conflicting elements" like autocracy and democracy, market freedom and state controls of the economy, partnership with the West and a rejection of Western values. It is leading to a dead end, she concludes, and there is a crisis looming ahead.

The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article, For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

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28. What Does Putin Want?, Peter Lavelle, Current History, October 2004 The author believes that Vladimir Putin follows a long-term reform agenda that includes authoritarian forms of "managed democracy" and "managed capitalism." Despite its remarkable economic recovery, fueled by high prices for oil exports, Russia faces some serious structural problems. In his efforts

to increase the Russian state's ability to govern effectively, Putin is seeking to break the power and drain the wealth of the super rich "oligarchs."

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29. The New American Cold War, Stephen F. Cohen, The Nation, July 10, 2006 The author has long been a critic of the U.S. failure to curb what he sees as its "triumphalism" at the time of the Soviet Union's breakup. He emphasizes that there is a continuing lack of understanding by leaders of both major parties in Washington of Russia's distinct traditions and interests.

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UNIT 4 Political Diversity in the Developing World Unit Overview

Part A.

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Latin America

30. Mexico's Disputed Election, Luis Rubio and Jeffrey Davidow, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006 Mexico's presidential election in 2006 was the first after the defeat of the longruling PRI six years earlier. The two top candidates represented different directions for the country-whether to continue on the road to political and economic liberalization or return to the state-driven development model of the 1970s and earlier. The article discusses the importance of the election for Mexico's future.

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31. Latin America's Left Turn, Jorge G. Casteneda, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006 The left has returned to Latin American politics, but it comes in two different strands-the traditional left with its origins in Marxism and leftist populism. The traditional left has undergone significant change and is now in power in Chile. Uruguay, and Brazil, while left-wing populism has an important presence in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina. The author argues that the traditional left is a more moderate and preferable option.

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Part B.

Africa

32. Nigeria: Chronicle of a Dying State, Ike Okonta, Current History, May 2005 Nigeria is the most populous and most diverse country in Africa. It is potentially also one of the richest. But Nigeria is also a prime example of a failed state, rife with corruption, and based on a violent and predatory relationship of rulers to the population that goes back to colonial times. A "reform team" will contest the elections scheduled for 2007.

The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

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Part C.

China

33. China: The Quiet Revolution, Doug Guthrie, Harvard International Review, Summer 2003 The reformers who led China toward a market economy avoided "shock therapy." Instead, they moved gradually in implementing changes that in the end turned out to be a major institutional transformation. This article explores their strategy and the reasons for the success of their "quiet revolution."

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34. Where's Mao? Chinese Revise History Books, Joseph Kahn, The New York Times, September 1, 2006 Beginning in the fall of 2006, high school students in China will have new textbooks in history that emphasize stability, trade and technology rather than revolution and class struggle.

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Part D.

India

35. India's Path to Greatness, Martin Walker, Wilson Quarterly, Summer 2006 Despite its numerous problems, India is a model for political survival as a multlethnic democracy. Its political institutions provide safety valves for expressing grievances and finding decentralized responses. The paradox is that India's enormous diversity and its cumbersome political system have enabled unity and democracy to combine. There are indications that a moderate prosperity may follow, as India continues the incremental deregulation of its economy, begun in 1991.

Part E.

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The Muslim World

36. Bin Laden, the Arab "Street," and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit, Dale F. Eickelman, Current History, January 2002 Osama bin Laden speaks in the vivid language of popular Islamic preachers, and he builds on a deep and broad resentment against the West. He benefits from the lack of democratic outlets in much of the Middle East that leaves no established platforms to express opinions on matters of public concern.

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UNITS Comparative Politics: Some Major Trends, Issues, and Prospects Unit Overview Part A.

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The Democratic Trend: How Strong, Thorough, and Lasting?

37. Democracy's Sobering State, Thomas Carothers, Current History, December 2004 The "third wave" of democratization, first identified and labeled by Samuel Huntington, has come to a standstill. It referred to the numerous democratic openings that began in southern Europe in the mid-1970s and then spread to much of the rest of the world. This article examines the cluster of factors that are blunting the further advance and consolidation of democratic government. Individually and together, they present a major challenge that cannot be removed by empty rhetoric.

The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

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Part B.

The Ambivalence about Markets: What Role for the State?

38. Capitalism and Democracy, Gabriel A. Almond, PS: Political Science and Politics, September 1991 Towards the end of the Gorbachev era, Gabriel Almond presented a Moscow audience with some key ideas about the ambiguous relationship between capitalism and democracy. Drawing in part on the work of other theorists, this leading political scientist explored ways in which capitalism both supports and subverts democracy as well as ways in which democracy may both subvert and foster capitalism.

Part C.

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The Politics of Group Identity: How Much Does It Matter?

39. Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cafe, The Economist, November 9, 1996 This essay critically reviews recent scholarly attempts to explain economics

and politics In terms of cultural differences.

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40. Globalization Is About Blending, Not Homogenizing, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 20, 2002 The author emphasizes that globalization does not necessarily mean homogenization or Americanization. He uses examples from Japan to Canada to illustrate his argument.

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41. An Explosive Combination, Amy Chua, Orlando Sentinel, September 21, 2003 Free-market economics and overnight democracy can become a volatile mixture when members of a market-dominant ethnic minority become seen as outside exploiters. Amy Chua explains and illustrates how this combination has fueled ethnic conflict in some developing countries and could recur in postwar Iraq.

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42. Jihad vs. McWorld, Benjamin R. Barber, The Atlantic Monthly, March 1992 Benjamin Barber examines two major tendencies that are shaping much of the political world today. One is a form of tribalism, which pits cultural, ethnic, religious, and national groups against each other. It clashes with a tendency toward globalism, brought about by modern technology, communications, and commerce. Both tendencies can threaten democracy.

Index Test Your Knowledge Form Article Rating Form

The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide and the Index.

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228 232 233

Topic Guide This topic guide suggests how the selections in this book relate to the subjects covered in your course. You may want to use the topics listed on these pages to search the Web more easily. On the following pages a number of Web sites have been gathered specifically for this book. They are arranged to reflect the units of this Annual Edition. You can link to these sites by going to the student online support site at http://www.mhcls.comJonlineJ.

ALL THE ARTICLES THAT RELATE TO EACH TOPIC ARE LISTED BELOW THE BOLD-FACED TERM.

African politics 14. 15. 21. 32. 37. 41. 42.

8. Waiting for a Wunder 9. 10. 12. 25. 30.

Women in National Parliaments The True Clash of Civilizations living With a Superpower Nigeria: Chronicle of a Dying State Democracy's Sobering State An Explosive Combination Jihad vs. McWorld

31. Latin America's Left Turn

Democratic politics

British politics

2. A Revised British Constitution: Tony Blair's Lasting Legacy? 3. 4. 5. 7.

2. A Revised British Constitution: Tony Blair's Lasting Legacy? 3. Who Killed the British Prime Minister? 4. Electoral Politics in the United Kingdom

11, Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis? 12. Political Parties: Empty Vessels?

8. Waiting for a Wunder

14. Women in National Parliaments

12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

18. Judicial Review: The Gavel and the Robe

19. Referendums: The People's Voice 20. The Great Divide

21. Living With a Superpower 22. The Case for a Multi~Party U.S. Parliament? American Politics in Comparative Perspective 23. A Too Perfect Union? Why Europe Said "No" 24. Bored by 'Results', Europe Regains Its Taste for Grand Plans

17. 18. 19.

22.

Central and Eastern Europe

23.

14. Women in National Parliaments The Great Divide Living With a Superpower A Too Perfect Union? Why Europe Said "No" Bored by 'Results', Europe Regains Its Taste for Grand

25. 26. 28. 29.

A Venture at a Standstill Shadows at Europe's Heart What Does Putin Want? The New American Cold War

27. 28. 30. 31. 32. 35. 36.

Plans

37. 38. 39. 41. 42.

37. Democracy's Sobering State

Chinese politics 14. 21. 33. 34. 37. 38. 39. 41.

Women in National Parliaments Living With a Superpower China: The Quiet Revolution Where's Mao? Chinese Revise History Books Democracy's Sobering State Capitalism and Democracy Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cafe An Explosive Combination

Political Parties: Empty Vessels? Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures Women in National Parliaments The True Clash of Civilizations What Political Institutions Does Large~Scale Democracy Require? What Democracy Is ... and Is Not Judicial Review: The Gavel and the Robe Referendums: The People's Voice The Case for a Multi~Party U.S. Parliament? American Politics in Comparative Perspective A Too Periect Union? Why Europe Said "No" Russia's Ersatz Democracy What Does Putin Want? Mexico's Disputed Election Latin America's Left Turn Nigeria: Chronicle of a Dying State India's Path to Greatness Bin Laden, the Arab "Street," and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit Democracy's Sobering State Capitalism and Democracy Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cate An Explosive Combination Jihad vs. McWorld

Developing world 14. Women in National Parliaments 15. The True Clash of Civilizations 30. Mexico's Disputed Election

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Latin America's Left Turn Nigeria: Chronicle of a Dying State China: The Quiet Revolution

Where's Mao? Chinese Revise History Books India's Path to Greatness Bin Laden, the Arab "Street," and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit 37. Democracy's Sobering State 38. Capitalism and Democracy 39. Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cate

Conservative parties 2. 3. 4. 5. 7.

Who Killed the British Prime Minister? Electoral Politics in the United Kingdom The End of French Europe? Angela Merkel's Not·So-Grand Coalition

10. Departing Japanese Leader Shook Up Politics as Usual 11. Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis?

13. Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures

20. 21. 23. 24.

Japanese Spirit, Western Things Departing Japanese Leader Shook Up Politics as Usual Political Parties: Empty Vessels? A Venture at a Standstill Mexico's Disputed Election

A Revised British Constitution: Tony Blair's Lasting Legacy? Who Killed the British Prime Minister? Electoral Politics in the United Kingdom The End of French Europe? Angela Merkel's Not-So-Grand Coalition

xiv

41. An Explosive Combination

41, An Explosive Combination

42. Jihad vs. McWorld

42. Jihad vs. McWorld

Economics and politics

Ethnicity and politics

3. Who Killed the British Prime Minister? The Strange Death ofTony Blair 5. The End of French Europe? 7. Angela Merkel's Not-So-Grand Coalition

4. 5. 15. 23. 26. 28.

8. Waiting for a Wunder Japanese Spirit, Western Things

9. 10. 13. 23. 24.

Departing Japanese Leader Shook Up Politics as Usual Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures A Too Perfect Union? Why Europe Said "No" Bored by 'Results', Europe Regains Its Taste for Grand

30. Mexico's Disputed Election 31. Latin America's Left Turn 32. Nigeria: Chronicle of a Dying State 35. India's Path to Greatness 36. Bin Laden, the Arab "Street;' and the Middle East's

Plans 25. A Venture at a Standstill 26. Shadows at Europe's Heart

Democracy Deficit 37. Democracy's Sobering State 39. Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cafe

27. Russia's Ersatz Democracy

41. An Explosive Combination

28. What Does Putin Want? 29. The New American Cold War

42. Jihad vs. McWorld

30. Mexico's Disputed Election 31. Latin America's Left Turn

European Union

32. Nigeria: Chronicle of a Dying State 33. China: The Quiet Revolution

2. A Revised British Constitution: Tony Blair's Lasting Legacy? 5. The End of French Europe? 7. Angela Merkel's Not-So-Grand Coalition

34. Where's Mao? Chinese Revise History Books 35. India's Path to Greatness 36. Bin Laden, the Arab "Street;' and the Middle East's

8. Waiting for a Wunder 23. A Too Periect Union? Why Europe Said "No" 24. Bored by 'Results', Europe Regains Its Taste for Grand

Democracy Deficit 37. Democracy's Sobering State

Plans

38. Capitalism and Democracy

25. A Venture at a Standstill

39. Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cafe 40. Globalization Is About Blending, Not Homogenizing

26. Shadows at Europe's Heart

41. An Explosive Combination

French politics

42. Jihad vs. McWorld

5. The End of French Europe? 6. France's Murky Mix of School and Scandal

Elections

11. Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis?

2. A Revised British Constitution: Tony Blair's Lasting Legacy?

12. Political Parties: Empty Vessels? 13. Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures

3. Who Killed the British Prime Minister? 4. 5. 7. 8.

Electoral Politics in the United Kingdom The End of French Europe? The True Clash of Civilizations A Too Perfect Union? Why Europe Said "No" Shadows at Europe's Heart What Does Putin Want?

Electoral Politics in the United Kingdom The End of French Europe? Angela Merkel's Not-So-Grand Coalition Waiting for a Wunder

14. Women in National Parliaments 18. Judicial Review: The Gavel and the Robe

19. Referendums: The People's Voice 20. 21. 23. 24.

10. Departing Japanese Leader Shook Up Politics as Usual 11. Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis? 12. Political Parties: Empty Vessels?

13. 14. 15. 16,

Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures Women in National Parliaments The True Clash of Civilizations What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require? 17. What Democracy Is . , . and Is Not

The Great Divide Living With a Superpower A Too Periect Union? Why Europe Said "No" Bored by 'Results', Europe Regains Its Taste for Grand

Plans 25. A Venture at a Standstill

German politics 5. The End of French Europe?

18. Judicial Review: The Gavel and the Robe 19. Referendums: The People's Voice

7, Angela Merkel's Not-SowGrand Coalition 8. Waiting for a Wunder 11. Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis?

22. The Case for a Multi-Party U.S. Parliament? American Politics in Comparative Perspective

12. Political Parties: Empty Vessels? 13. Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures

23. A Too Periect Union? Why Europe Said "No"

27. Russia's Ersatz Democracy

14. Women in National Parliaments

28. What Does Putin Want?

18. 19. 20. 21.

30. Mexico's Disputed Election 31. Latin America's Left Turn 32. Nigeria: Chronicle of a Dying State

35. India's Path to Greatness

Judicial Review: The Gavel and the Robe Referendums: The People's Voice The Great Divide Living With a Superpower

22. The Case for a Multi-Party U.S. Parliament? American Politics in Comparative Perspective

36. Bin Laden, the Arab "Street;' and the Middle East's

Democracy Deficit 37. Democracy's Sobering State

23. A Too Periect Union? Why Europe Said "No"

24. Bored by 'Results', Europe Regains Its Taste for Grand Plans

38. Capitalism and Democracy 39. Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cafe

25. A Venture at a Standstill

xv

Italian politics 11. 12. 13. 14. 18. 19.

Political parties

Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis? Political Parties: Empty Vessels? Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures Women in National Parliaments Judicial Review: The Gavel and the Robe Referendums: The People's Voice

2. 3. 4. 5. 7. 8. 10. 11. 12. 13.

.Japanese politics 9. Japanese Spirit, Western Things 10. Departing Japanese Leader Shook Up Politics as Usual

16.

11. Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis? 12. Political Parties: Empty Vessels? 13. Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures

14. 21. 39. 40.

17. 19. 22.

Women in National Parliaments Living With a Superpower Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cafe Globalization Is About Blending, Not Homogenizing

27. 28. 30.

Latin America, Mexico 14. 15. 17. 21. 30. 31. 37. 39.

31. 32.

Women in National Parliaments The True Clash of Civilizations What Democracy Is ... and Is Not Living With a Superpower Mexico's Disputed Election Latin America's Left Turn Democracy's Sobering State Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cate

35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

41. 42.

Parliamentary systems

A Revised British Constitution: Tony Blair's Lasting Legacy? Who Killed the British Prime Minister? Electoral Politics in the United Kingdom The End of French Europe? Angela Merkel's Not-So-Grand Coalition Waiting for a Wunder Departing Japanese Leader Shook Up Politics as Usual Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis? Political Parties: Empty Vessels? Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures What Political Institutions Does Large·Scale Democracy Require? What Democracy Is ... and Is Not Referendums: The People's Voice The Case tor a Multi-Party U.S. Parliament? American Politics in Comparative Perspective Russia's Ersatz Democracy What Does Putin Want? Mexico's Disputed Election Latin America's Left Turn Nigeria: Chronicle of a Dying State India's Path to Greatness Bin Laden, the Arab "Street:' and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit Democracy's Sobering State Capitalism and Democracy Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cate An Explosive Combination Jihad vs. McWorld

Religion and politics

2. A Revised British Constitution: Tony Blair's Lasting Legacy? 3. Who Killed the British Prime Minister? 4. Electoral Politics in the United Kingdom 5. The End of French Europe? 7. Angela Merkel's Not-Sa-Grand Coalition 8. Waiting for a Wunder 10. Departing Japanese Leader Shook Up Politics as Usual 11. Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis? 12. Political Parties: Empty Vessels? 13. Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures 14. Women in National Parliaments 16. What PoUticallnstitutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require? 17. What Democracy Is ... and Is Not 18. Judicial Review: The Gavel and the Robe 19. Referendums: The People's Voice 22. The Case for a Multi-Party U.S. Parliament? American Politics in Comparative Perspective 23. A Too Perlect Union? Why Europe Said "No" 26. Shadows at Europe's Heart 27. Russia's Ersatz Democracy 28. What Does Putin Want? 30. Mexico's Disputed Election 31. Latin America's Left Turn 32. Nigeria: Chronicle of a Dying State 35. India's Path to Greatness 36. Bin Laden, the Arab "Street:' and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit 37. Democracy's Sobering State 38. Capitalism and Democracy 39. Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cafe 41. An Explosive Combination 42. Jihad vs. McWorld

5. 9. 15. 17. 19. 21. 32. 35. 36. 37. 39. 41. 42.

The End of French Europe? Japanese Spirit, Western Things

The True Clash of Civilizations What Democracy Is ... and Is Not Referendums: The People's Voice Living With a Superpower Nigeria: Chronicle of a Dying State India's Path to Greatness Bin Laden, the Arab "Street:' and the Middle East's Democracy Deficit Democracy's Sobering State Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cafe An Explosive Combination Jihad vs. McWorld

Russia 14. Women in National Parliaments 21. Living With a Superpower 26. Shadows at Europe's Heart

27. 28. 29. 37. 38. 39.

Russia's Ersatz Democracy What Does Putin Want? The New American Cold War Democracy's Sobering State

Capitalism and Democracy Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cate

Social Democrats 2. A Revised British Constitution: Tony Blair's Lasting Legacy? 3. Who Killed the British Prime Minister? 4. Electoral Politics in the United Kingdom 5. The End of French Europe?

xvi

7. 8. 10. 11.

Angela Merkel's Not~So~Grand Coalition Waiting for a Wunder Departing Japanese Leader Shook Up Politics as Usual Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis?

32. Nigeria: Chronicle of a Dying State 36. Bin Laden, the Arab "Street;' and the Middle East's

Democracy Deficit 37. Democracy's Sobering State

12. Political Parties: Empty Vessels? 13. Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures

16. What Political Institutions Does Require?

Large~Scale

39. Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cafe

41. An Explosive Combination Democracy

42. Jihad vs. McWorld

U.S. comparisons

17. What Democracy Is ... and Is Not

19. Referendums: The People's Voice 22. The Case for a Multi~Party U,S. Parliament? American Politics in Comparative Perspective 27. Russia's Ersatz Democracy

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis? Political Parties: Empty Vessels? Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures Women in National Parliaments The True Clash of Civilizations What Political Institutions Does Large~Scale Democracy Require? 17. What Democracy Is .. . and Is Not

28. What Does Putin Want?

30. Mexico's Disputed Election 31. Latin America's Left Turn 32. Nigeria: Chronicle of a Dying State

35. India's Path to Greatness

18. Judicial Review: The Gavel and the Robe

36. Bin Laden, the Arab "Street;' and the Middle East's

19. Referendums: The People's Voice

Democracy Deficit 37. Democracy's Sobering State 38. Capitalism and Democracy

20. The Great Divide

21. Living With a Superpower 22. The Case for a Multi~Party U.S. Parliament? American Politics in Comparative Perspective 38. Capitalism and Democracy

39. Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cafe

41. An Explosive Combination 42. Jihad vs. McWorld

39. Cultural Explanations: The Man in the Baghdad Cafe

40. Globalization Is About Blending, Not Homogenizing

The Muslim World

Women in politics

5. The End of French Europe?

14. Women in National Parllaments 15. The True Clash of Civilizations

7. Angela Merkel's Not-So-Grand Coalition

14. Women in National Parliaments 15. The True Clash of Civilizations

21. Living With a Superpower

xvii

Internet References The following Internet sites have been carefully researched and selected to support the articles found in this reader. The easiest way to access these selected sites Is to go to our student online support site at http://www.mhc/s.comionlineJ.

AE: Comparative Politics 01 /08 The following sites were available at the time of publication. Visit our Web site-we update our student online support site regularly to reflect any changes.

UNIT 2: Pluralist Democracies: Factors in the Political Process Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

General Sources

http.'/Iwww.ceip,org

This organization'S goal is to stimulate discussion and learning among both experts and the public at large on a wide range of international issues. The site provides links to the weU·respected journal Foreign Policy, to the Moscow Center, to descriptions of various programs, and much more.

Central Intelligence Agency http://www,odci.gov Use this official home page to get connections to The CIA Factbook, which provides extensive statistical and political information about every country in the world.

National Geographic Society

Inter-American Dialogue (lAD) http.'//www.iadtalog.org

This is the Web site for lAD, a premier U.S. center for policy analysis, communication, and exchange in Western Hemisphere affairs, The 1OO~member organization has helped to shape the agenda of issues and choices in hemispheric relations.

http://www.nationalgeographic.com This site provides links to Nationa! Geographic's archive of maps,

articles, and documents. There is a great deal of material related to political cultures around the world.

U.S. Information Agency

The North American Institute (NAMI) http://www.northamericaninstitute,org

http://usinto.state.gov/ This USIA page provides definitions, related documentation, and discussion of topics on global issues. Many Web links are

NAMI, a trinational public·affairs organization concerned with the emerging "regional space" of Canada, the United States, and Mexico, provides links for study of trade, the environment, and institutional developments,

provided. World Bank hffp:llwww.worJdbank.org News (press releases, summaries of new projects, speeches) and coverage of numerous topics regarding development, countries, and regions are provided at this site.

World Wide Web Virtual Library: International Affairs Resources

UNIT 3: Europe in Transition: West, Center, and East Europa: European Union http://europa.eu.int

This server site of the European Union will lead you to the history of the EU; descriptions of EU policies, institutions, and goals; discussion of monetary union; and documentation of treaties and other materials.

http://www.etown.edulvll Surf this site and its extensive links to learn about specific countries and regions, to research international organizations, and to study such vital topics as international law, development, the international economy, and human rights.

NATO Integrated Data Service (NIDS) http../Iwww.nato.intlstructurlnidslnids.htm NIOS was created to bring information on security-related matters to the widest possible audience, Check out this Web site to review North Atlantic Treaty Organization documentation of all kinds, to read NATO Review, and to explore key issues in the field of European security.

UNIT 1: Pluralist Democracies: Country Studies France.com

Research and Reference (Library of Congress)

http://www.trance.com

http://lcweb.loc.govlrrl

The links at this site will lead to extensive information about the French government, politics, history, and culture.

This massive research and reference site of the Library of Congress will lead you to invaluable information on the former Soviet Union and other countries attempting the transition to democracy, It provides links to numerous publications, bibliographies, and guides in area studies.

GermNews http://www.germnew5.de/dn/aboutl Search this site for German political and economic news covering the years 1995 to the present.

Russian and East European Network Information Center, University of Texas at Austin

Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

http://reenic,utexas,edu

http://www.mofa.go.jp Visit this official site for Japanese foreign policy statements and discussions of regional and global relations.

This is the Web site for information on Russia and the former Soviet Union,

xviii

www.. mhcls .. com/online/ UNIT 4: Political Diversity in the Developing World

UNIT 5: Comparative Politics: Some Major Trends, Issues, and Prospects

Africa News Online

Commission on Global Governance

http://a/lafrica.coml

http://www.sovereignty.netlplgovlgganalysis.htm

Open this site for extensive, up-toMdate information on all of Africa, with reports from Africa's leading newspapers, magazines, and news agencies. Coverage is country-by-country and regional. Background documents and Internet links are among the resource pages.

This site provides access to The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, produced by an international group of leaders who want to find ways in which the global community can better manage its affairs.

IISDnet

ArabNet http://www.arab.net This home page of ArabNet, the online resource for the Arab world in the Middle East and North Africa, presents links to 22 Arab countries. Each country Web page classifies information using a standardized system of categories.

http://www.iisd.org/default.asp

Inside China Today

ISN International Relations and Security Network

http://www.einnews.comlchinai

http://www.isn.et~z.ch

This site of the International Institute for Sustainable Development, a Canadian organization, presents information through links on business and sustainable development, developing ideas, and Hot Topics. Linkages is its multimedia resource for environment and development pollcy makers.

Part of the European Internet Network, this site leads to information on China, including recent news, government, and related sites pertaining to mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.

This site, maintained by the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, is a clearinghouse for extensive information on international relations and security policy, Topics are listed by category (Traditional Dimensions of Security, New Dimensions of Security) and by major world regions.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

United Nations Environment Program

http://www.oecd.orglhomel

http://www.unep.chl

Explore development, governance, and world trade and investment issues on this OECD site. It provides links to many related topics and addresses global economic issues on a country-by~country basis.

Consult this home page of UNEP for links to critical topics about global issues, including decertification and the impact of trade on the environment. The site leads to useful databases and global resource information.

Sun SITE Singapore

We highly recommend that you review our Web site for expanded information and our other product lines. We are continually updating and adding links to our Web site In order to offer you the most usable and useful information that will support and expand the value of your Annual Editions. You can reach us at: http://www.mhcls.comlannuaieditions/.

http://sunsite.nus.edu.sglnoframe.html

These South East Asia Information pages provide information and point to other online resources about the region's 10 countries, including Vietnam, Indonesia, and Brunei.

,,

xix

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xxi

UNIT 1

Pluralist Democracies: Country Studies Unit Selections 1.

2. 3. 4. 6. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy, Laza Kekic A Revised British Constitution: Tony Blair's Lasting Legacy?, DonleyT. Studlar Who Killed the British Prime Minister? The Strange Death of Tony Blair, The Economist Electoral Politics in the United Kingdom, Donley T. Studlar The End of French Europe?, Steven Philip Kramer France's Murky Mix of School and Scandal, Katrin Bennhold Angela Merkel's Not-So-Grand Coalition, The Economist Waiting for a Wunder, Ludwig Siegele Japanese Spirit, Western Things, The Economist Departing Japanese Leader Shook Up Politics as Usual, Norimitsu Onishi

Key Points to Consider • What is the "index of democracy," and how would you explain its fairly low ranking of the UK? • What were the main items on Tony Blair's constitutional reform agenda, and how have they been implemented? Have they invigorated civic participation in the UK? • How did Tony Blair manage to hold on to power for so long? • Discuss the repeated political discontinuities and ruptures that mark French development and relate it to the phenomenon of Bonapartism. • Explain the periodic French resort to cohabitation. • What are some signs that French politics have become more centrist or middle-of-the-road for the main political parties? • How did the formula, "first vote with the heart, then vote with the head;' boomerang for the Left in the presidential elections of 2002? • What is the contradiction between promise and practice in the French policy of assimilation? • Discuss the preconditions for the collapse of Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe. • How did Angela Merkel benefit from feminist reforms in Germany? Explain the difference between a "grand coalition" and a "small coalition"-and give examples of both. • Explain why Japan's LOP (Liberal Democratic Party) is jokingly said to be "neither liberal, nor democratic, nora party." • What has been the role of this party in postwar Japanese politics? • How did Prime Minister Koizumi speak the language of neoliberal economic reform in Japan, and what kind of resistance did he encounter?

Student Web Site

www.mhcls.com/online

Internet References

Further information regarding these Web sites may be found in this book's preface or online. France.com http://www.franc8.com

GermNews http://www.germnews.deldnJabouti

Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs hffp:!!www.mofa.go.jp

xxii

a social or economic component in its definition of political democracy. In a summary of its findings, the index states that a little more than one-half of the world's population lives in "a democracy of some sort"-usually a very imperfect one. It may soon be a little less than one-half, given the present trends. Humanity's other half lives in decidedly non-democratic conditions. Using four regime types, the index concludes that: o

fewer than one person in seven (13 percent) lives in one of the 28 countries that it classifies as "full democracies:'

• almost three times as many people (38.3 percent) live in one of the 54 "flawed democracies:' • approximately one person in ten (10.5 percent) is found in one of the 30 "hybrid regimes." • almost four in ten (38.5 percent) live in one of the 55 "authoritarian regimes:"

The primary aim of this collection of articles is to promote a comparative understanding of contemporary politics. It pays special attention to the major varieties of representative democracy and includes reports on alternative nondemocratic forms of governance. Together, the readings will increase familiarity with the varied patterns of politics found in today's world, again with a special attention to the varieties of the democratic experience. They also discuss such related 'matters as the conditions that appear to favor or impede democracy's emergence, survival, and enhancement. The challenges are many, and they are by no means only external in origin. They include the widely discussed phenomenon of civic disengagement in advanced and relatively affluent societies. It turns out that the withdrawal from politics is not exclusive to Americans. That should be of concern, for democracy eventually becomes meaningless and will atrophy without an active demos. Democracy won can become democracy lost. It is useful to begin with a general inventory of the alternative forms of rule found in the world's 165 independent states and two territories (not including its 25 micro-states). The recently developed "index of democracy" is a useful source of comparative information on the state of governance in the world today.' Using 60 indicators across five broad categories, the index evaluates each of the 167 countries and then ranks them in terms of their overall score. Some of the rankings may come as a surprise, including the placement of the United States in rank 17, but they are supported by a wellconsidered methodology and empirical data. The categories are based on a "thick" or non-minimalist definition of political democracy that includes more than free elections and a basic guarantee of political freedoms and civil liberties. The index also gauges how well a government functions in implementing its decisions, how vigorously the citizenry takes advantage of the opportunities to participate in public life, and how supportive the pOlitical culture is of such democratic political participation. In conformity with the dominant liberal democratic tradition, it does not include

No Global Sweep of Democracy. There is no reason to assume that democratic rule will soon become global or that we can successfully build democracy when and where we choose. After a quarter of a century that recorded a widespread and unexpected advance of democratization, that trend appears to have come to a standstill in the late 1990s. There are signs that a weaker counter-trend of retreat from democracy may have set in-a topiC taken up by Thomas Carothers in unit five. Cultural and Socio-Economic Context. The democracy theme helps explain some of the topical and institutional emphasis of this collection. Is there a cultural-regional dimension embedded in the data? Even a cursory look at the index would find it hard to ignore a striking regional concentration of regime types. • The Middle East and Africa have the highest incidence of authoritarian government and the lowest occurrence of democracy. The single case of ''full democracy" among the 64 regimes in these two regions is the tiny island nation of Mauritius. There are 7 "flawed democracies" in sub~Saharan Africa, but only 2 in the Middle East and northern Africa. o

Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Australasia score high in the "flawed democracy" category, which is found in 43 of its 80 countries. In addition, these regions have 14 cases of "hybrid regimes" and 16 "authoritarian regimes; including that of China. There are only seven ''full democracies" here-including only a single case in Asia (Japan).

• By contrast, 18 of Western Europe's 21 countries are ranked as "full democracies." Even more striking is the fact that of the world's 28 full democracies, all but two (Mauritius and Japan) lie either in Western Europe (18), in Central Europe (2), or in "overseas" countries that politically were dominated by settlers from Europe and their descendants (6).

1

Culture and region matter, but they are by no means the whole story. There are also countries within Europe or primarily settled from there, which have not participated fully in the democratic experience. And it is sobering to remember that the most virulent attacks on democracy in the twentieth century came from European fascists who claimed to represent the political wave of the future. Another look at the country listings suggests the possibility that the socio-economic dimension sometimes rivals the cultural-regional one in attempts to explain the very uneven distribution of both democracy and income in the world of today. Britain, France, Germany, and Japan have been selected as case studies of pluralist democracy for a number of reasons. After the United States, they are the most populous and economically powerful of the 28 "full democracies." In addition, they are probably somewhat more familiar to most readers than the other countries in the category-and it makes some sense to begin with the more familiar and proceed to less familiar territory later. Finally, they offer sufficient similarities, differences, and contrasts to serve our comparative endeavor. Our four countries are best approached as real world examples of democracy-"warts and all." It is striking that they all developed from some form of oligarchic rule into pluralist democracies with representative forms of government and rule of law. None of them is an ideal type or model. Each one of them has democratic shortcomings. Indeed, they all rank relatively low among the full democracies. Each has its own peculiarities that invite individual narrative and single case focus. There is a lot to be said for country specialization, but the decisive step into comparative studies is taken when cross-national comparisons are added. Looking more closely at the political landscape in our four pluralist democracies is a useful way to become more familiar with different forms of democratic expression. The difference between a presidential-congressional system and a parliamentary form of rule is a basic institutional theme that is explored by Christopher Allen's article in Unit Two. There will be ample opportunity to make other comparisons with the United States before the collection moves to a series of non-Western case studies in Units Three and Four. They contain no surprises. The countries or regions chosen are: Russia, China, India, the Middle East, Iran, Latin America in general, and Mexico specifically. Even our small sample prompts reflections on the fragility of democracy. Of our four case studies of pluralist democracy, the UK was the only one that did not turn away from its democratic heritage at some point during the twentieth century. Italy, Japan, and Germany were the most prominent among several countries that abandoned the democratic road in the period between the two world wars. France followed suit after its defeat and partial military occupation by Germany in 1940. After World War II, these countries started out with new democratic constitutions. Representative governments were quickly restored in a number of other European countries where it had collapsed as a result of Nazi invasion and occupation. Only the UK continued to function-as it had for centuries-within an evolving framework of basic laws, rules, and conventions that are often referred to as its "unwritten" or "uncodified" constitution.

It is historically ironic that contemporary Britain ranks only in place 23 on the democracy index, quite far behind today's Germany (13). It also trails Japan (20). Britain's relatively low position on the list can be partly explained by its unusual concentration of power in the political executive, for the index of democracy assumes that a predominance of the legislature is more likely to encourage overall democracy. But the most detrimental impact comes from Britain's very low score on political participation-voter turnout, level of party membership, and willingness to engage in politics. In this category, Britain shares the lowest rating among all the full democracies with Mauritius and Uruguay. What, then, is a Democracy? The concept is contested, and it makes sense to follow Laza Kekicin's advice to avoid an either-or proposition (as in "a country is either democratic or it is not")' It is useful to remember that although Alexis de Tocqueville regarded the United States as a democracy in the 1830s, by today's stricter standards there was probably no country (with the exception of New Zealand) that would qualify as a democracy as late as 1900. By using a continuum, it becomes possible to differentiate between varying aspects and degrees of democracy. Moreover, it can be shown where a country has become more-or less-democratic over time. Robert Dahl's contribution in unit two provides considerable illumination because he skillfully brings historical, institutional, and theoretical considerations to bear on our understanding of democracy. He names six '~undamental" institutions that can be seen as essential for reaching a minimum level of modern representative democracy or what he has long called "polyarchy." Dahl adds a set of further going democratic criteria that the established democracies generally fall short of meeting. He ends with a call for raising the level of representative democracy. In their article, also found in unit two, Terry Lynn Karl and Phillippe Schmitter provide another valuable discussion of democratic governance. They emphasize that democracies differ considerably in their institutional infrastructure even as they meet some generic criteria that make democracy a unique political system. Their discussion ranges over procedures and principles that make democracy possible, and they add a valuable reminder of "what a democracy is not:' For example, a democracy does not provide a guarantee of higher economic growth, greater administrative efficiency, or ultimate political harmony among many other desirable achievements. All good things do not necessarily come together. In an intellectual tour de force, found in unit five, Gabriel Almond addresses a major topic that Robert Dahl has also addressed-the complex and ambiguous relationship between capitalism and democracy. Almond argues that capitalism "supports democracy" but also "subverts democracy;' even as democracy "subverts capitalism" but also "fosters capitalism:' His own preference appears to be what below is presented as "the great compromise:' In any case, he has directed attention to what may be the greatest political handicap of capitalism. It may well be more efficient and productive than other economic arrangements, but it has failed to provide a morally and intellectually persuasive theory of distributive justice rooted in the market. In a joint position paper

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released in the late 1990s, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroder used this deficiency as the reason for their support of an interventionist state. The government leaders of the UK and Germany at the time explained that while they were in favor of a productive "market economy:' they were opposed to a "market society." In other words, they did not want markets to determine major societal priorities. This appears to be a commonly shared position taken by a number of social reformers today. The Modern Nation State. The three West European countries in our sample show the impact of some major developments that are changing the political, social, and economic map of their continent. Europe was the birthplace of the modern nation state, and it is now the location where that basic political construct is undergoing a partial and ambiguous transformation. In prinCiple and practice, all of the member nations of the European Union (EU) have agreed to an unprecedented dilution of their tradition of national sovereignty. As a result, some familiar aspects of their political identity, like national borders or distinctive national currenCies, have been reduced in importance or entirely replaced. None of this Signals the end of the modern nation state or its imminent displacement by a United States of Europe. But no student of comparative politics will want to ignore the EU as a novel political formation. It is examined in unit three, along with its constitutional and democratic "deficit:' The Great Economic Compromise. Each of these countries has arrived at some "mixed" form of market capitalism, but the manner and degree of state intervention in the economy show considerable variations. Since the ''Thatcher Revolution" of the 1980s, Britain has moved closer to the relatively open market conditions of the United States, while France and Germany have followed a more organized and regulated form of capitalism. The highly protected and corporatist Japanese economy is less competitive and sometimes described as neo-mercantilist. Economic Rankings. When compared in economic strength, the four countries have relatively high and fairly similar ran kings. They are all members of the Group of Seven (G 7), where they rank behind the United States among the world's biggest market economies. If China's economy were included, that huge and rapidly developing country would probably take third place in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). On the other hand, if national economies were compared in terms of their GDP per capita, China would fall far behind. By this measure, our four countries would themselves slip somewhat in ranking, as they were passed and separated from each other by a few smaller, high-performing

problem were merely a cyclical one, It would lend itself more easily to solutions within the existing policy framework. But structural components seem to require a thorough revamping or "reinvention" of the welfare state. Almost everywhere in Europe, this popular social contract has been based on a "pay-as-you-go" formula that in practice involves an intergenerational transfer of wealth. There is much room for creative politics here. Quality of Life. Each of the four countries records a high performance when it comes to a standard measure of the quality of life. The Human Development Index (HDI) places Japan slightly ahead of equidistant Britain and France, closely followed by Germany. Once again, the aggregate figures are strikingly similar. Income Disparities. The four countries show some notable differences when compared for disparity in income, as measured by the GINI index. Yet none of them records as big a gap between the highest 10 percent and the lowest 10 percent of the household incomes as the one found in the United States. The income gap is still lowest in Japan and highest-and thus closest to the U.S. situation-in Britain since the "Thatcher Revolution:' France used to have an unusually big gap between its highest and lowest income earners, but the GINI index shows a marked reduction of the gap during the past quarter of a century. It seems plausible to link a good part of this development to the delayed political breakthrough by the Left, followed by its dominance in French politics from 1981 to 1986, from 1988 to 1993, and again from 1997 to 2002. Finally, the Scandinavian countries have very low disparities in income, even as they continue to score high on overall GDP per capita, the quality of life index, the perceptions of low corruptibility, the index of democracy, and the advancement of women to high appOinted or elected political office. One reasonable conclusion would appear to be that it is not incompatible for a country to maintain the conditions for a vigorous economy even as it also pursues the goal of reducing income disparities-and those additional policy goals that seek to enhance life chances can be added to the public agenda as well. Ethnic and Cultural Diversity. There are some additional European developments of importance for comparative political studies. For example, much of the continent has experienced difficulties in coping with the growing ethnic and cultural diversity brought about by the arrival of many economic and political immigrants during and after the cold war. Japan remains far more homogeneous, but even this island nation has experienced some ethnic diversification and could one day conceivably conclude that it needs an active immigration policy to offset the aging of the Japanese population. In Western Europe it is widely understood that the influx of newcomers has had stimulating economic and cultural consequences, but it has inevitably brought issues of multicultural co-existence and tolerance back onto the political agenda in a new form. Politics of Xenophobia. It is remarkable that there appears to be a similar level of potential support for xenophobic populist politics in much of Western Europe. It hovers around 15 percent of the popUlation, sometimes even more,

economies. Saving the Welfare State. Europeans have begun to examine carefully another of their major contributions to contemporary politics, the modern welfare state. In practically every country there are attempts to define a new balance between economic efficiency and social justice, as governments and publics are confronted with the increasing costs of a popular and relatively generous system of welfare and service entitlements. Longer life expectancies and lower birth rates contribute to the funding problem. If the funding

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but it has not been mobilized to the same degree in all the countries. Germany is one of the countries where such farright politics have been largely kept at bay, at least in federal politics. Politics of the Environment and Globalization. Even as West Europeans seek to come to terms with the challenge of greater diversity, their politics has also been affected by a growing awareness of global interdependence. Environmentalists are active in the Green parties. But the other and usually older parties have taken up the ecological theme as well. It is reflected in their widespread support for national and international initiatives to protect the environment, such as the Kyoto Treaty. They are also trying to adjust to the new information technologies and the many challenges of the global market with its opportunities for expansion and its widely perceived threat to job security and economic stability. Political Terrorism and Civil Liberties. The events of September 11, 2001 and the aftermath have sharply increased the role of organized violence and unpredictability in our political world. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon were directed at the United States, but the clandestine networks of supporters and sympathizers apparently reach deep into the immigrant communities of several European countries, including the ones we have singled out for special discussion here. Similar strikes have already affected European democracies: the train-bombings in Madrid in the spring of 2004 and in London in the summer of 2005 are the best known examples. There is no transAtlantic consensus on the most effective strategy for dealing with the new terrorism. One crucial assumption of the traditional policy of containment seems not to apply to this kind of activity, namely that the deSire for self-preservation will restrain potential opponents by making them reluctant to risk severe retaliation. The search for an appropriate and effective response will preoccupy our politics for a long time to come. The Transatlantic Gap. It is hardly surprising that the transatlantic debate over terrorism has revived the timehonored practice of engaging in public reflections on more fundamental cultural and political differences between continental Europe and the United States, One of the most widely discussed contributions has come from the American political writer, Robert Kagan. He argues that Europe and America are not just separated on the important issue of Iraq. In a widely quoted phrase, Kagan sums up his perception of the difference: "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus:' He points out that Europeans are more likely than Americans to favor multilateral approaches and to prefer a resort to "soft" rather than "hard" power in international relations. Kagan's thesis has touched off a lively debate, much of it critical. In his spirited response, found in unit two, Timothy Garton Ash critically discusses "The Great Divide" from a British perspective and explains why he finds Kagan to be only "half right." Traditional Values and Secular-Rational Modernity. The transatlantic values gap is illuminated by the world values survey, an ambitious project led by Ronald Inglehart at the University of Michigan. It studies cross-cu~ural similarities and differences in 81 societies' around the world-including the

ones discussed in this book. One of its major findings is that while contemporary Americans and West Europeans share some basic values of "self-expression" that are closely associated with political and economic freedoms, Americans tend to be far more traditional, religious, and patriotic in their values than their more "secular-rational" West European contemporaries. The resulting "values gap" between the United States and Western Europe is evident on the cultural map that accompanies the article, "Living with a Superpower:' in unit two. Continuity and Change. This is the point at which to embark on a serial discussion of politics in the four countries that make up our sample. But two suggestions of caution may be in order. First, in our concern to include the most recent changes and newest challenges, we must not lose sight of some equally important if less dramatic elements of continuity or even inertia in political life. In the stable democracies of Western Europe and Japan, the political process is usually defined by a relatively mild blend of change and continuity. Here political agendas are normally modified rather than discarded entirely, and shifts in the balance of power do rarely take the form of revolutionary displacements of a ruling group. Instead, there are occasional changes of government as a result of coalition disagreements or routine elections. Second, this capacity to adjust and adapt is important but may not always suffice. Dramatic disruptions of established political systems do sometimes occur, even in "our time" and in democratic contexts. In France, there have been periodic outbreaks of urban and suburban upheavals and riots, massive demonstrations, and politically motivated industrial strikes. In retrospect, it may be possible to reconstruct how the tipping point was reached that led to an unexpected upheaval, but that does not make such upheavals predictable. In the countries we now turn toward, the unexpected major turns in political development have included the following: The Thatcher Revolution, "New" Labour, and Blair's support for President Bush's Policy on Iran, President Mitterrand's social and economic reforms, the recurrent periods of cohabitation, the new French party system, the defeat of the EU Constitution, the collapse of the Communist bloc in Europe, Germany and the German unification, and the new German party system after the 1950s and now. Great Britain has long been regarded as the "mother" of the parliamentary system of government. In contrast to a presidential system, where the chief executive and legislatures are separately elected by the voters for fixed terms of office, a parliamentary government is often described as based on the "fusion" of the executive and legislative powers. Its most distinctive trait is that the prime minister, as head of government, is in some way Hchosen" or
strength, but they have gained a chance to play a role in coalition pOlitics that was previously denied them. After 1981, and again between 1997 and 2002, they were a small partner in the coalition government dominated by the Socialists, who had overtaken them on the Left in 1978. The Extreme Right. Le Pen's National Front (FN) seemed to be weakened by internal splits and rivalries, before it surprised many by capturing 17 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential election in 2002. The party continues to find right-wing populist support for its authoritarian and xenophobic rhetoric directed primarily against the country's many residents of Arab origin. In his article, Steven Philip Kramer does not mince words in describing this party as "fascist, racist, xenophobic, and often anti-Semitic, as well as staunchly anti-EU:' The Socialists (PS). Between these peripheral positions, we find the more centrist parties located. On the left of center we find the Socialists (PS), who were revived by Franqois Mitterrand in the early 1970s. It is a social reformist party, with a strong appeal to teachers and white collar workers. The revived Socialist Party is more responsible than any other party for France's welfare state development during the 14-year presidency of Mitterrand and the cohabiting 5-year government during President Chirac's first term. The Conservatives. On the center-right there is also one leading party that is conservative in a more traditional sense. It is the Rally for the Republic (RPR) that was organized as a neo-Gaullist party. Jacques Chirac played a major role in creating this party during the early 1970s, after de Gaulle's death. It is a neo-Gaullist party-that is, it can be counted on to support measures that will strengthen the armed forces, protect French industry and agriculture, and reinforce law and order. It has taken over some defectors from other parties, notably the UDF. Since the eleelions of 2002, the party has presented itself as the UMP (Union for a Popular Majority or, simply, the Union for a Majority). One major change is the decline of t~e previously sharp ideological struggle between the Left and the Right. This seems to have resulted in a sense of loss among some French intellectuals who prefer the political battle to have drama and implications. They apparently find it hard to accept that the grand struggle between Left and Right has been replaced by a more moderate and mundane party politics of competition among groups that tend to cluster fairly close to the center of the political spectrum. The French faced an electoral marathon in 2002, when there were two-stage elections for both the presidency and the National Assembly. It Was expected in advance that the focus of the relatively short presidential campaign would be on the two veteran warhorses, Chirac and Jospin. The big surprise was the elimination of Jospin in the first stage. He ran a close third behind Chirac, who came first, and the far right candidate, Le Pen, who came second. As in 1995, many people on the Left had apparently voted "with their hearts" in the first round. The result was that the Left vote was split among a multiplicity of candidates, none of whom had a chance of making it into the second round. This time, however, the result was the failure of the main candidate of the Left to make it into the second round, since socialist Jospin gathered slightly fewer votes than nationalist Le Pen. In the

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promptly dubbed "cohabitation:' It only lasted two years, until the end of Mitterrand's seven-year presidential term, but during that time this form of power sharing had a remarkable effect on the balance of power and responsibility between president and prime minister. Mitterrand drew back from the active political role he had played during his first five years and let Prime Minister Chirac dominate the political stage. Chirac's government took advantage of the new relationship. During its two years in office, it in effect rolled back some of Mitterrand's social and economic reforms. The French have returned to this version of power-sharing in two more recent time periods-from 1993 to 1995 and again between 1997 and 2002. Each time, the same basic pattern could be observed: In domestic politics, the president becomes a less central and less act'lve political figure and the prime minister takes over the leadership in most public matters. One could also say that the system becomes decidedly more parliamentary (or more prime ministerial) and much less presidential in a period of cohabitation. In the second half of 2005, France was torn by a prolonged series of suburban riots in which young people of North African descent played a major role. Order was eventually restored, but the damage went far beyond the toll of human injuries or the torched cars and buildings. Major politicians seemed to be in a state of shock, and their responses came slowly and unci early. Sargozy stood apart by combining an early and unambiguous demand for law and order with sug. gestions for constructive public policy measures to give more reality to the French promise of integration. The dramatic events drew attention to flaws in the celebrated French policy of full assimilation of immigrants. In 2007, France plans to hold both presidential and parliamentary elections. There will presumably be many politicians eager to enter one or the other race. It will be interesting to see whether Left voters will remember the lesson from 2005, when in the two rounds of the presidential contest they planed to vote "first with the hearr' and then, in the second round, "with the head:' As a result, they spread their vote among several Left candidates who had no chance of winning. The result was that the chief Socialist candidate, Lionel Jospin, did not make it to the second round, where he would probably have made a good showing. Instead, the incumbent Jacques Chirac ran against right-wing candidate and founder of the National Front, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and beat him soundly. At the beginning of 2007, the two most prominent candidates for the presidential race appeared to be the conservative, Nicolas Sargozy, and the socialist, Segolene Royal. There have been female candidates for the French presidency before, but with exotic party labels that doomed them to be "also rans:' This time, however, the Socialists have stirred up the French race with a woman candidate who seemed to be the only politician, male or female, capable of beating Sargozy. Would France follow Germany in electing a woman as its chief executive? Germany was united in 1990, when what had been the eastern German Democratic Republic joined the western Federal Republic of Germany. The event came as one of the big surprises in recent political history, and neither the Germans nor anyone else were ready forthe shift. There were

no carefully prepared "unification plans" waiting for implementation. Instead, quick judgment and improvisation became the order of the day. Considering such matters as the lack of preparation, the unreliability of the official East German statistics, and the ideological separation of the political elites in the two states, there was an enormous potential for chaos, conflict or corruption. It is difficult not to be impressed by the fairly low incidence of such problems. On the other hand, the unification has led to an east-west divide in German politiCS that has attracted the attention of comparativists. German unification was closely connected to the general weakening and eventual collapse of Communist control in that part of the world. There seem to have been two major preconditions for the rapid transition from authoritarian communism to representative democracy in all of these countries. First, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had abandoned the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine under which the Soviets claimed the right of military intervention on behalf of the communist regimes that had been set up in these countries after World War II. Their rulers were now basically left to fend for themselves. Second, when the test came, these same national leaders turned out to have lost their will to powerthat is, their determination (and ability) to assert themselves and hold on to power at any cost. Once that became plain, they had lost the game, for none of these regimes had a reservoir of popular legitimacy to back them up. A snowball-like effect set in, and within a year the people's democracies were no longer there. But four decades of communism had left an imprint that would not be removed so readily. The two German states had been established in 1949, four years after the total defeat of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich in World War II. During the next 40 years, their rival elites subscribed to the conflicting ideologies and interests of East and West in the cold war. When the two German states began to prepare their separate fortieth anniversaries, the division had lost its provisional character-or so it seemed. National unification was just around the corner, but no leading politician was on record as having foreseen the imminent upheaval. A leading American dictionary published in 1988 reflected the conventional view that the division of Germany was by now a fact of political life. It simply defined Germany as "a former country in Central Europe:' East Germany comprised the territory of the former Soviet Zone of Occupation in postwar Germany. Here, the rulers established a Communist political system with an economy based on Soviet-style central planning. East Germany lagged far behind West Germany in its recovery from the ruinous war, but it gained a reputation for having built one of the most productive economies in the Soviet bloc. The Berlin Wall was erected in August of 1961 to end what for East Germany had become an economically ruinous flight of people to the West. As a result, its population stabilized at about 16 million by the late 1980s. West Germany comprised the regions that had been the American, British, and French zones of occupation. By the time of unification, it had become a prosperous society of about 62 million people-nearly four times as many as in East Germany. The new West German state had been carefully constructed as a representative democracy that reflected the Founders' determination to avoid the political disaster associated with

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the Weimar Republic. New constitutions often attempt to include remedies for the ills that beset a previous political system. That was very much the case with West Germany's constitution. Called the Basic Law, it was replete with institutional safeguards, including elaborate checks and balances. It set up a strong federal system, a very active system of judicial review, and gave special emphasis to the importance of a vigorous system of democratic parties. Perhaps the most unusual feature of the Basic Law was that it carried a notice of its own limited shelf life. It foresaw the day when Germans in a united and free country could work out a new constitution. That scenario was not to be. Germany has been united, but the Basic Law (much amended over the years) remains in effect. West Germany experienced an early, sustained, and impressive economic and political recovery from the postwar disorder. This development stood in sharp contrast to the problems that had beset the first German republic, prior to the Nazi rise to power. Basically, the Weimar Republic in its last years had become a deeply fragmented and politically radicalized society, whereas West Germany started out as a politically exhausted, post-revolutionary society in which individual energies were largely channeled toward the pursuit of economic self-betterment. The new state benefited from an unusually long economic boom that had been triggered by the currency reform of 1948. The second German republic passed the pragmatic test of performance ("does it work?"). By the 1970s, just before some structural problems began to darken the economic horizon, Germany's political class began to refer with new found self-confidence to Modell Deutschland, "the German model."

the Weimar population had been. Their votes were based on moderate or centrist preferences for parties that largely pursued moderate policies and made centrist appeals. The result was a simple and amazingly stable party system. During the 1950s, German politics largely concentrated around the two leading parties, the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU or, in Bavaria only, CSU) and the centerleft Social Democrats (SPD). Beginning in 1957, these two parties together received well over 80 percent of the vote-and occasionally topped 90 percent. As a result, West Germany ended up with a "two and one-half" or '~wo plus one" party system in thE! Bundestag between 1961 and 1983. The business-friendly and liberal Free Democrats (FOP) were the only small Bundestag party to survive the concentration of the party system. Despite their modest share of the vote (an average of 8 to 9 percent), they held the balance of power, and this gave them an opportunity to be kingmakers. In their heyday, the Free Democrats were one of the most successful small parties in Western Europe. In 1982, one of their last dramatic impacts on West German politics came about when they switched coalition partners in midterm. They left the SPD after 13 years of co-governing and joined a new governing coalition led by Helmut Kohl and the CDU/CSU. They immediately joined the COU/CSU, with whom they served for another 16 years, until 1998. By that time, the FOP had served in government for a total of 40 years. Their role as small coalition partner was at this point taken by the new party of Greens that had entered the Bundestag in the early 1980s. After that, West Germany had a "two plus two" party system that became a "two plus three" party system with the addition of the post-communist PDS in the year of German unification. Small or big, two or three party coalitions? In contrast to Britain's single-party tradition, West German governments were based on coalitions. These were led by one of the two major parties and included the small FOP as majority-making junior partner. The only interruption in this pattern of small coalitions was a three-year period in the late 1960s, when the two leading parties came together in a "grand coalition:' with the FOP relegated to the role of small opposition party. East Germany began to unravel in 1989. There were peaceful protest demonstrations in several cities and a dramatic westward flight of thousands of defiant citizens. In effect, these people were "voting with their feet"-and that turned out to be very effective. The confused East German rulers reacted with a mixture of conciliatory and repressive measures that only made the dissidents bolder. After sacking their long-time leader Erich Honecker in October 1989, the Communists elected a new party leadership and adopted a new party name. This Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) also adopted a new program that identified it as a democratic left-wing socialist party. It tried a form of power-sharing with noncommunist groups and agreed to hold a free East German parliamentary election in March 1.990. The March election in East Germany resulted in a new non-communist coalition government that favored a short, quick route to unification. It was to begin with an early monetary union in the summer and a political union by the fall

The West German "Two-plus-One Party System." A key role in the West German political success story before unification had been the development of the parties and their coalition politics. The Weimar party system had mirrored Weimar society and been highly fragmented and polarized, producing considerable instability. To avoid the splintering effect attributed to the Weimar system of pure proportional representation (PR), West Germany adopted a modified system of PR that was designed to keep very small parties from gaining seats in the Bundestag. It is a two-ballot system in which the second and most important ballot is cast for a party. The parties win a share of the total number of Bundestag seats that is approximately equal to its share of the second or party vote, but only parties that win 5 percent or more of the second votes are eligible to participate in this proportional distribution of Bundestag seats. The 5 percent clause will be set aside in the rare case of a small party that has managed to win at least three single-member districts on the first ballot. The 5 percent clause and three districts rule has kept very small parties out of the Bundestag since they were adopted in the 1950s. That includes several far right-wing parties that occasionally have managed to gain entry to one of the state parliaments. But the new West German party system could not have been engineered through electoral law alone. Instead, it reflects the electoral choices made by voters who were not nearly as deeply divided or ideologically driven as

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of 1990. That was indeed the route taken, in tandem with international negotiations that involved the former World War II allies, the United States, the UK, France and the Soviet Union, as well as East and West Germany. Basically East Germany entered into the existing Federal Republic with its institutional framework. Here some critics saw a missed opportunity to revamp or even "democratize" the Basic Law. Others pointed out that the Basic Law had stood the test of time, by already lasting about three times as long as the Weimar Republic. More technocratic reformers sometimes point out that this would have been an opportune moment to streamline the increasingly cumbersome federal system and consolidate some of the smaller states. The rush to unite Germany would probably have been slowed down by adding such items to the agenda. . Each of the former Communist-ruled countries made its own transition from one-party rule and central planning toward a pluralist democracy and a market economy. The path taken by the eastern part of Germany differed greatly from all the rest, because it alone involved a full merger with a successful (and much larger) non-Communist part of the same nation.' As a result, East Germany had the advantage-if advantage it was-of having a prosperous and accomplished West Germany as "sponsor" of its post-Communist reconstruction. It became the recipient of generous social programs and some heavy public investments in the infrastructure that were made possible by huge financial transfers from western Germany. It received as well a ready-made and time-tested constitutional, legal and organizational infrastructure as a result of the merger. At first glance. Germany's unification would appear to have been an unusually friendly and generous takeover. But the projection of West German institutions into East Germany did not transform the East into an easterly extension of the West. Eastern Germany came to depend on "the golden West" to supply public funds and fill vacant leadership positions that required modern business skills or simply to meet consumer demand with Western products. Some East Germans began to see themselves as partial losers in the unification process-most obviously former elite members who had lost privileged positions and social status, many professionals whose occupational competence did not readily fit into the new order, and the many who for the first time in their lives experienced unemployment. By the late 1990s the jobless approached 4 million in Germany, nearly 10 percent in the West and nearly twice that rate in the East. The parties that had come in from the West-the COU. SPO, FOP and Greens-often found it difficult to reach many of the voters with such biographies. The Communist rulers had made great efforts to promote Marxism-Leninism as the new socialist state's official ideology. They do not appear to have had much success in this endeavor, but the experience of life in the GOR nevertheless seems to have left a general ideological residue that still differentiates East from West in Germany more than a decade and a half after their unification. Basically, many easterners seem inclined to prefer a more egalitarian and risk-free order, along with a major role for the state in a kind

11

of collective definition of social justice. By contrast, more westerners seem willing to accept as fair or just an outcome that primarily reflects unequal individual achievements and outcomes in a competitive market context. This resembles a key difference between a socialist and a capitalist orientation, although the difference in "real" life is less sharp-edged than suggested by the ideological contrast. Perhaps one should think in terms of different tendencies rather than dichotomous ("either-or') positions. The one home-grown political party was better positioned for focusing on the grievances of East Germans. It became essentially a regional protest party of socialist reformers. There was a high volatility in East German voting behavior, but the total share won by the POS in the East alone rose from 11.1 percent at the time of unification to hover around 20 percent until 2005, when it rose to 25.3 percent-exactly the same share as the COU in the East. In effect, the East Germans had created a "three party system" that operated alongside a "two plus two" party system in the West. For in the West, before the addition of the Left Party in 2005, the POS received only about 1 percent of the vote-even less than the FOP and the Greens received in the East. In an almost evenly balanced Bundestag, the POS-whether in parliament or not-drew enough votes to act as a spoiler, by either producing a stalemate or tip the election in favor of the Right. The election results from 1994, 2002, and 2005 would all have produced different winners without the POS. In 1998, the German voters finally drove Helmut Kohl's government from office. The next government was similarly based on a small coalition, but now the Greens had replaced the Liberals as majority makers. By deciding that it was time for a change, German voters produced a result that was similar to the turnabouts in Britain and France a year earlier. In Germany the change was also generational. The new government was composed of Germany's first post-war generation in power as well as it's first left of center governing coalition. The Bundestag election of 2002. This was the closest election in the history of the Federal Republic. Both SPO and COU/CSU won 38.5 percent of the vote, but a quirk in the two-vote electoral law gave the SPO three more seats than its major rival. At the start, the SPO had a poor stand in the polls. It could hardly claim to have delivered on the promise of an economic turnaround, yet it managed to catch up. The electoral recovery was in large part attributable to Chancellor Schroder's campaign, in particular (1) his more impressive performance in the televised debates with the conservative chancellor candidate, Edmund Stoiber, (2) his unusually sharp disavowal of President Bush's strategy toward Iraq, and (3) his well timed appearance as a decisive leader in dealing with the great floods that ravaged parts of eastern Germany in the month before the Bundestag election. Structural Reforms: Federalism and Agenda 2010. After the 2002 election, German politics turned more seriously toward the task of basic structural reform. The two main topics were the country's federal structure and its socioeconomic model. Federalism is a crucial element not only in the country's governance but also in its self-understanding,

as reflected in its official name, the Federal Republic of Germany. The founders of the West German state had regarded a strong federal arrangement as a key safeguard against a dangerous concentration and potential abuse of power in the central government. Today there are outspoken reformers who believe that the federal entanglements often impede effective governance in Germany. At the same time, there are powerful vested interests that wish to keep the present arrangements, perhaps with some modifications. There may be even broader agreement about the need for a basic socio-economic reform in Germany. Yet there is no consensus about the specific reform meaSUres themselves. The discussion resembles that carried on in several other advanced societies. It proceeds from the insight that Germany's generous social welfare model will be unsustainable in its present form over the long run. Germany faces not only the familiar demographic shifts of an ageing society and stiff economic competition from abroad. Its problems are compounded by the economic burden of post-communist reconstruction in eastern Germany. Germans have traditionally favored a socially more contained form of capitalism than the untrammeled market version that prevails in Britain or the United States. They are unlikely to accept the kind of massive deregulation that was introduced in the United States and Britain by conservative governments in the 1980s and largely accepted in both countries by their center-left successors in the following decade. Both the political culture and institutional framework of Germany (and much of mainland Europe) lean more toward corporatist and communitarian solutions than their British and American counterparts. At the beginning of 2004, Chancellor Schroder succeeded in mobilizing parliamentary support for a comprehensive structural reform package, Agenda 2010. It ran into protests as Germans began to anticipate the painful rollbacks they were facing. The SPD, as the leading government party, dropped sharply in the polls and experienced an unprecedented loss of voters and dues-paying members. There was an institutional power shift as well, when victories in several state elections gave the Christian Democrats enough votes in the federal upper chamber (Bundesrat) to have a blocking majority. After the defeat of the SPD-Ied coalition in the most populous state of North Rhine Westphalia for the first time in four decades, SchrOder announced his intention to hold the next Bundestag election a year early. He managed to obtain the necessary approval by the Federal President and the Constitutional Court. During a short campaign, in which SchrOder and the SPD pulled out all the stops, the CDU/CSU managed to lose a more than 10 percent lead and came out only one percentage point ahead of the SPD (35.2 to 34.2 percent). It was the first election since 1949 in which the two major parties had together received less than 70 percent of the vote. That has led to a discussion in Germany whether the near duopoly by the CDU/CSU and SPD is coming to an end and will be replaced by a more fragmented, pluralized party system. The relatively strong performance of the Left. PDS determined the outcome of the 2005 election. This alliance

brought together the eastern PDS and western socialist dissidents, who had reacted to SchrOder's "neoliberal" reforms by gathering behind the former SPD leader and one-time chancellor candidate, Oskar Lafontaine. Thus the political alliance overcame the weakness of the PDS, which can win between one-fifth and one-fourth of the vote in eastern Germany but not more than 1.2 percent in the West. The Left Party brought in almost four times as many votes in the West as the PDS had at best been able to win-4.4 percent. The Left would not have passed the 5 percent barrier by itself, but by adding the result in the eastern states (25.3 percent) the alliance won a combined total of 8.7 percent. The coalition possibilities were greatly restricted because of politics or arithmetic, quite often both. Germany has not tried minority government at the national level, and it rarely discusses it as a workable alternative to a governing majority coalition. As we have seen, the classical German "small coalition" was arithmetically impossible-whether "red-green:' "red-yellow:' "blaCk-yellow," or "blaCk-green:' PDS was also impossible for reasons of politics. The post-communists have entered into governing coalitions at the state level in former East Germany; they are still regarded as political anathema at the federal level. The SPD had special reasons for not getting cozy with the defectors who had joined the renegade, former SPD leader, Lafontaine. Majority coalitions based on three parties were arithmetically possible, but turned out to be politically impOSSible. In the end, the two big parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) decided to form a black-red "grand coalition;' headed by Angela Merkel. The challenges facing this coalition and its remarkable leader are discussed in the readings on German politics in unit one. Japan has long fascinated comparative social scientists as a country that modernized early, rapidly and thoroughly while maintaining its Japanese, non-Western identity. This topic is explored in the article "Japanese Spirit, Western Things." There seem to be few cultures that have shown a similar capacity to "assimilate" borrowings from abroad. Japan moved tentatively toward a semblance of the parliamentary form of government after World War I, but further steps were blocked by a militarist takeover in the early 1930s. After World War II, Japan came under military occupation but, unlike Germany, it was occupied by a single power only, the United States. A parliamentary form of representative democracy was installed in Japan under American superviSion. This new political system soon acquired indigenous Japanese characteristics that set it off from the other major democracies examined here. The adaptation of the representative institutions took place in the context of a prolonged economic boom, which had begun a little later but became in some ways even more impressive than that of West Germany after World War II. It helped the new system gain legitimacy by meeting the pragmatiC test (it "worked"). The party system shows some superficial resemblance to the many weak and internally divided parties of the Third and Fourth Republics. In Japan, however, there are informal but well established, alternative networks for contact and

12

communication between leading politicians and their counterparts as business leaders and top bureaucrats. Since its creation in 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has played a leading role in Japanese party politics. Most of the time, the many opposition parties have been divided and they have provided little effective competition. Yet the LDP could be said to provide its own opposition. According to a standard political joke, the Japanese Liberal Democrats are neither Liberal nor democratic-and they do not really constitute a party either! There is some truth in this remark. The LDP has essentially performed like a conservative political machine that loosely unites and balances several rival factions, which in turn consists mostly of the personal followers of political bosses who stake out and pursue factional claims to benefits of office. In Japanese politics, the LDP performs an important coordinating role, and if it were not there, it might have to be invented in order for the parliamentary side of the Japanese system to work. Such a conclusion is supported by the political chaos that resulted during the one year when the LDP was absent from the government. That was in 1993, when the LDP temporarily lost its parliamentary majority. Thereupon seven different parties, spanning the spectrum from conservative to socialist, formed a fragile coalition government. It was incapable of defining or promoting a coherent policy program and stood helpless as the Japanese economy continued on its course of stagnation. The long postwar economic boom had petered out somewhat later for Japan than in Western Europe, but by the beginning of the 1990s the Japanese economy was on the decline. One year, two prime ministers and several cabinet reshuffles later, a revived LDP managed by the summer of 1994 to return to the cabinet in coalition with its former rivals, the Socialists. The peculiar alliance was possible because the Socialist leadership took a thoroughly pragmatic view of coalition politics-as did the LDP. By December 1995, the more experienced LDP had recaptured the prime ministership for itself. There followed a rapid succession of short-lived governments headed by LDP factional leaders. When the post once again became open in April 2001, there were a surprising number of willing candidates and an even more surprising victor. The unexpected new leader of the Liberal Democrats and new prime minister of Japan was Junichiro Koizumi. He had unequivocally identified himself as committed to a new course of thorough reform that would go beyond the economy into realms that hitherto had been deemed out of reach for politics. Once in office, Koizumi immediately took some symbolic steps to show that he meant business. His first cabinet included five women, including the controversial Makiko Tanaka who became head of the foreign ministry. Considered assertive, she quickly became a target for opponents of the new course. She was dismissed as foreign minister in January 2002, but immediately replaced by another prominentwoman.

Although he had learned the traditional ways of Japanese party politics before reaching the top, Koizumi soon became widely known for having adopted an unconventional approach. His leadership style brought him media attention and, at times, personal popularity as with no previous prime minister. But he was less successful in turning his popularity into political capital. He used every opportunity to call for economic reform, and he mastered the language of structural innovation. No previous Japanese prime minister had made such outspoken neoliberal demands for privatization and deregulation. But he worked within a context that was not conducive to reform. His proposals ran into tough resistance from conservative elements in the political class, including factional leaders of his own party and members of the high civil service. It is remarkable that Japan's prolonged economic stagnation, lasting from the early 1990s for well over a decadeand not yet completely over has not resulted in more political protests or electoral repercussions. A key question has been whether the fragmented parliamentary opposition would one day overcome its divisions and find a way to become a more coherent, alternative force. It is a vision that has brought The Economist to speculate about the possible emergence of a two-party system, with the newly emerging Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) as the clear alternative choice for mainstream voters. So far, this reading of Japanese party politiCS has failed to pan out. The immediate result of the 2003 parliamentary election was that Koizumi remained prime minister with his coalition intact. Japanese politiCS seemed to continue in its well-worn groove. Prime Minister Koizumi continued to run into opposition to his plans for economic liberalization, and much of the resistance came from members of his own party. When his plans to privatize the postal service were rejected by the upper house of parliament in 2005, Koizumi used the occasion to call for early elections. His move resembled the one taken about the same time by the German chancellor in reaction to a political stalemate. The immediate outcome was very different for, in contrast to Gerhard Schroder, Koizumi won a landslide victory. The Japanese prime minister had used the opportunity to purge his party of some rebels, and in the following parliamentary session the Liberal Democrats acted more as a team and mobilized support to have 82 of 91 proposed bills passed, including the one to privatize the postal services. The turnabout came in the fifth year of Koizumi's tenure as prime minister-far too late to give him an opportunity to pursue his new course to the end, if that had seriously been his intention. In 2006, following his party's rules on term limits, he stepped down. Unlike many of his predecessors, Koizumi did not try to pick his own successor. In September 2006, Shinzo Abe was elected to succeed Koizumi as leader of the Liberal Democrats and prime minister of Japan. Some observers called attention to what they regarded as the new leader's unrepentant attitude to his country's war crimes as likely to have major foreign repercussions. Others found it difficult to

13

2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. An early discussion of this potentially problematiC dependency on the West German sponsor is found in my essay: Christian S0e, "National Unification and Reconstruction in Germany: The Problem of Old and New Divisions:' in Gaines Post, ed., German Unification: Problems and Prospects (The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Monograph Series, Number Three: Claremont, 1992).

believe that Japan would put its hard-won, good relations with China, South Korea, and other neighbors at risk by indulging in a revival of nationalism.

Notes 1. Laza Kekic, The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy, included in Comparative Politics 07108 as article one.

14

Article 1

The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy LAZA KEKIC

Defining and Measuring Democracy

3. Regularly contested elections conducted on the basis of secret ballots, reasonable ballot security and the absence of massive voter fraud. 4. Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open campaigning.

There is no consensus on how to measure democracy, definitions of

democracy are contested and there is an ongoing lively debate on the subject. The issue is not only of academic interest. For example,

although democracy-promotion is high on the Jist of American foreign-

The Freedom House definition of political freedom is somewhat (though not much) more demanding than its criteria for electoral democracy-Le., it classifies more countries as electoral democracies than as "free" (some "partly free" countries are also categorised as electoral democracies). At the end of 2005, 122 states were classified as electoral democracies; of these, 89 states were classified as free. The Freedom House political-freedom measure covers the electoral process and political pluralism and, to a lesser extent, the functioning of government and a few aspects of participation. A key differenc.e in the various measures of democracy is between "thin" or minimalist ones and "thick" or wider concepts (Coppedge, 2005). The thin concepts correspond closely to an immensely influential academic definition of democracy, that of Robert Dahl's concept of polyarchy (Dahl, 1970). Polyarchy has eight components, or institutional requirements: almost all adult citizens have the right to vote; almost all adult citizens are eligible for public office; political leaders have the right to compete for votes; elections are free and fair; all citizens are free to form and join political parties and other organisations; all citizens are free to express themselves on all political issues; diverse sources of infonnation about politics exist and are protected by taw; and government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. The Freedom House electoral democracy measure is a thin concept. Its measure of democracy based on political rights and civil liberties is thicker than the measure of electoral democracy. Other definitions of democracy have broadened to include aspects of society and political culture in democratic societies.

policy priorities, there is no consensus within the American govern-

ment on what constitutes a democracy. As one observer recently put it, "the world's only superpower is rhetorically and militarily promoting a political system that remains undefined-and it is staking its credibility and treasure on that pursuit" (Horowitz, 2006, p 114). Although the terms "freedom" and "democracy" are often used interchangeably, the two are not synonymous. Democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that institutionalise and thus ultimately protect freedom. Even if a consensus on precise definitions has proved elusive, most observers today would agree that, at a minimum, the fundamental features of a democracy include government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed, the existence of free and fair elections, the protection of minorities and respect for basic human rights. Democracy presupposes equality before the law, due process and political pluralism. Is reference to these basic features sufficient for a satisfactory concept of democracy? As discussed below, there is a question of how far the definition may need to be widened. Some insist that democracy is necessarily a dichotomous concepta state is either democratic or not. But most measures now appear to adhere to a continuous concept, with the possibility of varying degrees of democracy. At present, the best-known measure is produced by the US-based Freedom House organisation. The average of its indexes, on a 1 to 7 scale, of political freedom (based on 10 indicators) and of civil liberties (based on 15 indicators) is often taken to be a measure of democracy. The index is available for all countries, and stretches back to the early 1970s. It has been used heavily in empirical investigations of the relationship between democracy and various economic and social variables. The so-called Polity Project provides, for a smaller number of countries, measures of democracy and regime types, based on rather minimalist definitions, stretching back to the 19th century. Freedom House also measures a narrower concept, that of "electoral democracy". Democracies in this minimal sense share at least one common, essential characteristic. Positions of political 'power are fined through regular, free, and fair elections between competing parties, and it is possible for an incumbent government to be turned out of office through elections. Freedom House criteria for an electoral democracy include:

The Economist Intelligence Unit's Measure of Democracy The Economist Intelligence Unit's index is based on the view that mea~ sures of democracy that reflect the state of political freedoms and civil liberties are not thick enough. They do not encompass sufficiently or at all some features that detennine how substantive democracy is or its quality. Freedom is an essential component of democracy, but not sufficient. In existing measures, the elements of political participation and functioning of government are taken into account only in a marginal way. The Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the

1. A competitive, multiparty political system. 2. Universal adult suffrage.

15

ANNUAL EDITIONS

Table 1

Economist

il'1olnl"'o

Unit

nOI'Ylr"~":"~\1

Index 2006

Category scores Rank

Overall I Electoral Process II Functioning III Political IV Political V Civil Score and Pluralism of Government Participation Culture Liberties

Full democracies Sweden Iceland Netherlands Norway Denmark Finland Luxembourg Australia Canada Switzerland Ireland New Zealand Germany

Austria Malta

Spain

US Czech Republic Portugal Belgium Japan Greece

UK France Mauritius Costa Rica Slovenia Uruguay

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11~ 11~

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20~ 20~

22 23 24 25~

25~ 27~ 27~

9.88 9.71 9.66 9.55 9.52 9.25 9.10 9.09 9.07 9.02 9.01 9.01 8.82 8.69 8.39 8.34 8.22 8.17 8.16 8.15 8.15 8.13 8.08 8.07 8.04 8.04 7.96 7.96

10.00 10.00 9.58 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.17 9.58 9.58 10.00 9.58 9.58 9.17 9.58 8.75 9.58 9.58 9.58 9.17 9.58 9.58 9.58 9.17 9.58 9.58 10.00

10.00 9.64 9.29 9.64 9.64 10.00 9.29 8.93 9.64 9.29 8.93 8.57 8.57 8.21 8.21 7.86 7.86 6.79 8.21 8.21 7.86 7.50 8.57 7.50 8.21 8.21 7.86 8.21

10.00 8.89 9.44 10.00 8.89 7.78 7.78 7.78 7.78 7.78 7.78 8.33 7.78 7.78 6.11 6.11 7.22 7.22 6.11 6.67 5.56 6.67 5.00 6.67 5.00 6.11 6.67 5.00

9.38 10.00 10.00 8.13 9.38 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.13 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.13 7.50 6.88 8.75 7.50 8.13 7.50 8.13 6.88 6.88 6.88

7.91 7.89 7.88 7.82 7.74 7.73 7.68 7.60 7.60 7.53 7.43 7.43 7.40 7.38 7.37 7.35 7.34 7.30 7.28 7.18 7.10 7.06 7.04

8.75 9.58 9.58 9.58 9.58 9.17 9.58 9.17 9.17 9.58 9.17 9.58 9.58 9.58 9.58 9.58 9.17 9.58 9.17 9.17 9.58 9.58 9.17

7.86 8.93 7.14 7.50 7.50 6.43 8.21 7.86 6.79 6.79 7.86 6.43 7.50 7.86 6.43 7.14 7.14 6.07 6.64 6.79 5.71 6.07 6.07

7.22 5.00 7.22 6.67 5.00 6.11 5.56 5.00 6.67 5.00 5.00 6.67 6.11 4.44 6.11 5.56 5.00 6.11 7.78 6.11 6.67 6.11 6.11

6.88 6.25 7.50 5.63 7.50 8.13 5.63 8.88 6.25 6.88 6.88 5.63 5.00 5.63 5.63 5.63 6.25 5.63 7.50 5.63 5.00 5.00 5.63

10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.71 9.71 9.71 10.00 10.00 9.71 10.00 10.00 9.41 9.12 9.71 9.41 8.53 9.12 9.41 9.41 9.41 9.41 9.12 9.12 9.71 9.41 8.82 9.71

Flawed democracies South Africa Chile South Korea

Taiwan Estonia Italy

India Botswana Cyprus Hungary Cape Verde Uthuania Slovakia Brazil Latvia

Panama Jamaica Poland Israel Trinidad and Tobago Bulgaria Romania Croatia

29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36~

36~

38 39~

39~

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

16

8.82 9.71 7.94 9.71 9.12 8.82 9.41 9.12 9.12 9.41 8.24 8.82 8.82 9.41 9.12 8.82 9.12 9.12 5.29 8.24 8.53 8.53 8.24 (continued)

Article 1. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy

Table 1

Unit

Economist

nAm(1,f'r.'. ,:,'" ... ,

"-)'-'''''':!~'>.:;;)i!,\ :"",,,/,:(,,.::~ ',\':;:,\:,"':

~::.~ ;~"',~

,-'

---,;, ::\-.j"'~>-.-w.ati~~

From The Economist, February 9, 2006. Copyright © 2006 by The Economist Newspaper, Ltd. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission, Further reproduction prohibited. www.economist.com

58

Article 9

Japanese Spirit, Western Things When America's black ships forced open Japan, nobody could have predicted that the two nations would become the world's great economic: powers pen up. With that simple demand, Commodore Matthew Perry steamed into Japan's Edo (now Tokyo) Bay with his "black ships of evil mien" 150 years ago this week. Before the black ships arrived on July 8th 1853, the Tokugawa shoguns had run Japan for 250 years as a reclusive feudal state. Carrying a letter from America's president, Millard Fillmore, and punctuating his message with cannon fire, Commodore Perry ordered Japan's rulers to drop their barri-

Nowadays, although poor countries still want Japan (along with America and the European Union) to free up trade in farm goods, most rich-country complaints about Japan are aimed at its approach to macroeconomics and finance, rather than its trade policies. Japan's insistence on protecting bad banks and worthless companies, say its many critics, and its reluctance to let foreign investors help fix the economy, have prevented Japanese demand from recovering for far too long. Once again, the refrain goes, Japan is unfairly taking what it can get from the world economy-exports and overseas profits have been its only source of comfort for years-without giving anything back. While these complaints have always had some merit, they have aJl too often been made in a way that misses a crucial point: Japan's economic miracle, though at times paired with policies ranging from protectionist to xenophobic, has nevertheless proved a huge blessing to the rest of the world as well. The "structuraJ impediments" that shut out imports in the 1980s did indeed keep Japanese consumers and foreign exporters from enjoying some of the fruits of that miracle; but its export prowess allowed western consumers to enjoy better and cheaper cars and electronics even as Japanese households grew richer. Similarly, Japan's resistance to inward investment is indefensible. not least because it allows salvageable Japanese companies to wither; but its outward investment has helped to transform much of East Asia into a thriving economic region, putting a huge dent in global poverty. Indeed, one of the most impressive aspects of Japan's economic miracle is that, even while reaping only half the potential gains from free trade and investment, it has still managed to do the world so much good over the past haJf-century.

O

ers and open the country to trade. Over the next century and a

half, Japan emerged as one of history's great economic success stories. It is now the largest creditor to the world that it previously shunned. Attempts to dissect this economic "miracle" often focus intently on the aftermath of the second world war. Japan's occupation by the Americans, who set out to rebuild the country as a pacifist liberal democracy, helped to set the stage for four decades of jaw-dropping growth. Yet the origins of the miracle-and of the continual tensions it has created inside Japan and out-stretch further back. When General Douglas MacArthur accepted Japan's surrender in 1945 aboard the battleship Missouri, the Americans made sure to hang Commodore Perry's flag from 1853 over the ship's rear turret. They had not only ended a brutaJ war and avenged the attack on Pearl Harbour-they had also, they thought, won an argument with Japan that was by then nearly a century old. America's enduring frustration-in the decades after 1853, in 1945, and even today-has not been so much that Japan is closed, but that it long ago mastered the art of opening up on its own terms. Before and after those black ships steamed into Edo Bay, after all, plenty of other countries were opened to trade by western cannon. What set Japan apart-perhaps aided by America's lack of colonial ambition-was its ability to decide for itself how to make the process of opening suit its own aims. One consequence of this is that Japan's trading partners, especially America, have never tired of complaining about its economic practices. Japan-bashing reached its most recent peak in the 1980s, when American politicians and businessmen blamed "unfair" competition for Japan's large trade surpluses. But similar complaints could be heard within a few decades of Commodore Perry's mission. The attitude was summed up by "Mr Dooley", a character created by Peter Finley Dunne, an American satirist, at the close of the 19th century: "Th' trouble is whin the gallant Commodore kicked opn th' door, we didn't go in. They come out."

Setting an Example Arguably, however, Japan's other big effect on the world has been even more important. It has shown clearly that you do not have to embrace "western" culture in order to modernise your economy and prosper. From the very beginning, Japan set out to have one without the other, an approach encapsulated by the saying "Japanese spirit, western things". How did Japan pull it off? In part, because the historical combination of having once been wide open, and then rapidly slamming shut, taught Japan how to control the aperture through which new ideas and practices streamed in. After eagerly absorbing Chinese culture,

S9

ANNUAL EDITIONS

philosophy, writing and technology for roughly a millennium, Japan followed this with 250 years of near-total isolation. Christianity was outlawed, and overseas travel was punishable by death. Although some Japanese scholars were aware of developments in Europe-which went under the broad heading of "Dutch studies"-the shoguns strictly limited their ability to put any of that knowledge to use. They confined all economic and other exchanges with Europeans to a tiny man-made island in the south-western port of Nagasaki. When the Americans arrived in 1853, the Japanese told them to go to Nagasaki and obey the rules. Commodore Perry refused, and Japan concluded that the only way to "expel the barbarians" in future would be to embrace their technology and grow stronger. But once the door was ajar, the Japanese appetite for "western things" grew unbounded. A modern guidebook entry on the port city of Yokohama, near Tokyo, notes that within two decades of the black ships' arrival it boasted the country's first bakery (1860), photo shop (1862), telephone (1869), beer brewery (1869), cinema (1870), daily newspaper (1870), and public lavatory (1871). Yet, at the same time, Japan's rulers also managed to frustrate many of the westerners' wishes. The constant tension between Japan's desire to measure up to the West-economically, diplomatically, socially and, until 1945, militarily-and its resistance to cultural change has played out in countless ways, good and bad, to this day. Much of it has reflected a healthy wish to hang on to local traditions. This is far more than just a matter of bowing and sleeping on futons and tatami, or of old women continuing to wear kimonos. The Japanese have also clung to distinct ways of speaking, interacting in the workplace, and showing each other respect, all of which have helped people to maintain harmony in many aspects of everyday life. Unfortunately, however, ever since they first opened to the West, anti-liberal Japanese leaders have preferred another interpretation of "Japanese spirit, western things". Instead of simply trying to preserve small cultural traditions, Japan's power-brokers tried to absorb western technology in a way that would shield them from political competition and protect their interests. Imitators still abound in Japan and elsewhere. In East Asia alone, Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad, Thailand's Thaksin Shinawatra, and even the Chinese Communist Party all see Japan as proof that there is a way to join the rich-country club without making national leaders or their friends accountable. These disciples of Japan's brand of modernisation often use talk of local culture to resist economic and political threats to their power. But they are careful to find ways to do this without undennining all trade and investment, since growth is the only thing propping them up. Japan's first attempt to pursue this strategy, it must never be forgotten. grew increasingly horrific as its inconsistencies mounted. In 1868, while western writers were admiring those bakeries and cinemas, Japan's nationalist leaders were "restoring" the emperor's significance to that of an imaginary golden age. The trouble, as Ian Buruma describes in his new book, "Inventing Japan" (see article), is that the "Japanese spirit" they valued was a concoction that mixed in several bad western ideas: German theories on racial purity, European excuses for colonialism, and the observation from Christianity that a single

overarching deity (in Japan's case the newly restored emperor) could motivate soldiers better than a loose contingent of Shinto gods. This combination would eventually whip countless young Japanese into a murderous xenophobic frenzy and foster rapacious colonial aggression. It also led Japan into a head-on collision with the United States, since colonialism directly contradicted America's reasons for sending Commodore Perry. In "The Clash", a 1998 book on the history of American-Japanese relations, Walter LaFeber argues that America's main goal in opening Japan was not so much to trade bilaterally, as to enlist Japan's support in creating a global marketplace including, in particular, China. At first, the United States opened Japan because it was on the way to China and had coal for American steamships. Later, as Japan gained industrial and military might, America sought to use it as a counterweight to European colonial powers that wanted to divide China among their empires. America grew steadily more furious, therefore, as Japan turned to colonialism and tried to carve up China on its own. The irony for America was that at its very moment of triumph, after nearly a century of struggling with European powers and then Japan to keep China united and open, it ended up losing it to communism. A half-century later, however, and with a great deal of help from Japan, America has achieved almost exactly what it set out to do as a brash young power in the 1850s, when it had barely tarned its own continent and was less than a decade away from civil war. Mainland China is whole. It has joined the World Trade Organisation and is rapidly integrating itself into the global economy. It is part of a vast East Asian trade network that nevertheless carries out more than half of its trade outside the region. And this is all backed up by an array of American security guarantees in the Pacific. The resemblance to what America set out to do in 1853 is striking. For both Japan and America, therefore, the difficult 150year relationship has brought impressive results. They are now the world's two biggest economies, and have driven most of the world's technological advances over the past half-century. America has helped Japan by opening it up, destroying its militarists and rebuilding the country afterwards, and, for the last 50 years, providing security and market access while Japan became an advanced export dynamo. Japan has helped America by improving on many of its technologies, teaching it new manufacturing techniques, spurring on American firms with its competition, and venturing into East Asia to trade and invest.

And Now? What, then, will the continuing tension between Japanese spirit and western things bring in the decades ahead? For America, though it will no doubt keep complaining, Japan's resistance to change is not the real worry. Instead, the same two Asian challenges that America has taken on ever since Commodore Perry sailed in will remain the most worrying risks: potential rivalries, and the desire by some leaders to form exclusive regional economic blocks. America still needs Japan, its chief Asian ally, to combat these dangers. Japan's failure to reform, however, could slowly sap its usefulness.

60

Article 9. Japanese Spirit, Western Things

For Japan, the challenges are far more daunting. Many of them stern from the increasing toll that Japan's old wa.ys are taking on the economy. Chief among these is Japan's hostility towards competition in many aspects of economic life. Although competitive private firms have driven much of its innovation and growth, especially in export-intensive industries, Japan's political system continues to hobble competition and private enterprise in many domestic sectors. In farming, health care and education, for example, recent efforts to allow private companies a role have been swatted down by co-operatives, workers, politicians and civil servants. In other inefficient sectors, such as construction and distribution, would-be losers continue to be propped up by government policy. Now that Japan is no longer growing rapidly, it is harder for competitive forces to function without allowing some of those losers to fail. Japan's foreign critics are correct, moreover, that its macroeconomic and financial policies are a disgrace. The central bank, the finance ministry, the bank regulators, the prime minister and the ruling-party politicians all blame each other for failing to deal with the problems. All the while, Japan continues to limp along, growing far below its potential as its liabilities mount. Its public-sector debt, for instance, is a terrifying 140% ofGDP. Lately, there has been much talk about employing more western things to help lift Japan out of its mess. The prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, talks about deregulatory measures that have been tried in North America, Europe and elsewhere. Western auditing and corporate governance techniques-applied in a Japanese way, of course-are also lauded as potential fixes. Even inward foreign direct investment is held out by Mr Koizumi as part of the solution: he has pledged to double it over the next five years. The trouble with all of these ideas, however, is that nobody in Japan is accountable for implementing them. Moreover, most of the politicians and bureaucrats who prevent competitive pressures from driving change are themselves protected from political competition. It is undeniable that real change in Japan would bring unwelcome pain for many workers

and small-business owners. Still, Japan's leaders continue to use these cultural excuses, as they have for 150 years, to mask their own efforts to cling to power and prestige. The ugly, undemocratic and illiberal aspects of Japanese traditionalism continue to lurk behind its admirable elements. One reason they can do so is because Japan's nationalists have succeeded completely in one of their original goals: financial independence. The desire to avoid relying on foreign capital has underlain Japan's economic policies from the time it opened up to trade. Those policies have worked. More than 90% of government bonds are in the hands of domestic investors, and savings accounts run by the postal service playa huge role in propping up the system. ParadoxicallY, financial self-reliance has thus become Japan's curse. There are worse curses to have. of course: compare Japan with the countless countries that have wrecked their economies by overexposing themselves to volatile international capital markets. Nevertheless, Japan's financial insularity further protects its politicians, who do not have to compete with other countries to get funding. Theories abound as to how all of this might change. Its history ought to remind anyone that, however long it takes, Japan usually moves rapidly once a consensus takes shape. Potential pressures for change could come from the reversal of its trade surpluses, an erosion of support from all those placid postal savers, or the unwinding of ties that allow bad banks and bad companies to protect each other from investors. The current political stalemate could also give way to a coherent plan, either because one political or bureaucratic faction defeats the others or because a strong leader emerges who can force them to co-operate. The past 150 years suggest, however, that one important question is impossible to answer in advance: will it be liberalism or its enemies who turn such changes to their advantage? Too often, Japan's conservative and nationalist leaders have managed to spot the forces of change more quickly than their liberal domestic counterparts, and have used those changes to seize the advantage and preserve their power. Just as in the past, East Asia's fortunes still greatly depend on the outcome of the struggle between these perennial Japanese contenders.

From The Economist, July 10,2003. Copyright@2003byTheEconomistNewspaper,Ltd. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission. Further reproduction prohibited. www.economist.com

61

Article 10

Departing Japanese Leader Shook Up Politics as Usual NORIMITSU ONISHI

What's more, far-reaching electoral reforms pushed through by a coalition of minor parties during the Liberal Democrats' lO-month ouster from power in 1993 laid the foundation for the changes under Mr. Koizumi. He pressed for painful economic reforms despite opposition from inside his own party. Those changes included deregulating industries, cleaning up the banks' bad loans and slashing the enormous and frequently wasteful public spending that had won his party votes for decades.

okyo, Sept. 18-Junichiro Koizumi swept to power in 2001 promising to "destroy" his ruling Liberal Democratic Party and, by extension, Japan's encrusted postwar order. To a remarkable extent, he succeeded-though hardly as radically as he had hoped. When Mr. Koizumi, 64, retires on Sept. 26, he will leave a Japan with new bearings: a smaller central government, greater faith in free markets and a new assertiveness in world affairs. But his vision of a new Japan has already produced a backlash among Japanese who believe he has destroyed, along with the bad, much that was good of the old Japan. Yet, while his pOlicies were often unpopular, he has consistently drawn high approval ratings from voters hungry for charismatic, strong leadership. Even as Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain and other politicians have suffered for their endorsement of the war in Iraq, Mr. Koizumi-who to this day has expressed only the staunchest support for the war-has remained unscathed. He retires with an approval rate hovering around 50 percent, the highest of any long-serving postwar prime minister, perhaps because voters believe that he has fulfilled his promise of shaking up the old Japan and that it will be up to his successors to lead them to a new one. Clearly, though, there is no going back to the old ways, no matter who is elected as the leader of the Liberal Democrats on Wednesday and then chosen as prime minister next Thesday. "He's dramatically changed everything about how Japanese politics worked," said Park Cheol-hee, an expert in Japanese politics at Seoul National University in South Korea. "Future prime ministers will have to follow his path. I don't think they can go back to the good old days of relying on interest groups and bureaucrats. The public will expect prime .ministers to take real policy initiatives. Things have fundamentally' changed." How much of that change is attributable to Mr. Koizumi's policies is constantly debated among experts. The move away from ·.the Liberal Democrats' politics of vested interests and patronage was inevitable, because Japan simply does not have the money it had before the collapse of its real estate-inflated "bubble economy" in the late 1980's, and after the succeeding years of little or no growth.

T

But the revival of Japan's economy, many experts say, owes

as much, if not more, to private companies' own restructurings and the booming trade with China's explosive economy. Whatever his share of the credit, Mr. Koizumi articulated more than anybody else the need for Japan to change. In the decade before his election, Japan went through a succession of weak leaders bewildered as to how to even begin guiding the nation out of an all-encompassing malaise. Mr. Koizumi was blunt. He told the Japanese, in some of his most famous slogans, to expect "pain to accompany structural reforms," and said he would cany out "structural reforms without exceptions." To the surprise of almost everyone, his blunt talk and actions won him widespread support. "The conventional wisdom was that Japanese prime ministers were inherently incapable of exerting leadership;' said Takeshi Sasaki, a political scientist at Gakushuin University and a former president of the University of Tokyo. "But Koizumi exercised leadership with great tenacity and tried many new things-things that prime ministers had not said or done until now." Unlike his predecessors, Mr. Koizumi eschewed the compromises that had led to paralysis. In a society that values consensus, he was famous for making decisions on his own and seemed to excel in making 'political enemies. He was-in the words of his first foreign minister, Makiko Tanaka-a "weirdo." And the public loved him. Each time voters had a chance to choose between him and Japan's old-fashioned politicians and bureaucrats, they backed him in large numbers. Last year, for example, he could have been stymied after members of his own party voted down a bill to reform the country's massive postal savings system-effectively a savings bank that paid very low interest on deposits and had long lubricated

62

Article 10. Departing Japanese Leader Shook Up Politics as Usual

But critics say Mr. Koizumi used foreign opposition to the shrine visits to rally nationalist sentiments among Japanese, who had lost their self-confidence because of the long economic slump and had grown fearful of China's rise. Under Mr. Koizumi, nationalist politicians and scholars who would like to whitewash Japan's militarist past have found fertile soil and moved into the mainstream. Government~sanctioned school textbooks increasingly omit facts from Japan's wartime history, like the use of slave labor and "comfort women" during the years it occupied Korea and Manchuria, or the massacre of 100,000 to 300,000 Chinese in Nanjing. Japan's troubles with its neighbors, especially China, eventually grew so severe that policy makers and scholars in Washington in the past year began expressing worries that Mr. Koizumi's policy was hurting Japanese-and Americaninterests in Asia. But Mr. Koizumi's open appeals to nationalist symbols like Yasukuni won him and his party votes, a lesson that was absorbed by his likely successor, Shinzo Abe, the chief cabinet secretary. At home, Mr. Koizumi diminished the role of the central government and the bureaucracy and gave local governments more authority. He deregulated industries, opened opportunities for entrepren~urs and freed big companies to hire a greater percentage of temporary workers. Japan's economy has bounced back, though its long-term recovery is uncertain. In a backlash against Mr. Koizumi's promarket policies. an increasing number of critics have said that the changes have favored the rich and corporations, and that they have contributed to a widening in income gaps and a fraying of Japan's vaunted egalitarianism. Mr. Koizumi showed little interest in addressing those con~ cerns. After passing the law to change the postal savings system last fall, which Mr. Koizumi had long regarded as the glue that held together the old Japan, he appeared to lose passion for his job. In June, he refused to extend a parliamentary session despite unfinished legislative business. He could not wait to leave the building, it was said, so that he could go to the United States and travel with Mr. Bush to Graceland.

the Liberal Democrats' political machine. But Mr. Koizumi responded by calling a snap election. After winning a landslide, he easily won approval to privatize the post office, potentially freeing its enormous reserves to serve the economy rather than the politicians.

He extended his single-mindedness to foreign policy, cementing Japan's alliance with the United States after a decade in which the value of the alliance had been questioned. He pushed through a special law to deploy troops to Iraq on a reconstruction mission, in a move that many Japanese considered to be against the spirit, if not the letter, of the country's pacifist Constitution. He tied the Japanese armed forces closer to the American military by participating in missile defense. "The better our relations with the United States, the easier it will be for us to build good relations with China, South Korea,

Asian and other countries in the world," Mr. Koizumi said during a visit to Japan by President Bush last November. "That's my basic belief."

Mr. Koizumi may have nurtured such an ironclad relationship with Mr. Bush that he was rewarded with a farewell road trip to Graceland. But he brought Japan's relations with China to their lowest point in decades, and presided over the rise of a

narrow nationalism at home and Japan's diplomatic isolation in the region. He made annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the Shinto memorial where Japan's war dead and war criminals are enshrined. Most of his predecessors had avoided the shrine, regarded as a symbol of Japanese militarism in this region. Because of the visits, China and South Korea have refused to hold talks with Japan. Japan's hawks, though, say Mr. Koizumi's priorities were right. "I give him a perfect score," said Hisahiko Okazaki, a fonner senior diplomat and a leading conservative commentator. China's long-term strategy, Mr. Okazaki said, is to weaken the Japan-United States alliance. "If that's the case, Japan's grand diplomatic strategy toward China is obvious," he said. "What Mr. Koizumi did, as a strategy toward China, was correct."

From The New York Times, September 19, 2006. Copyright © 2006 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

63

UNIT2

Pluralist Democracies: Factors in the Political Process Unit Selections 11 . Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis?, The Economist 12. Political Parties: Empty Vessels?, The Economist 13. Interest Groups: Ex Uno, Plures, The Economist 14. Women in National Parliaments, Inter-Parliamentary Union 15. The True Clash of Civilizations, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris 16. What Political Institutions Does Large-Scale Democracy Require?, Robert A. Dahl 17. What Democracy Is ... and Is Not, Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl 18. Judicial Review: The Gavel and the Robe, The Economist 19. Referendums: The People's Voice, The Economist 20. The Great Divide, Timothy Garton Ash 21. Living With a Superpower, The Economist 22. The Case for a Multi-Party U.S. Parliament? American Politics in Comparative Perspective, Christopher S. Allen

Key Points to Consider • Explain the terms "Left" and "Righf' in European politics. Why have the terms "center-left" and "center-righf' come into use? • How do you explain the apparent shifts toward the political center made by parties of the moderate Left and moderate Right in recent years? • Why are women so poorly represented in Parliament and other positions of political leadership? In what way has this begun to change, where, and why? • What are the democratic essentials as discussed by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl? • What are some of the major arguments made in favor of the parliamentary system of government? Do all parliamentary systems function as well in reality? • Why do you think Christopher S. Alien includes a multiparty system in his discussion of institutional transplantation? • Why did de Gaulie include a national referendum in the constitution of the Fifth Republic? • How does the use of judicial review in a country like Germany compare with our own? • Do you agree with Robert Kagan, that "Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus?" Why or why not?

Student Web Site

www.mhcls.com/online

Internet References

Further information regarding these Web sites may be found in this book's preface or online.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace http://www.ceip.org

Inter-American Dialogue (lAD) http://www..;adialog,org

The North American Institute (NAMI) http/lwww.northamericaninstitute.org

64

Observers of contemporary Western societies frequently refer to the emergence of a "new politics" in lhese countries, but there is no consensus on what is novel in the political pro~ cess or why it is significant. Although no one would dispute that there have been major changes in the politics of these societies during the last ,three decades or more, it is more difficult to establish comparable patterns of transformation or to gauge their impact and endurance. Yet a central task of the comparative study of government is to help us identify, describe, and explain continuities and changes in the political patterns of

occasional newcomers are admitted to the c!ub-or excluded from it. Each country's party system remains uniquely shaped by its political history, but it is possible to delineate some very general patterns of development. One frequently observed trend is toward a narrowing of the ideological distance between the moderate Left and Right in many European countries. Because of this partial political convergence, it now often makes more sense to speak of the Center~left and Center~ Right. Even where such a convergence is observable, there are still some important ideological and practical differences between the two orientations. The Right is usually far more ready to accept as "normal"

society.

or "inevitable" the existence of socia! or economic inequalities, and

In two important lines of inquiry, political comparativists have exam~

normally favors lower taxes and the promotion of market forces-with

ined the rise and spread of a new set of "postmaterial" values and,

some very important exceptions intended to protect the nation as a whole

more recently, the growing signs of political disaffection in both "older"

(national defense and internal security) as well as certain favored values

and "newer" democracies. The articles in this unit also explore some

and interest groups (clienteles). In genera!, the Right sees the state

other trends with major impacts on contemporary politics. Very high on

as an instrument that should provide security, order, and protection

the list are the uneven advancement of women in politics, especially

for an established way of life. The Left, by contrast, traditionally

their rise into high elective and appointive public office, and the recent

emphasizes that government has an important task in opening greater

wave of democratization-the uneven, incomplete, and unstable but nevertheless remarkable spread of democratic forms of

opportunities or "life chances" for

governance to

everyone, delivering

affordable

public services, and generally reducing social Inequalities,

many countries during the last three decades.

EVen as the ideological distance between mainstream Left and Right

Since the early 1970s, political scientists have followed Ronald

narrows, there are also signs of some political differentiation within each

Inglehart and others who first noted a marked increase in what they

camp. On the Center~Right side of the party spectrum in European politics,

calted postmaterial values, especially among younger and more highly

economic neoliberals must be clearly distinguished from social con~

educated people in Western Europe. Such voters showed less interest in

servatives. European liberalism has its roots in a tradition that favors

traditional material values of economic well*being and security, instead

civil liberties and tolerance but that also emphasizes the importance of

stressing particlpatory and environmental concerns in politics as a way

individual achievement and laissez*faire economics. For neoliberals, the

of improving democracy and the genera! "quality of life." Studies of post·

state has an important but limited role to play in providing an institutional

materialism form a very important addition to our ongoing attempt to

framework within which individuals and social groups pursue their inter"

interpret and explain not only the so-called youth revolt but also some

ests without much government intervention. Traditional social conser-

more lasting shifts in lifestyles and political priorities. But the shift in the

vatives, by contrast, emphasize the importance of stability and continuity.

postmaterial direction has not been complete, nor is it necessarily per-

They often value the strong state as an instrument of order, but many of

manent: note the apparent revival of material concerns among some

them also show a paternalist or pragmatic appreciation for welfare state

younger people, as economic prosperity and security seem to have

programs that will help keep ''the social fabric" from tearing apart.

become far less certain. Political reform activities also seem to evoke

On the Left, democratic socialists and ecologists stress that the

considerably less interest and commitment than they did in the 1970s.

sorry record of

This should not be mistaken for a return to the political patterns of

communist~ruled

states in no way diminishes the validity

of their own commitment to social justice and environmental protection

the past. Instead, we may be witnessing the emergence of a new mix of

in modern industria! society. For them, capitalism wi!! continue to pro~

material and postmaterial orientations, along with "old" and "new" forms

duce acute socia! problems and dissatisfactions that require politically

of political self-expression by the citizenry. Established political parties

directed redress. Today, many on the Left show a pragmatic acceptance

appear to be in somewhat of a quandary: the traditional bonding of many

of the modified market economy as an arena within which to promote

voters to one or another party seems to have become weaker, a phe~

their goals of redistribution. Social Democrats in Scandinavia and

nomenon also known as dealignment. Some observers perceive a con-

Germany have long been known for taking such positions; in recent

dition of political malaise in advanced industrial countries, suggesting

years their colleagues in Britain, Spain, and, to a lesser degree, France

that the decline of confidence in public officials and government shows

have followed suit by abandoning some traditional symbols and goals,

up not only in opinion polls but also in voting behavior.

such as major programs of nationalization.

The readings in this unit begin with three political briefs that present

Some other West European parties, originally further to the Left, have

a comparative perspective on public disillusionment with politics and the

also moved in the centrist direction In recent years. Two striking examples

decline in voter turnout, the partial weakening of the political parties,

of this shift can be found among the Greens in Germany and in what used

and the apparent growth of special interest lobbying. Most established

to be the Communist Party of Italy. The German Greens are by no means

parties seem to have developed an ability to adjust to change, even

an establishment party, but they have served as a coalition partner with

as the balance of power within each party system shifts over time and

the Social Democrats in several state governments and have gained

65

respect for their mixture of practical competence and idealism. They now

in voter turnout has been practically eliminated in recent decades, and

appear to have become a firmly established small party with a distinctive

younger women show a more liberal orientation than formerly in their foreign

program and a solid record in coalition politics. The Italian Communists

and social policy preferences. These are aggregate differences, of course;

have come an even longer way in reaching their present Center-Left posi-

women, like men, do not present a monolithic bloc in political attitudes and

tion, abandoning the Leninist revolutionary tradition and adopting reform-

behavior but are divided by a variety of interests and priorities. One general~

ist goals and strategies similar to those identified with social democratic

izallon seems to hold; there is much less inclination among women to sup-

parties elsewhere in Western Europe. Renamed the Left Democrats (OS),

port parties or candidates that have a decidedly "radical" image. While European women still tend to be employed at !ower wages and

they joined Center-Left coalition governments in 1998 and 2006. in

Both Center"Left and Center"Right moderates in Europe face a challenge from the populist tendency on the Far Right that usuaUy seeks to

lower~skilled

jobs than their male counterparts, the socioeconomic

status of women in other parts of the world is often far worse. According

curtail, halt, or even reverse immigration, sometimes with a separate

to reports of the UN Development Program, there have been some rapid

neo-fascist appeal. (A charismatic leader like Jorg Haider of the Austrian

advances for women in the field of education and health opportunities,

Freedom Party can speak to both orientations.) The electoral revival of the

but the doors to economic opportunities are barely ajar. In the field of

far-Right parties can be linked in considerable part to anxieties and tensions

political leadership, the picture is more varied, as the UN reports indi-

that affect some socially and economically insecure groups in the lower-

cate, but women generally hold few positions of importance in national

middle and working classes; these parties typically eschew a complex

politiCS. Rwanda is an exception. The recent genocide has left women,

explanation of the structural and cyclical problems that beset the European

now nearly two-thirds of the country's population, in positions of leader-

economies, instead blaming external scapegoats, namely immigrants and

ship. Another notable exception is Costa Rica, the only "older democ-

refugees from Eastern Europe as well as developing countries in Africa

racy" located in Latin America.

and Asia. Nowhere are these parties in control of a national government,

The institutional framework of representatlve government is the

but they represent a potentia! threat to the established parties, which have

subject of the third section of this unit. Here the authors examine and

responded by making concessions on immigration and refugee policy.

compare a number of institutional arrangements: (1) essential charac~

Women in polities are the concern of the second section in this unit.

terisUcs and elements of a pluralist democracy, (2) two major forms of

While there continues to be a strong pattern of under~representation

representative government, (3) varieties of judicial review, and (4) the

of women in positions of political and economic leadership practically

use of national and regional referendums as well as other forms of direct

everywhere, there are some notable differences from country to coun-

democracy. The topic of pluralist democracy is a complex one and needs

try and party to party. Generally speaking, the parties of the Left have

to be discussed from different perspectives. Robert Dahl draws on a life-

been far more ready to place women in positions of authority, with some

long commitment to present what he regards as the basic institutional

remarkable exceptions (Margaret Thatcher in Britain, Angela Merkel in

infrastructure of a representative form of government. Philippe Schmitter

Germany, and Simone Weil in France).

Far~Right

parties tend to draw

and Terry Lynn Karl present a superb discussion of what a democracy

markedly less support from female voters, but at least one of them is led

"is and "is not." The next two political briefs examine the remarkable

by a woman: Pia Kjaersgaard founded and still heads the People's Party

growth and variety of forms taken by judicial review in recent years as

of Denmark. In structural terms, proportional representation systems

weI! as the arguments for and against the use of the referendum as a

give parties both a tool and an added incentive to run female candidates.

way of increasing the electoral involvement with

t~ere

po!icy~making.

must also be an organized

The last articles in this unit examine American Politics in Compa-

will and a strategy among decision makers to use the available tool for

rative Perspective. Timothy Garton Ash critically reviews Robert Kagan's

the purpose of such a clearly defined reform.

argument about the "Great Divide"between the United States and Western

But here too, there can be exceptions;

Where the political will exists, affirmative action can become such a

Europe in the prevailing approach to international relations. Without

strategy for promoting change; such a breakthrough has happened in

dismissing the alleged differences, Ash points to some shared values

the Scandinavian countries, which have a markedly higher representa-

and interests that continue to link the two. In its discussion of American

tion of women in parliament and in party leadership. In the Scandinavian

beliefs and values, The Economist also sees areas of similarity and dis-

countries, the political center of gravity falls somewhat to the Left, and

similarity, singling out the high incidence of traditional bellefs in the

proportional representation makes it possible to set up party lists that

United States as opposed to the more secular orientation prevailing

are more representative of the population as a whole. It usually does

in Europe.

not take long for the more centrist or moderately conservative parties to

Finally, Christopher S. Allen brings U.S. political institutions into

adopt the new concern of gender equality, and these parties may even

our comparative framework. His article can be seen as part of a long

move toward the forefront Even a decidedly non~feminjst politician like

tradition of American interest in the parliamentary form of govern-

Angela Merkel can benefit from reforms that have a feminist origin, as

ment and, to a lesser degree, in a multiparty system. Allen organizes

Myra Marx Ferree plausibly argues in her article in this unit. Outside

his argument as a mental experiment in institutional transplantation,

Scandinavia, signs of the growing political prominence of women can

in order to explo're how a multiparty parliamentary system would be

been seen in traditionally conservative countries such as the Republic of

likely to change the American political process. His intriguing rear-

Ireland, Switzerland, and Japan.

rangement of our familiar political setting serves as a reminder that institutions are not neutral but have important consequences for the

Changes that erode gender inequality have already occurred in areas other than representation in government. For example, the gender gap

political process.

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Article 11

Public Opinion: Is There a Crisis? After the collapse of communism, the world saw a surge in the number of new democracies. But why are the citizens of the mature democracies meanwhile losing confidence in their political institutions? This is the first in a series of articles on democracy in transition. veryone remembers that Winston Churchill once called democracy the worst form of government-except for all the others. The end of the cold war seemed to prove him right. All but a handful of countries now claim to embrace democratic ideals. Insofar as there is a debate about democracy, much of it now centers on how to help the "emerging" democracies of Asia. Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe catch up

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with the established democratic countries of the West and Japan. The new democracies are used to having well-meaning observers from the mature democracies descend on them at election time to ensure that the voting is free and fair. But is political life in these mature democracies as healthy as it should be?

If opinion research is any guide, the mature democracies have troubles of their own. In the United States in particular.

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