American Israelis

American Israelis Jewish Identities in a Changing World General Editors Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Yosef Gorny, and Judit B...

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American Israelis

Jewish Identities in a Changing World General Editors

Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Yosef Gorny, and Judit Bokser Liwerant

VOLUME 13

American Israelis Migration, Transnationalism, and Diasporic Identity

By

Uzi Rebhun The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Lilach Lev Ari Oranim Academic College of Education and Bar-Ilan University

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2010

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rebhun, Uzi. American Israelis : migration, transnationalism, and diasporic identity / by Uzi Rebhun, Lilach Lev Ari. p. cm. — ( Jewish identities in a changing world) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-18388-9 (hard copy : alk. paper) 1. Israelis—United States— Social conditions. 2. Jews—United States—Social conditions. 3. Jews— United States—Identity. 4. Israel—Emigration and immigration. 5. United States— Emigration and immigration. I. Lev Ari, Lilakh. II. Title. III. Series. E184.I7R43 2010 305.892'4073–dc22

2010003794

ISSN 1570-7997 ISBN 978 90 04 18388 9 © Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

In Honor of Sergio DellaPergola

CONTENTS List of Tables ..................................................................................... List of Figures .................................................................................... Preface ............................................................................................... Chapter 1. Migration, Transnationalism, Diaspora, and Research on Israelis in the United States ............................... 1. Overview ............................................................................. 2. International Migration ...................................................... 3. Transnationalism ................................................................. 4. Contemporary Diasporism ................................................. 5. Israelis in the United States: The State of Research ........ 5.1 Definitions, Measurements, and Number of American Israelis ......................................................... 5.2 Emigration Motives, Emigrants’ Characteristics, and Return to Israel .................................................. 5.3 Absorption and Integration in the United States ..... 6. Data and Methodology ...................................................... 7. Structure of the Book .........................................................

ix xiii xv 1 1 1 7 10 13 13 16 18 21 24

Chapter 2. Migration and Settlement in the United States ...... 1. Overview ............................................................................. 2. Geographic Origin and Ethnicity ...................................... 3. Chronology of Migration ................................................... 4. Age and Gender ................................................................. 5. Family and Children ........................................................... 6. Geographic Distribution and Residential Preferences ....... 7. Summary .............................................................................

27 27 30 34 40 44 49 55

Chapter 3. Socioeconomic Acculturation and Mobility ............ 1. Overview ............................................................................. 2. Educational Attainment ...................................................... 3. Economic Acculturation: Employment, Occupation, and Income ................................................................................ 4. Housing Characteristics ...................................................... 5. Proficiency in English .........................................................

59 59 65 72 82 86

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contents

6. American Citizenship ......................................................... 7. Determinants of Social and Economic Attainments ......... 8. Summary .............................................................................

90 93 96

Chapter 4. Jewish Identification and Attachment to Homeland ................................................................................ 1. Overview ............................................................................. 2. The Multifaceted Structure of Jewish Identification in the United States ................................................................ 3. Denominational Identification ............................................ 4. Observance of Religious Rituals and Holidays ................. 5. Community Involvement .................................................... 6. Determinants of Jewish Identification ............................... 7. Attachment to Israel ........................................................... 8. Summary .............................................................................

105 107 112 120 125 127 131

Chapter 5. Discussion: The Multifaceted Israeli Diaspora ........ 1. Overview ............................................................................. 2. Theoretical Aspects ............................................................. 3. A Reflection of Israeli Society ........................................... 4. Israeli Emigrants and American Jewry .............................. 5. Challenges for Public Policy ............................................... 6. Epilogue ..............................................................................

137 137 140 144 146 149 153

101 101

Bibliography ................................................................................. 155 Index ............................................................................................ 167

LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1. Areas of Origin of Israelis in the United States, 1980–2000 ................................................................................ Table 2.2. Period of Emigration to the United States by Place of Birth: Israeli Americans, 1980–2000 ................... Table 2.3. Age at Emigration and Gender: Israelis in the United States, 1980–2000 ....................................................... Table 2.4. Age at Emigration by Area of Birth: Israelis in the United States, 1980–2000 ....................................................... Table 2.5. Marital Status of Israelis in the United States by Gender, 1980–2000 ............................................................ Table 2.6. Marital Status of Israelis in the United States by Age, 1980–2000 .................................................................. Table 2.7. Children of Married American Israelis, 1980–2000 ................................................................................ Table 2.8. Geographic Distribution of American Israelis and Total American Jews, 1980–2000 ........................................... Table 2.9. Geographic Distribution of American Israelis by Place of Birth, 1980–2000 ................................................. Table 2.10. Metropolitan Residence Status of American Israelis by Marital Status, 1980–2000 ..................................... Table 3.1. Educational Attainment and Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Age, 1980–2000 ................... Table 3.2. Educational Attainment and Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Gender 1980–2000 .............. Table 3.3. Educational Attainment and Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Place of Birth (Israel or Other Country) and by Ethnic Origin, 1980–2000 .......... Table 3.4. Educational Attainment and Mobility among American Israelis of the Middle and Recent Emigration Waves by Main Demographic Characteristics, 1990–2000 ... Table 3.5. Employment Characteristics among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Age, 1980–2000 ................................ Table 3.6. Occupational Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Age, 1980–2000 ....................................

32 36 41 44 46 47 48 51 53 54 66 67 69 71 75 76

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Table 3.7. Income Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Age, 1980–2000 ........................................... Table 3.8. Economic Characteristics and Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Gender, 1980–2000 ................................................................................ Table 3.9. Employment Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Place of Birth, 1980–2000 .......................... Table 3.10. Employment Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Ethnic Group, 1980–2000 .......................... Table 3.11. Economic Characteristics and Mobility among the Middle and Recent Waves of Israeli Emigrants in the United States, 1990–2000 ....................................................... Table 3.12. Housing Characteristics and Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Age and Place of Birth, 1980–2000 ..................................................................... Table 3.13. Housing Characteristics and Mobility among Middle and Recent Wave Israeli Emigrants in the United States, 1990–2000 ....................................................... Table 3.14. English Proficiency among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Selected Demographic Characteristics, 1980–2000 ................................................................................ Table 3.15. English Proficiency among Middle and Recent Wave Israeli Emigrants in the United States, 1990–2000 ...... Table 3.16. American Citizenship among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Selected Demographic Characteristics, 1980–2000 ................................................................................ Table 3.17. American Citizenship among Middle and Recent Wave Israeli Emigrants in the United States, 1990–2000 ...... Table 3.18. Significant Effects of Variables Involved in American Israelis’ Socioeconomic Attainments ...................... Table 4.1. Denominational Identification of American Israelis and American Jews in the United States ................................ Table 4.2. Denominational Identification of American Israelis and American Jews by Place of Residence ............................. Table 4.3. Denominational Identification among American Israelis and American Jews in the United States by Marital Status ..................................................................... Table 4.4. Observance of Religious Rituals and Holidays among American Israelis and American Jews and among Jews in Israel ............................................................................

77 78 79 80 82 84 86 89 90 92 93 96 109 110 112 114

tables and illustrations Table 4.5. Observance of Religious Rituals and Holidays among American Israelis and American Jews by Place of Residence ............................................................................ Table 4.6. Observance of Religious Rituals and Holidays among Israelis in the United States by Tenure ...................... Table 4.7. Observance of Religious Rituals and Holidays among American Israelis and American Jews by Marital Status ..................................................................... Table 4.8. Community Involvement among American Israelis and American Jews .................................................................. Table 4.9. Community Involvement among American Israelis and American Jews by Place of Residence ............................. Table 4.10. Community Involvement among Israelis in the United States by Tenure .......................................................... Table 4.11. Community Involvement among American Israelis and American Jews by Marital Status .................................... Table 4.12. Direction of the Statistically Significant Effects (Positive and Negative) of Demographic, Social, and Emigration Characteristics on Jewish Identification among Israelis in the United States .................................................... Table 4.13. Israeli Identification and Identity among American Israelis and American Jews in the United States ....................

xi

117 118 119 122 123 124 125

127 129

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1. Typology of Jewish-Israeli Identity in United States Population Censuses ................................................................ Figure 2.1. Distribution of Israeli Emigration to the United States by Year of Arrival and Area of Origin, 2000 .......................................................................................... Figure 2.2. Ratio of Percentages of Identical Age Groups among American Israelis (Age at Emigration) and among Jews in Israel (Current Age), 1980 and 2000 ......................... Figure 3.1. Expected Relations among Demographic Variables, Migration Characteristics, and Socioeconomic Attainment among American Israelis ..................................... Figure 4.1. Denominational Identification of Israelis in the United States by Tenure .......................................................... Figure 4.2. Connection to Israel among American Israelis by Tenure in the United States ............................................... Figure 4.3. Direction of the Statistically Significant Effects (Positive and Negative) of Demographic, Social, and Emigration Characteristics on Israeli Identification among Israelis in the United States .................................................... Figure 5.1. The Relationships Involved in the Social Integration and the Israeli and Jewish Identification of Israelis in the United States ....................................................

23 39 42 95 111 130

132 142

PREFACE At the outset of the twenty-first century, the population of Israel numbers nearly seven million inhabitants. This figure represents the number of persons who hold resident status and live in Israel permanently. Three fourths of them are Jewish; the rest are Muslims, Christians, Druze, and persons not classified by religion—often kin of Jewish immigrants, or others eligible for Israel citizenship under the Law of Return, from the former Soviet Union. Another large Israeli community dwells abroad. Despite the difficulties in defining and identifying this community, conservative estimates number it at about half a million persons, a large majority of whom are in the United States. The rate of emigration from Israel i.e., the share of emigration relative to population, is not exceptional by Western standards and, despite temporary fluctuations, has been declining over time. These characteristics have not ruled out an ongoing scholarly, public, and political debate, sometimes acute and mired in controversy, about the ‘descenders” (“yordim,” the opposite of ‘olim, “ascenders,” as Jewish immigrants to Israel are known in the traditional coinage). In Israel, a country still in the process of nation-building, ‘aliyah’—Jewish immigration—is an ideological factor of the highest order. It expresses the principal goal of the Jewish national movement and is part and parcel of the country’s canon writings, from Herzl’s Der Judenstaat, through the Proclamation of Independence, to the Law of Return. Immigration is an effective component in Jewish population growth that is expected to help sustain the country’s Jewish majority, its ability to defend itself, and its economic power. Therefore, emigration is construed as a matter of weakness and the prioritization of personal and material cravings over the public well-being and the collective commitment. Over time, however, the attitude toward emigrant Israelis has been changing amid broader social and cultural changes such as the ascendancy of individualistic values and the spread of globalization tendencies; structural changes in economic opportunities; and the growing use of advanced digital communication media which, in turn, have broadened the phenomenon of international migration. These changes, reflected in statements and stances of official Israeli figures and in the public discourse, express a more moderate and tolerant approach toward emigration,

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manifested among other things in the use of more neutral terms for those who leave as emigrants rather than as yordim. The changes reinforce the country’s relations with, and political and economic use of, Israelis who dwell abroad; references to emigrant Israelis in politicalparty platforms; discussions about granting broader rights to Israelis abroad, including participation in parliamentary elections from their foreign places of residence; and encouraging them to return to Israel by offering significant economic benefits. As stated, emigration from Israel is part of a global phenomenon of voluntary migration that has expanded steadily in the past twenty years. This migration has been taking place among developed countries and from less-developed countries to West European and North American destinations. Today’s migration, unlike that in previous times, is typified by the reshaping of relations with the origin country and the destination country. Furthermore, the migrants maintain world-spanning relations that include members of their national or ethno-religious group who, like them, chose to leave their homeland and resettle in some other country. Accordingly, migrants live in transnational spaces and create a ramified set of interrelations in the social, economic, cultural, and political spheres, among others. This has perceptible effects on their patterns of acculturation and social integration in the host country, including dual political loyalties. These processes become more complex when migrants move to a country that already has a veteran community of similar ethno-religious origin that does not share their national past such as the encounter of Israeli emigrants in the United States with the local American Jewry. Under these circumstances, the migrants are at a ‘double diaspora’ status, being concurrently Israelis and Jews. This book is concerned with the American Israelis. It is a scientific study based on analysis of comprehensive and up-to-date information about the emigration of Israelis to the United States, the émigrés’ acculturation and their social and economic integration, and their patterns of Jewish identification, including relations with the State of Israel. Using different and complementary sources and applying research approaches from the domain of the social sciences, we trace the migrants throughout the formative period of the American Israeli community as it has settled in and developed over the past twenty-five years. The main area of interest in our study is the presentation and analysis of empirical findings. However, we also discuss the implications of the findings for both Israeli society and American Jewry, and how both are reacting in view of the challenge of maintaining strength

preface

xvii

and continuity under conditions of heightened international migration. Accordingly, the Discussion of this book offers several ruminations on public policy and community planning. We discuss basic questions of Israeli society in the broadest sense, yet the issues raised may be personally sensitive to many who live in Israel and have relatives and friends who have linked their fate to some other location; they are certainly of special interest to the American Israelis themselves. Those who wish to see a reflection of their own experience, or that of their relatives, in the findings of this study will probably find similarities; along with them, however, experiences and trials that are unique to them will appear. The fact that we used data from primary sources but did not initiate, plan, or gather them, coupled with our painstaking insistence on using only accepted and common research methods, assures the objectivity of this study and cleanses it of the authors’ ideological or emotional involvement in its object. Following the accepted practice in scientific research, the book sets the Israeli case in its broad theoretical context, which in the matter at hand relates to international migration, transnationalism, and diaspora studies. Accordingly, it also makes a contribution to the general discipline of the social sciences. The empirical underpinnings of this study include data from the three most recent United States censuses—1980, 1990, and 2000— which were made available to us by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota; three Jewish population surveys of Greater New York (2004), Miami (2002), and Los Angeles (1997), which we were allowed to access via the North American Jewish Data Bank, and the National Jewish Population Survey (2000), also made available to us by the Data Bank. We thank Dalia Sagi for helping us loyally and diligently with data processing for this study; and Judith Even and Adina Schwartz for editorial assistance. The translation of this manuscript was made possible by generous grants from the Ben-Eli Honig Fund of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Dushkin Fund of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Finally, we are grateful for the dedicated care of this manuscript by Jennifer Pavelko, Katelyn Chin and Michael J. Mozina at Brill. April 2009 Uzi Rebhun The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Lilach Lev Ari Oranim Academic College of Education and Bar-Ilan University

CHAPTER ONE

MIGRATION, TRANSNATIONALISM, DIASPORA, AND RESEARCH ON ISRAELIS IN THE UNITED STATES 1. Overview The relocation of Israelis to the United States is an international migration phenomenon that has contemporaneous characteristics. It takes place between countries that, despite social and economic differences that are sometimes considerable, are defined as developed and advanced. Accordingly, it is a voluntary migration, motivated by economic desiderata and cultural preferences and, more generally, by the desire of attaining a higher standard of living. Since ideological baggage is a factor that plays a role in Israeli life, the expected material gain to be made by emigrating significantly surpasses parochial national and religious ties. Furthermore, the émigrés often continue to define themselves as Israelis, maintain strong relations with their country of origin, and adopt transnational social and cultural patterns. This chapter presents the theoretical framework of international migration generally and transnational migration specifically, including diasporic affinities. Furthermore, it reviews the state of research on Israelis in the United States. It concludes by describing the empirical infrastructure of our study, the methodological approach used, and the structure of the book. 2. International Migration Human history is replete with geographical transitions and residential changes. Natural disasters, epidemics, wars, and exile have prompted groups and, at times, entire peoples to leave their settled localities in search of a new living environment. Others are motivated by a craving for adventure and the intrigue of discovering an unknown place or following in the footsteps of pioneers and settlers who wave the banner of their national or social ideology. Some are drawn to economic opportunities and cultural stimuli. Hence, migration—as a

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social phenomenon—reflects, either as a cause or as an effect, social, economic, and political variations of places of origin and destination, and it influences both the societies involved in the migration and the migrants themselves (Lee, 1966). The interplay of push and pull factors, whether imposed or originating in free choice, has created many waves of migration. The size of these waves, the distance covered by the migrants, and the migrants’ characteristics vary over time and space (Pries, 1999). Migration and individuals’ mobility have developed within the framework of specific rules that are elemental components of a broader process of modernization. According to this approach, the migration phenomenon develops in several stages that can be defined as a ‘mobility transition’ (Zelinsky, 1971). Differentiating among the stages of this transition, and the determination of the timing of the changeover from one stage to the next, are based on several factors: the underlying motives, the type, and the intensity of the migration. Since there is a strong overlap between the mobility transition and the processes of modernization, the transition focuses mainly on the most recent era in human history. From this juncture, one may identify points of intersection and tangent between the mobility transition and the ‘demographic transition’. The mobility transition is marked by five main stages in the development of individuals’ spatial mobility. These stages have progressed along the axis of time. Stage 1 began in the pre-modern traditional society of Europe and lasted until the Middle Ages (and, in developing countries, into our own era). Stage 2 spans the early transition society, corresponding to the seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century. Stage 3 marks the late transition society of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Stage 4 is the advanced society of the first half of the twentieth century up to the 1970’s. Finally, Stage 5 is the contemporaneous supra-modern society of the future. Obviously, each stage did not begin at the same time in each place. Furthermore, other migration patterns may also exist in each of these phases, chiefly patterns from prior stages or types of mobility that are not considered the definition of a phenomenon of total social and cultural change that constitutes a developmental phase in human society. In the first stage of the mobility transition, migration was on a very small scale. Apart from local mobility for purposes of livelihood (hunting, fishing, agriculture), it was limited to transitions between socio-spatial units following marriage or among members of the aristocracy. This stability changed

migration, transnationalism, diaspora, and research

3

with the onset of modernization, rapid natural increase, changes in the ways in which agricultural and production systems functioned, and improvements in material welfare, transport, and communications. These made migration from rural areas to more central parts of the country possible and are the main attributes of Stage 2. In Stage 3, the continuation of urbanization processes was accompanied by circuitous waves of migration within large urban and metropolitan areas, enhanced at this stage not only by economic motives but also by social and cultural calculations. Stage 4 was marked by the international migration of unskilled or semiskilled workers from less-developed countries to developed countries that were undergoing rapid development and had shortages of working hands in blue-collar occupations and services. In this stage, new factors worked their way into the individual’s considerations pro or con migration; they reflected a decline in the importance of family relations in favor of socio-cultural consumption patterns and lifestyles. Accordingly, migration now encompassed steadily growing numbers of well-educated, middle-upper class people in the liberal professions. The last stage of the mobility transition largely anticipates future migration trends and witnesses the continuation of a certain level of international migration from developing countries to developed ones, coupled with the tightening of political and governmental control on the entry of new settlers. Today’s migration is arguably a mass phenomenon. The number of migrants even seems to exceed that of earlier periods, including the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. In the last two decades of the previous millennium, more than 140,000,000 people left their countries of residence as labor migrants or refugees (Pries, 1999). Roughly 100,000,000 of them were voluntary migrants. One of the differentiating characteristics of this migration relative to its precursors is its origin. No longer do Europeans migrate from their native countries to a limited number of former colonies. Rather, migration has become a global phenomenon in which the number of sending and receiving countries has grown perceptibly, with the developing countries as the greatest sources of supply (Massey, 1999). Many factors explain this mass migration; they include the widening of economic disparities between countries; the spreading and improvement of mass communications; fast and inexpensive intercontinental transport; advanced technology that allows people to stay in touch even when geographically far apart; the quest for a higher standard of living; violent ethnic conflicts; and environmental

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and ecological problems. These factors are accompanied by processes of demographic change in the employment structure and aging of the population in developed areas which generate a demand for working hands in blue-collar trades and services that need to be drawn from outside sources (Pries, 1999). From a neoclassical perspective, (voluntary) migration is an outgrowth of inter-regional differences in labor supply and demand, and of wage disparities. People leave countries that have large supplies of labor and scanty capital, turning to wealthy countries that pay high wages and suffer labor shortages (Massey et al., 1993). Through migration, people aspire to improve—or stabilize—their educational achievements, income level, professional career-fulfillment opportunities, and lifestyles. Scholars who study migration at the micro level focus on the individual and the decision-making system at the personal level. They consider migration the fulfillment of the individual’s expectation of an appropriate reward for his/her occupational qualifications and labor (Castles and Miller, 1998). From this standpoint, international migration is perceived as a form of investment in human capital (Sjaastad, 1962). People choose to migrate to places where they will be more productive. Before they benefit from the economic improvement, however, they have to make the investment involved in migration, including expenses related to leaving their place of origin and settling in the new destination. They must also invest efforts in learning the new language and culture and coping with the vicissitudes of adjusting to the new labor market. Finally, they have to pay the psychological price of severing old relations and weaving new social networks (Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). Hence, considerations and influences of other people, especially spouses and children, play a role in the decision to migrate. Sometimes ethno-religious needs, or any other consideration related to group belonging that has singular cultural patterns, are also taken into account. This turns migration into a complex and multidimensional matrix that includes personal, family, and community factors at the individual level and, at the macro level, structural socioeconomic characteristics of origin and destination (Massey, 1990). Aside from the aspects of origin, flow of migration, and opportunities (foremost economic), another important component of migration is the migrants’ socio-cultural integration in the new country (Hirschman et al., 1999). Migration disconnects the individual from the familiar and known and moves him/her to a new physical and social environment.


5

The erasure of familiarities from the ‘old country’ is not absolute, of course; it depends on the migrant’s age, the circumstances of his/ her migration, his/her personality, etc. ( Jackson, 1969). The changes that the migrant experiences in his/her contacts with the new society may take place in a variety of fields: attitudes, behavior patterns, values, sense of group belonging, language, social roles, beliefs, and self-identity, to name only a few (Lehrer, 1993). The extent to which the migrant is willing to distance him/herself from the patterns of the origin country and adopt new customs and traditions, along with dominant social ideologies relating to inter-group relations, determines his/her socio-cultural absorption whether in the direction of segregation or of assimilation. Newly arrived migrants have economic acculturation difficulties in the destination country for reasons such as lack of familiarity with the labor market and command of the local vernacular. At times, too, their occupational skills are poorly matched with the economic structure of the destination society and cannot always be fully utilized. Therefore, some migrants are willing at first to accept less desirable and less lucrative jobs. Over time, however, they are expected to climb the socioeconomic ladder. They become more knowledgeable in the migration country’s language, local cultural customs, labor market, and possibilities of advancement. As time passes, they may attain a standard of living that resembles or even surpasses that of the local population (Borjas and Tienda, 1993; Chiswick, 1978; 1979; Raijman and Semyonov, 1997). To cope with the economic, social, and cultural absorption difficulties, migrants often avail themselves of social networks—arrays of relationships based on kinship, friendship, and national or ethnic origin (Harbison, 1981; Lauby and Stark, 1988; Massey, 1990) that smooth the adjustment and acculturation process. These networks serve as a place of ethnic solidarity and trust and as a source of human capital enabling their members access to economic opportunities that would be offlimits to them otherwise (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). In contrast, members of the group who lack well developed social networks in the preferred destination country carefully consider the viability of going through with their migration plans. Under such circumstances, migration is more likely among members of the groups at the two extremes of the socioeconomic scale, i.e., the lower class and the upper class, whereas those in the middle class refrain from switching countries of

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residence. Those in the lower class take a risk when they move to a new society without the support of social networks, but their potential loss is small because their human capital and resources in the origin country are scanty in the first place. For those in the upper class, while the gain to be made by emigrating may be offset by the loss, their ab initio strength in the origin country and their personal attributes, including possibilities of reverse immigration (returning to their origin country), help them in the new country as well. Those in the middle class, in contrast, have enough resources to get by comfortably in their countries of residence; accordingly, they will seriously consider the possibility of emigrating—when the purpose is to improve their standard of living—only if it does not carry a high risk of losing these resources due to, among other things, an expected lack of support in the new location (Findley, 1987). The structural effect of networks is reflected in the cost/benefit reckoning that the prospective emigrant performs when choosing the timing of his/her emigration. The existence of relations between one who plans to emigrate and one who has already emigrated and has settled in the destination country makes it more likely that the former will go through with his/her plan (Massey, 1990). The large numbers of persons who have migrated in recent years to several principal destination countries, including the United States, come from diverse origin groups. The solid social and cultural infrastructures that they have established already, albeit only in several main large cities, serve as an important initial absorption network for additional migrants who occupy different positions on the socioeconomic scale in their countries of origin. Migration may, of course, also have far-reaching effects on structural characteristics of origin and destination countries alike. Large numbers of migrants may boost demand for labor in industries and services that are designed to help absorb the migrants; accordingly, they may lower the country’s unemployment rate. The migrants, in turn, may move into occupations that suffer from labor shortages. However, migrants may also compete with non-migrants in the labor market and ferment inter-group tensions. Furthermore, newly arrived migrants may influence cultural patterns in the host country such as cultural activities, clothing styles, foods, linguistic diversity, etc. If emigrants have electoral power, they will aspire to establish political camps to represent their needs or they will adopt monolithic voting patterns that strengthen one sociopolitical camp or another.


7

3. Transnationalism Recently, international migration is also called transnational migration. This approach emphasizes the differences between migration in earlier times and that of today. The concept of transnationalism first seeped into research on international relations in reference to the growth of international organizations, especially NGOs. Later on, it made its way into sociological research on immigration and immigrant adaptation. Transnational migration is defined as the process by which migrants shape and preserve relations that connect their society of origin with that of their new place of residence (Basch et al., 1994). The social space that transnational migrants inhabit is fluid and changes continually through a set of connections and commitments to more than one place (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Smith, 2005). The spaces that accommodate the connections are even more ramified and include the relations of migrants with members of their national group who live in other diasporas and also local native peers of their ethno-religious belonging group (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007). Hence, the nature of transnational migration affects not only the migrants themselves but also non-migrants through the flow that takes place among the different spaces of people, money, and social patterns of norms, values, ideas, and identities. Accordingly, the approaches toward the social absorption of immigrants have also changed. Early classical approaches claimed that the longer the duration of migrants in the new destination, the more they socially and economically resemble natives even if their ethnic origin continues to have a residual influence on their structural mobility, and that both migrants and natives change with inter-group encounter (Alba and Nee, 2003; Gordon, 1964). A subsequent approach, known as ‘segmented assimilation’, emphasized the integration of immigrants into the socioeconomic underclass and their convergence into cultural-behavior patterns of backward subgroups (Portes and Zhou, 1993). Since the 1990s, transnationalism theory has introduced the view that migration is a multidimensional process that includes political, economic, cultural, and religious aspects among others, and that, as it continues, combines independent considerations in the transition from one country to another. On the one hand, this approach of transnationalism focuses on migrants’ ability to blend social and identity resources from their different societies at origin and destination

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in order to amplify their independence from the commitments and constraints that bind them to their homeland (military service, religious links, etc.). On the other hand, the importance of the economic, political, and family structures within which transnational migrants manage their communities and their lives are not overlooked. This approach also redefines the interrelations of geographic and social spaces; according to this view, immigrants’ social space may span several geographic regions and may not necessarily narrow itself and assimilate into one location, as was once the case. In this new social structure, migrants act in transnational spaces that affect not only the patterns of absorption and integration in the host society but also relations with the origin country and, in turn, the macro indicators of the countries involved in the migration process. In this manner, the concept of transnationalism offers a new point of view on the study of contemporary migration (Gold, 2002; Portes, 2001; Pries, 1999; Tilly, 1990; Vertovec and Cohen, 1999). Technological developments are facilitating transnational migration in more meaningful ways than before. Today, it is possible to maintain relations and be active in two countries at a high frequency and at low cost. Furthermore, today’s migrants inhabit social structures and surroundings that are more tolerant toward ethnic difference and do not inhibit ongoing transnational relations. Since the host countries need the migrants’ labor and skills, they willingly allow these transnational connections to be preserved. Furthermore, migrants are differentiated in the nature and intensity of their transnational endeavors: some integrate their relations with the home country into many permanent fields of their lives while others limit them to occasional events and keep them small in scale (Basch et al., 1994; Kivisto, 2005; Levitt, DeWind, and Vertovec, 2003). The intensity and stability of the spatial expansion or, alternatively, its temporariness, may vary among different groups of migrants and also over time and across space. Thus, they create different levels of transnationalism that include shaky and short-term relations between the origin and destination countries, strong but short-lived transnational exchanges and reciprocities, weak but long-lasting international social relations, and transnational communities that have strong roots in at least two countries (Faist, 2000). The forms and intensivities of transnational activities may also vary among different facets be they political, economic, social, or religious activities (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Vertovec, 2004) or between official or unofficial activities (Kim, 2006; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Mahler and Pessar, 2006).


9

Transnational migrants, a.k.a. ‘new immigrants’, are motivated mainly by the wish to raise their standard of living, i.e., to find better work and have higher earnings than they had in their country of origin—in other words, a quest for a broader structure of opportunities (Gold, 1992). However, migrants are not representative of the population at origin (Borjas, 1988). Two main factors play a role in the process of migrant selection: objective socioeconomic indicators such as schooling and vocational training, and personal traits that are hard to overtly discern, such as capability or productivity. This selective pool of migrants goes through an additional selection process on the basis of the destination countries to which it is worth their while to migrate. According to this approach, there is a ‘migrant market’ of sorts, in which various countries compete for potential migrants. This competition takes place because different countries offer immigrants different arrays of economic benefits and have different absorption policies toward target groups such as professionals, family who are seeking reunification, etc. Immigrants compare the cost and gain of immigrating to particular destination countries in light of the economic or legal constraints of these countries (Borjas, 1988). Thus, the characteristics of transnationalism and relations with the country of origin depend heavily on how the host country receives the immigrants. While most countries accept immigrants who have occupational skills and who speak the local vernacular well, they are much less hospitable to unschooled immigrants who have weak language skills. Immigrants of the latter type are more prone to transnational lifestyles because they cannot assure themselves a stable economic and social setting in the new country (Guarnizo, 2003; Levitt, 2007). Conditions of transnationalism also shape immigrants’ political loyalties to and involvement in their origin and destination countries. Relations between citizen and state are multidimensional. Origin and destination countries redefine the rights and limitations of their dual-citizenship residents amid negotiations and mutual compromises between the immigrants’ political demands and the importance that every country attributes to its citizenry at large (Koopmans and Statham, 2003). These political relations include participation in elections as voters or candidates, membership in political parties and organizations in both countries, and political lobbying in one country on behalf of the other (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007; Smith, 2001). Transnational politics also include cross-border organizational initiatives for action on behalf of the general interests of immigrants of the same national origin or to help such immigrants in certain countries.

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The transnational approach views migration as a dynamic process that accommodates factors at both the macro-social and the microsocial levels. Migration is coupled with political, ethnic, community, and family networks and relationships. At the time of migration and afterwards as well, migrants maintain social and economic relations with more than one country. The analysis of contemporary migration, of the transnational type, should be pursued from a holistic point of view (Guarzino, 2003; Gold 1997a). Such an approach facilitates research that is aware of the dynamic between the structural motives and the personal motives of migration, in which migration is not permanent and further migration—return migration or moving on to a third country—is always possible (Basch et al., 1994; Dinnerstein et al., 1990; Guarzino, 2003). 4. Contemporary Diasporism International migration, especially in its transnational context, is generating ethno-national diasporas that are becoming growing components in many Western countries, including the United States (but also in other countries that receive labor migration, such as the Persian Gulf states) (Sheffer, 1986). This is not a trait of recent migration only; individuals and families that belong to ethno-national entities and have lived outside their homeland for several generations are deviating from the path of immersion and assimilation and are identifying perceptibly with their origin group, establishing and joining ethnic organizations, and taking public action in the name of and on behalf of their homeland and on behalf of members of their ethno-national group in other diasporas (Sheffer, forthcoming). Concurrently, host countries experience internal ideological and social changes exhibiting greater openness toward the culture of ethnic and religious minorities. On the other side of the divide, societies and governments in homelands or origin countries undergo highly significant changes in the direction of greater tolerance of, and at times even sympathy for, their diasporas—an attitude that affects behavior patterns and relations among them (Sheffer, 2001). As stated, the world’s diasporas are growing steadily in number and size as is, accordingly, their geographic dispersion across continents and countries. After the initial absorption stages—integration into the education and economic systems of the social mainstream and study


11

of the local language, or the resurrection of veteran generations’ ethnic identity—the émigrés attain a critical mass that allows them to establish and bolster formal and informal networks on the basis of common origin (Amersfoort, 2004). Diaspora émigrés organize to set up organizational infrastructures that are designed to help maintain group cohesion, to offer mutual social and economic aid, and to assure their interests in the society at large (Galchinsky, 1998; Sheffer, 1986). As they go about this, they preserve values, social norms, and narratives of the homeland. A large number of such organizations may be set up, reflecting different religious and political orientations. The drawing of cultural borders amid structural absorption gives the émigrés a feeling of ‘at home abroad.’ A central component in the singular identity of members of a diaspora is the maintenance of ties with the origin country. These ties are reflected at several different and complementary levels including the familial, the economic, the social, the organizational, and the political. As the diasporic émigrés strive to maintain relations with the ‘old country’, they become more extensive and more intensive in their activities. They disseminate knowledge about, and the culture of, their country of origin and act on behalf of its political and economic interests. They also act at the personal and family level of sending money to relatives (Shain, 1999; Sheffer, 1986). These particular émigrés are well educated individuals who often serve as mediators and creators of connections among technological enterprises and projects in both countries and, aided by their proficiency in the language of the origin country, they establish personal connections that enhance investment in the country that they left behind (Heruti-Sober, 2008). Ethnic diasporas also maintain very strong emotional ties with the homeland. Such ties are based on the psycho-symbolic elements of the émigrés’ ethno-national identity. Diasporic members share and know their mother country’s historical legacy, preserve its myths, often understand and even speak their ethno-national language, and demonstrate a high level of identification and solidarity (Sheffer and RothToledano, 2006). These connections strengthen at times of tension or during a security crisis overseas ( Jacobson, 2002; Shain, 2007). Another fundamental aspect in the cross-country relations of diasporic émigrés, apart from those with the homeland, is the connection with other communities in the diaspora of the same group. This connection focuses mainly on assistance at times of distress and crisis. Presumably such aid is offered indirectly, via the shared homeland, but

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it may also develop independently through the mediation of a political lobby and via philanthropy. Accordingly, one may identify three or even four different and complementary axes of diaspora relations. Each stands on its own but exhibits interplay and interaction with the others: relations between the diaspora and origin country, between the diaspora and the host country, among different communities in a given diaspora, and possibly between one diaspora and other ethnic diasporas in the same country (Sheffer, 2003). Additional characteristics of Diasporism include the émigrés’ religious identity and behavior patterns in both the private and public spheres. Religion supports, and to a large extent is reshaped by, the migration experience, including the transition from a country where the migrants were members of an ethno-religious majority to a new country where they become a minority; by the settlement process; and by establishing ethnic and transnational relations (Hagan and Ebaugh, 2003). By belonging to ethno-religiously based entities, émigrés connect with ethno-religious peers in their origin country, in the new country, and elsewhere in the world (Bowen, 2004). Religion also connects people by allowing them to feel like links in a chain of memory that binds the past, the present, and the future; by so doing, it sustains the feeling of shared belongingness and heritage (Hervieu-Leger, 2000). Religious networks, ritual observance, and religious festivals and organizations also help émigrés to amass social capital, especially if this is assisted by longer-tenured members of the group (Martes et al., 2002). Amid these endeavors, the ethno-religious identification and organizational action are reshaped and blend original affinities of the origin country with accepted patterns of the new country and are appropriate for the immigrants. Transnational migrants may also export conservative or progressive religious narratives and practices, which have social and political ramifications, to their countries of origin (Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007). As time elapses, and the longer they remain in their new locality, the less migrants think of themselves as being in exile. Even if they overtly or covertly regard their settlement as permanent, they relate to the homeland as their true and ideal home and the place to which they, or their offspring, will ultimately return (Safran, 1991). Even as host countries grant diasporas on their soil the legitimacy to express ethnoreligious exceptionalism, including ancestral affiliation and patriarchal origin, so are homelands treating their diasporas with greater recognition. Homelands acknowledge today, at least rhetorically, the social


13

and political importance of diasporic émigrés and their economic contribution to the home country. However, the homeland’s political and establishmentarian leadership, as well as its inhabitants, view the homeland as the nation’s political and cultural hub, assign themselves a superior status, and treat the diaspora’s needs as of secondary if not marginal priority. The tension between the two coexisting connections, to the homeland and to the host land, eventually evolves into a dual loyalty that may be reflected in the swapping of preference for the policies of the local administration or those of the homeland (Sheffer, 2001). The equilibrium of this bi-national loyalty is influenced by the generational status of diaspora members. It could be expected that loyalty to and ties with the homeland will be strongest among emigrants and would weaken steadily among their foreign-born offspring, whose loyalties tilt toward the host country. In any event, the latter do not think of the mother country as their ‘true’ homeland. They were not born there and may not have even visited there; for them, it is more a historical, symbolic, or spiritual homeland (Ezrachi, 2001). The modern diaspora is not disengaged from the world-spanning processes of globalization. Globalization underscores the growing similarity among different regions of the West and the formation of common models of organization, resources, and cultures. It facilitates the flow of financial resources, technological knowledge, opinions, and more. It uses high-tech transport and communications to make societies and countries increasingly homogeneous. These global developments make it easier for diasporas to maintain relations with origin countries and other segments of the same diaspora in different countries. However, the more the members of a diaspora adopt specific norms and values of the host society, the greater their cultural heterogeneity becomes even if they also maintain origin patterns (Ben-Rafael et al., 2006). 5. Israelis in the United States: The State of Research 5.1

Definitions, Measurements, and Number of American Israelis

The phenomenon of emigration from Israel is part of contemporary migration, i.e., it is transnational. However, it has a uniqueness that transcends the demographic and economic aspects that are involved in changing countries of residence. Emigration from Israel clashes with Zionist ideology and is perceived as a failure of the Jewish ingathering

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in Israel (Eisenbach, 1989). Jewish immigrants to Israel are called ‘olim’, a concept borrowed from the world of religious content, as in olim laregel (pilgrims), and from the concept of ascent. Conversely, emigrants from Israel are called yordim, denoting those who descend from the Holy Land to the exilic and secular world. These words carry a heavy emotional charge that censures those who leave Israel (Avruch, 1981; Friedberg and Kfir, 1988; Ritterband, 1986). Likewise, by diminishing the Jewish population of Israel—by themselves and via the expected future loss due to their children who will be born abroad—emigrants worsen Israel’s demographic balance ( Jews versus non-Jews) and evoke fears of damage to its social and economic strength in the ongoing conflict with its Arab neighbors (Cohen and Haberfeld, 1997). Nevertheless, Israel’s expatriate rates are unexceptional by Western standards (Cohen, 2007). Despite the keen scholarly interest and the lively public discourse over emigration from Israel, the number of Israelis abroad has not been estimated or even approximated. The available sources of information provide no legal or subjective/declarative indication whatsoever about the nature of leaving Israel. Often such a transition is a lengthy and continual process that begins with a tourist visit to or a trial residence in the foreign destination, continues with vacillations that may include an interim stay in Israel, and ultimately culminates with the sinking of permanent roots in the new country’s soil. Estimating the number of Israeli emigrants is even more complex because many of them continue to define themselves as Israelis, maintain close relations with relatives and friends in Israel, including frequent visits, and even do army reserve duty. Even after spending many years abroad, some consider their stay ‘temporary’ and proclaim their intention of returning to Israel at some future time. Since some of the departees had immigrated to Israel just a short time earlier, they do not consider themselves former Israelis and are not necessarily perceived as such by those around them. Apart from, and perhaps due to, the lack of an official definition of an Israeli emigrant, any attempt to estimate the numbers of such people must overcome difficult obstacles. The main source for the estimation of the size of this group is the system, which is administered by the Israel Border Police, that controls and records movements of residents across the country’s borders. The bases for the estimation are two forms, one for outgoing residents and one for incoming residents. By means of these forms, one can determine the number of


15

Israeli residents who left the country on a given day and did not return within a specified period of time (one year, for example). According to this method, which is based on ‘vital data’, a resident’s stay abroad starts over on the day of his/her last exit. Such an approach may fail to count as emigrants those Israelis who have permanently left the country but visit frequently and, for this reason, are counted anew as being abroad after every visit. Another method is to count cumulative movements, i.e., the number of Israelis who have left Israel since the country was founded less the number of Israelis who have returned. This group would include as emigrants people who died abroad and others who left for brief periods—as tourists, for study, on business, or as part of a diplomatic mission—and have not yet returned. Both methods generate, by and large, an estimate of the total number of emigrants without differentiating between Jews and non-Jews and irrespective of destination country. According to various estimates, more than 90 percent of Israelis who emigrate are Jewish, and slightly more than half of them have settled in the United States (Cohen, 2007; Lev Ari, 2002, 2005; Sicron, 2004, Cohen and Tyree, 1994). Another possible source for estimating the number of Israeli emigrants is at destination countries. In the American context, the decennial population censuses yield information on countries of birth and other social and cultural indicators that one may use to indirectly estimate the number of Israelis. The United States Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization also has information about in-migrants but does not document out-migration, which may be return immigration to the origin country. Likewise, this bureau’s information pertains solely to legal migrants. Cohen (2007) used the 2000 United States census to estimate the number of Jewish Israelis in the United States, Israeli-born or otherwise, at 175,000. Cohen’s estimates correspond to earlier findings about Israelis in the United States (Gold, 2002). This population constitutes the core American Israeli population. In a slightly wider circle, that of the ‘extended’ Israeli population, one may include the emigrants’ American-born children, whose numbers are estimated as several tens of thousands. Furthermore, some Israelis married American-born persons in the United States—mostly American Jews but also nonJews. Adding these non-Israeli spouses to the tally, we may arrive at an ‘enlarged’ Israeli population of more than a quarter of a million persons.

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The rate of emigration from Israel is moderate and is similar to, if not lower than that of other Western countries, especially countries that have experience at receiving large numbers of international migrants (Sicron, 2004). Some emigration from Israel is return migration of ‘olim’ back to their origin country, or repeat migration of ‘olim’ to a third country; the rest of the emigrants are Israel-born. Despite fluctuations, Israel’s out-migration rates have been falling over time relative to the much faster growth rate of its population (DellaPergola, 2004). 5.2

Emigration Motives, Emigrants’ Characteristics, and Return to Israel

Although migration of Israelis to the United States was observed shortly after the country was born, until the mid-1970s it was composed largely of olim who had not ‘made it’ in Israeli society (Eisenbach, 1989). Since then, and especially since the Yom Kippur War, a growing number of out-migrants have been Israeli-born. Economic hardships, cumbersome bureaucracy, security threats, the heavy civic burden of army reserve duty, and limited opportunities in a small country all serve as push factors that whet Israelis’ predisposition to emigrate (Sobel, 1986). Notably, wars and hostilities, at least those up to the 1990s, did not lead to an increase in emigration and actually dampened the wish to leave (Levy, 1992; Levy and Guttman, 1974). Economic and cultural stimuli abroad are equally important if not more so (Cohen, 1969; Herman and LaFontaine, 1982). Social and economic push and pull factors do not suffice by themselves to induce emigration; for the most part, they combine with weak Jewish and Israeli identity (Damian, 1987; Cohen, 1969, Friedberg, 1988). Be this as it may, most emigrants did not experience any grave socioeconomic deterioration of the sort that would make it impossible for them to live in Israel; instead, the American dream seemed more promising to them. This was further enhanced by the Americanization of Israeli society (Rebhun and Waxman, 2000) and the erosion of the status of Jewish identity as a component of the Israeli identity. A significant pro-emigration factor was the formation of a critical mass of early Israeli expatriates who attracted new Israeli emigrants (‘chain migration’) easing the latters’ absorption in the new country (Herman and LaFontaine, 1982; Sobel, 1986). Additional reasons for emigration at that time were higher studies, in-service training, family reunification,


17

and disillusionment with Israel (Elizur, 1984; Cohen, 1969; Lamdani, 1983; Gold, 1992, Sobel, 1986, Shokeid, 1988). Another large wave of emigration began in the mid-1980s due to a combination of the effects of the First Lebanon War and the upturn in Israelis’ exposure, as tourists, to other cultures and new opportunities in Western countries. Accordingly, this emigration featured a combination of political and security-related push factors with economic and cultural pull factors in the destination countries, the latter playing an increasingly powerful role over the years. Thus, a growing similarity has been evolving between emigration from Israel and the transnational migrations of other groups. Emigration from Israel is voluntary, the emigrants seek personal and self-fulfillment in their destination countries, and they are largely a ‘product’ of world trends of economic integration coupled with the decline of Zionist ideology. Likewise, Israeli society’s attitude toward emigration has changed perceptibly in the past two decades: from absolute and sharply expressed rejection of the departees, to the extent of banishment from the Israeli consensus, to a more topical attitude devoid of ideological baggage and condescension. This should be seen as part of the rising tide of political and socioeconomic liberalism, which also encourages pluralism and an openness to the phenomenon of emigration (Sheffer, 1998). Accordingly, organized American Jewry has also been internalizing a greater degree of comfort with, and openness toward, the Israeli component of the local Jewish society. However, the Israeli emigrant population in the United States is different from other migrant populations in the United States in several general respects. While the differences are highly conspicuous relative to migrants from Latin America or developing countries in Asia and Africa, they are also visible in comparison to migrants from Western Europe. Apart from the young age profile that typifies migrants at large, the Israelis are rather well educated, occupationally proficient, largely self-employed, and are characterized by a high average income (Bozorgmehr et al., 1996; Cohen, 1988; Cohen and Tyree, 1994; Gold 1997a). However, the later the emigration, the smaller is the Israeli emigrants’ socioeconomic advantage over their Western peers (Cohen, 1988). The Israeli emigrants also are better schooled than average Israeli Jews (Cohen, 2007). Most studies about Israelis who emigrated to the United States indicate that, collectively, they are higher on the socioeconomic status scale than Israelis at large and Americans at

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large (Cohen and Haberfeld, 1997; Eisenbach, 1989). The socioeconomic differences between the emigrants and those who remained in Israel may be explained, albeit partly, by the strong representation of those of European origin (Ashkenazim) among the former, since Ashkenazim on average rank higher on the Israeli stratification ladder (Lev Ari, 2002; Rosen, 1993). Yet, the Israeli emigrants are not cut of one cloth. One may find them at different extremes of the socioeconomic continuum. Some are well schooled and hold prestigious and well paying occupations while others stand on low rungs of the social ladder, including some below the poverty line. This ‘economic dualism’ (Cohen, 1989) may originate in a bipolar self-screening process that potential emigrants go through before they leave Israel or, alternatively, a polarization process among a homogeneous group of Israeli migrants at destination (Cohen, 1988, 1989; Cohen and Tyree, 1994). Ideological motives, Jewish identity, socioeconomic factors, and family considerations merge as ‘hold-repeal’ or ‘push-pull’ factors in the decision to stay in the new country or return to the homeland. Unlike emigration, which is prompted mainly by instrumental factors along with family factors, considerations relating to return migration are abetted mainly by non-instrumental factors such as family and, to some extent, friends. The considerations that favor return migration originate more in factors of attraction to Israel than in push factors from countries abroad (Lev Ari, 2006). It is the combination of these factors and national and international factors that determines the proclivity of Israelis, like other Jewish migrants, to return to Israel. According to Cohen (2007), more than two-thirds of those who left Israel between 1975 and 1980 returned to Israel before 1990 after having spent two and a half years in the United States on average. Most return migrants ‘go back’ more quickly than that—typically, after no more than five years. Overall, the longer the duration abroad, the less likely is the return to Israel, and vice versa (Lev Ari, 2006). 5.3

Absorption and Integration in the United States

Studies about Israelis’ success in the United States focus on different and complementary aspects of economic, social, and cultural absorption. The findings have not always been uniform; they propose diverse patterns of absorption and integration into the local society. There are also differences among the Israelis in the strength and nature of their


19

connections with the homeland and in their transnational relations, foremost by socioeconomic indicators and ethnic origin. Unlike the large waves of Jewish migration to the United States in the late nineteenth century and the ethnic migrations to the United States in the 1960s, Israelis have not concentrated in specific economic industries (Shokeid, 1991). There is no clearly demarcated industry in which they specialize or amass with particular salience. Israelis are not typically noted for organized ethnic activity and do not take part in economic activities on the basis of intermittent relations. Gold (1992; 1994; 1999), in contrast, maintains that Israelis in the United States have created a range of particularistic activities, including economic initiatives, collaborative ventures, and buying goods and services from other Israelis. In the United States, there are identifiable Israeli economic niches in fields such as real estate, construction, jewelry and diamonds, security, engineering, and communications. In this sense, Israelis have stepped into the occupations and social roles of early ethnic immigrants who abandoned them after having ‘made it’ (‘ethnic succession’). These occupations reflect, in part, the integration of Israelis into typical Jewish socioeconomic structures, helping to effect certain changes in these settings in the areas where they have settled (Gold, 1992). Due to this occupational structure which was typical mainly of the early Israeli emigrants, this group of migrants was perceived as being unorganized, impermanent, and socially marginal notwithstanding their important human resources such as strong educational credentials, reasonable proficiency in English, and property (Kass and Lipset, 1982; Lipner, 1987; Mittelberg and Waters, 1992; Sobel, 1986). Among the later Israeli emigrants, especially those of the past decade, professionals in high-tech and scientific research are making their appearance in growing numbers, finding their positions as employees of large computer-related corporations and in the American academia. The various dimensions of immigrant absorption—economic, social, and cultural—are interrelated. Successful social and economic absorption enhances the emigrants’ satisfaction with their decision to relocate to the United States (Lev Ari, 2008). The more occupational prestige and schooling an emigrant has, the deeper his/her cultural absorption, including a better command of English and greater exposure to American culture (Rosenthal and Auerbach, 1992). Israelis in professional occupations connect with and take part in community and ethnic settings (Gold, 1997b; 1999). Successful socioeconomic absorption

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prolongs the stay and increases the likelihood that the emigration will be permanent; accordingly, it whets the emigrants’ eagerness to develop social and institutional relations with their ethno-religious affiliation group. The Israelis may then choose an ethnic identity that will give them a sense of community belonging. Ethnic or religious identity is an important element in their Americanization. In contrast, Israelis who do not succeed in their socioeconomic absorption but choose to stay on anyway maintain a strong Israeli identity and gravitate very strongly to familiar niches of others from the same origin. Socioeconomic failure is also accompanied by a growing sense of marginality and estrangement toward the local society. For example, Israeli women of Mizrahi (‘Sephardi’/Oriental) origin experience slower social and economic mobility than their Ashkenazi counterparts and, in turn, tend to more emphatically maintain an Israeli identity, to be more estranged from American society at large, and to want to return to Israel (Lev Ari, 2002; Lev Ari, 2008). Among Israeli emigrants at large, however, the longer they stay in the United States, the more strongly they feel that America is home. (See also: Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Liu, 1992; and Markowitz 1993.) Culturally, the Israelis’ national identity is based mainly on a subjective sense of Israeliness and Jewishness and has characteristics of secular Judaism. Most American Israelis neither belong to synagogues or other local Jewish organizations nor do they conscientiously observe religious rituals (Mittelberg and Waters, 1992). However, the longer they stay in the United States, the more diligently do they observe major Jewish festivals and ethnic and religious precepts that are meant to preserve their Israeli identity. The definition of the Israeli emigrants’ identity is essentially ambivalent. On the one hand, they are eager to adopt a bi-national identity—Israeli and American—and thereby benefit, depending on circumstances and changing personal needs, from both the opportunities and openness of American society and the warmth and intimacy of the Israeli community (Gold, 1992). On the other hand, by defining themselves as American Israelis, they confirm to themselves and those around them that their settlement in the United States is final (Shokeid, 1991; Mittelberg and Waters, 1992; Gold, 1992, Rosen, 1993; and Uriely, 1993). American Israelis have created for themselves, in a significant way, an Israeli subculture that includes informal encounters, shared events such as dancing and sing-alongs in Hebrew, leisure time in cafés and restaurants that


21

feature Israeli cuisine, attendance at performances of Israeli artists, etc. (Shokeid, 1991). Along with eagerness to make the most of the economic and cultural opportunities and personal freedom that the United States offers, many American Israelis wish to maintain various kinds of relations with Israel (Gold, 1997a). They do so by preferring Hebrew as the spoken language in the home, resorting to Hebrew print and electronic media (newspapers, television, web sites, radio), staying in regular contact with relatives and friends in Israel, participating in philanthropy and activities for Israel, visiting Israel frequently, and giving their Americanborn children Israeli names (Gold, 1994, 2000, 2002). Some develop economic relations with Israel. However, these transnational relations are uneven in terms of access and complexion; they vary to an extent that largely corresponds to stratification status. Well schooled Israelis of European extraction demonstrate more intensive and powerful transnational involvement and circulate from place to place with greater physical and virtual ease than those with less schooling who are of Mizrahi extraction (Macionis, 1997; Gold, 2002). Accordingly, the differences in affiliation with transnational social and economic networks place American Israelis in varying states of integration and absorption. However, transnational relations and the equilibrium motion of bipolar connections—with Israel and with the United States—are expected to change in favor of the American connection as the emigrants gain longevity in the United States; this is certainly so among their children, few of whom consider themselves Israeli (Lev Ari, 2002, 2008; Kimhi, 1990; Rosenthal and Auerbach, 1992). Important events in Israel, and the emigrants’ inexperience with them, induce a sense of distance and emphasize the disparities between the two communities, leading to a feeling of not belonging to Israeli society (Gold, 2002). 6. Data and Methodology The main empirical foundation of this study is a set of three American censuses from 1980, 1990, and 2000. To identify Jewish Israelis from these sources, one has to surmount two main obstacles. First, the separation of religion and state in the American Constitution precludes any investigation of religious identity and behavior patterns in the census. For this reason, it is impossible to distinguish Jews from non-Jews

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among the Israel-born or those who declare Israeli ancestry. Second, since Israel itself is an immigration country, some American Israelis were born in a third country, immigrated to Israel, and moved on to the United States later. In the census, members of this group declare a country of birth other than Israel. To overcome these obstacles in defining the target population of our study, we adopted the typology proposed by Cohen and Haberfeld (1997), which bases itself on the simultaneous use of three questions that are introduced in the American censuses: country of birth, ancestry, and language spoken at home (Figure 1). First, we distinguish between the Israel-born and those born in another country. Among the former, we define as Jews those whose language at home is Hebrew or Yiddish and whose ancestry is not Arab, Palestinian, or Armenian. We also define as Jews those whose language spoken at home is not Hebrew or Yiddish but also not Arabic or Armenian and whose ancestry is other than Arabic, Palestinian, or Armenian. A very small number of respondents cited Palestine, not Israel, as their country of birth. They are defined as Jews if they spoke Hebrew, Yiddish, or any language other than Arabic or Armenian at home and concurrently reported their ancestry as Israeli or other. For those not born in Israel, we assume that those who speak Hebrew at home came to the United States from Israel or at least spent some time there; accordingly, they are defined as Jewish Israelis. We also include as Jewish Israelis those who were not born in Israel and who speak a language other than Hebrew at home but reported Israeli ancestry. As Cohen and Haberfeld note, this group may include some who speak Arabic at home; most of them are Jews who were born in Muslim countries in Asia and northern Africa and immigrated to Israel and, subsequently, to the United States. This is the broadest definition of Jewish Israelis that can be applied to the American population census data. Even this typology, however, omits several subgroups of Israelis, including those born abroad who immigrated to Israel and subsequently to the United States and do not speak Hebrew at home or did not declare Israeli ancestry. It also excludes return migrants, i.e., American Jews who had immigrated to Israel and subsequently returned to their country of origin.1 Overall, the data files from the three American censuses, each of which consti1 Notably, Cohen and Haberfeld do suggest a way of estimating the number of Israelis in these two subgroups. However, it does not allow us to analyze the Jewish Israelis’ demographic indicators and their social and economic mobility.


23

tutes a representative sample of the population, include 2,869 Jewish Israelis aged 18 and over: 712 in the 1980 census, 974 in the 1990 census, and 1,183 in the 2000 census.2 a. Israel-born Israel-born Language spoken at home

Other than Hebrew/ Yiddish/Arabic/Armenian

Hebrew/Yiddish

Ancestry

Other than Arabic/Palestinian/Armenian

b. Foreign-born Foreign-born Language spoken at home

Other than Hebrew/Yiddish

Hebrew

Ancestry

Israeli

Figure 1.1. Typology of Jewish-Israeli Identity in United States Population Censuses 2 We used the 1 percent and 5 percent data files from the 1980 and 1990 censuses and the 1 percent file from the 2000 census.

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Since American population censuses are concerned only with the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the population, we also used data from three Jewish surveys of communities with large Israeli populations—New York (2004), Miami (2002), and Los Angeles (1997)—that allow us to analyze the Israelis’ Jewish identification patterns. In these surveys, Jews were defined as those who reported Judaism as their religion or reported no religion but consider themselves Jewish. Among these, we define as Israelis those who were born in Israel, had lived in Israel five years before the survey, or who indicated Israel as their last country of residence. By applying these criteria, we obtained a sample of 300 Israelis. We compare the Jewish identification patterns of Israelis in the United States with those of the American Jewish population at large in order to evaluate trends of segregation vs. integration into the veteran American Jewish environment. We also analyze data from the National Jewish Population Survey (Kotler-Berkowitz et al., 2003). Admittedly, this survey includes slightly fewer than 100 Israelis by the definitions of the communal surveys mentioned above. Nevertheless, it allows us to explore something that the communal surveys hardly permit due to their paucity of questions and the lack of comparability among them: to examine the nature and intensity of American Israelis’ relations with their homeland, and how these relations change with lengthening time of residence in the United States. 7. Structure of the Book This book is organized around five main chapters. The analysis of the American Israelis’ characteristics is accompanied by empirical evidence in tables and graphs. Each chapter includes a concise summary and discussion of main findings. After the foregoing review of the theoretical literature on international and transnational migration, the characteristics of the modern diaspora, and previous studies on Israelis in the United States, Chapter 2 sketches the characteristics of Israelis’ emigration to and settlement in the United States. Among other things, it analyzes the Israelis’ origin (born in Israel or elsewhere) and their ethnic identity, the chronology of their emigration, their age upon emigration, their gender composition, patterns of family and children, and residential


25

preferences in the United States. The use of three successive censuses allows us to compare different waves of emigration that cover the main period of the increase in emigration from Israel. Chapter 3 analyzes the Israelis’ patterns of social, economic, and cultural integration, including those relating to schooling, employment, housing, language, and naturalization. We trace changes in these characteristics as the Israeli emigrants prolong their stay in the United States. This allows us to provide insight into the nature and intensity of success in the new country. We also compare the social and economic attributes of early waves of emigrants with those of later waves in order to assess changes in the selectivity of those who leave Israel. We also explore, by applying advanced scientific methods, the determinants of Israelis’ mobility and integration into the host society. Chapter 4 examines the Jewish identification of Israelis in the United States. We choose several main patterns that reflect behaviors in the personal and public spheres. We compare the Israelis’ ethno-religious characteristics with those of the American Jewish population at large in order to estimate processes of integration and segregation between the two subpopulations. We also explore the emigrants’ connections with Israel and how they evolve as their stay in America lengthens. The concluding discussion in chapter five links the general theoretical background with the empirical findings about Israeli emigrants in the United States. This will enable us to estimate the extent to which Israelis in the United States are transnational migrants who are creating an Israeli diaspora that draws cultural boundaries between themselves and the rest of the American population and between themselves and American Jews. By contemplating the matter in this way, we can draw conclusions about the Israelis’ integration into various circles of their new surroundings and about their power as a meaningful social, economic, and political participant in Israel’s complex relationship with the rest of the world. These findings may have important implications for public policy of the Government of Israel and national institutions, the American Jewish community, and for the ways in which American Israelis will organize to preserve their connections, and those of their families, with Israel.

CHAPTER TWO

MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1. Overview Migrants in general and voluntary migrants in particular, are a demographically and socioeconomically unique population group. They are motivated by the aspiration to improve their standard of living, they wish to fulfill professional qualifications, and they respond to various cultural stimuli. The interplay of pull factors in destination countries and hold factors in origin countries affects subgroups of the population differently. It sets in motion people who have weak geographic roots in their countries of residence or who lack strong connections in their places of residence (including family, friends, social involvement, or an ideological orientation) and are not strongly dependent on other family members. It also animates those who can more easily overcome the intervening obstacles that are involved in migration and cope with the challenges of social integration. These migrants are young, unmarried, largely male, and with high human capital reflected in their educational and occupational credentials (Bogue, 1969; Gerson et al., 1977; Lee, 1966; Shryock and Siegel, 1973). People who rank high in the class hierarchy are exposed to social and economic opportunities outside their place of residence, and their spatial awareness oversteps their local economic system, hence they have greater possibilities of mobility between international labor markets (Ritchey, 1976; Wolpert, 1965). Concurrently, the immigration policies of destination countries often prefer people who have strong professional skills and the potential to contribute to technological and economic development, making it easier for them to obtain the documents for permanent settlement (Iredale, 2001). This kind of selection is often called ‘positive,’ i.e., of people who have good credentials and qualities and who respond to positive factors in destination areas of migration. For the most part, they live in places where conditions do not force them to emigrate; nevertheless, they emigrate if better opportunities present themselves and if they consider an alternative place of residence advantageous. However, emigration

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may also be negatively selective, i.e., a response to adverse factors in the place of origin. These factors, such as an economic slump or an increase in unemployment, have a stronger effect on people in low socioeconomic strata (Lee, 1966). As a rule, the decision to emigrate, or alternatively to ‘stay put’, is made after weighing the balance of positive and negative factors in areas of origin and destination, considering the intervening obstacles of various kinds, and taking into account the expected cost-benefit outcome of emigration, especially in terms of monetary reward (Borjas, 1988; Sjaastad, 1962); “as in other voluntary processes involving social and demographic change . . . migration will actually occur only after given thresholds of migration desirability and feasibility will have been attained” (DellaPergola, 1986: 295). Nevertheless, the differences between migrants and non-migrants may not always be neat and consistent; important exceptions to almost every typical difference may be found. For example, it is customary to attribute high rates of migration to professionals. However, this type of migrant presumably will be represented less significantly by practitioners of white collar professions who hold local working certificates, such as doctors and lawyers. Furthermore, high-income earners may prove to be a geographically stable group if they have location-specific capital in businesses or professions that connect them with the location and serve as holding factors. Inversely, jobless persons, who by and large are more willing to migrate than employed persons (noneconomic factors adjusted), do less migrating at times of economic downturn in the country of destination (Bogue, 1959; Goldscheider, 1971). Furthermore, due to the economic restructuring that many Western countries, including the United States, have been undergoing, demand for unskilled or semiskilled workers has been declining in recent years (Massey, 1999). Accordingly, poorly educated people may find it harder and harder to obtain work as time passes. In such a situation, the United States becomes a less alluring destination for socioeconomically disadvantaged migrants. More generally, the matching of industrialization and economic development processes with easier access to information about opportunities and conditions in alternative places of residence, enhances human migration which is in turn less selective. This expansion of the migration phenomenon is affected by the attitude, which is steadily gaining momentum, toward personal freedom as a value more important than group or place loyalty, and further assigns higher priority to personal needs than to those of the collective.

migration and settlement in the united states

29

In the new country, the spatial dispersion of emigrants does not resemble the residential preferences of the local population. Emigrants tend to settle in large metropolitan areas, particularly those where industrial, economic, and scientific activity are concentrated. They are also attracted to areas that already have a high concentration of earlier emigrants from the same country of origin or with whom they share ethno-religious identity. Settlement in an environment where there are people who speak their language and know their customs provides the new emigrants with an important source of material assistance and social support as they take their first steps in the new country. These social networks may also help them to find jobs and housing (Gurak and Kritz, 2000; Kritz and Nogel, 1994). However, emigrant groups with a high proportion of people with professional qualifications will attach less importance to congregating with origin peers (Alba and Nee, 1997). Their spatial distribution will also include new areas of development and rapid industrialization which have a strong demand for advanced knowledge and are characterized by convenient living and housing conditions and a high-level education system. As a rule, the longer emigrants remain in the new country, and the more they acquire new skills, obtain better information about opportunities in alternative locations, and amass human capital, the more they will move spatially, diminishing the level of group concentration (Dunlevy, 1980; Fang and Brown, 1999; Funkhouser, 2000). It is also noteworthy that (voluntary) emigration is a long-standing and multi-phased process of cost-benefit calculations (Lee, 1966). Emigration begins by elucidating and weighing opportunities both in the place of residence and in the alternative country. It is continued by the act of emigration itself and the absorption processes in the new surroundings. It ends by making the decision—after having experienced the new country sufficiently and according to the legal possibilities—to settle permanently in the new place. Somewhat paradoxically, those who succeed in the new location and get the most out of it may choose to return to their country of origin. The economic capital that they amassed and the human capital that they enhanced now give them levels of personal confidence and professional opportunities that surpass those of people who did not experience major mobility and, for that matter, those non-migrant peers in their country of origin. Furthermore, when migration is associated with a heavy ideological load (as in the case of emigration from Israel), successful emigrants, once they come back, are more confident about justifying their temporary

30

chapter two

relocation abroad than those who left the country of origin and failed to improve their economic and social situation. This chapter examines migration characteristics and the main demographic and social traits of Israelis in the United States. We focus on several dimensions: the origin of the Israelis, i.e., whether they were born in Israel or elsewhere, immigrated to Israel and later moved on to the United States (and, if so, where they were born); time of arrival in the United States; their age and gender profile; family patterns; and areas of settlement in the United States. Where appropriate, we compare the emigrants’ characteristics with those of the total Israeli Jewish population and with those of American Jews at large. Importantly, some of the socio-demographic data reflect characteristics of the population at the time of the specific census. This is especially true for early migrants who arrived in the United States long ago and may have acquired new traits, or replaced old ones. Therefore, the differences between emigrants and non-emigrants are largely estimates of the socioeconomic status of the two groups. It is likely that the shorter the duration of the emigrants in the United States, the more closely their characteristics reflect those with which they departed from Israel. 2. Geographic Origin and Ethnicity Because Israel is a young country that traces most of its population growth to immigration from widely scattered Jewish communities in different countries and continents, it is expected that American Israelis will form a diverse mosaic of areas of origin (nativity). This expectation is further reinforced since each wave of immigration is accompanied by return migration to the country of origin or secondary migration to a third country. Generally speaking, anyone who experienced migration can more easily move again than native-born persons. Most Jewish immigrants to Israel originated in Eastern Europe or countries in Asia and northern Africa to which it is difficult if not impossible to return. Therefore, those who fail to integrate successfully or decide to leave Israel for other reasons turn to new countries, including the United States. Furthermore, the more Israelis there are in the United States in general, and from specific countries or origin groups in particular, the more it is expected that new emigrants with similar backgrounds will choose the same destination. Below we examine the American Israelis’ countries or regions of birth, their ethnic origins, and how


31

these affinities have changed over time. Notably, each census includes the survivors of the previous census (i.e., those who did not leave the United States and are still alive) as well as new immigrants during the decade preceding the census. In each intercensal decade, some Israelis may have moved to the United States and left in the interim, either returning to Israel or re-migrating to some other country, and were not enumerated in either of the two censuses. Among all adult Israelis who were living in the United States in 1980, slightly more than half (58.8 percent) were born in Israel. This rate climbed gradually to roughly two-thirds in 1990 and 72.3 percent in 2000 (Table 2.1). Although this change may, to some extent, be a reflection of differences between the Israel-born and those born in other countries in leaving the United States, or in mortality, it is probably traceable mainly to long-term trends in the nativity patterns of Israel’s Jewish population, namely an upward trend in the proportion of the Israel-born. Indeed, Israeli data show that while only one-third (32.9 percent) of adult Jews in Israel were native-born in 1980, the rate climbed to 44.3 percent in 1990 and nearly half (48.7 percent) in 2000 (CBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, relevant years). The share of Israel-born among Israelis in the United States increased perceptibly in the first decade of the study, 1980–1990, and much less vigorously afterwards. The recent change in the profile of American Israelis by country of origin—Israel or other location—is related, as we show below, to the great wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s, which, like every mass migration, was accompanied by re-migration to a third country, the United States in this case. Overall, the empirical findings show that the share of the Israel-born is higher among Israelis in the United States than among the population of the country of origin, i.e., Israel. However, this overrepresentation has been narrowing over time: the ratio of Israel-born among Israelis in the United States to the Israel-born in the Israeli Jewish population fell from 1.8 in 1980 to 1.5 in 2000. Among the foreign-born, the largest group was born in Eastern and Central Europe. Natives of this region accounted for roughly half of all foreign-born Israelis in the United States in 1980. Their share declined in the following decade but then bounced back to almost its ‘initial’ level with the arrival of several tens of thousands of Soviet Jews in the United States after having first migrated to Israel in the wake of perestroika (Tolts, 2008). An opposite trend, of an increase followed by diminution, is characterized by Israelis born in Western

32

chapter two

Table 2.1. Areas of Origin of Israelis in the United States, 1980–2000 (Percentages) Area of Origin/Year

Total Native-born Israelis Foreign-born Thereof: East/Central Europe West Europe Asia North Africa Latin America Canada/South Africa/Oceania

Year 1980

1990

2000

100.0 58.8 41.2 100.0 51.2

100.0 67.9 32.1 100.0 41.0

100.0 72.3 27.7 100.0 47.9

19.4 13.6 11.2 1.2 3.3

24.5 12.4 9.6 5.2 7.2

17.9 15.7 8.2 3.9 6.4

Europe, Latin America, and areas which were previously part of the British Commonwealth. These fluctuations are explained by the fact that Jews from these countries began to immigrate to Israel in substantial numbers only in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which was also the peak period of Western Jewish immigration to Israel (DellaPergola, 1986; DellaPergola, Rebhun, and Raicher, 2000). Note that it takes new immigrants several years to decide to leave for another country. With greater long-term consistency, the share of Israelis born in northern Africa—from countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt—gradually decreased, while the share of those born in Asia increased (although not consistently). Hence, the differences in their share among American Israelis are roughly twofold. In-depth insight into the findings by individual countries of origin reveals that the largest numbers of Israelis, in descending order, were born in Poland, the former Soviet Union, and Morocco. In order to deepen our understanding of the American Israelis’ characteristics, we classified them by their ethnic extractions. To this end, we first used information on ancestry. For those who did not indicate their ancestry and were not born in Israel, we determined ethnicity by country of birth. Still, quite a few Israel-born individuals noted their ancestry as ‘Israeli’, and accordingly could not be classified as Israelis of Ashkenazi or Sephardi origin. Over time, the proportion of the Israel-born in the United States who indicated their ancestry


33

as Israeli climbed from one-third in 1980 to more than half in 2000. It stands to reason that this is associated with the growing share of Israelis who are third-generation in Israel, i.e., born to parents who were also native-born Israelis. As for the Israeli-born who did note their ancestry, their response certainly reflected family background and a subjective attitude toward the socio-cultural influence, either of the origin country of at least one parent or of Israel. Among the foreign-born, we found a strong correspondence between country of birth and ancestry. When we aggregated the Israel-born who reported ancestry other than Israeli with the foreign-born who reported their ancestry or had it determined by their country of birth, it was found that in 1980, about one-fifth (21.1 percent) of American Israelis came from an Asian and northern African background; we define them as Sephardi Jews. Their share declined somewhat during the decade (to 18.1 percent in 1990) but grew again to 23.3 percent in 2000. Accordingly, the rest of the American Israelis for whom ethnic extraction could be determined were of Ashkenazi background. The correspondence between the distribution of the foreign-born Israelis’ countries of birth and their subjective definition of their ancestry has strengthened over time. This can be interpreted as part of the general American trend of multiculturalism and the increasing awareness of and pride in group origin, be it racially, ethnically, or religiously based, including the adoption of specific ethnic patterns of cultural consumption (Glazer, 1997). We also found that the share of Jews of Asian/African origin among American Israelis is much smaller than their share in the Jewish population of Israel, which has been around one-half in recent decades, notwithstanding minor fluctuations (CBS, Statistical Abstracts). Israelis of Asian/ northern African extraction may be underrepresented in the United States because they have stronger religious connections that serve as hold factors in Israel; it may also be due to educational and occupational qualifications that do not correspond well to opportunities in the United States that might allow them to significantly improve their economic situation and standard of living. The geographic and ethnic background of American Israelis is different not only from that of the Israeli population as a whole but also from that of their American Jewish counterparts. Most American Jews today (90 percent) are native-born (Goldstein, 1992) and a growing proportion of them are third- and fourth-generation Americans. Accordingly, they are very distant from any direct personal experience

34

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with emigration, including that of their parents. Thus, they cannot share with Israeli emigrants the experiences and challenges of moving to a new country. Furthermore, various estimates suggest that only one-tenth of American Jews are of Sephardi origin (DellaPergola and Rebhun, 1997). If so, while Sephardi Jews are underrepresented among the emigrants relative to their home society (Israel), the opposite is true in regard to the host Jewish society, American Jewry, with Sephardim being represented more than twice among American Israelis as among their hosts. Insofar as these Israelis have religious and cultural affinities that attribute importance to their ethnic origins, they may face a shortage of synagogues, community organizations, and social and cultural activities that correspond to the customs and traditions of their ethnic belonging. 3. Chronology of Migration Emigration from Israel, like emigration in general, is motivated by a combination of push factors in the origin country and pull factors in the destination country, personal considerations, and the possibilities of entering into preferred countries. On the whole, large-scale and ethnically diverse immigration to the United States in the second half of the twentieth century ensued especially after the United States immigration laws were amended in 1965 (Zhou, 2001). Shortly afterwards, by coincidence, powerful push factors began to operate in Israel, specifically the impact of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the First Lebanon War of 1982, as well as the economic crisis in the mid1980s (Sobel, 1986). Concurrently, Israelis began to obtain greater exposure to the West via mass media, especially television, but also via outbound tourism and more generally the penetration of Western consumption and cultural patterns (Rebhun and Waxman, 2000). These factors, coupled with social and ideological changes that stressed individual needs over collective ones, created conditions that made an upturn in emigration from Israel possible. This accumulation of factors at the macro level which encourage emigration gathered momentum due to mass immigration to Israel from the former FSU in the 1990s. Some of these immigrants, predictably, failed to sink roots in the new country and sought to settle elsewhere. A large number of Soviet Jews had initially emigrated directly to the United States (Tolts, 2001), reinforcing existent characteristics of the local Russophone Jewish commu-


35

nity; this made the United States a preferred alternative for secondary migration of Russian Israelis. Following the rule of every social phenomenon, the more Israelis who emigrated to the United States, the more legitimate this behavior became and the more emulators it had. Others were attracted to friends and relatives who could serve them as a framework of support and assistance, at least in the initial stages of acculturation in the new country. Below we examine the chronology of Israeli emigration to the United States in an attempt to link trends in the extent of this emigration with events in Israel and the United States, and how these fluctuations in emigration vary among subgroups of foreign-born versus Israel-born Israelis and, among the former, by major continents of origin. Table 2.2 presents the distribution of Israelis’ arrival in the United States by each of the censuses of 1980, 1990, and 2000. Accordingly, the data in the table end in different years and at ten-year intervals that correspond to the time of each census. In the first two censuses, the largest group of Israelis was the one that had arrived in the five years preceding the specific census, and in the last census the share of the 1995–2000 emigrants was the second-largest of all the periods. These data attest to the increase in Israeli emigration to the United States over time, and perhaps some return migration or re-migration to a new destination among earlier emigrants. However, while in each of the first two censuses more than two-thirds of Israelis reached the United States in the intercensal period (1970–1980 and 1980– 1990, respectively), in 2000 this was true for only one-fifth of American Israelis. This means that, over time, an increasing share of Israelis attained long tenure in the United States with all the implications this might have on their acculturation into American society, their institutional infrastructure and social networks, and their connection with Israel. There are differences, sometimes considerable, in the timing of emigration by nativity between native Israelis and those who were born in other countries, immigrated to Israel, and then moved to the United States (Table 2.2). In each census it was found that a higher percentage of the foreign-born, as compared to Israel-born, had emigrated to the United States before 1950. The share of this group is particularly salient among those enumerated in the earliest census (1980), representing more than one-third of all foreign-born Israelis who lived in the United States at that time. Some of them may be Jews who had immigrated to Palestine and then left before the State of Israel

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Table 2.2. Period of Emigration to the United States, by Place of Birth: Israeli Americans, 1980–2000 (Percentages) 1980

1990

2000

Year of emigration

Total

Israelborn

Foreignborn

Total

Israelborn

Foreignborn

Total

Israelborn

Foreignborn

Total –1950 1950–59 1960–64 1965–70 1971–74 1975–80 1981–84 1985–90 1991–94 1995–00

100.0 20.0 14.1 14.6 11.8 12.7 26.8 – – – –

100.0 9.3 15.6 14.7 13.8 15.9 30.6 – – – –

100.0 34.8 12.0 14.5 9.1 8.3 21.2 – – – –

100.0 6.5 13.1 8.7 10.6 10.4 12.3 14.0 24.4 – –

100.0 2.3 14.1 8.7 10.6 10.2 13.0 12.8 27.5 – –

100.0 13.8 11.1 8.7 10.7 10.7 10.6 16.6 17.8 – –

100.0 4.1 10.5 5.7 10.5 6.4 15.5 8.5 17.0 5.6 16.2

100.0 2.2 8.7 6.0 8.6 6.3 17.4 8.2 18.5 6.2 17.9

100.0 8.9 15.0 5.0 15.4 6.8 10.7 9.3 12.9 4.3 11.7

was founded. The declining share of veteran emigrants in subsequent censuses is due partly to the expansion of immigration to Israel after achieving statehood. In the wake of this enlarged immigration, somewhat expanded emigration from the country occurred, and accordingly pushed the time of the emigrants’ arrival in the United States to later years. It also stands to reason that the emigrants who arrived in the United States before 1950 were an adult population with a high mortality rate, meaning that some of them died before the subsequent censuses. To a large extent, high rates of emigration were also observed at times shortly following relatively large waves of immigration to Israel or events related to Israel’s security. For example, the high percentage of Israelis who arrived in the United States in the second half of the 1970s and were enumerated in the 1980 census evidently reflects, in part, a response to the Yom Kippur War (since as a rule it takes some time for thoughts of emigration to ripen into action), and also the emigration of Soviet immigrants who had moved to Israel in relatively large numbers in those years. Similarly, the increase in the 1990 census in the share of foreign-born Israeli emigrants who had arrived in the United States in the 1980s can be traced in part to Soviet immigrants in the decade preceding 1980 as well as to longer tenured Israelis who had been influenced by the First Lebanon War and, perhaps, by the dire economic situation and high inflation that prevailed in Israel at the time.


37

The increase in the 2000 census in the share of emigrants who reached the United States in the half-decade preceding the census may be due to Soviet Jews who first chose to immigrate to Israel and then moved on to the United States. The early 1990s immigrants had strong Jewish and Zionist identities, but those who followed them were less connected to the Jewish collective and to the State of Israel and had high intermarriage rates; accordingly, they were more likely to leave several years later. Unlike foreign-born Israelis who emigrated to the United States and presumably settled there permanently after wandering among three countries (their country of birth, Israel, and the United States), the Israel-born might exhibit some movement in the opposite direction, back to Israel, after trying out American life for several years. However, those who emigrated in the half-decade preceding each census were still becoming acclimated to life in America; therefore, they accounted for a higher proportion of the total than the share of emigrants from earlier periods. Nevertheless, the findings allude to linkage between important events in Israel—especially the Yom Kippur War, the First Lebanon War, and the economic situation in the early 1980s—and the rise in emigration. The effect of domestic events may have been stronger among the Israel-born than among foreignborn Israelis, as reflected in differences in the share of each group in each census among emigrants of the second half of the 1970s and of the 1980s. Figure 2.1 provides a more comprehensive assessment of the longterm fluctuations in emigration from Israel, and of inter-group differences, by detailed examination of the time of settlement in the United States according to individual year of arrival and several specific regions of origin. The analysis focuses solely on data from the 2000 census. All subgroups exhibited a wave-like pattern, years of scanty emigration succeeded by years of upturn and so on. Among the Israel-born, there was an initial increase in emigration to the United States in the second half of the 1950s or, to be more precise, from 1956 to the end of the decade. Additional meaningful fluctuations were observed in 1973, between 1978 and 1981, in the second half of the 1980s, and in 1999–2000. These milestones overlapped or approximated Israeli events including the Sinai War, the Yom Kippur War, the Likud’s accession to power, the First Lebanon War, and the high inflation of the mid-1980s. Several ups and downs in the emigration of Israelis

38

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born in Eastern and Central Europe resembled those observed among the Israel-born. However, the increase in their emigration around the time of the Yom Kippur War began earlier and may be attributed to immigration to Israel from the Soviet Union and several of its East European satellites several years earlier (mainly around 1968) and the emigration of some of them to the United States a short time later. Emigration by members of this group also increased perceptibly in the early 1990s, coinciding with mass immigration to Israel from the FSU. Although West European immigrants are represented in the study by only a small number of respondents, one gets the impression that they also emigrated (to the United States) in response to significant Israeli events and acculturation experiences in Israel very shortly after the arrival of large numbers of them (after the Six-Day War). Those who immigrated to Israel from Muslim countries in Asia and north Africa behaved more like the Israel-born than like their peers who were born in Eastern and Central Europe. In other words, there is no evidence of substantial emigration to the United States of Israelis of Asian and north African nativity shortly after immigration to Israel, particularly in the 1950s and the early 1960s—at least not at the same pace exhibited by other immigrants in the same years. This suggests that the considerations favoring another move after immigrating to Israel did not necessarily originate in absorption hardships or in a large disparity between the expectations of the immigrants and the reality that they found in Israel; rather, they seem to have been a response to discomfort with domestic events. However, immigrants from countries of distress in eastern and central Europe and from Muslim lands resemble each other in that they are not strongly attracted to new opportunities in the United States and do not share the general propensity—which has been growing recently among the Israel-born and immigrants from developed countries in western Europe, Canada, South Africa and Latin America—to emigrate to the United States. This propensity is reflected in differences among the groups in the share of emigrants who recently settled in the United States: the percentage of recently arrived Israeli emigrants to the United States among those born in countries of distress was perceptibly lower than the corresponding percentage among those born in Israel or in affluent countries.

0

47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99

Percentage

4 2

2 1

0 0

Percentage 10

8

6

Percentage

2 2

1 1

0 0

Percentage 5

4

3

Percentage

Israel-born 9

7 8

6 7

Western Europe

16 8

14 7

12 6 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99

47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99

8

47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99

47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99


Year

Year

39

Eastern/Central Europe

6

5

4

3

Asia/North Africa

Year

5

4

3

Other Areas Year

20

18

14 16

12

10

8

6

4

2

Year

Figure 2.1. Distribution of Israeli Emigration to the United States by Year of Arrival and Area of Origin, 2000

40

chapter two 4. Age and Gender

The ( Jewish) population of Israel is young. The average age of the inhabitants of the country is lower than that of most Western populations. For example, in 2000 the median age of Jews in Israel was 27.6—roughly eight years younger than that of the American population (35.3). The difference is even greater if the comparison is limited to white Americans (CBS, Statistical Abstract 2001, U.S. Census Bureau, 2001). This characteristic is the result of Israel’s high fertility patterns, which are above the intergenerational replacement level, assuring the persistence of the classic shape of the age pyramid. There is also a tendency—typical among migrants—to be overrepresented in young age groups. We would expect the American Israelis to be a young group; they were certainly so at the time they settled in the United States. However, since some of the Israelis in the United States first went to Israel and only later moved to the United States, the age composition of the American Israelis may vary by place of birth and over time. From the point of view of gender, it should be noted that Israel’s Jewish population, like any other population, is almost gender-equal among people in their twenties and thirties and begins to change toward a surplus of women in older age groups. However, native-born Israelis and foreign-born Israelis may have different gender ratios. This would be the case among the latter in particular if their immigration to Israel was voluntary, such voluntary movements being typically comprised of a majority of males. The large majority of American Israelis emigrated as young people (Table 2.3). About half of them did so in their twenties and early thirties, between one-fifth and one-third emigrated as children—evidently with their parents—and the rest are concentrated in the age cohorts up to 65. A comparative look at the data from the three censuses reveals important changes over time. First, age at emigration declined and a large proportion of the emigrants reached the United States immediately after being discharged from the army. Thus, the share of American Israelis who were 18–24 years old when they arrived in the United States climbed from only 16.6 percent in 1980 to more than one-fourth (25.3 percent) in 2000, whereas the share of those in the next age group, 25–34 at the time of emigration, declined during those years. The proportion of Israelis who moved to the United States as children also grew perceptibly: from 20.8 percent of American Israelis


41

Table 2.3. Age at Emigration and Gender: Israelis in the United States, 1980–2000 (Percentages) 1980

1990

2000

Total Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total 0–17 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–64 65+

100.0 100.0 20.8 19.7 16.6 17.3 32.6 36.0 16.1 14.7 13.8 12.0 0.2 0.3

100.0 22.0 15.8 28.9 17.6 15.8 0

100.0 21.0 17.7 37.9 15.7 6.8 0.9

100.0 19.5 18.1 38.8 14.9 7.6 1.1

100.0 22.8 17.2 36.9 16.6 5.9 0.6

100.0 100.0 30.7 28.3 25.3 26.6 29.7 30.7 9.9 10.5 3.6 3.1 0.7 0.7

100.0 33.6 23.7 28.6 9.2 4.2 0.7

in the first census to 30.7 percent in the last one. The interpretation of these findings is that over time a growing share of Israeli emigrants is very young, probably not yet married, or composed of families with children, and that there are many fewer Israelis who are of middle age. An additional and complementary way of assessing these changes is by comparing the age composition upon emigration of American Israelis with that of Israel’s Jewish population. Figure 2.2 presents the ratio of the percent of each age group in the total American Israeli population to the percent of the corresponding age group in Israel’s Jewish population in the same year. A ratio of 1 means that the share of the age group is the same in both populations, namely the American Israelis and the Jews in Israel. A ratio greater than 1 means that the specific age group is overrepresented among the emigrants, whereas a ratio smaller than 1 means that it is underrepresented among the emigrants relative to Israel’s Jewish population. The comparison was conducted for the two poles on the time axis, 1980 and 2000. The findings show clearly that the proportion of children (0–17) among Israeli emigrants increased significantly during this period and that their share today resembles that of children in the Jewish population of Israel. Concurrently, the selectivity of young people gathered strength and the proportion of those who emigrated at age 18–24 and were living in the United States in 2000 was more than twice as high as the share of this age group among Israel’s Jewish population. The selectivity of the next age group also increased but more modestly. The trends described above characterize both men and women (Table 2.3). Concurrently, the age composition of emigrants in both gender groups is becoming more similar. In 1980, 53.3 percent of Israeli men in the United States reached the country at age 18–34,

42

chapter two 2.50 2.16 1.92

2.00

2.08

Ratio

1.68 1.43

1.50

1980 2000

0.99

1.00

0.80 0.82 0.58

0.50 0.18

0.00

0–17

18–24

25–34 35–44 Age

45–64

0.02 0.06

65+

Figure 2.2. Ratio of Percentages of Identical Age Groups among American Israelis (Age at Emigration) and among Jews in Israel (Current Age), 1980 and 2000

whereas only 44.7 percent of Israeli women in the United States belonged to this age group at that time. Women outnumbered men in the middle age group (35–44) by 33.4 percent to 26.7 percent, respectively. In a process that was already seen in 1990, and continued in the subsequent decade, the age distribution by gender has largely converged: 57.3 percent of men and 52.3 percent of women arrived in the United States at age 18–34 and the share of those aged 35–64 was almost identical (13.6 percent and 13.4 percent, respectively). The earlier high representation of the middle-aged among emigrant women may indicate that this was largely an emigration of families. Recently, growing proportions of Israeli women have been emigrating at young ages, presumably while still single. The Israel-born and the foreign-born emigrate to the United States at different ages (Table 2.4). The former are markedly younger. A larger proportion of them emigrated to the United States as children and the share of mature emigrants (age 45+) among them is very small. Likewise, the proportion of young adults (mainly in the 18–24 cohort), who definitely emigrated alone, was higher among the Israelborn than among their foreign-born peers. Over time, the age composition of both nativity groups moved toward convergence, chiefly due to the decline of age at emigration of the foreign-born Israelis.


43

By 2000, there were already no large differences between the Israelborn and the foreign-born in all age groups from 18 and over. These trends mainly characterized Israelis of East European and Western extraction. In the past, emigration to the United States by Israelis who had been born in these areas evidently involved people who had immigrated to Israel many years earlier, grew up in Israel, and later decided to leave the country, or alternatively, elderly immigrants who had only recently moved to Israel and left the country shortly afterwards. Today, on the contrary, emigration to the United States by Israelis who were born in these regions is of young people, including some who had immigrated to Israel with children and left for the United States afterwards. The continuing emigration of young families with children who immigrated to Israel and then moved to the United States is seen especially among those born in Western countries (Europe, Canada, South Africa, and Oceania), one-third of whom were children in 2000. The age profile at the time of emigration of those born in northern Asia/Africa was different from that of the other foreign-born and varied inconsistently and sometimes with severe volatility in the intercensal periods. The differences by continents of origin probably derive from the chronological distribution of immigration to Israel, which in the case of northern Africa and Asia had largely terminated by the mid-1960s, and from unique disparities between expectations and social and economic experiences in Israel. Differences in acquaintance with people in the United States and exposure to economic opportunities there further abetted the differences between the groups. However, also among those of north African and Asian extraction there has been a noticeable increase in the share of young emigrants (in their early twenties) and a decline in the proportion of the 45–64 age cohort. Importantly, in the two early censuses, those who were children when they emigrated to the United States and were represented by a small number of cases in the sample, came mostly from Asia, including Iran and Iraq. However, in the 2000 census, somewhat surprisingly, about half of those emigrants who were children when they arrived in the United States had been born in eastern Asia; they noted that they spoke Hebrew at home, or identified their ancestry as Israeli, hence they fit our definitions of Jewish Israelis. We presume that they were born in that region while their parents served as diplomats, academicians, businesspeople, or in other fields, and settled in the United States later as children either directly or via Israel (or via a third country).

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Table 2.4. Age at Emigration by Area of Birth: Israelis in the United States, 1980–2000 (Percentages) Israel-born Age at emigration

Foreign-born Total

EasternEurope

WesternEurope/Latin America/South Africa/Oceania

Asia/ Africa

100.0 29.3 13.8 25.9 12.1 19.0 –

100.0 10.0 13.3 50.0 13.3 13.3 –

100.0 18.5 10.9 40.2 18.5 9.8 2.2

100.0 9.1 10.9 34.5 34.5 7.3 3.6

100.0 33.3 25.6 29.5 5.1 3.8 2.6

100.0 16.7 30.3 31.8 13.6 6.1 1.5

1980 Total 0–17 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–64 65+

100.0 27.4 20.8 34.3 12.3 4.8 0.3

100.0 11.6 10.8 30.3 21.1 26.1 –

100.0 4.1 8.1 22.8 29.3 35.8 – 1990

Total 0–17 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–64 65+

100.0 25.1 21.0 39.8 10.6 3.2 0.4

100.0 12.4 10.4 33.7 26.9 14.5 2.0

100.0 8.8 9.8 27.5 30.4 22.5 1.0 2000

Total 0–17 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–64 65+

100.0 34.5 25.1 28.6 8.4 3.2 0.1

100.0 20.6 25.7 32.7 14.0 4.8 2.2

100.0 14.8 23.4 35.2 19.5 4.7 2.3

5. Family and Children The family is a central value in Israeli Jewish society. Notwithstanding changes that Israel has undergone in recent decades, its status is much more solid than that of the family in other modern societies (DellaPergola, 1993; Goldscheider, 2002). Israel’s family patterns are manifested,


45

among other things, in relatively early marriage, a low divorce rate, and large numbers of children (CBS, Statistical Abstracts). The combination of early marriage and the typical stages of the Israelis’ life cycle, including military service, leave a relatively small interval of years for bachelorhood, the marital status most closely associated with migration. Assuming that Israeli emigrants in the United States continue the social behavior patterns of their country of origin, one may postulate that they will marry quite soon after emigration, either with an Israeli with whom they emigrated or with someone whom they met in the United States. Getting married and establishing a family strengthen an emigrant’s connection with the new location. In contrast, those who do not marry for reasons including limited availability of preferred spouses, i.e., other Israelis or American Jews (Rosenthal, Kfir, and Friedberg, 1994), are more likely to return to Israel. In recent years, there has been an increase in the tendency of young families to emigrate, especially those who are in the fields of high-tech and scientific research. Accordingly, we would expect that a high rate of American Israelis will be married.1 This part of the study attempts to answer the following questions: what is the marital status of Israelis in the United States and how has it been changing over time? What are the differences in marital status between men and women? How is the marital status of American Israelis differentiated by geographic origin? Do Israeli families have children and, if so, were these children born in Israel or in the United States? A large proportion of American Israelis are married (Table 2.5). In 1980, nearly 71 percent were married, 17 percent were single, and the rest were almost equally divided between divorced and widowed. In 1990, the marriage rate increased slightly, to some three-fourths of all American Israelis, but in 2000, it receded to around two-thirds while the share of singles and, particularly, that of divorced, increased. To support these findings, we examined in each of the three censuses the marital status of only those Israelis who arrived in the United States in the decade preceding the census. This approach increases the possibility that marital status at the time of the census would correspond more closely to that at the time of emigration. This inquiry also

1 Unfortunately, data constraints do not allow us to keep track of Israelis’ marital status at the time of emigration but only at the time of each census.

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Table 2.5. Marital Status of Israelis in the United States by Gender, 1980–2000 (Percentages) 1980

1990

2000

Marital status

Total

Males Females

Total

Males Females

Total

Males Females

Total Single Married Divorced1 Widowed

100.0 17.0 70.9 5.3 6.8

100.0 18.4 72.8 6.6 2.3

100.0 14.9 75.3 6.3 3.4

100.0 17.9 72.5 7.3 2.3

100.0 19.7 68.4 9.1 2.9

100.0 22.6 66.1 10.0 1.3

100.0 15.6 68.8 3.9 11.7

100.0 11.3 78.9 5.1 4.8

1) Including separated.

revealed a consistent increase in the share of singles and a decrease in the proportion of married Israelis. These findings strongly coincide with our previously reported evidence of long-term changes in age at emigration and, in particular, the increase in the proportion of the young-adult cohort. The three censuses show consistent differences in the marital status of Israeli emigrant men and women (Table 2.5). Corresponding to gender differences in age at marriage, i.e., the propensity of men to marry at a slightly older age, a higher proportion of men is single. Also, American Israeli men have a higher divorce rate than American Israeli women. By the same token, as one would expect due to the difference in life expectancy between men and women, widows outnumber widowers. Unlike the first census, it was found in 1990 and 2000 that American Israeli women had a higher marriage rate as compared to their men counterparts. These differences are compatible with the different family patterns of Jewish men and women in Israel. The long-term changes in American Israelis’ marital status do not just derive from changes in the age composition of this population. Table 2.6 shows the substantial increase in the share of unmarried persons in the 25–34 age cohorts: from slightly less than one-fifth in 1980 to more than one-third in 2000. In the next age group, too (35–44), the share of those never married surged over time, to one in ten in 2000. Concurrently, the increase in the percent of divorcees occurred mainly in the oldest age group of 45–64. Furthermore, the share of those married in the age group that is most typical of people getting married, 25–34, diminished from approximately three-fourths in 1980 to slightly more than half in 2000. These trends attest to real changes in the marital status of Israelis in the United States.

100.0 16.2 71.1 8.0 4.7


47

Table 2.6. Marital Status of Israelis in the United States by Age, 1980–2000 (Percentages) Marital Status Age

Single

Married

Divorced1

Widowed

71.0 19.6 1.9 2.8 3.5

19.0 75.7 86.1 88.7 51.8

– 4.8 11.1 5.7 2.4

– – 0.9 2.8 42.4

71.4 30.4 4.6 2.9 2.6

23.2 64.9 87.6 85.5 70.5

5.4 4.7 6.9 8.2 3.8

– – 0.8 3.4 23.1

81.5 38.9 11.5 5.2 1.8

18.5 55.4 80.9 77.8 73.4

– 5.7 6.8 14.9 7.3

– – 0.9 2.1 17.4

1980 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–64 65+ 1990 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–64 65+ 2000 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–64 65+ 1) Including separated.

Notably, data not presented here due to space constraints point to considerable differences in marital status between Israel-born Americans and those born in other countries. The differences persist even after taking into account the disparity in age composition between the two groups. In particular, there is a salient tendency among those born in Israel to marry later in life. In 1980, for example, 23 percent of Israel-born emigrants in the 25–34 age group were single and only half that proportion (11 percent) of the foreign-born were single. The corresponding rates were 33 percent and 17 percent in 1990, and 41 percent and 22 percent in 2000, respectively. The ‘deficit’ in the proportion of singles among those not born in Israel translates into a higher marriage rate among this population. These findings are compatible with the older age composition of the foreign-born at the time of emigration; accordingly, they support the argument that emigration

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of native-Israelis is largely a matter of individuals in search of new experiences and social and cultural opportunities, whereas that of the foreign-born is an emigration of families. It stands to reason, then, that these divergent emigration patterns leave more room for return migration by the Israel-born. A complementary dimension to the assessment of family patterns is children. Here we focus on married emigrants only (Table 2.7). About two-thirds of married American Israelis have children. This rate has remained fairly stable over time, but was lowest in 2000. More significant changes took place in the children’s place of birth, Israel or the United States. Over time, the number of Israelis whose children were all born in Israel has been decreasing and the number of those whose children were all born in the United States has been rising. In 1980, the rates in both groups were similar (at around 45 percent) but by 2000 the share of the former had diminished to less than one-fifth and that of those whose children were all born in the United States had climbed to more than 70 percent. These changes are definitely related, if only partly, to the downward slant of age at emigration. Yet, it is possible that it also reflects changes in family planning and postponement of child rearing till after settlement in the new country; children born in the United States have American citizenship by birth which, in turn, has weighty implications for the parents’ naturalization and the possibilities of the entire family being able to remain in the United States. The marital status of American Israelis is significantly different from that of their peers in Israel. In particular, Israelis in America have a high marriage rate. In 2000, as stated, two-thirds of the Israelis in the United States were married and only one-fifth were single. The corresponding rates among the Israeli Jewish population that year were Table 2.7. Children of Married American Israelis, 1980–2000 (Percentages) Year

% with children Thereof: Total All children born in Israel All children born in the U.S. Children born in Israel and U.S.

1980

1990

2000

67.1 100.0 45.1 44.0 10.9

69.5 100.0 30.2 51.7 18.1

64.1 100.0 17.2 70.8 12.0


49

57 percent and 29 percent, respectively (CBS, Statistical Abstract 2003). However, these differentials derive from differences in the age compositions of the two populations since it is the Jews in Israel who typically have the stronger family commitment. Focusing on the 25–34 age group, we find that slightly more than half of American Israelis were married in 2000 (Table 2.6) but that the marriage rate among their peers in Israel had reached nearly two-thirds, and that the rates of singles were 38.9 percent and 29.6 percent, respectively (CBS, Statistical Abstract 2003). These differences between American Israelis and Jews in Israel recurred consistently in older age groups, albeit in a narrowed state. The divorce rates, in turn, were 9 percent among American Israelis and 6 percent of the Jewish population in Israel. We do not know whether the emigrants’ divorces took place before emigration or in the United States. However, sociological theories claim, and empirical studies have found, that international migration aggravates tension between spouses and makes the dissolution of the family cell more likely. The differences in divorce rates may also indicate that divorced Israelis wish to distance themselves from their extended families and the familiar surroundings of relatives and friends in Israel. This is because in Israel, although much has changed in recent years, divorce is still considered a deviation from social norms and primary Jewish values. The higher divorce rate among American Israelis may also reflect the adoption of American patterns and norms. Differences were also found between the marital status of American Israelis and that of American Jews along general lines resembling the differences between American Israelis and the Jewish population of Israel (Kotler-Berkowitz et al., 2003). A conspicuously unique characteristic of American Jews is their very high share of widowed persons. This rate is 2.5 times greater than that of American Israelis and can be explained by their relatively old age profile. 6. Geographic Distribution and Residential Preferences A further dimension of international migration is the migrants’ choice of place of settlement in the new country and their patterns of group dispersion or concentration. Jews in Israel, whether they were born there or arrived in the country as immigrants, experience life in a Jewish-majority society and share the collective identity of a Jewish state that is reflected in daily life. Israelis in the United States, in contrast,

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are part of a Jewish ethno-religious minority within a predominantly Christian environment. It is anticipated that their dual status of being emigrants and Jews will attract them to regions with high concentrations of veteran American Jews. These regions are in large metropolitan areas and major cities which, to begin with, are especially attractive because of their economic and cultural opportunities. However, the choice of where to settle and the preference for proximity to other Jews, or to other Israelis, may vary in accordance with one’s motives for emigration. Those who leave Israel mainly due to push factors, as opposed to stimuli in the destination country, encounter more social and cultural difficulties in their absorption, not to mention psychological hardships; accordingly, they seek informal relations with members of their ethno-religious group, including areas of residence. Differences in American Israelis’ settlement patterns may also occur according to their geographic origins. Those born in Israel, by and large, have no prior experience of American life; therefore, they will prefer to settle in regions with high density of other Israelis and, at least, a large Jewish community, both of which may provide them with a supportive setting as they acculturate in the United States. Those born in other countries, in contrast, may have less need for proximity to other members of their national or ethno-religious belonging group, especially if they arrived in the United States as adults, have experienced life as a minority in a gentile-majority society, and also experienced immigration to a new country, namely Israel, when they moved there. Even among the latter, there may be differences between Israelis born in Western countries (Western Europe, Canada, South Africa, and to a large extent, Latin America) and those born in the Communist bloc and in Asia and northern Africa. Those from the West enjoyed freedom and strong social and economic integration in their countries of origin; accordingly, they have abundant self-confidence that they bring to the United States as well. Those in the second group, in contrast, had a harsher experience as Jews in their countries of origin, quite often accompanied by discrimination and persecution; therefore, they may lack the kind of self-confidence that the first group has. Empirical findings show that Israelis clearly prefer the American Northeast (Table 2.8). In 1980, more than half of all American Israelis (56.4 percent) lived in that part of the continent. Slightly more than one-fifth (21.1 percent) lived on the other (western) side of the continent; the southern region and especially the Midwest were less attractive to Israeli emigrants. Over time, the proportion of Israelis in the northeastern United States declined to slightly less than half


51

(49.4 percent) and their presence in the west increased with particular strength (28.8 percent). Some of this change reflects a preference for places of settlement by new Israelis who arrived over the past two decades. However, it is also the outcome of internal migration of veteran Israelis to the Sunbelt areas, i.e., southern and western states that offer warm climates. Data not presented here show that among veteran Israelis, namely those who emigrated to the United States before 1980, the share of those dwelling in the northeast fell from 56 percent in 1980 to 51 percent in 2000 while the proportion of those in the West climbed from 21 percent to 26 percent, respectively. Furthermore, among Israelis who lived in the United States in 1995 and over the next five years (up to 2000) moved to a different region, many more moved from the Northeast to the West than the other way around—three times as many, in fact. Notably, within the various regions, most Israelis concentrate in a small number of major states such as New York in the Northeast, California in the West, Florida in the South, and Illinois in the Midwest. Moreover, the concentration of Israelis in these states became even stronger during the review period (1980–2000). For example, the share of Israelis in the northeastern United States who lived in New York State climbed from 73 percent in 1980 to 81 percent in 2000. The corresponding rates were 84 percent and 89 percent of Israelis in the west who lived in California, 49 percent and 54 percent of Israelis in the south who dwelled in Florida, and 34 percent and 48 percent of Israelis in the Midwest who lived in Illinois, all these changes having taken place in the respective years. Table 2.8. Geographic Distribution of American Israelis and Total American Jews, 1980–2000 (Percentages) American Israelis

Total Northeast Midwest South West Index of Dissimilarity: Israelis/Jews

Total American Jews1

1980

1990

2000

1980

1990

2000

100.0 56.4 7.0 15.5 21.1 6.7

100.0 53.9 6.1 12.6 27.4 14.2

100.0 49.4 5.4 16.4 28.8 13.2

100.0 57.9 11.9 15.8 14.3 –

100.0 44.3 10.8 22.1 22.8 –

100.0 42.7 12.4 22.6 22.3 –

1) Data for 1980 refer to all United States Jewish population (children and adults), and are derived from: Chenkin and Miran, 1980. The data for 1990 and 2000 are based on our own data analysis of NJPS from the respective years.

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The geographic distribution of American Israelis strongly resembles that of American Jews at large (Table 2.8). This similarity is mostly salient in the preference of both groups for the Northeast and the West. Today, however, American Israelis prefer these two regions more than American Jews do. By contrast, they concentrate less intensively in the Midwest and the South. The under-representation of Israelis in the south may be explained by their age composition, which is younger than that of American Jewry, and the lesser importance that they attribute to the warm climate and weather conditions that prevail in that part of the country. Overall, the differences between American Israelis and total American Jews have been widening over the years: the index of dissimilarity, that reflects the percentage of people in one population group who would have to relocate to a different region in order to equalize the geographic distribution of both populations, increased from 6.7 percent in 1980 to 14.2 percent in 1990 and then diminished slightly to 13.2 percent in 2000. Despite the rather large geographic units according to which the data were analyzed, the Israelis maintain a high level of geographic differentiation and physical segregation from their local religious reference group, i.e., American Jewry. They prefer to converge into an environment that speaks their language, practices their customs, and follows Israeli cultural patterns. Such physical segregation may also be a cause for, or the outcome of, social and economic segregation. The spatial distribution of Israelis in the United States varies by their geographic origin (Table 2.9). The native-born Israelis are concentrated less intensively in the Northeast than the average for Israeli emigrants and exhibit a strong preference for the west. There are also differences among the foreign-born with those originating in western countries (Western Europe, Latin America, Canada, and South Africa) standing out for their disproportionate share in the West, whereas those of Asian and African extraction are overrepresented in the Northeast. Generally speaking, the Israel-born are more similar to those born in Western countries than to those born in Asia/Africa. Given what we know about socioeconomic stratification in Israel along ethnic-origin lines, and assuming that Israeli emigrants in the United States exhibit similar differences, we believe that the Israelis’ areas of settlement in the United States attest to the different distribution of employment opportunities for emigrants who are differentiated by their educational and occupational attainment. Over time, the geographic dispersion of the different subgroups of American Israelis are becoming more


53

Table 2.9. Geographic Distribution of American Israelis by Place of Birth, 1980–2000 (Percentages) Region of Residence

Israel-born

Born in Europe/Latin America/Canada, South Africa/Oceania

Born in Asia/Africa

1980 Total Northeast Midwest South West

100.0 54.1 9.1 12.6 24.3

100.0 58.3 4.4 20.0 17.2

100.0 63.3 3.3 18.3 7.3


100.0 53.3 6.1 13.4 27.1

100.0 58.8 6.7 11.3 23.2

100.0 40.0 3.6 10.9 45.5


100.0 47.0 5.5 15.8 31.7

100.0 56.8 6.1 18.3 18.8

100.0 52.2 3.0 16.4 28.4

similar. In this process, the Northeast is steadily losing ground among all subgroups whereas settlement in the West is becoming more prevalent. These processes have been especially rapid among Israelis born in Asia/Africa. These findings, coupled with the prior evidence of an increase in the concentration of Israelis in several specific states, point to the high and still rising level of spatial segregation of American Israelis in the United States, irrespective of their geographic and socio-cultural extraction. From the point of view of the planning of services and public policy aimed at this population, the increasing concentration may make it easier to determine where to place institutions and activities in an effort to preserve the ties of these emigrants to Israel. The overwhelming majority of American Israelis tend to prefer living in large cities and metropolitan areas. In all three of the studies

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Table 2.10. Metropolitan Residence Status of American Israelis by Marital Status, 1980–2000 (Percentages) Total

Single

Married

Divorced/Widowed

100.0 60.1 39.9

100.0 75.8 24.2

100.0 57.1 42.9

100.0 54.0 46.0

100.0 60.9 39.1

100.0 76.9 23.1

100.0 57.7 42.3

100.0 61.8 38.2

100.0 59.7 40.3

100.0 74.4 25.6

100.0 55.6 44.4

100.0 58.7 41.3

1980 Total City Center Suburbs 1990 Total City Center Suburbs 2000 Total City Center Suburbs

referred to here, more than 90 percent of them were metropolitan dwellers. These patterns reflect their educational characteristics and occupational qualifications as well as their cultural preferences that are more accessible in an urban environment. In this respect, American Israelis resemble the rest of American Jewry (Rebhun and Goldstein, 2006). Within the metropolitan areas, the Israelis concentrate closer to the core; about six in ten dwell in city centers and the rest live in the suburbs (Table 2.10). The distribution between core and periphery in the metropolitan areas has remained unchanged over time. Data not presented here also show no significant differences in distribution between metropolitan core and suburbs by place of birth (born in Israel or abroad), or among the foreign-born by main continents of origin. The emigrants are rather strongly differentiated between the different parts of the metropolitan area by marital status (Table 2.10). Singles prefer to live in the more central parts of the metropolitan areas; the married tend to spread out between core and periphery in a more balanced way. In 1980, for example, three-fourths of the singles lived in core areas and the rest in the suburbs, while the distribution among the married was 57 percent and 43 percent, respectively. These distributions remained largely unchanged afterwards. The formerly married (divorcees and widows/widowers) were more similar to


55

those who were married than to the singles. In other words, a change in status from ‘married’ to ‘formerly married’ is largely unrelated to moving to a city center, attesting to the wish to remain in a familiar physical and social environment. 7. Summary American Israelis exhibit several conspicuous characteristics. While some of them correspond to general theories about migration and findings of general research, others underscore the singularity of emigration from Israel. Furthermore, the American Israelis are not cut of one cloth; there are differences, sometimes substantial, by nativity, i.e., between those born in Israel and those born elsewhere. Among the latter, the differentiation is by regions of origin and also by the time of their settlement in the United States. The main characteristics of the American Israelis also attest to their demographic and social selectivity relative to the Jewish population of Israel and, concurrently, the extent to which they are similar to or dissimilar from their host ethno-religious environment, namely American Jews. Unlike their Israeli counterparts, American Israelis included considerable numbers of native-born Israelis as opposed to foreign-born, but the share of the former increased between 1980 and 2000. As these changes took place, the distribution of Israeli-born and foreign-born among the American Israelis became more similar to the corresponding distribution of Israel’s Jewish population. The regions of origin of the foreign-born, and fluctuations therein, largely correspond to the waves of Jewish immigration to Israel from the various corners of the Jewish diaspora. These fluctuations are somewhat indicative of dissatisfaction with their acculturation in Israel and a quest for new opportunities in the United States. Jews of Asian-African origin (Sephardim) are consistently underrepresented among American Israelis relative to their share in the Jewish population of Israel. By contrast, this relatively small proportion is roughly twice as high as the share of Sephardim in the host American Jewish population. As expected, the share of Israelis with long tenure in the United States has been rising over time. This attests to the accumulation of Israelis who emigrated to the United States in earlier periods and stayed there. Even though emigration is an uninterrupted and continuing phenomenon, it does wax and wane in specific years and periods.

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Growth in Israeli emigration to the United States largely overlaps with events in Israel, including the Yom Kippur War, the First Lebanon War, and the inflation crisis in the first half of the 1980s. These events had a particularly strong effect on the Israel-born; the emigration of the foreign-born, in contrast, was timed several years after large waves of immigration to Israel from their countries of origin. Israelis emigrate to the United States at young ages. The large majority of American Israelis were in their twenties and thirties when they made their move. Over time, age at emigration has been declining, and it is becoming more and more common in the immediate post-army years. These changes are observed among men and women alike. The Israel-born tend to emigrate to the United States at younger ages than those born elsewhere; over time, however, largely due to changes among those born in eastern and western Europe, the differences between the Israeli-born and the foreign-born in age at emigration have been narrowing greatly. The share of those who emigrated to the United States as children has also increased, proving that the emigration of young families has also gathered strength. Indeed, a large percent of American Israelis are married. Yet, the share of singles among them has been rising with the passage of time; this increase derives only partly from the declining age at emigration and in larger part reflects a real change in the emigrants’ marital status. This stands out in particular among men and less so among women, and more among the Israel-born than among those born elsewhere. Among men, there was also an increase in the divorce rate. Furthermore, among the married, the share of children already born in the United States and not in Israel has been growing over time. After taking differences in age composition into account, we realized that the family profile of American Israelis is flaccid relative to that of the Jewish population in Israel. This may reflect, among other things, the absence of traditionally-oriented and religious Israelis in the phenomenon of emigration. American Israelis display a conspicuous preference for settlement in the northeastern quadrant of the United States and, to a lesser though still appreciable extent, in the western part of the continent. The tendency to head west has been growing over time, reflecting the recent emigrants’ preference and internal migration by long-term Israeli Americans. Within each region, the Israelis concentrate in a small number of major states. These geographic patterns largely correspond to the spatial distribution of American Jews at large. Nevertheless,


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the Israelis clearly prefer the Northeast and the West as against the Midwest and the South, and these interregional disparities have actually been widening over time. American Israelis who were born in Israel and those of European extraction are more drawn to the West, whereas the foreign-born and those of Asian/African extraction prefer the Northeast. These differences evidently originate, albeit partly, in the distribution of economic and social opportunities in the United States, which may correspond to the particular characteristics of different subgroups of American Israelis. Similarly, a very large majority of American Israelis settled in metropolitan areas and is divided rather equally between city centers and suburbs. Their attraction to the different parts of the metropolitan area, core vs. periphery, depends largely on marital status with singles preferring to live in the urban core and the married, as well as the formerly married (divorcees and widows/widowers), favoring the suburbs. These findings provide a thorough and multidimensional look at the main emigration and settlement characteristics of Israelis in the United States and the ways in which they have changed over time. They also lay an essential infrastructure for the analysis of the emigrants’ acculturation and social and economic success in their new country. The next chapter analyzes and discusses several different and complementary trajectories of integration in the United States, including educational achievements, economic status, and proficiency in English, to name only a few.

CHAPTER THREE

SOCIOECONOMIC ACCULTURATION AND MOBILITY 1. Overview Every society has different ways of apportioning its social and economic assets among its inhabitants. The uneven distribution of these resources, including education, employment, and income, creates social stratification. The resulting hierarchy may be influenced later on by nativity status—whether inhabitants are natives or immigrants— and also by the way the latter are received by, and absorbed into, the host society (Goldscheider, 2002). Social and economic characteristics are not constant; nor are people’s positions on the stratification ladder. Modern contemporary societies are typified by the acquisition of human capital that determines upward mobility and socioeconomic status. Social mobility is defined as a shift from one level of social and economic attainment to a different stratum within the stratification structure. A person’s rung on the stratification ladder is divided into two dimensions: prestige, especially in regard to occupation, and socioeconomic status. Prestige is mainly a reflection of the ambition and the general will to achieve; accordingly, it is a subjective assessment of the reputation that social status commands. A socioeconomic index is a score that expresses rewards that are given for the objective measurement of an individual’s characteristics; thus, it may also serve as a way to compare between subgroups in a given society or different societies. Both indices represent different, albeit interrelated, aspects of social stratification (Kerckhoff et al., 1989). Occupations and the qualifications involved with them, as well as human resources that command returns in the labor market, are important foundations for opportunities in people’s lives and for the individual’s class stratification in h/her society. A hierarchical ranking of this kind often overlaps influences in social, economic, and political power centers (Yaish, 1995; Kraus and Hodge, 1990). Migration across international boundaries places the migrants at the start of their journey in the new country in jobs and incomes that are often inferior to their educational and professional qualifications, and

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it diminishes their personal welfare (Chiswick, 1979; Constant and Zimmermann, 2004; Raijman and Semyonov, 1995). New arrivals encounter difficulties in integrating into the domestic labor market, finding employment suitable to their vocational qualifications, and attaining adequate economic returns (Borjas, 1982; Chiswick, 1978). These obstacles are explained by restricted access to information (Chiswick and Sullivan, 1995; Kossoudji and Ranney, 1984), low levels of human capital (Borjas, 1982; Raijman and Semyonov, 1995), limited acquaintance with the host environment, including proficiency in the local language (Chiswick and Miller, 1998; Greenlees and Saenz, 1999), and lack of personal contacts (Da Vanzo, 1981; Granovetter, 1995). Furthermore, information asymmetries between employers at origin and destination regarding immigrants’ true productivity reduce immigrants’ wages, with somewhat different effects on high- and lowskilled workers (Katz and Stark, 1984, 1987). Similarly, if emigration takes place under circumstances of labor shortage at the destination, it allows the host society to fill, by means of the emigrants—including those who are overqualified—unwanted jobs at the bottom of the occupational ladder. For lack of other possibilities, immigrants agree, albeit temporarily, to accept work in low-level and therefore poorly paying jobs. Most such positions are found in a secondary labor market that offers impermanent work and uncertain terms of employment, wages, and social benefits (Piore, 1979). The socioeconomic stratification of immigrants is fluid. As time in the new country elapses, the economic cost of immigration is expected to diminish (Carliner, 1996; Chiswick, 1978). The economic price of immigration exhibits a U-shaped curve of economic change that reflects a decline in socioeconomic status upon settlement in the new country followed by upward mobility (Chiswick et al., 2003; Poston, 1994; Simon and Sullivan, 1988). Changes in socioeconomic stratification also take place after new waves of immigrants arrive. According to the Ethnic Succession Model, every group of immigrants joins the economy at the bottom of the economic hierarchy, accepts the least prestigious and lowest paying jobs, and thereby allows longer-tenured groups to move to higher rungs on the employment ladder. This model is characteristically apt at times of economic growth and labor shortage; accordingly, it ascribes much importance to the time of arrival in the new country (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein, 1987). More generally, the timing of immigration affects the immigrants’ structure of

socioeconomic acculturation and mobility

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opportunities and, in turn, the success of their absorption in the new country (Lieberson, 1980). The economic cost of international migration varies among groups (Adsera and Chiswick, 2006; Antecol, 2000; Semyonov and Lerenthal, 1991). Country of origin is indicative of socio-cultural resources and specific structural and ecological factors that may either hinder or enhance socioeconomic achievement in the receiving society (Lieberson and Waters, 1988; Stier and Tienda, 1992; Willis and Yeoh, 2000). Entrepreneurial activities or self-employment, including those within ethnic niches, are important determinants of economic integration and mobility (Evans, 1989). Variations in economic attainment among different foreign-born groups also derive from the treatment and sympathy the groups receive from the host society (Boyd, 1984; Poston, 1994). Even among migrants from a single country, different subgroups may enjoy different degrees of success in their acculturation, especially if differentiated by socioeconomic background and ethnic or other cultural origin (Borjas and Tienda, 1993; Portes and Rumbaut, 1990). Furthermore, the source of the emigrants’ human capital—whether acquired in the origin country or in the destination country—influences their economic absorption. Human capital acquired in the country of origin delivers a smaller financial return than human capital acquired in the destination country; over time, working experiences in the new country may increase the returns for these qualifications (Friedberg, 1995). Obviously, too, the area of settlement affects employment and income patterns by exposing the migrants to specific conditions of the labor market and structure of opportunities (Greenlees and Saenz, 1999; Lieberson and Waters, 1988; Waxman, 2001). Within each immigrant group, there are differences between men and women in socioeconomic integration (Boyd, 1984; Haberfeld, 1993; Sullivan, 1984). Gender differences are often more substantial among immigrants than among the local population at large (Boyd, 1984). The ‘double disadvantage’ of being both female and foreignborn is attributed to the sex-segregated occupational structure that still typifies many modern countries; it limits women’s job opportunities and wages as a whole (Philzacklea, 1983) and comprises of underassessment associated with ascribed affinities including national origin and ethnicity (Epstein, 1973; Hoffman-Nowotny, 1978). Family burdens, normally imposed on women, are aggravated under conditions of immigration and separation from family and relatives, thereby

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limiting the time and energy available for acquiring the language of the receiving country and, consequently, economic attainment patterns (Dumon, 1981; Hoffman-Nowotny, 1978). As noted above, another manifestation of successful absorption and integration is the acquisition of the local language. Linguistic proficiency broadens the possibilities of social and economic integration. Many studies provide empirical evidence of these kinds of relations and their effect, including on labor-market mobility, wage level, and consumption of services and activities of various kinds (Chiswick and Wentz, 2006). Proficiency in the local language is not an independent factor in the reinforcement of immigrants’ socioeconomic acculturation; it combines with higher education that enhances relations between immigrants and natives, expands information and economic opportunities, and correlates positively with higher wages (Chiswick and Miller, 1998; Remennick, 2004). Command of the local language is also important for citizenship, and the combination of both of these generally enhances the likelihood of integrating into the labor market and society at large (Kritz and Gurak, 2005). Notably, in contemporary transnational migration, some migrants wish to maintain their connection with their homeland and events there; this may impede their acquisition of the local language. Proficiency in the language of the new country is also affected by personal characteristics including age, level of education, the presence of children in the home (Long, 1990; Service and Craik, 1993), the ‘distance’ (difference) between the language of the origin country (mother tongue) and that of the destination country (Chiswick and Miller, 1998), and the possibility of avoiding study of the local language, either due to employment in ethnic economic niches or due to the presence of enough people who speak the language of origin in the migrant’s residential environment (Chiswick and Repetto, 2000). Immigrants aspire to naturalization as a matter of course. In the United States, citizenship requires five years of permanent resident alien status, positive behavior, passage of a test in basic English, and demonstration of knowledge of American history and civic rules (Chiswick and Sullivan, 1995). Accordingly, naturalization enshrines the immigrant’s status as a citizen of the new country legally and permanently. Not only does it eradicate the menace of deportation (Castles, 2007); it also confers social entitlements including the right to vote, work, and receive social services. Similarly, citizenship confers many rights relating to sponsorship of the immigration of first-degree relatives.


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Transnational migrants may hold two (or even more) citizenships concurrently. However, one would expect the acquisition of local citizenship to reinforce immigrants’ allegiance to the new country and improve their integration and acculturation (Metropolis Conversation Series, 2007). An important and complementary domain of attainment that attests to socioeconomic absorption is ownership of tangible goods (Alba and Logan, 1992). Since immigrants typically arrive with limited capital and economic assets (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 2000), their consumption behavior and property purchase signify allocation of financial resources through labor-market participation and familiarity with the host culture. Among the various forms of immigrants’ wealth accumulation and material well-being, homeownership may be the most central and important. The fact that homeownership entails a significant financial investment makes it ‘a sign of commitment to the host society, in a manner consistent with assimilation theory’ (Alba and Logan, 1992: 1516). Ownership of dwelling enforces contacts with individuals of high social status and different ethnic backgrounds (Myers, 2005). More generally, it may strengthen the immigrants’ social identity and acceptance by the main-stream of the host society (Balakrishman and Wu, 1992). Furthermore, since family housing has important implications for succession, it reflects disparities between immigrants and the native population as well as among different immigrant groups, and creates the potential for intergenerational socioeconomic inequality (Hamnett, Harmer and Williams, 1991; Saunders, 1990). The implied permanence of purchasing a home is likely to foster the acquisition of various durable goods that combine to improve living conditions and welfare and, accordingly, promote successful housing absorption. Housing characteristics generally help to establish a person’s class status, economic activity, and political preferences, and may also influence social relations (Mitchell, 1971; Slater, 1997). The willingness of people to make housing decisions increases with better understanding of the local market, the perceived impact of the general economy on their household, and the security of their employment (‘consumer confidence’) (Garner, 1991; McCray, Weber and Claypool, 1986; Zagorski and McDonnell, 1995). Therefore, in the case of immigrants, homeownership is an important indication of multifaceted social and economic integration as well as the success of a policy aimed at meeting immigrants’ expectations and attaining the host society’s goals.

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In this chapter, we examine the social and economic mobility and acculturation of Israelis in the United States. We focus on several main social and economic characteristics that jointly may provide a comprehensive insight into these emigrants’ achievements. The characteristics include: education; employment, occupation and income; housing indicators (mainly homeownership); proficiency in English, and citizenship. The selection of these characteristics is largely based on the theoretical and empirical literature on immigrants’ social and economic absorption. These indicators were used in the Ruppin index of immigrant integration in Israel (Semyonov et al., 2007). We investigate the Israelis’ mobility by tracking specific groups (‘cohorts’) of Israelis across the 1980–2000 period. Specifically, we focus on those who arrived in the United States in or before 1975, i.e., who had been in the United States five years or more when the 1980 American census was conducted—a length of time that may provide good evidence of the permanence of their emigration (Cohen, 2007). Representatives of this group were identified in the 1990 census as having been living in the United States for fifteen years or more, and, respectively, for twenty-five years or more in the most recent census, that of 2000. This cohort follow-up allows us to gain an impression of the changes in the social and economic characteristics of these Israelis and to trace their mobility patterns in various senses. In each of these senses, we investigate mobility patterns by main age groups, gender, and geographic and ethnic origin. Similarly, we track the mobility of more recent Israeli emigrants who arrived in the United States between 1975 and 1985, and examine how their socioeconomic achievements changed by 1990 and by 2000. A complementary investigation of the American Israelis’ mobility and absorption focuses on the differences between the socioeconomic attributes of Israelis in three waves of emigration: Israelis in the 1980 census who reached the United States before 1975 (the ‘early’ wave), Israelis in the 1990 census who reached the United States between 1975 and 1984 (the ‘middle’ wave), and Israelis from the 2000 census who reached the United States between 1985 and 1995 (the ‘recent’ wave). This comparison allows us to estimate the effects of different periods of birth, of different socialization processes in the country of origin, and of different experiences in the host society, as factors that relate to acculturation in the United States. Finally, we attempt, by means of a comprehensive investigative array, to asses the contribution of a lengthy series of factors—including


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emigration attributes, regions of settlement, and demographic traits— to the American Israelis’ social and economic mobility. 2. Educational Attainment Education plays an important role in the acculturation of immigrants and their descendants. Advancement in educational attainment is a major avenue to accessing social and economic opportunities among recent waves of immigration to the United States. The economic restructuring in the second half of the twentieth century has substantially reduced the availability of low or semiskilled jobs that once paid good wages and benefits (Massey, 1990). Indeed, because of changes in occupational opportunities geared toward higher levels of schooling, it is likely that the socioeconomic success of recent immigrants will depend more on educational attainment than in the past. Furthermore, the higher one’s level of education, the more one is familiarized with local norms, values, and traditions and, accordingly, the more successful is one’s acculturation. However, educational opportunities may vary among immigrant groups according to the timing of their settlement in the United States, their initial traits, and the value that they attribute to education (Mare, 1995). The educational levels of the Israeli population are differentiated by ethnic origin, namely European/American vs. Asian/African, and further by individual countries of origin within each pair of continents. Coupled with the general long-term improvement in Israeli schooling, the educational attainment of American Israelis may also differ by geographic background. It has also been found that men’s achievements in the various components of social mobility (foremost income) substantially exceed those of women (Lev Ari, 2002, 2008). Notably, American Israelis are better schooled than their Jewish peers in Israel: the average educational attainment of American Israelis at large was 12.8 years in 1980, 13.4 years in 1990, and 13.7 years in 2000. On a similar scale based on three Israeli population censuses that were conducted at roughly the same time, the corresponding rates among Jews in Israel were 8.5 in 1972, 10.1 in 1983, and 11.2 in 1995. Furthermore, the educational attainments of the Israeli emigrants were more impressive than those of the American population, which worked out to 9.7 years, 10.2 years, and 10.6 years, respectively, in the three most recent censuses.

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We now investigate the changes that took place in American Israelis’ average years of schooling. We focus on Israelis who by 1980 had already been in the United States for five years or more; we examine their educational level at this point and as it was observed later on, in 1990 and 2000. Our focus is on those who had emigrated to the United States at age 18 and over. The educational level of these Israelis climbed gradually from an average of 11.5 years in 1980 to 13 in 1990 and 13.1 in 2000 (Table 3.1). The improvement was especially salient among those who had been in the youngest age group of 20– 29: their educational score rose from 12.4 in 1980 to 13.3 during the next decade, by which time they belonged to the 30–39 age bracket, and to 14 in 2000, when they had joined the 40–49 age group. In other words, the average educational level of this cohort rose by more than one and a half years over time. Typically, people make their main scholastic effort when they are young. Accordingly, the improvement at older ages, if any, would be much smaller. Thus, those who were in the 30–39 group at the beginning of the period made only modest improvements in their educational level, and those even older showed inconsistent changes. Table 3.1. Educational Attainment and Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Age, 1980–2000

Average Years of Schooling1 Age 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70+

1980 Census (5+ Years in the U.S.)



11.5

13.0

13.1

12.4 13.6 13.5 11.1 – –

– 13.3 14.0 14.1 12.0 –

– – 14.0 13.8 13.3 11.4

Average years of schooling was measured according to the following scale: No education at all, including kindergarten=0; Grades 1–4=2.5; Grades 5–8=6.5; Grade 9=9; Grade 10=10; Grade 11=11; Grade 12=12; 1–3 years of College=14; 4+ years of college=16.

1


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Educational attainment and mobility vary by gender (Table 3.2). Shortly after they arrived in the United States, men surpassed women in their average level of education with 12.2 years vs. 10.8 years, respectively. Although both groups experienced upward educational mobility, women did so to a greater extent. While men improved their average schooling by one year of study, women added more than two years on average. Gradually, then, the gender disparities among American Israelis disappeared as the average for both genders climbed to slightly over 13 years. Notably, these processes are characteristic of western societies in general, including Israel, where the educational gap between women and men has vanished in recent years and women have pulled slightly ahead among recipients of advanced degrees (Masters and Ph.D.) (Swirski and Swirski, 1998; Schafferman, 2007). Since the acquisition of higher schooling takes place mainly at young ages, as stated, it does not collide with family obligations. In any case, female Israeli emigrants, whether they emigrated alone or with a spouse, acquire schooling credentials similar to those of men. It is anticipated that this will be accompanied by stronger proficiency in English, better acquaintance with local Americans, and deeper exposure to American society and culture. There are differences in educational attainment and mobility between the Israel-born and the foreign-born (Table 3.3). At the beginning of the surveillance period (1980), the Israel-born had perceptively higher educational attainments than foreign-born Israelis with a differential of two years of study—12.6 vs. 10.5, respectively. Over time, however, the foreign-born managed to acquire education at faster rates than their Israeli-born peers and added 2.5 years on average, as against only a modest increase among the Israel-born. Consequently, the differences between the two groups had narrowed greatly by 2000. The evidence of inconsistency in the educational mobility of the Israelborn—of an increase in the first decade followed by a slight decline in Table 3.2. Educational Attainment and Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Gender, 1980–2000

Men Women




12.2 10.8

13.2 12.9

13.1 13.1

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the second decade—suggests some selective remigration of highly educated Israelis to a third country or, almost certainly, back to Israel. By contrast, the foreign-born, after having already experienced immigration once (to Israel) and having left that country, would find it harder to return to Israel even if they had amassed important human capital in the United States. In any case, these Israel-born, unlike the foreignborn, may have intended ab initio to spend a limited period of time in the United States in order to acquire higher education and advanced degrees, and even if their stay in the United States was prolonged for whatever reason, ultimately they returned to Israel. The findings about differences between the Israel-born and the foreign-born in initial levels of education largely reflect their schooling in Israel. The Israel-born had better educational opportunities than the foreign-born, including those relating to high-school equivalency and even academic studies. Some of the foreign-born were Holocaust survivors from Europe who had not managed to complete their studies in their countries of origin and, having reached Israel, had to contend with acculturation and livelihood hardships. Others came from Asian or African countries, which in the mid-twentieth century were still in the early phases of transition from traditional to modern societies, and attributed no great value to secular education. The difference between Israel-born and foreign-born emigrants was further augmented since, as early studies have suggested (Lev Ari, 2002), most Israeli-born emigrants to the United States in the first decades after the country was founded were offspring of immigrants from Europe; their educational attainments in Israel at the time were immeasurably higher than those of the offspring of immigrants from Asia and northern Africa (Swirski and Swirski, 1998; Pasternak, 2003). The trend among foreign-born Israelis in the United States, i.e., the narrowing of gaps between themselves and the Israel-born, offers an explanation according to which these emigrants had a strong infrastructure for the acquisition of education and an awareness of its importance and the possibilities that it would allow them for successful acculturation in the United States. For the foreign-born of European origin, educational mobility marks the continuation of prior traditions of aspiring to education and the acquisition of knowledge; the conditions of their settlement in the United States now allowed them to act on these traditions. For those born in Asia and northern Africa, who, as stated, had been less exposed to modernization processes, this mobility reflects positive selection among members of this group in Israel.


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Table 3.3. Educational Attainment and Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Place of Birth (Israel or Other Country) and by Ethnic Origin, 1980–2000

Place of Birth Israel-born Foreign-born Ethnic Origin Israel Europe-America Asia-Africa




12.6 10.5

13.7 12.2

13.2 13.0

12.5 11.2 11.2

13.7 12.6 13.4

13.1 12.9 13.3

Indeed, the highest level of education in the 1980 census (12.5 years) was reported by those who declared their ancestry as Israeli; those of European/American and Asian/African origin were far behind (11.2 years in both groups). It is interesting that the educational characteristics of the latter groups were absolutely identical at the time. This similarity suggests that emigration to the United States by Israelis of European/American origin may have been negatively selective, i.e., less educated members of this group in Israel emigrated, while the emigration of those of Asian/African origin was positively selective, i.e., composed of the better educated stratum among this group. Later on, the Israelis of Asian/African origin experienced faster mobility and by 2000, had caught up with the other two origin groups—Israeli and European/American. Thus far, our analysis has focused on the educational characteristics and mobility of Israelis who arrived in the United States before the mid-1970s (the ‘early’ wave). Our attention now turns to the question: what were the educational characteristics of more recent Israeli emigrants and what were their experiences in their new country? To this end, we trace the group that arrived in the United States in the decade between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s (the ‘middle’ wave). The data in Table 3.4 indicate that the educational profile of this group was much different from that of the earlier Israeli emigrants. At the first point of our surveillance of these emigrants, they had 13.4 years of schooling on average, two years more than the early Israeli emigrants had (Table 3.1). Given their initial educational attainment at the point of departure, one would expect any further improvement to

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be slower. Indeed, by 2000 their number of years of study had increased only slightly, to 13.6. Even so, they were better educated that year than the Israeli emigrants of the early wave. Detailed data show that the educational level of Israeli emigrants of the middle wave surpassed the attainments of their predecessors in all age groups who had arrived in the country before the mid-1970s. Improvement was evident in most age groups and took place largely at the same rate. Furthermore, the initial high educational level of the new arrivals characterized both men and women. The strong similarity between the genders is especially striking in view of the gender differences that were found in our aforementioned observations of long tenured American Israelis. What is more, it was the Israeli women who held a small advantage in average educational level. With the prolongation of time in the United States, however, the more similar the men’s and women’s educational levels became amid upward mobility. The educational level of Israel-born and foreign-born Israelis is especially interesting among emigrants of the middle wave. Unlike the veteran emigrants, those who arrived in the United States between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, the foreign-born typically displayed especially high educational attainments shortly after their arrival. A large share of these foreign-born Israelis may have immigrated to Israel in childhood and were less influenced than the earlier generation by conditions in their countries of birth that limited the acquisition of education; in contrast, they were exposed to the educational opportunities that Israel offered. It may also be that some of these foreign-born Israeli emigrants had reached Israel in the late 1960s and early 1970s from West European and other developed countries, possibly bringing educational attainments that were already high, as would befit the high socioeconomic class of Jews in those countries, and moved to the United States later on. Over the years, however, it was in fact the Israel-born who experienced especially significant upward educational mobility. The decrease in the schooling level of foreignborn Israelis is a little difficult to explain. One possibility is that those among them who left the United States—perhaps back to their country of birth—were positively selective. Another possibility is that some members of this group redefined their ancestry: as their tenure in Israel receded into the distance, and since they had not been born in Israel, they chose to define their ancestry in terms of their country of birth. For this reason, and since they also seem to have spoken the


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vernacular of their country of origin (not Hebrew) at home, they no longer corresponded to our typology of Israelis in the American censuses. The greater exposure of the foreign-born to the Israeli education system, together with the change in the countries of origin of the foreign-born Israelis, also greatly narrowed the initial differences by ethnic origin (as compared with their fellow Israelis who had emigrated to the United States earlier). It may also be that their especially high levels of education are explained by their Western origin; many of them were born in Europe/America. We treat the long-term changes among those born in Asia/Africa with a grain of salt due to the small number of cases (several dozen only) in this group. The most recent Israeli emigrants (1986–1995) were characterized, shortly after their arrival in the United States, i.e. in 2000, by a higher level of education than their predecessors had at a similar stage of their settlement in the country. Furthermore, the recent immigrants’ educational level was higher than that attained by Israelis of the early and Table 3.4. Educational Attainment and Mobility among American Israelis of the Middle and Recent Emigration Waves by Main Demographic Characteristics, 1990–2000

Average Years of Education Age 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 Gender Men Women Place of Birth Israel-born Foreign-born Ethnic Origin Israel Europe-America Asia-Africa

1990 Census (5–15 Years in the U.S.)



13.4

13.6

14.0

13.8 13.4 13.8 13.2 –

– 14.0 13.6 13.6 13.5

13.7 14.1 14.2 13.7 14.0

13.4 13.6

13.6 13.6

13.9 14.2

13.3 13.7

13.7 13.2

13.9 14.5

13.1 13.8 13.4

13.7 13.9 12.7

13.8 14.6 14.3

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middle waves by 2000. These findings suggest—if one may judge by educational attainments—that the selectivity of Israeli emigration to the United States has become much more positive. The high attainments of members of the most recent wave are especially typical of several subgroups: the middle age brackets, women, the foreign-born, and those of European/American and Asian/African origin (and are less typical of the Israel-born and those of no distinct ethnic origin). 3. Economic Acculturation: Employment, Occupation, and Income Above we argued that (voluntary) migration is the outgrowth of interregional differences in labor availability, labor demand, and wages. People leave countries that have abundant supplies of labor and low supplies of capital in favor of wealthy countries that are typified by high wages and limited availability of labor (Massey et al., 1993). Through migration, people aspire to professional advancement, a higher income, and a better quality of life (Castles and Miller, 1998). From this perspective, international migration is perceived as a kind of investment in human capital (Sjaastad, 1962). Economic advancement is rarely immediate; when they first settle in the destination country, many emigrants lose some of their economic status. However, the longer they stay and the more familiar they become with the new labor market, the more they attain higher rungs on the occupational and income ladder and the more they benefit from rewards that correspond to their occupational credentials until they attain a standard of living that resembles, if not surpasses, that of the local population (Borjas and Tienda, 1993; Chiswick, 1978; 1979; Raijman and Semyonov, 1997). Most studies on American Israelis attest that this group has higher socioeconomic attainments than those of the Israeli Jewish population as well as that of the United States population (Cohen and Haberfeld, 1997; Eisenbach, 1989). Nevertheless, Israelis can be found on both ends of the socioeconomic continuum. In contrast to people whose occupations confer prestige and high income, there are others who occupy low strata on the social scale including some who are under the poverty line (Cohen, 1988, 1989; Cohen and Tyree, 1994). Below we examine three different complementary economic characteristics of American Israelis—labor-force participation, occupation, and income—and their advancement in each of them.


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In 1980, roughly six of every ten Israelis who had been in the United States for five years or more were employed (Table 3.5). This employment rate remained fairly stable over the next two decades, as shown by the findings for 1990 and 2000. It closely resembles the employment rate among Americans at large (Wetzel, 1995) and approximates that of American Jews (Kotler-Berkowitz et al., 2003). In other words, emigrant status, which is often accompanied by the lack of an economic advantage, did not significantly mitigate the Israelis’ prospects of working. Presumably, a stable employment rate leaves room for movement in and out of the labor market at different stages of the life cycle, including studies, parenting, and retirement. Indeed, the detailed data by age show that the employment rate among American Israelis in the 20–29 bracket (which certainly includes those who were studying) was quite low in 1980, climbed afterwards to a high level among those aged 30–39 and 40–49, and then tumbled to an especially low level among those aged 60+. Follow-up of a given age group reveals, somewhat surprisingly, that the employment rate of those who were youngest at the beginning of the period declined in the first decade, from two-thirds to around one-half. The latter rate, among people who had reached their thirties, was perceptibly lower than that of their peers in the same age group in 1980. One possible explanation for this is a change over time in the gender ratio among members of this group. Thus, men slightly outnumbered women among those aged 20–29 in 1980 but women accounted for a clear majority (two-thirds) of the group a decade later, when the group was aged 30–39. Since marriage and childbirth are prevalent at this age, many women temporarily left the labor market and brought down the group’s total employment rate. Another explanation is one of positive selection: people who were the youngest in 1980 subsequently re-migrated to Israel, i.e., those who had worked and acquired advanced occupational credentials returned, whereas those who had not done as well stayed behind to continue seeking economic opportunities. In any event, these Israelis, having advanced to the next age group (40–49), had already attained the high employment rates that are typical of this stage in the life cycle, including the rates observed among members of the corresponding age bracket of Israelis two decades earlier. For the other age groups, the long-term changes correspond to the expected progression of stability or slight increase in the employment rate in the transition to middle

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age, followed by a downward turn as they reached the older age brackets and retired. Most employed Israelis are wage-earners (Table 3.5). Over time, however, they have made a perceptible shift from wage labor to selfemployment. This change can be seen both in differences in the first period (1980), especially among the three youngest age groups as well as in changes that the Israelis experienced as they aged. We infer from this change that, in their initial stages of settling into the new country, especially if this occurred at an early age when they had had no experience in self-management in their country of origin, American Israelis prefer to hold wage-earning posts—some of which, beyond doubt, are with firms and businesses owned by long-tenured Israelis (Sobel, 1986). In the early phases of their stay in the United States, they are insufficiently familiar with the domestic market to open their own business, their proficiency in English is somewhat limited, and they still lack the economic capital to invest in a private business. These characteristics of emigration also limit banks’ willingness to lend to them. As the emigrants gain longevity in the United States, many of these obstacles disappear. Furthermore, the Israelis build up their acquaintances and informal contacts with each other over time, including joint economic initiatives in self-employed settings. Increased familiarity with the American economy may also be helpful in attempts to develop international business relations with Israel and with other countries by means of Israeli emigrants who chose to settle in them. The main professional pursuits of Israelis in the early stages of their lives in America are white-collar and managerial jobs (Table 3.6). 70 percent of American Israelis were concentrated in the highest ranks of the occupational scale in 1980. The others worked mainly in services and menial blue-collar jobs; only a few held sales and clerical posts. This profile has undergone rather substantial changes, although at a slow pace that took two decades to come to light. Thus by 2000 the share of skilled workers had declined greatly and the share of persons employed in sales and clerical positions had increased vigorously. Generally speaking, the American Israelis’ occupational prestige improved mildly but perceptibly in the first decade and drifted downward later on. These trends correspond, by and large, to the aforementioned tendency of transition from wage labor to self-employment. We suggest that these changes also reflect the occupations of Israelis who chose to


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Table 3.5. Employment Characteristics among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Age, 1980–2000

Total Employment Rate Employment by Age 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70+ Total Wage Earners Rate Employees by Age 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70+




59.1

62.5

57.8

66.7 85.7 80.0 73.1 40.9 – 78.3

– 52.4 85.7 87.7 50.0 8.9 72.1

– – 83.3 78.4 58.5 13.5 68.5

89.7 82.1 68.1 77.3 84.6 –

– 71.4 70.4 74.1 71.4 75.6

– – 56.2 70.4 67.6 73.3

stay in the United States, whereas those in the advanced professions were more inclined to return to Israel or migrate to a third country. The changes in the occupational profile of American Israelis are revealed through a cohort follow-up (Table 3.6). Among those aged 20–39 in 1980 and 40–59 two decades later (in 2000), the proportion of white-collar workers fell from 46.4 percent to 29.9 percent, respectively, and that of managers declined from 29.8 percent to 19.6 percent, whereas the share of salespeople and clerks increased nearly tenfold, from 3.6 percent to 32 percent. Similar trends, albeit at a slightly slower pace, also characterized those in the middle-aged cohorts, who were in their forties and fifties at the beginning of the period and aged 60+ at the end.

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Table 3.6. Occupational Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Age, 1980–2000 (Percentages)

Total White-Collar Managers Sales/Secretarial Services Blue-Collar Occupation by age Total White-Collar Managers Sales/Secretarial Services Blue-Collar Total White-Collar Managers Sales/Secretarial Services Blue-Collar

1980 Census (5+ Years in the US)



100.0 45.0 24.2 4.5 11.4 14.9 Age 20–39 100.0 46.4 29.8 3.6 3.6 16.7 Age 40–59 100.0 43.5 23.9 6.5 13.0 13.0

100.0 47.3 28.2 5.3 11.2 8.0 Age 30–49 100.0 43.4 32.5 4.8 12.0 7.2 Age 50–69 100.0 48.3 27.0 6.7 9.0 9.0

100.0 32.9 18.5 32.2 4.8 11.6 Age 40–59 100.0 29.9 19.6 32.0 4.1 14.4 Age 60–79 100.0 40.4 14.9 34.0 6.4 4.3

Another indicator of economic success is income level. Obviously, the value of the United States dollar changed over time due to inflation, boosting nominal income commensurately. The question is whether the increase in the Israelis’ income mirrored the inflation rate and, if not, whether it surpassed inflation or failed to keep up. Notably, the dollar appreciated in nominal terms by 170 percent between 1980 and 1990 and by 130 percent between 1990 and 2000—bringing the total nominal increase in 1980–2000 to 230 percent (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2007). The increase in the American Israelis’ income level was much, much greater than the inflation rate; the average income tripled in the first decade and increased by another 150 percent in the second decade—by 470 percent during the two decades (Table 3.7). The pattern of income across age groups shows an upward trend until the 40–49 bracket, where income peaks and then declines. In the longterm upward mobility of income from young age to mature age, the


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Table 3.7. Income Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Age, 1980–2000

Average Income Income by Age 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70+




$12,280

$38,327

$58,471

$8,438 $14,342 $18,016 $13,178 $12,632 $7,328

– $26,761 $49,782 $48,454 $30,614 $19,523

– – $83,052 $62,893 $68,429 $32,329

improvement was more significant and conspicuous among the younger age cohorts. For example, the income of those aged 20–29 in 1980 had increased by 320 percent by 1990, when they moved into the 30–39 age bracket, and the income of those aged 30–39 in 1980 increased by 350 percent in the next decade, by which time they had joined the 40–49 bracket. Among older age groups in 1980, the improvement in income was less than threefold. These differences reflect typical possibilities of improving terms of employment at relatively early phases of occupational careers until attaining a high income in middle age, after which any improvement is more modest. The income level falls perceptibly at older ages, when retirement becomes prevalent. A comprehensive insight into the mobility of Israeli Americans is provided by means of the Duncan Socioeconomic Index (SEI). This index is a composite of three characteristics—years of study, occupation, and income level which are arrayed on a 0–96 scale (Burgard et al., 2003). This index, as calculated for our population group, (not shown here) climbed briskly in the first decade, from 35.9 to 42, but then receded slightly, to 40.7. Given the trends analyzed above for the specific components of this index—schooling level, occupation, and income level—one gets the impression that the increase in the Israelis’ levels of schooling and income did not compensate for the recent decline in occupational status, which had an appreciable effect on the total score. Furthermore, this index is sensitive to mobility among specific occupations in each of the broad categories analyzed here. Therefore,

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transitions to less prestigious types of work may have occurred within the categories, too. The economic characteristics of American Israelis and the changes that they have undergone over time are not uniform among men and women (Table 3.8). Several of the gender differences are especially salient: more Israeli men are employed than women; a larger proportion of men are wage-earners; the share of men employed in whitecollar occupations is lower but the share employed in management is higher; and the men’s income is appreciably higher than the women’s. However, the gender differences in all economic indicators have narrowed over time, and not always gradually. For example, the gender ratio in the employment rate declined from 1.9 in 1980 to 1.5 in 2000, that in the proportions of wage-earners narrowed from 0.8 to 0.97, that in the shares of white-collar workers fell from 0.5 to 0.7 and that in income narrowed from 3.5 to 2.5. Notably, these developments toward greater gender resemblance in economic characteristics coincide with very similar trends in both gender groups in the share of wage-earners, the share of white-collar workers, and in income levels. The differences between women and men have been narrowing Table 3.8. Economic Characteristics and Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Gender, 1980–2000

Employment Rate Men Women Wage-earners Rate Men Women Occupation Men White-Collar Managers Women White-Collar Managers Average Income Men Women




76.5 41.2

71.9 50.5

67.2 44.9

72.0 88.5

66.4 82.4

67.7 70.0

33.3 32.5

44.3 30.3

29.2 21.9

64.5 10.5

53.0 24.2

40.0 12.0

$18,861 $5,477

$54,503 $17,699

$78,194 $31,435


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because these developments have been moving more rapidly among women. There is one exception: the employment rate, which changed in opposite directions for American Israeli men and women. These findings correspond firmly with the ‘double disadvantage’ theory of being a woman and an emigrant and the vitiation of its impact as the emigrants’ stay in the new country is prolonged. Native-born Israelis outperform foreign-born Israelis in economic attainments in the United States (Table 3.9). This is manifested in various economic characteristics of employment rate, occupational composition, and income level. Insofar as these differences correspond to economic inferiority among the foreign-born Israelis before they left Israel, this subgroup may have sensed the failure of its economic absorption in Israel and, accordingly, chose to leave Israel and emigrate to a third country (the United States). Over time, however, the disparities in economic attainments between the Israeli-born and the foreign-born have narrowed greatly. In one important economic variable, income level, the two groups have even achieved parity. Table 3.9. Employment Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Place of Birth, 1980–2000

Employment Rates Israel-born Other Countries Salaried Rates Israel-born Other Countries Occupational Status Israel-Born White-Collar Managers Other Countries White-Collar Managers Average Income Israel-born Other Countries




68.3 51.2

73.7 48.6

62.1 53.7

78.9 77.7

77.6 63.5

69.7 67.1

50.0 26.9

45.6 31.6

38.2 17.1

39.4 21.3

50.0 23.0

27.1 20.0

$14,000 $10,802

$42,571 $33,089

$57,934 $58,983

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Distinction among American Israelis according to ethnic origin reveals differences in economic success (Table 3.10). Some of the differences are definitely explained by the demographic composition of the various subgroups, especially age and gender. Especially noteworthy is the higher rate of wage-earners among Israelis of European/American origin and the contrasting low rate of wage-earners among Israelis of Asian/African origin; the high concentration of persons of Israeli and European/American origin on the high rungs of the occupational ladder, relative to Israelis of Asian/African origin; and the absence of significant disparities in income level despite these differences in the nature of employment. To the extent that income is a major component in the individual’s subjective assessment of h/her economic success, there are no meaningful differences among the various origin groups. Furthermore, the close similarity in income level between Israelis of Asian/African origin and European/American origin may Table 3.10. Employment Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Ethnic Group, 1980–2000

Employment Rate Israel Europe-America Asia-Africa Wage Earners Rate Israel Europe-America Asia-Africa Occupation Israel White-Collar Managers Europe-America White-Collar Managers Average Income Israel Europe-America Asia-Africa




71.6 54.1 60.6

74.4 53.2 72.7

67.6 48.7 73.9

74.2 82.0 68.4

71.0 76.0 55.0

71.4 70.8 50.0

52.5 26.2

48.5 32.4

42.9 12.5

43.0 23.1

48.5 26.3

30.6 23.6

$12,569 $12,426 $10,775

$40,967 $33,434 $59,951

$59,496 $58,626 $54,520


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give the former a strong sense of satisfaction and evidence of the utilization of their capabilities in America in a way that persons of Asian/ African origin had not attained—at least to the same extent—in Israel, where the income gaps by ethnic origin are much greater. Table 3.11 presents the economic characteristics of the later Israeli emigrants, those of the ‘middle’ wave, who arrived in the United States between 1976 and 1985, and those of the most recent wave, who arrived in 1986–1995. Shortly after their arrival, those in the middle wave had higher employment rates than their predecessors had shortly after their arrival and even after having lived in the United States for twenty-five years. The employment rates of emigrants in the middle wave remained stable over time. Concurrently, the share of wageearners among middle wave emigrants was low from the outset, resembling that of the early emigrants after a relatively lengthy stay in the United States. Hence, it can be interpreted that this high employment rate is associated with the opening of independent businesses. Another explanation, we believe, has to do with the types of work that middle wave Israelis do: a larger share of these emigrants holds research and development jobs with high-tech companies than do long-tenured American Israelis. They arranged these jobs before leaving Israel and assured themselves rapid integration into the labor market. The middle wave emigrants, like the long-tenured ones, gravitated over time to sales jobs and away from white-collar and managerial posts. However, the transition to sales jobs took place faster among the middle emigrants—within one decade—than among the long-tenured, who spread the process across two decades. We infer that these changes in occupation and greater concentration in sales industries are not related specifically to longevity in the United States; rather, they are periodic changes that reflect new preferences in types of work. Be this as it may, the sales jobs continued to be with firms that employ Israelis as wageearners. Although the data cannot show this, the changeover from skilled jobs to sales may have occurred at the same workplace. Finally, the average income of middle Israeli emigrants shortly after arrival was considerably lower than that of their long-tenured Israeli peers in the same year (in 1990: slightly less than $30,000 as against slightly more than $38,000, respectively). However, given the inflation rate in the 1980–1990 decade, the initial salary of new arrivals in 1990 strongly resembled that of long-tenured Israelis in 1980. By 2000, the income level of American Israelis from both waves attained parity. In a nutshell, largely based on the employment rate and the income level,

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Table 3.11. Economic Characteristics and Mobility among the Middle and Recent Waves of Israeli Emigrants in the United States, 1990–2000 Middle Wave 1990 Census (5–15 Years in the U.S.) Employment Rate Wage Earners Rate Occupation White-Collar Managers Sales Services Blue-Collar Average Income

76.6 70.5 46.8 26.0 3.9 12.3 11.0 $28,551

Recent Wave

2000 Census (15–25 Years in the U.S.) 76.3 70.7 30.7 17.1 35.0 4.3 12.9 $59,439

2000 Census (5–15 Years in the U.S.) 74.7 78.5 40.3 15.4 19.5 10.7 14.1 $45,634

we suggest that the economic absorption of the middle wave Israeli emigrants was faster than that of their predecessors. Emigrants of the most recent wave had similar employment rates to those of the middle wave (Table 3.11). The share of wage-earners among them was higher, approximating that of the early emigrants. However, as we see from the types of jobs that they held, the high rates were not in white-collar occupations but rather, at least to a larger extent than among the long-tenured emigrants, in sales. These emigrants’ income level in 2000 was approximately $15,000 less than that of early and middle wave emigrants that year. This reflects differences in the longevity of their work in the United States, among other factors. 4. Housing Characteristics Acculturation and socioeconomic mobility in a new country are also reflected in housing characteristics. Characteristics of housing are among the most important aspects of the accumulation of property and material welfare. Immigrants purchase a home in accordance with their economic status in the destination country and the extent to which they believe that their settlement is permanent (Garner, 1991;


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McCray, Weber, and Claypool, 1986; Zagorski and McDonnell, 1995). We investigate two aspects of housing: homeownership and, among homeowners, home value. We focus mainly on differences in housing characteristics by age and place of birth, noting that we found no significant differences on grounds of gender and ethnic origin. In 1980, five years or more after they arrived in the United States, more than half of the Israelis (58.5 percent) already owned a home (Table 3.12). The homeownership rate among these emigrants climbed to around three-fourths in 1990 and to 80.1 percent in 2000, by which time they had amassed 25+ years of longevity. Notably, this rate is especially high; it surpasses that of Americans in general, which was less than 70 percent in 2000. Furthermore, we found a significant correspondence between homeownership and age. In the first period (1980), the homeownership rate was low in the young age cohorts, rose among those of middle age—the increase likely associated with marital status (marriage and children)—and declined again in the oldest age groups. This may reflect emigration in later stages of the life cycle, by which time the emigrants’ remaining tenure in the United States and their economic possibilities, including the earning of income and the acceptance of loans, were limited. The tendency to purchase a home seems to have been influenced not only by the stages of the life cycle but also by duration in the United States. Indeed, the cohort follow-up shows an increase in the share of homeowners as the emigrants move into older age groups, and the rates found are higher than those of their peers of the same age group ten years earlier. For example, the homeownership rate among those aged 20–29 increased from 41.7 percent in 1980 to 85.7 percent in 1990, by which time they were aged 30–39—a considerably higher rate than that of homeowners aged 30–39 in 1980 (73 percent). The rate of the surveyed cohort continued to climb afterwards, to 88.9 percent in 2000, when members of the group were aged 40–49 and had amassed 25+ years of duration in the United States. This rate, too, surpassed that of homeowners aged 40– 49 in 1980 (70.9 percent) and in 1990 (81.8 percent). Thus the findings attest, almost without exception, to the combined effect of age and duration in the United States on homeownership.

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Table 3.12. Housing Characteristics and Mobility among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Age and Place of Birth, 1980–2000

Homeownership Rate-Total Ownership by Age 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70+ Homeownership by Place of Birth Israel-born Other Countries Average Value of Home Average Value by Age 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70+ Average value by Place of Birth Israel-born Other Countries




58.5

76.2

80.1

41.7 73.0 70.9 57.7 59.1 45.2

– 85.7 81.8 86.0 72.9 53.3

– – 88.9 80.7 83.0 73.1

58.3 58.6 $334,743

81.8 69.4 $258,915

77.7 82.4 $355,014

$235,666 $339,157 $360,833 $263,583 $419,614 $374,052

– $260,972 $309,444 $257,193 $208,857 $201,249

– – $426,562 $363,978 $389,999 $267,631

$295,401 $368,289

$235,129 $350,168

$360,406 $350,168

Initially, the native-born Israelis and the foreign-born had the same home-ownership rate (around 58 percent). The Israeli-born, however, moved into private homes more rapidly than did the foreign-born. By 1990, more than 80 percent of the Israel-born owned a home as compared to only slightly more than two-thirds of the foreign-born. This finding is somewhat surprising, since one might expect the Israel-born to be less confident about the permanence of their settlement in the United States than the foreign-born, who had already experienced emigration twice—first to Israel and more recently to the United States—and regarded the latter country as their final home. By 2000,


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however, the rate of homeownership among the foreign-born also exceeded 80 percent. As the share of homeowners rose, the value of their homes declined— from an average of slightly more than $300,000 to around $250,000. The decrease was actually more startling than it looks because, as shown above, inflation was brisk during that decade. One explanation—consistent with the foregoing interpretations of the fluctuations in educational attainment and changes in occupation—is that there was selective return migration to Israel by the American Israelis who had attained high socioeconomic status and also owned the most expensive homes. Another explanation is that the Israelis who delayed buying a home may have belonged to lower socioeconomic strata than those who bought homes shortly after they reached the United States; over time, they did marshal the resources to buy homes but the dwellings purchased were modest and relatively inexpensive. As they amassed tenure in the United States, they improved their housing conditions and moved into more expensive homes. The average price of an Israeli-owned home in 2000 gives evidence of this; it rose (while the homeownership rate hardly changed) even after taking into account the inflation rate during the past decade. These fluctuations in home value characterized most age cohorts as they moved into older brackets. An exception was the youngest cohort at the beginning of the period; it experienced consistent upward mobility and also attained the highest level of home value. In other words, emigration at a very young age, at the beginning of adult life, enhances the prospects of home ownership and also of auspicious housing conditions as reflected in the value of the property. As with homeownership, from this additional standpoint of its financial value as well, the Israel-born and the foreign-born achieved very similar outcomes over time despite initial differences and slightly different patterns of advancement. Comparison of the various emigration waves (Table 3.13) suggests that emigrants in the middle wave bought homes with slightly greater celerity than the early-wave Israelis did. Among Israelis who arrived in the United States in the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, 63.6 percent owned a home by 1990 (compared with 58.5 percent of Israelis in 1980 who had settled in the United States before 1975). The increase in the homeownership rate was very similar to that of the early emigrants; by 2000, slightly more than three-fourths owned their own homes. Among recent-wave emigrants, the homeownership rate

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Homeownership Rate-Total Average Value of Home

Recent Wave




63.6

78.7

64.4

$254,935

$361,033

$572,284

in 2000 (64.4 percent) closely approximated that of emigrants from the previous wave after they had amassed similar tenure in the United States (63.6 percent). Interestingly, the average value of a home in 1990 was very similar among early and recent emigrants with this similarity persisting even after the increase in home value by 2000. This similarity may reflect imitation of longer-tenured Israelis by new emigrants upon their arrival in the United States. Further on, both groups displayed the same mobility patterns. However, the homes bought by the most recent arrivals were far more expensive than those purchased by their predecessors.

5. Proficiency in English Acquisition of and proficiency in the English language enhances an Israeli emigrant’s chances of finding work. The more proficient an emigrant is in English, the more types of employment and posts s/he can obtain and, in turn, the more social and economic progress s/he will make. A certain level of proficiency in English is also essential for naturalization. We assume that an important factor in disparities among Israelis in their English proficiency is their place of birth— Israel or elsewhere—including geographic origin: Europe/America or Asia/Africa. Given that most foreign-born Israelis originate not in Anglophone countries but in east-central Europe, where the study and use of English is severely limited, or in Asian/African countries, Israelborn emigrants who went through the Israeli education system have a stronger background in English and consequently progress and attain more in the United States. Israelis of European/American origin, whether born in Israel or elsewhere, are probably more exposed to


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Latin languages or other tongues related to English than their counterparts of Asian/African origin; accordingly, they are also accustomed to the consumption of culture in a foreign language. Furthermore, later emigrants were more intensively exposed to English before emigration via the education system, advanced electronic media, and the growing penetration of American culture in Israel. This factor, combined with their higher level of education, gives them a better grasp of English than earlier emigrants had, at least at the beginning of their settlement in the United States. In 1980, around 65 percent of Israeli emigrants who had been in the United States five years or more spoke English very well or exclusively, another one-third spoke English well, and a minority of 4 percent hardly spoke English or reported their proficiency in English as nil (Table 3.14). A decade later, in 1990, this group of American Israelis had improved its command of English considerably, nearly threefourths speaking English very well or exclusively. By 2000, the English proficiency of the early generation of Israeli emigrants showed a decline. This may reflect the aforementioned positive selection in return migration to Israel of socioeconomically advanced Israelis who, by leaving America, lowered the average English proficiency level of their peers who remained in the United States. Another explanation is that as these emigrants aged, they were less connected with official working environments and, perhaps, preferred increasingly to use their mother tongue at home and with relatives, resulting in some decline in their English proficiency. All three of the youngest age cohorts improved their command of English considerably in the first decade (1980–1990). The very youngest group continued to improve its proficiency in the second decade as well, 77.8 percent of its members reported being able to speak English very well or exclusively. The other age groups, contrarily, became less proficient in English. The above explanations relating to the AmericanIsraeli population at large, namely selective return migration to Israel and aging of the population, can correspond to the downward trend in English proficiency in the transition to older ages. In any event, in 2000 all age cohorts except the oldest were more proficient in English than their peers of the same age two decades earlier, in 1980. In other words, living in the United States improved the emigrants’ English: after 25 or more years in the country, they were more fluent than Israelis of similar age shortly after they settled in the United States. Still, around one-fourth of the American Israelis, even after a long

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tenure in the United States and even though some had settled there while relatively young, had not become truly fluent in English. Shortly after settling in the United States, men were more proficient in English than women. Later on, the women closed the gap and pulled ahead. These changes are somewhat surprising because men had a much higher employment rate than women and labor-force participation creates more contact with the surrounding population and more opportunities to improve language skills. However, as we showed above, the gender disparities in educational attainment narrowed perceptibly in the first decade and disappeared totally later on. Accordingly, women’s educational mobility was stronger than men’s and must have been related to the study in English at academic institutes. Likewise, a higher share of women than of men held wageearning posts and the nature of their work involved the need to speak the local language to a larger extent. For other women, it may be that staying at home and carrying the burden of family needs, including interacting with schools and children’s informal networks and, perhaps, watching more television, also enhanced their use of the language. In later years, the gender differences became even wider. Although we are measuring English proficiency here, the findings may be compared with those of Lev Ari (2002, 2008), who found no perceptible differences between men and women in speaking English. In reading English, however, the self-testimony of respondents suggested that women assess their ability to read English more positively than men do. Initially, native-born Israelis and the foreign-born were similarly proficient in English (Table 3.14). However, language mobility and improvement were faster among the Israel-born, who, despite fluctuations over time, pulled far ahead of their foreign-born peers. These differences may reflect disparate socioeconomic structural characteristics, including faster mobility among the Israel-born in education (especially during the first decade, 1980–1990); a higher employment rate, including employment in wage-earning posts; and a stronger concentration in white-collar occupations. Insight into English proficiency by ethnic extraction emphasizes, in particular, the appreciable improvement that took place among Israelis of Asian/African origin. Recall that this group experienced the most substantial mobility in educational level until it surpassed, on average, the levels of emigrants of Israeli or European/American origin.


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Table 3.14. English Proficiency among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Selected Demographic Characteristics, 1980–2000 English Proficiency

Total No/Little English Speaks well Speaks very well/only English




100.0 4.0 31.2 64.8

100.0 2.8 23.8 73.4

100.0 3.8 28.9 67.2

English Proficiency (well/very well/only English) Age Groups 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70+

58.4 66.7 52.7 69.2 72.7 69.9

– 71.4 74.0 86.0 66.7 64.4

– – 77.8 70.5 75.4 50.0

72.7 74.3

63.9 71.9

80.3 64.9

72.8 62.0

77.9 71.9 63.6

70.4 64.1 73.9

Gender Men Women

67.3 62.2 Place of Birth

Israel-born Foreign-born

65.4 64.2 Ethnic Origin

Israel Europe-America Asia-Africa

62.1 69.6 42.4

As we expected, shortly after they reached the United States the later Israeli emigrants were characterized by greater fluency in English than veteran Israelis at similar stages of their social acculturation in the United States, at rates of approximately three-fourths of middle wave emigrants and nearly 80 percent among those of the most recent wave (as against slightly less than two-thirds of the early emigrants) (Table 3.15). Data not shown here for lack of space suggest that the

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Table 3.15. English Proficiency among Middle and Recent Wave Israeli Emigrants in the United States, 1990–2000 Middle Wave

Total No/Little English Speaks well Speaks very well/only English

Recent Wave




100.0 3.3 22.3 74.4

100.0 7.7 20.7 71.6

100.0 4.6 16.1 79.3

improvement in English was typical of both genders and of Israelis from different ethnic backgrounds, and was particularly noticeable among those of Asian/African extraction. Assuming that English proficiency is related to other socioeconomic attainments, it is argued that the emigration of Israelis at large, including those of Asian/African origin, has become more positive-selective in recent times. Furthermore, recent emigrants born in Israel made a greater improvement in their English than veteran emigrants, but recent foreign-born emigrants did not. Apparently, the countries of origin of the latter group resemble those of their veteran American-Israeli peers—countries where exposure to English and opportunities to learn the language may have been deficient. Unlike the veteran Israeli emigrants, who improved their command of English while newly settled in the United States (the decline occurred only later), emigrants in the middle wave experienced a decline in their English proficiency in the first decade. Although the decline was slight, it may indicate that successful Israelis who decide to return to Israel are making this decision more quickly than in the past. 6. American Citizenship Naturalization cements an immigrant’s official status as a citizen of h/her new country. Accordingly, it is a major step in h/her social and economic acculturation and integration. In the United States, immigrants must spend at least five years in the country before they can receive citizenship. Since both the United States and Israel allow dual


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citizenship, Israeli emigrants do not need to renounce their Israeli citizenship or vacillate about the matter in order to be naturalized; most remain citizens of both countries. By retaining their Israeli citizenship, they may apply for Israeli citizenship for their foreign-born children as well. The long-term changes in the share of Israelis who hold American citizenship are perhaps the most consistent and significant among all indicators examined in this chapter (Table 3.16). By 1980, after five years or more in the United States, more than three-fourths of the Israeli emigrants already held United States citizenship. The rate climbed to roughly 90 percent ten years later and to nearly 95 percent in 2000. Thus, almost all Israelis who have spent 25+ years in the United States are American citizens. The upward trend is evident in all age cohorts as they advance in years and prolong their stay in the United States. Mobility toward citizenship is especially salient among the young; thus, the differences in the citizenship rate by age narrow greatly after 15+ years in the United States and continue to narrow later on. We found strong similarity in the share of Israeli emigrants with United States citizenship by gender. However, there were considerable initial differences in the share of United States citizens by country of birth—Israel or other—and by ethnic background. In 1980, only twothirds of the Israel-born held American citizenship as against nearly 90 percent of foreign-born Israelis. These differences may originate in different tenure in the United States within the broad definition of ‘five years or more.’ However, they may also reflect different naturalization policies based on emigrants’ countries of birth and largely, in turn, on the person’s citizenship upon arrival in the United States, resulting in a longer naturalization process for Israelis. Over time, however, the citizenship rate of both groups, the Israel-born and the foreign-born, has been tending to similarity. Appreciable initial differences were also found in citizenship rate by ethnic origin. The highest citizenship rate was typical of Israelis of European/American origin; by 1980, 90 percent of them held United States citizenship, as against fewer than two-thirds of Israelis with no specific ethnic origin, and almost half of the Israelis of Asian/African origin. We assume that a sizable share of Israelis of European/American origin were foreign-born (and not second-generation Israel-born), and the fact of their having been born in these countries may have made it easier for them to obtain American citizenship. In turn, the

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very low rates of citizenship among Israelis of Asian/African extraction may be associated with the poor socioeconomic characteristics that they typically displayed at this time, including educational level, types of occupations, and English proficiency, which were obstacles for being granted American citizenship. As time passed and their upward mobility improved, their citizenship became more prevalent. This group, as we have shown throughout this chapter, experienced very meaningful social mobility in various domains. The veteran Israelis attained a citizenship rate of more than twothirds after having been in the United States for 5+ years. In contrast, the citizenship rate of those in the middle wave (who arrived in the United States in 1976–1985) was less than half by 1990 (Table 3.17). Furthermore, even after another decade, by which time their tenure Table 3.16. American Citizenship among Veteran Israelis in the United States by Selected Demographic Characteristics, 1980–2000 1980 Census (5+ Years in the U.S.) Citizenship Rate – Total

78.1



89.5

94.3

– 85.7 81.8 93.0 91.7 97.8

– – 94.4 90.9 96.2 98.1

89.2 89.9

95.9 92.1

88.3 91.0

92.2 96.3

84.9 92.8 90.9

91.5 95.7 95.7

Age Groups 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 70+

33.3 58.7 80.0 94.2 100.0 97.3 Gender

Men Women

78.4 77.7 Place of Birth

Israel-born Foreign-born

66.9 87.7 Ethnic Origin

Israel Europe-America Asia-Africa

63.5 88.7 48.5


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Table 3.17. American Citizenship among Middle and Recent Wave Israeli Emigrants in the United States, 1990–2000 (Percentages) Middle Wave American Citizenship

Recent Wave




48.4

81.1

40.8

in the United States added up to 15+ years, only 80 percent of Israelis held United States citizenship as against approximately 90 percent of their peers of similar tenure. Relating to the first point in time, one might argue that the differences between the more recent and veteran emigrants might originate in different tenure in the United States (since the stay of veteran emigrants was defined within the smaller range of 5+ years, whereas the range for new arrivals was set at 5–15 years), the differences observed later on, after longer tenure (15+ years), may allude to changes in the direction of greater stringency in American naturalization policy. Data not shown here indicate that the lower citizenship rates of recent Israeli emigrants are typical of men and women, of the Israel-born and the foreign-born, and of Israelis of different ethnic origins. Unlike the veteran emigrants, however, those of the middle wave had not closed the gaps by ethnic origin by 2000. Thus, only 60 percent of American Israelis of Asian/African extraction who had been in the United States for 15+ years held American citizenship. The argument that the terms of naturalization became stricter over time is reinforced by the especially low proportion of Israelis with United States citizenship among the most recent wave of emigration—only 40.8 percent in 2000 after 5–15 years in the country, a perceptibly lower rate than that of members of the middle wave in 1990, when their tenure was similar. 7. Determinants of Social and Economic Attainments Various factors affect the social and economic attainments of the American Israelis. These factors may be interrelated and one may be alluded from another. For example, tenure corresponds with age: the longer one is in the United States, the older one is. In another example,

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age corresponds to marital status. We also postulate that some of the socioeconomic attainments that we are trying to explain are interrelated. As Figure 3.1 shows, education is explained by demographic and migration characteristics; however, it influences and is influenced by other aspects of attainment and acculturation including economic characteristics, English proficiency, and homeownership. Similarly, English proficiency may enhance the likelihood of receiving citizenship, which, in turn, encourages homeownership. In order to estimate the effect of each demographic trait or migration characteristic independently of social and economic attainments, and to assess the main inter-effects of the attainments, we adopted an advanced (multivariate) data analysis approach.1 The analysis was conducted for the Israelis who were living in the United States in 2000 and had been there for 5+ years, i.e., had arrived in the country before 1995. We investigated all indicators of socioeconomic attainment including educational level, employment, occupation, income, homeownership, English proficiency, and citizenship. The main findings of the multivariate analysis, which are summarized in Table 3.18, suggest that age is the strongest and most consistent variable that affects American Israelis’ attainments. Young age corresponds positively and significantly to a high level of education and strong proficiency in English. In contrast, however, it weakens the likelihood of working, high income, and citizenship. When adjusting for the effect of the demographic and migration characteristics, Israeli women are less inclined to work than Israeli men, have a lower income, and are less proficient in English. Being married has a significant effect only on the likelihood of owning a home; this relation is positive, as expected. Israelis of European/American origin have exhibited an advantage over those who define themselves only as Israeli in working in white-collar or managerial occupations. In contrast, Israelis of both European/American and Asian/African origin are less likely to receive United States citizenship than those of ‘just Israeli’ origin. Some American Israelis of non-Israeli origin, especially if born abroad, may also hold the citizenship of their country of birth in addition to that of Israel; accordingly, they are in no rush to receive yet another citizenship, that of the United States.

1 Here we apply a multiple-regression analysis for education and income level; and logistic-regression for the other social variables.


Demographic Variables and Migration Characteristics

Economics Employment Occupation Income

English Proficiency

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Educational Attainment

American Citizenship

Homeownership

Figure 3.1. Expected Relations among Demographic Variables, Migration Characteristics, and Socioeconomic Attainment among American Israelis

Interestingly, by and large, tenure was not found to have a significant effect on Israelis’ social and economic attainments. Exceptions were homeownership and citizenship, which were positively affected by the prolongation of residence in the United States. For the other socioeconomic indicators, especially educational level and English proficiency, the absence of significant influence of tenure is compatible with the descriptive findings presented above, which show that members of the most recent wave typically had higher levels than members of the early wave, even after the latter had amassed long-term tenure in the United States. Accordingly, these social indicators—education and English proficiency—are largely embodied in the age variable. Indeed, when we removed age from the multivariate analysis, tenure became a factor that had a significant effect on all socioeconomic characteristics. Education, after it is acquired, becomes an important explanatory variable for other social and economic attainments. It enhances the likelihood of working, occupational prestige, income level, homeownership, and English proficiency. Education was not found to be an independent factor determining citizenship. Similarly, English proficiency did not have a meaningful effect on citizenship. In contrast, citizenship promotes homeownership. Perhaps more than tenure in the country, it is social capital that may predict attainments in other fields and as

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Table 3.18. Significant Effects of Variables Involved in American Israelis’ Socioeconomic Attainments Education Employment Occupation Younger age/ shorter tenure in the US

Income

HomeEnglish Citizenship ownership Proficiency

Older age/ longer tenure in the US

Higher education

Older age Longer tenure in the US

Being male

Ethnic origin: EuropeAmerica

Being male

Higher education

Being married

Younger age/ shorter tenure in the US Being male

Higher Higher Higher education education education English proficiency Citizenship

Older age

Longer tenure in the US Israelborn

a) When two variables appear in the same cell separated by a slash, it means that they alternately have a statistically significant effect on the dependent socio-economic variable, but not when they have jointly been introduced in the multivariate equation.

a consequence may strengthen the Israelis’ toehold in the United States and the permanence of their settlement there. Many new American Israelis reach the United States already having social capital, including education and fluency in English, or acquire them shortly after emigration. 8. Summary American Israelis have experienced impressive socioeconomic mobility. Not all of them, however, have equally fulfilled the ‘American dream’: differences among age groups, gender, and geographic and ethnic origin were found. Some groups arrived in the United States with poor initial attributes, but subsequently matched the attainments of groups that had reached the United States with more abundant human resources. The groups of American Israelis were also differentiated by their time of arrival in the United States; by and large, the later waves of emigration already had strong social and cultural capital,


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e.g., language resources, upon arrival; this facilitated their mobility later on. American Israelis in general are especially well educated in comparison with Israelis in Israel and with Americans. The educational mobility of several groups—young cohorts, women, Israelis who had been born abroad, and those of Asian/African origin—stands out in particular. Even though those of Asian/African origin had better socioeconomic attainments than their ethnic peers in Israel, they continued to be mobile in education even after they settled in the United States. Educational mobility is unquestionably related to mobility in other fields. Thus, the longer the Israelis remained in the United States, the more successful they were in integrating into the American labor market and matching the entitlements of the domestic population at large. Obviously, this was not the case for all Israelis equally. Parenting, for example, had an effect on Israeli men (and, above all, on Israeli women). Generally speaking, women had a lower employment rate than men throughout the period under investigation. Furthermore, the Israel-born outperformed their foreign-born peers in integrating into the American labor market. Many Israelis held wageearning positions upon arrival and, after spending several years in the United States and becoming better acquainted with the domestic labor market, they increasingly became self-employed (especially men). At first, the main occupational fields of American Israelis were management and the white-collar professions; over the years, this was accompanied by a transition to sales-related jobs. Some of those who practiced white-collar professions and had emigrated while young may have returned to Israel. Similarly, the American Israelis’ income level increased impressively, even after inflation is taken into account. Men and the Israel-born were the best performers in this regard, although foreign-born Israelis also displayed positive mobility. Over the years, most American Israelis purchase homes. Despite differences by demographic characteristics and, in particular, geographic and ethnic origin, almost all emigrants fulfilled the coveted American dream of homeownership after having been in the country twenty-five years or more. In the course of the absorption process, immigrants usually become more and more fluent in the local language as their exposure to the vernacular grows and they improve their participation in the destination country’s labor market. In addition, in the United States, English proficiency is a condition for naturalization.

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Most Israelis improved their language skills over the years. Obviously, fluency in English also relates to a strong educational level and young age at the time of emigration. As gender gaps in education narrowed among members of the early wave of emigration, gender-based changes in English proficiency took place: both men and women reported strong proficiency in English after several years in the United States. Positive educational mobility was also related to the acquisition of English-language capabilities among those born in Asia/Africa, who, as we argued above, experienced impressive educational mobility during their stay in the United States. Almost all Israelis who emigrated to the United States in the early wave hold United States citizenship. They already attained high citizenship rates after five years in the country; later on, citizenship became an almost universal indicator of this group. Several individual characteristics, including being Israel-born as against foreign-born and Asian/African ethnic origin vs. European/American ethnic origin (an indicator that may, in part, be associated with socioeconomic attainments), inhibit citizenship. Ultimately, however, almost all emigrants became American citizens. Amid the visible mobility of veteran Israelis, those who emigrated later, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, already came with stronger social and economic attributes and Israelis who migrated in the most recent wave recorded even more impressive initial attainments. The later Israeli emigrants, whether born abroad or in Israel and irrespective of gender, had already been exposed in Israel to better opportunities than the early emigrants who had to amass human capital such as education and English proficiency. They may also have accumulated financial savings that allowed them to buy homes rather quickly and of greater value. Given the relatively auspicious point of departure of the later waves of Israeli emigrants, their mobility, while positive indeed, was a bit mild. Somewhat surprisingly, this sluggish mobility occurred in the citizenship of more recent emigrants even after taking into account their shorter tenure in the United States, despite the strong human resources that they brought with them. Evidently, the introduction of greater stringency in American naturalization policy inhibited these emigrants’ citizenship. In an integrated analysis of the emigrants’ individual characteristics, age was found to be the most meaningful explanatory factor in socioeconomic mobility. The effect of age, however, acts in somewhat contrasting directions. Young people have better English proficiency and


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education but work in lower-paying occupations and make slower progress toward citizenship. Another factor associated with socioeconomic mobility is gender. Israel-emigrant women have a lower employment rate, earn less, and are slightly less proficient in English (mainly shortly after their arrival in the destination country) than men. Tenure also has a strong independent effect that enhances, above all, the chances of working, purchasing a home, and obtaining United States citizenship. Israelis of European/American nativity hold more prestigious occupations than those of Israelis born in Asia/Africa or Israel. Among the American Israelis, the well educated are the most successful in their socioeconomic acculturation in the United States. Various factors explain educational attainment, e.g., country of birth, gender, and age, and of course there are interconnections among the factors. However, those who managed to attain high levels of education after emigration also improved their English proficiency and the likelihood of citizenship, labor-market integration, and, of course, had high income. Thus, having strong human resources upon arrival in the destination country enhances the likelihood of absorption and shortens the time needed to integrate into the United States; it is not necessarily related to tenure there. Indirectly, from several cases in which the socioeconomic attainments of certain age groups declined over time, we infer that there has been positively selective return migration to Israel. Accordingly, the successful American Israelis are divided into two groups, those who choose to settle in the United States for the long run and those who return to Israel. To a large extent, those whose attainments are less auspicious are more inclined to stay in the United States.

CHAPTER FOUR

JEWISH IDENTIFICATION AND ATTACHMENT TO HOMELAND 1. Overview American society accommodates a large and diverse mosaic of immigrants who settled there in recent decades. Many of these immigrant groups have their own ethno-religious identities that are distinct from that of the majority population. As such, the immigrants are exposed to the general social and cultural ethos and patterns of the host society. The integration of racially, religiously, ethnically, or nationally distinct minorities is influenced by this exposure as well as by changes in the role of ethnicity and religiosity in the vision and praxis of contemporary America. This multifacetedness and the coalescence of the value systems and cultural behavior of the various groups—toward similarity or dissimilarity and separatism—may also shape the image of the Israeli-Jewish components in American society and the nature of the Israelis’ commitment to particularistic group identification. The social and cultural developments that characterized the United States in the second half of the twentieth century in these realms may pull in opposite directions: the undermining of group commitments and the weakening of relations with community institutions and networks and ethno-religious behavior patterns, or the provision of more convenient conditions than before for demonstrating defined and particularistic identification. The vast ethno-religious diversity of the United States, given its many immigrant population groups, has attracted the attention of sociologists and other social scientists. One of the most legitimate sources of separatism in American society resides in the domain of religious groups. Despite the dominant American outlook that recognizes the separation between religion and state, a widespread convention divides Americans into three segments: Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. In the ethno-cultural domain of systems and ways of life, in contrast, competing concepts stand out: Anglo-conformity, the melting pot, and cultural pluralism (including activist manifestations of

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‘multiculturalism’). The first concept, conformity, dominated America mainly in the first half of the twentieth century; it posited that groups of immigrants, after a relatively short period of volitional separatism, should renounce their cultural origins in favor of the host society’s behavior patterns and values, or at least take part in a process of cultural integration (the ‘melting pot’) between the various immigrant groups and local customs (Gordon, 1964). These two concepts, of conformity and the melting pot, are largely two versions of the same set of goals according to which cultural differences and connections with groups of origin have been steadily eroding over the generations and have been losing much of their importance as the immigrants assimilate into the social mainstream. According to this concept, affiliation status and intra-group connections will also diminish in importance amid growing modernization and emphasis on universalism and personal achievement (Blau and Duncan, 1967). Many perceive the melting-pot idea as a symbol of the liberal vision of American society; it has become the bearer of the political message of the United States as a land of opportunity in which race, religion, and ethnic origin do not obviate social mobility. From this standpoint, conformity is but another interpretation of the symbol that stresses the Americanization of the immigrants (Hirschman, 1983). The concept of diversity and cultural pluralism is different. Having risen to prominence in the ideological contest with the other models, especially since the 1960s, it propounds that all ethnic immigrant groups preserve the main fundamentals of their culture of origin, albeit within the framework of American citizenship and economic and political integration (Gordon, 1964). This concept fosters the maintenance of social and cultural autonomy of the various origin groups and legitimizes their preservation of a high level of identificational separatism. Recently, another trajectory of integration has been proposed of ‘segmented assimilation’ (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Gans, 1992; Alba and Nee, 2003). This alternative suggests that immigrants integrate—subject to the limits of their social and cultural opportunities—and focuses on the possibility that they will integrate into geographic and socioeconomic subgroups and frameworks of the lower classes of American society. Since, however, the immigrants’ settlement in weak niches is accompanied by an aspiration for a better future for their children, they will attempt to progress in accordance with social and cultural values of the local middle class.

jewish identification and attachment to homeland

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Indeed, in recent decades, just as it seemed as though the third- and fourth-generation European immigrants were marching down the path to assimilation, several scholars began to indicate that the Americanborn offspring of immigrants have been maintaining some level of ethnic identity and cultural heritage. Ethnicity, they argue, is a factor deeply rooted in the social reality; not only does it influence certain events, but it is often the source of the events themselves (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963). A profusion of social and political institutions acts in the service of ethnic groups’ particularistic interests; the groups, in turn, tend to perpetuate these institutions. Even if people of different origins come into contact and intermingle, it does not obviate the preservation of manifestations of group belonging. Furthermore, the various ethnic groups still exhibit pronounced differences in many of their structural characteristics (Greeley, 1974). One clearly finds ethnocultural cohesion among groups of whites (Novak, 1972) and ethnicity definitely stands on its own merits as an active factor in group survival and pressure to attain opportunities (Yancey, Eriksen, and Juliani, 1976). Religion and national origin remain reliable proxies for political and class behavior (Hamilton, 1972). Several researchers perceive the resurgence of emphasis on ethnic affiliation as a legitimate wish to sustain a particularistic tradition and distinct behaviors, given the risk of disappearance that looms over them due to the cultural hegemony of the melting pot. This has done more than resurrect important fundamentals of American society; it has also led to the recognition of the cultural and artistic autonomy of America’s diverse ethnic, religious, and racial components as the country’s desired social and political vision. Such developments indeed attest to ‘America becoming America’ (Novak, 1972: 291). Others, however, suggest that the ‘ethnic revival’ of whites be construed as a manifestation of an individualism that aspires to enrich the individual’s life and promote self-fulfillment (Alba, 1990; Gans, 1979, 1994; Lieberson and Waters, 1988). This is principally ‘symbolic ethnicity’ of voluntarism and the personal needs of identification, as opposed to specific cultural behaviors and group organization that had once been central and prominent. Hence, ‘symbolic ethnicity’ does not require institutions and networks of interrelations to preserve itself; it is meant to satisfy affective needs or quench the desire for an externally confirmed identification with a certain ethnicity, without active participation in group organizations or durable ethno-cultural habits.

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Symbolic identification can provide activity for leisure time or intermittent events; its practitioners use it to express their ancestral affiliation on major holidays, during vacations, and in ethnic folklore (foods, special expressions in the language of origin, etc.). This form of identification does not influence daily behavior nor does it integrate into the work routine or into family life. This perspective on the social reality has recently expanded into the domain of religion. While this nonsecular ‘symbolic religiosity’ does not manifest itself in leisure time as ‘symbolic ethnicity’ does, it, too, aims to express religious symbols without clashing with the secular way of life (Gans, 1994). This kind of identification largely reflects a process of ethnic personalization, i.e., the narrowing of ethnic manifestations to concepts of identification and new ethnic and religious behavior patterns in a variety of ways, detached from institutionalized and coherent conceptual framework and past legacies, sometimes amid internal contradictions. The symbols used by later generations of immigrants, or by new immigrants, may be more overt and visible than the cultures and organizations of earlier immigrants, including the emphasis on ancestral origin in a certain country or geographical region. This type of ethnicity may persist for many generations. What is portrayed as an ‘ethnic revival’ or a ‘religious revival’ is, in fact, nothing but a new phase in the assimilation of ethnic and cultural groups into the general local society (Gans, 1979, 1994). In the context of today’s transnational migration, the immigrantabsorption process in the United States is unfolding in the midst of internal structural changes that are occasioned by the dualism of the connection with the new ‘here’ and the old ‘there.’ These changes are also visible in the structuring of the immigrants’ ethnic and religious identity (Vertovec, 2004). Such transnational identities influence, and/ or are influenced by, political identification with more than one country, the retention of dual citizenship, economic relations in the form of transnational financial transfers, various cultural and kinship relations, and, more generally, dual political loyalties. The phenomenon also reflects the change from majority status in the country of origin to minority status in the destination country (Boyarin and Boyarin, 1993; Safran, 1991; Sheffer, 1986, 2003). The restructuring of the ethnoreligious identification of immigrants from a specific place of origin may also be affected by their exposure to their inclusive ethno-religious peer group. This happens if the peer group has had a sufficiently long history in the locality to develop patterns of belonging and behavior


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that are location-specific and different from those that were familiar in the homeland. In other words, immigrants may be considered a subgroup of a larger ethnic or religious collective, which can be isolated and examined in respect of its separatism from, or resemblance to, the inclusive identification (Narroll, 1964; Southall, 1976; Cohen, 1978). This approach of cross-cultural research—of sub-identities that draw on a separate historical or socio-cultural experience—indicates that the Israeli emigrants are a distinct subgroup of the American Jewish population. As they restructure their ethno-religious identification, they may adopt American-Jewish group behaviors that are appropriate for local reality—or may reject them. This chapter investigates the patterns, levels, and determinants of Jewish identification of American Israelis. We focus on several indicators of Jewish behavior in both the personal and the public spheres. The analysis compares the Israeli Americans’ patterns with those of American Jews at large and, where appropriate and to the extent possible, with those of the Jewish population in Israel. Special attention is paid to changes in the emigrants’ Jewish identification and attachment to Israel as they gain tenure in the United States. 2. The Multifaceted Structure of Jewish Identification in the United States Identification is the expression of one’s emotional, ideological, or practical relation to an ethnic or religious group belonging (Erickson, 1963; Herman, 1977). This expression is carried through an extensive set of particularistic group beliefs, values, commandments, and behavior patterns, as well as by attitudes. Hence, identification is multidimensional. The gradual merging of various identifications shapes the individual’s personal identity, i.e., the way one views oneself and is viewed by others (Erickson, 1963; Herman, 1977; Miller, 1963). This identity may be with an inclusive group or a secondary identity with a subgroup that exists within a broad ethnic or religious unit defined by a specific and distinct geographic origin and historical experience (Cohen, 1978). The multifaceted nature of identification stands out boldly among Jews in general, Diaspora Jews in particular, and American Jews above all. Jewish identification in the United States may be diagnosed as religious and ethnic at one and the same time (Herman, 1977; Winter, 1992; Phillips, 1991). A second distinction is between the private and

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public spheres of Jewish identification (Hartman, 2001). Likewise, we can distinguish between regular and frequent behaviors that permeate the individual’s daily life and intermittent behaviors at specific isolated points in time across the Jewish calendar or the personal life cycle (Gans, 1994; Rebhun, 2004). Identification also includes feelings and attitudes toward group belonging (Phinney, 1990). Each of these facets includes unique manifestations of commitment that should relate clearly and exclusively to the Jewish-belonging group and corresponds to the reality of local Jewish existence; thus, they jointly reflect different aspects of Jewish strategies of survival and continuity (Himmelfarb, 1982; Horowitz, 2003). The various indicators of Jewish identification do not exist in isolation; rather, they are mutually related and influence each other. Manifestations of Jewish identification may be specific to time and place, influenced by the demographic and socioeconomic composition of the local Jewish population and the general social and economic environment of the place of residence. Furthermore, various scholars use different indicators and consider their effect on group commitment and continuity differently (Cohen, 2009). The evaluation of Jewish identification does not always focus on the respondent’s own patterns; sometimes it focuses on the patterns of all members of the household or those of specific family members, whom the respondent influences or by whom s/he is influenced. Here we distinguish among five main areas of Jewish identification. Each area includes one indicator or several different indicators of behaviors or attitudes. The areas span a broad and comprehensive spectrum of manifestations of Jewish identification in the United States. They may be defined as follows: denominational identification, ritual observance, non-Jewish religious behavior, community involvement, and attachment to Israel. Denominational preference is one way, if not the main way, in which the American Jewish community identifies itself. Such an affiliation describes how people define themselves in terms of religious identity, which is mainly a self-definition and not necessarily an official denominational designation, and it reflects attitudes toward major religious and ethnic issues (Lazerwitz et al., 1998). It is customary to classify American Jews by assigning them to one of three large denominational streams—Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform—or by noting the lack of identification with any of them. The observance of religious rituals and holidays comprises prescriptive and proscriptive impera-


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tives relating to observance of the Sabbath, kashrut (dietary laws), and main Jewish festivals. Most of these imperatives are undertaken in the private domain. Some are regular behaviors; others occur infrequently or once a year. Here we focus on four rituals: maintaining kashrut (‘keeping kosher’) in the home, lighting Sabbath candles, lighting Hanukkah candles, and participating in a Passover Seder. We also relate to the extent to which American Israelis have adopted a major Christian religious symbol, the Christmas tree. The integration of nonJewish religious behaviors in the home attests to the blurring of Jewish identity and the cultural and religious influence of the general surroundings. Community involvement is a behavior that belongs to the public sphere and often entails a financial expense. Here we focus on synagogue membership, frequency of synagogue attendance, membership in a Jewish community center ( JCC), and donating to a Jewish federation or other Jewish causes. We test the Israeli identification with the help of three factors: an emotional attachment to Israel, familiarity with the social and political situation in Israel, and selfdefinition—Israeli or other. 3. Denominational Identification As stated, American Jewry is composed of three main ideological movements—Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform—with which local Jews may identify or choose not to identify. The United States, as a society that cultivates strong religious and cultural pluralism, offers fertile soil for the acceptance and dissemination of new religious ideas that aim to amend traditional rabbinical law and build a bridge between the traditional framework of life and modern living patterns. The alternative forms of relations between individual and community have slowed the process of identificational assimilation; the possibilities offered by the Conservative and Reform movements have proved themselves as principal sources for the preservation of Jewish group cohesion (DellaPergola, 1981). One of the conclusions of the modernizationsecularization thesis, however, is that American Jews’ ideological identity has changed considerably. According to the linear-assimilation model, the change in the transition from Orthodox identification among first-generation immigrants to Conservative and Reform identification takes place among the first generation’s children and grandchildren. Accordingly, a large percentage of the fourth generation,

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those born in the 1960s and 1970s, refrain from defining themselves in terms of any of the ideological movements. Non-affiliation with any main current in Judaism has been interpreted as the last stage before total assimilation (Goldscheider, 1986). Such patterns of ideological connection are unknown, or at least are not used in determining a differentiating classification, among the Jewish population of Israel. Most Israelis, although not religious, largely recognize the principles of Orthodoxy and when they observe religious festivals or rituals in their personal life cycle, they do so in Orthodox institutions following Orthodox religious customs. Accordingly, we assume that American Israelis will identify themselves as Orthodox even if they are secular or traditional in their behavior patterns, or will not define themselves in terms of any of the main denominations in their new American-Jewish environments. For Israelis, unlike American Jews, any connection with the Conservative or Reform movement would attest more to social and cultural integration into the local Jewish community than to a religious perspective. Indeed, Israelis in the United States exhibit particular ideological preferences. A comprehensive view of the three communities investigated here—those of New York, Miami, and Los Angeles—shows that slightly more than one-third (35.9 percent) of the Israelis define themselves as Orthodox, about one-fourth as Conservative, and 12.9 percent as Reform. All the others, roughly one-fourth of the total, identify ideologically with none of the three main denominations of American Judaism (Table 4.1). Among all Jews in these communities, less than half the proportion identifies itself as Orthodox relative to the share of Israelis who do so (16.4 percent) and the share of Reform is approximately 2.5 times that of the Israelis (32.4 percent). Among the other two groups, the Conservative and those lacking ideological preference, the rates are very similar in both population groups. The inequality index summarizes these differences by estimating them at 21.7 percent. Notably, the Israelis are differentiated by nativity status, i.e., Israel-born or foreign-born. In particular, a larger share of the former defines itself as Orthodox and a larger share of the latter identifies itself as Conservative. We suggest that at least some of the foreignborn Israelis, especially those of West European origin, were exposed in their countries of birth to the more moderate and liberal branches of Judaism and so find it easier integrate into them in the United States. Furthermore, foreign-born Israelis have a weaker Israeli identity than the Israel-born and have already experienced immigration to


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Table 4.1. Denominational Identification of American Israelis and American Jews in the United States (Percentages) American Israelis

American Jews

Denomination

Total

Israel-born

Foreign-born

Total Orthodox Conservative Reform None

100.0 35.9 26.3 12.9 24.9

100.0 38.1 21.9 13.3 26.7

100.0 28.7 40.2 11.5 19.6

100.0 16.4 28.5 32.4 22.7

and residence in Israel and decided to leave. For these reasons, their likelihood of returning to Israel is lower; accordingly, they are less inclined to participate in Israeli emigrants’ social and cultural networks and instead attempt to settle into the local Jewish community. There are substantial differences in the denominational identification of Israelis by place of residence (Table 4.2). Israelis in New York have an especially strong traditional connection and half of them define themselves as Orthodox—twice the rate of that among Israelis in Miami and 2.5 times greater than that of Israelis in Los Angeles. In contrast, the proportion of Conservative Israeli Jews in New York is about half of the corresponding rate in the other two Israeli communities. Los Angeles has a large Israeli Reform congregation that attracts roughly one-fourth of the Israelis in that city. The largest Israeli population that reports no denominational preference is that of Miami. The interregional differences in Israelis’ denominational identification reflect, to a major degree, differences among the American Jewish communities themselves. Admittedly, we do not know if the Israelis were prompted by their ideological preferences to choose these places of residence to begin with—either when they first settled in the United States or via subsequent internal migration—or whether they adopted these identifications over time, as they integrated into the local Jewish community more deeply. Be this as it may, our findings illuminate the specific characteristics of the Israelis in each community separately and the resemblance of these characteristics to local Jewish patterns. The similarity between the Israelis and the local Jews is especially strong in Los Angeles, with a dissimilarity index of 18.5 percent, followed by Miami (21.7 percent) and New York (25.7 percent).

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chapter four Table 4.2. Denominational Identification of American Israelis and American Jews by Place of Residence (Percentages) New York

Miami

Los Angeles

Denomination American American American American American American Israelis Jews Israelis Jews Israelis Jews Total Orthodox Conservative Reform None Index of Dissimilarity Israelis/Jews

100.0 50.3 17.7 9.7 22.3 25.7

100.0 29.1 25.0 28.1 17.8

100.0 25.6 33.7 5.8 34.9 21.7

100.0 9.4 30.8 27.4 32.3

100.0 18.8 35.4 25.0 20.8

100.0 4.4 31.3 41.9 22.4

18.5

Figure 4.1 provides a complementary insight into changes in denominational identification and how life in the new country affects this identification, by classifying the Israelis according to their tenure in the United States. The most salient difference between the two groups of Israelis—those ten years or less in the United States, and the veterans who have been in the United States for 11 or more years—is in the rate of those who identify themselves as Orthodox, at one end of the ideological continuum, and those with no identification at all, at the other end. While around one-fourth of newcomers defined themselves as Orthodox and over one-third as lacking ideological preference, the rates among veteran Israelis were 39.5 percent and 19.2 percent, respectively. One explanation for these differences may have to do with specific characteristics of early waves of emigration as against later ones and a stronger Jewish identity among the former. Another and perhaps more compelling explanation is that these findings reflect a long-term change in the self-definition of American Israelis. Shortly after they settled in the United States, a large percent of Israelis were unaware of or unfamiliar with the various possibilities of identifying and affiliating with different denominational movements (and perhaps with their institutions as well). Many of them did not lead a religious way of life and, accordingly, did not define themselves as Orthodox and segregated themselves socially and culturally from the American Jewish community. As they gained tenure in the United States, they were exposed to the various movements and, especially, to the need in America to affiliate with some religious movement in order

Percentages

jewish identification and attachment to homeland 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

111

19.2 37.9

12.1

12.8 28.5

24.2

25.8

None Reform Conservative Orthodox

39.5

Tenure 0–10 Tenure 11+ Tenure in the U.S.

Figure 4.1. Denominational Identification of Israelis in the United States by Tenure (Percentages)

to fit into the environment of organized Jewish life, i.e., to be involved with their ethno-religious group belonging. Consequently, despite a moderately growing tendency to identify with non-Orthodox movements (especially the Conservative), as the differences between veteran Israelis and recent emigrants attest, the Orthodox remain the largest group among the former. These Israelis, although already settled in the United States for a decade or more, continue to prefer the patterns that they had known in their country of origin whenever they need to identify ideologically and, at times and in turn, a practical relationship with some Jewish institutional setting. Accordingly, this is a segmented assimilation into a small ideological niche in American Jewry. It may not, however, be a matter of tenure per se. Given the young age of the Israeli emigrants, most of whom could not have had families when they arrived in the United States, many of them will marry over time. Marrying and establishing a family are among the factors, or the personal events, that cause people to join an organized and official community setting. Synagogues of course, but also other social and cultural institutions are often identified with a denominational movement of some kind. Be it due to a relationship between institutional affiliation and ideological identity or some other factor related to the change in marital status, it turns out (Table 4.3) that married Israelis prefer, to a larger extent than their non-married peers, to define

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Table 4.3. Denominational Identification among American Israelis and American Jews in the United States by Marital Status (Percentages)a American Israelis Denomination Total Orthodox Conservative Reform None

American Jews

Married

Unmarried

Married

Unmarried

100.0 42.4 26.5 11.3 19.8

100.0 23.7 26.3 14.4 35.6

100.0 21.9 27.7 31.7 18.7

100.0 10.1 28.7 32.5 28.7

a) Unmarried includes single, divorced/separated, and widowed

themselves as Orthodox (42.4 percent and 23.7 percent, respectively) and not as denominationally unidentified (19.8 percent and 35.6 percent, respectively). Significant differences in denominational preference by marital status were also found among the Jews at large: 21.9 percent of married Jews as against 10.1 percent of the unmarried defined themselves as Orthodox. However, the rate of married persons in the American Jewish community as a whole who defined themselves as Orthodox is half the rate of self-defined Orthodox among married Israelis; this reflects, in the main, different tendencies among Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews to marry and maintain family stability. 4. Observance of Religious Rituals and Holidays Ideological orientation with a branch of Judaism reflects, by and large, a theological and cosmological outlook on God, the Torah, and the Jewish people; it also attests to the willingness to integrate religious tradition into modern patterns of life. The observance of religious rituals, in contrast, is a practical manifestation of religious identity that involves overt behavior in accordance with explicit and clear patterns. Religious rituals are personal or family behaviors that exist in the private domain. They are anchored in an ancient Jewish tradition that includes a set of requirements around which a community with shared beliefs has formed (Medding, 1987). Accordingly, the observance of religious rituals is an authentic and accepted manifestation, although explicitly not the only one, of commitment to Jewish tradition. The observance of kashrut (‘keeping kosher’) reflects a regular and relatively rigorous routine of Jewish religious commitment. Slightly


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more than half of the American Israelis stated that they keep kosher at home (Table 4.4).1 There are differences, albeit minor, between the Israel-born and the foreign-born, with higher rates of kashrut observance among the latter. What is clear is that Israelis keep kosher at twice or more the frequency of American Jews at large. The differences between the two population groups may originate, at least partly, in the higher proportion of persons of Asian/African extraction among the former, given the affinity with tradition that characterizes this population group. Furthermore, food shops in Israel sell almost only kosher products; thus, when the emigrants reached the United States and found a new market of unfamiliar products and brands, some of them preferred to continue buying at least kosher meat products that are under reliable inspection and assure a high quality of food. The Sabbath is a central feature of Judaism and lighting candles is one of the manifestations of its observance. For some, candle-lighting is a matter of religious significance that fits into the broader concept of the Sabbath as a holy day. For others, it is more a symbolic act that encourages a sense of group belonging and a festive family atmosphere. Six of every ten American Israelis always light Sabbath candles in their homes and, together with those who usually light them, the proportion surpasses two-thirds. Only 15 percent never light Sabbath candles. Only minor differences are evident between the Israel-born and foreign-born. However, these differences are consistent with the findings about kashrut observance; accordingly, at least as far as regular patterns of ritual observance are concerned, Jewish identification is stronger among foreign-born Israelis than among their Israel-born peers. Roughly twice as many Israelis as American Jews always light Sabbath candles. At the opposite end of the frequency axis, the share of Israelis who never light Sabbath candles is less than half that of American Jews in general. Not only do American Israelis prove to be much stricter about observing the Sabbath by lighting candles than local Jews in the destination country but they are also much stricter

1 In New York and Miami, the question about kashrut at home was asked with no reference to the specific nature of this religious stringency (buying only kosher products, maintaining separate meat and dairy dishes, or both). In Los Angeles, respondents were asked to state whether they have separate dishes at home. We suggest that Israelis and Jews at large in Los Angeles who answer this question in the affirmative definitely also observe the other aspect of “keeping kosher” at home, i.e., buying only kosher products.

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than Jews in their country of origin, namely Israel. Studies in Israel (Levy, Levinson, and Katz, 1993, 2002) show that most Israeli Jews tend to spend the Sabbath with their families, wish to lend the day a quiet and familial atmosphere, and believe that the Sabbath should also be manifested in special ways in the public domain. Many of these properties of the Sabbath do not exist in the United States or are difficult to apply there; this whets the emigrants’ wish to compensate for their absence at home in various ways including the lighting of candles, whether they recite the blessing over the candles or not, and definitely by celebrating the Sabbath with a festive family meal. Table 4.4. Observance of Religious Rituals and Holidays among American Israelis and American Jews and among Jews in Israel (Percentages)a American Israelis Rituals/Holidays Dietary Laws (Kashrut) Sabbath Candles Never Sometimes Usually Always Hanukkah Candles Never Sometimes Usually Always Passover Seder Never Sometimes Usually Always

American Jews in Jews Israel

Total

Israelborn

Foreignborn

56.3

53.2

59.5

26.3

–

100.0 15.2 16.4 8.2 60.2 100.0 1.5 7.6 4.4 86.5 100.0 1.5 4.7 4.1 89.7

100.0 15.3 16.9 7.7 60.1 100.0 0 8.1 4.6 87.3 100.0 1.9 4.6 1.9 91.5

100.0 14.8 14.8 9.9 60.5 100.0 6.1 6.1 3.7 84.1 100.0 0 4.9 11.0 84.1

100.0 41.1 23.6 7.0 28.3 100.0 10.8 9.8 7.0 72.4 100.0 7.1 12.1 9.0 71.8

100.0 27.0 15.0 8.0 50.0 100.0 7.0 12.0 10.0 71.0 100.0 2.0 5.0 8.0 85.0

a) Data on Jews in Israel derive from: Levy, Levinsohn and Kats, 2002. The ‘sometimes’ group includes ‘rarely’ and ‘occasionally.’


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Like the Sabbath, lighting Hanukkah candles is a family event but also one that may take place in a small or broader social setting. Although Hanukkah is observed once a year, it is unlike other Jewish festivals in that it lasts eight consecutive days. Most American Israelis (86.5 percent) always light Hanukkah candles and, together with those who usually do so, nine out of ten observe Hanukkah by lighting candles, presumably accompanied by the recitation of blessings. Unlike the two previous indicators (keeping kosher and lighting Sabbath candles), the lighting of Hanukkah candles is slightly more frequent among Israelborn Israelis than among foreign-born Israelis. These differences may reflect a longer tradition of lighting Hanukkah candles among Israelis (the Israel-born) and the centrality of this festival in the Israeli education system, which left a strong impression on the Israelis even when they reached adulthood. Another explanation may lie in a stronger affiliation of the Israel-born, than of the foreign-born, with informal social networks of Israelis, for whom lighting Hanukkah candles creates an opportunity to get together. The utilization of such an opportunity, coupled with religious faith and a shared historical connection, may express, in particular, the desire for social encounter in a cultural context that includes ethnic foods and Hebrew songs. American Israelis are more inclined to observe Hanukkah regularly than American Jews at large and than Jews in Israel. The observance of Passover by taking part in a Seder is the most common behavior of American Israelis among the four patterns of ritual observance and holidays examined here. To a large extent, as with the lighting of Hanukkah candles, if not more so, the observance of Passover expresses the importance of a festive gathering that enhances family cohesion. Some Israelis may even seize the opportunity created by this holiday to visit Israel, or close relatives may visit them in the United States; in these cases they celebrate the Seder together. Nearly 90 percent of American Israelis always participate in a Passover Seder. In this respect, as with the lighting of Hanukkah candles, the Israel-born have a higher rate of participation in this once-a-year event than the foreign-born. The Seder participation rate of American Israelis is perceptibly higher than that of American Jews at large (a difference of approximately 20 percent). Furthermore, the share of those who always take part in a Seder is higher among American Israelis, although only slightly higher, than the corresponding rate among Jews in Israel. However, when we combine the two highest

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categories of frequency—‘always’ and ‘usually’—we find a similar level of Seder participation among both population groups. The ranking of the four Jewish identificational patterns among the different population groups deserves some attention. If we consider the highest frequency, ‘always,’ the most common behavior among American Israelis at large is the observance of Passover, closely followed by Hanukkah. This ranking resembles the characteristics of Jews in Israel, although the difference among them between those who ‘always’ observe Passover and those who ‘always’ observe Hanukkah is much greater. The order of importance of these holidays among Israelis, in America or in Israel, is different from that of American Jews at large, who observe Hanukkah at the highest rates, followed (closely) by Passover. Accordingly, while American Israelis continue to maintain the ranking of ritual observance and holidays that is customary in Israel, they raise the frequency of their observance of Hanukkah to a level closely approximating that of participating in a Seder. The strong similarity between the rates of identification with these two behaviors, Hanukkah and Passover, reflects the similarity between the two among American Jews at large. Thus, one may describe this aspect of the American Israelis’ identification as the continuation of origin characteristics along with change and adjustment to the characteristics of Jewish society in the destination. Here, it is noteworthy that around 4 percent of American Israelis stated that they have a Christmas tree in their homes with some frequency (‘sometimes’ or more). Perhaps lighting Hanukkah candles—observing a holiday that coincides with Christmas and New Year’s Day—expresses a contrast to the non-Jewish behavior of a non-Jewish spouse in intermarried households and sparks the Jewish spouse’s desire to stress the particularistic patterns of h/her ethno-religious belonging group (Fishman, 2004). It is possible to differentiate between Israelis who live in New York and Miami, who display high levels of identification (usually/always observing rituals) and Israelis who live in Los Angeles, who exhibit lower levels, especially in the regular Jewish behavior patterns of keeping kosher and lighting Sabbath candles (Table 4.5). These differences among Israelis by places of residence reflect geographic differences in identification among American Jews at large. These differences, of course, are the most salient in the most regular patterns, observance of kashrut and the Sabbath. Furthermore, the size of the differences between the Israelis and American Jews at large are not similar in all regions; the differences are smaller in New York and larger in Miami


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and, especially, in Los Angeles. For example, the ratio between the share of American Israelis who keep kosher at home and the share of American Jews who do so is 1.7 in New York, 3 in Miami, and approximately 3.4 in Los Angeles. Similarly, the ratios in lighting Sabbath candles are 1.7, 2.2, and 2.5 in the three cities, respectively. Despite minor differences between American Israelis and American Jews in lighting Hanukkah candles and participating in a Seder in all three communities, the ranking of the communities by the size of the differences remains largely unchanged. Consistent with the findings on denominational identification, the tendency to observe religious rituals and major Jewish holidays is stronger among long-tenured Israelis in the United States than among their more recently arrived peers (Table 4.6). The differences between veterans and the newly arrived are especially conspicuous in the regular identificational patterns of kashrut and the Sabbath, narrower in the observance of Hanukkah, and hardly evident in participation in a Seder. Accordingly, while Israeli emigrants who have been in the United States for up to ten years show an appreciable disparity between the most uncommon behavior, keeping kosher (47.1 percent), and the most frequent, taking part in a Seder (94.3 percent)—a gap of 47.2 percentage points—among Israeli emigrants who have been in the Table 4.5. Observance of Religious Rituals and Holidays among American Israelis and American Jews by Place of Residence (Percentages) New York Rituals/ Holidays Dietary Laws (kashrut) Sabbath Candles (usually/ always) Hanukkah Candles (usually/ always) Passover Seder (usually/ always)

Miami

Los Angeles

American American (A)/ American American (A)/ American American (A)/ Israelis Jews (B) Israelis Jews (B) Israelis Jews (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 65.8

38.9

1.69

64.0

21.1

3.03

33.0

9.8

3.36

70.6

42.6

1.65

74.4

34.0

2.19

59.4

24.2

2.45

92.5

85.4

1.08

93.0

76.6

1.21

86.5

71.5

1.21

98.1

85.1

1.15

93.0

78.9

1.18

87.5

75.2

1.16

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Table 4.6. Observance of Religious Rituals and Holidays among Israelis in the United States by Tenure (Percentages) Rituals/Holidays Dietary Laws Sabbath Candles (usually/always) Hanukkah Candles (usually/always) Passover Seder (usually/always)

0–10 Years in the U.S. (A)

11 Years + in the U.S. (B)

(B)/(A)

47.1 62.9

58.9 70.7

1.25 1.12

84.3

92.9

1.10

94.3

95.3

1.01

United States for more than eleven years, the respective difference is between 58.9 percent and 95.3 percent—a gap of 36.4 percentage points. Since it stands to reason that those who perform the regular behaviors also observe the holidays, the American Israelis have been forming, over time, a structured and coherent system of Jewish identification in which members display strong resemblance. This Jewish identification, effected by the observance of main religious elements that provide a sense of group identity and social cohesion, has evolved into a growing necessity that fills some of the missing gap of the Israeli identification and the strong family connections that were taken for granted in the country of origin. Similarly, assuming the existence of a positive relationship between denominational identity and ethno-religious behavior patterns and that many of the patterns investigated here are observed around family gatherings, it comes as no surprise that the level of Jewish identification is higher among married persons than among the unmarried (Table 4.7). The stronger identification of married American Israelis and the greater similarity found among members of this group in the share of those who light Hanukkah candles and participate in a Seder are strongly reminiscent of the patterns differentiated by tenure. Together they reinforce the proposition, mentioned above, that these two characteristics—longer tenure and being married—are interrelated. It also turns out that the differences in ritual observance and holidays by marital status are wider among American Jews at large than among American Israelis. Since the ‘not-married rate’ in our sample is slightly higher among American Jews at large than among American Israelis (38 percent and 33 percent, respectively), these differences in marital status contribute somewhat to the general disparities


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between Israelis and American Jews in Jewish identification. The effect of the differences in marital status on the differences in Jewish identification between American Israelis and American Jews is meaningful, as the differences between the two populations are larger in regard to the difference between married and unmarried in Jewish identification (A/B), especially in keeping kosher and lighting Sabbath candles, but less so in observing Hanukkah and Passover. Finally, it is also noteworthy that American Israelis have not adopted non-Jewish religious patterns. Fewer than 2 percent stated that they always have a Christmas tree at home. Even though the proportion is higher among Israelis in Los Angeles (3 percent) than among those in New York and Miami (slightly under 1.5 percent in each location), it is very low everywhere. In contrast, about 10 percent of the general Jewish population in these communities have a Christmas tree at home, and the rate in Los Angeles is especially high. These behavior patterns of American Israelis and American Jews are largely reflective of differences in their predisposition to Jewish endogamy. Table 4.7. Observance of Religious Rituals and Holidays among American Israelis and American Jews by Marital Status (Percentages)a American Israelis Rituals/ Holidays Dietary Laws-kashrut Sabbath Candles (usually/always) Hanukkah Candles (usually/always) Passover Seder (usually/always)

American Jews

Married Unmarried (A)/(B) Married Unmarried (A)/(B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 63.8

41.8

1.53

31.7

17.3

1.83

77.5

50.0

1.55

42.2

23.8

1.77

97.4

77.0

1.26

86.3

67.7

1.28

96.1

89.4

1.07

85.9

72.3

1.19

a) Unmarried includes single, divorced/separated, and widowed.

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chapter four 5. Community Involvement

Israel is a Jewish-majority country that does not practice separation of religion and state; for this reason, routine life in the public domain connects the individual with h/her identity and ethno-religious belonging group. In the United States, in contrast, it is the institutional Jewish community that plays the most prominent role in creating connections and involvement among Jews in religious, social, and educational-cultural activities. Organizational connections are external/public manifestations of Jewish identification that bridge between the private domain—the observance of religious rituals and a Jewish way of life— and the public domain of community life in the United States. Given these differences between the United States and Israel in the nature and significance of community membership and involvement, contact with American Jewish community institutions reflects a profound process of internalization of and adjustment to new patterns of identification. Integration and involvement in the Jewish community are manifested in various forms of institutional relations including those connected with a synagogue, Jewish organizations, and willingness to make financial donations to Jewish causes. Synagogue membership is an indicator of the level of religiosity and integration into the community’s religious life. Since the affiliation with religious institutions, however, is usually cemented at the local level, synagogue membership is also a measure of social integration, the strength of self-identification with organized local activity, the motivation to provide children with Jewish education, and the willingness to participate in support groups— including women’s or men’s clubs, youth groups, etc. (Goldstein, 1993; Goldstein and Goldstein, 1996; Phillips, 1993). Another element that is used to assess group commitment and is related to the synagogue is the frequency of attending services and participating in religious rituals. Formal membership is affected by demographic and social factors such as phase in the family life cycle, economic considerations, and tenure in place of residence, among other things; therefore, some people may have strong identification without being formally members of a synagogue. They may attend services anyway because Judaism, including its American version, does not condition participation in services on belonging to a synagogue or making another payment of some kind (Goldscheider and Goldstein, 1988). Another way of expressing a connection with the Jewish community is by belonging to an organization such as a Jewish community center ( JCC). It is true that


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people sometimes join such centers mainly in order to use facilities or participate in activity groups, especially sports. Even in such cases, however, the deliberate choice of a JCC is a marker of Jewish identification and a bridging factor between personal Jewish identity and Jewish communal life. JCC membership often reflects active involvement in Jewish encounters and events of various kinds. Jewish philanthropy also attests to a strong Jewish commitment. Donating to a federation that is largely locally connected is especially useful in assessing recent immigrants’ integration into the Jewish community. Notably, migration theories postulate that the economic situation and income level of immigrants—in this study, American Israelis—are less auspicious than those of the natives, i.e., American Jews at large. Earlier studies, however, suggested that income level has no effect on willingness to donate; rather, it only affects the amount of the donation (Cohen, 1980). Slightly more than half of the American Israelis belong to synagogues (Table 4.8), with basically the same rate among the Israel-born and the foreign-born. Their tendency to join a synagogue is somewhat stronger than among American Jews at large. This is an interesting finding because membership in an American synagogue and its accompanying community and social implications are totally different from those customary in Israel, where the synagogue serves chiefly as a house of prayer. Accordingly, the Israelis’ high rate of synagogue membership points to an enhanced level of adoption of AmericanJewish habits and may express their need, or wish, to have a congregational setting that provides not only religious services but also, and largely, opportunities to participate in community events and activities. Synagogue attendance does not necessarily depend on, and is not necessarily influenced by, membership in a synagogue. Members do visit their synagogues more often than others. Thus, 42 percent of American Israelis attend services once a month or more. However, many others who are not members go to synagogue anyway, if only a few times a year. The Israel-born displayed an especially strong tendency to attend services regularly, at least once per month. Notably, the rate of synagogue attendance on holidays or special occasions, or with greater frequency, is appreciably higher among American Israelis than among their Jewish peers in Israel, at 92.2 percent versus 78 percent (Levy, Levinson, and Katz, 2002). The share of American Israelis who attend synagogue also surpasses that among American

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Jews at large; this stands out in particular in the difference in attending services on a weekly basis. American Israelis and American Jews have very similar rates of JCC membership and tendencies to donate to Jewish causes. Among the American Israelis, however, there are differences between the Israelborn and the foreign-born: the tendency to donate is slightly weaker among the former and, accordingly, than that of Jews at large. American Jewish philanthropy entails a financial expense from which the donor gains nothing on an immediate and personal level (unlike synagogue or organizational dues) and its American format does not resemble the way donations are collected in Israel. As such, it may require close acquaintance with the Jewish community’s institutions and needs. Accordingly, one would expect it to be weaker among immigrants, especially those who have no prior experience as members of an ethno-religious minority community. Overall, consistently among the various indicators, one may say that the Israelis have settled in and reconciled their community patterns with those of their American Jewish peers. Table 4.8. Community Involvement among American Israelis and American Jews (Percentages) Israelis Community Involvement Synagogue Membership Synagogue Attendance Never High Holidays/ Special Occasions Once/Several Times per Month Once/Several Times per Week Membership in JCC Jewish Philanthropy

Total

Israel-born

Jews Foreign-born

52.2

52.7

50.6

47.3

100.0 7.8 50.6

100.0 7.2 53.2

100.0 9.4 42.3

100.0 13.2 55.6

15.2

11.5

27.1

15.5

26.4

28.1

21.2

15.7

25.8 60.5

24.4 57.0

29.1 71.6

24.3 61.8


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As with the observance of religious rituals, the various indicators of community involvement show that Israelis in New York have a generally stronger Jewish commitment than those in Miami and Los Angeles, in that order (Table 4.9). The high rate of synagogue membership among Israelis in New York stands out in particular. These Israelis also have the highest rate of JCC membership, although in this respect they are followed not by Israelis in Miami but by those in Los Angeles. The Israelis in Miami, however, are the most strongly inclined to donate to Jewish causes. Apparently, some of the internal differences among Israelis by place of residence mirror specific local patterns, i.e., spatial differences among American Jews at large. The most prominent examples of this are the rankings of the rates of synagogue membership, frequency of synagogue attendance, and Jewish philanthropy— New York, followed by Miami, and Los Angeles in last place—even if the size of the spatial differences varies among the indicators of communal integration. The differences between Israelis and Jews in general are presented in Table 4.9 by means of twelve cells (3 communities * 4 indicators of communal integration). In nine of the twelve, the ratio is greater than 1, showing that the Israelis’ level of communal involvement surpasses that of the local Jews at large. Community involvement, like the two previous patterns of identification (denominational identification and observance of religious rituals), is positively associated with tenure in the United States Table 4.9. Community Involvement among American Israelis and American Jews by Place of Residence (Percentages) New York Community Involvement

Synagogue Membership Synagogue Attendance (once + per month) Membership in JCC Jewish Philanthropy

Miami

Los Angeles

Ameri- American (A)/(B) American American (A)/(B) American American (A)/(B) can Jews Israelis Jews Israelis Jews Israelis (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) 59.4

58.0

1.02

48.8

41.1

1.19

42.7

34.4

1.24

43.4

37.2

1.17

43.0

26.1

1.65

37.5

25.2

1.49

47.6

47.1

1.01

10.5

14.0

0.75

24.4

11.2

2.18

61.9

68.3

0.90

65.1

70.5

0.92

54.2

45.2

1.20

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(Table 4.10). In all four indicators—synagogue membership, frequency of synagogue attendance, JCC membership, and Jewish philanthropy— veteran Israelis (11+ years in the United States) display stronger community involvement than their less-tenured peers. The differences between long-tenured and less-tenured Israelis are large—much larger than the differences found between the groups in the observance of religious rituals. The characteristics of community involvement show how important tenure is in the United States; such involvement is implemented via behaviors in the public domain and entails financial expenses and an investment of effort and time in participation in various communal-institution activities and social connections. Accordingly, it takes longer to develop and is manifested once the emigrants become more confident about the permanence of their settlement in the United States. With the prolongation of tenure, the Israelis display significantly greater community involvement than American Jews at large (see Table 4.8 above), including JCC membership and philanthropy for Jewish causes. Another factor that encourages strong community connections is marital status (Table 4.11). Differences in community involvement by marital status were found both among Israelis and among American Jews at large. Thus Israelis, married or not, belong to synagogues or visit them regularly (once a month or more) at higher rates than their American Jewish peers of similar marital status. As far as JCC membership and Jewish philanthropy are concerned, the differences between Israelis and the Jews in general are inconsistent and vary by marital status. These latter differences may be associated, among other things, with tenure in the United States and age (especially among unmarried Table 4.10. Community Involvement among Israelis in the United States by Tenure (Percentages) Communal Involvement

0–10 Years in the U.S. (A)

11+ years (B)/(A) in the U.S. (B)

Synagogue Membership Synagogue Attendance (once + per month) Membership in JCC Jewish Philanthropy

33.3 34.2

58.8 44.6

1.77 1.30

17.1 44.9

30.1 67.0

1.76 1.49


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Table 4.11. Community Involvement among American Israelis and American Jews by Marital Status (Percentages) American Israelis Communal Involvement Synagogue Membership Synagogue Attendance (once + per month) Membership in JCC Jewish Philanthropy

American Jews

Married Not (A)/(B) Married Not (A)/(B) (A) Married (A) Married (B) (B) 59.6

37.3

1.58

56.7

31.7

1.63

47.8

30.2

1.60

36.6

22.4

1.79

32.5 66.8

10.8 52.9

3.00 1.26

29.7 69.6

15.9 49.3

1.87 1.41

Israelis) and, perhaps, also with different social and economic characteristics. An advanced analysis of the data, provided in the next section, allows us to estimate the net contribution of marital status, as well as other individual characteristics, to the strength of the Jewish identification, including community involvement, of American Israelis. 6. Determinants of Jewish Identification Above we found differences, sometimes considerable, in Jewish identification of American Israelis by three main characteristics: place of residence, tenure in the United States, and marital status. These characteristics may be interrelated and may also be associated with other individual affinities such as age or education. For this reason, and in order to estimate accurately the independent effect of each characteristic, we entered a series of variables—each of which represents a major demographic and socioeconomic characteristic as well as emigration variables—into a suitable array of multivariate analysis.2

2 We ran a separate multivariate analysis for each variable of Jewish identification. For denominational identification, we distinguished among three groups: the Orthodox, the progressive movements (Conservative and Reform together), and none. This kind of variable, comprised of three categories, is suitable for a multivariate analysis of the multinomial logistic regression type. The other variables originally were, or

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The findings in Table 4.12 show that the longer they stay in the United States, the more strongly Israelis define themselves as Orthodox and prefer this self-definition over the more common local identifications of Conservative or Reform, or non-identification with any of the three main denominations within American Judaism. By the same token, even if it takes some time, Israelis strengthen their Jewish identification, especially after the beginning of their second decade in the United States. This effect is perceptible in various domains of Jewish identification including the observance of the Sabbath, keeping kosher, the observance of Hanukkah, and various manifestations of community involvement. Another leading factor that reinforces Jewish identification is marital status: married Israelis display a stronger Jewish commitment than non-married Israelis. The effect of place of residence indicates above all that Los Angeles is different from New York (the reference community) and, to some extent, Miami as well. Living in Miami and Los Angeles affects self-identity in the direction of adopting a Conservative or Reform self-identity or no ideological orientation at all, in contrast to the Orthodox one. Living in Los Angeles, in turn, weakens several major forms of Jewish expression such as keeping kosher, participating in a Seder, and belonging to a synagogue. The effects of the other variables are less consistent and, insofar as they are significant, they show that getting older strengthens Jewish identification. Higher education has polar effects, sometimes reinforcing Jewish identification and sometimes weakening it. Notably, when we inserted the place-of-birth distinction (Israel-born vs. foreign-born) into the analysis, we found that it had no significant effect on any of the patterns of Jewish identification. Israeli Americans are affected by tenure in contrasting ways. On the one hand, they continue to define themselves in the religious terms that are familiar and accepted in Israel, i.e., as Orthodox. On the other hand, they become more American over time and adopt behavior patterns that provide them with important anchors of group iden-

were designed as, dichotomous variables in the following way: lighting Sabbath candles, lighting Hanukkah candles, and participating in a Seder—never and sometimes vs. usually and always; keeping kosher, synagogue membership, JCC membership, and Jewish philanthropy—no vs. yes; frequency of synagogue attendance during the year—never or only on main holidays vs. once a month or more. The dichotomous nature of these identificational variables is appropriate for a logistic regression analysis.


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Table 4.12. Direction of the Statistically Significant Effects (Positive and Negative) of Demographic, Social, and Emigration Characteristics on Jewish Identification among Israelis in the United States Denomination

Significant effects on identification as Conservative/Reform vs. Orthodox: education (+), tenure 6–10 years (–), tenure 11+ years (–), Miami (+), Los Angeles (+) Significant effects of identification as ‘none’/unaffiliated vs. Orthodox: Married (–), tenure 6–10 years (–), tenure 11+ years (–), Miami (+), Los Angeles (+)

Sabbath Candles Dietary Lawskashrut Hanukkah Passover Synagogue Membership Synagogue Attendance JCC Membership Philanthropy

Female gender (+) Married (+), education (B.A. or more) (–), tenure 11+ years (+), Los Angeles (–) Married (+), tenure 11+ years (+) Los Angeles (–) Married (+), tenure 6–10 years (+), tenure 11+ years (+), Los Angeles (–) Mature age (+), married (+), education (B.A. or more) (–), tenure 6–10 years (+), tenure 11+ years (+) Mature age (+), married (+), Miami (–) Married (+),education (B.A. or more) (+), tenure 6–10 years (+), tenure 11+ years (+)

a. The independent variables are defined as follows: age—continuum from 18 and over, in single years; gender—women vs. men, with the latter as the reference category; marital status—married vs. unmarried with the latter including singles, divorcees, and widows/widowers as the reference category; tenure in the United States distinguishes among three groups: 0–5 years in the United States (reference category), 6–10 years, and 11+ years; place of residence distinguishes between New York (reference category), Miami, and Los Angeles.

tity and community-belonging in the new American social and cultural framework. These processes are not monolithically shared by all Israelis; those who choose to settle in Los Angeles in particular do not feel the need to express their Jewishness in practice as do Israelis in other large centers. 7. Attachment to Israel Finally, we examine the connection of Israelis with their homeland. Apart from investigating the strength of the Israeli identification, a

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major question is how this identification evolves as the emigrants gain tenure in the United States. Tenure, however, reflects more than processes of personal integration in the new society and the restructuring of identity; it also reflects exposure to periodic effects: expressions and attitudes of Israeli officials toward emigration from Israel and the emigrants themselves; the reaction of the local Jewish community to the Israelis; and political, social, and economic developments in both Israel and the United States that may influence national and ethno-religious identity (Gold, 2004). We cannot isolate the effects of the two dimensions of time—the micro dimension, i.e., each Israeli emigrant’s personal tenure, and the macro dimension, i.e., the periodic characteristics. However, we believe that the two dimensions largely affect the Israeli identification in a similar direction. Thus, longer-tenured American Israelis were not only intensively exposed to American society and culture but also emigrated to the United States at a time when the trends of thought about emigrants in Israel were contemptuous and off-putting. The two factors in concert must have weakened the bond of these Israelis to their homeland. In contrast, the less-tenured have not yet totally settled down in the United States, or at least not as their predecessors did, and they enjoyed a much more constructive attitude on the part of Israel’s representatives in the United States and the local Jewish communities. These circumstances create opportunities for the preservation of relations with Israel and, coupled with advanced electronic communication in its various forms, may mitigate the impact of the geographic distance from Israel. To investigate the American Israelis’ connection with the homeland, we focus on three indicators that may be culled from the United States National Jewish Population Survey: emotional attachment to Israel, familiarity with the social and political situation in Israel, and Israeli self-definition. American Israelis display a relatively high level of emotional attachment to Israel (Table 4.13). 81.2 percent described themselves as closely attached to Israel and another 14.5 percent described themselves as somewhat attached. A minority, less than 5 percent, expressed only a weak emotional bond. The levels of familiarity with the political and social situation in Israel were consistent with these findings: 78.3 percent are familiar, 13 percent are somewhat familiar, and slightly less than 10 percent are not very familiar or are wholly unfamiliar with the situation. The Israeli self-definition was more severely eroded than the two foregoing patterns. Thus, only 72.5 percent consider


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themselves Israeli; the others regard themselves as American or Israeli and American combined (with the two subgroups almost equally divided.) In other words, although the weakening of Israeli self-perception enhances the American perception, it does not necessarily weaken, or at least does not weaken to the same extent, other kinds of connections with Israel. From this point of view, the Israelis are experiencing an Americanization process that has specific Jewish characteristics and they are maintaining high levels of connection and familiarity with Israel, immeasurably surpassing the general American-Jewish average. The strength of the American Israelis’ ties to their homeland is uneven and perceptibly differentiated by the amount of time that has elapsed since emigration. The long-tenured are consistently less connected with Israel in all three indicators. The differences by tenure are especially obvious in two respects: familiarity with the political and social situation, and Israeli self-definition. While 92.3 percent of those who emigrated to the United States in the past decade defined themselves as very familiar with the situation in Israel, only 69.8 percent of those in the United States for 10+ years gave this response. The corresponding findings for Israeli self-definition are 88.5 percent and 62.8 percent, respectively. What we find, then, is that Israeli self-identity erodes at different rates in different patterns. Among the three indicators of Israeli identification perceptibly influenced by tenure in the United States, an especially small proportion of Israelis with more than ten years in the country continues to define itself as Israeli. An Table 4.13. Israeli Identification and Identity among American Israelis and American Jews in the United States (Percentages) Israeli Identification/Identity Emotional Attachment to Israel Very Somewhat Not Very Familiarity with Situation in Israel Very Somewhat Not Very Consider Self Israeli Yes No/Israeli and American

American Israelis

American Jews

100.0 81.2 14.5 4.3 100.0 78.3 13.0 8.6 100.0 72.5 27.5

100.0 30.4 38.0 31.6 100.0 36.1 52.2 11.7 – – –

Percentages

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chapter four 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

92.3

84.6

88.5

79.1 69.8 62.8

0–10 Years 11+ Years

Emotional Attachment to Israel (Very)

Familarity with Situation in Israel (Very)

Consider Self Israeli

Figure 4.2. Connection to Israel among American Israelis by Tenure in the United States (Percentages)

individual’s self-perception of national or group identity is much more central than emotional attachment or familiarity with the political and social situation in the homeland. It attests to an advanced stage in the process of integration in the new country which, in turn, weakens the likelihood that these people will eventually return to Israel. Since the connections with Israel are effected by a lengthy series of factors, we applied the multivariate analysis method, which allows us to estimate the independent effect of tenure on Israeli identification. First, however, we constructed an index of Israeli identification, composed of three variables: emotional attachment to Israel, familiarity with the country’s political and social situation, and Israeli selfdefinition. In the first two variables, respondents received a score of 1 if they had a very strong emotional bond with Israel and a score of 0 if their connection was ‘somewhat’ or ‘not very.’ Very strong familiarity with the situation in Israel gave the respondent a score of 1; any other response conferred a score of 0. For Israeli self-definition, we distinguished between those who responded in the affirmative (1) and those who responded in a negative or professed a dual IsraeliAmerican identity (0). The ‘Israeliness Index’ is obtained by adding the values for each variable, 0 or 1, weighting them by their relative scarcity across the entire sample of American Israelis (i.e., 1-P where P is the proportion of respondents in the total Israeli sample who claimed connection to Israel by means of the respective variable). The


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Israeliness score of the American Israelis ranges from a minimum of 0.68 to a maximum of 2.35, suggesting that none of the Israelis received a score of zero in all three indicators, but also that none scored one across all indicators. After controlling for major demographic and social characteristics including age, gender, marital status, education, occupation, and citizenship, we found that tenure in the United States has a significant negative effect on the Israeliness score (Figure 4.3).3 The strength of the effect (not shown here) shows that every year spent in the United States reduces the Israeliness score by almost 2 percent. Another important and expected finding is the negative relationship between United States citizenship and the score of Israeliness. Other factors that had meaningful effects on the Israeliness score are marital status (married) and a high level of education; both weaken an emigrant’s ties with Israel. On the other hand, older age encourages stronger relations with Israel. Furthermore, women exhibit higher levels of Israeliness than men. Unlike education, a prestigious occupation has a positive effect on Israeli identification. This may be related, albeit partly, to professional interests.4 8. Summary Both the transition to the United States and the change in status that renders Israeli emigrants an ethno-religious minority outside their homeland give rise to the need for American Israelis to reshape their Jewish identification and their attachment to Israel. The possibilities of Jewish identification in the United States are numerous and diverse. While some of these patterns and manifestations resemble those in Israel, chiefly in the private domain, others that belong to the social-public domain, including their nature and meanings, are unique to the new general and Jewish surroundings and specific places of 3 Given the continuous nature of the dependent variable of Israeli identification, we used the multiple-regression analysis. All the effects were found to be statistically significant. 4 We also examined another model that omitted the variables of occupation and citizenship, and hence is identical with the independent variables that were introduced in the testing framework of Jewish identification. This model also found a statistically significant and negative effect of tenure on Israeli identification at a very similar level of strength to that reported above.

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chapter four Age (18+)

Gender Female

Positive Occupation White-Collar/ Managerial

Positive

Positive

Marital Status Married

Education (BA+)

Negative Negative Tenure in the U.S.

Negative

Citizenship

Negative

Israeli Identity

Figure 4.3. Direction of the Statistically Significant Effects (Positive and Negative) of Demographic, Social, and Emigration Characteristics on Israeli Identification among Israelis in the United States

settlement. The elements of Jewish identification that the individual adopts reflect h/her wish to express uniqueness and group belonging, and their rhythm reflects the intensity of h/her identification. The preference of group identificational patterns, or estrangement from them, is also influenced by individual characteristics such as tenure in the United States, stages in the life cycle (especially marital status), and socioeconomic affinities. One of the new elements that an Israeli emigrant encounters and is hardly known in the texture of Israeli Jewish life is self-definition according to one of the denominational movements of American Judaism. Indeed, although they are presumably not observant, the share of American Israelis who define themselves as Orthodox is more than twice the corresponding rate among American Jews and also much higher than the share of Jews in Israel who define themselves as religious. In contrast, the share of American Israelis who identify with the


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Reform movement is much smaller than that of their American Jewish peers. The ideology and religious patterns of this denomination of Judaism are much different from those in Israel. Thus, insofar as American Israelis identify with any denominational movement, they prefer the one that they had known in Israel (the Orthodox), even if random encounters on holidays or at family events would have acquainted them with the very proximate and strongly similar movement (the Conservative), but they would not go so far as to embrace the very parochial new patterns of the Reform Movement or eschew all denominational identification. Overall, these patterns are typical of both the Israel-born and the foreign-born, with a slightly stronger tendency toward Orthodoxy among the former and toward Conservatism among the latter. Nevertheless, the various ideological definitions seem to cloak behavior patterns that indicate that a rather large share of American Israelis lead a Jewish life. This is manifested in regular daily customs such as keeping kosher (which more than half of American Israelis observe), observing the Sabbath by lighting candles (which is practiced regularly by more than two-thirds of American Israelis), as well as observing major holidays such as Hanukkah and Passover (as is done by nearly nine out of ten). In customs that we were able to compare, we found that the level of identification among American Israelis surpasses that of American Jews at large and even of Jews in Israel. American Israelis are also characterized by a higher level of Jewish-community involvement, especially in manifestations of a religious nature such as synagogue membership (more than half of American Israelis) and attending services (which more than 40 percent do once a month or more). In this sense, they demonstrate stronger Jewish identification than their peers, the American Jews. Six out of ten American Israelis donate to Jewish causes, a rate similar to that among the Jews in general. JCC membership is a less common behavior, typical of only onefourth of each of the population groups. The Israelis exhibit several distinct markers by place of birth, especially in the slightly higher rate of the Israeli-born to observe major Jewish holidays and attend synagogue services frequently. In contrast, the foreign-born are more inclined to keep kosher, observe the Sabbath, join a Jewish communal organization, and practice Jewish philanthropy. These differences reflect, at least in part, the contrast between patterns of life experienced solely in Israel by the Israel-born, and the experience, possibly lengthy, of Jewish life in the Diaspora among the foreign-born.

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American Israelis are differentiated by where they live. Consistently across the various patterns, those in New York display a stronger Jewish identification than those in Miami or Los Angeles. The Israelis in New York are more Orthodox, stricter in the observance of religious rituals—especially the regular ones—and, for the most part, are more involved in local community life. These differences among Israelis who live in different communities are largely reflections of the general American Jewish reality and the uneven distribution of Jewish commitment across the continent. American Israelis are also differentiated by tenure in the United States: the longer the tenure, the stronger is one’s Jewish identification. Obviously, those who have considerable tenure are also further along in the life cycle and have a high marriage rate. Being married also intensifies Jewish identification in both the private and the public domains. An advanced (multivariate) analysis of the data reinforces these findings. A complementary and possibly central element in the identification of American Israelis is their connection with the homeland. Obviously, this connection—manifested in various ways that we assess via the emotional dimension, familiarity with the social and political situation in Israel, and the extent to which Israeli self-definition still exists—is stronger among American Israelis than among American Jews. Accordingly, the main point of interest is the change that occurs in the strength of Israeli identification with the prolongation of tenure in the United States. In this case, time has a double meaning: first, the number of years in which Israelis have been physically away from Israel and exposed to the American society and culture, and second, the period when emigration to the United States took place and the atmosphere and attitude of the Israeli establishment and American Jewry toward the phenomenon of emigration from Israel and toward the emigrants themselves. We cannot untangle these two meanings, or aspects, of time. Either way, the empirical finding shows that the number of years in the United States has a negative effect on Israeli identification. We believe that this direction of influence is common to both dimensions crystallized in the factor of time. In this chapter we have used two different sets of data, one of Israelis in three large urban centers—New York, Miami, and Los Angeles—to investigate the characteristics of Jewish identification, and the other of Israelis throughout the United States to investigate their Israeli identification. Given what we know about the Israelis’ geographic preferences we believe that the sample from these three communities


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adequately represents the American Israeli population at large. If this is so, the American Israelis display an interesting and unique combination of preservation of, and change in, group patterns. On the one hand, their Jewishness and their perception of Jewish customs and values follow the traditional Orthodox models, largely expressing continuity of the major stream in Israeli Judaism. On the other hand, they immerse themselves in a personal and public entity that becomes more Jewish over time—here meaning ‘American Jewishness’—in local institutional and organizational settings, and at the same time distancing themselves from Israel. Ostensibly, this attests to a good accord between self-definition of ideological orientation and behavior patterns. It stands to reason, however, that most American Israelis, even if they define themselves as Orthodox, do not maintain a religious way of life in the Israeli sense of the term. As first-generation Americans, they live in tension between their Israeli past and their American present and attempt to reshape their Jewish identity and their group behavioral patterns and attitudes. As this process unfolds, they are evolving into a unique subgroup in American Jewry whose members define themselves, in high percentages, as Orthodox but do not behave like the American Orthodox in appearance or in adherence to an observant religious life. They display a stronger Jewish identification than American Jews do, and even though their Israeli identification weakens, it is nevertheless much stronger than that of their local Jewish peers. These patterns may serve as solid barriers against assimilation into the general American society.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION: THE MULTIFACETED ISRAELI DIASPORA 1. Overview Contemporary ideological and social developments are accompanied by enhanced movement of people across geographic areas and the way that the migrants, as well as the sending and host societies, perceive and cope with the phenomenon of migration. This coping reflects an interplay between the individuals’ wish to improve their welfare and quality of life and exploit better opportunities elsewhere without renouncing their connections with their home country on the one hand, and the destination country’s need and awareness of the economic utility of migrants and their increasing receptivity to the specific social and cultural needs of the newcomers, on the other hand. Concurrently, the objective obstacles to migration have been falling perceptibly; this is manifested especially in improved transport and the diffusion of advanced technologies that allow people to stay in touch with family and friends regularly and uninterruptedly—in a nutshell, the flattening of the world. Thus, migrants operate concurrently in several transnational spaces where they shape their socioeconomic status and restructure their group identity. The principal destination of transnational migrants is the United States. From the American standpoint, migration in the second half of the twentieth century constitutes another wave of newcomers who joined the second- and third-generation offspring of immigrants of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Whereas the early immigrants came mainly from Europe, most of the recent ones originate in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, where many countries are still in the early stages of their economic and technological development. Paradoxically, the earlier immigrants, who largely resembled members of the American social mainstream (‘White Anglo-Saxon Protestant’) in their social and cultural characteristics, were anticipated to adapt and assimilate into American society, while the recent immigrants, so different from the local majority, are accepted with an understanding of their cultural, religious, and social separateness. In many senses, too,

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American society displays flexibility and willingness to adapt its institutions and general social systems to the needs of recent immigrants—the use of Spanish is one example—allowing the newly arrived to become an important cultural tile in the American human mosaic. Whether it is part of internal ideological and social processes of greater pluralism and emphasis on multiculturalism, or the outcome of the recent immigrants’ presence and patterns, nonimmigrant Americans are also expressing greater interest in their ethnic roots and are developing a consciousness of group belonging that draws on the distant past and connects with ethnic and national origin in another country. The recent immigrants’ diasporic consciousness and identity, of course, is much different from that of the earlier immigrants’ American offspring. Most of the former are natives of their historical homeland; the latter do not have the self-image of people in motion or of migrants; their mother-country is not tangible, few of them have visited it, and it is at the most a historical, spiritual, or symbolic homeland. The new immigrants experienced their homeland personally and directly; the veterans may not have even heard personal recollections and stories from parents, grandparents, or other relatives about what life there was like. The recent immigrants speak the language of their homeland, are familiar with its society and politics, and consume its culture; the others, native-born later-generation offspring of early immigrants, know nothing about the homeland’s social and cultural characteristics. Most of the former hold dual citizenship—of the origin country and of the United States—while the latter are exclusively United States citizens; accordingly, the two groups exhibit differences in the scope of their loyalty, to both countries or to only one. Thus, the recent immigrants’ identity has developed transnationally, the connection with the homeland playing a major role whereas the identity of the veteran immigrants and offspring is inclusively ethno-religious and parochial even if it maintains some connection with another country or holy place. The countries of origin of the recent immigrants are different from those of the veteran American émigrés; therefore, the two groups do not share a similar diasporic self-identity, nor are they partners in common community activities. Among the recent American immigrants, however, the American Israelis are unique because their new place of settlement has a large and well established Jewish community with a ramified organizational and institutional infrastructure that no other ethnic group can match. This community may serve as a base

discussion: the multifaceted israeli diaspora

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for assistance, social and cultural absorption, and the satisfaction of group self-identity needs. The characteristics of the American-Jewish diaspora resemble the diasporic patterns of other Americans who are offspring of early emigration to the country. However, American Jews are further removed from their homeland than their non-Jewish American counterparts because their forebears, who migrated to the United States more than a century earlier, had also come from a foreign country (chiefly in Eastern Europe). Nevertheless, due to historical circumstances, both primordial and contemporaneous and due to the singularity of the Jewish people, Israel is an important anchor in the personal and collective identity of American Jews. For the Israeli emigrants, together with other possible ways of preserving Jewish identification that the local community provides, Israel is a mediating factor between the country of origin and the general society in the destination country. Likewise, many recent immigrants to the United States send support funds (remittances) to their families in the ‘old country’ and derive from this a measure of encouragement and acknowledgement that strengthens their toehold in the United States. In contrast, many American Israelis carry an ideological burden that generates a great deal of vacillation and reflection about living abroad and that may ultimately prompt them to re-migrate. This ideological burden, coupled with the all-important value of the family in Jewish and Israeli tradition and the strong long-term social relations that are typically maintained with childhood friends and army buddies, is largely unique to Israeli emigrants. The money sent to relatives by immigrants, be they Hispanic, Indian, Chinese, Muslim, or other, also helps the economy of the origin country, which is weak and poorly developed in most cases; accordingly, the origin society perceives the migrants positively. But the Israeli public and the country’s social and political establishment take a dim view of emigration and, although they are milder about it than they used to be, certainly deny the matter their sympathies. Another indicator that separates American Israelis from other immigrants is nativity status. Presumably most of the millions of immigrants who entered the United States in the last quarter of the twentieth century were natives of their countries of origin, whereas a rather large share of Israeli emigrants were born abroad, immigrated to Israel, and only later moved on to the United States. This difference between American immigrants as a whole and American Israelis may actually whet the desire of the former to return to their homeland at

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some stage, whereas among the Israelis this desire will weaken especially among those who were not born in Israel. Consequently, while the American Israelis share some characteristics of general transnational migration and the contemporary phenomenon of diasporism, they are differentiated in specific background affinities and the variegated and complex interrelations with the country of origin, the host country, and American Jewry. 2. Theoretical Aspects The American Israelis definitely constitute a modern diaspora. They meet the definitions of a diaspora more closely than do American Jews or any other Jewish community outside of Israel today as well as over the generations of life in exile. A central element in this matter is that most American Israelis were born in Israel and the share of the Israel-born among Israelis living in the United States has been rising over time. This Israeli diaspora developed as the outcome of voluntary migration by people who had enjoyed political freedom and equality, the social and economic conditions of a developed country, and a cultural and ethno-religious environment that provided them with a full sense of belonging to the majority society. Just the same, they elected to move to another country where they might better fulfill their educational and occupational capabilities and more easily raise their standard of living. On average, these emigrants are positively selected from the Israeli upper-middle class, people whose abilities positioned them at a favorable starting point for social and economic acculturation in the United States. Indeed, once in the United States they were upwardly mobile, surpassing the attainments of their American counterparts. From the social and economic standpoint, together with signs of permanence in the new location, namely homeownership and proficiency in English, the Israelis vaulted the hurdles of their encounter with the new society and managed to channel their human capital to afford them a high standard of living. The American Israelis’ main social and economic attributes—high rates of labor-force participation, homeownership, and proficiency in English—definitely affect their sense of belonging and their self-identity, which is becoming more and more American. Given their strong initial traits, they immerse themselves and integrate into the American social mainstream and do not practice segmented assimilation into


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weak niches, as may be typical of large groups among the masses of immigrants to the United States in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The new environment into which the Israelis integrate enhances their sense of success in and assimilation into the new society. Indeed, as time passes, the emigrants’ Israeli self-definition has been losing ground to an American-Israeli or even an unhyphenated American one. Still, most Israelis, even after amassing much tenure in the United States, identify themselves primarily and principally as Israelis. By so doing, they express characteristics of transnationalism and their multiple social and cultural space that moves between two locations. Furthermore, even when the identificational space is the United States, it is not necessarily ‘American’ as such but rather reflects the ethno-religious uniqueness of the Israelis and their recourse to the well-developed institutional infrastructures of the veteran local Jewish community. In keeping with diaspora theories, the more willing the new society is to accept the Israeli emigrants (as reflected, among other things, in the granting of citizenship and educational attainments), the more confident the emigrants feel in the new country and the weaker their ties to Israel. Accordingly, as Figure 5.1 shows, tenure in the United States has both weakening and strengthening effects on both Israeli identification and Jewish identification, with social characteristics serving as important intervening factors. The presence of a large veteran population of the same ethno-religious background as that of the emigrants, as in the case of American Jews and American Israelis, is unique and adds important elements to the body of empirical and theoretical knowledge about modern diasporism. The reshaping of the Israeli emigrants’ religious patterns and group identification was hardly an ex nihilo phenomenon. Apparently, within their intimate personal sphere, Israeli emigrants can observe religious rituals and holidays without assistance or a pre-existing infrastructure. These patterns of behavior, however, include the consumption of Jewish products—especially kosher food and other foods associated with major festivals—that are readily attainable across the United States today largely due to the foundations that were laid by veteran American Jews. Not only did the veteran American Jews invest years of effort and action in assuring the availability of such products, but it stands to reason that were it not for the size of American Jewry and the economic profitability of supplying kosher food, such a mechanism in its current magnitude would not have developed. The Israeli emigrants themselves are not a large enough group to establish a quantitatively

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chapter five Negative Negative Israeli Identification Positive

Tenure

Socioeconomic Characteristics

Jewish Identification Negative Positive

Figure 5.1. The Relationships Involved in the Social Integration and the Israeli and Jewish Identification of Israelis in the United States

sufficient demographic basis justifying the creation of a network of kosher food supply. Furthermore, at the socio-public level, the Israeli emigrants in the United States encounter a multitude of diverse Jewish institutions and organizations that offer religious, educational, and cultural activities that provide a sense of Jewish continuity, including elements of strong connection to Israel. Such an ethno-religious environment is unique in most senses and sets the Israeli emigrants apart from the other migrant groups in the United States. The relative ease of maintaining identification and community involvement may be an inhibiting factor against assimilation into the host society. From a collective point of view, such circumstances may act in two contrasting directions: they may hasten processes of distancing from the homeland in favor of an ethno-religious identification with local characteristics, or they may have a preservative effect by offering, among other things, a local institutional constellation and a generally high level of group identification, including that associated with the homeland. Hence, Israeli emigrants may reshape their identity in various ways and define their affiliation with the Israeli past, the Jewish present, and the new general surroundings. Such an identity is fluid and may changed for another. The identity chosen also reflects, either as a cause or as an effect, one’s behavior patterns and views on Jewish and Israeli topics. These identities largely create a scale that shows where the emigrant stands on a continuum bounded by separatism and assimilation at its extremes. These identities lend themselves to the following


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definitions: (1) Israeli identity; (2) Israeli and American-Jewish identity; (3) American-Jewish identity; and (4) American identity. Emigrants with an Israeli identity are those who choose to continue identifying solely with their origin country; even if this identity has elements of Jewish behaviors, they are manifested in the private sphere and have no institutional connections. Some emigrants who identify in this way settled recently and have not yet been so exposed to the local Jewish community; others are long-tenured but reject organized Judaism for religious or ideological reasons. The emigrant who has an AmericanIsraeli identity tries to integrate the elements of h/her Israeli and Jewish identifications through manifestations that are tailored to the reality of life as a member of an ethno-religious minority in the United States and by striving to preserve a specific way of life and collective belonging. Those who embrace an American-Jewish identity have reached an advanced stage in the weakening of their Israeli identification, and the adoption of local Jewish customs and patterns assure ethno-religious continuity. Those who adopt an exclusively American identity have come to the last stage of a two-fold assimilation—erosion of both the Israeli and the Jewish identification—even if they demonstrate Jewish behaviors and Israeli connections sporadically on special occasions. A comprehensive and integrated look at American Israeli patterns of identity and identification suggests that the most common types in this typology are ‘Israeli’ and ‘Israeli and American-Jewish.’ As Israeli emigrants prolong their stay in the United States, they shift from the first type to the second, reflecting processes of Jewish Americanization. However, small numbers of emigrants cease to define themselves as Israelis at all; the members of this group are divided between those who maintain some level of Jewish identification and those who eschew the observance of even the most central Jewish customs and traditions. Thus, some American Israelis do reside at the two weak poles of Israeli and/or Jewish identification. These gradual processes largely correspond to Alba and Nee’s typology (2003) of the assimilation of migrants into the American social mainstream, although, in the Israeli case, the local Jewish community provides the original pot of absorption. In the first stage, newly arrived emigrants shift and widen the boundaries of the collective in order to be included as part of Israeli society. As time passes, the boundaries become blurred as the American Israelis’ social profile drifts away from that of their peers in the homeland and becomes more similar to that of the local society. Later, this may lead to the crossing

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of boundaries as the emigrants place themselves at an even greater distance from their country of origin. This final phase is anticipated to intensify among the emigrants’ American-born offspring, reflecting the classic pattern of assimilation. From a structural point of view, namely education, work, language, etc., the Israelis’ assimilation is into the general American social mainstream. From the standpoint of selfand institutional identification, it takes place chiefly into the ethnic networks and structures of American Jewry. Thus, while their Israeli connection weakens over time, most American Israelis remain part of a distinct and visible community that has specific preferences in language, place of residence, cultural behaviors associated with place of origin, and ethno-religious affiliation. 3. A Reflection of Israeli Society The American Israelis, although not living in Israel, also shed light on and allow important observations about Israeli society. Israel’s out-migration rate is not high, especially given its large number of in-migrants. Israel has rather strong retention powers and offers its inhabitants opportunities and a quality of life that are not vastly different from those in the United States (the main destination of Israeli emigrants) and that, in any event, combine with ideological, religious, and socio-cultural factors to keep the level of out-migration low. However, there is tension between the wish to remain in Israel and the stimuli of the United States which has different effects among different subgroups of Israel’s Jewish population. Indeed, Israel does have a low emigration rate; nevertheless the share of children among the emigrants (who moved to the United States with their parents) has been rising over time. The implications of this are far-reaching because those who emigrate at an early age are exposed to the American education system, the local culture, and socialization with local peers, all of which probably make them much less likely to return to Israel when they reach adulthood. From a qualitative point of view, it is clear that the strongest groups in Israeli society, especially the young and the well educated, are strongly represented among the emigrants. However, on the basis of indirect evidence backed by prior studies, we have reached the conclusion that many of these well-educated people, after furthering their already-strong education attainments in the United States, ultimately return to Israel.


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Israel has a stronger retentive grip on persons of Asian/African origin than on those of European/American extraction. Insofar as Israelis of the former origin emigrate to the United States, they are a positive-selected group. Furthermore, once in the United States they raise their educational and economic attainments to levels that resemble and sometimes surpass those of Israelis of European/American origin. Ethnic disparities among American Israelis are smaller than those in Israel and may not persist at all. It is true that these Israeli emigrants of Asian/African origin may have succeeded in Israel as well and may have joined Israel’s high social and economic strata. It is also possible, however, that these Israelis would not have done as well in Israel as they managed to do under the social and economic conditions of a large country such as the United States whether this is for personal reasons, e.g., social and economic difficulties in moving from peripheral areas to major cities; for environmental reasons, e.g., scholastic achievements that did not correspond to the requirements of Israel’s higher-education institutes; or for structural reasons, i.e., a mismatch between their occupational credentials and the economic opportunities in Israel. At a different but complementary level, we found that foreignborn Israelis, some of whom originated in Asia/Africa and others from Europe/America, managed to close gaps in the United States that initially existed between themselves and the Israel-born. It may be that both groups—those of Asian/African origin and the foreignborn—faced objective or subjective barriers in Israel that ruled out the best possible translation of their personal abilities into social and economic attainments, and that they responded to this situation by trying another country. The Israelis’ initial characteristics shortly after they arrived in the United States, and the difference between the earliest wave of emigrants and the most recent wave, also show how far Israeli society has come in improving its inhabitants’ achievements. Even if the emigrants are not representative of the Israeli population at large, they seem to reflect several social changes that took place in Israel in the last quarter of the twentieth century, including, in particular, the increase in the Israelis’ level of education, improvement in English proficiency, and the attainment of gender equality in educational achievements. The conditions of life in Israel for the Jewish-majority society, in which Jewish tradition and religion are deeply planted in the public arena, severely narrow Israelis’ encounters with institutions and

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organizations of a religious nature and the quest for specific Jewish behaviors. That Israelis may distance themselves from these patterns in Israel does not mean that they disapprove of Jewish tradition in principle. As recent studies in Israel have shown (Levy, Levinson and Katz, 2002), most Israelis who do not strictly observe the religious commandments are traditional or non-religious but definitely not antireligious. Therefore, when they exchange their status for that of an ethno-religious minority in a Gentile-majority society, American Israelis have an infrastructure to which they may reach out to reinforce their Jewish identification in practical ways, including patterns entailing membership fees and rather intensive involvement. Judged by their ideological ties, the affiliation of some American Israelis is with institutions and organizations identified with the Conservative and Reform movements. The moderation and the religious pluralism that typify these denominations of Judaism may help these Israelis to integrate into local community life. These denominational movements, of course, have not managed to make inroads to attract large populations in Israel (Tabory, 2004). The difference between their success among American Israelis and their situation in Israel shows that Israeli society is content with its daily reality of Jewish events and rituals; it feels no need to formalize its Jewish identification by means of religious institutions or organizations. However, a larger fraction of American Israelis defines itself as Orthodox, and presumably the Jewish institutions or organizations that these emigrants join, insofar as they join them, would be of similar ideological orientation. This attests to the persistence of old patterns of religious behavior in Israeli society, patterns that the emigrants—who ostensibly have weaker Zionist and religious ties than Israelis at large—preserve and take to foreign countries as against the more progressive and less restrictive alternatives that the destination country offers. Thus, from the viewpoint of Jewish tradition and faith, and through the prism of American Israelis, we may characterize Israel as a conservative society. 4. Israeli Emigrants and American Jewry Israelis have become a conspicuous demographic and cultural element in American Jewry. Internal downward trends in the number and group commitments of American Jews (DellaPergola, 2005) are amplifying their importance. Taking together the Israeli emigrants and


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their American-born children, the total number of American Israelis is estimated at around a quarter of a million. Hence, they constitute approximately 5 percent of the American Jewish population (which was estimated in the most recent National Jewish Population Survey [2000] at 5.2 million) (Kotler-Berkowitz et al., 2003). This added increment, mostly dating to the last quarter of the twentieth century, settled in the United States at a time when internal quantitative losses due to negative natural movement occasioned by low fertility, population aging, and accelerated assimilation, had reached their peak. In fact, were it not for the Israelis, there would be fewer than five million Jews in America today, meaning that the collective would have retreated to its size in the middle of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the American Israelis have, by and large, maintained ‘Israeli’ fertility patterns, which exceed the intergenerational replacement level, as well as that of their American Jewish peers (Lev Ari, 2008). Together with additional migration of Israelis to the United States, and the persistence of the internal demographic patterns of local Jews, the share of Israelis in American Jewry will probably continue to grow. Although relatively few in absolute numbers, the Israelis stand out in traditional Jewish economic domains in which the Jewish presence has been dwindling severely in recent times. The high concentration of Israelis in private business and in sales is widening the Jews’ dispersion across economic activities and, accordingly, the possibilities of contact between them and Americans at large and the spheres of their influence on the general local society, as recently observed in industries such as real estate and the media. Insofar as Israelis’ private businesses employ not only other Israelis but also more and more local Jews, an ethno-religiously homogeneous working environment will increasingly take shape, facilitating the improvement of Jewish social cohesion. Furthermore, from the structural standpoint, Israelis tend to settle in a small number of cities that largely correspond to the areas of residence that American Jews prefer the most. This spatial similarity assures maximum channeling of the Israeli increment to the American Jewish population. One area of activity that is influenced by this effect is the political. Given the American electoral system—an Electoral College to which each state posts delegates—the especially large number of electors in states that have major Jewish population centers, and the rather uniform voting patterns of American Jews (with a clear preference for the Democratic Party), the Israelis are amplifying the Jewish community’s political strength, especially since the American

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Jewish patterns are replicated with even greater emphasis among the Israelis.1 This is significant in many ways for three kinds of interests: American-Jewish, world-Jewish, and those associated with Israel. The settlement of Israelis in cities that have large Jewish concentrations boosts these localities’ Jewish populations and enhances opportunities for contact and relations between Israeli and non-Israeli Jews. Since many American Israelis are young, they are having a particularly strong bolstering effect on the age groups in which intimate acquaintances and marriages typically take place; thus, they may help to somewhat mitigate mixed marriage among American Jewry. Similarly, the large percentage of their membership in Jewish institutions is reinforcing the organized Jewish infrastructure, which has lost much of its strength in recent years (Cohen, 1998; Rebhun, 2004). Even if only several thousand Israeli families join synagogues or a JCC, visit these institutions, and participate in their activities regularly, they may reenergize Jewish life. As they do so, they will enhance Israel-related activity and serve as ‘hasbara emissaries’ who can explain the complexity of Israel’s political and security situation. These behaviors may blunt the dissatisfaction that American Jews have recently been expressing about events in Israel in general and the Israel-Arab conflict in particular. A specific contribution that the Israelis are making is due to their proficiency in Hebrew. One of the most conspicuous characteristics of American Jews is lack of proficiency in this language. American Israelis can reinforce and expand the study of Hebrew in the Jewish education system, from day and ‘Sunday’ schools to Jewish-studies programs in colleges and universities and adult-education courses sponsored by the local Jewish community. Persons of Sephardi extraction, whether born in Asia/northern Africa or Israel, are well represented among the American Israelis and are bolstering the small Sephardi Jewish community in the United States. Given what we know about identification in Israel by ethnic origin, we may hypothesize that these Israelis have a strong Jewish commitment in the United States as well. Their settlement in the United States coincides with the emigration of large numbers of Iranian Jews to

1 Our own data analysis of the 2000 NJPS shows that slightly more than half of American Jews (57 percent) define themselves as liberal and the rest are divided almost equally among conservatives and ‘middle of the road’. The distribution of the Israelis, although represented in the Survey by a small number of interviewees, is 63 percent liberal, 13 percent conservative, and slightly under one-fourth ‘middle of the road’.


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America. Together, they constitute an important collective that can further the diffusion of Sephardi Jewish culture and traditions in the United States. Such efforts would find receptive soil in the general American tendency to multiculturalism. 5. Challenges for Public Policy The number of Israelis living abroad permanently has been growing in recent times and the large majority of the emigrants choose to settle in the United States. This trend is largely part of a global phenomenon of free migration that aspires to exploit social and economic opportunities and enhance quality of life. The expansion of the Israeli diaspora does not reflect an increase in Israelis’ predisposition to emigrate; rather, it expresses the accumulation, over many years, of Israelis who have left the country. Given the unique combination of the steadily growing number of Israelis living abroad and the ideological, personal, and public sensitivity associated with emigration from Israel, there is a need for public debate and planning aimed at challenging central goals and values of the State of Israel amid a tolerant view of the right of individuals to tie their fate to a location other than Israel. The aims of this policy should be to maintain strong relations between the émigrés and Israel without allowing this to be construed as encouraging or even legitimizing emigration from Israel. Obviously, issues of policy are highly intricate and charged. Accordingly, rather than recommending the adoption of a specific policy we attempt to set forth principles and point to possible directions of action that the findings of this study relate to, and reinforce their viability. The dimensions of action presented here consider Israelis’ emigration to the United States from two different and complementary perspectives: that of Israel and that of American Jewry. Notably, many of the directions of activity envisaged are aimed not only at the American Israelis but also at the Israeli diaspora at large. Our basic argument is that the planning and execution of public policy require a solid and up-to-date infrastructure of information about the Israelis living abroad. Israel does have one of the world’s most comprehensive border-control systems; it records every person who leaves or enters the country. The sources of information, however, provide no legal or declarative/subjective indication at the individual level about the nature of emigration from Israel. A transition

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of this kind is often a lengthy and continuing process that starts with a tourist visit or a pilot term of life abroad, continues with uncertainties that may include interim stays in Israel, and ends with the sinking of permanent roots in the soil of the new country. The process may be even more complex than this because many emigrants continue to define themselves as Israeli, maintain close relations with family and friends in Israel, and visit Israel very frequently. Even after many years away, some regard their stay abroad as ‘temporary’ and declare their intention of returning to Israel at some future time. There is no documentation or follow-up as to where Israelis settle and establish a presence abroad generally and in the various American states and cities specifically. Data about the emigrants’ main demographic characteristics are similarly lacking. The construction of such a database is a complex and possibly a very time-consuming thing to do. It may be assisted by Israel Border Police records, information from Israel’s diplomatic missions (consulates, Israelis’ homes, emissaries of national institutions such as the Jewish Agency), and government ministries (and especially the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, which Israelis contact to ask about returning-resident benefits), and also by focused initiatives in the print and electronic media, in which Israelis abroad are asked to provide information about themselves. The Israeli institutional system should update and adjust itself to the international dispersion of the Israeli population. One of the implications of emigration from Israel and the settlement of Israelis in the United States and elsewhere is the need to broaden the organizational conception and adopt a broad approach that recognizes the existence of a global Israeli population. Practically speaking, this means strengthening relations between the émigrés and Israel. It should be borne in mind that the Israeli population abroad, including that in the United States, is very heterogeneous. Consequently, some of its segments or groups are interested in maintaining and reinforcing relations with Israel and seek ways to accomplish this, whereas other groups prefer to make their dissociation from Israel not only physical but also social and cultural. The findings of our study show that most American Israelis have a strong Israeli identification. This population should be a target for the activities of official Israeli institutions. The nature of these activities should be determined in close cooperation with the emigrants and after their preferences and needs are clarified. These activities may include encounters with Israeli public figures and politicians, events involving cultural personalities from Israel, and activities via advanced


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technological media, among other things. The types of activities preferred may vary depending on the target population: large Israeli communities versus small ones; young Israelis and parents of children versus older ones; endogamous Israeli families versus Israelis who have married local Jews. As the American Israelis’ relations with Israel are shaped, the principle of reciprocity needs to be discussed. What we mean by reciprocity is the coupling of Israel’s responsibility for, and the granting of entitlements to, those abroad with the expectation, if not the obligation, that the emigrants will be active and will contribute time, effort and money to Israel. This is especially valid if one of the elements of the relationship between émigré Israelis and the State of Israel focuses on the right to vote in parliamentary elections or exert any other kind of political influence. An important subpopulation to address in nurturing relations between emigrants and Israel is the children, irrespective of whether they were born in Israel or abroad. Children typically settle into a new society quickly, become friends with local children, master the new vernacular until it quickly becomes their primary language, consume the local culture, and, in contrast, disengage from the family and friendship networks that they had had in their country of origin. The American Jewish educational infrastructure of day and supplementary schools is geared primarily to the reinforcement of the Jewish identification of local Jewish children. Since Israel is an important factor in Jewish education in the United States, these schools may serve as a surrogate, if only a partial one, for schools in Israel, giving the Israeli children some knowledge of contemporary Israeli history, society, and culture and maintaining their proficiency in Hebrew. In places that have large concentrations of Israeli families with children, special action and intervention should be undertaken to devise attractive regular programs that would be suitable for Israeli children as well. Among adolescents, the reinforcement of their Israeli identification may also be accomplished by means of youth movements. Various youth movements are active in the United States, some with local Jewish connections and others that are branches of Israeli movements. Presumably, the latter would be more effective in strengthening members’ Israeli identification, but if information exists about a large number of Israelis who belong to American-Jewish youth movements, ways to enhance their Israelrelated activities should be sought. In all educational settings, formal (schools) or informal (youth movements), the participation of Israeli children in visits-to-Israel programs should be encouraged.

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In tandem with activities that reinforce identification with Israel, appropriate mechanisms should be found that will provide Israelis abroad with Israel-related information associated with their interests and vocations. These mechanisms should be attentive to opportunities of return migration and they should be prepared to help American Israelis make this move. Sometimes the decision to return to Israel can be implemented rapidly if it is backed by institutional support and a strong likelihood of successful acclimatization in Israel. It must be realized that many Israelis abroad experience long-term ideological, social, and familial ambivalence and vacillations, albeit covert, about having left Israel and entertain thoughts or expectations of returning to Israel at some time. Labor-market opportunities and the economic boom-and-bust cycles that typify the modern era, including those of recent years, may also create conditions, sometimes unexpected, that make it better to live in Israel than in the United States or, at least tip the overall balance between the two locations to give Israel an edge. Such circumstances would entice Israelis to come home. Personal factors and family pressures may also motivate individuals to re-immigrate. The second complementary perspective of public policy relates to American Jewry and suggests that American Jewry may resort to Israelis as agents for the dissemination of Conservative and Reform Judaism in Israel. A rather large proportion of American Israelis belong to these movements and some ultimately return to Israel. These returnees may serve as an important pool of new members for the Conservative and Reform congregations that already operate in Israel; alternately, they may form ‘seed groups’ for new congregations. Similarly, many Israelis visit the United States in order to see relatives and family members and these visits often take place on the major Jewish holidays. Under such circumstances, it is likely that their stay will include a visit to a synagogue or other Jewish social or cultural activities sponsored by the non-Orthodox branches. This comes on top of regular exchanges of information between American Israelis and family members in Israel about the emigrants’ experiences and their relations with local Jews. All these give many Israelis a view of the Conservative and Reform movements that might lead to willingness to join the movements’ synagogues in Israel or enroll their children in their educational programs (schools and youth movements).


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6. Epilogue At the present writing, Israel and the United States are home to the two largest Jewish concentrations in the world. Each country has a Jewish population of slightly more than five million. The Jewries of Israel and the United States are not only the demographic mainstays of world Jewry but also the most important centers of Jewish culture and religion, each with its own complexion and style. The relationships between Israel and American Jewry are strong and tight in ways unprecedented among other religio-ethnic diasporas. On their margins, one sometimes discovers tensions and disagreements on issues of Jewish nationhood in Israel versus Jewish communal life in the United States, the center and the periphery of the Jewish people, the status of the progressive denominations of Judaism, and the ‘Who is a Jew?’ question, to name only a few. Some of the rethinking and reassessments of the role and status of each of these communities, and of the way they interrelate, reflect generational changes: the growing share of young American Jews who did not experience formative events such as the Holocaust, the establishment of the State of Israel, and the Six-Day War, and, contrastingly, young Israelis who were not exposed to the role and influence of American Jewry in Israel’s security and economic prosperity. Another part of the controversy reflects the special complexity of Israel’s way of coping with the Israel-Arab conflict, which has recently taken a harsher turn, and the Israelis’ growing distance from the internal challenges of identity and group continuity that American Jews face. They may also be the result of general social changes in both countries that stress individualism and focus on the here-and-now. In fact, the emigration of Israelis to the United States—the emigrants’ vacillations and characteristics, the attitudes of those who continue to live in Israel and of Israel’s institutions toward the emigrants, and American Jewry’s attitude toward the new Israelis—itself reflects some of the changes that each of the societies, the Israeli and the AmericanJewish, has been undergoing, as well as period-related effects. If so, the American Israelis are a microcosm through which we may understand each of the societies specifically and comprehend major contemporary social phenomena that are mediated by the spatial mobility of people and, in turn, of human capital and cultural patterns generally.

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INDEX

The letter t following a page number refers to a table. absorption 10, 16, 29, 61–62, 79, 99, 104 of Israeli immigrants to U.S. 18–20, 21, 38, 64, 82, 97 patterns of 8 social and cultural 5, 7, 50, 139 socioeconomic 19–20, 63, 64 See also homeownership acculturation xii, 5, 35, 38, 50, 57, 61, 62, 63, 94, 140 economic 72–82, 90, 99, 140 and education 65, 68, 99 social 89, 99, 140 and waves of emigration from Israel 64 See also homeownership affiliation status 102 age, American Israelis 40–44 community involvement and 124 composition 43 educational attainment and mobility 66, 66t, 71t at emigration 40, 41t, 42, 47, 56, 111 at emigration by area of birth 44t English proficiency and 87, 89t by gender 41–42, 41t homeownership and 83, 84t, 85 Jewish identification and 124, 125, 126 mobility toward citizenship and 91 occupation mobility by age 76t and socioeconomic attainments 94, 98–99 young emigrants 40–41, 45, 56, 85, 91, 94, 96t, 97, 98, 111, 144 aging of American Israeli population 87 aliyah ( Jewish immigration to Israel) xi American-Jewish identity 142, 153 American Jewishness 135 American Jewry American-Jewish identity 142 dissatisfaction with Israel 148 Israeli identification among 129t

Israeli emigrants and 17, 146–49 and Israelis’ assimilation 144 Israelis differentiation and segregation from 52, 105 native-born 33–34, 107–8 quantitative losses 147 Sephardi Jews among 34 social and cultural integration into 25, 108 spatial distribution 51t, 52, 56 trends in number and group commitment of 146 Americanization 20, 102 of Israeli society 16 process of American Israelis 129, 143 ancestry indicated by American Israelis 32–33, 43 Anglo-conformity 101, 102 Arabic 22, 23 area of origin, Israelis in the U.S. 32t army, Israeli emigration after discharge from 40, 56 reserve duty in 14, 16 social relations with army buddies 139 Ashkenazi Jews ( Jews of European origin) 18, 21, 32, 33, 98 women 20 Asian/North African Jews 17, 22, 30, 31, 32t, 33, 38, 50, 71, 113, 145, 148 age at emigration to U.S. 43, 44t educational attainments and mobility 65, 68, 69, 69t, 71t, 72, 97 English proficiency among 86–87, 88, 89t, 90, 98 employment mobility 80t, 99 income level 80–81 positive selection of emigrants 145 share among American Israelis 33, 43, 55 spatial distribution in the U.S. 52, 53, 53t, 57

168

index

and U.S. citizenship rate 91–92, 92t, 93, 94 as wage-earners 80 assimilation 5, 10, 102, 103, 108, 141, 142, 143–44 segmented 7, 102, 111, 140 theory 63 two-fold 143 attachment to Israel 142 American Israelis’ 128–29, 129t, 130, 131, 134, 141 behavior patterns, émigrés’ 5, 7, 10, 12, 45, 101 blue-collar and service occupations 3, 4 American Israelis in 74, 76t and economic characteristics and mobility by emigration wave 82t and occupational mobility 76t British Commonwealth of Nations, Jews originating from 32 California 51 Canada 38, 43 American Israelis originating from 32t, 50 spatial distribution in the U.S. 52 Central Europe Israeli Jews originating from 31 rates of emigration from Israel of 37 chain migration 16 children American Israelis emigration as 40, 41, 43, 56, 144 born in the U.S. 56 Israeli citizenship for foreign-born 91 in Israeli families 45 Israeli immigrants’ 15, 21 Jewish education for 120 of married American Israelis 48, 48t and nurturing relations with Israel 151 Christmas tree, in Jewish home 107, 116, 119 chronology of Israeli emigration to the U.S. 35 cities and metropolitan areas, American Israelis in 53–54, 57 distribution core/periphery 54 and marital status 54t, 54–55, 57 citizenship and naturalization 62–63, 64, 90–93, 92t, 94, 95–96, 96t, 98, 138, 141

children of American Israelis and 48 English proficiency and 62, 86, 97 Israeliness score and 131 rate 91–92 by selected demographic characteristics 92t and waves of Israeli emigration 92–93, 93t class, migration and socioeconomic 5–6 community. See Jewish community connections other communities in the diaspora of the same group 11–12 to homeland and host land 13, 21 intra-group 102 to Israel 21, 25, 35 with the homeland 19 to places and transmigration 7, 8, 11 Conservative movement, American Israelis identification with 106, 107, 108, 109, 110t, 111, 126, 127t, 133, 146 dissemination in Israel 152 consumption socio-cultural, 3, 33 Western 34 continuity 135, 142, 153 strategies 106 country of birth, American Israelis citizenship and 91, 92t educational attainments and mobility 69, 69t English proficiency and 89t Jewish identification and 126, 133 housing characteristics by 84t country of origin, socioeconomic achievement and 61 cultural patterns Israeli 52 Western 34 demographic balance, Israel’s 14 demographic transition 2 denominations, Jewish 107–12 identification with 106–11, 109t place of residence and identification with 110t marriage status and 111–12, 112t non-identification with 126 social and cultural institutions of 111

index See also Conservative movement; Orthodox movement; Reform movement destination country, 9, 15, 34, 50, 61, 99 and economic activity 5, 72, 82, 97 Israel as mediating factor in 139 Jewish religious behavior in 113, 146 language in 62 minority status in 104 relations with origin country and xii, 137 relations with settlers in 6 diaspora 11–12, 133 American Israelis as a modern 140 characteristics of American-Jewish 139 ethno-national 10 general status of members 13 Israeli 149 Jews’ identification and 105 diasporism 10–13, 140 modern 141 dietary laws. See kashrut dissimilarity, Israelis/Jews 109, 110t diversity, 102 divorce, divorced 45, 57 by age 47t American Israelis versus Jewish population in Israel 49 metropolitan residence status of 54t, 54–55 rate among American Israelis 46, 46t, 56 dual citizenship 9, 63, 91, 94, 104, 138 dual loyalties 13 political xii Duncan Socioeconomic Index (SEI) 77–78 Eastern/Central Europe, Jews from 30, 31, 139 American Israelis originating from 32t rates of emigration from Israel 38, 43 economic activity, Israeli immigrants to U.S. 19, 147 and relations with Israel 21 economic characteristics and mobility 24, 59 among American Israelis 64, 72, 78t, 78–79

169

attainments of Asian/African American Israelis 145 by emigrant waves 82t economics 95f factors for emigration 16, 17, 28 factors for return 152 Israeli crises and migration 34, 36 opportunities xi, 1, 5, 27, 43, 57, 62, 65, 73, 145, 149 education 64, 94, 95f, 96t, 98 American Jewry’s infrastructure of 151 attainments and mobility 65–72, 66t, 67t, 71t, 88, 95, 141, 145 and ethnic origin 65 and countries of origin 70–71, 71t gender and 67t higher 62, 126 improvement in level of 66–67, 69–70, 88 Israeli emigrants and 144, 145 Israeliness score and 131 level 95, 97 opportunities 65, 68, 70, 140 qualifications 33 Egypt, 32 emigrants, Israeli characteristics 15, 17 defining 14–15 demographic characteristics of 31 economic dualism of 18 educational level and attainments 65–72 national identity of 20 number of xi, 13–15, 147 by place of birth 35–36, 36t perception as a group 19 positive selection of 140 return to Israel by 18, 37, 68, 97 emigration, from Israel xii, 34 attitude of Israeli officials toward 128 attitude of Israelis toward 17 by place of birth 36t chronology of migration 34–39 and events in Israel 35, 36, 37, 38, 56 fluctuations in 37–38, 39t increase in 35 motives 16–17, 34, 36, 37–38, 43, 48, 50 nature of 149–50 rate of xi, 14, 16, 36 by area of origin 37, 39t selectivity of 69, 72, 90

170

index

timing and period of 35, 55, 36, 36t, 37, 134 timing by nativity 35 waves of 64, 69–70, 71t, 96–97 by year of arrival 39t employment 4, 60, 64, 81, 96t American Israelis rate of 73–74, 79, 82t area of settlement and 61 characteristics by age 75t distribution of opportunities 52 mobility among American Israelis by place of birth 79t rate 82t, 88, 97 endogamy 119, 151 English proficiency 19, 57, 62, 64, 86–90, 94, 95, 96t, 97, 140, 145 by ethnic extraction 88 improvement in 87, 88, 89–90 level of 87–88 place of birth and 86–87 reading 88 by selected demographic characteristics, 89t and waves of emigration 90t ethnic disparities 145 ethnic identity 103 ethnic origin 7, 138 ethnic origin, American Israelis 32–33 citizenship and 91, 92t economic success and 80 educational attainment and mobility 65, 71t employment mobility among 80t English proficiency and 88, 89t Sephardi religious and cultural affinities and 34 ethnic succession 19 Ethnic Succession Model 60 ethnicity, symbolic 103–4 ethno-religious belonging group 7, 12, 20, 29, 142 ethno-religious minority, Jewish 50, 122, 131, 143, 146 ethno-religious uniqueness, American Israelis 141 Europe 43, 68 European/American, American Israelis 94 U.S. citizenship rate 91 educational attainments and mobility 65, 69, 69t and employment 80

expatriates, Israeli 14, 16 exposure to the West, Israeli

17, 34

family, families 4, 8, 9, 11, 44–49, 118, 139 burdens on women 61–62, 67, 88 and emigration motives 18 emigration of 42, 48, 56 housing 63 networks and relations 3, 10 reunification 11 fertility patterns, American Israelis’ 147 First Lebanon War 17, 34, 36, 37, 56 Florida 51 former Soviet Union, Jews from xi emigrants from Israel 31, 32, 35, 36–37, 50 immigration directly to the U.S. 34–35 mass immigration to Israel from xi, 31, 32, 34, 38 gender, Israelis in the U.S. and age composition of emigrants, 41, 41t citizenship and 91, 92t and economic characteristics 78, 78t educational attainment and mobility by 67, 67t, 71t and employment 73, 79 and English proficiency 88, 89t, 90, 98 equality in Israeli education 145 and income levels 78–79 and Israeliness score 131 Jewish identification and 127t marital status by 46, 46t ratios 40 and socioeconomic integration and mobility 61, 98 geographic distribution, American Israelis’ 49–55, 51t and geographic origins 52 motives for emigration and 50 geography, background of American Israelis 33 globalization xi, 13 group belonging, consciousness of 138 group identification 142 group origin, pride in 33

index Hanukkah celebration and lighting candles 114t, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 126, 133 Jewish identification and 127t by marital status 119t by place of residence 117t by tenure 118t Hebrew proficiency of American Israelis in 148 spoken at home 21, 22, 43 heritage, cultural 103 heterogeneity, cultural 13 high-tech and research professions 19, 45, 81 hold factors, 27, 33 holidays and festivals, observance of Jewish 107, 114t, 121, 122t, 141, 152 Holocaust 153 survivors, education of 68 home value 83–86, 84t, 864 homeland attachment to 138 connections with 13, 19 treatments of diasporas by 12–13 homeownership, American Israelis 63, 64, 83, 94, 95, 96t, 97, 140 acculturation and 82 and age 83, 84t rate 84–85, 86t and waves of emigration 85–86 host country 6, 9, 12, 13, 61, 140 housing characteristics and mobility, American Israelis 82–86, 86t human capital 5, 6, 27, 98, 99, 140 acquisition of 59 international migration as form of investment in 4 source of emigrants’ 61 identification 105 American Israelis’ Israeli 16, 20, 23, 107, 108, 113, 118, 127–31, 129t, 132, 134–35, 141, 142–43, 150–52 disparity between Israelis and American Jews 118–19 Jewish 16, 105–7 personal needs of 103 political 104 symbolic 104 identity bi-national 20 ethnic 20, 104

171

personal 105 religious 20, 104 Zionist 37, 146 ideology about Israelis living abroad 139 changes in Israel 18, 29, 34 Zionist 1, 13–14, 17 Illinois 51 immigrants American society’s adaptation to needs of 138 social absorption 7 as subgroup of larger ethnic or religious collective 105 immigrants, Israeli. See emigrants, Israeli immigration amended law (1965) 34 to Israel xi, 31, 34, 36 timing of 60–61 income 4, 17, 28, 59, 61, 64, 78t, 82t, 96t gender and 78 migration and higher 72 mobility among American Israelis by age 77t level of American Israelis 76, 78, 79–81, 97 pattern 76–77 individualism xii, 103, 153 inflation, high Israeli 36, 37, 56 integration 8, 10, 21, 24, 30, 64, 64, 101, 128, 120, 140–41 economic 17, 19, 60, 61, 62, 63, 81, 90, 97, 99, 102 of Israeli immigrants to U.S. 18–21, 24, 130 Jewish community 109, 120, 121, 123, 123t, 146 patterns of 8 political 102 socio-cultural xii, 4–5, 7, 63, 102, 108 intermarriage 37, 116, 148 Iran 43 Iraq 43 Israel Border Police 14, 150 Israel American Israelis’ attachment to 127–31, 129t, 131, 134, 141 and American Jews’ identity 139 attitude toward emigration 139, 149 average age in 40 chronological distribution of immigration to 43

172

index

as conservative society 146 developments influencing identity 128 economic crisis and emigration from 34, 36, 37 establishment of the state 153 expectations and social and economic experiences in 43 familiarity with social and political situation in 128, 129, 129t, 130 family as value in 44–45 fertility patterns in 40 gender distribution 40 immigration waves to 36, 55 institutional activities for American Israelis 150–51 nativity patterns of Jewish population 31 out-migration 144 relations between emigrés and 150 schooling in 65, 68 Israeli and American-Jewish identity 143 Israel-Arab conflict 14, 148, 153 Israeli population, global 150 Israeli society, American Israelis and 144–46 Israeli subculture 20–21 Israeliness 20 Israeliness Index 130–31 Jewish community center ( JCC) membership 107, 120–21, 122, 122t, 123, 123t, 124, 124t, 148 Jewish identification and 127t, 133 Jewish community American Israelis and the infrastructure of the 138–39 institutional 120 integration and involvement in 107, 120, 123–25, 126, 133 involvement 107, 122t, 133, 134 local 143 political strength of 147 reaction to Israelis by local 128 surveys 23 Jewish identification, American Israelis 105–6, 125–27, 127t, 131–33, 146 new patterns of 120 organizational connections and 120 Jewishness 20

kashrut (kosher food laws), observance of 107, 112–13, 114t, 117, 119, 126, 133, 141–42 by marital status 119t by place of residence 117t by tenure 118t labor and migration 3, 4, 6, 8, 27 shortage 4, 5, 60 labor-force, rates of American Israelis’ participation in 140 labor market 59, 60, 61, 152 integration into 81, 97 and language proficiency 62 language skills 9, 11, 19, 62. See also English proficiency Latin America, Jews originating from 32, 38 American Israelis originating from 32t, 50 spatial distribution in the U.S. 52 Law of Return xi liberalism, political and socioeconomic 17 Libya, 32 life cycle, Jewish identification and 132, 134 Likud 37 Los Angeles denominational identification in 108, 109, 110t Jewish community involvement 123, 123t Jewish identification in 126, 127, 127t, 134 kashrut in 113 n. 1 observance of rituals in 116 similarity between local and American Israelis Jews in 109 loyalties, immigrants’ 138 managerial professions 74, 75, 94, 97 and economic characteristics and mobility 78t and economic characteristics and mobility by emigration wave 82t and employment mobility by place of birth 79t and occupational mobility 76t marital status of American Israelis 45–48, 46t, 57, 125, 132, 134 by age 47t

index community connections and 124, 125t and home ownership 83, 94 Israeliness score and 131 Jewish identification and 118, 119, 126 metropolitan residence status by 54, 54t of peers in Israel 48–49 marriage 45, 111, 148 mass migration, characteristics of contemporary 3–4 melting pot 101, 102 metropolitan areas. See cities and metropolitan areas Miami denominational identification in 108, 109, 110t Jewish community involvement 123, 123t Jewish identification in 126, 127t, 134 kashrut 113 n. 1 observance of rituals in 116 middle age group, gender ratio 42 Midwest, United States, as region of settlement for American Israelis, 50, 52 migrant, migrants jobs 59–60 language acquisition and 62 market 9 selection 9 social space of 7, 8 transnational 137 migrate, decision to 4, 19, 28 migration 137 as dynamic process 10 expansion of 28 goals 1 international 1–6, 149 as multidimensional process 7–8 networks 11 transnational 7–10, 104, 140 transnationalism and study of contemporary 8 migration, voluntary xii, 1, 140 factors prompting 4, 5, 28, 72 gender ratios and 40 multi-phased process 29 Mizrahim 20, 21 mobility 59, 98 between international labor markets 27

173

individual’s spatial 2 patterns of 64 social and economic 20, 65 stages of transition 2–3 structural 7 upward 60, 140 modernization 2, 3 modernization-secularization thesis 107–8 Morocco, 32 multiculturalism 33, 102, 138, 149, 138 National Jewish Population Survey, United States 23, 24, 128, 147 national movement, Jewish xi nativity status of American Israelis 139, 140 denomination identification and 108–9 naturalization. See citizenship and naturalization networks absorption 6 migration 10, 11 social 4, 5–6, 29, 35 new immigrants. See migrants: transnational New York City denominational identification of American Israelis in 108, 109, 110t Jewish community involvement in 123, 123t Jewish identification in 126, 134 kashrut in 113 n. 1 observance of rituals in 116 New York State 51 NGOs 7 non-identification with denomination 108, 126 North Africa. See Asian/North African Jews Northeast, United States, as region of settlement for American Israelis, 50–51, 52, 53, 56, 57 number of American Israelis xi, 13–15, 147 observance of religious rituals and holidays 106–7, 112–19, 114t, 117t, 118t, 119t, 120, 141 occupation 64, 96t

174

index

composition of American Israelis 79 and economic characteristics and mobility 82t and education 65 Israeliness score and prestigious 131 mobility among veteran American Israelis by age 76t opportunities 140 qualifications 33 Oceania 43 olim (‘ascenders’) xi, 14 emigration from Israel 16 organizations American Israelis 34 Jewish 20, 120, 142 organizations, diaspora émigrés 11 origin country relations with 8 ties with 11 transnationalism and relations with 9 Orthodox movement 106, 107 American Israelis and the 108, 109, 110–11, 110t, 126, 127t, 132, 134, 135, 146 married Israelis and the 111 Palestine 22, 35 parenting 97 Passover seder, participation in 107, 114t, 115–16, 117, 118, 119, 133 Jewish identification and 127t by marital status 119t by place of residence 117t by tenure 118t permanence of settlement 64, 84, 96, 124 philanthropy, Jewish 120, 121, 122, 122t, 123, 123t, 124, 124t Jewish identification and 127t, 133 place of residence, American Israelis 50–51, 125, 126, 147–48 community involvement by 123, 123t denomination identification by 110, 110t geographic origins and 50 Jewish identification and 134 observance of religious rituals and holidays and 117t See also Los Angeles; Miami; New York City pluralism 138

cultural 101, 102, 107 religious 146 politics, American Israelis influence on 147–48, 148n politics, transnational 9 population censuses, U.S. 15, 22–23, 25 prestige, occupational 59, 74, 77 professional qualifications, migration and 3, 4, 19, 27, 28, 29 professionals 9, 19, 27, 28, 29 professions advancement 72 career opportunities 4, 29 migrants with liberal 3 return to Israel by those with advanced 75 public policy 53, 149–52 push and pull factors 2, 16–17, 18, 27, 34, 50 quality of life

72, 137, 144, 149

reciprocity 151 Reform movement, American Israelis identification with 106, 107, 108, 109, 110t, 126, 127t, 133, 146 dissemination in Israel 152 relations with Israel, Israeli immigrants’ 21, 24 religious identity, émigrés’ 12 re-migration 31, 35, 73, 139 selective 69 remittances to home country 139 research jobs. See high-tech and research professions residential preferences. See place of residence, American Israelis return migration 10, 16, 18, 30, 35, 48, 85, 87, 99, 152 return to Israel 6, 10, 15, 18, 22, 29, 31, 35, 48, 90, 97, 109, 130, 139, 144, 152 of those with advanced professions 75 intention 20, 150 selective 73, 85, 87, 99 rituals, observance of religious 20. See also kashrut; Hanukkah celebration; Passover Seder; Sabbath observance Sabbath observance and lighting candles 107, 113–14, 114t, 116, 117, 119, 133

index Jewish identification and 126, 127t by marital status 119t by place of residence 117t by tenure 118t salespeople and clerks, American Israelis as 74, 75, 81, 82, 97, 147 and economic characteristics and mobility by emigration wave 82t and occupational mobility 76t schooling 9, 19 secondary migration 10, 16, 30, 31, 43, 75 U.S. as choice for Russian Israelis’ 35 security, migration and Israel’s 16, 17, 36, 38 selectivity 9, 25, 41, 55, 68, 85, 87 negative 28, 69 positive 27, 69, 70, 72, 90, 99 self-definition American Israelis 110, 128–29, 129t, 130, 134, 135, 141 by denominational movement of American Judaism 132 Israeli 1 self-employment and private business owners 17, 61, 74, 81, 97, 147 self-identification 7, 138 American Israelis 120, 129–130, 140, 144 place of residence and 126 separatism 101, 142 identificational 102 Sephardi Jews (Asian/North African origin) American Israeli 32, 33, 34, 148 American 34 community organizations 34 share among American Israelis 33, 55 service occupations. See blue-collar and service occupations services, planning of 53 Sinai War 37 Six-Day War 38, 153 social and cultural activities 152 ethnic origin of American Israelis and 34 social and cultural space, American Israelis 141 social capital 96 social changes, in Israel 34, 145 social cohesion, Jewish 147

175

social integration, synagogue membership and 120 social opportunities 57 social relations, Israeli emigrants’ 139 socioeconomic attainments, American Israelis 72 determinants of 93–96 effects of variables involved in 96t socioeconomic mobility 82, 96, 98–99 socioeconomic status 59 of Israeli immigrants in U.S. 17–18, 85 socioeconmic stratification, immigrants’ 60 South, United States, as region of settlement for American Israelis 52 South Africa 38, 43 American Israelis originating from 32t, 50 spatial distribution in the U.S. 52 Soviet Jews. See former Soviet Union, Jews from spatial segregation of American Israelis in U.S. 52, 53 standard of living 1, 5, 6, 9, 27, 140 stimuli, cultural, as motive for emigration 16, 17, 27 Sunbelt, internal migration to the 51 support groups, participation in 120 survival, strategies 106 synagogues 20, 34, 107, 111 attendance 120, 121–22, 122t, 123, 123t, 124, 124t, 133 Jewish identification and 127t membership 120, 121, 122t, 123, 123t, 124, 124t, 133, 148 non-Orthodox 152 for Sephardim in America, 34 technology and mass migration 3 and transnational migration 8 television 34 tenure in the U.S., Israelis’ 18, 20, 30, 35, 55–56, 72, 95 attachment to Israel and 105, 128, 129, 131 and denominational identification 110–11, 126 and educational level 70 and English proficiency 87–88 and homeownership 82–83 Israeli identification and 141

176

index

Jewish community involvement and tenure 123 Jewish identification and 125, 126–27, 128, 132, 134, 141, 143 and observance of religious rituals and holidays 117–18, 118t time, attachment to Israel and effect of 128 tourism, outbound 14, 17, 34 transnational relations 8, 12, 19, 21 Tunisia, 32 United States Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization 15 United States, developments influencing identity 128 unmarried American Israelis 46, 47, 57 as emigrants 42, 56 marital status by age 47t metropolitan residence status 54t unmarried migrants 27 visits-to-Israel programs voluntarism 103 voting patterns 6

151

wage-earners, among American Israelis 74–75, 75t, 78, 78t, 82, 97 and ethnic origin 80 and immigration waves 81 women as 88 wars and hostilities, as emigration motive 16 West, United States, as region of settlement for American Israelis, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57 Western Europe, Jews originating from 31–32, 50

West European Israeli immigrants to U.S. 32t, 38, 70 spatial distribution in the U.S. 52 Western Jews, American Israeli 43 white-collar occupations 74, 75, 78, 88, 94, 97 and economic characteristics and mobility by gender 78t and economic characteristics and mobility by emigration wave 82, 82t and employment mobility by place of birth, 79t and occupational mobility 76t widowed, 112t, 119t, 127t American Israelis 46, 46t, 47t, 54t, 57 American Jews 49 metropolitan residence status of the 54t, 54–55 women attainments of 94 ‘double disadvantage’ of 61, 79 English proficiency of 88 Israeliness score and 131 See also family; gender Yiddish 22 Yom Kippur War 16, 34, 36, 37, 38, 56 yordim (‘descenders’) xi, 14 young adults, American Israelis 42 youth movements 151 Zionism 146 ideology 13, 17 identity 37

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