Analysing the Foreign Policy of Small States in the EU: The Case of Denmark

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Analysing the Foreign Policy of Small States in the EU The Case of Denmark

Henrik Larsen

Analysing the Foreign Policy of Small States in the EU

Also by Henrik Larsen FOREIGN POLICY AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: France, Britain and Europe (1997) THE ESDP AND THE NORDIC COUNTRIES: Four Variations on a Theme (with N. Græger and H. Ojanen) (2001)

Analysing the Foreign Policy of Small States in the EU The Case of Denmark

Henrik Larsen Jean Monnet Professor in European Foreign and Security Policy Integration, University of Copenhagen

© Henrik Larsen 2005 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–333–96473–6 ISBN-10: 0–333–96473–X This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Larsen, Henrik, 1964– Analysing the foreign policy of small states in the EU : the case of Denmark / Henrik Larsen. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–96473–X (alk. paper) 1. Denmark – Foreign relations – 1972– 2. European Union – Foreign relations. I. Title. DL261.L36 2005 327.48904⬘09⬘045—dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

2005041542

Contents List of Figures

vii

List of Tables

ix

Acknowledgements

x

List of Abbreviations

xii

1 Setting the Scene: Small State Foreign Policy in the EU and the Case of Denmark 2 Theoretical Background and Analytical Framework National foreign policy and international organisations The impact of international organisations on national foreign policy and the basic approach of the book An analytical framework for the study of Danish foreign policy content in an EU context

1 13 13

15 39

3 Policy towards EU Member States: the Role of the EU I. The EU II. Denmark III. Conclusion

64 65 67 76

4 The Fight against Terrorism I. The EU II. Denmark III. Conclusions

78 78 84 98

5 The Balkans I. The EU II. Denmark III. Conclusions

102 102 108 119

6 Development and Aid I. The EU II. Denmark III. Conclusions

123 123 127 143 v

vi

Contents

7 Africa I. The EU II. Danish policy III. Conclusions

147 147 151 163

8

Latin America I. The EU II. Denmark III. Conclusions

166 166 171 182

9 Trade I. The EU II. Denmark III. Conclusions

185 185 187 192

10 Conclusions and Wider Perspectives for the Analysis of National Foreign Policy in an EU Context I. Presentation of the findings II. The broader implications for Danish foreign policy: the role of the EU across the board III. Is the study of Denmark of general interest for the study of small states in the EU?

195 195 201 208

Notes

213

Bibliography

221

Index

234

List of Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 4.1(a) 4.1(b) 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 7.1 7.2

European foreign policy, taken from White (2001) Policy conducted mainly within the EU Policy conducted inside and outside the EU Policy conducted mainly outside the EU An active or passive Danish policy in the EU? Constitutive effects of EU foreign policy? Central factors explaining the relationship between Danish foreign policy and EU policy Articulation of actorness Strong EU policy, weak Danish actorness Weak EU policy, strong Danish actorness Strong EU policy, strong Danish actorness Weak EU policy, weak Danish actorness Articulation of actorness Articulation of actorness Danish policy inside or outside the EU? Level of Danish policy activity within the EU Constitutive effects? Why this state of affairs? The background of Danish policy. A summary Articulation of actorness Danish policy inside or outside the EU? Level of Danish policy activity within the EU Constitutive effects? Why this state of affairs? The background of Danish policy. A summary Community development policy concepts Denmark’s development policy concepts Articulation of actorness Danish policy inside or outside the EU? Level of Danish policy activity within the EU Constitutive effects? Why this state of affairs? The background of Danish policy. A summary Articulation of actorness Danish policy inside or outside the EU? vii

19 40 40 41 41 42 45 52 53 54 55 55 89 90 93 97 98 101 111 116 118 119 121 125 131 134 139 141 142 146 155 159

viii List of Figures

7.3 Level of Danish policy activity within the EU 7.4 Constitutive effects? 7.5 Why this state of affairs? The background of Danish policy. A summary 8.1 Articulation of actorness 8.2 Danish policy inside or outside the EU? 8.3 Level of Danish policy activity within the EU 8.4 Constitutive effects? 8.5 Why this state of affairs? The background of Danish policy. A summary 9.1 Articulation of actorness 9.2 Danish policy inside or outside the EU? 9.3 Level of Danish policy activity within the EU 9.4 Constitutive effects? 9.5 Why this state of affairs? The background of Danish policy. A summary

160 162 165 175 177 180 181 184 190 191 191 192 194

List of Tables 2.1 Four modes of Danish policy vis-à-vis the EU 3.1 Bilateral meetings Denmark–EU member states (plus candidates) 10.1 The seven policy areas examined. Summary of conclusions 10.2 The remaining policy areas. Some preliminary suggestions on the basis of the model

ix

56 73 197 202

Acknowledgements This book is a result of a long process, and I owe a great debt to many people and institutions who have helped me on the way. Participants in panels at BISA, EUSA and ISA where I have presented work related to the book have given me many helpful comments. In particular Chris Hill has commented on conference papers on two occasions as panel chair at BISA and several of his comments have found their way into the book. I am especially grateful for his suggestion to eschew the use of the term ‘residue’. Thanks are also due to David Allen, Wolfgang Deckers, Donald Hancock, Rita Jokela, Mette Jolly, Ian Manners, Helena Sjursen, Karen Smith, Brian White and Richard Whitman. Trine Flockhart and Morten Kelstrup provided comments on a paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Danish Society for European Studies in Aalborg in September 2003. I am grateful for their suggestions to include new policy areas among the cases examined (although it gave me a bit more work!) and for figures illustrating the main points. Thanks are also due to the students in my Master’s seminar on European Foreign Policy at the Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, for their comments on chapters of the book. I also owe a great debt to politicians, academics and practitioners who agreed to be interviewed on issues in relation to the book. My sincere thanks are due to MPs (Members of the Folketing) Charlotte Antonsen, Claus Larsen-Jensen, Jeppe Kofoed, Mogens Lykketoft, Jens Hald Madsen, Niels Helveg Petersen and Jan Trøjborg. Sincere thanks are also due to Kenneth Nyström from Eastern European Studies, Copenhagen University, for sharing his knowledge on the Nordic countries and the Balkans with me and to Michael Kluth, Roskilde University, for communicating his personal research results on Denmark and Latin America with me via e-mail. I am also very grateful to the many people in the Danish Civil Service, in particular in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who allowed me time to interview them. Their help was indispensable for writing the book. Many shared general insights with me that went far beyond the area in which they themselves were engaged directly. Kasper Høeg-Jensen kindly read through the manuscript and provided insightful comments on both the empirical aspects and the broader argument of the book for which I am grateful. I am also indebted to Palgrave Macmillan’s anonymous referee. The clear and perceptive x

Acknowledgements xi

suggestions for improvements from a different epistemological position from my own have no doubt contributed to a better book. I owe special thanks to my research assistant Signe Winther Jensen. Her detailed, intelligent and constructive comments on the draft chapters and her independent efforts in many fields have contributed to making this a better and more readable book. SWJ’s advanced computer skills have been of great use in producing the figures and tables. Her work has been of an outstanding quality and without her fast and reliable work I would never have been able to meet the deadlines. Thanks are also due to my parents and my parents-in-law who provided help at various stages in the process. I am grateful to the Danish Research Agency (SSF) who funded significant parts of the research for the book (grant no. 24-01-0238). Thanks are also due to the Institute of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, my workplace, who contributed to making the research and the presentation of research results possible financially. My final thanks go to Louise, Alexander and Nicklas. Louise commented on all parts of the book with her usual skill. Alexander and Nicklas have been closely linked to the process of writing the book, as work on it began just before they were born. I thank all three for their endurance. Henrik Larsen

List of Abbreviations ACP ASEAN AWACS CAP CARDS

African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries) Association of South-East Asian Nations Airborne Warning and Control System Common Agricultural Policy Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation CBSS Council of the Baltic Sea States CEECs Central and Eastern European countries CEG Capabilities–expectation gap CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy COREU Correspondance Européenne (European correspondence) CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe DAC Development Assistance Committee DG Directorate-General EC European Community ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office ECMM European Community Monitoring Mission ECOSOC Economic and Social Council ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EDF European Development Fund EP European Parliament EPC European Political Cooperation ESDP European Security and Defence Policy EU European Union FPA Foreign policy analysis FRA Former Republic of Yugoslavia FRESTA Peace and Stability for South-East Europe FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GNP Gross national product GSP Generalised system of preferences IGC Intergovernmental Conference IO International organisation IMF International Monetary Fund IR International relations ISAF International Security Assistance Force xii

List of Abbreviations xiii

JHA KFOR LAC LDC LLD MEDA MFA NATO NEPAD NIP NGO OECD OSCE PC PFP QMV RDC SAA SADC SAP SFOR SHIRBRIG SICA SNU TEU UN UNDAF UNDP UNHCR UNMIK UNMOP UNPROFOR UNSC US WMD WTO

Justice and Home Affairs Kosovo Force Latin America and the Caribbean Grouping Less developed country Least developed country Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Ministry of Foreign Affairs North Atlantic Treaty Organisation New Partnership for Africa’s Development National Indicative Programme Non-governmental organisation Organisation for Economic Corporation and Development Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Programme Country Partnership for Peace Qualified majority voting Democratic Republic of Congo Stabilisation and Association Agreement Southern African Development Community Stabilisation and Association Process Stabilisation Force [in Bosnia-Hercegovina] Multinational Stand-By High Readiness Force for UN Operations Central American Integration System Danish government’s Commission on Security and Disarmament Treaty of European Union United Nations United Nations Development Assistance Framework United Nations Development Programme United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka United Nations Protection Force United Nations Security Council United States [of America] Weapons of mass destruction World Trade Organisation

xiv List of Abbreviations

Some central Danish concepts DANIDA Danish International Development Agency Folketinget Danish Parliament Folketingets Europaudvalg Parliament’s European Affairs Committee Folketingets Udenrigsudvalg Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee Forsvarsministeriet Ministry of Defence Regeringen Danish Government Udenrigsministeriet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Udenrigspolitisk nævn Foreign Policy Committee Statsministeriet Prime Minister’s Office

1 Setting the Scene: Small State Foreign Policy in the EU and the Case of Denmark

The starting point for this book is the issue of the conduct of foreign policy for small states within the EU. On the one hand it is often stressed by observers, practitioners and analysts that the EU framework in foreign policy has fundamentally changed the nature of foreign policy for small states by giving them access to decision-making on international issues on which they would not otherwise have had any significant say. It is often taken for granted that the EU is crucial for the conduct of small members’ foreign policy. The background for this is the widespread perception that the EU foreign policy framework provides unique access to the scene of world politics for small member states through the sharing of information and participation in procedures and policies that expand the scope of their foreign policy. A central academic work in the field has shown how policy-makers in small EU member states see their own country’s participation in EU foreign policy as having strengthened the range and depth of the foreign policies of minor states (Tonra, 2001: 269). More fundamentally, CFSP has become the central forum for the delineation of foreign policy interests in smaller states. This can be illustrated by the statement of a policy-maker in a smaller EU member state that ‘… for the larger states, this is part of their foreign policy spectrum, whereas for the smaller states this is their policy’ (Tonra, 2001: 263). If the EU foreign policy framework has changed the context for small state foreign policy, there are grounds for launching the wider claim that EU foreign policy constitutes a structural frame for small state foreign policy that is different from the frame constituted by other international organisations. According to this line of argument, then, the foreign policy of the EU constitutes the main framework for small state foreign 1

2


policy for structural reasons. And to this can be added reasons of a more voluntarist character for the centrality of the EU foreign policy framework. The increasingly voluminous body of EU policy in various foreign policy fields means that more and more aspects of small state foreign policy may be covered by EU policy. Small state foreign policy might then increasingly be seen as principally echoing EU views without much in the way of a national residue outside the EU or even interests or perspectives on world politics with a distinctive national flavour. The increasing volume of EU policy leads one to expect that small states would attempt to further the core issues in their foreign policy through EU foreign policy, as this would give unique possibilities for obtaining initial support for these issues in a wider grouping. There would, in other words, also be a voluntarist drive on the part of small states for conducting their foreign policy through the EU, even if it was accepted that participation in EU foreign policy might, at the same time, constrain national foreign policy in some ways. On the other hand, it is often mentioned as a characteristic of European foreign policy that it consists of 15 national (and now 25) policies and an EU foreign policy (White, 2001; Allen, 1998; Hill, 1997). While there is no doubt that analysts who stress this view often focus on the foreign policy of the major powers alongside EU foreign policy, it is still part of this approach that also small member states continue to have substantial foreign relations outside the EU. Hill stresses that there is still plenty of life in national foreign policy (Hill, 1998b, 2004: 160). Policymakers in Tonra’s (2001) study also stressed their ability to pursue an entirely independent line when this was determined by needs of national foreign policy (Tonra, 2001: 268–70). The view according to this way of thinking is, therefore, that there are significant parts – even of small state foreign policy – that do not merely echo EU foreign policy and that this situation is not about to change overnight. The idea in this book is that it is interesting to attempt to locate small state foreign policy in relation to the tension between these two general views outlined above and to explore the reasons for the position found. This is crucial if we want to understand the importance of the EU foreign policy for small states. The question of which picture is the most appropriate is a key one as it raises the question of whether small EU member states’ foreign policy today is mainly conducted through the EU frame. If this is the case, then our approach to the analysis of the foreign policy of small member states would need to take into account that the EU framework is the primary window onto the world and a toolkit for acting in the world. This would, at least at first glance, break with the traditional understanding

Setting the Scene 3

of foreign policy where policy preferences are seen as primarily nationally generated and foreign policy conducted in a more or less institutionalised environment, but not as totally embedded within one organisational frame. If foreign policy is primarily conducted through a single organisational frame, this suggests a strong influence of that framework on national preferences and stances and, indeed, the whole character of national foreign policy. If national foreign policy is almost entirely conducted through the EU, it is an open question whether there can still be said to be a state foreign policy as traditionally conceptualised in foreign policy analysis (FPA), as the salient institutional and geopolitical surroundings look very different from traditional assumptions. We would need to develop a different framework for the analysis of ‘foreign’ policy for (small) states who are members of the EU. The ‘small’ in ‘small states’ is placed in parentheses above because the answers to the questions raised here have implications for the way in which the foreign policy of all EU member states is analysed. The analytical framework developed in this book could, in principle, be used for analysing all EU member states. The reason for the inclusion of ‘small’ in the title of this book is the assumption that the issues raised about the encapsulating and transformative role of the EU for the study of national foreign policy are more relevant for smaller states than for larger ones.1 Although the analytical framework developed could be seen as useful for all categories of member states, the empirical study and its conclusions are based on Denmark – by most standards one of the smaller states in the EU – and I do not, therefore, want to claim from the outset that the approach taken here is relevant for all kind of states. I will return to this issue in the conclusion. Some may say that the tension identified above between the two general positions on the role of the EU in state foreign policy is uninteresting due to the lessons of the 2002–3 Iraq crisis and its aftermath. According to this view, the absence of anything more than a formal EU policy on this major issue and the close political alignment of several small EU states with the US – Denmark more strongly than most – demonstrates that an EU foreign policy is an illusion and, if it ever existed, is lying in ruins now. The idea that EU foreign policy might have a particular importance for small member states is therefore deemed more irrelevant than ever. The view taken in this book is that Iraq is only one out of the many issues that are dealt with in EU foreign policy. Iraq is, of course, an extremely important issue as it shows that the EU does not, at present, have a joint policy on one of the most important security issues in the

4


post-11 September world. It demonstrates that the EU does not have a policy on all international issues including some of the most crucial global ones in the field of security. However, at the same time in spite of disagreements, the EU has had common policies in many, if not most, other areas – before and after the 2003 war against Iraq. Basic differences on general security issues between EU actors have been squared through the sharing of a broader understanding that EU foreign policy is of value based on politically compatible discourses on ‘Europe’ (Wæver, 2000: 266–77). The Iraq crisis has not challenged this fundamentally and we have not yet witnessed an unravelling of EU policies en masse post-Iraq. The institutional structures of the CFSP and the ESDP have, if anything, been strengthened in the Constitutional Treaty of June 2004. US pressure on individual EU member states to take a stance for or against the US on a multitude of areas related to terrorism combined with European disagreements on the fight against terrorism may, of course, lead to a fundamental break-up of EU policy in the future. But at the time of writing this is not happening, and all signs are that the participants continue to consider EU foreign policy of value and worthwhile. The assumption is, in other words, that developments in the field of security do not in any simple way affect cooperation in other EU policy areas. The basic theme of this book is the Europeanisation of national foreign policies where Europeanisation is understood as the impact of EU foreign policy on both the procedures and substance of national foreign policy (see Chapter 2). The literature which zooms in on the question of the Europeanisation of national foreign policy is not overwhelming. Two recent works, however, stand out in this respect. The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union by Ben Tonra presents some interesting and significant conclusions in this field on the subject of the views of actors (Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands) on the importance of the CFSP and its procedures (Tonra, 2001). The cross-national comparisons in The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States edited by Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (2000) are extremely interesting and the conceptual framework covers many aspects and processes of potential importance for the issue of the Europeanisation of national foreign policy. However, because of the wide scope of the book, there is relatively little space allocated to the central issue of how much national foreign policy is conducted respectively within and without the EU. In this book, I look at what the two above-mentioned books and other literature in the field have not covered at length due to their specific foci.

Setting the Scene 5

The focus in this study is the substance of small state foreign policy rather than procedures. To be able to discuss the extent to which the foreign policy of EU member states relates to EU foreign policy we have to look at national foreign policy broadly across its many domains. This is a different angle from existing work in the field, including the two central works mentioned, which has tended to focus on procedures and processes and only given limited space to the systematic examination of the substance of policy in relation to the question of the relationship between the foreign policy of member states and the EU. A main point of interest in this book is in which parts of national foreign policy are conducted through the EU and which parts are not. This perspective is in its nature complementary to the existing work on procedures and follows on from the parts of the work of Manners and Whitman which deal with ‘policy within or without the EU’ (dealt with in the next chapter). But it also has the potential of challenging some of the procedural findings (which stress the binding and very comprehensive character of EU procedures in foreign policy), if it is found that substantial parts of national foreign policy are conducted outside the framework of the EU (or only partly within the EU framework), even if actors generally continue to consider the EU’s procedures as binding and comprehensive. The question raised is, in other words, which parts of national foreign policy (all?, some?, none?) are affected by the participation in EU foreign policy-making. There is also a second interesting angle to the question of the role of the EU in small state foreign policy which has to do with the voluntarist and dynamic dimension of foreign policy. It is part of the general assumptions in the first view mentioned above that the scope of small state foreign policy has been considerably expanded by participation in EU foreign policy processes. Small states that have hitherto not had the capacity or the mental horizon to be engaged in all corners of the world, can now, according to this way of thinking, become global actors through participation in shaping EU foreign policy which has a wider geographical and functional scope than many national foreign policies. The provocative question that arises from that is whether small states are in fact active in relation to shaping the EU’s many external policies. Is the apparent offer of wider global participation used actively? And, closely linked to this, are small states attempting to expand the EU policy frame to new areas (as would be the assumption drawing on the first view)? Or do the smaller states also attempt to keep their domaines reservés or chasses gardées in various policy areas (along the lines of the second view)?

6


When dealing with the significance of EU foreign policy for national foreign policy, a third and more profound dimension can be said to be the extent to which the substance of national foreign policy is structured by EU concepts. This is, in other words, a question of the constitutive effect of EU foreign policy concepts on national frameworks of meaning. By ‘constitute’ I mean to provide agents with understandings of their interests and, at a deeper level, identities. Here an obvious answer is not given in advance, but a reasonable expectation is that the more national foreign policy is conducted within the EU, the more EU concepts structure national foreign policy. On the one hand, it may be possible that even if national foreign policy is conducted outside the EU, concepts of EU foreign policy might still be shaping national foreign policy substance significantly in some areas. On the other hand, it is also possible that even in cases where national foreign policy is largely conducted within the EU, concepts and arguments in national foreign policy remain national. This question is important in order to assess the role of EU foreign policy for national foreign policy, and – in a broader sense – to be able to discuss whether national and EU foreign policy are so interwoven that national foreign policy for EU member states cannot be analysed separately from the EU’s foreign policy-making. A study across areas is imperative in an attempt to come up with some kind of answer to the issues raised above. Although it is usually claimed by national foreign ministries and political practitioners that there is one general foreign policy line the principles of which link together the various elements that can be grouped under national foreign policy, this cannot a priori be assumed to be so. Traditionally, representatives of states, often foreign ministries, construct an image of a cohesive entity of national foreign policy across issue areas through, for example, speeches (Neumann, 2001: 146–52). A national foreign policy consists of activities in many different policy fields. But the concepts or issues at stake in each field of policy do not per definition link up with more general statements of policy articulating one general policy line – at least not in a way which can be easily discerned from general foreign policy statements. Whether or how they do is an empirical question and may show that understandings and dynamics within the different issue areas of foreign policy are more central to understanding foreign policy in these areas than general statements expressing an assumed general national foreign policy line. To take an example central for the theme of this book: official Danish statements about general Danish foreign policy in the post-Cold War period draw on a discourse according to which the EU is presented as an indispensable and pivotal framework for Danish

Setting the Scene 7

foreign policy – including Danish participation in the CFSP (Larsen, 2000a; Tonra, 1997). According to the 2003 government White Paper on priorities in Danish foreign policy … The EU is the key to Denmark’s ability to influence the world around us … (Regeringen, 2003a: 4) … the foreign policy situation more than ever calls for a EU that stands united and assumes global responsibility. … Denmark must work to ensure that the EU fully exploits the existing framework and thereby exerts an impact on the international scene. (ibid., 12–13; see also Petersen, 1999: 18)2 However, on the basis of this dominant understanding of the crucial role of the EU in general Danish foreign policy, it cannot a priori be taken for granted that the EU plays a central role in all parts of national foreign policy. In principle, Danish foreign policy might in some areas be conducted mainly within the EU while in others the EU is just one organisational frame among others or not relevant at all. A study of the role of the EU across different areas of national foreign policy is therefore essential in order to understand the role of the EU in national foreign policy. A key question here is the way in which a dominant discourse about a pivotal role for the EU in general Danish foreign policy shapes the various areas of national foreign policy. The questions raised above, however difficult they may be to answer, are primarily questions that call for answers in terms of what and how rather than why. An answer to these will give a picture of the role of the EU vis-à-vis national foreign policy in terms of foreign policy substance and hence the degree of overlap between national and EU foreign policy systems. However, the interesting next step is to ask why we identify the pattern that we do with regard to the relationship between national and EU foreign policy across the different areas of foreign policy. The presumption is that if concepts can be suggested for analysing and understanding differences across issue areas of foreign policy on the basis of a concrete case – an EU country – then these concepts may be of use for asking questions about, and understanding, the relationship between national and EU foreign policies in the case of other countries. The primary level of analysis is an EU member state and its foreign policy. This is not because I am hostile to the systemic view which is widespread within studies of EU foreign policy: that EU foreign policy and member state foreign policy are part of the same overall foreign policy system and that the two therefore cannot be separated in an analysis of foreign policy in Europe (see for example White, 2001: 40). Rather,

8


I argue that this systemic view focuses on the procedural/decision-making dimension and that it is also necessary to examine in terms of foreign policy substance to what extent small state foreign policy is actually conducted within or through the EU. This may give a feel for the ‘extension of the EU foreign policy system’ as compared with other systems of foreign policy, here the national ones. The point of departure in this book, therefore, also holds the assumption, which is then opened to empirical inquiry, that we can still study national foreign policy of EU member states and the way it is conducted; that it is still a separable analytical category even in the context of the EU. A transformation of national foreign policy is thus not taken for granted but, rather, subjected to empirical study. The central question is asked from the perspective of the member states. But this does not mean that the answer will necessarily confirm the relevance of this level of analysis. In broader terms, an aim of the book is to shed light on the issue of whether and in what ways the national foreign policies of small member states have been transformed by membership of the EU. Here, this is being approached through a study of the relationship between EU and national foreign policy in different policy areas in the case of one country. This book asks the questions raised above in a study of Danish foreign policy. Of the smaller states within the EU that one could choose, Denmark is an interesting case. Denmark is by now a long-standing member of the EU, and as such has been taking part in the policy processes – including cooperation in the field of foreign policy – within the EU for more than 30 years. At the same time, it is often described as a reluctant member, a member with significant reservations with regard to the EU integration process (see for example Larsen, 1999). The clearest expression of this are the four Danish exemptions concerning European citizenship, the euro, European defence and justice and home affairs inserted into the Maastricht Treaty at the Edinburgh Decision in 1992 and included in subsequent treaty revisions. While the character of the general Danish approach towards the EU does in certain ways make Denmark a case outside the EU mainstream (often understood as the six founding member states), and therefore potentially of limited general interest, there are even stronger arguments in favour of Denmark being a very interesting case: if it is found that Danish foreign policy is to a large extent conducted within the EU and with significant effects on Danish foreign policy conceptualisations, then this would also have implications for the way we would look at the foreign policy of other small states closer to what could be understood as the EU mainstream

Setting the Scene 9

(the meaning of which is, of course, less clear in an EU of 25). However, at the same time, an approach focusing on national frameworks of meaning (which will be outlined in Chapter 2), and thus the meaning dimension of foreign policy, excludes generalisations of a formal positivist kind. At the end of the day, we will need to examine the dominant meaning structures in the EU country in question and the way these shape policies rather than drawing firm general conclusions from the Danish case. But the study may pinpoint broad meaning structures that may be interesting to focus on in a foreign policy study of this kind, and in this sense be of more general value. In the case of Denmark, the questions raised are not least challenging because the EU plays an important role in the dominant Danish foreign policy discourse. Since the end of the Cold War the EU has increasingly been presented in official Danish documents as the point of departure for Danish foreign policy or the key to Denmark’s ability to influence the world as the quote above from a central government foreign policy publication illustrates.3 Other institutions such as NATO and the UN, and indeed the bilateral relationship with the US, are also seen as essential, and the links and balances between these organisations are crucial in Danish foreign policy. Denmark is among the most pro-Atlantic countries in Europe.4 However, Danish links to NATO and the UN are frequently presented as going through the EU (Larsen, 2003). The question is whether this dominant general understanding on the EU is reflected across foreign policy areas. Is there one foreign policy line (where the official description is suitable) or are there, rather, a range of foreign policy lines where the relationship between the conduct of national foreign policy within and outside the EU differs? And if there are differences across areas, what is the background for this? Concretely the questions asked then are: 1. To what extent is Danish foreign policy conducted within the EU? 2. Has Denmark attempted to expand the scope of EU foreign policy into new areas and has Denmark been active within the areas examined? 3. Is the EU framework constitutive of Danish policy stances? Does Danish foreign policy use the same language as EU foreign policy? The book answers these questions by examining seven areas of foreign policy: Denmark’s bilateral policy towards the other EU member states, anti-terror, the Balkans, development cooperation and aid, Africa, Latin America and trade. The idea is that these areas cover the breadth of the issues that are involved in Danish and EU foreign policy including both functional and geographical policy. The choice of policy areas is made in

10 Analysing the Foreign Policy of Small States in the EU

the following way: the fight against terrorism is clearly an example of an area that has to do with security, arguably the most important dimension politically after 11 September 2001. Trade is an economic area with important political implications. The last functional area chosen is development. It is chosen because it contains important aspects of value promotion (along with economic and security concerns). We therefore have cases of security, trade and value promotion – the three dimensions along which foreign policy is often described. In terms of geographical areas, areas outside and within Europe have been chosen. Outside Europe, Africa and Latin America have been chosen. Inside Europe the Balkans have been selected. Denmark’s bilateral relations to other EU member states has been selected, as this comprises one of the traditional concerns of Danish foreign policy and probably also for many other small EU member states. Many other policy areas could have been included which space have not allowed. Policy in NATO, the missile defence issue and the security aspects in relation to Greenland are central areas in Danish security which could have been examined. Moreover, one could also have looked more closely at areas outside the traditional realm of foreign policy such as international environmental issues or more aspects of international economic relations. The reader might (justifiably) find that the focus in this book is too heavily on traditional foreign policy issues. Other readers may wonder whether there are too many policy areas examined and whether a more in-depth analysis of each area might have produced more insight. However, when one looks at the substance of a particular area as opposed to general expressions of procedures with regard to the relationship between national and EU foreign policy one is often met with the objection that ‘yes but what about x policy area which is very different from the xx areas examined’. It is thus important from this particular angle to present a convincing range of different policy areas. The areas chosen for the above reasons thus cover a wide spectrum of areas. Yet others may finally feel that the areas chosen are not ‘typical’, and might, for example, give the impression of a too significant degree of Danish foreign policy conducted outside the EU (not least the area of development). In Chapter 10 I take up this issue in the discussion of whether findings apply to Danish foreign policy across other issue areas. The book will analyse the background for differences between areas and attempt to understand why there are differences. This will be done on the basis of a theoretically based analytical framework. The core assumption in this (which is drawn on and examined in the comparison of the seven policy areas) is that the extent of Danish policy conducted

Setting the Scene 11

outside the EU framework is shaped by the relationship between the Danish agency articulated in relation to the policy area concerned and the strength/weakness of the EU policy in the area. The relationship between Danish and EU foreign policy thus depends on both the EU and the Danish level in the policy area in question. The general philosophical underpinnings of the understanding in the book can be characterised as a constructivist ontology in the sense that a fundamental role in the analytical framework is attributed to the way in which intersubjective systems of meaning are integral to, and shape, policy structures and processes. Socially shared systems of meaning define who the principal actors are and make possible certain policies while excluding others. The fundamental reasons for the state of affairs identified are seen to be rooted in fundamental meaning structures, here conceived as discourses. However, while this implies an interest in how meanings are created and fixed at all levels, I do not examine all potentially relevant meaning structures in the same analytical depth. The interest in carrying out discourse analysis is limited, then, to the articulations of actorness in each of the chosen issue areas of Danish foreign policy. This delimitation derives from practical concerns rather than theoretical or epistemological considerations; we cannot open up all aspects of social life to (discourse) analysis at the same time. I am thus bracketing certain dimensions assuming sedimented meaning structures here while opening up other dimensions for inquiry. Hence the book both draws on post-structuralist elements and elements that may be seen as closer to the constructivist middle ground (see Chapter 2 for a more elaborate account of the understanding on which the book is based). The overall aims of this book are thus: 1. To suggest a conceptual framework within which we can study the importance of the EU for national small state foreign policy and understand differences between policy areas. 2. To apply this framework to Danish foreign policy in seven areas. 3. To discuss the results with regard to the implications for the study of Danish foreign policy. Will a special EU model of foreign policy analysis be needed? 4. To reflect on the use of the framework drawn on to analyse the relationship between small state foreign policy and EU foreign policy, in other words the general value of the knowledge produced by the research. The main conclusion in the book is that the relationship between Danish and EU foreign policy varies according to the policy area in


question. With regard to Latin America, trade and, to a lesser extent, the Balkans, Danish foreign policy is mainly conducted inside the EU. In development, Africa and the fight against terrorism policies are conducted both inside and outside the EU, in the latter case also with the US. The fruitful role of the basic concepts suggested for analysing Danish foreign policy in an EU context is confirmed. At the most general level, the study suggests that in some areas of foreign policy the national foreign policy system and EU foreign policy are so interwoven that there is no national articulation of actorness without the EU while in others this is not the case. The situation is therefore mixed as to the role of national foreign policy systems vis-à-vis the EU foreign policy system. In some cases EU and national foreign policy are essentially part of one foreign policy system whereas in other cases this is not so. The broader implication may be that we may need different variations of FPA for different policy areas and for different countries within the EU. This is not to suggest that each country or policy area shall have its own ‘theory’ or ‘FPA’: the study presents concepts and theoretical elements for analysing foreign policy across the different policy areas and articulations of actorness. The book is built up in the following way: in the second chapter I discuss the existing relevant literature concerning small states in EU foreign policy. The need for a new focus is presented and a framework is put forward for how to analyse the policy areas examined concretely. A theoretically based scheme for understanding differences between areas is suggested. Methodological issues are outlined. The next seven chapters (3–9) are the empirical chapters where the cases are analysed drawing on an analytical scheme developed in Chapter 2. The first of these cases, bilateral policy towards other EU member states, is dealt with in Chapter 3. This chapter is somewhat different in structure from the subsequent chapters as the case examined does not allow the same use of the analytical framework as in the other empirical chapters. In Chapter 4 the subject is anti-terror and in Chapter 5 the Balkans. In the sixth chapter we look at development. The seventh chapter deals with Africa, and the eighth Latin America. Chapter 9, the final empirical chapter, analyses the trade area. Chapter 10 is the concluding chapter in which I turn to a broader discussion of the results for Danish foreign policy. The general value of the findings for the analysis of national foreign policy in the EU is outlined.

2 Theoretical Background and Analytical Framework

The aim of this chapter is to present a conceptual framework for the analysis of the issues outlined in the introduction. I will first outline some central dimensions of the study of the relationship between states and international organisations and the implications of these for foreign policy analysis (FPA). I will then discuss some general issues relating to the study of national foreign policy in an EU context. The next step will be to review the literature about national foreign policy in the EU. On the basis of these preliminaries, the analytical framework for the book will be described in the core of the chapter. Following this, I will deal with methodological and definitional issues in relation to the study. Finally I will summarise the analytical scheme outlined.

National foreign policy and international organisations The traditional approach to FPA assumes that the creation of national preferences takes place within the state-shell or that the state-shell is the unit which is affected (Carlsnaes, 2002: 332–42).1 The assumption is that states are the primary organisational forms in international relations (IR), in spite of the opening of the hard shell of the realist billiard ball which is a defining pluralist feature of FPA. States are seen to be constrained by their environment, including international organisations, but they are still viewed as the primary actors whose policy output should be examined. States as the unit for the analysis of foreign policy are not understood as undergoing any fundamental changes as a result of the interaction with the environment which would shape the way foreign policy should be analysed. 13


However, the question can be asked whether states’ participation in international organisations may under some circumstances represent a challenge to this traditional model. This could, for example, be the case if all functional and geographical areas and issues towards which the state directs its foreign policy are dealt with through one specific organisation. Firstly, this could become a challenge to the traditional foreign policy approach because an intensive involvement in, or, indeed, integration with, other countries may be in conflict with the central model of FPA which tends to assume a relatively autonomous national decisionmaking process including the formation of national preferences. If a state’s conduct of foreign policy cannot meaningfully be distinguished from a particular organisation’s or unit’s foreign policy, then this must have bearings on the way statist ‘foreign policy’ is analysed. It must challenge the assumption of a hard shell which generates policy preferences that are only subsequently promoted in the international environment. Secondly, and at a higher level of abstraction, it might lead to a questioning of what the appropriate unit is for the analysis of ‘foreign’ policy in the context in which this organisation operates: is it still the state, the international organisation or some kind of new postmodern hybrid combining national and organisational foreign policy-making?2 If the latter is taken to be the case, the most relevant foreign policy question may become how the foreign policy of this postmodern unit ought to be conceptualised and analysed. The focus would no longer be on state foreign policy alone – if at all. The choice of Danish foreign policy in an EU context as the object of study is based on the assumption that the EU foreign policy framework is in some way special and that it is therefore analytically interesting; that it seems plausible that the states’ participation in the EU and in particular EU foreign policy may have effects that challenge traditional features of states’ foreign policy – either by constituting a comprehensive EU policy framework within which most elements of national foreign policies are conducted (thus creating a shell around the shell!) or by having unique constitutive effects on national foreign policy. The key argument for the assumption that the EU as a foreign policy frame is different from other international organisations, is that foreign policy-making in the EU must be seen in the context of a general process of European political and economic integration. Through the general integration process of the EU, the autonomy (or sovereignty) of the member states has been compromised in favour of common institutions operating within a legal system antecendent to that of the member states themselves (Tonra, 2001: 4).

Theoretical Background and Analytical Framework 15

The impact of international organisations on national foreign policy and the basic approach of the book Since 1945 the issue of the role of international organisations for state policy can be said to have become accentuated as the post-war period has seen a huge expansion of the number of formal international organisations in all areas. Foreign policy has increasingly become an activity that is carried out through or within international organisations. In the following, I will outline general approaches to the relationship between national foreign policies and international institutions. One can identify three general approaches to the influence of international organisations on national foreign policy (Checkel, 1999: 546–7): 1. Rational choice. This conception of institutions is ‘thin’. Institutions are at most seen as a constraint on the behaviour of self-interested actors – unitary states. The organisations are seen as strategic contexts for the actors (states). They merely influence the strategies that actors employ to achieve certain given ends. The states recalculate how to achieve their interests in the presence of structures. Within this approach, organisations are seen as intervening variables (Hobson, 2000). 2. Historical institutionalism. Within this school, institutions get ‘thicker’ but only in a long-term perspective. In the short term, organisations provide incentives for instrumentally motivated actors to rethink strategies. They are a constraint on behaviour. In the long term, institutions can have deeper effects on actors, as actors’ initially selfinterested strategies become locked into particular institutional structures. Organisations are seen as both intervening and independent variables. 3. Sociological institutionalism. For sociological institutionalists institutions are ‘thick’. States and international institutions are seen as mutually constitutive of one another. Organisations contribute to constituting actors and their interests in the long and the short term. To ‘constitute’ means to provide agents with understandings of their interests and identities. Institutions, therefore, do not simply constrain behaviour as in (1) and (2), but also form the framework of meaning within which this behaviour takes place. According to this understanding, institutions are strongly independent variables. A general constructivist approach to the relationship between states and international organisations (which is the wider context in which the third category is embedded) maintains that the formation of states’ interests is also shaped by norms and values at the international level. The


context or membership of organisations will, it is argued, always to some extent be constitutive for states’ understandings. International organisations, in other words, are not just seen as regulating states’ foreign policy behaviour; they also contribute to constituting states’ preferences and the derived interests.3 Checkel’s view is that it is an empirical question which one of the three approaches should be favoured. I share Checkel’s view to the extent that it is an empirical question whether the relationship between a particular international organisation and a state can be seen as mutually constitutive and thus constitutive of a state’s concepts and identities, although membership of an international organisation in principle always contributes to shaping who ‘we’ are in a given state. At the same time, the basic theoretical approach to IR adhered to also shapes the way we create and study the empirical material. The understanding of IR in this book is based on a constructivist ontology: a fundamental role is attributed to the manner in which intersubjective systems of meaning are integral to policy structures and processes. Intersubjective meaning structures define who the principal actors are and enable certain policies while excluding others. However, a basic constructivist conception of the ontology of IR allows different approaches.4 At one end of the spectrum, one finds the view that a constructivist ontology can be combined with an ontology according to which social dynamics are not seen as wholly meaning-based. This is the view taken by constructivists in IR who want to build a bridge to rationalists. At the other end, one finds the fully post-structuralist view that nothing has ontological status outside meaning and everything in the social world is therefore a social construction. Differences also exist within the epistemology of constructivism, that is the theory of how intersubjective meanings are to be studied. At one end of the spectrum lie approaches that see language as transparent in line with modernism or rationalism in IR. At the other end of the spectrum language is seen as the necessary object of study when studying meaning as there is no meaning outside language – a central premise of post-structuralism. It is thus not possible to carve out one single constructivist position. Rather, there are many constructivist approaches which in some respects are closer to rationalists, while, in other respects, they are closer to the foci of full post-structuralists (see Smith, 1999 for a similar position).5 In this book I will understand constructivism on the basis of the ontological claim that social reality is constituted by meaning structures


which both produce and reproduce social actors. To the extent that material elements exist, these are attributed meaning by social actors; they do not have any inherent meanings in themselves. This is not to deny that there are constraints on meaning-based practices, emanating from historically segmented understandings (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). But in any case, the way people or social entities construct representations of what they do as part of what they do is seen as playing a pivotal role in the analysis of social phenomena, and the social construction of meaning is therefore the point of departure. In this book the fundamental meaning structures are conceptualised and analysed as discourses in the broad societal sense of Foucault (1989) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985). The interest in the constitutive character of language as discourse thus brings the approach close to a poststructuralist approach. It implies a fundamental analytical interest in how meanings are created and fixed at all levels. However, I do not examine all potentially relevant discursive constructions of meaning in the field of study at the same level of analytical depth. This is due to practical concerns rather than theoretical considerations: we cannot open up all aspects of social life to (discourse) analysis at the same time. I am thus bracketing certain dimensions assuming that the articulations of meaning here can been seen as sedimented while opening up others for inquiry. Discourse analysis is here primarily focused on the articulations of actorness in each issue area of Danish foreign policy (see below for a definition of actorness). It is for the reader to judge whether the dimensions and categories that have been chosen for analysis are relevant and interesting. The approach in this book can thus be said to comprise both elements close to the constructivist middle ground and more post-structuralist elements: the relatively firm scheme used as a framework for the analysis throughout the book and the bracketing of the meaning dimension of certain aspects of the field of study can be said to place it closer to the constructivist middle ground in terms of epistemology; the elements closer to a post-structuralist epistemology are the fundamental interest in discursive articulations of ‘actorness’ and in the language of foreign policy. The two elements are linked at the ontological level in that the bracketing of the meaning dimension of certain aspects of the field of study is an analytical device and not an ontological one. Social construction is primary. This general theoretical point of departure has consequences for how to study the relationship between state and international organisation and what kind of questions can be asked about the relationship in the


empirical sections later. First of all, one can study the language and discourse that prevails at both the state level and the organisational level. Secondly, the analysis of the meaning dimension through discourse analysis may point to Checkel’s approaches (1) and (2) above as relevant as well as (3), if central concepts are found to be national rather than organisationally based. Thirdly, we can examine the deeper question of state identity in the EU context. We can analyse whether the language of foreign policy in EU member states draws on the same conceptual structures as the EU. And we can look at whether an EU member state might in foreign policy consider itself a ‘state’ before anything else. Or whether state identity in the EU may take a different form in that member states might consider themselves units which are intrinsically tied to the EU foreign policy – possibly in particular areas of foreign policy. The EU may be seen as a supplement or as a support for the member states, and not as a new sovereign subject taking over from them (Wæver, 1995). But the EU context may also embody a changed core of state identity where state agency is formulated together with EU agency.6 National foreign policy and governance in European foreign policy This book contributes to the debate on Europeanisation of national foreign policies through a case study of the Europeanisation of foreign policy. In a wider sense, the book is part of the broader discussion about Europeanisation of national policies and polities. The primary level of analysis, then, is the EU member states and their foreign policies. This is not because I am hostile to the view which is gaining ground within studies of EU foreign policy: that EU foreign policy and member state foreign policy are both part of an analysis of European foreign policy governance and can only be separated analytically as in White’s Understanding European Foreign Policy (2001: 39). White’s key point is that there are three types of European foreign policy: (1) Community foreign policy (policy processes surrounding external action arising from the competence of the Commission in trade, development operations with third parties, agriculture etc.); (2) Union foreign policy (the CFSP framework); (3) National foreign policy. According to White, European Governance in the foreign policy field appears to take all three forms, which can be differentiated for analytical purposes, although it should be stressed that a key research task that the foreign policy analyst can undertake is to establish the extent to which these types have become interwoven over time. Clearly, the more extensive


Community foreign policy

EU foreign policy

National foreign policy

Figure 2.1 European foreign policy, taken from White (2001)

the relationships between them, the more justified we are in using the label ‘European foreign policy’. (White, 2001: 39) The subsystems are viewed as intertwined (see Figure 2.1). The national foreign policy subsystem is thus enmeshed with the EU subsystems where ‘habits of cooperation, accepted advantages of shared information, responses to common threats, cost saving through increased cooperation have all significantly altered patterns of national policy making’ (White, 2001: 41, citing Hill and Wallace, 1996: 12). Jørgensen has characterised these interwoven subsystems which come together in the EU Political Committee (now the Political Security Committee) as ‘the diplomatic republic of Europe’ ( Jørgensen, 1997). I build in this book on the work that points out that the different types of European foreign policy have become intertwined. The aim of the book is to inquire further into the degree of overlap between national foreign policy systems and the two other systems, taking the case of a specific country. The results may further reinforce or qualify this basic understanding of three interconnected circles. Whether it turns out that Danish foreign policy is mainly conducted through the EU or not, this certainly has consequences for the issue of whether it ever makes sense to separate analysis of national foreign policy from the two other types analytically. The study may thus give a feel for the extension of the national foreign policy system as compared with the (two) EU foreign policy systems. The starting point is that, at the present point in time, the interconnectedness can be taken as the point of departure for inquiry, and not as an assumption that is a priori valid for all aspects of foreign policy.


The basic premise is, then, that we can still study the substance of EU member state foreign policy and where it is conducted, that it is still a separable analytical category even in the context of the EU. That the EU has transformed national foreign policy is not taken for granted but, rather, subjected to empirical study. The central question is asked from the perspective of the member states, but this does not mean that the answer will necessarily confirm the relevance of this perspective. What it does mean is that there are sufficient indications of national agency for this perspective not to be deemed a priori irrelevant. The findings have potential implications for the question of the overlap or fit between national and EU foreign policy. I do not assume that a transformation of national foreign policy has taken place as I do not take it as a given that member state foreign policy is mainly conducted within the EU with EU concepts as the main conceptual source when looking at foreign policy substance across policy areas. A main motivation for the book is the aim to cast light on the question of whether and in what ways the national foreign policies of small member states have been transformed by the EU. Here this is being approached through studying the relationship between EU and national foreign policy in different policy areas. This premise also affects the definition of foreign policy used in this book. Wæver (1994) has analysed the possible conceptual challenges to FPA and its focus on states from a postmodern/post-structuralist perspective. According to Wæver, the state system is undergoing change with consequences for which units are appropriate to analyse when analysing foreign policy – if the term ‘foreign policy’ is at all still suitable (Wæver, 1994: 43–5). Nowhere is this change more apparent than in Europe. Arguably, we see features of a neo-medieval, post-Westphalian system (see for example Ruggie, 1993). The problem is that we do not yet know the nature of the defining units. There does not, of course, need to be only one type of defining unit. But it is necessary for an analysis to have an understanding of the nature of the units. Otherwise we will not have the basis for an analytical framework let alone a new theory (Wæver, 1994: 244). This has implications for the conduct of FPA within the EU. It is difficult to go beyond FPA to a new kind of ‘post-foreign policy analysis’ without an understanding of what the new units are which necessitate new forms of analysis (Wæver, 1994: 245). There is, in other words, no clear ‘post-foreign policy’ analysis out there waiting for us, although there are many theoretical and empirical studies pointing to new actors and new political systems – in particular in Europe. As will be discussed below, important studies have clearly pointed in that direction.


White argues that well-trodden FPA methods could be used to analyse European foreign policy in the form of the three types of European foreign policy outlined above and that the links between these are an important object of FPA in Europe.7 This is the point of departure for this book. We cannot at present say that FPA has to be conducted in a special and new way because the country in question, Denmark, is located within the EU. But the results of this study might well further the argument that a new FPA for European states is necessary and on the basis of this case hopefully contribute to such an analytical framework. Drawing on the assumptions in White’s book, there are more foreign policy actors in European foreign policy than just states. A primary candidate to be an actor in the field of foreign policy beyond the states is of course the EU as expressed in the CFSP or ESDP, or the Commission in the field of trade. If we want to study EU member state foreign policy in relation to EU foreign policy we therefore need a definition of foreign policy which does not limit foreign policy to an activity conducted by states. Moreover, it must be a definition which does not leave out any area dealt with in the international realm. This is to avoid excluding policy areas by definition in the comparison between state and EU foreign policy – potentially damaging if one of the actors examined tends to concentrate their policy efforts in particular fields (it is, for example, often claimed that the EU focuses on softer security and economic aspects of IR). At the same time we also need a definition which retains a certain parsimony with respect to the vast number of international transactions conducted. In one of the most comprehensive books on FPA to date, Christopher Hill defines foreign policy as ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’ (Hill, 2002: 3). The term ‘independent actor’ allows the inclusion of foreign policies of actors such as the EU, whereas ‘official’ allows the inclusion of outputs from all parts of the government machinery of the independent actor in question (Hill, 2002: 3–4). As to the substantial content of foreign policy, Hill sees the central political aspects of this activity as actions, statements and values relating to how the actor wishes to advance its main objectives and to shape the external world (Hill, 2002: 4). Moreover, foreign policy is also an attempt to hold together or control the various activities the actor is engaged in internationally, an attempt to create coherence (Hill, 2002: 4–5). I take Hill’s definition as my point of departure. It has the implication that all official actions of the government machinery (EU or Danish) aimed at the environment outside its boundaries are included.


Hill’s definition is a relatively broad one compared to other definitions which privilege states – both as actors and as the target of foreign policy action (see, for example, Manners and Whitman, 2000b: 2; White, 1989: 1). Some important points of clarification need to be added here. First of all foreign policy is understood as a general area of activity, as when for example talking about ‘the aims of Danish foreign policy are …’ or ‘EU foreign policy aims at furthering …’. However, I also understand foreign policy as the subareas within this general activity. Policy towards, for example, the threat of terrorism, Latin America or policy with regard to international trade, are all areas of foreign policy. While the analyst may be able to see some links across the different subareas and the aim of practitioners will often be to further consistency across fields which could lead to a claim of a general foreign policy line, such coherence cannot be assumed. Analysing foreign policy is, in other words, not a question of analysing an assumed rational consistency across or within areas, although, as will be argued later, general frameworks of meaning are important when analysing foreign policy. And this is, indeed, the reason why it is interesting to analyse different policy areas. In the case of Denmark, this is a crucial point of departure, as the pivotal role of the EU for Danish foreign policy is often stressed in general Danish foreign policy statements. It means that if the analyst is interested in the role of the EU in Danish foreign policy he will have to look across issue areas as the importance of the EU in every area cannot be assumed. Secondly, it raises the question of whether state policy towards affecting the EU’s foreign policy or policy towards other EU member states is foreign policy. The approach taken here is to examine these areas as if they are foreign policy and then subsequently discuss whether this a useful label in the light of the results. Again the analytical approach here is ‘as if’ followed by discussion of whether the results support this approach. Literature on national foreign policy in an EU context In the following I will discuss the literature on national foreign policy in an EU context linked to the broader issue of Europeanisation. The general literature dealing with the Europeanisation of national policies and domestic transformation took off in the 1990s and is by now considerable (Ladrech, 2002a: 387; Risse et al., 2001: 3). Europeanisation is increasingly employed as a term to describe a process of transformation in Europe, although there is no definitional consensus as to whether it


refers to transformations of EU institutions themselves and the participation of national actors in this process or to the domestic dynamics as a result of European integration (Ladrech, 2002b: 391). If we look at the second element (which is justified if we are interested in the impact on the national level rather than developments at the EU level), it seems fair to say that the focus in the literature has been on the impact on national institutional and organisational adaptation to European integration. The emphasis has, in other words, been on how European integration has affected the way ‘national’ political and administrative processes take place often based on case studies. In a central book, Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, it is for example concluded that ‘Europeanization transforms the domestic structures of the nationstates and the meanings attached to them’ (Cowles and Risse, 2001: 237). There are nevertheless differences as to how strong the impact of European integration on national political and administrative systems is judged to be. Some judge European integration to have already had a significant impact on national structures (Olsen, 2003; Lardrech, 1994, 2002b; Cowles et al., 2001; Jacobsson et al., 2001) whereas others are more sceptical about the impact not least in the case of Denmark (Blom-Hansen and Christensen, 2004). There has not been anywhere the same amount of literature in relation to the study of the Europeanisation of national foreign policies as compared with national domestic policies. To the extent that EU member states have been analysed in the context of EU foreign policy the focus has been the national approach to the CFSP in general terms and often the limits and possibilities for the CFSP conditioned by these national policy stances – rather than the possible arrows in the opposite direction. In the two central works edited by Hill (1983, 1996), the main focus in the chapters is the policy towards the CFSP, although the 1996 book has interesting sections on the impact on the national foreign policy systems which shows full awareness of broader issues with regard to the Europeanisation of foreign policy and considerations concerning the EU as the rescue of the nation state (Allen, 1996; Hill and Wallace, 1996: 10–12). While these studies are important academic pivots, in particular with regard to the national backgrounds for the countries’ approaches to the CFSP, some recent work focuses more specifically on the impact of EU foreign policy on national foreign policies. First, Ben Tonra’s work has among other things attempted to identify common understandings of the CFSP among small member states – Denmark, Ireland and the


Netherlands (Tonra, 2001). Second, other work has attempted to formulate a framework for analysing EU member states’ foreign policies in an EU context and apply this to EU member states (Manners and Whitman, 2000a). The two latter works follow the tendency in general studies on Europeanisation in focusing on procedures in the form of the adaptation of political/administrative systems rather than on the content of policy (see e.g. M.E. Smith, 2000, 2004). In the following I will present and review this literature including its empirical implications and findings with regard to Denmark. My aim is to develop a framework for the analysis of Danish foreign policy in an EU context which looks at content of policy rather than procedures. While Europeanisation understood as adaptation of political and administrative structures and procedures to European integration is, indeed, an important focus of study also in the field of foreign policy, the argument made here is that we also need to look at policy substance when studying the Europeanisation of national foreign policies. The question, in other words, is which national foreign policy areas that are Europeanised, in the sense of dealt with through the EU. Prior to this, however, I will discuss the relevance of the adaptation approach, which is a general approach to FPA. The focus of this theory is not the Europeanisation of foreign policy, but rather the general foreign policy line in a particular policy field. However, recent application of the theory to explain national foreign policy within the EU – including Danish foreign policy – makes the model interesting to evaluate in this context (N. Petersen, 1998; Mouritzen et al., 1996; Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995). And, not least, the adaptation theory has been the principal theoretical model used in studies of Danish foreign policy (Jørgensen, 1995) which calls for a discussion of the theory in this context.

1. The adaptation theory and Danish European policy The adaptation theory aims to explain, in general terms, the likely overall postures of a country’s foreign policy. While the initial steps in the development of the theory were taken by Rosenau, the theory has later mainly been developed in Denmark and with Denmark as the case to be explained (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 14; cf. Wæver, 1994: 251), in particular by Nikolaj Petersen and Hans Mouritzen. In the following I will take Petersen’s use of the theory (1977, 1998; Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995) as the point of departure, but also draw on other work


within this school when this seems to fill gaps or answer relevant questions. The main point in adaptation theory is that the general orientations in a state’s foreign policy can be predicted from its score on ‘influence capacity’ (offensive power) and ‘stress sensitivity’ (internal vulnerability). The first is the state’s ability to influence its external environment through its capabilities in a broad sense, whereas the latter is the extent to which societal structures of a state are affected by international events. Although decision-makers’ perceptions might affect policy, in the longer run the ‘objective position’ in terms of influence capacity and stress sensitivity is decisive (N. Petersen, 1977; 1998: 43). The focus in the theory is the relative balance between the internal and external environment in shaping foreign policy. If the influence capacity of a state is high and stress sensitivity is low, the policy line will be dominance. A dominance policy will attempt to mould the external environment according to domestically generated values. If both influence capacity and stress sensitivity are high, the policy line will be balancing. Balancing is based on a ‘give and take’ attitude to international politics. If the influence capacity is low and stress sensitivity is high, the policy line will be acquiescence, whereby the state in question is forced to accept major incursions on national preferences by the external environment. Finally, if both stress sensitivity and influence capacity are low the line will be quiescence, that is isolationism (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 14; N. Petersen, 1998: 38). The adaptation theory assumes a general (international) trend towards balancing in foreign policy due to the growing interdependence among states. As integration is both a response to interdependence and reinforces it, it follows that a balancing policy mode tends to prevail among states that take part in integration. Most EU countries thus follow the balancing strategy most of the time (N. Petersen, 1998: 40–1, 45–6). The balance mode is characterised by a high degree of active participation. It is a policy of give and take to further national interests. Concessions are given in the expectation that they will be more than offset by the benefits of integration (N. Petersen, 1998: 45). At the same time, however, according to the theory, there will always be significant differences between member states due to their varying positions of influence capability and stress sensitivity. While balancing is the general policy mode, there might therefore be nuances within this line with states drawing on elements of other adaptive modes (dominance, acquiescence, quiescence). Weak states might for example use bastions to avoid sliding into uncontrollable acquiescence.8 Of relevance


for Denmark, this will also be the case if a state does not share all the goals of integration (N. Petersen, 1998: 44–5, 47). To the basic objective and material criteria of influence capacity and stress sensitivity in a balancing strategy is added an ideational element – the degree of identification with the immediate and ultimate aims of integration expressed in different attitudes towards the integration dilemma (N. Petersen, 1998: 46). Such attitudes might form the background for variations among the states participating in integration with the same influence capacity and stress vulnerability.

According to adaptation theory, Denmark, due to the relationship between influence capability and stress vulnerability, will conduct a ‘balancing’ strategy in the EU. Petersen sees the sceptical Danish policies in some areas as factors moderating the general balancing line explained in terms of ‘strength’ or ‘vulnerability’. The Danish referenda in 1992 and 1993 are drawn on to explain this (N. Petersen, 1998: 51). Specifically concerning Denmark’s stance towards the CFSP, Petersen argues that: In foreign policy proper a straightforward balancing strategy has been the normal posture. Since 1973 Denmark has participated actively in the give and take process in both the EPC and the CFSP. … In the security field, strategies have been different, however, and characterised by a continuous rearguard fight for small and hardresisted concessions against the expansion of the EPC. (N. Petersen, 1998: 49–50) Denmark has thus been willing to adapt her national policy to common EU policies while also being active in certain policy areas. Denmark has put forward demands in relation to CEE policy while concessions have been most prominent in Middle East policy (N. Petersen, 1998: 49). However, the defence and security areas are seen as different. Here strategies are closer to the acquiescent and quiescent policy mode. These strategies, which are seen as supplementing the general balancing line on the CFSP in the late 1990s, are presented as the consequence of the referendum in 1992 (N. Petersen, 1998: 50). Generally a foot-dragging approach in the EU has been present in high politics areas whereas balancing policies have prevailed in low politics presumably seen as including the pure foreign policy part of the CFSP (N. Petersen, 1998: 52).


The classical configuration of Danish foreign policy during the Cold War is seen as the four cornerstones (or five arenas) of Danish foreign policy (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 38–40). In their analysis of the early–mid 1990s, Due-Nielsen and Petersen still identify five arenas of Danish foreign policy. The big change from the classical configuration is that foreign policy cooperation is now seen as taking place primarily, but not only, in the EU arena (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 40–3): … the European dimension has grown in importance across a number of policy fields so that it is now unquestionably the most important aspect of Danish foreign policy. … Functional compartmentalisation is reduced and will be further reduced, if the EU takes on a definitive security role, or if the CFSP comes to effectively cover policies towards the rest of Europe as well as the third world. … In this case Denmark’s foreign policy problematique will shift from that of balancing national interests across different networks of international cooperation to providing strong and convincing inputs to the CFSP. … (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 43) The view of the adaptation theory appears to be that there is a change in Danish foreign policy from the Cold War period to the post-Cold War period both in terms of the conceptual framework and the policy processes going on within it, but not a more profound transformation towards one primary organisational framework for Danish foreign policy.9 A major transformation might come but is not yet there due to the inadequacies of EU foreign policy (Due-Nielsen and Petersen, 1995: 43).

Three points of criticism can be levelled against the adaptation theory and its application to Danish foreign policy partly from a constructivist perspective10 on the relationship between states and international organisations outlined above: (a) The meaning dimension is exogenous as the basic idea is that nonideational factors determine the general policy line in the long run. Adaptation is a process based on material elements. Meaning is added after the establishment of the importance of influence capacity and stress vulnerability and so is not presented as a basic framework within which policy is shaped. However, from a constructivist perspective the framework of meaning within which a country’s


(European) policy takes place is crucial for understanding their (European) policy (Larsen, 1997). To take an example, whether an organisation is seen as either the crucial organisational context for a country or, conversely, as an organisation of only marginal importance, is likely to affect the strategy mode in a more profound way than simply modifying the basic balancing strategy, as the adaptation theory assumes. The dominant Danish post-Cold War discourse, according to which the EU is both a central economic and a political actor with a central role to play in the field of security and an indispensable framework for Danish foreign policy (Larsen, 2000a), is not just an additional factor; rather it is a central structural dynamic to be taken into account when analysing Danish foreign policy in a European context. (b) Bargaining within the balancing mode within which Denmark finds itself is assumed to take place on the basis of exogenously given national interests. Adaptation under the balancing mode appears to be adaptation within limits. The theory seems to assume a policygenerating core which is always in control of what it gives and what it takes. The impression given is that the balancing mode, Denmark’s approach to the EU, is characterised by a give and take bargaining, just like in other organisations. The possibility that the generation of national interests might be affected more profoundly in the form of an endogenisation of national interests through an extensive and enduring integration process is not considered.11 (c) Substance of policy is not the focus. The framework aims to explain a general policy line and not the making of foreign policy towards particular issues. The substance of policy is, in other words, exogenous. An examination of concrete policy areas might, however, challenge the findings of the theory with regard to the general policy line. The adaptation framework thus offers a theoretical interpretation of the Danish line with regard to EU foreign policy cooperation (balancing with some modifications). Moreover, the application by Due-Nielsen and Petersen offers a general interpretation of the EU’s role in Danish foreign policy compared with other fora. However, the adaptation framework does not deal with the possible broader implications of the European dimension being the ‘most important aspect of Danish foreign policy’ or, indeed, what this means. The framework does not consider that the perceived importance of the EU as central for Danish (foreign) policy may already have had more profound consequences for


the shaping of Danish foreign policy or its general profile. The meaning dimension is exogenous just like the definition of national interests. This is a consequence of the basic rationalist assumptions of the theory. Moreover, the making of foreign policy substance in particular policy areas is not a focus in the theory as it is aiming at explaining a general policy line. An alternative framework is needed in order to explore the content of Danish foreign policy in a European context, more specifically a framework which can embrace the content of policy and the meaning dimension including the organisational choices. 2. EU foreign policy cooperation and small states’ foreign policy: Ben Tonra’s work The key question posed at the outset of Tonra’s book The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policies (2001) is whether the development of foreign and security policy cooperation within the EU has constrained or empowered Danish, Dutch or Irish foreign policy – that is three smaller states within the EU (Tonra, 2001: vi).12 The book first attempts to develop a theoretical framework which ‘is capable of acknowledging the development of collective processes beyond strict intergovernmental boundaries and at the same time provides for the continuing salience of national foreign policies’ drawing on elements of constructivist theory (Tonra, 2001: 35). The main empirical elements of the book are three cases in which the evolution and capacity of the CFSP and the role of three minor member states in that evolution are examined (The Middle East [1970–95], South Africa [1976–95] and the former Yugoslavia [1990–96]). The analyses of these cases are followed by a chapter on the assessment by practitioners in the three countries of the role of EU foreign policy in national foreign policy. In this chapter Tonra presents some extremely interesting findings on the basis of interviews in the three countries: Tonra finds among other things that socialisation had led to a primary coordination reflex among the European partners for new initiatives and that the language used in the CFSP has become more and more common (Tonra, 2001: 261, 269). National foreign policy-making processes are increasingly seen as driven by the European agenda, and political cooperation has become the central forum for the delineation of foreign policy interests in each of the three states examined (Tonra, 2001: 263). The foreign policy decision-making process is becoming more and more dependent on the information distributed through the CFSP. As a result of the increased information and access, the foreign


policy agenda for the three countries examined is seen as having expanded (Tonra, 2001: 261–9). Tonra’s general conclusion is that the relationship between national foreign policies and the EPC/CFSP has been, and continues to be, a reciprocal one (Tonra, 2001: 279). This expresses itself in two major ways (and goes against a traditional realist intergovernmental interpretation of the CFSP). Firstly, the formulation and output of national foreign policies have changed as a direct result of participation in the process. Secondly, this means that small states’ participation in the process is not based on ‘side-payments’ and marginalisation when CFSP stances are formulated. Policy-makers see the process as constraining all participants and at the same time providing significant added value (Tonra, 2001: 280). As for the main question of whether participation in European political cooperation has constrained or empowered the foreign policies of the three countries, the answer is both – owing to the reciprocal character of national and European foreign policy (Tonra, 2001: 284–5). According to Tonra’s study, The exercise of foreign policy is constrained by participation in the process of creating a collective foreign and security policy. Foreign policy makers in the 3 states … do not act without reference to the views of their colleagues. … [On the basis of the three cases examined] … it is evident that these states have, at one time or another, been constrained in the actions they took or the policies that they adopted. There is a new external element that has been internalised in the creation of national foreign policies … foreign policy makers freely acknowledge that the output of their policies … has been compromised in pursuit of consensus. (Tonra, 2001: 285) As for empowerment … minor EU states have the opportunity to pursue the same foreign policy objectives in a framework [which], if they are successful, has an international impact far and away greater than the state could hope to achieve in isolation … policy makers remain free to maintain an independent national position (italics added). (Tonra, 2001: 286)

Aside from providing some significant insights into Danish, Dutch and Irish foreign policy, Tonra’s work puts forward the crucial general point


that mechanisms are at play within the CFSP which can be seen to modify the traditional foreign policy model, intergovernmentalism, in relation to analyses of states’ foreign policy in an EU context. The key point is the strongly endogenous character of policy-making in the EU context. The practitioners’ assessments give a picture of an intersubjective meaning structure which frames and shapes cooperation in the EU and which is pivotal for small state foreign policy both in terms of administrative structures, national foreign policy agenda and influence on the world stage. As such it provides an interesting answer to the question of the impact of participation in the EU on small EU member state foreign policy. It points to European intersubjective structures at the procedural level which give the EU a central role in national foreign policy. At the same time, however, the study also leaves open some important questions. If participation in EU foreign policy has had such profound effects on small state foreign policy procedures as The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policies suggests, then one would expect this to have profound effects on the substance and overall framing of the foreign policy of small member states. It would be interesting to know how much of small states’ foreign policy is conducted through the EU and to which foreign policy areas Tonra’s conclusions apply. This is to some extent dealt with in the three case studies. However, the three cases and the interviews with practitioners are not well integrated. The general conclusions about the reciprocal relationship between national and European foreign policy seem to be based more on the interviews with practitioners than on the three case studies. The general statement about how ‘the relationship between national foreign policy and European foreign policy has been, and continues to be, a reciprocal one’ seems to be a stronger statement than the somewhat weaker conclusions about the three policy areas examined, according to which ‘these states have at one time or another, been constrained in the actions they took or the policies they adopted’ (Tonra, 2001: 279, 285). The conclusions on the three case studies do not present participation in the EU framework as more constraining for national foreign policy than participation in other organisations such as the UN, NATO or the OSCE. In fact, the relative importance of the EU framework for national foreign policy compared to other organisational fora is not discussed systematically. The general conclusions about a reciprocal relationship between national and European foreign policy suggest a pivotal role for the EU in national foreign policy. However, this is moderated in the cases of


Denmark and Ireland as the promotion of common EU policy is not seen as being the primary national foreign policy interest (Tonra, 2001: 287). The conclusion of the book must then be that, in the case of Ireland and Denmark, participation in EU foreign policy has not altered the focus of national foreign policies towards one primary organisational context, in spite of the above-mentioned reciprocal relationship between national and EU foreign policy. Another dimension of Tonra’s study that could have been developed more systematically is the nature of the constraints on national policies and the deeper effects of EU policy stances on national understandings in the areas examined. The main focus in the three cases examined (apart from the foreign policy importance of the EU) is on describing national stances and their background and, to a lesser extent, on exploring how successful the three countries were in promoting their policies in the EU. Only in the chapter on the Middle East (Chapter 8) is there an analysis of the possible internalisation of EU stances. A more systematic focus on the role of the EU compared with other fora and the extent to which national policy understandings were affected more profoundly by EU stances in different policy areas (as opposed to other multilateral contexts) could have provided insight into the degree to which participation in EU processes affected more profound understandings in substantial areas. In summary, Tonra’s work is important as it presents significant crossnational intersubjective understandings on the role of EU foreign policy for national foreign policy. These understandings both reflect and contribute to making the EU foreign policy part of small EU member states’ foreign policy framework. Participation in EU foreign policy has an administrative and political impact, forms their foreign policy agenda and gives influence on the world stage. Tonra’s assessments are also identified in interviews with Danish foreign policy practitioners. Thus Tonra’s work suggests a wide-ranging Europeanisation of foreign policy procedures. However, it could have been interesting if there had been more of a focus on foreign policy substance, both in terms of the extent to which small state foreign policy in different areas was in fact conducted through the EU13 and whether national foreign policy understandings in different areas were affected by participation in the EU. This would complete the picture of the relationship between EU and national foreign policy. 3. Manners and Whitman’s approach to analysing the foreign policy of EU member states The work of Manners and Whitman The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States (2000a) is the other significant recent contribution focusing


specifically on national foreign policies in an EU context (together with Tonra’s work referred to above). The book attempts to set up and apply a framework for examining EU member states’ foreign policy and aims at application of this framework in case studies of the member states’ foreign policy written by individual country experts. The crucial question which is asked in this tour de force, and supported by empirical study, is whether it is valid to assert that there is a need for a distinctive FPA approach to the study of EU states (Manners and Whitman, 2000b: 1). The empirical and theoretical ambition and the scope of the book make it a pivot for a discussion of the nature of EU member state foreign policy. An analysis of Danish foreign policy in an EU context must begin by taking a stance towards the approach and insights of this book. The book argues for a distinctive approach to the FPA of EU states. Two justifications are given for this: first, FPA needs to push beyond the boundaries constructed within US FPA and continue to move towards a more appropriate approach informed by more recent European thinking, and second, the European condition needs to be analysed properly. Theoretical work in this field has had to take account of the triple developments of a post-Cold War Europe, complex interdependence in Europe and the increasingly integrated Europe (Manners and Whitman, 2000b: 4–5). On the basis of these two elements Manners and Whitman suggest a framework for comparative analysis of the foreign policy of EU member states. It consists of three general categories: (1) Foreign policy change (comprising adaptation and socialisation), (2) foreign policy process (including domestic and bureaucratic processes), and (3) foreign policy action (conceptualised as whether foreign policy action takes place with or without the EU). These variables contribute to the backbone of comparative study and to establishing whether the traditional foreign policy model still applies to EU member states’ foreign policy or whether a transformational (i.e. pluralistic) model applies (Manners and Whitman, 2000b: 11–13). It is generally concluded that ‘… a transformation of EU member states foreign policy has taken place as a result of the European condition’ (Manners and Whitman, 2000c: 242). I will briefly present the conclusions in relation to each of their three analytical categories. As far as the first is concerned (adaptation and socialisation), it is concluded that most of the states have adapted their policies in the light of different historical experiences and economic conditions. The same pattern is found with respect to the socialisation of decision-makers which is seen as strongest among the smaller states and weakest among France, Germany


and the UK. As far as domestic factors in the policy process are concerned (the second main category), it is argued that a clear distinction between European and domestic policy is no longer possible – a condition that is not only a result of EU membership. With respect to the third analytical category (foreign policy action with or without the EU), three patterns emerge amongst the EU member states: 1. For EU member states with extensive foreign relations (mostly the UK and France) the EU is predominantly perceived as a constraint or a means to amplify national foreign policy (Manners and Whitman, 2000c: 263). 2. EU member states with less extensive global relations tend to conduct a large part of their foreign policy through the EU (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Greece and partly Denmark), what Manners and Whitman call ‘European foreign relations’. For these countries the EU is more often perceived as an opportunity for national foreign policy action (Manners and Whitman, 2000c: 263). 3. A third pattern can be observed in those EU states which do not have an extensive pattern of foreign policy relations, but also tend to work through other international organisations such as the UN, NATO or the OSCE, labelled by Manners and Whitman ‘international foreign relations’. In this type of pattern, EU membership represents not so much an opportunity or a restriction, but merely another forum for the foreign policy of these states, among which are mentioned Austria, Finland, Sweden and Germany (Manners and Whitman, 2000c: 264). The answer to whether the states act with or without the EU does depend, then, on which state we are looking at. The strategies of the states towards EU foreign policy integration on concrete issues also vary between attempting to shift foreign policy areas to Brussels, more broadly attempting to use the EU as a means of rescuing national foreign policy, and (somewhat contrary to the two first categories) in some cases attempting to renationalise elements of foreign policy (Manners and Whitman, 2000c: 265).

Denmark is analysed drawing on the analytical framework in a joint chapter on Denmark and Ireland written by Ben Tonra.14 In relation to political and administrative procedures, Tonra restates the findings from


his own 2001 book (under the heading of ‘Foreign policy change – the internal environment’), although the stress on Europeanisation is stronger: Institutional coordination – common work practices and structures, a shared information base and the establishment of a common substantive agenda – set up a truly collective context through which a large portion of ‘national’ foreign policy is being formulated and pursued. That does not eliminate the role of unique national perspectives, concerns or even of declared ‘interests’. It does, however, underline the degree to which a substantial portion of the national foreign policies of Denmark and Ireland are being translated and formulated through a European context before it even hits the intergovernmental negotiation table. Moreover, there is also evidence of the construction of some collective identification – whether this is the ambition to put forward a united front at the UN, efforts made to internalise the aims of collective foreign policy making or even the simple urge to ‘rally round’ a united European position. What is crucial to note is that the participants do not see this process as a zerosum game: setting the pursuit of ‘national interests’ against a defined EU interest. It is a means by which the two are defined together. (Tonra, 2000: 230–1) Foreign policy substance is analysed under the heading of ‘Foreign policy actions with or without the EU?’. The restrictions imposed by the CFSP are viewed as marginal by policy-makers. Tonra finds that policymakers are seen to be satisfied with the development of the CFSP, which in the final analysis is subject to national vetoes. There is no great distinction between the evaluations of the CFSP and EU external relations (that is, foreign economic relations) although different rules apply (Tonra, 2000: 237–8). Tonra describes the relationships and issues which from the Danish perspective are seen as special and which are given priority vis-à-vis the EU framework (he does not positively describe the areas dealt with inside the EU). In terms of relationships, it is the relationship with the US/NATO, Nordic Cooperation and the Baltic States which Denmark sees as special. In terms of issue areas the most obvious is security and defence policy by virtue of the Danish opt-out on defence issues. A second set of issues are those of human rights and development cooperation. These play an important role in the Danish ‘foreign policy profile since they generate significant domestic interest’ (Tonra, 2000: 239).


The security issue is presented as special in that any EU cooperation in this area is seen as ‘difficult, dangerous, or at least of doubtful utility. Both states [Denmark and Ireland] therefore continue to hold this area of policy apart from the European context’ (Tonra, 2000: 240). However, the remaining special relationships and issues are not kept outside the EU as domaines reservés: ‘Neither Nordic cooperation, support for the Baltic States, human rights nor development cooperation are necessarily seen to be adversely compromised by EU Membership. … Only the security relationship with the US and thus NATO is set deliberately and forcibly apart from the EU framework’ (Tonra, 2000: 239). The picture that we get from Tonra’s contribution is therefore of a Danish foreign policy where only security issues and the relationship with the US are held apart from the EU whereas other areas, even areas of Danish priority, are dealt with within the EU (if not here alone).

The three categories examined within the framework (each subdivided into two variables) are interesting and appear relevant for analysing the question of foreign policy in an EU context. It is the framework that is used for analysing the individual countries in their book. However, a weakness of the framework is that the three general categories used for analysing EU member states’ foreign policy seem to appear a bit deus ex machina. There is no clear explanation given for why exactly these variables are particularly relevant as a comparative framework for the foreign policy of European states, and it is not clear how or whether the categories relate to the more general foreign policy models mentioned, ‘traditional FPA’ and ‘transformational FPA’ (Manners and Whitman, 2000b: 12). The analytical framework does, on this background, appear undertheorised and disconnected from more general theoretical inquiry, although links are not impossible to imagine. It seems to me that one of two alternative paths could have been taken which would have eased the task: (1) to have taken a general transformation of national foreign policy in a European context for granted and compared national foreign policies within this new framework, or (2) to have made the assumptions more open and used categories which allowed information to be gathered about whether a change has taken place on the basis of what central foreign policy models would consider as change. The study appears to be too ambitious for what is possible in a comparative study of 15 countries: it both wants to examine whether the system has changed and how national foreign policies should be analysed within a new foreign policy system.


A weakness in the framework is also that it does not take a clear view on the possible use of constructivist-inspired questions. Although Manners and Whitman do refer to the use of constructivist approaches (Manners and Whitman, 2000b: 7–8), and some of the empirical contributions in the book are also inspired by this approach (notably the chapter on Denmark and Ireland by Tonra and the chapter on Germany by Aggestam), it seems to me that the potential of questions based on a constructivist approach are underexplored or not sufficiently thematised in the book. Most fundamentally we can ask whether membership has constitutive effects on national foreign policy preferences including on the substance of foreign policy (and not only processes). It is important to stress that a possible constitutive effect of EU foreign policy on national foreign policy – as assumed within a constructivist perspective – is not just expressed through a rapprochement of views on specific policy issues. At a deeper level, one might be able to identify the spread of common discourses on broad themes such as security or stability or on specific regions. This might be furthered through an extensive sharing of information at many levels which contributes to a similar framing of issues (via COREU, discussions in Brussels or New York and among EU embassies in third countries). This spread of common discourses might be found even if differences exist on specific policy issues. A strength of the framework (compared with the two previous approaches discussed) is that it includes the issue of whether the content of national foreign policy is conducted with or without the EU. Although the other questions asked within Manners and Whitman’s analytical framework are also relevant for the analysis of the foreign policy of EU member states, it is on the background of this question that they become relevant. For example, the issue of whether national elites are now socialised into EU cooperative structures and adhere to a common EU discourse on foreign policy cooperation is very important for whether one can speak about an EU integration of national foreign policy and how national foreign policy decisions are shaped; but it is a procedural feature. Procedural understandings (for example, in the form of EU elite socialisation to common procedures) say something about how decision-makers perceive and shape the framework, but less about which national foreign policy issues are dealt with and therefore shaped by the framework. It cannot be taken for granted that the existence of common procedural understandings or socialisation leads to a particular fit between national and EU foreign policy in terms of policy substance.


While the inclusion of this element (inside/outside the EU) is clearly a strength, a problem is that it has to compete with many other elements in the analytical framework at different levels of abstraction. It is therefore not given very much space or analytical depth in the chapters on the member states in The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States and does therefore inevitably appear somewhat superficial. In the case of Tonra’s chapter on Denmark (and Ireland), which employs the analytical framework of the book better than most of the other chapters, it would, for example, have been interesting to know whether the EU framework is the most important one for promoting Danish national foreign policy priorities or whether other fora (or bilateral action) are more important. It would also have been interesting to go further than the focus on Denmark’s defence opt-out which does not provide the full picture with regard to Denmark’s attitude towards the EU as a security actor more generally or, indeed, Denmark’s engagement in other EU foreign policy areas (Larsen, 2000a, b). The focus on the defence opt-out may be behind the editors’ hesitation in the concluding chapter about whether to place Denmark in the category of ‘European foreign relations’ (Manners and Whitman, 2000c: 263). Concluding remarks on the three approaches The empirical applications and implications of the three approaches discussed all offer interpretations of aspects of the three questions raised in Chapter 1. But none of them offers anything like answers to them all. Both the application of the adaptation theory and the application of Manners and Whitman’s framework can be said to provide partial answers to which aspects of Danish foreign policy that are conducted within and outside the EU. But the answers are very general and are not based on analyses of issue areas more broadly. As for the issue of the Danish level of activity within the EU and Danish attempts to expand EU foreign policy areas, the applications of all the approaches come up with answers. But again these are very general and are not based on analyses across issue areas. Concerning the last issue of the constitutive character of EU concepts on Danish foreign policy concepts, none of the three approaches provides answers. Adaptation theory does not do that, due to its rationalist foundation which influences the questions that are asked. Tonra’s work provides very interesting findings with regard to an intersubjective structure of meaning among small states relating to EU decision-making


and the role of the EU in small state foreign policy. It does not go as far as an analysis of common concepts in substantial foreign policy areas, but it provides an important background for the question of the role of the EU for small state foreign policy from a constructivist perspective, including analyses of the impact of EU concepts in areas of national foreign policy. Manners and Whitman’s framework does not ask the constructivist question about the application of EU concepts in specific areas of national foreign policy. On this basis, there is a need for an analytical framework which can provide an answer to the three questions raised in Chapter 1. The framework must be designed to produce knowledge of the main features in Danish foreign policy in an EU context and to evaluate the possible need for a special FPA approach for EU member states. This is what I will turn to next, drawing on my theoretical point of departure as outlined above.

An analytical framework for the study of Danish foreign policy content in an EU context The aim of this section is twofold: first, to present an analytical framework for the study of the content of Danish foreign policy vis-à-vis the EU. The analytical framework is directed towards the production of knowledge about the question of the role of the EU in Danish foreign policy compared with other fora and the question of the extent to which Denmark has contributed to shaping, and been active within, the different areas of EU foreign policy. The framework is also designed to cast light on the extent to which EU foreign policy substance can be seen as constitutive of Danish foreign policy substance, in other words whether Danish foreign policy uses EU concepts and language and whether there is an ‘import’ of EU policy stances. Second, the aim of the section is to provide an understanding of differences in these respects between foreign policy areas identified within the analytical framework. Analytical framework: key questions The primary interest of the framework is the extent to which the substance of Danish foreign policy is conducted within the EU framework, unilaterally or in conjunction with other organisations. The first question asked in relation to the issue areas examined is whether Denmark (1) takes part in foreign policy cooperation exclusively


Denmark

EU Figure 2.2 Policy conducted mainly within the EU

Denmark

EU Figure 2.3 Policy conducted inside and outside the EU

or almost exclusively in the EU (‘exclusivity’ is primarily to be expected in areas where the EU framework legally excludes national action), (2) takes part in foreign policy cooperation in other international fora as well as in the EU and unilaterally/bilaterally, or (3) does not take part in foreign policy cooperation in the EU. We can, therefore, think of three possible situations: policy areas where there is next to no Danish foreign policy conducted outside the EU context, policy areas where Danish foreign policy is partly conducted through the EU and areas where Danish foreign policy is not conducted through the EU (for an illustration of these three situations see Figures 2.2–2.4). When looking at this dimension, the EU policy frame in the area concerned must be outlined as well as Danish policy. The context of other organisations in which Danish policy is (or is not) conducted or in which an EU coordination takes place must also be outlined. However, the policies of these organisations will not be outlined in detail just as the nature of the


Denmark

EU Figure 2.4 Policy conducted mainly outside the EU

P

A

Denmark

Denmark

EU

EU

An active Danish policy

A passive Danish policy

Figure 2.5 An active or passive Danish policy in the EU?

wider international structural context in which the EU and Denmark are located will not be subject to a detailed discussion. The second question asked is whether Denmark has been active or passive in the issue area under analysis. The question can be subdivided into whether Denmark has attempted to expand EU policy in the issue area concerned and whether Denmark has taken an active role within the area concerned.15 The two dimensions are likely to be linked in that an active policy with regard to whether the EU should deal with an area of foreign policy will go hand in hand with an active policy within that policy area (and the same for passive policies). The representation in Figure 2.5, therefore, does not distinguish between the two sets of subquestions, and, in the empirical analysis, the two will be aggregated. But if differences are found between the level of activity with regard to the two subquestions this will be noted. I ask how deeply the level of


activity/passivity goes. Is it restricted to the Foreign Ministry or is it more widespread in parliamentary and wider societal circles? The third question asked is whether there are constitutive effects of Danish participation in EU foreign policy in the given issue area. The interest is in the extent to which EU foreign policy content can be seen as constitutive of Danish foreign policy content. Are the basic ‘Danish’ concepts in the policy area exogenously or endogenously defined (with regard to the EU context)? In relation to the issue of endogenous/ exogenous, the much broader issue of the impact of language and discourse should also be included. Is the Danish discourse drawn on in relation to particular policy issues an EU discourse (in which case the EU context can be seen as constitutive), a national discourse or both? Is there an ‘import’ of EU policy stances in areas where there was little in the way of a concrete Danish policy prior to the involvement in the EU? It should be added that in the application of the framework the book does not systematically look at the extent to which Danish foreign policy concepts might have influenced the EU’s foreign policy concepts in the areas examined – an influence which would be expected from a constructivist perspective as illustrated by the double arrows in Figure 2.6. The chapters looking at policy areas do not focus specifically on this (obviously) interesting relationship. In line with the general focus outlined above, the aim is to analyse the role of the EU in Danish foreign policy, and not the impact of Danish foreign policy on the EU. The question about the constitutive character of EU concepts in relation to Danish policy is placed last because it is assumed that the likelihood of a constitutive impact of the EU concepts is greater, the more Danish policy is conducted within the EU framework. It therefore makes

C?

Denmark

EU Figure 2.6 Constitutive effects of EU foreign policy?


sense to place it last, although one could in principle also have started out with the question of constitution. The aim of the framework is thus to identify the nature of the role of the EU in different areas of Danish foreign policy. The figures serve to illustrate the central foci in relation to each set of questions and will be used in the findings of the empirical analysis of the case studies. Such illustrations also have weaknesses. They are simplifications of a much more complex social reality. The figures focus on what are the main points of interest here and therefore leave out the many other connections that are present in complex social life. This is not least the case with regard to Figure 2.6 where a constructivist perspective would suggest that double arrows could be drawn to many other international actors, as negotiations of meanings are part and parcel of all social relationships and always a two-way street. Also, the representation of the state (Denmark) as a black box (a circle) is, of course, a simplification that is only justified by the scope of this study where Denmark is, to a large extent, studied as a unitary actor. The figures (and indeed the analytical framework which they illustrate) might thus seem undynamic not only because of the many social links that they ignore, but also because they depict the situation now and do not illustrate the way things have developed diachronically. In spite of such weakness, the view taken is that the figures can be of help to illustrate a few very important things in relation to each set of questions which outweighs the negative elements mentioned. Some specific explanatory points about the figures: the strength of the EU policy in a given area is illustrated by the shading and thickness of the box ‘EU policy’ (where EU policy is very uneven in an area, containing significant ‘holes’, this will be illustrated by a line of uneven shading and thickness). The thickness and the shading of the arrow depicting Danish policy indicate where this is predominantly conducted. An A and a thick arrow refer to an active policy whereas a P and a thin arrow mean a passive one.16 C refers to the identification of constitutive effects of EU concepts, whereas (C) with a short arrow and a thin line means that there are few constitutive effects. In the empirical part of the study I do not focus specifically on the constitutive impact of Danish concepts on the EU which means that there are no arrows from Denmark to the EU in relation to the constitutive dimension in the figures illustrating the findings in the empirical studies. This is because the main focus here is on the role of the EU in Danish foreign policy rather than the other way round.


The relationship between EU and national foreign policy across policy areas – what matters? The aim of the following is to suggest a theoretically based framework for understanding the relationship between national and EU policy in different issue areas: the situation within each policy area is identified by using the analytical framework above. The aim is to judge the utility of the framework across the policy areas examined. If it is fruitful, we may then use it to say something about Danish foreign policy more broadly and about important factors in judging the role of the EU for small states’ foreign policy more generally (treated in Chapter 10). The point of departure is that the basic features of the role of the EU in national small state foreign policy depend on elements both at the EU and at the national level. Danish foreign policy is not launched in a vacuum. Neither does EU foreign policy affect national small state foreign policy in a uniform way. We can therefore talk about a kind of adaptation between the EU and national foreign policy leading to different degrees of policy outside the EU, active/passive policy in the EU and constitutive effects of participation in EU policy-making. The adaptation is not (as in the adaptation theory of Nikolaj Petersen) an automatic process resulting from the capabilities of the adapting state vis-à-vis its external environment. Neither is it a function of the states’ varying willingness to leave control to international organisations depending on whether the issue area is high or low politics as in Hans Mouritzen’s control–relax model of IGOs. In Mouritzen’s model there is seen to be little leeway for international organisations in high politics but some elasticity in state control in low politics (Mouritzen, 1998: 115–23). Rather, it is the ‘fit’ between the strength of EU policy and the (national) constructions of agency in specific policy areas that is the crucial element.17 The background for my adoption of this line is the following: following the earlier critique of the adaptation model for treating policy substance and the framework of meaning as exogenous to the model, the focus in the analytical model proposed is policy content and meaning. National capabilities are not the point of departure. Their role is understood here mainly with reference to the framework of meaning within which they are placed. The meaning dimension is seen as fundamental and cannot be reduced to other possibly material structures. The framework thus asks why the situation in a given foreign policy area is as it is with regard to policy conducted within/without the EU, the active/passive policy line and constitutive effects brought out by the EU meaning systems. It is important to add that the basic features of the role of the EU in national small state foreign policy certainly also depend on the IR context beyond both the national and the EU level. But the argument is that this


context is, under all circumstances, reflected in these two levels, so that we can defend looking at these two levels (EU, national) analytically with regard to the general question raised at the outset. Some might find this unsatisfactory, making the theoretical claim that the ‘real causes’ are located elsewhere – such as, for example, in the unipolar power structure of IR at the present moment in time or the regional power structure. Ignoring for the moment the question of which causes would be the ‘real causes’, the argument here is that this kind of approach will be too abstract to answer the question of the role of the EU in national foreign policy directly. The basic assumption is that the EU foreign policy frame is so comprehensive that it is analytically interesting to concentrate on examination of the fit between this level and the national level. However, a full analysis of the organisational context of Danish foreign policy would, of course, necessitate an examination of Danish policies vis-à-vis all other international organisations and bilateral action rather than just taking the EU as the point of departure. But to return to the main argument, two elements are seen as central for the state of affairs within a foreign policy issue area, described as follows (see also Figure 2.7).

Intensity and resources in EU policy

Danish policy inside or outside the EU? An active Danish policy in the EU? Constitutive effects of EU policy on Danish foreign policy concepts?

Denmark

EU

Danish articulations of actorness

Figure 2.7 Central factors explaining the relationship between Danish foreign policy and EU policy


1. Whether the EU in the area in question has an identifiable and strong policy This is a precondition for the possibility that Danish foreign policy can be influenced in the field concerned in the broadest sense of the word. EU policy can, to a large extent, be considered as a given for small states. Although Denmark can contribute to making EU policy forceful and substantial, there will have to be more general backing for it to be so, not least by EU great powers. So although EU foreign policy is a result of a ‘negotiated order’ (Smith, 1996) where small states also take part in the negotiations, it will appear as a given for the individual small state. EU policy can in this respect be seen as falling within a continuum: at one end policies are resourceful, detailed and long-term (for example expressed in terms of common strategies, joint actions, common positions and declarations) and with day-to-day involvement; at the other, policies are based on few resources, only general policy statements, few CFSP instruments and little day-to-day involvement. At one end of the continuum, EU policy must be expected to be more likely to affect its environment and (in this case more importantly) the ‘national’ policy of the participating EU actors. At the other, it will (in the extreme) hardly be constraining or enabling at all. The location of EU policy in a given area on the continuum outlined is an important framing condition for the impact on Danish foreign policy. In line with the constructivist position outlined above, the strength and intensity of the EU framework are not seen as a material given. It is the way in which EU policy is understood by Danish political actors that is crucial, as EU policy elements have no inherent weaknesses or strengths beyond the understandings of the actors involved. However, in the concrete analysis here, I will not examine the understanding dimension of the strength of the EU framework in a given area. I assume that there is an overlap between what the Danish political actors involved and the analyst might identify as a strong and a weak EU policy in relative terms. The findings in my interviews with practitioners in relation to the empirical chapters in the book confirm this assumption, which suggest a sedimentation of views in this field drawing on the terms of Laclau and Mouffe (1985). I therefore employ given definitions of whether an EU policy is relatively strong or weak (see below) and assume that actors share this view. Apart from the practical reasons for this (it is not easy to research assessments of the strength of the EU’s different external policies as expressed in Danish political discourse as EU policies in many areas are


not a subject of political debate or detailed government assessments), the idea is that it is not the varying conceptions of the relative strength of different EU policies that are interesting from an ‘understanding perspective’. Rather the interesting points are the basic national understandings of the importance of the foreign policy area in question and how these understandings ‘read’ the possibilities or constraints that the EU policy frame gives rise to. This leads me to the second element. 2. Danish articulations of actorness in policy areas A central question is how to conceptualise the nature of the domestic/ national realm. In line with broad constructivist assumptions, the framework of meaning within which national policy is shaped is seen as the fundamental ‘structural’ factor in the domestic realm which shapes and constrains other forces. Other elements such as the amount of resources allocated to foreign policy (military, economic and administrative/diplomatic) and the concrete interests of segments of the domestic environment are also significant, but these can be understood as shaped within the framework of the dominant political framework of meaning. Basic frameworks of meaning are conceptualised here as discourses. Meaning, then, is studied in terms of language. The key assumption is that people’s ways of speaking are organised in discourses which do not just mirror our surroundings, identities and social relations in a neutral way but play an active role in shaping and changing them. Discourses are used as resources to form representations of the world. They are never just reflections of an already existing reality, but contribute to creating the social world including aspects of the world such as foreign policy. In this sense we can say that discourse is a constitutive force in the construction of the social world. Discourses attribute meaning to the world or aspects of the world in such a way that other ways of representing the world are excluded or marginalised. The understanding of discourse drawn on here takes as its point of departure the Foucaldian understanding of discourse as a limited range of possible statements promoting a limited range of meanings. Discourses constrain what it is possible to say. According to Foucault, discourses create the social world by constituting certain forms of knowledge, identities and social relations. Discourses are socially and culturally specific and our knowledge, identies and social relations are therefore contingent: they are tied to a particular time and place but could have been (and can become) different (Foucault, 1989[1972]; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Larsen, 1997). The use of discourse analysis


for examining the meaning dimension of foreign policy has at least four main advantages compared with belief system approaches or phenomenological approaches: 1. A discourse approach is non-individualistic. Discourses are social meanings which individuals have to draw on to communicate. Texts are not merely products of the individual’s mind. 2. We can read texts. This is the basis for the analysis of discourses. There is no social meaning beneath the text that cannot be reached. The analyst need not worry about what is ‘really’ meant by a text. 3. Struggles over meaning are central parts of a discourse approach and allow us to understand fundamental differences in the domestic realm. 4. Language is given a strong theoretical foundation as self-referential (based on Larsen, 1997: 20–1). In earlier work within FPA, discourse analysis has been used to analyse foreign policy, particularly in a European setting. It has been argued that discourse analysis of the concepts of state, nation and Europe is crucial for understanding the European policy of European states. In broader terms, the argument can be extended to arguing that discourses on nation and state are fundamental for understanding the foreign policy of states, since foreign policy is based on the discursive construction of who ‘we’ are (see Hansen and Wæver, 2002; Larsen, 1997, 1999, 2000a; Holm, 1993, 2000; Wæver, 1998; Holm et al., 1989). The assumption in this work is that language and discourse are always contested, always on the move. At the same time political discourse is seen as sufficiently stable for it to be interesting to study its constitutive role in relation to foreign policy. It is thus possible to present the discursive structures in a particular state relevant for foreign policy. These structures can be analysed in terms of discursive layers where some elements, usually the ‘we’ in relation to state and nation, are ‘deeper’ and more resilient, whereas other elements such as concrete European policies are much more malleable. A change within the discourse in relation to foreign policy is therefore not necessarily a total change of discourse. This book draws on the same basic understanding of discourse as shaping, enabling and restraining foreign policy, but takes a different focus. First of all studies so far – including my own – have attempted implicitly or explicitly to examine general discourses in order to understand a general foreign policy line (see for example Hansen and Wæver, 2002; Larsen, 1997, 1999, 2000a; Holm, 1993, 2000; Wæver, 1998; Holm et al., 1989). Most of the studies have analysed the basic discursive


configurations with regard to states, nations and Europe in the countries examined and linked these to general foreign policy or to European policy.18 This book is interested in discourse as a shaping and enabling force in specific foreign policy areas rather than in relation to a general policy line due to the point of departure set out in the introduction. In the light of previous work this gives rise to a question about what discourse it is relevant to study. If we want to understand the role of the EU in Danish foreign policy in different policy areas, it is not obvious whether to analyse general articulations of meaning in relation to the Danish state/nation and its place in Europe (as has mainly been done in studies so far) or to study discourses in relation to the role of the Danish state/nation in particular policy areas. On the one hand, and in line with previous analyses, the general discourse on the role of the Danish state/nation (or another state) as an actor in the EU, or IR more broadly, could be expected to be the source discourse or root of discourses on the role of Denmark in specific policy areas. On the other, more general discourses about the role of the Danish state, Danish nation and the role of the EU in Danish foreign policy also function as myths in the sense of Laclau and Mouffe (1985): they claim a unity of meaning which is impossible in society. Traditionally representatives of states, often foreign ministries, have constructed an image of a cohesive unit across policy areas, through, for example, speeches (Neumann, 2001: 146–52). Discourse analysts have used these as an empirical background for referring to discourses on who the general ‘we’ are in foreign policy. But a general ‘national foreign policy’ is an articulation of various activities and areas of policy. The concepts or issues at stake in each field of policy do not per definition link up with more general statements of policy considered as roots. The two analytical strategies can be united by assuming that general policy statements on the role of the Danish state/nation are expressions of a discursive hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: Ch. 3) which has spread across policy areas and thus provides the conceptual roots for the role of the Danish state in all policy areas. This book takes as the point of departure the discursive articulations of actorness of the Danish nation/state in particular policy areas. This may appear as a break with the assumptions in the previous studies of foreign policy including my own. It is certainly not a break in so far as discourse analysis is relevant in all social contexts – general as well as more specific. But it may be a challenge to the assumptions in the studies so far which have tended to assume that national foreign policy or European policy are based on some fundamental discursive structures


around which other and more superficial elements and policies revolve. What I am doing is making this an empirical question when it comes to the various subareas of state foreign policy. We may expect that the same core concepts are at play in these subareas as in more general articulations. But this is not an assumption. Subareas of foreign policy may have their own history, contexts and articulations of actorness. As mentioned in the introduction, this is particularly challenging in relation to the role of the EU across policy areas, as the EU is in the dominant general discourse attributed a central role in the fulfilment of the aims of the Danish nation/state. The main aim of this study is not, however, to provide a general critique of the approach to discourse analysis in foreign policy which attributes a central role to certain deep and general concepts, but rather to suggest a way of analysing the role of the EU vis-à-vis the states across the areas of foreign policy. Moreover, the analysis of the concepts of state and nation in each issue area will not be deep enough to evaluate the prevalent perspective or to fully consider possible links between levels. By ‘actorness’ I mean the discursive construction of who the ‘we’ is in a given policy context including the aims, principles and values of this we. This is a different usage of the term ‘actorness’ from the work of Bretherton and Vogler where the term is used extensively in relation to EU foreign policy. For Bretherton and Vogler actorness is ‘the capacity to act’ and ‘actorness logically presupposes presence’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 33). It is based on something pre-existing, a presence. From the examples given in Bretherton and Vogler’s work this presence appears to have a non-ideational dimension. Different from this, but in line with the constructivist understanding in this book, my starting point is the level of construction rather than anything pre-existing. By ‘articulation’ I mean the practice which establishes a relation between elements (for example words) in such a way that their identity is changed as a result. The structured totality of this is a discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 105).19 The structured totality that is of interest here is the discourse on Danish actorness in particular policy areas. I analyse the articulations of actorness in the same way as one would examine the importance of a general discourse on the state/nation for an assumed general policy line. I do not take as the point of departure more general expressions of the role of the Danish state/nation in general foreign policy or towards Europe. I assume that if more general discursive structures play a role, this will be found as part of the empirical analysis of the dominant discourse in each policy area. The interest


is in what role is articulated for the Danish state/nation in the area concerned. The second way in which the use of discourse analysis in this book takes a different turn from previous studies is in its focus on the boundary of the ‘we’ in relation to particular policy areas. The interest is in the articulation of Danish actorness in relation to the EU. The analysis looks at situations where the subject matter is Danish foreign policy and where expressions of Danish actorness in some form would therefore be expected. If, for example, the acting subject of policy in a given field is always articulated as ‘Denmark and the EU’, this suggests that there is little foreign policy that is carried out by ‘Denmark’ alone in this policy area. If, on the other hand, there is never any reference to the ‘EU’ in a given policy field, but only to ‘Denmark’ or ‘Denmark ⫹ xxx (not the EU) as actors’, this would suggest that, in broad terms, there is Danish foreign policy conducted outside the EU. The analysis will be sensitive to various discursive articulations of the relationship between ‘Denmark’ and ‘the EU’. At least four possibilities in relation to the articulation of Danish and/or EU agency in a given area seem plausible: (1) ‘Denmark’, (2) only ‘the EU’, (3) ‘Denmark and the EU’. ‘Denmark and the EU’ also includes constructions of the relationship between ‘Denmark’ and ‘the EU’, where the two agents are not directly co-located, but co-articulation is nevertheless identifiable from an analysis of texts, for example in the form of ‘Denmark in cooperation with its EU-partners’. This category may also encompass instances where it is difficult to distinguish between the two agents in articulations in a particular policy field where the identity of the actor is not clear from the text (for example through an unclear ‘We’). It also comprises cases of polysemy where usages of ‘Denmark’ and ‘EU’ slide into each other. (4) The ‘EU’ may be presented as an essential instrument for Denmark. Linguistically, one would expect constructions like ‘Denmark has through the EU’ or broader articulations of the EU as essential for ‘Denmark’s ’ foreign policy in a given field. The analysis may show a mixed picture where, within the policy field concerned, there are different articulations of the relationship between ‘Denmark’ and the ‘EU’. Whether and how they differ is, however, also interesting. The focus of this part of the analysis is the relationship between Denmark and the EU. The analysis will, however, also look at the articulations of ‘Denmark’ with other actors, as Denmark may also be co-articulated with other international organisations or groups of countries. For an illustration of possible articulations of actorness, see Figure 2.8.


DK

EU

Only Denmark is articulated as an actor

Only the EU is articulated as an actor

DK EU

DK + EU

Denmark is co-articulated with the EU

DK + IO DK + ?

Denmark is co-articulated with other countries or international organisations

The EU is articulated as an instrument for Danish policy

Figure 2.8 Articulation of actorness

As in most kinds of post-structuralist discourse analysis, it is not possible to say why a particular articulation of, for example, ‘Denmark’ and ‘EU’ is used, although the empirical analysis will point to some ‘genealogical features’. To mention the most interesting case, there are at least three extra-discursive interpretations of why there might be a co-articulation of ‘Denmark’ and ‘the EU’: 1. Co-articulation of Denmark and the EU as subjects might be an expression of a situation in which foreign policy integration has increased in the area concerned and the language therefore reflects the political processes. 2. Co-articulation might also be an expression of a situation where Denmark has never been engaged in the policy area concerned and Denmark has therefore never, to any large extent, articulated itself as a subject in this field. Denmark’s actorness in this field is therefore inseparable from the EU. 3. The dominant Danish view within this policy area is that Denmark needs the EU to achieve its aims and this is expressed through co-articulation. But whatever the background for the particular usage, the Danish articulations of foreign policy actorness must be expected to have policy


C

Denmark

EU

P

Little Danish policy conducted outside the EU Passive Danish policy in the EU Strong constitutive effects

Figure 2.9 Strong EU policy, weak Danish actorness

implications for whether Danish foreign policy takes place inside or outside the EU and for the extent to which policies and concepts in Danish foreign policy are separable from those of the EU. The co-articulations are part of the construction of the (political) world and thus have political effects. There is, thus, no useful distinction to be made between the social power implications of co-articulations such as ‘Denmark and the EU’ and the ‘barometer’ understanding of this (as a reflection of something else).20 On the background of the considerations above about the ‘external’ (the strength of EU policy in the given policy area described above) and ‘internal’ elements shaping Danish policy (articulations of actorness for the Danish state/nation in the policy area/co-articulations with the EU), one can put forward the following four suggestions for categories that can be expected with respect to Danish policy vis-à-vis the EU, activity/ passivity and the constitutive effects of EU policies on Danish policy: 1. EU foreign policy intensive and resourceful. Little articulation of Danish actorness. In this category, the infrequent articulations of Danish actorness is the basis of little Danish policy interest or domestic attention. There are frequent articulations of ‘Denmark and the EU’. In this situation the expectation is that there is little Danish policy conducted outside the EU framework and that Danish policy within the EU is passive. The EU framework of meaning in this case has constitutive effects on Danish policy concepts (see Figure 2.9). 2. EU foreign policy not intensive and resourceful; ‘Denmark’ is articulated as an actor. Denmark is primarily articulated separately as an actor, but there are also articulations with other actors than the EU and in a few cases with the EU itself. Danish policy is intensive and resourceful and there is an engaged domestic political constituency. Danish


policy is also conducted bilaterally outside the EU or in other multilateral contexts. Within the EU, Denmark is active in this issue area. Possibly, Danish attempts to raise EU interest have not succeeded. Constitutive effects on Danish policy concepts are limited (see Figure 2.10). 3. The EU has an intensive and resourceful policy in the field. ‘Denmark’ is articulated as an actor. In this category, ‘Denmark’ is articulated as an actor sometimes together with articulations of ‘Denmark through the EU’. Denmark has a well-defined policy and there is domestic political interest in the area. Denmark conducts bilateral and multilateral policy outside the EU context (but less than in the preceding case). It actively attempts to shape EU policy. If EU policy legally excludes separate policy (as in the case of external trade, agriculture and similar areas), there will be very little policy conducted outside the EU, but an active policy within it. Some constitutive effects on Danish policy understandings in the area are possible, particularly if EU policy legally excludes a separate national policy (see Figure 2.11). 4. EU foreign policy is not intensive or resourceful. Little articulation of Danish actorness. ‘Denmark’ is not articulated as an actor in the area. Danish policy is very broadly formulated and domestic interest is weak. The same is the case for EU policy. There is rarely any Danish policy outside the EU (although the scope for this would be wide), as there are few expressions of Danish policy in this area. Danish policy within the EU is not active. When Denmark is forced to pronounce itself on an issue within this area, EU policy (although not intensive and resourceful) might provide a source for Danish policy stances.

(C)

Denmark

Danish policy mainly conducted outside the EU A

Active Danish policy in the EU Constitutive effects limited

EU Figure 2.10 Weak EU policy, strong Danish actorness


Danish policy conducted inside and outside the EU

(C)

Denmark

A

Active Danish policy in the EU Constitutive effects are possible

EU

Figure 2.11 Strong EU policy, strong Danish actorness

(C)

Few expressions of Danish actorness. Rarely policy outside the EU P

Denmark

Passive Danish policy in the EU Weak constitutive effects are possible

EU Figure 2.12 Weak EU policy, weak Danish actorness

This might make weak constitutive effects possible, since the limited EU conceptualisation in the area might be ‘imported’ (Figure 2.12). The four categories outlined might give the impression of fixed nonideational categories giving rise to causal explanations about the relationship between Danish and EU foreign policy. However, this is not the case. First of all, a crucial element, articulation of actorness, is an articulation of meaning.21 Second, the categories of ‘Danish actorness/little articulation of Danish actorness’ might not seem to take sufficient account of the complexity of articulations of actorness. However, I am suggesting some elements which seem so fundamental that the simplified summaries of the articulations that these imply can be justified. The concrete empirical analyses later go into the complexity of the articulations of actorness and their implications. Third, in line with the basic

56 Analysing the Foreign Policy of Small States in the EU Table 2.1 Four modes of Danish policy vis-à-vis the EU Little articulation of Danish actorness EU foreign policy intensive and resourceful

●

●

●

●

EU foreign policy not intensive and resourceful

●

●

●

●

1 Frequent articulations of Denmark and the EU Little Danish policy outside the EU Denmark passive in the EU Constitutive impact on Danish concepts 2 Denmark is not articulated separately as an actor Few expressions of Danish policy inside or outside the EU Denmark passive in the EU Limited constitutive effects

Articulation of Danish actorness

●

●

● ●

●

●

● ●

3 Denmark articulated separately as an actor, sometimes through the EU Danish policy conducted inside and outside the EU Denmark active in the EU Some constitutive effects on Danish concepts 4 Denmark is articulated separately as an actor Danish policy conducted inside and outside the EU Denmark active in the EU Limited constitutive effects

idea about the fit between EU foreign policy and national articulations of actorness as the basis of the relationship between Danish and EU foreign policy, there is not a relationship of causality between the elements mentioned. It is the elements which together create the context of a particular relationship between Danish and EU foreign policy. The four categories can be used to indicate which ‘mode’ we are in in each specific area (see Table 2.1). Definitions of central terms According to the definition of foreign policy by Hill referred to above, foreign policy is understood as ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’ (Hill, 2002: 3). Inspired by Bretherton and Vogler (1999) and their approach to actorness, we can say that for an actor to have a policy in an area it needs to have a certain minimum of (1) conceptions of itself as an actor in that area, (2) a framework of meaning within which concrete action takes place, (3) consistent and concrete policies, (4) some


kind of administrative/diplomatic apparatus to implement these policies and (5) resources and policy instruments. The five dimensions comprise both the background of foreign policy and the means to implement it. I will use these five dimensions as structuring questions when describing both the character of Denmark and the EU as an actor within a particular policy area. The presentation of the EU’s and Denmark’s policies in the areas examined will, therefore, follow this structure. However, for reasons of space here, the focus will be on the first three dimensions. If there are absences along one or more of these dimensions, the policy in the area will be characterised as weaker than if all dimensions, that is meanings, concrete policy measures, administrative capacity and resources are filled. I do not operate with absolute criteria for whether a policy is weak or strong. The labelling of a policy as weak or strong is based on comparison with other policy areas examined in the study rather than on absolute standards or the policies of other actors. Importantly, whether a policy is characterised as weak or strong according to the terms used here is not directly linked to the question of whether the actor and its policy are influential in the IR of the area concerned. A strong Danish or EU policy in the understanding used here is no guarantee of international influence in a policy area which also depends on the policies of other actors. To examine the policy of a given actor forces us to look at more dimensions than just ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’. It is the level identified in Hill’s definition (the concrete policy measures) that is the starting point of the analysis (when we look at the extent to which Danish policy is conducted outside the EU). But the roots of the policy, the articulation of actorness in the area and the framework of meaning are also studied as foundations for the more concrete policy elements. It is, therefore, important to stress that the distinctions between the five different dimensions of foreign policy in a particular issue area are analytical distinctions and not ontological distinctions (see also Hansen, 1998: 86). Concrete policy measures are not, then, seen as ontologically different from articulations of actorness or the framework of meaning in the given area. They are all components of foreign policy in that area. It is important to stress that when we look at the EU’s or Denmark’s policy towards a particular area, we are not dealing with a static entity since structures of meaning and policy are perpetually under negotiation. In the case of the EU, I see EU foreign policy as the result of a ‘negotiated


order’ resulting from the negotiations between the actors and pillars involved in EU foreign policy-making including the actor analysed here, Denmark (Smith, 1996). The focus is the nomothetic rather than the diachronic dimension. I do not systematically try to trace the historical development of policies within particular policy areas, but rather try to map out and understand the situation in the early twenty-first century within each policy area. The reason for this is primarily practical but also a choice between different possibilities. It is judged that an analysis across different policy areas, although in some respects more superficial, would be more sensitive to differences between areas than an approach treating only a few policy areas in depth. It is the many different dimensions of foreign policy and the possible variations between areas that represent the scope of my study. Methodological considerations In this section I will discuss general questions in relation to the overall approach of the study and then turn to my concrete analytical strategy. The approach used at the most general level in this study is a case study approach (George, 1979). The idea is that by looking at particular aspects of cases of the same kind, we can learn something general about certain aspects of other instances in this class of phenomena. The general method used in the book is therefore comparative. The cases analysed are different foreign policy areas and the role of the EU within these areas for Danish foreign policy. The comparative aspect lies in the interest in what shapes the relationship between Danish and EU foreign policy in particular policy areas. It is important to stress two things. First, the main comparison made is between different issue areas in Danish foreign policy – and not between foreign policy issue areas in different EU member states. The conclusions about what shapes the relationship between national and EU foreign policy are therefore strictly speaking about the state of affairs in Danish foreign policy. An approach focusing on national frameworks of meaning excludes generalisations of a formal positivist kind. We need to examine the dominant meaning structures in the EU country under analysis. But the study may point to the broad meaning structures that appear to be worthwhile focus points of a foreign policy study of this kind, and in this sense be of more general value. Second, an important part of the dimensions looked at have an ideational character in the broadest sense of the term. The main force in shaping the relationship is assumed to be the way the national discourses articulate (or do not articulate) ‘ Denmark’ as an actor in the area


and the relationship articulated with ‘the EU’. Some might argue that the use of discourse analysis would exclude the possibility of a comparative approach, as such an approach would be seen as a positivist form of social science and thus be incompatible with the use of discourse analysis. However, I would argue that implicitly studies drawing on discourse analysis often use a comparative approach, if more in the way of presenting examples than in actual case studies. Examples are often drawn on to show how different constructions of social subjects and objects affect the organisation of social life differently. Showing that the world could be different if social constructions were different (contingency) is a way of arguing that draws on a comparative understanding – but to point to difference rather than universal categories. To show that different discursive practices constitute different social practices (eg. foreign policy) is a comparative angle.22

How can we concretely examine specific policies and their background along the lines of the five dimensions mentioned above? As for the articulations of actorness and the framework of meaning in relation to particular policy areas, we are in principle looking at the political discourse in society as a whole (for a distinction between this and other kinds of discourse see Larsen, 1997: 26–7). While political discourses in relation to particular policy areas can be identified at the societal level outside the formal political system (for example in the media or in academic literature or fiction), the analysis nevertheless focuses on the discourses which are dominant within the formal political/administrative system. This is for the practical reason that the formal political context is one in which one can look for a focused debate about a policy area which is not always so easy in other spheres of society and therefore more difficult to research. I use secondary literature, debates in the Folketing, reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speeches, etc. In the case of the EU (when the focus is the framework of meaning within a particular policy area), the sources used are exclusively from the formal political context (Council, Commission, EP). Apart from the reasons for looking at official political material mentioned, this is also due to the difficulty – to say the least – of locating a broader European public sphere which can be analysed. The material for analysis when analysing frameworks of meaning both at the EU level and at the national level is official declarations, debates and statements by actors including political/administrative material (described in more detail below). It is


important to stress that the interviews with civil servants and former foreign ministers are not directly referred to when attempting to establish the dominant discourse in the policy area concerned. This is because a one-to-one interview situation is not considered as one where the actors are necessarily drawing on broader political discourse. The research interview is its own genre which cannot in a simple way be located in the public sphere. As for the examination of concrete policy measures, along the lines of Hill’s definition and points (3)–(5) above, I rely heavily on the following official sources at the EU level: Annual Reports on CFSP from the Presidency, the Commission’s account on EU external relations, the Commission’s annual account of development activities, official policy statements in the form of common strategies, joint actions, common positions and declarations. The ‘EU level’ not only refers to what is being decided in Brussels. It is also what happens ‘sur place’ with an EU imprint such as the work of the High Representative and special EU envoys in the field. The increased ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign policy identified by, for example, Allen (1998) also takes the form of activities outside Brussels. With respect to the analysis of Danish policy and whether it is conducted inside or outside the EU, I draw first of all on official Danish material about the policy area in question. An important source here is the annual article by the permanent secretary on Danish foreign policy in the Danish Yearbook of Foreign Policy. Secondly, I draw on interviews with civil servants – mostly in the Danish Foreign Ministry. The key challenge is how to establish whether Danish policy is conducted inside/outside the EU and whether the EU is the most important forum for Danish foreign policy or just one forum among others in each policy area. I draw on official material which concretely mentions the organisational context in which Danish policy is conducted in the field of policy concerned. I also rely on judgements of civil servants and former ministers in interviews. Here I read official material and information in interviews as factual accounts about where political and administrative efforts and resources are put in, the priority given to different multilateral fora and bilateral efforts, and which fora are considered most operational in relation to day-to-day policy issues in particular policy areas. It must, of course, be stressed that such judgements about the conduct of concrete Danish policy are not merely factual but linked to the more general discourses on actorness within the policy area concerned (which are also identified as part of the analysis). We can see this as a case of adherence to certain discursive structures, presenting policy processes


in a particular way of which we have to be aware in the analysis. However, according to the general constructivist perspective adopted here, actors’ understandings of actorness also contribute to creating concrete policy including the choice of fora. So if actors judge a forum to be more important than another, this will contribute to creating this social reality rather than being just ‘wrong’ and a misrepresentation of ‘reality’. Moreover (at a lower level of abstraction), one should be aware that relying heavily on interviews with practitioners in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will tend to exaggerate certain elements in the account of Danish policy: institutionally, national foreign policy practitioners can be expected to present their country as having a clear and active line in most foreign policy areas with little in the way of import of concepts from international institutional contexts. I finally look at the economic and administrative resources within and outside an EU context and bilaterally. The question of whether Denmark has taken an active/passive policy stance within policy areas also needs some clarification as to how this is examined concretely. Concerning the characterisation of a policy as active/passive, the point of departure here is, as in the case of weak or strong EU policy, that it is not possible to set up absolute criteria; the overall context of the inquiry influences the criteria for what is considered active. The question here was the extent to which Denmark uses the apparent possibilities for greater political reach in foreign policy through the EU. The use of these possibilities could be expected to be the presentation of policy initiatives within the EU foreign policy system, Danish contributions to policy discussions in the EU with political stances and the deployment of political and diplomatic resources in the EU foreign policy process. At the other end of the continuum, a passive stance in a policy area would be that Denmark never puts forward policy initiatives, never takes part in discussions with detailed views or does not prioritise diplomatic resources here. Part of the question is also the extent to which the national foreign policy constituency exerts pressure on the government to present new initiatives within the EU or whether the EU framework is not considered an instrument. The understanding of active/passive here is very broad.23 The main yardstick for saying that a policy is active or passive is the comparison with the other policy areas examined in this study. The study of the constitutive effects of participation in EU foreign policy also calls for some comments about the approach used. The main interest is whether ‘Danish’ concepts in a policy area are exogenously or endogenously defined (with regard to the EU context) and whether the


Danish discourse drawn on in relation to particular policy issues is an EU discourse (in which case the EU context can be seen as constitutive), a national discourse or both. A full examination of these issues is a very complicated task. If it is found that EU and Danish foreign policy use the same language within a policy area (or the Danish discourse is a hybrid including fragments from EU discourses), there are three possibilities: (1) EU and Danish discourse may be identical because EU discourse has shaped Danish discourse, (2) Denmark has contributed to shaping EU discourse, (3) Denmark and the EU are both affected by much broader discourses in international politics possibly carried by other organisations. The only solution in this case is to study the development of the policy area over a long period of time to see whether the development of terms and concepts in EU discourse precedes the use of this discourse in the Danish context and whether other organisations have also taken up this discourse.24 The scope of my study does not allow a full, systematic and parallel analysis of the developments of the concepts of the EU context and the national context across the policy areas analysed. The reader may find that the empirical analyses are only impressionistic first steps rather than a full analysis. What I attempt to do is to compare the discourses used in central parts of the policy areas in the first years of the twentyfirst century. I identify discourses in official foreign policy material at both the national and the EU level. Where relevant, I also include considerations about whether it is the EU context that has shaped the national context or the other way round. Summary and application of the framework in the study of the policy areas In this chapter the relevant literature with regard to the role of the EU in national foreign policy and with special reference to Denmark has been discussed. On the basis of a constructivist understanding, an analytical framework has been developed through which we can characterise the relationship between Danish and EU foreign policy in specific issue areas. Concepts have been put forward which provide the background for understanding the state of affairs in each foreign policy area. I will now proceed to examine empirically the seven foreign policy areas mentioned in the introductory chapter. The aim is to analyse the relationship between EU and Danish foreign policy along the lines of (1) inside/outside the EU, (2) passive/active within the EU and (3) constitutive use of EU foreign policy concepts. These focus points are therefore explored in each empirical chapter. As my analytical


framework suggests that the state of affairs within each policy area can be understood in the light of the fit between the EU policy frame and the Danish articulation of actorness in the area, the chapters will analyse and present the nature of the fit drawing on the concepts inspired by Bretherton and Vogler described above. The form of presentation in the chapters does not follow all elements of the framework strictly in the way they are outlined above. The first part of each chapter outlines the framework of meaning of EU policy and the policies, priorities and resources of the EU in the specific field in question. The second part first describes the Danish articulation of actorness in the field in question and the way in which it is co-articulated with the EU. It then goes on to present Danish policy and priorities and the extent to which Danish policy is conducted outside/inside the EU. Subsequently, the level of activity within the EU is outlined, followed by analysis of the constitutive use of EU foreign policy concepts in Danish foreign policy. The third part of each chapter is the conclusion. Here the findings along the lines of the three dimensions of the relationship between Danish and EU policy are summarised and an attempt is made to understand the state of affairs on the background of the EU policy frame and the Danish articulations of actorness. The relationship between Danish and EU foreign policy in the area is positioned with regard to the four categories outlined above (weak EU policy/little articulation of Danish actorness, strong EU policy/ articulation of Danish actorness, weak EU policy/articulation of Danish actorness, strong EU policy/little Danish articulation of actorness).

3 Policy towards EU Member States: the Role of the EU

An examination of the role of the EU in Danish foreign policy in the regional European setting can be approached in different ways. I choose to look at the bilateral relationships within the EU on the grounds that they have traditionally been crucial for national foreign policy in its regional context. Also, a study of bilateral policy within the EU will, as will be shown below, tell us quite a lot about the role of the different institutions in Danish policy within Europe. The question asked about the role of bilateral Danish policy towards the other EU member states is whether such bilateral relations have any substantial character of their own or whether they are mainly directed towards action within the EU or, indeed, other international organisations. That bilateral policy is directed towards the EU rather than the bilateral relations per se does not, of course, mean that there could not be bilateral concerns. If a country has another country as a prominent (often security) concern, this may not be directly observed in an intense bilateral relationship. Rather, this may be expressed through the country taking an active interest in striking alliances and participating in international organisations with, around, or against the country in question. In the case of the Franco-German relationship, for example, the EU policy of the two countries could, at least in part, be interpreted as an answer to the concern about the state on the other side of the Rhine. Bilateral relations might thus in an important sense shape EU policy rather than the other way round. The starting point here, however, is the extent to which Danish policy towards EU bilateral relationships is shaped by EU membership or, indeed, membership of other international organisations. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a small state such as Denmark may be expected to be more of a ‘receiver’ of EU policies and structures than a maker of these, which further 64

Policy towards EU Member States: the Role of the EU 65

legitimates my focus here on the impact of the EU on Danish policy rather than the other way round. The analysis in this chapter is different from the following empirical chapters in this book due to the nature of the subject. Thus it may, at first glance, appear not to fit in. But it is judged that an analysis of the EU area itself is worthwhile because it allows us to comment on what the predominant, traditional concern for small state foreign policy – the immediate environment – looks like in the context of the EU. As it does not make sense to talk about an EU policy towards the member states’ bilateral relationships, there will be no presentation of EU policy. Instead I will look at certain structural elements concerning the role of the EU for EU member states. For the same reason, there are no separate sections on the Danish level of activity and constitutive effects, although aspects of this are integrated in the sections on Denmark where this is relevant. The chapter will also take up some general issues in Danish foreign policy which are necessary to understand Danish policy in Europe, and the other foreign policy areas dealt with later in the book.

I. The EU Few EU documents present explicit guidelines let alone rules for the general conduct of bilateral relations, although the 1993 Copenhagen criteria and subsequent EU policy towards the enlargement process contained the general principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts between states (Presidency, 1993). We can nevertheless point to some features of a fundamental intersubjective and institutional character which can be said to constitute a kind of EU framework also for the member states’ bilateral reactions. The identification of the following three features is based on the basic social constructivist assumptions of this book. First, the EU is considered by its member states and institutional actors as a community of destiny which, at the most fundamental level, can be said to be held together by a common fear of the resurgence of conflicts from Europe’s past (Wæver, 1996, 2000). Although the character and strength of this intersubjective understanding vary considerably between member states and may for some only have developed after the Cold War, it can in some form be found in all member states including the Central and Eastern European ones (Friis, 2004). This is also the intersubjective base on which the EU is considered an anchor of European security and thus a pivot around which state relations revolve in Europe (Wæver, 2000), although NATO is also seen as crucial in this respect.


The EU is based, then, on intersubjective understandings or discourses which constitute a framework for bilateral relations between member states. Second, the EU is not just an international organisation; it is a political system in which the member states and institutions are actors (Hix, 1999). Affecting the EU core and its decisions thus becomes a central political aim for national ‘foreign’ policy. Third, the EU is not only an institutional structure but also a political process. It has common procedures for solving problems that cut across national boundaries and for creating rules and laws that commit and bind member states. At the same time, the EU framework, throughout its history, and particularly from the start of the new institutional dynamism in 1984, has been an institutional building site which member states have strived to shape together with the institutional actors. Member states and other institutional actors attempt to affect outcomes in the EU with considerable resources and at least a degree of adaptation to the Brussels structures (Hix, 1999; Hanf and Soetendorf, 1998). These points do, of course, have much broader implications than for just member states’ bilateral relations; they have consequences for all the foreign policy areas treated in this book. The intersubjective structures mentioned above are therefore the precondition for foreign policy cooperation elsewhere in the world. If conflicts between EU member states were more prominent than EU cooperation in Europe, then it would be unlikely for there to be substantial and institutionalised foreign policy cooperation in the other areas dealt with in this book. Expressed in realist terms, it would be unlikely to find much in the way of EU foreign policy if there was a traditional internal European balancing game going on at the same time. However, these shared understandings about the role of the EU in European security and the EU as a political system cannot be taken to mean that there are necessarily shared understandings about a uniform role for the EU in other parts of the world. But the shared understandings about the EU’s role in Europe provides a necessary basis for common policies outside Europe. The key point is thus that the basic general understandings on which the EU rests and the institutional processes around which it revolves have central implications for European security and European politics and thus also for EU member states’ bilateral relations. These structural features pull states towards an interest in affecting the EU’s decisions and thus make bilateral relations difficult to isolate, embedded as they are in a European political system. But the question remains as to what extent there is a Danish foreign policy directed towards bilateral relations in more narrow terms or aimed at areas outside the EU.


The above intersubjective structural elements do not provide an answer to this; they only suggest that there are intersubjectively based forces pulling states’ policy interests towards attempts to affect the EU. At first glance, there are still bilateral elements within the EU. Member states generally have embassies in other member states and bilateral meetings are reported in the media. Whether the number of bilateral meetings have gone up or down in line with the development of the EU cannot be said with any certainty. And we do not know whether the content and purpose of these meetings have changed. But the bilateral level of relations still remains.

II. Denmark Background, concepts and actorness Policy towards several of the present EU member states has historically been important in Danish foreign policy. Nearness or a position in the same regional security complex often makes for a salient foreign policy and security concern for a state (Buzan and Wæver, 2004). The major neighbouring states around Denmark have historically played a significant role in Danish foreign and security policy. Until the nineteenth century, Sweden was the major security concern for Denmark. The UK was an important player in Danish security from the early nineteenth century. And from German reunification in the middle of the nineteenth century, Germany became the primary security concern for Denmark (Lammers, 2000: 260–3). The three countries mentioned have been the most important trade partners for Denmark for the last two centuries (Bjørn and Due-Nielsen, 2003: 490). However, since 1945 Denmark’s bilateral relations in Europe have been multilateralised – that is, at least to some extent, embedded and conducted within international organisations. This has not least been the case with the relationship with Germany (Lammers, 2000: 262). In line with the dominant four cornerstone image during the Cold War, according to which Danish foreign policy was seen as based on cooperation in four fora (NATO, Nordic Cooperation, the UN and the EC), no organisation was presented as having priority over the others in Europe (Larsen, 2000a: 40–2). The dominant view was that the multilateralisation of relations in Europe was expressed in several organisations such as NATO, the CSCE, the Council of Europe and the EC. After the Cold War, the EU was increasingly presented as the most important pillar in the dominant Danish foreign policy discourse with functions that had previously been attributed to other cornerstones – among these a central political and security role for the Union (Larsen, 2000a).


A central political and security role for the Union in the discourse obviously has wider implications for Danish foreign policy than just within Europe, although the concrete implications are less certain across foreign policy areas (the question of the importance of the EU across foreign policy areas in the light of its importance in general statements was a central motivation for this study as mentioned in Chapter 1). But the pivotal role of the EU was expressed most strongly with regard to Europe, although NATO continued to be attributed a crucial role in hard security here (Larsen, 2000a: 42–5). This can be seen as the Danish variant of the general EU discourse on the central role of the EU in Europe outlined above. The dominant Danish discourse articulates the role of the EU in instrumental and less mythical terms than, for example, in France or Germany (see, for example, Larsen, 1997, 1999). But the EU is seen as essential for political processes in Europe, and, increasingly, reference is being made within the dominant political discourse to a shared common history and values, suggesting a understanding of the EU that goes beyond the purely instrumental use (Larsen, 2000a: 43). According to the 2003 government report on Danish foreign policy priorities, Our Membership in the EU is a key element in Danish foreign policy. We share history, values and interests with our neighbours in Europe. The internal market is the foundation of our economy and the EU is the key to Denmark’s ability to influence the the world around us. With the enlargement of the EU and NATO, a vital Danish foreign policy objective has been achieved. We have swapped a position as a frontline state in the conflict between East and West for a position at the heart of a new cooperative Europe. (Regeringen, 2003a: 5; see also F. Petersen, 1998: 15; 1999: 18–19) At this stage it might seem appropriate to ask if the much stronger role attributed to the EU in Danish foreign policy after the Cold War is a mere reflection of something else that ought to be the object of study. In many other EU countries the fear of a dominant Germany could be interpreted as a mirror image of these countries’ strong support for the EU prior to and following the Cold War. In the Danish case, this is more complicated. Contrary to, for example, the Benelux countries, EC integration was never clearly presented as a way of binding Germany into European structures. If anything an important fear, not least in the sceptical part of the population, was entrapment in the EC/EU with


Germany rather than the EU as a means to control Germany (Branner and Kelstrup, 2000: 26–7; Lammers, 2000). However, the view of the EU project as a way of overcoming Europe’s conflict-ridden past in the dominant Danish post-Cold War understanding can also be seen as a reference to Germany’s role in the history of Danish foreign policy. According to the dominant understanding of active internationalism in Danish foreign policy as expressed in 1990 in a report on the future of the Foreign Service, Danish foreign policy should be independent and not primarily reactive, be defined in global terms and use the means available to small states. The strategy towards Europe should be its focal point (Holm, 1997: 57; Petersen, 2004). The active internationalism of post-Cold War Denmark is thus strongly articulated in relation to the EU as illustrated, for example, by the very active Danish line in relation to the enlargement process, although within the dominant political discourse the four exemptions are seen as imposing limits on an active policy (Regeringen, 2003a: 9–10; Rasmussen, 2003a; F. Petersen, 1998: 9, 12; 2000: 27; Larsen, 2000a: 53–4).1 References to specific bilateral relationships in Europe are not common in official language. In the annual accounts of foreign policy in the Danish Yearbook of Foreign Policy by the Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs after the Cold War, there are no references to isolated bilateral events with EU partners in Europe.2 Danish actorness in Europe here is mainly articulated in relation to organisations in Europe such as, for example, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the OSCE, NATO and, in particular, the EU. It is explicitly stated that bilateral diplomacy is mainly about preparing the capitals for multilateral negotiations, and that the main activities of Danish foreign policy take place in international organisations (F. Petersen, 1998: 10, 24).3 Increasingly up to and after the 2004 EU enlargement, the role of Danish bilateral relations is articulated with clear reference to the EU: bilateral cooperation with other EU members is understood as a necessary way of striking coalitions in EU politics in all fields to maximise Denmark’s influence and safeguard Danish interests. According to the 2003 government report on priorities in Danish foreign policy:4 … the leap from 15 to 25 Member States will dramatically alter the nature of EU cooperation … previous working procedures and alliance patterns will change. Denmark should actively take part in the work to create the framework for the new enlarged Europe. … Under all circumstances it will be more difficult for Denmark to influence the


decisions taken in an EU with 25 Member States. This is unavoidable. Competition for influence and attention is tough in the European market, and it will be even tougher after enlargement. For Denmark to maximise its influence, it will need to pursue a pro-active, coherent and focused European policy. The impact of Danish views will be totally reliant on alliance building. … (Regeringen, 2003a: 9–10) At the general level, the most important role for Denmark’s bilateral EU relations is thus seen as part of necessary coalition politics within EU decision-making. The line of argument is increasingly that EU bilateral relations are becoming more important as the EU now comprises most European countries in a qualitatively new system in which Denmark will find it more difficult to shape the decisions and where alliance partners are therefore crucial. The Danish embassies and ambassadorial postings in other EU states are attributed more significance and prestige in the official statements of the Danish Foreign Ministry compared with the traditional understanding where the ‘white elephants’, that is the ambassadorial postings in Washington, Berlin, London, Paris, the EU, NATO and the UN, have been considered as being in a different class from the others.5 EU bilateral relations are, then, primarily articulated in relation to the EU and not their narrow bilateral content. Warm relations with the former Eastern European countries built up as part of the Danish support for the enlargement are presented as a strategic asset in the EU of 25.6 The clearest candidates for bilateral relations that are of value in themselves are the relations with the other Nordic EU member states, possibly within Nordic Cooperation, and the Baltic States within the context of the CBSS. Significantly, however, there is no reference to Nordic cooperation or Baltic cooperation as a separate forum in the 2003 report from the government on Danish foreign policy (Regeringen, 2003a; see also F. Petersen, 2002, 2003). The reference to these relationships is in the form of ‘solidarity’ in wider multilateral contexts, in particular the EU: The active efforts made towards pushing the enlargement process forward, crowned by the final round of negotiations in Copenhagen, have generated a large degree of goodwill and trust towards Denmark from new Member States. This is a good starting point for Denmark’s ability to safeguard its interests in an enlarged and transformed EU. … Particularly with regard to relations with the three Baltic States, a basis exists for fostering cooperation, which eventually might bear resemblance to the solidarity and quality characterising Denmark’s relations with the other Nordic countries. … (Regeringen, 2003a: 10)


Nordic cooperation and cooperation with the Baltic States are thus presented in the context of influencing the EU as part of a broader influence strategy. To the extent that there is a subregional focus, this is the Baltic Sea region. This region has, to a large extent, replaced ‘Norden’ as a special regional focus in Danish foreign policy (Wæver, 1992). Danish actorness is formulated towards this subregion (see for example Regeringen, 2003a: 24; Petersen, 2001: 11; Udenrigsministeriet, 1998b). At the same time, there is an increasing understanding that the geopolitics of Denmark plays a smaller role in Danish foreign and security policy. Official reports on Danish security after the Cold War have stressed the view that there are no direct military threats to Danish security (Forsvarsministeriet, 1998). The main security concerns in Danish policy have been issues of stability rather than direct military attacks. This has not least been the case in the Baltic Sea region where Denmark has had the most focused subregional foreign policy engagement. The enlargement has meant that most of Denmark’s surrounding states in the Baltic Sea region have become EU member states. The dominant understanding post-enlargement is that ‘EU–Russian relations will be the key focal point in the region following the enlargement’ and ‘that we should discuss with our partners in the region … how the Council of Baltic Sea States could be adjusted to the new realities’ (Regeringen, 2003a: 12). Thus the subregional Danish articulation of actorness in the Baltic Sea region is still there after enlargement, but the local dynamics are downgraded and subsumed under the broader umbrella of EU–Russia relations. Danish subregional actorness, then, is increasingly understood as expressing itself within the EU. In summary, the dominant Danish discourse on Europe articulates the Danish participation in the EU as crucial for Danish policy in Europe, although other organisations are also considered as important and Danish actorness is also articulated in NATO, the OSCE, the Baltic Sea Council and the UN. EU bilateral relations are increasingly articulated with regard to their role in fostering alliances within the EU. Policies and priorities Denmark has diplomatic relations with all EU member states and embassies in 24 out of the 25 EU member states (there is no embassy in Malta). This is by far the biggest concentration of Danish bilateral embassies in any region, as the embassies in EU member states constitute nearly half of all Danish bilateral embassies. A possible way of judging the importance of the issues dealt with in bilateral relations is to look at the agenda of bilateral Danish meetings with other EU member states. The actual agendas of such meetings are


not made public. But press releases from the Danish Foreign Ministry before or after the meetings can give an indication of the agenda of the meetings and, just as important, the priority of the items from a Danish perspective. The interesting questions to ask here are whether the issues dealt with are (1) bilateral matters in a narrow sense, that is issues that mainly concern Denmark and the other country. This may also concern issues in their immediate environment; (2) EU issues, (3) issues in other organisations, (4) other issues in or outside the EU. In the following, I will present the results of a content analysis of the agenda of bilateral meetings at the level of prime ministers, foreign ministers and ministers for Europe in the period 1 January 2002–June 2004 mainly as reported in press releases from the Danish Foreign Ministry. I include meetings both with EU member states and candidate members, as the latter could be seen as potentially having an intra-EU dimension already from 2002. It is assumed that the order in which an item is mentioned on the agenda expresses its importance for the one who describes the agenda, the Danish government. It is clear that my approach here has some limitations, including its focus on the quantitative rather than qualitative dimension and the possible difference between what is said about the meeting and at the meeting.7 Nevertheless it can provide some indications which can be used for further inquiry (see Table 3.1).8 A count of items on the agenda of the bilateral meetings of which we have information about the agenda (there were 39 meetings in all – 19 of them with EU members and 20 with CEE candidate members) shows that in all of these meetings, the EU was in some form an item on the agenda. In 23 cases, the EU was the item mentioned first in the press releases/information from the Danish MFA. The other items that topped the list of items (once each) were: flooding in Central Europe (1), the war against terror (1), Iraq (1), NATO (3, twice shared with the EU), the situation in the Balkans (1) and the German–Danish minorities (1). Further down the lists of items mentioned, were items such as other issues within the EU (sometimes in addition to the EU issue mentioned as the top item), the transatlantic relationship, Baltic Sea cooperation, the Middle East, Iran, Afghanistan, ICC, Russia, and bilateral questions (3–4 cases). The EU is the item which is mentioned most frequently in different forms (for example the IGC, the agenda of the Danish presidency or EU enlargement). Out of the 84 items mentioned at the meetings, 50 of them were in some way linked to the EU. The strong position of the EU as an item could be linked to the Danish presidency in the period examined. There are usually many bilateral meetings as part of the presidency function – 23 out of the 39 meetings

73 Table 3.1 Bilateral meetings Denmark–EU member states (plus candidates). Period: 01.2002–06.2004. Levels: Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Minister of European Affairs Date

Meeting/level

Source

Information about agenda (yes/no)

14.01.2002

DK–UK Foreign Minister DK–Germany Foreign Minister DK–Germany Prime Minister DK–Poland Foreign Minister DK–Slovenia Prime Minister DK–Latvia Prime Minister DK–Germany Foreign Minister/ Mayor of Hamburg DK–Estonia Foreign Minister DK–Poland Prime Minister DK–Germany Prime Minister DK–Slovenia Foreign Minister DK–UK Prime Minister DK–Austria Foreign Minister DK–Estonia/Latvia/ Lithuania/Poland Foreign Minister

Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA

No

21.01.2002 23.01.2002 01.02.2002 06.–07.02.2002 27.–28.02.2002 05.04. 2002

12.04.2002 24.04.2002 25.04.2002 12.06.2002 12.06.2002 22.06.2002 26.–27.06.2002

28.06.2002 10.09.2002 29.09.2002 02.10.2002 04.10.2002 05.10.2002

DK–Slovenia Minister of Europe DK–France Minister of Europe DK–Turkey Foreign Minister DK–Croatia Foreign Minister DK–Czech Republic Foreign Minister DK–UK Prime Minister

Press release from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA/ information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA

No No No Yes Yes No

Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No

Continued

74 Table 3.1 Continued Date

Meeting/level

Source


17.10.2002

DK–Sweden Prime Minister DK–Austria Prime Minister DK–Germany Prime Minister DK–Bulgaria Foreign Minister DK–Latvia Foreign Minister DK–Austria Prime Minister DK–Germany Prime Minister DK–Sweden Prime Minister DK–UK Prime Minister DK–Poland Prime Minister DK–Slovenia Foreign Minister DK–Latvia Prime Minister DK–Slovenia Prime Minister DK–Germany Foreign Minister DK–UK Foreign Minister DK–SchleswigHolstein Foreign Minister/Premier DK–Germany Prime Minister/ Chairman of Bundestag DK–France Foreign Minister DK–Czech Republic/Slovakia Foreign Minister DK–Sweden Foreign Minister

Information from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA

Yes

18.10.2002 18.10.2002 01.11.2002 27.11.2002 02.12.2002 03.12.2002 04.12.2002 04.–05.12.2002 19.–21.02.2003 03.–04.03.2003 14.03.2003 26.05.2003 07.07.2003 17.07.2003 09.10.2003

17.10.2003

22.10.2003 11.11.2003

17.12.2003

Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Information from Danish MFA

No

Press release from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA

Yes

Press release from Danish MFA

Yes

Yes

Continued

Policy towards EU Member States: the Role of the EU 75 Table 3.1 Continued Date

Meeting/level

Source


18.12.2003

DK–Latvia Foreign Minister DK–UK Prime Minister DK–Latvia Foreign Minister DK–Estonia Foreign Minister DK–Germany Prime Minister DK–Poland Foreign Minister DK–Ireland Foreign Minister DK–Netherlands Foreign Minister DK–UK Foreign Minister

Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Information from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA Press release from Danish MFA

No

10.–11.03.2004 05.04.2004 14.04.2004 15.04.2004 21.–22.04.2004 23.04.2004 18.05.2004 25.–26.06.2004

No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes

where I have information about the agenda fall in the year of the Danish presidency (second half of 2002). However, we find the same pattern after the Danish presidency, although the EU accounts for fewer items on the agenda. What does that suggest? First of all, direct bilateral questions in a narrow sense do not play a prominent role in Denmark’s relations with its EU partners at the level of foreign ministers at least. Only in the case of meetings with Latvian, German and French counterparts was reference made to bilateral subjects of a narrow character. In the case of Germany, these questions (Danish minorities, Baltic Sea cooperation) were items at a meeting between the Danish Foreign Minister and the President of Schleswig-Holstein – not at the meeting with the German Foreign Minister which also took place in the period examined. Second, by far the most important item in these bilateral contexts is the EU in some form, in particular its ‘internal’ dimension such as the IGC, the presidency agenda, major policy areas and the enlargement. Third, issues in other organisations such as NATO or the UN also come up (without reference to the EU). Fourth, broad international political issues, including security issues, are raised (also without reference to the EU). The latter may take the form of the coordination of peacekeeping forces within the UN or NATO or support for membership of the Security Council.


On the basis of this material, bilateral relations between Denmark and its EU partners are, to a very large extent, aimed at influencing the EU and its decisions. Bilateral questions in a narrow sense (as dealt with by foreign ministers) play a minor role. The strongest ‘rivals’ to EU issues are issues in other organisations, NATO and the UN in particular, and broader international political and security issues. Rather than being multilateralised, Danish bilateral relations are thus primarily EUropeanised. Out of the total of 53 ministerial meetings registered in the period,9 most meetings were held with Germany (9) followed by the UK (6), Latvia and Poland (5 each), Slovenia (4) and Sweden (3). These figures suggest that Denmark’s foreign policy concern with the closest neighbours still prevails. But at the same time, the most prominent issues discussed at these meetings are not bilateral matters in a narrow sense. The examination of the agendas indicates that EU issues are the most important items in bilateral relations with these countries. Items that rival the EU are not narrow bilateral issues but other international issues than the EU. This implies that Danish relations with its closest neighbours are more about understanding and influencing their neighbours’ views on general EU issues and EU foreign policy than narrow bilateral problems, although it is also about wider international issues. Interestingly in this context Nordic–Baltic coordination meetings at the level of prime ministers preceding meetings in the European Council have now been institutionalised (interview, Prime Minister’s Office). The role of the EU is, therefore, very significant as seen from within the prism of Danish bilateral relations.10 Denmark’s level of bilateral activity towards its EU partners varies. There is clearly a higher level of activity towards the neighbouring countries, including the other Nordic countries, and the larger EU partners than with countries in the south of Europe. The importance of geography has not disappeared. The countries in Denmark’s neighbourhood continue to play a large role in bilateral diplomacy. But this is less because of narrow bilateral concerns than because of the role of these countries in coordinating the content of policy for the EU context (and beyond).11 The EU therefore also plays a profound role for bilateral relations in Denmark’s immediate surroundings.

III. Conclusion The EU’s role in Europe is based on intersubjective understandings of its role in European security and as a political system. This can be said to provide a framework which shapes European politics, including


EU bilateral relations, and which the member states attempt to shape through their bilateral relations. Within the dominant Danish discourse, the EU is presented as the anchor and pivot of European politics. Bilateral relations within the EU are primarily, if not only, seen as means of influencing the EU framework. A content analysis of the agenda of bilateral Danish meetings with EU member states and candidate members confirmed that the primary content of Denmark’s bilateral relations with its EU partners was the preparation of policy in the EU. However, bilateral relations were also aimed at promoting Danish views in other organisations within and outside Europe, and promoting Danish policy aims towards other international policy issues. I will end with an attempt to construe the findings in this chapter in terms of the concepts presented in Chapter 2 (which as mentioned is only partly possible, as this area is different in nature from the other areas dealt with). The intersubjective understanding of the EU as the strongest organisational structure in Europe combined with Danish articulation of actorness in Europe linked to the EU, provides an understanding of why Danish bilateral relations are, to a large extent, directed towards the EU. At the same time, the fact that the EU is not presented as the only significant organisation in Europe means that bilateral relations are also used for other instrumental purposes. In terms of the categories outlined in Chapter 2, this situation comes closest to category number three: that is, both a strong EU role and Danish agency – also expressed in bilateral relations in the EU.

4 The Fight against Terrorism

‘Terrorism’ is a very politically loaded term. What is understood as an act of terrorism by some is understood as an act of legitimate resistance by others. The chapter will not attempt to put forward a definition of the fight against terrorism in absolute theoretical terms, but rather in more concrete political terms. Measures against terrorism are understood as official measures taken against groups such as the IRA and ETA, but the focus will be on the measures taken against Al Qaeda and similar networks, in particular after 11 September 2001. Since key political actors link this fight to issues such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), crime and failed states, such issues will also be touched upon without passing a judgement on whether they should rightly be part of a ‘war against terrorism’. In a broader sense, then, the chapter deals with the policies towards the new international security agenda, post-11 September.1 Although policies against terrorist groups are not new, the much stronger emphasis on this area post-11 September in terms of a general security threat means that this is very much a policy field in the making. At the same time, more than most of the other areas in this book, it cuts across policy areas and touches on several different policy dimensions.

I. The EU Background, concepts and actorness The idea that the EC/EPC should be a security actor was controversial before the end of the Cold War. Only in the early 1980s was it agreed that the EPC could deal with the political and economic aspects of security, but the military aspects of security were a no-go area within the EPC. Anti-terror measures were discussed in the 1970s in the so-called 78

The Fight against Terrorism 79

Trevi Group (K. Smith, 2003: 174). But terrorism was dealt with here (secretively) as measures directed at terrorist movements in certain member states and not as a general and all-embracing security problem for the European countries as a whole. The institutionalisation of the area of justice and home affairs with the Maastricht Treaty was the beginning of a momentum in this field. The basic institutional structures were thus in place before 11 September 2001 ( Jørgensen and Pedersen, 2002: 113). In the aftermath of the fall of the wall in 1989, the profile of the EU in the field of security increased considerably and both insiders and outsiders considered the EU a pivotal actor and anchor in European security. The Maastricht Treaty made clear that the CFSP (art. J.1) could deal with all aspects of security. In the post-Cold War period after St Malo, the EU presents itself as a security actor – a security actor who can, in principle, draw on various suitable instruments from a toolkit ranging from the military to the civilian and economic, although understandings of the level and importance attributed to the military component vary (Larsen, 2002). Terrorism after 11 September 2001 in the eyes of the EU took on a much broader significance as a major international security concern than it had before. The EU clearly articulated itself as an actor with regard to this threat. Prior to 11 September, terrorism had been presented as just one of the many threats or challenges to EU security (Larsen, 2000b). Terrorism was thus mentioned explicitly in the report from the European Convention and in the Constitutional Treaty concluded in June 2004. In general contexts, the threat of terrorism is often ranked first, although other threats are also considered prominent. Accordingly, in the December 2003 European security strategy A Secure Europe in a Better World, terrorism, WMD, state failure and organised crime are presented as the biggest threats against international security (Solana, 2003: 5). While the security strategy emphasises economic and political means to tackle all the central threats and the importance of multilateral cooperation and international law, it also opens up for preventive military intervention if necessary (Solana, 2003: 7). The economic and political roots of terrorism are emphasised. Thus the strategy articulates the EU’s traditional security focus in terms of political and economic means while it also approaches the understandings in the 2002 US security strategy in its opening towards preventive military action (Everts and Keohane, 2003). There is no absolute break with the ‘toolkit’ conception, as military means are placed in a general context of means rather than given a special status (Larsen, 2002). Other problems than terror and WMD are also presented as being significant – particularly the threats arising from failed states which are not only seen in a terrorism


and WMD perspective. So while the EU presents itself as a security actor after the Cold War, and an actor in the field of anti-terror, terror is not presented as the only threat to international security against which the EU acts, post-11 September. Policies and priorities Following the attacks in the US, the overall framework was laid down in the Union’s action plan at the extraordinary meeting of the European Council on 21 September 2001. The plan contained a number of diplomatic, legal and operational measures with the aim of producing a comprehensive plan of action. In a revised plan of action after the terror attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, the strategic objectives were presented as the following: ●

● ●

●

●

●

●

Deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism Reduce access of terrorists to financial and other economic resources Maximise capacity within EU bodies and member states to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorist and prevent terrorist attacks Protect the security of international transport and ensure effective border control Enhance the capability of the European Union and of member states to deal with the consequences of terrorist attacks Address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism Target actions under EU external relations towards priority third countries where counter-terrorist activities or commitments to combating terrorism need to be enhanced (Presidency, 2004)

I will distinguish between EU policy measures that are aimed at the external environment of the EU and measures that are aimed at the EU internally: this is different from the other areas examined in this book which only look at the EU’s external policy. However, the EU considers the internal and external dimensions as two sides of the same coin in a qualitatively different way from the other policy areas examined in this book (cf. Zilmer-Johns, 2004: 3). I will first look at the external measures – that is policy initiatives aimed at the world outside the EU. These are policy measures falling under the EU’s external relations which include development aid and trade agreements under the first pillar and measures under the CFSP/ESDP in the second pillar.2 Diplomatically, anti-terror has become a prominent part of most of the EU’s external policies. The focus has been on both immediate threats


and the long-term causes of terrorism. The immediate EU reactions were to stress the strong solidarity with the US (see Jørgensen and Pedersen, 2002: 108–9). The EU has provided help to the US on legal issues and information. Diplomatically it supported the US attempts to strike a political alliance against Afghanistan in autumn 2001 inter alia by promising Pakistan more favourable terms of trade. The Union also supported the military operation in Afghanistan in autumn 2001, but there has been no agreement among the member states as to common military engagement for anti-terror purposes. The Union was the organiser of the St Petersburg conference on economic reconstruction of Afghanistan in December 2001, and has subsequently been the biggest international donor in Afghanistan. Anti-terrorism has been made an integrated dimension of the Union’s global policies in all fields (politics, trade, development). Anti-terror measures have been included in the Union’s broad network of political dialogues and agreements with states and regional organisations, and new agreements concluded with third countries are made conditional on partners’ active participation in anti-terror measures (Zilmer-Johns, 2004: 30). Economic assistance is given to support states’ implementation of the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 including the cutting of the funding of terrorism. This has been made an object of an EU joint action. The prevention of terrorism is increasingly one of the declared motivations for the development aid of the Community and the member states, with aid being made conditional on anti-terror measures. The EU has drafted threat assessments of the risk of terrorism in a range of regions and countries (9 regions, 55 countries) which constitute the basis for political dialogue with these countries and regions. The Union has also agreed on a common list of terror organisations as a base for common actions (including the freezing of assets). The exchange of information between member states in this respect, however, is limited to intelligence about broad long-term threats rather than operational intelligence aimed at revealing terrorist groups or preventing concrete actions; operation intelligence is exchanged bilaterally on a reciprocity basis. The Union has increased its measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD. The EU judgement, like that of the US, has been that access of terrorist groups to WMD could have severe security consequences (Council, 2003c). While the EU shares the concern of the US about the threats from a link between WMD and terrorists, the EU does not publicly name countries suspected of supporting terrorist organisations


(Zilmer-Johns, 2004: 13–14). In line with the Union’s stances in other international contexts, the EU has tended to conduct critical dialogues with marginalised states rather than isolating them. As a central example, the Union has taken an increasingly hard line on Iran, but has made no explicit link between terrorism and WMD in this case and has continued diplomatic dialogue. The EU as a whole has not supported the US in relation to US’s characterisation from 2002 of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’ and the US action against Iraq in 2003. When the US extended its anti-terror strategy to including possible attacks against axis of evil states as part of a broader strategy of pre-emption, the disagreements among the EU countries became substantial ( Jørgensen and Pedersen, 2002: 110–11). Iraq has been a central source of contention both between Europe and the US and within the EU. The political divisions within the EU with the UK, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain (who changed sides in March 2004) on one side (and later the new CEE member states) and France, Germany and Belgium on the other has meant that, since late 2002, the EU has not had a substantial policy on the central political issues regarding Iraq. The Union has been split on the necessity and character of an explicit UN mandate on armed action against Iraq, and these divisions have remained with regard to the subsequent reconstruction of Iraq. The EU security strategy in June 2003 was partly an attempt to prepare for closer EU ranks in future crises in the light of Iraq (Zilmer-Johns, 2004: 13). The joint French, German and British initiatives in autumn 2003 towards Iran, although not an EU initiative, suggested that the central EU countries did not want the Iraq conflict to be an obstacle for other diplomatic initiatives by the Union in this field. Militarily, the EU has not until now taken part in anti-terrorism activities. The three EU military operations to date – in Macedonia and Congo (in 2003) and Bosnia (2005–) – were not linked to concrete antiterror concerns. The European forces taking part in the fighting against alleged Al Qaeda terrorists and sympathisers in Afghanistan are not under an EU mandate, and the subsequent NATO stabilisation force ISAF has no connection to the EU’s military dimension. The present EU military preparations do not focus on fighting terrorism through direct military action against terrorist networks. Rather, the focus is on stabilisation and the prevention of state failure which can, of course, be seen as linked to long-term prevention of terrorism. However, the future EU role in this field, as in others, is not static and depends on both the division of labour between NATO and the EU and the political balance of forces within the EU.


In summary, external EU policy has thus to date focused on the non-military dimension of anti-terror measures including an integrated diplomatic and economic approach with long-term aims drawing on the EU’s global web of political and economic agreements and links. Turning now to the EU’s internal policy measures, these can generally be said to have been developed faster and to have a more detailed and legal form than the external anti-terror measures post-11 September 2001. A ground for this is that the measures relate to the core areas within the Community including its internal market (Zilmer-Johns, 2004: 46–7). Central in the area of justice and home affairs were three key decisions made at the Laeken summit in December 2001:3 (1) to produce a common definition of acts of terrorism and minimum (national) sentences for acts of terrorism, (2) to formulate a European arrest order and (3) to compile a common list of terrorist organisations (Zilmer-Johns, 2004: 33; Jørgensen and Pedersen, 2002: 112, 115). These decisions have ramifications for other aspects of EU regulation within justice and home affairs. Previously, for example, the absence of extradition agreements made it possible for Basque terrorists to hide in other member states. The issues had been on the agenda in the EU in the 1990s without the member states being able to reach an agreement as to substance. However, in spite of the Laeken decisions in this field, measures have only slowly been incorporated into national legislations. The common European arrest order has, for example, not been incorporated into national legislation by many of the member states. Following the terror acts in Madrid in March 2004, agreement was reached on a faster national implementation of these measures to be completed by June 2004 (Presidency, 2004). Police and intelligence cooperation has increased post-11 September 2001. An EU decision has been made to extend the exchange of intelligence about terrorism between member states. Even so, there has been considerable reluctance towards the sharing of information between the EU partners more broadly, as opposed to ad hoc bilateral exchanges on a reciprocity basis. The European police agency, Europol, has been given a more prominent role within the field of anti-terrorism (Zilmer-Johns, 2004). However, Europol still depends on information provided by member states. To the extent that member states have supplied such information, it has mostly been post hoc. In the 2004 Treaty, more power to Europol is envisaged. Cooperation on the protection of critical infrastructure has increased in spite of the multiple sectors of society involved and the cross-pillar character of the area within the EU (Zilmer-Johns, 2004: 39). Mutual assistance with non-military means in the case of emergencies in member


states, involving the need for protection of civilians, has also been developed post-11 September and has been used on several occasions (Zilmer-Johns, 2004: 40). The solidarity clause proposed by the 2003 Convention and already decided by the European Council on 26 March 2004 after the terror attacks in Spain in March 2004, makes assistance to other member states in the case of terrorist attacks a mutual obligation with the possibility for drawing on all means. The indications about the use of military means inside the EU so far, however, are that these will be used post hoc to deal with the effects of terrorist acts rather than to deter or fight terrorists (Zilmer-Johns, 2004: 43). The March 2004 European Council created the post of EU CounterTerrorism Coordinator to coordinate both internal and external measures in this field (Presidency, 2004). This suggests that EU anti-terror policy is more than just an immediate post-11 September reaction, although differences between member states in this field remain. In summary, there is, since 11 September, a strong EU anti-terror policy which is supported by external and internal (justice and home affairs) means. But it is a policy with significant holes. The internal measures have been implemented unevenly. Disagreements on Iraq have been marked.

II. Denmark Background, concepts and actorness In official Danish assessments of threats to Danish security before 11 September 2001 international terrorism played a very limited role. Possibilities for terrorist attacks were mentioned in the report of the Defence Commission of 1997, but did not represent a prominent concern. From the end of the Cold War, the official Danish conception of threats went from a focus on direct physical threats to Denmark from the outside, to an emphasis on broader, indirect threats to Danish and European security in the form of unstable international surroundings (N. Petersen, 2002: 118–19; SNU, 1995). After 11 September 2001, this threat conception has been combined with an emphasis on direct threats against Denmark and Denmark’s allies in the form of terrorism (N. Petersen, 2002: 129–30). The threat of terrorism is considered to have both an internal and an external dimension. The post-11 September terrorist threat quickly reached the top of Danish foreign policy concerns. In the words of the Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the official account on Danish foreign policy of 2001, the fight against terrorism was the ‘primary priority’ of Danish


foreign policy in 2001 (F. Petersen, 2002: 4). The Danish language of support for the US after the attack used terms such as ‘shoulder to shoulder with the US’ and a willingness to support the US ‘all the way through’. The attack against the US was presented as an attack against democratic ideals (N. Petersen, 2002: 120–1). For example, the then Prime Minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, stated during the opening session of the Folketing, on 1 October 2001: The attack in New York and Washington is not simply another terrorist attack. It is not simply an attack on two cities in the US. It is a ruthless attack on everything we represent: individual freedom, safety for many, and our collective security – everything that sustains the concept of democracy. (Quoted and translated in Rynning, 2003: 28) One month later he stressed that ‘we do not want to give up our way of life, our democracy, our values, our safety. … Our future is common – our security is also that of NATO and the US’ (translation from the Danish cited in Rynning, 2003: 28). Threats from terrorism and WMD, and the links between them, were presented as the new overarching threats to international and Danish security. The broad threats to ‘everything we represent’ meant that they were also constructed as threats to Denmark – both through the threats to international values that were also Danish values and in a more physical sense. In official references to threats, terrorism and WMD were generally mentioned first followed by threats such as failed states, instability on the borders of Europe and organised crime (see, for example, Møller, 2003; Jensby, 2003). Although there were also seen to be other broad threats to Danish security, the threats against ‘everything we stand for’, arising from terrorism and WMD, occupied a pivotal role in the dominant Danish discourse on security. Denmark and its liberal democratic values depended on the active defence of international order against these threats (Rynning, 2003). According to the government’s 2003 report on Danish foreign policy priorities, International terrorism is a threat against our peace and security and can strike any country and any population – also Denmark and the Danes. The terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 have moved the boundaries. … It is absolutely vital that we actively fight terrorism, gain control of the spread of WMD, and implement stronger efforts to eradicate the causes of terrorism. … We must


employ all foreign policy instruments in the fight against terrorism. It is imperative that we use national, regional and global means. … (Regeringen, 2003a: 21) The traditional Danish engagement in peacekeeping increased further after the Cold War and expanded to include participation in peacemaking based on a broader conception of military actorness (Heurlin, 1996). Post-September 2001, the Danish government articulated Denmark as a committed international actor with regard to what was seen as the overarching terrorist threat. The new Liberal–Conservative government after November 2001 presided over a change in the dominant foreign policy discourse which could already be discerned in the reactions of the previous government to 11 September: post 2001 there were seen to be few limits to Danish military actorness which was presented as a central component of a generally active international policy. Where Danish military activism had hitherto expressed itself through mediation in conflicts and support for humanitarian causes, the present activism also applied to Denmark’s stance with regard to the main strategic security divisions in the world today and hence also the military fight against terrorism (Rynning, 2003: 28; Regeringen, 2001). Previous Danish policies have, at least in part, drawn on basic understandings of Denmark as an ‘anti-power state’ (Hansen, 2001); the new line constituted a break with the dominance of the ‘anti-power’ understanding. Within the articulations of Danish actorness in the field of anti-terror, there were differences post-11 September in how actorness could and should be expressed. The dominant discourse to which the government post-November 2001 adhered stressed that actorness should inter alia take the form of military support for the US in the ‘war against terrorism’. The opponents of this understanding (which included the Social Democrats) were sceptical towards Danish actorness in military operations in support of the US and tempted to focus more on softer means including peace-supporting operations, the UN and the EU (Larsen, 2003, 2004). The opponents thus drew on elements of the ‘anti-power’ understanding. The Danish articulations of actorness in this field, then, are not unitary as there are differences in how and where this actorness should be expressed. These manifested themselves in the domestic political disagreements about Danish participation in the war in Iraq in 2003. The basic discourse on the importance of the terrorist threat, however, is in many respects shared. The focus in the following is on the dominant discourse of the government after November 2001.


The threat from terrorism was presented as so grave by Danish governments post-11 September that they suggested that the international community and Denmark should be active at all levels: in the UN, with the US and NATO, with the EU and bilaterally. From the outset, ‘Denmark’ presented itself unambiguously as an actor in this fight. In the words of the Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the 2001 annual report, ‘… Both bilaterally and through our membership of international organisations such as the UN, EU, NATO and OSCE, Denmark contributes with all available means to the ongoing efforts …’ (F. Petersen, 2002: 4; see also Regeringen, 2004a: 12–14). Danish agency in this field is, at the most general level, articulated as pre-existing and separate, with an ability and an obligation to act in a broad range of international fora. EU and Danish actorness With respect to the weighting of the different international fora in Danish anti-terror policy ‘… The EU remains in cooperation with the UN and the US, the central forum for the fight against terror’ (Regeringen, 2003a: 20–1). This articulation of the role of the EU in antiterror policy is parallel to the general conceptual figure in the 2003 government report on priorities in Danish foreign policy: in its foreign policy, (1) Denmark should act through the EU, (2) where Denmark should work to further cooperative transatlantic relations, (3) which were seen as the precondition for Denmark being able to influence the global agenda and the UN. But although the EU is presented as the organisational point of departure and frame for Danish foreign policy, also with regard to terrorism, the link to the US/NATO is not only seen through the prism of the EU: the bilateral relationship to the US/NATO remains crucial for the hardest security threats, the present manifestation of which is terrorism (Regeringen, 2003a; Petersen, 2003: 14; Larsen, 2004). According to the Prime Minister, Rasmussen: We cannot protect ourselves against international terrorism or fight it alone. We need the help of the Americans. Therefore the European main track will also in the future be a strong alliance across the Atlantic between Europe and the US. Denmark finds itself solidly and well placed in this main track. … Global terrorism has replaced the two-front confrontation of the Cold War. … Denmark’s security is better guaranteed by a superpower in North America than by the fragile balance of power between the UK, Germany and France. … [Europeans taking over responsibility for their own security] is not


realistic in the foreseeable future. That is why the alliance with the US is crucial in Danish security policy. And we must be prepared to help the US when we are asked. (Rasmussen, 2003b; see also Møller, 2002c) According to this discourse, then, the EU and bilateral links to the US are essential in a security perspective with regard to the fight against terrorism because Denmark’s European partners cannot guarantee Danish security within the foreseeable future and because Denmark is articulated as having a strong affiliation with the US in terms of values and history. In concrete policy contexts in the ‘fight against terrorism’ there is rarely a co-articulation of agency in the form of ‘Denmark and … [other actors]’, although ‘Denmark’ is frequently constructed as acting within the West/international community, UN, EU and with the US. When the actions of the EU are described in official texts, this is mostly in the context of economic and political measures which relate to long-term root causes of terrorism and, in particular, EU internal matters (see, for example, Møller, 2004; Trøjborg, 2001: 524–9). In these contexts, only EU action is described so that the articulation of EU agency takes the place of Danish agency (see for example F. Petersen, 2002: 14–16). There are also cases of conflations of agency where it is unclear whether the actor is ‘the EU’ or ‘Denmark’ (as in Møller, 2004). Conflations also occur with other organisations than the EU: there are conflations of agency where it is unclear whether the ‘we’ is ‘Denmark’ or ‘the UN’ or ‘the international community’ as a whole (see for example Rasmussen, 2002: 109–17). It is, in other words, not only in relation to the EU that a conflation of agency takes place. However, in most policy contexts, the two actors are articulated so that both can be discerned as entities, that is as ‘Denmark’ and ‘the EU’ (see for example Regeringen, 2004a: 4; F. Petersen, 2002: 14–16). Common articulations with regard to Denmark and the EU are instrumental articulations whereby Denmark draws on the EU for furthering its views on anti-terror. Take the following example: ‘The current EU Presidency provides us with a good platform for furthering these values [in relation to anti-terror policy]’ (Møller, 2002e). ‘Through the EU we can pool our efforts and achieve results that far exceed the possibilities of any individual state’ (Møller, 2004). Since 11 September this articulation of the instrumental relationship between ‘the EU’ and ‘Denmark’ has become the most common articulation of ‘Denmark’ with other actors when the subject is general political and economic measures particularly of a longterm character. Here the EU’s instrumental role is articulated as essential


Danish articulations of actorness strong Denmark

Articulations of Danish agency in relation to bilateral and multilateral policy measures, particularly with regard to military measures and development

World community/United Nations

Denmark + US Denmark

Denmark + EU Denmark + IO

Denmark acts within the context of the UN/ international community. Articulations with the US, multilateral organisations or the UN/ the international community Co-articulation with the EU is the most common co-articulation

Denmark with the US and international organisations

Figure 4.1(a) Articulation of actorness

(see for example the many instances in Møller, 2004). There are many formulations in the first government report on terrorism which articulate the essential and instrumental role of the EU in this field for Denmark (Regeringen, 2004a: 5, 20, 26, 38, 40). However, the dominant discourse still articulates ‘Denmark’ as the actor in relation to concrete anti-terrorism policy measures such as concrete participation in the international war against terrorism, military and humanitarian action in Afghanistan, development aid, support for UN resolutions and affecting the response of NATO (F. Petersen, 2002: 5–7, 13; P. Rasmussen, 2002: 109–17; A. Rasmussen, 2003b; Regeringen, 2001; Møller, 2002d). In summary we can, therefore, conclude that ‘Denmark’ is articulated as an actor in this field of policy. Denmark is also co-articulated as an actor with the US. The EU is increasingly becoming the most common organisation with which Denmark is articulated, although it is not the only organisation or frame (see Figure 4.1(a)). This is particularly the case in the context of political and economic long-term developments and legal questions. This predominantly takes the form of Denmark using the EU as an instrument, ‘Denmark through the EU’ (see Figure 4.1(b)). Policies and priorities Danish policy after 11 September 2001 can be characterised by five central elements, the first four external, the fifth internal.


Denmark EU

Denmark is frequently articulated as acting through or by the aid of the EU framework when the context is broad economic, political and development measures Figure 4.1(b) Articulation of actorness

1. Strong support for the US line in the ‘war against terrorism’ (and a role for NATO) Denmark expressed strong sympathy with the US after the attacks and a willingness to support US measures in the ‘war against terrorism’, a term that was accepted and used in official Danish language. The activation of NATO’s article 5 after the 11 September attack was strongly supported by Denmark, as the attack was seen as equivalent to what traditionally has been considered military attack (N. Petersen, 2002: 120). Copenhagen from the outset signalled willingness to contribute militarily in support of US policy. The debate about possible military attacks against ‘axis of evil’ countries as part of the ‘war against terrorism’ led to a split between the US and parts of Europe. Although Denmark did not use the term ‘axis of evil’, it did not distance itself from it and on many occasions used language that bore similarities to the US language on terrorism. Alliance loyalty and dialogue with the US were the overriding concerns and did not allow for explicit criticism of US policy (Møller, 2002a). The Danish government’s loyalty towards, and identification with, the US was stronger than most comparable countries inside the EU. The government, which came to power after the elections in November 2001, further stressed its support for the US (N. Petersen, 2002: 130–1). In the international controversy in relation to Iraq leading to the war in 2003, Denmark was among the staunchest supporters of the US. The Danish Prime Minister was one of the eight European prime ministers who signed the letter of 30 January 2003 in support of the US approach to Iraq. In the run-up to war the Danish government drew on many of the American (and British) governments’ arguments for launching a war against Iraq, including the threat to the world constituted by Iraq’s


WMD, the risks of links to terrorism and the interpretation that there was no need for a new mandate from the UNSC to engage in a war against Iraq.4 Denmark retained forces in Iraq when Norway and Spain withdrew theirs in spring 2004 (Norway and Spain had not taken part militarily in the actual fighting of the war against Saddam’s regime in spring 2003 contrary to Denmark). 2. Military contributions While the deployment of military forces during the Cold War had only been for the purpose of peacekeeping, the post-Cold War period had seen an expansion of tasks undertaken by Danish forces towards operations that involved actual fighting (in parts of the former Yugoslavia). Post-11 September, Denmark contributed to the ‘war against terrorism’ in Afghanistan by replacing US personnel in NATO AWACS and in the Balkans. Denmark contributed forces in Afghanistan both to the direct fighting against alleged Al Qaeda sympathisers from January 2002 and to the ISAF stabilisation force (a UN operation later transferred to NATO). Denmark also took part in the war against Iraq and the subsequent occupation/stabilisation force with the US. This placed Denmark among the minority of countries which contributed militarily also to the hardest part of the ‘war against terrorism’. The use of forces in actual fighting (apart from the air strikes in Kosovo) is new in a Danish post-1945 perspective (N. Petersen, 2002: 124–7, 132–3). This strong military support of the US can be said to have led to a reinforcement of the military element in the Danish post-Cold War active internationalism. The participation in actual fighting in the ‘war against terrorism’ was controversial within Denmark. In the Folketing there was a sizeable minority including the main opposition party, the Social Democrats, who felt that the priority in Afghanistan should be on ISAF rather than on the more direct anti-terrorist activities with the US (Rynning, 2003; N. Petersen, 2002: 124–7).5 The government decision to contribute forces to the war against Iraq on the basis of a controversial UN mandate split the Folketing and the population right down the middle. A degree of unity was only partly restored in the Folketing when the subsequent occupying/stabilisation force was deployed, although the size of it remained controversial. These disagreements were based on the two opposing conceptions of Danish actorness in this field according to which Denmark should either take part in all necessary military endeavours with the US in the fight against terrorism or focus on softer means including peace-supporting operations (outlined above).


3. Bilateral political initiatives Anti-terror measures became an important element in bilateral relations after September 2001 – not least with the US. Other substantial bilateral relationships were those with the countries and organisations receiving Danish development aid. The prevention of terrorism rapidly became a concern in development programmes after September 2001, and the importance of this aspect in official documents on development increased as development aid was placed in a strategic and geopolitical context (Regeringen, 2003a, 21–2; 2004b). Denmark put pressure on the recipient countries to take measures with regard to the relevant UN resolutions on prevention of terrorism such as Resolution 1373. However, the main focus was the deeper causes of terrorism, closely linked to the stated general aim in Danish development aid of helping to create better societies (see also the section on development). The most high profile bilateral/unilateral policy measure was the plan for political reforms in the Arab world. Initially, the idea for an OSCElike structure in the greater Middle East region was presented during the Danish Prime Minister’s visit to Washington in spring 20036 and subsequently at the European Council in June 2003. A more concrete plan was presented by Copenhagen in December 2003 (and later in the same month in the EU) which involved funding to further political reform. In the Danish aid budget, means were allocated for the democratisation of the Arab world, and the Danish Foreign Minister brought up the initiative at bilateral meetings with his Arab counterparts. The Danish plan was subsequently presented in the EU with support from Sweden, Finland and the Baltic States (interview, Prime Minister’s Office). 4. Strong support for anti-terror measures in international fora (UN, NATO, EU, OSCE) Denmark strongly supported anti-terror measures in all international fora, the UN, NATO, the EU, OSCE (F. Petersen, 2002: 123). Strong support for a role for the UN was also expressed. The implementation of UN resolutions was given weight within the EU and other frameworks. In the UN, the measures were, in many cases, coordinated within the EU. On the issue of Iran in the UN Human Rights Commission, for example, Denmark’s wish for condemnation in 2002 gave way to the EU’s policy which was to give dialogue with Iran another chance (Møller, 2002f). Denmark was a strong supporter of anti-terror measures within the NATO frame, although NATO did not take on many concrete anti-terror tasks. Fora such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe and OECD


were ascribed a less prominent role (see formulations in Regeringen, 2004a: 14). While Denmark supported general measures in the fight against terrorism in all fora, with respect to non-military measures there was a focus on the EU. This was particularly the case with regard to the EU’s JHA measures, but also the political, economic and development measures towards the rest of the world through the EU’s extensive political and economic global links. The reason for this lay in the wide spectrum of possibilities offered by the EU in this field (interview, MFA). Copenhagen works for a further extension of the EU’s policies in this field. Denmark supports ‘a strong EU as the pivot of cooperation between member states in the fight against terrorism’ (Møller, 2004). 5. Internal measures A bill on terrorism in December 2001 was swiftly passed in the Folketing to ensure that Denmark lived up to various decisions on anti-terrorism in the UN and the EU. This included the 1999 UN Convention on Terrorism which Copenhagen was the fifth country to ratify (N. Petersen, 2002: 128–9). Denmark had not earlier had anti-terror legislation (Jensen, 2001). The new laws in this field were passed quickly compared with the other EU countries (see section below on constitutive effects). Danish policy inside and outside the EU is illustrated in Figure 4.2. An active Danish policy? Within the EU Danish policy can be characterised as active favouring of a strong EU policy in this field in close cooperation with the US. Firstly, Denmark strongly supported EU measures in this field from 11 September.

Danish policy is mainly conducted outside the EU regarding military action and bilateral development aid (Areas where EU foreign policy is not resourceful and intensive)

Denmark

EU

Figure 4.2 Danish policy inside or outside the EU?

Danish policy is mainly conducted inside the EU regarding broad economic and political measures (Areas where EU foreign policy is (very) resourceful and intensive)


Instruments within the CFSP should be strengthened, the EU should take the lead in carrying out UN Resolution 1373, and legal and policy cooperation in this area should be further intensified (Møller, 2002b). Denmark was also in favour of the European arrest order, a common definition of terrorism and minimum sentences for acts of terrorism. Strengthening the EU’s efforts in the war against terror was a priority during the Danish presidency in autumn 2002, although behind the no.1 issue of EU enlargement. In its political dialogue with regions and states during the presidency, Denmark pushed the issue of making common EU threat assessments the background of EU demands. The presidency also supported a package with measures on law enforcement and protection of the civilian population (Udenrigsministeriet, 2003b). It supported a strong role for the 2004 appointed anti-terror coordinator (Regeringen, 2004a: 4). Secondly, Denmark belonged to the group within the EU which most strongly supported cooperation with, and references to, the US and NATO. Denmark wanted NATO to be mentioned at the same level as the UN in the EU’s declaration post-11 September (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001d). It strongly supported a cooperation agreement with the US concerning extraditions and legal help in this field (Møller, 2002b), and accordingly promoted them during the Danish presidency. On several questions concerning the fight against terrorism, Denmark has aligned itself more closely with the US than most of its EU partners (N. Petersen, 2002: 132). In the split between the EU states on the action to take against Iraq from early 2002, Denmark was firmly in the pro-US group with the notable exception of the presidency period where it adopted a stance as bridge-builder between the EU countries (Udenrigsministeriet, 2003b: 21). The Danish Prime Minister signed the letter of support for the US with seven other European countries on 30 January 2003. Its military participation in the war against Iraq with a small group of other countries placed Denmark (together with the UK) firmly in the pro-US wing. Although the split between the EU countries with regard to the American approach to the war against Iraq was clearly a serious concern for Copenhagen which was keen to see a unifying UN role, EU unity was never the primary aim. Thirdly, Denmark has generally been very active in this field when compared with the level of activity in other policy areas (interview MFA). Copenhagen expressed preferences as to the formulations in the first post-11 September EU declaration in support of the US. During the Danish presidency in autumn 2002 high priority was given to the ‘fight against international terrorism’ (see above). Copenhagen has generally


been very active in relation to the linkage between development aid in narrow terms and prevention of terrorism (interview, MFA). The Danish plan for political reform in the Arab world, launched later the same month (December 2003) in the EU, had a clear anti-terror dimension (Jerichow and Hannestad, 2003). The Danish government actively supported intensified EU anti-terror policy measures after the Madrid terrorist attacks in March 2004 through a proposal for common EU capacity goals in civilian protection, in particular in relation to biological and chemical terror attacks (Regeringen, 2004a: 8). Copenhagen also insisted on including terrorism in the subjects to be discussed in relation to the trade and cooperation agreement with Iran in 2002 and in EU agreements more generally (Regeringen, 2003a: 20; Udenrigsministeriet, 2003b: 21). The very swift Danish passing of laws compared with other member states – incorporating the EU’s anti-terror measures into national legislation already in December 2001 – could also be seen as an active political stance. The significant exception to this are the areas that relate to the Danish exemptions in the field of defence and justice and home affairs. Due to the defence exemption obtained at the Edinburgh summit in 1992, ‘… Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the Union that have defence implications …’ (quoted in Larsen, 2000a: 48). In the field of justice and home affairs, Denmark only takes part in the decisions that are taken on an intergovernmental basis, that is, it does not take part when decisions are taken by QMV in the first pillar (Udenrigsministeriet, 2003d). In the field of defence, Denmark has kept a very low profile, although it has participated in general political discussions (Græger et al., 2002). It has consequently held a very low profile on issues concerning military responses to terrorism including the formulations in the Constitutional Treaty. But Denmark has, in general terms, supported the measures taken by the EU in this field and been active in non-military crisis management. In the field of justice and home affairs, terrorism has so far predominantly been decided on an intergovernmental (pillar 3) basis and Danish participation and activity have not been restricted. When the Danish exemptions have not been involved, Denmark has been active within the EU in relation to terrorism compared with other areas (interview MFA). It has generally supported an expansion of EU policies in this field – also where exemptions applied. The government launched the idea in autumn 2003 of altering the JHA exemption along the lines of the UK arrangement in JHA (via a referendum) which would allow an opt-in on certain areas. This was aimed at allowing Denmark to take part in


anti-terror measures after the adoption of the EU Constitutional Treaty (which would introduce more QMV in justice and home affairs), while staying outside EU policy concerning immigration (Rasmussen, 2003c). There was generally significant domestic Danish interest in the field of anti-terrorism and the links to action in the EU. The Folketing supported the EU’s JHA measures, although many MPs felt that the procedures were too fast given what they saw as the profound nature of the changes. Others were against the EU framework decisions, arguing that these measures were just as much a threat as terrorism itself since the definition of terrorism was too broad! (Dahllöf, 2001). As for the external side of EU action, this was generally supported. The substantial domestic disagreements with regard to the use of the EU, however, exploded with regard to the more offensive US approach to the ‘axis of evil’ countries, and, in particular, the war against Iraq. The argument from the centre-left, drawing on the opposing discourse mentioned above, was increasingly from 2002 that on issues of global terrorism, Denmark should work for a stronger EU position along the lines of the Franco-German views rather than (what they saw as) the focus on the bilateral relationship with the US. There were substantive disagreements on the Danish participation in the war against Iraq (Carlsen and Mouritzen, 2003: 214–15). Immediately after the war was over, public opinion tended to become more supportive, but as the coalition ran into military difficulties in Iraq significant parts of public opinion again turned sceptical towards the military presence in that country. It is difficult to discern whether a joint EU stance was supported as the question was not asked in polls. The level of Danish activity within the EU is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Constitutive effects We can distinguish analytically between the internal and the external aspects of EU anti-terror concepts. Internally, the so-called terror package in December 2001 should ensure that Denmark lived up to various decisions on anti-terrorism in the UN and the EU (N. Petersen, 2002). Central parts of the legislation prepared by the Danish government in October 2001 and quickly passed in the Folketing in December 2001 bore a close resemblance to the proposal from the Commission. There were similarities both in the terms used and in the order of the elements in the legislation, a point that was noted in the select committee report on the law (Dahllöf, 2001). The central formulations of art. 114 in the Danish penal code came to include a definition of terrorism which was


A Denmark (P)

Danish level of activity is high – apart from in areas affected by the Danish exemptions

EU Figure 4.3 Level of Danish policy activity within the EU

close to the EU’s. There was no such definition in Danish law before (Regeringen, 2004a: 19). With regard to the interpretation of new central passages in art. 114, the Danish Ministry of Justice has referred to the EU declaration accompanying the EU anti-terror framework agreement on the fight against terrorism as a framework for interpreting Danish law. The later Danish implementation of the EU framework decision on a European arrest order was also an introduction of concepts which had not been present in Danish law before. This suggests that elements of EU language were imported. As for the external side, there were few clear signs of Danish import of EU language. EU political declarations on terrorism post-11 September concerning the fundamental understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism and the way to deal with it, did not suggest an incorporation of EU language into Danish language. EU declarations with regard to Iraq were carefully drafted compromises between member states based on the lowest common denominator. If there was any import of concepts in the Danish political context, it could also be from the language in the general Western political context, the UN and, indeed, the US political language. The official Danish language used on anti-terrorism had similarities to the dominant language used in Washington rather than to specific EU discourses. This was, for example, the case in relation to the US use of the ‘axis of evil’ from 2002, where Denmark did not distance itself from the US in the same language as some EU partners did. In a debate in the Folketing on 20 February 2002, the Foreign Minister, when questioned about the appropriateness of the concept, ‘axis of evil’, did not answer explicitly but referred to the serious character of the threat of terrorism and the necessity of loyalty to the US (Møller, 2002a). In the political debate before and after the Iraq war


(C)

Denmark

Indications of import of EU justice and home affairs concepts into Danish legal/ political language

EU

Figure 4.4 Constitutive effects?

it was the opinion of many analysts that the official Danish discourse in justification of the war, to a large extent, followed the movements in the Anglo-American discourse in this area (Sønderriis, 2002; Suane, 2003; Metz, 2004). However, there were also aspects in the official Danish discourse which can be seen as drawing on ‘external’ EU concepts. Elements in the EU security strategy were drawn on in autumn 2003 by the Danish Foreign Minister. As a summary of an expert meeting on ‘new security threats’, the Danish Foreign Minister presented the main threats in the same terms and with the same priorities as in the EU security strategy where terrorism was mentioned first. Reference was explicitly made to the security strategy (Møller, 2003). The security strategy may not have constituted a clear break with Danish conceptualisations and its creation may have been actively encouraged by Denmark. But the use in Danish speeches of EU conceptualisations can nevertheless be seen as an example of EU constitutive effects. The issue of import of EU language in this field is illustrated in Figure 4.4.

III. Conclusions 1. Inside or outside the EU? Danish policy on terrorism has been carried out under the auspices of the EU in relation to non-military and long-term measures. This has particularly been the case with regard to the intra-European legal and cooperative measures, but also the general political and economic aspects of anti-terror measures towards the rest of the world. At the same time, however, Danish policy has also been conducted in other organisational fora and bilaterally: in the UN (where there was also EU coordination)


and in NATO. The bilateral relationship with the US has been a central lieu in which Danish policy in this area has been conducted, not least with respect to the military dimension. The most important bilateral relationships in terms of resources have been the countries selected for Danish development aid. 2. An active or non-active policy? Denmark can be characterised as active in this field when compared with other Danish foreign policy areas. The exception to this generally active line are the areas affected by the Danish exemptions in the field of defence and justice and home affairs. Copenhagen supports a further extension of the EU’s role in this field. 3. Constitutive effects? The examples presented suggested some EU conceptualisations in Danish policy with regard to JHA measures against terrorism, and to a much lesser extent with regard to overall EU conceptualisation of security. 4. Why this state of affairs? (a) EU frame The EU’s anti-terror policy can be seen as uneven, that is consisting of both strong and weak elements which is also the perception by Danish practitioners in the field. EU policy is strong with regard to the intra-EU measures in justice and home affairs, although the member states’ speed of implementation varies just as the level of police and intelligence cooperation in relation to operational aspects. The links to the general JHA area, however, has given the measures a legal character so far unknown in the field of security in the EU. The integration of antiterrorist measures into the Union’s external activities including development has made it a strong policy in so far as there are links between politics and economics – in particular with regard to the many EU agreements with most parts of the world. However, in certain areas there is no substantial EU policy due to disagreements among member states. The issue of the war against Iraq and its aftermath is an area where there has de facto been no Union policy.7 (b) Danish actorness Terrorism has from 11 September 2001 been defined as a central priority in Danish foreign and security policy, and ‘Denmark’ is strongly articulated as an actor in this field including its military aspects. In most policy contexts, the EU and Denmark are articulated so that both can be


discerned as actors, that is as ‘Denmark’ and ‘the EU’. Articulations with regard to Denmark and the EU are predominantly instrumental articulations where Denmark draws on the EU for furthering its anti-terror aims. However, the articulation with the EU is the most common articulation of ‘Denmark’ with other actors when the subject is general political and economic measures – particularly of a long-term character. There is an opposing political discourse8 which also articulates Denmark as an actor in the field of anti-terrorism, but does not see military action with the US directly against alleged terrorists as following from this actorness. The presence of these two elements (mixed strength of EU policy and a strong Danish articulation of actorness) can serve to understand that Danish policy is conducted both inside and outside the EU. As there are areas where EU policy is not resourceful and comprehensive (the military field, Iraq), this accounts for a significant number of Danish policies outside the EU in some areas as Denmark has ambitions to participate across policy fields due to the strong articulation of actorness. At the same time, the Danish defence exemption can also be seen as part of the background for Danish policy conducted outside the EU: Denmark has had to act outside the EU to express its willingness to contribute to international order militarily, the most important examples of which have been the military actions with the US from the late 1990s. However, the actions and the strong feeling of affiliation with the US cannot only be seen as grounded in the defence exemption. Even without the exemptions Denmark is likely to be an Atlanticist country (Larsen, 2004). It can, of course, be argued that the reason why the EU has not had any policy in certain fields is exactly because countries like Denmark have prevented it. However, it is not right to conceive of this as a question of certain countries preventing an EU policy on anti-terrorism. The key problem has been disagreements within the EU about what EU policy should be – not the desirability of an EU policy as such. As for the active Danish policy within the field of anti-terrorism, the possibilities of the EU framework in terms of combining political, economic and legal means combined with strong Danish actorness, account for the Danish level of activity and the wish for an extension of the EU framework in this field. It is not least in this way that one can understand the instrumental articulation of ‘Denmark’ with ‘the EU’. The exception are the areas affected by the Danish exemptions. The grounds for this lie in the presence of two different understandings in Denmark in relation to the EU as a security actor:9 the dominant one argues that the EU could and should be a security actor and thus also in


Some areas of EU foreign policy are not resourceful and comprehensive (military security, Iraq)

(C)

Denmark

EU

A (P)

Some areas of EU foreign policy are (very) resourceful and comprehensive (legal affairs, broad political and economic measures)

Strong articulation of Danish actorness

Figure 4.5 Why this state of affairs? The background of Danish policy. A summary

the field of anti-terrorism. The opposing understanding lies behind the Edinburgh exemptions. This limits Danish participation in concrete aspects of EU anti-terror policy (see Græger et al., 2002). The suggested incorporation of EU concepts in justice and domestic affairs may appear puzzling. However, the way in which Danish legislation was adopted in this field indicates the way in which the strong Danish actorness played a role. Thus the fast incorporation of these EU anti-terror measures into Danish legislation can be seen as an expression of willingness to obtain legal concepts in an area which was considered crucial post-11 September and where there were no existing Danish legal concepts.10 It was not because of a lack of agency in this field that Denmark incorporated EU concepts but rather the opposite. The Danish government took advantage of the possibilities offered by the EU (see, for example, Jensen, 2001). The suggested, limited incorporation of other EU concepts in the field of general international security is an expression of how in some areas EU concepts could be drawn on despite the strong Danish actorness in this field. The relationship between Danish and EU anti-terror policy has elements of both categories 2 and 3 outlined in Chapter 2. The articulation of Danish agency is strong, but there are areas of high politics where EU foreign policy is not intensive and resourceful, coming close to non-existence, and others where it is intensive (or very intensive) and resourceful. Figure 4.5 illustrates the relationship between Danish and EU policy in this field and its background.11

5 The Balkans

In this chapter we return to Europe again. But here the subject is an area outside the EU, the Balkans. In this chapter, the ‘Balkans’ refers to the five states, Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and SerbiaMontenegro including Kosovo. In official Danish and EU documents, this grouping of states is often referred to as the West Balkans. The focus in the chapter is the period after the 1999 Kosovo war.

I. The EU Background, concepts and actorness The EU presented itself as an actor in the post-Cold War Yugoslav crisis. The statement made by the Luxembourg President of the European Council Jacques Poos that this was the hour of Europe in spring 1991 epitomised the predominant feeling that the EU had a special responsibility and interest in the regional crisis. It was initially seen as a European crisis for which the Europeans were mainly responsible and where US intervention was not at first expected (Ginsberg, 2001: Ch. 4; Hill, 1998b: 20). The dominant Western and EU discourse had been one which claimed that the Balkans, due to its special character, were prone to everlasting war and conflict (Hansen, 1998). The primary policy implication of this was a focus on containing the conflicts in the region in order for them not to spread. Although conflicts did not spread to outside the Balkans, the EU was not successful in its attempts to reconcile the conflicting parties,1 and the UN and NATO were drawn into the area. As difficulties arose for it in the early 1990s, it presented its ambitions in the Balkans in more modest terms.2 102

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But in the second half of the 1990s and, in particular, after the 1998–99 Kosovo crisis, EU ambitions for the region rose again. The conflict in Kosovo was articulated as something in relation to which the Europeans could not stand idle. According to the conclusions of the March 1999 European Council, ‘On the threshold of the 21st century, Europe cannot tolerate a humanitarian catastrophe in its midst … we are responsible for securing peace and cooperation in the region’ (cited in Hill and Smith, 2000: 393). From the late 1990s onwards, the Balkan crisis was also presented as a test for the CFSP (Larsen, 2002). After the Kosovo conflict, two key elements in the EU understanding were articulated, framing EU policies: that democracy, rule of law, human rights and a market economy had a beneficial effect on peace and stability (as generally found in EU foreign policy). And that the countries in the West Balkans were considered part of the European family of states which would not be complete until they had become members of the EU. The then Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, said in 2003 that ‘the map of the EU will not be complete until the countries of the Western Balkans are included on it. There is a great deal of work to do …’ (Chris Patten quoted in Commission, 2003c). The language framing the policy towards the region, then, moved from one of management of crisis and conflict towards a mixed language where the Balkan states were at one and the same time described as countries under preparation for their future membership to the EU and the objects of crisis management, the so-called ‘regional approach’. Thus the Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans, decided at the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 16 June 2003, characteristically had as its first heading ‘Moving towards European integration’ and as the subsequent subheading ‘Further consolidating peace and promoting stability and democratic development’ (Council, 2003b). There was, then, a shift from a dominant discourse of containment and the Balkans as a region marred by inevitable conflicts towards seeing the Balkans as part of the EU/European self. The language relating to the membership perspective increasingly resembled the language used in relation to the CEE countries and their membership perspective from the early 1990s, with terms such as ‘own merits’, ‘catch up’, ‘regional co-operation’ (Council, 2003b: 12) and the ‘Copenhagen criteria’. Policies and priorities The dedication by the EU of political, diplomatic and economic resources in quantitative terms increased from the early 1990s, but in


qualitative terms the EU’s absence of political will on important points and the lack of military means were severe weaknesses in the complex set of regional conflicts in the 1990s. A significant weakness of Union policy was the lack of ability to act in rapidly changing and complex situations – which was the menu of the day for the Balkans crisis in the 1990s. However, the EU’s policy instruments became much more forceful as the immediate and military elements of the crisis receded. From 1999/2000, the role of the EU in the region became more prominent. EU policy became more intense, more resourceful and more long-term due to the membership perspective introduced. The background to the more prominent role was the change of regime in Serbia, the strengthened democratic processes in the region through a democratic ousting of leaders in several countries and subsequent preferences in the countries for membership of the EU. It was also furthered by the relative peace among the ex-Yugoslav republics. At a more institutional level, the appointment of an EU High Representative added to the EU’s capacity for sustained diplomatic action. In addition to this, the St Malo process had provided the EU with a (modest) military capacity which was first drawn on in Macedonia in March 2003. During the military action against Serbia in 1999, hints had been dropped by EU member states about a swift path to EU membership for the countries which cooperated in the Kosovo conflict against Belgrade. This became the initial step in the new role for the EU in the region (Hill and Smith, 2000: 385–6). And it led onto a political path in which the EU was strong. The Union was from 2000 effectively conducting the very early stages of a pre-accession strategy for the countries in the Balkans. The agreement was significant. It was the expression of an overarching consensus among member states which seemed able to serve as a guide to practical policy in the face of difficulties. After the Kosovo war, two mutually sustaining lines of EU policy could be identified – one regional/multilateral, the other bilateral. At the regional level, the EU proposed a new Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for South-eastern Europe to replace the earlier regional strategy. For the countries of the West Balkans what was on offer was not just a cooperation agreement but a Stability and Association Agreement (SAA). The countries were offered this kind of agreement if they made progress in relation to democratic principles, human rights, rule of law, regional cooperation, a market economy and the implementation of the Dayton Agreement – progress which should be reviewed regularly by the Commission (Council, 2000). This process which became characterised as the ‘centrepiece of the Union’s policy in the Balkans’, consisted in

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providing the five West Balkan countries with the prospect of participation in European integration (Council, 2001a: 2). The Summit of Heads of State and Government of 24 November 2000 between the EU and the five countries of West Balkans confirmed that those five countries were potential candidates for EU accession. With a membership prospect invoked, the policy has struck a new chord. The EU described the SAA as ‘an anchor for reform in the Western Balkans’ and likened the SAA process to the accession of the CEE countries (Council, 2002a: 4). At the European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003, the EU added elements drawn from the accession process of the CEE countries to the SAP (strengthened political cooperation, enhanced support for institution building, promotion of trade and the possibility to participate in certain Community Programmes) that were very similar to the ones applied to Central and Eastern Europe after the 1993 Copenhagen summit. The EU’s instruments through which the countries are prepared for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement are an assistance programme (CARDS), technical advice, trade preferences and cooperation in fields such as justice and home affairs and political dialogue. The Community aid programme for the countries engaged in this process is endowed with a financial reference amount of 5.65 billion euro for the period 2000–6 (Petersen, 2001: 17–19). Community assistance is also given in the form of humanitarian aid. Community aid is thus allocated to the triple tasks of furthering regional cooperation, the development of infrastructure in the broadest sense of the term and humanitarian aid (diminishing). Macedonia (FYROM) was the first country in the region to be invited to sign an Association Agreement in April 2001 linked to the EU’s diplomatic efforts with regard to the conflict in the country in 2001. The other countries are at different stages in the negotiation process for an SAA with the EU. The second EU policy element at the regional level was the stability pact for South-eastern Europe set up in May 1999 to embed the political solution to the Kosovo crisis in a broader framework (see the EU Common Position on 17 May 1999 published in Hill and Smith, 2000: 397). The initiative is supported by a community of more than 40 countries. But the EU plays the leading political and economic role. The Union has appointed a Special Coordinator for the pact. The main added value of the Stability Pact is seen as lying in its ability to promote political agreement on greater regional cooperation (Council, 2002b: 8). At the bilateral level, the EU engaged in diplomacy which in terms of both intensity and resources went further than the EU efforts in the


early 1990s. The EU, in particular through its High Representative Solana, was very active in the process of removing President Milosovic from power and bringing about a democratic change in Serbia. A Common Position was adopted in February 2000 aimed at supporting democratic forces in the FRY (Council, 2001a: 43). After Vojislav Kostinica’s victory in the Serbian presidential elections in October 2000, the FRY was invited to participate in the SAP (Council, 2001a: 4). Subsequently the EU through High Representative Solana has conducted a very active diplomacy aimed at keeping Serbia and Montenegro together on a new constitutional basis lest there was yet another regional split-up. In the EU’s diplomacy, a clear link has been made between an agreement on constitutional arrangements that would keep the two republics together, on the one hand, and progress towards partipation in the EU integration process on the other (Council, 2002b: 6). In Macedonia (FYROM), a civil war broke out in the first half of 2001 as parts of the ethnic Albanian minority took up arms. The EU underlined its strong attachment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FYROM and saw the conflict as threatening the stability of the region. It supported the FYROM government’s efforts to solve the conflict. The EU’s presence in FYROM was strengthened by the appointment of a resident representative of the EU to act under the authority of Solana. Both engaged in intensive diplomatic efforts, accompanied by parallel Commission activities. These efforts, in close cooperation with NATO and the US in the region, were, in the words of the Council, ‘instrumental’ for the conclusion of the so-called Ohrid framework agreement in August 2001 and the subsquent adoption of the necessary constitutional amendments relating to the rights of the ethnic Albanians. The EU granted additional macro-financial aid conditional on the implementation of the Ohrid agreement. There was a deployment of 54 EUMM observers in FYROM together with observers from the OSCE to stabilise the situation. In April 2003, the EU took over from NATO in operation Concordia – the first time ever that military forces were deployed by the EU; 350 men (approximately half the size of the original NATO force) took part in the operation which drew on NATO’s facilities. The force was replaced by an EU police force in December 2003. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Union’s presence was also strengthened. The appointment of Paddy Ashdown as the EU’s Special Representative in March 2002 meant that Ashdown’s position would be double-hatted as he was also the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia. The Union presented this as a signal of how the future of

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Bosnia lay in integration into European structures (Council, 2003a: 50). The EU took over the police operation in Bosnia-Hercegovina from the UN in January 2003 and the military operation from NATO in 2005. Compared with the other areas examined in this book, the Balkans represent the area where the greatest number of formal CFSP instruments and resources have been used. The Balkans have been a permanent item on the agenda of EU foreign ministers from the early 1990s (if to a somewhat lesser extent after Kosovo). The whole panoply of EU instruments in terms of common positions, joint actions, declarations and sanctions/ carrots have been used, far exceeding anything attempted in, for example, Africa. Special representatives were appointed. The post as High Representative created in 1999 made the EU better armed for diplomacy and mediation and was more than anything else engaged in the former Yugoslavia. Considerable economic means were used to support this policy and to provide humanitarian assistance. Since 1991 the EU has provided more than 7 billion euro in assistance to countries in the region. In the year 2000, a six-year programme of 5.65 billion euro was agreed for the Western Balkans (Petersen, 2001: 19). Compared to other geographical areas, this was one of the highest allocations of economic means per capita only surpassed by the means allocated to the CEE applicant states. The strengthening and intensification of the EU’s policy in the region post-1999 did not, however, mean that a track had been laid out which automatically projects EU policy into the future. An important criticism of Union policy in the Balkans after Kosovo has been that, although the ambitions are clear, the matching economic funding is not projected into the future and that the strength and intensity of the policy will not necessarily be maintained (K. Smith, 2003: 238). Moreover, the strengthening of EU policy in the Balkans has not meant that general problems in the EU foreign policy machinery have disappeared. The general problem of coordination between the activities in the Community pillar and the CFSP pillar, could also be identified in the Union’s policy in the Balkans – also among the representatives on the ground. In summary, compared with the anti-terror area (and as we shall see in the areas which follow), the EU policy towards the Balkans post-Kosovo must be characterised as the most resourceful, most long-term and most intensive. The de facto pre-accession strategy comprised a policy with a high level of detail in bilateral policy and regional activities. The SAP expressed a high degree of agreement about the long-term visions for the region, illustrative of the fact that post-Kosovo internal differences between member states’ policy aims in the region had


diminished. The EU crisis management diplomacy was the most intense and efficient example of Union diplomacy issuing from the second pillar, although problems of external consistency and a full military capacity remained.

II. Denmark Background, concepts and actorness Denmark cannot be said to have any traditional aims or ambitions in the Balkans. Lene Hansen’s (1998) description of the dominant Western discourse on the Balkans as a region with special, inherent social features that doomed it to conflict was arguably also dominant in Denmark and the Nordic countries.3 Denmark had been against an involvement in that part of the world, opposing Greek and Turkish membership of NATO in the 1950s due to fear of excessive geopolitical commitments. The Balkans were not considered part of the Danish regional security environment (in contrast to the Baltic Sea region) (see SNU, 1995: Ch. 7; Forsvarsministeriet, 1998: Ch. 1). There were no particular cultural or historical links to any of the countries in the Balkan region. Danish concerns about the Balkans post-Cold War were based on considerations for the wider consequences for European stability, the humanitarian aspects of the problems of the Balkans and the implications in terms of refugees. Danish concerns stemmed from an increased willingness to take responsibility for the management of international crises after the Cold War, in particular in Europe (SNU, 1995: 285, 301). Thus the dominant Danish understandings about active internationalism including its military components, and the construction of Europe as the primary focus for Danish foreign and security policy – rather than a concern for the Balkans as such – provided the broad framework of meaning for Danish policy towards the Balkans in the post-Cold War period. ‘Denmark’ was the subject of, and point of departure for, international action in the Balkans, although to varying degrees ‘with’, ‘within’ or ‘through’ multilateral fora. Although there are many contexts and issue areas where Danish agency is co-articulated with multilateral agency, the overall context of political debate, official government material and semi-official reports is about how to further the interests and influence of the unit ‘Denmark’. At the same time, the enlarging EU is increasingly presented as the pivot for the European cooperative structures. According to the Danish 2002 EU presidency’s programme ‘The EU plays a major and essential role in the Western Balkans’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2002d: 30; see also

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Udenrigsministeriet, 2003a: 17). EU membership for the five West Balkan states is a long-term aim that is strongly shared by Denmark. The broader context of this is the link between the enlargement processes in the Balkans and the long-held Danish vision of a broad, cooperative Europe, originally emphasised in relation to the OSCE during the Cold War, but now primarily also embodied in the EU: ‘The vision of an open Europe based on peace, stability and democracy must be maintained. … The primary efforts must be made through the EU …’ (Regeringen, 2003a: 10). Danish political endeavours are presented as a combination of initiatives through the EU and focused bilateral initiatives: Denmark’s contribution shall be a combination of involvements through the EU and focused bilateral involvement. … The new enlarged EU now presents itself as the pivot for European cooperation, stability and development. This is both the case in relation to the new member states, [and] the situation in the Balkans. … (Regeringen, 2003b: 6)

EU and articulation of Danish actorness in the Balkans In the 1990s, Danish actorness in official language in relation to the Balkans was frequently co-articulated with multilateral actors but ‘Denmark’ was also an acting subject. The articulations of ‘Denmark’ as an actor were frequent in relation to the Danish contribution to peacekeeping operations and, to a lesser extent, civilian observers, police and aid.4 An information booklet from the Danish Foreign Ministry lines up the areas in which Danish actorness was typically articulated in the 1990s: Denmark has in all aspects of the international efforts contributed significantly in relation to the Western Balkans. Danish soldiers have thus been sent out … [together with], military and civilian observers and policemen … Denmark has … contributed personnel to the OSCE, … . Add to this that Denmark has granted extensive aid for reconstruction. (Udenrigsministeriet, 1999a: 35) In many contexts where the stated aim was to present Danish foreign policy, there were only descriptions of the actions of the multilateral frameworks present in the Balkans and no declarations of Denmark’s own aims or actions. However, actorness was frequently referred to as ‘Denmark’ acting through a multilateral framework in the


form of ‘Denmark supported the UN/NATO/OSCE/EU/the international community’ or ‘Denmark contributed to … ’. In these contexts the reference to ‘Denmark supports … ’ was often in the same areas in which articulations of separate actorness could also be found such as military contributions to peace-supporting operations, police operations or aid (see for example Udenrigsministeriet, 1999b: 127–9; 2000g: 164–5; Petersen, 1999: 22–3). Co-articulations could also be found with the EU in political contexts, but were not as pervasive.5 After the 1999 Kosovo conflict, co-articulations with the EU have become more common. There are articulations of agency in relation to the Balkans where only EU agency is mentioned in accounts of Danish foreign policy (see for example Udenrigsministeriet, 2001c: 118–19). The EU is presented as the central organisational framework within or through which Denmark acts. Danish agency outside the EU is described as a supplement to general EU action: In the Balkans, the EU has made an important contribution6 to stability and peaceful development. … It is not least for this reason that we must maintain and exert influence on continued strong EU involvement in the Balkans and supplement this with Danish bilateral initiatives aimed at securing stability, democracy and economic growth. (Regeringen, 2003a: 11; see also Regeringen, 2003b: 7) Co-articulations of Danish agency with other multilateral organisations are still made. However, the EU is articulated as the main organisation through which Danish policy towards the region is conducted, and which defines which bilateral Danish efforts are useful – that is, the substance of separate Danish agency (see Udenrigsministeriet, 2003a, b: 23). The new stress on the EU’s pivotal role in the Balkans has been maintained across changes of government. The Social Democrat Foreign Minister Mogens Lykketoft (2000–1) thus stated on 23 August 2001 that ‘A European Union with double as many countries as today is the most beautiful initiative for neighbour solidarity and long-term security. … The prospect is that the Stabilisation and Association Agreements … are extended to the Western Balkans …’ (Christensen and Wæver, 2002: 264–5).7 The policy platform of the Liberal–Conservative government of 26 November 2001 read: ‘In the field of the CFSP we will work to to ensure maximum unity in the EU’s position in the world including in the Balkans and the Middle East’ (Regeringen, 2001; the Balkans were not mentioned in relation to any other international organisations in the government’s policy platform).

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Denmark

General articulations of Danish agency in relation to European security on the basis of active internationalism

Denmark + IO

Danish agency in relation to the Balkans is predominantly articulated with the EU – in different forms

Danish agency is also articulated with other international organisations

Denmark + EU

Denmark

Denmark EU

EU


In the middle of the first decade after the new millennium there is, then, an articulation of general Danish agency in relation to the Balkans based on the importance attributed to European security and active internationalism. The EU is presented as the pivotal multilateral structure in the Balkans. Danish agency is often articulated in relation to strengthening the EU’s position or acting through the EU (‘within’, ‘through’ ‘Denmark and the EU’). Where individual Danish agency is articulated in relation to concrete policy measures, this is frequently presented as complementary to the EU. However, at the same time separate Danish agency is still expressed vis-à-vis the other multilateral organisations present in the Balkans – the UN, NATO and the OSCE (see Figure 5.1). The shift in the Danish articulations of agency with respect to the Balkans can be seen as closely linked to the political developments in the Balkans. Danish articulations have adapted to the fact that the EU is now engaged in a pre-accession strategy in the Balkans while NATO’s role here is diminishing. Policies and priorities Danish policy in the 1990s was conducted in different multilateral fora (UN, OSCE, NATO/PfP) with the EU as an important forum on certain issues. The EU’s intense and resourceful policy in some areas made it an important forum for Danish policy – but not the only one. There were no explicit Danish calls for raising the profile of the EU. When UN and later NATO intervention in the conflicts occurred after initial EU crisis


management efforts, Denmark contributed significant numbers of military personnel and police to the efforts in these two organisations relative to its size (on average 800 men). The significant bilateral and multilateral contributions to humanitarian aid and reconstruction, together with multilateral military contributions, were the most tangible Danish contributions in the Balkans during the conflicts of the 1990s. This provided a background for a political (and public) focus on the military components of Danish policy and to a lesser extent the police effort. The smaller number of Danish ECMM monitors and participants in OSCE missions were the object of much less political interest. In general, Denmark supported the UN and other multilateral organisations’ involvement in the Balkans conflict. It was strongly supportive of an important OSCE role. This general multilateral approach in the crisis distinguished it from other EU countries such as the Netherlands who placed a stronger emphasis on the EU (Tonra, 2001: 223–5). Danish policy towards the Balkan crisis was conducted through the OSCE, UN and NATO as well as the EU. Nonetheless, the EU represented a key forum for Denmark for multilateral political reactions on day-to-day events, policy endeavours of a regional character and for the activities of which the EU was in charge (such as the civil implementation of the Dayton Agreement). Bilateral action was supported by the opening of embassies in the new countries in the Balkans, if not in all. Embassies were opened in Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Albania and the embassy was maintained in Serbia/Montenegro (FRY). The choice of countries in which to open new embassies did not, apart from the continuation in Belgrade, stem from historic or cultural links with particular countries but from current concerns (military presence, police presence, aid) and considerations about future EU membership (Slovenia) (interview, MFA).

From 1999/2000, after the Kosovo conflict, Danish policy has been conducted through the EU as the most operational political forum. The main factor in bringing about this development has been the development of EU policy in line with the more prominent role of the EU in the Balkans post-Kosovo. Danish policy towards the region, post-Kosovo, is conducted along two main lines, bilateral and multilateral measures: the bilateral policy measures have to a large extent taken the form of aid and assistance to countries in the region. These have been concentrated on Bosnia,

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Kosovo, Albania and Serbia. After the Kosovo war in 1999, a Danish action plan for aid to the Western Balkans was drafted. In 2002 the aid to these countries was 235 million Danish crowns (approx. 35 million euro), 4 per cent of total Danish bilateral aid (Udenrigsministeriet, 2003a: 24). The so-called Neighbourhood Programme of 2004 is a merger of various smaller aid programmes aimed at the EU’s new neighbours: 850 million Danish crowns (approx. 110 million euro) will be spent over a four-year period mainly in the Baltic Sea region and in the Balkans both of which will have high priority in the programme. Part of the stated aim is to strengthen the Danish position in the region and to give Danish views weight within the EU (Regeringen, 2003a: 10–11). The focus will be on democracy, human rights, reforms of the justice system, civil society and the media, plus security and stability (Udenrigsministeriet, 2003b: 6). These long-term concerns have also underpinned Danish contributions to international organisations in general (UN, OSCE, EU). Danish bilateral aid to the Balkans has not been aimed at the construction of the physical infrastructure as the aid is not understood as development aid.8 Compared with other EU countries, Danish bilateral aid, relative to the size of the country, is high (Petersen, 2001: 18). Generally, there is an overlap between aid and the political interest in the selected countries, although this is less clear in the case of Albania. The political focus is on Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo. As Croatia is coming closer to EU candidate status, interest in this country is also increasing as part of the effort to gain new allies within the EU. The view is that Danish foreign policy has few resources at its disposal, and this necessitates choices. The aim for the future is a concentration of Denmark’s efforts to obtain a synergy between activities in fewer countries in the Balkans so that Denmark becomes a relevant actor with some influence in the region. However, there are few illusions about major political effects of Denmark’s bilateral efforts. But as a minimum, Copenhagen can always ‘stand up and be counted’, that is, show political presence in the region by its stances (interview, MFA). As far as Danish policy in multilateral frameworks in relation to the Balkans is concerned, Danish stances are expressed in four contexts: the OSCE, the UN, NATO and the EU. The OSCE is seen as playing a significant role in the Balkans on issues such as electoral support, the furthering of democratic institutions and human rights – not least in Kosovo (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000g: 164). Although there is EU coordination within the OSCE, Danish policy is that, while EU coordination in the OSCE is useful, a unitary EU voice is inter alia seen to limit the


possibilities for dialogue with Russia and the US (interview, MFA). Although there are limits to the OSCE’s role, it has an important part to play in the Balkans. It is the official Danish view that the substance of the issues should determine whether the OSCE should have an independent role in the Balkans in particular areas. There is thus a Danish policy emphasis on the OSCE’s role in the Balkans which leads to support for an independent role for the OSCE in certain areas and to reluctance towards the EU speaking with a unitary voice in the OSCE (see speech of Foreign Minister Lykketoft, 16 May 2001, in Christensen and Wæver, 2002: 398–414). With regard to the UN, Denmark has supported the UN missions in the Balkans. It has contributed personnel and financial means to UNMIK in Kosovo, the latter also through the EU’s responsibility for the economic pillar under UNMIK. In January 2001 the former Danish Defence Minister, Hans Hækkerup, was appointed as the UN Special Representative in Kosovo and thus Head of UNMIK (a post which he only held for a year). The prominent UN envoy for refugees Søren Jessen-Petersen is a Dane. Denmark also contributes an observer to the UNMOP mission in Croatia (Christensen and Wæver, 2002: 719). Concerning NATO, Denmark has contributed on average about 800 soldiers to the NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia since the deployment in 1995. In 2003 the remaining Danish forces were withdrawn as part of the completion of the military part of the Dayton Agreement. Denmark has also contributed forces to the NATO-led KFOR in Kosovo after 1999 (approx. 400 men in autumn 2004). A Danish major-general has been leader of KFOR forces in Macedonia and Albania and senior military representative of NATO in Macedonia (COMKFOR REAR). Danish forces also contributed to NATO’s operation Amber Fox in Macedonia from 2001 to March 2003, aimed at protecting the international observers in parallel with the EU’s and the OSCE’s efforts (Christensen and Wæver, 2002: 712–15). In April 2003 the force was replaced by the EU operation, Concordia, on which occasion the Danish forces were withdrawn as a consequence of the Danish defence exemption (the force was replaced in December 2003 by the EU police mission PROXIMITA where Denmark played a prominent role through its leader, a Danish national). The EU framework is the most important organisational and operational framework for Danish policy in the region towards the middle of the first decade of the new millennium. The SAP is attributed crucial regional importance and is characterised by the Danish Foreign Ministry as ‘the overall strategy towards the countries of the Balkans’ (author’s emphasis) (Petersen, 2001: 19).

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The EU is not only seen as central because of its long-term aims for the region, but also because of its concrete impact on peace and stability in the region now – an evaluation one could not find in such a sharp form in Danish policy in the 1990s. The EU is seen as by politicians and practitioners as being able to use a much broader range of instruments in crisis management in the region than any other actor (interview, MFA). The Union’s actions in the region since the Kosovo war are generally seen as successful and not ridden by the same degree of disagreements as in the 1990s (interviews Danish Parliament, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The dominant view is that the EU provides the framework for the political processes within which Denmark acts. Generally, the assumption, in the words of a high-ranking official in the MFA, is that ‘… we have got a bilateral relationship with all the countries … we have got many troops down there, we have got aid programmes … but the overarching framework at the end of the day remains the EU’s policy towards the countries’ (interview, MFA). According to another official participating in the implementation of Denmark’s policy towards the region, ‘We cannot really influence the political process that much bilaterally. I mean not decisively. But we have got the possibility to support the right things within the EU …’ (interview, MFA). The former Foreign Minister, Mogens Lykketoft (2000–1), has also stressed the central role of the EU and the limited role of bilateral measures not least in the field of conflict prevention (interview with Lykketoft). Danish (aid) policy can also be seen as shaped within the framework of the OSCE and the UN organisations as well as the EU since the complementary nature of Danish aid to these organisations is also stressed in official contexts. But the dominant reference is to the complementarity to the EU (see, for example, Forsvarsministeriet m.fl., 2002: 23, 28). As the EU is by far the biggest donor in the region, coordination with the EU is also the most obvious. Danish policy inside and outside the EU is illustrated in Figure 5.2. Within the EU, Denmark has put forward views on both geographical and thematic issues. Geographically the level of activity within the EU has been highest where Copenhagen has a military presence, where it has granted bilateral aid and where EU membership of the country concerned is less distant. The interest in the political development has been strongest in relation to Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Croatia. In terms of aid, the interest has focused on the synergy between Community aid and Danish aid in Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia. Thematically, the emphasis has been on the development of (1) justice systems, (2) law and order including police structures, and (3) democratisation. One of


Danish policy is primarily conducted within the EU Denmark

Some supplementary bilateral policy

EU Figure 5.2 Danish policy inside or outside the EU?

the most prominent Danish policy engagements within the EU has been in relation to the police (Udenrigsministeriet, 2002d: 31; 2003a: 17; 2003b: 23). Concerning Serbia, Denmark put forward a proposal with the UK in 2000 concerning democratisation, and belonged to the group of countries which quickly pushed for support for the new regime after the fall of Milosovic (interview with Lykketoft). It was singled out as an achievement of the Danish presidency that a mandate for opening negotiations for an SAA with Albania in 2002 was decided (Udenrigsministeriet, 2003a: 17). There is a special situation in relation to the EU military operations in Macedonia and Bosnia: Copenhagen has not taken part in the decisions in this field due to the defence exemption and has kept a very low profile here; but the Danish government has supported the ESDP development in the Balkans in general terms, in spite of not being able to take part in EU military operations herself. The Danish level of activity has only been constrained in very specific fields so far as a consequence of the exemption. The Danish level of activity within the EU can be characterised as medium, that is not as active as on anti-terror, development or Africa, but more active than on Latin America (see the following chapters). An experienced practitioner judges the level of political activity as ‘decent’ without being high. According to the same practitioner, ‘Denmark is placed as well as it can’ in the EU context, suggesting that this is a level of activity that cannot easily be increased given the circumstances (interview, MFA). It has been argued that generally countries are heard in relation to EU foreign policy on the basis of their concrete engagement in the policy area concerned. Expressions of concrete interests are listened to more than promotion of abstract principles (Tonra, 1997: 195). In line with this, the judgement of a centrally placed official is that

The Balkans 117

the Danish military presence in the region has made a difference from countries with less of a presence. Denmark’s military presence extends Denmark’s ‘visiting hours’ within the EU context – but not infinitely! The same is the case with Danish aid to the region, the political value of which is, however, judged to be less than the military presence. There are limits to the possible level of activity given Denmark’s level of engagement in the region. Another limit on an active line are the national resources or ‘energy’ to do so. While there are some possibilities for shaping the EU’s approach, there are restrictions on how far small states can promote individual initiatives in the EU (interview, MFA). Generally speaking, the Danish domestic political environment and public attention in relation to the Balkans have concentrated on the dramatic military aspects of the crisis. Following from that, the focus in Denmark’s contribution has been on the Danish endeavours in peacesupporting operations in the area through NATO and the UN and the participation in the Kosovo war. This emphasis has also characterised the treatment of the area in the Folketing and its Foreign Policy Committee and European Affairs Committee (where day-to-day business in foreign and European affairs are dealt with); there has been less focus on the political aspects of the crisis in the region. It is the judgement of participating members of the Folketing that the EU’s actions in the region have not been the subject, over time, of much discussion in the committees. This is mostly attributed to consensus on this subject among the mainstream parties – which is different from an area like the Middle East or indeed Iraq which is more frequently discussed (interview, Kofoed; interview, Antonsen). However, interest in the role of the EU in this area is increasing and it is more and more common for the members of the Folketing to raise questions (interview, Kofoed). We can therefore say that the Danish political engagement in the Balkans through the EU so far has been politically uncontroversial and that there have been no pressures from the Folketing for a more active policy, although there may be signs of change in this respect. At the same time, however, the military commitments in the UN and NATO have also been strongly supported as part of Denmark’s active internationalism and general willingness to use military means.9 The Danish level of activity in the EU is illustrated in Figure 5.3. Constitutive effects The SAA process has led to an import of EU vocabulary into Danish policy towards the Balkans. The framing of the main political discourse now concerns the countries’ taking part in an enlargement process on


(A) Denmark

Danish policy activity between active and passive


the basis of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. Developed during the accession process of CEE states, the enlargement discourse draws on a number of different elements which are articulated into a whole. The countries are judged in terms of their ‘progress’ which depends on their performance in a wide range of reforms in relation to their economies, standards of democracy, human rights, good government and the rule of law. Each country is expected to draw up a national action plan which provides an agenda against which to measure progress towards an SAA which again is a step towards membership (see, for example, Udenrigsministeriet, 2003d: 27). While this is not the only discourse which frames and shapes Danish policy, it is gaining strength towards the middle of the first decade of the new millennium. It has been widely argued that EU language used in relation to the enlargement of the CEE countries has had constitutive effects on the political stances of the member states with regard to the enlargement (Smith, 1999). Once the prospect of membership for a group of countries is agreed upon, this opens the national door for the concepts and language of enlargement processes. This can also be said to have been the case with the language used in Danish political processes during the enlargement process with the CEE countries – a language which has also been constrained and shaped by the common EU discourse in this field (interview in the Prime Minister’s Office). While the enlargement discourse will come to frame the policy process more and more as the Balkan countries come closer to EU membership, this is not the only discourse in use. There is also a discourse of crisis management and conflict prevention as in relation to Macedonia. As there are more international organisations involved which may work within overlapping frameworks of meaning, it is less clear which parts of Danish Balkan policy draw specifically on EU language. From a quantitative point of view, the sheer amount of EU political texts produced on

The Balkans 119

C Clear indications of constitutive effects Denmark

EU Figure 5.4 Constitutive effects?

current developments in this field suggests that these texts must be an integral part of the Danish policy-making process in this field. The Balkans top the list of EU common positions and joint actions every year and figure prominently as a topic in CFSP declarations.10 The issue of Danish use of EU concepts in this field is illustrated in Figure 5.4.

III. Conclusions 1. Inside or outside the EU? The EU is the most important political framework for Denmark in the Balkans region. It is seen by policy-makers as the most operational political forum. However, Danish policy is also conducted in other organisational contexts outside the EU. Expressions of Danish policy can be identified within NATO, the UN and the OSCE. Within the UN and the OSCE, Denmark not only puts forward views through the EU in this area. The clearest Danish multilateral contributions in the region outside the EU are the forces deployed in Kosovo. Danish bilateral action in the region is often seen by practitioners as a supplement to the efforts of the EU. The main objects of political interest in these relations are Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia and, to a lesser extent, Albania. A main focus of bilateral action is aid. The Neighbourhood Initiative consists of bilateral efforts at the regional level, aimed at furthering stability. Danish bilateral assistance, however, only covers selected aspects of the aid efforts in the Balkans. The aid from the Community is about 30 times as high and covers a broader area. 2. Active or passive in the EU? Within the EU, the Danish level of activity can be characterised as being medium compared with the other areas examined. Danish points of interests can be identified, but Copenhagen is rarely among the


front-runners in the definition of the EU’s Balkan policy. There are no pressures from within the Danish political system to become more active within the EU. 3. Constitutive effects As far as constitutive features in participation in EU policy-making are concerned, the clearest feature is the presence of elements of the EU enlargement discourse in relation to the Balkans. The amount of texts produced by the EU on crisis management and the political processes in the region suggests that the concepts used in these may also affect Danish foreign policy language in relation to the Balkans. 4. Why this state of affairs? (a) The EU framework EU policy has become increasingly strong, post-Kosovo, to a large extent due to the diminishing of the conflicts. This has given scope for a detailed policy of preparation for enlargement backed up by economic means which are broader and more comprehensive than in the 1990s. The EU’s diplomatic capacity has increased in the area. The intensive diplomacy of Solana in relation to FRY and Macedonia expresses a stronger and more detailed EU policy which also includes crisis management. The areas of EU policy have also expanded as the EU has taken over police actions and military actions from other organisations. EU policy has thus become broader, more detailed, and contains more instruments including military ones. To this should also be added a higher degree of unity between the EU countries about the political line in the region – a perception that is shared in Copenhagen. (b) Actorness Denmark articulates agency in relation to the region. But it is not an agency which is articulated with a concern for the Balkans per se. It is an agency which is linked to Denmark’s general international engagement in furthering international order and humanitarian issues, combined with an articulation of Europe and EU enlargement as the primary concern. There is articulation of separate Danish actorness, based on support for specific aid projects or the use of military means. However, in many political contexts, Danish actorness in the region is co-articulated with the EU or substituted by ‘the EU’ on its own. Often articulations express the instrumental use of the EU in Danish foreign policy. There are also articulations of Danish actorness within other organisations.

The Balkans 121

As for the question of the role of the EU for Danish policy, the grounds for the EU being the most important frame for Danish foreign policy in the Balkans are a detailed, long-term and resourceful EU policy with more instruments and agreement among the actors coupled with a formulation of Danish actorness which articulates the EU as the most important instrument for Danish policy in the general political context in the region. The separate articulation of Danish actorness which can also be identified provides the background for some elements of Danish policy which are bilateral or conducted in other organisations – although often also through the EU. Compared with the period before Kosovo when the EU frame was less prominent in Danish policy towards the Balkans and the military presence in NATO loomed large, the most important factor behind the change in Danish emphasis is the strengthening of the EU’s policy frame and actor capacity in the Balkans region. There do not appear to have been significant changes in the basic Danish articulation of actorness in the Balkans from the 1990s to the first years of the twentyfirst century. But the strengthening of the EU’s actorness has been the background of increased co-articulations of Danish and EU actorness in the region. Denmark has not attempted to prevent the strengthening of the EU’s policy in the region. If anything, the opposite is the case. As the EU framework is strong and Danish agency is of a very general character towards the region, this provides us with an understanding of the ‘middle level’ of Danish activity within the EU. As for the question of constitutive effects on Danish foreign policy-making, the elements above also underpin the presence of constitutive elements of EU discourse in Danish policy formulations with regard to the Balkans: the

C (A) Denmark

General articulation of Danish actorness in European security (not specifically about the Balkans)

Very comprehensive EU policy EU Figure 5.5 Why this state of affairs? The background of Danish policy. A summary


EU frame is a very comprehensive framework with its enlargement elements. With an articulation of Danish actorness not specific to the region, an understanding is provided of why enlargement elements find their way into Danish political discourse. Figure 5.5 illustrates that the relationship between Danish foreign policy and EU policy in the Balkans is a combination of the ideal types in categories 1 and 3. EU policy is strong and intensive. Danish agency is articulated in general terms with regard to European security but not specifically towards the Balkans, placing it in an intermediate position with regard to strong/weak articulation of actorness and thus between models 1 and 3.

6 Development and Aid

We now look at the area of development and aid. The focus here is the EU’s aid – that is, the aid given by the Community and not the individual member states.1 The aid of the Community places it as the fifth highest donor on a global scale. In absolute figures, the total aid from the Community in 2000 was just above 5 billion euro, that is about three times as much as Danish development aid (OECD, 2002). I analyse the field of development and aid by examination of the Third World concerns of the Community and Denmark. At the same time, I make the point that the focus of both EU and Danish aid has shifted from the Third World to Eastern Europe. The main focus is, however, the aid to the Third World.

I. The EU Background, concepts and actorness The Community positions itself as an actor in the field of development. The most general statements of principles in relation to the EU’s development policy can be found in the Treaty. According to the Nice Treaty (art. 130) the aims of the Community’s development policy are: The sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them; the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy; the campaign against poverty in the developing countries. The general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. 123


The European Communities Development Policy. Statement by the Council and the Commission (Commission, 2000a) reiterated these elements. It is stressed that the Community activities in the field of development should be concentrated on the following six vertical areas: 1. Link between trade and development; 2. Regional integration and cooperation; 3. Support for macro-economic policies and the promotion of equitable access to social services; 4. Transport; 5. Food security and sustainable rural development; 6. Enhanced institutional capacity building. To these vertical concerns are added five horizontal aspects: At every stage of the execution of its activities, the Community also needs to mainstream cross-cutting concerns comprising the promotion of human rights, equality between men and women, children’s rights and the environmental dimension. … Conflict prevention and crisis management [also] require systematic attention in view of the serious implications for the developing countries concerned. (Commission, 2000a: 10) Development, then, is approached through the basic conceptual figure shown in Figure 6.1. Basic aims to eradicate poverty are: sustainable economic and social development of most disadvantaged countries, integration into the world economy, a campaign against poverty, and the promotion of liberal political values. Six vertical and five horizontal concerns cut across these areas.2 Policies and priorities The 1975 Lomé Convention and its subsequent revisions still appear to be the centrepiece of the EU’s efforts to provide help to the Third World in spite of the relative decline since the Cold War in aid to the poorest countries in the world. The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP) covers more than 80 African, Caribbean and Pacific states, that is approximately 40 per cent of the UN’s membership. The ACP continues to receive the largest amount of aid in proportional terms, but the trend is towards the wider spread of EU assistance (see below). The Lomé system is unique in its emphasis on promoting development. Traditionally, the EC’s aid under the Lomé agreements, as in the case of Denmark, was given without political conditions. However, in

Development and Aid 125

Economic and social development

Campaign against poverty

Promotion of liberal political values

Integration into world economy

Aims, activities and cross-cutting concerns in Community development policy concepts

Enhanced institutional capacity building

Food security and sustainable rural development

Transport

Macroeconomic policies and equitable access to social services

Regional integration and cooperation

Trade and development

Environmental dimension Equality between sexes Democratisation Human rights Conflict prevention and crisis management POVERTY ALLEVIATION

Figure 6.1 Community development policy concepts

the 1990s political conditionality entered the Lomé system as a result of EU insistence. The changes obtained by the EU in the 2000 Lomé V (Cotonou) Agreement marked a break with many of the elements of the four former agreements and suggest that the EU is moving into a postLomé era (Elgström, 2000). In the 2000 Cotonou agreement, the partnership ideals of the 1970s have continued to exert influence so that the relationship remains rule-bound and negotiated and the parties formally equal. However, the principles of ‘good governance’ (implying the use of political conditionality in aid), ‘WTO compatibility’ and ‘integration into the world economy’ have, at the EU’s insistence, penetrated and transformed the traditional Lomé partnership (Elgström, 2000: 195). As well as reflecting international norms in relation to development, the content of the 2000 Cotonou system also reflects the reduced status of, and political interest in, the ACP in the EU’s development policy (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Elgström, 2000). Aside from the Lomé agreement, the Community’s development policy is directed towards other countries and regions as part of association agreements. A substantial part of the Community’s relationship with


Latin America and Asia has taken the form of trade concessions and various types of development cooperation with the LDCs (less developed countries) and the LLDs (least developed countries) in both regions. Significant parts of the EU’s relationship with the Mediterranean have concerned development goals in that region. A network of trade and cooperation agreements, sometimes going back to the 1970s, has provided an institutional relationship with many countries (Piening, 1997: 169). Most significantly, the relationship with CEE countries which following the Cold War became a relationship with candidate members of the Union, has also involved the donation by the EU of considerable amounts of aid to development, not least in order to prepare the countries for membership. Aid to the Mediterranean and particularly, the CEE countries has increased considerably since the end of the Cold War, while aid to the ACP has declined correspondingly in relative terms. In 1989 the African countries received approximately 75 per cent of bilateral Community aid, and Asia and Latin America respectively about 15 and 10 per cent. In 2000 Africa received 41 per cent, Asia 13 per cent, Latin America 9 per cent and Europe 31 per cent (OECD, 2002). The tendency, then, is towards a more even geographical spread of Community aid, with candidate countries and the countries bordering the EU as the main beneficiaries. And this has meant a fall in Community aid in relative, if not absolute, terms to sub-Saharan Africa where most of the world’s poorest countries are located. Through the various forms of aid (the Lomé/Cotonou regime, parts of association agreements and partnership agreements), the EC’s bilateral development activities in the early twenty-first century are directed towards approximately 120 countries covering most potential candidates for aid. The Community is also represented in multilateral UN development contexts such as the UNDP. However, the EC makes limited use of multilateral funds and contributions are focused on humanitarian aid (OECD, 2002). According to the Nice Treaty, the Community’s development policy is parallel and complementary to the national development policies of the member states. The aim is consistency with the development policies of member states (TEU art. 130). However, whether consistency is an issue at all for the individual member state varies considerably according to the degree to which a member state contributes development aid outside the Community. Greece, for example, spends very few resources on development activities apart from the money allocated through the Community (in which case there is no consistency issue), whereas Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands contribute significant means to development activities over and above the means channelled through the Community.


As in the case of trade policy, it is the Commission which is responsible for negotiations with third parties – that is, the countries that receive aid. EU member states make payments to the European Development Fund (EDF) annually on the basis of the Commission’s forecast of expenditure. The division of project-related aid between ACP member states is determined by the Commission, which subsequently negotiates – bilaterally with ACP countries – the terms of the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) for the utilisation of the aid. These cover the five-year period of the EDF and are subject to approval by the Council of Ministers (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 124–5). The Commission shoulders the administrative burden of the EU’s development efforts. The directorate-general responsible, DG VIII, is the operational centre in Brussels, although a humanitarian aid office (ECHO) has been set up to administer food aid and other urgent assistance. In addition to its HQ staff, DG VIII also deploys delegates in most ACP capitals. The delegates are responsible for overseeing and evaluating EDF-financed projects (Piening, 1997: 181). The Commission’s resources in terms of personnel at their representations in the countries receiving aid are not huge. A weakness in the Commission’s representation and in the implementation of the Community’s development aid is that its base of legitimacy is the Community, that is the first pillar. To the extent that aid is used politically, the general problems of consistency in relation to action that covers more than one pillar can also be found here. This hampers the realisation of the potential that EU development aid has as a result of its high level. As development is increasingly linked to trade and the WTO system, the position of the Commission with its long-established role in trade is strengthened. At the same time, it can be argued that the increasingly tight link made between development and security weakens the position of the Commission. In summary, the Community policy in the field of development can be said to be strong as it provides a large amount of resources and links development to trade and general political matters. However, Community development policy is weakened by problems of consistency between the EU pillars.

II. Denmark Background, concepts and actorness Danish development aid began in the 1950s. Initially, it took the form of contributions to the development activities of the UN, but from the


late 1960s, bilateral aid gained in weight to reach a 50–50 division between multilateral and bilateral aid in 1966 (Holm, 1982: 32). Since the 1960s, Danish aid as a percentage of the GNP has been more or less steadily increasing from 0.09 per cent in 1960 (Christensen, 2002; Holm, 1982: 51) to reach approximately 1 per cent in 1992.3 Danish development aid was instigated through pressures from alliance partners during the Cold War to contribute to containing the spread of communism (Holm, 1982: 33). But it also had a more active dimension: it represented a way of raising Danish prestige in international affairs – initially through concentrating on efforts within the UN development agencies. The focus on the UN was a reflection of the more general role of this organisation in Danish foreign policy (Holm, 1982: Ch. II). The internal background for the development efforts was the general understanding that Denmark was a good society and ought to help those in the world who were worse off (Holm, 1982: 50). This was, and is, not primarily linked to a history of world engagement or an understanding of national interest, but to the view that the social and humanitarian features of Danish society made it particularly suited to engagement in international cooperation. According to the preface by the Minister of Development in the 1994 En Verden i udvikling – Strategi for dansk udviklingspolitik mod år 2000 …, ‘A social and humanitarian tradition has given us the experience which makes it possible to take up the international challenges … ’. Closely linked with the idea of a good society was the welfare state. Danish society was seen as possessing a cohesion from which others could learn. To an extent this understanding was a component of an overarching Nordic identity. The Nordic model was viewed as the source of the Nordic states’ superiority over the rest of Europe and an asset which the Nordic states could bring to the world (Østergaard, 2000). The prominent position of moral arguments compared with historical or economic interests places Denmark in the same group as the other Scandinavian countries and possibly the Netherlands – a group which has been labelled ‘humane internationalists’ (G. Olsen, 2003: 72). It has been part of this understanding that the use of force in the pursuit of national interest internationally was illegitimate (G. Olsen, 2003: 72–3). Acceptance of the use of military power for purposes other than peacekeeping was one of the new elements in the dominant Danish foreign policy understanding following the Cold War (Græger et al., 2002: 94–5). However, use of military power is still legitimated by its internationalist purpose rather than by national interests. The underlying understanding of Denmark as a good society with a moral obligation to help others less fortunate, together with a scepticism


towards the use of power as such, can be seen as the basis for the Danish articulation of actorness in the field of development. These two elements have been linked in that the scepticism towards the use of power has made a championing of moral causes, as in development aid, the most obvious field in which strong and assertive actorness could be articulated – without power politics connotations! Denmark is in Danish development policy discourse strongly articulated as a separate subject and a capable state: … In a world marked by changes Denmark must make a difference through its development aid. … We do this by being in front in the direct cooperation with the development countries and, at the same time work to obtain the biggest possible effect of the joint international efforts of which Danish aid is part. … (Regeringen, 2003c) The term ‘small state’ does not figure frequently in specific development contexts. Denmark is articulated as a moral, solidarist subject distinguished from states that give less or lower quality aid (Due, 2001: 74).4 It presents itself as among the leading players in this field (Regeringen, 2003c). It can be argued that the specific aims of development reflect the self-understanding of the society in question. The ‘other’ or the one who is to be ‘developed’ is constructed as ‘undeveloped’ with reference to the image of the ideal in the society that gives the aid. At the same time, drawing on Campbell (1992) and Todorov (1999), one can argue that the identity of the donor society is constructed in the same process with reference to the features that ‘undeveloped’ countries do not yet possess. The particular conception of Danish society as a good society linked to the welfare state does not just provide the framework of meaning for giving aid but also for the particular way in which it is given. The general focus in Danish development aid both prior to and following the Cold War has been the principle of the alleviation of poverty. The poorest countries in the world in absolute terms or the poorest parts of the population have been seen as the natural recipients of Danish aid. This was not mentioned in the basic law on development aid in 1971, but it has been stated before and after (Christensen, 2002: 8; Udenrigsministeriet, 1999c; Holm, 1982: 36). Aid to the poorest was traditionally given for humanitarian reasons and because a more just distribution of goods starting with the poorest was assumed to lead to a more peaceful and ordered world – the latter seen as being in the interest of Denmark, being a small state. The creation of economic growth in poor countries


was a central goal of the development strategy, built on a parallel with the welfare state and on what was seen as a social and humanitarian tradition (Due, 2001). After the Cold War, the first strategy for Danish development aid, En verden i udvikling – dansk udviklingspolitik frem mod år 2000, was put forward in 1994. It was stressed that the point of departure was to fight poverty through sustainable economic growth. In the implementation of Danish development aid, three cross-cutting or horizontal concerns were to be taken into account at all levels: (1) the role of women of the development process, (2) the environmental aspect, (3) the furthering of democratisation and human rights. The cross-cutting concerns more concretely expressed features in the Danish understanding of the nature of a good society – that is, a society with gender equality, consideration for the environment and respect for democracy and human rights; features which defined Denmark as a subject (Due, 2001). The failure of the development partner to engage in dialogue in relation to the three concerns would lead to reduction in aid given. There were no great changes in the strategy of 1994 from the last strategy before the end of the Cold War in 1988, although the third cross-cutting concern was extended in 1994 to also comprise democratisation. The most important change in the 1994 strategy was the introduction of sectoral aid rather than project aid as the concrete development approach (Olsen, 2002e: 7). The subsequent development strategy, Partnership 2000, presented to the Folketing in October 2000 and supported by all political parties except the extreme right and the extreme left, took the form of a precision of the previous strategy on several points: three new high priorities were added which were said to bring ‘… Danish development policy in line with the latest international trends of development and main trends in aid policy thought’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000b: 13, author’s translation): HIV/Aids, prevention of violent conflicts, young people and children as a resource. The main conceptual figure in Danish aid policy, then, can, in simplified form, be said to consist of three layers: (1) the fight against poverty understood in a broad sense (the deepest level), (2) an emphasis on the environment, gender, democracy and human rights (‘cross-cutting concerns’, the second level), (3) new areas of high priority (HIV, prevention of violent conflicts, young people and children), the third and most malleable and changeable level. In 2001, with the establishment of a new government and 11 September, two new areas were added to this third level – business development and the fight against terrorism (Udenrigsministeriet, 2002a: 14). Since 2001, the security aspect,


particularly in the form of anti-terrorism measures, has tended to become more than just a concept at the third level; rather, it has become a more central concept in official Danish development language in line with many other Western countries. Where the basic goal of Danish development has traditionally been the alleviation of poverty for humanitarian and broader international security reasons, the more direct Danish and international security concerns have come to play a bigger role. In the Regeringens bud på nye prioriteter for dansk ulandsbistand 2004–2008 (The government’s proposal for new priorities in Danish Development Aid 2004–8 – Regeringen, 2003c), the fight against absolute poverty remains the pivotal concern. The Danish development efforts are directed towards five central challenges, thus suggesting a shift from the earlier three ‘cross-cutting’ concerns. At the same time, many of the former ‘cross-cutting’ concerns have been maintained in another form. But stability, security and the fight against terrorism have been elevated to one of the five challenges (Regeringen, 2003c: 1–5), and entered other contexts in the document. This represents a change in the balance between the concerns of the development countries and the (security) concerns of Denmark (Due, 2001: 91). Clearly, the new focus on the prevention of terrorism in Danish development aid is a challenge to the conceptual figure shown in Figure 6.2. But the basic figure in

The three layers in Danish development policy concepts Business development

Young people and children

Violent conflicts

HIV/Aids

Democracy and human rights Gender/equal rights Environmental dimension Security and the fight against terrorism

?

Poverty alleviation

Figure 6.2 Denmark’s development policy concepts


Danish development discourse – based on the fight against poverty – does not appear to have been altered fundamentally at the time of writing.5 The EU and articulations of Danish actorness In this section I look at the way Denmark is articulated with the EU and other international actors as agents in relation to Danish development policy. Analysis focuses on the first two Danish development strategies after the Cold War and, more specifically, on the annual reports of Danida after the Cold War. The co-articulation of Danish agency with the EU and other organisations in Danish development policy varies significantly according to the context. In the context of development as a part of the general political and economic whole, the EU is mentioned as an essential instrument for Danish policy, making Danish views heard and making a difference in the international contexts of relevance for the development. The most common construction in this context is that Denmark uses the EU to promote its own views or to make a difference through the EU. The EU is presented as the primary forum for Danish influence whereas the UN is presented more as a political and normative framework. But although the EU is articulated as having this important role for (general) Danish development policy, a close identification in the form of ‘Denmark and the EU …’ is rarely, if ever, found. The EU is constructed as an essential instrument for Danish policy but not as an equal subject. The stressing of the EU as essential for the political and economic context of Danish development policy is a feature that is increasingly prevalent after the Cold War.6 In the preface to the 1994 development strategy, the EU is mentioned together with the UN (which comes first) and the Nordic countries (mentioned after the EU) as strong points of departure for an active Danish role (Udenrigsministeriet, 1994; see also Udenrigsministeriet, 1994: 42). The 2000 strategy says that ‘… Denmark has the possibility, particularly through the EU, to play an active role and make a difference in the international contexts of importance for the developing countries …’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000b: 5) and also ‘Denmark will work actively to ensure that the ongoing strengthening of the … CFSP is translated into a common, progressive EU line within international organisations’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000b: 100). A different role and agency for the EU is constructed when the context is development in more narrow terms. In official material containing references to concrete bilateral development aid or to action in multilateral development organisations, it is most common for Denmark to


be presented as the acting subject without any reference to other actions or institutions (see, for example, annual reports from Danida). When reference is made to other actors or institutions, Danish agency tends to be co-articulated with other international actors (including states) more often than with the EU. Concerning the co-articulation of agency, reference is mostly to the UN and its special agencies and the World Bank. Frequent expressions are ‘Denmark and the other donors’, ‘Denmark and the UNDP’, ‘Denmark and the World Bank’ or ‘Denmark and (one or more of) the Nordic countries’.7 When the EU is mentioned in relation to general accounts of multilateral aid, it is often mentioned last.8 However, in the new millennium, there are a greater number of references to the EU, including the co-articulation of agency in relation to concrete bilateral development policy and actions within (UN) development organisations, such as ‘Denmark and the EU’ or ‘Denmark and the Commission’, but they are not frequent. And often documents express direct criticism of the EU’s development policy.9 In relation to the Community’s aid, the EU is positioned in the discourse as one framework to be influenced by Danish values and policy aims rather than an essential frame for Danish development policy. It is an object of policy more than an instrument for policy: ‘Denmark will also support the current efforts being made to … improve the quality of EC assistance. … This will take place through participation in the forming of the EU’s general policy in this field …’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000: 100, see also p. 99). When the context is Community aid, the expression ‘Denmark and the EU’ is rarely used.10 Official material often makes a clear distinction between Denmark and the Community aid.11 There are, in other words, two discourses at play. One of the discourses is one that articulates the EU as an essential actor through which Denmark acts and articulates the EU as an instrument for Danish development policy at the general political and economic level. The other discourse is one which articulates the EU as one among many objects of Danish development policy with Denmark as acting subject. I describe the content of each discourse in turn in the following. In the first discourse the distinction between Denmark and the EU as actors is occasionally blurred, although the importance of the EU for Denmark as an acting subject is stressed. The co-articulation mostly occurs when the context is general political and economic matters (for example, in relation to normative matters within the UN). This discourse dominates in most general development policy contexts and shapes Danish policy practices here. Here, there is rarely a close co-articulation of agency in the form of ‘Denmark and the EU’.


Denmark


Denmark + IO

Sometimes co-articulations with other multilateral organisations/countries

Co-articulations with the EU in different forms (in very general development contexts)

Denmark + EU

Denmark EU


The discourse which presents the EU as one among many objects of Danish policy and positions Denmark as acting subject is dominant in narrower bilateral and multilateral development contexts (see Figure 6.3). Denmark has to act with other donors to ensure efficiency and is part of an international community where the UN is the overarching frame, although Denmark is not equated with the others or with the UN frame. This discourse shapes practices within the narrow field of bilateral and multilateral development aid. In relation to most areas of development, as outlined in the annual reports of Danida since the end of the Cold War, the acting subject is Denmark and the approach is the second development discourse. This is both the case in relation to Danish policy in the UN’s development agencies and in the concrete description of horizontal and geographical development activities with regard to specific areas. Denmark is presented as an active actor with significant views to contribute12 and, in relation to development, as a foregangsland (‘exemplary model’) in this field. Policies and priorities The aim in the following is to outline concrete Danish development policy and to describe the fora in which Danish development policy is conducted including the important bilateral contexts. It also includes the issue of whether and where Danish policy is active. In the following, I will distinguish between the role of the EU in Danish development policy and Danish policy within the EU. Denmark spends about 1 per cent of its GNP on development aid, which ranks it as one of the countries that gives the most development


aid in the world, at the time of writing competing with Norway as the biggest contributor in relative terms. This marks Denmark out compared with the trend among donor countries after the Cold War, where development aid has been significantly cut in most donor countries. In absolute terms, Danish aid is not negligible even compared with the major OECD countries (see, for example, Udenrigsministeriet, 2003a: 12). Its aid has for a long time been divided equally between aid given via multilateral organisations and bilateral aid. Of the aid that goes via multilateral contexts, about 10 per cent goes via the EU (and hence about 5 per cent of total Danish development resources). The rest is allocated to the UN and its special agencies (43 per cent), the World Bank (18 per cent), and regional development banks (Udenrigsministeriet, 2002a: 90). The proportion of aid given through multilateral organisations is considerably higher than for the greater powers. Following the guidelines in the last three development strategies (see above), bilateral development aid concentrates on a small number of Programme countries who benefit from more aid compared with other recipients of Danish aid, a commitment to long-term aid based on longterm plans and the development of whole sectors within the recipient countries. In the 2003 Regeringens bud på nye prioriteter for dansk ulandsbistand 2004–2008 (The government’s proposal for new priorities in Danish Development Aid 2004–8), the number has been reduced to 13. According to the guidelines the countries are selected on the background of the criterion of poverty. Sixty per cent of the bilateral aid is spent on the Programme countries and the aim in Regeringens bud på nye prioriteter for dansk ulandsbistand 2004–2008 is to transfer more economic means to this category. The rest of the bilateral aid is spent on so-called Transitional aid (countries which, owing to political developments or war, are judged to be in need). The commitment to this group is less long-term and the countries in this group therefore also change more frequently. Other categories of bilateral aid are given to regional organisations and to individual projects in particular countries. These are, however, less important quantitatively than Programme aid and Transitional aid. After 11 September there has been a new emphasis on aid to the Middle East, and an aid programme has been launched there (see chapter on terrorism). The majority of bilateral aid is still spent in Africa. Since the fall of the wall, Denmark has allocated growing amounts of aid to the CEE countries. This follows the trend in Community aid. But, in contrast to the Community’s aid, there was a growth in Denmark’s traditional development aid in absolute terms until ultimo 2001, although the growth in funds to the CEE countries was much faster.


In bilateral development aid, the financial, political and administrative resources are concentrated on the Programme countries. This is where Denmark has embassies which often have very close contacts with national political decision-makers based on the often significant amount of aid given in relative terms. In Third World countries which are not Programme countries, Denmark often will not have an embassy. There will be a relatively significant amount of institutional knowledge in the Danish Foreign Ministry and political engagement in the ways of Programme countries. Moreover, the domestic Danish environment will often focus on these countries, although not exclusively. Other countries in which Denmark is interested for development reasons are those that have previously received Danish development or where Danish development aid is being phased out. In these cases there will often also be a degree of institutional memory or knowledge which allows a policy interest or engagement here. The same will be the case for the countries receiving Transitional aid (interview, MFA). An interesting angle from the point of view of the importance of different multilateral frameworks for bilateral aid, is the local donor coordination of Danish bilateral aid to the Programme countries. My examination of the description of the role of donor coordination in each of the Danish country strategies for the Programme countries indicates that in most countries where there is donor coordination, UN-led or World Bank-led organisations are the primary fora for the coordination of aid. The EU framework is rarely the primary forum for coordination. Only in Burkina Faso and in Zambia is EU donor coordination mentioned, in the latter case together with World Bank and Nordic coordination. There is little evidence of particularly close coordination between Danish bilateral aid to the Programme countries and the aid of the Commission. In some cases, there is an informal local exchange of information among EU member states about the Community projects in the country (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000e: 17). Multilateral aid is mainly channelled through the UN system, the World Bank, the regional banks, the IMF and the EU. Within the UN system, Denmark is very active with respect to the programmes and funds that report to the ECOSOC – in particular, the UNDP to which Denmark is the seventh biggest contributor in absolute terms (Udenrigsministeriet, 2002a: 95). There are no indications of cooperation with the Commission within the UNDP. Denmark has given strong support to the so-called UNDAF process (United Nations Development Assistance Framework) (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001a: 99). Danish coordination within


these fora, where clear Danish policy targets can be identified, is mostly with the other Nordic countries. The relatively high Danish policy profile in this field is directly linked to the fact that funding to these bodies is voluntary and membership of the boards of these agencies is based on financial contribution. The other EU members have not all been prominent contributors. In the World Bank, Denmark shares a seat on the board with the other Nordic countries and the Baltic States. In the regional development banks, Denmark shares a seat with different combinations of countries, but none of them is the full group of EU member states or the Commission. In political contexts where development is linked to broader political and economic conditions, such as the global UN conferences, the Social Summit, the Monterey Summit and the Johannesburg Summit, EU coordination has been the dominant forum for coordination through which Danish policy has been conducted. Within the EU, Denmark has taken a very active line in relation to the issue of development aid. Denmark can be placed in the group of mostly Northern member states (Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Finland) who are active in this area with a policy line often labelled as ‘progressive’. There are many official expressions of how Denmark has understood itself as being successful in influencing the priorities of Community aid. In relation to the Commission’s communication about the aims of Community aid from 2000, a Danida annual report states that ‘In many areas there is agreement between the proposals of the Commission and Danish foreign policy goals’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001a: 120, author’s translation). The six priority areas chosen in EU aid are seen by the practitioners to be highly influenced by Denmark, and the priority on Africa is also understood to be in accordance with Danish priorities (interview, MFA). Denmark was very active in shaping both the Council–Commission development strategy in 2000 and the Cotonou agreement the same year (interview with former Development Minister Jan Trøjborg). Denmark has generally been active in influencing the Lomé system not least through concepts such as ‘partnership’ (Christensen, 2002: 13). In relation to aid to developing countries which receive both bilateral Danish Programme country aid and Community aid (often through the Cotonou agreement), Denmark is active in assuring coordination of this aid, for example through the insistence that the Commission’s draft strategy for the country should be sent to the Danish embassy in the country for comments (interview, Danish MFA). It is the stated Danish aim to influence the Commission’s activities in the Programme countries


(Udenrigsministeriet, 2001a: 120). Denmark also plays an active part in regional community aid initiatives in regions where Denmark has Programme countries. The Community gives development aid to about 120 countries (in which there is a Commission delegation) and thus has a much larger geographical and economic presence in the field of development than Denmark’s bilateral development aid. This gives Denmark and other smaller member states a potential influence on development activities far beyond their own national development programmes. However, Denmark does not provide detailed inputs or comments on Commission development activities which take place in countries that are not Danish Programme countries. But Denmark systematically tries to influence the country strategies drafted by the Commission by attempting to include priorities in Danish development aid, such as, for example, the fight against HIV/Aids (interview, MFA). However, Denmark does not have the administrative capacity (or such a capacity is not judged to have high enough priority to merit more administrative resources) to influence the implementation of concrete Commission development projects in countries where Denmark is not a bilateral donor. And this has not been a political priority (interview with Jan Trøjborg, Minister for Development, 2000–1). Official Danish policy is that the relationship between EC aid and national development aid should be one of complementarity. Together with the majority of the member states, Denmark has rejected Commission proposals for a gradual phasing out of member states’ bilateral aid towards a joint Community aid policy. Denmark has thus gone against a centralised, Brussels-based control of all EU aid and has emphasised the importance of increased decentralised coordination in the receiving countries in broader, sector-specific coordination groups (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000e: 10–11; interview, MFA). Notwithstanding its opposition to the phasing out of member states’ bilateral aid, Denmark is among the strongest supporters of cooperation with the Commission in the recipient countries. Denmark, together with the Netherlands, is the only country which has adopted policies to ensure consistency between bilateral and EC programmes (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 122). According to a high-ranking civil servant in the MFA closely linked to aid policy-making, ‘… The Commission is clearly our ally. In the field of ideas and conceptually it is fine. The weakness is the capacity for implementation’ (interview, MFA). Denmark is thus supportive of Community aid and, if the efficiency of the implementation of Community aid was greater, Denmark would, in the words of the


same civil servant, be a proponent of ‘a very, very large EU aid’ (interview, MFA). The reason given for this was that it might contribute to pushing other member states closer to the 0.7 per cent of GNP to development which is a UN goal supported by Denmark. At the same time, Community aid and the EU’s measures in this field are seen by Danish practitioners as being in the best interests of development if they are complementary to the states’ measures – both in terms of the concrete aid efforts and of the EU’s unique assets through its ability to combine aid and trade (interview, MFA). So, all in all, the status with regard to EU aid is that it is by no means the only outlet of Danish development policy and should not be so even if Danish means allocated through the Community could be increased with an increase in EC aid efficiency. However, practical coordination between national development aid and Community aid is seen by Copenhagen in favourable terms. The basis of this, though, is that Denmark has very little to learn from the Community’s concrete aid efforts, given its exemplary record in this field (see, for example, Udenrigsministeriet, 2000e: 17). It is also frequently argued that an identifiable bilateral part of aid is necessary for popular support of high development assistance in Denmark (an argument which not only applies to EU aid). Denmark would therefore like an adjustment of the present situation with regard to Community aid in the interest of increasing aid to the Third World, but no fundamental change in the balance between the EC aid and national aid in this field. In the field of concrete aid, the Community is seen as one agency among others whereas, in relation to the more general political and economic framework, it is the primary operational framework (interview, MFA). In summary, Denmark in the field of development can be characterised as active both inside and outside the EU context (see Figure 6.4).

Danish policy mainly conducted outside the EU in pure development matters Denmark

EU

Danish policy mainly conducted inside the EU in general policy areas and in matters concerning the link between development and trade



In the following, I discuss the extent to which there are domestic pressures for an active policy within the EU. An active domestic environment? The administration of development in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida, has been heavily involved in the concrete formulation of Danish development policy. The Folketing has, right from the beginning of Danish aid, formulated very wide policy principles which have left a substantial leeway to Danida in the implementation of policy, using many resources (Olsen, 2001b). However, other segments of society are also involved in shaping Danish development policy. Olsen has argued that Danish aid policies in the 1990s were basically a result of ‘close cooperation between the NGO’s, the business community and the aid administration, with the bureaucracy as the most crucial partner in the policy-making process’ (Olsen, 2001b: 661). It has been noted how this policy sector has been remarkably separated from other Danish policy sectors. Members of the policy segment, to a large extent, draw on the same discourse (identified in the section on actorness above) and share a self-perception that ‘we are all in this because of idealistic and un-selfish motives which has contributed to lifting aid out of the general political debate as public policy issues’ (Olsen, 2001b: 661). However, although the policy process is separate from other policy areas in Danish politics, it is a characterised by a relatively high degree of involvement by other than government actors compared with many other issues in Danish foreign policy. The existence of a policy community which, to a large extent, draws on the same discourse on the role of Denmark as a good state which should contribute to international development provides the background for an active Danish policy in this field. But within this policy community there have so far been very few discussions on the role of Community aid, let alone a more active or different use of Community aid. There has been consistent support in opinion polls for both Danish development aid and its specific level over time. Olsen (2001b) has pointed out that development ranked low among policy priorities for voters. This can be said to provide leeway for adherents to a discourse according to which Denmark should be active in the field of development. The Folketing contributes to the formulation of Danish development policy through a mixture of ad hoc intervention and the supply of certain principles in relation to the revision of development strategies. When the Folketing deals with Denmark’s participation in the development activities of the EU, the recent focus has been on problems such as scandals


A Denmark

An active Danish policy within the EU


due to fraud within the Commission rather than on the principles and aims of Community aid policy. This is the case within the Foreign Policy Committee which prepares aid issues. It is the view of politicians and civil servants interviewed that debate about the Community’s development policy on a day-to-day basis is very limited. There are few if any proposals for a more active – or just different – Danish policy with regard to Community aid and the many countries that receive Community aid. More discussions, however, take place when the issue concerns the link between trade and development. Here, there is more political interest in the Folketing. In summary, there is a domestic Danish engagement (in business, NGOs, parliament and Danida) in the field of development policy, a level of engagement which is higher than in many other fields of foreign policy. This engagement is framed in terms of a general discourse of Danish engagement in development as a good state and provides the basis for an active Danish policy. However, among the domestic political forces within and outwith Parliament, there is little interest in Community aid and its links with bilateral Danish aid. The level of Danish policy activity within the EU is illustrated in Figure 6.5. Constitutive effects of EU concepts? There is a significant degree of common language between the EU and Denmark in the field of development, as outlined above. Many of the same terms are used in Danish and EU discourse, although the internal organisation and the chains of equivalence differ. The fight against poverty is the foundation of discourses both in Denmark and the Community. At lower and more concrete levels than the general levels outlined above, there is also an overlap in concepts.


C

(C)

Weak constitutive effects on Danish language are possible

Denmark

EU

Danish influence on EU concepts

Figure 6.6 Constitutive effects?13

However, there are few indications that the EU language has affected the language used in relation to Danish development aid. In fact, the chronological dimension – that many of the principles in EU development aid were formulated in the Danish political context before their formulation in the EU documents – points, if anything, to a Danish influence on EU concepts (see Figure 6.6). This is the case with three of the cross-cutting concerns in the EU development figure (gender, environment, democracy/human rights) which were articulated in Danish development strategies from 1987/88. Conflict prevention, which found its way into EU policy in the 1990s, also appears in the Danish language roughly at the same time. The new Danish emphasis on development aid in the context of anti-terrorism post-11 September was not preceded by EU concepts. If anything, the influence was in the opposite direction (see Chapter 4). Specifically in relation to the basic aim of Community aid, the fight against poverty, Denmark is in many analyses seen as one of the actors behind the EC/EU language on development which was used in the first formulations about development in the TEU in 1991 (see, for example, Olsen, 1995). The repeated stress on the importance of the compatibility between EU and Danish development aims in the Danida annual reports (see for example Udenrigsministeriet, 1999c, 2000a) also points to EU incorporation of (inter alia) Danish aims. The basic conceptual figure behind Danish development aid does not, then, appear to emanate from the EU. At the same time, there may be some scope for the import of concepts from other sources into the Danish language in relation to development, if not into the basic Danish conceptual figure. The import of concepts may take place in particular areas such as humanitarian aid and macroeconomic policy but it is not ‘the normal way’ (interview, MFA). Olsen argues that the main


import of concepts into Danish development policy comes from the international development agenda, from UN organisations including the World Bank and from selected donors (Olsen, 2002a: 14–15). This was the case in the 1990s with concepts such as ‘environmental concerns’, ‘human rights’, ‘democracy’ and ‘conflict prevention’. Some of these concepts were brought into the language of Danish development policy on the initiative of the Danida administration (Olsen, 2002a: 14–15; 2002b: 32–3). Other concepts have been incorporated as a result of pressure from the Folketing – itself influenced by international debates (Olsen, 2002a: 17). Other concepts were also included as a result of pressure from Danish NGOs (Olsen, 2002a: 16; 2002b: 32–3). In summary, then, the language of Danish development policy has been affected by concepts based on various sources but there are few indications of the incorporation of concepts unique to the EU into the language of Danish development policy. As for the question of the incorporation of stances and concepts into areas of development politics where Denmark has previously had no policy, the Community’s development aid to the more than 100 countries to which Denmark does not give any aid, seems like a candidate in point. However, looked at in more detail, one does not get the impression of strong constitutive effects on Danish development policy. Due to a lack of resources, Denmark’s development administration is only involved at a general level in the Commission’s activities outside the countries that receive Danish aid. As Denmark’s material engagement is limited, policy stances and language are not likely to be incorporated through their operationalisation in fields of practice. Paradoxically, then, limits of capacity limit constitutive effects. This indicates that Denmark has not expanded its mental developmental horizon or ambitions dramatically as part of the wider development efforts in the Community; official Danish language does not suggest that Community aid is seen as an integral part of Danish development aid. With regard to aid to the Danish Programme countries, the expressions used are along the lines of ‘Denmark has contributed with xxx projects. Denmark has [also] as a member of the EU contributed aid’ (interview, MFA). The analysis shows, then, a clear separation in the official language between the EU and Denmark as subjects.

III. Conclusions 1. Inside or outside the EU? Only 5–6 per cent of the total Danish aid is allocated via the Community. In narrow development contexts, Denmark acts bilaterally


or through other organisations – the UNDP and the UN’s special agencies in particular. In the multilateral development contexts, Denmark acts alone, with other ad hoc groupings or with the other Nordic countries and rarely with the EU or the Commission. In relation to the up to 20 Danish bilateral Programme countries, there is considerable scope for Danish action outside the EU. The EU is not the primary local donor coordination framework. However, Denmark attempts to influence the Commission’s plans. Thus there is a Danish policy outside the EU in both multilateral and many bilateral contexts – in particular with regard to the Programme countries. However, there are a number of key contexts in which there is little scope for Danish policy outside the EU. This is the case with regard to policies concerning the link between development and trade politics and more general politics – arguably the most general framework. This is also the case when it comes to development aid to approximately 120 countries globally where the Community is a donor and Denmark is not a bilateral donor. Towards most of these countries there is no residue outside the EU. Denmark attempts to influence the Commission’s development strategies for these countries generally, but does not attempt to influence the individual Community aid projects in these countries due to a shortage of administrative resources. 2. An active Danish policy in the EU? Denmark very actively attempts to shape general Community development policy, and indications are that Copenhagen has significantly contributed to the formulation of Community aid policy. There is no wish for a fundamentally different balance between EC and Danish aid efforts, but a willingness to increase Community aid if it became more efficient, as this would contribute to raising other EU countries’ contributions to development. 3. Constitutive effects? There is a significant degree of common language in the EU and Denmark. However, there is little sign of an impact of EU language on the language of Danish development policy. If anything, there are indications of the influence of Danish development concepts on the Community’s development policy. There are, paradoxically, also limits to constitutive effects through capacity. While, in principle, Denmark has gained access to a much expanded range of development activities in the majority of countries that only receive EC aid, this influence is only used to affect general values in the development plans for these


countries. This distance must also limit the import of concepts into Danish aid policy. 4. Why this state of affairs? (a) The EU The Community frame within the field of development can be said to be strong due to the amount of resources available, and the possible links made between development and general trade and political matters. At the same time, Community development policy is weakened by problems of consistency between the EU pillars. The specific Danish understanding is that there are also problems of implementation. (b) Danish articulation of actorness Denmark is articulated as a very strong actor in this field on the basis of a link between societal features and Denmark’s role in this field. The articulation with the EU (and other organisations) in relation to agency in Danish development policy varies significantly. In the context of the general political and economic aspects of development, the EU is in official Danish political contexts articulated as an essential instrument for making Danish views heard. A different role and agency for the EU are constructed when the context is development in more narrow terms. Here Denmark is presented as the acting subject without any reference to the EU. Although the EU framework is strong, the very strong articulation of Danish actorness based on domestic societal values, combined with its considerable resources, suggests why there is considerable scope for Danish policy outside the EU context. In general political/economic development contexts, where there is less scope for policy outside the EU, Denmark is active in the EU as expressed in the articulations of Danish actorness through the EU. The strong Danish articulation of actorness also explains why there are few imports of EU concepts into Danish policy, as the EU is not the only framework for Danish policy and Community aid is not considered of a high quality. At the same time, Denmark is not able to exploit fully the increased room for manoeuvre for development activities provided by the Community’s aid in a whole range of countries. At the most general level, the lack of influence of Community development concepts on Danish development language can also be linked to the Danish discourses on the role of the EU in relation to Danish development policy. The infrequent co-articulations in relation to concrete development concepts clearly hold in check the influence of EU


concepts on Danish concepts in relation to concrete development. The lack of influence of EU concepts on Danish concepts in relation to concrete development is arguably also linked to the broader understanding that it is the fundamentally good features of the Danish welfare state that are to be exported to the developing world – not just any features. This fundamental level of exceptionalism makes for a resilience towards the import of concepts from the Community context at a deeper level. The situation in the field of development resembles category 3 outlined in Chapter 2. The EU policy frame is strong, but not as strong as in the case of EU policy in the Balkans. The Danish articulation of actorness in this field is so strong that there are clear aspects of policy which are conducted outside the EU policy framework and where the EU is just one forum among others. The strong Danish articulation of actorness also underpins Denmark’s active policy within the EU and the absence of clear constitutive effects of participation in the EU. It could even be argued that since the Danish articulation of actorness is exceptionally strong, the field of development is closer to model 2 than model 3. However, as the EU frame is also resourceful in terms of the link to political/economic dimensions and the geographical areas covered, there are also areas where Community policy is the main or only aspect of Danish policy as reflected in articulations of actorness through the EU. The background of Danish policy is summarised in Figure 6.7.

Strong articulation of Danish actorness C

(C)

Denmark

A

Comprehensive EU policy – though not as strong as EU policy towards the Balkans

EU Figure 6.7 Why this state of affairs? The background of Danish policy. A summary

7 Africa

We now move on to look at Africa. In this chapter ‘Africa’ will be understood as sub-Saharan Africa.1 The grounds for focusing mainly on sub-Saharan Africa is that analysts and Northern policy-makers tend to make an analytical distinction between the northern end of the continent and the rest. The countries along the Mediterranean coast are, in one way or another, linked to the Middle Eastern security complex whereas the southern states are not (Buzan and Wæver, 2004). Moreover, they are generally wealthier than the southern countries on the continent.

I. The EU Background, concepts and actorness The principles of the EU’s policy towards Africa can be seen as based on two components: first, the general development aims in the treaty applied to Africa, in particular, the abolition of poverty (referred to in the previous chapter on development) and, second, the political aims of furthering human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law, good governance and conflict prevention and resolution in Africa. The overall goal is consistency between the development efforts and the political aims. In addition to the general principles underlying the EU’s relations with development countries, the political principles expressed in the Cotonou framework represent the central political principles of the EU’s policy towards Africa since the great majority of countries south of the Sahara are part of the ACP group. The Cotonou agreement thus describes central elements in EU policy towards Africa. The two central political elements in Cotonou, expressed in articles 8–9, are the 147


promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and stability and peace. The basic political aspects of the EU’s Africa policy within the CFSP are expressed in the common position of 25 May 1998 on human rights in Africa and in the common positions of 2 June 1997 and 14 May 2001 on conflict prevention (Council, 1997, 1998a, 2001b). The common position of 25 May 1998 says that: The Union is committed to encourage and support the on-going democratisation process in Africa on the basis of respect for the following principles: a) protection of human rights …, b) respect for basic democratic principles, including …, c) the Rule of Law …, d) good governance. … The Union … shall consider … increasing its support for African countries in which positive changes have taken place. … Where changes are negative, the Union shall consider the appropriate responses that could help reverse those developments. … (Council, 1998a) Concerning peace, stability and conflict prevention in Africa, the Council Decision of 14 May 2001 states that … There is a link between conflict prevention and democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance, where development cooperation has a strategic role to play in strengthening capacities to manage conflicts in peaceful ways. … The objective … is to contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts in Africa by strengthening African capacity and means of action in this field, in particular through support for OAU and subregional organisations … [in] close cooperation with the UN. … The EU shall develop a proactive, comprehensive and integrated approach. … (Council, 2001b) In the official EU language there is no obvious hierarchy presented between the principles and aims, as conflict prevention and the spread of fundamental freedoms are both presented as central for development as outlined in the last chapter. Neither is clearly presented as subordinate to the other in EU text as priorities are presented as varying from context to context. However, from the late 1990s, prevention and resolution increasingly enter as principles behind what the EU is doing in Africa, as illustrated by the above-mentioned common actions on

Africa 149

conflict prevention and the references to conflict prevention in the Cotonou agreement. Policies and priorities As the majority of the Cotonou countries are African, articles 8 and 9 on political dialogue and articles 96 and 97 in the Cotonou agreement which contain the consultation procedure before the imposition of sanctions and suspension of cooperation, are central to EU policy. The other set of relevant political instruments are the normal CFSP instruments (Danish Presidency, 2002a). Africa figures as a topic in the CFSP more prominently than the other regions outside Europe. Out of a total number of 349 joint actions and common positions by 2002, 66 were about Africa (Council, 2002c). This places Africa as the second most important region measured in these terms, exceeded only by the Balkans. Expressed in the number of CFSP declarations, Africa also ranks high. In 2000, 60 out of 199 CFSP declarations were about Africa (Council, 2001a). In 2001, the number was 41 out of 196 (Council, 2002b). And in 2002, 74 out of 204 (Council, 2003a). However, there is no ‘common strategy’ on Africa. Most EU declarations and démarches concern human rights, good governance and democracy and urge the parties to the conflict to use political rather than military/violent means to reach a solution in conflicts. It is also in Africa that most of the EU’s so-called negative measures (sanctions, interruption of economic relations) are applied (Council, 2002a). Support is given to the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa – often in support of the UN’s efforts. These include the conflicts in the Great Lakes region, the Mano River area, Angola, Zimbabwe and the Horn of Africa. The EU’s policy measures include mediation in regional conflicts (for example, through the sending of the special envoy Ajello to the Great Lakes region and the special envoy Serri to Ethiopia/ Eritrea). In some cases the EU has imposed arms embargoes (for example, against Liberia and Ethiopia) and sanctions (against Unita in Angola and Sierra Leone). A significant dimension of EU policy is the support of regional cooperation through links to African organisations, not least in the field of security where African peace and security initiatives such as peacekeeping are supported. This is the case with regard to ECOWAS and SADC with which the EU conducts regular political dialogues and also with regard to the Mano River Union. An EU–African dialogue has also been launched with the Cairo declaration of 2000. The EU also aims for cooperation with the AU, the successor of the OAU, and in particular


the NEPAD, as complementary to the dialogue with the regional organisations within Africa (Danish Presidency, 2002b). A substantial part of EU policies concerns the furthering of human rights, democracy (including free and fair elections), good governance and the rule of law, and, as a consequence, many declarations and démarches criticise violations of these principles in individual countries and urge free and fair elections, a broad dialogue with the opposition, political solutions to conflicts and respects of agreements. Offers of electoral assistance are also given (Council, 1998b, 1999, 2000, 2001a: 20–6; 2002b: 26–31).2 The EU has considerable resources at its disposal in Africa. First of all, the EU’s aid efforts (both through the Community and the member states) are very substantial. The Community’s aid often constitutes a two-figure percentage of the state budget of an African country. The Community’s and member states’ aid is significantly higher than other donor countries’ aid to the region. This, together with the close links that the former colonial powers and other donors (including Denmark) have to many of the countries, renders the EU a powerful actor in Africa – at least in relative terms. The Community aid to Africa is implemented by the Commission and its delegations in almost all African countries. The political part is conducted by the Presidency, the High Representative and special envoys. The institutional separation between development cooperation (Pillar one) and the political aspects (Pillar two), which builds on different competences and decision-making procedures, is a major structural weakness which applies generally to EU foreign policy areas.3 Whereas development cooperation has a long-term perspective, political relations are often short-term reactions to political events. Arguably, the political instruments under the Cotonou agreement are not fine-tuned in that there is a gap between the political dialogue in articles 8–9 and the more drastic article 96 (the procedure before the imposing of sanctions and suspension of cooperation). These consistency problems mean that the potential of the EU to play a strong role in peace processes or to affect negative political developments seems larger than the de facto role played (Danish Presidency, 2002a). In this field, as in others, the EU has difficulties in reacting to, and controlling, ongoing events – not least because of its decision-making structures which often require coordination between many national and institutional actors. However, among the non-African organisations, the EU is the most politically active with respect to day-to-day developments on the continent. In summary, the EU’s policy towards Africa can be characterised as relatively detailed with many joint actions, common positions, and

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declarations and resourceful with many policy instruments available – in particular through its high development aid to the region.4

II. Danish policy Background, concepts and actorness There is little in the way of a Danish conception of Africa as a geographical area where Denmark has a special role to play on the basis of historical reasons, general strategic concerns, or concrete economic interests. There have not been official Danish policy principles on the approach to Africa as a geographical entity specifically directed towards the continent.5 The government’s announcement in October 2004 that an official Africa strategy will be published therefore looks like a historical break.6 The fact that Denmark has a colonial past in Africa, which ended with the sale of the Gold Coast to the UK in 1850, is very rarely referred to, if at all, in relation to the background for Danish engagement in Africa (Christensen, 2002: 7). Moreover, the basic understanding is that Africa is insignificant in international politics and, in particular, in the world economy. According to the former Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen, for instance: ‘… The problem with Africa is that it does not play any role. … They … have got a very small economy’ (interview with the author). The Danish political interest in Africa, to a large extent, takes as its point of departure development concerns. The general principles which dominate in the field of development are strongly articulated in relation to countries and policies in Africa where the basic poverty criterion applies more than anywhere else (Christensen, 2002: 8, 11). The linking of Africa to development issues can also be found in the Danish population’s image of Africa. To the extent that Africa is seen as a unit, the continent is seen as dominated by chaos and dictatorship with poverty as the dominant economic condition. Africa is, on this background, seen as a helpless continent (Christensen, 2002; Holm, 1987: 19). The Danish articulation of actorness in Africa is, therefore, closely linked to the articulation of actorness in the field of development. Denmark’s role and responsibility with regard to the colonial past are, if anything, understood in opposition to the bigger ex-colonial powers who are suspected of protecting their own historical interests on the continent. The self-understanding of virtually no Danish colonial past in Africa gives Denmark a moral upper hand in its dealings in Africa, for it cannot be suspected of protecting long-standing interests. (The EU is sometimes seen as an instrument for counterbalancing the old colonial powers


in Africa.) At the same time, many of the principles in the field of development can, conversely, be seen to be shaped by the fact that Danish development aid has, ever since its start, been concentrated in Africa. Since the beginning of Danish development aid, Africa received more than 50 per cent of the bilateral Danish aid budget, at present approximately 60 per cent (Udenrigsministeriet, 2003a: 20; Olsen, 1995: 248). The Danish aid principles can thus be seen as formulated with the concrete political conditions in Africa as a background. De facto, the focus on Africa in development means that Africa is constructed as an important object of Danish policy. The statement of the Social Democrat foreign affairs spokesman Jeppe Kofoed in the Folketing on 26 October 2000, when discussing Partnerskab 2000, is illustrative: ‘Our focus on Africa as the biggest recipient of our bilateral aid shall … be maintained, … and not least in a world where Europe increasingly has to ensure that Africa does not become the forgotten continent’ (F3 Thursday, 26 October 2000). In relation to Africa, Denmark’s general political principles and aims concern development, the improvement of the internal conditions in African countries (furthering human rights, democracy, good governance) and the enhancement of stability on the continent. While the two latter elements are often linked in political discourse to the furthering of development – that is, the first element – they are also articulated as principles that are important in their own right. In many cases, links are also made between all three concepts. However, towards the beginning of the twenty-first century, the role of stability and peace is clearly emphasised more both as a necessary component of development and in its own right (see, for example, Udenrigsministeriet, 2000f: 5–8, 14). Aims and arguments about the internal organisation of societies in Africa are not new. Denmark was a prominent and long-standing critic of the apartheid regime in South Africa until its demise (Christensen, 2002: 11). Denmark, then, is articulated as an active actor in Africa as an extension of the actorness in the field of development that is based on moral and social grounds. This also includes an engagement in conflict resolution as a spillover from the development considerations. According to a publication from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘A strengthened Danish involvement in preventing and handling violent conflict in the development countries is a natural extension of Denmark’s significant engagement in the development countries and our active role of the UN …’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000f: 5; see also p. 19).7

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The EU and articulations of Danish actorness There is an articulation of a Danish political role in Africa on the basis of Danish actorness in development, although it is not as strong as in pure development contexts. ‘Denmark’ is in most contexts articulated as the acting subject in policy towards Africa. This is also the case in the field of security where ‘Denmark’ is presented as an independent actor, even though it is also co-articulated with other actors (see, for instance, Udenrigsministeriet, 2000f: 11, 45–6, 53, 89, 92). Although the UN is presented as the overarching political framework for Danish policy in Africa, the use of the EU is often stressed in relation to the operational political contexts. The EU is in many instances presented as the concrete and necessary framework for policy towards Africa: [about conflict resolution in Africa] We shall stress the importance of the UN … but in many contexts the UN has unfortunately not done what was necessary. The EU has therefore also by virtue of its political and economic weight an obvious – and so far unfulfilled obligation – to contribute constructively. … Denmark must work actively for the EU to upgrade its involvement across the whole area. (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000f: 14) The most common articulation in relation to political and broader economic issues in Africa is that the EU is presented as an essential framework through which Denmark acts and augments its influence. The way actorness is articulated in these contexts is with Denmark as the acting subject that often but not always acts through the EU framework: Within the framework of the EU, but also bilaterally, Denmark supports regional economic cooperation between groups of development countries … [about Lomé] … Denmark will in the negotiations about EU development cooperation work to give higher priority to human rights together with democratisation and a joint effort in the field of conflict prevention … bilaterally Denmark seeks, inter alia in Southern Africa, to strengthen the SACD countries’ endeavours to develop a free-trade zone. (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000f: 44–5) and Denmark will work to extend ACP/EU cooperation. More generally, Denmark will work for a coherent engagement from the side of the


EU towards the development countries which ensures that the whole spectre from conflict resolution … to long-term aid and trade cooperation can be covered. (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000f: 51, author’s translation) However, there are instances where Denmark and the EU are co-articulated as subjects in the strong form of ‘Denmark and the EU’ or as a conflation of the two. Most of these are in relation to trade or trade-related issues with consequences for Africa, and sometimes in relation to the Lomé regime (see, for example, Jeppe Kofoed, in the Folketing on 17 April and 26 October 2000). But there are also cases of more political contexts where the EU and Denmark come close to being articulated as a single actor: [after mentioning Denmark’s support for regional peacekeeping in Africa] It is the responsibility of the developing countries to secure peaceful and stable development, but, in cooperation with its EUpartners, Denmark can and should assist development countries in creating the preconditions necessary. … (Petersen, 2001: 25; see also Udenrigsministeriet, 2000f: 14–15) In summary, in relation to political contexts in Africa the EU is presented as the most important tool in many contexts, with the UN as the broader political framework. In some contexts Denmark and the EU are co-articulated and there are cases of the conflation of actorness. But this is less common than contexts in which ‘Denmark’ is the sole acting subject or where ‘Denmark’ is articulated as acting through, or with, the EU framework (see Figure 7.1). Policy and priorities The level of activity, level of detail and the organisations through which Danish policy towards Africa is conducted, vary considerably according to which of the three following categories an African country is placed in. The first category consists of the nine African countries currently selected for Danish Programme aid (Benin, Burkina Faso, Egypt (the only one that is not ACP),8 Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia). These countries receive Danish aid that for most of them amounts to rather high percentages of their countries’ GNP. Denmark sometimes comes third or even second as a donor in these countries after the former colonial powers. In this group of countries, there is a strong local diplomatic presence, often intensive contacts to many parts of the national governments and a strong interest in the

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Often articulations of acting through the EU Denmark

Strong articulations of Danish actorness Denmark EU

UN is often articulated as the general frame Sometimes co-articulations with other IOs

Denmark + EU Denmark + IOs Denmark UN


political developments of the country. There is a detailed Danish policy. There is Danish domestic interest in the Programme countries among political parties, business organisations, NGOs and parts of the academic community. According to former Social Democrat Foreign Minister, Mogens Lykketoft, these Programme countries are the political focus of Danish African policy as ‘we have never had a particularly strong interest in the countries in the rest of Africa … [apart from] South Africa …’ (interview with the author). For the group of countries selected for Danish Programme aid, the EU is an important frame for Danish policy, but not the only one. Denmark takes an active part in the shaping of EU policies towards these countries. But Copenhagen also carries out relatively significant policy moves on its own, that is, on a bilateral basis (for example cutting-off aid to Eritrea and Malawi in 2001). Denmark also acts through other groupings than the EU, for example the like-minded group (the UK, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries), with the US (as in the case of the weapons embargo towards Sierra Leone in the early years of the new millennium), or ad hoc with the other Nordic countries. Denmark also acts politically through the UN. The role of the UN in the form of the General Assembly is, however, seen as very general and not suited to dealing with day-to-day political problems or acute crises (interview, MFA). In any case, in the General Assembly, there is EU coordination in


most cases. According to vote counts, Denmark has been shown to be the EU country that breaks the least with the EU line in the General Assembly (Strömvik, 1998). With the exception of the rare cases where Denmark is a member of the UN Security Council, the most direct UN forum for political action in Africa between UN General Assemblies is the UN Human Rights Commission, in particular when Denmark is a member. The Human Rights Commission is, however, seen as difficult to use for operational political purposes because of its broad membership and because of its restricted meeting period (interview, MFA). In the Human Rights Commission there is also EU coordination.9 The general view among MFA civil servants is that the EU is the main operational multilateral forum for Danish policy towards this group of African countries, as there is a level of coordination and means that cannot be obtained in the UN context or with other actors. In the words of a prominent civil servant closely associated with the CFSP process, ‘… what else [would it be] …?’ (interview, MFA). However, Danish bilateral policy towards the African Programme countries can be said to go further than EU policy. EU coordination does not play a central role in the Danish attempts to stabilise or develop the Programme countries on a daily basis. But if the political situation in or around a particular country becomes very tense (as, for example, in Zimbabwe in 2002), then EU policy in the form of sanctions becomes the primary framework for Danish policy. In these cases, Denmark will not normally take very strong diplomatic measures towards a country without the parallel framing action of the EU. In a situation in which Denmark estimates that a diplomatic démarche is necessary, Denmark will attempt to carry this out through the EU, often followed up by bilateral measures such as, for example, the suspension of aid (interview, MFA). Denmark might launch political initiatives towards this group of African countries without consulting the EU, something that is not likely in, for instance, the Middle East (interview, MFA). According to practitioners, the variation in the extent to which the EU is consulted and used has to do with how developed the EU’s policy is towards the country or region in question. According to former Foreign Minister Mogens Lykketoft, ‘… Given that the EU has actually had a weak profile … south of the Sahara, … there has perhaps been a higher degree of independent foreign policy’ (interview with the author). But the attempts to use the EU in a particular case can also be an expression of whether the EU can be mobilised behind Danish demands. When mobilisation of the EU is not achievable, bilateral action becomes

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primary (as in the case of Malawi in 2001 where the EU did not want to jeopardise its relationship with the country by supporting Danish demands for tougher action) (interview, MFA). A special bilateral line may also be a result of differences of emphasis in, respectively, the EU’s and the Danish lines. For example, in spite of EU criticism towards Kenya, Denmark has retained Kenya as a Danish Programme country. There can, then, be gaps between EU stances and the Danish bilateral policy line for different reasons which have to do with the strength and intensity of EU policy and the way it is read from a Danish perspective. Generally Danish foreign policy practitioners do not see the policy line of the EU as a constraint on Danish foreign policy choices in Africa. It is mostly seen as an instrument that is useful in particular kinds of situation but which does not restrict Danish foreign policy action (interview, MFA). An important exception to the pattern in this category of countries that receive aid are the political relationships with the regional African organisations such as ECOWAS or SACD or the general organisations, the AU and NEPAD. Earlier Danish political relations with these organisations were mainly bilateral. Now the political relationship to these organisations is conducted under the auspices of the EU, although Denmark also gives bilateral aid to SACD. There is little in the way of a bilateral policy towards these organisations outside the EU, but Denmark is active within the EU (interview, MFA). Danish policy towards Africa as a whole within the EU must be characterised as active. Denmark belongs to the active group of countries in the EU together with France, the UK, Germany, Sweden, Portugal and Belgium. During the Danish Presidency in 1993, Denmark submitted a proposal for strengthening cooperation on Africa (Larsen, 2000a: 51). The Danish Presidency in 2002 also put forward a proposal for strengthening the EU’s ability to act in Africa. The essence of the Danish proposal was that the consistency between EU pillars should be enhanced, greater consistency in policy views sought and the ability to produce policy responses be better adapted to the changes in the situation (Danish Presidency, 2002a). It was thus an expression of a wish to see the EU generally play a stronger role in Africa. Copenhagen would like to see ‘more EU’ in the political field in Africa, not least because the EU is seen as a way of curtailing and limiting the power of the former colonial powers (interview, MFA). The Danish policy towards the Programme countries in Africa within the EU can also be described as active. Denmark belongs to the group of Nordic countries plus the UK and the Netherlands in the EU which


believe that political changes can and should be attempted in Africa (southern European countries, including France, tend to believe that political conditions in Africa are difficult to change, and are more pragmatic). The former colonial powers consider Denmark a significant player in these countries. In a country like Burkina Faso, for example, Denmark is the most involved, together with France. The second category of African countries is heterogeneous, although aid is also a keyword here. This group consists of countries that have development-related debt to Denmark or which have previously been Programme countries (Malawi, Sudan, Eritrea, Niger and Zimbabwe). Into this group also fall countries which receive other kinds of aid including Transitional aid (for example, South Africa, RDC, Niger, Lesotho, Angola, Rwanda and Cameroon). In the case of South Africa, the strong historical Danish opposition to the apartheid regime has led to a heavy engagement in the affairs of this country (Christensen, 2002). Countries which are of general political importance on the continent (for example, Nigeria) can also be said to belong to this group. Denmark will not have an embassy in these countries (apart from South Africa),10 but will have stances towards the general political issues relating to the country. Here the EU is considerably more important as a forum for policy and there is less Danish policy conducted outside the EU than in the first category. The third category consists of the rest of the African countries which amounts to nearly half of the countries in Africa. In these countries there is no Danish diplomatic representation and no bilateral activity. To the extent that Denmark takes part in discussions about these countries in international fora at all, Danish positions are based on ‘general Danish humanist interests’ rather than detailed and substantial views. Copenhagen will go along with views that can gather general consensus, or views that are supported by countries with whom Denmark often shares views (interviews, MFA). There is rarely participation in discussions about operational decisions within or outside the EU. However, if the region of the country in question comprises a Danish Programme country, Denmark will often be engaged and express views on the situation. This is, for example, the case in West Africa where the Danish presence in Burkina Faso and Benin means that Denmark might also express views within the EU on developments in Mali, Chad or Mauritania. The EU framework is seen by practitioners as the vehicle through which the political engagement in the Programme countries provides access to influencing the wider regional political setting and thus to a degree of Danish engagement there. The EU provides a platform

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for a Danish regional policy engagement which would otherwise not exist (interview, MFA). No Danish views are put forward if a country in this category is not part of the regional context of a Programme country (such as for example Madagascar). All in all, this means that there are few countries in Africa where Denmark would not put forward any views. But for the countries in this third category which are ‘drawn in’ by the regional context, the engagement is not comparable to the level of Danish activity towards the Programme countries (interview, MFA). The political stances that the EU takes are therefore the primary expressions of Danish policy for countries in this category. In summary, in the words of the former Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen, ‘… We pursue our own influence … bilaterally [in the Programme countries and South Africa]. But for the majority of the African countries we are mainly “with”, that is following in the wake of the ACP cooperation’ (interview with the author). This is illustrated in Figure 7.2. Generally, the domestic Danish environment interested in development questions is also interested in political issues in Africa. This is not least the case for the NGOs (Olsen, 2002e). NGOs frequently bring cases to the attention of MPs who raise them within the political system. In the Folketing, the issues brought up are a mix of single issues that catch the headlines and more long-term ones, with the first kind dominating. Often more complex issues are not discussed. General pressures from political parties in the Folketing for using the EU for particular political purposes in Africa are rare. On the agenda of the Folketing’s Foreign Policy Committee, Africa may be dealt with as a separate point and/or as a point on the EU External Affairs Council’s agenda. Pressures to draw on the EU in particular cases in relation to Africa are not identified in my interviews with politicians

Denmark

EU

Danish policy is mainly conducted outside the EU in relation to Programme countries and South Africa Danish policy is mainly conducted inside the EU in relation to other countries and African organisations



Generally a high level of activity within the EU A Denmark

EU

(A)

The level of activity, however, varies considerably with the category of countries concerned

Figure 7.3 Level of Danish policy activity within the EU

and civil servants. The relationship is almost the opposite: in relation to questions in the Folketing about what the government has done about a particular country or problem in Africa, reference to an EU stance will often serve as justification for the government having done something. Africa as a point on the agenda of the EU External Affairs Council’s agenda is not a point in relation to which much time is spent in the Danish parliamentary process (interview with Social Democrat foreign affairs spokesman Jeppe Kofoed). The active Danish line in the EU on Africa cannot, therefore, be seen as an expression of direct pressures from the active domestic segment interested in Africa.11 There are no identifiable domestic pressures either for using the EU frame more extensively, for example with respect to countries in Africa where Denmark has few bilateral opportunities outside the EU. The level of Danish policy activity within the EU is illustrated in Figure 7.3. Constitutive effects? There are strong similarities between the discourse and concepts in the EU’s and in Denmark’s policies towards Africa. However, in parallel to my analysis of the field of development, it is difficult to point to general concepts or elements of language that have been incorporated into Danish discourse from the EU context. This is because many of these elements have been present in the Danish or international contexts at the same time as they have been taken up by the EU, making the question of the origins of the concepts difficult to answer unequivocally. As in the case of development, the focus on security in EU policy towards Africa in the late 1990s is not unique to the EU and the provenance of the conceptual import on Danish policy therefore not clear (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000f: 16). In relation to the countries in Africa towards which Denmark has some relations (categories 1 and 2 above), it is difficult to find indications of

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constitutive effects on Danish policies and understandings. According to practitioners, no important edges have been cut off Danish policy positions. But at the same time, it is also the case that Denmark ‘does not let itself be isolated’ during negotiations on Africa, in the words of a high-ranking MFA official (interview, MFA). Denmark is thus not totally intransigent towards compromises in this field of the CFSP in Africa. Although such adjustments may be very minor (and concrete rather than conceptual) with Danish fundamental understandings left unaltered, ‘rough edges’ may be smoothed also in relation to the Programme countries. As for the third group of countries above – countries in Africa where Denmark has traditionally not had any specific policy line or bilateral contact – the import of EU policy stances and language in relation to these countries would seem a likely possibility. The interesting question is how Denmark draws on the EU positions towards these countries in the (rare) situations where Denmark is forced to pronounce itself on one of these countries in a context which is not formally an EU context. If Denmark has internalised the EU’s stances, one would expect Denmark to pronounce itself on the issue by drawing on the EU’s concepts and language. My empirical analysis shows that in situations where the Danish government is asked to pronounce itself on one of these countries, the reference to the substance and language of EU policies is not introduced by the formulation ‘Denmark believes that …’. Such a formulation would suggest that Denmark had internalised the EU’s position as part of its understanding of world politics. This is the formulation that is used in the case of countries with which Denmark has bilateral contacts and a well-defined policy line. Rather, the official formulation used in the case of countries with which Denmark does not have any bilateral contacts is often ‘Denmark supports the EU’s declaration on …’ (interviews, MFA). In this way, ‘Denmark’ can be said to distance itself from the EU’s stances, indicating that they are not fully internalised as part of ‘Danish’ political understandings. The participation in the Union’s stances thus broadens the possibilities to engage in wider political contexts, but the extent to which the wider context has been fully incorporated into the Danish mental universe in relation to Africa is less obvious. The official expressions used indicate a reticence towards incorporating EU stances fully into the Danish foreign policy universe. This indicates that if there is a constitutive effect of Denmark’s participation in the EU’s policies towards African countries, this does not take the simple form of the agent ‘Denmark’ speaking the EU’s discourse unreflexively. Denmark associates itself with policy


stances rather than discourse and these stances are kept at arm’s length from ‘Denmark’ through the formulation ‘Denmark supports the EU declaration …’. More broadly, the common argument that Danish/small state participation in the EU’s foreign policy has widened the scope of Danish foreign policy may be correct in that Denmark is party to decisions relating to countries or regions where it has had no such engagement before (as in the case of many of the African countries). But in the case of the countries in Africa which are not part of groups 1 and 2 above, Denmark does not take on board an active stance towards these countries, let alone the substantial views which might frame a higher level of activity. Denmark’s restricted scope in parts of Africa also restricts the degree to which EU views are internalised. Where one can arguably talk about a constitutive effect arising from the EU context is in the EU’s focus in some situations on Africa as a whole continent and as a political entity (as in the 2000 Cairo declaration) rather than as a range of individual countries. As mentioned, it has been difficult to find an official Danish policy on Africa as a whole. But within the EU, Denmark has been actively furthering strategies towards the whole continent, for example in the form of proposals during its presidencies in 1993 and 2002 (see above). So although this has not been realised in the formulation of an official Danish ‘Africa policy’ until recently, this is interesting because it is an example of a language in which Denmark engages in the EU context and which has not had a clear ‘Danish’ equivalent.12 It is significant that Danish political relations with Africa as a whole and the regional organisations in Africa are conducted almost exclusively through the EU. The issue of Danish use of EU concepts in policy towards Africa is illustrated in Figure 7.4.

(C)

Denmark


Few indications of constitutive effects – except with regard to Africa as a whole

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III. Conclusions 1. Inside or outside the EU? There is a difference between the groups of countries in Africa with regard to whether Danish policy is conducted inside or outside the EU. Towards the countries that receive large amounts of Danish aid (the Programme countries) and South Africa, there is a bilateral Danish policy, and Danish policy is also conducted in other organisational contexts than through the EU. The EU is one instrument among others. The EU is, however, the most important operational multilateral framework for political matters in Africa also for this group of countries, in particular in political crises. For the countries in the second category, the EU is more important. For the third category of countries where Denmark has few links through aid or history, the EU is the exclusive forum for Danish policy with negligible policy conducted outside the EU. As for political relations to Africa as a whole or to the African regional organisations, these are almost exclusively conducted through the EU. 2. An active policy in the EU? Denmark is among the most active countries in relation to Africa. The level of activity, however, varies according to the category of African countries in question. It is highest in relation to the Danish Programme countries and other countries to which Denmark has previously given aid or had historical relations (South Africa). Denmark also expresses views on other countries in the region of the Programme countries and, indeed, African regional organisations and the continent as a whole. The Danish activity towards these regional fora does not have a parallel outside the EU. Denmark is passive in relation to countries which do not fall into the previous categories mentioned. This last category is the smallest one. 3. Constitutive effects? The clearest example of the EU having constitutive effects on Danish policy is the political conceptualisation of Africa as a whole. This can be found in the EU’s language and policies, but not until recently in the Danish political language in the form of an ‘African policy’. It is a conceptualisation in which Denmark engages in the EU context and which does not have an obvious ‘Danish’ equivalent. There are few indications of constitutive effects arising from the EU’s policy towards the Programme countries or towards other countries towards which Denmark has previously given aid.


4. Why this state of affairs? (a) EU framework EU policy towards Africa can be said to be strong, intense and comprehensive. Many legal CFSP instruments are used and declarations issued. There are very strong economic means at the disposal of EU policies through the Cotonou agreement and bilateral aid. There is EU involvement in many crises and cases of conflict resolution. The old colonial powers are engaged in this policy. However, there are also weaknesses, one of which is the parallel national action. Another is the lack of consistency in action between the institutional pillars of the EU. (b) Articulation of Danish actorness Denmark is a strong political actor in Africa. The background of this is a dominant discourse which constructs ‘Denmark’ as an actor with moral responsibilities and obligations in Africa parallel to the discourse on development. Africa has for a long time been constructed as an object to be developed. ‘Denmark’ is in most contexts articulated within this discourse as the acting subject. When the EU is mentioned in Danish foreign policy discourse in this field, the most common articulation is that the EU is positioned as an essential instrument for ‘Denmark’ rather than articulated as one with Denmark. This is particularly the case in relation to broader economic issues linked to Africa. The fit between these two elements (EU policy relatively strong, Denmark articulated as an actor) can serve as a background for understanding both the Danish political scope vis-à-vis the EU, the active use of the EU and the limited but still identifiable constitutive effects. The EU policy is relatively strong and intense, but not fully unitary or coherent. The strong Danish discourse on actorness in Africa defines the scope of Danish policy in Africa, leading to a policy of strong engagement in many areas linked to the Programme countries – where EU policy is sometimes less strong or less detailed than Danish policy in spite of its relatively strong character. At the same time, the capacity of the EU makes it the most important multilateral tool for Danish policy in Africa. Even a strong Danish articulation of actorness does not provide the drive for detailed policy towards all African countries. In relation to those African countries with which Denmark has no bilateral links, the EU constitutes the exclusive framework for action owing to its comprehensive character. The strong Danish actorness accounts for the active Danish approach to Africa within the EU. It is reflected in the EU’s role in the articulation of actorness as something that is not fully ‘into’ ‘Denmark’ in Africa (in the form of ‘Denmark and the EU’), but

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something that is mostly articulated as an instrument for Denmark. The strong articulation of Danish actorness in Africa can account for the limited constitutive effects of EU policy on Danish policy concepts. The will to conduct a policy ‘over and above’ the EU suggests why conceptual effects of the EU framework are limited, although an important example can be found concerning the conceptualisation of Africa as a whole. The situation in the field of policy towards Africa fits category 3 outlined in Chapter 2. The EU policy frame is strong, although not as strong as in the case of EU policy in the Balkans. The Danish articulation of actorness in this field is strong. It is so strong that there are aspects of policy which are conducted outside the EU policy frame and where the EU frame is just one forum among others. This is also the background for Denmark’s active policy within the EU and the limited constitutive effects of participation in the EU on Danish policy. It could even be argued that in relative terms, policy towards Africa is closer to category 2 when it comes to the Danish Programme countries and South Africa given that the Danish articulation of actorness provides the background for a high level of policy activity here. However, taken as a whole, as the EU frame is resourceful across most parts of Africa, there are also geographical areas where the EU policy is the only Danish access to policy and where Denmark only contributes through its policy stances in the EU. The background of Danish policy in this field is summarised in Figure 7.5.

(C) (A)


Denmark Comprehensive and resourceful EU policy (but not as strong as in the Balkans) EU Figure 7.5 Why this state of affairs? The background of Danish policy. A summary

8 Latin America

The last geographical area dealt with in the book is Latin America. Latin America is used, in this chapter, as a category that covers both Central and South America.

I. The EU Background, concepts and actorness Europe’s relations with Latin America (LA) have for a long time been secondary to the US’s relations with LA. The US has dominated in terms of economic transactions and influence on regimes (Piening, 1997: 119). In spite of the attempt by several European countries in the 1950s to revive their old often colonial contacts, the newly founded EC engaged in little exchange with LA and made no coordinated efforts to address the growing needs of much of LA for development aid and cooperation. Trade agreements were concluded with some countries in the 1970s and early 1980s, but compared with the EC’s relations with other parts of the developing world, the content of these was modest (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 130). The EC’s increased political and economic engagement in Latin America in the 1980s was furthered by Spain’s and Portugal’s accession to the EC. But the beginning of the return of democracy to LA, a higher degree of political stability, the attractions of new markets and growing integrationist trends in LA also contributed to the new European interest in LA (Piening, 1997: 121–2). While the EU presents itself as an actor in LA, it does not describe itself as the key actor in the region; that role is left to the US. In the words of the Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, in 2002: … some observers … like to see the European Union as trying to compete with the US. This is not our intention. The US has a geopolitical 166

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and strategic relationship with Latin America that no other region could have. … For the EU, Latin America is and will remain a vital economic and political partner in its own right. … We all share history and values. We respect each other. We trade and invest in each other’s markets … Our civil societies see alike in many different areas. And we are all committed to working together in international institutions to find effective multilateral solutions to global problems, … The EU is determined to help to consolidate the economic and political achievements that the region has already made. (Patten, 2002) The character of the EU’s relationship and engagement with LA has since 1999 been described as a ‘strategic partnership’ based on three dimensions: greater political dialogue; sound economic and financial relations based on comprehensive and balanced liberalisation of trade and capital flows, and dynamic cooperation in key sectors (including development aid) (Commission, 2000b). The term ‘strategic partnership’, as opposed to just ‘partnership’ as in the case of the Cotonou countries, suggests that the EU benefits internationally from cultivating a political and economic relationship, and that cooperation provides the EU with a political ally and strengthens the EU economically. Economic gains often seem to lead the list before political aspects. At the same time, Union discourse also refers to problems of development, human rights, weak democratic structures and political instability in LA. The general EU discourse on LA, then, both contains instrumental concerns for the EU and a mission to effect change in LA. While the EU is presented as an agent in LA and with LA, EU actorness towards the subcontinent is not given as much emphasis as towards most other regions. It is not a – let alone the – core region in the Union’s foreign policy. It is illustrative that in the annual reports by the Presidency on Union foreign policy, LA is mentioned far down the EU’s list of geographical policy areas after the Mediterranean region, Asia and Africa (Council, 1998b, 1999, 2000, 2001a, 2002b, 2003a, 2004). Policies and priorities The EU’s structured relationship with the LA countries takes place both at multilateral and bilateral levels, and at subcontinental, regional and national levels. At each level, a range of cooperation agreements including political dialogue have been concluded, although the tendency is that the relations with the subcontinental fora (covering the whole of LA) have a more political character. All the EU’s agreements contain conditionality with respect to breaches of human rights and democratic


principles. As the EU’s preference is for dealing with other regional organisations, the EU’s approach has been to favour dealing with LA subcontinental, regional and subregional groupings, and to encourage these LA integration processes rather than engaging in policy relations at the level of the individual states. The most ambitious agreement has been the framework agreement with Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay). Another important grouping is the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) with whom the EU also has a framework agreement. The EU hopes to obtain association agreements with both groupings. However, the Union also has bilateral agreements with individual countries, most of which are countries which have not wanted to subsume their policies under regional LA organisations. This is, for example, the case with Chile and Mexico. The EU has regular meetings with the LA groupings, although not always at the level of foreign ministers. The format of the agreements is, in general terms, similar to the set-up in other parts of the world. The agreements contain three main parts: political dialogue, trade/economic questions and cooperation (development aid). And they contain clauses on conditionality in the case of violations of human rights or democratic principles. The EU’s relations with some LA countries are not, however, covered by these interregional agreements, but by the Cotonou Convention of 2000. This is the case for the ACP countries, Surinam, Guyana and many of the countries in the Caribbean. The EU’s stance towards Cuba, laid down in 1996 in the only common position so far in relation to LA, encourages a transition to pluralist democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and an improvement of the standard of living. In 2002, the EU assessed that the situation was improving so much that Cuba was promised membership of the Cotonou agreement. In EU foreign policy towards LA, the CFSP instruments used are declarations and démarches: there is no common strategy for LA, no joint actions and only one common position (about Cuba); rather, many declarations are issued and démarches are made. The EU’s political stances towards individual countries (outside the formal political dialogues) take the form of recommendations or reactions in relation to events. Concerning internal stability, the EU has in the period 1997–2001 expressed its support for negotiations between governments and guerrilla groups or other opposition groups within countries, in some cases promising economic support for this process (Colombia, 1997–2001; Paraguay, 1999; Guatemala, 1997–99). The Union supports international agreements which are seen as strengthening regional stability such as

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the one between Chile and Peru (1998–99). The EU has also expressed concern with regard to internal issues that relate to human rights and democracy such as in the cases of El Salvador (1998), Haiti (1997), Jamaica (1997), Colombia (1998) and Paraguay (1997), including condemnation of violence and massacres (Paraguay, 1999 and Mexico, 1997). It has criticised fraud in elections (Haiti, 1999–2000) and has expressed its support for ending political and constitutional crises and for strengthening and consolidating democracy (Peru, 2001; Haiti, 1998). Positively, it has welcomed ‘the democratic spirit’ in elections (Colombia, 1997) and elections ‘which meet international standards’ (Peru, 2001) as well as efforts in the field of human rights (Guatemala, 1999) (Council, 1998–2003). Key elements in the Union’s political declarations are thus national reconciliation and stability, regional stability, human rights, free elections, consolidation of democracy and good governance. These same political priorities also apply to the EU’s relations with the LA regional organisations together with a focus on free trade, development and the fight against drugs (in the case of the Andean Community and SICA). The EU generally gives priority to the conduct of political dialogues with the interregional organisations (Mercosur, Andean Community, San José) and the subregional levels rather than bilaterally, although bilateral dialogue does exist. Hence, in the annual reports of the CFSP, the dialogues with the regional organisations have come to take up most, if not all, of the description of the policies towards LA (Council, 1998–2003). Important exceptions to this are the relations with Chile and Mexico which do not take full part in the regional LA organisations. How can we characterise the EU’s policy towards LA in terms of level of detail, intensity, and long-term goals and resources? The scope of the EU’s policies is comprehensive. The EU has some kind of agreement with all countries which include political dialogue alongside trade and cooperation. Community aid in some form or another goes to all countries in the region. The economic free-trade dimension is very advanced, in particular in relation to Mercosur, Mexico and Chile. The EU is engaged in a dialogue on most subjects with the organisations in the region and in some cases also with individual countries. It reacts to many of the central political problems in the subcontinent. It is also the view taken by practitioners in Copenhagen that there is more EU agreement on LA than ever when taking a long-term perspective, even though Spain, in particular, continues to promote its own agenda in parallel with the Union (interview, MFA). While LA has become more important for the EU, in particular after the Cold War, it is not a region that can measure up to the regions closer


to Europe or Africa. In the annual EU reports on foreign policy, LA takes up less space than sub-Saharan Africa and is placed after most other regions. Although it is a region in which the EU promotes its general foreign policy objectives and values, relations with LA (as opposed to, for example, Africa) have a strong trade side to them (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 130). This is reflected in the less than prominent position of LA in general CFSP documents and the absence of common positions or joint actions towards the region (apart from Cuba). The aim of influencing current political developments within LA, if clearly present, is not among the primary strategic aims. The policy therefore also appears to be less ambitious. The focus in many cases on trade issues rather than political issues also points to a political framework that is less intensive than the economic one. The EU High Representative does not pay frequent visits to LA, but the Commission has delegations in the majority of countries. In terms of resources given, the EU’s aid to LA in 2000 ranks as number 5 after CEE, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and North Africa. LA receives 9 per cent of the total EU aid (OECD, 2002). So although the EU’s policy draws on resources, these are less than those available to other parts of the world. While many of the countries in LA are poor, the wealthiest of them belong to the global middle group in terms of income per capita. Aid does not play an immense political role in these contexts. Here EU market access rather than aid is an attractive resource. The EU policy is therefore not as strong as in relation to Africa (or many other development countries). There are several reasons for this: the aid to the LA subcontinent as a whole is less significant in relative terms than in Africa. Aid is not as important for the national economies and development efforts in the LA countries as in the cases of Africa or the Balkans. Moreover, the Cotonou agreement or the SAAs are more comprehensive and detailed frameworks for affecting change in the ACP partner states or the Balkans than agreements with the LA countries. The SAAs in the Balkans have a clear long-term goal compared with the less ambitious aim of agreements in LA. Also, the colonial links for the EU as a whole are less strong than in Africa where the UK and France are engaged, which affects the intensity of relations. The EU’s focus is more trade-oriented and less political than in Africa or in the Balkans. For these reasons (and because the US is so powerful here), the EU is not such an influential actor in LA as in these other two regions. The general assessment of the EU’s policy towards LA is that it is comprehensive, has resources and a certain leverage in trade, but that it is not as strong as EU policy in Africa or the Balkans.

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II. Denmark Background, concepts and actorness Historically, Denmark has had a very limited political engagement in LA in spite of long-standing diplomatic and trade links and an identifiable immigrant population in Argentina and Brazil. The main focus has been on trade, although the importance of this trade has been less than, for example, the cases of countries like Sweden and the Netherlands (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 52–3). Denmark has not historically constructed a particular role or mission for itself in LA and the latter does not figure independently in major general accounts on Danish foreign policy or Danish security post-1945 such as the Seidenfaden report (Regeringsudvalget vedrørende Danmarks sikkerhedspolitik, 1970; Hækkerup, 1965; Udenrigsministeriet, 1993; SNU, 1995; Regeringen, 2003a). LA has generally been understood in terms of the North–South problematic and hence the area of ‘development’ rather than as a region in its own right in which Denmark had political interests. No particular security risks were seen as emanating from LA. The location of LA in a development context (and the focus on non-political Danish aid during the Cold War) together with a critical stance towards the political regimes in the region up to the 1990s contributed to making state-tostate links less obvious.1 In contrast to Africa, where the concentration of aid could be said to ascribe a de facto special role to Denmark, Danish development aid to LA post-1945 was never significant enough to drive a specific interest in LA. The Danish reactions to the 1982 Falklands war did not suggest any particular Danish interest in LA or, indeed, sympathy for Argentina (Larsen, 1996). In the annual accounts on Danish foreign policy by the Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, LA is not even mentioned in the period 1997–2002, although it is mentioned at some length in the account of 1996 (Petersen, 1997). There are only two Danish Programme countries in LA, Bolivia and Nicaragua. That in itself both contributes to, and reflects, a lower Danish political interest in LA. There can be said to be a formal articulation of actorness towards LA. But this has been directed towards (limited) development concerns and trade and not towards exerting an influence on the political developments in the LA subcontinent. However, there has been a new interest in LA in Danish foreign policy from the 1990s not least inspired by other countries’ moves in the field of trade (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 52–3). This is presented as a result of the openness of the new democratic LA governments which are interested in discussing general Danish political


concerns such as human rights, democracy, disarmament and environmental issues (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 54–5). The new focus is presented as one which is not just a question of narrow trade concerns, but also broader political possibilities for creating better, democratic societies in LA. The Danish Foreign Ministry publication UM Tema on LA (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b) is an indication of a degree of Danish interest in the dynamics of the area; at the same time it can also be seen as a Foreign Ministry attempt to create an interest in the area, not least in trade (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: introduction). In spite of this stronger Danish sense of political agency in LA, the dominant understanding is still that LA is a marginal region in Danish foreign policy2 with little in the way of a specific Danish political mission, in spite of stronger agency in relation to the fields of development and trade. EU and Danish actorness Danish foreign policy actorness in relation to LA is frequently coarticulated with the EU in general policy contexts. There are many cases of the co-articulation of actorness in official texts in the form of ‘Denmark and the EU’ or a conflation of agency. It is, in many situations, difficult to see whether it is Denmark or the EU that is articulated as an actor or for whom action is prescribed. Significantly, there are no other organisations or actors than the EU that are co-articulated with Danish agency in relation to LA. Official material only mentions other actors or organisations that Denmark cooperates with in relation to development issues in contexts that have to do with the two Danish Programme countries (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 16). In the general political and economic realms, ‘the EU’ is the only other actor with which ‘Denmark’ is co-articulated. The structure in the preface by the Foreign Minister to the Danish Foreign Ministry publication on LA (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 4–5) is characteristic with respect to the role ascribed to the EU and the relationship articulated between the ‘EU’ and ‘Denmark’: … The trade between the EU and Latin America has … been developing strongly. … The EU countries, since the mid 1990s, have concluded a series of agreements … with countries and regions in Latin America. … These agreements contribute to strengthening the political dialogue, including the dialogue on human rights, and provide the possibilities for an amelioration of economic cooperation with … the region. From the Danish point of view, we are working to extend our relationship with Latin America – both bilaterally and

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through the EU. There is increasing attention paid to possibilities for export. Denmark contributes considerable development aid to some of the poorest countries. … Within the EU, Denmark supports an extension of cooperation with Latin America through … ever more committing agreements between the EU and the countries in LA which are ready for this. … Developments do not proceed equally fast in all countries, and there are also setbacks. … Where this happens, including in the democratization process, Denmark seeks, together with its EU partners, to contribute to moving developments in the right direction. … The aim of this thematic booklet is to describe present tendencies … and the new possibilities … for extending relations between these countries and Denmark and the EU. (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 4–5) Here the description of the developments in LA slides into a description of the links between LA and the EU: the EU is thus presented as a given framework for relations with the subcontinent with no clear distinction being made between the EU and Denmark. Separate Danish actorness is expressed with regard to export possibilities and development aid. Danish actorness is articulated within the EU in the context of more general policy developments and slides over into co-articulation with the EU in relation to moving democracy processes forward. Danish agency with regard to LA is thus articulated with or through the EU in the context of exerting influence on political and economic developments. A Danish agency that is separate from the EU is articulated when the area is development and trade promotion. However, Denmark’s relationship to the EU is still, to a large extent, articulated as Danish promotion of its interests rather than a co-articulation in a form which would suggest a merger of agency and interests; Danish policy interests are construed as being conducted or promoted through the EU. Denmark’s policy scope is presented as having expanded greatly as a result of the membership of the EU, as Denmark does not have the capacity, on its own, for the broad engagement in the region which the EU has. But the EU works to the advantage of a pre-existing Danish agency: (Under the subheading ‘Possibilities for Denmark by virtue of EU cooperation with Latin America’) Denmark supports the development of links between the EU and Latin American countries and sees the developments taking place as a significant supplement to the bilateral links. The EU’s political dialogue with the countries in LA is


considerably more extensive and covers more countries than Denmark itself would have the resources for. The EU’s political statements vis-à-vis … the region … is of greater significance than if Denmark expressed itself on its own. (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 54) However, this fundamentally instrumental articulation of the use of the EU (which distinguishes between EU and Danish agency, as the EU is presented as a power multiplier for Denmark) is not drawn on in most general political and economic contexts where agency is frequently co-articulated in the form of ‘Denmark and the EU’, just ‘the EU’ or a conflation of agency. When reference is made to the general political and economic context, the usage slides from pre-existing Danish agency to co-articulation with the EU (as in the above citation from the preface) and thus a much less distinct Danish agency in the form of ‘Denmark’. Danish agency, unarticulated with the EU, is still the rule in the field of development also in LA, although co-articulations with the EU are more common here than, for example, in the case of Africa. The field of export promotion, trade and economic cooperation (as opposed to trade more generally), is also a locus for the articulation of Danish agency. This is where a more active ‘Danish’ agency is presented as possible at the bilateral level after LA became more ‘interesting for DK’ in the 1990s (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 4–5): ‘Where Denmark’s interests in the political field are primarily taken care of through EU cooperation, there are still unexploited possibilities in the economic and trade field, where Denmark has good possibilities to engage itself directly’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 54. See also Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 4–5). In summary, there is a higher degree of conflation and co-articulation of agency between Denmark and the EU in relation to LA, as compared with the previous fields examined. The official Danish language on the use of the EU is about the unique furthering of Danish interests in the region through the EU instrument. However, the co-articulation or conflation of agency is very frequent, particularly in the general political and economic fields, although a total merger between Danish and EU agency across the board cannot be found. Danish agency without the EU is articulated in the fields of concrete development aid and trade/export promotion (see Figure 8.1). Policies and priorities Compared with the previous areas examined, LA is attributed much less of a role in terms of Danish political energy spent and resources

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Denmark

Weak articulation of Danish agency in relation to Latin America

Denmark + IO

No special Danish role or mission

Danish agency is also articulated with other international organisations in relation to development (UN)

Danish agency in relation to Latin America is predominantly articulated with the EU in different forms when the context is political or general economic matters

Denmark + EU

Denmark EU

EU


committed. The number of desk officers that deal with the geographical area of LA in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs constitute approximately 10 per cent of the number that work with Africa (Udenrigsministeriet, 2003f ). There are five Danish embassies on the LA subcontinent at the time of writing (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua and Mexico) compared with nine in sub-Saharan Africa and embassies in nearly all EU countries and in many candidate states. The Danish development aid to LA constitutes just 10 per cent of total bilateral aid. The aid to LA, however, has been almost doubled in the period 1994–99 as a result of the inclusion of Bolivia and Nicaragua among the Programme countries (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 60). The focus in Denmark’s relations with LA, however, varies considerably between countries and regions of the subcontinent. In most contexts, trade and export promotion are the main foci of diplomatic activity, whereas in a few countries political, economic and development concerns also prevail. The countries that receive the most intensive Danish political attention are the Programme countries, Bolivia and Nicaragua. Denmark also supports the implementation of the regional peace agreement around Guatemala through a bilateral aid programme and has been engaged in attempts to keep the Guatemalan government to its promises in the peace process particularly with regard to human rights and the rights of indigenous peoples (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 56–60). There are regular ministerial visits and visits by the Folketing to these


countries. In Bolivia, Denmark has taken an active line compared with other countries in promoting the rights of the indigenous population to whom the majority of Danish aid is also allocated. In Nicaragua, the focus has been on transport, farming, the environment and public administration/decentralisation. In 2001, a programme on democracy and good governance was launched. Denmark (and other donors) have from 2000 criticised what it sees as the Nicaraguan government’s lack of initiatives to further good governance. Copenhagen has made the release of aid conditional on improvements in good governance (Udenrigsministeriet, 2002a: 49–50). In these contexts there can be said to be a bilateral policy that goes further than the policy of the EU. There is also Danish political interest in the wealthier countries, Chile, Brazil and Mexico, where there are Danish embassies and regular ministerial visits (the Danish embassy in Argentina was closed in 2002). There is also political interest with regard to Cuba. However, the Danish bilateral relationships with the wealthy Mercosur countries and Chile and Mexico are very much focused on furthering trade and facilitating economic interaction. In the above-mentioned MFA publication on LA, five times as much space is spent describing ‘possibilities for strengthening trade cooperation with new markets’ than on describing the bilateral political dialogue, and the emphasis here is on what is done by the Danish MFA in the field of trade and export promotion in the Mercosur group and in Mexico. Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico are seen as the most important trade partners in LA. Interviews at the Danish embassies in Brazil and Argentina (when it existed) and Chile also indicated that these representations primarily saw themselves as bridgeheads for trade.3 The annexes in the MFA thematic issue on LA contained the EU’s broad political and economic declarations and only economic/aid related/technical agreements between Denmark and several of the remaining countries in the region (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 90–5). This points to the non-political/economic focus in Danish bilateral policy towards these countries (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 56–60). With the exception of the relations with Bolivia, Nicaragua and the regional peace process around Guatemala – where the focus also includes development and politics – the Danish bilateral links, then, concentrate on export promotion and on facilitating Danish trade. However, this is not to say that there are no bilateral Danish political measures at all directed at countries other than the Programme countries. There are clearly political measures such as a Danish-sponsored seminar on peacekeeping in Chile linked to the UN in 2000. There has also been Danish support for the setting up of a Chilean Ombudsman. However,

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these activities are seen as lying within the EU Rio framework. Also, Denmark since the 1990s has consulted with LA foreign ministers in the margin of the UN General Assembly which has led to closer cooperation on peacekeeping in relation to the setting-up of the UN Standing High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). The Danish Queen visited Chile and Brazil in 1999 and the Foreign Minister has been on official visits to Chile, Brazil and Mexico. However, in the overall picture, political activities are not where the Danish bilateral emphasis is placed.4 Apart from development where there are examples of coordination with other donors or work in a broader aid framework, the only organisational frame where Denmark takes part in concrete cooperation in relation to LA is the EU. It is through the EU that most political and general economic issues with regard to LA are pursued. In the words of a high-ranking civil servant closely associated with the CFSP: ‘It is clear that the EU framework is vital for us down there … [as it provides support on consular and trade issues] and the EU framework is also our key to influencing the development down there, to the extent that we manage it’ (interview, MFA). This is illustrated in Figure 8.2. Within the EU Denmark belongs to the group of northern European countries (Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, UK) which compared with the southern Europeans (Spain and Portugal in particular) focus more on human rights, good governance and conditionality along with suspension clauses in agreements with LA (interview, MFA). In line with the general Danish views on international trade and development, the Danish position is that the EU’s negotiation mandates with the LA countries should be as liberal as possible and compatible with the WTO aims for multilateralism in trade. Agreements should contain provisions about political dialogue and economic and technical cooperation which

Danish policy is mainly conducted within the EU context in the general political and economic fields Denmark

EU

Bilateral policy only conducted in development aid/political involvement in a few countries and in trade/ export towards the most wealthy countries



further sustainable growth in the partner countries. Community development aid to LA should be poverty oriented (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 54–5).5 Denmark generally supports an extension of the EU’s general policies towards LA, in particular towards the most developed countries in the region (Mercosur, Mexico, Chile). Copenhagen has worked for a quick completion of negotiations about free trade with Mercosur and Chile. Closer EU cooperation with the Andean Group and with the Central American countries are also expressed aims (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 45; 2002d: 31). Although Denmark supports an extension of the EU’s agreements and policies in LA, it is not a country which actively pushes for a stronger general EU policy towards the region through policy initiatives in the EU. After the Danish Presidency in autumn 2002, there was even a certain relief among civil servants that the EU policy measures towards LA in the period had been of a practical, manageable character rather than demanding crisis management or major political initiatives (interview, MFA). Concerning the Danish attempts to shape policy towards individual countries, these vary considerably from country to country. Denmark focuses on the two Programme countries, Bolivia and Nicaragua, plus Guatemala, with regard to the peace process in that country. In relation to Bolivia and Nicaragua, Denmark puts forward stances on most aspects of the EU’s policies, although development issues weigh most heavily. Denmark is among the active countries with regard to shaping EU policy towards these countries, and Copenhagen might, for example, put pressure on the Presidency to issue a declaration about the situation in these countries (interview, MFA). The other EU countries find that Denmark has a legitimate right to put forward strong stances towards these countries given its aid programmes. Copenhagen, to a lesser extent, puts forward views on the countries and regions bordering the countries which receive Danish aid such as Central America. Copenhagen might also put forward views about other countries in which it has an embassy, but as the embassies in Chile and Brazil (and, until 2002, Argentina) are broadly considered ‘trade offices’ (interview, MFA), they do not provide a background for detailed or active stances on political questions. Denmark has stronger political views on Mexico6 and on Cuba, where there is no embassy, towards which Danish ministers have historically been among the most critical, for example showing resistance with regard to Cuba joining the Cotonou Agreement. For the rest of the LA countries, Denmark does not express detailed stances within the EU (interview, MFA) and must be characterised as non-active. When Denmark

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pronounces itself on these countries (as occasionally about Haiti), its views are ‘pragmatic’ (interview, MFA), that is, based on general values and views which command broad support. It will often support the stances of the countries with which it usually agrees on LA. All in all, active Danish policy within the EU is concentrated on the few countries that receive Danish development aid and, to a lesser extent, the bordering areas plus the countries where there are Danish embassies. For the remaining countries, the level of engagement in shaping EU policy is low. Generally speaking, EU policy is not characterised by practitioners according to my interviews as a constraint on Danish policy in the region, but rather as an added possibility or (with respect to the development efforts in the Programme countries) as one forum among others. From within the Danish political system, there are very few, if any, pressures on the government to formulate policy stances on LA, let alone to promote policy stances towards LA within the EU. Politicians, in line with the general articulation of actorness outlined above, express very little interest in LA – a lack of interest that extends to the population where a region like Africa receives more attention. The chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee characterises LA as ‘not the hottest issue you can find’.7 In the parliamentary context, this is illustrated by the fact that LA is rarely dealt with as a separate point in the Foreign Policy Committee or other relevant select committees or, indeed, in the Folketing plenary. Latin American political issues formally come up in the form of the agenda prior to the EU External Relations Council in the Foreign Policy Committee and the Foreign Minister’s report after the Council meeting. But here there is very little political discussion of LA.8 According to the chairman of the Parliament’s European Committee most discussions here are about the ratification of EU trade agreements with LA, rather than about political issues.9 We do not, in other words, find an active domestic political constituency that puts pressure on the government to put forward initiatives within the EU. Rather the picture is one of little political interest in the region and a parallel lack of interest in effecting EU initiatives in this field. However, the understanding is that the EU ‘pulls Denmark along’,10 and provides Denmark with a presence in this part of the world – also in the case of budgetary cuts leading to reductions in the Danish foreign policy presence here.11 In broad terms, there is an understanding that the EU has an important role in this field, but not an apparent desire to use this more actively.


Denmark

EU

P Generally a low level of policy activity within the EU


The level of Danish policy activity within the EU with regard to LA is illustrated in Figure 8.3. Constitutive elements The concepts and structures in the EU’s relationship with the LA subcontinent and regional subgroupings represent, to a large extent, the Danish foreign policy concepts in this field. There are no equivalent Danish ‘bilateral’ relations at the subcontinental or regional level and no Danish statements of principle at this level (see Figure 8.4). In general terms, the EU’s agreements with LA occupy a central framing role for the Danish approach to the region. In the information booklet from the Danish MFA about LA (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b), the EU framework with its concepts and principles is presented as the framework for Danish policy through the factual way in which it is described as the context of Danish policy. At a more detailed level, the central documents provided in annexes to Latinamerika are the EU’s political and economic agreements with the region rather than official Danish policy documents. The Danish documents published have a much more technical/export-related character. The annexes to the MFA publication thus take the form of: 1. General economic indicators about LA and the groups of countries; 2. An overview of EU documents: the Rio declaration between the EU and LA/Caribbean from 1999, the EU agreements with Mexico, Mercosur and Chile, the Andean Group and Central America; 3. Danish bilateral agreements (concrete agreements about inter alia trade/investment/taxation agreements and aid agreements with Bolivia and Nicaragua). The broad political and economic conceptual frameworks for Danish policy in LA thus appear to be constituted by EU agreements in this

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C Denmark

Indications of constitutive effects on Danish concepts at the levels of relationship with the whole subcontinent and with regional groupings


field. There are no references to broader Danish policy documents. This suggests that there is no alternative Danish conceptual or supplementary framework as far as the general political and economic principles are concerned. In relation to the bilateral Danish level, the structure in the (short) section on Danish bilateral relations in the same publication follows the general structure of the presentation of the EU’s structures based on the 1996 EU strategy (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 40–6). The relationship is divided into political dialogue, economics/trade and development with human rights and good governance as central parts of both political dialogue and development (cf. Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b: 56–65). This three-part structuring is similar to the structure in most of the EU’s international agreements and thus suggests a Danish internalisation of the EU’s conceptual approach to bilateral relations in LA at a general level, although, of course, this does not say anything about the content and weighting of each category. A comparison with the Danish conceptualisation in relation to Africa, for example, suggests that Danish foreign policy language does not, in this case, follow the figure of EU’s structures at the bilateral levels in the same way. In Africa there is more of an integrated conceptual approach to the bilateral relationships with the countries, mostly pivoting conceptually around Danish economic aid. The situation in relation to countries where Denmark, through the EU, becomes a party to a policy towards a country where it has previously had very little in the way of policy and no embassies and links is one where a Danish internalisation of EU stances may be likely. For example, in the words of Ben Tonra, ‘in the early 1980s … the Danish Foreign Ministry involved itself for the first time in Central American issues, through the EPC’s support for the Contadora process’ (Tonra, 2001: 263). In this case, the EPC’s engagement was followed by a Danish


engagement in Central America, and a Danish approach thus developed in interaction with the EPC/EU framework. However, the difficulties of researching this particular area are great, as it is difficult to identify examples of Danish policy towards such countries and thus the subsequent use of EU concepts! Foreign policy officials whom I interviewed do have reservations about whether there are cases in which Denmark adopts EU concepts and policy wholesale. They stress (as in the other policy areas examined) that formulations along the lines of ‘Denmark supports the EU’s policy in this field’ would be likely in these situations rather than an articulation of ‘Denmark’ as an actor which draws on EU policies and concepts (interviews, MFA). In other words, there is also here a certain distancing from the adoption of EU concepts.

III. Conclusions 1. Inside or outside the EU? There is little scope for Danish policy towards LA outside the EU when it comes to general political and economic policy positions towards the continent as a whole. Strong Danish stances on policy issues in bilateral relations with LA countries are concentrated on the two Programme countries (Bolivia and Nicaragua) and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala and its peace process. In these bilateral contexts, Denmark pursues policies that go further than the EU’s. Other countries towards which Danish stances can be found are the richer countries, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Here the bilateral focus is trade promotion, while more general political and economic questions are dealt with through the EU, although there are also expressions of political stances at the bilateral level. However, for this group of countries the EU is the primary operational multilateral framework within which these stances are promoted. The only context in which other organisations are frameworks for Danish action in relation to operational policy in LA, is in the field of development aid. For other countries than those mentioned above, the EU is the framework through which Danish policy is conducted, as there are no expressions of Danish stances with regard to these countries in bilateral contexts which are ‘over and above the EU’. All in all, there is little Danish policy conducted outside the EU apart from the relationship to Bolivia and Nicaragua, the two Programme countries, and Guatemala. 2. An active or non-active policy? Generally, Denmark does not belong to the group of active countries on LA within the EU. The exception to this tendency is policy towards the two Programme countries, Bolivia and Nicaragua, as well as Guatemala.

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There is also a degree of activity with regard to the countries surrounding the above-mentioned three countries plus Chile, Brazil, Mexico and Cuba. Denmark is favourable towards an extension of the EU’s policies in LA, but does not put forward any general policy initiatives for this to happen. EU policy is generally seen as a possibility and an extension of the possibilities for Danish policy rather than a constraint. 3. Constitutive effects? There are indications of constitutive effects on Danish foreign policy concepts both at the level of the relationship with the subcontinent as a whole and towards regional groupings. The structure in the presentation of Denmark’s bilateral relationship with LA in official documents at a general level follows the structures in the EU’s agreements with the region. Towards the countries where Denmark does not have embassies or special links, the constitutive effects of EU policies are potentially significant. It is not clear, however, whether the participation in EU policy has led to the internalisation of EU concepts into Danish foreign policy in this field; a more modest internalisation of policies seems more likely. 4. Why this state of affairs? (a) EU frame The general assessment of the EU’s policy towards LA is that it is comprehensive, has resources and leverage in trade. But it is not as strong as EU policy in Africa or the Balkans. There is no direct EU involvement in crises in LA in contrast to Africa or the Balkans; the policy framework is less comprehensive and the economic resources less important. (b) Danish actorness There is little articulation of Danish actorness with regard to LA. There is little sense of a Danish mission or role in the region apart from furthering trade. ‘Denmark’ also articulates itself as an actor in relation to development issues. The most frequent articulations in general political and economic contexts are ‘Denmark and the EU’, ‘The EU’ or ‘Denmark through the EU’ being the acting subject. The presence of these two elements (a comprehensive EU policy, but not as strong as towards Africa or the Balkans; plus an articulation of Danish actorness in LA which is weak and often takes the form of co-articulations with the EU) can serve to understand the little Danish policy towards LA conducted outside the EU and hence the limited scope of Danish bilateral relations outside the Programme countries. The EU is such a prominent framework for Danish policy, in spite of being weaker


than in many other policy areas, because there is no significant Danish political engagement or articulation of Danish actorness in relation to the LA continent which could lead to political pressures for a more unilateral policy or the use of other fora or partners. The EU is considered a main actor, which is, in many policy contexts, inseparable from ‘Denmark’. The EU thus becomes the operational forum for, and coordinator of, policy stances. The low Danish profile within the EU on LA can be linked to the weak articulation of Danish actorness towards LA. This also accounts for why Denmark, on one hand, would like an expansion of the EU policy frame but, on the other, does not put forward strong stances in this respect. The Danish policy towards the Programme countries arguably has more to do with articulations of agency in the field of development than agency with regard to LA. The indication of relatively strong constitutive effects on Danish foreign policy concepts can also be linked to the EU framework as the only framework for Danish policy in many contexts, and the frequent co-articulation with the EU as an actor in general political and economic contexts. Figure 8.5 illustrates that the relationship between Danish foreign policy and EU policy in the case of LA comes close to category 1 outlined in Chapter 2. Although EU policy is not as strong, intensive and resourceful as in other areas examined, it does not fall in category 4 (not intensive, or resourceful). There is little articulation of Danish actorness in LA compared with the other areas examined. Where Denmark is articulated as a stronger actor in the LA context, this has more to do with the Danish understandings of its role in development than its role in LA.

Weak articulation of Danish actorness, often as co-articulations with the EU

C P Denmark

EU

Comprehensive EU policy – though not as strong as towards Africa or the Balkans


9 Trade

The point of departure in this last empirical chapter is trade. Trade is primarily understood here as trade in goods, although I mention other forms of trade. There will be a focus on trade as dealt with in the WTO, while I also briefly deal with other areas.

I. The EU Background, concepts and actorness The field of trade is the area in which the EU, in the form of the Community, has had the longest and strongest claim to actorness stretching back to the 1950s. Some have even argued that if the EU had anything that could be likened to a foreign policy, the trade policy and other related policies conducted by the Commission on the basis of the Community pillar was it (Smith, 1998). The Community has been one of the key players in the shaping of the post-1945 multilateral trade system (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999), as it has represented the member states in this field. According to the Nice Treaty art. 131, the Community should contribute to the harmonious development of world trade, the gradual abolition of restrictions in international trade and the lowering of tariffs. The competence to negotiate and enter into international trade agreements lies with the Commission and the Community and not the individual member states (art. 133). The Community has generally supported a multilateral trade system (as opposed to unilateral or bilateral measures). The present tendency is that the EU is not as multilateralist as the development countries or Canada, but more multilateralist than the US (Beukel, 2001: 103–4). At the various Rounds within the GATT (later WTO) since the 1950s, which gradually reduced tariffs and barriers to free trade, the two main 185


aims of the Community were to promote the general liberalisation of trade but, at the same time, also to ensure that the effects of that liberalisation were not too damaging to Community or member states’ interests (Mouritzen et al., 2003: 136; White, 2001: 60). The latter has taken the form of a defence of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It has also included a foot-dragging attitude towards the speedy implementation of certain trade liberalisation measures (Beukel, 2001: 104). At the same time, the Community has also wanted the ‘soft’ post-materialist values such as environmental issues and animal welfare to be included in the WTO agreements. The aim of expanding the agenda of the WTO with new items has until recently been blocked in WTO negotiations due to the Community’s inflexible stance on radical reform of the CAP. Policies and priorities The Community’s trade agreements cover both multilateral and bilateral contexts and economic sanctions. The bilateral agreements extend to more than 120 countries globally. The policy has a strong legal quality and, short of a few areas, states cannot negotiate or conclude agreements separately in the trade area1 where states have transferred competence to the EU. The EU does not have sole competence for trade in services and intellectual property rights. In practice, however, the EU also negotiates for the member states in these fields, although the mandate for the Commission here is decided by unanimity which is different from the QMV in the remaining areas of trade (Mouritzen et al., 2003: 168). The treaty base of the common trade policy and its exclusive Community competence make it unique among the foreign policy areas of the EU. In contrast to other areas, Community policy is unrivalled by parallel member state policy. This fact contributes to making policy comprehensive and detailed. The Community’s status as the world’s biggest trade bloc with 20 per cent of world trade gives it considerable strength in negotiations as an actor which cannot be ignored. At a much more concrete level, the Community embodied in the Commission has a staff in this field comparable to national foreign ministries with delegations all over the world. A weakness in the EU’s otherwise strong trade policy is its own lack of flexibility and speed in international negotiations. It is sometimes difficult for the EU to show leadership in international organisations due to its inflexible internal decision-making. EU positions are often based on fragile compromises in the negotiation mandate (Mouritzen et al., 2003: 136). While a lack of flexibility might in some cases be an asset in

Trade 187

negotiations for the EU, the inflexibility also leads to difficulties in striking more strategic deals when the situation changes. Since the mid 1990s, the EU has had difficulties promoting a broader agenda in the negotiations. This has been due to the lack of willingness to engage in reform of the CAP which has impeded the ability to introduce the softer issues on the WTO agenda. However, in spring 2004 there were signs that the EU is softening its stance with regard to reform of the CAP. A joint letter by the European Commissioners, Fischler and Lamy, in May 2004 suggested that the EU was now willing to give concessions with regard to reform of the CAP (Commission, 2004). As this move is based on the internal EU reform in farm expenditure, this may turn out to be a new phase in the EU’s policy in the WTO in so far as the EU will find it easier to set the agenda with CAP reform on its way. In summary, Community trade policy is very resourceful, comprehensive and detailed. In the central area of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements, the Community has a legally based competence to the exclusion of national policy. In spite of the complex decision-making system in this field which gives little flexibility in negotiations, trade policy can be characterised as the strongest of all the EU policies examined in this book.

II. Denmark Background, concepts and actorness Denmark, we know, is a small and open economy. Its exports constitute 35–40 per cent of its GNP. According to the dominant view as expressed by the Danish MFA: ‘… The trade with other countries is an integral part of the Danish economy and welfare. Denmark, therefore, has a strong interest in taking part in international trade cooperation and ensuring, in this way, a high degree of predictability in the conditions for international trade …’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2004e). Denmark, then, is presented in strong terms as an actor in the field of trade policy (see also Beukel, 2001: 90–4). This agency is linked to the welfare of Danish society. On this basis, it has, in the words of an experienced MFA practitioner, been ‘natural to work for an open, multilateral trade system and liberalisation of world trade. A strengthening of the multilateral trade system has constantly been on the agenda’ ( Jønck, 1993: 306, 310). There is a consensus among Danish political actors on multilateralism in the WTO as the main approach of Danish trade policy (Beukel, 2001: 89–90). In the words of the former Foreign Minister Helveg Petersen in 1996, ‘Denmark’s objective interests makes it one of the strongest


supporters of the WTO’ (Helveg Petersen quoted in Beukel, 2001: 92). The key Danish issues promoted in the WTO are liberalisation of trade, development, the environment and workers’ rights (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000f: 19). Copenhagen is according to Beukel among the least ‘footdragging’ of the wealthy countries in the WTO as far as liberalisation of trade measures is concerned. Although Copenhagen’s wish for a broader agenda of the WTO supports the aim of creating the same basic market conditions for trade, it can also be seen, in parallel to Danish development concerns, to be a function of Danish social ideals central to Danish self-understanding (see Chapter 6). However, the Danish wish for a broadening of the agenda is held in check by the fear that a broader agenda may also lead to allowances for protectionism (Beukel, 2001: 104–5). There is, then, a strong articulation of actorness in this field that is presented as pre-existing or outside the EU context. Characteristically, a heading on the website of the Danish MFA (www.um.dk) reads ‘How does Denmark conduct its trade policy internationally?’ Danish views in this field are expressed at a high level of generality often without direct reference to the EU. EU and Danish actorness At the same time, the conduct of Danish trade policy is seen as fundamentally affected by the EU: ‘As a consequence of the EU’s competence in the field of trade policy, Danish trade policy, to a large extent, consists of influencing the trade decisions which are made in the EU’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000h: 17; see also Jønck, 1993: 309–10). The cooperation in EU trade policy is legitimised by the international power that Denmark (and the other EU countries) acquire by speaking with one voice: ‘… By speaking with one voice Denmark and the other EU countries become forceful in international trade negotiations …’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2004b). Co-articulations with the EU are common in official texts. These take the form of ‘the EU’, ‘Denmark and the EU’ or ‘Denmark through the EU’. ‘The EU’ is often used when the context is WTO negotiations and general relations of power between trade blocs. Take the following example: ‘Before the ministerial meeting, the US and the EU had agreed on a common proposal in the field of agriculture’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2004a: 24). ‘Denmark and the EU’ are used when the context is what is seen as joint issues promoted within the WTO as in the following case: ‘Together with other countries, the EU and Denmark would like to see WTO agreement on these four subjects’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2004a: 24). The articulation ‘Denmark through the EU’ is drawn on when the context is how Denmark has

Trade 189

influenced or should influence the EU: ‘It was, to a large extent, possible to influence the stance of the EU, so that Danish key issues such as the environment, workers’ rights and the conditions of development countries became an essential part of the EU’s negotiation position’ (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000h: 4).2 However, articulations where ‘Denmark’ is the only acting subject are also plentiful in official material about international trade. For instance, in an information booklet from the MFA about the WTO and international trade policy, the main focus is on describing the WTO system and the Danish views and initiatives in this regard (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000h). Although the central role of the EU is stressed (as in the quote above), there is less emphasis on the structures and policies of the EU in the description of day-to-day politics in the field of trade. The focus is often Danish policy with regard to the WTO agenda rather than how Danish WTO policy is conducted via the EU and its bargaining system. Similarly, in the motions in relation to debates on the WTO in the Folketing, the EU is usually referred to, but the focus is on what stances Denmark should take with regard to WTO issues rather than how it could influence the EU agenda. ‘Danish initiatives’ are often mentioned without reference to the EU framework (see for example Udenrigsministeriet, 2004f). ‘Denmark’ remains an actor that is not always articulated with the EU in the field of trade. The legal competence of the EU in this field has not, in other words, brought about a merger or persistent co-articulation of agency. The EU is presented as a very general frame for Danish policy rather than as an integral part of Danish trade policy in all cases. In fact, Denmark on some occasions presents the EU as a structure outside itself, as when it praised the letter by Lamy and Fischler of May 2004 or the EU’s concessions in the field of agriculture (Udenrigsministeriet, 2004d). The Danish articulation of actorness in the field of trade is illustrated in Figure 9.1.

Policies and priorities As a member of the EU, Denmark cannot negotiate or enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements in the areas covered by the EU’s trade policy. In practice, this is also the case for areas of trade where the EU does not have full competence but where it is given a mandate on the basis of unanimity among the member states (see above). Denmark does not go against an EU role in these fields. The main aim of Danish trade policy is to attempt to influence trade decisions (negotiation mandates of the Commission) within the EU.


Denmark

Denmark is articulated as a strong actor Frequent articulations of ‘Denmark’. Often in relation to concrete instances of policy

Also articulations of: 1. ‘Denmark and the EU’ (when joint views are presented) 2. ‘The EU’ (in WTO negotiations and in the context of international power blocs) 3. ‘Denmark through the EU’ (Danish influence on the EU)

Denmark + EU

Denmark EU

EU


However, politics is not only about affecting decisions in a narrow sense. Drawing on Hill’s definition of foreign policy in Chapter 2, foreign policy is also about influencing the views of other actors in line with one’s own view of the world. In this sense there are also Danish policy elements outside the EU. Trade has, for example, been a subject at bilateral talks between Denmark and the US. In relation to the problem in getting the WTO’s Doha Round back on track, there have been Danish bilateral initiatives in Africa. These have taken the form of seminars with African countries on the WTO (in collaboration with the other Nordic countries). A specific WTO dialogue with the Danish Programme countries in Africa (see Chapter 6) has also been launched (Udenrigsministeriet, 2004e). After the enlargement Denmark has taken part in trade political consultations with the new Eastern European members. At WTO meetings Denmark also makes speeches where specific Danish views are presented.3 The question is if these activities outside the EU amount to more than a promotion of general EU positions. Once a decision on the EU’s negotiation mandate has been made, it is a fixed principle that the member states do not publicly go against it (Mouritzen et al., 2003: 144). In line with this a centrally placed practitioner in the MFA has characterised the main function of these bilateral initiatives as ‘fuelling the machinery’. But at the same time there is also an element of promoting basic Danish understandings in this field (interview, MFA). In any case, a national flavour

Trade 191

Danish policy is mainly conducted inside the EU

Denmark

(EU has full competence in negotiations leading to trade agreements)

EU


High level of Danish activity within the EU

Denmark

A

EU


must be expected to these activities, including the choice of partners for these activities (see Figure 9.2). In comparison with the other policy areas treated in this book there is little doubt that Danish policy within the EU in the field of trade is active (see Figure 9.3).4 There is an active national constituency in the form of the Folketing, interest organisations and grassroots movements (Beukel, 2001). WTO matters are dealt with in the European Affairs Committee. In contrast to most of the other areas dealt with in this book, the Folketing here engages in a debate on trade issues (interview with Claus LarsenJensen). There are, therefore, domestic pressures on the government for taking action on trade policy in the EU. Constitutive effects There are no concrete examples of clear constitutive effects in this field. Although Denmark cannot go publicly against EU negotiation mandates, this does not mean that language of the EU mandates is incorporated into Danish discourse. A central case is agriculture. Denmark has, for


(C) Denmark

No indications of substantial constitutive effects


many years, been discontent with the EU’s intransigent stance on reform of the CAP in the WTO. Denmark worked hard to lower the CAP in 1999, but once it was decided upon, it could not publicly denounce the EU mandate for WTO negotiations (Mouritzen et al., 2003: 144). However, although Denmark has not publicly spoken out against the EU’s mandates, it has not imported the conservative view on reform of the CAP either. Denmark continues to actively promote reform of the CAP within the EU, the link between development and trade and other key Danish points in the WTO. Moreover, the EU mandates for the WTO often contain the same subjects as those furthered in the Danish national negotiation mandate. An example is the EU mandate for the WTO negotiations in 1999. The difference consisted mainly in the priorities made between them in the actual negotiations (Mouritzen et al., 2003: 139–340). The number of EU concepts that were not already present in the Danish language in the field of trade is therefore limited. The biggest conceptual impact, it can be argued, does not relate to substance but to procedure – namely, the concepts and time frames of the trade policy decision-making process in the EU. These concepts, as is also the case in many other areas of Danish political/administrative life, frame and shape the policy process in the field of trade (‘full competence’, ‘mixed agreements’, ‘art. 133 committee’, etc.). The Danish use of EU concepts in the field of trade is illustrated in Figure 9.4.

III. Conclusions 1. Inside or outside the EU? Danish policy in the field of trade is almost exclusively conducted within the EU. As far as negotiations and agreements on trade are concerned,

Trade 193

there is no Danish policy outside the EU, and Danish policy is aimed at influencing EU policy. There are nevertheless Danish policy measures also conducted outside the EU framework. These are mainly aimed at influencing other countries’ stances in the WTO or striking alliances within the EU. These can be seen as complementary to the EU policy, although they also contribute to promoting Danish views. 2. Active in the EU? Denmark is very active in the EU in this policy area compared with the other areas examined. There is an active domestic environment (Parliament, interest organisations, NGOs) which puts pressure on the government for an active line in the EU. 3. Constitutive effects? In my analysis I found no cases of EU concepts having constitutive effects on the substance of Danish political language on trade. Although Denmark has to live with elements of EU policy which it does not favour, this does not lead to an internalisation of EU concepts on substance. 4. Why this state of affairs? (a) EU framework The EU policy in trade is very strong due to the legally based competence of the Community, the comprehensive and detailed character of policies, and the resources which it possesses due to its prominent role in world trade. Trade is the strongest EU policy of all the areas examined in this book. (b) Danish actorness There is a very strong Danish actorness in this field articulated with the significant role of international trade for the Danish economy and Danish welfare more broadly. The situation in this field can be understood in the light of the fit between these two elements. An EU policy on trade that legally excludes national trade negotiations and agreements in most fields is the background for Danish policy predominantly being conducted in the EU. This is expressed through the frequent co-articulation with the EU. That there is policy conducted outside can be understood on the basis of the strong Danish actorness in this field. The active Danish role within the EU can also be understood in terms of the strong actorness. The Danish actorness is expressed in the EU because the EU policy is so strong and therefore a central locus for influence.


The absence of identified examples of constitutive effects may seem puzzling, as one would expect that an EU policy frame that is so strong would lead to an import of concepts into the Danish political language in this field. However, the interpretation must be that the very strong Danish actorness has been a guard against the import of concepts in this field. Expressed in more concrete terms, the understanding that the welfare of Danish society depends on trade and the strong engagement of many parts of the Danish political environment in this field, have made it more likely that concepts would be born or nourished here rather than in the EU (or elsewhere). This is, of course, also due to trade being different from more traditional foreign policy areas in its direct impact on domestic economic structures and actors. In terms of the model outlined in Chapter 2, we are closest to category 3. The background of Danish policy in the field of trade is summarised in Figure 9.5.

Very strong articulations of Danish actorness in the field

(C)

Denmark

EU

A EU policy is very comprehensive and resourceful The EU has full competence in international negotiations leading to trade agreements


10 Conclusions and Wider Perspectives for the Analysis of National Foreign Policy in an EU Context

This concluding chapter first presents the findings in the seven policy areas analysed. It then takes up the two broader issues raised in the introductory chapter: the wider consequences for Danish foreign policy of participation in EU foreign policy and the broader foreign policy analysis implications for the study of small state foreign policy in an EU context.

I. Presentation of the findings The results of the analysis of the Danish case in relation to the seven policy areas show that Danish foreign policy inside/outside the EU, the level of Danish policy activity within the EU and the constitutive impact on Danish foreign policy concepts, vary across policy areas. Regarding Danish policy towards other EU member states, the main political purpose of these bilateral relationships increasingly is to strike political alliances within the EU policy process and, to a lesser extent, to strike alliances in other multilateral contexts. This goes together with a Danish discourse according to which the EU is the primary anchor for security, political processes and Danish policy in Europe. In the field of anti-terrorism, Danish policy is conducted within the framework of the EU where the EU has taken measures and has a policy line which also includes justice and home affairs. Compared with the other policy areas examined, Copenhagen is active within the EU in this area where the EU has a policy, and has supported an expansion of EU policies in the field of anti-terrorism. The exception is the policy areas where Denmark is exempted due to the Edinburgh Decision. Indications 195


are that Danish policy concepts have been affected by EU concepts in the field of JHA. Danish policy has been conducted outside the EU in relation to the military aspects, bilateral relations with the US and development issues. Concerning Danish policy towards the Balkans, there are elements of Danish policy that are conducted bilaterally, although the EU framework is the most important context in which Danish policy is conducted. Danish policy within the EU can be characterised as semi-active, compared with other areas. Copenhagen would like to see a further strengthening of the EU role in the Balkans. Danish foreign policy concepts in this field are affected by the EU language used in the preaccession process for the region. In the field of development, the most important elements of Danish policy (aid) are conducted outside the EU. The constitutive effects on Danish foreign policy concepts are limited. Denmark is very active within the EU in this field. Copenhagen favours a limited expansion of the role of the EU in development. With regard to policy towards Africa, significant elements of Danish policy are also conducted outside the EU, although the EU is the most important multilateral context in which Danish policy is conducted. The Danish policy within the EU can be characterised as very active (but less than in the field of development). The Danes favour an expansion of EU policies in Africa. There are constitutive effects on Danish foreign policy concepts in the approach to Africa as a whole. In policy towards Latin America, there are limited Danish policy measures outside the EU. Danish policy outside the EU mainly takes the form of trade promotion and the furthering of bilateral trade links. The main exemption are the two Programme countries where the level of Danish political engagement is higher. Denmark’s policy within the EU is not active compared with the other policy areas, although Copenhagen supports an extension of the EU’s role here. Danish foreign policy concepts show considerable similarity with those of the EU. With regard to international trade, Danish policy is predominantly conducted within the EU as a consequence of the legal situation whereby the Commission negotiates agreements on behalf of the member states. Copenhagen is very active in this field and accepts a de facto broader role for the EU. No substantial constitutive effects could be found. In Table 10.1 the principal findings of the analysis of the seven areas are presented in the light of the concepts drawn on in the analysis to understand the similarities and differences between areas.

Table 10.1 The seven policy areas examined. Summary of conclusions EU policy

Danish articulation of actorness

Danish policy inside or outside the EU?

Active or passive Danish policy in the EU?

Constitutive effects?

Development

Strong

(Very) Strong The EU as instrument in development–trade links

Inside and outside

Active

Limited

Security (antiterrorism)

Medium (weak and strong elements)

Strong Sometimes with the EU

Inside and outside

Active and passive

Limited/some

Trade (and equivalent areas)

Very strong

Strong Frequently with the EU

Predominantly inside

Active

No

Africa

Strong

Strong

Inside and outside

Active

Limited/some

Latin America

Medium/strong

Weak Frequently with the EU

Predominantly inside

Predominantly passive (except for Programme countries)

Yes

The Balkans

Strong

Medium Frequently with the EU

Predominant inside or complementary to the EU

Between active and passive

Yes

Bilateral relations with EU member states

The primary content of Denmark’s bilateral relations with its EU partners is the preparation of policy in the EU. Intersubjective understandings of the EU as the strongest organisational structure in Europe combined with Danish articulations of actorness in Europe linked to the EU

197


The concepts put forward and used are found to be useful in relation to understanding differences and similarities between policy areas with regard to policy inside/outside the EU, level of activity within the EU and constitutive impact on Danish foreign policy concepts. The study of the seven areas suggests that the role of the EU in Danish foreign policy (inside/outside the EU, passive/active line, constitutive effects) can be seen as based on the fit between the strength of EU policy in the policy area concerned and the national articulation of actorness (which takes the form of categories such as ‘Denmark’, instrumental use of the EU, or ‘Denmark and the EU’). In the following I will go through the findings from the seven case studies with the aim of summarising the background for the relationship between EU and Danish foreign policy as presented in Table 10.1. The frame of reference is the four categories of fit between Danish and EU foreign policy outlined in Chapter 2 and the question of the extent to which the seven cases demonstrate the usefulness of this scheme for understanding the status of Danish policy vis-à-vis the EU. The four categories are, of course, ideal types with an analytical function. In the real world we find ‘in-between categories’ that do not fit the general categories neatly, such as different kinds of ‘medium’ rather than just ‘strong’ and ‘weak’. Where there is a strong articulation of ‘Denmark’ as an actor and the EU policy frame is strong, this leads to a situation where there is also a Danish policy outside the EU. There is Danish activity within the EU and few or limited constitutive effects. This can be said to characterise the areas of policy towards Africa and, in particular, development. In policy areas with weak or no articulations of Danish actorness and a strong EU policy frame, there are few instances where Danish policy is conducted outside the EU. There is a passive Danish stance within the EU and constitutive effects on Danish foreign policy concepts. This is the case in Danish policy towards LA where in Danish policy contexts Denmark is often co-articulated as an actor with the EU (‘Denmark and the EU’) or ‘the EU’ takes the place of Denmark. The EU policy towards LA cannot be said to be as strong as the EU policy towards Africa or its development policy. But the Danish articulations of ‘Denmark’ as an actor in this field are so weak (compared with Africa or development) that it does not give rise to policy initiatives that go beyond the EU’s policy framework. This also provides the basis for the limited level of activity in this area within the EU and for the constitutive effects of EU policy on Danish policy concepts. If there is an articulation of Danish actorness which can be characterised as ‘medium’, while the EU policy frame is strong, we get a situation where there are some Danish policy elements outside the EU policy framework, but where

Conclusions and Wider Perspectives 199

most Danish initiatives are within, or seen as complementary to, the EU. This is the case of policy towards the Balkans. ‘Denmark’ is articulated as an actor generally in relation to European security, but there are no specific articulations of Danish actorness when it comes to the Balkans. The EU’s policy with its pre-accession elements (supported by economic means) and preventive diplomacy is a very strong and intensive policy compared with other EU policies. This combination is the background of the existing but limited policy scope outside the EU, the medium level of activity within the EU and the constitutive effects on Danish foreign policy concepts with regard to the language of pre-accession. When Danish articulations of actorness are strong at the same time as the EU policy frame is so strong that it legally excludes national representation, there are only limited Danish policy elements conducted outside the EU. This is the case with Danish policy towards international trade. Denmark has strong views on international trade and understands itself as an actor in this field. But the EU policy frame is so strong in the realm of trade that it excludes national action on negotiation and conclusion of agreements. In this situation there is, however, an active Danish policy within the EU. Where there are strong general articulations of Danish actorness and a strong and intensive EU policy in some areas, but with significant ‘holes’ in the EU policy frame, one would expect that Denmark would be active within the EU when the EU had a policy, but also that it was active outside in the areas where the EU had weak or no policies. This is the case in the anti-terrorism area. Here Denmark has been active within the EU in the areas where this was possible given the Danish exemptions. The background for this is a dominant Danish discourse according to which the EU is an important actor in security. Within the EU, the primary content of Denmark’s bilateral relations with its EU partners is the preparation of policy in the EU. European intersubjective understandings of the EU as the strongest actor in Europe combined with Danish articulations of actorness in Europe linked to the need to influence the EU are the background of this. The fruitfulness of the basic concepts in the scheme for the analysis of Danish foreign policy in an EU context (the fit between the strength of EU framework and the articulation of national actorness) is demonstrated by the patterns identified in the study of the seven areas in Danish foreign policy described here. It provides us with concepts for understanding and analysing policy inside and outside the EU, the level of activity in the EU and constitutive effects on Danish foreign policy concepts. The central conclusion is that the relationship between


Danish and EU foreign policy varies according to the policy area in case. This is not a surprising general conclusion on a study that looks at several policy areas. But as an answer to the initial question raised in the introduction on the relationship between EU and national foreign policy, it shows that neither of the two basic views outlined in the introduction are appropriate. Along the lines of the three questions asked above, the broader implications are: 1. The degree to which Danish foreign policy is conducted inside or outside the EU varies. The EU is a dimension in the majority of policy areas. It is the most operational multilateral political forum for Danish foreign policy in most policy areas, but not always the only one. The extent to which Danish foreign policy is conducted inside or outside the EU varies as a consequence of the fit between the strength of the EU policy frame and Danish articulation of actorness. The role of the EU in Danish foreign policy is, in other words, not uniform. Even in the trade case where the EU policy frame legally excludes national negotiations, there is no total suppression of Danish actorness outside the EU. 2. There is not an even level of Danish activity within the EU across policy areas. There are areas where Denmark conducts a very active policy within EU foreign policy and areas where it very rarely if ever puts forward any policy stances. Participation in EU foreign policy has not led to Danish participation in all aspects of global affairs. Thus, participation in the EU frame apparently does not in itself make small states engaged in the whole world. Whether there is an active line or not depends on the Danish articulation of actorness in the area. The key is therefore the national meaning structures, rather than the apparent possibilities within the EU. At the same time, there are examples of policy areas where the EU can be said to have given rise to engagement in new policy areas. These are, however, linked to areas where strong political actorness is already articulated (through for example geographical proximity to Programme countries). 3. The presence of constitutive effects of EU policy on Danish foreign policy varies across policy areas according to the fit between the strength of the EU policy frame and the national articulations of actorness. However, the articulation of national actorness seems to be somewhat more important for constitutive effects than the character of the EU framework. Comprehensive EU policy frames such as the agreements between the EU and LA and the pre-accession agreements in the Balkans give rise to constitutive effects whereas the exclusive legal EC competence in trade does not.


II. The broader implications for Danish foreign policy: the role of the EU across the board I will now discuss the general role of the EU in Danish foreign policy by drawing on the concepts established and the results of the seven case studies. This will be based on the areas of the seven case studies and the preliminary application of the framework to remaining areas of Danish foreign policy. The EU’s policy here is labelled as ‘weak’, ‘medium’ or ‘strong’ and the articulation of Danish agency is similarly labelled ‘weak’, ‘medium’ or ‘strong’. This is a very rough approach compared with the method used in the case studies. Analysis of actorness is impoverished by only using pre-established categories like these, as they will not convey the complex framework of meaning within which actorness is articulated. To understand how Denmark acts in relation to the EU policy framework in a policy area, we need to analyse and understand the specific articulations of actorness in the area concerned. In this sense the approach used might give the impression of preconceived, objectivist categories (weak–strong) which do not pay tribute to the complexity of articulations of actorness. However, what the scheme attempts to do is to establish some broad links between concepts which provides a framework for understanding the link between Danish and EU foreign policy in the light of what the study has pinpointed as concepts that may be interesting to focus on in a foreign policy study of this kind. The concept of actorness is not an objectivist category, but one based on the construction of meaning: articulations of actorness (even in terms of ‘weak–strong’) are not material structures outside meaning. The strength of EU policy, as in the seven case studies, is conceptualised on the basis of a given yardstick. This is, however, an analytical choice and could (and should in a more comprehensive analysis) be based on actors’ understanding (see Chapter 2). The rough categories do, however, allow us to come up with suggestions as to the state of affairs across many of the possible policy areas. Table 10.2 is based on a preliminary judgement of the strength of EU policy and Danish articulations of actorness across the remaining areas of Danish foreign policy that have not been analysed and presented in Table 10.1. Tables 10.1 and 10.2 taken together suggest a broad picture of Danish foreign policy in an EU context. On the basis of the empirical analyses of the seven areas analysed and the suggestions in Table 10.2 based on the concepts found useful in the empirical analysis, one can make the following general observations about Danish foreign policy in an EU context.

Table 10.2 The remaining policy areas. Some preliminary suggestions on the basis of the model Danish articulation of actorness

Danish policy inside or outside the EU?

Active or passive Danish policy in the EU?

Constitutive effects?

Baltic Sea region Russia North America/ transatlantic relationship Asia

Strong Medium–strong Medium

(Very) Strong Medium Strong

Mostly inside Mostly inside Inside and outside

Active Medium Active

Limited Some Limited

Medium

Weak–medium

Mainly inside

Yes

Oceania Mediterranean/North Africa Middle East

Medium–strong Strong Strong

Weak Weak Medium–strong

Yes Yes Yes

Human rights International environmental affairs

Strong Medium–strong

Strong Strong

Active Active

Limited Limited

International macroeconomic coordination UN

Medium

Weak

Inside Mostly inside Inside with some initiatives outside Inside and outside Inside at major multilateral conferences Also outside Not part of decisions on the euro

Passive (apart from PCs, former PCs and Burma, China, Pakistan and Japan) Passive Passive–medium Active

Passive

Yes

Strong in UNGA Less strong in UNHRC Weak in UNSC

Strong

Active

Limited/ some

OSCE

Strong

Strong

Active

Some

NATO Peace-supporting operations

Weak Weak–medium

Strong Strong

Passive Passive

Some

Mostly inside Mostly inside Inside the EU in case of an EU line Mostly but not exclusively inside Outside Outside the EU

202

EU policy


1. Almost all areas of Danish foreign policy have an EU dimension as understood along the lines of the three dimensions examined. The exception is the hardest aspects of military security. 2. In geographical terms, the role of EU foreign policy is most significant in Latin America, Oceania, Asia and North Africa. The Danish articulation of agency is weakest in these areas. In these contexts Danish policy is primarily conducted within the EU as the EU provides policies which can be characterised as medium or strong. 3. In functional areas, the impact of the EU in Danish foreign policy is strongest in trade, agriculture and external fishing where there is no policy outside the EU due to the legal establishment of the Community as the international negotiator in these fields. The active Danish agency here is predominantly articulated within the EU. In other areas with an economic dimension, Danish policy is primarily conducted within the EU in multilateral fora including environmental questions. In relation to non-military aspects of security, the EU is the most significant framework for Danish policy in Europe and in many cases also outside Europe. The role of the EU is weaker in relation to military aspects of security and peace-supporting operations in particular, although a change may be under way. However, here Danish policy is not conducted in the EU because of the Danish defence exemption. The high-profile Danish participation in international military operations based on the Danish articulation of agency in this field may be affected by an increasing EU role in this area. If, in the future, many peacesupporting operations become EU operations, Denmark’s military participation may either diminish or be pushed towards participation in high-intensity operations with the US (Græger et al., 2002: 129–39). 4. In relation to Danish policy within international organisations, the EU is often the primary framework of coordination for Danish participation. The more economic and trade-related the organisation, the more important the EU is in Danish foreign policy (the strongest example is the WTO where there is no Danish ability to negotiate due to the exclusive competence of the Community). It is also the case in relation to summits on environmental issues and the link between trade and development, and in more political contexts. Danish policy within the UN General Assembly (Strömvik, 1998), the UN Human Rights Commission and the OSCE is primarily coordinated within the EU, although Denmark does not always follow the EU line. As Denmark articulates itself as an actor in these contexts, the strength of the EU framework makes for an active Danish policy within the EU, but sometimes also outside.


An important exception to this is Danish policy within NATO where the EU does not have a coordinated line (and Denmark would, in any case, be exempted from EU stances). Another important exception is Danish action within the UN’s specialised development fora where Danish development actorness is strong and Community policy is not prominent. 5. Danish relations to its neighbours are primarily about creating coalition partners within the EU system (but also beyond). Close to Denmark, in the Baltic Sea region, ‘Denmark’ has since the end of the Cold War been articulated as a very engaged actor. But it is also closest to home that the nature of Danish foreign policy has changed most dramatically as Denmark’s neighbours are now all EU member states or closely associated with the EU. Bilateral relationships are now embedded in an EU framework which has located conflicts and close cooperation within a European political system. Purely bilateral concerns play a subordinate role in Danish foreign policy in Europe. 6. In Europe outside the EU, as in the case of the Balkans, there is Danish bilateral policy. But this policy is complementary to the increasingly unitary and strong EU framework within which most general Danish policy is conducted. The clearest cases of policy outside the EU has been in relation to peace-supporting operations in the Balkans (at the time of writing only in Kosovo). 7. Around Europe the relationship to Russia and, in particular, North Africa is predominantly conducted within the EU with few elements of national policy. In the case of North Africa/the Mediterranean, the background for this is the weak Danish articulation of actorness in this area combined with the comprehensive Barcelona Process/MEDA policy framework of the EU. In the words of a prominent MFA civil servant associated with the CFSP, Danish policy towards North Africa compared with the EU’s is like ‘a bicycle path compared to a six-lane motorway’ (interview, MFA). The Danish policy towards the Middle East and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is in many ways comparable to the Danish policy towards the Balkans. Danish policy is increasingly conducted within the EU with national policy as complementary to the EU’s policy. In the Middle East EU policy has, particularly from the second intifada in 2000, become more unified, strong and resourceful with fewer bilateral initiatives to confuse the picture of Solana, the Presidency and the Commission acting on behalf of the EU. Not unlike many other countries, there is a Danish articulation of actorness towards the area as the conflict is seen as central in international politics and linked to general engagement in the question of international order. To this should be added the Danish engagement


in the Palestinian self-governing authority through aid based on actorness in development. Danish actorness is, however, often co-articulated with the EU. This makes for an active Danish policy within the EU and a weak, but identifiable, bilateral policy outside the EU. However, proposals such as the Danish Wider Middle East Initiative in 2003 which had not been discussed in the EU before its launch show that Danish bilateral policy in the area is not always complementary to the EU in a narrow sense of the word! 8. Outside the northern hemisphere, the strong Danish actorness in the field of development has significant implications beyond this area. It is the basis of a policy over and above the EU and an active policy within the EU with regard to particular political relations outside the northern hemisphere. The point of departure for the Danish political interest in Africa are the nine Programme countries on which Danish policy is focused. In Asia and, in particular, Latin America, where Denmark’s articulation of actorness is weak and where Danish policy is largely conducted within the EU framework, the Programme countries (two in Latin America and two in Asia) are the central foci of political interest which give rise to a policy otherwise only conducted within the EU. (In Asia there is also a political focus on China and India. The latter used to be a Programme country.)1 9. Constitutive effects on Danish foreign policy concepts from participation in the EU are most likely in relation to Latin America, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, Oceania and Asia. 10. Denmark is active within the EU in relation to the functional areas of development, trade, human rights and the environment. In terms of geographical areas Denmark is active towards the transatlantic relationship/ the US, Africa, the Middle East, selected countries in Asia and to a lesser extent selected countries in Latin America. It is also active in relation to the UN and the OSCE. All in all, the general picture of Danish policy towards the EU is mixed in relation to policy inside/outside the EU, activity within the EU and constitutive effects on Danish foreign policy concepts. With regard to the question raised in Chapter 1 about whether Danish foreign policy has been fundamentally transformed by the Danish participation in EU foreign policy or whether it is still a national foreign policy that functions relatively unaltered by the participation in the EU framework, this obviously depends on what is meant by ‘Danish’ and by ‘foreign policy’. If we take Danish foreign policy to mean that there is an actor labelled and accepted as the recognised state of Denmark that can pronounce


itself on international issues, then there is clearly plenty of Danish foreign policy. Denmark has embassies in most parts of the world and missions to major international organisations. The number of bilateral embassies today is slightly higher than before the entry into the EPC in 1972 – 56 versus 59 today (M.E. Smith, 2000: 620). Even in areas which are not seen as central to Danish foreign policy such as, for example, Latin America, Denmark does have bilateral relations. But if by (Danish) foreign policy we understand the external action of an actor that is not wholly embedded within one organisational framework as foreign policy has tended not to be, then the judgement is more complicated. Between the EU countries the substance of bilateral policy has changed or is about to change drastically. The traditional focus in Europe on bilateral relationships and post-1945 multilateral organisations has been replaced by coalition-building primarily aimed at political problems inside the EU. Given the crucial role of the immediate surrounding areas in defining the scope of national foreign policy traditionally, the present focus on acting primarily within one regional organisation is unique. The dominant government discourse which presents the EU as pivotal in general Danish foreign policy together with a broader European understanding of the EU as a community of destiny of some kind are central to understanding this situation. The contexts in which the bilateral perspective is the most important are not many. The main context in which this is the case is that of the Programme countries in Africa and the relationship with the US including the security of Greenland. NATO is also an organisation towards which the Danish bilateral relationship is significant. Otherwise the EU is either the only framework or the most important of the multilateral frameworks (with the exception of the area of pure development where the UN framework is the most important). Against that, it can, of course, be argued that the Danish relationship with the US and NATO decisively disproves the fundamental role of the EU in Danish foreign policy because it shows that the important area of military security is dealt with outside the EU. It may well be that the role of the EU is strongest in foreign policy and in soft security and weakest in hard military security, even though a military dimension is being developed post-St Malo with three EU operations so far. However, looking at Danish foreign policy across the board, the realm of military security is still only one out of the many areas dealt with in the everyday activities of Danish foreign policy, and should not distract from the role of the EU in most of these (as indicated in Table 10.2). This counter-argument may seem to hinge on a quantitative rather than a qualitative logic. However,


the initial questions asked in the book related to the role of the EU with regard to national foreign policy substance and whether small state foreign policy was mainly conducted within the larger shell of EU foreign policy. Considerations about the full range of foreign policy activities must therefore have a place in the way these questions are addressed, as foreign policy is not only about hard security issues. An approach privileging the conduct of the military aspects of security policy over other policy areas (as often the case in many realist-inspired analyses of the EU) when analysing and assessing the relationship between member state and EU foreign policy carries the risks of not being able to comprehend the many national foreign policy processes related to the EU and of disqualifying in advance the importance of areas where the EU is strong. To the extent that the four-cornerstone discourse which dominated Danish foreign policy during the Cold War was ever reflected in policy practices, this is certainly not an appropriate description of Danish foreign policy today when we look across policy areas. The EU is closely interwoven with Danish foreign policy in most policy areas with the exception of the military dimension of security which is linked to NATO and the US. Other fora do not have the same independent status, and bilateral action is often the most common alternative to EU action. There are areas (as mentioned above) where Danish foreign policy is not mainly conducted through the EU. In this sense and in these areas there is still a Danish foreign policy close to the way this has traditionally been conceived in FPA. But in other areas the EU is the most important framework. And in some of these areas ‘Denmark’ is not the main actor articulated in concrete instances of policy, but rather ‘the EU and Denmark’ or just ‘the EU’. In Wendt’s terms, outlined in Chapter 2, this suggests that in some foreign policy areas there is a change in Denmark’s corporate actorness as opposed to just the social actorness. There is, in other words, not just a change in the social attributes of the ‘we’ in question but a change in who the ‘we’ is. Such articulations of actorness are found in the cases of the Balkans and Latin America, and to a lesser and varying extent in the other policy areas analysed. And this has profound consequences for who the actor in these areas is. If the ‘we’ articulated is frequently something else than ‘Denmark’ in a particular area, this must call into question the ‘Danish foreign policy’ label in the areas. FPA tends to assume an actor with a stable identity whose policy is to be analysed. In most of the other areas analysed (apart from development), the co-articulation with the EU takes the form of ‘Denmark via the EU’.


Denmark is thus the privileged part of the subject articulated. However, as this is the most common articulation beside ‘Denmark’ in these cases, it is analytically interesting. The prominent place of the EU in the articulations of actorness suggests a link between national and EU actorness in these areas which positions the EU as essential for Danish foreign policy and thus in a weaker way part of Danish actorness. This implies an identification with EU foreign policy and a challenge to the state as the identity container in foreign policy which is usually assumed in FPA. Although it is increasingly accepted that FPA could also be carried out on other units than states, very much with the EU in mind (White, 2004; Hill, 2002), FPA (or other analytical frameworks) are not able to analyse foreign policy of mixed unit articulations. It may of course be said that in both empirical groups of cases above there is also an articulation of actorness in terms of ‘Denmark’ which suggests that little has changed fundamentally. Even so the mixed articulations of who ‘we’ are show that actorness is not stable and therefore points to how participation in EU foreign policy might have profound effects on the ‘we’ in Danish ‘foreign’ policy. A total co-articulation or merger of agency in the form of ‘Denmark and the EU’ or just ‘the EU’ was, however, not the case in any of the foreign policy areas analysed. The national element in actorness is still very present in many areas. Wæver (1995) has argued that the EU is broadly seen as a supplement or as a support for the member states, not as a new sovereign subject taking over from them. This study of Danish foreign policy confirms this point. At the same time, the articulations of actorness also vary considerably as expressed across foreign policy areas. In some cases the articulation of ‘we’ suggests a challenge, at least in part, of the member state as the main actor in certain foreign policy areas. In others the ‘we’ often includes the EU as essential, although the privileged actor remains Denmark. And there are also cases where articulations of Denmark are dominant (development). In any case, the articulation of actorness in the Danish context is not stable across the areas analysed and the EU is the actor with whom Denmark is most frequently co-articulated in different forms.

III. Is the study of Denmark of general interest for the study of small states in the EU? The Danish case suggests that the role of the EU for small state foreign policy is significant but also that it varies considerably across policy areas according to the fit between EU policy and national articulations


of actorness. This suggests that we cannot take for granted that small states participating in the EU use or relate to the EU frame in the same way across policy areas. Specifically, we cannot assume that all small states will be active within the EU foreign policy across policy areas in spite of the increased influence which the EU frame is often assumed to provide for small states. Whether they are active will have a lot to do with the way they understand themselves as actors in the policy area concerned. The EU framework does not, so to speak, bring out state activity in all fields. We cannot assume, either, that small states will always consider the EU the central focus for their foreign policy. The conceptual import of EU concepts cannot be taken for granted in all foreign policy areas, as it also depends on the articulations of national actorness in the field. In general terms the importance of the EU for national foreign policy is closely linked with national foreign policy identity in different policy areas. Without a national articulation of actorness in a given area, there will not be national policy conducted outside the EU if the EU has any policy at all. In this case a co-articulation of actorness with the EU can be expected. Conversely, a national articulation of actorness in an area is the necessary basis of an active role in the EU. What are the broader implications for the analysis of small state foreign policy in the EU context? In Manners and Whitman’s book it has been suggested that we need a new transformational FPA for EU member states (Manners and Whitman, 2000a). If the importance of the EU framework varies across areas, as this study of one country suggests, then we might also need a different FPA for different policy areas and different countries when it comes to the relationship between national and EU foreign policy. The approach in this book suggests that in some policy areas where the EU does not play a dominant role, we might come closer to a more traditional FPA understanding. The reason is that for the country concerned the EU is just one among several international fora. The actor will in this case, for example, still be articulated as ‘Sweden’, ‘Belgium’, etc. The external environment of the state in question could be said to consist of many different kinds of actors rather than an overarching institutional framework in the form of the EU. And most crucially participating states articulate themselves as the central actors. In other policy areas there might be a need for a ‘transformational’ FPA in relation to the country under analysis. If in national contexts the actor is articulated not as, for example, ‘Belgium’ but as ‘Belgium and the EU’ or just ‘the EU’ and national foreign policy is mainly about


influencing EU foreign policy, this suggests a blurring of the border between the national and the EU. If the key actor is not only the national self, but a ‘we’ which includes the EU, that must lead to a change from traditional FPA, which theorises based on the states’ sense of themselves as identity containers which construct a line of demarcation between national political systems and international institutions. Co-articulations of actorness with the EU suggest that the presumed ‘national foreign policy’ takes place in a very institutionalised context, the EU, which encapsulates national foreign policy. In White’s (2001) terms, then, the national and the EU types of foreign policy overlap. In these contexts elements such as socialisation into European decisionmaking structures are clearly more important for explaining a particular decision than in policy areas where we are closer to the traditional model. In these contexts, negotiations in the EU are key points in analysing ‘foreign policy’ decisions. The important question, then, is what an FPA for EU member states would look like in such cases. A primary element would be to establish how in the foreign policy area concerned national actorness co-articulated with the EU would produce a common framework of meaning and a common realm or structure of policy in the area concerned. More concretely, to the extent that we are still interested in the member states as units, the central focus will be on the background of the conduct of the member state within the EU foreign policy system. The analysis of member states’ policy within institutional (EU) foreign policy processes would be central. The character of this institutional EU foreign policy-making system would therefore be the primary ‘external’ framework for member states’ action. Central questions would be: why do member states promote the views they do in EU foreign policy-making? Who do they cooperate with within the the EU? What is the role of national implementation of EU foreign policy in this area ? How do member state policies interact with the executives of EU foreign policy (the EU President, the EU Foreign Minister, the Commission and the Presidency)? Where the first two questions centre on the influence on foreign policy within the EU, the last two focus on how the EU policy framework in the area is filled out and implemented by the member states in interaction with other institutional EU actors. The difference from more traditional FPA is that this kind of analysis would be focused on explaining member states’ policies within the special setting of the EU foreign policy structures which would mediate the effects of the broader international political environment. At the same time, the analysis would have to be open to the possibility that part of


member states’ policy in the area concerned is not conducted within the EU context but in an environment that does not only include the EU. The general conclusion that we need a varied FPA for different member states in different areas might seem somewhat unsatisfactory for those who would like to see a full-blown analytical framework as the aim for analysing member states’ foreign policy in an EU context. But it does not imply that each country or policy area shall have its own ‘theory’ or ‘FPA’: the study presents concepts and theoretical elements for analysing foreign policy across the different policy areas and articulations of actorness. The categories of Danish policy vis-à-vis the EU presented in Table 2.1 may be helpful here in sketching out where a special kind of FPA is necessary for EU member states. It is particularly in category 1 (little national actorness, EU foreign policy intensive and resourceful) that we might need a new EU member state FPA. Here articulation of joint actorness suggests an interwoven system where the characteristics of the EU decision-making system are central in analysing ‘national’ foreign policy. In category 2 (little national actorness, EU foreign policy not intensive and resourceful) we will probably not need a new foreign policy model because there is little ‘national’ foreign policy to analyse! But EU decision-making must be taken into account if anything. Category 3 (national articulation of actorness, EU foreign policy intensive and resourceful) is the most complicated. Here we will need elements both of an FPA for EU member states and from more traditional FPA. The analyst will have to take into account the nature of decision-making procedures in the EU when analysing national foreign policy as the EU is considered a crucial forum (articulations often ‘through the EU’). But it is also necessary to include more traditional concerns about the international environment, as action also takes place outside the EU.2 In category 4 (national actorness, EU foreign policy not intensive and resourceful) we will not need a special FPA for analysing national foreign policy. The EU is considered a framework at the same level as other international organisations and not a shell around the state shell. Although EU foreign policy decision-making procedures will have to be taken into account when analysing national foreign policy, these will only be one element in that analysis. The next question is, of course, whether the majority of foreign policy issues in national foreign policy fall within more traditional FPA or a model which would have to include EU structures as a central element. In the Danish case, the general picture is mixed across the seven cases


examined, the clearest common denominator being the presence of the EU in most contexts. One place where the study of Denmark points to a clear need for a special approach to FPA for EU member states is in Europe in relation to policy towards other EU member states. Here it was argued that the general political content of Danish policy is increasingly aimed at the EU level. In this area national foreign policy has to be analysed as part of a political system with many actors and levels, as has increasingly become the political science approach to analysing the EU under the heading of multi-level governance (see for example Hix, 1999). The situation in this area can be expected to be the same for most small states. However, other cases in my analysis such as Africa or development do not point to a need for a new FPA for EU member states. The suggestion with this background is to call for more in-depth studies of the role of EU foreign policy in national foreign policy. Only in this way can we judge the need for change in the way we study national foreign policy in an EU context. We need to further substantiate Manners and Whitman’s distinction between ‘European’ foreign relations and ‘international’ foreign relations (Manners and Whitman, 2000c: 263–4). In this book the focus has been on a small state as it was assumed that small state foreign policy was the most likely to have undergone major change through participation in EU foreign policy. However, this is an open question and in-depth studies of bigger countries which draw on the analytical framework in this book would be interesting. A possibility is, of course, that the differences between EU foreign policy areas and national articulations of actorness may make analytical ambitions difficult to fulfil. High analytical ambitions may be impossible given the ensemble of the European foreign policy systems (Carlsnaes, 2004: 2).

Notes 1 Setting the Scene: Small State Foreign Policy in the EU and the Case of Denmark 1. The studies in Manners and Whitman (2000a) suggest a more modest impact of the EU on the larger member states’ foreign policy than on smaller states. 2. Generally throughout the book, quotes from official documents are from the official English version when one exists. Otherwise the quotes are translated by me. The bibliography will tell whether the document quoted is in English or in Danish. 3. The Danish government which came to power in November 2001 has by many analysts been seen to upgrade the Atlantic dimension in Danish foreign policy at the expense of the EU dimension. Although I agree that the emphasis has changed, the view taken here is that the basic terms used to characterise the role of the EU have not undergone a fundamental change. 4. Readers with a neorealist inclination might thus have preferred a study on whether and in what ways Denmark acts with the US in the post-11 September world rather than the present study of the role of the EU!

2 Theoretical Background and Analytical Framework 1. Carlsnaes is sceptical towards the classical dividing line between domestic and international politics that this is based on (Carlsnaes, 2002: 342). 2. For conceptual considerations about the relevant unit of FPA facing these issues see Wæver (1994). For approaches analysing the EU as a postmodern foreign policy actor, see M. Smith (2003) and Bretherton and Vogler (1999: Ch. 1). 3. For a concrete analysis of the impact of norms in different international contexts on constituting states’ preferences, see Finnemore (1996). 4. I use a broader understanding of constructivism than in IR generally where constructivism is frequently understood as the middle ground between rationalism and reflectivism. 5. For a distinction between the different strands, see for example Ruggie (1998: 880–2). 6. Without associating myself with Wendt’s philosophical assumptions, there is a certain similarity between the distinctions made here and his terms ‘social identity’ and ‘corporate identity’. Corporate identity refers to the intrinsic, selforganising qualities that constitute an actor individually whereas social identity are sets of meaning that actors attribute to themselves while taking the perspective of others, that is the perspective of a social object (Wendt, 1994: 385; 1999: Ch. 5). According to Wendt, a change in a state’s social identity will not necessarily lead to a change in its corporate identity which is much more resilient. Corporate identity has pre-social elements linked to the type of state, 213

214 Notes

7.

8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

14.

15. 16.

17.

18. 19. 20. 21.

22.

role and collective identity (Wendt, 1999: 234). States’ participation in the EU policy process may affect the states’ social identity, but possibly only to a lesser extent their corporate identity (Wendt, 1994). However, in line with Smith’s criticism of Wendt, I find that Wendt leaves little room for ‘the domestic politics in constructing the “pre-social”, “exogenous” platform of the state’ (Smith, 2000: 161–2). For White, the same six standard questions of FPA can be used for analysing all three types of foreign policy, although the actors, processes and contexts may be found to differ from area to area. FPA is not tied to a focus on states (White, 2001: 32–6, 41). The term ‘bastions’ was first used by Hans Mouritzen (1988: 78). See also the formulation ‘by the mid-1990s certain nuances have been added to the classical configuration’ in Due-Nielsen and Petersen (1995: 40). Only the first two are based directly on a constructivist perspective. The only formulation that suggests the possibility of an adaptation that goes further is the following: ‘[about Denmark] … making a number of demands but also willing to adapt her national policy to the common policy’ (N. Petersen, 1998: 49). See also Tonra (1997, 1998, 2000, 2003). It should be mentioned that Chapter 11 presenting the practitioners’ assesments also contains interesting analyses of the impact of European foreign policy cooperation on national foreign policy substance in several policy areas in the form of quotes from practitioners (see e.g. Tonra, 2001: 263–4). The argument for analysing the two countries together is their similarities in their distance to the EU mainstream due to their special status in defence, their common understanding of the importance of values in IR and indications of Europeanisation of foreign policy (Tonra, 2000: 224). The categories are inspired by ( but not identical to) Mouritzen (2003: 31). In figures where I both illustrate whether policies are conducted inside and outside the EU and whether Danish policy is active or passive, the thickness of the arrow is not related to the active/passive question. In these cases it is only the letter (A or P) that illustrates the situation (Figures 2.9–2.12, 4.5, 5.5, 6.7, 7.5, 8.5 and 9.5). For an analytical framework which also focuses on ‘fit’ (between domestic national structures and EU structures) to explain the Europeanisation of national structures, see Cowles et al. (2001: 6). For a critique, see Knill (2001). For a list of these studies prior to 1998 see Wæver (1998: 113). In Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985: 105) terms elements then become moments. But in the latter case the analyst would be more interested in dimensions other than discourse. And the strength of EU foreign policy could, as mentioned above, also be analysed through looking at the understanding side. The choice here is purely practical. The generalisable scope is therefore limited to pointing to which broad meaning structures or discourses that are relevant with regard to the subject of this study. Any kind of construction in relation to these broad meaning structures is in principle possible and subject to empirical analysis. For discourse analytical studies which start from the assumption that certain kinds of meaning structures are the relevant object of study in relation to a given

Notes 215 problematic (policies towards Europe), see Hansen and Wæver (2001), Wæver (1998), Holm (1997), Larsen (1997) and Holm et al. (1989). With respect to generalisability in constructionist analysis in general, see Silverman (2004). 23. For a example of a definition of active/passive which draws on more absolute criteria, see Holm (2002: 23–4). 24. This suggestion is inspired by Wendt’s suggestion for how to examine whether foreign policy preferences are exogenous or endogenous to an organisational context (Wendt, 1992: 423). See also Smith (1999: Ch. 1). However, Wendt does not focus on the language dimension of meaning and change. He seems to assume that meaning can be read off the language which has a transparent character.

3 Policy towards EU Member States: the Role of the EU 1. See Holm (2002) for the view that Danish foreign policy activism ended after the 2000 referendum on the euro. 2. Based on the reading of the accounts of the years 1996–2002 in F. Petersen (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). 3. The references are to places where the context of the account is more general than just Danish policy in Europe. But many of the examples of organisations given are European. 4. There is a very heavy reliance on quotes from this report in this chapter. This is because I see the report as the most comprehensive expression of newer general trends in this field at the present time. 5. The access of Danish diplomats to political decision-makers in most of the 25 EU countries is singled out and points to the importance of EU alliancemaking in the new system. It is not suggested, however, that the EU postings are being considered as more important. Other embassies outside Europe (and not just the ones that belong to the category of ‘white elephants’) are now attributed more weight as a result of what is seen as the more active profile of Danish foreign policy (Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs Friis Arne Petersen quoted in Politiken 5.3.2004 [Thyge, 2004]). 6. The former Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen (1993–2000) has stressed that the intense Danish bilateral diplomacy towards the Eastern European countries after the fall of the wall, together with the support for a broad enlargement, were also aimed at the acquisition of new allies in the EU following the enlargement (interview with the author). The chairman of the foreign affairs select committee, Jens Hald Madsen (2001–), presented the same view of the role of Denmark’s bilateral EU relations in an interview with the author. However, the Danish bilateral diplomacy was not all that different in aims and scale from the diplomatic efforts of other EU member states (interview, MFA). 7. Other limitations are: (1) The lack of historical data to make comparisons. However, the difficulties involved in making such comparisons are considerable. The Danish MFA does not possess complete and accessible files of this material. Even in the period concerned, it cannot be guaranteed that all official

216 Notes

8.

9. 10.

11.

4

meetings are included. (2) The period examined is, in some respects, special. One special feature about the period is that Denmark was president in autumn 2002, boosting the number of bilateral EU meetings. Special thanks are due to my research assistant Signe Winther Jensen for intensive research in this field and for producing this table. It should be stressed that the table does not aim to be a complete list of the Danish bilateral meetings in the period. The table is based on the information that has been available. It is possible that there have been more bilateral meetings with (other) EU partners. Which is more than the 39 mentioned above, because it also includes meetings where I do not have information about the agenda. The central role of the EU in relations with neighbours can also be detected in the agenda of the cooperation between Nordic foreign ministers and in the CBSS. Here EU items are also prominent (for the period examined, see the agenda of the meetings of Nordic foreign ministers 31.10.2002 and CBSS 21.6.2004). This chapter does not go further into the interesting question why meetings with these countries still take precedence in other contexts than issues in Europe.

The Fight against Terrorism

1. I am, of course, aware that the term ‘fight against terrorism’ is not neutral. But it seems an appropriate metaphor to characterise the new international security agenda. 2. The following draws heavily on Zilmer-Johns (2004). 3. The agreements were framework agreements in which the aims were common but the form and means to implement it were national. 4. In the political debate following the war, on the absence of WMD found in Iraq, the government maintained that there had been many reasons for going to war against Iraq but that the main one was that Iraq had not complied with the resolutions of the UNSC (see for example Rasmussen, 2003d, e). 5. Although the Social Democrats accepted the participation in the direct military anti-terror efforts in Afghanistan. 6. A primary motivation for the plan was the assumption that the American idea about a democratisation of the Middle East was right and that Danish practical ideas (as opposed to more antagonistic European voices) could be helpful for the US (interview, MFA). 7. This uneven character of EU policy is not a simple reflection of differences between pillars. Strong measures such as agreements with third countries build on both pillar one and pillar two issues. However, the weakest elements can be said to be in pillar two and the strongest in pillar three. 8. And a third (weaker) discourse according to which it is the ‘war against terrorism’ which is the threat to Denmark, and Danish actorness is therefore irrelevant (parts of the radical left). 9. The two discourses on actorness in anti-terror outlined above both fall within the first view of the EU as an actor outlined here. 10. For official formulations confirming this interpretation, see Regeringen (2004a: 18–20).

Notes 217 11. An illustration which is complicated due to the significant differences in the strength of EU policy within the area of anti-terror.

5

The Balkans

1. A common view among observers is that EU policy with regard to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 has been a flop based on the observation that the political initiative, which the EU initially had, shifted to the UN, NATO and the Contact Group in the 1990s. From the perspective adopted here, the question of whether EU policy was successful is a different question from whether the EU had a policy based on identifiable principles and economic and diplomatic resources employed in relation to this policy. From this perspective there is little doubt that the EU had a policy (see Ginsberg, 2001: 85–104). 2. In the words of Hill, the capabilities–expectation gap narrowed (Hill, 1998b). 3. In a book by Nordic scholars on the Balkans (Svanberg and Söhrmann, 1996) the general Swedish ignorance about the Balkans is seen to have gone through several historical phases from a Romantic image, through an image of Communist dictatorship to one (now) emphasising violence and misery (Svanberg and Söhrmann, 1996: 16). Interestingly, in the editors’ introduction to the book, the image of the Balkans as a region that is prone to conflict due to the Balkan mentality can also be discerned (Svanberg and Söhrmann, 1996: 15). 4. See for example Wøhlk (1997: 17–19). 5. See, for example, Udenrigsministeriet (1999b: 127–9). 6. The official English version here deviates from the Danish version. The Danish version states ‘har bidraget afgørende’ which in my translation would be ‘has contributed decisively’. 7. The Social Democrat/Radical Liberal coalition government was succeeded by a Liberal/Conservative coalition government after the general elections on 11 November 2001. 8. The question of whether aid to the former Yugoslavia could be taken from development aid funds has been politically controversial in Denmark. The dominant view has been that development aid could not be given to the former Yugoslavia as it was not poor compared to the Third World. 9. The Kosovo operation was, however, more politically controversial as the Socialist Peoples’ Party as well as the Unity list opposed the war ( Jakobsen, 2000). 10. However, the number of EU declarations on the region have been declining since 2000. This may reflect a decline in the EU interest in the region, but more likely a larger degree of reliance on Community instruments rather than CFSP instruments as the countries move closer to the EU, a tendency that could also be discerned in relation to the policy towards the CEE countries before membership (Smith, 1999).

6

Development and Aid

1. A broad understanding of aid is applied which also includes emergency aid. 2. In the statement the horizontal concerns are mentioned after the six priorities and added by the Council.

218 Notes 3. The right-wing coalition government that came to power in November 2001 cut aid to under 1 per cent of GNP. This became a subject of heated political debate. 4. This section describes the articulation of actorness at the most general level. For a more extensive description see Holm (1982: 40). 5. For different views, see for example the interview with Paul EngbjergPedersen in Faber and Ringkøbing (2002) and Vilby (2004). 6. Although the formulations in the 2003 Regeringens bud på nye prioriteter for dansk ulandsbistand 2004–2008 do not suggest a further strengthening of the role of the EU compared with the 2000 report. 7. For examples of articulations of the importance with donors other than the EU, in particular the UN, see Udenrigsministeriet (1996: 41, 71, 74, 78, 82; 1997: 9, 13, 14, 26, 29, 30, 34, 40, 48, 54, 60, 61, 64, 66, 74, 76, 87; 1998a: 15, 36, 54, 57, 60, 74, 80, 85; 1999c: 47, 54, 80; 2000a: 9–10, 49, 61, 65, 73, 79; 2001a: 10, 113; 2002a: 27, 53, 108). 8. Udenrigsministeriet (1994: 41, 44; 1996: 94, 96; 1998a: 79, 86; 1999c: 105; 2002a: 123). 9. For examples of EU aid being mentioned as central (some of which also contain criticism of the Community as a development actor), see Udenrigsministeriet (1996: 88; 1998a: 80; 1999c: 80; 2000a: 76, 87, 96, 106, 131; 2001a: 19, 43; 2002a: 13, 18, 27, 38, 57, 88, 116), Wøhlk (1997: 24, 29) and Petersen (2001: 25). 10. But there are instances of the two being articulated as one actor in the material of the Danish MFA in new millennium (Petersen, 2001: 25; Udenrigsministeriet, 2002a: 19). 11. See sections on the EU aid in the annual development reports from Danida. 12. See for example Udenrigsministeriet (1996: 46–7; 1997: 48; 1998a: 5, 7, 26, 30; 1999c: 8, 10; 2000a: 5, 16, 72; 2001a: 46, 101; 2002a: 106) and Petersen (1999: 25). 13. Arrows both way rather than just an arrow illustrating the import of EU concepts in Danish policy have been inserted in this figure (and in Figure 6.7) due to the clear indications of Danish concepts on EU language in this field.

7

Africa

1. The exception to this is in relation to questions about the continent as a whole and the regional organisations. When the term ‘Africa’ or ‘African’ is used in this chapter as shorthand, it refers to either sub-Saharan Africa or the regional and continental organisations. 2. The EU’s pursuit of these goals has, by some analysts, been seen as characterised by double standards. Some have pointed to a marked difference between stances towards smaller countries and larger and more influential countries which are given more leeway (Danish Presidency, 2002b; Smith, 1998). It has also been argued that a change in EU African policy took place in the 1990s from a focus on human rights and democracy to a focus on stability due to the concrete European interest in avoiding refugees (Olsen, 2002c). 3. This might, however, be somewhat eased with the appointment of a European Foreign Minister based in both the Commission and the Council as agreed in the Constitutional Treaty.

Notes 219 4. Aid which has, however, been declining in relative terms after the Cold War (both the Community’s aid and that of the member states). 5. Since there has not been an official, generally formulated political strategy on Africa as a whole, for analytical purposes one has to look at the contexts where the subject is development issues which deal with Africa if we are to examine the dominant discourses in this field. See, for example, the annual reports from Danida. I owe this point to Gorm Rye Olsen. 6. Announced in the Prime Minister’s statement on the occasion of the opening of the Folketing, 5 October 2004. This move alledgedly had more to do with the Prime Minister’s aim of giving his government a softer image after the Iraq war rather than any particular concern for Africa (interview, Prime Minister’s Office). 7. The citation is not specifically about Africa, but, in the publication, the majority of the conflicts and sources of instability are seen as located in Africa so that the context is implicitly Africa (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000f: 23, 24, 26, 27, 31, 53, 89). 8. Aid to Egypt, according to the government’s plan of July 2003, will be phased out. 9. Denmark, however, has not always put a joint EU line before its own stances herein, as in the 1997 resolution where Denmark voted with the US against China. 10. South Africa could arguably also have been placed in the first grouping due to Denmark’s long-standing interest in the country as indicated by the presence of an embassy. 11. However, the domestic interest in Africa linked to development is a political factor which the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy is aware of. It attempts to preempt domestic reactions (interview, MFA). 12. Former Foreign Minister Mogens Lykketoft considers this an example of conceptual EU influence on Danish policy towards Africa (interview with the author).

8

Latin America

1. However, during the Cold War, Denmark received many political refugees from Chile and Argentina (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b). 2. This understanding was confirmed in my interview with the former Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen, 7 May 2003. 3. Correspondence with Michael Kluth, Roskilde University, who conducted interviews in the years before the writing of this book. 4. This paragraph is based on information obtained in my interview with former Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen, 7 May 2003. 5. In at least one instance, Denmark has also shown itself to belong to an Atlantic grouping in relation to LA, as Denmark post-11 September was part of the group of countries within the EU which supported the US definition of terrorist movements in Colombia (interview, MFA). 6. The embassy here is a watchtower for developments in the Caribbean where Denmark has no other embassies.

220 Notes 7. Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee Jens Hald Madsen, interview with the author, 10 July 2003. 8. Chairman of the Foreign Policy Select Committee Jens Hald Madsen, interview with the author, 10 July 2003. 9. Claus Larsen-Jensen, interview with the author, 16 June 2003. 10. Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee Jens Hald Madsen, interview with the author, 10 July 2003. 11. Former Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen, interview with the author, 7 May 2003. The concrete context in which this came up in interviews was the incoming government’s budgetary cut in 2001 which led to the closure of the Danish embassy in Argentina.

9

Trade

1. Increasingly the bilateral agrements are so-called mixed agreements containing elements which are only partially within Community competence, which means that they have to be ratified both by the EU and the member states. 2. For other examples of these articulations see the website of the MFA (www.um.dk). 3. See, for example, Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller’s speech at the WTO meeting in Cancún, 10–14 September 2003 (Udenrigsministeriet, 2004g). 4. See, for example, the formulations in Udenrigsministeriet (2000h: 4).

10 Conclusions and Wider Perspectives for the Analysis of National Foreign Policy in an EU Context 1. It has been argued from a realist perspective that smaller states, in particular, are predominantly interested in their immediate environment. Countries and regions further away from the geographical home are of much less interest as their influence here is minimal (see for example Mouritzen, 1998, 1999). From this perspective it is not surprising that Danish articulations of actorness are weak in many parts of the world outside the northern hemisphere (Latin America, Oceania, Asia). Although there is little doubt that the Danish articulation of actorness is strong and developed close to home and most resources are spent here (as much aid is given in Europe as in Africa), the realist thesis has significant shortcomings seen from the perspective and findings in this book: there are areas far away from home where Denmark articulates actorness – particularly in Africa. This is not just a question of narrow and apolitical development concerns. In the Programme countries Denmark is strongly involved in influencing political developments backed up by substantial development aid. It is not clear how this would have beneficial effects close to home. 2. This situation might be the closest candidate to seeing national foreign policy as part of a postmodern foreign policy system (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: Ch. 1).

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Interviews Politicians Former Foreign Minister, Niels Helveg Petersen: 7 May 2003. Member of the Parliament’s European Affairs Committee, Charlotte Antonsen: 21 May 2003. Former Minister of Development, Jan Trøjborg: 28 May 2003. Former Foreign Minister, Mogens Lykketoft: 25 June 2003. Chairman of the Parliament’s European Affairs Committee, Claus Larsen-Jensen: 16 June 2003. Chairman of the Parliament’s Foreign Policy Committee, Jens Hald Madsen: 10 July 2003. Member of the Parliament’s Foreign Policy Committee, Jeppe Kofoed: 18 June 2003.

Civil servants 15 interviews conducted with civil servants at different levels in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (anonymous). One interview conducted in the Prime Minister’s Office (anonymous).

Index ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries), 124, 126, 147, 159 acquiescence, 25 actorness, 17, 47–56, 60, 71, 201, 207, 208 and Africa, 152, 164 and the Balkans, 120–1 and development aid, 145–6 and Latin America, 172–5, 183–4 meaning of, 50, 201 and terrorism, 99–101 and trade, 188–9, 193 adaptation, 33 between EU and national foreign policy, 44 adaptation theory, 24, 38 and Danish European policy, 24–9 meaning dimension, 27–8 Afghanistan, 81, 82, 91 Africa, 147–65, 198, 212 aid, 126, 135, 150 conflict prevention, 147, 148–9 and Denmark, 151–63 and EU, 147–51 North Africa, 203, 204 and UN, 153 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, see ACP African Union, see AU agriculture, 203 aid, 123–47 EU, 123–7 aid programmes, Balkans, 113 Airborne Warning and Control system, see AWACS Albania, 113, 116 Allen, D., 2, 23, 60 Andean Community, 168, 169, 178, 180 Argentina, 171, 176, 178 articulation, 201 meaning of, 50 Ashdown, Paddy, 106

Asia, 203 aid, 126 assistance programme (CARDS), 105 association agreements, 125–6 AU (African Union), 149, 157 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control system), 91 ‘axis of evil’, 82, 90, 96, 97 balancing policy, 25, 26 Balkans, 91, 102–22, 199, 204, 217 n. 3 aid programmes, 113 and Denmark, 108–19 EU policy, 103–8, 119 and European integration, 105 and NATO, 111–12, 114 Baltic States, 70, 71 Barcelona Process, 204 Beukel, E., 185, 186, 187, 188 bilateral relationships, within the EU, 64–7 Bjørn, C. and Due-Nielsen, C., 67 Blom-Hansen, J. and Christensen, J., 23 Bolivia, 171, 175, 176, 177, 180, 182 Bosnia, 82, 116, 120 Bosnia-Hercegovina, 106–7 Branner, H. and Kelstrup, M., 69 Brazil, 171, 176, 177, 178, 183 Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J., 50, 56, 125, 127, 166, 170, 185 ‘Brusselisation’ of foreign policy, 60 Brussels structures, 66 Burkina Faso, 136, 158 Buzan, B. and Wæver, O., 67, 147 Cairo declaration, 149, 162 Campbell, D., 129 CAP (Common Agricultural Policy), 186, 187 CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation), 105 234

Index 235 Carlsen, P. and Mouritzen, H., 96 Carlsnaes, W., 13, 212 case study approach, 58 CBSS (Council of the Baltic Sea States), 69, 70, 71 CEECs (Central and Eastern European countries), 126, 136 CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), 1, 4, 18, 21, 23, 30, 31, 132, 149 and Africa, 161 and Denmark, 7, 26 and Latin America, 177 policy towards, 23 Checkel, J., 15, 16, 18 Chile, 169, 176, 177, 178, 180, 183 Christensen, S., 128, 129, 137, 151, 152, 158 Christensen, S. and Wæver, O., 110, 114 co-articulation, 52–3, 133, 154, 172, 174, 188, 210 Cold War, 67 Colombia, 168, 169 COMKFOR REAR, 114 Common Agricultural Policy, see CAP Community, 185 conflict prevention, Africa, 147, 148–9 conflicts, 65, 66 Congo, 82 constructivist approach, 15–16, 29, 37, 39, 43, 46, 56, 213 n. 4 control-reflex model of IGOs, 44 Copenhagen criteria, 65, 103, 118 Copenhagen summit, 105 COREU (Correspondence Européenne–European correspondence), 37 corporate identity, 213–14 n. 6 Cotonou Agreement, 125, 137, 147–8, 149, 150, 164, 167, 168, 170, 178 Council of the Baltic Sea States, see CBSS Council Decision (14 May 2001), 148 Council of Europe, 81, 92–3, 104, 167, 169 Cowles, M. et al., 23 Cowles, M. and Risse, T., 23

Croatia, 113, 114 Cuba, 168, 170, 176, 178, 183 Dahllöf, S., 96 Danida (Danish International Development Agency), 133, 137, 140 Danish Commission on Security and Disarmament, see SNU Danish Middle East Initiative, 205 Danish Presidency, 149, 150, 157, 178 Danish Yearbook of Foreign Policy, 60, 69 Dayton Agreement, 104, 112, 114 democracy, 150, 152, 169 Denmark, 1–12 action plan for the Western Balkans, 112 active internationalism, 69 active/passive policy stance, 61 actorness and terrorism, 99–101 and Africa, 151–63, 164–5, 196 aid policy, 115 aid through multilateral organisations, 135 ambassadorial postings, 70 analytical framework for foreign policy content, 39–43 anti-terrorism policy, 89, 92, 93–6, 98–9, 100–1, 195–6 articulation of actorness in policy areas, 47–56, 71, 86, 89, 90, 145, 153, 164, 188, 190, 201, 208 ‘balancing’ strategy, 26, 28 and the Balkans, 108–19, 120–1, 196 bilateral development aid, 135–6 bilateral meetings, 73–5, 76 bilateral policy, 9–10, 64, 69, 71–2, 77, 112–13, 199, 206 and CFSP, 7, 26 coalition partners, 204 co-articulation with the EU, 53, 110 Cold War foreign policy, 27 defence, 35 Defence Commission, 84 development aid, 127–46, 196, 205: within the EU, 137 Development Aid proposal (2004–8), 131, 135

236 Index Denmark – continued development, and the EU, 132 development policy, 131, 134–40, 142–3 embassies, 70, 71, 112, 137, 158, 175, 176, 178, 183, 206 and the EU, 51 EU membership, 8 EU and national foreign policy, 44–56, 68 EU presidency, 72, 75 EU role in general foreign policy, 7, 8, 22, 199–200 European Affairs Committee, 191 European policy and the adaptation theory, 24–9 EU and terrorism, 87–9 exports, 187 Foreign Minister, 98 foreign policy, 11, 32, 34–5, 38, 69, 205–6: and the EU, 198; and EU policy, 45; priorities in, 69–70; role of EU in, 201–8 Foreign Policy Committee, 179 and Germany, 67, 75 influence on EU, 76 and Iraq, 90–1, 94, 96 and Latin America (LA), 171–84, 196 Middle East policy, 26, 204–5 military contributions, 91, 112 ministerial meetings, 76 multilateral aid, 136 multilateral policy on the Balkans, 113–15 and North Africa, 204 peacekeeping, 86, 91, 128 policy: in the EU, 41–2; towards other EU member states, 195; within international organisations, 203–4 Programme aid to Africa, 154–6, 163, 164, 165 Programme countries in LA, 171, 172, 175 referenda (1992 and 1993), 26 security, 28, 35, 36, 67, 84, 131 as a small state, 208–12 statements on general foreign policy, 6–7

support for anti-terrorist measures in international fora, 92–3 support for US, 90, 94, 99 and Sweden, 67 terrorism, 84–98, 131 trade, 187–92, 196: with Latin America, 171, 176 and the UK, 67 and the US, 36, 213 n. 4 use of EU language, 97, 98, 118, 141–2 welfare state, 128, 146 and WTO, 187–8, 189–90 ‘Denmark through the EU’, 89 development, 123–47 discourse, 17, 18, 42, 47 EU, 62 discourse analysis, 11, 47–51, 59 Doha Round, 190 domestic policy, 34 dominance policy, 25 Due, M., 129, 130, 131 Due-Nielsen, C. and Petersen, N., 24, 25, 27 EC (European Community), 67 ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office), 127 ECMM (European Commission Monitoring Mission), 112 ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council), 136 ECOWAS (European Community of West African States), 149, 157 EDF (European Development Fund), 127 Edinburgh Decision, 195 Edinburgh summit, 95 Elgström, O., 125 elites, 37 El Salvador, 169 empowerment, 30 En Verden i udvikling – Strategi for dansk udviklingspolitik frem mod år 2000, 128, 130 environmental questions, 203 EPC (European political cooperation), 30, 181 and security, 78

Index 237 ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy), 4, 21, 116 EU, 92–3 and Africa, 147–51, 163 aid, 123–7 anti-terror policy, 80–1, 84, 99–101 and articulation of Danish actorness in the Balkans, 109–19 and the Balkans, 103–7, 114–15, 120 bilateral relationships within, 64–7 bilateral trade agreements, 186 as a community of destiny, 65 Constitutional Treaty, 4, 95, 96 constitutive effects of foreign policy, 6 Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 84 and Danish actorness on LA, 172–5 and Danish African policy, 163 and Danish foreign policy, 198 and Denmark, 51 Denmark’s influence on, 76 development policy, 123–4, 125, 126 discourse, 62 External Affairs Council, 160 inflexibility, 186–7 and Iraq, 3–4 and Latin America (LA), 166–70, 178, 183 level of Danish activity, 97 military operations, 82 and national foreign policy, 5, 31 and national small state foreign policy, 1 and the nation state, 23 operation Concordia, 114 police and intelligence cooperations, 83 policy, 46–7 as a political system, 66 role in Danish foreign policy, 201–8 and Russia, 71 security role, 67–8, 79 Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for South-eastern Europe, 104 strategic objectives on terrorism, 80 and terrorism, 78–84 trade, 185–7, 193 and WMD, 81–2 and the Yugoslav crisis, 102

EU enlargement, 70, 118 EU foreign policy, 18 cooperation and small states foreign policy, Tonra’s work, 29–32 FPA within the EU, 20–1, 210–11 framework, 1–3, 14 of member states, 32–8 and national foreign policy, 6, 18–22, 23, 32 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, see MEDA European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office, see ECHO European Commission Monitoring Mission, see ECMM European Communities Development Policy, 124 European Community, see EC European Community of West African States, see ECOWAS European Council (March 1999), 103 European Development Fund, see EDF European foreign policy community foreign policy, 18 governance, 18 national foreign policy in, 18–22 Union foreign policy, 18 ‘European foreign relations’, 34 European integration, 23 and the Balkans, 105 Europeanisation, 35 definition of, 22–3 of foreign policy procedures, 32 national foreign policy, 4, 18, 22 Europeanisation of National Foreign Policies, The, 4, 29–32 European political cooperation, see EPC European Security and Defence Policy, see ESDP European Union, see EU Europol, 83 Everts, S. and Keohane, D., 79 Falklands War, 171 fishing, 203 Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, The, 4, 32–8

238 Index foreign policy analysis, 22 ‘Brusselisation’ of, 60 Danish and EU, 11–12 definition of, 56 of EU member states, 32–8 national preferences, 13 see also national foreign policy foreign policy action, with or without the EU, 34 foreign policy analysis, see FPA foreign policy procedures, Europeanisation of, 32 foreign policy substance, 32, 35 Forsvarsministeriet (Danish Ministry of Defence), 71 Foucault, M., 17, 47 four-cornerstone discourse, 67, 207 FPA (foreign policy analysis), 3, 12, 13, 14, 209 Manners and Whitman on, 33, 36 within the EU, 20, 211 France, and Germany, 64 free trade, Latin America (LA), 169 Friis, L., 65 FRY, 106, 120 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), 185 George, A., 58 Germany, 68–9 and Denmark, 67, 75 and France, 64 Ginsberg, R., 102 global participation, 5 Gold Coast, 151 Græger, N. et al., 95, 101, 128, 203 Greece, 126 Greenland, 206 Guatemala, 168, 169, 175, 176 peace process, 178, 182 Hækkerup, Hans, 114 Hækkerup, P., 171 Haiti, 169, 179 Hanf, K. and Soetendorf, B., 66 Hansen, L., 57, 86, 102, 108 Hansen, L. and Wæver, O., 48 Heurlin, B., 86

Hill, C., 2, 21, 23, 56, 102, 103, 190, 208 Hill, C. and Smith, K.E., 103, 104, 105 Hill, C. and Wallace, W., 19, 23 historical institutionalism, 15 HIV/Aids, 130, 138 Hix, S., 66, 212 Hobson, J., 15 Holm, H., 69, 128, 129 Holm, U., 48 Holm, U. et al., 48 ‘humane internationalists’, 128 humanitarian aid, 105 human rights, 35, 147, 148, 150, 152, 169, 172, 175, 177 Human Rights Commission, 156 IMF (International Monetary Fund), 136 ‘influence capacity’ (offensive power), 25 institutions, 15, 31 integration, and balancing policy, 26 intergovernmentalism, 31 internal vulnerability, 25 ‘international foreign relations’, 34 international organisations, 69 anti-terrorist measures, 92–3 Danish policy within, 203–4 impact on national foreign policy, 15–18 and national foreign policy, 13–14, 31, 34 international relations, see IR International Security Assistance Force, see ISAF Iran, 82, 92 Iraq, 72, 82, 84, 86, 97–8 2002–3 crisis, 3–4 and Denmark, 90–1, 94, 96 Ireland, 32 security, 36 IR (international relations), 13, 44–5 ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), 82, 91 isolationism, 25 Jacobsson, B., 23 Jamaica, 169

Index 239 Jensby, S., 85 Jensen, F., 93, 101 Jerichow, A. and Hannestad, A., 95 Jessen-Petersen, Søren, 114 JHA (Justice and Home Affairs), 95, 96, 99 Jønck, F., 187, 188 Jørgensen, K.E., 19, 24 Jørgensen, K.E. and Pedersen, T., 79, 81, 82, 83 Jørgensen, M.W. and Phillips, L.J., 47 Kenya, 157 KFOR (Kosovo Force), 114 Kofoed, J., 117, 154 Kosovo, 103, 104, 113, 114 Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C., 17, 46, 49, 50 Ladrech, R., 22, 23 Laeken summit, 83 Lammers, K., 67 Lamy and Fischler, 189 language, as discourse, 17 Larsen, H., 7, 8, 9, 28, 38, 47, 48, 59, 67, 68, 79, 86, 87, 95, 100, 103, 157, 171 Latin America (LA), 166–84, 203, 205, 206 aid, 126 democracy, 169 and Denmark, 171–84 and the EU, 166–70 free trade, 169 human rights, 169, 172 internal stability, 168 and the US, 166 Latinamerika, 180 LDCs (less developed countries), 126 LLDs (least developed countries), 126 Lomé Convention, 124, 137, 154 Lomé V (Cotonou) Agreement, see Cotonou Agreement Lykketoft, Mogens, 110, 115, 155, 156 Maastricht Treaty, 8, 79 Macedonia (FYROM), 82, 105, 114, 116, 120 civil war, 106

Malawi, 157 Manners, I. and Whitman, R., 4, 5, 22, 24, 209, 212 approach to analysing foreign policy of EU member states, 32–8, 212 n. 1 meaning EU systems, 44 intersubjective structure of, 38–9 social construction of, 17 socially shared systems of, 11 in terms of language, 47 MEDA (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership), 204 Mercosur, 168, 169, 176, 177, 180 Metz, G., 98 Mexico, 169, 176, 177, 178, 180, 183 MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 94, 95, 113, 114, 115, 136, 137, 139, 142, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 169, 176, 190, 204 Middle East, 29, 32, 92, 95, 204–5 aid to, 135 and Denmark, 20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see MFA Møller, P., 85, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98 Montenegro, 106 Mouritzen, H., 24, 44, 186, 190 multi-level governance, 212 national capabilities, 44 national elites, 37 national foreign policy, 2–3, 210 in an EU context, literature on, 22–4 and EU foreign policy, 6, 20, 23 in European foreign policy, 18–22 Europeanisation, 4 impact of international organisations on, 15–18 and international organisations, 13–14 National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), 127 national preferences, in foreign policy, 13

240

Index

NATO, 9, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 75, 76, 89, 90–1, 92–3, 94, 102, 203, 206 and the Balkans, 111–12, 114, 117 Operation Amber Fox, 114 Operation Concordia, 106 ‘negotiated order’, 46, 57–8 Neighbourhood programme (2004), 113 NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development), 150, 157 Netherlands, 138 Neumann, I., 6, 49 NGOs (non-governmental organisations), 140, 143, 159 Nicaragua, 171, 175, 176, 178, 180, 182 Nice Treaty, 123–4, 126, 185 nomothetic dimension, 58 ‘Norden’, 71 Nordic Cooperation, 67, 70, 71 North Africa, 203 and Denmark, 204 North Korea, 82 Norway, and Iraq, 91 Oceania, 203 OECD, 126, 135, 170 offensive power, 25 Ohrid framework agreement, 106 Olsen, G., 128, 130, 140, 142, 143, 152, 159 Olsen, J., 23 OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), 69, 71, 92–3, 109, 112, 113–14, 203, 205 and the Balkans, 113–14 Østergaard, U., 128 Paraguay, 168, 169 Partnership 2000, 130, 152 Patten, Chris, 103, 166–7 Peru, 169 Petersen, F., 7, 68, 69, 70, 71, 85, 87, 88, 89, 92, 105, 110, 113, 114, 154 Petersen, Helveg, 187–8, 215 n. 6 Petersen, N., 24, 25, 26, 84, 85, 90, 91, 93, 96, 171

Piening, 126, 127, 166 policy structures, 11 political discourse, 59, 60 post-structuralism, 17 poverty, 124–5, 129–30, 131, 142, 147, 151, 178 Presidency, 65, 80, 83, 84 procedural understandings, 37 procedures, in small state foreign policy, 5 PROXIMITA, 114 QMV (qualified majority voting), 95, 96, 186 quiescence, 25 Rasmussen, A., 69, 88, 96 Rasmussen, P., 89 rational choice approach, 15 Regeringen, 7, 68, 69, 71, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 109, 110, 113, 129, 131, 171 Rio framework, 177, 180 Risse, T., 22 Ruggie, J.G., 20 Russia, 204 and the EU, 71 Rynning, S., 85, 86, 91 SAA, see Stability and Association Agreement SADC (South African Development Community), 149, 153, 157 St Malo process, 104 St Petersburg conference, 81 San José, 169 SAP (Stabilisation and Association Process), 107 Secure Europe in a Better World, A, 79 security, 4, 10, 65, 66, 76, 131, 203, 206 non-military aspects, 203 Seidenfaden report, 171 Serbia, 104, 106 democratisation, 116 SICA, 169 small states, 129 clarification of meaning, 3 and Denmark, 208–12

Index 241 small states – continued and EU external policy, 5 and their immediate environment, 220 n. 1 small states’ foreign policy, and EU foreign policy cooperation, Tonra’s work, 29–32 Smith, K., 16, 79, 107, 118, 185 Smith, M., 46, 58 SNU (Danish Government’s Commission on Security and Disarmament), 84, 108 social construction of meaning, 17 social identity, 213–14 n. 6 socialisation, 33 social reality, 16–17 sociological institutionalism, 15–16 Solana, J., 79 Sønderriis, E., 98 South Africa, 29, 152, 158, 163 South African Development Community, see SADC Spain and Iraq, 91 terrorism, 84 Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for South-eastern Europe, EU, 104, 105 Stability and Association Agreement (SAA), 104, 105, 117 Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe, 105 state-shell, 13–14 state system, 20 ‘strategic partnership’, 167 ‘stress sensitivity’ (internal vulnerability), 25 Strömvik, M., 156, 203 Suane, E., 98 Sweden, and Denmark, 67 terrorism, 4, 10, 78–101, 130 Denmark, 84–98 and EU, 78–84 TEU (Treaty of the European Union), 126 Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans, 103 Todorov, T., 129

Tonra, B., 1, 2, 4, 7, 14, 23, 35, 36, 112, 116, 181 work on small states’ foreign policy, and EU foreign policy cooperation, 29–32 trade, 10, 185–94, 203 Denmark, 187–92 EU, 185–7, 193 transformational model, 33 Transforming Europe, 23 Trevi Group, 79 Trøjberg, J., 88, 138 Udenrigsministeriet (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 71, 94, 95, 108, 109, 110, 113, 116, 118, 129, 130, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 142, 152, 153, 154, 160, 171, 172, 173–4, 175, 176, 178, 180, 181, 187, 188, 189 UK, and Denmark, 67 UM Tema, 172 UN, 9, 67, 75, 76, 92–3, 102, 127, 132, 133, 135, 205 and Africa, 153, 155 aid, 128, 136 and the Balkans, 111–12, 114, 117 Convention on Terrorism, 93 General Assembly, 203 Human Rights Commission, 92, 203 resolutions on prevention of terrorism, 92 Standing High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), 177 UNDAF process (United Nations Development Assistance Framework), 136 Understanding European Foreign Policy, 18 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), 136, 144 UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo), 114 UNSC, see UN Security Council UN Security Council, 91, 156 Resolution 1373, 81, 94 US, 3, 81 Danish support for, 90 and Denmark, 9, 36, 206

242 Index US – continued and EU member states, 4 and Latin America (LA), 166 security strategy, 79 terrorist attacks, 85 value promotion, 10 Wæver, O., 18, 20, 24, 48, 65, 71, 208 ‘war against terrorism’, 90, 91 welfare state, 128, 129, 130 White, B., 2, 7, 18, 19, 21, 22, 186, 208, 210

WMD (weapons of mass destruction), 85, 91 and EU, 81–2 World Bank, 133, 135, 136, 137 WTO (World Trade Organisation), 127, 177, 185, 186, 187, 203 and Denmark, 187–8, 189–90 Yugoslavia, 29, 102, 217 n. 1, n. 8 Zambia, 136 Zilmer-Johns, L., 80, 81, 82, 83, 84 Zimbabwe, 156

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